Globalization and “Minority” Cultures
Studies in International Minority and Group Rights

Series Editors

Gudmundur Alfredsson
Kristin Henrard

Advisory Board

Han Entzinger, Professor of Migration and Integration Studies (Sociology), Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands; Baladas Ghoshal, Jawaharlal Nehru University (Peace and Conflict Studies, South and Southeast Asian Studies), New Delhi, India; Michelo Hansungule, Professor of Human Rights Law, University of Pretoria, South Africa; Baogang He, Professor in International Studies (Politics and International Studies), Deakin University, Australia; Joost Herman, Director Network on Humanitarian Assistance the Netherlands, the Netherlands; Will Kymlicka, Professor of Political Philosophy, Queen's University, Kingston, Canada; Ranabir Samaddar, Director, Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group Kolkata, India; Prakash Shah, Senior Lecturer in Law (Legal Pluralism), Queen Mary, University of London, the United Kingdom; Tove Skutnabb-Kangas, Åbo Akademi University, Dept. of Education, Vasa, Finland; Siep Stuurman, Professor of History, Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands; Stefan Wolff, Professor in Security Studies, University of Birmingham, the United Kingdom.

VOLUME 8

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/imgr
Globalization and “Minority” Cultures

The Role of “Minor” Cultural Groups in Shaping Our Global Future

Edited by

Sophie Croisy
## Contents

List of Figures  VIII
List of Contributors  IX

Globalization and “Minority” Cultures

*Introductory Comments*  1
  *Sophie Croisy*

### PART 1
Reconceptualizing the Role of Minority Cultures in a Global Context

*From Anthropophagy to Glocalization*
  *A Hundred Years of Postcolonial Responses to Globalization*  23
  *Jacques Pothier*

*Mondialisation, minoritarité et conscience altéritaire*  31
  *Emir Delic*

*Reflexive Minority Action*
  *Minority Narratives and New European Discourses*  55
  *Tove H. Malloy*

### PART 2
Minority Cultures and “Glocal” Political Resistance: Thinking New Models of Identity and Citizenship

*Indigenous Peoples and National Self-Image in Australia and New Zealand*  77
  *Adrien Rodd*

*Globalization and Resistance*
  *The Tibetan Case*  92
  *Molly Chatalic*
Can the Afghan Diaspora Speak? Diasporic Identity in the Shadow of Human Rights 109
  *Shirin Gul Sadozai and Hina Anwar Ali*

Protecting Minority Population in Europe with European law 122
  *Coralie Fiori-Khayat*

PART 3

Minorities’ Economico-Environmental Struggles

Feudalism and Integration of the Native Peoples of Peru in the Worldwide Economy 141
  *Natividad Ferri Carreres*

Re-Singing the World
  *Indigenous Pedagogies and Global Crisis during Conflicted Times* 160
  *Makere Stewart-Harawira*

Idle No More
  *Indigenous People’s Coordinated Reaction to the Twin Forces of Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism in Canada* 185
  *Ryan Duplassie*

PART 4

Non-Homogeneous Forms of Cultural Development:
The Linguistic Paradigm

Indigenous Languages, Gender and Community Organisation in the Era of Globalization
  *The Case of the Mazatec Women of the Naxi-í in Oaxaca, Mexico* 207
  *Karla Janiré Avilés González and Angela Ixkic Bastian Duarte*

Against the Ethnicisation of Regional Territorial Minorities
  *Contribution from the Basque Experience in France* 224
  *Thomas Pierre*
PART 5
Art as Resistance

Visualizing Development with Identity
   Relational Aesthetics of Indigenous Collaborative Community Art Projects  237
   Pauline Oosterhoff, Arno Peeters and Iris Honderdos

Communication for Social Change in Indigenous Communities;
Limitations of Community Radios and Other Proposals
   Igloolik Isuna Productions  258
   Bianca Rutherford Iglesias and Concepción Travesedo de Castilla

PART 6
Literary Dismantlements of Global/Colonial Domination

L'indianisme au Brésil au travers des traductions, des adaptations et des transpositions en français du poème épique de José de Santa Rita Durão sur la découverte de Bahia
   Caramurú. Poema épico do descobrimento da Bahia (1781)  281
   Alain Vuillemin

Spatiality and the Literature of Globalization  302
   Sze Wei Ang

Tierno Monénembo's ‘Fula’
   Between Distance and Empathy  319
   Roxana Bauduin

Index of Names  329
Index of Subjects  334
### List of Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Overview shot of the installation “The Red, Gold and Green of the Khasi”</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Close-up of the installation “The Red, Gold and Green of the Khasis”</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Khasi farmer women with traditional umbrellas</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4a</td>
<td>Traditional Khasi umbrella in the installation</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4b</td>
<td>Serpent as a threat to Khasi culture</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>“Rooted” installation overview; inscribed sculptures of trees and baskets</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Uwa rangers killed Chelangat Saima and his brother, when they were grazing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>their cattle inside the park boundaries</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Women in the village of Mengya, weaving baskets for the installation</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Uprooted seedlings and children’s drawings</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Contributors

**Sophie Croisy**
received her Ph.D. in contemporary anglophone literature from the University of Florida, USA, in 2006. She is an assistant professor at the University of Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, France, where she teaches American literature, language teaching pedagogy and English for the sciences. Her research is in trauma studies; she focuses specifically on representations of trauma in Native American literature. She is the author of *Other Cultures of Trauma: Meta-metropolitan Narratives and Identities* (2007). She is currently working on a book on the politics of trauma in Louise Erdrich’s most recent fiction.

**Jacques Pothier**
is a professor of American literature at the University of Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, where he is a member of the CHCSC (Centre d’Histoire Culturelle des Sociétés Contemporaines) research group. He is a vice-president of the Institut des Amériques (France). He has published two books, *William Faulkner : essayer de tout dire* (Paris, Belin, 2003) and *Les nouvelles de Flannery O’Connor* (Nantes, France, Le Temps, 2004). His fields of research cover the literature of the South, interactions between the literature and history of the South and Latin-American literature, modernism and post-modernism, literature and the visual arts, the theme of space, the epistemology of American Studies, the role of literature in the construction of ethnic, local or national identities and as privileged field for cultural transfer. He is involved in the edition of the works of William Faulkner in la Pléiade, Gallimard.

**Emir Delic**
is an assistant professor at Saint-Anne University and a researcher associated to the research chair on francophone literatures and cultures in Canada. Emir Delic has a Ph.D. in French literature and critical theory from the University of Ottawa. His research interests are the institutional stakes of minority literatures and the philosophical approaches to the poetics of three genres (the tale, the essay, travel writing). His current research is on the links between identity and otherness in Franco-Canadian literature. His most recent publication is a special issue of the journal *Analyses*, co-directed with Lucie Hotte and Jimmy Thibeault, entitled “Devenir soi avec les autres. Identité et altérité dans les littératures francophones du Canada” (@analyses, vol. 6, no 1, winter 2011 [on line: www.revue-analyses.org]). He is currently working on a book about the global hermeneutics of the “minorized” subjects through a study of their relationship to time.
Tove H. Malloy

is the director of the Danish-German research centre, the European Centre for Minority Issues, based in Flensburg, Germany. She also teaches at the University of Southern Denmark and Flensburg University. She has previously taught at the EU’s Master Programme in Human Rights and Democratisation in Venice, Italy as well as other Master programmes in Europe. She is a political theorist by background specializing in the political and legal aspects of national and ethnic minority rights in international law and international relations, especially in the European context. Her areas of expertise cover the major international organizations, the European Union as well as individual countries. In addition to her academic career, Prof. Malloy has served in the Danish Foreign Service in numerous positions and represented the Danish Government in international fora on post-conflict resolution for Rwanda and Bosnia, transition and development for Albania as well as on indigenous affairs issues. She is currently a member of the Advisory Committee on the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities elected by the Committee of Ministers in respect of Denmark. She is the author of the book, National Minority Rights in Europe (OUP, 2005) as well as numerous articles and chapters about minority issues.

Adrien Rodd

is an assistant professor in British history and contemporary issues at the University of Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines and a member of the CHCSC research group. A former student of the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Cachan, he has the “agrégation” (French highest teaching diploma) in English and in 2010 completed his doctorate on the topic “Britishness and national identity-building in the Commonwealth countries of the Pacific.” His research focuses mainly on identity issues in former British colonies. He has participated in conferences and published a number of articles on the topic, most recently on the issues surrounding indigenous languages in Australia and New Zealand, and on the repercussions in the Pacific of the United Kingdom’s joining the EEC. He lectures on contemporary British society, the British Empire and the Commonwealth, and on historical and contemporary issues in Australia, New Zealand and other Pacific nations.

Molly Chatalic

is an assistant professor at the University of Western Brittany (UBO, France) and a member of the HCTI (Héritages et Constructions dans le Texte et l’Image) research group. She teaches in the Department of Applied Foreign Languages and in the English Department. Her field of research is related to aspects of
American Cultural Studies (feminism, minority groups, counterculture) and Tibet (language, culture, literature). Her book *Le Bouddhisme américain* was published in 2011 (Bordeaux University Press).

**Shirin Gul Sadozai**

lives in Islamabad and is a consultant for the World Bank on the following issues: social protection as a tool for improved public administration and governance, social protection’s role in growth. She is also in charge of designing a qualitative social assessment of cash transfer under the WB current programme. She is also visiting faculty in the Department of Social Sciences at Bahria University, Islamabad, Pakistan where she teaches the following courses: “Introduction to Anthropology” and “Qualitative Research Methods.” She also teaches a graduate course, “Women in development,” at the Fatima Jinnah Women’s University and is an external supervisor for their master’s program in gender studies.

**Hina Anwar Ali**

received her B.B.I.T from Curtin University, Australia. She received her M.A. in Political Science from Punjab University, Lahore. She now lives in Pakistan and is active in youth affairs: she has served as a coordinator for the Youth Alliance for Human Rights. She has also worked as a facilitator with the UNFPA, Pakistan. Involved in various social causes, Hina serves as Secretary General of Society for Welfare Activities, Vice President of Mashal-e-Rah and President of The Awareness Network. Previously, she has worked and been associated with various national and international NGOs which focus on education, human rights advocacy, women empowerment, gender and youth issues. Additionally, she has been the founding lead coordinator of the Indo-Pak Youth Forum For Peace (IPYFP) which aims at fostering peace initiatives, consolidating democracy and good governance, building the capacity of young people within these two countries to understand the nature of conflict, identifying their role and taking positive actions for bridging the gaps by focusing on attitude and behaviour change for peace and conflict management.

**Natividad Ferri Carreres**

received her law degree from the University of Valencia in 1994 and went on to get a master’s degree in fundamental rights and an undergraduate degree in English, both at the University of Caen, France. She teaches at the Ecole de Management in Caen and is currently working on her Ph.D. The title of her dissertation is *Moriscos, indios o españoles? Identidades en el Viejo y el Nuevo*
Mundo. It is a comparative study between two “minor” communities, Moriscos and Indians, which analyzes the relationship between these two communities and the Crown of Castilla in the 15th and 16th centuries.

Coralie Fiori-Khayat
has a Ph.D. in private law from the University of Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, France, and a Ph.D. in English Studies from La Sorbonne, Paris, France. She is an associate member (foreign law practitioner) of the American Bar Association (business law section). She has worked as a translator (French/English/Russian) for tribunals and as a contractual teacher in English and law at the University of Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines and at Paris-Dauphine University. In 2009, she founded “Traduction JEF6CFK,” an independent translation office specialized in law, the economy and finances. She is also a member of the European Society of Criminology.

Makere Stewart-Harawira
Of Maori (Waitaha) and Scots ancestry, she was raised in Aotearoa, New Zealand and has lived in Alberta, Canada for the past 9 years. Prior to her appointment in the Department of Educational Policy Studies at the University of Alberta in 2004, she taught for 10 years at Te Whare Wanaga o Awanuiarangi, an Indigenous (Maori) post-secondary institution in Aotearoa New Zealand and the University of Auckland. She is the author of The New Imperial Order. Indigenous Responses to Globalization (2005), and a number of edited chapters and journal articles on indigenous issues. Her research interests include Indigenous knowledges and Indigenous global movements, environmental stewardship, Indigenous self-determination and global governance, global citizenship, peace and conflict studies, among many others. She is currently developing a research program which examines the intersection between Indigenous communities’ traditional knowledge and the ‘triple crisis of sustainability’ – economic, environmental and food security with a view to improving the communication with and contribution by Indigenous communities in the realm of adaptive policy development.

Ryan Duplassie
is a Ph.D. candidate in Native Studies at the University of Manitoba in Winnipeg, Canada. In his research he examines the significance of water to the Anishinaabe, or Ojibway, people and the implications this has for the meaning of treaty, and Treaty #3 specifically. More particularly, he is interested in the water keepers – Anishinaabe women like his grandmother – and their relationships with water. Ryan is striving to make his work, his research, and his life
practice to be one process. He is actively involved in reinvigorating traditional Anishinaabe skills and lifeways on the lands and waters of Treaty #3. He also has roots in England, Scotland, Germany, and of course the Plessis region of France. With a foot in both the indigenous and settlers’ worlds, he walks for all his relations.

*Karla Janiré Avilés González*

is a social psychologist at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM, Mexico). She received her Master and Ph.D. in Social Anthropology from the Center for Research and Higher Studies in Social Anthropology (CIE-SAS, Mexico). Her main research interests are intercultural conflicts, language policies and the management of multilingualism. She has taught courses and seminars in various institutions, including the University of Newcastle (England), the Sorbonne (Paris 3, France) and the National Autonomous University of Mexico. She is the main editor of the collective book *Between stigma and resistance, ethnic dynamics in times of globalization* (2011). She is working as a contractual researcher for the Research Group “Empirical Foundations on Linguistics” (Paris 7, UMR 7597).

*Ángela Ixkic Bastian Duarte*

is a professor at the Autonomous University of the State of Morelos (UAEM, Mexico) where she teaches social sciences. She received her M.A. and Ph.D. from the Centre for Research and Higher Studies in Social Anthropology (CIE-SAS, Mexico). Her research interests are gender, ethnicity, social movements and environmental conflicts. Her most recent publication is *Desde el sur organizado. Mujeres nahuas de Veracruz construyendo política*, published by the Metropolitan Autonomous University in 2011. She was one of the editors of the book *Cultura e identidades rurales* published in 2012 (UAM-X, “Rural Worlds” series).

*Thomas Pierre*

Pauline Oosterhoff is a research fellow at the Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, with over 20 years of international experience in public health research and advisory services and media production. She has master’s degrees in political science and international public health and a PhD in medical anthropology. She has developed and managed programs focusing on access to health, notably sexual and reproductive health and HIV, gender, and human rights, for UNDP, Médecins Sans Frontières, the Medical Committee Netherlands Vietnam, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and other local and international NGOs and media organizations. She started working with urban and rural indigenous and minority groups on health and human rights in Asia and Africa in 1996. She developed and wrote dozens of international peer reviewed articles, assessments, manuals and training curriculums. In addition to her research and advisory work, she produces documentary films, installations and performances combining participatory action research and professional art production.

Arno Peeters is an autodidact composer: in 1983, well before the DJ became the new superstar, he was already experimenting with tape and simple hifi-equipment, trying to emulate the effects and sounds of electronic (pop) music like Kraftwerk, Laurie Anderson, Art of Noise and Coil.

In 1989 he was one of the technopioneers in the Netherlands. However, disappointed by the conventions of this style of music, he applied himself to more experimental music. In 1996, his focus shifted away from releasing towards working more projectbased. Nowadays he is a radio producer and editor with Dutch National Radio (Radio 6 and Radio 1 resp.). With his own one-man company and studio Tape TV Productions, located in Utrecht, he assembles, edits and mixes for radio, film and games on a regular basis and specializes in surround sound and audio within interactive applications. He now works intensively with installation artist Iris Honderdos. Together they worked on community based installations and performances, most recently in Kiev (Ukraine 2004/2005), Hanoi and HaLong (Vietnam 2006–2009), Finland (2008) and Armenia (2011).

Iris Honderdos is an artist who has her roots in several different backgrounds. After having worked in psychiatry, she started a study with the AVK in Leeuwarden to become a drama teacher and then moved to the Academy of Fine Arts in Utrecht in 1986. Apart from three-dimensional work, she became fascinated by photography. As a freelancer she worked for several magazines but
searched for the “third dimension”: she wanted to escape the world of just points on paper, by combining it with other materials. She ended up creating large spatial installations. In 1992 she was invited to take part in an international symposium in the former Czechoslovakia, just after the fall of communism. It was there she discovered the core of what would become so specific in the projects she carries out all over the world: meeting people in new, unknown or difficult situations and translating those experiences into a work of art on the spot.

**Bianca Rutherford Iglesias**

received her bachelor's degree in journalism from the University of Málaga, Spain. She then received a European master's degree in multimedia projects management from the Institut National de l’Audiovisuel (France) and a master's degree in journalism in 2010 after defending her thesis on the production company Igloolik Isuma Production, a model of communication for development. She now works as head of International Relations at the Political Science Institute of Saint Germain, France. Previously, she was in charge of the development of research and communication for the Faculty of Law and Political Science at the University of Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, France. Particularly sensitive to the defense of indigenous cultures and in accordance with the UNESCO philosophy, Bianca worked as General Coordinator of the UNESCO Chair in Communication at the University of Málaga. She currently works with the French association *Conversations du Monde* – an association that works for the preservation of oral traditions around the world.

**Concepción Travesedo**

is the Director of the Associated Center of the Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia in Málaga and an Associate Professor of Communication at the Universidad de Málaga. She received her B.Sc. in Information Sciences from the Universidad Complutense de Madrid in 1994 and completed a postdoctoral program at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, India, in 1998. She worked at the Universidad Europea de Madrid from 1996 to 1998 and obtained her Ph.D. in Journalism from the Universidad Complutense de Madrid in 2000. In 2003 she got a position as Associate Professor at the Universidad de Málaga, where she remains up to this day. C. Travesedo conducted a postdoctoral research program at Leuven University in 2008, and in 2013 was appointed Director of the Associated Center of UNED in Málaga. Her teaching and research topics are International Information, Communication for Development and Peace, Global Media System and Methodologies and Techniques in Communication Research.
Alain Vuillemin

Sze Wei Ang
prior to joining the Department of Comparative Literature at the University of Hong Kong, was a Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Comparative Literature at UCLA where she taught classes that took up the questions of race, religion, ethics, and the nation-state within the areas of Asian American and South East Asian Studies. She has begun working on a book manuscript that traces how ethical claims about race converge or diverge within comparative multicultural contexts. Professor Ang is on the editorial board of the international journal Culture and Dialogue.

Roxana Bauduin
received her Ph.D. in comparative literature from Paris III, Sorbonne Nouvelle, France. She is a poet and journalist and she has been teaching courses in international relations, political science and crosscultural communication for six years at the University of Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, France. She published, in 2012, a study entitled Une lecture du roman africain depuis 1968. Du pouvoir dictatorial au mal moral (L’Harmattan publishing house, 2013). Her research focuses on issues of interculturality as they are represented in African francophone historical literatures.
Globalization and “Minority” Cultures

Introductory Comments

Sophie Croisy

Theoretical Perspectives

Contemporary work on the relationship between minority cultures¹ and globalization²—a relationship presented as a dialectical/dialogical one by Makere Stewart-Harawira in her book *The New Imperial Order: Indigenous Responses to Globalization*³—offers today new and hybrid perspectives on the challenges of globalization. Texts that deal with that relationship are characterized by the multifarious connections they formulate between a multiplicity of knowledge communities that defend culturally grounded social and political philosophies and a multiplicity of knowledge areas (literature, history, philosophy, sociology, political theory, international relations, etc.), which allows for the diversification of viewpoints on the topic of human development in today’s global context of economic, political and cultural systematization.

This variety of perspectives that highlight the local and global issues of minority cultures in the face of global phenomena allows for a diversification of the topics addressed by “mainstream” global studies literature and encourages the development of new strands of reflection which have not been given enough space so far in the literature that evaluates and critiques globalization processes. The inclusion of so-called “minor” perspectives⁴ from across the

¹ Within the context of this publication, the term “minority” refers to cultural communities (mainly diasporic communities and ethnic groups) that have suffered, and still suffer today, from multiple forms of discrimination and which have experienced therefore a lack of social, economic, political opportunities and a lack of recognition/representation within their located geopolitical spaces.

² Globalization: set of practices imposed from the top-down that subordinate people (groups, communities, nations) to profit-driven values, or more broadly, to reductive capitalistic notions of development. Thomas D. Hall and James V. Fenelon see the contemporary world system as a “globalizing version of late industrial capitalism, intensely pursuing the neoliberal project of a system run entirely by market principles, tempered only by parallel efforts to keep current elites in powerful positions,” *Indigenous Peoples and Globalization: Resistance and Revitalization* (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2009), 123.


⁴ Although the majority-minority divide which implies contrasting cultural frameworks is slowly collapsing as social movements and literatures across the globe are becoming increasingly culturally multifaceted.
globe in the reflection on globalization expands the analysis on, and illuminates certain aspects of specific contemporary global phenomena which are oftentimes deleterious to human evolution as the concrete expressions of hegemonic, homogenizing forces created by profit-driven value systems. In “Globalization, Minorities and Civil Society,” Koichi Hasegawa describes the different facets of globalization: in a society that does not limit itself to the nation-state but has taken on a global/international perspective, capital, information and labor move across borders thanks to the development of means of communication—a movement that fosters political, social and cultural change at global and local levels.

Minority groups’ living conditions and cultural evolution have been historically intertwined with the development of global order and have suffered from early to present phases of globalization. Minority groups are often cited as victims of global processes since global forces increasingly dictate the fate of local communities within nations and their regions. However, they are rarely consulted for the techniques or technologies of accommodation and resistance they have implemented as a response to global processes both at local and global levels. Mainstream globalist literature does not yet offer analytical space to so-called cultural minorities in the process of questioning the values and practices of globalization. As a matter of fact, as Duane Champagne argues in his foreword to Indigenous Peoples and Globalization: Resistance and Revitalization, “Most contemporary theory does not conceptualize the existence or presence of indigenous peoples, let alone offers a theory or conceptualization of the cultural, political, social and territorial continuity of contemporary indigenous peoples and nations.” He further argues that

---

5 In the book he has edited with Timothy Sinclair, Approaches to World Order, Robert Cox defines hegemony as “an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of production that penetrates into all the countries and links into other subordinate modes of production. It is also a complex of international social relationships that connect the social classes of the different countries. World hegemony can be described as a social structure, and economic structure, and a political structure...[It] is expressed in universal norms, institutions and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behavior for states and for those forces of civil society that act across national boundaries, rules which support the dominant mode of production” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 137.


contemporary theories of social change should include indigenous people—and I would broaden the scope of his analysis to include minor cultural groups in general—to bring the diversity of human experience and societies into current reflections and studies on future possibilities of human development. This diversity would allow for the study of multiple “patterns of change” in the past as inspirations for patterns of future possibilities beyond contemporary, homogenizing global discourses of cultural and economic expansion. Such discourses preclude the transformation of current global social and economic systems into less exploitative, less invasive and more humane, collective, distributive patterns of development beyond Western/colonial and neo-imperialist forms of cultural domination.

The purpose of this publication is to bring to the forefront of global studies these new perspectives that address the relationship between globalization and the experiences of cultural minorities worldwide, and these literatures that take into account other, so-called “minor” cultural perspectives that prove crucial to the necessary process of questioning contemporary global values and practices and complicating current debates on the causes, consequences, future of globalized practices in a variety of fields: politics, education, culture, the economy, etc. These new literatures on the relationship between globalization and minority cultures seek to reformulate this relationship on new bases by relying on the possibilities of a cross-cultural exchange between divergent, and sometimes utterly contradistinctive, praxes. The goal here is to develop new theories and practices of transculturality that link different theoretical and cultural spheres in order to formulate new discussions and propositions about appropriate responses to give in defiance of the adverse effects of globalization—such responses imply a review and critique of the theoretical foundations of globalization and the subsequent formulation of more humanist theoretical bases to global practices in all areas of human development.

The historical theme of structural continuity, a crucial theme in the literature about resistance to present neo-colonizing/globalizing forces, has been taken up by citizens of nation-states who, given the global crisis in progress, are looking for ways to survive and resist a whole network of anti-democratic and destructive global projects, while at the same time relying on constructive global practices and tools, such as technologies of communication, to publicize and counteract the many instances of political, economic and cultural violence worldwide. It is therefore appropriate to reflect upon the links, the common features, the possibilities for developing collaborative projects between minor and mainstream alter-globalization movements in the fight

---

8 Hall and Fenelon, ix.
against the deleterious aspects and effects of globalization, with the hope to see the differential space between “minor” and “mainstream” make room for renewed forms of intercultural relationships and new definitions of citizenship—a citizenship grounded in “glocal” politics, aware and critical of the global processes at play in the workings of local communities, and sufficiently “global-savvy” to use the tools of globalization in order to limit its negative effects.

The point is not to idealize or glorify the experiences of minority cultures in the face of change, nor is it to deny the value of existing critical reflections on globalization that are rooted in the history and experience of so-called mainstream cultural groups. The point is to strike more connections between different experiences in order to think up the best alternatives to problematic global systems in place and to a way of life brought about by global life patterns that is not satisfactory anymore to the majority of world citizens. These alternatives may come out of local/ “minor” cultural practices and experiences which can influence global systems positively and help so-called modern societies question the political, economic and cultural ontology of the present world order. The goal is to complicate current debates in a variety of fields on the causes, consequences, future of globalization processes, without co-opting or harnessing the knowledge and practices of minor cultural groups to try and improve existing human systems of knowledge and development, which would be an aporetic process as one cannot simply apply a new set of cultural practices to systems of development that have historically relied on other practices to grow. Such a process would not question contemporary global systems of knowledge production and dissemination as it would simply erase the historical specificity of group evolution (whether “minor” or mainstream), a specificity that needs to be surveyed and understood so that productive and constructive intercultural exchange between cultural groups can happen in the future. The texts gathered in this publication participate in this process of intercultural global criticism. These texts are spaces that promote the interpretation of theoretical and practical responses given by cultural minorities in response to global phenomena. They present analyses of the ways in which these responses participate in theorizing and operationalizing new perspectives, beyond dominant discourses, that question contemporary global praxes of human representation and development.

A constructive intercultural critical process would involve recognizing the practical and epistemological alternatives proposed by marginalized cultural groups whose concepts, principles, models and efforts in exploring new paths of thinking and living have not been sufficiently explored. As a matter of fact, dominant theories of modernization have often regarded cultural minorities
as communities that had to undergo inevitable change to adapt to and eventually enjoy the benefits of modern (Western) society, or else be annihilated. The knowledge and practices of cultural minorities have often been dismissed by dominant discourses of human development as having very little analytic or scientific use, as being an impediment to the development of modernity. To participate in the critique of such a deficient scientific rationale is one of the objectives of this publication.

As poet, researcher and political activist Susan Hawthorne argues in an article entitled “Wild politics, beyond globalization,” what we need in order to tackle the global crisis is a “diversity matrix” of concepts and practices put forth by groups and peoples who have been vulnerable to global politics, its economic and trade policies, its corrupted epistemological bases. For Hawthorne, globalization is a “distinct outgrowth of western capitalist and patriarchal systems” that favor practices of disconnection between cultural communities and between people and land resources. Such practices have become structural and they have led to the violation of the rights of groups (whether social, cultural or gendered) that share a “vulnerability to macroeconomic policies, new systems of trade rules and the structures of violence that exemplify globalization.” Hawthorne proposes a new form of global politics, “wild politics,” based on the diversity of human experience and the building of strong connections between communities “with relationship considered more important than profit” and with the re-inscription of notions of common good in global decisions about human development. This diversity matrix of concepts and practices that resist hurtful global phenomena exists within cultural communities around the world which struggle locally and globally against the encroaching of global normative structures of power. This matrix represents an inexhaustible resource for citizens, communities, researchers and teachers around the world who are looking for valuable sources of insight into the conditions of human life and seek to articulate new epistemological and practical alternatives to contemporary dominant discourses on human economic, intellectual and social development—alternatives which are greatly needed in times of crisis. Solutions to this global and multidimensional crisis we are facing today are necessarily transcultural and transnational and will require more collective work than the present-day solutions presented to us can allow since

10 Hawthorne, 253.
11 Hawthorne, 243
12 Hawthorne, 255.
these current solutions do not, unfortunately, question the very modes of thinking and organizing life that are foundational to the dominant states and the international regulations under which we live and which have participated in the global crisis. In order to expand contemporary spaces of intercultural exchange and perform real epistemological shifts in dominant discourses about human development, a number of tensions we encounter in contemporary discourses on the relationship between minority cultures and globalization need to be addressed.

One of the responses to the destabilizing effects of globalization has been a conservative return to cultural sectarianism, where so-called dominant cultures resist the influence of so-called minor cultural communities (and vice versa), where cultural identity appears as an essentialist encoding of human identity and cultures are perceived as closed systems of values and practices which exclude the influence of “the foreign” —this protective reaction to global phenomena is a revised, contemporary version of “culturalisme,” a term revisited by Jean-François Bayart in his book *L’Illusion Identitaire*, which describes the crystallization of cultural identity groups and communities as a shielding maneuver against the oppressive effects of globalization. Of course, globalization has also given birth to international forms of identity politics that have had positive consequences on the maintenance of cultural communities around the world, a process that has benefited from the globalization of communication and information technology. However, extreme forms of identity politics have led to the fractioning of cultures—a highly permissive consequence of globalization where cultural segmentation nourishes intercultural conflicts within states and beyond borders.

Lindsay Whaley, in an article entitled “The Future of Native Languages,” argues that “We are in the midst of a massive demographic transformation on our planet—a shift from linguistic and cultural diversity toward linguistic and cultural homogeneity.” She sees globalization as “a process of increasing international integration of economic life” that has in turn caused the increasing international integration of cultural life, which means that globalization has produced hegemonic cultural spaces that have demanded of local structures and communities drastic adjustments and forced their assimilation into a global cultural pattern at the expense of local languages, local cultural patterns and local concerns.

---

14 Translated as “The illusion of cultural identity.”
16 Whaley, 969.
Thus we can certainly argue that globalization is an ambivalent phenomenon, filled with contradictions and tensions, with highly deleterious or sometimes desirable aspects and outcomes. Globalization has produced hegemonic systems of influence carried by multinational corporations that homogenize human development—the terms disneyfication/disneyisation\(^\text{\ref{disneyfication}}\) or macdonaldization\(^\text{\ref{macdonaldization}}\) of society have become popular to describe this phenomenon. Globalization has created transcultural interfaces that have led to conflicts between communities. However, it has also facilitated the internationalization of media and communication industries and has increased cultural interconnectedness across borders, thus offering opportunities for cross-fertilization of cultural values, experiences, patterns, etc. Moreover, human and ethnic rights movements across the globe have become leading forces in the fight against permissive global phenomena by using the global tools and institutions at their disposal. The Internet has become a tool for the development of global indigenous movements as it has strengthened access to information, foreign policies, audiences, despite its undeniable distorting influence; in the political and legal domains, international institutions have been called upon to address minority issues worldwide as ethnic social movements have increasingly influenced world politics and worked toward ideals of transnational democracy\(^\text{\ref{transnational democracy}}\). In the process of challenging markets and institutions that sought to crush them, these movements have deconstructed and redefined the scope of these global tools and institutions as well as a number of their foundational principles.

In his book *Indigenous Peoples in International Law*, S. James Anaya, a professor of human rights law and policy at the University of Arizona, traces the...
history of indigenous rights movements. He argues that before the modern era of human rights, international law was shaped by state actors—colonial or postcolonial states—and so favored the colonizing forces controlling the states. This has changed rather recently and international law, though still state-centered, is “now pulled at by a discourse directly concerned with individuals and even groups.” International law has been, in the past 40 years, more and more influenced by the demands of minority groups beyond borders; groups that once were objects of discussions have now become real participants in a transnational dialogue that concerns them and everyone on the planet—such as the right to self-determination, a concern shared by world citizens who bear the disastrous social consequences of the economic dependence of states on global financial institutions. The point here is that “minor” cultural groups have produced major change by establishing a strong foothold in the international system through a language of human rights that has dealt with inequalities on local and global scales. They are forcing the law to reform itself and take into account the demands of groups that are not culturally or politically dominant within states; they are forcing this very normative space of inquiry and regulation, the law and its connected institutions, to morph from a space of cultural hegemony into a space of transcultural democratic development, which is an important—though slow and always imperfect—shift for minor, ethnic, indigenous, autochthonous, first nation communities around the globe and for all communities and groups that are defending human rights beyond states, on a global scale, through protests and critiques of the global phenomena that are putting the interest of a few above the interest of the whole.

The undesirable effects of globalization are being placed in check today by the people who have been the most vulnerable to them and who have built global alliances based on shared social and cultural traits or ethical postures in order to resist dominant global strategies that have had dire consequences on their lives at local levels. In his article “The Globalization of the rule of law and human rights” Steven T. Walther writes, “As global corporations and other economic entities continue to become more powerful (even now many are more powerful economically than some nation states of the UN), there will likely be an increased pressure toward requiring them to adhere to minimum standards of ethics and to discharge certain responsibilities toward society, including respect for human rights.” In the near
future, the role of cultural communities worldwide that have been challenging deleterious global phenomena at local and international levels and working on the diffusion of power through society against global tendencies to concentrate it in the hands of a few, is likely to become prominent.

In the midst of the present global crisis, responsible political discourses point to the necessity to bridge gaps between cultural communities within national spaces and across borders in order to improve the social and political conditions of individuals and communities worldwide. The goal is to create more spaces of cultural transition, of intercultural relationality, of equal participation in discourse by developing models of participatory or deliberative democracy where non-dominant cultural groups would be involved in the formulation of “an intercultural public space,” an expression coined by political scientist Michael Rabinder James (we could also cite the expression “multicultural public sphere,” coined by Francisco Colom González in his essay “Intercultural Justice and the Public Sphere”). Such a space is “critical for the democratic accommodation of cultural difference.” This space of intercultural relationality is to replace the spaces of cultural segmentation in and around which we live today, where cultural groups are clearly hierarchized in public and political discourses regulated by dominant cultural communities and are not given equal access to decision-making processes. The development of intercultural spaces is part of a process Dharm P.S. Bhawuk has coined “global community psychology,” which is a model of knowledge (created from Hindu cultural insights) where new, global intercultural forms of knowledge “or etics have to be grounded in the specific cultural contexts or emics” and are produced by learning from untapped cultural resources, by moving beyond limitations of the traditional configurations of one’s intellectual and cultural world and by acknowledging the necessity to use multiple paradigms, multiple worldviews. This model of knowledge relies, according to Bhawuk, on

---


24 Colom Gonzales, 4.


“the multi-paradigmatic approach”\textsuperscript{27} to knowledge production, an approach that values non-Western theoretical positions. The goal here again is to keep formulating new epistemological and practical alternatives to contemporary dominant discourses on human development and question the very ontologies upon which these discourses have been erected.

For teachers and researchers worldwide, this epistemological question is crucial. In the academic realm in France, we are struggling with an education system and corresponding institutions that are organized upon clearly delimited areas of knowledge or professional disciplines (English, history, sociology, chemistry, biology, etc.). These knowledge areas are disconnected and grounded in a culturalism that is both disciplinary and social, despite the high level of consciousness in teachers and researchers as to the necessity to lead students and future researchers on the path toward transdisciplinarity and transculturality so as to help them shape creative and transformative research and teaching methods adapted to a more and more complex, interconnected and pluralistic world. Today, teachers and researchers are responsible for making their methods of inquiry and reasoning more relevant than those offered by professional disciplines that still rely on methods of inquiry that remain cognicentric, highly ethnocentric—sometimes quite pedantic— and encourage principles of separation and dichotomy. In a study entitled “Teachings from the Deep South: North–south Contributions to Integral Education,” Adrian Villasenor-Galarza argues that “nowadays the value of transformative, holistic and integral approaches to education is slowly being recognized” even though “our education systems still perpetuate recalcitrant biases based on fragmentary conceptions of self and world”\textsuperscript{28} and knowledge. In this study, he begins to explore the place of indigenous practices from the global south and the role they can play in bettering education programs which rely on a multi-dimensional model of education and push students to go beyond traditional, disciplinary, anthropocentric methodologies of knowledge acquisition. Such transformative projects which emphasize the necessity to formulate new research methods in a transdisciplinary and transcultural context are slowly developing and the specific features of these programs are designed to help students use their imagination and their creativity as well as a multiplicity of knowledge traditions to conduct creative research that deals with the concrete issues we are facing in these times of global crisis—a crisis that impacts the cultures of education around the world and the national communities that

\textsuperscript{27} Bhawuk, 314.

promote these cultures. In France and other countries worldwide, the intensifying intercultural tensions between so-called dominant cultures and minority groups will eventually force national and international institutions that participate in developing school curricula to question very seriously the cultural paradigms on which these curricula are based as well as the education systems that reproduce them.

In his essay “Transdisciplinary and Creative Inquiry in Transformative Education: Researching the Research Degree,” Alfonso Montuori argues that “scholarship can become an opportunity to create ourselves in and through the process of inquiry and participation—both in a community of scholars and in the wider global community” through the integration of disparate perspectives that will challenge the foundational assumptions of disciplines and of the institutions that harbor them and “engage the inquirer as an active, embodied and embedded ethical participant to the world.” The fragmentation of thought and knowledge into disciplines and into cultural areas is problematic and will have to erode since areas of research that study the evolution of our societies, areas of inquiry that are crucial to the survival of humanity (such as ecology, for example) have to draw on multitude disciplines, from hard science to the humanities, for research and the dissemination of information on that research. They also have to draw on a plurality of cultural dimensions in order to understand the causes and consequences of global phenomena; in the case of ecology, industrial and economic policies, geophysics, biology, environmental analyses help us understand specific environmental phenomena, but explanations for the irrational and maladaptive global human responses or reactions (mainly insufficient) to the imminent environmental disasters predicted by researchers worldwide, are to be looked for in spirituality, in psychology, in literature, in history, in the West, the East, the North and the South, in communities worldwide and their cultural practices.

Culture shapes our identities as individuals, as members of a community, as citizens of a nation state, as citizens of a community of nations, etc. It also shapes our methods of inquiry and knowledge acquisition. Intercultural phenomena serve to reconceptualize cultural identity beyond cultural essentialism, as a relational and evolving creative process of inquiry that cannot be confined to the context of a single nation, a single homogenous perspective,  

30 Montuori, 123.
but should be viewed, as Alfonso Montuori puts it, in “a larger, transcultural, planetary context.”

Hence the necessity to develop methods of inquiry that take into account the qualities of the researcher and the diversity of methods that can impact the way we produce knowledge. We would not like to reduce the scope of cultural minorities’ fight for recognition and human rights to a study of their methods of inquiry and knowledge acquisition and dissemination, but it has been one important aspect of minority struggles in response to colonization and modernization, and there is a whole body of knowledge and practices coming out of so-called minor cultural spaces which global discourses about knowledge production and dissemination have only begun to take into account.

The diversity of articles presented in this volume suggests nuanced analyses, grounded in particular places and conditions, of how minority groups have been targets, in more ways than one, of globalization and its practices; these articles also describe and analyze the ways in which minority groups are, in some instances, putting beneficial global tools (such as the global media) to good use in their fight against detrimental global influences. Furthermore, these articles investigate the ways in which minority groups are influencing global practices, institutions and knowledge areas by projecting new ideas, concepts, perspectives of inquiry and development onto the global stage and new, contestatory forms of globalisms grounded in transcultural and transnational coalitions, against theories and forms of globalisms imposed from the top by international and state actors.

This publication is the outcome of a conference organized by the CHCSC research group at the University of Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, France, in June 2013. The conference, entitled “Globalization and Minority cultures: the role of so-called minority cultures in rethinking the future of modern societies,” aimed at bringing to the forefront of global studies these new perspectives, theories, texts, practices that address the relationship between globalization and the experiences of cultural minorities worldwide and show both the real and potential influence minority knowledge can have on the world. The fact that this conference took place in France is of particular significance when we know that France is still very much “in denial” when it comes to recognizing the importance of “its” minority population, although this population is, quite visibly, shaping the contemporary multicultural architecture
of the French Republic. Today, still gangrene by white patriarchal elites that hold onto both political and economic power and have actively participated in the ghettoization of minority populations throughout the 20th century, France does not, however, hesitate to position itself on the international scene as an unwavering global actor and role model in promoting democratic values across borders. The contradiction between this aura of global political respectability that national (or international) actors seek to build and the reality of their social and political actions toward specific populations inside and across borders, is one of the many paradoxes that readers will find articulated and critiqued in the articles to come. Indeed, these texts bear witness to the theoretical and technical capacity of “minor” communities to uncover and offer alternatives to globally unreasonable thinking processes and behaviors that do not seek the resolution of deadly contradictions (human survival versus environmental destruction, international collaboration versus nationalist policies, the preservation of cultural diversity versus global cultural homogenization, etc.). They bear witness to the role minority cultures can play in shaping our global future.

Overview of the Volume

The articles presented in this publication are organized into six parts. Part I, “Reconceptualizing the role of minority cultures in a global context,” addresses the philosophical role of minorities in deconstructing dichotomies (colonized/colonizer, minor/major, etc.) and critiquing concepts that have sustained problematic perspectives and practices of globalization which the authors of these articles seek to dismantle. This theoretical repositioning is key to understanding the new forms and practices of globalisms enhanced by “minor” philosophies and cultural practices worldwide.

Part II, entitled “Minority cultures and ‘glocal’ political resistance: thinking new models of identity and citizenship,” brings forth the role of minority groups in countering “modern,” national and global political forces that promote monolithic and reductive models of identity and citizenship. As a response to imposed politics of assimilation or alienation, minority populations have nonetheless managed to elaborate means of resistance with the local/global tools at their disposal, showing the way to those who seek to redefine the conditions of human (and other) life within new, humane political frameworks. The last article in this section deals with one of these means of resistance: the law. It discusses the development of legal support to minorities, and thus the complexification of the role and content of the law (both national
and international) and its evolution in protecting minority (and more globally, human) rights locally and globally. One of the questions raised by the author of this article is, can contemporary national and global legislation and the official bodies that ensure the application and respect of the law participate today in the alter-globalization effort? Can the law and legal institutions really be carriers of change, equality, prosperity for minorities (and citizens in general) within and beyond state borders?

In Part III, “Minorities’ economico-environmental struggles,” authors address the battles “minor” cultural groups are waging today as they look for solutions to resolve the contradiction in which modern societies have been caught, that is the global need to protect the environment, human rights and life in general versus the fulfillment of the noxious economic and energetic requirements of modern life. The articles in this section address, in a very sincere and unrestrained manner, the crisis of sustainability nations around the globe are facing today, the history of that crisis, the ways in which minority groups have been and still are victims of that crisis and the paths they are choosing to resolve the (above-mentioned) contradiction which stands at the heart of the crisis.

In Part IV of this volume, “non-homogeneous forms of cultural development: the linguistic paradigm,” authors analyze the role and place of minor languages in the contemporary global context of linguistic homogenization. The articles gathered in this section of the volume negotiate quite expertly the relationship between minority groups’ fight for social and cultural survival within the regional communities they inhabit—a need partially fulfilled in the process of preserving “minor” languages—and the global responsibility to oppose the hierarchization or leveling of languages in the era of linguistic homogenization. In this section, the issue of linguistic sur/re-vival is connected to broader issues of gender and cultural representations.

Part V, which is entitled “Art as resistance,” addresses the role of artistic productions in promoting non stereotypical representations of minority groups and acknowledging the roles these communities play in developing sustainable cultural and economic models of development that are based on the merging of consciences and practices from “mainstream” and “minor” knowledge frameworks.

Finally, in Part VI of the volume, “Literary dismantlements of global/colonial domination,” specific fictional spaces of globalization are analyzed in order to critique and deconstruct the colonialist framework that has historically shaped the relationship between specific (so-called “dominant” and “minor”) cultural groups. The articles in this section, beyond this critique of the colonial manipulation and acculturation of so-called “minor”
communities, also participate in constructing new, productive globalist literary spaces where new possibilities for intercultural connections, beyond cultural dualities and oppositions, are revealed.

**Part I: Reconceptualizing the Role of Minority Cultures in a Global Context**

In “From anthropophagy to glocalization: a hundred years of postcolonial responses to globalization,” Jacques Pothier puts into historical perspective the relationship between actors of globalization (throughout colonial and postcolonial times). He disrupts the traditional colonizers/colonized, major culture/minor culture dichotomies and hierarchization, acknowledges the active role of so-called minority (sub-)cultures in shaping intercultural relations and communities and asks for new perspectives and a new theorizing of the state and space of power relations in today’s global world, where stronger intercultural relations between mainstream and “minor” cultural groups can potentially become new tools to address the challenges of globalization. In “Mondialisation, minoritarité et conscience altéritaire,” one of the two texts in this collection presented in their original language (French), Emir Délic develops the notion of “conscience altéritaire” (consciousness of the other) in order to address a crucial issue in today’s global world, that of the epistemological predominance of Western thought in all areas of life that have a global dimension. The author points to the absence, from the public scene, of knowledge perspectives that are not born into traditional Western epistemological poles, and to the necessity to take into account these perspectives in order to create new forms of intercultural relationship, beyond binary oppositions, as well as new epistemological positions through which to deconstruct these binaries, so as to start living and seeing the world multidimensionally. Finally, in “Reflexive minority action: minority narratives and new European discourses,” Tove H. Malloy analyzes the ways in which minority groups influence global/European discourses on democracy-related issues through reflections and actions that seek social change in the midst of a crisis that has consequences on minority groups and citizens in general. Change involves crucial political acts such as a redefinition of the very methods of dealing with the effects of globalization on European citizens and a redefinition of the role of the institutions that are responsible for coping with these effects—processes that Tove H. Malloy has coined “reflexive citizenship acts” and which rely on new discourses of political action based on intercultural and transnational exchange.
Part II: Minority Cultures and “Glocal” Political Resistance: Thinking New Models of Identity and Citizenship

In “Indigenous peoples and national self-image in Australia and New Zealand,” Adrien Rodd tackles an issue that has both local and global roots and repercussions: the redefinition of national identity in the face of global phenomena. The author analyzes the role of Indigenous people, in these two neighbour countries, in reconceptualising definitions of national identity in a globalized context against monoculture—a process in progress around the world since the framing of common, collective national identities which would nonetheless make room for cultural differences is an issue that modern nations are facing today. In “Globalization and Resistance: the Tibetan case,” Molly Chatalic discusses the contemporary status of Tibetans as colonized or exiled people that have led the historical fight against Chinese imperialism and struggled against the imposition, by the Chinese, of destructive forms of modernity. Tibetans hope to conduct their relationship to modernity and globalization on their own terms and the author analyzes the ways in which they are resisting imposed forms of modernity by using the global tools at their disposal to access and produce knowledge, communicate on their political status and struggle and respond to Chinese invasive and destructive economic activities and political violence, thus presenting an inspiring model of global citizenship to the world. In “Can the Afghan diaspora speak? Diasporic Identity in the shadow of human rights,” Shirin Gul Sadozai and Hina Anwar Ali reflect upon the characteristics of the social and legal identity of the Afghan diasporic community living in Pakistan. Through both a theoretical reflection on the place of minorities in national communities and an analysis of narratives from Afghans living in Pakistan and Pakistanis interacting with them, the authors analyze the strategies of resistance developed by Afghan refugees in Pakistan as they try to define their place and identity in a country where “the global ‘imaginaire’” (a term coined by the authors) adversely influences the local and global image of Afghans. Finally, in “Protecting minority population in Europe with European law,” Coralie Fiori-Khayat discusses the role of the European Union in protecting minority groups facing discrimination at local levels, showing how national issues involving minorities are being dealt with at the global level and are influencing the evolution of international law. Minority rights in Europe are protected by a body of law and the authorities that ensure the implementation and respect of the law. Although the author brings forth the effectiveness of this global legal apparatus, she also points to its limitations and the necessity to continue the effort in promoting democracy and freedom—the moral cornerstones of EU—for minor cultural groups that seek recognition, respect and citizen rights.
Part III: Minority’s Economico-Environmental Struggles

In “Feudalism and integration of the Native Peoples of Peru in the worldwide economy,” Natividad Ferri Carreres explains how Spanish colonization initiated the earliest period of worldwide globalization through the transposition of the feudal system to the “new world.” She examines to what extent the colonial/feudal structure has survived in the relationship between the Indian communities and the institutions of the actual Peruvian society, fully integrated into our global economy, and how in spite of that structure, legal rules promoting consensus between economic needs and cultural preservation of indigenous people afford rural and indigenous communities access to development and protect indigenous rights and Peruvian lands against multinational companies. In “Re-singing the world. Indigenous pedagogies and global crisis during conflicted times,” Makere Stewart-Harawira dissects the tension between global economic development/global governance and the preservation of indigenous/human rights and the environment. As a context for that discussion, the author draws a picture of the historical evolution of indigenous fights for cultural and environmental rights and analyzes the importance of that fight in the process of resolving the complex crisis of sustainability countries around the globe are facing today. Finally, in “Idle No More: Indigenous People’s coordinated reaction to the twin forces of colonialism and neo-colonialism in Canada,” Ryan Duplassie analyzes the scope of Canada’s revolutionary “Idle No More” movement, an Indigenous political and social contemporary response to national and global forms of political and economic imperialism. The author assesses the ways in which “Idle No More” serves as a platform to organize and share information about Indigenous concerns in Canada, mainly human and environmental ones. He shows how this local movement turned global has led to connections and collaborations between indigenous and non-indigenous people in Canada on issues of preservation and economic sustainability.

Part IV: Non-Homogeneous Forms of Cultural Development: The Linguistic Paradigm

In “Indigenous languages, gender and community organisation in the era of globalization: the case of the Mazatec women of the Naxi-í in Oaxaca, Mexico,” Karla Janiré Avilés González and Angela Ixkic Bastian Duarte examine the experience of an organisation of Mazatec women in Oaxaca, Mexico, to demonstrate how global phenomena can offer ways to escape the marginalization, in its diverse increments, experienced by minority groups. The authors demonstrate that Mazatec women in Oaxaca, Mexico, have reinforced their ethnic and linguistic identity while working
to develop more just gender relations (a crucial contemporary global concern),
thus suggesting that globalisation can also be a space of opportunities for minority
(sociolinguistic) groups. Then, in "Against the ethnicisation of regional territorial
minorities: contribution from the Basque experience in France," Thomas Pierre
critiques the global trend of linguistic homogenization through an analysis of the
Basque demands for linguistic and cultural recognition and preservation, a politi-
cal struggle which could ideally serve as a strategic space for thinking new forms of
social, political and intercultural cohesions beyond cultural traditionalisms and
global monolithisms.

Part V: Art as Resistance

In “Visualizing development with identity: relational aesthetics of indigenous
collaborative community art projects,” Pauline Oosterhoff, Arno Peeters and
Iris Honderdos deal with issues of representation of minority groups as they
analyze two art projects that were developed in 2012 through a collaboration
between non-indigenous (Dutch) artists, development and museum experts
from the Royal Tropical Institute in Amsterdam and representatives of indige-
nous communities, the Benet (Uganda) and the Khasi (India). The authors
reflect upon the use of such interactive and collaborative art projects in pro-
viding alternatives to stereotypes of indigenous people and stressing their role
in national development initiatives. These collaborative art projects offer
means of empowerment to indigenous groups which become active partici-
pants in constructing representations of their culture and formulating their
hopes for the future despite a tense cultural and economic context. In “Commu-
nication for social change in indigenous communities; limitations of commu-
nity radios and other Proposals: Igloolik Isuma Productions,” Bianca Rutherford
Iglesias and Concepción Travesedo de Castilla theorize the relationship
between communication and human development and analyze the role of
audiovisual production (and information technologies) as appropriated tools
that allow minority populations to promote their visibility, secure linguistic
and cultural survival, assert their identity and defend the preservation of indig-
enous heritages through sustainable models of development.

Part VI: Literary Dismantlements of Global/Colonial Domination

In “L’indianisme au Brésil au travers des traductions, des adaptations et des
transpositions en français du poème épique de José de Santa Rita Durão sur la
découverte de Bahia: Caramurú. Poema épico do descobrimento da Bahia (1781),”
the second text in this volume published in its original language (French), Alain Vuillemin analyzes the archeology of a concept, “l’Indianisme” (indigeneity), as it evolved in Brazil—an evolution which is traced through the fictional reiteration of a myth, that of the encounter between Tupi Indians and Europeans, in a series of texts that offer various perspectives, some colonialist others more nativist, on that particular myth. The fact that multiple versions of this myth have been told throughout history points to the constant need to question the meaning of (national) identity in Brazil, a questioning that has historically been influenced by the indigenous perspective. In “Spatiality and the literature of globalization,” Sze Wei Ang, in her analysis of Shani Mootoo’s novel *Cereus Blooms at Night*—a text that can be coined a “fiction of globalization”—states that though postcolonial globalization has replaced colonial masters with native elites in “freed” nations, this replacement did not interrupt colonial spatial logic which continues today to define minorities’ experiences. She tackles notions of space under globalization and discusses how they affect the ways in which “minor” bodies are dislocated by strongly anchored colonial notions of space. Space under globalization continues to connote forms of colonial domination and the author’s reading of Mootoo’s text seeks to dismantle globalization’s unequal power relations and the role of inherited colonial notions of space in (re)producing forms of inequality. Finally, in “Tierno Monénembo’s ‘Fula’: between distance and empathy,” Roxana Bauduin traces the intercultural evolution of an ethnic group, the Fulani people, which has managed to negotiate—and thus has been an actor of—its survival through time and space. The history of this people, marked by a tension between the cultural core values of the group and the necessary integration of foreign values and beliefs, acknowledges the power of crosscultural fertilization in the process of surviving change—an often violent process—in a transhistorical context of globalization.

**Bibliography**


PART 1

*Reconceptualizing the Role of Minority Cultures in a Global Context*
While post-colonialism is generally associated to the post-World War II global movement toward independence in former colonies, the intellectual move toward cultural independence goes back much further than the last sixty years. Paraphrasing the well-known title of a classic study on post-colonial literature, the Empire has been writing back for a long while.\(^1\) Of course politically post-colonialism started at the end of the eighteenth century with the independence of the United States, closely followed by that of Haiti, and then of the Hispanic republics in Latin America. Therefore it would seem legitimate to start a reflection on the post-colonial cultural situation with the early Americans’ claim for cultural independence, when the former British citizens of the thirteen North-American colonies had to forge their cultural identity with the English language that they shared with the former colonizing nation.

Reinforcing difference by turning to the local features was natural, all the more so as ever since 1492 a process of reverse influence from the New World on the Old World had been taking place: not only had the Native Americans helped the founding fathers discover and manage the natural resources of the new continent, but a counter-conquest of the Old World had been taking place through the digestive tubes of the invading nations. The Europeans were soon hungry for tomatoes, potatoes, peppers, chocolate, Indian corn and...turkeys (although their American origin was not so hidden in French, *dinde* referring more clearly to their West Indian origin).

Considering intercultural relations from the point of view of food is not as trivial as it may seem. Even today, it is everybody’s experience that while people cling strongly to their family-inherited eating habits, they are generally ready to adopt many exotic foods more easily than other foreign cultural practices. Admittedly, it was not so with the early *conquistadores* who were shocked by some of the eating practices of the Native Americans they first encountered, that they soon came to refer to as *cannibals*.

Almost a century ago, the Brasilian poet Oswald de Andrade remembered these first encounters when in May 1928 he launched his *Manifesto Antropófago*.
in the first issue of the São Paulo-based *Revista de Antropofagia*. This short text, whose modernist and even surrealist form is reminiscent of the long poems of T.S. Eliot and Ezra Pound, was crammed with provocative references to the anthropophagic practices of the Amazonian Indians but also with classic literary references such as Montaigne’s essay on the Cannibals. The Brazilian writer insisted on the wisdom and astuteness of the minoritized people from whose point of view he was addressing the Europeans, dating his text in reference to a distinctly American chronology, “Year 374 of the Eating of Bishop Sardinha.” The cannibals were wise enough to select the best morsels from the intrusive culture to derive from them strength and energy that could increase the impact of their cultural creativity:

Cannibalism. Absorption of the sacred enemy. To transform him into a totem. The human adventure. Earthly finality. However, only the pure elite manage to realize carnal cannibalism within, some sense of life, avoiding all the evils Freud identified, those religious evils. What yields nothing is a sublimation of the sexual instinct. It is a thermometric scale of cannibalist instinct. Once carnal, it turns elective and creates friendship. Affectivity, or love. Speculative, science. It deviates and transfers. We arrive at utter vilification. In base cannibalism, our baptized sins agglomerate - envy, usury, calumny, or murder. A plague from the so-called cultured and Christianized, it’s what we are acting against. Cannibals.

The “cannibal” response suggests an original combination of the double legacy of colonization, from the culture of the native people and from their colonist, in which the post-colonial culture emerges richer because it can sift through these legacies. This frame of mind can be compared to the double consciousness Ralph Ellison has shown that African Americans had a chance to develop, since as oppressed minority it was essential for their survival to understand the

---


4 “Minoritized” is a recent coinage that applies to cultural groups that are treated as minorities, regardless of their actual demographic status.

5 De Andrade, *Manifesto*. 
frame of mind of the whites while the dominant majority did not need to do so.6 Ellison draws the parallel between the “Indians” the protagonists in the Boston Tea Party pretended to be and the mask the black man still has to put on in a segregated society, that links him to a protest position that the majority community no longer has to assume—by having to act dumb to deflect attention from themselves, he argues that African Americans embody the core of the American identity as “masking jokers” and benefit from a double consciousness. The minority discourse’s strategic advantage is that it has to know that there are several perspectives.

At this point it may be a good time to ponder on the words we use to refer to the agents of the postcolonial response. First, there is the spatial metaphor, dear to V.S. Naipaul among others, of the “centre” and the “periphery.” Certainly there are peripheral cultures (or peoples?), but interestingly “central cultures” sounds awkward, and that is because discourses originate from the centre—the discourse of scholars and scientists no less than that of political power. It is where the grammatical subject of discourse is situated, and the peripheral cultures are the predicate. The central discourse defines national identity (especially in the nineteenth century when the development of nation states is also the development of national identities), but the identity of the other (minority) group also originates in the centre: it is a product of the colonizing process.7 Second, an ambiguously quantitative or qualitative metaphor: majority culture vs. minority culture. Actually the quantitative approach is misleading: the “minority” culture may well be that of the demographically more numerous portion of the population. This apparently neutral term may well thus cover a quality assessment: the “minor” culture is minor in that it is younger, less advanced and/or of an inferior quality—adopting the term “minoritized” will therefore be more appropriate, insisting as it does on a status forced upon such communities.

In the heyday of the French colonial expansion, at the time of the Second Empire and the Third Republic, the dominant discourse was that Algerians and other lesser ethnic communities should be treated as the Gauls had been treated by the Roman Empire: they were mostly brutes that the glory of the colonizer was to acculturate for their own good, to detach them from their idiosyncratic and superstitious practices that could not be considered as


7 Anne-Marie Thiesse shows how national identities are built in Europe in the Romantic period on a mostly Scottish template that spreads to the Eastern periphery of the continent, La création des identités nationales: Europe XVIIIe–XXe siècle (Paris, Seuil, 1999).
culture. The white man’s burden was to convert them to the enlightenment of modern civilization, a discourse that is not totally extinct. However, in his *Epistles*, the Roman poet Horace had famously warned that transcultural influence sometimes worked the other way round: ‘*Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit, et artes intulit agresti Latio*.’

This brings us to the type of culture that is expected of “minoritized” peoples. The case of the new French museum in Paris that replaced the politically charged *Musée des Colonies* is interesting. The original project changed names quite often in the span of its comparatively short history, witnessing to the embarrassment of the intellectual and political spheres. The museum originated in the Paris international exhibition of 1931, whose theme was the colonies. From 1931 to 1935 it was the *Musée des colonies*, then *Musée de la France d’Outre-mer* (Museum of Overseas France) until the end of the 1950s, eventually *Musée des Arts africains et océaniens* in 1961 and *Musée national des Arts d’Afrique et d’Océanie* in 1990. The shift in names reflects a shifting emphasis from the civilizing influence of France in the world to a showcasing of the arts from other continents. The latest evolution of museography leads to the *Musée du Quai Branly*, whose name is just its location, avoiding the controversial name that President Chirac had thought of, *Musée des Arts Premiers*. ‘*First arts*’ sounds arguably more positive than “primitive arts.” While the arts of first nations are acknowledged as fully dignified, their cultures’ achievements are still only aesthetic, downplaying the world-view, spirituality or ethics in their cultural context, insulating them from the implicit (second?) arts that would come next.

Meanwhile, in the Gaulish collections of the archeological museum of St Germain-en-Laye, the emphasis shifted, emphasizing that the artefacts long collected, once tokens of primitive art, reflect a complex and sophisticated civilization. As the present curator Laurent Olivier put it in an interview for Arte television, “We benefitted from the perspective of the anthropologists on primitive art, which shows that there are different visions of reality that are expressed by motives that to us are merely geometrical, and that are actually concepts, symbols. We don’t know how to consider Gaulish art from the inside. There is a

---

8 "Greece once conquered in turn conquered its uncivilized conqueror, and brought the arts to rustic Latium."


mythology, a history behind it! It is thanks to the surrealists that our gaze at primitive art, also Gaulish art, has changed." Olivier explained that André Breton spent time in the US during World War II and became interested in Navajo puppets, which changed the French perspective on their own Gaulish legacy.

A more comprehensive appreciation of minoritized cultural groups needs to take into account the ethic and cognitive dimension of their thought—which is not like making up the myth of minoritized cultural groups as holding the key to the future against a capitalist, globalizing and therefore limited western thought. Rather, some form of syncretism should be allowed to play as it always has: after all the Gaulish and Roman cultures did merge and enrich each other.

How then to value the input of minoritized groups without falling into the trap of more generalization, more essentialism—new forms of cultural colonialism? The term “Alter-globalization” posits such groups or communities as ‘other’ in reference to the subject of enunciation, thus keeping them marginal in the act of discourse. This “other” globalization tends to value a rootedness in the concrete realities of local territory, on communal values. Is there a new romanticism there? Such other modes of apprehension could be stigmatized as clinging to imaginary values, while the mainstream civilization masters the symbolic, and that most abstract form of symbolism that is not just cash, but virtual cash.

Or is not the struggle over? There would be nothing else to do but assess the mechanics of interaction between cultural groups as they become intensified by the new media of communication, so that it becomes possible for cultural groups to dispense from local territory and their members to build a strong and valuable sense of diasporic identity. This is the world of transnational collective identities that Arjun Appadurai foresaw.12 The deterritorialization of culture would be encouraged by the need for diasporas to link to the culture of their native country through international cultural productions. Such an optimistic vision of globalization sees the advent of a positive hybridity (called creolization in some contexts). Even the dissemination of mainstream western productions is not necessarily seen as a threat because this cultural imperialism can creatively be distorted and lends itself to creative and humorous reappropriations.

In Cosmopolitanism (2006), Kwame Anthony Appiah insists on a transnational identity that tends toward homogenization; he points out that syncretism

---

is not a new thing, as cultural identity, local though it may be, has always resulted from contaminations. Even ancient Egypt was not as insular as to exclude foreign influence. If cosmopolitanism results in moral universalism, the temptations of colonialism might return—willing the peoples’ bliss against their needs. It is necessary to make sure that marginalized, stifled voices from the margins, from beyond the borders could be heard. Deterritorialization can also be, after Deleuze and Guattari, a usage of the other in reference to the subject that is the only thing that matters, an oblique approach that is not necessarily wrong, if one considers that Alexis de Tocqueville’s study on Democracy in America (1831) stemmed from an inquiry into the prison system in the United States with the purpose of improving it in France, and went beyond this scope because its author had another agenda—to liberate France from its old regime limitations.

At this point a distinction should be made, clearly put to light by the revolutions in the Middle East over the last few decades, or even going back to the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Cosmopolitanism in all its forms is more easily accessible to the ruling elites of developing countries than to the working classes. Cosmopolitanism and the cultural hybridity of world culture have little to offer to the inferior classes, even in their diasporas in the more developed countries. As is more and more universally admitted, intercultural exchanges are essential to any active cultural community. Cultural transfers, métissage, hybridity, creolization are loosely referred to, somewhat subjectively, even affectively. But the essentialist prejudice on the inner consistency of cultures lives on. How to gauge the structuring value of cultural transfers? How can they converge? To what extent does culture play a role in power games, or is this link cultural?

The post-colonial, post-national world of globalization suggests a more general question: is it possible to contemplate post-cultural identities? The excitement of communicating with the global village contradicts an urge to acknowledge oneself as distinct from the others, to be localized. Should this lead to a gendered approach of globalisation vs. localisation? A bundle of stereotypical associations tumbles open: if there is resistance, then there is oppression and its victims—should the victims be protected, or provided sanctuary? A benevolent sense of superiority lurks, with simplified oppositions, as Louise Yelin¹⁴ and Carla Freeman¹⁵ have exposed it: the dichotomy

---

male/power/globalisation/western homogenisation vs. female/local/resistance/unadulterated culture results in a reduction of the local to negativity in reference to a standard process. It may also lead to ignorance of the play of interactions that have always kept cultural communities alive.

What then is the dimension, the perimeter of re-localisation? We are witnessing this debate in crisis-ridden Europe, in emerging nations as they are caught in various integration strategies, religious wars, conflicts over natural resources that question national boundaries. There may be territories—in the Americanist milieu one could use the term *frontier* as it is proposed by Gloria Anzaldúa, while remaining cautious about the traps of metaphors—where the localization of minoritized cultures, crisscrossed with dialogical cultural inputs, can produce temporarily identifiable discourses. They are Mary Louise Pratt’s ‘contact zones’ or Edouard Glissant’s “cultural zones” that serve as crucibles for the contemporary dialogical American novel. In these privileged frontiers one can contemplate that a culture is a crucible of information, experiences, economic exchanges, and more importantly sort out the voice of agents that are not the second or third person of the colonial discourse.

To conclude—more than ever, the status of peripheral cultural groups and the individuals who identify with them cannot be considered from the point of view of unbalanced power struggles between major actors and minor subjects; in a global world intercultural relations operate at several levels, and members of minoritized groups can to some (more or less large) extent choose their levels of involvement in various cultural communities. New terms of discussion emerge, new discourses allow new types of interactions, while this flexibility is also offset by threats of an unprecedented scale, like the destructive power of weapons of mass destruction, the extensive capabilities for private spying and above all the threats on the natural environment of the planet. Strangely, those threats can be causing more insularity as mortal humans face possible global changes their race has been responsible for that are far beyond their capacity to comprehend them in a life time.

---


Bibliography


Mondialisation, minoritarité et conscience altéritaire

*Emir Delic*

[...] et si des fois il semble
que moi je suis pas tout là imagine le pauvre
monde lui elle nous autres tous
et qui parfois s'ignorent sinon se méconnaissent¹ [sic]

_Consciousness is the teacher helping you with your boots._²

**Introduction**

Dans son ouvrage intitulé _Globalization. The Human Consequences_, Zygmunt Bauman cible avec acuité la profonde ambivalence entourant ce vocable qui s'impose, depuis plus d’un quart de siècle, comme un fétiche : “For some, “globalization” is what we are bound to do if we wish to be happy ; for others[,] “globalization” is the cause of our unhappiness.”³ Serait-il fortuit que ce constat du sociologue polono-britannique vaille à bien des égards autant pour la mondialisation que pour l’appartenance à une minorité ? Si le fait d’être mondialisé et être minoritaire peuvent, en effet, tous deux se voir traités à la fois de fléau et de félicité, c’est parce qu’ils partagent un même trait saillant, à savoir l’incertitude de l’avenir des sujets qui évoluent dans ces conditions. Il n’est pas inutile de rappeler dans ce contexte que la mondialisation – au premier chef celle des cultures, elle-même inextricable de celle des marchés –, tout en permettant la multiplication et la diversification des lieux de socialisation, a occasionné la fragmentation et l’étiolement des repères identitaires à l’échelle planétaire. Les

---

1 Robert Dickson, _Abris nocturnes_ (Sudbury : Prise de parole, 1986), 32. Désormais les références à cette œuvre seront indiquées par le sigle AB, suivi du folio, et placées entre parenthèses dans le texte.

2 Patrice Desbiens, _L’homme invisible/The Invisible Man_ (Sudbury : Prise de parole, 2008 [1981]), 27.


© EMIR DELIC, 2015 | DOI 10.1163/9789004282087_004

This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the prevailing CC-BY-NC License at the time of publication.
dynamiques inédites d’exclusions et d’inclusions sociales qui en ont résulté ont eu pour effet de fragiliser et de complexifier les processus d’identification dans nombre d’États-nations modernes qui tenaient presque pour close la question de leur identité collective respective. Cette donne n’est cependant pas nouvelle pour les diverses minorités culturelles éparpillées aux quatre coins du monde. Tout au contraire, les traversant depuis toujours, la fragilité et la complexité sont leurs biens communs. Car, quels qu’en soient les causes et les effets particuliers, l’une et l’autre informent l’imaginaire minoritaire tant sur le plan individuel que sur le plan collectif.

Comment expliquer alors que, dans le corpus de plus en plus volumineux des études portant sur la problématique identitaire, rares sont encore aujourd’hui les analyses qui tendent une oreille attentive aux dynamiques relationnelles régissant les univers marginaux et mouvants des minorités culturelles comme celles du Canada francophone ? N’y aurait-il pas pourtant lieu de croire qu’à force de composer avec l’opiniâtre présence de l’autre qui les infiltre quotidiennement, elles recèlent, elles aussi, des connaissances et des pratiques sur le vivre-ensemble ? Les sociétés minoritaires n’auraient-elles pas enfin une contribution majeure à apporter au développement contemporain des sociétés des savoirs ?

Ce sont là les questions qui forment la toile de fond de cette étude qui aura pour objet de proposer une réflexion épistémocritique sur l’être minoritaire. En s’inspirant de l’anthropologie philosophique de Paul Ricœur et en s’appuyant sur les littératures minoritaires du Canada francophone, elle aura deux orientations complémentaires. D’une part, il s’agira d’interroger la méconnaissance des minorités culturelles à l’ère de la mondialisation à partir de l’hypothèse que cette méconnaissance ressortit, par-delà l’indifférence affichée par


6 Voir François Paré, Théories de la fragilité (Ottawa: Le Nordir, 1994).

les cultures majoritaires, à un malaise épistémologique. D'autre part, le rapport à soi du sujet minoritaire constituant un élément primordial frappé par ce malaise, la tâche sera de développer une modélisation de ce rapport qui s'articulera autour de la notion de conscience altéritaire. Ainsi viserons-nous à mettre en lumière non seulement que les cultures minoritaires sont porteuses d'immenses richesses heuristiques, mais encore et surtout que ces richesses ne sont accessibles qu'à la condition de reconnaître pleinement la nécessité d'une pensée théorique et critique des conditions de vie spécifiques du sujet minoritaire.

La méconnaissance des minorités culturelles

Au rang des auteurs franco-canadiens les plus éloquents sur le thème des minorités, on compte la romancière acadienne France Daigle. Si la précarité et les contradictions congénitales de sujets marginaux représentent des constantes dans son œuvre, son troisième roman y consacre un traitement particulièrement subtil. Se déployant par l'imbrication de courts fragments narratifs apparentés aux instantanés, *Histoire de la maison qui brûle. Vaguement suivi d'un dernier regard sur la maison qui brûle* tresse la trame de deux fables enchâssées où s'entrelacent espaces et temps, passés et présents, petite histoire et grande Histoire. Aussi la forme y rencontre-t-elle le fond, tant et si bien que même les larges intervalles blancs, au propre comme au figuré, qui, de page en page, séparent les fragments de texte des deux fables, se muent en espaces lourds de sens. En effet, l'aménagement typographique de cette œuvre rhapsodique a partie liée avec une alternation savamment rythmée entre paroles et silences, l'ici et l'ailleurs, le soi et l'autre, soulignant de la sorte l'amphibologie fondamentale inhérente au devenir des peuples minoritaires, écartelés qu'ils sont entre “crainte” et “espoir” devant l'éventualité de leur anéantissement.

---

10 Les fragments narratifs de l'œuvre occupent entre une à neuf lignes de texte, la majorité d'entre eux n'en dépassant pas six. Le texte de la page gauche est toujours aligné au haut de la page ; et le texte de la page droite, au bas de la page.
11 On notera que le premier livre de France Daigle s'intitule *Sans jamais parler du vent. Roman de crainte et d'espoir que la mort arrive à temps* (Moncton : Éditions d’Acadie, 1983).
Voilà qui renvoie à l’une des plus grandes apories caractéristiques de toute communauté évoluant en situation de marginalité, aporie qui relève d’une tension constante entre l’apparition et la disparition de soi et que le poète franco-ontarien Patrice Desbiens place au centre de son écriture. C’est notamment le cas de son récit poétique *Homme invisible*/*Invisible Man*. Dans cette œuvre “bi-langue,” qui raconte le récit de vie d’un Franco-Ontarien en quête de soi, Desbiens sonde enprofondeur le ballotement entre les deux désirs qui accaparent peu ou prou l’esprit de tout sujet minoritaire : celui de s’afficher et celui de se renier en tant que tel. Il est questions de deux désirs aussi ardents que lacinnants :

Voilà l’homme invisible qui se promène le long des rues de la ville de Québec.
Planant sous la surface des choses comme un sous-marin.

[...]

Apparaît.
Disparaît.
Apparaît.
Disparaît.
Le jeu de l’homme invisible.
Attention tassez-vous le vlà [sic] qui repart.
Glouglou glouglou.

*So the invisible man is walking along and around the streets of Quebec City. Gliding like a submarine just beneath the surface of things.*

[...]

*Appear.*
*Disappear.*
*Appear.*
*Disappear.*
*The game of the invisible man.*

---

12 Il s’agit véritablement d’un récit, non pas bilingue, mais en “deux langues,” les deux versions française et anglaise correspondant rarement l’une à l’autre. Elles cherchent plutôt à se compléter dans leurs perspectives contrastées. Dès l’incipit, on lit par exemple : “L’homme invisible est né à Timmins, Ontario./Il est Franco-Ontarien.”/“The invisible man was born in Timmins, Ontario./He is French-Canadian.” (Desbiens, 22–23 ; nous soulignons).
Si Patrice Desbiens est le premier, du moins au Canada francophone, à thématiser aussi explicitement la dialectique apparaître-disparaître, François Paré est le premier à la théoriser. Ce dernier affirme que l’on peut tenir “ces deux verbes, apparemment inoffensifs enracinés dans le spectacle et la magie,” pour “les effrayants syntagmes dans lesquels toute la vie des individus minoritaires se résume.” Pour s’en convaincre, il suffit de revenir à Histoire de la maison qui brûle. Vaguement suivi d’un dernier regard sur la maison qui brûle de Daigle. À y regarder de près, le titre de l’œuvre reflète à lui seul l’oscillation perpétuelle entre l’apparition et la disparition de soi se déployant en milieu minoritaire. En ce sens, l’image de “la maison qui brûle,” plus précisément l’image de la maison qui est en train de brûler et qui, semble-t-il, ne finira jamais de brûler, traduit avec finesse la vision endémique du cataclysme collectif qui hante les minoritaires et qui renvoie à l’idée que, puisqu’ils composent sans trêve avec une dilution, sinon une dissolution, de leur espace vital, ils seraient toujours en voie d’extinction. Il n’empêche qu’en dépit de ce pronostic funeste, ils endurent, ils persistent, comme s’ils appartenaient à “une race qui ne sait pas mourir,” pour reprendre la célèbre caractérisation des Canadiens français par Louis Hémon. Cette persistance se signale également dans le titre du roman de Daigle. C’est que, de cette “maison qui brûle,” il existe une “histoire” et, par surcroît, une “histoire” qui, à l’instar de son objet, ne cesse de se projeter dans la continuité en s’assortissant d’une suite incarnée par un “regard” rétrospectif et transformateur. Qui plus est, la persistance rattachée à la condition minoritaire ne se manifeste pas ici seulement au niveau de la représentation. Elle s’inscrit également au niveau de l’effectuation dans la mesure où la simple existence du roman de Daigle prévient, très expressément, la consommation

13 Desbiens, 70–71.
15 Paré, Théories, 21.

De fait, il faut souligner avec force qu’à défaut de territoire physique clairement identifié et identifiable qui leur appartienne en propre, la majorité des groupes minoritaires misent sur l’espace imaginaire, culturel, pour contrer la disparition qui les guette. C’est dans cette perspective que Fernand Dorais, dans ses études pionnières du fait français en Ontario au début des années 1980, soutient que les francophones de cette province canadienne majoritairement anglophone devraient s’appliquer à “compenser l’espace physique par l’espace culturel.”\footnote{Fernand Dorais, \textit{Entre Montréal et…Sudbury : pré-textes pour une francophonie ontarienne} (Sudbury: Prise de parole, 1984), 68.} Aussi le discours, \textit{lato sensu}, s’avère-t-il le principal vecteur de survie et d’éprouvonsissement des groupes minoritaires, en particulier des groupes linguistiquement minoritaires comme les Acadiens et les Franco-Ontariens.\footnote{“La littérature, parce qu’elle est ni plus ni moins qu’un discours, est le mode d’existence privilégié des peuples minoritaires,” souligne François Paré dans \textit{Les littératures de l’exiguïté} (Ottawa: Le Nordir, 2001[1992], 35).} Or, pour créer et maintenir un espace discursif apte à sous-tendre une culture, ne faut-il pas pouvoir désigner la réalité propre à cette culture ? Ne faut-il pas pouvoir la nommer ?\footnote{Voir Nathalie Bélanger \textit{et al.} (dir.), \textit{Produire et reproduire la francophonie en la nommant} (Sudbury: Prise de parole, 2010).} Maus aussitôt la question posée, le couperet tombe: l’acte de nommer ne va guère de soi en contexte minoritaire, au point qu’il peine souvent à échapper à un certain flou sémantique se cristallisant dans un véritable malaise lexical.

La dénomination va effectivement si peu de soi dans les sociétés minoritaires qu’elle peine souvent à échapper à un flou sémantique se cristallisant dans un véritable malaise lexical. Prenons, à titre d’exemple, le domaine de la littérature. Une variété de termes-concepts ont vu le jour au cours des trois dernières décennies pour désigner les littératures “périphériques,” “dominées,” que nous avons nous-mêmes choisi de qualifier de “minoritaires.”\footnote{Ce choix tient, entre autres, à des fins de connivence avec des contextes linguistiques autres que le contexte francophone. Rappelons qu’on dit “literatura minoritaria” en espagnol, “minority literature” en anglais et “Minoritäten-Literatur” en allemand.} Les deux

```
désignations ayant remporté le plus grand succès sont sans doute les "littératures mineures" et les "littératures de l'exiguïté." Parmi les expressions moins connues, quoique tout aussi valables, figurent les "littératures d'émergence," les "littératures de l'intranquillité," les "littératures liminaires," les "littératures de la résilience," les "littératures de la contiguïté" et, tout récemment, les "littératures de la traversée." Révélateur du fait que les écritures minoritaire s'abreuvent aux sources d'une réalité polyvalente, le foisonnement des expressions visant à décrire ces écritures n'est donc pas niable. Toujours est-il que la préférence d'une expression sur l'autre importe moins, en réalité, que la nécessité, soulignée directement ou indirectement par chacun des critiques, d'une "pensée de l'exiguïté," c'est-à-dire d'une pensée mettant en avant des modèles théoriques et des outils analytiques qui tiennent compte des conditions spécifiques de production et de diffusion des "petites" littératures et cultures. Si alors, comme il vient d'être mentionné, les diverses


24 Paré, *Les littératures*.


dénouements des dénouements (voir la réalité des littératures et des cultures minoritaires de manières différentes, manières qui se montrent tantôt en contraste, tantôt en opposition, des schèmes perceptifs et interprétatifs issus des cultures dominantes, majoritairement européennes.\textsuperscript{32} Vu sous cet angle, le malaise lexical, diffus mais incontournable, qui caractérise la réflexion sur les minorités de par le monde cache en dernière instance un malaise épistémologique. Résultat ? Les savoirs “autres” dont sont investies les peuples minoritaires, y compris les savoirs sur le vivre-ensemble si prisés à l’ère de la mondialisation, se trouvent ou bien complètement ignorés, ou bien relégués à l’insignifiance.

A vrai dire, c’est dans le souci de ne pas tendre, tant soit peu, au malaise épistémologique alimentant la méconnaissance des minorités que nous avons évité jusqu’ici à dessein l’adjectif “minorisé” et le substantif qui est en dérivé, soit la “minorisation.” C’est que ces termes usités, du moins dans le langage critique, renferment d’emblée des connotations négatives, privatives, peu importe qu’on leur donne une coloration active ou passive. Prise dans son acception active, la minorisation se réfère, on le sait, à l’amoindrissement de la valeur ou de la qualité de quelqu’un ou de quelque chose, le plus ordinairement à des fins d’exclusion et d’oppression. Quant à son acception passive, qui est moins répandue, citons la définition communément acceptée qu’en donne François Paré dans ses retentissantes \textit{Littératures de l’exiguïté} : “La minorisation est la pensée vivante du minoritaire vécue en chacun des individus. Elle est un état d’esprit, une condition absolue de désespoir de ne jamais pouvoir s’accomplir dans le discours dominant.”\textsuperscript{33} Or, si le sujet minoritaire se réalise certes en composant avec une certaine privation, pour ne pas dire avec certaines dimensions existentielles destructives, on ne doit pas oublier qu’il est également en mesure de bénéficier des dimensions proprement productives de sa condition. Soyons clairs: loin de nous l’idée de glorifier les marges, de faire fi des conditions de vie éprouvantes qui sont les leurs, mais on se tromperait sévèrement de penser que celles-ci ne revêtent que des traits négatifs. Après tout, que les minorités culturelles réussissent, comme nous l’avons signalé ci-dessus, à tirer de leur précarité une stabilité, cela n’est-il pas révélateur de leur capacité unique de transformer la négativité en positivité ?\textsuperscript{34} Et cette capacité ne constituerait-elle pas leur plus grand bien ?

\textsuperscript{32} À ce sujet, on lira avec intérêt Winfried Siemerling, \textit{Récits nord-américains d’émergence : culture, écriture et politique de re/connaissance}, Patricia Godbout (trad.) (Québec: PUL, 2010).
\textsuperscript{33} Paré, \textit{Les littératures}, 27.
\textsuperscript{34} Si plusieurs critiques œuvrant dans le domaine des littératures minoritaires ont fait valoir cette capacité, Raoul Boudreau la souligne sans ambages alors qu’il propose son concept
C'est dans le but précis de ne pas négliger la richesse et la portée de telles dimensions productives et généralement insoupçonnées des cultures minoritaires qu'il nous semble indiqué de recourir au terme de *minoritarité*. Par ce terme, qui se veut le contrepoint nominal de l'adjectif “minoritaire” et qui a l'avantage de ne pas évoquer *a priori* de connotations négatives ou positives, il faut donc entendre l'être minoritaire dans toute l'acception du terme.

**La conscience altéritaire: une modélisation du rapport à soi**

C'est un aspect particulier de la minoritarité qui fera l’objet de la seconde partie de cette contribution. Il sera question plus précisément d'explorer le rapport à soi du sujet minoritaire à la faveur d'une incursion dans l'œuvre philosophique de Paul Ricœur et dans l'œuvre littéraire de deux auteurs francophones, à savoir le poète Robert Dickson et le romancier Daniel Poliquin.

Commençons par le postulat suivant: le propre des cultures minoritaires, c'est la relation asymétrique qu'elles entretiennent au pouvoir. Continuons par une mise au point: l'asymétrie de cette relation résulte du décalage entre vouloir-pouvoir et ne pas pouvoir *comme* l'autre dominant. Pour éclairer les enjeux que soulève ce décalage, il paraît utile de convoquer au rendez-vous l’herméneutique du soi de Ricœur telle qu’élaborée surtout dans ses ouvrages *Soi-même comme un autre* et *Parcours de la reconnaissance*. Ce qui invite d'emblée au recours aux travaux du philosophe français est le fait que son herméneutique du soi s'articule autour de l'idée de l'*homo capax*, de l'homme capable. Capable de quoi? Capable, somme toute, de se réaliser pleinement. Soit. Mais qu'en est-il de l'*homo incapax*? Qu'en est-il de sa réalisation de soi?  

---


36 Ricœur écrit “J’aimerais porter au premier plan mon insistance [...] sur la fonction de rassemblement conceptuel que j’attache à l’idée de l’*homo capax*. Sous ce thème j’essaie
Le sujet minoritaire pourrait-il être rapproché de l'homme incapable ? Il est permis de le penser pour peu que l'on convienne que l'incapacité signifie dans ce contexte, non pas un manque total de capacité, mais une capacité moindre par rapport à la capacité possédée le sujet majoritaire – pensons à l'Anglo-Canadien au Canada, au Français en France et au Québécois au Québec.

Cela dit, ce sur quoi il faut s'attarder dans la vaste réflexion de Ricœur, c'est la notion clef d’“attestation de soi.” Au moyen de cette notion, le philosophe entend cerner le mode aléthique particulier à son herméneutique. L'attestation de soi, en ce sens, est définie comme "l'assurance [...] d'exister sur le mode de l'ipséité," terme que Ricœur emploie pour insister sur la réflexivité foncière rattachée à la constitution de tout sujet. De façon analogue, l'attestation est également définie comme “confiance” du sujet en soi, ou, ce qui revient au même, comme “confiance” du sujet dans quatre types de capacités réflexives ou de pouvoirs-faire qui structurent son accomplissement et son appréhension de soi, à savoir son pouvoir de dire, son pouvoir d'agir (au sens d'accomplir des actes immédiats), son pouvoir de raconter et de se raconter et son pouvoir de s'imputer ses actions (au sens de s'attribuer la responsabilité de ses actes). Remarquons en outre que l'attestation a un contraire spécifique, le “soupçon,” lequel renvoie à tout ce qui met en déroute la confiance en soi. Si c'est là la situation du sujet en apparence neutre, mais en réalité majoritaire, que Ricœur a en vue, que dire du sujet minoritaire ? Que dire du sujet qui, loin de composer avec un soupçon que nous pourrions qualifier d'ordinaire, doit faire face à un soupçon persistant et ubiquitaire, soupçon qui fragilise l'attestation de soi au point que la confiance du sujet dans ses différents pouvoirs-faire se mue en méfiance ? En pareille occurrence – et en dépit du résumé très grosier que nous venons de faire de la pensée ricœurienne – il est possible d'affirmer que le contraire de l'attestation de soi est, non point le soupçon, mais une véritable contestation de soi. Il est impossible de ne pas signaler qu'on trouve des échos de cette opposition spécifique entre attention et contestation sur le terrain langagier, là où significations et usages des mots s'éclairent autant qu'ils de regrouper les capacités et incapacités diverses qui font des humains des êtres agissant et souffrants. Si les notions de poiesis et de praxis sont amplement développées, dans mon œuvre, la contrepartie du subir, du pâtir et du souffrir l'est moins. ("Une réponse de Paul Ricœur," dans Joy Morny (dir.), Paul Ricœur and Narrative : Context and Contestation (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1997), xlv.)

38 Ricœur, Soi-même, 351.
40 Ricœur, Soi-même, 34–35, 393–401.
se déterminent. Ainsi, on ne s'étonnera pas de constater que l'attestation de soi d'une minorité s'accompagne généralement de gains de cause en matière de contestations, soient-elles de nature sociale, judiciaire, politique ou autre. Les Franco-Canadiens, les Gallois, les Frisons, les Basques, les Kosovars, les kurdes, les Tibétains, sans parler de toutes les populations indigènes du soi-disant “Nouveau Monde,” les Maoris, autant d'exemples patents qui en témoignent.

Si la contestation se révèle de la sorte comme l'apanage du sujet minoritaire, il reste à interroger l'impact de cette opposition particulière entre attestation et contestation sur le rapport à soi. Pour ce faire, il convient de tourner notre regard vers la fin de *Soi-même comme un autre*, où Ricœur expose le lien qui noue l'ipséité à l'altérité. L'originalité de son analyse pénétrante de ce lien réside en ceci qu'il fait voir combien l'altérité est inséparable de l'ipséité. Au fond, elle en est constitutive, s'y incorporant par le biais de différentes expériences de passivité, elles-mêmes réparties entre trois modalités: le corps propre (la chaire), autrui et la conscience. De ces modalités, nous mettrons de côté les deux premières pour nous pencher sur la troisième. C'est que la conscience constitue une modalité de “passivité-altérité” bien étrange dans la mesure où, tel que le signale la métaphore de la voix de la conscience, elle nous place dans une situation d'écoute des plus paradoxales. À bien y penser, cette voix, qui semble s'élever des tréfonds obscurs de notre être, se présente néanmoins comme un appel provenant en dehors de nous-mêmes. Mais ce n'est pas tout: Ricœur montre qu'à ce phénomène unique d’“injonction,” il faut joindre celui d'attestation, étant donné que la conscience s'avère indispensable à l'affirmation de notre assurance d'exister. Il en découle que la conscience apparaît simultanément comme injonction faite au soi et comme attestation de soi. Au demeurant, toujours d'après Ricœur, la conscience, parce qu'elle occupe une position en tiers par rapport à autrui et au corps propre, est non seulement l'expérience de passivité la plus opaque, mais elle projette sa force d'attestation sur les deux autres expériences de passivité. Autant dire, selon nous, que toute modification dans la modalité de passivité-altérité de la

---

41 Il va sans dire que nous employons faute de mieux cette appellation pour désigner les francophones minoritaires du Canada. Le malaise lexical évoqué plus haut commence manifestement par l'auto-désignation.
42 Voir la contribution de Thomas Pierre dans ce volume.
43 Voir la contribution de Molly Chatalic dans ce volume.
conscience, et donc dans sa force d’attestation, se répercute sur les modalités de passivité-altérité d’autrui et du corps propre, puisqu’elle offre cette particularité remarquable de les traverser par principe.

Avec cette conception ricœurienne de la conscience présente à l’esprit, allons tout droit au nœud du problème: comment la contestation de soi,apanage de l’être minoritaire, se manifeste-t-elle au niveau de la conscience, soit au niveau le plus opaque de l’attestation de soi ? Une démarche opportune à l’exploration de cette question vient de se signaler. Comme la conscience se projette sur les deux autres modalités de passivité-altérité placées avant elle, ne pourrions-nous pas atteindre la conscience en remontant en quelque sorte la pente à partir du corps propre et en passant par autrui ? Mais ne venons-nous pas alors d’écarter ces deux modalités de passivité-altérité ? Cela est vrai.

Il n’empêche que, si nous devions marquer le corps propre se manifestant en milieu minoritaire d’un seul trait déterminant, ne pourrions-nous pas dire qu’il est marqué au coin d’une certaine intempestivité ? Car, pour le sujet minoritaire, affirmer sa présence dans l’espace social, c’est inéluctablement se livrer, se découvrir, en chair et en os, dans un espace qu’il habite certes, mais qui n’est pas intégralement le sien dans l’ordre socioculturel, politique et surtout symbolique. Voilà pourquoi sa présence ne saurait s’affirmer que par accès, par excès.48 Et si l’affirmation de soi du sujet minoritaire a ainsi des allures intempestives dans le monde qu’il habite, n’est-ce pas parce qu’autrui, par son regard et par sa réaction à son endroit, la rend telle ? Et si tel est le cas, n’est-ce pas parce que l’ordre établi par le “groupe de référence,”49 soit par le groupe

---

48 Dans sa discussion de l’air excessif que prend la présence du sujet minoritaire dans l’espace, Paré écrit : “Ne suffit-il pas d’avoir un jour commandé en français dans un train ou un avion au Canada un vulgaire café ou autre friandise en soi sans importance pour sentir dans le visage du préposé anglophone l’intensité de la différence qui s’exacerbe en nous ? Et cette criante différence (elle est pourtant si fragile!) vient toujours briser, à ce qu’il nous semble, le ronronnement, la douceur opiniâtre de l’unanimité autour de nous. L’air, dans ces cas-là, n’est plus tout à fait le même. En nous, l’invisibilité s’est exposée au grand jour” (Théories, 23).

49 Nous reprenons d’Eric Landowski le terme de groupe de référence. Il le définit dans Présences de l’autre. Essais de socio-sémiotique II (Paris : puf, 1997) : “Ce qui sépare le groupe de référence des groupes qu’il pose par rapport à lui-même comme étrangers, comme autres ou comme déviants, ce n’est jamais en effet, “tout simplement” ni une différence de substance produite par des dysfonctionnements sociaux, ni même quelque hétérogénéité préétablie en nature (quitter à ce que les dysfonctionnements en question aient pour effet de l’accentuer) et qui, en s’imposant comme des données de fait, suffiraient pour démarrer les frontières entre identités distinctes. En réalité, les différences pertinentes, celles sur la base desquelles se cristallisent les véritables
majoritaire qui gouverne l'espace social, accuse la non appartenance, l'étrangeté, bref, l'altérité, de la présence du sujet minoritaire ? Si alors, dans son rapport quotidien au monde (relatif à l'altérité du corps propre) et dans celui à ses semblables (relatif à l'altérité d'autrui), tout indique au sujet minoritaire qu'il "n'en est pas" ou qu'il "n'en est pas tout à fait," bref qu'il est xenos, c'est-à-dire un étranger bénéficiant de l'hospitalité d'autrui, il est difficile de voir comment son rapport à soi (relatif à l'altérité de la conscience) n'en serait pas "affecté," au sens phénoménologique d'influencé. Comment, en effet, dans la situation de contestation de soi que le sujet minoritaire vit au jour le jour dans ses rapports au monde et à ses semblables, la voix de la conscience pourrait-elle ne pas faire résonner en son for intérieur pour lui dire : "Tu es autre ?" Et, dès qu'il est lancé, cet appel n'est-il pas reçu ?

Que l'ipséité du sujet minoritaire se trouve contestée de cette manière dans tous les "foyers" de passivité-altérité n'est pas sans conséquences. D'autant plus que cette contestation va s'amplifiant en cascadant, par une espèce de choc en retour, de la conscience en direction des foyers d'altérité-passivité d'autrui et du corps propre. Il s'ensuit que le sujet minoritaire, se sachant autre "de bout en bout," s'avère investi d'un sentiment aigu, exacerbé, de son existence. Dans cette perspective, il est possible d'envisager qu'il possède une conscience altéritaire, soit une surconscience de soi-même comme un autre. Cette notion entend traduire ce qui réside au cœur de la manière spécifique dont il s'atteste dans le champ pratique: l'intensification foncière de son rapport à soi.

Qu'est-ce qui caractérise ce rapport intensifié à soi ? Quels en sont les signes ? Pour répondre à ces questions, le recueil Abris nocturnes de Robert Dickson nous servira de référence première puisqu'il ausculte soigneusement les dimensions variées de la conscience altéritaire du sujet minoritaire, ainsi qu'en témoigne admirablement le poème "ça fait tellement longtemps...":

tout se mêle en un vif...

...sentiments identitaires, ne sont jamais entièrement tracées d'avance : elles n'existent que dans la mesure où les sujets les construisent et que sous la forme qu'ils leur donnent. Avant cela, il n'y a à vrai dire, entre les identités en formation, que de purs différences positionnelles, presque indéterminées quant aux contenus des unités qu'elles opposent" (25–26).

50 Nous songeons évidemment ici à la notion de not-quite de Homi Bhabha, élaborée dans The Location of Culture (London : Routledge, 2004 [1994]), 121–131), mais aussi à celle d'être-en-que-lque-sorte de François Paré, développée dans Théories de la fragilité (54–65).

51 Ricœur, Soi-même, 368.
et jeunesse subite aubaine
ou rivière de conscience incertaine
coulant sans forcer
sans frayère d’une autre ère
que la mienne.

_AN, 16–17_

Avoir une conscience altéritaire, c’est donc s’accomplir et s’apprêhender en ayant toujours, à divers degrés, son existence, son être, _sur la conscience_. Impliquant un retrait sur soi d’un genre particulier (“sans frayère d’une autre ère/que la mienne”), cet état d’esprit découle de l’impression vive, tantôt confuse et obscure, tantôt crue et cuisante, que son être-dans-le-monde est autre (“_tout_ se mêle en un vif”). Mais qu’est-ce qui éveille cette impression ? Il ne peut s’agir que de la reconnaissance du manque de ses pouvoirs-faire en regard des pouvoirs-faire du sujet majoritaire ? Il en procède que la conscience altéritaire jaillit au flanc de l’écart entre vouloir-pouvoir-faire et ne pas pouvoir-faire _comme_ l’autre dominant. Et cela, à commencer par l’acte de s’exprimer :

je tente d’écrire et mes doigts boivent
l’encre je tente de parler et mes
lèvres se polluent je tente d’aimanter et j’éloigne […]
[...] j’essaie d’
essayer mais la tentative échoue.

_AB, 40_

Alors que, dans le poème “automnales” duquel sont tirés ces vers, le “je” poétique _d’Abris nocturnes_ fait valoir que ses tentatives d’exprimer sa réalité de minoritaire se soldent par un échec, dans le poème suivant, intitulé “d’âpres après,” il dévoile l’impact affectif, voire existentiel, de cet embarras :

d’âpres après à arracher un sens absent où les ongles glissent sur le tissu déchiqueté d’équivoque : pâleur mâle, vertige de tige vide. automne à l’instant même.

---

52 Au sens heideggérien. Voir Martin Heidegger, _Sein und Zeit_, 19e éd. (Tübingen : Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2006 [1927]).
l’instant d’après, amande et sans explication. absent, comme anéanti : le goût douteux de s’anéantir. mieux vaut dormir, remplir ce vide, non le creuser davantage, sans gain aucun

AN, 43

Ainsi que l’évoque ce passage, le retrait sur soi qui caractérise la conscience altéritaire du sujet minoritaire prend d’emblée des allures énigmatiques, dés- stabilisantes, d’un “sens absent,” “anéanti.” Toutes les vertus représentatives et curatives des “mots” censés dire des “choses” apparaissent alors comme suspendues, du moins temporairement, à “l’instant d’après,” à l’instant qui suit une nouvelle tentative de dire, de se dire. Qui pis est, dans le sillage de cette défaillance langagière répétée, (res)surgit “le goût douteux de s’anéantir,” de se renier, généralement en s’inclinant devant les forces assimilatrices de la majorité. Il n’en demeure pas moins que cette tentative de se faire disparaître en se fondant dans la masse majoritaire s’évanouira aussitôt au profit de quelque chose de “mieux.” Ce virage s’amorcera par le désir de “remplir ce vide,” et ce, non en recourant au langage de l’autre dominant (celui-là même qui ne promet “aucun gain”), mais en se dotant d’un langage apte à exprimer la minorité (qui, lui, prend forme grâce à une expérience de nature onirique). Comme nous réservons pour la fin de notre réflexion l’analyse de cette issue favorable de la trajectoire du sujet minoritaire, laquelle est parfaitement incarnée par le “je” poétique de Dickson, traitons pour l’heure des deux versants, négatif et positif, de la conscience altéritaire.

D’abord, il importe de souligner que, si d’avoir une conscience altéritaire revient à avoir son être “sur la conscience,” cela ne signifie pas, comme pourrait le suggérer l’emploi habituel de cette expression qui bascule volontiers dans les connotations anathématiques, que la conscience altéritaire implique un quelconque éventail de déterminations aprioristiques. À l’instar de la conception ricœurienne de la conscience “dé-moralisée,” la conscience altéritaire telle qu’elle est envisagée ici n’est intrinsèquement ni “bonne” ni “mauvaise.” Fondamentalement “in-/certaine,” “coulant sans forcer,” (AN, 17), pour reprendre de nouveau les mots de Dickson, elle se conçoit plutôt comme une structure cognitive dynamique dont les sens (les valeurs sémiotiques) et, oserait-on dire, les usages (les valeurs pragmatiques) dépendent de l’expérience vivante, chaque fois différente, qu’en fait le sujet qui s’en trouve investi.

54 Voir Ricoeur, Soi-même, 401–404.
Aucunement dit, tout dépend de la manière dont la conscience altéritaire est supportée. On peut soit “mal” la supporter ou, mieux sans doute, la supporter comme un mal, avec difficulté ou, tout simplement, avec embarras (tel que nous supportons un malheur ou une infortune qui nous afflige), soit “bien” la supporter ou la supporter comme un bien, avec succès, voire avec enthousiasme (tel que nous supportons une cause ou une équipe de sport dont nous sommes épris). Tâchons maintenant d’expliquer davantage ces deux dimensions. À cette fin, le cheminement identitaire du personnage de Calvin Winter dans le roman *L’écureuil noir* de Daniel Poliquin*55* fournit un terrain fertile. Originaire d’une “petite ville de Huronie”*56* *(EN*, 31) et établi dans le quartier, historiquement francophone, de la Côte-de-Sable à Ottawa, Calvin, à la fois héros et antihéros du roman, incarne à bien des égards une figure emblématique du sujet minoritaire. À vrai dire, ce personnage franco-ontarien trace un parcours de vie pétri de perplexités, dont la moindre n'est pas qu'il est le fils d'un Québécois royaliste et d'une huguenote loyaliste, legs familial contradictoire s'il en est un. Maintenant, ce qui doit retenir notre attention chez ce personnage, c'est son désir de “changer de vie” *(EN*, 16) en vue d'acquérir une “vérité nouvelle de [s]on existence” *(EN*, 20). Bien qu'il caresse ce désir depuis longtemps, il se décide seulement à le réaliser au tournant de la quarantaine, à l'époque où il doit passer des nuits à veiller son père malade à l'hôpital. C'est après une telle nuit de veille, en rentrant chez lui à pied, dans l'air sec et froid d'un matin de mars, que Calvin met en œuvre sa mutation identitaire. En cela, il agit, nous dit-il, à l'instar des protagonistes d'une “légende locale”: “Ce matin..."
de mars, je me suis rappelé une légende locale. Ces écureuils noirs [qui peuplent le quartier de la Côte-de-Sable] seraient en réalité d'anciens rats qui se seraient mêlés à des écureuils gris pour éviter les mesures de dératisation\textsuperscript{57} (EN, 17). Afin de sceller cet acte de mutation, Calvin va jusqu'à faire publier sa propre notice nécrologique. D'où la possibilité d'ouvrir le récit largement homodiégétique et intradiégétique qu'il nous livre de sa vie sur une “Préface posthume”:

Si vous êtes déjà venu à Ottawa, vous me connaissez. [...] Si vous n'êtes jamais venu à Ottawa ou si vous n'y habitez pas, ça ne fait rien. Vous savez qui je suis, il faut que vous m'ayez vu quelque part, un jour. J'incarnais la Conscience coupable, la mienne comme la vôtre, et je demandais pardon pour tout le monde. Même pour vous. 

\textit{EN, 7–9}

Ce passage appelle deux remarques. En premier lieu, il n'est pas vain que le héros ne donne aucune importance à son identité personnelle. Aussi signale-t-il qu'il se veut représentatif de quiconque vit, comme lui, en situation minoritaire. Car, à ses yeux, quelles que soient les circonstances particulières de pareille existence, tous les sujets minoritaires partagent un même sort: la “Conscience coupable.”\textsuperscript{58} En second lieu, le héros fait entendre que c'est la culpabilité qui motive sa décision de faire peau neuve. La question se pose dès lors de savoir d'où lui vient le sentiment de culpabilité si l'on cherche à élucider ses implications.

Tout porte à croire que la culpabilité a chez Calvin deux sources connexes. D'une part, elle est nourrie par la responsabilité qu'il assume pour l'injustice et la malveillance envers autrui d'un père, qui, comble de honte, a été avocat et juge à la Cour fédérale.\textsuperscript{59} D'autre part, elle est une affaire d'héritage: Calvin a, de fait, hérité de la “Conscience coupable,” synonyme de la “mauvaise conscience,” de ses parents.\textsuperscript{60} Curieusement, cet héritage a passé par les deux mantras que ces derniers se sont efforcés d'instiller dans l'esprit de leur

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item Cette “légende” n'est pas sans rappeler le besoin d'adaptation des groupes minoritaires au contexte majoritaire dans lequel ils évoluent, de même que le jugement qu'on porte sur eux.
  \item L'emploi de la majuscule connotant l'universalité donne d'ailleurs poids à l'idée de reconnaissance dans l'expérience commune de la marginalité.
  \item “[T]u ne pouvais pas savoir que je passerai ma vie à racheter la tienne,” confie Calvin à son père inconscient (EN, 47).
  \item Calvin déclare sans détours que “la la mauvaise conscience était un état d'esprit répandu dans la famille” (EN, 45).
\end{itemize}
progéniture et qui touchent respectivement à l’ordre et au conformisme. À quelle fin les parents ont-ils ainsi prôné ces valeurs ? Ils entendaient inculquer à leurs enfants la culture anglophone (et majoritaire) aux dépens de leur patrimoine francophone (et minoritaire), ce qui devait les aider à monter l’échelle sociale dans un Canada majoritairement anglophone. Bien que Calvin, à l’inverse de ses deux frères et de sa sœur, se soit activement opposé aux mantras familiaux de l’ordre et du conformisme, ces mantras ont fini par déteindre sur lui. Ne pas poser de gestes de travers, ne pas incommoder, s’effacer, disparaître, telles sont en fin de compte les leçons qu’il a subrepticement reçues et appliquées, parfois avec acharnement, tout au long de sa vie :

Si la caissière au magasin omettait de me remettre toute la monnaie qui me revenait, pas un mot de protestation. Après tout, j’avais donné un trop gros billet à la pauvre demoiselle. J’ai commencé à fumer parce qu’on m’a offert une cigarette un jour. Je ne pouvais pas dire non, j’aurais offensé celui qui me l’offrait. Longtemps, aussi, j’ai bu de la bière même si je n’en ai jamais aimé le goût. Il m’est arrivé de coucher avec des femmes grosses, laides ou niaiseuses, parce que je craignais de les blesser en leur disant non. Je conservais mes regrets pour après.

\[EN, 11–12\]

Le penchant de Calvin à se réduire au silence, quoiqu’il tire son origine du foyer, n’y est donc pas confiné. Il préside véritablement à toute sa vie, y compris sa vie de couple, comme le vérifie le fait qu’il a vécu dix ans avec Zorah, une femme qu’il n’aimait pas et à qui il n’a jamais osé révéler ses pensées intimes. De plus, il importe de remarquer que, de l’aveu de Calvin, “[l]a certitude instinctive du péché est inséparable de [s]es premiers souvenirs” (\[EN, 10\]) de sorte que, dès sa plus tendre enfance, il avait l’impression que, “quel que fût le péché, il neigeait par [s]a faute” (\[EN, 10\]). D’où les ratiocinations forcées, évoquées plus haut, pour justifier son inaction dans une variété de situations de la vie. Et si besoin est d’une dernière preuve pour l’influence nécvise qu’exerçait sur lui sa “mauvaise conscience” (\[EN, 45\]), notons qu’il avait l’habitude de se déclarer coupable pour toutes sortes d’infractions qu’il n’avait pas commises :

J’ai pris du temps à comprendre qu’il était inutile d’aller me dénoncer aux autorités. Le plus souvent, à la petite école, la maîtresse me répondait en souriant que je n’étais pour rien dans le tort qui avait été fait : un mur vandalisé ou l’œil au beurre noir d’un élève à qui je n’avais jamais adressé la parole. […]
Devenu adulte, j’ai surtout fait rire de moi. Au chantier d’exploration pétrolière de la mer Beaufort, à mon premier repas là-bas, mes commensaux se sont mis à dire que la soupe goûtaient la pisse [...]. Il m’a fallu tout mon sang-froid pour ne pas me lever et déclarer : “Les gars, je sais que la soupe goûte drôle, mais c’est parce que je viens d’arriver et que je n’ai pas l’habitude des grands réfectoires [...]. “ Incapable de remuer ma cuiller dans mon bol, j’ai attendu un long moment, et j’ai fini par me rendre compte [...] que c’était une blague qu’on répétait tous les soirs au cuisinier, une sorte de rituel, sans plus. [...] J’avais bien fait de me taire, on aurait ri de moi, comme à tant d’autres occasions où je ne m’étais pas contenu à temps, avouant à des visages étonnés des infractions dont on me croyait incapable.

Compte tenu de l’emprise étouffante que sa “mauvaise conscience” avait sur lui, il n’est pas surprenant que Calvin eût tendance à se réduire au silence, à s’effacer en société. Il n’est pas surprenant non plus que cette tendance ait progressivement miné sa confiance en lui-même ou, pour être plus précis, sa confiance dans ses différents pouvoirs-faire. Dans ces conditions, il est impossible de voir comment Calvin, à titre de sujet minoritaire, aurait ressenti sa conscience altéritaire autrement que comme un mal. On pourrait même dire qu’il la ressentait comme un mal insupportable, interprétation qui expliquerait le fait que ce n’est pas seulement après une nuit de veille passée auprès de son père malade que Calvin se résout à mettre en œuvre sa “mutation” identitaire, mais aussi après avoir traversé lui-même une dépression nerveuse nécessitant un séjour de plusieurs mois à l’hôpital psychiatrique.

Quoi qu’il en soit des circonstances entourant sa décision “changer de vie” (EN, 16) il reste que cette décision le met sur le chemin laborieux d’un réel accomplissement de soi. Une étape essentielle à franchir sur ce chemin – le héros lui-même s’en rendra à l’évidence – consiste à prendre une distance déchirante à l’égard de soi-même :

Ce qui se passe, c’est que ma mutation, façon écureuil noir à l’accent rat, m’a donné une lucidité que je n’avais jamais connue auparavant. Je suis désormais capable d’avouer l’inavouable, et j’ai découvert que la vérité est bien plus drôle que le mensonge. Si vous ne me croyez pas, essayez au moins une fois dans votre vie de divorcer d’avec vous-même, vous verrez qu’on arrive à dire des choses étonnantes sur soi. Ça en vaut la peine

EN, 95
Or, si “ça en vaut la peine,” c’est justement parce que “divorcer d’avec soi-même” est le seul moyen de mesurer, en tant que sujet minoritaire (“façon écureuil noir à l’accent rat”), la juste valeur de sa conscience altérite. En d’autres termes, divorcer d’avec soi-même est le seul moyen de mettre en branle un processus de réalisation de soi au terme duquel le sujet minoritaire, tout en sachant que sa conscience altérite peut toujours prendre des traits négatifs, est en état de mettre à profit ses traits positifs et de les valoriser. Car, tout compte fait, c’est sous le signe du “bien” que renferme la conscience altérite qu’il faut placer la fin de *L’Écureuil noir*. c’est pour la première fois de sa vie que Calvin tombe réellement amoureux d’une femme, Maud ; qu’il se voit capable d’assumer le rôle de père ; qu’il reconnait, en toute quiétude, que l’existence a ses ombres et ses lumières ; bref, qu’il a l’impression d’avoir enfin trouvé sa place dans le monde.

Il n’est cependant pas dit par là qu’une fois les deux faces, positive et négative, de conscience altérite pleinement assumées, le parcours identitaire du sujet minoritaire doive suivre une pente unidirectionnelle, ascendante, vers la complétude de soi. Tant s’en faut! Pourquoi ? Parce que la conscience altérite bat décidément au rythme des aléas de la vie. Aussi ne cesse-t-elle d’allier les traits tant destructifs que productifs rattachés à l’excentricité des marges. À vrai dire, ces deux extrêmes, aussi bien que tout l’espace incertain de l’intervalle qui les sépare, fondent la plasticité et les potentialités sémantiques de la conscience altérite en tant que structure cognitive dynamique. Le poème “d’âpres après” de Dickson se montre de nouveau fort éloquent dans cette optique. Car si les premiers vers de ce poème font ressortir, comme nous l’avons vu, la défaillance des vertus représentatives et curatives du langage, les derniers font voir et entendre qu’un temps meilleur se profile à l’horizon, temps où, comme dans le cas de Calvin, les contraires en arrivent à s’harmoniser:

```
DES des
EN en
CHANTE chante
MENTS ments
des des
en en
chante chante
ment ment
s s
```
À la lumière de cet extrait évocateur, on comprend pourquoi il est impossible d’accorder à la conscience altéritaire du sujet minoritaire des prédications aprioristiques: supportée différemment par tel sujet à tel moment et en tel lieu, elle ne peut que faire varier ses significations. Il n’en demeure pas moins que l’on peut observer ceci à son propos: si on la supporte (comme un) “mal,” elle revêtira des aspects dysphoriques, et si on la supporte (comme un) “bien,” elle revêtira des aspects euphoriques. Il s’ensuit en définitive que la conscience altéritaire peut se concevoir comme une dialectique vivante entre un pôle dysphorique et un pôle euphorique, le premier étant porteur des effets négatifs, destructifs, néfastes, de la minoritarité, et le second de ses effets positifs, productifs, fastes.

Conclusion

Si cette étude risque d’avoir soulevé plus de questions qu’elle n’a apporté de réponses – auquel cas elle aura déjà atteint l’un de ses objectifs, soit celui de stimuler le discours critique sur les minorités –, il s’en dégage néanmoins plusieurs constats concernant la place des peuples minoritaires dans l’économie mondiale des sociétés des savoirs.

Il est clair que les valeurs heuristiques de la minoritarité ont longtemps été, sinon ignorées, du moins dépréciées et que cette oblitération stratégique des savoirs propres aux “petites” cultures est largement tributaire du joug avilissant des “grandes” cultures. Heureusement, à la faveur de remises en cause et d’ouvertures récentes du discours critique au sein même des États-nations monolithiques, cet état de fait commence lentement à changer ; en témoigne

d’ailleurs cet ouvrage qui découle d’un colloque international tenu non loin de l’une des plus “grandes” capitales centralisatrices du monde. Toujours est-il qu’une question se pose avec insistance: la méconnaissance actuelle des peuples minoritaires ressortit-elle uniquement à leur mise à l’écart systématique par les cultures dominantes ? Cela est moins sûr. Comme il a été montré, le malaise épistémologique qui, malgré les progrès des vingt dernières années, sévit encore dans le domaine des études minoritaires a contribué, à sa façon, au manque de reconnaissance des savoirs dont les minorités sont investies. Et, étant donné le besoin élémentaire de méthodes et de modes de pensée arrimés aux réalités minoritaires, comment ne pas considérer que ce malaise épistémologique est lui-même dû à des carences théoriques ?

En tout état de cause, c’est dans le dessein d’éclairer la spécificité du rapport à soi du sujet minoritaire que nous avons esquissée ici la notion de conscience altéritaire. Renvoyant à la surconscience de soi-même comme un autre, elle se comprend comme une articulation dialectique entre deux pôles complémentaires, euphorique et dysphorique, le premier étant le siège de valeurs productives de la minoritarité, et le second de ses valeurs négatives. Ainsi, en plus de rendre compte des traits souvent contradictoires attribués aux sujets minoritaires, la notion de conscience altéritaire fait valoir que la différence qui institue l’altérité de ces sujets n’est jamais évidée de sens, mais qu’elle constitue au contraire un lieu fécond de réflexion sur les rapports plurivalents entre identité et altérité. Il semble bien qu’une telle prise en charge de sens et de savoirs longtemps obnubilés se montre propice non seulement à une perception lucide, sans doute plus juste, de soi de la part des minoritaires, mais encore à des échanges mutuels et transfrontaliers sur l’avenir des sociétés, grandes et petites, à l’heure avancée de la mondialisation que sonne le XXIe siècle.

Bibliographie


Imbert, Patrick (dir.). Le Canada et la société des savoirs. Ottawa: Chaire de recherche

Imbert, Patrick (dir.). Américanité, cultures francophones canadiennes et société des
savoirs. Ottawa: Chaire de recherche “Canada: enjeux sociaux et culturels dans une


Leclerc, Catherine et Lianne Moyes. “Littératures en contiguïté: France Daigle au


Morency, Jean. “L’image de la maison qui brûle: figures du temps dans quelques romans
uottawa.scholarsportal.info/ojs/index.php/revue-analyses/article/view/763/664>,
page consultée le 19 décembre 2013.

Champion, à paraître en 2015.


Simon Langlois (dir.), Identité et cultures nationales. L’Amérique française en mutation:


Ricœur, Paul. “Une réponse de Paul Ricœur.” Dans Joy Morny (dir.), Paul Ricœur and


Siemerling, Winfried. Récits nord-américains d’émergence: culture, écriture et politique
Cultural minorities react differently to globalizing forces. While globalization has been seen mainly as a negative influence on integration in multicultural societies, the late-modern perspective of reflexive human action shows a different picture of how some cultural minorities adapt to social change induced by globalization. This paper examines the reflexive actions of cultural minorities seeking to eke out strategies for coping with social changes. This will be discussed in terms of minority narratives influencing European discourses on cohesion, citizenship and the environment. It will demonstrate that some minorities seek new spaces for politics in an effort to influence bottom-up democratization through politicization of regional territory, through the reframing of ideologies, by mobilizing intra-regional networks and through intra-state politics. It will maintain that such bottom-up minority mobilization is fuelled by reflexive citizenship acts seeking to transform institutions and strategies. The basic argument is that human reflexivity is at work in the dialectics between cultural minorities and institutions facing social change due to globalization.

Introduction: Minorities and Social Change

The world looks more uncertain today than ever before. At the end of the last Century, scholars gloomily spoke of the end of the “nation-state”\(^1\) and the “end of history.”\(^2\) Others warned about the end of ideology and that globalization was now a matter of culture; cultures against cultures in a “clash of civilizations.”\(^3\) These were of course sweeping statements about a world that was becoming much more inter-connected and perhaps inter-dependent for good and for bad. Cosmopolitans would say it is good; particularists would say it is bad. Often cosmopolitans are elitists who favour open economic markets, whereas particularists represent non-dominant groups without a voice of

---

power. The ramifications of global developments on the future of human society were however realistically linked to risk, and a new paradigm, the “risk society,” was introduced.\(^4\) This picture is gloomy especially because it includes numerous cultural minorities facing arguably double struggles to adapt to these social changes both as human beings and as members of minorities.

Social change is a phenomenon that often makes people insecure, even if it is not easy to determine how insecure our world has become. While states and governments are retooling to deal with “contingency politics,” meaning politics that take into account the unexpected, the accidental, and the unforeseen,\(^5\) it is becoming common knowledge that principles are contested and identities are more complex than portrayed in the literature. Conflicting values have led scholars to argue for “incommensurability,” that mutual comprehension is difficult and at times particularist commitments are mutually exclusive.\(^6\) Illiberal cultural practices thus make transcultural justice problematic, and divergent personal judgements create normative dilemmas because dissenting voices remain suppressed by a hegemonic dialogue. Thus social change often has greater influence on minorities than on the members of the majority, especially if members of minorities do not have the social and human capital to build capabilities that help avert negative influence. Moreover, it is also increasingly accepted that the ontological diversity of human nature means that identity will always meet difference,\(^7\) that culture should not be essentialized\(^8\) and that “groupism”\(^9\) is one of the most controversial aspects of late modern life and politics. These demands for understanding the facts of late modernity, or the idea that the present time is interpreted in light of historical reinterpretation and the confluence of cultural, social and political currents, according to some scholars, require reflexive thinking and reflexive action. There are, therefore, two variables at least in the study of social change that influence the understanding of minorities’ ability to adapt; these are the external forces that bring on the changes and the reflexive actions that meet these changes.

External forces refer to phenomena that take place outside society and which have the ability to influence society. In this paper, the force in question is globalization in its several forms. Reflexivity in terms of human action is a social theory concept based on the idea of individual autonomy. In this paper, the individual autonomy of cultural minorities is examined in terms of the outcome that their reflexive action may have on institutions coping with social change. The paper begins with a brief discussion of definitions of the structure of external forces (globalization) and the reflexive actors (cultural minorities), followed by a short section about academic approaches. The main part of the paper will discuss three discourses relevant to understanding the reflexive nature of the actions of one sub-category of cultural minorities, Europe’s “traditional minorities.” The central question is whether cultural minority reflexivity can be put to work in the social change processes caused by global external forces. The Conclusions will offer a few thoughts on this and argue that a new set of Terms of Reference is needed for studying minorities.

Variables: External Forces

Being a composite and very complex force, it might be instructive to break down globalization into the several forces that are relevant to the present topic. First, in the European political science debate on cultural minority existence, globalization may be equated with Europeanization. This is not an attempt to blur the line between Europeanization and globalization, but globalization is a compounded concept. By Europeanization is usually meant that the moral, political and economic power of the developed part of the European Continent influence the remainder – and less developed – part of the Continent in terms of values and norms.\(^\text{10}\) There is thus an Orientalism present in the forces of

Europeanization. Moreover, it is more than mere EU integration. Globalization as expressed through Europeanization is more prominent in the cultural minority debate because it has more direct influence on the lives of members of cultural minorities, both in terms of legal protection and cultural development. While minority issues are still considered a matter for national governments, institutions at the supra-national level often set the stage for how governments should address minority issues. This is at least the case for non-discrimination of certain minorities of various backgrounds, including cultural groups, which is now dictated by two EU Directives as well as the Union’s new strategy on Roma integration. And in the case of the cultural rights of national minorities, several inter-governmental treaties impose on governments to protect these, such as the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM). Thus, in Europe cultural development, or the preservation and promotion of minority cultures, in relation to international power structures is seen mainly through the European lens. Yet, when it comes to issues of financing minority cultures in the time of economic crises, the global economic situation is often blamed. Therefore, any analysis of cultural minority mobilization in Europe must engage with both the forces of Europeanization and of globalization.

Secondly, globalization as a concept shares some of the forces assigned to Europeanization, including the Orientalist view of transfer of ideas and ideals from the developed to the developing world. Where Europeanization has by and large been linked to development through democratization, globalization is usually seen in a much more expedient light. Globalization is linked to the necessity of financial and economic transnational exchange, and for this reason it makes more sense to speak of global politics rather than globalization. However, there is limited empirical data showing the direct cause and effect of the process of globalization. Nevertheless, cultural exchange is often seen as an outcome of this economic exchange rather than the opposite. As discussed in the Introduction, the negative side of globalization in relation to cultural minorities has had an impact in the public space; xenophobia, Islamophobia and general hostility towards foreigners have become the order of the day in many European societies. With regard to Europe, it is questionable, however, whether this is as a result of increased economic exchange across borders, i.e. globalization, or whether it is a result of the growing divide between North and South.

---


Thirdly, the North–south divide refers to the gap in development between countries of the North, such as Western Europe and the United States of America as well as Canada and Japan, and the South, representing countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia. The debate on the development gap was first started by a commission of statesmen lead by the German Chancellor Willy Brandt. In a 1980 report, the commission highlighted the failure of the world economic system to provide social and economic equality for humanity. Arguing that the economic trends needed to be reversed, and that solutions and strategies needed to be urgently implemented, the Commission warned that growing income disparity of the Northern and Southern Hemispheres would lead to financial and economic instability as well as the growing problem of poverty. They further argued that there is a mutual interest for developed and developing countries to deal with the burning issues in order for humanity to survive the “immense risks threatening mankind.” They believed that co-operation was the tool to create change and facilitate worldwide growth and development. To enforce one state model of development onto another was deemed unnecessary. The report made recommendations in a number of areas of concern, including poverty, health, housing, equality, migration, the environment, disarmament, trade and energy. Above all the report was an appeal to all world leaders and people from every strata of life to participate in the shaping of a common future for the world.

In the three decades after 1980, much has been done to close the gap between North and South. International organizations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as well as key United Nations agencies, such as the United Nations Development Program, have worked with both sides of the development gap to improve the situation. But results have been mixed. The inability to overcome problems has created a flow of migrants from the South to the North. Economic inequality but also violent conflicts in both Africa and Asia have pushed destitute groups towards the European Continent. The insecurity and unwillingness of European countries to welcome the destitute has created a new environment of antagonism in the public sphere. And unlike the minority rights regime adopted by European governments for members of minorities holding citizenship, there does not exist a comprehensive minority protection scheme for the so-called third country nationals. At best, governments have been willing to adopt certain anti-discrimination measures but this does not require governments to be pro-active in order to overcome discrimination.

---

Definitions: The Reflexive Actors

As noted, reflexivity is a late modernity view of individual autonomy. It denotes a characteristic that is required of human beings living in the complex world of late modern society. In particularly the confluence of the cultural, the social and the political in the changing social sphere contributes to the need for enhanced reflexivity. Reflexive action can thus be both negative and positive. According to experts, a low rate of reflexivity results in an outer-direction of the individual’s identity, whereas a high rate of reflexivity results in independent action forming pro-actively and inner-directed autonomous identity.

More technically, reflexivity cancels out the cause-and-effect view of human action by arguing that the bidirectional effect of reflexivity renders cause and effect capable of changing roles. This has been seen as negative by some anthropologists whereas culturalists consider it a positive process.

One of the main challenges of understanding cultural minorities in Europe – whether the reference is to migrants, immigrants or long-time residents – is the multi-faceted nature of minority identity. The term, cultural minorities or cultural groups, is actually quite broad and thus quite vague because arguably all people are carriers of cultural characteristics whether they belong to a minority or the majority. In Europe, the term refers to a number of identity minorities, and in international law it is divided into more specific definitions. International law thus operates with concepts based on specific characteristics and ascriptions, such as religion, ethnicity, race, language, national allegiance, sexual orientation, etc.

For analytical purposes, one might make a distinction between “old” and “new” minorities. This is a controversial typology but nonetheless at times helpful. While “old” minorities refer to groups that have become minorities due to the European history of battles for sovereignty over territory, “new” minorities refers to those groups that have made conscious decisions to move to European countries. The latter category is technically called immigrants, while the former may technically be referred to as autochthonous or “traditional” minorities. In this paper, the discussion of reflexive action in relation to external forces is focused on traditional minorities, because their


14 A. Giddens, The Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Stanford University Press, 1991).


16 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 27 or the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.
Reflexive Minority Action narratives have provided some empirical evidence of reflexive action, albeit very limited.

By traditional minorities is understood those minorities who live traditionally in a homeland territory from which they derive their identity as members of a certain nation, territory or language group. The homeland territory is usually situated in regions whose sovereign allegiance and belonging have been contested among competing sovereign states. Often the territory has been contested through bellicose means thus rendering the minorities of the region objects of wars and eventually of settlements. At times the settlements have resulted in transfer of sovereignty to new rulers, thus incurring a need for minorities to change allegiance to the new rulers or flee the territory. In Europe, traditional minorities include, but are not excluded to, national minorities, such as the Germans in Belgium, Denmark or Poland, the Austrians in Northern Italy or the Catalans in Spain. Included are also ethnic minorities, such as the Sinti and Roma or the Russian speakers in the Baltic states. Language minorities, such as the Bretons, the Welsh or the Frisians are also considered traditional minorities. And finally, the indigenous groups of Northern Scandinavia are technically speaking traditional minorities, although some indigenous groups contest the label minority.

Throughout European history, traditional minorities have provided shifting narratives which have been interjected into the European political discourses. Although history is a major factor in the identity of traditional minorities, some of the observations made in this paper are also relevant for other cultural minorities, such as immigrants, because the focus is on minority actors and actions in terms of global politics. Thus, the broader aim is to begin a new research framework that examines whether reflexive actions by minorities are influencing contemporary discourses seeking to cope with institutional adaptation to social change induced by external forces.

Approaches: Narratives and Discourses

There are several ways of studying reflexive action of minorities, both quantitative and qualitative. Either way, the research results will feed into the overall picture of the existence of minorities. One might call this the “narratives” of minorities. Specifically, when wishing to study reflexive human existence, it is important to look at members of minorities as subjects, rather than objects. Studying objects provides only one side of human nature; the inactive existence. Studying humans as subjects, on the other hand, allows for analysing active existence. It is the active nature of the narratives that provide a picture
of reflexive action. Moreover, narratives of minorities do not exist in a vacuum but are situated in larger contexts which one might call discourses. Before proceeding, it might be helpful to pause to define briefly “narrative” and “discourse.”

Narrative is a word borrowed from the science of history or historiography. Essentially it is the method of storytelling which organizes chronologically a single coherent story. Usually it is descriptive rather than analytical; it is concerned with people not abstract circumstances; and it deals with the particular and specific rather than the collective and statistical. Basically, one could argue that we are all storytellers. Historiographers would like to think that it is a tool exclusively to their discipline which has been cultivated historians of eminence, such as Thucydides, Gibbon and Macaulay. This method gave way in the 20th Century to a hegemonic force of “new historians” who favoured a method of quantitative detail and cause-and-effect analysis. The science of history thus became influenced by a methodology informed by the natural sciences, i.e. positivism. This changed in the 1960s and 1970s when new historians began returning to the method of storytelling because they wanted to discover “what was going on inside people's heads in the past, and what it was like to live in the past, questions which inevitably lead back to the use of narrative.” In short, historians of the narrative tradition rebelled against the reliance on positivistic methods based on quantitative and cause-and-effect analysis.

Similar sentiments were felt in other disciplines of academia, and in the social sciences narrative is used in a similar manner but perfected to include not only story telling but also the power of stories and the stories of power, of individuals and groups. Human geography for instance is about the way people live, and several sub-fields provide tools to understand cultural or political aspects of human geography. Post-structuralists operate with concepts such as genealogy and geography combining them as the narrative of any given phenomenon. Political sociology also provides good methodology for understanding narrative. It looks at how major social trends can affect the political process, as well as exploring how various social forces work together to change political policies. Essentially, the change towards narrative in historiography coincided with the constructivist revolution in the social sciences.

In relation to traditional minorities and the narratives which they represent, the constructivist approach of human geography and political sociology is helpful in that it provides the tools to account for the historical events of traditional

---

minorities as actors constructing their communities and community relations. Narratives of traditional minorities are, therefore, the stories of the existence of minorities as groups, actors and subjects of larger forces. These forces may be likened to discourses which as an analytical tool can provide for an understanding of how power influences minority narratives.

A discourse is not a debate or a discussion. It is not a chain-of-texts or articulations of opinions. It is a space where forces of power vie for hegemonic positions in the formation of a polity that aims to govern certain aspects of human life. This is of course crudely put. More correctly, experts would state that a discourse is neither an organizing centre nor is it a structure. A discourse does not promote meaning; it informs social interaction. It does not prescribe cognitive action; it influences it. The identity of a discourse is constructed through political struggles and is also transformed through political struggles. In fact, discourse identities compete for hegemonic position through political struggles. Moreover, a discourse does not presuppose order; it is defined by the presence of conflict or divergent opinions. Thus, the hegemonic identity or position of a discourse changes when it is confronted with conflicts or divergent views it cannot bring under control. It follows that discourses are relational, and their identities are formed through differentiation from other discourses. In a way, discourse identities compete for space on the political horizon by articulating concrete positions within a realm of non-fixed activity. Hence, discourses and their identities become fixed through the relationship with other discourses which together constitute a totality called a discursive formation.

Examples of discursive formations where traditional minorities have been seen as objects are the older discourses of the 19th and 20th centuries. The historical development of traditional minority narratives in 19th and 20th Century Europe follows in many ways the war-and-peace history of Europe, or in modern political science terms, security and justice. From the Peace of Augsburg (1555) to the Dayton Peace Agreement (2005), the securitization of minorities has been steady. Today, this security discourse is exemplified in the work of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). After the adoption of the United Nations' (UN) Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948) a justice discourse developed which sought to protect members of traditional minorities as individual human rights holders. The hegemonic agent of this discourse is the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for

---

the Protection of National Minorities (1995) and the monitoring system thereto attached. In these discourses, the focus on traditional minorities has shifted from religious minorities to national or linguistic minorities. Throughout, minorities have been a hot political agenda item often situated at the top of the agenda for military and inter-state war settlements. Consequently, the existence of minorities was seen as threatening European security and peace. The events in the Balkans at the end of the 20th Century helped cement this view. As traditional minorities were subjected to the on-going power struggles of the day, the focus on security and later on justice was a natural but not necessarily a comprehensive approach.

Unlike the security and justice discourses of the previous centuries, 21st Century discourses involve minority narratives that describe reflexive action. This is not to argue that minorities have not been active in the security discourse; ethnic conflicts have involved minorities but it is questionable whether this has been on the basis of reflexive, autonomous action. A major argument of this paper is, therefore, that the new discourses show minorities from a different perspective. This requires an analytical approach which examines minorities as subjects.19 In the next Section, three such discourses and their incorporation of minority narratives are discussed.

New European Discourses

All European discourses are in the nature of things built around the issues that concern Europe’s future. This is also the case of the new discourses. 21st Century discourses aim at building institutions that can cope with social and political changes induced by global forces. There are three contemporary discourses that incorporate articulations of reflexive minority action narratives. These are the cohesion discourse and the European citizenship discourse as well as one global discourse, the environmental discourse. The first two are power formations that seek to cement full integration through democratization of the European Continent, and the third is a direct response to the global threat of environmental degradation. With regard to the two European discourses, the main structure is of course the EU but other structures, such as the Council of Europe and the OSCE also form part of the frame.

The Cohesion Discourse

The cohesion discourse in Europe forms around the EU’s territorial cohesion through regional policies that aim to bring EU member states closer together economically and socially. Solidarity between member states is an important articulation of this discourse. In addition to territorial cohesion, social cohesion and social unity are other specific articulations of this discourse. Thus, the cohesion discourse involves a complex matrix of institutions, policies and agendas, including the EU’s Agenda 2020 and the Regional Policy as well as the Schengen Agreement and other inter-governmental agreements, such as the principle of subsidiarity of the Maastricht Treaty (1991). These agendas and policies open up for new spaces for politics that allow for actor input in new ways.

One new political sociology approach to re-examining Europeanization proposes a new framework for studying “EU political capacity” as both a social construction and a resource for regional actors in developing their strategies of engagement. Arguing that since existing institutional dimensions have been extensively studied and with mixed results through the lens of multi-level governance, this approach goes beyond deterministic approaches and finds new ways of understanding the relationship between European integration and regional governance. In particular, the focus is on processes of change as exemplified in regional ex post and ex ante strategies of EU engagement based on interactions between formal and informal polity-making, as well as identity construction and ideologies about EU polity-building. In particular, emphasis is upon four political processes of change, (1) the politicisation of regional territory, (2) the framing and reframing of ideologies of EU polity-building, (3) the forging and mobilisation of intra-regional networks and (4) intra-state politics.

The first, the analysis of the politicisation of regional territory involves studying regional actors and the way in which they use the notion of the region’s territory in their strategies. Of importance is to describe territorial ideologies as well as linkages to EU integration while also identifying other types of European inter-dependence. Describing both actors and visions provides the researcher with opportunities to identify new dynamics of both ex post and ex ante strategies for regional EU integration and ultimately for assessing regional EU capacity.

The second set of processes of the framework relates to the existence and application of ideologies of EU polity-building in regional governance.

By ideology is meant that regional actors may hold “a certain vision of the integration project, albeit a latent (and contested) one” and consequently projected Europeanization might be facilitated by an imagined understanding of the effects of European integration.21 The question is whether regional actors have such a vision about the common good of EU integration or whether they see it as a problem. The direction that regional actors take in this regard exposes the extent to which regional strategies are a result of ex post or ex ante processes with ex ante processes requiring the existence of an ideological drive.

The third, the process of mediation, in which actors develop a vision for future development strategies may also explain how policy makers adapt to social and economic changes. Here, the question is whether actors seek greater empowerment in the overall EU integration process, as distinct from within specific policy areas. Variables include networks and partnerships between local governments, socio-economic actors as well as interest and industry organizations in various policy fields. Questions to answer are whether these linkages merely problematize regional development and/or seek to legitimize their own position through references to territory.

The fourth set of processes is intra-state territorial politics. This includes inter-governmental arenas as well as the set of rules and policy procedures which shape inter-actions between regions and central governments. Relevant is how these actors may influence EU processes within national states in terms of formal and informal co-operation, and how power is assigned not only through delegation of competences but through patterns of regulation. Common to these processes is that cultural exchanges facilitate the outcomes. One might argue that a phenomenon of inter-cultural power exchanges take effect.

Recent research from the border region between Denmark and Germany has shown that traditional minority narratives speak to this phenomenon of inter-cultural power exchanges. This is the story of the national minorities contributing to building anew the “old” Danish–German border region and transforming it into a European “cross-border regional space for politics.”22 Within the framework of EU integration, regional development became a priority for actors on both sides of the border. This resulted in a concerted actor effort to define a new cross-border regional profile that could promote the region as both “modern” and “European.” In particular, the transformation of the border itself from a security border to a Schengen border provided architects

with new resources to seek to institutionalize this identity. At the same time, new actors became involved in cross-border interactions. Importantly, these included national minorities who sought to give cultural impetus to local politics. Drawing on unique social capital, including natural bridge-building with kin-state cultures, as well as a collective identity that was increasingly being framed as “European,” national minorities created a specific cultural role for themselves in a space where regional politics and minority politics were viewed as sharing common goals. In particular, this included the goal to bring about prosperity through the revival of a cross-border regional identity, based on joint histories and inter-culturalism. Although today this is still largely an elite phenomenon that may take some time to reach into mainstream society, a new regional identity based on a hybridity of culture and territory appears to be in the making. The Danish–German border region may, therefore, be a unique example of the new dynamics of Europeanization and reflexive minority action.

The Citizenship Discourse

The European citizenship discourse has formed over the last couple of decades and often takes its clues from the public debate on EU constitutionalism and the so-called “democratic deficit.” The Maastricht Treaty is seen as the watershed that began the citizenship discourse. It aimed to address the problem of democratic deficit which put the EU on the path towards a constitution. Thus, the EU’s approach is civil society oriented and aims to overcome the gap between the EU and its citizens. It focuses heavily on activating citizens to become involved. With the (reformed) Lisbon Treaty, the EU provided citizens with the option to petition the European Commission through the so-called European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI), a tool by which one million citizens can sign a recommendation or request to the Commission on specific issues. The EU has also designated 2013 as the Year of the European Citizen promoting hundreds of projects seeking to activate citizens to participate. It is, therefore, not a normative discussion of citizenship rights and the legal ramifications for those who are not included in the EU polity because of being excluded from holding citizenship in one of the EU member states. Rather, it is a discourse articulating ideas of reflexive action. Two new approaches to studying citizenship speak to this European discourse.

The first, the notion of “acts of citizenship” is a theory, which will help assess what types of actions transform social institutions and people.23 The theory

---

offers conceptual tools to ascertain how citizens and non-citizens can enact themselves as citizens, meaning how do they bond and become activists in various areas of public life. Three principles define the approach. Firstly, to investigate acts of citizenship is to interpret them through their grounds and consequences, which includes subjects becoming activist citizens through scenes created. Secondly, acts of citizenship must be recognized as acts that produce actors who become answerable to justice against injustice. And thirdly, acts of citizenships do not need to be founded in law or enacted in the name of law. In short, acts of citizenship are those acts that transform forms and modes of being “political” by bringing into being new actors as activist citizens through creating new sites and scales of struggle.

The second approach relevant for traditional minority citizenship research looks for new spaces for citizenship in terms of the new transnational demands that individuals’ identities require.\(^\text{24}\) This refers to the overlap of memberships that many individuals now experience as a result of higher mobility and open borders. This is a pluralist notion that connects the global and the local, or the international and the national. Thus, it overcomes one-dimensional and binary thinking through the pluralist approach to time and space. It allows for a multi-dimensional view of personal identity and loyalty. In practice it requires the inter-action between national policies so it is not a post-national citizenship. With regard to minorities, whether traditional or immigrants, this approach speaks to the transcultural nature of identities. In so doing, it argues for new dimensions of democracy, or even reconceptualization of democratic theory.

Traditional minority narratives are stocked with stories of civil society actions. In fact, traditional minorities are likely to accumulate more social and human capital than the average citizen due to the nature of minority actions.\(^\text{25}\) In order to preserve their culture and language, minorities are often forced to be more involved in their own society than the average member of the majority. Members of minorities often volunteer in their community. Reflexive minority capital and participation are thus the key words in the new narratives that traditional minorities represent in terms of citizenship.

---

\(^\text{24}\) J. Blatter and A. Schlenker, “Between nationalism and globalism: Spaces and forms of democratic citizenship in and for a post-Westphalian world,” in Working Paper No. 6 (Institute of Political Science, University of Lucerne, 2013).

Taking again the example of the narratives of the three national minorities in the Danish-German border region, the national minorities have exhibited reflexive citizenship skills, in particular in terms of drawing on their cultural as well as social and human capital when participating in local politics. The human and social capital of the national minorities in the Danish-German border region is evidenced in the large self-administration of institutions, such as educational and social care facilities. The self-administration of such institutions alleviates the majority society from significant burdens in terms of both finances and structures, because the self-administration of those institutions would otherwise require public administration that was funded by the national government. Moreover, human capital is evidenced at the level of political participation both through the political parties and the corporate institutions. Their political participatory competence is a sign that they possess the human reflexivity needed in a democratic society that wishes to encourage not only representation but also participation.

A strong example of reflexive action at the European level is an initiative started in 2011 by the umbrella organization of national minorities in Europe, the Federal Union of European Nationalities (Fuen). The initiative of an ECI aims to collect one million signatures in order to petition the European Commission. Essentially, the ECI allows one million EU citizens to participate directly in the development of EU policies, by calling on the European Commission to make a legislative proposal. The aim is to reinforce citizenship of the EU and to strengthen the democratic functioning. An ECI invites the European Commission to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties. Requests can only ask the Commission to act within its legal powers. Signatures must be collected within a 12-month period and from a minimum of seven countries. The minority ECI was submitted to the Commission and opened for signatures on 15 July 2013. It requests the Commission to work for a package of minority protection measures that will benefit all the European minorities as well as regional and minority languages. The package should include measures for both large and concentrated minority communities as well as small language communities in Europe. The package has been named the Minority SafePack Initiative.

---

26 Malloy, supra note 23. See also Malloy et al., supra.
27 Malloy et al., supra note 26.
29 See also <www.youtube.com/watch?v=j3BchZKvA7U>, visited on 12 August 2013.
The Environmental Discourse

The environmental discourse actually started at the global level before it became embedded in European politics. At the global level, it became articulated in a discourse of global disaster through the so-called Rio Process which started in 1972. In the EU it is still a non-directional discourse where no member state or main actor is able to take the lead. A strategy has been devised in 2001, and the idea of Sustainable Development is now the mantra and a full EU strategy. The notion of sustainable development of the environment has been a global concern since the Bruntland Commission’s report (1987). Familiar minority narratives that speak to the environmental discourse are in fact not European. To the Zapatistas in Mexico, the destruction of the jungle for oil extraction and large-scale logging were some of the core issues that motivated their freedom movement. Native Americans in other parts of the Western hemisphere are known for a moral concern for the Earth that provides for more natural management of the environment than any environmental agency could muster. However, work is done in Europe to turn Europeans into Green citizens and Green virtues are fostered to make Europeans protect the Earth for future generations. To traditional minorities who live in homelands from which they derive their identities, the environment is particularly important. This means that the protection of the environment is often intrinsically linked to the protection of the minority culture because the survival of the cultural identity is dependent on the survival of the homeland, i.e. the region’s environment.

The notion that identity formation is linked to the territory of a homeland is explored in political philosophy. Territory on this view both sustains one’s identity and excludes other identities. Territory derives from the Latin terrere, meaning to frighten, to terrorize, to exclude, and territorium is a place from which people are warned. Thus, to occupy territory is to receive sustenance and exercise violence, and to be territorialized is to be occupied by a particular identity. Identities are thus constructed through territorialisation, and the health and the wealth of territory becomes an important part of the individual’s self-understanding. Protecting the territory which provides this nurture becomes essential. In the case of traditional minorities this is often referred to

as the homeland. The narratives of traditional minorities in Western Europe show increasing interest in protecting the homeland territory. Participation in the environmental sector, therefore, becomes a natural next step in the active and reflexive strategy for cultural survival.

A green strategy for minority homelands is increasingly employed. For instance, German minority farmers in Denmark have taken the lead in bringing Danish agriculture into the organic realm as well as in creating bio-energy. In Germany, an environmental wing of the Danish minority has created a grass-root organization following the “think globally, act locally” mantra of the new environmental movements. The North Frisian minority is directly involved in the protection of the islands off the west coast of Schleswig-Holstein. They participate in a Euro-region, the Wadden Sea Region, which consists of a number of the islands off the west coast of Northwest Europe. The aim of this Euro-region is the preservation of the biodiversity in the wading waters off the coast. Indeed, in Northern Italy, the German-speaking minority living in the Province of Bolzano in South Tyrol has installed green infrastructure on the skiing slopes. In fact, a member of the Green party in South Tyrol has proposed an entirely different type of minority, not defined by ethnicity or allegiance to a nation but by the biosphere that it inhabits, the Alps. The Saami population of northern Scandinavia and northern Russia have also become active in environmental protection precisely because the lands from which they traditionally derive their living and identity have increasingly been expropriated by governments for activities likely to destroy the environment. In other words, the narratives of indigenous people and traditional minorities are defined by reflexivity about environmental protection.

Conclusions: New Terms of Reference

There seems no doubt that social change is happening and most likely due to external forces, such as globalization. This paper has discussed the reflexive actions of cultural minorities in the effort to eke out strategies for coping with the social changes incurred by external forces. This process has been described in terms of the reflexive actions of traditional minority narratives influencing European discourses on cohesion, citizenship and the environment. It has been demonstrated that traditional minorities seek new spaces for politics in an effort to influence bottom-up democratization of the European Continent.

through the politicization of regional territory, through the reframing of ideologies, by mobilizing intra-regional networks and intra-state politics. It has been maintained that the bottom-up behaviour is fuelled by reflexive citizenship acts seeking to transform institutions by transnational knowledge and allegiances. And it has been shown that traditional minorities have become reflexive about the environment; in particular, the environment of the territory from which they derive their self-identification. These processes of cultural minorities’ reflexive action are contributing to the new management modes required in a world of contingency politics aimed at protecting social institutions during periods of external pressure. Hence, human reflexivity is at work in the dialectics between cultural minorities and majority institutions facing external forces causing social change.

It is now possible to argue that a new set of Terms of Reference is needed for the study of cultural minorities and globalization. What would these new Terms of Reference look like? What would be required for studying these phenomena? A broad label for what would be required is critical thinking and theorizing. More specifically, critical theory must be explanatory, practical, and normative at the same time; it must explain what is wrong with current social reality, identify the actors to change it, and provide both clear norms for criticism and achievable practical goals for social transformation. It must focus on human beings as producers of their own historical form of life. Searching for reflexive action is thus a good beginning. But also critiquing mediocre theories of social transformation, including sweeping statements about globalization is necessary. I have suggested that the new narratives of cultural minorities are a good place to begin. With regard to traditional minorities this includes searching for new narratives of political action and inter-cultural power, of acts of citizenship and transnational minority capital as well as ecological identities of territory. And by placing these narratives in contact with the meta-discourses of social and political changes it seems more likely that new behaviour is detected, and perhaps new theories of cultural minority power are unpacked.

Bibliography


Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press, 1992).

Giddens, Anthony. The Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Stanford University Press, 1991).


PART 2

Minority Cultures and “Glocal” Political Resistance: 
Thinking New Models of Identity and Citizenship
Indigenous Peoples and National Self-Image in Australia and New Zealand

Adrien Rodd

In the 1970s and 1980s, Australia and New Zealand performed a U-turn in self-identification by formally embracing cultural diversity. Since then, national identity in both countries has become somewhat uncertain and contentious. Over the past decades, the debate over what it means to be an Australian or a New Zealander in a multi-ethnic, multicultural, globalised society has simmered continuously, and has periodically erupted into national public discussions and disagreements. This article aims at examining the importance which the presence and participation of Indigenous peoples may have on the national self-image held by their non-Indigenous fellow citizens.

Challenging Invisibility in a Homogenous Society

Until the 1960s and 70s, both countries had a policy of cultural and ethnic homogenisation, whereby society should be uniformly “British” – a “monoculture, where everyone lives the same way,” as Australian Immigration Minister Billy Snedden put it approvingly in 1969.\(^1\) This implied racially restrictive immigration policies, which of course could not apply to the Indigenous population. Indigenous Australians (Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders\(^2\)) were, depending on the colour of their skin and whether they had any white ancestry, either subjected to exclusion and segregation, confined to reserves, or subjected to a self-defeating policy which combined an attempt at forced assimilation with continued discrimination. In New Zealand, by contrast, there was no deliberate policy of exclusion; efforts were made early on to draw Maori into colonial society, where they might expect to be treated almost as equals – so long as they were willing to assimilate and become culturally British. In both countries, the clear and explicit aim was for Indigenous peoples to be rendered “invisible,” either through rejection or through a form of cultural and even “biological” assimilation.

---


\(^2\) Torres Strait Islanders inhabit the islands between Queensland and Papua New Guinea, and are culturally distinct from Aboriginals.
Aboriginals were not invited to integrate into colonial society. The very nature of colonial expansion was to seize their lands without compensation, forcibly expel the “natives” further into the interior, and 

*de facto* sentence them to starvation, when they were not decimated by diseases or simply murdered by settlers. They were not perceived, even hypothetically, as “fellow Australians.” Indeed, legally they were not Australian; they were denied civil liberties and political rights. Section 127 of the Constitution of 1900, repealed in 1967, provided that they were not to be counted in the census. A Aboriginal peoples made a conscious effort to maintain their traditions, customary practices and values, but were faced with forced disconnection from the lands in which those traditions were grounded, in addition to often catastrophic demographic decline.

The “White Australia” policy, formally adopted at the time of federation in 1901, considered that the very existence of Aboriginals was a problem to be resolved. So-called “full-bloods” were – it was thought – too primitive to be assimilated, and doing so in any case was not deemed desirable, since it would have invited a black population into white society. Thus they were confined to reserves, where it was assumed they would eventually die out and disappear. The “problem” was the existence of so-called “half-caste” children, the illegitimate offspring of white fathers and black mothers in the bush or the Outback, unrecognised by their fathers and raised in Indigenous communities. From the late 19th century, these children were routinely seized, by force, to be placed on mission stations or adopted into white families. The 1937 federal Conference on Aboriginal Welfare harmonised this policy, and clearly set out its objective: “[T]he destiny of the natives of Aboriginal origin, but not of full blood, lies in their ultimate absorption by the people of Australia.” Or, in the words of Cecil Cook, the Protector of Aborigines in the Northern Territory ten years earlier: “The problem of our half-castes will quickly be eliminated by the complete disappearance of the black race, and the swift submergence of their progeny

---

3 The rationale was that their presence should have no bearing on the number of seats allocated to each state in the federal House of Representatives.

4 Select Committee on the Aborigines and the Protectorate, *New South Wales Legislative Assembly Votes and Proceedings* (1849), 25.


in the white.”\footnote{Cecil Cook, 1927, quoted in David Hollinsworth, \textit{Race and Racism in Australia} (Katoomba: Social Science Press, 1998), 39.} Aboriginals were, very explicitly, to be made to disappear. A.O. Neville, the Protector of Aborigines in Western Australia, put it perhaps most clearly of all in 1937, during the conference: “Are we going to have a population of 1,000,000 blacks..., or are we going to merge them into our white community and eventually forget that there were ever any aborigines in Australia?”\footnote{Auber O. Neville, in \textit{Aboriginal Welfare}, 11.}

This eugenics policy on a wide scale did not succeed in ‘eradicating’ Aboriginals. It did, however, cause widespread suffering. Officials were told to pay no attention to the “unfortunate” feelings of mothers whose children they were seizing.\footnote{Aborigines Department of Western Australia, \textit{Report for Financial Year ending 30th June 1902} (1902), 3.} Siblings were deliberately separated.\footnote{Phillip Knightley, \textit{Australia: a biography of a nation} (London: Vintage, 2001), 116.} The children, later to be known as the “Stolen Generations,” were \textit{not} assimilated into white society: they continued to be subjected to racial discrimination and segregation, lacking access to education or employment, except in the most menial tasks.\footnote{James Jupp, \textit{From White Australia to Woomera} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 22.} They were, however, very efficiently cut off from their own people, losing all knowledge of their own language, land and identity.

By contrast, Maori were British subjects, under article 3 of the Treaty of Waitangi of 1840, whereby Maori chiefs had ceded sovereignty to the British Crown.\footnote{Or were presumed to have ceded it. The interpretation of the Maori language version of the Treaty remains a matter of debate.} Although the Treaty was soon discarded by the colonial authorities, the \textit{Native Rights Act} of 1865 reaffirmed that the Maori were British, with equal rights and duties to those of the settlers. They “benefited” (so to speak) from favourable racial stereotypes. Due to their physical appearance and customs, they were deemed to be “quasi-white” and “quasi-civilised,” which meant that they could and should be assimilated easily enough into a white society.\footnote{George W. Rusden, \textit{History of New Zealand} (Melbourne: Chapman & Hall, Ltd, 1883), 350.} The words of New Zealand’s first Governor, William Hobson, were interpreted as a promise of assimilation: “\textit{Hi iwi tahi tatou}” (“We are one single people”).\footnote{Philippa Mein Smith, \textit{A Concise History of New Zealand} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 47.} In 1867, all Maori men were granted the right to elect a small number of representatives
to the colonial parliament, a right which was extended to women in 1893. Maori MPs soon played an active part in colonial politics. Indigenous New Zealanders were also encouraged to join the civil service. By the very end of the 19th century, they were beginning to graduate from universities, in small numbers, and to become lawyers, doctors or government ministers.

While in Australia there was a mixed policy of exclusion of “full-bloods” and "assimilation" of "half-castes," in New Zealand the marriage of whites and Maori was viewed positively. The aim was similar: biological absorption, with the ultimate expectation that the Maori as such would disappear. As William Herries, Minister for Native Affairs, put it in the 1910s: “I look forward for the next hundred years or so, to a time when we shall have no Maoris at all, but a white race with a slight dash of the finest coloured race in the world.” He could not have been more explicit.

Broadly speaking, however, there was no widespread assimilation at that time. The vast majority of Maori continued to live a rural lifestyle grounded in traditional practices, and to speak their own language; most white New Zealanders, indeed, had fairly little daily interaction with their Indigenous fellow subjects. If Maori were “invisible,” it was not because they had been culturally or biologically absorbed, but rather because most of them still kept to themselves.

Maori, however, had legitimate grievances, just as Aboriginals had. Maori lands were sometimes seized by force; more commonly, tribes were forced to sell land, through a combination of deceit, legal obligations and outright bullying. Maori politicians campaigned on the issue, leading to some limited restitutions or compensation in the 1920s. Similarly, there was a gradual recognition that Maori people did not wish to “disappear.” Gordon Coates, who became Conservative Prime Minister in 1925, had grown up in proximity to Maori communities, interacting with them far more than most white people in his day. His friend Apirana Ngata, arguably the most prominent Maori politician of the time, became his informal adviser on Indigenous policy, despite sitting

---

15 Since 1976, Maori have had the option to register on the general electoral roll, rather than register in a Maori constituency. (Following the 2011 general election, 19 per cent of MPs are Maori, mostly representing general constituencies, while Maori constitute about 14 per cent of the population. By contrast, there is one Aboriginal member (i.e., 0.4 per cent) in the Australian federal Parliament following the 2010 election, while Indigenous Australians constitute about 2.5 per cent of the population).
17 Belich, Paradise Reforged, 466.
18 Reform Party.
on the opposition benches. While pursuing a policy of overall assimilation, Coates actively encouraged Maori arts and crafts production,\(^\text{19}\) which was viewed as safely compatible with close-knit integration. The idea was emerging that a remnant of Maori culture provided New Zealand with an attractive particularity. Indeed, postcards at the time depicted New Zealand as “Maoriland,” where British-looking landscapes and towns coexisted with the unique “exoticism” of an Indigenous presence.\(^\text{20}\) Maori art, particularly sculpture, had been admired by whites ever since first contact, and perceived as a sign of Maori civilisation. In the 1930s, Maori voters began to favour politicians of the Ratana movement, which, for the first time, rejected the idea of cultural absorption, and advocated a distinctive, renewed and unified, pan-tribal Maori cultural identity. Ratana found an ally in New Zealand’s first Labour Prime Minister, Michael Savage (1935–1940), who set about improving Maori access to education and economic opportunities, provided them with equal rights to welfare, but also expressed support for the maintaining of a distinct Maori identity.\(^\text{21}\) In 1960, in response to the increased urbanisation of Maori, the official policy, as outlined in the Hunn Report, was to “combine (not fuse) the Maori and Pakeha\(^\text{22}\) elements to form one nation wherein Maori culture remains distinct.”\(^\text{23}\) The phrasing sounded promising; in practice, however, the expectation was still that Maori would assimilate as much as possible into a “British” way of live, while white New Zealanders of course were not expected to adopt Maori practices or values. Protest movements in the 1960s highlighted grievances over the continued seizing of lands, and emphasised Indigenous rights under the Treaty of Waitangi,\(^\text{24}\) making the Maori inescapably visible.

In Australia, meanwhile, Aboriginal protest movements had begun in the 1920s, petitioning for a restitution of stolen children and lands, an end to segregation and discrimination, freedom of movement in and out of the reserves,
equal rights in terms of access to education and employment, and equal political rights. Inspired by the example of New Zealand, they asked for the right to be represented in government.25 The petitions were routinely turned down. Prominent among the movements was William Cooper’s Australian Aborigines League, in the 1930s.26 At this stage, Aboriginals did not claim the right to cultural difference. They demanded that which was most urgent: the right to be considered Australian, and to be granted the most basic of human and civil rights. Or, to put it another way, the right to integrate into colonial society, now that their own way of life had been shattered and had become untenable.

Civil rights campaigns by Indigenous Australians and their non-Indigenous supporters, reaching the public through media coverage, led to their obtaining the right to vote in federal elections27 in 1962, followed – logically enough – by their being counted in the census from 1967. In the early 1970s, the removal of children finally ceased. In 1975, under Labor Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, the Racial Discrimination Act outlawed all forms of racial discrimination, following New Zealand’s Race Relations Act of 1971.28 There were sporadic cases of land restitutions in Australia over the following years, but as this was seen as a state issue rather than a federal one, progress was slow. The concept of native title was not recognised in law until the High Court case Mabo v Queensland in 1992, followed by the Native Title Act 1993. Native title, however, is considered to be extinguished wherever Aboriginals have not been able to maintain a continuous presence on the land.

Constructing Identity in a Multicultural/Globalised Society

Promoting Indigenous Identity
The very concept of indigeneity is, of course, a product of the encounter with colonisers, and subsequent marginalisation in relation to the settler majority. Prior to such contact, Aboriginals did not have a collective name for themselves, and neither did Maori; their identity was grounded in tribes or clans,

25 Petition of the Aboriginal Inhabitants of Australia to His Majesty, George V, etc..., (1933), quoted in Bain Attwood and Andrew Markus, Thinking Black: William Cooper and the Australian Aborigines League (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2004), 35–36.
27 In 1965, Queensland was the last state to grant Indigenous people the right to vote at state level.
28 Under Conservative Prime Minister Keith Holyoake (National Party).
common descent, a spiritual connection with a particular area of land (particularly in Australia) and, for Aboriginals, language. The collective name “Aboriginal” was imposed from the outside, and it was not until the 1920s that different Aboriginal peoples used it to claim common interests and common grievances. In New Zealand, the very earliest settlers viewed themselves solely as British, and described the Indigenous tribes as “New Zealanders.” By the 1830s, settlers had, however, claimed that name for themselves as they envisaged their future in the colony, while the first peoples of the land now called themselves tangata maori – which means “normal people.” They recognised the settlers as human beings, but of an ‘abnormal’ sort; this differentiation laid the grounds for a collective sense of Indigenous self-identification. Gradually, pan-tribal movements sought to build on a common identity, albeit without negating the importance of tribal belonging. In Australia, as languages and cultures were erased, and the vital connection to the land was broken, denying people the very essence of their specific identity, ethnicity and the Aboriginal “label” became an obvious basis for a reconstructed identity, and for more effective collective demands. Hence the notions of Aboriginality and Maoritanga which came to be defined gradually, in the 20th century, around elements of cultural identity, perceived to be shared rather than grounded in any particular tribe or clan.

In the 1970s, the state in both countries quietly abandoned its assimilationist policies. It was now accepted that Indigenous people, as citizens, could participate in society, without fully subscribing to the monoculture which, until then, had formed the basis of these countries’ national identities. Crucially, and inevitably, Maoritanga and Aboriginality were constructed in large part through a process of differentiation from society’s dominant and mostly British culture or values, or way of life. To be Indigenous, then, was to do things differently from the descendants of settlers, by recalling and preserving pre-colonial practices, and to want to continue doing so. Consequently, the nation now had to perceive itself as a union comprising majority and minority cultures defined through self-differentiation.

More generally, it is in the 1970s and 80s that both countries opened up to globalisation, and their national identities became far more complex, uncertain

30 The suffix – tanga can be loosely translated as “that which refers to.”
and contentious. Ever since the colonial era, they had largely isolated themselves from the rest of the world, focusing on their tight-knit relationship with the "mother country," relying on the United States for defence, and turning their backs on the Asia-Pacific region in particular.\footnote{New Zealand's micro-imperialist endeavours in Polynesia, exercising control over remote small island territories in the name of the British Crown, constitute only a partial exception.} Restrictive, racist immigration policies were gradually dismantled from the 1960s, ending the often-affirmed idea that national unity required racial homogeneity. In 1973, to the dismay of many Australians and New Zealanders, the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community, and in so doing turned its back in turn on the Commonwealth. Not only did this mean the end of Commonwealth trading privileges, but New Zealanders and Australians were curtly informed that they would no longer be considered British nationals when visiting the "home country."\footnote{Knightley, \textit{Australia: a biography of a nation}, 302.} Rejected by the 'motherland', they had not only to diversify their foreign trade, but to rethink their place in the world, and the very notion of who they were. If not British, then what?

In the 1970s, as non-white immigrants were seen on the streets of Australia, Labor Prime Minister Gough Whitlam began to talk of "multiculturalism," a new national identity for this new and changing era. Immigrants would no longer be required to assimilate into a British way of life.\footnote{Al Grassby, \textit{A Multi-Cultural Society for the Future} (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1973), 2–3.} Whitlam’s successors in the 1980s promoted and encouraged cultural diversity as an asset for a vibrant and modern, post-British nation. The promotion of cultural diversity, it was said, would facilitate social cohesion, by making cultural minorities feel welcome and accepted, thus making them feel Australian.\footnote{Australian Ethnic Affairs Council, \textit{Australia as a Multicultural Society} (Canberra: government press, 1977), 7.} The nation’s museums and art galleries, as well as the state media, were encouraged to "reflect Australia’s cultural diversity."\footnote{Jupp, \textit{From White Australia to Woomera}, 5.} This naturally included expressing the value of Indigenous cultures. But the main Indigenous issue, first broached by Labor Prime Minister Bob Hawke in 1991, was that of reconciliation.\footnote{Bain Attwood and Andrew Markus, \textit{The Struggle for Aboriginal Rights} (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1999), 24.} In 1992, his successor Paul Keating gave what is arguably the most significant speech in Australian history, in Redfern, the predominantly Aboriginal quarter of Sydney:
Complex as our contemporary identity is, it cannot be separated from Aboriginal Australia...It begins, I think, with the act of recognition. Recognition that it was we who did the dispossession. We took the traditional lands and smashed the traditional way of life. We brought the disasters. The alcohol. We committed the murders. We took the children from their mothers. We practised discrimination and exclusion...38

Reconciliation was expressed as the necessary precondition to building a shared, harmonious society, grounded in a common identity as fellow Australians. National Sorry days at the end of the century enabled more than a million ordinary Australian people to express their grief and regret over the Stolen Generations, through marches or through widely circulated “Sorry books”39; this was followed by a formal apology by the government and Parliament in 2008.

Meanwhile, however, the Hawke government in the 1980s had continued Australia’s embrace of globalisation by dismantling protectionist barriers and liberalising the economy, diminishing the welfare state which had been a cornerstone of Australian society. New Zealand’s Labour government adopted similar policies at the same time, under David Lange. Australia and New Zealand were opened up to the world’s goods and migrants, with enthusiasm on the part of their respective Labour governments, but far less so on the part of many ordinary people. The reclusive, racist, protectionist, paternalist monoculture had given way to an age of diversity – and, almost inevitably, of concern, questions and uncertainty.

In 1975, Bill Rowling’s Labour government in New Zealand set up the Waitangi Tribunal. Its task was to offer recommendations as to how the authorities should respect and uphold the “principles of the Treaty”40 – a novel concept. One of these principles was to be the preservation of Maori taonga – a word featuring in article 2 of the Maori language version of the Treaty of Waitangi, and retroactively interpreted as meaning “cultural treasures.” In 1987, the Court of Appeal found respect for the Treaty’s principles to be a legal obligation for public authorities.41 Thus, it was incumbent upon the state to ensure the survival, continuation and enhancement of Indigenous culture. As a consequence, the Maori language became an official national language of

39 Knightley, Australia: a biography of a nation, 332.
40 Treaty of Waitangi Act, preamble.
New Zealand, alongside English. Preschools in which the Maori language was used exclusively, so as to revitalise it within a new generation, had initially been set up as private initiatives; they now received government funding and support. Public funding was dedicated to the renovating of marae, tribal or pan-tribal community centres. On a more symbolic level, in the 1980s the nation was redefined, in bipartisan public discourse, as a bicultural partnership between Pakeha and Maori, grounded in the Treaty of Waitangi, which was celebrated as the nation’s “founding document.”

**Being “Non-Indigenous,” and the National Self-Image**

It was in this context that the national image had to be rethought in such a way as to integrate Indigenous cultures. Broadly speaking, the “cultural content” of Indigenous identity was seen as fairly clear, even if it subsumed local differences under the blanket image of a national Indigenous culture. For instance, the didgeridoo is specific to northern and central Australia, and Indigenous dot art developed in Australia’s central deserts, but these elements are widely perceived as “Aboriginal culture,” and by extension as a unique, valued and instantly recognisable aspect of Australian culture. Thus they are represented on postcards and souvenirs, a cultural package to export a memorable image of the country. Similarly, the haka, performed by All Blacks of all ethnic backgrounds, arguably provides a far more famous and striking cultural image of New Zealand than anything produced by the country’s non-Indigenous people. And greenstone tiki pendants, small Maori carvings of strangely warped figures, are perhaps the most iconic product to be sold to tourists.

In addition to what might be seen as a form of easy commercial objectification, Indigenous authors have given their own voice to representations of contemporary society. Most famously in New Zealand, Whiti Ihimaera’s novel *Whale Rider* depicts a young Maori generation’s simultaneous upholding and modernising of tradition, while Alan Duff’s *Once Were Warriors* casts a grim light on urban Maori gangs who have abandoned the essence of their culture in favour of one that is rootless, warped, violent, but not entirely hopeless. Both of these novels reached an international audience when they were made into films, in 2002 and 1994 respectively. Some of the world’s most prominent

---

45 The didgeridoo is a wind instrument made from a long hollowed-out branch.
46 The film version of *Once Were Warriors* was itself directed by a Maori filmmaker, Lee Tamahori.
images of New Zealand were thus mediated through an Indigenous focus and perspective. In Australia, Indigenous writers have not achieved such international prominence, although Sally Morgan's autobiographical exploration of Aboriginality has been read by many non-Indigenous Australians,\footnote{Sally Morgan, \textit{My Place} (Fremantle: Fremantle Press, 2010 [1987]).} and Aboriginal authors such as Jack Davis or Kevin Gilbert have produced plays, poems or novels depicting Indigenous struggles and disorientation, compensated by a tentative or fierce pride in one's cultural roots. More significantly in terms of effective imagery, the recent film \textit{Australia}, which was intentionally and explicitly marketed globally to attract tourists to the country,\footnote{Elizabeth Gosch, “See the film, then come visit,” in \textit{The Australian}, June 16, 2008. <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/see-the-film-then-come-visit/story-e6frgcs6-11116642284>, visited on 26 June 2013.} offered scenes of Aboriginal mysticism and endurance in the Outback, depicted as the heart and source of the country's identity.

This national appropriation of Indigenous art or imagery, and the more personal works of Indigenous writers and artists, have partly addressed the uncertainty prevalent at the heart of national identity since the profound social and economic changes of the 1970s and 80s, and since the hurtful 1970s rejection by the "motherland." But in these recently opened, recently globalised societies, in which the expression of minority cultural identities is actively promoted by successive governments, a recurring question over the last decades has been what it might mean to be an Australian or a New Zealander without having a meaningful, personal connection to Indigenous culture, or indeed to any immigrant minority culture.

This was seen perhaps most strikingly when, in 1998 and 2001, New Zealand and Australia respectively opened a national museum, set up as a government initiative to depict the country’s national identity, its unity in diversity. The Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa,\footnote{Literally, 'the place of this country's treasures'.} in Wellington, has broadly been seen as a success, but it has also raised questions and controversies. Among its primary aims was to represent the country's biculturalism. But while representing Maori culture posed no great difficulty, the concrete representation of Pakeha\footnote{See note 22.} culture and identity was inherently problematic. The decision to depict a modern, consumerist way of life, rather than a “culture” in the more noble sense, was criticised.\footnote{Michael Goldsmith, “‘Our Place’ in New Zealand Culture: How the Museum of New Zealand Constructs Biculturalism,” in \textit{Ethnologies comparées} 6 (2003). <http://recherche.univ-montp3.fr/cerce/r6/m.g.s.htm>, visited on 26 June 2013.} Australia's National Museum in
Canberra, which depicted the “Australian Way of Life” through the everyday consumer objects of suburban materialist comfort, while devoting other sections to a respectful representation of Indigenous culture, faced similar criticism, particularly from the right. But it was in New Zealand that the issue was most pressing from a non-Indigenous perspective. If the nation was now to be imagined as a partnership of two distinct but united cultural communities, the Maori and the Pakeha, then the question of “Pakeha culture” had to be raised. What did it mean to be a Pakeha, as distinct from being simply a New Zealander? The question might conceivably seem artificial, but it was inherent in the new official definition of the nation, and it was grappled with – all the more so as the National Museum had highlighted the question rather than offer a fully satisfactory answer. It touched, of course, upon the issue of national specificity in a globalised world.

New Zealand’s most prominent historian, James Belich, refers to it as a Pakeha “identity crisis.” He argues that minority communities can identify with, and claim, a fairly clear cultural identity, whereas Pakeha – loosely defined as the descendants of British settlers – cannot. Sociologist Claudia Bell suggests that “[t]he Maori cultural renaissance has led Pakeha to respond by taking a closer look at who we are.” She refers to cultural representation days in schools, during which children of Maori, East Asian, southern European or Pacific Islander background are able to demonstrate elements – such as clothing or songs and “traditional dances” – which supposedly epitomise their culture, whereas Pakeha children are left to simulate a rugby match, for instance. Bell comments that this implies ethnic minorities have culture while Pakeha have only sport; to go further, one could remark that the Pakeha children are acting out an element of national identity, rather than one specific to any community. In other words, Pakeha identity appears indistinguishable from the wider nation (Maori included), which in turn appears to lack any clear cultural content.

In 1999, historian Michael King published a book entitled Being Pakeha Now, in which he identified as a “white native,” and explained:

To be Pakeha on the cusp of the twenty-first century is not to be European; it is not to be an alien or a stranger in my own country. It is to be a non-Maori New Zealander who is aware of and proud of my antecedents, but

---

52 Belich, Paradise Reforged, 465.
54 Bell, Inventing New Zealand, 88–89.
who identifies as intimately with this land, as intensively and as strongly, as anybody Maori.\textsuperscript{55}

This is perhaps as close as anyone has come to resolving the conundrum. It posits a continued distinction between Maori and Pakeha, thus preserving the foundational notion of biculturalism, while simultaneously affirming that both peoples together constitute one people, through their common attachment to their country, their land, their shared way of life and the myriad cultural references that Maori and Pakeha share, and which distinguish them from foreigners.

Globalisation came suddenly to New Zealand and Australia, when, largely by necessity, they opened up to the world’s migrants and commerce, at the same time as they were forced, through London’s unilateral dismantling of the “British world,” to construct new, post-British national identities for themselves. Within this context, Aboriginal and Maori cultures, being uniquely grounded in their respective countries, were promoted as a key part of a widely shared national image.\textsuperscript{56} Nonetheless, as cultures from around the world are also celebrated as those of minority communities, both countries have entered a persistent period of uncertainty, nagged by an endlessly repeated question: What common identity can, and should, be promoted to bind together the people of a globalised society?

\textbf{Bibliography}


\textsuperscript{55} Michael King, \textit{Being Pakeha Now} (Auckland: Penguin, 1999), 239.

\textsuperscript{56} The latest example of this came in February 2013, when the Australian Parliament adopted, on a bipartisan basis, a bill formally recognising Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders as the nation’s first peoples. Aden Ridgeway, an Aboriginal and former federal Senator, responded to the passing of the bill by commenting that Australia’s pre-colonial Aboriginal history “connects every Australian today – black or white– with the oldest living culture in human history”. He also referred to the New Zealand model, where he said non-Indigenous people view Maori culture as part of their own. \textit{Cf.} Aden Ridgeway, “Constitution needs to include Australia’s first chapter,” \textit{Sydney Morning Herald}, February 14, 2013. <http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/constitution-needs-to-include-australias-first-chapter-20130213-2edaz.html>, visited on 26 June 2013.


**Articles**


**Reports**


Aborigines Department of Western Australia. *Report for Financial Year Ending 30th June 1902, 1902*.

Select Committee on the Aborigines and the Protectorate. New South Wales Legislative Assembly Votes and Proceedings, 1849.

**Acts of Parliament and Court Cases**

*Treaty of Waitangi Act, 1975.*

*Māori Language Act, 1987.*

Globalization and Resistance

The Tibetan Case

Molly Chatalic

Introduction

When discussing the question of globalization and its effect on minority populations, as well as the effect in turn of minorities on the future of the world, the Tibetan case presents multiple facets and raises numerous questions related to this issue. The Tibetan minority finds itself having to negotiate between an imposed globalization and one which is voluntarily embraced. Indeed Tibetans are caught between two aspects of this phenomenon: on the one hand, they are coping with and resisting Chinese occupation and colonialism which is itself reinforced by certain effects of globalization (i.e. the need to secure strategic positions and especially resources; the constraints linked to entering the stage of international powers, the adoption of consumerism and materialism) and on the other hand, they are learning to skilfully employ features of globalization as tools and strategies of resistance (in terms of communication, economic mobility, financial and legal assistance, education, etc.). As we shall see, they are becoming citizens of the world while upholding their primary identity as Tibetans.

The Tibetans: A Global Minority Community?

Tibetans are a minority in China, in what they consider as Tibet in China, and in exile, but not yet within the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). As an ethnic minority group, Tibetans come 9th in terms of numbers (5.8 million) in the list of 56 national minorities (shaoshu minzu) recognized in China. As opposed to the Tibet Autonomous Region defined by China, the territory they themselves consider as historically representing an independent Tibet covers about ¼th of China. Tibetans have been escaping their country over the past six decades,

---

1 <www.tibet.org/Activism/Rights/poptransfer.html>, visited on 31 July 2013.
2 The Tibet Autonomous Region covers 1.2 million square kilometers. The surface of the area considered as Tibet by Tibetans covers 3.8 million square kilometers (approximately the equivalent of Western Europe) and includes TAR, Qinghai, parts of Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan.
ever since the “peaceful liberation” of the country by the Chinese Communists. In exile and in the West, to describe the experience of Tibetans within China and the fact that many of them live in exile now, terms previously used in the case of Jewish populations such as genocide and diaspora are now also commonly applied in the case of Tibetans as in that of other minorities, although the first term is usually qualified and used in the expression “cultural genocide.” Within the current international context of a rapidly changing world, the Tibetan case could perhaps serve as a paradigm for other repressed or exiled minorities due to certain specificities of their particular group: the choice of non-violence, their adaptation in exile while retaining a very strong sense of primary identity, and their dream of independence or of returning to their homeland one day, and this after sixty years of what they consider as a state of occupation of their country. This paper will deal with both the Tibetans still living within Chinese-occupied Tibet and those living in exile, with the view that they constitute a whole as a global minority community and that their sense of belonging to one people transcends national boundaries imposed by colonialism and exile.

Indeed, colonialism does not only pertain to European history: there have been numerous examples of colonialism as well in countries of the Middle East and Asia (such as in Japan, China, former Siam, India, etc.). Chinese colonization (as seen from the Tibetan viewpoint) since the 1950s has had a major impact on Tibetan society and has led to the emergence of a Tibetan diaspora in several phases, starting with the flight of 80,000 Tibetans into exile in India in 1959 (in fact many wealthier families had already established themselves there in the preceding decade, foreseeing the difficulties to come). Of course, Tibet had already been coveted in the past by the Chinese, British and Russians, but the Liberation Army’s offensive at the end of the 1950s ended in a decisive take-over and in the permanent flight into exile of the Dalai Lama who represents a focal point for the identity make-up of the majority of Tibetans.3

Until 2008, between 2,000 and 3,000 Tibetans had continued to escape over the border into Nepal and India every year (usually after a two or three-week trek over the mountains). This escape is motivated by unbearable living conditions experienced inside Tibet by Tibetans due to economic, cultural, religious, and educational discrimination, to constant surveillance and police control,

---

3 The Dalai Lama is usually qualified as being the “sun” for Tibetans, his counterpart or the “moon” being another religious leader, the Panchen Lama. These qualifications illustrate the Tibetan propensity to use natural symbols in their depiction of daily reality and also point to the vital and life-sustaining role these two figureheads play in the identity make-up of the Tibetan community.
and to lack of freedom of speech and opinion. Some Tibetans also simply wish to meet the Dalai Lama once in their life before undertaking the risky journey back. With the change of government in Nepal\textsuperscript{4} and the enforcement of border controls by the Chinese, the number of refugees has decreased sharply.\textsuperscript{5} No passports have been issued to Tibetans so far in 2013 by Chinese authorities in Tibet, meaning that no legal means of leaving Tibet are available. The diaspora (established mainly in India, Western Europe and North America) represents around 150,000 people, and its members continue to be mobile, moving from one country to another following family or clan links, job opportunities and settlement programs.\textsuperscript{6} The mobility which characterizes this minority in exile seems to stem from and to illustrate the lack of long-term commitment of most of its members to remaining in the different countries where they have settled out of necessity. The dream of going back to Tibet one day, even if one may doubt that this will ever be possible, is still very present for many and in the meanwhile, the world outside of Tibet, especially India, Nepal, Western Europe, Taïwan, Japan and Australia, constitutes a place of passage and mobility in a secure and relatively free environment.

As in the case of other minorities, the Tibetans exist in part as a diaspora, but a tightly linked one. There is nevertheless a certain cultural and educational schism between Tibetans born in Tibet and those born in the diaspora, especially for the second and third generations which have been more prone to acculturation. This breach is also due mainly to the variation in exposure to globalization and to the differences in educational opportunities within and outside of Tibet which are available to Tibetans. Nevertheless, the high degree of networking, of solidarity with newcomers and of family and clan bonds

\textsuperscript{4} Nepal was an absolute monarchy up until 1990, when it became a parliamentary monarchy. The massacre of the Royal family by the Crown Prince led to King Gayendra taking power, dissolving the Parliament and imposing martial law, in part to counter a Maoist insurgency which had been ongoing since 1996. A national uprising in 2006 finally saw the Parliament reinstated in its powers and Nepal became a federal Republic in May 2008, when the monarchy was abolished.

\textsuperscript{5} The Nangpa-la Pass incident in September 2006 during which a party of Tibetans fleeing Tibet were shot at from behind by Chinese soldiers (one nun was killed) in full view of a group of Western mountaineers made international headlines and is an illustration of the dangers that Tibetans face in attempting to cross the borders into neighboring countries. <www.dailymail.co.uk/home/moslive/article-1285035/A-murder-shadow-Everest-Why-innocent-Tibetan-nun-gunned-Chinese-soldiers-Himalayas.html>, visited on 31 July 2013. See also <www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/world/asia/china-makes-inroads-in-nepal-stemming-tibetan-presence.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&ref=global-home>, visited on 1 August 2013.

\textsuperscript{6} For example, the Tibetan United States Resettlement Project in 1992 allowed for the establishment of one thousand Tibetans in the United States.
allow for mobility of individuals among the different diasporic communities established in various countries. This resilience of community, whether inside Tibet or in exile, is mirrored in the resilience of the Tibetan spirit, in the importance they grant to their fundamental ethnic identity which may find its source in a sense of responsibility to the world. Although they do not consider themselves as a “chosen people” (as they are not people of the Book, but “insiders,” which is the Tibetan word for Buddhists), they do have a sense of their specificity or role on the global level. The small number of their community and the desire to maintain their ethnic identity may explain the tendency among Tibetans so far to raise parentless Tibetan children within the Tibetan community instead of having them adopted outside the community, and to marry among themselves, two communitarian trends which are not always easy to follow in the context of globalization but which characterize many minority communities concerned with their long-term survival.

The majority of Tibetans living inside Tibet (i.e. the “Tibet Autonomous Region,” Qinghai and parts of the different provinces of Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan) express a feeling of being more and more marginalized on all levels by the dominant Han society and live in what one French journalist (Cyril Payen) recently qualified as an Orwellian situation, as prisoners in their own country, which is being turned into a fake-Tibetan Disneyland for Chinese tourists, in contrast to the mythical Shangri-la like image it has long possessed in the world’s imagination. This Disneyfication is apparent in the control, reconstruction and rehabilitation of temples for tourists, in the existence of official dance troupes and groups, in the promotion of Tibet as an exotic destination within reach. But as in other Disneylands or theme parks, which are geared at offering immediate pleasure in a safe environment, the outer shell is empty of authenticity and the actors must play fake roles to satisfy the public. Although the Chinese tourists probably do not realize it, the Tibetan population is under very close watch. The surveillance cameras in Lhasa have now been supplemented by a ‘grid system’ which closely monitors all the inhabitants and happenings neighbourhood by neighbourhood, block by block, and building by building, thus reinforcing the “Big Brother” simile.

---

7 The Han population constitutes the main ethnic group in China today and represents about 93% of the Chinese population. It is distinct from other groups such as the Manchus, the Mongols, the Huis, the Tibetans and other minority ethnic groups.

8 The Drepung Monastery near Lhasa charges tourists for entrance, photos and filming. Monks receive the fees and this income is controlled by policemen. Only a small percentage is returned to the monastery: <www.rts.ch/video/emissions/mise-au-point/5326823-le-tibet-made-in-china.html>, visited on 29 October 2013.

of the capital itself, Lhasa, has become mostly Chinese. Plans for a new shopping mall right next to the Potala are underway and the foundations being laid in the middle of the old streets of Lhassa forbode the worst for the old traditional houses lining these streets. The destruction of the older neighbourhoods and houses is justified by China in that modernism always destroys old traditions to make things better. The historiographical debate about which civilization, that of China or that of Tibet, is older and greater as well as what political ties existed between them is an ongoing one today among Chinese, Tibetan and Western scholars.

Adapting to a Global World, Adopting New Tools

Whether they are “insiders” or exiles, whether they live alone or in a community, Tibetans have adapted to this forced modernization due to the dual effects of colonization and globalization and are learning to use all the modern tools of communication to create a worldwide network, a global Tibetan community. In Tibet proper, the use of iPhones and applications such as WeChat allow for rapid communication and the sharing of photos and information with Tibetans outside of Tibet. However, WeChat is feared to be monitored and used by the Chinese government to track dissident activity. A similar application, Yakchat, “developed by Iron Rabbits, a virtual and anonymous hacker collective that develops a number of open source apps and supports Tibetan activism,” uses servers located outside of China but is not yet easy to access in China and is so far used mainly by Tibetans in exile.10 The broadcasts of Voice of America and Radio Free Asia are accessed with satellite dishes which recently underwent an eradication campaign in Tibet. More and more websites and blogs in Tibetan are appearing on the Internet, and Wikipedia rates its Tibetan-language version as 139th in terms of its number of articles (a little over six thousand articles in Tibetan, with almost a thousand active users).11 Apple computers and iPhones are favored by Tibetans within and outside of China because they incorporate Tibetan fonts in their list of standard languages for direct screen use. Of course, there is great censorship in China, and currently, Tibetans found to harbour pictures of the Dalai Lama, of the Tibetan flag or of self-immolators on their mobile phones are arrested

and imprisoned, as are those Tibetans who transmit photos and information to people outside of China. Beatings and torture are regular parts of the arrest and imprisonment procedures. Nonetheless, Tibetans continue to communicate with each other across the borders, whether for private purposes (family, business) or to publicize what is happening in Tibet. Thus global means of communication contribute to Tibetan activism and resistance inside and outside of Tibet.

Tibetans’ resistance to being assimilated by Chinese society or to being acculturated in exile while adapting to globalization is currently being expressed through an outburst of literary and artistic creation. In literature, the use of implicit language (through metaphors and traditional images) prevails within Tibet (although some knowingly risk almost immediate arrest, torture and imprisonment by being explicit in their writing or declarations). Recently arrested writers in Tibet include Gangkye Dupakyab, Samdup, Yudrang and Drensal, who had allegedly established a group called “Marchung Ngogol Tsokpa,” which translates roughly as “Red Movement,” or the writer called Tsultrim Gyaltse. A poet, Lobsang Namgyal, was also arrested in 2013 for his book of poems expressing Tibetan identity. Tibetans writing in exile and in English include such writers as Jamyang Norbu, Buchung Sonam, Tsering Wangmo Dhompa and Tenzin Tsundue. All of these writers refer to Tibetan identity in their works which stand as a testimony of what Tibetans experience and feel inside and outside of Tibet. Their impact is limited to the international audience interested in the Tibetan issue. In general, autobiographies are the most successful in reaching this international readership. However, with the use of the Internet, more and more non-Tibetans with an interest in literature are gaining access to blogs and sites in English about Tibetan writers and poets as well.

Songs are also a favored medium of expression for Tibetans and Youtube is replete with traditional and modern Tibetan songs. Rap has become popular especially among young Tibetans in exile. A recent example of resistance through rap is the song RESPECT, in response to a Chinese TV drama series called Tibet’s Secret, whose portrayal of Tibetan society has enraged

---

12 This rap song, by the Tibetan rap group Sheep Droppings, was sung in Mandarin which ensured that its message would receive a wide audience in China. It was posted on Youku and subsequently removed. The full lyrics can be found on <vimeo.com/59539322> (visited on 29 October 2013). The following excerpt sums up the gist of the message conveyed: “This isn’t about independence or separatism, this is about respect. We don’t need you to change history or change the facts. Uneducated and ignorant, mendacious and deceptive. Some idiots here betray us for their own advantage.”
Tibetans. There are more and more Tibetan film-makers as well who want to participate in the global development of an internationally-recognized means of communication, but, within Tibet, imprisonment and torture are again often the price to pay when trying to depict the situation through Tibetan eyes for an international audience. After producing the film *Leaving Fear Behind* in Tibet, aimed at expressing the Tibetan reality to the world during the year of the Beijing Olympic Games, Dhondup Wangchen was arrested in 2008 and sentenced to six years in prison. He received the Visual Arts Guild freedom award in June 2013. Not only are Tibetan writers, singers and film-makers targets of Chinese censorship, even a French journalist was harassed and threatened by Chinese Embassy officials in Paris and Bangkok for a documentary on the current situation in Tibet which was aired on the French television channel France 24 on 30 May 2013.

One of the top priorities of Tibetans is education, which is accessible especially in exile. Education is of course a means of progressing both within a global context as well as in Chinese society. Nonetheless the illiteracy rate for Tibetans in Tibet is still very high and fees for school are often difficult to afford for nomads or more modest families. Tibetan schools supported by foreign funds and run by Tibetans have been closed since they are not under Chinese government control and are considered as subversive. While still the primary language in elementary schools, Tibetan becomes an option in highschool and Chinese is the main working language if one wants to find a job. There are a number of Tibetans attending highschools in the Tibetan areas of China and they made headlines in October 2010 and again in March and December 2012.

---

13 *Tibet’s Secret*, by Chinese film director Liu Depin, recounts the history of Tibet during the 1930s and 1940s in 46 episodes, as told by its main character, Tashi, a Tibetan lama.


15 This award was received on Dhondup Wangchen’s behalf by his wife, Lhamo Tso, in New York. Her husband is scheduled to be released in 2014. Even if he is released before the due date, the release of prisoners is not always a cause for optimism as she explains: “The reason for my growing worry is an observation that is shared by many people: in the past few months a wave of releases of Tibetan writers and activists has taken place. The health conditions of all the released men were deplorable.” <http://www.filmingfortibet.org/news> visited on 29 October 2013.

by demonstrating against the change in textbooks from Tibetan to Chinese. Since 1959, one of the government-in-exile’s main priorities in India has been the establishment of schools for Tibetan children and a full-scale curriculum, including scientific subjects, all in Tibetan, which they have successfully managed to implement. Most Tibetans in India also speak at least English and Hindi besides their mother tongue. The Dalai Lama himself encourages the learning of Chinese for practical reasons, albeit not to the detriment of Tibetan. Indeed, maintaining one’s mother tongue helps uphold one’s identity, whereas Chinese is useful for professional purposes. In the West, most Tibetan families try to make sure their children are schooled in the Tibetan language as well as being fluent in the language of their country of residence. In the United States, Tibetan language classes are usually held on Sunday. In September 2013, Tibetan language teachers attended the 3rd Conference of the North American Language Schools in New York to discuss a standardized national class syllabus, class textbooks (Levels I to III) and the creation of a website. The 4th Conference is to be held in 2014 in Washington D.C. The level of organization of this event points to the importance given to maintaining their language by the Tibetan community.

Another measure of Tibetans adaptation to the modern world is their political evolution and education outside of China. The desire of populations for democratic forms of government often seems to follow in the wake of globalization, although democratic governments per se still seem to be mostly limited to the West or to developed countries. Ironically, when one considers the Chinese discourse of the liberation of the Tibetans by the Chinese from feudalism and serfdom, it is in fact democratic governments in the world which have been the main models of inspiration for the Tibetans in exile while Tibetans in China continue to negotiate their cultural survival under an atheist Communist government. Over time, Tibetan society in exile has itself adopted more democratic modes of government, with an elected Parliament, a Prime

---

17 <www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/22/tibetan-school-pupils-protest-language-china>, visited on 7 August 2013. This imposition of the Chinese language to the detriment of Tibetan can be interpreted in different ways: a means of standardizing education, of saving money, or of erasing ethnic identity. For Tibetans, the last explanation defines what they are experiencing.

18 The 1st and 2nd Conferences for North American Tibetan Language Schools were held in Michigan (2008) and in the San Francisco Bay Area (2012).

19 The Tibetan Parliament in exile is composed of 44 delegates elected for 5 years and meets during two yearly sessions (March and September). Representation is based on affiliation to one of the three traditional regions of Tibet (U-Tsang, Amdo and Kham), to one of the
Minister and regular elections. The limits of the democratic model are apparent in the lack of multiple political parties, a situation which appears to have just started to give raise to serious debate. When the Dalai Lama decided to step down from his political role, a Harvard-educated Tibetan, Lobsang Sangay, was elected as the first Prime Minister of the Tibetan government-in-exile on 8 August 2012, by 50,000 Tibetans. One of the Prime Minister’s specificities is his willingness to engage in dialogue with Chinese abroad. Women are also represented in the government: the Minister of Information and Foreign Affairs, Ms Dicki Chhoyang, is one such example. Female Members of Parliament include Miss Tenzin Dhardon Sharling, Mrs Dolma Tsering Teykhang, Mrs Bhumo Tsering, Mrs Juchen Konchok, Mrs Youdon Aukatsang, Miss Yangchen Dolkar, Mrs Gang Lhamo, representing a ratio of one to six in comparison to male members. Another example of this inspiration based on institutional models from the United States is the “Tibet Corps” which has been created in order for young educated Tibetans to share their talents and to support various institutes mainly connected to the Central Tibetan Administration. Tibetans struggle daily to uphold their language, religious practices, and traditions, whether within China or in the world abroad. A very symbolic form of transnational non-violent Tibetan protest action has recently arisen in the form of Lhakar (“White Wednesday”) both inside and outside Tibet. The term refers to the birthday of the Dalai Lama which falls on a Wednesday, and on this one day of the week, Tibetans make an effort to speak Tibetan, to dress in Tibetan clothes, to eat Tibetan food and to buy Tibetan products. Especially outside of Tibet, this requires adapting to a daily schedule and environment which may not be conducive to expressions of ethnicity, except in the privacy of one’s home or with friends. This activity can be seen as an innovative form

five traditional religious schools, or to the diasporas of Europe and North America. There is however no multiparty system as of yet and the Dalai Lama still has an influential role. (“Avancées et limites da la démocratie tibétaine,” Diplomatie, n.63 (juillet-août 2013), 39).


21 As expressed on the lhakar.org website: “In recent years since 2008, Tibetans in Tibet and in exile have taken diverse Lhakar Pledges, resolving to boycott Made-in-China products, or to go vegetarian every Wednesday, to speak pure Tibetan, or to read a Tibetan newspaper once a week, or to wear chuba every Wednesday, etc. Through these pledges and actions, Tibetans are coming together in the greatest noncooperation movement Tibet has ever seen.” <lhakar.org>, visited on 28 October 2013. Embracing vegetarianism is supposed to help prolong the Dalai Lama’s lifespan. A chuba is a traditional piece of female or male clothing.
of cultural resistance to modern standards imposed through either colonialism or globalization covering language, clothes, food and consumption. This form of resistance is inspired by past examples of other minorities’ pacifist methods of civil disobedience, especially under the aegis of Gandhi or Martin Luther King. One can also take Lhakar pledges and join Lhakar vigils (in this case, outside of Tibet). The main effects seem to be an increasing awareness of a common identity and cultural heritage to be upheld and defended through means which are available to all and which are not liable (in normal circumstances) to be met with violent retaliation.

Resisting Through Globalization, Using New Tools

The Tibetan issue is a concern for many thinkers and international associations but is often eclipsed by economic imperatives. The flexing of muscles in 2013 between China and European countries such as Germany and France on importation taxes and the threat of a “commercial war” is only the continuation of a long series of verbal sparring. There is also constant pressure by Chinese Embassies around the world on state representatives or politicians not to receive the Dalai Lama.

In turn, Tibetans use international vectors of pressure in order to obtain recognition and support. Many groups and associations have been created over the years; for example in the United States, one can cite the US-Tibet Committee (established in 1977), Tibet Fund (1981), ICT (International Campaign for Tibet, 1987), as well as thirty Tibetan Associations. The Tibetan Youth Congress (based in India), and Students for a Free Tibet (founded in New York) both represent the aspirations of a younger generation to accelerate the rate at which the situation is changing in favour of Tibetans. Tibet Lobby Day was created in the US in 2009 and is now being instituted in other countries as well, such as Japan, Canada, Australia, India, the UK and other European countries. Tibet Lobby Day takes place in March (around the symbolic day of March 10th which commemorates the Tibetan uprising in 1959) and is the occasion for Tibetan supporters to meet and lobby representatives of the countries where they reside in order to keep the latter informed about the situation in Tibet and “to ensure the issue of Tibet is kept high on the agenda of their government.”

Many cultural associations, such as Rokpa and Tibet
Foundation, also strive to finance projects inside Tibet (schools, orphanages, etc.) but this aid is generally seen as foreign intervention and their efforts are in most cases stymied by the Chinese authorities. In their quest for justice, Tibetans seized Spanish Courts in 2008 in an attempt to prosecute Chinese leaders for human rights abuses. In October 2013, Spain’s National Court agreed to hear charges of genocide against Hu Jintao who was Communist Party Secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region between 1988 and 1992 and oversaw a crackdown on anti-Chinese riots in 1989. The timing coincides with the expiration of his diplomatic immunity.

Tibetans have struggled since 1959 to have their country recognized by international instances. So far this has produced very little effect apart from raising sympathy for the Tibetan cause. As early as 1960, the nongovernmental International Commission of Jurists, composed of eleven international lawyers, had produced a report entitled *Tibet and the Chinese People’s Republic to the United Nations* which accused China of genocide against the Tibetans. This report found that China had violated sixteen articles of the Universal Declaration of Rights in Tibet. Tibetans and Tibetan support groups have continuously appealed to the United Nations and other international instances over the previous six decades, but to little effect in Tibet proper. In November 2013, Chinese nationals, Tibetans and other international organizations protested the election of China to the United Nations Human Rights’ Council after the review of its human rights record. Despite these protests, China won its seat on 12 November 2013. China’s argument according to which its treatment of human rights in Tibet is a “domestic” or “national” issue which does not concern other countries is not valid as other countries are now concerned with the flow of refugees and asylum-seekers from China and Tibet, and as this issue

---


has now become an international one. The Tibetan government-in-exile itself finally entered the world stage in 1991 by becoming a founding member of the Unrepresented Nation's and People's Organization (UNPO). The Dalai Lama also gained international recognition by receiving the Nobel Peace Prize (which he dedicated to the Tibetan people) in December 1989 and was awarded the Congressional Gold Medal by the US Congress on October 17th, 2007. If the Dalai Lama has become an international icon and almost attained “rock star” status according to the words of a recent interviewee, he is still qualified as a “splitsist demon” by the Chinese authorities. The Dalai Lama has been a constant representative and spokesperson for the Tibetan cause for six decades during his constant travels around the world, even as he gives conferences on various subjects, Buddhist teachings and initiations, fulfilling his role of Buddhist monk and teacher. He has stepped down from political responsibility but continues to be the reference point of the global Tibetan community, inside and outside of Tibet. The aspiration of the majority of Tibetans is to be able to meet him face-to-face one day. But for many Westerners, the Dalai Lama has become an important figure as well. He has published or co-authored around fifty books in English, thus gaining an international readership as well as becoming a global spiritual reference.

But what do Tibetans offer the world community as a minority ethnic group? Many of them still dream of going back to their homeland one day and see their establishment in India or the West as a temporary stepping stone. In their projecting a “Tibetan” future for Tibet, new theorizations on the Tibetan space as a possible zone of peace and environmental conservation for the world have recently been put forward, in particular by religious leaders in exile, first and foremost by the Dalai Lama but also by the 17th Gyalwa Karmapa.

26 Tim Boyd, President of the Theosophical Society in Chicago which hosted the Dalai Lama’s recent visit to Chicago. Skype interview conducted by author on 17 May 2013.
27 The Dalai Lama has turned this into a joke and calls himself a “sleeping demon” which, added to his own qualification of himself as a Marxist at heart, is a good illustration of the Tibetan sense of humour.
28 The Dalai Lama presented the 5-point Peace Plan in Washington in 1987, one of the five points being the establishment of Tibet as a demilitarized zone. The Strasbourg Proposal addressed to members of the European Parliament in June 1988 reformulated the same points.
29 The 17th Gyalwa Karmapa is one of the main Tibetan hierarchs whose authority is widely recognized by most Tibetans. The current incarnation is a matter of dispute (two incarnations were recognized, one in India and one in Tibet). The latter received official recognition by the Dalai Lama and escaped from Tibet at the beginning of the new millennium (28 December 1999 to 5 January 2000) at the age of fourteen, making international
This is in sharp contrast to the current exploitation of the natural resources of Tibet (which is, ironically or not, called the “Western treasure-house” in Chinese) by the Chinese and of their use of Tibetan bases for nuclear-missile silos and for the possible current or future stockpiling of nuclear waste. The strategic importance of Tibet as the water source for a large part of Asia also extends its geophysical relevance beyond the borders of China. While maintaining an iron grip on the Tibetan minority within Tibet, the Chinese government is also encouraging the development of Tibet into a main tourist attraction for Chinese Han as we have already mentioned. However, international standards of heritage do not seem to apply in Tibet. The current destruction of old Lhasa is of concern not only to Tibetans but to many instances around the world, and the UNESCO World Heritage Committee was petitioned on 26 June 2013 on this issue.\textsuperscript{30} Tibetan supporters have also called for a boycott of InterContinental Hotel which plans to open a new luxury hotel in Lhassa in 2014—InterContinental Resort Lhasa Paradise—since the hotel will most probably not employ Tibetans except in menial tasks and will accommodate wealthy Chinese businessmen and Party cadres.\textsuperscript{31}

Much reflection is taking place nowadays in the world on viable models for the perennity of society/ies. Common keywords include the environment, sustainability, responsability, and respect. The Dalai Lama uses the expression of “universal responsability,” and humanism. Spirituality as a possible value for the future might also be added in contrast to materialism, individualism and consumerism. One of the main characteristics of Tibetans in general is their loyalty to Buddhism, although its transmission is not always easy to maintain either under an atheist Communist rule or in a global world driven by materialism and consumerism. On the other hand, Tibetan Buddhism has become quite popular among Western societies and many people have embraced it as a daily practice. In such a way, aspects of the Tibetan culture and language are also spreading on a global level. Nevertheless, with the encouragement of the Dalai Lama, this form of spiritual technique is being synchronized with


\footnotesize{30 \url{<www.change.org/en-GB/petitions/help-stop-the-destruction-of-my-home-lhasa-tibet>}, visited on 31 July 2013.}

\footnotesize{31 \url{<www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/23/tibet-activists-boycott-intercontinental-hotel-plan>}, visited on 7 August 2013.}
science through research on the effects of meditation for example and regular international seminars are hosted by the Mind and Life Institute which has links to M.I.T. Tibetan meditation techniques are thus entering the global mainstream therapeutic field without always carrying the label of “Buddhist.” Tibetans are thus also participating in the development of a “global Buddhism” by perpetuating Buddhist practice within their communities but also by transmitting Tibetan teachings and techniques to those interested in balancing the materialism and consumerism of current global societies with some measure of spirituality.32

Conclusion

It is true that globalization has advanced modernization, transformation, and consumerism in China and by repercussion has affected Tibetans in China, through the forced modernization of Tibet (exploitation of resources, Disneyfication of the culture and religion). As explained by Thubten Gyatso (the representative of the Tibetan community in France), Tibetans do not reject modernization but want to be able to conduct it on their own terms, with a respect for religion and culture.33 Although they may be considered as uneducated and backward by the dominant Han population, they are technosavvy and keen on education. They often have a feeling of being “bought” by Chinese material goods. Contrary to the case of some minorities, globalization has become a medium of resistance and a tool of survival for the Tibetan community which has seized every opportunity to use modern means of communication inside and outside Tibet and economic openings in exile to uphold its identity and cohesion as a minority group, one who, so far, has chosen to follow the strategy of non-violence advocated by their moral and spiritual leader. This choice of non-violence seems to be the only available option to a people who are profoundly Buddhist at their core.

This deliberate and enduring choice of non-violence poses a moral question or standard on the international level, especially for Western democratic societies which usually favour economic considerations over human ones. Nevertheless, the Tibetans pacifist approach to resistance may explain the

32 There is much to be said about the phenomenon and the spread of a “global Buddhism,” but the subject lies beyond the scope of this article.

“capital of sympathy” they usually benefit from, which often makes it easier for Tibetan refugees to gain asylum status compared to other minority groups, or to find a way to the West through government resettlement programs. But this image of a model refugee minority does not carry much weight apart from a moral one in the economic and political strategies being played out on the board game of the world, however much many Tibetans would wish to see Western countries intervene directly to help them in China. Apart from moral condemnations and reports on the situation of human rights, there seems to be little these countries can do when facing China. Up to date,\textsuperscript{34} the 123 self-immolations of Tibetans, in Tibet (as well as in Nepal and India), mainly of monks but also of nuns, lay men and women (parents in all of the latter cases), and teenagers, have had very little impact on the outside world. This impact depends mainly on the amount of media coverage which might be devoted to the subject, but international headlines and news focuses change quickly. What little news coverage there may be in China is used to blame the Dalai Lama and the government-in-exile for incitation. Outside of China, the media around the world usually relate the very difficult conditions faced by the Tibetans in their homeland which lead to these self-immolations. The question remains of the motivation of those who immolate themselves. Even if many Tibetans themselves do not agree on this radical choice, it is usually explained through the idea of self-sacrifice and as an act of despair for lack of any other means of expression. In making this choice, self-immolators exercise no violence on the Chinese, and there is no destruction of property or people except of themselves. If one wants to be cynical, one could add that the only hardship added to the burden of Chinese soldiers in Tibet (300,000 or one fifth of the Chinese Army; one soldier for twenty Tibetans) is that they must now also carry fire-extinguishers in addition to their regular weapons.

One could add one last specificity the Tibetan people as a minority have to offer the world: their sense of humour and enduring good spirits in the face of hardship. This aspect of their resilience after sixty years of colonization and exile can be seen as a new global tool for reaching-out to the international community and showing it that the Tibetans are far from having given up but that they have managed to maintain their fundamental good humour in the face of

\textsuperscript{34} The 123rd self-immolation was that of monk Tsering Gyal in Tibet on 11 November 2013. His last words were: “Today, I burned myself for the re-union of Tibetans. My only hope is the unity among Tibetans and the preservation of the Tibetan language and tradition. If we do that, all the Tibetans will be re-united.” <www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=34213&article=Golok+self-immolator+Tsering+Gyal+succumbs+to+burns&t=1&c=1>, visited on 12 November 2013.
hardship and will continue to do so as long as necessary. This capacity to not
give in to despair while being able to make fun of oneself or to see the irony in
difficult situations could be seen as a new kind of global political strength.

**Bibliography**

**Books**


J. Knaus, *Orphans of the Cold War. America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival* (Public
Affairs, New York, 1999).

D. Lopez Jr. *Prisoners of Shangri-La. Tibetan Buddhism and The West* (The University of


**Articles**

J.M. Hess. “Statelessness and the State: Tibetans, Citizenship, and Nationalist Activism
79–103.


E. Yeh. “Will the Real Tibetan Please Stand Up! Identity Politics in the Tibetan Diaspora.”
*Tibet, Self, and the Tibetan Diaspora, Voices of Difference* (Proceedings of the Ninth

**Internet Sites Consulted in Researching this Article**


http://tibetanculture.org/.


http://www.freetibetanheroes.org/home.php/.

http://www.freetibet.net/.


http://www.rangzen.net/.
http://www.thetibetconnection.org/.
http://www.tibetaid.org/.
http://www.tibetanpoliticalreview.org/.
http://www.tibet-foundation.org/.
http://www.tibetfund.org/.
http://www.tibethouse.us/resources/directory/u.s.-tibet-organizations/.
http://www.tibet.org/.
http://youngtibet.com/.
Can the Afghan Diaspora Speak? Diasporic Identity in the Shadow of Human Rights

Shirin Gul Sadozai and Hina Anwar Ali

Introduction

The case of Afghan refugees in Pakistan is one of the most protracted refugee situations in the world. Formally assisted by both the UNHCR and the Pakistani government, in the form of the provincial Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees and the Ministry for States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON), the lives of these refugees and migrant Afghans in Pakistan are shaped largely by how they are “seen” in the Pakistani “imaginaire.” The premise of the paper is that the Afghan identity in Pakistan is constructed through the Pakistani State discourse(s) of fearism, international development agencies and the larger geo-political context. This paper seeks to understand the legal and social identity of the Afghan diaspora living in Pakistan. Building on narratives from Afghans living in Pakistan and Pakistanis with regular interactions with Afghans, the paper will examine the strategies of resistance for Afghan refugees in Pakistan as they negotiate their identity and the idea of home.

The rights of minorities are quite often the weakest link in the complex equation of citizenship and entitlement in nation states. It can be argued that the state interface with them as refugees or asylum seekers and later as citizens, and the society’s interaction with them directly after integration or through public discourse on refugees and asylum seekers, provide insights into the ethos of citizenship and democracy.

In reverence to Spivak’s stance the paper attempts to unveil who does speak on Afghan identity and when the Afghans speak, who is listening.

The findings and analysis presented remain interim and in no way conclusive; they are part of an on-going research, shared with a community of academics working on similar issues, for a cross-fertilization of ideas. The researchers/authors remain grateful to the University of Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines and the organizers of the International conference on Globalization and Minority People, held on 19th June 2013, for providing an opportunity for sharing and discussing the information presented in this paper.

Categories such as “migrant,” “asylum seeker” and “refugee” exist and are explained within a global context. A new kind of global imaginary is being shaped by the fear of the Other, or what is termed fearism, that is, “a process and discourse [of] hegemony [which] creates an experience of fear that is normalized...keeping the cultural matrix of ‘fear’ operative and relatively invisible.” Appuradai observes that “the blurred lines between ‘them’ and ‘us’ has existed forever and globalization only exacerbates these uncertainties and produces new incentives for cultural purification.” We explore whether this theory holds true with reference to the Afghan diaspora, keeping in view that “the novelty of our era, which threatens the very foundations of the nation-state, is that growing portions of humanity can no longer be represented within it.” For both Appuradai and Agamen, the refugee is at the centre of globalization—for Appuradai as part of the “ethnoscape,” i.e., the shifting world, and for Agamen as “the sole category in which it is possible today to perceive the forms and limits of a political community to come.” Thus it can be argued that our era, that of globalization, contributes to the understanding of the category “refugee” as much as the category helps our understanding of our era.

There is a more obvious layer of globalised discourse from international organizations and aid agencies working within a humanitarian and human rights framework. This layer seems to contradict with the hegemony of fear. Zembylas (2010) argues that for Agamen the failure to question the separation of humanitarian concerns from politics—and thus the treatment of immigrants/refugees/asylum seekers as bare life, excluded from the political community and exposed to death at every turn—signals a resemblance between humanitarianism and the discourse(s) of fearism. Examples of such discourse come from the International Committee of the Red Cross, the non-political actions of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and more precisely the refusal of these organizations to comment on

---

the actions of political regimes. It is therefore argued that humanitarian agencies operate under a variant of this “fearism.” The presentation of the migrants, refugees and asylum seeker as fearsome is not only in political and media discourses; it also echoes in the discourse of humanitarian agencies.

A further layer of globalised discourse comes through what Appuradai refers to as mediascapes, that is the distribution of the electronic capabilities to produce and disseminate information (newspapers, magazines, television stations, film production studios, etc.), which are now available to a growing number of private and public interests throughout the world. The media are often the conduit for the hegemonic discourse of fearism. The politics of fear\(^\text{11}\) acknowledges the important role of power relations, cultural scripts and media in the process of figuring immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers as fearsome. Hence, when we take Appuradai’s ethnoscapes, mediascapes and ideoscapes as elements of our globalised world, it may be suggested that the ideoscape, defined as “concatenations of images” about the refugees (who are part of the “ethnoscape”) is (potentially) disseminated simultaneously in Kabul, Karachi and New York through the mediascape.

Primarily, the concept of the imaginary (imaginaire) is applied to examine the discourses of fearism finding their way into perceptions of Afghan identity, at the legal and social levels: “In short we have to understand the imaginaire as the dimension from which issues a continous dialogue between heritage and innovation that characterizes political action in its cultural aspect.”\(^\text{12}\) The global context of the Afghan identity formation within various discourses of fearism can be read through these distinct junctions: the 1979 USSR invasion of Afghanistan, the 1995–96 Taliban government in Kabul and the 2001 World Trade Centre attack leading to the ongoing global alliance of War on Terror (WoT).

In this analysis, we examine identity at two levels, legal and social: legal identity, as given by the Proof of Registration (PoR) for Afghans in Pakistan and social identity as expressed, verbal and written, in the perceptions of those around them. The examined narratives include written narratives from journalistic and bureaucratic sources and discussions with representatives of the Afghan diaspora,\(^\text{13}\) as well as representatives of the Pakistan government administration, aid agencies working with Afghans in Pakistan and Pakistanis

\(^{10}\) Zembylas, 36.

\(^{11}\) Zembylas, 31.

\(^{12}\) Bayart, 137.

\(^{13}\) So far, these include the Afghans residing in Pakistan and Canada. The research was carried out in 2013.
in Afghan majority neighbourhoods. In this paper, discourse is both a unit of data collection and a unit of analysis.

Forming and Negotiating Identities: the Camp, the Afghans and the Law of Exception

In contemporary states, identity is the authoritative marker of exclusion and inclusion.\(^14\) When Others are constructed as fearsome, “they are excluded from the field of human values, civic rights and moral obligations...[thus] maintaining the boundary that divides ‘us’ from ‘them’.”\(^15\) In Pakistan, it was in the mid-to late 1990s that the Afghan identity was expressed as dangerous to the nation in the prevailing discourse. In time, the Afghans could not be included without inflicting serious damage on Pakistanis. The resentment and even violence against the Afghans, then, was seen as a justified response toward the threat posed by them.

With around 1.7 million registered Afghans living in Pakistan,\(^16\) the country has been host to the largest proportion of the largest refugee population\(^17\) in the world for more than 30 years. Pakistan’s recognition of Afghan refugees was prima facie, albeit without many restrictions at all. The Pakistan government neither signed nor was a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention\(^18\) and the 1967 protocol.\(^19\) In addition, the domestic legislation (Foreigners Act 1946,\(^20\) 14 Antje Ellerman. Undocumented Migrants and Resistance in the State of Exception Prepared for presentation at the European Union Studies Association meeting in Los Angeles, CA, April 2009, 11.
15 Papastergiadis 2006 in Zembylas, 39.
16 An estimated 1 million or more are unregistered (multiple sources including UN agencies).
17 According to UNHCR’s ‘Global Trends’ Report, one out 3 refugees, across the world, is an Afghan.
18 The UNHCR 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees is the key legal document in defining who is a refugee, their rights and the legal obligations of states.
19 The Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (also known as the New York Protocol) entered into force on the 4th of October 1967. Whereas the United Nations 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees had restricted refugee status to those whose circumstances had come about “as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951’ and has given states party to the Convention the option of interpreting this as “events occurring in Europe” or “events occurring in Europe or elsewhere,” the 1967 Protocol removed both the temporal and geographic restrictions.
20 The Foreigners Act, 1946 is a Pakistani law enacted to grant the certain powers to Pakistani government in matters of foreigners in Pakistan. The Act was enacted before Pakistan became independent. The Act defines a foreigner as a person who is not a citizen of Pakistan.
Foreigner Registration Act 1939,\textsuperscript{21} etc.) remains inadequate and at best ambiguous. For more than 20 years, Afghans in Pakistan remained largely undocumented. Those in camps were issued ration cards which for a period also doubled as a means of identification. However, it is clear that while the concentration of Afghans coming to Pakistan was found in the 300 camps\textsuperscript{22} that were set up, there was a sizeable Afghan population outside the camps as well. It was in 2005 that registration for Afghans (inside and outside the camps) was undertaken by the Pakistani Government, in collaboration with the UNHCR. Close to 3 million Afghans were registered and certified with a “Proof of Registration” (PoR) document.

Canadian Afghan journalist and documentary maker, Nilofor Pizar, remembers a warm reception and helpful local population during her stay in Pakistan, when she was fleeing Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion. Pakistan was lavish with praise globally for its generosity in hosting Afghan refugees through the 1980s. Comparisons were often made with Iran, which was specifically criticised for forced repatriation. Pakistan, on the other hand, maintained the rhetoric of Afghan guests. At the height of the international generosity, the international community supported Pakistan in this effort for as much as US $100 million\textsuperscript{23} annually, funnelled through Pakistan for the Afghan population living in Pakistan. The global narrative on Pakistan changed following the Soviet withdrawal and the fall of Kabul to the Taliban in 1996. One indication of this changed role for Pakistan was in the drying up of financial support for the Afghans. This was also the time when in the absence of any work programmes or ration card system, an even larger number of Afghans left the camps to seek a livelihood outside the camps. The late 1990s saw the emergence of policy directives to police stations that called for Afghans to be hauled up and sent back to Afghanistan. The USCR report on the change in conditions of Afghans in Pakistan, published on September 28, 2001, predicted “The appalling terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 are likely to trigger fundamental changes in states’ and individuals’ attitudes towards foreigners, and particularly in the reception and treatment of refugees. The refugee population most likely to be immediately affected is Afghan refugees in Pakistan.”\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{21} An Act to provide for the Registration of Foreigners in Pakistan & extends to the whole of Pakistan.

\textsuperscript{22} Most of these were in the two provinces of Balochistan and North West Frontier (renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2011).


\textsuperscript{24} USCR 2001, 4.
There is an acknowledgement of an overall change in perception of Afghan refugees in Pakistan (USCR 2001; IRIN 2007; HRCP various reports 2001/2-2009). This change in perception appears to have translated into a change in attitude which is shared by the Afghans interviewed: “It is simple. My father did not face what my brother had to face till we sent him away to Canada. Don’t get me wrong, there were problems for our family when we first came but for my husband to have to go to the local police station and bribe them to let my brother go is harassment, simply on the basis of being Afghan” (urban Afghan woman married to a Pakistani).

To understand the transition as expressed in the above statement, it is important to explore the elements of cultural identity, global discourse and the politics of nation state and refugee as an intricate medley. Following the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by USSR, there was an exodus of refugees to the neighbouring countries. Pakistan was an ally against the USSR, a pre-dominantly Muslim country with a sizeable Pashtun population.

Hence, initially, the shared religion\(^ {25}\) and culture was invoked in the global discourse and reflected in the political actions in Pakistan. As Boesen\(^ {26}\) writes, “The Pushtun Afghan refugees and the local Pakistan population share fundamental cultural links: language (Pushtu), religion (Sunni), and the Pushtun cultural system, which they call the Pushtunwali (The Pushtun way). The basic values of Pushtunwali are twofold: merana (magnanimity) and melmapalana (hospitality).” As mentioned, the mid-1990s ushered in a change and by 1999,\(^ {27}\) the government refused to consider all newly arriving Afghans as prima facie refugees, resorting to deportation and even detention, border closures, camp closures and voluntary and forced repatriation among other actions. The refugees also faced greater restrictions on movement, employment, and access to public services within the camps and refugee villages. In 2001, Pakistan officially closed its borders to new arrivals. For the camps in Germany to be effective, the Nuremberg Laws stripping the Jews of their citizenship rights were a necessary prerequisite;\(^ {28}\) Without prime facie recognition and any official

---

\(^{25}\) Countries such as Saudi Arabia helped finance the mujahedeen in order to help rid Muslim Afghanistan of the Soviet “infidels” (op.cit).


documentation, these refuges were also rendered stateless within Pakistan and moved into a zone where “the exception and the rule, the licit and the illicit”²⁹ were indistinguishable. The above quotation is all the more significant since a Pakistani citizen was able to negotiate (or even buy out) a release for the Afghan brother of his wife, not an Afghan. Agamben observes “When the rights of man are no longer the rights of the citizen, then he is truly sacred, in the sense that this term had in archaic Roman law: destined to die.”³⁰ The exacerbation of the distinctions between Afghans and Pakistanis is a transition contrasting the initial drumming up of cultural similarities. The stripping off of these similarities was a necessary precondition for the state of exception wherein “the normal rule of law is suspended and in which the fact that atrocities will be committed does not depend on the law but on the ethical and civil sense of the police that act temporarily as sovereign.”³¹ The following two excerpts from a conversation with Afghans in Pakistan further illustrates that they do live without a rule of law and are at the mercy of the police as sovereign where sovereign is define by the ability to designate homo sacre.

The first time the police stopped me and my brother, he was upset. He showed them his papers (referring to the PoR), yet they wouldn’t let him go. I was scared and just so my brother wouldn’t get into any trouble, I gave them all the cash I had with me at the time. It happens now too, and we do bribe them.

Urban Afghan student at a private institution

My husband is a taxi driver and we live in a predominantly displaced Somalis and Afghans area. Police routinely stop taxi drivers who are Afghan just to extort money, threatening them with rotting in jail without any legal recourse. We barely make enough to sustain ourselves, yet we’d rather bribe them than have my husband incarcerated and me, my daughters and my young son left without his protective presence.

Urban Afghan woman, domestic worker

The discussions further highlighted that “getting into trouble,” that is being taken to the police station, could lead to the writing of a report, which they wanted to avoid by paying the bribe. While we could not talk to the police, we relied on conversations with Afghans to conclude that the fear of being taken to the police station was used by the police to extort money. Hence, using

²⁹  Agamben, 2000, 40.
³⁰  Agamben, 2000, 22, 3.
³¹  Agamben, 2000, 41.
Agamben’s analogy of the camp, while the actions of the police represent the law of exception being extended beyond the camp itself, the police station resembles the camp, with its law of exception or naked life that Arendt refers to as “a space where power confronts nothing other than pure biological life without any mediation.”

The Afghans outside the ‘camp’ therefore do not want to go inside the “camp.”

**The Hegemony of Fearism: Conduits, Amplifiers and the Construction of the Other**

In the popular Pakistani imagination, by now the Afghan is “the Other,” responsible for moral decay in a hitherto pristine Pakistani culture through a combination of debauchery and violence. This moral malaise does not consist only in the introduction of violence and weaponization, but also prostitution. Here are some representations of such popular perceptions gathered during conversations with Pakistanis regularly in contact with Afghans living in Pakistan:

They have been key in bringing the drug culture, Kalashnikov culture; in the Zia era, the formal economy GDP was 5% and the black economy was 8%.

Retired Pakistani Army Officer

The men are drug addicts and their wives are prostitutes to make ends meet. Due to prostitution, abortion is rampant and they are willing to bribe doctors with dollars to get it done (Pakistani doctor practicing in Afghan concentrated neighbourhood).

Forced repatriation is a very dangerous policy option. You cannot get the Afghans out, there will be daily bombings as a reaction, if they do.

Aid Agency worker

These expressions are representative of fearism which finds its way into the popular “imaginaire” through “multiple threads that interconnect fear with the “stranger” other.” These threads include the national discourse on Afghans as well as the international discourse on terrorism. The Afghan in Pakistan is constructed as a moral, physical, economic and security threat. Such an effect
of seeing the “Other” as a threat caused dualities of “us” and “them” to emerge. Some excerpts are shared from the discourse of international aid agencies which seem to depict the same fearism as in the popular “imaginaire.”

Afghans concentrated in and around villages and camps have contributed to the degradation of the environment accelerating the deterioration of the physical infrastructure, forests and livestock grazing areas.

Afghans living in Pakistan have strained the Pakistani service sector’s financial resources and infrastructure in the affected and hosting areas. Even where camps were fully closed 25–30 percent of Afghans preferred to remain in Pakistan. Afghan school children account for at least 20–25 percent of the students in Pakistani schools in these areas.

The menial jobs that the local population shies away from, such as garbage collection and recycling in the major urban areas, are undertaken by Afghans.

These statements are from a document for the development of an assistance project in the refugee hosting areas. The overall context of the argument within the document is therefore humanitarian. Being a UN project, it is apolitical. Yet, we see that these statements are congruent with the discourse(s) of fear, which constructs the Afghans in Pakistan as detrimental to Pakistan. The help provided is therefore rooted in a human rights discourse. In other words, like the discourses of fearism compelled by the law of exception, the international aid agencies’ discourse also views the Afghans simply as bodies, bare life separate from political life.

Resistance: Coping by Using the Weapons of the Weak

Scott argues that while the weapons of the weak are strategies of resistance, they do not amount to acts of empowerment, but are better understood as acts of desperation. Often, these acts of desperation are coping strategies for thwarting social control. Ellerman discusses “resistance by means of identity-stripping” by illegal migrants in Germany: “These self-stripping strategies

34 JOINT UN PROGRAMME on DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT available at <www.undp.org.pk>.

clearly exemplify the possibility of resistance in the state of exception.”

In Pakistan, we can see a version of this among the Afghans that we spoke to. To explain the everyday negotiation of identity by the Afghan population, we introduce the idea of a “line of visibility” as a weapon. Both in terms of social and legal identity, their coping strategy is to stay below the line of visibility:

I speak English and they ask me where am I from, I get away with saying “I am from the middle east.”

Male student

My cousins in Afghanistan make fun of me because I look so Pakistani, but I think it’s better. At least I don’t have many explanations to give.

K is an Afghan woman in her later twenties and works in a local business at as a receptionist and assistant

I am more Pakistani than I am Afghan, anyway. I dress Pakistani, I speak Urdu so well, my friends are all Pakistani. Unless somebody visits my place, they never know that I am Afghan.

Female student

I know there are women who do not disclose that they are Afghans, they do this because it makes them feel safer.

Nazneen

For the Afghans living in Pakistan, this everyday subterfuge is to create space in what most consider a temporary home. While no one that we talked to mentioned going back to Afghanistan, they did not see Pakistan as “home” explicitly. Nazneen, an Afghan woman living in Pakistan who has been quoted several times in this paper, is a mother of four who came to Pakistan in 1998 after the Taliban stopped her in the street and beat her for lifting her burqa (veil) in public to breathe during an Asthma attack. Since then, she has alternately been working in people’s houses, stitching clothes and selling knitwear to a local store to make ends meet. Her husband is a taxi driver. She shared, “For me, Afghanistan is my country, my love, my pride. Afghanistan zindabad.” However, implicitly, Pakistan is associated with home, as they explained knowing the streets here and not knowing them in Afghanistan: “What would I do there?”


37 Afghanistan.
I don’t even know the streets. I wouldn’t be able to run simple errands. What do I know about the place? Nothing!” (Nazneen). However, the Afghans in Pakistan are different from the illegal migrants in Germany as discussed by Ellerman, in that their destination of choice is not the country they have escaped to, namely Pakistan. Given a choice, they would much rather be in some developed country of North America, Europe or Australia. Most of our respondents had at least one relative in one of these countries.

Hannah Arendt observes a “priceless advantage” that refugees have: “History is no longer a closed book to them and politics is no longer the privilege of Gentiles...Refugees driven from country to country represent the vanguard of their people.”\(^{38}\) Though this needs\(^ {39}\) further development, we do look at some conversations displaying this priceless advantage, which we link to Appuradai’s notion of “imaginaire” which is also a means of subversion and to Agamben’s idea of the “power of intellectuality” which he argues is the power to reunite life to its form or prevents it from being dissociated from its form.

We have argued in this paper that the lives of Afghans in Pakistan are shaped largely by how they are “seen” in the Pakistani “imaginaire.”\(^ {40}\) Our respondents were aware of this control exerted on them at a social level and even how it extended to the articulation of their legal identity: “If I could change one thing, it would be the way the men in this country look at me,”\(^ {41}\) Nazneen’s shared. Her story is not unique, nor is her experience. It is, however, her being a refugee which has given her the insight expressed above.

To be honest, Pakistanis have also changed. They weren’t like this, they are quite backward. Just look at your TV, from covering head to sleeveless and western attire, now. Whereas women from Kabul when they first came, they wore sleeveless and western clothes and were generally, more fashionable. Now that is not bad but only different. The Pakistanis categorised that as bad and associated it with being loose.

Urban Afghan woman, living in Pakistan for 30 years

She went on to explain with an example:

See, we are different for Pakistani weddings might be segregated but ours are not. For Pakistani, it might be strange to dance in wedding ceremonies, when men are present. For us, the dance is a gift to the couple and their families, signifying that we are sharing in their happiness. If we

---

\(^{38}\) Arendt in Agamben 2000 16, 7.

\(^{39}\) Arendt in Agamben 2000 16, 7.

\(^{40}\) Deleuze in Bayart, 132.

\(^{41}\) All names are changed to protect respondent privacy.
don’t dance, they might think they are not happy with this match, It can, actually, offend them.

She explained how cultural differences were used to contribute to what we refer to as discourses of fearism:

I have, personally been asked “So are you kaafirs then, you wear a white dress for weddings.” White dress is cultural, from Turkmenistan to Iran to Afghanistan even Arab countries, it is white for the bride. It is Pakistan taking from Indian subcontinent that you have read. So I now tell the person asking, unless you are Hindu for wearing red as a bride or eating chillies, we are not kaafirs.

We understand the above conversation as an example resistance and coping strategy based on the “priceless advantage” since in this explanation we see historical, cultural and political analysis from a person who is not a political analyst or a historian. She was simply faced with the situation of having to leave her home country and confront a culture different from hers, which led to questions she had to find answers to. The resistance is especially evident where exiles use their intercultural knowledge to counter the Pakistanis’ question at a social level with a retort that counters the Pakistani nationalistic discourse of difference: “the State of Pakistan has not been fair to us. It has wanted its people to feel about us the way they wanted. How do they claim they have given us space? Where? What space? We pay rents and that too a higher premium. We are partly responsible for appreciated rentals through the 80s and 90s” (K from the private sector). K is aware that it is the social perception created through various conduits of the discourses of fearism which compels most homeowners to avoid having her as a tenant, simply because she is an Afghan. However, it is what we refer to as the law of exception that leaves her no recourse to legal action if she is asked for higher than market price as rent, simply on the basis of being Afghan.

Faraz, an Afghan student shared with us how the global imaginaire is fuelled by the mediascape and shapes the ideoscape, and we will end our analysis of the status of Afghan refugees in Pakistan with his comment:

Before coming to Pakistan, I hated Pakistan. We all did in Afghanistan. In fact, when I first got an opportunity to come to Pakistan on a scholarship,
my friends discouraged me so much so that I gave it up, citing family problems. Everyone in my country hates Pakistan. My mother is totally illiterate, she hates Pakistan. So I thought why does she hate Pakistan? She doesn't even know much about it. She hates Pakistan because my father hates Pakistan. Why does my father hate Pakistan? My father hates Pakistan because the media tells him to.

Bibliography


Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), 2001/2-2009 Reports.

IRIN—Humanitarian News and Analysis, a Service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Reports 2007.


Protecting Minority Population in Europe with European Law

Coralie Fiori-Khayat

One would generally think that law is a national issue, and thus far from taking into account the issues of globalization, apart from economic issues. Whilst this approach was fully efficient for decades, it has now turned to be outdated as States developed not only economic partnerships but also and mostly political partnerships. From this point of view, Europe can be seen as a model of innovative partnership, the institutional structure of which had never been created so far. Though it was first rooted in an economic partnership during the 1950s it quickly evolved to become a unique form of political partnership (different from a federation or a confederation, though), where each state remains sovereign while being so intricate within the partnership, that almost all its political strategies are defined within this supranational entity. The fact is that Europe is seen as an El Dorado or, at least, as a “safe harbour” not only by non-European minorities, who fled wars and misery, but also by European minorities whose treatment can be seen as discriminatory as far as local policies are concerned. In other words, though legal issues are fundamentally national ones, they tend to be rooted more and more deeply into the seeds of globalization, as minorities at stake can come either from out of Europe or from Europe itself.

Legal protection for the minority population within Europe is characterized by a fundamental paradox. Europe has been decorated with the seals of democracy, human rights and fundamental freedom as the Treaties marked its founding days. However, it was not until 1995 that the European Council (which is not part of EU) started dealing with minority population issues. Though the horrors that swept us between the two world wars and across the 1940s are fortunately no longer around today, the fact remains that some countries – especially the new Member States – clearly subject discriminatory treatment to a section of their nationals. However, in order for a State to be accepted and continue as a member of the European Union it must inherently respect the values of the EU, which include promoting democracy and respecting fundamental freedom. The Directorate General of Justice (DG JUST) of the European Commission has been given the responsibility to ensure over the entire territory of the European Union that the Member States respect the values of EU; it will make sure in particular that any sort of discrimination does...
not take place within EU. The European institutions (primarily the Commission) as well as the individuals have been provided with the legal apparatus and authorities to ensure effective implementation of minority rights. But is this body of law effective? Answering this question is more complex than one could think. Indeed, while this apparatus seems effective (I), it turns out to be illusive (II).

An “Apparently” Effective Body of Law

From a purely normative point of view, the existing body of law is comprehensive for the most part in the sense that protection against discrimination is as much based on primary legislation that – under French law – belongs to constitutional principles, as on secondary legislation that has the force of law (A) as per the French hierarchy of legal norms. Better yet, the penalties imposed by these texts are particularly deterring as any norm that is not subject to penalty is just a namesake (B).

Complete Body of Law: Treaties and ECHR Convention, the Treaties of European Law

European legislation is indeed quite comprehensive in this aspect. The primary legislation, i.e. its treaties includes the rules for protection of third world nationals.

Since the Treaty of Rome, the subject of prohibiting ethno-racial discrimination has been laid down by Article 12 EC, now Article 18 of the Treaty of Lisbon as regards the functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This text provides that:

Any discrimination on the grounds of nationality is prohibited within the applicable scope of this Treaty without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein.

The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, may implement regulations to prohibit such discrimination.

The least we can say after reading this text is that it seems to be characterized by a particularly wide scope. The references made in the “scope [of the] Treaty” are quite detailed in this respect. In fact, it traditionally distinguishes the scope of competence [of the Community and Union] and the scope of the Treaty; the latter is intended to be wider than simple scope of competence in the sense that it includes skills and powers vested to the member states in principle:
their scope is in that case limited because of the consequences that national normative legislation can have on the effectiveness of EU law.

The issue of its applicability to nationals of the European Union and prohibiting the discrimination they may be subjected to is well-known and has become a well-established case-law, and one of its major illustrations is the famous GRAVIER case. Similarly, the subsidiarity of Article 18 TFEU has rarely been discussed: the text of this well-established case-law is applicable if and only if other more accurate primary legislation does not intervene within a determined scope to prohibit the discriminations based on nationality: this is direct application of the classical adage *specialia generalibus derogant*.

The answer to the question of the applicability of the text to non-EU nationals is in fact much more clear. A negative response prevailed in general according to prevailing case-law opinion and much of the authors until ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Hence, the ECJ opined in 2002 that Article 12 TEC “requires each Member State to ensure complete equality of treatment between its own nationals and the nationals of other Member States in a situation governed by Community law.” Some authors have also reckoned that because of the changes introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam (particularly with regard to secondary legislation taken or to be taken under Title IV of TEC), it was likely that Article 12 of TEC (now Article 18 of TFEU) should apply to foreign nationals: did the Treaty of Amsterdam not create new competences for the European Community, which will mostly be applicable to the nationals of other countries for it is the Community (the European Union since the Treaty of Lisbon), which is responsible for policies on visas, asylum, immigration, and free movement of people in general. This analysis could be further enhanced by the same structure as the Treaty of Lisbon: Article 18 of TFEU is given in the second part of the Treaty of Lisbon entitled “Non-discrimination and EU citizenship” as well as the former Article 13 of TEC, which is now Article 19 of TFEU as regards the prohibition of discrimination and benefits the nationals of other countries.

As regards Article 19 of TFEU (formerly Article 13 of TEC) in particular, there is no legal basis under primary law in the fight against discrimination based on race or ethnicity. Its insertion, linked to the Treaty of Amsterdam, was in general hailed as a breakthrough in the fight against discrimination. Its effectiveness however remains questionable. In fact, its first weakness is

---

1 ECJ 293/83 Miss GRAVIER/Liege City, ECR, 1985, 593; See also ECJ 24/86, Mr. Vincent BLAILOT/University of Liege, ECR 1988, 379.

2 ECJ, 6th June 2002, Ricordi and others, C-360/00, ECR, 2002, I-5089; in the same direction, ECJ 4th June 2009, Athanasios Vatsouras/ARGE, C-22/08 and C-23/08, ECR, I-04585.
that Article 19 of TFEU does not have any direct effect: in other words, although it enables the European Union to take steps to prevent or stop ethno-racial discrimination, it does not in principle set out any general prohibition of such discrimination (and therefore cannot be relied upon as such by the claimant). In addition, Article 19 of TFEU sets out a comprehensive list of six prohibited grounds of discrimination, which include ethno-racial backgrounds, but not nationality which is somewhat surprising. Finally, as we will see in a moment the penalties that could be handed in case Article 19 of TFEU is violated, entail a cumbersome procedure provided in Article 7 of TFEU.

European Convention on Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights is not far behind. This text (which is part of the constitutional principles under French law) has a wider scope than the European treaties: it binds the members of the European Council including 47 countries from the EU Member States to Azerbaijan, the Russian Federation, Montenegro, Turkey and Georgia. The European Convention on Human Rights has two texts intended to prohibit discrimination: Article 14 of the Convention on one hand and Article 1 of the additional Protocol No. 12 on the other.

With regard to Article 14 of the Convention, it binds all the states that have ratified the European Convention; its particularly large formulation allows the European Human Rights Court a wide scope of manoeuvre for its actions. This article stipulates that: “Everyone must enjoy the rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights regardless of skin colour, sex, language, political or religious beliefs or origins. The prohibition of discrimination is closely linked to the principle of equality which holds that all people are born and remain free and equal in dignity and rights.” However, Article 14 suffers from being a “dependent” provision. In other words, it cannot be invoked alone but must be supported by another legislation of the Convention. The European Court of Human Rights has shown relative leniency in its requirements since it is sufficient that there is a “relationship” between the alleged violation of Article 14 and the rights protected by the Convention so that it can validly stipulate. The combination of Article 14 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 has therefore allowed the honourable Court to enter big litigations relating to social benefits on the right of ownership. The honourable Court has been particularly innovative as regards discrimination based on ethnic origin in particular. In one famous case, the honourable Court held that:

---

3 ECHR Grand Chamber, 6th July 2005, Nachova/Bulgaria, §145.
Discrimination is treating differently, without an objective and reasonable justification, people in relevantly similar situations (see Willis v. the United Kingdom, no. 36042/97, §48, echr 2002-IV). Racial violence is a particular affront to human dignity and, in view of its perilous consequences, requires from the authorities special vigilance and a vigorous reaction. It is for this reason that the authorities must use all available means to combat racism and racist violence, thereby reinforcing democracy’s vision of a society in which diversity is not perceived as a threat but as a source of enrichment.

It is under this principle of obiter dictum that the honourable Court was thereafter able to use for example the concept of purely Community law of indirect discrimination. The most obvious example is the DH/Czech Republic case. In this remarkable judgment, the Grand Chamber especially invoked a variety of sources in support of its motivation: legal texts of the European Council, decisions of the House of Lords (even though the UK was not a party to the proceedings), decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States as well as “the relevant community laws and practices,” starting with Article 19 of TFEU... Delivered on a member of the Roma community, the DH/Czech Republic judgment states that “the vulnerability of Roma/Gypsies requires special attention to their needs and their different lifestyle as much in the given regulatory framework as in the process of reaching the decision in individual cases.” However, “special attention” does not mean “special protection” and the current events continue to prove this every day. In any event, the fact that Article 14 of ECHR cannot be invoked alone does not plead for its great strength despite the progresses, although sometimes bold, made by the European Court.

With regard to Article 1 of Protocol No. 12, it is certainly applicable autonomously (it does not need to be invoked therefore in support of the violation of any treaty provision) but it is just a protocol. In other words, under treaty law it binds only the countries which have ratified it. And the least we can say is that only a few of them have done so; precisely nineteen states have cautiously refrained from ratifying the Protocol No. 12 including Germany, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey. We may agree with an author who observes that these states are “probably frightened by the avalanche of queries that general ratification would generate and highlight the

---

fact that European societies are riddled with discrimination of all kinds, in all places and with regard to all kinds of people.”5 Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 is therefore not applicable in many countries despite its autonomous character.

**Secondary Legislation**

Since the early 2000s, EU institutions have agreed to further integrate deterring body of law to fight effectively against racism and xenophobia. It is essentially the Council’s Directive 2000/43/EC relating to implementation of the principle of equal treatment among people irrespective of racial or ethnic origin6 (the “race” directive) and Directive 2000/78/EC establishing the general framework for equal treatment in terms of employment and work.7 However, it is important to remember the Directive’s legal regime: it will not become binding until the period specified in the text has expired, the period during which the Member States must carry out its implementation. Whether the Directive’s objectives (given in the recitals) are binding on the States, they have full freedom to choose the suitable way to do this and they are in fact always free to go beyond what the Directive requires. The failure to implement the Directive is the responsibility of the defaulting Member State, which can be sentenced to fines by the European Union Court of Justice. The conviction by the European Court for Protection of Human Rights requires that the denounced Member State does not amend its legislation within a “reasonable time” subsequent to its conviction...

The “Race” Directive aims at establishing a common framework for Member States to fight against discrimination based on race or ethnicity in various fields. Under the 13th recital of the preamble to the directive, the legislation is applicable to the nationals of countries outside EU. Moreover, it is not clear how this Directive would help the nationals of EU states, as their rights and in particular their right against discrimination because of their race or ethnicity are already recognized by the primary law...

Its purpose is particularly extensive as it seeks to prohibit any direct or indirect discrimination based on race or ethnic origin; if direct discrimination is easily identifiable, indirect discrimination is defined as follows: according to article 2, paragraph 2, point b, indirect discrimination exists “where any seemingly neutral provision, criterion or practice is likely to cause any particular disadvantage to people of any particular race or ethnic origin with regard to...
others, unless such provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by
any legitimate objective and the means of achieving such objective are appro-
priate and necessary.”

The Directive introduces size restriction in Article 3 paragraph 2, which
states that “[t]his Directive does not cover differences of treatment based on
nationality and intends without prejudice the provisions and conditions relat-
ing to admission and residence of the nationals of other countries and stateless
people in the territory of Member States or any treatment related to legal status
of the concerned nationals of other countries and stateless people.” However
regrettable it seems, this restriction was a necessary compromise for even
adopting the Directive. In fact, the Member States feared that their prerogatives
and powers as regards entry and residence of aliens from outside EU would be
limited by the Community law. Even so, any difference in treatment on the basis
of nationality criterion can easily fall under the scope of the Directive because
of the prohibition of indirect discrimination since the difference in treatment
described as indirect discrimination is likely to prejudice the interests of the
nationals of the offending state with the same ethnic background.

However, the member states are perfectly free to be more protective of the
aliens from outside EU than the Directive stipulates as it aims to set a mini-
mum framework. Similarly, if the normative provisions of a Member State are
more protective than the provisions fixed by the Directive, the said Member
State cannot lower its level of protection to the level provided in the Directive
(Article 6, paragraph 2).

**Deterring Penalties (Theoretically)**
The EU membership rights may be suspended especially in case the obliga-
tions under Article 19 of **TFEU** are not fulfilled. This provision of suspension is
planned by Article 7 of **TFEU** in the draft that the Treaty of Nice had provided

Article 7 of this Treaty on the functioning of EU provides for not one but
many procedures that in principle correspond to the so-called gradual response
system. The first procedure aims to distinguish a “clear risk of serious breach.”
The second procedure aims to determine “a serious and persistent breach.”
The third procedure deals with penalties by authorizing suspension of certain
rights (including voting rights) of the Member State but leaving its obligations
intact. Contrary to what Article 7 would suggest, the implementation of these
procedures is the least difficult. Initiating the procedure as enforcing the
penalties requires the so-called “super-majority,” which is almost unanimous.
This means that only the “very serious” or downright “extremely serious”
violations could eventually be punished although the Treaty provides for penalties in case of “serious violation”: for the record let us recall here that the proceedings were initiated under Article 7 against Hungary at the end of 2011. After voting for clearly anti-Jewish laws, it was considering plain criminalization of homosexuality in defiance with the mandatory European legislations on this subject. It seems that the prospect of fines brought it back to reason – the question though is for how long.

To consider penalizing a Member State, it must have committed serious human rights violations in terms of Article 2 of TFEU: “respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, respect for human rights including the rights of people belonging to minority populations” – and not theoretically intended because its interpretation under Article 7 is essentially restrictive, which is a repressive legislation; the same Article 2 quite remarkably describes the very characteristics that establish the EU “pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men.” It is precisely because it talks about minority populations in Article 2 (as in Article 19 of TFEU) that an observation and penal procedure could be planned in this regard.

**Observation Procedure for “Clear Risk of a Serious Breach”**

Only three instances can instigate the observation procedure:

- one third of the Member States;
- the European Parliament (after specific report from the competent committee, the European Parliament will vote for double majority: two thirds of the votes cast + majority vote by Parliament members)
- the European Commission (under its regulations: majority of the number of Members specified by the Treaty)

They must produce a rational proposal both legally and effectively. This proposal is then submitted to the Council which will act by 4/5th majority of its members (22 members); the Council’s decision is forwarded to the European Parliament that will vote for two-third majority. The concerned State may not take part in the vote but it must be heard before any decision – or else such decision will be void. This decision is subject to periodic evaluation: “The Council shall regularly verify whether the grounds that lead to the said observation remains valid.”
Observation Procedure for “Serious and Persistent Breach”

Unlike the first phase, the European Parliament no longer has the power of initiative in this case. In other words, only the European Commission (under the same rules of majority) or a group representing two-thirds Member States may intervene. The proposal, as in case of the first procedure, must be substantiated both legally and effectively. The proposal by the Commission or two-thirds member states is then forwarded to the European Council (i.e. all heads of state or government) which must decide by unanimous vote. In other words, abstaining will not be considered equivalent to veto but only one negative vote will prevent the proposed observation of “serious and persistent breach.” Again, the offending State may not take part in the vote but must be heard before any decision – with the same penalties. If any serious and persistent breach is found, the European Council may make “recommendations” to the offending State.

Suspension of the Member State’s Rights

For the suspension procedure to be initiated, it is necessary that the European Council has already found a case of serious and persistent breach, which has not been remedied. Only one European institution can act at this time in accordance with Article 16 of TFEU: the Council (i.e. the Council of Ministers and not the Heads of State and Government). It will act with super-qualified majority after hearing the offending member state; the latter will not take part in the voting, again abstaining will not be considered equivalent to veto. Until 1st November 2014, this super-qualified majority will amount to 74% of the members representing at least 62% of the population. From 1st November 2014, the super-qualified majority will amount to four-fifth Member States representing at least two-third population. The suspension of voting rights is obviously one of the measures that the Council can take: it may suspend “certain rights of the said Member State under the several treaties” including the right to vote. The impact of this suspension on the rights and obligations of private entities (individuals or legal entities) must be taken into account and conversely, the “obligations of the said Member State under the several treaties shall be binding to this State in any event.” These measures may be modified and the suspension may be lifted as per the same rules “in response to the changes into the situation having led to imposed measures.” As noted by one author, this means that:

---
8 The date on which the new provisions provided by the Treaty of Lisbon (TFEU) will come into force and will replace the current provisions from the Treaty of Nice (2001).
After reading the European treaties, it appears that the Member States are given the option to suspend certain voting rights of a Member State which does not respect EU values. However, the procedure is very complex and it requires a strong political will. Everything happens as if while drafting the treaties the Member States had anticipated themselves being subjected to such suspension procedure and wanted to reduce this risk as much as possible.9

As complete and theoretically deterring it may be, this body of law is mostly destined never to be used. In fact, it turns out be totally unrealistic.

Factually Illusive Body of Law: Sensitive Case-law in Terms of Political Refugees and Minority population; No Protection for Minority Languages

One might think that Article 10 ECHR, which sets out a fundamental right to receive and disseminate all kinds of information, devotes some form of “linguistic freedom” that would allow minority languages to exist. However, it is not so: the however large text of Article 10 must be interpreted restrictively as it has a sense of paradox! Insofar as linguistic freedom is not intended, it is understood as the right to speak in a language other than the official language of the country. Therefore, the honourable Court declines ratione materiae jurisdiction to any request for the right to speak in a particular language.10

This praetorian position is for sure likely to jeopardize minority languages since it is open to the government authorities to prohibit their use in the official or even public sphere. Therefore (but I think this issue will be discussed with detailed analysis by another speaker tomorrow), the language is part of a person’s identity and “killing” the language is, to one degree or another, endangering the people who use it.

Protection of Minority Population and Right of Entry into Europe: the SAADI Case

The facts giving rise to this important judgment are relatively simple. Mr. SAADI, a doctor by profession, belongs to the Iraqi Kurdish minority. He fled Iraq and is seeking asylum in the UK with “temporary right of entry papers.” It is undisputed that Mr. SAADI fully and consistently cooperated with

9 P. VERLUISE, 8th April 2012, Diploweb.com.
10 See European commission on HR, 17th May 1985, Mr. CELRFAYT/ Belgium; ECHR – 21st September 2010, Mr. BIRK-LEVY/France: the Convention does not guarantee the right “to an elected representative to use the language of choice to make statements and express the vote in an assembly.”
the British authorities. He was however arrested during a meeting and put in detention into a centre for aliens. Mr. SAADI turned to the European Court after the various appeals he had made to challenge the validity of his detention particularly on the basis of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, were rejected. By Chamber judgment the European Court certainly thought that there had been a violation of Article 5 §2 of the Convention but not Article 5 §1, and thus validated the reasoning of the House of Lords, which essentially considered that it was possible to apply the same legal treatment to the situation of an asylum-seeker and a person who is illegally present in the country; an appeal was petitioned against the judgment and the European Court convened in the Grand Chamber. The judgment of 29th January 2008 confirmed that there was no violation of Article 5 §1.\footnote{ECHR 13229/03, SAADI/UK.}

The honourable Court observed in particular that:

64. Whilst the general rule set out in Article 5 §1 is that everyone has the right to liberty, Article 5 §1 (f) provides an exception to that general rule, permitting States to control the liberty of aliens in an immigration context. As the Court has remarked before, subject to their obligations under the Convention, States enjoy an “undeniable sovereign right to control aliens’ entry into and residence in their territory” [...]. It is a necessary adjunct to this right that States are permitted to detain would-be immigrants who have applied for permission to enter, whether by way of asylum or not. It is evident from the tenor of the judgment in Amuur that the detention of potential immigrants, including asylum-seekers, is capable of being compatible with Article 5 §1 (f).

65. On this point, the Grand Chamber agrees with the Court of Appeal, the House of Lords and the Chamber that, until a State has “authorised” entry to the country, any entry is “unauthorised” and the detention of a person who wishes to effect entry and who needs but does not yet have authorisation to do so can be, without any distortion of language, to “prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry”. It does not accept that as soon as an asylum-seeker has surrendered himself to the immigration authorities, he is seeking to effect an “authorised” entry, with the result that detention cannot be justified under the first limb of Article 5 §1 (f). To interpret the first limb of Article 5 §1 (f) as permitting detention only of a person who is shown to be trying to evade entry restrictions would be to place too narrow a construction on the terms of the provision and on the
power of the State to exercise its undeniable right of control referred to above. Such an interpretation would, moreover, be inconsistent with Conclusion no. 44 of the Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ Programme, the UNHCR’s Guidelines and the Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation [...], all of which envisage the detention of asylum-seekers in certain circumstances, for example while identity checks are taking place or when elements on which the asylum claim is based have to be determined.

Prohibiting the Collective Deportation of Aliens

Prohibiting “collective deportation of aliens” does not appear in the European Convention as such, but two additional protocols (Protocols No. 4 and 7) that govern the deportation measures. Keep in mind that the deportations are as such legal. No state can afford to take in an unlimited number of aliens; the health infrastructure, economic and social fabric, educational and medical institutions would not outlive them – not to mention the negative political fallout from the existing population. The deportations must still be supervised in order to avoid abuse and convenient labelling of scapegoats. In fact, the framework of collective deportations by European treaty law traces its roots in the “collective deportation” of aliens during World War II or rather the Jews deportation policy at the request of Third Reich authorities to put it more clearly.

The European Court adopted a clear case-law position only at the advent of this millennium with the Conka/Belgium judgment (5 February 2002). For the honourable Court, “any collective deportation is prohibited when any measure is taken compelling the aliens as a group to leave a country, except where such measure is taken after reasonably and objectively examining the particular situation of each individual alien of the group.” To denounce Belgium in the Conka judgment, the honourable Court observed that there was some doubt on the collective nature of deportation of the concerned minority population (Gypsies). In fact, first of all the political authorities had already given orders to execute the deportation operations, after which the concerned people were summoned at once by police authorities. In addition, the order to leave the territory was formulated each time under the identical terms. Moreover, it was almost impossible for them to contact a lawyer. Finally, their asylum procedure was still pending.

The honourable Court has also denounced Italy recently for carrying out “repatriation” of Libyan refugees (returned to Libya) hailing in high seas. As the

12 ECHR 701/75, Henning Becker/Denmark, 3rd October 1975.

13 ECHR Grand Chamber, 23rd February 2012, Hirsi Jamaa/Italy.
fact that the arrest of these refugees took place outside Italian territorial waters does not prevent the application of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, the honourable Court has observed that the Italian authorities had not reviewed the individual situation of each person in the group of refugees sent back to Libya. On the contrary, France has not been denounced for deportation of an Afghan refugee, returned to Afghanistan. The honourable Court has observed that the applicant’s statements about his personal situation and the risks he will allegedly stand if he returns to his country had been taken into account as was the status of war in Afghanistan. In other words, being from a country at war would not make him eligible to escape deportation. In other words, the states have some – understandable – latitude to decide on the fate of minority population on their soil. Nevertheless, the lack of harmonization in this field leads to disparate solutions that are risky for legal safety – not to mention the human consequences.

**Whose Fault Is It?**

The European Commission partakes the Treaties the power to inform the other institutions (including the European Council and the Council) for setting off either the warning procedure in case there is a risk of violation or the observation procedure for serious violation. It can also refer to the European Union Court of Justice for penalties (mainly financial) against the offending state for violating the Treaties (Articles 18 and 19 of TFEU in particular), or for failure to implement (or “infidel” implementation of) a directive.

This possibility unfortunately remains mostly virtual. We are well aware that the body of law designed to protect minority population in Europe proves largely illusive.

So who is to blame? Irrespective of what they say, the understaffing within the European Commission first of all together with their often amazing personnel management, whose headcount remains globally stable despite successive expansions.

After that, it is the growing demand for “laws” and “norms.” While the European Commission is not, in fact far from it, the only competent body to produce the laws at EU level it has the least monopoly on legislative initiatives. While the Directorate General of “justice” is not the only authority to exercise this monopoly, and then there are a dozen other Directorate Generals, nevertheless it is the responsibility of the Directorate General of Justice to check whether the EU law is properly applied in the Member States. It also ensures the effective coordination of international judicial mutual assistance that the

---

public often hears about especially in criminal cases, much less in civil and commercial matters although it is a matter of big dispute.

In addition, it is the position for the less ambiguous European Court for Protection of Human Rights. Very quick to punish the states in case of delayed justice (certainly criminal but also in civil matters), very concerned about respecting the privacy of people who commit various crimes (drug trafficking, pimping or acts of terrorism), the Strasbourg Court showed a lot more restraint when lives of political opponents are at stake: the Saadi case was exposed. Numerous opponents to less democratic regimes have been sent back to their country of origin while it was assumed that their fate would be dubious, since the States requesting for extradition certified that their confessions obtained under torture would not be considered as proof...Of course, the European Court takes sides – and is happy! – for the protection of Roma minority. But there are still miles to go before the minority population truly benefits from the protection that the legislations are supposed to provide them.

Finally, it is the flawed approach of the States themselves as well as the political, sporadic but violent upheavals that shake them. In this respect, the law applicable in Europe is a reflection of the society (or the myriad of societies) that creates it. The societal challenges of a world anguished by economic crisis are reflected in the course of development as well as implementation of this law, the crisis that we are unfortunately far from getting out of some-time soon.

Bibliography


PART 3

Minorities’ Economoico-Environmental Struggles
Feudalism and Integration of the Native Peoples of Peru in the Worldwide Economy

Natividad Ferri Carreres

Introduction

The discovery of America opened the door to the first planetary global expansion. Near 1580, under the monarchy of Philippe II, the term “Universal Crown” was used to designate the worldwide Spanish territories which included Europe (The Netherlands, Portugal, and a part of Italy), America, Africa and Asia (Goa, Macao and the Philippines). The frontiers spread, the world became larger, and the ideas, laws, persons and commodities began to circulate. America was the center of this process. The silver went to Europe and to Asia from America, and the Chinese products, such as silk and porcelain, went to Europe through America. In the same way, the notion of local and native land changed. As a result of the exchange between autochthonous societies and Spain, Spanish institutions were adapted to the new context. In other words, a transculturation process started, a re-territorialization, where the European item was integrated into new lands, resulting in a neo-local model.

The neo-local model, based on the feudal Spanish ideal, kept some aspects of Spanish feudalism, such as political and social coercion, and the social relations between the feudal lord and the serfs. In America, however, and particularly in Peru, the extractive activities of silver and gold, their commercialization and the profit motive created a new economic system, a “trade system” that favoured the emergence of new commercial markets and unequal exchange relations between the central European area and the peripheral American one.

2 Gruzinski, 81.
The conquistadores were at the origin of this process. These first European colonizers achieved a feudal transfer, bringing with them all the imagery of the European knight and medieval lord, and projecting into America the medieval dream that was denied to them in Spain. During the Reconquista of Spain, the noble knights who fought against the Muslim enemy were rewarded for the heroic deeds performed by means of mercedes: the knight was placed at the head of a dominion, with the use of the lands given by the King and the authority over vassals bound to serve him and pay him tributes. The mercedes were given in appreciation of the services rendered, but at the same time served to strengthen the loyalty of the nobility to the King in the event of a conflict. How was the medieval machinery exported to America? What kind of legal support would allow the Crown and the conquistadores to appropriate lands and Indians and convert them into dominions and vassals? How did a feudal labor system create a capitalist form of production inserted in a global system?

The Feudalization Process

The figure of America’s conquistador had little to do with the knights that recovered the Iberian territories from Muslim rule. The former came from a lineage of lower rank. Ruggiero Romano defines them as “poor devils, minor children of the nobility” whose main concern was to “become more worthy.” They were not motivated by a desire for justice, nor heroic deeds, but by the obtainment of wealth and, above all, of the social prestige denied to them in Spain. Three impetuses defined the conquistador of the Indies: gold, glory and gospel. Gold, as the wealth they would never reach in Spain; glory, because the doors of the nobility and social prestige were closed for them on the old continent, while America offered the opportunity to ascend; and gospel, because they were responsible for expanding and perpetuating the spirit of crusade and evangelism that had culminated in the reconquest of the Kingdom of Granada.

America settled in the mind of the conquistador as the extension of Spain. Silvio Zavala admits that “the immigrant in America was not a new man, as he was linked by deep roots to his Western ancestors.” Karen Spalding points out that “the dichotomy of Spanish society was also exported to America in the

---
6 I.A. Leonard, Los libros del conquistador (Fondo de cultura económica, 2006), 59.
distinction between the nobles or members of the Church and the common... the distinction between those who served others (Indians) and those who were served (Spaniards).”

The author gives us the definition of colonial society according to Juan de Solórzano: “Así como cualquier república bien concertada requiere que sus ciudadanos se apliquen y repartan a diferentes oficios...así también...conviene y es necesario que, según la disposición de su estado, y naturaleza, unos sirvan, que son más aptos para el trabajo, y otros gobiernen y manden en quienes se halle más razón.”

Following the ideas of Spalding, the Indians became the dominated group in the colonial society, and therefore the only group that could be forced to perform servile tasks, in close relation to a low social rank. This state of servility was imposed upon the Indians firstly to justify a duty of justice over those defenseless people who could not be abandoned to themselves or to the tyrants that ruled them. Then, a detailed characterization of the Indian and his behavior was introduced from the ideology of contempt. It is worth transcribing the meticulous description made by Juan de Matienzo, judge at the Audiencia de Charcas around 1570, which leaves no doubt about the defects of Amerindian cultures and the benefits of being reformed by the Spaniards:

Los indios de cuantas naciones se han descubierto son pusilánimes y tímidos, que les viene de sus melancolías. Naturalmente, tiénense en menos de lo que se podrían tener. No piensan que merecen bien ni honra...Son muy crédulos, fáciles y mudables...Desde niños los enseñan a cargarse...Cuanta más fuerza tienen en el cuerpo tanto menos tienen de entendimiento...No trabajan más de para aquella que han menester por comer y beber aquella semana...Tienen habilidad en oficios mecánicos de todos géneros, de tal manera que hacen cuanto les mandan muy buenos labradores. Siendo de estas condiciones y costumbres les está mejor ser sujetos a españoles y gobernados por ellos que no por los Ingas...Según la ociosidad de los indios y su condición y el daño que de ella se sigue, es de entender que es bien inclinallos y compelellos al trabajo.

8 K. Spalding, *De indio a campesino* (IEP, 1974), 151.
9 Spalding, cited by the author, 152.
10 Spalding, 168–169.
Once the Indians had been reduced to the category of “wheel horse,” and once their necessity for the proper functioning of the colony had been justified, a way to control such a huge “flock” had to be found. The encomienda turned out to be the perfect institution for the exploitation of indigenous labour force, as well as for the payment of the services that the encomendero granted the Indians (indoctrination, protection, watching over their comfort); it also allowed the realization of the conquistadores’ feudal dream: to obtain social privileges such as those that existed in Spain, through the donation of land, villas and vassals to the lord.

What was the encomienda? Juan de Solórzano gives us its legal definition in the 17th century, in his monumental work Política Indiana: “un derecho concedido por merced real a los beneméritos de las indias para percibir y cobrar para sí los tributos, de los indios...conforme a la ley de sucesión, con cargo de cuidar del bien de los indios en lo espiritual y temporal.” The first Indian encomiendas were established in the West Indies, and later Cortés transplanted them to Nueva España: “Cada encomendero recibiría de Cortés un número determinado de indios, a los que gobernaría y de los que recibirían tributo en servicios personales y en especies.”

The Indian encomienda, as we have pointed out, consisted in the allocation of a plot of land and Indians by the conquistador, set up as a monarch, as a reward for the heroic deeds performed, although it did not confer the right of land ownership that was left in the hands of the King. But the encomendero did have a direct and personal control over the allocated Indians. This control showed up through the arbitrary imposition of work and duties that the Indians should perform. Therefore, the better or worse treatment of the Indians depended on the encomendero, underscoring the personal character of the institution during the first period. In the first encomiendas, the Indians were considered as the support of the encomendero. The value of the encomendero, his prestige, was measured by the number of Indians he had. In fact, this period gave rise to the expression “feed” (dar de comer), which amounted to granting Indians, and not land or mines.

---

16 Friede, 41.
The formula of the *encomienda* title at the dawn of the conquest read: “Por la presente encomiendo a vos...al cacique...con mas todos los caciques, capitanes e indios al dicho cacique sujetos; al cual y a los cuales mando que vos den y acudan con toda la comida y bastimentos y vestidos que hubiereis menester para vuestra casa y persona...Y con tanto que no les molestéis, y enseñéis las cosas de nuestra Santa Fe católica.” However, the abuses committed during the early years caused a schism between advocates and opponents of this institution. Those who defended it employed solid arguments, which were religious (expansion of Christianity), political (to ensure the control and settlement of the Spanish population, to satisfy the dominant minority), and economic (to increase the income of the King). With the *encomienda*, the entire colonial framework crystallized in its economic, fiscal, social, religious and political aspects. It was clear that the continuation of the colony depended largely on the survival of this institution. As Silvio Zavala says: “el arraigo de las encomiendas no podía suprimirse sin desorganizar la economía de las colonias.... La colonización reposaba económicamente sobre el trabajo de los indios. Si la corona insistía en limitar y destruir las vías que los españoles utilizaban para valerse de los indios, la colonización no podía subsistir.”

The history of the *encomienda* is a history of power transfers back and forth between monarchs and *encomenderos*. The chaos and the early absence of legal rules to regulate the *encomienda* were followed by the New Laws. These allowed the Crown to control this institution, but at the same time, showed the political impossibility of the monarchs to veto it: economic, financial and social interests were at stake at too long a distance. Crown and settlers fought a constant duel during three centuries to preserve their own interests: the *encomenderos* for the permanence of feudalism, and the Crown to put in place all the bureaucratic apparatus of the modern State. How could the Spanish feudal model articulate the Andean society in the worldwide economy of the time? The discovery and conquest introduced in America a dominant
minority, from the political and economic point of view, which reduced the majority native population to the status of dominated minority.

How did the germ of “europeization” emerge in the Incan society? Roman Ruggiero points out that the replacement of the original society by a European one of feudal type was easy in the case of the Incan Empire, due to its high level of organization, unlike what happened in the case of other nomadic and tribal peoples. But we cannot discard other circumstances such as epidemics, the superiority of Spanish weaponry, and the political divisions at the heart of the Incan Empire, which provided Pizarro with a mass of men who knew the area. What is clear is that the conquest was experienced by the indigenous population as a kind of “dispossession” and “chaos” of its traditional universe, embodied in the Emperor’s death.

Initially there was simply a transfer at the head of the State, from the Incan Emperor to the King of Spain. The Incan lands passed into the hands of the Spanish Crown, but the economic system based on the Indian labour force remained. The colonial society in Peru did not appear out of nowhere, but rather, as Nathan Wachtel points out quite rightly, was made from the survival of ancient structures within a new context. It is from the ruins of the Incan Empire that the colonial society established its foundations.

The Andean pre-colonial economy was based on a system of subsistence and barter, under a regime of reciprocity and redistribution of resources. No money was handled and exchanges were made in local markets. With the encomienda, the Spaniards dismantled this system, taking over all the resources and reshaping a regime of servitude different than the already existing one. The act of labour ceased to be a form of communion with the gods (the Indians provided labour force, cultivating the lands of the Emperor-God, and he rewarded them by redistributing the goods they needed for their livelihood), to become an unpaid imposition.

At this point, we can wonder how the emerging colonial society was inserted in the Spanish economic system. In the years 1560–70 the Incan society had been completely dismantled, and the Viceroyalty of Peru was on the edge of chaos, due to epidemics, a declining population, revolts, perpetual encomiendas, and the abandonment of land. At the same time, the colonization of America emerged as a model of commercial exploitation, characterized by the exploitation and export of precious metals and other raw materials. America

---

22 R. Ruggiero, supra note 5, 15.
23 N. Watchel, La vision des vaincus (Gallimard, 1971), 54.
24 Watchel, 134.
25 E. Florescano, La clase obrera en la historia de México (UNAM, Siglo XXI editores, 1996), 32.
was being shaped as the main supplier of these primary goods to Europe, obtained thanks to the work of the Indians.

In this context, the Indian encomienda could not conserve in America its original feudal status (production for local markets, subsistence economy). There, it had to be inserted within a capitalist economic system dominated by mining development and the investment of enormous sums of money from merchants and foreign bankers, and the emergence of large commercial transatlantic lines. The arrival of Viceroy Francisco de Toledo was to be decisive in the reorganization of the colonial society. As Juan M. Ossio states, his policy was “el corolario de sucesivos intentos por dejar sentir la presencia del Estado en contra del creciente poderío de la iniciativa privada de los conquistadores.” Toledo reorganized the chaotic pseudo-feudal society by laying the foundation of a colonial society of mercantile character, with the establishment of three institutions: the forced migration (the mita), the indigenous ‘reductions’, and the legislation of the tax collection by the Crown.

The encomienda and the mita personified the extortion by the Spaniards in America. In the mid 17th century the commercial and agricultural demands increased, and as a consequence, so did the demand for workforce. The extraction of minerals increased as well, and international trade began. In this context, the mita (a coercive working system through the forced migration of the Indians) allowed the Crown to assume its economic needs, enlisting the Indian workers by force and distributing them in farming, mining and domestic work, in exchange for a wage stipulated between encomenderos that did not reach the Indians. Usually the mitayo Indian moved with members of his community to ensure its maintenance and reproduction. Thus, feeding costs were the responsibility of his community of origin, who took over the financing of the raw material extraction. As a result, the production costs for the Spaniards were insignificant.

26 S. Zavala, supra note 7, 240–250.
27 J.M. Ossio, Los indios del Perú (Editorial Mapfre, 1992), 171.
29 K. Spalding, supra note 8, 101–102: “Tómese la palabra mita utilizada para designar el turno de trabajo o el intercambio recíprocamente debido por los miembros de una comunidad, a sus jefes y al gobierno Inca, y posteriormente aplicada por los españoles al reclutamiento de mano de obra para trabajar en las minas y en otras empresas coloniales.”
31 E. Tandeter, supra note 28, 39.
Eventually, the payment of a salary to the Indians was accepted, and stipulated every year, during the first years in kind and later on in currency. As the Spaniards sold to the Indians products brought from Europe at a price that they could not afford, they forced them to sell back their workforce in other mines, in order to earn some money and avoid being in debt. Nathan Wachtel defines this situation as a proletarianization of the Indians, because the sums of money they earned did not allow them to generate a capital, as they had to use them to deal with debts and burdens imposed by the Spaniards. But, on the other hand, with the sale of European products to the Indians, the latter managed to enter the international market system, not only as producers, but also as consumers of European goods.

The new economy introduced by the Spaniards changed the Peruvian Indians, farmers and cattle breeders within a collective and communally supportive exploitation system, into proletarians for private exploitation or simple peasants relegated to the poorest and least productive lands. The Indians assumed their new role within the colony as a “pact of reciprocity,” whereby the Crown guaranteed their possession of the land in exchange for their tribute and work at the mita. However, the need to recruit a lot of workforce for the mita led to the gathering of the Indians into easily manageable communities. Toledo described the model of the indigenous Incan communities: first the dispersion of the Indian population provoked by the encomiendas, then the grouping in villages, the reducciones, made in the Spaniards’ image and likeness, but separated from them and keeping the rural Andean organization and a local authority. Ossio believes that “es en aquellas reducciones donde las modernas comunidades campesinas andinas encontraron su partida de nacimiento.”

According to Fernando Fuenzalida, the reducción was the most comprehensive instrument that allowed the germ of colonization to be spread:

La reducción fue la institución creada para satisfacer una serie de requerimientos, a varios niveles, no únicamente de tipo económico: a nivel económico, la organización de la población incaica en unidades fácilmente manejables capaces de proveer al país con mano de obra...
A nivel político el mantenimiento de un campesinado libre cuya única lealtad esté dirigida a la corona... a nivel religioso, la difusión de la religión y valores por los cuales la conquista fue realizada... A nivel social, el mantenimiento de fronteras netamente demarcadas entre los gobernantes coloniales y el campesino indígena sometido.\textsuperscript{36}

These reducciones were at the origin of the indigenous smallholdings and the present communities. They were usually the less productive lands. In addition, they were intended for the usufruct and their sale was not allowed. At the same time, the Crown allowed the “compositions,” some kind of deed of ownership given to the Spaniards who had occupied land without possessing the necessary titles.\textsuperscript{37} This process accelerated the formation of latifundia, farms or ranches.

**Colonial Heritage and Inclusion of Indigenous Peoples in Today’s Global Economy**

In three centuries of Spanish colonization of Peru, Spain dislocated the Incan society, transferred its feudal society model, and adapted it to the new situation of commercial exploitation. Not only did colonization change the social, political and economic structures of Peru, it also transformed the Indians, “feudalizing” them first, and then turning them into a kind of proletarian, an agent of the emerging global trade. Nevertheless, the Indians were excluded of the free labour market, because they were constrained to work extracting and transporting the minerals without a salary.

With the passing of centuries, but especially after independence (1821), the gap between feudalism and capitalism became clearer and deeper: capitalism prevailed in coastal towns, populated mostly by creoles, heirs of the Spaniards, while the feudal regime was relegated to the mountains, the lands associated with the Indians. When the mineral extractive activities declined, the agricultural commercial activities had been developed in the coastal lands, with a free labor force, such as proletarian workers. At the same time, the traditional agriculture producing for the local market was located in the highlands, the Sierra, under the hacienda system where the production was based on servile relations. The political independence of Peru reinforced this situation, limiting the Indian participation to the global economy.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{36} F. Fuenzalida, ‘La comunidad tradicional’, in \textit{El campesino en el Perú} (IEP, 1970), 66.
\item \textsuperscript{37} J. Friede, \textit{supra} note 15, 53.
\end{itemize}
The Cultural Lag in the Peruvian Dominant Class Excludes the Indians from the Global Economy

Independence and Republic represent a hinge period to understand the current situation of the Indians in Peru. The independence revolution was not a movement of integration of the indigenous group. On the contrary, even if the criollos (Spanish descendents) promoted it and a distribution of land was ordered, it favored the landowning aristocracy of the colony which preserved its rights and properties intact.

José Carlos Mariátegui studied the feudal inheritance of the Peruvian Indians. In his work, “Siete ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana,” he asserts that the Republic is a Peruvian and liberal regime as opposed to the Viceroyalty, which was a Spanish and feudal regime, and therefore the Republic “tiene deberes que no tenía el virreinato...Le tocaba elevar la condición del indio.” Mariátegui accuses the Republic of feeding the backwardness of the Indians and sinking them into misery, when it broke the symbiosis that linked them to the land. According to the author, the land is the raison d’être of the Indian, he “ha desposado la tierra,” but the colony snatched it from him and the Republic has not restored it. Therefore, the Republic bears more responsibility for making the Indians lethargic, by stripping them permanently of the only material property that gives meaning to their existence.

The rural Peru during the 20th century was dominated by the gamonal and the greater agricultural plantations owned by criollos or European immigrants who were often absent. The haciendas functioned by “remote control,” with a mass of servile indigenous population. Lords and serfs were in a feudal

---

38 W. F. Ogburn, Social change: with respect to culture and original nature (Oxford England, Delta Books 1966). Cultural lag is the notion that culture takes time to catch up with material innovations. This lag causes social and political conflicts.
39 J.C. Mariátegui, 7 ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana (Biblioteca Amauta, Lima, 1952).
40 Mariátegui’s thesis about the feudal character of the colony can be arguable. Stern in his article ‘Feudalismo, capitalismo y sistema mundial en la perspectiva de América Latina’ puts us on guard regarding the trap of considering colonial economic exploitation solely from a feudal perspective.
41 J.C. Mariátegui, supra note 39. 37.
42 Mariátegui, 37.
43 Mariátegui, 43. Gamonal is a resistant and parasite Peruvian plant which grows inhibiting the growing the neighboring plants. This word was used since the 19th century to designate the landlords without colonial lineage which dispossessed the community’s lands by illegal means.
44 H. Neira, Cusco: Tierra y muerte (Populibros peruanos 1964), 115.
archaic context, living in an involution process until the agrarian reform promulgated in the second half of the 20th century. During the first half of the century, the number of Indians working in one hacienda was an important item to estimate its value. As a result, during four centuries, the relationships between the landlords and the Indians had not changed significantly, the gamonal had only imitated the encomendero, and the Peruvian State took the place of the King of Spain.

However, between 1962 and 1964, the Indian peasants of the highlands of Cuzco and Puno claimed their rights and attempted to recover their lands from the haciendas. They organized peasant unions and reoccupied theirs lands, handling flags with this device: “Land or Death.” This peasant mobilization pushed the State to elaborate programs of land reform which ended the feudal system in the highlands of Peru, and allowed the peasants to develop a consciousness of their collective force vis-à-vis the State and the others classes. Victor Villanueva considers that through this mobilization the peasant political level raised and the peasants showed that they were able to lead rational demands, organize their class struggle, and achieve their goals. In addition, the peasant mobilization reinforced the idea that education was essential to overcome poverty.

This mobilization, and the political measures taken by the military government between 1968 and 1975, created the conditions to integrate the “vanquished of the Spanish Conquest” to official Peru. However, neo-liberal waves arrived in Peru with Fujimori’s government. The state mining companies were sold to multinational enterprises which acquired new land concessions to exploit silver, copper and gold, in exchange for the payment of a beholden or mining tax to the State. These precious metals are located in the highlands, in peasant community territories. They did not have any legal means to protect their lands when the Peruvian State decided to obtain high revenues to the detriment of the peasant’s standard of living.

Yanacocha is a very good example of how foreign enterprises are working in the highlands nowadays. Located in Cajamarca region, north of Lima, this mine is the largest in South America. It was created in 1992, with the Newmont Mining Corporation of Denver as the major shareholder. The city has tripled its population and developed its infrastructure services, and has already received from this enterprise USD 812 million as mining tax. As a result, 44% of the

45 Neira, 75.
46 V. Villanueva, Hugo blanco y la rebelión campesina (librería editorial Juan Mejía Baca, Lima 1967), 178.
47 Source: INEI.
revenues of Cajamarca region come from this tax. These are unequally distributed among the villages of Cajamarca. In fact, near 80% of the inhabitants of Encañada, Sorocucho and Huasmin are living under the poverty threshold.48

Two years ago, Yanacocha proposed a new mining project in Cajamarca, specifically in Conga. This area possess near 6,000 hectares of land used for crop production and cattle feeding by the peasant communities. If the project is realized, four natural lakes would disappear and the Conga people should be removed from their lands and houses without any compensation.49 In addition, the neighboring water resources would have a high risk of being contaminated with cyanuric acid. This ecological catastrophe would be even more critical for the Indian population because mountains and lands are linked to their cultural believes.

The Indian Struggle against the Onset of Ultra-Globalization and the Legal Measures to Protect Their Territories

International legislation is increasingly concerned about the welfare and recognition of indigenous peoples. Concerning this legislation, I will mention the Convention 169 of the ILO (International Labor Organization) about the right of referendum, signed by Peru in 2007. The Convention has two basic postulates: respect for the culture, ways of life and traditional institutions of indigenous peoples; and referendum and effective participation of these peoples in decisions that concern them.50 As to the right of referendum, the Convention says in article 6: “Al practicar las disposiciones del presente Convenio, los gobernantes deberán...consultar a los pueblos interesados, mediante procedimientos apropiados, y en particular a través de las instituciones representativas.”51 It accepts the importance of land for these cultures, recognizes the right of property and possession over the land they traditionally occupy, and requires governments to take appropriate legal measures for the fulfillment of this legal norm (article 14):

48 Source: inei.
49 J. Abdelrahim, “La maldición de Atahualpa,” in El País (19 February 2013); “Chaupe y su familia viven en el epicentro del terreno que Yanacocha ha adquirido para ejecutar el proyecto Conga...jamás recibió un dólar por el agravio...De la noche a la mañana se enteraron de que, a cambio de nada, una minera estadunidense había era dueña de las tierras donde tiene su casa.”
1. Deberá reconocerse a los pueblos interesados el derecho de propiedad y de posesión que tradicionalmente ocupan...

2. Los gobiernos deberán tomar las medidas que sean necesarias para determinar las tierras que los pueblos interesados ocupan tradicionalmente y garantizar la protección efectiva de sus derechos de propiedad y posesión.

3. Deberán instituirse procedimientos adecuados en el marco del sistema jurídico nacional para solucionar las reivindicaciones de tierras formuladas por los pueblos interesados.

However, the Peruvian Congress waited until August 2011 to promulgate the Law of Prior Referendum, which allows the application of the Convention to safeguard these rights.\textsuperscript{52} Later on we will discuss the reasons for this delay.

On the other hand, the Peruvian Constitution is still reticent to recognize these communities. The Constitution of 1993 stipulates, in article 66, about natural resources that they are “patrimonio de la Nación.” The State is sovereign in their exploitation. The right of property is recognized in article 70 of the Constitution, but subject to the interests of the State: “El derecho de propiedad es inviolable. El Estado lo garantiza. Se ejerce en armonía con el bien común y dentro de los límites de la ley. A nadie puede privarse de su propiedad sino exclusivamente por causa de seguridad nacional o necesidad pública.”\textsuperscript{53} What are these public needs referred to in the law? Would they be mainly economic interests?

The answer is probably yes. It is known that the greatest natural resources of the country are located in the territories occupied by indigenous peoples. Thanks to article 66 of the Constitution, natural resources are owned by the State, which is therefore sovereign to decide who will undertake the exploitation of such resources.\textsuperscript{54} Also under article 70, citing the need for public or common good, the State can ‘rip’ territories from indigenous peoples and grant their exploitation to private companies. Despite the fact that the international community has pointed out its interest for the protection of the natural territories of the Indian communities, the Peruvian laws depend on economic and political interests. The political measures taken by the last two presidents, Alán García and Ollanta Humala, reinforce this statement.

\textsuperscript{52} J. Jerjes Loayza, \textit{supra} note 50, 89.


\textsuperscript{54} P. Castillo, “Marcos legales de acceso a la tierra, Caso Peruano,” research not published (Lima, CEPES, 2010), 28.
Alán García, in his second term, governed Peru between 2006 and 2011. In 2008, he promulgated some legal decrees in order to sign the TLC (Free Trade Agreement) with the USA. These decrees promote the oil extraction of the Amazon region through land sales to foreign companies. These measures permitted to sell 60% of the land of a region if 50% of the participants of the communal assemble, plus one, agreed to sell the land. These measures provoked a community revolt in Bagua, with 33 deaths. García did not make anything to promulgate the Law of Prior Referendum; instead, he adopted demagogical and anti-Indian positions pointing out the responsibility of the indigenous communities in keeping the underdevelopment of the forest region. In June 2009, he compared the Indians to the “Perro del Hortelano” (dog in the manger), that does not eat and does not let others eat. In other words, he blames the indigenous communities for the backwardness suffered by the country, by not wanting to take advantage of their lands and not allowing others to do so:

Hay millones de hectáreas para madera que están ociosas, otros millones de hectáreas que las comunidades y asociaciones no han cultivado, ni cultivarán...además cientos de depósitos minerales que no se pueden trabajar...Así pues, hay muchos recursos sin uso, que no son transables, que no reciben inversión y que no generan trabajo. Y todo ello por el tabú de ideologías superadas, por ociosidad, por indolencia o por la ley del perro del hortelano que reza: si no lo hago yo, que no lo haga nadie.

He accuses the indigenous peoples of increasing the indebtedness of the country, because they do not want to exploit their own resources and prefer the country to spend money buying them from other countries:

Y contra el petróleo, han creado la figura del nativo selvático “no conectado”; es decir, desconocido pero presumible, por lo que millones de hectáreas no deben ser exploradas, y el petróleo peruano debe quedarse bajo tierra mientras se paga en el mundo US$90 por cada barril. Es preferible para ellos que el Perú siga importando y empobreciéndose.

In an interview with Alán García in 2009, the former President of Peru declared about the indigenous peoples: “Estas personas no tienen corona. Estas personas

57 See note 358.
no son ciudadanos de primera clase...quien piensa de esa manera quiere llevarnos a la irracionalidad y al retroceso primitivo.”

During the four years in power, García did not make any attempt to promulgate the Law of Prior Referendum which would authorize to apply the principles of the Agreement 169 of the ILO and the recognition of the right to referendum.

The coming to power of Ollanta Humala in 2011 marked a turning point in the back and forth between government and indigenous communities. When he was a candidate, he visited Cajamarca and promised to protect the rights of the peasant population. He asked the people during an electoral meeting: “There exist some lakes and it seems that they are for sale, do you want to sell the water? Because in the mining areas, the preliminary consultation was already done, but were you consulted about it? What is more important, water or gold? Because you do not eat nor drink gold, we drink water, our children drink water, and our cattle drinks water...Consequently, I promise you to respect the will of Bambamarca people concerning the mining issue.”

According to his promise, once Humala assumed the political power he promulgated the Law of Prior Referendum, pointing out his interest to establish a dialogue between the people and the investment companies’ interests. In article 3, it aims to open a space of exchange between the different parties, government and indigenous communities, so that all angles are evaluated and they can negotiate and set conditions: “La finalidad de la consulta es alcanzar un acuerdo o consentimiento entre el Estado y los pueblos indígenas u originarios respecto a la medida legislativa o administrativa que les afecten directamente, a través de un diálogo intercultural, que garantice su inclusión en los procesos que les afecten directamente.”

However, it seems that political interests are more important than those of the indigenous communities. The law promulgated has some ambiguities and gaps, beginning with the identification criteria of indigenous peoples. These criteria are: direct descent from populations originating from the national territory; lifestyles, spiritual and historical ties with the territory they traditionally use or occupy; cultural patterns, social institutions and customs, and way of

---

60 J.M. Silva, “¿Qué viene después de la aprobación de la Ley de Consulta Previa?,” in La República (26 August 2011).
61 Law of Prior Referendum, in “Aquí el texto completo de la Ley de Consulta Previa, promulgada por el presidente Humala,” in La República (6 September 2011).
life different from other sectors of the national population (article 7 LCP).\textsuperscript{62} The problem is that a community that does not speak the indigenous language, or is composed mainly of a mestizo population, or does not descend directly from those pre-colonial communities, would not be included within this legal framework.

In Peru there are 13,885 peasant and native communities recognized and entitled,\textsuperscript{63} of which not all meet the identification criteria of the Law of Prior Referendum because they did not preserve their language or thousand-year-old traditions. The peasant communities of Cajamarca are in a vacuum legal situation. Today, the government of Humala has decided to exclude from the criteria of the law communities of the coast and mountains (incidentally those who have major mineral resources), under the pretext that they are peasant communities linked to urban activity and the service of the State,\textsuperscript{64} and therefore fall outside article 7 of the Law of Prior Referendum. Other ambiguity of this law is based on the fact that the decision resulting from the referendum does not constrain the government to change or suppress the project. This law permits the Indians to express their will, but does not warrant that it will be taken into account by the government.

Currently, the Cajamarca region, to the North of the country, is suffering once more from the speculation over its land, as at the time of the conquest. “Conga va,” “Conga no va,” are the battle cries of government and community members, respectively. What is the priority, gold or water? Capitalist development or respect for the ecological system? For the Indian communities, development comes from the use of water resources which become a mean of agricultural production and cattle breeding. Their life depends on these economical activities, on the harmonious equilibrium between man and nature.

In the last two years, the Indian communities of Cajamarca, knowing the lack of legal means to protect their rights, have organized to defend themselves. Their mobilization includes strikes, road blockades, and peasant rondas.\textsuperscript{65} These rondas have restored the old community networks of solidarity.

\textsuperscript{64} Servicios en Comunicación Intercultural, <servindi.org/actualidad/27622>, visited on 25 June 2013.
\textsuperscript{65} G. Huamani, M. Moscoso, P. Urteaga, “Rondas campesinas de Cajamarca: la construcción de una alternativa.” The peasant rondas (armed peasants) were born towards 1970, the northern region of Peru. At this time, the peasants conceived rondas as means to fight
and collective work, organized through turns, and have impeded temporarily the realization of the mining project. The peasants showed a collective response vis-à-vis a private enterprise.\textsuperscript{66} The rondas accomplish the function of justice administration and keep social order in the communities.\textsuperscript{67} They seem to be the best organized response of the Indian communities.

Will progress be one day compatible with durable development? Will the Indians be able to participate actively in their development without losing their resources, vital for their survival? What will be the price to pay? Refuse progress and keep their resources, or participate in globalization as mining workers and give up their control? Here lies the huge trap in which these peoples have been caught: Peru is a country rich in mineral resources. The survival of many indigenous communities depends on the proper management of their exploitation. But many politicians believe that progress can only be brought through the liberal sale of these resources to large private companies, not worrying about whether these companies generate wealth for the communities they extract the minerals from, if they invest in infrastructure, schools or roads, or if they generate jobs in the region. One such example is that of the multinational mining company Southern, which has invested USD 2 billion and only employs about 1,200 workers. Moreover, they buy machinery and equipment abroad and remit their revenues offshore.\textsuperscript{68} For decades, these economic interests have hindered the enactment of legal provisions favourable to the interests of indigenous communities. Here lies the explanation for the delay in the promulgation of the Law of Prior Referendum. A change of government was necessary in 2011 to modify the course of things.

Conclusion

“Indian” is a term that Europeans invented at the time of the conquest. It referred to anyone who had lived in America before the arrival of the Spaniards. The conquest converted the Indians into vassals of the Crown; the conquistadors converted them into servants, but the colony inserted them into the

\begin{itemize}
\item against cattle robs and crop steals, a social illness in the rural, \textlangle http://www.cepes.org.pe/debate/debate003/03_articulo.pdf \rangle, 68, visited on 10 October 2013.
\item J. Gitlitz, “Decadencia y supervivencia de las rondas campesinas del norte del Perú,” \textlangle http://www.cepes.org.pe/debate/debate28/02_Articulo.pdf \rangle, 24, visited on 10 October 2013.
\item G. Huamani, M. Moscoso, P. Urteaga, \textit{supra note} 65, 74–75.
\item J. Oscategui, “A otro perro con ese hueso,” in \textit{La República} (18 November 2007).
\end{itemize}
capitalist economy, transforming them into proletarians. The independence and Republic, in its eagerness to erase racial differences involving the term “Indian,” transformed them into peasants, cornering them in the mountains and hindering their access to the city. In colonial times, the Spaniards were in charge of the exploitation and marketing of natural resources. Today, the foreign multinational mining companies exploit and market those resources, covered by the Peruvian government.

In 1532, Pizarro captured Atahualpa in Cajamarca. The chronicles of the conquest say that, to obtain his freedom, the latter promised to fill two rooms of silver and one of gold, the size of the room in which he was imprisoned. The Spaniards agreed to the proposal, the Inca gave them the gold and silver, but he was executed anyway. This incident illustrates the immense greed of the Spaniards, which led them to undertake a race for the acquisition of rich lands with which to continue enriching the chests of the State. The social and economic gap caused during the colonial era was never overcome; on the contrary, it was accentuated during the republican period. The thirst for gold and silver and the struggle for land have not ceased. Apparently, gold and land continue today to be at the epicenter of social conflicts in Peru.

The new national and international legal framework shows that progress and tradition are not incompatible. Progress does not mean massive exploitation of resources, but bringing economic growth and facilitating the social inclusion of the more remote and isolated communities. The Law of Prior Referendum should not be understood as a penalty to the companies, but as an alternative to reach consensus. The law should allow assessing the shortcomings and the needs of the territories consulted in order to establish the viability of the commercial project. It is the key to the access to development and inclusion of the rural communities, and the safeguarding of the rights of these peoples.

There is a “shadow zone” that will have to be resolved, so that legislation concerning indigenous communities does not only mean a delay in the implementation of a commercial project and protests by indigenous communities, but the State recognition of a cultural background that belongs to them. For the first time, this law gives voice and vote to indigenous communities, while trying to reduce the endemic gap between countryside and city. Cajamarca, site of the Conga conflict, hides countless riches from the time of the Incas. The gold Atahualpa “sold” to the Spaniards in exchange for his release, in the 16th century, placed Peru on its way to exporting its precious metals without any benefit for the heirs of the vanquished of the conquest. Has the actual Peruvian government learned the lesson?

69 J. Abdelrahim, supra note 49.
**Bibliography**


Mariategui, José Carlos. 7 ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana, Biblioteca Amauta, Lima, 1952.


Silva, J.M. “¿Qué viene después de la aprobación de la Ley de Consulta Previa?,” in *La República*, August 2011.


Re-Singing the World

*Indigenous Pedagogies and Global Crisis during Conflicted Times*

_Makere Stewart-Harawira_

**Introduction**

Speaking of the global crisis of sustainability, Noam Chomsky observed, “Throughout the world, Indigenous societies are struggling to protect what they sometimes call ‘the rights of nature’, while the civilized and sophisticated scoff at this silliness.” In particular, Chomsky declared that,

Leading the effort to preserve conditions in which our immediate descendants might have a decent life are the so-called “primitive” societies: First Nations, tribal, Indigenous, aboriginal…. The countries with large and influential Indigenous populations are well in the lead in seeking to preserve the planet. The countries that have driven Indigenous populations to extinction or extreme marginalization are racing toward destruction.¹

On an earlier occasion, the geographer Bernard Nietschmann made a similar contention.

Where there are nation peoples [place-based communities whose relationships with their homelands (both land and water) govern their roles and responsibilities] with an intact, self-governed homeland, there are still biologically rich environments [...] the converse is equally striking: State environments—where the non-nation peoples live—are almost always areas of destructive deforestation, desertification, massive freshwater depletion and pollution, and large-scale reduction of genetic and biological diversity.²

---


While Chomsky’s comment can of course be argued as overly simplistic and reductionist, it nonetheless highlights a critical point of tension for Indigenous peoples in the context of globalization, the tensions between economic development and participation in the global economy, and the preservation of traditional ways of life, including subsistence lifestyles, and of nature itself, with which historically they have held a deep and enduring relationship which defines their identity and their relationships. However, as Cherokee scholar Jeff Corntassel points out “When asked about living sustainably today, Indigenous peoples inevitably confront the ongoing legacies of colonialism that have disrupted their individual and community relationships with the natural world.”

I take these three sets of comments as my starting place for this article in order to contextualize one of the most critical points of tension for Indigenous peoples, that between economic development and participation in the global economy, and preservation of nature, in particular on Indigenous customary lands. As states increase their strategies of reincorporation or dispossession and extinction in response to both the demands of global capitalism and the demands of Indigenous peoples, these tensions are the backdrop for renewed acts of resistance by Indigenous communities across many areas of the globe, At the heart of these issues is the unprecedented expansion of unsustainable resource extraction across every resource-rich territory on the globe, including the traditional territories of Indigenous peoples. This is the backdrop against which Indigenous communities across the globe are enacting a politics of refusal and the place from which Indigenous peoples are engaged in what I have referred to elsewhere as the “re-singing the world.”

In writing this chapter, I locate myself as an Indigenous person from Aotearoa New Zealand, a country in which the relationship between the peoples of the land and the settler government is held to be defined by the Treaty of Waitangi, now living as a guest in the traditional lands of the Cree, Dene,
Blackfoot, Nakoda, and Anishnabe peoples in the Canadian Province of Alberta, an area covered by three of the eleven numbered treaties signed between the First Peoples of Canada and the British Crown. The politico/economic changes currently occurring in both countries, Canada and Aotearoa New Zealand, bear upon the relationship between Indigenous peoples and their rights to their traditional customary practices and way of life in very specific ways. Thus they are integral to my discussion here. One way that these changes can be understood is in relation to the intersection of the crisis of sustainability and the assertion of the rights of capital over state sovereignty, over international human rights law and indeed, over the entire lifeworld. As a global discourse, the crisis of sustainability refers to both an environmental and an economic crisis. In recent years, the concept of “triple crisis” has come to signify the interrelationship between financial, environmental and food security crises that collectively impact the worldwide sustainability of human society. Indigenous communities intersect the “triple crisis” of sustainability in multiple ways. Located at the intersection of the imperatives for non-renewable energy expansion, sustainability, and ecological preservation, traditional and Indigenous communities occupy about 20 per cent of the world’s land surface, often at the margins of arable lands. The land occupied by Indigenous communities also holds hundreds of gigatons of carbon – the recognition


In Canada, the numbered treaties secured certain areas of traditional lands from the rapid encroachment of settlers and allowed lands outside of these reserved lands to be shared in return for certain promises regarding education, health, the right to hunt, fish and practice their traditional lifestyles for as long as the sun shall rise, the grass grow and the rivers run. Held as sacred by First Nations Chiefs and communities, these promises were broken by the Crown and subsequent governments as quickly as they were made. The Numbered Treaties continue to be sites of struggle over meaning and intent, recognition and redress.


of which has significant implications for industrialized countries seeking to secure significant carbon stocks in an effort to mitigate climate change policies.\(^9\)

In this article I propose that in this contemporary moment, the global and local space within which Indigenous rights to cultural heritage and their traditional relationships with land and territory are mediated and negotiated is directly connected to this “triple crisis of sustainability” through being subsumed within a form of globalization best described as a new form of imperialism. In this context, Indigenous peoples are finding new ways to engage and to reshape their future, and indeed, our collective future. The chapter proceeds as follows. It begins with a clarification of the distinction between ethnic minorities and Indigenous peoples. A theoretical commentary on globalization interwoven with the activities of Indigenous peoples internationally leads to a discussion of the changing role of the nation-state and Indigenous peoples-states relations. An important theme here is the goal of Indigenous self-determination and its discursive and coercive reconstructions. The final section looks at the recent resurgence of Indigenous activism centred on traditional customary rights and the huge expansion of natural resource extraction occurring in many Indigenous territories. The overarching objective of the article is an endeavor to unpack some of the broader implications of the political struggles of Indigenous peoples in the context of the global crisis of sustainability.

**Distinguishing the “Indigenous”**

To begin with, it should be recognized that Indigenous peoples in countries that have experienced internal colonisation, that is to say, countries in which the colonising people settled and stayed, rather than returning to their place of origin\(^10\) do not conceive of themselves as minorities, or as “ethnic groups.” Rather, they regard themselves as sovereign peoples in occupied lands, lands that have been occupied by people whom they originally welcomed as guests, whose subsequent policies and strategies of assimilation and/or extinction saw Indigenous and First Peoples’ populations drastically diminished and, at least according to some of the covenants in international law,\(^11\) become widely reduced to dependent peoples, in many cases with no legal status as

---

9 World Bank, 2008, 23.
“people.” 12 Although the term “Indigenous” implies a particular status of “first peoples” to the occupants of a land who were there first, in recent years it has become more widely applied to legitimize claims to special status based on multi-generational occupation, giving rise to a certain ambiguity in the discourse. In contrast, the term first nations or first peoples refers to those who were not only born in the country, but whose ancestors were the first people in the land, or in some cases, according to oral histories, were always present in the land. Thus Indigenous peoples claim their lands on the basis of occupation since time immemorial. Some Indigenous groups use the term “tribes” while others prefer to use the nomenclature “Indigenous nations,” a political statement by which Indigenous sovereignty is asserted. In her study of Indigenous identity and struggles in the Amazon Basin, Goncalves describes indigeneity as the narrative by which Indigenous peoples explain their political, cultural and social experiences. As Goncalves recounts, it is a narrative about survival and about cooperation and alliances. Described as at once “the historical account of the experience of colonization and the political subjectivity which is embraced through this process,” 13 on this and similar accounts, the accounting for and recounting of the historical experience of colonization is as much a definition of indigeneity as is the cosmology of relationality by which indigeneity is also defined.

One of the most important recognized commonalities shared across Indigenous ontologies are genealogies of interconnectedness, that is, the genealogies by which Indigenous peoples trace their ancestral relationships to the land, to the cosmos and to one another. It is not unusual to see Indigenous scholars describe the inseparability between human beings and the natural world as the most important defining characteristic of indigeneity. This is well demonstrated in the following explanation of Maori concepts of whenua (land), by ex-Maori Language Commissioner Patu Hohepa. As Hohepa describes, the physical and spiritual significance of Maori relationship with the land is embedded in the Maori language which connects land and afterbirth, and is given recognition in ceremonies which return the placenta (whenua) to the land (also whenua). Thus Hohepa explains,

12 In Canada, Aotearoa New Zealand and Australia, Indigenous peoples were denied citizenship until the mid-1970s, except under certain circumstances which involved giving up their status as Indigenous peoples. For a comparative account, see A. Armitage Comparing the Policy of Aboriginal Assimilation: Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, UBC Press, 1995.

The words “nooku teenei whenua” (This is my land) is given much stronger meaning because of the above extensions. Having ancestral and birth connections to above is also translated as “I belong to this land, so do my ancestors, and when I die and join them so too will I be totally part of this land.”

It was in similar terms that the late Vine Deloria described the great reluctance of many (North American) tribes to “surrender their homelands to the whites because they knew that their ancestors were still alive on the land.” Mason Durie has described the relationship with land, forests, waterways, oceans as one of two sets of determining characteristics as key signifiers of what it means to be Indigenous. The first are primary and legally-oriented commonalities to do with human rights arguments, claims to self-determination and sovereignty. The second set of characteristics are to do with systems of knowledge that integrate Indigenous world views, values and experience, the dimension of time and relationship with the environment and deriving from the environment relationship – culture, human identity and group structures and processes that celebrate the ecological union and a language so strongly influenced by the environment that it is not spoken as a first language in any other part of the world. This set of secondary characteristics defines a set of aspirations that sit at the heart of what it means to be Indigenous today. As Durie states elsewhere, “all Indigenous peoples have a tradition of unity with the environment,” pointing out that this tradition is reflected in song, customary practice, subsistence life styles, rituals and practices associated with birth, healing, death. Manuka Henare explains that this has historically been translated as meaning that, “the resources of the earth do not belong to humankind; rather, humans belong to the earth,” a characteristic that Durie describes as integral to the “shaping of attitudes and thinking,” and for “the organizing of Indigenous knowledge.”

From these accounts, rather than histories of colonization, dispossession or claims to prior settlement, it is the nature of the relationship with place that is
held to be the most defining characteristic of Indigenous peoples. Here there is no sense of humankind as dominant over creation or that creation exists for humankind to exploit. Rather, humanity is understood as being a part of the entirety of creation in a relationship that carries particular responsibilities of caretaking, of guardianship, of protection. Critical also is the sacred nature of this relationship, a view that is a central tenet of indigenous epistemologies and which is given expression through ceremony, through the chanting and singing of ancient forms of prayer, and through fasting. For many, the concept of ‘singing into being’, or re-singing the world, is a ritual and practice that inscribes and re-inscribes the profoundly sacred nature of the interrelationship with humankind and the rest of creation.

A Theoretical Lens on Globalization

The concept of relationality is not, of course, unique to Indigenous peoples but has salience also in discussions about globalization. As a signifier, globalization refers to both a historical process and to the conceptual change in which it is reflected – belatedly and still incomplete, as Arnason noted in 1990, pointing out that interpretations of this process of globalization have proved as prone to reductionism as the theories that were adapted or applied to the nation state. As international economy theorist, R.W. Cox reminds us, theory is not neutral but is always for or on behalf of someone or something. He describes theory as falling into two broad categories – those that maintain the status quo and those that seek to be transformative.18 Discussions about globalization inevitably center around certain key thematics – a world order based on the Westphalian state system and interrelationships of governance and democracy, and the relationship between states and the global economy. Accounts of the development of world order commonly adopt approaches which either trace the evolution of modernity from its beginnings in western philosophical political thought or adopt an international relations perspective dominated by the development of the Westphalian model of nation states, the restructuring of Europe under the aegis of the Treaty of Versailles, the post-world war two establishment of the institutions of international order, and the post-1989 emergence of a neoliberal system of government without governance. Other accounts focus on the proliferation of non-state actors such as

non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other sectors of civil society. Indigenous, Third World and feminist critiques as well as postmodern analyses of imperialism and neo-imperialism generally fall into the category of alternative accounts. Conceptually speaking, the origins of globalization have been variously located in the exodus from Africa, thirteenth century Indo-China-Europe, reborn again in fifteenth-century European expansionism, late nineteenth-century European Imperialism, and confined to the late twentieth century. Some views see the overall processes of globalization as having occurred for at least two thousand years, while Marxists Andre Frank and Barry Gills extend the view of the world system as far back as 5,000 years.

A useful analysis by Gomes, Robertson and Dale describes a critical, relational approach to globalization as one that “relies upon the assumption that the world is and has become even more and more relational.” This, they explain, means that “socio-historical phenomena are interrelated, interdependent, and inter-twined processes, where each one conditions, and is conditioned by, the others; each one constitutes and is constituted by, the others.” An important point here is that rather than the real being out there constituted by a group of facts or given data, “the real is a concrete reconstruction” which can and does take different epistemological and ideological routes. Echoing Cox’s comment, Jessop identifies two positions amongst globalization critics that demonstrate these different epistemological and ideological routes – an “ideological category that obscures the continuities between today’s global economy and older forms of imperialism, and that of a neutral, scientific concept that can be operationalized, tested, and applied to


guide research, strategy and policy.” These continuities between earlier forms of imperialism and today’s global economy are a key focus of Indigenous critiques of globalization in which the acquisition and control of lands and territories that are important either for their mineral wealth or their strategic positioning has been a central goal of key financial/industrial interests.

Importantly, however, and regardless of its ideological and epistemological origins, the shape and contours of globalization that became visible in the second-half of the twentieth century is not a single unitary process but one that is “hyper-complex” and as yet incomplete. Taking up an analysis by Panitch and Gindin, globalization is often usefully conceived of as occurring in stages, the first phase being the 11th to 15th century, the second generally being recognized as beginning in 1989 with American expansionism and given expression in what came to be called the 12 principles of the Washington Consensus that undergirded structural adjustment, firstly in developing countries and then in developed countries. The politically and economically tumultuous 1960s and 1970s provides one of the markers of this period of the expansion of global capitalism. They also marked the emergence of a “qualitatively new dimension in contemporary international diplomacy,” albeit one with significant historical precedent. In this period and not for the first time, Indigenous peoples again took their concerns to the international arena.

**Indigenous Peoples in the Global Arena**

The struggle of Indigenous peoples to emerge from the paternalism of the colonial past is well documented, particularly with regard to the significant achievements most notably since the 1970s when Indigenous movements in a sense erupted onto the global stage. Achievements won during this time include the granting of observer status at the United Nation to a number of

---


Indigenous NGOs, the sometimes successful lobbying of the World Bank regarding projects that involve their dislocation and/or the destruction of sacred sites, lands, and resources, and the revision of International Labour Organization Convention 107— a pernicious document which embedded Indigenous peoples under the guardianship and tutelage of nation states over Indigenous peoples. In this period, the strengthening of international networks of Indigenous peoples saw the emergence of a new “politics of indigeneity” as a critical component in the affirmation of Indigenous peoples’ determination to reclaim their histories, epistemologies, cultural rights and political autonomy. In collaboration with non-Indigenous colleagues, advocates, and civil society movements, this global movement of transversal unity (Soguk, 2009) was in large measure responsible for significant changes in their relationships with the international system of nation states as well as the international juridical human rights system. A series of meetings that formalized the presence of Indigenous peoples’ missions in the United Nations with the establishment of the UN Working Group on Indigenous People marked the beginning of twenty-five years of protracted struggle for the recognition of Indigenous rights, leading finally, to first the passing of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to the UN General Assembly, and in November 2007, the ratification and passage of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDROP) into International human rights law. Significantly, of the 159 states represented at the General Assembly at the time of the vote, the only four states to vote against the adoption of the Declaration, i.e. Australia, Canada, the United States, and New Zealand, are former British colonies, each with sizable Indigenous peoples living within their nation-state borders.

These states cited fundamental incompatibilities between the Declaration and their respective constitutional and legal frameworks, eventually endorsing the Declaration to the extent that each reconciled what had been perceived to be inherent incompatibilities with their existing laws. The predominating logic behind their later reconciliation was that the spirit of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was acceptable only because implementation of contentious articles was non-binding. One such article of critical significance to Indigenous peoples is Article 3 which declares that, “Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and economic development.”

Equally critical is the protection of rights to

---

cultural expression, practice of traditions, relationships with their land and territories embedded in Articles 11–3 and 24–27. Speaking of the Declaration’s import, New Zealand Prime Minister John Key declared that his government “did not sign up to anything; [it] affirmed a declaration that is non-binding and aspirational.”

For the United Kingdom’s ambassador to the United Nations, Karen Price, feeling the need to re-emphasize the non-binding nature of UN declarations, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples had to remain effectively symbolic, since it was “non-legally binding and did not propose to have any retroactive application on historical episodes.”

The government of Canada went further, declaring the Declaration to be “non-legally binding document that does not represent customary international law nor change Canadian laws” (Anaya, 2010). The Declaration itself points to limitations in its proposal. Article 4, for instance, limits the “Indigenous right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to [only] their internal and local affairs,” echoing the contention over potential secession that states had consistently argued lay at the base of their consistent and continuing objection to any notion of Indigenous peoples self-determination. Responding to the passing of the Declaration, Ward Churchill (2011, 526) argued that its “delineation of Indigenous rights not only fails to fulfill the aspirations of those who pursued such an articulation during the last quarter of the twentieth century, but reflects a radical disjuncture from previous codifications of the right to self-determination in international law.” By co-opting the term “self-determination,” stated Churchill, the Declaration’s rhetoric underscores a ‘consecration’ of legal-frameworks that continue to marginalize and disenfranchise Indigenous peoples. In this sense, then, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is another manifestation of the ongoing tension between state-sovereignty and Indigenous self-determination.

While the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, notwithstanding its many inherent oversights, was a landmark for the recognition of Indigenous-rights in international law, Indigenous interventions that in various forms have been integral to Indigenous strategies of resistance and reconciliation since the earliest days of colonisation remain persistent in the global


33 As Indigenous scholars such as Franke Wilmer and Taiaiake Alfred have remarked, the term sovereignty is itself a product of a colonial imaginary. For a more extensive discussion of sovereignty, see Stewart-Harawira, 2005, 114–144.
political arena. Indeed it is at the intersection of Indigenous demands for the recognition of Indigenous rights and environmental crisis that these counter discourses have emerged as one of the most powerful voices against the devastating impacts of global capitalism. Since the 1990s, and earlier, denied equal representation with states at high-level international conferences seeking to address urgent issues of biodiversity, Indigenous peoples have sought other venues, often in parallel meetings to the regional and international conferences from which they were excluded, and in which they were denied representation, in which they have repeatedly referred to the warnings of their ancestors and voiced their concerns for the environment and for the denial of their rights to protect their own territories from destructive development processes. From the first World Indigenous People’s Conference on Territories, Rights and Sustainable Development, Kari-Oca I which resulted in the “Kari-Oca Declaration” to other declarations such as the “Declaration of Quito, Ecuador. Indigenous Alliance of the Americas on 500 Years of Resistance,” the “Cochabamba Declaration (2010) which called for the establishment of an International Climate Justice Tribunal,” and more recently, Kari-Oca II (2012), Indigenous peoples have reaffirmed their rights to retain their languages, engage in their cultural practices including subsistence lifestyles, and the urgency of the need to protect nature. They have called attention to the impact of destructive practices in agriculture, mining and water management and to the need for a new global paradigm that restore the harmony between nature and human beings. In all cases, the relationship is described in terms which emphasis its fundamental nature of interdependent, indivisible, and spiritual.

A significant number of very important and successful outcomes of Indigenous peoples’ international efforts for recognition of the importance of traditional ecological knowledge and of Indigenous practices of sustainability have ensued that are directly attributable to these endeavors. They include recognition in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) which resulted from the 1992 UNEP “Earth Summit” conference at Rio de Janeiro, the International Indigenous Forum on Biodiversity (IIFB) formed at the III Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (COP III) in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in November 1996, the 2008 World Bank report The Role of Indigenous Peoples in Biodiversity Conservation and many other regional and international instruments and reports. Important as they are, however, as with the UNDRIP and other international human rights instruments, due to the nature of the international structure of governance, these mechanisms fail to protect Indigenous peoples’ rights to protect their traditional lands and practice their customary lifestyles. Indeed, as Tully argues, “rather than freeing [Indigenous peoples] from long-standing internal colonisation, the struggle for recognition
has tended to reproduce it in an altered and ameliorated form without effectively challenging, negotiating and modifying the forms of deeply sediments colonial conduct of both non-Indigenous and indigenous peoples that sustain it.”

Yet despite the inherent limitations of the UNDRIP, its ratification and eventually, endorsement by the CANZUS group of states (of which Canada was the last to sign), was widely seen as having a significant impact on Indigenous peoples-states’ relationships. From some perspectives, it marked the culmination of the shift from assimilation by states to the recognition of the right to self-determination, a right that in some cases was advanced through renegotiated treaty settlements (cf. Aotearoa New Zealand and British Colombia, Canada) was under-scored by much-heralded apologies from governments (Canada, New Zealand, Australia), by long-fought for recognitions of the right to be consulted about industrial development on their traditional territories and the development of co-management regimes and benefit-sharing agreements, and by reconciliation strategies which attempt effect redress for the appalling treatment of Indigenous children in residential schools during the twentieth century. From other perspectives, the shift in state policies from assimilation to accommodation of rights in a politics of recognition that Corntassel describes as the “illusion of inclusion” results in a reconfiguring of the same forms of colonial power that Indigenous peoples’ demands for recognition sought to transcend. The recognition of Indigenous rights, won through long protracted struggles and often at great personal and community cost, is at all times mediated by states’ proscribing of conditionalities that limit the extent to which these outcomes achieve their aims and objectives. While Indigenous peoples’ demands for recognition of customary rights and practices constantly challenge the legitimacy of settler states, states are continuously seeking new ways to limit or redefine these rights and reincorporate Indigenous natural resources into their own economic agenda. Tully

37 Tully, 2008b, 160.
describes this in terms of “participation in relations of governance of production, consumption, militarism, securitization, leisure and so on.” In this fashion, the recognition of Indigenous peoples’ rights has been accompanied by further retrenchment and resistance on the part of some states and renewed efforts to re-incorporate Indigenous peoples into the capitalist state. A process well entrenched since the early days of colonialism, this has typically involved reshaping and corporatization of traditional Indigenous governance structures, the interpretation of ‘capacity-building’ as capitalist modes of economic development and the incorporation of local Indigenous communities within capitalist structures which took for granted ideologies based upon notions of *homo economicus* and the diminishment of traditional Indigenous values of collectivity and relationality.

**Imperial Relations in a Post-Colonial World**

The backdrop to this politics is the restructuring of the nation state by neoliberal forms of imperialism, a shift to a universal “debt regime,” the emergence of new economic structures of global governance and the redefinition of notions of development and state sovereignty. In the 1980s and 1990s, the development of regime theories and the popular liberal notion of “governance without government” raised critical questions about a reconfiguring of the principles and practices of democracy. During this period the concept of “rolling back of the state” gained considerable purchase in some quarters, as did notions of “limited democracy.” Some theorists argue for a state that is considerably weakened, or rolled back, leaving the floor open for alternative structures of governance, while others argue that while globalization has seen changes in the role of the state, the state has always acted as an agent of capital and that far from being diminished, the role of the state as an agent in the establishment of global capitalism has been integral. Here the notion of the “hollowing out of the state” has been a useful explanatory tool. Jessop (and others) has been careful to point out that, “Just as globalization does not

---


39 Cox, 1954, 54.

generate a single set of pressures that affect all states equally, there is no common response by all states to the multiple forms assumed by globalization."^{41}

Under neoliberalism, Jessop states, the relationship between the state and the market is fraught with contradictions. Nonetheless, in 2008, the “continued reciprocal interdependence of ‘market’ and ‘state’ as complementary moments of the capital relation”^{42} was brought sharply into focus as the financial crisis of neoliberalism brought the essential nature of the states-market relationship to the fore.

In 1898, informal imperialism was a means of asserting US rights to free markets “in all the old countries which are being opened up to the surplus resources of the capitalistic countries and thereby given the benefits of modern civilization.”^{43} The popular assumption that the decolonization program begun in the 1960s also represented the end of imperialism has been slow in its decline. As Tully remarks, global democracy authors have promoted the notion that the global transformations of the 1990s and the shift to global governance represented a welcome move towards global democracy.\(^4^4\) The reality, however, is that not only is the international human rights system troublingly flawed, it fails at the most fundamental level to protect the rights of Indigenous peoples living within internally colonized territories. The cause of this failure lies in the dominance of capital over human rights. This most notably includes the exercise of cultural rights and norms and the rights to protect traditional lands from destructive forms of exploitation. As Jessop points out, states are heavily implicated as agents in this process. Internal and external forms of colonization having succeeded in gaining access to the natural resource wealth of Indigenous peoples, today the recognition of Indigenous customary rights represents a potential barrier to the full realization of the interests of capital. The response from states in alignment with capital has been instructive. Faced with the refusal of Maori to accept the extinguishment of their rights through the ongoing treaty claims process, the New Zealand government’s response was to overturn the previous jurisdiction of the Maori Land Court to hear and determine Maori customary claims relating to the foreshore and seabed, thus effectively extinguishing Maori claims to the foreshore and seabed,\(^4^5\) and in 2006, to vociferously oppose the passing of the UN Draft Declaration within

---

41 Jessop 2010b, 42.
42 Jessop 2010b, 39.
43 Conant, 1898, cited Tully 2008b, 132.
45 New Zealand *Foreshore and Seabed Act* 2004.
the UN Human Rights Council. By 2012 and in the second term of the National government administration led by Prime Minister John Key, legislative action had escalated to include the passage of legislation aimed at undercutting existing environmental protection embedded in the NZ Resource Management Act,\(^{46}\) freeing up restrictions on certain kinds of development on customary Maori lands, and placing major state-owned hydro power stations on the open market in a move that presaged wide-scale marketing of the country to foreign investment, opened up vast swathes of the country to gold and oil mining, including deep sea oil mining, and granted approval for an open-cast coal mine on Dennistong Plateau on ecologically unique conservation land. The response by Maori community people in the region where deep sea oil exploration was commencing was to take to the ocean – by a range of methods, including swimming – to protest the intrusion of oil drilling in their customary fishing areas. Similar protests have been held around much of the New Zealand coastline. In a country well known for the exercise of the democratic right to protest, the reaction by government was to pass under urgency legislation by means of which protests on the open ocean within certain conditions are deemed illegal and incur extraordinarily punitive outcomes.\(^{47}\)

Parallel processes occurred in Canada. There, the enactment of the two huge omnibus bills passed rapidly into law by the Canadian federal government and the well advanced plans to build an extensive pipeline network carrying oil south into the United States (the Keystone pipeline), west to the coast of British Colombia for export to China (the Northern Gateway pipeline), and east to the opposite coast, prompted a fresh resurgence of Indigenous activism and protest which has galvanised communities across the continent of North America. In March 2012, following the announcement of the first Omnibus Bill, Bill C-38,\(^{48}\) a Bill which decimated existing environmental protections of waterways, including impact assessments of over water pipelines and rights of consultation, in temperatures of minus 25 degrees centigrade and below, a group of youth from a remote Northern Aboriginal community began a 45 day 4,000 km trek on foot, dragging their necessities by sled. Their objective was to meet with the Canadian Prime Minister to demand federal protection of the

---


\(^{47}\) Cf. the NZ Crown Minerals Amendment Act 2013, otherwise known as the “Anadarko Amendment” in recognition of the fact that its passage enabled the Anadarko oilrig to begin operations in New Zealand waters in the face of fierce public opposition.

\(^{48}\) Jobs, Growth and Long-Term Prosperity Act S.C.2012, c.19, Bill C-38 and its companion, Bill C-45, also known as the ‘Jobs and Growth Act’ are further discussed in Duplassie, R, p. 131, footnotes 422 to 425, this volume.
waterways. Prime Minister Harper’s refusal to meet with them when they arrived in Ottawa exhausted and ill but having gathered many supporters along the way, fuelled already high tensions and concerns. In November 2012, as Duplassie describes (pp. 130 this volume), months of gathering outrage catalyzed a nation-wide uprising under the nomenclature of “Idle No More,” a movement which immediately connected to the global wave of opposition against the expansion of oil extraction activities across Indigenous lands. As in all Indigenous counter-movements, for Idle No More participants, traditional practices of ritual and ceremony are integral in the reconnection and strengthening of body, mind and spirit to the land and to the ancestors. In this sense, ceremony provides the framework and the means to hold the space for reclamation of rights, reclamation of land, and the reclamation of spirit. Today, across the globe the Indigenous resurgence movement is reuniting Indigenous communities as well as hearts and minds using the tools of non-violent protest against the destruction of their lands – ceremony, dance, prayer, singing, and the politics of refusal.

**Negotiating the Spaces**

Nothing in the previous section should be read as implying that Indigenous communities have no involvement in natural resource extraction. The right to determine for themselves their modes of development is a central plank in Indigenous demands for recognition of the right to self-determination, particularly forms of economic development that will move Indigenous communities out of poverty.49 Thus Indigenous involvement in benefit-sharing partnerships involving natural resource extraction on their lands has been an important pragmatic response to the encroachment of resource extraction on Indigenous lands. In such cases Indigenous leaders legitimately argue that, given that the development will occur with or without them, it makes good economic sense to participate, and to bring whatever benefits possible to their communities.50 Here Bolivia provides a useful insight. Latin America, the site of the

---

49 The slogan ‘out of poverty’ dominated the International Indigenous Conference on Mining which I attended in Ontario in 2010. This was concretized in two concurrent sessions, one an Indigenous caucus, the other, Mining 101. Attendance at the former session was no more than a dozen people while the latter was attended by well over 200.

most radical opposition to neoliberal restructuring in the past five years, emerged as one of the strongest examples and symbols of hope for the Indigenous sovereignty movement, as Chomsky acknowledges. By the 1980s, the internationalization of the Guatemalan Mayan struggle and other Latin American Indigenous movements saw Indigenous Latin America become highly visible in the global community. In the 1990s, the Indian movements of Ecuador, Quechua, Mexico’s Zapatistas, and the Aymara and Quechan peoples of Bolivia, and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to one of Latin America’s foremost Indigenous women, Rigoberta Manchu, signaled new levels of Indigenous engagement and visibility in Latin America which impacted on Indigenous movements throughout the world.

During the same period, the increasing influence of new forms of liberalism had a proscribing influence that shaped these relationships in problematic ways. In January 2006 in Bolivia, the presidential inauguration of the Indigenous leader of a nationally unified movement which was reclaiming control over Bolivia’s natural resources signaled a new moment in the relationship between the nation state of Bolivia and Indigenous peoples, giving effect to the right of Indigenous peoples to control their own natural resources and to open new possibilities for deepened, more inclusive forms of democracy. Two of Morales’ key policy planks are economic prosperity and the re-nationalization of resources. The re-nationalization of oil development and its removal from the control of foreign interests is integral to these aims. In both Canada and Aotearoa New Zealand, a number of Indigenous leaders advocate for participation in oil development, provided it is done “sustainably.” In truth, as the excesses of laissez-faire capitalism deposit their legacy of toxification into the lands and water on which many Indigenous communities depend, the choice not to engage likewise becomes impossible to sustain. As Corntassel asks, “what happens when the medicines, waters, and traditional foods that Indigenous peoples have relied on for millennia to sustain their communities become contaminated with toxins? What recourse do we have against those destructive forces and entities that have disconnected us from our longstanding relationships to our homelands, cultures and communities?”51 For many, the choice between extremes of poverty and economic development that is gained through participation in the benefits of resource extraction in a time of unprecedented ecological and economic crisis becomes an almost unbearable tension.

In a period when the demand for the world’s remaining resources combined with new technologies to extract previously inaccessible resources in the remotest regions, are putting even the most isolated minorities and Indigenous peoples under increasing threat from governments and private companies wanting to profit from the resources found on or under their lands, the supremacy of market-based capitalism coupled with what can only be described as a frenetic and frantic last grab at the diminishing (and, due to melting ice and permafrost, newly-accessible) minerals propels renewed policies of exclusion and disenfranchisement. From the point of view of investors, Indigenous communities’ opposition to destructive policies of excessive natural resource exploitation represent one of the greatest stumbling blocks to ‘realizing’ these assets. For states, there are two possible responses, either reincorporation of Indigenous communities into market capitalism or new forms of disposses-

sion and extinction through legislation. Reconciliation strategies that result in the extinction of Indigenous claims to rights achieve both, as do benefit-sharing agreements which exchange rights to customary practices of sustainability for income-generation. For Indigenous communities similarly, there are two broad sets of responses, accommodation with a view towards greater economic self-determination, or resistance. Between each end of the scale, of course, lies a more nuanced range of responses, including “transformation from within” in the classic master’s house and tools approach. Tully accurately identifies critical problems with this approach. When these tactical approaches are viewed alongside the corresponding way in which imperial power is informally exercised, these forms of resistance model the ways in which subal-
terns are conscripted to “unwillingly play a role in developing these imperial relationships.”

As the realities of increasingly fragile ecosystems, the severity of droughts, increasingly high temperatures and devastating storms demonstrate, the time for nuanced responses and endeavors to transform ‘from the inside’ may have run out. For if there is a single signifier of the abject failure of globalization in the twenty-first century, it is surely the damage that has been wreaked upon the earth’s biodiversity, and the consequential fragility of sustainable life on this planet. Against the backdrop of the commodification of the biosphere and the ongoing excesses of global capitalism’s reach into local economies, the failure of neoliberal globalization to bring promised benefits to Indigenous peoples or indeed, to the overwhelmingly largest percentage of humanity is best demonstrated by the enormity of the triple crisis of sustainability. The extreme by recent reports such as the 2012 World Bank report entitled Turn Down the

---

52 Tully, 2008b, 161–162.
Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must be Avoided which notes that countries’ current emission pledges and commitments are alarmingly inadequate and “would most likely result in 3.5 to 4°C warming, emphasizing that this would be marked by extreme heat-waves, declining global food stocks, loss of ecosystems and biodiversity, and life-threatening sea level rise.” In May 2013, new research from Europe showed that a 4°C global temperature rise is well within the range of possibility this century, the cost of which will mean “human disaster” for the planet and includes the effect of the world’s oceans reaching their capacity to absorb much of the world’s carbon pollution creating “catastrophe across large swaths of the Earth, causing droughts, storms, floods and heat-waves, and drastic effects on agricultural productivity leading to secondary effects such as mass migration.” In November 2013, a group of scientists led by Jim Hansen declared that the agreed limit of 2 degrees C of global warming places the survival of humanity at extreme risk.53 In November 2013 the 5th IPCC report spelled out in unequivocal terms the risk to human life that the world faces in this temporal moment, one which is increasingly called ‘the sixth great extinction’. In 2014, reports that seek to highlight for the public the dangers to survival with which the world is now faced include the March 2014 report by NASA climatologist, Drew Shindell, which warned that global warming may increase by 20 per cent.54 In contrast to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) estimate of 1.8 degrees, Shindell’s study estimates a transient climate response of 3.06 degrees. More recently, the American Association for the Advancement of Science Climate Science Panel took the unprecedented step of developing a range of initiatives to warn the American public that climate change puts the well-being of people of all nations at risk.55

For many Indigenous people, the active engagement in the re-singing of the world in this time is not only a reclaiming of Indigenous ontologies, Indigenous ways of being and knowing and living in the world, it is perhaps humanities greatest hope for survival. The resurgence of Indigenous movements is predicated on a return – not to a life without the basic benefits of modernization – though our unchecked collective actions may yet bring that

upon all of us – but to a restoration of the relationship between human beings and the lifeworld, to a profound recognition of our deep interconnectedness across all species and a return to the recognition of the sacred in all things. The re-singing of Indigenous ontologies into the re-singing of the world directly engages the urgent need for a new global paradigm for our shared future. This is without doubt our greatest and most urgent challenge.

Bibliography


default/files/Turn_Down_the_heat_Why_a_4_degree_centrigrade_warmer_world_must_be_avoided.pdf>.


Canada’s Idle No More continues a centuries old Indigenous political and social reaction against the twin forces of globalized economic imperialism and nation-state colonialism. In December 2012, Aboriginal Canadians initiated through cellular and online communications a massive national response to the strategy of Canada’s majority Federal Conservative government to further entrench Canada as a raw resource colony serving the transnational, globalizing cadre of corporations and cartels, financiers, bureaucrats, and the militaried, militias, and police forces hired to safeguard exploitative capital. Indigenous people have long been challenging and resisting industrial and environmental exploitation and pollution in response to their respective local situations and continue to do so in accordance with their limited means. Global communication tools such as the Internet, however, have revolutionized the means of resistance. Cellular networks, email listservs, facebook, youtube and twitter allow news, stories, and histories to be disseminated widely by Indigenous people, generating a volume of dialogue and information-sharing only possible in the twenty-first century. These communication systems also allow for the spontaneous planning of solidarity-building Aboriginal round dances and Indigenous-led rallies, protests, conferences, teach-ins, and information sessions. With so much information shared, respective local resistances and Indigenous cultural restorative initiatives are able to be contextualized for all Canadians as responses to the twin realities of nation-state colonialism and global economic and resource imperialism.1

Opposition to such formidable systems entails a cooperation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians that resembles the spirit of treaty between nations of sovereign peoples. Treaties are therefore summoned

1 Indigenous peoples from colonized or formerly countries worldwide also showed their affinities with for Idle No More by disseminating over the internet photos of group or individual support. Idle No More was also shown early support by activist groups from former imperial centers such as Great Britain, France, and Germany.
in Idle No More discussions as legal, constitutional, historical, and ethical agreements that embody the potential of true partnership between peoples. That said, no formal alliances between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians have resulted from Idle No More. There are no recognized “leaders” of the “movement.” Indigenous people who are asked to engage radio, television, and Internet journalists tend to be lawyers, academics, and experienced politicos and negotiators, but these individuals refuse to be acknowledged as leaders. There are no formal institutions or memberships for Idle No More, no political parties. There are no universal declarations made. Rather, Idle No More is a catchy twitter hashtag first shared in December 2012 that has come to serve as a identifying call for Indigenous activists and academics and their non-Indigenous allies to rally for the ethical implementation of treaty, and concomitantly for equitable, sustainable social economies that support environmental protection measures. Not all resistance initiatives fly under a physical or nominal “Idle No More” banner. That said, it is understood implicitly that all forms of resistance are supported by the Idle No More platform generally. This paper outlines how Idle No More serves as a platform for organization, activism, and information-sharing that incorporates and expresses the totality of Indigenous concerns in Canada. It addresses the social, political, legal, and historical complex surrounding the opposition to global capital and the Canadian state as facilitator. The ultimate purpose of Idle No More is to rally for sustainable economies. In order to achieve such economies, a revolution in thinking and economic practice is necessary. To generate support for revolutionary acts, Idle No More participants encourage historical, political, and economic truth-telling. It is hoped that truth will lead to the ethical understanding and implementation of treaty and support for Indigenous cultural revitalization efforts that require stringent environmental safeguards stewarded in partnerships between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal groups. Details of the situation in the community of Grassy Narrows First Nation illustrate how a localized context speaks to the intersecting local-regional-national-global complex.

The Federal Conservative “Economic Action Plan” and the Beginning of Idle No More

Idle No More began in late 2012 when a highly controversial tactic to facilitate globalized, neo-colonial exploitation of Canada’s resources was aggressively and unilaterally passed by the Federal Conservatives, encapsulated in an
impactful set of federal budget bills, Bills C-38\textsuperscript{2} and C-45.\textsuperscript{3} Taken together, these budget bills facilitate the Conservatives’ “Economic Action Plan.”\textsuperscript{4} The Economic Action Plan relies on mainstream Canadians’ senses of residually racist entitlement to resources and a high material standard of living. The Conservatives promise jobs to Canadians by way of expanded industrial growth through state and provincial support of accelerated resource extraction by multinational corporations. Investment is encouraged by these bills by a drastic reduction in Canada's environmental regulations and through corporate tax breaks, which undermine Canadian civil rights and human rights through tax extortion, and threaten the sustainability of Canada’s environmental regenerative capacities and clean water supplies. To attain this, Bill C-45 undermines several Aboriginal land rights, and First Nations’ abilities to administer their “reserves” in self-determining ways that could limit “development” and “economic growth” for the governments, corporations, and their workers and shareholders.\textsuperscript{5}

Saliently, most of Canada’s resource extraction takes place on territories protected by historical treaties between the federal Crown and First Nations.

\textsuperscript{2} Bill C-38 is also known as the “Jobs, Growth, and Long-Term Prosperity Act.” The mesmerizing list of its tabled laws and amendments can be viewed on the website of the Parliament of Canada. <http://parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&DocId=5697420>, visited on 9 August 2013.

\textsuperscript{3} Bill C-45 is also known as the “Jobs and Growth Act.” It contains amendments to portions of Bill C-38 and well as new legislation. Its laws and amendments can be viewed on the website of the Parliament of Canada. <http://parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&DocId=5942521>, visited on 9 August 2013.


\textsuperscript{5} The bills within omnibus Bill C-45 affecting portions of ‘Indian Act’ – the federal Act that outlines rules, regulations, and responsibilities for First Nations – are as follows: Bill C-27 First Nations Financial Transparency Act, The First Nations Private Property Ownership Act (Proposed), Bill S-2 Family Homes on Reserve and Matrimonial Interests or Right Act, Bill S-6 First Nations Elections Act, Bill S-8 Safe Drinking Water for First Nations Act, Bill C-428 Indian Act Amendment and Replacement Act, Bill S-207 An Act to amend the Interpretation Act, Bill S-212 First Nations Self-Government Recognition Bill. Opposition to these bills by Aboriginal people lies in the fact that though they are given innocuous titles that appear to benefit Aboriginal people and communities, it is felt that their implementation will do the opposite. These bills were not given adequate consultation and input from First Nations, but were rammed through hastily into legislation as part of the omnibus package. To view an Indigenous lawyer’s criticism of these bills, see Pamela Palmater’s discussion, starting at minute 57:00, in the following youtube video that went viral, as an educational piece, on social media. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H3tj8cCDc98>.
According to Canada’s Aboriginal people, the treaties are meant to legislate the sharing of lands by reserving viable portions of First Nations territories for Indigenous survival and cultural continuance. However, Canada’s Federal and Provincial governments have historically and continually assumed ultimate authority to make resource-based decisions for all lands and waters without consistent, meaningful consultation and negotiation with First Nations concerned. The federal Economic Action Plan is therefore by nature ensconced in the historical project of global economic imperialism through Canadian colonialism, and flagrantly trounces constitutionally protected Aboriginal rights and treaty rights. The Conservative agenda also ensures the continuance of destructive and unsustainable, polluting industrial extractive processes as its economic mainstay.

Legislative threats to Canada’s water protection measures were the immediate impetus for the #idlenomore twitter hashtag in December 2012. The health of Canada’s waters and waterways are a concern shared by Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians alike, evidenced by their integrated presence at protests and demonstrations against oil and gas pipelines in Western Canada; protests that preceded Idle No More. Integrated activism around water continues

6 On territory where treaties were never negotiated, there are dozens of Indigenous land claims in the court system that seek to maintain inherent Indigenous rights to respective territories. These land claims, when resolved, are known generally as modern-day treaties.

7 The terms ‘Indigenous’ and ‘Aboriginal’ are often used interchangeably, though ‘Indigenous’ can be equated with ‘First Nations’ specifically. The term ‘Aboriginal’ includes First Nations, Inuit, and Metis together. ‘Native’ is a term that has become rather out of vogue. Canada’s Indigenous peoples are still officially recognized by the state as ‘Indians’, and are governed, for example, by the state-drafted Indian Act. Some Indigenous people refer to themselves as Indians after generations of dealing with state authorities, though they are of course cognizant of the term as a colonial misnomer.

8 Oil and gas pipelines are highly controversial as they corrode easily, and are known to rupture and spill with disconcerting frequency. The remoteness of spill locations, and inadequate emergency and clean-up response infrastructure adds to concerns over environmental and financial costs, ultimately shouldered largely by First Nations and citizen tax-payers. There has been sustained Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal cooperation in opposing the Northern Gateway pipeline, proposed by the multi-national Enbridge energy corporation, to transport bitumen (oil sand) from the large multi-national oil sands operations in northern Alberta across the Rocky Mountains to the west coast of British Columbia. Its proposed passage traverses several dozens of lakes and rivers, many of which flow through unceded [i.e. disputed areas undergoing Indigenous land claims processes] First Nations territories and protected areas. Moreover, once the bitumen reaches the coast, it is meant to be transported by sea-going oil tankers through a notoriously treacherous and unpredictable route past island channels, eventually to reach the open Pacific where it will be transported to
to occur in public spaces in Canada, from shopping malls to city parks to Parliamentary and Legislative buildings, impressively invigorated by the Idle No More impetus. To wit, one of the more egregious of the legislative amendments packaged with Bill C-45 is a severe alteration of the country’s Navigable Waters Protection Act (1882) – Canada’s oldest environmental protections Act. It has been rearranged to the Navigation Protection Act (NPA, 2012). In the government’s words, “[t]his initiative is in line with the Government of Canada’s commitment to returning to balanced budgets, streamlining the regulatory process, eliminating red tape and encouraging long-term economic growth and job creation.” Here, economic growth is sold to Canadians by promises of job creation but at the expense of water safeguards and meaningful liability for polluting multi-national corporations. Direct and robust protection of the vast majority of Canada’s waterways is removed, as indicated in the removal of “Waters” protection from the Act’s title. Instead, the new Act protects the rights of corporate ‘navigation’ on Canada’s waters for their extractive and processing purposes. Informed critics observe that “[t]he NPA would exclude 99.7 per cent of Canada’s lakes and more than 99.9 per cent of Canada’s rivers from federal oversight...It is estimated that Canada contains over 2.25 million rivers, [only] 62 of which are protected under the NPA.” Rivers excluded from remaining protections are those planned to be traversed by cross-country oil and gas

---

9 An example of a public round dance attended by the author and his children in a Winnipeg shopping mall, see <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iZ7wEClyYyU>. The author was also engaged in Winnipeg’s Idle No More-inspired “Water Wednesdays” initiative at Memorial Park across from the provincial Legislature whenever possible throughout the summer of 2013, disseminating pamphlet information and concern around water policy. For an example of local news video coverage of an Idle No More rally at the Manitoba provincial Legislature, see <http://metronews.ca/news/winnipeg/472574/idle-no-more-protestors-rally-in-winnipeg/>. For coverage of this same event by the Canada’s national public media outlet, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), see <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/over-800-attend-idle-no-more-rally-at-manitoba-legislature-1.1402199>.

10 For the federal government’s full explanation of the Navigation Water Act, see <http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/mediaroom/backgrounders-npa-6911.htm>. 
pipelines. In other words, the new legislation in practice prioritizes the rights of multinational corporations to “navigate” the waters as required for their water-intensive production, processing, refining, and waste-storage procedures. Activists identifying with Idle No More rally against state catering to neo-colonial industrial expansion and pollution by global corporations.

One way that Indigenous activists are gaining non-Indigenous supporters through Idle No More information-sharing is to appeal to their concern for the public purse. Tax dollars are used for the majority of industrial cleanup costs. Moreover, “investment incentives” to multinational corporations are offered by Federal and Provincial governments in the form of very attractive and profitable corporate tax deductions. Governments also use the public purse to build roads and infrastructure on behalf of industry. On all counts, governments are subsidizing corporations by transferring tax-payers’ heavy income and consumer taxes directly to corporate shareholders who enjoy tax breaks and increase shareholder profits. Environmentally and financially, it is a system of public risk for private gain. There are few penalties under the new Act for violators. Extraction corporations and their subsidiaries – many profiting millions of dollars annually – are issued these penalties under the Act’s amendments: proposed amendments to the Navigable Waters Protection Act establish an administrative monetary penalty scheme. Under this scheme the maximum penalty for violation is $5,000 in the case of an individual, and $40,000 in any other case. Under the proposed amendments, non-compliance with certain provisions may constitute an offence under the Act. Persons found guilty of committing an offence may be liable on summary conviction to a term of imprisonment of not more than six months, or to a fine of not more than $50,000 or both. (italics mine)

Idle No More serves to awaken and inspire complacent Canadians. They are being extorted while Canada’s collective waters are being abused, threatening survival in a very real sense. Already, many First Nations residing downstream from toxic industrial effluent are reeling from increased cancers and other

---

11 This quote, within a most thorough and important critique of the Navigation Protection Act is found at <http://www.ecojustice.ca/files/nwpa_legal_backgrounder_october-2012/>.


13 As an example of the state acting as facilitator to global capital interests, the Federal Conservative government is aggressively seeking a trade deal with the European Union that may include the privatization of water resources for profit, open to powerful European water management, bottling, and distributing corporations. See the slideshow at the bottom of this article. <http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/10/19/ceta-canada-eu-free-trade-deal_n_4124867.html>.
ailments due to contamination.\textsuperscript{14} It is well known to Canadians that close to one-third of First Nations “reserve” communities experience long-standing, chronic lack of access to clean drinking water. Many are situated on polluted lakes or rivers and the governments fail to upkeep sanitation and filtration facilities. Since the advent of Idle No More, awareness of the complexity of Indigenous water-related health problems across Canada has spread even more widely through social media and teach-ins. The author observes that increasing numbers of non-Indigenous Canadians refer to First Nations illnesses in their vocal disaffection with the federal Conservative government and globalizing corporations engaged in resource extraction industries. Non-Aboriginal Canadians are hereby becoming aware that their own safe drinking water and access to nourishing food cannot be taken for granted. Beginning with shared protests over oil and gas pipelines and sustained through the auspices of Idle No More, solidarity between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal citizens is increasingly evident in Canada. This is points to some success for the Idle No More platform.

It has become clear that growing numbers of non-Aboriginal commentators are better educated than they were a year ago. They are quicker to articulate the links between land and water degradation, the abuse of the Canadian taxpayer, and the abuse of First Nations tied spiritually, culturally, and economically to Canada’s exploited lands and waters. Aboriginal people are more visible at general civic municipal meetings and urban ‘town hall’ events, and non-Aboriginal organizers are more frequently calling on their Aboriginal fellows to sit on discussion panels and make public presentations at universities and municipal council rooms. In short, one of the more obvious results of Idle No More in the past eleven months has been a coming together for co-presentations between concerned Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadian citizens, academics, activists, scientists, and even economists.

\textbf{Idle No More: Building Solidarity with Mainstream Canadians}

Idle No More is a social platform that allows Canada’s Indigenous people to lead the discussion beyond the theoretical and practical research offered by

\textsuperscript{14} For example, read below of the increased cancers affecting residents of Fort Chipewyan First Nation in northern Alberta, downstream from the infamous oil sands extraction and manufacturing operations. \url{http://rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/emmapullman/2013/07/tar-sands-leave-legacy-cancer-and-polluted-water-aboriginal-peopl>}. Detailed later in this paper is Ontario’s Grassy Narrows First Nation, a community still fighting for adequate compensation for mercury poisoning of their traditional waters beginning in the 1960s.
Occupy Wall Street’s exposure of state-global collusion in financial graft and corruption. At Occupy Wall Street’s zenith, Aboriginal activists and academics – as occupied, colonized people – presented Canadian and American participants of the Occupy movement with a more enriched and mature discussion of the implications behind the notion of “occupation.” From the 17th-century imperial era to present, Aboriginal nations and their environments have been occupied, exploited, and abused by actors in a globalizing colonial and neo-colonial system that operates locally in intimate, historical Indigenous ecological spaces. Non-Indigenous Occupy Wall Street protesters were therefore placed in the context of complicity in the exploitative historical process that has defined economies in North America for several centuries, beginning with the fur trade and on through the industrial revolution. Through education, many non-Indigenous protesters were at that time compelled to direct their energies toward decolonization totally. In short, Indigenous people affiliated with Idle No More are creating movement beyond occupation, expressing their sovereignty in a dance of resistance that summons Indigenous cultural pride alongside the political and ecological exigencies inherent in the decolonization process. Indigenous activists are inviting their non-Aboriginal fellows to join in the dance of decolonization, as it is understood that the revolution in thinking and practice is not possible without mass empathy and participation. Education is required for the cultivation of the empathetic impetus.

The movement of brown bodies trip wires of erstwhile complacency in Canada. Sensitive and often near invisible are the colonial tripwires and booby-traps set unwittingly by the state, and guarded often inadvertently by a mis- and under-educated Canadian mainstream suffering from the diseases of racism, entitlement, and entertainment and consumer distraction. Non-Indigenous activists in the Occupy movement exemplified how well-meaning and impressively informed critics of mainstream socio-economics can miss the decolonization imperative. Idle No More suggests an activism that is ensconced in mass education for the purpose of revolution embedded within a decolonizing praxis. Social media links blogs and other journalistic and historical sites popular and academic, mainstream and alternative allow for public education in a way unknown in previous eras of resistance.15 Change in mainstream consciousness is slow, but tangible.

15 For an example of a popular blog/resource site, see that of Chelsea Vowel, an Albertan Plains Cree-speaking Metis lawyer and educator living in Montreal. <http://apihtawikosan.com/2012/12/16/canada-its-time-we-need-to-fix-this-in-our-generation/>. For an example of the mainstream media’s engagement with the omnibus bills, see Aaron Wherry’s articles in Canada’s popular national news magazine Maclean’s <http://www2
Social critique within anti-colonial theory is generated predominantly by academics. These views have long been disseminated in Native Studies departments at universities beginning with historical revisionism in the postwar era of human rights, and more recently of Aboriginal rights. Indigenous academics and a growing majority of their sympathetic non-Indigenous colleagues are taking deliberate steps to popularize anti-colonial theories and expositions alongside those directed for anti-globalization purposes. As academic material trickles to mainstream consciousness, a growing contingent of non-Indigenous critical thinkers are evidently awakening to the possibility of partnership with their Indigenous fellows in reaction against the Economic Action Plan as a colonial state strategy to entrench the globalizing system of exploitative capital.

Solidarity within the mainstream is essential for meaningful opposition. The overarching strategy of Indigenous people in the initial weeks of Idle No More was to promote partnership through the ethical understanding and implementation of Canada’s treaties. The Idle No More ethos posits that relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians should be built on the mutual respect reflected in the spirit of Canada’s historical treaties – at least from the Indigenous perspective – signed as nation-to-nation agreements between the federal Crown and signatory First Nations. Ethical understanding of treaty allows for the open and truthful dialogue necessary to foster and develop the responsible communities and sustainable economies anathema to the federal Economic Action Plan.

There are social, historical, legal, and constitutional reasons that treaties should embody respectful relationships in Canada. Section 35(1) of Canada’s Constitution – officially repatriated from the British Crown in 1982 – recognizes and affirms Aboriginal rights and treaty rights. However, the precise nature and applicability of Aboriginal rights and treaty rights in operation remain legally undefined in provincial and Supreme Court legislatures. Notwithstanding, Idle No More sympathizers recognize that Aboriginal peoples hold inherent rights to their historic homelands and a generous hand in the development of sustainable resource management within those spaces.

---

16 The text of Section 35 of the Constitution Act, as well as historical context around Aboriginal spokespeoples’ struggle to have Aboriginal rights and treaty rights recognized and affirmed in the Constitution, is provided here by the Arts faculty at the University of British Columbia (UBC). <http://indigenousfoundations.arts.ubc.ca/?id=1050>, visited on 9 August 2013.
Treaties are presented as viable historical, legal, constitutionally protected entities that can forward equity and reconciliation in Canada. Addressing the federal Economic Action Plan as a violation of Canada’s Constitution is a viable legal option for Indigenous people. Support by non-Aboriginal activists and academics for such a constitutional challenge is being sought and the author observes that the support is growing among enlightened non-Indigenous individuals and groups.

**Residual Racism and Colonialism: Challenges to Mainstream Solidarity-Building**

It is conceded, however, that despite the ramping up of public education efforts since Idle No More began, mainstream Canada is still quickly polarized when acts of resistance hit their pocketbooks; for example, when actions force work stoppages or block transportation and supply routes. Indigenous resisters employ such tactics as a last resort, only after repeated attempts at open and truthful dialogue are rebuffed. Tried and tested Machiavellian strategies of divide-and-conquer allow government-influenced corporate media – particularly conservative national print and television media – to undermine any form of resistance. Criticisms of Canada’s resource-intensive practices are presented as an attack on Canada’s economy generally, and the use of force to quell environmentalist/Indigenous activism is presented necessary for “national security.”

State force leveled against Indigenous activism is still supported by much of the mainstream, though with more information and analysis shared, general sentiment is visibly shifting. The crux of the polarization lies in the fact that most Canadians are dependent on extractive industry for employment and material comfort, whether in the primary extractive and manufacturing sectors, secondary distribution and retail sectors, or the multitudes of peripheral service businesses whose requisite cash flow is dependent ultimately on the above. Racist entitlement is built intrinsically into the colonial economic paradigm and Canada’s non-Indigenous population has shown itself historically to be covertly and overtly disparaging towards Aboriginal people. Under attack,

17 For example, see <http://www.ctvnews.ca/greenpeace-aboriginal-groups-seen-as-extremist-threats-1.769418>.

18 The comments section in any online mainstream news story on Idle No More reveals racist and mis-educated vitriol by the public. As an example, see comments below this national news article about Attawapiskat Chief Theresa Spence’s decision to end her
therefore, are the Indigenous cultures tied to Canada’s lands and waters, and the Aboriginal rights and treaty rights meant to safeguard Aboriginal cultural continuance and cultural and economic self-determination. Mainstream settler/worker populations and their sundry institutions do not escape complicity in these violent takeovers. The average working Canadian engaging with Idle No More is placed in the difficult position of deciding whether it is worth upending their daily employments and jeopardizing their personal financial commitments for the sake of supporting the environment and concomitant Aboriginal rights and treaty rights to viable lands and waters. Idle No More is thus challenged then to engage the mainstream in revolutionary-type discourse without alarming the status quo. It is a difficult venture that requires time and patience.

From the Aboriginal perspective, treaties honour and acknowledge the possibility of positive relations with non-Aboriginal partners within respective treaty territories. Idle No More induces meaningful partnership by reminding Canadians of the country’s collective colonial situation, and how mending our economies is not only a fiscal and environmental concern, but is a project ensconced inherently in the cultural and social politics of reconciliation as well.

It is a challenge to compel a mis- and under-educated Canadian mainstream, working under the auspices of globalizing multi-national corporations, to understand Aboriginal protest as anything other than a threat to their financial security. A systemic revolution in social and economic relations is difficult to achieve but Idle No More activists are making strident efforts to remind Canadians that without ecological integrity within a respectful social landscape, no sustainable economy is possible. We as Canadians will not be able to take care of our lands and water, and each other, unless the exploitative ethos is mitigated and until Indigenous peoples take their place as respected treaty partners.

The Indigenous World View: An Aside Towards a Different Economic and Social Paradigm

Indigenous people have been compelled to defend their “rights” in the colonial courts of law. However, when given the chance they have articulated their own understandings of law not as a set of rights but as matrices of obligations and

responsibilities to their relations – rocks, waters, soils, sky, trees, animals, ancestors, and future generations. It is epistemologically understood that respect for the cosmological set of relations is necessary for humanity’s survival, as all humans are biologically reliant on the abundance offered by clean lands, waters, and skies. Deep knowledge about sustainable living has been generated over several generations by this ontological set of mores and daily praxes. In his book, *Sacred Ecology*, social anthropologist Fikret Berkes notes about “traditional ecological knowledge” after years of living on the land with Canadian Aboriginal groups, that when the Inuit participants in a 1995 conference were asked to describe traditional knowledge, there was consensus on the following meanings: practical common sense; teachings and experience passed through generations; knowing the country; being rooted in spiritual health; a way of life; an authority system of rules for resource use; respect; obligation to share; wisdom in using knowledge; using heart and head together... Implied in the concept is a component of local and empirical knowledge of species and other environmental phenomena. [Yet] there is also a component of practice in the way people carry out their agriculture, hunting and fishing, and other livelihood activities. Further, there is a component of belief in peoples' perceptions of their role within ecosystems and how they interact with natural processes...purely ecological aspects of tradition cannot be divorced from the social and spiritual... Traditional knowledge systems tend to have a large moral and ethical context; there is no separation between nature and culture. In many traditional cultures nature is imbued with sacredness...this is "sacred ecology."  

Idle No More is a platform that seeks acknowledgment of and respect for Indigenous knowledge and what it lends to respectful economic praxes. It situates that knowledge not of the past, but as a set of epistemological and practical tools to help enable ethical and sustainable livelihood for Canadians in the present. Spokespeople affiliated with Idle No More beseech people to allow the truths of ultimate biological interdependency found in Western ecological sciences to corroborate Indigenous knowledge of the same. In this way

20 Berkes, 5–6.  
21 Berkes, 11.
people can meet respectfully in the center. They can determine together their collective twenty-first century exigencies, and the ethical and economic ethos under which those exigencies need to be addressed for any possibility of success. It is clear that the modes of thinking and acting supported by mainstream global capitalist/consumer culture, as it is promoted by our so-called modern (Western) societies and governments, is exploitative, toxic, and unsustainable. Idle No More is a platform that calls for a social and economic revolution. What sets it apart from previous revolutionary calls is the foregrounding of Indigenous knowledge as an integral tool in resolving our collective environmental and economic challenges. We all operate locally. Indigenous knowledge is local knowledge and it must be respected.

**Cultural Revitalization and Knowledge Transfer in Grassy Narrows First Nation, Treaty Three: an Example of Idle No More in Action**

Andrew Keewatin is a respected Elder, trapper, hunter, outdoor educator and community addictions counselor in Grassy Narrows First Nation. He holds ‘traditional ecological knowledge’ of the forest, and of his community history, worth several PhDs. He is venerated locally for his tender efforts with youth, and his outdoor teaching skills. He volunteers at the high school and hosts land-skills workshops at the Grassy Narrows Trappers’ Center in hopes to instill in young people a desire to engage with their territories, outdoors – to embrace the “sacred ecology” that is their inheritance as Anishinaabe. Like many First Nations, the youth in Grassy Narrows are without intimate knowledge of their customary lands and land-based practices. Decreased intergenerational passing of traditional skills and knowledge is one of the legacies of residential schools and state child foster programs. Moreover, generations of general harassment by police and state and provincial ministries have also taken their financial and psychological tolls. Ontario’s provincial Ministry of Natural Resources, for example, for decades abrogated treaty by illegally and universally enforcing provincial hunting, fishing, and trapping restrictions on Aboriginal people using their own lands. Indigenous people who failed to satisfy “the law” faced crippling fines, confiscation of outdoor equipment, or incarceration. These realities have combined to compromise the people’s willingness and ability to engage their lands outside and away from their small “reserves.” Idle No More advocates for the re-engagement and indeed the re-occupation of traditional territories so that young Indigenous people can meaningful engage in the rightful environmental stewardship of their ancestral lands.
The Idle No More platform looks inwardly in this way, recognizing that Indigenous people have much restorative work to accomplish if they are to be contributing treaty partners. Andrew Keewatin is performing this work.

In the summer of 2013, Andrew and the author began an intensive, long-term project to facilitate the transfer of Anishinaabe land skills and cultural knowledge to a handful of teenage participants from Grassy Narrows. Our focal exercise in 2013 was camping out on site as Andrew taught us to build a large trapper’s cabin. The cabin sits at the north end of beautiful “Indian Lake,” roughly thirty minutes by motorboat from the village of Grassy Narrows. The cabin will be used as eventual host site within a small tourist enterprise, reinvigorating the tradition of guiding on the water, and of welcoming visitors. If the bulk of this paper is any indication, the area is ripe with interactive educational opportunities and the author is working to set up liaisons with regional colleges, and the universities to bring students to the site. This type of programming represents the spirit of sharing conceived of by Indigenous signatories of Treaty 3. The events and information around Idle No More disseminated via social media galvanized the participant youth from Grassy Narrows to sign up for the project. Several youth articulated to the author their renewed interest in their traditional lands and waters because of interaction with Idle No More activities online, and they articulated their wish to commiserate with non-Aboriginal tourists and students on their territories. Without Idle No More, young people in Grassy Narrows may not have been motivated to participate. Such are some of the incalculable but tangible ways that Idle No More inspires Indigenous people in Canada, especially youth.

This project is a localized response to the unfortunate loss of traditional land knowledge and ecological destruction experienced by Grassy Narrows. It is meant to engage the youth from the reserve with their non-Aboriginal treaty partners as well and visitors interested in how the land embodies treaty relationships. Such an ecotourism project sits within a growing movement of Indigenous-led ecotourism initiatives worldwide, each with their own respective goals and parameters, yet with these important commonalities distilled for us by Australian researcher Heather Zeppel:

- Tourism connected with Indigenous culture, values, and traditions
- Tourism products owned and operated by Indigenous people
- Tourism based on Indigenous land and cultural identity, controlled from within by Indigenous groups
- Tourism which includes Indigenous ‘habitat, heritage, history, and handicrafts’
- Typically involves small tourism businesses owned by tribes and families
– Tourism focused on Indigenous knowledge of culture and nature
– Tourism that supports human rights and democratic movements

In Grassy Narrows each element falls in line with the overarching goal of the Idle No More platform: to support Indigenous rights, human rights, treaty rights, and sacred ecology within a rubric of real reconciliation in Canada based in an ethical understanding of treaty. Increasing numbers of Canadians are vocally questioning and challenging the unethical and illegal exploitation of people and their environment by rapacious multinational extraction industries. Idle No More is a vehicle wherein ideas for economic alternatives can be discussed between all Canadians, online or in personal meetings. Such projects allow for an organic, realistic venue for such discussion.

The success of this project benefits Grassy Narrows in several ways. As mentioned, it will offer a meeting place where sustained and intensive dialogue with students and recreational visitors can occur. Also, non-indigenous tourism operators in the region have witnessed a robust interest in experiencing the land with local First Nation guides. As yet the region is without a means to cultural access, physical infrastructure, or programming. Grassy Narrows’ goal is to begin to provide such for the Treaty 3 region. For its leadership and service, sustainable dollars will be welcomed to the community. Of course, such an ecotourism and education enterprise is dependent on the integrity of the forests and waters. As such, the construction of host cabins throughout the territory could benefit the community by adding to the Supreme Court decision the legal teeth necessary to challenge the province’s ability to issue logging licenses there. Most importantly, the teenage participants in the cabin-building project are beginning the journey of rediscovering what responsible stewardship of lands and waters feels like. Interaction with tourists and visiting students encourages communication between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians. Interaction can nurture the important personal relationships necessary for reconciliation and the honouring of treaty as a respectful political, economic, and environmental management partnership.

---

22 Heather Zeppel, *Indigenous Ecotourism: Sustainable Development and Management.* (Trowbridge, U.K. Cromwell Press, 2006), 9. Zeppel’s work is an excellent and thorough collation of most academic literature and recent conference presentations on Indigenous ecotourism until 2006, much of which emerges from Australia. Zeppel examines the distinctive local exigencies and experiences of several Indigenous ecotourism projects from Latin America, Asia, and Africa, and distils for the reader in her introduction their respective similarities, as noted.

23 Zeppel, 15.
Opposition to the federal Economic Action Plan and concomitantly, opposition to the globalizing cadre of corporations intent on maintaining the status quo, is inherent in such revolutionary local partnerships between mainstream Canadians and their Aboriginal treaty partners.

**Conclusion: A Didactic Farewell**

It is impossible to ascertain in hard data the impact that Idle No More has made on Canada’s social and political landscapes. But it is certain that the collective consciousness has been raised to a noticeable degree. Racism and financial poverty of have historically ensured Indigenous peoples’ marginality on Canada’s mainstream socio-political radar. However, the globalizing advent of internet and social media have proven to be great equalizers. Indigenous people now have equal means to mass vocalization at a time in Canada’s experience when their voices are most required, and their Indigenous world-views, embodied in diverse notions of sacred ecology, are most relevant. Indigenous activists and academics, in solidarity with their non-Indigenous supporters, are persistent in their push for economic and ecological sustainability, only achievable through respectful social relations. As ecological threats are alarming increasing numbers of people, the Idle No More platform is gaining more credibility and Indigenous people are gaining more respect and support among the mainstream.

A revolution in thought and praxis is required to meaningfully oppose globalizing neo-colonial economic practices facilitated by colonial entities operating behind dubiously legitimized nation-statehood. To achieve revolutionary potential, it is necessary to work on all levels simultaneously: cultural, environmental, educational, economic, legal, and political. Mainstream Canadians must be engaged at each level in order to harness their collective power in numbers and clout. Idle No More spokespeople employ non-threatening dialogue to compel Canadians to see their role as complicit in the colonization and exploitation of Canada’s lands and First Peoples; that their high material standards of living are fruits from stolen lands and the abuse of real people living among them.\(^{24}\) To do so without raising their ire in self-defensiveness is no

---

\(^{24}\) It is beyond the purview of this paper to delve with deserving detail into the problem of missing and murdered Aboriginal girls and women in Canada. As part of Canada’s colonial narrative, Indigenous modes of sexual conduct have been misunderstood and appropriated such that Aboriginal women are viewed as wanton and licentious. As such they are deemed less deserving of respect and have been exploited through rape, murder, and
mean feat. The currents of racist entitlement and complacency are still formidable in mainstream Canada. Canada’s colonial education curricula normalize narratives of “white” superiority and the righteousness of European and Canadian conquest and ‘progress’. Idle No More emanates counteractive ripples of re-education and ethical appeal that aim to create waves of action for the revolutionary cause.

It is not possible to predict how or if Idle No More will achieve its goal, but it is clear that a revolution must occur if Canadians – and indeed peoples worldwide – are to survive with any semblance of health and dignity. In the coming epoch of climate change, inundated coastlines, extreme pollution, drought, crop failure, water shortages, and famine, human societies will have two essential choices: to cooperate in order to minimize suffering and warfare, or to allow those with power and military means to dictate the terms of the lessers’ demise. Globalization has normalized the exploitative power systems of neo-colonialism and unsustainable consumerism, assisted by colonial entities. Canada’s governments have long served as eager hosts to these systems, elaborated by the federal Conservative Economic Action Plan. The bulk of the Canadian mainstream has proven stubbornly complacent, satiated by material excess, fleeting comfort, and promises of “jobs.” However, there is a visible turning of the tide. Idle No More is playing an integral role in raising consciousness, and in

abduction into prostitution rings. Laterally, decades of residential school abuses normalized forms of sexual violence for many Aboriginal people, who were not permitted to be raised in traditional nurturing, functional family and social environments. Combined with alcoholism, sexual violence is an unfortunate problem within many First Nations communities. With roots in colonial modes of oppression and exploitation, the sexual targeting of Aboriginal women by both Indigenous and non-Indigenous men is problematic for many communities. In parallel, abuse of the environment is contextualized by Aboriginal women as violence against Mother Earth, directly associated with violence against girls and women. Several hundred girls and women are missing and murdered in Canada. It is not surprising that Canada’s federal government refuses to conduct a full practical and theoretical inquiry into the issue, a refusal for which United Nations special rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous peoples, James Anaya, has taken them to task after his recent visit to Canada. See <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/un-human-rights-investigator-says-canada-needs-inquiry-into-missing-aboriginal-women/article14870214/>. The problem is recognized internationally. To read on Amnesty International’s ‘No More Stolen Sisters’ campaign, for example, see <http://www.amnesty.ca/our-work/issues/indigenous-peoples/no-more-stolen-sisters>. For an example of how social media is used to address the issue, and to help locate missing Aboriginal girls and women in Canada, see the facebook page <https://www.facebook.com/pages/Missing-Murdered-Aboriginal-Women-in-Canada/313160025391260>.
emboldening multifarious forms of cooperative resistance to globalized systems of exploitation and destruction forwarded by the Economic Action Plan.

It is indeterminable what forms the socio-political revolution in Canada might take if successful. Intrinsic to treaty relationships, from the Indigenous perspective, is open dialogue and continual negotiation as developing conditions warrant. It is unknowable what will emerge from purposeful interchange between Indigenous knowledge holders, Western-trained scientists, infrastructure maintenance and delivery experts, and experienced politicos on all sides. What is certain is that a different form and ethos of structural planning is necessary. Ecologically, we must understand watershed science and the benefits of biodiversity so that we can mitigate the use of harmful chemicals and stop compromising our waters so that we can continue to grow and harvest healthful food. In terms of energy, we must use alternatives to fossil fuels so that our lands and waters remain vital and the effects of climate change are minimalized. Socially and economically, we must re-learn to consume less, to recycle almost all materials with non-polluting technologies, and stop extracting resources that are not crucially required. We must shift our notion of “jobs” towards the fulfillment of useful “roles.” In short, we must embrace as a collective our sacred ecology so that we might in fact survive. En route to becoming more responsible for the materials we use for our daily living, our relationships and cooperative capacity will have grown and matured. It is understood that our environmental problems cannot be addressed without first correcting our social challenges. Canada’s economy, like many other colonial economies worldwide, is predicated on environmental racism. This must be arrested if humans have any hope of survival. The exploitative ethos must be curtailed and human energies redirected toward responsible relationships.

Such revolutionary change is anathema to the globalized system exploitation of lands, waters, and the Indigenous peoples tied culturally and economically to those sacred ecologies. Colonial and neo-colonial exploitation is so normalized by mainstream economic and social systems that revolution hardly seems possible. The challenges sometimes seem too numerous and run too deep, the systems too complex, the machinery too automatic. That said, Indigenous people the world over have shown themselves to be resilient, and, ultimately, optimistic. With dialogue and cooperation anything is possible. Canadians mustn't be complacent. Canada’s Indigenous people are showing the rest of the population that the time to act is now. As “minorities,” Indigenous peoples the world over are reacting to the deleterious aspects of globalization. But by doing so, they are in fact working to generate a new wave of globalization predicated on concerted applications toward survival. This can only be accomplished by acknowledging the collective human family, and treating
each other as brothers and sisters. We are all kin in biological and historical reality. We must acknowledge these facts and honour our responsibilities to each other, to re-foster positive relationships with one another. The Idle No More platform is in fact providing for such performance. It may not be possible, but Indigenous people – Canada and worldwide – are acting, pleading, educating, and hoping. They are showing the globalized mainstream that we must, as a collective, be Idle No More.

Bibliography


PART 4

Non-Homogeneous Forms of Cultural Development: The Linguistic Paradigm
Indigenous Languages, Gender and Community Organisation in the Era of Globalization

The Case of the Mazatec Women of the Naxi-i in Oaxaca, Mexico

Karla Janiré Avilés González and Angela Ixkic Bastian Duarte

Introduction

It is estimated that more than half of the languages spoken on the planet will disappear in the course of this century. This phenomenon is attributed, among other factors, to broad trends towards linguistic and cultural homogenisation that are promoted by the neoliberal model of globalisation. The authors of this article wonder if other forms of experiencing globalisation exist which might provide ways to change the multi-faceted marginalization experienced by minority sociolinguistic groups. We explore this question by examining the experience of an organisation of Mazatec women in Oaxaca, Mexico, who have managed to reinforce their ethnic and linguistic identity while working to develop more just gender relations.

---

1 We thank the scientific and financial support provided by the IUF Mesoamerican Morphophonology project (MAmP) to carry out the field research, and also to the Axe 7 EM2 project at Labex EFL (Paris 3 and 7) for analyzing the data. Information on this project can be found at “EM2 Cross-mediated endangered language elicitation.” <http://axe7.labex-efl.org/em2-description>, visited on 14 November 2013.

2 Neoliberal ideology promotes the shrinking of the state and the promotion of free markets. It implies the implementation of reforms that make citizens responsible for services that were previously provided by the state. These reforms have had specific effects on indigenous peoples, who now receive even less support than before, and who have increasingly been made responsible for their own well-being. They have become responsible for marketing their own produce for instance, even though historical conditions have left them in a weak position to compete in the market. In Mexico public spending was dramatically reduced through structural adjustment policies imposed by the International Monetary Fund in the 1980s and through measures adopted by the government of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–1994). Social spending was reduced and measures were taken to privatize elements of the education and health systems. The process of agricultural reform was stopped, as were subsidies to the agricultural sector, leading to a situation in which many indigenous peasant farmers could no longer survive in the countryside. See Maylei Blackwell et al., “Cruce de Fronteras, Identidades Indígenas, Género y Justicia en Las Américas,” in Desacatos 31 (2009): 13–39.
The group we refer to is the Naxi-í Organisation of United Women, which has more than a decade of experience of organising Mazatec women and of developing productive activities that contribute to family incomes. The use of the Mazatec language has played a fundamental role in this process. In the following pages we reflect on the relation between this organisational process and the reactivation of the language.

Naxi-í is based in the village of San Jerónimo Tecoatl in the Sierra Mazateca region of Oaxaca State in Mexico. It has 1,606 inhabitants, according to official statistics. The large part of its inhabitants speaks the indigenous Mazatec language. Nonetheless, the displacement of Mazatec by the only official language of the country – Spanish – is linked to a process of historic linguistic and cultural imperialism which began with the Spanish Conquest.

Experts point out that a high proportion of languages spoken on the planet are disappearing. According to Krauss half of these will vanish during the course of this century. Language extinction represents the loss of a huge range of ancestral knowledge relating to ecological environments, systems of medicine and religions as well as other cultural aspects of the speakers.

In Mexico, the diversity of indigenous cultures and languages (it is estimated that there are around 400 linguistic groups) is also threatened with extinction. This is a result of the monocultural national project, which legitimated the imposition of Castilian Spanish through policies which promote a subtractive bilingualism. Language Policies imposed by governing elites have varied over time. In general terms, during the colonial period segregationist policies tolerated the use of indigenous languages, in order to enable the transmission of Castilian Spanish, to gain control of local resources and to accommodate the indigenous population to the new dominant culture. During the 19th century the integrationist policies of an independent Mexico were
characterised by a rejection of multilingualism in the political sphere, instead maintaining Spanish as the only official language. In the face of the failure of previous policies to hispanicize the population, the move towards corporatism in the 20th century was accompanied by the recognition of certain indigenous values and practices and the institutionalisation of bilingual education. This was undertaken partly as a move to gain the support of the indigenous population, but above all in order to continue the process of biological, linguistic and cultural intermingling of indigenous and mestizo populations. While the Mexican state currently has a policy of multiculturalism, underpinned by the constitutional recognition of the linguistic rights of indigenous peoples, at national level Spanish continues to be the only official language of the country. Furthermore, in practice, official bilingual education continues to privilege the learning of Spanish.\(^7\)

Another factor that has contributed to the loss of indigenous languages has been the need of the indigenous population to enter the labour market. This is a result, among other things, of the crisis of the rural economy.\(^8\) This has led to a situation in which speakers of indigenous languages represent only six per cent of the total population of the country (estimated at 101 million inhabitants, according to data from the last Census of Population and Housing carried out in 2010 by INEGI).\(^9\) The linguistic group that is the subject of our study – Mazatec – accounts for roughly 200,000 speakers, located principally in the state of Oaxaca. Although *Ethnologue: Languages of the World* classifies the Mazatec spoken in San Jeronimo Tecoatl as ‘vigorous’,\(^10\) ethnographic research indicates a growing breakdown in linguistic transmission between generations, leading to the learning of Spanish being privileged at home as much as at school. These issues lead us to investigate the importance of Mazatec among

---

7. Ávilés González, “Aquí ya no hablan mexicano...”
10. A recognized and prestigious catalogue of world languages. Paul M. Lewis, Gary F. Simons, and Charles D. Fennig (eds.), *Ethnologue: Languages of the World, Seventeenth Edition*. Dallas, Texas: SIL International, 2013. <http://www.ethnologue.com>, visited June 7 2013. According to this source there are 20,000 speakers of Mazatec in the region, accounting for 10% of all speakers of the language. This figure includes speakers in the municipality of San Jeronimo Tecoatl as well as other localities where other versions of Mazatec are spoken.
its speakers, in particular in the activities coordinated by the Naxi-í Organisation of United Women.

The reflections set out in this article are based on field work carried out in San Jeronimo Tecoatl during the summer of 2012. This included semi-structured interviews, recording of life histories, and carrying out workshops and ethnographic observation in order to assess the use of Mazatec in different contexts. These activities served not only as tools for the collection of data but also to make a contribution to supporting the preservation of local languages and culture, and to promoting the empowerment of speakers through the mutual transfer of knowledge. We consider this “empowerment” to be co-participative, on the basis that each one of the participants is recognised to have differing but complementary knowledge and experience.

This article is divided into four sections. The first of these is this introduction; the second discusses the link between the recovery of Mazatec as promoted by members of the Naxi-í and the broadening of spaces for participation by women. The third section discusses the idea that growing links between actors in different parts of the world (as occurs in the context of globalisation) have stimulated new, culturally differentiated understandings of the participation of women in communal decision-making. In conclusion, the final reflections section develops the idea that the process of organising women can renew indigenous languages but also political and ethnic identities, and in this way generate creative forms of social participation. This suggests that globalisation is not a one-way process, and that it can also provide opportunities for minority sociolinguistic groups to overcome aspects of their marginalisation, at least to a certain extent.

Gender Equity from a Mazatec Perspective

When speaking of problems linked to gender relations, indigenous women frequently refer to domestic violence or other kinds of tensions within the family.

11 The “Languages and You” questionnaire, developed by Jean-Léo Léonard and Liliane Jagueneau (Sorbonne Nouvelle University – Paris 3, and University of Poitiers, France) was used. It was translated and adapted for the Mexican context by Karla Janiré Avilés González.

They mention women who have difficulties obtaining permission from their husbands or fathers to leave the house, or of girls who don't have the same opportunities to attend school as their brothers. Many refer to customs or traditions that provide support for these practices, but which are now changing in the face of women's opposition.\footnote{Various studies have investigated this issue. These include a study by Sandra Cañas on Tsotsil women in Chiapas who have converted to Islam (Sandra Cañas, "Islam y Relaciones de Género en San Cristóbal de Las Casas, Chiapas," in Avilés González and Terven \textit{Entre el Estigma y la Resistencia}); a study by Ixkic Bastian with an organisation of Nahua women in the south of Veracruz state (Bastian, \textit{Desde el Sur Organizado}), and one by Adriana Terven also on the organisation of Nahua women in the Sierra Norte of Puebla state (A. Terven, "Reivindicación de la Costumbre Jurídica en el Juzgado Indígena de Cuetzalan. Retos Desde el Estado," in Avilés González and Terven \textit{Entre el Estigma y la Resistencia}).}

Although such practices also occur in non-indigenous societies, their existence has been used as an argument to describe indigenous societies as primitive or backward, and to suggest that these women need to be \textit{protected} from their own cultures. Some liberal feminist theorists and academics, such as Susan Moller Okin have helped to strengthen the stereotype of indigenous women as victims of their own traditions.\footnote{Susan Moller Okin, "Liberalismo Político, Justicia y Género" in Carmen Castell (ed), \textit{Perspectivas Feministas en Teoría Política}, (Barcelona, Paidós, 1996) and "Is Multiculturalismo Bad for Women?" in Susan Moller Okin, \textit{Is Multiculturalismo Bad for Women?} (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1999).} This claim is made on the assumption that the cultural reproduction of indigenous groups requires the perpetuation of practices that limit women's individual freedoms, subordinating them to collective structures. Indigenous women would therefore be freer to the extent that they \textit{integrated} themselves into national Western societies. Post-colonial feminists such as Chandra Mohanty,\footnote{Chandra T. Mohanty, "Encuentros Feministas: Situar la Política de la Experiencia," in Michèle Barrett and Anne Phillips \textit{Desestabilizar la Teoría. Debatess feministas contemporáneos}, (Mexico, PUEG/UNAM, 2002).} or Lata Mani,\footnote{Lata Mani, “Tradiciones en Discordia: el Debate sobre la Sati en la India Colonial,” in S. Dube, \textit{Pasados Poscoloniales}, (Mexico, El Colegio de México, 1999).} feminists who recognise the importance of difference such as Iris Marion Young,\footnote{Iris Marion Young, \textit{Justice and the Politics of Difference}, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990).} and
indigenous feminists as Alma López Mejía,18 and Martha Sánchez Nestor,19 respond to this issue by arguing that while it is important not to deny the subordination of women in different cultural contexts, it is also important to avoid portraying them simply as victims of patriarchy.

The lack of recognition of certain women’s rights is neither a constitutive nor static cultural trait, because cultural practices are themselves the result of the interaction of economic, geographic, social, political and ecological factors, and are influenced by the dynamic character of each of these factors. In questioning practices that bind them, indigenous women transform their own culture. This process reinforces the importance of framing the questions we ask about their experiences within the context of their own particular histories and trajectories. As we will see, the women of the Naxi-í assert the importance of their own culture, while at the same time subjecting it to criticism, in recognition of the fact that traditional gender norms can restrict their own development. In this context, one hears frequently that the experience of organising has transformed their lives and allowed them to change family relationships.

Testimonies illustrate that before the organisation existed, Mazatec women of San Jerónimo were not accustomed to leaving the house to meet and take part in collective activities. The desire of some women to participate more actively in the political and economic life of the community led them to accept the invitation of the then municipal president to establish an organisation of Mazatec women. In this way the Naxi-í was born in 1999. The first women who worked to establish the organisation came up against the opposition of other women as much as that of men, and found many doors were closed against them. As illustrated in the following testimony, this opposition was strongly linked to predominant local conceptions of gender relations, in which women are meant to carry out domestic tasks and to look after their families, rather than to participate in formal politics.

Mariela,20 56 years old and one of the most active members of Naxi-í, talks about the origin of the association: “The organisation was founded in 1999 with the aim that we women could participate more actively within our

---

20 All interviews were carried out in September 2012 in San Jerónimo Tecoátl, Oaxaca, by Karla Janiré Avilés González. For reasons of confidentiality participants’ names have been changed. Some interviews were carried out in Spanish, others in Mazatec, depending on
community. According to our traditions, there is very little participation by women in nearly all Mazatec communities. [But] we used to ask ourselves why women shouldn’t be involved in community activities. At community level it’s always been men who made the decisions. They still do so now, though it’s not like it used to be.”

Mariela recalls that in that era it was very unusual for women to take part in the political life of the community. In communal assemblies for example “the person who had to attend was the man, because he was the one who was meant to make decisions on behalf of the women.” Efforts by the women to organise themselves took place at the same time as government initiatives at municipal and state level to increase the number of women participating in formal political processes. Although this helped them, the women nonetheless had to struggle for every gain they have made. At times these were silent battles which took the form of “everyday resistance,” rather than open rebellion. For example, to take part in the assembly they concealed themselves among a group of men from outside the village and hidden in this way made their way to the meeting place. As we shall see shortly, the use of Mazatec in everyday settings and above all in this political space is also an element of these ‘silent battles’. We will also see that the local language has played and continues to play an essential role in sustaining the activities of the Naxi-í.

At the beginning, 27 women began to organize. This number has grown even if the total number fluctuates over time. At first productive activities were destined for household consumption; later on production for sale to the market was undertaken. Activities have included cultivation of organic vegetables, preparation of fruit and vegetable conserves, as well as the keeping of domestic fowl.

The organisation’s work has also helped to bring important technological advances within reach of the community. For example, an internet café was established, providing a means of accessing advanced technologies in an autonomous manner, enabling communication via the internet, and also contributing to the association’s income, through renting out internet access. In effect, this “globalized” form of communication has helped the association achieve its goals, by enabling links to be established more easily with groups outside the community, with state or national associations, and with researchers and universities at an international level. Indeed, the contacts established between members of the MAmP project and the women of the Naxi-í were

---

the linguistic abilities of the interviewees. Women from the community helped with the translations. This particular interview was carried out in Spanish.

21 James Scott, *Los Dominados y el Arte de la Resistencia* (Mexico, Era, 2000).
initiated and maintained via the internet, which proved to be a highly effective medium of communication.

Workspaces have also been created in which various productive activities such as the manufacture of conserves can be carried out, and in which meetings and workshops are held. Interactions with counterparts elsewhere in the world are clearly present in all these activities. The women of the Naxi-í have actively sought out these external connections, whether at national or international level, which in turn have contributed to their own learning process. For example, the most recent workspace was built with the help of a group of German students, who combined the use of local materials with the latest architectural techniques, thereby creating a space for the Naxi-í's productive and organisational work.

Such encounters are characterised by multilingualism: German, Mazatec and Spanish are used in the same space, with the latter language serving as a lingua franca between Germans and Mazatecs. Nevertheless, the women hold their discussions in Mazatec and make decisions which are then disseminated in Spanish. These experiences illustrate that even when international contacts are taken into account, Mazatec does not play a secondary role, but is in fact central to the organisational life of the women of the Naxi-í.

In addition, Naxi-í members have documented part of the culinary tradition of San Jeronimo Tecozatl in a recipe book “Forgotten Flavours,” which both men and women from the community contributed to. This book of traditional recipes was originally written in Spanish. However, its authors intend to translate it into Mazatec in the near future. This project was undertaken with the support of other organisations, including in particular that of the Centre for Support of the Oaxacan Popular Movement (CAMPO). The relationship with this non-governmental organisation (NGO) was also central in the decision by the Naxi-í to work to involve women in all activities figuring in the municipal development plan. All of the projects comprise elements of the activities undertaken by the Naxi-í to revitalize Mazatec traditions by involving members of the community.

In spite of the obstacles described above, the Mazatec women of San Jeronimo have achieved important advances in the field of gender relations. This is the fruit of the persistence of the women of the Naxi-í to defend their rights: one of the most important achievements is their right to speak and vote in communal assemblies. Even though the exercise of "linguistic

---

rights does not figure among the explicit demands of the Naxi-i, the use of Mazatec in oral terms has emerged as a strategy of resistance and even of ethno-linguistic re-conquest. The women’s stories reveal that the gains mentioned have been achieved, either directly or indirectly, through the use of Mazatec. For instance, it was through this language that they developed their ability to articulate their cause. The ways in which the language is used differs according to communicative competence of speakers. This includes monolingual speakers and different degrees of bilingualism. Mazatec is the language of monolingual Mazatec members of the Naxi-i, whether young or old. As such, it is in fact the medium for the empowerment of Mazatec women. The case of Mariela is paradigmatic in illustrating the acquisition of communicative competence in Mazatec. Mariela had stopped using her native language after living for nine years in Mexico City. However, her involvement in the public life of the community, undertaken at first through a group of housewives, and subsequently with the Naxi-i, led her to take up her the mazatec language again. In her own words: “people often used to ask me to pause (in my community work) because I couldn’t speak Mazatec very well.” From then on, Mariela told herself, “if all the other women speak Mazatec, I have to be able to speak it well!” She then worked hard to increase her fluency. This improved her ability to bring groups together and to work with them, and to be heard not only by Spanish speakers but also by monolingual Mazatec women. This illustrates that bilingualism has been an important tool for the work of the Naxi-i and that it has not hindered the revitalization of Mazatec. In fact, we can describe it as an additive bilingualism, rather than a subtractive one, because it actually enables and promotes the use of the indigenous language. This is remarkable, given that the trend at national level is towards subtractive bilingualism, in other words, promoting the use of Spanish in place of native languages. (Schooling in San Jeronimo, for example, is undertaken exclusively in Spanish).

The Mazatec language proved to be a force that helped to push forward and give cohesion to the political organisation of women. Since the establishment

24 For a more detailed discussion of linguistic policies in Mexico, and in particular the speaking and writing of different variants of Mazatec, see Jean-Léo Léonard et al., “Multilingual Policies Put into Practice.”
25 José Antonio Flores Farfán. Cuatreros somos y toindioma hablamos (CIESAS, Mexico, 1999).
of the association, monolingual Mazatec women have participated in activities such as the production of conserves or in the workshops held by external actors. During a workshop on the geo-linguistics of Mazatec held in September 2012, we observed the importance of the language in the way that its use empowered these women. Without Mazatec, the work of Mariela and the other members of the organisation would not have had the same depth. In fact it allowed them to reach all aspects of everyday life in San Jeronimo Tecoatl. For instance, it helped them to negotiate the “permission” of their husbands so that they could continue taking part in the political and productive activities of the Naxi-í (see below).

Fernanda, a thirty year old monolingual Mazatec woman and a member of the Naxi-í since its foundation, mentions that the use of the indigenous language within the organization has been central in ensuring her involvement. She explains that she likes to be part of the organisation because she feels included and learns new skills, such as how to manufacture conserves or to take part in projects. These new abilities are translated and transmitted through Mazatec, even though, like other indigenous Mexican languages, it has been considered as linked to the past and to immovable tradition. The practice of the Naxi-í therefore calls into question the false dichotomy between tradition and modernity, in which many interpretations of indigenous life are caught up.

Nonetheless, the achievements of the Naxi-í need to be placed in context. Fernanda, for instance, says that not all of the roles she plays as a woman are valued, and that she doesn't necessarily feel freer as a woman because she is a Naxi-í member. These days her husband “gives her permission” to take part in the organisation’s activities. However, to achieve this she first had to convince him, explaining in detail the activities carried out in meetings in order to persuade him that she wasn't doing anything wrong. Other women also enter into similar negotiations with their husbands, indicating that it is very difficult to develop equal relations inside the family. It also suggests though that the process of organising is contributing to changing gender roles, and that women have an active and fundamental part in this process. It is worth remembering that only a short while ago they had no right to speak or vote in assemblies, and that taking part in political activities or productive projects outside their homes was unthinkable.

---

27 This workshop was an element of the MAmP project, and had the aim of identifying the native words for the flora and fauna found locally, in order to promote the community’s appropriation of its ecological and linguistic environment.
New Meanings in the Context of Globalisation

Globalisation tends to be analysed from an economic point of view, or as a phenomenon that is fundamentally linked to the means of communication. It is often explained as a series of measures taken to liberalise the economy and is identified with the great influence of multinational companies and with the expansion of the Internet and of information and communication technologies. These approaches suggest a collection of anonymous flows that move across the world without restriction and which impact on the daily life of people and social groups, without their being able to do very much about it. Furthermore, there is a tendency to equate globalisation and neoliberalism, and in this context to present neoliberalism as the only possible economic alternative, as natural, and as the destiny towards which all forms of social organisation tend.28

In contrast to these unambiguous assessments, the authors of this article, following Daniel Mato29 and Inda & Rosaldo,30 view globalisation as the result of various historical trends which have served to intensify interactions between nations and peoples. These do not occur only in the context of asymmetric power relations. These interactions have cultural, political and economic dimensions that can only be separated from each other in analytical terms, and they are actually much more diverse than simply a process of homogenisation, or the merging of ways of life or cultural symbols.

Parallel to the trend towards globalisation, there is also a process of localisation. That is to say, globalisation implies as much a process of re-localisation as


Furthermore, the local and the global are not mutually exclusive: the former needs to be understood as an aspect of the latter. As we shall see in the case of the Naxi-i, the mass production of symbols and cultural information is not creating a global culture. The re-localisation of these discourses actually produces a multiplicity of different scenarios, because individual interpretations of those symbols and information vary. The experience of the Naxi-i shows clearly that Mazatec women are not passive receptors of external messages, but rather agents who create new meanings through a process of dialogue.

The organisation’s activities have been marked by contact with associations and persons outside the community. Notable among these are various civil organisations based in the capital of Oaxaca State (including campo, as mentioned), as well as other institutions working at national level or based outside the country.

The Naxi-i has worked with these organisations in the analysis of gender relations as well as in various productive projects. Through work with civil associations, government and non-government organisations, and multilateral agencies, concepts and new ideas such as empowerment, gender equity, citizenship and politics have reached San Jeronimo Tecoatl. They are now familiar terms which are important to Naxi-i members, and their lives have been transformed and enriched through this experience. An example of this relates to understanding the term politics. For the women, “this is not an issue which solely relates to political parties or the government,” but rather an activity in which all participate, which “has to do with everything in society, whether in the community, in school, at work, in the state, and also in the country...for example, the work that women undertake in a community for the benefit of all.” Although this vision of politics is close to radical democracy and the construction of a citizenship which is not simply passive, it has not limited the involvement of women in formal political spaces. The women participated for

---

32 With this in mind Roland Robertson proposes the term ‘glocalisation’, as a concept that better explains economic and cultural phenomena (Beck, ¿Qué es la Globalización?).
33 Beck, ¿Qué es la Globalización?, 14. Ixkic Bastian Duarte (Duarte, Desde el Sur Organizado) found similar reflections in relation to politics in an organisation of Nahua women in the south of Veracruz state, which are close to those of liberation theology. The perspective developed by indigenous women, together with the non-governmental organisations with which they work, is closely related to the construction of active citizenship and radical democracy.
instance in the development of the *Manual for Encouraging Political and Electoral Participation by Indigenous Women in Oaxaca*.\(^{34}\)

We found these and other concepts written on posters which are hung up in the spaces where activities are carried out, and also in materials that they have put together to promote the participation of women in the state.\(^{35}\) According to this explanation, the *empowerment of women* is achieved through analysis of one’s own environment. Following the popular education tradition of Paulo Freire\(^ {36}\) and Participatory Action Research of Orlando Fals Borda,\(^ {37}\) they describe this process as consciousness-raising. Empowerment also requires having confidence in themselves, and the strengthening of self-esteem which in turn requires the broadening of work, educational and economic opportunities. This kind of empowerment should not only be for women, according to the *Naxi-í*’s thinking, because as such it would be incomplete. Instead, it has to take men into account too, because only by working together is it possible to construct equitable gender relationships.

What has already been said about the *Naxi-í* experience shows that globalisation cannot be reduced to economic elements; rather it has a cultural dimension that includes political elements. The women we have referred to are transforming their culture by looking at it anew. Its particular forms are integrated into their understanding of community dynamics. The initial understandings of terms that have arrived in the community as part of the process of globalisation, such as *gender equity*, or *empowerment*, have been appropriated and transformed by these actors. They show us that meanings are generated within social movements, and that *transnational* voices also participate in this process.

**Final Reflexions**

In Mexico, as in many other places, there is a tendency to think that indigenous women, simply for the sake of being such, are *destined* to live in situations of gender inequality which are more severe than *western* or *westernised* women

---


who experience for example physical or psychological violence, or various kinds of dependency. The Mazatec women with whom we have worked call into question this stereotype however, by reflecting within the context of their own culture on inequalities between men and women, and in proposing strategies to construct equitable gender relations that take their own context into account.

The organisational trajectory of the Naxi-í therefore calls into question unambiguous understandings of gender relations, language, identity and globalisation. They show that ethnicity is not synonymous with oppression, nor is it the antonym of modernity. Neither is tradition opposed to change. We have suggested that processes of organisation and social transformation such as those undertaken by the Mazatec women can be seen as renewing political and cultural identities, but also indigenous languages. Through these processes indigenous subordinated groups redefine concepts and practices, broadening the spaces for political action. The Mazatec women we have referred to are developers of social meaning and not simply reproducers of external discourses. Organisational processes are also processes of reinterpretation. This finding leads us to ask ourselves what are the meanings of global discourses, such as gender equity or the empowerment of women, in indigenous contexts.

The stories and activities analysed here show that globalisation, understood as the intensification of communication and of global linkages rather than an exclusively economic process, has played an essential role in the organisational process of the women of the Naxi-í. They have been able to establish support networks that contribute to the empowerment of Mazatec women, as well as to reactivate indigenous sociolinguistic practices. In the same way, the experience analysed opens the way for reflection on contemporary societies, by showing that while the homogenizing tendencies of globalisation are undeniable, possibilities for linguistic and cultural revitalisation also exist.

Bibliography


Against the Ethnicisation of Regional Territorial Minorities

_Contribution from the Basque Experience in France_

_Thomas Pierre_

Since the last decade of the last century and after more than thirty years of Basque-related demands (euskatxale and/or abertzale),1 the issue of institutionalization of the French Basque Country has reached some legitimacy in daily public debate among the local political class. In 2013, the majority of mayors supported the creation of a “territorial community” which would imply the official recognition of a new “Basque Country” local authority. Indeed, today the French Basque Country benefits from no official recognition. With Béarn, it makes up the Pyrénées-Atlantiques department within the Aquitaine region.2

As to the Basque language (euskara), the claim that it should be made official, seen as the means to give it a protective legal framework, appears today to be less outlandish than yesterday, and this applies to the opinion of many local elected representatives as well as that of a growing, even of a majority, share of the population.3 At least, this shift of attitudes towards the possible institutionalization of the French Basque Country points to a change of paradigm for individual and collective links with the local language and culture.

It’s in the light of this relative upheaval that we must consider the coming into being of clubs and societies which are violently opposed to Basque language entering the public domain. This phenomenon seems indeed to be the real sign of a significant tightening of the symbolic balance of power in favour

---

1 The term euskatzale means, in Basque language, “bascophile.” It is currently used to name the Basque cultural movement. The term abertzale means “patriot.” It is used for the naming and self-naming of all the Basque nationalist movements. Today, the term “Basque nationalist” is challenged by the majority of abertzale who prefer to call themselves and to be called patriots. To refer to the French Basque Country, I shall use both the following names: “North Basque Country” and “Iparralde” which literally means “North side.” This expression is used by reference to the Spanish Basque Country or “Hegoalde,” the “South side.”


3 Internet site of _Office Public de la Langue Basque_ (OPLB). Complete reference in the bibliography.
of Basque-related circles, whatever their nature (abertzale and/or euskaltzale), although they are still a minority in the polls. It is a fact that, within the debate as to the legitimacy of the Basque language entering the public domain, ideological differences are fiercely clear-cut. Opponents systematically put forward the argument that applying institutional bilingualism would necessarily undermine one of the founding principles of the French Republic, the principle whereby citizens’ equality before the law implies official francophone unilingualism.

On the other hand, Basque-related circles claim that official use of euskara as the institutional framework would right a democratic deficit and a social injustice. They are not demanding a return to an exclusively bascophone Basque country. They are campaigning for the official recognition of the bilingual character of basco-french society. In this way they are sharing the opposition to global ideologies which lead to a leveling of language and culture and which don’t care about the future of territorial minority languages.

We must specify that this conflict is happening within a sociolinguistic context marked by increased marginalization of the Basque language. Indeed, between 1991 and 2006, the number of Basque speakers dropped from 34 per cent to 22,5 per cent of the population. However, some data allow Basque language militants to remain optimistic and mobilized in response to the seriousness of this euskara-unfavourable disloggia situation: among the young 16–24 year-old generation, the number of Basque speakers grew between 1996 and 2006 from 11,6 to 16% (Mintzaira Internet site).

Despite everything, the Basque language in France has an uncertain future and these data are traumatic in the Basque Country to the extent that language is traditionally considered to be the country’s raison d’être: Euskal Herria,
whole of the Basque Country, literally means “Country of the Basque Language.” In the same way, belonging to the group must traditionally happen through language. According to the self-name Euskalduna, translated by the French word Basque, identity and language merge. Euskalduna is the contraction of euskara-du-n-a, “he or she who speaks Basque.”

By showing the social part played by the central feature of identity and its contemporary political practice, we propose to state the Basque militant experience’s new contribution to thinking about modern societies’ cultural future in the context of increased globalisation/plurilisation of cultural values and language use. How do the Basque movements proceed in their venture of rehabilitating the symbolic character of the local linguistic referent? To what extent does this rehabilitation provide an answer to new society issues emerging from increased individual and collective spatial mobility? How does Basque militantism propose to make the linguistic fact both a cultural (in accordance with tradition) and political feature (in accordance with citizenship)? What sort of argument is put forward to make Basque culture and, within it, euskara, as much an element of social cohesion and mobility as a vector from which to answer both the monolithism of global ideologies and the contemporary need to be faithful to tradition?

**Euskara’s Officialisation: the Basque Minority’s Narrow Communitarian Plan?**

In the 2000s, opposition to Basque institutional claims is made up by two societies, the Citoyens-en-Adour-Pyrénées Vivre-Ensemble Association and the

---

6 Euskara is considered by linguists to be a language island to the extent that it has no relationship with the neighboring Latin languages surrounding it. The question of its origin and possible parentage has not yet been answered scientifically. A number of hypotheses are put forward so as to link the Basque language and population with a linguistic family or to a population identified elsewhere; linguists, anthropologists and geneticists are trying to explain in what conditions they came to occupy the aquitano-pyrenean lands. The fact is that euskara has been the language of the people or peoples who have been living on either side of the western Pyrenees from prehistory until our time. At the current state of analyses, scientists agree about one fact: euskara existed before the arrival of the Indo-Europeans.
Lissagaray Circle, to which must be added local elected representatives of traditional national parties such as the Socialist Party or the U.M.P.7

This grouping makes up a speech forum for challenging the whole of euskaltzale and abertzale aspirations. These different actors have in common that they base their discourse on common and widespread representations of Basque activism by instrumentalising the theme of a supposedly intrinsic link between Basque minority, euskara, nationalism and ethnicist views of society.

What’s more, this opposition declares that they challenge the Basque language, the Gascon language or any other so-called “regional” language being made official on a par with the French language. Besides, they recall that they do not at all object to regional languages’ transmission and learning. But according to them, this is already possible within the current French legal framework. In issue number 7 of cap Vivre-Ensemble journal, we can read that the associations’ aim is to declare itself clearly in favour of teaching and transmission of regional languages “based on families’ wishes and in the respect of all regional cultures”: “There should be no specific rights granted to a group of speakers within a territory according to the Conseil Constitutionnel’s remarks in its reasons for its decision on the European chart of regional languages. Especially if this territory is already defined.”8

Far from leading to a debate, euskara’s claim to officialisation only makes opponents want to make their militant discourse public, incompatible with necessary conditions for debate because of being against in principle. For

---

7 Since September 1999, the cap Vivre-Ensemble association, following the Communist Party and Front National’s example, has been the only organization categorically and publicly to object to the institutional reforms supported by Basque-related groups. This association includes very few activists. These claim to belong to the left or to the “republican” right. They say that they are defending, “republican spirit,” the unity and territorial integrity of France. In October 2003, the Lissagaray circle was created by Jean Espilondo, then socialist deputy and general councilor of Anglet-North, Christian Aguerre, formerly editor of the weekly La Semaine du Pays Basque, Jean-Claude Paul-Dejean, former history teacher and Pierre Bidart, academic and responsible for Izpegi editions. This association stems from thinking within the local Socialist Party. Within this thinking group come together at the same time a majority of socialists but also non card-carrying people claiming to be “of the left.” The Circle includes many teachers. Half of the members are in work, the other half not working. Some members are Basque speakers (Interview, on July 20th 2004, with Christian Aguerre). According to Christian Aguerre, the Circle has no links with the cap Vivre-Ensemble association. Be it as it may, one of its founders Jean-Claude Paul-Dejean also belongs to the association.

example, many opponents consider officialisation of the Basque language to be inappropriate to the sociocultural characteristics of the Basque country’s population: “Beware, it’s a matter of co-officialisation, that means putting French and Basque on the same level. That seems dangerous to us and non-representative of the cultural diversity of the geographical area concerned” (Interview with a member of the CAP Vivre-Ensemble association in January 2000).

Analysis of this statement shows us how discourses against officialisation are both full of strong ideology, but also ideologically very poor. Taking the above quotation by its opposite, we could, for example, ask the following question: wouldn’t it be just as legitimate to consider non-recognition of the Basque language to be non-representative of the cultural diversity of the French Basque Country? On evidence, yes. But, dialectically speaking, this question cannot be asked within spheres which are favorable to the institutional status quo because their reasoning is built on deep belief in the existence of the Basque minority or, in other words, of the Basque ethnic group. This opposition sticks to the idea of a Basque world, which by nature is intrinsically essentialist, fixed, tightly closed, and atemporal. That is why, whether it be about linguistic, political, cultural or identity issues, associations which are against Basque nationalism lean on this representation. This allows them to maintain that the officialisation claim is an authoritarian and ethnicist idea wished for by a minority, the activist Basque minority. According to Christian Aguerre, formerly editor of the weekly La Semaine du Pays Basque and, in July 2004, a member of the Lissagaray Circle:

One thing is certain, that is that people cannot be forced to speak Basque except within a totalitarian structure. If Basques have to go through the obligation of learning and using this language to hold down a job as is the case in the Basque Autonomous Community [...] I say no, and secular laymen say no because it’s the antimony of liberty. If the day comes when people will have to learn Basque to be employed by Bidart Town Hall, quite a few will bugger off. And the Basques will remain among themselves. Co-officialisation of Basque leads to a situation where in order to get a job, you have to be bilingual, and I don’t want that. I don’t want my children and grandchildren to have to learn something they don’t want in order to earn the right to an economic living.

Interview with Christian Aguerre in July 2004

---

9 Here I mean by the expression Basque world the representation space which refers to all that is felt, thought and/or perceived as being Basque.
According to him, the fact of the French language being the language of the Republic doesn’t exclude other languages. But he thinks that parity among languages is incompatible with the principle of equal treatment for each citizen: “So what are we going to do? Civil servants who only speak Basque will be needed, well at least who use it. Others will say: ‘what about us gascons...Can you imagine the set-up, it’s just madness!’” *(ibid).*

In the last statement, a slip of the tongue followed by immediate awareness of this slip are witness to the passionate discourse which characterizes many opponents to the institutionalisation of Basque language. How can this language be made a publicly recognized means of exchange when that which is thought to come within the *Basque world* is perceived only in terms of exclusiveness: “who only speak Basque?” A potential Basque-speaking future civil servant is thought of as only speaking Basque because...he speaks Basque. This statement is witness to a fanciful view of the contemporary Basque-speaker’s condition, all the more so because in the Basque Country, cases of monolingual Basque speakers are very rare. Ignoring this fact, Christian Aguerre sees claims to systematic bilingual education in state schools as “the antinomy of liberty.” In this case, the idea of liberty relates to “freedom of conscience” which he links to “secularism.” He considers that the outlook of having to learn Basque in order to be a civil servant in the Basque Country is “violent coercion” *(Ibid.)*. For it to be compulsory to teach and use the French language within the public domain is not a “freedom of conscience” problem for Christian Aguerre since the French language has a national, civic, and universal vocation, it’s the language of the Republic and, what’s more...it’s his language. Here it must be stressed that beyond denouncing the link between Basque language and Basque nationalism, refusing to accept the institutionalisation of *euskara* is based on a postulate: the Basque language is the language of the Basques and not of the Basque Country, it is the language of a minority, the *Basque ethnic group*, and not that of a territory, the Northern Basque Country, which doesn’t exist in the eyes of the law.10 It is clear to see here that stigmatization of territorial cultural minorities finds justification in the idea that so-called “ethnic” groups are intrinsically unable to make mobilizing categories for progressist

---

10 The French Basque Country, however, enjoys the non-contractual status of a “Pays,” as set up by the “Pasqua law” of February 4th 1995 on regional planning and development, which states in its article 23 that “the Pays embodies the social and economic community of interests as well as, as the case may be, reciprocal solidarities between town and country.” The territorial demarcation of this “Pays,” called “Basque Country Pays,” was directly inspired by the three French Basque provinces’ prer evolutionary layout (Labourd, Basse-Navarre and Soule).
social processes out of their linguistic claims, processes which go beyond the issues of identity rights (Appadurai, 2006). In the French case, this stigmatization happens under the pretext of defending republican universalism, an ideal which is said to be challenged by regionalist localism (Pierre, 2010). Now Walter Benn Michaels shows that globalization also leads to another phenomenon: a tendency shared in all corners of the earth to valuing linguistic diversity (Michaels, 2006). Recourse to languages as mobilizing categories lets us state a social situation problem in terms of linguistic minorities/majorities and no longer exclusively in terms of ethnic minorities/majorities.

Systemized Bilingual Teaching: Cultural Egalitarianism?

In this context, Richard Irazusta, a member of Abertzaleen Batasuna,\textsuperscript{11} stated in October 2004 that the officialisation concept means that the Basque language will benefit from the setting up of a systemized bilingual education aimed at all the school-age population in the Basque Country. (Interview with Richard Irazusta). So behind this concept the idea emerges that the Basque language must ideally become the language of all the country’s inhabitants, and not of those who come from Basque-speaking circles and/or of those who were born in the Basque Country. It must become the language of “Basque Country Territory,” promoted by the “Basque Country 2010” territorial prospect Development Scheme started by the State,\textsuperscript{12} and not the language of an ethnic minority or of an officially recognized political attitude. That is why, from a symbolic point of view, the plan for systematic teaching of euskara in state schools is considered to be an answer to the recurrent accusation of ethnicism. This accusation takes its inspiration from a vulgarized history of Basque

\textsuperscript{11} Abertzaleen Batasuna [Union of patriots] is the most important left-wing abertzale party by the number of activists and of elected representatives in the French Basque Country. It regularly gets between 10 and 15\% of the polls. It demands the recognition of the whole of the Basque Country within Europe based on a federation of peoples and not of nation-states. More specifically, it works towards getting a first institutional recognition of Iparralde by demanding, in particular, the creation of a Basque Country département.

\textsuperscript{12} As from July 1992, an official invitation from Bayonne’s sous-préfet was addressed to political elected representatives, to representatives from educational, cultural, social and economic circles, as well as from different public services, to undertake a prospective and participative thinking process about the French Basque Country’s future towards 2010. A vast enterprise of territorial prospecting and of canvassing civil society was then launched. Two committees were created : the Conseil des Elus du Pays Basque and the Conseil de Développement du Pays Basque (Ahedo, 2003 ; Chaussier, 1996 ; Jacob, 1994 ; Ségas, 2004).
ethnogenesis where the amalgam between Basque identity and essentialism dominates; a mixture which stems from the myth of Basque singularity.

The systemized teaching of Basque, i.e. an idea of the Basque language as a potential common and public idiom, allows it to become somehow disethnicized. According to Basque-related circles, normalized teaching would automatically depoliticize the Basque language because the fact of learning it would no longer depend on parental choice but on the language’s public status and therefore only on living and going to school in the Basque Country. This model is seen as the means of going beyond the idea whereby, to learn Basque, be it from a very early age or as an adult, you must come from Basque-speaking circles, have Basque origins and/or come from an abertzale family. Therefore the officialisation idea is in no way linked to the idea of minority, neither from a legal point of view, nor from a representation point of view.

This sort of reasoning is relatively recent among the abertzale world. Indeed, the claim to a right to equality is not at all the same as the classic claim to a right to difference. The right to difference discourse enters into the game of the system it challenges: by implicitly accepting the legitimacy of a norm – that is by agreeing to the regionalized and ethnicised version of the Basque fact –, it gives itself a narrow communitarian dimension. In some way, claiming the right to difference amounts to reading the world through the viewpoint of the birth of the French State: a hierarchy was established between mobile citizens’ national temporal culture and tightly closed ethnic atemporal regional culture. To make the notion of “difference” a right amounts to agreeing to the opposition between the so-called “political” sphere and the so-called “ethnic” sphere, as well to all its derivatives – nation/region, society with State/society without State, society with writing/society without writing, society with history/society without history, civilized/barbarian, public sphere/private sphere...In the Basque case, the pervasiveness of these antagonisms – making a world view – is all the stronger because its central justification is a common belief in the a-temporality of the Basque world, a belief in the existence of the Basque ethnic

---

13 Here I understand the concept of myth to be the meaning given by Roland Barthes, namely that myth is “a system of communication, it’s a message” (Barthes, 1957). Also, by the myth of Basque singularity, I mean the historically built narrative according to which the Basque world is an enclosed world or, in other words, an ethnic group.

14 A survey by the Institut Culturel Basque, carried out between 2004–2005 over the whole of the Basque country and entitled Pratiques culturelles et identités collectives en Pays Basque, showed that amongst the Iparralde population this representation of basque identity was the most widespread: <http://www.eke.org/fr/eke/gure_ekintzak/batek_mila/batek_mila_ekintzak/inkesta>. 
group, an anthropological category born in the XIXth century. So the claim to a right to difference is necessarily stamped with classical representations which a “regional culture” should fit into. On the contrary, in the case of the claim to a right to equality, the norm, in this case the institutional status quo, is challenged. The implementation of the right to equality would imply a fair treatment of both the Basque Country’s historical languages that is to say a co-official status of French and Basque in the public domain.

Conclusion

Basque-related movements are trying to apply to euskara the idea of “territorial identity”: its officialisation would imply that in the French Basque Country everyone would learn and be able potentially to use French and Basque. By this territorial logic, nationalist formations and, more generally, the cultural movement, are trying to place themselves within a logic which is far removed from any essentialism by claiming an extra right which relates to citizenship and not to ethnicity. Semantically, this position is based on the fact that euskara is an objective datum giving rise to subjectivity, it comes outside the idea of atemporality even if it is the origin of its development conditions. In fact, on the one hand it allows contemporary basque militantism to remain part of local cosmologic tradition and on the other hand to create a parallel structure towards the dynamics of freeing basque culture from the water-tight myth of basque ethnicicity. Basque criticism of culturalo-linguistic uniformisation movement born from the globalization phenomenon therefore involves an attempt to rehabilitate the ancestral link between language and group membership. To answer sociolinguistic issues about increased individual and collective spatial mobility, the militant basque experience appeals today to the modernity of traditional data. By claiming that euskara should enter the public domain, basque militantism is putting forward an update of the symbolic character of language as much as making local culture open to all.

So the opponents to officialisation of the Basque language are, paradoxically, those who place themselves (all the while challenging it) within an ethnic and essentialist logic: by claiming that the only people to learn Basque will be those who wish to, they are thus marking out the community of Basques, the community of Basque speakers within the Basque Country itself. To make the basque language a public implement and a shared value within a territory makes no sense for these associations to the extent that they consider basque culture to be intrinsically “regional” and the basque group to be, by nature, narrowly communitarian, “ethnic,” and therefore tightly closed.
Bibliography


Interview in January 2000 with a member of the association CAP Vivre-Ensemble, Bayonne-Baiona.

Interview in July 2004 with Christian Aguerre, formerly editor of the weekly La Semaine du Pays Basque, Bidart-Bidarte.

Interview in October 2004 with Richard Irazusta, member of Abertzaleen Batasuna, Hendaye-Hendaia.


PART 5

Art as Resistance

:::
Visualizing Development with Identity  
Relational Aesthetics of Indigenous Collaborative Community Art Projects

Pauline Oosterhoff, Arno Peeters and Iris Honderdos

Introduction

Balancing indigenous and minority people’s economic development with the preservation of their cultural heritage is a critical issue in contemporary discussions among both ethnographic museums and development experts. The right to development for indigenous peoples, along with the preservation of their identity, has been widely recognized by various international treaties and laws.¹ Many indigenous peoples have asserted at many international forums where this right to identity was discussed that the dominant development paradigm and globalization are causing the destruction of their indigenous economic, social and cultural systems. These claims are also validated by policy-oriented research on indigenous peoples and development.² Representatives of minorities and indigenous peoples demand the right to choose their own development path – development with culture and identity – in a number of international organizations, such as the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. However, there is a diversity of identities within indigenous and minority communities, such as those based on gender and age.³ Recognizing such

---


differences is important, and can contribute to a more complete and accurate picture of rich indigenous cultures, but it can also be seen as divisive and threatening to already marginalized populations. The ethical perils and moral burdens that face outsiders who try to represent diversity and change within marginalized indigenous cultures through art have been extensively debated, in particular by critical visual anthropologists.\(^4\) Cultural anthropology as a discipline assumed that an “outsider” could objectively describe and explain a culture from the insider’s point of view. Ethnographic film was a way to ‘record’ and explain the native’s perspective. Anthropology should enable Westerners “to see the world through the eyes of the native” (Malinowski 1922).

But this ability to represent others has been seriously questioned by a range of actors including indigenous filmmakers who want to take charge of this representation process. A common problematic representation of indigenous cultures by outsiders in film and photography is a victimizing, tragic portrayal of “disappearing” cultures facing extinction via contact with the “western” or “developed” world. Another is the romantic portrayal of “stone-age cultures” that have been untouched by development. Such problematic iconizations of the heroic indigene have been with us ever since George Catlin’s 19th-century paintings of noble Native Americans and the partially staged dramatic sequences of Inuit life in Robert Flaherty’s *Nanook of the North*. Both the romantic and the tragic portrayals of indigenous peoples are variations of essentialist “othering” by outsiders that fail to recognize indigenous cultures’ internal diversity, their long history of participation in the global market economy, and the aspirations and abilities of indigenous individuals to improve their own lives. One approach to address the problems associated with outsiders representing indigenous cultures has been to work on art projects in a more participatory fashion with indigenous communities. Representatives of indigenous communities, it is hoped, can provide a more complicated and realistic insider’s portrayal of their community. This view of authorship, where only insiders can describe a culture accurately, is also essentialist and raises some old and thorny questions about the abilities, rights and responsibilities of artists to create works above and beyond their personal identities and lives.

This article deals with two participatory community art projects exploring aspirations and fears regarding identity and development with representatives of indigenous Benet peoples in Uganda and Khasi peoples in India. The projects were implemented in collaboration with Dutch artists as well as development and museum experts from the Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam, in

2012. The development experts worked for over a decade on indigenous well-being and are part of a global network of development practitioners, activists and indigenous representatives. Through these contacts a number of indigenous groups in Asia and Africa were identified that experienced clear tensions between cultural heritage preservation and development. One key consideration was the availability of a variety of local leaders and organizations, especially indigenous ones, who understood and supported a collaborative artwork on indigenous identity, aspirations and fears. Another was community access to basic necessities such as drinking water, physical safety, and electricity for computers. The first selection of five groups was made through desk research and interviews, followed by field visits by experts to discuss the project in person and show examples of other joint projects and installations. Some potential communities visited, such as the Maasai in Kenya, expressed great interest, but lacked sufficient food and water even for their own needs. Hosting artists to live with a family on a compound and having to share their scarce resources would have been a serious burden. Trucking resources such as water, food and electricity in, could also create tensions and we decided against it for ethical reasons.

### Indigenous Peoples, Cultural Heritage and Development

Indigenous peoples are a heterogeneous but significant group that number 370 million and live mostly in Asia, Africa and Latin America. They make up an estimated third of the world’s poorest “bottom billion,” with poorer health outcomes than the majority populations or as Stephens et al. (2005) have put it indigenous peoples are “behind everyone, everywhere.” They are key stakeholders in international development cooperation and debates. However, in practice indigenous voices and issues are often still invisible. In some cases the very use of the term “indigenous” is avoided, which makes it hard to know who are indigenous groups or how many members they have. India does recognize indigenous rights but the government frequently refers to indigenous people

---

under the terms “scheduled tribes” or “Adivasi.” These local terms do not have the same international legal status and recognition, and unless one already knows the local terms it would be hard to research indigenous peoples even in English language texts.

In other countries such as Indonesia or Botswana, the word “indigenous” is no longer employed at all, or only for very small groups, because the term has legal connotations with regards to land rights. In Indonesia many terms have been used to describe their communities since independence, including native people, adat communities or adat law communities, and isolated people. These communities are often displaced from their land for the implementation of development projects in sectors such as forestry, mining, and agriculture, such as palm oil plantations on Kalimantan, the home of many peoples who were previously considered indigenous. (Myrna Safitri and Rafael Edy Bosko 2002) In Botswana the San, who are recognized by the UN and African organizations as indigenous peoples are not recognized as such by the government. In 1966, the government has adopted a ‘non-racial’ policy at independence and holds that all citizens of the country are indigenous. Claims of the San to their native lands are dismissed.

Indigenous land rights, both individual and collective, are violated in many countries. Such land rights are recognized by numerous international statutes, including the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention of 1989 (“ILO 169”), the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the American Convention on Human Rights. Indigenous peoples can claim land rights from national governments using these laws, including land that has valuable mineral resources.

For ethnographic museums, the mission to preserve and support the cultural heritage sector has all too often led to essentialist misrepresentations of indigenous cultures as “traditional” or “endangered” by development or resistant to change. The critical study of the social role and impact of museums that developed in recent decades has suggested that engagement with the concepts of social inclusion and exclusion will require museums – and the profession and sector as a whole- to radically rethink their purposes and goals and to renegotiate their relationship to, and role within, society (Sandell 2003: 45). Nowadays, there is consciousness that museums have been linked to nationalist, modern and majority-culture discourses, neglecting diversity and excluding indigenous peoples and other minorities in shaping the social agency of the museum. Sandell (2002) argues that museums as social institutions have the ability to promote collective action and potentially empower individuals and communities towards social inclusion. There is also more awareness that
the distinctions between traditional and modern are not clear-cut; individuals can be both traditional and modern. In addition there is wider recognition of the importance of individual agency in shaping and responding to wider changes.

Appadurai (2004) argued that cultural preferences for global cultural products may not just be a sign of the loss of ‘traditional’ culture but rather reflect the capacity of individuals to aspire to a different and better life. Aspirations are a hybrid mix of choices expressing multidimensional, many-faceted and socially embedded capacities and hopes to improve life. Aspirations can be complementary or may substitute each other. For example, young Hmong, an ethnic minority group in South-East Asia, use their mobile phones to listen to radio programs made in the United States or Australia by overseas Hmong broadcasting in the Hmong language. They embrace both traditional and modern cultural customs and consider themselves as new transnational citizens. Rather than lamenting the loss of traditions, there is a need to examine more complex ways to represent cultural heritages that are both more accurate, and recognize indigenous cultural and development aspirations in a global world.

In order to understand what these aspirations might be it is necessary to listen to and involve indigenous peoples. A more inclusive engagement and representation of marginalized groups and their aspirations in both development and cultural settings require some form of enhanced participation. Indigenous critical collaborative and participatory productions are not new, as evidenced by audiovisual productions such as “Through Navajo eyes” (1962) and the Brazilian “Videos in the Villages” of Vincent Carelli (1993). However, the need for participation is today more widely recognized and supported by development and cultural practitioners, national governments and donors.

**Participatory and Community-Based Art Projects**

In the last decade there has been a surge of participatory and community-based art projects all over the world, including in the Netherlands, where they continue to grow in spite of budget cuts for the arts. Under the flag of community art, a broad range of project sail that differ greatly in form, content and aim. But they have one thing in common: they create a bridge between art and society (Twalfhoven 2010: 4).

Many well-known organizations such as PhotoVoice explicitly aim to empower invisible or marginalized communities and use (digital) photography as a tool to make their views and concerns visible to (remote) policy makers or donors. PhotoVoice aims to build skills in disadvantaged and
marginalized communities so that they can represent themselves and achieve positive social change through the use of participatory photography and storytelling methods. Such positive social change can include recognition of their individual talents as storytellers or attention for their issue by authorities that have ignored them.

How should these community art initiatives be judged? Should they be judged as artworks, as contemporary history writing, as popular heritage preservation or as civil society engagement? Nicolas Bourriaud, a French art critic who explores the rise of interactive art, argues that the public wants to get closer to the artists’ thoughts and work. The process of emotional, intellectual and physical interacting of the public with artwork and with the artists is a process of “relational aesthetics.” (Bourriaud 2002) Relational aesthetics include the desire of the public to have interpersonal connections and relations with the art, not just an aesthetic appreciation. And it is in their ability to engage people with both the artwork and the artist in new ways that their public, civil value should be sought.

Community artworks invite citizens to be involved in the artwork, providing new opportunities and modes of engagement for artists. In addition, they appeal to politicians at a time when the state’s role in the social sector and the arts is receding, and they cater to the more interactive demands of today’s consumer-oriented citizen. Yet two important questions in these interactions are the following: who is the community and who participates? Mansuri and Rao argue that the term “community” in the literature on development is frequently used without much qualification “to denote a culturally and politically homogeneous social system, or one that is, at least implicitly, an internally cohesive and more or less harmonious entity” (Mansuri and Rao 2003:10). In reality the definitions of a community geographically, culturally or conceptually can be complicated. How do (semi) nomads or rural (seasonal) migrant workers for example, fit into an administrative community? If one “targets” nomads through allocating resources in an administrative zone based on their presence when the administrator is there they might literally not be there when the resources arrive. Targeting semi-nomadic peoples as a cultural entity could potentially avoid that issue but may obscure local structures of power. Power relations matter at the level of the community, between the state, artists and communities. Some groups or individuals have a bigger voice than others. When power inequities within and between communities are not recognized, the participative process can be hijacked by local elites. When one works with indigenous peoples on community art it is therefore important to avoid romantic harmonious views and critically reflect on what community and representation mean in that specific cultural context and society.
The Project: Visualizing Development with Identity

The authors of this article have been involved in international development and community art projects for two decades, including several projects with minority ethnic and indigenous groups. In this article we reflect on two recent joint projects with indigenous Benet peoples in Uganda and Khasi peoples in India in 2012.

These projects were undertaken as part of a collaborative initiative, “Visualizing Development with Identity,” between an ethnographic museum, a library, and development experts at the Royal Tropical Museum. The lead author was the project leader and the two artists worked with communities on the production of installations, soundscapes and film productions that examined and countered stereotypes of indigenous people. This team hoped to enable indigenous people to create installations and soundscapes that visualize and articulate their diverse views and aspirations on culture, development and identity, as well as to establish collaboration with local universities, indigenous artists, museums and galleries. As clearly visible outsiders to these indigenous cultures, we were faced with many moral and practical dilemmas with regards to authorship, ownership and participation in the process of developing these projects. Both communities are globally recognized as indigenous communities with strong links with their ancestral lands and the forests. We will use these cases to explore whether and how collaborative production of art installations with representatives of indigenous groups can provide alternatives to “traditional” cultural stereotypes of indigenous peoples and their relationship to national development initiatives. We will also discuss what participation, community and empowerment could mean, and hope to make some contributions on the question of how to assess the impact and effectiveness of such projects.

The Red, Gold and Green of the Khasi, Meghalaya, India

The Khasi are an indigenous matrilocal and matrilineal group of around 1.2 million people, mostly living in eastern Meghalaya, a state in northeast India. India has an indigenous population of 98 million, almost a quarter of the world’s indigenous population, most of it residing in the northeastern part of the country.

---

6 These are official estimates from the Census of India. Actual numbers are not known.
The Khasi make up the majority of the state’s population. They hold important government posts, UNESCO has recognized their language, and there are Khasi newspapers, as well as a rich Khasi-language literature on different aspects of their culture and on the environment. The Khasi, both men and women, are doing well in many regards compared to other indigenous groups. However, compared to mainland India, their health and economic status is poor. The area is one of the most ecologically diverse forested areas in the world (Chatterjee et al. 2006). There are over 50 sacred forests, which are at the heart of Khasi culture. The close relationship of the Khasi with the forest has resulted in unique cultural skills, such as the construction of bridges woven from living tree roots. The forests are rapidly being destroyed by mining and other development activities.

In preparing for the art project, in both the Netherlands and India, we implemented a participatory action approach and methods that closely resemble the participatory rapid appraisals (PRA) used in development projects, such as mapping and ranking in focus group discussions. We conducted a literature review, and discussed with Tropical Museum staff the feasibility and methodology of exhibition-making for museums in indigenous societies with few material artifacts. Prior to the arrival of the artists in the indigenous communities, the project leader visited the project host, a university in the Meghalayan town of Shillong, to discuss the plan. She also conducted participatory observations in villages and in the city, and met with various stakeholders, such as healers and journalists. The artists continued this research and conducted several weeks of participatory observation in urban centers and villages. They gave in-depth presentations of earlier work to media representatives, traditional healers and students; they interviewed leaders and gave hands-on trainings to local artists. These methods provided insight on the key themes related to identity and development according to these Khasi representatives, and on the availability of cultural artifacts to visualize these themes.

It soon became rather clear that there are significant differences of opinion among the Khasi about what development with identity means. Young urban people, for example, connect and identify themselves with both Khasi culture and global rap culture; they did not report contradictions between being a Khasi, using mobile phones, and listening to rap or pop music over the Internet. Other, older stakeholders, however, viewed global culture as a threat to Khasi culture and identity.

---

As a result of these very different views on what Khasi identity means, four distinct yet interrelated projects emerged: a short video documentary on Khasi herbal healers, a rap production on alcohol abuse with three young Khasi artists, a three-dimensional installation with a soundscape, and a festival to launch the installation with poetry and Khasi musicians working in different musical traditions. This allowed different voices to express their views on development with identity. For this article we will focus on the installation, as this was the focus of the project in both Uganda and India.

The installation consists of four ‘rings’ in which each of the seven elements (referring to the *Ki Hymniew trep*, the seven Khasi tribes) represent a particular aspect of Khasi social relations. The lowest circle of large baskets represents the “gold” of the Khasi, the natural resources: rice, bamboo, limestone, *shriew* (a local root vegetable), coal, betel nuts and medicinal herbs. This installation and the soundscape thematically interweave the ways that global and local indigenous cultural elements simultaneously support and undermine contemporary Khasi culture.

The second upper circle of cone-shaped baskets represents key aspects of the Khasi spiritual cultural heritage: language, matrilinearity, music, sacred forests, ethics, beliefs and rituals and herbal healers.

The outer circle consists of local rain shields (*knup*).
FIGURE 2  Close-up of the installation “The Red, Gold and Green of the Khasis”

FIGURE 3  Khasi farmer women with traditional umbrellas
At the bottom, a circle of serpents depicts the dangers that threaten Khasi culture and identity: alcoholism, the influx of foreigners, corruption, pop culture and TV, urbanization, religion and pollution.

The soundscape consists of voices (sound) summarizing the visual information coming from 14 loudspeakers that are mounted inside the baskets and the
rain shields, creating a spatial dialogue between them. Also, sounds from the sacred forests and Khasi ritual drumbeats can be heard.

In the center of the installation a rope ladder goes upwards. This refers to the Khasi legend of Jingkieng Ksiar, a golden rope ladder on U Sohpetbneng (the mount of the heavenly umbilical cord), from which the tribes would descend from heaven. They would labor all day and cultivate and reap profits from the land. Then each evening they would return by the same route. This golden ladder was severed when sin crept into the world. As a consequence of the severance, nine families remained in their celestial abode and seven settled on earth and multiplied. The ladder also resembles the double helix of DNA, linking biological and spiritual identity markers.

The installation and its presentation were attended by hundreds of people from different backgrounds, mostly from Shillong and the surrounding area.

---

It received positive press reviews on the front pages of seven state newspapers and on social media from indigenous journalists and leaders. The installation is now permanently hosted by the Don Bosco Ethnographic Museum, the largest ethnographic museum in northeast India. The museum provides information on all the tribes in India’s northeast through the display of sculptures, artifacts, films, and computer-based interactive narratives.

_**Rooted, an Installation with the Benet People in Kapchorwa,**_  
_Uganda_

The Benet are a small, little-known indigenous group in Uganda living on the margins of society on the slopes of Mount Elgon, near the Kenyan border. It is estimated that the Benet number about 20,000 people. They are culturally related to but distinct from the Sabiny. The Benet were initially pastoralists who also hunted and gathered. They may have resided in the forests of Mount Elgon for over 200 years, escaping cattle rustlers from the plains. The Benet sometimes refer to themselves as Mosopbishek: people who live on the mountain.

In 1993 the Ugandan government declared Mount Elgon a national park, dispossessing the Benet of their land. The creation of the park was accompanied by physical violence against the Benet, as well as continuous marginalization by the state bureaucracy. The Benet were excluded from development in and around the area (infrastructure and healthcare), yet they still had to pay taxes. In 2005 they successfully instituted legal action against the government of Uganda, alleging that they are the historically indigenous inhabitants of the land around Mount Elgon, which entitles them to stay. In spite of pressure from local and international NGOs and lobby groups, and several in-depth studies of the land issue, the situation of many Benet remains uncertain.

The infrastructure in the small communities where the artists worked with the Benet people is very poor, with muddy roads, little to no access to electricity. And even in Kapchorwa, the local capital where the artists stayed and worked mostly, resources are tight. This poses challenges for the use of equipment for research, documenting, sketching, editing or composing. Illiteracy rates are high, and many Benet are very poor. However, the Benet

---

10 Sebei is the official name, but they are mainly known as Sabiny.
people encountered during this visit made a clear and articulate analysis of the installations that the artists had put together with other communities in other countries, such as with HIV-positive women in Vietnam, and how they could apply these collaborative art techniques.

The artists conducted additional participatory observations in villages around Mount Elgon and met with Benet leaders as well as politicians. From these interactions it became clear that the sense of identity among older Benet is shaped to an important extent by their displacement from their ancestral land. Outsiders like NGOs and researchers may have reinforced this focus on displacement in their interactions with the Benet. When projects and research explore a certain topic, such as land rights, other issues such as musical culture, oral history skills and the views of the younger generation receive less attention. Nowadays, they employ few artifacts that might represent a traditional material culture, and little performative culture (songs or dances) is presently performed or shared with the younger generation. This does not mean that Benet have “lost” their culture, but there is a change in the production of material cultural artefacts.

In this installation, The Benet’s different views of their identity were integrated in one installation with four distinct elements: inscribed sculptures of trees and baskets, uprooted seedlings, children’s drawings and an accompanying soundscape.

The sculptures of trees and baskets visualize several key themes of ancestral heritage that lie at the heart of Benet identity.

![Image: "Rooted" installation overview; inscribed sculptures of trees and baskets]
The sculptures obviously refer to the forest, but the “trees” are grouped four by four: a spiritual numerical value within Benet society. For example, during the circumcision ritual, a boy must run around his hut four times before the operation can take place. The tree poles, normally used to build huts, crop-containers and fences, have the names of deceased Benet written on them. The names have been chosen by Benet elders and spokesmen, and are written in their original Kupsapiny clan-form, which makes them directly identifiable to local Benet.

The baskets refer to the ancient trade relations between the Benet women and outsiders, exchanging baskets for money or food. A basket could be exchanged for the amount of maize, wheat or rice it could hold. Traditional Benet basket weavers wove specific baskets for this installation. These baskets are also arranged in four separate groups: healers (green “dipped” baskets), elders (white), judges (black) and victims of the evictions (red).

The second element of the installation consists of tree-seedlings. These have both a negative and positive symbolic connotation. Planting trees is intended to “contribute” to the National Park. By contrast, clearing trees from one’s land to make way for individual cultivation has become a way of resisting the park and marking the land as an individual’s property. Yet planting trees is also a necessity for soil conservation (to avoid landslides). Planting trees means investing in the future, and hence implies trust that the planter can keep their land in the future. The roots cannot reach the soil. They symbolize longing and doubt as to whether to hold on to the past or invest in the future. The third element examines the linkages between the past, the present, and the current situation through children’s eyes.

These children’s drawings on plywood parts (25x25cm and 30x15cm) portray the small plots of land dotted on the slopes of Mt. Elgon and the futures the Benet children living here have envisioned. There are drawings of the animals they have, what they want to be in the future, what they would buy if they had 10,000 Ugandan shillings, and what they would grow on their lands. The line behind the seedlings represents the situation as it once was: enough land was there to herd the cattle, which is why this line of drawings is neatly spaced. The line in front of the seedlings, however, depicts the lack of land: everything is piled up. The three elements together represent the widely shared idea that intensified agriculture and more land are needed to supply the growing population, in addition to education, which can help the children to secure different

---

11 This reasoning has been examined in detail by David Himmelfarb in his PhD thesis *In the Aftermath of Displacement: A Political Ecology of Dispossession, Transformation, and Conflict on Mt. Elgon, Uganda.* (University of Georgia, Athens, GA).
UWA rangers killed Chelangat Saima and his brother, when they were grazing their cattle inside the park boundaries.
professions as adults. A soundscape composition that accompanies the installation consists of environmental sounds that were recorded inside Mt. Elgon Forest (cicadas and crickets, birds, streams and bees), interwoven with the voices of elders and women speaking about life in the past, and of children voicing their future plans and dreams. Traditional forest instruments and songs accompany these recordings.
The presentation of the installation in Kapchorwa was a success, with most attendants being Benet, some of whom had never travelled outside their parish before. Dozens of dignitaries also attended: politicians, community leaders, and representatives of civil society. The installation provided a unique opportunity for the Benet to represent themselves and become visible to local leaders. Reviews in the written press, TV and online were positive, describing the exhibit as a new way of addressing social issues through art. The installation subsequently travelled to Makerere University in the capital of Kampala, accompanied by Benet participants who explained the project to students, staff, visitors and press. It will ultimately be hosted in the Benet Cultural Center, currently under construction in Mengya. For the Benet the production of the installations and their launches provided a way to engage with local politicians and citizens, and to present their history, their culture, and their aspirations in a positive and aesthetic fashion.

Reflections on Participation, Power and Relational Aesthetics in Indigenous Community Art Projects

These two collaborative art installations, in which a display of daily artifacts narrates a multi-faceted story provided by indigenous local community representatives, differed sharply from previously existing portraits and narratives of the communities they represented. Both installations interweave disparate community voices and concerns regarding identity and development into a coherent whole, and discuss this narrative with both insiders and outsiders. But their complexity, a result of local participation, also renders them very difficult for outsiders to understand without local interpretation. When artworks are made for and by a local population, their significance may be hard to grasp for outsiders, for whom the choice of four rather than seven or a hundred trees for the sculptures of trees and baskets seems rather arbitrary.

The installations do not claim to speak for all Benet or Khasi. Those who participated and were able to voice their views were mostly formally educated or occupied important positions in local society – healers or traditional leaders, local businessmen and teachers – speaking on behalf of the uneducated. Although the Benet and Khasi are different in many ways, both installations visualize complex aspirations and fears in relation to the preservation of cultural identity and heritage, and in both, the disappearance of forests and ancestral lands in a globalizing economy plays a key role. In both installations, the views expressed on how to integrate development with identity are hybrid and contradictory. They reflect a desire to be grounded rather than uprooted,
and to be connected to a larger global whole. Children want to master the English language, to complete formal education, to become teachers or policemen, to promote justice and improve the current situation. In Red, Gold and Green, coal is both a natural resource and a cause of pollution and the destruction of sacred forests. Also, it drives an illegal influx of low-wage labor, with all its associated problems.

In Rooted children express their desire to settle and study, yet permanent settlement is also problematic for pastoralists. The trees themselves have become markers of globalization for the Benet; natural reserves create new categories of insiders and outsiders with respect to natural resources. The meaning of planting a tree varies according to its location. It is different in a local space (such as a garden) than in a national or global space (such as an internationally funded nature reserve).

What can we say about the contribution such initiatives make towards indigenous people’s efforts to integrate globalization and development with identity? First, the projects helped the Khasi and the Benet to give concrete form to economic and cultural desires and anxieties that had often remained vague or unvoiced. The participatory work method motivated large audiences of young and old indigenous people, in communities that do not normally visit art galleries or ethnographic museums, to attend the presentations. The projects were a channel for indigenous people to become objects of knowledge for themselves, and to become the producers of that knowledge. While the artists were outsiders and the initial work was financed internationally, the costs were low: the total budget for two installations (including its presentations), a music video and two short documentaries was 68,000 euros. Just as important, both installations are now hosted by local institutes and maintained with local funding, suggesting that the ongoing impact if not the initial jump-start is sustainable.

The production of the installations employed indigenous artisans and artists, and in both contexts there was a wide diversity of stakeholders who provided input to the artworks. Some local artists received training in installation-making. Such participation does not necessarily imply any significant boost to economic development or political empowerment. However, the projects mobilized and organized indigenous people, cemented established relationships and developed new ones between artists, participants and audiences.

The value of these art projects might therefore best be seen in terms of relational aesthetics: the capacity to involve citizens in studying and representing themselves, to reflect on the right to development with identity in a globalizing economy, and to provide new opportunities and modes of engagement for
local and international artists to work with indigenous people and help them visualize their aspirations and concerns.

Acknowledgements

This Interdepartmental Collaboration project at the Royal Tropical Institute (KIT) has been funded by DGIS. The authors are particularly thankful for the support and input of KIT staff, notably Anke van der Kwaak, Itie van Hout, Richard van Alphen, Tilly Minnée, Wayne Modest and Ilse Eggers. In India, special thanks are due to Glenn Christo (MLCU), Sandra Albert (London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine), Alka Kharsati (traditional healer), Patricia Mukhim (Shillong Times) and SPIKAP.

In Uganda we would like to thank Moses Mwanga, Moses Kiptala, Elizabeth Kwagala (MU) David Himmelfarb (University of Georgia) and Aggrey Kibet (ActionAid Uganda).

We would like to thank Matt Steinglass for editorial input and advice.

Bibliography


Safitri, Myrna A. and Rafael Eby Bosko *Indigenous peoples/ethnic minorities and poverty reduction Indonesia* Environment and Social Safeguard Division, Regional and Sustainable Development; Asian Development Bank, Manila, Philippines, 2002.

**NFHS-3. International Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS) and Macro International.**


Communication for Social Change in Indigenous Communities; Limitations of Community Radios and Other Proposals

Igloolik Isuma Productions

Bianca Rutherford Iglesias and Concepción Travesedo de Castilla

The radio is the most used means of communication in social change projects in indigenous communities. However, it is not free from problems regarding invisibility, isolation and inbred knowledge. Communities who depend exclusively on this media seldom broadcast their messages outside their environment. They are doomed to a paradoxical isolation within a new international society where most local needs have global causes and solutions. Moreover, its inbred nature makes it difficult for the construction of knowledge networks, which can enrich a culture with foreign elements. That is the reason why it is timely to study the possibilities offered by new technologies to adopt strategies in the field of communication for social change. In this paper we are analyzing the sample from the Inuit film company Igloolik Isuma Productions. It is our intention to describe the strategy used by this private, independent company to become an economic, social and political force of change within its indigenous community since 1990. This objective has been partially achieved thanks to Isuma TV online, which links and offers services and contents to indigenous producers all over the world. To sum up, Igloolik Isuma is a great example of success for experts in communication for social change who are reticent to accept the tremendous possibilities offered by new technologies and hybrid projects based on Internet usage.

The Starting Point: the Self-Management of Social Media

The relationship between communication and human development has been discussed by Everett Rogers,1 Wilbur Schramm2 and Daniel

---


© IGLESIAS AND DE CASTILLA, 2015 | DOI 10.1163/9789004282087_016
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the prevailing CC-BY-NC License at the time of publication.
Lerner, the promoters of the first academic studies on this topic. Thereafter it is assumed that social media play a major role in spreading new possibilities and practices within the processes of cultural innovation and development, to encourage greater participation of citizens in society, and to help them acquire the skills that progress demands. The current perspective of development communication goes further by rejecting the one-way vertical communication broadcasting models and assuming that the development is accelerated by active participation of each individual in the communication process itself. People should be informed in order to solve their problems, and that information is provided by the media. Furthermore, if the media are accessible, the community can make its information needs known and discuss their actual living conditions.

In this regard, the most developed form of participation should be the self-management principle which implies the right to participate in the planning and production of media content. The essential elements of a participatory communication project should be the following: ownership of the project by the community to achieve self-management, a minimum of experience and knowledge of the field, and the creation of horizontal communication networks capable of channeling the messages to outsiders and reach an audience to share knowledge and experiences.

According to Gumucio-Dagron, “the most successful strategies of development communication are those that fortify their own traditional means of communication, amplifying the local speeches and anchoring them in culture.” The majority of theorists adhere to this premise. Moreover, they argue that mass media and traditional ways of transmitting oral communication should include mechanisms of horizontal, dialogical and participatory communication. These communication paths should be combined in different ethnic environments. Besides, Jaen Servaes is in favor of the integration of diverse media “The modern mass media and the parallel networks of folklore or interpersonal media are not defined as mutually excluding. In certain contexts, both can achieve longer-range success if used in an integrated manner considering the needs and peculiarities of the local context.”

---

3 Wilbur Schramm and Daniel Lerner, *Communication and change: The last ten years and the next.* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1976).
5 Alfonso Gumucio-Dagron, “¿Prometeo viajando en Cadillac?: los telecentros como el prometido fuego del conocimiento,” in *Signo y Pensamiento* 44 (2004b), 84–91.
However, it has to be emphasized that the commitment to outlining a dialogue between new media and traditional channels of oral transmission, which is particularly relevant to the development of certain minority ethnic groups, makes sense only if accompanied by horizontal and participatory management. It is only in this context that we can, according to UNESCO, accomplish “the most advanced and comprehensive form of participation”: self-management. In this regard, the strategy should contribute to a media ownership by the community and its autonomy from external players, as well as the ability to use these tools according to their particular way of understanding life. It is basically a question of making media available to the needs of the community, responding to their demands and thus contributing to the preservation and strengthening of their cultural identities.

The aim is, thus, to address an analysis of the capacity of modern media to, as Wilbur Schramm said, supply and complement as mobility multipliers or progress stimulus the oral channels of traditional societies. The purpose is to boost the community's progress from the best possible platform, that is, a reaffirmation of indigenous identity and integration without acculturation in a diverse environment.

Audiovisual production, the Internet, and other mixed resources give an example of successful strategies for social change in the new global and digital society. Although it is true that the most relevant models have emerged in developed contexts—both economically and in the field of individual rights and freedoms protection—the possibility of exporting and adjusting them to less privileged areas can be considered. Therefore, any study of the different examples of indigenous media that can be found around the world leads us to the conclusion that each community should choose the kind of medium that best suits their needs. However, this entails being aware of every alternative and being open to the possibility of incorporating more sophisticated technologies than the radio. Communities should appropriate the media and redesign them according to their particular cultural interests. They should not assume that ICTs are only useful when utilized the same way dominant cultures have been traditionally using them.

In this paper we intend to comprehensively analyze the possibilities offered by a medium such as audiovisual production, which helps visibility and asserts

---
identities. We are also investigating the ability of the World Wide Web, that is, integration and construction of knowledge networks, to assert human development projects based on the creation of self-managed media. We are choosing the Inuit film production company Igloolik Isuma Productions to investigate the many possibilities offered by this model.

The Limitations of Community Radio: Invisibility, Isolation and Inbred Knowledge

It has been a long time since community radio started to be considered the most advantageous media to foster the progress of indigenous communities. Undoubtedly, radio is the most widely used media for this purpose, and it is considered to be of utmost importance by most researchers. The five fundamental characteristics of community radio stations are accessibility, participation, self-management, ownership and responsibility;\(^\text{10}\) in other words, its tendency to meet the needs of the community, to pursue the participation of community members in the ownership, production and transmission of message, and its conception as a nonprofit public service.

Generally speaking, these educative, popular or community media boost agricultural development, political participation, access to healthcare information, social transformation, identification of common interests, cultural protection, etc. According to Gumucio-Dagron, “radio has been the most appealing instrument for communication and participatory development for more than fifty years. It is certainly the most widespread communication tool in the world and the ideal means to accomplish social change.”\(^\text{11}\) Its simplicity and low cost, as well as the ability to reach the most isolated and excluded communities, overcoming geographical distance and illiteracy, turn radio into the pioneer and model media in the field of participatory communication.

Despite the success achieved with community radio, some possible collateral effects should be identified in the spheres of invisibility, isolation, and inbred knowledge. Communities who found their development strategies in the use of community radio stations have little capacity to channel their

---

\(^{10}\) Louie Tabing, *How to do community radio. A primer for community radio operators* (Nueva Delhi: UNESCO, 2004), 11–12.

messages abroad; they do not opt for visibility, and when they do, they do not focus on integrating in diverse environments. In many occasions they preserve an isolation that seems paradoxical in the new global society, where all local needs have, at least partially, a global root and solution. Finally, its inbreeding nature makes it difficult to build networks of knowledge that could enrich typical cultures and traditions with elements of knowledge and cooperation from abroad.

Community radios are helping to preserve languages and traditions in small settlements, but they do not spread their cultural wealth beyond the own ethnic group boundaries. In the new global society, where social interaction can either develop into conflict or cooperation, integration within diversity seems to be an unavoidable challenge. Therefore, one of the highest restrainer features of community radio can be situated in the area of visibility. The pro indigenous spirit that commonly assembles these community media preserves in many cases the invisibility of the group. The strictly native communal media, those who place ownership and management exclusively in the hands of the community, are frequently week potency radios unable to surpass the confines of the regional area in which they operate.  

As Carlos del Valle says, many researches have been conducted on indigenous communities and media, but they have been mostly focused on the representations of ethnic groups in media discourse, being the purpose of analysis centered on the media rather than on the ethnic groups. That is to say, the discourse on minorities is only an excuse to study media behavior.

But, who are we talking about in this comprehensive exercise? We think we understand other communities in these analysis, but what we really do is a self-reference, and in this continuous self-reference we cause two effects: (a) an inevitable distortion of the other- although we understand that it is not possible to avoid this deformation, and (b) a discourse centered in a self-reference (...), in which symbolic elements are selected by observers, in an exercise of invention of what is observed.  

At this point, the crucial task for indigenous and minority communities is to take up the challenge of boosting their visibility not by intermediation, but by

their own appropriation of media, especially media capable of reaching a global audience.

In addition to the limitations of community radio in the decisive sphere of visibility, the “communal” nature of these media also implies a tendency towards isolation from the environment in which, in a more or less conflicting way, they are immersed. And this is a problem in a context where the main decision-making centers go beyond boundaries and overcome national borders. This demonstrates the loss of power not only in the local environment, but also at national levels.

The complexity of international society implies that nations have increasingly constricted room to respond to the interests of citizens. National states confront problems of global size and nature that seriously destabilize their internal structures. Among these problems, poverty stands out, a way of life with common features in every local process of reproduction in all states, albeit with local variations. Consequently, socio-cultural transformations are required to accommodate translocal solutions and new development strategies, that is, different organizational structures which are able to cover the diverse transversal dimensions of poverty, ready to promote social integration, popular action and participation. All these purposes demand focusing on new instances of social action that could well be supranational organizations coordinated with social movements and NGOs, or cross-border regions organized and synchronized with national states.14

Finally, returning to the limitations of community radio, we believe that it is not worth to ignore the technological tsunami that is revolutionizing the global communications field, social participation, and certain processes of democratization in developing countries. All in all, communities cannot be condemned by technophobic prejudice to exclude a few communication flows that are developed by radically different parameters. In fact, among the most suggestive features of the most technologically advanced media we can find their capacity to promote the construction of Knowledge-Based Networking. According to Vikas Nath,

Knowledge Based Networking rests on the strong belief that communities have knowledge and expertise which needs to be synergized with the existing information [...] Just as the knowledge gap needs to be bridged between developing and industrial countries, so there are gaps within the

---

country. Knowledge Based Networking bridges the gap between the communities [...] it allows access to information worldwide, promotes networking transcending borders, languages and cultures, fosters empowerment of communities and helps spread knowledge about best practices and experiences. It implies that knowledge is acquired not just by creation but also by transfer of knowledge existing elsewhere. [...] Networking for knowledge-sharing caters to the global thirst for information, builds up awareness among the change agents or those who can exert external pressure, and encourages informed and active participation of communities and individuals. Furthermore, it creates a mechanism which enables articulation and sharing of local knowledge with potential for further enrichment of this information as it passes through the network users.\footnote{15}

At this point, it is worth recalling the Declaration of Principles of the World Summit on Information Society (\textit{wsis}) where the importance of the new context and its possible impact on solving common problems has been emphasized. The new way of how to create and share knowledge can yield benefits and positive transformations to our society.\footnote{16}

According to Stephen Browne, we are talking about a new paradigm that defines the most important means of acquiring knowledge; those that arise from a combination of local knowledge with the knowledge we acquire from elsewhere. It indicates a rejection of the traditional model that considers that the leading economic powers will always be “the opposing expert” and acceptance that the information can or cannot be \textit{useful} whether it is from the South or from the North. The concept represents the process of cultural interaction from an intercultural viewpoint that sees globalization as \textit{the compression of cultures}, far from the nuanced theories that argued that the globalization of communication and culture promotes imperialism and cultural homogenization.\footnote{17}

\begin{footnotes}
\end{footnotes}
In conclusion, if the creation training is and ought to be an indigenous phenomenon with idiosyncratic features following the endogenous process focused on local context, “the development of capacity can also be accelerated and increased in response to external stimuli.”\textsuperscript{18} ICTs should not be considered as an objective, but as a tool that can successfully participate in certain cases in communication projects for social change. As pointed out by Manuel Acevedo, the Network Society is here to stay, and it is not worth analyzing whether it is the best context to promote human development. The convenient step is to begin to study how we can maximize the best features and minimize obstacles in this new scenario.\textsuperscript{19}

Applying this new approach to the traditional metaphor for development cooperation, it has been assumed that the strategy of giving a fish to a human being to end hunger is counterproductive in the long term. Furthermore, we know there is a better possibility than teaching them how to fish; that is to learn the traditional technique as a counterpart, to check if we know how to make nodes from the most solid networks and unite knowledge. On account of the possibilities of building knowledge and ICT network, it is also possible to build an information carrier to collect data on fish prices in different markets, weather and fishing conditions, species available, tips of other fishermen, spare parts stores, etc.\textsuperscript{20} In this context, it is worth pausing to examine the possibilities of integration of other media, such as video, films and the Internet to promote social change, preserve, enrich and spread the cultural identity and contribute to the development of minority social groups.

However, in the midst of the technological and communications revolution, radio remains to be the paradigmatic example of community media in large parts of Latin American and African societies in full communicative and technological revolution. In fact, given the scant attention to initiatives that exploit the synergies between new technologies and traditional media, such as film or radio, and also meet the requirements to be considered successful participatory communication projects, we find vast literature on the community radio.


This extensive bibliography stripe is so repetitive, that it often leaves the impression of being an exhausted field of study which has not had either epistemological or real practical progress in a long time.

As long as this inexpensive technology allows an indisputable success in a context of economic marginalization and/or policy, there are other scenarios with similar or different issues in which it is possible and advisable to use different communication tools. The purpose is not only domestic integration and development of the community, but also its visibility and acceptance in an environment culturally and ethnically different. The best experience of communication for development is found in economically prosperous contexts with legislation in the field of equal opportunities and human rights so far. Although it is not an unconditional requirement, areas with better conditions are turning to more advanced technologies, as in the case of indigenous Inuit (Canada), Sami (northern Europe), Maori (New Zealand) and other American Indian communities in the United States.

These examples, highlighting the successful Inuit film producer Igloolik Isuma Productions, may serve as models for the expansion of development strategies based on the use of audiovisual production and/or the Internet to other economically disadvantaged settings. On account of previous experience, the new technologies can also get results and even response to needs that community radio cannot meet in less economically prosperous systems.

The Possibilities of Videos and Films in the Field of Communication for Social Change

Although Latin America is not the region where the most successful video-based projects of social change communication have been developed, we find some examples applied to the field of rural development as early as the 1970s. Calvelo Manuel Rios is found among the pioneers, as a FAO expert and creator of Massive Training Methodology Studies, later known as Massive Multimedia Pedagogy.21 The MMP, which challenges the theoretical model of information-transmitter-receiver model, takes as its motto the following Confucius quote, “I hear and I forget. I see and I remember. I do and I understand.”

However, the audiovisual production reached its peak as a means of social development in the ‘80s, when the documentary or ethnographic film broke the classical paradigm according to which “we” were always filming “them.”

---

From the moment that indigenous peoples managed and appropriated audiovisual production, they also became primarily responsible for creating their own image. At first some artists preferred to work with settled directors as the activist Vincent Carelli at the Indian Trabalho Center of Sao Paulo, and Sarah Elder and Leonard Kamerling at the Alaska Native Heritage Project. Others collaborated with anthropologists such as Terry Turner, who started the Kayapo Video Project. The rest was introduced to film production individually, like the video artist and activist Victor Masayesva Hopi, Jr, and producer and director Zacharias Kunuk Inuit.22

The global media has become a powerful field of audiovisual productions. Giving as an example the milestone movie *Pathfinder* (1987) directed by Nils Gaup Sami and seeing the more recent *Smoke Signals* (1998) and *Atanarjuat: The Fast Runner* (2001), it is obvious that directors and indigenous activists have appropriated the technologies used by the leading economic powers to document cultural traditions, counteract distortions of Aboriginal peoples, and build indigenous cultural future. The awards reaped by many of the productions in international film festivals and streams of sympathy for indigenous issues planted in international public opinion demonstrate the importance of production. Moreover, the relevance of documentaries implies having the ability to become known abroad. And last, but not least, the media are playing a crucial social role by providing a tool for the creation of new practices of solidarity, identity and community.

Since the birth of such productions, a broad range of researchers have analyzed how the communication technologies are being transformed and adapted to meet the needs of indigenous communities. The research was conducted following objectives such as the creation of screen memories, their importance in activism in the Amazon and Brazil and other indigenous communication initiatives in Latin America, the impact of Inuit film and ways of representation of identity in the video Amerindian. Likewise, the investigation focused on the efforts to “colonize” the screens, that is, the different national cultural policies that either promote or constrain native media production, or native esthetical representations in indigenous media.

The festival First Nation / First Features: a showcase of World Indigenous Film and Media, screening a vast repertoire of films created by indigenous directors from around the world, was held in New York in 2005. The films echoed how to resort the narrative traditions in order to create cinematographic visions that highlight the old indigenous cultural worlds, integrating

them into contemporary narrative models with the ability to access local and global audiences. It also demonstrated the way this can be achieved by covering a huge variety of styles and content, the most common remains to be family relationships, the transfer of traditional legends to the screen, the contemporary reality and the difficulties of integration into urban lifestyles in these communities, and its links to Earth.23

Essentially, all the indigenous media have a political component that, at least, calls for the preservation of their own language and culture. Similarly, these media have not escaped the thorny and controversial issues affecting their own indigenous movements. There have been attempts to cross certain boundaries and reach other aboriginal communities that have served as a platform to claim the possession of land and have demanded competence to be creators of their own image.

Beyond its artistic value, indigenous film production attracts community organization and has become a tool of social and cultural appropriation. The cheaper technology, especially in the case of video, has helped democratize audiovisual production. Therefore, the ability to create movies, series and documentaries does no longer belong exclusively to major film and television companies, but form a part of community life. The community video production can contribute to personal and collective empowerment and to the demystification of commercial media; it can reverse the roles of power and fortify collective strength.

The media can contribute to cultural resistance, as reflected by hundreds of indigenous professionals who work daily on the radio and to a smaller extent, on television. The resistance can be consolidated by the indigenous cinema and it helps cultural and linguistic normalization. Moreover, it can afford to do so with a subversive formula by resorting to fiction. The anthropological report and political pamphlet can be avoided by the narration. In fact, the most subversive of indigenous films can be apolitical in appearance. The love stories and thrillers can symbolize more effective forms of resistance than activists’ productions. Even when using a minority language in a non-political way, it is located at the same level as the dominant language. Consequently, a film which does not appear to be political turns to be even more political, precisely because it does not seem to be so. Thus, this type of films can be considered a strategy of cultural resistance among other reasons because it breaks

stereotypes, it is expressed in the minority language and uses fiction in a subversive way.\textsuperscript{24}

**The Internet as a Source of Opportunity, Stand-Alone or Integrated Hybrid Project**

The acceptance of video and films as a tool for social development projects for their “creativity and ability to adapt to the flux of social and cultural contexts”\textsuperscript{25} contrasts with the arousing suspicion of the Internet. It was defined by Gumucio-Dagron and many other authors as the main responsibility of the *electronic apartheid*: “The availability of computers and connectivity is not a cure for development and social change because the network, as configured, is not an ideal tool for the majority of the world’s population.”\textsuperscript{26} On the other hand, we agree more with the thesis defended by scholars like Manuel Acevedo and activists such as Jean-Paul Marthoz. From Ruiz’s perspective, it would be just a false myth that information technology and communication increase inequality or inequity.

While at an early stage of development the technologies tended to amplify the differences, their future depends on the prevailing economic and social models. There are examples of cases when national policies were committed to extend the benefits of ICT to the whole society (Korea, Ireland, Latvia, Jordan, and Venezuela). Despite the fact that the global digital division is extensive, it will be restricted as has happened to other ICTs (radio, TV, telephone). The following reflection by Acevedo is difficult to refute: “Do public libraries contribute to increase the inequality between the more favored literate and illiterate people? Would it be a reason to prevent its construction or close them until the universal literacy will be accomplished?”\textsuperscript{27}

Meanwhile, Marthoz emphasized that new technologies of information and communication have enhanced capabilities of civic organizations “Thanks to

\textsuperscript{24} Antoni Castells i Talens, “Cine indígena y resistencia cultural,” in *Chasqui* 84 (2003), 50–57.
\textsuperscript{27} Acevedo, “Información, conocimiento y TICS.”
modern media, especially the Internet, the global networks can create, mobilize, and act easily.”\textsuperscript{28} The motto \textit{do not hate the media, be the media} that was proclaimed by the supporters of alternative information is not only valid for industrialized countries. Even in Côte d’Ivoire there are hundreds of African Internet users who got connected immediately to the website of Human Rights Watch to get the report in which abuses of their government were exposed.

However, certain technophobia or at least skepticism is still generally perceived, regarding the ability of the Internet to become a useful and adaptable source for disadvantaged minorities. This is likely to happen because many of the leading theorists and experts on social change communication fields come from Latin America, where, in general, the communication is still committed mostly by community radio. Gumucio-Dagron in his famous 2001 work “Making Waves. Stories of Participatory Communication for Social Change” does recognize the potential benefits of hybrid projects that combine video and the Internet. The study was a result of an initiative of the Rockefeller Foundation, which promoted a series of meetings of experts in order to reflect on communication for social change at the dawn of the new millennium from April 1997 to 2001. It reflects 50 experiences defined by the communications director of the Foundation, Denise A. Gray-Felder, as “some of the most innovative experiments in participatory communication in the world.”\textsuperscript{29}

The Bolivian academic assumed that “Although the video as a tool of participatory communication for social change is only in its very beginning [said in 2001], its potential is enormous, particularly because of expected convergence with Internet programs of high visual content. This convergence of wireless technology...with the radio and television” would be “the way forward,” so that technology can form an appropriate response, while culture, identity and community participation should occupy the center of the discussion.\textsuperscript{30} Anyway, this monograph on the developments in the field of participatory communication for social change continues to take a chance on community radio as the best tool so that communities from the South could change the circumstances of their poverty, discrimination and exclusion.

Moreover, the study has a unique focus on countries in the South, particularly on regions of Latin America, Africa and Asia. The experience developed in indigenous communities integrated in the North is excluded. The Fourth World

\textsuperscript{29} Gumucio-Dagron, “Haciendo olas,” 1.
\textsuperscript{30} Gumucio-Dagron, “Haciendo olas,” 26–35.
is characterized by exclusion or marginalization in the context of wealth and development such as the Inuit community in Canada, the Native Americans or Australian aborigines, despite the fact that we find exciting projects in between. The projects are designed to preserve and keep alive specific minority cultures threatened by the obligation to live and interact with companies that are real worldwide cultural powers. It is interesting to notice that major international agencies and institutions involved in the fight against the causes of poverty have been directing their gaze towards the many possibilities offered by ICTs and are behind the most important publications on the subject.

There has been an interesting research on the opportunities offered by the Internet together with radio broadcasting, but there is hardly any literature on other types of hybrid projects. However, the most ambitious works we have found about the relationship between ICTs and human development come from areas of study such as engineering telecommunications, education and even anthropology, while researchers in the field of mass communication appear to follow largely anchored technophobia when it comes to relating to media and social change.

Currently one of the main focuses of research on the potential of ICT for human development is the one at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The research seeks through various projects to dismantle myths such as the phone offering a better and cheaper opportunity to connect the isolated rural inhabitants than the Internet and digital messaging services. Examples like DakNet in India, Motoman Project in Cambodia and the organization First Miles Solutions, show the strength of the Internet usage based on the intermittent connection, asynchronous communication, which allows remote villages benefit from communication with the rest of the world which is 20 times cheaper than that of a telephone line.31

Although indigenous peoples are barely represented in cyberspace, information highways provide a platform for any community, no matter how isolated they are. All communities can increase the sphere of influence and gather political support in their struggle for cultural survival. In clear advantage to those who only rely on the radio, the communities that are already using the network and strengthening internal links are connecting with other indigenous peoples scattered throughout the world and creating networks for activism based on their many common interests. Of course, the use of the Internet and a new digital platform does not have to be the same as those used in the

North. The application to be given will depend on their particular needs, encouragement of the development of networks of political activism, and the ability to make known their traditional cultures in other territories.

Several recent initiatives have helped us to envision the number of possibilities that are offered by hybrid projects, in this case in disadvantaged communities integrated in rich democratic countries. Igloolik Isuma, the independent film production company run by Inuits, mentioned in previous lines, has been distributing its work of filmmaking on its online portal for years, and offers coverage, live broadcasts and access to audiovisual archive collecting antique Inuit culture and tradition. As the creator of the site explains, “Isuma has coveted for a long, long time to use the Internet to connect to the remote Arctic peoples around the world, a way to bring people to Igloolik avoiding the enormous costs and difficulties involved scroll and allowing the Inuit to remain in their communities or away on the tundra without losing contact with the twenty first century.”

Us Mob, a project by Arrernte Aboriginal Australians living in the reserves of Alice Springs, is another example of youth online portal that broadcasts series and offers all kinds of interactive content to present the everyday life of children in the reserve. To quote its creator, David Vadiveloo, “I have tried to build a bridge of dynamic communication that Arrernte youth initiated in Alice Springs with an invitation to all children in the world to play, share and engage with stories that are common to all young people.”

To end with, the teen Canadian series The Raven’s Tales, made by indigenous artists and writers using digital animation techniques, is another example of what anthropologist Faye Ginsburg defined as cultural activism. They use the media not only to preserve and build their communities, but also as a way to stimulate their transformation through what we might call strategic traditionalism.

In addition to these cases, we will study in detail the successful example of Igloolik Isuma Productions.

Conclusions: The Igloolik Isuma Productions Model

The Inuit people, like all indigenous people, are heirs and bearers of a valuable cultural heritage, including their own perspective of the world. Despite having suffered from colonization, being evicted from their land and having their ethnic, linguistic and cultural identity suffocated, this community has shown

---

32 Ginsburg, “Rethinking the digital age,” 296.
33 Ginsburg, “Rethinking the digital age,” 297.
34 Ginsburg, “Rethinking the digital age,” 302.
great vitality and capacity to adapt. As Denis Lachate expresses it, “La flexibilité de leur système socio-culturel traditionnel pourrait bien se révéler finalement leur atout principal dans la création d’un nouveau mode de vie.”

Insofar as the world wide globalization processes introduce more and more challenges for indigenous peoples, there is a growing tendency to recognize that preserving these cultural heritages is necessary. This is because indigenous peoples who base their life styles in a flowing relationship with nature represent a model of sustainability and a sample to follow for the industrialized world.

Unfortunately, subsistence economy and a sustainable life style led by most indigenous peoples have not been enough to prevent the climate change impact, particularly in Arctic regions, which are the most affected according to many scientists. Climate change impact in this area is so high that the traditional Inuit lifestyle is being questioned. It is a lifestyle that has ice and snow as the basis of their culture. Having said that, we have to realize that this is a community whose culture, based on oral transmission, is having to face an inter-generational breach in their transmission process. This fact shows the urgency to find solutions that allow the preservation of their cultural heritage. A good example of this search for a solution to preserve and broadcast the Inuit intangible heritage is the first independent Inuit production company Igloolik Isuma Productions. Their objective is to retake their culture through the production of fiction films and documentaries from their own perspective and language.

Igloolik Isuma Productions was created in 1990, at Igloolik, Nunavut to produce films and broadcast the Inuit culture and symbolic language. Seventy five per cent belongs to the Inuit community and all of its founders, except Norman Cohn, who is co-founder and treasurer, are Inuit. From its inception, Isuma was known for its original style, breaking barriers between documentaries and fiction, staging a new way to understand the world. Among its most representative productions we have docudramas that seek to create the Inuit lifestyle. The most significant production is the series Nunavut, or Our Land. However, its most remarkable production may be the film *Atanarjuat, the Fast Runner*, based on a traditional Inuit legend. The film won the Caméra d’or award at the Cannes festival, 2001. *Atanarjuat* has also been the first Canadian film in Inuktitut language and all its actors are Inuit inhabitants within the community. This film tries to transmit as faithfully and truthfully as possible an

---

important legend in the Inuit tradition that would be very difficult to reproduce outside fiction, in order to respect the Inuit ancestral vision, including shamanism, mixing the real world, legends and dreams.

From January 2008, the production company also has an online support, that is, Isuma TV. This is a multimedia platform whose main objective is to link different indigenous directors all over the world so that they can post and share their audiovisual productions. The videos sent can be visualized through the web free of charge. At the moment, the web is offering more than 1000 indigenous video productions in thirty different languages. From April 2009, new services were added and Isuma TV became Isuma TV 2.0. After the latest update, the site allows, among others, the following services:

- Upload and exchange multimedia content with people and communities anywhere in the world.
- Create a channel, group or blog.
- Invite users to become channel members and keep them informed of updates and activities.
- Import other blogs to Isuma TV.
- Watch videos and make comments through writing, audio or video.

In its site, Isuma offers live coverage and broadcast plus access to an audiovisual archive made of old items that reflect the Inuit tradition and culture. As the designer of the site explains, “For a long time, Isuma has longed to use the internet to connect the far Arctic with peoples all over the world, in an attempt to bring individuals to Igloolik without the enormous cost of travelling here, as well as to make it possible for the Inuits to stay in their communities or deep in the Tundra in touch with the twenty first century.”

Simultaneously to audiovisual and multimedia productions, Isuma takes active part in the development and empowerment of Igloolik and Nunavut communities, enhancing employment and organizing activities aimed to different sectors or this community. These are among them:

- Tarriasuk Video Centre, the first non-profit film school in the Arctic, founded by Isuma in 1991 with the help of Canada Council of the Arts.
- Arnait Video Productions, the first independent production company made by Arctic women. From its creations in 1999, it produces audiovisual programs and contents form the Inuit woman point of view. This group assisted Isuma with the script and direction of the film Before Tomorrow (2007).

---

36 Ginsburg, “Rethinking the digital age,” 300.
• Innusiq, or Life, is a drama group for youngsters created in 1999. With the aim of fighting suicide among the young people in Nunavut, that has alarming suicide rates, through artistic activities.

• Artcirq, the same as Innusiq, has made its main objective to raise awareness among the Inuit youth about the meaninglessness of suicide as a way to end their problems. Born in 1998, this is a social circus that combines current doctrines with traditional Inuit based techniques.

Regarding Isuma’s filmography, they have twelve documentaries, three fiction films and two TV series, as well as some films of its own and some experimental co-produced films. These include the already mentioned Atanarjuat, the Fast Runner, awarded in Cannes. The fact that a film such as this one has gone beyond local and national boundaries plus has been praised by an international audience deserves special attention.

It is necessary to point out that, in general, the topics this production company approaches are about the past and the ancestral lifestyle, rather than the present and its problems, whatever the genre. In fact, there are few Isuma films that are about current topics and relate to the youth. To be more specific, there are only four documentaries that are not about traditional practices or past problems. These are Nipi, Artcirq, Qallunajaut and Kiviaq vs. Canada. Even in fictional productions, such as the TV series Nunavut or films like Atanarjuat, the main objective is to recreate traditional lifestyle and the transmission of Inuit myths.

Isuma attempts to heal the numerous injuries and wounds it has as a result of colonization, such as the expulsion of their land, sedentary life style, and Catholicism and Anglicanism that demonize their beliefs, through the recovery and reconstruction of the Inuit old way of life from the Elders’ discourses, appropriating their culture and with their own voice. This is certainly a needed and effective memory therapy to cure a widespread feeling in this type of community whose recent history has been suffering from the imposition and manipulation of foreign elements. This implies, however, the risk of indirectly neglecting younger generations who have a serious identity problem. Such problem is mostly reflected in the high rate of suicide, unemployment and drug addiction among the younger members of the Inuit community.

However, it is also true that the use of audiovisual tools and new technologies is already a way to get closer to young people. This is mainly because they are a more attractive transmission media and can better relate to the new generations. These tools allow not only oral but also visual transmission, in addition to having the ability to store all this ancient wisdom to pass on to future
generations after overcoming physical and temporal boundaries. Finally, they are a method to repair the intergenerational gap largely caused by the youth abandoning their home communities.

In conclusion, Isuma’s case is remarkable as a leader for other indigenous communities in the field of reappropriating culture through the use of new technologies. It has been through this production company that the Inuits have taken audiovisual tools and adapt them to their needs and their world. However, Isuma’s highest accomplishment cannot be found just in the appropriation of technologies that should have been classified as new technologies. Neither is it due only to its self-management nor to its internet platform. But its main accomplishment is the fact that it managed to narrow the generational gap transmitting knowledge through tools used by new generations. Moreover, Isuma has simultaneously gone beyond its community borders and those of the nation that hosts them, Canada. On one hand, it has been internationally appreciated and awarded. On the other hand, it has created a network of knowledge and a platform for millions of producers and indigenous communities through its platform Isuma TV.

The lack of studies, new paradigms and innovative initiatives in the field of participatory communication for social change that successfully combines new technologies with traditional media, such as the lack of interest in some appealing initiatives on indigenous communities in the North, justify the need to stop and learn from successful and exemplary experience led by communities like Inuit, Sami, Maori and other American Indian groups.

A comprehensive overview of the many strategies utilized to put the media in the service of human development should lead to the conclusion that each community should be able to choose and design the best model to meet their own needs. In order to make the best choice, it is necessary to reformulate many prejudices and accept that ICTs can be much closer to any citizen than is often thought.

Bibliography


PART 6

*Literary Dismantlements of Global/Colonial Domination*
L’indianisme au Brésil au travers des traductions, des adaptations et des transpositions en français du poème épique de José de Santa Rita Durão sur la découverte de Bahia

*Caramurú. Poema épico do descobrimento da Bahia (1781)*

Alain Vuillemin


José de Santa Rita Durão (vers 1718–1784), né à Cata Preta (Mariana aujourd’hui), dans l’État des Minas Gerais, au Brésil, orateur et poète, ordonné prêtre dans l’ordre de Saint-Augustin et considéré comme le fondateur de l’indianisme au Brésil.


Jacques Cartier (1491–1557), navigateur et explorateur français, découvreur du Canada en 1534.

Catherine Des Granches, fille de Françoise Dumast et de Jacques-Honoré, chevalier et connétable de Saint-Malo.


Franco Tasso Paes (né en 1946), journaliste et écrivain brésilien originaire de Bahia.

Eugène Garay de Montglave, de son vrai nom Eugène Moncla (1796–1878), polygraphe et traducteur, proche de Dom Pedro Ier (1798–1834), empereur du Brésil de 1822 à 1831, dont il a traduit la correspondance en français.

Voir Durão, José de Santa Rita: Caramaru, ou la découverte de Bahia [traduit par Eugène Garay de Montglave], Paris, Eugène Renduel, 1829. Édition en ligne, site Gallica de la Bibliothèque Nationale de France:
Saint-Malo.25 Un film brésilien de Guel Arraes,26 sorti en 2001, Caramurú. A invenção do Brasil,27 a retracé cette histoire, de même qu'un roman, déjà cité et publié aussi en 2001, Catarina Paraguaçú. A Mãe do Brasil de Franco Tasso, qui n'avait pas encore été traduit en français en 2013. Ces textes et ces films décrivent comment le monde connu s'est brusquement étendu en 1500, au temps des grandes découvertes, à la fois pour les indiens Tupis du Brésil et pour les Européens. Deux civilisations, deux univers, se sont rencontrées et se sont aussi affrontées. Si on entend par “mondialisation,” en cet exemple précis, la création d'un espace et d'une entité politique et culturelle unique par le biais de la conquête du Brésil par le Portugal, ces écrits conçus entre la fin du XVIII siècle et le début du XXI siècle reconstruisent une sorte d'archéologie de cette unification et de cette “globalisation,” pour s'exprimer en des termes qui ne sont apparus dans la langue française que vers la fin du XX siècle. La constitution au XVI siècle des grands empires coloniaux européens a été une préfiguration de ce phénomène. Ce processus a aussi engendré sa propre négation. L'évolution des titres cités est déjà une indication. Entre le poème épique de José de Santa Rita Durão et les derniers romans d'Olga Obry et de Franco Tasso, la perspective initiale, coloniale et “européaniste,” s'inverse presque complètement : l' “indianisme,” la prise de conscience d’un sentiment identitaire propre, indien et indigéniste, purement brésilien, s'affirme avec de plus en plus de force. Ce que ces traductions et ces transpositions en langue française révèlent aussi, c'est que cette aspiration est très mêlée. Ces livres racontent la naissance d'une identité métisse, hybride. Comment se concilient en ces témoignages composites la revendication d'un héritage autochtone, la reconnaissance d'une multiplicité d'apports étrangers, et le désir de les assimiler, de se les approprier et de les fondre ensemble ?

Un héritage autochtone

L'indianisme, c'est d'abord un héritage autochtone, indigène, qui est réhabilité et revendiqué. C'est le patrimoine des anciens indiens Tupis ou Tupinambas qui habitaient dans la région de Bahia et qui étaient présents tout au long des


26 Guel Arraes (Miguel Arraes de Alencar Filho), né en 1953, cinéaste brésilien originaire de Recife, Pernambuco.

côtes du Brésil, de l'embouchure de l'Amazone à l'Uruguay actuel. Ce sont leurs us et leurs coutumes traditionnelles, leurs croyances et leurs convictions ancestrales et, aussi, leurs rites, y compris les plus cruels, qui sont rappelés.

La description des coutumes et de la manière de vivre des indiens Tupis avant l'arrivée des Européens est une première affirmation identitaire, une première forme d'indianisme. Ce qui est dit est toutefois très reconstruit, deux ou trois siècles plus tard, à travers ce que les auteurs différents qui se sont intéressés à la légende de Diogo Álvares et de Catherine Paraguaçu, au Brésil et en France, ont pu avoir lu ou retenu de témoignages contemporains de la découverte du Brésil au XVI siècle, à savoir : *Nus, féroces et anthropophages*28 de Hans Staden29 en 1557 et *Les Singularités de la France antarctique*30 d'André Thevet31 en 1558, et *Histoire d'un voyage en la terre du Brésil, autrement dit Amérique*32 de Jean de Léry33 en 1578 et, également, le chapitre “Des Cannibales” au premier livre des *Essais*34 de Michel de Montaigne35 en 1580–1587. Alfred

---

29 Hans Staden (1525 ?–1576 ?), soldat et mercenaire d'origine allemande, embarqué comme canonnier en 1554 sur un vaisseau espagnol qui s'échoua près de l'île de Saint-Vincent, au large du Brésil. Capturé par une tribu Tupinambá qui pratiquait l'anthropophagie rituelle, il fut racheté à ces indiens par le capitaine d'un navire français après neuf mois de captivité.
31 André Thevet (1516–1590), prêtre franciscain français, chapelain de la flotte de l'amiral Nicolas Durand de Villegaignon, fondateur de la ville de Rio-de-Janeiro.
33 Jean de Léry (vers 1536–1613), voyageur et écrivain français, converti à la religion réformée, protestante, et cosmographe du roi de France Henri II.
   - Tome I : <http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k6382240z.r=montaigne+essais.langFR>,
   - Tome II : <http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k63435243.r=montaigne+essais.langFR>,
   - Tome III : <http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k6343523p.r=montaigne+essais.langFR>,
   - Tome IV : <http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5780127w.r=montaigne+essais.langFR>,
   - consultés le 28 juillet 2013.
35 Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592), moraliste et philosophe français.
Métraux\textsuperscript{36} y ajoute dans sa préface au roman d’Olga Obry, \textit{Catherine du Brésil, filleule de Saint-Malo}, le nom d’Yves d’Évreux,\textsuperscript{37} un moine capucin français, auteur en 1615 d’une \textit{Suite de l’histoire des choses les plus mémorables en Maragan en 1613–1614},\textsuperscript{38} à propos de la fondation de la ville de São Luís de Maranhão, en 1612, dans l’État actuel du Maranhão, au nord-est du Brésil, où il s’était rendu entre 1612 et 1614, à la demande de son Ordre. On pourrait y ajouter le témoignage d’un autre missionnaire capucin, Claude d’Abbeville,\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Histoire de la mission des pères Capucins en l’Isle de Maragnan et terres circonvoisines},\textsuperscript{40} paru en 1614, qui évoque les mêmes singularités des mœurs indiennes.

Dans les traductions et les adaptations de \textit{Caramurú}, le poème épique de José de Santa Rita Durão, les auteurs insistent surtout sur le caractère étrange, très exotique, des mœurs des indiens. Des préjugés moraux insidieux et contradictoires, accentuent les différences et forcent les traits. Dans \textit{Caramurú ou la découverte de Bahia}, Eugène Garay de Montglave essaie de préserver le regard apparemment neuf, étonné que le jeune Diogo Álvares porte sur les us et les mœurs des indiens Tupis, tels que José de Santa Rita Durão les avait imaginés. Le chapitre VII de la traduction, intitulé “Un village américain,” en décrit le mode de vie. Un chef indien, Gupeva, explique à Diogo Álvares comment les grandes étapes de l’existence se déroulent pour les siens, pour les membres de sa tribu. L’habitat est collectif. La vie est communautaire. Le village se compose de huit grandes cabanes en bois, en osier et en roseaux, disposées en carré. Chacune de ces constructions abrite entre six cents et mille personnes. À l’intérieur, à chaque pas, des hamacs se balancent. C’est là que les indiens de Gupeva naissent, vivent, grandissent, mangent, dorment, méditent et meurent, le moment venu. Leurs joies et leurs peines, leurs souffrances et leurs deuils, leurs rites et leurs cérémonies, leurs fêtes et leurs danses, leurs libations et

\textsuperscript{36} Alfred Métraux (1902–1963), anthropologue d’origine suisse, naturalisé américain en 1941.
\textsuperscript{37} Simon Michellet, en religion Yves d’Évreux (vers 1570–vers 1633), moine capucin français, historien et explorateur français.
\textsuperscript{39} Clément Foullon, en religion Claude d’Abbeville (?–1632), moine capucin français, missionnaire au Brésil en 1612.
\textsuperscript{40} Claude d’Abbeville, \textit{Histoire de la mission des Pères capucins en l’isle de Maragnan et terres circonvoisines, où est traicté des singularitez admirables et des moeurs merveilleuses des Indiens habitans de ce pays, avec les missives et avis qui ont esté envoyez de nouveau par le R.P. Claude d’Abbeville.} (Paris: imprimerie de F. Huby, 1614).
leurs festins. Tous vivent nus. Le film de Nelson Pereira dos Santos,41 Como gosto-so era meu francês42 en est une illustration très exacte. Le roman d'Olga Obry, Catherine du Brésil, filleule de Saint-Malo, insiste sur cet état naturel très primitif. La nudité paraît avoir été la plus grande différence par rapport aux mœurs européennes.

Les convictions ancestrales, religieuses et morales, des indiens Tupis sont remémorées. Caramurú, le poème épique de José de Santa Rita Durão, en reste la source principale. Olga Obry y ajoute d'autres sources dans Catherine du Brésil, filleule de Saint-Malo, en un appendice intitulé "À la recherche d'une trace perdue," Gupeva expose ces croyances à Diogo Álvares au chant III de l'épopée de José de Santa Rita Durão et aux chapitres IX, X et XI de la transposition d'Eugène Garay de Montglave. Olga Obry les évoque d'une manière très allusive en la première et en la seconde partie de son propre roman, avant que Diogo Álvares ne fasse intrusion dans la vie de la future Catarina-Paraguaçu. Les indiens Tupis auraient cru en l'existence d'un Être suprême, un "Être puissant qui a créé le monde,"43 qui aurait régi le ciel, commandé à la pluie, à la grêle, aux vents, à la tempête. Il aurait été le maître des nuées, des éclairs et de la foudre. Il aurait habité le ciel. Il aurait été "l'architecte du monde,"44 un être créateur, démiurgique, qui aurait vaincu le néant, créé le ciel, la terre, les ténèbres et la lumière. Les indiens Tupis l'auraient appelé le grand "Tupa"45 ou "Tupan" (le "Tonnerre") mais cet être, Gupeva en fait l'aveu, serait demeuré "incompréhensible,"46 énigmatique. Son œuvre serait restée inachevée. Cet "Être suprême" n'aurait pas encore enseigné aux indiens Tupis comment résister au mal. Le monde serait encore infesté d'"Anhangás,"47 de créatures malfaisantes, maléfiques, enfermées par un arrêt du grand Tupa en un endroit, par-delà les montagnes, où brûlerait "un incendie que le temps n'éteindra point."48 À l'inverse, par-delà ces mêmes montagnes, il existerait aussi une "contrée de bonheur [...], un jardin sans modèle,"49 un lieu délicieux où, au sein du grand Tupa, vivaient les âmes de ceux qui furent des justes durant

41 Nelson Pereira dos Santos, né en 1928, cinéaste brésilien originaire de São Paulo (SP).
42 Nelson Pereira dos Santos, Como gosto-so era meu francês (« Qu'il était bon mon petit Français »), long métrage, DVD, 1971.
43 José de Santa Rita Durao, Caramaru, ou la découverte de Bahia [traduit par Eugène Garay de Montglave], (Paris, Eugène Renduel, 1829, tome I, 69).
44 Durão, tome I, 69.
45 Durão, tome I, 69.
46 Durão, tome I, 167.
47 Durão, tome I, 180.
48 Durão, tome I, 180.
49 Durão, tome I, 182.
leurs vies terrestres. Bref, aux indiens Tupis, il n’aurait manqué que la révélation. Ils auraient déjà entrevu Dieu, le Paradis, l’Enfer. L’exposé de ces croyances attribuées aux indiens primitifs est très réfracté par les convictions religieuses, chrétiennes et catholiques, du frère José de Santa Rita Durão, professeur de théologie à l’université de Coimbra, au Portugal, à l’époque où il concevait son poème épique à la gloire de Caramurú.


50 Obry, Catherine du Brésil, 13.
51 Obry, Catherine du Brésil, 13–14.

En ces transpositions et en ces adaptations de l’histoire de Caramurú et de Paraguaçú – Diogo Álvares et Catherine Álvares – l’”indianisme,” c’est tout d’abord la prise de conscience de la persistance au Brésil d’un héritage autochtone, indien ou plutôt amérindien et brésilien, constitué par le souvenir de coutumes traditionnelles, de croyances anciennes et de pratiques guerrières particulièrement cruelles et féroces. Ce legs est très ambigü. Dans *Caramuru, ou la découverte de Bahia* d’Eugène Garay de Montglave, Diogo Álvares découvre cette indianité avec étonnement. Dans *Catherine du Brésil, filleule de Saint-Malo* d’Olga Obry, l’histoire de cette indienne, cette Paraguaçú qui découvrit l’Europe, l’étonnement paraît avoir été réciproque. La première rencontre entre Paraguaçú et Diogo Álvares fut une double découverte réciproque. Ce fut aussi un terrible choc des civilisations.

**Les apports étrangers**

En cette indianité revendiquée, il est des apports étrangers. Paraguaçú, devenue Catherine du Brésil après son baptême en France, en a une vision prémonitoire à bord du navire du capitaine Duplessis qui la ramène au Brésil. Au chant IX du poème de José de Santa Rita Durão et aux chapitres 26 à 30 du roman d’Eugène Garay de Montglave, la jeune femme entre en extase. Elle entrevoit alors l’histoire du Brésil telle qu’elle se déroulera du milieu du XVI siècle jusqu’à la fin du XVIII siècle. Elle décrit aussi ce que les contacts avec

52 Obry, *Catherine du Brésil*, 17.
53 José de Santa Rita Durão, *Caramaru, ou la découverte de Bahia* [traduit par Eugène Garay de Montglave], Paris, Eugène Renduel, 1829, tome 2, 214.
l'Europe apporteront au Brésil, à savoir la foi chrétienne, la civilisation et, aussi des pratiques coloniales très brutales.

La foi chrétienne serait le premier de ces apports. C'est la conviction de José de Santa Rita Durão, élève des jésuites à Rio-de-Janeiro, prêtre dans l'ordre de Saint-Augustin puis professeur de théologie catholique à l'université de Coïmbra au Portugal. La traduction de son *Caramurú* par Eugène Garay de Montglave respecte ces certitudes. Dans *Jakaré-Ouassou, ou les Tupinambas*, l'attitude de Daniel Gavet et de Philippe Boucher est plus nuancée. Philippe Boucher était un pasteur protestant. Dans *Catherine du Brésil, filleule de Saint-Malo*, le regard d'Olga Obry est beaucoup plus laïc. Dans *Caramurú* de José de Santa Rita Durão, en dépit du titre, le véritable sujet, le plus développé, c'est l'histoire de Paraguaçu, celle de la “Mère de la Patrie” (“À Mãe da Pátria”) comme il le déclare au début du chant I de l'épopée, en une strophe qui n'a pas été traduite par Eugène Garay de Montglave. Le chant III rapporte les circonstances de la première rencontre entre Paraguaçu et Diogo Álvares, et les chants VI à X retraçent le grand voyage en France, sous le règne supposé du roi Henri II, vers 1547. C'est une sorte de récit autobiographique qui raconte surtout comme la jeune indienne Tupi aurait découvert l'Europe, la France, Paris et le palais du Louvres, et les circonstances d'un baptême parfaitement imaginaire, au chant VII, en la présence du “monarque très chrétien Henri II de France […] ami de la foi,” avec, à ses côtés, la reine Catherine de Médicis. Diogo et son épouse indienne sont salués comme “le roi et la reine du Brésil.” Le baptême est aussitôt décidé. La reine donne “son propre nom à Paraguaçu [et] veut que désormais on ne l'appelle plus que Catherine.” La légende se substitue à l'histoire. Olga Obry le relève en l'appendice à son propre roman, *Catherine du Brésil, filleule de Saint-Malo*. Au terme de *Caramurú* de José de Santa Rita Durão, au dernier chant, à la strophe LIX, Catherine Paraguaçu appelle les indiens Tupis à se soumettre à l'autorité du roi du Portugal et à se convertir à la religion de “ce Dieu puissant [Jésus-Christ] qui, attaché à une croix immortelle, expia vos crimes et paya votre perversion.” Le propos est pieux. L'intention est édifiante. L'union de Catherine Paraguaçu et de Diogo Álvares
symbolise cette adhésion et cette conversion. La réalité fut toute autre. Daniel Gavet et Philippe Boucher le laissent entendre dans *Jakaré-Ouassou, ou les Tupinambas* dont l'action se situe aussi vers 1547 et où les indiens Tupis restent très attachés à leurs croyances traditionnelles. Dans *Catherine du Brésil, filleule de Saint-Malo*, Olga Obry imagine également que Catherine Álvares aurait déploré, en sa vieillesse, entre 1557 et 1586, la manière dont les indiens auraient été évangélisés avec beaucoup de rudesse et, aussi, refoulés non sans brutalité vers l'intérieur des terres.


65 Durão, tome III, 212.
68 Obry, Catherine du Brésil, 146.
70 Gavet, 33.


Une identité métisse

Telle que José de Santa Rita Durão et Eugène Garay de Montglave la rapportent, et telle qu’Olga Obry la reprend en la fouillant, plus d’un siècle après, la légende de Diogo Álvares et de Catarina Paraguaçu est le récit d’une double découverte,
mutuelle, celle de l'autre, celle de celui qui est un étranger. À travers la relation de cette première rencontre, emblématique, entre une jeune indienne indigène, autochtone, et un aventurier européen, allogène et exotique, l'indianité et l'européanité s'affrontent, se pénètrent et se fondent en une identité différente, mixte, mélangée. En découvrant et en s'initiant aux mœurs des indiens Tupis, Diogo Álvares tend à devenir l'un d'entre eux. À l'inverse, en venant en Europe, en France, Paraguacú se transforme en une européenne. Les conceptions indianistes, nativistes ou indigénistes modernes se nourrissent de cette légende. Ces deux mythes de Caramurú et de Paraguacú constituent un véritable archétype de l'identité brésilienne. Ils incarnent symboliquement une forme d'intégration mutuelle. Jusqu'à quel point, en ces témoignages, ces personnages d'indiens natifs et d'étrangers européens ne seraient-il pas que des métis, des doubles et des mêmes, des reflets symétriques mais inversés, réciproques, des uns et des autres ?

Ces indiens sauvages ne seraient que des européens primitifs déguisés. La remarque a été faite en 1961 par un écrivain et un traducteur français, Georges Raeders, à propos de la traduction française du *Caramurú* de José de Santa Rita Durão par Eugène Garay de Montglave. Que ce soit dans le poème épique initial, en portugais, ou dans sa transposition en prose, en français, “les Tupinambas de Santa Rita Durão,” observe cet auteur, “sont, sinon toujours des Européens travestis en sauvages à la tête ornée de plumes multicolores, du moins, bien souvent, des indigènes idéalisés” qui vivent, qui combattent et qui meurent comme “de véritables chevaliers [européens ] du Moyen-âge,” qui sont soumis à des princes. Ils sont adoubés “par un léger coup de plat d'épée sur l'épaule.” L'héroïne, Paraguassu, apparaît au moins une fois en une “véritable Amazone, armée à l'européenne, avec une cotte de maille, une épée et un casque.” En d'autres passages, ces indiens imaginaires expriment des sentiments et des idées qu'ils n'auraient pas pu avoir au XVI siècle. C'est le cas au chant III de *Caramurú* de José de Santa Rita Durão qui correspond aux chapitres 10 à 12 de *Caramuru, ou la découverte de Bahia* par Eugène Garay de Montglave. Gupeva, le chef de la tribu indienne qui a recueilli Diogo Álvares, expose longuement à son interlocuteur européen ses conceptions métaphysiques, étrangement proches des croyances chrétiennes, comme le relève

---

75 Georges Raeders (1896–1955), universitaire et écrivain français, professeur à l’université catholique de São Paulo (SP) au Brésil.


77 Raeders, 107 et sq.

78 Raeders, 107 et sq.

79 Raeders, 107 et sq.
également Georges Raeders. Un autre exemple, encore beaucoup d’autres, ce serait le moment “où Paraguassu,” commente ce même critique, “demande après la bataille à Álvares ce que deviennent les âmes des morts non baptisés qu’elle aperçoit. Celui-ci lui expose alors le dogme de la damnation éternelle mais elle répond en argumentant comme un philosophe du XVIII siècle.”80 Ces indiens frustes sont très évolués. Sous la plume de José de Santa Rita Durão ce sont des européens civilisés mais déguisés en sauvages primitifs.

En revanche, les étrangers, les Européens, ne seraient que d’autres sauvages mais indiens et civilisés, raffinés, policiés. Le choc des cultures est violent. Au chant VII de Caramurú de José de Santa Rita Durão et au chapitre 22 de Caramuru, ou la découverte de Bahia d’Eugène Garay de Montglave, Paraguaçu est comme anéantie par le spectacle de la civilisation à son arrivée en France. Lorsqu’elle remonte la Seine vers Paris, sur une felouque, une barque légère, “Paraguaçu,” note l’auteur, “[…] reste immobile et comme anéantie. Elle ne respire plus, elle ne parle plus, son œil est fixe, son visage sans émotion […]. Une stupeur soudaine lui ravit la voix, l’ouïe, la parole et la mémoire.”81 Le voyage d’abord, sur ce qui ne pouvait lui apparaître que comme un très grand navire français, celui du capitaine Duplessis, l’accueil, à Paris, tout au long des rues, par une foule en liesse, la Cour et la réception au palais du Louvre, en la présence du roi de France, Henri II, et de la reine Catherine de Médicis, tout la sidère. Lors de la cérémonie du baptême, “Paraguaçu” devient “Catherine.” L’alliance, la juxtaposition des deux prénoms voudrait signifier que désormais, dans le récit et dans la légende, la double identité, européenne et chrétienne, indienne et païenne, de la jeune femme deviendrait le signe et l’illustration de la manière dont l’état de civilisée aurait dorénavant supplanté l’état de nature antérieur. La civilisation aurait triomphé. Son baptême, suivi à la fin de l’épopée par un appel à la conversion au christianisme de tous les indiens serait une façon de suggérer, dans la perspective de José de Santa Rita Durão et de ses épigones, que les peuples européens n’auraient fait que précéder les nations indiennes vers un même but, un même idéal, une “même impulsion divine.”82 La décision, prise par “Paraguaçu” de devenir “Catherine,” en serait l’indice. L’argument est théologique. Il se fonde aussi sur une conviction indigéniste. “Caramurú [de José de Santa Rita Durão] est,” rappelle Georges Raeders, “au témoignage de tous les historiens de la littérature brésilienne, le véritable premier manifeste du nativisme83 et de l’américanisme dans la littérature brésilienne en langue portugaise.

80 Raeders, 107 et sq.
81 Durão, tome III, 164–165.
82 Durão, tome III, 143.
83 Raeders, 107 et sq.

En ces textes, en ces reflets réciproques, la perception de l’autre, de la différence et de l’altérité se transforme sous l’effet de “l’invention d’un passé [qui aurait été] partagé.” Les indiens barbares n’auraient été que des

84 Durão, tome II, 174.
85 Durão, tome III, 98.
86 Durão, tome III, 98.

Conclusion

Le Brésil a été découvert le 22 avril 1500 par Pedro Álvares Cabral. A cette date, en 1500, la population indienne, native, était plus que majoritaire. En 1600, un siècle plus tard, les indiens Tupis n’étaient plus qu’une infime minorité. L’indianisme est peut-être né à cette époque, entre 1510 et 1550. Si l’on suit la légende de Diogo Álvares Correia, le premier habitant européen, portugais, du Brésil, et de son épouse indienne Catarina Álvares Paraguaçú, baptisée en France, en 1522 à l’église de Saint-Malo, en Bretagne, telle que José de Santa Rita Durão le rapporte en 1781 dans son poème épique, Caramurú, traduit ou plutôt transposé en prose, en français, en 1829, par Eugène Garay de Montglave sous le titre de Caramuru, ou la découverte de Bahia, la prise de conscience et la revendication d’une identité indigène, autonome, mixte, serait née de cette première rencontre entre Catarina Paraguaçú, la “Mère du Brési,” et Diogo Álvares, le “Caramurú.” Les transpositions, les adaptations, en portugais et en français, de cette légende fondatrice dans Jakaré-Ouassou, ou les Tupinambas de Daniel Gavet et de Philippe Boucher en 1830, dans Paraguassú, un opéra de J. O’Kelly et de J. Villeneuve en 1855, dans Moema de Delgado de Carvalho en 1892 et, entre 1942 et 1953, dans Catarina do Brasil: a Índia que descobriu a Europa et Catherine du Brésil, filleule de Saint-Malo d’Olga Obry, et, enfin, en 2001, dans Catarina Paraguaçú. A Mãe do Brasil de Franco Tasso, correspondent à autant d’étapes de la constitution de ce mythe identitaire majeur, fondateur. Cette légende a un fondement historique. À la fin de son roman, en portugais comme en français, Olga Obry rappelle les rares traces qui ont été retrouvées de l’existence historique de ce couple mythique. Diogo Álvares est enterré au monastère de Jésus à Salvador da Bahia et Catarina Álvares repose en une chapelle de l’église de la Grâce, à Graça, au centre de cette même ville de Salvador da Bahia. Olga Obry reproduit aussi dans son livre le fac-simile de l’acte de

88 Obry, Catherine du Brésil, 140.
89 Blaise Cendrars (1887–1961), de son vrai nom Frédéric Louis Sauser, journaliste et écrivain d'origine suisse, naturalisé français en 1916.
91 Cendrars, 63.
Cette effervescence esthétique et intellectuelle, très réduite et minoritaire au Brésil, ne préjuge pas non plus de son véritable impact sur la vie politique brésilienne moderne.

**Bibliographie**

**Ouvrages**


Delgado de Carvalho Joaquim, Torres. *Moema*, opéra créé au Théâtre lyrique de Rio-de -Janeiro en 1892, s.l., s.r.


France : <http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k56272819.r=Jakar%C3%A9-Ouassou+ou+les+Tupinambas.langFR>.


**Articles**


Filmographie


Spatiality and the Literature of Globalization

Sze Wei Ang

What does literature teach us about globalization or imagining the global? Does it make sense to speak of a “literature of globalization” or “fictions of globalization” when scholars continue in their deep disagreements about the shape and reach of global phenomena? And, if so, what would these novels, short stories, or poetry look like and what are their main concerns? The cultural analytics of space and its effects on how we read fiction, especially fiction written by minorities, is important to these questions. Global flows and the inequalities they generate affect how fiction is published, marketed, read, and taught in our universities today; therefore, they embody important portraits of globalization’s effects on social life. A novel like Shani Mootoo’s *When Cereus Blooms at Night* illuminates how colonial notions of space have been carried over into the world under globalization, and how those notions organize our experiences in racial, gendered, and sexual terms. Because globalization has often replaced former colonial masters with native elites, and the national borders set in place after decolonization have not disrupted colonial spatial logics, some aspects of colonialism continue to shape minority experience today.¹

Notions of space under globalization and how it affects the ways in which our bodies are legible in racial, gendered, or sexual terms, remain anchored to colonial notions of space.

The imaginary island of Lantanacamara in the novel is based on Trinidad and Tobago, formerly a British colony. Written as a letter by Tyler, the omniscient narrator, the novel’s plot is structured through the characters’ experiences as Tyler understands and interprets them. Tyler, the transgender nurse who cares for Mala, addresses the narrative to Asha, Mala’s sister who manages to escape from Lantanacamara, and also to the readers who chance upon the letter and who might know Asha “wherever she might be.”² Thus, it addresses and implicates a global readership as its intended audience. The novel begins

¹ See Masao Miyoshi’s article on how the history of colonialism sets the stage for globalization. Decolonisation at the end of WWII signals a change in the form of government, but the relations of colonialism are still present in the relationship between transnational corporations, native elites, and the poor (p. 728). The question of whether or not globalization is exactly like colonialism in all aspects is beyond the scope of this essay as it merely focuses on spatiality.

with the story of how Mala’s father, Chandin Ramchandin, was adopted into the white Reverend Thoroughly’s family as a child, and later is abandoned by his wife, Sarah, who absconds with Lavinia Thoroughly. The children Mala and Asha were prevented from escaping, and the rest of the novel narrates the repercussions of that interrupted flight from Chandin’s home. Mala eventually becomes insane after being regularly raped by her father and subsequently abandoned by Boyie, her lover, with whom she is finally reunited at the end of the novel.

Space influences the responses to the novel in a number of different but related ways: first, the novel is taught and categorized based on geopolitics, whether consciously or otherwise;

and second, critics note that questions of space are important thematics when they comment on racial, economic, and gendered differences in the novel; and finally, less obviously but no less importantly, the novel’s narrative strategies reveal how social discourses surrounding racialised subjects depend on how space is divided and organised. The geopolitical concerns of globalization are mirrored in the extant criticism of the novel where the debates around *Cereus Blooms at Night* is symptomatic of our continued reliance on geopolitical divisions in literary studies.

At various institutions, the novel is read and taught alternatively as South Asian, Caribbean, Asian-Canadian, Asian-American, diasporic, or a postcolonial novel. The umbrage that these debates sometimes provoke reveals how seriously literary critics take our national or regional assignations. They reveal not only our need and desire for clear categories, but also that these categories are often based on spatial relations. Both the desire for and the lack of clarity is symptomatic of globalization’s effects on the experience of space.

As a form of social and cultural organisation, how we navigate space embodies the structural problems of economic and social inequality. Feminist geographer Gillian Rose argues that space is the medium of social experience and it determines both our social relations and subjectivity. How we understand the

---

3 Edward Said’s seminal work, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), begins with the “...distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts....” (12), and today, to continue to remain unaware of how geopolitics affects literary criticism and debates is to remain willfully unaware of how power works in academia and in publishing.

4 See for example debates in Eleanor Ty’s and Christl Verduyn’s edited collection, *Asian Canadian Writing Beyond Autoethnography* (Ontario: Wilfred Laurier P, 2008), especially the essay by Clarissa Lai.

social role of motherhood, for example, is informed by codes of behavior that depend on the places in which those behaviors take place. Today, most of us live our lives in the space of the city, and increasing global urbanization has revealed multiple, new social and political challenges because the spaces of the urban and the rural are spaces that are highly inequitable. In other words, space is important to all our social experiences.

Critics have paid considerable attention to the novel’s settings and its characters because they experience multiple marginalizations and displacements. For example, Mariam Pirbhai reads Mala’s yard as a metaphor for new forms of community-making; Dunja Mohr similarly notes that the division of house and garden represent patriarchal and matriarchal lines of power; and for Isabel Hoving, plant metaphors represent traumatic histories that otherwise cannot be represented. Sarah Casteel argues that the Caribbean garden serves as a witness and testament of the violence of colonialism and of European scientific knowledge, but that the garden also holds the key to freedom and independence. I follow these critics in their emphasis on space as illuminating the racial and gender hierarchies at play in the novel by foregrounding how patriarchy organises our social experience in gendered terms. However, while most of this extant criticism lauds the novel as a form of utopian resistance, my reading also complicates those characterisations because minorities’ experience of globalization continues to be marked by concepts of space set in place during colonialism.

6 *Cereus Blooms at Night* is not set in a city, but as David Harvey argues in his essay, “Right to the City,” globalization means that the rural and the urban are interdependent.

7 George Lipsitz demonstrates in his chapter “The Crime *The Wire* Couldn’t Name,” How *Racism Takes Place* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011) that as successful as the television series is, it ignores the effects of housing policies have had on black communities in the U.S. The humanities are also important to understanding space’s effects on racialised subjects because, as Said argues following Foucault, discursive power has effects as real as those exerted through political institutions.


9 Dunja Mohr, ed. *Embracing the Other: Addressing Xenophobia in the New Literatures in English* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2008), 287.


Spatial Relations of Colonialism and Patriarchy

The major themes in *Cereus Blooms at Night* are of spatiality, but space also plays an important part of the novel's revelations and it is this stylistic element that most obviously mirrors colonial notions of space. Cause and effect in the novel's plot progression depends as much upon space as it does the chronological sequence of the characters' actions. The different periods in the novel are organised and presented as representations of space while Chandin's life is divided between the plantation barracks, the Thoroughlys' home, the seminary, and finally, his own home. His daughter's life passes completely in her own compound; and the space of that home becomes a way of marking the passage of time in the village. Subsequently, occultation and revelation within narrative development occur through the use of colonial spatial tropes, especially in the later sections when the town discovers Mala's garden and her father's corpse. The novel's central tensions are rooted in the regulation and transgression of spaces and the relations around those spaces, and the text offers a way of challenging colonial notions of space that have been carried over into the present age but it does so without offering utopian possibilities.

Overall, the plot's major progressions occur when the different characters invade and (mis)use the spaces normally associated with patriarchal, racial, and sexual order: Sarah and Lavinia manage to evade Chandin's surveillance and their relationship develops in Sarah's kitchen while he is away at work; as Sarah and Lavinia plan their elopement, Sarah keeps the house in order to avoid suspicion; and later, Mala's and Ambrose's courtship is later consummated in the same kitchen. By drawing our attention to how unspoken rules govern our use of space through the transgressions of those rules, the spatial dimension of the novel teaches us to see how male domination is sustained because men and women have separate, unequal spheres of influence. Gender inequality is discernible and also sustained because of the spatial practices that condition those behaviors. For Marangoly George whose work takes up political definition of home and belonging, the space of “home” is itself a fictive idea that nonetheless has immense discursive power. What may seem like an organic entity within social life is really a product of textuality, that is, a constant discursive construction and reconstruction of the links between people and their spaces.12 The concern over space in this novel is so primary

---

because it establishes the forms of social relations that reproduce regimes of power and control.

The strict markedness of certain spaces as “Chandin’s” or “Sarah’s”—presented as a map of the colonial home—begins when Chandin moves in with the Thoroughlys as a member of the white missionary family:

Chandin’s favorite time of day was after the evening meal when the family gathered in the living room for an hour of relaxation. At other times he was unsure of his place in this new household...Chandin found that a straight-back upholstered chair had come to be marked as his. Although it was only a physical place, the chair became an antidote to the chaos of his uprootedness.¹³

The chaos that is the colonial home, for Chandin, is a chaos resulting from his multiple experiences of the space of colonization. He is twice displaced, first as part of a migrant family, and then as a transposition into the missionary family; here, he first learns that space makes sense only when it is accompanied by rules about how it is to be lived in, and by whom. Later, in his own house, Chandin establishes separate territories within its grounds: the house itself is marked as feminine, domestic space that he rejects along with his marriage while he claims the porch, the gateway to the house, from which he can police the comings and goings of those who enter his house. By doing so, Chandin reclaims a patriarchal power that allows him to draw boundaries as a form of agency not allowed to him while he lived with the Thoroughlys. Gayatri Gopinath in particular, argues that Mala’s home can be productively read as destabilizing the terms of colonial domesticity when read as a counter-space to Chandin’s,¹⁴ but Gopinath’s reading of space is utopian only as a form of reaction. Mala reclaims as her own space the garden that is first designated as the children’s space only after losing her sanity. Her reclamation, like Chandin’s, is a mimicry of the colonizers’ need to submit space to colonization, and this mimicry, I will argue, manifests itself in crucial ways in and through Tyler’s narration which is the focus of the last section of the essay. Tyler is not a colonized subject, but his reproduction of colonial tactics in his narration marks him as a subject of globalization where colonialism’s politics is made invisible even while it is still at play.

¹³ Mootoo, 31.
Spatial Relations and the Body

The development of the novel depends on the subversion of the rules governing how space can be thought of and used that are a legacy of colonial paternalism. This belief that the control of space is therefore a control over the bodies that inhabit those spaces recasts women as objects to be owned that further invokes tropes of colonialism, and they remain relevant to globalization. Colonialism and globalization are not to be conflated, but insofar as spatial logics are concerned, globalization continues to rely on colonial logics of space. The gendered and racialised subject continues to be circumscribed by these spatial logics even if it appears as a mirror image, and I will argue that Tyler embodies globalization’s effects on minorities even as he perpetuates them.

Mala’s trauma cannot be explained solely either in colonial terms, or as a story of globalization. Because there are historical continuities between the two phenomena, any reading of this novel then has to recognize that its form also reflects those historical continuities. Until we recognize how these logics still hold a great deal of explicatory power, globalization’s utopian promises will continue to seem like a farce to minorities. In this novel, even though Tyler is a sympathetic narrator who is himself marginalized, he nonetheless also inhabits a privileged position.

The spatial encoding of codes of behavior has historically affected the colonial subject disproportionately because of the fear of the racial and feminine Other. As Amy Kaplan argues, the notions of “domestic” and “foreign” go hand in hand; one without the other makes little sense:

The concept of foreign policy depends on the idea of the nation as a domestic space imbued with a sense of at-homeness, in contrast to an external world perceived as alien and threatening. Reciprocally, a sense of the foreign is necessary to erect the boundaries that enclose the nation as home. Domesticity, furthermore, refers not to a static condition, but to a process of domestication, which entails conquering and taming the wild, the natural, and the alien.16

---

15 Such intersections explain why extant criticism on the novel argue that the novel offers an exemplary treatment of solidarity between the two main characters, but instead I argue that such solidarity is nonetheless mitigated because the narrator continues to navigate space according to colonial logic.

In order to secure the colonial center, that is to secure empire’s “at-homeness,” colonialism had to create terrifying foreign Others. However, in this novel, the control of colonial space and the control of bodies of color are turned on its head. The space and bodies of whiteness and the space and bodies of minorities have to be “managed,” but they are managed as if in a mirror image.

The process of “domestication” becomes truly terrifying in the case of the minority in this novel. Mala’s father dominates and controls Mala’s body when he rapes her, and it appears as a grotesque mimicry of colonial conquest. “Domestication” in the novel does not mean enforcing domestic boundaries, but rather, tearing them down so that the colonizer is granted greater access to that body. Mala has to be “disciplined” and “tamed” because her body, so much like her mother’s, is threatening, and this discipline comes in the form of refusing Mala any control over her own body. While the white mother in the imperial imaginary is a figure through which the woman’s “moral influence” secures the boundaries of empire, the figure of the racialised Other is marked by the very absence of boundaries that reminds us of the spatial logic of how corporations work under globalization.

Gillian Rose notes that in feminist histories of science, images of “conquest,” “violation,” and “penetration” were central to seventeenth-century science, and that they helped legitimate the exploitation of nature, read woman:

> The femininity of Nature invoked both the passive and nurturing Mother Nature of organic theories of the self and cosmos, as well as the tempestuous and uncontrollable wild Nature of storms, pestilence and wilderness; both Woman’s fecundity and her evil lust placed her closer to Nature than men, and both characterized Nature itself.¹⁷

Women’s bodies always already exist as a representation of space; as representation, women’s bodies need to be physically controlled but that control is further completed and supplemented by the interpretation of the body’s symbolic meaning; women’s bodies are a synecdoche for space. Like the colonies, weaker countries today need to open up their borders to centers of capital flow. If the purity of the white colonial mother is a synecdoche for the wholeness of the colonial metropolitan center—they are whole because they are bounded and closed—then Mala is a synecdoche of how former colonies need to be opened up to globalisation’s flows. Colonial figurations of bodies and spaces continue to be relevant because minorities’ experiences reflect how globalization reproduces similar relationships of power.

¹⁷ Gillian Rose, *Feminism and Geography*, 69.
Thus, the focus on how space is claimed, owned, or colonized gives Mala her legibility and status as a subaltern, and it is also crucial to the novel’s plot development. In the sections of the novel where major revelations take place, the plot evolves because of how the social significance of space transforms the social relations that are represented. For example, in the middle sections of the novel, Mala’s yard is a metonymy for how her body is an object of fear, and how the village’s relation to that fear of her body changes as the community changes. Mala’s yard and body have no essential meaning except to serve as a reflection of the social changes within the community.

The villager’s decision to contain Mala is parallel to the changing nature, use of, and response to the social significance and the control of space:

> Everyone in the village seemed to have finally forgotten about Mala. The generation of children who harassed her by calling names and pelting her with mango seeds had grown up. Their children preferred to chase each other within the confines of their own yards, playing games of cops and robbers, cowboys and Indians.¹⁸

The first generation of neighborhood children cope with fear and discomfort by invading Mala’s yard and stealing the fruit from her trees. The second, later generation of children, however, do not invade Mala’s yard but instead enact in their own yards games that mimic real plays of power and control of states. Under globalization, in Tyler’s narrative perspective, space and the body of the Other performs similar functions, but have different qualities where the actual act of policing has become more subtle. The relationship between space under colonization and that which has been formally decolonized is one of continuity insofar as space requires careful policing.

In this second generation, the present-time of Tyler’s narration, Mala is not just unknowable in the sense that she is unable to make her voice heard, she has become physically absent in their games of power and control. As a specter, Mala continues to play a role in the disciplinary mechanism of surveillance:

> They occasionally noted the ever-widening, ever-lengthening rows of bleached white snail shells planted along the inside of her fence. But they expressed no curiosity about this or about her rare, unpredictable appearances out of the impenetrable sea of brambles and stinging nettles that barred a view of her house. When they had to pass by, the children walked

---

¹⁸ Mootoo, 113.
on the other side of the street, glancing through her fence—not to see her but to make sure she did not see them. According to their parents, she possessed the ability to leap her fence, track an offending child into its hiding place and tear out its mind.¹⁹

The children's playacting no longer mimic the direct invasions of the colonial period, instead, in their studious avoidance of Mala's yard, space contains and constrains Mala's and the children's behaviors because those fears have become internalized and are thus invisible. The children have been disciplined to see their own yards as “safe” spaces where they ritualize the practice of policing one another, but it is the racial and feminine Other that provides the unconscious fear of and desire to police space. Similarly, under globalization, even though foreignness is no longer controlled by direct geopolitical power, it nonetheless remains a figure of fear and suspicion that affects global social relations.

As the novel progresses, the villagers' fear of Mala's yard results in her eventual confinement in the nursing home because Mala's yard embodies her so-called madness and she is consigned to insanity in part because of how she uses and inhabits space in ways that are strange and illegible. But Mala's insanity is itself a product of and response to the social significance and the control of space; and her conduct is a response to the personal trauma of having had her body literally treated as colonized land. Her most poignant response to the psychic colonialism of sexual abuse and abandonment is represented in her relationship with her imaginary friend, Pohpoh, the little girl who stands in for Mala's younger self, and it mirrors colonialism's spatial violence.

The novel's narrative structure interweaves Otoh's actual physical incursions into Mala's yard with Pohpoh's nightly, possibly imaginary, invasions of other families' homes. Pohpoh, also Mala's childhood nick-name, is the little girl that Mala creates at about the same time she “loses” her mind. It is at this point in the novel when Mala “sees” Pohpoh hiding, and manages to “protect” and “free” Pohpoh from the police; the distinctions between Mala and Pohpoh also begin to blur:

Fear was breaking her, was unprying her memory. She was reminded of what she usually ignored or commanded herself to forget: her legs being ripped apart, something entering her from down there, entering and then scooping her insides out. Her body remembered. Mala remembered. She heard the voices of the police. She reconfigured what they said to match

¹⁹ Mootoo, 113.
her story of how she saved Pohpoh that day... She squeezed her eyes tightly and ignored the people trampling, destroying her yard. She put all her efforts into protecting Pohpoh.\textsuperscript{20}

In Mala's mind, the territorial invasions are inseparable from the rape of her body; Mala is "mad" because all space is the "same" to her, and this sameness is further enabled by the breakdown of the temporal frame. Her singular, very particular experience of spatial and temporal order consequently, and her refusal to explain or defend that experience, responds to even if it does not comment on the violence she has encountered.

In these sections, Mala resorts to the language of property and proprietorship when she becomes the imaginary Pohpoh who traverses silently through the neighbors' homes, but only insofar as to recognize her own marginality. Pohpoh, Mala's alter ego, still lives in her father's house but has the power to invade her neighbor's houses by night. These homes belong to what Pohpoh imagines to be a "happy," complete family, and in this, her dreams are a grotesque reworking of Chandin's own desires for a "happy family": "She imagined bedrooms with a happy family, a fairy-tale family in which the father was a benevolent king. There would be a fairy queen for a mother and enough little cherub siblings to fill a very large shoe or pumpkin carriage, their fat, \textit{pink faces} smiling even as they slept."\textsuperscript{21} The fairy tales which form Pohpoh's imagination are not Afro- or Indo-Trinidadian, but European. Their influence cannot be traced to Mala's own childhood, and it is a form of cultural imperialism that is disingenuous because it has been normalized. The reclamation Pohpoh's journeys transgresses not only the boundaries her father places on her, but also that of the white Other to whom the fairy tales belong:

...the layout of houses were predictable, depending on the social status of the dwellers. It thrilled her to have guessed correctly which room followed which. Her eyes brightened with triumph as she stood at the entrance to the living room.... There would be no hint of a stranger's presence, no trace of entry.... She felt triumphant. Avenged.\textsuperscript{22}

Pohpoh's triumph or vengeance is not aimed at this particular family or at any one particular family but rather is directed at the artifice of the class-specific "happy family" whose image we first see through the boy Chandin's eyes when

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20} Mootoo, 175.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Mootoo, 157 (emphasis added).
\item \textsuperscript{22} Mootoo, 158–159.
\end{itemize}
he first moves into the Thoroughly's home. But why does Pohpoh feel triumphant and vindicated by these trespasses? On whom has Pohpoh taken revenge, and what is the form of that reprisal? Pohpoh's victory can be attributed to not only her invasion of the families, but also to how that invasion remains undetected.

Spatial Discourse and the Limits of Narration

The stylistic features of narrative affect our understanding of space because as Michel de Certeau argues, stories in and of themselves are spatial practices; they contain codes that order movements in space. “Story” offer ways of organizing or analyzing space that allows it to change and affect spatiality rather than being constrained by it because of how it conditions the way we think about and experience the world around us. Stories establish the limits of spatiality by telling us where the narrative begins and ends and thus orders our experiences for us: “[Story] creates a field that authorizes dangerous and contingent social actions…. A narrative activity, even if it is multiform and no longer unitary, thus continues to develop where frontiers and relations with space abroad are concerned.” While feminist and Marxist critics such as Gillian Rose, David Harvey and George Lipsitz demonstrate that our experiences of our cities impacts and shapes our communities and our relations to the world, de Certeau turns our attention to how narratives set up the experience of space in the first place. The practice of reading or listening to a story precedes the social relations that the navigation of space enables.

The unreliable narrator of the novel sets up narrative limits that are crucial to the reading of the novel as less than utopian, and such a reading, therefore, has implications for how we understand the politics of globalization. Other critics have often focused on the novel's narrator and note that as the novel’s main narrator, Tyler is at once a liminal and a central character. For example, Rosamond King describes Tyler as liminal because the text precludes his own stories as a transgendered subject, and it is representative of the social exclusion that transgendered communities experience in the Caribbean. The position from which one speaks establishes a strong link between space and

24 Mootoo, 125.
truth; the position of marginality gives us a clear view of power’s disastrous effects.

Critics further observe that Tyler’s marginality as a narrator and a character enables us to the limitations of our political imagination. Vera Kutzinski takes the position that as a first-person narrator, Tyler refers to himself only as “I,” and thus performs the possibility of obviating the limitations of language in identity politics.\(^\text{26}\) On a textual level, therefore, Tyler forces us to reject as inadequate the kinds of critical acts that purport to clarify even as they obscure:

Tyler's narrative, and Mootoo's novel, pleads with its readers to take care to notice Mala’s ‘ordinariness’ underneath the labels that less careful readers affix to her: madwoman, murderer, incest victim, freak... We may not be able to do without abstractions and categories. But we can refuse to use identity labels as epistemological shortcuts that, at one glance, tell us everything we need to know—about individuals, ethic groups, nations, and yes, critical methodologies. Because identity labels simulate knowledge, they obstruct imaginative access to the complexities of human lives and of lived communities.\(^\text{27}\)

Kutzinski draws parallels between Tyler and Mala as they both repudiate a subject formation constituted on the basis of the gaze of the other. Kutzinski’s reading here is reminiscent of poststructuralist arguments that feminist and other minority subjects are discursively produced by the very political structures that profess to give them their freedoms.\(^\text{28}\) In her reading of *Cereus Blooms at Night*, Kutzinski uncovers the limitations of representational politics through the parallels she draws between Tyler and Mala. The categories of “madwoman” and “transgender” are reduced to ontological equivalence, even if it is in the form of a negation, and as a consequence, Kutzinski reveals how empty those categories are when they are divorced from representational politics per se. Tyler’s position read as either marginal or central therefore reveals the need for different kinds of knowledge and political interventions.

However, most extant criticism of the novel does not note Tyler’s unreliability as a stylistic device in the novel, but the effects of Tyler’s language and


\(^\text{27}\) Kutzinski, 144.

\(^\text{28}\) Judith Butler’s *Gender Trouble* is one of the more classic, well-known examples of post-structuralist arguments in this vein.
rhetoric is perhaps worth noting. In her essay “An Ethnos of Difference,” Mariam Pirbhai’s reading of Tyler notes his unreliability but nonetheless contends that as a nurse, Tyler not only ameliorates Mala’s material conditions where she has been institutionalized but also sets into motion an emotional healing process through their shared identification as outcasts and outsiders in Lantanacamara. Pribhai recognizes that Tyler is not above “narrative slippage,” and that indeed, such slippages are constitutive of Tyler’s performance as an amateur biographer or interpreter. Pirbhai reads the breaches, gaps, and interruptions in Tyler’s narration as enabling both characters to engage in friendship. But more importantly, these breaches also identify the socio-political processes that fragment the characters’ sense of self in the first place.

While he is a sympathetic, perceptive and kind narrator, Tyler shifts from the positions of first-person and an omniscient narrator throughout the novel, and he informs our understanding of Mala and her history. His own concession that he is liable to “lapses” as a narrator in the opening of the novel teaches us to approach the text with caution. Even sympathetic narrations cannot be fully trustworthy because like Tyler, our concepts of space and land continue to retain colonial influences; the stories he tells are refolded into a colonial imaginary but their position of privilege and power are now hidden.

Consequently, the correlation between Tyler’s and Mala’s shared queerness or shared marginalization cannot be read as unequivocally utopian because Tyler uses the vocabulary, and consequently, the rationalization of colonization. For example, the description of Mala’s garden and her life in it after she becomes insane is partly related to us in scientific language that presumably belongs to Tyler who speaks as an omniscient narrator: “At first Ave, Hexapoda, Gastropoda and Reptilia burrowed instinctively into nooks and crevices. They realized eventually that they had no cause to hide.” Tyler’s “lapses,” as he calls them can take the form of autobiographical interruptions, but Tyler’s melodic insertions of himself and his life story are not distracting, violent, or even unpleasant. However, Tyler’s “narrative slippages” present Mala’s life in a

---

29 Rosamond King is right to point out how Tyler’s recognition that he is “only” a device sets limits on the value of his own story, but she does not account for how his unreliability plays out in the novel.


31 Pirbhai, 249.

32 Mootoo, 128.
language that arguably does not belong to Mala. These narratives consequently retain trace of the voice of an Other whose choice of language and tropes is not apolitical. Tyler’s interruption into Mala’s narrative is insidious because it is not so much an interruption as it is a naturalization of his own voice, and it is precisely our inability to distinguish between Mala’s and Tyler’s perspectives that allow some critics to valorize their shared queerness.

That inability to distinguish between the two also allows for a conflation that is both too easy and too uneasy. It is too easy because without Tyler, Mala’s story would be completely illegible, and it is also uneasy because the text forces us to question that very access when it foregrounds Tyler’s voice as a voice that still depends on colonial notions of space. Pohpoh’s bittersweet and hauntingly repetitious victory directs our attention to how the novel complicates our own responses to Mala’s story because this colonial language recasts Mala’s story as Tyler’s own. The denotation of ownership in Mala’s garden reflects Tyler’s values rather than Mala’s own: “Mala permitted them to roam boldly and multiply at leisure throughout her property.”

Reading the novel is an uneasy experience not because the madwoman narrates her own story in a contemporary update of the “Yellow Wallpaper,” but because the text again refuses to give us access to the subaltern. Thus the text reflects to us our desire—so much like Tyler’s—to possess a text that reveals the inner motivations and desires of its protagonists.

As an omniscient narrator, Tyler exposes our desire for knowledge, especially our desire to know the motivation behind the putative “sick mind.” Why does Tyler claim to know “the truth, the whole truth, every significant and insignificant bit of it,” and on what basis do we trust Tyler’s declaration? The scientific categories in these descriptions are reminiscent of colonial efforts to categorize and classify different kinds of knowledge, and therefore require us to reexamine Tyler’s hubris when he claims to know “the whole truth.” Tyler’s and Mala’s shared marginalization should be acknowledged and certainly their friendship is central to the novel. Nonetheless, Tyler’s and Mala’s shared marginality produces tensions between the politics we would like to see affirmed in the text—in this case, utopian possibilities for people who are oppressed by racial, gender or sexual inequalities—and how the text stops short of portraying that victory as unmitigated or conclusive.

Walter Bissey, the judge who presides over Mala’s case in court had tormented Mala, Asha, and Ambrose when they were children. The cruel pranks played on Mala were mimicries of the territorial logics that later governs Mala’s

---

33 Mootoo, 128 (emphasis added).
34 Mootoo, 7.
adult life: the playground was divided into territories, and the water-pipe at its center is the position of power, from which Mala, Asha, and Ambrose were ostracized. When Mala confronts Walter and his friends in this section of the novel, Walter draws a line on the ground between them but then changes the rules:

Walter crossed over his side of the line. ‘This is my side, you can’t cross it!’ Pohpoh said. He stared at her in disbelief. He and his friends burst out cackling, hissing and jeering, as though it was the funniest joke they had ever heard. They laughed so hard they doubled over, hitting their thighs and holding their stomachs. ‘Is you who draw the line? Or me? I draw the line. I go where I want. Who have stick in they hand? You or me?’

That there are rules belies the fact that those rules are subject to change on the whim of those who “have stick,” a lesson Mala learns early in her life. Despite any extant laws on private property or rape, Mala has little recourse to gaining the protection under those laws. Even Asha’s letters which could have changed the course of Mala’s life were not delivered, “because the righteous postman, deeming the Ramchamdin house to be a place of sin and moral corruption, refused to go up there.” Despite suspicion and even knowledge of the rapes, nothing is done to protect Mala. Instead, territorial logics of good and evil are used to ostracize and further inflict harm on those who are already victims.

The victories, revisions, and reclamations of space and spatial practices are merely punctuations within the novel that have to be read in light of its more proper, if wistful and uncertain ending. At the end of the novel, Mala is at least saved from incarceration by a childhood schoolmate who is now a judge, and who manages to track down Asha’s letters. But this novel also ends where it begins. The organisation of spatial tropes in the novel re-emerge in the narrative through Tyler’s perspective as the writer of the letter, and it returns to Tyler’s plea directed at a global community but it is also a community that is without referent because it is anonymous and unknown. The novel thus begins and ends by speaking to a subject who is spatially dislocated, thus it contains utopian possibilities but they are held in suspension.

That Mala, or rather, Tyler, resorts to spatial tropes reflects the limitation of our abilities to re-imagine a world where space does not connote domination. The novel complicates the claims of place-based identities without discarding

---

35 Mootoo, 86–87.
36 Mootoo, 243.
them in a utopian gesture, but it also does not reduce that politics to the more commonly held opposition of place to space. Rather, both the notions of place as "local" and space as "global" are central to and subsequently also complicit with the determinations of national or ethnic identity. If literature is to play a part in dismantling globalization's unequal power relations, it has to teach us to question space's role in reproducing inequality. Space as an analytic within this narrative retains its utility but it remains contaminated by its dependence on cartographical imperialism.

Bibliography


Kim, Christine. “Troubling the Mosaic: Larissa Lai’s *When Fox is a Thousand*, Shani Mootoo’s *Cereus Blooms at Night*, and Representations of Social Differences.” *Ty*, Eleanor and Christl Verduyn, eds.


Tierno Monénembo’s “Fula”
*Between Distance and Empathy*

*Roxana Bauduin*

**Introduction**

Tierno Monénembo is a Guinean writer who left his country in 1969 in order to escape Sekou Touré’s regime\(^1\). He is the author of nine novels and a stage play; he won the Renaudot prize for the *The King of Khael* published in 2008. Some of his stories and his novel *Fulani* (published in 2004) are inspired by the history of his own ethnic group, the Fulani people. The novel contains numerous historical, anthropological and cultural elements on Fulani society: it is based on a series of authentic documents that informed the fiction. The Fulani are widespread in fifteen countries throughout Africa. Their nomadic lifestyle promotes intercultural connections although their identity was forged through the preservation of the Fulani language and Muslim traditions. Transhumance punctuates the course of the history of this ethnic group the origins of which are still ambiguous.

In *Fulani*, the author reconstructs the history of the Fulani people from the perspective of a Serer, member of a neighbouring tribe, establishing thus a “joking kinship”\(^2\) between the story-teller and the listener, the Serer and the Fulani, linked by the same questions about characters and events populating the novel. They are considered to be relatives and by choosing the dialogue mode, the author suggests that the reader is listening to a family story. The Serer is placed in the position of an observer, but also in that of a “griot”\(^3\) whose presence provides a space for the development of a legend. The narrative is written as the transcription of an oral story told in a language that which is informal. It presents Fulani history as a series of multifaceted, shifting moments in time and space.

This dynamics could be read as part of the globalization that Nayan Chanda\(^4\) identifies with a process initiated by the first population movements around

\(^1\) Sekou Touré, first President of the Republic of Guinea (1958–1984); his regime was considered to be a dictatorship.


\(^3\) A “griot” is a storyteller in African cultures.

the year 100,000 BC. When read within this specific context, the story becomes what James Clifford calls a series of “historical processes of displacement,” justifying what Ulf Hannerz wrote in 1996: “That image of cultural mosaic, where each culture would have been a territorial entity with clear, sharp, enduring edges, never really corresponded with realities. There were always interactions and a diffusion of ideas, habits, and things.” The term “dynamics” could provide clues for mapping the spiritual territory of this tribe, marked by a diversity of cultural influences which could have led to many radical discontinuities over time. This brings us to our main question concerning the unity of the Fulani ethnic group: who and what made it possible? We will explore this question considering, like Frederik Barth, that maintaining a border is a condition of survival for each ethnic group. Monénembo’s novel highlights both the concept of ethnic dynamics with its specific progress and heterogeneities in the case of the Fulani, but also depicts Fulani culture and history as repositories of constant and specific coordinates or norms.

**A Progressive Dimension**

Throughout his novel *Fulani*, Monénembo underlines a strong progressive dimension in the history of the Fulani people, materialized in their nomadic lifestyle and the diversity of their ethnic connections. The idea of crossed, mixed, multiple identity is preserved in the titles of the three parts of the story, each corresponding to the Fulani chronology and naming a succession of processes of integration and assimilation.

The first part, entitled “For Milk and Glory,” corresponds to the great migration of the Fulani. The story begins in 1400, a time when the tribe was wandering around to meet the needs of transhumance as they lived on “wild grasses and sips of sour milk,” but also to pillage. It continues with the creation of the Kingdom of Fouta Toro. Led by Koli (Great Bull), the Fulani managed to impose their dominance on other people who lived in the Senegal River Valley and set

---

up a powerful dynasty that ruled for over three centuries and was replaced in 1776 by the theocratic regime established by Souleymane Bâl. The second part of the novel, “Lords of the Spear and Inkwell,” insists on the creation of the Kingdom of Bundu, the first Muslim state to be founded by the Fulani. This period is followed by the establishment of theocratic regimes in Futa Toro, Sokoto, Adamawa and Macina, and it is marked by a bloody jihad meant to impose the religion of Allah. In fact, the change was sudden and deep. From simple shepherds, they became propagators of the new religion in a very short time. Finally, the last part of the novel, “The Fury of the Ocean,” is marked by the story of colonial conquest. Europeans began to manifest imperialistic desires and sought to eliminate traditional kingdoms. This led to the collapse of the political institutions in place, one after the other. It is a diffuse period about which, far from any tragic illustration, the narrator, who also plays the role of a trickster, exults:

You did not doubt, did you?, that God, in His infinite mysteries, foresaw a creature even crazier, a more pathological liar, more cruel, more adventurous, more arrogant and more boastful than you...From the coast, where he pretended to doze, the white man was watching carefully your stupid messianic targets and your feverish agitation [....]. Well done, swashbuckling! Alleged son of Abraham!

This fragment is representative of the tone of the novel and creates a space of playful and dangerous dialogue between the narrator and the listener. Its effect is that of an on-going performance transmitting real facts and data. Monénembo maintains a certain tension in the exchanges between the two, which stresses the idea that the Fulani people assimilate and are assimilated through a constant process of negotiation. The diversity of The Fulani people’s geographical, ideological and historical movements, such as described in the novel, corresponds to a large mobility which constitutes a privileged network of dissemination of values and beliefs. What could be called the progressive dimension of Fulani history is part of the globalization process which is perceived as a

---

9 Ancient Fula cities in Western Africa.
10 Tierno Monénembo, 287: “Tu ne te doutais pas, n’est-ce pas, que Dieu, en ses infinis mystères, avait prévu encore plus fou, plus mythomane, plus cruel, plus aventurier, plus hautain et plus hâbleur que toi...Depuis les côtes où il faisait semblant de somnoler, l’homme blanc surveillait attentivement tes stupides visées messianiques et tes fébriles agitations [....]. Bien fait, fanfaron! hypothétique fils d’Abraham!”
space of exchange and progress; the continuous movement of the Fulani, through time, from one territory to another seems to generate a perpetual revival of values and traditions in spite of a certain stress and strain. Thus, the ethnic identity is not only based on immobile pillars, but on specific features of a group at a specific historical moment. Those features represent a social force that keeps the individuals of a community together as members of a totality. The way the Serer presents them reflects his readiness to take part in their joy or sorrow, placing the Fulani history into a global one. The emotional reaction paradoxically translated through an imprecation, which is, in fact, part of the ritual of joking kinship, creates a symbolic link between the two ethnic groups throughout the novel. From this perspective, *Fulani* could be read as a novel of otherness, a story of self seen through the other’s eyes, deeply connected to the Serer, to the Fulani, to the reader as well and thus integrated into a global history of humanity.

**A Heterogeneous Space**

The movement of the Fulani people on the African territory appears to be chaotic. Nevertheless, it is governed by natural disasters affecting the quality of the pastures for this tribe of cattle herders or by wars of conquest or territorial defence. This wandering is part of the nomadic lifestyle and it constitutes a significant path for exchange leading to ethnic mixing. This last element turns out to be both a source of conflict and of material and spiritual wealth. Both *nomadism* and ethnic mixing could be considered two mobile pathways towards an early globalization. This is described in the following fragment taken from the very beginning of the novel in which the Serer reminds the Fulani: “Your identity is confusing; your countries are too many. Your path is full of white and shady areas, of intricate crossing and surprising diversions, inveterate nomad!”¹¹ This state of deep confusion, these ambiguous roots and this lifestyle, always on the move, could have been factors of destruction. They have become instead elements of cohesion and progress.

First, *nomadism* is based on a mystery shrouding the origins of the ethnic group and the Serer explains this fact by using rhetorical questions and exclamations: “Who are you? Where are you from? When did your tribe of cow

---

¹¹ Tierno Monénembo, 18: “Ton identité déroute, tes pays sont trop nombreux. Ton chemin déborde de blancs et de zones d’ombre, de croisements alambiqués et de surprenantes dérivations, nomade invétéré!”
herders spring from nothing on the shores of Senegal? In the sixth, the seventh, the eighth century? The one who could tell would be clever indeed!"\(^\text{12}\) This distant approach contrasts sharply with the Serer's deep knowledge of Fulani history. The irony of the text establishes, as Linda Hutcheon says, “a dynamic relationship, a communicative process”\(^\text{13}\) between the Serer, the Fulani and the reader. This could be a sign of objectiveness from the Serer's part as well as an attempt to preserve the oral tradition in this narrative which is so rich in events, facts and data. The story also aims to depict the attacks and conflicts that Fulani people have encountered during their uncountable wanderings: “(they) reproached to your ugly race the fact of steeling the kola and the palm wine that bringing the merchants from Gabou, the fact of letting animals ransack their fields and desecrate their sacred groves and ponds.”\(^\text{14}\) These outbursts of violence ignited the imagination of people who came into contact with the ethnic group. A paradoxical attitude oscillating between insult and sympathy places the image of the Fulani in a sort of liberating in-between. The eye of the other, sometimes ironic and sometimes appreciative, will follow the fergo or the numerous and tortuous exodus that gradually becomes a mission of conquest. On one hand, this ethnic mixing is described as a source of conflict, but also of wealth throughout history. On the other hand, it is conceived as a rift, but also as a guarantee of the survival of the people: “Thou hast no more left. You have never stopped defiling our rivers, devastating our fields, haunting our villages and nights. Without asking, you planted your hut and destroyed the landscape. It was too late when we opened our eyes.”\(^\text{15}\)

The fragment is significant and sets the tone of the whole text which is thus built as a story shared not only with the Fulani, but especially with the reader. The narrator becomes a vital mediator between us and an ethnic group anxious to preserve its specificities. Several elements presented in the text such as nomadism, ethnic mixing, the wars of conquest or the religious issues provide


\(^{14}\) Tierno Monénembo, 26: “(on) reprochait à ta vile race de dépouiller les marchands de la kola et du vin de palme qu'ils ramenaient du Gabou; de laisser ses bêtes saccager leurs champs et de profaner leurs mares et leurs bois sacrés.”

\(^{15}\) Tierno Monénembo, 14: “Tu ne nous as plus quittés. Tu n'as plus arrêté de souiller nos rivières, de dévaster nos champs, de hanter nos villages et nos nuits. Sans rien demander, tu as planté ta hutte, et démoli le paysage. Il était déjà trop tard quand on a ouvert les yeux.”
a fertile field for investigating a spiritual territory which is often ignored or poorly understood by the Western reader. Their proliferation in the novel enhances the diversity of angles for understanding the Fulani phenomenon. Nevertheless, their constant repetition illustrates a spiral movement integrated in a history in which the human dimension is never neglected.

A Normative Frame

“Norms are the general expectations of a demand character for all role incumbents of a system or subsystem.”

Norms function as reminders, pillars and boundaries for the whole society. To the Fulani, these pillars are the legends, religious traditions and cattle breeding. The legends revolve around political power and the fights for it. If one could synthesize Fulani history, this synthesis could be illustrated by a long list to which new names are constantly added and from which others are dropped out. Nevertheless, the same names come together with the legend of the hexagram of coralline which is passed on from one generation to another. Within the novel, history could be defined as the space in which people perform memorable actions but also as a recollection of less structured memories. Are those elements the strongest factors of cohesion of this widespread ethnic group? A founding legend and the nomadic lifestyle deeply connected with cattle breeding and territorial conquest are added to a long tradition of “joking kinship” as a way towards conflict resolution, as a means of dealing with political authority:

Joking kinship as practiced in Senegal (and many other parts of Africa) generally consists of widely held notions of perceived relatedness that may link large extended families (patrilineal and sometimes matrilineal clans), or ethnic groups. As observed in the founding colonial anthropological works on the subject, and in more recent scholarship, in this region joking kinship typically centers on regularized patterns of mutual ribbing, insulting and teasing, with primary themes of historic subordination/slavery and food insecurity.

---

17 The “hexagram of coralline” is considered to be the sacred stone of the Fula ethnic group.
By making this practice his own way of writing, the author of the novel underlines its importance. Joking kinship is a social and political strategy allowing its actors to remove pressure or resentments, but also to reduce distance between people. On a symbolic level, the word becomes a scapegoat. Persecution occurs against the word itself which is the one banished from the community. From the author’s perspective, the whole Fulani history could be seen as deeply linked to the use of the word—a use that carries dual characteristics. If used outside the joking kinship, however, the word can easily become a persecutor itself, if we were to employ René Girard’s terminology. Such is the case in the Fulani’s founding legend which explains the origins of the Fulani division. It is the story of a succession: a Fulani father has to choose between his two twin sons, Biron and Birane. They are both equal in strength and intelligence; who will be his inheritor? The final test consists in an intellectual game, a riddle, allowing the Father to find the easy way out in order to make this difficult choice:

I’m a funny little boy. If you send me buy things, I do not come back. Who am I?
– The trickster, answers Birom. You give him cowries to buy groceries, but he disappears with the goods.
– The arrow, answers Birane. When you pull it, it does not return, it is housed in the prey.
– Birane, you are the most imaginative, Birane, you’re my elder son! decided Doya Malal. When I am no longer of this world is you will inherit the hexagram of coralline, the sigil of our clan.

Words can destroy, banish and punish. Doya Malal’s decision will affect the destiny of the future generations in a radical manner. From a symbolic point of

---

20 Oral legend belonging to the Fula ethnic group.
21 Tierno Monénembo, 213: “Je suis un drôle de petit garçon. Si l’on m’envoie faire les commissions, je ne reviens pas. Qui suis-je?
- Le filou, répond Birom. On lui donne des cauris pour acheter des provisions, il disparaît avec la marchandise.
- La flèche, répond Birane. Quand vous la tirez, elle ne revient pas, elle reste logée dans la proie.
- Birane, tu es le plus imaginatif, Birane, tu seras mon fils aîné! trancha Dôya Malal. Quand je ne serai plus de ce monde, c’est à toi que reviendra l’hexagramme de coralline, l’insigne de notre clan.”
view, Doya Malal chooses the arrow instead of the trickster, war instead of wit, conflict instead of peace.

When employed within the framework of “joking kinship,” the word endorses a cathartic value; it heals, expiates individual or common faults and connects the members of the community. Moreover, there is no need for victims embodied by “a well-known stranger (...) invited in a feast which ends with his lynching.” The word is the only victim embodying evil and that evil is thrown away, far from the community, at the very moment the word is pronounced. Following the same pattern, the act of writing itself becomes a cathartic project. Every time the Serer addresses the Fulani, their communication is based on teasing and insulting, like in the fragment below: “You have the right to rave; no one is bound to believe you, infamous vagabond, thief of kingdoms and hens! Forget it! Legends say that we are cousins. The same blood, but we are not cut from the same cloth! You, despicable shepherd, I, noble Serer.” Words avoid war, segregation and other kinds of conflicts. “Joking kinship” becomes the elusive yet the persistent ethnic tie. In his study *The Gift*, Mauss analyses joking as a form of social control that corresponds to mutual rights. Turned into a ritual, it becomes a regulator of the social system and, in this particular case, a warranty of peace and stability between different ethnic groups. The “norm” represented by joking kinship is, paradoxically, a way of going beyond limits, standards or prejudice, a means of unifying.

**Conclusion**

The novel “Fulani” can be read as the description of a long journey through space and time oscillating between disasters and resilience. Tierno Monénembo attempts to reconstitute the spiritual map of this nomadic people whose identity was forged almost exclusively through exchanges. This article has focused on the factors involved in the survival of the Fulani ethnic group as they were depicted in literature. The Fulani history, resembling more a series of incursions in the territories of the Senegal Valley in search of water and good land, of bloody wars of conquest and ethnic mixing processes, could have been a

---

23 Tierno Monénembo, 287: “Tu as le droit de délirer, personne n’est tenu de te croire, infâme vagabond, voleur de royaumes et de poules! Soit! nous sommes cousins puisque les légendes le disent. Du même sang peut-être, de la même étoffe, non! Toi, l’ignoble berger, moi le noble Sérère.”
synonym of alienation and loss of cultural memory. Instead, while reading Tierno Monénembo’s novel, the impression is that of witnessing perpetual cultural reconstruction in a world that went global from its very beginning. For this ethnic group, progress is associated with the scattered roads taken along their nomadic wanderings. Space has been split according to their movements while their way of life has followed the same secular norms and habits. Thus, one can talk about a Fulani *continuum* based on a set of socio-cultural and economic transfers that could be defined as characteristic features of what we call globalization today. From this very perspective, the book becomes a fable on the everlasting search for a resolution of the conflict between identity and hybridization.

**Bibliography**


Index of Names

Abdelrahim, Jaled 152n2, 158n
Abu-Lughod, Janet 167n2
Acevedo Ruiz, Manuel 265n2, 265n3, 269
Addison, Tony 162n2
Agamben, Giorgio 110, 114n4, 115–116
Aguerre, Christiane 228
Aldea Vaquero, Q. 143n5
Alén Garabato, Carmen 37n7
Ali-Khodja, Mourad 37
Ali, Maurizio 262
Alley, Richard 179
Anaya, S. James 8
Anderson, Ewan 114n2
Anderson, Robert B. 176
Anzaluda, Gloria 29
Appadurai, Arjun 27, 110, 230, 241
Appiah, Kwame Anthony 27
Arendt, Hannah 114n4, 119
Arndt, Channing 162n2
Arraes, Guel 284
Ashcroft, Bill 23n
Attwood, Ben 82n1, 84
Avilés Gonzáles, Karla Janiré 208n4, 209, 201n1, 211n1, 212n3, 217n1
Barrett, Michèle 211n3
Barriga Villanueva, Rebecca 208n4
Barth, Frederik 320
Barthes, Roland 231n1
Batiri Williams, Esther 201n2
Bauman, Zygmunt 31n
Bayart, Jean-François 6, 109, 111
Blatter, Joachim 68
Beck, Ulrich 56, 218n1
Becker, Michael 70
Beiers, J. Marshall 168
Bélanger, Nathalie 36n4
Belich, James 80, 81, 83, 88
Bell, Claudia 88
Beltrán Salmón, Luis Ramiro 259n2, 260
Berkes Fikret 196
Bertrand, Jean-Pierre 37n1
Bessonard, Christine 224n2
Bhabha, Homi 43n1
Bhawuk, Dharm P.S. 9
Binetti, Vincenzo 110n4
Biron, Michel 37n5
Blackwell, Maylei 207n2
Boesen, Inger W. 114
Borocz, Joszef 173n1
Börzel, Tanya 57n
Bosko, Rafael Eddy 240
Boucher, Philippe 283n1, 288, 290, 292
Boudreaux, Annette 37
Boudreaux, Raoul 37, 38n3
Bourdieu, Pierre 60n3
Bourriaud, Nicolas 242
Boyer, Henri 37n7
Browne, Stephen 264–265
Brubaker, Rogers 56
Bryman, Alan 7
Brzezinski, Zbigniew 168n2
Bujes, Maria Isabel 217n2
Butler, Judith 313n3
Burgogne-Larsen, Laurence 127
Calvelo Ríos, Manuel 266
Cameron, Kate 82
Cañas, Sandra 211n1
Caporaso, James 57n
Cardinal, Linda 36n1
Carter, Caitriona 65
Carton, Michel 32n4
Casarino, Cesare 110n4
Casteel, Sarah 304
Castell, Carmen 211n2
Castells i Talens, Antoni 269
Castillo, Pedro 153
Castillo Durante, Daniel 321n1
Cendrars, Blaise 298
Champagne, Duane 2–3
Chanda, Nayan 319–320
Chatterjee, Sudipto 244
Chomsky, Noam 160
Clifford, James 320
Collin, Amy D. 321n1
Colom González, Francisco 9
Connolly, William E. 56n2, 70n3
Corntassel, Jeff 161, 172, 177
Cotton, Charles 24n2
Coulthard, Glen S.  172
Cowles, Mary.   57n
Cox, Robert W.  2n1, 166, 173
D'Abbeville, Claude  286
Daigle, France    33, 35, 46
Dalai, Lama      93–94, 103
Dale, Robert    167
Dana, Leo Paul  176
Dana, Theresa E. 176
De Andrade, Mario  283
De Andrade, Oswald 24n4, 298
De Certeau, Michel 312
Delanty, Gérard  60n1
De Las Casas, Bartolomé 143n4, 145n2
De Léry, Jean  285, 289
Deleuze, Gille  28, 37
DELORIA, VINE 165
Del Valle, Carlos  262
De Montaigne, Michel 24, 285
De Santa Rita Durão, José 281, 287, 289–296
Desbiens, Patrice 31n2, 34
De Solórzano Pereira, Juan  144
De Tocqueville, Alexis 28
D'Évreux, Yves  286n3
Dickson, Robert 31n2, 43, 45
Di Meglio, Alain  37
Dorais, Fernand 36
Dowell, Kristin  268
Dube, Saurabh  211n4
Duarte Bastian, Ángela Ixkic 209n2, 211n1, 212, 218n3
Dunstall, Graeme 83
Durie, Mason 165
Edward, John  210n2
Ellerman, Antje  112, 118
Ellison, Ralph  25

Faessel, Sonia  37n3
Fals Borda, Orlando  219n4
Featherstone, Kevin  57n
Fenelon, James V.  112
Fennig, Charles D.  208n4
Fisher, R.M.  110
Fishman, Joshua 215n4
Fletcher, Richard  271

Florescano, Enrique 146
Flores Farfán, José Antonio  215n3
Foucault, Michel  45n1
Foullon, Clément  286n4
Frank, André Gunter  167n2, 167n5
Freeman, Carla  28
Freire, Paulo 219n3
Friede, Juan  144–145, 149
Fuenzalida, Fernando  149
Fukuyama, Francis  55

Galvan, Denis 319n2, 324n3
Garay de Montglave, Eugène 282, 289
Garet, Daniel  288
García Pérez, Alán  154
Gauvin, Lise  37n1, 37
Gavet, Daniel  283n1, 290, 292–293
Gills, Barry  167n2, 167n5
Gitlitz, John  157
Giddens, Anthony 60
Gilbert, Anne 36n1
Gindin, Sam  168n4
Ginsberg, Faye 260, 267, 272, 274
Girard, René 325
Glissant, Edouard 29
Godbout, Patricia 38n1
Godzich, Wlad  37n3
Goldblatt, David  58n
Goldsmith, Michael 87
Gomes, Alfredo N. 167
Goncalves, Marcela 164
Gopinath, Gayatri  306
Gosch, Elizabeth  87
Graham, Douglas 86
Grassby, Al  84
Grey, John  56
Griffiths, Gareth  23n
Gruzinski, Serge  141
Guattari, Félix 28, 37
Guéhenno, Jean-Marie 55
Gumucio-Dagron, Alfonso 259, 261, 269, 270

Hall, Thomas D.  112
Hannerz, Ulf 320
Hansen, James 179n1
Harvey, David  304n1, 312
Hasegawa, Koichi  2
Hasson, Amir 271
Hatch Dupree, Nancy 114n2
Haugard, Mark 114n4
Hawthorne, Susan 5
Heidegger, Martin 44n
Held, David 58n, 174n4
Hémon, Louis 35
Henare, Manuka 165
Himmelfarb, David 251n
Hollinsworth, David 79n1
Hotte, Lucie 36
Hoving, Isabel 304
Howe, K.R. 81n3
Huamani, Giselle 156n4, 157n2
Humala, Ollanta 155n2
Hunn, J.K. 81
Huntington, Samuel P. 55
Hutcheon, Linda 323
Imbert, Patrick 32n1, 32n4
Inda, Jonathan 217n3
Irazusta, Richard 230
Isin, Engin F. 67
Jagueneau, Liliane 210n1
Jay, Paul 27n2
Jessop, Bob 168, 173–174
Jerjez Loayza, Javier 152–153
Jiménez, Beatriz 154
Jiménez Abollado, Francisco Luis 144
Jupp, James 79, 84
Kahn, Robert Louis 324
Kaplan, Amy 307
Katz, Daniel 324
Keating, Paul 85
Kharecha, Pushker 179n1
King, Michael 81, 86, 89
King, Rosamond 312, 314
Kiste, Robert 81n3
Knightley, Phillip 79, 84, 85
Krauss, Michael 208
Kutzinski, Vera 313
Lachance, Denis 273
Ladrech, Robert 57n
Lai, Clarissa 309n2
Lal, Brij 81n3
Landowski, Eric 42n2
Larsen, Peter 162n3
Leclerc, Catherine 37n7
Leonard, Irving A. 142
Léonard, Jean-Léo 208n4, 210n1, 215n2
Lerner, Daniel 259n1
Lewis, Paul M. 209n4
Lipsitz, George 304n2, 312
López, Alma 212
Lorena Caballero, Sybil 263
Maalouf, Amin 32n2
Macchi, M. 162n3
Maffi, Luisa 162n3
Malloy, Tove Hansen 64n, 66, 68–69, 71
Mani, Lata 211n4
Manners, Ian 57n
Manosh, Das 248n
Mariátegui, José Carlos 150
Marangoly George, Rosemary 305
Markus, Andrew 82n1, 84
Marthoz, Jean-Paul 270
Martín Butrageño, Pedro 208n4
Martínez-Andrade, Luis 141
Mato, Daniel 217n2
Mauss, Marcel 326
McCarthy, James 179
McGrew, Anthony 58n
McGrew, Tony 7n3
McMichael, P. 173
Mein Smith, Philippa 79, 81
Méaux, Alfred 293
Meyer, Jean-Baptiste 32n4
Michaels, Walter Benn 230
Miyoshi, Masao 302m
Mohanty, Chandra T. 211
Mohr, Dunja M. 304
Molina, Marie 179
Moller Oskin, Susan 211n2
Monémenbo, Tierno 320–323, 325–326
Montuori, Alfonso 11
Morency, Jean 35n, 5
Morgan, Sally 87
Moscoso, Martin 156n4, 157n2
Moyes, Lianne 37n7
Naipaul, V.S. 25
Nath, Vikas 263–264
Neira, Hugo 150, 151
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neville, Auber O.</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nietschmann, Bernard</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyela, Désiré</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obry, Olga</td>
<td>283, 284, 286, 287–290, 292–293, 298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogburn, William F.</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O’Kelly, Joseph</td>
<td>283n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oliver, W.H.</td>
<td>80m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osétegui, José</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ossio, Juan M.</td>
<td>147, 148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oviedo, Gonzalo</td>
<td>162n3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panitch, Leo</td>
<td>168n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papastergiadis, Nikos</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paré, François</td>
<td>32n3, 35, 36n3, 37n2, 38, 42n1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasquier, Romain</td>
<td>65, 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pentland, Alex</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pereiro de Santos, Nelson</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pérez, Michel</td>
<td>37n3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perraton, Jonathan</td>
<td>58n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philips, Anne</td>
<td>56n5, 211n3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre, Thomas</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pirbhai, Mariam</td>
<td>304, 314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poliquin, Daniel</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pratt, Marie-Louise</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price, Sally</td>
<td>26n3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabinder James, Michael</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radaelli, Claudio</td>
<td>57n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raeders, Georges</td>
<td>294–295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reynolds, Henry</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riaudel, Michel</td>
<td>296–297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rickard, John</td>
<td>77n1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ricoeur, Paul</td>
<td>32, 39, 40, 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ridgeway, Aden</td>
<td>89n2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risse, Thomas</td>
<td>57n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ritzer, George</td>
<td>71n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robertson, Roland</td>
<td>167n22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robertson, Susan L.</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rogers, Everett M.</td>
<td>258n1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rorty, Richard</td>
<td>56n2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosaldo, Renato</td>
<td>217n3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rose, Gillian</td>
<td>303, 308, 312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruby, Jay</td>
<td>238n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruggiero, Romano</td>
<td>141n3, 142, 146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rusden, George W.</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saftri, Myrna</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Said, Edward</td>
<td>303n1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sánchez Nestor, Martha</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandell, Richard</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sato, Makiko</td>
<td>179n1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sawian, Bijoya</td>
<td>248n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schlenker, Andrea</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholte, Jan Aart</td>
<td>167n3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schramm, Wilbur</td>
<td>258n2, 259n1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scott, James</td>
<td>213n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servaes, Jean</td>
<td>259, 260, 264n3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shindell, Drew</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiva, Vandana</td>
<td>162n2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siemerling, Winfried</td>
<td>38n1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silva, J.M.</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simons, Gary F.</td>
<td>209n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinclair, Timothy</td>
<td>2n1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith, David A.</td>
<td>173n1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spalding, Karen</td>
<td>143, 145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spivak, Gayatri</td>
<td>109n1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staden, Hans</td>
<td>285, 289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephens, Carolyn</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stern, S.J.</td>
<td>141n3, 148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stewart Harawira, Makere</td>
<td>1, 161n2, 167n1, 170n3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stone, Lawrence</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stransky, Nicholas B.</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove</td>
<td>208n3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabing, Louie</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamahori, Lee</td>
<td>86n5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tandeter, Enrique</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarp, Finn</td>
<td>162n2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasso, Franco</td>
<td>282, 284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Templos, Ibarra Y.</td>
<td>217n1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terven, Adriana</td>
<td>208n4, 211n1, 217n1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thériault, Joseph Yvon</td>
<td>36n1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thevet, André</td>
<td>285, 289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thiesse, Anne-Marie</td>
<td>25n2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thompson, Robert C.</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiffin, Helen</td>
<td>23n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torfing, Jacob</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tully, James</td>
<td>163n2, 172, 178n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twaalftvogel, Anita</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ty, Eleanor</td>
<td>303n2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urteaga, Patricia</td>
<td>156n4, 157n2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Page Numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verduyn, Christl</td>
<td>303n2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verluise, Pierre</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vorraber Costa, Marisa</td>
<td>217n2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villanueva, Victor</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villasenor-Galarza, Adrian</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wall, Diana</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wangchen, Dhondup</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watchel, Nathan</td>
<td>146, 148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whaley, Lindsay</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whalter, Steven T.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilkinson, David</td>
<td>167n1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williams, David V.</td>
<td>165n1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilson, Pamela</td>
<td>260n3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yelin, Louise</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young, Iris Marion</td>
<td>211n5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zavala, Silvio</td>
<td>142, 147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zembylas, Michalinos</td>
<td>110–111, 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeppel, Heather</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Index of Subjects

Anthropology
  indigenous art and 238
Audiovisual production
  indigenous development and 266–269
Afghan diaspora in Pakistan
  change in perception of 114–115
  fearism and 109–110, 116, 120
  legal status of 113
  resistance of 117, 120
Alter-globalization
  minority groups and 27
Altrité
  conscience de 39, 44–45, 49, 52
  passivité et 41–43
Art
  colonialism and 26
  indigenous people and 241–242, 245–248, 249–255
Australia
  indigenous writers in 87
  minority policies in 78–79, 80–81
  multiculturalism in 84–85
  national self-image in 86
Basque language
  conflict in the recognition of 225, 228
  identity and 226
Benet people
  community art projects of 250–254
  identity of 249
Brésil
  colonialisme et 297
Canada
  aboriginal rights in 193
  Grassy Narrows people in 197–198
  indigenous cultural revitalization in 197
  Occupy movement 192
  resistance to land exploitation in 202
  threats to the environment in 187
  water protection in 189–190
Capitalism
  Encomienda and 147–149
  globalization and 171, 173–174, 177–178
Citizenship
  European discourse of 67–68
  regional language recognition and 229
  traditional minorities and 68–69
Collaborative art projects 245–248, 250–254
Cultural minorities
  conscience altéritaire et 39, 44–45, 49, 52
  definitions of 60
  knowledge of 4–5
  littérature franco-canadienne sur méconnaissance des 32–33
Cultural periphery
  center and 25
Culturalism
  knowledge and 10
  Land rights
  Canadian aborigines 175, 202
  Maori and 175
Colonialism
  cannibalistic response to 24
  identité brésilienne et 297
  indienisme et 292
  mimicry and 306
  “primitive” art and 26
  space and 305–306
Communication technology
  indigenous communities and 267
  indigenous development and 261–262
Convention 169 of the ILO 152
Cosmopolitanism 28
Declaration of Principles of the World
  Summit on Information Society 264
Deterritorialization
  culture and 27
  Discourse identities in Europe 63–70
Double-consciousness 25
Economic development
  North-South divide and 59
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index of Subjects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education and minorities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Encomienda</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capitalism and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>status of Indians during</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environmental issues</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indigenous responses to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indigenous rights and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minorities’ homeland and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minority politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sacred ecology and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Essentialism</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnographic museums</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Europe</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>citizenship discourses in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identity and development in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>laws about minorities in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>European Commission</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>role of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>European Convention on Human Rights</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>European law</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minority populations and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>penalties in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>protection of third world nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>repatriation of aliens in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Race Directive in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relational aesthetics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indigenous projects and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fearism</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imaginary construction of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani state discourse of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>First Nations / First Features festival</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fulani people</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cultural reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>globalization and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>history of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>joking kinship and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spiritual territory of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender issues</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet as a tool to address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mazatec women and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trans-community experiences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global communication tools</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indigenous associative development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indigenous resistance through the use of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Globalization</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ambivalence of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as external force of social change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capitalism and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contradictions of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cultural reconstruction and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cultural sectarianism and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>definition of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>diversity and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europeanization and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulani history and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global politics as</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global warming and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>international law and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>literature of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minority cultures and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neo-feudalism and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>new politics of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>space and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibetans and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global literature</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>madness in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>marginalization in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spatial disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spatiality in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global warming</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identity formation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>homeland and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identity stripping</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resistance as</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Idle No More</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crosscultural connections and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>destruction of lands and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassy narrows education project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sacred ecology and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Igloolik Isuma productions
  cultural reappropriation in 274–276

Indianisme
  Brésil et 284–285, 289
  civilisation et 291
  foi chrétienne et 290
  nostalgïe et 298
  pratiques coloniales et 292

Indians
  definition of 157–158

Indigeneity 82–83
  apports étrangers et 290
  definition of 164
  gender and 213
  politics of 169

Indigenous art
  anthropology and 238
  Benet people and 250–254
    film as 267–268
  Khasi people and 247–248
  participatory projects and 238–239

Indigenous development
  audiovisual production and 266–269
  Benet people and 249
  communication and 258–259
  Khasi people and 244
  limits of radio communication and 261–262

Indigenous people art and 244–254
  communication technology and 267
  education and 10–11
  essential representations of 240
  ethno-linguistic reconquest and 215
  gender issues and 213
  globalization and 2
  global rap culture and 244
  hacienda system and 151
  internal colonization and 163
  land resources and 153–154, 156, 179, 188–189
  mining and 151–152
  multiculturalism and 214
  participatory art productions of 24
  relation to land 164–166, 171
  rights of 152, 158, 174, 193, 240
  romantic portrayal of 238
  self-determination and 8, 176–177
  sustainable development and 160–162, 178
  triple crisis of sustainability and 162–163

Indigenous knowledge
  art and 247–254
  cultural revitalization of 197
  networking and 263

Indigenous Languages
  audiovisual productions and 268
  community radios and preservation of 262
  extinction of 208
  reconquest of 215

Indigenous resistance 117
  the media and 268

Indigenous women
  consciousness raising and 219
  gender politics and 218
  Naxi-í organization of 212–213
  professional enhancement of 214

International Labour Organization
  Convention 107, 169

Individual autonomy
  reflexive action and 60

Information technology
  civic organization and 269–270
  cultural survival and 271

Kari-Oca I and II 171

Khasi people of India
  cultural art projects of 245
  identity of 243, 248
  outside threats to 247

Land rights
  indigenous people and 240

Language
  Basque identity and 225–226, 228
  indigenous 209
  recognition of regional 229

Latin America
  Indigenous struggles in 177

Literature/Littérature
  franco-canadienne 33
  geopolitical divisions in 303
  global 302
  representational politics in 313
  représentation des indiens dans la 286
  marginalization in 315–316

Littérature minoritaire Australia and 87
Index of Subjects

dénomination et 36–38
Fulani people and 325

Maori people 79–81, 83, 85, 175
Mazatec women 211–212, 218

Mexico
gender, indigeneity and politics in 213
indigenous languages in 209
Naxi-í organization of Mazatec women 208

Mimicry 306

Minorities
alter-globalization and 27
Australia and 78–79, 80–81
citizenship 68–69
cultural reconstruction of 326–327
domestication of 308
invisibility of 77
museum work and 26, 247–254
narratives of 61–63
social change and 55–56
traditional 61

Minority politics
environmental discourse and 70
regional politics and 66–67

Minority rights
state laws and 169–170; 193

Mita
Indigenous Incan communities and 147
reducciones and 148–149

Mondialisation
fragmentation identitaire et 31; see also globalization

Multiculturalism
in Australia 84–85, 214;
see also transculturality

National self-image
Australia and 86

(Neo-) Feudalism
capitalism and 149, 173
Incan society and 146
Peruvian Indians and 150

New-Zealand
identity crisis in 88
minority policies in 79–81, 85
national self-image of 86

Occupied movement
Canadian indigenous resistance and the 192–193

Pakistan
Afghan resistance to exclusion in 117, 120
fear of Afghans in 109–110
status of Afghans in 113, 114–115

Peru
land management issues in 155–157
Law of Prior Referendum in 155–156

Postcolonialism 23

Radio communication
indigenous development and 261–262

Rap music 244

Reflexive action
art and 247–254
traditional minorities and 69

Regional language 227
teaching of 230–213

Representational politics 313

Saadi case 131–132

Self-determination 8, 176–177

Social change
social media and 260

Space
colonialism and 306
identity and 305
social inequality and 303–304
the body and 307

Stereotyping
Indigenous people and 211, 243

Sujet minoritaire
altérité, passivité et 41–43
conscience coupable et 47
contestation et 41
rapport à soi et 39–40

Sustainability 162–163

Territorial identity
Basque linguistic issues and 232

Tibetans
education and 98
exile and 93–95
global tools of resistance for 96–97
government in exile of 103
Tibetans (cont.)
in China 99
marginalization of 95
pressure groups of 101–102

Transcultural art projects
Benet people and 249–254
indigenous intervention in 241–242
Khasi people and 245–248

Transculturality 3–4
art and 241–242, 245–248, 249–254
food and 23
identity and 27
non-violence and 105; see also multiculturalism

Treaty of Waitangi 85, 161

Triple crisis of sustainability
indigenous people and 162–163

Tupis 285
identité métisse des 294
identité religieuse des 287–288

UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People 169
government of Canada and 170
UNDIP 171–172
UN Working Group on Indigenous people 169

Water protection
minorities and 189–190