“It is rare to have a comparative analysis of the genesis and evolution of victim support outside a small clutch of English-speaking countries. Victim Support and the Welfare State is thus special because it looks at the birth of just such a development in Sweden, hardly a stranger to that world, but one that was quite individual, engulfed as it was in a welfare state where there was not even a term for crime victim. We have had descriptions in the past of the links between welfare and incarceration, and welfare and crime rates, but none between welfare and victim services. Gallo and Svensson’s book is therefore doubly welcome, tracing, as it does, the shaping step by step of an unusual project through a succession of remarkably distinctive financial, political and policy regimes.”

Paul Rock, Emeritus Professor of Sociology,
London School of Economics

“Victim Support and the Welfare State is a most stimulating analysis of a central development in criminal policy. By choosing a non-Anglo-American country as an object of analysis, the book reveals similarities as well as differences in the expansion of the crime victim issue. The linking of victim support to the general development of politics shows its structural prerequisites. This intriguing book shows that victim support is both a cause and an effect of criminal policy, and that the emergence of the crime victim clearly has an entrepreneurial character.”

Henrik Tham, Emeritus Professor of Criminology,
Stockholm University and former President of the European Society of Criminology
This book provides a rich analysis of the history of Swedish victim support. With the majority of research on victim support centering on the Anglosphere, this book offers a unique case study for considering the role of the victim in the criminal justice system. While Sweden has enacted many laws to support victims, and victim assistance programs have grown rapidly, welfare policy has become more restrictive and crime policy, to some degree, more punitive.

Drawing on archival material and interviews with key representatives for the Swedish Association for Victim Support (BOJ), this book examines what role the victim movement has played in a changing welfare state. It argues that BOJ filled a function in the decentralization and privatization of the Swedish welfare state and explores distinctive features of the Swedish victim movement and the form it has taken, as compared to that in other countries.

This book will be of interest to scholars and students of criminology, sociology, social policy, civil society studies, and social work, and those engaged in studies of victims and victimology.

Carina Gallo is an Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice Studies at the School of Public Affairs and Civic Engagement at San Francisco State University. Her scholarship addresses historical and international trends in crime and welfare policies, with particular attention to how policies and laws intending to support underrepresented and marginalized groups have developed over the last century. She is especially interested in the “criminalization” of poverty and the penalization of vulnerable populations.

Kerstin Svensson is a Professor of Social Work at Lund University in Sweden. Her research interests revolve around the practice, organization, professionalism, history, and role of social work in society. She is also interested in how knowledge is created and passed on; how the relationship between social worker and client is developed; how support and control interact in social work; and the role and function of the individual in the organization, whether the organization is a public authority or a voluntary organization. Kerstin has primarily studied these aspects of social work in relation to issues of crime, abuse, and youth.
Concerns about victimisation have multiplied over the last fifty years. *Victims, Culture and Society* explores the major concepts, debates and controversies that these concerns have generated across a range of disciplines, but particularly within criminology and victimology. As the impacts of globalisation, the movement of peoples and the divergences between the global North and global South have become ever more apparent, this series provides an authoritative space for original contributions in making sense of these far-reaching changes on individuals, localities and nationalities. These issues by their very nature demand an interdisciplinary approach and an interdisciplinary voice outside conventional conceptual boundaries. *Victims, Culture and Society* offers the space for that voice.

Each author adopts a strong personal view and offers a lively and agenda-setting treatment of their subject matter. The monographs encompass a transnational, global or comparative approach to the issues they address. Examining new areas of both empirical and theoretical enquiry, the series offers the opportunity for innovative and progressing thinking about the relationship between victims, culture and society. The books will be useful and thought-provoking resources for the international community of undergraduates, postgraduates, researchers and policymakers working within the broad field of victimisation.

**Sexual Violence against Older People**  
*Hannah Bows*

**Victim Support and the Welfare State**  
*Carina Gallo and Kerstin Svensson*

For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/Victims-Culture-and-Society/book-series/VICS
Contents

List of figures ix
List of tables xi
Foreword xiii
Acknowledgments xvii
Lists of abbreviations xix

1  Introduction 1

2  The golden age of the welfare state 20

3  The end of social-democratic hegemony 39

4  A welfare state in transformation 50

5  A welfare state in times of crisis 81

6  A hibernated welfare state 95

7  Marketization and Europeanization of the welfare state 124

8  Victim support and the state in close alliance 147

Index 161
List of figures

4.1 Victim Support Södertälje’s outgoing and incoming calls from 1986 to 1991 57
4.2 Trygg Hansa’s logotype 71
4.3 BOJ’s logotype 71
5.1 Growth of local BOJ victim support centers from 1980 to 2014 86
5.2 The Ministry of Justice and the Crime Victim Fund grants to BOJ (SEK) 91
7.1 SoS’s grants to BOJ for its work with violence against women from 2004 to 2014 (SEK) 129
List of tables

7.1 List of BOJ’s employees by total full-time equivalent (FTE) and type of positions 133
A nation’s political tradition can make all the difference, even when it is subject, inevitably, to shifting political winds over the course of many decades. Had the Swedish Association for Victim Support (BOJ) been launched in America’s corporate state capitalism, it would have fared very differently than it did during its emergence in Sweden’s social democracy. In the United States, victim services (such as the first victim compensation programs in the 1960s) began amidst two pronounced, American ideologies: first, as a rationale for get-tough, law-and-order, punitive crime policies, and second, as an extension of U.S.-style welfare. On the one hand, enhancing official power (unleashed from due process rights protections) could be pursued in the name of protecting and promoting crime victims, even though it accomplished neither. On the other hand, to benefit from victim services, one had to prove that one was “innocent” (didn’t “precipitate” the victimization) and “needy” (would qualify for welfare for the poor). This created a situation where many victim initiatives were more symbolic than tangible and where victims were politically manipulated for ulterior motives by those in power. Those individuals and groups in the United States that have genuinely sought to put the interests of crime victims first have – unwittingly or not – had to navigate treacherous waters of ideology and power to accomplish anything at all for victims, who remain vastly underserved.

In Sweden and the other social democracies, the “welfare state” carries a very different meaning, and in many ways, the term is a misnomer. Instead, policy is driven by the norm of solidarity (we’re all in this together), and social insurance programs are designed for the society generally, rather than merely for marginalized groups, such as in the United States, where welfare is more often than not used as a social control mechanism. As a result, it’s not surprising that the concept of “victim” (as a segregated category, implying an associated identity) emerged only very recently in Sweden. Now that it has appeared, it nevertheless is treated as an experience, not as a label.

In the book that follows, Carina Gallo and Kerstin Svensson illustrate the difference between victim services pursued as social control and victim services pursued as social democracy. In exhaustive detail, they follow the birth
and development of BOJ through three stages: construction, consolidation, and restructuring. It’s the story of how a victim services infrastructure gets built amidst significant political changes, beginning in the 1980s. While the BOJ first emerged during the twilight of Sweden’s decades-old social democracy, it had to ride the waves of significant changes into the 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Cold War produced a wave of neoliberal politics and economics in Europe, which challenged even entrenched welfare states such as Sweden. The conservatives came to power and began privatizing the Swedish system. In response, the BOJ had to develop under a shifting political ideology. While victim services in Sweden were initiated within a human rights context – emphasizing community and solidarity – the BOJ found itself pulled toward U.S. and U.K. models of victim policy. And yet it also resisted, unwilling to tie victim services to a more punitive regime against offenders. While the return to power of the social democrats helped the BOJ consolidate itself, the conservatives again reasserted themselves, signing on to the marketization of the welfare state. This forced the BOJ to restructure itself, in its desire to remain allied to the state, while not losing its more progressive objectives on behalf of victims.

It’s been a delicate balance. As Gallo and Svensson demonstrate, the BOJ has made all the necessary adjustments to become a very prominent and successful organization, and that trajectory is worth examining for its own sake. The BOJ has represented civil society, yet also has a strong relationship with succeeding Swedish governments. It has avoided being coopted by official crime policies yet has nevertheless yielded to a dilution of Swedish social cohesion, putting specialized crime victim issues on the political agenda. It has accepted a certain weakening of structural explanations for crime and other social problems amidst the increasing neoliberal pressures in Sweden, which focus more on individual, than on social, responsibility. And it has collaborated with the more liberal, rather than feminist, notion of abused females as victims rather than merely women.

Even so, despite the weakening of Sweden’s welfare state and the more conservative pressures it has felt in recent years, the BOJ has remained influenced by its social-democratic context. That is, it avoids talking about victimhood and pitting the victim against the offender, it shuns calls for more punitive crime policies, and it embraces principles of universal human rights more so than specialized rights categories. Whether the BOJ can remain true to these principles in the immediate future remains to be seen, especially if assaults on Swedish social democracy continue, but it’s been a fascinating balancing act thus far.

To explore these and related issues, this study provides a rare, in-depth look at the development of victim policies and movements beyond the English-speaking nations. For reasons of political tradition, among other factors, victim initiatives differ depending on the society. This research by Gallo and Svensson helps us understand this phenomenon beyond the narrow
U.S.–U.K. perspective that has dominated so much past victim research. This is a captivating, well-written, and meticulously researched study that will become a landmark for significantly broadening and illuminating the field of victimology.

Writing this book has been a great journey. We would not have been able to complete it without the support of a number of people, to whom we want to express our gratitude. First of all, we would like to thank the funding body, the Swedish Crime Victim Fund, which made this project possible through a generous research grant. We want to give special thanks to the staff at Victim Support Sweden (formerly Swedish Association for Victim Support, BOJ) for their participation and generosity in giving us access to the organization’s archive and for participating in interviews. We want to express our appreciation to the editors of this series, Professors Kerry Carrington and Sandra Walklate. Your work has been a great inspiration to us, and we are honored to be able to contribute to this book series.

During the work with the book, many people have helped in various ways. The staff at BOJ’s national office kindly provided good practical conditions for handling the archival material. We digitized and organized all documents in BOJ’s archive, partly for the organization and partly for the project. Several volunteers participated in this work, whom we recruited through Volontärbyrå in Stockholm. Viktor Lindgren has contributed with transcriptions of the interviews. Undergraduate and graduate students at San Francisco State University and Holy Names University have been involved in data processing and the formatting of publications. We thank Signe Bergström and Tova Wisten at San Francisco State University for searching a number of databases and articles, and finding a 1969 article which includes the Swedish term for crime victim (brottsoffer). This is earliest use of the term we have found in this project. Sven-Erik Alhem, Hans Klette, Björn Lagerbäck, and Eva Larsson generously gave us time and shared their experiences in interviews. Many thanks to all of you! In April 2019, in the very final stages of completing this book, we found out that Eva Larsson and Hans Klette had passed away with only weeks in between. We are honored to have had the opportunity to talk with them about their experiences.

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the basis for this book. Professor Robert Elias and Annika af Sandeberg have both co-authored publications in the project. We have presented our manuscripts at different scientific conferences, seminars, and working groups, where the participants have given us thoughtful feedback. We especially want to mention the Carceral Studies Working Group in Berkeley; the Civil Society Network at Lund University; the Victimology Research Network at Lund University; the Humanities and Social Sciences Association’s Writing Group at University of California, Berkeley; and the School of Public Affairs and Civic Engagement at San Francisco State University. Most of all, we thank our families for your support and patience.
# List of abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AVC</td>
<td>Aid for Victims of Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOJ</td>
<td>Swedish Association for Victim Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BrOM</td>
<td>The Swedish Crime Victim Compensation and Support Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRÅ</td>
<td>The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dir.</td>
<td>Swedish government committee directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ds.</td>
<td>Swedish government memorandum</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOPP</td>
<td>National Organization against Sexual Abuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSO</td>
<td>Swedish Disability Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEAA</td>
<td>Law Enforcement Assistance Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVSS</td>
<td>National Association for Victim Support Schemes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOVA</td>
<td>National Organization for Victim Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPOs</td>
<td>Non-profit organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POMC</td>
<td>Parents of Murdered Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop.</td>
<td>Swedish government bill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKS</td>
<td>The Swedish National Organization for Women’s Shelters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPS</td>
<td>The Swedish National Police Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKR</td>
<td>Swedish Association for Women’s Shelters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SoL</td>
<td>Swedish Social Services Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF</td>
<td>Swedish Association for Senior Citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SoS</td>
<td>The Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOU</td>
<td>Swedish government official report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSE</td>
<td>Victim Support Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>VSS</td>
<td>Victim Support Sweden</td>
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Swedish victim support from an international perspective

Victim support organizations started to develop in the 1970s. As many scholars have pointed out, the women’s movements’ establishment of shelters for abused women made way for wider victim support in many countries. In this book, Sweden serves as an example of how victim support organizations develop. Sweden is a small country with a population now around 10 million inhabitants. Yet it is well known internationally, in politics as well as in social sciences, because of its wealth and highly developed welfare system.

Most international empirical research on victim support organizations has centered on the United States and the United Kingdom, where victim assistance programs date back to the 1970s. Early U.S. victim support programs had their roots in human and women’s rights but diverted into law-and-order perspectives in the 1980s (Elias, 1993; Gallo & Elias, 2016; Garland, 2001; Simon, 2007; Weed, 1995). Some of the earliest victim and witness assistance programs in the United States were located in prosecutors’ offices and were designed to help victims and witnesses navigate the criminal court system, encourage them to cooperate, and thereby improve conviction rates (Derene, Walker, & Stein, 2007). Scholars have also carefully examined the driving forces behind victim programs in the United Kingdom (e.g., Mawby & Gill, 1987; Rock, 2004; Walklate, 2017). Scholars such as British sociologist Paul Rock (2004) and law and criminal justice scholar Matthew Hall (2010) have recognized the influence of human rights on the agenda of the U.K. victim programs. Rock (2004) has also shown that organizations promoting crime victims’ rights in the United Kingdom have resisted elements of the United States’ crime victim policy orientation, such as victim impact statements, which can be used to argue for a harsher penalty.

From the studies available, there has been a tendency to generalize victim policy patterns in the United States and the United Kingdom to other countries. Researchers have highlighted and criticized this trend and argued that there is a need to recognize national variations in how policies toward crime
Introduction

are formed (e.g., Bonnan-White, 2017). As Pemberton points out (2009), the victim movement is not one unified phenomenon; there appears to be a number of victim movements. The concentration on punitiveness as a driving force behind victim policies and programs can also distract our attention from a broader range of influences (Hall, 2010). There is now a growing body of research that examines cross-national variations in victim support.

Despite this thorough body of literature, there are still many questions to be answered. In particular, how have countries outside of the Anglophone sphere approached issues related to victims? U.S. criminologist Michael Tonry (2004) has highlighted the need for case studies related to crime that combine historical studies and empirical data analysis, and attempt to tell stories of individual countries over time. According to Tonry, stories collected from a number of countries will allow us to look across national boundaries in search of patterns and generalizations in policies and practices. This book aims to provide just that.

The book adds to the literature by providing a rich analysis of the history of victim support in Sweden. The trajectory of Swedish victim support has something to teach us since Sweden, in many respects, is radically different from many Anglophone countries. Sweden has a long tradition of comprehensive welfare state policies and low incarceration rates. We will show that despite contrasting circumstances, there are some common features in how victim support was established and developed across countries. By illuminating the evolution of victim support in different types of societies, the core of the development of victim support can become clearer. The book hence contributes to a more general understanding of the social conditions that facilitate or counteract the development of victim support programs. It also contributes to the understanding of the political aspects of victim support and how different political perspectives have influenced its development. Thereby, the book shows how victim support can be seen as both a tool for and a result of political change.

The emergence of Swedish victim support

In Sweden, the conceptual identity of the “crime victim” is fairly new. It is often said that the term crime victim (brottsoffer) did not exist in the Swedish language until 1970 (Österberg, 2002). There are, however, examples before that: for example, in a 1969 article (Anttila, 1969) in the Swedish Law Journal (Svensk Juristtidning). This is the earliest use of the term we have found in this project.

At the end of the 1970s, the first non-profit women’s shelters were established. These shelters opened the field of victim support and put victimization on the political agenda, but they focused on women only. Soon, other organizations took up the call for a broader victim definition. The first generic non-profit crime victim assistance programs emerged in the early 1980s, and
in 1988, five local victim support centers formed a national umbrella organization called the Swedish Association for Victim Support (BOJ; now Victim Support Sweden). While the women’s shelters were organized around the notion of women directly helping women, BOJ focused on organizing help for others; crime victims themselves had not organized or called for better services.

Since the late 1980s, the concern for crime victims has grown dramatically, and the government enacted numerous laws to support this group. By 1995, only seven years after BOJ was formed, almost 100 local victim support centers had been established and covered the whole country. Yet little is known about the rise and development of victim support organizations in Sweden. Most Swedish studies have focused on the political aspects of crime–related issues rather than on how victim support organizes and what these organizations do (e.g. Bergenlöv, Lindstedt Cronberg & Österberg, 2002; eds. Lernestedt & Tham, 2011; Tham, 1995; Tham, Rönneling & Ryttbro, 2011). The NPOs in this field have received surprisingly little attention from researchers. While several Swedish studies have focused on non-profit women’s shelters (e.g., Enander, Holmberg & Lindgren, 2013; Helmersson, 2017; Mattsson, 2011; Nilsson, 2009; Wendt Höjer, 2002), almost no studies have investigated BOJ. The few research studies in the area have mainly studied the local victim support centers’ services for victims (Åkerström, 1990; Jägervi, Holmberg & Lindgren, 2013; Helmersson, 2017; Mattsson, 2011; Ryding, 2001, 2005; Svensson, 2002, 2006). Hardly any study has focused on BOJ as a national umbrella association, which set how the local organizations are run and determine national attitudes in relation to victim support. This is not only the first comprehensive study of BOJ’s organization and practice as a uniting body for the local centers and voice in the political debate but also the first study that put BOJ’s development in a political and contemporary context.

The “right time” for a national victim support organization

Victim support has not raised much debate in Sweden, even if it has been high up on the political agenda. Soon after BOJ introduced the idea of victim support, there was a general understanding of this as something “good.” No one objected, and no questions were asked. From transcripts of discussions in Parliament, we can see that all political parties and politicians, from left to right, were favorable to BOJ and praised its practice (Svensson, 2006). Nothing in BOJ’s practice or ideas was questioned, the governmental debate, rather, turned into a parade of politicians from all parties telling stories about their positive impressions of victim support. When we asked Björn Lagerbäck, a psychologist and one of BOJ’s founders, how it was possible to establish and build the organization, he said,
Introduction

Well, it was the right time. To say it was the right time is wrong, but it, it was a humanistic ambition that no one opposed … There were not really any antagonists.

The argument that it was the right time is important. Previous studies have indicated that Swedish victim support organizations emerged from a changed welfare state and a restructured organizational landscape of NPOs (Svensson, 2007). BOJ was established and grew at a time when the Swedish welfare state, society, politics, and organizational fields were going through substantial changes. We will come back to aspects of these changes in the various chapters of this book but will highlight three general factors here.

- Society became more individualized; social problems were defined as individual problems.
- Rehabilitation as a fundamental goal in crime policy was questioned.
- The organization of welfare services changed from a large public sector to a model where NPOs and private organizations also began to deliver social services.

Swedish society went, like many others, through a transformation at the end of the 20th century. The era of industrialism was over, globalization increased, digitization began to accelerate, and the economy changed. Sweden also started a transformation from a homogeneous to a more heterogeneous society. This was in many ways a historic turning point, not only in the case of victim support. Nevertheless, one can see the emergence of victim support as an idea and the fact that it is given space as a sign of the time. “Being the right time” is, however, not enough for an idea to be converted into a nationwide organization and an activity that engages many people locally, and receives support and influence in state and politics. To understand how it happened, we need to follow BOJ’s rise and development, and put it in context – the political development.

Objectives of this book

This book examines the role of BOJ in a shifting welfare state, where welfare policy has become more restrictive and crime policy, to some degree, more punitive. How did a group for which we did not even have a term in the Swedish language just some decades ago become one of our most important social and political subjects? How did BOJ find its place in contemporary politics and in a society where comprehensive governmental welfare programs and women’s shelters already existed? More specifically, the book aims to understand BOJ’s role in the political debate as well as the complex relationship between BOJ; the state; politics; and adjacent organizations, primarily the women’s shelters. Our analysis starts in the late 1970s, when the seeds
for the first victim support centers were planted, and ends around 2014. The primary focus of the book is BOJ’s national umbrella organization, rather than crime victimization, the affiliated local victim support centers, or their work with supporting victims. Crime victimization and victim support do, however, constitute the base for the organization we have studied. Moreover, since there is an apparent connection between BOJ and the local centers, we need to discuss the local centers and their work occasionally.

The book will show that BOJ is both a creator and a creation of its time. BOJ could fill a function amid the decentralization and privatization of the Swedish welfare state. In this makeover, NPOs were of particular interest to policymakers as they represented civil society and were founded on positive humanitarian values. BOJ has not explicitly contended for tougher policies on crime. However, it has indirectly pushed the political discourse in a neo-liberal punitive direction in a number of areas. It also played a role in changing structural discourses on class and gender by supporting a notion that claimed abused women as crime victims and not as women primarily. Over time, BOJ adhered to contemporary governing ideas. This transformation can be viewed as a co-optation, whereby BOJ is eager to do as the state, or welfare market, might expect. It could also be seen as a success of BOJ’s lobbying, where they provided politicians with arguments for the ongoing changes in criminal policy. BOJ’s development thus came to be a question of following the government’s aspirations. Before unpacking the details of BOJ’s rise and development, we will set the scene by presenting an overview of BOJ as well as our methodological and theoretical approach.

The Swedish Association for Victim Support – an overview

BOJ is the oldest and largest victim support organization in Sweden. Similar to many other European victim support organizations (e.g., Hall, 2010), human rights forms the foundation for BOJ’s work, which aims to provide “fellow-human support, information, and practical guidance to those exposed to crime, witnesses, and relatives” (BOJ, 2014, p. 1). BOJ is the only nationwide Swedish organization that focuses on victims of all types of crime. BOJ’s official definition of who is a “crime victim” is based on the United Nation’s (UN; 1985) Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victim of Crime and Abuse of Power (BOJ, 2018a). Under this Declaration, a person may be considered a victim, regardless of whether the perpetrator is identified, apprehended, prosecuted, or convicted. The term can also include the victim’s family and persons who have assisted crime victims (UN, 1985). Other Swedish victim assistance schemes are significantly smaller and offer services to specific groups: for instance, the Swedish Federation for LGBTQ Rights offers support to LGBTQ people who have experienced crime. The municipal social services also run victim support programs,
including support centers for young crime victims. According to the Social Services Act (2001:453; Chapter 5 §11 SoL), the duties of the social welfare board include working for those subjected to crime. BOJ is, however, clearly the dominant organization in the field of victim support through its coordinated anchorage across the country and its history of putting victim issues on the political agenda.

BOJ is run as an NPO (ideell förening), a membership-based association, and is governed by an elected national board. One distinct feature of Swedish NPOs is a high degree of membership, which has been seen to represent internal democracy (Wijkström, Einarsson & Larsson, 2004). Also, the welfare state, where the public bodies dominated, was built on engagement in membership organizations, so called popular movements. In that sense, BOJ was organized in a traditional Swedish way. It is the members that maintain the organizational structure, elect the board, and hold the important bi-annual meetings where the guidelines for the coming years are decided. While the local centers are built on the activities of their members, the national organization has the local victim support centers as members. This means that in the bi-annual meetings where the decisions are made, the participating members are representatives of the local centers. Individual people can become members of the local victim support centers and thereby participate in their meeting and decisions as individuals, but in BOJ, individuals can only take part if they are assigned from the local center. BOJ’s role is to be an umbrella organization that guides and supports the local centers with education, training, and informational material.

In the early 2000s, when over 100 victim support centers were affiliated with BOJ, the rapid quantitative expansion leveled off, and the number of centers has now decreased to around 80 centers. The local centers pay a membership fee of 1,000 SEK. BOJ has always had a strong anchorage in politics and public administration, and in traditional bodies, such as the Church of Sweden and even the royal family – H.M. Queen Silvia is an honorary member of BOJ.

Despite its political significance and the supportive role for all local centers, only a few people are employed in BOJ. Around 16 people are employed in BOJ’s national office in Stockholm, including a secretary-general, a chief financial officer, an administrator, and a communication coordinator (BOJ, 2016a). The names of the titles have changed over time, but for consistency, we will use the same titles throughout the book. Although BOJ does not provide direct support to victims, it operates a national hotline as a way to coordinate and support the work in the local centers. Finally, and maybe most importantly, BOJ has a role as an advocacy organization and seeks to influence policy by raising awareness among policymakers and the public about the needs of crime victims.

The local centers serve geographically defined areas. The centers have their members and annual meetings, where the members elect a local board
consisting of a chair, a secretary, a treasurer, and other members. Apart from the local practice, the members of the local centers can participate in working groups and projects for BOJ. BOJ does not allocate any funds to the centers, which in that sense are independent organizations that have to find funding to support their operations. The local centers offer emotional support, practical help, information, and help to apply for criminal injuries compensation. The support is free and available to everyone, whether or not the crime has been reported, and regardless of when it happened (BOJ, 2018b). Volunteers called support persons (stödpersoner) provide most victim support. They get a short training based on BOJ’s material, and they operate under a confidentiality pledge. According to BOJ (2013, p. 3), the support person’s task is to:

- Provide information about the victim’s rights in the investigation of the crime and criminal proceedings.
- Provide emotional support and practical guidance.
- Communicate with authorities and insurance companies.
- Provide support and information before, during, and after the trial.
- Refer, if necessary, to social, legal, psychological, or medical expertise.

Many centers have employed volunteer coordinators, but it happens that sometimes, even coordinators are volunteers. Support persons and employed staff provide approximately 60,000 hours of victim support every year (BOJ, 2016b).

In 1995, a local BOJ center initiated the first Swedish witness support program in Växjö, a small city in southern Sweden, with the support of the Swedish Compensation and Support Authority (BrOM),2 where volunteers provided support to victims and witnesses before and during trials. This initiative inspired BOJ to spread this idea over the country, and today, there are witness support programs at close to all Swedish courts.

Local BOJ centers run most witness support programs, but in some courts, other organizations provide this service. In the administration of BOJ as well as of the local centers, witness support is separate from victim support in the sense that they have different education, meetings, and so on, and they keep their own statistics. In some centers, this goes also for the practice, where the volunteers engage in support either for witnesses or for victims. In other centers, the practice overlaps, and the same volunteer can be active in both practices. The task of witness supporters is the following according to BOJ (2013, pp. 3–4):

- Provide support and information before, during, and after the trial.
- Explain the legal process, dedramatize the process, and be a company.
- Refer, if necessary, to social, legal, psychological, or medical expertise, or other support within BOJ.
The role of a witness support volunteer differs from the role of the volunteers working at the centers. Primarily, they operate in different places. While witness support mainly is given in courts and in meetings person to person, victim support is mainly given over the phone. Victim supporters could encourage victims to talk about the crime in order to sort things out and grasp the situation. Witness support volunteers are trained not to talk to witnesses about the crime as they should not influence the court hearing, and their support is limited to the time in and around the court hearing only (BrOM and The Swedish National Courts Administration, 2008). The local BOJ centers support around 80,000 crime victims and witnesses every year (BOJ, 2018a).

In 2015, BOJ officially changed its name to Victim Support Sweden (Brottsofferjouren Sverige), which follows international developments. Victim Support in England and Wales’s original name was the National Association of Victim Support Schemes (NAVSS). In 2007, the European Forum for Victim Services (EFVS), an umbrella organization for European victim support organizations, became Victim Support Europe (VSE). In this book, we will mainly use the name that the organization used during the examined period, that is, the Swedish Association for Victim Support (Brottsofferjourenas Riksförbund). We will use the Swedish abbreviation, BOJ.

A contemporary and retrospective history of victim support

Victim support organizations are designed around conceptualizations of whom crime victims are, their trajectory, and their needs. These conceptualizations are reflected in written documents of organizations, such as letters, annual reports, minutes, and information material. Through the construction of these documents, organizations represent themselves collectively to others as well as to themselves internally (Atkinson & Coffey, 2011). This book is based on BOJ’s national archive from 1988 to 2014 and interviews with key figures in the organization. In the very beginning, BOJ had its base at the local victim support center in Södertälje, a city just south of Stockholm. The center was one of the very first when it was established in 1984. We also got access to archival documents from that center. Moreover, we have reviewed key government bills and directives relating to crime victim support.

This book is based on the results of a research project examining BOJ’s history, funded by the Swedish Crime Victim Fund. We formulated the project, and the fund granted our application. Parts of the project have also been presented in other publications (Gallo & Elias, 2016; Gallo, af Sandeberg & Svensson, 2018; Svensson & Gallo, 2018a, 2018b). The content and text of the various publications are partly overlapping as they come from the same project, but there are also apparent differences in perspectives and questions we have analyzed. While the other publications have focused on specific themes, this book presents an overarching analysis that brings together the different
publications with additional, not formerly used, material. This book is the only text where we develop and present the project’s overall conclusions.

**An extensive collection of archival material**

BOJ provided full access to its national internal archive, which contains rich data on the organization’s activities. The archive holds an extensive collection of documents, such as letters, member magazines, annual reports, informational and educational materials, and minutes from board meetings and working groups. These documents can be understood as BOJ’s self-image or collective memory, comprising the ideas that unite and institutionalize the organization.

Many of the documents are available in digital form from the mid-2000s. Older documents, from the 1980s onward, were available in hard copies only, which BOJ stored in an archive room in its national office. We manually scanned and digitized these documents with the help of volunteers. We sorted all the documents based on the type of document and in chronological order. We led the work in organizing the archive, but the volunteers were connected to BOJ. This way, we simultaneously created an archive for BOJ and a comprehensive material for the research project. Although BOJ has shown interest in the research project and contributed to its realization, the project was not ordered by, nor controlled by, BOJ.

The archive consists of documents that allow us to follow BOJ’s development over time, including bylaws, annual reports, board minutes, member magazines, and minutes from annual meetings. Other documents are bound to specific times or events: for example, letters and working group minutes. There are also documents that reflect specific events but events that are continually recurring, such as meetings for coordinators at the local centers, training material, and comments on legislative proposals. These documents show the continuous guidance given by BOJ to the local centers, as well as the specific themes at each event, which provides a picture of BOJ’s stance on different matters and how issues have changed.

**Interviews with key figures**

To complement the archival material, we conducted retrospective interviews with all previous and current secretaries-general and chairs of the national board, except Per Svensson, who passed away in 2001. To a large extent, five people have been central to BOJ’s emergence and development:

**Björn Lagerbäck** is a psychologist and founded the first Swedish victim support center in Malmö. When he founded the center, he was working in the Swedish Prison and Probation Services, and then in an insurance company. He was a leading person in establishing and building BOJ, and served as the chair of the national board from 1991 to 1994.
Per Svensson was a local police officer in Södertälje. He was one of the founders of the Södertälje victim support center, which is the oldest center that is still in operation today. He was one of BOJ’s founders. He served as the chairman of BOJ’s national board from 1988 to 1990 and secretary-general from 1991 until he passed away in 2001.

Hans Klette was a professor of criminal law at Lund University. He was one of the founders of a local BOJ center in Lund and joined BOJ’s work early. He chaired BOJ’s national board from 1995 to 2008.

Eva Larsson came in contact with BOJ through her work in the study organization SV in the early 1990s. After that, she started working with education at the BOJ national office. She served as BOJ’s secretary-general from 2001 until she passed away in 2019.

Sven-Erik Alhem is a lawyer and a prosecutor. He has held several higher positions in the Swedish Prosecution Authority. He also describes himself as an independent public debater and is often consulted by the media on various issues. He has served as chair of BOJ’s national board since 2009.

To a great extent, these five people have led the activities reflected in BOJ’s national archive. They have also drawn up many of the documents. Even if we did not get the opportunity to interview Per Svensson, we located some of his work through the Södertälje center’s archive. Svensson served as the chair of the Södertälje center’s local board until 1991. He, for example, had a column in its member magazine called “Per’s page,” where he wrote about his thoughts on victim support. Moreover, Björn Lagerbäck and Eva Larsson worked closely with Svensson for many years and talked about his ideas and perspectives in the interviews.

BOJ’s archive is extensive, and it has not been possible to analyze all information contained therein systematically. We have done detailed analyses of some documents: for example, the annual reports and all documents from BOJ’s first years. In other parts of the archive, including member magazines, education material, and minutes, we have done broader, more explorative searches and analyses. Together, these investigative strategies have given us a good understanding of the organization and its development.

We analyzed the documents and interviews using archaeological and genealogical methods, as described by the French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault (1972). The archaeological approach aims to reveal the material from each “layer,” that is, each specific time, while the genealogy method aims to find the relationships between the materials over time. Moreover, this study analyzed the material reflexively, examining how documents for the later periods referred to documents for the earlier stages.

We first undertook a thematic analysis of the archival data and interviews, and identified common patterns and themes. We then conducted a historical analysis of the material in the context of contemporary governing political ideas with the help of research studies and governmental texts. The coding
was concept-driven, meaning that we created a hierarchical list of possible codes before the coding took place based on the conceptual framework and previous studies. We also amended the code-scheme as we detected new ideas and categorizations in the material (Gibbs, 2008).

The different documents in the archive complement each other. Minutes from a meeting can describe that BOJ has taken a stand on an issue and decided to send a letter to a politician, and the archived letter shows that BOJ sent it. Thus, the documents have reinforced each other, and a coherent story crystallized. In the cases in which BOJ referred to other materials in the archive, we proceeded to review the original sources. We conducted the interviews after we sorted and analyzed some of the documents; thereby, we had the opportunity to validate the information in the archive. The interviews hence complemented the documents and gave additional perspectives to the continued analysis.

We also extracted statistical data from the material: for example, related to growth and funding. We combined the data to create historical overviews. In some cases, we reached out to external bodies to confirm the data, including BOJ’s main funders – both government agencies, BrOM, and the National Board of Health and Welfare. In the few cases where we saw a discrepancy between the sources, we used the numbers from the government agencies. When available, we have used official English translations: for example, the titles of laws and other legislative material. Other than that, we have done all translations from Swedish to English in the book, including archival documents, interview transcripts, previous research, and government material.

In sum, the material that forms the basis for the book is contemporary (archival documents) and retrospective (interviews). The material gives both an overview and a detailed picture of BOJ and its activities. The archival documents have been our primary material, while the interviews provided a framework for the documents based on retrospective stories. The archive and the stories told in the interviews hence enriched each other in the reconstruction of BOJ’s history.

Victim support as a component of social and political change

This book presents a critical analysis of BOJ’s history, aiming to understand the establishment and development of the organization in its contemporary context. According to British sociologist and criminologist Sandra Walklate, the term critical means excavating “the appearance of ‘things’ in terms of their underlying generative mechanisms” and considering “the socio-economic and historical context in which events occur” (Walklate, 2017, p. 380). Inspired by Foucault, our intention is hence not to seek the reason for specific statements in “the things that were said” (Foucault, 1972, p. 129).
Rather, as Foucault recommends, we have examined the discursive systems that set the boundaries of what can and cannot be said. We regard statements in the archival material and the interviews not as unique but as utterances “born in accordance with specific regularities” (Foucault, 1972, p. 129). This book is hence exploratory in that it regards BOJ as being influenced and shaped by broader social and political forces in Sweden. An analysis focusing on factors internal to Sweden would, however, be incomplete. We will, therefore, situate our analysis of Sweden within a broader comparative context, drawing mainly on studies from the United States and Western Europe. We do not evaluate the effects of victim support or BOJ’s ideology, but our point of departure is that we question the assumption that victims are best served by policies that are tough-on-crime and deprive offenders of rights5.

**The power of the institutional context**

With a critical approach as the overarching context, we examine BOJ through a lens of neo-institutional theories and concepts of organizational field and landscape. Weick and Bougon (1986) argue that organizations primarily exist in our thoughts and perceptions. It is therefore essential to understand the structures that hold an organization together, what Weick and Bougon call “cognitive maps.” The map is the organization as it “contains the structure, the process, and the raw material from which agreements and conflicts are built when people coordinate action” (Weick, 2001, p. 328). Cognitive maps serve as guidance for both the organization and individuals in and around the organization. They develop through mutual understanding in mutual interaction, where participants agree on a common picture. You may have different opinions, but you agree on what you see differently, which will guide the organization’s practice. In discussions based on a geographic map, people may have different views if the distance between two locations is long or short, or which way is best to take, but they do not discuss whether the locations exist; they are taken for granted. Similarly, cognitive maps represent views that are taken for granted in the organization when there are different solutions regarding which paths to take.

Weick also uses the concept of “presumption of logics,” which is similar to a self-fulfilling prophecy. This concept implies that there do not have to be facts underlying the logic; it is sufficient that there is a general belief in an idea. In other words, it is enough that there is support for the idea that victims need assistance from volunteers – it does not need to be proved or questioned. This concept is beneficial for understanding the development of BOJ as it relates to the situation where “[p]eople do not actually see causes and effects; they infer them” (Weick, 2001, p. 392).

The governing idea for the organization constitutes the structure that holds the organization together. With the idea as the map, the practical arrangements are organized and fitted into the organizational landscape.
As organizations are neither self-contained nor self-sufficient, we must also grasp their context or ecology (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Our perspectives build on the idea that new organizations have to show isomorphism to get recognition; in other words, they have to resemble other organizations in the field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). New organizations often struggle to gain a foothold in the fields in which they want to operate. To achieve this, they have to adhere to the institutional logics in their fields so that they can compete for resources. When organizations need and compete for the same resources, the external control is enhanced as a way to strengthen predictability in an uncertain situation (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Within an organizational field, organizations are hence interdependent and control each other as they are all dependent on the same context. This also allows them to develop in similar forms and to create similar logics (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Scott, 1992; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). By understanding the organizational field and the contemporary context in this case, we can get knowledge of BOJ’s sense-making, how it became possible, how it has developed, and how it has interacted within its context.

The power of individual actors and entrepreneurs

The book seeks explanations for BOJ’s establishment and development in social change, yet it will acknowledge the power of entrepreneurs in establishing an organization. DiMaggio states that “new institutions arise when organized actors with sufficient resources see in them an opportunity to realize interests that they value highly” (1988, p. 14). These actors create a new meaning or system of understanding when they combine disparate sets of institutions to form something new (Garud, Hardy & Maguire, 2007). The British criminologist Paul Rock argues that criminal justice organizations usually start small, and they are started by enthusiastic people (Rock, 1988). Rock has described the founders of victim programs in other countries, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, as driven, dedicated, and charismatic. As Rock points out, founding “an organization is no common thing, and those who do so tend to be correspondingly uncommon” (1988, p. 367). BOJ’s founders are no exception. Their passionate engagement, individual skills, and different backgrounds had an undeniable impact. A few, active, entrepreneurs created not only the organization but also the demand for the organization’s practice.

In studies of organizations, especially in neo-institutionalist studies, there is, however, often little emphasis on individual actors. The U.S. sociologist Neil Fligstein (1997) has argued for a theory of institutional entrepreneurship. He argued that actions are the outcomes of the social skills that institutional entrepreneurs possess. Those skills translate into institutional arrangements that produce organizational fields. Fligstein regards social skills as “the ability to relate to the situation of the ‘other’” (1997, p. 398). In this,
the institutional entrepreneurs need knowledge about the current situation in the organizational field, including the positions of the actors in the field. Besides, they need knowledge about which kinds of actions make sense in the field and in context. In their endeavors, entrepreneurs must work both for internal cohesion within the organization and for the legitimization of the organization in its context.

This is echoed by the U.S.-based scholar Julie Battilana (2006), who argues that institutional entrepreneurs need a keen interest and a social position that provides legitimacy and enables agency. This position could be either formal or informal. Further, entrepreneurs should have interorganizational mobility. Moving between organizations implies a broader exposure to different organizational contexts, which, in turn, helps when moving beyond what is taken for granted. Battilana also argues that institutional entrepreneurs need to have a willingness to change and the ability to do so. Rock (1988) describes this as a dialectic where both the funders and the organization change and grow as the funders create an organization and a world that affects them. We will hence understand the process of establishing BOJ through the entrepreneurs’ agency. We will get to know the organization’s context through the actions taken and agreements made by the entrepreneurs. We do this by tracing the entrepreneurs’ path through the archival documents in combination with the retrospective interviews.

**Structure of the book**

The book’s point of departure is the changing welfare state. We intertwine the rise and development of BOJ with a historical narrative of the social and political context in Sweden as well as international developments related to victim support. The book is divided into five time periods, which follow government shifts in Sweden. We are aware that many shifts in Swedish crime and welfare policy have occurred independently of who has been in government. The time periods in the book could thereby be seen as to a large degree technical/practical; however, as we will see, some government periods do represent turning points in BOJ’s history. Chapter 2 gives a brief background of crime and welfare policy in the 1960s up until 1978. The 1960s is sometimes referred to as the golden age of the welfare state, with a strong belief in equality, solidarity, and universalism. We will show that crime was considered a social problem with consequences for society, not a problem for the individual victim of crime. In the 1970s, the dominance of the Social Democratic Party, which had ruled since the early 1930s, was challenged. Before long, the idea of the “crime victim” would become central in Swedish society. In the chapter, we will explore the emergence of Swedish criminal injuries compensation, which is often referred to as one of the first initiatives for crime victims.
Chapter 3 covers the period 1976–1982, when the social-democratic government lost the election to a center-right coalition. Neoliberalism entered the public debate, and questions related to welfare, crime, and punishment started to be discussed in a new way. In 1978, the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act (SFS, 1978:413) was enacted, and the first women’s shelters opened. Two years later, the first generic victim support center opened. However, due to lack of interest in its service, the center closed within a few months. In this chapter, we will show that the first victim support center, as well as criminal injuries compensation, was built on welfarist ideals. Chapter 4 deals with the period 1982–1991, when the social-democratic government regained power, and neo-liberal ideas began to influence Swedish policy seriously. In this chapter, we will reconstruct the establishment of the first lasting victim support center in Södertälje in 1984 and BOJ in 1988. We will show how BOJ emerged in just a few years without public or political demand.

Chapter 5 covers the period 1991–1994, when a center-right coalition governed, and Sweden went through a severe recession. The voluntary sector expanded significantly in the early 1990s. BOJ was no exception; it grew rapidly in the early 1990s, in tandem with increasing public and political interest in victims of crime. Meanwhile, gender was replacing class as the primary focus of political analysis in the area of violence against women. Chapter 6 covers the period 1995–2006, when a social-democratic government attempted to restore the welfare state yet encountered difficulties due to a large national debt. Despite the shift in government, the political focus on victims of crime increased steadily in the second part of the 1990s. BOJ now started developing the practice by specializing its support and put in much effort to reach more victims. Chapter 7 covers the period 2007–2014, when another center-right coalition gained power, and the role of the state and municipalities as service providers quickly became more restricted. BOJ now started a vigorous effort to standardize and streamline its victim support while extending support to “vulnerable crime victims,” which, apart from children, included elderly people, people with disability and people with different ethnic backgrounds. In parallel with this development, BOJ now entered a phase when centers started merging and closing. Chapter 8 provides general conclusions and identifies areas for further research.

Notes

1 In this context, the state involves mainly the Ministry of Justice and other ministries and authorities, such as the BroM and the National Board of Health. Politics essentially refers to parties and politicians in the Parliament, the government, and its different bodies.

2 BrOM is a state authority under the Ministry of Justice. It was established in 1994 and promotes victims’ rights, interests, and needs while dealing with matters related to the Swedish crime victim compensation program. It also administers
the Crime Victim Fund, which supports projects and research aiming to improve
the situation of victims.
3 The Crime Victim Fund is funded by fees from offenders and administered by
BrOM.
4 We did not access documents related to staff cases and issues as there were strong
ethical reasons not to use them. These documents would probably not have
helped us answer the questions in this book, so it does not limit the project.
5 Research into crime victims’ punitiveness is, as highlighted by Pemberton
(2012), still fragmented. There are some indications that victims of severe forms
of crime may be more punitive, but there is no evidence that imposing harsher
punishments will do victims any good (Pemberton, 2012).

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Chapter 2

The golden age of the welfare state

Welfarist ideologies

We must firmly reject the view of man that tend to divide people into two categories – us and them. On the one side the righteous, moral, and successful and on the other side the hesitant, the trying, and those who have not succeeded to assert themselves in the performance society’s hunt for power and money. This view of man is utterly false.

Paul Lindblom (The Social Services Committee, 1971, p. 25)

The 1960s is often referred to as the golden age of the Swedish welfare state. This quote by the late Paul Lindblom, a scholar, influential public voice and director for a school of social work, illustrates the prevailing thinking about society, deviance, offenders, and victims of that time. In essence, scholars, such as Lindblom, criticized the entrenched divide between “us” and “them,” where people who deviate from society’s norms are seen as fundamentally different. Bengt Börjeson (1967), a psychologist and criminologist who later came to be a leading social work scholar, echoed Lindblom and argued that concepts such as “criminal” had been cumbersome since they trick us to believe that people labeled as “non-criminal” do not commit crimes. Börjeson developed an alternative model, which stated that “those who deviate are just like the rest of us” (1967, p. 425).

On the whole, the 1960s was characterized by a strong belief in equality, social solidarity, and universal access to public services. The ongoing evolution and growing prosperity seemed poised to continue indefinitely. The engagement of popular movements built the welfare state, and social welfare provisions of all kinds were predominantly a state matter. The voluntary sector primarily advocated for the rights of different marginalized groups, such as social service clients and people with disabilities (Lundström, 1995). Similar to many other Western countries, Sweden experienced rising crime in the post-war period. Crime and punishment were, however, on the whole not considered a political question until the mid-1960s (Tham, 2001). Sweden
The golden age of the welfare state came close to being a textbook example of what the British criminologist David Garland (2001) calls a penal-welfarist state. Crime was considered a social problem, resulting from inequalities and poverty and with consequences for society. On an individual level, rehabilitation of the offender was the ideal, and the offender’s recidivism risk was an essential part of sentencing. If those who committed crime were rehabilitated, society would be saved from crime. New Zealand-based criminologist John Pratt (2008) argues that this “penal exceptionalism” was rooted in the Swedish welfare state’s institutionalized solidarity and egalitarianism.

**Basic principles of the Swedish welfare state**

After being a poor rural country in the 19th century with a high level of emigration, the situation changed during the 20th century. Sweden saw changes in all areas, especially in living standard. Cultural and ethnic demographic homogeneity characterized Sweden. To a great extent, the social-democratic labor movement opposed labor immigration from other countries, although it did provide some help to political refugees (Johansson, 2008). In 1945, the number of people born abroad in Sweden was as low as 1.5 percent (Statistics Sweden, 2004, 1947). The industrial sector and the state’s finance were strong, especially from the mid-20th century. As the demand in the labor market increased, the restrictive labor market policy against immigrants and refugees became increasingly unsustainable (Johansson, 2008). In the 1950s and 1960s, people came to Sweden to seek work, mostly from Nordic and European countries. In 1960, 4 percent of the population was born abroad (Statistics Sweden, 2018a).1 Finnish people were the largest group, making up one-third of people born abroad (Statistics Sweden, 1962). During the strong economic growth in the 1960s, there were not enough people in Sweden to fill the need of workers, despite a migration from the rural areas to the newly built suburbs. Big companies went abroad, for example, to Yugoslavia, to recruit workers. Nevertheless, Sweden was still an ethnically homogeneous country, which may have facilitated lenient penal policies (Lappi-Seppilä, 2008).

The migration in Sweden was not only an international issue. As the flourishing industry needed workers, and the agricultural work changed with new machines and large units, people left the rural areas and moved into the bigger cities. The Social Democrats, who had held a governing position since 1932, strived for good housing conditions for all people and after minor reforms, a large step was taken before the 1964 election when the Social Democrats announced that one million residences should be built before 1975. Many houses were built, and large modern suburbs developed around the bigger cities. Considering that Sweden at the time had a population of approximately 8 million, it is obvious that this was a huge investment, as well as a huge relocation of the population (Statistics Sweden, 2018a).
The main issue for the Social Democrats concerned the labor market. Already in 1938, an agreement was made between the labor unions (that were closely connected to the Social Democrats) and the Swedish Employers Association. The agreement concerned job security, rules for negotiations of salaries, ways for dealing with redundancies, and limitations and rules for strikes and other measures in conflicts. This agreement came to have considerable importance for the continued development (National Encyclopedia, 2018). Since then, several laws were enacted for the universal protection of good working conditions and job security. Paid vacation from work was stated in law, starting with two weeks 1938, and one more week was added in 1951, 1963, and 1978 when the law stated five weeks paid vacation for all employees (SOU, 1975:88).

Apart from work and housing, the idea of the welfare state concerned equal access to education of high quality for all children. In 1962, a school reform implemented a system with nine years of compulsory public schools for all funded by taxes. This should facilitate education for every child, no matter the parents’ background, education, or financial status. A universal social security system had been built to cover sick leave, maternity leave, pensions, and so on, and different reforms had subsidized health care (Elmér, 1973). During the decades in the mid-20th century, commissions had also worked with proposals for a new Criminal Code as well as new laws for social welfare and social service. Social security was not connected to employment but covered all people living in Sweden, or at least it was the governing principle. Safety and security were regarded as something that concerned the social sphere and that it should be provided through the state or at least facilitated by the state.

Danish sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen (2002), famous for his explanation of different forms of welfare system, has talked about welfare systems as investment strategies, and of “child-centered social investment strategy,” with Sweden as an example. Thus, an evident example of the ideas behind universal welfare can be seen in child benefits. A means-tested child benefit was introduced in Sweden already in 1937, for poor families and single parents, and in 1948, it was replaced by a benefit to all children, no matter the parents’ income. The ambition was to support all families and promote good living standards for all children growing up. Of course, this was more important for poor families, but they did not have to ask for benefits, it was a right that everyone had (Duvander & Johansson, 2008). By having universal benefits, costs for administration and control was minimized as well as the risk of some people to be deemed as less valuable. This argument had a bearing also financially, as those with high income paid higher taxes and took part of the benefits (Elmér, 1973).

The public social security system was regarded as a “transferring system,” not as costs. Taxes funded the welfare system, and those with higher income, or who were rich by inheritance or by owning capital and land, paid not only
a higher amount but also a higher percentage in taxes, than poor people. The transferring system not only transferred welfare and funding between people but also resources across the country, which, for example, meant that poor rural areas got different kinds of subsidies. The governing idea was that all people in Sweden should have similar preconditions (Elmér, 1973). It also implied that the state should provide the necessary preconditions for a good living, security, and safety.

The dark side of the golden age

There is sometimes a tendency to romanticize Swedish crime and welfare policies. Sweden did get the world’s best social standard in many areas, but the ambition to eliminate social risks on which the Swedish welfare state was built also led to less favorable elements. The high-cost social reform and social engineering required that the non-productive elements, and social risks were effectively managed by the state (Spektorowski & Mizrach, 2004). The Swedish model presumed that people were subsumed in a collective and those who did not become objects for tangible integration efforts. Barker (2012) argues that the Swedish welfare state incorporates exclusionary and punitive mechanisms against those who are not fully incorporated in the social, economic, and political order.

Studies have shown that the formation of citizenship in the Nordic welfare states also excluded cultural elements of minority populations. This can be illustrated by the discrimination of the indigenous people, Sami, for large parts of the 20th century. In the Swedish welfare state, citizens should be productive and useful, and the nomadic Sami could make the most of the barren arctic landscape through reindeer herding (Kortekangas, 2017). However, reindeer herding had to be modernized and made more efficient, not by the Sami’s themselves, but by the state through nomad schools, primarily taught in the Swedish language (Kortekangas, 2017). As a result, many Sami people lost their language and identity. The state did not officially recognize the Sami as an indigenous people until 1977.

The aim to provide safety and equal opportunity to everyone was also shown not to be fully implemented. In 1967, spouses and scholars Gunnar and Maj-Britt Inghe published the famous book “The Unfinished Welfare,” where they highlighted shortcomings of the Swedish welfare state. Gunnar Inghe was a professor in social medicine and Maj-Britt Inghe was a social worker and researcher. Both had strong social and political engagements. The book was based on a study financed by the insurance company Folksam. It showed that despite economic growth and welfare expansion, welfare had not spread to all groups of society, and poverty was still prevalent. Inghe and Inghe argued that the ideology of welfare ought to include all citizens. The book highlighted crime as a problem but related it to contemporary ideas of societal problems and class divisions. Victims of crime were not discussed at all.
A welfare state for all, including incarcerated people

Socially excluded groups, such as incarcerated people and people with substance abuse and psychiatric problems, now began to organize themselves (e.g., Adamson, Grip, Modig, & Nestius, 2004). In 1970, incarcerated people formed a labor union, Sweden’s Prison Worker Union; it was only active for a year, but it still points at the spirit of the time (Edling, 2004). Comprehensive welfare reforms also included incarcerated people. One such example concerns the right to vacation from work. In 1963, the government had enacted a law that granted all workers a right to four weeks of vacation (prop. 1963:68). A few years later, in 1972, the Swedish Prison and Probation Services founded an open institution for prisoners’ vacation and recreation, Gruvberget, that still exists. Incarcerated people can still apply for a temporary two-week placement at Gruvberget to participate in a variety of courses focused on sports, parenting, and fishing. Gruvberget reflected an ideal where everyone, even incarcerated people, had rights, to, for example, vacation. The care of incarcerated people of that time shows that criminal policy and practice had a firm belief in offenders as human beings with a possibility to change. This was all part of the idea that people were equal and that crime was something that was caused by and affected society, where some committed crime and some became affected by crime, even if they were not yet labeled as “victims.” At this time, the victim concept was not used as it related to a victimized person and thereby was a way of individualizing the problem.

Overall, Swedish professionals, activists, scholars, and political leaders questioned the legitimacy of prison as an institution. In the first half of the 1970s, the government decriminalized a number of crimes, and the prison population decreased substantially (Tham, 1995). In a presentation to the Social Democratic Party Congress in 1975, the Swedish Minister of Justice, Lennart Geijer (1969–1975), stated that prison, on the whole, was so destructive to society that it should be replaced by other measures to combat crime (Geijer, 1975). Geijer was known as the “prisoners’ friend,” and his goal was to reduce the Swedish prison population from 4,000 to 700. Crime policy should, according to Geijer, focus on crime prevention measures in the broadest sense:

Our party’s future goals should lead to a society where crime policy plays a less important role than today. We strive for a solidaric society with a better distribution of income, housing, education, work environment, and culture. It should eventually lead to a reduction in crime.

(Geijer, 1975, p. 614)

This was not only rhetoric, but it was also evident in practice. The new 1965 Penal Code (SFS, 1962:700) led to broad reform of the Prison and Probation Services in 1973 and 1974, with a strong focus on non-custodial sanctions
and mandatory early release. At the end of the 1970s, those sentenced to life, the most severe punishment in Sweden, were released on an average of eight years (Philip, 1983). Geijer did not mention crime victims in his speech, yet he did point out that we must protect “people in society” against certain offenders who are dangerous and where today we have no alternative to prison (Geijer, 1975, p. 614).

Crime victim or the injured party

The care of offenders and the understanding of crime as a reaction to a social situation in the post-war era did not have any focus on individual victims of crime. As we saw in the introduction, the word crime victim was not used in the Swedish language until 1969. Other Swedish words have, however, been used for people affected by crime: for example, the judicial system uses the term the injured party (målsägande). To understand this concept, we must first give a brief overview of the Swedish courts and criminal proceedings.

Sweden is based on a civil law system, but with elements of common-law procedures. In Sweden, the preliminary investigation follows an inquisitorial model, that is, the suspect is not a party in the case. However, the trial has an adversarial character, where the opposing parties (the prosecutor and the accused) prepare evidence and argue their case, rather than the court. But the judge plays a more active role than in common-law countries. Criminal courts have three levels, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and District Courts. The courts are governed by the Parliament through legislation but are otherwise independent. The Ministry of Justice is responsible for civil law and criminal law. An edition of Swedish laws (Sveriges Rikes Lag) is published annually. The criminal process is divided into the preliminary investigation and the trial.

In criminal proceedings, the victim of the case is referred to as målsägande, which roughly translates to owner of the case. The official English translation is injured party. According to the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure (SFS, 1942:740) 20 Chapter 8 §, the injured party is the person against whom the offense was committed and who was affronted or harmed by it. Historically, Lindstedt Cronberg (2011) has shown how the injured party’s position in criminal proceedings has gradually weakened. The injured party had the first prosecution right; the state only brought charges for crimes where the injured party disregarded their right. In 1864, public prosecution became equal to private prosecution, and in 1948, public prosecution became primary. Since then, the injured party’s position has been weakened further, as a larger number of crimes has come under public prosecution and the criminal justice system has become more complicated and professional (Lindstedt Cronberg, 2011). Compared to many other countries, the injured party still has a strong position in criminal proceedings and can, for instance, submit evidence, join the criminal case as an auxiliary prosecutor, and ask questions
to the defendant and witnesses (Blixt, 2016). Over the last decades, we have also seen a number of reforms aiming to again enhance victims’ participation. Legislative reforms have also assigned the police and prosecution a number of duties toward the injured party, especially related to information and support, some of which we will discuss in this book.

**Law-and-order emerges on the political agenda**

The radical vision of the correctional system and the state’s all-inclusive ambitions also of marginalized people proved to be a parenthesis in history. There were also groups fighting against integration, which wanted to escape the state’s control of how to live their lives. Non-custodial sanctions came to be more used, but it did not replace the prison sentence to any higher degree. The ideas of an extensive decrease in the use of prisons from the early and mid-1970s were never implemented. There were also causes of concern on the horizon for Swedish social democracy. During the 1970s, the hegemony of the social democracy weakened, and other political voices became strong. One such example is that crime policy started to get politicized (Tham, 2001), primarily by the conservative Moderate Party which brought up law-and-order on the political agenda. The political left was, however, still hesitant.

Concurrently, the perception of crime was shifting. At the 1975 Social Democratic Party’s Party Congress, Mats Hulth, a social-democratic politician, talked about youth in urban areas and the policies that had been set in place to manage them:

> The order problem was used by the Moderates for a political campaign against the government, requiring powerful government measures. Law and order were the slogans of the Moderates. The Swedish Daily News and other conservative newspapers went out with a malicious campaign, which argued that fellow citizens could not go out in Stockholm in the evening without risking being raped, killed, or assaulted.  

(Hulth, 1975, p. 622)

Concurrently, some studies, in Sweden, as well as in other countries, suggested that rehabilitation had not been successful in reducing recidivism (e.g., Bondeson, 1977; BRÅ, 1977; Martinson, 1974).

In mid-1970, economic growth leveled off, and neoliberal ideas – that is, belief in free markets and limited state intervention – entered the Swedish society. As the Swedish economy slowed down, people from outside Sweden had a harder time finding work and labor immigration became regulated. In 1972 and 1973, emigration was higher than the immigration (Statistics Sweden, 2018b). Many people also came to Sweden fleeing war and oppression in Asia and South America (Statistics Sweden, 2004). Soon, the idea of the
“crime victim” would take hold in Swedish society, where the understanding of crime, society, individuals, and social problems was changing. Before we describe the first initiatives for crime victims in Sweden, we will present a brief history of Swedish women’s movement. There are some similarities and overlaps between the trajectory of the Swedish women’s movement and the victim movement, but, on the whole, they have been two different social movements with two different ideologies.

A women’s movement focused on labor and class, not violence

In the first decades following World War II, violence against women was not yet a social problem or a political question in the Western world; it was considered the domain of the private sphere. In the mid-1960s, shelters emerged from Al-Anon groups in the United States, where women who had been abused by husbands with alcohol abuse problems could seek refuge (Johnson, 1981). These shelters later opened their doors to abused women in general (Tierney, 1982). In the early 1970s, the first internationally recognized women’s shelters started to take form. In 1971, Chiswick Women’s Aid was founded in London, and in 1974, Women’s House, the first feminist women’s shelter in the United States, was established (Johnson, 1981).

In the early 1960s in Sweden, violence against women was not yet addressed as a significant problem; the women’s movement still primarily organized around labor issues. Issues related to gender, violence, and sexuality were brought forward only when they converged with class or labor issues (Elman & Eduards, 1991; Pringle, 2010). Alcoholism and mental illness were primarily used to explain severe and repeated violence (Wendt Höjer, 2002).

In the 1960s, the discourse on gender equality started to shift. As there was a considerable need for workers in the industrial sector, women were encouraged to enter the labor market. This was in line with the social-democratic ambitions about gender equality and politics started to be slightly in favor of women’s emancipation. Women’s strengthened position in the labor market improved the legal position of women, as well as the female body. In 1965, marital rape became illegal, and in 1968, eight women founded Group 8, a feminist organization in Stockholm. Group 8 was inspired by the U.S. anti-war movement and women’s liberation movement (Schmitz, 2007). Violence against women did not become a key issue for the women’s movement until the second part of the 1970s.

Victim compensation: a child of penal welfare

Victim compensation schemes were one of the first initiatives for victims of crime in the Western world. The idea of restitution was raised already at the end of the 19th century: for example, at an 1878 International Prison Congress
in Stockholm (Jacob, 1970). It would take until the 1950s, until Margery Fry, a British penal reformer, put the idea of victim compensation forward. Victim compensation differed from restitution in that the state helped victim pay for expenses that result from crime. Restitution involves payments made by the offender to the victim. The first victim compensation programs were formed in New Zealand in 1963, followed by England in 1964, and the United States in 1965. Victim compensation was initially framed as a social welfare issue. In the United Kingdom and New Zealand, early victim compensation sprung out of a campaign to reform prisons and abolish specific forms of punishment (Weed, 1995). In the United States, however, victim compensation quickly turned to being tied to criminal prosecution (Elias, 1983; Kim & Gallo, 2019). U.S. compensation also required cooperation with law enforcement and was funded by offender fees rather than tax dollars.

**Escape schemes facilitating more open forms of corrections**

In Sweden, there are a number of ways to be compensated for damages and injuries caused by crime. The offending individual is primarily responsible for paying damages. Private insurance plans may also in some cases cover them. If the offending individual cannot pay damages and if the victim does not have insurance, the victim is in some cases entitled to compensation from the state – so-called criminal injuries compensation (BrOM, 2017). To understand the origins of Swedish criminal injuries compensation, we need to take a short flashback to the 1940s.

In the construction of the welfare state in the 1940s and 1950s, tort liability for criminal acts was included in the Swedish Penal Code (SFS, 1864:11), yet most of the provisions were applicable, regardless of whether the act giving rise to liability was punishable by crime (Hellner, 1974). Tort law was seen as one way of addressing damages in a system of comprehensive welfare programs and private insurance plans. At this time, many private insurance companies had started to offer home insurance plans, which combined separate insurances against, for instance, fire and burglary. In 1943, the insurance company Folk-sam signed the first collective home insurance with the housing co-operative SKB. Some reform proposals even outlined far-reaching reform aiming to replace tort liability with social insurance (Hellner, 1974). In 1946, the Ministers of Justice in Sweden, Denmark, and Norway appointed an inquiry to review and recommend tort law (SOU, 1950:16). The 1950 report outlined:

Whether social insurance can replace tort law in questions of personal injury, depends on the extent of the benefits that the insurance provides. It may be possible to abolish tort liability for personal injury in most cases, if social insurance, which includes all accidents, is successful in giving
the broad sections a reasonably good protection against losses caused by
damage caused by third parties.

(SOU, 1950:16, pp. 167–168)

The report did, however, highlight the rehabilitative functions of paying
damages, which could “could be pedagogical appropriate means to bring
him [the offender] into insight into the meaning of his deed” (SOU, 1950:16,
p. 155). Yet the report expressed doubts against government compensation
funds for victims of crime and asked:

Why would someone who had been injured by arson receive state com-

pensation but not someone injured by lightning? And why should tax-
payers pay compensation for someone hit by a train when the driver is at
fault but not otherwise.

(SOU, 1950:16, p. 84)

Although the 1950 report was hesitant against state compensation for victims
of crime, it highlighted that there may be good reasons for the state to com-
pensate for damages caused by persons in or discharged from prison. As we
will see, these proposals were already in the works.

In the 1940s, a number of people submitted petitions to the Ministry of
Social Affairs about damages caused by pupils who had run away from state-
rerun reformatory schools for delinquent youth. In response to these petitions,
the government established so-called “escape schemes,” which provided
compensation for injury and damage caused by persons who have escaped
from prisons, reformatory schools, and alcohol rehabilitation centers (prop.
1948:87; SOU, 1977:36). In the bill underlying the reform, the government
argued that it was regrettable that people living close to an institution were of
higher risk than others to be subjected by crime:

It is evident that the danger of injuries of this kind is unusually high in
the neighborhood of such an institution, as is the case here. It may be
unfortunate if the population of the region in which an institution is lo-
cated should be at higher risk than others. It would be unfortunate if the
placement of an institution in a particular city would cause concern and
reluctance in surrounding communities.

(prop. 1948:87, p. 3)

The escape schemes were also part of a broader strategy to reduce surveillance
and facilitate more open forms of corrections. As reflected in the bill:

Another reason for reimbursement in the present case is that both prison
and other forms of care seek more open forms of care with less compulsion
and surveillance. Escapes will happen to some degree, but the inconveniences that arise are small compared to the benefits of an open system. (prop. 1948:87, pp. 3–4)

The government used the legal term *injured party* to describe those who had suffered damages and not the term *crime victim* as it was not yet a term in the Swedish language. Damages were referred to as “crimes,” however, the government also used other terms, including “inconveniences” as in the quote earlier. In fact, the damage did not even have to been caused by crime for compensation to be paid (SOU, 1977:36). Crime victimization was hence seen as one among many other social risks, including illness, traffic accidents, natural disasters, and unemployment, which should be addressed with a social insurance strategy (Kim & Gallo, 2019). The escape schemes were administered by the National Board of Health and Welfare (SoS) under the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs and funded by taxes. If private insurance did not cover the damages, the state mostly granted full compensation without means-testing (SOU, 1977:36).

**Means-tested criminal injuries compensation**

In 1965, the Swedish Parliament passed a new Penal Code (SFS, 1962:700), which excluded provisions on tort liability. The provisions on tort liability in the 1864 Penal Code continued to apply until a new Tort Liability Act (SFS, 1972:207) came into force in 1972. Around the same time, many private home insurance plans began to include *assault protection* (överfallsskydd) that compensated for damages that the offender could not pay. However, there were still gaps in the insurance coverage, especially in lower socio-economic areas. As a response to these discrepancies, the government established a new means-tested criminal injuries compensation scheme in the early 1970s under the Ministry of Justice (prop. 1971/72:1). The scheme was primarily established for those who could not get compensation from the offender, social insurance, or private insurance, and considered the financial situation of the applicant. Compensation was aimed at “socially harrowing needs,” including income loss and medical and dental care (prop. 1971/72:1, p. 15). A police report was required, and the victim was obligated to transfer the claims against the offender to the state. The government stated that the state could only recover claims from offenders “in exceptional cases” (prop. 1971/72:1, p. 15).

Some referral bodies pointed out that other injured groups also could be compensated by public funds: for example, victims of accidents. However, the government highlighted crime victims as a particularly needy group:

In comparison with many other injured groups in society, crime victims are generally in a particularly unfavorable situation, because they
often lack the opportunity to receive compensation from the person who caused the injury … I, therefore, take the view that for the category of injured people that crime victims represent there is a particularly significant need for complementary measures by society and that there should, therefore, be a possibility to pay compensation for those who suffer from personal injury by crime.

(prop. 1971/72:1, p. 16)

As we can see in this quote, the government now used the word *crime victim* (*brotsoffer*) to describe those who suffered damages through crime. When the government enacted the 1971 criminal injuries compensation scheme, the idea of the “crime victim” was still new in Sweden. In other countries, crime victims had become an established category, and support and interventions for this group had started to take.

**The idea of victim support is born**

The history of victim support goes back to the early 1970s in the United States and Europe. The interest in victims had started to grow at a time when society was understood as a risk society. In Sweden, however, risks were still related to aspects other than crime, traffic being one example (Österberg, 2002). In this section, we will situate the analysis of Sweden within a greater comparative context.

**A victim ombudsman and services to the poor**

In the United States, an awareness of child abuse and rape victims in the late 1960s and the early 1970s had led to a concern for providing services for all crime victims (Dussich, 1981). In the early 1970s, John Dussich³ developed the concept of *victim ombudsman*. The ombudsman idea originates from Sweden, which in 1809 established the office of the Parliamentary Ombudsmen (*Riksdagens ombudsmän*), working to ensure that public authorities and their staff comply with the law. Dussich learned about this government functionary in his travels to Sweden where his brother lived at that time (personal communication, July 14, 2018).

In the early 1970s, Dussich wrote a white paper about the victim ombudsman concept, which should act as a “combination counselor, confidant, press agent, and friend-in-court for the victim, just as the public defender looks out for the criminal” (The Arizona Republic, 1973, p. 37). The ombudsman would primarily work with poor people since the rich could afford lawyers. One argument for the ombudsman, similar to the arguments for the first victim compensation schemes, was that they could justify a more lenient
approach to offenders. According to Dussich, the “criminal might be given a better break if the police and courts knew his victim was being compensated” (The Arizona Republic, 1973, p. 37). In 1973, Dussich presented the paper at the First International Symposium in Victimology in Jerusalem, Israel, where it attracted much interest. The victim ombudsman concept was later renamed and expanded by Dussich as the victim advocate concept (first adopted in Fort Lauderdale, Florida) and became the basis for the first programs with this new label throughout the United States.

Around the same time, the first U.S. generic victim support centers had started to take form. Aid for Victims of Crime (AVC) in St. Louis, Missouri, is often recognized as the first victim support scheme internationally. Carol Vittert, a wealthy 27-year-old suburban housewife, founded AVC in 1972. Vittert wanted to do something to help people in an area “where nothing had really been done before” (Klemesrud, 1975, p. 17). Vittert and other volunteers went down to the police department and got a list of victims, drove to their homes, and asked how they were doing (University of Akron, 2002). The organization later hired staff that assigned cases, referred to them by the police, to volunteers, which offered a range of different services, including practical help, child care, help in contact with authorities, and support in finding a new home and job (Klemesrud, 1975). AVC primarily worked with the poor and that the people they met did not have “carfare, insurance, or medical insurance” (Klemesrud, 1975, p. 17). The typical victim was said to be an unmarried mother of eight who lived in public housing and had her purse snatched containing welfare checks and food stamps. Most victims, as well as volunteers, were African American (Klemesrud, 1975).

**Victim support and the expansion of the U.S. carceral state**

In the early 1970s, law-and-order was already established on the political agenda in the United States. Crime and welfare policy had begun to move in a punitive direction in the 1960s as a response to mid-century demographic transformations, the gains of the African American civil rights movement, and the threat of urban youth (Hinton, 2016). Already in 1967, President Johnson’s Report on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967) expressed concern that many citizens failed to report crime and refused to cooperate in investigations, which would lead to a number of initiatives for victims. The so-called “Tate Murders” also marked the end of the “idealistic” 1960s, where Charles Manson and his followers murdered the actress Sharon Tate, who was eight months pregnant, and four other people. Charles Manson became the representation of evil in U.S. society.

Vittert, AVS’s founder, also expressed concern that some people may start victim support programs “only to prosecute criminals.” She underlined that
the purpose of her program was “not to get tougher sentences for criminals—only to help the victims” (Klemesrud, 1975, p. 17). Carol Vittert’s prediction was right. U.S. victim assistance programs would soon forge close ties with law enforcement and prosecution efforts. Many studies have demonstrated how the U.S. victim movement came to serve as a way of justifying and promoting punitive ideals and law-and-order policies (Elias, 1993; Garland, 2001; Simon, 2007; Wacquant, 2009; Weed, 1995).

In the early 1970s, victim/witness programs spread throughout the United States, supported by the federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) under the Department of Justice. Many programs aimed at cutting costs, encouraging witness participation, making the system more efficient, and increasing conviction rates (Institute for Neighborhood Initiatives, 1980).

**The rise of European victim support schemes**

In the 1970s, the idea of victim support also started to take hold in some European countries. In 1974, the first victim support pilot scheme opened in Bristol, England. The scheme originated from a study group set up by the Bristol Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders (BARCO), to explore issues related to crime victims (Holtom & Raynor, 1988). Projects for victim were also developed by probation officers in the Netherlands in the 1970s and focused on conflict resolution (Wemmers, 1996). The decision to establish the Bristol group stemmed from an awareness that penal reform had neglected the “victim,” which could lead to resentments and a mobilization of law-and-order perspectives (Holtom & Raynor, 1988). The scheme collaborated with the local police, which provided names and addresses of victims. Volunteers often visited victims the same day offering to help and listen (Maguire, 1991). The Bristol scheme contained four elements, which became key ideals in U.K. victim support (Mawby & Gill, 1987):

- An independent organization that utilized community resources, with support of the police.
- An appointed full-time coordinator.
- Volunteers provided victim support.
- Functioned as an immediate crisis service agency.

The scheme found that traditional vulnerability criteria, such as age, socioeconomic status, or type of crime, as a basis for referrals were inadequate; hence, all victims should be offered victim support (Reeves, 1985). Future schemes would also lay great emphasis on reaching out to victims, rather than waiting for victims to contact them (Maguire & Corbett, 1987). The Bristol
initiative was suspended after a few months due to a lack of funding (Mawby & Gill, 1987), but it could still serve as an example. Victim support had become a concept in the United Kingdom, and similar schemes started to spread throughout the country. Unlike victim support programs in the United States, however, these schemes did not develop political aims or an interest in the offender and sentences (Maguire & Corbett, 1987).

**Conclusion and discussion**

This chapter has shown that with a homogeneous population, a strong state, and ideas about a comprehensive and inclusive welfare, there was little room for individual crime victims during the post-war era in Sweden. Crime was a social problem, not a problem for individuals. The lack of interest in victims of crime in Scandinavia may be somewhat unexpected. Why did their comprehensive welfare policies not specifically include victims of crime? It was, however, probably because of their welfare policies, not despite them, that Scandinavian countries developed victim support programs relatively late in a Western European context. Already at the first symposium of victimology, Reiman (1973) highlighted that a definition of the victim of crime requires the incorporation of liberal ideas, such as individual responsibility. Or else, there are no assignable crime victims. If we, as Reiman pointed out, assume that crime is a social phenomenon instead of an individual act, we will find ourselves with a meaningless distinction. Then there is no boundary between victims of crime and victims of disease or accidents, nor between victims and offenders (Reiman, 1973).

In the 1960s, victim compensation plans were formed internationally, initially targeting poor people. Elias (1986) argues that victim compensation plans, similar to other welfare programs of that time, was used to regulate lower-class disorder (Elias, 1986). In the early 1970s, the first victim support programs emerged in the United States, which also primarily worked with poor people. The conceptual idea of the “crime victim,” was also taking hold in Swedish society. In 1972, the Swedish government established a means-tested criminal injuries compensation scheme, aimed at compensating economically disadvantaged sections of society. As we will show in the next chapter, welfarist ideals also inspired the first Swedish victim support programs.

**Notes**

1 This can be compared to 18.5 percent in 2017 (Statistics Sweden, 2018a).
2 Al-Anon is a self-help group for the family and friends of people with alcohol abuse problems. The program was founded in the United States in 1951. The first Swedish Al-Anon group was registered in 1976 (Al-Anon & Alateen, 2018).
3 John Dussich was then a graduate student at Florida State University. He is now Professor Emeritus in Criminology at Fresno State University in California.
References


A case against rehabilitation and public spending

In the mid-1970s, social-democratic ideals still had significant influence but started to fade. Conflicts within the Social Democratic Party also started to become apparent, in particular between crime policy and drug policy, where some demanded the abolition of compulsory treatment, and some argued for stricter policies (Tham, 1995). In 1976, the social-democratic government lost the election to a center-right coalition. Concurrently, the criticism against rehabilitation as a key part of crime policy had grown stronger. Crime also continued to increase in Sweden: for example, violent crime rates increased from the 1960s and stabilized in early 1980s (von Hofer, 2011).

In 1977, a working group at the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ, 1977) presented the report *A new penal system, ideas and proposals*, which argued that effectiveness of rehabilitation lacked empirical support. The influential report raised debate and initiated a reform of penal sanctions. The center-right government continued to emphasize the importance of restricting the use of imprisonment, despite this, imprisonment increased, especially in relation to violent, drug, and economic crimes (Tham, 2018). The center-right government also put less emphasis on structural explanations of crime-sharpened policies on drugs (Tham, 2018). In 1982, all types of assault, including domestic violence, came under public prosecution. After the 1979 oil crisis, the center-right government announced that there would be no further economic expansions; all policy bills between 1980 and 1982 contained the need for decreased public spending (Lindvall, 2006).

Women’s shelters put victimization on the agenda

In the 1970s, several social and financial reforms, such as the expansion of public child care and the move from joint to individual income taxation, strengthened women’s social position and increased women’s participation in the labor force (Karlsson Sjögren, 2016). This ultimately facilitated a coming public debate on violence against women. The government put committees
to work, but the process was not that easy. In the end of the 1970s, many women came forward and claimed the Swedish welfare state had failed to acknowledge violence against women (Elman, 2001). As U.S. political scientist Amy Elman (2001) points out, the state’s emphasis on poverty, unemployment, and substance abuse masked the gender specificity of male violence against women. It was also impossible to know the extent of violence against women since assault statistics were not classified by gender until 1980 (Wendt Höjer, 2002).

In 1978, when the first women’s shelters were established in Sweden, women’s shelters were already widespread in the United Kingdom and the United States. In 1980, 150 women’s shelters existed in the United Kingdom (Johnson, 1981). By 1981, most states in the United States had domestic violence statutes, and domestic violence programs existed in nearly every metropolitan area (Ferraro, 1981). Swedish women’s shelters opened up the field of victimization and put victimization on the political agenda, but they focused on women only. Before we describe the first victim support centers in Sweden, we need to consider international developments in victim support.

The first national organizations for victim assistance internationally

While specialized services for victims of crime did not exist in Sweden in the mid-1970s, victim support in some other countries had grown to the point that national organizations started to take form.

National Organization for Victim Assistance

In 1976, the National Organization for Victim Assistance (NOVA) was launched in Fresno, California, bringing together 200 participants from 17 states (Weed, 1995). NOVA registered as an NPO, with elected members representing victim activists and experts from criminal justice, mental health, and victim services, as well as appointed members from the business sector (Weed, 1995). The conservative victim advocate Frank Carrington was one of the speakers at NOVA’s 1976 meeting. Carrington is considered by many in the United States to be “the father of the victim’s rights movement” (Dussich, 2015, p. 75). A few years earlier, Carrington had published the book *The Victims*, where he portrayed campaigns for offender rights and the abolition of the death penalty as the real causes of crime (Carrington, 1975). Carrington also came to serve on NOVA’s board of directors.

NOVA originally operated as a volunteer-run coordinating body and information center and held conferences funded by the federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) in Akron (1977), Minneapolis (1978), and Philadelphia (1979) (Maguire, 1991; Weed, 1995). By 1977, there were more than 100 victim/witness programs in the United States, many with
support from LEAA (Schneider & Schneider, 1981). Other victim programs had emerged without LEAA funding. In the end of the 1970s, the U.S. Congress abandoned LEAA, which was a big concern for victim programs. As Bob Denton, the former Executive of the Victim Assistance Program in Akron, Ohio, expressed in 2002, “One of the things that killed us in ‘76 and ‘77 and ‘78 was the death of LEAA. We just began to get money into victim programs when we killed ‘em.” Some programs were phased out and some were institutionalized in existing organizations, primarily district attorney’s offices (Sales, Rich, & Reich, 1987; Weed, 1995).

In 1980, NOVA hired its first staff member, moved into an office space, and began to develop standards for victim services (Weed, 1995; Young, 2008). NOVA also held its first annual conference in Portland. The annual meetings would become the organization’s most widely known function and the basis for funds and grants from the Justice Department and the National Institute for Mental Health (Weed, 1995). The organization also provided training for those working with victims and developed a policy platform for victim’s rights (Young, 1997). In 1981, NOVA hired Marlene Young to serve as the organization’s first executive director (Weed, 1995).

By now, over 500 victim support programs existed in the United States (Dussich, 1981). According to Schneider and Schneider (1981), four major types of program dominated the field of victim assistance:

- Counseling, emergency services, and social services
- Services assisting victims and witnesses in dealing with the criminal justice system
- Advocacy on behalf of victim’s rights during legal processing
- Prevention program targeted at prior crime victims.

NOVA would become a leader in victim advocacy and came to have an immense impact on policies and practices for victims of crime in the United States.

**Weisser Ring and National Association of Victim Support Schemes**

European national organizations for victim support started more or less parallel to the ones in the United States but on a different basis. In many cases, probation officers, who worked with offenders, took part in the initiatives, which put less emphasis on retribution or harsher punishment. The European ideas were more consensus-based and strived to solve conflicts, rather than polarize between offenders and victims. The same years as NOVA was formed, in 1976, a journalist founded Weisser Ring in Germany, which became the country’s largest victim support organization (Wergens, 1999). Weisser Ring offers a range of different services, such as counseling, financial
assistance, and help in contact with authorities. Police and social services refer victims to Weisser Ring. In 1979, Weisser Ring opened in Austria.

In 1979, the National Association of Victim Support Schemes (NAVSS) was formed in England and Wales with private trust funding and support from the Home Office’s Voluntary Services Unit (Simmonds, 2013). The main aim of NAVSS was to provide the best possible services to those members of the community who have suffered injury, loss, fear, or distress as a result of crime (Reeves, 1985). The basic principles of the organization were (Reeves, 1985, p. 683):

- The wide range of needs, including information, advice, practical assistance, support, or therapeutic intervention, suggest an equally wide range of services beyond the capacity of an individual helper or small agency.
- People are unlikely to identify themselves as “in need” and, in this country at least, police research indicates that few people are likely to ask for information or assistance even when they want it.
- Many of the services required already exist within local communities and these should not be duplicated.
- According to current thinking, crime is the responsibility of the whole community, and as far as possible, all sectors of the community should be encouraged to play a part in dealing with the effects of crime.
- It is not possible to determine from police records which victims will benefit from assistance until an offer has been made.
- It is not helpful to encourage a “victim identity,” and long-term dependency on special victim services could be counterproductive.
- Victims should be directed toward the normal services, which already exist in their communities as far as possible.

Each scheme had a coordinator, usually a volunteer, but later, this often developed to a paid position, which supervised the volunteers and ensured that it provided quality services (Reeves, 1985). The police referred victims to the schemes. NAVSS came to serve as an example for many other countries, including Sweden as we will see. About 30 schemes were included from the start, which had primarily been initiated by probation officers but were also started by voluntary organizations and the church (Holton & Raynor, 1988; Mawby & Gill, 1987). By 1980, the schemes, which relied almost entirely on volunteers and charitable donations, had more than doubled (Maguire, 1991). Victims were generally portrayed as those who have been affected by volume crime, such as theft and burglary (Rock, 2006). NAVSS had also hired its first staff member and director Helen Reeves, a former social worker and probation officer (Reeves, 1985). Reeves would serve as NAVSS chief executive for 26 years; to many, in the United Kingdom and internationally, “her name became synonymous with Victim Support” (Victim Support, 2005).
At the end of the 1970s, there were also a handful of projects in the Netherlands. A national organization, which was more closely related to the NAVSS in England, would not develop until 1984 (Wemmers, 1996).

**The efforts (and failure) to establish a national victim organization in Canada**

At the end of the 1970s, victim support programs with close cooperation with the police had started to take form in Canada. The largest scheme, Edmonton Victim Services Unit, was set up in 1979, where police and volunteers offered advice, crisis counseling, and practical help, mainly to victims of crime but also to victims of accidents and other non-criminal incidents (Maguire, 1991). In 1979, Canadian criminology scholar Irwin Waller attended the NOVA meeting in Philadelphia and came back inspired and “just like a man transfixed” (Rock, 1986, p. 109). In 1980, he joined NOVA’s advisory board (Rock, 1986). He was also a member of the Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada and acted forcefully in both the academic and the political fields (Rock, 1988). Rock has described Waller as “the Canadian moral entrepreneur” (Rock, 1988, p. 367).

In 1980, Waller persuaded NOVA to hold the conference in Toronto, Canada, which he organized (Rock, 1986). At the conference, Waller raised the idea of forming a Canadian Organization for Victim Assistance (COVA; Rock, 1986). But Canadian NPOs for victim support refused to unite in a national organization; many claiming that there were already enough NPOs that could absorb victim services (Rock, 1986, 1988). Representatives of women’s shelters claimed that a national victim organization would inflict losses on women. As one woman expressed at the 1981 conference:

> How much would we lose in a general victims movement when trade-offs are going to be made? I may sound paranoid but if an organization’s not focused expressly on women and their concerns the people who lose are women … How should resources be used in victim work? Women need all the resource they can get. Whatever resources are available should go to women so that they don’t get lost in the shuffle.

(Rock, 1986, p. 361)

Other women objected to the announcement of victim support as a new issue; as one woman stated, “Women are not new to victim assistance. So why all of a sudden is it a new issue? This is a fogging of the issue” (Rock, 1986, p. 361). There have been more attempts to form COVA, but none have succeeded. There is still today no national umbrella victim organization in Canada. Rock (1988) concludes that Canadian victim support programs were formulated by governmental and criminal justice agencies and grew, to a great extent, independently of substantial popular demand from NPOs.
In sum, by the end of the 1970s, victim support had become a phenomenon in the Westernized world. This can be illustrated by the formation of the World Society of Victimology in 1979 with members of different countries. Victim support had also spread to other parts of the world. For example, in Australia, the scheme Victim of Crime Service was founded in 1979 as a self-help group for families and friends of homicide victims (Rock, 2006). While many victim assistance programs had also come to the point that they united in an umbrella organization, Swedish victim support did not yet exist even as local centers. The seeds for the first program had, however, been planted.

The emergence of Swedish victim support

In 1978, the center-right government proposed one of the first significant reforms for crime victims – the 1978 Criminal Injuries Compensation Act (SFS, 1978:413), which offered state compensation for personal injury. The act merged the escape schemes and the criminal injuries compensation scheme under the Ministry of Justice and retained welfarist characteristics (Kim & Gallo, 2019). Similar to the 1948 escape schemes, the government argued that criminal injuries compensation could create support for open forms of corrections. In the 1971 bill, the government stated that:

An increased governmental responsibility for criminal injuries can contribute to a positive attitude towards the more open and humane prison services that the government in the broad agreement has decided upon.

(prop. 1977/78, p. 9)

Taxes funded the act, and restitution for victims of crime was seen as a state responsibility. The government explicitly stated that the state should exercise caution in requiring the liable party (skadevållare) to pay back the money, since a large “compensation burden” could hinder his or her rehabilitation (prop. 1977/78:126, p. 9). The 1978 act required a police report to request compensation. However, the bill underlined that, in some cases, the applicant may have reasonable grounds for not making a report:

The absence of the notification does not constitute an obstacle to the application being considered. The police can for example, without a report, have been informed about the crime and settled the case. Another practical case is that the perpetrator and the injured party belong to the same family. The requirement of police notification may also be waived in escape damages when it already from start is clear who is the perpetrator and the damage is more commonplace. It should then be sufficient for the damage incident to be reported to the appropriate institution. This is especially true when the liable party is enrolled in youth care school.

(prop. 1977/78:126, pp. 53–54)
The government used both crime victim (brottsoffer) and injured party (skadelidande) to describe those who suffered damages.

The first Swedish victim support center opens its door

In 1980, the first Swedish victim support center opened in Malmö in southern Sweden, where professionals, such as lawyers, social workers, and insurance clerks, worked together to support victims (Lindgren & Lagerbäck, 1996). One of the entrepreneurs behind that center was Björn Lagerbäck, a psychologist who later would be one of the key founders of BOJ. Lagerbäck has also later engaged other NPOs on the basis of his interest in victims’ rights and victim support: for example, the National Organization for Dependents of Victims Killed by Violence (Riksorganisationen för våldsdödade). His political engagement led him to serve for many years in the Malmö City Council representing the Liberals with a special focus on crime victim issues. In the 1970s, Lagerbäck had worked with empathy training for clients in the Prison and Probation Services, which included an understanding of the victim’s situation. Gradually, he came to think more about the victim’s situation and how Sweden could have such a progressive criminal justice system, without anything being done for crime victims.

The Malmö center started as a complement to public authorities. Lagerbäck has highlighted that the center would not have been needed “if the police and social services worked well” (Nydahl, 2008, p. 5). Lagerbäck has also described the origin of victim support as a “correctional treatment project” (Cloareq, 2018, p. 16), which he dissected in the retrospective interview. First, he took a structural approach and argued that victim support centers were needed to create legitimacy for the rehabilitative correctional policies and practices of that time:

I was aware that in the eyes of the public opinion, is the correctional system was driven too far, to say in its progressive development, there was a risk of a backlash if victims of crime were given attention at the same time. These two [victims and offenders] must be considered at the same time to get public acceptance.

Second, he took a more individualistic therapeutic approach, stating that victim support centers could play a key role in crime prevention and offender rehabilitation. As a psychologist in the Prison and Probation Services, Lagerbäck explored various methods of preventing crime and recidivism. He argued that victim support centers could help perpetrators understand the consequences of crime. If perpetrators could relate to their victims and see the pain they had caused, they would be less likely to commit crimes in the future. As he expressed, “when you talk to inmates in prison, no one is as upset as a thief who has had his or her prison cell burglarized.”
But where are the victims?

When the Malmö center opened, it had problems attracting victims to their services. In the interview, Lagerbäck highlighted that very few victims visited the center:

I remember when we opened in Malmö, in February 1980, I thought we would have to put up barricades for everyone that should be there; there had been so much media attention … One person came, a prostituted woman who came in and wanted to warm herself before she started to work.

Similar to the first victim scheme in Bristol England, the Malmö center ran as a project and ended within a few months. An evaluation of the center stated that victims had been reluctant to seek support by themselves (Löfström & Ståhlberg, 1988). Nevertheless, the media’s interest in the Malmö center anchored the idea of victim support and initiated a discussion. Victim support had also caught the government’s attention. A 1981 government report wrote about the Malmö center and suggested that:

Victims of crime (and this does not only apply to victims of sexual abuse, but generally) are given the opportunity to social, psychological, and other curative and practical help through the establishment of specific social units, which can complement police work. The kind of pilot scheme helping victims of crime that has been tried in Malmö police district.

(SOU, 1981:64, p. 247)

In 1982, the Red Cross opened another victim support center, in Stockholm, in collaboration with the social services and the police. Also, this project ended within a year, since it had not found suitable working methods to reach crime victims. A local police officer in Södertälje, Per Svensson, would, however, read a newspaper article about the Stockholm center, which sparked his interest (Säfström, 2018). A couple of years later, Svensson would start the first lasting victim support center. In the early 1980s, there was, apart from violence against women, still little public and political concern for victims of crime. Swedish victim support would not start to grow until the second part of the 1980s.

Conclusions

At the end of the 1970s, the first Swedish women’s shelters opened, which had a specific focus on violence against women and a political agenda on women’s issues in a broader sense. For other persons who had been subjected to crime,
there was no organized support. The solution to victims’ problems up to that point had been sought in an extension of general welfare provisions. If one had been sexually assaulted, the health care system could help with somatic and psychological health care. If a child was beaten by their parents, which from 1979 was considered a crime, the social service unit for child welfare could investigate and try to find solutions and interventions, not only for the child primarily but also for the whole family. None of these measures were taken because the person had been “victimized by crime” but because there was an unfortunate social, physical, or psychological situation for the person. There could certainly be a parallel police report and investigation with a focus on the offender, but no one focused on the injured party as a “victim” even if help was offered.

In the late 1970s, national victim support organizations were formed internationally: for example, NOVA in the United States and NAVSS in the United Kingdom. NAVSS came to advocate for improved services for victims, rather than more rights in the criminal justice system (Pemberton, 2009). Interestingly, NOVA and NAVSS did not know of each other’s existence until 1982 (Pointing & Maguire, 1988). In the early 1980s, Sweden was, as van Dijk (1988) has highlighted, still somewhat reluctant to supplement the existing welfare and health institutions with specialized services for crime victims. Even if crime victims were not yet on the political agenda, the necessary components for establishing NPOs for victim support had developed.

A political shift toward a more individualized society had started, ideas of victimization and victim support existed in other countries, and the progressive criminal justice system was questioned.

In 1980, a local victim support center was established in Malmö, by Björn Lagerbäck, a psychologist working in the Prison and Probation Services. While women’s shelters grew from the women movement and the struggle for women’s rights, victim support was legitimized by, on the one hand, a structural understanding related to rehabilitative and preventative systems of thought, which related to the collective tradition. On the other hand, victim support was founded on the idea that victimization is an individual problem, with the individual offender and victim, rather than society, as a starting point. This new way of thinking came to further prosper in the 1980s. The changes were not graspable in contemporary practice, but in a retrospective light, it is evident that the way of understanding society, as well as individuals in society and their problems, was under transformation. We will now show how it all developed.

**Note**

1. Note that in Sweden the term *liberal* refers to classical liberalism with an emphasis on free markets and limited government.
References


The state, the economy, and the organization of welfare

In the early 1980s, state budget deficits had increased in Sweden. In 1982, the social-democratic government returned to power and tried to take control of the situation by cutting spending and state intervention, and privatizing some state enterprises (Huber & Stephens, 1998). The universal principles of the Swedish welfare state also changed, with an increase in the proportion of people relying on means-tested relief rather than right-based welfare (Sunesson, Blomberg, Edebalk, Harrysson, Magnusson, Meeuwisse, Peterson & Salonen, 1998). The Swedish tradition of a strong state governance and a market economy shifted as the role of the state weakened. The market became stronger, and other actors got space, primarily private organizations in new forms and new forms of NPOs. The concept of “civil society” was not yet used but would later come to represent the organizational field that slowly started to get a more central role in the 1980s. Voluntary welfare work, which had been regarded as a distinct activity of concerned citizens, moved toward market-oriented service production (Sunesson et al., 1998).

Soon after the 1982 election, the social-democratic government announced a 16 percent devaluation of the Swedish currency (SEK), which was the last in a series of devaluations. As a result, Swedish exports increased, and the economy recovered, at least temporarily. Immigration also changed further in the 1980s, when many people immigrated from Iran, Chile, Lebanon, Poland, and Turkey (Statistics Sweden, 2018).

Emerging punitiveness and the expansion of penal law

By the 1980s, the Swedish progressive criminal justice thought and reforms of the prior decades started to move toward more punitive ideals. Swedish crime policy did slowly become more focused on criminal individuals rather than on criminality as a social problem. Penal law also expanded, particularly in areas related to drugs and violence against women (Tham, 1995).
Democratic Party now started to embrace a stricter drug policy and compulsory treatment (Tham, 1995). During the 1980s, generic victim support would get established on the political agenda and opportunities would arise for the voluntary sector. Violence against women was still primarily understood as a social problem, but gradually individualistic and psychological explanations emerged (Andersson & Lundberg 2001; Wendt Höjer, 2002). Gender was not an overarching consideration. Violence against women was regarded as a class conflict, not a gender conflict (Wendt Höjer, 2002, p. 111).

**International development in victim support**

Before we enter the scene of Swedish victim support in this period, we will give some examples of the contemporary developments in some other Westernized countries.

**National Organization for Victim Assistance and the U.S. Crime Victim Fund**

With the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the U.S. victim initiative’s emphasis on law-and-order accelerated. One of President Reagan’s first initiatives was to launch the “decade of the crime victim” and establish a Presidential Task Force on the Victims of Crime. Conservative victim advocate Frank G. Carrington was one of the proponents of the task force, who had a close connection to National Organization for Victim Assistance (NOVA). Conservative “tough-on-crime” rhetoric ingrained the 1982 final report of the Presidential Task Force on the Victims of Crime. Many of the Task Force’s recommendations were hence a call to expand the carceral state, rather than supporting victims.

In the early 1980s, many victim/witness programs moved from federal funding to state or county funding (Weed, 1995). At the end of 1983, the NOVA estimated that there were approximately 1,000 local programs operating at the local level. Most of these programs were housed in district attorneys’ offices and police departments (Sales, Rich & Reich, 1987). Many states also passed crime victim legislation. One example is the 1982 California Proposition 8 “Victim’s Bill of Rights,” which rolled back the rights of the accused and expanded victims’ rights. The bill gave victims a right to appear and express their views at felony sentencing hearings and parole hearings, so-called “victim impact statements.” Parents of Murdered Children (POMC) was one of the organizations that worked toward the passage of Proposition 8. Doris Tate, the mother of Sharon Tate, killed by Charles Manson and his followers (see Chapter 3), had joined POMC and was one of the first who made a victim impact statement at Charles “Tex” Watson’s parole hearing in 1984. Watson was known as Manson’s right hand and was serving a life sentence for his involvement in the Tate and other murders. By 1984, 14 state legislatures
had passed bills ensuring funding for victim and witness assistance programs (Karmen, 1984). Most programs were funded through penalty assessments on convicted people rather than taxes from the general public. To secure stable and consistent funding for victim/witness programs, the 1982 Task Force recommended the establishment of a federal Crime Victim’s Assistance Fund.

In 1984, Congress passed the Victims of Crime Act (VOCA). The Crime Victim Fund, which provides funds to states for victim assistance and compensation programs, was in the center of VOCA. The federal Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) that was founded in 1988 administers the fund. The Crime Victim Fund provided a steady stream of funding for victim assistance and enabled programs to spread throughout the country. From 1983 to 1990, the number of victim assistance program grew from 1,000 to 5,000 (Fattah, 2000), and many were accelerated and supported by the Crime Victim Fund.

By now, NOVA was a heterogeneous organization, held together by its board, which represented diverse strains and ideologies (Rock, 1986). NOVA often described itself as an organization focusing on matters affecting victims only and welcoming groups of all ideological and political persuasion (Maguire, 1991). Many leaders in NOVA, however, did undoubtedly promote and embrace conservative tough-on-crime ideologies and policies aiming at offenders, not just victims. NOVA’S first executive director Marlene Young has described President Reagan’s Task Force, as the victim movement’s “biggest turning point” and “greatest accomplishment” (University of Akron, 2002). Victim assistance was also increasingly becoming a professional discipline. For example, in 1987, NOVA adopted a Code of Professional Ethics for Victim Service Providers (Beloof, 2012).

International instruments and European national victim organizations

Starting in the 1980s, international organizations have developed several instruments for victims of crime dealing with issues pertaining to information, protection, compensation, and assistance. In 1982, the World Society of Victimology (WSV) set up a committee on Codes of Conduct for Victims at its fourth symposium in Tokyo and Kyoto (Mawby & Walklate, 1994). One year later, the Council of Europe ratified the European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes, which obligates states to compensate victims of intentional violent offenses resulting in bodily injury or death. Sweden signed and ratified that Convention in 1983 and 1988. In 1985, the United Nations (1985) adopted the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and the Abuse of Power. The WSV influenced and shaped the Declaration, and in 1987, it was granted consultative status with the U.N. (Mawby & Walklate, 1994). In the same year, the Council of Europe (1985) adopted a recommendation on the Position of the Victim in the Framework of Criminal
**Law and Procedure.** The United Nations and Council of Europe’s instruments served only as guidance to the member states. But they reflected new expectations on the state, including consumer demands on the criminal justice system (van Dijk, 1988).

In parallel, several national European victim support organizations were born. Many European countries followed the National Association of Victim Support Schemes (NAVSS) in England and Wales (Hall, 2010). The Irish Association of Victim Support in 1983 and the Scottish Association of Victim Support Schemes in 1985 (Hall, 2010). In 1985, the Dutch Association of Victim Support was founded, which together with NAVSS has driven much of the policy discussion on crime victims in Europe (Hall, 2010). The Dutch Association of Victim Support’s national office resembled NAVSS, by providing structure and standardization for the local schemes (Wemmers, 1996). Other tasks of the national office included marketing, initiating local schemes, editing a newsletter, and providing internal and external training (Wemmers, 1996). The Dutch Association does not only support victims of crime but also victims of disasters and traffic accidents.

In 1985, the Victims Compensation Act introduced a special compensation scheme for victims of violent crime in Belgium. The Act established a “Compensation Fund,” for victims of crime, financed by the Ministry of Justice’s budget and an “obligatory solidarity contribution” leveled on convicted offenders (van den Wyngaert, van Daele & Vandeginste, 2002). The Belgian fund would inspire the Swedish Crime Victim Fund that was established in 1994. Belgian Victim Support Flanders was officially established in 1991 and has since then had a significant impact on victim-oriented legal reforms and guidelines (Brienen & Hoegen, 2000).

European victim support organizations started to collaborate as the number of organizations grew. In 1987, a group of European national victim support organizations met to discuss common ideas and issues. The organizations then decided to meet annually. In 1990, the organizations established the European Forum for Victim Services (EFVS) an umbrella organization advocating on behalf of all victims of crime. BOJ has, since its establishment, been active in EFVS and collaborated with other European victim support organizations. EFVS adopted its constitution in June 1990 in Stockholm, Sweden. BOJ was one of the 11 founding member organizations. Björn Lagerbäck and Hans Klette were members of EFVS’s first Steering or Executive Committee. One of the founding goals of the Forum was to exchange experiences between member organizations to share best practice and knowledge.

In the second part of the 1980s, it was clear that victim support had become a success. There were over 5,000 victim/witness programs in the United States, and victim support schemes existed in almost every major city in Canada (van Dijk, 1988). In Europe, 300 victims support schemes were in operation in England and Wales, 50 in the Netherlands, and 200 in Germany (van Dijk, 1988). Victim support was also spreading to other parts of the world. In South
Africa, NICRO (2018), a large NPO specializing in crime prevention and offender reintegration, started offering services to victims and witnesses of crime and violence. In Sweden, however, things were just getting started.

**Sweden’s first lasting victim support center**

In November 1983, Per Svensson and Saara Beckman, a local police officer and a deacon, started a helpline for crime victims in Hovsjö in Södertälje around 30 km south-west of Stockholm. The Södertälje police were favorable to the idea and let Svensson and Beckman use a room at a local police department, and the church contributed with a phone (Säfström, 2018). Every Thursday night, crime victims could talk with a police officer or someone from the church. The support was anonymous and cases were not forward to other authorities (Liimatainen, 1983).

Svensson’s background as a police officer and Beckman’s from the church complemented each other and gave a broad base for the center. Similar to Lagerbäck, Svensson’s interest in victim support came from his work. As a policeman working with people in a local community, Svensson often met crime victims who, according to him, did not receive support or protection. The police did not have any possibility to support victims, and there was no other agency to which they could refer them. He often met people who needed someone to talk to but also advice on how to fill out insurance papers or write to the compensation board to get financial help (Säfström, 2018). The various stories that he heard woke his interest in finding a solution where victims could get help. As Svensson expressed in a local newspaper:

> As a police officer, you often have so much to do that you cannot stay with the victims and listen to their wishes. By opening this helpline, we hope that those who need to talk get in touch, either by phone or they come to the neighborhood police station.

(Liimatainen, 1983, p. 6)

In the interview in this project, BOJ current secretary-general Larsson talked about Svensson:

> It was the encounter with an old lady who had had her purse snatched and after that did not dare to go out for a walk that really caught his attention. He saw the consequences it had for her. And a lady who had a burglary in her basement storage unit, which most people apparently regard as a trivial matter, but to her, it was devastating, she felt really bad. From that, his thoughts and ideas developed.

Beckman grew up in a Christian sect, Kartanoism, in Finland. Beckman’s parents had turned to the sect in the early 1930s and started raising their
children per the manor’s doctrine (Sopanen, 2014). Beckman left the sect in 1949, when she was 22 years old (Sopanen, 2014) and then immigrated to Sweden. She would later write a book in Finnish about her difficult childhood, which was characterized by violence, threats, and abuse, named Did they know what they did? (Tiesivätkö he mitä tekivät?) (Beckman, 1999). In Södertälje, Beckmann was active in the church as well as in different NPOs: for example, the local women's shelter. At the Södertälje victim support center, Beckman handpicked the first volunteers for the helpline from the different church communions (Nyström, 1984). Beckman highlighted that the helpline “in no way should be seen as a competitor for the women’s shelters,” but “rather a complement” (Liimatainen, 1983, p. 6).

Svensson confessed that he “had stolen the idea” from a visit to the Stockholm victim support center, which had opened one year earlier as a collaboration between the Red Cross and the police (Liimatainen, 1983, p. 6). When he came back, he contacted the Red Cross, which were not able to participate (Ruhde, 1983). Since Svensson was engaged in the church, he then proceeded to contact Beckman who go equally interested in the idea (Ruhde, 1983).

Similar to the Malmö and Stockholm center, the Södertälje center had difficulties building interest for their services. Just a few weeks after it opened the local newspaper stated that the helpline had problems reaching out to victims. By now, the helpline was open three days a week and had 16 volunteers, of which four were priests. Despite the strong commitment, the helpline had only gotten in contact with five victims in the first three weeks. According to Svensson and Beckman, these five victims had major problems because of their exposure to abuse and bag snatching among other things. Svensson and Beckman knew that there was a great need for the helpline, the question was just how victims could find out that it exists (Ruhde, 1983). Svensson and Beckman put up posters, sent information sheets to hospitals, district nurses, and other organizations, but the calls were still sporadic (Nyström, 1984). They also opened a Sunday helpline in 1984, but since the “response was non-existent,” the center closed it down after less than three months (BOJ Södertälje, 1984, p. 2). The story about the Södertälje center, and possibly BOJ as it exists today, could hence have ended here. But it did not. Svensson and Beckman were patient enthusiasts, and in the fall of 1984, they decided to switch their approach.

**Immigration, integration, and victim support**

The first change meant that Svensson and Beckman converted the more openly organized helpline to a membership-based NPO (ideell förening). From the Swedish tradition of popular movements, membership-based NPOs could get public funding from the municipality, which was one of the reasons Svensson and Beckman established the center in this form (Lindgren &
Lagerbäck, 1996). NPOs have a high degree of freedom in using the association grants, which gives them the possibility of engaging in political advocacy. In 1984, Svensson stated that:

We want people to join us and become members. We need many passive [members] who believe in our cause. Although the organization is small, it costs money.

(Nyström, 1984, p. 14)

The Södertälje Municipality supported the center over the years to come by: for example, financing two apartments that the center used as an office and as a victim shelter. In the beginning, crime victims stayed over in the support persons’ home. As late as 1988, two girls stayed in a support person’s home for six weeks, while waiting to get their own apartment.

The Municipal Immigration Bureau and its responsible authority, the Immigration Board, also supported the center’s work: for example, with grants and interpreters. Municipal Immigration Bureaus had been established in the 1960s and were one of the first public initiatives in Sweden, on both state and local levels, to actively work to integrate immigrated people (Sarstrand, 2007). In the 1960s, Södertälje had a high influx of foreign labor. Södertälje became a multicultural city. Starting in the mid-1970s, many Syrani/Assyrians came to Sweden, primarily from Turkey, and concentrated in Södertälje, Hovsjö in particular, where the local victim support center was located. When the Södertälje center was initiated in the early 1980s, there were 3,000–4,000 Syrani/Assyrians in Södertälje and the municipality had launched extensive programs to combat segregation, unemployment, and lack of education among this group (Forshällen, 2015). The integration problems in Södertälje, and the costs associated with tackling them, received attention at a national level. There was also an emerging tendency, especially among politicians in the conservative Moderate Party, to start emphasizing the importance of defending Sweden against “immigrant criminals” or large numbers of immigrants in general (Forshällen, 2015).

The Södertälje center paid particular attention to immigrated people. Already at the first meeting in November 1983, the “secretary was asked to write to the local radio that they include a weekly report on the center and that we also turn to immigrants.” At the next meeting, in January 1984, a representative from the center promised to contact the Immigration Bureaus and make sure that the “business card from the center is translated and sent to the various immigrant associations.” In 1986, the center received 5,000 SEK from the National Immigration Board, which made up 20 percent of the center’s total income. In 1989, the center received 20,000 SEK from the local Immigration Board to create information material in different languages, including Assyrian, Arabic, English, Finnish, Polish, Turkish, Serbo-Croatian, and Spanish.
We could also show examples how the center worked to weave immigrated people into a narrative about what it is to be “Swedish.” for example, by informing “immigrated parents” of their children’s behavior in society. In January 1989, the board discussed the center’s engagement in a youth center in Hovsjö at a board meeting, which according to them “was a difficult task since a gang of 20 immigrant youth sabotages the activity there.” The board also highlighted that the gang “had a bad reputation and are aggressive.” Just a few months later, minutes from a staff meeting reported that “Immigrated parents, Assyrian, has gotten information in the church about their children’s behavior in society.”

We will contact victims instead of waiting for them to contact us

The second, and most important, change, according to Svensson, was that “we contact the people who are affected instead of waiting for them to contact us” (Nyström, 1984, p. 14). The Södertälje police sent victims’ names, address, and phone number to the helpline volunteers but excluded the names of the suspect or other confidential information (Nyström, 1984). Beckman highlighted that “most people they called have been very positive” that they “have been grateful that someone cared about their problems” (Nyström, 1984, p. 14). The Södertälje center’s new model became a success. In 1986, the center had 69 incoming calls and 9 visits to the center. Four years later, in 1991, incoming calls had increased to 778 and visits to 154 (see Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1 Victim Support Södertälje’s outgoing and incoming calls from 1986 to 1991.
The Södertälje center came to serve as the model for BOJ’s local victim support centers, with volunteers who provided victim support and a coordinator for managing the work. Operating shelters for victims did, however, not become part of BOJ’s mission and practice.

At the end of 1984, the Södertälje center was the only organization in Sweden offering support to victims of crime, but Svensson felt that change was imminent. In a local newspaper, Svensson stated that:

It is the spirit of the time. In mass media, the person who committed the crime has usually been written about and got to speak. I think it is about to be a change to this now.

(Nyström, 1984, p. 14)

While the first Swedish local victim support centers established in the mid-1980s had not met the anticipated interest, women’s shelters had proliferated and come to the point that they united in an umbrella organization, the National Organization for Women’s Shelters (ROKS) in 1984. The formation of a national umbrella organization is a sign of a social movement’s success, growth, and maturity (Enander, Holmberg & Lindgren, 2013).

The birth of a national Swedish victim support organization

As early as 1982, Per Svensson from Södertälje visited Björn Lagerbäck in the city of Malmö. The Malmö center had closed down in 1980, but Lagerbäck continued to work on issues related to crime victims. In 1985, he opened a new victim support center in Malmö. When the Södertälje center managed to stay open, Svensson and Lagerbäck began to discuss victim support as a national issue and the ideas for an umbrella organization started to take form. In parallel, more victims support centers were being established. In 1986, centers were founded in Trelleborg, Sundsvall, and Borås.

Two passionate entrepreneurs with a new vision

When Lagerbäck and Svensson decided to work together, the development of a national umbrella organization took off. Their area of focus was slightly different. In the retrospective interview, Eva Larsson described how Lagerbäck brought in his experience as a psychologist and argued for professional support for victims, while Svensson aimed for support provided by volunteers, from one human being to another. In the retrospective interview, Lagerbäck said:

My ambition was that it would be a professional organization at the bottom … Per [Svensson] initially emphasized volunteer support persons, and we did not have that. So, I can say that I had this professional orientation, and I mean that.
The different constituents were not an issue between the two men who later became BOJ’s founders. In the interview, Larsson pointed out that their discussions were friendly, and they remained open to different approaches. In the retrospective interview, Lagerbäck highlighted that victim support volunteers were doing good initial work and that Svensson was right in involving them. Lagerbäck and Svensson often discussed who built the first Swedish victim support center. It is not entirely clear. Lagerbäck opened the Malmö center in 1980, which did not endure, while Svensson established the Södertälje center in 1984, which still exists today. Depending on how one sees it, one or the other was first.

Lagerbäck and Svensson had the essential characteristics of institutional entrepreneurs, as described by Battilana (2006). They were passionate and had a keen interest in raising awareness of victim support as an issue. They also had strong social positions based on their own experiences and backgrounds. Therefore, they could relate to the other actors in the field and know what kinds of actions made sense (e.g. Fligstein, 1997). This would later give BOJ a social position and legitimacy.

In the very beginning, victim support was no real “field” that caught interest or gathered people. Lagerbäck and Svensson successfully gained their position through their work in pushing the crime victim issue onto the political agenda. In doing so, they did not position victims in opposition to offenders but claimed that victims should have the same access to support as offenders. In a quote that illuminates the core of BOJ’s ideas, Lagerbäck says:

“It is a task for society to protect its citizens against enemies as criminals, just as we have a defense against alien enemies. And if society fails in that, it has a moral responsibility to give victims of crime restoration in different ways, and then there is a need for professionals. Because, as I see it, as an offender, you have access to all kinds of professionals when you are in prison or on probation. Thus, you should also have access as a victim. Well, of course, I realize that there is also a need for support from a fellow-human; there is a certain value in being there, not because I am a psychologist, but because I care for you. And that is the Good Samaritan.

Lagerbäck and Svensson’s ideas of equal access to services related well to the Swedish welfare model way of thinking, but they also pointed out deficits in the welfare system. Apart from Lagerbäck and Svensson’s enthusiasm and endeavors, there also had to be a societal interest.

Two murders and the ideal evil offender

In 1986, Olof Palme, the Swedish social-democratic prime minister, was shot on an open street in Stockholm, a murder that has yet not been resolved.
U.S. legal scholar Jonathan Simon (1998) has pointed out that a single incident, such as the assassination of a leading politician, can become a vehicle for the transformation of perspectives, debates, and opinions as well as have a strong influence on politics and legislation. Indeed, some argue that the assassination put the nail in the coffin for Swedish social democracy as it had been practiced since the early 20th century.

Two years after the assassination of Palme, in the summer of 1988, a family of three was killed in the so-called “Åmsele murders” by Juha Valjakkala and his girlfriend Marita Routalammi. Valjakkala had just been released from prison in Finland. Valjakkala executed a father and his 15-year-old son in a cemetery on their knees, begging for their lives. The young couple chased down the mother, who had gone looking for her family, beat her to death and cut her throat. Murders are relatively rare in Sweden, and triple-murders are extremely rare, why some people argue that the Åmsele murders changed our perceptions of offenders, society, and crime (e.g. Lagercrantz, 2006). For proponents of a more punitive crime policy, Valjakkala was the perfect image of a psychopath offender. Still today, the media describes the murders as one of the most merciless acts in Swedish history.

Aina Fahlander lost her daughter, son-in-law, and grandson in the Åmsele murders. Similar to Doris Tate, whose daughter was murdered by Charles Manson and his followers in the United States, Fahlander became engaged in victim support organizations Sweden. Fahlander’s approach was, however, very different to Tate’s. While Tate worked for tougher crime policies, Fahlander became a strong anti-violence advocate with a strong emphasis on reconciliation. One year after murders, in 1989, Fahlander would speak at BOJ’s conference, and she was invited back to the 1990 conference. After Fahlander died of cancer in 1991, BOJ archived her obituary; tributes to her work; and a transcript of one of her speeches, which indicates a close relationship between her and the organization.

In Fahlander’s speech, she reflected on the murders and what could have caused them. Interestingly, offending people only play a minor role in the speech. Instead, Fahlander blames societal change where profit, money, prestige, and commercialism have gotten more and more space. As she states in the following quote:

In my grief and despair, I have contemplated what our society has become when human beings can perform such a terrible act. Where are cause and effect, where are conscience and responsibility, have people forgotten or suppressed these things. Morale has been eroded, we see and hear it daily. Money governs, and almost everyone complains, but how do human beings feel inside, are they happy, are children happy in our society … What has happened in our society that affects people.

Fahlander encouraged the audience to “confront the old men those who only think about money – the profit” and to “fight for a better way of living, where
the human being and nature is in focus.” Fahlander mentions Valjakkala and Routalammi, whom she refers to as “human beings,” “young people,” and “afraid.” In the following quote, she talks about Valjakkala, who then yet had not admitted his guilt in the murders:

A person that does not acknowledge what he has done, what do we call them – yes, cowardly. If you are cowardly, then you are afraid. If you look at an animal, for example, a dog – it has been beaten in his upbringing and it is scared when in a pressed situation can jump on you and bite. I think people also react like that – if I am cowardly, afraid, and in a pressed situation, people can be dangerous for their surroundings.

Since 2001, Åmsele church holds an annual reconciliation mass to honor Fahlander’s work.

**Government reports and new victim legislation**

At the end of the 1980s, crime started to become firmly established on the political agenda. Crime policy partly shifted away from rehabilitation and prevention of crime, and in 1989, “just deserts” became a leading principle in the Swedish Penal Code (Tham, 1995). In parallel, the interest in crime victims increased, and the government commissioned the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ) to do two reports on victim support.

In the late 1980s, several party motions of the center-right coalition focused on crime victims, and the Liberal Party was especially active (Tham, 2001). The government also proposed a number of laws specifically addressing victims of crime. The Act on Counsel for the Injured Party (SFS, 1988:609) was passed in 1988. Under the provisions of the Act, the injured party, primarily victims of severe sexual abuse, may, in some cases, be represented by a counsel during the legal process. Since 1988, victims of a number of criminal acts have a right to compensation for violation of personal integrity (kräkingsersättning). In the same year, the injured party’s right to information was strengthened: for example, about the right to a counsel.

**A quest for internal and external legitimacy**

Lagerbäcks and Svensson’s formation of BOJ was possible through a quest for external and internal legitimacy, by providing external information to decision makers at high political levels while providing internal information to local centers. Based on the archival documents and the interviews, it is clear that Lagerbäck held the outside contacts and wrote letters to ministers and other external parties, while Svensson focused mainly on the internal work of the organization and establishing local centers. The archive does not reveal any external demands about the need for victim support. It was consistently
BOJ’s founders that both highlighted crime victim’s needs and demonstrated potential ways of meeting them.

In the archive, there are copies of letters sent to many influential decision makers: for example, to the Ministry of Justice and the Minister of Justice, the Ministry of Social Affairs, the National Head of the Police, the two largest cities in Sweden, and all members of the Swedish Parliament. In 1987, the Parliament had discussed measures for victims of crime. The Ministry of Justice also claimed that existing government, municipalities, and counties were responsible for this group. Just a few months later, in April 1988, the director-general of BRÅ Marianne Håkansson was interviewed in a television show, where she expressed the need for non-profit initiatives that would complement state interventions. In response, Lagerbäck sent a letter to the Minister of Justice demanding that the Ministry of Justice further investigate possibilities for volunteer-based victim support. A week later, BOJ sent the next letter to the Ministry of Justice. This letter called for the education of professionals and state authorities on crime victims’ reactions and needs and ended with an invitation to visit BOJ. Lagerbäck also wrote a letter to the Minister of Justice, Laila Freivalds, about HIV testing of men suspected of rape.

This correspondence is the first documents in BOJ’s archive. The letters do not directly deal with BOJ, but they show that parallel to when the organization was formed, the founders pushed victims support as an issue in relation to government policy. Most letters to public bodies in 1988 follow the same structure. On the one hand, they include a demand relating to some central issue, and on the other hand, they include information about BOJ. It is evident that the letters were part of a campaign aiming to increase political interest in victim support – a way of seeking external legitimacy. Interestingly, much of this work was done before the organization was formally established.

The first document about BOJ comes from another source, the Södertälje victim support center in 1988, where Svensson writes about the umbrella organization in an information sheet:

Today it consists of an interim board, with representatives from Malmö, Trelleborg, Borås, and Sundsvall. We have been working on statues and other procedural issues since last year. We intended to have our first meeting on May 6. It got moved to September 5.

(BOJ Södertälje, 1988, p. 5)

The information sheet shows that Lagerbäck was chair of the interim board, with Svensson as vice chair. Directly after the first meeting, Lagerbäck wrote a letter to the National Police Commissioner, Nils-Åke Åhmansson, inviting him to be an ex-officio member of BOJ’s national board to represent the National Police Board (RPS). Lagerbäck also wrote to all members of Parliament to inform them about BOJ. In the letter, he stated that BOJ would intensify the work of providing adequate assistance to people who have been
victims of crime. Through the letters, victim support centers became known to decision makers, and the organization was anchored in both a political context and the police organization.

BOJ also had external support from the very start. Two days after BOJ’s first meeting, the leader of the conservative Moderate Party, Carl Bildt, visited the Södertälje center to show his support. Bildt had initiated the visit to the Södertälje center himself out of curiosity. According to the Södertälje member magazine, Bildt had underlined the importance of voluntary-based services. In 1991, Bildt would become the Swedish Prime Minister in a center-right government, which would propose significant reforms for crime victims. In October 1988, the Minister of Justice Laila Freivalds visited the Södertälje center. The Södertälje center’s member magazine wrote an article about the visit and stated that

Yes, it is actually true. We are very much noticed in society at the moment. The 26th of October is the time for the next visit. Then our new Minister of Justice came to visit. The goal is to establish victim support center throughout the country, she thought. She did not see any risk in allowing NPOs to take care of such heavy social work.

(BOJ Södertälje, 1989, p. 9)

Parallel to this, BOJ aspired to create internal legitimacy with the few centers that existed. The interim board was anchored in the local centers, but formally, BOJ did not exist yet. In the interview, Lagerbäck expressed that some of the local centers voiced concerns about it being too soon to form a national organization, but Svensson was eager to get it going. In September 1988, BOJ sent a letter containing information about the national organization to the eight local support centers that existed at the time. The letter stated that four centers were represented on the interim national board. It also included information about BOJ’s first national meeting, which was to be held in May 1989. In February 1989, Lagerbäck left his position as chair of the interim national board to become the coordinator for EFVS. Svensson acted as chair until the first national meeting, which he organized.

**Candles and church bells: a special day for crime victims**

In addition to politics and the police, BOJ had a close connection to the Church of Sweden, which supported BOJ both financially and ideologically. They also contributed with facilities and people throughout the country that engaged in building up victim support centers. Many of BOJ’s events were linked to the church and were highly emotional. On January 30, 1989, the Archbishop of the Church of Sweden expressed his support for BOJ and the idea of victim support. As a result, Lagerbäck wrote a proposal to the national meeting in which he suggested that BOJ had a dialog with the Church of
Sweden. He also proposed an annual national offertory whereby funding would be raised for local victim support centers’ work.

On February 22, 1989, BOJ held a public event for crime victims in Stockholm. The event would later become the International Crime Victim Day. Several European countries observe the European Day for Victims of Crime annually on February 22. According to Lagerbäck, he got the idea on a night train between Malmö and Stockholm. As he describes in the Swedish Crime Victim Fund’s newsletter in 2004:

Martin Luther King’s words woke me up one night on the train between Malmö and Stockholm and thereby initiated the establishment of the International Crime Victim Day, which was manifested February 22, 1989.

“The tragedy in the world is not the brutality of the evil people but the silence of the good people,”

This first event manifested the key components of BOJ activities; it was public and aimed toward an understanding of crime victims’ situation, it was well anchored in central institutions in society, and the message was emotional and meant to touch the audience.

At the event, the well-known Swedish actress Anita Björk read the short story *To kill a child* by journalist and writer Stig Dagerman. The story was published in 1948 by the National Society for Road Safety and is based on parallel stories. One story is about a child who was asked by his mother to pick up sugar from the neighbor. The other story is about a man who was heading for an excursion in his car in a radiant mood. Their paths crossed and the child got overrun by the car and dies. Both the man and the mother wished that they had acted differently, but now it is all too late.

The choice of story at BOJ’s event is interesting for a number of reasons. To begin with, it is an accident, a traffic accident that does not implicate a crime. Issues related to safety have long been related to traffic, rather than protection against crime. Swedish historian Eva Österberg (2002) has addressed the increased traffic during the post-war era as one of many factors behind the establishment of the concept of crime victim in Sweden. The perception of traffic as a more significant threat to personal safety is still present in Sweden today. The American sociologist Nicole Rader (2017) found, in a study of how Swedish parents talk with their children about safety, that they speak more about traffic safety than the risk of crime.

Another interesting aspect of the story is that there is no “evil” perpetrator. Reasoning about crime in other contexts often builds on a typical image where the victim is good and the perpetrator is bad. In Dagerman’s story, the situation, the accident, is in focus, which, in line with BOJ’s approach, has emotional and psychological consequences. Finally, it is a strong emotional story. To create emotional understanding for the
“suffering victim” was a crucial component of BOJ’s efforts to build interest for victim support. There were no hard facts in the form of figures or demands from real crime victims that supported the claims brought forward by BOJ. Rather and above all, BOJ’s accounts conveyed emotional, psychological, and humanitarian feelings.

BOJ’s event was supposed to be a one-time event. However, shortly afterward, in March 1989, Lagerbäck submitted a motion to BOJ’s first national meeting, suggesting that a manifestation against violence in society and for solidarity with victims of crime should be held annually. In the interview, Lagerbäck said that he launched the idea internationally around 1990. As Lagerbäck explains:

From the beginning, I was the one who brought it up, as an initiative in Sweden, that we should have a day for crime victims. And then, I was a member of the European Forum for Victim Services […] So I took it to the board [of the European Forum for Victim Services] and I gave a very beautiful description of how we did things in Sweden, that we lit candles and had the church bells ringing, and they thought it was wonderful. It was not that comprehensive, but that is how the International Crime Victims Day was created.

Lagerbäck also describes how it was not just the idea as such but also the specific day that got a European anchorage.

**Building a national victim support organization**

In May 1989, the Malmö, Sundsvall, Södertälje, Trelleborg, and Borås centers formally established BOJ at its first national meeting. However, the entrepreneurs often refer to September 5, 1988, as the date BOJ was founded when they had their first joint meeting and decided to establish an umbrella organization. In connection with the first national meeting, BOJ held a conference, which included a session on crisis processes and an exchange of experiences with the Ministry of Justice and the police. The meeting adopted BOJ’s first bylaws and operational plan. According to the first bylaws, BOJ goal was to (1) stimulate the establishment of a collaboration between local victim support centers with the task of giving help and support to individuals who have been subjected to crime and (2) work for a better response to crime victim’s needs and rights through a social debate.

**A victim support center in every police district**

One of BOJ’s first goals was to inspire the creation of new local centers. BOJ’s aim was to create centers in each of Sweden’s then 118 police districts.
As soon as the national organization BOJ was founded, Svensson started traveling around the country encouraging people to start new local victim support centers, with support from his colleague at the Södertälje center, Saara Beckman. Svensson visited local police organizations, where he lectured about victim support. Svensson spoke about his background as a policeman in close contact with people in the community, which gave him legitimacy, and the police often offered administrative resources and facilities for victim support.

BOJ’s archival documents from 1989 mainly discuss various practicalities within the organization. There are also newspaper articles written by the entrepreneurs to raise awareness of victims’ needs and about the opening of new local victim support centers. Even if we cannot find documents on external claims for victim support, there was external support for the organization. There were also signs of external activities and support, especially from RPS. In 1989, RPS published a handbook on how the police could support the establishment of victim support centers. The project was carried out by Per Svensson and was to a great extent built on experiences in the Södertälje victims support center. In the handbook, RPS stated that:

RPS wants to promote the establishment of victims support centers and has therefore taken the initiative to create this tutorial. It is intended to, in particular, to be a means of assistance and a guide for police authorities who wish to support the establishment of victim support centers.

(RPS, 1989, p. 6)

The handbook also voiced that the newly appointed social-democratic Minister of Justice Laila Freivalds had expressed support for victim support center.

In 1989, BOJ started to collect statistics from the local centers. BOJ recorded all contacts with victims, which meant that the same victim could be counted several times. During 1989, the number of local centers had increased to 13, which had a total of 4,204 instances of contact with victims, by mail, by phone, and through visits to the centers (BOJ, 1989). Moreover, the local centers made visits to the victim’s home and accompanied victims to court, as well as to other authorities, such as the police and social services. In 1990, after the handbook was published, RPS employed Svensson to travel around the country to give information and encourage people to start local centers, but he also acted in the name of BOJ. The goal to form new centers disappeared already in 1990 when BOJ’s focus shifted to raising the quality of the existing centers. In the 1990 annual report, BOJ states that the national board was not “striving to create as many centers as possible; rather, the centers that already exists and has recently been formed should be as high quality as possible” (1990, p. 1).
**Fellow-human support**

In the 1980s, the idea of organized psychosocial support had developed. New support groups took form: for example, groups for people in crisis connected to specific incidents, such as accidents and disasters. Toward the end of the 1980s, SoS published guidelines for how psychological, psychiatric, and social support should be arranged after major accidents and catastrophes had affected the community (Nieminen Kristofersson, 2002). The organizational landscape in the field of social support was still mainly based on public administration and governmental organizations at the national, regional, and local levels. Most NPOs that started during this period were based on people forming popular movements to fight for their own rights or well-being (Meeuwisse & Sunesson, 1998). BOJ differed from these organizations in the sense that its focus was to organize help for others. Sweden did not have a tradition of establishing new NPOs acting on behalf of vulnerable groups. These kinds of organizations existed to some extent in connection with the Church of Sweden and other religious bodies, but they were usually part of the public welfare system.

From the start, BOJ was founded on the idea that they could offer victims a different kind of service than the state. For example, unlike many government agencies, BOJ does not keep any files or records on the people the local centers meet and support. BOJ also clearly distanced itself from being “professionals” by using the term *fellow-human support* (*medmänskligt stöd*) to describe the services that the local centers provide. Previous studies have found that BOJ’s local support centers highlight their “fellow-humanness” and time resources as key distinctive features of their work (Jägervi, 2016; Ryding, 2001, 2005).

One of the main themes of BOJ’s 1989 conference in Södertälje was “someone to talk to.” As NAVSS, BOJ did not focus on a particular group of victims, aside from the wide category of volume crime (e.g., Rock, 2004). As Eva Larsson, BOJ’s current secretary-general expressed in the interview:

> In the beginning, I think it was more about having someone to talk to. It was like, being able to process, and crisis and trauma, as we say, that was the main focus, it was seen as the most important support victims needed. And you also saw that it was lacking completely in society … It was more what is called volume crime that was in focus, so it was assault, purse snatching, that type, and theft, and that type of crime.

**Funding and the first stakeholders**

When BOJ was formed in 1988, the Södertälje victim support center provided a space for the organization and supported BOJ financially. Before BOJ’s first meeting in 1988, the founders applied for government funding for national
office and training for local victim support centers, which was denied. Lagerbäck also wrote a letter to Minister of Justice, Laila Freivalds, requesting that those who supported crime victims should receive state compensation at the same level as laymen in the Prison and Probation Services. He stated that it was unequal if those who support offenders receive compensation but not those who support victims. Lagerbäck did not only request funds, but he also had a proposal for a national crime victim fund that would be financed by a fee of 50 SEK paid by those convicted in criminal cases. We will return to the crime victim fund in the next chapter of this book, but again, we can see how BOJ elevates its questions and ambitions to a political level, which gives the organization external legitimacy.

The archival material from 1989 reveals that BOJ applied for funding from a wide range of organizations, including farmers’ associations as well as all bishops in Sweden. In 1989, the Ministry of Justice gave BOJ a grant of 500,000 SEK to support a project manager, the establishment of new centers, and education. Beginning in 1991, the Ministry of Justice doubled this grant to 1 million SEK. The 1989 grant was supposed to be a one-off grant, but the Ministry of Justice continued to support BOJ until 1994 when the government established the Crime Victim Fund, which, since then, has been BOJ’s major source of funding.

From the archival documents, it is clear that BOJ managed to convince other organizations to pay for its costs, insurance companies in particular. This was essential, as BOJ had little funding. Trygg Hansa, one of Sweden’s largest insurance companies, became involved early in the development of BOJ. Already in 1986, Trygg-Hansa had contributed to the local Södertälje center, with an electronic typewriter and printing of information material. Since private home insurance plans often included both property and assault protection, insurance companies often came in contact with victims of crime. Insurance companies hence had an interest in organizations to which they could refer victims for support. Over the years, Trygg-Hansa has, for example, supported BOJ trainings. Another insurance company, Skandia, where Lagerbäck worked, also contributed to BOJ’s activities. Skandia also supported the local centers: for example, in 1990, it housed the Kristianstad center in southern Sweden (BOJ Kristianstad, 1990).

**Uniting the national organization**

In 1990, 28 local BOJ victim support centers were in operation. Some centers, such as the Södertälje center, were expanding quickly, while others were having problems reaching victims. One example is the center in Trollhättan in western Sweden that in the 1990 annual report stated that the “frequency of calls has been low” (Trollhättan Victim Support, 1990, p. 1). One of the Stockholm centers hoped that:
Their volunteers would continue their work, which after a calm start-up period will be significantly more intense as our activities become known in the police, social services, and health care, and the public.  

(Södermalm Victim Support, 1990, p. 2)

BOJ now entered a phase where the founders were working to bring the organization together around a shared set of ideas: for example, shared education and logotype. Most archival documents from 1990 include internal information, but there are also letters sent to the Minister of Justice and other politicians with information on how the number of local victim support centers was growing. The archival documents show that by this time, BOJ had become a consultative body on crime victim–related issues and policies. In 1990, the government invited BOJ to submit feedback on an inquiry about an international youth exchange. In its response, BOJ underlined the importance of legal protection and support for youth victimized abroad. BOJ highlighted its support as a resource for Swedish youth. In a very short period, BOJ had been established and taken place in a political context (BOJ, 1990).

**A shared and national education**

Education became a central issue in the establishment of BOJ and the local centers. In September 1989, BOJ reached an agreement with a study organization, SV, about the education of support persons in the local center. SV is the Center Party and the Liberals study organization. The board decided that all education should be organized by and provided through SV. Through the agreement, BOJ established a shared and national education for the local centers. SV prepared the education material and accounted for the cost of the education through study circles under its auspices. In an undated document from 1990, BOJ confirmed a deal with SV on a variety of training sessions related to psychology, how to start a local victim support center, and how to be chair and treasurer of a local victim support center.

In 1990, BOJ and SV held a two-day course for study circle leaders in the local centers (BOJ, 1990). SV also created materials to use in volunteer training: *People in Crisis* (BOJ, 1990). In several documents from this time, BOJ highlighted that volunteers should undergo continuous assessment during training.

In a speech at the 1991 national conference, Svensson underlined the importance of education:

> A very important issue is education, as I see as a survival issue. It should go as a red thread through the organization, from the local centers, through the districts, eventually, and to the central education … We have also developed a new study plan, an in–depth education for support persons,
and we have done that in collaboration with SV … The support persons are the organization’s face outward … The support person’s efforts spread like rings on the water, and there must be positive rings, then it will be a positive reception.

At this point, Eva Larsson, who later became BOJ’s secretary-general, worked at SV. She was very pleased that BOJ early had a focus on education and says, “a tribute to BOJ that saw the importance of education at an early stage.” In 1991, Larsson participated in two of BOJ’s central trainings as a representative from SV. In the interview, Larsson talked about how she got involved in BOJ through her work at SV.

Immediately when I started my job [at SV], we were going to come up with a joint study plan. And then I became very engaged and to me, BOJ was a blank sheet. I had no knowledge that such an organization existed at all. I thought it was a very exciting organization so I go very engaged in the collaboration, in their questions, I participated in many of their conferences. So over the years, we had a lot of cooperation.

When we asked about how SV came to be responsible for BOJ’s education, she said, “Well, Per met someone from there. They were both in Södertälje, so it was more of a coincidence … SV was involved in social issues.” We can thus see how the founders anchor BOJ through their knowledge and networks. The founder’s connection to representatives of other organizations and their ability to be able to communicate easily with them has been essential for BOJ’s development.

**The life buoy: a fitting, but recognizable, symbol**

In 1990, BOJ adopted a common logo for the organization. However, it was not a simple process. The first local victim support centers had different logos; the Malmö center had a picture of a bird with a broken wing, and the Borås center had the deacon symbol, and the Södertälje center had a white and red life buoy. The life buoy was a suitable symbol for BOJ since the Swedish word for *life buoy* (*boj* in Swedish) was the same as the organization’s acronym. As Larsson expressed in the interview:

I think, yes, I think that Södertälje had sketched out this logo from the beginning. And Södertälje had a bit weight and pondus … I think many people saw this symbolism between lifebuoy [boj in Swedish] and victim support [BOJ]. Which was like a safe one.

But there was a problem: the insurance company Trygg-Hansa’s logo was also a life buoy, which was very similar to the life buoy logo BOJ intended to adopt. This led to many formal and informal discussions (see Figures 4.2 and 4.3).
BOJ had a good relationship with Trygg-Hansa. After minor adjustments of the logo, BOJ sent an application to the Patent and Registration Office to register this life buoy as its logo in May 1990. The application contained an approval from Trygg Hansa.

In BOJ’s first publication National Information (Riksinformation), Per Svensson informed that there was a decision about the symbol, the life buoy:

Finally, we have got our new symbol. There have been many twists and turns, especially with Trygg Hansa. Now it is necessary, and I hope everyone can stand behind this symbol, despite all the suggestions. It is important that we get the right feeling and this is ours. It is also good that we can help spread it. The centers that have not yet adopted any symbol could well take this one.

The life buoy remained BOJ’s logo until 2013. The first newsletter also discussed an agreement with SV. It recommended that the local centers “point
at the model that was developed in Södertälje,” and there were agreements on both financing and a study plan. In addition, the newsletter included a description of the establishment of centers and funding. The themes discussed in the first issue of the newsletter reoccurred in the following three numbers published in 1990. It also included reports and in-depth themes.

**Backlash or step toward independence?**

Already in the construction phase, BOJ suffered its first backlash. In 1989, three social work students visited the newly established center in Gävle, after which they reported three local police offices (Gävle, Sundsvall, and Södertälje) to the Parliamentary Ombudsmen. The students had found out that the police gave information about victims of crime to the local BOJ centers. The work of all BOJ centers built on referrals from the police. The students wanted the Parliamentary Ombudsmen to review this procedure in relation to the Secrecy Act (1980:100). This led to many years of discussion with the Parliamentary Ombudsmen, as well as within BOJ. The discussion is still, after almost 30 years, brought up from time to time within BOJ. Parallel with the Parliamentary Ombudsmen’s investigation, Svensson sent a letter to the police authorities about his work with victim support, as a representative for RPS. Svensson wrote that he has been employed by RPS to establish victim support. He wrote:

> It is important to point out to police authorities that the government should not run victim support, but the responsibility rests on a voluntary basis. However, the government’s support is very important, especially in the development phase.

The letter itself, and the fact that it is archived by BOJ, shows a close connection between the police and BOJ. Svensson concluded the letter with:

> Finally. The need for this activity [victim support] is beyond doubt. The response from police authorities has been great because those working in the police have for a very long time drawn attention to the need for support and assistance to crime victims. “At last, something happens for this forgotten group” is a statement I often hear when I have been out in the country. This is not a mere flash in the pan, but a beginning movement for support and assistance to crime victims.

From the Parliamentary Ombudsmen’s investigation, it appears that the Gävle police department had not yet referred any people to the local victim support center. In Södertälje, the police department referred 497 people to the local victim support center. The Sundsvall police department followed a procedure where they asked people if they wanted contact with the local victim support
center before they referred them. The Parliamentary Ombudsmen stated that there was substantial support for crime victims, in the police and Parliament, but also that:

The question that is relevant in this case is the condition under which information from a police report can be sent to a victim support center. I hereby would like to begin by affirming that victim support centers are NPOs and not authorities, which, among other things, means that the regulations in Chapter 14 in the Secrecy Act about the handover of confidential data between authorities does not apply. The right of those who are active in a victim support center to access confidential material is thus essentially the same as that of any individual.

In the statement, the Parliamentary Ombudsmen criticized the way in which the police had referred victims to the local victim support center in Södertälje. The Parliamentary Ombudsmen argued that the law did not allow the police to send information about crime victims to the local centers routinely. The Parliamentary Ombudsmen stated that they could not find any practical need for such routines, as the victim should decide whether they want contact with the victim support center or not.

The Parliamentary Ombudsmen did hence recommend the model applied by the Sundsvall police. At the same time, the Parliamentary Ombudsmen noted that the police was obligated to give out police reports since they are public documents. But some documents must be reviewed in relation to the Secrecy Act. Thereby, the Södertälje center’s idea that the police should continuously and routinely pass on victims’ name and contact information to victim support centers was not possible. At least not in that shape.

As a result of the Parliamentary Ombudsmen’s statement, the police adopted new procedures and had to ask victims whether or not they wanted to be referred to the support center. The police also had to review each case to determine if the referral could inflict harm and they had to remove the name of the offender. The police should then register what had been referred and created procedures for different kinds of cases. Local victim support centers could not bring police reports from the centers, which was problematic since many support persons contacted victims by phone from home. Only support persons who had completed BOJ’s education and been approved could be support persons.

Svensson now wrote a letter to the local centers claiming that RPS had expressed support for the police’s referrals of victim’s contact information. In his letter, he reproduced and commented on the Parliamentary Ombudsmen’s statement. Svensson reminded that some police reports were not confidential. He also highlighted that the victim support centers went beyond the Secrecy Act since support persons give a confidentiality pledge. This is, however, regarded as a skewed interpretation of the
Secrecy Act, as it covers government authorities and not NPOs. The representatives for BOJ argued as if they were officials from an authority, roles that they were used to from their former professional practices. But support persons in an NPO are not bound to secrecy in a legal sense. Svensson countered the Parliamentary Ombudsmen’s statement as a general opinion and explained that:

The Parliamentary Ombudsman has no direct experience of our work. At the time of reporting a crime, it is usually difficult for victims to decide whether or not they need help. If there is no immediate dialogue about the emotional distress, there is a risk that this can remain untreated. This can, in the long run, lead to a lower quality of life, as psychological resources are bound to the untreated trauma.

From the letter, we can see that while BOJ took responsibility for informing all the local centers about the Parliamentary Ombudsmen’s statement, it did so in resistance, as indicated by its diminishing of the statement. Svensson concluded the letter by noting that the Parliamentary Ombudsmen did not direct any official criticism against the three police authorities. He also wrote to the police authorities and communicated his interpretation.

BOJ’s 1991 annual report described the Parliamentary Ombudsmen’s statement as a problem for the local centers. Svensson and Lagerbäck met in person with the Minister of Justice, Laila Freivalds, and tried to convince her to work to change the law so that referrals could be made from the police. At the same time, Svensson and representatives from the local centers held discussion with the National Police Commissioner, Björn Eriksson, in response to the Parliamentary Ombudsmen’s statement. BOJ’s lobbying was, however, unsuccessful, and the law was not changed.

The Parliamentary Ombudsmen’s statement threw a spanner in the works of BOJ. The idea of victim support had a great opportunity to gain attention quickly, but the practice in which victim support should be given met resistance. The direct meeting with victims was not as simple and obvious as the general idea of providing support. The police were divided on the issue, and its procedures varied throughout the country. The statement also threatened the logic that BOJ was built on, that volunteers at the local centers would contact victims referred by the police. This idea was fundamental for BOJ, as it never emphasized victims as actors. BOJ saw the volunteers as actors and the victims as objects for their efforts and support. When the police suddenly had to ask victims for their permission before sending their contact information to BOJ, the victims became acting subjects. This was not the entrepreneurs’ projected image of victims. If victims were not referred, the whole idea of the organization was hence threatened.

The Parliamentary Ombudsmen’s decision started a discussion between BOJ and the police, both nationally and locally on how the police could
pass on contacts to the centers, and more generally, how the collaboration between the centers and the police should be organized. From working in very close cooperation with the police, victim support centers became more detached and independent, at the expense of access to victim referrals. This could be seen as a backlash, but it could also be regarded as a step in the process of becoming an independent organization. Even if it did not follow the plan.

**Relationship with women’s shelters**

Before we move on to the next period, we must revisit BOJ’s relationship with women’s shelters. In the 1980s, women’s shelters were the only “competitors” to the victim support centers. There were, however, in general, important differences between women’s shelters and victim support centers. Women’s shelters had a clear focus on women, while victim support centers were engaged in all victims. Based on this “open-to-all” approach, victim support centers could argue that they were needed. This stance also distinguished BOJ from the women’s shelters umbrella organization, ROKS. ROKS grew dramatically in the 1980s. In 1985, ROKS received a government grant from SoS of 60,000 SEK to cover costs related to trips and administration. Just five years later, this grant had increased to 1.2 million SEK.

Internally, ROKS had, from the start, been divided between two perspectives: one that viewed violence against women as a social phenomenon and wanted to help individual women, and one that viewed it as a gender-political issue and wanted to change society (Nilsson, 2009). By the end of the 1980s, ROKS has, however, indisputably an organization influenced by theories that viewed men’s violence against women as an expression of male superiority. In 1990, ROKS organized a talk where radical feminists scholars Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon from the United States spoke about pornography, gender inequality, and sexual subordination in front of a Swedish parliament committee (MacKinnon, 2006; Waltman, 2011). MacKinnon and Dworkin publicly criticized the Swedish notion of equality for being based on male standards and stated that “if men don’t need it, women don’t get it” (MacKinnon, 2006, p. 99).

Larsson notes that women’s shelters were a forerunner of BOJ, but that BOJ differed from women’s shelters in that it supported both women and men:

> At that time [the end of the 1980s], there was a clear divide, because the shelters were still more if I can say, feminist … almost a bit militant feminist. So there was a big difference between women’s shelters and victim support centers in the beginning.

There was also a resistance to men in some women’s shelters, as they meant that women who had been subjected to violence needed to be in an environment
without men. In BOJ’s perspective, these women’s shelters did not want to collaborate with victim support centers. Larsson also stressed that some women’s shelters could not “talk with” or “be in the same room as” men. She highlighted that ROKS and some individual women’s shelters had made clear that BOJ did not have the competence to support abused women. Lagerbäck echoes Larsson’s remarks:

Go back to the 1980s, when I came with cases that concerned the women’s shelter, and I knocked on the door and [name excluded] refused to let me in so that I would not infect their premises; no men could be there. There has been some relaxation in the collaboration in [city excluded] — for example, where there [is] a joint victim support center and women’s shelter. Then there are those, what should I say, more militant women’s shelters, where men are real damn cucks.

As Lagerbäck points out, BOJ’s relationship with ROKS and women’s shelters has varied over the years, which we will come back to. There have also been varying relations in varying local contexts. Some victim support centers and women’s shelters collaborated closely in the 1980s. In 1990, in Södertälje, the integration between the local victims support center and the women’s shelter had reached a point where the two organizations merged. In the 1990 annual report for the Södertälje center, we can read the following:

Over the years the women shelter has joined BOJ [Södertälje] in the work to support victims, which has been very positive for those seeking help. The women shelter has many years of experience in helping abused women. The women’s shelter has kept its opinion-forming part. The office furniture has been transferred to BOJ [Södertälje].

Accompanying the merger, the women’s shelter formed a freestanding advocacy organization (Södertälje Women’s Shelter, 1990). The merger was controversial. The joint organization could, for instance, not seek membership in ROKS.

Conclusions

In the 1980s, the belief in crime prevention and rehabilitation that has formed the basis for or crime policy throughout the 20th century was questioned. Social policy started to lose its dominance over crime policy, and in 1989, “just deserts” became a leading principle in the Swedish Penal Code (Tham, 1995). Concurrently, NPOs became requested in new areas, and private organizations gradually entered the field of welfare provision. There was also a general awareness of the possibility of providing and organizing actions for psychosocial support for abused women and for people affected by crises.
The first lasting victim support center was established in 1984 in Södertälje. Similar to the Malmö and Stockholm centers, the Södertälje center had difficulties building interest for their services. But it managed to stay open by contacting victims instead of waiting for them to contact them. In the 1980s, both women’s shelters and victim support centers formed national umbrella organizations: ROKS for women in 1984 and BOJ for all crime victims in 1988. BOJ’s founders generated interest by uniting their ideas with the mindset of the church, police, corrections, and insurance companies in its own “victim support logic,” which they spread through education and lobbying. BOJ did not compete with any other organizations. It was similar in its structure to an NPO but took its task from other organizations; the main idea was to add something new. On these grounds, BOJ could grow without competing with other organizations, even if there was no explicit demand for the service they offered. ROKS was BOJ’s only competition, but initially, there was no collaboration between the two organizations on a national level. No documents in BOJ’s archive from the first years deals with women’s shelters. Meanwhile, on a local level, some women’s shelters and victim support centers worked closely together. BOJ’s relationship with women’s shelters would change over time.

Victim support had now become recognized internationally. While victim assistance in some other countries, such as the United States, had already moved toward becoming a professional field, BOJ emphasized its voluntary character and “fellow-humanness.” Moreover, crime victim funds supported by fees paid by convicted people had been established in both the United States and Europe. The Swedish Crime Victim Fund was founded later, in 1994, which we will explore in the next chapter.

In the end of the 1980s, victim support had become a political issue that the government needed to address. The government enacted number of crime victim laws, including a right to compensation for violation of personal integrity. Wergens (2014) has highlighted that this compensation, which is provided independent of other injuries and which aims to restore the dignity harmed by crime, complies with human rights standards. In the following chapters, we will show that a human rights perspective also has influenced BOJ’s work to a great extent.

**Notes**

1. The Swedish National Police Board (RPS) was the central supervising authority for the police from 1965 to 2015.
2. There is no word conveying the meaning of this term in English, roughly it translates to *fellow-human support.* The term implies an emphatic symmetrical relationship where the supporter and those being supported share the fact of being “human.”
3. According to the fundamental law in Sweden, everyone has access to official documents held by the public authorities. The Secrecy Act limits this right when it, for example, concerns documents that should be protected due to personal integrity for the people it concerns.
References


From a welfare state to a welfare society

In the early 1990s, the Swedish welfare state underwent a remarkable transformation. Already in the early 1980s, a trend toward decentralization and privatization had begun, but it escalated in the turn toward the 1990s, a decade that Hort (2014) has called “the decennium terrible.” Taxes had funded the strong welfare state through a progressive income tax system. This system faced a backlash in the 1980s when increasing numbers of people questioned the high tax pressure from the government. At the beginning of the 1990s, an agreement between the Social Democrats and the Liberals introduced a new tax system where the fundamental idea was that everyone should pay 30 percent of their salary as an income tax. This decision came just before a significant recession that hit Sweden and further tested the rationale of Swedish crime and welfare policies. Unemployment rate skyrocketed from approximately two to eight percent. The new income tax system and the recession limited the government’s ability to fund activities in the public sector (Hort, 2014).

In 1991, a center-right coalition took office, and the conservative Moderate Party formed the government together with other the center-right parties. The short-lived populist right-wing party New Democracy also entered the Parliament with 6.7 percent of the votes. New Democracy exited the Parliament just three years after in 1994. It would take until 2010 until a new populist far-right party entered the Parliament. During their time in power (1991–1994), the center-right government boosted the transformation from a welfare state to a welfare society (Hort, 2014) by introducing several cuts in the Swedish welfare state in conjunction with, as we will see in this chapter, significant reform for crime victims. Swedish welfare policy started to shift from a large public sector toward a model where NPOs and private organizations, to a great extent, delivered social services. Letting NPOs complement the governmental sector was a way for the government to respond to privatization demands and obtain more resources in times of fiscal difficulties (Lundström, 1995). Newly established right-wing think tanks, inspired by ideas and texts from the United States, purposely worked to include the concept of “civil society” in the public discourse (Hort, 2014; Trägårdh, 2008).
In the beginning of the 1990s, the government decentralized regulations for the municipalities so that they would become more independent from the state. Simultaneously, the government transferred a number of welfare issues to the municipalities, which were now free to use other providers for giving services with public funding. This opened the door for a number of new organizations to enter the field, including private for-profit organizations, as well as NPOs. Private tax-funded schools, hospitals, and elderly care came into the public scene and parallel the government embraced NPOs. Several “hybrid-organizations” between public and voluntary work developed, such as shelters for abused women.

In a 1993 governmental report (SOU, 1993:82), social scientists illustrated Sweden’s long tradition of social movements and other kinds of engagement in “civil society,” even if the concept had not been used before. In study after study, it was shown that Sweden had a high level of social capital, membership, and activities in NPOs, despite the high proportion of public funding (Trägårdh, 2008). Thereby the idea of engaging volunteers in doing work for civil society was given a base and anchorage within Swedish society, although the forms for it would turn out to be different from the traditional forms in Sweden. NPOs were of great interest for policymakers as they represented civil society and gave connotations to positive humanitarian values. The organizations that started to establish in this period were not mainly based on public interest as social movements (Meeuwisse & Sunesson, 1998) but had more in common with private enterprises. Civil society should, together with private companies and the local public bodies, mainly the municipalities, build the welfare society in what the right-wing parties in their election manifesto had called: a **New Course for Sweden**. Concurrently, immigrants fleeing the war in former Yugoslavia further contributed to a more heterogeneous population.

The Swedish voluntary sector expanded significantly in the early 1990s. As we will see in this chapter, BOJ was no exception. Another example is the alcohol and drug abuse treatment program Alcoholic Anonymous (AA), which became highly influential both as a self-help group and in private treatment facilities (Hort, 2014). Between 1985 and 1994, the number of AA meetings multiplied nine-fold from 100 to over 900 (Bergmark, 1995). Bergmark (1995) has highlighted that AA’s rapid expansion during this period can be related to a societal context where the “individual” and “individualism” have become important concepts. Before the 1980s, the governmental and the church-related organizations had almost exclusively provided alcohol treatment.

**“Criminals should be in prison, you should dare to be out”**

Parallel to a changing social welfare landscape in Sweden, rehabilitative penal policies and practices were questioned. Crime victim issues also became firmly established on the political agenda and the government
enacted numerous laws to support this group. The conservative Moderate Party explicitly polarized victims and offenders – a new approach in Sweden at the time. In the 1991 election campaign, the Moderate Party used slogans such as “Criminals should be in prison. You should dare to be out” (Heckscher, 1992). In the Swedish budget proposal of 1992–1993, the center-right government portrayed the “crime victim” as legitimizing the existence of the penal system (Andersson, 2002). Demker and Duus-Otterström (2009) suggest that it was the loss of a collectivist conception of society in Sweden that fed into a situation where crime no longer was seen as an offense against society, but rather as an aggression of one individual against another. Given this perspective, policies become more focused on individual “crime victims.” According to Demker and Duus-Otterström, the conservative Moderate Party led the transformation to a more victim-centered criminal policy.

Violence against women as a product men’s superiority

The women’s movement lost a bit of momentum in the 1980s, only to be revitalized in the early 1990s, when all political parties from left to right declared themselves feminist. Gender equality policy focused increasingly on individual rights and solutions rather than unequal gender relationships (Tollin, 2011). The political discourse around violence against women was an exception, as it moved beyond individual explanations to highlight unequal gender relations and power (Holmberg, Enander, & Lindgren, 2015). In 1992, ROKS added the word feminist to its bylaws (Nilsson, 2009).

In 1992, Margareta Hydén defended her doctoral dissertation in social work, the second dissertation on violence against women in Sweden, Woman Battering as Martial Act: The Construction of a Violent Marriage. One of Hydén’s critics was theology scholar Eva Lundgren, who criticized Hydén for leaving out a feminist perspective and a gender power analysis (Lundgren & Mellberg, 1993). Lundgren had a close connection to ROKS, and in 1993, she was appointed as professor of sociology with a focus on violence against women.

In 1993, the center-right government initiated an inquiry under the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs to review issues related to violence against women and propose measures to counter such violence from a “woman’s perspective.” The directives (dir. 1993:88, p. 3) explicitly stated that “violence against women is related to questions about equality between women and men, the distribution of power between the gender, and men’s violence against women.”

BOJ’s position in a new crime policy

In the early 1990s, crime victims as a group in need of support had become a truth that no one opposed in Sweden. BOJ was a recognized organization
with a logo, board, newsletter, and temporary governmental funding. BOJ had also started to develop national guidelines for local training. BOJ had the support of and recognition from the Ministry of Justice, the National Police, the Church of Sweden, insurance companies, and a study association. There were also different kinds of local support for the local centers. Both external and internal legitimacy were now established. Without stable funding and as a new organization in the field, BOJ already had political influence, not only for its own legitimacy as an organization but also for victim support in general.

After the 1991 government elections, BOJ had an even more clear position, as the idea of supporting victims found its place in a center-right crime policy. The idea of the “crime victim” came to support a shift away from more welfarist notions of crime control, even if this was never an explicit idea of the entrepreneurs. BOJ expresses support for the rehabilitation of offenders, with the addition that victims should get the same support to recover from crime. For example, a response to a departmental memorandum about crime victims in 1992, signed by Lagerbäck and Svensson, stated that:

The basic view of Swedish prison and probation services is that an offender that is found guilty of a serious crime should be reintegrated into a normal life through a series of societal initiatives. The aim is partly the humanitarian view that the offender and his family should be ensured an orderly way of life and social security. Partly that the support initiatives for the offender should give him and his family the constitution to earn a living and thus eventually also lower societal costs. The conditions underlying support to the perpetrator must be fully applicable to victims who, of not fault of their own, suffered from physical, psychological, social, or economic damage from the perpetrator’s crime.

The impact of the election year is evident in BOJ’s correspondence. While internal affairs dominated BOJ’s archival material in 1990, most of the documents in 1991 concerned correspondence with politicians. Still, there is nothing in the archive showing external demands for victim support. BOJ sent individual letters to the private addresses of politicians who had some kind of involvement in issues relating to crime and victimization. BOJ also sent letters to the Minister of Justice and all members of Parliament. The letters provided information about BOJ, the local centers, and the importance of BOJ’s work. Furthermore, BOJ invited politicians to visit the organization and emphasized the need for funding.

Before the September 1991 election, Lagerbäck sent letters to the social-democratic Minister of Justice, Laila Freivalds, thanking her for her support. After the election, in October, Lagerbäck sent three letters to the new conservative Minister of Justice, Gun Hellsvik, which all related to the funding of BOJ. The first letter was about funding for employees at BOJ’s office and
for a BOJ newsletter. The second letter concerned a Crime Victim Fund, and the third letter argued that the Probation Service ought to take victims’ perspectives into account. The new center-right government had ideas about reforming crime policy, and BOJ was eager to ensure that victims were represented in these reforms.

After only a few years, BOJ had taken its position in the organizational field and had won acceptance from the state. The former social-democratic government supported BOJ, but the backing from the center-right government was even stronger, as BOJ’s ideas were a very good match for the politics of the new government. When the conservative Minister of Justice, Gun Hellsvik, gave a speech at the BOJ annual meeting in 1992, she said that the non-profit segment attracts creativity, commitment, and initiative in a way that is not possible in a public authority.

**Dramatic growth of local victim support**

Most of BOJ’s internal discussions in the early 1990s concerned practical issues on the division of labor and responsibilities within the organization. BOJ’s independence from the police allowed for new partnerships. In February 1992, a BOJ newsletter sparked a debate about whether or not local victim support centers could criticize the police. The newsletter noted that victim support centers depend on the police in their work, but it is important to act in the interests of the victim and to express criticism when needed. The documents from 1992 mainly concern internal affairs, but there was also information about contacts with the Minister of Justice. The internal discussion reflects a growing organization, with some discussions about connecting local centers in regions. We can now see reflections of “business as usual,” as most arguments in the documents are repeated from earlier years. In 1992, the organization was undoubtedly well established. There were also calls for more professionalized roles within BOJ, for instance, an education coordinator.

BOJ also continued to inspire the creation of new centers. It is evident that BOJ worked intensively both internally and externally to grow the organization. For example, between January and March 1991, BOJ representatives attended 22 local events. This averages to two local events per week. In the early 1990s, the number of victim support centers multiplied quickly, along with an increasing social and political interest in crime victims. In 1992 alone, 22 local BOJ centers were established. In 1994, only six years after BOJ was formed, the number of centers had reached 86 (see Figure 5.1). This development continued some more years, until the early 2000s when centers started to merge and the total number decreased even when new centers were established (see Figure 5.1).

The centers’ contacts with victims also grew significantly. Between 1989 and 1994 the centers’ contacts with victims had increased from 4,204
to 38,972, the number of incoming calls from victims to the centers from 497 to 6,604, and outgoing calls to victims from 2,173 to 21,674. BOJ rapid growth in the early 1990s did not concur with an increase in reported crime. In fact, in the early 1990s, reported crime had started to stabilize (BRÅ, 2006). Actual crime rates had also started to stabilize already (von Hofer, 2011). Swedish homicide and manslaughter cases, which are often considered the least biased of all crime statistics, increased between the mid-1960s and the 1980s and then remained stable or declined slightly until the mid-2010 (BRÅ, 2015; von Hofer, 2011).

BOJ had not yet, in a structured way, started specializing its support based on different groups of victims. Children are mentioned a few times in BOJ’s annual reports in the early 1990s. In 1993, BOJ organized a seminar on victims of incest (BOJ, 1993a). In 1994, BOJ initiated a three-year project about children as victims of crime in collaboration with the organization Children’s Right in Society (BRIS) (BOJ, 1993a).

**Maintaining a unified map of the organization**

To understand an organization, one must understand the organization’s inner logic and how it is upheld, what Weick (2001) calls a “cognitive map.” Cognitive maps generate meaning for novel situations, reorganize concepts,
and determine what a person will do in a situation (Weick, 2001). During BOJ’s first years, the founders worked to create a map and anchored it both in a wider national, political, and organizational context as well as in the local centers. As the number of centers increased in the early 1990s, and more people got involved, BOJ developed ways of maintaining a unified map and the complexity of the organization increased. In order for the map to consist, it was crucial that BOJ internal work mirrored what was said in its external lobbying campaigns. The map was hence continuously reconstructed in an interplay between BOJ, the local centers, and the context with its actors. Even though BOJ worked actively for the establishment of the local centers, BOJ has not controlled everything that has happened. The governance has been based in dialogue, where initiatives for change have come from BOJ, as well as the local centers.

Nevertheless, the map is held by BOJ’s national board and national office, which used a number of tools to keep it together. One example is BOJ’s annual meeting. Similar to other NPOs, BOJ holds national meetings, where the local centers gather. In the first years, BOJ held meetings annually, and in 1993, they became bi-annual. The meetings are two-day meeting in different locations in the country. One of the recurring program items is that the Minister of Justice has a speech. The programs for the meetings have a recurring structure, where the first day is devoted to lectures, discussions, and social activities and the second day to annual meeting negotiations.

BOJ has, to a great extent, conveyed its basic values to the local centers through education. In 1993, BOJ published the first *Handbook for Support Persons*, which the local centers could use in their training and guidance of volunteers. In the foreword, Lagerbäck wrote that:

The help that the Swedish victim movement wants to bring to victims must be characterized by good quality and easy accessibility. One of the cornerstones is education.

(BOJ, 1993b)

The handbook and the policy document mentions honesty, compassion, moral courage, service orientation, and a healthy understanding of the law as valuable qualities for support persons. The handbook also points out that all support persons need to be “professional” in the sense that are “guided by what benefits the person seeking help, and not by their own feelings” (BOJ, 1993b, p. 11). But since the work was done on “a voluntary basis, human to human, there is no stamp of authority on the activity” (BOJ, 1993b, p. 24).

BOJ has also worked to maintain a unified image of the organization through information. During BOJ’s first years, information to the local centers had been in the format of newsletters in the format of copied typed pages. In 1992, BOJ received a publication license from the Swedish Patent and Registration Office for the publication *Crime Victim Journal* (*Brottsofferjournalen*).
The layout and format now began to be more magazine-like. In addition to the text, there are pictures of the people who express opinions and advertisements for crime victim-related activities. The content was largely based on the same themes as before, but they are now published together with interviews with the National Police Commissioner, corporate representatives who donated funds to local centers, and individual victims of crime.

After some planning, BOJ founded a national magazine, the *Crime Victim Magazine*, which is published still today. The first number was published in 1994, where Svensson wrote as its chief editor.

Being able to present the Crime Victim Magazine is a milestone for us who support and help crime victims. For a couple of years, BOJ purposefully worked to create an opinion-forming body. (Svensson, 1994, p. 1)

Each issue contains an editorial of the chair of BOJ’s national board, parliamentary decisions, and articles with different perspectives on victims and support activities. It also writes about the valuable work that the local centers perform and gives examples of good efforts. The magazine advertises crime victim-related activities from a wide range of sponsors, including insurance companies, lawyers, social services, and psychotherapists. BOJ had hence now created a body that united the organization and the local work with its lobbying efforts.

**A Swedish Crime Victim Fund**

In the early 1990s, BOJ still had problems finding stable funding, and the entrepreneurs continued to send information to local victim support centers and politicians. BOJ also offered special memberships to private companies (BOJ, 1992). In 1991 and 1992, the City of Stockholm and the insurance company Folksam each contributed with 400,000 SEK per year to the “Stockholm Project,” which aimed to create victim support centers in Stockholm’s six police districts (BOJ, 1991). Folksam would continue to contribute to BOJ: for example, by lending its facilities to BOJ’s conferences and board meetings. Up until this point in time, BOJ’s funding attached to specific projects was temporary and could not be anticipated to be permanently available in the future. Some local centers were also having financial difficulties. The Umeå center in northern Sweden expressed that their first year “had been a constant struggle to get an economy that makes it possible to continue our operations” (Umeå Victim Support, 1990). The Gävle center in east central Sweden declared that:

When our funds started to run short in the fall and the organization could not even pay the phone bill, we tried to apply for additional grants
A welfare state in times of crisis

from Gävle municipality in order to be able to continue our activities. These applications were rejected, and we were out of money.

(BOJ Gävle, 1990, p. 1)

**A fund financed by offenders, not taxes**

Going into the 1990s, compensation funds for victims supported by convicted people had now been operated for half a decade in some countries, such as the United States and Belgium. As we saw in the previous chapter, Lagerbäck proposed the establishment of a Swedish Crime Victim Fund, financed by convicted people already in 1988, in a letter to the social-democratic Minister of Justice. In the interview, Lagerbäck stated that he had gotten the idea from the fund in Belgium and his work as a psychologist in a crisis hotline at an insurance company. In his work, a woman who had been subjected to a crime had asked him who would pay for her therapy:

I answered honestly, you get that from your taxes, or through your insurance. And I thought, hell, it has to be those who commit the crime. It is reasonable that they pay, and then I started to raise the question of a crime victim fund ... The idea came from Belgium, where there was a similar fund into which fines were allocated, and with that as a framework, we developed the idea and suggested that convicted offenders should pay a certain amount into a crime victims’ fund.

Similar to the 1950 government report (SOU, 1950:16), Lagerbäck emphasized that it “was a pedagogical idea that the offender should pay.” Here, we can see that Lagerbäck’s experiences from different organizations allowed him to elaborate on different ideas and combine them in new ways, which Battilana (2006) describes as essential characteristics for institutional entrepreneurs.

In 1991, BOJ appointed Svensson as its first secretary-general and Lagerbäck took over as chair of the national board. BOJ close relationships with central policymakers, especially the various ministers of justice in the early 1990s, are evident in the archival material. In the 1993 annual report, BOJ stated that they had:

been in constant contact with representatives of the Ministry of Justice. Contacts have also been held with members of Parliament and representatives from different political parties to inform about the development of their activities and future needs.

(BOJ, 1993b, p. 2)

BOJ’s work also gained political attention. In February 1993, BOJ organized a “Crime Victim Parliament” at the International Crime Victim Day, which
engaged crime victims, support persons, and coordinators in the local centers. Representatives from the National Police Board, the Swedish Prosecution Authority, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, and the Swedish Enforcement Agency participated in a panel. The program included interviews with crime victims led by Lagerbäck and a panel discussion led by Svensson (BOJ, 1993b). Some of the suggestions that emerged from the meeting were that (Ds. 1993:29):

- The municipality’s responsibility to support crime victims should be clarified in the Social Services Act.
- The social services’ work with crime victims should be done in collaboration with NPOs.
- Those who are convicted in criminal cases should pay 500 SEK to a central crime victim fund.

Shortly after, in spring 1993, the Ministry of Justice drew up a memorandum (Ds. 1993:29), which included many of the suggestions that had been raised in BOJ’s Crime Victim Parliament. For example, the memorandum raised the idea of clarifying the social services responsibility for crime victims, but there were no accompanying recommendations to amend to the Social Services Act (Ds. 1993:29). It also proposed the establishment of a Crime Victim Fund supported by fees paid by convicted people. The government also underlined the importance of NPOs, such as BOJ and women’s shelters.

In February 1994, less than a year after the Ministry of Justice presented the memorandum, the center-right government proposed one of the most noteworthy bills for crime victims, *Crime Victims in Focus: A Crime Victim Fund and Other Measures to Strengthen the Position of Crime Victims* (prop. 1993/94:143). The centerpiece of the bill was the Crime Victim Fund, for example, which was set up together with the establishment of the Crime Victim Compensation and Support Authority (BrOM). The fund supports projects and research aiming to improve crime victims’ situation. The fund is open to researchers, NPOs, as well as public and private organizations. The fund does not allocate any funds directly to crime victims. Unlike the 1978 criminal injuries compensation program, the government did not finance the Crime Victim Fund through taxes, but rather through a fixed fee of approximately 300 SEK, which anyone convicted of a crime punishable by a prison sentence is required to pay. Since the courts mainly should sentence to non-custodial punishments, this meant, in practice, that those sentenced to fines, probation, and conditional sentences also had to pay the fee, if the Criminal Code stated that the crime could lead to a prison sentence. In addition, the fund accepts gifts from individuals and organizations. BrOM was established under the Ministry of Justice to promote victims’ rights, interests, and needs while administering the Crime Victim Fund and the crime victim compensation program.
Since 1994, the fee to the Crime Victim Fund has been raised twice, in 1999 to 500 SEK and in 2015 to 800 SEK. The female Minister of Justice at that time, Gun Hellsvik (conservative Moderate Party), brought the bill to the Swedish Parliament. In the interview, Lagerbäck expressed that he and Hellsvik used to say that they “have a child together, and that is the Crime Victim Fund.” According to Lagerbäck, he pushed the establishment of the fund and Hellsvik made it happen. The 1994 bill also included other provisions: for example, related to the injured party’s right to bring a support person to police interrogations.

With the establishment of the Crime Victim Fund, BOJ had secured reliable funding. The Crime Victim Fund has been BOJ’s main source of funding since 1994. The fund has supported BOJ with a yearly operating grant, that is, a grant that covers overall costs and is not restricted to specific programs. The operating grant has grown steadily (see Figure 5.2). In addition, the fund has funded a range of BOJ’s projects. None of these projects were state initiatives; they were all funded following BOJ’s applications to the Crime Victim Fund. In this way, BOJ shapes its own practice, and the state funds it.

Starting in 1994, BOJ annual reports specifically thank BrOM (BOJ, 1994). A speech by BrOM director-general also became a standing item on BOJ’s national meetings.

![Figure 5.2](image.png)  
*Figure 5.2 The Ministry of Justice and the Crime Victim Fund grants to BOJ (SEK).*
Conclusions

This chapter has shown that BOJ grew dramatically in the early 1990s. By 1994, only six years after BOJ was established, 86 local victim support centers in operation throughout Sweden. The idea of fellow-human support and NPOs taking the role in victim support fitted well into the neoliberal set of ideas characterized by a weaker role of the state that was taking hold. Funding an organization that relies on volunteers, such as BOJ, costs less than providing government services (Simmonds, 2016). It was cheaper for the state to invest in BOJ than to create a new government-run victim support program. BOJ was from the very beginning a strong lobby organization. Even though BOJ expressed support for welfarist and rehabilitative ideals, it provided a way for the center-right government to implement new policy ideas. For example, BOJ was instrumental in the creation of the Crime Victim Fund supported by fees paid by offenders, not taxes. The Crime Victim Fund symbolized that the state now had given the neglected crime victim attention, without any increased costs (Svensson, 2006).

Unlike other NPOs of that time, such as Alcoholics Anonymous, BOJ did not develop into a “we-for-us” organization, but rather a “we-for-them” organization (Meeuwisse & Sunesson, 1998). BOJ does not assume that helpers and those who are helped have the same problems or that you need to have personal experiences of crime to provide support. Neither did BOJ develop its practice on the basis of experiences, demands, or expressed needs from victims. BOJ’s support became more similar to support previously offered by organizations connected to the church, where being a human was the common ground, but one person had a problem that the other one had not (but could get in the future or possibly had in a distant past).

As the number of centers increased in the early 1990s, and more people got involved, BOJ developed ways of maintaining a unified image of the organization. For example, in 1994, BOJ founded the Crime Victim Magazine, which became an important organ for uniting the organization and its lobbying work. Governance of local victim support has, to a great extent, been done through information and education, but later more clear guidelines were put in place. At this point, BOJ had not drawn attention to any specific crime victim group, except children, who are mentioned a couple of times in the annual reports. As we will find in the next chapters, this was soon about to change.

References


International successes for the victim movement

In the 1990s, victim support had achieved success internationally. Even though crime rates declined in the United States, victim-oriented policy expanded rapidly in conjunction with rapidly growing incarceration rates. A common perception was that there were numerous unidentified victims out there. As Ed Staut, the Executive Director of Aid for Victims of Crime (AVC), the first victim support organization in the United States, said in 2002:

> So, I don’t think the needs have changed, except that they’ve grown in numbers as more and more people have become victims. We have to ignore the fact maybe that the crime rate is down, because there are still so many – there’s hundreds of thousands of victims who have never been served.

(University of Akron, 2002)

By the mid-1990s, every U.S. state had a Victims Bill of Rights and victim witness assistance programs designed to provide both rights and social services (Weed, 1995). Victim services were also increasingly professionalized. In 1995, the U.S. Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) established the National Victim Assistance Academy (NVAA), which offered academic courses in the field of victim’s rights and victim assistance. This was a start of OVC’s multiyear funding strategy for the development of state victim assistance academies (Derene, Walker, & Stein, 2007). In 2006, more than 500 victim service providers had received credentials from the National Advocate Credentialing Program (NACP), which was created in 2003 (Derene, Walker, & Stein, 2007).

Concurrently in Europe, crime policy and social democracy increasingly emphasized law-and-order under slogans such as “tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime” (Tham, 2001). Programs for victims of crime were also spreading quickly. In the United Kingdom, National Association of Victim Support Schemes (NAVSS) had grown to a national movement
offering victim support in each of the 42 criminal justice areas in England and Wales and Home Office funding of £28 million (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2003). European victim support programs primarily emphasized human rights, support, information, and compensation to victims, rather than harsher punishment of offenders (Hall, 2010; Pemberton, 2009; Rock, 2004). Some victim organizations addressed the victim-offender overlap, that is, that victims and offenders often are same people. One example is the Austrian organization Victims First, which sought to show that many offenders themselves had been victimized (Brienen & Hoegen, 2000).

European victim services also moved toward standardization. In the 1990s, EFVS developed several statements aimed at improving the rights of victims of crime. In the statements, EFVS recognized both international statements on basic human rights and the rights of the offender. EFVS (1998, p. 10) highlighted that “free victim support services, staffed by volunteers and professionals, should be considered a basic right for all victims of crime.” In 2001, the Council of the European Union (2001) established the Framework Decision on the Standing of Victims in Criminal Proceedings, which was the first legally binding document related to victims of crime within the European Union (EU). The Framework Decision did, however, use a vague language, which offered room for interpretation (Groenhuijsen & Pemberton, 2009).

Generic victim support had also spread to other Nordic countries. Victim Support Finland (VSF) was founded in 1994, and Victim Support Denmark (VID) was founded in 1998, both inspired by BOJ in Sweden (Brienen & Hoegen, 2000; Wergens, 1999). The Red Cross coordinates VSF (Rikosuhripäivystys) that offers free support by volunteers trained with “expert training in human relations” (Wergens, 1999, p. 149). The government and Finland’s Slot Machine Association are VSF’s main funders. VID (Offerrådgivningen), interestingly, supports not only victims of crime but also victims of accidents.

**Sweden enters the European Union**

In September 1994, the Social Democrats returned to power with the aim to reconstruct the welfare state. However, due to national debt from the recession and weak support in the Parliament, most reforms were symbolic, bringing little substantial change. Hort (2014) argues that the welfare state “hibernated” between the two major financial crises, from the mid-1990s to 2008. Many would agree that the immediate economic crisis in Sweden was over by the end of the 1990s (Rothstein & Lindbom, 2004). Later in 1994, Sweden voted to join the EU, which later came to influence BOJ through legally binding victim support directives to member states. Sweden’s entry to the EU also opened the borders to migration in both directions; it became
easier for Swedes to move to EU countries, while EU citizens could settle in Sweden (Statistics Sweden, 2004). In 2004, more countries entered EU, which resulted in higher immigration from some new member states, including Poland and Hungary (Statistics Sweden, 2013). Many people also came to Sweden fleeing war and oppression in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Syria (Statistics Sweden, 2017).

Despite the shift in government, the political focus on victims of crime increased steadily in the second part of the 1990s. The government and NPOs initiated many new programs for victims of crime; many were accelerated and supported by the newly established Swedish Crime Victim Fund.

**Human rights and specialization of victim support**

In 1995, professor of criminal law Hans Klette assumed the role as the chair of BOJ’s national board. Human rights was a key question for Hans Klette. Under Klette’s leadership, BOJ’s focus on human rights became more defined and explicit. During his 13-year term (1995–2008), Klette worked to put Swedish crime victim policy and legislation in an international human rights perspective. Klette (2001, 2004) has written two book chapters on human rights. In the 2004 chapter, Klette writes that:

> In all societies, there are fundamental values that affect people’s behaviors. In our country, it is primarily about democracy and participation, freedom, justice, equality, solidarity, and security.

(Klette, 2004, p. 45)

Klette then provides a review of key rights discussed in relation to legal cases and European agreements. The responsibility of society for crime victims is emphasized in Klette’s editorials in the *Crime Victim Magazine* throughout his term. In 2005, BOJ included human rights in its basic principles and goals. Human rights are now not only a basic idea in BOJ’s lobbying work, but it is also reflected in the governance of the local centers.

At the end of the 1990s, it was clear that BOJ’s parallel work to form local centers and advocate for victims on a national level had been very successful. In 1997, BOJ stated that “crime victims have been a forgotten group, but their situation has improved over these years” and that “a victim mentality had taken a hold in people’s minds” (1997, p. 4). BOJ continued to grow but at a slower pace. The growth of BOJ centers reached its peak in 1999 with 111 centers and nationwide coverage. The total number of BOJ centers remained around 110 centers until the mid-2000s when centers started closing and merging.

When BOJ reached the goal of establishing centers throughout the country, the organization started developing the practice by specializing its support and categorizing victims. According to Eva Larsson, the idea of specializing
in different victim groups came up during a study visit to Victim Support England in 1996:

We had been on a study visit, Per and I, in London, and there were a few things that we took home. Partly we saw, wow, what a big organization, already maybe fifty employees in their national office. And then, to be able to immerse yourself in different victim groups, which we have continued to do.

Professional development can drive specialization. In other words, BOJ specialization can be a way to find new and challenging things to work with. At the end of this period, in 2006, BOJ had the equivalent of nine full-time employees, including a secretary-general, education coordinator, information officer, and two project leaders in the areas of young crime victims and violence against women. In the interview, Larsson expressed:

When we have expanded categories of victims and victim groups then there are consequences and our competence must increase. We have also developed various training programs. And then, we see crime victims who are severely affected and traumatized and need professional help.

**Without witnesses – no trial**

BOJ also worked to extend their support to more victims and identify new victim groups, one of the clearest examples being witnesses of crime, which went from being non-existent in BOJ’s annual reports until the mid-1990s to one of BOJ’s main target groups in the 2000s. The first witness support program was a local initiative by the Växjö victim support center in southern Sweden. Birger Gustinger, a former police officer who was active in the center, got the idea after being contacted by a worried witness. During the spring of 1995, the Växjö center ran a pilot project with district court “hosts/hostesses.” In the same year, BOJ’s annual report mentions witnesses for the first time stating that the local centers should help witnesses “as time and resources permit” (BOJ, 1995, p. 12).

The evaluation of the Växjö project was positive, and the program continued. BOJ also started to spread knowledge about witness support, and in 1997, it translated witness support education material into English. In the late 1990s, many of BOJ’s projects focused on witnesses, for instance, they tried to get courts to contribute financially to their witness support program under the slogan “Without Witnesses – No Trial” (BOJ, 1999, p. 10). In 1999, BOJ added witness support to its mission statement, and three years later, in 2002, BOJ stated that “a local BOJ victim support center consists of a number of victim and witness support volunteers, whose task is to support and assist
victims and witnesses” (2002, p. 2). Thus, a local initiative became a matter for BOJ, which spread to other centers and then to the whole country. Larsson explains:

Local centers saw this as very important and valuable very quickly. And also chief judges who also saw this as a good activity … In some district courts, it was the chief judge who took initiative and who made contact with the crime victims. So this was a very important milestone, we got two legs to stand on.

In 1998, BOJ organized the first national training for witness support, and Eva Larsson prepared a handbook for witness supporters in the framework of a project funded by the Crime Victim Fund. In 1999, BOJ was granted a government grant for a witness support in Jönköping County, a project that was subsequently extended. In parallel, other centers began to conduct witness support activities, but there were major problems with funding, a matter they brought to BOJ. Around the same time, BrOM initiated witness support programs, which would later lead to tension with BOJ.

BOJ also increased its focus on youth as victims of crime, in parallel with emerging municipal programs for this group. Nevertheless, the victim category that without argument has been in the center of BOJ’s interest is abused women.

**An alliance between criminal justice, radical feminism, and victim support**

In the field of violence against women, the gender power theory, with ROKS as one of its proponents, came to dominate the debate for much of the 1990s. Domestic violence also more and more came to be became framed as a crime within criminal law, rather than as a social problem within the welfare system (Eriksson, 2010; Wendt Höjer, 2002). Violence against women was now something that the criminal justice system could and should deal with (Wendt Höjer, 2002). Efforts to look beyond poverty and unemployment as the key causes of domestic violence allied some feminists with right-wing forces.

Reforms targeting crime victims and abused women were now becoming increasingly intertwined. One manifestation of this alliance came in 1994, when the center-right government appointed the chair of the commission on violence against women (Dir. 1993:88), Britta Bjelle, to be the secretary-general of the newly established Crime Victim Compensation and Support Authority (BrOM). Before Bjelle was appointed, she was a prosecutor and a member of the Swedish parliament representing the Liberal Party (1985–1994). One year later, in 1995, the “cooperation with the Crime Victim Compensation and Support Authority” got a separate heading in BOJ’s annual report (BOJ, 1995, p. 10). Under the heading,
BOJ established that BOJ “has had a very close and constructive cooperation with Britta Bjelle, the head of the Crime Victim Compensation Support Authority” (1995, p. 10). In 2001, BOJ (2001) highlighted in its mission statement that cooperation with the Authority should be a priority. The statement remained in the mission statement until 2012, when BOJ revised its mission.

A government inquiry into victim support

In June 1995, the social-democratic government set up an inquiry under the Ministry of Justice to investigate measures taken to support crime victims in the previous decade (Dir. 1995:94). The directives were drawn up in the aftermath of a severe financial crisis and pointed out that “the state of the government’s finances implies that there is no scope for amendments that involve increased costs” (Dir. 1995:94, p. 25). Instead, the inquiry should aim to find solutions that redistribute resources. The directives mentioned that a counsel for the injured party is costly and that the injured party does not always necessarily need support from a legal expert. Rather than legal support, the directives stressed the need to develop the kind of support given by local victim support centers and women’s shelters, such as in the form of lay support persons similar to lay supervisors used in the probation services. According to the directives, the newly established BrOM should be considered to have such a role.

The 1995 crime victim inquiry (Dir. 1995:94) had close ties with the 1993 commission on violence against women (Dir. 1993:88), despite being initiated by a different government under a different government department (Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Health and Social Affairs). Some expert panelists and members served on both inquiries. The links between the two inquiries resulted in reforms that explicitly defined abused women as “victims of crime” (Ljungwald & Elias, 2010). The directives for the crime victim inquiry emphasized support and service rather than offender punishment. The word “offender” is mentioned once only in the directives, and sharpened penal law is discussed in a few areas. The use of preventive measures was highlighted as the main area for the inquiry to investigate. The directives pointed out that:

> Crime prevention is very important to the crime victim’s situation. Successful crime prevention work lowers the risk that people will be exposed by crime and contributes to increased safety.

(Dir. 1995:94, p. 22)

Over the past decade, theories of men’s violence against women have largely been based on gender power perspectives. Women’s researchers in and outside Sweden have used a collective term to describe structural differences in conditions for women and men: Patriarchy. The term is used to denominate the patriarchy in various forms, structurally and individually. The researchers argue that the patriarchy has evolved from a direct and visible and now unacceptable female oppression to an indirect and invisible one. The patriarchy means that institutions and phenomena that may seem gender-neutral still work in favor of men’s interests.

(SOU, 1995:60, p. 101)

The committee proposed legislative amendments in a number of areas and recommendations about the attitude public authorities should adopt in the area of violence against women. The commission proposed that a national center for women, who have been subject to rape and abuse, should be estab-

lished (SOU, 1994:56). The National Center for Battered and Raped Women was set up at the University Hospital in Uppsala in 1994.

Three years later, in February 1998, the social-democratic government introduced the landmark Women’s Peace bill (prop. 1997/98:55) under the Ministry of Labor. The bill was based on the commission on violence against women’s 1995 report and the gender power theory. The bill included a range of measures to combat violence against women – for example, a broader definition of rape, a new crime (gross violation of women’s integrity), and the criminalization of the purchase but not the sale of sexual services. The bill also specified abused women as a responsibility for the social services in the Social Services Act (SoL). In the same year, in 1998, BOJ’s annual reports mentioned violence against women for the first time. Over the following years, BOJ organized and participated in several seminars on the topics of “violence against women” and “men’s violence against women.”

A government report into victim support

In March 1998, just one month after the introduction of Women’s Peace bill, the crime victim inquiry presented their work in the report Support to crime victims: what has been done? What should be done? (SOU, 1998:40). The report gave a broad account of the measures taken over the ten years and proposed a number of legislative and other changes, including an extended right to counsel for the injured party and an increased fee to the Crime Victim Fund from 300 to 500 SEK. Crime prevention, which the directives pointed out as an important area of research, was given a three-page section in the report (out of 362 pages). The report argued that there were no grounds to highlight crime prevention as an area needing more attention since more attention had already been provided: for example, in the national crime prevention program Our Common Responsibility (Ds. 1996:59). The report
also mainly discussed crime prevention in terms of individual, rather than structural, measures, including a ban on physical protection for victims and an obligation for prisons and institutions to provide information to victims when incarcerated people are away from the units.

The report cited the need to develop support outside the financial and legal areas, as commissioned by the directives. The report stated that it has been assumed that the legal counsel for the injured party should provide counseling. According to the report, however, “counseling and personal support often can be better provided for by an engaged support person than a counsel for the injured party,” which “primarily should focus on the legal part of his or her task” (SOU, 1998:40, p. 130). Besides family and relatives, local victim support centers, and possibly other contacts at social services or health and medical services gave the best personal support. According to the inquiry, the counsel for the injured party already delegated counseling to women’s shelters, local victim support centers, social services, and health and medical services.

While working with the report, the crime victim inquiry had been contacted by BOJ and BrOM, which both suggested that special regional coordinators should coordinate victim support. There was, however, an important difference between the two models. BOJ wanted the coordinators to be employed by them, while BrOM wanted the coordinators to be state employees. Nevertheless, the inquiry rejected the idea of state-employed victim support coordinators. It did not contend that BrOM could have a role in a system similar to lay supervisors used in the prison and probation service, as suggested by the directives. According to the inquiry, a better idea was to support NPOs financially, so that the recruitment and education of support persons can be extended and improved. The report underlined that most of its proposals could be implemented without significant cost increases. Contribution to NPOs should be financed by increasing the fee to the Crime Victim Fund from 300 to 500 SEK, which would generate approximately 7 million SEK per year (SOU, 1998:40, p. 23). The report also suggested that the provisions about victims of crime should replace or be added to the provisions on abused women in SoL. The report noted that the provisions would push the social services to pay attention to people “who are in need of help and support,” specifically “because they have been exposed to crime” (SOU, 1998:40 p. 353). It was, hence, not enough for the government to define abused women as a group in need, and it was also vital for the government to define these women as victims of “crime.”

Three months after the crime victim inquiry presented their report, in June 1998, BrOM in collaboration with BOJ, wrote to the Ministry of Justice suggesting two parallel pilot projects for coordination of voluntary victim support. The Crime Victim Fund granted funds to both projects – one led by BrOM and one led by BOJ. BrOM employed a crime victim coordinator in Örebro County in central Sweden, who, for instance, did an inventory of
victim support and arranged training. One result of BrOM’s project was the initiation of witness support at three district courts (prop. 2000/2001:79). BOJ also employed a regional assistant in Södermanland and Östergötland, which supported the local centers. The local centers could also forward their phones to a county helpline to increase their availability (BOJ, 1999). Most local victim support centers were positive to the project, but some expressed concerns that the county helplines would take away work from them (prop. 2000/2001:79). In 2001, BOJ expanded the project to a national helpline, which in 2002 received 4,910 calls (BOJ, 2002).

**BOJ’s declaration to ROKS – we are alike but different**

Meanwhile, some women’s shelters within ROKS were increasingly criticizing their organization’s stance on violence against women. The primary critic was a social-democratic Member of Parliament, Elisebeth Markström, who had served on the same municipal board as BOJ’s secretary-general at the time, Per Svensson (Enander, Holmberg, & Lindgren, 2013). The ideological shift became complete in 1996 when 16 women’s shelters formed a new organization, the Swedish Association of Women’s Shelters (SKR), with Markström as chair of the national board. ROKS and SKR came, as Gabriella Nilsson (2009) points out, to represent two different perspectives on violence against women. ROKS regarded violence against women as a gender policy problem and gender-based advocacy as the main task of women’s shelters, while SKR saw violence against women as a social problem and service delivery as the main task of women’s shelters. BOJ welcomed the establishment of a women’s shelter organization that did not admit to the gender power theory. According to Larsson, one of the reasons SKR branched out of ROKS was the latter’s “attitude toward men.” Regarding BOJ and SKR’s collaboration, Larsson points out that:

> Per and Elisebeth knew each other from before. So we felt that we had the same ideology and attitude, so we started our collaboration with them already when they were formed.

Over the years that followed, BOJ and SKR collaborated closely. The alliance strengthened and justified the existence of both organizations, which, as Larsson puts it, “complemented each other.”

**Captured Queen**

The Women’s Peace bill (prop. 1997/98:55) commissioned BrOM to undertake a victimization study focusing on violence against women. The authority appointed professor Eva Lundgren and the head of the National
Center for Battered and Raped Women, Gun Heimer, to conduct the study. In 2001, Lundgren and colleagues presented the results of the study in the report *Captured Queen: Men’s Violence against Women in “Equal” Sweden* (Lundgren, Heimer, Westerstrand, & Kalliokoski, 2001). BrOM’s secretary-general Britta Bjelle wrote the foreword to the report. Here again, the close connection between the areas of violence against women and victims of crime is obvious. The report was based on the gender power theory. The study, which was the first Swedish prevalent study on violence against women, claimed that almost half of Swedish women had been exposed to violence at some point after their 15th birthday. This was a quite striking result since Sweden is considered to have one of the highest levels of gender equality in the world. The study also challenged earlier explanation models in which abused women were viewed as different from non-abused women (e.g., Wendt Höjer, 2002) and argued that domestic violence occurred regardless of class, ethnicity, occupation, or level of education. The report did not support alcohol abuse as an explanation to violence against women. The violence was seen as having the potential to occur anywhere — there were no safe havens for women (Lundgren et al., 2001). The study made an immense impact among both scholars and practitioners in the fields of violence against women and crime victimization. It was even a source of inspiration for crime novelist Stieg Larsson; some of the facts in his widespread Millennium trilogy (e.g., Larsson, 2005) are based on the Captured Queen study.

Lundgren and the gender power theory did not go uncontested. Opponents of a gender-based analysis had started to mobilize (Westerstrand, 2010), criticizing it for being ideological and heteronormative, and for holding all men responsible for violence against women (Enander, Holmberg, & Lindgren, 2013; SOU, 2004:121). The phrase “men’s violence against women” gradually started to fall out of usage, replaced by phrases that conceal gender power inequalities — for example, “violence in close relationships” (Mattsson, 2011), which could include same-sex couples, siblings, parents, and so on. The shift in perception of violence against women opened up a space for other actors, including BOJ.

**Professional crime victim rehabilitation**

At the end of the 1990s, Lagerbäck and Svensson’s roles in BOJ decreased, which would open the door for new leaders and put different questions in focus: for example, in the area of violence against women. BOJ also took further steps toward professionalizing and standardizing its support. In 2000, Svensson took a leave of absence from his position as secretary-general to build his own rehabilitation center for crime victims. He was inspired by Fogdaröd, an NPO run by priests and deacons that since the mid-1990s had organized retreats for victims of post and bank robberies. Svensson had
followed the retreats closely, as he increasingly recognized the need for more professional support to victims of crime. The Crime Victim Fund supported the project with 500,000 SEK. BOJ’s education secretary Eva Larsson deputized for Svensson during his absence. The center offered five-day retreats to crime victims, with walks, active listening, stress management, and relaxation exercises. The activities were led by dietists, physical therapist, and behavioral scientists. In this new project, once again, the problem of reaching crime victims came to light. In the grant application to the Crime Victim Fund, Svensson wrote that:

The most difficult task is to find good and appropriate routines to reach persons that are in need of crisis support. It is a long-term and demanding work.

In September 2000, Svensson sent a letter to BrOM where he informed that he had named the center *Aries* (*Väduren*) since the zodiac sign includes “fire, creation, warmth, and energy” and stands for a “new start in life.” He also stressed the importance of professional help for victims:

In my work as a secretary-general [at BOJ] over the years, I saw that there is a need for professional crisis support for severely affected victims. Experience has shown that a special rehabilitation is necessary for victims to regain the same level of functioning as before the crime/event.

Svensson wanted to start six or seven rehabilitation centers. Various institutions including employers, insurance companies, social insurance agencies, and the social services were intended to pay for the rehabilitation. The individual victims should not pay anything. Between September 2000 and April 2001, two groups of crime victims participated in Aries’s retreats. In May 2001, the Crime Victim Fund granted another 300,000 SEK to Svensson and Aries rehabilitation center. In this application, Svensson highlighted that he had put in tenders to 12 social insurance agencies, all of which had been rejected. He, therefore, needed “additional time to process, appear in the media to get such an impact on this new thinking so it is possible to finance this activity.” Svensson never got the chance to complete the project since he, just a few months after, in August 2001, suddenly passed away. In an obituary in one of Sweden’s largest newspapers, Hans Klette (2001) stated that “Per Svensson laid the foundation for and built up one of our country’s most significant social movements, BOJ!”

**Closeness That Hurts: About Violence against Close Kin**

In 2001, Larsson became BOJ’s secretary-general, a position that she held until she passed away in April, 2019. One of Larsson’s first projects as secretary-general
was to write a book about “violence in close relationships,” with the support of the Crime Victim Fund. BOJ was actively involved in deciding the book’s focus and perspectives, which it intended to use as training material for the local centers. In March 2000, Larsson presented on the book’s progress at BOJ’s board meeting. The minutes from the meeting states that:

It is an extensive and complex area. In addition, there are different theories about why women are abused. One is the normalization process, for example, by Eva Lundgren. It is represented by, among others, the Crime Victim Compensation and Support Authority and ROKS. The second model indicates that the woman does not perceive the violence as normal, something that Margareta Hydén, Judith Lewis Herman, the National Police Board, and the Swedish Courts stand for.

In the meeting, the executive committee of the board advocated for the latter theory, which the board agreed was an important complement to the former. Nevertheless, after some discussion, the board decided that several different models should form the foundation for the book.

The collaboration between BOJ and SKR had intensified as SKR sought membership in BOJ. After long planning, BOJ’s national office moved from Södertälje to an office in Stockholm in 2001, which was shared with the Swedish Association for Women’s Shelters (SKR) and the National Organization against Sexual Abuse (HOPP). The office was located in Södermalm, an old working-class area that was gentrified in the late 20th century with an influx of middle-class residents. In 2001, BOJ’s member magazine interviewed Markström, who then still chaired SKR’s board. Markström noted that some local BOJ victim support centers had started women’s shelters – something that she saw as a “good model” (Hörnström, 2001a, p. 16).

Larsson’s book *Closeness That Hurts: About Violence against Close Kin* (BOJ, 2003) was published in 2003. Larsson describes different theories explaining violence against women, citing both Lundgren and Hydén. But essentially, the book was a manifesto of the ideology that differentiated BOJ from ROKS and other proponents of the gender power theory. As Larsson points out:

Partly, we brought up that also men need treatment, it was not acceptable to bring it up then. We thought that there was not just one theory, this is so complex, so we need to look at several factors. But that was not acceptable to them either, at this time; there was only one universal theory.

In the same year in which the book was published, BOJ included violence against women in its mission statement. By now, Elisebeth Markström had resigned as the chair of SKR’s national board. But her engagement in BOJ
grew stronger, and in 2005, BOJ elected Markström to serve as a substitute on its national board.

The criticism of Lundgren and the gender power theory had also escalated and culminated in a 2005 television documentary called *The Gender War* (Könskriget, 2005). The two-part documentary examined Swedish state feminism, specifically the connection between radical feminists and Swedish politicians. *The Gender War* led to wide-ranging debates about feminism, as well as about the feminists portrayed in the documentary. Uppsala University (2005) also initiated an investigation that concluded that the thesis of Captured Queen concerning the universality of violence against women was misleading. Although the report included data showing that some men do constitute a greater threat to women than others, this was not made explicit. Radical feminism’s fame and powerful influence on Swedish policy had come to an end.

**Intensified focus on violence against women as funding opportunities arise**

In 1997, the social-democratic government appointed a committee to review state grants to NPOs working in social areas. The aim was to create a new efficient system with increased performance management. ROKS’s chair of the national board, Angela Beausang, acted as a special adviser to the committee. In 1998, the committee presented the report *What do we get for our money? Performance management of state grants to some organizations within the social area* (SOU, 1998:38). The report showed that ROKS’s state grants from the National Board of Health and Welfare (SoS) had increased from approximately 1.7 million to 4.5 million SEK between 1992 and 1996. The report concluded that the performance management of the Ministry of Health and Social Affair’s grants to NPOs was low or non-existent. To address this, the committee suggested a new, more uniform and efficient, system for distributing grants. The ordinance (1998:1814) came into force the same year. SoS handled the grants, which supported national NPOs working in the areas of alcohol and narcotics, violence against women, and vulnerable children and their families. The purpose of the grants was to strengthen and complement the state, county councils, and municipalities by supporting NPOs. NPOs receiving the grants had to make a three-year plan of their work and how it will be evaluated. In 2002, ROKS and SKR were granted approximately 7 and 2 million SEK from SoS, respectively. BOJ received its first grant from SoS in 2004 in the amount of 200,000 SEK, which has since then increased significantly.

Starting in 2006, the County Administrative Boards also started distributing funds to local NGOs working in the area of violence against women (prop. 2005/06:1; SoS, 2011). The funds were initially dedicated to women’s shelters. As a result, BOJ started to raise awareness about its “extensive” work
with abused women: for example, by sending letters and Larsson’s book, *Closeness That Hurts*, as a Christmas gift to politicians (BOJ, 2004). As a result of the lobbying, local BOJ centers became eligible to apply for portions of the allocated funds (BOJ, 2005; prop. 2005/06:1). BOJ also initiated a project aimed at enhancing the local centers’ knowledge about violence in close relationships. Between 2004 and 2006, BOJ trained 358 people in the local centers to better support women exposed to violence in close relationships. In her interview, Larsson talked about how government grants influenced BOJ’s decisions about victim groups and prioritization, in particular in the area of violence against women: “Indirectly it affects all NGOs, what is prioritized right now. And that is, of course, the government’s decision.” Violence against women remained a priority for the social-democratic government throughout the rest of their term.

**Professionalization, minimum standards, and regions**

In the second part of the 1990s, BOJ continued efforts to professionalize victim support. For example, BOJ wrote that support persons should have a “professional approach,” which includes “knowledge, understanding, and awareness” (1998, p. 31). Eva Larsson also worked on a number of publications for BOJ (1998): for example, a new *Handbook for Support Persons*. SV funded the handbook, and it was written in collaboration with Laila Stub who worked on a project building up victim support in Norway. The handbook built on a model where the training of support persons was done at the local centers, but the structure and content were based on BOJ’s handbook. There are also agreements about how, for example, support persons should be approved and what criteria should be taken into account. In this way, BOJ maintained a common ground throughout the organization, and those who do not live up to the basic principles are unlikely to be able to work in the name of the organization. Volume crime was still the main focus of the 1997 handbook, Larsson and Stub writes:

> Crime victims who need of BOJ’s activities are primarily victims of personal injury, humiliation, and violation; victims of volume crime. It is the main crime category that BOJ deals with. Others are burglary, unlawful threats, purse snatching, robbery, rape, and obstruction of justice. (BOJ, 1997, p. 12)

The handbook also previews BOJ emerging focus on so-called vulnerable victims, which would crystallize in the mid-2000s. Under the title *Who is a crime victim?* Larsson and Stub discussed women, youth, elderly people, and people with disabilities. Larsson and Stub also wrote about refugees and immigrated people, to which “a violation becomes an addition to the ‘normal’
adaptive difficulties they may have” (BOJ, 1997, p. 12). Less than a decade later, BOJ would launch extensive projects for all of these groups.

More direct guidelines to the local centers took form in the 1990s. At the 1995 board meeting, BOJ’s national board set out minimum standards for the local centers. According to the minutes from the November 1995 meeting, each center should have:

- A sufficient number of trained and approved support persons.
- A coordinator (with a job description).
- Set times for when the center is open.
- Clear rules for the collaboration with the police.
- Access to a physical space.
- A safe storage place for documents.
- A separate phone with increased availability through an answering machine, minicall, or a mobile phone.

It would, however, take until the 2000s, that minimum standard became more present in BOJ’s discussion and material.

**A new organizational level in the form of regions**

In 1997, BOJ organizational structure changed, when the national meeting added a level between BOJ and the local centers in the form of regions. This middle position carried the tension between the local and national. The motion that initiated the decision had in its heading “member influence and organization” and the argument focused on strengthening local work. The minutes from the national meeting reveal a discussion about the role of regional coordinators and that it would be investigated whether regional coordinators should be adjourned at BOJ national board meetings. However, instead, it was decided that national board members should be invited to meetings with the regional coordinators. The decision illustrates an asymmetry where the national board is given insight into the regional coordinators’ discussions, but one wishes to contemplate the reverse. It was not given that the regional coordinators would have insight into the work of the national board. From national board meeting protocols, it is also clear that regional coordinators had ideas and views that were not always in line with BOJ’s view. The organizational change was further strengthened in 1999 when the phrase “working for regional cooperation through regional councils” was incorporated into the bylaws as one of BOJ’s goals.

**Minimum standards with a European influence**

In 2000, BOJ’s national board noted that some centers did not comply with the minimum standard set out five years earlier. The minutes from the March
board meeting stated that “when a center does not have any operation or has an inferior operation the regional coordinator is contacted. Despite repeated attempts, some centers do not work.” In this context, “not working” partly meant that the center did not offer (good) support and help to crime victims, and partly that the center did not send annual reports or annual meeting minutes to BOJ.

In 2005, BOJ annual meeting adopted minimum standards for the local centers. The minimum requirements derived from EFVS’s 1998 guidelines, *Statement of Victim’s Right to Standards of Service*, which BOJ emphasized “should be the basis for each local victim support center that is affiliated with BOJ” (BOJ, 2005, p. 8). BOJ emphasized the anchorage in a European context and that BOJ, as a member of the EFVS, must comply with its guidelines. The requirements had now become more detailed and outlined that the centers should:

- Have a sufficient number of support persons. The requirements for confidentiality, approved basic training, and continued further education should be met.
- Record the board meetings in minutes.
- Have access to an appropriate physical space for the purpose of having telephone calls and visits by crime victims.
- Have good accessibility. When using a landline or a mobile phone, the crime victim's right to confidentiality should be guaranteed.
- Have a safe storage space for confidential documents, which should be destroyed after the contact is completed.
- Have a phone number registered with the organization.
- Establish and apply safety routines in the work with crime victims.
- Comply with BOJ decision on how to keep statistics.

The minimum requirement relates to the local center’s possibility of being a member of BOJ, not the local center’s operation itself. A local center can continue to provide victim support even though it does not meet the minimum requirements, but without being a member of BOJ. The requirements are set to make the local centers that are members of BOJ exhibit a similar image; they must represent BOJ’s map. Nevertheless, BOJ’s board meeting minutes show that a recurring difficulty is to determine what constitutes a deviation from the minimum requirements and what makes a center “not work.”

The archives clearly show that BOJ is kept up to date with the developments in society in general as they are continuously working on developing the organization in a detailed and structured way. BOJ is also starting to prioritize between different potential areas for lobbying efforts. National board
meeting minutes give the impression that BOJ’s evolving national office handles many issues but reports and discusses these issues with the board.

BOJ’s growing focus on professionalization can also be captured in the growing number of the staff in the national office. In 2005, the national office employed an equivalent of eight full-time workers, including a secretary-general, editor, education coordinator, and an administrative manager (BOJ, 2005).

**The Malexander murders and victim impact statements**

In the United States, reforms of victims often emphasize the rights in criminal proceedings: for example, in the form of “victim impact statements.” Victim impact statements occur when victims give a statement to the court about the consequences of the crime and make requests for sanctions against the offender (Goodey, 2005; Karmen, 2004). Victim impact statements have traveled the world, in particular to countries with an adversarial approach to criminal justice (Walklate, 2017), but also to European countries with more inquisitorial systems. In the Netherlands, which adopted victim impact systems in 2005, the victim can speak only about the consequences of the crime and not the desired punishment for the defendant (Lens, Pemberton, & Bogaerts, 2013).

In Sweden, the injured party has strong participatory rights but not in the form of victim impact statements. Victim impact statements have, however, been a topic of debate: for example, in relation to the murder of two police officers and the following court hearing at the end of the 1990s. The case could have been a watershed moment in BOJ’s history in relation to victims’ participatory rights in criminal proceedings. But instead, BOJ took a stance against victims’ involvement in sentencing and early release and expressed how they differed from victim organizations in the United States.

In May 1999, two police officers, Robert Karlström and Olov Borén, were shot after a bank robbery in Malexander, a minor village in southern Sweden. In Sweden, it is very rare that police officers die in the line of duty; only around 30 policemen have died from deadly violence since the early 20th century. Yet it was the court hearing that made Malexander a historical court case. In the last day of court, Olov Borén’s fiancé, Annelie Ljungberg, took the floor and got a space that was not at all common in Swedish court hearings. In an emotional speech, Ljungberg said that the “the shot had not only taken Olle’s life, but also they joy for life I had” and that she was “hoping for a life sentence which, at least in your case, means that someone throws really away the key” (Nilsson, 1999). No one interrupted Ljungberg, but immediately following the speech, the preceding judge took a break. He then resumed the hearing by apologizing to the defendants for what Ljungberg
had said (Henricson, 2000). Ljungberg later expressed that she regretted the speech “a little” and felt “reprimanded” (Nilsson, 1999).

Ljungberg received support: she was, for instance, awarded the *Swedish Speaker Award* for her speech in court. But there was also pushback. In a debate article about the case named *The mourners must not be judges*, the political-scientists Marie Demker and Ulf Bjereld argued that:

Victims’ relatives, their suffering, and their opinions have come in focus in a distasteful way. Relatives have no right to impose penalties in a civilized society. When mourning in emotional words can take stand in the question of guilt, it is a threat to the rule of law. Believing that courts would not be affected by this is to be naive.

(Demker & Bjereld, 2000)

The Malexander case influenced BOJ in a very concrete way. The day after the shooting, BOJ held its annual meeting in Motala, about one hour’s drive from Malexander. Hans Klette opened the meeting by highlighting the shooting with a minute of silence. In the interview, Larsson expressed that:

Yes, I think our organization became very affected because just when it happened we had our annual meeting in Motala, and they were so close as well. And of course since many are police officers and we have close collaboration with the police so, yes, this was so brutal … This brutal ice-cold assassination with their own service weapons. It has affected the whole Sweden … And it becomes more brutal for crime victims.

But the arguments infringing on the rights of offenders did not follow. On the contrary, in the 1999 annual report, written just after the Malexander court hearings, BOJ added basic principles guiding its work in the annual report, which declared that “efforts to support crime victims should not be made at the expense of efforts to rehabilitate offenders” and that “crime victims’ rights must be accorded the same priority as perpetrators’ right” (BOJ, 1999, p. 4). Again, here we can see BOJ expressing support for rehabilitation and protecting the rights of convicted people, with the addition that victims should be afforded the same rights. BOJ also explicitly acknowledged the victim-offender overlap: for example, in 2002, BOJ organized a seminar in collaboration with the Swedish Prison and Probation Service named “Perpetrator and victim – different sides of the same coin” (BOJ, 2002, pp. 11–12).

In the interview, we asked Larsson about BOJ’s view on victim impact statements. She argued that victims should have the opportunity to talk about their feeling and the consequences of the crime, even in court. However, according to Larsson, victims should not have any say in the sentencing or
early release. Larsson illustrated BOJ’s position by telling us about a question she had gotten at a seminar:

And then when it was my turn, I got the question about BOJ perspective on whether or not victims should be able to influence early release. And there I said that we do not have any point of view, we do not consider it reasonable not for victims either. And then I heard a big sigh [of relief] in the whole room. Some of the people I talked with afterward thought we would prefer the victims to be involved, just like in the United States. But we differ from that point of view.

We could also find evidence of this position in BOJ’s archive: for example, in conjunction with a new law for the conversion of life imprisonment into a fixed term (prop. 2005/06:35), BOJ claimed that the victim should have the opportunity to share how the crime has impacted their lives; however, the victim should not have a say in the decision of whether or not the life sentence should be converted into a fixed term. For many victims, this could, according to BOJ, pose a burden (BOJ, 2006, p. 22). Van Dijk (1988) has, in a similar fashion, pointed out that making the victim responsible for the imposition of a punishment can be a source of anxiety to the victim.

A bill focused on support to victims

In March 2001, the social-democratic government presented the Support to Crime Victims bill (prop. 2000/01:79), which clarified the social services’ responsibility for crime victims and extended the right to legal counsel for injured parties. The bill discussed measures such as shortening the turnaround time and increasing the number of solved cases in the criminal justice system. However, overall, the bill had a clear focus on support and treatment for crime victims and the principal measures relate to education, cooperation, and research. Aside from a few exceptions, such as in the section about mediation, offenders are almost completely absent in the bill. Despite the recent public debate related to the Malexander case, the bill did not discuss victim impact statements. The bill brought up the Malexander case in a proposal to extend the right to legal counsel for those who are not considered injured parties: for example, relatives of homicide victims.

Reconceptualizing social work: a victim-centered approach

Up until the 2000s, BOJ’s material discusses social welfare institutions, such as the social services, the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, and SoS, only sporadically. In the previous chapter, we saw that BOJ and the center-right
government raised the idea of clarifying the social services role in supporting victims of crime already in 1993, but there were no accompanying recommendations to amend to the SoL (Ds. 1993:29).

At the end of the 1990s, calls to improve the municipal social services’ work with crime victims were growing louder, in particular in relation to abused women. Voices were raised against the social services for failing to acknowledge the criminal dimension of domestic violence (Elman & Edwards, 1991). The commission on violence against women (SOU, 1995:60) had also objected to the social services’ perception of violence as an aspect of other issues, such as substance abuse and relationship problems. The social services needed, as Swedish gender scholar Joelsson (2005) later underlined, to recognize violence as violence, perpetrators as perpetrators, and crime victims as crime victims.

One of the social services’ first specialized units for crime victims was so-called Support Center for Young Crime Victims, which was founded in 1999 in collaboration with the police with financial support from the Crime Victim Fund. The increase in reported muggings committed by youths served as the catalyst for the project. The centers provide counseling, information, and practical help to youths who had been exposed to crime, as well as to their parents. Swedish sociologist Cecilia Hansen Löfstrand (2009a, 2009b) has shown that the municipal centers, just like BOJ, had problems reaching their target group. The assumption at the centers was that many youths deny what has happened to them, but sooner or later, they need to confront their identity as crime victims. One social worker expressed that she worked to “crack a hole in the shell in which the crime victim hides,” utilizing special pedagogical tools and techniques (Hansen Löfstrand, 2009a, p. 138). Hansen Löfstrand argues that the very existence and work of the municipal support centers were legitimized by the idea that victimhood was widespread in society and that the real number of victims was unknown.

In the 2001 bill, the government proposed that the 1998 provisions afforded to abused women in SoL should be extended to all crime victims (prop. 2000/01:79). The 1998 provisions provided a detailed description of measures that the social services should undertake for abused women (prop. 1997/98:55). For other crime victims in the 2001 reform, the government merely stressed the importance of collaboration between the social services and local NPOs (prop. 2000/01:79). The social services can open special care or counseling units for crime victims, such as support centers for young victims, which are often more accessible than child protection and other forms of assessment units (Bergmark & Lundström, 2007). The social services can also finance the activities of NPOs, such as local women’s shelters and victim support centers.

Similar to the crime victim inquiry, some legislative actors explicitly stated that they did not see the 2001 amendment to the SoL as an extension of the
social services’ responsibility to all crime victims, but as a way to emphasize that abused women’s status as “crime victims.” For example, one motion from members of the Green Party lauded the inclusion of the 1998 provisions under the heading “Crime Victims,” pointing out that this heading stressed “that women who have been exposed to violence are crime victims” (Motion So53). When SoS’s secretary-general Kerstin Wigzell was interviewed by BOJ (2001, p. 12) in relation to the 2001 reform, she underlined that abused women and their children “both are crime victims.” In 2006, the government broadened the crime victim category by adding provisions for children who have witnessed domestic violence or other abuse to section 5:11 SoL. The government explicitly justified the provision with the statement that it would be “positive if it became natural to consider children who have witnessed violence as victims of crime” (prop. 2005/06:166, p. 18).

Many of the social services’ victim-centered units came to function as an extension of the criminal justice system. Wacquant (2009) has highlighted that refined systems of supervision and control connected to welfare programs often are an alternative to incarceration in social-democratic countries, such as Sweden. Studies have shown that social workers at the municipal support centers for young crime victims see themselves as intermediaries between the police and youth (Burcar, 2005; Hansen Löfstrand, 2009a, 2009b). In 2005, the SoS (2005) stated that young crime victims and witnesses often are more inclined to stand by their statements while receiving support at the centers. It also highlighted that the centers’ support often resulted in better police investigations and made it easier to bring cases to court.

**Witness support – a task for BrOM or BOJ?**

In 2001, the government did not provide the social services with any resources for their work with crime victims, a concern raised in referral body statements, motions and reservations. At the same time, the government highlighted NPOs “important and necessary complement to the public sector” (prop. 2000/01:79, p. 12). As the bill stated:

> Support from people who are engaged voluntarily, which might have experienced similar situations, is probably as valuable as a support person appointed by the court.

(prop. 2000/01:79, p. 41)

This seems to be a mutual understanding. Since 1999, BOJ has explicitly described itself as a complement to the public sector.

Nevertheless, the government believed that the state could have a role in coordinating victim support. The government argued that BrOM’s 1999 project in Örebro had been a success much because “there was a state employee
who was a driving force and acted as a link between the authorities and non-profit organizations” (prop. 2000/01:79, p. 21). The bill hence commissioned BrOM to develop and coordinate collaborations between different authorities and NPOs. The government also tasked BrOM and the Swedish Courts to initiate witness support programs throughout the county, something that would lead to tensions with BOJ.

In the early 2000s, BOJ aimed to make sure that there were witness support programs at district and appellate courts “together with BrOM and the courts” (BOJ, 2003, p. 5). But in 2005, the division of responsibility in relation to witness support had undoubtedly become a problem. In the 2005 annual report, BOJ writes:

Another important question that BOJ has pushed for in its opinion work is the decision on the future responsibilities for witness support. During the fall, the Ministry of Justice has worked with the question that has been resting for a long time. In a letter to the Ministry of Justice, BOJ has stressed that a government agency should not be responsible for the activities of NPOs and it is important to have clear rules for cooperation. The organization that is responsible for the activity must also be responsible for recruitment and education.

(BOJ, 2005a, p. 14)

BOJ also highlighted the need for resources to run and coordinate witness support. The following year, the government commissioned BrOM and the Swedish Courts to work for the initiation of witness support programs at all district and appellate courts. This time, the government underlined that the work should be done in close collaboration with BOJ. In the 2006 annual report, BOJ wrote that:

BrOM has the overall responsibility for the program. However, the writing is clearer that the assignment is to be done in close collaboration. Since the actual work is carried out by NPOs, it is natural that they handle the recruitment of witness supporters.

(BOJ, 2006, pp. 21–22)

Over the next years, BOJ would continue to emphasize its need for a sovereign role and resources.

The 2001 bill also brought up police referrals. According to the bill, BOJ was concerned that many centers did not get information about victims. The government had received requests that the police should be able to routinely, and without the victim’s consent, send information to victim support centers. But according to the government, one could not assume that all victims want the police to forward information about them.
The first steps toward tendering in generic victim support

In the early 2000s, social welfare organizations started to get a more significant place in BOJ’s material. Eva Larsson also participated in a number of seminars organized by SoS.

In conjunction with the 2001 reform, BOJ published a two-page interview with SoS’s secretary-general Kerstin Wigzell in its member magazine called *The social services has had an unclear role* (Hörnström, 2001b). The topic of the article was the proposed crime victim provision in SoL; however, it mainly discussed the social services’ work with violence against women. Wigzell reinstated the idea that the municipal social services have a responsibility to support abused women, but for many other crime victims, supporting NPOs is sufficient. In 2002, BOJ began to thank SoS in the concluding words of each annual report (BOJ, 2002). Up until then, BOJ had only thanked their staff, volunteers, BrOM, and the National Police Board (RPS).

In 2004, BOJ revised its mission to be “a complement and an alternative” to the public sector regarding work with crime victims (BOJ, 2004–2008, 2012, p. 2). To be an alternative, the organization’s activities should have some characteristics that differentiate it from the public sector; it can also symbolize the potential for a competitive relationship (SOU 1993:82). In the same year as BOJ added “alternative” to their mission statement, young crime victims appeared in its annual report for the first time, in conjunction with a visit to municipal support centers for young crime victims (BOJ, 2004). By now, a number of municipal support centers had been established throughout Sweden. BOJ may have seen the municipal centers as rivals. BOJ’s emerging focus on this young crime victims could be seen as a way to show that they had the competence and skills to support this group.

In 2005, BOJ initiated an extensive three-year project directed toward young crime victims named *Support to young crime victims – a human right*. BOJ also organized three regional seminars on young crime victims. BOJ member magazine also dedicated a number to young crime victims, where they included a two-page interview with Ann Hellströmmer, the founder of the first municipal support center for young crime victim. In addition, BOJ started to maintain and report statistics on the age of the crime victims, which showed that almost a third of the victims the local centers supported were between 15 and 22 years old (BOJ, 2005). With these statistics, BOJ could show that it was already supporting young crime victims. Moreover, BOJ started targeting elderly crime victims and crime victims with disabilities. When BOJ (2006) met Queen Silvia in 2006, it was to inform about its particular focus on “children and young as victims of crime and to crime victims with disabilities and with other ethnic backgrounds.” BOJ’s attention to these groups would intensify in the next period.
In 2005, BOJ’s member magazine dedicated a number to the social services work with crime victims. In one of the articles, the social-democratic Minister of Health and Social Affairs, Morgan Johansson, highlighted the importance of collaboration between the social services and victim support centers, which according to him in a commendable way “help draw attention to crime victim’s vulnerability and improve their situation” (Mörner, 2005, p. 15). He also opened the door for a model where local BOJ centers carry out commissioned work for the municipal social services on a contract basis by stating:

Yes, I am positive to this. The social service contract out many parts of their activities. BOJ has unique knowledge and experience when it comes to supporting and assisting crime victims in different situations, which is important to take advantage of. They often have the opportunity to better understand the victims’ situation and find appropriate efforts.

(Mörner, 2005, p. 15)

Yet Johansson concluded the article by stating that “the state always has the ultimate responsibility” (Mörner, 2005, p. 15).

Conclusions

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the interest in crime victims continued to grow under the social-democratic government, which culminated in a 2001 victim support bill (prop. 2000/2001:79). The social-democratic government continued along the lines of the previous center-right government by emphasizing the role of NPOs in victim support. According to the government, however, the state should have a role in coordinating NPOs, which lead to tensions between BOJ and BrOM, particularly in the area of witness support.

The 2001 bill included a reform to SoL (SFS, 2001:453), which introduced victim support as a priority for the social services. Ljungwald (2011) has shown that, similar to many other reforms during this era, the amendment to the SoL was merely symbolic and that social services have almost exclusively focused on women, children, and youths. The economic crisis of the early 1990s ruled out reforms that might bring high increased costs, and explicitly expanding crime victims’ rights at the expense of the convicted people (toughening penal law or promoting victim impact statements) was not in line with social-democratic ideology (Ljungwald & Elias, 2010).

The 2001 reform to the SoL also reconceptualized abused “women” as victims of “crime” in SoL. The provisions in SoL may hence, just like many other reforms in criminal policy, be more about “defining a social problem” than “finding a solution to a social problem” (Andersson, 2002). The tendency to see victims and offenders as two different parties with conflicting interests would soon become more common, in Sweden as well as
other Nordic countries (Tham, Rönneling, & Rytterbro, 2011). The shift in perception of violence against women opened up a space for other actors, including BOJ.

Going into the millennium, BOJ was entering a consolidation phase, where it was established, but should be maintained. BOJ also started specializing its support and categorizing victims. In particular, BOJ started conceptualizing itself as an organization serving abused women, while simultaneously distancing itself from ROKS and the gender power theory. In 1996, BOJ found an ally in the newly established SKR, which focused on the individual woman and her specific experience and criticized ROKS’s concentration on structural issues and for being too “feminist” (McMillan, 2007). Apart from abused women, BOJ defined and drew attention to other categories in this time-period; youth and witnesses are the clearest examples.

BOJ also put in much effort to reach more victims, not only via the local centers. In 2001, BOJ started a national helpline aiming to “increase availability” and “reach more crime victims” (BOJ, 2002, p. 13). In the next time-period, BOJ growth stabilizes as it tries to standardize and streamline its victim support. Toward the end of this period, one of BOJ’s board members, Magnus Lindgren, wrote a book named Exposed and Vulnerable Crime Victims, which highlighted the situation of victims that showed special reactions, problems, and needs, including elderly, children, people with disabilities, victims of homophobic and racist crime, and children and girls with immigrant backgrounds (Lindgren, Pettersson, & Hägglund, 2004). In the next period, BOJ’s focus on so-called “vulnerable” victims would increase.

Note

1 The County Administrative Boards come under the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs and work to implement government policy in the Swedish counties.

References


A hibernated welfare state

A hibernated welfare state


Chapter 7

Marketization and Europeanization of the welfare state

The Swedish welfare state in a new era

In September 2006, the center-right parties came together as the Alliance and regained power in government under the leadership of the Moderate Party. Before the election, the Moderate Party rebranded the party as the New Moderates (Nya Moderaterna) symbolizing an ideological move toward the center. The Alliance came to stay in power for eight years, until 2014. The soon to be Prime Minister, Fredrik Reinfeldt, had some days before the 2006 election declared to the International Herald Tribune that “What we are doing is taking responsibility for the Nordic Welfare State, but putting it in a context of a new era” (quoted in Hort, 2014, p. 86). In this new era, Sweden approached European normality, rather than being an exceptional Nordic welfare state. Sweden has sought to be active and a driving force in international organizations, such as the European Union (EU). As we will see, these international collaborations influenced both the Swedish government and BOJ’s policies and practices for victims.

Now, the transformation from a welfare state to a welfare society that began in the early 1990s had a fresh start. The Alliance injected a new round of changes into the welfare sector, and the role of the state and municipalities as service providers became more and more limited. The wide field of public service in many sectors altered to a public-funded market, where private enterprises made a steady progression. Tax-funded private schools developed and competed with public schools; the same happened to elder care and soon also to treatment centers for various social and health issues. Although some treatments and interventions remained the domain of the public sector, the role of public bodies has become concentrated on assessing needs and selecting interventions, as well as funding and controlling the work done by private companies and, to some extent, NPOs.

New Public Management (NPM), that is, cost-cutting, doing more for less, and making service delivery more business-like (Hood, 1991), had by this time become an indisputable focus of almost all organizations. The NPM wave extended to NPOs since its introduction to Sweden in the early 1990s,
which is under increased pressure to make their services more efficient and cost-effective. Overall, the Swedish voluntary sector has moved toward increased professionalization, which makes it seem like it requires special skills to perform voluntary unpaid assignments (Svedberg, 2005). Besides, from the late 1990s and onward, a debate on knowledge and evidence-based practice has been vivid in and around human service organizations in Sweden. This had influenced the general idea of “working with people,” which should show effects, something that came to have an impact on the discourse on victim support.

Swedish demographics and attitudes toward immigrated people, Muslims in particular, continued to change. Most foreign people had come from Europe (55 percent) and Asia (30 percent). Immigration had also increased from Africa (Statistics Sweden, 2010). In the 2010 election, the Sweden Democrats (SD), a conservative right-wing populist party entered Parliament with 5.7 percent of the votes. Before the election, SD released a controversial campaign video showing an elderly white woman trying to claim her pension but is overhauled by women wearing burqas and pushing strollers. When the war broke out in Syria in 2011, many people came to Sweden, and immigration exceeded all previous numbers. In 2014, 16.5 percent of the Swedish population was born abroad. Finnish people were still the largest group, followed by Iraq and Poland (Statistics Sweden, 2018).

Continued welfarist crime policies – for some

Just a few months before the general election in 2006, the Moderate Party outlined how crime should be fought in the document New Moderates on Zero Tolerance for Crime. They suggested, for example, tougher sentencing, more stringent rule on deportation of aliens, and privately run correctional institutions. The Moderate Party also argued that victims of crime should be treated with knowledge and empathy and be given genuine, practical assistance. There should, for example, be assistants for victims of crime on duty 24 hours a day at every police station in the country.

Looking back at the late 2000s and early 2010s, however, many would agree, however, that Sweden did not go through a penal crisis. Penalties have increased, especially for violent, sexual, and drug crimes, but the support for a humane criminal justice system remained strong, along with a desire to not incarcerate. Between 2006 and 2014, the prison population rate decreased from 79 to 61 per 100,000 of the nation’s population (Institute for Criminal Policy Research, 2018). This is relatively low, even from a Western European perspective, where the median prison population rate is estimated around 84 (Institute for Criminal Policy Research, 2016). Sweden has also increasingly used electronic monitoring of offenders as an alternative to imprisonment. The motto for the Prison and Probation Service has since 2008 been “Better out” (Bättre ut), a concept without direct meaning in Swedish but that
sums up the rehabilitative ambition that every offender should have better preconditions to live a life without crime after having served a sentence. A recent study on attitudes toward punishment in Scandinavia (Balvig, Gunnlaugsson, Jerre, Tham, & Kinnunen, 2015) showed that when asked a simple question, the public wants harsher penalties, yet when presented with more information, the public becomes less punitive and on average demands lower sentences than judges.

Recent research has, however, pointed to a selectivity of changes, where more welfarist criminal justice policy and practices may be receding for marginalized populations (Gallo & Kim, 2016; Pratt & McLean, 2015; Shammas, 2015). Pratt and McLean (2015) have framed this development as a “burification” in Sweden and Shammas (2015) as a “dualization” in Norway. Pratt and McLean (2015) argue that the end of Swedish penal exceptionalism is greatly overstated; however, it has been “reconfigured” to include “legitimate” Swedes and exclude immigrants and ethnic minorities. In a similar fashion, scholars have recognized the endurance of universal welfare policies but pointed to policy changes mainly marginalized groups, immigrants, social assistance recipients, and long-term unemployed in particular (Bergmark, 2008; Gallo & Kim, 2016; Lappi-Seppälä, 2008; Rothstein & Lindbom, 2004).

**Crime victim reform and human rights**

Political reforms to support crime victims have, similar to the general development in Swedish crime policy, focused on criminalization to some degree. The inclination to see victims and offenders as distinct and opposing groups has also become more common during recent years (Tham, Rönneborg, & Rytterbro, 2011). A study of crime-policy bills from 2005 to 2010 showed that crime victims are described as good, innocent, and needing help, whereas the offender is seen as a bad, ruthless scoundrel who needs to be punished severely (Heber, 2014). Demker and Duus-Otterström (2008, p. 24) have argued that the increasing interest in crime victims may have served as a “window of opportunity for the recall of general prevention” in Swedish crime policy. According to Demker and Duus-Otterström, it was the conservative Moderate Party which led the transformation to a criminal policy increasingly focused on crime victims. Some measures for crime victims have also moved in a more punitive direction, criminal injuries compensation being one example. In 2014, the new government enacted a new Criminal Injuries Compensation Act (2014:322). Criminal injuries compensation still relies on public funds, but the government sharpened the recourse claims against the convicted person. In the bill, the center-right government stated:

> A driving force for people to commit a crime is the prospect of achieving economic gain … It is therefore important that those who commit
crimes are not only prosecuted but also are deprived of the possibility of harvesting the profits of crime. If society makes it difficult for perpetrators to benefit from crime, it can be assumed that crime is decreasing. (prop. 2013/14: 94, p. 48)

This is a sharp contrast to the 1978 Act, which stated that the state should exercise caution in recourse claims. Overall, tort law has gotten a more prominent role in Sweden (Schultz, 2016).

Nevertheless, most would agree that law-and-order policies have not (yet) overtaken the Swedish victim movement. Scholars have challenged the claim that the Swedish victim movement is part of punitive ideals, law-and-order policies, and an individualization process. Wergens (2014) argues that victim initiatives may have been launched via a retributive outlook and can perhaps dichotomize victims and perpetrators. Wergen’s study, which examines how the protection of child victims is expressed in Swedish legislation and policies, shows that most measures taken for victims have been directed at victims as a group. According to Wergens (2014), the Swedish victim movement’s emphasis on care and treatment can be seen as a commitment to human rights, such as individuals’ equal worth and dignity and the right to a fair trial. This is similar to other European countries, such as the United Kingdom, where human rights have been a driving force behind victim reform (Hall, 2010; Rock, 2004). The Swedish state has also provided victims with far-reaching possibilities to obtain material compensation. Since 1988, victims of a number of criminal acts have a right to compensation for. Wergens points out that the crime victims’ right to compensation for a violation of personal integrity (kränkningsersättning), which is provided to a number of crime victims independent of other injuries, and which aims to restore the dignity harmed by crime, complies with human rights standards. Wergens (2014) has pointed out that human rights practices still do not fully inform Swedish victim policies, particularly in providing protection and solving crime.

Women’s shelters in a publicly funded market

Violence against women remained an important issue for the center-right government, but with a new definition of the problem. The government called for the professionalization of women’s shelters and, in the long run, a model in which women’s shelters carry out commissioned work for the municipal social services on a contract basis (Enander, Holmberg, & Lindgren, 2013; Hedlund, 2009). This means that the shelter must deal with the administration of the cases and is under the supervision of the Health and Social Care Inspectorate (IVO). The municipal social services are responsible for ensuring that the shelters deliver quality services as defined by the Social
Services Act (2001; SFS, 2001:453) and that the shelter staff has the required skills (SoS, 2016).

A similar trend is evident across western jurisdictions (Booth & Carrington, 2017; Kim, 2013; Messner, 2016; Messner, Greenberg, & Peretz, 2015; Simmonds, 2016). Radical feminism, as the U.S. sociology and gender studies scholar Michael Messner (2016, p. 16) points out, has been “largely eclipsed behind the rise of non-profit and state-driven initiatives that confront issues like gender-based violence through a professionalized and marketized public health model.”

In addition, the center-right government began conceptualizing violence against women as an individual problem pertaining to women with specific obstacles, rewriting and editing out earlier understandings of men’s violence against women as a structural gender power concern in policies and guidelines (Holmberg, Enander & Lindgren, 2015). Men’s violence against women was now part of a gender equality policy that was more focused on the individual (Holmberg, Enander, & Lindgren, 2015).

After the gender power theory lost its strong position in politics, and with a new center-right government in place, there were no given positions in the field of violence against women or, rather, the emerging publicly funded market. Swedish Association of Women’s Shelters (SKR) did not oppose the center-right government’s new policies; in fact, it was cautiously optimistic (Holmberg, Enander, & Lindgren, 2015). BOJ worked to further establish itself as an organization serving abused women, to a great extent under the leadership of SKR’s founder and former board chair, Elisebeth Markström. In 2006, BOJ formed a working group, which aimed to be a resource in BOJ’s work in the field of violence against women, with Markström as one of its members (BOJ, 2006). Most local BOJ victim support centers were now part of local networks addressing violence against women (BOJ, 2007). Markström wanted to take the local centers’ work even further and encouraged them to run women’s shelters parallel with their ordinary activities (Mörner, 2007). At its 2007 annual meeting, BOJ adopted a statement on combating violence in close relationships (BOJ, 2007). By now, BOJ had trained 929 people in the local centers to better support women exposed to violence in close relationships. BOJ noted that through the education effort, “the local victim support centers had received a better foundation for the applications to the County Administrative Boards [for funding]” (BOJ, 2007, p. 14).

In 2008, BOJ received funding from the National Board of Health and Welfare (SoS) to identify municipalities without women’s shelters. One of the aims of the project was to investigate whether local BOJ centers were interested in developing women’s shelters in municipalities that did not have one. BOJ concluded that the local centers had a great interest in strengthening their work in the area of violence against women, but starting women’s
shelters within more centers had to be seen as part of a long-term strategy (BOJ, 2008, p. 14). Both SKR and the National Organization for Women’s Shelters (ROKS) contributed information to the project. The BOJ annual reports for 2007 and 2008 also briefly mention collaboration between BOJ and ROKS.

BOJ efforts to build a profile in the area of violence against women was successful. In 2009, BOJ grants from SoS for its work in the area of violence against women had increased to 650,000 SEK, and in 2014, the grant was over 1000,000 SEK (see Figure 7.1).

![Figure 7.1](image)

Figure 7.1 SoS’s grants to BOJ for its work with violence against women from 2004 to 2014 (SEK).

BOJ competes with other NGOs for these grants and must apply every year. No organization enjoys guaranteed long-term funding. BOJ is obliged to report how it has used the funds at the end of the year. In 2009, 2010, and 2014, BOJ received another of the SoS grants that support NGOs working for LGBT persons who have been exposed to intimate partner violence. The grant ranged from 46,000 to 1 million SEK (SoS, 2015).

**Standardization of victim support**

The push for professionalization, standardization, and streamlining is present in the area of not only violence against women but also generic victim support. In the 2000s, international organizations worked to ensure that victims
receive uniform information, protection, and high-quality support. In 2008, the European Forum for Victim Services changed its name to Victim Support Europe (VSE) to convey a corporate and professional image (Hall, 2010). VSE met regularly with European institutions to influence EU policy and legislation.

In 2012, the European Council of European Union (2012) replaced the 2001 Framework Decision on the Standing of Victims in Criminal Proceedings, with a Directive establishing minimum standards on the rights, support, and protection of victims of crime. The Directive aimed to make victim support more unified in Europe. VSE (2016) was directly involved in the development of the Directive. Victims’ right to access victim support services is specified in Article 8 of the Directive, which states that the Member States shall ensure that victims and their family members shall have access to confidential victim support services free of charge. Member states had until November 2015 to bring into force the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions necessary to comply with the directive. The Swedish government has explicitly stated that BOJ helps fulfill the conditions in Article 8 (victims’ right to support services) set forth in the Directive (Ds. 2014:14; prop. 2014/15:77).

In some European countries, there has also been a significant shift in the funding of generic victim services. Simmonds (2016) has shown that victim services in the United Kingdom increasingly have been subject to “the market” to achieve efficient support. In addition, the U.K. government has emphasized the importance of competition in victim services. The Police and Crime Commissioners are now responsible for commissioning a range of victim services (Simmonds, 2016). To ensure future commissioning, victim services are held accountable for the outcomes they achieve rather than the numbers of victims they have contacted or supported (U.K. Ministry of Justice, 2012).

**A uniform profile – from south to north**

In 2006, BOJ adopted a policy document, which presented, among other things, the role of support persons and witnesses supporters:

> To be a support person and a witness supporter means being a fellow-human being for an affected person in need of help. It requires an awareness of the special relationship which, in spite of the human base, is not an equal relationship … To some extent, one can say that the victim and the witness are in a state of dependence because of their need for help. It requires a correct and empathetic response.

(BOJ, 2013a, p. 3)

The policy document stated that the supporters should be “empathetic fellow-human beings” and that they should refer to expertise as needed. Lagerbäck echoed this statement in the interview and said that “Volunteering has its
limit, and that relates to fellow-humanness, but then it is also important to ensure that you do not do harm.” In the same year, BOJ appointed a working group tasked with developing local victim support and quality assurance. The group planned visits to local centers to start a dialogue about what support they needed to reach the minimum requirements (BOJ, 2006). Moreover, BOJ developed an *Association Handbook*, which included information about BOJ’s history and basic values. According to BOJ, the book was “an important step in the quality work aiming to give victims of crime best possible support” (BOJ, 2006, p. 13). One year later, BOJ’s annual meeting decided that all centers should meet the minimum requirements by 2009 (BOJ, 2007). Gradually, BOJ had specified a model for the local centers that all could be measured against, enabling a more uniform image across the country. In the interview, Larsson highlighted the importance of BOJ holding the same standard and provided equivalent support:

So if we are talking about a good victim support then it should mean the same thing if it’s up in Norrland [north], or whether it is in Stockholm or in Skåne [south].

BOJ also worked with the local centers to get a more uniform web presence: for example, where websites followed the same model (BOJ, 2014).

In BOJ’s archive, some centers have well-functioning victim support but are nonfunctioning NPOs. BOJ has excluded some centers, and some centers have themselves reported that they do not live up to the minimum standards and, therefore, want to withdraw from BOJ. There are also new local victim organizations that have chosen not to be members of BOJ. Local victim support centers are thus governed to work according to the established guidelines if they want to be members of BOJ. However, there is nothing that prevents them from providing victim support as desired but not in the name of BOJ.

BOJ hence protects a unified stance in the centers that are part of the organization but do not put obstacles to other organizations wishing to pursue victim support in other forms. This also applies to national initiatives for victims of crime, even when they have been formed by former key members of BOJ. One such example is the think-tank *Foundation Safer Sweden* which was established by a former BOJ board member Magnus Lindgren in 1998. Lindgren states that Safer Sweden was founded as “a response to the absence of an independent actor who could professionally raise the victim issues while helping other actors to work more structured at both strategic and operational levels” (Safer Sweden, 2018).

**Marketing and branding**

In 2009, BOJ launched an extensive organizational development program. NPM now started to influence BOJ work and guidance to the local centers.
Managerial concepts used by governmental organizations and the business sector undeniable started to creep into BOJ language. In 2009, BOJ established a new working group focused on “organizational development.” In the following year, BOJ highlighted that they were doing a “situational analysis” (omvärldsanalys) to get an idea about how the situation for crime victims looks, both internally and externally (BOJ, 2010a, p. 7). This kind of analysis examines the environment the organization is operating in and how it is changing and is in business also referred to as “business intelligence” or “market intelligence.” According to BOJ, the analysis was aimed at helping the local centers’ “secure the quality” of their operations (BOJ, 2010a, p. 7).

Marketing and branding also got a predominant place in BOJ’s material. This can be captured just by studying the format and layout of BOJ’s annual reports. The 1989 annual report is roughly six pages long and contains hand-written tables. The 2014 report is approximately 40 pages and includes photos of events, volunteers, and board members, as well as statistical graphs and diagrams giving an image of the victims the local centers meet and support. This development could be explained by changing and more accessible technological support, but it also has to be acknowledged as a reflection of discursive changes in society. In 2014, BOJ had a website, a Facebook account, and a YouTube channel (BOJ, 2014). In 2011, Larsson announced that BOJ’s “brand name must be strengthened” and that BOJ “must get a more uniform profile” (BOJ, 2011, p. 13). According to Larsson, BOJ “should work to change, but without losing the local anchorage.” In the interview, Larsson also underlined that:

We must also be able to show our activities and the support more clearly so that funders, the police, and other actors have confidence in our organization.

In Larsson’s reasoning, we can recognize the “accountability” that is important in organizations influenced by NPM. You must show what you do to get confidence. BOJ also adopted a new education plan in 2011, which worked to keep the organization together based on basic principles.

“We need to think in a new. We need to be more active”

In 2012, BOJ initiated an organizational inquiry. According to the January minutes of BOJ’s national board, the ambition was “We need to think in a new way. We must be more active. We need to work more preventative. We must be better at making demands on different societal functions.” This coincided with relocation of BOJ’s national office from Södermalm to Hammarby Sjöstad. Hammarby Sjöstad is also part of Södermalm but was not gentrified until later. The area was converted from an old run-down industrial area to a modern eco-friendly district in the early 2000s.
By now, the office had employees totaling approximately 10 full-time positions, including an editor, an IT/web manager, an education officer, and an organizational developer. BOJ’s evolvement can also be captured in the titles of its staff. Until 2003, the head of the national office was named “association secretary.” In 2003, this title changed to “association director” and in 2008 to “secretary-general” (see Table 7.1).

BOJ sought to redefine the local victim support volunteers as “professionals.” Starting in 2007, BOJ stated that the local centers are composed of “volunteers and qualified support persons” (BOJ, 2007, p. 2). In 2010, BOJ added the word “professional” before “fellow-human being” when they underscored that they base their voluntary work on “professional fellow-human beings” (BOJ, 2010a, p. 6). According to BOJ, this meant that “support and responses to crime victims are built on competence through personal suitability and different trainings” (BOJ, 2010, p. 6). A year later, BOJ stated that they were working to develop a new organization where local centers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>FTE</th>
<th>Type of Positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>Chair of the board, education-coordinator, project leader Stockholm Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Association secretary, editor, household technician, office clerk, secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>Administration manager, association secretary, economy assistant, editor, education secretary, project assistant county coordinator, project assistant witness support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>Administration manager, assistant national helpline, association director, coordinator national helpline, editor/information manager, education-coordinator, office clerk, phone operator/clerk, project leader young crime victims, project leader crime against convenience stores, project leader violence against women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>Assistant national helpline, coordinator national helpline/ support in your own language, economy manager, education-coordinator, IT-manager, phone operator/ clerk, project leader violence against women, project leader victims disability, secretary-general, witness support coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>Administrator, assistant national helpline, coordinator national helpline, economy manager, editor/information manager, education-coordinator, IT and web manager, office clerks, organizational developer, project leader victim and disability, manager violence against women, secretary-general</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
throughout Sweden could provide “competent fellow-human support” (BOJ, 2011, p. 9). In 2012, the word professional also made its way into BOJ mission statement, when BOJ established that the main task of the local victim support centers is to give “professional fellow-human support” (BOJ, 2012, p. 2). The combination of these terms in BOJ’s archive shows the tension in the organization between the old and the new thinking in how victims are best served. It also shows how the external influence governs the development of BOJ.

**New basic principles for the new Victim Support Sweden**

The 2013 annual meeting decided to change the organization’s name and that a new logo should be developed. The Swedish Association for Victim Support (Brottsofferjourneras Riksförsånd) should now become Victim Support Sweden (Brottsofferjourner Sverige). All local centers should use the same brand, with Sweden replaced by the local centers’ location. For administrative reasons, the new name was not formally adopted until 2015. The 2013 meeting also adopted the document *Basic principles for Victim Support Sweden*, key thoughts that already characterized the organization but which were now also written down and decided. The document begins:

BOJ’s purpose is to offer and give fellow-human support, information, and practical guidance to crime victims, witnesses, and their next-of-kin. BOJ’s work is a complement and alternative to governmental support. BOJ emphasizes active cooperation with other organizations and authorities to continuously develop support for those exposed to crime and strengthen their rights.

The document further shows that the crime victim’s vision for crime victim support is that everyone exposed to crime must receive equal support in dealing with:

- All parts of the judicial process, including police investigations, protection and damages issues, and insurance issues
- Mental, physical, social, and existential consequences of crime.

According to the document, support measures must be offered promptly and continue until the need of the person exposed to crime is met. A person exposed to crime is a person who experiences that they or their next-of-kin have been exposed to crime, whether or not a police report has been made.

The document also presented keywords, including empathic, engaged, credible, and responsible. None of this is new, but with the adoption of the document at the national meeting, the organization’s view of its activities had been manifested.
As BOJ tried to standardize and streamline victim support, it entered a phase where centers were merging and closing. Between 2006 and 2014, the number of local BOJ centers decreased from 108 to 92. In 2012, the total number of victims BOJ serves also started to decrease. In 2012, BOJ supported 99,279 crime victims and witnesses. In 2014, this number had decreased to 85,687. Still, in 2014, three decades after the first victim support center was founded, a minority of the victims contacted BOJ and the local centers themselves (14 percent). Most victims got referred from the police (84 percent) (BOJ, 2014).

**Continued commitment to human rights**

Human rights have had a significant impact on BOJ’s policies and practices. In the second part of the 2000s, BOJ’s focus on human rights got more defined. In 2008, BOJ’s (2008) *Crime Victim Magazine* devoted a special issue to human rights. Over the years, BOJ’s commitment to human rights principles has been put to the test: for example, in 2008, when 10-year-old Engla Höglund was raped and killed by 42-year-old Anders Eklund on her way home from soccer practice. The murder became national news, and Engla’s funeral was broadcast live on television. Engla’s mother, Carina Höglund, became politically active and a strong victim advocate. She spoke actively in the media about crime victims and their situation, often promoting harsh punishments for convicted people. She also sued the state for failing to prevent her daughter’s murder, a case which she lost. Höglund did not join BOJ, but another NPO, the National Organization of Relatives of Homicide Victims (RAV), which provides support and forms opinion for relatives of homicide victims. In BOJ’s material, there is evidence of collaborations between BOJ and RAV; however, we have not found any support of Höglund or her public statements around the time of the murder. Moreover, at the September 2008 court hearing, Eklund’s defense attorney cited Dagerman’s poem *To kill a child*, that is, the same story that was read at BOJ’s first public event in 1989. As a result, Höglund lashed out on Eklund’s lawyer and left the courtroom.

In 2009, Klette resigned as BOJ chair of the board and wrote the following in his last editorial:

> During my 14 years as chairman of BOJ, I have written around 70 “The chairman has the word” in the *Crime Victim Magazine* that, which a few exceptions, have dealt with human rights primarily from a crime victim’s perspective and expressed the wish that the state should live up to the European Council’s minimum standards. BOJ work with these requirements must continue.

(Klette, 2009, p. 2)

In the interview, Hans Klette summarized BOJ’s approach with “We are fellow-human beings of equal value who must collaborate for survival.”
A prosecutor takes over the leadership of BOJ

In 2009, BOJ elected a new chair of its national board, Sven-Erik Alhem, an independent public debater and retired prosecutor. Although Alhem was engaged in issues related to crime victims, he had not, as the previous chairs Lagerbäck and Klette, been active in a local BOJ center. But Alhem had been in contact with BOJ in his role as a prosecutor. Early in his career, he had participated in the education of BOJ’s support persons through the county court in Malmö. He had also had several contacts with Lagerbäck who had contacted him about cases involving individual victims of crime. Alhem also had contact with Klette from the time he was studying in Lund. Although Alhem was “new” in BOJ, victim support was not new for him and he was already familiar with several of the key actors in the organization.

BOJ’s attention to human rights would continue under Alhem’s leadership. Although Alhem has made many public statements in favor of heavier penalties for convicted people, he has not moved BOJ in a significantly more punitive direction. Just after he was elected, he was interviewed for an article in the Crime Victim Magazine, which highlighted that:

He [Alhem] believes that he can support the basic principles directly. He has been committed to crime victims for a long time. He also notes with satisfaction that one of BOJ’s five basic principles is that efforts should not be made at the expense of the rehabilitation of the perpetrator. That human rights are the base and that the organization wants to push that the rights of victims should be given the same priority as the criminal. He also supports that fully.

(Mörner, 2009, p. 13)

In the interview for this project, Alhem also acknowledged that many victims are offenders, and vice versa. “We can never rank people by suspects or victims, you can quickly change from one another to another.” Alhem expressed that one can very well discuss legislation for victims but “never at the expense of accused or suspected.” In the 2009 interview, Alhem also mentioned the murder of Engla Höglund, but without including Carina Höglund or Anders Eklund.

When I heard that this was the first time she rode home from football training by herself, it was difficult.

(Mörner, 2009, p. 14)

Nevertheless, Alhem has now, a decade after the murder of Engla Höglund, publicly supported her mother Carina Höglund, when she argued against the conversion of Eklund’s life sentence to set time sentence. Another dimension of the victim-offender overlap that is conveyed in BOJ’s material is that people crime victims can become offenders. As Larsson expressed in the interview:
An important aspect to bring along is that many of those who are offenders today have been a victim of crime when, earlier, perhaps when you were a child. Unfortunately, there are very many who have lived in an abusive family, who later becomes an offender, when they are older. We can take the issue with bullying. Where you may have been bullied during school years, then becomes an offender, so it is very complicated … Sometimes it is subtle if you’re an offender or victim.

BOJ’s focus on human rights culminated in the adoption of its Basic principles for Victim Support Sweden. The document sets out the basic principles under three headings: (1) Human Rights, (2) Rule of Law/Legal Security, and (3) Fellow-Human Support with Good Quality. Under the heading Human Rights, BOJ writes:

Human rights are the basis for our work. These apply to each person regardless of ethnicity, skin color, gender, language, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, political opinion or social status and establishes the equal value and equal rights of all people. In order to protect the rights of victims of crime, the crime victim is highlighting in particular.

BOJ also refers to a number of international statements and declarations, including the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as the EU 2012 Directive is about minimum standards that provide more direct guidelines in regard to victims of crime. BOJ work aligns with arguments throughout the Directive. The Directive, for example, states that crime victims should be treated with respect and dignity and that they have a right to information, support, and to be heard in the judicial process. In the interview, Alhem talked about what it means in practice for witnesses in court and how it could be:

It is, therefore, a stressful situation, and there is no welcome there, no welcome, but you have to find a hall, session hall, yourself. And then you always hear these voices, which are a little theatrical … “at Hall 5 a case between public prosecutors and Lisa Petterson is handled, wanting parties and witnesses to enter the courtroom” … It sounds like a trade fair almost. And then there is always new calls, “is the witness Johansson in …” yes. And absolutely no one who says “Welcome to the District Court … do you want a cup of coffee?”

Alhem’s story exemplify how both a human rights and a crime victim’s perspective reoccur in BOJ’s argumentation. The right to be heard exists, but having the right to participate in the court hearing does not automatically mean to be welcome. By taking into account what could be attributed to Article 1
of the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights in the question of how we should “act in a spirit of community.” Overall, human rights and the state’s responsibility for its citizens is also a recurring theme in the interview with Alhem, who said:

Society has a major responsibility for victims of crime. If you start from scratch then society has the greatest responsibility for that no human is being subjected to crime.

**Vulnerable crime victims and cutting-edge expertise**

The concept of “vulnerable” crime victims has gained momentum internationally. The EU’s 2012 Directive mandates that particular attention should be paid to vulnerable victims, which they describe in the following manner:

In the context of the individual assessment, particular attention shall be paid to victims who have suffered considerable harm due to the severity of the crime; victims who have suffered a crime committed with a bias or discriminatory motive which could, in particular, be related to their personal characteristics; victims whose relationship to and dependence on the offender make them particularly vulnerable. In this regard, victims of terrorism, organized crime, human trafficking, gender-based violence, violence in a close relationship, sexual violence, exploitation or hate crime, and victims with disabilities shall be duly considered.

In the United Kingdom, the U.K. Ministry of Justice (2012) has pushed for a victim support model that targets those in greatest need. According to the government, victim support services should especially give priority to repeat victims, vulnerable victims, and victims of serious crimes. The Ministry of Justice described Victim Support England’s original model, which, similar to BOJ, offers support to all those referred by the police, as “unsustainable and wasteful” (U.K. Ministry of Justice, 2012, p. 18). The U.K. Ministry of Justice has highlighted that Victim Support needs to make sure that “support is not routinely provided to those who do not need or want it.” According to the U.K. Ministry of Justice, this is particularly important since research shows that victims of the most serious offenses “often do not get the support they need” (2012, p. 10).

As we will see, BOJ has also followed a trend focusing on “vulnerable” crime victims, which it defined as the elderly, children, people with disabilities, homosexuals, marginalized people, victims of hate crime and racism, and so on. BOJ underlined that its fundamental victim support and advocacy work should be complemented with different building blocks, one example being “cutting-edge expertise aimed at different groups of victims” (BOJ, 2010a, p. 6).
Children and youth

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the municipal social services initiated programs for youth as victims of crime. In the second part of the 2000s, social services started many programs for children as victims of crime. Parallel with this development, BOJ focus on children and youth intensified. When we asked BOJ secretary-general of that time, Hans Klette (1995–2009), which crime victims BOJ should support, he answered:

Women and children in the home who are crime victims, and then there are the young boys in society that fight who become crime victims.

In the 2000s, BOJ often discussed children in conjunction with violence against women and as victims of other crimes. In 2006, “children and their parents” got a separate heading in BOJ’s annual report, where BOJ (2006) described its participation in the project MUSAS II. BOJ had come in contact with the project through its membership in VSE. In the first step of the project, representatives from six European countries worked together on a training model for volunteers on children who have been subjected to violence. In the second step, the model was offered to a number of new countries. The aim of the training was to:

Raise awareness of children who are victims of crime, understand the importance of the parents in the support of the children, and the victim supporters’ role as a bridge between children and parents.

(BOJ, 2006, p. 15)

In total, 372 children under 12 years had been in contact with the local centers in 2006. Most children had been exposed to abuse (43 percent) (BOJ, 2006). In 2007, BOJ introduced children into their mission statement. BOJ goals included the establishment of a National Children's Center and a Children's Code, and to incorporate the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child into Swedish law. BOJ also highlighted the need to strengthen children’s rights in a press release. One year later, BOJ organized a two-day training, where the participants were taught how they support children and their parents. The education included theory and practical methodology, including role play. After completing the training, participants should bring their knowledge to their local and regional communities (BOJ, 2008). Some local centers argued that children needed support from experts. They did not agree with the idea that local BOJ centers should provide support to children. BOJ met the objections by stating that:

Experiences from centers around the country show that this expert help by no means is obvious and sometimes very difficult to obtain. BOJ's
statistics show that the local centers have contact with children under 12 years old … As a complement to society’s supportive activities, BOJ also needs to pay attention to children as victims of crime. BOJ’s national board considers the issue so prioritized that the education was funded through the Crime Victim Endowment Fund.

Again, here we can see how BOJ uses their statistics to show that they are already working with a group that, according to them, the local centers should prioritize. Over the next years to come, BOJ continued its lobbying for children. However, many local centers did not embrace the idea of supporting children. The number of children served by the local centers also did not increase. In 2014, BOJ declared that 11 (out of 92) centers accounted for most contacts with children, which had given support to 10–35 children each. Some centers actively referred children to social services, child and adolescent psychiatry, or other organizations (BOJ, 2014).

BOJ’s focus on youth also intensified. In 2006, BOJ organized four 2-day courses for participants from the local centers, where each center put together an action plan on their continued work with young crime victims. BOJ (2006) started the production of a book, website, and four movies about young crime victims. In 2009, BOJ made a movie named, Stand up! About Wanting to Witness and Report for youth 13 years and older. According to BOJ (2009, p. 12), the movie “explains why it is important to witness and report – both for yourself and others.” In the same year, BOJ launched a website for young crime victims, which, according to BOJ, increased the number of questions from youth significantly (BOJ, 2009, 2010). Representatives from BOJ and the local centers also participated in an annual music festival in Hultsfred to offer support to youth (BOJ, 2009). According to Larsson, BOJ shift in focus from volume crime to children and youth can, to a great extent, be explained by the professionalization of BOJ’s victim support.

If you look historically, how it has changed, as I said before, so it was mainly volume crime. In the very beginning, victim support should not support children and youth as it requires more professional help. It was the same with serious crime categories, such as rape and murder. There we did a limitation in the beginning. Then we have seen more knowledge and competence, so we can also support these groups.

BOJ was also influenced by overall increased attention to children and youth as crime victims. In the interview, Larsson explained:

Unless we get increased contributions, then we actually can’t, then we must consider if we can work with all crime victims … Right now I feel like people have begun to focus a lot on youth, so now we may have the opportunity to focus on youth and continue to develop [our work in this area] more, as we have wanted for many years.
When we asked Larsson where she thinks the interest in youth came from, she answered, “I think it is the current government that has highlighted this area as important.” The reasoning shows how the state governs BOJ; if BOJ does not get enough funds, it must prioritize, and then BOJ prioritizes in line with the state’s wants. Swedish municipalities have, in a similar fashion, imposed more control over the local BOJ centers. Some municipalities have replaced relatively unconditional grants with so-called “cooperation agreements,” which might give them greater influence over how the centers use the grants. In 2013, more than a third of BOJ local centers had signed a collaboration agreement with their local municipality (BOJ, 2013b).

Immigrated people and ethnic minorities

The Södertälje center, Sweden’s first lasting victim support center, was, as we saw earlier, supported by the local Immigration Bureau and had a strong focus on immigrated people. In the mid-2000, BOJ also started targeting its support to immigrated people. In 2006, the Crime Victim Fund supported a project, where BOJ recruited and trained volunteers with a so-called “different background than Swedish” (BOJ, 2006, p. 15). During the fall, BOJ trained ten volunteers who could give support in Russian, Spanish, Persian, Arabic, Serbian, French, and Hungarian. BOJ also started translating its information material. The aim was to build a pool of competent volunteers with language and cultural knowledge. The 2006 annual report states that

BOJ wants to formulate strategies and methods for long-term efforts to strengthen the local centers’ resources in this area and establish contacts with other organizations and activities that act in the area.

(BOJ, 2006, p. 16)

One year later, the “possibilities of diversity” was one of the themes in the national conference for coordinators in the local centers, which included a lecture titled Under the same Roof, but on different Plane Fields; Reflections about a diverse Society. At the end of the conference, BOJ raised a number of questions that the participants wanted to bring home to discuss diversity in the local centers (BOJ, 2007). In the same year, the Crime Victim Magazine published a special issue on multicultural victim support. By 2009, BOJ has 23 active language volunteers representing 19 different languages. BOJ has also conducted an information campaign to reach different immigrant organizations and marketed special information sheets at local centers, police, social services, and hospitals. Moreover, BOJ has set up a special number where victims could get in contact with a volunteer in their own language (BOJ, 2009). BOJ’s initiative received praise from the local centers as well as external bodies.

Support in your own language is highly appreciated by the local centers, but also externally by, for example, the police, health care and others
who come into contact with victims of a different ethnic background than Swedish.

(BOJ, 2011, p. 6)

BOJ centered on immigrated people as victims of racism and xenophobia. However, BOJ has also actively worked to draw attention to victims of culturally specific crimes, including honor-related violence and trafficking. In 2011, it received a grant to work with human trafficking, and in 2013, BOJ organized a seminar on the theme, in which 84 people from the local centers participated. Immigrated people was again a theme in BOJ’s national conference for coordinators in 2013. The 2013 annual report stated that:

The proportion of the population with foreign background has increased significantly since the 1980s and many centers estimate that there is a major need for further education to support people of different ethnic background than Swedish.

(BOJ, 2013b, p. 20)

Despite demands for a specialized and efficient victim support, BOJ ambitions still, as they have always been, are to support all crime victims. As Alhem expressed in the interview: “we are committed to support everyone and not categorize … We do not give the cold shoulder to anyone.” BOJ’s 2014 annual report also stated that BOJ’s “goal is to that all victims will be given the opportunity to receive a good support from the crime victim” (BOJ, 2014, p. 4).

**Elderly and people with disabilities**

In the mid-2000s, BOJ paid increasing attention to elderly and people with disabilities, which it portrays as “hidden groups.” BOJ would collaborate strategically and extensively with different NPOs to develop projects with these groups in focus, including the Swedish Association for Senior Citizens (SPF), and the Swedish Disability Federation (HSO). SV was also actively involved. For example, in 2006, BOJ organized a conference with SPF about abuse against elderly people with 190 participants (BOJ, 2006). The three organizations also published a book together named *Lack of Security, Threat and Abuse of the Elderly* (BOJ, SV & SPF, 2006). In 2010, BOJ and HSO received a four-year grant from the Swedish Inheritance Fund raise awareness of violence and abuse of people with disabilities through education and cooperation (BOJ, 2010a). In 2010, BOJ worked actively to anchor the project with the local centers through visits and training:

The project manager, who started in September 2010, worked most of the fall and winter with anchoring the project at local centers and HSOs
around the country. Several locations were visited and on some occasions, the project manager had joint meetings with local center and HSO. There was a great interest in the project and for the respective organization … The aim is to strengthen cooperation between the organizations and to anchor the knowledge in the area. This is primarily done through the training programs planned at the location, which are aimed at support persons and witness supporters, but also coordinators and assistants at the center. Key staff in HSOs will also receive training that focuses on crime victimization.

(BOJ, 2010, p. 16)

When Larsson in 2010 published a new edition of her book *Closeness That Hurts*, it included a new chapter about particularly vulnerable groups: for example, elderly and people with disabilities (BOJ, 2010b). BOJ project with HSO culminated in 2014 when they published the joint book *Violently Invisible: A Book about Crime Victimization and Disabilities* (BOJ, HSO, SV, 2014). After a decade of work of raising the competence about elderly people as victims of crime, BOJ could also declare success in this area:

Approximately 10 percent of those who meet the country’s local victim support centers are victims of crime over 65 years old. BOJ has a broad experience-based knowledge of meeting elderly victims of violence. We know that violence and abuse of the elderly is a hidden societal problem and that crime victimization among the elderly can have particularly serious consequences.

The close partnership with SPF and HSO illustrated and affirmed the strong position and authority that BOJ had gained in the field of NPOs. Both SPF and HSO are well-established Swedish NPOs with a history going back to the early or mid-20th century. SPF and HSO also needed BOJ in their quest to conceptualize their members as victims of “crime.” A timely partnership, where all could benefit from each other.

**Conclusions**

In the 2000s, the role of the state as a services provider continued to decrease. In many cases, NGOs now come into a market where they competed with private companies in offering treatment, support, or other kinds of interventions (Hort, 2014). The political discourse in the field of violence against women also moved away from a gender power analysis. Violence was considered something that affects a particular type of woman, and the perpetrators were portrayed as genderless deviants (Helmersson, 2017). The shift undercut ROKS’s dominant position and opened up the field for other actors, such as BOJ, to compete for resources and position. Increasingly, BOJ’s ambitions for
its practice and local centers grew to resemble the aims of women’s shelters. Having established itself in the field, BOJ aspired to adopt a form similar to other organizations – a practice known as isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) – and even initiated a discussion about running local women’s shelters.

In parallel to these efforts, it streamlined, standardized, and professionalized its support. BOJ worked intensively to maintain the cognitive map of the organization, that is, that the organization as a whole had a combined perspective on how victim support should be done. This was done by centralizing its support and developing more direct standards and requirements for the local centers. International statements and directives have influenced this development: for example, the EU’s (2001) Framework Decision on the Standing of Victims in Criminal Proceedings.

As BOJ has tried to standardize the support, BOJ paid increased attention to so-called particularly “vulnerable” groups of victims, including children, youth, elderly people, and people with disabilities. A similar development can be observed in the United Kingdom where Victim Support England, alongside demands for efficiency, increasingly focused on children who have been victims of sexual and/or emotional abuse occurring within the family (Simmonds, 2016). BOJ has also actively drawn attention to immigrated people, in particular victims of culturally related crimes, such as honor-related killings. Research has shown that a focus on these victims can empower immigrated women and open up spaces for women’s groups, but it can also pave way for exclusion of immigrated people in the name of victim’s rights (Abu-Lughod, 2011; Hellgren & Hobson, 2009).

References


Creating and keeping an organization united

The development of BOJ is in a way a success history about how an organization is established, takes a place in a context, and is held together over time. This does not mean there have been no contradictions within the organization. Ever since the first discussions about whether it was time to start a national organization or to wait, there have, of course, been discussions and members have had different positions. Nevertheless, the organization has grown and continued to develop.

Three stages in the organizational work

We can document three stages in the BOJ’s development: construction, consolidation, and restructuring. During the construction phase, 1988–2001, BOJ was built, local centers formed across the country, and the organization grew to build a structure with regional coordinators. Similar to victim organizations in other countries, BOJ’s passionate founders had an undeniable impact. The entrepreneurial spirits and experiences of Per Svensson and Björn Lagerbäck were of great importance to the organization the first years. The two entrepreneurs were strong and dedicated and combined their various skills and could anchor the organization in a broader context. They acted in different organizational fields, politics, NPOs, government agencies, which taken together allowed them to move beyond what is taken for granted in one specific context (Battilana, 2006). The founders “made sense” of the organization, even though no victims were calling for support, at least not in the public debate, nor were there other organizations claiming that they did not have the resources to support victims. The founders hence created not only the organization but also the demand for the organization’s practice.

While Björn Lagerbäck took the central part of the external contacts, Per Svensson worked with establishing of new centers all over the country and to help them get started in the direct practical work with victim support. BOJ followed the model National Association of Victim Support Schemes
(NAVSS) in England and Wales with volunteers who provided victim support and a coordinator for managing the work.

In the 1990s, the number of local centers grew dramatically. Similar to NOVA and other victim groups in the United States (Hall, 2010), the founders lobbying achieved results relatively quickly, including support from the Ministry of Justice, the establishment of the Crime Victim Fund, and long-term stable funding. Gradually, Per Svensson became the one who, in his role as secretary-general, stood as the representative for the organization in parallel with Hans Klette, professor of criminal law, who became chair of the national board in 1995. Going into the millennium, BOJ started specializing its support based on different groups of victims.

The consolidation phase began with several parallel events of major importance for the future development. After long planning, BOJ’s national office moved from Södertälje to an office in Stockholm in 2001, which was shared with the Swedish Association for Women’s Shelters (SKR) and the National Organization against Sexual Abuse (HOPP). Around the same time, Svensson passed away suddenly. Björn Lagerbäck by then had stepped down from central positions in BOJ, even if he was still active in the organization. In the same year, BOJ initiated a national helpline, which centralized victim support. Direct support to victims was still a task for the local centers, but BOJ took a role in answering and communicating calls from victims. The archive material clearly shows that BOJ continuously worked on developing the organization in a detailed and structured way. Soon BOJ started to prioritize between different potential areas for lobbying efforts. National board meeting minutes give the impression that BOJ’s evolving national office handled many issues, but reports were presented and discussions held with the board.

In the mid-2000, BOJ started a vigorous effort to professionalize, standardize, and streamline its victim support while extending support to groups that traditionally have required professional help. International statements and directives greatly influenced this development. In parallel, BOJ now entered a phase when centers started merging and closing. The number of victims BOJ serves also started to decrease.

In 2008, BOJ initiated discussions about the role of the chair, the national boards, and the national office, which formed the transformation to the next phase. In 2009, a former prosecutor, Sven-Erik Alhem took over the leadership of BOJ’s national board. In the same year, BOJ launched an extensive organizational development program, which led to increased administration and put high demands on its national office. Marketing and branding also got a predominant place in BOJ’s material.

The restructuring phase was initiated in 2012 with an organizational inquiry. This coincided with a relocation of BOJ’s national office from central Stockholm to Hammarby Sjöstad. The office had recruited more staff and could no longer be accommodated in the premises shared with SKR and HOPP. The restructuring of BOJ’s organization and the new office can be seen as a result
of the same development. The organization had grown, bureaucratized, and been structured in a new way. BOJ manifested the restructuring and new way of working at the 2013 annual meeting when decisions were made to change the name to *Victim Support Sweden* and adopts the document *Basic principles for Victim Support Sweden*.

**Perspectives of human rights and of people as equals**

Some key basic ideas existed already when BOJ was established and has followed and characterized its work – most of them bringing together views of human beings. BOJ’s view on human beings relates to how contemporary and contextual views of society and is manifested in how individuals are regarded in different roles, such as victims, offenders, and support persons. Similar to many other European victim support organizations (Hall, 2010), human rights principles have governed the ideas of BOJ all through their history. According to Hall (2010, p. 107), the development of “rights” discourse has been an international, globalized trend for the last 50 years. As a consequence, the concept of rights has been applied to a diverse range of groups and lately also to victims of crime.

Human rights and the state’s responsibility for its citizens is a recurring and frequent theme in the archival material and the interviews. BOJ’s first bylaws from 1989 convey a human rights perspective, even though they were not yet defined as such. The bylaws stressed that the organization should work to better meet the needs and rights of persons who have been exposed to criminal acts. BOJ would, however, not define these rights as human rights until later. BOJ’s human rights perspective would become more defined and explicit under the consolidation phase and Klette’s leadership 1995–2008 and culminated in the adoption of the *Basic principles for Victim Support Sweden* in 2013, where it has a central place. It is evident that BOJ not only talked and wrote about human rights but it has also been the basis of BOJ’s activities, both in external opinion formation and in internal communication.

BOJ has taken a human rights approach not only by focusing on victim support but also by largely resisting reforms that limit the rights of offenders. Unlike victim advocates in some countries, such as the United States (Gallo & Elias, 2016; Garland 2001), BOJ has not explicitly contended for tougher policies on crime or portrayed victims and offenders as polar opposites. In BOJ’s earliest documents, crime victims are described as “being exposed to crime or criminal acts.” It is thus the phenomena of crime and the *incident* or the *act* that is highlighted, not the person who commits the act. Lagerbäck described in the interview that the client that he worked with as a psychologist in the prison and probation services often described that they also had been exposed to crime, something they were very upset about. We have also described how BOJ, in one of its very first events, presented a story where both victims and transgressor suffered from the crime.
Over the years, BOJ has continued to acknowledge the complexity of crime and that victims and offenders overlap. BOJ has also taken a clear stance against victims’ involvement in sentencing. On the whole, offenders do not hold a significant space in BOJ’s material. When BOJ writes about people who commit crime, they argued that crime victims should also have access to support, not that the support should be transferred from one party to another. But, according to BOJ, there must be a balance in how resources are distributed. The image that permeates BOJ’s arguments is that if we give victims the support and the resources they need, and perpetrators rehabilitation that prevents recidivism, it will overall be a positive outcome for victims of crime. Punishment is almost completely absent in BOJ’s material.

By focusing on the situation and the position that the individual person has gained, the starting point is the current event. BOJ does not write or talk about victimhood as part of a person’s identity but as an experience. People who are subjected to crime and people who commit crime can have many different roles and identities simultaneously in different contexts. Thus, there is no need to polarize identities against each other. In the situation where you have been subjected to crime, you may need different types of support, regardless if you have committed a crime or not. In the same fashion, can a person who has committed a crime in another context need support after being exposed to crime – one does not rule out the other. Another dimension that is conveyed in BOJ’s material is that victims of crime can become people who commit crime.

Another perception that reoccurs in BOJ’s material is that we all, as human beings, need each other. This comes especially clearly in the descriptions of the role and function of support persons in the local victim support centers. BOJ has always had the ambition that crime victims should have access to voluntary support persons throughout the country. These volunteers should be not an alternative to professionals but a complement to society’s resources. This means, for example, that the support persons are not expected to do therapy or have long-term contacts with victims. Support persons are “empathic fellow-human beings” that should refer to expertise as needed. The image of support persons as a complement to professional resources, a reinforcement of public resources, and a guide for the victims is reflected in BOJ’s archive. BOJ’s founders and current leadership also echoed this approach. In the interview, Alhem said that “It really matters to be able to say ‘I think it could be wise for you to maybe seek a psychiatrist or something.’”

Human rights are hardly a controversial issue in Sweden or in work related to crime victims. Swedish authorities and organizations have explicitly framed victim support, protection, and compensation as human rights issues in a general sense without really defining in detail what they mean by that. BroM (2013), which administers the Swedish crime victim compensation program, has a whole section on their website named Crime Victims and Human Rights. Human rights also formed the very basis for the government’s
Victim support and the state 151

2007 national action plan for violence against women (Enander, Holmberg, & Lindgren, 2013). There is no resistance to enforcing these principles; it can rather be seen as obvious. The issue of human rights can also be problematized in many ways, and it can be demonstrated that parts are not met. This may also be the case when dealing with criminal proceedings in Sweden and the victims’ position. BOJ has, however, consistently pushed for human rights in its lobbying work and guidance of the local centers. In order to understand how these thoughts translate into action in local practice, one could study the direct work that is being done. For the context presented in this book, we can unambiguously say that human rights have been a question that has held the BOJ together.

Creating cognitive maps

In this book, we have shown that BOJ and the local centers hold together and worked on the basis of collective ideas. BOJ’s fundamental ideas constituted a map, a cognitive map, for how to act. The map is not only a solid structure for the organization’s activities but also a detailed map with clear roads. It contains guidelines and policies in all relevant areas as well-structured and well-defined channels for dissemination of information through education, conferences, and publications. Yet there is room for discussion at the national meetings and to some extent within the framework of the national board’s work. The discussion is limited by clear agreements defining BOJ’s area of responsibility in relation to the local centers, which is well established at all levels of the organization. In this way, the organization’s “inertia” is maintained, that is, it is not open to launch all too new thoughts and that there are no dramatic changes. The upholding structure was, for example, seen in 2013, when there was a decision of a new name, but for structural and administrative reasons, the decision could not be implemented until 2015.

Organizations are often characterized by slow change. That is not only what makes an organization “recognizable” from time to time but also what can be a barrier when the outside world changes and an organization is not following developments. Hannan and Freeman (1984) argue that organizations that are inert are those that are best conditioned to endure. People who work within an organization take on the organization’s cognitive map, thus becoming “embedded” in the organization’s way of thinking (Garud, Hardy, & Maguire, 2007). When people act in the name of the organization, they need to maintain the credibility and legitimacy of the organization, which is more possible if there is an overall and lasting view of the organization’s purpose. An institutionalized and consistent view of the organization’s purpose does not necessarily mean that you also do what you say you should do. The important thing is that the common idea is maintained, inward in the organization as well as outwardly (Weick, 2001). BOJ has successfully created a cognitive map that established the organization and gave it legitimacy.
There are no studies on the extent to which the victim support is “useful,” “effective,” or where it leads, but neither are there any requirements for evaluation. There is an accepted understanding of BOJ’s activities and that they, with respect for human beings, meet the needs of crime victims as a complement to society’s other resources, an understanding that has a strong foundation in the organization.

**Anchoring the organization in a field**

An organization always acts in interaction with its surroundings and is, therefore, dependent on its context. BOJ was not only formed as a new organization but also focused on new issues. It happened in parallel. The same people who worked on building the organization also spread information about crime victims and the need for victim support. In that work, three societal developments were of importance, which relate to the state, politics, and women’s shelters.

**BOJ as a complement to the state**

According to Hall (2010), many European victim organizations defended their voluntary, apolitical character and rarely found themselves in opposition to their governments. We have seen that in Sweden, but it is also valid for other countries: for example, the Netherlands. BOJ was founded on the idea that NPOs can offer victims a different kind of service than the state.

Nevertheless, ever since BOJ was formed, it has acted in close cooperation with the state. The role of the organization as a complement to other resources in society places it in a position as a civil society organization between the people and the state. BOJ’s connection is closer to the state than the people. BOJ’s founders frequently interacted with government agencies and ministries, which has continued over the years. The Minister of Justice has, for example, always been invited as speakers at BOJ’s national meetings. BOJ’s connection to the people is not as clear. There are no traces in the archival material about a broad popular anchoring of the organizations. People generally get to know about BOJ through the media and public events. BOJ’s dialogue, however, takes place with decision-makers, authorities, and organizations, rather than people in society, which is the subject of information dissemination rather than dialogue partners. BOJ has also, similar to other victim support organizations in Sweden, as well as internationally, had problems reaching victims to support. One of the reasons for this lack of interest could be the temporality and the low interest in assuming the identity of being a victim.

Since 1999, BOJ has explicitly described itself as a complement to the public sector. BOJ has never had any ambition to take over the state’s responsibility and describes victims as a forgotten group. The state soon accepted this
role. In 2004, BOJ revised its mission to be “a complement and an alternative” to the public sector regarding work with crime victims. Hereby, BOJ marked that there were victims support programs in the public sector, but it was of a different kind. The Swedish government has explicitly stated that BOJ helps fulfill the conditions in Article 8 (victims’ right to support services) outlined in the 2012 EU Directive (Ds. 2014:14; prop. 2014/15:77). In the same manner, BOJ has highlighted that the government “would not be able to fulfill the Directive’s demands without the local BOJ centers’ services” (BOJ, 2015, p. 4).

The state and BOJ have a different emphasis in their statements, but it is obvious that they share the view where BOJ is, and should be, an important complement. The relationship is based on a mutual, implicit understanding that BOJ should provide victim support, and the state should fund it. But there are rather few specified contracts, although it is more or less explicitly stated that none of the parties take any responsibility for the other. In that way, the relationship is vaguely formulated and flexible. BOJ can seek funding elsewhere and the state can demand contracts for the funding of victim support and create public services in this field.

The state has always funded BOJ’s activities. The local centers have largely had municipal funding and BOJ has had government funds. Since 1994, the Crime Victim Fund has been BOJ’s main source of funding. The establishment of the fund exemplifies the cooperation between BOJ and the state. BOJ pushes for a question and the state transforms it into action, an act that secured stable and reliable funding for BOJ. A fee paid by those convicted in criminal cases finances the fund and by extension BOJ. But the state regulates the amount that convicted people should pay. BOJ also pushed to make victim support a responsibility for the municipal social services in the Social Services Act in 2001, which, by extension, secured funding for BOJ’s local victim support centers. Through the existence of local victim support centers, the social services have a body to refer crime victims to.

BOJ’s operating grants from the Crime Victim Fund have grown over time regardless of which government has been in power and been combined with grants for specific projects. None of BOJ’s projects were state initiatives; they were all funded following BOJ’s applications to the Crime Victim Fund. In this way, BOJ shapes its own practice and the state funds it. Starting in the mid-2000s, the National Board of Health and Welfare has also funded BOJ, primarily in the area of violence against women. In addition to the state grants, the private sectors and other NPOs have funded BOJ. These funds have mainly focused on specific projects or events, while state funds have formed the basis for BOJ’s activities. Membership fees have constituted a very small part of BOJ’s revenues over the years (1–3 percent) and has been of minor or symbolic importance.

This book has shown that the state’s role in relation to BOJ is strong. Without the state funding, BOJ would look quite different and possibly not even
exist. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that funding makes BOJ dependent on
the state. There are several examples of how BOJ has influenced state agencies
to make decisions that are in its favor, not the least the establishment of the
Crime Victim Fund and the provisions in the Social Services Act. This means
that the relationship with the state could be seen as mutual. Through BOJ,
the state can live up to international directives, and the municipalities can
live up to state directives, while BOJ can carry out their activities through
the state funding.

Victim support and neoliberal logic
The relationship between BOJ and politics has always been very clear. Poli-
tics has obviously been dependent on which government has been in office.
But general social developments have also had an impact on how different
political issues have been pursued. We took our starting point in the 1960s,
which is often described as the golden age of the Swedish welfare state. At this
time, there was little public interest in victims of crime; victim support would
not be established until two decades later. The pursuit of the Swedish welfare
model fostered a narrative that placed the fault on a societal level to create
legitimacy for reform. Welfare programs were built on distribution and risk,
rather than cause and fault (Ewald, 2002). You did hence not need to take on
the identity of an innocent victim to get access to different resources. Instead,
comprehensive and universal social-insurance schemes provided protection
from risks and losses. Other Scandinavian countries have also been somewhat
reluctant to implement special services for victims of crime.

Sweden’s welfare policies may hence explain why crime victim was not
a concept in the Swedish language before the 1970s. So, what did one call
someone that had been affected by crime before that? The answer is that they
were just that, affected by crime. To better understand this, we can use the
analogy “unemployment victim,” which is a term rarely used in the English
language today. People are simply unemployed. Empirical studies have indi-
cated that the percentage of victims that express that they need support is
higher in countries with limited welfare states when compared to countries
with extended welfare states (van Dijk, Kesteren, & Mayhew, 2014). Besides,
since social welfare provision was primarily a government matter, there was
little space for NGOs such as BOJ.

As neoliberalism entered the public debate and crime and welfare poli-
cies started to shift in the 1970s, something happened that changed people’s
thinking about crime and victimization. An argument for providing support
to victims of crime can be linked to the rising criticism of penal-welfarism.
Several state investigations and research reports had pointed to problems
with the current penal system. In 1978, the center-right government en-
acted the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act. These are all early signs of a
new perspective in crime policy, primarily driven by the center-right parties.
Criminal injuries compensation, however, became a state responsibility and funded by taxes. In the early 1980s, the first generic victim support center opened its doors. The first victim support centers were bound by welfarist ideals, but with a notion of crime prevention that focused on the individual victim and the offender, rather than on society. BOJ hence grew out of a newly formed field and a new way of thinking about victimization in general. Concurrently, decentralization and privatization of the Swedish welfare state started to escalate, along with demands for a firmer crime policy.

In the move toward a more neoliberal political economy, the idea of the victim of crime was both rational and needed. The justification of this shift required a reconstruction of “the victim” and what (or now; who) is to blame for “social problems.” The idea of the crime victim disconnected the notion of the “victim” from structural explanations and connected it to individual responsibility. It also places the fault for unfortunate conditions on “offenders,” revealing society from responsibility. This reasoning shows how the ideas of the crime victim and neo-liberal ideology complement and interact with each other.

Crime victims became central in crime policy, which facilitated a more punitive agenda against people who commit crime. A few dramatic and attentive homicides, including the murders of the Swedish Prime Minister and a family at a cemetery in the second part of the 1980s, gave power to the development. Although it was not BOJ’s intention to put victims and offenders against each other, it was a favorable climate for the development of victim support. In the early 1990s, the voluntary sector expanded significantly. BOJ was no exception; centers proliferated in the early 1990s, in tandem with increasing public and political interest in victims of crime. With Sweden’s entry into the European Union in 1994, new international perspectives influenced policy. At the end of the 1990s, victim support centers were located throughout Sweden. Crime victim issues were now established on the political agenda, and more specialized issues were raised. In the 2000s, the role of the state as a services provider continued to decrease. In parallel, BOJ streamlined, standardized, and professionalized its support.

This book shows that in Sweden, the idea of the crime victim and victim support has been constructed as a part of a new conceptualization of how social problems should be addressed. BOJ has never explicitly polarized victims against people who commit crime. However, it has indirectly pushed the political discourse in a neoliberal punitive direction in a number of areas: for example, by relying on a division between victims and offenders, and above all on a more individualistic notion of crime prevention. BOJ has been a source of ideas for a policy that the government wanted to implement. BOJ hence emerged and grew as a policy actor at a time when it was needed.

One of the most obvious examples was the Crime Victim Fund, which was supported by offender fees, rather than taxes. Research has also shown that the crime victim provisions in the Social Services Act, which were also proposed...
by BOJ, constituted a normative reorientation of the Act, in which individual responsibility increasingly replaced solidarity, the holistic view, and a right to assistance according to need. Many of the social services’ victim-centered units also came to function as an extension of the criminal justice system. Since the early 2000s, the social services’ specialized units for “crime victims” have also increased dramatically in conjunction with a more punitive and controlling approach toward young offenders. Another recent example of this development is BOJ’s increasing focus on so-called “vulnerable victims.” Under this umbrella, which has also gained ground internationally, groups like disabled people and elderly people struggle to present themselves not only as marginalized but also as victims of crime. Thus, if there is no one to blame for their problems, they do not have a right to anything (Ewald, 2002).

In this study, we have shown BOJ emerged and grew stronger in conjunction with a changing ethnic demographics in Swedish society. In future studies, it would also be interesting to examine victim support in relation to these shifts, as well as the integration and exclusion of immigrant people. What role does victim support play in homogeneous versus heterogeneous societies?

The silencing of a structural discourse in the area of violence against women

In Sweden, similar to many other countries, women’s shelters were established before generic victim support centers. The first women’s shelters were established in the late 1970s, followed by the generic victim support centers in the early 1980s. At this time, the political discourse primarily framed violence against women as a socio-economic problem, and criminal justice interventions were regarded as inefficient. In the 1980s, both women’s shelters and victim support centers formed national umbrella organizations: ROKS for women’s shelters in 1984 and BOJ for generic victim support in 1988. Even if women’s shelters and victim support centers took different approaches (targeting women and all crime victims, respectively), they competed in the area of giving direct support to victims, as well as the umbrella organizations competed in lobbying, advocacy, and policy work.

In the 1990s, gender came to replace class as the primary focus of political analysis. The gender power theory, with ROKS as one of its proponents, came to dominate the debate on violence against women for much of the 1990s. Violence against women became something that the criminal justice system could and should deal with (Wendt Höjer, 2002). In 1996, 16 women’s shelters formed a new organization, the Swedish Association of Women’s Shelters (SKR), which regarded service delivery as the main task of women’s shelters, rather than a gender-based advocacy as the main task of women’s shelters. Around the same time, BOJ started conceptualizing itself as an organization serving abused women, while simultaneously distancing
itself from ROKS. The political discourse moved away from a gender power analysis. Violence was considered something that affects a certain type of woman, and the perpetrators were portrayed as genderless deviants (Helmersson, 2017). The shift undercut ROKS’s dominant position and opened up the field for other actors, such as BOJ, to compete for resources and become a strong voice in this area.

Many studies have highlighted how ROKS and the gender power theory have dominated, or even owned, the area of violence against women in Sweden. Recently, Swedish social work scholar Sara Helmersson (2017) stressed that the perspective held by SKR has left an equally strong imprint on Swedish politics, especially in the 2000s, as we confirm in this book. The current study makes a significant contribution by expanding the analysis and examining the role of BOJ in the political discourse.

In this book, we have shown that BOJ could play a role in changing structural discourses on class and gender, by supporting a notion that claimed abused women as crime victims and not as women primarily. What started as a feminist project addressing patriarchal structures had thus, to some degree, transformed into a liberal project calling for criminal justice interventions (e.g., Kotiswaran, 2014, 76). BOJ found an ally in SKR, which focused on the individual woman and her specific experience and criticized ROKS’s concentration on structural issues and for being too “feminist” (McMillan, 2007). In this new perspective, the central political question was not how to structure social and economic systems but, instead, how to serve individual women, with neither class nor gender as the starting point for the analysis. BOJ’s ambitions for its practice and local centers grew to resemble the aims of women’s shelters. Having established itself in the field, BOJ aspired to adopt a form similar to other organizations – a practice known as isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) – and even initiated a discussion about running local women’s shelters. Overall, one can hence see victim support and women’s shelters as competitors of resources in the same field.

The future of victim support – Sweden and beyond

This book provides a rich analysis of the contemporary history of Swedish victim support. One could interpret the results in this book from two perspectives: on the one hand, as a story of a successful organization and, on the other hand, as a story about the history of the crime victim movement in Sweden. Nevertheless, it stands clear that the organization and the movement have developed in symbiosis. BOJ formulated questions related to crime victims, put them on the agenda, and has been the dominant actor in crime victim support over the past 30 years.

The history shows that BOJ developed in a time when a space opened as society and politics went through a significant shift. It did not just “happen,” active entrepreneurs made it happen, and their efforts were successful because
of the specific situation at that time. The history shows that BOJ kept a strong position and continued to have political influence, but there is also unequivocal evidence for stating that they successively became adjusted to their context in the field. They engaged in the same questions as other organizations, for example, in violence against women, and started to highlight specific groups more than a generic perspective on all crime victims. Does that mean that BOJ now is just one organization among others? Yes, in some senses it is. The founders’ extraordinary activity has faded out as their issues gain attention, and the dramatic shift cannot continue to be dramatic. In the contemporary situation, BOJ is no one organization parallel to other in the field. Yet they have a strong voice, and they have a central role in the field.

Could history tell us something about the future? The answer to that question is not easy. Both strengths and weaknesses for the future development can be deduced from history, and they can even be connected to the same factors. One of the central characteristics for BOJ is that it has had a very solid organization over time, where very few different persons have held the managing position. With now a history of 30 years, it is still only four persons who have held the position as chair and only two who have been secretary-general. This, together with the organization’s very strong common cognitive map, foster continuity and strength. But it also opens for risks and weaknesses. The latest secretary-general, Eva Larsson, was with the organization, in different roles, more or less since it started to grow and develop. Now, when actors who have been essential in BOJ’s construction phase is no longer part of the organization, it will show whether the cognitive map is strong enough to continue to uphold the organization.

If we seek the answer in history, we can see that the very first local center, the one in Malmö that opened in 1980, was essential for BOJ’s development. Svensson sought contact with Björn Lagerbäck when the now oldest local center was planned, which led to a fruitful cooperation. Björn Lagerbäck continued to be active in relation to the center in Malmö. He supervised the volunteers there for many years. And he was very clear with the aim that the public sector should provide support for crime victims. BOJ’s role was to put light on victim issues and to serve victims with support and information in initial contacts. In the time when Björn Lagerbäck completed his work, the local center in Malmö became a part of the municipality’s social services and became professionalized. Professional social workers continued the work in the same spirit that BOJ had spread, but victim support in Malmö is no longer given through an NPO. Did this happen because of Björn Lagerbäck’s withdrawal? Was the center actually so dependent on one specific person, even if it was a very significant and influential person? Or was the task of bringing victim issues and constructing forms of support for victims was accomplished, and a new era took over? To understand this, more thorough studies would have to be made of that specific center and whether the process will be copied in other parts of the country.
Another strength seen through history is the anchorage in, and ability to follow, the contemporary development in society. This capability has made BOJ strong over time and helped it to keep its position in society. The other side of this aspect is that there is a risk of co-optation, a risk of turning into a service provider for other ideas, where the funding governs the practice, and the organizations’ ideas are subordinated. So far, this cannot be said to have been the case for BOJ, but it is a risk for the future. Such developments have been seen for women’s shelters in Sweden, as well as for victim support in other countries, as in the United Kingdom.

To be able to foresee the development, more studies of the evolution of victim support in different countries are needed. With a wider knowledge base, patterns in the developments would be easier to spot. So far, from what we have shown in this book, we can conclude that BOJ managed to put victim issues on the political agenda and make several reforms happen, while also developing a comprehensive and cohesive practice for victim support. Regardless of what the future will bring, this has changed the politics, as well as the practices, in the field of criminal justice and social support.

References


Index

Note: Page numbers with **bold** refers to tables; *italics* refer to figures and page numbers followed by “n” denote endnotes

Act on Counsel for the Injured
   Party 61
adversarial 25, 111
Åhmansson, Nils-Åke 62
Aid for Victims of Crime (AVC) 32, 95
Al-Anon 27, 34n2
Alcoholic Anonymous (AA) 82
Alhem, Sven-Erik 10, 136, 148, 150
“Åmsele murders” 60
archival material 9, 12, 68, 84, 89, 149, 152
“Association Handbook” 131
Australia, 44
Austria, 42, 96
AVC see Aid for Victims of Crime (AVC)

BARCO see Bristol Association for the
   Care and Resettlement of Offenders
   (BARCO)
*Basic principles for Victim Support Sweden*
   134, 137, 149
Beausang, Angela 107
Beckman, Saara 54–5, 57, 66
Belgian Victim Support Flanders 53
Belgium, 53, 89
Bildt, Carl 63
Bjelle, Britta 99, 100, 104
BOJ victim support center, 98, 99, 110
Borås center, 70
Börjeson, Bengt 20
BRÅ see National Council for Crime
   Prevention (BRÅ)
Bristol Association for the Care
   and Resettlement of Offenders
   (BARCO) 33
Bristol victim support scheme 33

BrOM see Crime Victim
   Compensation and Support
   Authority (BrOM)

Canada 53; national victim organization
   in 43–4, 52–4
Canadian Organization for Victim
   Assistance (COVA) 43
*Captured Queen: Men’s Violence against
   Women in “Equal” Sweden* 103–4
Carrington, Frank G. 40, 51
children: high quality education for 22;
   victims of crime 86, 139–41
Chiswick Women’s Aid 27
civil law 25
civil rights movement 32
civil society 5, 50, 81, 82, 152
*Closeness That Hurts: About Violence against
   Close Kin* (Larsson) 105–8, 143
Code of Judicial Procedure 25
Code of Professional Ethics for Victim
   Service Providers 52
Codes of Conduct for Victims 52
cognitive maps 12, 86–7, 144, 151–2, 158
common law 25
consolidation phase 148
construction phase 147
cooperation agreements 141
Council of the European Union 52,
   53, 96
COVA see Canadian Organization for
   Victim Assistance (COVA)
crime policy 4, 5, 24, 26, 32, 39, 50, 60,
   61, 76, 83–5, 95, 118, 126, 154, 155
crime prevention 24, 39, 45, 54, 61, 76,
   100–2, 155
Crime Victim Endowment Fund 140
crime victimization 5, 30
Crime Victim Magazine 135, 136, 141
Crime Victim Parliament 89, 90
Crime Victim Compensation and Support Authority (BrOM) 8, 15n2, 99, 115–16, 150
Criminal Code 22, 90
criminal injuries compensation scheme 7, 28, 31, 44, 126, 155; means-tested 30–1, 34
Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 15, 44, 126, 154
criminal justice system 25, 45, 47, 99, 125, 156: humane criminal justice system 125; interventions 156, 157; and radical feminism, alliance between 99–103
Dagerman, Stig 64, 135
disabilities: crime victims with 117; elderly and people with 142–3
domestic violence 39, 40, 99, 104, 114, 115; gender-based 128
Dussich, John 31, 32, 34n2
Dutch Association of Victim Support 53
Dworkin, Andrea 75
Edmonton Victim Services Unit 43
education 6, 7, 22, 56, 62, 69–70, 73, 77, 85, 87, 92, 98, 102, 104, 105, 111, 128, 132, 133, 136, 142, 151
EFVS see European Forum for Victim Services (EFVS)
entrepreneurs 43, 45, 65, 66, 74, 84, 88, 89, 147, 157: with new vision 58–9; power of 13–14
Eriksson, Björn 74
escape schemes 28–30, 44
ethnic minorities, immigrated people 141–2
European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes 52
European Council of European Union (2012) 130
European Forum for Victim Services (EFVS) 8, 53, 63, 65, 96, 110, 130
European national victim organizations 52–4
European victim support organizations 5, 8, 53, 149
European victim support schemes 33–4, 96
Exposed and Vulnerable Crime Victims (Lindgren) 119
external legitimacy 61–3
fellow–human support 5, 59, 67, 77, 77n2, 92, 130, 131, 133–5, 137, 150
feminism 27, 75, 83, 99, 107, 119, 157
Finland, 54, 60, 96
Freivalds, Laila 62–3, 66, 68, 74, 84
Fry, Margery 27
Gävle center, 72, 88
Geijer, Lennart 24, 25
gender–based analysis 104
gender–based violence 128
gender equality policy 83, 128
gender power theory 99, 103, 104, 106, 107, 119, 128, 156, 157
The Gender War 107
generic victim support 51, 96, 117–18, 129, 156
Germany, 41, 53
government bills 8, 29, 39, 44, 51, 52, 88, 90, 91, 101, 103, 113–16, 118, 126; Support to Crime Victims bill 113; Women’s Peace bill 101, 103
government reports: gender power theory 100; and new victim legislation 61; 1981
government report 46; 1950
government report 89; into victim support 101–3
Green Party 115
Gustinger, Birger 98
Håkansson, Marianne 62
health care 22, 47, 69, 141
Heimer, Gun 104
Hellströmmer, Ann 117
Hellsvik, Gun 84–5, 91
HOPP see National Organization against Sexual Abuse (HOPP)
HSOs see Swedish Disability Federation (HSOs)
Hulth, Mats 26
human rights 1, 137, 138, 150; approach 149; commitment to 135–8; crime victims reform and 126–7; perspectives of 149–51; principles 149; and specialization of victim support 97–9 “hybrid-organizations” 82
Hydén, Margareta 83, 106
immigration 50, 125; and ethnic minorities 141–2; integration and victim support 55–7; labor 21, 26; people 56, 57, 108, 125, 144
institutional context, power of 12–13 integration 26, 55–7
internal legitimacy 61–3, 84
International Crime Victim Day 64, 65, 89
international instruments 52–4
International Prison Congress 27–8
inquisitorial 25, 111
Irish Association of Victim Support 53
isomorphism 13, 144, 157
Israel, 32

Johansson, Morgan 118

Kartanoism 54
King, Martin Luther 64
Klette, Hans 10, 53, 97, 105, 112, 135, 136, 139, 148

Lack of Security, Threat and Abuse of the Elderly 142
Lagerbäck, Björn 9, 45–7, 53, 58, 59, 61–5, 68, 74, 76, 84, 87, 89, 91, 104, 130, 136, 147–9, 158
law-and-order 32, 51, 95; policies 33, 127; on political agenda 26–7
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) 33, 40–1
Liberal Party 61, 99
Lindblom, Paul 20
Lindgren, Magnus 119, 131
local victim support: centers 3, 5, 6, 8, 47, 56, 58, 64–6, 68–70, 72, 73, 76, 85, 88, 92, 100, 102, 103, 110, 128, 131, 134, 143, 150, 153; dramatic growth of 85–8; volunteers 133
Lundgren, Eva 83, 103, 104, 106, 107

MacKinnon, Catharine 75
Malexander murders 111–13
Malmö center 45–6, 55, 58, 70, 77
Markström, Elisebeth 103, 106, 107, 128
minimum standards 108–11, 130, 131, 137
Moderate Party 83, 124–6; conservative 26, 56, 63, 81, 83, 126
Municipal Immigration Bureau 56
municipal social services 5, 114, 117, 118, 127, 139, 153

National Association of Victim Support Schemes (NAVSS) 8, 41–3, 47, 53, 67, 95, 147–8
National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ) 39, 61
national education 69–70
National Immigration Board 56
National Organization against Sexual Abuse (HOPP) 106, 148
National Organization for Victim Assistance (NOVA) 40–1, 43, 47, 51–2
National Organization for Women’s Shelters (ROKS) 58, 75–7, 83, 99, 103, 107, 119, 129, 143, 156–7; BOJ’s declaration to 103–8
National Organization of Relatives of Homicide Victims (RAV) 135
National Police Board (RPS) 62, 66, 72, 77n1, 90, 106, 117
National Society for Road Safety 64
National Victim Assistance Academy (NVAA) 95
NAVSS see National Association of Victim Support Schemes (NAVSS)
neoliberalism 15, 154; political economy 155; victim support and neoliberal logic 154–6
Netherland, 33, 43, 53, 111, 152
New Public Management (NPM) 124, 131, 132
NICRO 54
non-custodial sanctions 24, 26
non-profit organizations (NPOs) 2–6, 40, 43, 45, 47, 54–6, 63, 67, 73, 74, 76, 77, 81, 82, 87, 90, 92, 97, 102, 104, 107, 114–16, 118, 124, 131, 135, 142, 143, 147, 152, 153, 158
Nordic Welfare State 23, 124
NOVA see National Organization for Victim Assistance (NOVA)
NPM see New Public Management (NPM)
NPOs see Non-profit organizations (NPOs)
offenders: electronic monitoring of 125–6; fund financed by 89–91; rehabilitation of 21, 84, 112; rights of 40, 112, 149
Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) 52
organizational work: consolidation phase 148; construction phase 147; restructuring phase 148–9
organization in field, anchoring 152–7
Palme, Olof 59
Parents of Murdered Children (POMC) 51
Parliamentary Ombudsmen 72–4
Penal Code 24, 28, 61, 30, 76
“penal exceptionalism” 21
penal law 50–1
penal welfare, child of 27–31
police district, victim support center in 65–6
Position of the Victim in the Framework of Criminal Law and Procedure 52–3
prison 24–9, 44, 45, 47, 59, 60, 82–4, 90, 102, 125, 149
Prison and Probation Services 24, 45, 47, 68, 125
private insurance 30, 82; companies 28; plans 28
professional 25, 52, 58, 74, 77, 87, 98, 104–105, 108, 130, 133, 134, 148, 150, 158
public-funded market 124; women’s shelters in 127–9
radical feminism 128; alliance between criminal justice and 99–103; influence on Swedish policy 107
Reagan, Ronald 51
Reeves, Helen 42
rehabilitation: crime policy 61, 76; effectiveness of 39; professional crime victim rehabilitation 104–5; and public spending 39
Reinfeldt, Fredrik 124
restructuring phase 148
ROKS see National Organization for Women’s Shelters (ROKS)
RPS see Swedish National Police Board (RPS)
Scottish Association of Victim Support Schemes 53
SD see Sweden Democrats (SD)
Secrecy Act 72–4, 77n3
SKR see Swedish Association for Women’s Shelters (SKR)
social democracy 21, 22, 81, 96: case against rehabilitation and public spending 39; emergence of Swedish victim support 44–6; government 50, 100, 101, 107, 118; labor movement 21; national organizations for victim assistance internationally 40–4; women’s shelters, victimization 39–40
Social Democratic Party 14, 39, 50–1
social insurance 28
social security 22–3, 84
social services 114; contract 118; role 114
Social Services Act (SoL) 6, 90, 101, 118, 127, 153–5
social welfare 6; institutions 113; issue 28; landscape in Sweden 82; organizations 117; provision 154
social work, reconceptualizing 113–15
Södertälje victim support center 8, 15, 46, 54–9, 62, 63, 65–8, 70, 72, 73, 76, 77, 106, 141, 148
SoL see Social Services Act (SoL)
SPF see Swedish Association for Senior Citizens (SPF)
stakeholders 67–8
Staut, Ed 95
Stockholm victim support center 46, 55, 77
support person 7, 56, 58, 69, 70, 73, 74, 87, 90, 91, 100, 102, 108, 115, 130, 133, 136, 143, 149, 150
Support Center for Young Crime Victims 108, 114
SV 69–71, 108, 142
Svensson, Per 9, 10, 46, 54–9, 61–3, 66, 69, 71–4, 84, 88–90, 103–5, 147–8, 158
Sweden Democrats (SD) 125
Swedish Association for Senior Citizens (SPF) 142, 143
Swedish Association for Women’s Shelters (SKR) 103, 106, 107, 119, 128, 129, 148, 156
Swedish Disability Federation (HSOs) 142, 143
Swedish Employers Association 22
Swedish victim support center 45, 54–8
Swedish welfare state 5, 23, 81, 124–7, 154, 155; basic principles of 21–3; universal principles of 50
“Tate Murders” 29, 32
tort law 28, 127
Tort Liability Act 30
“tough-on-crime” rhetoric 51
traditional vulnerability criteria 33
Trollhättan center, 68
Trygg-Hansa 68, 70, 71, 71

Umeå center, 88
United Kingdom (UK): victim programs 1, 13; victim support 1, 33, 42, 144
UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and the Abuse of Power 52
“unemployment victim” 154
UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights 137, 138
United States (US): carceral state 32–3; compensation 28; Crime Victim Fund 51–2; victim assistance programs 1, 33; victim support programs 1
Valjakka, Juha 60
Växjö victim support center 7, 98
victim advocate 32
victim–centered approach 113–15
victim compensation 27–31; plans 34; program 90; schemes 31
“victim identity” 42
victim impact statements 51, 111–13
victim movement 2, 27, 33, 52, 127, 157; international successes for 95–6
victim ombudsman 31; concept 32; and services to poor 31–2
Victims Bill of Rights 51, 95
Victims Compensation Act 53
Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) 52
victims support 55–7; as component of social and political change 11–14; model 138; organizations 8–11; programs 41; schemes 53
Victim Support Europe (VSE) 8, 130
Victim Support Finland (VSF) 96
Victim Support Sweden 8; basic principles for 134–5
violence against women 27, 40, 46, 51, 83, 99–101, 104, 108, 117, 119, 127–9, 139, 158; commission on 114; as funding opportunities 107–8; “men’s violence against women” 75, 101, 104, 128; as product men’s superiority 83; structural discourse in 156–7
Violently Invisible: A Book about Crime Victimization and Disabilities 143
VOCA see Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) volunteers 7–9, 12, 32, 33, 42, 43, 55, 57, 58, 59, 74, 82, 87, 92, 96, 98, 117, 132, 133, 139, 141, 148, 150, 158; welfare work 50
VSE see Victim Support Europe (VSE)
VSF see Victim Support Finland (VSF)
vulnerable crime victims 15, 108, 119, 138–43, 144, 156

Weisser Ring 41–3
welfare: crime policies 125–6; criminal justice policy 126; policies 4, 14, 32, 154; programs 154; Swedish welfare policy 81; welfare state 81–3
Western Europe, 12, 34, 125
Wigzell, Kerstin 115, 117
witnesses: support volunteers 8; Swedish witness support program 7; victim witness assistance programs 51, 52, 95; Without Witnesses – No Trial” 98; witness support 7, 99, 115–16, 130, 143; role of 8; in
United States, witness program 1, 53; volunteers 8
women: movement on labor and class 27; Swedish women’s movement 27; victim witness assistance programs 51, 52, 95; violence against (see men’s violence against women)

women’s shelters: in publicly funded market 127–9; relationship with 75–6; victimization 39–40
World Society of Victimology (WSV) 44, 52

Young, Marlene 41, 52
youth, victims of crime 139–41