



# RHYTHMS AND RHYMES OF LIFE

MUSIC AND IDENTIFICATION  
PROCESSES OF DUTCH-  
MOROCCAN YOUTH

**Miriam Gazzah**

AMSTERDAM UNIVERSITY PRESS

ISIM DISSERTATIONS

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# Rhythms and Rhymes of Life

## Music and Identification Processes of Dutch-Moroccan Youth

Een wetenschappelijke proeve op het gebied van de Letteren

P R O E F S C H R I F T

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor  
aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen  
op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. mr. S.C.J.J. Kortmann,  
volgens besluit van het College van Decanen  
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## *Notes on transcription*

In the transcription of terms in Arabic and Arabic names, no diacritic signs have been used except the <sup>ˆ</sup> to indicate the Arabic letter <sup>ˆ</sup>ayn and the ' for the Arabic letter *hamza*, with the exception of the word *shaabi*. This word is used as a genre label for 'popular Moroccan folk music'; on the internet and in music shops. On the compartment labels it is usually transcribed without diacritic signs. Terms that are common in the English language or toponyms are transcribed in their most common English form, for example, *burqa*, *jihad* and *Mecca*. These words are not written in italics. In other cases, I have used italics to indicate the Arabic origin of the words, for example, *hadith*, <sup>ˆ</sup>*ulama* or *anasheed*.

*In this dissertation parts of song lyrics are cited and translated from Dutch into English (fair use). I have tried to get in touch with the rightful authors of these texts to ask permission for citing and translating them, but this was to no avail.*

# Introduction

Ahmed (organizer of Moroccan concerts): “Music does something to people. Being together [during a concert] also touches people, it gives them a certain identity; as if...it’s like they are all going to Morocco on a boat. You feel...you are separate, but you are one. That is a feeling that I cannot explain to you. You know? We all have that same feeling. And then [when the boat arrives], then you see your country. With a concert, it’s the same thing: a feeling of solidarity comes over you. You want to share the music with each other, just like you want to share food. That is the feeling it gives.”

Amal (freelance journalist): “It is not like the music is there and you are outside of it, you know....You *are* the music.... [During a concert or party] I have to dance. I have to! It is shyness that can stop me, but when I start dancing, then euhh...wonderful!”

M.G: “Do you notice what is going on around you..?”

Amal: “Ehmm, well you see, I am, of course, a Moroccan girl and we are always aware of who is watching us, because anything can and will be used against you in a court of law. Ha-ha.”

Aisha (student): “[Music is] the soundtrack of my life. I like that phrase. And I really believe it. There are songs that when you hear them, doesn’t matter if it is ten or fifteen years ago, you know exactly what you were doing at that time, what happened, that kind of stuff. Yeah, it is...background, it is a frame of reference, it is décor, it is experience, atmosphere...”

Music is everywhere in our contemporary society: in shopping centres, in elevators, on the radio and on TV, when you are put on hold during a telephone call, in aeroplanes and so on. In his book *Musicophilia*, neurologist Oliver Sacks explains that, for human beings, listening to music is a neurological as well as an aural, emotional, and physical activity. Our brain is neurologically sensitive to the sounds, rhythms, structure, and melody of music.

Music is able to arouse very powerful emotions, such as happiness, lust, sadness, and other emotions. When human beings hear music, they (unconsciously) move their muscles to tap to the beat, they mimic the facial expressions of the musician, or use a specific body language to express emotions (Sacks 2007: 9). Music, therefore, affects all our sense-organs. But, music is, in addition to all of this, also a kind of social activity - it can create feelings of unity and solidarity or feelings of detachment- and it is very powerful tool in the organization of social life.

Music has been part of *my* life as long as I can remember. It has been a driving force, an inspiration and a comfort in bad times. As a toddler I took naps while listening to the sound-track of the popular 1980s TV series *Fame*. Between my sixth and sixteenth year I took piano lessons studying works of Mozart, Chopin, or Rhythm and Blues pieces. I grew up listening to the pop music of the 1980s and 1990s, indulging myself into a lot of different styles and genres, ranging from rock (U2, Guns n' Roses, Metallica), to pop (George Michael, Michael Jackson, Madonna) and R&B and soul (Boyz 2 Men, Bobby Brown, Prince). During my teenage years, I got more and more interested in my roots, and started to explore the musical scene of North Africa and later on the musical cultures of the rest of the Arab world. Not surprisingly, I found in Algerian *raï* music a rebellious attitude teenagers are looking for. Besides, *raï* music was different, it was not average, and it gave me a tool to distinguish myself from peers. Although *raï* music was rebellious and could not always be appreciated by my parents, it did satisfy the need to connect myself to my parents, my family history, and subsequently my North African roots.

My academic fascination with music dates back to an experience in July 1995, when I visited a concert of the world's most famous *raï* music singer (Cheb) Khaled from Algeria in the Tunisian harbour city Monastir. The effect this singer had on his audience was incredibly intense. It seemed a magical event throughout which Khaled's charisma put a spell on the audience. During Khaled's performance it seemed as if the world had disappeared around us and the only thing that mattered was the here and now. It was an eye-opening event for me, because it demonstrated that music not only constructs connections between musician and listener, but it also creates connections between listeners. Music creates community, even if this community is visible and exists only during the musical performance. When we listen to music in the safety of our own house, it creates therefore an imagined community. This insight instigated my ongoing query into the power of music.

This dissertation is about music, and how it contributes to individual and collective identification processes of Dutch-Moroccan youth. It discusses what role music plays in the construction, creation, and expression of their individual and collective identities. It is about festive experiences and religiosity, about stigmas and stereotypes, about belonging and disaffiliation and trying to make sense of it all. It deals, in essence, with Dutch-Moroccan youth and the way they use music in articulating senses of belonging and disaffiliation. In the description of these processes, I include both music as such, and musical events, such as dance parties, concerts, and festivals. This musical approach enables a new understanding of the way Dutch-Moroccan youth identify themselves and others. Through a focus on music, a central element in the lives of youth, this thesis will show insights into how, through music and musical activities, Dutch-Moroccan youth position themselves in Dutch society. All along, Dutch society and its struggles with multiculturalism and its debates on integration, the position of Islam and fear of terrorism form the backdrop to this story.

## **1. Moroccans in the Netherlands: Roots, facts, and figures**

Moroccan immigrants have been part of Dutch society for over thirty years. At present, in the Netherlands there are over 329.000 people of Moroccan descent (CBS, August 2007), which makes them the third largest minority group after the Surinamese and Turkish population groups.<sup>1</sup> Of these 329.000 people of Moroccan descent 161.000 are part of the second generation.

In the 1960s and 1970s, thousands of young Moroccan men migrated to the Netherlands as guest workers. Due to a lack of workers, especially factory, industrial and mine workers, Dutch government recruited workers in the Mediterranean, first Italian, Spanish and Portuguese, workers, later Turkish and Moroccan labourers (Benali and Obdeijn 2005: 211). A large concentration of Moroccan immigrants ended up in the big Dutch cities in the vicinity of industries, but also in the east and south of the Netherlands, either because of the presence of industry (east) or mines (south). Nowadays, most Dutch-Moroccans still reside in the *Randstad*, the urban area between the cities of The Hague, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Utrecht. Labour migration and later on family reunion from Morocco to Western Europe really picked up from the 1970s. These workers usually had temporary labour contracts and residence permits and were thus supposed to return to their home countries after a couple of years. This never happened.

It is estimated that roughly 60 to 80 % of the Moroccans in the Netherlands trace their roots back to the mountainous Rif area (Benali and Obdeijn 2005: 211) and speak a Berber language (Douwes et al. 2005: 29). The rest of the guest workers originate from various other regions in Morocco. This has produced a rather heterogeneous Dutch-Moroccan population, which consists of Moroccan Berbers and non-Berbers, some speaking a Berber language and Moroccan-Arabic (and Dutch), others speaking only a Berber language (and Dutch), and later generations only speaking Dutch (Chafik 2004: 129).<sup>2</sup> There are three main Berber languages spoken in Morocco, namely *Tashelhiyt* (roughly in the region south of Marrakech), *Tamazight* (in the Middle Atlas area), and *Tarifit*.<sup>3</sup> The Berbers from the Rif speak *Tarifit*. Yet, in daily speech (Dutch-) Moroccans often refer to all these languages using the umbrella term *Tamazight*, which thus stands for any of the Moroccan Berber languages (Stroomer 2002: 14).

The term 'Berber', which comes from the Greek root word 'barbarian', has negative connotations, such as someone who is aggressive and backward. Therefore, some Berbers prefer to call themselves *Imazighen* (which literally means 'free people') and their languages *Tamazight*. Speaking in very general terms, Berbers are considered distinct from Arab Moroccans because they speak a Berber language, often in addition to Moroccan Arabic, and have a different 'culture'. This becomes clear in persistent stereotypes that suggest that Berbers are tribal peasants living in mountainous areas and rural areas, opposed to Moroccan Arabs who are considered to be civilized city people. Stereotypically, Berbers are considered non-intellectual, proud, autonomous, and independent people (Eickelman 1981: 215).

Historically, ever since the French colonized the Moroccan territory, the relationship between the Berber population and the non-Berber population in Morocco has been somewhat strained. Since Morocco's independence in 1956, Moroccan leaders have always emphasized its Arab identity, leaving little room for the expression of other identities (Obdeijn 2005: 239). The existence of Berber languages was denied, as acknowledgement of these languages (and cultures) was considered threatening to the unity of the Moroccan state (ibid.). However, from the beginning of the 1990s onwards, King Hassan II allowed for more cultural autonomy for the Berber population: the ban on writing in the Berber script '*tifinagh*' has been lifted (ibid. and Chafik 2004: 121)<sup>4</sup> and news broadcastings in the three Berber languages aired on Moroccan television and education in the Berber languages was allowed.

Most of the second-generation Dutch-Moroccans have Dutch citizenship (and often also a Moroccan passport). It is estimated that most Dutch-Moroccans belong to either the middle or lower classes. Educational levels of Dutch-Moroccans have improved over the last couple of years. In particular, Moroccan girls of the second generation increasingly start and obtain qualifications from a higher education (Bijl et al. 2005: 24-25).<sup>5</sup> Yet, in general, many Dutch-Moroccans of the first and second generation still find themselves in a social and economic marginal position. Many Dutch-Moroccans of the first generation have become occupationally disabled and are dependent on social benefits, because of the physically demanding jobs they worked in for many years. Second-generation Dutch-Moroccans, often males, lag behind in educational level and are overrepresented in unemployment rates. A recent report written by the CBS commissioned by the Ministry of Justice shows that overall employment rates, educational levels among Dutch-Moroccans, including the second generation, still lag behind those of the average Dutchman (Jennissen and Oudhof 2007: 177). In addition to this, Dutch-Moroccans, and especially Dutch-Moroccan young males, continue to be associated with unemployment and crime, and more recently, with Islamic radicalism and terrorism.

### *Religion and culture*

The great majority of the Dutch-Moroccan community present themselves as Muslim. Of course, many differences in practicing Islam exist. The Dutch-Moroccan community consists of many practising Muslims, but also of many 'cultural' Muslims, i.e. people who call themselves Muslims, but do not actively practise Islam, referring to actively visiting a mosque, praying five times a day, and abstaining from alcohol (Douwes 2001: 14). In general, Phalet and Ter Wal detect a trend of privatization of Islam among young Dutch-Moroccans, meaning that although the participation in religious rituals and mosques is decreasing among second-generation Turks and Moroccans, their identification with Islam remains (Phalet and Ter Wal 2004: 39).

Many Dutch-Moroccans attribute great value to the preservation of what they perceive as Moroccan cultural traditions. This is reflected, for example, in the way they organize and celebrate weddings or religious holidays. The desire to conserve, what they perceive as 'Moroccan' traditions, requiring 'Moroccan food, dress, music, and art', has triggered off the establishment of a Dutch-Moroccan retail circuit in many Dutch cities. This circuit includes shops owned by Dutch-Moroccans selling fruit, vegetables, and *halal* meat, Moroccan art or hand craft and furniture, Moroccan traditional dress, and

fashion and Moroccan and Arab music shops. The so-called 'black market'<sup>6</sup> in the Dutch city of Beverwijk, a large assembly of thousands of market stands selling food and non-food products in several former machine shops, also harbours a so-called 'Oriental market' that is a concentration of Moroccan (and Turkish and Asian) shops and retailers.<sup>7</sup> The districts *Lombok* and *Kanaleneiland* in Utrecht are other examples of places with large concentrations of 'ethnic' shops, including many Moroccan shops. The *Hoofdbedrijfschap Detailhandel* (Head Branch of the Retail Trade Industry), an institute that researches and provides statistics on the Dutch retail trade, reports that in 2004, 24% of the retail trade companies owned by *allochtonen* are food- and supply businesses. The majority of these businesses are shops specialized in the sales of foreign food supplies.<sup>8</sup>

Furthermore, the wish of many Dutch-Moroccans to marry 'the Moroccan way' has caused the emergence of a sector of industry entirely dedicated to 'Moroccan weddings'. This commercial line of business survives solely on Dutch-Moroccans who want to organize their wedding in a Moroccan way. This branch includes shops selling or renting Moroccan wedding dresses and jewellery, shops selling Moroccan pastry and providing food catering, DJ's and music bands specialized in Moroccan music, and the so-called *neggafas* or *zeyyanas*, i.e. personal make-up and dress assistants helping the bride, and wedding planners specialized in organizing Moroccan weddings (Essers and Benschop 2006). Moreover, recently several websites have appeared offering information on all kinds of issues relating to the organization of a Moroccan wedding in the Netherlands. The best-known example of this kind of site is [www.yasmina.nl](http://www.yasmina.nl).

## 2. Changing policies

During the first decade of the guest workers' stay in the Netherlands, in the 1960s and the early 1970s, no specific policy was applied to them, in terms of integration into Dutch society, since these guest workers were supposed to work and reside in the Netherlands only temporarily. The state tacitly supposed that the guest workers maintained their culture, language, traditions, customs, and identity, because that would facilitate the return to their home countries. This policy, labelled as 'integration while maintaining identity',<sup>9</sup> turned out not to be beneficial neither for Dutch society nor for the immigrants themselves (Boender 2001: 79), because it became clear that it resulted in a very limited participation of the immigrants in Dutch society.

The limited participation was also caused by lack of government support for the guest workers (Penninx 1979: 16).

In the 1973, the oil crisis hit the Netherlands and many Turkish and Moroccan guest workers working in the heavy industry sector lost their jobs. Many of these workers had to apply for social benefits. Only then, when they had to register officially to receive benefits, it became clear that many of these workers had already resided much longer in the Netherlands than was ever planned. During this time, many guest workers had started to bring their wives and children to the Netherlands too. This resulted in a growing population of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants and their families. The position of ethnic minorities not only became economically more vulnerable, the attitude towards them also started to change. It had become clear that these guest workers were not going back to their country of origin and that Dutch society had to provide economical as well as social opportunities for this group. The position of these former guest workers had become more problematical and complex, from both an economical and a social perspective.

In the early 1980s, the Dutch government had accepted that the guest workers were here to stay and it started to advocate the idea that the Netherlands is a multicultural society, with large sections of the population having roots outside of the Netherlands. Besides the emergence of Turkish and Moroccan communities, as a result of labour migration, many Surinamese people and people from the Dutch Antilles migrated to the Netherlands, which gave the Netherlands its permanent multicultural character. Partly inspired by media debates and due to a growing economy and the availability of funds and subsidies, the government started to develop and implement specific integration policies in order to incorporate these immigrants properly into society and to encourage active participation in it. The Dutch government now wanted to emphasize the multicultural character of the Netherlands.

Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the Dutch concept of denominational segregation ('pillarization'<sup>10</sup>), which had always been the basis of government policy, was applied to immigrants as well. The ultimate goal was to integrate immigrants into Dutch society while giving them the opportunity to preserve their own identity, including Turkish and Moroccan-Arabic language education to immigrants' children. This policy was to result in the construction of the migrant communities' own 'pillar', meaning their own social, cultural, economical, and even media network, similar to the already existing pillars of the catholics, protestants, and so on (Boender 2001: 84).



This Dutch policy aimed to offer second-generation immigrants the chance to construct a sense of identity relating to their parents and their 'fatherland', including Arabic language education for Moroccan children. Ironically, Dutch politicians did not realize that, in the case of the Moroccan community, most of the immigrants' native tongue was Berber and not Arabic.

In the mid-1980s, when it became clear that 'integration while maintaining identity' was not successful, Dutch policy changed. Immigrants, whose label changed into 'ethnic minority' were lagging behind (WRR Report 2001: 169). The unemployment and crime rates among ethnic minorities were relatively high. The government shifted their policy to what they called a policy against disadvantage.<sup>11</sup> This specific integration policy was aimed at increasing the levels of education, language skills, employment rates and decreasing crime rates among immigrants. In essence, the term implies a policy aimed at erasing the disadvantage immigrants have in comparison to average Dutch people. The new aim became to help ethnic minorities to jobs and to open up the labour market to them, i.e. fighting discrimination on the labour market and improving their educational levels (Penninx 1979: 26). In short, it aimed at increasing participation levels of ethnic minorities in all fields of Dutch society. The policy's focus was to erase the drawback ethnic minorities had in employment, language skills and education, by concentrating on individual responsibility and collective solidarity and tolerance. The issue of (cultural) identity was no longer a primary focus of the policy, and it was left to the individual to decide whether they wanted to maintain their cultural identity in whatever way (Prins 2000: 12-13).

From the early 1990s onwards, the official attitude of the Dutch government towards ethnic minorities started to change again, and integration policy became stricter and more compulsory. Right-wing politician Frits Bolkestein initiated 'a national minority debate' with a speech and an article in the *Volkskrant* in 1991, in which he called for more 'guts' concerning the integration policy of minorities. Bolkestein suggested that he spoke for the 'ordinary Dutchman', who suffered from problems caused by minority groups in poor neighbourhoods in the big cities. Others stated that Bolkestein's ideas had similarities with extreme-right ideas. Bolkestein's approach broke with the attitude of previous governments who were afraid to be (called) racists and were often considered 'too soft' when discussing and naming specific socio-economical issues of minority groups (Prins 2000: 26-31). Bolkestein's 'national minority debate' was the beginning of a change in Dutch's integration policies. His intervention to stop the 'softness' fits in with a new moral offensive of the administration of Prime Minister Ruud

Lubbers. This new approach was caused by high unemployment rates and deficiency on the state budget and consisted of cut-backs on social benefits and an overall 'no-nonsense policy' that was aimed at reminding the Dutch not only of their rights, but also of their duties and responsibilities regarding the state (ibid.: 25).

Whereas before, there had been a general optimistic belief in the construction of a Dutch multicultural society, first based on the Dutch tradition of 'pillarization' and later on built on a rather patronizing disadvantage policy, both these policies were now considered to have failed (Tayob 2006: 76). Dutch government replaced the disadvantage policy with a more business-like approach to integration. Ethnic minorities, now called *allochtonen*, were considered to integrate with at least a minimum of participation in society, through education, work, learning the language and cultural participation (WRR Report 2001: 173-174). Hence, *allochtonen* were expected to strive for citizenship,<sup>12</sup> not only in the legal sense of the word, but maybe even more so in the cultural, social and economic sense of the word, becoming actively involved in all parts of Dutch society (ibid.; Boender 2001: 86).<sup>13</sup> To achieve this kind of integration, ethnic minorities were required to speak Dutch and to adhere to the most basic social norms and values of Dutch society, such as freedom of speech, tolerance towards gays, emancipation of women, and individual freedom. All in all, this policy insisted on more responsibilities, duties, and commitment to Dutch society (Prins 2000: 13; WRR Report 2001: 169).

As a result of changed circumstances, which are also reflected in the government reports, such as high crime rates among young Dutch-Moroccans, high unemployment rates among ethnic minorities, and increased polarization between the *autochtonous* Dutch and *allochtonen*, the approach towards ethnic minorities also changed. This stricter approach towards integration is also reflected in a more restrictive immigration policy. It has become much more difficult for non-Western migrants to get a residence permit in the Netherlands, even if they are married to a Dutch person. Another result of this firmer and more rigid approach to integration is the establishment of the 'Ministry of Urban Areas and Integration policy'<sup>14</sup> in 1998, which is almost entirely dedicated to developing policies aimed at integration of *allochtonen*. One of its main achievements was the law that made it mandatory for persons from outside the European Union wishing to migrate to the Netherlands, to take an exam after following an 'integration course'; a course that is supposed to prepare migrants to their stay in the

Netherlands by teaching them basic Dutch norms, language, history, traditions, and culture (Prins 2002: 8-9).

*The Islamization of immigrants: from guest workers to Muslims*

The different ways in which guest workers, ethnic minorities, *allochtonen*, etc. are labelled by society also has implications for how they see and represent themselves. In that sense, processes of labelling and identification are related. In chapter one, I will present some theoretical explanations about the implications (imposed) labelling and stereotyping can have on identification processes in general. Chapter five discuss in detail the effects of stereotyping upon Dutch-Moroccan youth and the ramifications it has for the musical productions of Dutch-Moroccan rappers. Next, I describe how the labels used to describe migrants have changed from 'guest worker' to 'Muslim'.

The changes that took place in government policies concerning immigrants, as sketched above, often went hand in hand with changing political attitudes and public opinion vis-à-vis immigrants in Dutch society. The shifts in the debate and the changing policies are reflected in the labels used to refer to immigrants. This becomes particularly clear through the different labels used in the past twenty years to refer to immigrants and their offspring.

In the 1960s and 1970s, Dutch-Moroccans started out being labelled as 'guest workers'. The term guest workers focused on the immigrants' economical purpose and their temporariness. However, during the early 1980s when their permanent stay in the Netherlands became clear, the general term to refer to Dutch-Moroccans became 'ethnic minority', also because of the title of a government report about integration, which was entitled 'minority memorandum' (1983) (Prins 2000: 25). Dutch-Moroccans (and other minorities) were considered distinct from the Dutch because of their ethnicity, their roots in another country, i.e. their cultural difference. In addition, the term minority indicated that this group was numerically inferior to the majority, the Dutch.

From around the end of the 1980s, yet another term came en vogue, namely *allochtonen*. This word originally comes from the Greek language and means 'of foreign descent', and is widely used today. This term originated from a government report published as early as 1971, when sociologist Hilda Verweij-Jonker used it as a substitute for the label immigrant. However, it is not exactly clear why the term *allochtonen* only became popular from

the early 1990s onwards. It may have something to do with the fact that the *autochthonous* Dutch believe that this term expresses best the boundary between the Dutch and all who are not considered Dutch. Since the early 1990s, the term has been gradually incorporated in popular speech. There are different definitions of the word. The Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS), tracking Dutch demographic trends, uses it to refer to residents in the Netherlands who are born abroad (first generation) or people of which at least one parent is born abroad (second-generation). The CBS also makes a distinction between Western *allochtonen* and non-Western *allochtonen*, in order to make the concept applicable to the original guest workers from Turkey and Morocco and other immigrants from Western countries, such as Germany or the US (CBS 2007).<sup>15</sup>

In popular speech, the general term '*allochtonen*' implies all people who are perceived to have roots outside of the Netherlands. Yet, the term is often specifically used to refer to first, second- and third-generation Dutch-Moroccans (and/ or Turks). The use of the term for the second and third generation is somewhat problematic since they are often born and raised in the Netherlands. In fact, the term is most of the time used as an umbrella term to refer to people who are not Dutch, and in particular for non-Western immigrants and their offspring. Often the term refers implicitly to Dutch-Moroccans or Muslims, as opposed to Western immigrants such as Germans or Americans who are not labelled *allochtoon*. The term '*allochtoon*' has become a very popular term in the public and media debate on integration, and it has also acquired negative associations connecting the term *allochtoon* to people who are not (willing to) integrate, who do not speak Dutch and who are Muslim.

The label 'Muslims' became more widely used after 9/11. This event put Islam and Muslims under the political spotlights in virtually every country of the world, including the Netherlands. As a consequence of this, *allochtonen* have become increasingly defined as Muslims, whether or not the person referred to is in fact a (practising) Muslim(a). The terms '*allochtonen*' and 'Muslims' are even used as synonyms (SCP 2004a: v, vii, viii, 8-9).

The classification of Dutch-Moroccans as 'Muslims' and '*allochtonen*', defining them consequently as non-Dutch, continues to highlight the distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims, and between Dutch-Moroccans and the autochthonous Dutch. This classification, which lumps together the labels 'Moroccan, Muslim and *allochtoon*', totally disregards the existence of Dutch Muslims, such as Dutch people who converted to Islam and ignores the fact that many of these 'Moroccan-Muslims and *allochtonen*' hold Dutch

nationalities. Moreover, the term Muslim itself has also become associated with terrorism, radicalism, and fundamentalism, because of numerous, ongoing media reports about repression of women, terrorism, wars, fundamentalist, and dictatorial regimes that are related in one way or another to Islam and Muslims. All in all, the term Muslim is often used with a negative undertone. The use of the categorical label 'Muslim' has created a sharp demarcation line between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Netherlands. For example, already in 1997, Shadid and Van Koningsveld noted how the term Muslim has acquired many meanings, including an ethnic association:

"Muslims are in one way or another, members of an ethnic minority. They are people of foreign descent and practising one common religion. Moreover, these people are recognisable by external appearances. This massive labelling of Moroccans and Turks blurs the fact that there are many levels of religiosity and that there exist big differences in contents of religious attitudes within these groups" (Shadid and Van Koningsveld 1997: 35-37).<sup>16</sup>

In summary, whereas during the 1980s, the country of origin was considered the most important marker, and immigrants were simply labelled as a guest worker from Morocco or Turkey, or as an ethnic minority on a more abstract level, nowadays religion has become one of the most important identity markers. As we have seen, immigrants are no longer distinguished by their cultural difference, but are now mainly distinguished either by their religion or by their 'otherness' in general, referring to them as 'Muslims' or '*allochtonen*'.

Stefano Allievi detected a trend of Islamization of immigrants in Europe in the past years, referring to how immigrants in public and political debates are categorized as Muslims instead of Moroccans or Turks, for example. Allievi notes how:

"...[d]iscussions in the public sphere about Islam in Europe have become more and more crucial in defining the symbolic integration of Muslim communities. Cultural conflicts related to Islam in the public space have erupted in many countries of Europe...The immigrant...has progressively become "Muslim", both in his/her perception by the host societies and in his/her self-perception....Immigration, in a word, tends to be "islamized"" (Allievi 2006: 37).

The immigrants themselves also activated an increased self-identification based on religion: while the first generation often did not emphasize

their religious identity, second-generation Moroccans and Turks started to present themselves gradually more as Muslims, rather than Turks or Moroccans. In fact, the rising visibility of Muslims in the Netherlands is the result of two trends taking place simultaneously. On the one hand, large numbers of second-generation immigrants prioritize their Muslim identity<sup>17</sup> over their cultural or ethnic background. On the other hand, government policies and public debates in the media on the position of Muslims and Islam in the Netherlands also triggered this inclination to present oneself as Muslim (Douwes 2001: 14). The present Dutch public debate on integration focuses predominantly on Islam and Muslims in the Netherlands.

### *The public debate on integration*

Dutch society has experienced a great deal of turmoil in the past decade. In particular, events such as 9/11/2001, the murder of Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn in 2002, and that of film director Theo van Gogh in 2004, shook up the nation and instigated debates about the position of Islam, Muslims and '*allochtonen*'. Moreover, within this debate the Dutch-Moroccan community is frequently labelled as a problem group. Ever since the murder of Van Gogh by a 26-year-old second-generation Dutch-Moroccan born in Amsterdam, Dutch-Moroccans have not been out of the political and media spotlights.

Integration has become *the* buzzword in current political and media debates. However, up to this day, everybody seems to have different interpretations of what integration means and there is no clear-cut definition of what integration is. This makes the issue of integration rather fuzzy. When are you really integrated into Dutch society? When you can speak Dutch, when you eat 'hutspot'<sup>18</sup> on a weekly basis, when you listen to Andre Hazes,<sup>19</sup> or when you have a job in a Dutch firm? There appear to be no clear answers to these questions. In fact, integration can hardly be measured objectively. This also becomes clear when we read the official criteria for successful integration, as stated by the Dutch government in 2006/2007:

"In this policy, a group is supposed to be 'integrated' when its members:

- speak the Dutch language,
- proportionally participate in structural, societal fields,
- maintain inter-ethnic contacts,
- subscribe to the basic Dutch social norms.

In other words, [successful integration is] proportional participation (socio-economic, socio-cultural, and political) of groups of *'allochtonen'* in the Dutch society and meeting its requirements (mastery of the language) and handling [application] of the norms" (Jennissen and Oudhof 2007: 12).

This definition of integration sounds rather straightforward, but still leaves room for different interpretations. For example, what is meant by 'proportional participation' and what exactly are these 'basic Dutch norms'? This report and many others do not give definite answers. Nevertheless the debate on integration has continued unceasingly in political and media spheres. Bolkestein's views initiated a national minority debate, whose aftermath is still visible nowadays.

Bolkestein's main point of critique against the government's integration policies of the 1980s was that they had been "cuddling the *allochtonen* to death"<sup>20</sup> by which he meant that through its patronizing and soft policy of almost literally taking people by the hand in their integration process, the government had made minorities too dependent on the state. Bolkestein also stated that the Dutch government, while promoting the multicultural society, had denied the socio-economical problems of many 'multicultural' neighbourhoods. This resulted in isolation rather than in integration.

As a solution to this problem, Bolkestein put forward some important points that he considered should be central in integration policy: European values should remain important, in the sense that separation between church (religion) and state, freedom of speech, and the position of women should remain untouched and accepted. Rather than considering minority groups as socio-economically backward and making them dependent on the state, Bolkestein claimed that minorities had to take their own responsibility and adjust to basic Dutch norms (ibid.: 4-5). His critique was thus not only directed at the government policy, but also at the minority groups. Specifically, Bolkestein warned about the "non-liberal and anti-Western values" of Islam and much of his discourse focused on Islam and its threat to the equilibrium of Dutch society (Prins 2000: 27-28). Bolkestein feared that Islam would jeopardize the division between state and religion, the emancipation of women and homosexuals, and would eventually obstruct integration. Bolkestein's intervention in 1991 gave the first impulse to a renewed discussion on integration and played an important part in the shift of labels that resulted in the transformation of ethnic minorities into Muslims.

The way Bolkestein composed his discourse, which he at first expressed in interviews with leading Dutch newspapers in 1991 and later on in a book

called *Moslim in de polder* (1997), has recently been characterized as 'new realist discourse'<sup>21</sup> (Prins: 2000: 21-22 and Boender 2001: 86). Bolkestein's objective was to put the 'integration problem' back on the political agenda. Large sections of Dutch society supported his views. This also points to a changed attitude among 'ordinary' Dutch people towards ethnic minorities and Muslims in specific.

From Bolkestein's intervention in 1991 onwards, issues relating to integration, such as religion, especially Islam, culture, language, and identity have not been absent from the political agenda and have been discussed at length in the Dutch media. In this period, numerous incidents were reported in the Dutch media that related in one way or another to integration, Islam and Dutch-Moroccans in particular. Topics such as the allegedly bad results of children in Islamic schools, debates about headscarves, veils and burqas, Dutch-Moroccan boys rioting and destroying wreaths of flowers on graves during the official yearly Remembrance Day of World War II on the 4th of May, imams claiming that homosexuals may be killed, radicalism among young Dutch-Moroccans, gay-bashing by young Dutch-Moroccan men, and so on. The prominence of Dutch-Moroccans in much of these media debates seems to indicate that this group is looked upon as a symbol of failed integration. In the next section, I will highlight three Dutch opinion makers who have been very influential in the recent debates on integration and Islam and who predominantly focused their discourses on the position of Dutch-Moroccans in the Netherlands.

### *Dutch opinion makers, 2000-2005*

The public figures I discuss here were highly influential, not only in directing the debate in certain directions, but they also played significant roles themselves in events and incidents relating to the debate. All three of them focussed on the supposed incompatibility of Islam and Dutch society and to the position of the Dutch-Moroccan community, a community, which, in their views, is first and foremost a community of Muslims.

A politician who, like Bolkestein, publicly dared to criticize the integration policies of the Dutch government vigorously was Pim Fortuyn. More specifically, his discourse on integration and Islam focused on 'Muslims' and their reluctance and/ or incapability to adjust to Dutch values and norms. Fortuyn, a right wing, self-made politician who was originally a writer and columnist and had a degree in social sciences, became known for his very critical (most of the times negative) view on Islam and Muslims in the Netherlands during his political hey-days: the years 2001-2002. Yet, already in



1997, he published his book *Against the Islamization of our culture*<sup>22</sup> in which he described Islam as an intolerant religion (Douwes et al. 2005: 145-147). Fortuyn received much political attention when he called Islam 'a backward culture' in the *Volkskrant* in February 2002. He blamed Islam for much of the problems among second-generation Dutch-Moroccans. Fortuyn was hated by many people for many reasons: some socialist politicians disliked him, because they considered his political discourse populist, and some 'allochtonen' and Muslims hated him, because they considered his discourse anti-Islamic and disrespectful towards Islam. He was killed on May 6th, 2002, in Hilversum by a Dutch environmentalist fanatic.

A second public figure playing an important part in the Dutch debate on Islam and integration is Dutch-Somali politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Together with Fortuyn, she dominated much of the political debate on Islam in the Netherlands during the period 2002-2006. In 2002, she made a remarkable switch from left-wing political party PVDA (social democrats) to right-wing liberal party VVD and at around that same time she started to express critical views on Islam, which rapidly turned her into one of the Netherlands' most controversial public figures of recent times. Although she claimed that her political aim was to emancipate Muslim women in the Netherlands, she was not liked by Dutch-Muslims, who, most of the time, disapproved of the way in which she wanted to 'help' Muslim women. Dutch-Muslims were suspicious of her ever since it became clear that Hirsi Ali had distanced herself from her religion, i.e. Islam. She was thus not a Muslim herself anymore. After she had insinuated in an interview with Dutch newspaper *Trouw* that the Prophet Muhammad was a paedophile, describing him as 'a pervert' in January 2003, she lost all credibility among Dutch Muslims (Douwes et al.: 150).

Her cooperation with Theo van Gogh in 2004 resulted in the production of a controversial film about abuse of Muslim women, called '*Submission*', which only added to her bad reputation among Dutch-Muslims (Moors 2005: 8-9). Hirsi Ali wrote the script for this movie and added the voice-over. The film *Submission*, the literal translation of the Arabic word *Islam*, was made with the intention to draw attention to the abuse of Muslim women. The film does not really have a clear story line or a plot, but is more a collection of poetic, lyrical statements, and visual effects. The film was criticized for its form rather than its content. It shows naked women dressed in see-through burqas<sup>23</sup> revealing Qur'anic calligraphic writings and scars and traces of beatings on their bodies. It was meant to demonstrate how women in Islamic communities are oppressed and abused, linking Islam and Muslim men with aggressive and inhumane behaviour. As expected, the naked

women and the Qur'anic transcripts on their bodies were considered acts of blasphemy by many Muslims. In addition, many people criticized the movie, because it was a stereotypical, Orientalist representation of abusive and oppressive Muslim men and subjugated, dominated Muslim women (ibid.).

A third important opinion maker and public figure in the debate on Islam and integration was Theo van Gogh, a film director, talk-show host and columnist who had great impact on the Dutch public debate. Theo van Gogh was assassinated on November 2nd, 2004, in his hometown Amsterdam only a few miles from his home by Dutch-Moroccan 'Mohammed B'. Van Gogh's discourse on Islam and Muslim in the Netherlands, mainly expressed in his weekly columns in the daily newspaper *Metro* until his death in 2004, consisted mostly of a degradation of the Islamic faith, a view that he aired enthusiastically and viciously. He was especially known for linking Muslims with bestiality by calling them "goat-fuckers". He and his followers claimed that "they were preserving 'Dutch norms and values' which they perceived as being under threat by the presence of 'almost one million Muslims' in the Netherlands (ibid.: 8). His controversial film *Submission* (2004), produced in cooperation with Hirsi Ali, is generally assumed to be the direct cause for his murder. Van Gogh was stabbed to death with a knife that had a letter to Hirsi Ali attached to it.

These three persons do not play a role in Dutch politics anymore today, two of them having been murdered and one of them having fled the country. Nonetheless, their legacy still resonates in current public debates. All three of them had a great impact on the transformation of the political and media debate on integration. Their contributions shifted the focus of the debate from an optimistic multiculturalist discourse to a negative discourse that perceives Islam as incompatible with Dutch society (Tayob 2006: 75). The public discourses of all three continuously ascribed integration problems to the 'backwardness' of Islam.

The discourses of these three public figures together with the impact of events such as 9/11/2001 and the murder of Van Gogh caused the Dutch-Moroccan community to be labelled as a problem group. The imposition of the labels 'Muslim' and '*allochtoon*' and the prominence of the Dutch-Moroccan community in the public debate, could give the naive and indifferent citizen the impression that 'it is all about those Moroccans'. This hardened climate created a hotbed for some factions in society to freely express racist and prejudiced opinions against Muslims, foreigners, Dutch-Moroccans or anybody who is different and perceived as a threat. At present, right-wing, anti-Islamic Dutch politician Geert Wilders, who is leader of the Party of Lib-

erty (PVV), which he founded in 2006, has risen from this political climate and has won considerable parliamentary support during the Dutch elections in November 2006. One of his most recent ideas is to ban the Qur'an, because, according to Wilders, it is a fascist book that prompts violence (Wilders 2007). In his film *Fitna* (2008) he combines the Qur'an with violent scenes from recent events, suggesting a link between Islam and violent behaviour. This discourse fits perfectly into anti-Islamic discourses of Fortuyn, Hirsi Ali, and Van Gogh.

### 3. The field of study of Dutch-Moroccans

Incidents in society and the debates it instigated, as well as the criticism of integration policies expressed in media and political spheres, often inspired scholars to explore precisely these issues. A number of factors have contributed to the fact that studies on Dutch-Moroccan youth are dominated by topics related to politics, social marginality, religion and language. The trends in the public debate are reflected in the kind of studies conducted on Dutch-Moroccans. Below, I briefly review a number of the studies on Dutch-Moroccans in general.

Bel Ghazi (1986) conducted a study that deals with Dutch-Moroccans and their migration experiences and the economical consequences of migration. To understand Dutch-Moroccans in the Netherlands, Bel Ghazi also turns his view to Morocco and its culture. Language studies on Dutch-Moroccans have also been published regularly. For example, Boumans (1996) studied code-switching among Dutch-Moroccans by analyzing language use in the speech of Dutch-Moroccans.

Topics such as crime and youth delinquency, the position of Moroccan-Muslim women, school dropouts, and lack of political participation were also popular during the 1980s and 1990s. For example, to name but a few, Koningsveld and Shadid (1996) published on political participation and identities of Muslims, including Dutch-Moroccans, in non-Muslim states. Van Gemert (1998) explored the relationship between culture and criminal behaviour in case of Dutch-Moroccan boys. Pels (2003) wrote about public disturbance caused by Dutch-Moroccan boys. In 2005, Werdmölder did something similar in his book on Dutch-Moroccan boys in Amsterdam and their criminal behaviour (Werdmölder 2005). During the 1990s and early new millennium, the discussion about the issue of integration and Islam had a large impact on studies about Dutch-Moroccans. Obdeijn and De Mas (2001) scrutinized second-generation Dutch-Moroccans in a book entitled

*The Moroccan challenge* and the *Social Cultural Planbureau* (Social Cultural Plan Bureau<sup>24</sup>) issued a report edited by Phalet and Ter Wal (2004) on Muslims in the Netherlands, investigating among other things, religious engagement among Dutch-Turks, and Dutch-Moroccans.

In addition, a number of surveys including Dutch-Moroccans have been conducted by Dutch research institutes, such as TNS NIPO, CBS, and SCP. Most of these surveys do not deal with Dutch-Moroccans exclusively, but with *allochtonen* in general and report, for instance, on the integration rate of different groups in society. They are a reflection of the public debate and its tendency to mix up *allochtonen* with Muslims, Dutch-Moroccans, and Dutch-Turks and others.<sup>25</sup> In the new millennium, events such as 9/11 and the assassination of Van Gogh led to an ongoing flow of studies on topics dealing with (political) Islam, radicalization, Islamic terrorism and fundamentalism: ranging from introductory publications about the basics of Islam and (Dutch-) Moroccan Muslims (Douwes et al. 2005; Demant 2005; Buitelaar 2006), to an in-depth analysis of the network of the alleged Dutch-Moroccan Islamic terrorist-cell *the Hofstad-group*, to which the murderer of Van Gogh belonged (Groen and Kranenberg 2006; Buijs 2006).

Quite understandably, scholars working on issues of (post-) migration, identity, and religion are inspired by current, acute and urgent events in society relating to migration, integration and religion. It is also understandable that state policies and media debates affect the kinds of topics scholars choose to study, even more so when we take into account the fact that many scholars are dependent on (external) funding by institutes, which are in turn often subsidized by the state. The fact that the state struggles with integration policies and high crime rates among Dutch-Moroccan teenagers explains the preference of this subject matter over others. However, as regards Dutch-Moroccans and especially Dutch-Moroccans of the second-generation, the balance between studies about subject matters that dominate the media and public debate and studies about alternative topics seems lost.

#### **4. Youth culture, music, and post-migration identity**

To grasp the social significance of music requires an understanding of the specific localities and the different sensibilities produced each time a musical performance and reception take place. The relationship between performance, reception of the musical sounds, and the lyrics (if there are any) is crucial in defining the meaning of music. In academic writings, music

is often considered to function as a group symbol and a means through which group unity and solidarity are sustained (Ronström 1992: 181). Langlois argues:

Music provides a medium for the expression, open or obliquely, of shared sentiments and normative values. At the same time a range of social elements compete for ownership of musical genres as potent symbolic property. Whether looking at performance or more general forms of social use, musical activity involves an interaction between the individual and the group, which in turn involves specific cultural restraints and possibilities (Langlois 1996: 203)

Studying music thus means studying music in its social context. The relationship between musical discourse, lyrics, performance styles, identities, and consumer positions, is crucial (Whitely 1997: xvi). Music is a multi-functional system to which can be assigned different, sometimes conflicting meanings, emotions and social values simultaneously. According to Ronström, music is powerful exactly because it can be charged with various, contested meanings, but at the same time, it can still function as a symbol of a community or social group. Music enables people to feel connected to other people, without knowing if the other people have anything other in common besides this feeling of solidarity instigated by the music. This makes music a powerful element in social life. However, music can also instigate feelings of conflict and disrupt feelings of unity. In order to understand these different processes, an approach is needed that relates the music to its social context, to the performance and to the reception of the music. This will result in knowledge about a specific social group that comes into being in a specific musical context or comes into being in relation to that music. As a result, this approach reveals insights that are not revealed in studies focussing merely on economical, political, or religious topics.

In case of pop music, academic studies often deal with the relationship between pop music, youth, and youth culture. From a European perspective, youth culture, music and cultural expressions of youth in post-migration contexts have received far more academic attention than is the case in the Netherlands. In France, especially since the 1990s, studies on the second-generation North Africans (*beurs*) appear regularly. For example, Gabriele Marranci's articles (2000; 2000a; 2003) on the role of *raï* music shows how music and its corresponding youth culture are significant in identity construction processes of second-generation North African immigrants. According to Marranci, *raï* music offers *beurs* the opportunity to construct

and express identities that are distinctly different from the identities of their parents and other ethnic youth in France. Other scholars contributing to this field are Bouziane Daoudi and Hadj Miliani. They wrote one of the first studies on Algerian raï music (1996) and they recently wrote on North African influences in French culture (Bouziane and Daoudi 2002). Anthropologist Ted Swedenburg (2001; 2001a; 2003) has published on raï music and Arab music in general with varying focuses, ranging from an analysis of raï music in France to an examination of the link between hip-hop and Islam in Europe. His work often deals with ethnic youth in post-migration situations and music in European contexts.

France and its North African youth have frequently been studied in relation to raï music and more recently in relation to hip-hop. A great deal of these studies describe how, through the use and production of these types of music, they try to escape their marginal position by striving for more acceptance in overall French society, but all the while maintaining and giving expression to their 'otherness'. This becomes clear in Marranci's analysis of the case of singer Faudel, born 1979 in France from Algerian parents. He is a successful singer who makes raï music, including North African rhythms and melodies, but who increasingly sings his lyrics in French and also adds French translations of his Arabic lyrics in his CD-booklets, in order to reach a wider audience and get more airplay on French radio and television (Marranci 2000: 11). Faudel's latest album *Mundial Corrida* (2006) is predominantly sung in French.

In Germany, Turkish youth are widely researched, the focus often being the vibrant German-Turkish hip-hop scene (Kaya 2002; Soysal 2001; El-Taybeb 2004; Çağlar 1998). Andy Bennett (2000; 2001), for instance, did work on hip-hop in Frankfurt am Main and included the view and role of ethnic youth within the German hip-hop scene in his study. Bennett's work demonstrates how American hip-hop is not simply imitated, but is applied to a local context, Frankfurt in this case. Hip-hop made by German-Turks in Frankfurt, mostly deals with racism and citizenship. Bennett describes how hip-hop for German-Turkish youth is a very local expression; through rapping about local experiences and sensibilities and performing them in 'the right way', the rapper becomes intrinsically part of its local social context. Besides, hip-hop has become a tool for German-Turkish youth to act out their 'coolness', i.e. it becomes a way to express a certain authentic identity and to set oneself apart from others who are 'not cool' (Bennett 2000: 149-150). Authenticity and 'coolness' are of course important elements in many youth cultures around the world.

Thomas Solomon (2005; 2006) studied hip-hop made by youth with Turkish roots in Germany, as well as hip-hop made by Turkish youth *in* Turkey. His work shows how national politics in Germany are reflected in the hip-hop productions of Turkish-German youth. Topics such as racism, Islam and citizenship are often the centre of the rappers' attention. In particular, Solomon's work goes beyond ample descriptions of how a global genre, such as hip-hop, is locally incorporated, but in fact, analyses thoroughly how this local incorporation of hip-hop in Germany and Turkey by Turkish hip-hoppers actually takes place. By analysing the music, the performers' discourses, the lyrics and the scene, Solomon demonstrates how these young hip-hoppers place themselves in society. Solomon illustrates how Turkish rap in Germany constructs Muslim identities, not in order to articulate a specific religious and spiritual Islamic identity, but to construct a sense of identity and self-worth among Turkish Muslims in Germany (Solomon 2006: 73). His work is a good example of how issues of (post) migration, ethnicity, identity, youth culture, and music can come together.

Concerning the UK, studies on Asian youth, with roots in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and other Asian countries, and their cultural expressions, such as literature, movies, and music, are also available (Sharma et al. 1996; Baumann 1996; Bennett 2000 and 2001; Baily 2006). Gerd Baumann has extensively studied Asian youth in England and occasionally his work touches on music and youth culture. One of the first and better known publications on the topic of ethnicity, music and youth culture is the edited volume *Dis-orienting Rhythms*, which discusses British-Asian youth, their musical preferences and its political (in-)significance. By means of grounded descriptions and analyses of Asian music, such as bhangra, bhangra-rap, Asian Kool, and Jungle and its lyrics, the authors illustrate how new Asian dance music is used by artists and audience in the UK to resist essentialist portrayals of Asian youth and mark their hybridity in musical, as well as social identifications. The contributors to this volume take an approach that breaks away from simple, Orientalist descriptions of Asian music as an exotic genre in the World music category (Sharma et al. 1996: 8-9). They demonstrate how Asian music is a cultural production that not only symbolizes an affirmation of Asian traditions or roots, but is simultaneously an expression of a mix of musical alliances of British-Asian musicians with Britain and the imagined homeland (Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and so on) (*ibid.*: 21-26). The volume clearly points to the fact that new Asian dance music and its corresponding British-Asian youth culture have created a space in which British-Asian youth and others struggle over what the master signi-

fier 'Asian' means in the context of a British nation that seems to divide everything in black and white, which makes Asians difficult to label (ibid.). In other words, British-Asians seem not to fit into the description of either 'black or white' (race), which makes them, for others, difficult to categorize. Through making music, British-Asian youth can enter into a debate about what it means to be British-Asian and articulate their specific positions in British society.

More recently, Andy Bennett (2000; 2001) dedicated several writings to the phenomenon of bhangra music in the UK. Bhangra is a mix of Punjabi, Asian, and Western pop music, which was highly popular among British-Asian youth in the 1990s. His work demonstrates how Asian youth use bhangra music to connect themselves consciously to their 'parental' culture, in their own, youthful way or, in contrast, to distance themselves from this culture by deliberately rejecting bhangra music and the Asian music scene. Bennett's study emphasizes how bhangra music *can* be used to collectively express and valorise their British-Asian roots, through the organisation of bhangra dance events for instance, but not necessarily so at all times. Local knowledge and sensibilities determine what kinds of meaning are ascribed to bhangra. Bennett's account of incidents of violence during bhangra events shows how Asian youth visit these events for different and sometimes conflicting reasons. While one group attends these events to concretely articulate and celebrate their Asianness and their adherence to certain Asian customs and religious norms, another group, which has distanced itself from Asian culture and adopted the attitudes and habits of local white British youth, attends the events merely to socialize with other Asian peers and not so much to celebrate their Asian traditions. The mixing of these two groups in one space, may lead to conflict. Bennett writes:

"...in a setting where many of the social actors are highly sensitised to the need to be seen endorsing fundamental aspects of their respective traditional identities, those who detract from such traditions are often singled out and stigmatised" (Bennett 2000: 122).

In chapter four we will see that music is, in case of Dutch-Moroccan youth, not always a binding factor either, but can also become controversial and disruptive. Here, there is an additional factor, religion, which also plays an important role. In line with Sharma et al., Bennett indicates how music in a post-migration situation should not only be considered an expression of solidarity and collective identities that celebrate a certain ethnic back-



ground, but can also be an instigator of conflict and competition over the true meaning and function of such music.

Overall, the field of study of post-migration experiences and cultural-artistic expressions in Europe is continuously developing and growing. Under the influence of incidents of racism, discrimination and migration, scholars in France, Germany, and the UK have started to explore the position of youth living in a post-migration situation by scrutinizing their musical preferences and linking them up to their (often marginal) social positions. We may conclude that this field is still relatively young and in full development.

*The field of study of Dutch-Moroccan youth culture, music, and identity*

As far as the Netherlands is concerned, one can hardly speak of a field of study that concentrates on pop music, youth in post-migration situations and youth culture. Topics such as music and other cultural expressions, leisure time, youth culture, and its connection to identification processes among youth in post-migration situation and Dutch-Moroccan youth in particular have mostly gone unnoticed. Like all young people, Dutch-Moroccan youth are involved in music as producers, but this is something that only now and then appears in the media or academic publications. A number of them are involved in producing music in a range of different genres. Additionally, Dutch-Moroccan youth are, besides producers, of course also music consumers around which a retail industry of specialized music shops and a Dutch-Moroccan musical scene have emerged.

In the current political climate and academic debate on Dutch-Moroccans, the perspectives of Dutch-Moroccan youth are rarely included explicitly. Much is said 'about them', but Dutch-Moroccan youth are rarely included in the debate. In fact, little academic research has been done on Dutch-Moroccan youth's standpoints, their outlook on and experiences in Dutch society. A study of Dutch-Moroccan youth's musical consumption and production patterns provides insight into their life worlds, their experiences and their (aspired) position in Dutch society. I have chosen as the topic of this study the role of music in identification processes of Dutch-Moroccan youth. This approach will lead to a deeper understanding about how Dutch-Moroccan youth position themselves in Dutch society and how they use music to present *and* represent themselves. In Dutch society, this group is often the topic of political and academic debate and is subjected to a great deal of negative stereotypes. A musical approach on how Dutch-Moroccan youth react to or are inspired by these political circumstances and academic

debates is therefore interesting. As the interview fragments at the beginning of the *Introduction* already indicate, music means different things to different people. From a scholarly point of view, it is important to analyze what these meanings are and why they can be powerful in the social organization of life. This is what my study aims to do.

In the following overview, which is not meant to be exhaustive, I present a number of studies that are related to my topic. I describe how my research fits in with these studies and to what extent my approach differs from them. In 1982, Trees Pels conducted a literature study on ethnicity, socialization and leisure activities of Turkish and Moroccan youth in the Netherlands (Pels 1982). She demonstrated that in those days Turkish and Moroccan youth had a desire to preserve their cultural heritage and identity (*ibid.*: 88), which was, I assume, also a result of the Dutch policy of integration while maintaining identity. Pels concludes that during leisure time activities, Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Moroccan youth spent most of their time with peers, i.e. other Turkish or Moroccan youth, and that Turkish and Moroccan girls, due to socio-cultural and religious factors, only infrequently participate in any kind of leisure activity (*ibid.*: 99).

In his 1993 study on Moroccan young men in the Netherlands, Frank Buijs gives a detailed description of the lifestyles, political attitudes, and religious orientations, and experiences of a group of twenty young Moroccans who arrived in the Netherlands between 1968 and 1988. One chapter of his book gives special attention to music and leisure time. This chapter is entitled 'Friends and leisure time' and in it Buijs describes how a number of the young men in his study prefer going out to 'Moroccan parties' because they are 'fun' and offer the opportunity to meet fellow Moroccans. Due to the survey-character of Buijs' study, there is little room for in-depth analysis.

In 1996, Hassan Bousetta reviewed the status of art, culture and literature in the Moroccan community in the Netherlands. Starting from the notion that cultural expressions are an important factor in the way ethnic communities position themselves in society, Bousetta gives an overview of several cultural and artistic expressions of Dutch-Moroccans and describes the government's (lack of) support for some of these activities. Bousetta also notes that during the 1990s, a number of organisations were set up to promote and encourage cultural productions of Dutch-Moroccans. His introductory exploration of the cultural field of Dutch-Moroccans, shows that the state's policy aimed at political emancipation of Moroccans obstructed rather than promoted the production of new or innovative cultural and artistic developments. Bousetta writes:

“As long as financial support and the control over this [cultural and artistic] infrastructure remain interconnected to a policy which is primarily aimed at political participation, artists will have problems taking up innovating projects” (Bousetta 1996: 192).

Bousetta’s article points to a discrepancy between government policy aimed at encouraging political participation and the activities undertaken by Dutch-Moroccan artists, writers, musicians and singers who prefer to make art without being connected to some specific political aspiration.

A project called TCULT,<sup>26</sup> a joint project from several Dutch universities and institutes, uniting scholars from cultural, as well as linguistic disciplines, intensively observed two multicultural neighbourhoods in Utrecht called *Lombok and Transvaal* over the period of one year. In 2002, they published the results of their study, which now and then reports on music and leisure time activities of Dutch-Moroccan youth living in these districts (Boumans et. al 2001). A small survey that was conducted in order to get an impression of the musical preferences among the students of a local high school indicates that among Dutch-Moroccan youth hip-hop, rap, R&B, and Moroccan music are liked most.

In 2002, the Verweij-Jonker institute issued a report on leisure time activities of Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turks entitled *I know my friends from the street* (Boonstra et al. 2002). This survey gives an overview of leisure time activities of young Dutch-Moroccans. The report concludes that the groups studied hardly engage in making new contacts in public. The respondents spend their leisure time mostly with members of their own ethnic group, and members of the same sex. Just like Pels’ study, this report emphasizes the fact that the Dutch-Moroccan youth who were part of this study spend their leisure time with other Dutch-Moroccans and that their leisure time activities are heavily influenced by ‘Moroccan culture’ (ibid.: 56), a concept that remains undefined and is not contextualized throughout the study.

In 2006, Dominique Caubet published a book entitled *Shouf shouf Hollanda. Succesvol en Marokkaan*. For her book, Caubet interviewed fourteen Dutch-Moroccan artists, including three rappers, five actors, one stand-up comedian, one painter and four writers. This book is a literal transcription of these interviews and provides an inside perspective on the motivations, limitations and experiences that Dutch-Moroccan artists have had in their career. Although most interviews focus on the question of language use by the Dutch-Moroccan artists, Caubet sometimes touches upon wider social topics. For example, the interviews with the rappers present some

preliminary hypothesis about the motivations of the Dutch-Moroccan rappers to make the music they make. Caubet describes the artistic productions as characterized by individualism, universalism, freedom and humour, in particular self-mockery. The artists reject any kind of label that suggests that their work is purely 'intercultural'. Most of them present themselves as individual artists who make artistic productions that are not meant to be 'Moroccan'. They try to escape social pressure of the Dutch-Moroccan community, but all the while most of them are proud to announce that they are Moroccan (Caubet 2006: 264-265). This already indicates a complex relationship the artists have with overall Dutch society, the Dutch-Moroccan community and all the claims that are made by others about their art.

In *A music history of the Netherlands, a sequence 2000-2005*, musicologist Lutgard Mutsaers writes about Dutch-Moroccan rappers and in particular notes the development and uprising of Dutch-Moroccan hip-hop. She labels this Dutch-Moroccan hip-hop *Maghrap*, a combination of the words Maghreb (North African) and rap (music). Rapper Raymzter attracted a lot of media attention to Dutch-Moroccan hip-hop, but Mutsaers notes that this increased media attention did not lead to more academic attention for 'the Dutch-Moroccan subculture' (Mutsaers 2006: 954-959). Mutsaers raises some interesting points about hip-hop produced by Dutch-Moroccan youth and its social engagement, its specific use of street slang and the typical Dutch-Moroccan pronunciation of the letters 'r' and 'g', which makes their way of rapping popular among Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch kids (ibid.: 959). Mutsaers concludes that there is a broad need for further studies on the Dutch-Moroccan perspective in Dutch hip-hop.

Fairly recently, the Dutch state-sponsored institute for multicultural development *Forum* published the first two of a series of researches on identity, lifestyle and religious experiences of young Moroccans and Turks in the Netherlands, of which the first two publications are entitled *From Allah to Prada* (2006) and *From Fasting to feasting* (2007). These studies are mainly based on a so called panel-study, which stands for a methodology whereby a number of key-respondents, who are considered to represent a network of people, are interviewed several times. The focus is on qualitative information and retrieving inside information about the people the key-respondents are supposed to represent. The key-respondent is not the focus of the interviews, in a sense that his or her personal experiences and discourse are central, but rather his or her network of friends, colleagues, peers, and their experiences and discourses (re-formulated by the respondent) are central (Nabben et al. 2006: 21-22). In the first publication, one chapter is devoted

to leisure time and nightlife, which deals with topics such as fashion, music, idols, and the use of drugs. The authors state that the majority of the Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Moroccan respondents listen to 'multi-ethnic' and 'black music', and the respondents aged between 19 and 25 also have a specific interest in music from Turkey and Morocco. They go out in the regular Dutch nightlife circuit, but the authors also note a rising trend among the respondents to visit Turkish or Moroccan dance parties organized throughout the Netherlands (Nabben 2006 et al.: 42-43).

Besides, the report notes that, as already indicated by Pels and the Verweij-Jonker Institute report, Dutch-Moroccan girls face restrictions regarding the choice of leisure time activities. Nabben et al. assume that the girls have less freedom to start with, compared to boys. This is also the reason why girls are less inclined to go out and visit parties, according to the authors. They explain that social control among the Dutch-Moroccan community is an additional reason for Dutch-Moroccan girls not to go out, out of fear of being recognized (ibid. 30-31). The study does not investigate in detail why the girls are afraid to be recognized by people they know and what this social control exactly entails, although some hints are given in the text: respondents in the study indicate that they perceive going out and dancing in clubs in regular nightlife as un-Islamic, because of the presence of alcohol and flirting men and women and that is why they do not go out (ibid: 36-37). Moroccan parties where no alcohol is served and that end in the early evening are increasingly popular among Dutch-Moroccan youth, according to the authors. Besides, these parties play Egyptian and Moroccan music and Algerian raï music, which is not the case in regular Dutch discos and clubs and this is yet another reason for their popularity among Dutch-Moroccan youth (ibid.) In general; this study presents a preliminary exploration of the current musical preferences and nightlife and/or leisure time activities of Dutch-Moroccan youth. It is a good starting point for a deeper analysis of the relative popularity of certain musical genres and why a considerable amount of Dutch-Moroccan youth tends to visit their 'own' parties. A thorough understanding of music and its social function requires an exploration of the relationship between the music, its performance, its reception, its consumers, and its social context. Only then can we make further assumptions about the reason why Dutch-Moroccan youth apparently prefer to go out and listen to Moroccan music *with* other Dutch-Moroccan youth.

The 2007 publication *From Fasting to feasting* again dedicates a chapter to 'Leisure time' and one to 'Music and parties', which elaborate on the

chapter about leisure time in the first publication. The chapters present an extensive description of eight 'mono- and multi-ethnic parties'. Mono-ethnic refers to parties targeted specifically at one ethnic minority; multi-ethnic parties target a multicultural audience (Korf et al. 2007: 91) Included in this description are two (mono-ethnic) Moroccan parties. In the description, the authors note some interesting phenomena, such as the behaviour of the crowd, the way of dancing, the decoration of the event, the music that is played and the overall ambiance. They regard the role of Islam as significant, because the absence of alcohol is an important element attracting Dutch-Moroccan Muslim visitors. Besides, these Moroccan parties are considered to have a social function, because they create an opportunity for Dutch-Moroccan youth to meet each other. The authors also note the organization of Moroccan women-only parties, a way to conform to Islamic rules that demand gender segregation in public spaces, which is yet another sign of the importance of Islam (ibid.: 89-102).

The rough outline of academic writings dealing with Dutch-Moroccan youth culture, music and identity demonstrates arbitrariness in the way this subject has been treated by scholars. From the available literature, I have taken some significant points of departure for my research. First of all, in random order, Dutch-Moroccan youth seem to prefer to socialize with other Dutch-Moroccan youth in their leisure time. Second, several scholars assume that 'Moroccan culture' affects the choice in leisure time activities and musical preferences, reflected in the emergence of 'Moroccan parties'. Third, the literature indicates that Dutch-Moroccan girls face restrictions and social control in their choice of leisure time, although it does not specify exactly how. Fourth, the musical preference of Dutch-Moroccan youth are 'black music', such as R&B, pop music, Arabic and Moroccan music, including *raï* music, Egyptian pop, Moroccan folk music, and Berber music. And, hip-hop seems to have a special appeal to Dutch-Moroccan youth.

The publications of Forum are particularly valuable, because they put forward some interesting trends in Dutch-Moroccan youth's musical preferences and leisure time activities related to music. It is my aim to elaborate on their findings, and come to a more detailed description of the role of music in the identity construction processes of Dutch-Moroccan youth. Specifically, the trends detected earlier by Forum and Buijs, such as the emergence and social significance of 'Moroccan parties', the inclination to socialize with other Dutch-Moroccans, the obstacles Dutch-Moroccan girls face in their choice of leisure time activities, and the specific popularity of certain music genres among Dutch-Moroccan youth, are all phenomena that I shall ana-

lyze further. Pels, Buijs, Caubet, Mutsaers, and Forum provide useful clues as to where to look for a more elaborated and detailed analysis, such as the role of Islam, social control, and gender, discrimination of Muslims, and Dutch-Moroccans in regular nightlife.

Using ethnographic fieldwork and participant observation, I examine which meanings Dutch-Moroccan youth ascribe to their musical predilections and how they use music in their identification processes. In doing this, the significance the music has for young Dutch-Moroccans is the main focus. Whereas the studies I mentioned above contain descriptions of the most popular genres among this group and an overview of their leisure time activities, my study analyzes why certain genres are more popular, and what actually happens at these so-called 'Moroccan parties'. The narratives of Dutch-Moroccan youth about why they like certain music and why they visit certain events combined with my observations during events in which I participated, lead up to new information about the role of music in identity construction processes of Dutch-Moroccan youth.

I hope my study will provide new insights on how, in a post migration situation, music and musical experiences of second-generation migrants serve as important parameters for their attitudes on the society they are living in, on how they want to (re)present themselves and how these musical representations interact with wider social and political discourses. It remains to be seen if their children will reproduce and imitate their parents' musical practices and preferences. The third and following generations will, in all likelihood, develop their own distinct, typical musical preferences and activities. After all, many young people do not like their parents' musical taste, and even if they do, they would probably not admit it. In the end, as one interviewee remarked, the point is that the next generation will listen to music that fits their generation.

## **5. Methodology**

### *Data collection*

The data material on which this study is based, originates from in depth-interviews, participant observations, Internet-forum-discussions and song text analysis. The in-depth, one-on-one interviews are the fundamental source of information. I have conducted twenty-nine interviews, with Dutch-Moroccan youth<sup>27</sup> of which sixteen are female and thirteen are male. These respondents are all music consumers. Most of them are also concert

visitors, party visitors etc. This category of interviewees is labelled consumers. Twelve of them are, besides music consumers, also active as (semi-) professionals in the music scene, either as artists, singers, DJ's, or party or concert organizers. This category of respondents will be called producers. The interviews I conducted with the producers are also included in the analysis of the consumers, since these producers are all consumers as well. Their interviews thus serve a double purpose.

All interviews but one were taped with a mini-disc-recorder with permission of the interviewees and later transcribed. The average length of an interview was approximately one hour, although some took over two hours. The interviews were conducted in the period between January 2004 and July 2005. The selection of the interviewees followed from a snow-ball effect, which resulted in a mixed and varied sample of Dutch-Moroccan youth with various social, educational backgrounds, resident in different regions of the Netherlands. The interviewees are all aged between twenty and thirty (with a single exception). Almost all of them belong to the second-generation of Dutch-Moroccans, meaning that their fathers came to the Netherlands during the 1960s and 1970s as guest workers. Some of the interviewees were born in Morocco and came to the Netherlands at a very young age (this is sometimes called the 'one and a half generation'). Most of the interviewees were born and raised in the Netherlands.

The Moroccan roots of the people I interviewed can be traced back to different regions in Morocco, such as the urban city areas of Casablanca, Fez, Marrakech, and Nador or small villages in the rural areas of the northern Rif mountains. Depending on the region of origin of their parents, the respondents are either able to understand to some extent Moroccan-Arabic or one of the several Berber languages. Twenty-one of the twenty-nine understood and spoke Moroccan-Arabic. There were some differences, however, between those who understand it passively and do not speak it actively and those who understand it and speak it actively. Seven of the twenty-nine respondents spoke a Berber language. Very few of them have language skills in both Moroccan-Arabic and a Berber language. All the interviewees speak Dutch and all the interviews were conducted in the Dutch language.

Most of the twenty-nine interviewees were educated at intermediate vocational educational (MBO) level or higher. Twelve of them were studying for or had already obtained their bachelor degree (HBO). Five of the respondents were studying for their master degree (university degree) or had already obtained it. I was unable to gain information on the educational background of three of the respondents (see the appendix 1 for a complete



list of the respondents and some background information, and the dates and locations of the interviews).

As I gave priority to obtaining information from Dutch-Moroccan youth from different regions in the Netherlands as much as possible, I chose to work with a snow-ball method when selecting interviewees. This gave me the opportunity to reach beyond one network of friends or classmates, and tap into the networks of Dutch-Moroccan youth throughout the Netherlands. The interviewees are resident in different regions of the Netherlands: they come from the western urban area of the Netherlands called *Randstad*, from the southern region of the Netherlands, from rural areas and small towns, such as Waalwijk, Boxtel, Helmond, as well as cities such as Tilburg, Den Bosch, and Nijmegen. This has the advantage of covering a broad geographical scope. A disadvantage of this method is that the researcher in this case could not reach the level of depth one might obtain when studying one given group of people in one given location, such as a group of friends or band-members for a longer period of time.

For reasons of privacy, I have decided to preserve the anonymity of all the interviewees. First of all, revealing the identities of the interviewees does not add new information or substantial facts to the conclusions of this study. In addition to this, all the interviews took place in an ambience of confidence and trust and publicizing statements of some of the interviewees could result in a problematic situation if the person in question was known to the outside world. Besides 'officially' arranged interviews, I have also used information gathered from random encounters I have had during the course of this project with people who were, in one way or another, interested in my research. These conversations often proved to be helpful as well.

In addition to the interviews, I have conducted participant observation during the period 2003-2006 at a wide range of different musical events, ranging from a small student association dance party with some thirty visitors to a mega-concert of various famous Moroccan artists with up to three thousand participants. I have visited over thirty events in different regions, although the majority of the events took place in the Randstad. I have made extensive notes of my observations and these notes have proved to be very helpful in making connections between discourses on music and musical experiences in concrete situations.

Moreover, song text analysis of Dutch-Moroccans musical productions also served as a method to obtain information about the way identity construction takes place in or through music. Especially for the hip-hop genre, song text analysis proved helpful in assigning some important themes in the

repertoire of Dutch-Moroccan hip-hop productions. Many of these hip-hop songs I collected are/ were only available through the Internet. A problem that arises when studying music productions distributed on the Internet, is the uncertainty about the source of the music, i.e. the authentic producers or composers. I have not been able to ascertain that all artists and their productions included in the collection I have analyzed have a Dutch-Moroccan background, since rap productions on the Internet are often hard to trace back to their original source. However, based on the accounts from my respondents, the language used in the raps (the use of Moroccan-Arabic or Berber expressions), and the stage names, I could determine that a Dutch-Moroccan background was the most probable.

Finally, I have regularly and intensively observed several websites aimed at and/ or established by Dutch-Moroccan youth, such as Maroc.nl, Maghreb.nl, Marokko.nl, and yasmina.nl. Most of these sites have forums dedicated to topics such as music, nightlife, and party-calendars. These sites are a substantial and effective addition to the other data I have collected.

### *Analysis*

For the analysis of the data for this research project I have combined different analytical perspectives. Since the study of music and musical activities requires exploring relations between the music, its performance, its receptions, and its social context, a combination of methods and perspectives was required. My point of departure was always to focus on the interviews and on empirical observation. In fact, I concentrated on 'observable realities of the world' (Jenkins 2004: 10) i.e. on human beings and their works and artefacts. My aim was to arrive at a deeper understanding of the interaction between music and identification processes of Dutch-Moroccan youth involved in this study. My analytical focus lay on the perceptions and categories used by the respondents themselves. I tried to stay as close as possible to the 'insiders' perspective'.

This methodological strategy of analysis partly resembles a methodology called grounded theory, which was developed by Glaser and Strauss in 1967. Scholars working with this methodology often focus on basic social processes and basic human (inter)action, such as living with chronic illness (Clarke 2005: xxxii). This makes it suitable for my research dealing with music and its role in social life. It is an empirical approach to the study of social life through qualitative research and analysis (ibid.: xxxi). The methodology of grounded theory is based on a thorough reading of the collected data and texts and labelling categories, concepts and characteristics and the rela-

tions between them. These categories are labelled with codes, referring to particular, remarkable, outstanding, or recurring phenomena occurring in the research data. Coding can be done systematically, but in the tradition of grounded theory, coding has a quite informal character (Glaser and Straus 1967: 107). I coded the collected data rather informally, mostly sticking to the point of view of the actors in my research.

I have not followed the complete procedure of grounded theory, but used some elements of it. One element of grounded theory that I have used is to start my research without a presupposed theory, but by collecting data in an unbiased way and by using data as the basis for my assumptions (ibid.: 3). My general aim when using this particular element of grounded theory was to infer specific and general assumptions from these data I collected. My goal was to deduce information from this data, to discover patterns and subsequently analyze whether this pattern applies to a wider group of people, or a wider range of social situations or contexts.

What I also borrowed from the grounded theory is the careful reviewing of the complete corpus of the data and trying to seek patterns, finding out if anything stands out as puzzling or surprising. This, then, will show how the collected data relate to social theory, organizational accounts, or common-sense expectations, and whether inconsistencies appear between different people's beliefs or between people's discourses and their actions. These patterns or the absence of them are brought to light by means of validation through triangulation, i.e. comparison of the different kinds of data from different sources, and by the assessing to what extent these different data converge and support each other (Seale 1998: 231). For example, comparing interview accounts with field notes, and texts appearing on Internet forums, or comparing interview accounts from several interviewees, provides information on the varying roles music can play in identification processes of Dutch-Moroccan youth.

### *'Doing homework'*

Traditionally, anthropology used to be known for its study of allegedly 'exotic' cultures in far-away countries, often in other continents. Nowadays, anthropologists do much more. As a result of migration, globalization, and new communication technologies the world has become a 'small place'. Consequently, what was historically called the anthropologists' home (i.e. the West) has become a site of anthropological study as well. Lavie and Swedenburg state that in present times of migration, multicultural states and globalization, it is equally important for anthropologists to do 'home-

work' as it is to do 'fieldwork' (Lavie and Swedenburg 1996: 20). In the past, the term 'fieldwork' was associated with travelling to a foreign, 'mysterious' country or tribe in order to understand these cultures through partaking in participant observation. Nowadays, fieldwork is also 'homework', or in other words, doing anthropological fieldwork in a place that is near (and dear) to the researcher's home. These kinds of study are extremely valuable since they provide insights into how our 'own' society works and unravel taken-for-granted ideas about why things are the way they are.

During the course of my research project, it has become clear that 'doing homework', i.e. conducting anthropological research in the place that the researcher calls home, is sometimes easy and sometimes hard. My affinity with the Dutch-Moroccan community, established through family relations and intense personal contacts with Dutch-Moroccans during my studies and supported by my own North-African roots, proved to be very helpful. Whereas some people 'warned' me about the reluctance of Dutch-Moroccan youth to cooperate with researchers, journalists and the like, finding interviewees was never a problem. More importantly, nearly all the interviews I conducted with Dutch-Moroccan youth took place in an atmosphere of confidence and openness and I was almost always able to create a confidential relationship with my interviewees. In fact, most of the interviewees expressed in one way or another a sense of relief, since they could talk openly with me about something that mattered much to them (music), as opposed to talking about topics that did not, such as terrorism or Islamic fundamentalism.

Conducting research in the place or country one is born and raised in has the advantage of 'knowing your way around'. I could easily use my own network of friends, family, and colleagues to get to respondents or any other information I required. Such a network would not have been available, had I conducted research abroad. A disadvantage of 'doing homework' is the risk of overlooking or underestimating (and leaving out of the research) certain social phenomena, because they are so obvious and natural in the perception of the researcher. In the course of this project, I have always tried to keep enough distance from the data in order not to take things for granted.

Being involved in this project for the past four years, it has become clear to me that I, the researcher, am also an essential part of my own study. Apart from being an exploration of different identification processes of Dutch-Moroccan youth, my research has turned out to be a process of defining my own identity as well. Not because I wanted it that way, but because outsiders have forced me to. Numerous times I was asked by Dutch

and non-Dutch fellow scholars, colleagues, journalists, and so on, if 'I am of Moroccan origin myself', as if only a 'Moroccan' (leaving undefined what a 'Moroccan' exactly is or does) could conduct a proper research on Dutch-Moroccan youth. Apparently, my outward appearance, dark eyes, and dark, curly hair was linked to my research topic, and people immediately assumed that I must be of Moroccan origin in order to have any interest in this topic. Although this imposition of an identity at times annoyed me deeply, it enabled me to connect emotionally to the group of people I was studying. Dutch-Moroccans and especially Dutch-Moroccan youth constantly have to deal with assumptions of 'outsiders', such as teachers, bosses, peers, journalists, politicians, scholars, about their identity or identities.

This emotional connection was acknowledged by one of the interviewees who told me that if "I had been an autochthonous [white] Dutch researcher, I would have gotten an X-amount of information out of her, but because of my own non-Dutch background, my affinity with her religious and cultural background, I got an X-amount plus something extra." She felt comfortable enough with me to speak her true mind, whereas if I had been an autochthonous Dutch researcher she would probably have been more reluctant to do so. Her attitude towards me enabled me to get access to information that otherwise would have remained hidden behind a mask of discomfort, cautiousness, and reluctance. Young Dutch Muslims and, especially, Dutch-Moroccans are often (considered to be) very reluctant to talk to researchers and reporters, because of a fear that their words will be taken out of context. My North African roots, my familiarity with North African culture and religion (Islam), and maybe most importantly my passion for music helped me to create common ground between the interviewees and me and to construct a relationship of trust and familiarity, which resulted in a privileged position compared to a researcher from another background.

### *Terminology*

In this study I refer regularly to 'Dutch-Moroccan youth'. It must be noted that this term is not a term that the subjects of this study use to describe themselves. Most of the respondents used such terms as 'Moroccan', 'Muslim', or '*allochtoon*', to refer to themselves. Furthermore, the term 'Dutch-Moroccan' is not popular in media reports, political discourse, or popular discourse as well, since in those cases, 'Moroccans' or '*allochtonen*' are mostly used as labels to signify people that are of Moroccan descent living in the Netherlands. Yet, for the sake of clarity and objectivity, I want to use a specific, neutral term to denote the subjects of my study. When

searching for it, I found that the term 'Dutch-Moroccans' meets these criteria best. It designates the Moroccan roots of these young people. Their parents emigrated from Morocco to the Netherlands. The term 'Dutch' signifies their Dutch nationality and stands for the fact that most of the subjects are born, raised and educated in the Netherlands. The term 'youth' in this study refers to people aged roughly between 20 and 35 years of age.

Throughout this study, I use the term 'Dutch-Moroccan community' from time to time. This may seem to imply that I assume that there exists a coherent community of people of Moroccan descent who feel they are members of this group. The term may also suggest that all Dutch-Moroccans consider themselves to be part of this group. Yet, it should be clear that this concept needs not apply to all people of Moroccan origin in the Netherlands. In fact, a great deal of this study is concerned with the question if, how and to what extent Dutch-Moroccan youth feel connected to 'a Dutch-Moroccan community' or not. In a study on Pakistani youth, religion and identity in Britain, Jessica Jacobsen explains her use of the term Pakistani community as follows: "In writing of the local 'Pakistani community' I am thus referring to an entity whose parameters are shifting and evolving..." (Jacobson 1998: 3). In the same vein, my study investigates the role of music and musical activities in the ways in which Dutch-Moroccan youth experience their position as children of Moroccan migrants who are born and raised in another country than their parents. Looking at their musical preferences, consumptions, activities and productions, my study addresses the very question of how the respondents tend to describe and understand the social group(s) to which they feel they belong.

Finally, my study does not claim to be representative, in the sense that I include statistical or quantitative reports on how many Dutch-Moroccan young people listen to a certain genre, or how many of them visit 'Moroccan parties'. Rather, this qualitative study aims to present an impression of Dutch-Moroccan youth's musical preferences and activities and in the broadest sense. This study thus aims to demonstrate a great richness and variety in musical preferences and activities and I have cherished this abundance, in order to provide detailed and nuanced descriptions. Although much of my study is concerned with Dutch-Moroccan youth who consume music and visit parties, concerts etc., I do not mean to imply that *all* Dutch-Moroccan youth in general, consume music and visit parties to the same extent as my interviewees. Some Dutch-Moroccan young people, including some of my own respondents, are not interested or involved in any kind of music consumption or production at all.

## 6. The structure of this thesis

In order to analyze the link between musical preferences and identification processes of Dutch-Moroccan youth, the question that will guide this thesis is what is the role of music and musical events in the identification processes of Dutch-Moroccan youth? In the first chapter, *Theorizing Identity, Music, and Youth Culture*, I develop a general framework that elaborates on the theoretical concepts identity, and its relation to music and youth culture. Here, I discuss issues relating to identity of youth in post-migration situations as well. From chapter two onwards, ethnographic description is more central, although I continue to connect the analyses of ethnographic material to theoretical concepts.

The second chapter, *An Outline of the Dutch-Moroccan Music Scene*, presents a detailed description of the Dutch-Moroccan musical scene. It also provides essential background information on the musical genres that dominate the scene. These genres are at the same time the favourite genres of Dutch-Moroccan youth. This chapter is an upbeat for the following chapters in which the musical events and music genres are described and analysed more thoroughly.

The third chapter, *Music, Events and Identification Processes: Shaabi and the Awakening of Dutch-Moroccanness*, describes how music (*shaabi*, i.e. popular Moroccan folk music) and social and musical events play a significant role in the process of becoming aware of being Dutch-Moroccan. *Shaabi* is a central genre in much of the musical events targeted at Dutch-Moroccan youth. Through an investigation of its centrality in these events and the individual narratives of the interviewees about *shaabi*, a connection is made between festive experiences and the social significance of the *shaabi* genre.

Chapter four, *Music, Islam, and Gender: Balancing Acceptance and Rejection*, deals with the role of Islamic discourses and its impact on the way Dutch-Moroccan youth perceive music and an Islamic lifestyle to be compatible or not. In the narratives of the interviewees the discrepancy between the theoretical and the practical interpretations on the issue of music's permissibility in Islam plays an important role. The second part of this chapter deals, in two case studies, in detail with the implications that the dominant Islamic discourse, implying the immorality of female performers, has for two female Dutch-Moroccan artists.

Chapter five, *Dutch-Moroccan Hip-Hop and Stereotypes: Records of Resistance*, illustrates how Dutch-Moroccan youth use hip-hop music as a tool to resist stereotypes. Hip-hop music plays a significant role in their

resistance against persistent stereotypical images of Dutch-Moroccans. Historically, hip-hop music is known for its ability to challenge stereotypes and articulate social criticism. Dutch-Moroccan youth use hip-hop not only as a weapon against stereotyping, but also as a cultural repertoire offering them the opportunity to express alternative narratives about their identities, breaking through the imposed boundaries of what it means to be a Dutch-Moroccan in the Netherlands.





# 1. Theorizing identity: music and youth culture

## 1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to provide a general theoretical framework for understanding how processes of identity 'work' in practice. I have chosen to work with theoretical approaches that focus on tangible and observable manifestations of identity. This search for a hands-on and practical theory of identity led me to the works of Richard Jenkins (2004) and Maykel Verkuyten (1999), supplemented by the ideas of Rogers Brubaker (2004), Brubaker and Frederick Cooper (2000), and Cornell and Hartmann (1998). These scholars present theories that describe and analyze processes of identity in social reality in particular. Their descriptions illustrate how identification processes manifest themselves in observable expressions and tangible phenomena. Music is such an observable behavioural pattern.

Academic research into identity, identification processes and identity expression is conducted predominantly in the field of social psychology, sociology and anthropology. Jenkins and Verkuyten emphasize the relationship between individual and collective identities and the outside forces, such as political, economic, and social circumstances, that impose themselves on these identities. They analyze the impact these forces have on identity construction processes and vice versa. Both Jenkins and Verkuyten integrate perspectives from diverse schools of thought into their view on identity. Their theories stem from sociological and anthropological perspectives and partly from social psychology, while Cornell and Hartmann mainly use anthropological and sociological approaches. Brubaker and Cooper use a combination of perspectives.

Given that my objective is to focus on perceptible and observable manifestations and expressions of identity in relation to music, the ideas of the above-mentioned scholars complement my research questions in a helpful and natural way. In a manner of speaking, by taking the best of all these theories, I aim to develop a useful and workable definition of iden-

tity that can be applied to my collected data material on Dutch-Moroccan youth.

*Identity: one term, different meanings*

In daily speech and in academic vernacular different meanings are assigned to the word 'identity'. In daily speech, it is often used to refer both to a static thing and to a process. The word identity is used to specify someone's or something's specific features or characteristics. The identity of that person or thing is intrinsically coloured by those characteristics and makes that person or thing unique. In this sense, identity relates to individuality.

The term is also used by social scientists who use it to explain different kinds of identification processes. The Dutch anthropologist Maykel Verkuyten distinguishes between three different types of identity-concepts. In his opinion, the concept 'identity' is used in a descriptive way, as a kind of container concept referring to all kinds of different human features ranging from soul-stirring feelings, personal preferences to social memberships. Secondly, the term is used in an explanatory way, for example, to explain why someone is deviant or criminal. Identity is then applied as an explanation model for a particular kind of behaviour. Thirdly, Verkuyten notes how the term is used in a normative way, meaning that in contemporary society, individuals are expected to 'have an identity'; not having an identity is undesired, which implies that all people should have the right to have an identity (Verkuyten 1999: 22-23). Verkuyten argues that discussions on the politicization of identity emerge from this normative perspective on identity:

"In these discussions identities are considered as historical and political constructions within which differences in power play a decisive role. Minority groups claim a right to be different and to decide for themselves who and what they want to be" (ibid.: 23).

The issue of identity has thus become important in national and international politics.

Everybody has a right to an identity, and politicians from all kinds of dispositions have been fighting for the rights of groups of people with certain identities. The political struggle for more rights of indigenous people in several countries is a clear example of identity politics (Jenkins 2004: 10).

The term 'identity' refers to many different things and social processes. Brubaker and Cooper remark:

"...[T]he term 'identity' is made to do a great deal of work. It is used to highlight non-instrumental modes of action; to designate sameness across persons or sameness over time; to capture allegedly core, foundational aspects of selfhood; to deny that such core, foundational aspects exist; to highlight the processual, interactive development of solidarity and collective self-understanding; and to stress the fragmented quality of the contemporary experience of 'self', a self unstably patched together through shards of discourse and contingently 'activated' in differing contexts" (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 8).

Brubaker and Cooper seem to suggest that the concept of identity is burdened with too many meanings and tasks. Many scholars agree with the view that the term 'identity' has become an ambiguous term, which needs clear demarcations whenever used in scholarly texts. However, not everybody has the same strategy for avoiding confusion and ambiguity. The issue is then how to find a way to study and describe identity without becoming too vague, too essentialist or too fluid and flexible. Jenkins, and Brubaker and Cooper both, present different, but complementary approaches to avoid this.

First, I present Jenkins' theory of identity, supplemented by the views of Verkuyten. His theory focuses on the analysis of the dynamics of identity processes from a practical point of view. In other words, Jenkins explains how identity is located in actual social contexts and how it comes to materialize in the practices of every day life. Particularly, Jenkins considers the process as a string of interactions between individuals and groups and his theory points out the importance of theorizing 'identification' rather than 'identity'. Jenkins' work could be seen as a first step forward in a new trend of theorizing identity, although his work is more recent than that of Brubaker and Cooper (2000). I use Brubaker and Cooper's approach as an elaboration of Jenkins' work because it builds on it and is aimed at demarcating clearly different social processes that take place in and around 'identity'. In doing this, Brubaker and Cooper also aim to circumvent vague and confusing descriptions of identity. They focus especially on the idioms used in previous theories, which they find inadequate most of the time. They take identity theory to another level by suggesting that it may be better to reject the term 'identity' altogether. Their idea is to use three different clusters of meanings of identity instead.

## 2. The dynamics of identity

As identity is a concept that stands for complex and various processes, it is useful to see how dynamics of identity work. Only then can we make clear distinctions between identity's different meanings. A first step in understanding processes of identity is to look at how human beings deal with their social surroundings, including people and objects. Jenkins focuses on the processual character of identity and stresses that the processes of identity construction, which he calls identification, should be at the heart of the analysis. According to him, the concept of identity must always be seen as a process whereby human beings and their experiences, during their interaction with their social surroundings, are the core of identification processes. Only then can the concept of identity be used in a practical way. Jenkins' theory demonstrates how a processual approach to identity can be combined with descriptions of observable manifestation of identity. In other words, a strong point of Jenkins' theory is that it allows for including the postmodernist idea of fluid identities, but all the while it keeps linking this fluidity to observable manifestations of identification processes and the influence of (ever-changing) external circumstances.

Jenkins starts with explaining that 'having an identity' is a natural consequence of the way human beings' minds work. In our contemporary world, all people are expected to *have* an identity. Verkuyten also referred to this. This attitude towards our social surroundings is a reflection of human nature's inclination to categorize the world, to map the social surroundings in understandable, graspable images and concepts. Classifying people and things, and giving them certain labels is a basic need for human beings. Without classifying and categorizing their surroundings, human beings could not make any sense of the world we live in. Jenkins writes:

"Identity is a matter of knowing who's who (without which we can't know what's what). It is the systematic establishment and signification, between individuals, between collectivities, and between individuals and collectivities, of relationships of similarity and difference...Identity is our understanding of who we are and of who other people are, and, reciprocally, other people's understanding of themselves and of others (which include us). The outcome of agreement and disagreement, at least in principle always negotiable, identity is not fixed" (Jenkins 2004: 5).

Verkuyten links identity to human inclination to classify and categorize as well. He argues that human beings have three basic needs, which lie

at the basis of the production of identities: the need to organize and give meaning to their social surroundings, the need to obtain social recognition and validation, and the need to bond with others (Verkuyten 1999: 24-25). Verkuyten adds the important statement that the categorizations people make do not inform us about the meanings and values attributed to these categories.

“Membership to a category of people *is* a social identity. It indicates one’s social position, nothing more, nothing less. This does not say anything about social meanings and implications of that social membership, about whose view counts when making category divisions [between groups of people], or about what one emotionally feels regarding one’s social identity” (ibid: 24).

So, if human beings need to categorize their world, what then are the criteria for making these different categories? Differences and similarities and more importantly, how people perceive things to be different or similar, are key elements in the creation of categories. The perception of similarities and differences is crucial in the construction of categories and identities. The creation of boundaries between categories is thus a logical result of the creation of categories. Identity is thus not only about making a mental map of our surroundings and putting labels on the different categories invented. The meanings and values attributed to these categories and labels are important in understanding the social significance of identity as well.

Identity is for a great deal a matter of perception of similarities and differences. Since we can only speak of similarities and differences in (knowing) the presence of ‘others’, it is only through interaction with ‘others’ that identities come to life. This is why Jenkins suggests that we should speak of an identification process, rather than just identity. The term ‘identification’ points more directly and is semantically closer to the processual mode of the constructions of identity and the importance of interaction, than the substantive noun ‘identity’ (Jenkins 2004: 5). This means, that “identity can *only* be understood as process, as ‘being’, or ‘becoming’. This also means that identity is flexible. Jenkins remarks:

“As social scientists, therefore, keen to avoid reification, we should probably only ever talk about ‘identification’.... For sociological purposes identification can be defined minimally as the ways in which individuals and collectivities are distinguished in their social relations with other individuals and collectivities” (Jenkins 2004: 5).

'Identity' is not a static thing, but a process. Jenkins explains why it is important to make a clearer definition of identity and points out in what direction we should be thinking:

"Too much contemporary writing about identity treats it as *something* that simply *is*. This pays insufficient attention to how identity 'works' or 'is worked', to process and reflexivity, to the social construction of identity in interaction and institutionally. Understanding these processes is central to the understanding of identity. Indeed, identity can *only* be understood as process, as 'being' or 'becoming'. One's identity – one's identities, indeed, for who we are is always singular *and* plural – is never a final or settled matter" (Jenkins 2004: 5).

In line with Jenkins' observations, I use the concept of identity only in the sense of a process of identification. The term stands for a process of identification, a process whereby individuals identify with or separate themselves from others on an individual or collective level. Exploring how these two levels interact and influence each other, leads to the core of how identification works in general.

#### *Individual and collective identification*

Individual and collective identification processes cannot be separated. They are in fact interwoven and affect each other. Both identification processes can only come into being in interaction. However, individual and collective identification processes each have their own typical features and originate from different circumstances. In the following, I present Jenkins' explanation of individual and collective identification processes and how these two processes are always interconnected.

Jenkins states that the primary individual identity of human beings comes into being in the interaction between selfhood and the "internalized attitudes of significant others." According to him, individual identity is mainly based on human beings' earliest childhood experiences. In the socialization process in the early years of life, primary identities such as human-ness (in contrast to animal-ness), selfhood (personality), gender, kinship, and ethnicity, are established and are more robust, stable, and resilient to change later in life than other identities (Jenkins 2004: 19). As a result of this, people are aware of or have a basic sense of where they belong: they are part of this family, which has a specific joint history with other families; they have this gender, etc. The formation of these identities takes place in the interaction between an individual and his or her nearest social surroundings.

But, Jenkins remarks, the story does not end here. An identity is not simply expressed or articulated towards the outside world. The outside world has to accept and validate it, before one's identity can really be established. In other words, besides what we think of ourselves, what others think of us is equally important in the construction of an identity. Although some may deny it, what others think of us matters, also in the way we identify with others or not. Thus, self-image (what we think of ourselves) and public image (what others think of us) are an ongoing dialectic in identification processes. In turn, what we think of others also affects them. For example, when someone is constantly labelled as Dutch, although the person in question does not define himself as Dutch, this labelling process will have an impact on that person's identification processes.

Following from this distinction between self-image and public image, we must also make a distinction between the label of an identity and the meaning it has for the bearer of this identity label. This is another complicating factor in identification processes. When two people identify themselves as Dutch, this may mean something totally different to each of them. Although the name is the same, the experience of this Dutchness may be completely different for both. Jenkins calls this a nominal and a virtual identity:

"It is possible for individuals to share the same nominal identity and for that to mean different things to them in practise, to have different consequences for their lives, or for them to 'do' or 'be' it differently...The name [of an identity] can stay the same – 'X' – while what it means in everyday life to be an 'X' can change dramatically. Similarly, the experience [of being an 'X'] can stay relatively stable while the name changes. Both can change" (Jenkins 2004: 22).

Instead of nominal and virtual experiences of identity, Verkuyten speaks of objective and subjective identity experiences:

"The experience of a social identity cannot be deduced from a categorical membership. The personal interpretation can differ from what is socially defined... Great difference in identity experience may exist between people who count themselves as members of the same group" (ibid: 39).

This distinction is important because it points to the impact power structures (can) have on identification processes. Calling someone 'Dutch' does not immediately imply that other people will also label this person as



Dutch or that the person in question thinks of himself or herself as 'Dutch'. Labelling others with a certain identity does not automatically mean that they 'internalize' this label and identity, or, in other words, also identify themselves with this label (Jenkins 2004: 76). Additionally, if they do not think of themselves as 'Dutch', the meaning and significance this label has for them might differ greatly from what the person who labelled them had in mind. So, the nominal identity is not always the same as the virtual identity.

The force of labelling becomes significantly more important in the case of difference in power. When state institutions consistently categorize and label a group of citizens as 'X', and the state decides that all 'X-s' are entitled to social services or access to certain resources, it is clear that labelling by state institutions can have important consequences. In this case, when a state institution labels a group of people as 'X', it is obvious that allocation of that specific identity has concrete consequences for those people. Verkuyten explains how the Dutch government's social benefit policies are based on making distinctions between different categories of people. This division helps the state to legitimize that certain people, belonging to a particular category, get certain benefits, and others do not (Verkuyten 1999: 25).

Identification can in this sense become a political tool in supporting a group's specific interests: for example to gain access to social services, benefits, and acquire the right to establish schools or political parties. For this collective identity to be articulated successfully and to be accepted, a believable and convincing representation of a group's distinct identity is needed. This often depends on access to tools to claim this identity and make this claim legitimate. However, identity labels can also be resisted or rejected. Again, it depends on the kinds of resources available to a particular group whether they are successful in rejecting a specific identity label. Resisting the imposition of labels can be difficult if a group has no access to resources to resist the label distributed by a more powerful majority.

On the collective level of identification processes internal-external dynamics are at work as well. Internalization of a particular collective identity is not automatically identical to how a group is identified by others externally. Collective identities can be constructed from an insider or outsider perspective, meaning that for example, a group of people might consider itself to constitute 'a group', while outsiders might not consider these people as 'a group'. Insider and outsider perspectives might suggest that there are two types of collectivities: one that is constructed through a joint, collective identification with a group by the group members themselves, and a group that is constructed through the eyes of 'observers', which the group

members themselves may not be aware of (Jenkins 2004: 80-81). Hence, collective identities come in two shapes: a group *for* itself, by which he means a collectivity whose members have declared themselves a group, and a category *in* itself, which is a group that is defined by others (ibid: 21). What has become clear is that self-definition and definition by others, on an individual and a collective level, is an important indication for how people think about what kind of people belong to what kind of groups.

Again, these two processes interact and affect each other. Similar to self-definition and definition by others on an individual level, group identification and categorization have a bearing on each of these processes. For example, a number of people may consider themselves to be part of one group, because they (perceive to) share history, roots and blood bonds and they call themselves X. In Jenkins' terms, they are a "group for itself." Yet, others may define the people of this group differently and call them Y (a category in itself) or this group may not be recognized by outsiders and only exist 'underground'. This may result in tension between those who categorize and those who are categorized. Again, power relations are important in this process of group-identification versus categorization, since power structures determine what definition counts in which context. Jenkins therefore also stresses that:

"[P]roblematizing the group-category distinction also underlines again the centrality of power, and therefore politics, in identity maintenance and change. Asserting, defending, imposing or resisting collective identification are all definitively political" (Jenkins 2004: 21).

Important in determining which point of view becomes the dominant one, are power relations. Power relations often determine whether a label gains recognition among a wider group of people. Jenkins writes:

"Internalisation may occur if an individual is authoritatively labelled within an appropriate institutional setting....The capacity of authoritatively applied identification to constitute or influence individual *experience* affects whether or not individuals internalise the label(s) concerned. This is a matter of whose definition of the situation *counts* (put crudely, power)" (ibid.: 20).

Verkuyten also recognizes the importance of power relations in processes of identification. Especially in the case of collectivities, such as a minority versus a majority, being defined by others becomes increasingly

important. When a minority group is labelled or defined by the majority, this label has a great chance of becoming the standard label for this minority. Even though the minority group prefers to define and present itself in other terms, the definition of the majority probably will remain dominant (Verkuyten 1999: 32-33).

In the previous account, Jenkins already touched on the relation between identification processes on an individual and a collective level. These two levels are difficult to separate, since individuals identify themselves with collectivities most of the time. It is therefore inevitable, when discussing identification processes, to speak of individuals *and* collectivities. If individuals identify with a certain group of people, they do so because of a perception of similarities existing between themselves and this group. Before talking about groups, we must acknowledge that, apparently, a group of people have declared to be a group. Determining what criteria are valid in order to claim membership to a group relies on the perception of similarities, as well as the perception of differences with others/ other groups. Inclusion into one group implies exclusion from another. Similarity evokes difference; assessing similarities entails assessing differences simultaneously. Jenkins says:

“People must have something significant in common – no matter how vague, apparently unimportant or apparently illusory – before we can talk about their membership of a collectivity...To define criteria for membership of any set of objects, is at the same time, also to create a boundary, everything beyond which does not belong...Defining ‘us’ involves defining a range of ‘thems’ also...In the human world similarity and difference are always functions of a point of view: our similarity is their difference and *vice versa*. Similarity and difference reflect each other across a shared boundary. At the boundary we discover what we are and what we are not” (Jenkins 2004: 79).

As we have seen in this section, identification processes cannot be seen separate from power relations between individuals, between groups and between individuals and groups. Identities can be imposed upon people. Imposed identities can be resisted, although it might be hard to reject them totally. Furthermore, when imposed identities evoke negative associations or imagery, this is clearly a negative experience for those who are so labelled. These imposed identity labels are also called stereotypes. Stereotypes can evoke resistance, in different forms. According to Jenkins, individuals or groups can resist negative labels or strive for more positive recog-

inition by means of four different strategies: mobility, assimilation, creativity, or competition (Jenkins 2004: 89). I will come back to the different ways of resisting stereotypes individually and collectively in chapter five. There, I will also elaborate on the consequences of stereotyping and the role of power structures in identification processes.

In brief, Jenkins does not reject the concept 'identity' *per se*, but emphasizes its processual character by promoting the analysis of identification processes rather than 'identity'. He states that in describing identification processes clear and bounded definitions of the concept are needed. This line of thought on how to use the concept of identity and how to define it is very constructive. Brubaker and Cooper present three alternative definitions of 'identity', which may help to avoid confusion and reification regarding analyses of identity processes.

### *Three clusters of identity*

Brubaker and Cooper make a case for avoiding the confusing usages of the term identity. By making clear how 'strong' and 'weak' concepts of identity are often used synonymously, they demonstrate the term's ambiguity and its ineffectiveness. They present three clusters of meanings in order to prevent ambiguity and vagueness when using the term 'identity'. Their proposition is very much in line with Jenkins' ideas, since they all promote an approach to the study of identity in terms that are as clear as and as close to social reality possible.

Furthermore, before introducing their alternatives, Brubaker and Cooper make a distinction between strong and weak concepts of identity. The strong concept of identity considers identity as something that all humans and accordingly all groups, racial, ethnic, political groups, and so on, have. This concept of identity focuses on similarities between people with the same identity and sharp distinctiveness from others. In contrast, weak concepts of identity consider identity as fluid, flexible, multiple, hybrid, fragmented, and so on. These weak concepts of identity, often found in post-modern writings, try so hard to avoid essentialist and 'strong' concepts of identity, that the term often becomes infinitely 'elastic' to such an extent that it cannot be used in any kind of analytical work at all (ibid.: 11). Brubaker and Cooper conclude that the single word 'identity' is overburdened with too much theoretical work. Hence, they suggest that all the different meanings surrounding identity must be untangled and substituted with clearer, unambiguous terms. They suggest three different 'clusters of terms': iden-

tification and categorization; self-understanding and social location, and finally commonality, connectedness, and groupness (ibid.: 14).

By “identification and categorization”, Brubaker and Cooper refer to the process by which people identify, characterize and locate themselves vis-à-vis others, situating themselves in a narrative, or placing themselves in a category, in any kind of context. Self-identification and how one is identified by others, i.e. categorization, can vary from context to context and are therefore situational and contextual (ibid.). In contrast to the term identity, identification forces us to specify who is identifying with what (ibid.: 16). As Jenkins also suggests, instead of focusing on identity as a condition, the use of the term identification emphasizes the processual character of identity and enables one to include in its analysis the role of external factors.<sup>1</sup>

The second cluster uses the terms “self-understanding and social location”, which refer to “‘situated subjectivity’: one’s sense of who one is, of one’s social location, and of how...one is prepared to act” (ibid.: 17). This kind of identity refers to an emotional and cognitive understanding of an individual and his or her position and relations to the outside world. It focuses on “one’s own understanding of who one is” (ibid.: 18). This sense of self can take many forms and self-understanding may change over time, but they can also be stable (ibid.: 17-18). The concept of self-understanding does not include, however, other people’s understandings of an individual, which always have an impact on one’s self-understanding.

Finally, Brubaker and Cooper’s third cluster of terms is ‘commonality, connectedness and groupness’. This cluster, involving collective identification processes, is meant to designate the process whereby individuals express their personal feeling of belonging to a particular group and their feelings of difference or antipathy towards others (ibid.: 19). This feeling of connectedness and groupness shapes personal experiences and can determine social and/ or political action (ibid.: 20). Brubaker and Cooper state that:

“‘[C]ommonality’ denotes the sharing of some common attribute, ‘connectedness’ the relational ties that link people. Neither commonality nor connectedness alone engenders ‘groupness’ - the sense of belonging to a distinctive, bounded, solidary group. But commonality and connectedness together may indeed do so” (ibid).

In conclusion, I think that the concept of identity is still useful to work with, on the condition that the concept is well-defined. Brubaker and

Cooper point out to be aware of the term's ambiguity and its limitations and they propose therefore the usage of alternative terms, so as to avoid confusing and contradictory accounts of what is meant by 'identity'. Their use of an alternative analytical idiom that is sensitive to the multitude of the term's meanings will enable scholars to analyze and describe 'identity' from a perspective that opens up a whole spectrum of social practices that go alongside with and have an impact on identification processes. Combining Jenkins' theory, which describes identification processes in well-demarcated terms and which focuses on the materialization of these processes in social practices, narratives and rituals and customs and so on, with Brubaker and Cooper's alternative idiomatic terms that are sensitive to the complexity of these, helps to provide accounts of identification processes that are transparent and that relate theory to social practice.

In this thesis, I will use Brubaker and Cooper's first cluster 'identification and categorization' as a guideline in the analysis of Dutch-Moroccan youth's identification processes in relation to music. Together with Jenkins' elaboration of 'identity dynamics', the focus of identification processes will be how people locate themselves *vis-à-vis* others, while always including the role of external factors such as processes of categorization by others. In chapter three, Brubaker and Cooper's third cluster, 'commonality, connectedness, and groupness', is rendered central. In particular, it will feature a detailed analysis of how Dutch-Moroccan youth use music and musical events as a mode to construct (temporary) groupness. Chapters four and five revolve around 'identification and categorization' again. Chapter four includes an analysis of the debate on the (in-) compatibility of music and Islam and describes how this debate affects the way Dutch-Moroccan artists are categorized by other Dutch-Moroccans. Chapter five concentrates on how imposed identities and negative associations brought about by processes of categorization affect Dutch-Moroccan rappers and their music.

### **3. Ethnicity**

In studies on identity in post-migration contexts, the concept of ethnicity is regularly used as a guiding principle. Although I do not use ethnicity as a guiding line for this thesis, I use some of the elements of theories on ethnicity, since these apply to social identity in general. As an important aspect of general theories on identification processes, ethnicity is, as such, relevant for my research.

The history of anthropological studies on ethnicity features a heated debate between three different approaches. From an anthropological viewpoint three important paradigms have been applied to ethnicity: primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism. Here, I want to highlight these three important theories on ethnicity briefly and present the most important advantages and weaknesses of ethnicity as a theoretical concept. This review will illustrate how ethnicity is often described as a form of social identity, which relates it to theories I have presented earlier. Therefore, elements of ethnicity theory can be applied to the analysis of other identification processes as well.

Ethnicity has frequently been a starting point for many scholars interested in immigrants and their children in Western Europe and elsewhere. The term ethnic minority, in daily speech, refers to a group of people, often immigrants, having some kind of joint history, often in the form of kinship or country of origin and who follow the same cultural paths, have the same behavioural codes and have a particular outward appearance. This quite straightforward approach to ethnicity has gained much popularity. From a scholarly point of view however, the dynamics of ethnicity and ethnic identification processes are not that simple. Scholars often assume that ethnic identification processes are not so much about the 'cultural stuff' enclosed *in* a group, but more about the perception of similarity and difference and the creation of social boundaries *between* groups. This dynamic is important in *all* identification processes.

Primordialists depart from the assumption that ethnicity is fixed at birth and cannot be changed, lost or transformed. They believe that every human being has primordial attachments that are fixed and rooted in unalterable circumstances (Cornell and Hartmann 1998: 48). These primordial attachments include outward appearance, joint kinship, history, language, religion, culture, and place of birth. The idea is that these primordial attachments are dominant in identification processes, because they are there from the moment we are born. Cornell and Hartmann write:

"They happen to us first, and they happen before we have the opportunity or capacity to make meaningful choices. The ethnic identity created by these elements is therefore incomparably resilient and enduring" (ibid: 49).

Ethnic identity is then considered an assumed given, something that was always there and will always be. The fact that ethnic identity is supposed to be primordial implies the existence of some kind of basic identity.

Primordialism points to the significance of this basic ethnic identity as an inspiration for action, because it considers ethnicity as an identity that is highly emotionally loaded and has its own autonomic power (Cornell and Hartmann 1998: 52; Verkuyten 1999: 51). Ethnicity and the social meanings attributed to it are considered vital in the daily lives of people. However, what if someone is born to parents with different ethnic identities? The idea of primordial ethnic identity then becomes rather elusive. Another weakness of primordialism is that it also implies that human beings attach *most* value to their ethnic identity. This is not always the case. What about religious or other social identities, like class or occupational identities? (Cornell and Hartmann 1998: 50; Verkuyten 1999: 50-51) Other social identities might also serve as motivation for action or receive much commitment. This idea is not accounted for by primordialism. Finally, primordialists reject the idea that ethnic identities can change and vary. Ethnic categories and the feelings and meanings attributed to them, can change over time, which makes the idea of basic ethnic identities quite unsustainable (Cornell and Hartmann 1998: 50).

Few scholars nowadays adhere to primordialism anymore, in the sense that primordialists believe in the existence of a primordial ethnic identity one is born with. However, many scholars still point to the importance of the *idea* of joint history, kinship, culture, language, appearance, and so on, in the construction of ethnic categories (Verkuyten 1999: 51). The primordial ties are a social construct, which are legitimized through a discourse that states that the ethnic ties are primordial. One could indeed argue that primordial ideas human beings have about their own ethnicity, such as the perception of sharing with others history, kinship, language and culture, play a major role in the construction and continuity of ethnic identities. The aim for scholars is, not to try to demarcate and define these 'shared cultural traits', but to clarify how ideas about primordial attachments play a role in the construction of ethnic groups in practice.

Instrumentalists start from the idea that ethnicity is variable and serves as an asset, which can be used in the promotion of certain interests. For instrumentalists, ethnic identities are far from fixed. Individuals are active agents within an ongoing process of using ethnic identities in the promotion of self-interests (Cornell and Hartmann 1998: 59). Ethnicity, in the instrumentalist sense, can also be used as a basis for political mobilization or for claims to certain resources (ibid: 57). Instrumentalists emphasize the utilitarian nature of ethnicity.



Boundary maintenance and group recruitment is a key issue in the instrumentalist approach towards ethnic identification processes. Rather than similarities in history and culture and other features of an ethnic group, inter-ethnic relations determine where the boundaries of the ethnic group are placed. In this sense, shared cultural traits, common knowledge and shared behavioural codes and patterns are to be understood as products of boundary maintenance and group recruitment of an ethnic group. Perceptions of a joint history and a shared culture are not characteristics by which others can define and recognize ethnic groups, but are features of ethnic organization that are used by members of an ethnic group to preserve the continuity of the ethnic group. The 'cultural stuff' is only important when the cultural stuff is made relevant in the boundary construction between different ethnic groups (Eriksen 1993: 39). Ethnic groups are then the result of certain social situations and contexts that either highlight or decrease the salience of ethnic identities in the lives of individuals (Cornell and Hartmann 1998: 60)

According to some, the process of the construction of boundaries between identities of different groups is more important than "the cultural stuff it encloses", which is considered crucial in the primordial approach (Eriksen 1993: 26-27). This implies that ethnic identification processes are not so much the result of similarities between group members and differences between members and non-members, but revolves all around the perception of these differences and similarities. The objective, observable differences between ethnic groups are not what matters in the construction of ethnic categories, but rather the perception of differences lies at the foundation of ethnic identification processes.

Moreover, from an instrumentalist viewpoint, it is possible for members of ethnic groups to decide to (try to) abandon their membership, although in practice this might not happen frequently. This is an important difference between the primordialist and the instrumentalist approach. In the case of conflict or threatening situations, such as civil war and the danger of ethnic cleansing, it could make (more) sense for people to try to lose their membership of a particular ethnic group.

There lies a danger in overemphasizing the importance of certain circumstances in the emergence and continuity of ethnic identities. Instrumentalists cannot account for the resilience of an ethnic identity in cases when this identity is disadvantageous for a particular group, yet continues to be maintained. Another weakness that follows from this is that from an instrumental point of view, ethnicity could theoretically disappear when

there is no political or economic interest to strive for. This is not the case. Ethnic identities are often present and at work and matter a great deal to people, even when there is no clear political or economic interest at hand (Cornell and Hartman 1998: 65). The instrumentalist approach thus helps to understand how and why ethnic identification processes mobilize people under certain circumstances. However, it fails to explain why ethnic identities often remain a resilient force for individuals and a distinctive power, loaded with great emotional weight in their daily lives. In analyzing the driving force behind ethnic identities an instrumentalist approach risks putting too much emphasis on the promotion of certain interests and too little on the active contribution to the shape and form of ethnic identities by group members themselves.

As a response to this, some scholars stress the importance of circumstances in the creation of ethnic interests, but *also* the idea that ethnic identities can emerge out of circumstances, but *without* the intervention of interests (Cornell and Hartmann 1998: 59). This is called a circumstantialist approach. It considers ethnic groups not as fixed entities, which are unchangeable and inflexible for all time. Rather, ethnic groups have permeable and fluid boundaries. For example, it is not hard to imagine that being a member of the Turkish community in the Netherlands in the 1970s required emphasis on different cultural traits and features than it does nowadays. Besides, what it meant to be a member of the Turkish ethnic community in the 1970s differs from its meaning in 2007. Circumstances have changed considerably and certain identity markers have become more important in the boundary construction between the Turkish community and the Dutch one. For example, religion, i.e. Islam, has become far more important in the process of boundary creation, since it has become an important aspect that is considered to distinguish the Turks from the Dutch, whereas in the 1970s this was not as salient and relevant.

A third approach is the constructionist view, which, in a way, combines the instrumentalist and primordial view and also adds some new accents. This approach stresses the processual character of collective identification processes, focussing the analysis on the process of boundary maintenance and group recruitment. The boundaries between groups are produced in transactions and interactions with individuals and collectivities. These boundaries are not fixed, but flexible, situational, and negotiable (Jenkins 2004: 107). Ethnicity often only emerges when there is a social urgency for it. Cornell and Hartmann point to the importance of social relevance for 'ethnic' identities to arise. In their words:

“Ethnic...identities and the groups that carry them change over time as the forces that impinge on them change, and as the claims made by both group members and others change as well. [This constructionist] approach focuses on the ways ethnic...identities are built, rebuilt, and sometimes dismantled over time. It places interaction between circumstances and groups at the heart of these processes. It accepts the fundamental validity of circumstantialism [instrumentalism] while attempting to retain the key insight of primordialism, but it adds to them a large dose of activism: the contribution groups make to creating and shaping their own identities” (Cornell and Hartmann 1998: 72).

Cornell and Hartmann stress that ethnic identities organize social life to a greater or lesser extent (ibid.: 73). The comprehensiveness of ethnic identity, i.e. the extent to which it affects social life and social action, varies. This variation may also exist within one ethnic group. Some members may experience their ethnic identity as a very important element in the organization of their life, while for others this is not the case (ibid.: 76). Over time, however, this may also change.

For constructionists, circumstances are not the *only* driving force behind ethnic identities. Individuals are active contributors to their ethnic, and other social identities as well. Individuals respond to social circumstances and are guided by their own perceptions, positions, and plans (ibid.: 77). In doing so, people often use ‘the raw materials of history, cultural practice, and pre-existing identities to fashion their own distinctive notions of who they are’ (ibid.: 79). Here, we see that notions and perceptions about primordial traits and elements of identity become important in the construction of ethnic identities. The claims people make about their own identities are as important as the circumstances. The interaction between, for example, the claim of being primordially connected and specific political circumstances, such as for example institutional labelling of an ethnic group, are both part of a continuous process. As a result, ethnic identities are fluid and never finished (ibid.: 80).

Claims that legitimize primordial ties are, for example, shared ancestry, shared cultural practice, shared history, and the like. These criteria are not only significant because of their content, but because they draw boundaries between different categories of groups. Meanings and values attributed to identities also play a significant part in claiming an ethnic identity. This may be as simple as the assertion that “we are good people”, but can also be more complex (Cornell and Hartmann 1998: 81-82). In the process of attributing meanings, people are free to interpret their own histories, to resist imposed

labels, to claim a future. Constructionists have an eye for the active contribution of individuals and collectivities to the shaping and construction of their 'own' ethnic identities. From a scholarly point of view, it is interesting to see what kinds of meaning are attributed to ethnic or other social identities in order to gain insight on how these meanings relate to their social context.

As a consequence of the importance of these claims, relations between members of different ethnic groups and relations between members of the same ethnic group are also important in the continuity of an ethnic group. That is to say, from the moment one defines oneself as a member of an ethnic group, other members of the group have the 'right' to judge and evaluate one's behaviour and measure it up to the 'standard of morality and excellence' (Jenkins 98: 2004). This means that opinions, views, and attitudes of members towards co-members have consequences for the person in question, inasmuch as one has to take into account the shared value-orientations of the ethnic group. The interaction between co-members is just as important as the interaction between ethnic members and non-group members and the influence of outside circumstances.

Consequently, and this is also valid for other identification processes, presenting oneself as having a particular ethnic or other social identity is not enough. It must be performed in such a way that co-members accept it. But also, 'others', outsiders, who are not members of this ethnic group, must accept this claim to ethnic identity, if it is to be effective. A successful performance of (ethnic) identity depends on the balance between one's self-definition, one's social or ethnic group and one's co-members' validation or rejection of this ethnic identity.

In sum, the constructionist approach considers neither the circumstances, nor the response actions to these circumstances as the sole producer of ethnic identity (Cornell and Hartmann 1998: 101). Any kind of identity is never the result of a single action of an individual, but always the result of interaction between the individual and the outside world. The creation, expression and performance of all identification processes are always subjected to circumstances and events happening outside the one who is doing the 'identifying'. The discourse on ethnicity bears parallels with that on social identification processes as I described before. Jenkins also points to this in his work, when he states that religious, social, gender, and cultural identification processes generally work in the same manner as ethnic identification (Jenkins 2004: 104-107).

#### 4. Applying identity theory in post-migration context

The volume of texts written on identity has increased in the past decade, since many scholars, journalists and politicians have 'discovered' its relevance in contemporary multicultural societies. According to Lavie and Swedenburg, the presence of non-white immigrants has started to break down the myth of Western culture perceived as a homogeneous, timeless, coherent whole. They state that: "[t]he savage [meaning the unknown foreign stranger, i.e. the immigrant] is no longer out there, but has invaded the 'home' here and had fissured it in the process" (Lavie and Swedenburg 1996: 2). A consequence of these immigration waves from 'the East' into 'the West' is that processes of inclusion and exclusion, and accordingly identification processes, apparently have become more important (ibid.: 3). Globalization and migration flows in many Western European societies have contributed to a growing awareness of the population's heterogeneity and have pointed to the social significance of identification processes of individuals and groups in society.

In the course of time, scholars have thought up numerous concepts to demarcate particular groups living in a post-migration context. The term 'ethnic' has been regularly used in such texts, for example in the combinations ethnic minorities, ethnic communities and new ethnicities (Huq 2006: 37). Since migrant communities are often numerically inferior to the rest of the population, the term 'minority' is often included in the concepts defining these communities. Other terms that regularly turn up are transnational communities, diaspora, migrant communities, and nowadays 'religious group' has also become an identity marker for communities or groups of people in post-migration contexts. As a result, some groups in post-migration contexts are often labelled by a religious identity marker, turning immigrants and their offspring into 'Jews', 'Muslims' or 'Hindus', for example.

New concepts to describe particular identification processes of groups in post-migration contexts have emerged. In academic writings on post-migration identity, concepts used to describe these specific processes are, for example, hybridity (Modood and Werbner 1996), multiple identities, post-migration identity (Baumann and Sunier 1995); sometimes hyphens are used to indicate a double identity (Çağlar 1998; Dibbits 2006). Moreover, in several studies, second-generation migrants are considered to live 'in-between', 'with' or 'in' two cultures, indicating a split cultural position and shifts between the culture of the host country and the culture of the country of origin of their parent(s). This is an assumption that resonates in media reports as well. These studies and reports often suggest that these (young)

people move *from* the cultures of the host country to their parents' culture, which they are assumed to copy uncritically. From a scholarly point of view, this assumption is rather difficult to defend, since it seems to imply that both the host country's culture and the culture of the country of origin are uniform, unchanging and coherent entities. Inasmuch as it is possible to speak of *a culture*, the supposition that these *cultures* are unchanging and static over time cannot be sustained. Such an outlook on identity and culture fails to take into account the complexity and fluidity of identification processes.

Although scholars have been creative in inventing new concepts to describe groups of people in post-migration contexts, the concepts by themselves cannot explain or illuminate the particularities, the specific circumstances and the specific identification processes of that group on an individual or collective level. If we want to study identification processes of individuals and groups in post-migration contexts, the focus should not be on thinking up new concepts defining the boundaries of the group, but the focus should be on thinking up new ways of studying identification processes that occur within this group. We have seen that identification processes are fluid and that they are affected by the views of others and ultimately all these processes are affected by social circumstances that are continuously changing. If one wants to study identification processes of people in a post-migration context, one has to take into account all these factors.

Along these lines, Brubaker suggests that we should not simply assume the presence of ethnic groups, but analyze how ethnic groups *come into being*. The basic analytical category should not be the 'group', but the processes that constitute the feeling of 'groupness'. Brubaker states that we must avoid reification and focus on circumstances that produce 'groupness', instead of assuming the existence of everlasting, bounded groups:

"Shifting attention from groups to groupness, and treating groupness as a variable and contingent rather than fixed and given, allows us to take account of – and, potentially account for – phases of extraordinary cohesion and moments of intensely felt collective solidarity, without implicitly treating high levels of groupness as constant, enduring, or definitionally present. It allows us to treat groupness as an *event*, as something that happens... At the same time it keeps us alert to the possibility that groupness may *not* happen, that high levels of groupness may *fail* to crystallize, despite group-making efforts of ethno-political entrepreneurs, and even in situations of intense elite-level ethno-political conflict" (Brubaker 2004: 12).

In other words, we should not focus on the end-product – ethnic or any kind of social identity, but on the lines along which identification processes happen, or do not happen. If we look at identity not as the end-product that contains some basic markers and key elements, but as a process, we gain more insight into the way this process is influenced by external phenomena, for instance one's definition by others and the impact of social circumstances. This approach allows us to incorporate these other factors, which are equally important in identification processes, such as the self-definition of an individual. Moreover, this approach also allows us to incorporate the process of resistance against imposed identities or external categorization. Individuals and collectivities have the option to decide consciously to resist external categorization. Then, a process of de-identification rather than identification is at hand.

Research on identity in post-migration contexts should not depart from the presupposition that there *is* a certain identity (on an individual or collective level) to begin with, but analyze how experiences and perceptions contribute to the construction of such an identification process linking individuals to an ethnic or any other kind of social group. Brubaker writes that ethnicity – and this is probably valid for other social identities as well – revolves fundamentally around “a way of perceiving, interpreting, and representing the world” (Brubaker 2004: 17). Ethnic or social identities are not “things *in* the world, but perspectives *on* the world” (ibid). Brubaker points strongly towards the importance of studying the personal experiences of individuals in order to see how their experiences in their daily lives contribute to identification processes. Focusing on the experiences and perceptions of individuals allows us to see what kind of ‘cultural artefacts and codes’ are important from the point of view of these individuals. It offers us the possibility to include what elements, artefacts, objects or discourses are important in the individual’s “way of perceiving, interpreting, and representing the world.”

To grasp the complexity of post-migration identification processes and its relationships to wider society, a focus on cultural artefacts and textual representations, such as literature, movies, and music and the daily realities of how these artefacts and representations are used, manifested and lived out, is very useful, since these artefacts and manifestations inform us about experiences from an insider’s point of view (Lavie and Swedenburg 1996: 18), and about a particular “way of perceiving”, as Brubaker states. In line with Jenkins and with his own previous work with Cooper, Brubaker calls for an analysis of identification processes that concentrates on the insider’s

perspective. A study of one's social location and its reflection in cultural artefacts can provide important insights into identification processes of individuals and groups in post-migration contexts.

### *Symbols of identity*

People's thoughts and intentions about identifying themselves with a particular group remain invisible for others to see. Human beings often resort to the use of symbols to make identification processes concrete and articulate them to the outside world. A symbol is a sign, whereby the representation or shape of the sign has no innate relationship with the meaning assigned to it. Symbols are usually things that are not naturally special but are assigned a special and symbolic meaning. For example, a piece of cloth with the horizontal stripes in the colours red, white and blue, i.e. the Dutch flag, has become the symbol of the Dutch nation, because of people's associations with it and the meanings assigned to it.

In daily life, people who feel that they belong to a particular group, and identify themselves with this group, most of the times articulate this not in a literal, verbal way, but in a symbolic way. Doing things in a certain way and the arguments for doing things that specific way become a manifestation of an identification process. For example, dancing in a certain way, visiting music events, listening to a particular kind of music, wearing specific clothes, buying a particular kind of music, behaving in a certain way, are all manifestations and symbolizations of identification processes.

The function of symbols in the context of identification processes is to generate feelings of belonging. Symbols need not always be a marker of cohesion; they can also become markers of disruption and conflict. The power of symbols lies in the fact that they serve as tools to create a (momentary) collectivity, while at the same time symbols are often designed in such a way that they can be assigned various meanings. Jenkins describes this eloquently when he talks of how symbols are important instruments for creating communities:

"Symbolizations of community are umbrellas under which diversity can flourish, masks behind which a considerable degree of heterogeneity is possible. In my terms the mask or umbrella is a *nominal* identification. This is always symbolised: in language, but also potentially in other forms, whether visual, musical or whatever" (Jenkins 2004: 116).



Jenkins underlines how symbols are used to designate a nominal identification, to articulate the 'name' of a particular identification, and not a virtual identification. Symbols thus enable people to articulate a "consistent face to the outside world" (ibid.: 117), while group members amongst themselves might have totally different opinions on what the symbols mean and symbolize. The strength of symbolization is founded in its capability to represent a coherent whole towards the outside world, while at the same time these symbols might represent a group which is "behind the mask of cohesion and unity", highly diverse and heterogeneous.

In order to explain how symbols work as a tool in identification processes, Jenkins relies on Anthony Cohen's argument discussing community as a social construct. Symbolization or symbolizing collectivity through certain activities, such as a shared ritual, a wedding or funeral, a sports team, a yearly municipal festival, etcetera, work both as a way to shape a sense of togetherness and in turn, this togetherness is in itself also a symbolic construct (Jenkins 2004: 112). During symbolic collective events notions of collectivity are mobilized. The people involved in this activity become a group through participation in this activity. As Brubaker says, groupness is an event. A group is temporarily evoked through this event (Brubaker 2004: 10), since the people involved in this event define themselves, although maybe temporarily, as a group. They are then at that time "a group for itself" (Jenkins 2004: 21).

Members of this group may interpret the notion of groupness differently. The notions upon which this group is built and its power to unite, depends upon the capacity of the symbols to "encompass and condense a range of, not necessarily harmonious or congruent, meanings" (Jenkins 2004: 112). It matters to what extent group members perceive these symbols to be representative for their group. This implies that people can have very different notions of what these symbols mean, but still perceive the group to be a coherent whole. The use of symbols, or the engaging in symbolic activities, allows for a varied interpretation of what these symbols exactly mean, but at the same time, these symbols, vague and undefined as they often are, still work as a binding factor between the people involved in these symbolic activities. Again, the creation of a feeling of togetherness among group members can take place, when members perceive the symbol as an expression of this feeling.

Activities that are filled with symbols of collectivity are, for example, weddings, funerals, and other family events, but also soccer matches, local events such as carnival celebrations and many other rituals. Dress, fashion

and language also contain or are symbols of collectivity. All these different symbols can shape collectivities on different levels of society; a family, a group of football-supporters, a municipality, a religious collectivity, an age group (for example, teenagers who speak slang), a social class, a youth culture, etc.

Symbols have 'a group-defining meaning'. Mundane things, which we sometimes take for granted, such as clothing, language, customs, gestures, rituals, hair fashion and colours can all be symbols of identification. Symbols embody in a visible and accessible way the unique character of a group. Symbols are the departing points for group members to experience this uniqueness. At the same time, these same symbols function as a distinction marker between groups (Verkuyten 1999: 78).

The power of using symbols to construct a sense of community or collectivity relates to the fact that there need not be a physical proximity of the members of the group symbolized. Rituals and events where symbolic activities occur are places where members of the same group are also physically in each other's presence. However, symbols can also express collectivity in other spaces where "the rest of the symbolized group" is not physically present, but implicitly present through symbolic expression. According to Jenkins:

"...symbolizations of identification allow us, sociologically and in every day life, to think about and to model – in other words to imagine – collectivities and relations between them. Symbolisation permits the necessary abstraction of individuals and collectivities, and the relationship between them, which is the constitutional basis of the notion of society" (Jenkins 2004: 119).

For example, when two kids in the presence of adults start talking in street language (slang), a language usually not used by adults, they symbolically revitalize and articulate their membership to a youth street culture through using this language. In this sense, symbols are powerful tools to evoke senses of collectivity and in this case, language is used as a symbol of youth culture.

For a long time, scholars have described how youth cultures are particularly creative and innovative in shaping, using and expressing membership to youth cultures symbolically. In the next section, I briefly survey one aspect of this symbolic expression, music, in particular the relationship between (pop) music and youth culture.

## 5. Music, youth culture, and identity

There are numerous arguments for taking a musical approach to studying youth in general and to youth in a post-migration situation in particular. First, music is considered to be an art form and cultural expression that can evoke powerful emotions and memories and is consequently closely related to people's feelings of home, of belonging, of the past and of the future. This ties in with my approach, which focuses on how experiences, discourses and feelings of individuals contribute to their identity construction. When people choose to listen to a certain kind of music, this reveals something about their 'way of perceiving' the world and themselves. Baily and Collyer cite Lomax:

"...the primary effect of music is to give the listener a feeling of security, for it symbolizes the place where he was born, his earliest childhood satisfactions, his religious experience, his pleasure in community doings, his courtship and his work – any or all of these personality shaping experiences" (Lomax 1959 cited in Baily and Collyer 2006: 173).

Secondly, many scholars have attributed to music a central role in identity construction processes. In addition to its emotional power, music is a symbolic tool to be used to include and/ or exclude people. Not only can music create symbolic boundaries between, for instance minority and majority groups, but it can also symbolize divisions existing within minority communities.

In the third place, music can inform us literally and directly about migrants and their offspring's attitudes, feelings, frustrations, and dreams, more than other cultural symbolic phenomena, such as food or fashion, can. Especially the lyrics of music can be studied as concrete and specific signs of their attitudes and positions, because they can tell literal stories about experiences of the singer (Baily and Collyer 2006: 168). The Dutch musicologist Mutsaers states:

"Music is resounding identity. No other form of expression states in such a direct manner...so much about cultures. The musical baggage of immigrants – in immaterial forms such as songs, melodies and rhythms, and in material forms such as music carriers, instruments and written music – and the way they manage this baggage says something about the question whether and how they want to present themselves in changing circumstances" (Mutsaers 1998: 167-181).

In the fourth place, music and its related social activities are probably the primary form of leisure for most young people worldwide. Music is a relatively democratic cultural phenomenon. Music, and particularly pop music, is far-reaching because it is widely available and accessible through radio, television, and the Internet. Youth in particular is involved in consuming and producing pop music (Bennett 2000: 1; Huq 2006: 4, 42; Carrington and Wilson 2006: 65).

Finally, music, as a cultural practice, is very open to influences from outside. It is easily mixed with new and/ or other cultural practices and is consequently able to innovate and as a result, to articulate new identities (Baily and Collyer 2006: 174).

*Music as an object of study: from tribe to youth culture*

Scholars have been studying music for a long time. Theodore Adorno's sociological work on mass culture dating back to the 1930s contributed a great deal to the study of (pop) music. Adorno considered popular media and music products as standard creations, which are basically formulaic and similar. Although through pseudo-individualisation these products seem distinct, they are, in fact, all constructed the same way, according to Adorno (Williams 2001: 7-11). He believed that music, and in particular pop music, is a social medium, which absorbs the social meanings and then articulates them in the form of music. He suggested that music is a reflection of the ideas, conceptions and meanings of the artist, which are in turn heavily influenced by mass culture elements, wrapped up in notes and rhythms, in lyrics and sounds. Adorno's theory assumes a one-to-one relationship between social meanings in every day life and the message conveyed through music.

In 1964, building on Adorno's work, Allan Merriam was one of the first scholars to study and analyze music from an anthropological point of view. His work *The Anthropology of Music* (1964) was mainly concerned with music in social life and broke through the limited musicological method of analyzing music in isolation from its social surroundings (Stokes 1994: 47). A combination of comparative musicology and Merriam's anthropological approach resulted in the emergence of a new discipline, ethnomusicology, whose main aim was, according to Merriam, to attack ethnocentrism and bring out the richness of the music of 'others', referring to musical cultures of non-Western people. This field of study was also stimulated by national folklore movements, which strove for the preservation and dissemination of musical heritage (Williams 2001: 104).

From the 1970s onwards, the study of pop music was often incorporated into research on youth, youth culture and identity from a wide range of scholarly perspectives. A noteworthy idea that stands out in many of these studies is how strongly pop music and identity are interconnected. Many ideas and theories within the study of youth culture, music, and identity derive from the famous work *Resistance through Rituals. Youth Subcultures in Post-War Britain* (1976). Sociologists Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) in Birmingham indicated that there is a connection between certain music styles and subcultures. Their pioneering study explained how British youth subcultures constructed and expressed their identity by means of clothing, lifestyle and music. The post-war period brought about a destruction of traditional social structures of British society: changes in the leisure time structures of youth and modernization and industrialization processes, which resulted in unequal socio-economic developments, caused a large discrepancy between the different social classes *and* between different generations (youth and their parents). The CCCS regarded youth subcultures as 'magic solutions' for the economic and social contradictions experienced by British middle and lower working class youth. Class differences and social inequality were regarded as critical factors in the emergence of youth subcultures (Gazzah 2001: 24-30).

Much of the CCCS's focus lay on how style and 'bricolage' played a role in youth (sub) cultures. In cultural studies, the concept of bricolage refers to a process by which people acquire objects from different social contexts to create a new cultural identity or meaning with it. The CCCS found that subcultures such as the punk movement, used bricolage in a subversive way. Punk culture strived for more individual freedom and was generally anti-authoritarian (Frith 1984: 47). A famous example of bricolage is the punk subculture's use of the safety pin as a form of decoration (on clothes or on the body). In this way, an object that usually possesses one, uncontested meaning in the dominant culture (a safety pin is a kind of utensil) acquired and was assigned a new, subversive meaning. By using the safety pin as a decoration of body or clothing, the punk culture turned a very cheap, trivial utensil into a fashion accessory. In the dominant British middle class culture, accessories are usually expensive and (meant to be) unique. The use of such a trivial device as an accessory mocks its original meaning and purpose and puts forward an individualized statement against the middle class that represents, in the eyes of the punk culture, a materialistic ideology emerging from a society based on industrialization and restriction of its citizens' lifestyles<sup>2</sup> (Hebdige 1979: 84; Abma 1990: 34; Gazzah 2001: 29-30).

Style, including fashion, behaviour, language use, and music, and the bricolage of all of these elements, was considered a form of resistance to the hegemonic ideology of British society. This ideology consisted of the promotion of the nuclear family, as opposed to the extended family that was part of the lower and middle working class ideology, the imposition of media and school systems ruled by the bourgeoisie. By means of deviant styles (in dress, language, behaviour, and musical preferences) British youth tacitly and subtly expressed a dissatisfaction with and resistance to the dominant middle class ideology.

The establishment of a youth culture was regarded by the CCCS as a claim to symbolic space in which the youths could freely express their powerlessness and discontent with the status quo, without interference of parents or authorities. However, due to an exaggerated concentration on these hidden ideologies behind style, the CCCS did not go into the reasons why certain groups used certain kinds of style, fashion, language or music to express this resistance (Bennett and Kahn-Harris 2004: 4-6).

In due course, the CCCS's concept of youth subculture was used as an all-encompassing term for whatever social aspects in the lives of youths were related in one way or another to some kind of music, style, and fashion (Bennett and Kahn-Harris 2004: 1). Critics accused the CCCS of assuming that behind each youth subculture there were latent ideologies of resistance towards the hegemony of British bourgeoisie (Huq 2006: 14). In addition, the CCCS's supposition that youth subcultures comprise a fixed group of people was criticized because it overlooked the possibility of fluidity and turnover of membership (Martin 2004: 30-31). Finally, the CCCS was criticized for attributing too much value to the role of class in the formation process of youth subcultures and neglecting the role of gender and ethnicity for a great deal in the formation of youth subcultures (Huq 2006: 10-13).

After a spate of publications in the 1980s and 1990s on youth and subcultures and the role of style and bricolage still following for a large part the CCCS's track (Hebdige 1979; Thornton 1995; McRobbie 1999), a new wave of studies dealing with the meaning of pop music entered the debate. The ongoing critique on the CCCS eventually resulted in the emergence of new perspectives on youth (sub) cultures, the use of the term subculture gradually being replaced by new terms and concepts. Instigated, among other things, by flows of migrants into Europe, the increasing popularity of African-American and Caribbean music genres in Europe and the US during the 1990s – such as reggae and hip-hop – new interests in the role of ethnic-

ity, race and music in youth culture surfaced (Carrington and Wilson 2004: 71; Huq 2006: 12, 24, 33-38).

In sum, during the 1980s and 1990s, there occurred a shift in the methodology of youth culture studies. The focus shifted from an 'outsider's' perspective that analyzed youth cultures from the outside, with a presupposition of the existence of resistance to political and socio-economic circumstances, with little attention given to discourse of youth themselves about the reasons why they do the things they do, to an 'insider's perspective' that focuses more on the discourses of youth culture participants and their motivations, with an eye for external influences and changing circumstances (Gazzah 2001: 32-34). I take this approach as a starting point for my study as well. By concentrating on the narratives of youth themselves and by participating in musical events, I have tried to take on a veritable insider's perspective, or at least, I have tried to come as close as possible to it.

## **6. Conclusion**

This chapter has presented the theoretical concepts I use throughout the rest of this thesis. This theoretical and abstract discussion is necessary in order to understand the different terms and concepts used in theories on identity and identification. Most importantly, this chapter has explained that identification processes are not one-dimensional, but always occur in interaction. In line with Jenkins, I emphasize that an analytical focus on processes of identification is important. This also implies that in that study, interaction between different groups and individuals as well as the influence of external circumstances must be included. Brubaker and Cooper also stress the processual character of identity. They suggest the rejection of the term identity altogether, because its meaning is too blurred and the term used for too many different things. Instead, they present three clusters that distinguish between three different types of meanings attributed to the concept of identity.

When articulating or expressing identification, human beings often turn to the use of symbols. Symbols are tokens of identification that express to the outside world a sense of cohesion, while they simultaneously serve as a mask behind which a heterogeneous and diverse collection of people resides. Brubaker indicates the importance of experiences and perceptions of people in identification processes and the meanings they carry. When studying identification processes, the focus should not be on the end-product, i.e. the search for some kind of identity, but on the lines along which

identification processes take shape. This allows for an approach that does not assume the presence of fixed groups (and identities) in society, but focuses on experiences of individuals and the role of external circumstances in the emergence of the feeling of belonging to a certain group, i.e. groupness. Music can be a very important symbol of identification and can play a central role in the events that constitute groupness. My study revolves around the meanings that are attributed to and constructed through music genres and musical events and how these genres and events are used in identification processes.

In the next chapter, I present a description of the Dutch-Moroccan musical scene and profiles of the most important musical genres in this scene. From chapter three onwards, detailed ethnographic descriptions and analyses of music and musical activities and their relation to identification processes are rendered central to the argumentation. In the chapters three, four and five I will describe in detail how Dutch-Moroccan youth use music as a tool in identification processes on individual and collective levels.





## 2. An outline of the Dutch-Moroccan music scene

### 1. Mapping out the scene

Ali: "Well, that is not an easy question. Because when somebody asks me that, then I say: I love *all* kinds of music. From world music, but also of course, I love Moroccan music very much...But what I listen to depends on the day, the weather, the time of day. Late at night, for example, I love listening to Umm Kulthum. Yes, but when I am really upbeat, then I can express that by listening to dance music...I also love Cuban Son<sup>1</sup>, Algerian *shaabi*, like Dahmane el Harrachi, Mohamed el Anka, Kamel Messaoudi, and others. But I also like raï, *shaabi* [Moroccan], religious songs, gnawa and Nass el Ghiwan, Jil Jilala. I also visit concerts of Moroccan, Berber, and Arab musicians...I don't really buy that much music, but when I am in Morocco I buy a lot of cassette tapes; in the Netherlands, I only buy a CD when I really want it. I do not download much from the Internet. And I watch the satellite dish [i.e. TV] when I am at my aunt's and there I watch the latest videos, that is why I would love to have a satellite dish as well, so I can watch the music shows and [Arabic] movies."

Dounia: "[I listen to] lots of Arabic music. And also R&B, but not everything [not all R&B], but I prefer Arabic music."

M.G.: "Can you name some names?"

Dounia: "Euh, Egyptian music, for example, and also music from the Middle East. Just, real Saudi, with those sounds in it I like very much. Also, Moroccan music, in particular *shaabi*. That, I like a lot, but not *all shaabi*. And also songs by Umm Kulthum, I find them really beautiful, and also Abdelhalim Hafez. Really, that old style, I love that and I listen to it."

M.G.: "What is in your CD player right now?"

Souad: "*Shaabi*,...Mustapha Bourgogne, Senhaji, Jedwane. Raï is not really my style, although some songs of Khaled and Mami are very good...And I also listen to *sharki* and Berber music, like that song *Lella buya*..."

Fatima: “Yes, *raï* music, I like it. Especially when I was younger, and those were the songs from the mid 1980s and early 1990s,...Cheb Kader and Cheb Khaled. And Cheb Mami of course...Cheba Zahouania, euhh that is one side of it. Lots of old school *raï*. But the past ten years or so, I haven’t listened to it [*raï*] at all. And on the other side, there you have *shaabi*, of course. That is a really famous genre. And because those artists come here to the Netherlands [to perform], then one time you just go to a concert. And here [in the Netherlands] you have, for example, one concert that features four or five different artists at once. There you have Mustapha Bourgogne [a famous *shaabi* artist], whom I love. Euhh, and who else? Najat Aatabou [one of Morocco’s most known female singers], who doesn’t know her? ... And on the other hand, with the rise of satellite dishes and the many Arab videos, Amr Diab has become a real famous one. Amr Diab<sup>2</sup> is, like, the first artist who taught me [some] Arabic language. When I was eleven or so, I did not know much about it...But I also love to listen to blues, soul, especially older soul music by Otis Redding and also Tina Turner, Lionel Richie, and regarding the more recent [soul artists] Norah Jones, I like that really quiet, beautiful music, but also Alicia Keys; a little bit more that R&B style, but it doesn’t have to be all exposed [referring to nudity in video clips].”

Amal: “The kinds of music I listen to are very diverse, but in general it is black music. So, from Sean Paul [hip-hop and dancehall artist from Jamaica] to Umm Kulthum [classical Egyptian singer], you know classical music. And from hip-hop...to euh, ...I also have a Bløf CD [a Dutch pop-rock band who sing in Dutch] and one by the Goo Goo Dolls [American rock band]... if there is passion in it, you know...And recently, in the morning when I wake up, I regularly put on the Qur’an, because I have become a little more spiritual lately. But then again, I also often put on a smash hit, a Moroccan smash hit, or Faudel or Khaled [*raï* artists from France/ Algeria], yeah that wakes me up. Then, I feel, I don’t know, it just gives me a kind of energy.”

From these interview fragments it becomes immediately clear that the ‘average’ Dutch-Moroccan youth listens to a wide variety of musical genres. Without hesitation *shaabi* is played right after 2Pac’s raps. Qur’anic recitations are listened to one morning, while the next morning, Khaled blasts out of the speakers with his pop-*raï* style and rebellious lyrics on alcohol and love. During the holy month of Ramadan, some like to listen to *anasheed*<sup>3</sup> and recitals of Qur’an texts on CD-ROMs, while the other months of the year one listens to Ali B’s raps.<sup>4</sup> Although at first sight, the musical preferences of the Dutch-Moroccan youth I interviewed appear to be an indefinable mish-

mash of genres, I was able to discern some general trends and recurring patterns.

The musical genres that play a central role in the narratives and the events of Dutch-Moroccan youth can be divided into a category of Moroccan or, more generally speaking, Arab music and a category of western pop music. Within the category of Arab music it is mainly Moroccan *shaabi*, raï music, Moroccan Berber music (called *amazigh*), and Middle Eastern music (*sharki*) that are well liked. Within the category of American music it is contemporary urban music, or so-called 'black music' such as R&B (including a range of subgenres like New Jack Swing, Soul, and Nu Soul), hip-hop (rap), and mainstream pop music dominating the Dutch charts.

In this section, I present a short review of the emergence and development of the Dutch-Moroccan music scene. The term 'Dutch-Moroccan musical scene' or 'Dutch-Moroccan musical events' in this thesis refers to events aimed particularly at a Dutch-Moroccan audience, but also refers to events that are not specifically aimed at them, but nevertheless attract a relatively large Dutch-Moroccan audience. After that, in section two, I describe the profiles of the most important genres.

Today's Dutch-Moroccan musical and cultural scene is built on the foundations of this circuit that goes back to the late 1980s when some small organizations, such as the PMJU (Platform Moroccan Youth Utrecht) and the Amsterdam youth centre *Argan* started to organize musical festivals and other activities dedicated to Moroccan (and Berber) music (Bousetta 1996: 186). In the early 1990s, raï music was becoming increasingly popular internationally, due to the success of the Algerian raï singer Khaled, and gradually spread from the Maghreb to Europe. In the Netherlands, raï music first and foremost found a fan base among the Dutch-Moroccan community. This resulted in the creation of several raï music bands and acts, some of which eventually became very successful in the Netherlands, such as Raïland, Nou-joum Raï, and Cheb Ashraf. It was at this time that the so-called raï parties, often day-time parties, became very popular and were organized all over the Netherlands.

However, since the late 1990s, the international hype around raï music settled down and gradually disappeared, while other musical genres pushed themselves to the foreground. Two important organizations emerged in the late 1990s: one commercial company from Waalwijk, and one non-profit organization, supported by the Dutch government and other sponsors, from Amsterdam, specialized in the production and promotion of Moroccan musical events and artists. These two organizations, which start-

ed out very small, producing one or two events yearly, have developed into major institutions organizing several bigger events yearly. They have also inspired others to copy some of their events and ultimately gave the Dutch-Moroccan musical scene a large boost.

In addition to these two major players, there are numerous smaller organizations set up by Dutch-Moroccans, which produce events targeting a Dutch-Moroccan audience. Some of them are merely short-term associations, meaning that these organizations are created especially for the production of one specific event, while others are able to survive for a longer period of time. Not only Dutch-Moroccans themselves are involved in the production of the scene, several Dutch (pop) music venues and professional bureaus occasionally arrange events, for example concerts of famous Arab or Moroccan artists, such as Paradiso and Melkweg in Amsterdam, Rasa in Utrecht, 013 in Tilburg and the Amsterdam Concert Hall.

The presence of these major and minor organizations guarantees the continuity of the scene. Whereas at the outset, in the 1980s and 1990s, events aimed at attracting Dutch-Moroccans occurred only once or twice every year, nowadays events take place at a much higher frequency, in the major Dutch cities and elsewhere. During the cultural season of 2004-2005, I have counted approximately 50 events aimed at attracting a (predominantly) Dutch-Moroccan audience taking place all over the Netherlands, yet Amsterdam hosted most of these events.<sup>5</sup>

The Dutch-Moroccan musical scene does not only consist of concert and party organizers, but is also supported by a retail trade of Moroccan and Arab music. The four major Dutch cities, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Utrecht and The Hague have music shops specialized in Arab and/ or Moroccan music. The first Moroccan music shop was established in the 1990s in Utrecht, called *Al Kautar*, and has a predominantly Dutch-Moroccan clientele coming to Utrecht from all over the country to buy its favourite music there. Another important site where Arab and/ or Moroccan music is to be found is in a town called Beverwijk, north of Amsterdam. Here resides the so-called black market, which is a large collection of thousands of stands selling all kinds of goods, from computers to clothes, from furniture to music. Several stands are specialized in Moroccan and Arab music and some of these stands are local divisions of shops located in one of the major cities. In addition, since 2000 an on-line music shop was set up ([www.marocstore.nl](http://www.marocstore.nl)) specialized in Moroccan and Arab music. At present, this on-line shop has added books, DVDs and CD-ROMs to its catalogue.<sup>6</sup>

Undoubtedly, the Internet has enlarged the possibilities for buying and downloading music from all over the world and gives people the opportunity to search for very particular music goods on a global scale. The continuity of the Dutch-Moroccan scene is also supported by numerous websites enabling Dutch-Moroccans to download, share and provide music and video clips. Peer-to-peer programmes such as Kazaa and LimeWire provide the opportunity to share and exchange music and Dutch-Moroccans intensively make use of these kinds of networks.<sup>7</sup> Other sites, such as [www.marokko.nl](http://www.marokko.nl), have several forums where music and events are central topics. For instance, part of the [marokko.nl](http://www.marokko.nl) site is a forum called 'club', which includes topics providing links to sites where specific music can be (freely) downloaded. In addition, many topics on 'club' deal with specific requests of people searching for a special song or album, often responded to by others who have access to that music, sending it to web servers such as [www.yousendit.com](http://www.yousendit.com) or [www.turboupload.com](http://www.turboupload.com) where the files are (temporarily) freely available for download, as most of the music files are too large to send through regular e-mail (Braak 2005: 21-22).

Additionally, sites such as [www.soundclick.com](http://www.soundclick.com) offer (amateur) artists the possibility to make their music on-line accessible and available for others to download onto their computer (after registration). I have come across several Dutch-Moroccan amateur bands, and especially rap crews, who used soundclick to reach a wider audience. Recently, software-company Microsoft offers Internet-users the opportunity to create a 'web space', where Internet-users can build up a profile and add all kinds of personal information including music. These web spaces are often ideal promotion opportunities for starting, new artists. Finally, the YouTube website has become very popular worldwide and serves both as a resource for watching music videos and a platform for amateur artists to put on view their musical qualities. Internet is thus a major factor in the permanence of an on-line, virtual Dutch-Moroccan musical world, which also contributes to the expansion and development of the real, off-line Dutch-Moroccan scene.

Besides a certain branch of the scene dedicated to the production and promotion of Moroccan (Berber) and Arab music, Dutch-Moroccans have increasingly become involved in a range of other musical circuits, such as hip-hop, cross-over pop music and mainstream pop music. Important and innovating actors in the contemporary Dutch-Moroccan music scene are Dutch-Moroccan DJs mixing 'traditional' Moroccan or Arab music with all kinds of other music, creating a whole new kind of dance music. The Dutch-

Moroccan music scene thus does not only revolve around Moroccan or Arab music.

Most prominent and popular music genres among Dutch-Moroccan youth and in the Dutch-Moroccan musical scene are, based on my interview material and observations, in random order, the Egyptian style Arabic pop music (*sharki*), Algerian and Moroccan raï music, Moroccan *shaabi* music, including popular Berber (*Amazigh*) music from Algeria and Morocco such as 'la nouvelle chanson',<sup>8</sup> *rewaffa* and *raï rifi* (all Moroccan genres), and hip-hop and R&B. The next section will provide background information on the most popular genres among Dutch-Moroccan youth, according to the interviewees and based on my personal observations during events. A number of these genres will return in the analyses in the remaining parts of this thesis.

## 2. Popular genres

At present, music consumption and production are dominated by a powerful music industry that uses marketing tools in order to sell music. Marketeers, party and concert organizers, people working in the retail business and journalists alike have been and still are involved in the creation and use of genre labels, either as a marketing strategy or for practical reasons to create order in the chaos and help the 'confused' consumer make a choice. Whether or not we agree with the labels put on certain artists and their music, we must face the fact that these labels are used by consumers and producers when they talk about music.

The construction of music genres is in fact a process of categorization. As I described in chapter one, categories, music genres in this case, are always social constructions based on subjective points of view. Their boundaries are fluid and the categories carry meanings that determine the boundaries between one and the other category. From a musicological point of view it is difficult, but not impossible to define genres on the basis of musical criteria, such as the use of certain instruments, certain rhythm patterns, etc. From a socio-cultural point of view, genres come into being through the meaning assigned to certain kinds of music. The fact that certain genres are discerned, while others are not, can tell us something about the way people view music and its social significance. Boundaries between different genres are always in flux and the labels put on genres by consumers, producers, media and music industry will always be highly contested by other consumers and producers. The genres I discern in the following pro-

files are based on the constructions of the respondents and my observations in music shops and on Internet sites. The categorization of the respondents was often similar to the categorization used in music shops and on Internet sites. Although the demarcation of genres may be interesting from an academic point of view, the consumers', i.e. the respondents' perception of how genres should be demarcated will be my starting point.

### *Shaabi*

The definition of the genre of Moroccan *shaabi* is disputed. First of all, the term *shaabi* in itself is vague. The Arabic word *shaabi* literally means 'of the people' and music referred to as *shaabi* music could be translated as 'popular folk music', but other terms and translations are plausible as well. Yet, translation of the term is not sufficient if we want to know what the label *shaabi* refers to, in the context of music, because what is exactly meant by 'popular, folk music'? In the available literature on Moroccan *shaabi* music, the label *shaabi* stands for more than one genre. In fact, it is regularly used as a catch-all term similar to 'pop' or 'rock' music, and it signifies a wide variety of styles. Hence, different genres go under the same name of *shaabi*.

*The Continuum Encyclopaedia* seems to describe different types of *shaabi* music, although it does not state so explicitly. In fact, the authors describe the different types of *shaabi* as if the genre emerged, developed and transformed from one type of *shaabi* into another. The authors start out explaining *shaabi* as popular Moroccan folk music sung in a Moroccan-Arabic dialect that encompasses symbolic, socially engaged, and sometimes militant messages containing social criticism directed at Morocco's rulers. These texts trace the origin of the *shaabi* genre back to the 1970s when Moroccan bands like Nass el Ghiwan and Jil Jilala emerged in Morocco (Shepherd et al. 2005: 5). The authors consider them as bands that express a great deal of social engagement with Morocco's socio-political and economic situation. Nass el Ghiwan has therefore been called 'The Rolling Stones of Africa'<sup>9</sup> or simply a protest band. Musically speaking, Nass el Ghiwan is inspired by African rhythms and melodies and so-called Gnawa music that is originally associated with the music of the black slaves living in (southern) Morocco (Broughton et al. 2006: 257).

Then Shepherd et al. of *Continuum* move on to another type of *shaabi* music. They stick the label *shaabi* to music made by the Moroccan musicians Abdelhadi Belkhayat (born 1940 in Fez, Morocco) and Abdelwahab Doukkali (date of birth unknown) and others. These artists started out in the 1960s and 1970s in Morocco as musicians who were heavily influenced by contem-



porary Egyptian music artists such as Mohamed Abdelwahab (1910-1991), Farid el Atrache (1914-1974), Umm Kulthum (1900-1975), and Abdelhalim Hafez (1922-1977), and by Algerian *shaabi* artists such as Dahmane el Har-rachi, Ahmed Wahby, and El Hadj Mohammed el Anka. These popular artists represented the mainstream popular music of Egypt and Algeria during the 1960s and 1970s (Shepherd et al. 2005: 65). Due to new technologies, such as gramophone records and cassette tapes and recorders, and the broadcasting of music on the radio and through TV-movies with Egyptian stars in the 1960s and 1970s, music from different regions of the world, and especially Egypt, became much more accessible for audiences in different places. This enabled artists to get acquainted with and let themselves be inspired by other types of music. Moroccan artists like Abdelhadi Belkhatat took elements from both Egyptian and Algerian genres and added some Moroccan flavours to it (Aydoun 2001: 145-146). This type of Moroccan *shaabi* music is characterized by the use of Egyptian rhythms and melodies, North African instruments, especially the *oud*<sup>10</sup> in combination with poetic lyrics in Moroccan-Arabic dialect inspired by and modelled after Moroccan *melhun*.<sup>11</sup>

*The Rough Guide to World Music, Africa and Middle East* (Broughton et al. 2006) makes a distinction between two different types of Moroccan *shaabi*: *al'āita* and roots-fusion. They use the label *al'āita* to indicate the "the oldest of the main chaabi styles, the music of the Arabic-speaking rural populations of Morocco's Atlantic coast" (Broughton et al. 2006: 255). According to *The Rough Guide* this kind of *shaabi* was the predecessor of a style they call "synthetic *al'āita*" featuring 'traditional instruments alongside keyboards, electric guitars and drum machines' that is now most popular in Morocco and emerged when rural populations moved to Morocco's urban areas. *The Rough Guide* mentions Orchestre Jedouane, Senhaji, Khalid Ben-nani, and Moustapha Bourgogne as "the heavy hitters" of this genre. Roots-fusion music is a hybrid genre combining "Berber music with Arab *melhun*, Sufi ritual, Gnawa rhythms, Western pop and rock, reggae, rap and occasionally political lyrics" (ibid.) Key artists in this genre are Nass el Ghiwan, Jil Jillala and they also include Najat Aatabou in the roots-fusion category (ibid.: 257).

Moroccan musicologist Aydoun writes about a contemporary Moroccan urban genre ("la chanson populaire citadine") characterized by its festive character; fast, danceable rhythms and the use of Moroccan instruments, such as the, *oud*, *qamanji* and *derbouka*,<sup>12</sup> as well as Western instruments such as keyboards, guitars and drums, which results in a bombastic mosaic of sounds (Aydoun 2001: 141-141). This urban style *shaabi* is influenced by

several Moroccan genres such as “*al<sup>c</sup>aïta*, *ᶜadbidat rma*, *izlan*...and la tradition gnawa,” and its emergence dates from the 1940s when the cassette and gramophone encouraged new artists to tap into new commercial markets (ibid.: 141-142). *Shaabi* is sung in the Moroccan-Arabic dialect and sometimes in a Berber language. In the past century, the *shaabi* song has broken through regional boundaries and has become a nationally known genre and is considered part of a national Moroccan music culture (ibid.: 143). New means of distribution of music, such as cassette players and radio, instigated the dispersal of the genre throughout Morocco (ibid.) *Shaabi* music is nowadays filled with new mixing techniques and electric instruments. Aydoun stresses that this type of *shaabi* revolves around the festive experience of dancing, singing and being together with friends and family. The primary social context where *shaabi* plays a dominant role is ‘the private party’ (‘la fête privée’) during which the audience can participate in the performance (ibid.: 143). He also emphasizes the randomness of the lyrics and the capability of its performers to improvise lyrics and keep the audience interested by constantly changing melodies, rhythms and lyrics during a performance (ibid.: 141-142). Aydoun concludes that a successful *shaabi* performance depends on the performer’s skill to captivate the audience and secure its participation (ibid.).

A quick analysis of *shaabi* lyrics reveals a set of recurrent themes. First, traditional lyrics describing family celebrations such as weddings or lyrics about harvest celebrations make up a large part of the traditional *shaabi* repertoire. Nowadays, songs dealing with immigration have also become important. For example, many *shaabi* songs that have proved to be very popular outside Morocco are songs about the loss of a loved one, the loved one in many cases being an immigrant. The song *Bladi kif yansak al bal* (roughly translated: ‘My country, how could I forget you?’) by Yahia<sup>13</sup> is about the difficulties of living far away from your native country and is dedicated to “all the [Moroccan] immigrants.” The song glorifies all the beautiful cities and places of Morocco and the singer commemorates the weddings and pleasant times spent there with family and friends. Many *shaabi* artists improvise lyrics during performances, singing about all kinds of topics.

Today, well-known Moroccan artists performing this urban style *shaabi* are, for example, Khalid Bennani, Tahour, Daoudi, Najat Aatabou, Mustapha Bourgogne, and many, many others. In the Netherlands, several bands and little orchestras also perform *shaabi*. Most of these bands consist of Dutch-Moroccan musicians. Ismaïlia is one of the oldest and best-known Dutch-Moroccan *shaabi* bands. Other Dutch-Moroccan bands are Al Kanar

and Anghaam. Note however, that most Dutch-Moroccan *shaabi* bands have a varied and mixed repertoire and are specialized in more than one genre. They often play whatever genre is in demand.

In review, most of the available documents present different definitions of *shaabi*, without clarifying what the definition of *shaabi* music is or how the genre has developed. This may indicate a lack of reliable documents, but it also shows that the definition of genres is always subject to subjective perspectives. Some of the definitions overlap with each other, which explains why some of the descriptions of *shaabi's* origin and history differ greatly. Aydoun, however, presents a rather clear-cut definition of that type of *shaabi* that is central in my research, particularly in chapter three. His definition of the *shaabi* genre seems to describe the genre in the way defined by my respondents. In his definition or demarcation of the Moroccan *shaabi* genre, a couple of elements are central: the use of Arab and Western instruments, the use of the Moroccan-Arabic and Berber language, its improvising and festive character, and the participation of the audience that is captivated by the *shaabi* performer's ability to constantly change rhythm patterns, melodies and song topics. This type of contemporary *shaabi* has Najat Aatabou, Daoudi, Mustapha Bourgogne, and Senhaji as its most famous exponents. This genre is popular among many Dutch-Moroccans. It has a central position in 'Moroccan' family celebrations, such as weddings, and has become a central genre in Dutch-Moroccan musical events as well. Throughout the rest of this thesis, the term *shaabi* refers to Aydoun's definition of the genre.

### *Rai music*

Another popular genre among Dutch-Moroccan youth is *rai* music. *Rai* music is originally an Algerian genre and its name refers to the Arabic word *ray*, meaning, among others, a way of seeing, opinion, view, advice, a will, a judgement. *Rai* is sung in the Algerian-Arabic dialect called *darija*, as opposed to the official standard Arabic used by official institutions. Others, however, state that the genre is labelled *rai* because the word *rai*, usually as a stopgap expression, appears very regularly in the lyrics of the songs (Schade-Poulsen 1999: 14). The language of *rai* songs is often mixed with French and Spanish expressions, and nowadays also English. It is said that the genre obtained the name '*rai*' because people in the region of Oran used to seek advice (*ray*) of a *shikh* expressed in poetry, called *melhun*.

Since there is little documentation on the roots of *rai* it is difficult to specify when exactly *rai* music emerged. Several contesting stories report-

ing on the emergence of *raï* still circulate. In her study *La chanson du raï* (Virolle 1995) Marie Virolle suggests that *raï* music can be traced back to the beginning of the 1900s when shepherds roaming the area of Oran sang songs inspired by old melodies of *melhun*.<sup>14</sup> The emergence of *raï* is usually associated with the start of migration from rural areas into Algerian cities during the 1930s at the time of the world crisis. Yet, according to Schade-Poulsen, other sources seem to indicate that *raï* music dates much further back (Schade-Poulsen 1999: 14). Musically speaking *raï* music has developed from a genre that is based on the use of traditional (North African) instruments in the 1900s, such as a flute and a drum by the *shioukh*, to a genre that implements a wide variety of Western as well as Arab instruments. For example, in modern pop *raï* one hears keyboards and synthesizers next to *derboukas*, *qamanji's*, and *ouds*. *Raï* is musically different from *shaabi*, because of its origins in Algeria, its rhythm patterns, and also its use of language is different, since *raï* music is often sung in the Algerian dialect. *Raï* music is lyrically different from *shaabi* because of the themes of the song lyrics that are often taboo-breaking, since *raï* artists often sing openly about love relations and sex, the use of drugs and social criticism. These are topics that are not meant to be openly discussed in North African or Islamic culture (Gazzah 2001: 72-82).<sup>15</sup>

As a result of the migration of Moroccans and Algerians in the 1970s *raï* music arrived in the Netherlands (Bousetta 1996: 182-194). After that, during the 1980s and 1990s Dutch media increasingly reported on *raï* music, which secured its continuity as a genre in the Netherlands. In the 1980s and especially during the 1990s, *raï* music experienced its most successful years in the Netherlands. *Raï* parties were organized throughout the country, *raï* artists regularly performed here and producers of world music and multicultural festivals started to add *raï* music to their set lists. Also around this time, one of the first Moroccan music shops was established in Utrecht.<sup>16</sup> This shop mainly relied on the sale of *raï* music during its pioneering phase. In addition, several Dutch-Moroccan *raï* bands emerged, of which bands such as *Raïland* and *Noujoum Raï* became quite successful. It was during these days in the late 1990s, that *raï* music experienced the peak of its popularity in the Netherlands, the highlight being in 1996 and 1997 when 'king of *raï*' Khaled performed twice in the Netherlands<sup>17</sup> and numerous media reports on this event appeared in newspapers and were aired on television (Vinckx 1997; RVU 1997; Loladamusica 1997). Between 1996 and 2002, other *raï* artists such as Cheb Mami, Cheba Zahouania, and Faudel performed in

the Netherlands. I attended most of these concerts and observed that the audiences consisted predominantly of Dutch-Moroccan youth.

Yet, from around the year 2000 onward, the hype around raï music started to fade away. The number of raï parties decreased and several Dutch raï bands, such as Noujoum Raï and Railand disappeared from the stage. Dutch media lost its interest in raï music and Khaled's hit *Aïcha* was long forgotten. Even though raï music still enjoys considerable popularity among Dutch-Moroccan youth today, the hype that surrounded raï music in the Netherlands in the 1990s has gradually faded away. Many interviewees, male and female, give an account of how in their teenage years, meaning the late 1990s, they loved raï music, visited concerts of raï artists, bought the newest releases and kept up to date with media publications on raï music.

MG: "Do you still listen a lot to raï music today?"

Ilham: "Euh yeah, but I don't follow it as closely as I used to. I don't buy all the magazines with pictures and photos of raï artists anymore. My musical taste is orientated much broader right now; I listen to *shaabi*, *sharki*, raï and pop music. I used to think Moroccan music was nothing [rubbish]; it was just all a lot a jangling for me. I could not stand listening to it. By now, I have come into contact with all kinds of other Arab genres and I have come to appreciate them much more."

MG: "Coming back to raï music: could you say that you were a big fan of raï but not anymore?"

Dounia: "Yes, that's what I have noticed, yeah. I have noticed that, when I was in high school, especially at that time, I used to listen to it a lot. But not the last couple of years. I still have those tapes from the old days you know, and gosh, to think that I was listening to that!"

Fatima: "In the old days you had Cheb Kader and Cheb Khaled. I was a big fan of them. And Cheb Mami of course, who doesn't know Cheb Mami? Cheb Zahouani, Cheba Zahouania, euh... [so I listened to] a lot of raï music. Lots and lots of old raï music. The past ten years or so, I don't listen to that at all, [I do] not [[listen to] raï really."

The reasons behind the loss of appeal of raï music in the Netherlands are multiple. First of all, when the media lost its interest in raï music, a great stimulus behind the raï music hype vanished. Media hypes are always short-term phenomena. After the novelty of raï music in the Netherlands faded

out and the 'exotic' topic of raï had been exploited by every TV programmes and newspaper, raï music was no longer 'news.' This decline in popularity is also linked up to the core function raï music fulfils. During the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s in Algeria, raï music developed from music played by sheep and goat keepers and later on, by female musicians called *shikhat*<sup>18</sup> during weddings and in cafes and brothels during the 1970s, to a rebellious pop music of the economically and socially marginalized Algerian youth in the 1980s. It ended up as the emblem of second-generation North African immigrants in France (also called *beurs*); symbolizing the fragile balance between perceptions and lifestyles of Western, French culture and North African, Islamic culture. Gross et al. write: "...raï mobilizes a cultural sensibility that is simultaneously Arab, modern, and socially progressive. The secular character of raï lyrics has become another form of ethnic identification, like holidays, cuisine, language and music" (Gross et al. 1992: 14).

Raï music in the Netherlands, either in the form of performances of Algerian artists or productions of Dutch-Moroccan artists, used to fulfil the role of articulating the rebellious and hedonistic ideology of its fan-base, but nowadays its popularity has been overtaken by hip-hop and *shaabi*.<sup>19</sup> Why then, did its popularity decline among its Dutch-Moroccan fans? One reason for the decline of raï's popularity in the Netherlands relates to the rebelliousness of raï music that did not have such an impact here as it did in Algeria. My interviewees pointed out that drinking alcohol, having a boy – or girlfriend and escaping social control are not such urgent issues for them as they probably were for Algerian youth during the 1980s. Raï music was thus not that taboo-breaking for Dutch-Moroccan youth as for Algerian youth. The impact of raï music on Dutch-Moroccan youth was reduced by the fact that some of its lyrical themes were not that relevant and urgent for Dutch-Moroccan youth:

Amal: "Yes, how should I say it? Raï is...it doesn't do much for kids anymore. And hip-hop; our society has become faster, more aggressive, and you have to be able to stick up for yourself, and then there is this rapper who says; 'I am this, I am that, I am the greatest, I am...' And then you can identify yourself with that. We are looking for recognition. And raï, those love songs and that kind of expressing your feelings, that looking for a[an alcoholic]drink. But all of that is already happening. We want heavier shit right now, you know."

Fatima: "You know, back then, back then, when I was younger...look, there is of course the influence of time. You become older and you are allowed to do more. You can do more; at least most people [referring to Dutch-Moroccan youth] have more freedom to do what they want when they become older. And raï music was obviously [important] when you were a teenager, when you're twelve, thirteen, ...fifteen years old. But at a certain moment in time you want more."

Dounia: "...if you watch TMF (Dutch Music television station) these days, all you see is those videos with everything young men want, right? Money, women, cars, what more could you ask for? While raï only sings about problems, haha. Like '*Ma'andi zhar*' (a catchphrase in the raï repertoire meaning 'I am out of luck') and bla bla. And 'I wanna go to Europe', but those people listening to it [raï] are already here [in Europe]!"

Raï music was highly popular during the 1990s, but nowadays most raï music fans have become young adults who only listen to raï music for reasons of nostalgia for those early teenage years, bringing back memories of visiting a raï concert for the first time and having your first 'crush'. Raï music, for most of the interviewees, stands for a phase of life, their teenage years to be exact, from which they have moved on. It refers to the past, more than it does to the present or future of second-generation Dutch-Moroccans.

Teenagers nowadays tend to listen less to raï music than the interviewees in their teens years. From their point of view, topics such as migration and being "home-sick" do not connect to their own experiences. They are already in Europe, migration is not an issue for them, and their relationship to their 'home country' is not as deeply rooted for them as for those whose history of migration lies in a much more recent past. Hip-hop relates much more to teenagers' current experiences, topics such as drugs, sex and the desire to become rich are delivered in rhymes and in a vernacular (American, English or Dutch street slang) that is much closer to them. Probably most Dutch-Moroccan teenagers speak and communicate with peers in Dutch or street slang. Moreover, I assume that raï lyrics in the Algerian or Moroccan-Arabic dialects are not that easily understood, because many Dutch-Moroccan teenagers are not (that) fluent in Moroccan-Arabic.

*Sharki*

A third significant genre is *sharki*. The Arabic word *sharki* in Arabic means literally 'from the east', and in the context of music in the Dutch-Moroccan vernacular, it refers to music coming from Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, or, more in general, the Middle Eastern Arab world. Because of the vast repertoire that is included in the term *sharki*, referring to both classical and popular Middle Eastern music, it is hard to define the genre and its origins. Few studies have dealt specifically with *sharki* music. This is why for this profile of *sharki* music I had to rely on my personal knowledge and information from websites.

When Dutch-Moroccans speak of *sharki* music they mean contemporary pop music from the Middle East, and particularly from Egypt, the cultural and musical centre of the Middle East. Some famous and popular *sharki* artists among Dutch-Moroccan youth are Egyptian singers Amr Diab, Iheb Tauwfiq, Mustapha Qamar, Lebanese diva Diana Haddad, and Egyptian-Moroccan singer Samira Said. Famous classical Egyptian artists such as Umm Kulthum, Mohamed Abdelwahab, and Farid el Atrache are usually also categorized as *sharki*, but are considered more classical than the previously mentioned pop artists. From the two kinds of *sharki* music, the classical and the modern form, the modern form is the most popular one among Dutch-Moroccan youth. Although all of my respondents are familiar with classical *sharki*, mainly Egyptian stars like Umm Kulthum, Mohammed Abdelwahab, Farid el Atrache, and Lebanese diva Fairouz, Dutch-Moroccan youth prefer to listen and particularly dance to modern *sharki* music.

The musical difference between the style of contemporary pop *sharki* and classical *sharki* is quite large. Classical *sharki* music from artists like Umm Kulthum, Adbelhalim Hafez and Farid el Atrache, became very popular in Egypt during the 1930s due to a booming film industry and the production of many musical movies starring actor and singer Adbelhalim and others. In Egypt, the genre as performed by Umm Kulthum, Farid el Atrache, and the like is called *tarab*. *Tarab* stands for an expressive style of music in which a small ensemble of musicians accompanies a solo vocalist. The word *tarab* has several meanings, among others it stands for a secular genre of music made in Near-Eastern Arab cities, it can signify 'art', it can also mean 'the extraordinary state evoked by music', and in a more general sense it means 'enchantment or 'state of ecstasy'(Racy 2003: 5-6). *Tarab* revolves around the interaction between singer and audience. Mass media, urbanization and the invention of new technologies (gramophone records, cassette tapes, radio



and television broadcasts, and film) stimulated the spread and popularity of *tarab* enormously.

Contemporary *sharki* music, in fact the pop music of the Middle East, developed from the mid 1980s in Egypt and is heavily influenced by Egypt's own traditional folk music, classical *sharki*, and Western pop music. Its beats and melodies are often oriental but its arrangements follow the typical Western pop song. The use of instruments like guitar, bass guitar, synthesizers and other electronic instruments dominates a great deal of the repertoire, which enhances its 'Western-like sound'. Yamina remarks:

"And ...Middle Eastern pop music [*sharki*], that is actually just like a Western pop song, only it is mixed with an Arabic flow. It is sung in Arabic but it could have been sung in English just as easily most of the times."

Although, according to Yamina, *sharki* music is just like a Western pop song, it keeps its Arab character by means of its Arabic flow (melody) and its Arabic lyrics.

In Egypt, this style of pop music is called *al-jil*, which means '(new) generation' and its songs are called *aghani shababiyya* ('youth songs') (Shepherd et al. 2005: 198). Famous exponents of *sharki* music are Amr Diab, Iheb Tawfiq, Mustapha Qamr, Nancy Ajram, Nawal Zughbi, and many others.

*Sharki* music mostly finds its way to its Dutch-Moroccan audience through satellite television. Most Middle Eastern countries broadcast their channels over the satellite making it available for TV-audiences resident outside of the Middle East. A great deal of Dutch-Moroccans own satellite dishes in order to watch Moroccan television (RTM and 2M, i.e. Morocco 1 and 2, are the two Moroccan TV channels). With these dishes, however, one has access not only to Moroccan channels, but to other North African, Middle Eastern and Asian channels as well, such as Al Jazira, Iqra (channel from Saudi Arabia broadcasting only on Islamic issues), Egyptian channels such as Nile TV, Nile News, ESC Egypt's state broadcasting, LBC from Lebanon, ANN Arabian News Network broadcasting from the UK, Al Iraqiyya from Iraq, Algerian television, and Tunisia's RTV7. All these channels, with the exception of the news and Qur'anic channels, regularly air *sharki* music, either within the context of music chart programmes, as entertainment or as pause music in between the end and beginning of a programme.

Besides satellite, *sharki* music is also available in some Dutch music stores and in the music stores specialized in Arab music, mostly located in the four Dutch major cities and often established and run by Dutch-Moroc-

cans. Some of this material consists of illegal copies of albums of *sharki* artists. Pirating of music is widespread in the Arab and North African music industry. Moreover, the most probable place where Dutch-Moroccan youth find (illegal copies of) *sharki* music is the Internet. Peer-to-peer programmes such as Kazaa, Napster and LimeWire enable users to exchange and share their music files, which results in wide distribution of the music. In addition, several websites targeted at Dutch-Moroccan youth have dedicated special forums in order to offer visitors the ability to talk about (their favourite) music, which often results in the exchange of links to other websites where you can (legally or illegally) download music. Another option often used is to refer others to sites where users have uploaded their personal music collections for others to download freely. Since most music files are too large to send through email, these sites offer the possibility of exchanging music files without using email. For example sites such as [www.speedyshare.com](http://www.speedyshare.com), [www.rapidshare.com](http://www.rapidshare.com) and [www.yousendit.com](http://www.yousendit.com) enable users to freely upload (and download) files.<sup>20</sup>

*Sharki* music's presence in the Netherlands does not rely on local (Dutch) productions of *sharki* music. Although many of the Dutch-Moroccan orchestras and wedding bands have included *sharki* in their repertoire, I have not come across a band, singer or musician that actively composes or produces (new) *sharki* music in the Netherlands. *Sharki* music is thus predominantly only passively consumed, and hardly actively produced in the Netherlands. Besides, live performances of *sharki* artists are also very rare. A reason for this is that bringing acts in from the Middle East is rather expensive and concert agencies probably doubt whether the costs will be compensated by the revenue and profits of the concert.

### R&B

The preference for American-based styles shows that Dutch-Moroccan youth are also very much grounded in contemporary Dutch music culture, since for most of the time the Dutch charts are dominated by American music. American genres like R&B, hip-hop, and Soul are the preferred genres of a great deal of Dutch-Moroccan youth. Nowadays, these genres are frequently lumped together under the category of 'urban' or 'black' music. In the Netherlands the term 'urban' has become the label for a variety of music genres that are popular among 'urban' multicultural Dutch youth, such as salsa, reggaeton, dancehall, hip-hop, R&B, etc. The term urban comes from the term 'urban culture', a term used in the United States to distinguish between culture and music from the city and from rural areas (country music).<sup>21</sup> In

the United States and the UK over time, the term urban became associated with hip-hop culture, which originally started out in cities; recently the term is used to refer to a wide spectrum of 'black or African-American music' such as hip-hop and R&B. In the Netherlands, the term urban seems to refer to African-American music, but also refers to other music genres liked by Dutch multicultural youth in urban areas. In due time, in the Netherlands, the term urban has become a trendy label, not only for a collection of music genres, but also for a life-style, way of dancing and dressing.

R&B must not be confused with the genre 'rhythm and blues'. Although R&B finds its musical roots in rhythm and blues, the two genre labels are not synonymous. R&B emerged from the American blues and soul music that experienced its heyday during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s in the United States and was popular among Afro-Americans in particular. During the 1980s and 1990s, musicians started to add more disco-like beats and high-tech production elements to the music, making R&B more danceable and modern. They also added stylistic elements taken from other genres, such as funk, hip-hop and soul. The R&B genre developed into a pop-chart genre with slick and polished arrangements, including romantic ballads but also very danceable up-tempo songs. The characteristic of R&B always remained the same, namely soulful vocals. Famous R&B artists from the 1980s and 1990s are Janet Jackson, Whitney Houston and R. Kelly. From the 1990s onwards R&B gradually crossed over to mainstream pop music charts, securing its commercial success. Contemporary R&B artists that have gained worldwide popularity are: Beyonce, Mariah Carey, Usher, Ashanti, Ciara, and Rihanna.

It was during the 1990s that producers Teddy Riley, Babyface and L.A. Reid created a new kind of R&B by adding rap and hip-hop beats to it. This resulted in songs that often incorporated expressive vocals and rap next to each other. On a musical level, electronic samples are used in addition to conventional instruments. This new genre was dubbed new jack swing. During the 1990s, R&B continued to be mixed with other kinds of genres, resulting in new subgenres of R&B. Genres like hip-hop soul emerged, which was grittier and funkier than new jack swing. Famous exponents of hip-hop soul are artists such as Mary J. Blige and Boyz II Men and Blackstreet.<sup>22</sup>

Another R&B genre derives its musical philosophy from the idea that R&B makes too much use of electronic elements and samples, resulting in a total dependency of artists on a production team. Artists like Maxwell, D'Angelo, Angie Scott, Erykah Badu, and Alicia Keys have taken a stand against this over-produced kind of R&B and try to make a purer and cleaner R&B. These artists try to reduce as much as possible the use of electronic and

artificial elements in their music, instead relying on conventional, traditional instruments, like the piano and guitar. This genre is called Nu Soul.<sup>23</sup>

### *Hip-hop*

Hip-hop music is an eclectic type of music, known for its bricolage of sounds and beats, but also for its bricolage of text fragments.<sup>24</sup> Another distinctive feature of hip-hop music is the extensive use of sampling. Hip-hop music often incorporates bits and pieces from different sources, such as songs, films, TV, commercials and street sounds. Originally, hip-hop music comes from the United States, specifically New York. In the 1970s, young African-Americans started rapping, that is talking in a rhythmic and melodic way, over drumbeats. In general, hip-hop fans and experts refer to Kool Herc and Afrika Bambaata as the founders of hip-hop. Hip-hop culture is often considered to have three focal points: music, graffiti art and break-dancing. In daily speech, the term hip-hop often refers to hip-hop music, which is often rap music.

Music critics and fans alike often make a rough distinction between two kinds of hip-hop music, based on lyrical themes. On the one hand there is the materialistic type of hip-hop. To this category belong songs about fast cars, money and jewellery. In this kind of hip-hop, also called 'brag & boast rap' in hip-hop terms, materialism, being rich, or in hip-hop terms 'living large', and also being adored by many women are glorified. The message is that getting rich is an ideal way of life. On the other hand, there exists another kind of hip-hop characterized by political awareness, social engagement and expression of social criticism. This type of hip-hop is often labelled 'message rap.'

Minority groups worldwide have found in message rap a way to articulate their frustration about their (often difficult) position in society. The volume edited by Tony Mitchell *Global Noise. Rap and Hip-Hop outside the USA* (2001) portrays in detail how hip-hop has been appropriated by minority groups worldwide. In general, scholars and music critics agree that what attracts minority groups to hip-hop music is its ability to express dissatisfaction and social engagement.

Hip-hop has been assigned many meanings and functions. Hip-hop has been studied extensively during the past decades, as opposed to music genres from North Africa or the Middle East, and this has resulted in a large reservoir of knowledge about hip-hop. Certainly not all hip-hop scholars agree on what hip-hop *is* and what its social significance is or can be. Since it is not my intention to get into the details of these discussions, I present here

a relatively general and broad profile of hip-hop, which is probably acceptable to many hip-hop scholars and fans alike.

Tricia Rose, an academic expert on hip-hop in the USA, considers hip-hop music to have emerged out of the desire to resist stereotyping experienced by young black people in disadvantaged New York neighbourhoods; and she also relates it to the negative depiction of African-American youth by American press and politics. Rose states that 'increasingly demonic depictions of young inner-city residents' facilitated the emergence of hip-hop.

Craig Watkins pinpoints 1982 as the year when hip-hop's first political song, 'The Message' by Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five, was released. Additionally, Craig Watkins reports of one of hip-hop's founding fathers, Afrikaa Bambaata, who considers hip-hop, besides a source of entertainment and amusement, a force for social change (Watkins 2005: 22).

Best and Kellner describe hip-hop as a historically black cultural expression talking about the oppression and marginal lives of young African-Americans in the USA and which has, ever since its emergence, been linked to groups of young people living in "a spectrum of marginalized situations ranging from racial stereotyping and stigmatizing to struggle for survival in violent ghetto conditions. In this cultural context, rap provides a voice to the voiceless, a form of protest to the oppressed, and a mode of alternative cultural style and identity to the marginalized" (Best and Kellner 1999: 1). So, hip-hop's political and social commitments are deeply rooted in hip-hop culture ever since its emergence.

Bambaataa was the founder of the 'Zulu Nation', a group of "warriors for the community", established to unite marginalized and disadvantage ghetto youth in New York City and to use hip-hop's energy to have a positive effect on African American youth (ibid.: 22-25). However, the works of the Zulu Nation were not positively received by everyone: at times the members of the Zulu Nation were accused of being aggressive and violent. Nowadays, Afrika Bambaataa and his Zulu Nation are still considered signature elements of hip-hop history.

Hip-hop historians often label the first phase of hip-hop culture as 'old school', emphasizing the pioneering character and creative abilities of the first hip-hop DJs and MCs<sup>25</sup> in the 1970s and 1980s, making danceable records with often cheery and positive lyrics. The term 'old school' is also used to refer to hip-hop's so-called 'Golden Age', between 1987 and 1993, when hip-hop productions topped the American and European charts with disco, funk, soul and jazz beats and lyrics glorifying African-American culture, often through light-hearted and optimistic topics on friendship, party-

ing and 'good times' (Watkins 2005: 15). Some of the most prominent artists in this period were, among others, the founders of old school hip-hop Run-DMC and Public Enemy, KRS-One, De la Soul, A Tribe called Quest, and during the 1990s Dr. Dre, Snoop Doggy Dogg and 2Pac.

In the 1990s American hip-hop took another, more aggressive direction with the rise of gangsta-rap (from the word 'gangster'). This subgenre emerged from the 1990s onwards and started in the underground circuit, far away from media attention and corporate influence. As opposed to the cheerful old school rap, youngsters in disadvantaged districts in American cities started rapping in a more profane, explicit, aggressive and angry way about their daily life experiences (ibid.: 45). Gangsta rap eventually did reach the mainstream music scene of America and Europe during the early 1990s with the release of successful songs of artists like NWA (Niggaz with Attitude), 2Pac, Ice Cube, Ice T. and many others (ibid.: 46). This type of hip-hop music is responsible for giving hip-hop a bad reputation, among some people, through its association with angry African-Americans, gangs, misogyny, homophobia, drugs, crime, violence, and poverty, either through the lyrics or through media hypes around the gangsta-rapper's own struggles with the law. A number of gangsta-rappers are known to have criminal records and the American press has regularly spelled these stories out. Among others, 2Pac, Snoop Doggy Dogg, and Ice T. have been in the American headlines concerning their (allegedly) criminal activities, often involving drugs, violence, and sometimes, even shootings.

Yet, not only the rappers themselves, through their personal activities outside of the music industry, caused controversy, but also the lyrics of gangsta-rap frequently reached media headlines. Rap lyrics glorifying violence and the use of drugs have caused a lot of commotion in America and have instigated many to exercise censorship on rap lyrics. A song by NWA released in 1989 called 'F\*ck the police' evoked reactions from US state institutions and even the FBI (Rose 1994: 128). Censorship has always surrounded hip-hop in America due to some of hip-hop lyrics' anti-establishment character, and its profanity, misogyny, anti-Semitism, violence, obscenity and glorification of a gangsta-lifestyle.

Besides gangsta-rap, many music critics identify another, alternative hip-hop subgenre called 'conscious rap' or 'message rap.' This genre is supposed to deal with political issues, express social criticism and to be socially involved. Conscious rap is, according to some people, unlike gangsta-rap, more politically and socially aware. This distinction between non-political/non-social rap and conscious rap is not accepted by all rappers and hip-

hop scholars. Tricia Rose demonstrates how, through the use of hidden transcripts, allegedly non-conscious rappers express a heightened awareness of their political and social surroundings and through these lyrics challenge the status quo (Rose 1994: 99-145). Rappers themselves do not always agree with the label 'conscious rapper' either. African-American Muslim rapper Mos Def rejects the label conscious rapper, because he considers it a marketing tool used by the industry. Besides, Mos Def feels that by accepting this label, he implicitly agrees with the supposition that his colleagues in rap music are not conscious.<sup>26</sup> In chapter five I will elaborate on the analysis of lyrics of Dutch-Moroccan hip-hop, and demonstrate that rap music, which is not represented or labelled as conscious rap, can contain 'conscious' and socially engaged messages as well.

Most recently, roughly from 1998 onwards, hip-hop's most popular exponents are predominantly associated with a 'bling-bling' lifestyle, referring to the fact that in their raps they glorify materialism, and the importance of being rich and the power that comes with the money. Rappers like Fat Joe, Puff Daddy, Outkast, 50Cent, Ja Rule, Jay-Z, and Kanye West are known for their materialistic lyrics and video clips in which they show off their 'bling-bling', a hip-hop term for jewellery, also referring in more general terms to a rich and wealthy lifestyle. This hyper-capitalist 'bling-bling' style is far removed from the more down-to-earth, gritty lyrics of the gangsta-rappers of the early 1990s. Watkins summarizes this style as follows: "The embrace of guns, gangsterism, and ghetto authenticity brought an aura of celebrity and glamour to the grim yet fabulously hyped portraits of ghetto life" (Watkins 2005: 2-3).

Thus, in the 1990s, hip-hop's commercial potential came to its fullest. In and outside of the United States, hip-hop has taken up a firm position in the music charts. Magazines, websites, and TV shows dedicated to hip-hop have been around in Europe and the US. Many hip-hop artists have reached worldwide fame and many hip-hoppers, from the USA and elsewhere, have been awarded prizes. In the global music industry hip-hop is nowadays acknowledged as an important genre due to its immense sales numbers. In the United States, between 1998 and 2000, hip-hop music's market share doubled, while sales numbers of other genres such as rock and pop dropped (Watkins 2005: 34). Hip-hop and rap music have established themselves firmly in the global music industry and in the American popular culture. Many elements from American hip-hop culture, for example its vocabulary, language and fashion, have been incorporated by youth cultures all around the world (Mitchell 2001).

In summary, hip-hop originally emerged from the ghetto districts in New York in the 1970s and was initially and predominantly an expression of the hardships of daily life and at the same time a tool to obtain symbolic prestige and status in a community that was looked down upon by wider society. Marginal youth, ethnicity, race and local, alternative identities played a major role in hip-hop culture in the 1970s and still do (Rose 1994: 34). In the past decades, hip-hop has been frequently associated with negative things and violence. Media attention for this aggressive and often negative type of hip-hop music has overshadowed the fact that other types of hip-hop music are also produced, consumed and developed.

### **3. Categorization of events**

The previous overview of the most popular genres among Dutch-Moroccan youth gives us some insight into what their musical preferences are and it gives us an indication of what kind of music they buy, download and listen to in the privacy of their own house. Yet, it does not inform us about the Dutch-Moroccan musical scene that has evolved from the late 1980s in the Netherlands, in which all these genres play significant roles. The next section expands on how the Dutch-Moroccan music scene is built up, who its most important architects are and what different types of events are prominent in the scene. The eclectic mix of genres that is found in the music collection of many Dutch-Moroccan youth reveals that this group identifies itself musically to many different worlds. Like the musical preferences of Dutch-Moroccan youth, the Dutch-Moroccan musical scene is also a configuration of different events. In fact, since the late 1980s, when the first musical events aimed at Dutch-Moroccan youth took place, the Dutch-Moroccan musical scene has developed into a scene that consists of a wide variety of events. Different types of events emerged in due time and at present we can distinguish between roughly five types of events: a concert, a dance party, a women-only party, a lounge party and a festival. The evolution of this variety of events can be attributed to the influence of both the producers and its audiences. Producers have in due course created new kinds of events, creating more variety in the inclusion of Islamic elements (such as a ban on alcohol or gender segregation), programmes, entry prices, accessibility, catering, and locations/ venues. Obviously, this has implications for the types of audience. Hence, the Dutch-Moroccan musical scene consists of a variety of events.



The character of a specific event and the make-up of its audience are determined by a number of variables or prior conditions. An important variable is the location and the venue where an event takes place. The locations of events are spread across the Netherlands. I visited events in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht, but also in more peripheral places such as Den Bosch, Tilburg, or Nijmegen. The venues varied from open-air locations (usually a public park), to concert halls, sports halls, university canteens, basements, and pop music venues.

Another variable determining the make-up and the number of visitors of an event is the serving of alcohol. Some music organizers choose not to serve alcohol during their events. This applies to the two biggest organizers in the scene. Both organizations have made this choice intentionally. It is common knowledge among Dutch-Moroccan youth that the events of these two organizations are alcohol-free. Other events, especially the open-air festivals and the concerts in concert halls or pop music venues, usually do serve alcohol. Since these events aim to attract large numbers of Dutch visitors as well, the serving of alcohol is maintained.

Another variable employed in the scene is the possibility to limit access to an event to a single gender. A non-profit organization from Amsterdam started to organize events, which are accessible to women only. These women-parties have proven to be very successful and other organizations started organizing them too.

One more variable concerns the starting and closing times of events. Through adjusting these times, organizers can have an influence on the kind of crowd they attract. The women-only parties always start in the early afternoon and end, at the latest, around eight at night. Concerts of singers and artists in a venue like a concert hall usually start at night and may therefore attract different audiences than the women-only parties. In chapter four I return to the issue of the sensibilities surrounding the prior conditions of Moroccan musical events in the Netherlands.

A final and most important variable regards the actual contents of an event, i.e. the programme or the kind of performances and entertainment offered. Obviously, the type of music, the performer, and the musical genres presented during an event, have a great impact on who will visit that specific event. The type of music or the type of performer is often the most important component for people in the process of deciding whether to visit a certain event. Combinations of *all* these different variables have resulted in the categories of events.

### *Types of events*

In the year 2004, I counted fifty events that took place, which means that almost every week some type of Dutch-Moroccan musical event occurred. Here, I do not refer to private events, such as family celebrations. Weddings and other family celebrations are not public events that are accessible for *everyone* and they are not considered to be part of the 'Moroccan dance party category'. This is why I have not included weddings and/or other private events in my analysis of the Dutch-Moroccan musical scene. This does not mean that these private events are irrelevant to the significance and popularity of some genres. Weddings play a major role in the popularity of *shaabi* music among Dutch-Moroccan youth. Chapter three elaborates on this in detail.

Regarding the Dutch-Moroccan musical scene, the Dutch-Moroccan youth I interviewed refer to events that are specifically aimed at Dutch-Moroccan youth with the expression 'Moroccan parties'. However, performances of certain artists in concert halls and a number of (summer and open-air) yearly festivals often also attract large numbers of Dutch-Moroccan youth, as I have witnessed regularly. Although these events are not labelled 'Moroccan parties' by the audience or the organization, these are sites and events where a relatively large part of the audience consists of Dutch-Moroccan young people. I have attended a number of these events as well, as part of my fieldwork.

A first type of event is the (mega) concert. These concerts are usually organized by (semi-) professional agencies, specialized in coordinating events targeted at Dutch-Moroccan youth. The main act usually consists of a performance of one or several Moroccan or Arab artists focusing their repertoire on *shaabi*, *raï*, or *sharki* music. The starting and closing time of these concerts varies. Mega-concerts in sports halls usually start in the late afternoon and end at around midnight. Organizers of concerts in large sporting halls always hire security companies, consisting of a group of well-built men and women dressed in impressive black uniforms and armed with earphones for internal communication. Concerts in theatres or concert halls often start at night and end around eleven o'clock at night. These venues usually do not hire an independent security company.

On the level of production, the major players in this scene are commercially driven, but there are also some non-profit organizations. Concerts that I visited that belong in this category are, among others, a performance of Khaled (*raï* music), a concert of Kabyle singer-song writer Idir (*amazigh* music) and two mega concerts of several Moroccan artists including Najat

Aatabou, Tahour, Senhaji, Rachid Kasmi, Said Mariouari, and Abdelmoula (*shaabi* and Berber music). These kinds of (mega) concerts usually attract large crowds of young Moroccans, sometimes even coming from neighbouring countries such as Belgium and Germany. The location of these concerts differ: they take place in professional pop music venues in the Dutch large cities, but also in venues outside of Randstad,<sup>27</sup> such as large sports halls or multifunctional locations. Depending on the capacity of the venue a concert of several famous Moroccan artists could attract up to five thousand visitors, most of them Dutch-Moroccans. These events are often enhanced with a range of side stalls offering all kinds of Morocco-related goods, such as food, jewellery, books and magazines on Morocco and Islam, and CDs, DVDs, and cassette tapes of Moroccan and Arab artists.

In the past, the serving of alcoholic beverages was rather standard, but after numerous incidents including fights among the crowd, harassment of girls, theft and other violent and criminal acts, a number of organizations decided to prohibit the use of alcohol during their events. Not only did these violent incidents limit the financial revenues of these events, they also gave events and concerts like these a bad reputation. A concert of Khaled in Rotterdam on October 5th, 1998, which I attended, ended with a police intervention after visitors found out the wardrobe was plundered (NRC 1998). Riots broke out and the next day Dutch newspapers and programmes reported on this. This bad reputation still exists, to some extent, among the Dutch and Dutch-Moroccans, as proves the following discussion, which developed on maroc.nl's message board where Nadya reacts to someone's account of a bad experience at a Moroccan dance party:

Eye\_onNadya: "Did you never learn not to go to crap [parties] like this? Save yourself the disappointment. Moroccan parties are nothing. I'd rather go to the Rotterdam Beach Club [famous Rotterdam night club]."<sup>28</sup>

The bad reputation the Dutch-Moroccan scene has, among some people, is the result of events that ended up with police intervention that appear in the news headlines the next day. The number of media reports on riots and theft after or during Moroccan musical events has always been bigger than the amount of reports promoting these events or covering them from a positive point of view. Yet, this does not mean, of course, that visitors and organizers of some of the events are innocent. Some interviewees, especially females, told me about their bad experiences during events often referring to (intoxicated) young Dutch-Moroccan men who cannot keep

their hands to themselves or commit other kinds of sexual harassment. Most of the interviewees blamed alcohol abuse by the visitors for ruining the atmosphere.

One of the pioneers of the Dutch-Moroccan musical scene has also struggled with this bad reputation and the fear of Dutch music organizers to set up a concert attracting large numbers of Dutch-Moroccans. Ahmed reports on his experiences during the first concert he organized in 1996. It was one of the first performances in the Netherlands of the ‘king of rai music’, Khaled, who in 1996 scored a big hit with his single *Aicha*.

“When we started out [in 1996], we were fresh and inexperienced, enthusiastic and not tainted by the opinions of others. So, then we found out that there were lots of problems with Moroccan concerts. The programming, Moroccan artists who did not show up, fights....and we only got to know that when the contract [with Khaled] was signed and in the mail! Haha, so actually, there was no way back. We got so many negative reactions, from all kinds of sides and peoples; we thought: what did we get ourselves into? It was only until that time that we came into contact with [other] Moroccans. Because, actually we did not really know Moroccans, only those Moroccans we met during our 3 week summer holiday in Morocco. [We did not know] those Moroccans in the Netherlands who broke stuff and stole bikes and things like that. So, when we first started out [our production and promotion agency] we noticed how Dutch theatres and concerts halls did not want to have anything to do with that. For example, Khaled performed in Tilburg and that was a big drama. And from 1999, 2000 onward we have at least tried to erase that trauma from their [programme managers of the Dutch theatres, concert halls and pop music venues] minds.”

A second type of event is the dance party that revolves around offering the crowd an opportunity to dance to their favourite music. It regularly involves the performance of one or several DJs specialized in Moroccan and Arab music (and often mixing them with Western urban genres), sometimes enhanced with an occasional live performance. The emphasis of the party is on the opportunity to dance. A variety of organizations, such as student-associations, commercial agencies, and non-profit organizations regularly arrange dance parties. Sometimes a corporation is temporarily set up especially for the coordination of an occasional event.

In the Dutch-Moroccan vocabulary these parties are referred to with the term ‘Moroccan party’ (in Dutch: *Marokkaans feest*). The events are usually located in dance halls, pop music venues, discotheques, youth cen-

tres, neighbourhood centres and attract a number of visitors ranging from approximately thirty to three hundred. These events can be found all over the Netherlands, in smaller towns and in larger urban areas. The serving of alcohol depends on the individual choice of the organization, and usually there is a security company present. The entrance fee is also an important criterion that determines for a large part what kind of crowd will visit the event. A number of interviewees indicated that they expected to experience more trouble (with boys) at parties with low entrance fees (below ten euros) than at parties with high entrance fees. It was assumed that people, i.e. men, who can afford high entrance fees, are less inclined to cause trouble or harass girls. Some party organizations allow girls in for free, in order to avoid that the crowd consists of only males.

I visited a dance party resulting out of collaboration between a student association and a party organizer in March 2004 in Rotterdam, which took place in the basement of a higher education institution building. Several known and unknown DJs specialized in Moroccan music, R&B, hip-hop, dancehall and 2step were programmed to perform. The party started at six in the afternoon and the bar served alcohol. The number of security people almost outnumbered the number of visitors, which I found quite alarming. When I left the party at around 19.30hrs, the visitor number mounted up to approximately one hundred. Girls could enter for free when they came in before 18hrs. Young men were in the majority and males paid ten euros entrance fees. Afterwards, I discovered through the website of one of the organizers that the party had ended prematurely when visitors found out that coats and bags had been stolen from the wardrobe, which resulted in some irregularities.<sup>29</sup> It turned out that the presence of security is not a guarantee for a successful and peaceful night-out.

A third type of event involves the women-only parties (also called *Hafra Annisa*, Arabic for feast for/ of women). These parties, which have become increasingly popular in the past year (2005), are accessible for women only and aimed at a Dutch-Moroccan female audience in particular. These parties often include, besides live performances (for instance of a Moroccan artist or a Dutch-Moroccan *shaabi* band), a DJ playing different music styles, workshops in applying henna, in DJ-ing, hip-hop etc., literature recitals, fashion shows, stand-up comedy or theatre. Yet, music is at the centre of the party, and in my experience the party only really gets started when the main act starts performing (usually a Moroccan *shaabi* artist). Access is restricted to women, but male employees, performers, and sound technicians are allowed.

Women-only parties were at first solely organized by a particular non-profit organization from Amsterdam (whose focal point is to stimulate the Moroccan musical culture in the Netherlands), but nowadays all kinds of other non-commercial organizations have also started to coordinate women-only parties, such as student associations and cultural institutions. The location is usually a pop music venue, a youth or community centre, a university canteen or a rented venue. Here, alcohol is never served. Some organizations hire security. Starting time of the event is always 'early' as these events usually take place during the afternoon.

I visited several women-only events, and what always struck me was that, although the programme of the event is often very varied and diverse (henna or DJ workshop, literature reading, fashion show or something else) it is often the music played by the DJ or the artists that excites the female audience. A women-only event I attended in September 2004 had a varied audience: many veiled Dutch-Moroccan girls between the age of fifteen and thirty, some of whom had brought along their mothers, aunts, cousins, or Dutch girlfriends. Half of the audience was dressed in trendy contemporary fashion; tight jeans worn on the hips, big belts, tight tops, and lots of jewellery. The other half was dressed in an evening gown or in Moroccan dress. A very small group of girls was dressed rather sexily, with revealing décolleté and very tight tops, or dresses. In general, the whole crowd looked very sophisticated and it seemed the motto was 'dress to impress'.

The event was well attended; halfway through the programme the venue was full of women. In a corridor a stand was selling *bstilla*<sup>30</sup> and Moroccan mint tea. In the main hall a female DJ was spinning tunes, ranging from *shaabi*, Berber music and *sharki*. At the beginning, most people had a hesitant attitude and stood waiting at the walls looking at the centre of the (dance) floor. However, as time passed by, more and more girls filled the dance floor, especially when the *shaabi* band started to perform. The whole crowd started dancing intensely, scarves were waved in the air, or were knotted around the hips in order to accentuate the dancing moves, or people were loudly singing along to the songs. There was a great interaction between the band and the audience and this resulted in a very exciting ambience. When the singer of the band urged 'the Moroccans' to cheer, this was reciprocated by a loud cheering '*Magharba, Magharba, Magharba* (Moroccans, Moroccans, Moroccans)'.

I describe the fourth type of events as lounge events. These are characterized by a combination of music, comedy, literature, lectures, drama performance etc. These events do not concentrate exclusively on music

and dance, but encompass other kinds of cultural expressions as well. Usually, musically speaking, lounge events do not limit themselves to only one genre. During lounge events R&B, hip-hop and dancehall naturally flow over in *shaabi*, *raï* and *sharki*. The organization often relies on non-profit organizations, such as student associations, cultural institutions and city and municipality councils. The setting is often the same kind of venue I mentioned for the women-only parties. Usually no alcohol is served.

A fifth type of event includes the festival. There are two kinds of festival: the multicultural summer festival incorporating performances of Moroccan, Arabic, and Egyptian artists, specifically aimed at attracting a Dutch-Moroccan audience; and the genre festival, a festival specialized in a specific musical genre (for example Berber music, *raï*-music, hip-hop, *shaabi*, *sharki*, etc.).

Non-profit festival organizers in cooperation with city councils and government financial support organize multicultural festivals such as *Dunya* in Rotterdam, *Ha-schi-ba* in The Hague, *Mundial* in Tilburg, *Amsterdam Roots*, and the *Nijmegen Summer Feasts*. Multicultural festivals regularly programme Arab or Moroccan music, such as *raï*, *shaabi*, or *sharki*. During multicultural festivals that are also always seeking a Dutch audience, alcohol is usually served. Multicultural festivals most of the time take place in open-air sites.

In the following, I describe my experiences during such a summer festival: a multicultural musical festival in Tilburg, a city in the south of the Netherlands. It was a glorious summer day, that Saturday. The train going in the direction of the city of Tilburg, where the festival *Mundial 2005* was to take place, was filled with festival visitors and football supporters dressed in orange, because the Dutch team was playing a game in Tilburg. The *Leij Park* is situated in the southern part of the city. It is a big city park, with trees, pavements, and sitting areas. At the main entrance, there was an ambience of conviviality.

When I entered the festival terrain, the first thing I heard was Arabic musical sounds. The so-called 'Moroccan yard' was situated at the entrance of the festival terrain. A small stage at the head of the yard featured a three-man Moroccan band. Three ladies were dancing in front of the stage, the rest of the audience was watching. The crowd was mainly Dutch-Moroccan. Around the stage several stands sold music, T-shirts in the colours of the Moroccan flag (green, red), which you could also have printed with your name. This T-shirt stand was very crowded and it sold a lot of green-red T-shirts with printed names of the new owners. At the opposite side a food

stand sold couscous and köfte (a Turkish snack). Next to these stands picnic tables were occupied by people eating and chatting.

When I arrived at the stage, the band started to play a Tunisian song (*Sidi Mansour*) and some people were loudly singing along, much to the appreciation of the singer. The rest of the crowd just stood watching. After this song, the singer asked the audience: do you want to hear *sharki* or *shaabi*? The predominant Dutch-Moroccan crowd clearly called for *shaabi*. The singer decided that it should be *shaabi*. The band set in a slow intro that changes into a mid-tempo song and gradually more and more people started dancing.

Genre festivals take place in pop music venues or youth and community centres and are predominantly aimed at a Dutch-Moroccan audience, since the focus of the programme is put on the artist and the quality of his or her musical performance. The organization of both kinds of festivals is usually in the hands of non-profit organizations, such as student associations, municipalities, cultural associations, and non-profit festival organizers.

The cross section of Dutch-Moroccan youth's musical collection reveals how Dutch-Moroccan youth affiliate themselves with different musical worlds. This is an indication the frames of minds of Dutch-Moroccan go beyond the borders of Dutch society. Going beyond the borders of Dutch society, affiliating themselves to the global musical worlds and youth cultures of the Middle East, Algeria, the United States, and the Netherlands, Dutch-Moroccan youth show that they are able to fuse several identities and configure a new identity: a Dutch-Moroccan identity that is specific to second-generation Moroccans, involving the incorporation and integration of several musical worlds. It demonstrates on the one hand the multiple nature of their identity/ identities through appropriation and adoption of Arab and Moroccan genres, thus constructing clear boundaries between them and 'ordinary' Dutch youth. On the other hand, their appropriation of R&B and hip-hop signifies a solid grounding and integration into the Dutch urban youth culture.

In the next chapter, I discuss the social significance of Moroccan *shaabi* music for Dutch-Moroccan youth. This chapter deals in particular with how *shaabi*, with its festive atmosphere and its association with authentic, traditional Moroccan culture, plays an important role in enabling the visitors to identify with other Dutch-Moroccans.





### 3. **Music, events, and identification processes**

## *Shaabi* and the awakening of Dutch-Moroccanness

#### **Introduction: My experiences at a concert**

It is the day after Christmas, the 26th of December 2004, which is a national holiday in the Netherlands. Thousands of Dutch-Moroccan youth gather in Den Bosch to visit a mega-concert of a number of Moroccan *shaabi* artists and other Moroccan genres. The main acts in the line-up are Tahour (one of Morocco's most famous *shaabi* artists who sings in Moroccan Arabic) and Najat Aatabou (one of Morocco's most famous female *shaabi* artists, who herself is originally Berber speaking, but all her songs are in Moroccan Arabic). Another artist who is meant to attract a great number of visitors is the Berber singer Said Mariouari who, supposedly, performs in the Netherlands for the first time. He sings his *shaabi* songs in the Berber language *tarafit*, the Berber language from the Rif. The doors open at four in the afternoon and the event lasts until eleven in the evening.

The venue is a large sports hall. Stands selling CDs are placed at the rear end of the hall. The stands sell, among other things, 'The best of Shaabi', and albums of Amr Diab (Egyptian pop singer), George Wassouf (*sharki*), and also *raï* music. Upon my asking I learn that they do not sell any music from Dutch-Moroccan artists. Next to the music stand, there is a stand that sells Turkish pizzas, Moroccan mint tea, popcorns, and cans of soda. The food is rather expensive. A Turkish pizza is priced six euro.

The crowd I observe is young and trendy. I roughly estimate the main bulk of the crowd is aged between 18 and 30. I guess that at the peak of the event,

there are about 3000 visitors. I see some girls wearing headscarves, the majority without. Many girls are dressed quite sexy, sometimes I think even a bit tacky. Some girls wear lots of make-up, jewellery, high-heeled shoes, tight tops, and trousers or short skirts, showing their belly buttons. Another part of the female crowd is dressed more conservatively and does not walk around with naked bellies, but is still dressed very hip, in designer trendy clothes. A part of the male audience is dressed in urban, hip-hop style, with lots of baggy clothes, sometimes jogging pants, baseball caps, and sneakers. The majority of the guys are dressed in chic, sophisticated pants, Prada shoes, and Armani shirts, sometimes topped off with leather jackets.

After a period of observation I conclude that the crowd can be categorized in three categories.

The first category is the smallest in number compared to the other categories. A small group of people are constantly present at the front of the stage, with their noses pressed to the stage, not wanting to miss anything of the performance. They dance wildly and cheer loudly whenever a performer appears on stage. This group is caught up in itself and in the performance. The group predominantly consists of girls.

A second category, which is also the lion's share of the crowd, consists of those who are constantly, also during the several performances, interacting with each other. Either they are dancing with each other, facing each other in circles, or they are talking. In this group several couples are forming. They have relatively little attention for the performance, meaning that they do not watch the performance as such, but are inspired by the performance to dance with each other,<sup>1</sup> sometimes even in circles with a large group.

A third category, a relatively smaller number of people, mainly men, is standing at the rear end of the hall. They seem to have no interest in the performances and are more absorbed in talking with each other, drinking and eating, or checking out the girls. Most of these men do not move around a lot, and they seem to be glued to the walls for the rest of the time.

When Said Mariouari appears on stage, a large cheer rises up from the crowd. Mariouari really knows how to get the crowd going. Lots of people are really excited and dance vividly to the rhythms of his music. A small number of die-hard fans sing along to all his songs. Some tough guys jump on each other's

shoulders to rise above the crowd. Lots of people dance in circles with each other. When Mariouari announces that the next song will be *Ga<sup>c</sup> ga<sup>c</sup> Zubeida* the crowd goes mad, as if they have been waiting for that song all the time. During the song, lots of people seem to sing along. After 45 minutes, Mariouari's performance ends.

In between the performances, a DJ spins the records; he only plays Moroccan *shaabi* music, or some *sharki* music. The DJ does not play any 'Western' genres, like hip-hop or R&B. He sticks to Arabic and Moroccan music.

Tahour is received with great enthusiasm and fervour. He starts his performance by reciting a Moroccan-Islamic prayer which is usually pronounced during weddings or other family celebrations. He starts: *Slaw a-sslaam 'ala rasul Allah...* and the audience immediately picks it up and jointly shouts the rest of the prayer. Then Tahour starts singing the song *Baba Bahri*, a traditional song (you could call it a North African evergreen, since this song is also known and loved in Algeria and Tunisia). During the song Tahour praises people, i.e. youth and girls, from different Moroccan regions. Among other things, he sings about people from Casablanca (*Bidawiyya*), Tetouan, Tanger (*Tanja*), Marrakech, and the Rif (*jebellia*). Persons in the crowd who might identify with these regions and places all get their chance to cheer for these regions or places in Morocco and literally express their loyalty to and affection for them. Tahour also sings and dedicates certain songs to Moroccan immigrants living in the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. When the concert progresses Tahour sings increasingly more about 'the Moroccan beauty' in general, in a metaphoric way. Sometimes he refers specifically to Moroccan beauties (Moroccan women, I assume) from Rabat, or other cities. But as he proceeds to the end of his performance, the unity of all Moroccans is stressed more and more, reducing the regional differences existent within Morocco he glorified and referred to before. At the end of his show he emphasizes the unity of *all* Moroccans, no matter where they live.

*Shaabi* music is particularly important in identification processes of Dutch-Moroccan youth. This identification process revolves around creating a connection with other Dutch-Moroccans and a disconnection from the Dutch. Music and musical events function in this identification process as inclusion and/ or exclusion instruments. The genre functions as an important trigger for identifying with other Dutch-Moroccans, both on an individual and a collective level. *Shaabi* music and its attendant events are the key elements in these specific identification processes.

In section one, I will start with an examination of *shaabi*'s position in the Dutch-Moroccan musical circuit, and after that I will give an overview of the meanings assigned to *shaabi* music by the Dutch-Moroccan youth I interviewed. How do they interpret *shaabi* music and its social significance? The associations *shaabi* evokes are intrinsically linked to how they use *shaabi* in their identification processes. In fact, the ways Dutch-Moroccan youth interpret and define *shaabi* are crucial in understanding its pivotal role in the Dutch-Moroccan musical scene.

Section two and its sub-sections present an account of how *shaabi* music functions as a cue for the *individual/ personal* awakening of a Dutch-Moroccan identity. By presenting examples from the biographies of the respondents, I demonstrate the importance of the first acquaintance with *shaabi* music in a social context. The first experience of *shaabi* music for most Dutch-Moroccan youth often occurs during 'a Moroccan wedding' in the Netherlands. The centrality these events have in the initiation of becoming aware of one's Dutch-Moroccan identity corresponds to Brubaker's argument about how (feelings of) groupness often emerges during social events and this groupness should not be considered to be present beforehand.

After that, in section three, looking at Dutch-Moroccan youth and musical events on a collective level, I explain how, in practice, music events build on the personal awakenings, by using the same music as a tool to (re-)create groupness. By taking Moroccan dance parties and concerts as my central focus, I demonstrate how certain behavioural patterns during Dutch-Moroccan events are signs of groupness, a temporary collective identification process, which could be considered a kind of invented tradition. Through the use of *shaabi*, which creates a specific kind of atmosphere, these events are expressions of intensely felt groupness.

## **1. The pivotal position of *shaabi* in the Netherlands**

*Shaabi* music was and still is for the most part the central genre around which many Dutch-Moroccan musical events are constructed. There are several reasons for this. First, originally, *shaabi* was the central genre during the first parties, concerts, and events that were organized for a Dutch-Moroccan audience during the late 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. *Shaabi* was the most obvious choice since most Dutch-Moroccans were already familiar with it through weddings and other family celebrations and it was a genre fairly popular in Morocco itself, which gave it a legitimate status among Dutch-Moroccans as well.

In addition, in order to arrange 'Moroccan weddings' in the Netherlands music bands that could play *shaabi* were required. This stimulated bands to incorporate the *shaabi* genre into their repertoire, which resulted in the existence of many Dutch-Moroccan bands focusing on *shaabi*. Since the wedding circuit is still one of the most important circuits for these bands to make money, most bands kept playing *shaabi* and did not experiment much with other genres. Ismaïllia, established in Utrecht, was one of the first Dutch-Moroccan bands that gained popularity through playing at Moroccan weddings.

Concert and party organizer Jan acknowledges that many bands still specialize in *shaabi*, which makes it the most dominant genre. Ahmed, organizer of one of the pioneer organizations in the Dutch-Moroccan music scene, feels that he is predominantly responsible for making *shaabi* such a central genre in the Dutch-Moroccan music scene. His organization started out organizing events that had *shaabi* music at the centre of their programmes and as a result, according to him, the audiences of his events and others, at the beginning of the emergence of the scene, expected *shaabi* at every event. Although Ahmed is well aware of the fact that Dutch-Moroccans probably listen to very different types of music at home, (see chapter two), during a Dutch-Moroccan music event, the audience is brought up with the idea that *shaabi* has to have a central position. His choice for programming and promoting *shaabi* was not so much based on what he perceived to be the most popular genre among Dutch-Moroccans, but was based on his personal preference. Other concert promoters modelled their events after Ahmed's events and this led to a central position of *shaabi* in the scene. In that sense, Ahmed's organization had a large impact on why *shaabi* music came to be central in the Dutch-Moroccan musical circuit.

Another factor explaining *shaabi's* continued existence in the Netherlands has to do with the presence of several Moroccan music shops in major Dutch cities. These shops predominantly sell Arabic and Moroccan music. A majority of the shelves often contain *shaabi* music. Some of this music is produced in Morocco and exported to Europe. Yet, another part is produced and distributed in Europe, especially in France and Belgium and has found its way to the Netherlands. In addition to retail of *shaabi* music, famous *shaabi* artists regularly perform in the Netherlands. Artists such as Najat Aatabou, Senhaji, or Daoudi usually attract large crowds of young Dutch-Moroccans.

*Dutch-Moroccan youth's readings of shaabi*

Ilham: "I feel Moroccan when I hear this [*shaabi*] music."

*Shaabi's* musical composition, i.e. its danceable beats, and its festive character are the main elements that attract Dutch-Moroccan youth to this music. Most of the interviewees associate *shaabi* with Morocco and traditional Moroccan culture and they consider it to be part of Morocco's cultural heritage. In this sense, *shaabi* music is also implicitly seen as a link to Dutch-Moroccan's parent culture. Many interviewees described the atmosphere during events where they heard *shaabi* music as one filled with nostalgia. A recurrent statement was that *shaabi* music makes you remember the summer holidays in Morocco.

Understanding how Dutch-Moroccan youth view and define *shaabi* and why they think this particular music is popular among many Dutch-Moroccan youths, is crucial for getting to grips with *shaabi's* continued central position in the Dutch-Moroccan musical circuit. Analyzing the interview material indicates a couple of important factors that Dutch-Moroccan youth perceive to be reasons for its popularity among Dutch-Moroccan youth. According to many of the interviewees, an important factor in the popularity of *shaabi* is its musical composition and in particular *shaabi's* danceable beats, which allow for intense dancing in a 'Moroccan way'.

Moreover, the respondents state that, in contrast to other Arab music genres, such as Egyptian popular music, *shaabi* rhythms have North African roots, which is confirmed by a musicological appraisal (Aydoun 2001: 141-143). A DJ who is regularly booked for Moroccan weddings explains *shaabi's* popularity among Dutch-Moroccan youth also in this line of reasoning, by saying that "it is all about the beats of *shaabi*." The DJ concludes that *shaabi's* popularity is related a great deal to its danceable beats.

DJ Hamid: "...I think it [*shaabi's* popularity] has to do with the beat of *shaabi*. *Shaabi* is really simple. Every musician in Morocco who knows a little bit about music and who can play a violin, can play *shaabi*. You have to be talented, you cannot just be a musician, but I think that most people who play *shaabi* are people from the streets. And they have developed [educated] themselves with *bendir* [a kind of North African drum] or violin. And there are certain lyrics in it, easy [lyrics], but as you said, most of them [Dutch-Moroccan youth] do not understand the lyrics anyway. It is dance music. It is music that is played during celebrations, you see that also with these kids aged 13 to 15, they still love

*shaabi*. And if you don't play *shaabi* during a wedding or a birth celebration party, then you have not played any good music."

According to the interviewees, *shaabi's* particular rhythm-patterns allow people to show off their dancing moves. The rhythms are usually called typically Moroccan and are excellent for showing off your (Moroccan) dance moves. Farida explains what happens to her when she hears *shaabi*:

"And *shaabi* at parties is so great. Once you're in it, you're in it. If someone plays *shaabi* at a wedding party, then you just cannot sit still. You just go!"

*Shaabi* music is considered to be dance music before anything else. It is party music; *shaabi* music, dancing, celebrating and being among loved ones and friends are all deeply interconnected in the discourses of Dutch-Moroccan youth on this genre. This is not only the case among Dutch-Moroccan youth, but in Morocco itself as well. Originally in Morocco *shaabi* was and is directly associated with festive culture, in particular with family celebrations like weddings (Aydoun 2001:143).

The interviewees indicate another reason why they love *shaabi*. *Shaabi* is often directly linked to Morocco, with a traditional Moroccan culture, at least in the eyes of the respondents, and implicitly as something that links Dutch-Moroccan youth to their parent culture. Souad states that:

"I think a lot of [Moroccan] people love *shaabi* music, because *shaabi* and Morocco belong together...It is entertainment and entertainment is part of life. It is part of festive occasions, such as weddings. *Shaabi* is part of Moroccan culture."

"...Moroccan *shaabi*, that is just like the atmosphere of Moroccan parties and celebrations. It [reminds me of] partying with everyone." (Chadia)

In the next section, I will go into how *shaabi* functions as a cue for an identification process with other Dutch-Moroccans. Building on my previous account of how *shaabi* is considered to be *the* party music of Morocco and how it is associated with Morocco and traditional Moroccan culture, I show, by means of interview fragments, how the first experience of *shaabi* music in a 'live' social context, such as a wedding, is important in the awakening of a Dutch-Moroccan identity.



## 2. The importance of weddings and getting to know *shaabi*

*Shaabi* plays a significant role in the process of becoming aware of being 'Moroccan' and identifying with other Dutch-Moroccans. By means of focusing on the progressive nature of the identification process, it becomes clear that identity is not something that simply *is* (Jenkins 2001: 5), but is processual, as I described in chapter one. Through analyzing interviews and focussing on specific experiences, I analyze what kind of occurrences and social contexts are important in developing an affective and active affiliation with a particular group. In other words, by concentrating on the biographies of the interviewees, I illustrate what kinds of social cues or what types of life experiences play a key role in the awakening of a process of identification with other Dutch-Moroccans. The first acquaintance with *shaabi* in a social context is crucial in this awakening.

A number of interviewees elaborately told me their story of how they first became familiar with Moroccan music, particularly *shaabi* music. Sometimes this first meeting with *shaabi* music occurred in surprising ways. The first introduction to Moroccan music often happens through family members and the first actual, concrete experience of Moroccan music during a social event is usually a wedding. Almost all interviewees refer to Moroccan weddings as an important reference point in their biographies.

As I described in chapter two, an entire commercial circuit, including shops, websites, wedding bands, catering companies, gift shops etcetera, around the organization and planning of so-called 'Moroccan weddings', has developed in the Netherlands since the 1990s. Many Dutch-Moroccans attach great value to having a wedding according to what they perceive as Moroccan style, including, among others, traditional Moroccan dress, Moroccan food and Moroccan music.<sup>2</sup> It is during these events that most Dutch-Moroccan youth are first introduced to *shaabi* music, either through live performances of a wedding band or through a DJ spinning records. DJ Malika, one of the few female DJs of Moroccan origin, grew up in the east of the Netherlands, in an environment with few other Dutch-Moroccans in her nearest surroundings. At a certain moment in time, especially after she moved to the Utrecht-area, an area with a large Dutch-Moroccan population, she got much more involved and familiar with other Dutch-Moroccans. Moving from Deventer where hardly any Dutch-Moroccans live, to Utrecht, where a large Dutch-Moroccan population lives, clearly also had an impact on Malika's process of becoming aware of her Dutch-Moroccanness. Obviously, social intercourse with other Dutch-Moroccans plays a significant role in this process as well. After her move to Utrecht, Malika started to increas-

ingly visit Moroccan weddings and parties and they started to intrigue her. Especially the music she heard at weddings and other celebrations fascinated her, and tickled her curiosity. As a result, a little later on, she started her personal inquisition into Moroccan music.

“I am from Deventer<sup>3</sup> and so I did not grow up with Moroccans or anything. And when I was eleven we moved to Utrecht. I have always been intrigued by the parties and celebrations we visited, family celebrations and stuff. And I was always interested in Moroccan music, but in Deventer you just could not get your hands on it. And at a certain moment in time, I started to work in my father’s shop during the weekends and little by little I got more and more interested into Moroccan music. And then you learn that it [the Moroccan musical culture] is a whole world of its own. And that is how I got to be where I am now. Through parties and weddings I [first] came into contact with Moroccan music. And so, [at first] I went looking for wedding music, since that was what I had always heard. And also Berber music in my case, because I am Berber. And then later you find out that there is also *shaabi*, *raï*, *gnawa*. I found it all so, how do you say, so spectacular that there existed this whole musical world with all these variations.”

These weddings are special occasions for Dutch-Moroccans, since they provide an excellent opportunity to express and show your dedication to ‘Moroccan traditions’ and to articulate affiliation with the Dutch-Moroccan community. The celebration of ‘Moroccan weddings’ in the Netherlands is, in a way, perceived as a continuation of tradition. It symbolizes a bond with the imagined homeland. Moroccan weddings are opportunities for the articulation of ‘Moroccanness’ within Dutch society at large. In addition to this, Moroccan weddings in the Netherlands, as well as in Morocco, are opportunities for showing off your prosperity and success. The bigger the wedding, the more guests and the more famous the wedding band, the bigger the prestige and status will be for those families organizing the wedding. Fatima explains:

“A wedding is a form of identity, because, of course, you are here in the Netherlands, and if you ask all Moroccan girls in the Netherlands: how would you like to have your weddings? Then they will probably all want to include Moroccan elements, even if it is just a Moroccan dress to wear. And wearing such a dress goes together with Moroccan music. You cannot play piano music or Mozart when you are wearing a *keswa fessia* [a bridal-dress from the

Moroccan town Fès], you know such a triangle-shaped dress. Then you just have to play Moroccan music. And when we are talking about music and identity, then these two things are strongly interconnected. Also at birthday celebrations, it is something you experience. During concerts and stuff, then it is only a matter of having the money to pay the entry price and wanting to spend your money on that and you just need to come from a family who accepts that [going to concerts], since concerts are usually late at night.... Yeah of course, [at weddings] they do spend a lot of money, right? As soon as something is personal, a party or celebration will give you the opportunity to show your friends and family: 'Hey, look at me, I am doing pretty well. Because I can afford this party, and you are welcome as my guest.' You see? Then, I think, that North African character surfaces. Because then you want to show off. Because, if you would organize only a really small, tiny party, then [people will think] you could just as easily not have thrown a party. That is what a lot of [Dutch-Moroccan] people say: 'Well then, just forget about it.'"

In the biography of DJ Said, a Moroccan wedding in the Netherlands played a pivotal role in his DJ-ing career. This DJ only first got to know Moroccan music through a Moroccan wedding in the Netherlands. His story on how he became involved in Moroccan music is quite interesting and very different from Malika's story. Although Said grew up in Morocco and only arrived in the Netherlands at the age of eighteen, he 'really got into Moroccan music' from the moment he attended a Moroccan wedding in the Netherlands:

"Yeah really, actually, I did not find Moroccan music that interesting....I still think Western music is more interesting, but through a wedding I got inspired to choose Moroccan music. There was this wedding [I was supposed to attend] but the band that was booked to perform did not show up. At that time, I was totally into music from the Cape Verde Islands and hip-hop, and then they asked me if I could be the DJ since I had the right equipment for it. I said OK, but then you will have to bring the music, because I do not have any Moroccan music, only one or two CD's, and one of Cheb Khaled because that music is a bit more modern. And so I was the DJ that night and it was great. The atmosphere immediately reminded me of Morocco. Really beautiful! And then to think that when I was still living in Morocco I did not like weddings at all! That's really funny! How that is possible; I don't know..."

Although DJ Said moved away from Morocco and made a conscious choice to distance himself from Moroccan weddings and Moroccan music, he literally says that he did not find Moroccan music that interesting: to his own surprise, upon arrival in the Netherlands he started to enjoy Moroccan music and the social context of a wedding much more than he did when he was still in Morocco. The DJ's experience at a Moroccan wedding in the Netherlands obviously meant something different to him than the Moroccan weddings in Morocco he attended. The atmosphere of the Moroccan wedding in the Netherlands must have triggered other emotions, other thoughts, other associations compared to the weddings *in* Morocco, and most importantly, this experience of a Moroccan wedding in the Netherlands prompted a different identification process. In Morocco, the DJ distinguished himself by stepping out of the mainstream of Moroccan music. He specialized in Western music and World music, i.e. hip-hop and music from the Cape Verde Islands. He brought this musical preference and the associations he attached to this music with him when he migrated to the Netherlands. When he was asked to be the DJ at a Moroccan wedding in the Netherlands, he immediately indicated that he was not 'into' Moroccan music, but only had some CDs of Cheb Khaled, since that music was 'a bit modern', according to him. Thus, he understood and assumed that a Moroccan wedding, also in the Netherlands, must include Moroccan music, such as *shaabi*. When others provided him with the 'right type of music', i.e. *shaabi* music, the DJ could perform at the wedding and immediately came to love the atmosphere, which reminded him of Morocco.

Apparently, it depends on the situation, on the geographical location and on social context, whether the DJ enjoys Moroccan weddings, or not. Being an immigrant living in the Netherlands for just a few years, a Moroccan wedding in the Netherlands made him think of Morocco in ways he never had before. It triggered the awareness that although he was not located *in* Morocco, he still had an affective bond with this country. The DJ's narrative indicates that the atmosphere at that specific wedding was crucial for this to happen. This environment was created through the inclusion of the right combination of people, dress, dance, and music.

The previous interview fragments show that not merely the music itself, but also other external factors, like moving from a small town to a city with a large Dutch-Moroccan population or migrating from Morocco to the Netherlands, affect the process of becoming aware of one's Dutch-Moroccanness. Dounia's initiation into Moroccan music follows a totally different path than that of DJ Said and Malika, and it is also an indication that outside

forces, in this case her mother, can be very significant for the development of a particular identification process. It shows how identification processes do not happen naturally, or are primordially part of someone's body and mind:

MG: "How did you first get to know Moroccan music?"

Dounia: "It is all because of my mother, because she listens to [Moroccan] music a lot. Especially since I was twelve years old, before that I did not have any interest in music at all. But my mom, at one point she was like: 'hey, this is going the wrong way, meaning [that I was] really becoming too Dutch', and she did not like that at all and then she was like: 'hey, I have to pull her back into our culture a bit more.' So, then every time we were watching satellite TV (i.e. Moroccan TV), she told me: 'you sit here and you keep watching.' And I said: 'But mom, I don't understand [the Moroccan language].' And then my mother said: 'listen carefully and then I will translate it for you.' And so it gradually developed until I understood everything better. And then at some moment in time I really started to enjoy it."

Malika, DJ Said and Dounia followed very different routes in their process of becoming aware of being Dutch-Moroccan. Their common denominator is that all three started to enjoy Moroccan music more from the moment they experienced it in a social context that had significant meaning for them: the music came alive through these experiences, as it were. However, the social cues or external forces that initiated the awakening process are very different. In other words, besides experiencing *shaabi* music in a real live social context, such as a wedding, other factors are also important in the activation of an identification process with Dutch-Moroccans. One's topographical location is significant, as well as the attitude of relatives or friends. Socialization with other Dutch-Moroccans is very important. An important moment of socialization with other Dutch-Moroccans is a Moroccan wedding. During these events, many young Dutch-Moroccan adults are initiated into Moroccan music for the first time. Weddings, and their central music genre, *shaabi*, in this way, become a symbol of Dutch-Moroccanness.

The first introduction to Moroccan music, often meaning *shaabi*, and this introduction is an important landmark point. The social contexts within which the first acquaintance takes place are sometimes different; most of the time the first introduction occurs during a wedding, but sometimes also within the privacy of home through family and friends. The first introduction is important because it determines for a great deal how Dutch-Moroccan

youth value Moroccan music. The context within which they first experienced Moroccan music serves as a parameter for how Moroccan music should be experienced. During a wedding Moroccan *shaabi* music has a central role in creating the right festive atmosphere for the celebration. DJ Hamid tells how at weddings he is supposed to play *shaabi* otherwise he will be blamed for not having done a good DJ-ing -job. DJ Said shares DJ Hamid's view:

"...for the Moroccan weddings [in the Netherlands] not much will change. That will always remain the same. *Shaabi* music will stay number one." (DJ Said)

This shows how Moroccan music, *shaabi* in this case, is intrinsically associated with Moroccan weddings and with creating the 'right' atmosphere. This link between *shaabi* and being 'Moroccan' is also clearly explained by Ilham who expressively talks of her experiences during Moroccan weddings:

"Moroccan music has gained more significance for me by now. *Shaabi*, you hear it at weddings, like Daoudi, they always play his music, and it is spontaneous and it makes people happy, everybody will dance to it and know the song. When I hear Moroccan music, I feel completely Moroccan, as if my identity becomes clear through it [the music]."

It seems that before Ilham had experienced *shaabi* music in a social context such as a wedding, *shaabi* did not have as much significance for her. However, after having visited some Moroccan weddings, *shaabi* music started to make more sense to her, as if it came alive through the context of weddings. So now, Ilham has accepted *shaabi* as being part of her identification process with other Dutch-Moroccans. *Shaabi* music enabled her to recognize being similar to other Dutch-Moroccans, since they were, during these weddings, all enjoying, singing and dancing to the same music. In fact, it helped her become aware of her Moroccanness and simultaneously she turned it into a tool to construct her Moroccan identity in a Dutch context. It also demonstrates how an individual identification process is not an isolated trajectory, but is always linked up to a social context. The social experience of *shaabi* music during a Moroccan wedding triggered an individual identification process, which resulted in the use of the genre to articulate an affiliation with and belonging to a group of people (i.e. being Moroccan in the Netherlands).

Interviewee Amal's narrative on her first acquaintance with Moroccan music and her involvement in it is also illuminating. It is an excellent example of how music is not 'naturally' part of someone's identity, but is, in her case, an active work in progress:

MG: "...how did you first get to know Moroccan music? And did you like it immediately?"

Amal: "No, I thought it was so melodramatic....I was of course...I was raised in Wageningen,<sup>4</sup> and I always socialized with Dutch people. So I only knew Count Down<sup>5</sup> and Top of the Pops. And I remember when my sister went to Utrecht to see her cousin, and there you had this music shop, you know: the music shop! [Amal refers to the music shop specialized in Moroccan and Arab music 'Al Kautar'] And then my sister brought back this CD of Cheb Mimoun. Yeah, Cheb Mimoun, I will never forget that, and I remember how she was listening to it at home. And I told her: 'Ooh how melodramatic, she wants to be Moroccan as well. Za<sup>c</sup>ma<sup>6</sup>! You know? Are you being Moroccan by listening to Cheb Mimoun [to her sister]? What about Cheb Mimoun? Yes, we only hung around with the Dutch and...yeah our parents, but...still we were really Dutchified.<sup>7</sup> But at a certain moment in time she started to bring others things home: Cheb Mami and Cheb Mani. And she brought it all back home and, to be honest, I could not get used to it. But then, after a while I entered university in Utrecht myself and I also went to this music shop and then...I also got to know more [Moroccan] girls and stuff, and then at that time I had visited a wedding, and I kind of liked it, this *shaabi* music. I did not know it at all, 'cause we in the Rif<sup>8</sup>, we don't have that. I only knew some Berber music. And so I bought some *shaabi* music [at the music shop], 'cause I went to a wedding and then I started to learn to listen to it. I did not understand it at all! I taught myself to listen to it. And after some time, I switched genres. I started to buy *derbouka*<sup>9</sup> music, just to catch those rhythms. And meanwhile I said to this guy [the music shop salesperson]: 'what are the tapes that sell best right now? I wanted to know what Moroccans were listening to. And there I went: 'Ga<sup>c</sup>Ga<sup>c</sup>Zubeida'<sup>10</sup>. (Amal starts singing the song). It was then that I got to know these kinds of things."

So, in fact the 'discovery' of *shaabi* music triggered Amal's interest in behavioural and consumption patterns of other Dutch-Moroccan youth. Again, similar to Malika's story, moving from a small town with a small Dutch-Moroccan population to Utrecht, a city with a large Dutch-Moroccan population and as a result the increased social interaction with other Dutch-Moroccan youth, was crucial. Getting to know more Dutch-Moroccan peers

often leads to an increase in interest in Moroccan music and its attendant events. This enables a kind of Dutch-Moroccan youth culture to emerge that is the result of the interaction of young Dutch-Moroccans with each other and the creative productions of Moroccan entrepreneurs and concert and party organizers feeding into this increased interest in Moroccan music. Additionally these two trends are both supported and influenced by what is being televised on Moroccan TV, which is available through satellite dishes in many homes of Dutch-Moroccan families.

In most of the interviews, it becomes clear that music has played a significant role in the process of becoming aware of being 'Moroccan': music is used as a tool to confirm one's authenticity or someone's authentic Moroccan identity. After having been introduced to Moroccan *shaabi* music for the first time, or sometimes after renewed acquaintance, many young Dutch-Moroccans embarked on a (further) search for their identity, trying to determine, through listening and exploring Morocco's musical culture, to what extent they identify with this music and make it part of their identification process.

*Shaabi* music functions, often in combination with additional external factors, like moving from a small town to a city, increased socialization with other Dutch-Moroccans and interventions of relatives to prevent becoming Dutchified, as a social cue for the awakening of Dutch-Moroccanness. In other words, for a considerable number of Dutch-Moroccan youth, the experience of *shaabi* music in specific social contexts initiates a certain identification process and prompts, among the interviewees, the recognition of belonging, at least in these social contexts, to a group: Dutch-Moroccans. *Shaabi* music and experiencing it in a social context, like a wedding, lead Dutch-Moroccan youth to become aware of their Dutch-Moroccan background. The public musical events, such as mega-concerts and dance parties, are opportunities to express an internal identification with other Dutch-Moroccans and at these events *shaabi* is used as a symbol for this identification process. Although the reasons for becoming involved in and wanting to get to know more about the Moroccan music culture are various and sometimes very surprising and unexpected, the final outcome of this involvement and incorporation of Moroccan music into their personal life is almost always the same: it triggers an identification process with Dutch-Moroccans, an awakening of Dutch-Moroccanness.

The narratives of respondents on their first experiences with *shaabi* demonstrate how *shaabi* functions as a "situational cue" that activates a particular personal identification process (Brubaker 2002: 163-189). The person-



al narratives and the biographies of my respondents, talking about their first acquaintances with *shaabi* music, illustrate how this music often, but not always, functions as a catalyst for an individual identification process with other Dutch-Moroccan youth living in the Netherlands. This is a process of personal and individual identification, a process of identification that starts internally and has a reflexive character, but is externally expressed and is ultimately aimed at articulating to the outside world someone's affiliation with a certain group. Individual identification processes, in my definition, are foremost a matter of personal reflection on one's social surroundings and revolve not so much around concrete articulation of that identity, but more around the process of becoming psychologically aware of it, usually instigated by specific biographical experiences.

In conclusion, all these individual trajectories of identification processes triggered by music in a specific social context, i.e. weddings ("the social cue") have one thing in common; they serve as frames of reference and are incorporated into one's value system. In addition, all these individual projects of identity are interconnected, because they all occurred, in the first place, from within one and the same socio-political context, i.e. Dutch society. The next section will elaborate on how social, cultural, and political circumstances within Dutch society influence or interact with the way Dutch-Moroccan youth collectively affiliate with certain music through creating specific events.

### **3. An expression of Dutch-Moroccan groupness**

On a collective level, membership to a group can only be achieved by the fact that individual members feel that they share similarities with people whom they consider as members of this group. However, this does not mean that this group is always at any moment in time equally meaningful to its members. The identities that are attached to this group need not be part of the daily routine of its members. Feelings of belonging to a group may be expressed at a certain moment in time, and may be absent at other times. A group can exist or come into being temporarily, for example during an event such as a concert, party or family celebration. This group disappears after the concert, party, or celebration is over: at least the group is no longer physically present in social reality. In the minds of the people who attended that event, however, this group virtually lives on.

Brubaker suggests that we should not talk about groups, but about "groupness as a contextually fluctuating conceptual variable" (Brubaker

2002: 167-168). He explains that shifting the focus from group to groupness allows us to incorporate in our analyses and possibly account for “phases of extraordinary cohesion and moments of intensely felt collective solidarity, without implicitly treating high levels of groupness as constant, enduring or definitionally present. It allows us to treat groupness as an event, as something that ‘happens’...” (ibid.: 168). Brubaker’s concept of “groupness as event” permits relating a temporary identification with a group of people to a specific event and vice versa. It allows for an analysis of events in terms of collective identification processes.

In the analysis of any group, it is important to know how groups come into being. The basic analytical category should not be the ‘group’, but the processes that constitute the feeling of ‘groupness’. Brubaker’s idea of groupness is useful in the analysis of Dutch-Moroccan musical events, because it offers the possibility to focus on what kind of role these events and its central *shaabi* genre play in the collective identification process of Dutch-Moroccan youth who visit these events.

Groupness is a process of identification expressed through a group effort of making symbolic signs, thereby articulating a temporary feeling of belonging to a certain group of people. To what extent are *shaabi* music and events the lines along which an identification process with other Dutch-Moroccan youth develops? I present a number of recurring phenomena I experienced during my numerous visits to Dutch-Moroccan events, which are important in the creation of groupness. By exploring first why Dutch-Moroccan youth visit these events and then contextualizing a number of remarkable behavioural patterns or performances of the audience, I will explain in the following how these events are occasions for expressing groupness.

When asked why Dutch-Moroccan events are popular among a considerable amount of Dutch-Moroccan youth, people give several answers. A reason suggested by some is that Dutch-Moroccan youth, especially men, are discriminated against in regular Dutch nightlife. Dutch media has given substantial attention to discrimination in Dutch nightlife. In the period between the late 1990s until now, reports are regularly published in newspapers and TV programmes about how non-white youth, and especially Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks are refused entrance in clubs, discotheques, and, to other nightlife events. In 2005, *Ethnicity and nightlife* was published, a study on the impact of discrimination and racism on nightlife activities of ‘allochthonous youth’ in the Netherlands. The study concluded, among other things, that Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish youth face the

most problems when going out in regular 'white' Dutch nightlife. Bouncers often refuse Dutch-Moroccans entrance (or anyone they perceive to be Dutch-Moroccan), in particular when they come in a group. The bouncers often say that the reason for refusing them entrance is the bad reputation of Dutch-Moroccan males, who are often accused of sexual harassment regarding women, aggressive attitudes, and uncontrolled, sometimes criminal behaviour when drinking alcohol (Komen and Schram 2005).

During my research the topic of discrimination towards Dutch-Moroccans in nightlife came up only rarely. Few interviewees, including male interviewees, indicate that discrimination in Dutch mainstream nightlife was a reason for them to avoid regular Dutch nightlife and visit Dutch-Moroccan events. Although a few of them acknowledge the possibility of discrimination towards Dutch-Moroccan youth, and in particular towards Dutch-Moroccan boys or young men, as an explanation for the popularity of Dutch-Moroccan musical events, the majority of the interviewees did not mention discrimination as a key factor in either the emergence nor the popularity of Dutch-Moroccan musical events.

An analysis of the behaviour of visitors during these events and their discourses on why they visit them, illustrates how a kind of traditional Moroccan identity is invented and constructed during these events. Through style, the visitors act out their vision of what a traditional authentic Moroccan identity should look like. Most of these events I visited breathe out the desire to 'be in Morocco and feel Moroccan'. Dancing in a way perceived to be typically Moroccan to rhythms of *shaabi* music, and sometimes even dressing in 'traditional Moroccan dress', such as a *qafan* or *takshita*<sup>11</sup> for the women and a *jelleba*<sup>12</sup> for the men, the presence of the famous Moroccan mint tea and the sales stands selling traditional Moroccan jewellery, books on Moroccan history, arts and craftwork, all contribute to an atmosphere filled with nostalgia for Morocco. At some occasions, visitors bring Moroccan flags and use it as a prop of Moroccaness by waving it around during the performance. Finally, the music is of course also an important element in creating the right 'Moroccan' atmosphere. Even though some visitors might never have visited Morocco, all these elements add to constructing a picture of authentic Morocco.

The discourses of the interviewees on their experiences during these events point in the same direction. Many of the interviewees refer to feelings of nostalgia when talking about their visits to these events. Others refer to calling back memories of summer holidays passed in Morocco, about rec-

ollections of weddings of family members in Morocco, about memories of their childhood in Morocco:

Aicha: "Moroccan music, you know it actually creates, even though you are here [in the Netherlands] really far from there [Morocco], you can create that Moroccan vibe. The same for these events, there is Moroccan music being played or performed, it does not matter if you are in Holland or in the United States, so to speak, it is a Moroccan party, there is Moroccan music, and yet you still have that feeling just for a bit that you are in Morocco."

Ilham: "I feel Moroccan when I hear this music."

Zohra: "Well, when I hear *jebbala* music (kind of Berber music from the mountains in the Rif), which is originally from my place of birth ... I think of my family over there, of the weddings in Morocco."

The context of festivity, in the interviews often referred to as 'the atmosphere', is crucial to the events' popularity. The festive atmosphere, as is also experienced during weddings, seems to be an important element in the motivation behind visiting events. In that sense, studying this festivity can inform us about particular ideas, attitudes, and discourses existent among a certain group of people. Samuli Schielke, who studied *mawlid* festivals<sup>13</sup> in Egypt, suggests that festivities revolve, not surprisingly, around having fun. However, this does not mean that festivities have pre-existing functions or meanings, i.e. to provide amusement and entertainment. Festivities and the meanings and functions assigned to it by their participants *can* be conflicting and ambivalent (Schielke 2006: 53, my italics). To have fun and enjoy oneself and enjoy the atmosphere are the most mentioned reasons to visit an event such as a concert of a *shaabi* artist. But what does this fun exactly entail? What conditions are important in creating the right atmosphere and what makes these events fun? The motivations for visiting events like these shine a light on this.

A first important reason to visit Dutch-Moroccan music events relates to the nature of the audience. The fact that Dutch-Moroccan events are still the domain of predominantly Dutch-Moroccan youth, meaning that few non-Dutch-Moroccans visit them, adds to their popularity. The great majority of the audience has a Moroccan background and this contributes to the idea that events like these are an exclusive Moroccan affair. Bennett has written on the function of bhangra in the UK and comes to a similar con-

clusion. He considers bhangra and the attendant events “a tool for asserting ‘Asianness’ because bhangra connects to a locally experienced need to feel Asian in a traditional way” (Bennett 2000: 105 and 110). Yet, Bennett warns us not to think of these audiences as harmonious and in agreement. The internal differences between different factions of the Asian audiences remain intact, such as religious differences between the Hindu, Sikh, and Muslim Asians. However, Bennett claims that bhangra music and its events are able, because of their focus on celebrating “an invented traditional Asian identity”, to smooth out internal differences that might exist (ibid.: 109-111). The concept of invented tradition, taken from Hobsbawm, indicates a “process of formalization and ritualization characterized by reference to the past, if only by imposing repetition.” According to Hobsbawm, an invented tradition “is a set of practices... which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a *suitable* historic past” (Hobsbawm 1983: 1). A key element for invented traditions to have any significance for their participants is the creation of a link with the past, either a constructed, imagined link, or a real one.

Like bhangra events in the UK, Dutch-Moroccan musical events in the Netherlands seem to thrive on a kind of invented tradition as well, since the set of practices observable during these events seem to seek a certain link with a peaceful and harmonious history, which has a conciliatory and appeasing effect on its audiences. Internal differences between Berbers or Arab Moroccans are played down, and I have not come across stories or accounts of fights or conflicts between visitors because of their ethnic differences. In this sense, an invented tradition is constructed during these events, representing a tradition of different factions of Dutch-Moroccan youth, uniting different ethnic backgrounds in a peaceful way, enabling them to celebrate together being Dutch-Moroccan.

Safeguarding this invented tradition for the participants is very important, and during these events this feeling is embodied in their reaction to the presence of people not fitting into this tradition. These reactions (re-) affirm the exclusive character of Moroccan musical events. For example, this perceived exclusiveness of Dutch-Moroccan events became painfully clear during several of my visits in the form of reactions of the audience to the presence of non-Moroccan visitors. At one time, a tall, blond female Dutch journalist accompanied me during such an event in concert hall Paradiso in Amsterdam, and many heads were turning when we passed by. Two Dutch-Moroccan young males started to whisper in our direction and the tone of

their voices was not friendly. At another occasion, a Dutch woman was dancing within a crowd of Dutch-Moroccan youth to the music of the Dutch-Moroccan band 'Ismāīliā', when one Dutch-Moroccan girl said to the other: "Is she putting into practice her belly dance lessons, or what?" Obviously, the Dutch woman belly dancing was considered to be out of place. The irony in the voice of the Dutch-Moroccan girl revealed, in my view, that in this social context only 'authentic' belly dancers, Dutch-Moroccan girls and women in this case, were supposed to show their moves. The Dutch woman was clearly considered 'out of place'.

Another example confirming that these events are sites of Dutch-Moroccanness is the implicit, often not unspoken desire to exclude non-Dutch-Moroccans. In an interview I conducted with Amal, she frankly tells me her feelings about the presence of Dutch people during Dutch-Moroccan events, when she answers my question about whether there is enough media attention for Dutch-Moroccan musical events, as follows:

"They have given some attention to it, to Moroccan music, I have seen it in magazines. Yes, then they focus on the number of headscarves...yes. Then I think, these people [Dutch journalists], just let them stay away, because they do not understand a single thing. Sure, I have read articles on Moroccan concerts, and lots of the time I am like: 'They [the Dutch] don't have to be everywhere, to be honest. They just don't understand a lot of these things: why a girl is dancing and why the boys are not all over her and touching her.'"

Participants and visitors of these events perceive them to be an opportunity to give concrete form to articulating a bond with other Dutch-Moroccans and especially with other Dutch-Moroccan youth. This may also explain why 'out of the ordinary elements' such as the presence of non-Dutch-Moroccans are sometimes approached with negativity, since these events are organized for and transformed by their audiences in a space for insiders only. The messages expressed during these events are therefore only directed at these authentic Dutch-Moroccan, the insiders, which explains hostile reactions to 'matters out of place', i.e. the presence of non-Dutch-Moroccans. These spaces are considered to be meant for the exchange of symbolic messages concerning Dutch-Moroccans only, which makes the presence of 'odd elements' problematic. Bennett states that:

"...in some instances musical tastes and accompanying consumption patterns are quite deliberately fashioned in such a way as to enable the clear articu-

lation of collective attitudes or statements that respond directly to everyday situations experienced in specific localities. Moreover, while such messages are sometimes transmitted in a publicly visible and audible fashion through the mediums of dress and musical preference, they are also frequently circulated only in the context of closed communication systems existing between those who choose to participate in specific events" (Bennett 2000: 68).

Bennett implies that events can be fashioned and organized in such a way as to attract a specific, distinct audience, in order to articulate a collective identity. Those who participate in these events are thus supposed to be part of this collectivity. When others, meaning people not supposed to be part of this collectivity, interfere in this process, it might evoke negative reactions, as is the case during some Moroccan musical events. The following interview fragments, indicating why some Dutch-Moroccan youths love to go to Moroccan parties or concerts or to listen to Moroccan *shaabi* music, support this idea.

"It evokes a sense of solidarity with other listeners."

"It is a way for me to express my feelings."

"It makes me feel different from the Dutch. It distinguishes me from the rest."

I suggest that the negative reactions to the presence of non-Dutch-Moroccans are linked to the possible threat these 'alien' elements could pose to the articulation of a collective identity. During these events, Dutch-Moroccan youth want to socialize with other Dutch-Moroccan youth, sometimes they want to dress in a traditional Moroccan dress, and they want to dance Moroccan moves, without being watched by intruders who might not understand their dress, dance and the way they interact with each other. The interview fragment of Amal that I have presented earlier should also be understood in this line of argument. Bilal's explanation of why he visits Moroccan musical events is short and simple. It is another sign pointing in the direction that Dutch-Moroccans perceive these events to be meant for Moroccans only:

"I have never been to a 'Moroccan' party in Morocco. It's obvious. I go to a Moroccan party [in the Netherlands] to see other Moroccans. You know."

Another motivation to visit these events is to search for a (life) partner. Research shows that relatively a great number of Dutch-Moroccans of the

second generation prefer to marry someone with a Moroccan background, although having the same religious background, i.e. Islam, is also an important criterion in the search for and choice of a life partner (Korf et al. 2007: 66; Hooghiemstra 2003: 5). The fact that these events are considered to be a meeting point for youngsters with the same ethnic (and religious) background makes these events, as Fouzia says “a kind of marriage-market.” She says that people go to these events either to specifically enjoy the music and performance or to look for a date or partner. Yamina, who has visited numerous events for her work and for personal reasons, also states that the possibility of meeting other Dutch-Moroccan youth and in particular a potential partner is yet another important motivation for visiting these events:

“Lots of young people, yeah that is right, they have a meeting point [at Dutch-Moroccan musical events], I notice that. They see each other, they run into each other, talk to each other, dance with each other, because elsewhere they do not meet. Because [mainstream] Dutch nightlife is mixed [meaning that men and women mingle]. And a café (pub), [it is not a place where] usually boys and girls meet each other. So, for [Dutch-Moroccan] youngsters, it [the Dutch-Moroccan musical scene] is a place to meet. That’s right, a kind of dating-circuit. A possibility, yeah.”

Whereas during Moroccan weddings in the Netherlands, Dutch-Moroccan youth can, of course, also meet other Dutch-Moroccan youth, the presence of parents and other family members restricts them to certain behavioural patterns. Interaction between boys and girls during weddings and other family celebrations is possible, but young people are often, due to social control, hesitant to freely dance, talk, and interact with each other. During the public musical events, parents and/or other older family member are absent, which makes these events free from the social control of parents. Although few of the interviewees mention the search for a partner as an important reason to visit events, I assume that the possibility of socializing with others, especially with people from the opposite sex, without the presence of parents, is what makes these events popular. Even if one is not looking for a potential husband or wife, dancing and chatting with someone of the opposite sex without being controlled by parents, can be an important reason to visit these events (Gazzah and Sonneveld 2005: 131 and Korf et al. 2007: 97)

These events are opportunities for Dutch-Moroccan youth to construct or experience moments of groupness. The pre-existing conditions of



these events, i.e. the way these events are set up (the programme, the music, performers, the starting and closing times), are on the one hand aimed at contributing to this groupness and on the other hand result in the creation of very specific and clear boundaries between this group and the rest. Implicit in the theory that music unites people and creates a community, is the idea that it also *excludes* people. In this case, *shaabi* concerts function as a tool to include specific young Dutch-Moroccan audiences and functions simultaneously as a tool to exclude many other audiences. 'Dutch' influences, i.e. the presence of 'native' or 'white' Dutch are rare, and few autochthonous Dutch people find their way to these dance events. These events are one of the few meeting points within Dutch society where the vast majority of the visitors have a Moroccan background. Note, however, that these events are always public events and accessible for everyone. Still, they have the tendency to ventilate a kind of exclusive Moroccan character. They are, as it were, 'something for Dutch-Moroccan youths only.' The atmosphere that dominates the events is that one finds oneself in a space and place that celebrates being Dutch-Moroccan without interference of outsiders. The events are an affirmation and expression of Dutch-Moroccanness.

#### *Power of the crowd*

Besides external preconditions shaping events into a space for expressing and celebrating Dutch-Moroccanness, the conduct of the audience itself also adds to this. A sign that these events are considered to be spaces for the articulation of Dutch-Moroccanness also lies in behavioural patterns occurring during these events. Moroccan musical events featuring, for instance, performances of *shaabi* artists, in essence, do not revolve around the actual performance of the artist. The bulk of the audience is usually more caught up in the interaction with each other. All over the dance floor people are dancing in circles around each other.

A frequently occurring phenomenon is that a large part of the audience is dancing with its back to the stage, seemingly not interested in what is going on on-stage. It appears that people are more concerned with becoming absorbed in the atmosphere and losing oneself in the spur of the moment, than in viewing the activities of the artist on-stage. I witnessed this phenomenon repeatedly. I wrote the following notes after visiting a mega-concert of several Moroccan artists. These notes illustrate how this phenomenon occurs:

A large part of the audience has some interest in and attention for the performing artists, but they have even more attention for their friends and others who are part of this group. It seems that people are also making new acquaintances. This can also be deduced from the way this group of people interacts. Besides interaction with the performing artists, which happens now and then, this group is mostly involved with and focused on interacting with other people in the crowd. The people in this group are very alert to what others in this group are doing. Sometimes when a certain group of friends in this group starts dancing in a certain way, you can see another group of friends imitating this after some time. From this observation I gather that the majority of the visitors came to this event to dance and interact with other Dutch-Moroccans, either with their friends or with new friends. When doing this, attention shifts from the performance to the rest of the crowd. I regularly observed that a number of people, during a period of time, literally stand with their backs to the stage. As if the performance is not taking place on stage, but in the crowd. They have some interest in the performances, but are most of the times observing the behaviour of the crowd in front of and around them.

The performance of the artists is gradually pushed to the background, whereas the performance of the crowd pushes itself to the foreground. I have witnessed this phenomenon numerous times and it occurred mostly during mega-concerts of several Moroccan *shaabi* artists. The behavioural patterns I described there are in some way similar to what happens during Egyptian mawlids, according to Schielke's description. According to Schielke, *mawlids* are "spectacles without footlights" (Schielke 2006: 75) meaning that the boundaries between actors and spectators are reversed. The distinction between audiences and performers is weak and often reversible. Schielke writes: "[the *mawlid*] does not have a clear hierarchy of authority that might reinforce a specific interpretation of what the festivity is about or how it ought to be celebrated. Interpreting and celebrating the *mawlid* remains in the hands of its participants, who may do it in ways that differ from those propagated by official authorities, and even defy them" (ibid.) What I take from Schielke's analysis is that the *mawlid* is an event that does not have a prescribed meaning and course. Its hierarchy is not clear and boundaries between the performer and his or her audience are also vague. Dutch-Moroccan events seem to be partly similar to *mawlids*.

Like *mawlids*, many Moroccan musical events follow typical behavioural patterns. Whereas it would seem logical for a crowd to enjoy the artist's performance by means of actually watching it, a large part of the crowd

of Dutch-Moroccan musical events regularly inverse this logic by taking over, figuratively speaking, the stage. In this sense, Moroccan musical events could also be called spectacles without footlights, because the boundaries between performer and audience are reversed. The crowd itself becomes the main performer and puts up a performance, meaning that through the power of the crowd and its numerical majority, it symbolically pushes the artist into the background. In this sense, this behavioural pattern is a manifestation of Brubaker's moment of intensely felt groupness.

The behavioural patterns taking place during these leisure time events, which revolve around the visitors taking the lead and figuratively taking charge of the show, could be considered a transcript of symbolic resistance against their marginal and subordinate position in Dutch society. Whereas in 'normal, daily life' Dutch-Moroccan youth have few resources to resist and escape their marginal and sometimes powerless positions, during these events Dutch-Moroccan youth take control and exercise their power over the event. The way visitors respond to 'intruders', as I described before, could also be seen in the light of a feeling of intense groupness and safeguarding this feeling.

#### 4. Conclusion

In sum, a great number of Dutch-Moroccan musical events are aimed at providing a space in which one can identify with (other) Dutch-Moroccans. The events are often full of symbols (flags, food, dress, music, and stands selling books on Morocco, and jewellery,) referring to Morocco's traditional culture, at least traditional in the eyes of the visitors. The prevalence of *shaabi* music has to do with the fact that this music represents a link with Morocco and is perceived as *Moroccan* music above all. Additionally, the events enable visitors to incorporate elements from their parents' culture, of which *shaabi* music is a great component, into their own youth culture, without parental interference or intrusion of non-Dutch-Moroccans. The role of *shaabi* within Dutch-Moroccan musical events revolves around expressing 'Moroccanness' in a Dutch context and creating bonds of affiliation with other Dutch-Moroccan youth.

These events represent a space where young people can freely be 'Moroccan', can behave, dance, sing and interact like what they perceive to be 'Moroccan'. Infused with nostalgia for Morocco, *shaabi* and its attendant events play a significant role in the assertion and preservation of 'Moroccanness' among Moroccan-Dutch youths, some of whom have never even

been to Morocco. Afterwards, when playing, for instance, *shaabi* music in the privacy of their house, visitors can relive the experience they had at that event, reinforcing the solidarity expressed there.

On an individual level, the narratives and biographies of the interviewees indicate that interpretations of *shaabi* music combined with local circumstances play a decisive role in its popularity. *Shaabi* music functions as a cue in the process of becoming aware of 'Moroccanness'. From the moment of the first acquaintance with *shaabi*, often at a wedding, one becomes more conscious of being Dutch-Moroccan. After experiencing *shaabi* in a live, social context, *shaabi* music then becomes a symbol that stands for an identification process with other Dutch-Moroccans, a symbol of solidarity with other Dutch-Moroccans and a key element in creating the right 'Moroccan' atmosphere of festivity. *Shaabi* music then becomes embodied in an identification process and acquires specific meaning for that individual.

Consequently, on a collective level, through visiting Moroccan concerts and other musical events, this Dutch-Moroccanness can be expressed, manifested, and celebrated. Dutch-Moroccan youth use these events as a tool in a collective identification process, through consciously appropriating and claiming the events as belonging to them. Although visitors may not identify with other Dutch-Moroccans outside of these festive musical spaces, they may prefer to identify with and present themselves as a Muslim, or choose to emphasize their self-identification as a teacher, a journalist, or a student. When they go to these events they want to articulate and give a concrete form to an intense feeling of groupness with other Dutch-Moroccan youth.

Music and music events can represent or create spaces where groupness can come into being. This groupness becomes associated with this music and the behavioural patterns that took place during the event. Elements that are essentially meaningful for the emergence of this groupness, such as, most importantly the music, but also the food, the people present, and their conduct, obtain a particular meaning linked to this groupness. The specific conditions, under which this groupness developed, become important markers of this particular collective identification process. In a broader perspective, groupness and the way it is shaped, formed and symbolized during an event becomes a point of departure upon which future collective identification processes during future events can be built.

The collective identification process, in the form of a momentary feeling of groupness, also has its repercussions upon the individual visitor. The fact that this feeling of groupness was once aroused in his/her minds can

cause him/her to want to re-live or re-experience this feeling of groupness. One can do this, for example, through (re-) listening to the music that was played during this event or through visiting another event such as a concert or dance party. Even though a group existed only temporarily, its social significance is not temporal and does not fade out after the event during which this group came into being. The feeling of groupness can thus be re-lived, even if one is alone.

## 4. **Music, Islam, and gender**

### Balancing acceptance and rejection

#### **Introduction: My experiences at a concert**

The venue, which was a large sports hall, was far from filled when at four o'clock in the afternoon the official kick-off of the party started. A presenter appeared on stage and addressed the audience in Dutch: "Welcome everybody, thank you for coming on the first day of Easter. Tomorrow we all have a day off<sup>1</sup>, so let's enjoy the party. There will be no alcohol served, because without booze we can have a very good time too." The crowd started to cheer and applaud in response to this remark. The presenter continued: "Fortunately all artists who will be performing today have made it to the venue, so we are very happy with that. Now here is Ruqbi to speak to you in Arabic. Unfortunately we have nobody who can speak to you in Berber." The crowd makes booing sounds.

Ruqbi was the Moroccan-speaking presenter, entertainer and time-filler between the performances. Dressed in a white *djellaba* and *fez* (traditional Moroccan men's garment and headwear), Ruqbi addressed the audience in the Arabic-Moroccan language and sometimes he switched to Dutch. He had a mouth organ and was accompanied by a *derbouka* player (a North African hand drum). In between the performances Ruqbi came on stage and played his mouth organ or encouraged the audience to start singing a particular song and at one point he started to recite the words: *Slat wa- sslam ʿala rasul Allah la jah illa jah sidna Muhammad, Allah mʿahu jjah al-ʿali*.<sup>2</sup> After Ruqbi recited the first couple of words, the audience directly picked up the rest and this resulted in a massive recital of this 'joint prayer', followed by a loud cheering of you-you's by the women in the crowd.

Somewhere halfway the event, Ruqbi came back on stage to entertain the visitors in between performances. He played some tunes on his mouth organ and after that he asked the crowd in Arabic, quite suddenly and out of the blue, to cheer for the people of Iraq, Palestine, Morocco, and the Netherlands respectively. This request was reciprocated with huge cheering and clapping, in particular for the people of Iraq and Palestine...

There was no alcohol served inside the venue, but this did not mean that there were no intoxicated people present. From around seven o'clock onward the atmosphere at the concert turned a bit tenser. At the entrance security guards started to refuse entrance to people, young men, who wanted to re-enter the venue after drinking alcoholic beverages outside the venue. This resulted in some arguments between security guards and visitors and even some pulling and pushing. When I left the concert and walked passed the venue I stumbled upon several empty beer cans and bottles and some empty 'Bacardi Breezer'<sup>3</sup> bottles which were chucked away in a dark corner of the building.

This description of a concert that took place in Den Bosch, a city in the south of the Netherlands, discloses a variety of topics relating to the complex relationship between music, performance, and Islam. It demonstrates how different discourses and corresponding identities come together and interact with each other within the range of one social context. What is immediately noticeable is how the behaviour of some visitors literally clashed with the Islamic norm that is promoted during the concert: people who were drunk were refused entrance. Another phenomenon, besides absence of alcohol, that gave this particular event a religious touch, was the recital of a Moroccan-Islamic prayer.

The event I described above was a non-religious event, and as such it was also promoted, but temporarily turned religious. In view of the fact that this phenomenon occurred repeatedly during other visits I made to other Dutch-Moroccan musical events, it deserves some further explanation. Before analyzing the event I described above, I will explain how the issue of Islam in relation to musical events came up in my research and what its relevance is in this research.

*The relevance*

At the beginning of my research project it was not immediately clear that the issue of Islam with regard to music would play a significant role. Yet, after having conducted the first interviews, it became clear that in the way Dutch-Moroccans practised Islam, the issue of music, performance and going out takes up an ambivalent position. In the interviews the perceived (in-) compatibility of music, performance, and going out in the lives of Dutch-Moroccan Muslims was brought up numerous times. Debates dealing with the legitimacy of music and performance for Dutch-Moroccan Muslims frequently developed into heated dialogues or monologues. The permissibility of music and performance in Islam also repeatedly arose on websites targeting Dutch-Moroccan youth, on chat-forums dealing with Islamic issues and on websites dealing with youth culture topics such as music and party calendars, in articles and magazines aimed at Dutch-Moroccan youth (for example *Mzine*), during cultural events, and in random meetings with young Dutch-Moroccans.

A discussion on music and its supposed incompatibility with an Islamic lifestyle spontaneously unfolded itself on an 'Internet-forum' part of a website aimed at Dutch-Moroccan youth, and evoked a range of different reactions. The discussion was launched within a general topic called 'music, parties, and nightlife' by 'Izan'. It is worth noting that this forum is *not* meant for discussing religious issues or Islam in general, hence the title 'music, parties and nightlife'. Rather, it is a forum used to exchange experiences of musical events, to find tips on upcoming musical events and the like. Nevertheless, the discussants seem to find it necessary and appropriate to discuss the topic in this forum. Izan labelled his topic: "Music is *haram*, according to the imam."<sup>4</sup>

**Izan:** Residence: Amsterdam

Do you think music is bad or makes you crazy? Express your opinion, because I would like to know.

Submitted: July 22, 2003 9:31 pm

**Aapje** (Little Monkey): Residence: Brabant:

Hmmm, one thing: I have been without music for ten days, and I can tell you one thing, I WENT CRAZYYYYYY

Submitted: Jul 24, 2003 1:44 pm

**Lilprincess:** Residence: Fairy tale country

There is music that is *halal*...of Yusuf Islam, he sings about Islam, really, it's beautiful.

Submitted: July 24, 2003 2:00 pm



**Aapje:**

Which imam says that? And I don't understand it, is he saying that he does not listen to music. Maybe not 2pac's music or something, but Umm Kholtoem maybe so.

Submitted: Sep 19, 2003 10:00 am

**MisSanae:**

I know that music is *haram*, but I do listen to it, it just makes things cosy. And Aapje, I don't think that an Imam listens to music, I know plenty of people who do not listen to music, because it's *haram*.

Submitted: Wo Oct 15, 2003 11:05 pm

**FATIHA19:**

*Ewa*<sup>5</sup>, people, music is *haram*, but it is okay to listen for a while, as long as you do everything Allah says, than you are allowed to listen to some nice music. *Ewa*, me myself I listen to the Qur'an and to music, everybody does it, there is nothing wrong with that.

Submitted: Oct 16, 2003 10:55 am

**Paprika:** Residence: Amsterdam/ paprika city

In my experience, the less you listen to music, the more focused you worship Allah, music makes your heart kind of dead.

Submitted: Oct 17, 2003 5:52 pm

**Esmaa:**

Hmmm, without music I cannot do my homework

Submitted: Oct 17, 2003 9:17 pm

The uncertain status of music in Islam and the way consumers and producers of music deal with this issue reveals how Dutch-Moroccan youth fashion their own individualized position within this debate. The debate on the compatibility of music and Islam discloses how Dutch-Moroccan Muslims justify in different ways their own musical activities. In these justifications there is often a tension between the interpretations of textual rulings of Islam and what one does in practice in everyday life.

Besides providing insights into tension between textual and practical interpretations of Islam, an analysis of this debate also discloses how the debate plays a role in identification processes of Dutch-Moroccan youth. Exploring Dutch-Moroccan music consumers' and producers' discourses on music and Islam shows how identification processes are played out inside a particular minority community, as opposed to other identification processes that are generated through interaction between a minority community and society at large. As the spaces where these kinds of processes take place are

usually not easily visible for 'outsiders' and are 'far from the public eye'; they usually remain 'underground' and unexamined (Mandaville 2001a: 169-186). By including this issue, I have an opportunity to demonstrate that identification processes within minority communities in a post-migration context, such as the Dutch-Moroccan community in the Netherlands, are not only about distinguishing yourself from the majority, i.e. the Dutch, but are also heavily influenced by debates taking place within the minority community and thus about ways of distinguishing one's self from the 'Dutch-Moroccan other'.

By asking questions such as: to what extent does the ambiguity that surrounds music (be it listening to it, creating it, or performing it) affect the way young Dutch-Moroccans incorporate music in their lives, I hope to bring more clarity about how this debate has implications for consumers and producers. Do they go to musical events or not, and why? How do professionals, artists, musicians, and DJs deal with the ambiguity concerning the status of musicians and performers in Islam? Is it an obstacle in their career or a source of inspiration? And regarding organizers of concerts and events, does this debate affect the way they organize their events? And finally, with regard to negative attitude that often surrounds female performers in Muslim communities: what strategies do Dutch-Moroccan female artists develop in order to challenge the negative images that surround female performers in particular?

I will start by focusing on consumers and then shift to producers; they both construct their own individual point of view on the basis of normative discourse that considers music and Islam incompatible. For producers, such as musicians, singers, dancers, etc., the effects of their musical activities are much larger, because of its publicness, than for consumers, who can easily and privately buy, listen, and enjoy music without anybody's knowledge. As a result, consumers and producers position themselves differently in this debate and have different types of justification for their musical activities. An additional complicating factor is that in theory the normative discourse rejecting music in Islam is clear-cut, but in practice, interpretations of theoretical and theological texts are fragmented. The uncertainty, also among Islamic scholars, contributes to the fact that Dutch-Moroccan youth often come up with very personalized and individual interpretations that are not based on (cyber-) imams or other types of religious authorities.

This chapter starts with an analysis of a case study of a musical event that is Islamized. I explain what this means, how this is done, and why. Some party-organizers deliberately incorporate certain religious elements

into their events. I suggest that this is done in order to increase the 'Islamic' legitimacy of an event. In section two, I describe in what way the Islamization of an event compensates for the unsettledness regarding dancing, listening to, and performing music. After that, in section three, I elaborate on the different discourses on the legitimacy of music in Islam in general and Dutch-Moroccan youth's readings of these discourses. The tension between theory and practice becomes clear in the way Dutch-Moroccan consumers and producers justify and explain their own musical activities. Finally, section four focuses on the issue of gender within this debate. By presenting two case studies, i.e. the narratives of two female Dutch-Moroccan artists, I explain how gender ideology in relation to music and performance, which is rooted in a combination of Islamic and socio-cultural mores, affects the way these two artists manage their careers, the way they identify themselves with others, and the way they try to achieve legitimacy and acceptance as Dutch-Moroccan female performers and Muslimas.

## 1. The Islamization of events

A trend of Islamization of Moroccan musical events in the Netherlands is developing. This trend involves both consumers and producers, who are adding Islamic elements to non-religious events. On the level of production, some organizers do not allow alcohol to be served in the venue. Sometimes events are only accessible for women, conforming to Islamic norms that forbid the mixing of genders in public spaces. According to Ahmed, an organizer of events, he adds Islamic flavours, because he wants to promote a 'respectable and decent' event:

"Look, everybody has their own input. When I look at myself, and ask [myself] why I do these things [organizing concerts], then my answer is: to provide people with an outlet, to make it possible for them to be together in a happy way, and to be happy and to respect each other. That is the intention. And if we wanted other stuff to happen, than I would be the first to include a dating-agency [in the event], and to sell pills [drugs] at the door and joints [soft drugs] as well, for the lovers of hash. And if I wanted people to smash each other's heads in, then I would not have heavy security at the door. It all depends on your point of view. Everybody is entitled to their own approach."

Implicitly, Ahmed refers to the Islamic respectability of his event and the fact that he prefers his events to live up to some Islamic norms: no alco-

hol, drugs, and to aim for a respectful interaction between men and women. Organizer Jan, who regularly arranges women-only events, simply states that he tries to attract larger audiences to his events by starting early and not selling alcohol.

Moreover, regarding the behaviour of the visitors, Islamic elements sometimes temporarily become part of behavioural patterns during musical events, such as the ritual of a joint prayer recital. In this sense, the consumers themselves create an Islamic atmosphere by massively and frequently reciting a Moroccan-Islamic prayer.

Party promoters and concert organizations try to tune into Dutch-Moroccan youth's needs. Through gender segregation, the absence of alcohol and early starting times, the promoters meet with norms that some Dutch-Moroccan youth maintain regarding their leisure time activities. Organizers aim to meet the requirements of Dutch-Moroccan consumers by making events, to some extent, Islamic. For example, a norm that is intentionally implemented is the absence of alcohol. Obviously, consuming alcohol is considered un-Islamic behaviour. Abstaining from alcohol is often presented as an important element of Muslim identity by many Muslims worldwide and also by Dutch-Moroccan Muslims.

In Frank van Gemert's study on Dutch-Moroccan youth this also becomes clear. In his conversations with Dutch-Moroccan youth defining who is 'a good Moroccan' and who is 'a bad one', in all instances the Dutch-Moroccan boys Van Gemert talked to, being a 'good, practising Muslim' was intrinsically linked to being a 'good Moroccan'. In relation to good and bad Moroccans, the youngsters made a distinction between those who are still 'small' (i.e. young, immature), referring to those who still have to sow their wild oats, and those who have become 'serious', meaning those who have become good, practising Muslims, who have stopped drinking (alcohol), smoking, and gambling (Van Gemert 2007: 122-124). The absence of alcohol at events aimed at Dutch-Moroccan youth is therefore implicitly a sign that these events are meant for those who have become, or are already 'serious'. In this sense, the design of such events conforms to the norm of the behaviour of 'good Dutch-Moroccans' and 'good Muslims'.

Another element that is implemented in some events is gender segregation. The aspect of gender segregation is employed in order to gain legitimacy. In settings like an *anasheed* festival during which Islamic songs praising Islam and the prophet are performed, or Islamic events that are specifically aimed to create an Islamic environment, such as lectures by Islamic scholars enhanced with Islamic performances, the separation of male and

female audiences was already common. However, the women-only events, promoted as *Hafla Annisa*, which is Arabic for ‘party of/ for women’, are not meant to be Islamic by means of their content or programme. In fact, women-only events usually resemble the programme of ‘regular Dutch-Moroccan musical events’, including music, performance and entertainment. The difference is that at women-only events men are simply not allowed entrance.

From around the beginning of the new millennium women-only parties started to become more and more popular. Eventually, one non-profit organization from Amsterdam initiated the idea and it has been a success ever since, and other organizations also started to apply this format to their events. The women-only parties are meant to provide Dutch-Moroccan girls, women, mothers, aunts, nieces, and friends with an opportunity to have fun and be together without the interference of men. Only male employees in the venue and male performers are allowed. Although the women-only events resemble much of the ‘regular events’, they also include additional elements, which are aimed specifically at a female audience, such as henna-art workshops where girls can learn how to apply henna, fashion shows demonstrating the latest Moroccan (bridal) fashion, and performances of female dance groups.

In addition, the starting and closing times of events are also used in a way to increase their Islamic legitimacy. There are daytime events and nighttime events. Daytime events are created to make it easier for Dutch-Moroccan girls to attend. Many Dutch-Moroccan girls face social control, which limits them in their choice of leisure time activities. Souad answered my question as to whether she visits concerts, as follows:

“No, I have never been to one. I would love to go, but that’s hard. My father always makes me come home on time, so I can hardly ever go anywhere late at night.”

In fact, visiting daytime events, as such, is not a question of doing something Islamic or un-Islamic; however, the interviewees’ narratives implicitly indicate that going out during daytime is considered more acceptable for Dutch-Moroccans, especially for girls. It is not the issue of whether it is un-Islamic to go out late at night that is at stake, but rather the question of complying with social norms. Conforming to the norms of decent, good Dutch-Moroccan conduct for a young Dutch-Moroccan girl enhances the dimension of being a good Dutch-Moroccan Muslima. Behaving like a ‘proper Dutch-Moroccan’ implicitly means behaving like a ‘proper Muslim’ as

well, as Van Gemert already demonstrated. A daytime event would probably be a more acceptable and legitimate solution for the student quoted above, since it is considered more appropriate for a Dutch-Moroccan girl, in terms of correct behaviour, to visit a daytime event, than to go out late at night.

For a number of respondents the criteria I mentioned are crucial in deciding whether they visit a certain event. Some Dutch-Moroccan girls have told me that they would never visit an event where alcohol is served. Some said they would not go to an event where there is a mixed audience (male and female). The following interview fragment shows how Zohra, a 29 year-old- student who wears a headscarf, makes an assessment of musical events that she would never visit:

“Well, I don’t want there to be girls dressed in very short skirts, who dance around guys and boys who are checking you out and accidentally bumping into you. That, I don’t want to experience. That is *haram*. [I would visit a concert where an artist sings] songs with good topics that make you think and that will keep you level-headed when you listen to them. For me, that is what makes it an acceptable Islamic outing. When that is the case, then you’ll just love it and then you should just go!”

The role of Islamic norms and Dutch-Moroccan social norms, implicitly linked to Islamic norms, manifests itself in the way Dutch-Moroccan youth have created a musical youth culture. In regular Dutch nightlife, drinking alcohol and the mingling of men and women are the norm. This rules out Dutch nightlife for those Dutch-Moroccan young women (and men) who do not want to be confronted with these phenomena. It explains the popularity of Dutch-Moroccan events that are attuned to these needs. The growing popularity of the women-only parties indicates that Dutch-Moroccan youth have a need to spend time together during their leisure time in an environment of fun, music, and entertainment. They prefer to do this in their ‘own’ specific leisure time spaces and with activities, which are tuned into their specific religious and socio-cultural tastes. As a result, a large part of the Dutch-Moroccan scene remains in a peripheral position in relation to ‘regular’ Dutch nightlife, and is an unfamiliar and ‘underground’ phenomenon for most Dutch people.

Next, I will elaborate further on the event that I described at the beginning of this chapter. This particular event was not arranged to be Islamic by design, but it got a temporarily Islamic touch through a sponta-

neous performance of a Moroccan-Islamic ritual, i.e. the collective recital of a Moroccan-Islamic prayer by the audience.

*'Blessing the crowd'*

Out of 27 events I visited, at seven events the recital of the Moroccan-Islamic prayer, as I described at the beginning of this chapter, took place. Five of these events were (mega-) concerts of Moroccan artists. The other two events where this phenomenon occurred were summer festivals, during the open-air performances of the Dutch-Moroccan band Kasba. In the case of Kasba's performances, it was the lead-singer who initiated the recital and encouraged the audience to join in. During the concert I described earlier in this chapter, it was the host of the show who initiated this recital. In the other cases, a number of spectators took the initiative in starting the recital, which the rest of the audience quickly picked up.

All in all, it is a relatively significant phenomenon during Moroccan cultural and musical events, especially during concerts of Moroccan artists in the Netherlands. In fact, it would be more accurate to call this a collective pronunciation of benedictions, rather than a prayer. This bestowing of blessings is a cultural tradition rooted in Morocco. Both Arabic-speaking and non-Arabic speaking regions in Morocco know the Arabic words to this famous benediction. It is often recited during weddings in order to bless the newlyweds with happiness and prosperity and to keep away the 'evil eye'. Besides weddings and other family celebrations, this ritual has its place in other social contexts as well. Whenever the Moroccan king visits a Moroccan town somewhere in the country, he is often welcomed by the residents with this pronunciation of benediction, as is regularly shown on Moroccan television. Other occasions where this custom takes place are, for instance, when people are about to leave for Mecca to perform the pilgrimage (*hajj*) and during circumcision celebrations.

The recurring performance of this custom at Dutch-Moroccan musical events in the Netherlands may seem to be a somewhat displaced phenomenon and therefore merits some further explication. This recital of blessings has several effects when it takes place during musical events in the Netherlands. First of all, it is a way for the visitors to express solidarity and unity. As this is, to my knowledge, a practice only known to insiders of the 'Moroccan culture', most Moroccans will recognize it. The words are recited in a particular rhythm and 'melody', which could be considered a kind of signature tune, which contributes to its recognizable character. In addition, it is in particular a custom grounded in Islamic traditions. The recital men-

tions the prophet Muhammad and Allah and it serves simultaneously as a way of praising Muhammad and Allah *and* somebody else, i.e. the person(s) to whom the benediction is addressed.

Another remarkable aspect of this practice is that men and women both have specific tasks. It is usually one man or a couple of men who will set in the recital, which is then immediately picked up by the rest of the crowd. This results in a collective recitation of men and women. Then, when the recitation is done, the whole ritual is rounded off by the loud typical North African you-you's of women (*t'zeghrita*). Men are not supposed to make these kinds of sounds. The ululations of women are a common North African practice, which also serves as a symbolic way of expressing blessings. Both men and women have their moment of being in the 'spotlights' during this short ritual, which in total usually takes up a couple of minutes. So, in conclusion, I would say that this phenomenon functions as a ritual through which identification with other Moroccan Muslims is publicly expressed. At the same time, the ritual creates a bond of unity between men and women who both take part in it.

The recitation of benedictions during non-religious events, transforms the event from a secular into a religious one for the moment. I interpret the collective shouting of these sacred Islamic words as a way for the audience to give the event Islamic legitimacy. The religious character of the words and the Moroccan origins of this ritual make it Islamic and Moroccan at the same time. Through this recitation, all visitors present will, in that moment, be reminded of their Islamic and Moroccan identities. It operates as a kind of wake-up call to the crowd: you should not forget your Moroccan and Islamic background, even though you are at the event mainly to enjoy the music and ambiance.

In sum, the Islamization of events is instigated by producers as well as consumers of these events. From the point of view of the producers, Islamizing events has an important commercial purpose. It is a way for organizers to erase or lessen the negative associations and ideas evoked by musical events among the Dutch-Moroccan community. By implementing elements such as gender-segregation or the absence of alcohol, organizers hope to increase the Islamic legitimacy (for its audience) and to make it more acceptable for Dutch-Moroccan youth (and their parents) to come. From a commercial point of view, it is thus interesting to attract a wider audience. Especially for a large number of Dutch-Moroccan girls, it is much less problematic to explain to their parents that they are visiting a women-only party, than a party where there is a mixed audience and alcohol is served. The reason



why it is important for Dutch-Moroccan youth to go out in a context that upholds certain criteria has to do with religious, Islamic views and socio-cultural norms on the permissibility of music, song, dance, and performance. I discuss this topic in the next section.

## 2. The debate on the compatibility of music and performance in Islam

The compatibility of music and performance in Islam is a controversial topic, not only for contemporary Dutch-Moroccan Muslims in the Netherlands. It has always been a controversial issue running through the history of Islamic legal and theological debates.<sup>6</sup> In the Muslim world, many different points of view on this topic have evolved during the past centuries. Without entering into the details of this legal debate, I will present here the most important arguments that have been put forward 'for' and 'against' music in Islam. My aim is not to find the final answer to the question of whether 'Islam permits music and performance or not'. Instead, I describe the different views on this topic in order to understand the different perspectives in Muslim communities on the status of music and performance.

Ethnomusicologist Al Faruqi reconstructed the main Islamic rulings on music. Islamic religious opinion constructed a hierarchy of different types of music and its performers. This categorization is meant to encourage lawful types of music and condemn others that are not approved of. She cites the Muslim scholar Ibn Taymiyyah, (d. 728 AH/ 1350) who stated that music and listening to it can either be forbidden (*muharram* or *haram*), un-favoured (*makruh*), indifferent (*mubah*), obligatory (*wajib*) or commendable (*mustahabb*) (El Faruqi 1995: 7). The recitation of the Qur'an (*qira'ah*), the call for prayer (*adhan*), religious chant, and chanted poetry with noble themes (*shī'r*) are all categorized as *halal* (ibid.: 8). Next, Al Faruqi mentions some other types of 'sounds' that fall into the category *halal*, such as family and celebration music including lullabies, women's songs and wedding songs, occupational music, such as caravan chants, shepherds' tunes, work songs, and military music (ibid.) Secular music and song, for which the term *musiqa* is often used in Arabic, a term that originally meant secular music using vocals and instruments, has remained a controversial issue and can, in principle, fall into all of the categories. Islamic religious opinion, according to Al-Faruqi, considers "sensuous music associated with unacceptable contexts" illegitimate (*haram*) and places it therefore in the category of forbidden actions (ibid.). More specifically, Al-Faruqi states that sensuous music

refers to music that “is thought to incite to such prohibited practises as consumption of drugs and alcohol, lust, prostitution, etc” (ibid.: 12).

The permissibility of music is not only related to the genre alone, but the social context within which the music is performed is important in determining its status too. Van Nieuwkerk refers to the eleventh-century Muslim scholar Imam al-Ghazali who deems “time, place, and associates” to be essential in determining its permissibility (Van Nieuwkerk 1995: 11). Al-Ghazali explains that if someone devotes too much time to either making or listening to music, this is not acceptable, since this will keep Muslims from performing their religious duties and prevents them from devoting time to their religion. As regards place, it must be an acceptable environment and the occasion of the musical performance should be in accordance with Islamic norms. Finally, the element of ‘associates’ refers to the type of people present at the musical performance. The same music may be permitted in one social context, but frowned upon in another social context with other companions present:

“Playing the *daff* (tambourine) was regarded permissible (*halal*) by jurists, for example, when done by women in the wedding or other joyous celebration, but condemned if used by men or in some other contexts, that provided an association with homosexuality” (Al Faruqi 1995: 19).

Other written traditions that are often quoted in the debate on permissibility of music are those of the famous, influential and authoritative scholars Bukhari (d. 256 AH/ 896), Ibn Majah (d. 273 AH/ 886) and Muslim (d. 261 AH/ 874), who report on situations in which the Prophet Muhammad allowed music and singing in his house or even in the mosque, or disapproved of it at other times. A verse from the Qur’an that is cited by Qaradawi in order to demonstrate the immorality of music is a verse that is also often put forward by other scholars and Muslims. In this particular verse, in *sura Luqman* (Barzizoua and Mullenders 2004: 2), ‘idle talk’ is often interpreted as singing and music:

“And among the people is the one who buys idle talk (at the expense of his soul) in order to lead (people) astray from the path of Allah without knowledge, holding it in mockery: for such there will be a humiliating punishment (31:6)” (Qaradawi 1994: 302).

It is often said that music and performance have been a topic of debate ever since the death of the Prophet. In our time, the permissibility of music in Islam is also still heavily debated. Yusuf Qaradawi, for example, a contemporary Egyptian Muslim scholar, who has a following among young Muslims in the European diaspora, presents in his book *The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam* (1994) the following *hadith* reported by Bukhari and Muslim as proof of the permissibility of music. The *hadith* reports that Aisha (one of the Prophet Muhammad's wives) and two other girls were singing and banging on a hand drum, while Muhammad listened to them with his head covered in a scarf. When Abu Bakr, Aisha's father, came in he reprimanded the girls. The Prophet then said to him: "Let them be, Abu Bakr. These are the days of 'Eid' (The celebrating days)" (Qaradawi 1994: 300; Barzizaoua and Mullenders 2004). Qaradawi supports the view that music, in the right context and for the right occasion, is allowed.

However, Qaradawi does put some limitations on what the right context and occasion should be like when the music and singing take place. He presents five central conditions that should be obeyed in order to make the use of singing and music permissible. First, he states that the subject matter of the song should not be against Islamic teachings and morals. He gives the example of songs that might encourage drinking alcohol or praising wine and the like, which make them *haram*. Second, the manner of singing also is important. The singing should not be supported by suggestive sexual movements, for example. Third, one should not devote too much time to music and singing. The aspect of time, as Al-Ghazali put forward, is important for Qaradawi as well. Fourth, in deciding whether music and singing are permitted, each individual Muslim has his/her own responsibility. If one knows one might be aroused by certain music or singing, it must be avoided, according to Qaradawi. He writes:

"Each individual is the best judge of himself. If a certain type of singing arouses one's passions, leads him towards sin, excites the animal instincts, and dulls spirituality, he must avoid it, thus closing the door to temptations" (Qaradawi 1994: 303).

Fifth, if music and singing take place in conjunction with *haram* activities, for example drinking alcohol or obscene behaviour, it is always *haram* (ibid.).

Qaradawi's criteria seem to be quite moderate and make, at first sight, no distinction between men and women in his discussion of the permissibil-

ity of music and singing. Yet, when we read Qaradawi's views on how men and women should behave in public and private spaces, the dimension of gender comes into play (Van Nieuwkerk 2003: 272). The segregation of the sexes is often considered, by Muslims and non-Muslims alike, as an essential feature of Islam. In relation to the segregation of the sexes, Qaradawi states that when unrelated men and women pass or meet each other, either in public or private circumstances, they should "lower their gazes" and "guard their sexual organs" (Qaradawi 1994: 152), which means, according to Qaradawi: "to avert one's gaze from the faces of the members of the opposite sex with one's eyes" (ibid.: 153). Consequently, Qaradawi argues that the mixing of the sexes can lead to men and women engaging in illicit eye-contact or even worse: illicit sexual relationships (ibid.). We can imagine that Qaradawi may consider it *haram* to visit a dance party where men and women mingle, dance and chat.

What is clear is that many scholars do not claim that music, singing, and performance are forbidden *per se*, but put restrictions on the kind of music, its lyrics, the audience, and the overall social context. These restrictions often stem from associations that are envisioned between music and all kinds of immoral, un-Islamic qualities, such as infidelity, adultery, and idolatry. In addition, Islamic gender ideology, and in particular the position of female performers, is important in explaining the difficult position of female performers and deserves special attention. The controversy surrounding female performers will be further discussed in section three of this chapter.

The central element in this entire debate on the permissibility of music and performance in Islam is thus the nature of the social context: who is performing for whom, what is the occasion, in what kind of location does the performance take place and what is the audience doing. In many of the Islamic theological and philosophical writings on the permissibility of music, the determining element is the question of whether there is a danger for situations to arise in which norms regarding gender segregation, the respectability of the performers and their audience, and the occurrence of illicit activities, such as the use of alcohol or drugs, homosexuality, illicit sexual relations, prostitution, and dancing of men and women, are transgressed. The way the audience and the organizers Islamize events is a response to this debate. By trying to avoid associations with *haram* behaviour and situations that are described above – associations that always lie in wait – audience, organizers, music producers, and consumers hope to legitimate their actions.

In short, the social context of music and performance that may incite associations with or facilitate these illicit, *haram* situations as described above, often determines whether a specific musical performance is permitted or considered *haram*. To sum up, music's ambiguous position in Islam is mainly caused by a strong emphasis on Islamic values and norms regarding gender-mixing especially in public spaces, the prevention of illicit sexual relationships between men and women, and the taboo on alcohol use.

### *Frames of reference*

In general, the Dutch-Moroccan youth I interviewed use few to no references to Islamic sources, such as the Qur'an, the written traditions or even to speeches of imams, when they talk about the permissibility of music in Islam. However, by looking at websites dealing with this issue and carefully analyzing my interview material, I have been able to deduce some recurring aspects in the discussion on the permissibility of music in Islam. This enabled me to detect some of the sources of inspiration which Dutch-Moroccan youth refer to. First, the Qur'anic verse from *sura Luqman*, as described earlier, and a number of *ahadith*<sup>7</sup> are frequently presented as authoritative Islamic sources. These sources are often portrayed as proof that music is *haram*. For example, 'Jamal' started a topic entitled 'Music is *haram*' on a discussion-forum called 'Music and dance'.<sup>8</sup> In this topic, he presents a number of Islamic sources in order to support his statement that music is *haram*. He starts his argument as follows:

"Music and listening to it is not allowed. It is a sin that is caused by *shaytan* [the devil]. Music is the reason for the hardening of hearts and making them sick. Scholars have jointly presented a clear *fatwa* on the prohibition of music. Here is some evidence that shows that music is forbidden. From the Qur'an: ..."

And then he introduces the verse from *sura Luqman*:

"And among the people is the one who buys idle talk in order to lead astray from the path of Allah without knowledge, holding it in mockery; for such there will be a humiliating punishment."

He then gives his own interpretation of this *sura*, which he bases on views of the well-known scholar Al Wahidi<sup>9</sup> and remarks of some companions of the Prophet who all stated, according to Jamal, that 'idle talk' refers to music. Then, he presents three different sections from different *ahadith*

taken from works of Bukhari.<sup>10</sup> Two of these passages refer to the making of music with musical instruments in combination with drinking wine and the presence of women, which are considered *haram*. A fourth section is a *hadith* that reports of wedding celebrations and other Islamic celebrations where it is allowed for women and among women to make music only with a *daff* (a percussion instrument), and to sing, although the singing should not include inappropriate words referring to love and body parts. Jamal ends his argument by saying “And Allah knows best.”

This mishmash of different bits and pieces of Islamic texts that Jamal has put together can be found on other Dutch-Moroccan websites as well. In fact, several exact copies of this text circulate on other places on the web. This particular text is always used to argue ‘against’ music. Those responding to this argument against music often do not use Islamic sources to counter it. Rather, they either discard it as unreliable or formulate their own personal views that are usually not directly linked to Islamic sources or texts or religious authorities. For example some reactions to Jamal’s argument are as follows. It seems ‘Jamal’ is not taken seriously and through mocking him, the other discussion forum-participants cut off any further serious discussion.

“Hello, what kind of rubbish is that? Since when is music *haram*? What is next?”

“I think you should better go and live on top of a mountain somewhere, where nobody speaks of *halal/ haram*. For the rest I don’t have anything to say....Allah knows, not you!!!!!!”

“Ok, ...I am a singer, I listen to music, ...ok, I go to hell....is no problem....”<sup>11</sup>

### **3. The consumers’ views on the compatibility of music, performance, and Islam**

Music and performance have always had a controversial position in Islamic history. Like the Muslim scholars living in the centuries just after the prophet’s death, Dutch-Moroccan youths hold very different and sometimes ambivalent views regarding the position of music in their lives (i.e. be it producing music, listening to music, going to concerts, or other musical events). The statements of Dutch-Moroccan consumers reveal several points of view on the permissibility of music in Islam. All of the interviewees, consumers and producers alike, were aware of the debate surrounding this topic and

they were all conscious of the fact that there is an ongoing Islamic legal debate as well.

The interview fragments presented in this section will illustrate how points of view on the position of music within Islam are often ambivalent and complex and how assumptions about theory and practice run through them. In addition, what people say they do and what they do in practice is often inconsistent. And thus in the end, there is often a discrepancy between what people say they do and what they do in practise. Therefore we must be careful to distinguish between people's idealistic representations of their behaviour and their behaviour in reality (Mernissi 1985: x). Through analyzing Dutch-Moroccan youth's readings of the status of music in Islam, it becomes clear that religious imagery and socio-cultural dynamics are at play at the same time and how discrepancies between theory and practice are justified.

To start with a quick scan of the interviewees' points of view on this topic, of the seventeen respondents in the consumer category, there were ten interviewees who stated that they do not consider music *haram*. Four of them stated that some music may be *haram*. Five of the seventeen agreed that music is *haram*, although for most of them this did not mean that they abstained from music or banned music from their lives. Rather, they accepted their own behaviour with regard to listening music as something sinful and maybe even dangerous. Two of the interviewees did not state any argument or did not have an opinion. From the interviews I have reconstructed the elements and criteria that are important in the assessment of music's permissibility and that lead the interviewees to their final judgment: *haram*, *halal*, or something in between.

The interviewees indicated several elements that can make music *haram*. The most important ones are as follows. First, devoting too much time to music is *haram*. Second, the content of the lyrics should not be about un-Islamic topics, such as drugs, alcohol, or sex. Third, the social context within which the music is performed or enjoyed should be in accordance with Islamic norms. Fourth, the kind of people present when making or listening to music also defines to a certain extent what is acceptable and what not. Fifth, the associations certain genres may evoke play a decisive role in what kind of music can be played in whose presence. Finally, the fact that music can influence your emotional state of mind and consequently can affect your behaviour and possibly make you lose your inhibitions is considered an important element why music could become *haram*.

In the next interview fragment, Bilal presents a rather fuzzy narrative in which the first criterion of 'time' plays an important role. He seems to agree with the fact that if one devotes too much time to it, or gets distracted from religious duties, that music is, in those cases, *haram*. He also refers to a *hadith* that considers some musical instruments *haram*. But, then again he does not explicitly make a connection between the reason why certain instruments are forbidden and the aspect of emotion:

"I agree [that music is *haram*]. They are right. Because, you see, music is emotion. Sometimes you are listening to music and the *mu'addhin*<sup>12</sup> is calling for prayer and you know that that is *haram*. And emotion is music. And there is one *hadith* that clearly states that the trumpet or *mesmar*<sup>13</sup> is *haram*. But not all instruments are *haram*. Because the prophet, when he arrived in Medina, he was welcomed with a music band. So, euhhh...not all music is *haram*, per se. But certain musical instruments are. According to that one *hadith*, the *mesmar* and instruments with strings, like a guitar, a violin, and contra bass, are *haram*."

MG: "And euhm..."

Bilal: [interrupting my question]: "And you want to know how I explain the dissonance [in my behaviour]? That I know that music is *haram*, and I still listen to it? Well, that is exactly like someone who knows that smoking is bad for your health, but still smokes....I think I am not a good believer. That is the only explanation I have. [Bilal starts to nervously tap his fingers on the table]...Sometimes you know that stuff is *haram*, just like smoking. You know smoking is *haram*, but then you should just have the courage to say that. I know that it is *haram* and that I should ask Allah for forgiveness and not just make up excuses, this and that. I belong to that category of people that admits to the faults we make. If I commit adultery, I know it is *haram*, but I will not explain it by saying: ohh it was love and this and that. You see? So, euhh..."

Bilal's opinion on the status of music is not really clear-cut. He seems to agree with the *hadith* that states that some instruments are *haram* and does not dispute this idea. As a consequence, he comes to the conclusion that most of the music he listens to is *haram*, because it uses *haram* instruments and because it may distract him from performing religious duties. He also states that music might keep you from listening to the call to prayer, and that music is emotion. It is not clear whether Bilal literally means that music prevents you from *hearing* the actual call to prayer or that he means that listening to music *prevents* you from answering the call to prayer and



performing your prayers. In any case however, besides music, there are a lot of other things that could distract someone from doing his religious duties, such as playing sports or hanging out with friends. In that case, it is not so much the music itself that is considered *haram*, but the fact that an activity prevents someone from practising his religion. All in all, since he listens to music that he considers *haram*, Bilal concludes that he is not a good Muslim.

Bilal gives the impression of struggling with the fact that he enjoys and consumes music on a daily basis, which, at the same time, he considers *haram*: "I am not a good believer." Yet, Bilal is also quick to notice that many 'other Muslims' are not as courageous as he is, referring to a category of people who will not come clean and own up to the 'faults' they make. By stressing his honesty about what he considers his own illicit conduct, and the suspected hypocrisy of others who do the same thing, Bilal seems to compensate his own 'bad' behaviour. Bilal's justification is based on his good intentions and he bends the boundaries of theory into the direction of his own practice.

The second element that can make music *haram* is the content of the lyrics. The content of the lyrics, as a majority of the respondents explained, is a significant factor in determining whether the music or performance is legitimate. Majdi says:

"As a Muslim you cannot listen to music which talks about alcohol. So, the fact that some music is forbidden, I can understand. But it depends on the lyrics. I mean, nice music on *da'wa*<sup>14</sup> and positive things, why not?"

Interviewee Amal describes how and why lyrics may be a dangerous element, but again, her discourse combines several other criteria as well, referring to religious and socio-cultural aspects. Besides the fact that this fragment, and others as well, clarify that music is often not taken for granted in many Dutch-Moroccan households, it also demonstrates how, despite a certain upbringing, this young lady presents her choice as a personal, individual choice that is not the result of social pressure or advice of some religious authority, but is the result of her own argumentation. This attitude was present among all the interviewees.

MG: "How was it at home when you grew up? Did your parents ever put some music on?"

Amal: "Well, when my father was around: never."

MG: "Never?"

Amal: "No, no, in that case, there was no music played in the house."

MG: "So, you too never played a cassette yourself when he was around?"

Amal: "No, no. Because, you know...the lyrics, euh. Then you'll hear somebody sing 'I love you' and my father was not too keen on that. Still nowadays. My father does not listen to music, because, as a Muslim, yeah, that's an interpretation of everybody; officially you cannot listen to music. So, my father does not listen to music at all, actually."

MG: "But he did not prevent you from..."

Amal [interrupting me]: "Yes, but you know, that's the weird thing with Moroccans, there are never any consistent rules, you know. One time you can do it, at weddings music is played loudly, while on the other hand, when you are sitting with your parents, then, because out of respect for them, you don't play music, because music means dancing, and yes,...you just don't do that with your parents. They know that you listen to music, but out of respect not with them."

MG: "But how can you reconcile or explain this to yourself? I mean: do you agree with people who say that it is *haram*?"

Amal: 'Music, you mean?'

MG: "Yes."

Amal: "Well, a friend of mine, who I regularly keep in touch with, and who knows a lot about Islam, he really doesn't listen to music and he says: 'It is just bad, because it influences your mood'. You go and watch a scary movie without sound, and then the movie is not scary anymore. The sound, what that does to you! And he says: 'When you are feeling down and you listen to a heavy-hearted singer like Mary J. Blige, which I used to do a lot when I was feeling down, really: you can feel it coming down on you.' And suppose you feel a little bit out of it and you put on some music [Amal starts singing: 'It's raining men, hallelujah'] and then afterwards you feel like the world is at your feet. It is weird, right, that music can do such a thing to you? I understand from an Islamic point of view, only Allah is allowed to do that, you know. He affects your mood, and that has to come from within yourself. Because, yeah, there are certain R&B songs that can give you the urge to make love to somebody, let's be honest! Well, then...I can understand that they say: no, that is not right, I can understand that."

Later on in the interview it becomes clear that her father does listen to music:

MG: "How did you ever get to know about Umm Kulthum?<sup>15</sup> Not through your father, I guess?"

Amal: "Well, actually yes, through my father! To be honest...yes...my father, funny, right? Yes, because she has earned a lot of respect...Umm Kulthum was somebody that my father could listen to, because...well, she could sing about love, but she doesn't sing about it with the kinds of words we were just talking about: bumping and grinding and winding'...She's more like: 'the eyes that fly away...' you know, these are poems and that is acceptable for my father."

This interview fragment shows how the interviewees see music not as intrinsically *haram*, but explain how, on different levels, it may become 'shameful' or *haram*. Listening to music in a private sphere, in the presence of your parents may result in a 'shameful situation' when, for example, the lyrics of a song talk about love or even sex. The music of Umm Kulthum for example, is assumed to be decent, classical music and lyrically very poetic. That is why playing Umm Kulthum in the presence of parents is not considered *haram*. On the other hand, music during a more public event, such as a wedding, usually does not result in 'shameful' situations; on the contrary, it is often seen as an inherent part of it.

Besides the lyrics, the environment and social context in which the music is made and listened to is important. The student Fatima clearly describes the kind of context making music *haram*, in her eyes:

"I always say: *Allahu 'alim*.<sup>16</sup> It's got more to do with the atmosphere surrounding it [the music]. For example, dancing in itself, you cannot make me believe that that is *haram*. But I can imagine that if you're dancing and you're almost half naked and you are in a cafe with people drinking [alcohol] and you are merely seen as a sex object by those men and they can all touch you, whatever, then I think: OK, that is kind of a sinful concept. But if you are dancing and you are just among women, and you just want to have some fun, and you are dancing with each other, just moving nicely, there is nothing wrong with that. And with music it is the same thing."

The people present when listening and enjoying music also play a role. Several respondents indicated that they did not listen to music in the presence of their parents 'out of respect'. In the same way that many Dutch-Moroccan young men admit to smoking, but never in the vicinity of their parents, some interviewees stated that they did not listen to music in the

presence of their parents. Female student Zohra mentions that not only sexually tinted lyrics, but also lyrics about love, and sadness cause shame:

“I would never listen to music in the presence of my parents. Shame for topics such as love and sadness makes me not want to do that. That is a kind of unspoken protocol: you don’t do that.”

However, besides the lyrics, the associations a certain music genre evokes, also play a role in why certain music is not listened to in front of parents. As the interview with Amal already illustrated, her choice for playing music in the presence of her parents is determined by the genre and its associations: she could listen to Umm Kulthum with her father, but would never enjoy R&B music with her father, because R&B often has quite sexually loaded lyrics. In general, the reputation and associations of a certain music genre play an important role in the degree of its legitimacy. *Anasheed* music (religious songs praising the prophet or Islam in general) is frequently mentioned as acceptable music that could be enjoyed with parents, whereas *raï* music, which is associated with alcohol use and ‘dirty lyrics’ about alcohol, love, and sex, is not considered appropriate to enjoy with parents, but can be listened to privately. Schade-Poulsen describes a similar phenomenon in his study on the reception of *raï* music in Algeria (Schade-Poulsen 1991: 101, 148-149).

Several degrees of legitimacy exist, based on the genres’ and the artists’ reputations and song lyric repertoire. The appropriateness depends on the social context and the categories of people present: in private spaces in the company of parents, one could listen to, for example, classical Egyptian music such as Umm Kulthum, *anasheed*, or traditional folkloric Moroccan music (such as *Souassa* music), but not to *raï* music or R&B. In public spheres, such as a Moroccan dance party with a predominantly young audience and no social control of parents or other family members, there could be played R&B or *raï* music.

A final ‘dangerous’ aspect of music that is put forward by the interviewees, is that it might influence someone’s emotional state or behaviour, as Samira reasons: “[T]his can and may only be done by Allah.” Other respondents also affirmed that music can make someone give in to his passions or become absorbed in another, imaginary world that could have a negative effect on someone’s behaviour. Ali says:

“Music is emotion; identification with another fantasy world, if that world is bad, then that is not good for you. That is why I understand that some people say that music is *haram*.”

The objection to music here focuses on the danger of losing control over your feelings, your emotions, your behaviour, or of changing your mood by means of music. Amal also clearly described how on a spiritual, religious level, music can become the cause of a situation that is *haram*. Losing control over your emotions and bodily movements and changing your mood is something that should only be caused by Allah. And when this is brought about by music, then it is something *haram*, according to Amal and some other interviewees. Zohra refers to several of these points as well:

“*Ulama*<sup>17</sup> just say: music is *haram*. Most of them, anyway. Music can lead to moving on the rhythm and that can lead to dancing of women, dancing women and men, and if you do that one time, then the next time you’ll think it is okay. It can lead to sensual and sexual feelings; women dancing in front of men, and also the other way around, ha-ha. And that’s something you, as a Muslim, ought to avoid... The fact that music is forbidden has also to do with shame and faith... Music can affect your *iman* [faith], it keeps you from doing serious things you can do for your religion, like reading the Qur’an, praying and stuff. For example, if you listen to music while actually you should be praying, then that is not right. But my sister listens to a lot of music, although she is very much occupied with her faith in a principled way. She always says her prayers on time.”

It is noteworthy that the interviewees advocate an active and personal approach that focuses on the notion of control: controlling emotions and behaviour, controlling a personal relationship with God, controlling your own reputation, are all recurring elements in the discourses on music and Islam. This is also an indication that the interviewees find a certain degree of autonomy and self-rule regarding the choices they make very important. This idea is also advocated by Qaradawi who, specifically on the topic of music and singing, puts Muslims’ individual responsibility forward as one of the criteria that Muslims should use in the assessment of the permissibility of music.

In the previous exploration, I have tried to show how Dutch-Moroccan youth position themselves in the debate about music and Islam and shift their focus from what they assume to be written down in theory and their own practices. Their different views make clear how a normative dis-

course on the incompatibility of music and Islam is implicitly present in the respondents' minds, although it is not clear-cut. As most of the respondents do not base their view on that of an imam or any other religious authority, their interpretations of what is *halal* and *haram* are individualized and personalized. It is especially valuable to them to believe that they make and construct their individual opinion on this topic, choice, even though their idea may be based on the ideas of Qaradawi, Al Ghazali, or any other religious authority figure.

On a more general level, this debate on the compatibility of music and Islam is limited to Dutch-Moroccans. Therefore, this debate serves as a line along which identification processes between Dutch-Moroccans take shape. Dutch-Moroccan youth articulate their point of view in relation to the 'Dutch-Moroccan other'. The debate on music is therefore not so much a debate between, for example, conservative and liberal Dutch-Moroccan Muslims, but much more a tool for Dutch-Moroccan youths to mark their particular position as different from their parents, their peers and other Dutch-Moroccan Muslims. In this sense, the debate on the permissibility of music in Islam and the position Dutch-Moroccan youth take in it, operate also as a tool to shape boundaries between different fractions.

The way participants use this debate is in line with Amir-Moazami and Salvatore's ideas on how different ways of veiling by Muslim women in Europe can become:

“...[A]n element in a strategy of life politics based on a 'distinction' in the Bourdieuan sense, though not in the first instance in terms of belonging to a certain social class, but rather in the sense of belonging to the group of 'good' versus 'less good' Muslim” (Amir-Moazami and Salvatore 2003: 63).

Along these lines, the debate on music and Islam is an instrument in an identification process that is constructed by and among Dutch-Moroccan youth: it enables them to discuss with other Dutch-Moroccans, who are familiar with the controversial and ambivalent nature of the topic and all of its sensitivities, therefore enabling them to distinguish themselves from their debate opponents and connecting themselves to those with the same ideas. Their views formulated in this debate therefore facilitate articulation of a specific identification with other Dutch-Moroccans sharing their views and simultaneously it facilitates a process of setting oneself apart from other Dutch-Moroccans with whom one disagrees.

*My life, my choice: an individual approach*

The discourses of Dutch-Moroccan youth on the compatibility of music and Islam embody several degrees of legitimacy of certain music. The discourses are rooted in religious imagery and socio-cultural norms on what is acceptable behaviour. In the way the interviewees articulate and create these discourses, a tendency towards individualism and putting one's own personal views at the centre can be seen. All of the respondents present *their* discourse as being based on their own personal choices and their personal ideas and beliefs. Authoritative, Islamic sources that might have inspired them are therefore not clearly described. Rather, the general trend in the interviews I conducted with consumers, male and female,<sup>18</sup> is that all of the interviewees have a very individual and active attitude towards the topic of music and Islam and towards the construction of their Islamic life and identity in general.

All the discourses have thus one common denominator: a personalized attitude towards religion in their life and in overall society, meaning that the interviewees present their discourses as individually constructed, not limited by external opinions or 'unwanted advice.' The interviews displayed a high degree of individuality. Some examples:

MG: "What would you do if someone tried to convince you that music is *haram*?"

Dounia: "I would say: 'you listen very carefully, that's my business and not yours. You are who you are and I am who I am, fortunately everybody will have its own grave later on, and I will be judged by my deeds and you by yours. Look, that you don't listen to music, does not make you a Saint and that you are all that. Who knows what you are doing wrong? So, let's accept everyone the way they are.'"

Souad: "I think you should not judge others... I do not see why music should be forbidden. The <sup>ʿ</sup>*ulama* themselves do not even agree with each other, so there is no clarity. It is just like some Muslims who refuse to shake hands with other people, because this may trigger erotic feelings of lust. Well, when I shake hands with somebody I don't think of such kinds of things. So, why shouldn't I shake hands?"

MG: "You just said that <sup>ʿ</sup>*ulama* say that music is *haram*. Did people in your surroundings ever confront you with this?"

Zohra.: "People in my surroundings like my father and my brother did mention once or twice that you should not listen to music. But I don't even listen to music that much anyway, so that is not so bad. And if I would listen to music more, then I would never listen to music in front of my parents. Shame for topics such as love and sadness make me not wanna do that. Those are a kind of implicit protocols; you just don't do that. People have told me time and again: do not listen to music, but listen to the Qur'an. I listen to the Qur'an as well, but sometimes I listen to music. I have certain music that I listen to and [to justify that] I have kind of developed my own theories on that [which she explained earlier in the interview: she does not listen to music that much, she only listens to quiet, peaceful music with respectable lyrics, for example Marcel Khelifa's music, and she does not let music distract her from her religious duties]."

These interview fragments show how the interviewees' opinions represent a personal, individual way of constructing their Islamic life, or at least in the perception of the interviewees. They promote a personal relationship with God and they disapprove of other people's interference in their religious life. They uphold the idea that each person has his/her own responsibility and accountability, also vis-à-vis his or her relationship with God. This individual responsibility is also found in Qaradawi's book where he writes on singing and music and he states that "each individual is the best judge of himself" (Qaradawi 1994: 303). In general, they advocate a general freedom of choice and speech. Nadia Fadil, who studied Moroccan girls in Belgium and their attitudes towards Islam, states that, "at the level of the individual 'believer' religious practice is no longer the consequence of prescription, but rather of choice" (Fadil 2003: 19). This way, they can justify their own practices, i.e. choices, towards what is, according to them, acceptable Islamic behaviour.

Many Muslims in post-migration contexts attribute great value to making individual choices, as Olivier Roy also notes. He explains that because of the lack of a total Islamic environment, Muslims in Europe have to make deliberate, conscious choices to practice Islam. Whereas in Saudi Arabia social pressure implicitly forces people to 'be' Muslim, in Europe, this pressure is lacking. Practising Islam then becomes an individual, rather than a communal choice (Roy 2002: 76-79). This attitude also shines through in most of the interviewees' narratives.

Phalet and Ter Wal also report on a trend of individualization of Islam among second-generation Dutch-Moroccans (Phalet and Ter Wal 2004: 39). They conclude that although participation in religious rituals and mosques



is decreasing among second-generation Turks and Moroccans, their identification with Islam remains present. Yet, Dutch-Moroccans have a selective and critical attitude towards the traditional Islam of their parents, at least traditional in the eyes of the children, and prefer a more personal, individual interpretation.

The interviewees' individual approach towards religion becomes clear in the general outlook they have on the way their parents experience Islam. The standpoint that Islam is not necessarily something that you just 'take over' from your parents is common among many members of second-generation Dutch-Moroccans (see De Koning 2008). The identification with Islam is, in fact, regularly an identification process where one relates one's own behaviour, lifestyle, and mindset to that of other Muslims, who are often also his/her peers. This identification process is more than often actively constructed by using all kinds of sources available to them: searching the Internet for information on Islam, searching in the Qur'an and *ahadith* to support a particular opinion, debating with peers and others, resisting conformism, making individual choices etc.<sup>19</sup>

This individual approach is facilitated by two factors. First, the individualized approach is related to the lack of Islamic consensus, for instance with respect to the issue of the permissibility of music and performance (Roy 2002: 76). As a result of this dispute, Dutch-Moroccan youth tap into different religious, Islamic and non-religious discourses in order to defend, explain and justify their own actions and arguments regarding their musical preferences, productions, and consumptions.

Second, this trend towards individualization of Islam is connected to the fact that Muslims take up a minority position in the Netherlands. Obviously, the Netherlands is not a society embedded in Islamic norms and behavioural codes. Olivier Roy suggests that, although Islamic codes regarding lawful and unlawful behaviour have always been an important issue for Muslims, it seems as if for the Muslims living in diasporas, the *halal-haram* classification has become increasingly important (Roy 2002:75-79, 140). Due to migration, religious securities are no longer present, as the new society in which Muslims live, is not intrinsically an Islamic society, in which all kinds of cultural and social institutions operate as guidelines for 'correct' Islamic behaviour. In case of migration, this loss of a comprehensive Islamic environment, which Roy calls 'religious certainties', sometimes results in a preoccupation with categorizing all aspects of life, including music, into *haram* and *halal* categories, in order to create some kind of religious certainties and

guidelines that can help Muslims direct their lives in an Islamic way (Roy 2002: 76 and 140).

As a consequence, practising Islam has to be a deliberate choice, rather than an automatism triggered by social conformism. This means that Muslims living as a minority in non-Islamic countries are much more inclined to reflect on their conduct and choices in life in an Islamic way. This attitude is also reproduced in how Dutch-Moroccan youth emphasize that their way of practising Islam is an individual choice. Their Muslimness is expressed in their individual relationship with Islam, rather than in a communal relationship. Being Muslim is no longer intrinsically the same as being part of an Islamic community or society and conforming to social norms, but becomes an individual identification process (ibid.: 78).

The importance of the individual and the value attributed to making individual choices is reflected in the way they assess the permissibility of music (and musical activities) as Islamic or not. This assessment is based on the ability to execute an Islamic form of self-control. For both young Dutch-Moroccan men and women controlling their conduct and having power over a certain situation is an important focal point around which the issue of compatibility of Islam and music revolves. All the objections put forward 'against' music and certain contexts in which music takes place, relate in one way or another to a 'fear of losing control': sexually loaded song lyrics can instigate feelings of lust, i.e. loss of control over emotions. Listening to sexually loaded lyrics in the presence of others, especially parents can prompt feelings of shame. Music can distract you from performing religious duties, which could be interpreted as a loss of control over your relationship with God. Performing music on stage as an artist or visiting a musical event as a fan can jeopardize your reputation, because of the associations with sex, drugs, and rock 'n roll and cause the loss of control over your honour. The presence of a mixed audience at a musical event can result in dancing and consequently can bring about feelings of love and lust. Loss of self-control, over one's body and one's honour are thus important criteria in the assessment of the permissibility of music and performance.

#### **4. The producers' views on the compatibility of music, performance, and Islam**

DJs, rappers, singers, and party-organizers, i.e. producers and their perceptions of the compatibility of music, performance, and Islam vary. Their position in this debate is probably more problematic because of the

publicness of their musical activities. Six out of ten considered music not *haram*. Two were in doubt and one did not have an opinion, whereas one of them stated that music is in fact illicit in Islam.

Lamia (female Dutch-Moroccan rapper): "I tell you straight up, [the fact that some people say music is *haram*], it doesn't do much for me. I know why I make music; I know who I am and what I believe in. And I mean: during the prophet's lifetime there was poetry and the Qur'an is poetry. It was a totally different time. Now we live in a different time. As long as your intentions are good, then only God can judge you. To me it [making music] is pure."

DJ Mo: "There are four different currents in Islam that all have different interpretations regarding the question if music is 'haram' or not. The Salafiyya say in any case that music is *haram*. And it is always said in Islam: if you have doubts about whether you are allowed to do something or not, you should NOT do it. So, then you would say: no music. But well, it is my passion, my life. I have done a bit of research into this during the past Ramadan month, and I have searched in the Qur'an for verses that state that music is *haram*. I have not found such a verse anywhere. I think it is written in some *hadith*...But, well, you can also do good and positive things with music, and I don't do any harm with it. I mean, when I am DJ-ing somewhere at night and entertaining the people, then at least we are not out stealing or something."

DJ Hamid: "I always say: everybody for themselves and God for everybody. I make music and I love music. I cannot live without music. That has always been my message, and I will keep repeating it. Somebody who believes in Islam and believes that music is *haram*. That is his interpretation. But I am different. And I don't judge others...Music can be a good thing. If you know how to use music well, it can be a very good thing. Music gives peace of mind."

Hicham: "Actually, it [performing music like we do] is *haram*. If the aim of a party is for men to celebrate among themselves, then it is no problem. But playing music...but actually if you play music, you should, euhhh,...[if you want to make *halal* music] you should sing about the prophet...But we never sing about anything negative...My answer is: music is *haram* if you play for a mixed audience, with men and women and there is alcohol served, then actually it is *haram*."

Again, the producers (male and female) put much emphasis on the personal nature of the relationship they have with God. Their commitment to an individual approach towards Islam was maybe even stronger than among the consumers. In addition, the intent with which music is made is very important for most artists. As Hicham explains, even though from a strict theological point of view, he considers his profession as a singer *haram*, his good intentions compensate for this. As consumer Bilal also stated (see page 159) DJ Hamid's argument too links up to the importance of good intentions. Here we see how the good intentions of a practice can prevail over the fact that in theory, hypothetically, one finds such a practice *haram*.

A similar line of thought is articulated by Muslim musicians of the Indian Khalifa community in the UK. Baily describes how a musician with a Khalifa Muslim background struggles with the negativity surrounding music in his community. Although, on the one hand, this musician acknowledges the unlawfulness of music in Islam, he counters this with the statement that he doesn't do "anything wrong with music" (Baily 2006: 266). Besides, considering the fact that many of the producers depend on their music for their livelihood, it is not so surprising that a majority of the interviewees strongly disagree with the statement that music is *haram*.

In theory, most artists, female as well as male, consider their profession not un-Islamic. However, in practice, many artists are confronted with others who may state that their musical activities are *haram*. For female artists, this confrontation occurs even more often. They experience more problems in their careers and personal lives than their male colleagues. This relates to the ambiguity in Islamic rulings on the permissibility of music *and* the position of women in public, and to a general negative, and sometimes disapproving, attitude that often surrounds female performers in Muslim communities. Their status is often deemed lower than that of male artists. Female artists are subjected to the idea that they practise an immoral profession.

## **5. The complex position of female performers in Muslim communities**

The position of female artists in many Muslim communities is not unproblematic. The status of female performers, female visitors of musical events, female musicians, and female dancers in many Muslim communities is ambivalent and often controversial.<sup>20</sup> In Egypt, for instance, public opinion considers female performers and entertainers to be involved in a

shameful profession (Van Nieuwkerk 1995: 2). Bart Barendregt has written on Southeast Asia where a new style of Islamic popular culture is developing and manoeuvring itself between religiously accepted behaviour and 'the eroticism of pop music'. The debate in Southeast Asia focuses in particular on female *anasheed* performers who have to deal with "the taboo on women singing in public, claiming that the female voice is part of the *aurat*, the parts of the body that must be concealed" (Barendregt 2006: 10).

The ambivalence surrounding female performers is also present in the Dutch-Moroccan community. One of the main driving forces behind the debate is an Islamic ideology that considers the female body as a sexual body, as opposed to the male body that is considered to be an economic body. This line of thought always associates female bodies to sexuality, whereas for male bodies this is not the case. Van Nieuwkerk explains:

"The definition of women as sexual beings and the female body as enticing is thus a very powerful discourse. It explains why female entertainers are shameful and bad, while, for instance, their male colleagues are not condemned for similar activities. The female body is shameful because it is by definition eroticizing and enticing, whereas the male body has several dimensions and is not seductive by nature. The male body, although sexual in presence of a female body, has other dimensions – for instance in the economic or political field" (Van Nieuwkerk 1998a: 29).

This also explains the often more difficult routes of female Dutch-Moroccan artists compared to their male colleagues.

A statement often heard in the Arab-Islamic world, and which is echoed in layers of Muslim communities in the West, is that women artists and performers are regarded as 'fallen women', whereas male performers are regarded with much less ambivalence and more neutrality. The bad reputation of female performers, singers and dancers in the Islamic world has to do with several factors, but all of them amount to the sensitive relationship between public space, social order, and gender. As I have described earlier, the female body is often associated with sexuality, and the male body is not. Hence, the role of gender relations in the debate on music and performance is crucial.

Van Nieuwkerk describes how in Egypt female singers are often discredited by the saying: *sawt el mar'a<sup>c</sup>awra*, which could be translated as "the voice of a woman is a shameful thing [lit. pudenda]" (Van Nieuwkerk 1998: 28). In Egypt, this is another element complicating the position of female

performers, and in particular female singers (Van Nieuwkerk 1998: 28). What does the term mean? *ʿawra* is a complex notion that links up women, sexuality, and shameful things, including parts of the body that should be concealed (Ahmed 1992: 116). Van Nieuwkerk refers to Al-Ghazali to explain the concept in reference to female performers. Al Ghazali states that the voice of a woman could seduce a (male) listener. He continues to say that, for men, it is dangerous to be tempted: "Avoiding temptation is the rule which ought to be followed and only if temptation is feared is music unlawful" (Al-Ghazali 1901: 235-237 quoted by Van Nieuwkerk 1998a: 8). Not only a female body, but also a female voice is considered to be something that can arouse sexual feelings among male listeners and this should be avoided, according to Al-Ghazali (Van Nieuwkerk 1995: 166-167).

In general, the presence of women, i.e. their bodies and their voices, in Muslim public space has always been a source of debate throughout Islamic history. According to Moroccan sociologist Fatima Mernissi, women can become potentially dangerous for society at large because they are able to create *fitna* (a notion often explained as 'disorder') in society, in public spaces. Mernissi states that in many Muslim societies women are seen as "uncontrollable representatives of sexuality" and could have a destructive effect on society (Mernissi 1985: 44). Although Mernissi considers *fitna* as one of the focal points in Islamic cultures, it remains to be seen to what extent the notion of *fitna* influences the behaviour of Muslim men and women in society.

In general in Muslim societies, female artists are considered more shameful than, for instance, female employees who also have to move through and be in public spaces. The reason for disapproval of female artists is an issue of alternation between cause and effect. Willy Jansen (1987) describes how cause and effect of the behaviour of female professional singers in Algeria *both* work to sustain their dishonourable status. The discourse on the status of female singers in the Algerian region studied by Jansen consists of both religious, Islamic notions and notions of social class and cultural background.

First, Jansen explains how these Algerian female professional singers are regarded as dishonoured, because of their origin.

"Musicians are disrespectable because their families merit no respect. Yet, this is not only a cause but also an effect. It is also argued that someone must be of servant origins because she is a musician" (Jansen 1987: 192).

Mobility of female singers is another aspect of their behaviour, which is at the same time a cause and an effect of their low status.

“Singers are perceived as indecent because of their mobility, or in reverse, perceived as mobile because they are indecent. They have to go over the street to the place of performance and return unaccompanied late at night” (ibid).

In addition, Jansen mentions the common belief that considers singing to be improper behaviour for women. Singing in front of men in public spaces is thought of as even more despicable. The publicness of female singing may become even more shameful because of the content of the song lyrics. Finally, Jansen states that in Algeria female artists are considered immoral, because they are associated with dancing, equating them with moving female bodies in public. Besides the voice of a woman, her movements can also lead to *fitna*. Dancing in public, in front of a male audience, is considered *haram*, because it attracts attention to their sexual female bodies.

For those Muslims who regard the female body merely as a sexual body, and believe that the male body becomes sexual only when in the presence of a female body, a female artist quickly falls into the category of immoral professions. According to this line of reasoning, female artists use their sexual bodies in order to make money, which explains why female performers are often considered similar to prostitutes, who also use their bodies to earn a living (Van Nieuwkerk 1995: 29-30). Fatima, talking about famous female Moroccan singer Najat Aatabou, articulates it clearly and bluntly:

“Yeah, for a party she is all right. But besides that, they [the Moroccans] don’t take her seriously, of course...In Morocco Najat Aatabou is seen as a *shikha*, a *shikha* is a little dancer, well nice. But she is not considered an artist.”

The word *shikha* literally means elderly woman in Arabic, but with a negative connotation. As opposed to the male version, *shikh*, which is an honourable term used to describe an elderly, wise man, within the context of music, the term *shikha* has negative connotations and is used in North Africa to describe a woman musician who sings promiscuous songs, is unmarried, smokes, drinks alcohol, and uses male instruments such as the flute. Very often she is also associated with prostitution (Jansen 1989: 195; Virolle 1995; Schade-Poulsen 1999: 16).<sup>21</sup>

In conclusion, I would like to cite Jansen’s crucial argument that:

"...music is seen as obscene when it disrupts the dominant gender ordering in its contents, and when it disrupts the concomitant sound barriers between the genders...Singing like dancing, laughing, or talking loudly is an exhibition of one's presence and one's sexuality, and a lack of control and 'weight'" (Jansen 1987: 193-194).

In review, the negative approach towards female performers is related to Islamic religious imagery on the one hand and to cultural discourses on the position of women in public space and in overall society on the other hand. Especially the presence of the '*fitna*-creating female body' in public is what provokes some Muslims to support the segregation of the sexes in public as well as in private spaces.

Thus, speaking in general terms on music, gender and Islam, we could state that within some Muslim societies and communities, female artists are regarded with more negativity than their male colleagues. Male performers are merely practising their profession, making money and providing for their family, whereas women performers are considered sexual bodies, making money, seducing their audiences, and therefore belong to the same category as prostitutes. Of course, it should be said that not all Muslims think alike and adhere to these ideas. Dutch-Moroccan youth are not inclined to cling to these negative ranges of thought concerning female performers. However, the stories of female Dutch-Moroccan performers make apparent that these 'Islamic ideas' on female performers have a great impact on the way they are perceived by the Dutch-Moroccan community.

### *Defence strategies: Conformity versus individuality*

By presenting the narratives of two Dutch-Moroccan female artists, Chadia and Farida, I clarify how they both, each in her own specific way, tries to manage her womanhood, her Muslim-ness, her Moroccan background and her artistic personalities. What kind of strategies do they develop in order to harmonize all these different elements? How do they deal with the negativity surrounding female performers? What defence strategies do they develop in order to acquire acceptance by their Dutch-Moroccan communities and how do they try to obtain respectability as an artist?

The interviews reveal how they both deal with different boundaries, boundaries they have set for themselves, or are imposed upon them by others. These boundaries include, for example, what they consider appropriate content of their song lyrics, the appropriate way of dressing themselves (on



stage) and their behaviour in general. Acting within these boundaries is necessary for them to be proper artists.

Chadia is a 21-year-old singer born in a small village in the south of the Netherlands into a Moroccan family. She has been singing since she was three years old, according to her parents, and she has been performing her talents since she was twelve years old. She has performed in Morocco regularly and she has even become somewhat of a celebrity over there. At present, she is working on her debut album, which is yet to be released. Her music is a mix of Arab and Western styles, which she herself calls 'oriental R&B'. Her lyrics are sung in Arabic-Moroccan dialect, in English and sometimes even in Hindi. Besides her music, she also studies international trade at an intermediate vocational education level. She calls herself Muslim. She does not wear a veil or headscarf.

Farida is a thirty-something youth worker with a higher vocational education diploma. She is also a resident in the south of the Netherlands. Farida was born in a small town in a southern region of Morocco (*Souss*), but when she was still a baby her family moved to a small town in the south of the Netherlands, where she still lives. She is a semi-professional lead vocalist in a band. Farida regularly writes lyrics in a Moroccan-Berber language called *Shilha*<sup>22</sup>, which has inspired many music critics to label the band as a 'Moroccan rock band', much to Farida's annoyance. The band has finished the recordings for their first album (2004), which is yet to be released and financed by their own funding.<sup>23</sup> She calls herself Muslim. She does not wear a veil or headscarf.

Although Chadia and Farida both assert their Muslimness and Moroccanness, the meaning they assign to them and the extent to which their Muslimness and Moroccanness guide their thinking and acting is quite different. Particularly interesting is the way they deal with the discourse on music, Islam, and gender. As I demonstrated earlier in section (see page 161), female performers often raise much more controversy in Muslim communities than male performers. These two young talented female artists are confronted with this controversy and have to find a way to deal with it. What strategies have they developed in order to obtain respectability as female artists among the Dutch-Moroccan community? To what extent does the way they behave, act, dress and sing, contribute to the purpose of measuring up to the norms of accepted behaviour for women in public? How do they deal with this gender trap?

The strategies that Chadia and Farida developed in order to overcome the obstacles and ambivalences projected upon them are, of course, not

the only possible strategies. It is not unlikely that between conformism and rebellion other options are possible as well. I have limited my discussion here to the cases of Chadia and Farida, since they presented themselves so clearly in my research material and because the juxtaposition of these two cases demonstrates the restrictions, possibilities, obstacles and the search for new avenues for Dutch-Moroccan female performers so well.

### *Bint el bled: The respectable performer*

Chadia: "I hear it a lot, people telling me that I am normal and that I've just got what Morocco needs. They often say: girl of the country, *bint el bled*, that's what they always say. And that is really nice to hear. And it doesn't have to be all revealing and open, for all to see [referring to sexy clothes] And I don't like that. And that may be just what they [the Moroccans] need..."<sup>24</sup>

While talking to Chadia, what struck me most was her preoccupation with portraying herself as being a decent, proper and respectable artist. Decent, in this case, signifies a conformist attitude towards traditional Moroccan and Islamic culture. She was very much concerned with convincing me that she was a 'nice girl', i.e. not drinking alcohol, not wearing (too) revealing clothes, not socializing with unrelated men and people who are associated with alcohol, drugs, not associating herself to alcohol and sex, either through lyrics or being in places associated with it. Chadia refers to this image as being a *bint el bled*, literally meaning 'girl of the country'.

Sawsan El-Messiri described the term *bint el bled* in her book *Ibn al-Balad: A Concept of Egyptian Identity* (1978) as a category of lower and middle class women living in working class neighbourhoods in Cairo. Many of these women work outside the house, some of them are employees and a large part of them consists of housewives and mothers. In Egypt, a *bint el bled* is a term used to describe a woman who has to stand her ground in a world dominated by men. An Egyptian *bint el bled* is assertive and proud and not afraid to speak back to a man. Because in the working class neighbourhoods there is relatively more freedom for women to interact with men, a *bint el bled's* female identity has a different connotation than other Egyptian female identities.

Siebert, writing on Egyptian national identities, explains a slightly different concept than El-Messiri and defines the Egyptian version of the *bint el bled* concept as follows: '[*Bint el bled*] connotes a clever, modest, working-class girl - who, although living in an urban centre, still retains ties to tra-

dition and the old ways. This character and her male counterpart, the *ibn al-balad* ('son of the country') are important for Egyptian identity' (Siebert 2002: 52). The term *bint el bled* is also used in writings on Egyptian female performing artists, such as belly dancers. Van Nieuwkerk explains how Egyptian female performers consciously build on and use the image of *bint el bled* in order to restore or regain respect (Van Nieuwkerk: 1998: 32).

*Bint el bled* is an expression that is known and used in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia as well, although the meaning of the term differs from that in Egypt. The meaning of *bint el bled* in Northern Africa partly relates to Egypt's version, but is nonetheless very different from its Egyptian counterpart. In Egypt, the concept has a strong class component, since the term is used specifically for women in the lower working classes of Egyptian society. In the Maghreb, the element of class divisions is absent from its meaning. The concept is merely and solely used in a flattering way. Besides, it refers more to a specific female identity, as opposed to a national identity, since the North African version designates a girl whose character, behaviour, composure, and appearance is deemed Islamic, respectful, and proper.

In the Maghreb, it is common knowledge that a 'girl of the country' must be treated with respect. When a Dutch-Moroccan girl is called *bint el bled* in Morocco by Moroccans, it is a compliment. A compliment because the term stands for a woman who has not forgotten her roots, her people, her homeland and displays respect for and conforms to her origins, her culture, her traditions, by a specific way of talking, dressing, acting, and behaving. Moroccans in Morocco appreciating these characteristics in a girl or woman not living in Morocco, may express their respect and esteem for this type of woman by labelling her *bint el bled*.

The concept of *bint el bled* is often used in North Africa in opposition to the concept of the 'westernized, immoral woman', stereotypically meaning a girl dressing in revealing Western clothes, drinking alcohol, talking loudly, mingling with unrelated men, etc.<sup>25</sup> These stereotypical features of the Westernized woman are all related to aspects of (*haram*) conduct often associated with female musicians (see for instance Van Nieuwkerk 2003: 271 and Qaradawi 1994: 303).

Knowing the symbolic connotations and associations connected to the *bint el bled* identity, it may not come as a surprise that Chadia has chosen this particular image as her ideal model. The supposed features and characteristics of the *bint el bled* are the exact opposite of the supposed 'immoral qualities' of female performers and musicians. It makes sense therefore that Chadia wants to be a *bint el bled*. Not only when she is in Morocco, but also

in the Netherlands. She uses several tools available to her in order to achieve this goal, focusing on both form and content of her existence as an artist, such as dress and song lyrics. In fact, she tries to keep away from anything that may endanger her image as *bint el bled*, which sometimes results in a somewhat forced and unnatural narrative.

In addition, what is important in this image of *bint el bled* is to come from a family of good standing and have the moral support of the family. For Chadia this is also the case; her father is her manager, her mother her stylist, and her brothers her biggest fans, and most of the time her parents accompany her during her performances. Chadia also emphasizes that she has the total support of her family, and that she is not an outcast or banned from the family. Whether Chadia operates under her family's social control by her free will or not, it is obvious that the involvement of her family is the reason why Chadia so persistently tries to steer clear of anything that might jeopardize her *bint el bled*-reputation and possibly also her career as a singer. Without the support of her family, it would be far more difficult to pursue a career as a singer, as Chadia says.

*Increasing respectability, increasing legitimacy: Singing words that suit*

In due time, Chadia has grown to be very critical of the content of her song lyrics. As I said, most of her lyrics are in English or Arabic-Moroccan. The English lyrics are sometimes written by her, but at times, her producer or music composer provide lyrics for the songs. In the following fragment Chadia stresses the importance of the suitability of the lyrics with her personality. As she takes warning from the ideal *bint el bled* image, the content of her song lyrics must also match that image. Her identification with a *bint el bled* is reflected in how she shapes her musical repertoire, including lyrics.

"I just try to take it easy, and finish every thing [the songs] in my own pace...And this takes more time, that is why the album is not finished yet. I am still working on it and would really like to write and produce it myself; I think that is very important. Because, I have noticed how, every time someone else writes a song for me, it is every time just not IT. Every time it is not MY style, not what I like. And so it is just not working...And yeah, that's why I prefer to write my own lyrics. The lyrics they write..., they are just not that good. You know, just the other day I got some lyrics [from a producer] and they went something like this: '... drum... bla bla bla...like Cola is to Rum'. Well, excuse me, I would never say that.

That is not my style. Then I think: well I should just stick to my own style. I won't pretend to be someone I am not. It [the lyrics] should represent me."

...

M.G.: "Are there any topics you will definitely not sing about?"

Chadia: "To say it just like that is a bit weird, but I don't have to sing about intercourse."

M.G.: "In many R&B songs that is very common."

Chadia: "Yes, indeed, in R&B songs you hear that a lot. Yeah, you can sing about love; that is nice. But when I am not doing it, then I won't talk about it. So, I only talk about things that really interest me. So you won't catch me singing about stuff like that, ha-ha."

M.G.: "So, no raï-like lyrics on alcohol or something in your songs?"

Chadia: "No, I don't sing that either."

Thus, Chadia refuses to sing lyrics, which are not 'appropriate' for her. She told me she does not drink alcohol, so consequently she won't sing about it, not even when it is used as a metaphor for something else. Any references in her lyrics that may be associated, in one way or another, with taboo topics like alcohol or sex must be avoided. In addition, for an unmarried woman, it is not appropriate either to sing about sex. Since a true *bint el bled* is supposed to conform to religious and cultural discourse requiring a single woman to abstain from sexual relationships, Chadia would be sending out contradictory messages if she would sing about it.

### *Avoiding associations: Making nice music in a nice dress*

Chadia: "Alicia Keys is really one of my great idols. And Asala<sup>26</sup> as well, because I like simplicity, also when you're singing. It doesn't have to be all glamorous and open and revealing [the clothes]. I don't like that at all and Keys is a great example of that. For her it is all about the voice and the music. A nice look is great, but in the end it is the music that counts. With Asala it is the same thing: I have never seen her dressing in something like this (Chadia points to her chest, referring to wearing very low-cut and revealing clothes)."

As mentioned above, Chadia also uses her dress in order to reaffirm her image as a *bint el bled*. During the interview Chadia repeatedly tells me she prefers to dress neatly (by which she means not too revealing, sexy clothes) and she wears little make-up. She is nevertheless dressed in the latest fashion, often wearing jeans and tops revealing her neck, shoulders,

and part of her chest. The motivation for dressing this way is also reflected in the kind of artists she likes to listen to. By explaining why she loves Alicia Keys and Asala: not only because of their musical qualities, but also, or even more so, she likes these artists because they represent, in Chadia's opinion, images of decent artists.

Keeping up appearances and maintaining a good reputation is equally important for Chadia as the suitability of her song lyrics. Responding to my question if she could have chosen to make or sing *raï* music, she says the following:

"...*raï*? I would never sing *raï*. Every music genre has its own label, its own reputation. People who sing *raï*, they are in a totally different world than the world I live in. Such people are totally different from me. I don't know if you know what I mean? Ha-ha. *Sharki* artists, you don't see them standing with a bottle of Bacardi. I have never seen it, and it does not happen actually. And *raï* artists always [drink alcohol], except Faudel. That's why I am a fan of him, ha-ha."

So, singing *raï* is out of the question because of the bad reputation of the genre and its association with alcohol (ab)-use of its performers. Overall, I conclude that due to her clinging to the *bint el bled* ideal, she intensely tries to concretize this image in reality. In other words, Chadia tries to uphold her nice-girl image with everything that lies in her ability. At the end of the interview, it becomes clear that she considers her nice-girl image as a kind of compensation for her being a singer. As if she is trying to say: maybe I am doing something wrong, but at least I am doing it in a nice and positive way. This resembles the way consumer Bilal and producers Hicham and Hamid justify their musical practices, as described in section three.

"You know what it is? I don't spread any negative vibes. And I don't say that I will be singing the rest of my life. It is so diverse, I don't do anything bad...I mean, I don't drink, I am not performing on stage half naked, I try to portray a positive image of us, so then they have to understand it a little bit, actually, I think."

The fact that Chadia indicates that she is not planning to sing for the rest of her life is significant here. Several interviewees, when explaining for instance why they go to dance parties, make music or listen to music, talk about 'becoming serious when they are older'. This notion of 'becoming serious'<sup>27</sup> that I explained earlier in section one, has become a very common notion used by Dutch-Moroccan youth and boys in particular. The phenom-

enon of becoming serious revolves around the idea that when you are still young, you might not perform all Islam's duties, but you are supposed to start doing so, when you get older, often meaning from the moment you get married. We could conclude from this that a number of Dutch-Moroccans consider their youth as a period in which they are suspended from some social and religious duties.

Chadia's story is partly in line with this postponement of religious duties,<sup>28</sup> in particular the postponement of marriage and starting a family, which is expected from a woman her age. The way Chadia narrates her story gives the impression that she understands that some people may consider her status as an artist right now as flawed behaviour, and this is why she leaves the option open to resign from her musical career and follow a path more in conforming to traditional Moroccan culture, i.e. stop singing, get married and have children.

In conclusion, identifying with Islam is important for Chadia, in so far as Islam provides her with some moral guidelines as to whom she can talk to, what to wear, and what to sing about. Her Muslim identity seems to be based not so much on spiritual, religious Islamic content, but more on the link between Moroccanness and Muslimness, articulated in a form of conforming to socio-cultural Moroccan-Islamic rules and norms. In this sense, it appears that her identification with Muslims is linked to socio-cultural norms within the Dutch-Moroccan community and leans more towards a kind of cultural Muslimness that is shaped by religious, as well as cultural codes. In effect, it is her Moroccan, cultural background that seems to be of more importance to her. Obviously, the fact that she proudly reports of people in Morocco considering her as a *bint el bled*, indicates that she strives to be perceived as an *all-Moroccan girl*, although she is not living in Morocco.

Chadia's strategy to conform to her parents' Islamic norms, especially with respect to those aspects of Islam dealing with space, gender and sexuality, may be the result of deliberate and involuntary choices. The fact that her family is so much involved in her career enables her, on the one hand, to pursue a career in music, but may, on the other hand, limit Chadia's options as well. It is of course difficult to say to what extent Chadia has made a deliberate choice to operate under her family's supervision, or whether it was imposed upon her. In any way, she seems happy with the situation as it is.

*Farida: 'A rebel with a cause'*

Whereas Chadia is preoccupied with her *bint el bled* reputation, ascribing great value to conforming to, what she perceives as, Moroccan and Islamic cultural norms, Farida stands out as a more rebellious person. Chadia conforms to gender norms. Farida is not afraid to be different and cross boundaries. Her story shows how she tries to maintain her Moroccan and Islamic identities, while at the same time putting forward a very strong individual, artistic, female identity disconnected from social, cultural, and religious boundaries. By demonstrating how Farida handles her musical career and her private life, I show how Farida deals with issues of social control, maintaining a good reputation, and gender in a very different way.

*A bad reputation*

As opposed to Chadia's preoccupation with her *bint el bled* image, which has an impact on her daily life, Farida is not at all concerned with the kind of reputation she has among the Dutch-Moroccan community:

Farida: "The Moroccans over here, in the Netherlands, really, I find them so strange. In Morocco, it is just normal, much more relaxed; the whole family asking me when the CD will be finished and when I will be performing again..."

MG: "What about the reactions you get here in the Netherlands?"

Farida: "Oh, we've got so many reactions: one of them was that people said that we were possessed [by demons]. Yes, really! So many gossip stories, yeah, the rumour mill... I am just infamous here in my town... But I have always done what I wanted to do, and you guys, you just do what you wanna do."

Apparently, Farida is not bothered by other people's opinions, an attitude with which the whole interview is interspersed. In that manner, she has been able to disconnect herself much more from social control and the pressure to measure up to Dutch-Moroccan cultural norms than Chadia. The fact that her family is not involved in her musical career enables Farida to maintain this individual approach. Farida's family members, her parents in particular, are not opposed to her musical career, but they do not stimulate it either. This becomes particularly clear when I ask her about the future plans of the band:

Farida: "Well, I would like to do this [making music] the rest of my life. When I talk about this to my mother she says: 'Well you cannot do this your whole life, because then you will never find a partner.' Then I say: 'Well, then that is just



bad luck.' Here we go again, discussing with my mom. Of course, in a relationship or marriage you should make sacrifices, but then again, why can't you just postpone things until you have time for them to do it [not clear whether she is referring to making music or something else]. But just to say: 'well I am not gonna do it because I have a new boyfriend, and he prefers me not do it, I would never agree with that. That's why I am still single. I've had some dates and each time I thought: Oh no, while listening to that guy talk. And I'd just say in the middle of our date: 'Sorry, I have to go now!'. One of the dates told me [referring to making music]: 'Yeah that is a disease. I can help you cure it. It's like an addiction, like alcoholism.' I was stunned! So, as long as it is possible I will continue [making music]. One of them also said: 'But when you get married, then you'll stop singing, right?' That is so old-fashioned....I would never stop because of a man! My mom says that I pay the price for that now, because I am still by myself. I say that does not make sense. But she is just concerned for me. In the end it will be all right. I mean, you should just have the freedom, also within a relationship, to do what you like, to be creative."

Evidently, Farida's mother prefers her daughter to get married and end her musical career, as if she suggests: "you can make music now, but somewhere along the line you will have to 'get serious'." It is worth noting that, in an indirect way, Farida's mother makes use of the discourse on music, Islam and gender. To be more specific, she tries to convince her daughter to change to a more serious lifestyle by criticizing her non-marital status. By saying that Farida will not get married as long as she makes music, she does not judge the religious permissibility of her status as an artist, but she does acknowledge and affirm the low social status of female artists. Nevertheless, Farida is not planning to comply with her mothers' expectations. She states that she will never give into these pressures.

The low status that female artists have within the Dutch-Moroccan community produces difficulties for female Dutch-Moroccan artists: not only does it create problems in their musical lives, but also in their social, private lives. Thus, like Chadia, Farida has to deal with this bad reputation of female performers and female party and concert visitors. Where Chadia tries to keep these associations away from her by literally distancing herself from people and spaces linked to these associations (alcohol, drugs, and sex), Farida has developed another strategy:

"People can get the wrong impression when they see you perform. It is my passion [performing], but in real life I don't like the nightlife at all. I'd rather go to

the theatre or to the movies, instead of spending an evening in a sweaty, smoky space, with people bumping into you, throwing beer over you, and making stupid remarks: '*Wesh inti maghrebiyya?* [Are you Moroccan?]. In the beginning, I used to answer them politely, but after a while it really started to get on my nerves....I am not a party animal, only on stage...I used to go to raï parties, but once you've been there, then you immediately get labelled 'a whore'. It gave boys the right to come up to you and talk to you, while I just wanted to enjoy the artist's performance. There was always something...eughhh [sounds of frustration]."

Instead of keeping away from these situations loaded with associations of alcohol use, mixed gender audiences and the presence of unrelated men, Farida is not afraid to enter into these kinds of situations, even though she has been through some bad experiences. An example of her not shying away from situations like these, is the story she told me about that time when she met an old friend after one of her performances with the band. There was a 'Moroccan party' going on somewhere in the same venue and she and her girlfriend decided to take a look and there she ran into this old Dutch-Moroccan friend: This story illustrates Farida's strategy for dealing with Dutch-Moroccan men who assume that all Moroccan girls they meet in the nightlife are 'loose girls'.

"It was a Moroccan-like party with a belly dancer. So, we went to take a look. [We saw] all kinds of ladies dancing and then this old friend said to me: 'Now you can show me how it's done' [referring to the belly dancing]. I thought that was so low! He thinks that, because I perform on stage, and sing like an artist, I would just....And he kept saying: 'O come on, then, show them how it's done.' I told him: 'No, let them dance and party.' And some of these girls were barely dressed. That's up to them, but to say to me that I should join them. At that point I just thought that he was just a yokel, a lout! Then you'll see how things are working in their mind: [Moroccan men think] If you sing on stage, then you are just corrupt and depraved. You're finished."

This fragment shows how the discourse on music, Islam, social contexts and gender boundaries are intrinsically linked to each other, also in Farida's mind. Although she totally rejects the dominant discourse that frowns upon female performers and all of its negative associations throughout the interview, she cannot escape being confronted with it or dealing with it. Her interpretation of her friend's encouragement to join the belly dancers

indicates that Farida assumes that his remarks stem from this dominant discourse. In other words, she assumes that he thinks of her as an indecent girl or woman and this makes her angry.

## 6. Conclusion

The issue of music and performance within the Dutch-Moroccan community is not settled. The normative discourse considers music and performance and an Islamic lifestyle incompatible. This normative discourse has concrete effects on the way Dutch-Moroccan musical events are organized and set up. There is a trend of Islamizing musical events aimed at Dutch-Moroccan audiences in order to attract wider audiences. By including some Islamic markers in events, producers and consumers of these events increase the legitimacy of the event and circumvent negative associations. By means of giving an event an Islamic touch and aligning it to certain Islamic norms, both organization and audience try to get round negative associations, making it more acceptable and legitimate from a religious as well as a socio-cultural point of view, to be involved in this musical happening.

The different justifications disclose that Dutch-Moroccan music consumers struggle with their interpretation of Islamic rulings and their own practices. Some accept the implications of their musical practices and label them as un-Islamic, but compensate for this by expressing their good intentions. Some dispute the normative discourse that links music and performance to un-Islamic behaviour. Others justify their musical practices with the argument that even Islamic scholars do not agree on this topic and if there is no agreement, there is no final ruling. The way consumers bend interpretations of Islamic decrees into the direction of their own practices, namely by stating that they have an individual relationship with Allah and the outside world should not interfere in this, demonstrates how these Dutch-Moroccan music consumers uphold an individualized approach towards Islam. The significance of fashioning their positions in this debate lies in the fact that they want to make individual choices and come to their own personal interpretations of what Islam means for them.

This emphasis on making individual choices also relates to the overarching, basic function of this debate, which is to serve as a tool for expressing a specific Dutch-Moroccan identity. The debate on the status of music within Moroccan community is a way for Dutch-Moroccans to distinguish themselves from others, especially from other Dutch-Moroccans, since they are aware of the topic's sensitivities. Therefore, the debate, and the way it

is constructed and articulated, is mainly aimed at fellow members of the Dutch-Moroccan community. This identification process is based on the perception of the imagined Dutch-Moroccan 'other', rather than on the imagined Dutch 'other'.

In comparison with the consumers, the effects this debate has on the private and professional musical life of producers are far more extensive. This is even more so for female artists. The stories of Chadia and Farida are clear examples. Dutch-Moroccan women involved in the music scene, either as active participants or as passive visitors, are constantly subjected to the discourse stating their disrespectability. This discourse, based on religious imagery, but maybe even more on socio-cultural norms of the Dutch-Moroccan community that brackets 'Moroccanness' together with 'Muslimness', leads to alternative ways to achieve legitimacy and respectability by Dutch-Moroccan female performers. Defence strategies such as conformism or individualism are used by Chadia and Farida in order to overcome the obstacles and ambivalences projected upon them. In order to justify and strive for acceptance as artists, the choices they make in their professional and private lives are often based on or checked with the normative discourse that disapproves of female artists.



## 5. Dutch-Moroccan hip-hop and stereotypes

### Records of resistance

“They wanna denigrate us, when they talk about us. We did not do anything wrong, but still they wanna hate us. They wanna denigrate us when they talk about us. It’s time to change this, don’t you realize it?”<sup>1</sup> (Taken from the song *Kutmarokkanen (F\*cking Moroccans)* by Raymzter, from the album *Royalistisch*, released 2003 by Top Notch/ Virgin).

Radia: “...especially our Moroccan boys [she starts whispering], they have such a bad reputation over here, and that is such a pity, because the bad things that is what they [the media] just really highlight, while, if they would only give more attention to the good things, then things would maybe be better here in the Netherlands.”

Bart: “I’ll bet you that whenever there is a Moroccan boy waiting in line at the cashier that a lot of Dutch people think: Oh watch out, there you have a bag snatcher...yeah, that is just the way it is.”

Amal: “And [why Dutch-Moroccan youth like] hip-hop [more than rail]; our society has become faster, more aggressive, and you have to be able to stick up for yourself, and then there is this rapper who says: ‘I am this, I am that, I am the greatest, I am...’and then you can identify yourself with that. We are looking for recognition.”

“The older you get, the more conscious you become of your surroundings and of the fact that others constantly confront you with your background. Especially if there has been on the news that Moroccan teenagers have been up to mischief. Then I have to defend myself for what others have done. Especially after 9/ 11 and the death of Theo van Gogh. I thought I was going crazy. I did not commit that attack, and I did not murder Theo van Gogh and then I just decided to

build a wall around me. It's ok, if this society likes to label people and wants to put them in boxes, then they just go ahead. Then I will just be whatever you like me to be. At times it is annoying to see how some people go by prejudices that emerge out of fear of the unknown. I hope that when I grow up, I can claim my own little place, whether I will be seen as a Moroccan or a Dutch person." (Dutch-Moroccan actress Maryam Hassouni [Caubet 2007: 205].)

Dutch-Moroccans have to face a public image that is often filled with stereotypical ideas. The feeling of being stereotyped, stigmatized, and negatively judged is common among many Dutch-Moroccan youth, as the song text and the interview fragments above illustrate. Dutch-Moroccan youth feel burdened by stereotypical images that are often negative and degrading. In this chapter I elaborate on how stereotyping has affected Dutch-Moroccan youth. In particular, I describe how Dutch-Moroccan youth use music in order to fight or invalidate these negative images. This will be the main question of this chapter.

Before that, however, I will first review the theoretical background of the process of stereotyping in section one, a process not only concerned with misinformation about a particular group, but also concerned with power structures and the continuation of the status quo. In section two, I will elaborate on Dutch-Moroccan youth's experiences regarding stereotypes. What kind of images do they feel are projected upon them? In order to reconstruct these images, and since little research is done on this topic, I rely on a publication entitled *Stigma: Marokkaan!* (2003), and my own interview material. In section three, I will consider the different strategies deployed by Dutch-Moroccans to resist these stereotypes. These strategies can be musical as well as non-musical. In section four, I focus on hip-hop in particular as a strategy for resisting stereotypes. Here, I focus on hip-hop produced by Dutch-Moroccan youth, a genre I have labelled 'maroc-hop'. In section five I describe the emergence and development of maroc-hop and its reception in Dutch media and by Dutch-Moroccan consumers. By means of analyzing the way maroc-hop rappers define themselves and an analysis of maroc-hop's lyrics I demonstrate how a substantial part of the maroc-hop repertoire could be regarded as a musical opposition to stereotypes.

## 1. Theory on stereotyping

### *What is a stereotype?*

Stereotypes, stigmas, negative image-forming<sup>2</sup>, labelling, these are all terms often used when writing or talking about the way Dutch-Moroccans are perceived in the Netherlands. Stereotyping and stigmatization are most of the time described in similar terms and often seem to be used as synonyms for each other. All of these concepts refer, in one way or another, to a process of imposing certain labels upon a group of people. I described in chapter one how self-identification and definition by others, i.e. categorization, are different processes with different effects. Human beings are inclined to classify their social surroundings in different categories. These categories are given labels and names. These category labels have a specific meaning and often also acquire a certain value, in due time. They can either acquire a negative connotation, or were negative to begin with. It is not unlikely for a label to be given to a group by non-group members for the purpose of categorization, to be totally different from the way the members of this group identify themselves. Processes of identification can collide with processes of categorization. Especially those labels that are or have become like negative characteristic tags, are often called stereotypes, stigmas or prejudices.

The term 'stigma' and the process of stigmatization were described in detail by Goffman (1963). From a sociological and socio-psychological point of view, he elaborates on the concept of stigma and its effects for the stigmatized. As the title of his book already indicates *Stigma. Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*, the notion of identity is crucial. According to Goffman, a stigma is an attribute that disqualifies the person to which this attribute is applied; it is "an undesired differentness" (Goffman 1963: 5). This attribute is believed to be deviant from the normative codes of behaviour or appearance in a particular society or setting. Deviation from the norm can result in the emergence of a stigma.

A stigma becomes the dominating characteristic of a group of people, suggesting that all individuals associated with or perceived to belong to this group are considered to have these disqualifying attributes as well. A stigma is thus a judgement about a group's difference (deviance) from standard, accepted behavioural codes and attitudes. A stigma, therefore, also involves a manifestation, a representation of power relations. Those who decide what is normal, accepted, standard behaviour or standard appearance, have the power to discredit and disqualify groups and individuals in case they trans-



gress these boundaries of normality. In fact, stigmas legitimize why the people who are in power are 'normal', and why 'deviant' groups of people are stigmatized. Stigmas can only exist because people categorize and classify their social surroundings.

Goffman's description of the concept stigma and the related process of stigmatization is very similar to Jenkins' definition of the concept of stereotyping. Although Goffman suggests that stigmatization is usually considered a very negative experience for those being stigmatized, Jenkins argues that stereotyping is not necessarily negative. According to him, stereotyping involves an exaggerated and oversimplified representation of a group of people, but this representation is not necessarily negative or hostile. In Jenkins' words, stereotyping is the "labelling and classification of collectivities in a partial and incomplete fashion" (Jenkins 2004: 127). Since the complex and excessive flow of information cannot be integrated completely and absorbed by the human mind, human beings resort to the simplification of this information flow. As a consequence, Jenkins writes, "...stereotyping is but an extreme example of the general classificatory process of ideal typification....And although the word has in many quarters come to attract wholly negative connotations, stereotyping is a routine, everyday cognitive process upon which we all, to some extent, depend" (Jenkins 2001: 127-128). Thus, the process of stereotyping is not inherently a negative or hostile activity: "stereotypes can flatter" (ibid.: 128). In conclusion, Jenkins considers the most important characteristic of stereotypes their tendency to "...emphasize a small number of putative similarities between the stereotyped rather than their infinite array of particularities and differences. Stereotypes are extremely condensed symbols of collective identification" (ibid.). Finally, Jenkins regards stereotypes as powerful symbols. Using stereotypes is using a symbolic discourse expressing power structures (ibid.).

In public opinion, stereotypes are often attributed to a lack of information about other, unknown groups of people. Pickering calls this the classical view of stereotyping. Indeed, he remarks, misinformation and the fears and fantasies rising out of that fear, contribute a great deal to the emergence of stereotypes (Pickering 2001: 12). Yet, if stereotypes thrive on misinformation, then providing people with 'the right, correct information' would result in the termination of stereotypes. But, often this is not the case. As a rule, stereotypes are resilient and remain existent during longer periods of time. And, Pickering adds, stereotypes usually re-surface in times of social tensions and conflicts in society (ibid.: 13).

Pickering defines stereotypes as “inaccurate images and representations of a social group or category by portraying them as homogeneous, including the stressing of certain forms of behaviour, disposition or inclinations which are taken out of context and are attributed to everyone associated with a particular group or category” (Pickering: 2001: 4). Stereotyping is then the process of ruling out the possibility of a nuanced, subtle representation of an individual and the group he or she is perceived to belong to, eliminating the option of a complex, multifaceted portrayal of this particular group. The result is that people are “reduced to the characteristic isolated by the stereotype” (ibid.).

In line with the previous theories, I consider stereotypes to be packages of information that are supposed to apply to people deemed to belong to one group. A stereotype is often the result of human beings’ inclination to categorize their social surroundings, but it can also be the consequence of a deliberate choice to emphasize power relations. Both the ‘natural’ and unconscious emergence of stereotypes (human beings’ inclination) and the creation of stereotypes with the purpose of emphasizing power relations result in an expression of power relations. Whether a stereotype emerged naturally or out of a deliberate action to stress one’s own higher morality, a distance is created between the stereotyped group and the one who is doing the stereotyping. Stereotyping results in the labelling of categories. As I described in chapter one, categories are based on perceived similarities and/ or differences between different groups of people. These labels are usually (meant to be) representative for the whole group, but need not be. A stereotype is a label that is based on a single characteristic or a feature that deviates from what the user of the stereotype considers normal, accepted behaviour. These deviant features may include appearance, dress, food consumption habits, religion, ideology, etc. Stereotypes inform us, to a certain extent, about what, within a certain social context, is deemed proper and accepted behaviour, and consequently what is not.

### *Who uses stereotypes?*

Everybody uses stereotypes. As we have seen before, stereotyping is regarded as a logical consequence of human beings’ nature to classify their surroundings. It provides order in the chaos. This is common for all people. But depending on who is doing the stereotyping, the effect of stereotyping is different. In the case of minority versus majority groups, often meaning immigrant communities versus the host society, the expression of stereotypes vis-à-vis a minority group, has a different effect than when a minority

group stereotypes the dominant group. This has to do with the fact that those belonging to a dominant group have a different power position than those belonging to a minority group. The dominant often use stereotypes as a legitimization of their powerful position, whereas the subdominant or the dominated use stereotypes to prove or express their ideological superiority over the dominant. This is also why, according to Pickering, stereotypes are not so much concerned with providing human beings order in a chaotic world, but with “questions of power and order” (Pickering 2001: 3).

Stereotyping, in most cases, involves a judgement of differences. The use of stereotypes causes those who are stereotyped to be fixed into “a marginal position and into a subordinated status, and consequently, they are judged accordingly, regardless of the inaccuracies that are involved in the stereotypical description given of them” (Pickering 2001: 5). Those in power who can express these judgements risk-free are, in fact, expressing and affirming their powerful positions, and use stereotyping as a tool to support these power structures. The norms that are re-affirmed and reinforced through stereotypes originate from established structures of social dominance. Yet, the less powerful also use stereotypes in order to claim their ideologically superior position over other subordinate groups. Or, in Erikson’s words, “...stereotypes directed towards a ruling group may alleviate feelings of powerlessness and resignation: they can be seen as the symbolic revenge of the downtrodden” (Erikson 1993: 22).

### *Why do we use stereotypes?*

The reasons why people use stereotypes are manifold. One reason why people create and use stereotypes is to create some kind of order in the chaos of abundant information. Since people cannot process all of the available complex and dense information flow about other groups, they deduce the other group’s motivations and attitudes from the limited information they have about this group’s observable verbal and non-verbal behaviour. These observable activities are not sufficient for wholly understanding other groups’ actions, which leads to ambiguity and uncertainty about their true motivations and attitudes. This vagueness leads, in turn, to the use of stereotypical attributions (Jenkins 2004: 128).

A second motivation for using stereotypes is justification of power relations, as already indicated. Pickering’ considers the motivation for using stereotypes to move beyond this issue of chaos, and stresses that stereotypes are used to legitimize existing power relations between different groups in society:

“Stereotyping may operate as a way of imposing a sense of order on the social world in the same way as categories, but with the crucial difference that stereotyping attempts to deny any flexible thinking with categories. It denies this in the interests of the structures of power it upholds... The comfort of inflexibility which stereotypes provide reinforces the conviction that existing relations of power are necessary and fixed... [the use of a stereotype] ... may create an element of order by seeming to lock a category irrevocably into its place, in an apparently settled hierarchy of relations. The feeling of security or superiority resulting from this may help to explain why such imprecise referencing of other people or other cultures spreads rapidly and is taken up uncritically on a widespread basis. The imprecise representations involved in this process of social dissemination create the illusion of precision, of order, of the way things should be. This is convenient for existing relations of power because it lends them a sense of certainty, regularity and continuity” (Pickering 2001: 3-4).

Thus, stereotypes can lend existing power relations legitimacy, since they legitimize the status quo and reaffirm the norms and values of those who are in power. Yet, groups that are less powerful can also resort to the use of stereotypes in order to mock the dominant group. Then, stereotyping functions, not as a way to legitimize existing power relations, but as an outlet for a less powerful group and as a tool to ridicule the powerful.

A third motivation behind the use of stereotypes is that they function as boundary markers between different groups. By focussing on the vices of members of other groups in the form of stereotypes that stress the abnormality of their behaviour, the individual member of a group is reminded why he is a member of this group and not of that other, abnormal group. Since stereotypes regularly, in one way or another, support the idea that ‘we are superior over the other group’, they function as very explicit and strong identity markers. Stereotypes play a role in the collective identification processes, in the sense that they justify to individuals their membership to their ‘own’ group. This also explains why stereotypes are not necessarily true or accurate representations of other groups: if one wants to stress why it is good to be a member of group A and not group B, one can resort to stereotypes in order to create at the same time clear boundaries between members of group A and B, and simultaneously justify the superiority of group A over B (ibid.). Stereotyping, which is an extreme, dense, and limited form of categorization, is one of the resources upon which human beings draw in the construction of their own identities.

In conclusion, motivations for the practice of stereotyping may differ, yet all of the motives relate, in one way or another, to the fact that stereotypes function as a tool to demarcate boundaries between different groups in society. Processes of identification and categorization are at work simultaneously when stereotypes are used.

### *The effects of stereotyping*

In the previous section I have shown how stereotyping is a process concerned with imposing labels upon groups of people. These labels are often associated with or evoke imagery of negative (but sometimes positive), out of order, deviant, immoral characteristics. Since stereotypes function as a tool to demarcate boundaries between different groups, one obvious result of using stereotypes is the separation and symbolic distancing between groups. Stereotyping might produce social tensions between different groups in society. Individual members of a group who are constantly stereotyped in a negative way, or feel that they are, may feel threatened in their identity – meaning, that if one’s identity is constantly linked to negative characteristics, one’s identity can become a large burden filled with feelings of inferiority, uneasiness, and powerlessness. And if the stereotyping has become a very widespread, common, and accepted habit among a large group of people, the stereotyped group might become estranged from the rest of society. In that case, stereotyping can result in the disruption of social cohesion (Harchaoui and Huinders 2003: 14).

Another effect of stereotyping is that the stereotypes can become a self-fulfilling prophecy (Eriksen 1993: 24). Through constant and continuous confrontation with a certain image, portraying one’s social identity as criminal and anti-authoritarian, for example, stereotyped individuals might decide (although probably unconsciously) to live up to that stereotypical image and actually start behaving in such a way. The stereotype has become the ‘ideal’ image to strive for: as if the stereotyped person says: “you say I am criminal, well then I will be a criminal.” An effect of constantly stereotyping someone as ‘criminal’ can lower the threshold for the stereotyped individual to become indeed ‘criminal’. It is often said that the public disturbance (hanging around on the streets and terrorizing the neighbourhood) and rioting of some Dutch-Moroccan teenagers in urban areas are partly caused by the powerful image of stereotypes and its effect to turn into self-fulfilling prophecies (Harchaoui and Huinders 2003: 15). Some people argue that the behaviour of these boys is to be excused because the stereotype that labels them as rioters is so powerful that they see no other options than to act like

that. This argument implies that a stereotype can be so powerful and has a predictive nature that it turns innocent boys into criminals.

## 2. Stereotypes

Most of the time, discussions in the media concerning Dutch-Moroccans focus on negative, problematic issues, such as radicalism, terrorism, crime, delinquency, youth on the street causing trouble, suppression of women, etc. A large part of the interest in Dutch-Moroccans in the past decade has been negative in tone and content. This has caused many Dutch-Moroccans to feel like living under a magnifying glass and constantly subjected to stereotypes expressed in the media, by politicians and others, including 'the average ordinary Dutchman'. The point is that many and maybe even most Dutch-Moroccans *feel* stereotyped. In fact, all of the interviewees indicated that they felt stereotyped. Many people, including both Dutch-Moroccans and the Dutch, acknowledge that Dutch-Moroccans are being stereotyped in Dutch society (Nabben et al.: 2006: 123-124).

Although stereotyping of Dutch-Moroccans is widely recognized and many people from different social and professional backgrounds plead for the abandonment of stereotypes, little academic research has been done into what the content of these stereotypes vis-à-vis Dutch-Moroccans is, and how these are perceived and received by Dutch-Moroccans themselves. A few Dutch surveys have demonstrated how the perception of Muslims, often bracketed together with Moroccans, in the Netherlands has become rather negative ever since 2001.<sup>3</sup> Yet, what the exact content of these negative images vis-à-vis Muslims and/ or Moroccans is and how these negative images have affected the Muslim and Dutch-Moroccan community remains unexamined. In order to provide some basic ideas about the content of stereotypes concerning Dutch-Moroccans, I have tried to infer the messages that are conveyed in stereotypes about Dutch-Moroccans. For this I have used the publication of Harchaoui and Huinders and my own interview material.

In the introduction of their edited volume *Stigma: Marokkaan!*, Harchaoui and Huinders present a general overview of what stereotypes are at hand these days within Dutch society concerning Dutch-Moroccans. They summarize the characteristics of which the stereotypical image of the Moroccan in the Netherlands is made up of, as follows:

“... [the Moroccan in the Netherlands is considered to belong to an] in essence backward culture, [and to be] rebellious, hostile towards the state, religiously

fundamentalist and criminal...Dutch-Moroccans feel that they are tackled on a collective quality (criminal, extremist), a social identity that disqualifies them, and especially the youth, beforehand. Journalists and researchers intensely search for negative qualities and they always find them among the marginalised part of the Moroccan community...The stigma Moroccan weighs increasingly heavily upon parts of the Moroccan community that are not marginalised, even more so since it [the stigma] is emphatically connected to issues of identity" (Harchaoui and Huinders 2003: 10, 13-14).

Interviewees expressing their thoughts on the way Dutch-Moroccans are represented in media, in political debates, confirm that, in their eyes, Dutch-Moroccans are stereotyped in a negative way and that this is a very undesirable situation. The content of the stereotypes they feel are imposed upon them relate to Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, crime and public disturbance, similar to the images invoked by Harchaoui and Huinders. Other dominant, prevalent stereotypes, according to the interviewees, suggest an unwillingness to integrate into Dutch society, bad command of the Dutch language, and oppression of women. Basically, if you put all these stereotypical images together, Dutch-Moroccans are, according to these stereotypes, fanatic, radical Muslims, criminals, terrorists, aggressive rioters, and reluctant to accept Dutch morals and values. This feeling of being burdened by stereotypes and negative labels has not left the Dutch-Moroccan community unaffected. During my field-work experiences and the interviews, the interviewees often complained about the resilience of stereotypes and the constant bad press they feel Dutch-Moroccans receive. Some have risen to the occasion and started up initiatives to fight stereotypes. Different strategies are available to them.

### **3. Strategies of resistance**

In the climate of fear and increased stress on distinctions between 'us and them' that dominates Dutch society these days, it is not hard to imagine that stereotypes reign unchallenged. For those who do not have (as much) access to resources and instruments, such as mass media or political power, it becomes relatively hard to fight these stereotypical ideas or to invalidate them. In our widely mediated and globalized society of today, Dutch-Moroccan youth have limited access or no access at all to official media channels, such as TV or radio channels and the press. In addition, they have no political or economic power to gain more access to these channels and have thus

little opportunity to fight stereotyping with these instruments. Then again, the Internet is a media channel that (almost) everyone has access to and Dutch-Moroccan youth are particularly active online and use the Internet regularly to distribute messages and images that fight or invalidate stereotypes. Dutch-Moroccan youth are very creative in finding strategies to challenge stereotypes.

To resist or fight stereotypes, several strategies are available to those being stereotyped. Verkuyten mentions a number of strategies<sup>4</sup> and I have added some strategies to these. It is important to note that the concept of strategies might imply a conscious, deliberate string of actions undertaken specifically to undermine stereotypes. However, most of them result from both deliberate *and* unconscious choices and actions employed by individuals or collectivities.

A first strategy to deal with stereotyping is the option to totally negate and/or ignore the stereotyping. This strategy of denial is not so much a strategy that tries to resist or invalidate the stereotypes, but more a strategy of coping psychologically with stereotypes.

A second strategy to resist stereotyping is to retreat into one's own group, and reduce contact with people who are not fellow group members to a minimum. Again, this strategy of isolation could be considered a strategy of dealing with stereotypes, rather than a strategy to fight them.

A third strategy is to (try to) adjust and adapt completely to the 'culture' of those who are expressing the stereotypes. The stereotyped individual distances him – or herself from the stereotyped group, its culture as Verkuyten writes, as much as possible, to avoid evoking any kind of association with this stereotyped group (Verkuyten 2003: 86-87). Through adapting to the 'culture' of those who are stereotyping, the stereotyped individual tries to circumvent all associations with the stereotyped group and changes the behaviour, appearance, or lifestyle that is deemed deviant. The aim is to erase all the qualities, features and characteristics that are deemed abnormal and to assimilate to the culture of the other, so that the stereotypes become invalid. Yet, it remains to be seen whether this strategy actually works, since outward appearance is often enough to trigger stereotypes (Eriksen 1993: 30).

A fourth strategy is to start to act like the stereotype, like the example I mentioned earlier of Dutch-Moroccan boys who harass the neighbourhood. Like a self-fulfilling prophecy, the stereotype triggers people to start to behave like it (ibid: 24). However, by confirming the stereotype one does



not erase it, of course. This 'strategy' is therefore more a response to stereotyping that must be considered as a way of dealing with it.

A fifth strategy consists of collective responses to stereotypes. By stressing and accentuating its positive characteristics and more specifically, the group's moral superiority over the other group, the stereotyped group resists the negative labels. A group that is less powerful or has few instruments to fight stereotypes coming from a dominant or majority group can also resort to using 'its own' stereotypes about the powerful. In section one, I already referred to this phenomenon. The stereotyped group says, as it were: "we are not bothered by your stereotypes, because we believe that we are morally superior." In this case, often those characteristics are highlighted which represent a sharp distinction between the stereotyped group and the stereotyping group (Verkuyten 2003: 88). For example, sometimes I heard Dutch-Moroccans stressing their moral superiority; they consider themselves Muslims who adhere to high moral standards, as opposed to the Dutch poor moral standards concerning loose sexual mores and lifestyle. As a result, from this strategy, according to Verkuyten, an opposition-identity could emerge. This opposition-identity focuses not so much on its cultural or political substance, but rather on creating boundaries between 'us and them', between those who are doing the stereotyping and those being stereotyped. This identity revolves around provoking reactions from others, rather than fulfilling a feeling of belonging (*ibid.*).

A sixth strategy to fight stereotypes is through social organization. Through organizing themselves strategically, a stereotyped group can try to oppose negative images and present more positive things. Of course, there are numerous ways in which a group can organize itself socially. The organization of conferences, congresses, and seminars, for instance, may be a way to distribute more positive ideas about Dutch-Moroccans. Another form of social organization is the organization of networks on the Internet. The Internet has become an important outlet for Dutch-Moroccans to resist and invalidate stereotypes. During the 1990s, young Dutch-Moroccans set up a number of web-sites, like [maroc.nl](http://maroc.nl), [maghreb.nl](http://maghreb.nl), [naffer.nl](http://naffer.nl), and [maghrebmedia.nl](http://maghrebmedia.nl). The last mentioned is specialized in publishing positive reports about the Moroccan community. These sites usually contain discussion panels (chat rooms) where people can air all their frustrations concerning racism, intolerance and stereotyping. To date, these sites have been very popular. Besides, during the same period in the late 1990s a wave of new magazines and weekly's were issued, such as *Mzine*, *Multined*, *FastForward*,<sup>5</sup> writing about the Dutch multicultural society and often featuring stories and

reports that either give a counter argumentation to stereotypical discourse by providing the Dutch public with background information on Moroccan culture or Islam, or report success stories of Dutch-Moroccans active in politics, sports or arts.

Moreover, the establishment of political organizations is a strategy, which is also a form of social organization. The formation of a political party could well be used as a tool to resist stereotyping, for instance, the AEL (The Arab-European League), the political party of Lebanese-Belgian Dyab Abu Jahjah, which started out as an association in 2000 (Verkuyten 2003: 90). Although the AEL's main objectives were and are political, one of their main goals is, according to their website, to fight racism, discrimination, and Islamophobia and to strive for equal relations between their members and the rest of society based on respect. In that sense, fighting stereotypes, which are symbols of unequal power relations, is an important element in their political activities.

A seventh strategy to invalidate stereotypes is the adoption of a nickname, a soubriquet or a *nom de gueux*. By taking on names that were originally associated with negative qualities of a stereotyped group, and giving them a totally different twist, the stereotyped group mocks the stereotype and the adjacent labels that go with that stereotype. Choosing to represent one's group by a name that was at first meant to degrade, and then changing its meaning and connotation by incorporating it as a mocking nickname, causes the stereotype to lose its degrading and humiliating meaning and maybe eventually its strength. A famous example of a group adopting mocking nicknames are Dutch homosexuals who started to call themselves 'flikkers', a term that initially had a very degrading connotation and was used as a contemptuous name to refer to homosexual men. The term 'nigger' has been adopted by African-Americans, who use it in a brotherly and intimate way to refer to fellow African-Americans, while white Americans using the term 'nigger' are still considered racists.

Mocking nicknames imply thus a double standard. If an outsider uses the negative term, the stereotyped group members still consider this degrading, but when the members of the stereotyped group use the term themselves in a mocking manner, the term is accepted. Obviously, the alternative, often sarcastic, ironic, and derisive, new meaning of the term makes it acceptable to use. A famous recent example in the Netherlands is the term 'Kutmarokkanen', meaning 'fucking Moroccans'. When Dutch politician Rob Oudkerk in March 2002, in a slip of the tongue referred to Dutch-Moroccan youth using this term and his words were aired later that night on television,

because they were accidentally picked up by an open microphone, Dutch-Moroccan rapper Raymzter hurried to write down and release his 2002 hit-record entitled *Kutmarokkanen* (see the beginning of this chapter for the chorus of the song). Ever since, the term 'Kutmarokkanen' has been accepted by Dutch-Moroccan youth and can be used in a mocking way among them. However, non-Dutch-Moroccans who use the term 'Kutmarokkanen' are branded as racists and xenophobes. Section five will deal specifically with the strategy of taking on nicknames by Dutch-Moroccan rappers and shows how they use this strategy in creating their stage-names.

An eighth and final strategy to resist stereotyping is "compensation and social creativity" (Kuik 2004: 30 and Jenkins 2004: 89). This strategy aims at excellence within a certain setting, such as the academic world, the world of sports, or the world of arts like theatre, music or literature, in order to change the image of the group into a more positive one. The motto of this strategy could be "to be noticed through excellence" and divert attention away from deviant or negative qualities (Van Heelsum 2003: 99, 106). A remarkable example of this strategy came from an advertising agency Attacom in Tilburg. The agency decided in 2002 to attack stereotyping of Dutch-Moroccans by launching a campaign 'in favour of Moroccans'. The campaign entitled *How nice are Moroccans?* attracted a lot of positive, but mainly negative reactions from Dutch and Dutch-Moroccan people (Bouali 2002; Felgata 2002). Some people thought that the campaign was a positive, active initiative to invalidate stereotypes. Others thought the campaign was ridiculous and useless, indicating that an advertisement campaign will never be able to change people's minds fundamentally. A reaction on a discussion forum talking about this campaign illustrates this view: "People who always had a grudge against Moroccans don't like to be told that they [Moroccans] are nice people."<sup>6</sup>

A concrete example of this strategy of compensation and social creativity is music. The notion that music can function as a tool in resisting stereotypes, or, in a more general sense, that music can be a way to express social protest, is widely recognized by scholars and laymen alike. Many studies have already been written on music's ability to articulate, symbolically or literally (through its lyrics), social dissatisfaction with some kind of status quo. The 1970s punk subculture, which revolved around the rebellious and loud punk music and its resistance towards dominant British institutions and their culture, is considered to be such a musical protest (Bennett and Kahn-Harris 2004:1). A more recent example of a music genre often related to resistance, social protest, and the articulation of alternative identities is

hip-hop music. In the past decade, hundreds, maybe thousands of publications on hip-hop music have been added to libraries around the world. Many scholarly publications deal with hip-hop's lyrics, its language, and vocabulary and its social significance.

Another concrete example of a resistance strategy against stereotyping that fits the category of compensation and social creativity is humour. Although in the literature I have not found any references to humour as a strategy, it is in fact a very useful and frequent strategy to invalidate stereotypes. By means of self-mockery, exaggeration, irony, sarcasm, or any other type of humour, people who are stereotyped can mock the stereotype. The performances of the Netherlands' most popular stand-up comedian, Dutch-Moroccan Najib Amhali, are filled with jokes and absurd, funny, and hilarious stories about Dutch multicultural society and Dutch-Moroccans. His shows attract Dutch people, Dutch-Moroccans and others with various ethnic backgrounds. Next, I describe how hip-hop can be employed as a strategy to resist stereotyping and challenge the status quo. In hip-hop lyrics, humour is often an important element.

#### **4. Hip-hop as musical resistance**

Hip-hop culture, generally assumed to consist of three elements, namely music, graffiti and break-dancing, has multiple options for fighting stereotypes. Fashion, i.e. clothing style, graffiti art, and the bricolage of several samples and genres in hip-hop music could all be analyzed within the context of hip-hop's 'confrontational nature'. Tricia Rose regards lyrics as one of American hip-hop's most significant elements. She writes that:

“...a large and significant element in rap's discursive territory is engaged in symbolic and ideological warfare with institutions and groups that symbolically, ideologically and materially oppress African Americans. In this way rap is a contemporary stage for the theatre of the powerless” (Rose 1994: 100-101).

Dutch-Moroccan hip-hop, too, displays elements of this ideological 'warfare' against Dutch society, the government, media, and stereotyping. Lyrics of Dutch-Moroccan hip-hop contain many messages expressing resistance against existing stereotypes on Dutch-Moroccans and Muslims, as well as against current power structures. As I mentioned above in section one, stereotyping may serve as a tool for the dominant power group to continue the status quo and maintain existing power structures. Through

hip-hop and rap lyrics in particular, Dutch-Moroccan rappers can articulate alternative stories and identities and fight stereotyping. To explain how Dutch-Moroccan hip-hop music is used as a tool in resisting stereotyping by Dutch society, I will elaborate on two of hip-hop's most important markers: self-definition, i.e. stage names and its lyrics, starting with a description of how stage names are often used as a tool to resist stereotypes. After that, I briefly describe the emergence and development of Dutch-Moroccan hip-hop and analyze how a specific part of this genre's repertoire resists stereotypes. I have coined the term *maroc-hop*, a combination of syllables from the words Morocco and (hip-) hop, to typify hip-hop music produced by Dutch-Moroccan youth.

### *Stage names mocking stereotypes*

Stage names are usually adopted by performers such as artists, musicians, actors, clowns, and others, in order to protect their privacy. Also, stage names are taken on when one's real name is considered dull, unattractive, difficult to spell or pronounce or when it evokes unwanted, negative associations. Some performers also choose a stage name because they think they will be more commercially successful with this stage name. In hip-hop, almost all performers take on stage names. Ever since its emergence from the streets of New York, rappers tell about their experience of "living on the streets and surviving in the ghetto" (Rose 1994: 1-2; Watkins 2005: 2). Therefore, hip-hop artists often present themselves as 'tough' or 'bad' boys or girls. The importance of a credible and authentic presentation of oneself as a hip-hop artist is thus at stake when inventing a stage name.

Maroc-hop has appropriated and adapted many elements from American hip-hop culture in specific ways. The emphasis on self-definition, for example, is emblematic. Stage names are a first step in self-definition and expression of an identity for, "hip hop's prolific self-naming is a form of reinvention... Artists... take on hip hop names... that speak to their role, personal characteristics, expertise, or 'claim to fame'" (Rose 1994: 36). Many hip-hop scholars consider these names to be a tool for marginalized youths to create prestige and status. They argue that most of the hip-hoppers come from lower class communities and have limited access to legitimate forms of status attainment in society and consequently resort to taking on new identities/ names that enable them to obtain "street credibility" or "prestige from below" (ibid.). This claim to fame through the use of powerful stage names is part of hip-hop's search for authenticity or street credibility. This search for authenticity is in hip-hop terms referred to as 'keeping it real'. The term

refers to an important value in the hip-hop culture: maintaining authenticity by staying close to the hip-hop culture 'on the streets' and being sincere to your origins. 'Selling out', i.e. making hip-hop music that is aimed at commercial and material success, is the opposite of 'keeping it real' (Huq 2006: 113).

In the case of maroc-hop, self-definition is based both on creating links with American or global hip-hop culture and on creating alliances with local communities. Almost all maroc-hop rappers have adopted an American style of self-naming, using abbreviations and American hip-hop terms, for example MC (i.e. Master of Ceremony) Berber and J-Rock. In maroc-hop, rappers choose names that relate to their coolness, power, and street smart or supreme qualities as a rapper, such as, Bad Brya, J-Rock, MC DMO (MC *the Mo*), Raymzter (a combination of his own name Raymond and the one who rhymes (best)). Sometimes names of rap crews relate to neighbourhoods or cities (Oudenbosch<sup>7</sup> Rappers/ ODB, Den Haag Connection/ DHC, Leidse Mafia, Schuilenburgse Mafia/ SBM<sup>8</sup>). These names are, obviously, very direct signs of the rappers' inclination to link themselves up to local areas and places, often their hometowns. They intrinsically connect their artistic persona and performance to the Dutch city they live in.

Also, many rappers have decided to maintain their "Arabic-Moroccan" names, affirming an alliance with their Moroccan background, while at the same time identifying with hip-hop. For example Soussi-B, refers to the southern Moroccan Souss region. Yes-R is a wordplay on the Arabic name Yasser. Casablanca Connect is a name of a Dutch-Moroccan rapper from Alkmaar. Although born and raised in the Netherlands, he chose to represent a direct link with 'homeland' Morocco by putting forward a connection with Casablanca. At the same time, he uses a very common hip-hop term 'connection', which is regularly used in hip-hop vernacular when referring to relationships between different rappers, rap crews, or hip-hop communities.

Interestingly, a number of maroc-hop rappers choose a stage name that mocks stereotypes and indicates a resistance to stereotyping. By taking on a degrading term as a nickname, rappers apparently try to evoke new, more positive associations with that specific term. The strategy of resisting stereotypes by turning the original meaning of a derogatory term into a nickname that mocks the original negative meaning, is used, for example, by, Ali B. He intentionally chose this stage name, referring to the way Dutch media speak about criminal suspects by reporting a first name and last initial, to mock the stereotypes implying that Dutch-Moroccan youths are all criminals. Thus, Ali B. used a term that suspects are referred to by the

media, i.e. a category label, and identified himself with this label, although in a mocking manner. Obviously, he himself is not a criminal suspect, but he appropriated the label used to categorize criminal suspects and turned it into his stage name. Effectively, a category label is made into an identification label. Ali B. also mocks his own turbulent and delinquent teenage years, during which he had been in contact with the police, because of his former occasional drug dealing and gambling addiction.

Another rapper who has turned a belittling and degrading term into his own personal, glorifying nickname is rapper Naffer. Naffer is a word that emerged from Dutch police jargon referring to a criminal suspect with a North-African appearance (North-African became abbreviated to 'Naffer'), often implying Dutch-Moroccans. Rapper Naffer is not the only one to put this name to a new use. The term Naffer has become a common term among many young Dutch-Moroccans. Scanning the nicknames of the users of Dutch-Moroccan website-forums reveals how many have taken on the name Naffer. In addition, a website has been set up called 'original Naffer', promoted as follows: "the most imitated authentic Naffer-site with the boldest forum." The website also provides links to all kinds of other Naffer-sites.<sup>9</sup> When used by young Dutch-Moroccans, this originally degrading term associating Dutch-Moroccans with crime and representing them as criminal suspects turns into a rebellious nickname with an insubordinate connotation.

A third term often used as an epithet by Dutch-Moroccan youth is the word 'mocro'. Where the term comes from is not exactly known, although, obviously, the word has its roots in the word 'Morocco'. It is a word coming from Dutch street slang and in a neutral sense it signifies a person with a Moroccan background. Yet, people have used and still use the term mocro also in an insulting way. In response, Dutch-Moroccan youth themselves have started to reverse its degrading meaning and use it as a term that stands for a proud, young, Dutch-Moroccan. Like the term Naffer, many Dutch-Moroccans have appropriated the word as their nickname for the on-line world. A Dutch-Moroccan website like [www.marokko.nl](http://www.marokko.nl) has over 81,000 registered members, of which over 1900 chose to include the term 'mocro' in their on-line nickname.<sup>10</sup>

The word 'mocro' became nationally known through Ali B.'s hit *Leipe*<sup>11</sup> *Mocro Flavour*<sup>12</sup> that is a typical brag and boast rap, glorifying Ali's rap qualities, his flow, his mocro flavour and his lyrical abilities. Basically, the song introduces the new *Leipe Mocro Flavour* style that Ali B wants to represent in the Dutch hip-hop scene. The term mocro is intrinsically linked to Dutch street slang, hip-hop music and youth culture. Ali B. also regularly uses the

term in lyrics of other songs and in his daily speech. During one of his concerts, which I visited in Amsterdam in November 2004, Ali addressed the audience with the term 'mocro's. At one particular point, he said: "They say Moroccans can only be mad and angry, but that is not true! Just show them that mocro's can party too!" From this statement, we see how he is aware of the stereotype that considers Dutch-Moroccans as angry, rioting people and he urges the audience, consisting of pre-dominantly young Dutch-Moroccans, to show the outside world otherwise. It is emblematic that he uses the term 'mocro' to address the audience and the term 'Moroccans' to signify Dutch-Moroccans in general. By using the term 'mocro's' for the audience, instead of 'Moroccans', or 'Dutch-Moroccans', Ali makes a clear distinction between the 'Moroccans' who consider themselves happy-party people (i.e. the audience) and the 'Moroccans' who are portrayed by the media as rioters and angry people. Ali B. evidently demonstrates his awareness of stereotyping by literally saying: "they say Moroccans can only be angry."

As a way of self-identification, stage names can be weapons in the fight against stereotyping. As stage names are very public displays of identity: it is the first thing a rapper says about himself or herself, stage names are very powerful and when the artist gains recognition and fame, the mocking stage names will become increasingly known among a large public. Self-definition, i.e. the way Dutch-Moroccans rappers present and define themselves through their stage name, is often linked to the stereotypes they feel Dutch-Moroccans are burdened with.. These mocking nicknames are often also appropriated by fans and other young Dutch-Moroccans who identify themselves with these nicknames and hence gain "prestige from below" (Rose 1994: 36).

## **5. Maroc-hop's origins and the importance of the Internet**

Dutch-Moroccan youth did not randomly choose to make hip-hop. A number of underlying conditions facilitated this choice. First, hip-hop is an accessible and widely accepted genre because it has international recognition. It is a genre that has become one of the most commercially successful genres in the last decade (Watkins 2005: 209). A second reason why many young people choose to make hip-hop lies in the fact that making hip-hop music does not have to be an expensive activity. It is in fact a very low-budget genre. All a rapper needs in order to make hip-hop is a voice, a feeling for rhythm, a computer with music software, and a microphone. A third element that makes hip-hop an accessible genre is the fact that nowadays the Dutch



music culture and the media have accepted rap in the Dutch language<sup>13</sup> wholeheartedly, whereas in the past this was not the case. To be more precise, Dutch-Moroccan rappers usually rap in street slang, which is a mix of several languages such as Moroccan Arabic, Berber, English, Papiamentu, and Sranan<sup>14</sup> (De Koning 2005: 36-41). Dutch-Moroccan youths have recently become more visible in the Dutch music scene and media. Maroc-hop is a genre that has developed from approximately the year 2002 onwards in two directions. The genre can be divided into two branches: a mainstream, commercial branch and an underground, amateur branch. Obviously, the mainstream maroc-hop rappers have received a considerable amount of press attention and some academic publications have been written on them. This contrasts with the underground branch of maroc-hop, which has, with some exceptions, remained unnoticed by mainstream Dutch media, music industry and scholars.

The rapper Raymzter's 2002 hit-record *Kutmarokkanen (F\*king Moroccans)* put Dutch Moroccan hip-hop on the musical map. Raymzter, a half Dutch-half Moroccan at that time 25-year-old rapper, wrote this song in reaction to a Dutch politician's controversial remark, a slip of the tongue. Eventually, this song became a big hit and cleared the way for other Dutch-Moroccan rappers. Ever since, Dutch-Moroccan youth have been more active and particularly more visible, in the production of a growing hip-hop scene. Ali B. has since become the most famous Dutch-Moroccan rapper and the most famous rapper in the Netherlands. He has released two albums successfully, in 2004 *Life on the streets* and in 2006 *Petje af (Hat off)* and has been awarded many prizes. He also has his own statue in Madame Tussaud's museum. He has produced numerous hit records between 2003 and 2006, among others *Het leven van de straat*, *Leipe Mocro Flavour*, *Ik ben je zat*, and *Ghetto* (with American R&B singer Akon).

During the period 2003 and 2006, I have collected from the Internet and officially released albums (CD's) over 100 songs from Dutch-Moroccan rap artists. This collection is made up of different artists from both the professional and amateur branch. The artists included in this collection work in different domains of the music market; ranging from artists firmly established in the Dutch mainstream music scene such as Raymzter, Ali B., Yes-R., Cilvaringz, Samiro, and Bad Brya, to relatively unknown, underground rappers. Ali B., Raymzter and Yes-R are the rappers that have been able to break through in the mainstream hip-hop scene and in the Dutch music scene in general and as a consequence have received a lot of media attention. They

make professional videos which are aired on the three Dutch music channels: TMF, MTV, and The Box.

More underground rappers and/ or rap crews like Appa, Salah Edin<sup>15</sup>, SBM, MC DMO, ODB (Oudenbosch rappers), DHC, Yassin SB, Intersection, El-Stylo, Naffer, MC Soufyane, Rif-Style, Casablanca Connect, Mounir Connected, MC Lahcen, Algerino, OneVoiz, El Stylo and many others operate mainly on the Internet and appear now and then in media reports. Therefore it is difficult to come up with an exact number of how many Dutch-Moroccan rappers there are in the Netherlands. Based on Internet research and the songs I have collected, I have traced at least twenty-five Dutch-Moroccan rappers who are currently active and whose productions are to be found in music shops or on the Internet. Nevertheless, I estimate that there are at least fifty or more Dutch-Moroccan rappers active.

Maroc-hop is a very young genre. Scholars, music critics and journalists have not (yet) recognized maroc-hop as a genre in itself, and reports on rappers with a Dutch-Moroccan background sporadically appear, with Ali B., Raymzter, and Yes-R as the exceptions. Popular music scholar Lutgard Mutsaers writes about 'Maghrap', referring to rap music and the Maghreb (North Africa), and considers Ali B. and Raymzter as its pioneers. Mutsaers acknowledges the importance of this new genre when she states that hip-hop "with a Dutch-Moroccan touch" is developing and growing:

"The Rif-riffs, camel melodies, and the souk-sound first introduced by Raymzter and further developed and popularized by Ali B., were new elements in Dutch pop music, unexpected like a fata morgana, fresh as an oasis" (Mutsaers 2006: 959).

Another scholar who has written on maroc-hop is Martijn de Koning. Both Mutsaers and De Koning detect a couple of recurrent characteristics in maroc-hop: its preoccupation with street life, its particular vocabulary, its typical use of (street) language, the use of particular, Arabic music samples, and its social engagement (De Koning 2005: 37; Mutsaers 2006: 954-959).

In the short history of maroc-hop, songs with controversial lyrics seem to be the rule rather than the exception. In fact, after the 'Hirsi Ali Diss' surfaced in 2004,<sup>16</sup> another song called 'De Kelder' (The Basement) by Youssef and Kamal that talks about torturing Dutch right-wing, and anti-Islam politician Geert Wilders, made the headlines in July 2005. All these songs found their way to the audience, including journalists, through the Internet and

were never officially released. This song that 'threatened' Wilders attracted a lot of media attention.<sup>17</sup>

Besides this song, many other raps in my collection of songs are similar to this one. These songs are often lyrical attacks, regularly called a diss, on right-wing politicians such as Wilders, Hirsi Ali, and late Pim Fortuyn, the media, the authorities, white people, racists, Lonsdale youth,<sup>18</sup> and so on. Titles of similar songs are: MC Lahcen's *Zwarte Vlek* (*Black spot*), DHC's *Racisten Diss* (*Racists' Diss*), DHC's *Hirsi Ali Diss*, Mounir Connected's *Somali Diss* (about Hirsi Ali), ODB's *Racist's Diss*.

Many rappers like DHC, who do not have official record deals, operate mainly on the Internet, in order to distribute their music. This provides them with a range of different options to share their music with a wider audience. They can either distribute their music through file-sharing sites (peer-to-peer/ P2P) such as Kazaa or LimeWire. These peer-to-peer networks provide free software, which can be used to directly exchange files, mostly containing music or video, between individual users. Another option for amateur rappers is to use websites such as Soundclick that enable users, i.e. artists, to freely upload their music and make a profile where background information on their music, their inspiration and their intentions with this music can be explained. Soundclick went on-line in 1997.<sup>19</sup> The music can be freely and legally downloaded, after you have registered on the site. Finally, the website Youtube is very popular among young people worldwide. The site enables users to freely upload self-made videos; either homemade or taken from TV shows, movies, etc. The slogan of Youtube is "broadcast yourself."<sup>20</sup> These videos can be watched freely. Youtube is often used as a platform for starting artists who frequently upload their video-clips.

The Internet is thus an important site for maroc-hoppers, as for many other novice artists these days. A great deal of the maroc-hop productions are only to be found on-line, especially those songs from amateur rappers. One has to know the name of the artist to trace him or her on the Internet. Word of mouth is thus crucial for a novice rapper to acquire some reputation. I have to note that not all beginning artists have the intention to break into the mainstream music industry and obtain official record deals. Some maroc-hoppers seem not interested at all in becoming professional artists, but seem to make hip-hop music merely as a personal, emotional outlet of frustration, anger, or powerlessness.

The underground status of a large portion of maroc-hoppers offers them great liberty in writing lyrics, because the chance of being heard by state institutions and/ or being prosecuted because of lyrics that are against

the law, is slim. Many Internet-productions remain unknown to many and even if the lyrics of a maroc-hop song are foul, offensive and sometimes even unlawful, there is relatively little chance to be prosecuted for it. With no intention of becoming a professional rapper, and with the freedom to write and rap lyrics free from censorship, rap lyrics may seem merely slurring-matches at first sight. At times, the songs are just plain cannonades of frustration, anger and rage that reveal nothing else but the need to rap as many curse words as possible in one verse. Rap crews like DHC, NAG, MC DMO, and many other obscure Dutch-Moroccan rappers have been producing these kinds of songs.

What all these songs have in common is that their lyrics are often fantastic stories on how the rappers lyrically attack and defeat some Dutch authority figure, often a politician. In this sense, these songs could be considered a glimpse into the consciousness of a rapper that tells of the rapper's fantasies of revenge on Dutch politicians, who, in their eyes, carry out policies that are aimed at keeping Dutch-Moroccans in a marginal position. Solomon (2006) writing on Turkish rap in the diaspora, analyzes the lyrics of a song called *Solingen* by Turkish-German rap band Tough Muslims. The lyrics of this aggressive and gangsta-rap style song includes the call to Muslims to attack non-Muslims:

“Hey Muslim, who is standing guard here? / Get your pistol and go outside / ...draw your gun / draw it, draw it, draw it / don't feel sorry, shoot them one by one.”

Solomon states that the song by Tough Muslims should:

“...not necessarily be understood as a threat to engage in actual physical violence, but rather, following the practice of rap in the US, as a hyperbole used for rhetorical effect” (Solomon 2006: 62).

Likewise, Best and Kellner state that hip-hop:

“with its extreme sexuality and violence...bursts through all boundaries of propriety, good taste, and decorum, creating genuine shock effects...rap often goes to extremes, over the edge, into that tabooed region of excess that threatens the protectors of law and order, morality and taste..., entering in a realm of anarchy, lawlessness, and chaos” (Best and Kellner 1999: 11).

Best and Kellner see hip-hop's profanity and vulgarity as part of hip-hop's nature to shock and believe that hip-hop's violent and aggressive lyrics should not be considered as direct signs of hip-hop artists being or becoming physically violent themselves.

### *Reactions to maroc-hop*

The Dutch media and an occasional scholar have sporadically shown an interest in some of the underground maroc-hoppers. Mutsaers (2006) and De Koning (2006) have analyzed some of maroc-hop's features and put them in a wider social perspective. They both do this by reporting on the controversial rap song 'The Hirsi Ali Diss'<sup>21</sup> by maroc-hop rap crew Den Haag Connection (also known as DHC). This song, in which the rappers threaten to kill politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali, had been circulating on the Internet unnoticed for some time and was picked up by journalists of prime-time news program NOVA in 2004, and triggered a big media-hype. Mutsaers writes that "[p]oliticians and judicature reacted without any knowledge of hip-hop issues as if DHC was not a musical project, but a vulgar, terrorist cell" (2006: 956). The individual rappers of DHC remained anonymous to the large public, yet the name DHC became nationally notorious. De Koning considers DHC's diss-rap to be an inherent part of Dutch youth and hip-hop culture and the result of the way Dutch society stereotypes Dutch-Moroccan youth:

"Feelings of injustice, discrimination and subordination, that are triggered by the way the debate on integration evolves, are brought together in one diss. For DHC, this is the way to react to an ongoing debate in which they feel dissed" (De Koning 2005: 41).

In public opinion, some consider these rappers and rap crews not to be authentic artists, but see them as young men wanting to attract media attention. DHC always claimed not to be responsible for putting the song on the Internet, but that it was meant as a personal outlet only. In 2005, two members of DHC were prosecuted for this song and were sentenced to 150 hours of community service.

The interviewees' reaction, which I take to represent a large part of Dutch-Moroccan youth in general, to these controversial songs, was totally different from the media's reaction. All interviewees were familiar with maroc-hop and most of them were also consumers of these songs to some extent and downloaded it from the Internet. All of them considered these songs as part of a hip-hop culture, a youth culture, a street culture character-

ized by assertiveness, aggression, and youthful rebellion. One interviewee said: "Hip-hop is just a genre that loves to shock." Rapping shocking, disturbing lyrics is thus considered to be part and parcel of hip-hop music, according to many of the interviewees.

Most interviewees regarded media reactions as hyped. Farida said: "It is a creative although blunt expression of the rappers' feelings." When discussing DHC and other maroc-hop crews many interviewees compared it to the American hip-hop culture coming from the 'ghetto'. Some interviewees referred to white American rapper Eminem's anti-gay lyrics that received a lot of media attention in the US. "Compared to Eminem's lyrics, most of the maroc-hoppers are not more shocking than Eminem's lyrics." One interviewee who is also a youth worker remarked, when I asked whether she was familiar with DHC and other maroc-hop bands:

"Yeah, I have a little brother who is 17, so he says to me: 'check this out, it is DHC: 'Yeah nice', I say. And I work with kids too, so I know them [maroc-hop songs] all, yes."

MG: "Why do you think hip-hop attracts so many Dutch-Moroccan youth?"

Farida: "Yes, I compare it to America. There you have the ghetto, the slums. And they have to rebel through their music. There you have Public Enemy and NWA [two prominent hip-hop crews] and stuff. I think exactly the same thing is happening over here. That rebellion, [with an attitude] like: 'who do you think you are!' And I think that is a good thing."

MG: "Really? Also when you listen to DHC? That is kind of violent and rough."

Farida: "That is all just provocation, a way to attract attention. I thought that was so typical, that they [DHC rappers] were arrested. And then that they announce it on the news; they were really underground right? And now everyone knows them instantly. And that was what they wanted! That is just provocation. Sure, certain words are unacceptable. But if you listen to Eminem, that is the same thing. He also openly raps about hating gays and stuff."

Farida's theory about the motives of the maroc-hop rappers is in line with what Verkuyten earlier mentioned as a collective strategy against stereotypes. Through the creation of an opposition-identity that is aimed at provoking reactions from others, a sharp distinction is made between the group who stereotypes and the group who feels or is stereotyped. Farida thus suggests that maroc-hop's lyrics should be seen as a provocation, especially aimed at attracting attention from media and state authorities, rather than as a transcript of the rappers' true intentions.

There is thus a large discrepancy between the way Dutch media and politicians, and Dutch-Moroccan youth observe and evaluate maroc-hop. Dutch media often resort to a reaction of moral panic, framing maroc-hop in the context of terrorism and Islamic radicalism; Dutch-Moroccan youth frame it within the context of hip-hop and youth culture. Even if most interviewees stated that they considered DHC's lyrics appalling and reprehensible, they estimated that the hype around the rap was not legitimate.

The moral panic that broke out after news programme NOVA aired a report on DHC's *Hirsi Ali Diss* is a direct indication of Dutch media and politics' stereotypical approach towards Dutch-Moroccan youth. The term "moral panic" has been coined by sociologist Stanley Cohen, who described it in his 1972 publication *Folk Devils and Moral Panics* as follows:

"A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnosis and solutions; ways of coping are revolved or (more often) resorted to" (Cohen quoted in Sluiter 2005: 6-7).

The behaviour of young people is a common theme in many moral panics, such as the youth cultures of the Mods and the Rockers in Britain during the 1960s and 1970s.

An important factor in moral panic is the deviancy amplification spiral, meaning an increasing cycle of reporting on a category of antisocial behaviour or other undesirable events. In fact, the process instigated by a moral panic also thrives on a mechanism that is crucial in the process of stereotyping, namely by labelling the behaviour of persons or groups of people as deviating from the norm. A certain phenomenon is hyped by the media and the issue that is stressed is how this phenomenon, a rap song in this case, is deviant, abnormal, and maybe even threatening to society.

The media and political reaction to maroc-hop resulted in moral panic infused by a fear of Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, and the current debates about freedom of speech and the prohibition of discrimination (against Hirsi Ali). The media framed these songs in the context of terrorism, radicalism, Islamic fundamentalism, and anti-Semitism; in short, the media framed it within a political context. The frames of youth culture, hip-hop culture, and the marginal position of Dutch-Moroccan youth were totally immaterial to their argument.

The response to the DHC rap is somewhat similar to the response of the American police and government to a number of American rap songs in the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, as reported by Tricia Rose. She describes a similar pattern of reactions that took place when songs of Ice T, Ice Cube and NWA were released in the States. These rappers rapped about 'Cop killers', 'F\*ck the police' and 'Who protects us from you [i.e. the police]?', respectively. The media and politicians following in its wake framed the songs within a context of crime, violence and deviant behaviour of African-American youth (Rose 1994: 124). Rose ironically notes how Ice T's song 'Cop Killer' was not even identified as a rap song by music critics, because it was a heavy metal song with hardly any rapping in it or any other of hip-hop's musical features. Yet, media and politicians framed the song as a rap song, since that was more useful in their argument against rap music. After all, rap music was typical African-American music and heavy metal music is usually produced, performed and listened to by white American kids. Even though Ice T's song was not a rap song, it was framed as such in order to portray rap music and African-American youth as anti-authoritarian, aggressive, criminal, and violent.

The few maroc-hop songs that have become known to a wider audience, through media exposure and news reports, are mostly those songs with very brutal, shocking, and controversial lyrics. Yet, not all maroc-hop songs are of that nature. In fact, maroc-hop is characterized by three categories of lyrical themes: the first category contains songs about local themes, the second category consists of songs about national (Dutch) themes, and the final third category includes songs dealing with international issues. In the next section, I will describe these categories and analyze several rap lyrics in all of these categories.

## **6. Maroc-hop's lyrics: A categorization of themes**

The maroc-hop repertoire encloses a typical collection of lyrical themes, which distinguishes it from 'regular Nederhop' and American hip-hop, or any kind of other hip-hop, for that matter. Many maroc-hop songs could be categorized within overall hip-hop categories, such as brag and boast songs, songs about the glorification of drugs, a gangster-lifestyle, and so on. Yet, a considerable part of maroc-hop songs are typical for the genre and develop topics that are signs of resistance to stereotypes and escaping imposed identities and labels.



Thomas Solomon, who researches Turkish hip-hop from Turkey and its diaspora, points out that much scholarly attention has been given to how local hip-hoppers have incorporated and re-interpreted American hip-hop and how hip-hop culture

“...is locally emplaced in Tokyo, Sydney and Istanbul...[C]omparatively less attention has been paid to the other side of the...coin: how locally significant issues and discourses are adapted to and embodied in these globally circulating cultural forms”(Solomon 2006: 59).

In my analysis of maroc-hop, I adopt Solomon’s approach and analyze which issues, topics and discourses are represented in its lyrics and how they relate to the national Dutch context. Although hip-hop is originally an American genre, Dutch-Moroccan hip-hop artists have not taken over American hip-hop by imitating it, but rather they have developed it in a typical way. Especially the repertoire that falls into the category ‘national’ often includes songs that resist the stereotypes with which the rappers feel burdened.

### *Local themes*

A great deal of the maroc-hop repertoire deals with local topics. The term local here refers to cities and towns in the Netherlands, but at times the songs deal with ‘even more local’ places, i.e. districts, neighbourhoods, or streets within a particular city or town. This category includes biographical stories about what is happening in a local neighbourhood, including battles between different rap crews from local districts, songs praising local hometowns or neighbourhoods, like bragging and boasting about how their neighbourhood is the best, and so on. An example of such a song in this category is *Schalkwijk Diss* by Den Haag Connections (DHC):

*Je strijd voor wat je strijd want je heb schijt in je broek van de DHC vloek/ nu zit je in de hoek waar de klappuh valluh / dus ga je beter stalluh voordat ik je kom knalluh/ hoe haal je ut in je hoofd om DHC te provoceren /ze kunnuh binnenkort je moeder condoleren*

Translation:

You fight for what you fight for and you are shit scared of the DHC curse/ now we have you cornered and there’s gonna be some slapping/ so you better stay put before we come to shoot / what were you thinking, provoking DHC / in no time they can send condolences to your mother

In this song, rapped in a very specific local accent immediately identifiable as a 'Hague accent', Schalkwijk, a district of a Dutch town called Haarlem, which is the home town of a rival rap band, is 'dissed', i.e. disrespected and mocked, and city of The Hague and the rap crew DHC is glorified.

Another example is a song from SBM, a rap crew from Amersfoort. SBM stands for Schuilenburgse Mafia, and Schuilenburg is a district in Amersfoort. The chorus of the song *Welcome to Amersfoort* is as follows:

Welkom in Amersfoort, waar de players playen. Waar we elke chick helemaal uitkleden. De stad van criminelen en loverboys. Rijdend in glimmende BMW's en Rolls Royce.

Translation:

Welcome to Amersfoort, where the players play. Where we undress every chick. The city of criminals and lover boys, riding shiny BMW's and Rolls Royce.

The rest of the song glorifies Amersfoort and its residents, especially the rappers themselves. The rappers warn everybody who 'hates' Amersfoort not to go there. The final verse of the songs says: "Amersfoort is the city you should be wary of." Numerous others songs similar to these are to be found in the repertoire of maroc-hop. All these songs indicate the rappers' concrete affiliation with their local Dutch context and their local social surroundings. Through these songs the rappers express a very specific local identity, identifying with their hometown, or their own district. In that sense, they connect themselves intrinsically to local places. Yet, at the same time, these songs are articulations of a global hip-hop identity. The songs address topics, which are very common for hip-hop songs worldwide: materialism, glorification of drugs, violence, and crime, and brag and boast about the rapper, his crew or hometown. Hence, the songs combine elements of a very local hip-hop discourse with those of a global hip-hop discourse.

Many songs in this category could also be categorized as 'diss raps' and 'battle songs'. These songs are specifically written to attack another rapper or rap crew from a rival town or a rival district. In order to express one's superiority, rappers often resort to bragging and boasting about their local town or area, its 'danger', and the specific local knowledge one needs in order to survive in their 'dangerous' neighbourhood. The competition is mocked by representing their hometown as stupid, boring and not cool. Remarkably, the rapper's hometown is linked directly to one's supremacy

as a rapper, as if one's hometown is an indication for one's rap skills and its hip-hop authenticity.

On the level of language use and vocabulary, these kinds of raps are often delivered in a very local vernacular using a local dialect or accent from a particular Dutch region or city. The different dialects in the Netherlands are very clearly recognizable and a rapper from Amsterdam can often immediately be identified as an Amsterdam rapper because of his speech, his vocabulary and his accent. In addition to this accent and local dialect, the lyrics are mixed with terms and expressions from the global hip-hop vocabulary, used in their original English version, sometimes Dutchified. For example, in this song by SBM the verb 'to play', a famous hip-hop term, is adapted to Dutch morphology and becomes 'play-en'. In this way, the rappers combine a local Dutch attachment with an affiliation to the global hip-hop scene, by mixing up local speech and global hip-hop vernacular. Through the usage of the Hague accent, a local social identity, being from The Hague, is represented in this song and at the same time a membership to the global hip-hop community is expressed.

When writing about the local hip-hop scenes in Frankfurt, Germany, and Newcastle upon Tyne, England, Andy Bennett refers to this phenomenon of juxtaposing and incorporating elements from a 'local and global space' as *glocalization*. This term is coined to represent the combination of local and global elements, i.e. *glocal*. This concept of *glocalization* is based on Lull's concept of cultural reterritorialization, which refers to a process whereby cultural products are considered "malleable resources that can be *reworked*, that is, inscribed with new meanings that relate to the particular local context within which such products are appropriated" (Bennett 2000: 138).

In the case of maroc-hop, a number of rappers prefer to present themselves as inhabitants of a certain local area, and not specifically as Muslims, Moroccans, or any other identity. The lyrics seem to evolve around confirming and reinforcing alliances or rivalries with local groups of people (other rap crews) and neighbourhoods, which is another important element in hip-hop culture in general. These songs express a resistance to stereotypes, in the sense that the narratives and identities articulated in the lyrics reject the stereotypical picture painted of Dutch-Moroccan youth. By presenting themselves specifically as a rapper from Amsterdam, or an MC from Almere, or a DJ from Hengelo, rappers combine a local identity with an affiliation to global hip-hop culture. Illustrative of this attempt to escape imposed identi-

ties and stereotypes, is the following statement of female Dutch-Moroccan hip-hop artist and singer Senna:

“I’m a hip-hopper...and just forget about the whole Moroccan thing...I’m Moroccan but I don’t try to stand out as a Moroccan singer because that doesn’t define me. Musically, my talent defines me...it’s a really hot issue right now, being Moroccan. Are you a good one? Or a bad one? Are you the one who is out every night causing trouble? Or are you the one that makes something out of her life?...[I] am a singer in the first place, then I’m Dutch, then Moroccan” (Senna quoted in Walter 2006: 23 and 29).

Senna is reluctant to put emphasis on her Moroccan identity first, since she feels that a Dutch-Moroccan identity is easily interpreted in negative ways and can evoke stereotypical ideas about her: Senna thus considers an explicit expression of the Moroccan part of her identity undesirable, since it can result in a judgement of her identity beyond her control. The salience of her statement seems to be that she tries to resist and avoid stereotyping by downplaying her Moroccan background.

Nevertheless, not all maroc-hoppers downplay their Moroccan background. Ayhan Kaya’s analysis of German-Turkish hip-hop applies to some of the maroc-hoppers as well:

“Turkish rappers in Berlin constitute a unique expression in the sense that they expose a cultural identity formation process which is a critique of the Cartesian binary opposition. They construct and reconstruct their cultural identity in a process whereby the conjunctions of ‘*either*’ (Turkish) and ‘*or*’ (German) have been consciously rejected. Instead, they employ the conjunction ‘*and...and...and...*’ in the process of identity formation as in ‘*German and Turkish and global and...*’ ...Thus, these youngsters display a unique subjectivity, a third position, where one can abstain from dichotomies” (Kaya 2002: 56-57).

In line with these German-Turkish rappers, Dutch-Moroccan rappers do not want to be categorized *only* or present themselves *merely* as (Dutch-) Moroccan rappers. By means of addressing local topics as I described above, they present themselves as rappers with a specific local Dutch background, located in a specific local area, distinguishing themselves from rappers in other Dutch regions and cities. All the while, all these Dutch-Moroccan rappers from different Dutch cities and areas continue to affiliate themselves

with the global hip-hop community by implementing elements of the global, often a synonym for American, hip-hop vernacular.

To sum up, through these songs, Dutch-Moroccan rappers express multiple identities. By using a typical vocabulary, accent, and speech, and addressing specific local topics, the rappers are able to put forward sensibilities and affinities towards their social Dutch surroundings, concretely placing themselves in these local places, while at the same time the rappers express a connectedness to both their local Dutch hometowns and the worldwide hip-hop community.

### *National Dutch themes*

This category includes songs that mainly deal with discrimination, racism, and stereotyping in Dutch society. In general, the songs address hot topics in Dutch society on a national level and focus on the problems of Dutch multicultural society and the debate on the integration of 'allochtonen and Muslims' in particular. As opposed to the more local topics in the previous category relating to local battles and rival cities, the topics in this category are related to overall Dutch society. In this category, resistance against stereotyping of Dutch-Moroccans, Muslim and Islam has a prominent place. In order to exemplify this category, I will present extracts from two songs: one from a song by Appa (Rachid el Ghazaoui, born 1983) and one from a song by J-Rock (Jihad Rahmouni, born 1982).

The Dutch-Moroccan rapper Appa was initially a member of a multicultural rap crew from Amsterdam called Tuindorp Hustler Click (THC). In 2005 Appa left THC and went solo. He is currently considered an upcoming rapper in the Dutch hip-hop scene and stands at the verge of breaking through in the mainstream Dutch hip-hop and national Dutch music scene. He is praised by fans and colleague rappers for his lyrical strength, his ability to rap about 'reality', and the social engagement coming through in his songs. He released a mix-tape<sup>22</sup> in 2006 called *De meest onderschatte* (*The most underestimated*). Appa's mix tape is also available on-line, as well as some of his videos which circulate on YouTube. In an interview with *State magazine*, a renowned on-line hip-hop magazine in the Netherlands, Appa states that his name means drunk in street-language, and it was the nickname he was labelled with when he was still into drinking, drugs, and delinquencies. These days, Appa focuses on his music career and the name now stands for "the rapper who leaves you with a hang-over" (Benmbarak 2006).

*Refrein:*

*Ik doe wat ik moet doen het is nu tijd ik kom op voor me volk en ik ga volop in de strijd  
een trotse Marokkaan is wat ik ben en wat ik blijf/ dus het wordt rwina als je te lang  
naar me kijkt*

*Ik doe wat ik moet doen het is nu tijd ik kom op voor me volk en ik ga volop in de strijd  
een trotse Marokkaan is wat ik ben en wat ik blijf/ dus het wordt rwina als je te lang  
naar me wijst*

*Verse 2:*

*Schuif aan de kant, het is tijd voor die echte shit, ben strijdklaar want het is tijd om  
te vechten, pik*

*Ga je wat uitleggen maar als je eens wist hoe het voelt om geclassificeerd te worden  
als terrorist*

*Ik ben een mens dus ik heb recht op mijn privé, dus waarom moet ik rondlopen met  
een ID*

*Ik heb een idee, maar wacht even waarom word ik nagewezen noemt Nederland het  
een cliché*

*Ik schrijf wat ik leef met mijn pen en alleen maar echtheid is wat ik schreeuw met  
me stem /je voelt de pijn en woede dus je vreest wat ik ben, ben zo gemaakt van het  
systeem maakt het beest van een mens spelen bevolkingsgroepen tegen elkaar uit /  
en tijdens alle wanorde wie pakt er de buit je vraagt je af wie zit er achter de kassa /  
dezelfde mensen met villa`s op de Vinkeveense Plassen / heb schijt aan de regering  
want ze maken een zootje / die rappende minister Dönner vreet ik op als een broodje  
want dit is niet te pikken en daarom groeit de jeugd op met de mentaliteit van: wilt  
u staan, want ik kan zitten / geloof je mij niet gappie vraag het aan Naffer / elke pen  
is machtiger dan een zwaard of blaffer en ik, ben even echt als een droom van een  
Palestijn / dus ik doe wat ik moet doen om te komen waar ik wil zijn, motherfucker  
Outro (gesproken):*

*Het word rwina als je te lang naar me wijst / dus haal je fucking vinger weg en  
beschuldig me niet zomaar van shit / kijk me niet scheef aan als ik in de winkel loop,  
ja jij ja, ik weet dat je me hoort*

*(Schuif aan de kant, Appa feat. Naffer, Mixtape De meest onderschatte, 2006)*

*Translation:*

I do what I have to, it is time, I stick up for my people and I lead the battle, a proud Moroccan is what I am and what I'll always be / so it is going to be a *rwina*<sup>23</sup> if you look at me too long.

I do what I have to, it is time, I stick up for my people and I lead the battle, a proud Moroccan is what I am and what I'll always be / so it is going to be a *rwina* if you point at me too long

Verse 2:

Move aside, it is time for the real shit, I am ready for battle, 'cause its time to fight, sucker

Gonna explain something to you, if you only knew what it feels like to be classified as a terrorist

I am a human being, so I have a right to privacy, so why do I have to walk around with an ID?

I have an idea, but hold up, why do people point their fingers at me and Holland calls it a cliché

I write about my own experience with my pen, and it is only realness that I shout with my voice / you feel the pain and anger and so you fear what I am, I am made this way, the system makes humans into beasts, plays people off against each other/ and during all the chaos, who runs off with the loot? / you ask yourself who is behind the cashier's desk / the same people with villas at the Vinkeveense Plassen<sup>24</sup> / I spit on the government because they mess everything up / that rapping minister Dönner<sup>25</sup>, I eat him like a sandwich, because this is unacceptable / and that is why the youth grow up with an attitude like: please stand up, because I wanna take that seat / you don't believe me homie? Just ask Naffer<sup>26</sup>/ a pen is more powerful than a sword or a gun and I am just as real as a Palestinian's dream / so I do what I have to do to get where I wanna be, motherfucker.

*Outro* (spoken):

It is going to be *rwina* if you point your finger at me too long / so keep your fucking finger down and do not just randomly accuse me of shit / don't look at me askance when I walk around in the shop / yeah, you / I know you hear me.

In different ways, this song addresses issues that relate to the stereotyping of Dutch-Moroccan youth. In particular, it deals with the stereotype that considers Dutch-Moroccans to be terrorists or have an inclination towards terrorism. However, before going into details, first of all, Appa clearly and firmly establishes his Moroccan identity by rapping in the chorus that he is 'a proud Moroccan' who will fight for his people. This way, he clearly identifies with other Dutch-Moroccans and represents himself as one of them. Although Appa describes his identity as purely Moroccan, his 'Moroccan' identity is evidently linked to being a Moroccan in the Netherlands and is shaped against the Dutch other in this song. It will become clear, however, that Appa's outlook on Dutch society is not completely friendly. Already in the chorus, which are the first lines of the song, it becomes clear that Appa calls for a resistance to, a battle against those who threaten his Moroccan

identity: “if you look at me too long, it is gonna be a *rwina*” meaning that trouble will come to those who threaten his identity and look at him too long, because they think he is that ‘terrorist’. In the video of this song Appa is shown wearing a T-Shirt with the word ‘terrorist’ written on it. As we have seen in the discussion of the effects of stereotyping, a feeling of a threatened identity is one of the effects. Here, Appa seems to feel that his identity is threatened and under attack. He acts it out by aggressively subverting it through lyrically threatening those, who he feels are responsible for the threat to his identity.

The song then goes into detail about Appa’s experiences as a Dutch-Moroccan young man in present Dutch society. By highlighting some political developments, Appa explains how Dutch government is, in his eyes, responsible for the fact that Dutch-Moroccans are negatively stereotyped, and that tension exists between different groups in society. Appa talks of being classified as a terrorist and then reports on a Dutch policy that has recently been installed, obliging every one in the Netherlands to carry an ID when one finds oneself in public spaces. If the authorities ask for your ID and you do not have it on you, you are fined. He seems to say that this policy is only applied to those whose appearance is suspect, i.e. Dutch-Moroccans. Appa implicitly expresses this frustration when he talks about being pointed at by people and the Dutch calling it only a cliché. Appa feels threatened in his (Moroccan) identity, a common symptom for people who are constantly stereotyped, and he literally talks of pain and anger. Then, very explicitly, he relates his own pain and anger related to this stereotyping, to the reason why others are afraid of him: “so you fear what I am.” Here, he raises the idea of ‘fear of Moroccans’; an issue that he seems to see as a fertile soil for the continuity of stereotypes. This line links up to a line Naffer rapped earlier in the song: “Move aside, if you see me as a problem.” Then, he goes on to justify his own angry attitude, triggered by feelings of being stereotyped, by stating that the Dutch government has created him this way: “I am made this way; the system makes humans into beasts.” Here Appa says that the stereotype of Dutch-Moroccans as angry, criminal people has the potency of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. Appa says that he is “made this way”, suggesting that the constant negative attitude towards Dutch-Moroccans has made him angry and he fears that continuous stereotyping can have negative effects on people and can turn their behaviour into a negative direction.

Appa does not only justify and defend his own angry attitude, but also that of ‘youth’. The line “...and that is why the youth grow up with an attitude



like: please stand up, because I wanna take that seat" refers to a poster that is often placed in public buses and transport calling for respect to the elderly among the passengers, by stating that it is respectful for younger people to give up their seat to the elderly and the handicapped. According to Appa, youth nowadays, live by another motto: "You must stand up, because I want that seat." Appa seems to link this assertive, maybe even aggressive and disrespectful attitude to the fact that Dutch-Moroccan youth feel deprived of respect in Dutch society. However, despite the direct, sharp and aggressive tone of the lyrics and the way they are delivered, Appa still calls for a peaceful, unarmed resistance against Dutch society and its stereotypes. By stating that the pen is always more powerful than swords or guns, Appa is certainly not appealing to a violent confrontation between Dutch-Moroccan youth and Dutch society.<sup>27</sup>

J-Rock's song *Jihad!* released by 24 Records, September 2006, deals with the experiences Jihad lives through relating to misconceptions and stereotypical ideas about his name. This song is far more friendly in tone and it has a more lively and gay sound than Appa's song. The song uses humour as a tool to undermine stereotypes concerning the rapper's name Jihad and all negative associations connected to it. This song includes a question-answer scheme between J-Rock and an imaginary female employee of an employment agency.

*Intro:*

*Waddup mensen dit is J na de R-O-C-K / Echte naam Jihad (Jihoe?) dat is m'n naam ja / Ze denken dat ik vaak in de problemen kom door m'n naam/ Maar dat valt reuze mee yo / Tenminste dat is hoe ik ermee om ga / Check it*

*Verse:*

*Ten eerste ben ik trots op mijn naam, dat deel ik effe mee kids / Voordat ik je nou vertel hoe de vork nou in de steel zit / Ik word dagelijks geconfronteerd / Door grappenmakers die me vragen ben je nou echt een terrorist / Ik ben opzoek naar een baan want ik heb geld nodig / Ik loop naar het uitzendbureau en stel me netjes voor ( ik ben ) / Ik krijg niets te drinken en ga zitten / Die dame vraagt geïrriteerd heb je nog een momentje / Oohooh daar gaan we weer ( oohooh ) / Ik heb m`n havo afgemaakt en toch word ik weer benadeeld ( tja ) / Je moet niet schrikken want ik doe geen vlieg kwaad / En aangenaam kennis te maken ik ben Jihad*

*Is het echt waar meen je dat serieus*

*Ik maak geen grappen schatje, ook al vind je het niet zo leuk*

*Je naam betekent oorlog zeg wat vind je daar van*

*Dat word je voorgeschoteld maar dat heeft er niets mee te maken*

*Chorus:*

*Jihoe ( Jihoe ) Jiwat ( Jiwat ) Jihad/ das mijn naam ja/ met die naam ben ik geboren  
ja*

## Translation:

Intro: What's up people, this is the J after the R-O-C-K/ Real name Jihad (Ji-Who?)  
That's my name yes / they think my name gives me a lot of trouble/ but it is not  
so bad, yo / at least, that is how I see it / Check it.

## Verse:

First of all, I am proud of my name, and that is something I wanna tell you kids/  
before I tell you the ins and outs about the matter / I am confronted daily by  
jokers who ask me are you really a terrorist / I am looking for a job, because I  
need the money / So I went to the employment agency and politely introduced  
myself / ik ben Jihad / I get nothing to drink and I sit down / the lady asks me  
one moment please / Ooh, there we go again / Oh-oh / I finished high school  
and still I am prejudiced, yeah well / You shouldn't be scared / I would not harm  
a fly / And nice to meet you / I am Jihad

'Is it true, are you serious?'

I am not joking baby, even though you do not like it

'Your name means war; tell me, what do you think of that?'

That is what you are told, but war has got nothing to do with it

## Chorus:

Ji- who ( Ji-who ) Ji-what ( Ji-what ) Jihad/ that is my name yes/ that is the name  
I was born with

J-Rock humorously and entertainingly tells the listener what it is like to have the name Jihad in contemporary Dutch society. Jihad, a name and word with heavy political and religious connotations, is a term that is also included in the Qur'an and other holy scripts, and has several meanings, of which the best known is 'holy war (against non-Muslims)'. Especially since 9/11, media reports almost always link the word *jihad* to violence, Islamic radicalism, and terrorism. Yet, as J-Rock explains to the listeners, the word or name Jihad is not a synonym for violence and aggression. The lyrics itself do not include the definition or meaning of the name Jihad, they only talk about what the name does *not* stand for, but a press-release states that the name was given to him by his parents, because they liked its literal meaning: internal battle.<sup>28</sup> The term *jihad al nafs* is an Islamic expression that refers to a human being's internal struggle to resist temptations and the ego from

prevailing. For example, fasting during Ramadan and praying five times a day are considered forms of *jihad al nafs*.

The conversation Jihad has with the female employee of the employment agency symbolizes how Jihad is constantly confronted with the negative connotations his name evokes. Jihad acknowledges that the female employee is not to blame for her stereotypical thinking, since “that is what you are told.” Implicitly, Jihad refers here to the media who “tell people how to think.” According to him, the media are the cause of the negativity surrounding his name.

Like Appa, Jihad refers to the idea of ‘fear of Moroccans, or Muslims’, which he apparently experiences in his life. The line “You shouldn’t be scared, I would not harm a fly”, indicates that Jihad observes a sense of fear when he interacts with Dutch people who do not know him. Yet, Jihad has no intentions to intimidate those who are afraid of him, like Appa does. Instead, Jihad continues to explain to the audience that there is no reason to fear him. Also in the next verse, Jihad defends himself by stating that he is not a “radical thinker, so don’t follow the hype.” The entire song combines a happy-go-lucky attitude, both represented in its lyrics as well as in the musical composition. The humorous attitude becomes particularly clear in the chorus, which uses the word/ name Jihad in a joking way, rhyming it with Ji-who and Ji-what. This cheery way of talking about Jihad on a bouncy rhythm, adds to the good-humoured approach Jihad has taken on this issue, although his rap is interspersed with a touch of irony. Focusing on the lyrics, it seems that Jihad is indeed bothered by the stereotypes he feels inflicted with. However, Jihad’s strategy to resist the stereotypes evoked by his name, an experience he is confronted with daily, is not similar to Appa’s. Jihad attempts by means of humour, to show how ridiculous the stereotype concerning his name is.

In review, these two songs, and many of the songs I have categorized as such, are expressions of resistance against the stereotypes Dutch-Moroccan rappers feel they are confronted with in daily life.<sup>29</sup> Both rappers refer to recent developments in Dutch politics, and consider 9/11 as an important starting point for the emergence of negative stereotyping vis-à-vis Dutch-Moroccans. The songs show how Dutch-Moroccans are frustrated about their bad reputation. Through these songs we learn that the rappers consider the public image of Dutch-Moroccan youth a mix of stereotypical ideas about Muslims, often seen as a synonym for Dutch-Moroccans. This image evokes strong associations with terrorism, crime and Islamic radicalism. By means of these songs the rappers try to invalidate these stereotypi-

cal images. Whereas Appa takes an aggressive, assertive, and provocative approach in order to fight stereotypes, J-Rock uses humour, irony, and takes on a happy-go-lucky, more nonchalant approach.

### *International themes*

Besides national issues, a great deal of maroc-hop repertoire deals with international topics, often international politics. The war in Iraq, 9/11 and especially the Israeli-Palestine conflict are popular song subjects. Like the songs about national themes, these songs indicate a considerable political consciousness among these rappers. For example, Omar and El Moro's track *Palestijnse strijders* (*Palestinian fighters*) is a song that talks about the Israeli-Palestine conflict.

*Palestijnse strijders ze vechten voor hun land/ Abbas en Sharon wanneer schudden ze de hand/ wanneer komt er nou vrede? / Yo laat me nou weten.*

Translation:

Palestinian fighters, they're fighting for their country / Abbas and Sharon when will they finally shake hands? / When will there be peace / Yo, I wanna know now

Another song on Palestine is DHC's *Palestina* (*Palestine*):

Refrein:

Hamas, Jihad, Hezbollah (2x) / DHC staat achter jullie

La sharqiyya, la gharbiyya, Filastin <sup>c</sup>Arabiyya

*La sharqiyya, la gharbiyya, Filastin Islamiyya*<sup>30</sup>

Vers:

*Wat is het voor een leven van een jongentje van vijf als zijn vader wordt afgeknald, voor zijn ogen lijdt/ ik kan het niet geloven, hoe komt een kind dit te boven/ het is een schande en dat is nog zacht uitgedrukt / 57 jaren lang worden de Palestijnen onderdrukt / ik krijg pijn als ik zie dat een Palestijn oversteekt bij een illegale grenslijn / vernederd wordt en mishandeld en als een hond wordt behandeld/ en als ie is teruggekeerd ziet hij dat zijn huis is gebombardeerd/ Zijn ouders zijn nu dood en niemand die het deert/ en hij zit op de stoep en laat een traan vallen, die zieke zionisten zijn weer binnengevallen/ Vind je het gek dat onze broeder nu een martelaar is, het is een droefenis/ maar weet je wat erg is, dat er niemand in de wereld wat doet/ het is een tranenvloed /Je ziet dagelijks op tv hoe een moslim dood bloedt/ Dus word wakker en niet op je dooie akker/ Ga ten strijde en laat je leiden door de horde van de schepper.*

Translation:

Hamas, Jihad, Hezbollah / DHC supports you

No east, no west, Palestine is Arab

No east, no west, Palestine is Islamic

Verse:

What kind of life is it for a five year old boy, when his father is shot dead, before his own eyes and suffers/ I cannot believe it/ how can a child handle this/ it is a disgrace and that is an understatement / 57 years already the Palestinians are suppressed / I hurt when I see that a Palestinian tries to cross a checkpoint / he is humiliated and abused and treated like a dog/ and when he returns home he sees his house is bombed. His parents are dead and nobody cares/ he sits on the sidewalk and tears drop/ those sick Zionists have invaded yet again / do you think it is crazy that our brother has become a martyr / it is sad/ but you know what is even worse? That nobody in the world does anything about it/ it is a wave of tears / every day you see on TV how a Muslim bleeds to death/ So wake up, and not at your leisure (and don't be lazy) / Go and fight and let the horde of the creator lead the way.

In these songs, you can find signs of a (pan-) Islamic identity among the rappers, since these songs, express a sense of affiliation with Muslims worldwide. Through these songs, Omar and El Moro and DHC created a musical space connecting to Palestinian youth, transgressing their own local boundaries of their hometowns and rival towns, going beyond the borders of Dutch society by affiliating themselves to their Muslim brothers in the Middle East. It clearly reveals that their frames of mind go beyond their own local situation. The rappers identify strongly with their 'Palestinian brothers'. Again, an appeal to fight this injustice inflicted upon the Palestinians is expressed in rhetorical words. I take it these words are not meant to be interpreted as a literal plea to take up arms against the 'Zionists', but rather as a symbolic expression of support towards the Palestinians and a way of articulating the extent to which the rappers feel connected to the Palestinians.

Moreover, concerning the vernacular, again, different languages are used next to each other in one song. The refrain is sung in a mix of Arabic and Dutch, and consequently creates a link between the rappers, their Dutch background, Palestine, and the rest of the Arab world. By singing in Arabic, the rappers express a link with 'their Palestinian brothers' as well with the whole Arab-speaking world. Besides, by claiming that Palestine should be Arab and Islamic, they put a clear political statement forward, supporting

the end of the Israeli occupation in Palestine and the domination of Islam. As in many of DHC's other songs, the Israeli's, often referred to as 'the Jews', are explicitly attacked. A strong pro-Arab, pro-Muslim and pro-Palestine point of view is also promoted in *Terroristen (Terrorists)*, another one of their songs.

## 7. Conclusion: An overall analysis

Reviewing all the categories, it becomes clear that maroc-hop lyrics are representations of a multitude of identification processes. In one song the rappers present themselves as 'proud' Moroccans, even though this Moroccan identity is inherently connected to Dutch society; and being Moroccan in the way Appa describes, is intrinsically linked to being Moroccan in Dutch society. In another song, the focus lies on a very specific local hip-hop identity, an identification process that evolves around making connections between other rap crews or, vice versa, setting yourself apart from other rap crews.

The vernacular and language that the rappers have created is an amalgam of elements from different languages, dialects, and repertoires. The songs use Moroccan-Arabic and Dutch, i.e. a mix between a local Dutch dialect (from Amsterdam, for example) and Dutch street-slang, which is a mix of Moroccan-Arabic, Turkish, and Surinamese languages, and this all is interspersed with a lot of English, often specifically American, hip-hop terms. All in all, the mixing of all these languages and their juxtaposition in songs are in themselves already indications of multiple identification processes developing in one song.

Regarding lyrical content, the texts are ongoing dialogues between rappers and their audiences (including fans, and other 'enemy' rap crews), but also between rappers and overall society. The rappers express signs of escaping imposed labels and stereotypes of Dutch-Moroccans as criminals, terrorists, and religious fanatics, or they create narratives that invalidate or reverse these stereotypes. When directing lyrics at 'society', the rappers usually address authority figures, the state, power holders, state institutions, certain politicians, and the media, and so on, often telling fictional stories about kidnapping or battling authority figures. At times, the lyrics are aggressive and violent, at other times they are humorous or sarcastic.

Maroc-hop's articulation of alternative points of view about the 'true' nature of Dutch-Moroccans, which rejects the public opinion about them, are a form of criticism of the way Dutch-Moroccans are represented by state institutions and media. A considerable part of maroc-hop lyrics, but certain-

ly not all, are attempts to undermine stereotypes, in the sense that through presenting alternative points of views, including personal biographies of experiences with stereotypes, maroc-hop rappers aim to subvert stereotypical ideas about Dutch-Moroccans. Rappers create a musical space in which they can safely and risk-free subvert current power structures. Making rap music offers them a possibility to symbolically become more powerful, gain prestige as an artist, and escape their marginal position.

In sum, the significance of Dutch-Moroccan hip-hop lies in the fact that it enables its producers to transgress the imposed, stereotypical boundaries of what it means to be Dutch- Moroccan. Through becoming involved in hip-hop, Dutch-Moroccan youth can retaliate and counter-attack the stereotypical and imposed labels, either by sheer dissociation from these stereotypes, or by articulating and prioritizing alternative identities that are significant and meaningful for them.

# Conclusion

Between September 2003 and November 2007, when I was doing preparatory research, conducting interviews and participant observation for this thesis, the political and media debate about Islam, Muslims in the Netherlands, and Dutch-Moroccans continued. When I was fine-tuning the final words of this thesis, Jan Dirk de Jong published his dissertation on (criminal) group-behaviour of young Dutch-Moroccans in the Amsterdam district Overtoomse Veld (De Jong 2007). Apparently, academic interest in this topic is still very much present and De Jong's publication received a lot of media attention.

In his thesis, De Jong argues that delinquency of Dutch-Moroccan teenagers in this district is not a result of 'Moroccan culture', but must be seen in the context of a specific "street culture in which the shaping of boundaries between us and them is highly important" (Groen and Kranenberg 2007). The behavioural patterns of this group, which the media sometimes refer to as a youth gang, are less connected with their Moroccan background and upbringing, than with "a desire for recognition, safety and fun" (De Jong 2007: 238-239). Particularly, hip-hop music and its adjoining culture function as a source of inspiration for these boys; they have a preference for rappers who live or have lived a true gangster-life, such as the American rapper 2Pac, the rappers of Amsterdam rap crew THC, and the Dutch-Moroccan rapper Salah Edin (ibid.: 103, 140).

These youngsters not only 'borrowed' idiom from hip-hop culture which they use in their daily speech, just like many kids worldwide, but they have also appropriated some of its social attitudes. Striving for 'bling-bling' and being loyal to your friends are important 'street values' in their street culture (De Jong 2007: 149-182). These are the same values that are also often explicitly expressed and promoted in hip-hop lyrics of American rappers, as well as in the lyrics of the maroc-hop rappers in this thesis. The hip-hop lyrics I analyzed in chapter five resemble the attitudes that are apparent in the street culture De Jong describes: the desire to escape imposed identities (stereotypes), an attitude of defensibility, being loyal to your friends ('crew'),



and (the desire of) being economically and sexually successful ('bling-bling' and being adored by many women in hip-hop terms). Hip-hop music is, in this sense, intrinsically intertwined with the lifestyle and value system of these Dutch-Moroccan youngsters. The descriptions of their lifestyles illustrate how hip-hop assigns meaning to their behavioural patterns; an indication that music, hip-hop in this case, can have a considerable impact on the behaviour and social attitudes of young people.

Popular music in particular and popular culture in general are important sites from which youth worldwide draw inspiration in the process of representing and articulating processes of identification. Hip-hop serves as one of these sources of inspiration. The relationship between hip-hop and the lifestyle of Dutch-Moroccan youngsters is one of the central themes of my thesis. The Dutch-Moroccan youth I met use, produce, consume and assign meanings to music in a way that touches upon different social spheres: socio-cultural, socio-political, and religious spheres. I have shown how individual narratives about music and its meanings in every-day life are linked to local circumstances. On a collective level, music is used in different social spaces and the interaction between these spaces and the meanings assigned to music define its social significance. For Dutch-Moroccan youth in a post-migration context, music provides an opportunity to express themselves and to affiliate themselves with different, sometimes conflicting worlds. They use it to create feelings of groupness, but music can also become a topic of heated debate and create divisions instead of groupness. Music enables people to create lines along which identification processes take shape or develop.

Chapter two demonstrates how the history, the main lyrical themes, the associations brought about by the (labels of) genres and the meanings constructed around them by producers and consumers, are crucial elements on which individuals base their musical preference. Equally important is that this personal preference is also embedded in local circumstances. They draw their musical inspiration from Dutch, Arab and American music. They have appropriated elements of 'ordinary' Dutch youth culture, for example the appropriation of hip-hop and urban culture, but also elements of what they consider their heritage or parent culture. Yet, changing circumstances have an effect on the types of music that are appropriated. While raï music could count on a large fan-base among Dutch-Moroccan youth in the 1980s and 1990s, its popularity has recently been surpassed by hip-hop, R&B, and raï N B. Raï music no longer related well to its audience. In a post-migration context, the urgency and relevance of most of its song-topics had disappeared.

Recent drastic changes in the socio-political climate in the Netherlands in comparison to the 1980s and 1990s have resulted in the need for musical genres that better represented Dutch-Moroccan youth's needs, desires, and frustrations, such as hip-hop.

My study demonstrates that music plays an important role in identification processes. In terms of the production of a music scene, Dutch-Moroccan youth have, through the establishment of a Dutch-Moroccan musical scene and the organization of Dutch-Moroccan musical events, constructed their own spaces, which are in tune with their specific musical preferences and their socio-cultural background. The respondents greatly value this background and want to give explicit expression to this feeling during these events. Also, these events have become partly adjusted to their religious needs. The narratives of their experiences during these events illustrate that most of these events are considered to be a 'Moroccan affair' whereby intruders and 'matters out of place' are at times critically monitored, in fear of a disruption of the 'Moroccan' cohesion. The events are places meant for dancing and enjoying music that Dutch-Moroccan youth like, for meeting other Dutch-Moroccans (making new friends or finding a partner), and for celebrating Dutch-Moroccanness. In a society that continuously focuses on the negative aspects of being Dutch-Moroccan and Muslim, Dutch-Moroccan musical events provide spaces free of stereotyping, where there are no demands for integration, and where they do not have to fear to be accused of crimes and terrorism. These events offer them the opportunity to express solidarity with other Dutch-Moroccan youth.

*Shaabi* plays a key role in the construction of this feeling of solidarity and unity. Music, in this case, serves a very clear purpose: i.e. to unite people and generate solidarity and commonality on a local level, such as during weddings and public Dutch-Moroccan dance and music events. The socialization of Dutch-Moroccans in an environment, in which family celebrations are deemed to be based on socio-cultural habits and rituals that their parents have taken from Morocco (and are thus considered authentically Moroccan), has produced a generation that is familiar with and attaches great value to these habits and the music genres that correspond with these habits and rituals. The importance of this socialization becomes clear in the biographical narratives of the respondents who report on how they were struck with and fascinated by the atmosphere of Moroccan weddings when they visited them for the first time. In particular, they were captivated by the effect *shaabi* music had on others and themselves during weddings and the feelings of solidarity, harmony, and nostalgia that arose out of this

atmosphere. Experiencing *shaabi* music in the context of a wedding for the first time often initiates a process of becoming aware of being or having a Dutch-Moroccan background. Music, in this sense, is a cue that triggers the identification process.

In the process of identifying themselves with peers, Dutch-Moroccan youth use *shaabi* as an essential element. At a concert or dance party, *shaabi* builds on its role during Moroccan weddings and sets off an atmosphere of enjoying the company of peers, free of restrictions and social control by parents, and free of other (Dutch) intrusions. In this sense, an active self-identification takes place as music functions as a tool to locate oneself in the same group as others. Since the same genre plays an important role in traditional Moroccan customs and rituals, with which second-generation Dutch-Moroccans are socialized, it is able to evoke this groupness. Especially since music is a symbol of what is perceived as 'traditionally Moroccan' - and this image is hardly ever disputed - it serves as a symbolic umbrella under which cohesion and connectedness prevail.

My analysis of groupness indicates that 'identity' is a process and not a static thing. The desire of Dutch-Moroccans to relive this groupness becomes clear in their motivations for visiting other musical events and the need to re-live this experience. The music and the meanings assigned to it, create the lines along which this groupness can emerge. People visiting these events do not go there to express their Dutch-Moroccanness; rather they visit these events to go through the motions of becoming absorbed in the 'Moroccan atmosphere' and subsequently feeling connected to other Dutch-Moroccans. This indicates that 'identity' cannot be considered as fixed and as a preconditioned state of being, but that at a certain moment in time in a certain social context, during a concert, people become absorbed in a process of identifying with others through the collective use of symbols and behavioural patterns. This groupness is temporary and when the event is over, the boundaries, ideology, and intention that contributed to the perception of the existence of a group, may become irrelevant. The elements that constructed this temporary groupness need not be relevant in other collective identification processes. Social contexts are crucial in determining what kinds of identification processes develop. Different identification processes occur in different social contexts. This indicates that identification processes are hard to isolate from external circumstances.

Most interviewees consider *shaabi* the most important tool in creating the right 'Moroccan' atmosphere and this makes *shaabi* an indispensable vehicle in the creation of groupness during public events. Yet, hip-hop

music and the identification processes concerned with it are much more open to individual interpretations and alternative identities. Maroc-hop is, in this sense, very different from *shaabi* music. Dutch-Moroccan youth both consume and actively produce hip-hop music, while *shaabi* is a consumption genre, meaning that more Dutch-Moroccan youths are active in producing hip-hop than in producing *shaabi*. Moreover, *shaabi* is used as a tool whereby the self, i.e. the visitor of an event, can identify with other Dutch-Moroccans. During *shaabi* events the central focus is on defining this in-group feeling and being recognized as Dutch-Moroccan. Hip-hop is a genre that is primarily used as a tool of direct engagement, whereby the self, i.e. the rapper, puts forward a claim to be heard and demands to be accepted as Dutch-Moroccan, Dutch, or Muslim, or whatever identification process is rendered central in a particular song. During *shaabi* events, one is being recognized as Dutch-Moroccan. Through hip-hop, one demands to be recognized as Dutch-Moroccan.

The hip-hop genre offers the opportunity to create new lines along which particular identification processes take shape. The recurrent themes in the maroc-hop repertoire include local, national, and international themes. The songs report on personal biographies of the rappers and their experiences in a local neighbourhood and their battles with other rap crews in rival towns. They speak of striving for wealth and often promote a materialistic attitude. The repertoires include songs that resist and mock stereotypes that the rappers feel Dutch society imposes upon them. The songs often reveal a political awareness in songs that deal with international politics, the situation in the Middle East, or criticize US foreign policy (in Afghanistan or Iraq). All these different recurrent themes reveal identification processes that cannot be captured under one label.

The rappers featuring in my study use hip-hop music to respond to certain socio-political circumstances and events, mostly through their lyrics, but sometimes also through their video clips or performances. With hip-hop music rappers respond to events and socio-political phenomena and the contents of the lyrics of maroc-hop are a clear sign of this. In their lyrics, Dutch-Moroccan rappers often do not present themselves specifically as either a 'Moroccan' rapper or a 'Muslim' rapper. Rather, they emphasize their local Dutch background, for example, when they are 'dissing' other rappers from Amsterdam, Rotterdam, etc. Yet, most of them remain conscious of their Moroccan and Islamic background as shown by their stage names and the topics of the songs. Hip-hop music functions as a channel through which rappers can air their frustrations regarding the political debate on

integration, the stereotypes about Dutch-Moroccans, international political events, such as 9/11 and the war in Iraq and so on. In the music, their way of perceiving, interpreting, and representing the world, is reflected.

Through hip-hop, rappers respond to processes of categorization they feel they are subjected to. The imposed category labels have a negative connotation (criminal, terrorist, radical) and their lyrics play on these labels and invalidate them, sometimes attacking them with an aggressive tone, at other times mocking them with humour. Dutch society's categorization of Dutch-Moroccans has a clear effect on the way rappers identify themselves, through their lyrics, with *allochtonen*, Muslims, Palestinians, Arabs, and other Dutch-Moroccans. In their repertoire, maroc-hoppers constantly change their perspective and affiliate themselves with different musical worlds and social groups and escape imposed labels.

For some people, Islam and, more specifically, what is presented as Islamic discourse, guides their individual preferences for or dislikes of consuming or producing a particular music genre. Discussions about the religious permissibility of music regularly take place among Dutch-Moroccan youth and reveal how the tension between theory and practice of Islam is bridged, by prioritizing an individualized approach towards Islam and advocating self-ruling and autonomy. The Islamic debate on the compatibility of music and performance and Islam, to a certain extent, also affects the way some Dutch-Moroccan music events are set up. The absence of alcohol, the emergence of women-only events and the way the audience legitimizes their participation in events through a joint recital of a Moroccan-Islamic benediction indicate that Islamic discourse has significant bearings on Dutch-Moroccan events and its audience.

The discussion about Islam and music demonstrates that music not always symbolizes unity. Music and the socio-cultural and religious sensitivities that surround it are interlinked. This becomes particularly clear in the discussions about the permissibility of music and the vulnerability of female performers in particular. This debate forces them to position themselves within the larger debate on how Islam should be experienced, and to make a connection between theory and practice in Islam. Their interpretations of Islam are individualized and their views fragmented. From a socio-religious point of view, this debate also functions as a tool to distinguish oneself from other Dutch-Moroccans. The effects and significance of music exceed the realm of popular culture or youth culture and impinge on social, cultural, political, and religious spheres as well.

The role of music in the identification processes of Dutch-Moroccan youth is manifold. Through *shaabi* music, an image of Morocco is (re) constructed that serves as a common denominator that binds all Dutch-Moroccans. In the context of musical events, such as concerts and dance parties, *shaabi* becomes the symbol of and enables the emergence of this in-group feeling. During these events one is recognized and accepted as Dutch-Moroccan. The way Dutch-Moroccan youth use hip-hop is much more a claim to be recognized in different ways: a demand to be accepted as Dutch, Dutch-Moroccan, Muslim or simply as a rapper from Amsterdam. The position of music in Islam has a complicating effect on the role of music in identification processes of Dutch-Moroccan youth. Some events conform, to a certain extent, to Islamic norms. For some artists and consumers the discussion about the incompatibility of music and Islam sets hurdles in their music productions and consumption patterns and they create specific strategies in order to take these hurdles on and get accepted as a Muslim(a) and as an artist. Others use Islam, meaning *their* interpretation of Islam, to legitimize their musical activities. The lack of Islamic consensus on this topic results in a variety of ways in which Islam is employed; some use it to identify and present themselves as Muslim, while others use it to categorize other people as un-Islamic.

Popular culture, including pop music and mass media channels, often serve as important reservoirs of images, expressions, loyalties, and discourses from which young people draw inspiration in the way they present, represent, articulate, and express processes of identification. This thesis is a first step in the construction of a Dutch field of study on the role of music and musical events in identification processes of second-generation immigrants in a Dutch post-migration context. It shows that music and youth culture cannot be studied in isolation from the rest of society. Through an investigation of youth culture and musical preferences of post-migration youth we gain insight into how they position themselves in society and how their music, their leisure time, and musical activities are affected by socio-political events and their own social, religious, and cultural backgrounds.

Many Dutch politicians and Dutch media stress the 'problem of Islam and Dutch-Moroccans' and talk frequently of Islamic terrorism, the prevention of Islamic radicalism among Dutch-Moroccan youth and many other issues related to Islam and Dutch-Moroccans. As this thesis has shown, the way one is categorized by others affects the way one identifies oneself. As a consequence of this constant labelling of Dutch-Moroccans as Moroccan

and Muslims, rather than Dutch, it may not be surprising that new Islamic youth cultures surface.

## *Suggestions for further study*

In the last few months (October and November 2007), several news items about 'new' Islamized products or phenomena appeared in Dutch newspapers. The daily newspaper *Spits* published a story on the first 'Muslim singles-night event' in the Netherlands (*Spits* 2007). This first-ever dating-event organized especially for Muslims who are in search of a life-partner was, according to the reporter, a big success. The daily newspaper *de Volkskrant* reported on "a Muslim comedy tour", talking about the debut performance of three American-Muslim comedians in the Netherlands (Henfling 2007). The same newspaper that same day also contained a short item on "the production of an Islamic car", about a Malaysian car-factory that wants to produce an Islamic car, including a compass to find the direction of Mecca and special filing compartments for the Qur'an and headscarves (Reuters 2007). Islamization appears to be applied in various fields of popular culture and in the production of new commodities. Is this also a reflection of changing identification processes that are shifting their focus from ethnicity to religion?

On the level of popular culture production, the emergence of 'Islamic' music, or Islamically inspired music is not completely new. Islamic hip-hop has conquered a place in the American and British hip-hop scene and industry, but appears to be still in its infancy in the Netherlands and has not yet reached a level of popularity as it has in the UK and the United States. Is the tension that exists between being a Muslim artist and the normative discourse that music, performance and Islam are incompatible, the reason why it is absent? Or is the urgency to make some kind of Islamic or religiously inspired hip-hop among Dutch-Moroccan rappers simply not there? Even though some Dutch-Moroccan rappers rap about Islam, state that they are inspired by it or use Islamic symbols in their videos<sup>1</sup>, their overall repertoire does not indicate a strong relation between their Muslimness and their artistic and creative performances or productions, as is the case for Islamic American hip-hop artists Native Deen, Soul Salah Crew, the British-Asian band Fun-da-mental, the British rapband Mecca II Medina and, the French rap-crew Médine (Popp 2004; Swedenburg 2001a; Solomon 2005, 2006; Abdul Khabeer 2007). It would be interesting to know to what extent Islam is (considered) an obstacle or an inspiration in the production and consumption of music and musical events by Dutch-Moroccan youth. In general, the issue of Islam and its role in new youth culture and popular culture productions is surely worth investigating more deeply.



Other examples of Islamic popular culture productions are the contemporary Islamic pop singers Sami Yusuf, with roots in Azerbaijan, born and raised in London, and Cat Stevens who converted to Islam in 1978 and changed his name to Yusuf Islam. They both have been active for several years in creating *anasheed* music in pop style that is popular among Muslim youth in Europe and the Arab world.<sup>2</sup> In the UK, the all-girl band Pearls of Islam make music (rap, *anasheed*, poetry, and spoken word) with percussion instruments and vocals. The lyrics often praise Islam and the prophet Muhammad.

In Indonesia, a vibrant popular music culture of bands inspired by the success of Western boybands à la Backstreet Boys and Take That has emerged. Barendregt reports on the superstar status of *anasheed* bands in Indonesia and Malaysia such as S'Nada, Raihan, and Rabbani (Barendregt 2006: 10). Traditionally, *anasheed* music is performed with a limited number of instruments or à cappella, because of the prohibition of certain musical instruments in Islam. *Anasheed* is usually performed with a choir that is made up of either male or female performers. This is in contrast to pop-idols such as Sami Yusuf and Yusuf Islam who perform with a band that uses (Western) instruments and who are the sole performers around which a fan-culture has emerged. This (female) fan-culture has also arisen around the Southeast-Asian Muslim boy bands, which has resulted in heated public debates. Many considered the bands too commercial and found that they focused their performance too much on the visuals (the good looks of the singers), rather than on the music and the vocals. In the Netherlands, I have not (yet) encountered Muslim boy bands, Islamic hip-hop bands or singers in the genre of Sami Yusuf who all specifically link their artistic productions to their own Muslim identity.<sup>3</sup>

Already in 2005, Boubekour reported on the surfacing of 'a new Muslim culture in the West' that produces 'new Islamic products', such as "Islamic street wear, Islamic soft drinks, Muslim pop-idols, religious songs, Muslim rappers and even Muslim comedians" (Boubekour 2005: 12). She concludes that through these new Islamized productions, Muslims in the West (i.e. Europe and the United States) strive for recognition of their Islamic values in Western society through incorporating these values into "a new Islamic culture that presents itself as cool and fashionable (i.e. modern), along with being competitive (i.e. powerful and dominant)" (ibid). This new Muslim culture, with a focus on consumption, is aimed at presenting a positive image of successful Muslims (ibid.: 12-13).

Boubekeur's observations, which are mainly based on research in France, the UK, and United States, tie in with the trend of partly 'Islamized' Dutch-Moroccan music events I described. Is this trend of Islamization an indication that the Dutch-Moroccan music scene will gradually become a scene that focuses on putting forward an Islamic identity, or will its 'Moroccan character' remain dominant? Or will the scene split into each of these directions? A study by Boogaarts-De Bruin indicates that among Dutch-Turkish youth a vibrant nightlife scene has emerged, which seems, at this point, *not* to be or become Islamized in one way or another (Boogaarts-De Bruin 2006; forthcoming). The Dutch-Turkish nightlife scene is a scene that thrives more on status and class distinctions than on Islamic distinctions. For example, alcohol is usually served, and gender segregation is not an option in this scene (Boogaarts-De Bruin: personal communication 2007). An interesting question is then why the Dutch-Moroccan music scene is more inclined to include and embody certain Islamic norms, while the Dutch-Turkish scene is not? Are Islamically inspired forms of youth culture and entertainment only a Dutch-Moroccan thing and if so, then why?

According to Boubekeur, the reason for the success of these new Islamic products is the fact that it stems from an individual motivation. By means of this consumptive, performative culture, Muslims are able to perform a Muslim identity based on "the choice of an individual consumer" (ibid.: 13). This new culture has an individual and fragmented character. Individual choices and individualized interpretations of Islam dictate much of the discourse within the debate on the compatibility of music and Islam as well. Certain moral norms that are intrinsically linked to individualized Islamic interpretations influence the choice of consumption of popular culture and music of some of my interviewees. Some female interviewees prefer not to watch MTV or TMF (Dutch music channels) because these channels air images, commercials and videos that they consider morally depraved and un-Islamic, such as too much nudity, and sexually explicit images, language use, or lyrics. These young women set a moral standard for themselves, inspired by Islamic discourse, which is embodied in their consumption of certain music genres and popular culture, and results in the rejection of certain other music genres and TV channels. The religious is thus at stake in the choice of popular culture consumption, or in other words: religion and fun have merged. It would be interesting to study whether this merging of religion and fun also takes places among other Dutch-Muslim youth and/ or European-Muslim youth and to what extent this is affected or brought about by social and political changes in the society they live in. Is the embodiment

of Islamic norms in the production and consumption of music, or in a broader sense, in the production and consumption of popular- and youth culture, an indication of the emergence of new types of Islamized youth cultures?

## Appendix

<b>Background information respondents</b>						
<b>Name</b>	<b>Age<sup>4</sup></b>	<b>Date interview</b>	<b>Residence</b>	<b>Moroccan roots</b>	<b>Education/prof.</b>	<b>Language<sup>5</sup></b>
Younes	29	13-1-2004	Tilburg	Fes	MBO	Arabic
Majdi	29	21-1-2004	Utrecht	Tetouan	HBO	Arabic
Hafid	29	26-1-2004	Utrecht	Unknown	Unknown	Arabic/Berber
Ilham	22	3-3-2004	Deventer	Aljadida	HBO	Arabic
Imen	25	24-3-2004	Nijmegen	Midar	WO	Arabic/Berber
Zohra	26	31-3-2004	Ede	Rif	WO	Arabic/Berber
Bart	34	7-4-2004	Amsterdam	Does not apply	Music academy	Little bit Arabic
Fouzia	26	5-5-2004	Nijmegen	Unknown	WO	Arabic/French
Souad	29	27-5-2004	Den Bosch	Marrakech	WO	Arabic
Bilal	28	2-6-2004	Tilburg	Fes	HBO	Arabic
Hamid	36	11-6-2004	Amsterdam	Unknown	Unknown	Arabic
Illyas	29	16-6-2004	Delft	Unknown	MBO	Arabic
Ali	29	16-6-2004	Rotterdam	Oujda	MBO+	Arabic/French
Yamina	34	18-6-2004	Amsterdam	Fes	HBO	Arabic
Fatima	27	21-6-2004	Den Bosch	Qenitra	HBO	Arabic
Hicham	34	22-6-2004	Boxtel	Oujda	Unknown	Arabic
Aicha	22	24-6-2004	Tilburg	Oost-Marokko	HBO	Arabic
Dounia	22	30-6-2004	Den Bosch	Noord-Marokko	HBO	Arabic
Radia	25	30-6-2004	Den Bosch	Nador	MBO	Berber
Rachid	30	1-7-2004	Rotterdam	Tetouan	Unknown	Arabic
Amal	25	17-9-2004	Amersfoort	Rif	HBO Journalism	Berber
Jan	34	4-11-2004	Amsterdam	Does not apply	HBO	---
Chadia	21	23-11-2004	Ravenstein	Casablanca	MBO	Arabic
Mo	27	25-11-2004	Rotterdam	Rabat	HBO	Arabic
Dikra	33	26-11-2004	Amsterdam	Tanger	WO	Arabic/French
Ahmed	35	30-11-2004	Waalwijk	Marrakech	HBO	Arabic
Lamia	22	1-12-2004	Amsterdam	Tetouan	MBO	Arabic
Farida	32	7-6-2005	Helmond	Zuid-Marokko	HBO	Berber
Malika	20	5-10-2005	Nieuwegein	Rif	MBO	Berber



# Notes

## Notes Introduction

- 1 Central Bureau for Statistics, Voorburg/ Heerlen, taken from [www.cbs.nl](http://www.cbs.nl), retrieved 30th July, 2007.
- 2 Between 40 to 50% of the Dutch-Moroccan community speak a Berber language (Chafik 2004: 129).
- 3 Known as *Riffijns* in Dutch, spoken in the Northern Rif.
- 4 Education in Berber languages only started from 2001 onwards.
- 5 Integratie Kaart 2005, taken from [www.cbs.nl](http://www.cbs.nl), retrieved March 21st, 2006.
- 6 The term 'black market' refers to selling goods 'black', which means selling them without taxes. The term has nothing to do with race or ethnicity.
- 7 See: [http://www.debazaar.nl/index\\_nl.html](http://www.debazaar.nl/index_nl.html).
- 8 Taken from: <http://www.hbd.nl/websites/hbd/files/Onderzoek%2FSamenvatting-etnisch-ondernemerschap.pdf>, retrieved November 17th, 2007.
- 9 In Dutch: *Integratie met behoud van eigen identiteit*.
- 10 In Dutch: *verzuiling*.
- 11 In Dutch: *achterstandsbeleid*.
- 12 In Dutch: *burgerschap*.
- 13 In the next section, I will elaborate on the development of different labels used for immigrants in the Netherlands.
- 14 From May 1st, 2007 onwards this ministry has been moved to the Ministry of VROM (Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment) while its name was changed to 'Residence, Districts and Integration' (*Wonen, wijken en integratie*) (see: [www.grotestedenbeleid.nl](http://www.grotestedenbeleid.nl)).
- 15 <http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/methoden/toelichtingen/alfabet/a/allochtoon.htm>, retrieved August 8th, 2007.
- 16 They call this labelling of all Moroccans as Muslims 'Islamization.'
- 17 Note that there are thousands of Christian Arabs and Turks in the Netherlands.
- 18 A typical Dutch dish.
- 19 André Hazes was a famous Dutch folk singer from Amsterdam who died in 2005.
- 20 In Dutch: *doodknuffelen*.
- 21 New realism is a concept referring to a new kind of public discourse in the Netherlands. This discourse is characterized by talking about 'truths', from the point of view of the average citizen and has an anti-socialist tone. A sense of reality is, in this discourse, considered to be an inherent element of Dutch identity. Another famous Dutch politician, besides Bolkestein, using this new realism rhetoric was Pim Fortuyn (Prins 2002: 1, 6-7).
- 22 P. Fortuyn, *Tegen de islamisering van onze cultuur. Nederlandse identiteit als fundament* (Utrecht: Bruna, 1997).
- 23 A burqa is an Islamic dress, originating from Afghanistan. This dress covers all of the female body except the eyes.
- 24 SCP is an independent academic institution that follows and researches trends in Dutch society relating to all kinds of social and cultural phenomena. SCP also gives advice to the Dutch government.

- 25 Institutions such as Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS), TNS-NIPO, the Socio-Cultural Plan Bureau (SCP), and WRR (*Wetenschappelijke Raad voor Regeringsbeleid*) regularly conduct and publish studies on the integration rate of non-Dutch residents.
- 26 TCULT stands for *Talen en Culturen van het Utrechtse Lombok en Transvaal*, meaning Languages and Cultures of the Utrecht districts Lombok and Transvaal.
- 27 All of the interviewees have a Dutch-Moroccan background, except two: Bart and Jan (see appendix I) who are Dutch. They are professionally as well as socially highly integrated into the Dutch-Moroccan community and the Dutch-Moroccan music scene.

## Notes Chapter 1

- 1 A recent report of the WRR also opted for a “processual approach” towards identity. Instead of taking “national Dutch identity” as a point of departure for this report, the authors state that identity must be seen as a “dynamic concept” and that different identification processes are rendered central in their research on which this report is based (WRR 2007: 33- 35). The report has the telling title *Identificatie met Nederland (Identification with the Netherlands)*.
- 2 Nowadays, hip-hop music is known for its mixing and matching of elements from various sources, such as TV commercials, movies, music, street sounds, etc.

## Notes Chapter 2

- 1 Cuban Son, also known as Son Cubano, is a Cuban music style.
- 2 Amr Diab is an Egyptian pop singer. He is loved by girls in particular, because of his good looks.
- 3 Songs praising Islam and the prophet.
- 4 Ali B. is a famous Dutch-Moroccan rapper who raps in Dutch.
- 5 Note that the Dutch government declared the year 2005 a year of celebration of the 400th birthday of relations between Morocco and the Netherlands, which resulted in an increased number of events related to ‘Moroccan culture’ and the Dutch-Moroccan community.
- 6 Currently, the on-line shop of MarocStore is (temporarily) closed, April 6, 2006. MarocStore is now specialized in organizing (bridal) fashion shows, which are accessible for women only.
- 7 On Dutch-Moroccan youth and the Internet see (Maroc.nl 2001; Brouwer 2004; 2005).
- 8 ‘La nouvelle chanson’ is the French label for Algerian, Kablyli (Berber) music that has Kablyli singer-songwriter Idir as its most famous exponent.
- 9 <http://www.public.iastate.edu/~abimad/nasselghiwane.html>, retrieved April 2007.
- 10 Arabic string instrument.
- 11 In a musical context *melhun* refers to a genre that mixes poetry and music. The genre consists of a vast corpus of poetry which is part of a tradition of songs and manuscripts. In the course of centuries this genre has gained popularity in North Africa because of its metric and lyrical finesse. *Melhun* is composed and performed in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia by old masters called *shikh* (singular) or *shioukh* (plural) (Aydoun 2001: 53-62).

- 12 An Arabic string instrument, an Arabic violin, and a North African hand drum respectively.
- 13 *Yahia and Nouri*, Edition Saâda Music, Utrecht. Year of release: unknown
- 14 See for a more extensive description of the history and development of raï: Virolle (1995) Daoudi & Miliani (1996), Schade-Poulsen (1999), and Marranci (2000a, 2000b, 2003)
- 15 I wrote my master's thesis at the University of Nijmegen in 2001 entitled *Music and society: The development of the raï music subculture in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s* on the origins and development of raï music in Algeria, including a chapter in which I analyzed song lyrics of raï music.
- 16 *Al Kautar*, music shop specialized in Moroccan and Arab music, was established in 1997. <http://www.lombbox.nl/lombokgeluid/alkautar.html>, retrieved September 17th, 2007.
- 17 February 1996, in Groningen and Den Bosch.
- 18 In May 2006, the famous *shikha* of raï music and often called the 'mother of raï music', *Shikha Remitti*, passed away at the age of 83. Taken from <http://www.cheikha-rimitti.com>, her official website, retrieved May 2006.
- 19 Whereas in France raï seems to have obtained a cultural mobility, according to Gabriele Marranci, meaning that the genre has been able to adapt itself musically and commercially to changing local circumstances, in the Netherlands raï music does not seem to be culturally mobile. In France, a hybrid genre called raï N B (a mix of R&B and raï music) emerged in the year 2004 and has become a popular genre for both French youths of Northern African origin, for French youth of African origin and for 'white' French youth. In the Netherlands, raï N B is passively consumed by mainly Dutch-Moroccan youth, yet in the active production of music raï music is relatively small, compared to *shaabi*, meaning that few Dutch-Moroccan bands specialize in raï music or compose new creations in the tradition of raï music. Exceptions are the bands Kasba, Amraoui and Raï Experience and JWO that perform raï music or cross-over music influenced by raï.
- 20 Of course, these sites are not only used to exchange *sharki* music. All kinds of music are available, but because of *sharki's* limited availability in the regular music shops in the Netherlands, the Internet is one of the most important sites to find *sharki* music.
- 21 This genre is also sometimes labelled 'urban contemporary'.
- 22 Taken from <http://www.allmusic.com/cg/amg.dll?p=amg&sql=77:72>, and [http://www.popinstituut.nl/genre/r\\_b.4302.html](http://www.popinstituut.nl/genre/r_b.4302.html) retrieved September 17th, 2007.
- 23 [http://www.popinstituut.nl/genre/nu\\_soul.4352.html](http://www.popinstituut.nl/genre/nu_soul.4352.html), retrieved September 17th, 2007.
- 24 As hip-hop music will play an important role in chapter 5 of this thesis, I present here a more elaborate profile of the genre.
- 25 MC stands for 'Master of Ceremony'. An MC in hip-hop terms was initially the person who entertained the crowd, presented the rappers to the audience, shouted out dedications often in rhymed verses and hyped up the crowd. An MC secured the continuity of a hip-hop performance. Nowadays, the term MC usually refers to the rapper, and many rappers have used the term in their stage names, for example MC Hammer, MC Lyte, MC Solaar, to name but a few.
- 26 Taken from: [http://misnomer.dru.ca/2003/12/conscious\\_hip\\_hop\\_vs\\_gangsta\\_rap.html](http://misnomer.dru.ca/2003/12/conscious_hip_hop_vs_gangsta_rap.html), retrieved September 19th, 2007.
- 27 The urban western region of the Netherlands, consisting of the four big Dutch cities; Rotterdam, Amsterdam, The Hague, Utrecht, which are also the areas with relatively large concentrations of Dutch-Moroccans.



- 28 Taken from: <http://www.maroc.nl/prikbord/forums/showthread.php?s=&threadid=124551>, retrieved January 3rd, 2005.
- 29 After the event, on the website [www.marochafra.nl](http://www.marochafra.nl) visitors discussed the event and their experiences, a discussion that took place over the course of several days, retrieved March 27-30th, 2004.
- 30 A Moroccan dish often served at wedding celebrations made of layers of chicken, eggs and crushed almonds encased in phyllo pastry, all topped with cinnamon and powdered sugar (other variations are possible).

### Notes Chapter 3

- 1 In section three I elaborate on this phenomenon.
- 2 See for example [www.yasmina.nl](http://www.yasmina.nl). A site that is entirely dedicated to providing information on organizing a 'Moroccan' wedding, including phone numbers of bands and DJs, addresses of food catering companies and shops of wedding dresses and so on.
- 3 Deventer is a town located in the east of the Netherlands that has, compared to cities in the Randstad, a relatively small population of minority groups.
- 4 A small town located in the centre of the Netherlands, in general considered being part of the Dutch Bible belt, consisting of an area reaching from Amersfoort, Nunspeet, Barneveld, and Harderwijk where high numbers of Christians, so called 'reformed congregations', live.
- 5 A Dutch music chart show that was popular during the 1980s and 1990s.
- 6 A Moroccan-Arabic expression that is difficult to translate. It signifies surprise and ridicule, something like the expression 'Oh yeah, right, as if...!'
- 7 Literally Amal talked of becoming like 'cheese', in Dutch: *verkaast*. The expression becoming or being like cheese, or being a cheese-head is used to mockingly refer to 'white Dutch' who are stereotypically cheese-eaters in the eyes of Dutch-Moroccans. In addition, the word cheese-head also refers to white Dutch often having light, blond hair, a cheese-like colour.
- 8 The Rif is the Berber speaking north-eastern mountainous area of Morocco where the majority of Dutch-Moroccan first generation immigrants originated from.
- 9 A North African hand drum.
- 10 This is the title of a famous Berber song, originally performed by Milouda el Houceimia, also known as Milouda el Houceima.
- 11 Moroccan women's garment
- 12 Moroccan men's garment.
- 13 *Mawlid*s are saint festivals during which Islamic saints are celebrated. In Egypt they consist of a combination of religious and spiritual activities and profane activities, such as pilgrimage to saint's tombs, performances of Sufi chants, and the consumption of snacks and visiting fairgrounds (Schielke 2006).

## Notes Chapter 4

- 1 In the Netherlands, the day following Easter is an official day-off.
- 2 Translation: Prayer and peace be with the messenger of God. There is no glory but the glory of our lord Muhammad; Allah, with him is the highest glory (Dessing 2001: 126, n. 134). Different versions of this prayer circulate among the Moroccan community in the Netherlands.
- 3 Bacardi Breezer is a mixed beverage of rum and soft drink with an alcoholic percentage between 5-7%, in a trendy, colourful bottle. Breezers, with their fruity and sweet taste, are very popular among young people, especially among girls.
- 4 Taken from: <http://www.mocros.nl/modules.php?name=Forums&file=viewtopic&t=343>, retrieved January, 2006.
- 5 *Ewa* is a Moroccan expression in this context meaning something like 'hey, people, listen'.
- 6 See for instance, *The Reliance of the Traveller*, a classic manual of Islamic sacred law, Ahmad Ibn Naqib Al-Misri (d. 796 AH/ 1418), (774 -776), and more recently, Qaradawi (1994: 311-314) and numerous Islamic websites, Q&A sections and other discussion forums deal with the question if music is *haram*.
- 7 *Hadith* (pl. *ahadith*) is a written tradition of Islam, which the Prophet Muhammad revealed to the world. His followers documented the lifestyle, statements, and rulings of the Prophet on different topics and these documents are part of the holy scripts of Islam.
- 8 Taken from: <http://www.tawiza.nl/forum/viewtopic.php?t=1193&highlight=muziek+haram>, retrieved April 19th, 2004.
- 9 Al Wahidi (d. 468 AH/ 1076) wrote *Kitab asbab al-nuzul* (*Book of Occasions of Revelation*). This book is part of a secondary genre of Qur'anic exegesis (*tafsir*) directed at establishing the context in which specific verses of the Qur'an were revealed.
- 10 Muhammad ibn Isma'il al-Bukhari (810-870 AH) collected prophetic traditions and they were published during his lifetime. The collection is one of the Sunni six major *hadith* collections and most Sunni Muslims view it as their most trusted collection of *hadith*.
- 11 Taken from: <http://www.tawiza.nl/forum/viewtopic.php?t=1193&highlight=muziek+haram>, retrieved April 19th, 2004.
- 12 The *mu'adhin* is the one who calls out from the mosque's minaret when it is time to pray.
- 13 An Arab wind instrument
- 14 *Da'wa* is an Islamic concept. It literally means a 'summon, call, or invitation'. In Islamic terms, it can refer to do an appeal to Allah, but can also refer to preaching Islam (sometimes with the aim to convert, i.e. to invite others to Islam). In a general sense, it can also refer to being a good Muslim.
- 15 Umm Kulthum (1904 - 1974) was an Egyptian female singer, famous throughout the Arab world and often called 'the Diva of the Arab song' (Danielson 1997).
- 16 God knows.
- 17 Muslim scholars.
- 18 This goes for the producers as well, which will be discussed later on.
- 19 For more on individuality, making personal choices and the construction of identity and religious identity of young Dutch-Moroccan Muslims see also De Koning (2008).
- 20 See for instance Van Nieuwkerk (1995, 1998, 2003).
- 21 A famous *shikha* in the raï music genre is the Algerian Chikha Remitti, considered to be the 'the mother of raï'.

- 22 *Shilha (tashelhiyt)* is spoken in the southern regions of Morocco, in the Atlas Mountains, by approximately 8 to 10 million people.
- 23 Personal communication, Farida, June 5th, 2005.
- 24 This fragment and all the following interview fragments are taken from the interview I conducted with Chadia, November 23rd, 2004.
- 25 Note that the expression *Bint el bled* has a prominent place in the raï music subculture and its song lyric repertoire as well. In many songs the male raï singer expresses his preference for a *bint el bled* over a *gaouria* (female foreigner), because of her 'authenticity and respectfulness' (for example, many of Cheb Hasni's songs refer to this concept).
- 26 Asala is a contemporary female pop singer from Syria.
- 27 Dutch: *serieus worden*.
- 28 Religious Islamic duties such as praying, performing the *haji*, giving alms (*zakat*) etc. In Chadia's case, she is implying that the postponement of one particular religious (and socio-cultural) duty, namely marriage, is inherent to her profession as an artist, but she plans to fulfil this duty in the future, when she has finished her musical career.

## Notes Chapter 5

- 1 Original Dutch lyrics are: "*Ze willen ons zwart maken als ze over ons praten. We hebben ze niks gedaan en alsnog willen ze ons haten. Ze willen ons zwart maken als ze over ons praten. Tijd dat dit verandert, heb je dat niet in de gaten.*"
- 2 In Dutch: 'negatieve beeldvorming'. A concept regularly used in the Netherlands referring to the public image of a particular group in society which is (re-)presented in a negative, deviant way.
- 3 See for instance: Harchaoui and Huinders 2003: 7-22 and survey of TNS NIPO on Increasing fear of Muslims, January 2005, taken from: [http://www.tns-nipo.com/sub\\_ext.asp?e000](http://www.tns-nipo.com/sub_ext.asp?e000), retrieved July 27<sup>th</sup>, 2007.
- 4 Verkuyten speaks of 'response strategies to negative social identities, stigmatization and discrimination' (Verkuyten 2003: 86).
- 5 Multined and FastForward are not published anymore.
- 6 Taken from the archive of [www.marokko.nl](http://www.marokko.nl), the topic was entitled: National campaign *How nice are Moroccans*, <http://forums.marokko.nl/archive/index.php/t-24734.html>, retrieved July 11<sup>th</sup>, 2007.
- 7 Oudenbosch is a town in the south west of the Netherlands.
- 8 Schuilenburg is a district of the town Amersfoort.
- 9 <http://www.geocities.com/naffernl>, retrieved July 27<sup>th</sup>, 2007.
- 10 <http://forums.marokko.nl/memberlist.php?do=getall&page=93&order=asc&sort=username&ausername=Moc>, retrieved July 24<sup>th</sup>, 2007.
- 11 Leip is a word coming from Dutch street slang. It is originally a typical expression used in the Amsterdam dialect and it means crazy, weird, funny, silly.
- 12 Leipe Moco Flavour was released in 2005 (Ali B. *vertelt het leven van de straat*, Spec, 2004).
- 13 Nowadays the genre is labelled 'Nederhop'.
- 14 Papiamentu is the official language of the Netherlands Antilles Islands and Sranan is the lingua franca in Surinam.

- 15 Appa and Salah Edin are about to break through in the Dutch mainstream music industry. November 2nd, 2007 Appa released his first official album *Streetfilosoof* (Streetphilosopher) (AppaMusic/ Top Notch). Note that the release date is November 2nd, referring to the day of the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004. Salah Edin released his album *Nederlands Grootste Nachtmerrie* (Holland's Worst Nightmare) (N.G.N./ Top Notch/ A.Focaliptic) May 7th, 2007. His album was controversial from the start. Casablanca Connect has already released international productions (including dance-remixes), but has remained still relatively unknown in the Netherlands.
- 16 The *Hirsi Ali Diss* by HDC will be further discussed in 5.5.1
- 17 In January 2008, a new rap song of this duo (*Woensel*) appeared on the Internet (Youtube). Its video features the (pretended) assassination of Geert Wilders by 'terrorists'. Just after its release, a remarkable press statement was published in newspaper *De Pers* in which the driving force behind the rap crew admitted to be a white Dutch autochthonous man from Eindhoven, whose true identity remains unknown (Hilkens 2008). In this press release, he apologizes to the Dutch-Moroccan community and claims that, through the making of these songs and videos, he wanted to make clear how Wilders manipulates, through the media, the public image of allochtonen and particularly plays on feelings of fear of Muslims and Dutch-Moroccans that may exist among some parts of the Dutch population. Through the creation of the virtual rap duo Youssef and Kamal, he wanted to demonstrate how easy it is to bring this negative image alive and manipulate the community.
- 18 Lonsdale is a clothing brand. In the Netherlands, the brand is known as the typical wear of extreme-right or neo-Nazi youngsters, who wear it underneath a bomber jacket only showing the letters NSDA on their shirts. This supposedly refers to the NSDAP, the party of Hitler. Between 2001 and 2005 several news reports told of fights between 'allochtonen' and Lonsdale youth.
- 19 [Http://www.soundclick.com](http://www.soundclick.com)
- 20 [Http://www.youtube.com](http://www.youtube.com)
- 21 Dissing is a hip-hop term referring to lyrically disrespecting competitive rap crews. To diss someone means to publicly ridicule and insult someone. Usually a diss-rhyme is supposed to be merely a lyrical, verbal attack.
- 22 Mix-tapes are common productions in the hip-hop scene and usually consist of around 10 songs or less including copyright music taken from other sources, meaning illegal copies. In the old days, mix-tapes were literally amateur productions recorded on cassette tapes and were often low-quality productions. Nowadays, mix-tapes are usually digital files in mp3 format and have a high quality, and they are easily distributed over the Internet. Mix-tapes are predominantly produced by rappers who are not signed on by a record company, although not all artists who produce mix-tapes are unsigned. Through word of mouth the rappers aim to create a hype.
- 23 *Rwina* is a Moroccan-Arabic term coming from the root word ruin; in these lyrics I take it to refer to problems, chaos, destruction, conflict.
- 24 The Vinkeveense Plassen is a region located in the centre of the Netherlands surrounded by nature and lakes and used for water sports. It is also an area where the rich and famous of Dutch society live.
- 25 Appa refers here to minister of Justice Donner who in February 2006 recorded a rap song on drug policy, which was freely available online. Appa calls him minister Dönner and not Donner. Döner refers to a popular Turkish fast food snack, a sandwich with lots of shoarma meat and garlic sauce that is very popular among youth in the Netherlands.

- 26 Naffer is a Dutch-Moroccan rapper who has collaborated with Appa on this song.
- 27 A song that is in tone and content somewhat similar to Appa's song is Salah Edin's *Het land van (The country of)* (2007), which tells about all the 'bad things' the Netherlands has to offer to Muslims and Dutch-Moroccans in particular. The song, its video and the album cover caused a controversy because a member of parliament deemed the song and its video to encourage radicalism. The appearance of Salah Edine added to commotion, since with his short beard and bald, shaved head he looks exactly like Mohammed B., the murderer of Theo van Gogh. This is also the picture featured on his album cover and in the video. Some lines from the song: The country of the biggest percentage of Muslim-haters. The country that was built by our fathers (referring to the Moroccan guest workers). The country that sees us (Dutch-Moroccans/ Muslims) as danger and terror...the country of terrorism, the country of extremists...the country where I was born, but where do I come from?/ The country that labels me as a Kutmarokkaan (F\*cking Moroccan).
- 28 [Http://www.maghrebmagazine.nl/2006/09/16/rapper-j-rock-legt-zijn-naam-uit/](http://www.maghrebmagazine.nl/2006/09/16/rapper-j-rock-legt-zijn-naam-uit/), retrieved August 2007.
- 29 Other songs fitting this category are Samiro's *Cousecouse* song, Raymzter's *Kutmarokkanen*, Ali'B's song *Geweigerd.nl (Refused.nl)*, ODB's *Racist Diss*, and Casablanca Connect's second verse in *Evaluation*.
- 30 This refrain is sung in Arabic. Hamas and Hezbollah are political organizations fighting for a free Palestine and the end of the Israeli occupation of Palestine territories.

## Notes Conclusion

- 1 The album cover of Appa's latest album release *Straatfilosoof* (2007, Top Notch/ Appa Music) features Appa wearing a white *jellaba* with his head covered by his hood and his hands folded open in front of him like he is reading his hands; a position that is part of one of the positions Muslims take on during prayer.
- 2 In November 2006, Sami Yusuf performed in Utrecht for thousands of predominantly young Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Moroccans (Korf et al. 2007: 99-100).
- 3 The Dutch-Moroccan mixed anasheed choir *Al Wahda* from Rotterdam performs with boys and girls and adults aged between 8 and 35 years. It has recently released its debut album *Mensen, luister eens*, including songs in Dutch and Arabic.
- 4 At the time when the interview was conducted.
- 5 Language skills (besides Dutch).

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## *Summary in Dutch*

### *Samenvatting*

Muziek is overal in onze huidige samenleving. Deze overweldigende aanwezigheid van muziek doet bijna vergeten dat muziek een belangrijk element is in de manier hoe mensen hun sociale leven organiseren. Muziek (maken, luisteren, kopen etc.) is een sociale activiteit die solidariteit en eenheid kan voortbrengen, maar kan ook juist een afstand, conflict of verwijdering veroorzaken. Muziek heeft het in zich om op diverse manieren zeer belangrijk en bepalend te kunnen zijn in het sociale en dagelijkse leven. Een onderzoek naar de sociale betekenis en functie van muziek verschaft inzichten in hoe mensen zichzelf positioneren ten opzichte van anderen in de maatschappij.

Het muzikale leven van Nederlands-Marokkaanse jongeren is tot op heden nog niet aan een grondig wetenschappelijk onderzoek onderworpen. Zij worden in het huidige Nederlandse politieke klimaat vaak als probleemgroep bestempeld, en deze negatieve aandacht heeft er gedeeltelijk voor gezorgd dat voor hun levensstijl, hun vrijetijdsbesteding en hun muzikale leven nog relatief weinig wetenschappelijke aandacht is geweest. In deze studie geef ik antwoord op de vraag hoe muziek een rol speelt bij het ontstaan van specifieke identiteitsprocessen en groepsvorming.

Muziek is een multifunctioneel systeem dat verschillende betekenissen en functies kan bevatten. Mijn onderzoek naar de rol van muziek (in de breedste zin van het woord, te weten muziekconsumptie, muziekproductie en muzikale evenementen) in de identiteitsvormingsprocessen van Nederlands-Marokkaanse jeugd laat zien hoe deze jongeren zich (muzikaal) presenteren en welke muziekgenres zij kiezen om hun identiteiten te vertegenwoordigen of te uiten. De jongeren die mijn studie centraal staan maken deel uit van de tweede generatie migranten. De meesten van hen zijn in Nederland geboren en getogen en hebben een Nederlandse nationaliteit (soms naast een Marokkaanse). Hun ouders arriveerden in de jaren '70 als gastarbeider in Nederland. De Marokkaanse gemeenschap bestond in 2007 uit ongeveer 329.000 personen, waarvan 161.000 deel uitmaken van de tweede generatie (CBS: augustus 2007).

De inleiding van dit boek geeft een overzicht van de migratiegeschiedenis van Marokkanen in Nederland en belangrijke aspecten van cultuur en religie. Marokkaanse migranten maken al meer dan 30 jaar deel uit van de Nederlandse samenleving. In de jaren '60 en '70 kwamen duizenden gastar-



beiders voornamelijk uit het Noord-Marokkaans Rifgebergte om in Nederland te gaan werken in sectoren waar een tekort aan arbeidskrachten was. Vaak kwamen deze gastarbeiders terecht in de industriële sector of in de mijnbouw. Pas in de jaren '70 en voornamelijk rond de periode van de oliecrisis werd duidelijk dat de meeste Marokkaanse gastarbeiders niet zouden terugkeren naar Marokko. De oliecrisis veroorzaakte werkeloosheid in veel sectoren van de industrie en veel gastarbeiders raakten hun baan kwijt. Om in aanmerking te komen voor sociale voorzieningen en uitkeringen moesten de gastarbeiders zich officieel laten registreren. Toen bleek dat er veel meer gastarbeiders dan tot dan toe de bedoeling was geweest nog in Nederland verbleven. Velen van hen waren inmiddels arbeidsongeschikt geworden en kwamen in de WAO terecht door de vele jaren van zware fysieke arbeid.

De meerderheid van de Marokkanen in Nederland is van Berberse afkomst. De Berbers hebben in Marokko sinds de Franse periode op gespannen voet geleefd met de Arabische bevolking. Er worden in Marokko vier verschillende Berbertalen gesproken. De meeste Marokkanen in Nederland hebben hun roots in de Rif en spreken *Tarifit*. In het algemeen spreken Marokkanen over de taal *Tamazight*, een overkoepelende term die een van de Berbertalen aanduidt. Berbers noemen ze zichzelf *Imazighen* (vrije mensen). De jongeren in mijn onderzoek spraken allemaal Nederlands. Sommigen van hen beheersen zowel actief als passief het Berbers (meestal *Tarifit*, maar een enkeling sprak een andere Berbertaal) en het Marokkaans-Arabisch.

De Nederlands-Marokkaanse gemeenschap hecht veel waarde aan het in stand houden van 'Marokkaanse tradities', zoals het vieren van bruiloften, familiefeesten en religieuze feesten op, wat zij beschouwt als, een 'Marokkaanse' manier. Ook veel jongeren van de tweede generatie volgen dit en willen bijvoorbeeld graag op de 'Marokkaanse manier' trouwen. Dit heeft tot gevolg gehad dat er een economisch circuit is ontstaan, gericht op 'Marokkaanse bruiloften'. Dit circuit bestaat uit cateringbedrijven die Marokkaans eten aanbieden, bruidsmodewinkels die Marokkaanse bruidskleding verkopen of verhuren, sieradenwinkels, weddingplanners en bands en dj's die de 'Marokkaanse' bruiloften muzikaal opluisteren. Ook bestaan er zogenaamde *neggafa's* of *zeyyana's*, opmaakstylistes (altijd vrouwen), die de bruid helpen bij het aanbrengen van haar make-up en het stileren van haar kleding en sieraden.

De meerderheid van de Marokkaanse gemeenschap presenteert en identificeert zich als moslim. Uiteraard bestaat er veel variatie in hoe de islam 'beoefend', beleefd en uitgedragen wordt. Uit onderzoeken blijkt dat de participatie van Marokkanen van de tweede generatie in religieuze activiteiten

en het moskeebezoek daalt, maar dat hun identificatie met islam wel aanwezig is. Veel Marokkaanse jongeren zetten zich af tegen de manier waarop hun ouders de islam beleefden, namelijk op een manier die zij beschouwen als een islam vermengd met Marokkaanse cultuur en traditie. Zij promoten een islam vrij van cultuur en traditie en sociale controle. Opvallend is in het bijzonder dat veel jongeren het geloof als een individuele praktijk zien en zich beroepen op een persoonlijke relatie met God waarover zij tegenover niemand verantwoording hoeven af te leggen. De islam van hun ouders is, volgens hen, veelal gebaseerd op collectieve rituelen en ingesleten tradities die niet bij de 'echte' islam horen.

De laatste jaren zijn Nederlands-Marokkaanse jongeren veel in het nieuws geweest. Al vanaf de jaren '80 van de vorige eeuw worden Marokkaanse jongens vaak geassocieerd met criminaliteit en overlast en sinds de moord op filmmaker, columnist en interviewer Theo van Gogh op 2 november 2004 door een Nederlands-Marokkaanse Amsterdammer worden Marokkaanse jongeren in verband gebracht met criminaliteit, terrorisme, radicalisme en Islamitisch fundamentalisme.

In hoofdstuk twee presenteer een overzicht van de meest populaire muziekgenres onder Nederlands-Marokkaanse jongeren en de muziekscene die is ontstaan. Vanaf eind jaren '80 en begin jaren '90 is er een muziekcircuit ontstaan dat zich richt op feesten, festivals, concerten en dansfeesten voor een Nederlands-Marokkaans publiek. Voortvloeiend uit de hype rondom raïmuziek in de jaren '90, begonnen een aantal organisaties zich op professionele wijze bezig te houden met het organiseren van feesten en muziek evenementen voor deze doelgroep. Door de persoonlijke drive van de pioniers van de scene, maar ook vanwege een toenemende vraag en behoefte vanuit het publiek, begonnen een tweetal organisaties, een uit Waalwijk en een uit Amsterdam, met het regelmatig organiseren van concerten en feesten. Ook anderen raakten geïnspireerd en dit resulteerde in een circuit van 'Marokkaanse' feesten en concerten. Ook bestaande (popmuziek)-podia, zoals de Melkweg, Paradiso in Amsterdam, 013 in Tilburg, Rasa in Utrecht en anderen, maar ook het Concertgebouw in Amsterdam programmeren sinds de jaren '90 regelmatig acts and artiesten die kunnen rekenen op een groot en jong Nederlands-Marokkaans publiek.

Ook zijn er in de loop van de jaren '90 en daarna diverse muziekwinkels opgericht die zich hebben gespecialiseerd in Marokkaanse en Arabische muziek. *Al Kautar* in Utrecht, dat sinds 1998 bestaat, is een van de bekendste. Klanten komen van heinde en verre om daar hun favoriete muziek te kopen. Daarnaast biedt het Internet een groot aanbod aan plekken waar men muziek

kan vinden. Diverse fora op websites gericht op Nederlands-Marokkaanse jongeren zijn toegespitst op muziek en het uitwisselen daarvan. Ook bestaat er een website die Marokkaanse en Arabische muziek verkoopt, [www.marocstore.nl](http://www.marocstore.nl), hoewel de online verkoop van muziek al een tijd stil ligt.

Een aantal muziekgenres neemt een centrale plek in in dit circuit. Dit zijn ook de genres die het meest populair waren onder mijn respondenten. Een van de meest genoemde genres is Marokkaanse populaire volksmuziek, of *shaabi*. *Shaabi* betekent in het Arabisch ‘volks’ of ‘van het volk’. Het is een genre dat als typisch Marokkaans beschouwd wordt. Van oorsprong heeft het een centrale plek in de familiefeesten in Marokko. Ook in Nederland speelt *shaabi* een grote rol op ‘Marokkaanse’ bruiloften en feesten, en ook op de publieke feesten heeft het een dominante positie ingenomen. *Shaabi* artiesten als Najat Aatabou, Daoudi, Senhaji en Mustapha Bourgogne trekken bij hun optredens in Nederland vaak duizenden jonge Nederlandse Marokkanen aan.

Raïmuziek is een ander genre dat in Nederland van oudsher geassocieerd wordt met Marokkaanse jongeren. De van oorsprong Algerijnse muziek, gezongen in het Algerijns-Arabisch, is muzikaal gesproken een mix van Arabische, Noordafrikaanse ritmes, melodieën en Westerse instrumenten en arrangementen. Tekstueel gesproken heeft raïmuziek een rebels karakter en de onderwerpen die erin worden besproken variëren van liefde, relaties, seks en alcoholgebruik, tot de wil om naar Frankrijk te emigreren, heimwee naar Algerije, en sociaal-economische problemen van de gemarginaliseerde Algerijnse jeugd. In Nederland ontstond er rond de jaren 1997-1998 een ware hype rondom raïmuziek. Enerzijds werd dit aangezwengeld door de grote hit *Aïcha* van de koning van de raï, Khaled, anderzijds doordat er door het land heen zogenaamde ‘raï-party’s’ werden georganiseerd, veelal overdag, waar vooral Marokkaanse jongeren zich uitleefden op raïmuziek.

Een derde genre dat veel populariteit geniet is de zogenoemde *sharki*-muziek. *Sharki* is een Arabische term die ‘oosters’ of ‘uit het oosten’ betekent. De term refereert aan popmuziek uit de Arabische wereld (het oosten), voornamelijk uit Egypte en Libanon, de centra van de Arabische entertainmentindustrie. *Sharki*-muziek mengt Arabische beats en zang met Westerse instrumenten en arrangementen. Bekende artiesten zijn Amr Diab, Mustapha Amr, Nancy Ajram, Nawal Zughbi, Diana Hadad, Iheb Tawfik, en vele anderen. Optredens van *sharki* artiesten in Nederland zijn zeldzaam, omdat het duur is voor organisatiebureaus om deze artiesten te boeken en naar Nederland te halen. Ook het risico dat er slechts een klein publiek op afkomt, draagt bij aan het feit dat er weinig optredens van *sharki* artiesten zijn.

R&B is ook geliefd onder veel Marokkaanse jongeren. Het van oorsprong Amerikaanse genre (niet te verwarren met rhythm & blues) is wereldwijd een gevestigd genre. Bekende hedendaagse R&B artiesten zijn, onder andere, Usher, Alicia Keys, Mary J. Blige, Craig David, Maxwell, D'Angelo, Blackstreet. R&B staat bekend om zijn gelikte muzikale arrangementen, strakke drums, en zachte, veel geïmproviseerde vocalen. De teksten gaan meestal over liefde en relaties.

Een laatste populair genre is hiphop, een genre dat zich kenmerkt door rapteksten en het gebruik van geluids- en muzieksamples uit andere bronnen. Het is ontstaan rond 1970 in New York doordat Afrikaans-Amerikaanse jongeren rijmend begonnen te praten (rappen) op beats en ritmes van al bestaande liedjes. De hiphopcultuur die zich ontwikkelde rondom de muziek bestaat uit graffiti, breakdancing en de muziek. Hiphopteksten zijn moeilijk onder een noemer te vangen. Hedendaagse Amerikaanse hiphop valt grofweg uiteen in twee categorieën: een materialistische kant en een sociaal geëngageerde kant. De materialistische categorie richt zich op het verheerlijken van rijkdom, geld, vrouwen en soms geweld, criminaliteit en drugsgebruik. De sociaal geëngageerde categorie focust op maatschappijkritische onderwerpen, zoals armoede, onrechtvaardigheid, het bestrijden van racisme en discriminatie. De ene categorie sluit de ander niet per se uit.

De diversiteit in muzieksmaak wordt ook gereflecteerd in de muziekscene. In de afgelopen tien jaar zijn er in de Marokkaanse muziekscene verschillende soorten feesten ontstaan. Daarbij kunnen vijf verschillende types evenementen onderscheiden worden: het concert, het dansfeest, een vrouwenfeest/*hafla annisa*, een lounge-event en een festival. Deze variatie in evenementen is een resultaat van het incorporeren van een aantal variabelen, zoals muziekprogrammering, begin- en eindtijden, entreprijs, wel of geen alcohol, scheiding van de seksen, catering.

In hoofdstuk drie analyseer ik de rol van *shaabi*-muziek bij de identiteitsvorming en het creëren van *groupness*. *Shaabi* is in combinatie met bepaalde sociale factoren een essentieel onderdeel is van het tot stand komen van *groupness*, een analytisch concept van Brubaker (2002; 2004). Dit concept focust op het analyseren van processen waarlangs een groep mensen uiting geeft aan het idee dat zij samen een groep vormen. *Groupness* legt de nadruk op symbolen, gedragspatronen en andere identiteitsmarkers die in de ogen van de groepsleden bijdragen aan het zich kunnen identificeren met andere groepsleden. Ik ga niet uit van enkele vooraf vaststaande kenmerken en ideologieën van een groep, maar bestudeer welke processen bijdragen tot de totstandkoming van *groupness*.

Uit de interviews en mijn observaties tijdens muziek-events blijkt dat *shaabi* door zijn specifieke positie in, wat door de respondenten als 'Marokkaanse' cultuur wordt gezien, een label als 'typisch Marokkaanse muziek' heeft gekregen. *Shaabi's* centrale plek tijdens Marokkaanse bruiloften speelt daarin een grote rol. De meerderheid van de respondenten komt via een bruiloft voor het eerst in aanraking met *shaabi*-muziek en de manier waarop deze in een echte, sociale context beleefd wordt. De ambiance, solidariteit, vreugde die tijdens de bruiloften heerst in combinatie met *shaabi*-muziek, die deze atmosfeer van samenzijn en samen dansen met anderen mogelijk maakt, zijn voor veel respondenten een fascinerende en bepalende ervaring geweest. Deze eerste kennismaking is vaak een activator van een bewustwordingsproces van het Marokkaans zijn en zet aan tot een nadere ontdekkingstocht naar de Marokkaanse en soms Arabische muziekcultuur. De behoefte om dit gevoel te herbeleven komt tot uiting in het bezoeken van openbare Marokkaanse muziek- en dansfeesten. Respondenten zeggen dat zij zulke feesten bezoeken om het gevoel van saamhorigheid met andere Nederlands-Marokkaanse jongeren te willen delen en uiten. Ook het ontmoeten van nieuwe vrienden en eventuele partners is een belangrijke reden om deze events bezoeken. De populariteit van Marokkaanse feesten en concerten komt ook doordat deze feesten een plek bieden om hun Marokkaans zijn te vieren, zonder bemoeienis van ouders, of autochtone Nederlanders, die volgens respondenten 'niet begrijpen' wat daar gebeurt. In een samenleving die constant de negatieve aspecten van het Marokkaans zijn benadrukt, biedt de Marokkaanse muziekscene een ruimte waar Nederlands-Marokkaanse jongeren zonder angst om gestereotypeerd te worden als crimineel of terrorist, zonder ouderlijke bemoeienis en zonder andere buitenstaanders expressie kunnen geven aan hun Marokkaanse achtergrond samen met andere jongeren die in dezelfde positie verkeren.

Hoofdstuk vier behandelt de rol van islam. Religie speelt een opmerkelijke rol in de manier waarop jongeren uitleggen welke muziek zij maken of beluisteren. Het debat dat in islamitische kringen gevoerd wordt over de toelaatbaarheid van muziek en performance beïnvloedt op diverse wijzen de manier waarop jongeren muziek consumeren en produceren. De kwestie draait met name om de link tussen muziek, performance en ideeën rondom seksualiteit. Vrouwelijke feestgangers, maar voornamelijk vrouwelijke artiesten worden vaak sneller als immoreel beschouwd. Dit maakt het voor vrouwelijke Nederlands-Marokkaanse artiesten nog ingewikkelder om hun muziek uit te dragen en geaccepteerd te worden door de Nederlands-Marokkaanse gemeenschap als Marokkaanse en als moslima. Sommige isla-

mitische geleerden zeggen dat muziek niet past in een islamitische levensstijl (muziek is *haram*, oftewel verboden). Dit idee is vaak gerelateerd aan de associaties die muziek oproept met lust, seks, drugs, flirten, kortom een losbandigheid die niet gepast is voor moslims, aldus deze geleerden. Andere geleerden stellen voorwaarden aan het consumeren of produceren van muziek en staan dus, tot op zekere hoogte, muziek toe. Uiteindelijk legt de bekende Egyptische geleerde Qaradawi de verantwoordelijkheid bij individuele moslims zelf door te stellen dat zij zelf moeten bepalen of en welke muziek hun aanzet tot immoreel, on-islamitisch gedrag. Weer andere geleerden stellen dat muziek toegestaan is (muziek is *halal*, oftewel toegestaan).

Dit debat heeft een weerslag op hoe sommige organisatoren van feesten en concerten hun events opzetten. Veelal is alcohol afwezig, conform het idee dat in islam alcohol verboden is. Ook worden er zogenaamde vrouwenfeesten georganiseerd, waarmee men zich conformeert aan de orthodoxe gedachte dat mannen en vrouwen in publieke ruimtes niet mogen mengen. Ook het gedrag van de bezoekers zelf demonstreert hoe religie een rol speelt. Ik beschrijf het ritueel van 'blessing the crowd' (het publiek zegenen), een fenomeen tijdens welke het publiek massaal een gebed reciteert waarin de profeet wordt geprezen. Ik leg dit ritueel uit als een manier om tijdelijk uiting te geven aan de Marokkaanse en islamitische achtergrond van de aanwezigen, evenals als een manier om het feest meer legitiem en acceptabel te maken. Door dit korte ritueel worden alle negatieve associaties die in de ogen van sommige moslims samenhangen met muziek, feesten en uitgaan, tijdelijk weggeveegd.

Het debat dat door geleerden over de toelaatbaarheid van muziek wordt gevoerd, wordt ook door Nederlands-Marokkaanse jongeren onderling gevoerd. Een analyse van wat de respondenten over dit onderwerp zeggen, laat zien dat dat wat als theorie van de Islam wordt verondersteld en dat wat in de praktijk wordt gedaan discrepanties vertoont. Deze discrepanties worden overbrugd doordat alle respondenten de prioriteit leggen bij het zelf maken van keuzen en een individuele islambeleving en uitoefening nastreven. Autonomie en zelfbeschikking staan boven alles, en deze argumentatie, een zeer geïndividualiseerde vorm van islam, maakt het de respondenten mogelijk dat wat men theoretisch en tekstueel als on-islamitisch beschouwd, in praktijk toch te doen. Op een ander niveau fungeert dit debat over de vraag of muziek *haram* of *halal* is ook als een onderscheidingsmiddel voor Nederlands-Marokkaanse jongeren. Omdat dit debat doorgaans niet bekend is bij autochtone Nederlanders en Nederlands-Marokkaanse jongeren op de hoogte zijn van de gevoeligheden en associaties die dit

onderwerp oproept, is het voeren van het debat over de toelaatbaarheid van muziek een middel om je af te zetten tegen anderen die een andere mening hebben in dit debat of om aansluiting te zoeken bij anderen die hetzelfde denken. Het debat is een middel geworden waarmee jongeren zichzelf positioneren en zich identificeren of juist afzetten ten opzichte van anderen.

In hoofdstuk vijf analyseer ik hiphopteksten die door Nederlands-Marokkaanse rappers zijn geproduceerd. Het blijkt dat naast religie, politiek en het sociaal-politieke klimaat een belangrijke rol spelen bij de identiteitsprocessen van Nederlands-Marokkaanse jongeren. Tekstanalyse laat zien hoe negatieve beeldvorming en stereotyperingen over 'Marokkaanse jongeren' fungeren als een bron van inspiratie voor de rappers. Processen van categorisering, waarbij de media en enkele politici Nederlands-Marokkaanse jongeren bestempelen als crimineel, terrorist, radicaal etc., hebben effect op de teksten van Nederlands-Marokkaanse rappers. De stereotyperingen waarmee Nederlands-Marokkaanse jongeren zich belast voelen worden in hiphopteksten ontkracht, belachelijk gemaakt of simpelweg verworpen. Via hiphopteksten, en soms ook via videoclip en albumcovers, laten rappers hun mening weten over de manier waarop Nederlands-Marokkaanse jongeren worden neergezet. Buiten het feit dat hiphop wordt gebruikt om stereotyperingen te ontkrachten, is hiphop ook een middel voor Nederlands-Marokkaanse jongeren om zich te identificeren met allerlei andere (muzikale) werelden. Het songtekstrepertoire van circa 100 liedjes laat zien dat er een aantal steeds terugkerende thema's is over onderwerpen op lokaal, nationaal en internationaal niveau. Het repertoire laat zich niet vastpinnen op één label, maar laat zien dat de rappers zich verbonden voelen met hun eigen Nederlandse buurt, met allochtonen in Nederland, Arabieren en Palestijnse moslimbroeders. De teksten tonen een politiek en religieus bewustzijn aan. In de teksten wordt regelmatig kritisch gesproken over het buitenlandbeleid van de Amerikaanse president Bush en ook de politieke kwesties in het Midden-Oosten komen aan bod. Hoewel weinig rappers zich specifiek presenteren als een moslimrapper, zijn er in de teksten ook vaak verwijzingen naar de islam.

## *Curriculum vitae*

Miriam Gazzah werd op 16 maart 1977 geboren in Vaassen, gemeente Epe. Vanaf 1989 volgde zij het Atheneum op de Koninklijke Scholengemeenschap Apeldoorn (KSG) aan de Jonkheer Molleruslaan. Zij vervolgde haar studie in Nijmegen waar zij in het studiejaar 1997 haar propedeuse Arabische taal behaalde aan de Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen (nu Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen). Van 1997 tot 2001 volgde zij de bovenbouwopleiding Mediterrane Studies die zij voltooide met een doctoraalscriptie over Algerijnse raïmuziek.

Tijdens haar studie liep zij drie maanden stage bij de Arnhemse Courant en was zij als speciaal verslaggeefster betrokken bij een reeks artikelen over de multiculturele samenleving onder de noemer 'Denken is vrij'. Van 2001 tot en met 2003 was zij als (freelance) verslaggeefster/ redactrice actief voor diverse regionale dagbladen.

Tussen 2003 en 2007 was zij promovenda bij het *International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World* (ISIM) gelieerd aan de Universiteit Leiden en de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen.

In 2006 en 2007 heeft zij bijgedragen aan de tentoonstelling *Multiple M, Life styles van Moslimjongeren* van de Amsterdamse stichting *Imagine Identity and Culture*.



