GLOBAL ANTISEMITISM:
A CRISIS OF MODERNITY
For Professor William Prusoff
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Charles Asher Small
Introduction

Charles Asher Small

In August 2010, the largest-ever academic conference on the study of antisemitism took place at Yale University. The conference, entitled “Global Antisemitism: A Crisis of Modernity,” was hosted and organized by the Yale Initiative for the Interdisciplinary Study of Antisemitism (YIISA) and the International Association for the Study of Antisemitism (IASA). The conference featured over 100 speakers from more than 20 countries from around the world. They included recent graduates at the beginning of their academic careers, experienced academics, and leading senior scholars who have dedicated their intellectual pursuits to the study of antisemitism, as well as legal experts, practitioners and others. More than 600 people attended the conference, including undergraduate and graduate students, scholars from many universities, including Yale University, practitioners and members of non-governmental organizations, civil servants and diplomats interested in the policy implications of the subject matter, and members of the general public. This volume presents a wide-ranging selection of the many important and challenging papers presented at the conference.

The Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP) was established in 2004, with a network of scholars from around the world and the support of a group of dedicated philanthropists led by the humanitarian and professor of pharmacology William (Bill) Prusoff, in response to a clear and ominous increase in global antisemitism. In 2006, ISGAP approached Yale University with a view to establishing an academic research center within the university. After determining that the center would meet all the necessary administrative, financial, and academic requirements, Yale University inaugurated the Yale Initiative for the Interdisciplinary Study of Antisemitism (YIISA) in 2006. It was the first academic research center focusing on the interdisciplinary study of antisemitism to be based at a North American university. ISGAP’s Board of Trustees supported and funded all of YIISA’s activities, co-sponsoring its seminar series and various other events and paying the salaries of its 14 employees. It also underwrote the August 2010 conference on which this volume is based.

1 In his opening remarks at the United Nations conference “Confronting anti-Semitism: Education and Tolerance and Understanding,” June 21, 2004, New York, Professor Elie Wiesel examined the rising levels and threat of antisemitism. The rise in contemporary global antisemitism is examined and substantiated in several chapters in this volume.

2 The fact that the first interdisciplinary and fully fledged research center on antisemitism at a North American university was only established in 2006 ought itself to be a the focus of a research project, especially given the role antisemitism has played in Western civilization.

3 ISGAP continues as a research center with its head office in New York. It develops academic programming at top universities, including McGill, Fordham (Lincoln Center Campus), Harvard Law School, and the Stanford’s Hoover Institution.
From 2006 to 2011, YIISA offered a successful graduate and post-doctorate fellowship program. Each year, it welcomed a group of scholars from leading universities in the United States and around the world, including several senior visiting professors. YIISA had a robust programming agenda. It organized over 120 seminars, special events, a series of films, four international conferences, symposiums and other gatherings at Yale University in New Haven, as well in New York, Washington, and Berlin. Its scholars carried out research projects and published important material on the interdisciplinary study of antisemitism. ISGAP and YIISA met the need to examine the changing contemporary state of and processes pertaining to global antisemitism. The fact that over 100 speakers participated in the aforementioned 2010 conference, and that all but ten of them attended at their own expense, is testimony to the extensive interest in the study of contemporary antisemitism.

The conference, “Global Antisemitism: A Crisis of Modernity,” offered an environment in which scholars from a wide array of disciplines, intellectual backgrounds, and perspectives would be able to present their research and engage in interdisciplinary debate. The call for papers was inclusive and encouraged scholars from around the world to present their work. Without such a free exchange of ideas, any notion of academic freedom is tantamount to rhetoric. The subject of antisemitism is complex and controversial, as many students and scholars of this subject know. It was therefore important to YIISA to provide a forum in which this important issue could be freely discussed and explored.4

4 It is not uncommon for scholars of antisemitism, especially those engaged in the study of its contemporary manifestations, to be labeled as right-wing, neo-conservative, or Islamophobic. Likewise, despite their obvious and sometimes extraordinary credentials, their scholarship is often unfairly categorized as “advocacy.” Such accusations, which are often made by those who engage in advocacy themselves, actually constitute a form of antisemitism. Others simply embrace the “gatekeeper” role within the academy, which Cohen describes as an attempt to maintain the status quo on behalf of institutional interests. See Robin Cohen, The New Helots: Migrants in the International Division of Labour (Gower Publishing, Aldershot 1987) and E. Bonacich, “A Theory of Middleman Minorities,” American Sociological Review Vol. 38 (1973) pp. 583-594. This is reminiscent of the McCarthy era interference with academic freedom. At that time, a notable scholar, Nathan Glazer, took it upon himself to report on members the Jewish community to the “Committee” in order to silence political views that were deemed unacceptable at the time (Cedric Robinson, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition (Zed Books, London 1983)). The academic activities of YIISA, in particular its work on state-sponsored antisemitism, Iran, and the Muslim Brotherhood, was denounced as “advocacy” by those with an interest in promoting the US administration’s general policy of “engagement” with Islamic states. Analogous views also found support within the Yale Corporation and administration, as well as among several tenured faculty, resulting in a de facto limitation of academic freedom. These perspectives were conveyed directly to my colleagues and me by leading members of the Yale administration and faculty members. It thus appears that the scholarly analysis of antisemitism in contemporary Middle Eastern societies infringed upon various political and economic priorities. Moreover, the possible investment of Gulf funds in Yale University, and other universities around the world, or fear of the discontinuation of such funding, is a question meriting unfettered research rather than a statement of fact. The question whether this so-called “advocacy,” which allegedly affected research on antisemitism, ought to be replaced by kosher “non-advocacy” research that does not disturb governmental or foreign donor sensibilities must now be on the table as an open question for research. Additionally, against this background, the possibility that the term “advocacy” itself has become a euphemism for “research relevant to current affairs and therefore likely to offend some powerful parties” must be subjected to critical scholarly scrutiny.
In June 2004, the United Nations, an institution that emerged from the ashes of World War II and the Holocaust, held its first official conference on antisemitism. This gathering served as a formal acknowledgement of the re-emergence of antisemitism as a contemporary matter of concern in a changing and globalizing world. It was hosted by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and Nobel peace laureate Professor Elie Wiesel at the UN headquarters in New York. Wiesel, the keynote speaker in a packed General Assembly Hall, noted that antisemitism is the oldest collective form of hatred in recorded history and that it had even managed to penetrate the United Nations itself. He questioned whether the world body, despite its role as a moral and political global leader, had forgotten the destructive and deadly impact of antisemitism. Some in attendance, Wiesel pointed out, actually endured its consequences: “We were there. We saw our parents, we saw our friends die because of antisemitism.” In my view, the 2004 UN conference on antisemitism marked a turning point in the response of academia to the subject of antisemitism. This renewed interest was a contributing factor in the establishment of ISGAP several months later.

The YIISA conference addressed two inter-related and important areas of research that both encompass various disciplines, namely (1) global antisemitism and (2) the crisis of modernity currently affecting the core elements of Western society and civilization. Is it possible that the emergence of the current wave of global antisemitism both reflects and forms part of a wider attack on the core elements of modernity, notions of Enlightenment, and Western civilization more generally by reactionary social forces empowered by the crisis of capitalism? Against this background, the participants in the conference addressed conceptual and empirical questions from a wide array of perspectives and disciplines. The diversity in approach and opinion was itself a sign of academic health.

* * *

Antisemitism is a complex and, at times, perplexing form of hatred. Some observers refer to it as the “longest hatred.” It spans centuries of history, infecting different societies, religious, philosophical and political movements, and even civilizations. In the aftermath of the Holocaust, some have even argued that antisemitism illustrates the limitations of the Enlightenment and modernity itself. Manifestations of antisemitism occur in numerous ideologically-based narratives and in constructed identities of belonging and Otherness such as race and ethnicity, as well as nationalist and anti-nationalist movements. In the contemporary context of globalized relations, it appears that antisemitism has taken on new complex and changing forms that need to be decoded, mapped, and exposed. The academic study of antisemitism, like prejudice more generally, has a long and impressive intellectual and research history. It remains a topic of ongoing political importance and scholarly engagement. However, especially at this important historical juncture, unlike prejudice and discrimination directed at other social groups, antisemitism—in particular its contemporary forms and processes—is almost always studied outside an organized academic framework.

The purpose of YIISA’s 2010 conference was therefore to explore this subject matter in a comprehensive manner and from an array of approaches and perspectives, as well as in its global, national, and regional contexts. The development of an interdisciplinary approach and consciousness, while encouraging analytical studies examining a preju-

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5 Professor Elie Wiesel is the Honorary President of ISGAP.
dice that remains widespread and but also appears to be experiencing a resurgence, was a key objective of the conference and YIISA’s general mission. The conference aimed to create a vibrant space in which high-caliber scholarship and open and free debate would develop, be nurtured, and have an impact.6

The process of globalization has led to an increase in adversarial identity politics. In this environment, Israel, as a central manifestation of contemporary Jewish identity, and Jews more generally have become the focus of scapegoating and hateful rhetoric. At a more structural and socio-historical level, the old ideologies and tendencies of anti-semitism have re-emerged and are being fused with anti-Zionism or what in many cases might be more appropriately described as Israel-bashing.7 The old theological and racist forms of European antisemitism are being amalgamated with anti-Jewish and anti-Israel pronouncements emanating in particular from the Muslim world, which is located mainly, but not exclusively, in and around the Middle East. Contemporary globalization and the related socio-economic, cultural, and political processes are being fused with these historical tendencies, creating the conditions that pose a threat to Jewish people and Jewish communities in the Diaspora. In addition, new structural realities within the realm of the international relations and the emergence of anti-Israel propensities appear to pose a threat to Israel and the Jewish people in a manner not seen since the end of World War II. Once again, in this age of globalization, the Jewish people seem to be caught between the “aristocracy” or “wealthy establishment” (core) and the marginalized or disenfranchised masses (periphery), as they have been throughout most of history.8

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6 The establishment of a research center similar to YIISA is urgently required within the academy. The approach of such an entity should be analogous to the one adopted by the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at the University of Birmingham (UK) and the Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations (CRER) at the University of Warwick (UK), yet with a specific critical approach to antisemitism. Both centers adopted an interdisciplinary approach with an emphasis on critical conceptual analysis based on solid empirical research. Currently, there are several small entities that study antisemitism, but they are all led by European historians with little or no background in the contemporary, regional, or interdisciplinary context. In fact, several of these scholars actually blame Israel for contemporary manifestations of antisemitism and underestimate the relevance of Islamism. This perspective is often based on “politically correct” views rather than rational scholarship. There is a need for vibrant analysis, study, discussion, and debate. A new entity for the study of antisemitism ought to combine an understanding of Western antisemitism and notions of “Otherness” with a willingness to tackle the contemporary changes sweeping the Middle East and knowledge of the region and its culture, including Islam and Islamism. The study of terrorism as it relates to contemporary antisemitism is also very much required. All these issues should obviously be examined in the context of processes associated with globalization, as opposed to the more frequently-used and descriptive concept of global antisemitism. Descriptive work without a critical, comprehensive, and conceptual interdisciplinary analytical framework will not be effective in assessing the contemporary condition, nor in creating appropriate policy responses. Policy development is a recognized and respected field of study within academia. This must be stated, since many who analyze antisemitism are “gatekeepers” who dismiss this vital scholarship as advocacy. This is not only problematic but also hinders the finding of solutions to key issues, indirectly undermining the safety of many.


8 See the Arab Human Development Report (United Nations Development Programme 2005). This report and other subsequent reports examine the impact of globalization on aspects of socio-economic marginalization stability in the Arab world.
With the advent of the “socialism of fools,” a term describing the replacement of the search for real social and political equity with antisemitism that is frequently attributed to August Bebel, Jews continued to be targeted. In much the same way, the current marginalization of the Jewish people in the Arab world—or, more accurately, the marginalization of the image of the Jew, since most of them were pressured to leave or expelled from Arab countries between 1948 and the early 1970s after a strong continual presence of thousands of years—is staggering. As the social movements in the Middle East have turned to their own version of the “socialism of fools” (i.e., the antisemitism of radical political Islamism), they have incorporated lethal forms of European genocidal antisemitism as their fuel. However, many scholars, policy-makers, and journalists of record still refuse to acknowledge this fact and to critically examine the ideology and mission of this social movement.

Anti-Judaism is one of the most complex and at times perplexing forms of hatred. As evident from the range of papers presented at the conference and in this volume, antisemitism has many facets that touch upon many subjects and scholarly disciplines. The term “anti-Semitism,” which was coined in the 1870s by Wilhelm Marr, is also controversial and at times confusing. Yet despite its etymological limitations and contradictions, it remains valid and useful. The term refers specifically to prejudice and discrimination against the Jewish people. Some incorrectly or for reasons of political expediency use the term to refer to prejudice against all so-called “Semitic” peoples, claiming that Arab peoples cannot be antisemites, as they are Semites themselves. This is fine in terms of etymological musing but not in terms of the history of language and thought, where terms acquire specific meanings over time that diverge from their etymological origins. In fact, antisemitism refers to a specific form a hatred that is mainly European in origin and focuses upon the Jewish people. Some scholars prefer to use the term antisemitism, without a hyphen and uncapitalized, since it refers to a form of hatred or a phenomenon rather than to a specific race or biologically determined group. Emil Fackenheim, for example, used the unhyphenated form for this reason. This volume and all of ISGAP’s other work also follows this approach.

Some scholars who have examined the complexities of antisemitism claim that it takes several forms, including social, economic, political, cultural, and religious antisemitism.

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9 Steve Cohen, That’s Funny You Don’t Look Anti-Semitic. An Anti-Racist Analysis of Left Anti-Semitism (Leeds 1984). The well-known saying “Anti-Semitism is the socialism of fools” (“Der Antisemitismus ist der Sozialismus der dummen Kerle”) is frequently attributed to Bebel, but probably originated with the Austrian democrat Ferdinand Kronawetter; it was in general use among German Social Democrats by the 1890s (Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (Penguin Group 2005)). For a discussion of antisemitism, including the notion of the socialism of fools, see David Hirsh, Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism: Cosmopolitan Reflections, The Yale Initiative for the Interdisciplinary Study of Antisemitism Working Paper Series, Editor Charles Asher Small, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2007).

10 Bassam Tibi makes the important distinction between antisemitism that was European in origin and genocidal, on the one hand, and the kind of anti-Judaism that was discriminatory in nature, which was historically prevalent in the Middle East and Islamic context, on the other.

11 Shlomo Avineri, Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization (New York 1968).

René König, for example, contends that these different forms of antisemitism demonstrate that the origins of antisemitism are rooted in different historical periods and places. When religion, in particular Christianity, represented the dominant way to perceive reality, the Jews were regarded as followers of the wrong religion. It was also believed that their refusal to accept the Christian messiah disqualified them from any form of redemption and even that Jewish stubbornness hindered world redemption. Finally, it is hardly necessary to recall that the Jews were accused of deicide. When the dominant manner in which Europeans perceived reality was based on the nation state and biological notions of race and ethnicity, the Jews were constructed as belonging to another, inferior race. According to the Nazis and others who subscribed to racist beliefs, for example, they were perceived as polluting the Aryan race and needed to be removed completely in order to save the purity of the “race” and “nation.”

At present, some argue for religious reasons that the self-determination of the Jews—the non-Muslim “Other”—on so-called Islamic land is a sin and should not be tolerated. Others, in the West, see Jewish stubbornness as the cause of radical Islam, Jihadism, and the instability in the region. When it comes Israel’s policies and existence, they believe that if only the Jews would change the problems in the region and in international relations as a whole could be resolved. If taken to its logical conclusion, this perspective could lead to great destruction, like other historical manifestations of antisemitism, since its aims is the eradication of Israel or any semblance of Jewish self-determination in the region. Despite the complete rejection of the Jewish narrative by the Iranian regime, Hamas, Hezbollah, and other Salafists and Islamists, many observers focus on the “Other” and are content to blame the “victim” of this ideology without properly examining it. In fact, attempts to critically examine these reactionary views are often deemed politically unacceptable. This contemporary form of antisemitism has many layers. New forms are mixed with older ones, such as conspiracy theories about Jewish power and culture, apocalyptic theories concerning the Jews. For example, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which played a key role in creating the conditions for the Holocaust, as well European antisemitism more generally, has now become part of the political and cultural mainstream in several Arab and Muslim societies.

The above-mentioned complexities make it difficult to define the different forms that antisemitism takes. This in turn makes it problematic to address and analyze the subject matter. It is no wonder, then, that contemporary forms of antisemitism have always
been difficult if not impossible to acknowledge, study, measure, and oppose. One hopes that it will not only be future historians who come to understand and address today’s lethal forms of antisemitism, too late to affect policy, perceptions, and predispositions.

The context of contemporary global antisemitism, on which the conference focused, covers international relations, which are increasingly in a state of flux and turmoil, as well as notions of tolerance, democratic principles and ideals, human rights, and robust citizenship. These values appear to be receding within many institutions and societies, while the international community seems to be less strident in trying to defend them. It would appear that the Jew, or perhaps more importantly the image of the Jew or the “imaginary Jew” as described by Alain Finkielkraut,\(^{17}\) is at the middle of this global moment. Both historically and today, antisemitism is a social disease that begins with the Jews but does not end with them, making the Jewish people the proverbial canary in the coalmine. This deadly strain of hatred often turns against other groups, such as women, homosexuals, moderate Muslims, and other sectors of the population who are perceived as not being ideologically pure, as well as against key democratic notions such as robust citizenship, equality before the law, and religious pluralism. Antisemitism is consequently a universal human rights issue that should be of importance to all.

In view of its character as the “longest hatred,” with a destructive power that is both well known and well documented, the historical lessons of antisemitism ought to reach beyond the Jewish people and concern scholars from a wide range of disciplines, both academic and policy-oriented. In fact, antisemitism should be perceived as a key aspect in the development of Western civilization, yet it is often perceived as a Jewish or parochial issue.\(^{18}\) This perception forms an impediment to the study of antisemitism in current academic culture, which favors the universal over the particular. In fact, the study of antisemitism is often regarded as unworthy of consideration or even as an enemy of the progressive universalistic worldview that is currently in vogue.

Certain members of the academic community, especially those who claim to espouse progressive and/or postmodernist views, often perceive the study of antisemitism as an attempt to undermine criticism of the State of Israel and accuse those engaged in this study of being political advocates rather than pursuers of real scholarship.\(^{19}\) In fact, in this postmodern age, this is a fairly common view in academic and intellectual circles.\(^{20}\) It is therefore important to embark on a systemic critique of the intellectual and political impact of this philosophical movement not only with regard to the safety and security of the Jewish people and their right to self-determination but also with regard to the integrity of the Enlightenment project and perceptions of modernity.

The contemporary canon includes a critique of the traditional “Western” cannon, for example by Michel Foucault and Edward Said, that has also helped to demonize Jewish cultural and historical narratives in relation to Israel and beyond. This perspective is now an integral component of many “good” university curriculums throughout the

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\(^{17}\) Alain Finkielkraut, *The Imaginary Jew* (University of Nebraska Press 1994).

\(^{18}\) The members of ISGAP specifically established YIISA, the first-ever research center focusing on the interdisciplinary study of antisemitism at a North American university, to create a space to engage in this subject matter freely.


\(^{20}\) See Robert Wistrich, *From Ambivalence to Betrayal: The Left, the Jews, and Israel* (University of Nebraska Press 2012).
Foucault welcomed the Iranian Revolution of 1979 as a triumph of spiritual values over the profanity of Western capitalist materialism. He perceived this Islamist revolution as a critique of Western culture and a protest against the political rationality of modernity. This sympathetic view of the Islamist revolution has been largely ignored, but it undoubtedly influenced the subsequent philosophical discourse and scholarship. Said, who was in Paris in 1979, fondly recalls spending time with Foucault and notes that they both hoped that the Iranian Revolution would develop into what the French Revolution was to Kant two hundred years earlier. Despite its violence, they hoped that the revolution would be a crucial step toward progress and emancipation for the people of Iran and the oppressed peoples of other nations. Their critique of modernity and Western colonial power, combined with the lack of an ethical alternative, prevented these early postmodernists from criticizing the excesses of the Iranian revolution and its failure to recognize the ‘Other’ as an equal and respected member of society. The works of Foucault and Said have thus helped to lay the foundations for the failure of many contemporary intellectuals to condemn the rise of Islamism as a social movement, especially in relation to its lack of acceptance of basic notions of “Otherness” within Islamic society, a cornerstone of democratic principles, and its vitriolic prejudice against the Jewish people and Israel. This intellectual development should also be considered in the context of global politics and the prevailing environment in many academic institutions, where the need for funding unfortunately appears to be having a growing impact on the curriculum.

Furthermore, Said’s attempt to undermine the legitimacy of Jewish self-determination in Israel and the Jewish historical narrative in the Diaspora needs to be critically examined with regard to its role in the re-emergence of antisemitism among intellectuals and within the academy. Such a critique of the critique is especially urgent at this time, as there seems to be little possibility to address antisemitism forcefully within the academy or to express outrage and concern regarding the recent successes of Islamism despite its reactionary agenda and worldview. Instead, these ideological and philosophical foundations enable leading and respected scholars such as Judith Butler to argue that Hamas and Hezbollah ought to be viewed as part of the progressive global left. It also encourages some observers, including scholars of antisemitism, to blame Israel for antisemitism throughout the world.


22 See Janet Afary and Kevin Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seduction of Islamism (University of Chicago Press 2005). Afary and Anderson examine Foucault’s 1978 visit to Iran where he met with leaders of the Iranian-Islamist revolution, including Ayatollah Khomeini. The authors document how this period influenced the philosopher’s understanding of issues such as the Enlightenment, homosexuality, and his quest for the notion of political spirituality. As the book demonstrates, this topic, which has been largely overlooked, is worthy of consideration.


24 For an analysis of social movements, which are transformational, and protest movements, which are reformist, see Manuel Castells, City, Class, and Power (MacMillan, London 1978).


26 Id. It is fascinating to note that Jewish scholars who blame Israel for various crimes and even antisemitism itself often enjoy much attention and popularity, more so than scholars doing the serious analysis and research. In fact, this is a common phenomenon with regard to the politics of hatred more generally and historically.
Even in the aftermath of the Holocaust, and despite the academy’s preoccupation with colonialism, racism, sexism, socio-economic, political, and cultural inequality, domination, and critical understandings of “Otherness,” antisemitism, especially its contemporary manifestations, does not exist as an area of study in the mainstream academic curriculum. Unlike other forms of discrimination, antisemitism is not an issue of significant concern. These developments have had the effect of placing attempts to defend the Jews—and their legitimate connection to Israel and Jerusalem—outside the realms of what is acceptable and proper. This is most troubling, given that the legacy of antisemitism in the academy and in Western civilization more generally has yet to be understood and addressed in the same way as other forms of discrimination and hatred. The contemporary perception in some quarters of the Zionist movement as an unfashionable, intellectually defunct, and morally bankrupt remnant of Western colonial racist culture—a perception that pays no attention to the competing narrative of Jewish national aspirations or the Jewish people’s millennia-spanning history in the region—is therefore a recipe for disaster. At the very least, it creates an uncritical blind spot for the role that antisemitism plays in the contemporary Middle East. To engage in the study of antisemitism is somehow perceived as supportive of the Zionist narrative, while the real threat that antisemitism poses is not understood and no polices are developed to address it, let alone to help thwart it.

In this environment, it is more acceptable to study the role of the Church or the role of fascism in antisemitism rather than its contemporary manifestations. In fact, if one looks at the history of antisemitism, it was never acceptable to study or examine contemporary forms of antisemitism at the time in which they occurred. The true challenge of effective and insightful scholarship is to understand the real threat that antisemitism poses to people and society today and to develop policies to protect ourselves against this threat. However, it is not uncommon to find scholars and institutions that are opposed to the study of contemporary antisemitism yet still blame Israel for its renewed prevalence without research to back up these claims. This response is not based on sound

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27 It is worth recalling that during the rise of Nazism the German academy as an institution voluntarily cleansed itself of Jews. See Saul Friedlander, *The Years of Persecution: Nazi Germany and the Jews 1933-1939* (Phoenix, London 2007). While I do not wish to compare the German academy of the Nazi era to the present academy, the role of the academy in studying, combating, or promoting contemporary antisemitism ought to be critically examined, regardless of the period. At present, the university campus atmosphere is once again becoming increasingly hostile in terms of the pressures facing Jewish students. In fact, US universities have a history of questionable relations with dubious interests, including the Nazi regime and Islamist interests. See Stephen Norwood, *The Third Reich in the Ivory Tower: Complicity and Conflict on American Campuses* (Cambridge University Press 2009) and Mitchell Bard, *The Arab Lobby: The Invisible Alliance That Undermines America’s Interests in the Middle East* (Harper Collins 2010).

28 For a clear example of this sort of conflation, see Joseph Massad, “Palestinians, Egyptian Jews and propaganda,” *Aljazeera*, January 7, 2013.

29 A good example of this phenomenon is Paul Gilroy’s book, *Between Camps: Nations, Cultures and the Allure of Race* (2001), which begins with a heavily nostalgic and sympathetic look at the Jewish refugees that fled Nazi Europe and arrived in the London cityscape of Gilroy’s childhood. It seems uncourageous, and is reflective of a general tendency within the academy, to condemn the horrible racist antisemitism of an era past while turning a blind eye to contemporary manifestations.
academic analysis but nonetheless finds appreciative academic audiences and in some cases enjoys the blessing of university administrations eager to receive funding from Gulf states and/or to avoid confronting inconvenient truths of the contemporary condition. For instance, at a recent gathering at Yale University, a group of historians of French society concluded that Jihadist antisemitism should really be understood as a metaphor used for rhetorical and political impact. None of the scholars in question were students of Arabic, the Middle East, Islam, contemporary political or social movements, or contemporary or post-Holocaust antisemitism. However, this did not stop them from adopting a position that would no doubt be welcomed by their institutions and gatekeepers.

Daniel Sibony, the French philosopher, provides insights into the above-mentioned attitudes, which appear to have taken hold in many elite academic institutions in the West. In fact, Sibony contends that deep down those who insist on ignoring Islamism and its reactionary agenda are actually anti-Muslim themselves. The silencing of scholars and human rights activists who are concerned about antisemitism and human rights in Middle Eastern societies is a manifestation of a deep fear, or phobia, of the Islamic world. This fear, which is combined with guilt over the West’s colonial legacy in the Middle East, is powerful. As a result, there is a tendency in certain circles to tolerate and justify reactionary Islamic attitudes, including sexism, homophobia, and antisemitism, despite their own liberal views. It is thus more convenient to blame the Jews for the stalemate in the Middle East and other related problems. Sibony traces this to the colonial mentality of not expecting the peoples of the Middle East and other parts of the world to adhere to the same criteria of human rights and civility as the “civilized” West. He also points out that those who continue to highlight these contradictions and dangers eventually come to be perceived as the problem and are targeted instead.

Sibony goes further, stating that there is an emerging fascination in the West with the genocidal antisemitic narrative of radical Islamism as expressed by the Iranian regime, the Muslim Brotherhood, and other Salafists. In a similar vein, Colin Shindler argues that the growing red-green alliance has come to see the displaced and marginalized members of the Islamic world as the new proletariat, who deserve Western liberal support and admiration. Anyone perceived as being critical of the new Islamic proletari-

32 An example of the manifestation of this fear occurred when Yale sociologist Jeffrey Alexander, speaking on National Public Radio (NPR), compared the work of YIISA to that of the Black Panthers. Such an irrational, ahistorical, and reductionist comment pertaining to the African American condition and to the complex issues of both racism and antisemitism provides an insight into the sort of hurdles that are prevalent in the academy with regard to this subject. “Yale Shuts Down Antisemitism Program,” National Public Radio, June 17, 2011.
at is immediately branded a reactionary. In this intellectual climate, voices condemning brutality, anti-democratic practices, sexism, homophobia, opposition to minority rights, and other violations of universal human rights are silenced, while expressions of genocidal antisemitism are dismissed as poor translations and/or hysterical rhetoric fashioned by the Zionist defenders of Israel. This is what makes the task at hand, namely to produce high-caliber scholarship and effective policy development and analysis for dealing with contemporary antisemitism—in particular its potentially genocidal variety—all the more challenging but also all the more urgent.

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The crisis of modernity refers to the crisis of capitalism itself. Regardless of one’s definition, the crisis is causing problems at local and global level and has become a key aspect of the contemporary condition. Institutions that play a key role in society, especially the state, are under increasing pressure. The crisis is affecting everything from the core to the periphery. Those in the periphery are experiencing high levels of socio-economic, political, and even cultural marginalization. In some areas of the world, the economic and political crisis in is so severe that it is causing failing and even failed states. Several states in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as several other Islamic states, are currently in this predicament. When such states fail, marginalization increases. The resulting power vacuum is increasingly being filled by radical Islamism, whose adherents, like those who follow neo-liberalism, actually detest the state, perceiving it as a vestige of the colonial era and Western imperialism. In many cases, the political actors and interests that are rising to power subscribe to ideological worldviews that are also extremely hostile toward Jews.

In the context of the conference title, the term “modernity” refers to the processes that led to the emergence of the specific and distinctive characteristics of modern society. In this context, the concept of “modernity” does not simply refer to a phenomenon of contemporary origin. It posses an analytical and conceptual value that embodies the defining characteristics of modern societies. According to Stuart Hall, these characteristics include:

1. The dominance of secular forms of political power and authority and conceptions of sovereignty and legitimacy, operating within defined territorial boundaries, which are characteristic of the large, complex structures of the modern nation-state.
2. A monetarized exchange economy, based on the large-scale production and consumption of commodities for the market, extensive ownership of private property and the accumulation of capital on a systemic, long-term basis. […]
3. The decline of the traditional social order, with its fixed social hierarchies and overlapping allegiances, and the appearance of a dynamic social and sexual division of labor. In modern capitalist societies, this was characterized by new class formations and distinctive patriarchal relations between men and women.

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The decline of the religious world-view typical of traditional societies and the rise of a secular and materialist culture, exhibiting those individualistic, rationalist, and instrumental impulses now so familiar to us.\textsuperscript{37}

The emergence of modern societies was spurred by new intellectual movements that developed during the Reformation, the Renaissance, the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century and the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. The transformation of Europe’s intellectual, philosophical, and moral framework was significant and played an important part in the formation of modern societies as encapsulated by capitalism and the rise of the nation state. In addition, Hall contends that the construction of cultural and social identities is an important aspect of the formation process. This then plays a key role in creating “imagined communities” and symbolic boundaries that define who belongs and who is excluded as the “Other.”\textsuperscript{38}

In the context of the YIISA conference, the “crisis of modernity” refers to the current breakdown of the political and economic system. However, this crisis also operates at a philosophical level, raising issues that are just as important as economic and political uncertainty. In fact, the uncertainty created by the crisis is eroding the moral and ethical rudder of Western institutions by creating a philosophical vacuum that is being filled by the moral relativism of postmodernism.

On one level, modernity offered a different vision of humanity, society, and the universe, but it also required a narrative to establish the legitimacy of its vision. This narrative constructed an image of the “Other,” living in darkness and irrational ignorance due to his so-called primitive religious beliefs. In contrast, the so-called Enlightened thinkers and scientists succeeded in liberating man from his material and philosophical poverty and placed him on the path to progress and perfection.\textsuperscript{39} This narrative, which was dominant in seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe, also provided the foundations for modernity’s racism, slavery, and—as some argue—even the Holocaust.

The “crisis of modernity,” then, is the recognition of the weakness of this narrative and the uncertainty of everything that has emerged from it, including the existing social order, ethical standards, and even our perceptions of ourselves. In this postmodern moment of uncertainty and competing relativist narratives, thinkers are prevented from thoroughly examining and speaking out against the forms of discrimination openly advocated by radical reactionary social movements, including but not limited to antisemitism, that challenge notions of equality and robust citizenship.\textsuperscript{40} Another result of the “crisis of modernity” is the emergence of the aforementioned red-green alliance.

\textsuperscript{38} Id.
\textsuperscript{39} Id.
\textsuperscript{40} Leo Strauss, a strong critic of modernity, attributed modernity’s intellectual degradation to the influence of several Enlightenment philosophers in the history of political thought who radically broke with classical political thinking. Strauss believed that, in doing so, these thinkers either directly or indirectly contributed to the emergence of historicism and positivism, and he held these movements accountable for modernity’s relativism, nihilism, and moral and intellectual demise. See Jens Olesen, “The Crisis of Modernity and Its Interpretive Significance: Leo Strauss on Reading Political Philosophy,” paper presented at the 14th International Graduate Conference in Philosophy, University of Essex, May 28, 2011.
which is gaining ground among scholars, practitioners, and activists, as well as within the political establishment.

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Much of the scholarship on antisemitism is descriptive in nature, especially concerning its contemporary manifestations. However, there is also a need to analyze antisemitism in the context of other processes—socio-economic, political, cultural, and ideological—and the impact of globalization. Few scholars contextualize their studies in this manner. There is therefore a need to combine empirical and conceptual analysis of antisemitism within an interdisciplinary framework. The contemporary condition, which is characterized by the crisis of modernity, the processes of globalization, which are governed by a neo-liberal approach, the weakening of the state, the emergence of radical political Islamism as an effective social movement, the reluctance of Western intellectuals to critically engage these processes, and the re-emergence for the first time since the Holocaust of a deadly form of antisemitism, requires the development of a creative, interdisciplinary, critical approach within a cooperative research entity to begin to assess this phenomenon in all its manifestations and implications. This is especially true at a time when—for all sorts of reasons—such an entity has many opponents.

Globalization has a direct bearing on contemporary antisemitism. During the last several decades, nationalism and new forms of identity politics have exacerbated existing social, economic, and political cleavages. The causes of this emerging crisis include the extension of global competitive markets and the effects of structural adjustment, the intensification of socio-economic inequalities, the blurring of international and domestic political conflicts, and the world-wide escalation of adversarial “identity politics.” The extension of information technologies and travel possibilities has created a new network of “global spaces” within the interstices of metropolitan life across continents, inhabited by a growing coterie of transnational professionals and specialists. From the perspective of this high-rise corporate economy and corporate culture, the city down below appears to be inhabited by immigrant populations competing for low-wage jobs in an increasingly informalized urban economy, as the state retreats from its welfare functions. The combined economic and political imperatives of globalization seem to sweep away particularities of time and place to generate common outcomes everywhere: growing ethnic racial and cultural heterogeneity, coupled with social and spatial polarization.

At the most general level, it is possible to think of globalization in terms of movement and circulation, a complexity of criss-crossing flows: some of it capital and trade, some of it people, and some of it signs, symbols, meanings, and myths. A common thread which runs through the existing body of literature is the idea that such flows and mobility across space have accelerated, speeded up, or gained a new momentum in the contemporary era, captured in such key phrases as “time-space compression,” “time-space distantiation,” and “intersecting scapes.” Thus the concept of globalization does not imply a shift from one period to another in the form of an historical rupture, as

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do other encompassing terms most frequently used to describe contemporary metropoli-
tan experience, namely post-Fordism and modernity. Rather it denotes an
intensification and stretching out of movements and flows, as captured for instance in
Giddens’s definition of globalization as “the intensification of world-wide social rela-
tions which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by
events occurring many miles away and vice versa.”

Some social groups initiate flows and movement, while other do not; some are more
on the receiving end of it than others; some are effectively imprisoned by it. There is
thus a dimension of movement and circulation; there is also a dimension of control and
initiation. The ways in which different social groups are re-inserted into, placed within,
and seize upon these flows, which are themselves differentiated, can both reflect and
reinforce existing power relations; it can also undermine them. What does not follow
from the considerations above, and yet continues to inform much of the literature on
global flows, is the social imaginary of a borderless world. Inherent to the concept of
global flows, differentiated and differentiating, is the capacity to transgress taken for
granted boundaries between nation states, between racial, ethnic, and gender groups,
and between the public and private spheres. This does mean, however, an increasingly
order-less world, one in which boundaries have lost their meaning. On the contrary,
borders have become the locus of struggles among a variety of social actors, mobilized
to reassert or redefine their boundaries vis-à-vis other relevant actors, and translate onto
the space of the metropolis.

Globalization divides as much as it unites. Alongside the emerging planetary dimen-
sions of business, finance, trade, and information flows, a localizing, space-fixing pro-
cess is set in motion. Between them the closely interconnected processes sharply
differentiate the existential condition of entire populations and of various segments of
each one of the populations. What appears as globalization for some means localization
for others; signaling a new freedom for some, upon many others it descends as an
uninvited and cruel fate. Some of us become fully and truly global; some are fixed in
their locality. Being local in a globalized world is a sign of deprivation and degradation.
An integral part of the globalizing process is progressive spatial segregation, separation,
and exclusion. Neo-tribal and fundamentalist tendencies, which reflect and articulate the
experience of people on the receiving end of globalization, are as much legitimate
reactions to globalization as the widely acclaimed hybridization of top-culture—the
culture at the globalized top. There is a break down in communication between the
globalized elites and the ever-more localized rest.

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It is in this context that contemporary antisemitism emerges. In a real sense, Israel is in
the middle of a region in which societies are experiencing critical levels of marginaliza-

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45 A. Amin, Post-Fordism: A Reader (Blackwells, Oxford 1994).
46 E. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory (Verso, London
1989); S. Watson and K. Gibson, eds., Postmodern Cities and Spaces (Blackwells, Oxford 1995).
48 Charles Small, “Creating National Identity and Otherness: Canada and the First Nations,” in
Olufemi Vaughan and Charles Small, eds., Globalisation and Marginality: Essays on the Paradoxes of
Local and Global Forces (Sefer Academic Press, Ibadan, Nigeria 2007).
tion, and in some cases collapse, threatening social cohesion and further complicating international relations. As mentioned above, globalization—through migration, trade and business, and advances in technology and telecommunications—is connecting people as never before, but it is also dividing them as much as it unites them. In the midst of these processes, contradictions, and emerging cleavages, antisemitism is once again flourishing in the form of the demonization of Israel and, by extension, Diaspora Jewry, with its real and supposed associations with the State of Israel. During five years of interdisciplinary programming and research projects conducted at the highest levels of scholarship, several YIISA scholars examined the emerging socio-economic, political, and cultural vacuum that is being filled by the burgeoning social movement of radical political Islamism. This movement embodies the most pernicious forms of antisemitism, including a consistent call for, and incitement to, genocide against the Jewish state, consistent with its ideological and religious worldview. Many scholars and policy makers do not recognize or acknowledge these developments. It is within this context that Israel is emerging as the “Jew among nations,” finding itself geographically, politically, and metaphorically in the center of this process, as well as on the frontline of a conflict over basic relations of the state and notions of democracy. Like the Jews of Europe during the interwar period, the Israel and—perhaps more so—Jewish people in Diaspora communities around the world will find themselves separated from the elites on one side and the working classes on the other. They will be more separated politically, culturally, and economically in the middle of competing forces as the crisis of modernity continues to evolve and its manifestations deepen. As Bernard-Henri Lévy contends, it is the role of the intellectual to shed light where there is darkness. It is the study of contemporary antisemitism and the struggle to develop social policies that will promote human dignity and respect for all that is once again an urgent calling for scholars.

49 With this in mind, it is important to consider the following three points:

(1) The failure to recognize antisemitism studies as a valid academic discipline contributes to the ongoing mood of apologetic lethargy concerning this long-lasting prejudice. Now more than ever, there is a need for a vibrant, critical, open interdisciplinary research center to develop research projects and interdisciplinary curriculums. Policy and policy development are respected areas of study that need to be included in the area of contemporary antisemitism studies. Those who dismiss this as advocacy are pushing an regressive political advocacy agenda of their own.

(2) The failure of academia to assert its independence from funding sources and government influence in the study of human rights and efforts to combat hatred is a failure worthy of research in itself, as it goes to the heart of free debate and democratic principles and practice.

49 It is important to consider the impact of social media and information technology on the dissemination of its ideas, discourse, and political culture, especially in the Middle East. This impact is like a double-edged sword, since it encompasses an utopian liberating effects but also empowers reactionary forces. In this context, it is interesting to note that certain hateful images of Jews with origins in European antisemitism are being “beamed” into Europe for the first time in many decades from the Middle East.

(3) Antisemitism is a major issue in the study of globalization, modernism, and post-modernism and also needs to be acknowledged as a legitimate issue in Middle Eastern studies. The study of contemporary antisemitism from an interdisciplinary perspective is crucial to scholarship, policy, and the protection of human rights, human dignity, and democratic principles, especially in these times of silence.

As Ruth Wisse has summarized the issue with insight and power: “Jews in democratic societies are not merely the proverbial canaries sent into the mine shaft to test the quality of the air: they function rather as the kindling used to set the system aflame. Why stop at the Jews?” In other words, the study of antisemitism is not a parochial matter, but a complex and explosive phenomenon that is bound up with matters of human rights, the protection of democratic principles, and citizenship, as well as notions of dignity. In the contemporary context of globalization, combined with the rise of reactionary social movements, we must not only examine and come to understand these complex processes as they relate to antisemitism: it is also incumbent upon us to develop approaches to safeguard and solve these attacks against all humanity.

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This book will be of interest to students and scholars of antisemitism and discrimination, as well as to scholars and readers from other fields. Rather than treating antisemitism merely as an historical phenomenon, this book places it squarely in the contemporary context. As a result, the papers presented in this volume also provide important insights into the ideologies, processes, and developments that give rise to prejudice in the contemporary global context.
I
CONCEPTUAL
APPROACHES
“New Europe,” Holocaust Memory, and Antisemitism

David M. Seymour*

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper is part of a larger research project that examines the ways in which the Holocaust comes to be subsumed within a discursive framework of contemporary forms of antisemitism. Here, I examine this tendency as it plays itself out at the intersection of two interrelated narratives: the construction of the “new Europe” and its self-legitimizing through the transmission of “Holocaust” to “Holocaust memory.”

Drawing on the concept of “Holocaust dissolution” and its connections with the process of commodification that I have developed elsewhere, I argue that the Holocaust memory of the “new Europe” rests ultimately on dissolving its specifically Jewish dimensions of genocide into an overarching concept of “modernity”—a modernity now transcended, but thought to capture the essence of the “old” Europe. Two consequences follow from this initial premise. The first is the strict equation made of genocidal antisemitism and modernity, and the second, intimately related consequence is the theoretical inability to recognize non-genocidal antisemitism not only in the “old” Europe but also in its new incarnation. I argue, finally, that it is this lack of recognition of even the possibility of antisemitism that accounts not only for the denial of claims of contemporary European antisemitism, but also the intensity with which those claims are sometimes met and the accusations of “bad faith” and Jewish “particularism” that accompany them.

2. NEW EUROPE, THE HOLOCAUST, AND HOLOCAUST MEMORY

Writing in his recent essay, Robert Fine offers a succinct account of the nature of Holocaust memory within the legitimizing practices of the new Europe. It is worth quoting at length,

After 1989, the “Europeanization” of Eastern Europe drew the former satellite countries of the Soviet bloc into the orbit of Holocaust commemoration. The Holocaust and

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Auschwitz became universal references for absolute evil. In this context, one temptation is to give the story of European antisemitism a happy ending and to pay tribute to the success of the new Europe in transcending its longest hatred. Antisemitism is tucked safely away in Europe’s past, overcome by the defeat of fascism and the development of the Soviet Union. The rise of political antisemitism in the late 19th century and its consolidation as an exterminatory antisemitism in the 20th century, are associated with the ethnic nationalism that prevailed in Europe at that time, especially in Germany and Eastern Europe; while the end of antisemitism is associated with the universal civil values now embodied in the European Union and European Convention on Human Rights.... This reassuring narrative looks back to an era in which antisemites saw themselves as guardians of the ethnically pure nation-state and forward to a post national Europe in which antisemitism is remembered, but only as a residual trauma or a museum piece....

Thus, the idea of Europe as the civilized continent is rescued from the wreckage.3

Fine’s account of the distinction between the old and new Europe includes a series of strictly demarcated binary oppositions, the nation-state/Europe, nationalism/cosmopolitanism, fascism/human rights, politics/civil society, and genocidal antisemitism/pluralism. The new Europe, in short, defines itself through its overcoming and neutralizing of the first term of each of these couplets and their “safe” consignment to the past. In this context, Holocaust memory and the Holocaust itself become a bridge or hinge between the old and the new Europe.

This last point is articulated by Levy and Sznaider in their project on the connections between the Holocaust, Holocaust memory, and human rights,

The Holocaust constitutes an epochal break. It has, therefore, the potential of challenging basic national assumption (like sovereign law in its own territory) and creating a cosmopolitanized public and political space that reinforces moral dependencies.... [W]hat has pushed the Holocaust to such prominence in public thinking has been the indispensable role it has served in the transition from a world of national sovereignty to a new world of interconnectedness and toward a more cosmopolitanized global society, of which the proliferation of human rights regimes is a prominent manifestation.4

Here, the Holocaust is cast in the role as “epochal break” between the old and the new and as containing the potential of bringing into existence the “new” (whether in Europe or elsewhere), but we also see a further oppositional couplet, that of Holocaust and Holocaust memory. Again the first term is consigned to the past and the second is seemingly rooted in the present. However, in the content of their representation of the Holocaust both in itself and in the context of the new Europe’s Holocaust memory, there is a line of continuity that crosses the assumed demarcation. That strand of continuity is what I refer to as Holocaust dissolution and its associated commodification. More specifically, I argue that the presentation of the Holocaust as Holocaust memory dissolves the praxis of genocidal antisemitism into a general or universalized account of the “old Europe” in such a way that any recognition of the particularities that may account for the genocide are lost along with the ability to recognize non-exterminatory forms of anti-Jewish hostility.

3 Ibid., at pp. 462-463.
3. **HOLOCAUST DISSOLUTION: THE COMMODIFICATION OF THE NEW EUROPE’S HOLOCAUST MEMORY**

In keeping with the new Europe’s post-modern and post-national framework, it is not surprising that its representation of the Holocaust should draw from that critical tradition. This connection is evidenced by Levy and Sznaider’s reference to “national sovereignty” and “national assumptions” as the operative causes of genocidal antisemitism. As such, this aspect of their work draws on the writings of Zygmunt Bauman, Michel Foucault, and Giorgio Agamben. Despite the important distinctions that exist between these works, a common unifying theme is the connection this school of thought makes between the Holocaust, the nation-state and an overarching concept of modernity.

For these thinkers, genocidal antisemitism is integral to the modernist “project” that is the defining characteristic of the modern nation-state. In terms of content, this project is characterized as an obsession with the needs of national order and/or the health of the national population. It is in this context that the Jews are cast as the “Other,” as the embodiment of the threat to such order and health. This project of order and health is both inaugurated and managed by the state; it is the state that classifies the population under its domain according the criteria of those who contribute to the health of society and those who pose a threat, that is, “those who shall live” and “those who shall die,” respectively. Inscribed within the very essence of modernity itself, genocidal antisemitism becomes the expression of this policing of boundaries and the expression of the very nature of modern national sovereignty. For Agamben, in particular, the classifying and its genocidal practice are present within the *praxis* of national law and the juridical rights inherent within it.

Although not fully theorized, Levy and Sznaider’s account of the Holocaust draws on accounts of this kind for an understanding of its causes. This point is evident in their belief, noted above, that the compulsive impulse to modern genocide is overcome by and in the post-national and post-modern Europe and its emphasis upon the *praxis* of cosmopolitan human rights that is said to constitute the juridical basis of a new transnational European civil society. Yet, it is precisely in this account that Levy and Sznaider’s presentation of the Holocaust exhibits the tendency to Holocaust dissolution and commodification that is also characteristic of the critical thinkers whose work they echo. By dissolving the Holocaust into the concept of modernity itself, it is not so much antisemitism that is overcome (since it is robbed of any autonomous existence) but, rather, the old (i.e. modern) Europe itself.

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This last point comes to the fore in the following ways. First, and most obviously, in a mirror image of the new Europe, the placement of genocidal antisemitism within the overarching concept of modernity, serves to deterritorialize and dehistoricize the historical actuality of the Holocaust. It cannot but overlook any consideration of why the Holocaust occurred at a specific time and specific place (Germany in the mid-20th century). In so doing, it dissolves the Holocaust’s specificity into the more abstract and universal framework of the modern European nation-state.

Implicit in this initial tendency of the dissolution of the particularism of genocidal antisemitism into the abstract universals is the positivist presentation of its conceptual schema. As no more than internal expressions of the “modern project” and of the *praxis* of biopolitics and racism, the aims and outcomes are read into modernity from its inception (including genocide). Related concepts, such as law, rights, the nation, Jews, antisemitism, and so forth appear on the scene in an equally ahistorical and static form. These concepts’ form and content, seemingly complete in meaning from their origin are, in other words, simply posited—the product of a seemingly omnipotent power. They take on the appearance of “brute facts.” This presentation of modernity’s operative concepts adopts the positivist mantra that what is, simply is. In so doing, they take on the aura of a force and fate of nature that cannot, nor could be otherwise. It is in this positivism that any notion of internal conceptual development is correspondingly abjured and all external relations are represented as innate and natural properties of the concept itself. To put the matter in slightly different terms, all the concepts relating to the Holocaust are presented as always already containing within them, both jointly and severally, the same inherent propensity of extermination found in the overarching concept of modernity itself.

It is in this context that the historical actuality of the Holocaust comes to be dissolved within the nature of “modernity” itself. However, as the above comments indicate, this does not lead to the position that the new Europe has transcended (modern) antisemitism. The claim that having transcended the modern Europe, we have, almost as a by-product, overcome the seemingly natural propensity to genocidal antisemitism says little about antisemitism that is neither nationalist, genocidal, nor political in origin. As the critique above indicates, the possibility of the presence of a non-political, non-nationalist, and non-genocidal antisemitism remains simultaneously invisible and untheorized.

The danger of such an account is that, since antisemitism (now defined only as genocidal antisemitism or the Holocaust) has not only been relegated to the past but has also been overcome by the legitimizing force of the new Europe, any claim of contemporary antisemitism that draws on its memory is deemed illegitimate from the outset. It calls into question the anti-anti, or, rather, post-antisemitic image of the new Europe. It is, I believe, the potentially destabilizing effect of claims of contemporary antisemitism on the new Europe’s gilded self-image that goes some way to explaining not only the denials of claims of contemporary antisemitism but also the intensity of those denials.

**4. HOLOCAUST MEMORY, COMMODIFICATION, AND THE MORAL ECONOMY OF THE “NEW EUROPE”**

As we have seen, all that remains in post-national and post-modern Europe is the memory of the Holocaust. But it is less a memory of the Holocaust itself than a memory of
the modernity into which the Holocaust has been dissolved. Separated from the structural conditions that made it possible, the Holocaust of the new Europe’s memory becomes nothing more than a symbol. It is a symbol, however, not of antisemitism, genocidal or otherwise, but of the old Europe itself, a Europe fragmented into nation-states along with its concomitants of national sovereignty, nationalism, and the genocidal impulse that is said to inhere within it.

Expressing its distance from the world that made the Holocaust possible, the new European symbol of the Holocaust is recast in the language of morality. The symbols’ purpose and function is to serve as a warning to be sounded whenever and wherever any of the tendencies of the old Europe threaten to reappear. The moral imperative contained in this symbolism of the Holocaust is contained in the maxim, “Never Again, Auschwitz.” It is to this symbolic value that Dubiel refers in his article The Remembrance of the Holocaust as a Catalyst for a Transnational Ethics?, when he notes that,  

For the Holocaust now provides the meta-narrative for sufferings inflicted for political reasons. It has turned into the supra-denominational passion story of late-modernity. Concepts, symbols and images are taken out of their immediate context and are employed to code, in a single term, the collective pain that people inflict on others. The symbolic repertoire has been adopted by political groups all over the world who are subject to extreme pain and distress. It is present in the political defense of human rights, in the re-moralizing of diplomacy, and in the turning away of the morally neutral Realpolitik.  

We see here an example not only of Holocaust dissolution and its re-surfacing as post-national and post-modern symbol but also of its resurfacing within the register of morality. Symbolic representation within this register forms the context in which claims of contemporary antisemitism are denied and creates the conditions for the particular intensity of those denials.

Perhaps the most concise way to explain this aspect of Holocaust dissolution is by analogy with Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique of commodification. For them, commodification is the process whereby unique and distinct elements of nature are caught up within the near universal realm of exchange. As a condition of entry, each individual element has to become exchangeable for all others. As a consequence of this demand, any specific or particular quality that inheres within them, and which obstructs that exchange, has to be expunged. It is only when emptied of such content and reformulated in strictly formal and, hence, universal terms that an element becomes a commodity and can take its place within the exchange realm of the economy.

This notion of commodification marks discussions of the new Europe’s adoption and adaptation of genocidal antisemitism as a moral symbol and explains the dissolution of the specificities of the Holocaust into formal universal terms. This point can be detected in Levy and Szaider’s work on Holocaust memory.

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9 Ibid., at p. 61.
Depicting its symbolic value in terms of its “abstract nature of ‘good and evil,’” the Holocaust can only serve its role as universal warning and call to action once it has been abstracted from or, rather, emptied of its particularist elements of its historical occurrence, including, of course, its specifically Jewish dimensions (amongst which is the presence of antisemitism).

It is only in such circumstances that the Holocaust, now presented in abstract, formal, and universal terms is free to play the symbolic role allocated to it. In such a form it takes its place as an ethical commodity within the exchange realm of the new Europe’s moral economy. It is only at this stage, therefore, when the Holocaust becomes freely exchangeable for any other number of situations, that its dissolution—a dissolution inherent in its symbolic value—is complete.

It is as a consequence of such “commodification” and the dissolution of which it is a part that, as Levy and Szenia note,

The Holocaust is now a concept that has been dislocated from time and space precisely because it can be used to dramatize any injustice, racism or crime perpetrated anywhere on the planet. However, as Adorno and Horkheimer argue, what cannot be contained within the commodity—that is, those particular aspects of the natural element that resist and obstruct its universalization—reappears in the image of a threatening and unpredictable “untamed nature.” Whilst, on the one hand, the commodity’s formal attributes permit its inclusion in the realm of exchange, on the other hand, its now expunged specificities (that which obstructs such entry) are recast as nothing more than an irrational remnant of the past or as no more than a superstitious myth having no place in the increasingly rationalized (i.e. commodified) world. These specificities are rejected in that world; they become that which cannot be recognized and subject to the status of exclusion and taboo.

Let me now make this analogy between Holocaust memory and the twin aspects of Adorno and Horkheimer’s conception of commodification more direct, so as to shed light upon the intense denials by many to claims of contemporary antisemitism. Read into the very fiber of modernity, of the old Europe, genocidal antisemitism takes on the appearance of a natural phenomenon and is raised to the status of a law of nature. From the perspective of the new Europe, whose self-representation turns on the transcendence or overcoming of such antisemitism, any recognition of its existence, whether as a continuation of past manifestations or as a new phenomenon, serves to undermine its defining claim. This factor alone goes some way to understanding the intensity of the denial of contemporary claims. To this initial point, however, a further element can be identified.

In an era in which antisemitism is deemed a thing of the past, claims of its contemporary presence appear to be no more than claims to see an irrational legacy of the past, of less enlightened times. Now that the Holocaust has become commodified, its now expunged content—its specificities and particularities, its potential continued existence

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13 Levy and Szenia, supra n. 4, at p. 156.
14 See generally Adorno and Horkheimer, supra n. 11, at ch. 1.
as “untamed nature,” its antisemitism—takes on the aura of superstition and taboo along with the prohibitions and sanctions that attaches to such abject phenomena.

5. CONCLUSION

In this paper, I have sought to understand why claims of contemporary antisemitism are met with such intense denial. Looking at the problem within the context of the “new Europe,” I have argued that the underpinning cause of the intensity of denial is that the account of the Holocaust as an inherent outcome of “modernity” and its reframing as “Holocaust memory” and universal moral symbol required dissolving the particularities of its Jewish dimensions, including dissolving the phenomenon of antisemitism into more universal and generalized concepts.

First, in the new Europe’s political reading of the Holocaust, antisemitism is recast as genocide. As a consequence, any consideration of modern antisemitism that does not fit into this genocidal concept remains both unseen and untheorized. In many ways, if such antisemitism does appear in these accounts, it is often presented as no more than a remnant from premodern times and hardly worthy of reflection.

Second, a similar dissolution is present in the new Europe’s moralizing of the Holocaust. Certain of its overcoming of genocidal antisemitism, the new Europe reduces the Holocaust to the symbolic value of an abstract and formal, universal, moral imperative. Again, however, this universalizing is dependent on the expulsion of that aspect of the Holocaust’s specifically Jewish content.

In both these instances, claims of antisemitism, genocidal or otherwise, are seen as no more than remnants of a previous age, an age now safely overcome and all but impossible to credit with any degree of seriousness. However, and more fundamentally, antisemitism as a “autonomous” phenomenon, one whose meaning, direction, and outcome are not determined by what amounts to an omnipotent political will to power, that is, one whose causes and responsibility are not so contained (and containable), is written out, not only of the structure of the new Europe itself but also of the old Europe that it is said to have overcome. In this context, therefore, the abject denial of antisemitism and the claims of bad faith associated with such denial may not be surprising. From the perspective of the new Europe, not only does antisemitism not exist today, but it has, as a phenomenon with specifically Jewish dimensions, never really existed in the past either.
Antisemitism and Anti-Capitalism in the Current Economic Crisis

Nicolas Bechter*

1. INTRODUCTION

In the current crisis of the economic system, many critics of capitalism feel confirmed in their views. They include radical leftists, who have always known that capitalism does not work, mainstream politicians, who do not question capitalism as such but only its neoliberal outbursts, and right-wing groups, who want to strengthen national states against a frenetic global economy.

As important as it is to radically question the structures of our society, it can turn out to be dangerous if it is not done properly. The crucial word is “radically.” With its Latin origin radix (meaning “root”), in the field of social sciences it implies digging to the roots of social phenomena and thereby exposing and criticizing their foundations. Inspired by Karl Marx and his Critique of Political Economy, Theodor Adorno made this his life’s work in various fields, including philosophy, sociology, and musicology. Adorno was also aware of the dangers of radical critique:

Not everything that tends towards extremes in whatever dimension can be considered radical, but only what attacks the negative situation at the root in an “inconsiderate critique of the status quo.” (Adorno 2003: 92)

This is especially important in the field of economic critique, as a superficial analysis of the structures and processes in an economic system can lead to premature verdicts. Such verdicts are never able to push through the ideological undergrowth and, for reasons that I will discuss later, often produce antisemitic consequences—whether consciously or unconsciously.

The first part of this paper identifies the societal structures and historical tendencies that make it possible to blame “the Jews” for the problems of the capitalist system. This is followed by a case-study of an Austrian right-wing newspaper as proof of the ideas presented.

2. POLITICAL ECONOMY

Two aspects of Marx’s Critique of Political Economy are relevant to the various antisemitism theories discussed in this paper, namely the process of surplus production and abstract domination.

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Marx starts his analysis of modern capitalist societies by analyzing the notion of commodity. This is surprising, as it would seem more obvious to start the examination with money. However, Marx realized that it is the commodity, not money, that is the basic unit of a capitalist economy and society. Money— the general equivalent— can then be deduced. Consequently, Marx’s critique of the bourgeois society is not a critique of money alone but of the whole process of capitalist production. He shows that surplus value, or profit, is not produced in the circulation sphere by selling the commodity at a higher price than the price at which it was bought but that it is produced by the workers in the production sphere and only realized by the capitalist in the circulation sphere.

Another important point of Marx’s critique of the political economy relates to the change in forms of domination. Whereas in the past there used to be a personal form of domination, such as the master-slave or landlord-bondsman relationship, in capitalism this domination has been transformed into an abstract form of domination. The members of modern societies are formally free, but unfortunately free in the double sense, that as a free man he can dispose of his labour-power as his own commodity, and that on the other hand he has no other commodity for sale, is short of everything necessary for the realization of his labour-power. (Marx 1995: 109)

3. ANI SEMITISM AND ANTI-CAPITALISM

Antisemitism has a strong affinity with anti-capitalism. From Shylock the reckless usurer, via the court Jew and Baron Rothschild, to the East Coast bankers, antisemites have frequently held the Jews responsible for the burdens of the (proto-)capitalistic society. It is crucial for the understanding of antisemitism to be aware of this link and to interpret it correctly. First and foremost, it is important to comprehend that antisemitism has nothing to do with real-life Jews, their behavior, or their habits. As the German author Ulrich Enderwitz puts it:

antisemitic judgements are, because of their own structure, not reactions to real outer experience, but projections of an inner conflict, not the empirical product of a process of perception and cognition, but a symptomatic expression of a discrepancy and resistance within the perceiving and cognizing subject. (Enderwitz 1998: 11)

For Adorno and Horkheimer, this projection is an important point in their antisemitism theory. In the third thesis of the “Elements of Anti-Semitism” in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, they make a connection between antisemitism and capitalism: “Bourgeois antisemitism has a specific economic cause: the concealment of domination in production” (Horkheimer & Adorno 2004: 182). This is the connection to Marx and the transformation of domination. The Jews, because of their historic position within the European economic system, were scapegoats for discontent with capitalism. Since some Jews were involved in the circulation sphere, they were the visible elements of the

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1 For a comprehensive discussion of antisemitism and the Christian interest ban (Zinsverbot), see Heil & Wacker (1997).
2 This is just one aspect of Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s thoughts on antisemitism. For an extensive summary, see Salzborn (2010: 96ff.). A helpful article on the various transformations of the antisemitism theory of the Frankfurt School is Martin Jay’s The Jews and the Frankfurt School. Critical Theory’s Analysis of Anti-Semitism (1980).
economic process. “[The Jewish merchant] is the bailiff for the whole system and shoulders the hatred for all the others” (Horkheimer & Adorno 2004: 183).

So we can see that blaming the Jews for the shortcomings of capitalism is an abbreviated critique of capitalist structures that stops at the sphere of circulation instead of going to the root of the problem, which is located in the sphere of production. It is a “conformist rebellion” (Claussen 2005) in which the antisemites can live out their thwarted ambitions without attacking the system as a whole or challenging the ruling class.

However, this failure to understand capitalist production is not just a subjective problem but is based within the structure of the society itself. “The responsibility of the circulation sphere for the exploitation is a societally necessary pretense.” (Horkheimer & Adorno 2004: 183) These necessities are strongly linked to such terms as fetish-character and ideology, which were used by Marx to describe capitalist society and were then employed by Moishe Postone, among others, to analyze antisemitism.

Postone’s understanding of the relationship between antisemitism and capitalism is a development of certain aspects of Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s theory. For him, the identification of the Jews with the circulation sphere was true in the case of traditional antisemitism but is no longer valid in the case of its modern form:

It is not that the Jews merely were considered to be the owners of money, as in traditional anti-Semitism, but that they were held responsible for economic crises and identified with the range of social restructuring and dislocation resulting from rapid industrialization. … In other words, the abstract domination of capital, which—particularly with rapid industrialization—caught people up in a web of dynamic forces they could not understand, became perceived as the domination of International Jewry. (Postone 1980: 107)

Postone explains antisemitism by referring to Marx’s concept of the fetish of the commodity, understood as a mysterious thing simply because in it the social character of men’s labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labour. (Marx 1995: 43)

This means that the relation between humans expresses itself in an objectified form, rather than a social form, because of the fetishism and the double character (value and use-value) of the commodity form. Thus, the commodity expresses and veils social relations at the same time. The abstract foundations of capitalist organization are veiled, and what is left are the concrete, sensual forms.

One aspect of the fetish, then, is that capitalist social relations do not appear as such and, moreover, present themselves antinomically, as the opposition of the abstract and concrete. Because, additionally, both sides of the antinomy are objectified, each appears to be quasi-natural. The abstract dimension appears in the form of abstract, universal, “objective,” natural laws; the concrete dimension appears as pure “thingly” nature. (Postone 1980: 107)

3 For a longer discussion, see Grigat (2007) and Postone (1993).
This is the crucial point in Postone’s theory. He thinks that modern antisemitism does not identify the Jews with the circulation sphere but rather with its other side: the abstract dimension of value as such.

When one examines the specific characteristics of the power attributed to the Jews by modern anti-Semitism—abstractness, intangibility, universality, mobility—it is striking that they are all characteristics of the value dimension of the social forms analyzed by Marx. Moreover, this dimension, like the supposed power of the Jews, does not appear as such, but always in the form of a material carrier, such as the commodity. (Postone 1980: 108)

The concrete dimension (labor, artisanry) can then be constructed as natural and ontologized as a constant and everlasting pillar of humanity. Antisemitism as an anti-capitalist outburst illegitimately separates the concrete and abstract dimension of capitalist society and focuses on agitating against this abstract dimension, against the money and financial capital personalized in international Jewry. In this fetishized perception, it is possible to pit honest manual labor against the exploitative, parasitic financial capital that biologizes capitalism.

The “anti-capitalist” attack, however, does not remain limited to the attack against abstraction. Even the abstract dimension also appears materially. On the level of the capital fetish, it is not only the concrete side of the antimony which is naturalized and biologized. The manifest abstract dimension is also biologized—as the Jews. … Modern anti-Semitism involves a biologization of capitalism—which itself is only understood in terms of its manifest abstract dimension—as International Jewry. (Postone 1980: 112)

4. **AUSTRIAN NEWSPAPER ****DIE AULA**

I have chosen *Die Aula* as a case study of how anti-capitalism and antisemitism are often linked for various reasons. First, it is not just some small publication but the monthly newspaper of an organization with very close ties to the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) (Gärtner 1993: 262ff) and a monthly circulation of 11,000 copies. The Freedom Party is a right-wing party that was established as the third party in post-war Austria and was more or less openly the party of the (former) Nazis. The Freedom Party became internationally infamous in the late 1980s and 1990s as the party of Jörg Haider (Bailer & Neugebauer 1993). It became part of the federal government in 2000 and five years later split into a pragmatic liberal-right party (BZÖ) and a hard-line right-wing party (FPÖ) (Luther 2006; Stephen Roth Institute 2005). The main topics of the FPÖ are currently immigrants, especially Muslims, and the neoliberal rulers in Brussels. However, anti-

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4 I would like to thank Willi Lasek, Nedim Mujanović, and Heribert Schiedel of the Documentation Center of the Austrian Resistance (*Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes—DÖW*) for providing me with literature and copies of *Die Aula* and for helping me to contextualize this material within the Austrian extreme right scene.

5 *Die Aula* do not make official statements on their circulation. However, the ÖZV, the Austrian periodical newspaper association, provides this figure on its website, at: <http://www.oezv.or.at>. According to Heribert Schiedel, an expert on the Austrian right-wing and neo-Nazi scene, this figure appears to be accurate, as *Die Aula* claimed to have 9,000 subscribers in the 1990s.
Antisemitism, in the past as well as in the present, is a constant topic of FPÖ politicians (Schiedel & Neugebauer 2002). The proportion of votes received by the Freedom Party varies significantly but seems to be stabilizing between 15 and 20 percent. It is therefore not just a marginalized group on the edge of the democratic spectrum.

The authors of *Die Aula* are sometimes FPÖ party members, like MEP Andreas Mölzer, but mostly people from the political environment of the Freedom Party: Nazi-romantics, neo-Nazis, Holocaust deniers, and German-national student fraternities (Gärtner 1996: 151-227). The main topics of *Die Aula* are the Verbotsgesetz, the “death” of the Austrian/German people due to “mass immigration” (Überfremdung), the general decline of art, culture, and civilization, the excesses of EU bureaucracy, “Usrael,” and the economic crisis. According to the Documentation Center of the Austrian Resistance (DÖW) *Die Aula* has moved increasingly toward neo-Nazism in recent years. Even though *Die Aula* sees itself as a newspaper of the political right, it has no problem supporting left-wing or Muslim politicians, as long as they follow a strict anti-Israel foreign policy. *Die Aula* therefore supports Hugo Chavez in his struggle against an alleged “Usrael” conspiracy, backs Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in his support of radical Islamist groups and his pursuit of nuclear weapons, and acknowledges the “courage” of two MPs of the German leftist party *Die Linke* who refused to applaud Israel’s President Simon Peres after he delivered a speech in the German parliament.

For this paper, I have examined all issues of *Die Aula* from 2008, when the economic crisis became manifest with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, to May 2010. Many articles during this period dealt with antisemitic topics, such as the “witch-hunt” against the Holocaust-denying bishop Richard Williamson of the St. Pius Society and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this paper, however, I will only deal with antisemitic statements concerning the economic crisis.

*Die Aula* dedicates a lot of its coverage to the economic crisis. It has published special issues on the crisis and crisis-related topics appear in nearly every issue.

The basis of the critique of capitalism in *Die Aula* is a fetishized understanding of how capitalism works, characterized by an inability to distinguish between the essence and manifestation of capitalist relations. Unable to comprehend the abstract domination of the value and internal antagonisms of capitalism, the newspaper’s contributors project these abstract societal processes onto the visible agents of these processes, namely the Jews. They imagine the Jews as the puppet masters of the modern economy who pull the strings behind the scenes to their own advantage. This picture of the puppet masters takes various forms, from subtle antisemitic codes to very explicit antisemitic phrases:

- “the globalists and their accomplices” (*Die Aula* 02/2008: 20);
- “worldwide oligarchic structures” (*Die Aula* 04/2008: 37);
- “jumping jacks of big money” (*Die Aula* 04/2010: 38);

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6 The difference between the extreme right and neo-Nazism is that the former is allowed by law, whereas the latter is regarded as a crime against the Verbotsgesetz, a law prohibiting the glorification of the National Socialist regime. The boundary between these two terms is often fluid and difficult to determine. Moreover, these terms are controversial within the scientific community. For a discussion, see Schiedel (2007: 23ff.).
as is well-known, in the United States, politics is being made behind the scenes: elites, dubious circles, high finance and various lobbies (e.g. AIPAC) are the financial backers and the true rulers” (Die Aula 04/2010: 23);
- “a convention of the grand lodges” (Die Aula 06/2010: 16); and
- “the architects of the financial-Shoah, who sent Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, Meryll Lynch, AIG and Washington Mutual into the credit-crematoria” (Die Aula 04/2009: 24ff).7

All these accusations are opaque and inaccurate. They leave room for interpretation, which is part of the conspirative logic: not naming something exactly only makes it more mysterious, as even experts are unable to see the whole picture. This conspiracy arises from a misunderstanding of the economy and an inability to recognize abstract forms of domination. Postone identifies this way of thinking as crucial to modern antisemitism:

In modern anti-Semitism [the imagined Jewish power] is mysteriously intangible, abstract and universal. This power does not usually appear as such, but must find a concrete vessel, a carrier, a mode of expression. Because this power is not bound concretely, is not “rooted,” it is of staggering immensity and is extremely difficult to check. It stands behind phenomena, but is not identical with them. Its source is therefore hidden—conspiratorial. The Jews represent an immensely powerful, intangible, international conspiracy. (Postone 1980: 106)

Another frequently used metaphor in Die Aula consists of biologized descriptions of capitalist structures. This usually takes the form of comparing the old, sane, natural form of capitalism to a despicable, abnormal growth that has to be brought under control:

- “the venom of global neoliberalism” (Die Aula 04/2008: 37);
- “financial investors as locusts” (Die Aula 11/2008: 26; 02/2009: 22);
- “predator-capitalism,” “Hydra” (Die Aula 03/2009: 32, 40; 06/2010: 25); and
- “banks as ravenous wolves” (Die Aula 06/2010: 25).8

These comparisons fit into the practice of biologizing capitalist structures as mentioned by Postone. A similar line of reasoning can be found when the newspaper’s contributors deal with problems of interest. The concentration on this particular branch of capitalist production is typical of a shortened, superficial analysis of capitalism. Furthermore, the critique of interest provides an excellent example of how the various aspects mentioned above can be combined: the fetishized critique of capitalism, the alleged Jewish influence in the sphere of circulation, and the concept of parasitic and unnatural growth.

5. SILVIO GESSELL AND HIS FOLLOWERS

This idea of abnormal outbursts of capitalism leads us to an alternative economic system that some contributors to Die Aula have in mind. Starting from the demonization of interest, they end up at the Natürliche Wirtschaftsordnung (Natural Economic Order), which is based on theories developed by Silvio Gesell (Die Aula 03/2009: 34; 06/2009: 16ff; 11/2009: 10ff). Inspired by the early anarchists (in particular Proudhon), Gesell (1862-

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7 All quotes have been translated by the author.
8 Ibid.
1930) argued that money and interest were the main obstacles to the true liberty of humankind. Whereas all workers and farmers have to work for their income, capitalists and landowners do not and live parasitically off unnatural interest. His solution to this problem was to introduce interest-free money, known as Freigeld or free money. The main difference between Freigeld and regular money is that Freigeld has an expiry date. It loses a certain percentage of its value every month. This is meant to prevent money owners from hoarding, thus keeping the money in constant circulation.

In a contemporary context, Gesell’s theory forms the basis of so-called exchange circles and regional money initiatives. These exchange circles became known to the wider public in Argentina during the economic crisis that struck the country around 2000. After a couple of months, these circles collapsed spectacularly. At a theoretical level, Gesell’s ideas are still discussed in academic circles. Furthermore, Gesell’s followers have tried to become an accepted current within (radical) left-wing discourses by committing themselves to the anti-globalization movement. In Germany, for example, at least two such groups are official members of Attac Germany: the Initiative für eine natürliche Wirtschaftsordnung (INWO) and the Christen für eine gerechte Wirtschaftsordnung (CGW). In addition, Gesell’s theory is often used by radical right-wingers as well as esoteric groups.

This paper is not the place to criticize Gesell’s theory in detail (for such a critique, see Rakowitz 2003). However, it is a striking example of a fetishized understanding of the economy, and it shows quite clearly why this is so interesting to right-wing authors. The first point is certainly that the whole program has a racist—or at least social-Darwinist—component:

Natural selection in its full, miraculous effectiveness is then restored. … No matter how great the quantity of abnormal material resulting from the propagation of defective individuals will be, that is brought into nature, natural selection can cope with it. Medical art can then delay, but it cannot stop eugenesis. (Gesell 1922: xi)

Of greater relevance to this paper, however, are the theoretical affiliations between right-wing ideology and Gesell’s theory.

(i) The whole idea that there is such a thing as a natural economic order is very tempting to antisemitic agitators. Gesell’s followers often use biological metaphors to promote their theory, such as the idea of a natural growth process. Everything in nature grows until it reaches a natural boundary, such as human organs. If they kept on growing forever, we would eventually die. In contrast, interest grows without a natural boundary and keeps on growing forever. Furthermore, it does not grow naturally but in an exponential manner. Gesell’s followers claim that nothing in nature grows exponentially, except cancer cells. Therefore, interest equals cancer and must be cut out of the organism.

(ii) The focus on only one aspect of the capitalist economy facilitates the personalization of economic processes and leaves room for conspirative, antisemitic interpretations. I do not claim that all Gesell’s followers are antisemites; I just want to show that this theory is structurally antisemitic and therefore dangerous. The whole theory is not a radical critique of capitalist society but just a critique of one aspect of it. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with this, but the problem is that Gesell’s theory exudes the aura of a revolutionary movement, of establishing paradise on earth, when all it does is to make a small adjustment to the current system. Marx described this form of critique as being “within the limits of what is permitted by the police and not permitted by logic” (Marx 1989: 29).
6. CONCLUSION

The notion of a radical movement that is actually not radical at all is precisely the kind of conformist rebellion referred to in the introduction that tends to include antisemitic aspects. When Adorno and Horkheimer state at the very end of “Elements of Anti-Semitism” that “it is not just the antisemitic ticket which is antisemitic, but the ticket mentality itself” (Horkheimer & Adorno 2004: 217), this is also true of the critique of capitalism. It is not just the shortened and explicitly antisemitic critique of capitalism that is antisemitic but the shortened critique as such.

LITERATURE


Equations in Contemporary Anti-Zionism: A Conceptual Analysis

Shalem Coulibaly*

1. INTRODUCTION

This article, which is based on several articles and research projects, aims first and foremost to present the criminogenic nature of contemporary antisemitism, which certain people, including people of African descent, have unfortunately adopted—through mimicry or imitation—as a result of ignorance or political calculation. It forms the final part of a larger work entitled “Africa and Antisemitism: From Indifference to Temptation and Antisemitic Speech.” It is resolutely opposed to antisemitism, especially among some Africans who have contributed to diatribes against Jews in France.

2. FALSE EQUATIONS BETWEEN ANTI-ZIONISM AND ANTISEMITISM: THE ART OF MISREPRESENTING HISTORY AND POLITICS

Many intellectuals who cannot be suspected of antisemitism reject the equation of anti-Zionism with antisemitism. The questions that I wish to raise in this context are as follows. Have they reflected on the contours of Durban I? Have they taken the time to decipher the logic of the anti-Zionist discourse, its critical ambiguities and the silence that it tends to impose on any defense of the Jewish cause? For me, the contemporary anti-Zionist discourse encompasses a dangerous performative contradiction. Combating antisemitism amounts to accepting the need to demonstrate the conceptual limits of the most objective criticisms. When anti-Zionists claim that they are not antisemites, how is one to interpret or gauge their scathing attacks on the legitimacy of the State of Israel? How is one to understand their calls for sanctions against Israel and the very existence of Jews in Israel! And not just in Israel but elsewhere. There are dangerous forms of objectivity. America is not Zion, but anti-Zionists are silent when the American flag and the Israeli flag are burned side by side with the same rage. This demonstrates the primary and basic anti-Americanism of the anti-Zionists, if not a performative contradiction.

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1 In 2006, during a Paris march in support of Lebanon organized by anti-Zionists, many young Africans among the protesters chanted the slogan: “Zionism is the criminal DNA of mankind.” Marches in support of the Lebanese people also took place in several African countries. In Senegal, for example, the Israeli flag was burned by a mob that included several elected politicians.

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Anti-Zionism thus does what it claims not to do, namely to be against the Jewish state but not against the Jews. We must remain lucid. Is it not so that the denial expressed by the prefix “anti” in anti-Zionism and antisemitism nowadays follows the same logic as the hatred of Jews and the desire to wipe them of the face of the earth? Until we have conceptualized and deconstructed the equation of these two terms, we must treat them as identical in the fight against antisemitism. Even a critical and objective anti-Zionist knows very well that, in a conflict, one cannot innocently set oneself up as a critic or judge of the protagonists. In fact, the differentiation between anti-Zionism and antisemitism is formalistic and specious, because, strictly speaking, they involve the same intent, the same hatred of the Jews. In L’Imprescriptible,² Jankélévitch explains that anti-Zionism is a form of linguistic trickery to justify antisemitism. An anti-Zionist, he argues, is a person who gives himself the right to be democratically antisemitic and to democratically popularize his hatred. Jankélévitch observes:

Anti-Zionism is in this respect an unexpected windfall, because it gives us permission and even the right—even the duty—to be antisemitic in the name of democracy. Anti-Zionism is justified antisemitism, finally put at the disposal of all. It grants permission to be democratically antisemitic.

In reality, anti-Zionism has the same target as antisemitism, namely the Jews. Otherwise, why plant bombs in synagogues in Paris or murder children and teachers at a Jewish school in Toulouse? Paris is not Jerusalem. Toulouse is not Tel Aviv. The era of globalization would thus appear to be an opportunity for anti-Jewish ideologies to prosper. Africans must understand this anti-Zionist hoax in order not to misunderstand this quagmire of antisemitism, which fraudulently posits the following equations: Zionism = colonialism, Zionism = apartheid and Zionism = racism.³ These equations, which are genuine historical travesties, relate to problems about which all Africans should be deeply concerned. They amount to nothing more than a revisionist form of African history and suffering. After all, have the people who come up with these equations even considered the history of colonialism and the desire of colonizers to civilize the savages? When have the Jews ever wanted to Hebraicize Palestinians so that they become Jews? Those who deceitfully establish these false equations should re-read Aimé Césaire’s Discourse sur le Colonialisme!

In order to prove that this so-called objective criticism of Israel’s is actually a refusal to engage with the Jews, I will analyze another anti-Zionist equation, which posits that: economic boycott of Israel = Middle East peace.

3. THE ANTI-ZIONIST ECONOMIC BOYCOTT AND THE REJECTION OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The era of globalization that characterizes the 21st century is a period of homogenization of modern economic, political, and cultural habitus. This bold global desire to transcend

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³ These equations are an unwholesome form of revisionism. After a visit to the Middle East, Desmond Tutu compared Palestine to a ghetto and Israeli democracy to apartheid. There can be no doubt that this was a misrepresentation of history and a sell-out of African suffering in the name of the Palestinian cause.
borders and achieve economic *rapprochement* between states has been accompanied by many upheavals placing contemporary attitudes between light and darkness, between hope and confusion. Likewise, the ideals of brotherhood and interhuman equality have stumbled over isolationism and communitarianism, religious fanaticism, and the blindness of terrorism, which is also global in nature. It is true that the contradictions and negative consequences of economic globalization are obvious and indisputable. The increasing impoverishment of many newly independent countries gives rise to the clamor of despair and revolt, while the economic crisis weakens the social and political foundations of the richest and most powerful states. But these economic consequences, while tragic, can still be fixed. This is because the essence of economics is exchange. Economic exchange, whether in the form of barter or capitalist speculation, even when forced and unevenly balanced, still constitutes a favorable opportunity for each of the participants. Economic exchange is thus a path to dialogue. Indeed, as men trade and exchange items and goods among themselves, they are bound to and have duties toward one another; as men are driven by quantitative interest, they can gradually correct their mistakes and significantly reduce inequalities born of economic games and challenges. Here, the commercial spirit remains open to other competitors and rivals, without rejecting them. Economically, the face and the existence of others are still significant, despite the usual selfishness that rules the business world. The economic interest requires collaboration and negotiation. Even at the height of apartheid, the boycott of South Africa was never so barbaric or insane, let alone systematic. States that currently support the boycott of Israel never stopped trading with South Africa, African countries included. Why then this harshness and intransigence toward Israel? Do the people who advocate and organize the global boycott against Israel really want peace between Israelis and Palestinians? Why do they not boycott the Palestinians when they set off bombs and launch missiles against unarmed Israeli civilians?

Finally, if economic exchange, as already noted, is not simply a process for circulating goods but also a fundamental means for interacting with each other, as well as a practical method for maintaining fairness, how should we interpret these boycotts of Israel? How can we deconstruct the false equations that the anti-Zionists use to stigmatize Israel? Is there desire for a quick peace in the Middle East? I doubt it! This is no longer a secret to anyone. Sympathy for the Palestinian cause, the pretext for contesting the State of Israel, is no more than a political accessory for the anti-Zionists, whose psyches are filled with anti-Jewish hatred, as well as disapproval and denial of very idea of a Jewish state, a state for the Jews. Clearly, the anti-Zionists/antisemites refuse to acknowledge their rejection of the existence of a free, autonomous, and independent Jewish state in the middle of the Arab world. What is emerging in the globalization of anti-Zionism, even in its objective and critical manifestations, is thus the political relinquishment of the Jews to condemnation and terrorism. I can endure these little unpleasantries. If this form of antisemitism can help Africans understand what it is that is outrageous about the attitudes of anti-Zionists, I believe it is important, as an African who has witnessed European and African antisemitism, to summarize my views on antisemitism in Europe over the past twenty years. It was this approach to antisemitism that enabled us—my colleagues and me—to create an association for dialogue between Jews and Africans (JUAF) in the 1980s, at a time when the far-right parties were demonizing the Jews, although nobody had foreseen intercommunity conflicts, especially between black extremists or Afro-Europeans and European Jews.
4. A BRIEF PHENOMENOLOGY OF CONTEMPORARY ANTISEMITISM

Antisemitism should not only be studied by sociologists and historians or left only to politicians to tackle. Philosophers should be the first to take an interest in it. The foundations of Western antisemitism are certainly theological, but there is a long list of the philosophers who have written about the Jews, from Kant to Sartre, by way of Hegel and many others. Antisemitism must be subjected to a multidisciplinary and multinational or global approach.

A. Antisemitism is not a disease

With friends, we spent many nights discussing the question whether antisemitism was a Western disease. A disease that, as a result of colonialism and now globalization, has been inoculated into the victims of colonialism and is now manifesting itself in strange and astonishing ways. But this idea of a disease was and remains unacceptable to me, due to the Levinasian concept of responsibility. Indeed, how can a sick person be held fully responsible for his actions? I objected that, if antisemitism was a disease, it would have been impossible to hold Hitler, his acolytes, and his followers in Europe responsible and culpable. Why did Jaspers take up arms against Nazi Germany while Heidegger was sympathetic to Nazism? There is no inevitability to becoming antisemitic. In other words, one embraces antisemitic theories by choice and out of conviction. Similarly, I rejected the idea that a victim of colonialism could use the evils of colonialism as an excuse to support and participate in antisemitic hatred. Having been a victim of colonialism does not annul our responsibility or the key choices we make in life. Despite these theoretical differences, we agreed that antisemitism was contagious—hence its expansion. It remained for me to find a definition that would encompass the permanence of antisemitism, its re-emergence and its adoption by colonized peoples—victims, as Levinas says, of the “same hatred of the other man,” the same racism “of which antisemitism would be the prototype” for all “policies of internment and social oppression.”

Starting from Levinas' thinking, I recorded my own perceptions of the surrounding antisemitism. For my part, I came up with three intersecting definitions of antisemitism, which I will discuss below.

B. Antisemitism is a problem of alterity, a rejection, and a stubborn resistance to the presence and free existence of the other

Antisemitism is not simply a manifestation of hostility or Judeophobia. As Levinas writes, antisemitism “is the repugnance felt towards the unknown of the other’s psyche, the mystery of his interiority.” That is to say that, for the antisemite, the Jew must lose his foreignness, at the very least that which makes him a Jew: Judaism, Zionism, Israel, and so forth. It is this entire logic of assimilation and exclusion that Levinas sums up and criticizes in his words. With this definition, we come face to face with a problem that is at once epistemological and existential. At the existential, intersubjective level, we are dealing with the repulsion of the other—the Jew in his capacity as a Jew. At the episte-

4 See the dedication by Levinas in Autrement qu’être ou au-délà de l’essence (1974) and Difficile liberté (1984) p. 201.
mological level, the repugnance felt toward the mystery of the interiority of the Jew is a product of the classical and modern Western concept of the composition of knowledge. The rapport that the antisemite wishes to establish with the Jew is therefore part of the same paradigm as the relationship between subject and object. The antisemite, being a subject par excellence, a traditional or transcendental ego,\(^6\) wishes to be the master and the owner of the relationship with the object—the Jewish being. From the perspective of the existential dialectic, it is the antisemite who creates the Jew and the Jew’s existence. Sartre was not an antisemite but an objective, engaged intellectual, indeed a philosemite. As already noted, objectivities and intellectual prowess can be costly.

In this kind of relational structure, subject and object remain in a state of difference that only the subject is able to manage and control. Nietzsche described this type of differentiation as the pathos of distance. The subject, who is master and owner, conserves his interiority, which is impregnable but always sealed to the object, whose alterity he incorporates without ever merging with the object. This constitution of the object by the subject should be understood as a characteristic and a specificity of civilization. To illustrate this proposition, let us consider the issue of translation. For Rémi Brague, an expert on the Middle Ages, every translation simultaneously comprises aspects of transport, imitation, and rivalry. For Western civilization, according to Brague, these three actions, which are inherent to translation, hinge on the method of inclusive digestion, which includes the object while maintaining its alterity or foreignness, while the subject conserves its interiority.\(^7\) In this regard, Brague notes:

> Within the genus “appropriation,” we can distinguish two manners of appropriating. I propose to call them “inclusion” and “digestion.” … In the case of an artificial inclusion, the enclosed object is maintained in one particular position, chosen because it facilitates observation. … This produces a paradoxical relationship between the interior and the exterior, the inherent and the foreign. What becomes the interior does not lose its alterity for all that. It is even, precisely by its internalization that the object is conserved in its alterity. … European civilization, according to my thesis, is based on the model of inclusion.

These words sum up perfectly the Jewish people’s various connections with Europe, and European civilization, from their expulsion from Spain until the Holocaust. In contrast to the full digestive appropriation of the object (e.g., Hitler’s final solution), inclusive appropriation (a symbol of the subtlety of post-Nazi antisemitism!) utilizes the denial of the object without a final solution. In this pathos of distance, the subject keeps its object under imperial control, where mastery, exclusion, and repulsion are always repeated. This ontological mastery of the self borders on total, totalitarian control. From this perspective, the Jew, in contrast to the Westerner, despite more than 2,000 years of coexistence, will remain other and foreign, like the object before the subject. Whatever his contribution to European society, the Jew—a “foreign” cultural and textual object that has been included and digested theologically and is politically tolerated and assimilated—will always be maintained in his original difference, not of his own volition but

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\(^6\) When faced with Kant or Hegel or, to a different extent, Sartre, we are dealing with the same phenomenology of the Jewish being.

purely due to the desire of the subject. He cannot change his status or claim the status of the subject. Finally, it is worth remembering that contemporary antisemitism is the desire to reduce the other to the image and the will of the Subject or the Self. Reduction always reflects the taste of the day. Like the antisemite, the anti-Zionist does not wish to brutally eliminate the Jews. Politically, he wants to determine the place of the Israelis, not only in the Middle East, but everywhere. He wants to control the Jewish destiny. Against this background, the consequences for the Jewish state are more than obvious.... In response to a civilization that insists on affording good treatment to the alien within its gates, another civilization states “become what I want you to be, because you are in my home.”

C. Antisemitism is a language and a worldview

Albert Camus said: “My language is my homeland.” This definition of a mother tongue is similar to an aphorism in the West African Bambara and Dioula languages, which states: *kouman yé douniale yé* (speech is the world). In other words, the world is language, a language through which people construct the world they have inherited in their image. This implies a performative language, speech taking shape within intersubjectivity and social horizontality. Language does not only create the world, it is a worldview that is constantly rebuilt by speakers. Maternal or paternal, language is inherited from others. Language is the first humanization of our being. Contemporary antisemitism is a language that is transmitted from place to place, from Western civilization to others nations. This languageperfects itself but never changes its nature. Despite their evolution and their reciprocal borrowing, French and English will never become the same language, each preserving its morphology and particular worldview. Antisemitism is a language of differentiation that endorses difference to the point of controversy and endless conflict. Put simply, antisemitism is the constantly renewed meta-narrative of a civilization founded on the rejection of peaceful and generous coexistence with the Jews. Combating contemporary antisemitism requires us to collectively rethink all the codes of modernity, along with religious hermeneutics.

D. Contemporary antisemitism is not new: it is simply performed by new people in new places

Antisemitism represents a stagnation in the development of world history. It is an extension of the same logic of Jew-hatred and the same machinery that popularizes Jewish stereotypes: stereotypes of religious and secular antisemitism adopted by other peoples. As a result, what is incorrectly referred to as the new antisemitism is merely a change of signs and signifiers. Through their speech and based on their own historicity, the new antisemites are expressing and updating inherited antisemitic signs. It is clear that the signified “Jew” remains identical, whatever the new signifiers of exclusion and hatred. The expressive and performative differences between contemporary forms of antisemitism do nothing to change the permanence of antisemitic stereotypes, which are scattered and transported around the globe. Antisemitism continues to this day. This is precisely because of the permanence of the Name used by antisemites. Antisemitic signifiers that are transferred elsewhere take on local color. The themes of this language may be changed or recreated indefinitely without any change to the signified “Jew” or its stigmatizing stereotypes. This aggressive permanence confronting the signified “Jew”
is not just political or historical. I believe that it is precisely at the sociological level that one becomes aware of the specific problem of the Name “Jew,” through the entanglement of the low antisemitism of the poor and the high antisemitism of the rich and the elites. Moreover, African elites form no exception. Globalization places condemnation of Israel, which is treated as a rogue state, in the mouths of every people and every country.\footnote{In 2008, in Africa, I was on a committee judging the master’s dissertation of a political science student. Without hesitation, he counted Israel among the states that fail to respect international law.}

Contemporary antisemitism is thus not new, or a renewal of past forms of antisemitism, but a simply a globalised intensification of a timeless phenomenon. New political actors and peoples are appropriating the themes of religious and secular antisemitism that have established the Name “Jew” as a problematic signified or an issue to be resolved. Whether one is looking at Sodom, Athens, Rome, Crown Heights, Belleville, Brussels, or Durban, it is always the same antisemitic language that is performed dialectically by local languages. The new antisemites merely fan the thematic flames of persistent antisemitism. This universalization explains—but does not justify—the inanity of the antisemitism of the African Diaspora in Europe and the United States and the temptation of antisemitism for the African continent, where anti-Zionism is following the global trend. In other words, all peoples and communities can freely use antisemitic speech, with or without the addition of only a specific emphasis.

Antisemitism metamorphoses without ever changing its nature. Just like a venomous snake that sheds its skin still remain remains a venomous snake, antisemitism retains its harmfulness and its criminogenic logic. This global proliferation of antisemitism explains—but does not justify—the antisemitism found among Africans and other peoples.

5. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is worth noting that contemporary anti-Zionism is etched into Western civilization as it is in other human cultures. It is the typical Western way of approaching the Jewish “being,” who has thus been turned into a global scapegoat. Culturally, politically, and theologically, antisemitism is reprehensible and must be combated. Economic globalization, which goes hand in hand with global shrinkage as a result of new information and communication technologies, will give rise not only to a new antisemitism but also to the continuous adaptation and adoption of anti-Zionism by other peoples. This process of delocalization and relocation has already taken place between America, which is home to the antisemitism of the Nation of Islam, and Afro-European radicals and activists such as the \textit{Tribu Ka} group and other expatriate African nationalists, who are known as Ethiopians. It is also poised to expand to Africa. Due to the criminogenic nature of antisemitism, it is important to spare Africa as much as possible. Because of the tragic history of black Africans, which is often compared to that of the Jews, black antisemitism is incomprehensible and unacceptable, not to mention outrageous. Afro-European extremists have spread their tentacles to Africa. They describe all blacks or Africans who enter into dialogue with Jews as traitors. The \textit{Tribu Ka} website states that that all pro-Zionist Africans should simply move to Israel. Africa has known religious, theological, and political antisemitism for a very long time. Islamic and Christian antisemitism has a long history. What will become of it in future with the rise
of religious fanaticism? At present, it is clear that anti-Zionism and antisemitism are increasingly converging around the world.

The definitions of antisemitism that I have provided here, which are frequently harsh and unpleasant, are primarily addressed to Africans. Apart from South Africa, where trade unionists and political figures openly demand a boycott of Israel, African anti-Zionism has hardly been the subject of systematic study. This gap must be filled. It is important to determine what can be done to tackle this antisemitism in the future, because the evil—or venom—that it represents could be fatal, first and foremost, to the Africans themselves, especially to African states already weakened by ethnicism. Any involvement or complacency on the part of Africans in the face antisemitism is a negation of their own history, because the arguments used by Third-Worldists and anti-Zionists contain elements of African historicity. This leads me to the following questions. How can any African be antisemitic in the name of the Palestinian cause or for any other reason? Will the antisemitism of the African Diaspora find similar expression in Africa? How should we judge and evaluate antisemitism in Africa? What analytical tools can be used for this purpose? Which Africa are we talking about? Despite the lack of statistics on antisemitism in black Africa, should African antisemitism be regarded as an important or a very small phenomenon or epiphenomenon. Is anti-Zionism, a modern mask for Jew-hatred, effective among African intellectuals in black Africa? Are there other ways to properly understand and describe antisemitism in Africa and among Africans? Given that America has Americanized European antisemitism and Afro-Europeans have Europeanized African-American antisemitism, is it not likely that black Africa will soon Africanize the antisemitism of its Diaspora? When some African-American nationalists adopted the antisemitic discourse in the 1960s and 1970s, there was talk of an epiphenomenon. When young blacks in France openly confessed, in front of the camera, to being antisemitic and proud of being so, there was also talk of an epiphenomenon, until these young people started prowling the streets of Jewish neighborhoods to beat up Jews. In the African context, it is not true that those who dare to describe antisemitism as an epiphenomenon are indirectly responsible for attacks on the synagogues of African Jewish converts? Is it possible that Africa is seeing the birth of a new antisemitism—the antisemitism of tomorrow?

9 These guiding questions are taken from a presentation I gave at Yale University. In this article, I have chosen to focus on anti-Zionism, but a larger work on antisemitism is in progress.

10 The issues discussed in this article relate to sub-Saharan Africa. There are many different African Diasporas, but they are all defined by their common African roots, hence Afro-American, Afro-Brazilian, Afro-Caribbean, and even Afro-European.
Antisemitic Metaphors and Latent Communication

Bjoern Milbradt*

The National Socialists—in their antisemitic propaganda—made substantial use of metaphors with which they dehumanized their victims, including metaphors of plague, cancer, octopuses that encompass the whole world with their tentacles, and different sorts of insects and parasites. In contemporary anti-imperialist and Islamist caricatures, a lot of similarities with “classic” antisemitic illustrations are quite obvious (ADL, 2010). These similarities are indications of parallels not only in iconography but also at the heart of the underlying ideology.

In recent years, something different happened in Germany. Metaphors of parasites appeared in political discourse without being linked to “the Jews” or to antisemitic ideology. What is up for debate is whether those illustrations and metaphors are nonetheless connected to antisemitic ideology or whether—as their advocates assert—they are nowadays completely harmless and in no way problematic.

1. DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTISEMITISM—A “FLEXIBLE PREJUDICE”

Especially—but not only—in Germany, we are confronted with changes in antisemitic resentment. In the country that is responsible for the systematic extermination of the European Jews, contemporary research on antisemitism has developed concepts that take into account that, since 1945, it is no longer possible for antisemites to utter their hatred in an open manner as was common in Nazi Germany. Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb (1984) have described this phenomenon as a form of latent communication, pointing out that the social taboo triggered changes in the content of the stereotype. Antisemitism did not vanish but could only be uttered in private situations. Alternatively, antisemites had to make a detour in order to clearly express their thoughts and feelings.

The latter is achieved by avoiding “classic” antisemitism in public discourse, for example by switching to more accepted resentments, such as the so-called “critique of Israel,” which in Germany and elsewhere often comes along with and is closely linked to anti-Zionist antisemitism. But this change does not mean for a moment that the classic antisemitism has become insignificant: A lot of researchers stress that some or all elements of it are merely being renewed or put into a new form, which means that they may serve as the basis of a consensus among different groups, as Robert Wistrich points out. This conspiratorial vision of Zionism, he argues,
assumed the existence of a dangerous, shadowy international conglomerate with its political headquarters in New York and Tel Aviv. The terminology of this post-1945 anti-Jewishness would no longer be predominantly Christian, fascist, or racist but neo-Marxist, Islamic, or anti-globalist. Nonetheless, there were similarities and continuities between the old anti-Semitism and the new anti-Zionism. (Wistrich, 2010: 496)

Research has therefore dealt with the fact that antisemitism is not an invariant stereotype but that it adapts to concrete historical circumstances and could be described as a “flexible prejudice” (Adorno, 1969). The current literature on antisemitism provides a lot of evidence to substantiate this assumption. If we interpret antisemitism as a stereotype that consists of a certain, historically rather invariant form that flexibly adopts a different content relative to specific historical circumstances (see, e.g., Haury, 2002), we are able to more adequately conceptualize the changes we observe in a theoretically sophisticated framework.

The stereotypical form of antisemitism consists of certain elements that have already been described in some detail. Thomas Haury identifies a Manichean world view, the personalization of complex matters, conspiracy theory, ethnification, and the goal of extermination (Haury, 2002). We can find these structural elements, for example, in anti-Zionist antisemitism. This exemplifies the assumption that the form is getting a new content and adapts to new (e.g. geopolitical) circumstances.

With regard to the contemporary economic and financial crisis, this formal approach may indicate that the potential for a widespread renewal of antisemitism as a world conspiracy theory is possibly much larger than the focus on the mere content is able to reveal. In the case of Germany, the results of an empirical study conducted by the Project on Group Focused Enmity show that a substantial amount of people attribute the cause of the crisis to “the bankers and the stock brokers” (Becker, Wagner & Christ, 2010). An additional alarming finding is that this causal attribution is significantly correlated with overt antisemitism, while the effect is moderated by the perceived impact of the crisis on the individual situation (see ibid.).

Theoretically, this phenomenon could be grasped as a prejudiced, false reaction to the development of capitalism and capitalist modernity. Moishe Postone (2005) links this false reaction to the general constitution of capitalist societies. According to Postone, people tend to attack only the abstract, “unproductive” elements of capital (e.g. financial capital) and to personalize them in the form of the alleged evil character of “the Jew”, while uncritically glorifying so-called “productive capital” (e.g. industry and agriculture). Postone states that people tend to personalize what they perceive as threatening developments within modern society, such as rapid urbanization, modern culture, and the general disintegration of traditional social relations and social life. In this regard, the development from religious anti-Judaism to modern antisemitism can be seen as being closely associated with the crisis-laden development of modern capitalist societies.

As for Germany, we are able to prove by means of quantitative data that the hatred against the State of Israel is one of the dominant aspects of antisemitism (Salzborn, 2008; Heyder, Iser & Schmidt, 2005). On the other hand, the above-mentioned perception of the ongoing financial and economic crisis and the frequent causal attribution of blame to

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1 Eighty-nine percent of the participants (n=890) of a representative survey “fully” or “some-
what” agreed.
“bankers and stock brokers” (and the accompanying correlation with antisemitism) point toward the possibility that there may be a large group of people who, while not openly blaming “the Jews” for the economic distortions, show patterns of thought that may be transformed into a renewed image of the “world Jewish conspiracy”. The widespread talk of a “real,” “honest,” and productive economy that is opposed to the “parasitic” and “greedy” financial economy that is said to be controlled by “the Jews” is, as we know (not only) from Postone, one of the elements of antisemitism. What we see today in Germany as well as in other parts of the world are world views that contain those elements without directly linking them to “the Jews” — they make use of the form of antisemitic resentment without giving it manifest antisemitic content. Thus, we have a stereotypical critique of modern society that consist, in part or in full, of formal elements that could easily be found in manifest antisemitism but are not yet linked to it. Nonetheless, a critical and cautious approach to antisemitism suggests that this connection could easily be established either by right-wing movements, agitators, and politicians or through “associational transition” (Adorno, 2003: 44) in everyday discourse. This implies that a certain stereotypical critique has to be affiliated with an image of “the Jew” or a “world Jewish conspiracy.”

2. METAPHORS AND ANTISEMITISM

In 2005, Franz Muntefering, a member of the German Social Democratic Party who at the time was also the German Secretary of Labor, decried private equity funds as “locusts” that did not care about German workers and German industry. He argued that that were anonymous, that they did not take any responsibility for Germany, that they had swarmed over Germany, exhausting its economy, and that they were greedy and money-crazed.

In recent times, talk of “parasites” has once again taken up a firm place in public discourse and political debate in Germany. The concept of the “locust” is especially prevalent, not only in political parties from the far left to the extreme right but also in labor unions and groups from the anti-globalization spectrum, such as the NGO “Attac”. In its monthly magazine, the biggest German labor union — “IG Metall” — published an article that described US financial investors as “bloodsuckers” that swarm over the country, attacking and exhausting German companies. The caricatures accompanying the article where probably the most striking example of the suspicion that certain iconographic elements of antisemitic, Nazi caricatures are once again being used in contemporary Germany (Ruegemer, 2005). Criticized for this, campaigners usually point out that they definitely not referring to “the Jews,” thereby avoiding further discussion.

In light of this, students of antisemitism should examine the possibility that—despite this emphatic denial of any kind of antisemitism—these metaphors convey elements of antisemitic resentment in the sense of latent communication and/or unintentionally.

To tackle this problem, it may be helpful to have a look at some philosophical thoughts on the topic of metaphors. How do metaphors work? According to Max Black (1962: 44), the “metaphor works by applying to the principal subject a system of ‘associated implications’ characteristic of the subsidiary subject.” Transferred to our example, this means that some characteristics of a parasite (the bloodsucker) are applied to another subject (US enterprises). A basic characteristic of a parasite is probably that it lives “at the expense” of other organisms, for example by sucking them dry. Thus, applying
images of vermin or parasites to something that is not *biological* but basically *social* is to draw a distinction between *productive* members of society and those who are *unproductive*. While Germany’s economy is depicted as productive, honest and self-consistent, an unproductive and greedy enemy is intruding it in order to exhaust it in a parasitic manner.

This is clearly not a case of antisemitic ethnification. IG Metall did not mean to identify “the Jews” as the “bloodsuckers” who are savaging the German economy. But, on a more formal or structural level, we are now able to identify some of the elements that—according to Thomas Haury—are characteristic of antisemitic resentments. Complex matters of (capitalist) societies are personalized and attributed to the viciousness and greed of the parasitic intruders. In a Manichean world view, everything that is evil attacks from the outside (not from the inside by German capitalists!). Finally, the German economy is depicted as basically *productive*, while the invaders are greedy, unproductive, and merely reaping profits.

Such a metaphorical view of society is this not necessarily manifest antisemitism, but it also cannot be regarded as completely harmless. Max Black writes that we must not “neglect the shifts in attitude that regularly result from the use of metaphorical language. A wolf is (conventionally) a hateful and alarming object; so, to call a man a wolf is to imply that he too is hateful and alarming…” (Black, 1962: 42). Additionally, parasites are disgusting, disseminate disease, and suck blood and other fluids. This implies a view of society that distinguishes between good, productive members of society and those who are evil and unproductive (e.g. bankers and stock brokers). So, in a certain sense, metaphors *create* similarities rather than describing pre-existing ones (ibid., at 37).

3. CONCLUSIONS

As a result, we are now able to say that the use of those parasite metaphors is not necessarily antisemitic. Nonetheless, they convey a very problematic view of society that should under no circumstances be regarded as *harmless*. “The metaphor selects, emphasizes, suppresses and organizes features of the principal subject by implying statements about it that normally apply to the subsidiary subject” (Black, 1962: 44-45). Thus, using the term “bloodsucker” to describe social mechanisms or people is to apply metaphorical features that have were previously used in Nazi hate speech to dehumanize its victims.

In this sense, they can form the basis for cross-party consensus. This already appears to have happened to some extent in the case of the term “locust” in Germany. When using this term, right-wing extremists really *mean* “the Jews” without having to say “the Jews” in their propaganda, while left-wing anti-globalization activists, for example, may “only” mean hedge funds.

These metaphors contain some or all *formal* elements of antisemitism without openly blaming “the Jews.” They constitute a very widespread ideological form of world views that are either latently antisemitic or at least easily adaptable to manifest antisemitism. Finally, they are capable of transferring ideas and ideology from Nazi antisemitism to our own time, by serving as a medium for passing on elements of antisemitic ideology under the conditions of social taboo and the need for antisemites to adapt to latent communication.
REFERENCES


Economic and Behavioral Foundations of Prejudice

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1. ANTISEMITES AS ADHERENTS OF AN IDEOLOGY

In 1998, Kenneth Arrow, a Nobel Prize winner in economics (1972), published a paper with the title: “What has economics to say about racial discrimination?” The background was racial discrimination in the United States. The topic of this paper is: What has economics, and in particular behavioral economics, to say about antisemitism?¹

Behavioral economics is the interface between economics and psychology and introduces feelings and emotions into the human behavior that economists study.² The behavioral concepts of dissonance, envy, and fear assist in understanding contemporary and also past antisemitism.

Antisemitism is a term invented by a secular European, Wilhelm Marr, in the 19th century to describe antipathy to the Jewish people that is not based on traditional religion-based prejudice. Antisemites do not disparage the Semitic languages, which is the other context in which the term “Semitic” is commonly used. The term “antisemitism” places prejudice against Jews in the category of an ideology—like capitalism and socialism.

It is characteristic of an ideology that defining premises take priority over intellectual discourse and factual information. Given the commitment of antisemites to their ideology, we should not expect to change an antisemite’s views.

The underlying principle of the ideology of antisemitism is that Jews should suffer or disappear. A definition of antisemitic behavior predicated on the principles of the ideology has three elements: (1) “big lies”; (2) demonization; and (3) denial to Jews of the right of self-defense.

Antisemites have used “big lies” in the course of history to accuse Jews of collective crimes, such as killing a god (deicide) or killing non-Jewish children for ceremonial purposes (the blood libels). In a continuation of past accusations, contemporary “big lies” in the new antisemitism accuse Jews collectively of wrongdoing through the Jewish

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¹ Antisemitism has been extensively studied in the social sciences. The literature includes Sartre (1948), Katz (1980), Lewis (1986), Aronson (1990), Fischer (1998), Julius (2010), and Wistrich (2010).

² On behavioral economics, see, for example, Kahneman (2003). Daniel Kahneman received the Nobel Prize for economics in 2002 for research with Amos Tversky that introduced and developed the field of behavioral economics.
state. Political correctness can prevent people from restating the past big lies about the Jewish people. The surrogate is the new antisemitism directed at the Jewish state as the symbol of the Jews.

Contemporary Western antisemitism is for the most part rhetoric. Because of the existence of the Jewish state, that is all it can be, with the exception of isolated instances of personal violence.

Antisemitic rhetoric can reflect guilt. Using the big lies, there are antisemites who accuse the State of Israel of being no better in its treatment of Palestinian Arabs than the government of Adolph Hitler and collaborating regimes were in their treatment of Jews. The accusation alleviates guilt about the past behavior of the accuser’s family and people. Jews in general do not accuse contemporary Europeans of complicity in past inhumane actions. However, some Europeans accuse themselves and alleviate their guilt by accusing Jews of doing what their grandparents and others may have done.

Religion is a more general basis for antisemitic ideology. Historically, the Church was concerned that seeds of doubt about Church doctrine could be spread because Jews did not accept deification of a Jew as a savior who, in exchange for belief, offers the afterlife. Jews cannot perceive of a god as descending to the level of a man or woman. Rather, Jews perceive the human objective as being for people to raise themselves up, to improve themselves, and to improve the world. The Jewish view contrasts with the Christian doctrine of the fall from grace and the worthlessness of man and woman in need of salvation. The Church confronted the problem that the Jews could not be controlled through the threat of excommunication. With Jews accepting neither the teachings nor the authority of the Church and not capable of being threatened with excommunication and eternal damnation in the world to come, other means were used against them. Here enters the basic ideological premise that Jews should suffer. The suffering demonstrates the consequences in this world of not accepting the savior and rejecting the authority of the Church. Not all Jews were to be killed. According to this doctrine, some Jews should always be left alive, so that the personification of evil could exist on earth and be contrasted with good.

There were also economic motives for the persecution of the Jews. The taxes that the Church could collect depended on the willingness of the masses to accept Christian doctrine. The Jews, in rejecting the teachings of the Church, set an example for others to follow that would diminish the tax base of the Church. The suffering imposed on the Jews was a lesson for those who might contemplate not accepting the temporal power of the Church and not paying the Church’s tithe.

Doctrinally for the Church, the Jews had been superseded. The reappearance of the Jewish state after 1,878 years—there was no Jewish state between 70 CE and 1948 CE—introduced a special problem. The Jewish people, who by doctrine and ideology should wander and be punished eternally, had returned to their homeland. The re-emergence of the State of Israel has thus created an essential dissonance. A prosperous secure Jewish state is an affront to the ideology that Jews should suffer and also contradicts the theory of supersession whereby the Jews should have been superseded by the Church.

Antisemites making accusations and seeking to diminish or end the Jewish state are prevalent in European Lutheran societies, although religiosity in these societies may not be high. Scandinavian governments and populations were very sympathetic to the State of Israel when the precarious pre-1967 ceasefire lines prevailed but overall became hostile after the Six-Day War of 1967. One interpretation is that Scandinavians are kind
people who support the underdog, which after 1967 was no longer perceived to be the Jewish state. Another interpretation is based on the Protestant doctrine of predetermination, whereby success in this world presages success in the world to come, and vice versa. As long as the Jewish people in Israel lived precariously and miserably within indefensible borders, sympathy could be offered for the outcomes observed in this world and the outcomes anticipated in the next. The change to Jewish success in this world is inconsistent with the doctrine that Jews are damned. Again there is dissonance.

Generally speaking, whether in Scandinavia or elsewhere, in cases where populations have abandoned religious belief, past behavioral premises of ideology can be culturally transmitted between generations and retained in collective memory. If the content of cultural transmission is that Jews are meant to suffer and should be inferior, there is dissonance when Jews are successful and capable of self-defense.

Like the antisemitism of the “right,” the antisemitism of the “left” is based on ideology—in the case of the left on universal values. Jews benefited from the “emancipation” of the Enlightenment but were criticized for using the opportunities provided by the new economic freedom to apply their abilities to enrich themselves, while not satisfying the requirement that they adopt the universal values of the enlightenment and cease adhering to their identity as Jews. Failure to embrace universal values is correspondingly the basis of the antisemitism of Communist and Socialist ideology. Marxist ideology calls for the creation of new men and women who divest themselves of their past identities. Jews, even if professing to be communists and socialists, have in general often not entirely divested themselves of their Jewish identity.

Modern economic analysis recognizes the roles of entrepreneurship and finance (money lending) in facilitating economic activity. Marxist ideology views the activities of merchants, middlemen, and financiers as socially unproductive and therefore regards Jews in traditional occupations of trade, business, and finance as not contributing productively to society. The left also blames the Jews for being instrumental in the introduction of capitalism by establishing the foundations for market activities. Because Jewish identity is visibly manifested in the State of Israel, the left is active in the new antisemitism of propagating big lies, demonizing, and delegitimizing the Jewish state and objecting when Jews defend themselves.

There is merit in an example from the many manifestations of the antisemitism of the left. Discrimination against women and girls in Muslim countries is well documented.

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3 On the Enlightenment as the origin of the contemporary antisemitism of the left, see Hertzberg (1990).
4 Thus, when Jews imbued with socialist ideology began to return to the land of Israel at the end of the 19th century, they divested themselves in various degrees from Jewish identity by removing Jewish traditions from their lives and forming collectives (or kibbutzim) and becoming farmers.
5 On attribution of capitalism to Jews, see Sombart (1951). Jews have also been criticized for introducing and supporting communism and socialism, although the Jews who were communists and socialists were often seeking to use the new universal values to escape their Jewish identity.
6 If not violent themselves, antisemites of the left support the physical violence of others against Jews and the Jewish state through rhetoric and funding. See, for example, reports at: <http://www.ngo-monitor.org/articles.php?type=whatsnew&article_type=reports>.
7 See, for example, Norton and Tomal (2009) and Cooray and Potrafke (2011).
Democracy has also been absent from Arab states.\(^8\) If true to its liberal principles, the left in Western societies would be critical of the gender discrimination and absence of democracy under Islam and supportive of the gender equality and democracy found in Israel. Fred Gottheil (2000), a professor of economics at the University of Illinois at Urbana, asked academics who had signed an anti-Israel petition presented to Barack Obama to sign another petition condemning adverse treatment of women and girls in Arab countries. The original petition had apparently been signed by some 900 academics, of whom Professor Gottheil was able to confirm the existence of 675. To these, he sent his new petition. Only 5 percent were prepared to sign the petition condemning acts against women in Arab countries such as wife beating, honor killings, and female genital mutilation. The signatories of the original petition (those whose existence could be confirmed) reported a disproportionate number of academic affiliations (one quarter) in the field of gender studies. Criticism of ill-treatment of women and girls in Arab countries would have constituted an implicit recognition of Israel as a democratic society with gender equality.

For the Jews who adopt the ideology of the left, the persistence of the State of Israel can hinder their personal shedding of Jewish identity and be an impediment to their hope that all Jews will cease to identify themselves as Jews and will, like themselves, accept the universal values of the left.\(^9\) Left-wing academics in Israel have been at the forefront of calls to boycott of their own country.\(^10\)

2. **WHAT DOES ECONOMICS SAY ABOUT PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION?**

Against this background of antisemitism as an ideology of the right or the left, let us now consider what economics has to say about prejudice and discrimination. The literature classification system of the academic economics profession is that of the *Journal of Economic Literature* and includes a category of “economics of minorities and races: non-labor discrimination.” The literature describes prejudice and discrimination with reference to people’s “tastes” or preferences.\(^11\) The preferences may be with regard to the “types” of employees that employers wish to have. For example, if a Jew is the most qualified person for a job but the employer refuses to hire a Jew, the prejudiced employer incurs a cost in hiring a less qualified employee. In this literature, the preferences underlying prejudice are taken as given and unexplained. The discrimination could also be due to the preferences of other employees rather the employer, in which case, again, costs are increased if the most suitable people are not employed.\(^12\) The relevant inference is that antisemites are prepared to incur personal costs to disadvantage or harm Jews.

A second approach to prejudice in economic analysis describes “statistical discrimination” or “profiling” based on the average attributes of a group.\(^13\) For example, because

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8 See Borooah and Paldam (2007), Rowley and Smith (2009), and Potrafke (2011).
9 Podhoretz (2009) describes Jews who do not wish to remain traditional Jews as following a new religion based on the universal principles of the ideology of the left. For a review of Podhoretz and interpretation in terms of identity and expressive behavior, see Hillman (2011).
11 See Becker (1957).
13 See, for example, Arrow (1972, 1998) and Phelps (1972). The subsequent extensive literature includes Schwab (1986), Altonji and Pierret (2001), and Borooah (2001).
of group norms of behavior, people belonging to a group may have attributes that employers find undesirable, such as arriving late for work or randomly taking days off.\textsuperscript{14} Or because women marry and have children, employers may discriminate by not hiring women because of the cost of training women who will not remain with the employer. Statistical discrimination does not explain the prejudice of antisemites: an antisemite would seek to disadvantage or harm Jews even if the attributes of each individual Jew were known.

We can turn to behavioral economics to seek foundations for the behavior of antisemites. We thereby recognize the role of emotions and feelings in explaining human behavior. With the existence of dissonance between observed outcomes and the ideology that Jews should suffer (the right) or disappear (the left), the behavior of antisemites appears to reflect fear and envy.

3. \textsc{fear and envy}

Charles de Gaulle has left us with a forthright statement of fear of Jews and fear of the Jewish state. De Gaulle had prepared an epitaph for the Jewish state in anticipation of the demise of Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War. Unexpectedly for de Gaulle, Israel won. Reflecting on the Jewish victory, De Gaulle declared:

Some people even \textit{feared} that the Jews, until then scattered about, but who were still what they had always been, that is, an \textit{elite people, sure of themselves and domineering}, would, once assembled again on the land of their ancient greatness, turn into a \textit{burning and conquering ambition}.\textsuperscript{15}

The observation was that Jews are elitist, ambitious, and overly successful, and also domineering, that their ambition and abilities are to be \textit{feared}, and that all the characteristics of the Jews that are to be \textit{feared} are manifested in the return of Jews to the land of Israel.

Fear of Jews is an historical phenomenon.\textsuperscript{16} Jews in Europe were feared because of their ongoing survival in the face of discrimination, pogroms, and expulsions. The survival of the Jews was explained by their being in league with the devil.\textsuperscript{17} Jews were regarded as having the ability to bring on the plague and also magically protect themselves against the plague (in fact, this protection was partly the consequence of the Jews’ hygienic standards, which are part of Jewish law). The Hebrew alphabet, in which Yiddish, the language of European Jews, is written, was feared as indecipherable and magical. Jews were also feared because of the retribution that antisemites believed would follow if Jews were ever in a position to take revenge for the suffering that had been imposed upon them.\textsuperscript{18} Fear is expressed in contemporary declarations that Jews

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{14} On individual attributes and group norms, see, for example, De Bartoleme (1990).
\item \textsuperscript{15} Press conference held at the Elysée Palace on November 27, 1967. From The Scribe, autumn 2001, available at: \textless http://www.dangoor.com/74049.html\textgreater .
\item \textsuperscript{16} The term Judeophobia has been used to describe fear of the Jews. See Fischer (1998).
\item \textsuperscript{17} Thus, for authenticity, the 2009 film “Sherlock Holmes” showed the words of the devil written in Hebrew.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Retribution is described, for example, in the opera \textit{La Juive} by Fromental Halévy. I thank Manfred Holler for this observation.
\end{itemize}
control capital markets (although this could also be envy). The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a 19th century Russian imperial forgery that retains contemporary antisemitic appeal, describes Jews as to be feared because of their conspiratorial intent to “control the world.”

As expressed by Charles de Gaulle, there is a link between fear and the State of Israel. There have been no large-scale European pogroms against Jews since the establishment of the modern Jewish state in 1948. The last European pogrom took place in 1946. The availability to Jews of the means of self-defense is a break from tradition that, for antisemites, evokes dissonance but also fear.

Altruistic people feel better off when others are better off. Envious people feel worse off when others are better off. People need not envy but, on the contrary, may admire the achievements of others. If they do envy, they may focus their envy on particular individuals. An antisemite is envious of Jews in general. Antisemites may envy Jews who are actually quite poor.

An object of envy may or may not be transferable (see Elster, 1991). In the past, when antisemites have envied Jews’ transferable possessions, because of the Jews’ lack of means of defending their possessions (and defending themselves), antisemites have simply appropriated Jews’ possessions. In response, Jews took measures to make their investments and possessions non-transferable through appropriation. Knowledge (also known as human capital) is not appropriable by transfer to others. Contemporary antisemites confront the problem, combined with dissonance and fear, that much regarding Jews that is envied cannot be transferred through appropriation.

Michael Aronson (1973) described the combination of envy and fear in 19th century Russia:

There are notes of admiration and envy as well as fear and anger in the anti-emancipation officials’ descriptions of the characteristics of Jewish businessmen. A number of terms recurred repeatedly. Jewish businessmen were characterized as: cunning, dexterous, energetic, enterprising, keen-witted, persistent, and resourceful in the pursuit of profit. (p. 148)

Most of these terms, if not applied to commercial activities, and especially if not applied to Jews, would undoubtedly have had positive connotations for the officials who used them. When applied to the commercially oriented Jews, though, they took on a negative connotation with the implication, “danger, beware.” (p. 149)

4. OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE, EDUCATION, AND “CLEVERNESS”

Non-appropriation is reflected in the occupational structure of Jews in Europe. Jews were traditionally not engaged in agriculture and were not peasants or serfs. They invested in “human capital” (personal skills and abilities), rather than “physical capital”
or land, and engaged in activities in which “working capital” turned over quickly. They were also middlemen, not directly producing physical output but facilitating output being produced and facilitating goods reaching final consumers. Jews were also physicians and wealthier Jews were financiers.

In a case study of the town of Pereiaslav in the Ukraine in 1881, Michael Aronson (1978) describes Jews as predominantly tradesmen and merchants, not manual workers. Jews also tended to be active in competitive markets in which individual skills were more important than connections. Yehuda Don (1990) reported that, in pre-Holocaust Central and Eastern Europe, economic activities of Jews were disproportionately in competitive retail markets and in professions and activities that did not require physical capital, and, again, that Jews were not active in agriculture. For example, in Eastern Europe, tailoring was a Jewish profession.

A characteristic of the occupational structure of Jews was therefore that losses from appropriation would be low. Similarly, the costs of having to leave quickly were low.

Jews engaged in commerce and trade because of economic networks based on communal trust (Greif, 1989, 1993). The facilitating role of Jews in economic activity is expressed in the economic decline of Spain during and after the Inquisition. The departure of expelled Jews contributed to Spain’s decline, but Spain also declined because of the withdrawal of clandestine Jews from the traditional Jewish activities of commerce and trade, so as to hide their Jewish identity. Continuing to use the network of European Jewish communities to trade and to travel for reasons of commerce would have been evidence that Jews who had professed to convert to Christianity had in fact retained their Jewish traditions and identity (Landes, 1989). Spain and also Portugal declined after the expulsion and forced conversion of Jews. In other locations, the Jews were welcomed by rulers as initiators of commerce. Julius Carlebach (1978, p. 13) observes:

> Prussia’s great elector (later Friedrich Wilhelm I) permitted not only Jews, but also some 20,000 Huguenots, to settle in Prussia, and if anything would have regarded the protests of Christian traders—that Jews used innovatory aggressive trading methods as opposed to their own sedate and settled methods—as full vindication of his intentions.

Local governing elites thus had reason to welcome Jews and indeed might support Jews against complaints of “unfair” competition from Christian competitors. For example, when Christians and Jews competed in food processing, the greater efficiency of Jews reduced the wage that Christian industrialists needed to pay Christian manual workers, and demands by Christian food processors for protection against Jewish competitors were denied.

The economic activities of Jews were beneficial for the broad non-Jewish population. For example, Jewish middlemen financed agricultural production by buying crops still growing in the fields, so enabling Russian peasants to pay taxes that were due (Aronson, 1990). The Jewish middlemen took a risk because they did not know the eventual market price when they purchased the still-growing crops.

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22 On the role of trust or social capital in economic development more generally, see, for example, Bjornskov (2006) and Biamoune-Lutz (2011).

23 Reported by Aronson (1978).
Aronson (1978, p. 201) observed that: “The Jews’ most vigorous enemies were undoubtedly their petty-bourgeois competitors in the towns.” Dennis Carlton (1995) of the University of Chicago has described how economic contact can create a predisposition of dislike. He called such predispositions “hostility externalities” and noted that “throughout the centuries, middlemen who happen to belong to a minority in a country have been singled out for hatred and have had their property destroyed.” Hence “when the middlemen comprise an identifiable group, there can be trouble.” Carlton therefore proposes that the roles of Jews in economic activity as “middlemen” resulted in “the stereotype of Jews as greedy and fanned the flames of antisemitism.”

Basically, the antisemitism reflected envy. Jews earned incomes from the organization and distribution of production rather than from working the land. From the perspective of antisemites, Jews added value “without working” and were overly successful.

Jews were often excluded from occupations that required university certification. The denial of access to universities and restrictions on occupations of Jews were intended to diminish income-earning opportunities, which was consistent with the ideology that Jews should be inferior and should suffer. Yet, in the course of economic development, the heritage of occupational restrictions became a source of economic advantage for Jews. Had Jews been allowed own land and be peasants, tendencies might have been put in place for them to remain so. Although denied admittance to universities, the Jews retained a traditional emphasis on literacy. There was a requirement to be literate to fulfill obligations of study of Jewish law and treatises. Cognitive ability depends on continuation of intellectual activity.

With Jews being required to educate children beginning from an early age as part of the requirement of being a Jew, the transmission of the obligation to educate and to learn was the basis for a comparative advantage in activities requiring reliance on memory, reasoning, and initiative in problem solving. In contemporary times, the high regard for literacy and education has resulted in disproportionate creative contributions by Jews. In general, Jewish populations in cities around the world are also visibly prosperous.

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24 Simon Kuznets (1960, 1972) proposed that occupational patterns reflected the desire of Jews as a minority to retain their identity by maintaining specialization in selected “Jewish” occupations. Be this as it may, Jewish life is communal, which affected occupations by requiring Jews to live together in urban or village environments in which the ten men required for a “minyan” or quorum in the synagogue were readily available.

25 Botticini and Eckstein (2005) investigated occupational change of Jews living under Islam in the first millennium of the common era and concluded that the transition of Jews from agriculture to urban occupations is explained by comparative advantage due to the Jewish emphasis on literacy and education. They report that Jews faced few if any occupational restrictions under Islam. Indeed, under Islam rulers would have wished Jews to be productive so that Jews could pay the special tax levied on Jews and Christians. See Borooah (1999) for another study of religion and occupation involving different Christian denominations.

26 In countries in which the retirement age is lower, the decline in cognitive ability of the population is also greater (Rohwedder and Willis, 2010).


28 There are many economic studies of the links between religion and income. For example, for a broad ranging study, see Bettendorf and Dijkgraaf (2010), who find that religious observance is associated with higher incomes in high-income countries and lower incomes in low-income countries.
resources and the need to allocate disproportionate resources to defense, the State of Israel has been economically successful, with high income and high values of human development indicators such as literacy, gender equality in education, and life expectancy. Through the kibbutz, Jews also confounded predictions that collective property (socialism) cannot succeed.

The antisemitic criticism that “Jews are too clever” reveals envy. Colleagues in England have reported that “Jews are too clever by half.” The bounty on the head of Albert Einstein was justified by Einstein being “too clever.”

5. GROUPS AND IDENTITY

People discriminate by favoring others in their group and disfavoring those in other groups. Such behavior occurs when people who previously did not know one another are arbitrarily assigned to different groups. People appear to obtain “expressive utility” from confirming their identity as a member of their own group and also by confirming that they are not a member of the other group.

When people live in small identifiable communities or groups, trust and cooperation allow economic and social outcomes to be achieved that are usually not possible for the broader population. Jews as minorities within larger populations may be envied—and feared—because of their ability to overcome the problems of distrust and disincentives for collective action present in the larger groups.

The opportunity may be present to join groups. People may, for example, choose to join groups that support a political party, or they may join different types of clubs. If Jews are a successful group, we envisage that people would wish to join the group.

In the case of a country club, people pay a membership fee; however, even if they are willing to pay the membership fee, they may be excluded. Jews as a people cannot and do not exclude. However, in the context of the traditional criteria, non-Jews cannot simply declare themselves to be Jews. Personal investments are required because of the need to learn and demonstrate knowledge of the obligations and responsibilities of being a Jew. There are also restrictions on behavior in being a Jew. In present times, non-Jews do choose to join the Jews notwithstanding the high personal investment. In

29 On the economic success of the State of Israel, see Senor and Singer (2009). In 2010, Israel joined the OECD (the organization of developed high-income countries). Israel also ranks high among countries on human-development indicators. For example, life expectancy in Israel exceeds that of most OECD countries and exceeds that of all but four other countries worldwide (Chernichovsky, 2010).

30 The success of a kibbutz has generally been limited to no more three or four generations, after which private property and personal incentives have been introduced. The kibbutz movement has also required public funds over the course of time for survival.

31 See Fischer (1998), noted by Cameron (2005, p. 156). Of course, not all Jews are “clever.” Ability is distributed in the population. Moreover, “cleverness” appears often to decline with generational distance from traditional Jewish values, confirming the role of intergenerational transmission of family values and attitudes to learning and critical enquiry.

32 See, for example, Sherif (1966) and Yan Chen and Sherry Xin Li (2009).


34 See Hillman (2010).

35 On group characteristics and the effectiveness of collective action, see Olson (1965).
previous times, because of antisemitism, it was uncommon for a non-Jew to wish to join the Jewish people. Historically, because Jews were required to live in designated permissible areas (ghettos), separateness was also an enforced consequence of Jews being required to live apart from the rest of the population.\textsuperscript{36}

The differences in identity associated with separation and belonging to different groups can evoke a sense that the groups are engaged in a contest.\textsuperscript{37} When Jews are successful, antisemites view the contest as having resulted in an inexplicable and undesirable outcome that is the source of dissonance—and envy and fear.

6. Political Leaders

Difficulties have arisen for Jews when governments and rulers have been antisemitic. Jews as a defenseless group have then been confronted with the harm that governments can do. Dennis Carlton (1995) observed that political leaders can organize the antisemitic sentiments of individuals in a population into collective hostility. Edward Glaeser (2005) of Harvard University similarly suggested that politicians and leaders use hate to form supportive political coalitions. In the most visible case of a government organizing harm of defenseless Jews, Hitler faced political competition (see Aleskerov, Holler, and Kamalova, 2010) and hence had need of political support from the population. The evidence is that Hitler did not need to convince an impressionable population that they should be antisemitic. Demonization or “satanizing” of Jews was deeply embedded in European culture (Katz, 1980; Carmichael, 1992). Goldhagen (1996) documents Hitler’s willing helpers. In contemporary times, it is uncommon for Western political leaders or parties to define themselves overtly as antisemitic with respect to intentions regarding the Jewish people, but the Jewish state as a collectivity representing the Jews allows expression by political leaders of antisemitic sentiment. The antisemitic rhetoric of

\textsuperscript{36} In economic analysis, the “theory of clubs” describes inclusion in and exclusion from groups. A “club” in general terminology describes people coming together for a common purpose, which can be to enjoy themselves or to benefit others through charitable acts. Economic theory has formalized the idea of a “club” as a means for people to benefit collectively in ways that they could not do alone. The theory applies to people confirming common identity. Club theory was introduced by Buchanan (1965), with the assumption that people can choose to join any club that they might wish. The possibility of exclusion was introduced by Ng (1973) and Helpman and Hillman (1977), and was further developed in terms of willingness to pay for entry by Hillman and Swan (1983). Cameron (2009) reviews how the theory of clubs can be applied to explain prejudice. Iannaccone (1992) uses the theory of clubs to describe membership of groups defined by adherence to religion. Berman (2000) describes orthodox Jews as belonging to a club for which the price of admission is strict adherence to Jewish traditions and engaging in subsidized full-time Jewish learning. He also notes that a consequence of membership is high fertility. The implication is that orthodox Jews are willing to pay the price of admission, which includes time, but other Jews are not (not all Jews are of course orthodox). An alternative explanation is that orthodox Jews obtain expressive utility from their Jewish learning, from their strict adherence to Jewish traditions, and from their children. In that case, in distinction to Berman’s hypothesis, orthodox Jews do not perceive themselves as making a “sacrifice” in being orthodox. They view adherence to Jewish traditions as a source of personal benefit rather than a personal cost.

\textsuperscript{37} For elaboration on contests involving groups, see Tan and Zizzo (2008). On divisiveness associated with groups, see Makowsky (2011). Konrad (2009) provides an overview of the economic theory of contests.
politicians is an indication that the rhetoric is favorable for political support. Political leaders can also signal antisemitic sentiment through voting in international bodies.\textsuperscript{38}

7. \textbf{WHY DOES PREJUDICE DIFFER AMONG POPULATIONS?}

Why does prejudice against Jews differ among governments and populations? The rhetoric of antisemitism is prevalent in Europe, and European governments have in general exhibited lack of sympathy for the Jewish state. In the United States, antisemitism is a marginal phenomenon outside of the ideological (and principally academic) left and some fringe groups on the right. Protestant groups in the United States in particular are principal defenders of the Jewish state against the new antisemitism. In the United Nations, it has been the Security Council veto of the United States that has saved Israel from enmity that in general includes votes of European governments. The popular belief in the United States is that personal success is primarily the consequence of effort. In Europe, the popular belief is that personal success is due primarily to luck. The belief in luck underlies envy of people who, through “luck,” have undeserved rewards. The preference for social equality is also greater when people believe that personal outcomes are due to luck rather than effort.\textsuperscript{39} Egalitarian preferences disfavor success through effort. Europeans work fewer hours and take more vacations, and retirement is on average earlier than in the United States.\textsuperscript{40} Europeans have exhibited greater tolerance in their welfare states for people who have been “unlucky,” without enquiring into the reasons for lack of self-reliance. Europeans have also exhibited sympathy for immigrants independently of the productive contributions of the immigrations to the home society, ostensibly on the grounds that the immigrants have been “unlucky” in having been born in the countries from which they came.\textsuperscript{41}

In the United States and other countries of settlement, such as Australia and Canada, where effort rather than luck is viewed as the primary reason for personal success, old and new antisemitism find less expression than in Europe. People envy less and they fear less the success of others. Indeed they tend to admire rather than envy success. In these societies, where effort rather than luck is viewed as the basis for success, Jews and the Jewish state have been broadly admired for their successes. Among European populations and governments, Israel is more often criticized than admired.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{38} The United Nations is the leading international forum for antisemitic rhetoric and voting (see US Department of State, 2008). Bayefsky (2004) estimated that 25 percent of UN resolutions have had the purpose of criticizing Israel.

\textsuperscript{39} See Alesina and Angeletos (2005).

\textsuperscript{40} See Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2001, 2005) and Blanchard (2004).

\textsuperscript{41} See Nannestad (2007).

\textsuperscript{42} The United States has often independently exercised its UN Security Council veto in defense of Israel. However, not all US presidents have been sympathetic to Israel, and the State Department has often been a source of enmity. On the records of US presidents’ support for Israel, see Podhoretz (2009); on the State Department and other US government agencies, see Loftus and Aarons (1994). With regard to Europe, traditional indigenous Europe is in demographic decline (see, for example, Berman, Iannaccone, and Ragusa, 2007, and Azarnert, 2010). The demographic change is documented to be accompanied by a change in the proportion of the population for whom work ethic is a primary value (see, for example, Nannestad, 2004). Reference to the demographic change is often silenced by invoking the guilt of past treatment of Europe’s Jews. A question that can be asked is whether European elites blame the Jews for the path of demise of indigenous European society.
8. PEOPLE BELIEVE WHAT THEY WANT TO BELIEVE

Professor Bryan Caplan of George Mason University has described how people choose to believe what they want to believe and choose the beliefs that give them the most personal satisfaction (Caplan, 2007). Or they choose an ideology and maintain views and behavior specified by the principles of the ideology that they have chosen. If this is the case, on encountering an antisemite, there is no point in presenting evidence that counters antisemitic beliefs. Antisemites choose what they want to believe about Jews and the Jewish state. They predicate their beliefs on the “big lies” that are used to justify demonization or, depending on the tone, “criticism” and recommend to Jews that they take actions or “make concessions” that compromise the personal safety of Jews.

Referring, for example, to the population exchange between Arabs and Jews from Arab states that took place in the early years of the Jewish state will not move an antisemite to stop condemning Israel “for creating refugees.” Sustaining the 1948 refugees and their families as perpetual refugees is part of antisemitism. As long as the “refugees” continue to exist, the Jewish state is threatened.43

There is also no point, for example, in drawing a comparison with the population exchanges of Hindus and Muslims that took place when the Indian sub-continent was partitioned and the states of India and Pakistan were created around the same time as the creation of the modern State of Israel. Parallel circumstances and information do not matter for antisemitic sentiment and rhetoric.44

9. THE MEDIA

The media should in principle inform. However, people often seem to choose to be informed by media whose positions they know beforehand and whose views they know they will find agreeable and appealing and will reinforce their own predispositions.45 The rhetoric of antisemitism is profitable for the media in attracting an audience that obtains satisfaction from confirming pre-existing antisemitic sentiments. In a society with sufficient antisemitic sentiment and with people believing what they want to believe, the media may, for reasons of profit, choose to report the “big lies,” demonize Jews, and describe Jewish self-defense as aggression.46

43 The United Nations provides intergenerational continuity of refugee status only to Arabs displaced as a consequence of the modern independence of the Jewish state.
44 The behavior of people believing what they want to believe can be present at the highest ostensible intellectual levels. Time preference is an economic concept describing willingness to defer gratification. People with a low rate of time preference succeed because they invest for future benefit rather than consuming in the present. Peart and Levy (2005, p. 24) describe the reaction of the statistician Karl Pearson on finding that, contrary to the outcome he wished for, data appeared to show a lower rate of time preference for the Jews than for the British. Jews were therefore “superior” to the British in patience in waiting for future benefits and in not behaving impulsively, but Pearson nonetheless chose to interpret his data as revealing deficiencies of Jews—confirming that people believe what they want to believe.
45 See Iyengar and Hahn (2009) and also Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) on the “market for news.”
46 The new antisemitism can be present in media in which left-wing Jews determine content and in which Jews are obliged to follow reporting guidelines.
10. CONCLUSIONS

Jews, like other peoples, do not like to be disliked. Where there is a problem, it is natural to seek a solution. With antisemites believing what they want to believe, and with governments and media in many countries responding to and reinforcing the culturally transmitted prejudice against Jews—and focusing the prejudice on the Jewish state—the “problem” does not have a mutually acceptable solution. Antisemites are therefore left to remain unhappy because of dissonance, as well as envy and fear. There is an incongruity in simultaneously envying and fearing Jews. This incongruity is expressed in the claim, for example, that Albert Einstein belonged to a population of inferior people or “Untermenschen.” The incongruity reflects antisemites’ attempts to resolve their dissonance.

Antisemites are, of course, but a part of the populations in which they are to be found, albeit with different levels of prominence. In any society, antisemitism is viewed as a prejudicial and self-demeaning ideology by people whose nature it is not to envy and who admire rather than fear the success of others.

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Antisemitism and the Victimary Era

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In this paper, I will offer an account of contemporary antisemitism in terms of Eric Gans’s “originary hypothesis” regarding the origin of language and culture. The originary hypothesis extends and revises Rene Girard’s analysis of mimetic rivalry: according to the originary hypothesis, the first sign emerged in a single event, a mimetic crisis in which the (proto) human group arrested their common and self-destructive convergence upon a common object by putting forward what Gans calls an “aborted gesture of appropriation.” Representation, then, is the deferral of violence, as is, therefore, all of culture. History is the ongoing process of preserving and, where necessary and possible, replacing such means of deferral (languages, rituals, beliefs, moralities, art, and so on), which are intrinsically fragile and under constant threat from mimetic desire, rivalry, and violence.

In a series of books, beginning with The Origin of Language in 1981, through The End of Culture, Science and Faith, and Signs of Paradox,¹ to mention a few, and his on-line column, Chronicles of Love and Resentment on his Anthropoetics website,² Gans’s “new way of thinking” has developed an account of history according to which the market system, and now the world market system, best realizes the reciprocity achieved on the originary scene. History is the liberation of humanity from attachment and “enslavement” to the singular object on the originary scene toward the universal exchange of objects within the market system. It is in the context of the market system that Gans first situates antisemitism:

The Jew is not in some undefined sense a scapegoat for the larger society’s frustrations. He serves as a model of the inexistent and unfigurable center of the market system … the Jew, having rejected the incarnation, incarnates the truly unincarnable—mediation…. In the postritual world of market exchange, the Jew is a paradoxical construction who regulates the self-regulating market, who fixes the prices determined by the interaction of supply and demand; we must eliminate him to gain control over this “inhuman” mechanism.³

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Gans’s allusion to the Jews’ rejection of the incarnation already suggests that the suitability of the Jews for such a “model” of the unfigurable center of the market has roots that precede modernity. Antisemitism, for Gans, is ultimately predicated upon the paradox of the Jewish discovery of monotheism: the Judaic revelation presented knowledge of a single God beyond the means of control of totemic religions and a single humanity whose knowledge of God is most profoundly revealed in the reciprocal relations between humans; at the same time, this very revelation is granted to a single people, “chosen” to work out before the world the implications of this understanding of the divine. The spread of monotheism, already inscribed in its universalistic origin, could hardly take place other than through resentment toward those who both gave this God to humanity and “selfishly” claimed an exclusive relation to Him.

What Gans calls Jewish “narrative monotheism” lays the groundwork for the eventual emergence of the modern market not only by de-fetishizing local totems but by separating faith in God and the obligation to follow the law from the national power and success of the Jewish people. If the defeats and even destruction of the nation are given meaning by demands and promises that transcend those temporal events, then moral meaning can be found in the contingencies of history, rather than the maintenance of a closed ritual space. But this contribution of Judaism to modernity collides with the more specifically Christian contribution or, rather, the revision of Christianity constitutive of modernity. According to Gans, “[w]here Jews had understood that the real center was inhabited by the Being of the sign, the Christians realized that this Being was generated, and could be generated anew, by an act interpretable as a victimization.” In other words, while Jewish victimization was already a sign of Jewish chosenness, this was a burden borne by Jews alone; for Christianity, the persecution of Jesus is imitable and identification with it the source of salvation. But this also meant that Christianity provides the model for antisemitism: “[t]he anti-Semite compels the Jew to enter the infernal circle of rivalry and persecution in order to reenact his own Christian conversion: he is the new Paul, and the Jew is the Saul he used to be.”

The consequence of this privileging of victimization and identification with it as a moral model is clarified by Gans’s account of the role of Romanticism in the development of the modern market. Gans speaks of the “constitutive hypocrisy of Romanticism,” wherein the Romantic individual performs his rejection of the market system and proclaims his persecution by all those situated within that system only in order, ultimately, to create a compelling self capable of circulating effectively within the market. In abiding tension with this individualistic gesture is the formation of nationalism along analogous lines, through the martyrdom of the nation and its heroes at the hands of its oppressors; oppressors that are, of course, simultaneously mimetic models. So, Gans argues,

anti-Semitism intensifies in the bourgeois era because it is at this point in history that persecution, which grants significance, comes to be preferable to indifference…. At this point the Jews’ indifference to Jesus is no longer a veil covering his guilt for the Crucifixion; it is itself the ultimate persecution. To opt out of the theater of national life is ipso facto to operate in the hidden realm of conspiracy. The Jew is the ultimate

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dandy whose detachment from society—in principle, regardless of fact—is the sign of his omnipotence. The anthropological meaning of anti-Semitism may be expressed in terms of the market, but only insofar as the lesson of the modern market is itself understood as a transhistorical revelation concerning human exchange. The Jew is designated the “subject” of the market because, faithful to the empty center revealed by the burning bush, he remains in principle indifferent to the object—whether of persecution or adoration—that he finds there.  

The fury of the Nazi’s assault against the Jews gathered together all these threads of the anti-market revolt within a desperate attempt to displace the primacy of the Jews and “falsify” their narrative: “[e]nragèd at the Jews’ monotheistic equanimity in defeat and disaster, the Nazis hoped to inflict on them a catastrophe so great that it could not be understood as a message of God to His people.”

The ultimately omnicidal potential for human violence revealed by the Holocaust introduces something new into this equation. The Holocaust marks the beginning of the victimary era, in which we are now living. The virulent hatred of the Nazis toward the Jews drew the world into a cataclysmic struggle, the like of which we will not survive again in the nuclear age. The eschewing of such hatred must be the center of the new system of deferral constructed after the war: whatever “looks like” the Nazi-Jew relation must be uncompromisingly proscribed. This, of course, creates an incentive to make one’s own grievance fit that model: post-colonial, anti-racist, feminist, environmentalist, and so on struggles are all cast in terms of the perpetrator/victim/bystander configuration extracted from the Holocaust.

The Jews are once again placed in a paradoxical position. First of all, the response on the part of the Jews to the consequences of their utter defenselessness in the Holocaust is to create and, with growing unanimity, support a Jewish nation-state. But the nation-state, with its ethnic exclusivity, preparedness for belligerency and narrow self-interest, is one of those things that “looks” very much “like” Nazism. Second, the victimary principle can only be universalized if the Jewish monopoly on Holocaust guilt is broken—the best way to do so is to present the Jews as oppressors, at least just like the rest of us, at worst uniquely so, insofar they have exploited the world’s guilt so as to perpetuate the very conditions that enabled their own victimization, only this time at the expense of others. Finally, then, the emergence of a new victim, the Palestinians, the victim of the Jews, completes the victimary metaphysics first set in motion by the essentially theological response to the Holocaust. The victimary system, then, depends upon this new, expanded antisemitism, in which the Jews are scapegoated for the crimes of the West as well as for the intensifying resentments toward the West, coming now, in particular, from the most bitter if not the oldest of those resentments: that of Islam.

It was the Israeli victory in the 1967 war that made it possible to maneuver the Jews, ideologically, out of the victimized and into the victimizer position. But this maneuvering might have gone no further than the kind standard anti-colonial critique applied to the United States in Vietnam or the European powers without the increasing abandonment of nationality on the part of Western Europeans and the rise of radical Islam. In this context, as Gans says, we are, first of all,

5 Ibid.
struck by the similarity between medieval and modern Christian antisemitism. In both cases, the Jew is accused of remaining behind in the “old” Israel rather than entering the New Israel of Christianity. It is by this suspicious archaism that he betrays his immoral preference for honoring the historical memory of his monotheistic discovery over its inherent promise of universality. Whether well-poisoner or Protocol-worshiper, the Jew is accused of refusing to “love his [non-Jewish] neighbor” as himself.6

Earlier, I suggested that we could attribute to the modern market a “Jewish” and a “Christian” component: the former being the location of meaning in one’s “patient” action within history and the latter in the processes of individual singularization of the player on the market. It would, in that case, be the “Jewish” component that insists upon the regularization of exchange by the rule of law within what would inevitably be a national framework—which is to say the same paradox of universality and exclusivity long associated with the Jewish place in the world. Only the United States has fully embraced this paradox and the burdens it implies, which not only accounts for the alliance between the United States and Israel but also that of antisemitism and anti-Americanism. In that case, the contemporary European attempt to transcend nationality is not so much a rejection of the modern market in the manner of Nazi and Communist totalitarianism as it is a rejection of one of the critical elements of the market, the nation-state under the rule of law, and an evasion of the paradoxes and resentments involved in the articulation of nationality and the world market.

With the most politically influential currents of contemporary Islam, meanwhile, we do most emphatically see a rejection of the market. Gans sees Islam, in its origins and today, as the monotheism of an “excluded majority,” forged out of resentment against the first monotheism and the prevailing, dominant one: “the Hebrews discovered monotheism as the source of communal harmony independent of political power; the Muslims discovered it as a means for mobilizing the margins of the decaying imperial provinces to overpower them.”7 Hence the Islamic notion of the “uncreated Koran,” a direct rebuke to the potential for interpretation and supersessionism (“distortion”) built into the Jewish and Christian scriptures. Today, though, this resentment places Muslims at the margins of the global market, which they cannot avoid, and, indeed, through the oil-producing states participate in substantially, but in such a way as to minimize the transformations in the division of labor that would reflect genuine cultural and ethical integration. The identification of Jews with the subject controlling the uncontrollable marketplace inherited from modern Western antisemitism is in a sense radicalized in the Muslim world, which can create a political identity against the market itself from the outside. In the course of an analysis of a 2004 speech by former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, Gans contrasts modern European antisemitism, which sees itself as occupying the same world as the Jews, with

Mahathir’s world [where], on the contrary, the Jews occupy a different world from us, and their hidden domination of that world is at the root of that world’s open domination of Islam. By setting up the Jews as the all-powerful enemy, he is encouraging

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7 Ibid.
Muslims to forget their military and economic inferiority to the West and focus on the infinitesimal number of their “real” masters. The only thing our billions need in order to vanquish these few million Jews is a collective will to power.  

Gans focuses more on the global Muslim “umma” in these reflections I am working with, than Muslims living within the Western countries, but following the line of his argument one could suggest that the convergence of this mutated form of Islamic antisemitism and the revival of antisemitism in the West along with the consolidation of White Guilt is creating a particularly intractable new strain. As Gans says, the anti-Israel contingent in the West does not distribute copies of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion but they respect the right of Muslims to do so. We might say that the Western Left plays the role of defense attorney to Islamic terrorism: it does not approve, but it is determined to see that the accused receive due process. “International law,” as the latest supersessionist project of the West, thereby becomes a vehicle for this new brand of antisemitism: as reflected in the Goldstone Report in particular, post-colonial, postmodern international law can readily be interpreted in such a way as to render any conceivable form of Israeli self-defense illegitimate; how else can we translate this project than in terms of a simple imperative: die!

The conclusion, I think, is that we cannot effectively address this emergent antisemitism without addressing the pathologies surrounding the global market. On the one hand, the form taken on the marketplace by what Gans calls Jewish “firstness” is that of the centrality of the entrepreneur, who organizes capital, introduces a new division of labor, and creates new desires. Despite claims of consumer supremacy, one source of the mysteriousness of the market’s workings is precisely that new products enter the market before anyone has been asking for or has even thought of them—tales of consumer manipulation take on their plausibility from this fact. Similarly, the solicitation of investment capital, from the outside, inevitably looks conspiratorial, especially when heavily regulated markets require political maneuvering before new projects can get off the ground. We can see exploitative and deceptive entrepreneurial practices as exceptions to the rule in a fundamentally beneficial market process; or we can see the honest worker and consumer as, a priori, the victims of malevolent and unaccountable market players: which perspective we adopt will determine the way we think about regulating economic institutions, and only a fundamentally benevolent view will make it possible to accept the basic asymmetry between producers and consumers, capital and labor, and resist the search for scapegoats for our disappointments in the market.

Second, though, as I suggested earlier, Jewish firstness is represented by a willingness to endure historical contingency, adhere to the moral law (even if no one else does), and ask for no recognition or “proof” of election. I should make it clear that even if this possible relation between law, morality, and history was invented by the Jews, it can, of course, be adopted by anyone (as, for example, in “American exceptionalism”). At any rate, this form of firstness takes the form of an embrace of normalcy—not at the expense of eccentricity, innovativeness, or otherness in general, but certainly as a rejection of the a priori victimary stance that artificially inflates the value of alterity. The location of cultural exemplars among the upholders of everyday middle-class values and common-

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sense patriotism and the social prioritization of such values might prove even more
difficult than rehabilitating the figure of the entrepreneur. Without such a cultural turn
in which we come to see entrepreneurialism and normalcy as the modes of deferral they
are rather than as exploitation and indifference to the other, though, antisemitism will
continue to attract and direct the resentments generated by the world market.

POSTSCRIPT
The term “antisemitism” has a direct competitor on today’s ideological and political
“market” for designating hate, one which, if it was not, could very easily have been
designed to undermine attempts to identify antisemitism—I am referring to the newly
coined concept of “Islamophobia.” I would like to add a brief critique of the concept of
Islamophobia to my paper because that concept has become an essential part of contem-
porary antisemitism. While sitting through panel after panel at the YIISA Conference on
the “crisis of modernity” represented by contemporary antisemitism, I considered that it
would be easy enough to compose hate speech laws aimed at preventing “Islamopho-
bia” that would have enabled the whole lot of us to be rounded up. If “Islamophobia,”
or, more broadly, “hate speech” against Muslims, involved generating fear or hatred of
Islam or Muslims, would it not be easy to make a case that directing such sustained,
unvarnished, unapologetic attention to the virulent forms of antisemitism at large in
Muslim communities today makes one guilty as charged? In other words, we are in-
volved in another asymmetrical conflict here: the more antisemitism spreads and goes
unchallenged in the Islamic world, the more those who simply point it out can be
presented as purveyors of hatred. There is, ultimately, within the victimary framework
that sees the “West/White/Capitalist” as intrinsically oppressive, a perfect identity
between accusations of antisemitism and Islamophobia (even if we are accusing Western
leftists, we are only doing so because they defend the Islamists, making even that cri-
tique indirectly “Islamophobic”).

It may be tempting for those of us who see antisemitism as the primary evil in to-
day’s world to reverse these terms, complete the polarization, and proclaim charges of “Islamophobia” to be intrinsically antisemitic. It is better to pursue the implications of this cannily
chosen term, which piggy-backs on the also relatively recently invented “homophobia”
(rather ironically, because it is hard to see how the manipulators of these respective
charges could avoid ultimately hurling them at one another). Entrance into the modern
marketplace and liberal political system involves surrendering the right to avenge oneself
upon those who have offended one. Nothing could be more basic than the notion that
crimes and violations be addressed to law enforcement rather than “enforcers” within the
community itself (with the exception of immediate self-defense, of course). But this condi-
tion cannot simply be imposed upon individuals—it must be imposed upon communities,
first of all at the beginning of any process of modernization, but subsequently with the
entrance of each new group into that process. There are various signs that a community
might need substantive reform in its practices, and the individuals in that community
protection from its authorities, to make such integration possible: these signs will ulti-
mately point back to some kind of “honor” culture, in which dominant men within the
community consider themselves and are considered by others obliged not to let insults,
collective or individual, stand, and to police effectively the actions of those who serve as
“tokens” of the community’s honor—women in particular.
I am not in a position to argue that Muslims in the West are still primarily organized as honor communities, although it does seem to me that in those parts of the world that are majority Muslim they clearly are. What I can argue, though, because any citizen can thus argue, is that we need to discuss whether or not that is the case. In other words, the assumption by default that each individual is prepared to enter the liberal order is no longer a tenable guide for policies regarding immigration and religious freedom. But we are very ill-equipped to have such discussions. Point out potentially dangerous elements of “honor” in particular immigrant communities (not only Muslim, but only in Muslim communities are such features aggravated by a universalistic religious culture so sensitive to offenses against its honor as to evolve totalitarian features) and you simply enter the game of noting equivalent features in every community: what about those Christians who bomb abortion clinics, do orthodox Jewish women really want to go around in wigs, etc. And, indeed, there are enough superficial similarities to stifle the discussion. Our notions of religious freedom and cultural diversity have gotten us to the point where even raising such questions, or making observations that could lead to such questions, is considered invidious. We see the same asymmetry once again: those who have banished honor altogether as “prejudice” are especially feckless in dealing with those for whom it is a daily reality.

The only viable response, I think, is to recall that liberalism does not really banish honor—rather, it redirects it toward the defense of innocent victims, victims of the violation of equal human rights, or the right to enter the market and the political sphere. For us, honor is located in the police officer who will defend a family against predators, but will also defend members of a family from predators within it. In the United States in particular, part of the legacy of slavery and abolitionism is that our openness to the most radical claims to individual freedom is balanced against a suspicion that certain forms of freedom entail a “separatism” that can be used to imprison others. Our negotiation of this boundary leads us to train our vision upon the entanglement of “separatist” forms of freedom with various and novel forms of coercion. A cultural shift that emphasizes, before any other principle, the right of individuals to leave groups and communities would effectively counter charges of “Islamophobia.” In other words, we need a visible, confident cultural consensus that tells the Muslim who wants to convert to Christianity, or to marry whom she wants, or to speak out against the community, that we will protect them without qualification. Such a defense of the “other” (whom we are really just proclaiming to be one of us) would also stiffen our spines in defense of “ourselves”—so that we would be spared the shame of censoring our own books and entertainment in accord with Islamic law.
The Antisemitic Imagination

Catherine Chatterley*

The scholarly study of antisemitism has been a small, specialized enterprise overshadowed and absorbed by the larger field of Holocaust Studies. In fact, many of the classic studies of antisemitism were precipitated by the rise of Hitler and can be seen as attempts to explain the Nazi culmination of this millennial hatred. Scholars such as James Parkes (writing from 1930), Cecil Roth (1938), Joshua Trachtenberg (1943), and Leon Poliakov (1955) were engaged in an investigative process of trying to comprehend how six million Jews could be annihilated in the very heartland of modern civilization. Historically, the field has interpreted antisemitism as a Western phenomenon, a product of Christendom, although one influenced by ancient anti-Jewish attitudes expressed largely by writers of the Roman Empire in the period between Nero and Hadrian (54-138 CE). With our focus shifting today to so-called “new” forms of antisemitism, especially to that of the Islamic world, it is important to re-examine our assumptions and clarify, once again, our definition of this phenomenon.

Jewish tradition explains antisemitism as natural to the structure of human existence. Quite simply, Esau hates Jacob. This primal hatred of the Jews exists in all places and in all times, independent of culture or religion or socio-economic circumstances. The rabbis did not contextualize antisemitism, it was not understood as a cause and effect phenomenon, but existed as an eternal aspect of existence bound up with the destiny of the Jewish People. This traditional rabbinic understanding of antisemitism rests upon a conception of Gentiles as an undifferentiated mass, whose inner core—or Esau-ness—remains consistent across time and space despite historical and cultural differences. It is also true that this conflict was perceived as a case of mutual hostility, rivalry, and competition rather than a simple one-sided assault against Israel. While there is much to be learned from this traditional reading of antisemitism, and one can certainly understand the perspective of the rabbis given the persistent and irrational nature of Jew-hatred, this kind of ahistorical interpretation is fundamentally inadequate.

Antisemitism is not a seven-headed hydra, popping up in different places at different times, as some kind of constant presence in human history. One of humanity’s most culturally specific and historically determined phenomena, antisemitism is the product of the rancorous separation between Judaism and the Jesus Movement of the first century. During the following four hundred years, Rabbinic Judaism and Christianity were finally and irrevocably divorced with the Church in control of the state and its legal code as the

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new imperial religion. In this period, we know that the Church worked relentlessly to purify itself by rooting out “judaizers”—those individuals still sympathetic to Judaism—and to separate Christians and Jews to prevent them from celebrating holidays, and observing Shabbat, together. The Church’s Theology of Separation was seen as necessary to establish its authority over society and became the basis for European legislation regulating Jewish existence under Christendom for centuries. Natural and inevitable, the separation between Jews and Christians was not. Retrospectively, we know that the triumphant and controlling position of Christianity in the empire and eventually throughout Europe led to the systematic exclusion of Jews, as a collectivity, from mainstream Christian society, to their deep and abiding marginalization, eventual demonization, and to their peculiar positioning in Western societies as middlemen associated with the despised money occupations. What we see in the history of antisemitism is a compounding of stigmatization and hatred, which over time results in the production of a composite character that combines extremely negative characteristics associated with, and resulting from, a variety of European anti-Jewish religious and economic accusations.

By approximately 1000 CE, the continent of Europe was Christianized, albeit unevenly and idiosyncratically in many places. The period of the High Middle Ages (1000-1300 CE) was in fact the actual laboratory that created what we know as the antisemitic imagination, and it was during these specific centuries that antisemitism first became a popular mass phenomenon. This vivid, image-obsessed imagination was Catholic and was fed not just visually but also aurally. It had a character at its center that appeared to have the power and determination to control the world, to influence events, and to wreak utter havoc in society. That character, that figment of the European Christian imagination, is “the jew.” He is the tormentor and killer of Christ—the Savior of universal humanity, according to Christian theology—who continues until the end of time to work against the Church and its Gospel; he is the ritual murderer and host desecrator who compulsively re-enacts the crucifixion with these homicidal anti-Christian Jewish rituals; the well-poisoner and the magician, both of whom are in league with Satan against Christian society; and of course the usurer who recalled Judas Iscariot, the tax collector and archetypal traitor of the Gospels. It is this character of “the jew” that populates the antisemitic imagination; it is by the appearance of this character that we know we are in the presence of antisemitism and not some form of xenophobia or hostility, be they the product of culture, politics, or even personal conflict.

It is important that we acknowledge the paradox at work in the history of antisemitism. The phenomenon itself is not transhistorical. It is first created, and determined, by the history of Christianity and its relationship to the Jewish people, and continues to evolve in correspondence with the historical development of specific cultural and economic relationships unique to different regions of Europe. At the same time, however, the basic characteristics of the caricature that this history produces and releases into the world from the 12th century on are remarkably consistent across time and place. Regardless of European region, denomination, language, or nationality, the characteristics of “the jew” are consistent. In other words, we see shifts in the articulation of perception over time in different contexts but not in the basic perception itself.¹ This continues to be the case today with contemporary forms of antisemitism.

So, while it is true that antisemitism is not a naturally occurring human phenomenon, the worldwide diffusion of Christianity and Western culture through European imperialism brought with it, implicitly, the character of “the jew” and therefore also introduced antisemitism to the world. Nothing else can explain the presence of this character—and the hatred for it—among indigenous peoples on several continents, sub-Saharan Africans, and the Japanese, or account for its absence in parts of the world unaffected by European imperialism or where European missionary efforts failed to have any significant effect like China and India.

Antisemitism is carried inside Western culture in the most complex ways because “the jew” is sewn into the fabric of the Christian imagination. It is crucial that we remember that until the last quarter of the 20th century, the West was a Christian civilization, and however secularized and multicultural Western societies are today, they remain saturated with Christian symbol, metaphor, and imagery. One might argue that one aspect of Christianity that has been retained after the Holocaust, despite the waning of religious belief and practice in Western societies, is a deep ambivalence and unease about the Jewish people and one’s relationship to them. Although we cannot quantify these attitudes, we know there is still suspicion, resentment, contempt, and ongoing hatred for Jews in parts of the population.

The central story of Western civilization is Christ’s Passion—understood until perhaps a generation ago as his suffering and death at the hands of the Jews or at the hands of Rome at the conspiratorial manipulation of the Jews—which is clearly accepted as fact in the four Gospels of the New Testament. For centuries, every generation of Europeans met the Jewish People through this story—through their extremely negative depiction in this text. If Europeans knew no Jews personally (and one has to realize that this is the reality for the vast majority of people then and now, regardless of location, due to the reality of human demography) this is the only exposure they were given to the Jewish people. In other words, “the jew” of the New Testament becomes the real existing Jew, with no accompanying awareness that this character is a creation of the Christian imagination. Over centuries of telling and retelling in Europe, the Gospels create a character who is a composite of several extremely negative figures (Caiaphas, Judas, the crowd—particularly as represented in the Book of Matthew) who retain their Jewish identity and therefore actually come to define Jewishness for Christians, while Jesus, his disciples, the Holy Family, Simon, and Veronica are freed of their Jewishness and are perceived as Christians instead. You have generations of Christians who do not know, because they are never taught, that Jesus, his mother, and the disciples are Jewish, or for that matter that his beautiful and humane teachings emanate from Judaism. Rather, the Gospels depict “the jew” as conspiratorial; vengeful; hateful; unrelentingly cruel and unforgiving; arrogant; blind to the truth; corrupted, especially by money; treasonous; criminal; and, at bottom, evil. Every one of these characteristics is recognized as fundamentally antithetical to good Christian behavior; instead, these dark qualities come to define the one tiny group in Europe that remains conspicuously outside the universal religion of humanity. This dialectical relationship between Christians and Jews, rooted in theology and characterized by a psychological splitting between good and evil, is one of the pivots of Western history and is actually the central dynamic at work in Christian identity formation. In other words, Christians are conditioned over millennia to define themselves against, and in specific opposition to, “the Jew.” To be Christian, then, is to not be Jewish.
The history of antisemitism is a process of reconfiguration, the basic template of which is Christian. The characteristics of “the jew,” of this figment created by Christianity, remain consistent despite their secularization in the West during the 18th and 19th centuries, their Islamization from the middle of the 20th century, and their globalization via the Internet and satellite television since 2001. Ironically, these later reconfigurations of Christian antisemitism have their own bible of sorts: The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion. Today, again, we have a world that meets the Jewish people through a libelous text, sold around the world in a record number of editions, promoted by certain governments and religious leaders, educators, and academics as an “historical text.” The book is again used today to explain the workings of international economics and politics and now also the ongoing war between Israel and the Palestinians, very much like it was used by Hitler to explain the supposed war between Germany and “the jews” and to illustrate “Jewish machinations” across the planet. This Czarist forgery reinforces all the same New Testament characteristics of “the jew”—he is conspiratorial, cruel, powerful, hateful, dishonest, immoral, selfish, arrogant, and most significantly—he is a victimizer—once again engaged in his own particularistic assault on universal humanity. In the antisemitic imagination, now as in the past, “the jew” is a nihilistic creature, obsessed only with himself, whose selfish Jewish interests make him an enemy of humanity and of any universal religion or movement for the broader interests of the world’s peoples. This is the classic and consistent dynamic of antisemitism, which is in essence a hatred of Jewish particularity. Historically, Jewish religion and nationalism have both been perceived as dangerously exclusive and hopelessly particularistic, and therefore hostile to humanity. One can see how any movement that sees itself as universal—be it Christianity, Islam, Marxism, or the contemporary international campaign for Human Rights—will have difficulty (to say the least) with Judaism and Zionism as they are (mis)understood by most people.

Whether in the West or the Middle East, be it termed old or new, classic or contemporary, we are dealing with a vicious, dehumanizing, and libelous phenomenon. Post-Christian forms of antisemitism all have at their core a caricature that far too many people believe corresponds to actually existing Jews. We take the word caricature from the Italian verb caricare, which means to exaggerate, but also tellingly to attack and to rouse. One of the truly frightening and dangerous aspects of antisemitism remains the provocative and threatening nature of the character at its centre—“the jew.” This character, by his very nature, provokes resistance in the form of attack from those who believe he exists. The violence, be it physical or rhetorical, that one perpetrates against “the jew” is always justified because it is conceived by its very nature as a protective act of self-defense. All antisemites, regardless of time and place, see themselves as victims of “the jew.”

In general, the world remains ignorant about the religion of Judaism, the modern political movement of Zionism, and the trajectory of Jewish history, and this is part of the problem. If the only information people have about Jews is based upon the caricature produced by the antisemitic imagination then Jews will continue to face real hostility and aggression in the world. One thinks of Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s admission that she thought Jews were demons, as her grandmother had taught her and her siblings in Somalia, until a friend in Amsterdam told her they were sitting in a Jewish neighborhood and she realized that Jews were actually human beings. This, of course, is precisely why the brutal antisemitic lies about Jews peddled by the media today throughout the Islamic
world are so dangerous. These lies have a direct impact on the hearts and minds of their audience—particularly children—just as they did, again, for 12 years under Hitler. Much of the content we see in Middle Eastern media is indistinguishable from Nazi propaganda, except that today’s sophisticated technology is that much more manipulative. Ignoring this reality, as so many critics of Israel in the West do, is not only fundamentally irresponsible but also irrational. In a post-Holocaust world, we know where these libelous ideas about Jews can lead. Given this ongoing failure of comprehension, one must reasonably conclude that despite the Holocaust, the West has learned nothing about the nature of antisemitism and our responsibility for it.

I would like to conclude by discussing the possible reasons for the persistent appeal of this character, especially outside its original theological context. One thing we can say with certainty now is that antisemitism is no longer strictly a Western phenomenon. It no longer requires Christian theology or culture, however secularized, to function or to resonate with the masses. This is a new development for the study of the history of antisemitism and it is worrying. As ugly as Christian antisemitism is, we could at least take comfort in the fact that it only made sense in a Christian, or post-Christian, context and could therefore be contained.

Antisemitism, unfortunately, is not only a function of religious theology or of culture, but is a phenomenon that taps into our nature as human beings. As a species, we have a general reluctance to examine ourselves critically and to admit our own faults, limitations, and mistakes. We have great difficulty taking responsibility for our own negative circumstances, our own suffering, and for our own role in, at least, partially creating these conditions. It is far easier and soothing to the ego to conceive of oneself solely as a victim, as someone who has been mistreated and exploited, through no fault of one’s own. This operates on an individual basis but also collectively, and the dynamic increasingly affects all forms of contemporary political culture. In an increasingly complex global economic environment, in an ever-changing bewildering world, it is simply convenient—and therefore appealing—to blame a very well established and precedential “Jewish Conspiracy” for the fate of the world and for one’s misfortune however conceived. This is far easier than engaging in the hard work of investigating the complex social, political, economic, and historical relationships that surround us, and that we ourselves influence.

Nietzsche had a name for this process, where human beings attach blame for their own failures and frustrations onto others: ressentiment. While this dynamic has always helped fuel antisemitism, it seems to be ever more central to contemporary reconfigurations of the phenomenon.
The Communication Latency of Antisemitic Attitudes: An Experimental Study

Heiko Beyer* and Ivar Krumpal**

1. INTRODUCTION

There might not be a discourse of more significance for the political culture of Western countries than the one grappling with the crimes of National Socialism against the Jews. The project of “re-education” not only had to fight the strong tradition of antisemitic and authoritarian resentments in Germany, but necessarily became an act of self-definition of liberal societies. Antisemitism research has elaborated its views on modern antisemitism since 1945 and has developed theoretical enhancements of classical approaches.1 Recent forms of antisemitism like “secondary antisemitism” (Schönbach 1961; Adorno 1997), “anti-Zionism” or “new antisemitism” (Rosenbaum 2004; Rabinovici et al. 2004) and “structural antisemitism” (Haury 2002) can be understood as reactions to the heightened public awareness and ostracism of antisemitic prejudices. The persecution and social sanctioning of antisemitic attitudes and opinions has influenced theoretical concepts and explanations within antisemitism research to some extent. However, it has had only a weak effect on methodological considerations such as how to obtain valid measures of antisemitic attitudes.

Sensitive questions in surveys are often perceived as too intrusive or even threatening, since they potentially require the interviewees to disclose behaviors or attitudes that violate social norms: “A question is sensitive when it asks for a socially undesirable answer, when it asks, in effect, that the respondent admits he or she has violated a social norm” (Tourangeau & Yan 2007: 860). Based on survey research, it is known that direct measurement of behaviors and attitudes that violate social norms yields socially desirable responses (Stocké 2004; Schnell et al. 2005; Diekmann 2008; Krumpal 2009, 2010). Interviewees tend to misreport on sensitive issues such as criminal behavior or unsocial attitudes (Van Koolwijk 1969; Lee 1993).2

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1 This paper focuses on attitudes and their communication. An attitude is, “… a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor” (Eagly and Chaiken 1993: 1).

2 There are two possible directions of social desirability bias: systematic “underreporting” of socially undesirable characteristics and systematic “overreporting” of socially desirable ones.
The question must therefore be raised how antisemitism, being a “sensitive topic,” can be measured at all if we assume that (at least) a subset of antisemitic interviewees are aware of the public norm of anti-antisemitism, interpret surveys as public situations, and therefore underreport their antisemitic attitudes. Previous research concludes that in the context of population surveys, antisemitic attitudes are reported truly on the whole (Bergmann & Erb 1991a, 1991b). This conclusion is based upon empirical findings indicating that interviewees who perceive the topic “Jews” as “sensitive” nevertheless show high levels of agreement with items reflecting antisemitic attitudes (Bergmann & Erb 1991b: 282).

We argue that questions about the perceived sensitivity of the topic “Jews” can be considered as sensitive as the ones asking about actual opinions toward Jews. It is possible that underreporting already occurs when questions about the perceived sensitivity are being asked, i.e. a subset of antisemites might give socially desirable answers to the questions about their actual opinion toward Jews as well as to the questions about the perceived sensitivity of the topic “Jews.” The possible conclusion of the researcher about the existence of antisemitic attitudes drawn from a defensive stance against the topic “Jews” might not be that difficult for the common perception as presupposed by Bergmann and Erb.

Previous methodological and social-psychological studies show that the survey design and the question context may have an impact on socially desirable response behavior (Schwarz & Bayer 1989; Strack 1992; Tourangeau & Yan 2007). Following these findings, we use an experimental design to demonstrate the effect of question context on socially desirable response behavior in a survey on antisemitism. We experimentally manipulate the temporary cognitive accessibility of antisemitic primary group norms by randomly assigning interviewees to complete an antisemitism scale either before or after assessing the attitudes of their friends (peer group networks of friends are assumed to be the respective primary group in our case). We demonstrate a significant interaction effect between question order and primary group norms on the propensity to self-report antisemitic attitudes. Our results indicate that the interviewees are more likely to reveal antisemitic attitudes when their friends share an antisemitic norm and when this norm is cognitively activated before self-assessment. Section 2 will outline the theoretical connection between antisemitism theory and survey psychology, and section 3 will present the results of our empirical study in more detail. We will draw some final conclusions in section 4.

2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

2.1 Concept and theory of antisemitism

Although we can distinguish several theoretical approaches that attempt to explain modern antisemitism before 1945, most of them insisting on its peculiarity both in comparison to the older anti-Judaism and other forms of racism (see Fein 1987; Bergmann 1988; Salzborn 2010), the development of a comprehensive theory dealing with

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3 Such variation of question order is assumed to trigger “context effects” (also known as “halo-effects,” see Nisbett & Wilson 1977) of previous questions on the answer process of subsequent questions by cognitively activating information in the previous questions that is relevant for answering the subsequent questions.
antisemitism after the Shoah is still in its infancy. In Germany, the first efforts in this regard were made by the “Critical Theory of Antisemitism” and particularly the empirical studies of the re-emigrated Frankfurt Institute of Social Science, which brought to light not only that antisemitic attitudes have remained present since 1945 on a more private level, although they are seemingly combated on the surface of public decision making (see Böhm 1955), but also argued that guilt and its suppression forms a new reservoir for aggression against Jews within German society (this is what Schönbach in 1961 first called “secondary antisemitism”; see also Adorno 1997). Also, within the “German Left” (Broder 1976; Brumlik 1986), we find the first self-critical discussions about anti-Zionism as a new and more accepted form of antisemitism that emerged from the New Left in the 1960s and has also become popular in radical Islamism. This “new antisemitism” (see Rosenbaum 2004; Chesler 2005; Rabinovici et al. 2004)—the label under which it is mainly discussed in the Anglo-American context—is, just like secondary antisemitism, a reaction to the sanctioning of genuine antisemitism and stems partly from new sources, but remains connected to the old resentment to a certain degree.

Bergmann and Erb (1986) grasp anti-Zionism as a form of “detour communication” for genuine antisemitism. Their concept of “communication latency” tries to accentuate the social latency of antisemitism after 1945 in contrast to a mere psychological latency. “Latency” is explicitly used in regard to social and not psychological functions. The communication latency of antisemitism in the German Federal Republic offers the basis for integration within the Western alliance without actually having to deal with the past. In this regard, the media and the education system are supposed to carry on the new raison d’état of anti-antisemitism in making clear what to say in public discourse and what not.

The differentiation between communication latency and psychological latency postulates that antisemitic attitudes remain conscious but are not articulated publicly. Antisemites have the urge to articulate their attitudes, but such communication occurs beyond the public level (Bergmann & Erb 1986: 230). New communication channels need to be found for the expression of antisemitism. The authors discuss two possibilities: “consensus groups” (such as right-wing networks) and “detour communication” (such as anti-Zionism).

If the focus merely rests on genuine antisemitic prejudices expressed publicly, the fact that antisemitism persists latently will be ignored. It is this persistence that is of relevance for the study of new forms of antisemitism and their relation to genuine resentments. The simple replacement of the term “Jew” with the term “Israeli,” for example, is often used to camouflage what can be detected, when examined more closely, as a clear case of antisemitism. Without such a closer examination it might be mistaken as rational critique of Israel’s foreign policy. In regard to standardized measurement instruments, this examination implies that we have to develop a better measurement instrument that is able to reproduce the actual attitude of the interviewees more validly.

2.2 The difference between actual and communicated attitudes

The implicit note of Bergman and Erb (1986) about reference groups (which they refer to as “consensus groups”) and their impact on the willingness to communicate publicly
sanctioned attitudes such as antisemitism may help us to determine the relevant mechanisms of the generation and communication of antisemitic attitudes. Let us start with some assumptions.

First of all, we distinguish analytically between a public norm and a primary group norm. The public norm is the commonly shared expectation that antisemitism shall not be articulated in public situations. Hence, there is only one parameter value that can be taken for granted: we speak of a “public norm against antisemitism.” The primary group norm is the shared expectation of a small definable private group (in our case the peer group of friends) whether antisemitic attitudes shall be articulated or not. The parameter values of such a norm can be located on a continuum with the endpoints (1) “norm against antisemitism,” implying that members of the primary group judge antisemitic expressions as being inappropriate, and (2) “antisemitic norm,” representing a position of antisemitism within the group. Ambivalence and indifference toward Jews can be located between these endpoints.

On the level of attitude generation, though both the public norm against antisemitism and the specific primary group norm influence the actual attitude, we assume that the primary group norm carries relatively more weight. If individuals hold attitudes that are not in accordance with the primary group norm, cognitive dissonance will occur. According to the theory of cognitive dissonance (see Festinger 1957), this is likely to be reduced by adapting the attitude to the primary group norm. Keeping this in mind, the primary group norm can be seen as better predictor of the actual attitudes of interviewees than the public norm.

On the level of attitude communication, however, we assume that the relative influences of the public and primary group norms are shaped by the definition of the situation. In public situations, the public norm of anti-antisemitism suppresses the communication of antisemitic statements, while in private situations the respective primary group norm is of higher relevance. If the primary group norm and the public norm diverge, it can be assumed that a discrepancy between public and private situations will occur. In public situations, individuals holding antisemitic attitudes of a relevant degree will not communicate their attitudes in a straightforward manner, but will adjust their communications toward the public norm. In private situations, the public norm has a relatively weaker influence and the primary group norm is of greater relevance. Thus, it is assumed that antisemitic individuals with a primary group sharing similar attitudes will communicate their antisemitic attitudes in private situations but will deny their attitudes in the public. We then face the problem of a difference between actual attitudes and communicated attitudes in public situations, which then diminishes in private situations.

If we assume that interviewees interpret surveys as public situations, a significant difference between the actual attitude and the communicated attitude would be the result. This difference could be interpreted as a social desirability bias. To decrease this difference, we could influence the interpretation and framing of the survey situation in such a way that it is in higher accordance with the private situation of the interviewee. For this purpose, we suggest cognitively activating the primary group norms via “context effects,” i.e. the influence of previous questions on the answering process of latter questions (see Schwarz & Sudman 1992). In this regard, we expect a “priming effect” (see Sloman et al. 1988) of previous questions to activate relevant information that is used for interpretation and answering of the subsequent questions. “This information is
either contained in the previous question or activated by the respondent in order to generate an answer to the previous question. Merely by having been activated before, the information subsequently becomes more accessible. Moreover, this process can occur without the respondent’s awareness...” (Strack 1992: 25ff.).

2.3 The impact of primary group norms on the communication of antisemitic attitudes

The answering of questions concerning one’s own antisemitic attitudes can principally be based on different, potentially relevant information and cognitive contents. Following psychological considerations, we can assume that from all possible information, the subset most easily accessible at the time of answering a question will have the strongest impact on the answering process (see Schwarz & Bayer 1989). If we want to increase the validity of our measurement, it is reasonable to embed the sensitive items measuring antisemitism in the private, primary group context of the interviewees. This means we have to increase the cognitive availability of primary group norms by activating respective cognitions before self-assessment. We will not provide this information to interviewees, but ask for it directly. Therefore, a self-generated cognitive anchor will serve the interviewees as the basis for the answering of the following questions: “By making a particular dimension, norm, or standard of comparison salient, context can … alter how respondents make their judgment. For example, prior items may trigger the application of a norm that is carried over to a later item” (Tourangeau 1992: 38). We predict that interviewees with antisemitic attitudes of sufficient strength might be more willing to give socially undesirable answers because the salience of the primary group norm is supposed to weaken the relative influence of the public norm. If, in contrast, such an anchor is not available, interviewees’ response behavior might be more strongly influenced by the public norm, which in turn would result in more socially desirable answers.

From these considerations, two hypotheses can be derived. They will be tested via an experimental design varying the question order. The treatment group will complete an antisemitism scale after assessing the attitudes and norms of their primary group. The control group will complete the same antisemitism scale before answering questions about their primary group (reversed question order).

Hypothesis 1: The strength of the correlation between primary group norms and communicated antisemitism will increase if the questions regarding the primary group norms are asked before those concerning the subjects’ own attitudes.

Hypothesis 2: Subjects with an antisemitic primary group will report more antisemitic attitudes if the questions regarding the primary group norms are asked before those concerning the subjects’ own attitudes.

2.4 Further determinants of the communication of antisemitic attitudes

It has been postulated that the willingness to communicate antisemitic attitudes varies depending on the cognitive availability of respective primary group norms. In addition, further determinants of the communication of antisemitic attitudes can be discussed. The strong and robust correlation between education (within a democratic society) and antisemitic attitudes can be considered a desideratum of the empirical research (see Weil 1985 for an international overview). Political interest could be considered another
determinant, since the public norm of anti-antisemitism is mediated not only through the educational system but also through the medial discourse. Another robust finding of antisemitism research indicates a strong association between right-wing attitudes and antisemitism (see Porat & Stauber 2010 for an international overview). Overall, education, political interest and political attitudes are three variables that, in addition to influencing actual attitudes, might have an impact on the communication of antisemitic attitudes. The following three hypotheses capture these considerations.

Hypothesis 3: The higher a subject’s level of education, the less likely it is that he or she will communicate antisemitic attitudes.

Hypothesis 4: The stronger a subject’s political interest, the less likely it is that he or she will communicate antisemitic attitudes.

Hypothesis 5: The more right-wing a subject’s political attitudes, the more likely it is that he or she will communicate antisemitic attitudes.

The differentiation between communicated attitudes and actual attitudes might seem fussy at this point, since surveys merely display the communicated attitudes (and not the actual ones) in any case. From the vantage point of communication latency, however, the distinction has to be taken into consideration for another reason. If we assume that our determinants mainly impact the communication of antisemitism (and not the actual attitudes), the strong correlation between the mentioned determinants and antisemitic attitudes might have been overestimated in the previous research.

We will illustrate this point via a gedankenexperiment. Let us assume that the actual extent of antisemitic attitudes in the group of higher educated interviewees is only slightly smaller compared to the group of lower educated interviewees. Let us further assume that the public norm of anti-antisemitism has a stronger impact on higher educated subjects than on less educated ones because the former are more aware of the public norm. Based on these assumptions, the likelihood of a socially desirable answer is expected to be higher for the group of higher educated interviewees than for the group of less educated ones. In other words, we expect that higher educated subjects are more likely to conceal antisemitic attitudes in an interview situation. The same reasoning can be used for the variable “political interest.” Finally, an even more basic finding of previous research on antisemitism can be put into perspective, namely the strong correlation between right-wing attitudes and antisemitic attitudes. In terms of the former gedankenexperiment, it could be postulated that the public norm against antisemitism might have a stronger influence on leftist individuals than on right-wing ones who are not afraid of “breaching the anti-antisemitic taboo.”

Therefore, we might ask whether the influence of the abovementioned determinants might have been overestimated. The following section will present the empirical tests of our hypotheses.

3. EMPIRICAL STUDY

3.1 Research design

In order to test our hypotheses, we conducted a randomized experiment. We experimentally varied the temporary cognitive accessibility of antisemitic primary group norms by
randomly assigning interviewees to complete an antisemitism scale either before or after assessing the attitudes of their friends. Half our sample was first asked about “a friend’s” attitude toward Jews and later asked about his or her own attitudes. The other half of our sample completed a questionnaire with a reversed question order. The following operationalization was used:

- **Treatment condition:** “The following questions deal with a completely different matter, namely with the standing of Jews in today’s world. But to start with it is not about your own opinion but about that of a friend. If you are not sure what exactly he or she would answer imagine the following situation. The two of you are sitting in front of the TV and a famous actor states one of the following sentences. To what extent do you think your friend would agree with the statement?”

- **Control condition:** “The same statements again, but this time it is about the opinion of a friend. If you are not sure what he or she would answer imagine the following situation. The two of you are sitting in front of the TV and a famous actor states one of the following sentences. To what extent do you think your friend would agree with the statement?”

By using a randomized experimental design, the actual extent of antisemitic attitudes, as well as all known and unknown covariates, are constant between the two groups. The principle of randomization guarantees that there are no systematic differences between the two experimental groups except for the experimental treatment, i.e. the degree of cognitive availability of primary group norms. Differences between groups with regard to the reported antisemitic attitudes, our dependent variable, can then be interpreted as being causally influenced by the cognitive availability of primary group norms.

The following study was conducted in April 2008 in Mittelschulen (secondary schools that do not prepare students for university admission) and Gymnasien (secondary schools that prepare students for university admission) in East Germany. A sample of 241 students between the ages of 14 and 18 were interviewed via standardized, paper-and-pencil questionnaires.

### 3.2 Description of the sample

Let us first consider the distribution of the socio-demographic variables: 3 percent of the interviewees were aged 14, 46 percent were aged 15, 33 percent were aged 16, 16 percent were aged 17, and 2 percent were aged 18. Furthermore, 52 percent were male and 48 percent were female. The variable education was operationalized via the question, “What kind of graduation do you expect to achieve?” The empirical distribution of education in our sample was as follows: 18 percent of interviewees expected to achieve a Hauptschule graduation (9 years of school, no university admission), 30 percent expected to achieve a

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4 The primary group norm was operationalized by asking for the perception of a “friend’s opinion” regarding antisemitic statements. Our interviewees were all juveniles. Our operationalization of primary group norms using “the opinion of a friend” is based on the assumption that mainly “typical friends” are remembered who could be seen as representatives of the opinion within the primary group. We assume that the interviewee will think of a “typical friend” and not of an “extreme friend” from whom he or she would tend to set him or herself apart. In this context, we expect an adjustment of the interviewee’s self-assessment to the preliminarily activated opinion of a “typical friend.”
Realschule graduation (10 years of school, no university admission), 3 percent expected to achieve a Fachhochschulreife graduation (11 years of school, with specific university admission), and 48 percent expected to achieve a general Abitur graduation (12 years of school, with general university admission).

Antisemitic attitudes were measured via specific items often used in standard antisemitism scales. Statements III and IV (see Table 1) have a reversed polarity to avoid acquiescence (see Schnell et al. 2005). The empirical distributions of the single items are displayed in Table 1. These items are the basis for the construction of an additive index ranging (like the single items) from 1 (no antisemitic attitudes) to 6 (strong antisemitic attitudes) with a mean of 2.6 and a standard deviation of 1.2.

Table 1: Items measuring antisemitic attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>totally disagree</th>
<th>disagree</th>
<th>rather disagree</th>
<th>rather agree</th>
<th>agree</th>
<th>totally agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. More than other people, Jews use nasty tricks to achieve what they want (see Decker &amp; Brähler 2006).</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Jews have too much influence in the world. (see Bergmann &amp; Erb 1991a).</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. I think it is good that more Jews live in Germany again.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. The Jewish culture has to be protected against its enemies.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Due to their behavior, Jews bear part of the guilt for their persecution (see Heyder et al. 2005).</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Values are percentages. The number of cases varies between 237 and 241 due to item non-response. A factor analysis of these items yields one factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1 (exact value: 3.23) and explains 65 percent of overall variance. Factor loadings range between 0.7 and 0.9. Reliability analysis of the index yields a Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.86. The index values range from 1 to 6 (like the single items). Higher values indicate stronger antisemitic attitudes.

The additive index regarding the friend’s attitude is based on the same items with a mean of 2.9 and a standard deviation of 1.1. Based on the two indices, the sample distribution of antisemitic attitudes is as follows: 70 percent of the interviewees (61 percent of friends) can be classified as unprejudiced (index values ≤ 3), 19 percent (24 percent of friends) show latent antisemitic attitudes (values > 3 and ≤ 4) and 11 percent (15 percent of friends) show strong antisemitic attitudes (values > 4).

Beside education, we introduced the covariates political interest and political attitudes. Political interest was measured via the following two items: “How often do you discuss politics with your family, friends, and acquaintances?” (mean = 2.8; standard deviation = 1.1) and “How often do you watch the news (television or internet) or read the news in newspapers?” (mean = 3.7; standard deviation = 1.0). The answers were “never” (11 percent for the first question and 1 percent for the second), “rarely” (30 percent and 11
percent), “medium” (30 percent and 27 percent), “often” (21 percent and 40 percent) and “very often” (8 percent and 21 percent). The variable political attitudes was operationalized via a 10-point self-rating scale, where the value 1 equals “left” and 10 equals “right.” Ten percent of the students can be labeled “extremely left” (values 1 or 2), 27 percent “left” (values 3 or 4), 48 percent are in the centre of the political spectrum (values 5 or 6), 11 percent can be labeled “right-wing” (values 7 or 8) and 4 percent “extremely right-wing” (values 9 or 10).

3.3 Empirical test of the hypotheses

In this section, we will test our hypotheses empirically. Hypothesis 1 states that the correlation between the self-reported attitude and the primary group norm will increase if the latter is cognitively activated. To test this hypothesis let us first look at the correlation coefficients between the own attitude and the friend’s supposed attitude in both groups. The control group, the group in which the friend’s attitude has not been activated shows a Pearson’s correlation coefficient $r = 0.75$ ($p = 0.00$). In contrast, the treatment group displays a stronger correlation of $r = 0.86$ ($p = 0.00$). The between-group difference is statistically significant (Fisher’s $z = 2.397$, $p < 0.05$). Thus, hypothesis 1 can be confirmed. As expected, the reported own attitude is more congruent with the primary group norm if we activate the latter before asking about the subjects’ own attitudes.

Hypothesis 2 states that subjects with an antisemitic primary group will report more antisemitic attitudes if the questions regarding the primary group norms are asked before those concerning the subjects’ own attitudes. To test hypothesis 2, we divided our sample into two categories: subjects with unprejudiced friends (61 percent of interviewees) and subjects with slightly or strongly prejudiced friends (39 percent of interviewees). For both categories, we compared the means with respect to the subjects’ own antisemitic attitudes (control group v. treatment group). Our results support hypothesis 2. In the first category, interviewees with antisemitic friends, the control group (the group in which the primary group norm had not been activated) had a mean of 3.3 ($N = 49$). In contrast, interviewees with antisemitic friends in the treatment group showed a mean of 4.0 ($N = 40$) indicating a higher level of self-reported antisemitism. This difference is statistically significant ($p = 0.00$). In the second category, interviewees with unprejudiced friends, no significant difference between means can be observed: 1.9 in the control group ($N = 63$) v. 2.0 in the treatment group ($N = 77$). Our results indicate that the interviewees are more likely to reveal antisemitic attitudes when their friends share an antisemitic norm and when this norm is cognitively activated before self-assessment.

The expected negative correlation between education and the willingness to self-report antisemitic attitudes (see hypothesis 3) can also be confirmed ($r = -0.47; p = 0.00$). Students with a higher level of education express antisemitic attitudes less frequently. Regarding hypothesis 4, the empirical findings are somewhat ambiguous. In view of the perception of political events (“How often do you watch the news (television or internet) or do you read the news in newspapers?”), no statistically significant correlation ($r = -0.02; p = 0.80$) can be observed. However, when looking at the participation in political discussions (“How often do you discuss politics?”), a statistically significant correlation ($r = -0.16; p = 0.01$) showing the expected negative sign can be observed. The more students discuss politics, the less antisemitic attitudes they express. Hypothesis 5 can
also be confirmed empirically. The more right-wing the interviewees’ political attitudes, the more often they express antisemitic attitudes. In this case, we observed a strong, positive correlation $r = 0.60$ that is statistically significant ($p = 0.00$).

Hypotheses 3-5 are largely supported by the bivariate analyses. However, as we already argued in the context of our *gedankenexperiment*, the strength of the correlations between education, political interest, and political attitudes on the one hand and antisemitic attitudes on the other is possibly overestimated. Taking into account the cognitive activation of (potentially antisemitic) primary group norms, we expect that better-educated, more interested, leftist individuals will reveal more antisemitic attitudes, thus decreasing the strength of the correlations.

To test these considerations empirically, we estimate two multiple OLS-regression models. Model 1 displays coefficients without controlling for the primary group norm. This reduced model confirms the bivariate findings and shows that the effects of our covariates are robust in a multivariate framework. Model 2 displays coefficients controlling for the cognitive accessibility of the primary group norm. Adding the question order, the primary group norm, and the respective interaction term, we find that hypotheses 1 and 2 are again supported. Regression model 2 indicates a strong, positive effect of the primary group norm (0.49 units change on the “antisemitism scale” per one-unit change on the “primary group scale”). The strength of the effect further increases when the primary group norm is cognitively activated before self-assessment (significant interaction effect between question order and primary group norms yielding an additional 0.31 units change on the “antisemitism scale” per one-unit change on the “primary group scale”). The negative algebraic sign of the coefficient regarding the influence of the question order indicates that the willingness to self-report antisemitic attitudes will only increase in cases where the primary group norm exceeds a certain degree of antisemitism. In other words, a sufficiently strong antisemitic primary group norm is necessary to cause the predicted higher value of self-reported antisemitism. To summarize, the interviewees are more likely to reveal antisemitic attitudes when their friends share an antisemitic norm and when this norm is cognitively activated before self-assessment.

Let us now turn to our determinants of hypotheses 3-5 again. In model 2, the effects of education, political interest, and political attitudes decrease substantially if we take into account the interaction effect between question order and primary group norms. This means that, if primary group norms are activated in the cognitive frame of the interviewees, the variables education, political interest, and political attitudes lose explanatory power. We suppose that the explanation for this finding is that once interviewees with a higher level of education and so forth frame the survey situation in a more private way, the difference between them and interviewees with a lower level of education and so forth decreases. Although education and political attitudes are of importance too, the primary group norms (and their cognitive activation) have the strongest effect on the willingness to self-report antisemitic attitudes as suggested by regression model 2. These findings confirm our *gedankenexperiment*, stating that the strength of the effects of the other determinants (education, political interest, and political attitudes) are possibly overestimated.
Table 2: Determinants of self-reported antisemitic attitudes (multiple OLS-regressions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.28*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0 = no graduation; 4 = higher education qualification)</td>
<td>(-5.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussions about politics (Political Interest I)</td>
<td>-0.14*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 = never; 5 = very often)</td>
<td>(-2.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reception of news (Political Interest II)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 = never; 5 = very often)</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political attitudes</td>
<td>0.30*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 = left; 10 = right)</td>
<td>(8.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0 = male; 1 = female)</td>
<td>(-1.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question order</td>
<td>-0.58*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0 = control condition; 1 = treatment condition)</td>
<td>(-2.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary group norm</td>
<td>0.49*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 = no antisemitism; 6 = strong antisemitism)</td>
<td>(8.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question order x primary group norm (Interaction term)</td>
<td>0.31*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.49*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * significant on 5 percent level; non-standardized coefficients, t-values in parentheses; dependent variable is self-reported antisemitism (1 = no antisemitism; 6 = strong antisemitism).

4. CONCLUSIONS

We can conclude that a better measurement of antisemitic attitudes does not only offer a more valid picture of the extent and the consequences of today’s antisemitism but also helps us to investigate the causes of antisemitic attitudes in a more reliable way. In this regard, it might not be very surprising that primary groups have such a strong influence on antisemitic attitudes. Considering the previous research, it seems worth mentioning that antisemitism is not merely a favorite toy of poorly educated neo-Nazis (which it is nonetheless).

The persistence of antisemitism in a private and latent realm has challenged both theoretical and empirical research on antisemitism. If quantitative antisemitism research does not take the sensitive character of antisemitism into account, it will systematically underestimate the extent of it and overestimate the correlations with known “state-of-the-art” determinants. And since these (potentially biased) empirical results are often discussed in the public media, we have to be very careful with our interpretations and conclusions. This is all the more true given that these empirical findings also influence the theoretical study of antisemitism. Only if we have a reliable picture of genuine antisemitism will we be able to analyze its relationship with indirect forms of anti-
Jewish prejudices such as anti-Zionism or secondary antisemitism. Whether anti-Zionists, for example, still hold genuine antisemitic attitudes but hide them in public is of great interest for the sociological and psychological study of this phenomenon.

Our empirical study is based on a relatively small sample and therefore can only be generalized to a limited extent. Future studies are encouraged to investigate larger and more representative samples of the general population and might also experiment with more sophisticated cognitive stimuli. They should also include items measuring anti-Zionism and secondary antisemitism to study the relationship with genuine antisemitism. To summarize, our experimental study has shown the importance of a well-designed measurement instrument that goes hand in hand with the theoretical study of the mechanisms of recent antisemitism.

REFERENCES


The Definition of Antisemitism

Kenneth L. Marcus*

1. INTRODUCTION

Defining antisemitism has always been complicated by the disreputable origins of the term, the discredited sources of its etymology, the diverse manifestations of the concept, and the contested politics of its applications. Nevertheless, the task is an important one, not only because definitional clarity is required for the term to be understood, but also because conceptual sophistication is needed for the associated problem to be resolved. This article will explore various ways in which antisemitism has historically been defined, demonstrate the weaknesses in prior efforts, and develop a new definition of antisemitism.

Building on the work of such thinkers as Jean-Paul Sartre, Theodor Adorno, Helen Fein, and Gavin Langmuir, this article demonstrates that a theoretically sophisticated definition of this term must fully account for antisemitism’s ideological, attitudinal, and practical qualities; its persisting latent structure within Western cultures; its continuities and discontinuities with analogous phenomena; its chimerical quality; its potentially self-fulfilling character; and its role in the construction of Jewish identity. Most importantly, the definition must account for the participation of antisemitic discourses and practices in the construction of the individual and collective “Jew,” both as false image and as actual being. This process is equally critical to the understanding of antisemitism and to the development of means of counter-acting what might be called antisemitism’s chimerical core.

2. ANTISEMITISM AS RACISM

The first and most treacherous intuition of many commentators is to begin with etymology. To this day, some commentators insist that antisemitism cannot mean hatred of Jews, when the term “Semites” refers to speakers of a language family consisting of many historical Middle Eastern languages, including not only Hebrew but also Arabic. From the beginning, however, antisemitism has always meant hatred of Jews, not hatred of Arabs or Semites.1 Bernard Lewis has debunked the canard, sometimes offered on

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behalf of Arabs, that they cannot be antisemitic, since they themselves are Semites. “The logic of this,” he responded, would seem to be that while an edition of Hitler’s Mein Kampf published in Berlin or in Buenos Aires in German or Spanish is anti-Semitic, an Arab version of the same text published in Cairo or Beirut cannot be anti-Semitic, because Arabic and Hebrew are cognate languages. It is not a compelling argument.2

The etymological approach is more broadly problematic because the term was coined (or at least popularized) by a self-confessed antisemite, Wilhelm Marr, who hoped that it would facilitate greater adoption of the racial hatred of Jews and Judaism which he and his compatriots promoted.3 Early definitions stressed the relationship between Jewish racial distinctness and repugnant moral attributes. For example, one 1882 German dictionary defined an antisemite as “[a]nyone who hates Jews or opposes Judaism in general, and struggles against the character traits and the intentions of the Semites.”4 The racial dimension is even clearer in a definition offered five years later by one of the architects of modern political antisemitism, who explained the concept as follows: “anti—to oppose, Semitism—the essence of the Jewish race; anti-Semitism is therefore the struggle against Semitism.”5 In recent years, no reputable authority would embrace a definition, like these, which assumes that Jews actually possess the character traits which their antagonists attribute to them.6 Nevertheless, some authorities continue to define the term in a manner that stresses the racial element in some forms of this animus. Those who define antisemitism this way tend to emphasize that racial Jew-hatred has been qualitatively different than other forms of this animus. They may point to the unique horrors of the Holocaust or argue that racist hatreds are more dangerous than other animus, such as religious bias, since racial characteristics cannot be eradicated other than by extermination. This approach has various disadvantages, such as its exclusion of even the most virulent forms of religiously motivated hatred of Jews and Judaism. More profoundly, such definitions have been criticized on the ground that that they appear to accept, or at least to assume, the discredited “Aryan myth” that Jews can be meaningfully described in terms of “race.”7

3. ANTISEMITISM AS ETHNIC PREJUDICE OR XENOPHOBIA

Many modern formulations have defined antisemitism, instead, as a discrete but largely generic form of a more general phenomenon such as ethnic prejudice or xenophobia. For

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2 Lewis, Semites and Anti-Semites, p. 16.
3 Wistrich, Antisemitism, p. xv.
5 Theodor Fritch, Antisemiten Katechismus (Leipzig, 1887), quoted in Dina Porat, “Historical Perspective.”
7 Ibid. For a discussion of the complexity of this question of Jewish racial distinctness, see Kenneth L. Marcus, Jewish Identity and Civil Rights in America (New York: Cambridge University Press 2010).
example, Webster’s Dictionary has influentially defined antisemitism as consisting of (any) “hostility toward or discrimination against Jews as a religious, ethnic, or racial group.” Indeed, some historians have characterized antisemitism in terms that suggest that it is merely a manifestation of xenophobia, rather than a specific form of hatred. In one strong version of this formulation, antisemitism is defined as being merely “the dislike of the unlike.” Such definitions treat antisemitism as distinguishable only in its objects from other forms of discrimination such as anti-black racism or anti-Hispanic ethnocentricity, rather than identifying a peculiar characteristic of the hatred of Jews.

This tendency to blur the lines among forms of prejudice has certain practical advantages. Analytically, it facilitated research, particularly in the period immediately following World War II, which demonstrated similarities among the divergent forms of hatred directed at different groups. Politically, it provides a basis for coalition-building activities by various minority groups. Legally, it supports the development of parallel regulatory regimes to protect persons who face discrimination under different suspect classifications. In Europe, where Jews are the paradigmatic case of a persecuted minority, other historical outgroups may seek legal protections by comparing their lot to the Jewish condition. In the United States, however, where African Americans are the paradigmatic case, other groups tend to achieve protection by comparing their status to that of American blacks. Understandably, general definitions of antisemitism, i.e., those that stress antisemitism’s continuities with analogous phenomena, have proliferated because they serve a number of practical objectives at times and in places where opposition to the persecution of Jews is perceived to be weaker, standing on its own, than if combined with other forms of anti-racism, multiculturalism, or human rights activity.

The problem with such general definitions, however, is that they suggest that antisemitism may be different only in the choice of persecuted outgroup, rather than in the nature or intensity of hatred. Historian Ben-Zion Netanyahu recognized this difference in intensity when he defined antisemitism as an animus that combines “hatred of the other, hatred of the alien and hatred of the weak” but “in a more forceful and consistent form than in any other form of hatred of minorities.” This recognition of intensity levels is important, but it neglects the difference in character that might explain the difference in virulence. Gavin Langmuir expressed this insight when he admonished that the kind of hatred symbolized by Auschwitz must be distinguished in more than intensity from the hostility represented by a swastika on the Eiffel Tower. The challenge, then, is to expand the definition of antisemitism in a manner that reflects the peculiar virulence to which it has been inclined.

4. ANTISEMITISM AS IDEOLOGY

One difference between antisemitism and some other forms of animus is that it encompasses not only attitude and practice (i.e., *Webster’s “hostility … or discrimination”*) but also ideology. This ideological dimension was well-articulated in Theodor Adorno’s mid-century definition: “This ideology [of antisemitism] consists … of stereotyped negative opinions describing the Jews as threatening, immoral, and categorically different from non-Jews, and of hostile attitudes urging various forms of restriction, exclusion, and suppression as a means of solving ‘the Jewish problem.’”13 This dimension is important because it illuminates the extent to which antisemitism has become pervasive in some cultures. This pervasiveness may in turn help to understand the ferocity of attitudes and practices that it has generated.

Helen Fein’s well-known definition further develops this cultural conception, defining antisemitism

as a persisting latent structure of hostile beliefs towards Jews as a collectivity manifested in *individuals* as attitudes, and in *culture* as myth, ideology, folklore, and imagery, and in *actions* — social or legal discrimination, political mobilization against Jews, and collective or state violence — which results in and/or is designed to distance, displace, or destroy Jews as Jews.14

Fein’s sociologically informed definition reflects the insight that the ideology of antisemitism is not merely a matter of a personal belief system but rather a more complex network of “myth, ideology, folklore, and imagery,” which is closely related not only to individual attitudes but also to discriminatory, political, and even violent actions.

5. ANTI-ZIONISM AND ANTISEMITISM

In 1966, *Merriam Webster* provided a secondary definition for antisemitism that has become important to understanding the ideology underlying this animus. According to this definition, antisemitism can also mean “opposition to Zionism: sympathy with opponents of the state of Israel.”15 It is significant that this definition appeared one year before Israel’s military victory in the 1967 war, when the Jewish state was still positively perceived in the Western world as a liberal democratic country whose enemies could reasonably be accused of antisemitism.16 In the current climate, few if any serious commentators would equate all opposition to Zionism with antisemitism.17 Nevertheless, there is clearly a relationship between the two concepts.18

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16 Porat, “Historical Perspective.”
17 The concept thus clearly excludes those who oppose the pre-Messianic establishment of the State of Israel as theologically premature, such as the *Neturei Karta*, those who oppose the State of Israel on general antinationalist grounds, including some anarchists, or those who merely criticize substantive policies of the State of Israel as they would those of any other government.
18 The remainder of this section and the section that follows draw from Kenneth L. Marcus, *Jewish Identity and Civil Rights in America* (New York: Cambridge University Press 2010), pp. 51-54,
In many cases, age-old antisemitic stereotypes and defamations are recast in contemporary political terms, describing Israel and Zionism in ways historically applied to Jews and Judaism. In this way, Israel (mordantly characterized as the “Jew of the nations”) is represented as demonically powerful, as conspiratorial, and as a malignant force responsible for the world’s evils. Theodor Adorno’s definition, discussed above, provides a useful means of exploring this phenomenon. While the influence of Adorno’s early work on prejudice has suffered from the passage of time, his definition shows disquieting freshness as a characterization of the relationship between antisemitism and anti-Zionism, as long as the word “Israel” is substituted for “Jewish” and “the Jews.”

Thus, the ideology of antisemitism would include: stereotyped negative opinions describing the Jewish state and its members, supporters, and coreligionists as threatening, immoral, and categorically different from other peoples, and of hostile attitudes urging various forms of restriction, exclusion, and suppression as a means of solving the “Israel problem.” The fluidity and resonance of this substituted language illustrates not only that the same “stereotyped negative opinions” classically directed against Jews are now directed against Israel but also that these stereotypes are applied for the same purposes of “restriction, exclusion, and suppression” as a means of resolving the “Jewish problem.” Similarly, Fein’s definition prods us to consider the use of anti-Israel “myth, ideology, folklore, and imagery” that mediates between anti-Jewish attitudes and anti-Israel social, legal, political and military action.

6. THE EUMC WORKING DEFINITION

In an important modern reformulation of the definition of antisemitism, the former European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) established a working definition of antisemitism that is notable for its explicit recognition that “such manifestations could also target the State of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity.” The US Department of State has announced that “this definition provides an adequate initial guide by which anti-Semitism can eventually both be defined and combated.” In particular, the EUMC definition provides several recent examples of antisemitism in public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and religious institutions that relate to this collectivity, including the following:

- Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective—such as, especially but not
exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions.  

- Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews.  

- Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e.g. gas chambers) or intentionality of the genocide of the Jewish people at the hands of National Socialist Germany and its supporters and accomplices during World War II (the Holocaust).  

- Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust.  

- Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations.  

These examples demonstrate the EUMC’s insight that the putatively political or anti-Israeli cast of much anti-Israelism shrouds significant continuities with antecedent forms of the “longest hatred.” In addition, the EUMC working definition provides the following examples of “the ways in which antisemitism manifests itself with regard to the State of Israel taking into account the overall context”:

- Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination.  

- Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.  

- Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis.  

- Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.  

- Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel.  

The EUMC emphasizes, as do virtually all commentators, that criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against other countries does not constitute a form of antisemitism. Indeed, virtually all commentators agree that criticism of Israel is not a form of antisemitism per se. The criteria by which antisemitic criticisms of Israel may be distinguished from other criticisms have now become largely conventional. They include the use of classic antisemitic stereotypes, such as the demonization of Jews or the Jewish state; the use of double standards for Israel and all other nations, including denial of national self-determination only to the Jews; and holding Jews collectively responsible for Israeli policy. What these criteria have in common is that they all indicate when facially anti-Israeli expressions are in fact an expression of an underlying anti-Jewish animus.

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24 This “classic stereotype” criterion for the new antisemitism has been widely recognized. See, e.g., US Commission on Civil Rights, *Campus Anti-Semitism*, p. 72.  


26 Working Definition.  

27 Ibid.  

28 Ibid.  

7. **Jews as Jews**

Whether antisemitism is directed at Jews individually or in collectivity, it consists of more (and in a sense less) than negative attitudes, ideologies, and practices directed at Jews. Jews form a diverse group, and they may face disadvantage because they are also gay, communist, old or disabled, and so forth. For this reason, it is sometimes said that antisemitism must be directed against “Jews as Jews,” rather than as individuals or as members of the various other groups to which individual Jews may belong.

However, this caveat may be insufficient to the extent that it does not account for the irrational quality of prejudice. In order to address the possibility that some anti-Jewish attitudes may well be deserved, the definition must exclude “realistic” assumptions. These may be understood roughly as assertions that are based on the same assumptions as those used to describe the ingroup and its members. At a minimum, then, the negative attitudes, practices, and ideologies directed toward Jews as Jews must be based upon erroneous assumptions that flow from the application of double standards.

One implication of this principle is that anti-Israelism, to be considered antisemitic, must instantiate negative attitudes, ideologies, and practices directed at the Jewish state as a Jewish state. As with other forms of antisemitism, this form of anti-Israelism is based upon erroneous assumptions that flow from the application of double standards. This definition, then, would exclude anti-Israelism that is not based on the state’s Jewish character, which is not factually erroneous, or which does not entail the use of double standards.

8. **Jews as Not Jews**

Based on these insights, we may be tempted to define antisemitism as a set of negative attitudes, ideologies, and practices directed at Jews as Jews, individually or collectively (sustained by a persisting latent structure of hostile erroneous beliefs and assumptions that flow from the application of double standards toward Jews as a collectivity, manifested culturally in myth, ideology, folklore, and imagery, and urging various forms of restriction, exclusion, and suppression). The problem with this developing definition, however, is that its elements are in tension with one another. On the one hand, this definition asserts that antisemitism must be directed at “Jews as Jews.” On the other, it insists that this animus is based on erroneous assumptions and beliefs about Jews. The question, then, is whether antisemitism is directed at Jews or whether it is directed at a set of hostile and erroneous assumptions and beliefs about Jews.

While antisemitism is certainly directed at Jews as Jews, it occurs in a context in which Jews are perceived as being something other than what they actually are. In this sense, antisemitism is directed not at Jews as Jews, but rather at Jews as not Jews. The original insight here is Jean-Paul Sartre’s: it “is … the idea of the Jew that one forms for himself which would seem to determine history, not the ‘historical fact’ that produces the idea.” Slavoj Žižek elaborated on Sartre’s insight, explaining that what antisemites

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find intolerable and rage-provoking, what they react to, is not the immediate reality of Jews, but the image/figure of the “Jew” which circulates and has been constructed in their tradition. . . . [W]hat the anti-Semite tries to destroy when he attacks the Jew, the true target of his fury, is this fantastic dimension. \(^{33}\)

This insight is reflected in Israel Gutman’s entry on antisemitism for the *Encyclopedia of the Holocaust*: “Throughout the generations, concepts, fantasies and accusations have stuck to the term that portrayed a negative cognitive and emotional web, at times independent of Jewish society as it was fashioned and existed in reality.” \(^{34}\)

While the object of antisemitic attitudes may be imaginary, the object of antisemitic practice is all too real. This is the gist of Jean-François Lyotard’s remark that, the “Jews” (or, as he calls this construction, the “jews”) are the object of misrepresentations with which actual Jews, in particular, are afflicted in reality. \(^{35}\) In other words, the anti-Semite may throw a punch at an imaginary “Jew,” but it is a real Jew who takes it on the chin. While antisemitic attitudes and ideologies are typically directed at a social construct consisting of images, perceptions, stereotypes, and myths, antisemitic practices fall upon real Jews.

This insight has come slowly to otherwise perceptive students of racism. For example, in his 1995 book on *The Racist Mind*, Harvard racism scholar Raphael S. Ezequiel finds it necessary to inquire whether leaders of the white racist movement in the United States could possibly hate Jews—and insists, rather astonishingly, that the answer “is not obvious.” \(^{36}\) After all, Ezequiel reasons, these racists do not know what Jews are really like. Instead, Ezequiel finds that American white racists direct their hatred at a wildly unrealistic notion of what it means to be Jewish.

As I think about it, I see that by “the Jew,” the organizer means the construct he carries in his head, a rather medieval figure who lurks behind the scenes and secretly makes conspiracy. That figure he does fear and hate with an extreme intensity. That figure is blurred in his mind with all Establishment figures in general—the heads of corporations, the heads of publishing companies, the heads of political parties, the heads of mainline churches—and he fears and hates the Establishment with passion. \(^{37}\)

From this, Ezequiel initially infers “that the leader doesn’t really hate Jews, since the figure he has called ‘Jews’ is an imaginary one.” \(^{38}\) He is, it seems, initially unaware that this ignorance is precisely what confirms the racist’s antisemitic character. It is only when it dawns on him that the figure that he is calling a “black man” similarly has nothing to do with real black people that Ezequiel is able to conclude that leaders of white racist movements hold “an extreme position as a hater of Jews.” \(^{39}\) Reflecting on


\(^{35}\) Jean-François Lyotard, “The jews,” in *Heidegger and “the jews”* (Andreas Michel and Mark Roberts, trans.) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1990), p. 3.


\(^{37}\) Ibid.

\(^{38}\) Ibid.

\(^{39}\) Ibid.
the parallels between anti-black racism and antisemitism, Ezequiel says that the racist “hopes to build on a white base of mass dislike and fear of African Americans; he hopes to build on mass anxiety about economic security and on popular tendencies to see an Establishment as the cause of the economic threat; he hopes to teach people to identify that Establishment as the puppets of a conspiracy of Jews.”

9. RAMIFICATIONS OF CHIMERICAL ANTISEMITISM

Several interesting observations have been derived from this way of thinking about antisemitism. The first is that antisemitism consists of confusing Jews with their false images. “Thinking that Jews are really ‘Jews,’” in this formulation, “is precisely the core of antisemitism.” In a similar formulation, it has been argued that antisemitism consists of the difference between the real Jew and the imagined “Jew” and the political ends to which this delta is applied. Dina Porat has aptly illustrated this position by contrasting the pitiful state of European Jews at the outset of World War II with the Nazis’ perception of omnipotent Jewish power.

The second observation is that the “chimerical” basis for antisemitism—i.e., its foundation upon fictional rather than realistic or xenophobic assumptions—is what makes it so virulent. Langmuir distinguishes “chimerical” prejudice from xenophobia on the ground that chimeria “present fantasies, figments of the imagination, monsters that, although dressed syntactically in the clothes of real humans, have never been seen and are projections of mental processes unconnected with the real people of the outgroup.” In other words, chimeria “have no kernel of truth.” Antisemitism is the best exemplar of this concept, since hostility toward Jews is based not on actual Jews but on what the name of “Jews” has come to mean for non-Jews. This is a general formulation of Alain Badiou’s observation that Nazism’s construction of “the word Jew as part of a political configuration is what made the extermination possible, and then inevitable.” This “chimerical” antisemitism is unusually virulent for the same reason ascribed to racist antisemitism, i.e., because there is nothing that can be done with actual Jews that can rid them of these imaginary characteristics short of extermination.

The third observation is that this same principle underlies global antagonism toward Israel. In other words, chimerical antisemitism consists of hatred aimed at false images of Israel, generally deriving from historical antisemitic stereotypes and defamations, and the extent of its potential virulence can be seen in the difference between image and reality. The latter can be seen in the contrast between Israel’s global image and its true power and status reflects the extent of antisemitic animus.

Anti-Israelists do not harbor animus against the actual State of Israel, nor do they address the actual historical ideology of Zionism. Rather, they direct their ire at complex

40 Ibid.
42 Porat, “Historical Perspective.”
43 Ibid.
47 Porat, “Historical Perspective.”
48 Ibid.
social constructs that stand in for the State of Israel and for the idea of Zionism, just as classical antisemites direct their hostility at false constructs of the Jewish people. Thus, Robert Wistrich argues that

\[m\]uch of this anti-Semitic world view has infected the body politic of Islam during the past forty years. Its focus has become the “collective Jew” embodied in the State of Israel. Its geographic center of gravity has moved to the Middle East, but the tone and content of the rhetoric, along with the manifest will to exterminate the Jews, are virtually identical to German Nazism.\(^4^9\)

As with classical antisemitism, however, these ideologies and attitudes do manifest in actions undertaken against actual Jews, both individually and in such collectivities as the State of Israel and those organizations that are perceived to support it.

The fourth observation is that the chimerical definition of outgroups invariably stands side-by-side with an equal and opposing chimerical definition of the ingroup. In this way, Badiou explained that the “Nazi category of the ‘Jew’ served to name the German interior, the space of a being-together, via the (arbitrary yet prescriptive) construction of an exterior that could be monitored from the interior.…”\(^5^0\) In constructing the “Jew” as a despised other, both Christian and Muslim antisemites and nations have created an “interior space” for the “being-together” of their respective groups. The same function is played, in the development of both regional blocs and a new global politics, by the construction of “Israel” as a “collective Jew” with perceived sinister traits of racism, nationalism, chosen-ness, elitism, aggression, and criminality. By constructing and excluding a chimerical image of “Israel as a collective Jew,” anti-Israel globalists can create a space of “being-together” that is constructed from an equally chimerical image of global anti-racism, post-nationalism, egalitarianism, pacifism, human rights, and so forth.

Finally, it must be observed that the power of a chimerical animus is often strong enough to bring some outgroup members within its ambit.\(^5^1\) “The catch, of course,” as Žižek has explained, “is that one single individual cannot distinguish in any simple way between real Jews and their antisemitic image: this image overdetermines the way I experience real Jews themselves, and furthermore it affects the way Jews experience themselves.”\(^5^2\) That is to say, some Jews, like their neighboring gentiles, have succumbed to the stereotype that antisemites have developed about them, and they may consciously or unconsciously fear that they will personally resemble the stereotype.\(^5^3\)

10. JEWS CONSTRUCTED BY ANTISEMITISM

When we adjust our working definition to reflect Sartre’s insight, we are left with the definition of antisemitism as a set of negative attitudes, ideologies, and practices di-
rected at Jews as Jews, individually or collectively, but *based upon* and sustained by a persisting latent structure of hostile erroneous beliefs and assumptions that flow from the application of double standards toward Jews as a collectivity, manifested culturally in myth, ideology, folklore, and imagery, and urging various forms of restriction, exclusion, and suppression. This is a helpful refinement, which reflects the unquestionable principle that antisemitism is based upon stereotypes and defamations rather than true facts about Jews. Unfortunately, however, it is ultimately difficult if not unsustainable to maintain a dichotomy between the truth of Jewish existence and the manner in which it is socially constructed. To the extent that a definition of antisemitism relies upon this dichotomy, it requires further development.

The problem, in simple terms, is that group defamations can become self-fulfilling prophecies. The extent to which even Jewish identity is constructed by antisemitism poses a difficult problem. When antisemites treat Jews as inferior, or demonical, they can influence the development of inferior attributes in their socio-symbolic identity. Ultimately, the “actual” Jew cannot be meaningfully distinguished from the “constructed” Jew. To some immeasurable extent, the Jew unavoidably becomes, in some meaningful sense, the object of social perceptions. Antisemitic ideology is thus said to exert a performative efficiency: it is not merely an interpretation of a pre-existing condition of Jewishness but also an imposition of characteristics onto the social existence of the people who are interpreted.

In American sociology, this follows from W.I. Thomas’s theorem that “if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.” Robert K. Merton reformulated this definition to say that the “self-fulfilling prophecy is, in the beginning a false definition of the situation evoking new behavior which makes the originally false conception come true.”54 Gavin Langmuir modified Merton’s definition and applied it to antisemitism as follows: “the self-fulfilling prophecy is, in the beginning, a motivated definition of an outgroup as inferior in one fundamental way that is accompanied by treatment that evokes new behavior in members of the outgroup that seems to corroborate and strengthen the original judgment of inferiority.”55 That is to say, when ingroups (non-Jews) have sufficient power, outgroups (Jews) may be forced to comply in important ways to the ingroup’s representations.

In European philosophy, the origin of this idea can be found in Sartre. Sartre did, after all, most famously assert that “it is the anti-Semite who makes the Jew.”56 Moreover, Sartre expounded that the antisemite “makes the Jew” not only as a figment of the imagination but also in the sense of shaping the actual reality of the Jewish people. In Sartre’s materialist analysis, the antisemite shaped Jewish identity by creating economic conditions in which Jews are forced to comply with the representations that antisemites create of them. For example, when Russian Czars treated Jews as inassimilable—butchering them in Moscow and Kiev to prevent dangers to Russia while favoring them in Warsaw to stir up dissension among the Poles—Sartre asks, “Is it any wonder that [the Jews] behaved in accordance with the representation made of them?”57

57 Ibid., p. 15.
More recent thinking would suggest that the self-fulfilling quality of outgroup misrepresentations arises from the use of language itself and not only from economic conditions. Some, following Heidegger, have argued that the being of the despised object cannot be distinguished from the image that we make of it. Rather, as Martin Heidegger taught, the being of things is disclosed only in the “house of being” that language makes for them. In this sense, the animus that antisemites harbor toward the Jew is baked into the very name of the “Jew,” as Jewish people are symbolized in the house that others’ language makes for them. In one version of this argument, certain harmful linguistic practices “constitute their addressees at the moment of utterance; they do not describe an injury or produce one as a consequence; it is, in the very speaking of such speech, the performance of the injury itself, where the injury is understood as social subordination.”

Language has this peculiar power both to create and to destroy because human beings are to some significant extent creatures of language, beings who require language in order to be. Human vulnerability to language is in this sense seen as a consequence of the human condition in which people and groups are beings defined within its terms.

Both Christian and Muslim antisemitism construct an ideological vision of Jews that distorts Jewish reality, just as Western and Eastern countries distort one another’s reality. Violence is directed at the web of symbols, icons, values, and attitudes that have become part of the perception of Jews. Powerful emotional currents, sometimes merging with waves of frustration and despair, are condensed into images such as the supposed murder of Palestinian children. This condensation, some have argued, is a basic characteristic of language, which follows from the construction and imposition of specific symbolic fields.

These insights on the social construction of Jewish identity require a further refinement of our definition. Under this refinement, antisemitism may now be viewed as a set of negative attitudes, ideologies, and practices directed at Jews as Jews, individually or collectively, but based upon and sustained by a persisting and potentially self-fulfilling latent structure of hostile erroneous beliefs and assumptions that flow from the application of double standards toward Jews as a collectivity, manifested culturally in myth, ideology, folklore, and imagery, and urging various forms of restriction, exclusion, and suppression.

11. ANTISEMITISM AND RESISTANCE

There are significant dangers, however, in this emphasis on antisemitism’s potentially self-fulfilling character. In the first place, some versions of this argument overstate the extent to which antisemites shape the image and reality of what it means to be a Jew. This is because other actors play a role in this process. Second, even when antisemitism shapes the reality of Jewishness, it sometimes does so in a manner opposite to what one


60 Butler, Excitable Speech, pp. 1, 2.

61 Žižek, Violence, p. 60.
might expect. In some cases, in fact, antisemitism can be self-defeating rather than self-fulfilling. Finally, the process of Jewish identity-formation remains open-ended. This creates opportunities not only for defeating antisemitism but also reversing the effects that it has had on constructing Jewish individuals and collectivities.

Sartre was correct in one sense to assert that it is the antisemite who makes the “Jew.” The problem with this analysis, however, is that the meaning and being of Jewishness are determined not only by antisemitic constructions but also by the constructions imposed by Jews themselves and by others who may be philo-Semitically disposed. Hannah Arendt provided the strongest rejoinder that Jewish identity is not exclusively shaped by antisemitism:

Even a cursory knowledge of Jewish history, whose central concern since the Babylonian exile has always been the survival of the people against the overwhelming odds of dispersion, should be enough to dispel this latest myth in these matters, a myth that has become somewhat fashionable in intellectual circles after Sartre’s “existentialist” interpretation of the Jew as someone who is regarded and defined as a Jew by others.62

Indeed, there is no reason to suppose that of all of the positive, negative, and neutral myths, ideologies, folklore, and imagery surrounding any population group that it should only be the negative—and indeed the chimerically hostile—ones that shape the identity or self-identity of even the most despised of people (other than in extreme circumstances such as Nazi Germany at the height of the Holocaust). In the Jewish case, some significant account must be made for the extent to which Jews developed and retained a distinctive and independent culture and heritage throughout Christian Europe and in the other places where Jews have lived throughout the diaspora.63

Moreover, Sartre himself was careful to emphasize that antisemitism has not only self-fulfilling but also self-negating capacities. In other words, many Jews are deliberately reinforced in their inclination to be “generous, disinterested, and even magnificent” by their desire to resist the stereotype of the Jew as avaricious, venal, and rapacious.64 In the same way, many non-Jews react negatively to antisemitic stereotypes, taking pains to counteract the effects of bigotry. In this way, antisemitism can also be self-defeating.

12. CONCLUSION

Antisemitism is a set of negative attitudes, ideologies, and practices directed at Jews as Jews, individually or collectively, but based upon and sustained by a persisting and potentially self-fulfilling latent structure of hostile erroneous beliefs and assumptions that flow from the application of double standards toward Jews as a collectivity, manifested culturally in myth, ideology, folklore, and imagery, and urging various forms of restriction, exclusion, and suppression.

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64 Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew, p. 95.
Embracing the Nation: Jewish Assimilationist and Anti-Zionist Responses to Modernity

C.R. Power* and Sharon Power**

1. JEWS AND THE “MODERN QUESTION”

With the idealization and proliferation of the secular Christian nation-state in Europe in the modern era, power and legitimacy were for the first time seen to flow up from the people, rather than down from G-d through his sovereign. Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment thinkers adapted Hellenic democratic theory to re-imagine the polis as a nation whose citizens were organic members of a body politic with its own, presumably unique, democratic will. The normative idea that a “people” should be self-governing, that in fact any other form of political arrangement was inherently unenlightened and oppressive, informed the new delineation of states, borders and sovereignty. Membership in a people, one’s personal sense of collective identity, became of crucial political importance. One people, one nation became the rule. Thus arose “The Jewish Question,” a consideration of what the presence of the Jews meant for the modern conception of nationhood.

The idea of the Israelites representing a distinct “people” became a key problem of modernity. As the universalism of Enlightenment thinking was transformed by 19th century socialist thinkers, Jewish difference, as collective difference, remained a central problem, deemed anathema to the socialist project, this time preventing the realization of the international socialist collective rather than of the liberal democratic nation. Socialists see the coming post-capitalist era as, by definition, a post-Jewish era. Thus Jewish and non-Jewish post-Enlightenment thinkers alike, from Voltaire to Hegel to Marx, realized that the new modern forms of political organization could be – and perhaps needed to be – articulated through resolution of the “Jewish Question.”

Inverting our perspective from the majority to the minority group, we can see how the Enlightenment brought with it for the Jews what we might call the “Modern Question.” The implicit question of modernity was an existential ultimatum: are you one of “us,” a legitimate member of the “people” of a given nation-state or international collective – which is by definition non-Jewish – or are you a separate “people,” an alien presence on the body of the nation? Jews have responded to this ultimatum in various ways, but two strong and conflicting answers were to emerge.

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The first response is the reaffirmation and reframing of Jewish difference that came to be expressed as Zionism. In an era when all rights flow from “peoplehood” and citizenship in a “nation,” one way for Jews to access those rights is by asserting their difference, breaking off from the nations in which they live and demanding equal rights as a separate “people.” This response eventually led to the founding of a modern Jewish nation-state, Israel.

The second response, which is the primary focus of this paper, is the negation of Jewish difference, which we classify as an assimilationist response. The new nation-state model held out the inherent promise of equality to Jews, since citizenship rights were granted to all simply by virtue of one’s belonging to the “people.” The secularizing impulse of modernity also meant that religious difference became privatized and ostensibly depoliticized. Under these conditions, Judaism could be tolerated as long as it was exclusively a personal faith. Thus, as a logical part of their assimilationist strategy to obtain equal civil rights, Jewish Reformers and maskilim worked to reformulate Jewishness exclusively into an expression of personal faith, with absolutely no national or political affiliation. Our proposal in this paper is that the major Jewish assimilationist responses to modernity, from the Enlightenment’s liberal and Reformist responses through 20th-century socialism, universalism and anti-Zionism, are driven by this impulse to deny Jewish difference and Jewish collectivity.

It is crucial here to define our use of the term assimilationist as a central element of our analytical framework. Some scholars use “assimilationism” in a way that might more accurately be termed “adaptationism”: the impulse of Jews to divest themselves of particular signs of difference in order to adapt to mainstream society. For our purposes, assimilationism is not merely a passive adoption by Jews of non-Jewish cultural, linguistic or national identity markers, but rather an active ideological compulsion towards the eradication of Jewish difference. Thus, one might be a highly assimilated Jew, but not necessarily an assimilationist. The unending need to identify, vilify and ultimately negate threatening Jewish difference is the key distinguishing marker of assimilationism as an active, politically salient ideology.

These two primary orientations, the one Zionist, the other assimilationist, characterize the ongoing Jewish response to the “Modern Question.” They are also perceived, particularly by assimilationists, as existentially threatening to one another. If Jews do indeed share some sort of national, and therefore political, association, how can they rightly demand access to belonging, and its attendant civic rights, in another nation or international collective? The question of Jewish “dual loyalties” persists to this day, although the language may have shifted from conflicting “Jewish loyalty” to conflicting “Zionist loyalty.” The assimilationist response, in its purest expression, has remained profoundly hostile to Zionism as an expression of Jewish difference, as it must indeed be hostile to any expression of Jewish difference. By tracing the major strategies that Jewish post-Enlightenment thinkers have utilized in their quest for political emancipation, we can gain a broader understanding of the connections between early assimilationist responses to the “Modern Question” and contemporary Jewish anti-Zionist thought.

2. ASSIMILATIONIST STRATEGIES

The rest of our paper outlines the major types of Jewish assimilationist strategies, which we have divided into three categories: the first is political apostasy, the personal renun-
EMBRACING THE NATION: JEWISH ASSIMILATIONISM AND ANTI-ZIONISM

... association and emphatic negation of Jewish “peoplehood”; the second is the “modernization” of religious Judaism so as to make it represent Enlightenment values; and the third is the strategy of positioning oneself as the “good Jew” in a “good Jew/bad Jew” dichotomy.

A. Political apostasy

Political apostasy eventually came to replace religious apostasy as a means for Jewish assimilation and emancipation. In the secularized modern world, a world where religious affiliation had ostensibly been subordinated to the political, the source of Jewish difference was re-centred onto the political as well. Whereas, in the Medieval era, conversion to Christianity theoretically allowed Jews to neutralize Jewish difference, promising an end to religious persecution, political apostasy carries with it a promise to end Jewish political persecution. All one has to do is reject one’s political difference through the emphatic negation of Jewish “peoplehood.” This can be clearly seen, for example, in the Statement to Napoleon made by the Assembly of Jewish Notables in late 18th century France, in which the Assembly stated:

"France is our country; all Frenchmen are our brethren…. At the present time, when the Jews no longer form a separate people, but enjoy the advantage of being incorporated with the Great Nation (which privilege they consider as a kind of political redemption), it is impossible that a Jew should treat a Frenchman, not of his religion, in any other manner than he would treat one of his Israelite brethren."¹

Similar statements of political apostasy can be found throughout the Western European debates on “The Jewish Question,” in which many Enlightened Jews hastened to claim their rights as emancipated citizens of the states in which they lived by denying any separate national or political claims as Jews.

Another aspect of political apostasy is the defence of Judaism as exclusively religious in nature to renounce all threatening political difference. This became a core tenet of the radical Reform Judaism movement of 19th century Germany and America. At the Second Reform Rabbinical Conference at Frankfurt in 1845, where the president charged speakers to “beware of creating any doubt concerning their allegiance to the state,” one speaker, Rabbi Samuel Holdheim, saw Zionism as contradicting German Jews’ patriotic “feeling for the fatherland.”² He asserted, “Our nationality is now only expressed in religious concepts and institutions…,” cautioning that, with respect to Judaism in Germany, “One must not mistake a national for a religious phenomenon, otherwise many abuses could be justified.”³ The same strain carried through the radical Reform movement in America into the late 19th and 20th centuries. The Platform of the Reform Rabbinical Conference in Pittsburgh, the basic statement of Reform Judaism from 1889 until 1937, included a principle rejecting Zionism and any restoration of laws formerly pertaining to the Jewish state based on the premise, “We consider ourselves no longer a

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³ Ibid., p. 164.
nation but a religious community....”

Even after the Second World War, by which time the mainstream Reform movement had rejected many of its earlier assimilationist and anti-Zionist positions, the earlier radical Reform version of political apostasy continued in a small segment of American Reform organizations, such as the staunchly patriotic and anti-Zionist American Council for Judaism.

For socialist and universalist Jewish thinkers, who reject nationalism on the basis of Enlightenment universalist values, the same impulse has led them to advocate political assimilation into an implicitly non-Jewish international proletariat. The important impulse to note here is not the type of collective into which the Jew is “assimilating,” but rather the Jewish collective that is being negated in the process. Marx, being one of the earliest “post-Jewish” internationalists, and certainly the most influential, adapted the assimilationist strategy to international socialism. When religious conversion proved insufficient to convince his fellow thinkers that he was not a Jew, Marx seemed compelled to negate his own Jewishness by promoting an end to all Jews, as Jews, everywhere. His famous statement, “The emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation of mankind from Judaism,” can be read as a personal secular declaration of apostasy from political Jewishness, as well as a statement of orthodox international socialist dogma.

Universalist Jewish thinkers throughout the 20th century have echoed Marx’s political apostasy, asserting, as did Marx, that the disavowal of Jewish difference is the first necessary step in the eradication of all political difference. Isaac Deutscher, who coined the term “non-Jewish Jew” in a lecture given to the World Jewish Congress in 1958, deeply admired those Jews who had, in his view, risen above Jewishness to approach the greatness of universal human values. For Deutscher, Jews such as Spinoza, Heine, Marx, Rosa Luxemberg, Trotsky, Freud and himself belonged to a Jewish tradition of dissent against Jewish separateness. Deutscher said that these “non-Jewish Jews” “went beyond the boundaries of Jewry. They all found Jewry too narrow, too archaic, and too constricting. They all looked for ideals and fulfilment beyond it, and they represent the sum and substance of much that is greatest in modern thought....”

B. “Modernization” of Judaism

A second, related, assimilationist strategy is to reformulate and represent Judaism as a thoroughly modern faith, an expression of the political, cultural and ethical ideals of the Enlightenment. For early radical Reformist Jews and for secular universalist Jewish thinkers, Judaism needed to be expunged of any threatening non-Enlightenment aspects, particularly tribalism, separatism and exceptionalism. Some 19th century Jewish thinkers, such as Martin Buber, while remaining committed to some form of Jewish spiritual and even national collectivity, nonetheless set about modernizing Jewishness by arguing that Judaism itself, properly realized, was actually the truest expression of universal Enlightenment values of rationality, justice and individual freedom. Isaac Deutscher uses this strategy in the abovementioned quote about “non-Jewish Jews.”

Deutscher believed that Jews’ unique positioning on the borderlines of nations and cultures grants them special access to universalist values that reject as oppressive the very existence of different nations, cultures and religions.

Building on the work of earlier Enlightenment Jewish thinkers who modernized Judaism in this way, contemporary Jewish anti-Zionist “post-identity” thinkers have thoroughly modernized Judaism and stripped it of all notion of separate collectivity. Judith Butler’s “Jewishness” conforms to this model. When she asks the question, “But what if one criticises Israel in the name of one’s Jewishness, in the name of justice…?” “Jewishness” in this quote becomes synonymous with Justice and, for Butler, whose body of work has been dedicated to self-proclaimed subversive activist politics, “Jewishness” becomes synonymous with “dissent.” She writes that it is wrong “to suppose that criticism is not a Jewish value, which clearly flies in the face not only of long traditions of Talmudic disputation, but of all the religious and cultural sources that have been part of Jewish life for centuries.” In so doing, she decontextualizes the Jewish tradition of oral dispute such that the entirety of Judaism itself becomes, in practice, this “disputation” [read dissent]. It is this decontextualized practice of Jewish dissent, emblematic of certain Enlightenment values, that becomes for universalist Jews the true Judaism in which they clearly sees themselves, but not Zionists Jews, reflected.

C. Being a “Good Jew”

The third major strategy used by assimilationists seeks to allow a certain sub-set of Jews to gain access to non-Jewish national or international belonging by insisting on a differentiation between the “good Jew” and the “bad Jew.” When used as an assimilationist strategy, the “good Jew” is that Jew who has been stripped of any and all threatening signs of Jewish difference, which are then displaced onto the “bad Jews.” The “good Jews” can point to those “bad Jews” who insist on Jewish separateness, using them as a foil to prove their own successful assimilation into the non-Jewish collective.

This strategy is necessary because of the “double bind” identified by Sander Gilman. The Enlightenment held out the promise of emancipation if only Jews would disavow their difference, and yet at the same time this promise proved to be false. A Jew always somehow remains a Jew, different, foreign, no matter how strenuously they may protest otherwise. The next logical move is to claim: I may be Jewish, but I am not like “those Jews.” Unable to de-Judaize themselves through political apostasy and secularization, these “non-Jewish Jews,” to use Isaac Deutscher’s terminology, have typically fallen back on the strategy of loudly and even violently distancing themselves from other Jews, whom they represent as “those Jewish-allied Jews,” the “bad Jews.”

Since the Enlightenment in Western Europe as well as in America, it has often been the Eastern Jew, stereotyped as religious, poor and backward, who served as the “bad Jew” in this dichotomy. In 18th and 19th century Germany, the maskilim sought to differentiate themselves from the religious and backward Eastern European Jews, while in France and

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8 Ibid.
Holland Sephardim fought for emancipation on the grounds that in dress, refinement, morality and intellect they were completely unlike and superior to the German and Polish Ashkenazim, who were largely viewed as unmodern and external to the nation.

In the latter half of the 20th century, Jewish anti-Zionist thought has also emerged to rely heavily on the good Jew/bad Jew strategy. In this case, the bad Jews are the backward, tribally oriented Zionists, while the good Jews are those enlightened few who have moved beyond Judaism to join in the universal movement against Israeli state power. All contemporary Jewish anti-Zionist thinkers emphasize that the Jewish community can be divided into two groups: the Zionist majority and the oppressed anti-Zionist minority. They stress that the main strategy of the Jewish anti-Zionist movement must be, in Butler’s words, to “widen the rift between the State of Israel and the Jewish people in order to produce an alternate vision of the future.”

Much like how some of those assimilationist Jews who used this strategy in centuries past tacitly, or even overtly, justified discrimination and hatred of certain “bad Jews,” so too do contemporary anti-Zionists justify and even advocate antisemitism against Zionist Jews. Indeed, one of the primary arguments of Jewish anti-Zionist thought is that Zionism is the main cause of antisemitism in the world today, due to its conflation of Jews with Israel and its commission of evil acts in the name of all Jews. As in centuries past, the assimilationist assertion is that Jews who want to get rid of antisemitism need to disavow Jewish difference and eschew those Jews who refuse to do so. Thus, Jews who refuse to reject Zionism should expect, and deserve, antisemitism directed towards them. Zack Furness, editor of the online journal *Bad Subjects* published out of the University of California at Berkeley, complains that the brunt of the resentment against Israeli policies will “most likely be shouldered by American Jews.” He laments, “We are the ones who will be forced to deal with the backlash of Zionist policies that we are encouraged to support.” Referring to this antisemitic backlash, he says, “If Jews are willing to uncritically take that chance, then they have no right to complain when they themselves have collapsed the distinction between Zionism and Judaism.”

Then there is Michael Neumann’s disconcerting essay “What Is Anti-Semitism?” in which we are informed that, due to the Zionist conflation of Jews and Zionism, since anti-Zionism is just and good, antisemitism should also be seen as just and good. He argues that if Zionists insist on labelling as antisemitic any opposition against Israel and against any Jew who is complicit in Israeli war crimes by refusing to denounce Israel, then both anti-Zionism and antisemitism must be, as he puts it, a “moral obligation.” Besides, Neumann continues, antisemitism is not that bad, “simple hostility” towards Jews and Jewish culture is “harmless,” and, anyway, those Jews who refuse to renounce Zionism and Jewish tribalism – which he characterizes as “racism, pure and simple; the valuing of one’s blood over all others” – deserve whatever they get. His final sentences are especially revealing in their callousness. He says:

10 Butler, supra note 7.
12 Ibid.
14 Ibid., p. 6.
15 Ibid., p. 10.
The scandal today is not anti-Semitism but the importance it is given. Israel has committed war crimes. It has implicated Jews generally in these crimes, and Jews generally have hastened to implicate themselves. This has provoked hatred against Jews. Why not? Some of this hatred is racist, some isn’t, but who cares? Why should we pay any attention to this issue at all?\(^\text{16}\)

In Neumann’s essay, we can see how the Jewish assimilationist strategy, which seeks to deny Jewish difference and allegiance, can and does lead in a reasonable and not unexpected way to the phenomenon of some Jews actively promoting antisemitism against their fellow Jews.

3. **CONCLUSIONS**

Political apostasy, modernization of religious Judaism, and being on the right side of the good Jew/bad Jew dichotomy: this is the internal logic and modus operandi of Jewish assimilationism. The pertinent question at this point, particularly given the context of these proceedings (a conference on antisemitism) is, of course, is Jewish assimilationism antisemitic? This is a complex question, but it would seem that the impulse to eradicate Jewish difference, be it from a national or international collective, is qualitatively anti-Jewish both in intent and effect. If a Jew feels the need to neutralize Jewish difference, he or she has already internalized the antisemitic belief that Jewish difference is inherently threatening. While universalists like Butler or Deutscher may claim that their location as “non-Jewish Jews” is somehow positive and progressively working towards the subversion of hegemonic nationalisms, their logic is inconsistent, since the neutralization or eradication of “Jewish Jews” can only serve to reinforce nationalism’s at times genocidal, xenophobic tendencies. Of course, there is an important space for dissent and negotiation within the global Jewish community, but if one values Judaism and Jews, one must also guard against impulses that are ultimately anti-Jewish. It is crucially important to distinguish between those Jewish voices who argue for an expansion of the theoretical and practical boundaries of belonging by insisting on their belonging in more than one nation – those Jews, for example, who assert their identity as both American and Jewish – and those who are working from a point of view which views Jewish difference as a problem that can only be overcome with its own erasure.

\(^\text{16}\) Ibid., p. 12.
1. INTRODUCTION

Since the works of critical theory on antisemitism and the authoritarian personality in the 1940s, the close connection of nationalism to antisemitism has been broadly recognized not only by critical theorists but also by other philosophers, such as Hannah Arendt. This close connection has been analyzed in detail with regard to the development of the European nation-states in the 19th century (e.g., Massing 1959; Arendt 1951; Claussen 1994) as well as the history of the 20th century, where it found its culmination in the Shoah (cf. Horkheimer & Adorno 2002; Lepsius 1990). Yet, the end of the Shoah and the National Socialist regime marked the end of neither nationalism nor antisemitism. The close intertwining of the two phenomena also persisted, for example in the manifold strategies of denial of memory and responsibility for the Nazi crimes. But also today, in times of economic crisis, patterns of antisemitism and nationalism are (re)activated and interwoven in simplistic explanations of the world that personalize social structures and attribute guilt and responsibility for socially induced problems to precast figures. It seems that, especially in post-Holocaust societies, exclusionary nationalist identification cannot do without antisemitism, in whatever latent form, as this combination seems to meet the need for certainty, stability, and unambiguous belonging in crisis-ridden periods (cf. Stoegner, Bischof & Rajal 2011).

In this paper we would like to highlight how the intertwining of nationalism and antisemitism is theorized, especially in critical theory. In doing so, we will briefly refer to Habermas’ concept of constitutional patriotism and interpret it as a normative foil for what he calls a postnational identity. Against this concept we will contrast Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s analysis of nationalism as a founding moment of modern sociation. The aim is to tackle the question why nationalism persists in spite of the nation-state’s partial loss of its objective function at the political level (e.g., in the European Union) and also in the context of an increasingly globalized economy (cf. Sassen 2009; Sklair 2006). However, we view contemporary nationalism not simply as a reaction to internationalization...
and the fragmented modes of contemporary identification, that is to say, not as a mere antimodernist and reactionary strain. Instead, this paper focuses on the dialectics of social structures, with the aim of showing that they intrinsically provoke nationalism and antisemitism. Thus, nationalism belongs to the very form in which society is organized. With this we come to the related question of antisemitism and how the close intertwining of both phenomena depends upon the same basic social structures. Thus, neither antisemitism nor nationalism are viewed as a unitary or static phenomenon, but rather as being conceived in their continuities and discontinuities.

2. Habermas’ Concept of Constitutional Patriotism

Let us start with Habermas’ concept of constitutional patriotism, which he began to develop in the course of the Historians’ Debate (Habermas et al. 1987) as a critical and cosmopolitical alternative to nationalism (see also Habermas 1987, 1992). With the term constitutional patriotism, Habermas tried to theorize the dissolution of the traditional close link of republicanism and nationalism (Habermas 1998: 116). The central statement suggests that the unquestioned need of belonging on the part of the individuals would be met by identifying with universal values rather than a country of origin. The love of one’s nation would then be based on the love of freedom and human rights for which this nation stood and would no longer recur onto essentialized and ethnicized moments (cf. Habermas 1998: 36ff., 1992: 642).

What is important to note is that constitutional patriotism does not replace national identification of the citizens, but rather gives it a reconciled notion (cf. Fine & Smith 2003: 470). Habermas somehow wants to rescue the possibility and legitimacy of national identity for post-Holocaust Germany. Constitutional patriotism means a decoupling of national identification and nationalism on the cognitive and emotional level; it stands for a national feeling that is ripped of pathological nationalism and instead is founded on a form of civic solidarity and citizenship (Habermas 1998: 116). This concept has been widely accepted (cf. Delanty 2005; Beck 2003) but also criticized (Fine & Smith 2003; Claussen 2004). According to Detlev Claussen, Habermas’ argumentation in the course of the Historians’ Debate shows that he did not critically supersede the terms and categories of the revitalized nation-state with which his revisionist adversaries confronted him. Instead, he adopted them himself, though in a different manner. Thus Claussen criticizes that the national would also have displaced the social in Habermas. Instead of overcoming the principle of national identification in its consequent critique, Habermas would have tried to alter national identification and make something republican—a sound patriotic feeling—of it (Claussen 1994: 25ff.). This critique is in line with Adorno’s analysis of nationalism, which starts from the assumption that, due to a relentless dynamic between the two aspects, a clear demarcation of a “sound national feeling” from pathological nationalism is impossible. For Adorno the problem in any national feeling is that it is still founded on the (often blind) identification with the nation or group, in which the individuals find themselves by chance (Adorno 1997b: 589). Thus, the very form of identification and collectiv-

2 In Meinung Wahn Gesellschaft, Adorno writes: “Gesundes Nationalgefühl vom pathischen Nationalismus zu scheiden, ist so ideologisch wie der Glaube an die normale Meinung gegenüber der pathogenen; unaufhaltsam ist die Dynamik des angeblich gesunden Nationalgefühls zum überwertigen, weil die Unwahrheit in der Identifikation der Person mit dem irrationalen Zusammenhang von Natur und Gesellschaft wurzelt, in dem die Person zufällig sich findet.” (Adorno 1997b: 589)
ity formation that is also the basis of a so-called sound national feeling, or patriotism, *per se* bears exclusion of those considered as others.

While for Habermas the term nationalism seems to be reserved for ethnic nationalism, his concept of constitutional patriotism very much resembles civic nationalism (cf. Fine & Smith 2003: 470). Meanwhile, Rogers Brubaker—like Anthony Smith (1995: 101) and Ulrich Beck (2003: 462)—points to the exclusionary force not only of ethnic nationalism but also of its civic variant. The civic model of nationalism, Brubaker writes (1999: 64), shows an extraordinary power of exclusion on the global level. While it is undoubtedly inclusive in that it includes all citizens regardless of gender, ethnic background, religion, class, and the like, all which is not part of the nation is potentially excluded.

On a global scale, citizenship is an immensely powerful instrument of social closure.... Access to citizenship is everywhere limited; and even if it is open, in principle, to persons regardless of ethnicity, this is small consolation to those excluded from citizenship, and even from the possibility of applying for citizenship, by being excluded from the territory of the state. (Brubaker 1999: 64)

But even within the nation-state’s borders, concerning those who are included as citizens, the civic model of nationalism implies the assertion of an internal homogeneity and thus the exclusion of the “other,” as Ulrich Beck argues with regard to the contradiction of citizen equality and social inequality in Western welfare states.

Within the national paradigm, what does this equality rest on in western welfare states? It rests on the formal equality of the citizens: income differences between men and women, places of residence, etc. do not endorse differentiated citizen status. All the individuals of a nation have the same rights and duties; differentiated citizenship status is unacceptable. This legally-sanctioned citizen equality corresponds to the guiding nation-state principle of cultural homogeneity (language, history, cultural traditions). The national principles of inclusion and exclusion thus determine and stabilize the perceptual boundaries of social inequalities. (Beck 2003: 462)

These methodological and epistemological reflections imply that the concept of constitutional patriotism still relies on the national principle of inclusion and exclusion that it simultaneously criticizes. For Beck, this is the result of a conceptual narrowing that he calls “methodological nationalism.” He demonstrates how such discourse extraverts those exclusionary mechanisms that are only seemingly overcome inwardly.

Already in the early history of the nation-state, this kind of inward homogeneity was demanded. All those who did not conform completely to the given norms were likely to be regarded as a “nation within the nation,” and thus as endangering the community. In 18th century revolutionary France, when Jewish emancipation became popular, Jews faced this dialectic of the civic nation, since they were confronted with an unequivocal choice between the Jewish community and the national community of the *citoyens*. It was seen as an insurmountable contradiction to belong to both. Jews should be included as

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3 We find this stance toward Jews as citizens of the modern nation clearly expressed by Stanislas Marie Adelaide, Comte de Clermont-Tonnerre, a liberal aristocrat and speaker at the French National Assembly, who made a statement in 1789 which—as Natan Sznaider (2010) puts it—became constitutive of Jewish modernity after the French Revolution: “We must refuse everything to the Jews as a nation and accord everything to Jews as individuals. We must withdraw
individuals and not as a community with equal rights. This implies a non-recognition of the dialectics of equality and difference, and its abolition in repressive unambiguosity. Later, in 19th century, after assimilation and acculturation had widely diminished Jewish difference, the compulsion of unity and unambiguosity resulted in the reaffirmation of Jewish difference in racist antisemitism. Other than in the period of the Enlightenment, when Jews had been deemed capable of being integrated into the nation as individuals, they were now seen as mere representatives of a newly constructed notion of race, as a biologized total other. This construction was needed as a clear-cut opposition to the construct of the nation that had become increasingly völkisch (Braun 1990; Gilman 1993). Jews were viewed as a non-nation, or even as an anti-nation and a rootless anti-people (Postone 1988; Rensmann 2004: 74), and thus served as a projection screen for the fears concerning the antisemites’ own fragile identity and unity. What seems to flee from and contradict a national description of the world and its constraint of unambiguous identification becomes manifest in the image of the Jew as rootless, mediating, inorganic, and abstract, viz. the non-nation or non-identity (Horkheimer & Adorno 2002: 164ff.; Holz 2001: 108; Rensmann 2004).

The image of the Jew as the non-identical that contradicts national unity, itself a result of collective canalization and projection, served as a basis for the murderous project of National Socialism, as Horkheimer and Adorno note:

No matter what the makeup of the Jews may be in reality, their image, that of the defeated, has characteristics which must make totalitarian rule their mortal enemy: happiness without power, reward without work, a homeland without frontiers, religion without myth. These features are outlawed by the ruling powers because they are secretly coveted by the ruled. (2002: 164ff.)

This expresses the dialectic of the nation, for which the ethnic notion of the nation is an ideal type, but which, to a certain degree, also concerns the civic notion of the nation. The equality of all citizens that the civic model guarantees is maintained only on an abstract level. It stands in open contradiction to the concrete inequalities in terms of political participation and distribution of the nation’s wealth. In this very gap between abstract equality and concrete inequality, Horkheimer and Adorno locate the reason for the rage that is discharged on the Jews as a minority.

Coming back to Habermas, it is important to note that he situates nationalism in the framework of economic and social processes of modernization: nationalism therefore would be a specifically modern manifestation of collective identity (Habermas 1987: 165), a modern phenomenon of cultural integration (Habermas 1992: 634). But (and this reflection is a prerequisite for his concept of constitutional patriotism) the exaltation of pathological nationalism in National Socialist Germany and the associated “shock” thereafter would have led to a disruption of the narratively constructed continuity of recognition from their judges; they should only have our judges. We must refuse legal protection to the maintenance of the so-called laws of their Judaic organization; they should not be allowed to form in the state either a political body or an order. They must be citizens individually. But, some will say to me, they do not want to be citizens. Well then! If they do not want to be citizens, they should say so, and then, we should banish them. It is repugnant to have in the state an association of non-citizens, and a nation within the nation. … In short, Sirs, the presumed status of every man resident in a country is to be a citizen.” (Quoted in Sznaider 2010: 429)
Germany’s national history (Habermas 1987: 167); and this disruption would preclude recourse to nationalism as means for collective identity formation in Western societies today. From this perspective, nationalism today appears as an anachronistic, irrational, outdated tradition.

3. **Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s Views on Nationalism**

However, the crucial question—why nationalism constantly reappears as an ideological pattern of cultural integration and the problem of its persistence and current effectiveness—is thereby not tackled. Max Horkheimer devoted his attention to exactly this problem after returning from American exile. His thoughts on nationalism were guided by the assumption—based on insights gained in the *Studies on the Authoritarian Personality*—that various ideologies such as nationalism and antisemitism (and also ethnocentrism and sexism) belonged to one—antidemocratic—attitudinal syndrome. In this broader ideological system, they are not only interrelated but can also avow for and intensify each other. Thus, if antisemitism and open racism are tabooed to a certain degree, like in Germany and Austria after the collapse of the Nazi regime, a functionally equivalent ideology can come to the fore, underneath which the dynamics of the other nonetheless still operate. In this specificity, Horkheimer located the topicality of nationalism as a catalyst of antisemitism after 1945, concluding: “Der neue Götzte ist das nationale Wir.” (Horkheimer 1985: 139). This new idol, the “national us,” met the need for collective and exclusionary identification that had previously been characteristic of Nazi antisemitism.

Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s analysis encodes the dialectics of nationalism and shows that its undoubted discontinuity after 1945 served to enhance of exactly those social structures that incite (nationalist) exclusive identification. Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s point is that nationalism and the need for it is not to be viewed as a shortcoming of the individuals who cannot cope with modernity. Instead, the very predisposition of modern individuals to identify in a nationalist way is intrinsically modern and not an antimodernist strain. The more individualization is emphasized in a society that actually denigrates the individual, the more the need for collectivity is pronounced on the part of the individuals. Thus, modernity itself leads to collectivization.

Accordingly, Horkheimer’s theory of nationalism is centered on considerations concerning the relationship of the particular and the general, the antagonism of the individual and the collective. This contradictory relationship that he recognized as a basis of nationalism can already be observed in the ambiguous concept of the classic liberal individual, which contains aspects of the *bourgeois* and the *citoyen*. While “as bourgeois the individual needs to think and act selfishly,” as a citoyen or “citizen, the individual has to care for society and the nation” (Jikeli 2010: 7). Still, in the progressive phase of bourgeois society, particular and general interests were—in spite of the antagonism—mediated to a certain degree by the ideas of the Enlightenment, whose aims, while not entirely fulfilled in material life, nevertheless also transcended the actual mode of sociation. The aim of a new social order, reflecting the principles of freedom, equality, and solidarity, and the corresponding activity of the collective gave sense and purport to the individual’s struggle for self-preservation, and in the form of universal rights they served the good of society as a whole. In this development, the legitimacy of the bourgeois individual as well as of the collectivity can be found. However, this legitimacy intrinsically belonged to liberal capitalism. Its abolition in the course of the constitutional centration and centralization of capital,
the monopolization of the means of production, and the disappearance of the mediating sphere of circulation—in late capitalism circulation is increasingly taken over by monopoly—had a deep impact on the bourgeois subject: under late capitalist conditions it lost its economic basis. In psychoanalytical terms, the autonomy of the bourgeois subject and its conscience, manifest in the conflict of superego and id, have fallen out of use due to the changed circumstances. The result was an increasing outer-directedness of the individual (Riesman 1989), whose behavior, in contrast to progressive activity in the liberal era, was reduced to mere conformism, as noted by Alex Demirovic (1992: 25). The individuals are lost in the compulsion of their careers, or they become “national comrades” who enthusiastically swear off senseless individuality (Horkheimer 1988a: 171). With the decline of its objective conditions, the bourgeois subject loses its function, and reason, formerly the organ of self-preservation, vanishes. Mere adjustment to blind progress then seems to be reasonable, rather than the establishment of the right society. Conformism is the unquestioned subordination under the status quo, the assimilation to reality without contradiction.

Like the bourgeois subject, nationalism might also have had legitimacy in the early days of the newly-founded nation-states in the 19th century. It expressed an overall progressive orientation, overthrowing the old feudal order. But the antagonism that had its basis in the unreconciled contradiction between an abstract demand for liberty, equality, and solidarity, on the one hand, and the real competition between the individuals, on the other, also manifested in nationalism from the very beginning. Furthermore, nationalism was not only a progressive means of social development but to a great extent also a reaction to modern secularization processes that performed together with the development of the modern nation-state. Nationalism thus served the compensatory function of filling the gap that the loss of religion had left. Identity is not formed out of itself but via mediation with something else, be it religion or Marxism as its “secular form” (Horkheimer 1988a: 428). The irrefutable need to belong to a superordinate concept is explained by the increasing weakening of individuality. And as the demand for self-determination and the conscious design of history, as expressed in Marxism, are blocked like religion, the individuals seek sanctuary in nationalism. This is one reason for the considerable mythologizing tendency in nationalism (Klinger 2008), such as the whole idea of the nation resembling an “imagined community” (Anderson 1991). The idea that the nation’s origins were located in immemorial times of humankind, as völkisch nationalism suggested, corresponded to the need to give the new bourgeois order the veneer of eternity (Benjamin 2003). This already implied a standstill in social development. If the bourgeois subject, characterized by autonomy and free will, already was in need of reassuring ideologies such as nationalism, then this was even more the case after the liberal individual, the bourgeois, had lost its foundation through the transition of capitalism from liberalism to monopoly.

This structurally mediated socio-psychological development is a major basis of the manipulative and authoritarian character that Horkheimer already described as the mental and spiritual glue of society, the “geistiger Kitt der Gesellschaft,” in his studies.
on authority and the family in 1936 (Horkheimer 1988b: 345). This character formation, specific to the years before the Second World War, was marked by an ambivalence between subjection and rebellion, as well as by an extreme narcissism that came together with a lack of affects. As a result, loyalty to the nation is perverted into “complete and unconditional identification of a person with the group to which he happens to belong. He is expected to surrender completely to the ‘unit’ and to give up all individual particularities for the sake of the ‘whole.’” (Adorno 1997a: 491) The reason for this blindness and lack of self-inspection with regard to identification is that the antagonism between the particular and the general has not been reconciled. The structural antagonism corresponds to the two contradictory demands within the individual—to serve a common goal as well as individual self-preservation. The modern individual is not capable of mediating this contradiction. Instead, it has been repressively removed at the structural level of society, where the general directly usurps the individual (Adorno 1997d: 380). But here the crucial point is that the general does not serve the “whole” but the particular interests of the ruling elites. The general is in fact the particular, while the real general interest—in freedom, equality, and solidarity—is eroded. Thus, for Horkheimer, nationalism is a tool of manipulation in the interest of the “rackets” (Horkheimer 1988a: 381), functioning as an integrating ideology, and the nation is the form of organization these rackets use to push through their own interests to the disadvantage of society as a whole. “That the whole would be the nation is pure ideology,” he writes elsewhere.\footnote{“Daß das Ganze die Nation sei, ist reine Ideologie. Der Nationalismus steht im Gegensatz zum Wohl der Gesellschaft, obwohl er das Wohl des Ganzen als seine Parole ausgibt.” (Horkheimer 1988a: 334)} Due to its own dialectics, the principles of the Enlightenment have been ideologically perverted and thus resulted in persisting inequality and oppression (Horkheimer & Adorno 2002). In reality, the imagined unitary community is fragmented and the collective not nearly as homogeneous as imagined in nationalism. Still, this society pretends to be purely individualistic, thus confronting the modern individual with demands he cannot cope with since he has lost the characteristics of an autonomous subject. The fact that the vain individual is hypostatized as an autonomous subject in a period when the conditions for autonomy are not sufficient forces individuals to stick to forms of collectivization. But collectivization in turn reaffirms their very helplessness and powerlessness. Still, collective identification has its specific logic, as the individual (unconsciously) experiences that his particular needs are constantly neglected in the triumph of the collective. According to Adorno, late capitalist society creates circumstances that frustrate individuals’ narcissism so constantly that they seek refuge in collective narcissism. By identifying with the collective, the individuals are given back a little bit of self-esteem, only to be dispossessed of that self-esteem by the same collective (cf. Adorno 1997b: 589; cf. Adorno 1997c: 681).\footnote{“Man müsste nur die Normen des bürgerlichen Privatlebens ernst nehmen und zu gesellschaftlichen erheben. Aber eine derart gutmütige Empfehlung verkennt die Unmöglichkeit, daß es dazu komme unter Bedingungen, die den Einzelnen solche Versagungen auferlegen, ihren individuellen Narzißmus so konstant enttäuschen, sie real so sehr zur Ohnmacht verdammen, daß sie zu kollektivem Narzißmus verurteilt sind. Ersatzweise zahlt er ihnen dann gleichsam als Individuen etwas von jener Selbstachtung zurück, die ihnen dasselbe Kollektiv entzieht, von dem sie die Rückerstattung erhoffen, indem sie wahnhaft mit ihm sich identifizieren.” (Adorno 1997b: 589)}
4. **THE CONNECTION BETWEEN NATIONALISM AND ANTISEMITISM**

Unambiguosness, authenticity, rootedness, unity—these are issues that characterize nationalism as well as antisemitism. They are effective devices to cover the actual antagonisms along which society is organized. In order to establish unity amidst antagonistic circumstances, a negative foil against which the self can be drawn as unambiguous and homogeneous is needed. The predetermined enemy confirms the triumph of repressive equality that the concept of the nation stands for. In the history of the European nation-state, the role of the negative foil, the non-identical, was traditionally attributed to Jews—they were regarded as a nation within the nation, as not belonging to the nation, or even as an anti-nation (Rensmann 2004: 74). This is worked out in detail by Paul Massing (1949), but also by Horkheimer and Adorno in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. Jean-Paul Sartre (1962) analyzes the history of the European Jewry and the development of antisemitism in Europe as processes independent of each other. In this view, the antisemitic personality invents the “Jew” according to his psychic economy, which, in turn, reflects the specific constellations of society. In contrast Sartre, Horkheimer, and Adorno advance a dialectical approach in which they stress the relationship between antisemitic imaginary and Jewishness. Still, the relationship is not perceived as direct or causal, but as mediated. In 1944, when they wrote the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Horkheimer and Adorno described two opposing points of view concerning Jews and antisemitism:

For the fascists the Jews are not a minority but the antirace, the negative principle as such; on their extermination the world’s happiness depends. Diametrically opposed to this is the thesis that the Jews, free of national or racial features, form a group through religious belief and tradition and nothing else. Jewish traits relate to Eastern Jews, and only to those not yet assimilated. Both doctrines are true and false at the same time. The first is true in the sense that fascism has made it true. The Jews are today the group which, in practice and in theory, draws to itself the destructive urge which the wrong social order spontaneously produces. ... The other, liberal thesis is true as an idea. It contains an image of the society in which rage would no longer reproduce itself or seek qualities on which to be discharged. (Horkheimer & Adorno 2002: 137ff.)

This is reflected in nationalist antisemitism that views the Jews as the anti-nation endangering national unity and identity. In today’s crisis-ridden society, there are also considerable insecurities concerning one’s own national identity and rootedness. The individual can barely absorb these insecurities psychically, which is why the feelings of discomfort are discharged and projected onto the Jews as an imagined homogeneous community. As Klaus Holz (2004: 55) points out, the figure of the anti-national Jew contains the fear and—it should be added—the wish that the world could possibly not be organized along the national principle anyway. But, in fact, the world is only superficially organized along the national principle, with the nation leading the individuals to believe in a homogeneity and unity that does not exist in reality. If we refer to the nation as an imagined community, this means that the world is actually organized according to another category—class and its antagonism—that is forcefully blocked out in nationalist ideology, where the contradiction between the particular and the general is abolished only in order to be confirmed in particularistic unity.
Thus, we have to understand both nationalism and antisemitism as intertwining ideological patterns based on structural specificities of modern society and not as mere prejudices on the part of individuals. This implies that they cannot be opposed by alluding to the fact that antisemitic representations do not mirror reality but stem from universal delusion. They are furthermore not to be viewed as an outdated attitude of some of modernization’s losers but as emanations and expressions of a deeper problem that must be the real object of critical analysis: the antagonistic, though forcefully tranquillized, relationship of the individual and society, of the particular and the general. This antagonism, already evident in the division of the individual into bourgeois or citoyen in the liberalist era of capitalist society, is a major source of the need for national hold in a purportedly postnational era and the need for collectivization in an era of alleged individualization. A critical theory of society has to analyze these needs not simply as pathological but as situated within the real living conditions and the form of sociation and collectivization. From this perspective, we can find logic in nationalism even today. Hence, Horkheimer wrote that, if there were not a portion of truth to nationalism, it would not be so easy to manipulate people against their own interests (Horkheimer 1988a: 337). Criticizing this ideology means recognizing the “truth” in it and changing society in such a way that the need underlying the ideology is satisfied without the pathological deformations of nationalism and antisemitism (Horkheimer & Adorno 2002: 180).

So, while Habermas seems to put forward a rather narrow understanding of nationalism, reducing it to the ethnic variant, the older critical theory of Adorno and Horkheimer develops a broader understanding of nationalism and nationalist exclusion that is also useful for an analysis of the continued existence of nationalism and antisemitism, namely that it is situated at the very centre of modern identification and the constraint on unambiguously identifying with a group one happens to belong to. This includes not only the ethnic variant of nationalism but also the civic variant, and thus what Habermas calls the “postnational constellation.” As exclusionary identification is regarded as an aspect of modern sociation, the persisting need for nationalist identification despite European integration can be explained from a structural point of view without reducing it to a mere individual matter. Instead, the European integration process that undoubt edly calls nationalist identification into question at the same time dialectically reproduces the need for exactly this exclusionary form of identification in that it hypostatizes individuality without really providing the conditions for living it.

What in Habermas’ concept of constitutional patriotism marks the impossibility and illegitimacy of ethnic nationalism today—the Shoah—has in reality been taken as a starting point for massive nationalist (and also antisemitic) resurrections since 1945. This can be plainly observed in the manifestations of secondary antisemitism, as well as in the process of the restoration of collectivity that began immediately after the collapse of the Nazi regime. The national collective had to be restored, and one major means for this was the invention of collective guilt. In this process of collectivizing and thus neutralizing guilt—because when all Germans are equally guilty nobody is actually responsible—Horkheimer (1996: 814ff.) located the continuity of the national collective in Germany.

7 “[W]enn im Nationalismus nicht ein Stück Wahrheit steckte, wären die Menschen auch nicht durch ihn zu manipulieren.” (Horkheimer 1988a: 337)
the satisfaction of the need for national and collective hold. The discontinuity in the national narrative that the Shoah has brought about and which Habermas sees as the starting point for a new, postnational form of identification, has been bridged successfully, and a new national we was created on the very ruins of National Socialism. Like secondary antisemitism, nationalism also persisted not only in spite of the Shoah and National Socialism but because of it. It is a means to establish continuity by bridging the disruption of civilization. It is a means of getting rid of the Nazi past without working through it.

5. CONCLUSION: ANTISEMITISM AND POSTNATIONALISM

The intersection of antisemitism and nationalism is thus still at work today. What has changed is the level at which antisemitic stereotypes are produced in Europe. This no longer occurs at a purely national level but increasingly at a supranational, allegedly postnational level (cf. Wistrich 2005; Taguieff 2002; Finkielkraut 2004). This goes hand in hand with a certain change in antisemitic stereotypes. While in 19th century’s political antisemitism the “Jew” was feared within the nation, as an anti-national figure that questioned the national principle (cf. Massing 1949; Holz 2001), this is no longer exclusively the case. Since the inauguration of the Israeli nation-state, and more obviously since 1967, antisemitic discourses, particularly those of the Left, no longer paint the “Jew” as representative of the anti-national. Today the “Jew” functions as a personification of the very principle of the national that the postnationalists themselves pretend to have overcome. Jewishness is at least as commonly associated with aggressive nationalism as with cosmopolitanism. This is part of a “new antisemitism” in Europe, “manifested inter alia in the depiction of Israel as a uniquely illegitimate state or people, Zionism as a uniquely noxious ideology, supporters of Israel as a uniquely powerful lobby and memory of the Holocaust as a uniquely self-serving reference to the past.” (Fine 2010: 416) This form of antisemitism (cf. Rabinovici, Speck & Sznaider 2004) singles out the Jewish nation-state as anachronistic in an otherwise postnational era. Thus, it operates with similar, if not the same, anti-Jewish stereotypes as the nationalist variant. In the disguise of anti-Zionism, nationalism and antisemitism can thus be acted out without arousing suspicion. The agents of these single-edged discourses can still represent themselves as anti-nationalists. But negatively it manifests the widespread need for national hold in an allegedly postnational era.

A major problem with the concept of postnational identity is that, even if it is advanced as part of an emancipatory movement, it still sticks to the principle of identification that is at the very heart of nationalism. After the disruption brought about by the Shoah, modernity did not reflect upon its intrinsic pathologies as sufficiently as Habermas’ concept seems to suggest. Modernity did not overcome nationalistic identification. Habermas is undoubtedly looking for a political community that does not incite antisemitism and nationalism. Given his vehement opposition to revisionism in the course of the Historians’ Debate, we cannot say that for him the problem of antisemitism is a problem of the past, as highlighted by Robert Fine:

What to my mind rescues Habermas from this mode of “historicising” antisemitism, that is, locating it in the past, is the active and practical engagement with memory of the Holocaust he demands of the new Europe. He was one of those protagonists of
the new Europe who in the words of Tony Judt saw it as “bound together by the signs and symbols of its terrible past” and as “forever mortgaged to the past.” The commitment Habermas expresses is to teach afresh to each passing generation the story of Europe’s murder of its Jews in order to “furnish Europe’s present with admonitory meaning and moral purpose” (Judt 2007: 831). (Fine 2010: 413)

A reductionist view of Habermas’ concept of postnationalism overlooks how much the past continues to weigh upon the present and converts it “from a demand for European self-reflection on its own murderous past into an uncritical resource by means of which we Europeans can again label the Other barbaric and defend ourselves as the civilised continent” (Fine 2010: 415). Meanwhile, Habermas’ own concept unwillingly seems to invite this reductionist view.

Habermas insists on the necessity of a postnational society today: anything else would be out of date, an anachronism hindering social development. But this perspective ignores the system-enhancing function of nationalism in an era that is not oriented toward real progress in the sense of an emancipated society but is characterized by a static if not backward orientation, by what Walter Benjamin (2003), with reference to Nietzsche, called the eternal return of the same.

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Modern Capitalist Society, Competing Nation States, Antisemitism and Hatred of the Jewish State

Robin Stoller*

1. INTRODUCTION

The fear of losing national identity and the power of nation states has once again become popular in Europe in the context of the discourse against so-called globalisation, the “unification” process in the European Union and, most recently, the financial crisis. In the context of the European Union, some observers have argued that the concept of the nation state based on ethnic or religious definitions has transformed into a transnational identity. The idea of a post-national era with a common identity and collective memory was promoted during the reforms.1 Furthermore, scholars such as Bunzl have argued that, in the age of the formation of a European identity, antisemitism would decline and Muslims would serve as the new scapegoats in the construction of a common European identity.2 But in fact the opposite is true. Rather than disappearing, the nation state as a regulator and the concept of the nation as an identity have remained, and the Jews are once again serving as scapegoats. Antisemitic statements and attacks have become more frequent and aggressive since the Al-Aqsa Intifada of 2000, the anti-American attacks on 9/11 and well over a hundred terrorist suicide bombings targeting and killing as many Jews as possible—mostly in Israel. In Europe, the mass killing of Jews in Israel and antisemitic attacks in Europe were partly rejected as antisemitic, but often (at least partly) rationalised as a form of resistance against the “Israeli occupation”. Hating the Jews has once again become popular in Europe and is partly authorised in the mainstream media—especially in the guise of Israel bashing.

Different studies show that classic modern antisemitic perceptions of national and international socio-economic processes have once again become prevalent. Over 40 per cent of Europeans agree that Jews have too much power in the business world and in

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international financial markets.\(^3\) Over 30 per cent blame Jews in the financial industry (at least partly) for the economic crisis.\(^4\) Almost half of interviewees agree that Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the country where they live.\(^5\) In a country like Spain, 58 per cent of Spaniards agree with statements such as “Jews are very powerful because they control the economy and the media”.\(^6\) The European unconscious knows about the Jews: they are “not true citizens”, they “stick together”, they have built an “artificial state” on others peoples’ land and they dishonestly exploit and dominate nations as an alien power through the financial markets and the media. What kind of perception of the world do these people have and how is it related to the functioning of current society? To understand some of these dynamics, this paper analyses some of the connections between the system of competing nation states, capitalist society, modern antisemitism and hatred of the Jewish state. In order to do so, I will focus on two elements of thought in our societies and their connections to antisemitism and anti-Zionism.

First, I will focus on the role of the system of competing nation states, with their hegemonic ideological rationales: the republican and the primordial or ethnic nation model. Both hegemonic ideological concepts have a specific impact on the perception of “the Jews” and Israel. Inclusion and exclusion, citizenship, rights of the individual guaranteed by the state and the right of a “nation” to its “own” state depend on the ideological rationalisation of these rationales.

Second, I will touch upon the relation between the largely impersonal processes and functioning of modern capitalist societies and modern antisemitism. How do individuals perceive structures, processes and exploitation in our society? What kind of connections exists between these perceptions and antisemitism?

Finally, I will argue that a specific connection between both these elements (the nation state concept and the perception of the functioning of society) forms the basis for conspiracy theories, which are projected onto Jews. One central problem in attempts to combat antisemitism is not only that there are Jewish stereotypes but also that the above-mentioned elements, which form the basis of conspiracy theories and eliminatory antisemitism, cannot be easily deconstructed in the society we are living in.

2. ANTISEMITISM AND THE PERCEPTION OF THE WORLD

In his essay “Portrait de l’antisémite”, Jean Paul Sartre commented that antisemitism is not just a matter of taste, a question of whether or not you like “the Jews”.\(^7\) Rather, he emphasised that antisemitism is a world view that is not limited to being against the Jews. He noticed that one cannot be an antismite without further intellectual principles.

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\(^3\) The poll by the Anti-Defamation League was conducted between December 1, 2008 and January 13, 2009 in Austria, France, Hungary, Poland, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. See Anti-Defamation League, Attitudes Toward Jews in Seven European Countries (February 2009) pp. 6-7, available at: <http://www.adl.org/Public%20ADL%20Anti-Semitism%20Presentation%20February%202009%20_3_.pdf>.

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 16.

\(^5\) Ibid., p. 5.


and described elements of this specific way of interpreting social processes and structures in modern capitalist societies. In particular, he mentioned specific perceptions not only of the nation but also of ownership structures, exploitation, money and so forth.

Adorno and Horkheimer, and later Postone, in particular, have examined the relationship between a specific fetishised perception of modern capitalist society and antisemitism. They state that, based on a fetishisation of capitalist structures, antisemites relate a negatively perceived, “artificial”, “abstract sphere” (banks, stock markets, individuals, intellect, money, etc.) to the Jews, as opposed to a “concrete sphere” (concrete work, production, factories, etc.), which is perceived as good and organic and related to the nation/people/Volk, that is to say, as being not Jewish.

In these antisemitic projections, Jews are non-workers, exploiters, intellectuals, bankers and stockbrokers, in contrast to the national community, which consists of “real workers” and honest, productive industries. In the Nazi ideology, this culminated in the odious sign over the gates of the forced labour, concentration and extermination camp Auschwitz, “Arbeit macht frei” (literally “Work will make you free” or “Work liberates”).

3. COMPETING NATION STATES AND ANTISEMITISM

I want to highlight that the concept of the nation plays a significant role in modern antisemitism. Even if traditional and religious elements take part in a transformed form, modern antisemitism is related to modernity and the current form of social organisation, namely modern capitalist society. We live in a society in which the political regulation of the economy and the construction of identity are built up, inter alia, by competing states, namely nation states. Even if there are transnational dimensions of political regulation of economic processes, the main players are still nation states competing with each other. Furthermore, the nation state is the only institution to be addressed by political actors and movements, especially in times of crisis. What kind of relation exists between the state and the population?

There are two predominant rationales for the inclusion of individuals in and the exclusion of individuals from nation states. They are those ideological rationales that legitimate the rights of citizens, the existence of the state and the extension of state territory. First, there is the republican concept based on the rationale that all the individuals living in a territory are members of the nation and therefore receive citizens’ rights. Secondly, there is the primordial concept based on genealogies: either “völkisch”, ethnic, cultural or religious. It is important to note that under the hegemonic interpr-

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12 These two models are the hegemonic forms in Western societies, but there are also other models. Unfortunately, I cannot focus here on other societies, such as Arab societies, the complex situation of colonial and post-colonial nation-building or the competing ideologies of nationalism: pan-Arabism and Islamism.
tation you can only be part of one nation: one person—one nation. And, in the face of competing nation states, you have to serve the interest of “your own” nation only. Both concepts, the republican and the primordial one, have a specific impact on the perception of Jews and Israel.

4. JEWISH CITIZENSHIP AND LOYALTY TO THE NATION

Consider the republican perspective towards the Jews in the 19th century. Those who supported the political emancipation of Jews regardless of their religion and culture often did not like the fact that religious Jews still believed in the Jewish religion. Religious Jews were perceived as “obstinate”. Secularised Jews who held on to Jewish heritage and rejected assimilation into secularised Christian culture were perceived as “others”. The price or expectation for the right of political emancipation was assimilation into Christian secularised culture, often without naming it as such. If Jews assimilated but still claimed to be Jewish, this contradicted the loyalty of the nation concept: one nation for each citizen.

In the case of the primordial nation concept, three rationales can be distinguished: religion, culture and “Volk”. If the rationale of the nation was based on religion, it was Christian. If the concept was based on culture, it often (implicitly) signified a secularised Christianity, which did not included any explicit Jewish heritage. If the concept was based on “Volk” (a German concept), it included a genealogy of blood, and the Jews could therefore not be part of the nation. Within the framework of these concepts, assimilated Jews, in particular, were suspected of destroying the nation from within. A different situation arises when we touch upon the perception of the Jewish state of Israel.

5. THE JEWISH STATE OF ISRAEL, NATION AND TERRITORY

When one looks at Israel and its perception through the lens of the primordial and republican rationales of the nation, one can observe some interesting changes. First of all, there is the traditional anti-Jewish concept: the primordial or ethnic one. This concept can be found among self-identified right-wingers as well as some left-wingers. From this perspective, a nation is established through genealogy: ethnic, cultural, religious or other. Some consider the Jews a nation, but most do not because they are perceived as a “mixed race” or just as a religion living as “guests” among nations. Their fathers and mothers do not have the same blood. But even if the Jews are considered a nation, the nation concept connects population and territory in a specific way. Under this concept, a nation is constituted through a particular form of genealogy of the population living “forever” in a common territory—an “autochthonous” population. From this perspective, Jews should not be allowed to live in Palestine as a nation, since the so-called Palestinian nation (which is perceived as Arab) has lived there forever. The “autochthonous” Palestinians have the right to live in Palestine, while Israel as an “artificial” construct has to disappear. This concept goes together with such expressions as “Israel

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13 Ibid.
14 This point comes up in times of crisis and war, but is also related to the tax system, elections, the issue of social welfare and so forth.
as a cancer”, “colonisers”, “imperialists”, “occupiers of Palestine” and so forth. Under this primordial concept, there is no space for the Jews, neither as “guests” among the “autochthonous” populations of Europe nor in Palestine.

This brings us to the liberal or leftist republican concept and its position towards Israel. Under the republican concept, a primordial concept is against universalistic principles. Different concepts related to Israel can be found, which at the end of the day all serve as political ammunition against Israel as a Jewish state. Firstly, there is the concept that every nation state has to disappear (the post-national perspective). The focus is mostly on Israel, since it is one of the more recent states to be established. From this perspective, the deconstruction of nation states should therefore start with Israel. But the concept of the one-state solution, a common Jewish-Palestinian state, also means the destruction of the Jewish state. A two-state solution, with equal rights for Palestinians and Jews in Israel would also cause problems given the demographic situation, even without considering the “right of return” of the so-called refugees. But what is emphasised most in this perspective is the fact that Israel defines itself a Jewish state. Whether it does so ethnically or religiously, either definition reminds the European “progressives” of their history. Whether it is the religious definition stemming from feudalism or the ethnic definition prevalent in modern capitalist societies, both definitions are seen as having been transcended in Europe and should therefore be overcome in general. From this “progressive” perspective, a nation state with a definition of citizenship based on ethnic or religious genealogy is perceived as racist and something that should be opposed. These universalistic rationales, which historically supported the political emancipation of the Jews in Europe regardless of their ethnic, religious or cultural genealogies, are now being used by the strongest enemies of the Jewish state. Such universalistic perspectives have become a rationale for opposing the existence of the Jewish state. The system of competing nation states and their hegemonic rationales does not include a Jewish state, which can serve as a state of refuge for all persecuted Jews or as a nation state for the Jews.

6. ISRAEL, JEWS IN THE DIASPORA AND DISLOYALTY

What kind of situations do Jews who are not living in Israel face in the context of a system of competing nation states? From the point of view that every citizen is part of one nation and has to serve the interests of their nation state, every Jew is perceived as potentially disloyal towards the state where they are living. The traditional general suspicion of disloyalty of Jews becomes worse when it comes to Israel. In a society based on competing nation states, every Jew is potentially accused of being more loyal towards Israel than to their nation state. Furthermore, as Israel is the only nation state in the world that threatens to be exterminated along with its population, every Jew speaking out against this threat is automatically perceived as a “Zionist” force. In the perception of antisemites, every Jew is an Israeli ambassador and is treated as such.

7. IMPERSONAL RULE, STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES AND ANTISEMITISM

I want to come back to the second aspect of modern capitalist societies mentioned in the introduction, namely the impersonal functioning of such societies and the perception of

15 I wish to thank Robert Fine for some ideas in this regard.
processes and structures. How is the functioning of capitalist societies perceived and how does this relate to antisemitism?

In contrast to feudalism, exploitation and the production of wealth is not effected through immediate personal dominance in capitalist societies. No individual is physically owned by another. Modern capitalist societies are based on contracts between “free” and “equal” legal entities. Every individual has to sell their labour power on the market if they do not have property for everyday production. The employer does not own the employee. Modern society is based on modern private property and on contracts between “independent” and “equal” individuals. The employer contracts the employee. The employee is “free” to choose the employer. The employee produces wealth for the employer and the employee is paid for his or her daily production. If the employee does not receive enough money for his or her daily production, no one is directly responsible. The employee can “choose”.

Especially during crises, when employees earn less, employers cannot accumulate capital and the state can no longer regulate, a responsible party is searched for. In the common perception, banks, stocks, shareholders, multinational companies and politicians are held responsible. People search for culprits and personalise the responsibility of the impersonal capitalist accumulation processes. This is the point where the system of competing nation states is relevant. When the political regulation of the nation state is not able to guarantee a minimum amount of wealth for the daily production of its population, “foreign forces”, “traitors”, “stockholders”, “banks” and “corrupt politicians” are blamed. The “cosmopolitan” Jews, who are “everywhere”, have no fatherland and are not perceived as part of the nation are thus blamed for the misery and the social processes that are perceived as being bad.

This specific connection between the perception of the impersonal functioning of capitalism and the system of competing nation states culminates in the Jews being blamed for a “global conspiracy”. The Jews are perceived as acting against nations, either from within those nations or against the Palestinians, Arabs or Islam. If the Jews contradict the existence of the nation state and if they are to blame for the above-mentioned misery, as they are according to this perception, in the logic of the antisemites there is only one possible way of dealing with them… This perception of the world therefore makes antisemitism the most dangerous ideology in society today.
II
THE INTELLECTUAL ENVIRONMENT
Fighting Antisemitism in the Feminist Community

Nora Gold*

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper focuses on my efforts over the past 20 years to fight antisemitism in the feminist community. Like my Jewish feminist sisters, I have been deeply disappointed and disheartened by this phenomenon. However, I have found various ways to remain inside the feminist movement and from there to fight the antisemitism from within. At times these efforts have worked to good effect.

In this paper, I will share some of the strategies I have used. Of course, what I will describe here is not intended as any kind of exhaustive list. However, by reviewing some of these strategies, perhaps it is possible to articulate some of our best practices and how we can be most effective at fighting antisemitism around the world.

Before discussing the specific strategies I have employed, I will offer a few general comments.

During the years that I have been doing this work, there has been a sea change in the nature of antisemitism, and at present the delegitimization of Israel has become so widespread on the left that it is virtually normative. There are, therefore, some implications to this for how we approach fighting antisemitism.

The first implication is that, while acknowledging the excellent efforts of Jewish communities around the world in the fight against antisemitism, we need to try new and different strategies. In my view, we need interventions that are innovative, creative, and smart, because, unfortunately, our enemies are innovative, creative, and smart, and because fighting a norm is different from fighting a group of neo-Nazi skinheads. For example, you cannot arrest a norm.

The second implication, or even premise, for this kind of activism is that, in order to be effective, you must be an insider in the group whose norms you are challenging or trying to change. Again, this is different from our traditional approaches to fighting antisemitism. You did not need to belong to the Aryan Brotherhood to fight them. Here, however, you need to share the language and the unique sub-culture, including the particular signs, symbols, and at least some of the norms, of this group, if you are to have any effect.

If all my years of working to fight antisemitism have taught me one thing, it is this: the only people who can influence the anti-Israel left are the pro-Israel left. Because,

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despite the differences between these two groups on the issue of Israel, they have a common language. Similarly, within the feminist community, the only people who can affect anti-Israel feminists are pro-Israel feminists. In other words, women who strongly identify as feminists, and at the same time love Israel and the Jewish people passionately enough to go to the mat for them. It is like with a family. It does not matter how nice or smart you are; if you are from outside the family, no-one is going to let you change something within the family. So, in this kind of work, one must work from within.

The third and final premise underlying this sort of activism is that, given how large and potentially daunting the problem of antisemitism is, one should only target for change those whom it is possible to influence. It is a waste of our limited time and energy to target hard-core antisemites. We should be directing our energy solely toward what I think of as the “well-meaning but ignorant.” Which is how I view many non-Jews—and many Jews, as well.

This is also how I view a lot of the feminists I know. For the most part, feminists are not a bad or malevolent bunch. They are even idealistic. They have just never thought much about the issue of antisemitism before, and no-one has challenged them to. The Israel Project has published some interesting research showing that non-Jews who talk to a Jew about Israel even once will, in a significant number of cases, come to see Israel more positively as a result. However, this research also shows that most Jews rarely have these conversations with non-Jews. So the people I target in my efforts are those who are open to influence and whose minds can be changed.

II. STRATEGIES FOR FIGHTING ANTISEMITISM IN THE FEMINIST COMMUNITY

I will now turn to the strategies that I have used. Of course, much of what I say here about fighting antisemitism among feminists can also be generalized to the broader left.

In approaching my particular corner of the shadow of antisemitism (i.e., the feminist community), I have divided my target group into feminists inside academe and those outside of it. This is not a perfect distinction, because virtually all feminist scholars (i.e., those working in women’s studies programs or in some form of association with them) also perceive themselves as part of the larger feminist movement. However, this distinction is still useful for our purposes, because this academic sub-group was able to be influenced by one particular strategy that is nowhere near as useful with feminists outside academe.

1. Feminist academics as a target group

With this group, I had one powerful tool—I would even say weapon—to work with, and this was my research. More specifically, I refer to my two most recent studies, which are both feminist in conceptual framework and approach. Both these studies were funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), which lent them prestige within the academic context. One was a national study of Canadian Jewish women and their experiences of antisemitism and sexism, and the other was a Toronto study of how Jewish girls aged 10-14 experience and understand antisemitism. The context in which I conducted both these studies was the Centre for Women’s Studies in Education (CSWE) at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at the University of Toronto, known as OISE/UT. In Canadian Jewish academic circles, OISE itself is reputed to be one of the most problematic institutions of higher education in
Canada in terms of its radical left-wing orientation and its anti-Israelism and antisemitism. This reputation is not without basis. A few years ago, I conducted a research study on 80 Canadian Jewish professors from four different Canadian universities, and from that research I know that certain parts of OISE are particularly challenging places, as are many of the women’s studies programs in Canada and internationally. However, the Women’s Centre at OISE/UT, where I have been located for the past decade, is a good place where I feel quite comfortable. An important part of this has to do with the woman who for many years was the Director there—a non-Jewish Judeophile who would never tolerate any form of antisemitism (or racism) at her center.

I will now discuss these two research studies. The genesis of this research was an encounter I had one day with one of my feminist colleagues, who was organizing that year’s panel on “Women and Diversity” in honor of International Women’s Day. I passed her in the hallway, and asked her if she was planning to include anything on Jewish women, and she said that that would not be appropriate, as Jewish women could understand oppression because we are white. I told her that this was not correct, and to make a long story short, initiated this research on Jewish women so that women like her, coming from a left-wing, anti-oppression perspective, could begin to understand the parallels between the “dual oppression” of women of color (sexism + racism) and that of Jewish women (sexism + antisemitism). In that way I could build some bridges between Jewish feminists and other feminists.

Conceptually, my Jewish women’s study is rooted in Jewish feminist scholarship, which is concerned with delineating the specific experience of being Jewish and female, and the contributions to this of both antisemitism and sexism (e.g., Beck 1995; Bridges 1989-2010; Cantor 1995; Gold 2004, 1998, 1997a, 1997b, 1993; Henry & Taitz 1996; Hyman 2002; Jewish Women’s Archive 2006; Kaye/Kantrowitz & Klepfisz 1986; Medjuck 1993; Nashim 2003-2010; Plaskow 1990; Pogrebin 1991; Siegel 1995, 1986; Weidman Schneider 1984; and Women in Judaism 1997-2010). My Jewish women’s study involved a random sample of 365 Jewish women from across Canada and clearly showed the extent of the antisemitism and sexism that Canadian Jewish women encounter in their everyday lives (Gold 2004, 1998, 1997a, 1997b). It also showed the different mental health implications of these two kinds of oppression. The women in the study who reported having had many antisemitic experiences in the past also had significantly higher scores on the Beck Depression Inventory than the other women in the sample, but no such result was found regarding sexism (Gold 2004).

Another important finding from this research project was that when these women were asked where their encounters with antisemitism had taken place, the second most frequent response was “at school.” This led me to wonder about the experiences of contemporary Canadian Jewish girls, which ultimately resulted in my longitudinal study on Toronto Jewish girls (aged 10-14) and their experiences of antisemitism. I followed these girls for four years, filming them throughout. This study, like the one on Jewish women, revealed disturbingly and unequivocally the reality of antisemitism in the lives of the participants and its impact on them. One can glean a small flavor of this from the short film (13 minutes long) that I made about the research on these girls, called “Jewish Girl Power.”

1 This film can be viewed on my website at: <http://www.noragold.com>.
The Jewish women’s study was the first national study anywhere on women’s experiences of antisemitism and the first to find, within any population, a statistically significant relationship between antisemitism and depression. The Jewish girls’ study was the first social science research study to examine over time the emotional and psychological impact of antisemitism on Jewish girls (or, actually, Jewish children altogether). But perhaps the most important contribution of these two studies was the opportunity they gave me to lay out before my feminist colleagues, in an irrefutable way, the ugly reality of antisemitism. I have presented dozens of times on each of these studies to audiences comprised of both Jews and non-Jews (and quite a few of these presentations were to feminists), and in each instance I used this talk as an entrée to teaching them about anti-Israelism as a form of antisemitism.

Occasionally I have met with comments that were stupid or hostile, such as, “You mean there are some good Jews—I mean Israelis?” However, generally speaking, the response from both Jewish and non-Jewish feminists has been positive. I have often been told, “I didn’t know about this. I just never thought about any of it before. This is very interesting. And important.”

Consistent with this, a few years ago, I received an extremely gratifying response from a feminist colleague I have never met, who at the time was the editor-in-chief of *Women’s Studies International Forum*, a prominent feminist journal based in England. Given that the paper I submitted there about my research, entitled “Sexism and Anti-Semitism as Experienced by Canadian Jewish Women: Results of a National Study,” was something of a “J’accuse,” I was pleasantly surprised and heartened not only when was it accepted unusually quickly and without revisions for publication in this journal, but also when the journal’s non-Jewish editor-in-chief wrote me a personal note to say that this article was so eye-opening for her, and in her opinion so important for all feminists to read, that she was going to jump the queue for it and put it into the very next issue. Which she did.

This incident, and the overall positive reception enjoyed by both of these research projects, as well as the film, have helped restore and maintain my faith in at least some of my feminist “sisters.”

Both of these research studies have also been useful weapons in a high profile panel discussion I engaged in that included one of the most vociferous anti-Israel feminist scholars in Canada. Even though this woman had packed the room with her students and acolytes, I won, at least partly because of the power of research, what quickly became a debate. My opponent had no research underpinning her comments; she just ranted. She was also foolish enough to violate a core aspect of feminist values, culture, and etiquette by refusing eye contact with me, and coldly rejecting my friendly, sisterly overtures that we work together to build bridges as feminists. Thus she exposed herself for what she really was (i.e., full of hate, and therefore not a true “sister” or feminist). This helped her to lose this debate. But the solidity of research was definitely a factor.

Afterwards, this professor’s students (at least half of whom were women of color or Muslim) came up to me to thank me and talk to me, and take copies of my paper. These young feminists were the perfect example of the “ignorant but well-meaning” people who are capable of being influenced that I alluded to earlier.

So this illustrates how research and scholarship were, and can be, used as weapons with which to challenge, confront, and educate a local, or international, community of feminist scholars. This is, of course, equally applicable to any other scholarly community one wishes to challenge, confront, and/or educate.
2. Targeting feminists outside academe

Obviously, when trying to influence people, different strategies and weapons are required for different target groups. The women I am thinking of in the larger feminist community are involved with feminist bookstores, feminist film festivals, feminist poetry readings, feminist journals, and/or in the feminist art world. They also work—for pay or as unpaid activists—in the field of violence against women (e.g., in rape crisis centers), as well as in the peace movement, or as part of the struggle for women’s rights, lesbian rights, reproductive rights, and other general human or civil rights. The most influential non-academic feminists I know tend to fall into these two groups (i.e., the arts and activism). I therefore designed interventions that target these groups as the main tools in my efforts to counteract antisemitism within this population.

A. The arts

In addition to my academic career, I am engaged in literary work. I am a fiction writer and also the founding editor of a new online literary journal, Jewish Fiction.net. This part of my life gives me another route into the feminist world, and another way of influencing it.

Regarding Jewish Fiction.net, I had several motives for starting this journal, but one of them was to counteract the boycott of many Israeli fiction writers. For example, when I was recently in Israel, I learned that a prize-winning Israeli author I know was supposed to have her book come out in French, in France, but that it was cancelled at the last minute, because the French publisher decided they could not “indirectly support the occupation.” I would like, through Jewish Fiction.net, to create a space for Israeli writers to showcase their work, where it can receive the international exposure it deserves. I have decided to publish at least two Israeli writers per issue. This journal will be widely distributed online, including throughout the feminist community. So this is how a literary journal can be a weapon.

In terms of my own fiction writing, my novel, Exile, is in itself a form of activism, a tool, and a weapon. Exile is a novel about the anti-Israelism in academe, and what happens to a young feminist who comes from Israel to spend a year studying in Canada. This novel is as yet unpublished. However, there have already been numerous public readings of it at literary conferences, and in public and academic venues (including feminist contexts), and very often this novel elicits a strong response from listeners. It makes people think. I hope it will have this effect on even more people when excerpts of Exile appear on Jewish Fiction.net.

So these are just a couple of ways that one can harness the deep and latent power of literature to help fight antisemitism. Of course, all of the other arts—music, dance, the visual arts, theatre, and so forth—can be used in this way as well. The arts speak to everyone, and speak to human experience at a concrete and intimate level. So, perhaps even more than academic research, which appeals primarily to the intellect, the arts can be an effective tool.

I have seen this, for example, with my short film, “Jewish Girl Power.” Its reach extends much farther than my research articles. Since it is available online and for free, it

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2 See: <http://www.jewishfiction.net>.
has been viewed by over 1,000 people, many of them feminists. But it also reaches further because it reaches into the heart, not just the mind.

A number of Jewish communities, as well as the Israeli government, are now coming to recognize that one of the best ways to fight stereotypes about Israel (and hence anti-Israelism) is through the dissemination of Jewish and Israeli culture and the arts. So the arts have great potential as a resource for us in our struggle, and the work I am describing here, it turns out, is part of a larger trend.

B. Activism

In terms of influencing the other influential group of non-academic feminists, the feminist activist community, the obvious tool to use is activism. I therefore recently started a new pro-Israel group in Toronto, comprised of Jews who want to fight antisemitism and also have ties to a variety of progressive causes and organizations, enabling them to infiltrate and influence these places. We have several feminists in our group. We have a union member who works for one of Canada’s most anti-Israel unions. We have someone formerly employed by the Ontario Human Rights Commission. And so on. So far, our group has had two good meetings, and this fall we plan to double in size.

So these are, in a nutshell, a few strategies that demonstrate some success in the fight against antisemitism in the feminist community (and beyond).

This work is difficult, but what makes it possible is the support I feel from non-Jewish feminists who are my allies and from other Jewish feminists, whom I experience as standing with me as I do this work. This includes some older Jewish feminists who have inspired me over the years, like Rachel Josefowitz Siegel, Evelyn Torton Beck, and Aviva Cantor.

I also am able to do this work because I am not naive. I do not expect that sisterhood, even at the best of times (and we are not in the best of times) will be simple. Just as I do not think family relations of any kind are simple. But whatever the tensions and difficulties, there is a deep connection to build on with one’s sisters. To use perhaps the most obvious example of sisterhood, consider the case of Rachel and Leah in the Bible. In 2010, I published an essay entitled, “Rachel and Leah: A Jewish Model of Sisterhood” in Kerem. In this piece, I challenge the common misperception of these two women as being, above all, competitors for a man. Instead, what my research uncovers is the immensely profound and passionate love that Rachel and Leah had for each other, and that this love outweighed all the tensions between them. Moreover, according to the midrash on Lamentations (Lamentations Rabbah, P’tikhta, 7:49), it was Rachel’s profound and passionate love for Leah that led God to deliver us (b’nei Israel) from exile.

For this reason, among others, I believe profoundly in the capacity of some women to truly listen to each other, care for each other, and change.

III. Conclusion

One persistent, even insistent, question that implicitly haunts any contemporary discussion of antisemitism is the question why the mainstream Jewish community, which has

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often been successful in dealing with traditional antisemitism coming primarily from the right, has until now had limited effectiveness at national and international level in dealing with “the new antisemitism” coming from the left.

I think this is related to the fact that the Jewish community, for the most part, has not tended to embrace the left. It does not understand the left, and it cannot really relate to it. As a result, it does not have anyone from the left on its team, and so it has no-one who can do this work. This, in our current situation, is now a major liability. Particularly since, as I have explained, the cleaning-up of the left can only be accomplished by those belonging to it.

However, those who are not feminists and/or on the left still have a crucial role to play in this. They can search out, and actively support, those of us on the left (the pro-Israel left, obviously) who are doing this challenging work. It makes an incalculable difference to those of us, for instance in this new group in Toronto, that in certain quarters of the mainstream Jewish community, we are perceived, and supported, as part of the international fight against antisemitism. This is far more helpful than the response that groups like ours often get: “Oh, you have ties and loyalties to certain causes on the left. Feh.”

As we all know, we are now facing some very difficult times, and it looks like they are going to get worse before they get better. We, as an international community of scholars, Jewish communal leaders, and activists, simply do not have the luxury of playing at internal Jewish politics with each other. In fact, the reality that we here span the entire political spectrum is one of our greatest resources, and a source of power. It means that we can get to more places where we can fight antisemitism.

In conclusion, it is my fervent hope that the love that we all feel for Israel and the Jewish people (am Yisrael) can — like the love between Rachel and Leah — overpower and outweigh the disrespect and divisiveness that sometimes occurs within our community. So that we, along with our non-Jewish friends and allies (and we do have non-Jewish friends and allies) can work together to defeat our enemies.

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INTRODUCTION

The recent increased rate of antisemitic incidents at U.S. universities has created a quandary for college and university administrators who seek to prevent behavior tending to disrupt education without running afoul of the First Amendment. A recent United States Supreme Court decision that upheld a state cross burning statute, Virginia v. Black,¹ may provide guidance for regulating antisemitism in public university spaces. This case reconfirms that speech is not an absolute right. Like defamation, antisemitic verbal attacks can result in dignitary harms. And like “fighting words” or “true threats,” intimidating antisemitism increases the likelihood that hate crimes will be perpetrated on campus. Accordingly, intimidating antisemitism is so incompatible with education that to prohibit its dissemination on campus would not disrupt the university’s mission of intellectual advancement.

Opponents of university hate speech regulations often rely on the Supreme Court reasoning in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, a case in which the majority found a municipal ordinance prohibiting cross burning to be unconstitutional.² Following the Supreme Court’s rationale, free speech libertarians and several lower federal courts³ asserted that university administrators lack the authority to regulate the communication of group hatred. Eleven years after deciding R.A.V., the Court upheld a more rigorously drafted cross burning statute than the one it struck down in R.A.V. The later decision, Virginia v. Black,⁴ defined the scope of legitimate limitations on hate speech in general, and its conclusions are applicable to the regulation of antisemitic speech on university cam-

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³ This paper proposes a more narrowly constructed hate speech code than the ones found unconstitutional in lower court decisions. Those district and circuit court cases were issued long before Virginia v. Black, which is the Supreme Court decision I primarily rely on to develop a campus anti-incitement policy. See UMW Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1178-79 (E.D. Wis. 1991). Because these decisions were not binding precedents, many colleges outside the courts’ jurisdictions retained various hate speech codes. JON B. GOULD, SPEAK NO EVIL: THE TRIUMPH OF HATE SPEECH REGULATION 159 (2005).
puses. In this paper, I argue that institutions of higher education can punish persons using university property to spread intimidating and defamatory antisemitism.

I. ANTI-SEMITISM ON AMERICAN CAMPUSES

Jewish students at several U.S. universities have recently been the targets of a growing number of antisemitic incidents.\(^5\) Antisemitic slurs are based on historic stereotypes that are derisive to Jews. Virulent antisemitism also aims to create a hostile environment for Jewish students and anyone, irrespective of religion, who is associated with Jewish causes, like Zionism.\(^6\) An Anti-Defamation League audit found that there were 94 antisemitic incidents on U.S. campuses in 2007, representing about 6 percent of total anti-Jewish harassment and vandalism that year.\(^7\) A consistent university policy against hate speech would demonstrate the gravity of these verbal attacks and could deter future antisemitic conduct. In formulating such a policy, it must be borne in mind that public university regulations can only withstand judicial scrutiny if they are based on judicial precedents concerning free speech.

The following is a short list of recent events: Jewish students at the University of California-Irvine report that antagonism has increased to the point that they must circumvent some parts of campus to avoid conflict, are reluctant to engage in activities sponsored by Jewish organizations, and have trouble focusing on their studies.\(^8\) In one of the most extreme examples of new antisemitism, Imam Mohammad al-Asi and Amir Abdel Malik Ali delivered speeches at a week-long event at the UC-Irvine that integrated traditional stereotypes with modern events claiming Jews are in control of U.S. media and responsible for the terror on September 11, 2001. In one speech Al-Asi asserted, “We have a psychosis in the Jewish community that is unable to co-exist equally and brotherly with other human beings.”\(^9\) In 2010, the Muslim Student Union at UC-Irvine, which the University subsequently banned from campus, sponsored a speaker who “compared Jews to Nazis” and “expressed support for Hamas, Hizbollah and Islamic Jihad.”\(^10\) At the University of California at Berkeley, swastikas were scrawled on a Jewish student organization’s pamphlet.\(^11\) In addition, Holocaust denier David Irving and Ku Klux Klan supporter Tomislav Sunic appeared at a group event on the University of Oregon campus.\(^12\)

Universities and policymakers around the country have drafted a variety of responses to the uses of hate speech on their campuses. The University of Nevada, Las Vegas is evaluating whether to institute a campus hate crime policy that would prohibit

\(^5\) Susan B. Tuchman, Editorial, Jewish Students of America, Know Your Legal Rights, JERUSALEM POST (Israel), Dec. 11, 2005.
\(^7\) Sonia Scherr, Anti-Semitism Goes to School, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Issue 131 (Fall 2008).
\(^8\) See Tuchman, supra, note 5.
\(^9\) Scherr, supra note 7.
\(^11\) Hate Speech Roils UC Berkeley Campus, N.Y. JEWISH WEEK, Sept. 26, 2008, at 50.
\(^12\) Jack Moran, Hate-Filled Graffiti Spurs Vigil, Concerns, REGISTER-GUARD (Eugene, OR), June 24, 2008, at A.
expressions motivated by racial, religious, gender, and political bias. Such a regulation could go further by also prohibiting destructive antisemitic statements. In Spring 2009, the Michigan Civil Rights Commission held an open public forum to better understand how to balance the testimonies of student victims with free speech concerns. At Auburn University, the multicultural center suggested sponsoring an event on hate speech after a professor received a racist message. Derisive, violent statements about Jews should be handled with the same gravity as other forms of hate speech.

Other universities have instituted aspirational civility norms for preventing the use of prejudicial slurs. The University of Chicago, for instance, requests its academic community to foster the marketplace of ideas by preserving the diversity, civility, and equality of its campus. St. Scholastica College in Duluth, Minnesota, issued a similar statement to students after hate symbols appeared on its campus, as did two other colleges in the state.

Some of these incidents of hate speech have been isolated occurrences. Others appear to be concerted efforts to make Jewish groups, students, and sympathetic faculty members feel uncomfortable, threatened, or isolated. The multiple locations where these events have taken place, which often occur hundreds or even thousands miles from each other, are an indication that the expression of intimidating antisemitism is not localized but in fact widespread.

II. First Amendment Standards

All public universities must abide by the First Amendment standards established by Supreme Court decisions on intimidating speech. In a case decided during World War II, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court contrasted constitutionally protected expression from violent fighting words, holding that “[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.” The social interest in “order and morality” outweighs any cathartic benefit a speaker may derive from statements that are likely to provoke a violent response in the average person. Fighting words, which are likely to draw the average person into a physical altercation, are analogous to some forms of antisemitism that tend to provoke violent reactions rather than evoking

15 Hannah Wolfson, Auburn Professor Reports Racist Note, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Oct. 22, 2008, at 6B.
16 Marilyn Gilroy, Colleges Grappling with Incivility, HISPANIC OUTLOOK IN HIGHER ED. June 30, 2008, at 8.
19 Id. at 574.
conversation, discussion, and a search for truth. Just as fighting words are unconnected with traditional speech values, antisemitic speech that is likely to incite violence is not protected by the First Amendment’s guarantee of self-expression. This dichotomy indicates that violently provocative hate symbols or inflammatory antisemitic statements are far from what is acceptable at a public university.

The verbal barbs of persons who express the desire to harm Jews are not amenable to counterarguments. Their veracity cannot be tested in the marketplace of ideas. Verbal intimations also differ from opinion, which is protected against government interference. Furthermore, no educational purposes are served by the provocative uses of symbols historically linked to violence, such as swastikas and Hamas flags.

Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, antisemitic speech that incites others to commit illegal acts or aims to intimidate victims can be regulated on campuses when it poses an imminent threat of harm. In a concurrence, Justice Byron R. White of the Supreme Court dismissed the notion that hate speech, of which antisemitism is only one example, is a legitimate form of political discourse: “Instead, it permits, indeed invites, the continuation of expressive conduct that … is evil and worthless in First Amendment terms…. Indeed, by characterizing fighting words as a form of ‘debate,’ … legitimizes hate speech as a form of public discussion.”

Not all expressions of hatred and intolerance are advocacy; therefore, some expressions of apathy, disdain, or outright malevolence toward Jews do not fit the paradigm of administratively punishable hate speech. This is the case with private antisemitic statements that are not intended to elicit immediate harms. Brandenburg v. Ohio, another seminal Supreme Court decision, indicates that the First Amendment probably protects students who display antisemitic emblems or insignia in private settings, like dormitory rooms or personal lockers. Antisemitic slurs are thus only actionable when they are made in public locations, such as a student union, classroom, or common area of a dormitory.

In some cases, statements might not be outright threats but defame Jews instead. Scurrilous falsehoods about Jews are not mere abstractions but contain content that can unjustly harm individuals’ reputations and community standings. Like any other form of defamation, the university should be able to provide remedies for students who have suffered as a result of stereotyping that demeans them in others’ eyes.

A 1992 Supreme Court case, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, raised concerns about the constitutionality of efforts to combat antisemitism and other forms of hate speech on campus. The case arose when juveniles set fire to a cross on a black family’s lawn. They were

20 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
23 On the issue of individual and group defamation, see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (“The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood.”); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (“Libelous utterances not being within the area of constitutionally protected speech, it is unnecessary, either for us or for the State courts, to consider the issues behind the phrase ‘clear and present danger.’”).
charged under a St. Paul, Minnesota ordinance against the display of symbols (like Nazi swastikas and burning crosses) that purportedly aroused “anger, alarm or resentment … on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.”\(^{25}\) The majority acknowledged that the city had a compelling interest to protect the human rights of the “members of groups that have historically been subjected to discrimination.”\(^{26}\) However, the Court held the ordinance to be an unconstitutional “content discrimination” rather than a blanket prohibition on all forms of fighting words.\(^{27}\)

In his concurrence, Justice White argued that the majority had deviated from precedents that had long allowed for content-based regulation of low-level speech. Using language reminiscent of the fighting words doctrine in *Chaplinsky*, White asserted that the state can prohibit speech that is “by definition worthless and undeserving of constitutional protection.”\(^{28}\) According to him, the majority substituted its own judgment for the City’s assessment that disparagements “based on race, color, creed, religion, [and] gender” pose “more pressing public concerns than the harms caused by other fighting words.”\(^{29}\)

A more recent opinion, *Virginia v. Black*, has diminished the significance of *R.A.V.* in the context of hate speech regulations generally and university speech codes specifically. *Black* arose from the prosecution of individuals who had burned a cross in public. The statute had been more carefully drafted than the one struck down in *R.A.V.* Virginia law rendered it “unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place.”\(^{30}\) A majority of justices agreed that the state did not violate the First Amendment by punishing those who burned crosses with the intention of intimidating others. And I believe its reasoning is applicable to specifically antisemitic symbols that are meant to intimidate. Mimicking the language in *Chaplinsky*, the Court found that intentionally intimidating cross burning is of “such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”\(^{31}\) The state statute was not a form of content discrimination because it prohibited all manner of cross burning, irrespective of whether it sought to intimidate others on the bases of race, religion, or other characteristic. The Court explained that Virginia could selectively punish cross burning, even though it did not criminalize all other forms of virulent intimidation, “in light of the cross burning’s long and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence.”\(^{32}\) This reasoning clearly analyzed the content of the communication to determine whether it is linked to racism and violent behavior.

It seems realistic to extrapolate from that judicial statement that college administrators can determine that antisemitic symbols can also intimidate students and visitors on college campuses. While it appears clear that intentionally intimidating antisemitic

\(^{25}\) *R.A.V.*, 505 U.S. at 380.

\(^{26}\) *Id.* at 395.

\(^{27}\) *Id.* at 387, 391.

\(^{28}\) *Id.* at 401 (White, J., concurring).

\(^{29}\) *Id.* at 407 (White, J., concurring).


\(^{31}\) *Id.* at 358-59 (citing *Chaplinsky*, 315 U.S. at 572).

\(^{32}\) *Id.* at 362-63.
symbols may be regulated on campuses, what is not certain is whether the fact finder can infer the speaker’s mindframe or whether the prosecution must prove it by direct or circumstantial evidence. A plurality of the Court found the statute’s prima facie evidentiary presumption to be unconstitutional. This group of four justices argued that, without requiring prosecutors to prove a defendant’s state of mind, juries would lack the evidentiary context needed to determine “whether a particular cross burning is intended to intimidate” or only to arouse anger. The implication for universities seeking to prohibit antisemitic intimidation on campus is that a university speech code should at least include a negligence element of the offense to avoid offending the First Amendment.

III. COLLEGE SPEECH CODES PROHIBITING ANTISEMITISM

The reasoning in *Virginia v. Black*, which recognized that a state can prohibit intimidating cross burning, was closer to international consensus on hate speech than any previous Supreme Court decision. The next case to reach the Supreme Court on the subject might expressly reflect on the lessons of foreign jurisprudence about how free expression can be protected while also prohibiting violent, group-based intimidation. In *Black*, the Supreme Court struck a delicate balance between the right of self-expression and the social dangers of true threats.

Antisemitic intimidation can have a direct and negative impact on Jewish students’ academic performance. Maintaining a safe environment is essential to educational and extracurricular success. Jewish students who have a reasonable reason to fear for their safety are less likely to participate in the classroom and in extracurricular activities. Whether the swastika is hung, a cross is burned, a degrading and aggressive speech is made in a dormitory corridor, or the Hamas Charter is displayed in a prominent place like a classroom or dormitory window, those expression of antisemitic hatred communicate support for or participation in violent conduct. In certain circumstances, expressions of hatred are likely to instigate violence, alienate students, or make for a hostile learning environment. This is very different than an art or history project incorporating historically destructive messages but having no advocacy component. Neither would parody fall under my definition because it enjoys First Amendment protections.

United States’ free speech jurisprudence gives public college officials less latitude to pursue charges against antisemitic statements on campus than is available to college administrators in some other democracies like Canada, Germany, and England. The reasoning in *Black* nevertheless indicates that the U.S. Supreme Court has begun to follow some of the same historical findings that foreign and international tribunals have been using to punish hateful expressions that threaten public safety. International norms and foreign laws on this subject indicate a worldwide consensus that hate speech is harmful to individuals as well as groups, especially those who have experienced a history of intolerance, discrimination, and oppression. The risk of allowing antisemitism

33 Id. at 362.
to occur on campuses unchecked is that inaction will leave the targets of violent communications vulnerable to more harassment and even assault. Being uncertain of their safety, Jewish students will be more likely to restrict their pursuit of available educational opportunities in departments where they are threatened. Students who experience a sense of impending danger are also likely to restrict their movements in dorms, student unions, or other commons areas that they have reason to believe are unsafe.

Black provides analytical responses to arguments proffered by opponents of hate speech regulations. Larry Alexander, for one, argues that hate speech is no more than verbal harm, conveying taunting ideas. Suzanna Sherry is similarly dismissive of the gravity of harms flowing from hate speech. She contends that regulation of it is driven by a political agenda that is “designed to improve the virtue of an unvirtuous population.” She criticizes the use of university hate speech codes for paternalistically enforcing virtuous behavior rather than allowing students to be self-directed. John S. Greenup takes this argument a step further, arguing that university officials should grant organizations like the Ku Klux Klan access to university locations unless their activities pose overt threats. His perspective recognizes the risk of intimidation but fails to make an assessment of whether tolerating an avowed terrorist organization like the KKK on campus is threatening, divisive, and disruptive to teaching and learning.

The assertions of Nadine Strossen and the ACLU that counterspeech can adequately defuse group hatred, promote civil liberties, and even increase tolerance on campus have been roundly rejected by the international community. The United States Supreme Court has now endorsed a narrow version of the consensus international perspective on free speech policy. Just as with sexual harassment in the workplace, counterspeech is an inadequate remedy for the intimidating attacks of hate speech. Antisemitism—like ethnocentrism, racism, and xenophobia—is too deeply imbedded in culture to be changed overnight through rational discourse. Telling university employees or students who are the targets of antisemitic attacks to simply respond rationally to

36 Larry Alexander, Banning Hate Speech and the Sticks and Stones Defense, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 71, 91 (1996).
38 Id. at 943-44.
40 Black, 538 U.S. at 389 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“To me, the majority’s brief history of the Ku Klux Klan only reinforces this common understanding of the Klan as a terrorist organization, which, in its endeavor to intimidate, or even eliminate those it dislikes, uses the most brutal of methods.”).
42 See TESIS, supra note 35.
43 See Jack M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 420-22 (discussing how “to the extent we allow verbal conduct creating a hostile working atmosphere, we thereby refuse to protect persons from certain forms of private racial and sexual discrimination. Conversely, to the extent that mere words can give rise to liability for employment discrimination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or other causes of action, we acknowledge that an employer or co-worker can be punished for making such statements.”).
hateful antagonists provides victims with no meaningful, procedural mechanism but mere paternalistic platitude. Just as responding genteelly to hostile comments at work does not solve the problem of workplace harassment, neither does counterspeech decrease the threats posed by antisemitic groups or individuals who carry out campus campaigns of intimidation, exclusion, and discrimination. Expecting students to simply talk things out and convince those who intimidate them of the fallacy of their threatening statements fails to provide a procedurally cognizable way of seeking legal redress.

The mantra that more speech will reduce the risks of antisemitism is based on a libertarian faith in the ability of communications to unmask and delegitimate hatred. The effectiveness of Nazi antisemitism in establishing political dictatorship in Germany belies the idea that accurate information will inevitably trump stereotype, innuendo, and dehumanization. It also places harassment and intimidation on a par with dialogue. To the contrary, the former are means of disengagement from a hated outgroup, while the latter is a form of mutual engagement between the interlocutors.

I believe that if a litigant were to challenge the constitutionality of a university code against antisemitic communications, a judge could uphold it on the basis of the majority’s consensus in Black. Like cross burning, antisemitic symbols that are tied to terror organizations or despotic regimes are semantically menacing; they rely on imagery, phrases, or slurs that have a social content beyond their immediate use and are meant to threaten targeted groups of individuals. Whether those messages are communicated by symbols or oral communication is less important than the issue of whether they constitute true threats. Before promulgating such a code of conduct, university administrators should assess the historic significance of certain forms of stereotyping, symbolism, and threats to determine whether they rise to the level of intimidation analogous to cross burning.

Jewish students should be provided the opportunity to offer feedback about the code. Their sense of safety is important for evaluating the gravity of the circumstances. How an objective listener would perceive the message is critical for determining whether a communication constitutes a true threat. For liability to attach, the speaker need not intend to commit the violence but only to intimidate the listener. Accordingly, prohibitions against antisemitism on campus need to address the extent to which ordinary Jewish students think intimidating statements create a hostile academic environment.

Allowing students or faculty members to intimidate others through bombast favors the liberty of antisemitic speakers’ to advocate discrimination and violence while denying the victims’ reasonable expectations of security on campus. The constitutional importance of the First Amendment to democratic governance and self-assertion does not extend to menacing messages that tend to diminish the targeted group’s sense of security when traveling through college commons areas and attending university

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45 Black, 538 U.S. at 354 (identifying Klan violence with burning crosses).
46 Lovell By and Through Lovell v. Poway Unified School Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1996) (“While courts may consider the effect on the listener when determining whether a statement constitutes a true threat, the final result turns upon whether a reasonable person in these circumstances should have foreseen that his or her words would have this effect.”).
47 Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60 (“The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat.”).
sponsored events. Jewish students and faculty members and their colleagues are more likely to think twice before going to hear the college orchestra or heading to the student union if it requires walking through an area where a cross has recently been burned, a swastika is displayed, or a supremacist rally has taken place. Antisemitic speakers are neither inviting intellectual debate and rejoinder nor seeking political dialogue. Theirs is a campaign of silencing through intimidation—something that threatens the university’s marketplace of ideas and is of no benefit to educational interactions. Academic freedom is not a license for harassment. Neither does the hate speech further the pursuit for truth: calling Jews vermin, claiming it is they who were responsible for the 9/11 attacks, or purporting that the Holocaust is a myth have nothing to do with a university’s mission to pursue truth. These derogatory statements are meant to exclude and stamp them with labels of outsiders and charlatans. Derisive speech becomes academically punishable when it is meant to defame, intimidate, threaten, terrify, or instigate violence.

While Black provides college administrators with a good starting point for preventing hate speech on campus, it does not go far enough in identifying expressive harms. Justice O’Connor’s view for the plurality, that the First Amendment protects ideologically driven cross burning not meant to intimidate, fails to fully recognize the symbol’s intrinsically social and political connections to the Ku Klux Klan’s history of racial violence and white supremacism. The supremacist “statement of ideology,” which she distinguishes from “intimidation,” relates an organization’s desire and willingness to segregate, racially polarize, and perpetrate violence. The same is true of other hate, exterminationist, or genocidal symbols—such as swastikas or Hamas flags—that are displayed on campuses to advance menacing ideological agendas. While the burning cross expresses a message specifically linked to group violence in the United States, the swastika symbolizes the worldwide effort to commit genocide against Jews and to subject other non-Aryans to subservience. Its threatening message is unambiguous.

In formulating a university hate speech code, it is important to distinguish between disciplinary measures available to administrators and punishments connected with criminal convictions. Educational penalties are designed to negatively impact a student’s or a faculty member’s record, while criminal punishment is more onerous because it involves the curtailment of liberty and greater social stigma. Educators can assess penalties without following the rules of criminal procedure, reducing the burden of proof required of university prosecutions. The “beyond a reasonable doubt” evidentiary

48 Id. at 365-66 (O’Connor, J., plurality) (stating that cross burning can both be used to intimidate or to elaborate a racist ideology).


50 Hamas is a genocidal organization whose charter uses violent antisemitism. The Hamas flag is just as ideologically violent as the swastika, relying on an ancient hadith to instigate mass murder: “the Islamic Resistance Movement aspires to bring the promise of Allah to pass, no matter how long it takes. As the prophet [Muhammad], may the prayer of Allah and his blessing of peace be upon him, said: ‘The time [Judgment Day] will not come until Muslims fight the Jews and kill them and until the Jew hides behind the rocks and trees, and [then] the rocks and trees will say: ‘Oh Muslim, oh servant of Allah, there is a Jew hiding [behind me], come and kill him.’”’ Id. at art. 7. The presence of a Hamas flag signifies support for this genocidal plan.
standard used for criminal prosecution is meant to prevent mistaken deprivations of liberty, something that is unrelated to college sanctions.

Recognizing this contrast is important, because the standard of proof for a criminal hate speech law, such as one prohibiting cross burning, is significantly more rigorous than what would be required for the censure of student hate speech. The O'Connor plurality's mental state requirement in Black Applies within the context of criminal liability, not civil penalties.

The most closely analogous standard of civil liability comes from defamation law. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court established that a private plaintiff seeking to recover damages for defamation about a public matter must prove that the defendant acted negligently. That is, liability for defamation only attaches in cases of negligent publication. To withstand a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a university code prohibiting antisemitism on campus, the provision should include at least a negligence fault component. A no-fault code is far less likely to be found constitutional. To avoid running afoul of the First Amendment, the campus complainant would need to demonstrate the speaker's negligence by a preponderance of the evidence. Such a standard would require proof that, under the circumstances, a reasonable speaker should have realized hostile expressions based on people's race, gender, religion, nationality, or sexual orientation were likely to intimidate or harm the reputation of a defined group or individual students. An additional provision must protect artistic and educational references to words and symbols that might otherwise be punishable.

In conclusion, the social and educational value of regulating intimidating and defamatory speech on campus outweighs the minimal burden it places on speakers. University hate speech codes raise First Amendment concerns that can best be resolved within the framework of Supreme Court jurisprudence on free speech. Public university officials aiming to improve campus safety can formulate policies compatible with the holding in Virginia v. Black.

Sanctions that punish the intentional dissemination of intimidating antisemitic messages on campus do not interfere with constitutionally protected free speech. Like the cross burning statute in Black, campus regulations can prohibit the public display of historically threatening symbolism. College administrators need not require proof of intentional intimidation because the sanctions available to them are far less onerous than criminal penalties. Negligently placing others in reasonable apprehension of harm or asserting false facts that damage their reputations should be punished by suspension, disenrollment, or withdrawal.

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52 Id. at 347 (setting out the standard for defaming private parties).
Marginalization and Its Discontents: American Jews in Multicultural and Identity Studies

Jennifer Roskies*

The key point about multiculturalism is that there has been almost no place in it for Jews.1

David A. Hollinger

1. JEWISH IDENTITY AND MULTICULTURAL DISCOURSE

“When it’s good for the Jews, it’s bad for Judaism.”2 This saying encapsulates the notion that the unprecedented freedom that served Jewish emigrants to the United States and their descendants so well has come at a price. Data that point to trends such as population decline3 have prompted numerous responses, including a concerted drive to research the state of Jewish identity. The driving motivation behind much of this research is an overriding concern with Jewish survival in the face of, not antisemitism and persecution, but the welcoming environment of pluralistic society in the United States. The overall objective of these studies, whether stated or implicit, is to leave no stone unturned in search of prescriptions to secure US Jewry’s future “in the struggle to preserve Jewish identity” and hence US Jewry itself.4

Recent decades have also seen a surge of academic inquiry in the fields of identity and multicultural theory, which have become among “the most extensively studied constructs in the social sciences” and historical research. The research examines issues

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related to identity in a range of forms—individual, collective, single, multiple, cultural, ethnic, gender, occupational, national, narrative, social and more—all in relation to “the complex interface of diversity in cultural and ethnic heritage in contemporary globalized society.”

Considering the imperative nature of these goals for bolstering the future of US Jewry as well as for understanding it from within the context of multiculturalism, one might think that scholars’ examination of these topics would be exhaustive. Yet notwithstanding volumes of valuable research that appraise emerging indicators of Jewish behaviors, attitudes and affiliations while weighing what they may portend for US Jewry’s numbers and resilience, certain areas of omission mar a cohesive overall picture.

One of these blind spots concerns much of Jewish studies’ overwhelmingly “inward” orientation, overlooking what Debra Kaufman referred to as “the subjective by-product of social location,” namely Jewish identity’s context within the US non-Jewish mainstream. To David A. Hollinger, this inward perspective typifies what he termed a “communalist” perspective, meaning:

an emphasis on the history of communal Jewry, including the organizations and institutions that proclaim Jewishness, and the activities of individuals who identify themselves as Jewish and/or are so identified by non-Jews with the implication it somehow matters.

This, as opposed to the “dispersionist” approach he advocated in order to rectify the disparity and to understand the “demographic overrepresentations” of Jews in “the US worlds of finance, film, science, psychoanalysis, philanthropy, political radicalism, modernist movements in the arts and other domains of modernity.” He explains:

[b]y “dispersionist,” I [refer to] a more expanded compass that takes fuller account of the lives in any and all domains of persons with an ancestry in the Jewish diaspora, regardless of their degree of involvement with communal Jewry and no matter what their extent of declared or described Jewishness. ... The skills promoted by the conditions of the European Diaspora ... surely help explain many kinds of Jewish success. ... [A] large swath of American popular and professional discourse ... [was] led by ... people who carried Jewish cultural baggage with them in their creative careers ... [whether or not they] identified themselves as Jews.

This broadened framework of study is in the interest of understanding both the overrepresentation and underrepresentation of different “descent groups,” an approach adopted by Yuri Slezkine, for example, who put forward the case that skills honed by centuries of life in the European diaspora paved the way for unprecedented Jewish

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7 Hollinger, supra note 1, at p. 4.

8 Ibid.


10 Hollinger, supra note 1, at p. 12.
impact over the course of the twentieth century in the United States and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{11} The dispersionist perspective, Hollinger claims, rejects the more common course of mystification or avoidance due to a perception that this would invite antisemitic inferences. Rather than opening the door to theories of “Jewish domination” or “Jewish genius,”\textsuperscript{12} he says:

The grounds for this reticence diminish, if not disappear, if these statistics can be explained by taking full account of the conditions under which the various descent groups have been shaped. Avoiding the forthright historical and social-scientific study of the question perpetuates the mystification of Jewish history and subtly fuels the idea that the answer is really biological and will serve to reinforce invidious distinctions between descent groups.\textsuperscript{13}

Turning his attention to multicultural studies, Hollinger points to a vacuum that is a mirror image to the communalist-dispersionist dichotomy:

The key point about multiculturalism is that there has been almost no place in it for Jews…. [M]ainstream scholarship has been slow to recognize and appreciate Jewish history in relation to the larger prehistory and history of cultural diversity in America…. One might think that this story [— the impact of groups of Jews on trans-Jewish events and discourses—] would attract the attention of mainstream historians interested in the idea of identity formation and cultural diversity as general phenomena, which has been a huge preoccupation of American historians for the last forty years.\textsuperscript{14}

Instead, due to an “ethnoracial manner of mapping cultural diversity,” which he dated back to the late 1970s, Hollinger contends that scholarship in multicultural and identity studies has discounted US Jews.

Jews were ignored [since] the main point of multiculturalism was color, and Jews were white, and a second point of multiculturalism was inequality, and Jews were doing very well. So, cool it, the collegial message was: let these [multicultural studies programs] deal with the needs of Americans color coded … in contrast to the white demographic block.\textsuperscript{15}

It is important to remember at this point that Jews have only recently come to be considered white, especially in the United States. Race as a social construct has been a remarkably fluid form of categorization over the past centuries.\textsuperscript{16} As Sander Gilman notes:

\textsuperscript{13} Hollinger, supra note9, at p. 597.
\textsuperscript{14} Hollinger, supra note 1, at pp. 16, 12.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., at pp. 17-19.
for the eighteenth and nineteenth-century scientist, the “blackness” of the Jew was taken as fact and as mark of racial inferiority [in addition to] … an indicator of [his] diseased nature. … By the midcentury, being black, being Jewish, being diseased and being ‘ugly’ came to be inexorably linked … one bore the signs of one’s diseased status on one’s anatomy, and by extension, in one’s psyche. 

Literature documenting race in the United States dates the designation of Jews as white as recently as the 1920s or the period following World War II. With the awareness of Nazi Germany’s racial policies and resulting horror, “the 1940s produced a profound revision in the taxonomy of the world’s races.” This is reflected in examples such as Arthur Miller’s 1945 novel Focus or Laura Z. Hobson’s 1947 novel Gentleman’s Agreement, later adapted into a film starring Gregory Peck, whose message was not only that Jews are difficult to tell apart from non-Jews but that their similarity to “real” Americans reflects their essential worthiness of racial equality as well. Expanding the definition of “whiteness” brought obvious benefits to Jews in terms of relative power within US society. The perceived differentiation from other racial groups coupled with the identification with mainstream white America positioned US Jewry to attain greater financial security and power during the second half of the twentieth century.

At the same time, in sources even more recent, Jews are described as “not quite white” or as “a different shade of white,” in other words, as not quite blending in. Ruth Frankenberg’s 1993 study involving white American women on the subject of their white identities noted statements by Jewish participants indicating that

several points must be made about the intersection of Jewishness and whiteness … Ashkenazi Jews for much of this century in the United States and Europe have been placed at the borders of whiteness, at times viewed as cultural outsiders, at times as racial outsiders, but in any case never as constitutive of the cultural norm.

Frankenberg’s study is revealing in other ways as well. In the relatively short section she devotes to the Jewish aspect of those women among her participants who were Jews (11 out of 30), the theme of experiencing antisemitism arose with every single one of them. Frankenberg picks up on statements by the Jewish women in her interviews, which describe their senses of identity as Jews over different stages in their lives, calling into question the “ethnoracial mapping” that excluded the experience of US Jews as a topic worthy of attention in its own right within mainstream research.


17 Gilman, supra note 16, at p. 370.
18 Jacobson, supra note 16, at p. 188.
2. Jewish Women: Doubly Eclipsed

Consistent with Hollinger’s observations, the intersection of Jewish women’s identities goes unnoticed within the general field of identity studies as well. When it comes to research examining gender, feminist, or multicultural identity, Jewish women are practically absent as case studies. Such “multiple exclusions,” as Sara R. Horowitz describes them, stand in marked contrast to the considerable literature in Black feminist theory and that of other racial and ethnic groups.

The omission of Jewish women from general multicultural research appears particularly curious in light of Jewish women’s contributions to the feminist movement in the United States, both as activists and as leading theorists. Hollinger in fact cites the

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Leading feminist Jewish theorists in a range of academic disciplines include:

Leading feminist Jewish theorists in a range of academic disciplines include:


feminist movement as a prime example of the lacunae he observes in multicultural research. “Despite the overrepresentation of Jewish women among the ranks of its leaders,” he notes, “(by how many thousand percentage points?) ... our scholarly and popular histories take virtually no notice of this astronomically huge demographic fact.”26 Research asking “in what sense is Women’s Liberation ... a Jewish story,”27 Hollinger claims, likening it to the way scholarship has explored the role of Protestantism in the abolitionist and civil rights movements, would help streamline US Jewish history’s integration into “mainstream US history.”

Joyce Antler’s documentation of radical feminism and Jewish women,28 which is among rare examples of academic studies to examine the interface of identities for Jews within their non-Jewish “social location,” illustrates a redeeming approach. Revealingly, the movement leaders she interviewed had disregarded the potential significance of being Jewish during the time of their activism during the 1960s and 1970s at the height of second wave feminism. Only much more recently and in retrospect had they begun to assert its relevance. Dina Pinsky has added dimension to this chapter of history in her study interviewing 30 Jews, most of them women, on the subject of their Jewish identities and their involvement as activists in the women’s movement during the same period.29

When subjects in Debra Kaufman’s expressed sentiments to the effect that their identity as Jewish women “is grounded in their experience as ‘the Other’ within Judaism,” for example, it spoke directly to and in concert with the experience of being a Jewish woman vis-à-vis Jewish men, as well as vis-à-vis the greater world’s perception of the Jew as Other.30 Nora Gold used both qualitative and quantitative methodology in interviewing 364 Jewish women from across Canada regarding their experiences of both sexism and antisemitism.31 These five studies—by Frankenberg, Antler, Pinsky, Kaufman, and Gold—provide isolated examples that indicate how much may be gleaned in a more thorough probing of the intersection of Jewish women’s identities.

26 Hollinger, supra note 1, at p. 11.
27 Ibid., at p. 8.
30 Kaufman, supra note 6.

If the rarity of research on Jewish women within mainstream multicultural research on the US feminist movement appears paradoxical, US Jewish scholars’ “fail[ure] to get Jews on the standardized multicultural map of the United States,”\(^{32}\) despite “the heavy demographic overrepresentation of Jews in the cultural industries, including academia,” is all the more so. The reason for this lacuna may stem in part from what Alan M. Kraut recalls as the “chilling effect” of an US academia still “rife with anti-Semitism” in the post-war period, when many of today’s senior scholars were embarking upon their academic careers.

In the aftermath of the war, unabashed Jew-haters in the academy needed to keep more of a lid on their attitudes when speaking publicly. However, graduate students with professional aspirations still often hesitated … to select a dissertation topic that identified them as Jewish…. Wise doctoral mentors took care to counsel against a topic that type-cast the young aspiring academic as “too Jewish.”\(^{33}\)

Even those committed to writing history sans Jews had an uphill battle. “Jews specializing in American history had a particularly difficult time getting jobs,” observes historian Edward Shapiro. “Historians were reluctant to entrust the teaching of the nation’s sacred history to such outsiders.”\(^{34}\)

Examples of this aversion were given voice in a study where US Jewish women—all senior members of faculty in the humanities or social sciences—described their choice of academic field of research.\(^{35}\) Many upheld the unwritten rule spurning Jewish themes within general academic contexts as a given assumption, some stating pointedly that choosing such a focus would have been akin to opting for “separatism” as opposed to the career they chose in the “mainstream.” A professor of American studies recalled her decision to forego a dissertation topic related to Yiddish in favor of “mainstream” career prospects:

If you viewed yourself as someone who wanted to live and work in an integrated environment, [it] was not really a viable option. But taking that intellectual drive and channeling it into the secular arena and excelling in … the bastions of American learning, that was something we [Jewish graduate students in the ivy league] could handle.

A professor of English literature and women’s studies articulated this sense of mutual exclusivity between Jewish topics and mainstream research when she spoke of course syllabi she developed on women, race, and ethnicity in which she did not think to include Jewish perspectives:

I know of no one, certainly no one here at the university, who teaches Jewish women writers, or … even Jewish writers, and that may be coincidence…. It may also have to

\(^{32}\) Hollinger, *supra* note 1, at pp. 5, 18.


do with a concern about a ghetto-ization. I’m not sure I would want to identify myself or be identified as someone circumscribed by a Jewish identification.

In contrast to the above trend of demarcation between mainstream academia and Jewish topics, recent documentation by Lila Corwin Berman traces a very different development over the same general period, a phenomenon that functioned indirectly—and almost surely inadvertently—in countering marginalization. During the second half of the twentieth century, Jews in academia (along with Jewish leaders, rabbis, and intellectuals) “sought to generate a public language … of presenting Jews to the United States” as a means of navigating relationships with non-Jews within an open, yet non-Jewish society. By creating this “intellectual framework,” Berman noted, Jewish leaders strove “to make Jewishness intelligible to the American public.”

When properly conceived, a public language of Jewishness, instead of marking Jews as outside of or peripheral to American life, enabled Jewish leaders to define Jews as indispensable to the United States.

Berman describes the intensive involvement of Jews within the academy, particularly the social sciences, and their active role in creating both the theories and the very language of academic discourse:

The Jewish attraction to the social sciences [was] a response to the particular circumstances of minority and Jewish life…. Sociology offered minority groups an opportunity to integrate their experiences into larger national contexts…. Sociological language and models became unrivaled sources of authority, sculpting the public language that American Jewish leaders used to talk about Jewishness…. The fact that Jews helped mold the field of sociology is critical to understanding why sociological language became so useful in Jews’ efforts to explain themselves to the United States.

In other words, for Berman, part of what secured US Jews’ entrance and acceptance into academic life was the terminology they themselves crafted within emerging academic disciplines.

Again, countering these gains are the gaps to which Hollinger pointed. For when it comes to US Jewry as the subject of academic research, the communalist emphasis, on the one hand, and the marginalization of Jews from mainstream topics, on the other, “allowed the narratives of American history and American Jewish history to remain mutually exclusive.” Yet what of the parallel effect he describes, the “large swath of American popular and professional discourse … led by persons of Jewish ancestry [or] people who carried Jewish cultural baggage with them in their creative careers.” How may this influence have “disseminated into [the] American public sphere” at large?

An excerpt from the interview with one of the scholars quoted above provides an example

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37 Ibid., at p. 6.
38 Ibid., at pp. 2-3.
39 Ibid.
40 Antler, supra note 28.
41 Hollinger, supra note 1, at p. 12.
42 Berman, supra note 36, at p. 6.
of how her contributions to academic discourse may have incorporated elements of her Jewish identity as she construed it. Describing her current academic venture, an international journal, she wonders:

The [journal] has been a really fruitful area that I’ve gone into…. Do I find this congenial because being Jewish makes me somehow more cosmopolitan-focused or something?

and surmises:

I can’t really say that I have had a sustained commitment to Jewish topics or Jewish intellectual concerns in my work, but in a sense … I like to feel that by doing the kind of scholarship that I do, and by being kind of both bold and careful and trying to move things in fresh directions, I’m somehow carrying on in Jewish intellectual traditions, even though it’s in the secular realm. I’d like to think that.

The mid-twentieth century pressures to which Kraut refers, where “wise doctoral mentors” curtailed their Jewish protégées’ academic areas of focus to exclude Jewish topics, imposed a doctrine of mutual exclusivity. The above excerpts reflect the kind of ingrained constraints that have shaped academic careers as well as the fields of multicultural and identity research. Yet the excerpts also suggest the “public language of Jewishness” to which Berman referred. Expressing that their “secular” areas of research may “carry on in Jewish intellectual traditions” indicates the degree to which Jewish academics’ work may implicitly carry blueprints rooted in Jewish experience—elements traceable in their scholarship and ultimately in the public sphere beyond.

4. “AN EMPIRICAL ORPHAN IN THE THEORETICAL STORM”

The absence of Jews as subjects within mainstream academic research stands in distinct contrast to another form of invisibility, namely that of Jewish women within the academic literature of feminist theory. In the former case, the marginalization of Jews stemmed from a barely-concealed, often baldly antisemitic aversion communicated to researchers setting out on their academic careers. A concurrent development, as we have seen, was US Jews’ leading contribution to social science theory and terminology, “molding the field,” in Berman’s words, and thus “enable[ing] them to define Jews as indispensable to the United States.” Perhaps ironically, the very fact of being “defined into” the mainstream, coupled with the prescribed “color-coded” cultural typologies, may have swayed US Jewish feminists from developing distinct theoretical models and epistemological standpoints, akin to those of Black feminists. Any perceived inclinations to do so were whitewashed.

Yet the absent “feminist Jewish standpoint” has signaled an element of homelessness both theoretically and in practice. Unarticulated and unnamed perspectives result in

44 Berman, supra note 36, at p. 6.
45 Hollinger, supra note 1, at pp. 17, 19.
46 Patricia Collins states that, ultimately, the goal of Black feminist theory is to articulate Black women’s standpoint, making full use of “access to both the Afrocentric and the feminist standpoints … [expecting that it] should reflect elements of both traditions, but be distinct—a search for the distinguishing features of an alternative epistemology.” Collins, supra note 22, at p. 206.
“social, psychological and spiritual malaise,” in Paula E. Hyman’s observation, as well as vulnerability. To borrow Elaine Showalter’s image from her essay “Feminist Criticism in the Wilderness,” without a theoretical basis, Jewish women have remained “an empirical orphan in the theoretical storm,” rendering US Jewish feminist women’s sense of belonging within the mainstream of the movement as ticklish if not tenuous. In truth, the experience of feeling like a “cultural outsider” (Frankenberg) and “Other” (Kaufman) is far from uncommon. Jewish-targeted enmity often takes the form of anti-Zionism and hostility toward Israel—the interconnected nature of these two bigotries has been demonstrated by Kaplan and Small. In certain circles, the option of being a feminist and a supporter of Israel is rendered mutually incompatible, a contradiction in terms. Bereft of theoretical belonging or anchor, not even loyal, committed, and radical feminists are exempt from bias, antisemitic slurs, and innuendo.

5. CONCLUSION: EXPANDING THE STORY

As we have seen, the “ethnoracial” mapping described by Hollinger that defined US Jewry as part of white mainstream culture complemented the Jewish “reticence” he cited to call attention to their own “overrepresentation” in so many facets of US life. The effective omission of Jews from multicultural and identity research as case studies in their own right leaves a gap in our understanding of US modernity. As in the case of Jewish women’s absence from feminist theory, it leaves Jews, women and men, ill-equipped to address the “not quite white” status that remains unexplored and unarticulated.

If the aim of studying Jewish identity is to channel understanding into securing US Jewry’s future; and of multicultural, identity, and feminist research to shed light on how individuals of different racial and ethnic groups—including Jewish women and men—negotiate their respective standpoints, the time for addressing the gaps in academic research is long overdue. Heeding Hollinger’s call to decipher matters such as “to what degree is Women’s Liberation a Jewish story,” future studies can aim to trace the “Jewish story” within different academic canons and thus shed light on its impact on developments during the past century both within academia and beyond. By the same token, additional study to trace the American, the multicultural, or the feminist “story” within the life stories of US Jews would stand to add valuable dimension to what we would learn of their Jewish identities, the course of their development, as well as where antisemitism’s impact was salient. Such study will move toward integrating Jewish and “mainstream” research, adding dimension with which to understand more fully the US—and US Jewish—experience.

50 Roskies, supra note 43.
NGOs and the New Antisemitism

Anne Herzberg*

1. INTRODUCTION

The intensification of the Palestinian terror campaign in the 2000s has been coupled with a renewal of attacks on Israel’s legitimacy and Jewish self-determination rights not seen since the 1970s during the Cold War.\(^1\) These attacks have been particularly severe in the United Kingdom, where senior Israeli officials have avoided travel for fear of being arrested for alleged “war crimes”\(^2\) and anti-Israel boycott campaigns have a strong following in the country.\(^3\) Violence has also accompanied these initiatives. In one case, Israel’s second highest-ranking diplomat in Britain was assaulted by Palestinian protestors after lecturing at Manchester University in May 2010.\(^4\)

This demonization is not confined to the United Kingdom, however. In August 2009, one of Sweden’s largest circulation dailies, Aftonbladet, revived the medieval blood libel, claiming that the Israeli army deliberately killed Palestinians in order to harvest their organs for profit.\(^5\) “Israel Apartheid Week” originated in Canada, where it continues to proliferate.\(^6\) The United States has also not been immune. In April 2010, the Israeli

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1 In the early to mid 1970s, the Arab League boycott of Israel was at its height. Backed by the Soviets, the League launched a campaign in various UN fora to brand Zionism a form of racism. These activities culminated in the 1975 “Zionism is racism” General Assembly resolution.


6 Coalition Against Israeli Apartheid (<http://www.caiaweb.org>).
ambassador was heckled at the University of California, Irvine; at several other UC schools (San Diego, Berkeley), resolutions were introduced calling for divestment from companies doing business with Israel.7

These incidents represent extreme manifestations of a “new antisemitism,” described by Canada’s former Justice Minister, Irwin Cotler, as “a new, globalized, virulent antisemitism” that “denies the Jewish People the right to live as equal members of the Family of Nations.”8

An often overlooked aspect of this “new antisemitism” is the role played by human rights and humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in contributing to the environment of demonization via politicized campaigns and lobbying. Disturbingly, many of these activities are funded by the European Union and European governments; large humanitarian Christian organizations that receive substantial government funding, such as Diakonia (Sweden), Trocaire (Ireland), and Christian Aid (UK); large foundations, such as the Ford Foundation, George Soros’ Open Society Institute, and Oxfam NOVIB; and even the progressive Jewish New Israel Fund (NIF).9

These NGO campaigns can be traced to the NGO Forum at the UN’s 2001 World Conference Against Racism in Durban, South Africa, which marked a major increase in the re-emergence of antisemitism.10 At the forum, officials from more than 1,500 participating NGOs, including international NGO superpowers, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, singled out Israel for condemnation, accusing it of perpetrating “holocausts,” “ethnic cleansing,” and “genocide,” and declared Israel to be a “racist, apartheid state in which Israels [sic] brand of apartheid” is a “crime against humanity.” The Conference revived the hateful 1975 “Zionism is racism” slogan, repealed in 1991 by the UN General Assembly, but still promoted by anti-Israel actors. At Durban, antisemitic flyers were distributed at official UN events, including one featuring Hitler’s visage asking, “What if I had won? The good things: There would be NO Israel and NO Palestinian’s [sic] blood shed” (see Appendix, Image 1). Mass demonstrations included the chant, “What we have done to apartheid in South Africa, must be done to Zionism in Palestine.” In preparatory events held in Tehran and at the conference itself, Jewish and Israeli participants were intimidated or excluded from meetings.

As Professor Gerald Steinberg notes, “the NGO Forum’s Final Declaration established the ‘Durban Strategy’—‘a policy of complete and total isolation of Israel as an apartheid state,’ and cal[ed] for ‘the imposition of mandatory and comprehensive

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sanctions and embargoes, the full cessation of all links (diplomatic, economic, social, aid, military cooperation, and training) between all states and Israel.”11

The “Durban Strategy” has underpinned a decade of anti-Israel efforts by NGOs, including the global boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement against Israel; NGO-initiated lawsuits throughout Europe and North America against Israeli officials for “war crimes” (“lawfare”); campaigns in the UN (e.g., the Goldstone mission, Human Rights Council) and other international fora such as the European Parliament; and “pursuing the parastatal Zionist organizations worldwide” by “dealing with them legally as racist, colonial institutions.”12

NGOs carrying out the Durban Strategy invest millions in publications, public relations blitzes, and lobbying efforts utilizing the rhetoric of human rights and international law to single out Israel as their ultimate violator and abuser.13 By couching political attacks in these terms, NGOs seek to create a veneer of credibility and expertise, thereby increasing international pressure against Israel. Since the 2001 Durban conference, this process has played itself out on many occasions—Jenin in 2002, the International Court of Justice’s case against Israel’s “apartheid wall” in 2004, the 2006 Lebanon War, the 2008-2009 Gaza War and the Goldstone process, and the May 2010 “Free Gaza” flotilla.

These cases have followed a standard pattern. Israel is faced with a spate of terror attacks and responds with counter measures of increasing severity in order to protect its population. NGOs immediately issue numerous condemnations, almost all against Israel, with accusations of “war crimes,” “crimes against humanity,” and the intentional targeting of civilians. These allegations are generally based on speculation with little to no hard evidence. The media and the international community adopt these claims at face value, rarely conducting independent verification. The UN, particularly the structurally biased Human Rights Council,14 engages in further condemnations, calling for international investigations and war crimes trials. NGOs are recruited to play an integral role in these processes further entrenching their influence and claims. The context of terror is completely erased, as are Israel’s rights to self-defense and self-determination. At the same time, virulent antisemitism from Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah is completely ignored.15


13 For instance, at a conference sponsored by Swedish NGO Diakonia, Hassan Jabareen of the EU- and NIF-funded Adalah announced a strategy where pro-Palestinian activists would try to portray Israel as an “inherent undemocratic state” and to “use that as part of campaigning internationally.” Diakonia, “Conference Report: Palestine/Israel: Making Monitoring Work: (Re-)Enforcing International Law in Europe;” September 2008. Report available on file with the author.

14 Close to two-thirds of the HRC membership are representatives from the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the non-aligned Movement. See: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/membership.htm>.

15 NGO Monitor has documented dozens, if not hundreds, of examples of these activities. See: <http://www.ngo-monitor.org>. 
Significantly, under the Durban Strategy, the concepts of Zionism and a Jewish state per se (not specific policies or territorial disputes) are the causes of Israeli “racism,” “apartheid,” and “occupation.” As such, NGO campaigns based on the Durban Strategy meet the working definition of antisemitism developed by the EU Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, and recommended for adoption by the United Kingdom’s All-Party Parliamentary Groups Against Antisemitism. The guidelines note the following as forms of contemporary antisemitism:

- Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust.
- Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations.
- Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.
- Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.
- Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis.
- Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.
- Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the State of Israel.\(^{16}\)

Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz has also presented criteria that distinguish antisemitism from legitimate criticism of Israeli policies or actions. Dershowitz’s criteria include:

- Comparing Israel to the Nazis or its leaders to Hitler, the German army, or the Gestapo. Denying, minimizing, or trivializing the Holocaust as part of a campaign against Israel.
- Characterizing Israel as “the worst,” when it is clear that this is not an accurate comparative assessment.
- Singling out only Israel for sanctions for policies that are widespread among other nations, or demanding that Jews be better or more moral than others because of their history as victims.
- Blaming Israel for the problems of the world and exaggerating the influence of the Jewish state on world affairs.\(^{17}\)

Similarly, British lawyer Anthony Julius has observed that this new antisemitism “became hegemonic in the 1990s and 2000s…. It is to be distinguished from the ‘old antisemitism’ because it takes Israel and the Zionist project as its collective term for the Jews.”\(^{18}\) Nevertheless, it is “continuous with the ‘old antisemitism’ in its principal stratagems and tropes, while novel in its specific focus upon the Jewish State—uniquely evil and without the right to exist.” He further notes that

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NGOs AND THE NEW ANTISEMITISM

in its milder form, it seeks to fix the world’s attention on the injustices of the Occupation … and its one-eyed refusal to find fault with any party other than Israel. In its stronger form it recasts the 1948 War as an originary act of persecution…. In both forms it tends to seize upon misjudgments and acts of injustice as proof of fundamental iniquity.

The following examples reflect several themes adopted by NGOs in carrying out the Durban Strategy that manifests this “new antisemitism.”

2. **NAZI-ERA ANTISEMITIC STEREOTYPES**

Several NGOs promote antisemitic stereotypes in their anti-Israel campaigning reminiscent of the most virulent images published during the Nazi era. One of the most egregious examples was posted on the website of the Bethlehem-based NGO Badil, which advocates for a Palestinian “right of return” to Israel, a policy intended to erase demographically the Jewish character of the country. A 2010 monetary award winner of its annual “Nakba” poster contest shows a grotesque caricature of a Jewish man, garbed in traditional Hasidic attire with a menacing grin, hooked nose, and sidelocks. Surrounded by skulls, he stands on a platform dated “1948,” crushing to death an Arab woman and child. He holds a pitch-fork dripping with blood (see Appendix, Image 2).

In addition to its poster contest, Badil is often involved in inflammatory activities that antagonize Jews. In 2007, Badil launched “A Call to Action” to mark 60 years of “Nakba.” The campaign called upon “global civil society” to take part in “BDS, legal actions, media work, and public education and publicity campaigns.” One program sought to enlist journalists “to organize a targeted campaign to expose the lies of AIPAC and the Anti-Defamation League and to expose the Jewish and Zionist community’s double standards regarding Nakba & Occupation.” Several large, European-government funded NGOs including Trocaire (Ireland), DanChurchAid (Denmark), and Oxfam Solidarity Belgium co-sponsored these activities. Badil has also been funded by the Norwegian, Swiss, Swedish, and Dutch governments.

3. **THE GLOBAL BDS MOVEMENT: SINGLING ISRAEL OUT FOR CENSURE**

The global anti-Israel boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement is another manifestation of antisemitism that is spearheaded by NGOs. As noted by Anthony Julius, this movement is a way of “segregating Jews” and directed solely at Israel as opposed to the dozens of other countries that engage in far worse abuses both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Promoting the “Zionism is racism” slogan is a cornerstone of BDS. For proponents of this strategy, the term “occupation” does not refer to an Israeli presence in territories acquired in the 1967 war, but rather refers to the establishment of Israel in 1948. In other

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19 The term “Nakba” or “catastrophe” is used by pro-Palestinian activists to refer to the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.


21 Campaign materials on file with the author.
words, this movement rejects a State of Israel within any boundaries. BDS rallies are frequently marred by violence, particularly in the United Kingdom, where patrons of Israeli goods are often threatened and intimidated.\textsuperscript{22} According to the BDS National Committee, a coalition of dozens of organizations that includes many EU- and European-funded NGOs:

The sources of Israel’s regime are found in the racist ideology of late 19th century European colonialism which was adopted by the dominant stream of the Zionist movement (World Zionist Organization, Jewish Agency, Jewish National Fund, a.o.) in order to justify and recruit political support for its colonial project of an exclusive Jewish state in Palestine (i.e. in the area of current Israel and the OPT). Thus, secular political Zionism translated ancient religious-spiritual notions of Jews as “a chosen people” and of “Eretz Israel” into an aggressive and racist, political colonial program, which—based on the doctrine that Jews were a nation in political terms with superior claims to Palestine—called to “redeem” Palestine, which was declared to be “a land without people.”\textsuperscript{23}

BDS campaigns also frequently utilize classic theological antisemitic tropes such as the blood libel. In a notorious campaign in 2004, Oxfam Belgium released a poster of a Jaffa orange dripping with blood, reading “Israeli fruits have a bitter taste … reject the occupation of Palestine, don’t buy Israeli fruits and vegetables” (see Appendix, Image 3). In May 2010, representatives from the NIF- and EU-funded Coalition of Women for Peace (CWP) and the EU-funded Israel Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD), participated in an anti-Israel divestment rally in Brussels, targeting Dexia, a bank with an Israeli subsidiary. During the event, one rally leader drank “blood” out of a wine glass—an apparent reference to the Medieval-era libel of Jews drinking Christian blood—supposedly to symbolize Israel’s alleged brutality (see Appendix, Image 4).

International NGO “superpowers” are active in the BDS movement as well and as such contribute to the spread of contemporary antisemitism as defined by the EU and others. Human Rights Watch (HRW) is a proponent of the Caterpillar boycott campaign,\textsuperscript{24} and Oxfam is involved in the boycott effort against Israeli cosmetics manufacturer Ahava.\textsuperscript{25} Amnesty International and Oxfam campaigned for an arms embargo against Israel at a March 2009 session of the UK House of Commons.\textsuperscript{26} Oxfam joined NGOs Trocaire, Diakonia, Christian Aid, and others calling for the suspension of the


EU-Israel Association Agreement. These organizations also engaged in lobbying throughout Europe, hoping to block Israel’s entry into the OECD.

The BDS National Committee (BNC) not only targets companies doing business with Israel, but has waged aggressive attacks against Zionist and Jewish organizations as “parastatal agents” of Israel. These attacks involve

[e]ngaging in judicial and criminal pursuit and accountability against, and applying pressure to remove the charity status and tax exemptions from, the Zionist organizations worldwide, including the World Zionist Organization, the Jewish Agency, and the Jewish National Fund, and dealing with them legally as racist, colonial institutions.

As noted above, Badil (which is also a BNC leader) organized a “targeted campaign to expose the lies of AIPAC and the Anti-Defamation League and to expose the Jewish and Zionist community’s double standards regarding Nakba & Occupation.”

4. APARTHEID RHETORIC

A key component of the Durban Strategy is to equate Israel with apartheid South Africa, despite the manifest differences between the two countries. Former South African dissident Benjamin Pogrund has remarked that the term “apartheid” is used “because it comes easily to hand: it is a lazy label for the complexities of the Middle East conflict.” Irwin Cotler notes that “the indictment of Israel as an apartheid state … also involves the call for the dismantling of Israel…” The singling-out of Israel as an “apartheid state,” therefore, is a form of incitement and in itself may be an expression of racism.

NGO campaigns invoking the apartheid canard take several forms, including: (1) gratuitous use of apartheid rhetoric; (2) characterizing the Arab-Israeli conflict as motivated by alleged Jewish race-hatred of Arabs, rather than one based on competing national and territorial claims; (3) disregarding the role of Arab bigotry; (4) ignoring the context of terror; (5) claiming all alleged violations of human rights and humanitarian law rise to the level of “apartheid,” albeit only if committed by Israel; (6) hypocritically accusing Israel of “apartheid” while actively participating in the political process and enjoying the benefits conferred by the state; and (7) ignoring practices in Arab and Muslim countries that more closely resemble apartheid South Africa.

27 Although the EU has association agreements with Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and other abusive and authoritarian regimes, these NGOs have not engaged in any substantive lobbying efforts to suspend these agreements.


30 For more on these campaigns, see Anne Herzberg, “NGO ‘Apartheid State’ Campaign: Deliberately Immoral or Intellectually Lazy?” NGO Monitor, March 22, 2010, available at: <http://www.ngo-monitor.org/article/ngo_apartheid_state_campaign_deliberately_immoral_or_intellectually_lazy>. 
Despite claims of being founded in principles of universal human rights and international law, many of these NGO allegations and legal arguments originate with the PLO’s Negotiations Affairs Department and were developed for propaganda purposes. Again, European and foundation funding plays a significant role in facilitating these campaigns, including grants from the New Israel Fund. Such funding is clearly inconsistent with a March 2010 statement by NIF CEO Daniel Sokatch, claiming that NIF “deeply disagree[s] with the use of ‘apartheid’ in the Israeli context. It is a historically inaccurate and inflammatory term that serves only to demonize Israel and alienate a majority of Jews around the world, including those who care deeply about issues of democracy, human rights, social justice and peace.”

Some notable examples of “apartheid” rhetoric from NGOs include a statement by Sarah Leah Whitson, director of HRW’s Mid-East North Africa Division, who claimed that Israel has put “a vastly discriminatory system of laws and policies in place that create a system of apartheid under any legal definition.” Jessica Montell, Executive Director of the NIF- and European-funded B’Tselem, commented that “the word apartheid is useful for mobilizing people because of its emotional power. In some cases, the situation in the West Bank is worse than apartheid in South Africa.” NIF- and EU-funded Adalah joined with European-funded Al Haq to issue a 302-page publication entitled, “Occupation, Colonialism, Apartheid? A Re-Assessment of Israel’s Practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territories under International Law.” The publication declares Israel guilty of “colonialism” and “apartheid” and purports to catalogue Israel’s “violations” including implementing a “Grand Apartheid” policy by placing Palestinians in “reserves and ghettoes.” The report concludes by demanding the international community “request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice regarding Israel’s practices of apartheid and colonialism.”

5. “JUDAIZATION”

Many of the NGOs invoking the Durban Strategy use the terms “Judaization” or “Judaize” in their campaigning. The PLO developed these expressions to erase the Jewish historical connection to the region, as well as to suggest that the very presence of Jews is alien and unacceptable. The use of the term “Judaize,” therefore, is an articulation of anti-Jewish discrimination.

This terminology bolsters several NGO themes, including that Jews are “foreign, colonial occupiers” in the region; that Jewish self-determination is “racist” and illegitimate, as opposed to Palestinian self-determination, which is an international legal obligation; and that the Law of Return and symbols such as the Israeli flag or national anthem are “racist” even though most European countries and all Islamic countries have official state religions and official state religious symbols. The term “Judaize” is not only used for East Jerusalem and the West Bank, but also to delegitimize Jewish neighborhoods in Jaffa, Acre (Akko), and the Negev—or, in other words, challenging the legitimacy of a Jewish presence even within the Green Line. While it is perhaps not surprising that the

31 Regardless of one’s views on the current legal status of East Jerusalem and the West Bank, the continual historical Jewish presence in these areas prior to 1948 is also denied by these organizations as is the destruction of Jewish symbols and infrastructure in this area during the Jordanian occupation from 1948 to 1967.
PLO would employ such terminology, it is immoral for human rights organizations to use phrases supporting ethnically-based exclusion.

Ir Amim, an Israeli NGO funded by the EU, NIF, Sweden, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, claimed in an October 2009 update that

[T]his process of accelerated Judaization and Israelization in East Jerusalem, … is part of an effort to change the existing discourse … of which the Muslim Quarter becomes “the renewed Jewish Quarter,” the Old City and the Holy Basin become “ancient Jerusalem.”

Similarly, in a September 2010 publication on alleged Israeli policy in Jerusalem, entitled Unsafe Space, the Association of Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) stated the report’s purpose was “to bring to light the stories of the Palestinian residents, to reveal the experience of life in the neighborhood as others attempt to ‘Judaize’ it.” Other NGOs that frequently invoke “Judaization” terminology include European-funded NGOs Defence for Children International—Palestine Section, the Alternative Information Center, and the Palestinian Center for Human Rights.

6. NAZI/HOLOCAUST COMPARISONS

As highlighted in the EU working definition, “accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust” and “drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis” are forms of antisemitism. Many NGOs engage in these accusations and comparisons and use Nazi or Holocaust rhetoric in their campaigns to describe alleged Israeli abuses toward the Palestinians. Terms such as “ghettos,” “ethnic cleansing,” “genocide,” and “concentration camps” frequently appear.

In a June 2007 report, Amnesty International referred to Israel’s security barrier, erected to protect against a wave of Palestinian suicide bombings targeting restaurants, malls, and buses that had killed hundreds and wounded thousands, as “the Wall of Death.” This phrase mirrored an appellation used to describe the notorious site near Block 11 at Auschwitz where thousands of prisoners were summarily executed.

Many NGOs exploited the Gaza War and the Goldstone process to engage in this form of demonization. For instance, Michael Warschawski of the European-funded Alternative Information Center issued highly inflammatory remarks during the war, offensively stating:

Ehud Barak, Tzipi Livni, Gabi Ashkenazi and Ehud Olmert don’t you dare show your faces at any memorial ceremony for the heroes of the Warsaw Ghetto, Lublin, Vilna or Kishinev…. You are not representing any continuity with the Warsaw Ghetto, because today the Warsaw Ghetto is right in front of you, targeted by your own tanks and artillery, and its name is Gaza….

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32 ACRI is funded by NIF, EU, Sweden, UK, Norway, the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, the Ford Foundation, and Christian Aid.
34 For more on the Alternative Information Center, see <http://www.ngo-monitor.org/article/alternative_information_center_aic_profile>.
Al Mezan, a Gaza-based NGO that receives substantial funding from the EU, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Ireland accused Israeli officials of “inciting a ‘holocaust’ (genocide).”

In its submission to the Goldstone panel, a group of NIF- and EU-funded NGOs36 (Gisha, ACRI, Adalah, Yesh Din, HaMoked, Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, and the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel) claimed that “a shocking picture emerges of harsh, inhuman and degrading conditions … [m]any prisoners … were held in pits in the ground, 1-3 meters deep, apparently dug by the army,” harkening to the execution and cremation pits used by the Nazis to exterminate Jews.

During the public hearings of the Goldstone mission, member Desmond Travers asked pre-vetted37 representatives of the Gaza-based NGO Gaza Community Mental Health Project (funded by the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Torino) a question laced with antisemitic undertones and which elicited a comparison of Israelis to Nazis:

We have heard testimony of great, uh, violence, seemingly un-militarily, unnecessary violence inflicted particularly on children. There have been instances of the shooting of children in front of their parents. As an ex-soldier I find that kind of action to be very, very strange and very unique. I would like to ask you if you have any professional insights as to what mindset or what conditioning or what training could bring around a state of behavior that would cause a soldier, a fellow human being to shoot children in front of their parents. Do you have any professional insights into that kind of behavior? [emphasis added]

In response, the representatives stated that:

With time the Israeli soldier has the image of absolute superiority…. There we see the arrogance of power and he uses it without thinking of humanity at all … inside Israel there is an identification with the aggressor, the Nazis.

Imagery associated with the Holocaust such as emaciated prisoners caged behind barbed wire or children holding up their hands while being threatened at gunpoint by soldiers is also commonly used by NGOs (see Appendix, Images 5 and 6). Other NGOs, like NIF-funded and EU-funded Mada al-Carmel and Adalah, accuse Israel and Jews of “exploiting” the Holocaust at the expense of Palestinian self determination:

We believe that exploiting [the Holocaust] and its consequences in order to legitimize the right of the Jews to establish a state at the expense of the Palestinian people serves to belittle the universal, human, and moral lessons to be learned from this catastrophic event, which concerns the whole of humanity.38

37 Witnesses chosen by the Goldstone mission to appear at the public hearings were extensively interviewed prior to their “testimony.”
7. CHRISTIAN ANTISEMITISM, SUPERSESSIONISM

Classic Christian antisemitism accuses Jews of deicide, the blood libel, and the libel of “poisoning wells” and advances supersessionism (replacement theology). Many NGOs have adopted these themes, substituting Palestinians as the new victims of these alleged Jewish crimes. These campaigns are highly offensive and reflect a gross insensitivity to interfaith relationships.

Sabeel Ecumenical Liberation Theology Center, a Jerusalem-based NGO, is a leader in the anti-Israel church divestment movement and frequently campaigns against a two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Palestinian Anglican, Naim Ateek, heads the organization and frequently employs antisemitic theological themes and imagery in his speeches and publications. His 2001 Easter message stated that “it seems to many of us that Jesus is on the cross again with thousands of crucified Palestinians around him. … The Israeli government crucifixion system is operating daily.” In a February 2001 sermon, Ateek intimated that Israel was responsible for the death of Jesus (the Palestinians): “Israel has placed a large boulder, a big stone that has metaphorically shut off the Palestinians in a tomb. It is similar to the stone placed on the entrance of Jesus’ tomb.” Sabeel is funded by the Swedish government via Diakonia, a Christian humanitarian aid organization.

Other NGOs exploit Christian holidays to issue condemnations of the Jewish state that invoke these classical antisemitic theological themes. In 2006, British NGO War on Want issued a Christmas card entitled, “Mary and Joseph being frisked on their way to find an inn for the night,” showing a pregnant Mary and Joseph being searched by IDF officers at the security barrier in Bethlehem (see Appendix, Image 7). Similarly, Amos Trust sells a “wall nativity” scene where a model of the security barrier runs through a traditional nativity setting (see Appendix, Image 8). Christian Aid promoted a Christmas appeal, entitled “Child of Bethlehem,” featuring the story of “Jessica,” a seven-year-old Palestinian girl allegedly injured by Israeli soldiers (see Appendix, Image 9) Christian Aid was heavily criticized by both Jewish and Christian groups for exploiting Christmas for its anti-Israel advocacy.

These anti-Israel theological campaigns are not only confined to Christian NGOs but are also promoted by NGO “superpowers.” During the 2006 Lebanon War, Human Rights Watch’s executive director, Ken Roth issued a supersessionist anti-Jewish slur that denigrated the Old Testament, claiming that Israel’s actions were motivated by “an eye for an eye—or more accurately in this case twenty eyes for an eye” which “may have been the morality of a more primitive moment.”

Modern-day expressions of these Medieval libels frequently reoccur in NGO campaigning. These include accusations of Israel uniquely imposing “collective punishment” on the population of Gaza and claims of a systematic Israeli policy to deliberately target Palestinian and Lebanese civilians in counter-terror operations. The context of Hamas and Hezbollah attacks against Israeli citizens are minimized or even erased.


During the Gaza War these types of accusations were particularly pronounced and also underlay the conclusions of the Goldstone report. Diakonia, for instance, declared that “[Israel’s] policy amounts to the collective punishment of the entire Gaza population.…” Oxfam charged that Israel engaged in “… massive and disproportionate violence against Gazan civilians in violation of international law.” A joint submission to Goldstone by ACRI, Gisha, Adalah, PHR-I, HaMoked, PCATI, and Yesh Din claimed Israel “deliberately and knowingly shelled civilian institutions.…” PCHR joined the chorus by alleging that Israel perpetrated “indiscriminate killing and continued systematic destruction of all the Palestinian institutions and civilian facilities in the Gaza Strip.”

Ken Roth also played a highly public role in promoting these charges. In December 2009, Roth wrote, “[t]oday, the prevailing U.S. doctrine—most notably in Afghanistan—stresses the importance of protecting civilians.…" 41 Israel’s view [is] that one prevails in asymmetric warfare by pummeling rather than protecting civilians.…”42 To support his claim, Roth misrepresented remarks of former Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni:

there is strong evidence that Israel wanted Gazan civilians to pay the price for Hamas’s abuses … as … Tzipi Livni, said: ‘I heard that Hamas declared the man killed by a rocket in Ashkelon “one of the Zionists” despite being an Israeli Arab. They don’t make a distinction, and neither should we.’

Roth used this quote as proof that the IDF was ordered by the highest levels of the Israeli government to indiscriminately kill Palestinians in Gaza. In fact, Livni was actually rebuking Israeli Knesset Member Ahmed Tibi for his remarks exacerbating racial divisions between Israeli Jews and Arabs and was encouraging Israelis to embrace a common identity in the face of rocket attacks from Gaza. Roth omitted this context entirely from his article, including Tibi’s remarks, in order to bolster his anti-Israel slander.43

Several Christian NGOs, including Christian Peacemaker Teams and other groups active in the BDS movement, accuse Israel of poisoning the Palestinian water supply. Amnesty International has also aided these claims. In October 2009, Amnesty released a 112-page report, entitled “Troubled Waters—Palestinians Denied Fair Access to Water,” claiming that Israel enacts “water policies and practices” in order to “discriminate against the Palestinian population of the OPT.” However, the report ignored evidence not only that Israel provides West Bank Palestinians with more water than required

41 Roth repeatedly advances this claim even though the empirical evidence does not support his charges. In fact, the United States and NATO have a much higher ratio of civilian casualties to combatants than Israel. For instance, in the November-December 2004 Battle of Fallujah in Iraq, US and British troops were alleged to have killed several thousand civilians. A forthcoming study examining the effectiveness of US targeted killings in Afghanistan and Pakistan have found that an average of nine civilians are killed for every combatant. The rate for Israeli operations was found to be two civilians for every combatant.


43 When NGO Monitor pointed out that Roth had distorted Livni’s remarks, HRW posted an “explanation” on its web page reprinting the op-ed, claiming the statement was “ambiguous” (even though it was not). No correction, however, was posted on the Foreign Policy in Focus site where the original piece is still available, nor did HRW amend its earlier reports that had made this same claim.
under the Oslo framework but also that in some areas Palestinian water thieves were responsible for stealing up to 50% of supplies. Amnesty also claimed that Palestinian water consumption (60-70 liters per person per day), is “the lowest in the region” even though this level is similar, if not better, than that of comparable cities like Amman, Tunis, and Algiers. Notably, the report was issued to coincide with a November 2009 speaking tour in the United States organized by the Palestinian Cultural Academic Boycott of Israel (PCABI) movement, entitled “Israel’s Control of Water as a Tool of Apartheid and Means of Ethnic Cleansing.”

Similarly, Amnesty International was also responsible for originating a claim during the Gaza War that Israel had “wantonly” destroyed Gaza’s only flour mill in order to hamper the Palestinian food supply. It further claimed that the mill’s “owners are adamant that the site was neither a launch pad for rockets nor a weapons cache, and the Israeli army has provided no evidence to the contrary.” Documentary evidence released by the UN (UNITAR) and the IDF refuted Amnesty’s version of events, clearly showing that the mill was damaged by artillery during a firefight with Hamas combatants.

8. CONCLUSION

Given the tens of millions of dollars funneled each year by European governments and prominent foundations to NGOs that are used to promote themes that fall under the EU’s own definition of antisemitism, it is important to highlight these examples and bring them to the attention of those underwriting such NGO activities. These funding agencies must recognize their role in spreading antisemitism by financing organizations that engage in these highly offensive and inflammatory activities. It is critical that funders adopt guidelines to prevent further abuse of taxpayer largesse and generous donations. It is also essential that such funding is regularly monitored and independent evaluations are conducted with mechanisms put in place for oversight. At present, little to no substantive evaluation of NGO activities is conducted by the European Union, governments or foundation funders.

Peace between Israelis and Palestinians is one of the most complex political issues of our time. Solutions cannot be found, however, when problems are solely viewed through a narrow ideological lens and morality and universal principles are exploited to promote bias and racism. Palestinian self-determination cannot be considered a just cause if it is obtained by propagating antisemitism—the “oldest hatred”—or by denigrating and seeking to exterminate Jewish self-determination rights. Hopefully, the critical questions raised in this paper will inform the debate and lead to the necessary reforms. Without such changes, peace and coexistence will be farther away than ever.

45 Id.
46 UNITAR, “Satellite Image Analysis in Support to the United Nations Fact Finding Mission to the Gaza Conflict”, July 31, 2009, at 33, available at: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/9/docs/UNITAR_UNOSAT_FFMGC_31July2009.pdf>. The UNITAR report notes that most of the damage found at the mill appeared to have occurred on January 16-18, 2009 (not January 10 as claimed by Amnesty) and was the result of “ground fire,” not an airstrike.
APPENDIX: NGO IMAGERY

Image 1: Flyer distributed at the NGO Forum of the 2001 UN Durban Conference

Image 2: Award-winning submission to Badil’s 2009-10 Annual Al-Awda Award

Image 3: Oxfam “blood orange” poster
Image 4: Anti-Israel divestment rally in Brussels, May 12, 2010

Image 5: “ Civilians Under Siege”

Image 6: Poster advertising Israeli Apartheid Week

Image 7: War on Want Christmas Card

Image 8: Amos Trust’s “Small Wall Nativity”

Image 9: Christian Aid’s “Bethlehem’s Child” campaign poster
The Image of Israel and Israelis in the French, British, and Italian Press During the 1982 Lebanon War

Marianna Scherini*

1. INTRODUCTION

The current debate on “new antisemitism” often identifies the media as one of the main sources of today’s antisemitism in European societies due to its representation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In fact, a majority of observers highlight the media’s liability for depicting the State of Israel as a “collective Jew,” thus providing a convenient channel for the outpouring of prejudice and—sometimes—hatred against Jews in general. In 2005, for example, Robert Wistrich, highlighted that

The problem in Europe today comes primarily from civil society—especially from the educated elites and the media, whose barely disguised hostility to Israel has created a new climate of suspicion toward Jews. This atmosphere is in many ways more reminiscent of fin-de-siècle Europe during the Dreyfus Affair than the 1930s. Then, as now, with Israel, the Jew in the collective sense was stigmatized as a pariah in European society.1

Yet, the issue is controversial. Opinions, as formulated during the a decade of debate, diverge on the main question of whether and, if so, when anti-Zionist statements and criticism of Israel turn into antisemitic discourse.2

Among those who criticize the notion of what Wistrich refers to as “antisemitic anti-Zionism,”3 the philosopher Brian Klug argues that “the depth and bitterness of [the Arab-Israeli] conflict is sufficient to explain, for the most part, the strength and intensity of the polemic against the state.”4 In Klug’s view, most anti-Israeli opinions, especially

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3 Wistrich, Antisemitism in Western Europe, p. 5.
those expressed in Muslim and left-wing or liberal environments, originate from “mere” anti-Western or anti-imperialist rather than anti-Jewish feelings. Klug does not rule out that criticism of Israeli politics could sometimes hide antisemitic contents, but he considers that only those cases that present classic anti-Jewish stereotypes (either in the text or subtext) can be addressed as antisemitic without fear of emphasizing the phenomenon of the new antisemitism.\footnote{Ibid., p. 131. In Klug’s view, the phenomenon of the “new antisemitism” in European societies is greatly exaggerated by scholars and commentators because of “a certain outlook or mentality: a way of viewing the world such that a person is disposed to overstate hostility towards Israel and Jews, or to assume that this hostility is antisemitic, or both.” Brian Klug, “Is Europe a lost cause? The European debate on antisemitism and the Middle East conflict,” Patterns of Prejudice, Vol. 39, No. 1 (2005), p. 47.}

This ultimately reduces the question where to draw the line between legitimate and antisemitic criticism of Israel to a matter of interpretation. Most authors in fact identify the same stereotypes whose antisemitic contents Klug denies as the latest form of classic antisemitic representations, analyzing how the same “patterns of anti-Jewish prejudice” have adapted to the new reality in which the State of Israel exists. The main tendency when analyzing the media discourse on Israel is therefore to trace back and expose the common roots of past antisemitic stereotypes and today’s representations of Israel.\footnote{See Manfred Gerstenfeld, “Anti-Israelism and Anti-Semitism: Common Characteristics and Motifs,” Jewish Political Studies Review, Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2 (Spring 2007). Gerstenfeld examines the “common characteristics and motifs” between anti-Israelism and antisemitism, highlighting for instance how the widespread representation of the Israelis as Nazis is clearly a new form of the past antisemitic core theme that identified the Jews with absolute evil. For an analysis of anti-Zionist contents underlying antisemitism focused on the British context, see Winston Pickett, “Nasty or Nazi? The Use of Antisemitic Topoi by the Left-Liberal Media,” in Paul Iganski and Barry Kosmin, eds., A New Antisemitism? Debating Judeophobia in 21st Century Britain, Profile Book/Institute for Jewish Policy Research, London, 2003, pp. 149-166.}

The present article contributes to this debate from a historical perspective. It aims to assess how the media representation of Israel was conveyed at a critical moment and turning point in Israel’s history: the events in Lebanon of September 1982.\footnote{As stressed by the literature on new antisemitism, the media representation of Israel that developed during the period following these events contributed significantly to shaping images of “the Israelis” that are still vivid today. See, for instance, Pierre André Taguieff, La nouvelle propagande antijuive, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 2010, p. 145; cf. Gerstenfeld, “Anti-Israelism and Anti-Semitism,” p. 85.}

This article argues that although it encompassed extremely negative features, the image of Israel and “the Israelis” painted during this time was not part of the classic antisemitic discourse. Although not (entirely) disconnected from past antisemitic representations, these features instead generated an image specifically describing the Israelis, conveying a “new” set of stereotypes about them. At the same time, by conveying a new perception of the role of Jewish communities in the Diaspora vis-à-vis Israel, the press indeed represented Israel as “the collective Jew.” However, the Diaspora Jews were compared to the image of Israelis. In other words, they were observed through the lens of the “new” representation of Israel rather than vice versa.

This article also addresses a second issue that emerges from the current debate. Most scholars and commentators indicate the key role played by the left-wing media in relation to today’s antisemitism in Europe. This article argues that, although they were...
more prominent in the left-wing press, the stereotypes concerning Israel were not confined to this perspective but were shared by the press in general.

The article analyzes the coverage of the events in five major mainstream newspapers from three European countries. These include the conservative Corriere della Sera and the left-wing La Repubblica for Italy, the conservative The Times and the left-wing The Guardian for the United Kingdom, and the left-wing Le Monde for France. The analysis is based primarily on news articles and aims to examine the features of “the Israelis” conveyed by the press in its daily reporting of events. Attention is also given to leading articles and commentaries, which expressed the newspapers political line throughout this period.  

The article is organized around the chronologic sequence of events, with a view to underlining significant evolutions in the discourse. It concentrates on two events that immediately followed the assassination of Lebanese President-elect Bashir Gemayel on September 14, 1982, namely the Israeli military intervention in West Beirut and the massacre of Palestinian refugees in the camps of Sabra and Shatila on September 16-18, 1982.

2. THE PRESS COVERAGE OF THE ASSASSINATION OF BASHIR GEMAYEL AND THE ISRAELI MILITARY OPERATION IN WEST BEIRUT

At the beginning of September 1982, the Lebanon war, which had broken out in June of the same year, seemed to be headed toward a solution. Furthermore, a new diplomatic era likely to usher in a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict seemed within reach. These developments benefited from a series of events that occurred during the preceding month, including the election of Maronite leader Bashir Gemayel as president of Lebanon and the evacuation of the PLO’s political and military leadership from Beirut.

However, on September 14, hopes for a peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflict were shattered when President-elect Gemayel was assassinated in a bombing in Beirut and Israeli forces moved in toward the western (Muslim) areas of the Lebanese capital a few hours later.

These events, which thrust the Middle East back into the limelight, received great attention in the press. In the following days, all the opening headlines focused on the Lebanese news, although coverage of similar events varied significantly among newspapers. This aspect attests to the variety of approaches taken when dealing with Middle East issues and particularly Israel.

While news articles described the destruction caused by the explosion and reported in detail the relief work at the scene of the attack, the press simultaneously devoted prominent attention to the portrait of the assassinated president.

In the British newspapers, Gemayel was depicted as a controversial figure. Both The Times and The Guardian reported on the violence that had marked his past deeds as the leader of the Maronite Phalangist militia. They minutely described some of his cruelest actions against Maronite opponents in the struggle for the group’s leadership as well as against the Palestinians during Lebanon’s civil war. On the other hand, both newspapers...
pers praised Gemayel for his conversion from a military to a political approach after his election to the Lebanese presidency and for his call for reconciliation between Christians and Muslims. Gemayel was the only Lebanese leader with enough support among different communities to be able to restore the country’s sovereignty. He was also the closest ally Israel had in Lebanese politics. For these reasons, the two British newspapers concluded that his death had led to a political void, which in turn could lead to the destabilization of the whole region. The newspapers thus assessed the importance and implications of this event mainly from the point of view of international relations.

A completely different interpretation of the attack appeared in Le Monde. The French newspaper chose to report on this event from the point of view of Lebanese society or at least one of its political factions. Both through the coverage of the news by Beirut correspondent Lucien George, a left-wing Lebanese national, and the numerous commentaries and editorials written by some of the newspaper’s most prominent columnists, Le Monde drew an hagiographic portrait of Gemayel. While completely omitting the violent aspects of his past, it described Gemayel as a charismatic and “romantic” leader, driven by “an almost insane passion for his country” and “a destiny to save Lebanon.” Moreover, the newspaper emphasized the consensus Gemayel enjoyed, which went beyond the ethnic and political boundaries of his own group, representing Lebanese society as unanimously animated by a determination to regain political unity after years of civil war. By doing so, it clearly ignored the conflicts that were still affecting Lebanon at the time, given that its recent past was marked by a bloody civil war.

The same perspective appeared in Italy’s La Repubblica, which was completely subordinate to Le Monde in this respect. In fact, its coverage and interpretation of events were supplied exclusively by Le Monde’s Beirut correspondent, Lucien George, who also acted as a correspondent for the Italian newspaper and whose articles were translated into Italian and published in La Repubblica either on the same day or the day after appearing in Le Monde.

Finally, another interpretation of this event appeared in the Corriere della Sera. In presenting Gemayel’s biography, the Italian daily emphasized the most brutal aspects of his past and explaining them by reference to the alleged “essence” of Lebanese politics and society, which it described—using an Orientalist paradigm—as being based on “feuds” and “feudal systems,” “principles unaccounted for in Western democracies.” The newspaper did not show further interest in the complex reality of Lebanon, thus failing

11 Among others, the newspaper’s editor André Fontaine and the newspaper’s Cairo correspondent Jean-Pierre Pérontel-Hugoz.
to transmit a realistic frame of reference for comprehending the attack and its implications for Lebanese politics and the situation in the Middle East.

From the beginning, the press also covered another issue relating to the attack. Ignoring who the attackers might have been (only later historiography would point to Syrian responsibility), reports, comments, and leading articles speculated about possible instigators and compiled lists of past and present enemies of Gemayel. Attention focused on the Palestinians, the Syrians, and the Maronite Franjieh and Chamoun families, but without any further analysis of these groups’ conflicts with Gemayel or their political views.

While the issue was abandoned by the British press, presumably due to lack of information, the Italian newspapers and Le Monde continued to speculate in the following days. In these newspapers, the hypothesis that the attack might have been committed by the Israelis—which had first been formulated in the Lebanese left-wing press and had been explicitly dismissed as irrelevant by The Guardian—was closely examined and received more and more credit. In news articles and comments, both La Repubblica and Corriere della Sera devoted increasing attention to the “advantages” that Israel might have gained from Gemayel’s death, while in Le Monde this issue appeared, albeit marginally, in George’s articles.

Concerning the reasons why the Israelis might have wanted Gemayel’s death, these newspapers supported the hypothesis that the Israelis wanted to get rid of Gemayel to prevent the stabilization of Lebanon, in order to forestall a potential withdrawal from the occupied territories of Gaza and the West Bank. Moreover, by highlighting the recent tensions between the Israeli government and Gemayel, because of the latter’s refusal to sign a peace treaty with Israel, the Italian newspapers regarded the Israeli leaders’ desire to take revenge on an ex-ally who had become recalcitrant as a second motive. For example, the Corriere della Sera supported the opinion of unspecified Lebanese Muslim leaders who stated that “the Israelis have killed Gemayel because he was adopting a hard line against them … they do not forgive whoever hampers their plans and they would do anything to boycott any attempts to bring peace to the region.” Because of the attention and interest it received, the hypothesis regarding Israeli involvement in the attack eventually gained prominence and legitimacy, despite the fact that it was not presented as a certainty.

From the outset, the news of the bombing against Gemayel was connected to the entry of Israeli troops into West Beirut. This was not only because of the sequence of events (articles reporting the attack appeared side-by-side with those reporting the military events), but also because the press, with the exception of The Guardian, interpreted Gemayel’s death as providing Israel with a “pretext” or “excuse” to launch a new military operation.

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17 Sandro Viola, “Continua l’operazione Pace in Galilea…,” La Repubblica, September 17, 1982.
The Guardian was the only newspaper that, in accordance with the official declarations of the Israeli authorities, described the operation as a search for hidden arms depots and the Palestinian militiamen who had remained in Beirut following the PLO evacuation, who were said to number between 2,000 and 4,000. The newspaper therefore interpreted Israel’s motive as preventing the military reorganization of the PLO and its allies in the political void caused by the assassination of Gemayel.\(^{20}\)

This interpretation also appeared in The Times, which announced the news of the military operation on its front page, stating that Begin had acted to preserve gains, i.e. to prevent the redeployment of PLO military groups in West Beirut.\(^{21}\) However, The Times also presented a second reading, which explicitly denied the officially Israeli position. Indeed, on the same front page, a report by Beirut correspondent Robert Fisk focused on the invalidation of the official Israeli declarations by reporting the words of the Lebanese Prime Minister Chaffiq Wazzan and the opinion of a young member of the Communist Party, who both referred to these declarations as “an excuse.”\(^{22}\) In another report on the same day, Robert Fisk reaffirmed this interpretation by linking the military action to the fact that “there was a favorite saying among Israeli officers in Beirut during the past four months: nature, they would say, abhors a vacuum.” In the correspondent’s words, “this anodyne phrase accompanied each tiny shift forward”\(^{23}\) that the Israelis had made in Lebanon.

Thus, although The Times, like The Guardian, gave a “rational” explanation for the Israeli intervention, the newspaper also ascribed it to an almost anthropologic factor: the fact that the Israelis liked to play the lord and master.

Conversely, the Italian press and Le Monde concentrated exclusively on the interpretation that denied any tactical or strategic purpose to Israel. Accordingly, the military intervention was explained by the emotions driving the Israeli leadership, particularly Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, speaking of their “dreams,” “desires,” and “ambition.” Le Monde, for instance, stated that the Defense Minister “has decided to take advantage of the attack against Bashir Gemayel to fulfill the occupation he has dreamt about since the beginning of the war.”\(^{24}\) Similarly, in the Corriere della Sera, the Israeli intervention was judged as being “from the beginning Sharon’s objective,” who “having gotten rid of the PLO, was waiting for the occasion to ‘complete the work’ and get rid of every terrorist, every PLO supporter, even the Palestinian refugees themselves.”\(^{25}\)

The interpretation of the operation as originating in irrational impulses was bolstered by the approach the newspapers adopted toward the military news, i.e. the way in which they reported the unfolding events. Alongside opinions and commentaries devoted to the examination of Israel’s possible motives behind the intervention, news


\(^{22}\) “Israeli troops advance as Lebanon buries its leader,” The Times, September 16, 1982.


articles described the events in extremely general terms, often using highly metaphorical language. All of this without any indication about the sequence of events, the quality of the troops and military means involved, or information about tactical and strategic decisions. News articles generically reported “gunfire and shooting,” “tanks progressing with confident slowness,” “combat aircraft flying low over the city,” and “forces tightening their grip” against residential areas of West Beirut. Moreover, the newspapers’ correspondents and special envoys contested the Israeli estimate that more than 1,000 militiamen remained in West Beirut. They further repeatedly reported that the Israeli targets (imaginary PLO and left-wing militias) only had at their disposal automatic machineguns, thereby suggesting there was an imbalance between the forces while also suggesting that the action was directed against civilians. For instance, Le Monde published a general report by its special envoy in Beirut as follows:

The kfir [missiles] awaken the city, and soon they throw people into shelters. The grip tightens on all sides, and, just before eight, the assault is launched. Tanks and commandos come up from the sea…Panic. Cars rush to a safe shelter. Women run, babies in their arms, toward the nearest shelter. Men follow them, carrying bread and water.

In this respect, The Guardian also gave a different account. It was the only newspaper to report a sequence of events, as well as the way the attack was conducted, together with an indication that the operation had taken place in an area that was the stronghold of Palestinian militias. The newspaper’s account therefore proves that information about what was going on was in fact available and that, using this information, events could be accounted for in a more comprehensive way.

3. THE SABRA AND SHATILA MASSACRES

The alarming Lebanese situation set in motion by Gemayel’s death suddenly took a dramatic turn with the massacres in the Palestinian refugees camps of Sabra and Shatila, in which, depending on the estimates, between 700 and 2,000 people were killed, most of whom were civilians. From September 19 onwards, news of the massacres made the front page headlines in all newspapers and news relating to these events monopolized the front pages during the following week.

Due to an initial lack of information about the exact nature of the massacres, the first reports described what had happened mainly through “television-style” descriptions of the destruction and the unburied corpses in the camps, as witnessed by the international


27 See, for instance, Leslie Plommer, “Israelis occupy Soviet buildings,” The Times, September 18, 1982: “The Israelis believe there are several thousand armed leftists and Palestinians still in West Beirut, but inside the camps they seemed to number to a few score of scared and trigger-happy guerrillas.”


journalists in Beirut who first entered the area after the killers had left. At the same time, these first accounts focused on Israel’s role in the massacres, which was also highlighted in headlines and leading articles.\(^{30}\) In fact, whilst rapidly reporting that the actual perpetrators of the massacres were confusedly identified by survivors as belonging either to the Phalangist militias or the Christian militia commanded by Major Saad Haddad (a military renegade who was Israel’s closest ally in Southern Lebanon), all reports mainly explored the Israeli leaders’ and soldiers’ responsibilities, either based on available information or in a hypothetical way. In fact, from the beginning and during the following days, this issue constituted the main focus of the majority of the commentaries and editorials.

Various newspapers blamed Israel with different degrees of responsibility. *Le Monde* and *La Repubblica* ascribed to Israel a direct involvement in the massacres. For instance, *Le Monde*’s first leading article commenting on the massacres asserted that with this episode Israel has reached the limits of the crazy logic that belongs to Begin, a paranoid folly that identifies every Palestinian as a terrorist—and therefore each Palestinian is believed to be one, the absolute evil to exterminate.\(^{31}\)

Similarly, *La Repubblica*’s leader explicitly identified Begin and Sharon as “the architects of the massacre,” adding that “we would never have imagined that the Israeli government could organize this latest manhunt (and womanhunt and childhunt) in the Palestinian camps in Beirut.”\(^{32}\)

During the following days *Le Monde* on three occasions devoted its second page entirely to opinions focused on Israel, discussing its involvement and role in the massacres, as well as the implications for the country at a political and moral level. Although various points of view were featured, those accusing Israel for the massacres were preponderant.\(^{33}\) Moreover, because *Le Monde* exclusively explored Israel’s involvement, its reading of the massacres clearly assigned more than a marginal or indirect role to Israel in the events, and instead portrayed it as the main character.

The *Corriere della Sera* ambiguously suggested there had been indirect Israeli involvement. Most of the news articles referred to the fact that Israeli soldiers were (only) indirectly involved for having failed to stop the killers in spite of their position around the camps’ perimeter. Nevertheless, the newspaper’s special envoy in Beirut, describing his conversation with a mother from Shatila whose family had been killed, declared that “we would like to suggest to the woman to put her four dead children, father, and husband on Begin’s desk.”\(^{34}\) Moreover, the newspaper’s leading article assigned major responsibility to the Israeli government, although it did not accuse the Israeli leaders of planning the massacres.\(^{35}\)


\(^{33}\) Among the newspaper’s most violent accusations of Israel, see, for instance, Tahar Ben Jelloun, “La haine de la paix,” *Le Monde*, September 22, 1982.


Similarly, in leading articles and opinion pieces, the British newspapers endorsed the theory of Israel’s indirect responsibility for having failed to stop the massacres and for being somewhat involved with the alleged killers at the military and political level.\(^{36}\) Two in-depth documentary reports, which appeared in the newspapers when more information had been gathered, provided a chronology of the massacres starting from the Israeli operation in West Beirut, thereby directly linking what had happened to Israel. Moreover, both reports—The Guardian’s suggestively entitled “Complicity in a massacre”—focused on Israel’s role and aimed to establish what the position and the involvement of the troops had been, as well as the degree of government’s responsibility that could be inferred from available information and official declarations.\(^{37}\)

While reports from Beirut continued to analyze Israel’s role in depth, in the following days all newspapers prominently featured reports from Israel that conveyed new information, mostly revealed by Israeli military correspondents in Beirut, about the government’s and the soldiers’ awareness that massacres were being perpetrated against civilians in the camps. The official version given by Defense Minister Sharon in the Knesset also received prominence. Sharon stated that, in agreement with top Phalangist leaders, Israel had indeed planned a military operation, which, according to those plans, should have been confined to action against armed militias still hiding in the camps, with Phalangists guaranteeing that no civilians would be harmed.

The press reported on this declaration as “evidence” of Israel’s responsibility, in some cases depicting it as an open “confession” by the defense minister. Sharon’s specific allegation that Phalangist militias had carried out the massacre, which was corroborated by evidence gathered by Israeli journalists in Lebanon at the same time, was either completely ignored or explicitly denied as fraudulent by the press.

Articles used the word “Phalangists” more frequently than the expression “Haddad’s forces” to refer to the killers, although correspondents continued to mention both armies, sometimes in the same story. Even more often, newspapers wrote about the perpetrators of the massacres while underlining their connection to Israel or, alternatively, their subordinate role vis-à-vis Israel. For instance, Robert Fisk, who often referred to the killers as “Christian militias” or “Israel’s Lebanese auxiliaries and allies,” wrote a report in The Times dealing primarily with the connection between the two groups and Israel rather than the two Lebanese armies.\(^{38}\)

The Guardian was the only newspaper that pointed to militia chief Elias Khobeika as the author of the massacres, as indicated by Sharon, and was also the only newspaper that explored the consequences this entailed for Lebanon.\(^{39}\) As evidence of Maronite involvement increasingly mounted, no other newspaper contemplated the political implications for Lebanon of Maronite involvement in the massacres, even when Bashir Gemayel’s brother, Amin, was elected to the Lebanese presidency.


\(^{38}\) Robert Fisk, “Militias are sustained by Israelis,” The Times, September 21, 1982.

\(^{39}\) Eric Silver, “Israel reveals Phalangist plans,” The Guardian, September 24, 1982. On the issue of the implications for Lebanon of Maronite involvement in the massacres, see, for instance, the following leading article: “The hands that held the smoking gun,” The Guardian, September 25, 1982.
The press also failed to investigate the motives behind the militias’ action. The first reports in the Corriere della Sera and The Guardian about the massacres raised this issue, but only marginally. In practice, both newspapers simply attributed the massacres to “endemic” Lebanese violence and the “atavistic hatred” nurtured by Christian groups against Muslims and Palestinians.\footnote{Ettore Mo, “Strage a Beirut Ovest: centinaia di morti,” Corriere della Sera, September 19, 1982; James MacManus, “Beirut stunned by barbarism,” The Guardian, September 20, 1982.} La Repubblica and Le Monde never contemplated and even explicitly denied the possibility that the Phalangists were animated by revenge because of the assassination of their leader Gemayel. The newspapers’ idyllic representation of the national unity fostered by Bashir clearly collided with the reality of the massacres. Both newspapers instead interpreted Sharon’s allegations as another Israeli attempt to destabilize Lebanon. This view was also shared by The Times, mainly through Fisk’s reports.\footnote{Robert Fisk, “Gemayel sworn in as President,” The Times, September 24, 1982.}

In contrast, the Israeli “motives” for organizing or allowing the massacres were analyzed in depth by the press, both in news reports and in leading articles and comments. All newspapers considered that one of the reasons behind the massacres was, as La Repubblica put it, “the intention of the Israelis to disperse the refugees in order to prevent national and cultural unity, which could favor the formation of armed groups.”\footnote{Miriam Mafai, “Anche commandos israeliani erano presenti alla strage,” La Repubblica, September 23, 1982; cf. Michel Tatu, “Le Liban, pays divisé ou Etat satellite?,” Le Monde, September 23, 1982.} This comment clearly assumes a political and strategic—and brutal—motive behind Israel’s involvement in the massacres. It was the only version presented by The Guardian, which, for instance, talked about a “strong suspicion that Mr. Begin, Mr. Sharon and a few more are intent on prolonging the [Lebanese] crisis to extract everything they can from it, including an atmosphere of terror among the Palestinians.”\footnote{“Israel needs an inquiry,” The Guardian, September 23, 1982.} However, this interpretation was marginal and the massacres were more often interpreted as deriving from Israeli leaders’ willingness to annihilate Palestinians, a “desire” belonging to the irrational sphere, beyond any political or military rationale.

For instance, the Corriere della Sera stated that the massacres were “absurd and found no justification in the logic of war.” It assigned their responsibility to Israel and suggested, using a comparison to World War II, that the Israelis were in fact animated by a desire of extermination similar to the one once suffered by the Jews during that period: “the Israelis have committed a historic crime. Indeed a people who came out of the lager could not and should not have committed the massacre of the Palestinians who stayed in the lager after the evacuation of the guerrilla.”\footnote{“Ora Israele condanni se stesso,” Corriere della Sera, September 19, 1982.}

La Repubblica conveyed a similar view. It held that the Jewish people had undergone a process of “mutation” in Israel by introducing the idea of an “Israeli disease” as the key to interpret events. The newspaper found the origin of the disease, characterized as the “emergence of a systematic and uncontrollable violence both at the level of the leadership and amongst the entire society,”\footnote{Francesco Alberoni, “Occhio per occhio dente per dente,” La Repubblica, September 22, 1982.} in the Jewish character of the state. In the editor’s words:

\textit{For instance, the Corriere della Sera stated that the massacres were “absurd and found no justification in the logic of war.” It assigned their responsibility to Israel and suggested, using a comparison to World War II, that the Israelis were in fact animated by a desire of extermination similar to the one once suffered by the Jews during that period: “the Israelis have committed a historic crime. Indeed a people who came out of the lager could not and should not have committed the massacre of the Palestinians who stayed in the lager after the evacuation of the guerrilla.”}\footnote{Francesco Alberoni, “Occhio per occhio dente per dente,” La Repubblica, September 22, 1982.}
[the origin of the disease] is primarily psychological. Israel has introjected part of the violence it has suffered from over centuries and now that it can, it gives it back furiously. From sacrificial victim, it has become executioner; from defenseless people, it has become a conqueror State.\footnote{Eugenio Scalfari, “Un male oscuro divora Israele,” \textit{La Repubblica}, September 22, 1982.}

Much like the Italian newspapers, \textit{Le Monde} considered that the Israeli leaders’ “folie exterminatrice” was one of the primary motives of the massacres. It featured several comments that assigned this irrational feeling to a “mutation” the Jews had undergone in Israel.

Finally, \textit{The Times} did not focus on the reasons behind the massacres. Nevertheless, a comment by Fisk conveyed the idea that the massacres were to be understood as an Israeli “obsession” vis-à-vis terrorism, thus once again placing the Israeli motivation primarily in the irrational sphere.\footnote{Robert Fisk, “Israel, victim of its own fears,” \textit{The Times}, September 29, 1982.}

4. \textit{“ANOTHER ISRAEL”: THE REACTIONS TO THE MASSACRES IN ISRAEL AND AMONG DIASPORA JEWS}

Another issue emerges from the analysis of the press during this period. The image of Israel described so far concentrates mainly on the representation of the government and the military. Following the massacres, newspapers also conveyed the image of what they described as “another Israel,” which referred not only to what was, in the newspapers’ judgment, “the finest part” of the Israeli public but also to Jews in the Diaspora.

From the beginning, the reactions of Israeli civil society to the massacres received attention in the press. News articles and reports from Israel described Israeli citizens as “anguished” and “distraught,” as well as “ashamed,” because of what had happened in the refugees camps.\footnote{See, for instance, Marco Bianchi, “Duramente repressa dalla polizia in Israele una manifestazione laborista contro Begin,” \textit{Corriere della Sera}, September 20, 1982; cf. Avigdor Livni, “Per Israele è l’ora della vergogna,” \textit{La Repubblica}, September 21, 1982; Eric Silver, “Israel reveals Phalangist plans,” \textit{The Guardian}, September 23, 1982; “The first and second schedules,” \textit{The Guardian}, September 29, 1982; “La faillite de M. Begin,” \textit{Le Monde}, September 21, 1982.} However, these feelings were never further explored. The news from Israel instead dealt with the political struggle that was raging in parliament between the government and the Labor opposition party, due to the refusal of the former to set up an impartial commission of inquiry into the involvement of the army and politicians in the events.

In addition to political coverage, correspondents reported on the protests that were taking place in the country. On September 25, the front page headlines of all newspapers were devoted to the news of a demonstration that the opposition and peace movements had organized the day before in Tel Aviv.

Although the news emphasized that this had been the biggest demonstration ever held in Israel since the foundation of the state, all newspapers also pointed out that only a minority of the population opposed the government. Moreover, no newspaper examined Israeli pacifism in and of itself. The demands of the pacifist movement therefore appeared to be directly related to the massacres and the opposition’s demands for a
commission of inquiry and the resignation of the government. The peace movement, as represented in the press, ultimately coincided with the parliamentary opposition.

The press’s analysis of Israeli society was thus limited to an investigation of political parties and political events, and the newspapers were unable to echo the various points of view circulating in Israeli social and political life.

Furthermore, from the start, the newspapers drew parallels between the Israeli reaction and the reaction of Jewish communities in the Diaspora. Both issues appeared in articles that were placed side-by-side on front and inside pages.

Several articles reported on the official declarations of the international Jewish community concerning the massacres and covered large and small initiatives promoted by Jewish institutions and groups. A protest organized by a few dozen Jews in Rome was thus compared to the 400,000-strong demonstration in Tel Aviv.

While the views of individual Israelis were either marginalized or ignored, on several occasions news articles conveyed the opinions of individual non-Israelis explicitly identified as Jews and gave prominence to interviews with intellectuals and community leaders.49

These “Jewish opinions” often unanimously condemned the Israeli deeds in Lebanon. As a consequence, newspapers represented Diaspora Jews as the true holders of the “original values of Judaism,”50 as opposed to the transgression of those values perpetrated by Israeli politicians.

The fact that, in the press’s view, the massacres concerned Diaspora Jews as well as Israelis can be clearly seen, for instance, in the following comment in the Corriere della Sera:

What is going on in the heart, in the mind, in the feelings of those who are called Levi or Segre, of those who have the name of a city and are linked, heart and soul, to the people of the “Exodus”? We asked intellectuals, writers … common people who are experiencing, once again, the nightmare of the uncertainty and of the Biblical curse, because of a now generalized condemnation.51

Clearly, the quality of the articles conveying the reaction of the Diaspora Jews was superior to that of the articles concerning the Israelis’ reaction. In addition, the repetition of these articles gave the impression that the members of the “other Israel” whom the newspapers talked about were first and foremost Diaspora Jews, whose image conflicted greatly with the negative image of the Israelis as presented in the news.

5. CONCLUSIONS

From this analysis of the newspapers’ coverage of the events in Lebanon of September 1982, three key issues emerge about the image of Israel and the Israelis as conveyed by the press during this period.


First of all, all newspapers tended to detach Israel from the surrounding historical and political context, which was merely presented as a “stage” on which the Israelis operated. In other words, the actions of the Israelis received prominent or exclusive attention, as clearly suggested in the analysis of the coverage of Gemayel’s assassination. Both the Orientalist representation of Lebanese society adopted by the Corriere della Sera and the approach of the British newspapers, which focused on the international consequences of Gemayel’s death, ignored Lebanon’s multifaceted ethnic and political reality. Le Monde and La Repubblica, on the other hand, chose to depict an idyllic image of Lebanese society that equally deprived the readers of the possibility to fully comprehend the complexity of the events.

When mentioned in the press, the various Lebanese groups were simply “labeled” under general political or ethnic terms (the left-wing, the Muslims, the Maronites, etc.) without any information on their political positions or ambitions.

The press adopted a similar aphasic representation of the Palestinians. In the accounts of the military operation in West Beirut, they emerged in an abstract manner as potential targets of the Israelis. Conversely, in reports about the massacres at Sabra and Shatila, they appeared either as unburied corpses or small groups of survivors (most often women) mourning what had happened. On this occasion, the press did not show any interest in their emotional individuality nor, as was the case for other Lebanese factions, in their political specificity. Instead, they were represented as symbolic victims of Israeli (mis)deeds.

Secondly, concerning the way the press portrayed the Israelis, the analysis reveals that their image was often based on prejudices toward Israeli leaders’ actions and motives rather than on an examination of the available data and information. This can clearly be inferred from the attitude of the press toward information from Israeli sources, which the press relied on only when it corroborated already established opinions, as happened with evidence gathered by Israeli journalists about Israel’s military and political involvement in the massacres. In contrast, information coming from the Israeli government was either ignored or denied regardless of its validity when it did not match “expectations,” as happened in the case of official declarations making allegations against the Phalangist militias. Although the Italian newspapers and Le Monde used this approach more often, it was sometimes also adopted by The Times. Certainly, the greater the amount of available information and the deeper the elaboration of the facts, like in The Guardian, the more balanced the ideas conveyed about the facts themselves and about the main characters involved in the events.

Nevertheless, the image of Israel and the Israelis painted by the press was misleading and almost exclusively represented the actions and opinions of the army and the government. Leaders were portrayed in very negative terms in all newspapers and were mostly described as being driven by a conquering will and irrational (negative) impulses, such as vengeance and a desire for annihilation. The image of the Israeli army that appeared in the news consisted mainly of military means (aircraft and tanks), conveying the idea of devastating force and the disproportionate (and indiscriminate) use of those means. These reports converged in validating the expression “Israeli war machine,” which was used by journalists and commentators in all newspapers as a synonym for the Israeli army, together with the use of phrases like “Sharon’s army” or “Begin’s troops,” which explicitly identified the army with the government.
Moreover, by referring to World War II when describing the massacres in Sabra and Shatila, the press implicitly drew a parallel between the Nazis and the Israelis, who were referred to as the executioners of today’s victims (the Palestinians). The Israelis were thus depicted in terms of absolute evil, and the interpretation of their actions, deprived of any political or sociological analysis, resorted to psychological categories. “Insane passion,” “folly,” and “mental disease” were all identified as belonging specifically to the Israelis.

Discussing the press coverage of the events in Lebanon of 1982 in his latest work *La nouvelle propaganda antijuive*, the French sociologist Pierré-André Taguieff argues that the criminalization of Israel based on the accusation of the Sabra and Shatila massacres derives from a campaign of disinformation that has all in all succeeded. But this campaign was successful because it offered a confirmation of what the audience already believed it knew. Something like an illustration considered as evidence of what Israel was expected to do.\(^{52}\)

From the analysis of the press, it is not a conscious campaign of disinformation that emerges but rather a “set of prejudices” about Israel that informed the work of the journalists, affecting their coverage of events, and was presumably shared by the audience the newspapers addressed. Moreover, these prejudices, although more prominent in the left-wing *Le Monde* and *La Repubblica*, were by no means exclusive to this side of the political spectrum. In practice, they were shared by the conservative *Corriere della Sera* and *The Times*. In the left-wing *The Guardian*, however, these prejudices were mitigated by the more comprehensive information provided by the newspaper.

Finally, the emerging image of “another Israel” was awarded a positive connotation through an ambiguous parallelism between a segment of the Israeli public and Jews in the Diaspora. Without any elaboration on the reality and the complexity of the relationship between Diaspora Jews and the State of Israel, the former were regarded as primary interpreters of Israeli actions and were treated almost as full characters taking part in the events.

The press presented Israel as the lens through which Diaspora Jews were observed, thus portraying it as the “collective Jew.”

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Durban Reviewed:  
The Transformation of Antisemitism  
in a Cosmopolitanizing Environment  

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I. INTRODUCTION

The objective of this paper is to discuss antisemitism\(^1\) in the cosmopolitanizing environment of the UN Durban Review Conference (henceforth, Durban II), which took place in Geneva in 2009. Based on our definition of antisemitism, we will map the transformations and continuities of antisemitism at Durban II as compared to traditional antisemitism. Instead of a mere description of the events, we seek to capture Durban II, the preparatory process, and the surrounding debates as a cosmopolitanizing environment.

As shall be explained later, such an environment is a fairly institutionalized setting that is located between the nation-state and (the so far non-existent) world society. This more abstract conceptualization of Durban II allows for an evidence-based investigation of the degree to which antisemitic practices\(^2\) were modified at Durban II. By way of conclusion, we suggest that, on the surface, antisemitic speech has been adapted to the new cosmopolitanizing environment of Durban II. A more thorough inspection reveals that the most remarkable turning point in modern antisemitism remains the Shoah and the subsequent establishment of the State of Israel. In other words, the patterns of resentment unfolding at Durban II are to be understood as antisemitism coming after the Nazi annihilation of European Jews and in light of the continued threat to the existence of a Jewish and democratic sovereign state.

The 2001 World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) in Durban and its 2009 follow-up, both organized by the UN, garnered wide media attention due to the antisemitic acts

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\(^1\) Throughout this text, the spelling *antisemitism* is preferred. In contrast to the hyphenated version, it visualizes that antisemitism is an ideology directed against Jews or people perceived as such and that it bears no relation to opposition against *Semitism*, which outside the field of linguistics is a largely meaningless concept.
\(^2\) In an earlier article (Falter & Kuebler 2010), based on a comprehensive analysis of all documents pertinent to Durban II, we identified the obsession with Israel as the sole bearer of blame for the Middle East conflict, the delegitimation of Jewish statehood, the equation of Israel with Nazi Germany, the Jewish world conspiracy myth, and the hijacking of Jewish Holocaust remembrance as the core antisemitic moments at Durban II.
of various conference participants and accredited NGO representatives, the almost obsessive concentration on Israel’s role in the Middle East conflict, and the corresponding protest, which included the withdrawal of several country delegations.\(^3\) Even commentators who are rather critical of Israel, such as Banton, argue that a unique opportunity to address racism, colonialism, and slavery at global level was thereby missed (Banton 2002: 359). In September 2011, Durban III took place in New York to mark one decade of what could be called the Durban process of UN anti-racism events and related preparatory processes.\(^4\)

The UN-Israel relationship has been tense since its inception. The UN’s disproportionate focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is characterized by an anti-Israel bias (cf. Mréjen 1998). Resolution 3379, branding Zionism as a form of racism, which was passed in 1975 and revoked in 1991, represents the pre-Durban nadir of this relationship. At the same time, the UN refers to the end of World War II as its founding moment, following the failure of the League of Nations, and has been active in Holocaust remembrance and genocide prevention since the turn of the millennium.

Before analyzing antisemitism and Durban II, our normative point of departure should be clarified. We advocate the viewpoint that international and regional organizations are shaped by power relations and unequal access. They accordingly constitute venues of politics, i.e. the ideologically grounded contestation of interests and preferences, and are clearly not a-political regulators. These international and regional actors by no means render the nation-state obsolete, but rather supplement it in terms of moderating member-state positions and re-importing adapted or novel policies to the domestic level. Conceding to Dahl’s skepticism (Dahl 2010), this does not automatically imply that international or regional organizations promote or at least partially function according to Western liberal democratic principles. This is especially true of intergovernmental organizations, whose actors are delegated or appointed by nation-state governments and cannot be elected into office or forced to resign by the people. Dahl’s critique of unrealistic expectations regarding global democracy can be expanded to the realm of transnational civil society. Yet ideology and interest-based politics do not necessarily need a full-blown democratic framework to materialize. Moreover, it is important to emphasize the significance of the UN’s legitimacy, which is due to its foundation as an immediate response to the crimes against humanity and atrocities of World War II and the inclusion of practically all sovereign nation-states. Antisemitic agitation in such an environment does not only bestow acceptability on this ideology but can also have a very tangible impact on concrete geo-political decisions.

\(^3\) Israel and the United States withdrew their delegations from the WCAR. Australia, Canada, Germany, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, and the United States refused to participate in Durban II due to the anti-Israel stances that became obvious during the preparatory process. The United Kingdom and 22 other European countries boycotted President Ahmadinejad’s speech. The Czech Republic, which held the rotating European Council presidency at the time, recalled its delegation shortly after Ahmadinejad’s antisemitic tirade.

\(^4\) Due to time constraints, Durban III is not covered in this analysis. It can only be assumed that our theoretical argument will be at least partially applicable to the decennial conference. As of the beginning of September 2011, Australia, Austria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Germany, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands and the United States had announced their intention to boycott the event.
II. ANTISEMITISM AFTER THE SHOAH AND IN LIGHT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL

We regard antisemitism as ideologically shaped hostility toward people who define themselves or are defined by others as being Jewish. Antisemitism is a complex of resentments against Jews as well as an ideological explanation of the world and society (Rensmann & Schoeps 2011: 21; Salzborn 2010b: 91). Antisemites pursue the idea of a harmonious community devoid of conflict and difference in standpoints. Contrary to racism, modern antisemitism conveys a Manichean dimension by imagining a “counter-race,” which according to antisemites ought to be annihilated (Horkheimer & Adorno 2001: 177). In this ideological assumption, Jews embody by their very existence the “principle of evil,” which clashes with other peoples’ welfare and interests (Sartre 1994: 28). Jews are blamed for social and political conflicts as well as economic crises, and they are regarded as a powerful clique that affects various social structures and phenomena. Antisemitism can therefore be regarded as a distorted perception and explanation of reality.

Being a hermetic worldview, antisemitism tends to resist all empirical evidence countering its ideological suppositions (Arendt 2001: 763; Salzborn 2010a: 331). However, antisemitic resentments do not remain completely steady, and their frames of ideological argumentation have transformed throughout history due to changing political, economic, and social circumstances (Laqueur 2006; Maccoby 2006; Wistrich 2010: 34). Since the Holocaust, overt antisemitic attacks against Jews have been gradually replaced with a coded political language that produces and reproduces antisemitic resentments less blatantly, especially within Western democratic nation-states and/or international and regional organizations shaped by the West (Rensmann & Schoeps 2011: 18). In addition, Holocaust denial, the fight against remembrance of the Shoah, and rejection of the State of Israel have been incorporated into the complex of antisemitic ideology. Though already an expression of antisemitic resentment before the establishment of Israel, in its aftermath anti-Zionism has increasingly become a focal point of antisemitic ideology (Wistrich 2010: 62). Displaying most features common to an ethnically defined nation-state, contemporary Israel’s self-characterization as a Jewish state is used as an accusation against it, turning it into a “Jew among the nations” in a seemingly post-national world. In this context, criticism of Israel serves as a smokescreen for less acceptable overt antisemitic attacks.

III. HALF-WAY TO A GLOBAL COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY

By analyzing antisemitic contributions to Durban II, we highlight current changes and continuities in antisemitism in a cosmopolitanizing environment. Fine’s useful distinction between the “cosmopolitan outlook” and the “cosmopolitan condition” (Fine 2007: 134) describes the tension between the ideal of a cosmopolitan world, as envisioned by

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5 As stated in the introduction, Israel defines itself as a democratic and Jewish state. Among its foes, its perception as a Jewish state is most salient. Likewise, Israel displays elements of liberal, ethnic, and republican statehood and citizenship (cf. Shafir & Peled 2002). The ethnic component is stressed here, as Israel’s immigration and naturalization laws are predominantly defined by criteria of ethnicity.
the Stoics in antiquity, Kant, and contemporary thinkers such as Held, and present-day globalized society with its existing—albeit isolated—actualizations of cosmopolitanism. In order to make sense of this non-linear process toward a (currently utopian) world society, the term cosmopolitanizing environment is introduced. This describes a partially institutionalized setting (more concretely UN bodies or regular meetings and large-scale conferences) that clearly transcends the boundaries of the sovereign nation-state or mere intergovernmental cooperation, is inclusive toward non-state actors, and realizes core elements of cosmopolitanism.

Such programmatic political cosmopolitanism in its idealized form has been cogently described by Archibugi (2010) and Held (2010). A future cosmopolitan democracy would be anchored in a UN-based world parliament, representing governments and individuals, with the important qualification that decisions should be taken most closely to the citizens affected. Issues that transcend the limits of subsidiarity and make it on to the agenda of the world parliament are thus understood to be of global significance. Archibugi (2010: 321) explains one of the key features of his and Held’s vision: “Admission to intergovernmental organizations is regulated by the principle of effective control over a given territory, excluding only governments that violate fundamental human rights (for instance, genocide and apartheid).” A watershed controversy within the discussion of political cosmopolitanism concerns the question of basic constitutional rules, most probably of Western liberal democratic design (a viewpoint advocated by Habermas), and Mouffe’s call for ongoing contestation that transforms antagonism into agonism (cf. Tambakaki 2009).

The case of Durban II is conceptually challenging, because it merges the existing cosmopolitan condition (as expressed in low thresholds to participation, (temporary) recognition irrespective of concrete form of government, and the cherished principle of dialogue) with the ideal of a global community stripped of racism, the negative legacy of slavery, and (neo-)colonialism. Certainly, the cosmopolitanizing environment that emerged during the Durban process is host to fundamental arguments concerning the potential membership of world society. Although this is a rather illusionary goal, disputes in this regard are fought out with the means provided by the existing cosmopolitan condition. Furthermore, Durban II was clearly informed by the framing of the issue of racism and the purported domination of the world by the West, the United States and, most ridiculously, Israel as a joint predicament. According to Beck (2010), affectedness shared by all or at least large segments of humanity provokes the search for cosmopolitan answers. Drawing on Pogge (2010), the principle of sovereignty is entirely abolished, but political units are reshaped in order to adequately respond to threats that cut across nation-state borders. Finally, the cosmopolitanizing environment of Durban II prominently features more or less explicit references to (real or perceived) crimes against humanity. This mirrors and possibly also perverts the basic cosmopolitan principle of the human rights of the individual supersed ing the power of sovereign states (as expressed in the juridification of the issue at the Nuremberg, Rwanda, and Bosnia tribunals and the ICC) (cf. Benhabib 2006; Hayden 2005). As explained in the seminal study by Levy and Szn aider (2005) on the globalization and universalization of Holocaust remembrance, the Holocaust serves as a blueprint for the global recognition of victimhood in a cosmopolitanizing environment.
IV. JEWS AND ISRAEL: A STUMBLING BLOCK ON THE ROAD TO A HARMONIOUS WORLD SOCIETY?

At Durban II, the struggle over inclusion in and exclusion from an ideal cosmopolitan world society culminated in an effort by Arab and Muslim countries and similarly aligned NGOs to exclude Israel from a future world society. Not surprisingly, this received a rather lukewarm reaction from UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon (4) and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navanethem Pillay (5), who vacillated between their outrage at Ahmadinejad’s antisemitism and their desire to keep the conference as inclusive and dialogue-based as possible. According to the conceptualization of antisemitism as outlined above, the singling-out of Israel from the apparently harmonious global community revolves around five dimensions, which include both changes and continuities in traditional antisemitic resentments. These dimensions are: the construction of a harmonious global community; exclusion from such a community; the deflation and reversal of guilt; falling victim to imagined Jewish domination and conspiracies; and the rejection of nationhood and nation-states.

Although 20th century antisemitism has always had an international dimension (Arendt 1948), it tended to be framed by national semantics (Holz 2001). Ironically, Jews were considered to be a cosmopolitan threat to the nation-state by undermining the national community through modern capitalism and international conspiracies (Rensmann & Schoeps 2011: 23). The notion of a homogenous collective is a key aspect of antisemitic ideology, but in the cosmopolitanizing environment the point of reference is gradually shifting to the idea of a harmonious world community devoid of conflict. Whereas in the national context Jews were depicted as an anti-national or cosmopolitan menace to the nation concerned, in a cosmopolitanizing environment that promotes the notion of global dialogue antisemites accuse Israel and Zionists of being a nationalist, racist, and particularist remnant in an imagined universalist surrounding. In both cases, Jews are perceived as the cause for international conflicts, economic crises, and human suffering. Due to the politically correct speech adopted after the Shoah, antisemitic speech rarely refers to the Jews but rather to the Jewish national movement, i.e. Zionism.

The overarching theme of the antisemitic speech acts at Durban II was the attempt to ostracize Israel and by extension, perhaps, the Jewish people from the desired harmony of the global community. The cosmopolitanization of international politics contributes to the globalization of the discourses of inclusion and exclusion beyond the nation-state. A Janus-faced process of othering can be discerned. On the one hand, the Other can be a respected part of humankind, whose diversity has to be accommodated by means of deliberation. On the other hand, a different Other is completely shunned from the imagined global community, as its very existence is regarded as a threat to the former. The discursive and practical exclusion of Jews and Jewish collectives from various types of community is a core device of antisemitic ideology. Whereas in Medieval Europe

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6 The terms *world society* and *global community* are not used entirely interchangeably here. While the first is indicative of an idealized cosmopolitan future, in which people associate with and assume responsibility for each other by dint of their belonging to humankind, the latter contains the notion of a more closely knit collective, which excludes people on the ground of certain criteria of belonging. One such criterion could be compliance with cosmopolitan ideals as defined by the insiders or potential insiders of the global community.
were expelled from towns and boroughs, in more modern times they have been regarded as a menace to gentile communities. Antisemitic outbursts in a cosmopolitanizing environment clearly include a disproportionate focus on the Middle East conflict. Under this distorted perception, the Palestinian side is made out to be the victim while the Israeli state is demonized. For example, the statement by the head of the Sudanese delegation at Durban II singled out the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and referred to “heinous crimes committed against the Palestinian people by the Israeli occupation” (10). Moreover he stated that “Israel continues to act against humanity,” thereby excluding it from the imagined community concerned with the protection of humanity. Two months prior to Durban II, the Iranian minister of foreign affairs accused Israel of “committing multiple crimes against humanity and war crimes.” Israel would not “pay the faintest respect to humanity and human rights” and would ignore “the values of the international community and the civilized world” (11). By demonizing Israel, antisemitic actors attempt to build the discursive foundations for its exclusion from a cosmopolitanizing global community.

The term Holocaust has been universalized to characterize other (real or perceived) crimes against humanity and the subsequent legitimate recognition of victimhood. This is part of a tendency to hijack and delegitimize this specific Jewish memory. A wealth of contributions at Durban II attempted to claim victimhood of a Holocaust-like crime in order to delegitimize the status of the State of Israel, which is an historical consequence of Nazis’ mass extermination of the Jews. This link is increasingly and awkwardly used by Holocaust deniers, who trivialize or reject the Shoah but also compare contemporary Israeli policies and military action to that of Nazi Germany in order to justify their hatred of the State of Israel. A consortium of several NGOs contributed a statement at Durban II accusing Israel of “implementing a policy of slow ‘ethnic cleansing’” (1). Another attempt to claim victimhood was displayed in a statement by Algeria during a session of the Preparatory Committee in which it claimed that Arabs were also “Semitites” and hence that they were affected by the exclusionary practices of European societies in a similar fashion to Jews (12). Others did not adopt the term of antisemitism for their own cause but, like the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), rejected any discussion on antisemitism. At Durban II, he remarked that the Review Process should not be “an anti-Semitism exercise” and in so doing repudiated any engagement with charges of antisemitism. Furthermore, he proposed that the participants should “address the real and serious challenges of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and islamophobia” (8, emphasis added). It was frequently suggested that the concept of Islamophobia was the exact equivalent of antisemitism and an even more pressing and ardent issue. In the most extreme cases, Israeli policies toward the Palestinians were equated with Nazi crimes. For example, the Iranian Neda Institute for Scientific and Political Research accused Israel of “intentionally and indiscriminately” targeting civilians in the Palestinian territories, arguing that “[t]his can only be explained by incessant indoctrinations of racial superiority….” It went on to state that a “genuine opposition to Nazism can only be achieved by fighting the concepts of racial superiority” (3). This statement thus links (alleged) Israeli policies to the Nazi concept of racial superiority and is tantamount to a reversal of guilt.

In a fiercely criticized speech at Durban II, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad incorporated key elements of several classic antisemitic conspiracies by suggesting to the assembly that “you are all aware of the conspiracies of some powers and
Zionist circles against the goals and objectives of this conference” (7). Shortly thereafter, he stated that the “making of a global society is in fact the accomplishment of a noble goal held in the establishment of a common global system”. In antisemitic ideology, the successful construction of a homogeneous world community is inextricably bound up with the projection of all real-life contradictions and cleavages onto an allegedly powerful clique of people (i.e. the Jews) who are perceived as inhibiting the progress and well-being of all other nations. Put succinctly, antisemites tend to regard themselves and/or their allies as victims of alleged Jewish domination. The perception of victimhood requires an easily identifiable perpetrator. By reducing complex phenomena and relations to the form of a single clique, this Manichean and distorted worldview is able to gain momentum. Antisemitic conspiracy theories have always transcended national boundaries, but in a cosmopolitanizing environment and given the universalization of Holocaust remembrance the presumed moral surplus of victimhood is outweighed by antisemitic fear of Jewish domination. Even the Western media’s criticism of antisemitic and anti-Zionist tendencies within the Durban process was linked to conspiracy theories. For example, an NGO named Europe-Third World Centre (CETIM) ascribed the “disinformation” to the influence of “financial oligarchies” (2).

The challenge posed by the imposition of globalization on a world still structured according to nation-state divisions and the uncertainties arising from that situation are projected onto Israel, which in the eyes of its enemies is an example of outdated and ultimately illegitimate nationalism. The nationalist agendas of other sovereign states were simply ignored at Durban II and were even defended against foreign interference. A collective of NGOs against racism against Arabs, Africans, and Muslims issued a statement singling out the Middle East conflict as the only evil in the region, while simultaneously protesting against the charges brought by the International Criminal Court against the Sudanese president (6). At the closing session of Durban II, the Pakistani representative of the OIC emphasized the “positive role played by the delegations of Palestine, Syria and Iran” and protested against the occupation of “Muslim lands” (9).

This examination of the contributions to the debate on Israel within the Durban process demonstrates that the concept of the nation-state as such had not been abandoned, but rather that a distinction had been created between legitimate and illegitimate statehood. In this vein, the branding of Israel as racist and nationalist must be deemed antisemitic, since almost every other country, as well as the general nexus of ethnically defined nationalism and racism, was not branded in this manner.

V. CONCLUSION: OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

Antisemitism is changing its appearance in response to changing social circumstances, while simultaneously preserving some of its core features. This statement holds true for the entire history of antisemitism and is also applicable, as argued here, in the case of Durban II. We have grouped the antisemitic practices at Durban II into five dimensions—the construction of a harmonious global community; exclusion from such a community; the deflation and reversal of guilt; falling victim to imagined Jewish domination and conspiracies; and the rejection of nationhood and nation-states—and buttressed our argument with particularly telling quotes from various Durban II documents. All of these dimensions contain specific elements of antisemitism in a cosmopolitanizing environment, such as the desire to overcome a nation-state-centered
world, the drafting of membership criteria that pretend to be inclusive to all but exclude some by delegitimizing them, and the reference to the international rejection of and jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. Comparable, if not identical, mechanisms of ostracism and dehumanization were employed against Jewish individuals and collectives throughout history. The deflation of guilt and the accusation of outdated nationhood clearly relate to post-Holocaust antisemitism and the establishment of a sovereign Jewish and democratic state. While one can discern changes in the antisemitic resentment expressed at Durban II and, more generally speaking, in a cosmopolitanizing environment, caution must be exercised in deciding whether there is anything really new here. We challenge the proposition of novelty and conclude that the antisemitism displayed at Durban II continues to draw on the post-1945 (defeat of Nazi Germany) and post-1948 (foundation of the State of Israel) features of antisemitism. This does not preclude that more substantial transformations could materialize on the path to further cosmopolitanization. For the time being, research on antisemitism should focus on the necessary criticism of the social conditions that produce and reproduce antisemitism.

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III
GLOBAL ANTISEMITISM:
PAST AND PRESENT
Antisemitism and Anti-Zionism in the “New” South Africa: Observations and Reflections

Milton Shain*

Almost two years ago, I was struck by two virtually concurrent news headlines: the weekly South African Jewish Report led with the headline “Low anti-Semitism in SA – but don’t be complacent” and a week later I received a piece from the South African Zionist Federation in Israel entitled “South Africa almost tops anti-Semitism charts”. The South African Jewish Report article was based on a talk by a senior researcher at the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, David Saks, who reported that South Africa had a relatively low rate of antisemitism: it was 10 times higher in the UK, France and Argentina, 15 times higher in Australia and 20 times higher in Canada and Germany.

The figures had been calibrated in terms of antisemitic incidents. The low number was attributed to dormant far-right white organizations, coupled with an anti-racist ethos in post-apartheid South Africa and buttressed by South Africa’s so-called chapter nine institutions, such as the Human Rights Commission, and the values embedded in the Constitution. On the other hand, the South African Zionist Federation based their claim that “South Africa almost tops anti-Semitism charts” on a “Pew Global Attitudes Survey of 2008”, which found that South Africans, along with Spaniards, Mexicans and Brazilians, held some of the most negative views of Jews outside of the Muslim world. According to the survey, 46 percent of South Africans harboured unfavourable views of Jews and of those 46 percent two-thirds disliked Jews in the extreme. A much lower figure of 11 percent was recorded in Australia – which had more incidents.

What one has here are measures by incidents on the one hand and measures by attitudes on the other. What should we make of the differences? Certainly we should not discount the role of ideas, especially in specific political contexts. In South Africa, for example, a serious “Jewish Question” was experienced in the 1930s and 1940s when – at a time of heightened Afrikaner ethno-nationalism – hostile ideas about the Jews were transformed by the radical Afrikaner white right into programmatic antisemitism.

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Today, this radical white right – with its conspiratorial views of Jewish wealth, power and influence – has effectively disappeared. In its heyday in the 1930s and early 1940s, movements such as the Greyshirts, the Ossewa Brandwag and the New Order – all clearly inspired by Nazism – were a serious menace. But these ideas eroded rapidly after the Second World War. Classic Jew baiting was restricted to a fringe ultra-right element, although the apartheid government did question Jewish loyalty in the early 1960s when Israel supported the African bloc in the United Nations, and it did, from time to time, remind Jews of their disproportionate involvement in anti-apartheid activities.\(^4\) In the “new” democratic South Africa, however, the white right is of marginal concern. On the other hand, the “black” or African majority has shown some proclivity towards anti-Jewish prejudices. While historically these victims of apartheid struggled to overthrow white minority rule and certainly never focused specifically on Jews when articulating grievances and aspirations, studies from the early 1970s show that the black population is not immune to anti-Jewish prejudice.\(^5\)

In recent times, industrial protests have occasionally identified specifically “Jewish capitalists” and antisemitic placards have been displayed at a number of strikes around the country. In the wake of the 2009 Gaza War, anti-Zionist protests led by the labour union federation COSATU raised the possibility of targeting specifically Jewish businesses. In some circles, Jewish loyalty to South Africa is questioned. But on the whole the black African population cannot be accused of widespread antisemitism. When it comes to the Muslim population – less than 2 percent of the total population but relatively influential – things are different. Many in this community share conspiratorial ideas of the old far-right white, manifested in the letter columns of the daily press and articulated in radio talk shows. Although the focus of their rhetoric is Zionism, their language often reveals classic anti-Jewish motifs and tropes. For some critics, at least, Jews or Zionists have become diabolically evil.\(^6\) This was best captured in the comments made by South Africa’s deputy foreign minister, Fatima Hajaig, at an anti-Zionist rally in January 2009:

They [Jews] control [America], no matter which government comes into power, whether Republican or Democratic, whether Barack Obama or George Bush... Their control of America, just like the control of most Western countries, is in the hands of Jewish money and if Jewish money controls their country then you cannot expect anything.\(^7\)

Holocaust denial has also crept into Muslim anger. In 1996, Radio 786, a Muslim radio station, had to apologize for airing an interview with Dr Ahmed Huber, who spoke of the “Holocaust swindle”, and in May 1998 the same radio station interviewed Dr Yaqub Zaki who, besides claiming that the “million plus” Jews who died in the Second World

\(^5\) See, for example, Melville Edelstein, *What Do Young Africans Think?* (South African Institute for Race Relations, Johannesburg 1972).
War had died of infectious diseases, spent much of his time engaged with elaborate Jewish conspiracies. Shortly after the Cape Town Holocaust Centre was established in 1998, a leading Muslim newspaper recommended readers acquaint themselves with the work of Arthur Butz and other "denialists". It was thus no surprise that the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* went on sale at the World Conference Against Racism in Durban in 2001.

Yet despite these developments, one cannot talk of classic antisemitism having serious traction in South Africa today. The public discourse is inclusive and non-racial, as opposed to exclusivist, as it was in the 1930s when the country had – as mentioned above – a serious "Jewish Question". Pluralism, multiculturalism, religious tolerance and "rainbowism" – the very antithesis of ethno-nationalism – is celebrated in South Africa. Cultural rights and religious freedom are enshrined in the new South African Constitution. This has the potential to take the sharpness out of ethnic conflict while militating against antisemitism. Of course, in some countries, multiculturalism has led to a dangerous identity politics, especially on the part of Muslims. So far this has not been the case in South Africa. Muslims were a part of "the struggle" for generations and appreciate the new constitutional order. One also needs to note the condemnation of antisemitism by political leaders in recent years. An apology from the deputy foreign minister, Fatima Hajaig, following her tirade is not without significance. She was not reappointed in Jacob Zuma’s cabinet when he took office in 2009.

Certainly, the climate for opposing classical antisemitism in South Africa today – built upon the ANC’s historic opposition to racism – is more favourable than it has been in the past. When it comes to anti-Zionism, however, things are markedly different. In particular, it is noteworthy that hostility penetrates into the highest echelons of government. For many, the very notion of an allegedly exclusivist and colonialist "Jewish state" is anathema. This worldview has a long history, deeply embedded in "the struggle". As far back as 1955, the ANC’s Freedom Charter stressed the unity of South Africa and opposed the politics of ethnicity or "tribalism". Intellectually, liberation was underpinned by a critique of the dangers of ethnic mobilization as evident in the Afrikaner national movement.

These ideas were further reinforced from the 1960s by Marxian currents within the academy, both in South Africa and abroad. Scholars deconstructed ethnicity – neither "natural or immutable" – in the words of Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido – while demonstrating how it was being manipulated and used in South Africa as a means to divide and rule, palpable in the apartheid project with its proposed puppet ethnic "homelands". A broadly "third worldist" and anti-colonial Weltanschauung evolved among exiled and domestic activists. They took a decidedly dyspeptic view of the West, its support for the apartheid state and the Pretoria-Jerusalem axis that evolved from the early 1970s, a relationship recently explored by Sasha Polakow-Suransky in his book *The Unspoken Alliance*.  

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8 Shain and Bastos, *supra* note 6, at pp. 24-25.
These ideas were fed by a growing anti-Zionist literature that demonized the Jewish state. In particular, Muslims acquainted themselves with this literature. Pained at the outcome of the Six Day War, buoyed by the “Zionism equals Racism” resolution of 1975 at the United Nations and radicalized by the Soweto uprising of 1976, a younger generation of Muslims were increasingly radicalized. They were further encouraged by the overthrow of the Shah in Iran in 1979 and the success of Khomeinism.

Although the Muslim voice carried little weight with most whites in apartheid South Africa, it is arguable that they added muster and substance to the broad left’s position, including “white” progressives who began to voice their support for what they saw as the legitimate anti-colonial struggle of the Palestinian people. By the late 1980s, an increasingly radicalized “left” criticized Israel as an exclusivist apartheid state. At the United Nations, Dr Neo Mnumzama, the Chief Representative of ANC – still in exile at the time – put it bluntly: “The South African people have never approved of Zionism. They see parallels of apartheid in Zionism and therefore their struggle against apartheid automatically has overtones of anti-Zionism which is not the same thing as being anti-Jewish”. 11

These views were shared by Aubrey Mokoena, a senior member of the United Democratic Front, an internal wing of the ANC. Zionism, he maintained, was simply racism, “because Zionism says we close our ranks on an ethnic basis. We take care of the Jewish interests. If you are Jewish it’s okay, if you are not Jewish, out.” 12 A former president of the “Africanist” Azanian Political Organization (Azapo), Ishmael Mkhabela, took a similar view, claiming that Zionism was a form of religious discrimination that was, in his view, the same as the racial discrimination faced by blacks in South Africa. 13 This alleged exclusivity ran counter to the non-racial and inclusive outlook of the liberation movement, both exiled and domestic. With it went a sense of unease with a Jewish state and, as the Rev Frank Chikane, Secretary General of the South African Council of Churches, put it, “an easy sympathy” for the PLO. 14 There is no doubt, said one prominent Soweto civic leader, Dr Nthato Motlana, in the 1980s, “that Black Africans tend to identify with the PLO… Let’s be clear about this, there is a perception of the Israeli-Arab conflict as one of almost colonialism of a white race coming out of Europe.” 15

Such ideas have survived and are now a staple of trade union and progressive activism. In addition, the English-language media – largely owned since 1994 by the Irishman Tony O’Reilly’s Independent Group – reinforced these positions. Columnists like Robert Fisk and John Pilger regularly poison a hostile anti-Zionist atmosphere.

When Yasser Arafat spoke in South Africa’s parliament in 1998, he was applauded when he referred to Zionism as racism, despite the notion running counter to the ANC’s stated position on the Arab-Israeli conflict, namely accepting a Jewish state alongside a Palestinian state. 16 Even 9/11 did not temper hostility. On 23 October 2001, the minister of water affairs, Ronnie Kasrils, a communist Jew, a member of the ANC underground

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12 Ibid., p. 34.
13 Ibid., p. 46.
14 Ibid., p. 22.
15 Ibid., p. 61.
for 30 years and a senior commander of its military wing, Umkhonto We Sizwe, read a statement on the Middle East in the National Assembly during a special Middle East debate that discussed the report of a fact-finding committee that had visited the Middle East.\(^\text{17}\)

Kasrils and his ANC colleague Max Ozinsky, a member of the Western Cape provincial legislature, then circulated the statement—slightly amended—with a view to getting as many Jewish signatories as possible. The final declaration was launched on 7 December 2001 under the banner “Not in My Name”. It was signed by only 284 Jews but had widespread support beyond the Jewish community, including the ANC and the media.

Kasrils has compared the discourse of “chosenness” in Zionism with “the way the Afrikaner trekkers also used it, the way many historical movements have done to advance the cause of a particular people. It’s an exclusivity which gives rise to racism and all sorts of negative things.”\(^\text{18}\) This notion of exclusivity—manifest in the ethn-national state—has always raised problems for the radical left. It challenges a deep seated universalism. But, in addition, the apparent success of South Africa’s so-called “miracle” further undermines the Zionist idea. That is to say, commentators increasingly ask why Israelis and Palestinians cannot follow the South African example and establish a single constitutional state, which includes Jews and Palestinians. They compare Zionists with apartheid ideologues of old and see Hamas and Islamic Jihad as demonized in much the same way as the apartheid government had demonized the ANC in exile. They argue that Israel—like the apartheid government—wants to cut a deal only with moderates like Mahmoud Abbas.\(^\text{19}\)

In this context, support for a two-state solution is rapidly eroding. One well-known former liberal newspaper editor, Allister Sparks, repeatedly contends that such a solution is untenable. Israel’s lack of will to remove the settlements coupled with demographic realities, he argues, has precluded this option. “Like South Africa’s bantustan policy it was a nice idea in theory: to separate rival groups living in one country so that each can have its own national homeland sounds like a moral solution—provided the separation is fair and the homelands are viable.”

In building his case, Sparks recalls how the apartheid planners had also denied demographic realities in their dream of a “white” South Africa. But eventually, he reminds us, they had to face the truth. Sparks’ great source is the book One State Solution by Virginia Tilley, an American academic now resident in South Africa. “Would a negotiated settlement for a one-party state,” asks Sparks, “not defuse the destructive antagonisms between Israelis and Palestinians as it has done in South Africa, and in doing so make Israel a much safer homeland for Jews than it is now?”\(^\text{20}\)

Sparks continues to draw parallels between Israel and South Africa and sees the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a South African prism. The fact remains, he argues,


\(^{19}\) See, for example, Allister Sparks, “Cutting a peace deal easier now”, Cape Times, 16 November 2004.

\(^{20}\) “Israel’s two state solution is dead”, The Star, 21 September 2005.
that many ethno-nationalisms grapple with the problem of other ethnic groups in their midst... The new South Africa has not required the forfeiture of the “Afrikaner homeland”. I well remember the dark warnings, uttered from pulpit and platform, over more than half my working life, that “one man one vote” would mean the “national suicide” of the Afrikaner volk and that they would never, ever contemplate it.21

Sparks’s views have wide resonance and reflect attitudes among the chattering class, particularly within a government that is informed by a mantra of non-racism, opposition to ethnic politics, a powerful anti-colonialism, support for the underdog and a particular understanding of South Africa’s so-called “miracle”, built upon respect for cultural and religious diversity.

Put simply, there is a general antipathy towards ethnic concerns. South African politics, notes Hermann Giliomee, a leading South African historian, is informed by “a dogmatic or intransigent universalism.” “Its point of departure,” he explains, is that race or ethnicity as a principle of social organization is essentially irrational and ephemeral and that there is no need to make any concessions to it. What this boils down to is the unshakeable conviction that there is not much more to racial or ethnic identification than the legacy of apartheid classification.22

With this mindset, the Palestinian struggle is seen as a classic anti-colonial struggle. And the parallels with black resistance in South Africa are taken even further. Many believe that the Palestinians were offered “bantustans” at Camp David in 2000, akin to what the “homeland” leaders were offered under apartheid. This, they maintain, will replicate the historic migrant labour system so powerful in South African consciousness.

To use the late Tony Judt’s term, for many South African elites, including radical Jews, Israel is an anachronistic ethnic state.23 Zionism as a Jewish liberation movement has receded into the mists of time; the term has become associated with exclusivism and expansionism. “It’s a policy that to me looks like it has very many parallels with racism,” explains Nobel Laureate Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu.24 Tutu is widely supported in the electronic and print media. The late Anthony Holiday, a philosopher at the University of the Western Cape, went so far as to advocate outlawing the South African Zionist Federation.25

Such views have been maturing for decades and are inextricably linked to a specific South African past. While the ANC’s commitment to multilateralism and the United Nations ensures support for a two-state settlement – for the time being at least – it seems to me that elites, driven and informed by activists, many of them Muslim, will continue to push for ties between Pretoria and Jerusalem to be cut.

Yet it needs to be noted that a Pew Global Project Attitudes Survey conducted in urban areas in South Africa in 2007 reported greater sympathy for Israel than for the Palestinians. The survey indicated that 28 percent of South Africans sided with Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as opposed to 19 percent with the Palestinians. Nineteen

24 Hoffman and Fischer, supra note 11, at p. 15.
percent sympathized with both the Israelis and the Palestinians.\textsuperscript{26} Perhaps this is because the majority of South African blacks are Christian, with a deep attachment to the so-called “Holy Land”. It also needs to be said that the Muslim community is not monolithic. Many Muslims are progressive, emphasizing Islamic humanism and universalism; others, of course, are conservative or Islamist, at odds with religious pluralism and ecumenism.

But there is a broad anti-Zionism, shared, as noted above, by many in the highest echelons of government. There are repeated calls – especially from activist groups such as the Palestine Solidarity Committee and the Trade Union Federation – to break diplomatic and trade relations ties with Israel. Hamas is popular among many Muslims. In July 2010, a former minister of education, Professor Kadar Asmal, called on the world to deny legitimacy to Israel. “It is time to delegitimize this entity”, he wrote, in the weekly \textit{Mail & Guardian} while reflecting on the Goldstone Report and the Gaza Flotilla.\textsuperscript{27} The Thinker, an intellectual monthly founded by Mbeki’s right-hand man, former minister in the presidency Essop Pahad, included vitriolic anti-Israel comment in its latest issue.\textsuperscript{28}

Memories are short. The drama of the Jewish suffering in the diaspora and the rebirth of the Jewish state have receded into the distant past. Regular television footage of Israeli forces in the territories, interminable talk shows dominated by anti-Zionists and an outpouring of literature comparing apartheid South Africa to Israel, continue to undermine the idea of the Jewish state. For many elites in South Africa, Zionism is a 19th century ethno-national movement caught off-side in the 21st century.

\textsuperscript{27} “World must deny legitimacy to Israel”, \textit{Mail & Guardian}, 25 June-1 July 2010.
\textsuperscript{28} See Letter From The Editor, Dr Essop Pahad, pp. 2-3; Mats Svensson, “Sharpeville and the Ship to Gaza”, \textit{The Thinker}, Vol. 17, 2010, pp. 6-10.
The Politics of Paranoia: How—and Why—the European Radical Right Mobilizes Antisemitism, Xenophobia, and Counter-Cosmopolitanism

Lars Rensmann*

1. THE RADICAL RIGHT AND ANTISEMITISM: IRRELEVANT AT THE MARGINS?

The radical right’s anti-immigrant resentments, and especially its anti-Muslim campaigns, have come under public and scientific scrutiny in recent years (Mammone 2011). Yet antisemitism as an ideological factor in mobilizing radical right voters has neither been systematically examined in scholarly research, nor has it received much media attention—in spite of some heated scholarly meta-controversies about the “new antisemitism,” that is, the partial or full convergence of radical right, radical left and Islamist antisemitism in the form of hatred of Israel and the chimera of “world Zionism.” In fact, while there are some notable exceptions—studies that explore the radical right and antisemitism (e.g. Weitzman 2010; Rensmann 2011)—public and scholarly debates often a priori presuppose that antisemitism is an ideology that is past its expiration date and thus also without significance in the radical right’s political and ideological mobilizations. Indeed, it is a widely shared belief in contemporary European publics that antisemitism has largely dissipated and generally become socially and politically irrelevant—even though such claims are difficult to substantiate and contradict social research findings. If antisemitism surfaces as a problem today, it is frequently suggested that it is instrumentalized and overused, presumably constituting an ubiquitous political charge allegedly employed by Jewish and Israeli lobbies in order to suppress dissent and fence off criticism of Israel in Europe and the United States (see, for instance, Mearsheimer & Walt 2009; for a scholarly critique of these claims, see Lieberman 2009a; 2009b). In a similar vein, some scholars and political pundits have suggested that the European radical right, with its anti-Muslim vigor, has turned “pro-Israel” and “pro-Jewish” (Bunzl 2007). Moreover, it has become popular to view Muslims as “the Jews of today,” a trope insinuating that Muslims are the subject of forms of systematic persecution in Europe similar to those faced by Jews in European history and that Islamophobia has generally replaced—not just complemented—antisemitism in 21st century Europe,

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or, in other words, that Islamophobia has become the “new antisemitism” (Guarnieri 2010).

Looking at contemporary radical right ideology and its political context, this article challenges the aforementioned propositions. It claims that, while racialized hostility against Muslims plays an important role in many radical right mobilizations alongside general anti-immigrant resentment, antisemitism remains an integral—indeed in many cases reinforced—element of new radical right ideology. For much of the European radical right, antisemitism continues to function as a constitutive, prevalent conspiracy ideology to explain the modern world and its crises. New radical right parties tend to modernize their ideology in order to increase their appeal, although overtly racialized stereotypes of Jews, ethnic minorities, and immigrants—as well as Holocaust revisionism—continue to surface in political campaigns. For instance, the alleged powerful conspirators of world Jewry are today often called “world Zionists.”

In general, the word “Zionists” is increasingly used as a synonym for “Jews” to make antisemitic attacks on world Jewry sound respectable. Among the radical right and beyond, the phrase the Zionists has generally become the main code for the Jews in antisemitic discourse. It blurs the boundaries between legitimate political critique, innuendo, and overt antisemitism, while mobilizing anti-Jewish resentments, and also helps avoid potential legal prosecution. In this ideological construct, the Jews and the Zionists seek to dominate the world, control Zionist-occupied governments (ZOGs) behind the scenes, and personify globalism and global modernity, including American and Zionist imperialism, the global financial system, and global capitalism.

Furthermore, the radical right’s political antisemitism does not harm their political mobilizations but, on the contrary, feeds into an increased public legitimacy of hostility against Jews, which is fueled by perceptions of the Middle East conflict and widespread hatred of Israel in society, as well as the recent globalization crises. Such resentment marches in step with, and complements, anti-immigrant resentments and prejudices against ethnic minorities.

The following sections summarize the findings of several qualitative content analyses of radical right party manifestos and public campaigns in order to establish the constitutive features of the European radical right’s contemporary ideology. It then examines the demand side, the general political context, and favorable conditions for radical right mobilizations of resentment, focusing in particular on the neglected resurgence of political antisemitism and its origins and causal mechanisms.

2. ANTISEMITISM, XENOPHOBIA, AND COUNTER-COSMOPOLITANISM IN CONTEMPORARY RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPE: THE CASE OF HUNGARY

In this section, I examine a country where the radical right has been most successful electorally: Hungary. The study focuses on the platforms and manifestos of the relevant radical right parties but also covers public statements by party leaders, party websites, and political campaigns as components shaping the political ideology of the European radical right.¹ Special attention is paid to the modernization of radical right party ideology.

¹ We classify parties as relevant that have shown at least some level of electoral success, scoring at least 3 percent or more in regional or national elections.
MIÉP (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja—Hungarian Party for Justice and Life) has been the most successful radical right party in post-Communist Hungary in electoral terms but has faded in relevance in recent years. Under the authoritarian leadership of István Csurka, the party promotes exclusivist nationalism and expansionist ambitions, especially with regard to the Hungarian ethnic minority under foreign rule. The 2002 national electoral campaign focused on an interrelated set of anti-globalization, antisemitic, anti-Communist, and anti-Israel issues. Regarding any cooperation with the West as part of a US-Zionist plan, MIÉP continues to oppose EU membership and promotes a distinctly anti-Jewish, anti-globalization ideology. For instance, bankers are portrayed as a bunch of Jews sucking the money of average people. Viewing cosmopolitan Judeo-Bolshevik plutocrats and cosmopolitanism and globalization as the main enemy, the party has explained the electoral successes of the left and the alleged ongoing Communist rule in Hungary by referring to Jewish-Zionist activity (Stephen Roth Institute 2002). According to Csurka, Hungarians are being exploited and oppressed by Jews who dominate the economy and literature. He also fears a Jewish conspiracy, whose perpetrators are sitting in New York and Tel Aviv (cited in Bos 2011). Antisemitism and hatred of Israel are the core elements of this extreme ethno-nationalist party, while resentment against minorities (or Muslims) is also part of the party’s ideology but less central to its identity.

However, the party has continuously lost ground since it won 5.5 percent of the vote in 1998. In 2004, electoral support for the MIÉP was down to 4.4 percent. By 2006, support for the party had fallen to 2.2 percent and it virtually dissolved, in spite of the fact that it had formed an electoral alliance with the initially even more radical Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (Movement for a Better Hungary). Jobbik has since taken MIÉP’s place as the most significant political and electoral extreme right force in Hungary. By 2008, the now independent Jobbik was already at 7 percent in national polls, and the party initially received a stunning 14.77 percent of the vote in the 2009 European elections. This turned Jobbik into the third strongest Hungarian party in the European Parliament. It consolidated this position in the Hungarian party system by mobilizing an average of 16.67 percent of the vote in the two rounds of the 2010 national elections.

Without being less radical in its ethnic nationalism, xenophobia, and, especially, antisemitism, Jobbik has managed to gain wider electoral appeal after its separation from MIÉP. Although the party’s current chairman is the young historian Gábor Vona, the modern face of the party and its best-known and most popular politician is the human rights lawyer and law professor Krisztina Morvai. Morvai is the head of the party’s EP delegation and has worked as a women’s rights advocate at the United Nations but also has a strong record of anti-Israel advocacy. Her leadership role in this radical right, extremely nationalistic party took many by surprise and instantly helped Jobbik to gain broader legitimacy in spite of its radical platform and catering to militant fascists.

Jobbik’s campaign platform for the 2010 elections declared the reunification of the Hungarian nation, the rebuilding of pre-1919 Greater Hungary, and (thus) the redrawing of Hungary’s borders to be its first priority and most important political goal—a radical right, nationalist, and expansionist claim that could ultimately give rise to a war with its European neighbors. It shows very little political constraint and fosters a radical

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2 See: <http://www.miep.hu>.
political orientation and rhetoric that openly attacks gypsies and Jewish capital. Its propaganda, along with its use of certain political symbols, is clearly reminiscent of Nyílaskeresztes Párt (NYKP), Hungary’s ruling Nazi party between 1944 and 1945, which established a ruthless terror regime that collaborated in the Holocaust (Maegerle 2009).

Its slightly more strategic mobilization focus is nostalgic Hungarian nationalism and opposition to globalization in its economic, political and cultural dimensions. Along with the leadership role of a feminist human rights lawyer, its fashionable opposition to globalism, the European Union, and foreign investment is turning the party into the prototype of a counter-cosmopolitan, modernized radical right party that seeks to mobilize both its core constituency of nationalist, radical right voters and a broader spectrum of globalization losers. While all the indicators of its counter-cosmopolitan ideological transformation are prevalent and highly salient, the party has not sacrificed its traditional fascist ideology and self-declared radicalism or its militancy, neither of which, incidentally, seem to alienate voters anyway.\(^3\) In 2007, Jobbik created the Magyar Gárda Kulturális Egyesület (Cultural Association of the Hungarian Guard). The Hungarian Guard is a paramilitary organization with sworn-in members designed “to awaken the active self-consciousness of the nation.” In 2009, the organization was prohibited, and this ruling was later confirmed by the courts. Jobbik has not shied away from racist and antisemitic rhetoric. Party-affiliated publications employ inflammatory rhetoric against Jews, Roma, and homosexuals. Party members are linked to anti-Roma and antisemitic violence (Freeman 2009).

The party also proposes the creation of a special national police unit to deal with gypsy delinquency. While the party is open to militant Christian Hungarian nationalism and radicalism displayed by subgroups of the party and segments of the party elite, Jobbik has broadened its appeal and transformed its party ideology and identity. First and foremost, this includes a major focus on opposition to globalization and Europeanization. Reaching out to various disenfranchised segments of the Hungarian electorate, the modernized party platform is still dedicated to a combination of anti-globalization views and coded popular antisemitism, alongside its previous support of Christian values, Hungarian nationalism, and attacks on Roma and other ethnic minorities. Serving both radical nationalists and disillusioned voters, its economic policies are primarily directed against “the neoliberal ideology dominated policies during these years under the name of privatization, liberalization and deregulation,”\(^4\) while it also rejects the Lisbon Treaty and European integration. Jobbik thus capitalizes on increasing joblessness, corruption crises, and social unrest caused by the global economic crisis. In light of widespread economic and cultural fears, the party mobilizes political and cultural resentments against pro-European and pro-cosmopolitan elites and minorities, as well as against multinational corporations, America, and Israel (i.e. globalism, imperialism, and international institutions).

The rise of Jobbik indicates that there is considerable legitimate political space for such counter-cosmopolitan, nationalistic, and antisemitic views in Hungarian politics. In fact, the party’s success is accompanied by a broader right-wing, nationalistic trend in Hungarian politics. Challenging conventional wisdom about electorates and their spatial

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\(^4\) Ibid.
representation in the party system, there seems to be no trade-off between party constituencies supporting xenophobia and nationalistic claims. On the one hand, due to various factors—including major corruption cases—the left-of-center *Magyar Szocialista Párt* (MSZP), which was the major governing party for most of the post-Communist period, collapsed at the 2010 national elections, receiving only 19.3 percent of the vote. Severely weakened, MSZP is now barely the biggest opposition party. On the other hand, the national-populist *Fidesz—Magyar Polgári Szövetség* (*Fidesz—Hungarian Civic Union*) gained 52.73 percent of the vote in 2010. It thus achieved an absolute majority that equipped the party with a two-thirds majority in the national parliament and the power to make sweeping changes to the legal system.

The national-populist *Fidesz*, led since its inception by the populist prime minister Viktor Orbán, campaigns against anti-national elements. While *Fidesz* is less radical than *Jobbik* and combines various political constituencies in its policies, it also provides a government that is apparently sympathetic to radical nationalism and antisemitic resentment. For instance, without being penalized by the party, *Fidesz* member of parliament Oszkár Molnár stated: “I love Hungary, I love Hungarians, and I prefer Hungarian interests to global financial capital, or Jewish capital, if you like, which wants to devour the whole world, but especially Hungary.” He also suggested that there was an Israeli conspiracy to colonize Hungary. Molnár found widespread support, even though the *Fidesz* government ratified an authoritarian media law that severely restricts freedom of speech on the pretense of fighting hate speech.

Hungary’s restrictive media laws, poor civil rights record, and discriminatory policies have come under increasing scrutiny from the European Union. However, it is also a sign of the times and of the new assertiveness of the populist and radical right in Hungary and across Europe with regard to xenophobia and antisemitism that *Jobbik* can flourish and that even politicians of the ruling party can mobilize resentments against Jews and gypsies without facing effective political opposition. The Cultural Institute of the Republic of Hungary, operating under the auspices of the *Fidesz* government, initiates discussions about what it calls the *Jewish problem* and how to deal with it. It is even doing so in Germany, as part of transnational Hungarian cultural policy (Balassi Institute 2011).

Another sign of public collaboration with the radical right and the legitimacy of ethnic nationalism and antisemitism in Hungary is the fact that the mayor of Budapest, István Tarlós, recently appointed István Csurka, the leader of MIÉP, and the nationalist György Dörner as new directors of the Hungarian capital’s prestigious New Theater, despite the concerns of Jewish groups and international condemnation. The new directors want to rename the theater and act against what they call “the degenerate sick liberal hegemony.” They have demanded that only Hungarian drama be performed and want to stop what they refer to as “foreign garbage,” which is regarded as a code word for Jewish and other non-Hungarian productions (Bos 2011).

3. **Europe’s Radical Right and the Mobilization of Resentment:**

**Comparative Findings**

If we look beyond Hungary, a comparative analysis of party ideologies and mobilizations in a study of 11 countries in Western and Eastern Europe reveals a partly heterogeneous picture. Political contexts and context-dependent variables play a significant
role, and campaigns are rarely conducted transnationally. In part, they respond to specific national issues and electoral demands. However, even though ideological priorities and mobilizations vary, there are some prevalent ideological features that generally characterize the contemporary European radical right.

Firstly, all radical right parties share a high level of xenophobia and anti-immigrant resentment. Immigrants are blamed for all kinds of economic and social woes, as well as for the loss of cultural identity. At present, this resentment is often—though by no means exclusively—directed against Muslim immigrants and, depending on the country, specific ethnic minorities. This expresses an ethnic nationalism and collective self-understanding that remains a core feature of the European radical right. It is intimately related to opposition to cosmopolitan diversity. However, there are exceptions to the rule. In Eastern Europe, anti-Muslim prejudice plays only a marginal role, if any, in the public mobilization of the radical right. Jobbik, the most successful radical right party in Europe, is predominantly antisemitic and also discriminates against Roma. In contrast, Muslims are largely irrelevant in campaigns.

Secondly, while retaining an ethnic-nationalist ideological profile, several relevant European radical right parties, have also become partly transnational in outlook. They claim to defend a Europe of nations against cosmopolitan influences and immigration, multi-national corporations, and global political norms and institutions, including EU governance. Some parties have developed a highly modernized, radically counter-cosmopolitan, anti-globalization identity (Mudde 2007) that reflects widespread sentiments in the electorate. The “counter-cosmopolitan” defense of cultural particularism includes, but is not limited to, national particularism.

Thirdly, and closely related to the second feature, antisemitism remains a core element of radical right ideology, old and new. In several cases, there is even a noticeable resurgence of antisemitism, at times coded in radical anti-Israel resentments, denouncements of “world Zionism” or “foreign influence,” and conspiracy theories. Such antisemitic mobilizations are often directly linked to the anti-globalization discourse, in which Jews are identified as the key agents of cosmopolitan cultural change, global power, and the global financial and economic system. Once again, Jews serve as a personified, reified explanation for the world’s ills. To be sure, the demonstrable relevance and revival of antisemitism in radical right ideology is at odds with popular perceptions of the radical right. Moreover, some premature scholarly claims that antisemitism has virtually disappeared as a mobilizing resource for the new radical right due to its allegedly bygone appeal run counter to our findings.

Rather, we are witnessing the emergence of a new ideology that combines domestic resentment against Muslims with hatred of Jews and opposition to cosmopolitan norms and cosmopolitization processes. In several cases, Israel, world Zionism, and Israel lobbies have become the primary target in the radical right’s approach to foreign affairs, which fosters support for radical Islamist terror against Jews and Israel, even though Muslim immigrants are not accepted as equal members of society.

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5 This should not be misunderstood as any kind of lexical ordering.
4. The Resurgence of Counter-Cosmopolitanism, Xenophobia, and Antisemitism in Europe

Before exploring several hypotheses to explain why such an ideological combination, and the resurgence of antisemitism in particular, may be an effective mobilizing tool in party systems in contemporary Europe, this section takes a close look at the changing political climate and the increased popular demand for counter-cosmopolitan, xenophobic, and antisemitic politics. This demand finds expression in (i) widespread, increasing resentments against Jews, Muslims, and immigrants; and (ii) the increased public and political salience of these subjects and related issues. In addition, (iii) economic and socio-cultural globalization crises tend to embolden and intensify previously existing antisemitic undercurrents, including reified perceptions of globalization and the cosmopolitanization of societies as “Jewish machinations.”

A. Increasing resentment of Jews and Muslims

PEW data indicate a strong relationship between anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim sentiments. Indeed, in the six European countries included in the PEW survey, the correlation between unfavorable opinions of Jews and unfavorable opinions of Muslims is remarkably high (neg .80; PEW 2008). Overall, negative views of Muslims have increased over in recent years. Exceptions are Spain and Germany, where negative views of Muslims are nevertheless still high (52 percent and 50 percent respectively). Moreover, there has been considerable progress in the cosmopolitanization of European societies (i.e. the diversification of European societies and the recognition of cosmopolitan diversity and norms). Yet there is still a considerable segment of the electorate that is hostile to immigrants and the socio-cultural change they represent. Largely overlooked in public debates, antisemitism has surged and resurged in Europe since the turn of the century. Antisemitism is a far cry from being merely an historical legacy. Instead, empirical data show that antisemitic attitudes remain an undercurrent—even if varying in scope and intensity—within European societies. Not only that: surveys indicate that such resentments are now more prevalent than in previous decades and that they matter more to certain segments of voters. Antisemitism, like xenophobia, is no marginal minority opinion at the fringe of society.

On average, antisemitic attitudes have been on the rise in Europe since 2000, although there are fluctuations and considerable cross-national variations. Moreover, hatred of Israel and “Zionists” has become a medium to express hatred of Jews. Forms of radical anti-Zionism, wishing for the destruction of the Jewish state and the de-Zionization of the world, may also be motivated by secondary antisemitism (Rensmann 1998): the desire to morally demonize Jews because they are living reminders of the German and European atrocities committed against them during the Nazi era. Equating the Zionists with Nazis is a way to project guilt and settle an old score. According to a seven-country survey including the most populous EU member states, almost every second European (45.7 percent) uses Nazi associations and comparisons when thinking of Israel. This means that they somewhat or strongly agree that “Israel is conducting a war of extermination against the Palestinians,” while 37.4 percent agree with the statement that “considering Israel’s policy I can understand why people do not like Jews” (Zick 2009: 13).
B. Increased public and political salience

Antisemitism and hostility against Muslims have become more salient issues in public, political, and media spheres. Anti-Muslim hostility seems to benefit from media debates about mosques and the alleged introduction of Sharia law. In recent years, the political and public discourse in Europe is also characterized by a high level of awareness and alertness in the face of anti-Muslim campaigns or statements. For instance, a popular bestselling book by former German politician Thilo Sarrazin, which includes blatantly xenophobic, racialized anti-Muslim claims, was subjected to scathing criticism by the German public and its political class. After the terrorist acts of Anders Behring Breivik in Norway in 2011, the public debate about anti-Muslim hostility reached a new peak, and anti-Muslim radical right groups such as Stop the Islamisation of Norway (SIAN) have come under renewed public scrutiny. Anti-Muslim resentments are becoming increasingly unacceptable to European publics, and parties associated with anti-immigrant or anti-Muslim resentments have recently lost electoral support. For instance, the national populist Progress Party of Norway suffered significant losses in local elections in the aftermath of Breivik’s terror acts.

However, while the public focus has shifted to anti-Muslim prejudices, which remain a controversial issue from which the radical right might still draw long-term gains, radical right parties also benefit from an increasingly legitimate public discourse that is hostile to Jews. This aspect has been neglected in recent research. There is an expanding zone of acquiescence in relation to antisemitism, which also finds reflection in the radical right, that has so far hardly been recognized in research on the subject. This increased legitimacy, or public tolerance, of anti-Jewish resentment is characterized by shifting boundaries in what is considered respectable discourse about Jews and Zionists. It also finds expression in the rise of conspiracy theories, which often lead directly to a reservoir of antisemitic images of Jews allegedly pulling the strings and controlling the world. Furthermore, antisemitism is also nurtured by a popular Manichean world view that is not necessarily antisemitic in itself but helps create a climate of anti-Jewish hostility and is increasingly gaining traction in European publics. It portrays the two countries in which most of the world’s Jews live, namely the United States and Israel, as the main—if not the only—villains in world politics and the global economy, while letting brutal dictatorships and repressive regimes across the world off the hook. Anti-Israel sentiments and anti-Zionism that go far beyond criticism of the Israeli government and its policies are in most cases no longer discredited as illegitimate resentments against another group or country but have become a badge of honor even among public figures and politicians on the left, who otherwise tend to support anti-discrimination policies and universal human rights (Hirsh 2007; Markovits 2011; Rensmann & Schoeps 2011; Wistrich 2010).

In its radical version, this Manichean world view manifests itself in publicly articulated stereotypes about war-mongering Zionists and a globally powerful Israel lobby that dominates governments and stifles free debate about Israel’s atrocities against innocent Palestinians. Such claims go hand in hand with a widespread immunization strategy in the form of antisemitism denial that reaches deep into the public and the political left. According to this view, antisemitism today is a priori relevant only insofar as it is seen as a spurious charge that the Zionists or the pro-Israel lobby would throw at critics of Israel (Hirsh 2007: 73). Flanked by the claim that criticism of Israel cannot be antisemitic (cited in Hirsh 2007) and the belief that, if there is any antisemitism, Israel is
to blame for its emergence, highly emotionalized boycott campaigns directed exclusively against the Jewish state are taking place across Europe. They are emboldened by the widely popular charge that Israel is an apartheid regime that deserves to be dismantled. Singling out Israel as a pariah among the nations, the aggressive demonization of the Jewish state far beyond any rational criticism, and the simultaneous denial of the problem of antisemitism are not limited to the radical right. They resonate in segments of the public across the political spectrum as well as in civil society, including left-wing student and teacher unions and the media. More often than not, such aggressive anti-Zionism slips into overt antisemitic stereotypes and resentment. For instance, the left-leaning British newspaper The Guardian recently published an article in which journalist Deborah Orr claimed that the Israel-Hamas prisoner swap—Hamas released the captured soldier Gilad Shalit in exchange for the release of 1,000 Palestinians responsible for the death of 600 Israelis, most of the victims women and children—proved that Israel nurtures a supremacist Jewish self-understanding of being a “chosen” people whose lives are worth a thousand times the lives of others (Orr 2011).

There is, at any rate, a noticeable erosion of the discursive boundaries that evolved in postwar Europe—about what is tolerated as part of public discourse and what is classified or scandalized as hate speech—with regard to Jews and Zionists. The most recent indicator of antisemitism’s renewed public toleration, if not legitimacy, is the fact that the extreme nationalist, radical right LAOS party, along with its chairman Georgios Karatzaferis, is part of the new Greek coalition government that was established in response to the European debt crisis. The LAOS party, claiming to represent true Greeks instead of Jews, homosexuals and Communists, campaigns against Jews and Israel in particular. The party received 7 percent of the vote in the last national election. Karatzaferis is a self-professed Holocaust denier who hates Israel and is known for his openly antisemitic statements. After the 9/11 attacks in New York, he repeated the myth that all the Jews were warned not to come to work that day before the Greek parliament. He has also questioned historical accounts of Auschwitz and Dachau. During Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in 2008, Karatzaferis said that the Israel Defense Forces were acting “with savage brutality only seen in Hitler’s time towards helpless people” (Uni 2011).

C. Impact of global economic and socio-cultural crises

Finally, global crises and crises relating to globalization have provided a fertile climate for the mobilization of resentments against immigrants and Jews on the grounds that they are responsible for these problems. By personifying the origins of theses crises in immigrants, foreign capital, and the Jews, in particular, the radical right can tap into—and strengthen the link between—existing social resentments and current multi-faceted crises of global modernity. In particular, the identification of Jews with globalism and cosmopolitan political, economic, and socio-cultural transformations corresponds to what we call counter-cosmopolitanism, that is, the generalized, particularistic opposition to the combined set of political, cultural, and economic transformations associated with globalization and cosmopolitan value change (Rensmann 2011; Rensmann & Miller 2010; Markovits & Rensmann 2010).6

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6 This rejection is part and parcel of, but not limited to, nationalistic attitudes; it can also entail religiously or culturally grounded motivations, and it can be expressed transnationally in its own organizational outreach or political alliance-building.
Counter-cosmopolitanism—the unqualified rejection of all forms of socio-cultural, economic, and political globalization, as well as cosmopolitan norms and diversity—is likely to become more prevalent during global crises. Counter-cosmopolitan parties, which generally oppose globalization and the cosmopolitanization of society (Beck & Grande 2007), seek to strategically mobilize those citizens who identify with the national community, citizens from economic strata that have traditionally been protected by the nation state and now find themselves increasingly exposed to foreign competition, and those who lack the cultural competence to meet the economic and cultural challenge of a globalizing world (Kriesi et al. 2008).

While counter-cosmopolitanism bolsters hostility against immigrants and cultural change, it particularly encourages hostility against Jews. As a form of reified critique of globalization, such generalized counter-cosmopolitanism is highly susceptible to conspiracy theories that invoke the old social image of the cosmopolitan wandering Jew. In antisemitic narratives, Jews have traditionally been identified with modernity, cosmopolitanism, and globalism. Jews or Zionists are now often charged with cosmopolitan social change, global wars and global domination, cultural diffusion, the global erosion of the nation state, “dual loyalties,” and capitalist crises. It is, after all, one of modern antisemitism’s distinct feature to function as an objectified explanation of the modern world. In this ideology, Jews are seen as the embodiment of these cultural and economic modernizations processes (including immigration) and as the agents that orchestrate them. In a world of abstract domination governed by complex, abstract, and anonymous social relations, the antisemites disclose the world’s problems as a Zionist scheme. The widespread uneasiness that is felt in the changing, postmodern world is thus projected onto the image of the Jew. If this projection is not framed as a global Jewish conspiracy, the problems in question are often blamed squarely on the Zionists and the allegedly disproportionate Jewish influence on politics and the media at national and global level through the powerful, secret Israel lobby and the Holocaust industry.

5. CONCLUSION

There is continuity and change in the political ideology of the radical right parties in Europe. A focus on anti-immigration issues and anti-Muslim resentment is accompanied by virulent antisemitism. Contrary to common perceptions, the latter remains an integral part of the radical right’s political identity and mobilization. While anti-Muslim resentments often matter, the claim that antisemitism has been “replaced” by other resentments cannot be substantiated; it is equally untrue that the European radical right has largely turned “pro-Israel” (Bunzl 2007). Instead, most of the radical right prominently features modernized, “anti-globalist,” and “anti-Zionist” antisemitism. Cross-national variations notwithstanding, antisemitism has gained in importance. This is especially true for the most successful radical right parties in Eastern and Western Europe, such as Jobbik (Hungary), LAOS (Greece), and FPÖ (Austria). In many instances, radical right parties cater to broader counter-cosmopolitan constituencies. This emerging modernized ideological profile combines xenophobic resentment against immigrants and European Muslims with a counter-cosmopolitan agenda, domestic antisemitism, and modernized anti-Zionist antisemitism in foreign affairs. Even though Muslim immigrants are rejected domestically, radical Islamists still gain the sympathy of the radical right for their struggle against world Zionism.
These mobilizations and transformations on the radical right supply side are supported by a set of favorable conditions. Radical right parties articulate an evident electoral demand by catering to significant counter-cosmopolitan constituencies that harbor resentments against social and cultural change in general and immigrants and Jews in particular. Moreover, they benefit from a broader European political climate in which certain anti-immigrant resentments have resurfaced and in which forms of modernized antisemitism (Rensmann & Schoeps 2011) are becoming increasingly respectable and tolerated. Finally, the radical right is one of several agents that seeks to exploit current European and globalization crises affecting European citizens, such as the European financial debt crisis, and feeds into persisting anti-Jewish undercurrents and conspiracy theories. These crises can also be seen as crises of cosmopolitanism that help foster counter-cosmopolitan responses, including hostility against immigrants and Jews.

The radical right’s resurgent and reloaded politics of paranoia in Europe find a special target in Jews and Zionists. The new and modernized radical right, emulating the old, thus plays its part in the emergence of a new international antisemitism. The oft-neglected, and at times denied, revival of antisemitism in radical right party ideology and beyond epitomizes what could happen, both on the political demand side and on the political supply side, in the event of a deeper political crisis in Europe. The broader resurgence of antisemitism can be theorized as an anti-modern, counter-cosmopolitan response to rapid economic and cultural change and current crises in the 21st century. Part and parcel of, but far from limited to, the radical right, there are indicators that this reaction has begun to move from the fringes to the center.

REFERENCES


Penalizing Holocaust Denial: A View from Europe

Aleksandra Gliszczyńska-Grabias*

The visual evidence and the verbal testimony of starvation, cruelty and bestiality were so overpowering as to leave me a bit sick. In one room, where [there] were piled up twenty or thirty naked men, killed by starvation, George Patton would not even enter. He said that he would get sick if he did so. I made the visit deliberately, in order to be in a position to give first-hand evidence of these things if ever, in the future, there develops a tendency to charge these allegations merely to “propaganda.”

General Dwight D. Eisenhower

The alleged Hitlerian gas chambers and the alleged genocide of the Jews form one and the same historical lie, which permitted a gigantic financial swindle whose chief beneficiaries have been the State of Israel and international Zionism, and whose main victims have been the German people and the Palestinian people as a whole.

Robert Faurisson

I. INTRODUCTION

Incorporating Holocaust denial into the catalogue of issues governed by legal provisions, and in particular by the provisions of criminal law, raises a number of understandable doubts. Aside from the controversies related to the indisputable interference with freedom of speech, there are problems concerning the form of legal provisions that would ban the dissemination of the negationists’ theories, as well as difficulties in guaranteeing the effectiveness and consistency of their proper enforcement.3

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3 The term negationism in relation to Holocaust denial seems to be more appropriate than the frequently applied term revisionism. The school of revisionism may be associated with historical research, whereas Holocaust denial has nothing in common with any academic conduct. Negationism comprises multiple forms of denying historical truth. Most frequently however, it is used to describe various forms of Holocaust denial. See, e.g., Deborah Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory (1994); Michael Shermer and Alex Grobman, Denying History: Who Says the Holocaust Never Happened and Why Do They Say It? (2000).
In the United States, the essential differences between the European and the American understanding of the free speech doctrine lead to distrust of and even objections to every single court trial or a custodial sentence for a Holocaust denier in Europe. Moreover, the question whether—and if so how—to punish someone for Holocaust denial, but also more broadly for hate speech dissemination, poses a challenge, especially for those European enthusiasts of the greatest possible freedom of speech. This is because they simultaneously and (apparently) contradictorily acknowledge the need to resort to legal instruments that restrict this freedom, in order to protect different values and the rights of other individuals.

The US “First Amendment ethos” makes it almost impossible to accept the restrictive way of dealing with negationists that we see in so many European legal orders. Conversely, most Europeans find the US legal doctrine of the unlimited freedom of speech, including Holocaust denial, disturbing. One of the primary reasons for such a discrepancy in legal attitudes is the estimated risk of the danger that negationists are likely to cause. As Professor Wojciech Sadurski puts it:

In the United States, the groups which feed on the literature such as “historical revisionism” are part of the political folklore, just as are flat-Earthers and Montana separatists: probably irritating and deeply offensive to many, but very unlikely to reach a capacity to challenge the democratic system to its core.

However, there are numerous other complex and persuasive factors that are crucial to the establishment of a legal ban on Holocaust denial in Europe. This article introduces the most fundamental arguments raised in the European discourse in favor of penalizing Holocaust denial.

II. HOLOCAUST DENIAL — DEFINITIONAL CONTROVERSIES

The basic difficulty that occurs while discussing the idea of penalizing Holocaust denial concerns the attempt to define the concept in legal terms. Due to the lack of a coherent, internationally recognized definition of the crime of negationism as a whole and Holocaust denial in particular, the scope of the penalization may differ considerably. At the

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4 The differences between the European and American perceptions of the conflict between free speech and hate speech cover many more issues than only Holocaust denial. A compelling description of the American understanding of the civil liberties doctrine in the context of hate speech can be found in a book by Aryeh Neier, former leader of the American Civil Liberties Union. See Aryeh Neier, Taking Liberties. Four Decades in the Struggle for Rights (2003), pp. 113-33.

5 The European states that penalize Holocaust denial are: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Lichtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and Switzerland. After the entry into force of EU Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law, all EU member states are legally obliged to penalize certain forms of negationism.


same time, such divergence in definitions allows for a more flexible approach, in which
the newly generated forms of Holocaust denial can also be considered as legally forbid-
den negationism.

A. Domestic law in European states

We observe different approaches to negationism in the legal provisions of European
states that penalize the public dissemination of Holocaust denial. It speaks for itself that
historical factors play a major role in defining the crime of negationism, as well as the
political intention to shape and influence the memory of the nation.

Under Polish law, it is legally forbidden to deny, publicly and contrary to the facts,
Nazi crimes, communist crimes, and other crimes constituting crimes against peace,
crimes against humanity, or war crimes perpetrated against persons of Polish nationality
and Polish citizens of other ethnicity or nationality in the period between September 1,
1939 and July 31, 1990. Such denial is subject to a fine or a custodial penalty of up to
three years, and the judgment is to be made public.8 The objective scope of the provision
is not limited to negationism concerning crimes committed by Nazi Germany; it also
covers denial of the Katyn massacre.9

The French Gayssot Act, named after its initiator, Jean-Claude Gayssot (a socialist
deputy in the French parliament), imposes a punishment of one month to one year of
imprisonment or a fine for individuals who publicly question the existence of one or
more crimes against humanity. These are crimes that have been defined in the statute of
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, included in the London Agreement of
8 August 1945 and carried out either by members of an organization declared criminal
pursuant to Article 9 of the aforementioned statute or by a person found guilty of such
crimes under French or international jurisdiction.10

German law regulates the issue of penalizing Holocaust denial in a more complex
way. There are several provisions that may be invoked against Holocaust deniers. One
of the provisions allows for penalizing anyone who publicly approves of, denies, or
belittles an act committed under the rule of National Socialism in a manner capable of
disturbing the public peace. Such a person shall be punished with imprisonment of up
to five years or a fine.11

The Austrian solution for penalizing Holocaust denial was introduced in 1992 in the
form of an amendment to the Prohibition Act of 1947, a special bill that banned the Nazi
Party and provided the legal framework for the process of removing all possible conse-
quences of Nazism from Austria. It was designed to suppress any potential future
revival of the murderous Nazi regime.12 However, the foremost reason for introducing
the legal ban on Holocaust denial in Austria was a number of court proceedings in

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9 In the spring of 1940, the Soviets murdered almost 20,000 Polish prisoners of war—military
officers, policemen, and intellectuals—in the forest of Katyn.
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html>.
which Holocaust deniers were acquitted due to an ineffective basis for accusation. Austrian judges regarded the legal ban on incitement to racial hatred as inapplicable to the negation of the Holocaust.\(^\text{13}\) As a result, a new provision was introduced. It stipulates that whoever denies, grossly plays down, approves of, or tries to excuse the National Socialist genocide or other National Socialist crimes against humanity in a printed publication, in a broadcast, or in any other media shall be punished with imprisonment for one to ten years and, in cases of particularly dangerous suspects or activity, up to twenty years. The court may also decide in favor of the forfeiture of property, which usually relates to the entire print run of the publication containing the negationists’ theories.

Liechtenstein\(^\text{14}\) and Romania\(^\text{15}\) explicitly mention the Holocaust in their negationism penalization laws. Liechtenstein law penalizes anyone who through speech, pictures, writing, or electronic media denies, crudely deprecates, or tries to justify the Holocaust or other crimes against humanity with imprisonment for up to two years. Romanian law, on the other hand, punishes public negation of the Holocaust or its effects with imprisonment for six months to five years. It is also prohibited to erect or maintain in a public space statues, statuary groups, or commemorative plaques celebrating persons guilty of committing crimes against peace or humanity, or to name streets, boulevards, squares, parks, or other public spaces after such persons.\(^\text{16}\)

If one agrees that penalizing this form of negationism is legitimate and relevant, it should be stated that, in order to make the penal method effective, the legal definition of Holocaust denial must be sufficiently broad and encompass not only the negation of the Holocaust but also, inter alia, its trivialization and justification. However, accepting such an extensive definition obviously implies a higher risk of excessive interference in the sphere of free speech and freedom of scientific research. It is also bound up with doubts concerning the legal interpretation of such legally imprecise concepts as trivialization or justification. Nevertheless, the Europeans remain firmly convinced that the interpretative difficulties do not prevail over the need to legally regulate the dissemination of Holocaust denial. This is because the boundary between legal and illegal behavior in this area is very fine, making it highly inadvisable to leave such behavior without clarification and an appropriate legal response.

B. The Council of Europe

The creation of the Council of Europe is inextricably linked to the horrors of World War II and the Holocaust. Accordingly, all member states of the Council of Europe unanimously recognize any manifestation of antisemitism as a human rights violation and regard the obligation to fight it as an integral part of counteracting racism in Europe.


This position of the Council of Europe has been confirmed repeatedly.\textsuperscript{17} The need to engage in an active and effective fight against antisemitism, together with the willingness to do so, was also one of the motivations behind the establishment of the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), which occurred during the First Vienna Summit Conference of Heads of State and Government of the member states of the Council of Europe in 1993.\textsuperscript{18} In the “Vienna Declaration” adopted at that time, a common policy for counteracting racism, xenophobia, antisemitism, and intolerance was agreed upon. In this declaration, the member states of the Council of Europe declared that they would combat all ideologies, policies, and practices constituting incitement of racial hatred, violence, and discrimination, as well as any action or language likely to strengthen fears and tensions between groups of different racial, ethnic, national, religious, or social background.

In 1997, the executive body of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe issued a recommendation that deals exclusively with the phenomenon of hate speech.\textsuperscript{19} In the appendix to that recommendation, hate speech was defined as speech covering all forms of expression that spread, incite, promote, or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, antisemitism, or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, and discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin. It is important that the concept of Holocaust denial was included in the category of speech that disseminates and propagates antisemitism.

In light of the growing wave of antisemitic attitudes in the member states of the Council of Europe, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted Resolution No. 1563, entitled “Combating anti-Semitism in Europe.”\textsuperscript{20} The Assembly emphasized the immense danger of antisemitism and called on all member states of the Council of Europe to vigorously and systematically enforce legislation criminalizing antisemitic and other hate speech, in particular any incitement to violence. In addition, it called on all member states to make public denial, as well as trivialization, justification, or praise, with racist intentions, of crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, a criminal offense. The resolution also includes a call to actively and strongly condemn all states sponsoring antisemitism, Holocaust denial, and incitement to genocide.


\textsuperscript{18} The compilation of the Council of Europe documents, available at: <http://www.coe.int/t/dcr/summit/decl_vienne_pl.asp>.


Moreover, the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems, deals with the issue of Holocaust denial in its Article 6, which stipulates that the each state party to the protocol:

shall adopt such legislative measures as may be necessary to establish the following conduct as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally and without right: distributing or otherwise making available, through a computer system to the public, material which denies, grossly minimizes, approves or justifies acts constituting genocide or crimes against humanity….\(^\text{21}\)

A direct reference to the need to penalize Holocaust denial may also be found in ECRI General Policy Recommendation No. 9: “The fight against anti-Semitism.”\(^\text{22}\)The most important aspect of the this recommendation concerns the form of legal provisions in the Council of Europe member states and their effective implementation. States should ensure that for all criminal offenses, antisemitic motivation will be regarded as an aggravating circumstance. The ECRI mentions the following actions, which, if committed intentionally, should be penalized: the public denial, trivialization, justification, or condoning of the Holocaust and the public denial, trivialization, justification, or condoning, with an antisemitic aim, of crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes committed against persons on the grounds of their Jewish identity or origin. Moreover, the ECRI recommendation indicates the need to punish by legal means the public dissemination or public distribution, or the production or storage aimed at public dissemination or public distribution, of antisemitic written, pictorial, or other material containing, inter alia, Holocaust denial.\(^\text{23}\) The need to implement an effective legal ban on disseminating Holocaust denial is thus emphasized here in the most explicit way.

C. European Union

The record of the debates, which took place over many years, on the shape of the common Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law indicate that those who supported the introduction of an obligation to penalize Holocaust denial by the EU member states followed the European rationale for such penalization.\(^\text{24}\) It should be emphasized that these provisions were the object of serious and turbulent disagreement, which obviously stemmed from the different approaches of individual EU member states to the general problem of penalizing speech.

Article 1(1)(d) of the Framework Decision obliges the EU member states to take the necessary measures to ensure that the following intentional conduct is punishable:


\(^{23}\) Id.

publicly condoning, denying or grossly trivialising the crimes defined in Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal appended to the London Agreement of 8 August 1945, directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin when the conduct is carried out in a manner likely to incite to violence or hatred against such a group or a member of such a group.

Article 1 also introduces a similar ban with respect to genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes as defined by the Statute of the International Crime Court. Not-

25 Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal — Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis (“London Agreement”) stipulates:

The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred to in article 1 hereof for the trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis countries shall have the power to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members of organizations, committed any of the following crimes.

The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility:

(a) Crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;

(b) War crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to Wave labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;

(c) Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.

Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.


26 Article 6 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court defines the crime of genocide as:

... any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

withstanding these provisions, the final content of the Framework Decision was disappointing to its supporters. Rapporteur Martine Roure of the EU Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs stated in her report on the proposal for a Council Framework Decision, she “regrets the failure of the Council’s text to move strongly forward and rise to the political challenge posed by the fight against racism and xenophobia.” She vociferously opposed the limits placed on the scope of the Framework Decision concerning the penalization of negationism in domestic law, according to which member states are free to chose to punish only such behavior that is likely to incite to violence or hatred. Martine Roure rightly claimed that: “Trivialisation of the crime of genocide is a form of racism, and Member States should be able to punish it even where incitement to hatred or violence is not involved.”

The Framework Decision indeed makes it possible to significantly limit the obligations imposed on member states. In addition to the remarks quoted above, member states may also declare that denying or grossly trivializing the crimes listed in the Framework Decision shall be penalized only if these crimes have been established by a final decision of a national court of a particular member state and/or an international court or by final decision of an international court only.

The Framework Decision came into force in December 2008, but the substance of the decision required a prolonged period of transposition in the EU member states. The states were obliged to take the necessary measures to comply with the provisions of this Framework Decision by November 28, 2010. By the same date, they were required to transmit to the General Secretariat of the Council and to the Commission the text of the provisions transposing the Framework Decision into their domestic legal orders. By November 28, 2013, the Council will assess the extent to which member states have complied with the provisions of the Framework Decision and review the Framework Decision. It seems highly likely that those member states that had not penalized any form of negationism before the entry into force of the Framework Decision will find it very difficult to comply with this part of the Decision. It remains an open question whether, or to what extent, the 2013 review process will indicate the need to exclude the ban on negationism from the scope of the Framework Decision.

It was claimed, in light of the significant differences in the legislation of the EU member states in the areas covered by the framework decision, as well as their different political and social traditions, that the compromise achieved was the only possible solution at this stage of the negotiations. However, although the Framework Decision contains several important and necessary elements, the document as a whole appears to be rather limited in scope. Nevertheless, the efforts to harmonize legislation at the EU level and the establishment of a consolidated catalogue of sanctions to be imposed against hate crimes and hate speech (including the public dissemination of negationism) is an important step in combating all forms of racism and intolerance.

28 Article 1(4) of the Framework Decision.
29 Article 10 of the Framework Decision.
III. FUNDAMENTAL PREREQUISITES FOR HOLOCAUST DENIAL PENALIZATION IN EUROPE

As discussed above, the issue of Holocaust denial and its penalization is of a profound significance for Europe. In order to carefully identify the reasons that justify restricting the freedom of speech of Holocaust deniers, it is essential to explain the essence of this phenomenon beyond its legal definition.

In layman’s terms, Holocaust denial is a form of negationism that refers mainly to the act of denying, trivializing, or justifying the crimes committed by Nazi Germany against the Jews during World War II, although it should be clear that denying these crimes affects all victims and not only the Jewish ones. In practice, however, Holocaust denial is carried out almost exclusively in relation to Jews, and this is how it is being popularized throughout the world. Professor Wojciech Sadurski rightly describes this phenomenon as “a part of a larger package of an ideology which maintains that Jews cannot be trusted on anything, even on their own past.”

In 1984, during a seminar held at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Professor Yisrael Gutman posed the question whether Holocaust denial was simply a short-lived phenomenon, or whether it had a future and would have to be dealt with. Today, when the theories spread by negationists have supporters all around the world, and the president of Iran openly claims that Holocaust is a fiction made up by Jews, raising Holocaust denial to the rank of a state doctrine, the answer to Professor Gutman’s question is, unfortunately, straightforward.

The circle that has gathered around the idea of Holocaust denial has always consisted of people from many different milieus, representing a wide spectrum of personal backgrounds and political ideals, even though the representatives of the post-war neo-Nazi movement in Germany, France, and the United Kingdom initially prevailed. Currently, the circle of Holocaust deniers around the world is much wider and has strengthened enormously, also in a financial sense, due to the support it obtains from many Arab states.

As time has passed, the range of statements described as Holocaust denial has also changed. The opinion of researchers dealing with the issue was initially that Holocaust denial was meant to clear the blame for the ideas of National Socialism and Hitler. Since then, the claims of Holocaust deniers have become more nuanced. They argue, inter alia, that even if Holocaust really took place, the number of victims was signifi-

30 Sadurski, supra note 6, p. 27.
33 The most well-known examples are nowadays the statements of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who repeatedly claims that the Holocaust was nothing but a “Jewish swindle.” For coverage, see, e.g., Anne Appelbaum, “Teheran’s Holocaust Lesson,” The Washington Post online, Dec. 12, 2006, available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/11/AR2006121101163.html>.
34 Deborah E. Lipstadt calls this kind of Holocaust denial hard core Holocaust denial, distinguishing it from soft core Holocaust denial, which includes, for example, describing military interventions of the Israeli army as the “Palestinian Holocaust.” See Deborah E. Lipstadt’s blog at: <http://lipstadt.blogspot.com>.
cantly lower than what the official statistics indicate; that it is true that many Jews perished during the war, but most of them were victims of contagious diseases and hard living conditions; that Hitler had never signed any written order to murder the whole Jewish population in Europe, so the Holocaust could not be described as a complex, precise plan; that Auschwitz was not a concentration camp but only a labor camp, equipped with such facilities as a swimming pool or a dance hall; that Zyklon B was only used for disinfection purposes; that gas chambers were first built after the war; that the testimonies of the former prisoners of the camps are not veracious, as they were given only to gain undue financial benefits; and that the evidence given by the former camp guards and Nazis was elicited by means of torture.

The threat stemming from the dissemination of Holocaust denial becomes even more apparent when one considers that general knowledge about World War II and the Holocaust in Europe. The level of historical awareness in society has always been the best guarantor of preserving historical memory. However, as indicated by a poll conducted in Great Britain in 2004, over 60 percent of the British population under the age of 35 have not heard of the “Final Solution,” and 30 percent of students surveyed in high schools in Brussels in 2005 were convinced that Oskar Schindler was one of Hitler’s advisers. It is thus clear how much opportunity has arisen for those who wish to distort and misrepresent historical truth.\textsuperscript{35} It should also be emphasized that, in the age of the Internet, the possibilities for disseminating negationist theories are almost limitless. This is proven by thousands of websites that furnish information about the “great Jewish lie” in a way that makes them appear to be based on reliable, scientifically-proven facts.\textsuperscript{36}

It is clear that the low level knowledge in society about the Holocaust and the lack of an appropriate response to its negation or trivialization are not in themselves a sufficient justification for penalizing Holocaust denial. Also, penalization should not stem solely from the fact that the claims of negationists are outrageous and evoke moral objections. If so, what are the reasons for recognizing the legitimacy of punishing words in the case of Holocaust denial? The most fundamental grounds for such legitimacy, identified in the European discourse, are the following:

\textdash the necessity to turn the memory and honor of the victims of the Holocaust into a legally protected value;

\textdash the conviction that restricting the negationists’ freedom of speech is acceptable in order to protect the very fundamental element of the history and national identity of certain European states and the heritage of European civilization as a whole; and

\textdash the recognition of Holocaust denial as one of the modern forms of antisemitism and a form of hate speech directed at Jews that may lead not only to a rise in antisemitic moods and attitudes but also to a rise in hate crimes committed on this basis.

\textsuperscript{35} The data cited are sourced from a survey commissioned by the BBC in December 2004 and from an opinion poll conducted by Res Publica, a Belgian political quarterly, in January 2005. Quoted from the Znak website, available at: <http://www.forumznak.org.pl/?lang1=pl&page1=news&subpage1=news00&infopassid1=2432&scrt1=sn> (in Polish).

\textsuperscript{36} The significance of the problem of the dissemination of hate speech and Holocaust denial via the internet was explicitly acknowledged in the above-mentioned Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalization of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems.
Such universal and axiological reasons (which are to be distinguished from the formal prerequisites that must be fulfilled in order to use a specific legal provision limiting the freedom of speech of the individual) should be seen as an attempt to formulate a justification for introducing a legal ban on disseminating Holocaust denial, in the sense that they indicate the European legislators’ rationale for using penal sanctions against negationists.

A. Memory and honor of the victims

The memory and honor of the victims has been strongly emphasized in Germany, where the dissemination of Holocaust denial is punishable on the basis of regulations that prohibit insulting and humiliating the dead, among other legal methods. However, this approach to penalization carries with it the risk of the negative effects of trials involving Holocaust deniers, which often turn into bizarre shows during which negationists get a chance to present their theories to a wider audience. This, in turn, may be perceived as an additional insult to the memory of the dead.

However, the consequence of trying to avoid such situations would be that no person who is willing to defend the legitimacy of his or her actions in court would be punished, on the grounds that it might encourage others to take similar actions or insult the feelings of individuals who suffered as victims of such actions. Moreover, the public spectacle of David Irving, the notorious Holocaust denier, denouncing his theories in front of an Austrian judge and loudly admitting that the Holocaust was indeed a crime perpetrated by Nazi Germany and that gas chambers were indeed used to kill the Jewish people ridicules the whole negationist movement and illustrates the weakness of this ideology. Thus, the existing negative aspects of the judicial consideration of Holocaust deniers’ guilt should not be seen as a sufficient argument against punishing Holocaust denial by means of legal instruments.

B. Historical truth and identity

The essence of the second reason for penalizing Holocaust denial, which is related to the preservation of historical heritage, is well captured in the words of Marek Safjan, a Polish judge of the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg. In the context of the discussion on the penalization of Holocaust denial in Poland, Professor Safjan has noted: “Human memory is short and deceptive, while the trivialization of lies and hatred disseminated in public space may have shocking and destructive effects, particularly for the young generation of Europeans.” In other words, punishing negationists is also aimed at halting the process of the gradual fading of the memory of the Holocaust and the crimes of totalitarian regimes, which are still not yet a thing of the past.

This argument also emphasizes the educational role of the state, which by introducing a legally protected taboo affirms certain values, such as a commitment to non-discrimination on the grounds of national, racial, or ethnic grounds. However, this

approach also carries a certain risk, namely that regulations that are only of a symbolic character will not be strictly executed. As a result of their controversial nature or vague wording, such provisions can thus be a risky method of assuring justice. Yet in the case of Holocaust denial, the significance of such provisions is deemed to prevail over any doubts. Moreover, from a European perspective, a proper legal response is an explicit form of warning against totalitarian regimes, which are always capable of resurgence.

C. Hate speech and hate crime

With regard to the third reason for penalizing Holocaust denial, which concerns the correlation between hate speech and hate crimes, it is important to remember that while most statements denying the Holocaust do not contain openly hostile or hateful antisemitic messages, the antisemitic motives for disseminating such statements are obvious to anybody who analyzes them in a broader context. For example, denying the Holocaust has been described as a manifestation of antisemitism in ECRI Recommendation No. 9 and in the working definition of antisemitism prepared by the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (which became the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights in 2007), as well as in resolutions of the European Parliament.39

Therefore, if we assume that Holocaust denial is a form or at least a manifestation of antisemitism, the legal regulations that would ban its dissemination must be regarded as part of a broader state strategy that aims to fight all forms of racial, national, or religious hatred and intolerance. The European states have undertaken international obligations in this respect, also in the legal sphere, by becoming parties to a number of international human rights treaties.40

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40 See, e.g., Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which stipulates that:

States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention, inter alia:

(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof;

(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law;

(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination.

It is possible that Holocaust denial does not translate into sudden, intense explosions of antisemitic sentiment or lead directly to acts of violence against Jews. However, a strong correlation between words and actions is indisputable, although it is difficult to determine when the critical transition takes place. Various forms of antagonism may lie dormant for long periods of time only to suddenly escalate, reaching the proportions of a mass psychosis. The history of the Third Reich’s hate propaganda leaves no room for doubt regarding the influence that words may have on deeds.

One recent, dramatic example of this correlation is the radio broadcasts aired on a Rwandan radio stations at the time of the genocide. Due to high rates of illiteracy in Rwanda, radio served as a powerful and effective way of inciting hate and violence against the *inyenzi* (cockroaches), a derogatory term used to describe the Tutsis. One of the key figures engaged in using words as a tool of genocide was Georges Ruggiu, a Belgian journalist who was found guilty of public incitement to commit genocide and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. As the Tribunal stated in its judgment:

> The media, particularly RTLM radio, was a key tool used by extremists within the political parties to mobilize and incite the population to commit the massacres. RTLM had a large audience in Rwanda and became an effective propaganda instrument. The accused, who was a journalist and broadcaster with the RTLM, played a crucial role in the incitement of ethnic hatred and violence, which RTLM vigorously pursued. ... His broadcasts incited massacres of the Tutsi population.

In this context, attention should also be drawn to the annual reports of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and the Council of Europe’s European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, which point not only to an apparent increase in racist, xenophobic, and antisemitic attitudes in most European countries but also to the growing number of assaults, beatings, and other acts of violence committed on the same grounds.

### IV. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The essence of each of the above-mentioned reasons for penalizing Holocaust denial is clearly mirrored in the case law of the Strasbourg-based European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the supervisory body of the European system of human rights prote-

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43 Id.
tion. The Court (and previously also the European Commission of Human Rights, which served as a part of the Strasbourg system until 1998) has repeatedly been faced with the problem of evaluating the methods by which the member states of the Council of Europe limit the freedom of speech of Holocaust deniers by means of their domestic legislation. It is significant that up until now the ECtHR has consistently and unambiguously refused to grant protection to Holocaust deniers, ruling that their complaints concerning the limitation of free speech were inadmissible.

However, the ECtHR’s position in regard to Holocaust denial has never been based on one consistent way of reasoning. The Strasbourg Court has used various techniques to establish the inadmissibility of negationists’ attempts to defend their views under Article 10 (freedom of speech) of the European Convention on Human Rights. In several cases, it has ruled that the legal limitations imposed on Holocaust deniers’ free speech by the member states were necessary for the protection of the rights of others, the public security, or public morals in a democratic society. At other times, the ECtHR has invoked Article 17 of the Convention, which stipulates that: “Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein....” As a result, every attempt by negationists to rely on Article 10 is regarded as an abuse of the rights guaranteed in this international human rights treaty.


Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights stipulates:

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

X. v. Germany is one of the earliest cases concerning Holocaust denial that were examined by the Strasbourg Court. The author of the complaint had displayed pamphlets that described the Holocaust as an “unacceptable lie” and a “Zionist swindle” on a notice board located on the fence of his property. A neighbor of Jewish descent whose grandfather had been murdered in Auschwitz filed a civil lawsuit against him. The Court of First Instance ruled that despite the fact that the pamphlets did not directly address the neighbor or his grandfather, they must be considered offensive to all Jewish victims of National Socialism and their surviving relatives. The court instructed Mr. X. to refrain from expressing his beliefs publicly. However, the Court of Appeal ruled that contents of the pamphlets, which denied the facts of the Holocaust, did not insult people of Jewish origin as a whole but only individuals who expressed certain opinions on the extermination of Jews during the Third Reich, opinions which, according to Mr. X., were untrue. The Federal Court of Justice issued a decision reiterating its previous rulings on this issue, according to which in Germany, because of its history, every individual of Jewish descent may feel insulted by attacks on Jews as a group or as a community, regardless of his or her personal experiences during the time of the Nazi regime, and even regardless of whether the person was alive at the time. The Court emphasized that Holocaust denial is not covered by the freedom of speech enshrined in the German Constitution.

The complaint filed by Mr. X. before the Strasbourg Court referred specifically to an alleged violation of Article 10 (freedom of speech) of the Convention, which in his opinion had taken place as a result of the distortion of historical truth by the German nation for political reasons. He also claimed a violation of Article 6 (right to a fair trial) of the Convention, due to the German court’s refusal to order a review of popular Holocaust denial publications and views, which were supposed to serve as evidence in the civil suit.

Concerning the alleged violation of Article 10, the European Commission of Human Rights (which at that time decided on the admissibility of applications) delivered a very significant judgment, finding that:

it was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable to consider the pamphlets displayed by the applicant as a defamatory attack against the Jewish community and against each individual member of this community. By describing the historical fact of the assassination of millions of Jews, a fact which was even admitted by the applicant himself, as a lie and a Zionist swindle, the pamphlets in question not only gave a distorted picture of the relevant historical facts but also contained an attack on the reputation of all those who were described as liars or swindlers, or at least as persons profiting from or interested in such lies or swindles. The Commission considers that the courts rightly identified this as the underlying tendency of the pamphlets in question. Their restriction was therefore not only covered by a legitimate purpose recognised by the Convention (namely the protection of the reputation of others), but could also be considered as necessary in a democratic society. Such a society rests on the principles of tolerance and broadmindedness which the pamphlets in question clearly failed to observe. The protection of these principles may be especially indicated vis-à-vis groups which have historically suffered from discrimination. The fact that collective protec-

tion against defamation is limited to certain specific groups including Jews is based on objective considerations and does not involve any element of discrimination contrary to Article 14 of the Convention.

Furthermore, in response to the accusation that, by not admitting the negationist materials as evidence, the German courts had violated Article 6 of the Convention, the Commission reiterated that the crime of the Holocaust was a historical fact that was proven beyond any reasonable doubt and did not need to be proven in the courtroom again. The German courts were not required to rule on whether or not the contents of the pamphlets were true but to consider the question concerning their insulting nature. In conclusion, the European Commission stated that the entire complaint of Mr. X. was manifestly ill-founded.

The Strasbourg Court also considered the penalization of Holocaust denial in another interesting context. This complaint concerned the imposition by the authorities of the city of Munich of various duties on the far-right National Democratic Party of Germany (NDP) relating to the organization of a conference, entitled “Germany’s future in the shade of political extortion?,” where David Irving, a well-known antisemite and Holocaust denier, was to deliver a key lecture. The NDP was obliged to ensure that the crime of the Holocaust would not be denied during the course of the entire conference and to inform participants of the sanctions resulting from incitement to hatred and insulting the memory of the dead. If statements denying the Holocaust were made, the organizers of the conference were obliged to block them or even to discontinue the conference immediately. Because of David Irving’s participation in the conference, the risk that statements negating the Holocaust would be made during the course of the conference was regarded as very high. The NDP’s complaint regarding the decision of the Munich authorities was rejected in subsequent court proceedings. Ultimately, the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled yet again that Holocaust denial did not fall under the constitutional protection of freedom of speech.

The authors of the application submitted to the Strasbourg Court claimed in particular that:

statements denying the persecution of Jews under the Nazi regime, in particular the denial of the existence of gas chambers were protected by the Convention as statements or opinions relating to contemporary history. In this respect, the applicant organisation maintains that, according to scientific research, the gas chambers in Auschwitz were not authentic.

In the NDP’s opinion, the scheduled conference was only meant to discuss the concept of anti-German atrocity propaganda.

The European Commission of Human Rights held that the application was clearly inadmissible and that the intervention of the German authorities had been justified and proportionate. According to the Commission, David Irving’s presence had rightly been regarded as a factor that made it highly probable that statements denying the Holocaust would be made and that public order disturbances would occur. The German authorities had been thus right to take steps to prevent this from happening. Referring to Article 17

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of the Convention, the Commission ruled that statements negating the persecution of millions of Jews by the Nationalist Socialist regime made in the context of a discussion about “anti-German atrocity propaganda,” were contrary to the essential values underlying the entire Convention.

Among the numerous complaints submitted to the ECtHR by Holocaust deniers is the one of Roger Garaudy, one of the key leaders of the European negationist movement, who had been fined by the French courts for denying the Holocaust. In the process of considering the legitimacy of said complaint, the Court unambiguously articulated its standpoint regarding attempts to use the Convention by persons who disseminate Holocaust denial. In its decision, the Court firmly asserted that Holocaust denial is:

one of the most serious forms of racial defamation of Jews and of incitement to hatred of them. The denial or rewriting of this type of historical fact undermines the values on which the fight against racism and anti-Semitism are based…. Such acts are incompatible with democracy and human rights because they infringe the rights of others.

As a result, the complaint was found inadmissible on the basis of Article 17 of the Convention.

The fact that the ECtHR relies on Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights in its case law concerning the public dissemination of Holocaust denial is very significant. However, it simultaneously raises several doubts arising from the exceptional character of this provision. According to the case law of the Strasbourg Court, as well as the ideas underlying the Convention itself, Article 17 was designed to serve as a “last resort” in cases where the limitation clauses appended to those provisions of the Convention that grant specific rights and freedoms could no longer be applied or might be deemed insufficient. The essence of the meaning of Article 17 was expressed during the consideration of the complaint in *De Becker v. Belgium*, where the ECtHR emphasized that Article 17 was applicable only to those individuals who posed a threat to the democratic order of the states parties to the Convention.

The fact that the ECtHR regards Holocaust deniers as individuals who pose this kind of threat is a clear sign that the Strasbourg Court understands and is ready to fight the dangers resulting from Holocaust denial in Europe. However, a question arises as to the scope and wording of negationists’ statements that are covered by Article 17. Would a similar line of argument apply to the efforts to negate the genocide that took place in Bosnia during the Balkan wars? The fact that the crime of genocide was committed in Bosnia at that time has also been proven beyond all reasonable doubt. Moreover, new provisions penalizing the negation of other genocides are being implemented by individual European states, as was the case with the French law prohibiting the negation of

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the genocide committed by the Turks against the Armenian people. Until now, the ECtHR has not been required to respond to this question, but it is most likely that it will soon face such challenges. Only then will it be possible to assert with certainty that the antisemitic character of Holocaust denial is a decisive factor on which the invocation of Article 17 of the Convention relies in the context of negationism.

V. UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE AND HOLOCAUST DENIAL IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT

The question of the freedom of speech of Holocaust deniers in the European context was also examined by an international, quasi-judicial body in the universal human rights protection system, namely the UN Human Rights Committee, after Robert Faurisson, another prominent representative of the European negationist movement, submitted a complaint to the Committee. Shortly after the so-called Gayssot Act, which penalizes Holocaust denial, had been adopted in France, Faurisson gave a press interview in which he stated, inter alia, that he did not believe in the existence of a “policy of extermination of Jews” and “magical gas chambers.” Eventually, a French court fined Faurisson.

During the proceedings before of the UN Committee, where Faurisson submitted his complaint, France raised the issue of the admissibility of the communication, arguing that it should be dismissed as inconsistent ratione materiae with the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It invoked Article 5 of the Covenant, which is similar in character and effect to Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights and stipulates that: “Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein....” It was emphasized that Faurisson’s complaint should be treated in the same manner as similar complaints submitted to the Strasbourg Court and found inadmissible. Article 20 of the Covenant was also invoked. This provision explicitly imposes an obligation on all states parties to prohibit by law any war propaganda, as well as any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence. However, the UN Human Rights Committee did not share the position of the French government and found the complaint admissible as regards the alleged violation of Faurisson’s freedom of speech, guaranteed by Article 19 of the Covenant.

When considering the merits of the communication, the Committee stated that, in certain circumstances, the Gayssot Act might lead to a breach of the Covenant, as it limits freedom of speech too extensively. However, it also emphasized that, in the case of Roger Faurisson, the French courts had managed to eliminate such a risk by carefully analyzing all circumstances of the case. Furthermore, the Committee referred to its


General Comment No. 10, which explicitly states that restrictions on the freedom of speech may be necessary in order to protect and ensure the interests of other persons and specific groups as a whole. Restricting the free speech of a Holocaust denier thus served to protect the right of the Jewish community in France to live a life free of fear and antisemitism. The statements made by Faurisson, interpreted in their wider context, stirred antisemitic feelings. As a result, the Committee decided that France did not violate any provisions of the Covenant. However, the Committee’s decision was accompanied by a number of individual opinions of the Committee’s members, who emphasized their concerns regarding the overly restrictive nature of French legal provisions penalizing Holocaust denial. Although they all agreed with the final conclusion of the Committee, they perceived the Gayssot Act as a potential threat to freedom of speech if used in a context other than the penalization of antisemitism.

One of the most striking elements of the Committee’s decision in Faurisson’s case was a statement by Professor Thomas Buergenthal, who is currently a judge of the International Court of Justice in the Hague: “As a survivor of the concentration camps of Auschwitz and Sachsenhausen whose father, maternal grandparents and many other family members were killed in the Nazi Holocaust, I have no choice but to recluse myself from participating in the decision of this case.” This powerful confession of a Holocaust survivor, forced by the Holocaust denier’s demand for protection of his antisemitic views in front of a UN human rights protection body, is indeed a symbolic one.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

The question of the legitimacy of penalizing Holocaust denial is part of a broader doctrinal dispute in which the views of those who advocate the unrestricted freedom of speech of the negationists clash with the views of those who see the need to use a specific legal barrier in cases of drastic abuse of this freedom. This question is also constantly present within European states. In 2007, the Constitutional Court of Spain found a legal provision penalizing Holocaust denial unconstitutional. It stated that the danger of restricting free public debate within the democratic society of Spain overrides the need to counteract dissemination of Holocaust denial.

Beyond such free speech violation controversies, the fact that European legislators and judges are having serious doubts about this issue is also caused by another disturbing phenomenon, namely the multiplication of so-called “memory laws” in many European states. In recent times, an increasing number of legal provisions penalizing various “historical lies” have been adopted, some of which are far from rational. For example, as already noted above, under the Turkish Penal Code it is forbidden to publicly claim that the Armenian genocide ever took place. In 2005, a world-famous Turkish

writer and Noble Prize winner, Orhan Pamuk, was accused of publicly insulting Turkishness after stating in an interview that the murder of Armenians by the Turks was nothing short of genocide. Grotesque as it may seem, at the same time France and Switzerland decided to penalize public denial of the Armenian genocide. The Russian parliament, on the other hand, has recently started drafting a law that could result in penalizing any critique of the actions of the Soviets in World War II—an unprecedented abuse of the truth from the Polish perspective. Which historical claims deserves legal protection? When does justified action against the abuse of historical truth turn into state-sponsored decreeing of an official version of history? These questions remain open, as the answers depend to a large extent on the specific historical context and the individual “memory law.”

And yet, in the case of Holocaust denial, it is not enough to speak of falsifying facts and historical events. It is an unprecedented phenomenon that has spread all over the world for a very specific reason: to incite hatred of one particular nation—the Jewish people. The fact that Holocaust denial is currently part of official state doctrine in Iran is terrifying. This makes it all the more problematic that a fellow at one of America’s most prestigious universities organized a meeting for students with the president of Iran, the very same person who has been saying for years that the Jews invented Holocaust and that Israel should be wiped off the world map.

The antisemitic motivation for spreading Holocaust denial is the most convincing reason for the need to punish negationists for their words. What is debatable is whether or not they should be punished by imprisonment. It is possible that establishing very high financial penalties for denying the Holocaust, combined with an obligation to publicize and publicly announce the judicial ruling in question, could also produce the desired effect. At the same time, we should be wary of the idea that it is only necessary to penalize Holocaust denial. Even though Germany has a special responsibility in this area, denying the murder of millions of Jews has the same objective and the same harrowing effects all over the world.

It is clear that the problem of penalizing Holocaust denial does not merely come down to making arguments for or against such penalization. The very shape of the particular legal provision, including the form and scope of the penal sanction and the manner in which national courts and law enforcement agencies use the available legal instruments, is equally important and controversial. These are the elements that most often determine whether or not the boundary between justified restriction of freedom of speech and excessive penal repression has been crossed.


The Judeo-Masonic Enemy in Francoist Propaganda (1936-1945)

Javier Domínguez Arribas*

1. INTRODUCTION

Between the beginning of the Spanish Civil War and the end of the Second World War, Francoist propaganda depicted Jews and Freemasons as two closely linked forces that conspired tirelessly against Spain. They were considered responsible for all the evils that afflicted the country, together with the leftists. While the “Reds” were an obvious and significant enemy for the nationalist forces, there were no more than about 5,000 Spanish Freemasons in 1936, and their influence in Spanish public affairs was limited, at least as an organization (although the individual influence of some Freemasons is another issue). However, their fate was the same as that of the “Communists”: relentless repression. The case of the Jews is even more surprising. The antisemitic propaganda of the early days of the Franco regime took place in a country where almost no Jews had lived since their expulsion by the Catholic monarchs in 1492. Furthermore, most members of the tiny Jewish community in the Iberian Peninsula in 1936 had arrived just a short time previously, coming mostly from Hitler’s Germany. Their number, although impossible to establish precisely, has been estimated at close to 6,000. In spite of the violent rhetoric against Jews, the regime did not systematically implement discriminatory policies against them. Above all, the Franco government did not facilitate Nazi antisemitic persecution during the Second World War, while some Spanish diplomats in fact protected Jews in danger. Why, then, were two groups that were so small, so different, and so differently treated by the regime, presented together by official propaganda as the powerful Judeo-Masonic enemy to be fought? This, among other aspects, is the focus of the research presented in this paper.4

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1 See José Antonio Ferrer Benimeli, “Franco y la masonería,” in Josep Fontana, España bajo el franquismo, Barcelona, Crítica, 1986, pp. 246-268 at p. 268. I would like to thank my colleague Susan Pickford for having corrected my English. A preliminary Spanish version of this paper may be consulted in VII Encuentro de Investigadores sobre el franquismo, Santiago de Compostela, Fundación 10 de Marzo, 2011 (CD-ROM).
3 See Bernd Rother, Franco y el Holocausto, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2005 (German orig. ed. 2001).
4 This research was conducted at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences, Paris) and culminated in a PhD thesis entitled “L’ennemi
This research is devoted to antisemitic and anti-Masonic propaganda during the first period of the Franco regime (1936-1945). In order to respect the internal logic of Francoist discourse, it has been necessary to make a joint analysis of the representations of Jews and Freemasons, because antisemitic and anti-Masonic references were very often intertwined in the regime’s propaganda. Taking this as my starting point, my research has been essentially based on a cross-analysis of two kinds of primary sources: first, the printed sources that made the dissemination of antisemitic and anti-Masonic propaganda possible, in particular the press and books that denounced the intrigues of Jews and Freemasons; and, second, several archival sources that reveal the precise nature of the links between the organization of Francoist propaganda and the creation of an anti-Judeo-Masonic discourse.  

The resultant research work, published in Spanish under the title of El enemigo judeo-masónico en la propaganda franquista (1936-1945), is divided in four parts, each consisting of two chapters. The first part studies two preliminary issues essential for a thorough understanding of the topic: the antisemitic and anti-Masonic tradition that later inspired Franco’s propaganda (Chapter I) and Franco’s personal attitudes toward Jews and Masons (Chapter II).

The second and the third parts follow a chronological pattern, focusing on the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War respectively. The situation of the Jews and the Freemasons is briefly presented at the beginning of each part, which share a common structure based on the propaganda means under analysis. Thus, in each of these two parts, one chapter focuses on the role of the press in the transmission of antisemitic and anti-Masonic ideas (Chapters III and V), while the other focuses on the most important official and unofficial publishing houses involved in disseminating these ideas in books and pamphlets in each period (Chapters IV and VI).

Finally, the fourth and final part moves beyond the chronological pattern to apply an interpretative scheme based on the following questions: what was the purpose of Franco’s propaganda about Jews and Masons, and what were its functions? Two of the functions of antisemitic and anti-Masonic propaganda are analyzed in detail: first, the use of anti-Masonic discourse within the Francoist coalition as a political weapon (Chapter VII); and, second, the invocation of a common Judeo-Masonic enemy as a means of cohesion, uniting the different factions of the coalition (Chapter VIII).

2. THE JUDEO-MASONIC ENEMY

Among other results of this research, it appears that the new Francoist regime led an unprecedented propaganda effort to present the imaginary Judeo-Masonic consortium as...
one of the major enemies of the regime and, by extension, Spain. But the antisemitic and anti-Masonic themes were not new at all. In some cases, they came from a centuries-old tradition, although the modern configuration of the Judeo-Masonic myth mainly emerged in the second half of the 19th century, due principally to a small group of French Catholic authors who acquired a strong influence in Spain. During the Second Spanish Republic (1931-1936), the anti-liberal radicalization of the right wing reinforced this myth. One of the few new aspects of Francoism regarding the transmission of anti-Judeo-Masonic theories is the fact that they were disseminated by the authorities for the first time.

It has also been demonstrated that the Judeo-Masonic enemy proved especially useful as a “substitute enemy” in cases where anti-Communist propaganda may have been counterproductive. This refers in particular to leaflets dropped behind the Republican lines during the Civil War, a means of persuasion in which anti-Communist arguments were useless, as well as to the context of the German-Soviet Pact (from August 1939 to June 1941), when Francoist propaganda had to tone down its anti-Bolshevik attacks.8

3. Influences

Several influences of a very different nature made their mark on Franco’s propagandists. First of all, they were the heirs of the long reactionary tradition that had given rise to the Judeo-Masonic myth. Coming from this ideological background, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion exerted a decisive influence in Spain, as did the work of French Catholic authors Ernest Jouin and Léon de Poncins.9

Nazi Germany’s influence is also apparent in the antisemitic propaganda produced in Spain. The Third Reich bribed journalists and financed the publication of works of propaganda during both the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War.10 However, the significance of Nazi influence should not be exaggerated, as has often been the case, in particular in discussions that hold it to be the sole form of antisemitic (and even anti-Masonic) propaganda spread in Spain, especially through the Falange, the Spanish fascist party. An analysis of Francoist propaganda regarding Jews and Freemasons shows that the anti-Judeo-Masonism of the early years of the regime did not emerge ex novo and that the Falangists were not its sole distributors, as has sometimes been suggested. It is true that Nazi antisemitic propaganda was available in Spain (sometimes transmitted through the Falange), but it came into a field that was already fertile. In fact, external factors did have some influence on the varying pace of anti-Judeo-Masonic propaganda prior to 1945, but they did not determine it.

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9 One of the latter’s books was particularly influential: Léon de Poncins, Las fuerzas secretas de la revolución: F.M.-judaísmo, Madrid, Fax, 1932 (French orig. ed. 1928).

Among the Francoist political factions engaged in spreading anti-Judeo-Masonic theories, the Falangists were the most active. This is due to the control they exerted over official propaganda between 1938 and 1945 rather than to any specific obsession with antisemitic issues, even less so anti-Masonic ones. In fact, these themes did not occupy a central position in the original thinking of the Falangists (with the sole exception of Onésimo Redondo).  

When they did use it for propaganda purposes after 1936, they essentially returned to the religious arguments that the most traditional forms of Catholicism, in particular Integrists and Carlists, had been espousing for several decades. Even then, their arguments sometimes lacked conviction. The predominant accusations against the Judeo-Masonic enemy, including those of the Falangists, did not have the modern nature claimed by fascism.

In sum, although the Falangists played a main role in the transmission of anti-Judeo-Masonic ideas, the data tends to underline the significance of another ideological current whose influence on Francoist discourse has often been underestimated: traditionalist thought. The cultural and ideological origins of the Judeo-Masonic myth, as used in the early years of the regime, were not fascist; rather, they lay in the reactionary ideas of national Catholicism.

4. FRANCO’S POSITION

The dictator’s personal position should not be overlooked when it comes to explaining the use of the Judeo-Masonic enemy in the regime’s propaganda, although his attitudes toward Jews and Freemasons were relatively independent from the ideas transmitted by his propagandists. In particular, Franco does not seem to have given much credit to the theory that linked Jews and Masons; he had very different points of view regarding each group (which has often masked the fact that the regime’s propaganda did link them). The Jews never occupied an important place in his thought and he even showed some understanding of the Sephardim, although this was because of their Spanish roots rather than their Jewishness. However, this did not prevent him from using antisemitic themes for propaganda purposes, as he did in various speeches, especially between 1939 and 1943, several of the articles he wrote for the newspaper Arriba in 1949 and 1950, and even in instructions given to the press during the Civil War that have only recently come to light.

Franco considered Freemasonry his worst enemy, even worse than Communism, and the dictator’s ideas about Freemasonry are essential in explaining the virulence of the propaganda against the organization, in which he personally took part. Franco wrote numerous anti-Masonic texts, beginning at the time of the Civil War, for use as the basis

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12 National Catholicism is the ideology that considers Catholicism as the essence of the Spanish nation.
14 The articles were published under a pseudonym and then compiled in J. Boor, Masonería, Madrid, Gráficas Valera, 1952. Some of the instructions for the press can be seen in AGM, CGG, 5/284 (20).
for leaflets and instructions to the press. He later decided to publish his own anti-Masonic articles in *Arriba*. One of the most significant results of this work was the detailed analysis of a previously unknown element that played a decisive role in shaping Franco’s thoughts and acts on Freemasonry, beginning in the early 1940s. This was the spy network known as APIS, which transmitted dozens of fake Masonic documents to the dictator over a period of more than 20 years, with the partisan aim of influencing him in an anti-Falangist and anti-Juanist direction.16

5. PROPAGANDA MEANS

Several means were used to transmit anti-Judeo-Masonic theories between 1936 and 1945. Visual media such as posters or films do not seem to have played a significant role, with rare exceptions, while oral forms of propaganda, such as lectures, talks, and speeches, were used to disseminate these theories among very different audiences. Speeches and lectures about the misdeeds of the Jewish and Masonic enemy were sometimes broadcast on radio, particularly during the Civil War, considerably extending their audience and even reaching the Republican side. Leaflets were also distributed in enemy areas during the conflict to encourage the desertion of militiamen; some contained invectives against Jews and Masons, who were accused of dominating Republican Spain. Further leaflets attacking the Judeo-Masonic enemy were distributed later on, for instance during a propaganda campaign for unity between the army and the Falange in the winter of 1941-1942.

The use of antisemitic and anti-Masonic discourse by the Franco regime is particularly evident when we examine newspapers and, above all, the *consignas* (instructions) sent to them by the official press and propaganda machine, during both the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War. During the first period, antisemitic and anti-Masonic themes appeared in the press on an almost daily basis, especially in 1937, due to the constant intervention of the new Francoist regime. The instructions were a way of launching very different campaigns with different goals. One of them, for instance, was to discredit initiatives at mediation in the eyes of public opinion, while another was to avoid any dissidence, warning Spaniards against the enemy’s infiltration of the new regime.19 During the Second World War, attacks against Jews and Masons followed ever more divergent paths in the Francoist press; although still abundant, they were no longer published on a daily basis and tailed off considerably toward the end of the conflict. The Franco regime’s use of such themes, especially antisemitic ones, was then increasingly shaped by developments in the international context, a trend already begun at the end of the Civil War.20

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15 Some of these texts and instructions can be seen in AGM, CGG, 5/283 (10) and 5/284 (27).
16 The Juanistas were the supporters of Juan de Borbón, son of Alphonse XIII and pretender to the Spanish throne. On the APIS network, see CDMH, *Presidencia*, 91; AFF, 965, 1061, 1244, 1246, 5071, 5072, 5073, 9459, 11389, etc.
17 An example of a broadcast of an anti-Masonic lecture can be found in AGM, CGG, 2986 (1).
18 AGA, *Cultura*, 21/119.
19 There were press campaigns against mediation in the springs of 1937 and 1938 and October 1938. Anti-Judeo-Masonic arguments played an important role in all three cases.
20 See Domínguez Arribas, op. cit., at ch. V.
In parallel with this press activity, two publishing houses at the service of the Franco regime played a major role in disseminating anti-Judeo-Masonic theories: Ediciones Antisectarias (1936-1939) and Ediciones Toledo (1941-1943). The former’s links to the regime were unofficial, unlike the latter, which concealed its origins to increase its persuasive power. At Ediciones Antisectarias, the ideological positions of traditionalism and Catholic integrist prevailed (despite the support that this collection received from the pro-Falangist minister Serrano Suñer), while Ediciones Toledo was controlled by the Falangists, although they were watered down and submissive to Franco. Therefore, each series of works distinguished itself by an orientation that was primarily Catholic in the case of Antisectarias and Falangist in the case of Toledo. However, with regard to Jews and Freemasons, the contents were not very different between the two publishing houses, being mainly characterized by anti-Judeo-Masonism with Christian roots.

The leading authors of the two publishing houses had very different careers, but they did have some points in common. Juan Tusquets, a priest, managed Ediciones Antisectarias and wrote the most important volumes in the collection, while Francisco Ferrari Billoch, himself a former Mason, was an anti-Judeo-Masonic expert for Ediciones Toledo, among other contributors. He wrote a single pamphlet under his own name for Toledo, but a number of anonymous brochures must also be attributed to him. Both Tusquets and Ferrari had begun their anti-Masonic (and antisemitic) careers prior to the uprising of July 1936, inspired by a rigid view of Catholicism.\footnote{Ibid., at chs. IV and VI. A preliminary version of these chapters may be consulted in Javier Domínguez Arribas, “Juan Tusquets y sus Ediciones Antisectarias (1936-1939),” in J.A. Ferrer Benimeli (ed.), La masonería española en la época de Sagasta, Zaragoza, Gobierno de Aragón, 2007, vol. II, pp. 1157-1196; and Javier Domínguez Arribas, “La propaganda anti-judeo-masónica durante el primer franquismo: el caso de Ediciones Toledo (1941-1943),” in J.A. Ferrer Benimeli (ed.), La masonería en Madrid y en España del siglo XVIII al XXI, Zaragoza, Gobierno de Aragón, 2004, vol. II, pp. 1165-1194.}

If we consider propaganda means as a whole, it is apparent that the Falangists’ gradual take-over of the propaganda department during the war and, particularly, in its aftermath did not imply a significant change in the antisemitic and anti-Masonic themes that appeared in Francoist discourse. Contrary to what one might expect, the period characterized by the highest “anti-Judeo-Masonic inflation” is that prior to the Falange’s control of the propaganda machine, that is, during the first half of the Civil War.

6. THE FUNCTIONS OF ANTI-JUDEO-MASONIC PROPAGANDA

If the regime did spread violent discourse against Freemasons and Jews in its early years, it was because it stood to gain many advantages thereby. “Everything can be used from the enemy,” says a fictional Franco in a story by a well-known Spanish writer.\footnote{Francisco Umbral, Leyenda del César Visionario, Barcelona, Bibliotex, 2001, p. 70 (1st ed., 1991).} This assertion can be applied to the Judeo-Masonic enemy, which could even be used to achieve goals that were unattainable through the mere invocation of the Communist enemy, as we have seen.

Among the functions of antisemitic and anti-Masonic propaganda, those addressed to the Spanish population as a whole must be considered first. The \textit{explanatory} function is maybe the most evident of all. Since it first emerged in the 19th century, the Judeo-
Masonic myth provided simple and comprehensive explanations for extremely complex situations, and this fundamental use continued in Franco’s Spain after 1936. These supposed Judeo-Masonic plots were a way of explaining the unexplainable, from the criticism against Nationalists by some foreign Catholics during the Civil War, which was considered incomprehensible, to the black market, corruption, and hunger in the post-war period.\(^{23}\)

The \textit{legitimating} function, equally obvious, was particularly necessary in the context of a state under construction that was imposing its rule through civil war. Alleged Judeo-Masonic control over Republican Spain legitimated the war effort and the establishment of a new regime, as well as the specific measures adopted by it, especially in terms of repression. The analysis of Ediciones Toledo has shown that some brochures justified specific repressive measures.\(^{24}\)

The central role of the \textit{repressive} function in anti-Judeo-Masonic propaganda must likewise be emphasized. Countless examples prove the existence of close links between propaganda and repression, although the former directed its invectives against both Jews and Masons and the second affected only the latter. The lists of Freemasons published by the Nationalist press at the beginning of the Civil War may be included in the “thread that leads from propaganda to repression,” to quote Dominique Rossignol, and the same is true of the works of Tusquets and Ferrari Billoch, which were used by the courts as evidence to prosecute Freemasons.\(^{25}\) Another fact is even more significant: both authors actively participated in the repression of the “sect” during the Civil War, along with other anti-Judeo-Masonic propagandists. Tusquets simultaneously managed the anti-Masonic section of Franco’s military intelligence and the collection that actually became its propaganda organ, Ediciones Antisectarias.\(^{26}\)

Other functions were specific to the factions that were part of the authoritarian coalition. Within this coalition, propaganda against Jews and Freemasons principally served two contradictory functions. On the one hand, the Judeo-Masonic common enemy was invoked to unite the different factions that supported Franco. In critical periods, those in charge of propaganda, and particularly the Falangists loyal to Franco who took over in 1941, aimed to ease tensions and to strengthen the regime’s stability by joining forces against this mythical figure. Both Ediciones Antisectarias and Ediciones Toledo, just like newspapers and other means of propaganda, published this kind of call for unity, meant particularly to neutralize existing conflicts between the military and the Falangists, as well as between the latter and all the other “families” in the nationalist coalition.

The principal function of anti-Judeo-Masonic propaganda within the Francoist coalition, however, was completely different from, and even contrary to, the aforementioned function. Its antisemitic and especially anti-Masonic discourse was not only directed against the various enemies of the New Spain (from Republican leaders to liberal Catho-

\(^{23}\) See, for instance, Juan Tusquets, \textit{Masones y pacifistas}, Burgos, Ediciones Antisectarias, 1939; and \textit{La garra del capitalismo judío. Sus procedimientos y efectos en el momento actual}, Madrid, Ediciones Toledo, 1943.

\(^{24}\) For example, \textit{La masonería en acción}, Madrid, Ediciones Toledo, 1941.


\(^{26}\) On the role of Tusquets in the anti-Masonic section of the Military Information Service (SIM), see AGM, CGG, 2986 and 2964 (2).
In fact, this kind of argument was also used by several factions of the authoritarian coalition as a powerful weapon to launch a more or less subtle attack on the opposing factions of the same coalition. This internal use can be seen in the press from the Civil War on, when Falangist newspapers presented anti-Judeo-Masonic arguments to criticize the former members of the CEDA (a rightist Catholic party), and vice versa. Ediciones Antisectarias did the same with the Falange and with one of its foreign models, Nazism. However, it was in the period of the Second World War that accusations of links with Freemasonry (Judaism being progressively left aside) became especially frequent within the Francoist conglomerate. Reading between the lines, it is possible to find this kind of insinuation in *La masonería en acción* (*Freemasonry in action*) (1941), one of Ediciones Toledo’s brochures, as well as in newspapers, sometimes due to instructions from the Falangists that controlled the press and propaganda offices. Everybody accused everybody else, although Falangists and Don Juan’s supporters seem to have been the main victims of these attacks, which in some cases even took the form of specific repressive action.

7. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Judeo-Masonic enemy, as it appeared in early Francoist propaganda, worked within the authoritarian coalition as a mechanism to regulate tensions and control internal dissidence. Sometimes, its invocation as a common enemy was able to reduce conflict; at other times, anti-Judeo-Masonic rhetoric acted as a safety valve, allowing tensions to be expressed (and maybe even resolved) through accusations of Freemasonry such as those directed against Pedro Sainz Rodríguez or Gerardo Salvador Merino, two high officials of the regime. After this kind of accusation, it was time to expect a possible intervention in favor of one faction or another by the supreme arbitrator—the Caudillo, whose anti-Masonic obsession was familiar to all. Francoism clearly emerges from this research as an extremely conflictive and non-uniform reality. This, in my opinion, is not to downplay its dictatorial and repressive nature at all.
“Artisans ... for Antichrist”: Jews, Radical Catholic Traditionalists, and the Extreme Right

Mark Weitzman*

The Israeli historian, Israel J. Yuval, recently wrote:

The Christian-Jewish debate that started nineteen hundred years ago, in our day came to a conciliatory close. ... In one fell swoop, the anti-Jewish position of Christianity became reprehensible and illegitimate. ... Ours is thus the first generation of scholars that can and may discuss the Christian-Jewish debate from a certain remove ... a postpolemical age.¹

This appraisal helped spur Yuval to write his recent controversial book Two Nations in Your Womb: Perceptions of Jews and Christians in late Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Yuval based his optimistic assessment on the strength of the reforms in Catholicism that stemmed from the adoption by the Second Vatican Council in 1965 of the document known as Nostra Aetate. Nostra Aetate in Michael Phayer’s words, was the “revolutionary” document that signified “the Catholic church’s reversal of its 2,000 year tradition of antisemitism.”²

Yet recent events in the relationship between Catholics and Jews could well cause one to wonder about the optimism inherent in Yuval’s pronouncement. For, while the established Catholic Church is still officially committed to the teachings of Nostra Aetate, the opponents of that document and of “modernity” in general have continued their fight and appear to have gained, if not a foothold, at least a hearing in the Vatican today. And, since in the view of these radical Catholic traditionalists “[i]nternational Judaism wants to radically defeat Christianity and to be its substitute” using tools like the Free-

* Director of Government Affairs, Simon Wiesenthal Center. My thanks to Mary Christine Athans, who so generously shared her important work on Denis Fahey and Charles Coughlin, for her encouragement and incisive criticism. In addition, I owe thanks to Heidi Beirich, who was also extremely generous in sharing her research on radical Catholic traditionalists, and to Margot Gendreau and Beverly Geller for their research assistance.


masons, it is in their views on Jews and Judaism that we can find the most profound expression of their radical rejection of *Nostra Aetate*, Vatican II, and the modern virtues of democracy and tolerance.³

Although the firestorm of publicity aroused in recent years by the actor Mel Gibson’s film “The Passion of the Christ” and the more recent Holocaust denial remarks of Bishop Richard Williamson have died down, they serve to remind us that for some Catholics the subsequent statements and reforms by the Church in regard to the Jewish people, such as *Nostra Aetate* and its successor documents, are still unacceptable, and the earlier tradition of “the teachings of contempt”⁴ still retain their validity.

An even more basic question is, of course, that of definition. Following the sociologist Michael Cuneo, I begin with the loose definition of those who have rejected the reforms of Vatican II and “entered into schism from the institutional church.” However, I should stress that the focus of this article will be on only examining the attitudes of those extreme traditionalists toward Jews, Judaism, and the related area of religious freedom.⁵

The Society of Saint Pius X (SSPX) has become the locus of the extreme Catholic traditionalist world. It was created in 1970 by Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre, who first came to attention when he refused to sign the Vatican II statement on Religious Liberty and the Church in the Modern World.⁶ As a result, in 1970, he created a traditionalist seminary in Econe, Switzerland, and in the same year he founded the Society of Saint Pius X. In 1973 and 1974, the SSPX came to the United States, with chapels being established in California, Texas, and New York. Lefebvre continued to publicly criticize the reforms of Vatican II, including the liturgical changes, and came into more and more overt conflict with Rome. He was ordered to close down his Swiss seminary in 1974 by Pope Paul VI but refused, and as a result his priestly functions were suspended in 1976. This did not stop Lefebvre, who upped the ante in 1983 by threatening to consecrate a successor.

Trying a different response, a year later Pope John Paul II reintroduced, under some conditions, the Tridentine (Latin) Mass, which was a gesture of conciliation to the traditionalists. Lefebvre and the traditionalists were not reconciled however, and three years later Lefebvre again threatened to consecrate a successor. This time the Vatican responded by entering into negotiations with the group, and indeed, on May 5, 1988, Lefebvre signed an agreement that required him to acknowledge his loyalty to the Vatican and to accept the new Mass as legitimate. In return, the SSPX was to be recognized and allowed to continue to use the Tridentine Mass in its services. The very next day, Lefebvre repudiated the agreement, and on June 30, 1988 he consecrated four bishops, in defiance of Rome’s authority. This time, the Vatican responded forcefully, excommunicating Lefebvre and his priests and putting the SSPX into a state of schism.⁷ Lefebvre died in 1991, but by then the SSPX had become established and was able to withstand the loss of its founder. Bishop Bernard Fellay (Swiss) was elected as Superior General in 1994 and was re-elected in 2006.

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⁶ Ibid., p. 91.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 91-92.
The most recent firestorm erupted when Bishop Richard Williamson of the SSPX questioned the reality of the Holocaust. Williamson was one of the four bishops consecrated by Lefebvre in 1988. In January of 2009, Pope Benedict XVI lifted the excommunications; however, on that same day an interview with Williamson aired on Swedish TV in which he said: “I believe that the historical evidence is strongly against, is hugely against six million Jews having been deliberately gassed in gas chambers as a deliberate policy of Adolf Hitler,” and “I think that 200,000 to 300,000 Jews perished in Nazi concentration camps, but none of them in gas chambers.”

The reaction from outraged Jews and others was immediate and grew upon exposure of Williamson’s history of antisemitic comments, which included a belief in the accuracy of the notorious forgery The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. The resulting storm of criticism caused the Vatican to insist upon Williamson’s renunciation of his Holocaust denial, which he has refused to do. However, in a letter in February 2009, he did say that “[o]bserving these consequences I can truthfully say that I regret having made such remarks,” but he never indicated a recantation of his views. The negative import of Williamson’s comments, coming amidst the ongoing reconciliation discussions with the Vatican, was also not lost on the SSPX leadership. Fellay weighed in on the matter by issuing a statement that said:

It’s clear that a Catholic bishop cannot speak with ecclesiastical authority except on questions that regard faith and morals. Our Fraternity does not claim any authority on other matters. Its mission is the propagation and restoration of authentic Catholic doctrine, expressed in the dogmas of the faith. It’s for this reason that we are known, accepted and respected in the entire world. The affirmations of Bishop Williamson do not reflect in any sense the position of our Fraternity. For this reason I have prohibited him, pending any new orders, from taking any public positions on political or historical questions.

Yet Williamson’s antisemitism was not new, or hidden. In a letter that was posted on the SSPX’ seminary website, dated February 1, 1991, Williamson reflected on the (first) Gulf War. First he pontificated that the war was instigated by Russia in an attempt to “kill with one stone … obstacles to the advance of International Socialism,” that would then allow “Russia to march through the now unguarded gateway to Europe.” But hidden behind the Russian advance, according to Williamson, was another, even more sinister cause. “However, behind the Gulf War, and even behind Russia, may one not, thirdly, fear the looming figure of the Anti-Christ?” The war was a creation of “the many friends of Israel in the USA … whooping for the United States to break the Arab strong man.” Finally, Williamson puts these comments into a clear theological perspective:

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10 See: <http://www.catholicierald.co.uk/articles/a0000226.shtml>. See also Steven L. Jacobs and Mark Weitzman, Dismantling the Big Lie: the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (Hoboken and Los Angeles, 2003) for current use of the Protocols as well as a detailed refutation of the text.
Until [the Jews] recover their true messianic vocation [by accepting the Church] they may be expected to continue fanatically agitating, in accordance with their false messianic vocation of Jewish world domination. ... So we may fear their continuing to play their major part in the agitation of the East and the corruption of the West.\(^\text{13}\)

In another letter to his supporters, written on the letterhead of the SSPX’s St. Thomas Aquinas Seminary in Winona, Minnesota just a few months later, while discussing the media’s debilitating influence on society (referring specifically to the confirmation hearings of Clarence Thomas for the Supreme Court), Williamson quoted the notorious *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* approvingly:

> ... it is indispensable to stir up the people’s relations with their governments in all countries so as to utterly to exhaust humanity with dissension, hatred, struggle, envy ... so that the goyim see no other course open to them than to take refuge in our complete sovereignty in money and all else.\(^\text{14}\)

Later in the same letter Williamson also cited Protocol 14 (“in countries known as progressive and enlightened, we have created a senseless, filthy, abominable literature”), referring to the “alternative life-style,” which in Williamson’s view is “so horrible as to cry to heaven for vengeance.” Williamson’s belief in the *Protocols* has remained consistent. A decade later, in a letter of May 1, 2000, Williamson wrote: “God puts in men’s hands the ‘Protocols of the Sages of Sion’ ... if men want to know the truth, but few do.”\(^\text{15}\)

Interestingly enough, Williamson’s letters demonstrate not only his antisemitism but also overt racism and sexism. In an even more recent letter, he explains the 2005 unrest in France by writing: “So when white men give up on saving Jews, looking after other races and leading their womenfolk, it is altogether normal for them to be punished respectively by the domination of Jewish finance, by the refusal to follow of the non-white races and by rampant feminism.”\(^\text{16}\) Finally, in the above-mentioned letter of February 1991, Williamson even combined two of those themes, noting criticism of his September letter in which he condemned women for wearing pants and jocularly compared it to criticism of his Holocaust denial, beginning the letter as follows:

> Few of you will be surprised to learn that the September letter appealing to the women not to wear trousers caused a strong reaction, comparable only to the reaction of the Seminary letter which referred to scientific evidence that certain famous “holocaust gas-chambers” in Poland cannot have served as gas-chambers at all.\(^\text{17}\)

While Fellay issued his statement in 2009, it is clear that Williamson’s antisemitism was evident and publicly disseminated to the membership of the SSPX at least for the 18 years prior to Fellay’s public statement. Furthermore, barring any evidence of prior repudiation or discipline of Williamson for his antisemitism, it is clear that Fellay was

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\(^{14}\) Williamson, letter of Nov. 3, 1991, copy in author’s possession.


\(^{17}\) See note 13 above.
being disingenuous at best when he claimed that “[t]he affirmations of Bishop Williamson do not reflect in any sense the position of our Fraternity.” In fact, the SSPX and the extremist Catholic traditionalist movement in general are shot through with anti-semitism to such an extent that I believe it is possible to consider antisemitism as one of the foundational doctrines of the movement.

If we return to Lefebvre, we see that his record on Jews and Judaism was also highly questionable. In an August 31, 1985 letter to Pope John Paul II, he was quoted as having spoken approvingly of “both the World War II-era Vichy Regime in France and the far-right National Front” and identified the contemporary enemies of the faith as “Jews, Communists and Freemasons.” In that letter, Lefebvre also criticized “all the reforms carried out over 20 years within the church to please heretics, schismatics, false religions and declared enemies of the church, such as the Jews, the Communists and the Freemasons.”

According to the same account, Lefebvre also gave an interview to the journal of the National Front in France, suggesting that Catholic opposition to a residence of Carmelite nuns at the site of the Auschwitz concentration camp was instigated by Jews.

Lefebvre’s followers often share this outlook. One of the four bishops ordained by him in 1988, Bernard Tissier de Mallerais, said in 1997,

The church for its part has at all times forbidden and condemned the killing of Jews, even when “their grave defects rendered them odious to the nations among which they were established.” … All this makes us think that the Jews are the most active artisans for the coming of Antichrist.

Bishop de Mallerais, who is the authorized SSPX biographer of Lefebvre, in an interview after the Williamson controversy erupted, responded as follows to a direct question about Williamson’s remarks: “I have no opinion about this. … I think that this question does not concern me, and I have no opinion on this question.”

Nor has their record been confined simply to making statements. In 1989, Paul Touvier, a fugitive charged with ordering the execution of seven Jews in 1944 as a Nazi collaborator, was arrested in a priory of the Fraternity of St. Pius X in Nice, France. The fraternity stated at the time that Touvier had been granted asylum as “an act of charity to a homeless man.” When Touvier died in 1996, a parish church operated by the fraternity offered a Requiem Mass in his honor.

When the controversy over Williamson exploded, I immediately went to the SSPX website and captured some documents that were removed shortly afterwards. They included two postings that reflected and summed up the SSPX’s position on Jews and Judaism.

In one essay, the Vatican II teaching that “the Jews should not be spoken of as rejected or accursed as if this followed from Holy Scripture” is described as “outrag-
The other essay claims that “Judaism is inimical to all nations in general, and in a special manner to Christian nations” and that “the unrepentant Jewish people are disposed by God to be a theological enemy, the status of this opposition must be universal, inevitable, and terrible.” There are claims that “the Talmud, which governs Jews, orders enmity with Christians” and that the “Jewish people persecute Christendom,” “conspire against the Christian State,” commit “usury,” and even “are known to kill Christians!” Thus, the essay defends the notion that Jews should not be “given equality of rights” but rather should be forced into ghettos (“isolated into its own neighborhoods”).

In their recent exposé of the SSPX and the Catholic traditionalist movement, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) cited a 1959 letter from Lefebvre’s close ally, Bishop Gerald Sigaud, stating: “Money, the media, and international politics are for a large part in the hands of Jews.” Bishop Sigaud also wrote: “Those who have revealed the atomic secrets of the USA were ... all Jews. The founders of communism were Jew [sic].” This letter was also posted on the SSPX website.

Heidi Beirich, the SPLC’s lead researcher on this story, noted: “And as of early February [2009], the SPLC reported that the Canadian SSPX website still hosted an archive of Williamson’s anti-Semitic letters, one of which complains that ‘Jews have come closer and closer to fulfilling their ... drive toward world domination.’” Other SSPX officials sound similar. After the Williamson controversy broke out, Fr. Floriano Abrahamowicz, a pastor and spokesperson for the SSPX in Northern Italy, defended Williamson and said he, too, was unsure if gas chambers were used for anything but disinfection or whether six million Jews were really murdered. He called the Jews a “people of deicide.” Abrahamowicz was later expelled from the Society.

Meanwhile Rev. Arnaud Sélégny, the general secretary of the SSPX international headquarters in Menzingen, Switzerland, is on record saying that Williamson would certainly be included in any reconciliation between SSPX and the Vatican because “everybody is allowed to have his opinion in the Society.”

These positions are not original to the SSPX, nor are they a theological innovation to current Catholic traditionalists; indeed, they bear a striking similarity to the writings of an otherwise obscure Irish priest named Father Denis Fahey, whose work is one of the most—if not the most—frequently cited by the members of the SSPX and similar believers. Mary Christine Athans, in her important book, The Coughlin-Fahey Connection: Father Charles E. Coughlin, Father Denis Fahey, C.S. Sp., and Religious Anti-Semitism in the United States, 1938-1954, thoroughly explored Fahey’s life and thought and how his theology of antisemitism made its way from Ireland to the United States.

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23 Can it truly be said that the Jewish race is guilty of the sin of deicide, and that it is consequently cursed by God, as depicted in Gibson’s movie on the Passion? Featured in the Q&A section, March 2004.


25 Intelligence Report, Winter 2007. A copy of this letter is in the author’s possession.


Fahey was born on July 2, 1883 in Kilmore, Golden, County Tipperary, Ireland. In 1900, he was a novice of the Holy Ghost Congregation in France, which was still dealing with the impact of the Dreyfus Affair and the French government’s anti-clerical actions, particularly the Associations Laws of 1905 that required religious congregations to be recognized by the government. At that time, France was an incubator of ecclesiastical antisemitism. As David Kertzer wrote: “In the cauldron of Catholic resentment toward the republican state in the 1880s, the Jews, visible in national politics, in the civil service and in the economy, served as a lightning rod, all that was wrong with modern French society.”

This was a struggle that began, according to those Catholics, with the French Revolution, which one such writer described as “[t]he greatest event of history for over 1800 years.”

In 1908, Fahey went to Rome, where he obtained two doctorates (philosophy and theology) and lived at the Collège Français (Pontifical French Seminary). Ordained in 1911, Fahey returned to Dublin in 1912, where he stayed (except for 1916-1920, when he was in Switzerland for health reasons) as professor at the Holy Ghost Seminary until death on January 24, 1954. Fahey was fairly prominent in Ireland, maintaining a high profile as a public intellectual, as evidenced by the fact that, upon his death, Irish Prime Minister Eamon de Valera attended his evening funeral Mass.

While in Rome, Fahey was heavily influenced by Father Henri Le Floch, who was the Superior of the Collège Français. Athans described Le Floch as an exponent of conservative right-wing French and Italian Catholic thought in those anti-Modernist years … Le Floch had substantial influence on Fahey. … He was later removed from his position as Rector because of his relationship to the controversial and anti-Semitic Action Française movement which was finally condemned by Pius XI in 1926.

Le Floch was also a revered mentor to Lefebvre. Athans, who interviewed a number of Fahey’s students and younger colleagues in Ireland, wrote that “[s]ome [priests] believe that Le Floch’s influence can also be traced to Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre … founder of the dissident traditionalist movement … known as the Fraternity of SPX.”

29 Vicomte Leon de Poncins, Freemasonry and Judaism (New York, 1994) p. 29. This book, originally published in 1929, is now released by what is apparently a black-oriented publishing house.
31 Athans, Coughlin-Fahey, p. 59.
33 Athans, Coughlin-Fahey, pp. 22-23.
Ireland John Charles McQuaid, who studied under Fahey. McQuaid’s biographer, John Cooney, has asserted that Le Floch’s “combination of theological rigidity and political conservatism rubbed off on the seminarians, among them … Marcel Lefebvre.”

Having been nurtured in the same intellectual milieu, it is no surprise that Fahey and Lefebvre shared much of the same weltanschauung.

Among other sources, Fahey also drew on the *Revue International des Sociétés Secrètes*. This journal was founded in 1912 by Father Ernest Jouin, who was described by Kertzer as “[t]he main champion of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and the best known exponent of Catholic antisemitism in the 1920s” in France. Jouin and his work were not isolated on the fringes of Catholic life. Pope Benedict XV gave Jouin the title of “Prelate of His Holiness”, which he used to add papal authority to his works, and he received further blessings from Vatican Secretary of State Gasparri in 1919 and later from Pope Pius XI as well. Jouin even claimed credit for originating the term “Judeomasonic” in 1920 and claimed to have been told by Pius XI to “[c]ontinue your Review … for you are combating our mortal enemy.”

Fahey was not the only one influenced by Jouin; the influential Italian fascist Roberto Farinacci in 1939 repeated some of these familiar themes in urging harsher anti-Jewish measures in Italy, claiming that the French Revolution had created a great wrong by proclaiming rights of men that grew into rights of Jews and that this situation required remedying by following the paths laid out by the Jesuits over the years in *La Civilta Cattolica* and by Jouin with his papal approved Review and publication of the *Protocols*.

Fahey was a prolific writer, publishing a series of books and pamphlets, many with repetitive titles and similar themes, including:

- *Grand Orient Freemasonry Unmasked as the Secret Power Behind Communism* (1950, republication of George F. Dillon’s work with a foreword by Fahey).

For Fahey, the world was a very simple but dangerous place. In his Manichaean perspective, he believed that God was only accessible through the Catholic Church, which in turn was “supra-national and supernatural.” However, God was locked in a cosmic struggle with Satan, who was, for Fahey, a very real antagonist. Although Judaism was

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36 Ibid., p. 129.
38 Ibid., pp. 267-269.
39 Ibid., pp. 283-284. Farinacci was described by Susan Zuccotti “as one of the countries most vocal Jew baiters,” in Zuccotti, *The Italians and the Holocaust* (New York, 1987) p. 49.
the chief antagonist, Satan’s agents in this world included “Bolshevism, as the most recent development in the age-long struggle waged by the Jewish nation against the Supernational Messias, our Lord Jesus Christ, and his Mystical Body, the Catholic Church.” Fahey followed that depiction with a comparison of Catholicism and Judaism that was totally to the detriment of the latter. According to his theology, by its rejection of Jesus as Christ, Judaism attempts to “recast [the world] in the mould of Jewish national life.” Fahey concluded by asserting that this rejection “cannot but mean the complete undoing of the Catholic organization of society,” which was, in Fahey’s view, the appropriate order of things.40

As mentioned above, Fahey regarded Communism as just a tool used by the Jews. “The real forces behind Bolshevism in Russia are Jewish forces, and that Bolshevism is really an instrument in the hands of the Jews for the establishment of their future Messianic kingdom.”41

Fahey’s contrast between Judaism and Catholicism had different implications, some of which transcended pure theological concerns. For example, in his above-mentioned tract The Rulers of Russia, Fahey spells out the differences between Jews and Catholics regarding what he terms “citizenship”:

Here it will be well … to contrast the Jewish idea of citizenship with the Catholic idea. … As members of their own “messianic” nation, they must strive for the domination of their nation over others, as thus they alone, they hold, justice and peace can be achieved on earth. The Jew would fail in his duty to the Messias to come if he did not subordinate the interests of other nations to Is own. … But the Catholic Church, being supra-national and supernatural, does not aim at the obliteration of national characteristics and qualities by the imposition of a national form, but at their harmonious development by the elimination of the defects due to original sin.42

This reading of theological history viewed Judaism as a religion committed to ruling over the other nations and its adherents as not possessing the qualities of eligibility for equal citizenship, while Catholicism by its nature (and despite the historical evidence to the contrary) is seen as less restrictive and the proper dominant authority in society.

Fahey further believed that the world had reached its peak in the 13th century, when the Church was its essential ruler (at least in Europe, which appeared to be all that mattered for Fahey). However, that state did not last long. For Fahey, there was no concept of religious liberty; in fact, it was a tool of the devil that was used to take the state and society away from the true worship of the Church. An echo of this belief can also be found in Williamson’s thought. In comments on Pope Benedict’s Address to the Curia of December 2005, Williamson stated:

What is wrong with freeing States from any obligation to Christ the King is that implicitly you are denying that Jesus Christ is God. … Religious liberty means in effect, a declaration of independence from God, which is directly opposed to the first Commandment. … However, where Catholics are in a sufficient majority, the State may physically prevent the public practice of false religion while tolerating their practice in private.43

40 Fahey, Rulers of Russia (Detroit, 1940) pp. 44-45.
41 Ibid., p. 22.
42 Ibid., p. 72.
This was a fundamental tenet of Lefebvre’s belief as well. In his biography by de Malle-
rais, he is quoted as saying that the acceptance of the doctrine of religious liberty is “a
scandal to Catholic souls (that) cannot be measured. The Church is shaken to its very
foundation.”

In January 2008, a SSPX theologian repeated this theme in a *Catechism of the Crisis of
the Church* addressed to the Church membership. After posing the question “Is there,
then, no right to the free exercise of religion?” he offered the following answer:

The true religion possesses the absolute right to develop and to be practiced freely, for
no one can be impeded from serving God in the way He Himself has prescribed. It is
an exigency of the natural law. The false religions, to the contrary, have no real right
to be practiced precisely because they are false and erroneous. Error can never have
any right; only the truth has rights.

The same *Catechism* succinctly summed up the SSPX’s stance on tolerance; tolerance, it
claimed, was simply “the patient endurance of an evil.”

For Fahey and similar thinkers, political freedom, not only religious freedom, can
only be found in, and thus only given by, the Church, and so the right order is one in
which the Church reigns supreme and delegates those freedoms as it desires and for its
benefit only. Outside of the Church, there are no rights and no freedom, and all in
opposition or in non-belief are agents of Satan.

Fahey’s traced it all back to the original fall of humanity in the Garden of Eden,
which was then followed by more recent tragic historical events, such as the Reforma-
tion and the French Revolution, with equally disastrous results. As he wrote,

[the] Protestant Reformation … broke the unity of European subjection to the suprana-
tional, supernatural Church of Christ. … It did not however install a naturalistic
international organization. … That was reserved for the French Revolution [which
began] the domination of the world by Masonic Naturalism. … Behind Masonry,
however, [was] the other naturalistic force of the once chosen people. … The Jews
everywhere made use of Freemasonry to secure the rights of becoming citizens of the
once Christian states.

Even the horrors of the Holocaust did not shatter Fahey’s deep-rooted antisemitism. He
did find it necessary after the Holocaust to attempt to draw a distinction between
unacceptable antisemitism, which was defined as “hatred of the Jewish nation” and
“opposition to the Jewish and Masonic naturalism,” which he endorsed as a vital aspect
of Catholicism.

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news.org/SSPX-DD.htm> (which is a traditionalist website).
(January 2008) p. 16.
46 Ibid.
sspx_what_really_is_anti_semitism.html>. The description that he quoted approvingly was taken
from a review of his book *The Kingship of Christ and the Conversion of the Jewish Nation*, published in
*La Civilta Cattolica* (March 1947).
felt by the world to the horrors of the Holocaust created the necessity for Fahey to try and distinguish his brand of antisemitism from that of the Third Reich. In the foreword to his 1953 book *The Kingship of Christ and the Conversion of the Jewish Nation* (the body of the book was written before the war but published afterwards) he wrote of

… the confusion created in minds owing to the use of the term “Anti-Semitism.” The Hitlerite naturalistic or anti-supernatural regime in Germany gave to the world the odious spectacle of a display of Anti-Semitism, that is hatred of the Jewish Nation. Yet all the propaganda about that display of Anti-Semitism should not have made Catholics forget the existence of age-long Jewish Naturalism and Anti-Supernaturalism. Forgetfulness of the disorder of Jewish naturalistic opposition to Christ the King is keeping Catholics blind to the danger that is arising from the clever extension of the term “Anti-Semitism” with all its war connotation to the mind of the unthinking.  

In the body of this book, Fahey went so far as to justify the Nazi actions against the Jews on theological grounds and to imply that the Catholic Church was even more of a victim. In Fahey’s words:

One can readily conclude that the National-Socialist reaction against the corroding influence of Jewish Naturalism on German national life leads not only to measures of repression against the Jews but to a dire persecution of the Catholic Church. The deified German race has attacked the rival natural deity, the Jewish race, directly, and has proceeded systematically to get rid of it as corrupting the very fount of deity, German blood.

In other words, the Nazis were only reacting to the Jewish threat, and their major fault was not in the reaction, but rather the form it took. In the same work, Fahey spelled this out in even greater detail: “We have seen that the Nazi movement in Germany is one of a number of national reactions against the naturalistic Internationalism of the Jewish Nation and of Freemasonry.” Thus, in Fahey’s vision of the Third Reich, the innate Jewish “naturalism” was something that was recognized by many as a danger that would naturally lead to defensive reactions, but it was the Church that was the ultimate opponent and the ultimate victim of the Nazis.

Fahey, like most conspiratorial antisemites, relied uncritically on highly questionable sources for his information. He used the most rabid of antisemites as reliable sources, for example citing Arnold Leese (in *The Fascist*, May 1939): “Jews are the chief owners of urban real estate in Poland.” Leese was one of the most well-known and radical antisemitic figures in England during that period. Among his writings was a work that claimed that the blood libel was real. He also served a number of prison sentences connected to his activities, which included aiding Waffen-SS POWs in escaping from England. Fahey also drew upon the classic antisemitic work *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. Athans has compared Fahey’s attitude to the *Protocols* to that of Henry Ford,
Charles Coughlin, and Nesta Webster (all antisemitic figures who Fahey admired), who “all admitted that [while] they could not prove the veracity of the Protocols … what was described in the Protocols was what was going on in the world.” Increasingly Fahey relied on the Protocols in his own work.54

And again, like many other conspiratorial antisemites, Fahey was prone to seeing conspiracies of Jews everywhere. In one of his books, he even claimed that Jews were attempting to eliminate from the celebration of Christmas any the religious meaning. The proof for this insidious plot was:

Christmas cards that show a row of dogs and a few birds have nothing to remind the recipient of what the rejoicing is for. … In this process of eliminating the supernatural Messias from the celebration of the anniversary of his birth, the largest firm of Christmas card manufacturers, have certainly played a great part. … All three directors appear in the communal Directory of the Jewish Year Book (and other Jewish communal activities).55

Thus, the Jews, through the ownership of a greeting card company by three Jews, were intent on stripping Christmas of its sacral meaning!

In other works, he published lists of Jews in the Russian/Communist leadership, as well as a list of “Members of the Jewish Nations in the United Nations Organization. … As of last year [1951] this tiny but powerful group of Zionist nationalists hold the following key posts.” This list comprised 86 names, spread over five pages.56 A forerunner of many extremists today, Fahey wrote that “[t]he real purpose of the UN is to pave the way for a ‘World Government’ to which all nations surrender their sovereignty and independence.”57

For Fahey, this threat from Jews meant that the Church had to fight back by all available means, including depriving Jews of their civil rights, thus denying them the latitude and freedom they were using to undermine society. He believed that

[a] step to be taken to undo the naturalism of the French Revolution and, at the same time, prevent onslaughts on the Jews, is to withdraw citizenship of other States from all of them, and limit them to citizenship of some other State, their own. That State must not be Palestine, for the Jewish claim to Palestine is implicitly a denial that they have disobeyed God and missed their vocation by the rejection of the True Supernatural Messias.58

Finally, after the Holocaust, he was worried that Catholic sympathy for Jews because of their terrible suffering would create a lessening of Catholic anti-Jewish vigilance. And, despite the growing awareness of the Nazi Holocaust, those crimes did not begin to compare to the ancient Jewish crime of deicide, which should have ordained history and the structure of society ever since: “Some Catholics seem to forget that the Jews who, in their terrible opposition to God … were intent on the most awful crime ever committed, the crime of deicide.”59

54 Athans. Coughlin-Fahey, p. 103.
57 Ibid., p. 174.
58 Fahey, Rulers, p. 75.
Mark Lilla has described how “[t]he Catholic Church in particular cast itself as spokesman for reaction throughout much of the [19th] century.” Fahey’s theology was clearly formed in and reflective of that Church. However, his teachings might well have faded into obscurity, but for the fact that he found a powerful ally in the United States in the person of Father Charles Coughlin who brought Fahey to the attention of a receptive audience across the Atlantic.

In her book on The Coughlin-Fahey Connection and in other writings, Athans has demonstrated how “the ‘theologian’ Coughlin quoted most frequently was an Irish priest, Father Denis Fahey.” Coughlin did not just quote Fahey or even base his thought on the Irish priest’s writings but took an even more active role, especially by reprinting and distributing Fahey’s tract The Rulers of Russia through his Social Justice Publishing Company in 1940, when Coughlin was at the height of his powers. This distribution ensured Fahey’s introduction to a mass American audience.

Coughlin was easily the most prominent Catholic and antisemite in the United States at that time. As one of his biographers wrote: “Coughlin ... dominated among antisemitic public figures in these years.” His domination was reflected in his reach. “Not only did he reach millions with his weekly radio broadcasts, but he also disseminated his extremist messages through his widely read magazine Social Justice, which claimed 200,000 subscribers.” The result was that he popularized an antisemitism that had a significant impact on US popular discourse and even translated into the spurring of antisemitic acts that were often led by his followers and threatened public safety.

As Athans has clearly demonstrated, by bringing Fahey’s writings to an American audience, Coughlin allowed Fahey to become a bridge between the French and papal reactionary Catholic antisemitism of the early 20th century and extreme right-wing groups and figures in America.

Another scholar described it as translating “the struggles of the Christ and Antichrist into contemporary terms, in which Christianity and America represented Christ, and Communists and bankers represented the Antichrist. And conveniently, the two evils were linked together in the Jewish race.” And, while a number of the hierarchy were displeased with Coughlin’s ravings, he nevertheless found a receptive and supportive audience in the diocesan press. One of his key supporters in the eastern United States was the Brooklyn Tablet. In a typical defense of Coughlin’s antisemitism, the editor (Patrick Scanlon) remarked:

Fr. Coughlin has fearlessly and courageously discussed the Jewish problem that others would pass by in cowardly silence.... [No Catholic can honestly criticize] Fr. Coughlin’s very temperate reference to the part that a Jewish Weltanschauung contributed to the untoward world conditions.

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61 Athans, Coughlin-Fahey, p. 224.
63 Ibid.
64 See, among many others, David Bennett The Party of Fear (New York, 1995) pp. 263-266.
65 Athans, Coughlin-Fahey.
What Scanlon called a “temperate reference” was translated by some of Coughlin’s followers into the formation of a radical group called the Christian Front, whose members were implicated in a series of disruptive and violent antisemitic acts that in the late 1930s and early 1940s disturbed the peace and threatened the security of Jews in cities with a large Irish Catholic presence such as Boston and New York. In both cities, the wave of antisemitism was often ignored by sympathetic Catholic police and eventually had to be countered through official action by Massachusetts Governor Leverett Saltonstall and New York Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia.\

Even before the wave of antisemitism became overt, the antisemitic discourse had become sufficiently heated and the issue sufficiently politically sensitive that it even reached the White House. In a 1941 memorandum to Myron Taylor, his personal representative to the Vatican, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote:

I forgot to mention that when you get the chance, you might express the thought that there is a great deal of anti-Jewish feeling in the dioceses of Brooklyn, Baltimore and Detroit and this feeling is said to be encouraged by the church. The point to make is that if anti-Jewish feeling is stirred up, it automatically stirs up anti-Catholic feeling and that makes a general mess.\

Taylor did raise the issue but found the Vatican essentially non-responsive. It was the Vatican’s resident American expert, Father Joseph Patrick Hurley, who himself was a virulent antisemite and who advised the Vatican to ignore Coughlin’s antisemitism.\

While the Coughlin-Fahey correspondence continued in the same vein even after Coughlin’s official silencing, the loss of Coughlin’s public platform certainly contributed to the lowering of Fahey’s profile in the United States.\

However, the damage had been done, and Fahey’s influence had become entrenched in certain circles. While for the most part scholars have traced Fahey’s influence in the extremist Catholic circles that they have been examining, it is entirely possible that his connection with Coughlin allowed his influence to spread even wider. Among Coughlin’s associates and allies were Gerald Winrod and Gerald L.K. Smith, who were foundational figures in American right-wing extremism. Smith was also in direct contact with Fahey, exchanging letters in late 1940s and early 1950s. Fahey wrote in a letter to Irish follower that

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68 FDR Archives, President’s Secretary’s File, 1941, Box 51.


70 For example, see Coughlin’s letter to Fahey: “while anti-Semitism is to abhorred in so far as it is related to hatred for the Jews as individuals and races, nevertheless, anti-Judaism, which means opposition to the Judaic concept of life, is not to be so condemned. … I cannot understand how so many amongst our hierarchy and clergy are demonstrating tolerance towards Judaism,” letter from Coughlin to Fahey, Mar. 5, 1941, quoted in Athans, New Perspectives, pp. 188-189.
the programme of Gerald L.K. Smith as taken from his paper *The Cross and the Flag* ... declares unflinchingly and unequivocally for the Rights of Christ the King. Are his detractors and smearers for Christ the King or against Him? The Judaeo-Communists tried to brand every man who stood for American nationalism and against Communism during the war as pro-Nazis.\(^{71}\)

Another such figure, Francis Parker Yockey, published an article in Coughlin’s *Social Justice* magazine in 1938. The Catholic born Yockey was a fervent admirer of Adolf Hitler, who attempted, especially in his almost incomprehensible book *Imperium*, to find a way to adapt Nazism to the post-World War II world. In his early *Social Justice* article, Yockey lamented that an “alien” control of the media resulted in the spiritual enslavement of American youth.\(^{72}\) The historian George Michael has also noted Coughlin’s influence on Willis Carto, arguably the most important figure on the American far right in the last half-century. Carto has founded and financed a number of major far-right initiatives over the last 50 years, including the Liberty Lobby and its newspaper *Spotlight*, the Institute for Historical Review (the center for Holocaust denial), *The Barnes Review*, and the Populist Party (which ran the notorious neo-Nazi David Duke as its 1988 presidential candidate). Carto recalls Coughlin as a seminal figure from his childhood.\(^{73}\)

As a youth Carto claims to have never heard of right-wing extremists, “with the exception of Father Coughlin, to whose broadcasts he would listen with the whole family.”\(^{74}\) Carto “recalled listening to Coughlin’s broadcasts with his family and described him as a spellbinding orator.”\(^{75}\) He also characterized “Coughlin as a genuine populist” and cited “opposition from Jewish organizations … as evidence of Coughlin’s bona fides as a true American hero.”\(^{76}\)

Carto was also influenced by Yockey, whom he visited in jail just before Yockey’s suicide. As Michael writes: “Yockey left quite an impression on Carto; as he once remarked, ‘I knew I was in the presence of a great force.’”\(^{77}\)

This nexus between the extremist traditionalist Catholics and the far right has continued to the present. Richard Williamson has also found himself taken up by a various aspects of the movement. Among those who have adopted the bishop are the notorious neo-Nazi and professional Holocaust denier Mark Weber, the director of the Institute for Historical Review, who in a March 2009 article entitled “Bishop Williamson and ‘Holocaust Denial’: Why the Uproar?” concluded that “[t]he Williamson affair underscores a well entrenched Jewish-Zionist bias in the cultural life of modern Western society, and reminds us, once again, of the power behind that bias.”\(^{78}\)

Robert Faurisson, the French academic Holocaust denier, who is currently in the middle of a squabble with Weber over the future of Holocaust denial, also sprang to Williamson’s defense. According to a posting on his blog:

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\(^{72}\) On Yockey, see George Michael, *Willis Carto and the American Far Right* (Gainesville, 2008) pp. 75-86.

\(^{73}\) Ibid.

\(^{74}\) Ibid., p. 20.

\(^{75}\) Ibid., p. 10.

\(^{76}\) Ibid., p. 154.

\(^{77}\) Ibid., p. 74.

\(^{78}\) See: <http://www.ihr.org/williamson_march09.html>.
The height of his enemies’ misfortune, and for the traditionalist Catholic he is … if he ever did fall to his knees before the new Inquisition he would immediately remind everyone of Galileo, the man whom science and history ended up acknowledging to be right despite his abjuration. Even if he wound up losing, Richard Williamson would thus have won.79

The links between the Holocaust deniers and Catholic extremists are not limited to Williamson. In 1993, the Journal of Historical Review, the house organ of the Institute of Historical Review, the central organization of Holocaust deniers in the United States, published in its September/October issue three short entries under the title “The Holocaust Issue: Three Christian Views.” Two were by traditionalist Catholics (including the late Joseph Sobran, fired by William Buckley from his journal National Review for antisemitism) and the other was by Bishop Louis Vezelis, described as the “editor of The Seraph, a traditionalist Catholic monthly.” According to Vezelis, “the preponderance of objective and factual evidence shows the promoters of the Holocaust story to be libelous frauds.”80 Sobran was defended by the Institute of Historical Review as far back as 1987 and later spoke at its 2002 conference.81

Despite the denunciations of Williamson’s Holocaust denial, and even some pro forma condemnations of antisemitism from the SSPX, there can be no question, based on their own writings, that the antisemitic teachings espoused by Fahey and repeated by Williamson still permeate the heart of the theology of the SSPX and many similar Catholic traditionalists.

For example, still available on the Asia SSPX’s website is an article from March-April 2000 by Bishop Salvador L. Lazo, entitled: “My Return of the Traditional Latin Mass: Autobiography of a Traditional Catholic Bishop.” In this article, Lazo lists some of the books that inspired him on his spiritual journey. They include Fahey’s The Kingship of Christ and The Conversion of the Jewish Nation, as well as others about the dangers of Freemasonry. Lazo was very open about their impact on his thought, writing that:

Reading these books gave me a better idea of the crisis and confusion in the Church today. It became clear to me who are the real enemies of the Catholic Church. Father Denis Fahey pinpointed them when he wrote: “The enemies of the Catholic Church are three. One invisible, Satan, and two visible: a) Talmudic Judaism, and b) Freemasonry.” … That Judaism is the visible chief enemy of the Catholic Church, is evident from the Church history, from words and deeds of individuals, and groups and the teachings of the Talmud of which the Kabbalah constitute the basis of Judaism.82

Williamson has openly held up Fahey as an authority to be relied upon. On the website of the SSPX’s US seminary (based in Winona, Minnesota), I recently found a letter

80 Louis Vezelis, “Examine All the Evidence,” in Journal of Historical Review, Vol. 13, No. 5 (September/October, 1993) pp. 34-35. Buckley’s opinion of Sobran’s antisemitism can be found in William Buckley, In Search of Anti-Semitism (New York, 1992). His conclusion (pp. 118-119) was that Sobran had indeed “written anti-semitic articles.”
written by Williamson in 1983, before he was even ordained as a bishop, in which, in relation to a book written by a Protestant author, he advised his readers that “Catholics should be very wary of this kind of book. Let them keep to sound doctrine and proven authors, for instance the excellent Fr. Denis Fahey.”

Finally, it must be recognized that Fahey’s baleful influence is alive today not only in the SSPX but also in similar-minded groups, as reflected in the following quote. It is from John Sharpe, the former Naval Academy graduate and officer and rabid traditionalist Catholic. Sharpe sued a local paper that had publicized his antisemitic beliefs for libel. In the decision against him, the judge wrote: “No reasonable person can read Sharpe’s individual writings and conclude that he espouses anything other than a deep, abiding and pervasive suspicion of and hostility toward Jews, whether considered as a collective people, religion, nation or ethnic group.”

Sharpe, who has his own traditionalist distribution house, concluded a 2003 article that he published in the SSPX’s magazine The Angelus criticizing the 2001 Vatican document The Jewish People and Their Sacred Scriptures in the Christian Bible with a quote from Fahey’s Mystical Body of Christ and the Reorganization of Society, in which he hoped that “we all then have the courage to respond with the words of Fr. Fahey: ‘In that sense, every sane thinker must be an anti-Semite.’”

The SSPX has been quite open about its goals. Speaking about the current efforts by Rome to bring the group back into the Church, Bishop Tissier de Mallerais was blunt, saying that “we do not change our positions, but we have the intention of converting Rome, that is to lead Rome towards our positions.”

Any attempt by the Vatican to bring these groups out of schism and into the Church must honestly confront these issues and not ignore or hide them. If baptism was once, for Jews, the ticket to admission to Western society, then acceptance of Vatican II, including the rejection of Catholic antisemitism and the acceptance of religious liberty, must be the price of admission for these groups into today’s Church. Pope Benedict has spoken movingly and powerfully about his feelings about antisemitism, the Holocaust, Jews, and Judaism. Yet unless the Church’s current deeds match its words, Jewish-Catholic relations will continue their downward trajectory of recent years.

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Post-war Antisemitism: 
Germany’s Foreign Policy Toward Egypt

Ulricke Becker*

1. INTRODUCTION

After 1948, every country that was diplomatically involved in the Middle East conflict was confronted with Arab hostility toward Israel and was therefore challenged with the task of reacting to such animosity. A new antisemitism emerged that was directed against the very existence of a Jewish state. This gives rise to several important questions. How did diplomats react to Arab animosity toward Israel? Did Arab antisemitism play a role in the conceptions of foreign policy? If so, was this topic actually brought up with Arab states? Did diplomats do anything to confront this problem?1

While these questions emerged for all diplomats, German diplomats had to address more specific concerns. Especially in Egypt, they were confronted with the ramifications of German antisemitic propaganda and politics, which many of them had personally designed and promoted only a few years earlier. The Middle East policy of the Nazis had been anti-British in design and antisemitic in essence. Especially during the second half of World War II, Germany had employed considerable efforts to incite Arabs to fight against Germany’s enemies via radio propaganda with a distinctly antisemitic, anti-British, and anti-American character, as Jeffrey Herf convincingly describes in his illuminating book on this subject.2 The Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin el-Husseini, was a close ally of the Nazis and had played a major role in programming propaganda broadcasts into the Arab World.3 In the post-war years, the Mufti—although he had been

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1 For the sake of clarity, Arab hostility toward Israel is not necessarily antisemitic. However, there is a point when political enmity opposing Zionism crosses over into antisemitism, for example when there is a positive reference to Nazi antisemitism or when the acceptance and dissemination of conspiracy theories like the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” is involved. Holocaust denial is also an important aspect of this new antisemitism.

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involved in war crimes—was a figure of considerable political influence in Egypt, and his Nazi-like antisemitism affected the Palestinian national movement and the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt. Then there was the circle of young officers including Abdel Nasser and Anwar as-Sadat. In July 1952, they seized power in Egypt in a military coup d'état. During World War II, both of them had collaborated with the Germans as guerrilla fighters. As politicians, Nasser and Sadat both recommended the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” as an important source of information on the nature of Israel and the Jewish people. Nasser’s brother Sauqi Abdannasir personally edited an Arabic translation of the “Protocols,” and under Nasser’s presidency in the 1950s one of the most radical antisemitic publicists of the Third Reich, Johann von Leers, who had been an open advocate of Jewish genocide, was employed in the Egyptian propaganda ministry. He was in charge of propaganda against Israel and organized lectures for Egyptian officials. Bernard Lewis is one of many historians who have pointed out how German National Socialism was openly praised in post-war Egypt. This was the political climate faced by German diplomats in Egypt at the beginning of the 1950s.

In this article, I will focus on two questions. The first question concerns whether German foreign policy sent signals to the Arab world that were understood as support for Arab hostility toward Israel. The most important examples of this are Germany’s refusal to establish diplomatic relations with Israel until 1965 and the support provided to Egypt’s military and arms industry by German experts. The second question concerns whether there was a transfer of ideas from the Nazi era to the post-war period. In this context, I will examine perceptions of Zionism and how decisions that helped to delegitimize the Jewish state were connected to the Nazi heritage. My research therefore also touches on the issue of the German political elite’s relationship with its Nazi past.

2. The Impact of German Foreign Policy on Arab Hostility Toward Israel

Usually, the historiography of German-Arab relations begins in 1952. In October of that year, Günther Pawelke, the first West German ambassador, arrived in Cairo. But his arrival was not the first chapter in German-Egyptian relations after World War II. Another group of Germans had arrived two years earlier, led by Dr. Wilhelm Voss, a former high-ranking SS officer (SS-Standartenführer). Voss had been one of Nazi Germany’s leading managers. In 1937, he was appointed general manager of the Reichswerke Hermann Göring. During World War II he also headed several large armament conglomerates, mainly in German-occupied Czechoslovakia. Czech companies and trusts were bought or dispossessed and integrated into Nazi conglomerates, two of which were led by Voss (Skoda and Brüninger Waffenfabrik). The Göring-Werke employed more than 1.8 million forced laborers, POWs, and concentration camp prisoners. In Voss’ area of operations, at least 18,000 people died of brutal abuse, a consequence of the murderous

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violence of the SS police state that was imported into the war economy and the concept of “annihilation through work,” which was first implemented at the Reichswerke. Voss was also a member of the so-called “circle of friends of Heinrich Himmler” (until 1935 the “circle of friends of the Reichsführer SS”), a group of about 40 leading SS officers, Nazis, and German industrialists who advised the Nazi Party on economic matters and supported the party financially. Voss thus belonged to the elite circles of the Nazi regime.

Voss arrived in Egypt at the end of 1950, after spending time in an American detention camp and under house arrest in Germany for about five years. He was stationed in the Ministry of War, where he laid the foundations for the Egyptian arms industry. He also brought several former generals and officers of the German armed forces to Egypt. This group of advisers, who served from 1951 to 1958, was comprised of up to 60 German officers. Wilhelm Fahrmbacher, a former general, headed the subgroup that was located within the Egyptian army. Fahrmbacher’s office was next to the office of the Egyptian Chief of Staff, and they worked closely together. Although the advisers stressed that their job was purely of a consultative nature and that they did not hold command positions, they were clearly involved in military preparations. Beyond documents concerning consultation on operative, strategic, and tactical questions, I have also found plans for military operations against Israel in Fahrmbacher’s papers. The group came to Egypt when King Farouk was still in power. However, Voss and Fahrmbacher kept their positions after the coup against Farouk in July 1952. According to CIA sources, Fahrmbacher helped the “free officers,” the circle around Nasser and Naguib, to prepare a plan for the army’s internal control in Cairo in case there would be a revolution.

Voss accompanied Egyptian officials on their trips to Germany and served as an intermediary to German industrial circles. He also maintained contacts with West German officials in the Foreign Office, the Trade Ministry, the Chancellery, and the Ministry of Defense, which was then in the process of being set up. Some observers considered his

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9 For information on Wilhelm Fahrmbacher, see his papers in Militärarchiv — Bundesarchiv (Freiburg/Germany), N194. In 1941, Fahrmbacher was commanding general of the VII Battalion that was involved in the war against Russia. From 1942 to 1945, he was a commanding general in Brittany and Normandy, France.
12 CIA report, September 5, 1952, in National Archives II, CIA Name Files, 2nd Release, RG 263, Box Nr. 133.
influence in Cairo and Germany to be higher than that of Germany’s official ambassador, Günther Pawelke, and rumor spread in intelligence circles that Voss would soon become an official West German representative.\(^{13}\)

The position of Günther Pawelke, the first official German ambassador to Egypt, was therefore not easy. The Foreign Ministry expected him to cooperate with Voss, and while the two got along well in the beginning conflicts began to emerge in April 1953, when Pawelke was concerned that Voss was acting against German interests.\(^{14}\) One claim was that he was cooperating with Communists, another that he maintained close contacts with the Arab and German circles around Mufti Amin el-Husseini and German businessman Joachim Hertslet, a committed and high-ranking Nazi who had worked for the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs. Hertslet was the leading force behind a campaign in the Arab states against the German compensation payments to Israel. (The Federal Republic committed itself to supply goods in the amount of DM 3.45 billion to Israel and to pay DM 450 million to the Jewish Claims Conference.)

In the end, it was Pawelke who decided to resign and leave Egypt in 1954 after he refused to cooperate with Voss, while the former SS man remained in his position. But Voss’ influence also faded, particularly after British Prime Minister Winston Churchill publicly criticized the activities of the ex-Nazis working as military advisers in May 1953 and accused them of training Egyptian guerrilla units that attacked British troops stationed in the Suez Canal zone. The German government then sent an official to Cairo who met with the advisers and gave them strict guidelines. The group was separated into two different units and lost a great deal of its influence with the Egyptian government around 1954. In spite of the British criticism, the above-mentioned German official highly valued the work of the Germans in Egypt, which he described as a “positive political fact” for Germany. He recommended exerting influence on the group and giving them a “feeling of official comradely support.”\(^ {15}\)

I believe that, in utilizing these contacts, the German government also sent a political message to the Egyptian government, signaling that former SS men were accepted mediators and negotiators, not to mention the fact that their function was to assist Egypt in its war against Israel.

### 3. THE TRANSFER OF IDEAS FROM THE NAZI ERA TO THE POST-WAR PERIOD

This brings me to my second point, the question whether there was a transfer of ideas from the Nazi era to the post-war period. I want to illustrate this question by focusing on the case of one diplomat. Wilhelm Melchers was employed in the German Foreign Office from 1925. He was appointed director of the Near East department in December 1939 and held this position until the end of the war.\(^ {16}\) Jeffrey Herf describes how he was

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\(^{13}\) CIA report, August 29, 1952, in National Archives II, CIA Name Files, 2nd Release, RG 263, Box Nr. 133.

\(^{14}\) Note Allardt, June 16, 1953, in PA AA, B2 VS, vol. 186A.

\(^{15}\) Ibid.

\(^{16}\) From 1931 to 1934 he served in the Near East department under the leadership of Fritz Grobba, from 1935 to 1937 he worked at the embassy in Tehran, and from February 1938 to September 1939 he held the position of consul in Haifa. Between 1951 and 1954, Kurt Munzel worked as Melchers’ deputy. During the Nazi period, Munzel was the head of the radio department and
involved in developing antisemitic propaganda for the Arab world.\(^\text{17}\) After the war, from 1951 to 1953, Melchers once again headed the Near East department. He thus wielded considerable influence over Germany’s Near East policy and the re-establishment of West Germany’s relations with Arab countries. From 1953 until 1957, Melchers was the head of the German embassy in Baghdad. During this time, he was also in charge of the legation in Jordan and for reports on Israel.

The way in which an antisemitic conception of Zionism influenced Melchers’ assessment of the Near East conflict after the war is evident from some of his reports. In 1955, he sent a report from Baghdad analyzing Israel’s policies, in which he described the Jewish state as being of an “expansionist nature.” Israel in its present form, he argued, would establish a “bridgehead” providing the basis for future “generous expansion.” An “uncompromising attitude” on the Arab side was therefore understandable, and a peaceful solution to the conflict impossible. The Arabs would “feel safe only after the last Jew had left Palestine.”\(^\text{18}\)

This report reveals how deeply Melchers’ thoughts were still influenced by Nazi conceptions. The idea that the Jews were intending to combine Palestine with Syria and Transjordan in a “huge Jewish home” had been among the core ideas of Nazi propaganda for the Arab world, as well as predictions concerning the murderous policies of the Jews toward the Arabs in Palestine and elsewhere.\(^\text{19}\) Melchers’ conclusion that it was impossible for Arab countries to tolerate even a small Jewish minority on Palestinian soil reveals his anti-Jewish worldview.

In what way did this worldview affect West Germany’s foreign policy? The most controversial issues in German post-war Middle East policy concerned the character of German relations with Israel. After the debate on compensation payments in 1952, the main question was whether Germany should establish diplomatic relations with the Jewish state. The debate cannot be explored in detail here; however, the result was that Germany refused to establish diplomatic ties with Israel until 1965.\(^\text{20}\) The decision in favor of this policy was made in 1956, when a secret conference of German ambassadors

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\(^{17}\) Herf, supra note 2, at pp. 38, 55, 74 and other pages.

\(^{18}\) Melchers to Foreign Office, March 21, 1955, in PA AA, Papers Wilhelm Melchers, Bd. 64.

\(^{19}\) See Herf, supra note 2, at p. 102.

who represented Germany in Middle Eastern states took place in Istanbul. The German ambassadors attending the conference unanimously opposed the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel, fearing protests from Arab countries and—as a consequence—Arab diplomatic recognition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). They even voted against the establishment of a trade mission, which was subsequently cancelled despite prior promises.21

Wilhelm Melchers was one of the first and most outspoken advocates in this debate. His reasons are expressed in a letter that he sent to the German Foreign Office in July 1955. In this letter, he painted a grim picture of what would happen should Germany establish diplomatic relations with Israel:

The establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel would cause a storm of outrage in Arab countries and would inflict serious damage to our political, economic, and cultural interests. … It would definitely unsettle the German-Arab friendship and—due to the Arab mentality—would turn friendship into hate, because the Arab countries would not forgive the betrayal of a good friend.22

Melchers here refers to a crucial point. Arab diplomats were convinced that Germany had acted under foreign pressure when it signed the Luxembourg Treaty, which regulated the compensation payments to Israel, in 1952. After Germany regained its sovereignty in 1955, the Arab world expected the German government to refrain from any step in favor of Israel. It is clear that Melchers was well aware of the anti-Israel component of the so-called German-Arab friendship. Moreover, he was clearly unwilling to give up the advantages he expected to obtain from Germany’s Nazi legacy.

The idea that Germany had been forced to sign the Luxembourg Treaty was indeed very widespread in the Arab world. Although this was not true, it is correct that the compensation payments were not very popular in Germany or among German politicians. Inside the Foreign Office in West Germany, however, overt Nazi-like anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism was taboo. Germany’s main aim in foreign policy was to be integrated economically and strategically in the Western alliance. It was crucial to establish a new image of a democratic society and to demonstrate a new beginning. As the U.S. High Commissioner John McCloy observed, Adenauer understood that “the way Germany acts toward the Jews in the future will be the acid test of German democracy.”23 Consequently, Adenauer often stressed that the compensation payments to Israel that he announced in September 1951 were a “necessity” to regain credibility in the Western world, in order to obtain credit and business contracts. In retrospect, the moral side of the question was not sufficiently emphasized. Historian Wageh Atek

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21 Cf. PA AA, B2, vols. 93 and 94.
22 Melchers to Foreign Office, July 29, 1955, quoted in Jelinek, supra note 20, at p. 342ff. German diplomats feared that Germany would consequently lose important economic contracts, as well as Arab support at the United Nations, and that Arab states would support the East German socialist state instead. In addition, the Federal Republic would face heavy losses in the cultural arena. The future of German schools in the Arab world would also be in trouble. At the conference in Istanbul, Melchers added another argument: The lives of German embassy staff and members of the German colonies would no longer be safe. See PA AA, B2, vols. 93 and 94.
quotes Egyptian sources revealing that Adenauer personally stated in front of an Arab delegation that the issue of reparations to Israel had been regulated in accordance with the wishes of the United States. Under-Secretary of State Hallstein reportedly said to the Egyptian Consul General in Frankfurt: “It is not possible not to sign the agreement. Israel through the Jewish magnifying glass in America and England is stronger than one assumes. It is impossible for the federal government to take counter-action.” In those statements, the antisemitic stereotype of Jewish power was given a new lease of life. It is therefore not surprising that many Arab politicians and journalists were under the impression that antisemitic and anti-Israeli views still prevailed in Germany and that the German government would have supported the Arab side in the conflict if it had been completely sovereign.

The above statement is not documented in German protocols of meetings between Hallstein and Egyptian representatives. According to German sources, Hallstein explained, on the one hand, that the decision to sign the Luxemburg Treaty originated from the desire of the German people to “wipe away” the “blemish” on the German honor resulting from the crimes against the Jews. On the other hand, he emphasized that Germany was not able not to ratify the agreement, as this would be “suicide.” Melchers made a similar argument in a meeting with the King of Jordan. He wired to Bonn that he had informed King Hussein that “the Arabs could not expect Germany to commit suicide, only to save their Arab friends from harm.” Moreover, Chancellor Adenauer argued that the “power of the Jews, particularly in America” was one of the most important reasons for him to seek reconciliation with the Jewish people.

4. CONCLUSION

In these and similar statements, German politicians and diplomats highlighted that they had not been completely free in their decisions. It is therefore not surprising that German diplomats failed to convey the message of a new, non-antisemitic Germany to the Arab states until 1965. This failure became obvious in a report sent to Bonn from the German embassy in Cairo in the summer of 1964. This report stated that the Egyptian government was convinced of the “existence of another, real, national Germany” that was hiding behind the official one. Nasser perceived the official Germany to be under pressure from Zionist circles and tried to encourage the “hidden Germany” to emerge for closer cooperation with Egypt. This analysis was made after President Nasser gave an exclusive interview to the Deutsche National- und Soldatenzeitung, a radical right-wing

27 Melchers to Foreign Office in Bonn, December 28, 1953, in B11, Bd. 1389.
29 Report on National Socialists and German scientists in Egypt, undated, author unknown. This report was written by a journalist who was in close contact with the embassy and clearly had access to embassy files. See PA AA, B36, vol. 140.
German journal circulating in Nazi circles, in May 1964. In this interview, Nasser described the Holocaust as a “myth” and announced that Egypt would crush Israel.30

During the 1950s and early 1960s, German diplomats in Arab countries were aware of the fact that they enjoyed considerable advantages in Arab countries compared to other Western states because of their refusal to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. In the words of von Waldow, a legation councillor at the German embassy in Baghdad:

There has been a strong argument in favor of the Federal Republic: the fact that Germany, in contrast to other Western democracies, has no diplomatic relations with the State of Israel. If we lose this argument in the future, the only defensive weapon we possess will be beaten out of our hands.31

Voices like these dominated the debate in the Foreign Office at that time. Anti-semitism in the Arab states was not criticized by German diplomats, nor was Holocaust-denial. Former high-ranking German Nazis were accepted as interlocutors in Egypt. A highly ambivalent policy toward Israel added to the deligitimization of the Jewish state. The episodes described in this article show how strongly antisemitism and complicity with Arab hostility toward Israel informed Germany’s foreign policy in the post-war years.

30 “Krieg mit Israel unvermeidbar. Warnung an Bonn, doch Liebeserklärung an Deutschland.” Interview with Gamal Abdel Nasser in Deutsche National- und Soldatenzeitung, May 1, 1964.
Great Expectations: Antisemitism and the Politics of Free-Speech Jurisprudence

Stephen M. Feldman*

This essay addresses two related questions. First, is anti-Zionist expression a type of hate speech (specifically, antisemitic hate speech)? Second, from the standpoint of American constitutional law, is (antisemitic) hate speech constitutionally protected under the first amendment? My thesis is that both questions are inherently political, and, as such, they cannot be answered definitively. To say that these questions (or answers to the questions) are political does not mean that we cannot rationally discuss or debate answers to the questions, but rather that we can never arrive at a non-controversial conclusion. One’s answers will necessarily reflect or manifest one’s interests and values, including religious and other cultural values.¹

I will initially address the second question — the question of first-amendment protections — and, in fact, the bulk of this essay focuses on this question. Toward the end of the essay, I will return to the first question and explain its relationship to the first-amendment issue.²

I. POLITICS AND FREE-SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE

Although many constitutional scholars deem free expression to be a constitutional lodestar,³ the United States Supreme Court has rarely resolved free-expression issues contrary to mainstream interests or values. The corollary to this point is that political and cultural outsiders or minorities often suffer at the hands of the Court, including in cases that appear to be great victories for free expression. Many cases that have upheld first-amendment rights involved situations where the protected expression attacked or injured outsiders or minorities.

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¹ I discuss the politics of free expression more extensively in Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America: A History (University of Chicago Press, 2008).

² I have discussed the relationship between antisemitism and the first-amendment issue of the separation of church and state in Stephen M. Feldman, Please Don’t Wish Me a Merry Christmas: A Critical History of the Separation of Church and State (N.Y.U. Press, 1997).

Two cases involving free speech in a hostile audience situation are illustrative. A hostile audience case arises when a speaker addresses a large group of people who begin to get upset and threaten possible violence. The speaker is humming along, “Blah, blah, blah,” but people in the crowd start to complain, “Murmur, murmur, murmur.” Perhaps, a couple of people in the crowd start pushing or shoving. Someone might yell, “You better shut up!” In these situations, the police have sometimes arrested the speaker for a crime such as breach of the peace or disorderly conduct. Hence, the Court has needed to address the constitutional question: does the first amendment protect the speaker’s expression even though it might generate violence (albeit violence against the speaker)?

In Terminiello v. Chicago, a hostile audience case decided in 1949, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant’s conviction under a disorderly conduct ordinance was unconstitutional. The speaker was a Roman Catholic priest, so in the context of the United States in the 1940s, one could possibly maintain that the Court protected the speech of a religious outsider. But the priest’s speech was an antisemitic diatribe. He condemned “atheistic, communist Jewish or Zionist Jews.” He claimed that Jewish doctors had performed atrocities on Germans, and he asked, “Do you wonder [that] they were persecuted in other countries?” Then he proclaimed that “we want them to go back where they came from.” The American Jewish Congress filed an amicus curiae brief that emphasized the frightening threat posed to Jews by such antisemitic hate speech, especially coming so soon after the Nazi Holocaust. Nonetheless, the justices held that the first amendment protected the speech.

Two years later, in 1951, the Court decided another hostile audience case, Feiner v. New York, but this time, the Court held the speech unprotected. The defendant, Feiner, was a college student who had spoken to a racially mixed crowd of seventy-five to eighty whites and blacks gathered together on a sidewalk in Syracuse, New York. He had encouraged the audience to attend a meeting of the Young Progressives of America, protested the city’s cancellation of a permit for an earlier Young Progressives meeting, and made derogatory remarks about “President Truman, the American Legion, the Mayor of Syracuse, and other local political officials.” The Court held that the first amendment did not protect this speech because, according to the Court, the speech created a clear and present danger, even though the evidence suggested otherwise. The justices seemed especially worried that Feiner had urged African Americans to “rise up in arms and fight for equal rights.” Yet, witnesses had sworn that Feiner had instead encouraged his listeners to “rise up and fight for their rights by going arm in arm to the [Young Progressives meeting], black and white alike.”

If we compare these two hostile audience cases, in the first, Terminiello, the Court protected inflammatory antisemitic speech, while in the second, Feiner, the Court allowed the punishment of speech largely criticizing public officials and encouraging African Americans to take political action. What is my point here? I am not arguing that the justices purposefully discriminated against outsiders or minorities (or peripheral groups), but rather that the convergence or lack of convergence of interests between

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6 Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 317 (1951); id. at 324 & n. 5 (Black, J., dissenting).
outsiders and the mainstream can influence the Court’s decisions. Derrick Bell has labeled this phenomenon the interest convergence thesis.7

Pursuant to the interest convergence thesis, the results in Terminiello and Feiner suggest that the Court is most likely to emphasize the principled protection of free expression when the speech or writing attacks or harms outsiders or minorities rather than the American mainstream or elites. Thus, in Terminiello, the Court found antisemitic hate speech to be constitutionally protected, while in Feiner, the Court found speech threatening the mainstream and elites to be unprotected.

A landmark free speech case, Brandenburg v. Ohio, decided in 1969, further illustrates this point. In Brandenburg, the Court articulated its most speech-protective standard ever for determining when subversive advocacy or, more generally, speech inciting unlawful conduct, would be outside of first-amendment protections and therefore punishable. Yet, one should not overlook that the defendant was a Ku Klux Klan leader who spouted typical hate speech, repeatedly denouncing blacks and Jews and warning that “if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might have to be some revengeance taken.”8

Another landmark free speech case, New York Times v. Sullivan, decided in 1964, underscores how the Court tends to protect the expression of outsiders when doing so converges or corresponds with predominant interests, values, or practices. The Times had published a full-page advertisement soliciting support for the civil rights movement. The advertisement contained several minor factual errors. For instance, it stated that students in Montgomery, Alabama, had sung “‘My Country, ‘Tis of Thee’ on the State Capitol steps,” but they had, in fact, sung the national anthem. Because the advertisement also criticized police reactions to civil rights protests, the police commissioner, Sullivan, brought a civil action in the state courts for defamation against the Times and four civil rights leaders (whose signatures had appeared at the bottom of the advertisement). Sullivan won in the state courts; in fact, the state’s highest court upheld a jury award for $500,000.9

A unanimous United States Supreme Court reversed and issued one of its most vigorous defenses of free expression. The Court articulated the highly speech-protective actual-malice standard for determining when a public official could recover damages in a civil suit against the press. A “public official” can recover “damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct” only if “he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”10

New York Times enunciated a strong conception of a free press, and, of course, the press celebrated the decision. But as the legal historian Lucas A. Powe emphasized, New York Times was “a race case first and foremost.”11 It not only protected the expression of black civil rights leaders but also assured that news media, like the Times, could continue to report the atrocities inflicted on civil rights activists in the South. The Court’s protec-

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10 376 U.S. at 279-80.
tion of the civil rights leaders and the press went hand-in-hand; news reporting, particularly on television, had helped nurture a national political coalition pushing for civil rights reform. This coalition had begun developing in the 1950s and reached its apex of power in the mid-1960s, as demonstrated by the congressional passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Thus, New York Times did not show the Court baldly and boldly protecting a minority group’s constitutional rights regardless of the political fallout. To the contrary, the decision manifested the Court’s compliance with a dominant national political coalition that was at its maximum power.\(^\text{12}\)

Taken together, these four cases—Terminiello, Feiner, Brandenburg, and New York Times—demonstrate a crucial point: the judicial determination of the scope of first-amendment protections is integrally political. The justices decide cases in accordance with the interests and values at stake. To be clear, I am not suggesting that the political nature of these cases manifests a corruption of the adjudicative process. Rather, politics is inherent to constitutional interpretation and adjudication, when accurately described.\(^\text{13}\)

Thus, the constitutional protection of hate speech qua hate speech, including antisemitic hate speech, is necessarily a political issue. The Court has decided several cases involving hate speech, but the Court has not yet explicitly held whether hate speech is or is not a low-value type of expression outside of first-amendment protection. With that said, though, the justices seem to be leaning strongly toward the conclusion that hate speech is constitutionally protected. If so, then the government, of course, would be precluded from criminally punishing such speech.\(^\text{14}\) Yet, to underscore the basic point, the judicial determination of whether hate speech is constitutionally protected in any particular case will be largely influenced by the interests and values at stake.

II. IS ANTI-ZIONISM HATE SPEECH?

Now, I can return to my first question: is anti-Zionist expression a type of hate speech (specifically, antisemitic hate speech)? Most commentators agree that one can criticize Israel without being antisemitic. For example, one might argue that Israel’s policy on new settlements is incorrect; such an argument is not necessarily antisemitic. It might merely be an argument about the justice and politics of settlements.\(^\text{15}\)

Simultaneously, many commentators agree that many anti-Israel arguments are blatantly antisemitic. For an example, I draw on the writings of Ken Marcus, who has described a situation that arose at the University of California at Irvine.

At [UC Irvine], pro-Israel Jewish students have been subject to stalking, rock throwing, and various forms of intimidation, and a Holocaust memorial was damaged or destroyed. Signs have been posted on campus showing a Star of David dripping with

\(^{12}\) See Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights (2000) (discussing the development of a political coalition supporting civil rights).


blood. Speakers at campus events have chastised Jews for arrogance and have spoken of the distinction between the “good Jews” and the “bad Jews.”

Yet, as Professor Marcus points out, some people would deny that even these statements and actions are antisemitic.

In any event, I would add a broader point: arguments criticizing Israel fall along a continuum, ranging from the “overtly antisemitic” to the “non-antisemitic.” Many arguments might fall somewhere on the continuum other than at the two extreme ends. For instance, when debating the appropriateness of new Jewish settlements, if a discussant focuses on the consequences of settlements for the long-term peace process, then the argument would probably not be antisemitic. But if the discussant adds that Israelis are the new Nazis, then the argument has shifted to the antisemitic side of the continuum.

So, how does this question—whether anti-Zionist expression is a type of (antisemitic) hate speech—relate to the question of first-amendment protections, including the first-amendment protection of hate speech? Well, if even the legal question of whether particular expression is protected under the first amendment is necessarily political, then the specification of anti-Zionist speech as being either antisemitic or not will also necessarily be political. In other words, the question whether somebody who criticizes Israel is simultaneously condemning Jews as a race or religion is an inherently political problem: one’s interests and values vis-à-vis Israel and Judaism will strongly influence the answer that one gives to this question.

Thus, when critics of Israel insist that their arguments are merely political and not antisemitic, they often are begging the question because whether anti-Zionism is political or antisemitic is itself a political question. This key point is something of a logical conundrum and therefore bears some clarification. Many commentators see a dichotomy, an either/or: criticisms of Israel are deemed either political—and, consequently, legitimate—or antisemitic—and, consequently, illegitimate. But this dichotomy, this distinction between political anti-Zionist arguments, on the one hand, and antisemitic (or hate-speech) anti-Zionist arguments, on the other hand, is too slippery to resolve these disputes definitively. It is too slippery because the distinction itself is political: we cannot determine whether anti-Zionism is merely political or is instead hate speech without accounting for our political interests and values, particularly vis-à-vis Israel itself.

III. CONCLUSION: EXCESSIVE EXPECTATIONS?

If both questions raised at the outset—first, is anti-Zionist expression a type of hate speech, and second, is (antisemitic) hate speech constitutionally protected under the first amendment—lead to inherently political answers, then what follows? First, we must guard against having expectations for law that are too great. The law, or legal doctrine, cannot eliminate antisemitism. It cannot prevent people from sometimes making anti-Zionist arguments that are antisemitic because, in part, the law itself cannot be separated from the underlying political battles regarding Israel and Zionism. If antisemitism spreads through society, we should not expect the law to save us.

Nonetheless, and this is a second conclusion, I do not mean to suggest that we should therefore disregard the law. The law, or the interpretation of law, is inherently political, but the law can simultaneously influence politics. While I have focused on American constitutional law, we should not forget the importance of statutory law. Legislatures might enact statutes that encourage positive results or developments, such as the reduction of antisemitism in society or the control of the detrimental effects of antisemitism (though, of course, legislatures must act within constitutional restraints). And even within the realm of constitutional law, important distinctions must be kept at the forefront. Constitutional restraints or limits generally apply only to governmental actors and not to non-governmental or private actors. Thus, for instance, a private university might be able to punish the dissemination of antisemitic hate speech, while a public university might be unable to do so (depending on the judicial interpretation of the first amendment).

Ultimately, we obviously need to find ways to stop the spread of antisemitism. Law might play a role here, but we need to think about other means as well.
A Brief History of Iberian Antisemitism

Lina Gorenstein*

1. BACKGROUND

In 1449, a discriminatory, racist, and antisemitic set of laws was passed in Toledo. It prohibited any Jew who converted to Christianity, or conversos, from participating in a professional corporation or being admitted to any honorific office of the state or the Church.

Known as the “Purity of Blood Statutes,” this legislation discriminated against individuals on the basis of their ethnic origin and was aimed exclusively at Jewish converts to Christianity and their descendants.

Since 1391, the number of converted Jews in Spain had been increasing. This was the year of the “Seville massacres” and the beginning of the conversion movement ordered by Friar Vicente Ferrer.

Traditionally, Jews in the Iberian Peninsula were subject to their own legislation, which was becoming increasingly restrictive. As conversos, they were in the same position as the Christians and could compete with them in every field.

In the realms of Christianity, the specific rights of Jewish communities were displayed in the foros that had been promulgated since the 11th century.1 These provisions regarding the Jews were rarely incorporated into the municipal charters of the various localities. The Jewish community constituted a separate political body, with its own justice and laws, directed by Jewish law or the Torah and the decisions of the Talmudic authorities.2 The taxes that the Jewish communities had to pay directly to the King were laid down in those charters and represented an important contribution to the royal treasury. The autonomy of the judarias3 was reinforced, and laws were issued reaffirming the autonomy of the Jews and assuring the safety of their property, regulated by the charters and submitted to the King.

From the 14th century, canonical legislation became more prevalent in the realms of Iberian Christianity. Legislation concerning Jews had already been applied across the rest of Europe. This was restrictive legislation,4 aimed at prohibiting familiarity between

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2 Leon Poliakov, De Moamé aos marranos, 2nd ed. (São Paulo, Perspectiva 1996) p. 94.
3 Judaria refers to a Jewish neighborhood.
Jews and Christians. It had already been introduced by the Lateran Council in 1215 but was only enforced in the Iberian Peninsula in the 14th century.

The tolerance and familiarity that ruled the relationship between Christians and Jews were slowly deteriorating. Since the middle of the 13th century—the end of the Christian Reconquista—the normalization of life in Christian society offered a fertile soil for antisemitism and traditional negative attitudes toward the Jews.

In the 14th century, the popular belief that Jews were poisoners and a destructive element within Christianity was spread throughout Europe, and they were blamed for the plague that devastated Europe in 1348.

Anti-Jewish feeling was growing, and the Jews were expelled from England, France, and some German cities. It is this environment that provides the context for the “Seville massacres” of 1391 in Castela.\(^5\)

The situation was different now, and the Old Christians reacted to this freedom by attempting to use legislation to limit competition from the converted Jews. In Toledo in 1449, a rebellion against the *conversos*—accusing them of being responsible for the rise in taxes—resulted in the promulgation of the *Sentencia-Estatuto*, known as the “Purity of Blood Statutes.”\(^6\)

The *Sentencia-Estatuto* was both a judgment and a legislative act against the *conversos*. In reality, it was a measure based on economic motives, but those responsible for this discriminating legislation used religious pretexts. They accused all the *conversos* of being secret Jews and, therefore, of being bad Christians. It did not matter what the *conversos* did: Judaism was in their blood, and they drank it in with their mother’s milk.\(^7\)

This was the first racial institutional legislation since the canonical laws. *Conversos*—or New Christians—were not equal to the Old Christians and would never be, since they carried in their blood the seeds of “impurity,” the seeds of Judaism.

This racist politics against the *conversos* accused them all of being false Christians. It reflected a conflict between the Old and the New Christian bourgeoisie—a competition for the work and trade markets.

This anti-Jewish politics reached its peak in 1492, when the kings of Spain presented the Jews with a choice between conversion or leaving the kingdom. The Edict of Expulsion was published on March 31, 1492 and gave the Jews until August to leave Spain.

These statutes were social and urban phenomena, with the purpose of stopping the converted middle class from competing in professional corporations and public office and blocking their social ascent. The statutes lasted for almost three centuries in the Iberian countries and its dominions, always favoring the Old Christian upper classes.

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5 Poliakov, *supra* n. 2, at p. 130.


7 IAN/TT/IL (Institutos dos Arquivos Nacionais, Torre do Tombo, Inquisição de Lisboa). File of Antonio Rodrigues Mogadouro, letter from Francisco Paes Ferreira attached to the file.
Dividing society into “pure” and “impure” groups, they excluded the converted from competition. This legislation provided the basis for a new institution that was introduced in Spain in 1478 and in Portugal in 1536, namely the Court of the Holy Office of the Inquisition. The concept of “purity of blood” was used by the Inquisitorial regime and applied effectively for three centuries.8

2. THE INQUISITION IN PORTUGAL AND BRAZIL

The New Christians guaranteed the Inquisition an economic basis to maintain itself.9 As a socio-economic group independent of religious involvement, the conversos were therefore the subject of the Holy Office. It can be said that the Holy Office of the Inquisition in the Iberian countries was introduced as result of antisemitism that had been in the ascent since the conversions and the massacres of 1391. Iberian antisemitism also had a fundamental biological factor in the form of “blood.” The Inquisition was based on genealogical research, which was aimed at finding the ethnic origin of the New Christians.10

The main objective of this paper is to show how the Inquisition applied this racial legislation was applied across the Portuguese empire by the Inquisition, particularly in Brazil. On the basis of several examples, it will show how these factors hindered the economic, social, and cultural development of this Portuguese colony from the 16th to the 18th century.

The main purpose of the Holy Office of the Inquisition was to control the religion of the New Christians—Jews who were all forcibly converted to Christianity in 1497—and their descendants. The existence of the Court of the Inquisition in Portugal made it very dangerous for the New Christians to live and work there. Many converted Jews therefore decided to move to Brazil, where it was easier to escape the vigilance of the Inquisition. The economic possibilities attracted the converts, who found better opportunities in the New World. From the beginning of the 16th century, many New Christians arrived in Brazil. They concentrated mainly in the northeast of the country where the sugar industry was more developed.11

Although there was no Court of the Inquisition in Brazil, life was not absolutely secure. For three centuries, its agents—familiares, comissários e visitadores (officials of the Inquisition)—persecuted and arrested New Christians suspected of being secret Jews. At first, the agents operated in the northeast of the country. In the 18th century, they also operated in the southeast, Minas Gerais, and Rio de Janeiro, after gold and diamonds were discovered there.

The Portuguese Inquisition had one main interest: revenue.

The opportunity to assimilate and integrate into mainstream society was greater in Brazil than in Portugal. Many New Christians ceased living as Jews, but a certain group

8 Anita Novinsky, Cristãos novos na Bahia (São Paulo, Perspectiva 1972) p. 43.
9 Ibid.
remained loyal to their ancient faith for centuries, while externally they behaved exactly like the Old Christians.

At the end of the 16th century, the Inquisition intensified its Brazilian activities in Bahia and Pernambuco. Many New Christians were denounced as secret Jews and transported to the inquisitorial prisons in Portugal.

From a traveler’s diary, we know that Brazil spared from the Inquisition for a relatively long time, but that the latter eventually became so rigorous that merchants were imprisoned and all their goods were confiscated on the slightest suspicion.

Portuguese legislation was also applied in Brazil. Laws regarding the New Christians were issued during the colonial period. In Rio de Janeiro, *conversos* were prohibited from becoming elected officials. A Royal Decree of 1611 stated that all candidates for municipal offices should be selected from among the noblest people and without “any trace of Jewish blood.” In 1643, another municipal decree stated that in Rio de Janeiro people should not be elected from “the nation,” meaning Jews.

In Inquisitorial documents, one finds many opinions about the New Christians from their neighbors, business partners, friends, companions, and even their children’s godfathers and godmothers. Most of them testified that, externally, the New Christians were good Catholics, following all the practices imposed by the Church. But they were unaware of what they did in the privacy of their homes.

All *conversos* were baptized, received the sacrament of confirmation, grew up as Catholics, and behaved exactly as the Old Christians. Their external behavior was corroborated by their neighbors but many times accompanied by a certain suspicion. They were “good Christians, but… New Christians.”

One example concerns the case of a woman who lived in Rio de Janeiro on her father’s plantation, where there was a chapel. After she was married, she continued living on the plantation. The commissioner of the Holy Office of the Inquisition in Rio de Janeiro declared that she had always been a true Catholic and that he never had doubts about her faith. But he did not know if she went to mass or what she did when she was at home. Another priest said of the same woman that she was a good Christian in her

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16 IAN/TT/IL, File of Brites de Paredes, Inquisição de Lisboa n. 399, Inquirição do Rio de Janeiro, 10 de julho de 1713.
exterior behavior. But as she lived on a plantation, far from the city, he did not know if she believed in the Church sacraments.\textsuperscript{17} 

There was thus always some uncertainty about the faith of the New Christians.

3. THE NEW CHRISTIANS IN BRAZIL

The ethnic origin of Brazilian families was known by the majority of the population of Rio de Janeiro, since they had been established there since the 16th century. François Froger, a French traveler who visited the city in 1695 estimated that three-quarters of the white population was of Jewish origin.\textsuperscript{18} Other documents confirm his opinion.

From the latest research, we know that the New Christians represented around 20-30 percent of Rio de Janeiro’s free white population during this period. Part of this New Christian community lived in the city and engaged in urban activities. Around 50 percent of the community was dedicated to agricultural activity, mainly the cultivation of sugar cane and sugar production. Some were owners of large sugar plantations, and some were small-scale farmers. It is interesting to note that some of the sugar-mill owners and farmers were also lawyers, doctors, or businessmen, maintaining a household in the city and upholding a strong family network.\textsuperscript{19}

The same families were involved in urban activities, the liberal professions, sugar cane plantations, manufacturing and trade, and trade with the mining region. The work of these families was divided among their members.

One member of the family would be engaged at the sugar mill, another in the city, and a third at the mines, in a typical colonial society relationship, which was patriarchal and agrarian, with large properties and slave labor (the plantations). The rural clan was the main cell of political and social organization, shaping a network of people linked to the clan and interconnected by a wide range of interests.\textsuperscript{20} These clans were the favored victims of the Court of the Inquisition, enabling it to arrest entire families.

When the Inquisition arrived at the beginning of the 18th century, panic reigned among the conversos. More than 300 people were arrested and had their properties confiscated.

More than 20 percent of the sugar mills of the region that belonged to New Christians fell into the hands of the Church, including their businesses, houses, and slaves, as well as their jewelry, gold, and silver.

The Brazilian colony suffered the economic consequences of these confiscations.

4. IMPACT OF THE INQUISITION IN PORTUGAL

There was a critical mentality in Portugal among those who understood the harm that the Inquisition was doing to the Portuguese economy. The Ambassador of Portugal to

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{18} François Froger, \textit{Récitation d’un Voyage fait en 1695, 1696 et 1697 aux cotes d’Afrique, detroit de Magellan, Brésil, Cayenne et Isles Antilles par un escadre des vassaux du Roi, commandée par M. de Gennes, faite par lê Sieur Froger, Ingenieur volontaire sur lê vaisseau Le Faucaun Anglais, Amsterdam, chez lês héritiers d’Antoine Schelte, MDCXCIX, pp. 74-75.}

\textsuperscript{19} Lina Gorenstein, \textit{A Inquisição contra as mulheres: Rio de Janeiro, séculos XVII e XVIII} (São Paulo, Humanitas 2005) p. 71.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., at p. 83.
the Court of Louis XIV, D. Luis da Cunha, wrote that the Inquisition had discovered “the mine of the Jews in Rio de Janeiro,” and confiscated their properties to a point that the King had to intervene himself.21

Similar criticism was expressed by Antonio Nunes Ribeiro Sanchez, a famous humanist and physician, who also understood that the confiscation of the sugar mills was ruining the sugar trade.22

Father Antonio Vieira also recognized the importance of the New Christians to the Portuguese economy, and he advised the King to adopt a more tolerant attitude, mentioning that the Jews were only discriminated against in Portugal and that they lived openly as Jews in the Holy City of Rome. Father Vieira also proposed that the King should welcome back all the Portuguese scattered across Europe, particularly the businessmen who had substantial experience in the field of international trade.23

Father Vieira attributed the misery of Portugal to antisemitism, which continued to drive the most important, cultivated, and prosperous Jews and secret Jews from the country.

Portuguese antisemitism was responsible for the backwardness of the Portuguese economy and culture. The Portuguese crown prohibited any development of the colony, including the existence of universities, and they censored books even more rigorously than those included on the Index by Rome. Most of the Portuguese population was illiterate, but all the New Christians condemned by the Inquisition knew how to read and write, including 50 percent of the women arrested.24

The anti-Jewish actions of the Church and the state did away with the most cultivated Portuguese poets and writers of the period. Bento Teixeira, who was considered the first poet of America,25 died in the dungeons of the Inquisition in Lisbon in the 16th century. Antonio Serrão de Castro,26 a well-known apothecary and poet who was one of the founders of the first Literary Academy of Lisbon, was incarcerated for ten years and finished his life begging on the streets of Lisbon. Antonio José da Silva, one of the main dramaturgists and greatest writers of the Portuguese language in the 18th century, whose plays are still staged today, was burned at the stake.27

After more than ten generations, the descendants of converted Jews were still discriminated against by law. To obtain important jobs and offices, a person had to submit

24 Gorenstein, supra n. 19, at p. 208.
26 Benair Ribeiro, Um morgado de misérias — o auto de um poeta marrano (São Paulo, Humanitas 2007).
detailed information on his ancestors to prove his “purity of blood.” Even so, the New Christians achieved high positions in society and managed to gain acceptance to the University of Coimbra, returning to Brazil with academic degrees.

During this period, Portugal had a peculiar administration, and laws were frequently ignored, depending on the interest of the moment. The conversos constituted the intellectual part of society and had the most advanced ideas. They represented the opposite mentality of the conservative, fanatic, and intolerant ruling class.

In the 18th century, the King’s minister, the Marques de Pombal, decided to improve the kingdom’s backward economic situation. He changed Portugal’s political landscape by eliminating the distinction between the Old and the New Christians and ending the Portuguese division between the “pure” and “impure.” Discrimination subsequently diminished, and the New Christians were gradually absorbed by society as a whole. In the 19th century, there was no more persecution, but the Inquisition continued as a respectable and venerable institution until its end in 1823.

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Antisemitism in Contemporary Poland

Marek Kucia*

I. INTRODUCTION

Poland is one of the most significant countries in Jewish history. In the Middle Ages, the Jews found a safe haven in the Kingdom of Poland. In subsequent centuries, they grew into a large community that contributed to the country’s welfare and developed a vibrant culture. In the 19th century, 80 percent of the world’s Jewry were living on the territories of what was then the Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania. Because of migrations in the 19th and 20th centuries, many Jews in Israel, America, and other countries have roots in Poland. In the period between the World Wars, three million Jews were living in the Republic of Poland. Constituting 10 percent of the country’s population, they were the largest Jewish community in Europe. In 1939-1945, more than 90 percent of the Jews of Poland perished in the Holocaust. The annihilation of six million European Jews occurred largely in what had been Poland. The Nazi German death camps of Auschwitz, Bełżec, Kulmhof, Majdanek, Sobibór, and Treblinka operated there. After World War II, Poland became a country with hardly any Jews. The Jewish community declined, as a result of migration, from 240,000 in 1946 to 40,000 according to estimates—or 1,000 by self-identification—in 2002.1

II. REPORTED POLISH ANTISEMITISM

Despite its rich and tragic Jewish past and low number of Jews today, Poland—now an established member of the free world (a member of NATO since 1999 and the European Union since 2004)—is reported to be a rather antisemitic country. For example, a survey that was carried out for the Anti-Defamation League in 2009 found that 55 percent of Poles share the antisemitic opinion that “Jews have too much power in the business world” (see Figure 1). It is of little consolation that the results in Hungary and Spain were higher.

III. RESEARCH

The question of the extent and character of antisemitism in today’s Poland and how it has changed in recent years are issues that I addressed in a sociological research project

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1 The number of Jews registered at local Jewish committees in Poland in 1946 was 244,000. The American Jewish Year Book (2003) gave the figure of 40,000 Jews in Poland. A total of 1,055 people identified themselves as Jews in the national census in 2002.

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Figure 1: Anti-Defamation League Survey 2009: “Jews have too much power in the business world” (percentage responding “probably true”)

Source: Anti-Defamation League (2009).

carried out in January and June 2010.\(^2\) The project consisted of two parts—quantitative and qualitative. The quantitative part consisted of a survey that was designed by me and conducted by the Polish member of the Taylor Nelson Sofres network OBOP on January 7-10, 2010 through face-to-face interviews with a country-wide random sample of 1,001 respondents representative of the population of Poland aged over 15 years. The maximum statistical measurement error was +/- 3 percent for the estimate of 95 percent. The qualitative part of my research project consisted of three focus group interviews that my students and I conducted in June 2010 with different groups of Catholics in different locations: (a) members of the Club of Catholic Intelligentsia in Kraków (six persons); (b) members of the Family of Radio Maryja in Rzeszów (nine persons); and (c) Catholic intellectuals in Lublin (five persons).\(^3\)

In designing the survey and analyzing its results, I drew on Polish sociological research into antisemitism from 1992, 1996, and 2002. The 1992 and 2002 projects were conducted by Ireneusz Krzemiński, a professor of sociology from the University of Warsaw, and his teams from the Institute of Sociology at the University of Warsaw and the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw (Krzemiński 1993, 1996, 2004). The surveys were carried out by the PBS opinion polling organization on samples of 1,011 (in 1992) and 1,098 (in 2002) respondents representative of Poland’s population aged over 18 years. The 1996 survey was designed and analyzed by Helena Datner (1997), a sociologist from the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw who was also a core member of Krzemiński’s team in 1992. Datner’s survey was conducted by the CBOS polling organi-

\(^2\) The research project “Auschwitz in the social consciousness of Poles, 2010 A.D.” was financed by the Polish government, the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, grant no. NN116445837. The project concerned antisemitism and the changing perception of Auschwitz in Poland since my Auschwitz research of 2000 (Kucia 2001a, 2001b, 2005).

\(^3\) The Clubs of Catholic Intelligentsia bring together moderate Catholics. The one in Kraków is sponsored by Cardinal Dziwisz, former personal secretary to Pope John Paul II. The Families of Radio Maryja are listeners of Radio Maryja—an extreme nationalist and traditionalist Catholic radio station, known for spreading antisemitic views, established and headed by Father Rydzyk. The Lublin intellectuals were graduates or faculty of the Catholic University of Lublin, and funders or supporters of Archbishop Życiński, one of the most open-minded and anti-antisemitic members of the Polish Roman Catholic clergy.
zation on a sample of 1,097 respondents representative of Poland’s adult population (18 years and above).

The main objective of my survey was to determine the level of three kinds of antisemitism: (a) modern antisemitism, expressed in the opinion that Jews have too much power or influence; (b) religious antisemitism, which consists of the belief that Jews are culpable in Christ’s death; and (c) what I call post-Holocaust antisemitism, expressed in the opinion that it is good that there are hardly any Jews in Poland as an effect of the Holocaust.

Modern antisemitism was measured by the questions that were designed by Datner and used in her and Krzemiński’s surveys:

1. Do you agree with the statement that Jews in our country have too much influence on...?
   (a) political life
   (b) economic life
   (c) press, radio, and television

2. Do you agree with the opinion that Jews have too much influence in the world?

The three items in the first question (used in 1992, 1996, and 2002) probed the political, economic, and media-related antisemitism at domestic level, while the second question (asked in 1992 and 2002) measured what may be termed international antisemitism. Each of these four items was given a four-grade scale to choose one answer: “strongly agree,” “somewhat agree,” “somewhat disagree,” or “strongly disagree,” with a few other options: “I don’t know, I am not interested,” “I am undecided,” or “difficult to say.”

The four items together constituted the index of modern antisemitism and anti-antisemitism as designed by Datner (1996). The positive answers (“strongly agree” or “somewhat agree”) to the four items constituted the scale of modern antisemitism: from four positive answers standing for strong modern antisemitism to no positive answers indicating no modern antisemitism. Analogically, the negative answers (“strongly disagree” or “somewhat disagree”) to the four items allowed one to construct the scale of modern anti-antisemitism: from four negative answers meaning strong rejection of modern antisemitism to no negative answers expressing no rejection of antisemitism.

Religious antisemitism was assessed by means of a question that Datner designed for the 1992 survey and Krzemiński also used in 2002:

Sometimes one hears the opinion that Jews have so many troubles because God punished them for the crucifixion of Christ. Do you agree with this opinion or not?

To measure post-Holocaust antisemitism, I designed the following question:

One sometimes hears the opinion: “It is true that the Holocaust—the annihilation of Jews—was a major crime, but it is good that as an effect of it there are hardly any Jews in Poland.” Do you agree or disagree with this opinion?

As in the case of modern antisemitism, respondents to the questions concerning the two other kinds of antisemitism were able to choose an answer from the same four-grade scale. In addition, there was the “difficult to say” option.

The qualitative part of the research was intended to deepen selected results of the survey. The participants in the focus group interviews were asked, inter alia, to discuss
what they thought when they heard the various questions that measured antisemitism, particularly what they meant by the word “Jews.”

IV. RESULTS

1. General findings

The survey revealed the following (see Figure 2):

Figure 2: Antisemitism and anti-antisemitism in Poland, 2010 (percentage agreeing or disagreeing with antisemitic statements)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Antisemitism</th>
<th>Anti-antisemitism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Holocaust</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. A minority of Poles agree with various antisemitic opinions, that is, the majority of Poles are not antisemitic.

2. However, antisemitic opinions are fairly widely spread in Poland.
   a. In particular, there are many supporters of international antisemitism, which is expressed through the opinion that “Jews have too much influence in the world.” Forty-five percent of Poles agree with this statement. On a positive note, it is the only antisemitic opinion that has more supporters than opponents (33 percent).
   b. Many Poles—34 percent in each case—agree with the opinions that show domestic political and economic antisemitism, that is, that the “Jews in our country have too much influence on political life [and] economic life.” Also, 27 percent of Poles agree with the statement of domestic media-related antisemitism, namely that “Jews in our country have too much influence on the press, radio, and television.”
   c. For a country where most of the Holocaust took place and that lost almost its entire Jewish community as a result, a surprisingly large number of Poles—one-fifth (20 percent) of the population—are supporters of post-Holocaust antisemitism, which is conveyed by the opinion “It is true that the Holocaust—the annihilation of the Jews—was a major crime, but it is good that as an effect of it there are hardly any Jews in Poland.”
   d. The level of religious antisemitism is disturbingly high. In a Catholic country that is the birthplace of Pope John Paul II—who declared any antisemitism to be a sin that has to be confessed and repented for and who recalled that the Church denounced its former teaching that the Jews are culpable in Christ’s death—as
many as 16 percent of people agree with the statement that the “Jews have so many troubles because God punished them for the crucifixion of Christ.”

3. Despite the fairly high levels of various kinds of antisemitism in Poland, there are more Poles who reject antisemitic opinions than those who share them (with the exception of international antisemitism).
   a. What is particularly encouraging is that 68 percent of Poles reject the statement of post-Holocaust antisemitism and 65 percent dismiss religious antisemitism.
   b. What is also positive is that the opinions that express domestic political, economic, and media-related antisemitism each had a relative majority of opponents.

2. One antisemitism or many antisemitisms?

The research design adopted for the survey presupposed the existence of several kinds of antisemitism. At the first level, these were the kinds that were measured by each of the six survey questions: political, economic, media-related, international, religious, and post-Holocaust. At the second level (based upon the categorization of survey questions), one can speak of four kinds of antisemitism: domestic (comprised of political, economic, and media-related), international, religious and post-Holocaust. The theory of antisemitism and the results of earlier research allow one to discern three kinds of antisemitism at the third level: modern (encompassing the three domestic kinds and the international kind), religious, and post-Holocaust. A deeper statistical analysis (the factor analysis) of the 2010 survey data revealed a very strong correlation among political, economic, media-related, and international antisemitism. This confirmed the theoretical assumptions and the findings of Datner and Krzemieński and proved that there exists among Poles a pattern of antisemitic views that are otherwise known as modern antisemitism. Interestingly, the statistical analysis of the 2010 data also showed a fairly strong correlation between religious and post-Holocaust antisemitism, which

Figure 3: Variety of antisemitism in Poland, 2010

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4 The categorial principal components analysis for categorial variables (CATPCA) that was carried out by a member of my research team, Mateusz Magierowski, showed the following values for the results of the four items: political 0.923, economic 0.933, media-related 0.871, and international 0.885.

5 The CATPCA component values for religious and post-Holocaust antisemitism data were 0.834 and 0.883 respectively.
allows one to discern a kind of antisemitism that may be termed historical. The modern and historical kinds of antisemitism belong to the forth level. In sum, the research carried out in Poland indicates that antisemitic views seem to fit into a five-level structure (see Figure 3) in which the modern and historical varieties are largely independent entities.

3. **Changes in modern antisemitism and anti-antisemitism**

A major problem that I address in my research is how the antisemitism of Poles, particularly the modern variety, has changed in recent years and whether it has increased or decreased. Also, I am interested in how anti-antisemitism has evolved.

The analysis of strong modern antisemitism, which is measured by the positive answers (“strongly agree” or “somewhat agree”) to the questions about political, economic, media-related, and international antisemitism (cf. Datner 1996), showed that it is represented by 22 percent of adult Poles (aged over 18 years).\(^6\) Twenty-three percent of Poles strongly reject modern antisemitism (“strongly disagree” or “somewhat disagree” answers to all four items). Since the previous survey in 2002, strong antisemitism has declined by five percentage points, and its strong rejection has increased by seven points. Compared to the results of the first survey on antisemitism in 1992, the level of strong antisemitism in 2010 was somehow higher, but its rejection was much higher (see Figure 4). Thus, in 2010, for the first time since antisemitism has been surveyed in Poland, the number of strong antisemites among Poles is lower (albeit only a little) than the number of those who strongly reject antisemitism. This and the decline of strong modern antisemitism between 2002 and 2010 and the steady increase in the strong rejection of antisemitism from 1992, through 2002, to 2010, are positive developments.

**Figure 4: Strong modern antisemitism and strong modern anti-antisemitism (percentage agreeing or disagreeing with four antisemitic opinions; respondents aged over 18)**

Comparing the data for the three domestic components of modern antisemitism, one can confirm positive developments (see Figure 5). The political, economic, and media-

\(^6\) The precise result was 21.5 percent (for respondents aged 18 or above), while the entire sample, which consisted of respondents above the age of 15, had strong modern antisemitism at 21.8 percent.
related kinds of antisemitism were all lower than in 1996 and, except for media-related antisemitism, also lower than in 1992.

**Figure 5: Domestic antisemitism: political, economic, media-related (percentage agreeing with antisemitic opinions; respondents aged over 18)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>1992</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data for the rejection of domestic antisemitism proved even more positive (see Figure 6). All three components—political, economic, and media-related—increased considerably to reach the level of relative majorities.

**Figure 6: Rejection of domestic antisemitism: political, economic, media-related (percentage disagreeing with antisemitic opinions; respondents aged over 18)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>1992</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All in all, Poles in 2010 proved to be less antisemitic and more negative about antisemitism than ever before. What is not encouraging, however, is that about one-third of the adult population of Poland still holds antisemitic opinions, including one-fifth who are strongly antisemitic.

4. **Who are Polish antisemites and anti-antisemites?**

An important research question was what socio-demographic categories of people in Poland adhere to antisemitic opinions. It was also interesting to see which categories in particular reject antisemitism.

From the results that could be expected given the previous research, two are particularly worth discussing. They concern the relationship of antisemitism to gender and age.

Gender influences antisemitism and anti-antisemitism. In the case of modern antisemitism, more men than women agree with antisemitic opinions, but more men than
women also declare their rejection of those opinions. In the case of religious anti- 
sememitism, the opposite is true: women are both more in favor and more against than 
men, although the differences are smaller than in the case of modern antisemitism. One 
might therefore conclude that gender relates to whether or not one shares antisemitic 
opinions rather than to what particular antisemitic opinions one shares.

Age also has an impact on antisemitism (and anti-antisemitism). Generally speaking, 
the older the respondents are, the more antisemitic they prove to be. Also, the younger 
the respondents, the more negative they are about antisemitism. This concerns all kinds 
of antisemitism: modern, religious, and post-Holocaust. The differences are usually 
fairly substantial. In the 2010 survey, for example, there were almost twice as many 
strong modern antisemites in the oldest cohort of respondents, aged 60 years or above, 
than among the 20 to 29-year-olds (28.1 percent v. 15.7 percent). The earlier surveys 
revealed similar differences. But anomalies also occur. In the 2010 survey, for example, 
there were more strong modern antisemites in the youngest cohort, of 15 to 19-year-olds, 
than among 20 to 29-year-olds (17.7 percent v. 15.7 percent). However, another research 
project that I carried out in 2005 among students aged 12-17 prior to their visit to the 
Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum proved the general tendency: antisemitism 
in this youngest group ever to be surveyed was minimal (see Table 1).

Table 1: Modern antisemitism among Polish adults and youth (adults: from 18 
years of age; youth: 12-17 years of age)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Adults 1992</th>
<th>Adults 2002</th>
<th>Youth 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 (none)</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 (strong)</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,011</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>1,098</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Krzemiński (1996); Krzemiński (2004); and Kucia (2007).

The differentiation in antisemitism according to age from the least antisemitic younger 
cohorts to more antisemitic older cohorts that featured in the surveys in 1992, 1996, 2002, 
and 2010 and the low levels of antisemitism in the youngest cohorts in 2005 generate a 
series of questions. If the earlier research reveals such low levels of antisemitism among 
the young, why does the later research show higher antisemitism after the young have 
grown older? Is antisemitism a developmental characteristic? To what extent is it age- 
dependent? What factors of a socio-economic nature influence the growth of anti- 
semitism in the course of life? The surveys show that antisemitism correlates with self- 
assessment of one’s own economic situation: the less one is satisfied, the more one is 
antisemitic. The qualitative research reveals that people who feel that they have little 
influence on or little participation in political life are more antisemitic than others. To 
what extent do these economic and political deprivations, which are after all age-related, 
explain higher antisemitism among older cohorts? In order to answer these questions 
further research is necessary.
Alongside the expected but nevertheless puzzling results, the survey also produced several unexpected outcomes. Two of them are particularly important. The first concerns the relationship between antisemitism and education; the second concerns regional differentiation in antisemitism.

In regard to education, the survey showed that there are comparatively many supporters of antisemitic opinions among those Poles with a higher education or still in education. Although the level of strong modern antisemitism among those who have studied at university is the lowest among all education groups (18.5 percent v. an average of 21.4 percent), one might expect an even lower result. At the same time, the respondents with higher education show more domestic political and media-related antisemitism and international antisemitism than the average. Students of upper secondary schools (ages 16-18) exhibit less strong modern antisemitism than the average (19 percent v. 21.4 percent), yet one might expect an even lower result given the many Jewish history, Holocaust, and tolerance educational programs that are taught in Polish schools. Thus education does not eradicate antisemitic stereotypes, but merely helps to decrease them slightly.

The most interesting finding of the survey concerned the regional differentiation in antisemitism. As far as the various components of modern antisemitism are concerned, Poland is composed of four parts: (1) the most antisemitic provinces of eastern Poland—Podkarpackie, followed by Podlaskie, but not Lubelskie, another eastern province; (2) the moderately antisemitic provinces of central Poland (Łódzkie, Mazowieckie, and Świętokrzyskie), southern Poland (Małopolskie, Opolskie, and Śląskie) and the eastern Lubelskie province; (3) the considerably less antisemitic western and northern areas that were granted to Poland after World War II (Dolnośląskie, Lubuskie, Warmińsko-Mazurskie, and Zachodniopomorskie); and (4) the least antisemitic areas of the former Prussian partition (Kujawsko-Pomorskie, Pomorskie, and Wielkopolskie). This composition does not overlap with the division of today’s Poland into its former Austrian, Prussian, and Russian partitions that was considered important in reference to antisemitism by Krzemiński (2004). Antisemitism is the highest in the formerly Austrian Podkarpackie and the formerly Russian Podlaskie. The Małopolskie province, which largely belonged to Austria, is almost as antisemitic as the formerly Russian Świętokrzyskie and Łódzkie. Only formerly Prussian Wielkopolskie stands out as one of the least antisemitic. What is striking is that modern antisemitism is higher in areas where there were more Jews before World War II: first in today’s eastern Poland (except for Lubelskie, which had a large Jewish population but where antisemitism is at an average level) and then in the central and southern areas. In areas where there were few Jews before

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7 The Podkarpackie province is also at the top of the list in terms of religious antisemitism and post-Holocaust antisemitism.
8 In 1772, 1793, and 1795, Austria, Prussia, and Russia partitioned the Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania. Between 1795 and 1918, Poland did not exist as a state. The territory of today’s Poland comprises vast areas of what in 1914 were the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian partitions and a part of Prussia—by 1945, the Third Reich—that was granted to Poland after World War II.
9 Krzemiński discovered the most widespread modern antisemitism in the former Austrian partition, above average modern antisemitism in the former Russian partition, and the lowest, below average modern antisemitism in the former Prussian partition (Krzemiński 2004: 95). He did not consider the areas of Germany that were granted to Poland.
the war, antisemitism is lower: in the former Prussian partition and the territories granted to Poland after the war (except for Opolskie, where antisemitism is higher). Interestingly, there is more antisemitism in the granted territories where there were very few Jews and hardly any Poles before the war than in the former Prussian partition that formed the western provinces of pre-war Poland, with few Jews and a mixed Polish and German population. The long-term impact of the regional differentiation in the number of Jews and their share in the population of a given area on today’s antisemitism in this area may be interpreted through the socio-culturally inherited memory of Polish-Jewish relations, stereotypes, and prejudices. If this is true, it is amazing how long-lasting the bad memories, negative stereotypes, and prejudices are!

The number and proportion of Jews before the war, the memory of Polish-Jewish relations, and the inherited stereotypes and prejudices seem to be the most important factors in the regional differentiation in antisemitism in Poland and Polish antisemitism in general. These factors do not, however, explain the peculiarities and anomalies of the regional differentiation in antisemitism. Two non-regular cases are worth discussing: the peculiarity of the western and northern provinces and the anomaly of the Lubelskie province. It is also worthwhile analyzing the case of the Podkarpackie province, where the factors identified as key issues coincided with others and produced the highest antisemitism of all kinds in the country.

The western and northern areas of today’s Poland have antisemitism below the country’s average but higher than in the neighboring provinces of the former Prussian partition, where it is the lowest. The western and northern territories belonged to Germany and were granted to Poland in compensation for its war losses and the loss of its pre-war eastern areas to Russia. Before the war, there were few Jews and almost no Poles there. After the war, the remaining Germans were expelled and Poles from eastern and central Poland moved in. Given the fact that the migrants were coming from the areas of the densest Jewish settlement in Poland before the war, one might expect an average or above average amount of antisemitism, if the hypothesis of the socio-cultural inheritance of bad experiences, negative stereotypes, and prejudices were to be applied. However, the below average level of antisemitism of the first, second, and third generation of Polish migrants to the western and northern provinces illustrates how much migration and a new environment weaken the socio-cultural transmission of bad experiences and negative stereotypes.

The Lubelskie province, one of the three eastern provinces of the country that share many socio-economic characteristics, has antisemitism at the average level, like the central and southern provinces. There are several factors that appear to explain the positive anomaly of Lubelskie, as qualitative research has shown (e.g., the above-mentioned focus group in Lublin, the capital city of the province). First and most importantly, the province’s religious leader, Archbishop Życiński, is a strong denouncer of antisemitism. He has condemned antisemitic statements by politicians and the media, including Catholic ones. On a more positive note, he ordered the inclusion of teaching on Judaism and Jewish history in the curriculum of seminaries. Following his example, priests-to-be, priests, and lay Catholics participate in rituals to commemorate the local

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10 The three provinces are predominantly rural and economically underdeveloped, with poor infrastructure, low levels of education level, and high level of religion and conservatism.
Jews who perished in the Holocaust. The rituals involve reading psalms in Jewish cemeteries and (at the site of) synagogues. Second, local enthusiasts, mostly devout lay Catholics, have established and developed non-governmental organizations whose objective is to preserve Jewish heritage. The best known is “Brama Grodzka” in the city of Lublin, but there are many similar organizations in the former shtetlekh of the Lubelskie province. Third, the Catholic University of Lublin, the only university of its kind in the country, at which Cardinal Wojtyła taught before he became Pope John Paul II and of which Archbishop Życiński is Great Chancellor, has contributed to greater levels of education among regional elites. Fourth, apart from receiving many school groups from the region to visit the site of the former extermination camps—the annihilation centers for the Jews of the area—the Majdanek Memorial and Museum and its Belżec branch offer various kinds of educational programs to teachers and the young. The impact of these and other factors have resulted in a lower level of modern antisemitism than elsewhere in eastern Poland.

The Podkarpackie province is the most antisemitic area of Poland from all perspectives. Before the war, this area had a sizeable Jewish community that constituted a large proportion of its entire population. This facilitated the development of bad experiences, negative stereotypes, and prejudices that flourished, in particular, at times of severe economic hardship. During the 40 years of Communist rule, when Poles did not have much influence on politics, the inhabitants of the Podkarpackie province felt particularly alienated, as the agrarian parties that had represented them before the war were banned and their predominantly peasant social background did not qualify them to join the Communist Party. This alienation was fostered by the stereotype of żydokomuna—the opinion that the Jews ruled the Communist Party and had imposed communism in Poland. Today, the inherited antisemitic stereotypes and prejudices are sustained and developed through a combination of various factors, as qualitative research has shown (e.g., the focus group in Rzeszów, the capital city of the province). These factors include a relatively low assessment of one’s own economic situation and a perpetual feeling of little or no influence on politics. However, the most important influences prove to be those of the conservative clergy, particularly the leader of the local church, Archbishop Michalik, and of the extreme nationalist and often overtly antisemitic media outlets of Father Rydzyk—the Nasz Dziennik newspaper, Radio Maryja, and Trwam television.

5. Qualitative results

As a key component of the qualitative research, the participants of the focus group interviews were requested to comment on the survey questions that measured various kinds of antisemitism and, in particular, to elaborate on the concept of “Jew” in those questions. Here are the most striking of their comments.

The “Jews in our country…” were understood as: “Polish-language politicians,” “Polish-language Jews who rule the country,” and “Poles who have Jewish roots”
It was felt that the word “politicians” in power in Poland is synonymous with the word “Jews.” The adjective “Polish-language” was meant to downgrade the person concerned as barely Polish-speaking and even non-Polish.

The “Jews [who] have too much influence in the world” were considered to be: “Jewish upper class,” “Jewish oligarchs,” “not ordinary Jewish people,” and “Jews in banks in America” (Rzeszów).

The statement of religious antisemitism, “Jews have so many troubles because God punished them for the crucifixion of Christ,” evoked a comment that shows that modern and religious kinds of antisemitism are related:

Yes, Jews do not have their land. They did crucify Christ and said “his blood on us and on our offspring.” … And really, there are Jews all around the world and therefore they have influence on the politics of the whole world. (Rzeszów)

The same religious antisemitic statement resulted in a quick and unanimous reply from the entire group in Kraków: “No! This is a heresy!” This group, although not fully free from modern antisemitism, proved to have internalized the teaching of the Second Vatican Council and the Polish Pope on religious antisemitism.

The opinion that entailed post-Holocaust antisemitism, “it is good that as an effect of the Holocaust there are hardly any Jews in Poland,” was rejected by all groups. Asked why, a Kraków participant said: “Jews are humans and therefore one cannot say it is good that they perished.” A woman from the Rzeszów group commented: “John Paul II taught us that Jews are our elder brethren in faith.” Yet elsewhere during the interview the same person stated: “Poland was Jewish before the war. If the Jews had not perished at Auschwitz and at other annihilation camps, we would have still been under the influence of Jewry.”

V. CONCLUSIONS

There is a considerable amount of antisemitism in Poland, yet less than is commonly believed. Despite the shocking antisemitic comments that one may hear in Poland, the majority of Poles are not antisemitic in any meaning of the term. There are two distinct kinds of antisemitism in Poland: (a) modern antisemitism, consisting of the belief that Jews have too much influence in Poland’s politics, economy, and the media, as well as in the world; and (b) historical, including religious antisemitism, with its belief that the Jews are being punished for the crucifixion of Christ, and post-Holocaust antisemitism, expressed through the opinion that “it is good that as an effect of the Holocaust there are hardly any Jews in the country.” Antisemitism is differentiated according to various variables, with regional differentiation being the most interesting, as it reveals the impact of such factors as Jewish settlement before the war, socially inherited memories, stereotypes and prejudices, migration, and the positive or negative role of religious leaders and the Catholic media. The results of the 2010 research show a decline in all kinds of antisemitism and an increase in anti-antisemitism. Let us hope that one day there will be no antisemitic Poles at all.
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Anti-Jewish “Propaganda” in Brazil under Dutch Occupation

Daniela Levy*

From 1580 to 1640, Portugal went through a period known as the Iberian Union. During this time, the King of Spain governed Portugal. Due to the establishment of repressive policies by King Felipe II of Spain against Holland, which had recently declared independence from the Spanish crown, the commercial relationship between the Dutch and the Portuguese was damaged. Up to this point, Portugal had depended on Holland’s financial and technical assistance in the refining and trading of its share of Brazilian sugar production. After Felipe II ordered the confiscation of all Dutch ships anchored at port in his dominions across Europe, Africa, Asia, and America, the Dutch West India Company, in an attempt to minimize the losses caused by this crisis, decided to find a way to obtain sugar directly from the northeastern region of Brazil.¹

The Dutch tried to occupy Brazil twice, in 1624 and 1630. They were unsuccessful in their first attempt (Luso-Brazilian troops defeated the Dutch after a year), but in 1630 they succeeded and occupied a large part of northeastern Brazil, where they remained for 24 years.²

At the time of the occupation, Brazil was quite cosmopolitan, with multiple ethnic groups and cultures coexisting. Jews, eager to find a refuge in Brazil, arrived from countries such as Portugal, Spain, Poland, France, and England. They moved to Brazil hoping for freedom. They were eager to find a place to live, a community where neither their place of birth nor their religion would be a reason to marginalize them or treat them as pariahs. Additionally, Jews from Amsterdam already engaged in trade with the Dutch envisioned increased opportunities for financial growth in the newly-conquered

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¹ The Dutch West India Company was an enterprise of Dutch merchants founded in 1602 using both State and private capital. Its purpose was to expand Dutch economic power in America through the conquest of land and the accumulation of capital. The company’s many shareholders provided the financial capital to equip its ships. The company’s fleet and maintenance costs were jointly accounted, and investors received dividends in the form of profit per share based on the overall results of the company, thereby diluting the risks of each individual voyage. It was based on the same model established by the Dutch East India Company that operated in the Orient. Both companies integrated capital, armed force, and decision making power, dividing the risks and the profits in proportion to each individual investment.

² The Dutch conquered the regions of Pernambuco, Maranhão, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraíba, and Sergipe. Some areas were recaptured by Luso-Brazilian defense militias shortly after and others remained under Dutch occupation until 1654.
territories. Soon after they arrived in Pernambuco, the Portuguese-Dutch Jews estab-
lished a community similar to the Sephardic orthodox community of Amsterdam.

During the 24-year Dutch occupation, Pernambuco experienced an extremely pros-
perous period, both culturally and materially. The religious tolerance that Holland
extended across the northeast of Brazil created an opportunity for scientific research,
literary production, and artistic creation to flourish. The Jews engaged in intense intel-
lectual activity under Dutch rule in Brazil and were able to build a synagogue, schools,
and welfare agencies.3

Jewish scholars, poets, and writers lived in Dutch Recife. They included the famed
calligrapher Yehuda Machabeu and the rabbis Mosseh Rafael d’Aguillar and Isaac
Aboab da Fonseca, both of whom wrote treatises in defense of equality among men.

Daniel Levy, also known as Don Miguel de Barrios, a Portuguese from Holland,
wrote poems based on the lives of Jews in the Brazilian colony. He dedicated a poem to
an esteemed member of the Jewish community of Dutch Recife, Abraham Cohen.4

As businessmen, the Jews played an important role in the establishment of new
Dutch commercial enterprises in Brazil. This was mainly because the Sephardim, who
arrived directly from Amsterdam, were familiar with both the Portuguese and Dutch
languages, a fact that made them indispensable.5

The directors of the Dutch West India Company indeed had a material interest in fa-
voring religious coexistence, but the cultural diversity of the population in northeastern
Brazil did not always result in harmony between Catholics, Protestants, and Jews.

Several documents from this period show that the various ethnic and religious groups
did not always live together peacefully. Portuguese and Dutch chroniclers expressed
antagonism, particularly against the Jews, their way of life, and their activities.

The historiography of this period frequently stresses the religious tolerance and
freedom that the Jews enjoyed in Recife. However, it is important to understand the
social reality that caused conflict between Jews, Christians, and Calvinists. “Tolerance”
was mandatory according to the Dutch West India Company, but competition among
businessmen and merchants led to disagreements.

During this period, Manoel Calado do Salvador, a Catholic friar who belonged to the
Congregation of Serra d’Ossa of the Order of Saint Paul, expressed intense antisemitic
feelings. In his book, entitled O Valoroso Lucidero e o Trinco da Liberdade, written during
the guerrilla war between Luso-Brazilian and Dutch troops (1645-1648), he described the
city of Recife as “a true paradise before the arrival of the heretic Jews.” He accused the
Jews of illicit gains, corruption, and rape, as well as other defamations of character. He
wrote that the Jews transformed “Recife into a Sodom and Gomorrah.”

Calado attacked Jews and New Christians (conversos) in many ways. One of his main
accusations was the fact that some New Christians, along with the newly-arrived Jews
from Holland, were trying to build a Jewish congregation. Since the New Christians
were all baptized, they were deemed Catholic heretics as soon as they returned to
Judaism and were circumcised.

3 See Arnald Wiznitzar, Os Judeus no Brasil Colonial, Ed. Pioneira, Sao Paulo, 1966, pp. 55-67;
4 Rabino Y. David Weitman, Bandeirantes Espirituais do Brasil—séc. XVII, Ed. Mayaanot, 2003,
pp. 132-297.
5 The Jewish community of Amsterdam was formed at the end of the 16th century by Portu-
guese refugees from the Inquisition.
Calado also condemned the dissimulating character of the New Christians. He wrote that they were betraying Portugal, as many seized the opportunity to return to old Jewish traditions, associating themselves with the Amsterdam Jews to obtain economic advantages. The Catholic friar made it known that, in his opinion, the New Christians and Jews were getting rich very fast and without effort, becoming sugar mill owners and profiting from the best opportunities in the region.

The Christian merchants accused the Jews and New Christians of greed, with the knowledge that their ability to speak both Dutch and Portuguese helped them in their commercial enterprises. Friar Calado took advantage of these complaints and transformed his sermons into diatribes against the Jews.

At this point, the old stereotypes and anti-Jewish myths that had existed since medieval times took root in Pernambuco; accusations of corruption and fraud gave Jews a bad reputation that did not correspond to reality.

After 1645, the Luso-Brazilian militia reorganized and began to exercise leadership in the fight to regain control over the Dutch occupiers. In August, a ship laden with cargo belonging to Dutch merchants and three Jews left Itamaracá island for Recife and sunk near Pau Amarelo, a region that had been conquered by the militia. Four merchants were arrested and sent to Bahia. One Jew managed to escape, but the other two Jewish merchants were held and later sentenced to death by hanging. As baptized Christians, they were given the right to receive Christian instruction before being executed. It is at this point that the stigmas of heresy and treason became confused. They were to die for treason to the homeland (collaborating with the Dutch). However, they would also die as Christians. Manuel Calado had been granted the mission to “remove the blindness by which the Jews led their lives.” He was overjoyed because, according to him, he was able to confuse the Jews and eventually made them declare themselves to be happy in the belief that their souls would be saved by Jesus who, in his mercy, would take them out of the hell they were living. Of course, in the end, they were both hanged.

Over many years, several historians leveled accusations against the Jews as traitors and collaborators with the Dutch. However, by the end of the 1970s, research conducted by Anita Novinsky demonstrated that many New Christians remained loyal to the Portuguese in the war to repossess the territory. There are many examples of such loyalty. Two masters of the sugar works, Diogo Lopes Ulhoa and Diogo da Serra, helped to defend the territory during the Dutch invasion of Bahia by building forts and trenches.

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7 Calado, op. cit. n. 6, at p. 101: “Todavia, depois que os holandeses a ganharam (Recife), (os judeus) haviam tirado o rebuço com que andavam encobertos, e se circuncidaram, e declarara por judeus publicamente, e estes tinham muitas fazendas de raiz na terra, mancomunaram-se uns com os outros, e prevaleceram e se fizeram senhor de engenho … e apoderando-se do melhor da terra … se circuncidaram com grande escândalo do povo cristãos.”

8 Ibid., at p. 117.

9 Ibid., at p. 48.

Others, such as Domingos Alvarez de Serpa and Matheus Lopes Franco, joined a special commission that was part of the Governor’s plan to raise funds for the purpose of recovering Pernambuco from Dutch occupation. Twenty-seven of the 180 donors (15 percent) were New Christians.\footnote{Anita Novinsky, *A Historical Bias: The New Christians Contribution to the Dutch Invaders of Brazil (17 Century)*, Fifth World Congress of Jewish Studies, 1972, pp. 141-154.}

The Dutch West India Company sent Count Maurice of Nassau to Recife in 1636 to govern the new colony. The two Portuguese who received him, João Fernandes Vieira and Gaspar Dias Ferreira, both wanted to establish grounds for coexistence between the local inhabitants and the new conquerors. According to Friar Calado, when the Old Christian João Fernandes Vieira approached Maurice of Nassau, he had the noble intention of guaranteeing the safety of the inhabitants.\footnote{João Fernandes Vieira subsequently became a leader of the resistance against the Dutch occupation.} On the other hand, according to Friar Calado, the New Christian Gaspar Dias Ferreira personified the stereotype of a “traitor Jew,” as he was only concerned with his own interests, eager to get rich at the cost of “the inhabitants blood.” In Calado’s words, he saw in the “friendship with Maurice of Nassau many opportunities to become illegally rich.” Calado accused him of embezzling crates of sugar that were to be offered as a gift to the Count by the masters of the sugar works. When judging the characters of João Fernandes Vieira and Gaspar Dias Ferreira, Manuel Calado explicitly took their origins into consideration.\footnote{Calado, op. cit n. 6, at p. 102.}

The Jewish collaboration with the Dutch in the conquest of northeastern Brazil is a myth, constructed with the help of Friar Manuel Calado, which was subsequently passed on to future generations by historians.\footnote{The main accusation that Calado makes about the Jews is that they were traitors to the homeland. Ibid., at pp. 48 and 51.}

The animosity of the Calvinists toward the Jews was mainly due to commercial competition but always came with an alleged religious pretext. Some Calvinist ideologists that had planned the conquest of northeastern Brazil supported the idea that religion should go together with arms in defense of the land granted by God.\footnote{José Antônio Gonsalves de Melo, *Gente da Nação*, Ed. Massangana, Recife, 1996, p. 205.}

Constant complaints by leaders of the Dutch Reformed Church were sent to the Governor of the Dutch West India Company in annual reports. They complained about the “arrogance” of the Jews and their dishonesty in trade. They also expressed concern over the danger of mixed marriages between Jews and Christians.\footnote{Hermann Waetjen, “A Egreja no Brasil Holandês” (The Church in Dutch Brazil), in *O Domínio Colonial holandês no Brasil* (The Dutch Colonial Domination in Brazil), Rio de Janeiro, CEN, 1938, pp. 350-353.}

As a result of these complaints and pressure from the Calvinist clergy under Maurice of Nassau’s government, the two synagogues in Recife were closed for a short period.\footnote{The synagogues remained closed from January 5 to January 10, 1638.}

They were only given permission to reopen after the Jews promised not to carry out any rituals that could be considered too “noisy,” such as the religious celebrations of *Simchat Torah* and *Purim*.\footnote{During the celebration of *Simchat Torah* and *Purim*, Jews sing and dance with joy. See Wiznitzer, op. cit. n. 3, at pp 64-65.}
A report sent to the Dutch West India Company in 1641 accused the Jews of dominating the sugar trade and professing their faith in public places. The Protestant clergy and the Christian merchants both requested in their reports that Jews should be prohibited from participating in auctions and becoming civil servants or tax-collectors.¹⁹

Demands for further ostracism of the Jews were made on a continuous basis. The Protestant clergy often cited the restrictions imposed upon Jews in other countries, such as the requirement to wear a badge on their clothes, or a red hat, or a yellow insignia on their chest to identify them, in order to prevent them from cheating or robbing Christians. Perhaps the most anti-Jewish complaint of all can be found in the following words:

> everyone knew of the methods used by the sons of Judah, who lied, fooled, and used false means that made competition difficult for Christians who do not resort to such treachery. … Because of their usury practices towards farmers, they are a true plague in Brazilian lands. Brazil belongs to Christians and not the damned sons and daughters of Israel who desecrate the name of Jesus. The Israelites are not needed here; Christians are able to do what they do!²⁰

The Dutch West India Company regarded the Jews who came from Amsterdam as important political allies, given its interest in intensifying the import and export trade. In addition, the company could not take any drastic action against them, such as agreeing to the request to exclude them from the retail business, due to the influence of its Jewish shareholders. Therefore, the only measures that were taken included prohibiting the construction of a new synagogue and imposing economic restrictions, such as the rule that two-thirds of brokers had to be Christians.

Maurice of Nassau became aware of the growing conflict. He advocated religious freedom for all inhabitants in the belief that tolerance could only benefit the Dutch government. He believed that taking a hard line against religious groups would only increase the chances of a revolt. Calvinist ministers, however, pressured him into issuing statements that were unfavorable toward Jews.²¹

The tolerance that Maurice of Nassau manifested was deeply appreciated by the Jewish community. In 1642, knowing that the Count had to return to Amsterdam, Jewish representatives offered him a sum of money for each year that he prolonged his term of office so that he would remain as governor in Brazil.

The concerns of the Jewish leadership in Amsterdam were borne out by the fact that a Calvinist Synod was established in Recife in 1642 by bishops from the Reformed Church. The Synod had executive and deliberative power over all matters related to the internal organization and moral behavior of the population of Dutch Brazil. They advised the government authorities to use coercive or punitive measures in those cases judged to be scandalous and deserving of censorship or punishment. Judgment and punishment were regulated by a civil court at the request of the civil or religious authorities.²²

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¹⁹ Ibid., at p. 64. The sugar mills (engenhos) that had been left behind by the Luso-Brazilians during the conquest of the land by the Dutch were auctioned off. At these auctions, it was possible to acquire a sugar mill at a price below its market value.

²⁰ Waetjen, op. cit. n. 16, at pp. 350-353.

²¹ Wiznitzer, op. cit. n. 3, at p. 66.

²² João Henrique Santos, “A Inquisição Calvinista—O Sínodo do Brasil e os judeus no Brasil Holandês” (The Calvinist Inquisition—The Synod and the Jews in Dutch Brazil), in Angelo Faria de Assis, Nara M. C. Santana and Ronaldo S.P. Alves (eds.), Desvelando o Poder—Histórias de Estado,
The Synod’s main concerns regarding moral behavior centered on five issues: the marital situation of couples living in concubinage; prostitution; concerns relating to invocations, blasphemies, heresies, and apostasies; transgression of the Sabbath by Jews and slaves; and freedom of religion for Jews and Catholics.

Notwithstanding the installation of the Synod in Brazil in 1642, the Class Assemblies—the name given to the meetings between the Dutch colonial government and the representatives of the Reformed Church—had discussed issues related to the Jews since 1637. Repeated criticism arose in these meetings over the freedom of Jewish worship, the “scandalous” Jewish religious practices, and the unfair competition in business dealings.

In the same year that the Synod was created in Pernambuco, a new set of regulations was created for all Jews. Under these regulations, Jewish men would have been prohibited from marrying Christian women and children of mixed marriages in which the mother was Jewish would have been raised by Christian parents. However, the leaders of the Jewish community spoke to the directors of the Dutch West India Company and the resolutions of the Synod were never put into practice.23

Trials against Jews were rare. The only known case was of a Jewish woman in Paraíba, part of the territory occupied by the Dutch, who was accused of “sacrilege,” in that she had spoken out against the name of “our Savior Jesus Christ and the Holy Baptism.” The Synod concluded that the case was not serious and that the woman showed promise of being converted, as she had started to attend church frequently.24

A ferocious anti-Jewish attack came from a Calvinist bishop named Vicente Joaquim Soler, who rendered services to the Dutch West India Company. In several letters, he accused the Jews of “sucking the blood of the people,” “stealing the Company,” and benefiting from “privileges that hurt Christian merchants.”25 These letters also reveal the Calvinists’ deep concern over the increase of the Jewish population. With the continuous influx of Jews from Holland and the increase in their birth rate, they could have become the majority group in the region.26

The reconversion of many New Christians to Judaism also raised concerns in anti-Jewish circles. In 1641, an Escolteto (a post combining the duties of a district attorney and a police officer) by the name of Paulo Antônio Daems requested that Gaspar Francisco da Costa, a rich New Christian, be banned from trading and his assets confiscated because he had reconverted to Judaism and submitted himself to circumcision.27

Among the various demonstrations of antisemitism in Pernambuco, there is the case of a Jew, accused of blasphemy, who was tortured and killed by a mob inflamed by the speeches of priests. The Jewish community of Amsterdam, always aware of what was

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23 Wiznitzer, op. cit. n. 3, at p. 55.
24 Ibid., at p. 121.
27 Daems’ duties were of an executive nature, and he also appointed judges. For several years, he was also general secretary of the government of Maurice of Nassau, having demonstrated on many occasions his aversion toward the Jewish people.
going on in Brazil, reacted with indignation and accused the Dutch government of Recife of supporting the persecution of Jews. They also complained that the Escabinos (lay members of a mixed court) of Mauricia should have let this case be tried by the Council of Justice, as they did in Holland for cases of blasphemy. They argued that the Escabinos lacked standing to judge this matter.\(^\text{28}\)

Several attempts were made to prevent Jews from practicing their religion freely. However, when the Ecclesiastic Council of the Calvinists decided that the two synagogues should be closed again, the Jewish community of Recife contacted the Council of the Elders (Sanhedrin) in Amsterdam, who wrote a petition in 1645 to request that no distinction be made between Jews and Christians in the Dutch colonies. In reply to this petition, a document entitled *Patente Honrosa* (Honorable Patent) was addressed to the Supreme Council of Brazil and the Governor. As a result, both synagogues remained open, and the Jews were able to continue their religious practices.\(^\text{29}\)

Antisemitism flourished vigorously in the economic realm. Several episodes reveal that competition and business disagreements led to discrimination against the Jews. Moisés Abendana, a sugar trader who had debts with several Dutch creditors (amounting to 12 florins), was found hanged under mysterious circumstances. The authorities concluded that he had committed suicide. The Council chamber of the Escabinos, led by Escolteto Daems, forbade his burial and determined that his body be displayed hanging as an example of the dishonesty of the Jews. The Jewish community leaders of Recife went to Governor Maurice of Nassau to defend the honor of Abendana, claiming that he was a victim of murder. In an attempt to avoid humiliation, they offered to pay Abendana’s debt plus a bonus for the inconvenience created by the incident. When the Governor declined their offer, they went directly to the creditors. On receiving the money, the creditors allowed the burial to take place.\(^\text{30}\)

The Portuguese continually tried to reconquer the lost territory, and in 1645 the Luso-Brazilians organized an insurrection. The Dutch reinforced their defenses while simultaneously becoming stricter in religious matters. Jews were accused of not respecting the Sabbath by working and opening their schools. Christians began to insult Jews in the street.\(^\text{31}\)

The period of the Dutch occupation of Brazil in the 17th century was one of the few times when Jewish life flourished at this time in history. However, it only lasted for a short period, and it cannot be said that it was entirely free of anti-Jewish feeling. In 1654, when the Dutch were forced to leave Brazil, the relative freedom of the Jews ended.\(^\text{32}\) The Jews left with the Dutch, only to experience new difficulties in the Caribbean and back in Amsterdam.

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\(^{28}\) de Melo, op. cit. n. 26, at p. 269. The Council of the Escabinos was a chamber of magistrates, the position of judge was an elected office, and any person was eligible. The chamber was presided over by an Escolteto.

\(^{29}\) de Melo, op. cit. n. 26, at p. 254.

\(^{30}\) Wiznitzer, op. cit. n. 3, at p. 76; Santos, op. cit. n. 22, at pp. 120-122.

\(^{31}\) de Melo, op. cit. n. 26, at p. 305.

\(^{32}\) In 1648, the Dutch experienced the beginning of their defeat in Brazil, when their territories were reduced to the shores of Pernambuco. A big battle in proximity to Recife, in Guararapes, marked the end of the Dutch occupation in Brazil. At the beginning of 1654, the war between Dutch and Portuguese troops ended with a capitulation agreement according to which the Dutch would have three months to leave the area. See Jacob R. Marcus, *The Colonial American Jew*, Vol. 1, Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1970, p. 209.
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Antisemitism According to Victor Klemperer

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People of Abraham, fighting against obstacles of all kinds are working their way upwards to humanity.¹

1. INTRODUCTION

... Nazism permeated the flesh and blood of the people through single words, idioms and sentence structures which were imposed on them in a million repetitions and taken on board mechanically and unconsciously. Words can be like tiny doses of arsenic: they are swallowed unnoticed, appear to have no effect, and then after a little time the toxic reaction sets in after all.²

Victor Klemperer (1881-1960) was born in Germany to a Jewish family and later became an outstanding specialist of French literature.³ As a full professor of Latin letters at Dresden Technical University from 1920, he had strong ties to the works of Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Diderot. He was impregnated with the “illuminist” way of thinking, and his free-faculty thesis was about Montesquieu, under the advisement of Karl Vossler, dean of Munich University.⁴ Klemperer spent the early years of his career in Munich, where one of his colleagues, also advised by Vossler, was another famous Latinist, Erich Auerbach, the author of Mimesis.

The importance of speaking about Victor Klemperer in the context of antisemitism relates to his analysis of the totalitarian Nazi regime, after he and his wife spent the twelve years of terror in Germany. It has to be said that this analysis was essentially oriented toward language, since Klemperer had discovered that language was a very powerful weapon used by the Nazi terror. The Nazis manipulated language with the general purpose of embedding the Nazi ideology and the particular purpose of disseminating antisemitism among the German people.

So, what is this analysis? Why did Klemperer and his wife stay in Germany instead of leaving the country as most Jews did? To answer these questions, it is important to know more about him.

¹ Published about the Jewish Emancipation in the German magazine Sulamith in 1811.
³ According to the Brockhaus Encyclopedia of 1925.
⁴ Vossler was a contemporary of the Italian philosopher, historian, and politician Benedetto Croce, with whom he maintained close cultural contact.
2. ABOUT VICTOR KLEMPERER

Klemperer was a true representative of the dream of so many Jews, ever since the Jewish Emancipation was promoted in Germany by Moses Mendelssohn at the end of the 18th century, to be accepted by the German society.

This had also been the dream of his parents, for whom he was the ninth and last child. As emigrants from the Prague ghetto, they settled down in Breslau, now Wroclaw (Poland), where his father, Wilhelm Klemperer, earned a doctorate in Jewish philosophy and theology. He became a rabbi, initially in small communities and ultimately at the Reformist Synagogue in Berlin. It is therefore not entirely surprising that three of his four sons converted to Lutheranism, taking into account that the Reformist ritual was relatively close to Lutheranism. His four daughters did not have enough autonomy for attitudes of this kind. Nevertheless, Klemperer’s mother is known to have been fairly advanced for her times as far as her Bildung (cultural education) was concerned. The whole family had the burning wish to be a part of the German society. They craved a kind of Jewish-German syncretism, associated with the concept of Bildung expressed by the German Jewish poets and writers Heinrich Heine (1797-1856) and Berthold Auerbach (1812-1882). According to George Lachmann Mosse (1918-2001), the German Jews’ search for Bildung was related to a search for a personal identity beyond the boundaries of religion and nationality.5

The new ways of thinking about and organizing society represented a rupture with the traditional Jewish concept of a “nation in exile,” insofar as they would make it possible to include the Jews in the German nation. Berthold Auerbach used to say that “the old religious life started from Revelation, whereas the new one would start from Bildung.”

Victor Klemperer had a strong connection to the spirit of the French Revolution, the Century of Lights, and the ideas of liberté, égalité, fraternité, which led his professional life toward the Latin letters, of which he became a full professor at the University of Dresden in 1920. He lost this position in 1935 upon the advent of the anti-Jewish Nuremberg Laws. Given his domestic environment, which was devoted to modernity and primarily oriented toward the aforementioned concept of Bildung, Klemperer avoided any contact with National Socialism, with its retrograde and racist mentality. He saw it as an exogenous epidemic that would be unable to survive in “his” Germany. Nazism was a perfect combination of a diabolical rationality at the service of the utmost irrationality.

National Socialism grew stronger and stronger before people’s very eyes, at the same time as it promoted the full-scale destruction of the incipient yet already decadent Weimar Republic. A great part of the German population did not accept the Weimar Republic, as they were nostalgic for the power of the Empire and the assumed protection of the Kaiser. Even after reading Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf, Klemperer was unable to believe that “his” Germany would let itself be infected by the virus of fascist totalitarianism. In his posthumous book Geschichte eines Deutschen,6 Sebastian Haffner explains that it was inevitable that some false messiahs would appear at the height of German hyper-

6 Sebastian Haffner, Geschichte eines Deutschen (A German’s Story), 8th ed. (München, Deutsche Verlags Anstalt 2001).
inflation. Hitler was only one of them. That explains why he was initially not taken seriously when Mein Kampf, the only book he ever wrote, was published in 1925, exposing his racist and antisemitic way of thinking.

The foundations of nationalist, racist, and totalitarian thinking aimed at preserving the “purity of Northern Aryan blood” against the “Jewish Bolshevist democratic internationalism” date back to this period, which marked the beginning of the struggle between the Übermensch (the Aryan) and the Untermensch (the inferior Jew).

Klemperer and his wife Eva Schlemmer, a Lutheran pianist, chose not to leave Germany despite the increasing Nazi influence. A great number of university professors joined Hitlerism. Klemperer’s professional environment became extremely dark. His brother George, a famous doctor, and his cousin Otto, the famous maestro, emigrated from Germany to the United States in the early 1930s, while Victor Klemperer was eventually forced into confinement at Dresden during the twelve years of terror from 1933 to 1945. He was first allowed to stay in his home, but from 1940 onward he had to stay in one of the three well-known Judenhäuser (Jews’ houses). He stayed there until February 1945, when Dresden was bombed by the Allies, which miraculously and paradoxically made it easier for the Klemperers to escape. They therefore survived the Shoah, just like his “Diaries,” which had been hidden thanks to his wife’s courage. She had entrusted them for safekeeping to the equally brave Dr. Annemarie Köhler, a doctor with whom they were friends.

According to Peter Gay, Klemperer is one of the most important German diarists. His notes on the Nazi period are one of the fundamental documents of the testimonial literature, as Elie Wiesel described it. In the immediate aftermath of the war, he was asked by a Dresden editor to publish them, yet he chose to write a new book in which he would present testimony on everything he had experienced from the viewpoint of the professor, the educator, the sociopolitical analyst, the philologist, the etymologist, the historian, the thinker, the philosopher, the Jew persecuted by racism, and, finally, the “survivor.” Klemperer was aware of the fact that this book would be the first step in his attempt to understand what this terrible, malignant phenomenon called Nazism had been. His basic question was whether the roots of Nazism could have been truly German, as shown by his analysis in Chapter 21: “German Roots” of the book.

He also wondered about the role of fanaticism and the fundamental role played by the Jews with regard to Nazism, as he explains in Chapter 26: “The Jewish War”:

The Jew is the most important person in Hitler’s state: he is the best known Turk’s head of folk history and the popular scapegoat, the most plausible adversary, the most obvious common denominator, the most likely brackets around the most diverse of factors. Had the Führer really achieved his aim of exterminating all the Jews, he would have had to invent new ones, because without the Jewish devil — “anyone who doesn’t know the Jew doesn’t know the devil” — without the swarthy Jew, there would never have been the radiant figure of the Nordic Teuton.7

Klemperer’s “Diaries” were only published after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1995. The book Klemperer published in Berlin in 1947, LTI—Lingua Tertii Imperii: Notizbuch eines Philologen, based on his “Diaries” written during the Nazi period, attracted little

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7 Klemperer, LTI, supra note 2, at p. 274.
interest. The survivors were concerned with finding food and getting a roof over their heads, as well as with finding their scattered relatives and retrieving their former jobs. But there was actually much more at stake. Nobody wanted to hear about the atrocities that had been committed, let alone in the form of a book. Everybody wanted to hide from the facts and deny their participation.

There were people who came to Klemperer to ask him for a letter stating that they had not taken part in anything, so that they could regain their place in society. He refused them all. If everybody denied their participation in the whole tragedy, then who had been the executioners?

Had he only published his “Diaries,” there would have been even less interest. While he was writing them, he never knew if he would still be alive the next day. Most of the people who belonged to Klemperer and his wife’s circle succumbed, either in the extermination camps or by suicide. Klemperer’s “Diaries” are among the most tragic books ever written. Besides hunger, illnesses, deportations, and murders, they show the cynicism and cruelty of the Nazi regime toward the Jews, the few remaining opponents of the regime, and some Catholic priests. It is frightening. There were cases, for instance, when the authorities sent an explanation for the death of one of the inhabitants of a Judenhaus in a camp, along with a small funeral urn, stating that the cause of death was an MI (myocardial infarction). Klemperer wrote that they would even allow burials, with the recital of kaddish and a sermon, but not without countless cynical acts. As the number of deaths increased during the war, the urns were no longer sent.

3. THE IMPORTANCE OF KLEMPERER’S NOTES

The analysis of Nazi speech in Victor Klemperer’s LTI is fundamental to our understanding of how totalitarianism is imposed on people, because it is an in-depth study of the fascist mental structure. It starts with an examination of how the German language was manipulated by those in power between 1933 and 1945. Many researchers of the National Socialist period have used LTI in their work, including the German writer Martin Walser (1927), the French historian Jean-Pierre Faye (1925), Professor Steve E. Aschheim of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, George L. Mosse (1918-2001), Ritchie Robertson of Oxford University, Renato Lessa of Rio de Janeiro, Paola Traverso of the Free University of Berlin, and others. They all regard Klemperer as the pioneer of the study of totalitarian language. To Aschheim, for example, Hannah Arendt’s Men in Dark Times would have been immeasurably enriched by Klemperer’s LTI, which appeared in 1947. As to why this was not in fact the case, he provides the answer himself: Hannah Arendt did not know Victor Klemperer.

Anne Frank’s diary and Klemperer’s “Diaries” and LTI are different to other testimonial literature, because they were written outside the concentration camps. This kind of narrative presents other perspectives on the true life of Jews in an urban environment. For instance, the Klemperers were able to stay together, in contrast to most survivors of the extermination camps, who lost all their loved ones. The tragic end of Anne Frank is

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10 Ibid., p. 71.
not in her diary. Another statement by Aschheim, quoting the work of Paola Traverso, argues that Klemperer’s *LTI* and “Diaries” are read so much because they provide the reader with a happy ending, since the couple ultimately survived.

To write *LTI*, Klemperer deconstructed the new language of Nazism. He sensed from the beginning of the Nazi regime that the German language was undergoing a change and named it *lingua tertii imperii* — the language of the Third Reich. He discovered that it was a manipulated language, aimed at preventing the population from thinking for itself, as those who think do not let others manipulate them. He thus got to the heart of the language manipulation developed by Goebbels, the Nazi propaganda minister. It was a language very poor in vocabulary and content, due to the use of vulgarizing commonplaces that erased the subtleties and complexity of culture. It was meant to reduce the capacity to think and prevent critical analysis. The spoken and written language were very similar to each other, always formulated in a declamatory, artificial, and easily memorized style, devoid of any ethics. While working on this mental impoverishment, Goebbels also targeted the innermost essence of any human being: faith. He went to great efforts to influence people to surrender — body and soul — to the totalitarian regime that would provide them with all they might need by worshipping Hitler, the *Führer*. Goebbels used every available method to convince the population, including the Nazi party's newspaper, radio broadcasts, speeches, military exhibitions, and parades, as well as the terror of constant murders and arrests — a diabolical combination of seduction and coercion.

Whether or not the roots of Nazism are typically German is another question that permeates the entire book. Klemperer considers this issue at length. Irrationalism leads to the destruction of reason. It is the perfect combination of a diabolic rationality at the service of the utmost irrationality. In Chapter 21: “German Roots,” he indulges in blunt auto-criticism:

> How was the terrible disparity possible between contemporary Germany and every single period of Germany’s past? I had always found the *traits éternels*, the abiding features of a national character of which the French speak, to be born out in practice, or at least that’s what I believed, and I had always stressed them in my own work. Was it all wrong? Was there any intellectual connection between the Germans of the Age of Goethe and the people who supported Adolf Hitler?  

4. **German Antisemitism**

With the rise of the Bavarian Illuminati in the late 18th and early 19th century, more and more demonstrations of antisemitism began to occur in Germany. After the Napoleonic wars and those conducted by Bismarck, after poor crops and other adverse events in the German economy, antisemitism gained currency. The Jews had entered the labor market, the universities, and the most cultivated and competitive circles of society. By the end of the 19th century, the German antisemitic party was founded. Heinrich von Treitschke, a prestigious history professor at the University of Berlin, a prominent

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12 Ibid., p. 129.
antisemite, and the author of the famous sentence “die Juden sind unser Unglück” (the Jews are our misfortune), was a major disseminator of antisemitism. In 1893, the Centralverein Deutscher Staatsbürger Jüdischen Glaubens, a Jewish association for the defense of the Jews’ civil rights, was founded in Berlin, and branches were later established in several other German cities. During its entire existence, until the Kristallnacht of November 1938, the members of the Centralverein were able to have more than 500 people arrested for having committed antisemitic acts. The strengthening of antisemitism, the rise of ultra-rightist parties, and exacerbated nationalism all began after Germany lost World War I. The confluence of all these negative factors deserves a whole separate study.

Klemperer’s importance has grown in the years leading up to the 50th anniversary of his death in 1960. In August 2010, a conference entitled “Le langage totalitaire d’hier à aujourd’hui. En hommage à Victor Klemperer” was held in his honor in Normandy (France), in the presence of the renowned historian Jean-Pierre Faye, the author of Totalitarian Languages and other works.

5. THE EUPHEMISMS

Much has already been written about the euphemisms created by the senior hierarchy of the Nazi regime. Klemperer exposed many of these half-truths. He wrote not only about these euphemisms but also about the ability to generate preconceptions, create stigmas, and turn into normal what is abnormal and inhuman. In LTI, for example, he analyses the stigma created by the obligation for Jews to add the names “Sara” or “Israel” to their names, the stigma of the “yellow star,” which isolated the Jews from the rest of the population, the boycott against Jewish businesses, and the cities “sanitized” of Jews, with signs announcing that a particular place, park bench, or building was judenrein (Jew-free). Klemperer comments on how the population started to see this procedure as “normal.” Persons who were unaware of his Jewish origins came to him to declare the “disgust” they felt for Jews.

Klemperer’s notes on euphemisms and paraphrases give his book a special significance. In recognition of that fact, Professor Hannes Heer of Hamburg University produced Im Herzen der Finsternis (In the Heart of Darkness), a book in which eleven professors comment on interesting paraphrases noted by Klemperer and quoted by those who studied his work. In this book, the authors make special mention of the comments of Professor David Bankier, who was also a Klemperer scholar.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, all the literature of the former DDR (German Democratic Republic) surfaced. This included Klemperer’s two books, which caused an actual frenzy upon their (re)launch. During a visit to Sao Paulo in 2002, David Bankier, then Director of the Yad Vashem International Research Institute, explained that people wanted to read Klemperer because he mentioned all those who helped him and his wife. This is in addition to the fact that, as Leopold von Ranke wrote, he told everything as it actually happened (“wie es eigentlich gewesen”).

George Steiner, another linguist, wrote the following about Victor Klemperer’s LTI:

The [Nazi] language no longer stimulates thinking, but confuses it. Instead of charging each expression with the greatest available energy and lack of circumlocutions, it loosens and disperses the intensity of sentiment. The language ceases to be an adventure (and a living language is the greatest adventure the human brain is capable of). In summary, the language is no longer experienced; it is only spoken.

…

As I republish this essay, I do it also because I believe in the validity of its argument. When I wrote it, I did not know Victor Klemperer’s remarkable book “Notes of a philologist”, published in East Berlin in 1947. … In a much more detailed way than I did, Klemperer, a professional linguist, outlines the submission of German to the Nazi slang and the linguistic-historical priors of this submission.

6. **FINAL CONSIDERATIONS**

After the Nazi experience, Klemperer’s attitude changed. He realized that he had also been a German with a feeling of national superiority. As he used to say, he believed in the *traits éternels* (eternal features) of each people. However, experiencing and surviving racial prejudice showed him how wrong this was.
Antisemitic Anti-Zionism Within the German Left—Die Linke

Sebastian Voigt*

1. INTRODUCTION

This essay analyzes the antisemitic anti-Zionism of the radical left in Germany and focuses mainly on the far left party Die Linke.¹ For several years, Die Linke has played an increasingly large role within the German political spectrum. The party was founded in 2007 as a result of the fusion of two other parties: the successor of the Eastern German Communist Party (SED) and the Election Alternative for Social Justice (WASG), a group of disgruntled social democrats and labor unionists who had split from the moderate left-wing Social Democratic Party (SPD). Currently, Die Linke is a hodgepodge of different, sometimes contradictory political ideologies ranging from orthodox Stalinists to moderate reformers. The evolution and composition of the party is thus hard to predict. Still, one thing is certain: Die Linke has become a major player in German politics and has a strong influence on the European left in general. In Germany’s last parliamentary elections in 2009, it gained 12 percent of the vote. In addition, it is the fourth strongest party in the Bundestag—Germany’s federal parliament. Several of its members hold seats in the European Parliament. At the present, it is the most important party in the European Left, an association of leftist parties in the European Union.² Die Linke is represented in 13 of Germany’s 16 state parliaments and is part of the governing coalitions in two states, including Berlin. In elections held during the past two years, Die Linke increased its share of the vote to 28 percent in the Eastern states of Germany (former GDR) and to an impressive 20 percent in some Western parts of Germany. This information is crucial to understanding the relevance of the following analysis.

2. OVERVIEW OF KEY DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE GERMAN LEFT SINCE REUNIFICATION: THE EMERGENCE OF A LEFTIST PRO-ISRAEL POSITION

Recently, a small but audible segment of the German left has started to consider criticism of antisemitism—and equally of anti-Zionism and anti-Americanism—as central to

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² See: <http://www.european-left.org> (last visited September 30, 2010).
the renewal of a progressive view of modern society. This includes support of Israel, which is in direct opposition to the position of the mainstream left.3

The emergence of a pro-Israel left is connected to developments in German society since reunification in 1990. The debate within the left should be regarded as a result of the profound political changes that took place at this time. Reunification was seen by many leftists as a reversal of the outcome of the Second World War. The reunification of Germany coincided with a wave of pogroms and racist attacks against foreigners, asylum seekers, and Jews. This led to fears of a “Fourth Reich” and the re-emergence of German imperialism. In retrospect, these fears were completely unfounded. Nevertheless, they were a direct consequence of a decisive rupture in German and European history. The decline of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War caused the world view of many leftists to collapse, even if they had never supported Soviet-style communism. The apparent victory of capitalism and of liberal democracy turned the established ideology of leftist thinking on its head and caused a fundamental disorientation.

At the time, a debate about the history of the left and its mistakes slowly started to emerge, and a small segment of the German left began to deal self-critically with anti-Zionism, anti-imperialism, and its relationship with the State of Israel. Several leftist magazines even supported the second Gulf War in 1990-1991.4 More members of the left supported the war against the Taliban after 9/11, and some unexpectedly supported the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship in Iraq in 2003.5

3. THE BAK SHALOM GROUP

These changes within left-leaning groups did not fundamentally affect Die Linke until 2007, when a group called BAK Shalom was founded with the purpose of exposing and combating antisemitism, anti-Zionism, anti-Americanism, and what was described as regressive anticapitalism within Die Linke.6

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4 The most important leftist magazine at this time was (and still is) konkret, which featured a long and difficult debate about the Second Gulf War. Some authors supported the war, which led to the loss of half the readership. See the homepage of konkret at: <http://www.konkret-verlage.de/kvv/kvv.php> (last visited September 29, 2010). There was also an extensive debate in the left in general. See, for example, Klaus Schönberger and Claus Köstler, Der freie Westen, der vernünftige Krieg, seine linken Liebhaber und ihr okzidentaler Rassismus oder wie die Herrschaft der neuen Weltordnung in den Köpfen begann (Grafenau: Trotzdem-Verlag, 1992).


Although I have never been a member of Die Linke, I have been in touch with many of its members. In addition, I once received a scholarship from the Rosa-Luxemburg-Foundation, which is closely linked to Die Linke. I was myself a founding member of BAK Shalom and have written articles and given talks about antisemitism and anti-Americanism. As a result, I was accused of being an agent of imperialism and called a Zionist traitor and a neo-liberal racist. Nevertheless, BAK Shalom managed to make this discussion, which had been going on for several years, a part of the overall framework of Die Linke. BAK Shalom received considerable media attention and for some time I was so optimistic that I believed it might be possible to substantially influence the political discourse within Die Linke. Unfortunately this was not to be. I was obviously too optimistic or may have been too naive—as I was often told from the very outset.

4. THE CORE IDEOLOGY OF DIE LINKE

The predominant fundamentalist ideology of Die Linke is anti-imperialist, adamantly opposed to the existence of Israel, and both overtly and covertly antisemitic. The most recent evidence of this ideology was revealed during the confrontation on the Mavi Marmara on May 31, 2010, when a commando of the Israeli Defense Forces stormed the ship after the captain refused to comply with the instructions of the Israeli navy. Nine people were killed in the ensuing struggle. Two current and one former member of the German Bundestag were on board the Mavi Marmara. All are members of Die Linke: Norman Paech, Annette Groth, and Inge Höger. They were arrested by the Israeli army but were released shortly thereafter.

It is noteworthy to look at what happened when they returned to Germany. They were not taken to task by Die Linke for cooperating with an organization with suspected terrorist links. Neither did they have to justify their support for radical Islamists who are well known to be reactionary to the very core and blatantly trample on the most basic human rights—especially women’s rights. Instead, the chairwoman of Die Linke, Gesine Lötzsch, expressed pride in their so-called mission. The only voice from within Die Linke that criticized the actions of her colleagues was Petra Pau, vice-president of the German parliament. She subsequently faced a storm of criticism from within Die Linke.

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11 Petra Pau wrote an open letter to the Jewish Community in Bremen and criticized the members of Die Linke who were on board the ship. See: <http://www.swr.de/report/-/id=6636856/property=download/nid=233454/mvqbrq/index.pdf> (last visited September 29, 2010).
The above-mentioned three politicians referred to themselves as “survivors of the Israeli massacre” and went on a propaganda tour of various German cities in order to tell the story of their heroism firsthand. During one of those events, Norman Paech, a former member of parliament and retired professor of law, went so far as to suggest that the next Gaza freedom flotilla should be accompanied by the German maritime forces that patrol the Lebanese border. If this request were to be carried out, it would amount to using the German military against Israel. The audience roared loudly in response to this suggestion, and one member of the audience was so fired up that he expressed his desire to hit the fascist State of Israel next time. Norman Paech called that “an idea.”

It needs to be emphasized that this scandalous response was made by a former member of the German parliament and former foreign policy expert of a legitimate German party that is represented in the Bundestag.

Alas, statements like these are merely the culmination of a process that has been in the works for some time. In 2006, for example, Wolfgang Gehrcke, a member of the Bundestag for Die Linke, wanted to invite representatives of Hamas to a conference. However, they were denied entry visas to Germany. Many members of Die Linke regard Hamas as the legitimate, democratically elected government of the Palestinians. The organization’s ideology and highly undemocratic structure does not raise a red flag within Die Linke, which conveniently ignores the virulent antisemitism of Hamas.

During the Lebanon War in 2006, Christine Buchholz, a hardcore member of Die Linke and currently a member of the Bundestag, referred to Israel and the United States as warmongering countries, adding: “Hezbollah represents, along with the peace movement in Israel and the international antiwar movement, the opposite side in the conflict. This is also the side that I am on.” Buchholz then went on to describe the “demonization” of Hezbollah as one of the most egregious prejudices expressed by the media during the war. For a politician of the left to say that she sides with a terrorist organization such as Hezbollah is almost beyond belief, but it also constitutes irrefutable proof of a very crucial shift in leftist politics and ideology.

5. THE UNDERLYING REASONS FOR THE LEFT’S HATRED OF ISRAEL

There are several explanations for the left’s bottomless hatred of Israel. One key factor is anti-imperialism, which is informed by a dichotomous view of the world. According to

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12 This “event” was recorded by radio journalists of the independent station Freies Sender Kombinat (FSK) in Hamburg. Afterwards, they produced a 60-minute radio program entitled: Wie antisemitisch ist die Linkspartei? (How antisemitic is the Left Party?). The program can be listened to online at: <http://www.freie-radios.net/portal/content.php?id=35000> (last visited September 29, 2010).


14 The quote in German is: “Auf der anderen Seite stehen in diesem Konflikt die Hisbollah, die Friedensbewegung in Israel und die internationale Antikriegsbewegung. Das ist die Seite, auf der auch ich stehe.” Interview with Christine Buchholz by Rüdiger Göbel, “Im Krieg muss sich die Linke positionieren. Die Dämonisierung der Hisbollah ist Teil der Kriegsführung,” Junge Welt, August 15, 2008. It is available online at: <http://www.achse-des-friedens.de/aktionen_lk05.htm> (last visited September 29, 2010).
this world view, the world and society are split into two opposing groups: one group
wants peace and the other group wants to pursue imperialism. In other words, there is
an exploiting First World and an exploited Third World. This is as simplistic a concept of
the complexity of modern societies as one could possibly imagine. It inevitably leads to
the personification of social relations, which makes it easy to pinpoint the persons
responsible for exploitation and oppression. This encourages all those who refuse to use
knowledge and rationality to understand the complex world we live in to entertain wild
conspiracy theories. On the basis of old, deeply entrenched prejudices, Jews are per-
ceived as those pulling the strings, while Israel is seen as the spearhead of Western
imperialism in the Middle East and as an artificial state that is a foreign object in the

6. \textsc{Orthodox Communist Ideology}

The anti-Israel ideology of \textit{Die Linke} has two roots. The first one is the communist
ideology and politics of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The GDR was not an
antisemitic country per se, although it mounted several anti-Zionist campaigns that
made ample use of antisemitic stereotypes. The so-called Merker trial in the mid 1950s,
during which Paul Merker and other leading members of the Communist Party were
convicted of having collaborated with Israel and the United States—the imperialistic
archenemies—is but one example. The GDR considered itself to be an anti-fascist state
and engaged in the self-righteous self-deception of having eliminated the roots of
fascism by nationalizing heavy industry and expropriating the reactionary Prussian
landowners.\footnote{See the monumental work by Jeffrey Herf, \textit{Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 69-105.} The hegemonic notion of fascism in the GDR stemmed from the orthodox
communist view, as expressed by Georgi Dimitrov in the mid 1930s. Fascism in power,
his said, is “the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic,

If fascism is regarded as the supreme form of capitalistic dictatorship, the antisemitic
ideology has to be put on the back burner. Antisemitism was not recognized as the core
of Nazi ideology but as a means of distraction employed by the ruling class to divide the
proletariat. Auschwitz and the annihilation of the European Jews was not recognized as
a rupture in civilization itself, as Dan Diner has pointed out.\footnote{Dan Diner (ed.), \textit{Zivilisationsbruch. Denken nach Auschwitz} (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Verlag, 1996).}
tries of Eastern Europe, Jews were not acknowledged as a distinct group of victims. Instead, communists and antifascist resistance fighters were the most important people to be memorialized. As a result of this delusion, adequate research of the Holocaust never took place. In addition, the GDR did not see any reason to normalize relations with Israel and rejected all claims for compensation by Holocaust survivors. After 1945, the continued existence of antisemitism, which was very much alive in a large part of the population, was never addressed or dealt with because—according to the ideology of orthodox communism—the socialist nations were seen as the true winners of history bringing progress to the world.

Besides the historical context of the Cold War and the strong relations between the Soviet bloc and the Arab states, this ideology played a major role in explaining the undiluted ferocity of anti-Zionism and the enduring comparison and equation of Israel with Nazi Germany in the GDR. This was not a legitimate form of political criticism but a fierce form of antisemitic anti-Zionism.19 To this day, this pernicious hatred of Israel deriving from orthodox communist ideology is alive and well in a large part of Die Linke.

7. THE ANTI-ZIONISM OF THE WEST GERMAN LEFT

The other justification of hatred of Israel in Die Linke is to be found in the history of the radical left in West Germany. Its relations with Israel differs from those of the GDR. Until the Six-Day War, the majority of leftists in West Germany had a pro-Israel attitude. However, the tremendous historical shift that followed this decisive war unleashed a fierce hatred of the Jewish state, which in turn became an integral part of the left’s identity. This hatred has all the attributes of a pathological aversion. Israel was no longer regarded as a socialist experiment, with its kibbutzim and its egalitarian ethos, but as a country of oppressors—by no one less than the recent murderous persecutors of the Jews. It was henceforth referred to as a racist, occupying power that deprived the Palestinians of their human rights and their national homeland.20 This hostility toward Israel can only be understood in the context of the widespread romanticization of revolution itself. Since Western democracies had given up on revolutions and since the proletariat that was supposed to be the carrier of the revolutionary banner was ignorant of its historical obligation, the longing for a revolution had to be transferred to the Third World. The ideology of tiermondisme was on the rise, and the left began to support all kinds of national liberation movements in the Third World as a redirection activity, an alternative for what was missing under their very own noses. Some groups even supported the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, but the Palestinians became the main object of solidarity. Their terror attacks were justified as the actions of an oppressed underdog fighting a powerful enemy. The Palestinians fitted neatly into the leftist cult of the noble guerrilla. Leftist radical groups like the Rote Armee Fraktion even received military training in Palestinian camps. Leftist West German groups went so far as to commit antisemitic crimes. On November 9, 1969, the thirty-first anniversary


of the Night of Pogroms (Kristallnacht) of 1938, a group called Tupamaros West-Berlin planted a bomb in front of the Jewish Community Center in Berlin and justified this attack as a necessary response to the so-called “fascist” crimes of the Zionists and as an expression of solidarity with the fighting fedayeen as the avant-garde of worldwide revolution.\footnote{See Wolfgang Kraushaar, \textit{Die Bombe im jüdischen Gemeindehaus} (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2005).}

8. SECONDARY ANSEMITISM

In addition to the above-mentioned explanations, it is obvious that neither East nor West Germany can be compared to other countries. When all is said and done, the fact remains that contemporary Germany is the successor to Nazi Germany. Thus, another feature has to be added to the leftist hostility toward Israel in order to explain this particular brand of anti-Zionist antisemitism.\footnote{See Lars Rensmann, \textit{Kritische Theorie über den Antisemitismus: Studien zu Struktur, Erklärungspotential und Aktualität} (Hamburg: Argument Verlag, 2001), pp. 231-287. See also Samuel Salzborn, \textit{Antisemitismus als negative Leitidee der Moderne: Sozialwissenschaftliche Theorien im Vergleich} (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus Verlag, 2010), pp. 317-342.}

After 1945, the official expression of traditional antisemitism became taboo in both Germanys. Unofficially, however, antisemitism was expressed both overtly and covertly without restraint. In the following decades, the ever-present antisemitic resentment had to find a different venue to express itself. After the Holocaust, every Jew personified the crimes committed by Nazi Germany. Jews were perceived as an obstacle to the development of a national identity and a positive identification with Germany and its history. Jews were seen as permanent accusers who perpetuated Germany’s bad conscience and exploited German guilt by demanding reparations. This antisemitism is perfectly expressed in the following paradoxical statement: the Germans will never forgive the Jews for Auschwitz.\footnote{This is how the Journalist Henryk M. Broder put it. See Henryk M. Broder, \textit{Der Ewige Antisemit. Über Sinn und Funktion eines beständigen Gefühls} (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Verlag, 1986), p. 125. See also Andrei S. Markovits, “A New (or Perhaps Revived) ‘Uninhibitedness’ toward Jews in Germany,” \textit{Jewish Political Studies Review} 18:1-2 (Spring 2006), available at: <http://www.jcpa.org/phas/phas-markovits-s06.htm> (last visited September 30, 2010).} This bizarre and twisted thinking eventually resulted in the externalization of German guilt. Nazis were consequently seen everywhere, but most specifically in Israel. In due course, Jews were—and continue to be—accused of having learned nothing from the Holocaust and acting like Nazis. On the other hand, Palestinians are regarded as the new Jews, the victims of the former victims. By demonizing and “Nazifying” Israel and opposing its existence, German leftists are able to construct an anti-fascist continuity for themselves and fight the anti-fascist battle that their Nazi parents and grandparents never fought.

The advantage of this secondary antisemitism to German leftists can be observed on an individual, psychological level (in West Germany) as well as on a collective level (in East Germany). The defamation of Israel as a fascist country and Zionism as a fascist ideology conveniently strengthens the anti-fascist self-deception. Because antisemitism was never recognized for the core evil that it was, and because fascism was merely seen as a different kind of capitalistic oppression, the Holocaust was not recognized as the
worst genocide ever committed in the history of all of humanity and consequently lost its abominable horror.

The most common example of current manifestations of secondary antisemitism is anti-Zionism. Although these ideologies are not identical, they overlap to a large extent. According to Léon Poliakov, Israel has become the Jew among the nations; it serves as the collective Jew.\textsuperscript{24} This antisemitic anti-Zionism is not exclusive to the German left but expresses itself in Germany in a highly unadulterated form.

9. IGNORANCE ABOUT IDEOLOGY AND THE INFORMAL LEFTIST-JIHADIST ALLIANCE

Ignorance concerning the destructive power of ideologies seems to be a particular blind spot of the leftist world view. This critical blind spot is repeated in the leftist attitude toward Islamism. It is also evident in \textit{Die Linke} and has grown in significance during the past few years. In previous decades, the German left supported various so-called national liberation movements but mainly secular ones. It supported the PLO and the PFLP but nowadays supports Hamas—a fanatically religious and oppressive organization.

This development was recently labeled the leftist-jihadist “Querfront” (cross-front) by the German Journalist, Ivo Bozic.\textsuperscript{25} Some parts of \textit{Die Linke} openly proclaim their collaboration with radical Islamic groups against the United States and Israel. Asked how they could have cooperated with radical Islamic organizations and fascist groups, the parliamentarian members of \textit{Die Linke} either claimed that they did not know who had organized the Gaza freedom flotilla or baldly denied that fascist or Islamist groups had indeed participated. Under a highly benign interpretation, one might consider such behavior naive. However, it is much more probable that these collaborators with radical Islamists know exactly what they are doing.

A certain convergence of orthodox leftist and Islamist ideology is obvious. Both share an anti-imperialist ideology, a deep hatred of Israel and the United States, and a dystopian yearning for a simple, pre-modern world. Both ideologies also reject globalization and financial capital as a symbol of the exploitative capitalist society. Both tend to simplify the complexity of the modern world into a clear-cut, black and white paradigm without shades of gray. Both feel morally superior and self-righteous and delude themselves in thinking that they are fighting for a higher cause and that they are always on the side of the global underdog and the oppressed masses. At the global level, the leftist-jihadist collaboration manifests itself in the alliance of Venezuela and Iran: the self-proclaimed socialist paradise of the twenty-first century and the reactionary dictatorship of the mullahs.

10. CONCLUSION

\textit{Die Linke} cannot and must not be dismissed as an irrelevant radical fringe on the left of the German political spectrum. That would be the height of irresponsibility. Because it

\textsuperscript{24} On the relationship between anti-Zionism and antisemitism, see Léon Poliakov, \textit{Vom Antizionismus zum Antisemitismus} (Freiburg: ça ira Verlag, 1992).

does not operate under the same political restrictions as the mainstream political parties, Die Linke often expresses widespread anger and hatred toward Israel more openly than those parties. The many examples of antisemitic anti-Zionism involving politicians of all parties are shocking, but only parliamentary members of Die Linke could participate in the Gaza freedom flotilla and still be supported by their party leadership. In no other party is the left's ingrained hatred of Israel as rampant.

In regard to Israel and the conflict in the Middle East, Die Linke may appear to be the avant-garde of German society. I hope that this is an overly pessimistic interpretation, and I would gladly be proven wrong in this regard. Still, I fear that my presumptions are not totally over the top. This is illustrated by the following incident that took place shortly after the incident involving the Mavi Marmara, namely when the German Secretary for Development, Dirk Niebel, was refused entry into the Gaza strip by the Israeli authorities. Even though it is widely known that Israel prohibits official visits by foreign dignitaries to Gaza so as not to legitimize the Hamas government, the German Bundestag passed an unanimous resolution condemning Israel’s actions, including the blockade of the Gaza Strip. Even conservative politicians who are in general considered to be pro-Israel praised Die Linke for its opposition to the blockade. This resolution serves as proof that all German political parties presented a united front against Israel. Needless to say, this new and alarming development undeniably strengthened Hamas.

Finally, it is important to note that the debate within Die Linke is not yet over and done with. The organization’s ultimate direction will be crucial for people on the left not only in Germany but also throughout Europe.

26 For a profound analysis of antisemitism in the political culture in Germany, see Lars Rensmann, Demokratie und Judenbild. Antisemitismus in der politischen Kultur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaft, 2004).
27 For the precise wording of the petition dating from June 30, 2010, see: <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/023/1702328.pdf> (last visited September 30, 2010).
28 A parliamentarian from the conservative CDU, Philipp Missfelder, praised the hardcore leftist member of Die Linke, Wolfgang Gehrcke, for sharing common ground concerning the Gaza blockade. The original quote in German is: “Selbst wenn in der Aussendarstellung häufig der Eindruck entsteht, dass die Linkspartei grundsätzlich anderer Meinung sei, so glaube ich doch, Herr Gehrcke, dass gerade auch die Wortbeiträge, die Sie schon an verschiedenen Stellen abgegeben haben, keinen Zweifel daran lassen, dass Sie sich auf einem ähnlichen, gemeinsamen Boden befinden, wie wir das tun.” See: <http://philipp-missfelder.com/de/Politik/Reden/70/35_Rede_im_Deutschen_Bundestag/artikel,535,1,1.html> (last visited September 30, 2010).
Two Thousand Years of Antisemitism:
From the Canonical Laws to the Present Day

Anita Waingort Novinsky*

My interest in antisemitism began during long years of studying, researching, and teaching about the Holy Office of the Inquisition and the converted Jews in Portugal and Brazil (New Christians, conversos, marranos, and anussim).

In this paper, I want to ask a question that was formulated a few years ago at a conference in Paris sponsored by the Jules Isaac Association:1 “Antisémitisme—a-t-il encore aujourd’hui des racines chrétiennes?”

One of the conference participants, Alain Finkielkraut, gave a positive answer, but said that we have to understand this question considering its paradox. On the one hand, the Church is today dialoguing with the Jews, but on the other hand present-day anti-Jewish propaganda is repeating the old slogans and defamatory arguments against them.2 Nostra Aetate has abandoned the infamous references to “Jewish deicide” and “treacherous Jews,” but if we compare the language and the vocabulary used by the present antisemites to that used in past centuries, we will still find a strong influence of the Church doctrine against the Jewish people.

Let us go back to the sources.

Reading the canonical laws and analyzing the expressions, opinions, and ideas that appear during the Church councils, we find terms like “abominable Jew,” “impious people,” “hard-hearted,” and “unbelievers.” If we decode the discourse of the language and find the hidden significance of the author’s experience, we will understand that the sense and the defamation message are the same as in the 20th and 21st centuries.

During the Visigothic period (4th and 5th centuries), there was a similar phenomenon to the forced conversion of the Jews to Christianity that occurred in Portugal in 1497. A clandestine Judaism flourished for more than a century in high medieval Spain, and we can compare, in many aspects, this early marranism to crypto-Judaism in the modern era (16th to 18th centuries).3

Izidoro (560-636), the famous Bishop of Seville, can be considered the ideologist for the discrimination against the Jews and one of the most ferocious antisemites of the

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2 Ibid., at pp. 8-13.
3 On the marranos and the Inquisition in Portugal, see M. Kayserling, Historia dos Judeus em Portugal, 2nd ed. (Sao Paulo: Perspectiva 2009), translated from the original German by Gabriela B. Correa da Silva and Anita Waingort Novinsky (Geschichte des Juden in Portugal, 1867).

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Church. His statements anticipated Nazi antisemitism by more than a thousand years. He tried to denigrate the Jewish faith, attacking the most sacred Jewish symbols—the synagogue and the Jewish Sabbath. To the holy place of prayer, the synagogue, he gave a sexual label; the Jewish Sabbath he considered a repulsive holy day, originating from luxurious sins.

Physically, the Jews were characterized as having a “bad smell,” which was a sign of their spiritual deterioration and biological evidence of a gradual dehumanization.

Here we find the same accusation as in Germany in the 20th century, namely that Jews were “worms” and not human beings. Baptism will not help, said the Bishop of Seville, as nothing can change the evil nature of these people, for they are all the anti-christ and carry the forces of Satan.

The accusation that Jews are not human beings may be considered the most extreme example of all the cruel designations that were imposed on the Jews. One thousand one hundred and forty years before the rise of Nazism, Izidoro, together with the high clergy, spread the idea that Jews were different creatures with a different nature and that no human reaction could be expected from such creatures.

Canonical law prohibited intermarriage and sexual intercourse between Christians and Jews. Jews were not permitted to eat together with Christians, to hold public office, to employ Christian servants or have Christian slaves, or to walk in the street during Passover. It was ordered that the Talmud and other Jewish books should be burned, and Christians could not use the services of Jewish doctors (even though all Portuguese kings had Jewish doctors).

From the 13th century onward, Jews were obliged to wear a badge on their clothes and were forbidden to build new synagogues. The Synod of Breslau (1267) imposed compulsory ghettos on the Jews, and at the Council of Basel (1434, session XIX) they were forbidden to obtain academic degrees.

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5 Sancovsky, supra n. 4, at pp. 275-276.

6 Ibid.

7 J. Trachtenberg, The Devil and the Jews. (New Haven: Yale University Press 1943); Sancovsky, supra n. 4, at p. 280, n. 744.

8 Sancovsky, supra n. 4, at p. 282.

9 Synod of Elvira (306).

10 Synod of Clemont (535).

11 Third Synod of Orleans (538).

12 Ibid..

13 Twelfth Synod of Toledo (681).

14 Fourth Lateran Council (1215).

15 Council of Oxford (1222).

16 Sancovsky, supra n. 4, at p. 285.

17 Ibid., at p. 297.
According to the Church, nothing noble could ever originate from the Jews, Christ could never have been a Jew, and not even Isaac could have given birth to the Jewish people.\(^{18}\)

As in Germany in the 20th century, Jews were considered by canonical law as infected and the disseminators of all sickness that existed in the kingdom. Julian, Bishop of Toledo (642 AC), suggested the need for a special prophylactic against the disease spread by the Jews. Sickness was considered by the bishop as a metaphor for the malignity of the Jews.\(^{19}\) The kingdom was divided into healthy and infected parts, exactly as in Spain and Portugal during the inquisitorial centuries and by the Germans during Nazism.

The Visigoths developed the foundation for the future demonization of the Jews. The idea that no conversion could change them because nothing could eradicate the malignity they carried was adopted by the Inquisition in the Iberian countries. And in 1449, in Toledo, professional corporations excluded all descendants of the *conversos*, under the pretext of “impurity of blood” but in reality to eliminate New Christian competition.\(^{20}\)

After having lived in the Portuguese and Spanish Empire for more than 15 centuries, Jews were declared foreigners, and there was no place for them any more. The Holy Office of the Inquisition was officially introduced in Portugal in the year 1536 by the King D. João III, solely due to the existence of converted Jews suspected of being followers of the Jewish faith.\(^{21}\) The Jews were the only people in the world for whom a specific court of justice was established to observe and arrest them. Historians that are not familiar with the inquisitorial documents can never be aware of the extent of the obsession against the Jewish people and the dimensions of the falsehoods spread among the Portuguese population.

The Catholic clergy was mostly responsible for the doctrine of hate that convinced the Portuguese to participate happily in the mass spectacles of burning at the stake of New Christians (*marranos*).\(^{22}\) The inquisitorial agents followed every step of the *conversos* and had the right to arrest them and deliver them to the Inquisition. All assets were immediately confiscated and divided between the Crown and the Church. Other heresies besides Judaism, such as sodomy, bigamy, and witchcraft, gradually also became subject to the Inquisition, but the majority of the trials were connected to crypto-Judaism.

The court of the Inquisition was a political institution that worked together with the Church. For several periods during the 17th century, the governor and the Inquisitor were the same person. Both the Church and the State acted with hypocrisy. The Inquisitors handed down the death sentences, but as the Church could not spill blood the victims were delivered to the King’s functionaries, who killed them.

The portrayal of the *conversos* during the Visigothic period was repeated during the Inquisition and again in the 20th century. Jews were regarded as spies, traitors, and betrayers of their fatherland. If Christians were not alert, in a hundred years the Jews

\(^{18}\) Ibid.

\(^{19}\) On the situation of the Jews in Portugal, see Kayserling, *supra* n. 3.


\(^{21}\) Kayserling, *supra* n. 3.

would occupy all the land. They were regarded as a highly dangerous group that caused a lot of harm because their main purpose was to conquer the world. The same idea was mentioned by the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, published in the Soviet Union in 1897 and still sold today.

All kinds of lies were invented in Portugal as they were during the Visigothic period. Pamphlets and posters were hung on church walls to persuade the population to take up arms against the Jews and eliminate “every Jew dog.” Books were written and published against Jews and conversos in the 17th and 18th centuries in Spain, manuscripts were distributed, sermons were delivered from church pulpits to convince people that the Jews must be blamed for every calamity that had happened. During the Acts of Faith, the long sermons were not directed at the different heresies, against faith and behavior, but mainly at the “Jewish nation.” We must point out that, in practice, the objective was not only the Portuguese crypto-Jewish population but all Jews as a people.

All the discriminatory measures and accusations from the canonical laws were repeated by the Inquisition in the Portuguese kingdom and later by the Nazis: the myth of pure blood (1935), the prohibition to walk in the streets on certain days (1938), the burning of Jewish books (1938), the destruction of synagogues (1938), and the prohibition of relations with Jews (1941).

23 After the Holy Office of the Inquisition was abolished in Portugal (1821), the country took a new direction politically and some of the descendants of the New Christians—poets, intellectuals, and writers—tried to tell the history of the previous dark centuries, with a certain degree of philosemitism. However, the majority of the Portuguese historiography ignored and erased this picture from the Portuguese landscape. It took more than a century for historians to start to research the Inquisition. Some antisemitic works appeared in Portugal at the beginning of the 20th century, and there are still authors today who try to minimize the effects and cruelty of the Holy Office.

During the three centuries of Inquisition activity involving the persecution and extermination of the New Christians, no one cared about their destiny. Not one nation protested against the genocide; not a single voice spoke out officially in favor of the miserable Portuguese Jews. The cultivated conversos, who were able to flee to Holland, wrote beautiful poetry expressing their sympathy and sorrow for the victims, in words and in tears. But besides Menashe ben Israel, who went to England to speak to Cromwell about the readmission of the Portuguese Jews, the world remained silent.

One man in Portugal, a Jesuit, who cannot be forgotten, had the courage to speak in favor of the Jews: Father Antonio Vieira. He went to Pope Innocent XI and asked him to help the innocent people who were burned at the stake in his country. Afterwards, some measures interrupted the court of the Inquisition’s work for a while, but activities soon resumed, and the fire continued to burn for the unfortunate Portuguese conversos.24

There are, nevertheless, some differences between the Inquisition and Nazism that are interesting to consider. The victims of the Inquisition had a name, and the trials lasted for relatively long periods. For months, or even years, the New Christian was


called before the Inquisitorial panel. There was a genealogy; he had a family. The process had a number, but the prisoner was a human being. For the Nazis, the Jew was not human, only a number on his arm and a label on his clothes. And the end of his life was faster, in the gas chambers, compared to the hours at the stake. The Inquisition was punishing a doctrine, an idea, a “weltanschauung” — a crime. For the Nazis there was no specific crime — it was only the “Jew” — and all were guilty, as they all contaminated the soil, the body, and the soul. Even in the Edict of Expulsion of the Jews from Spain (1492), the danger of “contamination” was mentioned. In 1493, Rome was stricken by a heavy leprosy epidemic that was called Pest marranorum. Prophylactic measures were ordered to exterminate the parasites and dangerous bacilli.

At the Conference on Global Antisemitism organized by the International Association for the Study of Antisemitism at Yale University (August 23-25, 2010), I saw a video about the Arab propaganda against the Jews, and I thought how unbelievable it was that, in a changing world like ours, 1,300 years after the Christian medieval councils, we still hear the repetition of the same defamatory concepts, the same accusations, the same lies, the same demonization, and even the same vocabulary.

From the Visigothic Kingdom, via the Inquisition, to Nazism, the defamatory language remains the same, be it anti-Judaism and antisemitism or anti-Israelism and anti-Zionism. The significance, sense, and purpose are the same: the destruction of the Jews.

From the past to the present, new elements have been added to the old inquisitorial and Nazi antisemitism: Israel and Zionism. Even if times have changed and the historical circumstances of the world are different, there are, as the historian Ephraim E. Urbach has also pointed out, certain similarities and parallels.²⁵

The antisemitism that was so widespread in Portugal, a country that was traditionally tolerant, and where the population coexisted amicably for centuries with the Jews, did not start with lower classes. It came from above, from the high clergy and the nobility. In Nazi Germany, the intellectuals were the first adherents of what later emerged as a genocidal regime demonstrating that the major danger to society stems from ideologies adopted by intellectuals.²⁶

The purpose of this paper is not to explain the reason for this long hatred of the Jews, but to show that its Christian roots continued to exist in the Nazi period and similarities can still be found in modernity.

Conversion and assimilation did not help. The Inquisition investigated as far back as seven or eight generations to identify Jews. Nazism only went as far back as the third or fourth generation. The Portuguese and the Germans hated the assimilated Jews more than their orthodox coreligionists.

For Zygmund Bauman, the factors and mechanisms that made the extermination of the Jews possible during Nazism continue to exist. There are reasons to worry, because we live in the same society that made the Holocaust possible.

In the words of Umberto Eco, if the past had not provided the hate and the defamation against the Jews, the Holocaust would never have happened.

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About the Editor

Dr. Charles Asher Small is the founding Director of the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP). He is also the Koret Distinguished Scholar at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. Charles holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from McGill University, Montreal; an M.Sc. in Urban Development Planning in Economics from the Development Planning Unit (DPU), University College London; and a Doctorate of Philosophy (D.Phil.) from St Antony’s College, Oxford. He completed post-doctorate research at the Groupement de recherche ethniciité et société, Université de Montréal, and was the VATAT Research Fellow (Ministry of Higher Education) at Ben Gurion University, Beersheba. Charles has held academic positions in the Department of Sociology at Goldsmiths’ College, University of London; the Department of Geography at Tel Aviv University; and the Institute of Urban Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He was Associate Professor and Director of Urban Studies at Southern Connecticut State University.

In 2006, Charles became the founding Director of the Yale Initiative for the Interdisciplinary Study of Antisemitism (YIISA), the first interdisciplinary research center on antisemitism at a North American university. At Yale he taught in the Political Science Department’s Honors Program on Ethics, Politics, and Economics and created and directed a post-doctorate and graduate studies fellowship program at YIISA. Charles has lectured internationally and has worked as a policy advisor in North America, Europe, Southern Africa, and the Middle East. He specializes in social and cultural theory, globalization and national identity, socio-cultural policy, and racism(s), including antisemitism. As a scholar on antisemitism, Charles has spoken as an expert to eight national parliaments around the world, addressed the United Nations, and been a guest lecturer at top universities in North America, England, Lithuania, Poland, South Africa, Italy, China, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Australia, Israel, and other nations. At present, under his leadership, ISGAP is holding a research seminar series on the interdisciplinary study of antisemitism at Fordham University Lincoln Center Campus, Harvard Law School, McGill University, and Stanford University’s Hoover Institution.