

Youth Civic and Political Engagement

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First published 2019

ISBN 13: 978-1-84872-161-6 (hbk)

ISBN 13: 978-1-84872-162-3 (pbk)

ISBN 13: 978-0-429-02557-0 (ebk)

Chapter 2

Psychological Factors Linked to Youth Civic and Political Engagement

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PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS LINKED TO YOUTH CIVIC AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT

As noted in the previous chapter, many psychological factors are related to young people's civic and political engagement. These psychological factors are often better predictors of different types of civic and political activity than either social or demographic factors (Barrett & Zani, 2015b; Fife-Schaw & Breakwell, 1990). They have also been found to mediate the relationship between macro, demographic and social factors and civic and political activity (Barrett, 2015; Brunton-Smith, 2011; Brunton-Smith & Barrett, 2014; Cohen, Vigoda & Samorly, 2001; Nie, Verba & Kim, 1974).

The present chapter reviews these psychological factors in detail. The specific factors that will be examined are the following: political knowledge; political attentiveness; political interest; political efficacy; the perceived effectiveness of participatory actions; personal, social and collective identities; trust; values; and emotions. We begin with political knowledge.

Political knowledge

There are several different types of political knowledge that can be distinguished. First, there is knowledge of the characteristics of political regimes and the processes related to their functioning. Western societies, where most of the research in this field has been conducted, are typically governed through democratic regimes, and for this reason most studies have examined young people's knowledge of democracy, elections, government, the role of the media, citizenship, rights and responsibilities, freedom, equality, rule of law, etc. Second, there is knowledge of current political incumbents, that is, of the individuals who hold particular political offices, who currently lead political parties or who are influential voices and operators within the political system. Third, there is knowledge of other current political facts, for example, knowing which political party or

parties are in control of the government or the legislature, the main features of the ideologies or the policies that are advocated by the main political parties, knowledge of political biases in particular media sources, etc.

The importance of political knowledge for both actual and expected future electoral participation has been widely documented in the research literature (e.g., Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Zukin et al., 2006; Torney-Purta et al., 2001). For example, CIVED (Torney-Purta et al., 2001) examined 14-year-olds' knowledge of the characteristics of democratic systems. The data were collected in 28 countries (see Table 1.2, Chapter 1). A significant correlation was found between knowledge of democracy and expectations of future voting – those students who had the most knowledge were also the most likely to say that they would vote when they became adults, and this knowledge was the single most important predictor of the expectation of voting in the future. However, this link between political knowledge and participation has been most widely demonstrated in relationship to electoral participation, rather than in relationship to other forms of participation. In fact, a more complex pattern emerges when other forms of political and civic participation are taken into account.

For example, in ICCS 2016 (Schulz et al., 2017), data were collected from 14-year-olds in 21 countries (see Table 1.2, Chapter 1). Several measures of expected future political participation were used. First, the students were asked to estimate the likelihood that they would participate electorally in the future (i.e., vote in local elections, vote in national elections, get information about candidates before voting in an election, etc.). Second, they were asked to estimate the likelihood that they would engage in the future in legal forms of political participation in order to express their opinions (e.g., contact an elected representative, take part in a peaceful march or rally, participate in an online campaign). Third, they were asked to estimate the likelihood that they would engage in illegal forms of political participation in the future in order to express their opinions (e.g., spray-paint protest slogans on walls, stage a protest by blocking traffic). Fourth, they were asked to estimate how likely they were to engage at some future date in other forms of active political participation (e.g., join a political party, join a trade union, join an organization committed to a political or social cause). The data were analysed to identify the relationships between all of these forms of future expected participation and political knowledge.

In all countries, students who had higher levels of knowledge about the characteristics of democratic systems were more likely to say that they would participate in elections in the future, replicating the previous finding by Torney-Purta et al. (2001). However, there were few differences associated with levels of knowledge in the students' expectations of participating in legal activities in order to express their opinions: those who had low levels of knowledge were as likely to say that they would engage in such actions in the future as those who had high levels of knowledge. However, when it came to expected participation in illegal activities, in every country, students who had *lower* levels of political knowledge were more likely to say that they would participate in illegal protest

activities. Also, and rather curiously, expected active political participation was higher in 12 of the 21 countries among students who had *lower* levels of political knowledge (there was no significant association between knowledge and expected active political participation in the other nine countries). Thus, when forms of participation other than electoral participation are used, a varied pattern emerges. The most counter-intuitive finding is the negative relationship between political knowledge and expected active political participation in the future. Schulz et al. (2017) speculate that more knowledgeable students may be more likely to consider their commitments carefully and to understand properly the constraints that they might experience in pursuing such engagement in the future.

Of course, having an expectation that one will engage politically in the future may not always translate into actual political action in the future. However, ICCS 2016 also examined the relationship between the students' political knowledge and their willingness to participate in current school activities, such as voting in a school election for a student representative, joining a group of students campaigning for an issue they believed in, participating in discussions in a student assembly and writing articles for a school newspaper or website. It was found that in 13 out of the 21 countries, political knowledge was related to willingness to participate in these school activities, with more knowledgeable students being more willing to participate in these various actions. In another seven countries, knowledge was not related to willingness to participate in school activities, while in one country (Colombia), political knowledge was actually related to being unwilling to participate in school activities (Schulz et al., 2017). The different patterns that arose in different countries are noteworthy, revealing the need to examine the role of psychological factors in conjunction with macro contextual factors.

Overall, it has been found that young people generally have low levels of all forms of political knowledge, including knowledge about system processes, incumbent political representatives, political facts and current issues (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Putnam, 2001; Wattenberg, 2007). This lack of political knowledge may be a significant factor that inhibits young people from engaging in civic and political action. Indeed, Pachi, Garbin and Barrett (2011), in a focus group study of 16- to 26-year-old British Bangladeshi, Congolese and English youth that was conducted as part of PIDOP, found that these youth often felt that they did not know enough about political issues to be able to engage in effective action to influence political, civic and social change, and cited this as one of the main reasons why they were civically and politically disengaged.

As far as demographic variations in political knowledge are concerned, there is consistent evidence of a systematic relationship between young people's political knowledge and their SES (Torney-Purta et al., 2001; Schulz et al., 2010, 2017). For example, ICCS 2016 used parental occupation, parental education and the number of books in the family home to measure SES. It was found that, on all three measures, higher SES was consistently associated with higher

political knowledge scores. This pattern occurred in every country that was studied (Schulz et al., 2017). We will revisit these findings in more detail in Chapter 3, where we discuss the role of SES at greater length.

There are also sometimes differences in political knowledge as a function of gender. For example, in the USA, it has been found that, at the age of 17–18 years, males typically have more knowledge than females, especially knowledge about political parties, elections and protest activities (Niemi & Junn, 1998; Wolak & McDevitt, 2011). However, the gender gap in knowledge tends to be relatively small, and there are also some studies that have failed to find a gender difference in political knowledge. For example, CIVED (Torney-Purta et al., 2001) found no statistically significant gender differences in knowledge in 27 of the 28 countries that were studied (although males did exhibit slightly higher levels of knowledge in 11 countries). By contrast, ICCS 2016 found that the females actually had higher levels of political knowledge than the males in 19 of the 21 countries studied (the USA did not participate in this study) (Schulz et al., 2017).

There also tend to be differences in levels of political knowledge as a function of the ethnicity of young people. For example, in the USA, African-American and Hispanic youth perform significantly worse on standardised tests and surveys of political knowledge than White and Asian youth; furthermore, this difference is already present by fourth grade and continues all the way through middle and high school (Levinson, 2010, 2012). Ethnic group differences were confirmed on a larger scale in ICCS 2016, where it was found that, in general, 14-year-olds from non-immigrant families had higher political knowledge scores than those from immigrant families, and students who spoke the language of school instruction at home tended to have higher scores than students who did not speak this language at home (Schulz et al., 2017).

Before leaving the topic of political knowledge, it should be noted that some studies have suggested that knowledge needs to be accompanied by, for example, institutional trust or perceptions of an injustice in order for participation to occur (Bennett, 2007; Hart & Gullan, 2010; van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2008). That is to say, simply having knowledge about system processes, incumbent political representatives, political facts or current affairs may not be sufficient in and of itself to mobilise young people to participate – young people may also need to engage in cognitive, emotional or ethical appraisals of political processes, representatives or current affairs in order to be sufficiently motivated to participate, and they may also need to feel that they can be efficacious through the particular forms of action that they undertake (see the discussions below on emotions, values and political efficacy, respectively).

Political attentiveness

Political attentiveness refers to the extent to which an individual pays attention to sources of political information such as the news and current affairs, documentaries on political events on the radio, television or Internet, political

debates and discussions, etc. It has been found that political attentiveness tends to be higher in early adulthood than in adolescence (Bennett & Bennett, 1989; Fernandez-Jesus, Malafaia, Ribeiro & Menezes, 2015).

Political attentiveness has been treated in the research literature primarily as an antecedent of civic and political participation, and higher levels of political attentiveness are indeed associated with higher levels of participation (Nie et al., 1996; Zukin et al., 2006). However, attentiveness may not influence political participation directly. This is because attentiveness is also related to internal efficacy (see below), which in turn is known to strongly predict levels of participation. In addition, it has been found that, in 14- to 18-year-old American youth, internal efficacy predicts political attentiveness, with attentiveness then predicting both political knowledge and intentions to vote in future elections (Pasek, Feldman, Romer & Jamieson, 2008). In other words, the patterns of causality involving attentiveness are probably highly complex, involving reciprocal relationships with other psychological variables.

Political attentiveness was examined by ICCS 2016, which included questions asking the 14-year-olds how often they used television and newspapers to obtain information about political and social issues. Overall, 66% of students watched television at least once a week in order to obtain information about news, whereas only 27% read newspapers at least once a week; however, these figures mask considerable variation across countries, with the range being 45%–80% for television and 16%–60% for newspapers, depending on the country concerned (Schulz et al., 2017). Compared with the findings of the survey conducted in the previous round of ICCS in 2009 (Schulz et al., 2010), in which data were collected from 14-year-olds in 38 countries (see Table 1.2, Chapter 1), these figures represent a decline in the frequency with which young people are attending to political and social issues through the use of traditional media.

It is possible, of course, that young people are turning to new media instead in order to access their news and information about political issues. For this reason, ICCS 2016 also included questions about whether students used the Internet at least once a week for obtaining information about political and social issues, for posting comments or images about a political or social issue and for sharing or commenting on other people's online posts about a political or social issue. It was found that, overall, 31% of students used the Internet at least once a week to find out information about such issues, only 9% posted a comment or image about such issues at least once a week and only 10% shared or commented on another person's online post about such issues at least once a week (but again, there were considerable variations from one country to another) (Schulz et al., 2017).

In other words, despite the declining use of television as a source of information, these 14-year-olds were nevertheless still more likely to use television than social media for obtaining information about political or social issues (66% vs. 31% overall). In addition, there was little relationship between the use of social media for obtaining information about political and social issues and levels of political knowledge. That said, there is good evidence that the use of television

and newspapers is associated with levels of political knowledge in young people (this evidence will be reviewed in Chapter 3, where we discuss the effects of the mass media in more detail). Thus, the idea that social media are now serving as a significant source of information and news for young people does not receive support from the findings of ICCS 2016.

Finally, it is important to note that political attentiveness sometimes has opposite relationships to participation depending on the specific form of participation that is involved. For example, as part of PIDOP, Brunton-Smith (2011) analysed data from the European Social Survey (ESS), which had been collected in 20 countries from youth aged 15–24 years old and from adults aged 25 years and older. He found that, in both age groups, higher attentiveness to political issues was associated with a higher tendency to vote and to participate civically but with a lower tendency to engage in non-conventional political participation. The fact that a single psychological variable such as attentiveness is related in opposite directions to different kinds of participatory behaviour implies that interventions aimed at boosting participation rates by increasing political attentiveness need to consider precisely which behaviours are being targeted, and also need to be mindful that other behaviours may be negatively affected as a consequence of the intervention.

Political interest

Political interest refers to the interest that an individual has in politics and political issues. Interest has sometimes been conceptualised as the converse of political apathy (Bynner & Ashford, 1994). There are scales that have been designed to measure political apathy, for example the Political Apathy Scale (e.g., Bennett, 1986), as well as scales to measure political interest more directly (e.g., Barrett & Zani, 2015b).

It has been consistently found that young people show lower levels of interest in conventional politics than adults, with many considering traditional politics to be ‘boring’, ‘irrelevant’ to their lives, ineffective and incomprehensible (Kiesa et al., 2007; Marsh et al., 2007; Zukin et al., 2006). Russo and Stattin (2017) conducted a longitudinal study into changes in levels of political interest among Swedish youth aged between 13 and 28 years old. They found that instability in levels of political interest was most pronounced between 13 to 15 years of age, but that interest became more stable with increasing age, especially from the early twenties onwards.

Political interest tends to be conceptualised as a psychological predisposition, which alongside political knowledge and political attentiveness leads to civic and political participation. And indeed, it has been found that, in both youth and adult populations, the more interest a person shows in political issues, the more likely they are to participate in civic and political activities (see, e.g., Brady et al., 1995; Brunton-Smith, 2011; Schulz, 2005; Schulz et al., 2017). Thus, Emler (2011), for example, proposes that political interest functions as the initial factor

that leads to political participation. He suggests that interest stimulates political attentiveness, which in turn leads to political knowledge, with knowledge leading to opinionation and to political participation.

However, the causality between interest and participation may sometimes actually run not from interest to participation but in the opposite direction, from participation to interest. Evidence on this issue is reported by Šerek, Machackova and Macek (2017), who conducted a longitudinal analysis of the relationship between young people's interest in politics and their political participation. The data were collected from Czech youth aged 14 to 17 years old. The analyses revealed an effect of participating in protests on political interest (but no effects of volunteering or of engaging with elections or elected representatives on interest). There were also no significant effects in the opposite direction, from political interest to participation.

The links between political interest and both political knowledge and political attentiveness are very close and are probably also bi-directional. Young people who learn about political issues and processes have been found to be more interested in political issues, and similarly young people who are interested in political issues show a preference for resources that allow them to learn more about political issues. Furthermore, it is difficult to isolate factors that promote or hinder one of these three variables without affecting the others simultaneously (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996).

Education is an important factor that has been found to be related to interest in many studies. For example, Emler and Frazer (1999) report that, in the case of British 16- to 19-year-olds, both the level of educational attainment and the amount of post-16 education are related to political interest. Likewise, Cicognani, Zani, Fournier, Gavray and Born (2012) report that, in Italy, 18-year-old students who are on an academic educational track rather than a technical or vocational track have higher levels of political interest. It also seems likely that engaging in political discussions further contributes to young people's political interest. ICCS 2016 found that political interest was strongly and consistently related to the extent to which 14-year-old students discussed political and social issues outside school with parents and with friends; this finding arose in every country that was studied (Schulz et al., 2017). Once again, the causality here is probably bi-directional, with interest leading to discussions and discussions further strengthening interest.

It has also been reported that SES is linked to political interest in at least some populations of youth. For example, Bynner and Ashford (1994) studied British 16- to 19-year-old youth. They found that lack of political interest and intention not to vote were associated with low SES, poor educational performance and cynicism about politics. That said, ICCS 2009 only found associations between SES and students' political interest in some rather than all countries, and even in those countries where the association was present, it was relatively small (Schulz et al., 2010).

In the USA, a gender gap in levels of political interest has been reported by Bennett and Bennett (1989), with females typically having less interest in

politics than males. Dassonneville, Quintelier, Hooghe and Claes (2012) also found a gender gap in favour of males in a study of 16- and 18-year-old Belgian youth. However, other studies have reported the opposite pattern in levels of interest between males and females. For example, Haste and Hogan (2006), in a study of British youth aged between 11 and 21 years old, found high levels of interest towards both social and political issues among females, with the females displaying a higher level of interest in social and environmental issues than males. Similarly, Pachi and Barrett (2012a; Pachi, Garbin & Barrett, 2011), in their focus group study of British Bangladeshi, Congolese and English 16- to 26-year-olds, found that the females tended to have just as much political interest as the males.

Political efficacy

Another important construct that has been linked to civic and political participation is political efficacy (Craig, Niemi & Silver, 1990; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Klandermands, 2002a; Schulz, 2005; van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2008). Three distinct forms of efficacy have been distinguished in the research literature: internal, external and collective efficacy. Each of these forms has different antecedents and different consequences for civic and political participation. *Internal political efficacy* is the belief that one understands political issues and is able to participate effectively in political situations; *external political efficacy* is the belief that politicians and political institutions are responsive to citizens' demands; while *collective political efficacy* is the belief that a collective group to which one belongs is able to have an effect on political situations.

There is a strong and consistent relationship in both adults and youth between political participation and internal efficacy: the higher the level of internal efficacy, the higher the level of both actual participation and future intended participation (Blais, 2010; Brunton-Smith, 2011; Schulz et al., 2010; Schulz et al., 2017; Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995). For example, ICCS 2016 found that, at 14 years of age, internal efficacy was significantly related to both expected electoral participation and expected active political participation (e.g., working on a political campaign or running for office) in all 21 countries that were studied (Schulz et al., 2017).

Similarly, the higher the level of external efficacy, the more likely the individual is to participate in the political processes that are controlled by the actors who are perceived to be responsive to the demands of citizens (Abramson & Aldrich, 1982; Craig et al., 1990; O'Toole et al., 2003; Pachi and Barrett, 2011a; Rosenstone & Hanser, 1993). When people do not believe that politicians or policymakers will take people's demands and needs into consideration, then they are less motivated to participate (Soss, 1999). Interestingly, O'Toole (2004), in a study of British youth aged 16 to 25 years, found that these youth differentiated between national and local scale politics. They felt that mainstream national politicians were unresponsive to their needs and that they could not have any

impact on decision-making at the national level. In contrast, they felt much more efficacious with respect to local political issues, issues which are treated on a smaller scale and which they perceived as having a direct effect on their own lives and their peers' and families' lives.

Collective efficacy in youth has been less extensively studied than either internal or external efficacy. However, collective efficacy has been identified as one of the main predictors of participation in collective action (i.e., organised social or political action carried out by a group of people to try to achieve a shared collective goal – marches, protests and demonstrations are typical examples). In a meta-analysis of 53 studies of collective action, several of which included youth as participants, van Zomeren et al. (2008) found clear evidence that collective efficacy predicts participation in such action. However, collective efficacy may affect participation in collective action indirectly rather than directly. For example, Jugert et al. (2016) found that collective efficacy is related to participation in pro-environmental behaviour among German 18- to 30-year-olds, but this effect is indirect; the perception that the collective group is capable of reaching its collective goals leads to an increased sense of internal efficacy, which in turn then motivates individuals to act on behalf of the group. One context within which the sense of collective efficacy among young individuals has been studied is the school: CIVED (Torney-Purta et al., 2001) examined the extent to which the 14-year-old students felt that, by working together, they could help to solve school problems. It was found that the majority of students had a moderately positive sense of collective efficacy in this context.

As far as the development of efficacy is concerned, Schulz (2005) explored this issue using CIVED data which had been collected not only from 14-year-olds but also from 17- to 18-year-olds (Amadeo, Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Husfeldt & Nikolova, 2002). He examined differences in both internal and external efficacy between 14-year-olds and 17- to 18-year-olds from 10 countries, and found that levels of internal efficacy increased across this age range, while levels of external political efficacy decreased. In other words, self-confidence in dealing with political issues and taking political action increased, while beliefs about the responsiveness of the political system to citizens' demands decreased. In addition, Schulz found that internal efficacy had a consistently positive relationship to expectations of becoming more actively involved in politics in the future at both ages, whereas external efficacy only had a relatively weak relationship to future expected involvement.

In terms of its relationship to other factors, internal efficacy is strongly related to political interest. This finding was obtained by Schulz (2005) in the analyses of the CIVED data and also by Schulz et al. (2017) in their analyses of the data from ICCS 2016. Indeed, the latter revealed a clear relationship between students' internal efficacy and their interest in political and social issues in all 21 countries that were studied. Exactly the same finding was obtained by Brunton-Smith (2011) in his analyses of ESS data in PIDOP. Indeed, he found that internal efficacy and political interest were so highly correlated with one another that

they effectively formed a single factor that was positively related to levels of participation: among those who had high levels of both internal efficacy and political interest, there were consistently higher levels of all forms of participation (i.e., voting, other forms of conventional political participation, non-conventional participation and civic participation). Furthermore, these same relationships were found to be present in those who were aged between 16 and 24 years as well as in those who were aged 25 years and older.

In addition, the analyses of CIVED data by Schulz (2005) revealed that external efficacy, perhaps not unexpectedly, is related to trust in institutions (government, local council, courts, police, parties and parliament). He also found that internal efficacy is related to political discussions with peers and parents and to the frequency of using media (newspapers, television and radio) for obtaining information about national and international issues.

Once again, there are demographic group differences in levels of efficacy. For example, a link between internal efficacy and SES has been found: youth whose families have a higher income and a higher educational level tend to have higher levels of internal efficacy (Schulz, 2005; Schulz et al., 2017). Youth from higher SES families are more likely to have access to resources such as time, money and opportunities for participation, all of which will enable them to acquire civic and political skills and attitudes such as internal efficacy and political interest that will enable them to participate civically and politically (cf. Brady et al., 1995). SES has also been found to be related to external efficacy, with those who have attained higher educational levels and higher incomes believing more in politicians' and government's responsiveness to people's needs (Flanagan et al., 2003; Soss, 1999; Wu, 2003). In addition, it has been reported that women and girls sometimes feel less efficacious than men and boys (Easton & Dennis, 1967; Goel & Milbrath, 1977; Lyons & Menezes, 2012), although there are also other studies that have not found any gender differences (e.g., Vecchione & Caprara, 2009; Wu, 2003). We discuss demographic differences in greater detail in Chapter 3.

While it is tempting to conclude that internal and external efficacy are causal factors that impact on participation, the causality that is involved here is almost certainly bi-directional. Quintelier and van Deth (2014) conducted a three-wave longitudinal study in which data were collected from Belgian adolescents when they were aged 16, 18 and 21 years old. They found that there was a reciprocal causal effect between political participation and internal efficacy, but the effects of political participation on internal efficacy were much stronger than the effects of efficacy on participation. These findings are consistent with those of Šerek et al. (2017), whose longitudinal study, which was conducted with Czech youth aged 14 to 17 years old, revealed that participation in protests strengthened both internal and external efficacy (as well as political interest), and that participation in volunteering activities strengthened external efficacy. It therefore seems highly likely that there is a reciprocal causal relationship between internal efficacy and participation.

Perceived effectiveness of participatory actions

A further construct that is closely related to external political efficacy is the perceived effectiveness of different participatory actions. Despite the significance of this construct, it has not received much attention to date, apart from a few studies that have been conducted with adult populations (e.g., Klandermans, 1984; Simon et al., 1998). In these studies, perceived effectiveness has been linked to people's cost-benefit calculations when they make decisions about which forms of action to take.

Notice that the perceived effectiveness of particular actions is distinct from external efficacy (i.e., the extent to which one believes that politicians and political institutions are responsive to citizens' demands). For example, one can feel that government is generally not responsive to citizens' demands (i.e., have a low sense of external efficacy), but in attempting to persuade a government about one's case, the judgement might still be made that, say, participating in a militant action (e.g., a mass protest on the streets) is more likely to be effective than participating in a moderate action (e.g., signing an e-petition).

Young people's perceptions of the effectiveness of different forms of conventional, non-conventional and civic participation were examined by Pachi and Barrett (2012a) as part of PIDOP. The data were collected from 16- to 26-year-old British Bangladeshi, Congolese and English youth living in London using focus groups. The findings revealed differences in judgements about the effectiveness of action across ethnic groups, genders and ages. As far as ethnic group differences were concerned, English majority young people believed more in the effectiveness of conventional forms of participation (such as voting) than ethnic minority young people. However, gender differences were also apparent; for example, the effectiveness of actions based on membership of a religious organisation was more salient among the female participants. In addition, age differences were present: older participants, in contrast to younger participants, gave greater emphasis to the effectiveness of participation through charities, which was seen as effective for ensuring the distribution of benefits to those who are most in need and for helping disadvantaged groups in society, as well as being important for personal development and enrichment. Differences based on the intersection between ethnicity, gender and age were also apparent. For example, as far as non-conventional forms of participation, such as spraying graffiti and joining demonstrations were concerned, these were largely rejected by the females who were below voting age and by the ethnic minority males who were above voting age, who argued that these actions were ineffective due to the fact that they involved breaking the law; thus, the perceived legality or illegality of actions was a particularly salient consideration for these particular subgroups of participants. More generally, personal experience of different forms of participatory action, perceptions of the effectiveness of different organisations, the personal need for expression and perceptions of discrimination were all widespread justifications that were given by these young people for their evaluations of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the various forms of action that were discussed.

Identities

Youth is a critical period in human development for exploring and developing identities and for thinking about one's own position and possible future roles within society (Erikson, 1963, 1968; Kroger, 2004, 2007). A central aspect of identity development during this period is reflecting on and considering one's role as a citizen within the wider social, civic and political communities in which one lives. The identity commitments that are made (or not made) can have important implications for civic and political behaviour.

There are many different types of identities that may be explored during youth. Some are based on personal attributes (e.g. studious, fun-loving), some on interpersonal relationships and roles (e.g. daughter, friend, student) and some on autobiographical narratives (e.g., born in London to middle class parents, educated at a state school) (Stryker, 1980; Deaux, 1992, 1996). Other identities may be based on membership of social groups (such as a nation, an ethnic group, a religious group, a gender group, a neighbourhood, or a school). When membership of a particular social group forms a salient part of one's self-concept, so that emotional significance and value is attributed to that group membership, then the person is said to have acquired a social identity (Tajfel, 1978). Furthermore, in cases where a number of people share the same social identity, feel solidarity with one another and take action together to pursue the goals of the group, they may be said to have acquired a collective identity (Klandermans, 1997). These multiple identifications with different attributes, relationships, roles, narratives and social groups help individuals to define, position and orientate themselves relative to other people, and can have significant consequences for individuals' civic and political behaviour.

Numerous researchers have built on Erikson's (1963, 1968) account of identity development during adolescence, with the most well-known body of work being that conducted by Marcia (1966; Marcia, Waterman, Matteson, Archer & Orlofsky, 1993). However, a more recent account, namely the three-factor identity model, has been used explicitly to explore the relationship between identity development and civic and political participation. The three-factor model proposes that identity development during adolescence involves an interplay between three key processes: *identity commitment* (which refers to the firm identity choices that have been made), *identity exploration* (which refers to the extent to which current identity commitments have been reflected upon and examined by searching for information and speaking to others about those identities) and *reconsideration of commitment* (which refers to the comparison of present identity commitments with alternative possible commitments when existing commitments are judged to be unsatisfactory) (Crocetti, Rubini & Meeus, 2008; Meeus, 1996; Meeus, Iedema, Helsen & Vollebergh, 1999; and Meeus, van de Schoot, Keijsers, Schwartz & Branje, 2010).

From the interplay between these processes, specific identity statuses emerge. Specifically, youth who have an *achievement status* are those who have strong

identity commitments that have been explored deeply and are not being reconsidered. Youth who have an *early closure status* have moderate identity commitments that have been neither explored nor reconsidered properly. Youth who have a *moratorium status* have low commitments to identities and are reconsidering these commitments in search of more satisfying alternatives that have a better fit to their needs and aspirations. Finally, youth who have a *diffusion status* have low commitments, have engaged in little identity exploration and are not reconsidering their commitments (Crocetti, Schwartz, Fermani, Klimstra & Meeus, 2012; Meeus et al., 2010).

Interestingly, links have been found between these various identity statuses and patterns of civic engagement. Crocetti, Jahromi and Meeus (2012) conducted a study with Italian high school students aged between 14 and 20 years old. It was found that those youth who had an achieved identity status were more involved in volunteer activities, reported higher levels of efficacy and had stronger aspirations to contribute to their communities than those who had a diffused status. In addition, a link was found between identity processes (i.e., commitment and exploration) and past and future volunteer activities, with the relationship between identity and future volunteering and future political participation being mediated by these young people's sense of civic duty.

Different identity styles have also been found to have consequences for patterns of participation. A distinction may be drawn between youth who have an *information-oriented style* (who actively seek out and evaluate identity-relevant information), those who have a *normative style* (who readily adopt the prescriptions and expectations of others) and those who have a *diffuse-avoidant style* (who delay the identity formation task for as long as possible) (Berzonsky, 2011). Crocetti, Erentaitė and Žukauskienė (2014) used these distinctions in a study of 14- to 19-year-old youth in Lithuania and found that youth who had an information-oriented style were more likely to participate in volunteering activities than those who had a normative or diffuse-avoidant style. Collecting a second set of data from the same youth one year later, Crocetti, Garckija, Gabrielaviciute, Vosylis and Žukauskienė (2014) further found that identity style was relatively stable over time, with the effects of identity style on civic behaviour being stronger than the effects of civic behaviour on identity style. That said, higher levels of participation in civic activities at the earlier point in time did reduce the tendency of those adolescents who originally had a diffuse-avoidant style to persist in the avoidance of identity issues.

Collective identities are particularly important in relationship to civic and political participation, because they can act as strong motivators to undertake collective action on behalf of the group. They help young people to articulate common grievances and common goals, which can politicise them and lead them to act together to change the prevailing situation (Klandermans, 2014, 2015; Simon, 2011; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; van Zomeren et al., 2008). Martínez, Peñalosa and Valenzuela (2012) provide a good example in a study of Chilean youth who were aged 16 to 24 years old. These youth identified

with social and political causes and integrated them into their own identities. Their sustained social action was related to their identification with the goals of the collective group organisations to which they belonged, and their accounts conveyed a collective sense of 'we' that was developed through working toward shared goals with the other members of these organisations.

Ethnic identity, in particular, can function as a powerful collective identity for young people who belong to ethnic minority groups and can motivate their civic and political participation. For example, in the USA, Jensen (2008) interviewed second generation immigrant youth aged between 14 and 18 years old, nearly all of whom regarded political and civic engagement as important. Some were highly active participants, especially at the community level. One-third were engaged in community activities that specifically had a cultural focus or occurred through cultural organisations, and their motivations were based on their ethnic or immigrant identities. In another study, Lyons, Chrysanthaki, Verkuyten, Selivanov and Pavlenko (2008) collected data from 15- to 18-year-old ethnic minority youth in England, the Netherlands, Greece, Spain, Russia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Georgia, focusing in particular on their use of the Internet in support of minority rights. It was found that there was a strong positive relationship between levels of ethnic identification and the likelihood of using the Internet in support of these rights. Likewise, van Bergen, Feddes, Doosje and Pels (2015), in a study of 14- to 18-year-old Muslim Dutch youth, found that their connectedness to their ethnic group (defined as their emotional attachment to and understanding of the culture of that group) predicted their willingness to use violence to defend their ethnic group. All of these findings are consistent with the notion that a minority ethnic identity, if transformed into a politicised collective identity, can be a powerful motivator of civic and political action for minority youth (Pachi, Chrysanthaki & Barrett, 2014).

However, as we have noted already, young people are in the process of developing not just a single but multiple identities during adolescence. Much of the research literature in this field addresses single identities and ignores their inter-sections. In real life, people's beliefs, emotions and behaviours are usually the product of a complex system of multiple identities, which sometimes interact in a complementary way and sometimes in a conflicting way. For example, Chrysochoou and Lyons (2011) found that a perceived incompatibility between national and ethnic/religious identities was negatively related to levels of political participation among 15- to 18-year-old Muslim youth in Spain and the Netherlands.

Another collective identity that can be important for young people is their identification with their school. The school is a space of common experiences for students, and this can reinforce their identification both with the group's space and with its members. It has been found with American 11- to 17-year-olds that the sense of solidarity with classmates predicts the motivation to act on behalf of the common good by protecting both the school space and other school members (Flanagan, Stoppa, Syvertsen & Stout, 2010). Thus, when young people are

given the opportunity to identify with a collective community, they can develop a sense of emotional belonging, trust and solidarity with that community, which in turn can lead them into active engagement (Kassimir & Flanagan, 2010).

Finally, it should be noted that most research examining the relationship between identities and civic and political participation has tended to regard identification as an antecedent of participation. The study by Crocetti et al. (2014), which was discussed above, is an exception in this regard. There is, in fact, very good evidence that, in adults, collective action itself can strengthen collective identities in particular (Klandermans, 1997, 2002; Reicher & Drury, 2010). It seems highly likely that the same phenomenon occurs in youth as well, with the causal relationship between collective identification and participation in collective action being reciprocal.

Trust

Trust has been conceptualised at an interpersonal, social, political and institutional level (Citrin & Muste, 1999; Newton, 2001, 2013; Weatherford, 1987). To trust someone or something is to believe that they are honest, well-intentioned, will not knowingly or willingly do you harm and at best will act in your interests. *Interpersonal trust* is the belief that another specific individual is trustworthy; *social trust* is more generalised, and is the belief that most other people in broader society are trustworthy; *political trust* is the belief that political actors and institutions ranging from politicians to the incumbent government to the political regime of a country are trustworthy; and *institutional trust* is the belief that societal institutions such as the police, courts, media, educational institutions, banks, companies, etc., are trustworthy.

CIVED (Torney-Purta et al., 2001) measured 14-year-olds' trust in national government, national parliament, political parties, local government, courts, the police, news on television, news on the radio, news in newspapers, the United Nations, school and the people who live within the respondent's own country. ICCS 2009 (Schulz et al., 2010) used a similar set of items to those used in CIVED, while ICCS 2016 measured trust using the same set of items as ICCS 2009, together with an additional item that measured trust in social media (Schulz et al., 2017). These three studies between them revealed that, in general, 14-year-olds tend to express the lowest levels of trust in political parties and the highest levels of trust in courts of justice. However, in countries which have high scores on indices of corruption and low scores on indices of government efficiency, more politically knowledgeable students tend to have less trust in institutions; by contrast, in countries which have low scores on indices of corruption, more politically knowledgeable students tend to have higher levels of trust in institutions (Lauglo, 2013; Schulz et al., 2017). ICCS 2016 also revealed changes in students' levels of trust between 2009 and 2016: in many countries, the ICCS 2016 students had higher levels of trust than their 2009 counterparts in government, parliament and courts of justice; however, they expressed lower

levels of trust in media and people in general. As far as trust in social media is concerned, ICCS 2016 found that social media were trusted less than traditional media (television, newspapers and radio). This could be the reason why students are more likely to use television rather than social media for obtaining information about political and social issues (cf. the discussion above in the section on political attentiveness).

Torney-Purta, Barber and Richardson (2004) also used the CIVED data to examine the relationship between trust in institutions and civic and political participation in six of the countries in which data had been collected from 14-year-olds. They found a relationship between institutional trust and expected future voting, volunteering, joining a political party and writing letters to a newspaper about social or political concerns. In addition, they found that institutional trust itself is sometimes predicted by reading articles in newspapers about current affairs (an index of political attentiveness). However, the relationship between trust and participation was fairly modest in magnitude, and other psychological factors (e.g., political knowledge) were much more powerful predictors of expected future civic and political participation.

However, the relationship between institutional trust and different forms of participation might not only be modest in strength. This relationship might actually vary in its direction depending on the particular form of participation involved. Evidence suggesting that this is the case is reported by Brunton-Smith (2011) in his analyses of data from the ESS, which were collected in 20 countries from youth aged 15–24 years old and from adults aged 25 years and older. He found that, in both age groups, institutional trust did indeed have different relationships with different forms of participation. For example, individuals with higher levels of institutional trust were more likely to vote, but they were less likely to participate in non-conventional political activities such as participating in public demonstrations and signing petitions. This finding does make intuitive sense, insofar as people who have high levels of institutional trust might not feel the need to take any action outside conventional channels because of their high level of trust in their elected representatives (cf. Amnå & Ekman's, 2014, 2015, concept of the standby citizen discussed in Chapter 1).

Finally, as far as social trust is concerned, Kelly (2009) explored the link between social trust and participation in American youth aged between 15 and 25 years old. She found that both ethnic majority and ethnic minority youths who had high levels of social trust were more likely to have performed voluntary service in the community within the 12 months prior to the study and were more likely to value the practice of voting than those who had low levels of social trust. In addition, ethnic minority youths who had high levels of social trust were more likely to say that they would engage in political volunteering; this relationship was not present in the majority youth. However, the causality here is ambiguous. It could be the case that high levels of social trust motivate individuals into voluntary service and valuing voting. Alternatively, it could be the case that when young people engage in strengthening their communities through

voluntary service and through voting, social trust is enhanced. Longitudinal data are really required to determine the direction of the causality that operates between trust (of all kinds) and participation. Unfortunately, such data from youth do not currently exist on this issue.

Values

Values are another set of psychological factors that can motivate civic and political participation. Values are general beliefs that individuals hold about the desirable goals that should be striven for in life (Schwartz, 2006, 2013). They motivate people's actions and serve as broad guiding principles for deciding how to act. They also provide standards or criteria for evaluating actions, people and events. Values transcend specific situations, and as such they are much broader than attitudes (which instead are usually focused on specific actions, objects or events). In addition, and importantly, values have a normative-prescriptive quality about what *ought* to be done or thought across many different contexts. They therefore differ from attitudes in this respect as well, because attitudes do not carry the same kind of prescriptive quality.

In an audit of the literature on the psychological factors related to young people's democratic competence, Barrett (2016) examined 101 conceptual schemes that purport to describe these factors. Examining the values contained in these schemes, he found that they commonly contained the valuing of justice, fairness, equality, democracy and the rule of law as components of democratic competence.

In fact, research indicates that valuing justice can be a particularly powerful value for motivating civic and political participation. This is because a social justice orientation can readily generate a deep sense of injustice when violations of just and fair principles are perceived, which in turn can lead to anger. This set of psychological conditions has been identified in many different national contexts as one of the primary motivations behind collective action among both adults and youth (van Zomeren et al., 2004, 2008). We return to the role of anger below, when we discuss emotions.

However, it is not only collective action that may be motivated by justice considerations. Neufeind, Jiranek and Wehner (2014) studied the role of justice considerations in volunteering, conventional political participation and participating in collective protests among a group of Swiss youth who had a mean age of 23 years. They found that these young people's beliefs about justice predicted the extent of their volunteering as well as their political participation. Likewise, Luengo Kanacri, Rosa and Di Giunta (2012) studied the role of benevolence (i.e., valuing the welfare of those with whom one is in frequent personal contact) and universalism (i.e., valuing the appreciation, tolerance and protection of the welfare of all people) among 19- to 29-year-old Italian youth. It was found that these two values were related to one another and that benevolence (but not universalism) directly predicted membership of civic associations (e.g., associations

for the protection of human rights, trade unions, volunteer social service associations). By contrast, valuing power (i.e., valuing social status and control or dominance over other people and resources) predicted membership of political associations.

Flanagan, Galloway, Gill, Galloway and Nti (2005) examined the values held by 12- to 19-year-old American youth. They explored these youths' definitions of democracy, the values they endorsed and whether the aspects of democracy that they found personally meaningful were concordant with their families' values. It was found that those who were older, came from better educated families, discussed current events at home and participated in extracurricular activities in school or in the community were more likely to define democracy correctly. The meanings that these young people ascribed to democracy were freedom, individual rights, civic equality, popular sovereignty and representative government. Social vigilance (i.e., wariness of other people who might take advantage and get an upper hand) and materialism were more prominent values for those youth whose families' views of democracy emphasised individual rights. By contrast, responsibility for the environment and for people in need were the values reported by youth whose families emphasised equality. Youth from more educated families were more likely to endorse social and environmental responsibility and were less likely to endorse materialist values and social vigilance.

In a study of British youth aged between 11 and 21 years, Haste and Hogan (2006) examined the issues that were of concern to them and the values that they held. It was found that there were three different sets of issues that concerned these young people: quality of life and social order (e.g., facilities for young people, health care, opportunities for women and controlling crime); perceived threats to national or cultural sovereignty (e.g., the effects of other countries on British politics and immigration control); and environmental issues and animal experimentation. Haste and Hogan report that these patterns were linked to three different moral orientations: an ethic of care, community and responsibility; an ethic of protecting the state and formal institutional action; and an ethic based on single issues and social activism. The first and third value orientations were more likely to be adopted by females, while the second orientation was more likely to be adopted by males.

Additional evidence about the role of values in young people's political and civic participation comes from a study of American 17- to 18-year-old students conducted by Malin, Ballard and Damon (2015). They found that, among those who were politically or civically engaged, concern about civic and political issues was usually accompanied by strongly held values, including concerns about injustice, the need to help others and the importance of the family. Distinguishing between traditional political activity (e.g., discussing political issues, attending demonstrations), expressive activity (e.g., expressing political opinions, contacting elected representatives) and community service (e.g., volunteering in the community, fundraising), Malin et al. found that community service had the most purposeful and involved participants, with these particular individuals

having the most sustained and strongest intentions to contribute to the world beyond the self.

An alternative perspective on the role of values is provided by young people's conceptions of what is meant by 'good' citizenship. Dalton (2008), in a study of American youth and adults, found that two broad dimensions characterised their views of what constitutes good citizenship. One dimension valued citizen duty: voting in elections, never evading taxes, serving in the military, obeying the law, reporting crime and serving on a jury. The other dimension instead valued citizen engagement: helping those who are worse off than oneself, both in one's own country and in the world, choosing products for political, ethical or environmental reasons, understanding others, being active in voluntary groups and associations, being active in politics and forming one's own opinions. The former is focused on allegiance to the state and the existing political order, whereas the latter is focused more on the moral and empathetic aspects of citizenship.

Breaking the results down by generation, Dalton found that adherence to citizen duty values was highest amongst the elderly and lowest amongst youth, whereas adherence to citizen engagement values showed the opposite pattern, being highest amongst youth and lowest amongst the elderly. Dalton further found that these two different value orientations predicted individuals' tolerance for others, support for civil liberties, support for minority rights and priorities for government spending. The orientations also predicted the forms of political and civic activity that were undertaken by individuals: those who adhered to citizen duty values were more likely to vote, whereas those who adhered to citizen engagement values were more likely to participate in demonstrations and consumer activism. Note that these findings echo those discussed in Chapter 1 on the shift among young people away from conventional political participation towards non-conventional political participation and civic participation – Dalton's findings imply that this shift is a consequence of a difference in the values that are held by young people vs. older individuals.

Dalton's conclusions, which were drawn from American data, were examined more broadly by Hooghe, Oser and Marien (2016) using the ICCS 2009 data that had been collected from 14-year-olds in 38 countries. Hooghe et al. found that they could also identify groups of individuals who adhered either to engaged citizenship values or to duty-based values. Those who adhered to engaged citizenship values (about 25% of the sample) attributed importance to protecting the environment, protecting human rights and helping others in the local community, and downplayed the importance of voting and joining a political party; those who adhered to duty-based values (about 20% of the sample) displayed the converse pattern. However, together, these two groups only accounted for 45% of the 14-year-olds, with the other 55% not fitting into Dalton's binary typology. These individuals instead showed one of three further profiles. A small group (about 6%) did not attribute importance to any of the citizenship behaviours examined and simply regarded themselves as subjects who should obey government and authorities rather than actively participate. A larger group (about 18%)

was characterised by attributing importance to many citizen behaviours but not to discussing politics or to joining a political party. The largest group (about 32%) viewed all citizen behaviours as being important. The differences between Dalton's and Hooghe et al.'s findings may well be due to the fact that the former were derived from older individuals, with the patterns displayed by the 14-year-olds being more characteristic of younger individuals whose citizenship values are still in the process of developing.

Emotions

Interest in the role of emotions in civic and political engagement has grown in recent years. A wide range of emotions has now been studied in adults, either as motivators of political and civic action, as factors that emerge during the course of action, or as consequences of action (Capelos, 2013; Capelos & Exadaktylos, 2015, 2017; Goodwin, Jasper & Polletta, 2004). For example, Omoto and Snyder (1995) found that the duration of voluntary service in the health field is predicted by emotions such as feeling a humanitarian obligation to help others, enjoyment in helping others, a feeling of community concern, and also by the personal satisfaction that is derived from engaging in voluntary service. Likewise, Jasper (1998) argues that emotions play an important role in collective protest. He notes that individuals can initially experience emotions that motivate them to join protest groups, and that other emotions are then formed or reinforced during the course of collective action itself. These emotions may be transitory context-specific emotions, usually reactions to information and events, or they may be more stable affective bonds and loyalties between members of the protest group. Negative emotions such as anger have also been found to play a significant role in motivating collective action (Leach, Iyer & Pedersen, 2006; Smith, Cronin & Kessler, 2008; van Zomeren et al., 2004). However, other emotions such as fear may co-exist with action-motivating emotions and suppress the role of those emotions and inhibit action-taking (Miller, Cronin, Garcia & Branscombe, 2009).

Most of the roles that emotions can play in the civic and political participation of adults have not yet been extensively studied in youth. However, it is known that 10-year-olds in both Canada and Taiwan are more likely to engage in environmental actions if they feel fear, anger and concern about current environmental issues (Huang & Yore, 2005). Youth volunteering has also been found to be linked to emotions: Bringle (2015) found that, in American college students, empathic anger (i.e., feeling angry about injustice or inequity to other people who are not family or friends) is associated both with a social justice orientation to community involvement and with levels of charitable activity (i.e., helping those in need) and advocacy (i.e., working to change public policy for the benefit of other people). Finally, van Zomeren et al. (2004) found that group-based anger is a strong predictor of the willingness to participate in collective protests about an injustice, a result that was obtained in three separate studies conducted with 20-year-old Dutch university students.

In general, females tend to score higher than males on altruism, empathy and social responsibility (Wilson, 2000). Young females, in particular, appear to understand that they are usually viewed as being more compassionate than men (Gordon & Taft, 2011); however, they themselves do not always accept this attribute. Taft (2010) found that they tend not to hold these gender stereotyped attributes in great esteem, partly because compassion has been associated with other attributes such as being ‘dreamy’ and ‘hopeful’ as part of a superficial female identity. Anger, on the other hand, is more commonly associated with males and is often regarded as being a socially unacceptable emotion for females (Brown, 1999).

Further feelings that have been examined in relationship to patterns of civic and political engagement are those that young people have towards their own nation. CIVED (Amadeo et al., 2002; Torney-Purta et al., 2001) found that most youth have positive feelings towards their nation at both 14 years of age and 17–18 years of age. A more fine-grained analysis of the data from the 14-year-olds from five Western European and five Eastern European countries by Torney-Purta (2009) revealed that these students could be grouped into five distinct clusters based on their feelings and attitudes across a range of issues: a *conventional-political cluster* of individuals who had positive feelings towards their nation, believed that governments had social responsibilities and believed that adults should be active in both conventional politics and civic activities; a *social justice cluster* who believed in rights for everyone but did not feel obliged to do anything about them beyond voting; an *indifferent cluster* who did not think much about being active in politics at all; a *disaffected cluster* who were similar to the indifferent cluster but felt more negatively about the rights of others and about being involved in the community; and an *alienated cluster* who did not believe in norms of citizen participation, were alienated from politics and did not believe in the rights of others. It was noticeable that positive feelings towards the nation were associated with valuing conventional politics and civic activities in both Western and Eastern European countries.

Finally, a wide range of negative emotions and their links to civic and political participation were examined by Pachi and Barrett (2012b) in their analysis of survey data collected from 16- to 26-year-old British Bangladeshi, Congolese and English youth as part of PIDOP. They looked in particular at negative emotions (e.g., anger, frustration, worry, shame) that were based on beliefs about specific issues (e.g., discrimination, environmental issues). They found differences in these emotions according to the demographic characteristics of the individuals, as well as differences in the relationships between these emotions and various forms of participation. Females appeared to have more pronounced negative emotions about both environmental issues and discrimination than males, while the older youth had more pronounced negative emotions than the younger youth about discrimination. However, negative emotions about environmental issues predicted volunteering only among the Bangladeshi youth, while negative emotions predicted expected future illegal non-conventional participation

(e.g., spraying graffiti) and lower levels of voting only among the Congolese youth. In the case of the English youth, their negative emotions were linked to a lower likelihood of using the Internet for political and civic purposes. In other words, different patterns of relationships between emotions and participation emerged in the three ethnic groups.

The implication is that it is important to examine emotions in relationship to specific issues in specific ethnic groups. We are therefore reminded once again that the psychological factors related to civic and political participation are often specific to specific subgroups of youth living within specific sociocultural and societal contexts. Young people's civic and political concerns and interests, and the ways in which they respond to these, clearly vary considerably across both demographic groupings and settings. Findings of studies therefore need to be interpreted cautiously, without overgeneralising conclusions beyond the evidence base that is actually available.

Conclusions

This chapter has reviewed a large number of psychological factors that are related to young people's civic and political engagement. These factors include: political knowledge; political attentiveness; political interest; internal, external and collective efficacy; the perceived effectiveness of participatory actions; personal, social and collective identities; social, political and institutional trust; values; beliefs about good citizenship; and emotions. As we have seen, in some cases there is evidence that these factors influence young people's patterns of civic and political engagement. However, as we have also seen, civic or political participation itself can also sometimes have a causal effect on these psychological factors, strengthening or weakening them depending on the factor and the form of participation involved.

This review of psychological factors has revealed a number of unresolved issues that will need to be addressed by future research. First, we have seen that the relationship between psychological factors and participation can vary from one country to another (e.g., the ICCS 2016 finding that, within different countries, political knowledge relates differently to participation in civic activities within the school and to future expected political participation). It is unclear why different relationships between psychological factors and participation should arise in different countries. For example, this might be due to different parental or teacher attitudes to youth participation in different countries, different political and policy discourses concerning youth participation in different countries, different meanings that are attributed by youth to the various forms of participation in different countries, etc. The sources of this cross-national variability clearly require further research.

Likewise, we still do not properly understand the variability in psychological factors that is associated with demographic characteristics such as SES, gender, ethnicity and age. It is one thing to identify the existence of these demographic

differences and it is another to explain them. It may well be the case that the variability stems from the different experiences that individuals belonging to different demographic subgroups have encountered in the family, in the peer group or in the school. We need to understand why these differences occur (and in some cases, why they occur in some countries but not in others). Future research will also need to be sensitive to the possibility that differences occur between different subgroups that are defined not in terms of a single demographic characteristic (such as SES or gender) on its own, but in terms of the intersection between nation, ethnicity, gender, age, SES and locale. We will return to some of these issues concerning demographic factors in the following chapter.

There has also been very little research to date into young people's understanding of legality and the rule of law in the context of civic and political engagement. As we have seen, the distinction between legal and illegal forms of action can have consequences for some young people's willingness to engage in certain kinds of actions, but precisely how their understanding of the law relates to their participatory behaviours is poorly understood at the present time.

Other under-investigated issues include how young people perceive the power relationships that exist between the various actors who operate at different levels of the political hierarchy, and how they perceive their own relationships to these actors. Their perceptions of adult norms concerning active citizenship, and their views regarding obedience to these norms, have also not yet been widely investigated. Further research is also required into the way in which young people's multiple identities interact with each other to drive their civic and political behaviours.

Finally, a large cluster of unresolved issues arises in connection with the causality that operates in this domain. As we have seen, there are sometimes reciprocal relationships between civic and political participation on the one hand and psychological factors such as internal efficacy, political interest and identity style on the other. This raises the broader question of the causality that operates between all of the psychological factors and civic and political participation. Further research is required to unpack the complex patterns of causal relationships that no doubt exist between the various psychological factors themselves and between the psychological factors and participatory behaviours. Furthermore, this research will once again need to be sensitive to the possibility that these causal relationships differ in different demographic subgroups as defined through the intersection between nation, ethnicity, gender, age, SES and locale. Such research will need to use longitudinal designs to follow the development of not only psychological factors but also civic and political behaviours through adolescence and early adulthood, as it is only longitudinal research that can produce a proper understanding of the causality that operates in this domain.

In the next chapter, we will add further complexity to this analysis by reviewing what is known about the relationship between young people's civic and political engagement and social and demographic factors.