# Security/ Mobility

## *Politics of movement*

Edited by
**Matthias Leese**
**Stef Wittendorp**

# SECURITY/MOBILITY

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# PREFACE

It is probably safe to say that every edited book is the product of a journey. It is probably also safe to say that alongside the endeavours of this journey, such a book has far more intellectual parents than those people who end up on the cover as editors. In this case, things started off with a summer school on 'Security, borders and mobility', which was jointly organised in Brussels by the University of Kent's Brussels School of International Studies, King's College London, and Sciences Po Paris in September 2013. There were a great many compelling conversations and discussions during those two weeks in Brussels – however, during a workshop led by Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet and Philippe Bonditti, a particularly interesting debate about the role of discourses and materialities in the organisation of security and mobility emerged. And then things took off from there.

What had originally begun with a little exercise in free association, problematising the seemingly banal concept of 'the door' – thereby highlighting distinct forms and functions of doors, their underlying concepts and imaginaries, and their effects and implications on security and mobility – almost naturally turned into a larger project to explore the role of materialities of security and mobility. Panels for the British International Studies Association 2014 conference in Dublin and the International Studies Association 2015 conference in New Orleans were organised. A workshop entitled 'Security/Mobility: Between Imagination and Authority' took place at the University of Amsterdam in September 2014. In short: the conversation continued. So we decided to take things another step forward by turning the workshop contributions into this edited collection. Writing this preface, we look back with pleasure on what has happened in the past two years, and we are excited to keep the conversations going. A workshop dedicated to the book's theme at the European Workshops in International Studies 2016 in Tuebingen will offer another opportunity to engage the subject of Security/Mobility in empirical depth.

However, the most important point here is to highlight that we as editors have not been alone in this project. Far from it. This is most tellingly reflected in the fact that the introduction to this book has six authors. Sharon Weinblum, Bruno Magalhães, Marijn Hoijtink, and Marie Beauchamps have been closely involved in the conceptualisation of this book. We are grateful for their critical reflections as well as their support all along the way – not only academically speaking, but also as friends. They also formed the group with which we put together the Security/Mobility workshop in 2014 – with Marijn and Marie doing

most of the organisational groundwork in Amsterdam. Put differently: this book is part of a larger collaboration.

This collaboration has in turn benefited from a number of people who have provided the space and the means to push conversations forward. So in random order, we would like to thank: Didier Bigo and *Cultures et Conflits*, Tugba Basaran, Marieke de Goede and the University of Amsterdam (particularly, the Amsterdam School of Cultural Analysis, the Amsterdam Centre for Globalization Studies, and the NWO VIDI project 'European Security Culture'), Luis Lobo-Guerrero and the University of Groningen (particularly, the Groningen Research Institute for the Study of Culture), Louise Amoore, Debbie Lisle, Manchester University Press and their staff, Anna Tilling, and of course the contributors to this book.

And maybe most of all thanks go to Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet, who, more or less inadvertently, has sparked all of this, and who has provided invaluable guidance. We are all the more happy that he was willing to provide the concluding chapter for this book.

*Tuebingen/Groningen, November 2015*

# Introduction: Security/Mobility and the politics of movement

Marie Beauchamps, Marijn Hoijtink, Matthias Leese, Bruno Magalhães, Sharon Weinblum, and Stef Wittendorp

MOBILITY TODAY IS regarded as both a condition of global modernity and as a source of insecurity. Not only are people on the move every day and on an unprecedented scale, but also a multiplicity of non-humans move and are being moved. Indeed, 'from SARS and avian influenza to train crashes, from airport expansion controversies to controlling global warming, from urban congestion charging to networked global terrorism, from emergency management in the onslaught of tsunamis and hurricanes to oil wars in the Middle East' (Hannam et al. 2006: 1), a diverse range of concrete and abstract things have become highly global and mobile. While such movement is often considered part and parcel of modernity, it also brings about increased complexity that becomes enmeshed with conceptualisations of threat – 'it is discourses about organized crime, global terrorism, undocumented migration and other dangerous mobilities' (Walters 2006: 199) that render movement a central political concern.

While contemporary liberal politics actively encourages and enables mobility for the sake of our modern lifestyle and the economic benefits that it yields, it also seeks to render the flows of such mobility knowledgeable and controllable. In order to do so, borders undergo restructuring and reorganisation into flexible filters that rely on accumulated knowledge about passers-through; data on travellers and goods now easily supersedes the speed of physical bodies and subsequently can be analysed and acted upon long before the arrival of an actual aircraft or sea vessel; and new technologies such as radio frequency identification (RFID) tags and GPS satellites make it possible to track and survey the movement of humans and objects across space in real time. This list of examples is tentative and could easily be continued – yet it is emblematic of a way of thinking about security and mobility together that is reflected in political programmes and ensuing analyses. What is striking is that research from the field of critical security studies largely focuses on movement as such, and on how it becomes targeted, regulated, and intervened upon. The emphasis, in accordance with the

political programmes that are meant to produce security, is predominantly on things and people *on the move*.

Less attention has been paid so far to the underlying physical *infrastructures* of such movement. The tangible, material side of mobility – the roads and tracks; the cars, boats, and planes; the architecture and barriers – has in fact long been taken for granted (Walters 2015). However, more recently, critical geographers have started to engage this seemingly immobile side of mobility – the 'fixities' and 'moorings' (Urry 2003: 138) that provide the often unspectacular and yet crucial underpinnings of movement. They call for emphasis to be placed on the enabling or restraining effects of what could be subsumed as mobility infrastructures. This book takes inspiration from this. In the vein of what has been deemed a 'new mobilities paradigm' (Sheller and Urry 2006), we seek to bring together two closely related strands of research: (1) inquiries that look into the political regulation of movement; and (2) analyses that engage the material enablers and constraints of such movement. We thereby attempt to bridge theoretical perspectives from critical security studies and political geography in order to provide a more comprehensive perspective on security and mobility.

To be concise: there are no clear-cut boundaries to be found between those two strands of research, and scholars have already started to transcend the permeable membranes between different layers of movement, as is detailed below. And yet we feel that intensified dialogue between mobilities and immobilities can in fact yield additional benefits for a critical problematisation of movement. This book is an attempt to gather perspectives on mobility that take into account both techniques and practices of regulating movement, as well as their underlying infrastructures. Together they form a perspective on a politics of movement that lies at the core of the production of security. Drawing on the insight that security is a contingent concept that hinges on the social construction of threat – which in turn must be understood through its political, social, economic, and cultural dimensions – we seek to contribute to a more fine-grained perspective on a presumably mobile and insecure world. The title of this book, *Security/Mobility*, is a direct reference to this world that at times appears dominated by these two paradigms. They are not opposed to each other, and, as hinted at above, a great deal of political effort is undertaken in order to reconcile the need for security and the necessity of mobility. We might say that security and mobility are entangled in a constant dynamic – a dynamic that converges in what we have conceptualised here as a politics of movement.

Before engaging the empirical contributions to this book, this introductory chapter looks a little closer into both the critical security studies literatures on mobility and into the 'new mobilities' literature, thereby providing broader conceptual ground for the analyses that follow. At the same time, it serves as an exploration of the potential pitfalls that can emerge through thinking about security and mobility together. In fact, as Peter Adey (2006b)

reminds us, 'if mobility is everything then it is nothing' – an overstretching of mobility as the key characteristic of modernity would indeed produce an empty signifier that loses its analytical purchase. This is not the only caveat. Debates on security, especially in the vein of securitisation theory, have witnessed similar arguments: if everything can be turned into a security matter, then security ends up being a hollow concept (Huysmans 1998). And yet, the world around us appears to be more mobile and more insecure than ever – or at least so political arguments go. Methodologically, we must be careful not to fall into the trap of overgeneralisation, thereby producing generic statements devoid of meaning. The contributions to this book avoid those pitfalls by engaging very specific sites of security/mobility, en route contextualising and carefully fleshing out the concepts with empirical detail. Not only do they provide fine-grained inquiries, but they also reconnect such inquiries to the overarching thematic of this book. They do so by thinking about power and government, about materiality and discourse, about identity and the law – in short: by thinking about the *politics of movement*.

## Security

The meaning of security is hard to pin down. When talking about security, one must first clarify a number of questions: 'what or who is to be secured from what or whom?', 'who should do security?', 'on what political and normative grounds should it be done?', 'how should it be done and what means should be used?', and so on. The answers to such questions are not easy. Depending on the perspective, we might say that security is either a necessary condition for any society (e.g., Der Derian 1995; Burgess 2011), a pathological tendency that potentially undermines what it was set to protect (e.g., Neocleous 2008; Molotch 2012), a means of government (e.g., Foucault 2007; 2008) – or all of these at the same time. In this regard, once more, there is not much difference between the concepts of security and mobility. Both remain abstract until they are filled with concrete, empirical meaning. The mobility part of Security/Mobility must relate, as we detail below, to questions of who or what moves, to the speeds and rhythms of movement, to origins, destinations, and directions, to means and methods of movement, and many more. But let us first look at how critical security studies have engaged mobility.

   If we were to pick one major theme, it would probably be that a main characteristic of the current politics of security is that it thrives on the openness of our times. Drawing on the work of Michel Foucault (2007; 2008) who argued that mobility (he uses the term circulation to be more precise) has become a prime target for political intervention at the threshold of modernity, scholars have analysed the political attempts to know, analyse, and subsequently sort

flows of mobility according to ascribed levels of threat. This literature, as it follows the political narratives of 'dangerous mobilities' (Walters 2006: 199), has been primarily concerned with themes that emerge around migration and the war on terror. Two unrelated figures of mobility have become connected in political discourses concerned with both security and mobility: on the one side of the spectrum, the figure of the migrant, which relates to (mass) movement itself, and whose arrival, often at the cost of the migrant's own safety, has become somewhat emblematic of political discourses on security. On the other side of the spectrum, the figure of the terrorist represents the ultimate threat that is perceived to be endangering society; the figure of the terrorist relates to movement as its suspicious presence is identified and filtered as a dangerous element within the flows of global movement in order to render us more secure and prevent the next attack.

As a result, the institutions, techniques, and technologies that monitor and regulate global flows have commanded reinforced academic attention. This is evident from inquiries into a broad range of topics: the discursive and practical regimes that attempt to sketch out the presumable danger from unrestricted movement (e.g., Jackson 2005; Balzacq 2011; Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2006; 2011); the transformation of borders and border checkpoints in the struggle against (illegal) movement (e.g., Salter 2004; Walters 2006; Pallitto and Heyman 2008; Muller 2009; Parizot et al. 2014); airports and their security regimes as the most symbolic sites of the fight against global terror after 9/11 (e.g., Salter 2008; Adey 2004; Leese and Koenigseder 2015; Lyon 2006; Schouten 2014); the practice of information-gathering, databases, and algorithms that inform risk assessments and other forms of anticipation (e.g., Amoore and De Goede 2008; Lyon 2003; Gandy 2010; De Vries 2010; Amoore 2011; Rouvroy 2013; Leese 2014); or the modes of cooperation and information exchange between security agencies and security professionals (e.g., Bigo et al. 2007; Balzacq 2008; Geyer 2008; De Hert and Bellanova 2011). This is another list that could be continued, but it suffices to illustrate the wide array of inquiries into mobility against the backdrop of the politics of security.

Before briefly turning to mobility in the next section, it should be pointed out that there have been valuable attempts to draw attention to some of the seemingly immobile infrastructures of security (politics). Notably, scholars have engaged architecture (e.g., Adey 2008; Fuller 2008; Jones 2009), and fences and walls that physically direct, interrupt, or constrain movement (e.g., Latte Abdallah and Parizot 2010; Vallet and David 2012; Rosière and Jones 2012; Pallister-Wilkins 2011; 2015), thereby highlighting the importance of materialities in the political regulation of movement and speaking directly to the analytical agenda that the 'new mobilities' literature has laid out.

## Mobility

It is precisely the political regulation of movement that the 'new mobilities' literature takes as its point of departure. In this vein, it reacts against work that takes human movement for granted. As observed by Tim Cresswell (2010: 18, emph. in orig.), earlier work on mobility was 'rarely actually *about* mobility'. Subsequently, more recent work on mobility problematises how mobility is brought into being, while at the same time scrutinising how (new) forms of mobility (re)structure social life (e.g., Cresswell 2006; 2010; Sheller and Urry 2006; Adey 2010). According to Jørgen Ole Bærenholdt (2013: 20–1) 'mobility studies draw an image of societies as being made up of various mobility systems as well as new forms of social obligations performed through these systems which ensure both connections at a distance and face-to-face meetings of otherwise detached persons'. The reinforced emphasis on mobility has spawned a cross-disciplinary research agenda that engages the rapidly changing social, political, and economic dynamics produced through mobility, and which are simultaneously productive of specific forms of mobility. There is a thriving body of literature that analyses expressions of mobility in areas such as globalised regimes of travel and transportation, leisure and business, borders and migration, communication and digitisation (e.g., Shamir 2005; Hannam et al. 2006; Sheller and Urry 2006; Urry 2007; Adey 2010; Squire 2011a; Bærenholdt 2013; Salter 2013).

Mobility must not, so goes the thrust of the argument, be conceived of in a singular fashion, but in a pluralistic, mutually constitutive sense that produces complex and layered assemblages of movement. Mobility is defined by Cresswell (2006: 3) as 'socially produced motion' in order to distinguish it from movement that denotes 'the general fact of displacement'. The concept of mobility thereby attunes the analyst to consider the strategies and social implications of bringing about movement (Cresswell 2006: 3). Adey (2010: 18) argues that mobility is necessarily relational, as every mobility is entangled with other mobilities. The linking of multiple mobilities can in fact generate 'zones of connectivity, centrality, and empowerment' (Sheller and Urry 2006: 210). Such constellations of mobilities can appear at first glance as immobile structures due to their seamless functioning whereby interacting parts appear as a whole (Adey 2010: 26). Mobility studies thus train the eye of the observer not to take for granted the conditions that make the movement of subjects and objects possible and thereby look anew at what appears initially as fixed or immobile.

However, mobility studies are not a plea to get rid of the category of fixity. To the contrary, as John Urry (2003: 138) points out, certain immobilities, also referred to as 'fixities' or 'moorings', in fact enable movement. Airports serve as a prime example of how mobility and immobility stand in a co-constitutive relation (e.g., Adey 2006a; 2008; Sheller and Urry 2006: 210). The highly mobile

business person, the tourist, the migrant, the criminal, and the terrorist – their movement is made possible by vastly immobile structures such as runways, arrival and departure terminals, and entry and exit routes to connecting cities (cf. Adey 2006b). Approaching mobility as sets of differentiated relations draws attention to how forms of mobility and immobility are produced in an overlapping and productive manner rather than as a dichotomy between the mobile and the immobile (Sheller and Urry 2006: 216). By viewing social relations from the perspective of mobility, the supposedly immobile is revealed as having a 'hidden ... history of trajectories of movement and social relations' (Adey 2010: 26). The mobile and immobile are infused with a politics that needs to be brought into the open.

## Towards a politics of movement

Mobility is never innocent. Gains in mobility to some simultaneously produce 'disconnection, social exclusion, and inaudibility' for others (Sheller and Urry 2006: 210). As Cresswell (2010: 20–1) puts it, 'forms of mobility ... are political – they are implicated in the production of power and relations of domination', which means that 'speeds, slownesses, and immobilities are all related in ways that are thoroughly infused with power and its distribution'. Consider, for instance, the practices at border checkpoints and airports: depending on factors such as citizenship, job status, travel history, membership of a frequent flyer club, or even a trusted traveller status that usually includes some form of security clearance, people will be treated in ways that are highly contingent on imaginaries of threat. As Robert Pallitto and Josiah Heyman (2008: 319) observe, 'security technologies frequently involve risk classification: who is to be inspected more closely or thoroughly, or who is to be permitted freer/faster movement'. Movement entails varying velocities, often justified by security arguments, and just as often grounded in the willingness to pay, as 'fast-tracking and convenience slowly trump all other concerns' (Muller 2010: 84). Each trajectory of movement comes with its own starting point, speed, rhythm, routing, experience, and friction (Cresswell 2010: 22) that, when taken together, constitute a complex, heterogeneous set of power relations.

Security and mobility, this much should have become apparent throughout this brief introduction, are politically charged concepts. This book seeks to highlight and scrutinise the politics of movement – manifesting itself in questions of who can be mobile, in what ways, when, and under what conditions – and the sites where those politics materialise and unfold their effects. The political regulation of movement hinges to a large extent on ongoing political struggles about who or what constitutes desirable or undesirable movement (Bigo 2002; Squire 2011b). This relates, amongst others, to the diverging experiences of people on the move – of tourists, business persons, commuters, students, asylum seekers,

and migrants. Equally, it relates to the role played by politicians, bureaucrats, border guards, and also less visible but no less important administrators, their managers, and software engineers designing algorithms for risk assessment technology.

It would be a mistake to regard the intertwining of security and mobility as a centralised, large-scale operation. On the contrary, as Mimi Sheller and John Urry (2006: 214) write, 'there are hybrid systems, "materialities and mobilities", that combine objects, technologies, and socialities, and out of those distinct places are produced and reproduced'. Interconnected trajectories of movement should then be seen as 'complex systems that are neither perfectly ordered nor anarchic' but display an 'orderly disorder' (Sheller and Urry 2006, 216). Security/Mobility is not a stable relationship, but a dynamic one that emerges and re-emerges across different spatial and temporal arrangements. Mobility, as Cresswell (2010: 18) tells us, 'involves a fragile entanglement of physical movement, representations, and practices'. It is exactly those movements, representations, and practices, infused with and the product of discourses about security, that are subjected to empirical scrutiny and theoretical reflection in this book. By approaching the production of security through the lens of mobility we encourage new questions, engage established themes anew and explore new empirical sites.

## Book outline

This book is divided into three main parts, which are framed by a prologue and an epilogue. The main parts are organised around *the movement of things* (Part I), *the movement of people* (Part II), and *circumscribing movement* (Part III). The authors engage a wide range of topics, concepts, and empirical sites. By highlighting mobility and immobility related to a red thread of (in)security, they flesh out what contemporary politics of movement look like. As argued above, a conceptually broad inquiry into security and mobility could lead to the suggestion of nearly all empirical findings being easily related to either security or mobility. The contributions to this book circumvent such a trap through their common reflection on the politics of movement. The chapters speak directly to questions of who/what moves, to the conditions and shapes of movement, and to the overarching frameworks of security politics that enable or constrain movement.

In the prologue (Chapter 2), Luis Lobo-Guerrero and Friederike Kuntz provide a contextualisation of the book's theme through the juxtaposition of contemporary and historical travel. Their chapter explores the notion of connectivity as making possible forms of security and mobility in different historical periods. Starting from a reflection on present-day liberal forms of mobility and security that rely on the active circulation of various elements,

the mainstay of the chapter is an exploration of a sixteenth-century Christian travel account mapping the biblical world and the kind of connectivity regarding mobility and security inscribed by this account. Their work unsettles today's taken-for-granted notion of effortless mobility and connectivity through the descriptions of dangerous travels in the sixteenth century, thus providing a change of perspective that highlights the contingency of contemporary mobility and security.

The first thematic block of the book is dedicated to inquiries of how things move. Andreas Baur-Ahrens (Chapter 3) engages the (re)organisation of cyberspace by examining the ongoing debates on data territorialisation. Building on cybersecurity discourses after the Snowden revelations, he analyses how the movement of data is supposed to be constrained such that it literally would not leave the territory of a nation state on its way from sender to receiver. Baur-Ahrens thereby highlights – against the placeless notion of cyberspace – the importance of the physical infrastructures of servers and data exchange points that exist in concrete buildings on national territories. The argument behind the rerouting initiatives he looks into is that data, once it does not physically leave the country on its travels, would be easier to protect. However, as Baur-Ahrens argues, such a political intervention into the open architecture of the Internet entails deep-seated transformations of power in cyberspace.

Pointing to a more abstract notion of security and mobility, Erella Grassiani (Chapter 4) demonstrates how knowledge about security becomes a commodity that can be marketed, sold, and, in fact, moved. Engaging the reputation of the Israeli Defence Forces as not only experts in security, but notably practitioners of security, Grassiani shows how private security firms in the United States construct their business model around precisely this reputation. She highlights the capacities of markets to render things mobile and relocate the abstract notion of Israeli security to another country where it manifests itself and transcends boundaries from the military sector to private service provisions for the civil sector. These companies do so by transforming their 'Israeli Security Experience' into a brand that symbolises not only security and safety but also values such as discretion and toughness.

In the last chapter of the first part of the book, Nathaniel O'Grady (Chapter 5) takes us on a journey – one that is as concrete as it is transformative. In his analysis of the British Fire and Rescue Services, he traces how data travels through their digital infrastructures until it is finally computed into risk assessments that intend to predict future occurrences of fire and thereby serve as a means of government. O'Grady points to the contingent nature of data, and how it changes both form and content as it becomes mobilised from one department to another. Similarly to Baur-Ahrens, the emphasis is on the mobile as well as the immobile parts of this journey at the end of which stands a novel technique of intervention into one of the most ancient and yet current threats, that of fire.

The second part of the book engages the movement of people. It is probably the most traditional part, as its contributions examine discourses of migration and asylum, and, closely connected to this, the mobilising, organising, and restructuring of borders. Through their methodological choice for discourse, the chapters manage to sketch out how both mobility and security are made meaningful and how the dynamics between who or what is considered dangerous and who or what can be mobile and under what conditions have an impact on what is understood as security as well as mobility. In the first contribution, Giannis Gkolfinopoulos (Chapter 6) looks at the hunger strike of migrants in the Law School building of the University of Athens in 2011. He focuses on the media representations of the occupation of the building and the discursive construction of threats around the hunger strike. Notably, the construction of threat images turns out to be closely related to the university and the Law School building – both as an institution and as a concrete building – the prestige of which was presented to be endangered.

Similar themes, although concerning a different case study, are picked up by Sharon Weinblum (Chapter 7). She engages the Israeli border discourse against the backdrop of arriving asylum seekers from Africa. Focusing on parliamentary debates, the chapter looks at how exclusionary techniques employed to regulate migrations are legitimised through the association of migrants as a problem of national security, as an economic threat, and as a threat to national identity. Contrary to the literature that examines borders as dislocated sites of control, the chapter instead directs attention to the regulation of migrations through very classical discursive frameworks: as tools of ordering, controlling, and physical enactment of statecraft and sovereignty.

Stef Wittendorp (Chapter 8) examines from a discourse perspective the debate on the abolition of border controls in the European Community (EC) in the second half of the 1980s. The chapter examines how the shifting constellation between the border as security device and as economic enabler made possible the removal of border controls as well as conceiving new forms of regulating security and mobility. In a broader context, the chapter is critical of the view of the EC and now European Union as a post-national entity that has successfully moved beyond a divisionary and exclusive nationally oriented politics. Instead, the regulation of mobility and thus the politics of inclusion and exclusion continue apace, although perhaps in less visible and more unexpected places.

Whereas the second part of the book addresses the movement of people as such and its public and political representation, the last part is dedicated to analyses of how movement is (actively) circumscribed. Christine Quinan (Chapter 9) starts this part by addressing questions of neoliberalism and gender surveillance in a post-9/11 era. The chapter discusses the boundaries of citizenship in a system that actively attempts to exclude, alienate, and violate certain identities, particularly transgender individuals and racialised or religious 'others'.

Bruno Magalhães (Chapter 10) examines the practices of judging the credibility of asylum requests in Brazil. Through ethnographic research with various Brazilian agencies involved in the asylum procedure, the chapter is concerned with how asylum cases come to be regarded as consistent or not; consistency being a requirement for granting asylum. Annemarie Mol's work on ontological coordination is drawn on to understand how different enactments of an asylum case are arranged. As such, the chapter is critical of procedures based on checklists since these overviews encourage a singular view of an asylum case in which there is little room for unexpected and genuine new information that might challenge the established view of the case.

The final chapter of the last part looks at the active expulsion of citizens from their national territory. Adding a historical note to a practice that has recently garnered renewed attention, Marie Beauchamps (Chapter 11) looks at the policy of denaturalisation in France at the beginning of World War II. Denaturalisation law as a juridical political discourse centres on the deprivation of citizenship; it draws on security rhetoric in order to rewrite the limits of inclusion and exclusion regarding citizenship and is a means to model the national community. Based on archival material collected at the French National Archives, she argues that denaturalisation law is at the core of the security/mobility dynamic: emphasising a fear of movement on the one hand, and the operationalisation of adaptable juridical practices on the other hand, denaturalisation interrupts our capacity for dissent while fixing the means to govern beyond democratic control. Her analysis thereby contributes to a better understanding of the politics of nationality where notions of selfhood and otherness are being shaped, mobilised, and transformed.

The book is capped off by a short epilogue. While the prologue serves to contextualise historically and unsettle contemporary notions of security and mobility, the epilogue makes an effort to close the bracket that this introduction has opened. Arguing from the disciplinary perspective of critical security studies, Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet (Chapter 12) takes a step back and evaluates what lessons can be learned from an agenda of Security/Mobility.

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**Prologue**

*Movement then and now*

# *Connectivity as problem: security, mobility, liberals, and Christians*

## Luis Lobo-Guerrero and Friederike Kuntz

O N 20 MAY 2015, Professor Smith landed at London Heathrow airport to examine a PhD thesis at one of the colleges of the University of London. After showing his passport and clearing customs, he headed towards the airport's Underground station where he took a train to Piccadilly Circus. Once there he took out his smartphone, opened a navigation application that a colleague had recommended to him by saying 'it will make you a local anywhere', and entered the address where he was expected within the next hour. From there on he followed the visual and audio instructions emitted by his phone and reached his destination in thirty-five minutes. With the aid of the public transport network and its information maps as well as with the smartphone, the navigation application, and its instructions, Prof. Smith felt confident that he would arrive at his destination in good time for the PhD defence. In fact, his colleague's statement was right: an observer would not have noticed he was foreign to the city although this was his first visit. The trip was an easy one. Only four hours earlier he had woken up at his home in Hamburg, and he was now in Central London conducting his academic business.

After the PhD defence and whilst resting at his hotel Prof. Smith had a chance to reflect on how smooth his journey had been and what had made it so. He thought first of the security aspects of it, of how he had to demonstrate via documents and inspections that he was a good citizen and a safe traveller. The way in which he had been security-checked at the airport in Hamburg and had been asked to identify at passport control when travelling to a country outside the Schengen Agreement were for him examples of forms of sovereign security (cf. Edkins et al. 2004). He also had to provide some information to his airline in advance so they could check that he was not on a restricted travel list. Had any of his data matched a profile that the technology had been set to identify, his case would have raised a flag and more questions would have followed (see Hagmann and Dunn Cavelty 2012). He also had to alert his employer, by completing a form, that he would be travelling for academic business to a different

country. If the country was considered to be of high risk, meaning outside the generally agreed liberal world, this might not be covered by the employer's liability insurance under normal terms and the university might have had to ask him not to travel or seek appropriate cover. That constituted for him a case of risk-based security (cf. Aradau et al. 2008; Muller 2008; Amoore and De Goede 2008; O'Malley 2004), which contrasted with the way in which sniffer dogs at the luggage reclaim area of the airport had smelt his luggage, searching for unauthorised goods or substances. He also observed the CCTV cameras that recorded all his movements from the airport to the university, the posters and announcements that alerted travellers to report any unaccompanied luggage or suspicious behaviour, and the police officers in high-visibility jackets, but by this time he was too tired to make up his mind as to what exact form of security these represented (e.g., Rasmussen 2004; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008; Stephens and Vaughan-Williams 2008).

By the time he began to think about the mobility elements that had made his journey so easy, he was already falling asleep. If he had kept awake, he would have had to think about the politics, logistics, and economics involved in international air travel (cf. Salter 2008), in planning cities, in designing, upgrading, and operating the urban transport systems so that places could be connected and in which ways, on the technologies involved in making digital pocket navigation applications possible, and the politics, economics, and socialities at play in allowing such instruments and technologies to be available to the everyday person. Had that not made him dizzy already, he could have gone deeper, reflecting on how his particular way of life, that of a liberal academic working in a Western European country producing and authorising forms of knowledge that liberal societies, governments, and industries demand, depends on him being able to connect almost seamlessly with ideas, goods, services, and people, within spaces made (liberally) secure through a plethora of security technologies and practices (cf. Muller 2009). In sum, he would have been able to realise that what makes his life liberal is a particular form of connectivity that requires the secure mobility of all those elements. Needless to say that, had he remained awake, thinking about the digital dimensions of his security and mobility would have led to permanent insomnia through reflections on what his connectivity had to say about liberal subjectivity.

Meanwhile, in a completely different historical setting, Hans Emius,[1] a friar and scholar from the city of Munster, began in the spring of 1590 his pilgrimage to Jerusalem and the biblical lands. Although he had never travelled further than a hundred miles, influenced by the study of M. Henricum Bünting's *Itinerarium Sacræ Scripturæ* (Bünting 1587) he had a rough idea of the regions he would travel through and to, and the distances between them. In Bünting's book, first published in Magdeburg in 1581, he had been able to examine neatly compiled tables listing the journeys of the biblical characters together with the

distances between the places they travelled. Bünting even provided conversions of those distances into German miles that helped Emius get a rough idea of the time his pilgrimage would take; it would be a very long journey. A fellow friar had heard Bünting talk about his work years before and had recommended the book to Emius, stating that it provided a most reliable compilation of biblical travels. Since distant travel at the time was not customary, aids for travellers were scarce and detailed knowledge of remote places was valuable. With his faith in God and relying on the scriptures as well as the geographical guidance of Bünting, Emius set off knowing that the journey would be dangerous and tortuous. However, the purpose of his trip justified it all, it was for him a moral and spiritual duty to visit Jerusalem and spread the word of God. But his legs ... well, they had until now been an impediment to the journey.

Reflecting on what a traditional journey of this kind would entail, he thought that on the way he would rely on his community of faith to provide him with shelter, food, information, and spiritual comfort. He would try to organise his journeys so that he could reach places where he would seek the support of the local church or fellow Christians. When possible he would try to travel with Christians and through Christian territories and settlements. At times he would seek the protection of those who would provide it. He would use his Latin as the *lingua franca* of educated people and would carry some gold as universal currency. As long as he could keep within the known markers of his faith, he would feel secure. In his actual journey, the one he began to conduct with the help of Bünting, none of these issues should be a problem. The kind of mobility involved rested on a new imaginary of travel which is detailed later.

Both our friar and our professor shared a concern for security. Their security, however, differed in principle, or to put it better, they differed at the level of rationality, understood here as that which enshrines the principles of formation of an apparatus. The principles of formation on which Emius's security operated differed starkly from those of Smith's. Whereas the ultimate principle for Emius's security was to serve and please God and His will, which in this case was to travel to the Holy Land, the principle for Smith's security was to remain free to be a liberal subject, which involved in his case to produce and sanction (liberal) knowledge by, for example, examining doctoral theses. The security of our friar derived from working towards the salvation of his soul, an arduous and continuous task. The security of our professor was that of his liberal freedom. In both cases, however, mobility was deeply interlinked with security and this interlinkage could be observed through the kind of connectivity that characterised their Christian and liberal life.

These two hypothetical cases highlight an issue at the core of contemporary critical security studies. Mobility is not simply a phenomenon through which to analyse how to provide security more effectively and more thoroughly. Both mobility and security are phenomena that relate to the specificities of forms of

life. In both the cases of Prof. Smith and Friar Emius, their ways of life rely on forms of mobility and forms of security that promote and protect the values on which they operate. Whereas the security of individuals within the European Union is expected to take a liberal form, the security of Christianity relied on the preservation of the core values of a community of faith.

To speak of a liberal or a Christian way of life is of course an intellectual generalisation (cf. Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2009). When what is taken to be a specific liberal or Christian life within a particular historical period and region is analysed in its details, it becomes possible to observe that each way of life requires and thrives on very particular forms of mobility and security. Just as it is not possible to speak of a liberal way of life in general, forms of mobility and security are expressions of how individuals and collectives understand their being in the world in relation to movement and danger. They will change as understandings of life change over time.

Although mobility and security respond to different logics, the former to one of position and movement and the latter to a logic of danger, they are both related to understandings of space and power as expressions of lived lives. As noted by Peter Adey (2009: xvii), mobility is 'a lived relation, an orientation to oneself, to others and to the world'. Security is understood here as related to the form of life in need of promotion and protection (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008). As characterised by relationality, the confluence between mobility and security can be observed in how forms of life are connected, the forms of connectivity that characterise them, and their understandings of connectedness. Such understandings will leave historical registers in the form of lived experience. These registers can be explored as empirical sites, as demonstrated below.

Before proceeding, we need to note that connectivity is never an abstract issue. It relates to how worlds are imagined and made, and imagination and crafting are power-imbued practices that should be taken as subjects of investigation. Connectivity is therefore an expression of power relations. How people connect and what makes connections possible are the result of the effective interaction of a myriad elements that need to be combined in strategic ways. The case of early modern practices of European mapping and atlas-making in the sixteenth century attests to this. In these practices, for example Bünting's *Itinerarium Sacræ Scripturæ* (henceforth Itinerarium), the mapping of connectivities is also the mapping of a theography that resembles a particular Christian imaginary of Europe and of the Christian life of educated people.

In what follows, this chapter takes Bünting's Itinerarium to explore three specific issues. First, how the imagination of security and mobility relate to understandings of how things, ideas, and beliefs are connected. Second, how material and discursive manifestations of security relate to the forms of authority they enact and/or legitimate. And third, how the framing of the imagination

of security and mobility structures the production of subjectivity. The relevance of examining these three issues through this very particular historical travel book is to provide a contrast to, and hopefully disrupt, contemporary liberal security analyses conducted within the loose academic framework of critical security studies.

## Mapping the biblical world

In Bünting's Itinerarium security and mobility relate through the biblical portrayal of the world in which humans (must) live. The world, therefore, is conceived as the creation of a creator, called God, who pre-arranged and pre-determined this. Accordingly, Bünting's treatise relates security and mobility to a world in which humans (must) live together with other creatures and things according to an arrangement, the fixation of which stems from God. Yet, humans are conceived as relating to the world and its biblical (hi)story – i.e. the narrative or story of the historical coming into being of the world, including all of its creatures and things – by mental processes, namely, imagination and experience (Bünting 1587: Advertisement to the reader). As a biblical or 'scriptural geography'[2] (Aiken 2009: 1), which, literally, shows the way to the Promised Land, among other things, Bünting's treatise is meant to serve as a manual or script for worship and pilgrimage leading to Salvation. To this end, the treatise presents maps and explanations, as well as travel reports of the biblical characters, which together reconstruct the place and 'places in which the story, or the narrative, of the Bible takes place' (Aiken 2009: 1), and translates the biblical world in terms of the biblical (hi)story.

In the following, we elaborate on the world as constituted by the maps and text in the first volume of Bünting's Itinerarium and discuss the implications of this world view for the relation between security and mobility. In doing so, we conceive of Bünting's treatise as an attempt to intervene in the conception of the world and produce subjectivities such as that of our fictitious Friar Emius travelling to and in the Promised Land.

Bünting's treatise accepts the truth of the Bible as an instance of the 'extraordinary / sublime / great grace / gift and welfare / of the pious and faithful God / ... his ... revealed word' (Bünting 1587: Advertisement to the reader, transl. Friederike Kuntz (FK)). The topology of the world, as well as life and events in its interior, are thus presented as grounding in God and as deriving their meaning from the same source. Given that Bünting was Vicar (*Pfarrherr*) to and a subject of the Duke and Master of Brunswick and Lüneburg, as the treatise indicates (Bünting 1587: Dedication to Duke and Master, transl. FK),[3] this view of the world seemed to have come naturally to him. Yet, drawing on the Bible for the constitution of the world has costs for the thus constituted world and the relation between security and mobility applying to and in this.

To start with, based on the Bible, the world is constituted in Bünting's trea-
tise as having three parts grouped around a centre, the latter being Jerusalem
and, more generally, the Promised Land. As the treatise frankly acknowledges,
in doing so, it neglects America or 'the new world', which, however, seems to
be acceptable as America is not mentioned in the Bible as part of the world
(Bünting 1587: 7). The treatise, furthermore, counts all of the distances indi-
cated on its maps in relation to Jerusalem and zooms in on and unfolds the
world by following the chronology of the biblical (hi)story (apparently), turning
after the presentation of maps of the world and its parts to such cartographic
motifs as the Exodus from Egypt (Bünting 1587: 29–30). Most important for the
relation between security and mobility, however, is the point where Bünting's
treatise begins its reconstruction and re-narration of the world of the biblical
(hi)story. Unsurprisingly, this starting point is '[t]he place / where the first
human Adam was made / and created by God of red soil' (Bünting 1587: 71,
transl. FK). According to the treatise, this place was called 'Paradise' and was
eradicated from the surface of the world by 'the Deluge', punishing Adam's and
Eve's sin (Bünting 1587: 71, transl. FK).

Bünting's treatise does not only gain from the Bible its account of the world
and the first humans that had to live and wander in this world. Most impor-
tantly, Bünting's treatise gains from the Bible an account of the present world
as having originated in human sin and divine punishment, that is, a (hi)story of
alienation of humans from God.[4] However, the treatise also nourishes hope for
humans' reconciliation with God when humans live piously in the world, which
is framed as bringing eternal life and rest in the Heavenly Paradise (Bünting
1587: 258). The world of Bünting's treatise is thus situated after '[t]he first
Paradise' and long after the biblical (hi)story, '[t]he other Paradise' being con-
sidered ever since only 'at God or in heaven' (Bünting 1587: 71, transl. FK). In
other words, the world of humans – i.e. the earth – is divided from and referred
back to heaven, where the promise of eternal life and happiness awaits those
who qualify on earth for this grace and reward granted by God in exchange for
a pious life. As a result, the movement and mobility of humans in the world
are related to the security of '[t]he other Paradise' (Bünting 1587: 71, transl.
FK). Yet, this security needs to be undertaken as a constant effort by humans to
secure their entrance cards to this Paradise in heaven while living in the world
by following the ways and examples of the biblical characters, in a transferred
sense. Thus, the movement and mobility of humans in the world is marked
by divine punishment and yet holds as well the promise of Salvation, which
is presented, in turn, as a departure from this world to a place of eternal life
and rest. Bünting's treatise, therefore, does not only construe the world and the
significance and basic parameters of human life and existence in it in accord-
ance with the Bible as being ordered and fixed. The treatise also addresses and,
thus, construes its readers as being in charge of the security of their entrance

cards to '[t]he other Paradise' (Bünting 1587: 71, transl. FK), as it were, and as creatures that relate to their world by the medium of their minds. Thus, the treatise tasks its readers to make sense of, follow, and implement the ways and example(s) of the biblical characters presented to them, while attributing to them the faculties to do so. For the relation between mobility and security this implies that humans are called upon to become active in securing their eternal life and rest by living a pious life. Yet, for this, humans need to comprehend the biblical (hi)story of their world and its implications for (their) life. And, to this end they need to imagine and grasp this first in its true materiality, that is, as the world together with the lay of the land, distances, sites, and places, as well as (first) humans and events. Therefore, the treatise's concern is to assist and support humans in imagining and grasping the biblical (hi)story of their world in its true extent.

Next to the pre-arranged and pre-determined relation between security and mobility in terms of world and heaven, Bünting's treatise constitutes a relation between security and mobility in the world that humans must secure by means of their movement, as it were. To comprehend the significance and implications of all of this from the Bible, humans need to be shown a reconstruction and description of the biblical topology and geography as well as the characters, deeds, and events taking place in them corresponding to the Bible. Yet, what is more, all of this needs to be translated truthfully and correctly for humans following the content and significance given to it in the Bible. Together, these two issues are needed for humans to imagine and grasp the true extents of the biblical (hi)story of the world and its implications for their life and existence in the world.

The actual full title of Bünting's treatise – as seen in figure 1 – is 'Itinerarium Sacræ Scripturæ That is / A Travel Book, about the entire holy Scripture / divided into two Books.' (Bünting 1587: Title, transl. FK). The title goes on to specify:

> The first part / covers [and/or grasps] all travels of the beloved Patriarchs / Judges / Prophets / Princes / etc. calculated according to German Miles / and the Lands / Cities [and/or locations, sites] / Water[s] / Mountain[s] and Valley[s] / thought of [and/or remembered] in the holy Scripture / Described according to all opportunity [and/or circumstances, and/or situatedness] and form / and Germanizing their Hebraic and Greek names / with attached short Allegories and Spiritual significances. (Bünting 1587: Title, transl. FK)

The second or 'Other [part]', in contrast, 'goes to the New Testament / and indicates / how the Virgin Maria / Joseph / the Wise from the Orient / the LORD Jesus Christus / and the beloved Apostles have travelled / collected by means of the most trustworthy and noblest Books and calculated in Geometrical manner' (Bünting 1587: Title, transl. FK). It is announced, furthermore, that the treatise is 'augmented' by a 'small' book on the money and measures featuring in the Bible (Bünting 1587: Title, transl. FK).[5] The treatise's engagement with

*Figure 1* Cover of Bünting's treatise.

measures and translations already in its title underscores the idea that humans are capable of imagining and grasping the biblical (hi)story of the world in which they live. Measures and translations are not simple tools to adapt biblical history to each and every individual experience. It presupposes, instead, a confrontation of lives and experiences with a truthful and correct image of what a Christian life should be, according to the Bible.

Altogether, Bünting's treatise, its maps, and travel reports are a glossary-like instrument having the function of assisting humans in imagining and grasping the biblical (hi)story of the world they still (must) inhabit to make them comprehend its significance and implications for their way of life in the world. By the same token, from the vantage point of the treatise, humans appear as being capable of imagining and understanding this (hi)story only if and when this is truthfully and correctly translated and transcribed onto the surface of the earth. Doing so, supposedly, the treatise crafts and charts a truthful image of the biblical world and calls this into a fleshly existence in (biblico-)historically and geographically correct form, thus allowing humans to form a truthful idea of it which, in turn, helps them to understand its significance and implications for human life.

### Mapping and measuring the biblical world

The world, as well as the geographical translation and re-narration of its (hi)story, which are thus presented in Bünting's treatise, claim their truthfulness and authority based on a mixture of fundamentals: the Bible; truthful methods of the translation of measurements of distances and names, and explanations of biblical characters and their (hi)story, etc.; finally, truthful reports of pious and trustworthy travellers to and in the Holy Land. All of these fundamentals are central for the truth of the projected image and, therefore, to the idea that readers can imagine and grasp. Based on these fundamentals, Bünting's treatise translates, measures, and reconstructs the biblical world and (hi)story in a truthful and correct way according to biblical (hi)story, and, in doing so, proceeds in four steps.

It begins by showing the already-mentioned maps of the world with its three parts (see figure 2), centred around Jerusalem, the Holy Land, and the travel of 'the children of Israel out of Egypt' (Bünting 1587: 29–30, transl. FK), etc. Secondly, it explains to its readers the maps as well as the method by means of which it translates and calculates the measures, distances, and locations featuring in the Bible. Thirdly, it offers a map and description of the Holy City of Jerusalem at several points in time (see figure 3) – for example, before its second destruction, in the then present. Finally, the treatise assembles and recounts the travels of the main characters of the books of the Old Testament. In so doing, it starts, as indicated, with God's creation of Adam and the once earthly location

*Figure 2*  Bünting's map 'The Whole World in a Cloverleaf' (1587: 4–5).

of the first Paradise before the fall. In its presentation of the travel reports of the biblical characters, the treatise seems to follow the order of the books of the Old Testament. The travel reports begin mostly with a list and a sum total of the distances the respective character travelled. They further comprise descriptions of sites, translations of names, and explanations of events and deeds associated with the character, as well as of their allegorical and spiritual significance, though this latter does not hold for all the accounts. Sites and cities already dealt with are indicated, but descriptions and explanations are not repeated.

The treatise's emphasis on truthful and correct measurement and translation shows that a truthful and correct imagination and grasp of the biblical world and its (hi)story are not considered possible without them. At the same time, based on such measurement and translation, Bünting's treatise also seeks to ensure the intelligibility of the biblical world and (hi)story, and its reproduction of them, and so claims its own usefulness, inter alia. In relation to the methods used, the Bible, as 'the' testimonial of God's will and word is and remains the first fundament of the world. It provides a description of the world as well as information on its origin, and distances and locations in it. Yet, to make sense for humans, all this needs to be translated into a language familiar to them. Methodologically speaking, this means the world described in the Bible needs to be imagined and drawn in accordance with the measures it uses. However,

*Figure 3* Bünting's map of the Holy City of Jerusalem (1587: 37–8).

to be imaginable and graspable, these need to be translated into more familiar measures – in particular, German, but also French and Walloonian (Welsch), miles. In the text of its explanation of its method, Bünting's treatise refers to names such as 'Gualtherus H. Riuius', 'Doctor Martinus Luther', 'Greek and Latin historians', including 'Strabo' and 'Hieronymus', and to names such as 'Ptolomeum ... Palaestinam', etc. (Bünting 1587: 31–3). On its first pages it shows, furthermore, a list displaying 'the noblest authors' used in it (Bünting 1587: 'The noblest authors based on whom the work is put together', transl. FK). Yet, in spite of all of those names, the translation of the biblical measures into more familiar ones actually is more an assertion of common knowledge, and is not introduced by explicit reference to any of the just-mentioned names.[6] The text states, for example:

> [O]ne stage [or degree] of heaven / comprises fifteen German miles on earth. Four minutes make a German mile. One minute makes a fourth of one German mile. ... The Holy Evangelists ... count by means of Stadia. ... One stage [or degree] covers four hundred and eighty Stadia on earth / from which it follows / that thirty and two Stadia make one German mile. One minute of heaven covers eight Stadia on earth / which make a forth of a German mile (Bünting 1587: 31, transl. FK)

Besides the Bible, understood as 'the' testimonial of God's will and word, the method on which Bünting's treatise claims its authority and truthfulness basically consists of a translation of biblical measures into familiar measures and a calculation of distances and locations mentioned in the Bible along these lines.

For further clarification regarding sites and locations mentioned and described as part of its attempt to remap and recount the biblical (hi)story of the world, not only scholarly works but also eyewitness reports of travellers to and in the Holy Land are drawn upon. For instance, Bernhard von Breitenbach is referred to, inter alia, for a description of Mount Sinai (Bünting 1587: 97) and the claim that in the city of Memphis 'there are so many people / as are around in Italy or Wallonia [Welschland]' (Bünting 1587: 160).

In short, the world constituted in Bünting's treatise depends not only on the Bible as a testimonial of God's will and word. It also depends on a method allowing for a supposedly truthful translation of measures used in the Bible in relation to the world, allowing, in turn, a reconstruction and calculation of the distances and locations in the Bible in familiar terms. Together the Bible and the method of translation applied to it provide the basis for the (claimed) truthfulness of the presented world. The purpose of the thus supposedly truthful and intelligible reconstruction of the world in which humans live and of its (hi)story is to assist and guide humans in imagining and grasping the two, when reading the Bible, and comprehending thus their implications and significance. The maps, their explanations, the explication of the method of measurement, the translations, and so on serve thus a didactic purpose, first and foremost.

## Cartography and human imagination

The didactic purpose of Bünting's Itinerarium shows particularly in the maps' figurative form, for which the treatise is probably best known among geographers and art historians.[7] For instance, the portrayal of the world as a three-leafed clover (Bünting 1587: 4–5), which is the first map, is introduced, inter alia, as a form that corresponds to the three parts into which the world is divided (Bünting 1587: 6) and thus helps 'the common man ... in learning to understand the lay of the earth' (Bünting 1587: 6, transl. FK). The treatise indicates as well, however, that the form of the earth does not correspond to the cloverleaf in every regard (Bünting 1587: 6). Both the correspondence and discrepancy between the world and its portrayal in the form of a cloverleaf are underscored by the map entitled 'the actual and true form of the earth and the sea' (Bünting 1587: 8–9, transl. FK) following the map entitled 'the world in a cloverleaf' (Bünting 1587: 4–5, transl. FK).[8] The two figurative portrayals of Europe in female form – or 'IN FORMA VIRGINIS' as the text says (Bünting 1587: 13,

emph. in orig.) – and of Asia as Pegasus function similarly. Against the backdrop of the world map entitled 'the actual and true form of the earth and the sea' (Bünting, 1587: 13), the shape of Europe is presented, for instance, as lending itself to a comparison with 'a virgin lying down' (Bünting 1587: 7, our transl.), and the figurative portrayal of Europe that implements this correspondence is stylised as assisting humans in 'imagining the lay of the whole of Europe' (Bünting 1587: 14, our transl.):

> The head [of Europe] / as you [can] see / is Hispania and right above in the crown / lays Lusitania otherwise called Portugal. The right ear is Aragon / and on the left ear / one has the kingdom Navarra / The breast of this Europe is Gallia or France / there one finds as well the royal city Paris. The Alps or mountains of the Alps / and the river Rhine / equate chains that Europe wears on the neck / and the Bohemian Forrest / together with the entire kingdom Bohemia / is like a golden cent / or like a round hanger and treasure / having been hung on the chains of the river Rhine / by means of the Main and the Hardtwald / as if by means of golden joints and silver robes. ... The mountains Albani / and the water Danubius / otherwise called the Danube / are like long belts and bodily chains / hanging down to the food. See thus [,] by means of this portrayed Europe / you can imagine yourself / the lay of the whole of Europe. (Bünting 1587: 14, our transl.)

The figurative maps or portrayals of the world and of its parts[9] do not pretend thus to correspond point for point to the real world and its parts. But they pretend to correspond sufficiently to the real world so as to be able to serve humans as aides-memoire with a view to the geography and topology of the world. That there is sufficient correspondence between the figurative maps and the real world is demonstrated by the map entitled 'the actual and true form of the earth and the sea' (Bünting 1587: 14) on the basis of which the female form of Europe is rationalised, as is the centre of the world in Jerusalem.

Next to the maps of the world and its parts, the translation of the measures used in the Bible for distances and locations is also a device designed to help humans imagine and understand the biblical (hi)story. By being recounted in German miles, distances and locations in the Holy Land become intelligible, as do the travels and the loads of the biblical characters. As it is put in 'the [second] preface by the author':

> When following this guide of ways and travel book / the holy Land / and also all other Lands / which are not remembered in the holy Scripture / become so [well] known / as if you had roamed around in them / and had seen them with your own eyes. (Bünting 1587: 2, transl. FK)

Thus, by providing a supposedly truthful reconstruction of the world, its parts, the Holy Land, and the Holy City of Jerusalem and an explanation of methods used to this end, Bünting's treatise seeks to underscore its own authority in teaching humans to imagine and grasp the significance and implications

of the biblical (hi)story. The figurative maps, on the one hand, are grounded in the Bible and function as aides-memoire given their sufficient correspondence to the world. German versions of measures and names, on the other hand, translate conditions that in the Bible feature in another language. Both the aides-memoire and the translations are geared to and address <u>we</u> humans' minds, and seek to facilitate, inter alia, readings of the Bible as well as the comprehension of its significance and implications.

Yet, the treatise goes deeper into framing the subjectivity of its readers by way of colonising their imagination. As noted earlier, the largest portion of the treatise recounts and lists the travels of biblical characters. In so doing, it also gives an account of deeds and events associated with them and describes the featured places and sites. Often, but not in every case, the treatise explains as well the spiritual significance of the discussed biblical character. A case in point and model account is the report and description of Abraham's travels:

> MASTER Abraham travelled from his fatherland / from Ur in Chaldea / until the city Haran in Mesopotamia / eighty and four miles / Gene. 11 / From Haran he travelled by God's order to Sichem / a hundred miles / From Sichen he travelled through the forest More / to the mountain between Bethel and Ali / seven miles ... From the forest Mamre Abraham travelled in the direction of Dan / thirty and one miles / and hit there the four Kings / that had captured Loth ... From Berseba Abraham travelled with his Sara again to the forest Mamre in the direction of Hebron / four miles / and there they died and are ... / Gen. 23. 25 / Sum of all travels of the Patriarch Abraham / Four hundred and forty-nine miles / Following now the description of cities and places / Ur / The city Ur in Chaldea / where Abraham was born / is called Orchot in our times / as Petrus Appianus writes / and is situated one hundred and fifty-six miles from Jerusalem in the direction of the sunrise. Ur means in German a light or fire / and might well have received its name / from the worship / that one has enflamed there fire sacrifices ... The spiritual Significance of the Patriarch Abraham / Abraham means ... Father / and thus Abraham is an image of God the Heavenly Father / who although he is father of many peoples / has nonetheless a single Natural Son / who goes by the name of Jesus Christus. Abraham he loved God so much that he did not spare his own son / in turn / God loved Abraham and the world so much / that he did not spare his sole son Jesus Christ. (Bünting 1587: 75–9, transl. FK)

By recounting the travels of the biblical characters according to this model, the biblical (hi)story takes shape as nothing but a huge travel event. This, along with the travel reports, gives us above all an idea of the landscapes and the places and parts of the world that feature in the Bible and the Holy Land. It also explains the spiritual significance of selected biblical characters as well as the quality of their deeds and God's reaction to them. 'King Jojakim', for instance, is described as 'a tyrant and bloodhound / who also wanted to kill the Prophet Jeremiam' and who was killed by Nebucad Nezar whom 'God ... had awakened' to this end (Bünting 1587: 193, transl. FK).

Yet, more importantly, by recounting and listing the travels of the biblical characters, including the sum total of the travelled distance(s), the treatise reveals their travel loads and their painstaking and restless lives, but also the marvels and punishments associated with them. The biblical (hi)story of Samson, for instance, who carried the gate of Gaza on his shoulders up on to the mountain close to Hebron, is intelligible and comprehensible as a miracle only, as the treatise holds, when we know that Samson had to carry this gate upon his shoulders for five miles (Bünting 1587: 2). Following this schema, the measurement and translation of names of and in the travel reports make the biblical (hi)story imaginable and graspable for humans in terms of the physical pains that the lives of humans on earth imply, but also in terms of the divine assistance and promise that awaits those who travel or wander piously and patiently on earth, and, in so doing, do good and refrain from evil.

In the end, the truthful maps and figurative portrayals or aides-memoire of the world, as well as the truthful accounts of the travels of the biblical characters, the measurement of distances, the translations of names, and the explanations of spiritual significances, etc., all help the readers to materialise the biblical (hi)story in their minds and to comprehend by this means of its implications and significance for their life and existence on earth. This being so, the biblical (hi)story in Bünting's treatise takes shape as one true (hi)story of the world in which humans (must) live, and as a parable of the pains of human life on earth and the promise of God in heaven. The purpose of all of these efforts is, as it were, to assist and guide then contemporary humans in empathising with the biblical characters, thus repeating their travels, to enable them to imagine and understand the same, along with their significance and implications. The function of the mapping and travel reports as parable and mental journey through the biblical (hi)story that operate through empathising repetition is underscored by the remarks with which the treatise ends:

> And thus I have now (thanks to God) described all travels consecutively / that are remembered in the Old Testament / by means of which one can nicely learn / how the holy Archfathers / Kings and Prophets / etc. have travelled occasionally in this vale of tears here on earth / and have accomplished some difficult / long and far-reaching travels / at great pains and with much work / until the beloved God has taken them from this miserable and painstaking life / to himself in joyful heaven / and thus has brought them to rest. God give to us all also once one / a blissful hour / that we bring together with the beloved Jacob the time of our Pilgrimage to an end / That may give the graceful and pious God / for the sake of his beloved Son Jesus Christ / who has acquired us with his costly Blood / Amen. (Bünting 1587: 258, transl. FK)

As the description of the Holy City of Jerusalem in its then present state underscores, such interior reconstruction and examination of the biblical (hi)story – that is, its mental and empathic re-enactment – is shown to

readers to be the sole way to comprehend the biblical (hi)story along with the sorely afflicted existence of humans on earth and humans' painstaking pilgrimage to the New Jerusalem (that is, the Jerusalem of the heavens), and the way to get there. This is all the more so because, as the treatise maintains, the sects guarding Jesus Christ's graveside and paying tribute to the Turkish Emperor indicate that 'the Lord Christus must no longer be searched for in the grave at the same place / but in his holy and saving word' (Bünting 1587: 70, transl. FK).

To reach the Promised Land of God, humans must thus travel through the Bible and, correspondingly, through their lives and they must fulfil in so doing their pious and painstaking pilgrimage on earth. Bünting's Itinerarium does not only map and measure this biblical world of humans and its (hi)story, along with its places, sites, characters, travels, deeds, and events. By allowing humans to mentally re-enact the characters' journeys, it lets them comprehend empathically the allegory or parable of human life and the promise of Salvation from life on earth. Bünting's treatise assists humans in understanding and leading their life as part of the Biblical life story.

## Secure subjects

When Friar Emius realised that the new day was already dawning, he rubbed the sleep from his eyes and closed with regret Bünting's Itinerarium which he had been reading during the night. He was tired. But he also felt content and was confident that the day before him would bring good things. As he left his room for Morning Prayer with his brothers he glanced at the book as it now lay on his desk. In the night, he had read about '[t]ravels of the ships of Salomonis' of 2,400 miles (Bünting 1587: 155, transl. FK), and the '[t]ravel of the Queen of Saba ... From Saba in Ethiopia [Morenland] / ... in the direction of Jerusalem / or two hundred and forty-one miles' (Bünting 1587: 155, transl. FK). He had read the description of the kingdom and city of Saba, its true location and people, and so on with great marvel and growing astonishment. He now also had an idea of the geography of the world in which the biblical characters travelled and just how long and painful their constant journeys must have been. The maps, the explication of method and other explanations in the treatise had helped him greatly with this. For the first time, Emius could imagine and grasp the world and its (hi)story in which he had to live and endure. Yet, it had been his readings about the first Paradise on earth, and about a 'worm'-like animal called a crocodile living in the Nile and Ganges (Bünting 1587: 73), that had caught his imagination the most. The treatise had told him, as well, about another animal, called 'Ichmeunon' (Bünting 1587: 73), which was described as the natural opponent and enemy of the crocodile. The relation between these two animals,

as the treatise had explained, corresponded to and translated into the struggle between the Devil and Jesus Christ. After his readings, Emius felt a desire to please God and confidence in his ability to do so. Compared to the biblical characters, his life seemed less hard. He would continue to live piously and patiently, and as God had foreseen for him, to reach the Heavenly Paradise and God, and eternal life and rest. Yet, the book had also left Emius curious. Throughout the day, he felt a growing desire to see the Promised Land one day with own eyes, and to live through the painful travels and harsh life of his biblical ancestors. But his legs ... if only they had not had to be amputated two years before. Nowadays he relied on crutches to move around. In spite of this, he had, with the help of Bünting, moved a little further towards Salvation.

In the meantime, Prof. Smith, in his hotel in London, checked emails for information on his airline's online check-in procedures to return to Hamburg. After finalising the process and assuring himself that he had his passport as always in the left pocket of his jacket, he prepared himself for a tour of London, guided by his smartphone and monitored by cameras. To return to Hamburg, he thought, he would need to go through passport control, security checks, and customs clearance at the airport, proving once again his good liberal citizenship. Prof. Smith thought for a moment just how much the people in Europe and elsewhere in the world were used to these procedures, protecting them from others and themselves. Yet, Prof. Smith thought, he would not reflect any further on this now. He would rather enjoy the day in London, with a good portion of trust in God and confidence in himself, the people and things around him.

Notes

1    The name and story are fictitious.
2    This term refers to '[non-fictional] literary works dealing with the places in which the story, or the narrative, of the Bible takes place' (Aiken 2009: 1). We rely on the term here as we feel this helps to give an idea of Bünting's book.
3    The place where Bünting was Vicar is not decipherable in the edition of the book used.
4    For a history of diplomacy drawing productively on this bifurcation see James Der Derian (1987).
5    This treatise is contained in the second volume of Bünting's treatise from 1585 (Bünting 1585).
6    The treatise indicates only that 'Doctor Martinus Luther' translated the term 'Stadium' into the German measure 'field road [Feldweg]' (Bünting 1587: 31, transl. FK and that Gualterus H. Rivius provides insight into the number of steps that together constitute a Welsh, French, and/or German mile (Bünting 1587:31).
7    For examples, see, for instance, Peter Meurer (2008) and Bret Rothstein et al. (2014).
8    The three-leaved cloverleaf neglects, on the one hand, America as a fourth part of the world (see 'Mapping the biblical world' earlier in this chapter) and it conceals, on the other hand, that 'the earth together with the ocean makes a round sphere' (Bünting 1587: 7, transl. FK).
9    It must be noted at this point that Africa, in contrast to Europe and Asia, does not appear in a figurative form, nor is it explained.

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**Part I**

*Things on the move*

# The power of cyberspace centralisation: analysing the example of data territorialisation

## Andreas Baur-Ahrens

IN 2013, SHORTLY after the revelations by Edward Snowden of the existence of mass surveillance programmes operated by his former employer the National Security Agency, Deutsche Telekom as one of the largest European telecommunications providers put forward the idea of a national and eventual Schengen routing of Internet traffic. National routing means that information exchanged between domestic servers and computers should travel only over domestic infrastructure and therefore remain within territorial borders – borders that traditionally play a minor role in cyberspace. The mobility of data traffic should be limited and regulated for the sake of data security by keeping sensitive information out of the reach of Anglo-American intelligence agencies. The idea of data security is also a driving force behind several similar initiatives and proposals to territorialise Internet traffic routing or data storage and has an impact beyond its technical implications.

As national routing requires changes to the basic functioning of the underlying Internet infrastructure, it affects also some of the core principles of the traditional design of cyberspace: decentrality without hierarchies with the aim of providing high availability and security. I argue that data territorialisation including national routing and storage requirements contributes to a general trend of cyberspace centralisation. Furthermore, I analyse the proposed changes to the Internet infrastructure with regard to power relations.

Power and its analysis is an important part of mobility studies as the regulation and control of mobility reflects and reproduces power relations (Sheller and Urry 2006: 211). Imaginaries of security legitimise the regulation and control of data mobility, which affects also social relations beyond their technical implementations. In the case of data territorialisation, this is done mainly by the use of infrastructure, as well as algorithms and code that organise and steer data traffic flows. This is of particular interest as 'the founders of the Internet embraced a design that distrusted centralized control' (Goldsmith and Wu 2006: 23). It was

'the architecture of the network itself that prevented the exercise of hierarchical organised authority, be it in the way of censorship, inequality, or the creation of commercial monopolies' (Hofmann and Holitscher 2004: 412, own transl.). Cyberspace was seen by some as a completely power-free space, as the famous 'Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace' by John Perry Barlow (1996) illustrates.

Cyberspace centralisation as limiting and steering information mobility is challenging this traditional architecture and the principles behind it. As we are living in an increasingly interconnected world, changes of power relations within the Internet infrastructure and connected structures and actors should not be underestimated.

The conceptualisation of power that I use is a constitutive one as it looks at the underlying relations of power that structure and shape identities, interests, and meanings in a co-constitutive way, and accepts the relevance and impact that technology has on social relations (and vice versa). As the analysis shows, there are roughly three traceable changes to power relations: (1) telecommunications providers become more important, gain more influence, and their identity as security actors is promoted; (2) government authorities' possibilities for action are enhanced and states' interference with the network's functions as well as the existence of territorial borders and their enforcement is legitimised; (3) data territorialisation is contributing to a general transition from a passive and dumb network to an increasingly intelligent and steering one, leading also to more passive and dependent users.

This chapter is structured as follows. I first give an overview of the concept of cyberspace and its technical basics and then present the conceptualisation of power that I use in order to analyse data territorialisation. In the empirical part I describe (1) the national routing and data localisation initiatives, followed by (2) why data territorialisation is a centralising process, and (3) an analysis of the power relations and changes thereof that are connected to the empirical examples discussed.

### Basic concepts: cyberspace, Internet infrastructure, and routing

The term 'cyberspace', once coined in science fiction for 'cybernetic space', has a long history of describing a virtual and so-called *separate* space from reality. 'Cyberspace' has been largely criticised for being too vague and misleading (e.g., Cohen 2007: 227; Thiedeke 2004) and was even called 'dead' by Fadi Chehadé, president of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) (Küchemann 2014). Nevertheless, although the idea of a (utopian) parallel world of virtuality has been mostly abandoned, the metaphor of cyberspace is still efficacious, predominant, and consequently worthy of attention (see Cohen 2007: 226, 235). However, the notion of cyberspace needs more

specification. This is why I use the word cyberspace mainly with reference to its technical elements: cyberspace is to be understood as an extending part of social reality, and not as a separate or virtual realm. Following Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski (2010a: 15–16) '[c]yberspace describes the human-made domain for action that exists as a consequence of an interconnected and inter-dependent global communications and computing infrastructure'. Thus, this definition includes all computers, devices, and servers, their connecting com-mercial or public infrastructure (routers, wires, data centres), as well as traf-fic protocols and standards. Following Mimi Sheller and John Urry (2006: 210, 212; see also Söderström et al. 2013: 7), it is these 'multiple fixities and moor-ings' materialised by immobile infrastructures, regulatory frameworks, and social practices that organise the flow of information. In order to understand the (irregular) movement of data and also its limitations and regulations, one has to look at the fixed infrastructures and 'gates' governing its mobility (Sheller and Urry 2006: 212).

In the following paragraphs I give a brief introduction to the technical basics of the Internet infrastructure and its predecessor Arpanet. These essen-tials are: (1) in contrast to traditional telephone systems with fixed and linear wires between all points of communication, the Internet consists of a chaotic web of wires, hubs, and nodes; and (2) the communication protocols of the Internet coordinate and govern the traffic routes and determine how data finds its way to its destination within the network and thereby organise the commu-nication flows. The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) defines how comput-ers may exchange information, whereas the Internet Protocol (IP) defines how computers are addressed and therefore how they can be found. The TCP and IP represent the technical implementation of a relatively simple idea to build an open, minimalistic, and neutral communications platform (Goldsmith and Wu 2006: 23). 'The core architectural guideline of the Internet is the end-to-end-principle. It is based on the idea that, in a distributed computing network, functionality should be provided by end hosts rather than by the network itself, using ... TCP/IP' (Glen 2014: 644). While the functions and the governance of the network are performed by the clients, the network provides only the basic and passive foundation for data exchange.

The TCP and IP form a simple, robust, and neutral communications net-work. Simple since it needs little information and oversight to function, robust since it reacts dynamically to errors and failures and re-establishes connections by routing around the error, and neutral since it does not look at the content of the information exchanged. The aim of its infrastructural design was to secure communications even in cases of attack on or failure of large parts of the sys-tem, which is why a self-organising, non-hierarchical, and therefore almost com-pletely decentral technology was developed. The idea behind this principle was to put the functionality of the network with the clients, and not with the network

itself or in central hubs that would be easy to destroy. Security by decentrality was one of the main driving forces behind its development as the Internet's predecessor Arpanet was a military communications network. Put differently, the original Internet 'is based on the idea of smart terminals and a dumb network' (Glen 2014: 644). 'Like a daydreaming postal worker, the network simply moves the data and leaves interpretation of the data to the applications at either end' (Lessig 2006: 44). This design made it possible to develop a diverse range of applications, including ones that nobody could have imagined when the Internet was invented – for example email, the World Wide Web (WWW), instant messaging, video-streaming, video-calling, and so on. All of them function on the basis of the same and practically unchanged infrastructure.

As the examples provided partly focus on changes to traffic routing, a more fundamental assessment of the technical characteristics of routing is necessary: data traffic, such as an email or a picture, is split into little data packages that find their way autonomously from the sender to the recipient. It is perhaps easier to understand if one imagined a book with all its pages separated, glued onto postcards, and sent to the recipient, who then puts all the pages back together again. Thereby, '[r]outing ... is the act of finding a path from one place to another on which a packet can travel' (Schluting 2006). In contrast to the postcard example, the packets are not travelling on the same and already known path determined by the mailing company, but each and every packet determines its own route and jumps dynamically from node to node, the so-called routers. Every router decides to which connected router it passes on the packet until it reaches its destination.

Furthermore, the Internet is not a homogeneous (cyber)space but rather a conglomeration of about 50,000 distinct subnetworks (Pohlmann et al. 2014: 113). Those subnetworks, the networks of Internet service providers or universities, for example, together form the Internet. They are connected via more than 500,000 handover points enabling communication between two or more networks. In simplified terms there are three different ways of connecting subnetworks: transit connections as well as public or private peering agreements. A transit agreement means that a smaller subnet, for instance a small Internet service provider or a data centre, pays a larger provider for access to other networks in accordance to the amount of data handled. In contrast to that, with peering agreements subnetworks connect to each other at handover points and forward traffic from the respective partner networks at no cost – a more equal arrangement than a transit connection. However, there are two versions of peering. Private peering is a bilateral connection between two networks, whilst public peering is peering at a central handover point where several providers can connect. Handover points with public peering are called *Internet Exchange Points* (IXP), and the world's largest IXP is DE-CIX (German Commercial Internet Exchange) in Frankfurt, Germany. To get a better idea of the functioning of an

IXP, one can compare it to a roundabout: a specialised company runs a roundabout where subnetworks can add their roads and connect their traffic. Traffic exchange between all the roads connecting to the roundabout is free, providers have to pay only for their infrastructure and a fee for using the roundabout no matter how much data they exchange.

Thus, between these 50,000 subnetworks there are a great number of connections either by peering or by transit agreements. 'The interconnection ecosystem is self-organising and highly decentralised. Decisions to interconnect are made independently by the AS [autonomous systems, i.e. subnetworks] ... [E]ven the administrators may not know, a priori, what path traffic will take' (Hall et al. 2013: 121). '[T]he fastest, technically and economically best route' is calculated dynamically for every packet (Dittler 2013: own transl.). This is why they coordinate their movement in a fraction of a second according to changing capacities and availabilities – yet territorial borders are traditionally not taken into consideration.

Before I turn to the changes that data territorialisation imposes on the traditional network character and data mobility of the Internet, let me first give an overview of the conceptualisation of power used for the analysis.

## Constitutive power

The impact of mobility studies lies 'primarily in their attempt to address explicitly the interplay of mobility and power. They do so with reference to questions of inequality, domination, and constraint' (Söderström et al. 2013: 6). Furthermore, information technologies have an important impact on our societies and social relations – and how social relations become mirrored in technology:

> Struggles over the design and regulation of network protocols and technologies will be a flashpoint for struggles about the shaping of networked space [i.e. social reality enhanced by information technologies] more generally (and vice versa). (Cohen 2007: 255)

It is therefore crucial to investigate how social relations are affected by and affect information technologies, and to track the power of discourses and practices of mobility in creating both movement and stasis (Sheller and Urry 2006: 211). It is also important to analyse what exactly constitutes power relations and how they work. Certainly, power is one of the core concepts of the social sciences and an 'essentially contested concept' par excellence (see Swartz 2007: 105). The genealogy of the concept of power is complex and expansive, and here it suffices to focus on a major differentiation in the power debate to clarify my understanding of the concept.

A major divide within power theories lies between a relational and a capacity-based approach (Baldwin (2013: 273–5). The latter approach implies that

power equals the sum of resources an actor possesses (see for instance Waltz 1979: 131). Based on a relational understanding of power, one can focus on interactions, for example, getting another actor to do something it would not otherwise do (see Dahl 1957: 202–3) or one can look into structural relations, constraints, and empowerment that influence underlying identities and interests themselves (e.g. Lukes 2005). Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (2005) provide a comprehensive concept that Stefano Guzzini (2007: 23) calls 'Lukes-plus-Foucault': they basically understand 'power [as] the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate' (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 8). Barnett and Duvall thereby try to capture a very broad range of kinds of power, and also oppose a clear differentiation between actors and structures. For the purpose of this analysis, their constitutive understanding of power[1] provides an appropriate conceptualisation as it is about the general shifts and changes to basic power relations that structure and give meaning to social interaction.

It is from this constitutive understanding of power that I take the idea that power comprises 'the co-constitutive, internal relations of structural positions ... that define what kinds of social beings actors are' as well as their 'social capacities and interests' (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 18). Furthermore, there are forms of power that constitute 'all social subjects with various social powers through systems of knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general social scope' (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 20). These kinds of power are not exercised by specific actors and are not interactional, but work through structural relations, or more diffuse systems of meaning, which is why the authors divide their constitutional power in more structural and productive forms. The latter ties in with post-structural and discursive power concepts. It is influenced for instance by Michel Foucault and conceives of discourse as 'productive', as (re)producing meaning systems and as imbued with social power relations. Constitutional power thus (re)produces social identities, practices, and authorisations that exercise discursive forms of power.

In order to investigate constitutive power relations, I analyse the positions of actors and their changes. Questions to be asked are: does the (also perceived) role of an actor change? Do actors have more or fewer options for action? What is their position in relation to other actors, structures, and technology? What general changes to influence and control can be observed? I also look into the more diffuse power relations that can be found in changes of basic identities and meanings. This is done by examining how consequences of data territorialisation have an influence on the exchange of meanings within discourse and on the (re)definition of identities (see Singh 2013). Are there changes to technologies or actors that shape the discourse? This can happen, for example, by giving more authority to a specific meaning or by preferring one meaning over another due to changing technical conditions.

In the following section I take up these types of power as the basis for the empirical analysis of (changing) power relations concerning data territorialisation as an expression of cyberspace centralisation.

### National routing initiatives

In the empirical part of this chapter, I analyse data territorialisation and the resulting changes in power relations. The trend of data territorialisation, often called 'data sovereignty',[2] is defined by Dana Polatin-Reuben and Joss Wright (2014: 1) as 'a catch-all term to describe different state behaviours towards data generated in or passing through national Internet infrastructure [that] has become a topic of significant international debate in the wake of the Snowden revelations'.

Data territorialisation is mostly legitimised by the need to secure cyberspace and contain so-called *cyber threats* (Deibert and Rohozinski 2012: 29–30) such as viruses, attacks, law infringements, fraud, and others that became possible because of the decentral and uncontrolled nature of the Internet. It is with reference to these threats that the structure of the Internet has been changing substantially in favour of further centralisation since the 1990s. But the relation between centrality/decentrality and security is not obvious at all. Both central and decentral designs represent a secure network: decentrality mainly due to the resilience and availability of communication connections, and centrality because of the means of control over actions on the Internet. The idea of a self-healing and self-organising cyberspace where states have at most a gardening and only minimally interfering function has been replaced by the idea of an intensified interventionist function and the need for more control and authority over the network (Dunn Cavelty 2013: 119; Hutter 2014; Mueller et al. 2013: 94).

Examples of centralisation are found in several global trends, for instance in the introduction of filter and gatekeeping technologies (see Deibert et al. 2008), an increased requirement for resilient and accredited infrastructure, and the implementation of de-anonymisation measures (see Kerr and Barrigar 2012), but also in the concentration of the Internet industry, of Internet hubs and data centres (see De Filippi and McCarthy 2012). Moreover, data territorialisation is contributing to cyberspace centralisation.

The process of territorialising data consists of two connected but technologically and regulatory distinct areas: the first one is about the *routing* of data. Roughly speaking, national routing guarantees that data traffic with a domestic origin and destination is not routed via foreign servers. This is sometimes labelled the 'national Internet'. However, this is misleading as it does not imply a complete shutdown of international data connections. Secondly, data territorialisation is about the location of *data storage*. Some states have already introduced

laws requiring certain data of citizens to be stored on servers that are physically located in their national territories.

Both forced national data storage and national routing initiatives as processes of data territorialisation represent a cyberspace centralisation, although Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu (2006: 152) describe a form of national routing, the 'bordered Internet', as 'decentralised governance'. My argument is that the centralisation takes place on a deeper level and only thereby allows the kind of decentralisation that Goldsmith and Wu are referring to. They are talking about a dissociation from existing central structures, but in order to achieve that, central structures in the respective area have to be installed first. Furthermore, Goldsmith and Wu's understanding of decentralisation requires a definition of what is 'national' and what is 'international', and one has to gather more detailed information about data traffic: its origin, destination, and possible paths of connection, but also the specific location of data packages, and basic information about the content. To gain this information, the end-to-end-principle (intelligent clients, dumb network) needs to be altered. Centres need to be set up or existing centres have to become smarter in order to evaluate data and apply corresponding rules. There needs to be a centralisation that operates on a much more basic level for the purpose of a seemingly global decentralisation of data storage and routing.

These initiatives ask for predetermined routing lists that are implemented as part of the routers that enable or disable certain routes. Routing becomes less dynamic and needs a categorisation of data packages into foreign ones that travel as dynamically as before and national ones that have to stick to national routes. Data with a domestic origin and destination have to go through national handover points no matter if these are slower, congested, or more expensive.

The advantage claimed by advocates of national routing lies in the fact that data is not passed over to foreign wires and servers and therefore remains physically within the country. In this way it becomes more difficult for foreign authorities to tap, read, or manipulate the data. One of the disadvantages put forward most frequently, however, is a decreasing quality of data traffic as it is more likely to experience overloads and congestions by purposely nationally routed traffic, and on top of that the consequence that alternative routes that increase failure safety and reliability might not be reached. Jonathan Obar and Andrew Clement (2013), for instance, argue for national routing. The authors note that a substantial part of Canadian–Canadian Internet traffic is routed via the United States, and urge for a national routing of Canadian traffic in order to maintain data security.

Yet an important public discussion started in Germany and other European countries after Deutsche Telekom demanded a national and eventual 'Schengen Routing' in a secret meeting at the German Federal Ministry for Economic

Affairs and Energy in October 2013 (see Berke 2013: n.p.). The same demand was put forward publicly at the Cyber Security Summit 2013 (in cooperation with the Munich Security Conference), which 'created a stir and reached high levels of government' (Clauß 2014: n.p., own transl.). The idea made it into the coalition agreement of the new German government in November 2013 (Koalitionsvertrag 2013) and chancellor Angela Merkel claimed that emails of European citizens should not need to travel across the Atlantic and that one had to build up communication networks within Europe (Clauß 2014). Thus, the idea of a national or Schengen routing became a topic within the EU. Whilst Neelie Kroes, the EU Commissioner for Digital Agenda until October 2014, was objecting to national routing, she welcomed European regulations on routing and supported a European cloud infrastructure (see Diersch 2014: 68). These proposals have been debated by US and European information technology industries and the press (see for instance Adhikari 2013; BITKOM 2013; Dittler 2013; Gropp 2014; USTR 2014).

In several other countries national routing has not been put forward as a separate and independent measure, but has been implemented as part of larger isolation and shielding programmes, for instance in China and Iran (see the so-called halal Internet or Great Firewall). However, the foci and purposes of these programmes are not comparable to standalone national routing.

Polatin-Reuben and Wright (2014) as well as Anupam Chander and Uyên Lê (2014) give an overview of regional routing and data localisation regulations in several countries. Since 2010, Malaysia has required data of Malaysian citizens to be stored on domestic servers (Chander and Lê 2014: 21); since 2012 health data of Australians has been subject to national storage regulations; South Korea demands domestic storage of geographic data; and Brazil discussed national storage regulations when passing the Marco Civil in 2013, but weakened the requirements at the last moment (Polatin-Reuben and Wright 2014: 3).

Deutsche Telekom proposed to the German Federal Government and the European Union (EU) to begin with a German national routing and to later extend this to a Schengen routing in order to keep US and British intelligence agencies out of the data flow in the Schengen area. However, there has not been a regulation on European or national routing yet. Deutsche Telekom has introduced in cooperation with other German providers an initiative called 'Email made in Germany' promising that emails are stored on servers on German soil. In November 2014, Deutsche Telekom added the affirmation that all emails sent between their customers' email accounts do not leave the German Internet infrastructure (see Heuzenroth 2014).

In the following section, I analyse the ideas, proposals, and implementations of different forms of data territorialisation with regard to constitutive power relations.

## Analysis of the power relations of national routing

As mentioned above, I will analyse in this section (potential) changes in co-constitutive power relations that go along with centralisation processes. For the analysis of structural and material power relations, it is helpful to look at the positions of actors and their (perceived) roles and options for action. One way of analysing courses of action and their transformation within the technical realm of cyberspace is to identify potential points of control and the actors who have access to them (see Clark 2012; Deibert and Rohozinski 2012: 24). In the present case of data territorialisation through routing and storage regulations, the most obvious points of control are routers and national data centres.

Furthermore, technical configurations matter not only by providing the material basis for structural relations, but technology can also have a normalising and empowering impact (see Hofmann and Holitscher 2004: 414; Fuhrmann 2002: 118). In order to capture these productive power relations creating centralisation through data territorialisation, I focus on changing systems of meaning. How are definitions and interpretations altered? How are identities and normalities shaped? How are these meanings and definitions connected to practices and policies that thereby appear as normal, possible, imaginable, legitimate, or desirable (see Barnett and Duvall 2005: 22)?

The following power analysis is made up of three parts with the first focusing on changes to the role of Internet service providers, the second looking into changes to the options and identities of government authorities, and the last providing a more thorough analysis of the fundamental technological changes of the Internet infrastructure and their consequences.

### Internet service providers

Internet service providers (ISPs) supervise important data traffic control points by operating the routers where national and international data traffic has or would have to be separated. By introducing national routing, their role then changes from the 'daydreaming postal worker' to a security actor since national routing is framed as significant for data security. By protecting against foreign spying, national security becomes a goal of private telecommunications providers. Having to distinguish between national data worthy of protection and international unprotected data, the self-understanding, identity, and role of ISPs within the telecommunications sector, the media industry, and in relation to government agencies changes. 'ISPs and telecom companies now help to determine the boundaries between security and privacy – indeed they have even begun to shape the national surveillance architecture' (Herrington and Aldrich 2013: 302). Internet service providers become partners in the governmental security apparatus and can exercise a new kind of control over

data traffic, information mobility, and thereby over all Internet users in the relevant area.

A comparison with the development of the Internet in Europe during the 1970s gives interesting insights: the Internet protocol suite (TCP/IP) developed in the United States – and characterised by openness, decentrality, and flexibility – competed for global acceptance with a standard called *x.25*, which was supported by European countries and telecommunications regulatory bodies. 'Under x.25 virtual circuits, the control and accountability of the network would be mainly in the hands of public network providers at the expense of private computer owners' (Castells 2001: 26). European post and telecommunications regulatory bodies wanted public national networks that connected to networks of foreign countries only via a few handover points. On the one hand, public networks could then exclude private and independent networks and on the other hand, they could make possible control over data and networks. Although the American approach succeeded, with the proposals for a national routing this very control over a more centralised network with predetermined handover points to other networks was back on the table. By changing routing practices, telecommunications providers could retrieve at least parts of their former position of power through central network control points that they used to have in the traditional telephone networks.

If one takes into account the internal structure of the telecommunications sector, one can also detect changing positions of actors within the sector itself. Deutsche Telekom stands out as an example in this regard, but this may be applied to other markets and national providers as well. As the primary provider in Germany and one of the largest in Europe the position of Deutsche Telekom as a 'national champion' would become even stronger through data territorialisation. This is due to the fact that Deutsche Telekom holds few peering agreements, but forces other Internet providers primarily to pay for transit agreements or to use existing agreements via other providers in the United States or elsewhere in order to connect to their network (see Gropp 2014; Greis 2014). With national or regional routing requirements, 'more providers would be forced to hand over their data to the wires of Deutsche Telekom' (König 2013: n.p., own transl.), which has not only economic effects but also concentrates control over data. It is not only that the position of large providers becomes more dominant (see Seiffert 2014; Welchering 2013), but it also expands their position in respect of other actors in the Internet industry, such as highly data-intensive content delivery networks, global transit providers, or IXPs. This may have an impact with regard to struggles over a restructuring of the network by abolishing network neutrality and introducing more steerable networks.

To sum up, the position and action capabilities of the large national providers would increase in comparison to market competitors, but also in relation to other industries, politics, and the public. This applies also to national storage

requirements such as those in Malaysia, Australia, or South Korea: the position of national providers strengthens as their products have to be considered in order to enable communications, even if they cannot compete in the market.

## *Government authorities*

In the second part of this analysis, changes to power relations including those in government authorities are analysed. I start with infrastructural changes with regard to positions of and possibilities for control, and then turn to changing legitimacies.

Although it is relatively complex and costly for governments to control, filter or monitor data traffic in a traditionally decentralised and intermeshed network, it becomes much easier with centralised routing and nodes, a reduction of the meshing, and a hierarchisation of the network architecture. This shift simplifies governmental surveillance and control (see Roberts and Palfrey 2010: 40) as it concentrates data traffic to a few points and a few autonomous systems. It does not mean that authorities obtain the specific tools for surveillance and filtering right away, but with central connection points to foreign countries and limited routing capabilities, the complexity of engaging in surveillance is greatly reduced.

Furthermore, if national routing guidelines are to be actively enforced, the authorities tasked with checking and monitoring the implementation of these guidelines would have to set up something like customs barriers which would give them enormous insight into people's communications. The role of the state would drastically change from that of a gardening state to an interventionist one, and especially the executive branch would gain influence. In a similar vein, guidelines for national storage of certain data increase the positional power of governments by enhancing their possibilities to gain access to the stored data. Because of the limitation of storage to national providers only, data is more concentrated and easier to reach, all relevant data centres being under national jurisdiction. It is not only that data territorialisation generates possibilities and options for traffic control that might be used for filtering or censorship, but the changes to basic functionalities of the Internet affect how the network functions and which interventions are legitimate. In the following, these changes to normal routing practices and opportunities for censorship are discussed. Based on a traditional and decentral understanding, '[t]he Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it' (Gilmore, quoted in Elmer-Dewitt 1993: n.p.). In case of failures or unavailability it used to be normal that the network, due to the dynamic and decentral architecture, would have provided a path around the error. In fact, this was the core function and aim of the network: availability by autonomous routing adjustments and therefore unrestricted mobility of data and information.

Centralised routing regulations alter this normality by imposing inflexible pre-defined allowed and disallowed routes. This leads to a normalisation of influence on routing, as well as the blocking of paths and content, thereby changing the foundational principles of cyberspace. 'The self-regulating process of the Internet community is based on connectivity which constitutes the "rough consensus" between all shareholders of a public good' (Hutter 2014: 535, own transl.). In other words, the rough consensus was that information mobility should apply to all parts of the network. This consensus is being challenged and the value of connection itself becomes negotiable. Taking up the conceptualisation of fixities (Sheller and Urry 2006), where through the fixities of infrastructure the mobility of information is made possible, one can observe that this mobility will be affected. Data that according to national routing should only be mobile within the national territory and travel on domestic hardware is not as mobile as it used to be. Data mobility is made possible by the material moorings and fixities of the underlying infrastructure, which is organised *nationally* rather than in a more unbounded fashion according to *efficiency and speed* of data exchange.

Through the increased importance of the storage location of data and the crossing of territorial borders of data, location in general, as well as national borders, become more important in a 'global' network. Territorial borders have not existed in cyberspace, but with national routing, political and territorial borders are being imposed on cyberspace or Internet infrastructure and technology. It becomes one of the core characteristics and central functions of the network to ask: is this data traffic domestic or international? Where is data stored? May traffic cross the border, and how are borders to be enforced and where? In its early years, cyberspace was considered to be a 'no-place', a place without governments and territorial borders (see Barlow 1996), but this 'placeless-ness' (Herrera 2007: 74) changes. With national routing, a national identity is attributed to data. Nationality as a concept itself becomes normalised in cyberspace although it was initially not inherent to the Internet's infrastructure.

Furthermore, if the functioning of the Internet infrastructure does not appear as self-organising, but as steerable or even with a normative responsibility to steer (in order to secure data from foreign actors), new possibilities for more and more far-reaching regulation are opened up. Government interference within the telecommunications sector becomes more common and can be legitimised more easily. Traditionally informed by competition law, infrastructure law, and media law, the general understanding of Internet regulation is more and more being characterised by its meaning for and within national security (see also Hall et al. 2013: 140).

Presenting data territorialisation as a means to protect data and citizens against foreign threats increasingly activates an *ingroup/outgroup* logic and fosters the perception of the state as the protector against evolving threats 'from

the outside'. From this perspective, it is only another step, especially in combination with the demands for governmental protection against child pornography or terrorist propaganda, towards a normalisation and legitimisation of governmental content filters. Or, as Deibert and Rohozinski put it:

> States no longer fear pariah status by openly declaring their intent to regulate and control cyberspace. The convenient rubric of terrorism, child pornography, and cyber security has contributed to a growing expectation that states should enforce order in cyberspace, including policing unwanted content. (Deibert and Rohozinski 2010b: 4)

National routing is not to be compared to actual censorship, but the general legitimation of governmental intervention and the technological changes that give more opportunities for control prepare the grounds for censorship. Furthermore, the rough consensus of global data mobility and availability is challenged and nationality of data and the protection of its security by steering the network becomes legitimate and normal.

### An intelligent network and dumb clients

The previous two sections took into account changes in the technical infrastructure by analysing the role of ISPs and governments in regulating the Internet. This last part of the analysis is concerned with the more fundamental changes in technology and their governing principles.

Probably the most important technical change accompanying national routing is found in the transformation towards an intelligent network with intelligent centres. As shown above, the Internet was created based on the principle of intelligent clients and dumb and passive networks for different reasons, which is why the end-to-end principle became one of the core characteristics of the network. It has guaranteed openness, decentrality, and the absence of control, and puts the responsibility for and power of the network in the hands of the users. By introducing national routing, central nodes are needed in order to decide over and intervene in data traffic 'intelligently' and to not pass it on passively and without screening. The transition to an intelligent network, also promoted by measures such as 'quality classes' or filters, is perhaps the most important structural change of the network and its meaning. The relation between Internet users, media companies, telecommunications providers, and the state changes. The gardening state and passive Internet providers become partners that operate an intelligent network together. On the other hand, the actors of the Internet that were deemed to be the active and powerful ones, the clients, users, and content producers are turned into more passive consumers and content providers, as they are increasingly depending on central structures. This is not to be understood in a sense that today's computers and devices can

do less than before, but the core of the argument is that more functions are to be relocated to the network itself, so that the network structures become more important for the whole system than the clients in the network.

Taking this argument a bit further: according to the end-to-end principle, the clients of the network are its sovereign. However, by national routing initiatives this sovereignty is and would be more and more transferred to the nodes and data handling points due to the shift to an intelligent, steering, and governing network. Moreover, according to the traditional understanding of the network, data is stored decentrally and processed by the clients and devices; the network is changing to a more centralised construct where clients only display data. (National) data centres become more central as it becomes more important where data is stored and from where it is displayed. And the network itself gains more weight: it organises and governs communication by itself and is not just a passive infrastructure that is used by clients to communicate with each other. To put it on a yet more abstract level: in the traditional network organised by the end-to-end principle, individuals using the network were understood to be its sovereign, to be the core of enabling communication. However, in an intelligent network, the central control mechanisms are in charge of facilitating communication and individuals become merely users. The network changes from a passive to an active actor, and users must get used to playing a more passive part in the game.

There are three connected shifts in power relations to be noted when looking at data territorialisation: (1) a strengthened role and position of national telecommunications providers, thereby also strengthening their identity as security actors; (2) an increased (executive) power for governmental authorities, an expansion of their possibilities for action, which might also be used to censor content, and a general legitimisation of intervention in the network's functions and the imposition of territorial borders on a global network; and (3) a general transition from a passive and dumb network to an increasingly intelligent and steering one regulating and enforcing mobility restrictions, leading also to more passive and dependent users.

## Conclusions

I have presented examples of and proposals for data territorialisation and argued that they can be understood as part of a trend of centralising cyberspace and its Internet infrastructure. I showed that these centralisation processes are connected to changing imaginaries of security that have a direct impact on the mobility and free flow of data. The free flow of data was once the main function of the network that was to be secured. National routing initiatives and national storage requirements are supposed to protect data, privacy, and citizens against a new type of threat: foreign intelligence. Furthermore, the original decentralised

set-up of the network was not only inspired by a different idea of security, but also by distinct ideas of power and control within the network. By analysing constitutive power changes that go hand in hand with data territorialisation, I have shed light on some of the very basic changes of the network and its connections to societal actors and social structures.

One of the main observations is the changing role and position of state authorities that not only gain more control over data, providers, and citizens, but also could use this control to monitor and censor content. Furthermore, the shift in meaning that puts states and their assisting providers in the role of protecting citizens from foreign and outside threats is also bringing to the table again the issue of border control. The providers' role changes to increased participation in the security apparatus, thus given them more control over their customers, more influence on the Internet industry, with national champions especially also benefiting economically. The users and citizens, on the other hand, are put in a more passive and dependent position with regard to both the authorities and the providers. Additionally, as decentralised information technologies are seen by some authors as empowering and/or liberating technologies allowing open discourse, including of otherwise marginalised positions (see Singh 2013: 6; Deibert and Rohozinski 2010c: 43), such a development poses problems for democracies as they need decentralised contexts and (political) participation.

The change of the role and functioning of the technical infrastructure is fundamental for many of these initiatives, and also for prospective developments. The increasing demand for an abolition of the end-to-end-principle and decentrality of the network that comes with data territorialisation is not only transforming the network to an 'intelligent' grid with 'dumb' clients, but it also has implications for (and of course is itself influenced by) a range of non-technical and social relations as shown above. The fixities of the Internet not only makes mobility possible, but with data territorialisation, the territorial borders of the infrastructure are also regulating and thus limiting the mobility of data. Further research should look into the role of technology in these developments, notably from a perspective inspired by ideas of material and technological agency, since technology and 'software, we might say, writes mobility' (Hannam et al. 2006: 5).

Cyberspace is not power-free and never will be. My analysis has demonstrated that centralising tendencies entail power shifts that are normatively relevant. Thus, it has become clear that demands for further centralisation such as data territorialisation need adequate critical reflection and public discussion to raise awareness of the structure and organisation of power relations in cyberspace. Information technology is no separate or even virtual space – it rather (re)produces social relations. How much power do we vest in decentral protocols and in intelligent and governing centres? How much influence should

companies and states be allowed to have and what functions and sovereignty do we want clients, and in the end ourselves, to have?

Notes

1    Barnett and Duvall describe a four-by-four matrix of ideal types of power of which only parts are used in this analysis. In their understanding, however, the four types of power are on the one hand the more interactionist types of compulsory and institutional power and on the other hand the more constitutive kinds: structural and productive power (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 12). It is not that interactionist types of power are irrelevant, but they are rather related to the acts of policy implementation or enabled by specific forms of constitutive power.

2    Since this term is also (perhaps even more so) used to address the rights of individuals in contrast to companies or state authorities, for reasons of clarity I prefer the term data territorialisation.

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# Commercialised occupation skills: Israeli security experience as an international brand

Erella Grassiani

ISRAELI SECURITY PERSONNEL, technology, and ideas are immensely popular in places around the world that are perceived or marked as insecure. The fact that an idea, strategy, person, or technology comes from this small country in the Middle East seems to be enough for people and states to blindly believe its effectiveness. At the heart of this conviction is the Israeli experience in conflict, urban warfare, and dealing with terrorism. As an American journalist wrote: 'everybody's favourite soldier of fortune is an Israeli with military experience' (Johnson 2010: n.p.). To illustrate this phenomenon, I will start with an example. A security company owned by an Israeli in the United States (US) was asked to set up security checkpoints in New Orleans after hurricane Katrina struck in 2005. The location where they performed this task was Audubon Place, which is a private, rich enclave. When hurricane Katrina hit, the inhabitants were afraid that criminals roaming the city's streets would rob their homes and they decided to hire this private security company (PSC) the operatives of which (Israeli ex-combatants) were helicoptered into Audubon Place by the American private military firm Blackwater, dressed in bulletproof vests and carrying M-16 automatic rifles. Interestingly, the inhabitants had specifically asked for Israeli security personnel. The operatives manned the gates of the enclave and made sure that no one entered. When interviewed by a journalist the Israeli ex-combatants said they had 'been fighting the Palestinians all day, every day, our whole lives', emphasising that the mere look of their gun would scare away criminals, making this job a piece of cake in comparison (Scahill 2005: n.p.). The Israeli founder of the company furthermore stated that '[his] people were highly trained to operate in hostile environments. That fit well with the demand of the situation in New Orleans' (Hutchinson and Masson 2007: n.p.), clearly making reference to their background in the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF).

This example illustrates the existence of a connection between Israel, a presumed security expertise, and a keen international market that makes the movement of such notions possible. It also fits neatly into the following description of the workings of the Israeli homeland security industry: '[it] sells its products and services by maintaining that Israel has experienced the horror – not virtually, but first hand – and consequently both knows how to deal with such horror and has developed the appropriate instruments to do so' (Gordon 2009: 3). 'The horror' refers here to terror attacks and other threats to Israel and its citizens. In order to understand this commercial, mobile aspect of the security/military industrial complex, I examine the ways in which what I call the 'Israeli security experience' (ISE) is exported and branded internationally by distributing it to other countries and thus making it mobile. I conceptualise this as 'security capital' and use this concept as an analytical tool to understand these processes.

At the heart of the increasing popularity of PSCs in general are perceptions of increasing risk, insecurity, and fear. Not only in the US, but also in Europe people are becoming increasingly afraid of possible terror attacks, 'the Muslim', the strange other, and the collapse of their familiar and comfortable lives. States and their policymakers speak about 'security' as something we always need more of and citizens start looking for ways to 'protect' themselves, to regain a feeling of safety. Security has been on states' minds since their early formation (Goldstein 2010), but if we look at states' subjects we see that especially after 9/11, and continuing today with foreign (European) 'fighters' joining the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, a so-called culture of fear (Furedi 2002; 2006) becomes visible. Jeff Sluka has even called this a 'terror of terrorism' and a 'paranoid fear of terrorism'.[1]

These preoccupations with (in)security reverberate not only in the way our feelings are constructed, but we are also made to feel responsible for our own security within a neoliberal notion of 'responsiblization' (Goldstein 2010: 492). In the world that Frank Furedi (2006: 3) describes, 'virtually every institution – bars, universities, doctors' surgeries, sport, public transportation – takes security very seriously. Burglar alarms, outdoor lights, panic buttons, CCTV cameras and an array of private security personnel are testimony to a flourishing market in fear'. Citizens become customers and (in)security has become a commodity, something we can buy and sell on a global market. The products or commodities that we can find in such markets are then products of our perceptions of fear, often propagated by the state (such as the discourse on the war on terror by the Bush administration). Thus, '[a] "culture of fear" has taken root in Western cultures, promoted by state institutions and exacerbated by those working within the media and security industries' (Mythen and Walklate 2006: 126). (In)security, in the words of Mark Neocleous (2007), becomes a fetish, a commodity which we cannot get enough of.

Here I explore the way specific PSCs that operate internationally brand themselves through the use of the Israeli combat and security experience of their founders and/or employees and through other links to Israel as a nation-in-arms.[2] Specific ideas about 'Israeli-ness' and subsequent notions of security thus become mobile globally and find their way into different (national) contexts. The assumption that being Israeli or having an Israeli connection means good security is interesting as it shows how 'knowing about' (in)security is something that can be accumulated and exported elsewhere and sold on the free market. I argue that 'Israeli-ness' in the form of ISE can be analysed as security capital. By using this concept we can trace how specific abilities and other forms of capital can offer security companies or consultants more standing and legitimacy within the world of security. Using this term can lead to insights into the broader processes of the global security/industrial complex connecting Israel with other places around the world and show how specific experiences and knowledge, but also materials, can be used to gain symbolic capital (Bourdieu 2002).

After discussing the ways in which we can analyse security and security experience as a commodity and brand, I discuss the specific case of Israeli security and explore the security capital as part of the ISE brand these security companies utilise abroad. This article is based on fieldwork in Israel and Kenya on the Israeli security industry and on the analysis of websites of PSCs that are founded by Israelis abroad.

## Security for sale

My approach towards the concept of security is a critical, anthropological one, as proposed by Daniel Goldstein (2010). His approach takes us away from the idea of security as a public good that is (ideally) available for all, towards conceptualising security through the meaning it has for people who supposedly are (in)secure or, as in this case, through the way it is used by sellers of 'security' as a commodity. While the Copenhagen school emphasised security, or rather securitisation, as intersubjective and performative, thus taking us away from looking at security in terms of what is a real threat or not (Buzan et al. 1998), it is still very state-centred (Goldstein 2010). A more anthropological, critical approach to security 'can explore the multiple ways in which security is configured and deployed – not only by states and authorized speakers but by communities, groups, and individuals – in their engagements with other local actors and with arms of the state itself' (Goldstein 2010: 492). I explore this idea in the private, profit-making sector by focusing on security companies and the mobility of their products and ideas.

When looking at the ways the concept of security is used in order to sell a specific good, we need to consider what kind of good it is. Should we conceptualise security as a collective good, ideally available to all, or as a private good,

available to those who pay for it (Krahmann 2008)? A collective or public good is characterised as 'non-excludable and non-rival in consumption' (Krahmann 2008: 383). It seems that in order to understand the growing private security market, security should be seen in the way it is conceptualised within this market, which is clearly as a private good one can buy and sell, even though it is often framed as serving the wider public.

This public increasingly internalises the perception of security as a private good. Ian Loader (1999: 381) reminds us that the 'assessments that individuals make of how "at risk" they are and what levels of protection they "need" are not precise, actuarial calculations ... but social and cognitive constructs assembled from a mix of experience, local rumour and storytelling, and mass-mediated imagery and information'. Part of this mix that provides ideas about risks for the public and about what security measures should be taken are PSCs themselves, who have become 'security experts' who not only provide security tools but also security knowledge (Leander 2005: 612). Thus, as Neocleous (2007) convincingly argues, the need for security does not come from an objective outside force, but is produced by the same security industry that sells it.

While security has often been analysed through the lens of consumerism, or the consumer culture that has been growing globally for decades (Loader 1999; Goold et al. 2010), I focus on the way security is branded by its producers, security 'specialists' and others on the sales side of the market. A product first has to become a commodity that has meaning for persons who are selling and/or buying it. For it to become a commodity, a product needs to go through a 'process of "evaluation," of qualifying and requalifying ... [when] the qualities of a product are stabilized; the product becomes a "good"' (Foster 2007: 713). This involves capital; once a good or idea is associated with specific values that are appreciated in society, the meaning and value they beget grows. These qualities and meanings are then bundled in a brand which has values and has an 'emotional dimension with which people can identify' (Van Ham 2001: 2), preferably by using few words but a strong message. It has been increasingly recognised that branding does not only apply to products, but also to places such as cities or whole countries (e.g., Kavaratzis and Ashworth 2005; Coaffee and Rogers 2008). A brand 'embodies a whole set of physical and socio-psychological attributes and beliefs which are associated with the product ... it is the forging of associations' (Kavaratzis and Ashworth 2005: 508).

Jon Coaffee and Peter van Ham (2008) show how security branding can be part of the way cities, neighbourhoods, or even states are marketed. They show how emphasising security measures in a place can add to the creation of unique selling points that strengthen a (city) brand. They thus view security as something that can strengthen a brand. However, I show that security and especially security experience and knowledge can be analysed as brands themselves,

brands that help to sell specific knowledge and technology and that are strongly connected to a specific place.

Another point that is brought up by these authors is the way that entities such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the European Union (EU) sell their goods by using their names as trustworthy brands. Through selling security goods with a 'made in [country]-label', the national character of security as a brand becomes clear (Coaffee and Van Ham 2008: 194). I use these ideas about branding, while extending them to include activities or experiences related to places; in this case combat and security experience that is intrinsically connected to 'Israeli-ness'. ISE is then labelled as 'made in Israel' (or 'Blue/ White' as is said in Israel, referring to the colours of the national flag), which provides security customers with a sense of buying something good, professional, and of high quality.

Thus it is important to think about the ways in which experience, in addition to security as a concept by itself, can become something that is used to sell or buy products and services on the market. In other words, when does a specific experience of an individual come to be regarded as capital in a Bourdieusian sense and beget value? In this case experience in the military and security industry is meaningful within Israeli society, as I explain shortly, and gives someone status. It is then exported elsewhere where this security experience becomes security capital in a non-Israeli context, and thus is made meaningful.

Joseph Pine and James Gilmore (1998) make a clear distinction between goods, commodities, services, and finally, experience as economic entities. However, from their perspective experience is something that a commercial agent can stage and offer people on the market, while I use experience as capital with which other services, goods, and commodities are sold on that market. Experience, in the way I analyse it, is thus not sold in a literal sense, but rather in the sense of the story, the history, and the unique selling point of a product. It is then important to look at 'the images that ... [PSCs] construct of themselves and the stories they tell about their products' (Joachim and Schneiker 2014: 247). These images and stories, in this case, consist of combat and security experience of security personnel connected to the PSCs. These are the narratives that give experience, products, and agents (security capital) their special value (symbolic capital) and finally their economic capital.

### Israel as a nation of security experts

Israel's state and society are heavily influenced by the military, and it is important to firstly understand this connection to see the way it affects the international security industry of which Israel is part. Gabriel Sheffer and Oren Barak (2013) have drawn a distinction between different 'schools' in the research of socio-military relations and each school has a different approach when it comes

to the militarisation of Israel. The traditionalists called it a 'nation-in-arms', the critics spoke more often of the partnership between the security and civil sectors while the 'new critics' called it a garrison state and emphasised its militaristic spirit. Sheffer and Barak (2013) have taken a new approach, which is to look at Israel's civil-security relationships as an informal network; a security network. For our purposes here, this approach is valuable as it emphasises the degree of the diffusion of former military personnel into the civil sphere, making the idea of different spheres an illusion.

Importantly, then, Israeli society and its state are highly militarised. Soldiers and (former) military commanders are omnipresent and strongly influential in the public sphere in which an idealisation of the fighting soldier is still evident.[3] A military background is crucial to becoming successful in civilian life, while a combat background can grant especially men access to all kinds of work opportunities at home or abroad. Or, as Sara Helman (1997: 306) writes, the 'sustained participation of Israeli-Jewish males in the military rests upon its construction in terms of a community ... belonging to this community of warriors is experienced in terms of embeddedness in society, as a criterion of normalcy and as an entitlement that legitimises participation in the associations of civil society'. Notably, this military presence and subsequent ways of thinking are accepted and naturalised because they are seen as necessary and inevitable in conditions of structural insecurity. These processes of normalisation that entail 'modes of thought and action in which security considerations are pre-eminent' (Lomsky-Feder and Ben-Ari 1999: 6) have been characterised by Baruch Kimmerling (1993) as cognitive militarism.

Security and feelings of insecurity and fear are part of the negotiation of daily life, part of Israeli culture itself (Ochs 2011). When we try to find the reasons behind this entanglement of the prevalence of military and security issues, with feelings of fear and insecurity in Israeli society, we can of course look at the history of Israel and the wars the country has fought over the years. However, we should be careful not to reduce this preoccupation of Israel and its citizens solely to a 'real' and perhaps logical outcome of this history. As already noted, (in)security and feelings related to this concept are social constructs. This is not to say there is no insecurity in Israel and no real fear, but I emphasise here that the production of things or people as a threat is man-made (often by the state or military and/or security agents) and does not follow naturally from actual events. I contend that in the Israeli case the preoccupation with security is mostly a product of state efforts to engage people in the national Zionist quest. From early in life children are made aware of the risks of touching unidentified objects, everywhere in the streets one can spot security personnel and soldiers, and entry into shopping malls and bus and train stations is only possible after opening one's bags for inspection. This reverberates in the ideas of the 'few against many', the need of self-defence against many hostile neighbours, and

in the post-World War II ideas of self-reliance when it comes to defending the nation – ideas the Israeli state has vocalised for decades.

Defending the nation is then foremost the official task of the military forces of Israel that have the meaningful name of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). While its name emphasises its defensive role, the IDF is also known for its aggressive operations against Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Even so, these operations are framed by the Israeli establishment and by the press as defensive operations against the biggest threat of all: Palestinian terror. Israel has occupied the West Bank and Gaza since 1967. Neve Gordon (2008) argues that while Israel's occupation regime was first geared to the principle of colonisation, where land and people were controlled by the occupier, it later shifted to a principle of separation, which means that the occupied population comes under the control of its own people (the Palestinian Authority in this case), while space is still under the control of the occupier. This principle becomes very visible through the security or separation wall, with technological features such as cameras, heat sensors, and different kinds of fences, that Israel has been building since 2006 and the numerous checkpoints manned by Israeli soldiers and increasingly by private security personnel as well (Havkin 2014).

Israeli combat soldiers and commanders, then, have wide experience in the workings of this occupation. They stand at checkpoints and carry out patrols and nightly arrest operations (Grassiani 2013). They learn who should be perceived as the enemy, how the enemy should be 'destroyed' or 'neutralised', about intelligence and cyberattacks, and about how to prevent terrorist attacks. Thus during their service, they gain experience in urban combat, collecting intelligence, security technology, combat techniques, and more. With this background someone could pursue a professional military career, or sometimes a career in the secret services. After an early retirement (often around the age of forty-five), many choose to use their knowledge and skills in the military/security industry in the civil sphere.

The extensive experience from military service, and often a military or security career afterwards, thus becomes an important career asset for many Israeli men.[4] Gordon (2009: 41) describes the way in which this typical Israeli experience plays a part in how the 'military and military industry have helped engender and develop Israel's homeland security sector'. This varies from specific know-how about security subjects, to combat experience in the military, to the right networks and ways of disseminating experience. Gordon (2009: 41–2) shows by outlining its different facets that '[t]he power of Israeli experience derives from its multiple significations, the ability to create an artificial unity among them under the rubric of "Israeli experience", and to deploy them in order to manufacture and sell homeland security products'. Having a military background, the right contacts, and being situated in the right social and national context then becomes capital that can

be marketed in order to sell goods and services. Importantly, the Israeli experience that is used to brand security goods on an international market is only part of the totality of Israel's military and covert activities in the Palestinian Territories. The suffering of the Palestinians under occupation is strategically left out of the picture (Gordon 2009).

The ISE brand is then closely connected to the Israeli state and its national brand; a state with a reputation of 'knowing security', or knowing terror and especially counter-terror. By emphasising this relationship with Israel, private companies can sell their products for a profit on the market. The direct relationship to the national brand of Israel begets them their unique selling point as sellers of high-quality security products.

## Israeli security abroad

The reputation of Israel as a 'specialist' in security and counter-terrorism is ingeniously used by security professionals in order to sell their skills and experiences. Numerous Israelis have settled abroad and have founded security companies. They have thus actively exported their experiences and security knowledge. Some reveal their Israeli roots with pride, others are more cautious. Many Israeli security professionals I interviewed told me that while their Israeli-ness was very valuable from a business perspective, at times they had to downplay it 'because not everyone likes us', thereby pointing at critical positions some countries have towards Israel. In the following examples, I mostly focus on the way 'Israeli-ness' is used, but it is important to keep in mind it is sometimes actively hidden as well.

As mentioned above, the ISE brand blends in with the national brand of Israel. I first describe this brand further. ISE symbolises not only security and safety for its clients, but also specific values as know-how, toughness, morality, and a distinct kind of masculinity, all linked to Israel as the supposed number one in the security industry. Simultaneously, this experience, which is often gained through working as part of a military occupation or the security establishment, is infused with culturally constructed notions of safety and security. While there are numerous non-Israeli security companies using similar messages, I contend that the companies I analyse here use a distinct experience and narrative that relates to Israel as a nation state and to its history. This does not necessarily mean that these companies work in completely different ways from non-Israeli security companies, but they do use ISE to promote themselves as different from and more professional than their competitors.

Nation states increasingly try to brand themselves by identifying with a certain ideology or theme. Israel has a long history of explaining and showing to the world who/what it is. These efforts are called *Hasbara*, literally 'explaining', a means of uncritically rationalising Israel's position to the outside world. These efforts have been spurred by negative attention in the international press often

related to Israel's military activities. But despite these negative reports and sentiments that have become louder in recent years, Israel still has succeeded in branding itself to the outside world as a country that is democratic, strong, a survivor, and superior in many industries, especially the security one.

*Hasbara* can thus be seen as a successful method to transport Israeli security capital across borders and Israeli-owned PSCs working outside Israel gladly use it. They emphasise Israel's elite security industry and its elite military consisting of the best soldiers. They use the combat and security experience and the national background of their founders and personnel as a brand. On one of the websites I analysed, the following quote is found: '[w]e continue to truly and accurately represent the Israeli brand of security and counter-terrorist training'.[5] This makes it crystal clear that these businesses are in no way oblivious to this branding.

The data I collected comes from different sources. I analysed websites of different (mostly US) security companies, owned by Israelis or having some kind of other connection to Israel or ISE. Importantly, these companies use their Israeli connections explicitly when branding themselves. Furthermore, I use public relations material that I collected and received at security exhibitions and conferences in Israel or during interviews with security professionals there. I also use the interviews with security professionals that I conducted, not only in Israel, but also in Nairobi, Kenya.

ISE is central to the way these companies brand themselves. I show below how this brand is largely composed of the following elements: a great amount of know-how through first-hand experience in 'things security' ('being there'), toughness, masculinity, a moral way of working, and a profound knowledge of terrorism. Importantly, Israeli security has to be fitted and adjusted to a different context. This is mostly done by collapsing the terrorist threat with a criminal threat, thus showing how the same security methods can be used for both instances, something which is debatable.

### The brand

As noticed before, for a brand to become a commodity, it needs to go through a process of qualification and requalification (Foster 2007). In the instance of ISE this has already been done, as Israel and its military have established a stable, positive aura around it. It is therefore ready to be branded, and a strong brand starts with a symbol. All companies I analyse here have understood this and the symbols they have chosen for their companies show a combination of (Israeli) national branding based on ISE. One US company's main symbol is an eagle with batwings in front of a triangle. The batwings are very similar to the symbol of the naval commando unit of the IDF, while the eagle is a known symbol for other units, but it is also used as the symbol for the US Navy Seals. The combination of

the two makes it very similar to regular IDF insignia. As the company explains, this eagle with batwings behind it was chosen to symbolise strength, readiness, and superiority.[6] Another US company, which was founded by an American Jew who joined the IDF and served in a special combat unit, portrays a shooter with a handgun, above him a text in Hebrew which says 'Counter Terror School'.[7] Beneath the shooting figure we find the English translation. A third US company also gives away the desire to communicate a strong connection to Israel; within a shield we see the American flag and the statue of Liberty, but on the forefront of these two American symbols we see a sword and an olive branch within the outlines of the Star of David, the symbol of the IDF. And finally, a South African-based company uses the symbol of the Golani brigade, a green tree with a yellow background that is recognisable to most Israelis as symbolising this infantry combat unit, and, most importantly, its name to show its close affiliation with that IDF unit in which the Israeli founder served. Symbols are important when sending a message about a company's goal and worldview and the Israeli connection is often part of it.

If we continue the story of the brand, Israeli know-how seems to be central to it. All companies of Israelis abroad mention the experience of their operatives in the Israeli military and secret services, and the Israeli security professionals I spoke to emphasised time and again how their Israeli (military and security) background was crucial for their business. Israeli military know-how seems to be taken for granted and is not explicitly explained, however. When I asked security professionals what it was that made this experience and background so specific they would not have an answer ready, and would mostly say to me (as a fellow Israeli) 'you know'. The assumption was that only mentioning it was enough. As one Israeli security professional who was based in Los Angeles told me: '[t]he Israeli security concept is the brand ... [W]e have no need for marketing, the results speak for themselves'. Implicitly (and at times explicitly), the link is made with Israel's rich experience of wars and terror and of its highly developed military industry.

In the testimonials of customers of Israeli-manned security companies, this is mentioned several times; a member of a Houston Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team wrote on one website: '[w]hat he [the instructor] brought to us was an expertise that could only be learned by one who has been there'.[8] The first sentence under the heading 'About Us' on the website of another US company reads as follows: '[i]n December 2001, Rami Hahitti, founded Security USA, Inc. a protective services company based on the principles he learned in the Israeli Defence Forces'.[9] Such statements can be found on many companies' websites, emphasising the connection to the Israeli military and the experiences the founders and/or operatives had there. The website of Security USA furthermore states that 'the Israeli security experience proves that when security issues are dealt with as a top priority, damage is greatly mitigated and people

feel less threatened. Reaching this state of readiness requires knowledge, practical training, simulation of unusual situations and mental toughness'.[10] Again, superior security knowledge is directly related to ISE. In explaining 'who they are', one company reveals its Israeli roots, as it claims to merge American and Israeli 'know how' into its services.[11] Another company based in Israel writes in its folder that their 'human factor which is manifested both in our security concepts, plans and also in our consultants and personnel, all former operatives of the Israeli Security Agency, Mossad and Defense forces' is the reason for its success.[12]

One company, IMS, was founded by Aaron Cohen, a Jewish US citizen who served in the IDF. In all interviews and news items in which Cohen or his company are mentioned, his experience as former operative in an Israeli elite combat unit is explicitly stated (when Cohen spoke during an interview with Larry King, his identity was shown on screen as 'former Israeli Special Forces Operative').[13] Thus this explicit connection to Israel and its military and/or security operations serves as a unique selling point for all these security companies. The fact that the operatives of the companies have experienced conflict, danger, and terror themselves as former Israeli combatants is an important part of their security capital, which is converted to symbolic capital on the international security market.

A second facet of the Israeli security brand is the emphasis on Israeli masculinity. Israeli combat soldiers and security professionals are almost solely men. The companies they set up abroad are also often entirely staffed by male operatives. While most PSCs emphasise their masculinity, I want to stress the distinct Israeli characteristics that are used by these PSCs. Israeli masculinity is in many ways closely connected to military experience and thus militarised. Early Zionist framing of the perfect new Israeli citizen or the 'New Jew' depicted him as the opposite of the ghetto Jew, who was seen as weak and even feminine (Wistrich 1995). Theodor Herzl, modern Zionism's founding father, was especially clear on this. His Zionism meant the forging of 'a noble ideal of a new Jew, a man living by the myth of chivalry, who will be the anti-thesis of the old ghetto culture' (Wistrich 1995: 15). The New Jew was a man who was depicted as the ideal soldier, defending his new land. The new generations of children, born in what was to become Israel were named 'Sabras' after the cactus fruit, as they were to be soft and friendly on the inside but tough on the outside (Almog 2000). Emphasis was laid on the fighting spirit of the new ideal Israeli, with clearly militarised masculine characteristics. These characteristics can be traced back to the brand I analyse here.

Cohen's personal story that features prominently on the IMS website fits right in with this concept of masculinity; the story is told of a young American who leaves his comfortable home behind to fight in a secret elite IDF unit, thus becoming the ideal Jewish Israeli man. Another feature of this distinct masculinity is an Israeli 'way of doing things' that was often mentioned to me in interviews.

This efficient, loyal, no-nonsense way of getting a job done is very much connected to the above-mentioned Zionist masculine figure that is a hard worker and loyal to the bone. Israeli soldiers are expected to comply with these codes of masculinity (Ben-Ari 1998). One employee of an Israeli company working in Nairobi told me, for instance, that it was the real caring (*ekhpatiut*) by the company for its customers and the company's efficiency that made the way in which he and his (male-only) team worked typically Israeli.

This way of working also features as part of the third element i discuss here; the companies' morality that is emphasised as part of the ISE brand. One company stresses its own code of ethics, which is almost literally copied from the official IDF code, albeit altered to be used in the public sphere and outside Israel. It even calls its code the 'Spirit of ISI' (ISI being the name of the company); the code of ethics of the IDF is called the 'Spirit of the IDF'. This latter code requires Israeli soldiers to uphold a high moral standard. Values mentioned in this code are, for example, comradeship, purity of arms (which means one can only use a weapon in defensive action), and discipline. Many of my informants also mentioned the work ethic as something specific to the 'Israeli-ness' of their companies. One informant told me how he and his colleagues when working in Gabon were able to complete their work within three months as they were very disciplined (*dvikut bamesima*), a Hebrew concept coming directly from the IDF code of ethics.

A fourth and final element of the ISE brand is knowledge of terrorism and terrorists. Most security professionals I spoke to and the companies I studied boast a deep knowledge of what terror is and most of all what the best ways are to combat it. These skills are taught to other (foreign) parties, such as SWAT teams or military units, during counter-terror trainings. Security professionals seem to take the relationship between being a former Israeli combatant or member of the Israeli Security Agency (ISA) and knowing more than average about Islam and terrorism as completely natural. The knowledge about terror and most of all the definition of what terrorism entails is presumed because of the experience of Israelis in a conflict involving Muslims (the Palestinians in this case) and terror attacks. It is thus seen as a given that their extensive experience with terror makes them experts, as can be read on one website: '[terrorism] seminars are taught by Israeli anti-terrorist professionals with extensive knowledge and years of hands-on field experience dealing with terrorism'.[14] Another company boasts that '[o]ur Israeli-trained security team can provide a proper on-site vulnerability assessment with expertise in specifically dealing with post 9/11 style terrorism attacks involving the use of explosives as well as active shooter type incidences that are focused at targeting mass crowds'.[15] During a security seminar I joined in Israel that was directed at different kinds of customers from all over the world, one afternoon was dedicated to a lecture on 'international and national terror threats', with a focus on the threat of Islam and Islamic terror. It is thus assumed that ISE also consists of correct or even objective knowledge

about Islam and the assumed threats it poses. However, the knowledge that is provided is very one-sided, if not to say racist and generalising.

### Notions of security and terrorism: adapting to foreign clients' needs

In the exploration of the ISE brand above, I emphasised the central elements of this brand that connected it to Israel as a state with a profound security background. However, it is important to acknowledge that these companies not only export and use the reputation of Israeli combatants and other security specialists, they also utilise culturally constructed notions of what security and terrorism is. Coming from a highly militarised society and having experienced and participated in a military occupation, the operatives of these companies are overly familiar with security concepts and their meanings are natural to them. Such notions are constructs, they are products of a specific socialisation within which security issues are perceived to be central to society's very being. When Israeli security agents go to work abroad, they not only export technologies and materials, they most of all bring with them specific ideas about what security and hostility mean, who should be perceived as the enemy, and what the best ways are to combat this hostile 'other'. However, in order for this mobility to be successful, the ISE brand must be tuned to the new context. I show below how this is done by categorising threats and spaces in such a way that military and anti-terror techniques from the military occupation of the Palestinian Territories can be used in the streets of New York or Los Angeles.

In the case of IMS, counter-terror and operations against stalkers of celebrities in Hollywood are put on the same page. While most people know IMS founder Cohen for his work with celebrities, the company website also emphasises counter-terror training and techniques. A direct connection is made between the protection of celebrities and the fight against terror, in which Israeli ex-soldiers are expected to specialise. Cohen was quoted as saying that giving Britney Spears subpoenas was 'pure counter-terrorism' (Spence 2007: n.p.). He added that tracking down Spears 'required the same tactics as tracking a terrorist' (Spence 2007: n.p.).

ISI boasts on its website about the operation mentioned in the introduction of this chapter by stating that

> [i]n the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, ISI was called upon to protect private assets. Within 24 hours, an ISI team was assembled and dropped by helicopter into the disaster zone and operated in the hostile environment for 60 days with no incidents or incursions.[16]

ISI's choice of words is interesting; while it was true there had been looting and a sphere of insecurity in New Orleans straight after the hurricane, to call the specific surroundings of Audubon Place a hostile environment is something

else. It is an effort to collapse images of war and conflict and those of criminality in a civilian, urban context into each other. And once a situation is identified as hostile and dangerous, it is not surprising to find military means being used to protect citizens. This militarisation of urban space can increasingly be seen in the US, but also in Europe. Stephen Graham (2011: xiv) calls this a 'new military urbanism', including 'militarized techniques of tracking and targeting' people within the city. Furthermore, it entails that the civilian population regards this militarisation as natural.

Besides blurring the lines between terror, war, and criminality, the 'enemy' also becomes a generic figure. When speaking about terror and while clearly connecting oneself to Israel and the Israeli military as Cohen does, the 'other' easily becomes associated with the Palestinian or the Muslim in general. This can be seen in a promotional film for IMS, in which Cohen performs a mock training exercise. He dresses up as 'the enemy' in order to surprise his trainees and see if they know how to react. He dresses himself as an Arab, wearing a *kafiya* scarf (a traditional Arab headdress, mostly worn by men and increasingly seen as a symbol of the Palestinian struggle for independence) and a beard. The 'other' in this case is clearly the Muslim 'other', a terrorist. As such the idea of who is the enemy is directly imported from the occupied Palestinian Territories into the Hollywood Hills.

As mentioned before, terrorism seminars given by Israeli security professionals are often exclusively about Islamic terror, or in the words of one company 'global Jihad radical Islamic Terrorism'.[17] Not only is the history of terror groups assumed to be taught, but solutions are also offered on the foreign market, thus emphasising that Israelis know very well how to deal with this common enemy. By collapsing different categories of threat (terrorism and criminality), as well as turning civilian spaces into hostile (war) zones, security companies using the ISE brand fine-tune their methods and ideologies to use them within different contexts.

## Conclusion

This chapter has shown the ways in which Israeli security and military experience has become security capital and subsequently a brand that is used to sell security products and ideas on an international market. Israeli security personnel, security knowledge, and technologies are very popular in times where everyone seems to believe we are under constant threat. Ideas about (in)security and risk are not only used by PSCs to sell their goods, but they are also created by these companies who portray themselves as security specialists, able to advise on risks.

By analysing companies that each in its own way identifies heavily with Israeli security and military experience, I defined a more general ISE brand. This

brand first of all consists of symbols related to Israel and the IDF. Furthermore, it contains the value of 'Israeli know-how' and a Zionist masculinity. Moreover, a specific kind of morality and work ethic is propagated by the brand, and finally the naturalisation between a background as an Israeli combatant and extensive knowledge of terrorism was identified. Importantly, I also showed how these companies try to fit this brand neatly into different contexts. By using categories of war and conflict within urban areas, and collapsing terror with criminality, military methods and technologies can be uncritically used within a civilian sphere.

I have looked at the larger military/security industrial complex through which Israel connects to the world beyond its borders by examining this connection on a small scale. By expanding the concept of branding from products and places to experiences and security experiences in particular, we can explore such efforts and understand more closely how culturally constructed concepts, technologies, and ideologies migrate from place to place within the larger context of military/security networks.

Notes

1  Presentation at the American Anthropological Association in New Orleans in 2010.
2  The PCSs are mostly not Israeli as such, because they are not registered in Israel, but they all have a distinct Israeli connection, often through the founders who are almost exclusively Israeli. PSCs are not new to our times and have existed in their current, business-like form since the end of the Cold War (Singer 2011). They can be seen as part of the growing privatisation of state tasks and responsibilities to the private public and private companies.
3  Israel has compulsory conscription; men are called up for three years, women for twenty-four months. All Palestinians living within Israel except for the Druze community are exempted from this conscription. Jewish Orthodox men and women usually do not serve, even though an elaborate debate on the subject takes place in Israel and efforts have been made to draft new laws on the subject.
4  While there are increasing numbers of women joining the ranks of combat soldiers, the great majority are still men. Also the (symbolic) rewards of this service are reserved for men only.
5  http://web.archive.org/web/20160303195509/http://www.ims-security.com/ (accessed 15 July 2016).
6  http://isitrainingcenter.com (accessed September 2014).
7  http://web.archive.org/web/20160120194836/http://ims-security.com/airport_security.htm (accessed 15 July 2016).
8  http://web.archive.org/web/20160310013452/http://www.ims-security.com/testimonials.htm (accessed 15 July 2016).
9  www.securityusa.info/Company/CompanyProfile (accessed November 2014).
10 www.securityusa.info/Company/CompanyProfile (accessed November 2014). The use of the concept of ISE by the company is a 'fruitful' coincidence. My terminology does not stem from it, but it is telling that a security company mentions it so explicitly.
11 www.isitrainingcenter.com (accessed September 2014).

12  ISDS folder.
13  www.youtube.com/watch?v=cysjcS-e1N4 (accessed October 2015).
14  http://web.archive.org/web/20141003232640/http://www.isitrainingcenter.com/
    terrorism-seminars.html (accessed 15 July 2016).
15  http://web.archive.org/web/20160106200028/http://www.ims-security.com/coun-
    ter%20terrorist%20security%20large%20events.htm (accessed 15 July 2016).
16  http://web.archive.org/web/20150213092805/http://www.isitrainingcenter.com/
    global-services.html (accessed 15 July 2016).
17  www.isitrainingcenter.com (accessed September 2014).

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# Mobility, circulation, and homeomorphism: data becoming risk information

## Nathaniel O'Grady

WALKING THROUGH THE corridors of a Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) headquarters in the north-east of England, you encounter an array of posters showing charts, graphs, and tables containing a variety of different information pertaining to fire emergencies. Affixed to walls, multi-coloured scattergraphs indicate the age of those most vulnerable to fire. Adjacent, a bar chart shows which fire stations have attended the most fire incidents on a month-by-month basis. A few further steps along, a map purports to show the distribution of fire incidents year on year. These posters boldly sit on the walls of the FRS headquarters as signs of how the dangerous but quotidian event of fire is captured, known, and articulated through analytics and the information it generates.

Although constructed through data on past events, the posters are attempts also to make sense of fire as a potential event, as a risk. The posters represent a specific logic to interpreting emergencies, one that underpins the enactment of what Stephen Collier and Andrew Lakoff (2015: 22), commenting on Michel Foucault's lectures on security (2007), refer to as 'population security'; in which past events accrue under the analytical gaze of those that govern them, and data sourced from these events are deployed to make projections concerning their probable and possible recurrence in the future. The posters in turn represent information which becomes actionable in its ability to shape, to mould, and to justify interventions in the present, but which are designed to attend to emergencies which will take place in the future. This emphasis on the ability to know, and to intervene upon, fire in anticipation of its occurrence represents a substantial shift in the wider operational and organisational priorities of the FRS, one which has been witnessed since the start of the twenty-first century (Department of Communities and Local Government 2012). Since the Fire and Rescue Services Act of 2004, the FRS strategic approach to governing fire has been one that has of course retained the importance of response to fires as and when they occur. But equal significance has been laid on building capabilities to prepare for, to prevent, and to protect from fire risks of the future.

The posters embody the importance of risk information to the FRS whilst also implying the centrality of anticipatory modes of governing to these authorities. Ultimately, however, they are but surface products that emanate from a multitude of institutionally situated, day-by-day, organisational processes constantly taking place in the FRS that engage data and digital technologies in different ways. In recent times, much work within critical security studies and within social science goes under the veneer of the information found in graphs and the like to inquire into how operable security information is generated from organisational processes. Laurent Bonelli and Francesco Ragazzi (2014), for instance, show the ongoing importance of paper-based memos to the functioning of French domestic intelligence services. Louise Amoore (2013; 2014) explains the ways in which information about the world is spun out by continual and emergent negotiations between human bodies, sense, cognition, and data. Martin Dodge and Rob Kitchin (Dodge and Kitchin 2005; Kitchin and Dodge 2011), alternately, trace the ways in which digital codes instantiate themselves ubiquitously across the everyday life of organisations and, indeed, whole cities. These data-based processes, as Daniel Neyland (2015) argues, speak of a broader trend by which technologies based on algorithmic rules, and algorithmic thought in general, come to structure organisational life at the same time as being deployed in these organisations.

It is no surprise that this literature has developed simultaneously with the risk ever-deepening embeddedness of digital technologies and data-based processes within security organisations. Software and data are now integral to the deployment of all aspects of a broad security apparatus that includes intelligence agencies, emergency responders, border security, and a host of other authorities (Amoore 2009; Bigo 2014; Chamayou 2013; O'Grady 2014). The everyday life of the FRS in no way escapes this fact. A whole digital infrastructure composed of software, hardware, code, human operators, and the processes that develop around these now underpin the governance of fire. For the purposes of this chapter, this infrastructure works to generate information on fire risk. It does so through transforming data into information that facilitates strategic decision-making on how potential fire emergencies can be prevented.

This chapter contributes to the literature cited above by taking a closer look at the risk information generated for the purposes of facilitating the enactment of anticipatory governing measures on fire emergencies. Drawing on ethnographic observation of a Fire and Rescue Service and its digital infrastructure, the chapter looks at how information is generated through, or rather out of, data gathered on fire. I focus on two crucial processes taking place in the FRS digital infrastructure here. Concentrating on the role of Quality Assurance Officers who verify the data that the FRS source from fire incidents, I offer an account firstly of how data moves through the FRS. Present at the scene of fires, the Incident Recording System (IRS) extracts data as fire incidents unfold in real time. This

data are then circulated to the Quality Assurance Officer to verify. Upon verification, data are mobilised to different analysis software across the FRS. The capacity of data to transform into information relies, I argue, on its capacity to move and how this movement is conditioned within the broader digital infrastructure in which it moves.

To appropriately conceptualise the movement of data, however, a more nuanced and distinct definition of what movement is needs to be outlined. Thus, I outline three forms of movement which bring data to life and purpose in the FRS. Firstly, I discuss data as an entity which can be described by its circulation. Circulation allows us to conceptualise the broad systems of flow that characterise the life of data in the FRS. The movement of data, secondly, is cast as one that is mobilised. Mobility brings into play how the flow of data is structured according to different interventions made, for instance, by data export functions or human operators. The capacity of data to become mobile and to circulate is not just a matter of anthropological and technological conditioning, however. Rather it is entangled in what, as a third category of movement, I call the transmission of data. Transmission describes how data are processed from one site to the next in becoming information. I argue that transmission is always accompanied by, and inseparable from, the homeomorphism of data. Homeomorphism refers to how data changes form as it moves across space or as it is transmitted. Transmission and homeomorphism refer overall then to how data accounts for a set of material entities whose form changes as it is processed through different organisational stages on its trajectory towards becoming information that can lead to the instantiation of anticipatory governance.

The transmission and homeomorphism of data capture is part of, and embedded in, the second organisational process the chapter focuses on. Here, I look at how mobilised data are analysed through software called Active. A risk-mapping software, Active receives data from IRS and analyses it to calculate the spatial distribution of future fire risk. In turn, Active facilitates what is called resourcing to risk; wherein the resources at the FRS's disposal are deployed according to the future possibility of fire. It is in this process of analysis that mobilised data transforms into actionable risk information. Drawing on empirical material on the generation of risk information through Active software, I argue that the process of transmission and homeomorphism are important to consider for two reasons. Firstly, it furthers our understanding of the mobilisation of data because it informs us as to who and what intervenes to make data move and become operable in the FRS. And secondly, I show how decisions around what data is mobilised actually affects how risk appears. The politics of transmission, mobility, and circulation, in other words, affects what will come to appear as fire risk on those posters affixed to walls in FRS headquarters across Britain and, ultimately, how fire emergencies are governed before their occurrence.

## Movement, mobility, and circulation

Understanding digital entities by their capacity to move has for some time been a matter of crucial significance in work across the social sciences. According to Scott Lash (2006: 323), 'the global information order', within which the security apparatus undoubtedly operates, 'seems to be characterised by flow'. It is through movement and flow that the technologies to which security agencies are now so indebted are brought to life (Simon and de Goede 2015; Lash 2006). Through studying its liveliness, we can grasp how, to where and with what licence data moves across the global security apparatus. Even the manifestation of data as material (Hayles 2005; Parisi 2013) in some way is underpinned and actualised through movement. Following Manuel Castells (2001), furthermore, Adrian Mackenzie (2011) suggests that even the supposedly static elements of a digital network are actually always enfolded in systems of movement, forming nodes and connection points to facilitate movement.

But the generic signifier 'movement' is far from sufficient for explaining the deployment of data and, later still down the line, how this data becomes actionable information that opens up future emergencies to governance in the here and now. As recent literature in geography (Adey 2006; O'Grady 2014), sociology (Urry 2007) and critical approaches to security (Salter 2013) shows, movement needs to be treated in more refined, nuanced, and distinct ways if we are to properly appreciate its importance to wider practices of governance in a world of informational ordering. Movement can, for instance, be split between mobility and circulation (Adey 2006; Salter 2013). On the one hand, circulation captures the broad systems of flow that consolidate as normal over time. One might think here, for instance, of the processes of normalisation that Foucault (2007) claims orients interventions made under modalities of power he calls security. Rather than being posited and prescribed as in disciplinary modes of governance, norms under the security apparatus emanate from within the population governed. A primary force of articulation of normalisation in populations is the serialised circulation of things, people, diseases, and other events over time.

Mobility, on the other hand, provides conceptual and critical purchase from which to name the conditions of possibility enabling, regulating, and making things move in specific ways. In recent literature, the role of 'the mobiliser' has been attributed to the border agent and their material devices (Amoore 2009; Salter 2013), or the layout of the airport (Adey 2009) itself. Although distinct on the spectrum of movement, mobility and circulation are reciprocally bound to one another. Circulatory flows are characterised by the conditions by which things get mobilised. What gets mobilised, in turn, organises broader systems of circulation. This might mean, to return to Foucault (2007) and his example, how miasma are mobilised according to the roads and walkways embedded in town plans. Conversely, that which gets mobilised affects broader systems of

circulation. According to Foucault and his example of diseases, broader systems of circulation will be disrupted if diseases become mobile.

I want to apply this nuanced distinction between mobility and circulation to data. For me understanding the movement of data as split between circulation and mobility is crucial. Circulation can capture the wider technological 'fixities' (Urry 2003: 138) that act as conduits for the massive flows of data across and indeed beyond an organisation like the FRS. In a way equally important, mobility allows us to highlight the different conditions and interventions that act as traffic lights for data; letting data move, making data stop. This dichotomy between circulation and mobility allows us thus to highlight two things. Firstly, with circulation, we can speak of broad normative routines that underpin the movement of data. That is, we can conceptualise the set of repeated daily activities that mould and are manifest in the movement of data in its day-to-day existence. As a brief example, at every fire incident the FRS attends, data is captured in real time and will enter into the wider normative routines of data circulation found in the FRS. To come to the second point: for these normative circulatory curves to exist, however, conditions are put in place to regulate how data is mobilised. Data captured from incidents moves through import and export functions that connect software at the scene of the emergency to software in the FRS headquarters. The distinction between circulation and mobility, rather than simply allowing us to account for the broad systems of flow that characterise the life of data, points to the array of agents that condition this flow.

We might inquire beyond export and import functions to understand what supports the mobilisation of data and how this mobilisation is conditioned. The codification of data might be thought of as technological support for the mobilisation of data. Codification refers to the process by which data on a specific event is articulated in a language legible to the software in which they are integrated. In being codified, data becomes amenable to the operations of the wider digital technologies in which they exist. It is through codification, as Katherine Hayles (2005) reminds us, that data takes on material form. Through codification, data appears, for example, as geographical coordinates, temporal units, or equipment identifiers. Gaining the material status it acquires through codification, data are simultaneously granted the capacity to become mobile. It is through codification that data can be made to move to different software. Geographical coordinates, once codified as such, will be able to travel to risk-mapping software, for example.

But in its facilitating and conditioning of movement, codification furthermore can hint at the different agential forces complicit in the mobilisation of data within wider circulatory flows. These agencies are not necessarily confined to inorganic technological components like the import and export functions already described. To return to Hayles (2005: 59): 'code implies a relationship between human and intelligent machines in which the linguistic practices of each influence and interpenetrate the other'. As a process that supports the

mobilisation of data, codification does not only reinforce the fact that the mobility of data is moulded through technological interventions but suggests that the mobilisation of data is in part organised through human interventions. In relation to codification, this might mean how human beings write algorithms upon which software is based, perhaps what data are sorted into what category within software once sourced, even perhaps which data are accepted in analysis and which are not.

Both mobilisation and circulation work together to co-produce actionable security information from data. This is apparent in how data enters wider data circulation conduits in the FRS. What codification suggests additionally is that this movement is underpinned by data taking shape and materialising. Movement of data is thus inseparable from the formation and transformation of data. In the next section, I probe this relationship between movement and transformation more deeply through the concepts of transmission and homeomorphism.

## The transmission and homeomorphism of data

Circulation and mobility present nuanced and distinct modes of movement by which data travel on their path towards becoming actionable information that shapes and legitimates the actions of security agents. Circulation reflects and effects a normal system of data movement whereas mobility enables and regulates the movement of data within this wider system. Interventions take place to mobilise data. These interventions might be bound exclusively to the realm of the inorganic as is the case with the briefly mentioned import and export functions. Codification, on the other hand, is a process emblematic of the interventions that human operators make in the mobilisation of data. But codification not only exemplifies a process by which data becomes mobile. Implicit rather within codification are issues surrounding the form that data takes, its material manifestations and the entangling of this matter of form with movement. In this section, I suggest that the dynamic movement of data and the emanation of information from this movement is intimately interwoven with how data changes form in generating information.

Tiziana Terranova, in her book *Network Culture* (2004), encapsulates in some ways the reciprocity between movement and the changing form of digital entities such as data and information in describing the process of transmission. Transmission for Terranova is the process by which information is communicated within and across a network of digital technologies. This process of transmission is characterised by entropy. Entropy, initially, serves to indicate the finite set of connections through which information might be communicated from one place to another. The mobilisation of information for Terranova, just as is the case with data, is always undertaken within specific conditions, whether this conditioning is anthropocentric, technocentric or most likely a mixture of both. But entropy here suggests

that with the conditioning of movement comes the reduction of possibilities of what information can actually mean. Terranova (2004: 20) claims, then, that 'the transmission of information implies the communication and exclusion of probable alternatives'. In the act of transmission, in the act of moving information from one place to another, the significance and meaning to which information might be attributed is reduced. Transmission is thus organised by entropy; the refinement and reduction in the possibilities of what data might mean.

Taking the work of Dodge and Kitchin (2005) as an example, transmission and entropy can be spread amongst the different digital entities seen to move through coded spaces and that feature in organisational processes. For instance, the authors map out a spectrum of forms that feature in the processing of barcodes. Barcodes are affixed to different objects. These barcodes allow the identification of one object from another but also enable the generation of swathes of data on these objects. By the instantiation of data generated from barcodes in local organisational contexts, these data elements become what are known as capta. Capta are the end results once data has been sifted and selected according to its relevance for a specific task. These capta become information after they have been subjected to different forms of calculative processing. With every stage in this process, entropy becomes more prominent because the stuff moving continually decreases in volume and the possible meaning and significance of that which is produced declines.

The spectrum of transmission presented here suggests that alongside the process of entropy through which refined information arises from data are processes by which data changes its form. Data becomes capta which in turn becomes information. As data move across space its form changes towards information. Calling forth the twentieth century's conceptualisation of information as the thing which mediates between 'living organisms and physical systems', Terranova (2006: 286) claims that information needs to be understood primarily as that which gives shape and form to matter. Reiterating this point, Alexander Galloway (2012) describes information as a point of coherence and beauty amidst the chaotic, self-fulfilling operations of the digital world. If we were to apply this to the spectrum Dodge and Kitchin have developed, information combines scattered data to create meaning. As John Law (2002) and James Ash (2014) have noted, data are characterised by homeomorphism wherein they change form and meaning as they are processed.

Transmission thus describes the movement of data from one place to the next. In transmission, as with codification, it is evident that data bears upon it both the human and technological hands that condition its movement and a homeomorphism where data changes shape and form on the road to becoming information. With transmission too, however, the conditioned movement and homeomorphism is inflected by a process of entropy, whereby the quantity of

data reduces as at becomes information. A homeomorphic attribute of data in its mobilisation and its becoming information is thus that it reduces in quantity as its meaning changes. In the next section, I show how data becomes actionable information in the FRS in a way characterised by conditioned mobility, transmission, and homeomorphism. I argue that it is through conditioned mobility and transmission that data from previous fires can morph into fire risk information. However, these processes that enable the generation of information are shaped by a number of interventions which, in conditioning the movement of data, also affect how fire becomes understood as a risk. The risk information generated, for all its coherence and beauty that Galloway and Terranova lavish it, only affords a skewed and partial perspective on the future reality it purports to represent.

## IRS and the selection of data

Since its introduction in 2009, the Incident Recording System (IRS henceforth) has been the seminal data repository for the FRS in Britain. The IRS stores data on all incidents attended by the FRS. From its mainframe in regional FRS headquarters throughout Britain, the IRS includes data import and export functions to two key sites of fire governance that submit data as fire incidents unfold. The IRS is connected, firstly, to local FRS control rooms, which oversee and coordinate response by communicating with the public and operative FRS response personnel. Control rooms generate for the IRS what are called narrative logs; a recording of all data communicated to the control room as an emergency unfolds. By recording the time of public 999 calls, data includes the time at which the FRS was alerted to fires. Tracking the time fire engines were mobilised and their arrival at the scene of the incident, the response time of the FRS is recorded. Any resources requested by the FRS as they respond to fires, such as the need for the police, or ambulances for injured people, are also captured. Secondly, the IRS collects data from operative staff responding at the scene of the incident. This data comes in the form of pro forma reports that offer a retrospective account of the incident attended. These reports include data, for instance, on the damage caused by a fire and what resources and personnel were used at the scene of the incident. These forms also include data recorded through narrative logs, such as that relating to injuries caused by the incident.

Both the narrative log and pro forma report are transmitted via export and import functions to the mainframe of the IRS in the FRS headquarters. Collated together, the data relates to 197 different variables concerning fire incidents. Along with those mentioned above, these variables might include whether the incident was considered accidental or motivated by malicious intent, whether the fire took place in a building or outside or, for example, if anything formed an obstacle to the FRS response. Appearing at the moment of interface with the IRS as different categories, these variables serve to classify and order the data

accrued from an incident. In this moment, data are sifted and moved into its relevant category depending on what variable it can be said to represent. Through sourcing, transmission, and ordering, data are mobilised in a way co-produced between human operators and automatic export and import functions. In responding to the incident, FRS staff at the scene or in the control room choose what data represents in relation to the incident and where and how it should be categorised. In turn, export functions transmit the data to the IRS mainframe and to the category chosen.

On first encounter, the incorporation of both pro forma reports and narrative logs would appear to offer the most comprehensive, thorough, and efficient form of data collection at the FRS's disposal. Rather than one data sourcing technology, the FRS doubles its data collection capabilities by having two accounts of the same fire. In reality, this double-handed process of data sourcing is potentially problematic. Along with accruing large volumes of data, the pro forma reports and the narrative logs can offer two different renditions of the single incident attended by the FRS. Collated together, as I show, the two reports are rife with contradictions where they overlap and report on the same variable concerning the fire. They offer a rendition of a single fire but from completely different spatial perspectives and temporal positions. Whereas the pro forma report gives a retrospective account of a fire from the scene, the narrative log records data as the fire incident unfolds in real time, but from the detached position of a control room.

Accommodating for contradictions in the different data-based renditions of the same incident, the data mobilised are subject to quality assurance once it arrives at the IRS mainframe within the FRS headquarters. This assurance role, played by a human operator, serves two key roles according to its protagonist. Firstly, the role identifies and eliminates discrepancies between the two different sites of data collection, making sure the right data appears in the right categories. It was stated by the Quality Assurance Officer that, for instance, the narrative log generated from the control room perspective regularly overstated the number of injuries. In contrast, the pro forma produced retrospectively at the scene of the incident would be correct in accounting for injuries. Data from the pro forma report would be incorporated into the IRS rather than data from the narrative log. This judgement on behalf of the Quality Assurance Officer was underpinned by a normative claim deriving from experience of both monitoring the IRS and previously fighting fires. Taking precautions deemed necessary, this contradiction in data will have been generated when operative staff responding to a fire have called for resources for dealing with casualties but have not used them once it is confirmed that the fire has not caused any casualties. The call for resources, however, would appear on the control room narrative log. The pro forma, being produced after the incident, would show that no injuries were accrued in the incident. By choosing data from the pro forma report over the narrative log, to

return to Terranova, the Quality Assurance Officer enacts an entropic process by which large volumes of data are reduced and refined.

But the Quality Assurance Officer is not only a role confined to that of adjudicator. Instead, the Quality Assurance Officer supplements the IRS with additional data that could not be acquired during or in the immediate aftermath of the incident. The Quality Assurance Officer defined his role here as 'filling in the gaps' left by attempting to record data in real time. Possessing very high stakes which could lead to criminal prosecutions, the cause of fire, for instance, is frequently omitted from both pro formas and narrative logs. In such cases, the Quality Assurance Officer will consult the Fire Investigators who examine the wreckage a fire has inflicted to determine the cause of the fire. Alternately, the Quality Assurance Officer described a situation in which the name of someone killed by a fire was omitted from the IRS database. The victim was identified not through queries in the FRS digital infrastructure but by a local newspaper article.

Conceptually speaking, the processes of data mobilisation, transmission, and homeomorphism are all components that in the case of the IRS are inseparable and rolled into one another. Along with being a data storage and sourcing device, one of the IRS's key functions for the FRS is its ability to mobilise and transmit data. The IRS itself is a technology that is scattered, appearing simultaneously in control rooms, on the frontline at the scene of the incident, and in the FRS headquarters. It is only through this disparate configuration that IRS can source data from two crucial sites of fire governance and export data back to the FRS headquarters. The mobilisation and transmission of data are conditioned by software in the form of export functions, and also by human operators. As I have suggested, this can be seen through decision-making processes about what data properly reflects the incident and what data does not. These processes themselves are the subject of reappraisal when data are subject to quality assurance. But in the mobilisation of data and its transmission from the site of response to the FRS headquarters, homeomorphism on the register of the continuum outlined earlier by Dodge and Kitchin is also evident. As data are categorised it is simultaneously reduced and selected for specific variables, variables that, as we shall see, are considered pertinent for particular kinds of analysis. In this process, data are selected for specific purposes and, as such, transform into capta. How data, in the form of selected capta, are analysed, thus extending processes of homeomorphism up until the point where risk information is produced, is a matter I turn to in the next section.

## Turning data into information

The IRS does not only function to mobilise data it has acquired from the scene of an incident and to transmit data to the FRS headquarters. To reiterate, it is instead a key repository for all data used by the FRS. Once data are sourced, transmitted, and ordered, the IRS serves to mobilise data to different analytic

software that plays a part in generating the risk projections through which the FRS enacts anticipatory modes of governance on fire risk. As data advance into the capillaries of the digital infrastructure of the FRS, it is further conditioned by those export and import functions mentioned above. The IRS can be imagined as a hub emanating from which are multiple conduits to different software. The IRS transmits data to this software automatically, with no more than a simple request for human sanctioning.

Active software is one site to which data from the IRS are transmitted. Active is supplied to the FRS by Total Software Solutions Ltd (TSS). A software developer based in the United States, TSS sells programmes to organisations across the world. According to promotional literature, their 'products and services are proven in the market to enable operators [to] increase revenues, reduce costs and increase operational efficiencies'.[1] Once acquired, tailored, and customised for the purposes of the FRS, Active is deployed with the hope of both bringing down costs and making operations more efficient. Active makes risk projections on the type and frequency of fires at different places within regions of Britain. By doing so, Active, as noted in the Chief Fire Officer Association's (CFOA) *Comprehensive Spending Review* (2010), aids the FRS in resourcing to risk, wherein decisions on resource allocation are made according to what can be calculated concerning the future occurrence of fire emergencies. Active contributes to a crucially importance process wherein budgets for different elements of emergency response are decided upon.

Active makes its risk projections spatially through mapping analysis. On first opening the Active programme on a computer desktop, a map of the region in which the FRS operates appears. Drawing on data sourced from the Ordinance Survey, visualised on the map are the circuits of transport running through the region, and clusters representing areas of dense human population are rendered, within which buildings of significance such as hospitals, schools, and major industrial sites rise forth. The towns and cities fade into brownfield sites, gradually turning into green rural areas. The natural topography and terrain of the region underpins this data, indicating areas such as valleys and hills, which, in the case of the region studied, lead out to the north-east English coastline.

Up to this point the map described has no special distinguishing features that would suggest a map used by the FRS. What appears on the computer screen, in other words, is a generic map of the region holding no special significance to fire risk. The map is customised for the specific purposes of the FRS when Ordinance Survey data are integrated with data from the IRS. Export functions from IRS automatically transmit data on all fire incidents that have unfolded in the region over the last three years. This data is uploaded by geographical distribution and superimposed onto the map. Past incidents of fire appear as flame symbols across the space governed. The data uploaded does not just show the location of fire incidents, however. Within the flame symbols across the map, rather, is a plethora of data on each fire. Selecting an individual fire symbol would reveal,

for instance, data on whether the fire occurred within or outside a building, what resources were used to respond to the fire, if any casualties were caused by the fire, or the damage the fire caused to the wider environment. Relating back to the previous section, in other words, flame symbols include all data checked, verified, and indeed modified by the Quality Assurance Officer. The hand of the Quality Assurance Officer in deciding both what data to mobilise and what data should become capta for the purposes of analysis thus affects what appears on the map and what does not.

A number of different geographical boundaries are also imposed on the map. Visualised as red lines, boundaries are shown indicating the different areas of responsibility for FRS stations. Further boundaries cut across these boundaries. These additional lines indicate the areas of responsibility for other emergency responders. Regularly incorporated into Active risk maps used by the FRS, for instance, are 'police beats', which delineate the specific areas in the region patrolled by local police stations. The mapping of a distributed security apparatus through the spatial boundaries Active visualises is of interest in itself. But what is of primary importance in this chapter is how Active is used by the FRS to tailor the resources at their disposal to particular types of fire risk prevalent in specific areas of responsibility for different fire stations. The first step involves identifying where fires happen most frequently. By the initial integration of fire location data onto the map, areas of high fire frequency are apparent. However, a further level of granularity can be realised by zooming in on any area. Upon zooming in, the flame symbols grow larger. As the process of zooming is repeated, the symbols blur into each other until they collectively form one large, multi-coloured symbol. The symbol overall remains red in colour but different gradations of red appear within it. The centre of the symbol is dark red and the strength of the colour fades as moves away from the centre are made. What these grades of red indicate are the areas of highest fire frequency in the centre and the decline in fire frequency over space.

It is not only the number of fires which occur in each area that the FRS wants to access through Active. Rather the FRS wishes to use Active to tailor resources present in individual fire stations to the particular types of fire incidents prevalent in different areas. To do so, analysts in the FRS must collate together different variables found in fire incidents. A lasso function inbuilt in Active is used to draw circles around all fires occurring within a specific area. All incidents captured within the lasso tool's span are then transmitted onto an Excel spreadsheet. Once transmitted, what is called a V-lookup function in Excel is deployed. This function allows analysts to group together the same variables present across fire incidents. Across the span of different fires, what now appears together are variables such as what casualties were caused by the fire and how long the service took to arrive at the scene of the incident.

Data on the same variable has been selected and integrated. Ultimately what is accessed by analysts is information regarding what kinds of variable are most prevalent at fires occurring in a specific fire station's area of responsibility. The same graphs and charts found affixed to walls in the FRS headquarters are generated through the Excel spreadsheet to show, for instance, how many casualties result from fires in specific areas, what resources have been heavily used in response to fires or if fires happen more frequently inside or outside buildings. In regard to the function of Active risk mapping, the information found here becomes actionable information when it shapes, facilitates, and conditions decision-making on what resources are needed to anticipate and mitigate fire risk in specific areas. From the analysis it performs, Active might influence the types of equipment invested in for specific fire stations. Alternatively, it might lead to an escalation in preventative home fire safety checks wherein firefighters work with residents in an area to plan evacuation routes from potential fires. In some cases, the information generated by Active could lead to a wholesale relocation, or even withdrawal altogether, of fire stations.

This chapter, however, is less about the decisions made from the information generated and more instead about how data transforms into specific kinds of information on fire risk. Rather than being about how information is actioned it is about how and what kinds of information become actionable through data-based organisational processes. As I have argued above, the emergence of specific forms of information on fire risk is entangled in the issue of how data is mobilised, the kinds of data that are transmitted from one place to the next, and how, in its movement, data morphs into information. The sources for IRS data are, as noted, both the narrative logs derived from FRS control rooms and the pro formas completed by operative staff at the scene of an incident. They represent two different data renditions of the fire incident from the perspectives of two crucial sites of fire governance. The role of the Quality Assurance Officer is to make decisions as to which data generated from the two sources properly accounts for the incident and is pertinent for analysis and which is not. Judgements over the pertinence of different data are enacted in what data becomes mobilised within broader systems of data circulation and what data does not. As Terranova notes, the judgement made by the Quality Assurance Officer follows the logic of an entropic process, whereby the volume of data is decreased as it becomes more refined and mobilised for the purposes of analysis. By deciding what data is mobilised, the Quality Assurance Officer ultimately influences what kind of information can be generated on fire risk.

The effect of quality assurance decision-making on information generated about fire risk can be exemplified if we return to the recording of casualties and what resources were called upon to deal with these casualties. As noted, narrative log renditions of fire incidents will include casualties that were indicated due to the deployment of resources to deal with casualties. In the pro forma report,

casualties will only be recorded if the resources deployed were actually used. If data from pro forma reports rather than narrative logs is transmitted to Active, as is common practice, the fire incidents described in Active will only record resources used and not resources deployed but not used. Although a detailed account of fire incidents is afforded in Active, the messy, often mistake-laden aspects of FRS response to an incident, captured in narrative logs but not in pro forma reports, are eliminated. The rendition of fire risk generated by information from Active is thus skewed by the process of entropy, which underpins decision-making as to what data should be mobilised and, ultimately, what data turns into information.

## Conclusion

The information security agencies now continually generate facilitates and is a symptom of the fundamental changes in the actions that they take, the interventions they make, and how they legitimate and rationalise their existence. But information is far from where the story starts in enacting and facilitating the types of risk-based governance that are now central to authorities such as the FRS discussed in this chapter. As a combination, an ordering and a comprehension of scattered flows of data, information is only a surface product. To furrow underneath this information and ask from whence it derives is to encounter a plethora of minute and intricate, organisationally situated, and locally instantiated data-based processes. These processes cannot be conceived as merely everyday laborious chores that bored workers undertake in a mundane routine. Generating the very material by which different agents of the security apparatus come to decisions about how to intervene, these techniques are part of the very mechanisms by which security is enacted and practised nowadays.

Issues concerning movement exist in the midst of these processes. In this chapter we have seen how movement has characterised, instigated, and influenced a variety of processes such as data sourcing, selection, integration, and analysis. But as our gaze on such processes becomes ever more minute, revealing the complexity of the manoeuvres and different stages that comprise them, the statement that 'organisationally situated processes by which information on risk emerges are characterised by movement' becomes increasingly obsolete of meaning. Instead, the generic signifier of movement needs to be broken down and compartmentalised into different modes. In this chapter, I have drawn on the dichotomy between mobility and circulation established in other literature (Adey 2006; O'Grady 2014; Salter 2013) and applied it to the case of how data becomes actionable information. If circulation designates and accounts for broad normalised systems of data flow, mobility conceptualises the conditions of possibility by which data are moved. Through the language of mobility, not only have the techniques prevalent in creating information been identified, but

their inner workings have been documented. On the one hand, the conditions of mobility are automatic and self-regulating, embedded in hardware and enacted through software commands. On the other, they operate through incorporating human-based decision-making.

But what happens to data as it is mobilised? I have argued here that, on its way to becoming actionable information, the mobilisation of data is inseparably entangled with its material transformation. The transmission of data from one place to the next is accompanied by the homeomorphism of data. What homeomorphism allows us to think of is the multiple form shifts which data undergoes in becoming information. In an age of Big Data, it might be expected that the amount of data used in the FRS would enlarge in volume and variety as it travels further and deeper into the bowels of the FRS digital infrastructure. In fact, the opposite is witnessed. Rather than growing, the mobility of data is organised by a process of entropy. Through its transmission and in its becoming information, the volume of data shrinks and becomes more refined to suit the specific analytic purposes of the software to which it moves. As icons of the minute processes discussed, the posters affixed to the walls in the FRS testify to this process of entropy. The posters are the result of a continual downsizing of the digital entities that the FRS accrue and deploy. It is the generation of small, discrete actionable information, and not the generation of Big Data that, at least for the time being, matters to the FRS.

But if this process of entropy has told us anything, it is that the transmission and homeomorphism of data are bound to one another in a way that bears the trace of the different conditions mobilising data in the first place. In mobilising data, as shown in relation to IRS, human operators do not just face the task of making sure the right data are categorised and moved to the right places. Instead, this act of mobilisation shapes and conditions what things are made accessible to analysis, to knowledge, and what are not. It influences heavily what information can be generated and also mediates how this information reflects the future to which the FRS increasingly orients itself strategically.

NOTE

1    www.totalsoftware.com (accessed October 2015).

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**Part II**

*People on the move*

# 'Illegals' in the Law School of Athens: public presence, discourse, and migrants as threat

Giannis Gkolfinopoulos

I N THIS CHAPTER I examine how the unexpected mobility and public presence of migrant bodies is discursively productive of a threat to the nation that merits another instance of mobility, only somewhat less unexpected: strong police intervention on university premises in Greece in 2011.[1] Both these instances evince a similarly uneasy balance between (in)security and mobility.[2] The strong police presence that followed almost immediately after the beginning of a hunger strike of undocumented migrants in the Law School of Athens placed the bastion of state forces of security at a site wherein, in this national context, their standing is pronouncedly *insecure*, given the history of Greek university occupations and a strong political tradition that prohibits police intervention within university facilities.

With a focus on this exceptionally publicised event, I analyse textual and visual images used by the press to report on the event. My main question is: what was it that in only two-and-a-half days led to a massive police operation and the rapid 'voluntary' evacuation of the building? The analysis identifies five themes around which the press coverage of the hunger strike is articulated. The argument put forward is that the public presence of undocumented migrants and the direct negation of their illegal status is considered a threat to the established national order that undermines the deep-seated division between what is considered normal and natural, and what is not; between Greeks and aliens. By analysing formulations deployed for reporting on this crisis, the chapter traces parts of the social context that makes them possible. In short, these culturally specific representations stem from, and contribute to, a nationalist project that aims to deny the authority of migrants as political agents, and thus secures the established social and national hierarchy. One crucial aspect of this hierarchy is permissible mobility. The active use of fixed, immobile structures of specific public spaces such as the building of the Athens Law School by illegal(ised) migrants

was considered unacceptable and the police were mobilised to restore the temporarily destabilised social regime of migrant illegality.

### The migrant hunger strike as social event

The subject of this chapter is one specific moment in what is usually called 'the problem of illegal immigration' in public discourse in Greece. On 25 January 2011, approximately 300 undocumented male migrants – mostly of North African origin – in coordination with Greek student organisations as well as some left-wing, anarchist, and migrant solidarity groups started a hunger strike demanding legalisation of all migrants living and working in Greece. The hunger strike started simultaneously in Athens and Thessaloniki. Most of the migrants entered a central building of the Law School of Athens, which was empty and in the process of being renovated. They settled there as the place where the strike would take place. A smaller number of migrants (around fifty) went to Thessaloniki and entered the trade union building (the 'Workers Centre'). This analysis focuses on the events at the Law School of Athens, the site that was widely conceived in public discourse as the real centre of the first phase of what became known as 'the strike of the 300 migrants'.

The entry of undocumented migrants into the Law School generated a fierce discourse that saturated the public domain. It was as though the visible presence of illegals in this seminal public building was not just deemed unacceptable, but also at the limit of the imaginable. The ensuing crisis was such that two-and-a-half days after the strike began, during the evening of 27 January, a large area of downtown Athens around the Law School was cordoned off by police forces, who, in coordination with juridical and university authorities, issued an ultimatum to those inside the building (migrants and others in solidarity with them) according to which they should either exit voluntarily or they would be forcibly removed. After hours of negotiations, the police allowed the migrants to exit the building. Migrants walked out and on to another site to continue their strike. The hunger strike ended on 9 March 2011 in a different space, a vacant private building called 'the Hypatia mansion', also in downtown Athens, the owner of which agreed to let it be used for this purpose during the negotiations.[3]

The declared demand of the hunger strike was the general legalisation of migrants in Greece and 'the same political and social rights and obligations as Greek workers'.[4] Of course, neither general legalisation was achieved, nor were the specific strikers themselves legalised. After forty-four days of hunger strike (from 25 January until 9 March 2011), they achieved an agreement with the Greek state, the basic points of which were: (a) the strikers were granted a six-month postponement of their deportation and a promise that they could get a renewal of that status, (b) they would be permitted to travel to their countries of

origin and then return to Greece, (c) the number of years after which a migrant is eligible to apply for legalisation dropped from twelve to ten, and (d) the number of work stamps required for renewing the residence permit and for securing health insurance was reduced (the latter for Greeks too). Beyond doubt, the agreement, even if it were to be fully respected, did not constitute a break with the current illegalisation regime. The strikers' status continued to be that of illegals.

## The politics of news coverage

This chapter is not about the hunger strike itself, considered as a political project (i.e. its preparation and organisation, or its internal political debates).[5] Rather, I focus on the almost three-day snapshot (25–28 January 2011) of the Law School crisis as presented by the press. The object of analysis is the hunger strike and the undocumented migrants as they appear in Greek public discourse.[6]

The translation of the migrants' actions into a threat is inherent in the mobilisation of police forces, but is not always explicit in public discourse. Taken in isolation and without the subsequent police intervention, the examined representations do not fit easily into the category of threat. Their contribution to the construction of that threat is clarified when they are perceived as different though interrelated parts of a social process that led to the eviction operation. What caused this response from the authorities is not identical to what was publicly said about it and there is no linear relation between the two. The analysis turns to the news coverage in order to unpick the process that led to this crisis by identifying specific discursive aspects of what is at stake.

At the centre of the perspective deployed here lies the recognition of the critical role of discourse in the formation of the very reality it supposedly just reflects (Fairclough 2003: 203–4; Hall 2001: 72–3). As Michel Foucault (1972: 49) put it, the field of discourse is a field of 'practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak'. The notion of representation deployed refers to the general use of signs (words and images) for the production of meaning (Hall 1997). Although discourse cannot be analysed as a stable and fixed object but 'as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies' (Foucault, 1991: 100), dominant media texts do have a 'preferred reading which ... will tend to reconstruct dominant values of a society' (Van Zoonen, 1991: 45).

In a different register, the constitutive dimension of discourse regarding the objects to which it (allegedly just) refers is also illuminated by Robert Karl Manoff and Michael Schudson (1986: 4), specifically with regard to the news: '[r]eporting is inevitably a part of a double reality, both separate from the world it tells stories about and a constituent of that world, an element of the story'. What follows from the above is that it is by becoming an object of

reporting, by entering the public sphere, that an issue actually becomes an issue, taking its specific form as something that really matters and its position in the hierarchy that defines how much something matters.

The analysis here is concerned with the coverage of the mainstream daily press. Certainly, television and the Internet constitute the largest part of the public sphere. However, newspapers continue to play a dominant role in setting the agenda of public discourse in Greece. It is common for questions discussed in parliament to be posed by politicians quoting articles from the Greek press. Also the popular morning news shows of major television and radio channels routinely rely on reports and opinions published in the daily newspapers. The examined newspapers, with all their historical transformations and discontinuities, are the oldest part of nationwide mass media in Greece and comprise hegemonic actors of the public sphere.

The newest among them, *Eleftherotipia* (Freedom of Press), a newspaper of centre-left origin, was founded in 1975, the first to be founded after the fall of the military junta (1967–1974). *Rizospastis* (The Radical), the newspaper of the Communist Party of Greece, is the oldest of the examined newspapers and was first published in June 1916. *Kathimerini* (The Daily) is one of the main conservative newspapers in Greece and was founded in 1919, while *Eleftheros Tipos* (Free Press), right-wing as well, was published for the first time in August 1916 although its recent history starts in 1983. Finally, *Ta Nea* (The News), *To Vima* (The Podium), and *Ethnos* (Nation), founded in 1931, 1922, and 1930 respectively, are three newspapers of the political centre.[7]

Moreover, it needs to be noted that the notion of the newspaper has undergone significant transformation. Printed material of one edition (rarely two) per day is now only one part of what a newspaper is. The other is its online content. The daily newspaper *To Vima* has moved even further, abandoning its paper edition altogether in November 2010. Furthermore, many of the traditional mainstream newspapers in Greece are part of larger media organisations, present at the same time in the fields of television, radio, and the Internet. While the press maps on to the tripartite political spectrum (left–centre–right), this research focuses on representations that tend to traverse conventional political positions, thereby appearing as non-political or somehow natural. The analysis takes as its object the configurations of discourse, not the newspapers, nor the persons who actually produced the texts or appear in them, moving in a direction similar to Alexandra Halkias' (2004) study of the public designation of the low birth rate in Greece as a major problem for the nation. The material I examine in this chapter focuses mostly on the conservative and centre-left newspapers that represent the core of the mainstream press in Greece.

The Law School crisis resonated with the general problem of illegal migration in Greece. By representing the public presence of migrants in the Law School of Athens as a serious problem, the press constitutes a specific discursive

Greece and, by the same move, a social field that is external to it. In analysing crucial segments of the coverage, I examine what was deemed unacceptable and even scandalous in the situation.

### Migrant illegality as a security risk

In Greece, 'illegal immigrants' constitute an emblematic form of the modern stranger whose arrival and presence is widely considered a serious security problem. However, neither illegal migration nor (in)security issues are natural phenomena. Migrant illegality is conceived here as a historically formed social regime. It is a configuration dependent on power relations and especially state power. It is dependent on the law, which sets the criteria of legality and, in so doing, carves out the space of illegality (Balibar 1993: 72–3; Tapinos 1999: 229; De Genova 2004: 166; Baldwin-Edwards 2008: 1449). As Catherine Dauvergne (2008: 15) argues, '[i]n the absence of law, there can be no illegal migration. In the absence of state enforcement attempts, illegal migration is no more than the proverbial tree falling silently in the forest'.

As laws and state institutions' choices do not remain identical over time, migrant illegality is a shifting, although lasting, aspect of social life and national order. Three legalisation processes have recently taken place in Greece: in 1998, in 2001, and in 2005/07 (see Triandafyllidou 2009). As Philippe Fargues puts it (2009: 544–5), a person can be legal in country A and illegal in country B, as well as legal at time frame A and illegal at time frame B. Some of the illegal migrants of the past ceased, at a certain moment in time, to be illegals and managed to attain the status of legal(ised) residents. This transformation works the other way around, too. Many fall from legal residence status to illegality because they cannot meet the criteria for renewing their residence permit. The same holds for many asylum seekers whose applications are denied (Düvell 2011: 288–9; Maroukis 2009: 10). Even though migrant illegality does not refer to the same persons over time, illegality constitutes a continuous reality.

What is also subject to change is the dominant perception of the illegal immigrant. Two decades ago the figure of the clandestine migrant in Greece predominantly referred to persons from Eastern Europe, mainly the dangerous male Albanian (Konstantinidou 2001; Pavlou 2001). Today, many Eastern European countries (such as Bulgaria and Romania) are members of the European Union and the public discourse has recently shifted attention from migrants coming from neighbouring countries to those from Asia and Africa. Today's abstract image of the illegal migrant in Greece is that of a person who is non-European, non-white, and predominantly non-Christian.[8]

As with migrant illegality, migration as a security issue is not an indisputable natural object. According to the dominant perception, migration constitutes a threat to the nation against which security practices are not only legitimised

but considered unavoidable. This perception, by taking both the nation and what threatens it as given, obscures the processes of their social constitution and secures their (re)production. The constitution of national (in)security as a problem is the result of social processes. Security questions, as Jef Huysmans points out (2002: 42), 'result from a work of mobilization in which practices work upon each other and thus create an effect that we call a security problem'. A security issue emerges as the product of a securitisation process which works through 'the identification of existential threats' (Huysmans 2000: 757). Today, the term migrant, as Didier Bigo argues (2002: 63, 71), designates 'a threat to the core values of a country, a state', both internal and external to national territory.

According to Bigo (2002: 65), '[s]ecuritization of the immigrant as a risk is based on our conception of the state as a body or a container for the polity'. In the already securitised dominant discourse on migration, illegal migrants – the exact opposite of citizens – represent the extreme of national danger. Being radically excluded from the polity and the domain of legality, illegal(ised) migrants constitute one of the main objects of police activity. Their physical presence in the public space of the city is already considered an alarming element of disorder. Similar to Georg Simmel's (1950 [1908]: 402) stranger, today's illegal migrant is not 'the wanderer who comes today and goes tomorrow but rather the person who comes today and stays tomorrow'. Or, as Zygmunt Bauman (1995: 2) writes, modern strangers are produced as the 'waste' of the 'state's ordering zeal'. Illegalised migrants do not belong to the national body and, even though they are not citizens and they do not fit into any of the official taxonomy positions (legal resident, refugee, etc.), they live on national territory, and thus expose state power as incapable of fulfilling its pretensions for exhaustive control over that territory. Seen from this perspective, the specific and explosive character of the illegal migrant figure is that he or she 'stays tomorrow', and that this 'waste' does not lie outside national territory but within it.

### Constructing the problem

In what follows I discuss five themes that were identified in the analysis. Their differences notwithstanding, they converge to form a continuum ranging from the migrants' mere presence as a serious discomfort, to a basis for establishing them as a threat as national/religious enemies, and a threat to so-called public health.

### *Occupying the university?*

One of the dominant representations of the hunger strike in the Law School, especially by the conservative press, was that of an 'occupation'. On 25 January

*Figure 4*  Article in *Kathimerini*, 25 January 2011.

2011, the day the strike began, *Kathimerini*, one of the main conservative news-papers, presented the issue on its front page under the title: '[r]enovated Law School of Athens occupied' (figure 4).[9]

The deployment of the notion of a university occupation sets aside the deed performed by the migrants themselves, namely the hunger strike, by inscribing it in a quite different context, the familiar set of university problems in Greece. University occupations in Greece were part and parcel of the dominant nar-rative of the *transition to democracy*. The occupation and uprising of Athens Polytechnic, which was crushed by the army on 17 November 1973, constitutes the apogee of the resistance to the military regime and 17 November is (still) an official national holiday. Thus, democracy in Greece is intertwined with a univer-sity occupation and its antipode with the suppression of that occupation. This specific historical process made it difficult for the Greek state during the follow-ing decades to openly suppress – with the use of force – university occupations.

The point made is that this surely is a problem, one that needs to be solved, but it is somehow familiar, at least at first sight. Moreover, it is not about the migrants' struggle but about university space and university functioning, as well as an implied laxness of previous and present governments in ensuring the proper framework for its governance. During the forty-year period that followed the fall of the military regime in 1974, the practice of university occupations was a common tactic used by the student movement. This involved taking over facilities and disrupting the normal functioning of the university. Both univer-sity authorities and the state in general are used to this practice, which, however, has been viewed as more and more intolerable in the dominant public discourse during the last few years.

Yet the undocumented migrant hunger strikers did not perform a university occupation. They entered a public building that was empty and out of use at

the time, and they did not disrupt any university functions. If the threat posed by university occupations lies in the blocking of all normal campus activities, then what was the threat posed by those who did not block any university functions? An answer is given by the title on the front page of *Ta Nea*, 25 January 2011: '[u]niversity occupations performed even by migrants!'[10] Surprise expressed by the use of the exclamation mark points directly to the subjects of this alleged occupation: 'even by migrants!' What manifests itself here is the *excessive* character of the specific occupation. A university occupation by students (or university staff) is a real problem, but, as this discourse indicates, at least they are nationals. An occupation by migrants is something totally different. The basis of the surprise expressed in the above title, and also the basis for the general discomfort of public opinion, is what emerges as the natural exclusion of migrants from the university as an institution. If it is natural for them not to be part of the university, if they have no place there, then it is natural to be surprised by their occupation of one of its central buildings. Further, as is implied in this rhetoric, it is now clear that state leniency with occupations of university facilities has gone far enough.

However, the representation of the hunger strike under the rubric of a university occupation also transforms the very notion of the occupation, by detaching it from the practice of deliberately blocking normal university activities. In this context, it is just by being present and visible in the university that the undocumented migrants perform an occupation. In fact, this transformed notion of occupation is widely accepted as common sense, forming a crucial aspect of the official state discourse on undocumented migrants in contemporary Greece.

Over a year later, during the election campaign of 2012 and talking about the so-called migration problem, former Prime Minister Antonis Samaras was widely quoted as saying that it was necessary to 're-occupy' our cities that were already occupied by illegal immigrants.[11] Also, former Minister of Public Order Nicos Dendias went even further at a press conference in 2012, when he presented the largest ever police 'sweep operation' against undocumented migrants, stating that Greece was a country facing an invasion comparable only to the Dorian one in antiquity. Most striking in both formulations is the radical detachment of the notion of invasion from war and armed conflict. Today's migrants, unlike their ancient counterparts, perform the invasion only by coming to Greece. Ironically, the code name of this police operation was 'Host Zeus'.[12] As with regard to the hunger strike at the Law School of Athens, undocumented migrants are considered as invading and occupying Greek cities simply by being there. Thus, when Greece is facing a form of mobility (undocumented migrants) entering its territory that is equated as being part of an ongoing war, it is necessary to react actively and directly. What logically follows from this as the next step is the intervention of police forces.

The supposed threat is not connected to political agency but to mere existence. It is not about what the migrants really do, but about their mere bodily existence on Greek national territory. In order for someone's physical and social presence to be considered a threat, it is necessary that he or she be radically excluded from the domain of so-called normal social coexistence. In the case of the Law School of Athens, however, migrant strikers acted as political subjects. By entering the Law School they challenged the mobility regime in place in Greece, which considers such an entry as a delinquent activity. By performing a hunger strike in this space, they publicly refused the very exclusion from public space. Their action made them political subjects and this is what was deemed excessive in their case.

## The Law School of Athens as an illegal migrants' camp

In the Greek context, the term camp (katavlismos) stands as a general signifier of messiness and dirt, directly related to social outcasts.[13] Being a standard part of the dominant discourse on Roma people for decades, the notion of camp easily migrated to the supposed problem of illegal migrants. In both cases, the notion refers to living conditions deemed abnormal, to spaces inhabited by the abject,[14] living at the margins of society and at the margins of Greek cities. In both, the term camp designates a site of misery and danger – related to crime and hygiene issues – which is and should be cordoned off from the space occupied by normal national subjects.

Thus, the representation of the migrants' presence in the Law School of Athens in the form of an illegal migrants' camp was already inscribed in a discourse formulating an unacceptable situation. One of the main daily newspapers, *Ethnos*, used this as its general title on the front page on 25 January 2011: '[t]he Law School became an illegal migrants' camp'.

The pictures that were used by the newspaper showed migrants lying on the floor with blankets and sleeping bags, emphasising disarray and the messiness of a camp. The notion of the camp was also used by Minister of Education Anna Diamantopoulou who, according to the 26 January 2011 edition of *Kathimerini*, made the following statement: '[t]he transformation of the Law School into a migrants' camp lies beyond the limits of tolerance. University authorities ought, according to the law, to defend the functioning of the university. Laws should be enforced with the assistance of all enforcement bodies of the State'.[15]

What is at stake in the above passage is both 'the functioning of the University' that should be 'defended', and nothing less than the enforcement of state law. This utterance is interesting due to the fact that the migrants did not disrupt any aspect of the above-mentioned functioning, given that the building they used was already closed for restoration work. In order to identify the threat implied in the Minister's statement, attention needs to shift to the 'transformation' of the Law School. The specific character of this

transformation, according to the mainstream press, is that of a degradation. The entry of the undocumented migrants into the university, a space from which they are excluded, and their use of it as a base for political action transforms this space into a makeshift migrants' camp. It is as if the shadowy margins of social life rushed violently into the bright centre of the public stage. In so doing, as the quoted statement indicates, they maximise their illegality by directly affronting unnamed laws of the state.

In a context in which migrant illegality has become natural, active negation of that very illegality appears as a threat, even though the strikers did not use any form of physical force against university facilities. If the law, studied and served in the Law School, is one of the main forces that constitute the division between legality and illegality, then to stand against that division is to directly attack the law. From the standpoint of the state and the established social order, precisely at the site of its reproduction, this is something, as stated above, 'beyond the limits of every possible tolerance'.

A milder form of the exclusion of undocumented migrants from the established social order, which is nevertheless pointing in the same direction, can be traced in the coverage of the leftist newspaper *Avgi* on 26 January 2011. The story quotes the Rector of the University of Athens (of which the Law School is a part) Thanasis Pelegrinis saying that '[o]n the one hand, you see those miserable humans trying to survive and, on the other, you should preserve the decency of the university'.[16] Even though the first issue posed here is a sort of humanistic one (miserable humans trying to survive), the second is the decency of the university. However, if the decency of the university is to be understood as a dimension counterposed to those 'trying to survive' (whatever this nebulous utterance means), then, logically, the university is to be understood as an institution the decency of which is preserved *by the exclusion* of those who are at the bottom of the social hierarchy, in this case the undocumented migrant strikers. Their exclusion emerges as a constitutive element of the university's decency, and that is the reason why those struggling to survive are considered as undermining its decency just by entering it. While leftist *Avgi* avoids the parallels of the hunger strike and the camp, and although it chooses to present the specific part of the Rector's statement which refers to the migrants as human, the binary wherein their mere presence is seen as a problem to the domain of decency, clearly belonging to the Law School, is neatly preserved.

### From migrants' camp to hotel/inn

Representations of an occupation and of a camp were powerful enough, but they were not the only ones in use. Others emerged as well, the common denominator of which was that they all referred to the discursive domain of housing. Thus, an

alternative configuration of the degradation of the university was a representation of the Law School as transformed into a hotel and the strikers as those who, quite rudely it is implied, arranged to stay without telling the hotelkeeper. There is a certain maxim in Greek that serves as a subtext for this representation: 'reckoning without the hotelkeeper'.

On 25 January, the opening day of the hunger strike, *Kathimerini* states:

> Floor-bedding for 250 immigrants, who start a hunger strike in order to be legalised, was arranged by left student groups and humanitarian organizations in the currently under renovation, historical entrance-building of the Law School at Solonos Street. This 'hospitality gesture' was organized 'without the hotel-keeper', despite the negative decision of the School authorities and the Rectorship of the University of Athens.[17]

The issue here is the floor-bedding and hospitality organised by leftist student groups and humanitarian organisations without the permission or, more accurately, against the will of the hotelkeeper. It should be noted at this point – and this is a general aspect of the public discourse on the Law School crisis – that the migrants themselves are considered incapable of organising their own hunger strike. Their social inferiority is obvious in the above passage as migrants appear to be mere objects of a power play between the real organisers (left-wing student and humanitarian groups) and those responsible for the Law School, or the hotelkeeper, namely the university authorities. All that the hunger strikers could be is hospitality receivers, and, according to the passage, a bad or suspect kind of hospitality because they ignored the hotelkeeper.

The right-wing newspaper *Eleftheros Tipos*, referred to a similar transformation on 26 January 2011: '[t]he transformation of the Law School into an inn, with leftist student groups as innkeeper, places not only the academic community and society before their responsibilities, but also the parties. Up to which point can the political exploitation of the migration problem go? "Sensitivity" cannot be an alibi for the abolition of the state'.[18]

Here the Law School is transformed into an inn, less prestigious than a hotel, and the role of the innkeeper is ascribed to the leftist student groups. What stays unchanged in both passages is the hierarchically inferior status of migrant strikers, who maintain the position of the problematic traveller. According to the passage, the danger that the presence of migrants in the Law School represents is grave: what is at stake is nothing less than the abolition of the state. The state's main duty is to secure the boundaries of the predominant social order. This means, among other things, to preserve the stable (re)production of the division between a university, namely a public institution for 'normal' subjects, and an inn, namely a marginal place were marginal wanderers can spend the night. Seen from this perspective, the degradation of the university to an inn undermines what is considered as the core of the state, namely the division between national subjects and illegal migrants.

What this discursive formation implies is that if the state is incapable of keeping migrants out of its most respected institutions, incapable of avoiding the transformation of a Greek university into an inn for clandestine immigrants, then it is a state on the fringe of abolition. This exaggeration notwithstanding, the fear of the abolition of the state was far from marginal in public discourse. This was made explicit at the highest political level. The centre-left newspaper *Eleftherotipia*, on 26 January 2011, quoted Prime Minister Giorgos Papandreou: '[t]he state cannot be abolished. The law should be enforced and all the relevant authorities should take responsibility.'[19]

The fact that the above representations are articulated in the realm of habitation is indicative of the social hierarchy between Greeks and illegal migrants. In a national context where home ownership is considered a cornerstone of social respect, migrant strikers are sketched as those who do not own a house. Those who live in a camp are homeless and those who stay in a hotel or an inn are foreigners who do not own a house of their own. The migrants' inferior social position is also marked by their floor-bedding, an undignified way of resting for those who do not have a bed, or those for whom there is no bed available. Being another name for the lack of dignity, floor-bedding *in the Law School* becomes interpreted as a direct threat to the established order.

## The Law School of Athens as mosque

Another aspect of the threat that migrant public presence was made to signify was the direct undermining of the Greek-Orthodox nature of the Greek nation state, which is widely considered as its foundational bedrock. It is not accidental that the opening phrase of the Greek Constitution is '[i]n the name of the Holy and Consubstantial and Indivisible Trinity'.[20] What is at stake in this cluster of representations is the radical otherness of migrants with regard to religion. The newspaper *Ethnos*, on 25 January 2011, in a two-page story under the alarming, capitalised title '[l]anding of illegal migrants in the Law School', positions a photograph of a migrant on his knees, while three others are sitting near him on a floor covered with blankets, one of them signalling the sign for victory. The man is kneeling on a rag and we can see him wearing his socks. The caption reads: '[t]he migrants state that they will continue their struggle until their demand for legalization is satisfied'.[21]

Another newspaper, *Ta Nea*, on 27 January 2011, in its two-page report on the Law School issue, used a large photo of some strikers lying on the floor among assorted blankets and sleeping bags. This is the background. The photographic lens focuses on one striker, on his knees on a rag, in a position implying prayer. The newspaper positions this photograph on the left of the photo layout. This caption reads: '[i]n the middle of the floor-bedding and the fuss of crowding, a migrant hunger-striker does not forget to pray'.

*Figure 5* Article in *Ta Nea*, 27 January 2011.

Diagonally across from this photo, in the upper right-hand corner of the layout, the newspaper has placed a smaller picture that consists of a close-up of one pair of shoes. Despite the portrayed single pair of shoes, the caption reads: '[e]xcept for blankets and makeshift beds, the spaces of the occupied historic building are covered with shoes' (figure 5).[22]

In a similar vein, *Eleutheros Typos*, on 25 January 2011, more or less used the same photo of a man praying (figure 6) with the following caption: '[m]igrant prays in the Law School of Athens'.[23]

The political differences between the above-mentioned newspapers notwithstanding, these texts and images form a representational continuum. They bring religion to the forefront with explicit references to prayer. The practice of prayer, highly valued in Greek society, is being linked to a frame of messiness. These migrants are Muslims and it is their religious identity that seems to seal the alterity of their presence in the Athens Law School. Floor-bedding and the crowded conditions are put together with images that function as visual proof of what the texts indicate. Thus, spatial disorder is intertwined with the thematic of prayer and Islam emerges at the core of it all, as the reason for the cultural/religious disorder.

In this context, shoes, either present or absent, function as the object that links spatial and cultural disorder. They refer to the religious practice of Muslims, according to which shoes must be removed for prayer. At the same time, shoes invoke the image of cultural Others turning a respectable public place into a makeshift, messy bedroom. Shoes here stand as the object marking the gap

*Figure 6* Article in *Eleftheros Tipos*, 25 January 2011.

between Christian Greeks and Muslim undocumented migrants. The portrayed messiness of the Athens Law School is not only derogatory but insulting in this national context. This representation is informed by a deep vein of cultural intolerance at the core of which there is a specific physical proximity that is itself deemed filthy. At this point the deployment of visual material is crucial: many images are filled with male bodies side by side in a space that is covered with blankets and sleeping bags. In the Greek context, these visuals punctuated by the element of shoes taken off recall both a certain discomfort of odour and filth on a more general level. The formation taking shape here is a lack of civilisation and, specifically, the inferior level of civilisation of Muslim illegal migrants, a level long ago surpassed by Greek Christians (and Europeans).

It is not just that a much respected historic building was occupied by homeless aliens, but that these aliens, as Muslims, are both *totally* alien and adversaries to Greek nationals. The anti-Muslim stance in Greece is deeply rooted in the national(ist) project of the fight against the Ottoman Empire for the constitution of the Greek state (1830). Turkey, seen as the heir of the Empire, is widely considered an eternal enemy of Greece. Thus, the sentiment of offence, obvious in the deployment of phrases such as a 'migrants' camp', 'floor bedding' and 'hotel/inn' as terms for university facilities, is intensified by the visual and verbal references to the religious practices of migrant strikers. Even though it is not said explicitly, the meaning is that along with a camp, the central building of the venerable Law School of Athens was transformed into a mosque. This

is something unthinkable in a city where there is still no officially recognised mosque, and all efforts to create one meet serious resistance.[24]

### The hunger strike as hygiene bomb

A key frame of reference of public discourse with regards to the migrants' hunger strike was that of public health. Through different, even opposing, positions, public debate exhibited a pronounced medical dimension, pointing to a risk stemming from the very bodies of the hunger strikers. As this discursive framing became dominant, mainly after the strikers had moved out of the Law School, the political agenda was turned upside down. The issue was not the threat to migrants' health from the hunger strike, but the threat to public health from migrant bodies.

According to *Kathimerini*, on 25 January 2011, the Dean of the Law School Mihalis Tsinisizelis 'focused on the dangers for public hygiene and security involved in the presence of the 250 individuals'. In the same article, the newspaper once more refers to what the Dean said: '[y]esterday, migrants were examined by doctors, some of them presenting the symptom of high fever. In the end, five of them were found infected by a virus.'[25]

Migrants figure as carrying disease, even though this 'virus' proved to be nothing more than common winter infections. Even in less conservative papers, where care seems to be taken to avoid overtly racist designations of the event, the presence of this frame is evident. For example, in centrist *Ta Nea*, on 25 January 2011, a small text-caption accompanying a photo of a large number of migrant strikers (a snapshot from the press conference held at the beginning of the strike) reads: '[s]chool closed. Approximately 250 migrant workers [. . .] who came early in the morning from Crete, are lodging in the building of the Law School of Athens and as a result the School remains closed, no classes are held, while hygiene conditions are intolerable since not even heating is available'.[26]

The above passage, in which the hunger strikers are positioned as migrant workers, namely the expression they themselves used, deploys the somewhat puzzling formulation of intolerable hygiene conditions with overt reference to the lack of heating. But lack of heating in a public building in Greece during the years of the current crisis is not sufficient for a designation of intolerable hygiene conditions. Thus, the article seems to imply something further, with its designation of not *even* heating. Though the passage is not specific about the hygiene conditions, it clearly posits the closing of the School as a result of migrants staying there. Through this discursive link, intolerable hygiene conditions and School closing become directly related to the migrant strikers' presence in the building.

According to the passage it is the incoming of the migrants 'early in the morning'[27] that directly resulted in the shutdown. However, the Law School

actually officially closed as a result of a decision by the School's Deanery,[28] as a contingent political response to the migrants' entry. The closing of the School was not an unavoidable necessity. By obscuring this crucial link, this discursive formulation at once depoliticises the closing of the School, representing it as a direct natural outcome of the migrants' arrival, and maximises the disturbance their presence should be seen as causing, given that the building was already temporarily closed for renovations. This is a move that naturalises the threat that migrant strikers represent for the university institution. In the absence of real evidence concerning a health risk, it is rather their very physical proximity, as well as their quantity, we might say by the photo's emphasis on the density of migrant bodies in this space that constitutes an intolerable hygiene condition.

The health security aspect of the public debate on the migrant hunger strike did not mean a general acceptance of there being a risk to public health. The leftist newspaper *Avgi*, on 25 January 2011, openly criticised the decision of the Law School's Deanery. 'There is no issue of a hygiene nature' reads a subtitle in bold letters which quotes a statement of the Solidarity Initiative (supporting the migrant strikers).[29] The following day, the newspaper reiterates the same position, adding that doctors had examined migrants in accordance with an order of the Rector.[30] Though presenting the opposite point of view, this leftist position feeds into the medicalisation of the hunger strike by confirming its very basis. By denying that migrant strikers carry diseases, this kind of discourse in fact accepts that they comprise a possible danger to public health. That is the reason why medical examination was deemed a legitimate move.

But the most characteristic formulation as far as public hygiene is concerned, was that of a 'bomb'. According to *Ethnos*, on 25 January 2011: ' "[n]obody has the right to occupy the space of the most historical [sic] university of the country, transforming it into a bomb for public hygiene and security", that was the comment of DAP'.[31]

What was only an implication in the first passage of this section now becomes explicit. It is not just that migrants are infected, but that they are infectious. Thus, the unsustained issue of the intolerable hygiene conditions takes a clear form. It is the incoming of migrants that transforms the building into a figurative bomb. Even though the wording adds security to public hygiene by using the linking word 'and', the horrifying form of a (ticking) bomb renders public hygiene securitised. After strikers had moved out of the Law School, bomb representations became common in public discourse on the hunger strike. A notable instance of this rhetoric occurred in the widespread media reporting of an announcement by Minister of Health Andreas Loverdos who directly connected migrant strikers with the spread of the so-called swine flu. According to *To Vima*, on 14 February 2011, the Minister stated that the hunger strike constituted 'a real infection "bomb" at the centre of Athens'.[32] Thus, the invisible threat of an influenza outbreak (of the

H1N1 type), a pressing public issue during the winter of 2011, took the visible form of clandestine Africans. In this manner, the threat their presence in the Law School of Athens represented took on a very concrete and almost unanimously formidable form.

What presents itself in the image of the bomb, I suggest, is radical exclusion. The representation of migrants' physical presence as a bomb threatening public hygiene and security severs the migrants from the very fields of public hygiene and security. A bomb is external to what is threatened by the bomb. From this perspective, migrant strikers as political subjects who deliberately put themselves at risk are either invisible or unimportant. Their medical condition becomes indeed an issue concerning public health, but not as an integral part of it. Their health is posed as the Other of public health, an external reality that threatens to destroy it.

## Conclusion

This chapter focused on widespread representations, deployed by the daily press, of the illegal migrants' hunger strike that took place in the Law School of Athens in January 2011. The undocumented migrants' demand for a general legalisation of all migrants in Greece triggered a fierce security crisis, which quickly led to a major police operation in order to drive them out. The public presence of the migrants was considered a threat that should be obviated, and this chapter has traced the discursive dimensions of its emergence. What was considered as threatened was nothing less than the established social/national order. Public space is for national subjects, so the argument goes, and not for clandestine migrants, and the Law School is not and should not be available for them. Thus, their entering this public space and actively negating their illegal status was presented as a dissolution of the social hierarchy.

Five themes were identified in the news coverage of the migrant hunger strike. Though articulated in different ways, all representations of the hunger strike can be seen as refractions of an event that is defined in dominant discourse as an impossible/intolerable situation. The political action of migrant strikers shifts from being defined as a university occupation needing direct state repression, to a transformation of the Law School to a hotel or inn, which is, moreover, being run under shady circumstances, on to a migrant camp and even a form of impromptu mosque. The culmination of these themes can be seen as occurring in the somewhat paradoxical representation of the hunger strike of these migrant men as a threat to the health of the *national* body.

In effect, the unexpected mobility engaged in by the migrants, by entering the building of the Law School of Athens, undergoing renovation at the time, in order to embark on a hunger strike seems to work so as to place the state in a position of unexpected precariousness. This is seen both in the actual

deployment of police forces, and in the specific content of the five identified trends in the representation of the events. While this temporary rupture in the balance of the security/mobility regime currently in place in Greece was ultimately – and quickly – resolved in favour of a consolidation of state security, this analysis of the news coverage indicates that the rupture was nonetheless of a scale that required a massive mobilisation of dominant racist thematics in order to assist the re-establishment of national order. Ironically, perhaps, since traditional national order was quite quickly re-established, the contours and strength of the coverage indicate that an important fault line exists nonetheless in the foundations of the contemporary nation state.

NOTES

1  The material analysed here is drawn from ' "Illegals" in press discourse', chapter 5 of G. Gkolfinopoulos, 'Social Representations of "Greeks" and "Foreigners" from 1990 to the present: Power and Resistance through the Lens of Violence' (PhD Dissertation, Panteion University, Athens 2014). The doctoral research was funded by the State Scholarships Foundation/IKY (2009–2013).

2  I would like to acknowledge the participants of the workshop Security/Mobility: Between Imagination and Authority, held at the University of Amsterdam, 25–26 September 2014 for their comments. I thank Matthias Leese and Stef Wittendorp for their very useful comments in the process of developing further the workshop paper. Last but not least, I am grateful to Alexandra Halkias for her close reading and incisive comments.

3  Vasilis Chiotis, 'The unwanted of Hypatia,' To Vima, 20 February 2011, www.tovima.gr/ politics/article/?aid=385605 (accessed 21 September 2014). All citations from the press have been translated by the author.

4  See the 'Statement of the Assembly of Migrant Hunger Strikers' (January 2011).

5  For academic political reflections of the examined hunger strike, see Regina Mantanika and Hara Kouki (2011), Alexandra Zavos (2011) and Olga Lafazani (2012).

6  The main research sample comprises 391 items (articles, comments, and/or images) taken from eight daily national Greek newspapers, for the full time span of the Law School events, from 25 January to 28 January 2011. The newspapers examined include *Ethnos* (Nation), *Eleftheros Tipos* (Free Press), *Eleutherotipia* (Freedom of Press), *Avgi* (Dawn), *Kathimerini* (Daily), *Ta Nea* (The News), *To Vima* (The Podium), *Rizospastis* (The Radical).

7  For a detailed history of Greek newspapers see Takis Psarakis (1993) and Dimitris Psychoyos (2004).

8  For an account of the role of migrant mobility in the formation of the Greek nation-state over time, see Parsanoglou (2007).

9  'Renovated Law School of Athens Occupied', *Kathimerini*, 25 January 2011.

10  'University Occupations Performed even by Migrants', *Ta Nea*, 25 January 2011.

11  Elli Triandafylou, 'A. Samaras: We Should Re-occupy the Cities', *Kathimerini*, 30 March 2012.

12  'Nicos Dendias on Migration Problem: We Face a New "Dorian Invasion" ', *To Vima*, 6 August 2012. Available at www.tovima.gr/society/article/?aid=469853 (accessed 15 September 2014).

13  With the exclusion of army camps and recreational camping sites.

14  The notion of the abject articulated by Judith Butler (1993: 3) refers to those who 'do not enjoy the status of the subject', to those 'who form the constitutive outside to the domain of the subject'.

15  Apostolos Lakasas, 'Ms Diamantopoulou Called for lifting of University Asylum', *Kathimerini*, 26 January 2011.

16  Dafne Sfetsa, 'Unprecedented Attack on Immigrants and University Asylum', *Avgi*, 26 January 2011.

17  'Renovated Law School of Athens Occupied', *Kathimerini*, 25 January 2011.

18  Anna Panagiotarea, 'Suffocation ...', *Eleftheros Tipos*, 26 January 2011.

19  Panos Sokos, 'Giorgos: The Law Should be Enforced', *Elefterotipia*, 26 January 2011.

20  For the Greek constitution see www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7 696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/001-156%20aggliko.pdf (accessed 10 September 2015). Also, for academic work documenting the foundational character of Greek (Christian) Orthodoxy in contemporary understandings of nationhood see, George Th. Mavrogordatos (2003) and Elpida Vogli (2007).

21  Mihalis Nivolianitis, 'Landing of Illegal Migrants in the Law School', *Ethnos*, 25 January 2011.

22  Giorgos Ch. Papahristos, Nicos Mastoras, Voula Kehagia and Manos Charalambakis, 'All-night Thriller and Ultimatum from Government', *Ta Nea*, 27 January 2011.

23  V. Nikolaou, 'Occupation and Hunger Strike in Athens Law School', *Eleftheros Tipos*, 25 January 2011.

24  In August 2016, the Greek Parliament voted again for a state-funded mosque in Athens. No other action has yet been taken.

25  Apostolos Lakasas, 'Humanism as Prey to Political Exploitation', *Kathimerini*, 25 January 2011.

26  Nicos Mastoras, Stelios Vradelis, 'Mass Hunger-strike by 300 Illegal Migrants', *Ta Nea*, 25 January 2011.

27  The newspapers' text is inaccurate. The migrants came from Crete on the morning of Sunday 23 January 2011, not on the morning of Tuesday 25 January.

28  The decision was taken on 'hygiene' grounds on Monday 24 January 2011. The School was to stay closed until Friday 28 January. According to a new decision of the Deanery, the School opened on Thursday 27 January. Between Monday and Thursday no improvement of hygiene conditions took place. See Anna Andritsaki, 'All-night Negotiations for Another Space', *Eleutheriotipia*, 27 January 2011. Also see Pikia Stefanakou, 'Rector Searching for Solution, Government Responds with Ultimatum', *Avgi*, 27 January 2011.

29  '300 Migrant Workers on Strike', *Avgi*, 25 January 2011.

30  Dafne Sfetsa, ' "We are not Criminals, We will Fight for our Right to Life and Dignity"', *Avgi*, 26 January 2011.

31  Mihalis Nivolianitis, 'Landing of Illegal Migrants in the Law School', *Ethnos*, 25 January 2011. DAP (in Greek) stands for Democratic Revisionist Avant-Garde and is the name of the main right-wing student organisation.

32  'Andreas Loverdos: Given Order to Military Hospitals and Private Clinics to be on Alert for the Flu', *To Vima*, 14 February 2011. Available at http://www.tovima.gr/%20society/% 20article/?aid=384349 (accessed 20 September 2014).

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# The management of African asylum seekers and the imaginary of the border in Israel

## Sharon Weinblum

IN 2005, SUDANESE men, women, and children, adopting the same route that smugglers and traffickers had used for decades, started crossing the Egyptian border to ask for refuge in Israel. In 2014, around 47,000 individuals who had taken the same path were present on Israeli territory, among whom were 8,852 Sudanese nationals and 34,475 Eritreans (Shani et al. 2014). While first depicted as survivors of genocide entitled to claim protection (Anteby-Yemini 2009; Willen 2010; Paz 2011), African asylum seekers[1] soon entered into a language of insecurity and criminality in the Israeli political discourse. The crossing of the Egyptian-Israeli border and the settling of asylum seekers in Israeli cities (in particular Tel Aviv and Eilat) became a matter of concern, and technologies blocking the incorporation of these non-Jewish migrants into Israel and its territory were deployed. These technologies included the refusal, until 2013, to examine individual asylum requests, the construction of a fence at the Israeli-Egyptian border, the amendment of a law criminalising the 'infiltration' of the Egyptian border by migrants, the use of detention against asylum seekers, and the 2012 and 2015 decisions to return African migrants to their country of origin or to third countries.

Against this backdrop, this chapter focuses on the legitimisation of these technologies of blocking and exclusion in the Israeli political discourse. More specifically, through a discourse analysis of political actors' public speeches and parliamentary debates, I seek to answer the following questions: how have exclusionary policies been justified in the Israeli political discourse? To which other elements have the mobility of asylum seekers and the policies in place been connected in political discourse and with what effects? How has the imaginary of the border, detention, and deportation played out in the discourse surrounding the issue of asylum seekers? By its approach, this contribution is in line with the substantial scholarship that has studied the construction of migrants in public discourses (Huysmans 2006; Walters 2008; Squire 2009). However, this chapter does not only explore how migrants are constructed in discourse but also

how the exclusionary techniques in place, including the building of the fence at the border, and the resort to detention and expulsion, are entangled in broader narratives on mobility, security, sovereignty, and the regime boundaries in Israel. By its object, this chapter is thus also complementary to the important set of studies focused on the border-mobility nexus. However, while these studies have mostly addressed the border either through the prism of exception (Doty 2003; Jones 2009; Salter 2008) or through a Foucauldian lens focused on discipline and control (Walters 2006), this chapter does not specifically ask what role the border plays, whether as a means of demarcation or in its 'liquid' form. Rather, it explores the imaginary of border protection (along with other technologies) as articulated in discourse and investigates to what extent this imaginary contributes to a broader discourse sustaining the exclusionary asylum policies in place.

The discourse analysis of political actors' speeches and debates indicates that Israeli exclusionary policies of asylum have been justified through very 'classical' securitising storylines where asylum seekers are constructed in three ways: as a threat to national security, as a disruption of social order, and as a threat to national identity. The analysis of political discourse also shows that in these storylines, detention and expulsion but, more significantly, the imaginary of the border as a protective shield, have played a significant role. From this perspective, the chapter moves away from the growing claim that the border should be studied as a liquid, dislocated site of control (Bigo and Guild 2010; Bigo 2014).[2] The chapter argues instead that in spite of the modernisation of border technologies and the conceptualisation of 'smart borders' (including in Israel), the regulation of the mobility of non-authorised migrants continues to be articulated in classical securitising frames where the border is presented as a line of demarcation protecting *us* from an *other*.

The first part of this chapter offers an overview of mobility control in Israel and of the management of African asylum seekers since their arrival in Israel in 2005. In the second part, this chapter investigates the discourses underpinning the asylum policies in place in Israel and discusses the effects of these discourses.

### Mobility, sovereignty, and regime boundaries in Israel

Promoting the mobility of some while monitoring that of undesired others has been central to the Israeli regime, its security practices, and the protection of its regime boundaries. In terms of regime boundaries, the 'ascent' (*aliyah*) of Jews from the diaspora to 'Eretz Israel' (the land of Israel) was at the core of the Zionist project according to which 'similar progression of immigration and colonization was the precondition for the coming into existence of the State of Israel in 1948' (Shafir 1984: 803). The Law of Return (1950), passed two years after the establishment of the state prolonged this approach by giving Israel a *jus sanguinis* model of immigration. The Law of Return provides that any Jewish persons and

their descendants may immigrate to Israel and be granted the status of *oleh* (i.e., the one who ascends) thus becoming Israeli nationals (Law on Citizenship 1952). In contrast, naturalisation procedures for non-Jews are rare and mostly confined to spouses of Israelis. As a consequence, the vast majority of immigrants who settle in Israel are Jews from abroad legally seen as 'returning' to Israel. The nature of immigration shifted slightly after the 1990s, when the Israeli government started calling temporary non-Jewish migrant workers to Israel.[3] However, despite the significant number of migrant workers who reside in Israel (around 100,000 undocumented migrant workers for around 70,000 migrant workers with documents[4]), and the growing number of migrant workers' children born and raised in the country, the government considers these migrants as temporarily authorised workers meant to remain at the margin of the polity and to leave the country after a fixed period of time (Kemp 2010). As such, they have no entitlement to apply either for citizenship or for permanent residency.

Aside from an immigration regime promoting the establishment of those inside the ethnos and excluding those defined otherwise, the Israeli government has put in place a series of policies meant to control and monitor 'dangerous mobilities' (Walters 2006: 199). Four years after the passing of the Law of Return, parliament passed the Prevention of Infiltration Law (1954), the purpose of which was to prevent potential guerrilla fighters within the Palestinian refugee population re-entering the territory.[5] The law more precisely provided that anyone entering Israel from a neighbouring state via a non-official entry point would be defined as an 'infiltrator' and could be subject to a punishment of five to fifteen years in prison (Prevention of Infiltration Law 1954). Concurrently, Palestinians who had remained in the country during the 1948 war and later became Israeli citizens were the subject of strong controls during the first years of the state's existence. From 1948 to 1965, the majority of Palestinian citizens living in Israel were put under military administration, which enabled the Israeli military to restrict this population's freedom considerably, including its freedom of movement (Lustick 1980). Almost seventy years later, 'biopolitical practices of mobility regulation' (Parsons and Salter 2008: 702) still epitomise the concern for mobility control and blocking in Israel. The screening of travellers and commuters at the airport, at the territorial border, or at train stations are ingrained daily practices, walls are part of the landscape (including the 'barrier of separation', *geder hafrada*, around the West Bank and the fence at the Egyptian border)[6] and the use of checkpoints to select those who are allowed to leave or move within the Occupied Territories are at the centre of the Israeli regime of occupation (Parsons and Salter 2008; Kotef and Amir 2011).

The modalities adopted by the Israeli authorities to deal with the border crossing of non-Jewish African asylum seekers and their presence in the country have to a large extent been a continuity of these practices of control, exclusion, and blocking. Exclusion first resulted in the absence, and later in the closed character,

of the Israeli asylum regime. In spite of the fact that Israel is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, the country has never incorporated the international convention in its national legislation. The granting of residency to boat people at the end of the 1970s and the temporary protection of Bosnians and Kosovars in the 1990s were the result of *ad hoc* government decisions that did not lead to the adoption of any asylum legislation (Yaron et al. 2013). In this context, the management of African asylum seekers as of 2005 was characterised by improvisation or, to use Yonathan Paz's (2011) words, by an 'ordered disorder'.[7]

In 2007, the Israeli government decided that 492 Darfuris, considered genocide survivors, would be granted temporary residence and working permits in Israel (Anteby-Yemini 2009; Willen 2010). For the other Sudanese and Eritreans who arrived in the following years, the asylum system was closed, however, asylum seekers being barred from submitting asylum requests altogether. Instead, asylum seekers from Eritrea and Sudan were granted temporary permits guaranteeing momentary protection from deportation. These permits, which must be renewed every two months at the Ministry of the Interior, allow Eritreans and Sudanese migrants to temporarily stay in Israel until the government deems it safe to return them to their country of origin. While allowing asylum seekers to temporarily remain on the territory, the permits nevertheless provide very limited access to health care (including for children) and to welfare services and explicitly mention that they do not constitute a working permit (although in practice, the work prohibition has been unenforced after Supreme Court ruling HCJ 6312/10 in 2011). In 2013, after pressure from the Supreme Court, the government agreed to start assessing individual asylum requests for the first time. However, by February 2015 around 5,300 asylum requests had been submitted, among which just 1,050 had been processed and only four had led to the granting of refugee status (Lior 2015).[8]

Besides the slow and dissuasive refugee status determination procedure, the government has put in place a series of policies aimed at regulating the movement of asylum seekers, encouraging the departure of those already in Israel, and blocking the arrival of those attempting to come. Among the tools employed, the government has used detention to varying degrees. After 2005, many African asylum seekers were arrested upon their arrival and detained in prisons located at the Egyptian border. While in detention, asylum seekers received medical examinations, their state of origin would be checked and they would be registered in a database – yet no asylum request would be taken. After a variable period of time (from a few weeks to a few months), some of these detainees were relocated in 'alternative detention' in *kibbutzim* and *moshavim* (collective farms) (Refugees' Rights Forum 2008).[9] Later on, those leaving detention were taken directly to cities, mainly to Tel Aviv, where most asylum seekers currently live.[10]

While detention was used in a non-systematic way in the early years, the 2012 amendment to the Prevention of Infiltration Law, which criminalised

migrants crossing the border without authorisation, formally introduced detention into the government toolkit. According to the 2012 amendment, any person (and his or her children) crossing the Egyptian border illegally was to be considered an 'infiltrator' and thereby subject to a three-year period of imprisonment without trial. For 'infiltrators' coming from an 'enemy state', namely Sudan, detention could be indefinite. In September 2013 the Supreme Court cancelled the amendment on the ground that it infringed some of the rights – human dignity and liberty – guaranteed by the Israeli Basic Law in a disproportionate way (HCJ 7146/12). Thereafter, the government introduced a new amendment to the Prevention of Infiltration Law providing that those crossing the border illegally would be held in prison for a maximum period of one year (in the prison of Saharonim located in the desert), while those already in the country and who could not be returned would be placed in open detention centres (Holot, located next to Saharonim) for an indefinite period of time (Prevention of Infiltration Law, Amendment 4, 2013). In mid-June 2014, about 2,500 asylum seekers were detained in Holot or Saharonim (according to Human Rights Watch 2014), and in September of the same year, the Supreme Court once again cancelled the amendment on similar grounds as in 2013 (HCJ 8425/13). In response to the ruling, the Knesset passed Amendment 5 of the Prevention of Infiltration Law, which turned the one-year period of prison into three months and the indefinite detention in open facilities into twenty months.[11] In 2015, the Supreme Court examined the law again and ruled that asylum seekers detained for more than one year should be released. However, it did not condemn the resort to detention in general (HCJ 8665/2014).

In parallel with, or as a complementary tool to detention, the government started making use of expulsion and 'voluntary return'[12] after 2012. Among those who were coercively or voluntarily returned were South Sudanese who lost their temporary protection in 2012 on the ground that South Sudan was considered a safe place by the government. Following this government decision, more than 1,300 South Sudanese were returned to the newly independent state (Lijnders 2013). Other asylum seekers from Eritrea and Sudan detained in Holot and in the prison of Saharonim were also encouraged to 'voluntarily return' to their countries or to third countries during the same period and in 2015, non-governmental organisations estimated that around 9,000 asylum seekers had left Israel (Drori-Avraham et al. 2015). In April 2015, the government announced its decision to expel all remaining asylum seekers from Eritrea and Sudan to third countries (known to be Rwanda and possibly Uganda), where they would allegedly receive a status. The decision has not been implemented at the time of writing.

Finally, concurrently to the other policies in place, the government worked on making it harder to cross the border. In the early years, soldiers patrolling at the Egypt–Israel border were encouraged to make use of 'hot returns', that is, to

directly return to Egypt the individuals attempting to cross the border. Later on, in 2010, the government announced its decision to build a wall along the entire Israel–Egypt border. The 240-kilometre barrier was completed in 2013, and since then only a few African asylum seekers have succeeded in crossing the border.

The next part of this chapter explores how these techniques of control, exclusion, and blocking used to deal with African asylum seekers were justified in the Israeli political discourse and with what effects.

### The construction of the threatening other and the imaginary of the border

Drawing on discourse theory and discourse analysis, the second part of this contribution explores the way Israeli policies of asylum have been articulated and justified in political discourse. More specifically, the next part disentangles the political discourse justifying the asylum policies by identifying two elements of the political discourse. On the one hand, I identify the main storylines present in the discourse, i.e., the main condensed statements 'summarising complex narratives, used by people as "short hand" in discussions' (Hajer 2006: 69). On the other hand, I unpack the chains of equivalence and opposition (Saussure 2002) through which migrants and the technologies of exclusion are articulated and given meaning. The discourses under study are official speeches by ministers and parliamentary debates since 2007, including the debates held in the Knesset over the three amendments of the Prevention of Infiltration Law (2012, 2013, 2014). The analysis displays that the political discourse justifying asylum policies has entailed three different storylines, which have constructed asylum seekers as a threat to national security, as disruptive of social order, and as a threat to national identity. It shows that in all storylines the notions of the border and border reinforcement have been central.

#### African migrants as 'infiltrators' and the border as a shield against existential threat

The first central storyline of the political discourse associates African asylum seekers with an existential danger through different chains of equivalence. As early as 2007, while the Israeli government had just made the decision to grant residency to asylum seekers from Darfur, Sudanese and Eritrean newcomers were connected with grave security threats. A member of the Knesset (MK) and member of the party then heading the government, for instance, claimed during a parliamentary debate on the issue:

> 90% of the infiltrators are not refugees, some of them constitute a security risk, and it is the Israeli government's responsibility to stand for our national interests, our security interests, and to make sure that security threats do not enter [our] border. (MK Plesner, Kadima, Parliamentary Debates on Darfuri Refugees, 2007)

From the beginning, asylum seekers were thus presented as potentially dangerous subjects intruding onto Israeli territory and threatening Israeli security. Explicitly labelled as threats or as dangerous potential 'terror operatives linked to Al Qaida' (MK Plesner 2007; Foreign Minister Livni, in Wurgaft 2007) they were also securitised through their association with other threats allegedly jeopardising the existence of the state. For instance, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared in a 2010 speech on national security:

> we must also lay the infrastructure that will prevent the free movement of illegal infiltrators [crossing the borders from Egypt]. We are going to erect an obstacle in the South, as this issue is no less important for our national security than the other things I mentioned [on the topic of national security i.e., Hezbollah and the Iranian threat]. (Prime Minister Netanyahu 2010a)

In addition to putting asylum seekers on an equal footing with two threats painted as existential in the Israeli discourse – Hezbollah and Iran – the notion of 'infiltrator' present in the aforementioned excerpts and commonly used by political actors (and journalists) to designate African migrants is noteworthy. As explained above, the notion of infiltrator was first defined by the Prevention of Infiltration Law, which was itself originally passed to prevent potential Palestinian combatants (*fedayeen*) from entering Israel in the early 1950s. Using the 'infiltrator' label to designate African asylum seekers and mobilising the Prevention of Infiltration Law to deal with the phenomenon of asylum (occasionally at first and then systematically after 2012) not only contributes to criminalising asylum seekers but also reactivates powerful memories and imaginaries of insecurity, border vulnerability, and terror. It thereby generates a classical securitising modality (Huysmans 2014), where the choices are either acting, or risking that the state dies. As stated by the prime minister two years later, the future and very existence of the country would indeed be at stake:

> We must control our borders – it's the duty and right of each country [...]. If over the five years or the decade the country is flooded with hundreds of thousands of illegal refugees, then there will be a real threat to our internal system, to the character of the state and its very future. (Prime Minister Netanyahu 2012b)

Besides the paradoxical association of the 'refugee' category with the notion of 'illegality', the connection of asylum seekers with the notion of a flood threatening the borders acts as another powerful discursive securitising move. The strength of the flood metaphor comes from its multiple dimensions and connotations. The notion of flood both evokes the biblical deluge, hence conveying apocalyptic imageries, and the image of a small isolated and vulnerable island

(Skilling 2011; Paz 2011). In Israel, which commonly describes itself as a 'villa in the jungle' (Shlaim 2012; Gordon 2011), the flood metaphor performs a very powerful role in the creation of fear, both drawing on and reinforcing the posture of defence and the siege mentality already present in the country. Furthermore, the equation between asylum seekers and a flood reinforces the construction of African migrants as a homogenous existential danger challenging the borders and the existence of Israel. Through this infiltration–flood–asylum seekers equation, asylum seekers are turned from potential refugees into unwanted bodies that need to be blocked without delay.

Overall, the deployment of a storyline framing asylum seekers as a security problem rather than as a human rights question (Huysmans 2000) not only disqualifies the claim that African migrants are potential refugees but also legitimates 'a stronger focus on border controls and a more crucial position of border police' (Huysmans and Squire 2009: 169). In this storyline, the border plays a central and persistent role. On the one hand, the border represents the root cause of Israel's vulnerability and the possibility that dangerous elements enter, for Israel is allegedly 'the only Western country that has a land border with the African continent' (Minister of the Interior Saar, Parliamentary Debates on the Prevention of Infiltration Law, first reading, 2013). On the other hand, the construction of 'infrastructures' at the border permits a reassertion of the role of the border as ' "protecting" the "us insiders" from the "them outsiders" ... be it ... armies, criminals, migrants or asylum seekers' (Newman 2003: 14). In such narration, the building of the fence at the border is thus more than just a tool 'that will prevent the free movement of illegal infiltrators' (Prime Minister Netanyahu 2010a): it becomes the means that will protect 'our internal system, the character of the state and its very future' (Prime Minister Netanyahu 2012b).

To a lesser extent, detention technologies participate in creating this imaginary of protection. As explained by the Minister of the Interior during the debates on the amendment of the Prevention of Infiltration Law after the completion of the fence:

> The fence alone is not enough. A person who has crossed thousands of kilometres in the desert and had his money taken, that person will cross, even with the fence. There is also a fence within Eretz Israel and illegal Palestinian residents do cross it. The fence is a complementary tool ... Without the closed facility and without the open facilities, they will come. (Minister Saar, Parliamentary Debates on the Prevention of Infiltration Law, second and third readings, 2013)

In this part of the story, the action of the border fence as a frontline expands inside the territory through the use of detention. Detention would play a similar role as the fence itself: it prevents, repels, and blocks the arrival of new asylum seekers onto the territory.

*The infiltrator as a challenge to social order: blocking and controlling
undesirable bodies*

The second storyline frames asylum seekers as destabilising factors threatening
the order of Israeli society. This storyline can be summarised by the following
recent declaration of the former Minister of the Interior according to which:

> [the presence of illegal immigrants] harms the fabric of Israeli society, damages the
> labour market, reduces the resources allocated to different sectors such as the educa-
> tion, health care and welfare systems, which Israeli citizens and residents enjoy, and
> unfortunately, sometimes increases crime in areas where illegal immigrants are con-
> centrated. (Minister of the Interior Erdan, Parliamentary Debates on the Prevention
> of Infiltration Law, first reading, 2014)

More specifically, two main chains of equivalence can be unravelled in this
storyline, both of which appear in this previous statement. The first one associ-
ates asylum seekers with the category of crime, fear, and daily insecurity. It is
underpinned by the categories of illegality and the repeated assertion accord-
ing to which 'most of the migrants from Africa are engaged in criminal actions'
(Minister of the Interior Yishai, in *Haaretz* 2012). At a time when demonstrations
against the presence of asylum seekers in Southern Tel Aviv (the neighbourhood
where most African migrants have settled) were frequent, one member of parlia-
ment who himself took part in several demonstrations declared in parliament:

> I recently saw the evil that residents of the neighbourhood go through, whose lives
> become hell. I see a lonely man, and he says: I am afraid to go back to my house, they
> threaten me, they hurt me, they tell me anti-Semitic things, they beat me. I am going to
> the police and no one answers me. This is the reality. Can we ignore this reality? (MK Ben
> Ari, National Union, Parliamentary Debates on the Prevention of Infiltration Law 2012)

The second central chain of equivalence deployed in this storyline articu-
lates asylum seekers as a threat to the Israeli economy and to the job market. As
claimed by one member of the Knesset during parliamentary debates:

> In hotels … all the workers, maids and cleaning staff are infiltrators. I am ask-
> ing: do you not think that this takes the job of an Israeli citizen? (MK Vaknin, Shas,
> Parliamentary Debates on the Prevention of Infiltration Law 2012)

Framed as a threat to the economy, asylum seekers are not individu-
als with singular paths, origins, and intentions. Instead, they are 'all infiltra-
tors', or 'labour infiltrators', and constitute 'a flood of migrant workers' (MK
Plesner, Parliamentary Debates on Darfuri Refugees 2007), a homogeneous cat-
egory of undistinguishable subjects menacing the citizens of the state and the
social order.

The storyline of asylum seekers as a threat to social order has several effects.
First, it casts doubt as to the real motive of African migrants' presence in Israel,

hence further disqualifying the category of refugee. As claimed by one MK during the 2014 parliamentary debates on the law: 'Why do you not tell the truth: what refugee is there here? After all, they are all job seekers' (MK Zeev, Shas, Parliamentary Debates on the Prevention of Infiltration Law 2014).

Second, similar to the construction of asylum seekers as a national security threat, framing African asylum seekers as 'culpable subjects' (Squire 2009: 107) rather than as people in need of protection enables the speakers to conclude that 'infiltrators' must be managed with police and security measures rather than humanitarian ones. As the then Minister of the Interior Eli Yishai claimed during a radio interview, 'most of the African infiltrators are criminals. I would put all of them, without exception, into a prison or other holding facility' (Minister of the Interior Yishai, in Weiler-Polak 2012), because '[w]e must make people feel safe again' (Minister of the Interior Yishai, in Efraim 2015).

Third, addressed through the prism of infiltration, crime, and danger to the job market, asylum seekers are further constructed as undesirable elements that the government must prevent from entering the country through different repelling means. Among these means, reinforcing or in fact sealing the border is again evoked as the key solution to defend Israel from the threatening flood. As the prime minister put it when evoking the decision to construct a fence at the Egyptian border:

> During the Winter Session, we will begin the construction of a fence in the South to prevent the massive infiltration of illegal job-seekers, which threaten the character and identity of the state of Israel. This is a necessary step to prevent the country from being flooded by elements that undermine our economy, as well as the unique structure we have built here. (Prime Minister Netanyahu 2010b)

Four years later, while the fence by then completely prevented new asylum seekers from crossing the border, dealing with the 'infiltrators' continued to be intertwined with the imaginary of border protection and border reinforcement. Introducing the amendment of the Prevention of Infiltration Law to the Knesset in 2014, the Minister of the Interior for instance justified the need for the law on the basis that '[t]he state of Israel has the duty to defend its borders, protect its sovereignty, protect the safety of its citizens and residents' (Minister of the Interior Erdan, Parliamentary Debates on the Prevention of Infiltration Law 2014).

## *The border as the enactment of national identity*

As mentioned above, the Israeli citizenship regime has first and foremost been designed in order to attract Jewish immigrants to the country. In this context, the presence of non-Jewish migrants has been mostly conceived as a controlled phenomenon aiming to remain temporary and at the margin of the regime

(Kemp 2010). In instances where the presence of non-Jewish migrants has seemed to endure, political actors and the media alike have been prompt to raise the spectre of the 'demographic threat' jeopardising the Jewish identity of the state (Kritzman-Amir 2009). Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the Jewish character of the state was very quickly part of the public conversation on asylum seekers. Concurrent with the rhetoric of compassion and openness inspired by the experiences of the Jewish people,[13] the Jewishness of the state was also referred to in a completely different way so as to justify the exclusionary policies in place. Explaining the rationale for improving border protection and the necessity to build a fence at the border, Prime Minister Netanyahu for instance argued:

> this phenomenon [the arrival of asylum seekers] is extremely serious and is threatening the various components of society, and of course threatens our national security and our national identity. It began over seven years ago, and when the government took office three years ago, we decided to deal with this problem in all its aspects – first of all, by stopping entries and second, by beginning to send abroad those who are here. If we do not stop their entry, the problem, which now extends to 60,000 infiltrators could easily develop into 600,000, and flood the country, thus eliminating to a large extent our character as a Jewish and democratic state. (Prime Minister Netanyahu 2012a)

Although the identity of the state is here labelled as 'Jewish and democratic', the reference to the demographic issue suggests that the element that needs to be preserved is above all the Jewish dimension of the state. This consideration has been made more explicit in other political statements including those by the Minister of the Interior during the discussions over the Prevention of Infiltration Law, when he stated:

> If we decide to be the liberal benchmark in the West, with our own hands, we will lose the only Jewish state that exists. And who denies this simple truth, should just walk around in Bern in Switzerland or in Brussels in Belgium, or Paris and see with his own eyes what happens when countries do not deal on time with the effects of illegal entry into their territory. (Minister of the Interior Saar, Parliamentary Debates on the Prevention of Infiltration Law 2013)

Other than constituting asylum seekers as a threat to national security and to social order, the dominant political discourse in the third storyline thus 'creates an image of immigration associated with an outsider coming inside, as a danger to the homogeneity of the state, the society, and the polity' (Bigo 2002: 67). More than a sheer disruption to the culture of the state, the arrival of the 'other' could turn Israel 'into a country that is not Jewish' (MK Hotovely, Likud, Parliamentary Debate on the Prevention of Infiltration Law 2011), hence potentially leading to the end of the state. Against the imminent danger that the country be wiped out by the waves of 'illegal infiltrators', reinforcing the

border appears as a central instrument, which political actors insist on normalising through comparisons with other states' experiences and practices. As claimed by one member of parliament during the debates on the Prevention of Infiltration Law, the state of Israel should indeed:

> protect its borders, because at the end of the day, this country is a country that we need to protect as a Jewish, democratic state, and that needs to protect its borders like any other Western country in the world. (MK Hasson, Likud, Parliamentary Debate on the Prevention of Infiltration Law 2011)

Acting along the border, the expulsion of 'those who are here' also plays out in this storyline, both bolstering the feeling of vulnerability and the assurance of protection against the threat. Former Minister of the Interior Yishai for instance stated on several occasions that to 'defend the Jewish majority ... each and every one of them [the infiltrators] will return to their countries' (Minister of the Interior Yishai, in Hartman 2011. The border and deportation are thus both constructed in a similar way: as protecting mechanisms enabling the state identity to survive. By excluding and including, these technologies enable membership and delineate the boundaries of belonging, 'with the "us" and the "here" being located inside the border while the "other" and the "there" is everything beyond the border' (Newman 2006: 172).

## Conclusion

Under the label of 'illegal infiltrators', African asylum seekers have crystallised all that threatens the state in the Israeli imaginary: the criminal and potential terrorist illegally infiltrating the border, the threat to national security, to the economic order, and to the national identity of the state. The objective of this chapter was to unpack this discourse and more specifically to disentangle the discursive processes by which the exclusionary asylum policies used to manage asylum seekers are justified by political actors. On the basis of a discourse analysis of political speeches and parliamentary debates, I have identified three main storylines framing asylum seekers and the responses to their arrival in different, yet interconnected ways. In the first storyline, asylum seekers are framed as a threat to national security, a threat as perilous and grave as Iran or Hezbollah. Against such a threat, the physical border embodied by the 'fence', the effect of which the detention camps prolong, is presented as a necessary tool to repel 'illegal infiltrators' allegedly threatening the security of the state. In another discursive move, asylum seekers are painted as the conveyors of fear, criminality, and economic threat. In this storyline, asylum seekers are equated both with an external danger, a flood of 'labour infiltrators' that the fence should hold back, and with an internal danger already 'infiltrated' within the country, which detention should contain. Finally, a third storyline of the Israeli political

discourse constructs asylum seekers as a threat to the Jewish identity of the state, a storyline in which the border and the fence epitomise the demarcation between a dangerous *them* and a Jewish *us*.

In this discourse, the different meanings conferred on the border play two connected roles. On the one hand, they reinforce the construction of asylum seekers as a threat to the entire country, its sovereignty, and identity. Associated with the notion of infiltration and flood, the border reinforces the image of a possible demarcation between a safe territory opposed to a dangerous, homogenous external threat to be repelled. On the other hand, the border, sometimes alongside detention and expulsion, also plays out as a shield guaranteeing protection to society, the state, the polity, and its identity. Overall, the border thus operates 'as a meta-concept that condenses a whole set of negative meanings, including illegal immigration ... At the same time [it holds] out the promise of a solution to these hazards' (Walters 2008: 174–5). In a context of disorganised asylum policies in Israel, resorting to the image of border reinforcement not only conveys a sense of fear, but the 'danger of losing control of the borders of the state and of the country's future' (Minister of the Interior Saar, Parliamentary Debates on the Prevention of Infiltration Law 2013), thus justifying the exclusionary policies, but also creating a sense of control, protection, and retrieved sovereignty. Such repeated convocation of the border as central to justifying the exclusionary policies of asylum (even when asylum seekers are no longer crossing the border) stands out against the growing imaginary of liquid or gaseous borders, among academics and practitioners alike (Bigo 2014). In contrast with this dislocated image of the border, the imaginary of closed borders and of the border as a shield remains strong and even at the centre of political discourse in Israel. In spite of the changes that borders have undergone with the development of new technologies (Bigo 2004; Ceyhan 2004; Dillon 2007) and despite the calls in the literature to move 'beyond territoriality' (McNevin 2014), the Israeli case thus suggests that the imaginary of the border as a protection against outsiders, as a way of reclaiming sovereignty and reasserting identity remains central to the political arena.

NOTES

1    Although most African migrants from Sudan and Eritrea are technically not asylum seekers since most of them have not been able to submit a formal asylum request, this chapter applies the notion of asylum seeker to Sudanese and Eritrean migrants since the reason for their presence in Israel is their desire to seek refuge in the country according to the meaning of the Geneva Convention.

2    The metaphor of liquidity refers to a transformation in the 'logic of control and security'. In such an approach of the border 'controls are organized through a series of imperceptible locks and weirs, through a "channelling" of flows, organized in several steps and through various forms of filtering. The idea that borders may be successfully closed or made impermeable is definitely abandoned; walls can always be surmounted, people evade control' (Bigo 2002: 213).

3   Most migrant workers in Israel come from Thailand, the Philippines, China, Nepal, and Sri Lanka (see: http://hotline.org.il/en/migrants-en/%e2%80%8fcountries-of-origin-of-refugees-in-israel/).

4   See Hotline for Refugees and Migrants: http://hotline.org.il/en/migrants-en/.

5   As indicated above, this law would later be used to deal with African asylum seekers entering Israel.

6   See on the use and effects of walls Stéphanie Latte Abdallah and Cédric Parizot (2010).

7   Until 2009, Israel in fact delegated the role of questioning, identifying, and determining the status of asylum seekers to the Office of the High Commission for Refugees of the United Nations with the Ministry of Interior having the last say on the decision. After 2009, the process was taken over by different branches of the Israeli government including the Unit of Identification and Questioning at the Department for Infiltrators and Refugees and the Refugee Status Determination unit.

8   The four asylum seekers recognised as refugees were from Eritrea. Five Sudanese were also granted refugee status but they were already part of the group of Darfuris to whom the government had decided to grant residence permits in 2007.

9   On the changes in asylum policies and detention procedures up until 2013, see Yaron et al. (2013).

10  Between 2008 and 2009, due to the concentration of asylum seekers in southern Tel Aviv, the government attempted to control the settlement of asylum seekers across the territory and started delivering permits valid only in specific areas 'north of Hadera or south of Gadera' (Lijnders 2013: 16). Similarly, in August 2015, after the Supreme Court ruled that asylum seekers detained in Holot for more than twelve months should be released, the government decided that those leaving detention would not be able to resettle in either Eilat or Tel Aviv.

11  The new amendment also introduced new fees to be paid by working 'infiltrators' and their employers.

12  Voluntary return was offered to all asylum seekers wishing to go back to their country, especially to those who were detained in Saharonim and Holot and for whom return was presented as the only possible alternative to detention. When consenting to leave Israel for their own country or a third country, they were offered a fixed amount of money (around $3,000) and a flight ticket. See on the use of 'voluntary returns', Adi Drori-Avraham et al. (2015).

13  In the first years in particular, those supporting the granting of refugee status to asylum seekers underlined time and again that the Jewish people would 'hold a special obligation' towards the asylum seekers (Kalir 2015: 2). For an analysis of the counter-discourse contesting the Israeli asylum policies and on the reference to Jewish history in this discourse, see also Sharon Weinblum (2015).

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# Reinventing political order? A discourse view on the European Community and the abolition of border controls in the second half of the 1980s

Stef Wittendorp

W HAT KIND OF order did the European Community (EC) and later the European Union (EU) become by deciding to abolish border controls between the member states in the second half of the 1980s? The EU has been celebrated as a postnational entity which has been able to overcome old enmities between European states that resulted in so many wars in the past. Against this background, the EU is often turned into a benevolent actor. Such was the message by European Commission President José Manuel Barroso and EU President Herman van Rompuy in response to the awarding of the Nobel peace prize to the EU in October 2012: 'this Prize is the strongest possible recognition of the deep political motives behind our Union: the unique effort by ever more European states to overcome war and divisions and to jointly shape a continent of peace and prosperity' (2012).

This chapter is critical of such a benevolent rendering of the EU by highlighting a process of simultaneous 'debordering' and 'rebordering' (Rumford 2006: 157). Although the EU claims to be an inclusive community with regard to the member states and the rest of the world by attempting to break down a variety of borders, it reinstitutes them in other places with the effect of rerouting and redefining mobility and thereby also legitimising new forms of security. Examining the discussion about abolishing border controls between the member states and the proposal for alternative schemes of control during the second half of the 1980s shows the grounding of the EC/EU as a distinct territorial entity and as such becoming involved in the regulation of who can enter the territory under what circumstances. This chapter thus adds a note of caution with regard to those who celebrate the EU as a benevolent, postnational development.

Central to the analysis is the concept of the border. Traditionally, borders were understood as physical markers of the state's territory. Research focused on describing and classifying borders (Newman 2001: 140–1) and

their function was understood as either open or closed (Rumford 2006: 160). A sociological approach to borders has turned attention to the meaning-making practices involving borders (Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2009; Parizot et al. 2014; Johnson et al. 2011). It led to the notion of bordering, a focus on the process through which borders are made and remade; borders are never permanent fixtures. As Alison Mountz argues, 'borders are always in a state of becoming, their conceptualization remains provisional in nature' (Johnson et al. 2011: 65). Accounts of bordering also moved away from the idea of borders as strictly territorial markers of state sovereignty. Borders are considered legal, social, political, and cultural markers that emerge across and inside territories (Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2009: 583; Parizot et al. 2014: 505). Rather than designating the edge of the state's territory, borders should be understood as a 'multiplicity', a marker that manifests at multiple locales and in various forms, as William Walters (2006: 198) argues. Sociological accounts of borders are critical of the thesis that globalisation leads to the disappearance of borders (Rumford 2006: 157).

Indeed, while some borders, such as the checks between EU member states, vanish, a process known as debordering, they reappear in other, sometimes less visible and perhaps more unexpected places, a process known as rebordering. An example of rebordering are the various databases (Schengen Information System, Visa Information System, Eurodac) maintained by the EU that regulate entry and exit regarding the EU. Border controls are no longer exclusively performed at the edge of the territory but both before and after crossing the geographical border (Johnson et al. 2011: 61; Parizot et al. 2014: 505). Debordering and rebordering are not characterised by an either/or logic, they occur at the same time, although perhaps in different places (Rumford 2006: 157). Borders are regarded here as spatio-temporal constructs that produce and are the product of distinct formations of power and space (Van Houtum and Strüver 2002: 142). As such, bordering affects who can be mobile, the conditions under which this mobility is (il)legitimate, with what velocities movement takes place, their rhythms, routes taken, the experience affecting the traveller, and the degrees of friction encountered (Cresswell 2010: 22–6). Border control is then understood as a 'form of sorting through the imposition of status-functions on people and things' (Cooper and Perkins 2012: 57).

The debate over the removal of border controls between the member states in the second half of the 1980s is situated here in relation to the terminology of sociologist Manuel Castells (2010: Vol. 1, Chap. 6) of the space of flows and the space of places. The abolition of border controls is an expression of a broader principle on which societies organise themselves, they are preoccupied with boosting the 'exchange and interaction' – flows – between actors that are 'physically disjointed' (Castells 2010: 442). In EC/EU terms, this means the breaking down of barriers between member states to contribute to an 'ever-closer union

among the peoples of Europe' (EC 1957: 11). This manner of organising societies is contra that of the space of places where 'form, function, and meaning are self-contained within the boundaries of physical contiguity' (Castells 2010: 453). Within EU studies, the notion of the space of flows has helped to capture and rethink the ambition of the EC/EU to become a singular space or monotopia (Jensen and Richardson 2004: 3), including the effects this has in terms of the conduct of government (Hajer 2000: 138–9). For this chapter, Castells's terms help identify a field of power relations in which the space of places, as embodied here by the sovereignty–territory nexus and globalisation as the pinnacle of the space of flows, triggers a productive tension in which new forms of governing become possible.

More concretely, the chapter examines how the abolition of border controls between the member states was made possible as a topic of discussion in the second half of the 1980s. It looks at the ways of public political reasoning about borders and border control. In the debate over the removal of these controls, the notion of the border appears both as facilitator of economic exchange and as security device, a duality of functions that seems to be at odds. Chris Rumford (2007: 330–1) has identified this tension in the context of scholarly writing as well. Accounts emphasising the openness of borders, that is focusing on borders as facilitating flows, coexist with accounts pointing to the securitisation of borders, that is the making of borders as security devices. His suggested way out is the 'networked border', a term that captures the idea of border control as not necessarily taking place at the territorial border but at various points throughout society (Rumford 2006: 158; see also Walters 2006: 193; Guild 2009). In line with Rumford, as well as Walters's earlier cited notion of the border as a multiplicity, the chapter argues that the economic and security functions of borders are not mutually exclusive but represent a productive tension (see also Mezzadra and Neilson 2013: 3) which has made possible new forms of government for the EC/EU. The chapter thus contributes to the historicising of the networked border. Several aspects lie outside its purview: it does not address the 'Schengen' and 'Brussels' initiatives as contending ways of conducting border control (for an insightful analysis, see Zaiotti 2011) and border control specifically refers to checks with regard to the crossing of persons instead of controls on services, goods, and capital unless stated otherwise.

The structure of the chapter is as follows. The first part elaborates the theoretical assumptions and the method of analysis. It introduces the notion of discourse as inspired by the work of Michel Foucault, shows what reading strategies are used in examining the sources, and points to the limitations of this approach and the sources. The second part situates the debate on the removal of border checks and the need for alternative controls in a wider context. It examines two interlinked discourses: one on European Union, premised on the notion of an ever-closer union between the peoples of Europe and the removal

of barriers between the member states, and another on valorisation, that is the EC/EU being relevant in the daily life of citizens. The interlinkage of these discourses enables discussion of the removal of border controls as a viable option. The third part focuses on the meaning-making practices concerning the border between the member states. The border is conceptualised as a barrier, although in different ways. According to economic reasoning, borders prevent optimum exchange and wealth creation, while following a security reasoning, the border is seen as an essential device of protection. The fourth part shifts the attention to the need for new regimes of control and the kind of claims underpinning them. Knowledge about cross-border events was central to this. The fifth part offers concluding reflections by examining the functions ascribed to the border and border control in light of the notions of sovereignty and territory. As such, it argues that the removal of border controls contributed to the emerging territoriality of the EC/EU and the limits within which the EU is conceived as a political order.

## Discourse analysis

The discussion on the abolition of border controls is approached through the lens of discourse. This part introduces and defines the notion of discourse, clarifies the methods employed in studying discourse, and discusses the primary material, including the limits of this specific approach. Discourse is widely used in the social sciences and this chapter builds on the work of Foucault in particular. Foucault's understanding of discourse (1972: 27; 1991: 59–60) refers to a set of rules through which meaning is established. Reality or knowledge is not accessible without the meaning-making practices that they produce and of which they are a product. What is real or fake, true or false, good or bad is not pre-given, but regulated by sets of implicit rules. Language, neither in written nor spoken form, does not mirror reality but brings about a reality as unfolded by language. Events, subjects, and objects become knowable by being ascribed particular qualities or meaning, instead of these meanings capturing an already existing reality. Discourse is at the same time infused with and the product of a nexus between knowledge and power. Those in a position of power have the ability to shape what counts as truth or knowledge more than others. On the other hand, the particular truth or knowledge also structures who or what can become authoritative. Every discourse is premised on the empowerment of particular meanings and the simultaneous marginalisation or even silencing of others (Foucault 1972: 27–8). Discourse as performative of particular truths and knowledge implies that meaning is contingent, in need of continuous reproduction and always open to change.

Although discourse can be studied in various ways, this chapter focuses on written texts. These texts are not read to gain insight into the motives of actors but

the texts themselves are the object of study (Rose 1999: 56; Wæver 2009: 165–6). The texts are studied to understand what Foucault (1991: 54) calls the 'criteria of formation' of a discourse, that is the implicit rules through which meaning emerges and within this how, through the mobilisation of language, the participants make meaningful certain events and the kind of subject-positions they construct for themselves and others. In terms of text selection, the interest is in authoritative articulations, texts that structure a discursive web of relations in such a way, thereby creating conditions of possibility for distinct meanings to emerge (Hansen 2006: 82). These texts are here referred to as key texts. At the same time, there is a need to account for the power/knowledge dimension of discourse, that is, the limits of what can and cannot be said or written. This requires the selection of texts that display what is referred to here as productivity.[1] Productive texts are those that provide a glimpse of what appears as unity, or rather is disunity organised as unity; such texts highlight the contingency of meaning.

Discourse is studied through two reading strategies that are presented here as separate for analytical purposes although they were performed simultaneously. The first is a reading to understand what terms, qualities, or dichotomies are drawn on to make known events, subjects, and objects. The reading goes beyond this as well by accounting for the regularities through which meaning is ordered. It is a reading to understand what the discourse forms as content and how it does so. This strategy is premised on the principle of exhaustion, additional texts are read until such material confirms the regularities already identified, although it is important to read across space and time (Wæver 2005: 39–40). The grouping of statements across space and time as forming a discourse is based on the prior assumption of the texts as all relating to the same object (Foucault 1972: 32), in this case the abolition of border controls. The second reading locates dissent and contradictions to understand the power/knowledge nexus of discourse. This reading is attentive to aspects that are either marginalised or silenced. Taken together, both readings account for the conditions under which particular (sets of) statements or meanings become possible.[2]

### The EC and the conditions of possibility for removing border controls

The debate on the abolition of border controls between the member states needs to be situated in relation to two broader discourses in order to understand how the removal of border controls could emerge as a topic of discussion in the first place. The first discourse is that of a European Union. The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, signed on 25 March 1957 and better known as the Treaty of Rome, introduced the terminology and logic on which the EC (and later the EU) organised itself. The initial preamblar statement of the Treaty of Rome refers to 'laying the foundations for an ever closer union between the

peoples of Europe' (EC 1957: 11).[3] The second preamblar statement translates this concretely into removing the 'barriers which divide Europe' (EC 1957: 11). These are barriers in a political and historical sense. As one of the goals set by the Treaty was the creation of a 'common market', the notion of barriers gained another meaning, that of removing 'obstacles to freedom of movement for persons, services and capital', as phrased in Article three (EC 1957: 15); these were barriers such as technical or administrative hurdles. During a summit meeting in October 1972, the political leaders of the member states formulated a new objective and linked the 'construction of Europe' to the creation of a 'European Union before the end of this decade' (EC 1972: 15), although the deadline was not met.

The figure of European Union appeared regularly in EC texts as the desired end goal and as a way to set priorities for the EC in order to overcome political or technical differences and move forward. The Report on European Union, appearing in 1975 and authored by the Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans (1975: 34) on behalf of his fellow heads of state or government urged a restoration of the 'political consensus on the aims and main features of the Union' and to make the EC matter in relation to the citizen. The Solemn Declaration on European Union, adopted by the Stuttgart European Council meeting in June 1983, mobilised phrases such as 'efficient decision-making procedures', 'greater coherence and close coordination' and 'the search for common policies' to prioritise the work towards a European Union (European Council 1983: 25). The European Commission's White Paper entitled Completing the Internal Market from June 1985 contained an elaborate list of measures and deadlines to achieve a 'single integrated internal market free of restrictions' (Commission of the European Communities 1985a: 4). All these texts suggest the member states had to act in unity and solidarity to create a space where there was no place for barriers to disrupt the flows between them. Ole B. Jensen and Tim Richardson (Jensen and Richardson 2004: x; see also Hajer 2000) refer to this ambition of the EC/EU as a desire for a singular space or monotopia as they call it.

The second discourse is referred to here as valorisation. The above-mentioned report by Tindemans plays an important part here. Tindemans (1975: 11) considered the EC to be in a 'crisis' and argued that the solution lay in 'Europe ... find[ing] its place again among the major concerns of public opinion thus ensuring that it will be the focal point of the political discussions of tomorrow. We must listen to our people'. Rather than having a 'technocratic Europe', Tindemans (1975: 12–13, 26–7) boldly formulated that a 'European Union must be experienced by the citizen in his daily life'. He mobilised the notion of '[a] citizen's Europe' to capture the desired centrality of the EC in the life of Europeans (Tindemans 1975: 26). One of the suggestions made by Tindemans to achieve this closeness to the citizen was the '*gradual disappearance of frontier controls on persons moving between member countries*' (Tindemans 1975: 27, emph. in orig.).

The notion of a citizen's Europe has since appeared in various key texts as legitimation for removing differences and barriers and continuing towards European Union (see for example European Council 1983; Commission of the European Communities 1985b). An important contribution in this regard were the two reports entitled 'A People's Europe' from the ad hoc Committee on a People's Europe, better known as the Adonnino Committee. The Committee was tasked to 'propose arrangements which will be of direct relevance to Community citizens and which will visibly offer them tangible benefits in their everyday lives' (Commission of the European Communities 1985b: 9). In the preamble of the Treaty on European Union, signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992, the principle of subsidiarity is justified in light of 'decisions ... taken as closely as possible to the citizen' (European Communities 1992: 3).[4] The urge to develop police and judicial cooperation was also inspired by 'bring[ing] the European Union closer to the people' (Council of the European Union and European Commission 1998: 3; see also European Council 1993: 9; 1995; 1999: 2).

The discourse on valorisation, that is, the EC/EU's desire to be relevant to the citizen, is strongly connected with the discourse on European Union. Their interlinkage creates a condition in which the place and role of border control could emerge as a legitimate topic of discussion. This link is facilitated by both discourses being premised on an aversion to barriers, although of different kinds. As has already been pointed out, the discourse on European Union is organised around the elimination of barriers in a technical (to facilitate the flow of goods, persons, services, and capital), political (to confront future challenges), and historical (prevention of war) sense. The valorisation discourse conceives of barriers as the hurdles encountered by the EC to demonstrating its presence in the lives of European citizens. Both discourses approach barriers in such a way that the form of government that is needed to overcome these hurdles can no longer be contained within the territorial arrangements that have long determined the organisation of societies and the state. This reflects David Campbell's (1998: 17) observation that 'we live in a distinctive political time marked by the absence of a corresponding political space; that is to say, the activity of politics is no longer (assumed it once was) concomitant with the enclosure of politics (the state)'. In between the debordering and rebordering of the EC emerged the possibility of pursuing or experimenting with new forms of government (the Schengen system; Europol).

### The border as barrier/enabler

The co-presence of discourses on European Union and valorisation should not lead to the conclusion that the removal of border controls between the member states was inevitable. Up until the mid-1980s it was not evident at all that the actual removal of border controls with regard to persons was a serious option.

Indeed, Tindemans had suggested it in 1975, but it did not become practice until well over a decade after. As the Commission stated in a reply to a question by the Danish MEP Kai Nyborg in 1980: '[u]nder Community law, freedom of movement does not entail the abolition of all checks at frontiers within the Community, nor even of systematic checks; it simply means the right to enter or leave Community countries on presentation of a valid identity card or passport' (European Parliament 1980: 1). The European Council began to move towards the removal of checks on persons when it decided on a 'reactivation of European co-operation' and called for a study of 'the abolition of all police and customs formalities for people crossing intra-Community frontiers' in June 1984 (European Council 1984: 8). This part shows the multiple meanings ascribed to the border and the logic that underpins the notion of border control.

Abolishing border controls between the member states was a sensitive matter in more ways than one. During a Parliament debate in 1985, the Dutch MEP Elise Boot recounted a story of being assisted by the Dutch frontier police after her car had broken down and that the police officers, upon learning she was an MEP, quipped that had they known this in advance, they probably would not have given her a lift (European Parliament 1985b: 249). The frontier police feared being made redundant by the removal of border checks. But the possible unemployment facing border guards was a marginal issue in the EC context. A predominant concern of the member states, various MEPs, and the Commission, while willing to remove obstacles to facilitate flows across the EC, was how to address crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, and immigration in the absence of border controls (European Parliament 1985a: 234; European Parliament 1985b: 247, 249; Commission of the European Communities 1985a: 6; 1992: 38). Border controls were regarded as essential in protecting public order and arguments for their removal were accompanied by the need to find alternative ways of protection. For example, the 1985 Commission White Paper referred to 'the legitimate concerns of the Member States about the need to control drugs and terrorism and is well aware of the role of internal frontier posts in this respect' (Commission of the European Communities 1985a: 10). The Adonnino Committee stressed the need to 'work on problems related to the effective cooperation between authorities responsible for the fight against crime' (Commission of the European Communities 1985a: 10). Commission President Jacques Delors later observed that 'the removal of the physical barriers – that is the borders – will naturally lead to the need for better and more effective coordination among the national administrations with respect to fighting crime, drugs and terrorism' (Delors 1988: 3; see also Commission of the European Communities 1985a: 9; European Council 1985: 13; Bunyan 1997: 10; European Parliament 1985a: 233; European Parliament 1991: 200; European Council 1988b: 3).

Still, the sensitivity involving the removal of border controls due to concerns about how to protect the public order *and* this removal becoming increasingly

more likely from 1985 onwards to complete the common market seems paradoxal. To understand this situation requires an appreciation of the border as a multiplicity in the EC context. One function of the border is as a security device. The earlier reference by Delors to the border as a barrier is instructive in this regard. The border as barrier is about preventing entry or filtering out undesirable subjects. The underlying assumption here is that in a situation without controls there will automatically be an influx of such unwanted elements. Notorious in this regard is the so-called Bruges speech by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1988) in which she stated that 'it is a matter of plain common sense that we cannot totally abolish frontier controls if we are also to protect our citizens from crime and stop the movement of drugs, of terrorists and of illegal immigrants' in September 1988.[5] Although couched in more euphemistic language, Delors (1988: 8) hinted at a similar scenario as Thatcher when saying that '[a]s the economy becomes more international so does crime and delinquency'.

The need for an alternative set of border control arrangements is predicated on a specific understanding of the behaviour of undesirable subjects who are thought to cross the border in the absence of controls. Notions of exploitation and abuse are frequently mobilised to legitimate border control given the presence of criminals, terrorists, and illegal immigrants seeking to move across the border. As was argued, for example, by the Irish MEP Patrick Cooney: 'there is need [sic] to protect against the possibility of international terrorism and organized crime seeking to exploit the greater freedom of movement and communication' (European Parliament 1993a: 65; see also European Parliament 1985c: 131; 1985b: 248; 1993b: 283). As the European Council concluded under the banner of 'Safeguarding the open society' in December 1986: '[t]hey (the heads of government) agreed that asylum should not be sought for economic and financial reasons and that steps must be taken to counter abuse' (European Council 1986).

Coexisting with the border as a security device is a view of the border as enabling opportunities and making possible connections. Scholarly work has begun to emphasise the enabling function of the border (Zaiotti 2011: 80–1; Cooper and Rumford 2013: 110; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013: 3). The border as enabler underpins the discourse on European Union where differences or barriers are thought to result in a sub-optimal condition in which full potential is not realised. Lowering, simplifying, or removing border controls and other barriers with regard to goods, persons, services, and capital is seen to yield new opportunities, and simultaneously to close the gap concerning political animosities between states which had resulted in bloody wars in the past. Such an understanding is present in the Treaty of Rome (EC 1957: 11, 15) and reproduced in, among others, the 1985 Commission White Paper (Commission of the European Communities 1985a: 6). As stated in the White Paper: '[t]hese difficulties must

be recognized, to some degree they must be accommodated, but they should not be allowed permanently to frustrate the achievement of the greater progress, the greater prosperity and the higher level of employment that economic integration can bring to the Community' (Commission of the European Communities 1985a: 7). The uninterrupted crossing of borders between member states is inscribed with an enabling function.

While the border as security device *and* as (economic) enabler at first glance appear as antithetical, both dimensions of the border are in fact predicated on a similar logic. The expectant behaviour of citizens as engaging in more economic interaction if facing fewer restrictions to travel across the border speaks to classical liberal economic thinking. From this perspective fewer barriers to trade enhances the impetus to trade due to an increase in expected profits and thus wealth. The EC citizen emerges as *homo economicus*: a rationally thinking being that acts when benefits exceed costs. The suggestion, put forward by amongst others Delors and Thatcher, of an expected increase in mobility of undesirable subjects between member states if no alternative border control arrangements are made, follows a logic similar to the mobility of the regular EC citizen. Indirectly, criminals, terrorists, and illegal immigrants as undesirable mobile subjects are enacted as rational subjects who scale up their operations, ambitions, and desires if expecting less resistance in crossing borders. The effect of criminals, terrorists, and illegal immigrants as abusers of the EC's freedom of movement not only groups, and explains their future behaviour as being driven by similar motives, it also nullifies any understanding of their acts as highly contingent geographical, political, social, and cultural practices. Reading the mobility of undesirable subjects as rationally informed also produces a rather bleak understanding of the context in which the EC/EU acts. Any effort to facilitate mobility, or for that matter peace, will always be paralleled by concerns about criminals, terrorists, and irregular immigrants seeking to exploit these freedoms.

### Knowledge about border crossings

What kind of knowledge informs the logic about the need for border control? Fact and speculation appeared to alternate in discussing future unwanted cross-border mobility. The following interaction is illustrative of this ambiguity. In debating the creation of Europol in early 1992, the German MEP Heinke Salisch claimed that '[w]e know now the extent to which internationally [sic] crime has focused on Europe as a centre of operations' (European Parliament 1993b: 282, see also 283–4). Digression from this claim was rare but revealing. In the same debate MEP Dorothee Piermont opposed police cooperation in the EU by arguing that '[t]he mafia and organized crime is [sic] cited as an example which apparently ... makes sense to everybody for institutionalizing police cooperation over and beyond specific cases' (European Parliament 1993b: 283).

Piermont thought the evidence about cross-border crime was anecdotal and she cautioned against translating knowledge about specific cases into broader patterns (see also Wilzing and Mangelaars 1993: 71). In order to understand the kind of knowledge informing and resulting from the discussion on the removal of border controls it is necessary to examine first how knowledge about illegal border crossings was generated.

An inquiry by the German MEP Rudolf Wedekind sheds light on this process. Wedekind asked the Commission whether it could provide information on the level of contraband seized at the borders between the member states as well as those with non-member states concerning the year 1982. Contraband referred to the smuggling of drugs and arms. Besides the fact that it took over two years to collect the information, the Commission also stated that 'the nature of the information varies from one Member State to another which makes it impossible simply to add the figures together' (European Parliament 1985d: 20–1). The knowledge on the level of contraband smuggled was nationally dispersed *and* due to national differences in collecting data difficult to assemble into a coherent and reliable picture for the EC as a whole (see also Anderson et al. 1995: 13). Generating EC-wide data was thus a tedious and time-consuming affair in the absence of EC bodies specifically entrusted with this task. Today, Europol fulfils this role, but previous to its official creation in 1998, there was no EC/EU body collecting data on cross-border criminality.

Border control was a very limited means of acquiring knowledge of illegal border crossings. In 1968 and 1973, the Council adopted legislation making it possible for workers, self-employed persons, and their families from the member states to travel to another member state simply by showing a valid passport or identity card (Europese Gemeenschappen 1968: 13; European Communities 1973: 15). Checks going beyond an inspection of the relevant identity document were no longer deemed desirable as they made crossing the border too laborious and would work against the EC idea of unimpeded travel between the member states (European Parliament 1979a: 11; 1979b: 15). Catching criminals and seizing illegal contraband was thus directed by the intuition of the border guard based on a quick inspection of the behaviour and appearance of the traveller and his or her identity document. Restrictions on systematic border checks beyond the examination of identity documents limited the gathering of knowledge about the extent of illegal cross-border activity. Border checks were performed amidst conditions of uncertainty and opened up space for speculation about the true extent of undesirable mobility across the border. Did the contraband seized at the border represent the actual amount smuggled, or did it reflect just the tip of the iceberg?

But the limited ability to know the extent of cross-border crime was no secret in EC circles. In fact, the discourse on border control is ambiguous here. On the one hand, the need for border control was taken for granted. While

national border controls would be abolished, borders would continue to exist and even be 'strengthened' and made more 'effective' at the border with non-EC states, the so-called external border (Commission of the European Communities 1985a: 10, 15; European Parliament 1985a: 233; European Council 1988a: 3; Trevi 1990). On the other hand, the removal of border checks could be achieved because the effectiveness of border controls as a security device was in doubt. In 1979, MEP Nyborg probed the usefulness of border controls for apprehending terrorists:

> [d]oes it [the Commission] agree that it is relatively easy for terrorists and other criminal elements to avoid being identified if they have prior knowledge of where, when and how these identity checks are applied; that controls at the Community's internal frontiers can therefore in the present context hardly be expected to produce spectacular results ...? (European Parliament 1979c: 1)

The Commission White Paper from 1985 put forward a similar vision: 'frontier controls are by no means the only or indeed the most effective measures' in tackling crime and terrorism (Commission of the European Communities 1985a: 10). And similarly Parliament the same year stated: 'arrest of drug traffickers is normally achieved through intelligence work rather than by random checking' at the border (European Parliament 1985a: 232). In 1997, well after the removal of border checks, Parliament observed, after an expert hearing on the matter, that 'contrary to earlier fears ... the dismantling of controls at the internal borders has not increased the danger of acts of terrorism, because ... the traditional internal border controls virtually never resulted in the arrest of members of terrorist groups' (European Parliament 1997: 29).

The discussion on the abolition of border controls is home to seemingly contradictory positions. There are claims that border controls between the member states were considered by and large to be ineffective. At the same time, there was an argument for alternative forms of control between the member states and a strengthening of control at the border with non-EC states. Understanding this ambiguity requires us to revisit the relation between the border as security device and as economic enabler. In the drive to complete the common market in the second half of the 1980s as a concrete manifestation of the EC materialising as a space of flows, the meaning of the border as economic enabler gained importance. However, the EC was premised on facilitating certain flows – goods, persons, capital, services – and only the legitimate varieties thereof, which necessitated regulation of some kind. Instead of casting the relation between the border as security device and as economic enabler as antithetical, as was done in this chapter's section on the border as barrier/enabler, the productive tension of the relation should be emphasised. The tension made it possible to conceive of alternative forms of control that would enable flows while filtering

out undesirable subjects. Border controls continued although no longer visibly at the edge of the member state territory, but in less visible ways and at various points inside their territories.

## Conclusions: at the limits of political order – sovereignty and emerging territoriality

Did the abolition of border controls – long considered one of the hallmarks of the sovereign state – signal the emergence of the EC/EU as a new form of political order? Did it bequeath the EC/EU with a uniqueness that set it apart as a form of political organisation different from the sovereign state? This raises the issue of what function border controls have. Any attempt to understand borders as spatio-temporal constructs requires an appreciation of the larger context in which they emerge (Johnson et al. 2011: 62–3).

Since the mid-1980s, Europe has been home to what Ruben Zaiotti (2011: 26) describes as three 'cultures of border control': a Westphalian system of nationally administered controls, an inter/transnational system that is Schengen, and outlines of a supranationally governed EU system. Despite these different cultures, border control has remained a practice of ascribing a status to someone or something – legal/illegal, risky/safe – that makes it possible to regulate flows. If performed by the state, border control is an expression and enactment of its sovereign authority. This implies that border control is linked to the notion of territory. As put by Stuart Elden (2009: xxx): '[t]he control of territory is what makes a state possible'. The edge of the territory is, depending on which side one stands, where a state's authority begins or ends. Hence Elden's (2009: 171) argument that territory is the spatial extent of sovereignty. In other words, the statist conception of sovereign authority is not possible without its association to territory. Border control ties together sovereignty and territory by continuously ascribing what can and what cannot legitimately pass into or across a territory. The conceptualisation of state sovereignty as supreme authority implies that state rule cannot be challenged outside the conditions specified by the state and that border control is an expression of how this authority is governed. To put it differently, border control has been rationalised as intrinsic to how sovereignty is administered or how the state governs.

Of what broader field of power relations is the debate on the removal of border controls and the appearance of alternative regimes of control an instantiation? The terminology of Castells – the rationales of the space of flows and the space of places – offers one perspective. Translating them in light of what has been said above highlights a friction between globalisation (flows) and sovereignty/territory (places). The manner in which this tension expressed itself in the EC in the mid-1980s – how to maintain security and enable (economic) flows – made it possible to experiment with new forms of governing and control.

The creation of the EU and the completion of the common market were regarded as answers to facilitate flows between the member states. Border control was reconfigured from a single sovereign's prerogative into a shared space of sovereignty between the member states with the aim of enabling flows (goods, persons, capital, services) and filtering out unwanted forms of mobility. It reflects an attempt to design a mode of government with the aim of capturing or regulating the political spaces of globalisation that exceeds the capacities of single states (see also Campbell 1998: 17).

However, the networked form of border control – i.e. checks throughout various points in society rather than at the edge of the territory – is indicative of the limits within which it is possible to think about forms of political order. After all, the making of border control as an EC/EU affair – via the incorporation of Schengen in the EU with the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 – made the EC/EU responsible for the administration of a territory (Walters and Haahr 2005: 111). As such, border controls as one of the ways in which the member states conducted themselves as sovereign states was transplanted to that of the EU. This calls into question Barroso and Van Rompuy's statement (2012) that the EU is a 'unique effort by ever more European states to overcome ... divisions' since border control is a means to enact inclusion and exclusion. While the divisions between the member states might have been transcended by the removal of border controls, they intensified the dividing line between EU and non-EU member states. This means there are limits to the celebration of the EC/EU as a postnational entity.

### Notes

1   The notion of productivity used in this chapter is specifically concerned with the revelatory potential of texts: how revealing they are of discursive limits and the contingency of truth and knowledge. This interpretation is slightly different from the more general manner in which, for example, Jennifer Milliken explains productivity: how discourse renders certain realities intelligible, see Milliken (1999: 236).

2   The texts themselves are of various form and from different bodies. There are debates from the European Parliament (hereafter Parliament) of which there are verbatim records. Additionally, Parliament texts consist of adopted resolutions and written questions from individual Members of Parliament (MEPs) and answers from the relevant EC/EU institutions. The European Commission (hereafter Commission) is present through various reports, a White Paper and a press statement. Texts from the European Council relate to a public statement and published conclusions following summit meetings.

3   The idea of an 'ever closer union' is already present in the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community which was signed on 18 April 1951, although this formulation is found only half way into the preamble and there is no mention of removing 'barriers', at least not in the preamble (ECSC 1951: 11).

4   The subsidiarity principle holds that in areas where the Community has to share its policy-making competences with the member states, policies will be developed by the institution that is best placed in relation to the matter at stake.

5    Thatcher's remark may seem out of place, especially since the United Kingdom did not join in the Schengen Agreement from 1985 and the Schengen Convention from 1990, which created an alternative control regime. While Thatcher placed herself on the outside of the discussion on removing border controls, she nevertheless contributed to the reproduction, like many on the inside, of a dominant conception of what would happen if border controls were removed and not replaced by alternative schemes.

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**Part III**

*Circumscribing movement*

# Gender (in)securities: surveillance and transgender bodies in a post-9/11 era of neoliberalism

## Christine Quinan

"In the years following 9/11, the US Department of Homeland Security advanced new security policies as part of the war on terror, including increased scrutiny of identification documents at airports and national borders, that almost never explicitly mention transgender populations. But transgender people, particularly trans people of colour, poor trans people, trans youth, and trans immigrants, are especially targeted by such scrutiny because they are more likely to have inconsistent identification documents. Related security measures, including increased restrictions on immigration and asylum, new forms of state scrutiny of those perceived to be undocumented immigrants, and the implementation of x-ray scanning technologies in airports and prisons typically do not cite explicit concerns with transgender populations. But because these policing practices are often concerned with individuals who appear to be fraudulent or deceptive, gender-nonconforming people – culturally constructed as concealing something – disproportionately feel their effects."

(Beauchamp 2014: 209)

AS THE POST-9/11 web of state violence and oppression captured Middle Eastern and South and Southeast Asian men and women as well as gender-nonconforming individuals, a perfect storm for surveilling, securitising, and disciplining racial, religious, and gender differences was created. With the proliferation of systems that exclude, alienate, and violate certain identities, particularly those who do not – or cannot – conform to a white, middle-class, secular, gender-conforming, heteronormative, able-bodied, legally employed, state-documented existence, both citizenship and mobility prove to have boundaries. As the epigraph by transgender studies scholar Toby Beauchamp uncovers, being transgender or gender-nonconforming is inextricably bound up in – and is triggering of – (state) mechanisms of surveillance, not dissimilar from the experience of other marginalised groups, such as people of colour, Muslim immigrants, and the poor. Bodily norms – informed by race, gender, and sexuality (i.e., whiteness, normative masculinity/femininity, and heterosexuality) – are encoded in tools of surveillance,

including body scanners, identity documents, and facial recognition software. These technologies became all the more commonplace after the events of 9/11, which offered a justification for expanding surveillance practices already in use or under development (Clarkson 2014: 35). But these sorts of security technologies affect different populations differently. As Alissa Bohling (2012: n.p.) writes, 'because gender has become one of the first markers in the technology-centric race for body-based data – known as "Biometrics" in surveillance speak – transgender and gender non-conforming people have been some of the first and most directly affected'.

This chapter focuses on an understudied topic in critical security studies: how neoliberal governing structures in the post-9/11 era relegate such gender-nonconforming bodies to the margins of society, with their gender ambiguity creating uncertainty for authorities and thus opening up these bodies to increased surveillance and governing. This investigation is guided by two sets of questions: firstly, what can the intersecting experiences of 'Others,' particularly transgender and racialised/religious others (which are of course not mutually exclusive categories) tell us about policing and surveillance in a post-9/11 era? Secondly, how does the nation state respond to national subjects who deviate? Could changes to passports or other identity documents increase the life chances of those who are the most marginalised or might it lead to increased surveillance? And when it comes to resistance, could invisibility and what I am calling 'ghostliness' be strategies to fight policing, surveillance, and control? To approach these questions, I take a multidisciplinary approach, analysing a recent novel entitled *Drag King Dreams*, written by transgender activist and author Leslie Feinberg (1949–2014), alongside an examination of a number of recent legal and policy-level changes that recognise more than two genders or that gender is not a fixed condition. At least nine countries now offer alternative gender options in legal and travel documents, including passports, and multi-national corporations are beginning to enact transgender-friendly policies. We may, though, wonder if these changes could be considered 'progress' or if they are merely performances of transgender acceptance that obscure a neoliberal focus on profitability and surveillance.

## Drag King Dreams

In 'Securitizing gender: identity, biometrics, and transgender bodies at the airport,' Paisley Currah and Tara Mulqueen write:

> the proliferation of sites where individuals can be stopped, searched, and required to verify their identity–as part of the 'war on terror' or as a consequence of federal and state initiatives to identify, locate, and deport 'illegal aliens'–only amplifies the importance of examining the production and policing of legal identity. (Currah and Mulqueen 2011: 565–6)

Although a fictional work, Feinberg's *Drag King Dreams* (2006) responds to this call to investigate the mechanisms of surveillance and the effects this has on gender-nonconforming individuals, effectively problematising the status of transgender bodies in post-9/11 societies. The novel tells a story of immigrant communities' exclusion intersecting with that of gender-variant individuals (many of whom are also immigrants and people of colour), both groups similarly targeted in the increasingly neoliberal climate of post-9/11 New York. Published in 2006, it is Feinberg's second novel, coming twelve years after *Stone Butch Blues* appeared to critical acclaim.[1] The ease and beauty that marked the former novel, however, seems to have faded away in Feinberg's latter foray into fiction writing. The prose is forced and clunky, with little emotion; it lacks nuance and its tone is often didactic. At times, it comes off as a communist lesson or parable about the importance of working-class organisation, teamwork, and coalitional politics (which is unsurprising given Feinberg's political work and affiliations). But despite its lacklustre prosaic quality, it is an important text. It highlights a number of timely themes and prompts critical investigations, asking us, for example, to look at the notion of citizenship, particularly what it means to be a 'citizen' when you do not fit into clear categories like binary gender classifications. It also examines nationalist discourses and how they function to include certain individuals and exclude others. It sees neoliberalism and capitalism as central to this exclusionary project, with the post-9/11 climate creating a perfect storm for disciplining gender variance. And in this, it shows us that collective struggle is the only way forward, the only response in the face of neoliberalist discourses of individualism and self-sufficiency. It has something important to say about interlocking systems of power and discourse and the very real effects this has on people's lives in the United States (US) and elsewhere, particularly those most marginalised and disenfranchised, including the poor, disabled, and undocumented.

*Drag King Dreams* highlights how the US state – here encompassing government, law and social policy, the courts and criminal system, the police, and the military – functions as a conduit for systems of inequality and privilege. It plays important roles in maintaining social values, controlling social order, and enforcing social power. For lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people, the state has also been central in institutionalising legal and social changes to support improving conditions – but, the novel asks, who is benefiting from such 'progress'? What kinds of LGBT people are included when, paraphrasing Dean Spade (2012), we get the law to say good things about us?

Although a notoriously difficult concept to pin down and define (hence its insidiousness), I use the term 'neoliberalism' here to refer to the policies and ideas of the past few decades promoted by powerful nation states and institutions (such as the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank), policies that destroy safety nets set up for vulnerable

people, dismantle gains made by social movements, and redistribute wealth and resources away from the poor and to the elite. This is not only an abstract system but also an ideology on how to govern and administrate. As Chandra Mohanty (2013: 970) writes, neoliberalism is marked 'by market-based governance practices on the one hand (the privatisation, commodification, and proliferation of difference) and authoritarian, national security-driven penal state practices on the other'. It makes itself known through institutions that manage populations and serve as gatekeepers, while also controlling, for example, who gets access to healthcare or who gets to be considered a 'citizen'.[2]

Taking a step back, it is worth further framing notions of (neo)liberal citizenship and subjecthood. While citizenship is historically, socially, and culturally contingent, Western models of citizenship typically view it as a set of commonly shared rights and obligations that bind individuals together, create political membership and social identity, and allow access to resources and benefits (Turner and Hamilton 1994: 4; Hines 2007a: 43). Central to liberal citizenship is a focus on rights and the idea of universal inclusiveness; however, this politics of inclusion depends on an exclusionary logic, wherein the 'bad' (or deviant) citizen/subject actually defines the conditions of possibility of the 'good' (or normative) citizen/subject. In this process, certain once-outcast identities have been seduced by the neoliberal economy and assimilated into normative notions of belonging. For example, regarding the notion of sexual citizenship, David Bell and Jon Binnie (2000: 204) discuss how gay and lesbian rights-based claims (e.g., same-sex marriage, military inclusion) entail a set of duties, first and foremost of which is the duty to assimilate, which constructs a binary between the 'good homosexual' and the 'bad homosexual', with the former being granted citizenship.

However, as Surya Monro (2003, 2005) has detailed, when it comes to transgender and gender-nonconforming individuals, existing models that work within – and are dependent on – a binary model of 'male citizens' and 'female citizens' are challenged. While claims to citizenship may be facilitated through a focus on rights, 'a gender binary model of citizenship continues to marginalise both the experiences and subjectivities of those who cannot or will not define as "man" or "woman", and, as such, is unable to account for the full spectrum of gender diversity' (Hines 2007b: n.p.), resulting in many trans people remaining on the margins of citizenship. Not exclusive to sexual and gender 'deviance' but also connected to race, ethnicity, and citizenship, certain bodies become recognisable subjects, while other bodies are narrowly constructed as internal enemies, or, as Jasbir Puar (2010: 2) has termed them, 'other Others'. Among these other Others we find, in particular, queer and trans people who experience homophobia along with poverty, racism, ableism, xenophobia, transphobia, sexism, criminalisation, economic exploitation, and other forms of subjection.

Returning to *Drag King Dreams*, the story takes place in 2003, just as the US was embarking on its invasion and eventual occupation of Iraq. The constant

backdrop to the characters' lives is the war, with which they are constantly confronted through media and public protests. The novel's protagonist and narrator is Max Rabinowitz, who is of unnamed age but is likely to be around late fifties. Foregrounded, though, is the precarious place of transgender populations at this historical moment of geopolitical violence at 'home' and 'abroad'. The novel opens with the line 'Who cares what anybody's got between their legs?' (Feinberg 2006: 1) spoken to Max by Vickie, an immigration lawyer who often hides her transness and lives as Victor. While talking on the train back from Manhattan to Jersey City, Max and Vickie's conversation is interrupted by the intense harassment of a fellow commuter who targets them for their gender non-normative expression. The next day, we learn that after parting ways from Max, Vickie was murdered (by whom we will never know), setting off a series of emotional and activist responses in the novel.

Max, we understand, is female-bodied and masculine-identified, but early on Max states: 'categories are a problem for me' (Feinberg 2006: 34). Max refuses to be called 'Mister,' and no preferred gender pronoun is claimed. (Neither will I use pronouns to refer to Max.) At one point late in the novel Max's neighbour, Mohammed, with whom a certain kinship develops, struggles with Max's pronoun, saying to Max and friend Heshie: 'You are always welcome at my store. Anytime. Your friend here, she... he is like my own family' (Feinberg 2006: 266). Once an activist and supporter of social justice causes, including the civil rights and anti-Vietnam war movements, Max has lost the 'revolutionary' spirit and has clearly retreated into a solitary existence, probably out of self-protection. Max lives at the margins, at the borders, like a ghost, not having a bank account, ID, driver's licence, or passport, a lack that points to the precariousness of Max's existence, gender in-betweenness, and daily struggle to survive. Although a loner who struggles to be part of a collective, Max does circulate in a number of spheres, all of which are spaces of 'otherness': first at Club Chaos, a club for gender queers, where Max works as a bouncer and then eventually at Club Pi, when the former club closes down; also in the Jersey City neighbourhood where Max gets to know a group of Muslim immigrants, mostly from Egypt, Pakistan, and Palestine, with whom Max feels a particularly strong solidarity; and the virtual world of the computer game AvaStar, a virtual reality game given to Max by Heshie, where Max begins to find a way to communicate with others.

Max's closest friend is Ruby, an HIV-positive African-American trans woman who struggles to afford care, as she has no access to health insurance or disability pay (and when she does receive care the nurses will not use her preferred pronoun, constantly reverting to 'he' and 'him'). Max also becomes close with Thor, a white American trans man who clearly brings together many struggles, most specifically transgender rights and the anti-war movement. Thor is eventually arrested for using the 'wrong' bathroom, but his biggest personal struggle is that he has lost custody of his child because he is trans. The novel's group of

gender-variant individuals falls outside society's hopes of 'productivity' – they work and live at night, as bouncers, bartenders, and drag performers, and they constantly delineate a difference between their lives and those of 'daysiders'.

### Post-9/11 solidarity and citizenship

In 'Normalized Transgressions: Legitimizing the Transsexual Body as Productive,' Dan Irving (2013) opens with a history of trans activism by invoking the 1966 Compton's Cafeteria riot in San Francisco's Tenderloin, an event that Susan Stryker (2008: 74–5) has shown to be one of the most significant acts of collective militant queer resistance to police harassment. Irving then turns to a series of questions about the Compton riot:

> Who were these trans activists? Their collective militancy in the face of police brutality seems a distant memory when compared to contemporary trans theorizing and politics. Why have we not inherited this legacy? What barriers to radical theorizations of gender variance and politics must be stormed to open emancipatory queer futures for trans people? How have possibilities for debate concerning these futures and strategies to shape them been foreclosed by efforts to construct *proper trans social subjects* that can integrate links between regimes of sex/gender and exploitative economic relations of production as mutually constitutive systems of domination? (Irving 2013: 16, emph. in orig.)

These questions could also guide my own analysis of Feinberg's *Drag King Dreams*. The novel, in many ways, indirectly responds to these pressing concerns over trans/queer solidarity, which comes in direct response to neoliberalism's reordering of social hierarchies, orders, and alliances and focus on individualism and self-sufficiency. In a post-9/11 political and social climate, Feinberg's characters recognise that there is no option but to fight; they realise that rights-based approaches and inclusion into – and even recognition by – mainstream structures will always come at a cost. In an interview, Puar describes this process:

> [The] binaries [of good citizen and bad citizen] have always been produced in relation to each other. So there has always been this idea of the 'other others' ... The 'other others' have always existed, but the situation has been more particular since 9/11. [This mechanism] is a collection of state discourses that are about laws and legislation and regulation, it's generated through media discourses and visibility, and through representational politics ... The state gets to reproduce itself as a kind of benevolent, liberal protector of its citizens on one hand, and on the other hand, it works to divide and fragment national bodies, so that its various parts can be controlled ... It's a good cop, bad cop technique. You produce a sense of protection and security and concern for diversity and tolerance. Meanwhile, there is increased surveillance and increased police presence in particular neighborhoods. All of these things happened post-9/11. And all of these are strategies and ways of regulating a population. (Puar 2010: 1–2)

Similarly, I am interested in examining how hostility towards gender transgression changes or intensifies during moments of nationalism, racism, and geopolitical violence, such as 9/11. As one of Feinberg's (2006: 175) characters reflects on this gendered and racialised surveillance: 'It's a big dragnet. Lots of people are getting caught up in it'. Trans woman of colour Ruby goes on to emphasise how the need for forms of identification after 9/11 would directly affect trans folks:

> Before she got killed, Vickie warned us of this so-called war on terror ... She warned everybody that while they were makin' war over there they were gonna step up the war on all of us here. All that Code Orange and Code Red ... she knew that's just code for racism. And she warned us when they start demanding more ID and searching people's bodies, and pokin' around in our lives and takin' away what few rights we won, folks like us are all gonna feel it first. (Feinberg 2006: 225)

Here, racism and transphobia overlap, mutually intensifying and becoming inextricable. And in fact, many of the characters were already dealing with structures that diminished their life chances before 9/11; the 'war on terror' only exacerbated discrimination, oppression, and violence they had already been experiencing. Ruby elaborates:

> [Vickie] didn't have to tell me that we got to fight the war right here, too. I knew that already. I've known that all my life. I hear a lot of folks talk about 'peace.' Well, I want some damn peace. But even in between these wars I've lived through, I never got any peace. The police have been treatin' me like the enemy since I was born. I can hardly make a living ... I can still get arrested at the drop of a hat just for bein' who I am. I get treated like I'm illegal just for walkin' down the street. All the cops have to say they saw me tryin' to turn some trick. My friend Thor here got beat up and thrown in jail, and for what? For goin' to the bathroom! And racism keeps rearin' its ugly head. I have to deal with it every day. And that's what these people who are gettin' rounded up are dealin' with. (Feinberg 2006: 225–6)

Constantly reminding us of the indebtedness to previous social movements, the novel demonstrates how transphobia cannot be looked at separately from racism, xenophobia, homophobia, sexism, and settler colonialism. Ruby continues on this collective element: 'We bring signs that say: "Stop rounding up our Muslim sisters and brothers! ... Stop the war! Bring those troops back now!" And when people say, "what's the connection?" we tell them what my mama taught me when I was knee high: a house divided cannot stand' (Feinberg 2006: 226).

Like Ruby, Max also points to the criminality of being gender-nonconforming, particularly when it comes to not having consistent identity documents, saying 'I am always a crime walking' (Feinberg 2006: 171). Similarly, Max's access to proper citizenship seems tenuous: 'I don't have a driver's license or passport, a credit card or bank account. I've never flown on an airplane; I've only looked up to see the clouds' (Feinberg 2006: 29–30). Deborah Cohler (2012: 225),

one of the few scholars to yet address *Drag King Dreams*, has observed that the novel demonstrates how solidarity among outsiders is 'both the consequence of and the antidote to conservative and neoliberal formations of citizenship'. For Cohler, the novel produces trans and queer identities in explicit opposition to the state, but also produces such identities through engagement with state power and nationalism. But how so? While we would be right to remark on the confining and limiting life one might live without such proofs of citizenship, I suggest that Max's 'ghostliness' may paradoxically serve such a resistance function, challenging state and institutional power and dominance.

More broadly, Max's circumstances force questions of citizenship and (non) normativity, a relationship also discussed by Aren Aizura (2006: 295–6): 'citizenship ... means fading into the population ... but also the imperative to be "proper" in the eyes of the state: to reproduce, to find proper employment; to reorient one's "different" body into the flow of the nationalized aspiration for possessions, property, [and] wealth'. Irving (2013) too has shown how social recognition of the transsexual has meant proving one's ability to participate in capitalist production processes. The novel's characters clearly defy this emphasis on both productivity and social recognition, so we could then ask: could this non-participation in the legitimised economy also be a resistance strategy? Do the characters want to participate in the legal wage labour economy? Are they even looking for recognition?

Of course this notion of productivity is also highly connected to citizenship and what it means to be a 'proper citizen'. But it is a catch-22 for many of these characters, especially Max, who despite being born and raised in New York to American parents, has no identification documents and cannot legally work. Max is a ghost to the state, existing in a netherworld that precludes any ability to be recognised. Legal wage labour would allow for such state recognition and full claims to citizenship, but without documents that accurately reflect Max's gender identity, Max is stripped of such 'rights' with which it may come, including the ability to work and travel, access education, and have a driver's licence, passport, bank account, or health insurance. But the state does not see ghosts, unless of course they are the undocumented immigrants, Muslims, people of colour, sex workers, differently abled individuals, or are otherwise deemed 'undesirable' to the state. Then, they are no longer ghosts but are instead hyper-visible.

Toby Beauchamp's work on surveillance of trans bodies proves helpful here. He asks: 'Which bodies can choose visibility, and which bodies are always already visible – perhaps even hypervisible – to state institutions? For whom is visibility an available political strategy, and at what cost?' (Beauchamp 2013: 52). And to this I would add, for whom is *invisibility* a political strategy? Sara Ahmed's (2006) brilliant theorisation of racialised space, mobility, and movement comes to mind here as well. Building upon

Ahmed's (2006: 139) argument that '[a] phenomenology of "being stopped" might take us in a different direction than one that begins with motility, with a body that "can do" by flowing into space', critical security scholars Shoshana Magnet and Tara Rodgers demonstrate how it is crucial to examine those who are 'being stopped':

> The bodies of Othered subjects who fail to pass the checkpoint, or who are dispro-
> portionately adversely affected or violated in the screening process, expose deep con-
> tradictions and fallacies in rhetorics of 'freedom of movement' that have historically
> been articulated to air travel, and that continue to underlie the promotion of new
> surveillance technologies. (Magnet and Rodgers 2012: 107)

For Max, invisibility is a survival strategy. But it is Max's whiteness that allows for this ghost-like existence, enabling Max to remain under the radar. Privacy here is a privilege – were Max to 'exist' and be legible to the state (in the form of documentation), Max would then be subject to state intrusion, tracking, and surveillance. Indeed, Max may use this particular invisibility as a tool, even as it disenfranchises, alienates, and oppresses. But there is also a vacillation between invisibility and visibility at work here, for on another level – that of walking around in the world – Max is hypervisible. People stare, harass, snicker, even physically assault this ambiguous individual who 'passes' as neither man nor woman. However, despite clearly not fitting into a two-gender system, due to white-skin privilege Max is not seen as a threat or ever seriously considered a 'terrorist' (even if one of the novel's protagonists does jokingly refer to the group as 'gender terrorists').

The indeterminate place, the in-betweenness where Max resides reminds me of Gloria Anzaldúa's notion of borderlands:

> Borders are set up to define the places that are safe and unsafe, to distinguish *us* from
> *them.* A border is a dividing line, a narrow strip along a steep edge. A borderland is
> a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural
> boundary. It is in a constant state of transition. The prohibited and forbidden are its
> inhabitants. *Los atravesados* live here: the squint-eyed, the perverse, the queer, the
> troublesome, the mongrel, the mulato, the half-breed, the half dead; in short, those
> who cross over, pass over, or go through the confines of the 'normal.' (Anzaldúa
> 2012: 25)

It bears repeating: although not a 'productive' and contributing member of the neoliberal economy, Max is allowed to live in those borderlands. Others would not be as invisible, including those with physical disabilities or skin colours or religious markers that do not allow them to 'blend in' in a US social environment where normative-gendered, able-bodied whiteness is seen as the neutral and unmarked. There are, though, privileges for some of living in the borderlands, which prompts the question of who gets to live there? Who does not have the privilege of choice and *must* live in the borderlands?

Although a number of borders and borderlands are alluded to throughout the novel (e.g., New York–Jersey City, Israel–Palestine, US–Mexico, day–night, male–female), it is that constant and so necessary border of the public bathroom that becomes most critical in Feinberg's novel. Bathrooms are a constant source of anxiety for the characters, and when Thor is arrested for using the 'wrong' bathroom, a series of events is set off that mobilises the group. Indeed, there is a constant border-crossing that happens at the threshold of this gendered/sexed space, and with this crossing comes danger and need for 'proof' of the 'right' body/identity. Of this symbolic border, Nael Bhanji, citing Aren Aizura, writes:

> In these contours of citizenship, belonging, and migration, how do ... borders themselves deterritorialize and reterritorialize us? Certainly, the borders of gender have a lot in common with those of home: both police 'spaces where those who do not 'belong' are separated from those who do.' [Aizura] Bathrooms and border crossings are both equally invested in preserving and maintaining boundaries (between male and female, or citizen and stranger) such that, 'at the border it is imperative to produce the right papers and look or act as if we belong–even paradoxically, when we are sure that we do.' [Aizura] In other words, the border marks a sphere of normality, of homeliness, that privileges properly gendered and sexed national bodies. (Bhanji 2013: 517)

Indeed, Feinberg's novel is specifically engaging with intersections between citizenship, movement, and gender – and their attendant deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation – that Bhanji describes.

As an aside, I want to ask what Max, who has no identification, would do if laws like the recent attempt in Arizona to target transgender individuals through the informally titled 'Show Me Your Papers to Pee' bill, existed? The passing of the bill would have legalised an already common form of harassment and policing experienced by many trans folks, that is, being threatened to 'prove' their right to use the bathroom. It is also worth noting that this came on the heels of – and in response to – two somewhat conflicting laws, but both characteristic of neoliberalism: (1) Arizona's 2012 passage of Senate bill 1070, which is the US's strictest anti-immigration legislation and allows for police to lawfully stop anyone suspected of being an 'alien' and forced to show documentation and (2) the city of Phoenix's 2013 passage of an anti-discrimination law that extended basic protections to transgender people in housing, employment, and places of public accommodation. State representative John Kavanagh who sponsored the transphobic bill explained his rationale: 'The city of Phoenix has crafted a bill that allows people to define their sex by what they think in their head. If you're a male, you don't go into a female shower or locker room, or vice versa' (cited in Ford 2013). The attempted law could be read as an example of the ways in which a focus on neoliberal anti-discrimination legislation can be distorted – that is, it precisely came in response to a successful rights-based approach – while simultaneously showing the precariousness of gender-ambiguous lives and taken for granted

'rights' such as using the bathroom. In a politically dishonest move, Kavanagh then twisted this concept to make it about 'safety', an equally neoliberal conceptualisation (Grewal 2006: 25).

Not dissimilar from the above example, *Drag King Dreams* teaches us that violence comes in many forms. The novel is bookended with violence, the first instance verbal and physical – culminating in Vickie's murder – while the final instance is symbolic and state-sponsored. Having been arrested for protesting the Iraq war, the group is placed in another site of gender segregation: a jail. Only three lines after Thor states that '[t]his is just the beginning of a new movement. A new era of struggle ... Just the beginning' (Feinberg 2006: 299–300), the state enacts further violence by calling these prisoners out by their birth names, reminding us of how much work remains. After Ruby is hailed as Tyrone Lanier and Thor as Carol Finster, the officer comes to release Max, the novel's final two words being 'Maxine Rabinowitz'. Again, the state intervenes. Even if Max believed to have existed (or not existed) under the radar, the state is clearly able to track even a ghost, and the state is invested in a particular identity for such ghosts.

### Gender autonomy and recent legislative changes

This brings me to larger questions around surveillance, security, mobility, state power, citizenship, and gender non-normativity. While border crossings are indeed rife with pitfalls for gender-nonconforming and transgender populations, there has simultaneously been a relative abundance of recent global state-based legislative and policy-level changes made with respect to gender identity and autonomy, changes that purport to make mobility and movement easier. Standard protocol in most countries that allow for change of gender has been that, at minimum, a medical diagnosis of gender dysphoria (or gender incongruence) be made, possibly followed by a number of other procedures that could include hormone therapy, sterilisation, or sex reassignment surgery. However, several countries (including Argentina, Bangladesh, Denmark, India, Nepal, and Pakistan) have instituted new laws and policies that range from adding a third-gender option to removing certain obstacles for declaring gender identity to the state. Moreover, in 2011 and 2012 Australia and New Zealand respectively introduced the X (or 'indeterminate' and 'unspecified') category as a marker of sex in passports.[3]

Although it is not necessarily appropriate to group together these countries, as they each have particular historical relationships to other 'genders,' I do think it is worth considering why there have been such legal changes that speak to the idea that there may exist more than two genders or that gender is not a fixed or static condition. So, given this caveat, I want to ask if these could be viewed as 'positive' changes. Could we see these changes as the individual

pushing back against the nation state, pushing the boundaries of the state, and the state responding and acknowledging self-expression? Is the nation state attempting to accommodate individuals who deviate from the 'norm'? How do these legal changes affect lives on the ground? How do they set off unintended consequences? Or are they just more insidious forms of state and corporate surveillance?

In particular, I am interested in what these laws do when it comes to passing through national borders – indeed, what do they have to say about mobility and security? When it comes to the passport, which we might realise itself implies a certain privilege, particular questions arise. As Nira Yuval-Davis (1999: 125) has stated, 'formal citizenship is normally associated with the right to carry a passport of a specific state'. Perhaps applicable to this discussion are her comments on some unintended consequences of the creation of an EU passport:

> While the formal intention has been to establish a 'borderless Europe', the transfer of responsibility of illegal immigration to the flight and shipping companies, has resulted in many cases in even more scrupulous checking of passports than before. An international system of stratification has been created, at the top of which are found western passports which almost always guarantee their carriers the right of free international movements and at the bottom of which are those who have no right to carry any passport at all. (Yuval-Davis 1999: 125–6)

What can this example tell us about the unintended (or perhaps intended all along) consequences of state actions to create more freedom and/or inclusion? I think it can certainly teach us that policy and legislation that may look to be about uninhibited mobility is in fact only applicable to certain bodies and actually results in heightened surveillance for others. Can this give us any indication of what might happen with an opening up of possibilities for changing gender on passports or other identification documents? While we might interpret the X in passports as actually allowing for easier passage across borders, it remains to be seen if having this indeterminate marker could inadvertently open up someone to ever more surveillance. That is to say, there is not yet enough empirical evidence to know if the X changes anything for trans people crossing borders. While security actors should be allowing for easy passage, individuals approach their jobs with a set of assumptions and preconceptions about minority groups, including transgender and transsexual people, people of colour, or people from developing countries. Here, Karine Côté-Boucher, Federica Infantino, and Mark Salter's recent reflections on the interpretive work in which such agents engage proves relevant:

> Security actors are interpretive actors in their own right. If border security actors are interpreters of policy and regulations as they go about their work routines inscribed in specific organizational cultures, settings and concerns, this means we accept that they can reflexively adopt (or not) dominant security discourses. Border

security practices are always intertwined, incorporated but also challenged not only by those who cross borders, but also by those who govern them. (Côté-Boucher et al. 2014: 198)

In this sense, more research is certainly warranted to understand how those with such sex markers are treated when crossing borders. And it is not only nation states that have been interested in making such accommodations, but also corporations. For example, as of February 2014, Facebook now offers fifty-eight options for self-identifying one's gender identity, which they call 'custom' gender settings (even though you cannot actually 'customise' your gender but must select from their pre-chosen options).[4] Here, it is important to remember that while Facebook and other tech companies are portrayed as progressive, they are simultaneously responsible for the continual gentrification and displacement of transgender and communities of colour (Hudson 2014).

Given a focus on profitability, it is worth interrogating if attempts by corporations such as Facebook to recognise transgender identity are only a performance of allyship and transgender acceptance, and if so, what this would then mean. When considering this question, it is worth bearing in mind Facebook's words to their investors, published days before their announcement of new gender options: 'We invest extensively in advertising technology capable of serving billions of ad impressions every day while maximising the relevance of each impression to selected users based upon the information that users have chosen to share' (United States Securities and Exchange Commission 2014). To date, one recent development in this area is that the US federal government has already invested nearly $200,000 to study how transgender women use Facebook, which most certainly relies on self-identification information gained, perhaps purchased, from the company (Harrington 2014).

## Conclusion

To conclude, I want to return to *Drag King Dreams*. What would its characters think of such 'progress,' whether through legal changes to citizenship and travel documents, or through corporate trans friendliness? As Max is beginning to embrace some form of early online identity, would Max rejoice at the fifty-plus options for gender identity, especially given the fact that Max found other forms of virtual reality and gaming so limiting? Would Max and the others see a 'third gender' as a positive development, or would they see it as a new form of state intrusion and surveillance?

At one point, Max states: 'Having a dream can change things. It can change the way you relate to people' (Feinberg 2006: 186). Indeed, it is this imagining otherwise that allows the characters to react to injustices around them and

develop deeper connections and alliances. And Max does eventually learn to relate to people differently, becoming active in a collective community that is protesting American imperialism and the invasion of Iraq alongside police violence and arrest of transgender individuals, immigrant communities, and youth of colour. But as the novel shows, those who are highly marginalised are often subject to increased surveillance and inhibited mobility. In this sense, it may be worth being wary of changes to passports or other identity documents that purport to be more 'inclusive'.

Mobility is, as the contributions in this volume make clear, never an innocent enterprise and is always implicated in the production of power (Cresswell 2010: 20–1). While recent conceptualisations of mobility, as both a condition of global modernity and a source of insecurity, can be traced back to the work of Michel Foucault (2007), it is also helpful to keep in mind Foucault's (2003: 253) insights into the convergences between disciplinary power and biopower and how norms appear: 'The norm is something that can be applied to both a body one wishes to discipline and a population one wishes to regularize'. In the context of my argument presented here, it would be worth then asking about the confluences between mobility, (in)security, and norms. We know that notions of normativity and inclusion are not stagnant. Not so long ago, same-sex sexualities were actively targeted, policed, and pursued by state bodies, whereas now we know that some homosexual bodies are seen as worthy of protection by nation states. In this sense, the X itself could become the new norm: those bodies the state hopes to discipline, and those populations it hopes to regularise. For example, Eric Stanley warns us of jumping to too-quick conclusions about these new options. Referring to both the Yogyakarta Principles on Human Rights and Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (2007) and the X in passports, he writes: 'an ethic of gender self-determination helps us to resist reading these biopolitical shifts as victories. Here the state and its interlocutors, including at times trans studies, work to translate and in turn confine the excesses of gendered life into managed categories at the very moment of radical possibility' (Stanley 2014: 90). Indeed, while these state-level interventions could, on the surface, appear progressive, they belie a reactionary response to containing and naming the non-normative.

NOTES

1   In between, Feinberg continued writing and publishing a number of influential texts and pamphlets on trans history and identity, some even crediting Feinberg with coining the term 'transgender'.
2   I refer specifically to a US context where a particular type of twenty-first century neoliberalism exists for two reasons: (1) contrary to other nation states, particularly those in Western Europe, the US has never truly functioned as a welfare state and privatisation has occupied a privileged position in the American economy, and (2) the 11 September 2001 attacks, which, although affecting nation states the world over, had particular

consequences for an American public, specifically those who were soon after (or perhaps already) considered 'undesirable'.

3    In Australia, although an X (or indeterminate) category has been allowed on passports since 2011, it was not until April 2014 that the government ruled that people are not unambiguously male or female, which then allows for a third gender under the law. However, the law is not so clear on what this indeterminate gender category will mean when it comes to marriage or domestic partnership. In New Zealand, X was also introduced as a new gender category on passports in 2012, with X meaning 'undetermined or unspecified'. Only a simple declaration is required to change one's passport. However, to change one's gender identity from male to female, or vice versa, (not to X) on citizenship documents, a more complicated Family Court declaration is still required. As it stands now, X is allowed but changing from one recognised gender to another is not so easy.

4    This has thus far only been made possible for accounts set to American English, which could prompt a whole set of questions about what it means for the US to be seen as the site for this 'progressiveness'.

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# One thing left on the checklist: ontological coordination and the assessment of consistency in asylum requests[1]

## Bruno Magalhães

RE THESE MEN and women arriving at our shores 'genuine refugees', entitled to international protection, or are they 'bogus applicants', trying to abuse our welcome? In this chapter, I look into the legal procedure known as Refugee Status Determination to get a glimpse of how the border between genuine refugee and bogus applicant is performed. In particular, ..., this chapter dwells on the notion of consistency and the impact it has over the outcome of asylum claims. Taking the work of asylum screening in Brazil as a setting, I propose to look at how examiners are steered towards denials when considering the degree of consistency in asylum seeker's narratives.

Along with the assessment of legal fit and empirical support, the judgment of consistency is one of the main cues on which examiners rely to rule on asylum requests. The perceived consistency of the asylum seeker's narrative is taken as a reliable indicator of the case's overall strength.

> The use of the indicator 'consistency' is based on an assumption that a person who is lying is likely to be inconsistent in his or her testimony, presumably because it is considered difficult to remember and sustain a fabricated story; and/or when challenged, it is assumed that individuals who are not telling the truth try to conceal their inconsistencies by altering the facts. The converse supposition appears to be that if applicants actually experienced the events they recount, and are genuine in their statements, then they will broadly be able to recall these events and related facts accurately and consistently. (UNHCR 2013: 149)

This chapter takes issue with the use of consistency as an indicator of credibility. As a number of studies carried out by asylum scholars of scholars and refugee protection organisations have pointed out, consistency assessments are often derived from rather contestable assumptions about how human memory works (Rousseau et al. 2002; Asylum Aid 2011; Jubany 2011; Griffiths 2012; Menon 2012; UNHCR 2013). To expect asylum seekers

to report violent experiences consistently have been charged for underestimating the impact of trauma over their narratives. From the point of view of case examiners, assessments of inconsistency also raise questions about the tacit understandings of relevance on which examiners rely, for example taking... when evaluating whether a case is consistent, examiners have to rely on tacit understandings of what kind of discrepancy is relevant, for example taking some inconsistencies as deceitful while acknowledging others as 'honest mistakes' (Griffiths 2012: 8).

Yet, despite the many questions that surround the use of consistency as an indicator of credibility, the identification of narrative inconsistency is still. Nevertheless, despite the "epistemic anxiety" that surrounds the use of consistency as an indicator of credibility, the identification of narrative inconsistency is still regularly accepted as a basis for denial (Cabot 2013, 454). Comparative studies on the status determination procedures among UNHCR member states have shown that narrative inconsistency is one of the arguments most commonly invoked by determining authorities to justify the denial of asylum claims (UNHCR 2010; 2013). As these results suggest, somehow justifications for denying asylum that point to a lack of consistency end up achieving the 'authority of legal knowledge' (Griffiths 2012: 8, Foucault 1979 : 136). How assessments of inconsistency manage to achieve truth-value is the main puzzle that concerns me here.

The argument put forward in this chapter is twofold. First, I borrow the notion of ontological coordination from the work of Dutch philosopher Annemarie Mol (1999, 2002a) to spell out a further reason to doubt the use of inconsistency as justification for denial. I argue that the belief that it is possible to assess a case's strength by relying on a judgment of consistency is dependent on the misleading assumption that different determination practices are looking at the same and singular underlying case. I contend that, if the enactments of the case emerging from different practices prove to be consistent, this result cannot be written off as a natural consequence of different practices exploring the same request. Secondly, I draw attention to the impact exerted over assessments of consistency by 'check-list' portraits of status determination. I maintain that to describe the relation between different determination practices as a list of steps is not an innocent aesthetic choice, but a rather efficient technology of government (de Goede and Sullivam 2016; Leander 2016). 'Check-list' descriptions of determination practices, I argue, have the political effect of Othering alternative enactments of the case. They steer asylum requests towards denial by making alternative ways of enacting a case hard to see.

To support these claims, this chapter shall stitch Mol's concept of ontological coordination to a series of stories I experienced while conducting documentary research, interviews and participant observation among case examiners in Brazil. During the two years I worked on this study, I took an internship position with Cáritas, one of the legal agencies responsible for guiding asylum seekers through the

meanderings of status determination. I followed asylum seekers in their encounters with the Brazilian Federal Police, with lawyers and case officers, in trajectories that took me through multiple sites: from Rio de Janeiro to São Paulo, from São Paulo to Brasília, and back again. I watched while men and women from all over the world – old and young, Angolans, Colombians, Syrians, Afghans – inscribed their lives on forms and handed in fading documents. I listened while they told their stories, sometimes in Spanish and Swahili, sometimes in French or in English, sometimes mixed with laughter and sometimes with tears. I observed while lawyers opened new files, filled them with notes and gave their initial judgments, after listening more or less persuaded by the applicants' reports. And, after long and hard negotiations, I also gained access to a beautiful arched building designed by Niemeyer in Brasília, where members of CONARE (the National Committee for Refugees) reopened those files to pronounce final rulings about people's lives.

And what did I see while following asylum seekers through society? I found an equally heterogeneous array of applicants and documents, poorly printed forms, lawyers, and case examiners, national treaties, old computers, yellow folders, fading stamps, interpreters, human rights records, ministerial representatives, oral accounts, cold meeting rooms and, sometimes, colder police officers; all coming together to establish or deny the refugee reality of asylum seekers.

To be sure, for the sake of full disclosure, I set out looking at these practices already convinced that the definition of whether the asylum seeker is a migrant or refugee cannot be traced back to a single and isolated event, as if the border between migrant and refugee were something that decision-makers got together at some point to build (Magalhães 2015, 2016). Michel Foucault (1998: 111) argued once that the task of a critical theorist is to make easy beliefs hard. The literature on security and borders to which I subscribe can be said to be rather critical in that sense. Virtually all easy assumptions – concerning why we have borders, how they come into being, where, when, and by whom – have been problematised. One of the key contributions that has been made by these studies has been to question the spatial and temporal reduction of border control to the activities taking place in ports of entry at the moment of crossing (Valverde and Mopas 2004; Amoore and de Goede 2005; Doty 2007; Walters 2006, 2008; Vaughan-Williams 2009; Johnson et al. 2011; Côté-Boucher et al. 2014; Maguire et al. 2014).

As a positive spin-off from these arguments, instead of studying the functioning of the border, we are now used to talking about how the work of *bordering* is performed (Johnson et al. 2011; Côté- Boucher et al. 2014 ; Maguire et al. 2014). Border*ing*, not border*s* anymore: a minor change in phrasing, but one that captures a lot. For at stake in...these few extra keystrokes is a shift between an ontologically substantialist and an ontologically relational approach. Instead of treating the existence of the border in substantial terms, studies focused on the performance of borders are interested in how the border comes into being

and how it is maintained. Taking my cue from this performative approach, I attend in what follows to how the the border between migrant and refugee is reinforced by an practice so apparently innocent as describing the work of status determination as a checklist.

## Step by step

After arriving in Brazil, asylum seekers visit Cáritas or other civil society reception centres and fill out an asylum request questionnaire. At the Federal Police, police officers prepare an affidavit and scan the asylum seeker's fingerprints. Stamped and signed by the federal officer, the asylum request is made official. Back at Cáritas, asylum seekers undergo eligibility hearings with lawyers and CONARE representatives. These eligibility officers then report to CONARE's Group of Preparatory Studies (GEP), where a first legal opinion is prepared on whether to grant or deny asylum. This recommendation is then forwarded to the CONARE plenary, where it is put to a vote (Jubilut and de Oliveira Selmi Apolinàrio 2008). It is the ontological politics that goes on during the first encounters in the procedure that I unpack next.

Let us start by taking the narrative down to the Cáritas branch in São Paulo, one of the main entry points for asylum seekers in Brazil. It first occurred to me that something was off with the checklist below (figure 7) during a meeting with



*Figure 7* Rights and duties of asylum seekers in Brazil, UNHCR/ACNUR *Handbook*, 24–5.

examiners there. During the time in spent in Brazil, I had the opportunity to talk to many examiners and ended up developing a basic opening line. I would ask the examiners to imagine I was a migrant and explain the asylum procedure to me. The answer I learned to expect came in the format of a checklist. Examiners would list the steps in the procedure and then tell me about their involvement. As I assumed I had a good understanding of the procedure, I asked for this overview mainly as a conversation starter. The idea was to get examiners talking and make up more questions from what they said. But the answer I was given at Cáritas really surprised me.

> [Mrs T][2] Well, if you want the official checklist you can read this leaflet in your folder. We give it to asylum seekers when they first get here. It lists all the steps. The process starts at the police, then you come here to talk to us, and then the CONARE agent comes down and so forth and so on. Now, of course, you have to take this with a pinch of salt. Because officially the person only becomes an asylum seeker after formalizing the request at the Federal Police, but in practice what happens is that the process usually starts here. 'Cause, as you know, we now have a waiting time of about six months before the foreigner gets to do the affidavit at the police. And, of course, during this time this person will have been here already. He will have told us a bit of his story and so forth, and will already be talking to our social workers and getting some help. So although the process can only be considered official after the person has gone through the fingerprinting etc., here at Cáritas the person already is an asylum seeker long before that.

What struck me as unusual in Mrs T's way of describing the procedure was more the idea of asylum seekers having different practical realities than the contrast between 'the real world' versus 'in theory'. That a checklist does not represent the messiness of practice can hardly be news to those involved in the work. Even the most ivory-tower-entrenched expert would assume that the step-by-step transition is likely to be less smooth than this checklist would make it seem. Cases do not follow a standard trajectory. Examiners do not know when hearings will take place. In practice, the procedure is complicated, of course. Although this situation says a lot about the transparency of the determination procedure in Brazil, Mrs T's contrast between official description and the work in practice was one I had come to expect. Her talk of a foreigner having different realities in different practices, on the other hand, really gave me pause.

A person can only be said to be an asylum seeker after fingerprints have been collected and an affidavit has been written. In São Paulo, foreigners usually wait six months to have access to these procedures at the Federal Police. *But here at Cáritas, talking to our social workers, the person already is an asylum seeker long before that.* 'Here and there', '[n]ow and then.' The notion of the same foreigner oscillating in status disconcerted me. I had listened to the procedure being described as a checklist so many times that I came to assume a continuous

progression: from foreigner to asylum seeker and from asylum seeker to refugee or failed applicant. Listening to Mrs T speak of a foreigner's reality as something that changes from site to site was encouraging in that sense. It made me realise that the versions of the case enacted in different practices can hang together in ways that are much less coherent than the image of the status-to-status progression imbued in my checklist.

I got the image of different versions of the case *hanging together* from the Dutch philosopher Annemarie Mol. 'Ontological coordination' is the more formal term Mol (2002a: 53) uses to speak about this. Listening to the examiner in São Paulo taking issue with the checklist overview made me confident that studying determination practices as enactment would not be a lofty endeavour. But I doubt I would have taken these critiques so seriously if I had not been sensitised by Mol to think of reality as a local achievement. With Michel Callon (1986), Bruno Latour (1986; 1993; 1999; 2010) and John Law (Law 1987; 1994; 1997; 2004; Law and Urry 2004), among other authors, Mol is part of a small group of scholars in science studies who study knowledge practices with an eye to contingency and heterogeneity. I read Mol's *The Body Multiple* (2002a) early on in my research and her arguments on coordination stayed with me.

Mol is a philosopher who spent many years studying diagnostic practices in medicine. Like status determination, the practices she studies are supposed to assess a person's *fit* with a certain definition. Is this patient anaemic? Is this a patient suffering from atherosclerosis of the foot? Like status determination, Mol tells us that producing an answer to these questions takes a lot of work. Each area of the hospital has its own say. Each practice brings its own diagnostic standard, its own instruments and diagnostic techniques. In her terminology, Mol tells us that each of these practices enacts a particular reality of the disease. In practice, she says, a disease such as atherosclerosis is enacted in multiple ways. And Mol (2002a: 55) insists that if these multiple enactments can be treated as manifestations of a single condition, then this is the result of coordination. Singularity is not given by the order of things.

Mol's argument on coordination can be described as a study on the relation between different 'diagnostic apparatuses'. Think of a patient entering a hospital and going through a series of diagnostic practices. When this patient leaves hospital, her discharge letter reads that she has been diagnosed with atherosclerosis on her lower limb. Mol insists that each of the diagnostic practices this patient went through did more than examine the patient from a different perspective. Faithful to the enactment principles, Mol shows how each of these diagnostic practices allows for the emergence of a unique reality of the condition from which this patient is suffering. Sliced and put under the microscope in the haematology lab, for example, the reality of atherosclerosis is that of a thickened blood vessel. In the radiology department, the reality of atherosclerosis is

that of a shadowgraph. Strictly speaking, the atherosclerosis these two practices are enacting is not the same. And yet, in the patient chart and the discharge letter these multiple ways of enacting atherosclerosis are reduced to different manifestations of the same disease (Mol 2002a: 30).

This is the puzzle that interests Mol: this oscillation between multiplicity in practice and singularity in the way that doctors talk about and deal with the disease. Mol (1999) claims that what makes this oscillation possible is the work of ontological coordination. The performativity insight breaks with the idea that our reality is anterior to and independent of the practices that bring them about. The notion of coordination, in turn, breaks with the idea that the singularity of the objects we study is anterior to the practices in which that singularity emerges. A patient enters into a hospital with a complaint. She goes through a series of diagnostic practices. At the end of the day, she gets out of the hospital carrying a letter saying she suffers from atherosclerosis. What Mol is telling us is that this singular diagnosis is never given by the order of things. It is always brought about. Singularity is contingent. It needs to be enacted itself (Mol 2002b: 220).

The questions that practitioners try to answer are, of course, not identical in status determination and in medical decision-making. Whether the diagnostics emerging from different practices are consistent is not always relevant for the doctor's decision on how to treat the patient. As long as the two diagnostics ask for the same treatment, whether they are consistent or not is a secondary concern for the doctor. This makes medical decision-making different from status determination, in which the judgment of consistency is a central concern. Yet, although it is important not to downplay their particularities, the two decision-making processes also have more in common than one might assume. Like the work of diagnosing a disease, the work of determination status is complex. It involves myriad determination practices: from the collection of fingerprints to the ruling at the plenary meeting. Each of these practices puts together its own array of humans and things. Each relies on its own standards of what qualifies as a strong claim and its own techniques for producing information. As with the medical objects Mol studies, asylum cases are multiple in practice.

What Mol encourages us to do is to reconsider the relation between these multiple enactments beyond the linear progression that checklist-thinking leads us to expect. Just as different diagnostic practices are not complementary ways of bringing out the same underlying condition, different practices are not only steps in the assessment of the same underlying case. Determination practices do more than approach the same underlying case from different perspectives. They enact different realities for the case (Mol and Berg 1994: 259). And, following Mol's advice, I would suggest that, if these enactments somehow align and allow for a consensual decision, then this alignment needs to be accounted for.

At the Federal Police, a very specific array of officers, interpreters, and interview techniques allows for the emergence of the case as an affidavit. At the interview room in Cáritas, questions are posed in a tone that invites details, medical reports are added to a folder, and the case emerges as an extended transcript. We can look at these practices as boxes to be checked in the assessment of the case, or steps in the path towards the final decision. Or we can look at status determination with an enactment gaze. Beyond the wordplay, an enactment way of studying the relation between these practices entails the denaturalisation of the alignment between their outcomes. In an enactment approach, agreement between different enactments of the case emerging from different practices cannot be written off as a natural consequence of the presumed fact that different practices are exploring the same and singular case.

## Lost on the way

To illustrate how attention to multiplicity and coordination destabilise the use of consistency as a decision criterion, let me move the narrative back to my field trip. After leaving São Paulo, I arranged meetings at Cáritas's sister agency in Brasília, the Human Rights and Migration Institute (IMDH in Portuguese). My suspicion of checklist overviews was strengthened by the stories I heard there. Whenever examiners mentioned strong and weak claims, I made a point of interrupting them and asking them to justify this contrast. How, I would ask, could they tell the difference? What was the standard they used? The notion of consistency came up often in the answers I got:

> [Brief one] Mr X, Syrian, requesting asylum to escape generalised human rights violations. The asylum seeker's credibility has been satisfactorily established. The asylum seeker offered enough detail of events and showed calm, tranquility, and conviction when reporting his story. *His narrative has been consistent* across the affidavit prepared at the Federal Police and the asylum request questionnaire filled in at Cáritas. There are no reasons to doubt his motivations to ask for asylum. Ruling: positive. (my emphasis)
>
> [Brief two] Mr E, Bangladeshi, requesting asylum to escape political persecution. The asylum seeker lacks credibility. The statements made by the asylum seeker in his asylum request questionnaire *are inconsistent* with the story reported at IMDH and the Federal Police. There are reasons to believe the asylum seeker omitted information about the events that led him to leave Bangladesh. During the interview, the asylum seeker seems to have been directed in his answers and oscillated in his description of events. There are reasons to suspect his credibility and to question his motivations to ask for refuge. Ruling: negative. (my emphasis)

The briefs above are excerpts of plenary rulings to which I had access during my time in Brasília. In Brief one, the case enacted at the Federal Police as an affidavit and the case enacted at Cáritas as a questionnaire are compared

and agree with each other. The versions of the case fit consistently. The claim's credibility is reinforced. In Brief two, the case as affidavit and the case as questionnaire are bridged again, but this time the two enactments do not cohere. The asylum seeker's credibility is put in question and the case comes across as weak. Described in terms of validity or correctness, the reference to consistency across practices often figured in the answers I received when I asked examiners about their criteria for telling strong from weak claims.

During my last day in Brasília, I interviewed a social worker, Mrs K, and asked her opinion about the use of consistency as an indicator of credibility. Her insistence on localising the applicant's status in terms of 'here and there' resonated with what I had heard in São Paulo. 'Of course,' Mrs K answered, 'if an asylum seeker tells a story at the police and another story here, then we will need to understand what is going on. But still, I have learned that there's just so much you can take from this'.

> [Mrs K] Like in this case I got involved with a few months ago: a young boy, Mr E, from Bangladesh [whose case was put forward for denial]. He got here with a group of six other men. They entered Brazil through Bolivia and asked for asylum when they got here. They did the interview at the police and all made some very vague comments ... about the economic situation in Bangladesh and so on. All very general, you see? And when our lawyer interviewed them, they said pretty much the same thing. They said they had come to Brazil because they needed to work ... because their country was very poor. So you see? When you ask what happened and the person keeps saying, like 'oh, I didn't have a job, I am poor, etc.,' we try to help, but it is very likely that the request will be dismissed.
>
> And, indeed: GEP did a recommendation, saying that it saw no well-founded fear; that it looked like economic migration and so on. Luckily, we work with eligibility but we work with migrants as well. We give aid to migrants in other dimensions: the social, the physical, the psychological. If the migrant has a health problem or needs pocket money he can come here and we try to help. And that is what happened with this boy. This boy came back here after his process, telling us that he needed money and that he needed a job.
>
> So we booked him an appointment with our social worker to assess his needs. And again, at first he pretty much repeated what he had said at the hearing. Just this time we went on asking for other things. He ended-up explaining that he wanted a job because he needed to send money to his wife and his children, who were starving in Bangladesh. We asked how come and he told us, 'Oh, it is because they have been expelled from our house.' When we asked why he said, 'Oh, it is because my house has been burned down.' And we asked what happened and he said, 'Oh, it's because my enemies burned down the house.' 'But which enemies?' ... [A]nd he kept going ... and we let him speak ... 'Oh, it was this and that.' And it so happens that, though his case wasn't about politics, it qualified as religious persecution.

In Mrs K's story, a young Bangladeshi arrives at the IMDH office and fills out a questionnaire. A police officer asks questions and prints an affidavit. IMDH lawyers and CONARE officers ask more questions and write their legal views. At

GEP and the plenary meeting, the multiple versions of the case that emerge in these practices are actively bridged. Questionnaires and affidavits are read side by side. Legal recommendations are compared. How consistent they are when contrasted to each other is a central concern. At the end of the day, as Mrs K puts it, everything points to migration. The fact Mr E's claim was put forward for denial, one might think, illustrates a fault in the procedure. But far more is happening, I think.

> [Mrs K] But you see? During the eligibility process he didn't mention any of this. Not to the police nor to the CONARE officer nor to our lawyer here. So everything pointed to migration. He spoke very little English and no Portuguese at all. He came along with these other guys from Bangladesh and repeated the same story they told. He pretty much repeated the same discourse we are used to getting from migrants. Only later, when a social worker did the social interview, *with a different logic*, he ended up revealing these details. So we rushed back to CONARE, saying that the case was not what it looked like. That it was much more complex; that we had new elements and so forth (my emphasis).

What Mrs K's story shows should not be dismissed as a fault in the procedure. Quite the opposite, in fact; judging by Mrs K's recollection, the procedure seems to have progressed smoothly, in the almost seamless progression from step to step that we are led to expect by the government's leaflet. The versions of Mr E's case enacted at the Federal Police and at Cáritas cohered. All practices encouraged the same conclusion on whether this young Bangladeshi was an economic migrant or a refugee. They 'pointed in the same direction'. Given this consistency across practices, denial was the decision plenary members had been steered towards. That this young man was not a refugee *was a fact*, I want to say, considering how the possible versions of the case had been arranged. There was consistency across practices, indeed. But this was not because all practices were looking at the same underlying case. Instead, consistency was achieved at the price of keeping the alternative enactment of the case that emerged from the social interview out of sight. Much more relevant than evidence of a fault in the system, this story points to the sort of ontological coordination that Mol tells us about.

## Living with inconsistency

In Mrs K's story, Mr E arrives at IMDH and claims fearing political persecution. His case goes through a number of determination practices that are supposed to tell whether this claim is credible enough and fits the refugee definition. In Mol's stories, a patient enters a hospital and claims to experience pain when walking. Her case goes through a series of diagnostic practices, which are supposed to tell whether her condition fits the medical definition of atherosclerosis. Mol (2002a: 66) insists that, by tying together a range of heterogeneous

ingredients in a particular way, each of these practices enacts a unique version of the condition from which this patient is said to be suffering. What puzzles Mol (2002a: 56) is how the versions of the patient's condition that emerge in these different practices can be drawn together as 'instances' of the same and single condition and described using a single name. While looking at the practices that make this possible, Mol ends up contrasting two general variants of coordination: a first, in which consistency between different enactments of a patient's case is strived for, and a second, in which inconsistency between enactments is simply lived with.

What is particular about forms of coordination that strive for consistency is that different enactments of the patient's condition are openly bridged. Different ways of enacting the condition are put side by side and compared. Doctors create common standards so they can choose among these enactments (Mol 2002b: 233). If these enactments do not map up to each other, these standards are used to decide what enactment will inform the diagnostic. When two ways of enacting the diagnosis are openly bridged and do not align, one of the diagnostic apparatuses wins the day. Sticking to one enactment and ditching the other is one of the forms in which multiple enactments of a patient's condition can relate when there is disagreement and consistency is strived for.

But here is the thing, Mol (2002a: 66) tells us: consistency is not always strived for. We might end up with a consensual diagnostic saying that this patient is atherosclerotic. That does not mean that all diagnostic practices concurred. Nor does it mean that potential mismatches between the versions of the case emerging from different practices have been actively considered and dealt with. Singularity in the diagnostic is not synonymous with consistency. Alternative ways of enacting the condition might remain in tension, even though this tension does not always come to the fore (Mol and Berg 1994: 259).

Mol (2002a: 102) gives an example of two ways of enacting atherosclerosis that relate in an inconsistent fashion without this inconsistency resulting in open controversy: the first is the enactment of the patient's condition we come across in the practice of vascular surgery. The second is the enactment of the patient's condition that emerges during the practice of internal medicine. Mol notes that, in these two settings, atherosclerosis is enacted as a problem with different temporalities. The doctor involved with vascular surgery approaches atherosclerosis as a present condition. The vascular surgeon is not so concerned with the process that led the patient to develop atherosclerosis. To the vascular surgery, an egg and bacon breakfast is one that patients might be happy to eat after their veins have been unclogged. For the internist, on the other hand, identifying what caused atherosclerosis is a main concern: the fact that the patient eats egg and bacon for breakfast is what needs to be avoided if the patient is not to develop these clogged veins again (Mol 2002a: 103).

Mol (2002a: 104) notes that there is a lot of potential tension between these two practices. She says that, in theory, the clash between these two ways of enacting the condition is 'full-blown'. For the internist, vascular surgery is a palliative: the fact that vascular surgeons pose as saving lives is close to hypocrisy. Vascular surgery does not address life-threatening habits by dealing only with the clogged vein instead of attacking the cause of the condition. And yet, Mol (2002a: 104) tells us, although all the necessary ingredients for a full-blown clash are in place, controversy does not happen. The two ways of enacting atherosclerosis do not match up to each other; but this inconsistency is lived with. The inconsistency is there, but the controversy remains potential.

To illustrate how this sort of cold inconsistency is possible, Mol (2002a: 104) comments on a conversation she had with an internist. This internist explains that, when a patient is diagnosed with clogged arteries, the doctors' main concern is whether the patient is at risk of suffering a heart attack or contracting gangrene. So, the patient who gets to the hospital is immediately referred to the vascular surgeon. What brought the patient to develop the condition is treated as a secondary concern. This, Mol argues, is a key aspect of how two enactments that are incompatible can nevertheless co-exist:

> Here, atherosclerosis is enacted as a present condition, there, as a process that has a history. Tensions between these ways to enact the reality of the disease are articulated. But it doesn't come to a full-blown fight. Instead, the differences between the condition atherosclerosis and the atherosclerotic process are distributed. (Mol 2002a: 104)

The enactment of atherosclerosis as encroached vessels (present condition/vascular surgeon) and its enactment as vessel encroachment (process-like/internal medicine) are potentially incompatible: favouring one comes at the expense of the other. But this potential incompatibility does not flare up in open mismatch. This, Mol (2002a: 108) tells us, is due to the very practical issue of distribution: these two ways of enacting the patient's condition are distributed in such a way that the practice that gives rise to the first enactment is part of the standard diagnostic path, while the practice that gives rise to the other is circumvented.

Modes of coordination that strive and do not strive for consistency are different in this respect. If openly bridged, alternative ways of enacting the diagnosis can prove inconsistent. But these incompatible enactments are not necessarily bridged. They can be kept apart somehow. They can be displaced, so that their inconsistency might remain potential and does not lead to open disagreement. What we have, when this happens, is inconsistent singularity.

In Mr E's case, if actively bridged, the version of the case being enacted at the interview with the social worker and the version of the case being enacted at the Federal Police would clash. Had Mr E not gone back to IMDH, these two

ways of enacting his case – as an economic migrant pretending to be a refugee or as a refugee fleeing religious persecution – would not be allowed to meet. Their potential for conflict would not have come to the fore.

For me, that is one of the most important aspects of Mol's argument on coordination: her insistence that singularity can be achieved without open bridging. Compare how different medical diagnostics relate and the way different determination practices are arranged. In the hospital, different diagnostic practices took place. There was no open disagreement between those practices that were openly bridged. The diagnosis of the condition encouraged by those practices that were compared all encouraged the same diagnosis. And doctors ended up with a consensual diagnosis at the end. Yet, Mol warns us that this singularity in the diagnostic does not allow us to exclude the possibility that there were possible alternative ways of enacting the condition that did not agree and that were simply kept out of the comparison. She reminds us of the alternative enactments that did not have a chance to make themselves present – enactments that were kept out of our field of vision or enactments that were Othered, so to speak. This sort of inconsistent coordination, I want to say, is what Mrs K's story points to. If there is no open disagreement between practices as concerns Mr E's status, we may assume that the lack of disagreement exists because all practices were exploring the same underlying case and managed to assess it properly. But no, Mol (2002a) insists: singularity takes continuous work. Enacting singularity takes ontological coordination: it involves arranging determination practices in a manner that somehow displaces alternative case enactments.

In Mr E's case, this coordination work takes the form of asking questions with an *eligibility logic* and arranging hearings in such an order that the case enacted at the social work interview gets lost on the way. Beyond Mr E's case, we see potential for this in the way the marshal asks question after question and translates 'demanded' as 'requested' while writing down Mr G's affidavit or the way the UNHCR officer highlights some aspects of the human rights report and downplays others. These are examples of contingent details in the determination practices that contribute to steer alternative enactment out of sight. Rather than underlying singularity, it is thanks to small practical arrangements like these that differences can be coordinated during determination procedures, defining what enactment of a case gets to guide CONARE.

### Checklist overviews as discursive devices

In this section, I rely on Mol's insights on difference and coordination to express what I find problematic about checklist overviews. In 1994, Mol published an article with Dutch ethnographer Marc Berg under the title *Principles and Practices of Medicine*. This contrast between principle and practice is central to the textbook image of how the work of diagnosing and treating patients is

organised. If we open a medical book and look at the principles part, we find chapters covering, for example, genetic and immunological sources of disease. If we check the practice part, in turn, we find sections with titles such as diagnostic techniques and care. Medical principles give the foundations on which medical practice stands. Practices are the things that doctors do in their day-to-day work. Mol and Berg tells us that, as the discourse goes, it is in the passage from principle to practice that doctors sometimes lose their way. While in a perfect world the medical practice should 'rest upon the foundations of principles', in the imperfect reality we live in, 'extra-scientific factors such as insecurity, pressure, emotions, scarcity, time-constraints, lead it to depart from the ideal' (Mol and Berg 1994: 247).

What Mol and Berg find particularly relevant about this principles-and-practices narrative is its rhetorical effect. Medicine is full of diversity, they say. Even a relatively banal condition like anaemia is prone to different definitions, each with their own diagnostic standards and practices (Mol and Berg 1994: 250). Mol and Berg are puzzled by the fact that, when the diagnostics emerging from two of these assemblages of definition, standards, and practices do not match, this discrepancy between 'diagnostic apparatuses' does not necessarily translate into a clash between their defendants. Two ways of diagnosing and treating anaemia might be incompatible, both in terms of the standards of normality they use and the diagnostic devices they demand. Even so, Mol and Berg (1994: 250) say, it is very common in medicine that doctors will continue to use both treatments as complementary, without this causing the sort of open clash that might be expected if we take consistency as a necessary aim.

To make sense of this situation, Mol and Berg (1994: 250) suggest that, on top of the practical arrangements that keep alternative arrangements distributed, this sort of cold inconsistency is facilitated by a 'principle-and-practice rhetoric'. When two ways of diagnosing anaemia lead to discrepant diagnostics, doctors can make sense of the discrepancy in terms of an assessment being ideal (belonging to the sphere of principles) but unpractical. 'Here, at the clinic, the laboratorial way of diagnosing anaemia would give more certainty but would be too costly or too fussy,' one could say. That is a powerful way of justifying the use of a diagnostic logic without having to take a stand on the overall pertinence of the other approach. A principle-and-practice rhetoric works thus like a sort of pacifying discourse. It makes it possible for discrepant diagnostics to co-exist in tension without this discrepancy coming to anyone's attention (Mol and Berg 1994: 258).

The checklist way of describing the relation between determination practices holds, I believe, a similar effect. When there is inconsistency, we might take it for granted that we need to strive for consistency. In turn, when we take consistency as a necessary goal, we might end up expecting controversy between those case enactments emerging from different practices. My point is that, like

the practice-and-principles rhetoric, the way of talking about different determination practices as if they were steps in a checklist also works as a pacifying discourse.

As alluring as it sounds, when it comes to judging the consistency of asylum requests, this pacifying potential is not necessarily a good thing, however. Checklist portraits leads us to expect consistency in the way cases come to the fore in different determination practices. When that consistency is achieved, we do not take into consideration the possibility that alternative ways of enacting the case might have fallen out of sight. By pacifying potential tensions between alternative enactments, checklist talk facilitates the Othering of alternative enactments.

In Mrs K's story, the interviews with the Federal Police and the eligibility lawyer at IMDH were consistent. They encouraged the conclusion that this young Bangladeshi's claim for refugee reality was weak. At a different interview, however, done with *a different logic*, the social worker gives more emphasis to the process-like sources of the claim. The questions asked and the way the interview was conducted were not the same. The version of the case emerging from these practices did not match the others. Plenary members would therefore be steered towards opposing assessments depending on which experimental apparatus was used to make each assessment.

Judging the version of the case enacted during practices one and two, plenary members were steered to conclude that this Bangladeshi was not a refugee. If they were to judge the version of the case as enacted at practice three, then this young Bangladeshi's claim for refugee reality would likely come across stronger. And yet, the inconsistency between these alternative ways of enacting the case would probably remain hidden, were it not for the unexpected interview that, conducted with a different logic, allowed for other elements to come up.

To paraphrase Mol, all the ingredients for a full-blown controversy were in place in Mr E's case. And yet, were it not for the unexpected interview, the alternative enactment of this case would have been lost. The controversy would not have become overt. This mismatch between alternative ways of enacting Mr E's case would have remained cold. It is in such a context that the critiques of checkbox overviews I heard in São Paulo and this Bangladeshi's story resonate. This Othering, I suggest, is facilitated by check-box overviews. By encouraging us to think of social care as belonging to a different dimension of refugee protection and to think of status determination in terms of steps in the assessment of the underlying same and singular case, checkbox overviews make this sort of practical displacement harder to grasp, foreclosing the drive to consider whether alternative ways of enacting the case have been Othered along the way.

Mol's terminology thus helps to make sense of what I find problematic about check-box overviews. The notion of enactment encourages us to treat each

practice as enacting a unique reality for the case. These check-box descriptions, however, still work under an assumption of singularity. They take as a given that different practices are ways of collecting information and producing a decision about the same and single case. Check-box overviews thus reinforce an assumption of singularity that gives consistency across practice such a relevant role. It naturalises the assumption that, if all practices are dealing with the same case, they should arrive at the same conclusion.

We gain something when we leave this sort of checklist talk aside: we get to notice the ontological coordination happening in the space between singularity and open controversy. We get to see how details as small as the order in which hearings are arranged, questions are asked, and evidence is organised might affect the outcome of asylum requests. We become more aware of how these small, practical arrangements end up making the difference between the asylum seeker emerging as a bogus applicant or as a refugee.

## Conclusion: performing inconsistency, steering decisions

The procedural handbook cited at the start of the chapter states that if applicants actually experienced the events they recount, and are being honest in their statements, than they should be able to recall these events and relate facts consistently. In this chapter I took issue with the assumption that common assent occurs *because they all looked at the same case free from bias and thus, as expected, got to the same assessment.*

To develop my argument, I extended the same logic to the justifications examiners give for denial and considered whether the logic holds. Suppose examiners all agree that Mr E's case is weak. Their assessment of the request is completely consistent, in the sense that all examiners involved in all steps of the determination work came to the same conclusion that Mr E is most likely an economic migrant instead of a refugee. Does this absolute consistency give reasonable basis for the denial of Mr E's request?

The argument I put forward in this chapter is that the fact that a case is consistently assessed as weak across different determination practices gives no basis for denying the request. This applies not only when there are small inconsistencies that might be shown to be false in the long run, but also when all practices agree that the case is weak. To speak of ontological coordination is to keep in mind that each determination practice ties together a range of heterogeneous phenomena in a very specific way. It is to acknowledge that the answer to whether the request is strong and the adoption of a particular apparatus to make this appraisal are simultaneous social processes.

Extended to how we conceive of the relation between determination practices, this approach problematises the assumption of singularity embedded in checklist overviews. Attention to ontological coordination encourages those

concerned with the work of status determination to be cautious about how we conceive the relation between different determination practices, for talk of status determination as a sequence of steps has political significance. To describe the relation between different determination practices as a list of steps works as discursive device: it enhances the aura of objectivity around negative rulings. This checklist way of thinking about status determination encourages us to expect consistency in the way the case should come to the fore. When that consistency is achieved, we do not take into consideration the possibility that alternative ways of enacting the case might have been Othered. By reinforcing the assumption that different practices are assessing the same underlying case, this sort of step-talk contributes to hide the practical arrangements that keep alternative ways of enacting asylum claims out of sight.

During status determination, an asylum case moves through a rich range of practices: the request at Cáritas, the formalisation of the case at the Federal Police, an interview with a lawyer, a hearing with a CONARE officer, a chat with a social worker, group debates among examiners in GEP, or a deliberation at a plenary meeting. In an enactment approach, these practices are not boxes to be checked or steps in the path towards a decision. They are not complementary tasks in the work of collecting information about a same and single case. As we get to appreciate if we look at status determination through enactment lenses, the way practices are arranged does more than disclose the strength of the case. It allows for the emergence *as a fact* the conclusion that the asylum seeker is not a refugee.

### NOTES

2   I use pseudonyms and initials to protect my interviewees and asylum seekers.

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# Modelling the self, creating the other: French denaturalisation law on the brink of World War II[1]

## Marie Beauchamps

> One is almost tempted to measure the degree of totalitarian infection by the extent to which the concerned government use their sovereign right of denationalisation.
> – Hannah Arendt (1968: 278)

IN 2014, DENATURALISATION (i.e. the deprivation of citizenship) surfaced as a pan-European (and more generally Western) problematic. Presented as yet another in a panoply of security measures within the ever-increasing array of counter-terrorism policies, denaturalisation was emerging as the favoured response of European countries (among which France, Britain, and the Netherlands) and the United States (US) against citizens departing their host states to fight, for example, in Syria. As denaturalisation is exposed as a political tool that would allegedly appease a feeling of insecurity, nationality law becomes a salient political area where

> [citizenship] and security work together to separate those with the right to security from those who are excluded from it – the former by granting and denying rights, the latter by separating the citizenry from those seen as endangering the rights of men and citizens. (Guillaume and Huysmans 2013: 4)[2]

As such, politics of denaturalisation reveal a specific mechanism of inclusion and exclusion. Enacting a discourse of authority that differentiates between social political subjects deemed trustworthy or threatening, denaturalisation law rewrites the limits of inclusion and exclusion to the national community, and sheds new light on what it means to be a national citizen.

In this chapter, I reflect on such contemporary issues of securitisation by reading a historical case: the expansion of denaturalisation law in France on the brink of World War II. Based on French parliamentary archival documents related to denaturalisation's legislative process, the chapter discusses the extent to which denaturalisation became a major political strategy, authorised in the name of the security of the nation. Especially attentive to the language at work in those political juridical documents, that is, paying

particular attention to rhetorical tropes, semantic fields, and argumentative logics, the analysis raises questions about the power of security as a rhetorical and political device. More specifically, it demonstrates how security became a means to legitimise the relegation of democratic principles (Buzan et al. 1998: 23–8), showing the extent to which security-driven arguments mobilise the notion of security beyond its operational ground – the intended effect of the arguments being not necessarily security as such, but rather the legitimation of denaturalisation practices. The effect is to turn nationality into a political tool – the denaturalisation of Charles de Gaulle, decreed on 8 December 1940 by the Vichy government, being the most striking illustration thereof. As politics of security impact on the political juridical concept of nationality, denaturalisation makes foreign those who are prosecuted in the name of the nation's security, highlighting those moments when notions of selfhood and otherness are shaped, mobilised, and transformed.

My approach to history is motivated by a genealogical method of research, starting with the recognition that contemporary denaturalisation practices continuously articulate a past that nonetheless remains only partially known to us. Accordingly, it reads the past not in terms of establishing a linear continuity between past and present, but rather by recognising the past's capacity to help us read the present while the present helps us read the past (Bal 1999), thereby revealing the contingency involved when some values of sovereignty become institutionalised while others are suppressed. Accordingly, the way I apprehend historical material acknowledges that 'the history delineated ... won't ... exhibit unbroken lines of value-preserving succession, but will rather be characterised by an overwhelming contingency' (Geuss 2001: 326). As such, genealogy opens up a space of critique: 'the critique of the injustice of the past by a truth held by men in the present' (Foucault 1984: 97). In Wendy Brown's (2001: 109) terms, genealogy attaches both history and philosophy to a political task – that of knowing who we are, knowing our ill body and bodies. 'The point of genealogy,' Brown (2001: 112) adds, 'is to introduce the possibility of a different discursive understanding of ourselves and our possibilities.' Introducing denaturalisation law as a seminal facet of Western systems of recognition and identification, this chapter compels us to look most critically at those contemporary events where security-driven arguments thrive, having an impact on questions of legitimate authority, political belonging, and citizens' rights. Before going into a systematic analysis, let me now open the chapter by contextualising denaturalisation practices during World War II through a close reading of a governmental note on the topic.

## A short introduction to the language of denaturalisation

At work in the French national archives, I discovered, in box after box, documents related to denaturalisation practices during the war, ranging from

ministerial notes, parliamentary documents, debates and reports, bills, decrees, and ministerial responses. A governmental note caught my attention as its introductory paragraphs reviewed the scope of denaturalisation so far.[3] It was dated 19 February 1951, written in the name of the French Ministry of Public Health and of the Population [Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population]. Addressed to the chair of the Commission for Justice and Legislation for the National Assembly [Commission de la Justice et de la Législation à l'Assemblée Nationale] in response to a bill amending certain provisions of the Nationality Code,[4] including provisions pertaining to denaturalisation, it read:

> *De 1940 à 1941, la 'révision des naturalisations,' portant sur 500.000 personnes devenues françaises depuis 1927, transforme la nationalité en un jeu d'écritures. ... Dans le même temps, la déchéance devient une arme politique: à côté de 125 déchéances de droit commun, on compte 375 déchéances politiques.*
>
> [From 1940 to 1941, the 'revision of naturalisations,' which targeted those 500,000 people who had become French since 1927, transformed nationality into a *jeu d'écritures* [dummy entry] ... At the same time, denaturalisation became a political weapon: besides the 125 cases of common law denaturalisation, there were 375 cases of political denaturalisation.][5]

It first struck me that these numbers from World War II no longer allow us to view, as is often the case in contemporary debates on the topic, denaturalisation as an exceptional measure. But most of all, the note interested me as it introduces a number of categories that informed denaturalisation practices at that time. These can be summed up as follows: (1) the systematic revision of naturalisation files; (2) the application of standards derived from common law jurisdiction; and (3) political motivations.

Due to space restrictions, this chapter will solely focus on the second and third categories, especially concentrating on the political and legislative processes that led to their implementation. Before going into the core of the analysis, however, let me first tease out what is at stake, starting with the following questions: what are the consequences of stating that only those latter 375 cases were *political* cases of denaturalisation, as opposed to those resulting from the revision of 500,000 naturalisation files and those resulting from common law jurisdiction? In other words, is the systematic revision of naturalisation files (a process that led to thousands of denaturalisation cases, or millions considering similar practices in other European countries at that time) not just as political as the political disagreements that resulted in the last 375 denaturalisation cases? On another level, is the interpretation of codified law not political in its own right too?

Besides, the two expressions '*jeu d'écritures*' and 'political weapon' encourage some preliminary reflections. If '*jeu d'écritures*' is commonly translated into English as 'dummy entry' by the Cambridge dictionary, the French expression also conveys that denaturalisation practices are likely to be embedded in the

heterogeneous space of language. Literal translations of the phrase '*jeu d'écritures*' result in 'game of writings,' 'game of scripts,' or in 'set of writings/ scripts'. Metaphorically at least – but I suggest also performatively – the expression portrays denaturalisation as the meeting point between heterogeneous language and rigid administration patterns. The virtuosity of the legal scribe, who introduces some *jeu* as latitude in the system, is a vivid image of where law and language meet.

As for 'political weapon,' the phrase reveals the extent to which denaturalisation is mobilised in a defensive battle: clearly, some territory has to be defended, and denaturalisation is deployed as weaponry to this end. Moreover, the expression acknowledges the contingent character of denaturalisation. Contingent in the sense that denaturalisation belongs to a set of political norms and political beliefs that determine the ways in which one should act, think, and speak (that is, it establishes a set of moral and behavioural standards). Now, if denaturalisation becomes a political weapon allowing the government to get rid of those people expressing fundamental critique, and to claim a renewal of the body politic, then denaturalisation is indeed a political weapon; a weapon that we would expect to be used by a totalitarian regime.

As this chapter further addresses and questions those categories that have informed and legitimised denaturalisation practices during World War II, I am particularly interested in the following questions: if denaturalisation serves as a political weapon that has a role in safeguarding the national community, which national community are we talking about? In other words, in the name of which community is a denaturalisation decree authorised? And how does it impact on the notions of security and mobility?

In the first section, I demonstrate how a rhetoric of security came to legitimise the extension of denaturalisation practices. The discussion revolves around a selection of parliamentary documents and ministerial notes, including the 1939 bill amending the provisions pertaining to the forfeiture of French nationality, presented to parliament in December 1939. In the second section, I discuss the extent to which such rhetoric of security contaminates the politics of nationality with a 'totalitarian infection' (Arendt 1968). Shifting focus from security to mobility, the analysis discusses what is at stake when mobile exclusionary norms format the limits of nationality, interrupting our capacity to dissent while fixing the means to govern beyond democratic control.

### Denaturalisation, security: the national community's operational limits

On 22 December 1939, the French Assemblée Nationale was presented with a bill amending the provisions pertaining to the forfeiture of French nationality, submitted by Albert Lebrun, President of the French Republic, Edouard

Daladier, Minister of National Defence and War and of Foreign Affairs, Georges Bonnet, Minister of Justice, Albert Sarraut, Minister of Home Affairs, and George Mandel, Minister of the Colonies. Inscribed in the context of the upcoming war, the bill's explanatory memorandum drew on the law of 19 March 1939 designed to give the government special powers to take measures deemed necessary for the defence of the country (Annexe nº 6356). This reference places denaturalisation on two axes. First, denaturalisation was an exceptional measure that required special powers in order to be pronounced. Second, denaturalisation served as a measure to defend the country.

Although the government presented denaturalisation as a security measure, the law of 18 July 1941, relating to measures to be taken against dangerous individuals, shows us that denaturalisation did not figure among the list of measures to take against individuals deemed to be a threat to national defence and to public security.[6] Does it mean that denaturalisation was not convincing enough a measure to take against those deemed dangerous to public security and national defence? This is unlikely, as such a hypothesis contradicts all official discourses on denaturalisation – the notion of security has indeed proven to be the most recurrent argument mobilised to legitimise denaturalisation practices. The juxtaposition of those two documents suggests instead that the 1939 bill rhetorically mobilised a security-related argument, the intended effect of which was not necessarily security as such, but rather the legitimation of denaturalisation practices. In other words, security was invoked beyond its operational ground. The effect is clear: relying on the idea that the nation had to be defended, denaturalisation reciprocally mobilised and constructed a specific kind of national community, thereby becoming an operational element in the maintenance of the national community.

The operational dynamic between denaturalisation and a related national community finds further emphasis in the explanatory memorandum to the 1939 bill pertaining to denaturalisation, which reads:

> *Il pourrait ... sembler superflu de prévoir dans une loi spéciale une modification aux textes du droit commun si, toutefois, l'état de guerre n'obligeait pas de mieux adapter aux circonstances les modalités d'application du principe de la déchéance.*
>
> *On ne saurait, en effet, méconnaître que c'est pendant les périodes d'hostilités que la fraude du bénéficiaire de l'acte de naturalisation pourra se manifester avec la plus grande évidence, que le critérium de la sincérité de son adhésion à la nationalité française sera le plus clairement établie.*
>
> *Il a paru, en conséquence, légitime, pendant la période des hostilités, de proroger les délais de la déchéance à l'égard des étrangers qui ont acquis notre nationalité et, d'autre part, d'étendre les cas dans lesquels peuvent être déchus les Français d'origine.*
>
> [It might ... seem superfluous to provide a special law to amend the texts of common law. However, the state of war forces us to better adapt to the circumstances and to revise the modes of application pertaining to the principle of denaturalisation.

One cannot indeed fail to recognise that during periods of hostilities, fraud by beneficiaries of acts of naturalisation will be manifest with the greatest evidence, and that the criterion of their sincere adherence to the French nationality will be most clearly established.

It has therefore appeared legitimate, during the period of hostilities, to extend the limits of denaturalisation practices for denaturalising foreigners who have acquired our nationality and, in addition, to extend the circumstances in which native-born nationals may be deprived of the French nationality.]

The excerpt is telling for several reasons. First of all, it rhetorically installs a security-related argument as central to the legitimation of denaturalisation. Furthermore, it reveals the extent to which denaturalisation relied on the ambivalent meaning of nationality, turning denaturalisation into a mobile exclusionary norm, which I will further discuss in the next two sections.

### Rhetoric and mechanisms of security

In terms of rhetorical structure, the excerpt opens indirectly with the hypothetical (and therefore ambiguous) mode of the conditional: '*il pourrait sembler superflu … si, toutefois, la guerre n'obligeait pas*' ['it might seem superfluous … however, war forces us to']. Fostering the illusion that the reader's potential objections have been taken into account ('it is superfluous' being the supposed expression of the reader's objection), such an indirect opening functions as a form of address towards the reader, who nonetheless has no room to speak back. Instead, the form of address mobilises a rhetorical pathos according to which the audience is expected to side with the authors, as the verb *obliger* [to force] conveys that denaturalisation is the sole appropriate answer to the situation of war: 'the state of war forces us to better adapt to the circumstances and to revise the modes of application pertaining to the principle of denaturalisation.' The effect is to silently shift towards the enunciation of a security-related argument which is posited as suitably central; the amendment of the law on denaturalisation was required – and hence appropriate – because of a state of insecurity.

The security argument is rhetorical in the first place, thereby typically instantiating a securitisation process. As Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde (1998: 21, emph. added) point out, 'by *saying* "security," a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development'. Beyond rhetoric, however, the 1939 bill further emphasises the extent to which the enunciation of security facilitates a structural change as it enables the law to be adapted. Such flexibility and adaptability strikingly resonate with Michel Foucault's understanding of apparatuses of security. To Foucault (2007: 63), security is tightly connected to an operation of normalisation which 'consists in establishing an interplay between … different distributions of normality

and [in] acting to bring the most unfavorable in line with the more favorable.' The term 'interplay' gives away that security is a matter of action and reaction between various normative structures, a dynamic that effects a process of repetitive changes and adaptations. In Foucault's (2007: 47) terms, 'security ... tries to work within reality, by getting the components of reality to work in relation to each other, thanks to and through a series of analyses and specific arrangements'. Furthermore, those analyses are grounded in the notions of risk, danger, and crisis (Foucault, 2007: 61): the norm is the result of a constantly renewed risk analysis, in which the expected behaviour of the population becomes both a benchmark of normality and that which needs to be normalised and controlled. This means that while operations of security produce a norm according to which suspect behaviour can be differentiated from what is deemed normal, the norm itself remains 'an interplay of differential normalities' (Foucault 2007: 63).[7]

Emphasising adaptability on the one hand and normalisation processes on the other, Foucault's approach to security is particularly helpful when scrutinising the politics of denaturalisation as presented in the 1939 bill. For, as the bill reads, denaturalisation is a *principle* which not only works according to certain '*modes* of application' (emph. added), but which also has the capacity to be *adapted* whenever it is deemed necessary. In this sense, denaturalisation can be compared to an empty signifier that facilitates and operationalises normalisation processes: available for semantic appropriation, it offers a structural space in which the constructed norm comes into operation.

But which are the norms both referred to and produced by this normalisation process? In other words, how does the bill pertaining to denaturalisation feed on and produce normative divisions that affect the notion of national identity, and, by extension, the notion of national community?

## The rise of new limits to the notion of national identity during World War II: between security and mobility

As stated by the 1939 bill amending the propositions pertaining to denaturalisation, the French national community is limited by the normative criterion of a 'sincere adherence to the French nationality.' The text generates a norm from which the limits of the national community become operative, offering a criterion to identify those individuals who must be aligned against the national community. Its formulation, however, distinctively reproduces those mechanisms according to which processes of normalisation remain by definition dynamic and adaptive. National community is centred on the normative concept of national identity. In turn, national identity has no clear-cut boundaries, its limits depending on what is being done with it – the practice of denaturalisation being one striking expression thereof.

As denaturalisation practices rely on subjective criteria, the boundaries of the national community are drawn as a result of processes of subjective interpretation which, in turn, depend on the flexible and adaptive capacity of the law. For what does it mean to sincerely adhere to the French nationality? Who decides whether sincerity is sufficiently proven, and on which ground? Clearly revolving around a word with a broad semantic content ('sincerity'), the limitative criterion sets up a mobile, subjective norm that cannot be defined objectively. Instead, the manifest process of interpretation involved turns the normative criterion into an interplay of differential normalities as it effects a process of repetitive changes and adaptation. Based on specific politics of reading and interpretation, the various approaches to nationhood invoked translate into operational concepts whose meanings evolve with and through the adaptive capacity of the law. As a result, practices of reading both instigate the law's flexibility, and are at the core of those legislative (and judicial) processes through which specific normalities are being formed and defined.

I was provided with a vivid description of such politics of interpretation and adaptation in one of the archival documents consulted. It came as a typewritten note entitled '*pour Monsieur le Secrétaire Général*' ['to Mr Secretary-General'] on paper with the official letterhead of the Ministry of Justice.[8] Although not dated, the note may be traced to 1941, as it was clustered with other documents from the same year. Its exact author and addressee remain unknown, the note being unsigned (which conveys that the document in question was a draft and not an official ministerial document). But its content reads as a response to a note by the Minister of Justice pertaining to the French politics of denaturalisation, which also evoked the jurisprudence of the Conseil d'Etat (Council of State) on the matter. More specifically, the content draws on the question of how to define the terms of '*actes contraires à l'ordre public*' ['acts threatening the public order'] – one of those categories central to denaturalisation practices, as those who commit an act threatening the public order are liable to denaturalisation. The note conveys that the Minister of Justice would have suggested it possible to define such a category objectively, while the author of the note, siding with the jurisprudence from the Council of State, emphasises the importance of keeping such a category subjective.

The first step in the author's argument reads that such politics of subjective definition 'both conforms with the will of the legislator and is reasonable' ('*cette politique est à la fois conforme à la volonté du législateur et raisonnable*'). Regarding the first proposition (i.e. the proposition to conform to the will of the legislator), the argument denotes a strong normative principle in line with Foucault's understanding of security. When conforming to the will of the legislator, loose definitions such as '*actes contraires à l'ordre public*' – and by extension the lack of 'a sincere adherence to the French nationality' – are 'intentionally used' so as to allow the government to pursue flexible policies so that decision-makers will not

be constrained in their work ['*en employant à dessein les termes très larges "d'actes contraires à l'ordre public" [le législateur] permet au Gouvernement une politique assez souple, une marge de décision suffisament grande pour qu'il ne soit pas lié dans son action*']. In other words, loose definitions allow regulation through adaptation. However, where Foucault's approach to security emphasises the population's behaviour as a benchmark of normality, the note's argument proves primarily concerned with the space available for the government to act. The top-down practical logic of the argument is striking: subjective definitions clearly serve those in power to intentionally broaden their space of action beyond control.

That such politics of normative adaptation is seen as reasonable tells us much about the discursive force of rhetoric when centred on the ideal of security. Far from conceding that subjective definitions extend the limits of the government's agency beyond democratic control, the note emphasises instead that a politics of adaptation serves the 'public interest' ('*l'intérêt public*'). The argument reads as follows: 'the same act can, at different times, constitute an act threatening public order' ('*Un même acte peut, à des époques différentes, constituer un acte contraire à l'ordre public*').[9] In other words, acts that would not qualify as a threat at a given time might become threatening in new circumstances. This is why, according to the author of the note, 'it would even be dangerous to lock the jurisprudence in overly strict regulations' ('*il serait même dangereux d'enfermer la jurisprudence dans des règles trop strictes*'). Indeed, the administration (be it the Ministry of Justice or the Council of State) 'must be able to keep a certain freedom of judgment. The government must also have the ability to vary its politics of denaturalisation in issuing more or less severe directives' ('*L'administration– Chancellerie ou Conseil d'Etat – doit pouvoir garder une certaine liberté de jugement. Le gouvernement doit aussi avoir la possibilité de varier sa politique de déchéance de la nationalité en lui donnant une orientation plus ou moins sévère*'). As the author concludes, '[we] are in an area where the inflexible rules of law have been discarded by the legislator and must not reappear via an overly strict jurisprudence' ('*Nous sommes dans une matière où les règles trop rigides du Droit ont été écartées par le législateur et ne doivent pas réapparaitre par le biais d'une trop stricte jurisprudence*').

Those arguments confirm the hypothesis that denaturalisation finds legitimacy in a rhetoric of security whose starting point is to prioritise the interest of the national community.[10] Furthermore, declared 'legitimate,' the bill's proposition institutes the premise – or even the promise – of a shared reference through law and becomes an expression of the complex relationship between law and the authority asserting the legality of the law.[11] It thereby appeals to a certain notion of national community in which the content of the bill would find meaning and recognition. But now that some citizens (i.e. native-born nationals who were first affectively and even unconditionally included) face the risk of being excluded by denaturalisation, whose notion of nationhood is being invoked? In other words, to which collective body (i.e.

national community) and to which authority does the law appeal while seeking legitimation?

## Denaturalisation and totalitarian infection: when mobility becomes a threat for and from the normalising power

The bill as presented to the Assemblée Nationale on 22 December 1939 was not adopted before the instalment of the Vichy regime. After consultation of all proceedings of the Assemblée Nationale for the end of the year 1939 and for the year 1940, I have had to conclude that the bill had never even been officially debated. There is in fact no trace of a potential debate. The spirit of the 1939 bill, however, resurfaces in the laws of 22 July and 23 July 1940, decreed by the Vichy regime. The law of 22 July 1940 on the revision of naturalisation decrees announced:

> *Il sera procédé à la révision de toutes les acquisitions de nationalité française intervenues depuis la promulgation de la loi du 10 août 1927 sur la nationalité.*
> [One will proceed to review all acquisitions of French nationality pronounced since the enactment of the law on nationality of 10 August 1927.][12]

One day later, the law of 23 July 1940 on the denaturalisation of French nationals who have left France decreed:

> *Tout Français qui a quitté le territoire français métropolitain entre le 10 mai et le 30 juin 1940 pour se rendre à l'étranger, sans ordre de mission régulier émanant de l'autorité compétente ou sans motif légitime, sera regardé comme ayant entendu se soustraire aux charges et aux devoirs qui incombent aux membres de la communauté nationale et, par suite, avoir renoncé à la nationalité française.*
> [All French citizens who left the French metropolitan territory between 10 May and 30 June 1940 to go abroad, without a regular mission statement issued by the competent authority or without a legitimate reason, will be regarded as having sought to evade the loads and duties binding members of the national community and, consequently, having renounced French nationality.][13]

The latter law was amended by the law of 28 February 1941, which stated:

> *Cette déchéance sera également prononcée contre tout Français qui, hors du territoire métropolitain, trahit par ses actes, discours ou écrits, les devoirs qui lui incombent en tant que membre de la communauté nationale.*
> [Denaturalisation will also be pronounced against all French citizens who, outside the French metropolitan territory, betray by their deeds, speeches, or writings, the duties binding them to the national community.][14]

A second amendment was brought by the law of 8 March 1941, in which it was decreed that denaturalisation would also apply to 'all French citizens who, without authorisation from the Government and as of 1 December 1940, went or will go to a dissident area':

*tout Français qui, sans autorisation du Gouvernement et à partir du 1er Décembre 1940, s'est rendu ou se rendra dans une zone dissidente.*[15]

Clearly, the national authority invoked in those texts does not refer to the national community in terms of all who consider themselves French. Instead, the national community appears as the sum of those being recognised as worth being French by the government at that time. In fact, many of those being denaturalised as a result of those new directives never ceased to claim being French and acting on behalf of the French nation. The most salient example is that of Charles de Gaulle, who, based in London and leader of the resistance movement called the Free France, never ceased to see his duty as being that of serving France, sustaining its autonomy and its resilience in the international context of the time. As François Bédarida's (1994: 23) study on de Gaulle and the resistance confirms, '[de Gaulle] boldly proclaimed himself to be the leader, not of a foreign legion based in Great Britain, but of the French nation at war'. Combined with de Gaulle's affective description of his patriotism in the opening pages of his memoirs (in which he explicitly refers to France as being *his* country, even describing its successes and errors as his own), his sense of duty towards France makes it unambiguously clear that the General never ceased to consider himself as a member of the French political community.

Accordingly, the national community invoked in the bill is bounded by the governmental, formal reading of the nation's limits, including an orchestrated securitisation of mobility. As the laws of 23 July 1940, 28 February 1941, and 8 March 1941 emphasise, denaturalisation practices primarily targeted political subjects crossing the nation's territorial borders – as well as its geographical borders demarcating between those areas admitting the Vichy regime and those resisting it structurally. But while physical mobility was marked as a sign of enmity, the government expanded its politics of denaturalisation by means of flexible and adaptive exclusionary criteria.

As such, denaturalisation law confronts us with an authoritarian vision of the nation's structure, in which those in power have – and take – the means to reshape the nation's exclusionary circumference at will. In order to further analyse such politics of national identity, I engage with Hannah Arendt's (1968) study on the origins of totalitarianism, in which she critically comes to grips with those political forces that led to the totalitarian catastrophe of World War II. Addressing the worrisome unpredictability of a political system whose adaptable juridical practices of interpretation prevented any form of genuine democratic control, she states that '[never] has our future been more unpredictable, never have we depended so much on political forces that cannot be trusted to follow the rules of common sense and self-interest – forces that look like sheer insanity, if judged by the standard of other centuries' (Arendt 1968: vii). Further analysing those processes that,

according to her, lead to the decline of the nation state and to the end of the rights of man (in the sense that those processes fully broke down the principle of equality before the law) (Arendt 1968: 290), she draws attention to the role denaturalisation practices play in totalitarian politics. As she tentatively puts it, 'one is almost tempted to measure the degree of totalitarian infection by the extent to which the concerned government use their sovereign right of denaturalisation' (Arendt 1968: 278).[16] While Arendt's term 'infection' connotes otherness and parasitic takeover, it tellingly qualifies the government – the latter being not commonly associated with otherness. Knowing that flexible normative criteria have become a means to govern beyond democratic control, Arendt's formulation marks the tendency for governments to estrange themselves from democratic principles as they exercise denaturalisation; infectious elements affect the national community in the sense that they are parasitic to its democratic health. While governments act so as to shape a national community worthy only of the government's own normative framework, they dramatically reduce the people's capacity to contest authoritative claims imposed from above.

In the French context, such estrangement from democratic control turns up as the administration appropriates acts of political contestation to categorise dissent as a proof of enmity.[17] Adopting a rhetoric of emergency and security typical of securitisation processes (Buzan et al. 1998), the French government imposed its politics of denaturalisation upon those constructed as foes. Its behaviour thereby perfectly ties in with Arendt's observation that

> [denationalisation] became a powerful weapon of totalitarian politics, and the constitutional inability of European nation-states to guarantee human rights to those who had lost nationally guaranteed rights, made it possible for the persecuting governments to impose their standard of values even upon their opponents. (Arendt 1968: 269)

The claim that the measure is appropriate because of the state of war (1939 bill) does not stand up against Arendt's arguments. Anticipating any objections referring to a conceivable natural right to self-defence in times of hostilities, she indicates that

> the behaviour of these governments may appear today to be the natural consequence of civil war; but at the time mass denationalisations were something entirely new and unforeseen. They presupposed a state structure which, if it was not yet fully totalitarian, at least would not tolerate any opposition and would rather lose its citizens than harbour people with different views. (Arendt 1968: 278)

The French context of World War II offers an interesting nuance to Arendt's perspective. Although it remains difficult to tell whether mass denaturalisation was foreseen, there are at least signs that denaturalisation was a controversial

measure. Such was the case of Thomas Olzanski, born in Poland in 1886, French citizen since 1922 and denaturalised on 7 December 1932 for having committed 'acts contrary to the internal and external security of the French state,' which sparked significant protest.[18] A militant syndicalist and communist miner, Olzanski had been labelled a threat to national safety based on his communist publications in *L'Enchaîné*, a bi-weekly publication from the Nord *département* (Weil 2008: 244). The archival file documenting his case testifies to the controversies it aroused among the public and politicians alike. Often echoing the much wider political contest between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the file discloses numerous petitions calling the government to cancel Olzanski's denaturalisation and expulsion. It also contains a number of letters of protestation addressed to the Ministry of Justice, as well as letters of advice from national and international human rights organisations warning the French government against the negative impact Olzanski's denaturalisation would have on France's reputation. For instance, a protest letter from the Comité Regional Intersyndical Italien, dated 7 August 1932, notified the Minister of Justice that their trade union had 'decided to make every possible effort to alert workers about the outrageous fact [of Olzanski's denaturalisation], so as to denounce the so-called French democracy, whose methods are rather worthy of fascist countries' ('*nous avons décidé de faire le maximum d'effort pour alerter les travailleurs sur ce fait scandaleux, et dénoncer ainsi la soi-disant démocratie française, digne des méthodes des pays fascistes*'). For some, at least, pre-war denaturalisation policies already looked dangerously totalitarian.

Furthermore, in France, denaturalisation was not an entirely new measure. Its exclusionary logic had been developed since the beginning of World War I, and its structural insertion into the French civil code in 1927 points to the French government's structural tendency to reserve themselves the right (in a literal sense) not to have to tolerate any opposition. Now, it may be too strong a statement to claim that France therefore never reached its democratic principles but instead has kept functioning in a prescriptive and controlling manner.[19] But in terms of a politics of nationality, it must be granted that the republican and liberal concept of nationhood claimed in all French official discourses does not hold. Instead, practices of denaturalisation betray a politics of nationality through which the nation's symbolic boundaries have been secured by means of a powerful exclusionary principle, based on a differentiated understanding of the concept of nationhood.

To such exclusionary ends, the adaptive quality of the law is crucial as it enables each new administrative political formation to redesign the limits of what is being perceived as acceptable opposition. Far from representing the necessary historical flexibility required to recontextualise ancient and sacred texts, the government's appropriation of adaptive practices betrays a crass authoritative logic, made unambiguous by the above-mentioned 'Note to Mr Secretary

General' tentatively dating from 1941. The context of World War II further demonstrates the extent to which normative limits are flexible and spaces available for contestation extremely narrow. While hundreds of French citizens were denaturalised because they had left the metropolitan territory without 'a regular mission statement issued by the competent authority or without a legitimate motive' (law of 23 July 1940), thousands of them were also denaturalised as a result of the massive and structural revision of all naturalisation decrees issued since 1927 (law of 22 July 1940).

## Conclusion

Emphasising a fear of movement on the one side, and the operationalisation of adaptable juridical practices on the other, denaturalisation law manoeuvres at the core of the security/mobility dispositif. It demonstrates a regime of security where two kinds of mobility conflict with one another. Particularly suspicious of those political subjects practising mobility physically, a politics of denaturalisation nonetheless relies on adaptable juridical practices that shape the contours of the nation's exclusionary circumference. While denaturalisation law becomes a mobile norm of exclusion that relies on processes of subjective interpretation, a politics of denaturalisation performs as a means to model the national community while excluding those deemed a threat to its interests.

Denaturalisation law's relationship to security is likely to be misleading: despite it being legitimised by means of a security rhetoric, denaturalisation does not work as a genuine security device. On the contrary, this study has exposed that while governments invoke feelings of insecurity when they seek to legitimise denaturalisation practices, their rhetoric 'in the name of security' does not necessarily alleviate feelings of threat and vulnerability. Instead, in line with processes of securitisation (Buzan et al. 1998), their rhetoric of security serves to legitimise a substantial political intervention. With regard to mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion proper to the politics of nationality, the language of denaturalisation makes foreign those who are prosecuted in the name of the state's security (Honig 2002), not only because it literally makes foreign those being prosecuted through empirically defined administrative categories (e.g. national identity and citizenship). Most importantly, denaturalisation makes foreign those who are perceived as a threat beyond any empirical line (Honig 2002): it is used for political purposes, enabling governments to constantly review, adapt, and redefine who is considered a threatening subject.

As such, the politics of denaturalisation add to Giorgio Agamben's (1997: 108) dictum according to which states of exception cease to refer to 'an external and provisional state of factual danger' and come 'to be confused with juridical rule itself'. The product of exceptional measures stabilised into

law, denaturalisation law links those historical moments of threat to a politics of security that has become omnipresent, if not hyper-present, in modern Western societies. In a time obsessed with the securitisation of borders and identities, this chapter's genealogical exposure compels us to question what is really at stake in present-day denaturalisation rhetoric. Indeed, if the war in Syria is now used as a pretext to put denaturalisation on the agenda, the broader framework in which bills are drawn up is the fight against terrorism. An alibi for exceptional measures, the notion of terrorism nonetheless knows no definite definition (Tuman 2010; Jackson 2008). Yet, it reactivates those political juridical processes through which notions of selfhood and otherness are shaped, mobilised, and transformed.

## Notes

1  A preliminary version of this chapter was presented at the BISA conference in Dublin in 2014.
2  The term 'citizenship' encompasses much more than being a country's national, and includes for instance the potential to resist institutional forms of recognition (Isin 2012; Isin and Nielsen 2008; Guillaume and Huysmans 2013). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the relationship between nationality and citizenship in detail, as well as to discuss citizenship's potential to resist practices of exclusion such as denaturalisation. For the sake of clarity, nationality is here understood as a traditional citizen's right.
3  Dossier Proposition de la loi Hugues. Archives Nationales serial mark 20000145/4.
4  Annexe n° 10738. Proposition de loi tendant à modifier certaines dispositions du Code de la nationalité et à renforcer les mesures interdisant l'ingérence des réfugiés et ressortissant étrangers dans les affaires intérieures de la France. Appendix to the minutes of the 25 July 1950 meeting of the Assemblée Nationale. Archives Nationales, serial mark 20000145/4.
5  Unless otherwise indicated, translations from the French are by the author.
6  Loi du 18 Juillet 1941 relative aux mesures à prendre à l'égard des individus dangereux pour la défense nationale et la sécurité publique, published in the *Journal Officiel* on 1 August 1941; Archives Nationales, serial mark 19900353/1.
7  The term 'normalities' can best be understood as those normative criteria produced by and regulating processes of normalisation.
8  Archives Nationales, serial mark 19950165/10 C 2698, a box for which special permission was required for consultation, granted by the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Culture and Communication.
9  This sentence was a handwritten addition on the manuscript.
10  Denaturalisation being a practice that sets up the limits of the national community, it is fair to qualify the 'public interest' as 'interest of the national community'.
11  It would take the discussion too far astray to discuss here the broad philosophical debate on the concept of legitimation in detail. For further discussion, I refer to David Ingram's very comprehensive work *Law: Key Concepts in the Philosophy* (2006).
12  Loi du 22 Juillet 1940 relative à la révision des naturalisations, *Journal Officiel de la République Française*, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris, serial mark MICR D-10046.

13  Loi du 23 Juillet 1940 relative à la déchéance de la nationalité à l'égard des Français qui ont quitté la France, *Journal Officiel*, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris, serial mark MICR D-10046; Archives Nationales serial mark 19900353/1.

14  Archives Nationales serial mark 19900353/1.

15  Loi du 8 Mars 1941 relative à la déchéance de la nationalité à l'égard des Français qui se rendent dans une zone dissidente, *Journal Officiel* 11 March 1940, Archives Nationales serial mark 19900353/1.

16  The tentative style of the sentence backs up Arendt's realisation that her observation is not a universal rule, as she adds in parentheses 'it would be quite interesting then to discover that Mussolini's Italy was rather reluctant to treat its refugees this way' (Arendt 1968: 278).

17  Dissent being understood either in terms of an act threatening the public order, an insincere adherence to the French nationality, or the act of going abroad without the explicit consent of the government concerned.

18  Archives Nationales, serial mark BB/11/6489 di 41506x14.

19  It is a broadly sustained claim, however, to recognise that the Vichy regime was authoritarian more than democratic (Marrus and Paxton 1995; Weil 2008; Simonin 2008).

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*Epilogue*

# Unpacking the new mobilities paradigm: lessons for critical security studies?

## Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet

SINCE THE BEGINNING of the twenty-first century, across the social sciences and humanities there has been a widespread and increasing interest in issues of mobility. In many respects, what is referred to as the 'new mobilities paradigm' is an endeavour that critical security scholars should engage with even further. This book is one step down this road. In further pursuit of this, I take a step back and reflect more broadly on the intersections, actual and potential, between the literatures on mobilities and critical security studies.

The 'new mobilities paradigm' emerged across different disciplines from sociology to geography, anthropology to business studies, migration and tourism to urban studies.[1] Mobility may be undoubtedly fashionable but evaluating its significance is not easy. As Thomas Faist (2013) notes, it is problematic to assume that enhanced mobility is self-evidently positive or equally shared. Indeed, the current global refugee crisis is a tragic reminder of how mobility and immobility are certainly at the core of international politics, in both positive and negative ways. As the 'flow' of refugees grows, one can witness the increasing proliferation of discourses looking askance at those who attempt to move, remodelling them in terms of potential risk or threat. All of a sudden, borders have to be strengthened and fostered and refugees become questionable and suspicious migrants. Security fears fuel a new spate of wall-building around the world rather than pathways from one country to another. Ours does not seem to be a borderless world where mobility is enhanced, but rather more a securitised world in which social and political exclusions are on the rise (Shamir 2005). The refugee crisis and the inevitable deployment of logics of securitisation do not obviate the fact that goods, information, and people are certainly moving across borders more, differently, and for some even faster. Likewise, the fact that mobility can be slowed down or even stopped does not pre-empt the possibility of examining the embodied nature and experience of different modes of travel, or

of being a traveller in different places: '[t]he very idea of movement implies both a sociological imagination for spatial matters and a geographic sensitivity to understanding social and cultural processes of movement' (Vannini 2010: 112).

It is otiose to say that learning, writing, and teaching about security requires coming to terms with an incredibly diverse and large amount of literature. It is also no exaggeration to say that security studies have undergone a remarkable boom since the mid-1990s. The boundaries of contemporary politics, discourses, practices, practitioners, producers, and end-users of security know nearly no limits. Security is the *lingua franca* of our times, a pervasive yet contested central element of national, international, and transnational politics. More worryingly, security has evolved into a self-propelling and complex system. Security works as an interlocking auto-referential system that incessantly drives itself (Huysmans 2014).

Critical observations on our current security constellation have flourished over the same period. Across critical security studies, changes in security are interpreted and widely discussed, in the spirit of Max Weber, as processes of bureaucratic rationalisation, the privatisation of and '(de)differentiation' between social and professional universes (Bigo 2002; 2014). The rediscovery of Michel Foucault (1977) and Ulrich Beck's (1999) notions of dispositif and risk society, respectively have significantly impacted upon the ways in which security has been understood and analysed. They have given rise to numerous discussions informed by studies in terms of processes of individualisation and exclusion (Bauman 1998; 2000), governmentality and control (Garland 2001; Lyon 2003), and, more recently, processes and logics of commodification (Loader 1999; Avant 2005; Neocleous 2007).

Across this literature, the notion of mobility has always been central yet not necessarily discussed as such. I would suggest here that the interest in 'mobility' in critical security studies has been largely, perhaps only, been understood in relation to a rather Foucauldian interpretation of power and population control, i.e. the establishment of institutions of regulation, control, and correction of types of mobilities construed as imperfect, with the ultimate goal of settling down populations and improving their utility and docility (Aradau and Blanke 2010). In line with John Torpey's (2000) compelling analysis of how passports and identification documents are to be viewed as the products of elaborate bureaucracies devoted to identifying individuals, regulating and localising them, I would argue that within critical security studies there are three discernible arenas that address the issue of mobility. The first is an emphasis on the policing and governance of mobility (Bigo 2002; Bonditti 2004; Scherrer et al. 2010). Here the notion of mobility is largely seen as a by-product of an analysis of the rationale and practices of a rather successful monopolisation of the legitimate means of movement by states and their bureaucracies (police, customs, and diplomacy). Analyses of mobility in terms of governance are also

key to most of the recent investigations of risk management techniques and the seductive allure of biometric data in the development of security (Amoore and De Goede 2008).

A second trend in the critical security literature, largely concomitant with the first, is concerned more specifically with borders, agents, and tools of border control, disputed territories, and other liminal spaces. Considerations on the multiplicity of actors involved in that singular space (border guards, diplomats, police officers, NGOs, travellers) and the diversity of their agendas, roles, tactics, and routines has been the focus of empirically informed studies (Andreas 2000; Ackleson 2005; Côté-Boucher et al. 2014; Bigo 2014). Attention to the inescapable interconnection of diverse security discourses, different legal regimes and policies at play in these peculiar border spaces, observing and analysing what is going on, who is going through, and who and what is stopped, has led to timely and rich analyses on the regulation of mobility. However, as a contributor to this literature I must confess that the concept of mobility itself was something of a second-order concern.

The third trend in which mobility figures large is driven by an interest in analysing the narratives of threat and risk in relation to migration, circulation, and freedom of movement (Guild and Bigo 2005). In many ways, the very particular European context, starting with the loosening of the internal borders in the then European Community as a result of the Schengen accords largely contributed to the development of reflections on security, circulation, and mobility. Largely informed by this political context, the medium- and long-term impact of enlargement processes on issues of external and internal security, especially in the context of new EU membership, but also in the context of partial accession of states and of the more recent implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), has been crucial in redirecting mobility to the core of critical security studies (Jeandesboz 2014).

Finally, any discussion of the place of mobility in the critical security literature would be unsatisfactory if there was no mention of the rise of surveillance studies, its impact on security studies in particular and on the study of social control more generally (Lianos 2013). The emphasis on technologies and the different tools used in order to enhance surveillance is a crucial part of the critical security research agenda. David Lyon (1994; 2003) aptly highlights how surveillance actually became a feature not only of the specific monitoring of suspects on the move but also of the generalised social sorting of populations.[2] In an anxious post-9/11 world, the proliferation of new airport security measures has certainly received more attention than before (Adey 2004; Salter 2008), and propelled the issue of mobility to another level, combining security with notions of circulation, high and low motion, risk assessment and social sorting, governance, and control. Again mobility is seen very much as the by-product of a multi-layered configuration of borders, social boundaries, and control,

particular infrastructures and technologies created, implemented in historically and sociologically informed contexts. What the theoretical implications of these automated systems of surveillance, control, and border management, actors, routines, and rationales might have for the notion of mobility itself has perhaps not received sufficient consideration.

For this reason, mobility studies and the new mobilities paradigm are worth considering more closely. In many ways they are aligned with the recent analytical trends in critical security studies briefly mentioned above. Nonetheless, we need to remind ourselves that a focus on mobility is not quite as novel as first appears. I am thinking here of the work of Manuel Castells (1996) on 'flows', Arjun Appadurai's (1996) notions of variety of '-scapes', or Zygmunt Bauman's (1998) metaphor of 'liquidity'. Additionally, John Urry (2000) has identified what he calls an emerging culture of mobility at the heart of global society, thereby launching a trend in sociology and, subsequently, among geographers. Whether many scholars today remember that period of intense and puzzling analyses of what were seen as significant transformations of social and political life in the late 1980s and early 1990s is a moot point. At that time, such concepts were welcomed as essential and timely in order to chart the evolutions of the world under the combined influence of the opening of Communist Bloc countries to the market economy and the information and communication technologies revolution. The overwhelmingly optimistic or grandiose tone of Urry's (2000) bold manifesto to move 'sociology beyond societies' has been subsequently replaced, however, by a more cautious understanding of how 'mobility, immobility and moorings' are dialectally connected (Hannam et al. 2006). It would be easy to be mesmerised by the profusion of buzzwords, mobility being the latest. The crucial point, however, is not the speculative debates about the so-called novelty of mobility but rather the analytical tone that is woven into the fabric of mobility studies. The move from the analysis of objects to processes, from fixity to motion is what makes the 'mobility turn' attractive in the first place.

This motion-oriented research agenda brings together space, place, and power relations in a very interesting way. It involves complex hybrid, but also hidden, geographies, especially if one pays attention to the different constituent parts of mobility: mobility and its experience is about speed and cadence, the journey and the direction, and all the different objects and places of friction and control along the way (Cresswell 2010). Interestingly, the renewal of migration studies begetting new theories (Massey et al. 1998) has contributed to the expansion of both the scope and nature of the agendas of mobility studies and critical security studies. The contribution of migration studies, beyond extremely precise and well-informed case studies, is that movement goes with confinements and enclosures. Put differently, immobility and mobility are part of the same logics or regimes of regulation and traceability that are creating

spaces entirely dedicated to a transnational mobility, access to which is neither straightforward nor universal (Sassen 1998; Harvey 2006).

In the main, mobility approaches have proved fruitful in generating conceptually rigorous and empirically rich studies across disciplinary boundaries. I think there are two elements of mobility studies that could valuably inform future critical security studies. First, the turn to mobility could be seen as an invitation to discover or to develop even further our interest in the 'hidden geographies' in security studies, those mundane places and possibly subaltern activities that inform and affect our understanding of security. I think this collection of articles is a first contribution to just that. Second, to reflect further upon the implication of notions of speed and acceleration for security studies and how it is connected to violence. Speed not only epitomises a form of mass mobility but also contributes to mechanisms of exclusion, social sorting, and stratification. Current forms of social control are aimed at favouring the movement of certain goods and people while impeding the movement of others. This is certainly not new, as Christophe Studeny (1995) and Tim Cresswell (2006) have shown. Nonetheless, as Bryan Turner (2007) rightly suggests, there are important developments involving the securitisation of modern societies that create significant forms of immobility.

This growing presence of the notion of mobility within critical security studies is not so much a new turn but more a timely invitation for critical security scholars to reconsider the notion of time and space. Indeed, Hartmut Rosa (2003) invites us to investigate this incredible speeding up of social life. It is not that everything and everyone is moving faster. It is, for example, about considering how new forms of organisation and administration supported by a technological boost produce tangible effects on mobility, its imaginary, and all of its social dimensions. Some people, actions, or ideas move faster than others, and some are literally rendered motionless (Virilio 1986; Bauman 1998). As David Harvey (1990: 261) notes, the 'time-space' compression – our perception and the organisation of space and time in our social life – has been utterly transformed by this technological acceleration. This shift in our late modernity is even more dramatic when it comes to the expanding galaxy of security. Lyon (2006), like many others, aptly shows that electronics-based networks segregate as much as they connect, and that they do so selectively.

Critical security scholars need to reflect more on how security and the surveillance of mobility produce different forms of quarantine and seclusion in an anxious global world. This idea of regimes of mobility is a promising avenue. Talking in terms of regimes entails, firstly, the foregrounding of the visible but also the various unrecognised forms of immobilisation. Secondly, it implies the reintroduction of reflection on the modes, mechanisms, and tools of social and political ordering and their developments. Finally, it implies a confrontation with our own limitations of thoughts and the dismantling of our prevailing legal understandings of movement, mobility, and security (Guild and Bigo

2005; Basaran 2011; Basaran and Guild 2016). As such, there is more to be analysed in the repatriation agreements, the architectures of the refugee camps, and the control orders designed to limit the mobility of suspects through tagging, confinement to their homes, and restrictions on their communication. Furthermore, the fact that mobility of data is privileged ahead of the mobility of persons, or, more accurately, certain categories of people, is not only an interesting sign of our times but also of how the critical security agenda might be slightly ahead of that of mobility studies.

The overarching invitation proffered by the prominence of mobility studies is actually to go back to philosophical questions about mobility, modernity,and liberty and to explore their political implications in a post-9/11 world. This is what this volume is aimed at; re-interrogating the normative imperative of mobility, re-engaging with the differences between being mobile, being secure, and being free is certainly a way for critical security scholars to try to find the last shards of hope for humanity in a world that has become a trap for so many. Seen from this perspective, this book is a testament to the vitality and maturity of both the field of critical security studies and the disciplines within which this intellectual endeavour is embedded.[3] This volume is, hopefully, a first step on the way to a series of exchanges and a greater circulation of knowledge on security, immobility, and mobility.

### Notes

1   The literature is voluminous but key examples include Massey et al. (1998), Urry (2000), Sheller and Urry (2006), Vannini (2010), Cresswell (2006), Salazar and Schiller (2014).
2   See also Haggerty et al. (2006), Guittet and Jeandesboz (2009), Bauman and Lyon (2012).
3   On a more personal note, it is also a pleasure to be part of such an enterprise that sparkled during a summer school in Brussels in 2013.

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