This international collection discusses how the individualised, reflexive, late modern era has changed the way we experience and act on our emotions. Divided into four sections that include studies ranging across multiple continents and centuries, *Emotions in Late Modernity* does the following:

1. Demonstrates an increased awareness and experience of emotional complexity in late modernity by challenging the legal emotional/rational divide; positive/negative concepts of emotional valence; sociological/philosophical/psychological divisions around emotion, morality and gender; and traditional understandings of love and loneliness.

2. Reveals tension between collectivised and individualised-privatised emotions in investigating ‘emotional sharing’ and individualised responsibility for anger crimes in courtrooms, and the generation of emotional energy and achievement emotions in classrooms.

3. Debates the increasing mediation of emotions by contrasting their historical mediation (through texts and bodies) with contemporary digital mediation of emotions in classroom teaching, collective mobilisations (e.g. riots) and film and documentary representations.

4. Demonstrates reflexive micro and macro management of emotions, with examinations of the ‘politics of fear’ around asylum seeking and religious subjects, and collective commitment to climate change mitigation.

The first collection to investigate the changing nature of emotional experience in contemporary times, *Emotions in Late Modernity* will appeal to students and researchers interested in fields such as the sociology of emotions, cultural studies, political science and psychology.

Edited by Roger Patulny, Alberto Bellocchi, Rebecca E. Olson, Sukhmani Khorana, Jordan McKenzie and Michelle Peterie.
The sociology of emotions has demonstrated the fundamental and pervasive relevance of emotions to all aspects of social life. It is not merely another specialized sub-discipline; rather it aims to reconfigure bases of mainstream sociology. This book series will not only be of interest for specialists in emotions but to sociology at large. It is a locus for developing enhanced understandings of core problems of sociology, such as power and politics, social interactions and everyday life, macro-micro binaries, social institutions, gender regimes, global social transformations, the state, inequality and social exclusion, identities, bodies and much more.

**Love and Society**  
Special Social Forms and the Master Emotion  
*Swen Seebach*

**The Emotional Market**  
Capitalism, Consumption and Authenticity  
*Edited by Eva Illouz*

**Emotions in Late Modernity**  
*Edited by Roger Patulny, Alberto Bellocci, Rebecca E. Olson, Sukhmani Khorana, Jordan McKenzie and Michelle Peterie*

For more information about this series, please visit:  
[www.routledge.com/sociology/series/RSSE](http://www.routledge.com/sociology/series/RSSE)
Emotions in Late Modernity

Edited by Roger Patulny, Alberto Bellocchi, Rebecca E. Olson, Sukhmani Khorana, Jordan McKenzie and Michelle Peterie
Contents

List of contributors xiii
Foreword xx
JACK BARBALET
Acknowledgements xxv

Introduction 1
ROGER PATULNY, REBECCA E. OLSON, SUKHMANI KHORANA,
JORDAN MCKENZIE, ALBERTO BELLOCCHI
AND MICHELLE PETERIE

References 6

1 Emotions in late modernity 8
ROGER PATULNY AND REBECCA E. OLSON

Introduction 8
Emotions across history 10
Classical emotions 10
Modern emotions 11
Late modernity 12
Emotions in late modernity 14
Complexity of emotions, and newly complex emotions 14
Individualised emotions 15
Commodified emotions 16
Mediated emotions 17
Reflexively managed emotions 18
Conclusion 19
Note 20
References 20
PART I

Emotional complexity and complex understandings of emotions 25

2 Emotive-cognitive rationality, background emotions and emotion work 27
ÅSA WETTERGREN

Introduction 27
Emotion and reason 27
Emotion, action and emotion work 30
Assumptions and implications of the model 32
Emotional regime vs emotive-cognitive frame 33
The Migration Board: procedural correctness 34
Conclusion 37
Notes 38
References 39

3 Conceptualising valences in emotion theories: a sociological approach 41
ALBERTO BELLOCCHI AND JONATHAN H. TURNER

Conceptualisations of emotional valences 41
What is an emotional valence? 41
Valence and hedonicity 42
Valence and polarity 43
Valence and solidarity 43
Valence and health 44
Valence and biology 45
Clarifying emotional valence for a sociology of emotions 46
Emotions in late modern societies 51
Chapter summary and concluding remarks 53
Acknowledgement 53
References 54

4 Emotion and morality: a sociological reading of the philosophy of emotion 56
JORDAN MCKENZIE

Introduction 56
On emotion and morality: philosophy 57
On emotion and morality: sociology 62
Conclusion 66
References 66
5 Sociological approaches to the study of gender and emotion in late modernity: culture, structure and identity

KATHRYN J. LIVELY

Introduction 69
Symbolic interaction/dramaturgy 72
Group processes 74
Social structure and personality 75
Affect control theory 77
Conclusion 78
Note 80
References 80

6 Loneliness and love in late modernity: sites of tension and resistance

NICHOLAS HOOKWAY, BARBARA BARBOSA NEVES, ADRIAN FRANKLIN AND ROGER PATULNY

Introduction 83
Love and loneliness in late modernity 84
Social media and loneliness 86
Companion animals and loneliness 89
Conclusion 91
References 93

PART II
Individualised emotions as private responsibility

7 Emotions and criminal law: new perspectives on an enduring presence

SUSANNE KARSTEDT

Introduction 101
Emotion sharing: universal dynamics in criminal justice settings 103
Emotion sharing: the framework 103
The legal setting: restraining or enabling? 105
Disjunctions: emotion sharing between victims, perpetrators and audiences 107
Conclusion: enhancing the emotional capacity of criminal justice 109
References 110
8 Undramatic emotions in learning: a sociological model  
JAMES P. DAVIS AND ALBERTO BELLOCCHI

Introduction 114
Conceptualisation of emotional energy 116
A graphical model of emotional energy 119
Feelings 120
Ideas 121
Bodily movements 121
Intensity of emotional energy 122
Separating notions of intensity, drama and valence 122
High-intensity, undramatic emotional energy 123
Low-intensity, dramatic emotional energy 125
Implications and future research 126
Acknowledgements 127
Note 127
References 127

9 Emotions and the criminal law: anger and the defence of provocation  
SARAH SORIAL

Introduction 129
The law of provocation/loss of self-control 130
Emotions and late modernity: anger and self-control 133
The philosophical literature 133
The empirical evidence 135
Socialisation of emotions 137
Conclusion 139
Notes 139
References 140
Cases 140
Texts 140

10 Achievement emotions: a control-value theory perspective  
REINHARD PEKRUN

Introduction 142
Emotion and achievement emotions 143
Origins of achievement emotions 144
Appraisals as proximal individual antecedents 145
Distal individual antecedents: the role of achievement goals 147
The influence of tasks and social environments 148
Functions of emotions for learning and achievement 150
  Positive emotions: enjoyment, hope, pride, and relief 151
  Negative activating emotions: anxiety, shame, anger, and confusion 151
  Negative deactivating emotions: boredom and hopelessness 152
Reciprocal causation, emotion regulation, and therapy 153
Relative universality of achievement emotions 153
Concluding comments 154
References 154

PART III
Mediated emotions 159

11 Mediating English historical evolution in Charles Kingsley’s Hereward the Wake (1866) 161
ANDREW LYNCH
  Englishness and ‘the spirit of freedom’ 161
  Degenerate monks and manly Protestants 162
  Hereward: avatar of English racial evolution 165
  Emotion and the resilience of English separatism 173
  References 174

12 Affect and automation: a critical genealogy of the emotions 176
ELIZABETH STEPHENS
  Introduction 176
  The strange sad tale of James Tilly Matthews and the Air Loom 177
  Automata as wonder machines: entanglements of intimacy and industrialisation 180
  Affect: autonomic vs automated 184
  Conclusion 186
  References 187

13 The digital mediation of emotions in late modernity 190
KATHY A. MILLS, LEN UNSWORTH AND GEORGINA BARTON
  Introduction 190
  Depicting and evoking emotions in images 191
  Music, emotions and multimodality 192
  Research description 193
  Analysis: extending the appraisal framework to the moving image 194
  Findings: a multimodal analysis of film 195
Contents

Conclusion and recommendations for research and educational practice 205
Note 206
Acknowledgement 206
References 207

14 Public feeling: the entanglement of emotion and technology in the 2011 riots 209
JENNIFER HARDING

Introduction 209
Context of disturbance 210
Mainstream media response to the riots 211
A politics of resentment 213
Digital society and mediated emotion 215
Affect and assemblage 217
Conclusion 219
Notes 219
References 220

15 Storied feelings: emotions, culture, media 223
E. DEIDRE PRIBRAM

Introduction 223
Sociocultural emotionality 225
In defence of narrativity 226
  Mediated pleasure 226
  Sound 228
  Images 231
Conclusion 234
Notes 235
References 235

16 Screening the refugee: Freedom Stories and the performance of empathy in an ‘emotional community’ 237
SUKHMANI KHORANA

Asylum seeker policy in Australia 237
Empathy as the ‘correct’ response 238
Refugee documentaries and mediated community screenings 239
Witnessing and the performance of empathy 240
Mediated affect and publics in late modernity 244
References 248
## PART IV

### Micro- and macro-reflexively managed emotions

#### 17 Impartiality and emotion in everyday judicial practice

**Sharyn Roach Anleu and Kathy Mack**

- **Introduction** 253
- The performance of impartiality 254
- Research design 254
- Judicial officers’ understanding(s) of impartiality 255
  - The judicial oath 256
  - Keeping/maintaining an open mind 256
  - Putting aside bias and emotion 258
- Impartiality and emotion management 258
- Conclusion 262
- Notes 264
- Acknowledgements 264
- References 264

#### 18 Power, (com)passion and trust in interprofessional healthcare

**Rebecca E. Olson and Ann Dadich**

- **Introduction** 267
- Healthcare hierarchy 269
- Emotions in healthcare hierarchies 270
  - Interaction rituals 271
  - Emotional discourses 272
- Interprofessional care models and emotion 274
- Late modern, emotionally reflexive clinicians 276
- Conclusion 277
- Note 278
- Acknowledgements 278
- References 278

#### 19 Compassion and power: (emotional) reflexivity in asylum seeker friendship programmes

**Michelle Peterie**

- **Introduction** 282
- The politics of fear 283
- Asylum seeker friendship programmes 285
- The dark side of compassion 286
### Contents

*Empirical investigations* 288
- The imperative to act 289
- Negotiating privilege 290
- Shared performances 291
*Reflexivity in late modernity* 292
*Acknowledgement* 293
*Note* 293
*References* 293

20 **Affective dynamics of conflicts between religious practice and secular self-understanding: insights from the male circumcision and ‘Burkini’ debates** 297

*CHRISTIAN VON SCHEVE AND NUR YASEMIN URAL*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Religious’ emotions in historical perspective</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotions and emotional regimes</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The religious-secular divide as an affective arrangement</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases and discourses</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21 **Towards ‘keystone feelings’: an affective architectonics for climate grief** 311

*THOMAS BRISTOW*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global affect as an oxymoron, or the question of scale</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The (affective) politics of commitment</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practices, moods and modes</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthropocene anxiety and anticipation</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The uses and disadvantages of metaphor for life</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards a conclusion</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postscript (a word on keystone feelings)</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgement</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusion: emotions in late modernity** 327

*ROGER PATULNY, REBECCA E. OLSON, SUKHMANI KHORANA, JORDAN MCKENZIE, ALBERTO BELLOCCHI AND MICHELLE PETERIE*

*Index* 329
Contributors

Editors

Roger Patulny is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Wollongong, Australia. He researches emotions and emotion management, gender, social capital and social networks, and employment and the future of work. He has completed Australian Research Council Grants on ‘Poor Women and Lonely Men: Examining Gendered Social Inclusion and Connection in Australia’ (DP: 2009–11), and ‘Who You Know or Where You Go? The Role of Formal and Informal Networks in Finding Employment and Maintaining Wellbeing’ (LP: 2015–18). He co-founded the Contemporary Emotions Research Network (CERN); the TASA Thematic Group on the Sociology of Emotions and Affect (TASA-SEA); and edited three special editions/sections on emotions for *AJSI* and *Emotion Review*. His detailed profile and full publications can be found at: http://rpatulny.com

Alberto Belloccchi is a Principal Research Fellow and Associate Professor in the Faculty of Education, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia. His research program currently consists of two strands focusing on emotional engagement and science inquiry. Through empirical research he has advanced sociological theories of emotion and interaction in topics including how social bonds are formed, maintained and disrupted during classroom interactions, how emotion management unfolds as a social phenomenon, and he has conceptualised emotions as social phenomena. These topics lead to practical implications for classroom practitioners seeking to support the formation, repair and sustenance of social bonds between students and students and teachers, they inform teacher emotion management practices for sustaining social bonds, and identify the connections between emotion and understanding science concepts. Alberto is a member of the editorial board for the *Journal of Research in Science Teaching*, and a lead editor of the journal *Cultural Studies of Science Education*. He is the lead co-editor of a collection entitled *Exploring Emotions, Aesthetics, and Wellbeing in Science Education Research* (Springer, 2017).
Rebecca E. Olson is a Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Queensland. Funded by competitive national grants (e.g., NHMRC, Cancer Australia), her research intersects the sociologies of medicine and emotion. Her 2015 book, *Towards a Sociology of Cancer Caregiving: Time to Feel* (Routledge), draws on these interests. She is a founding member of the Contemporary Emotions Research Network. From 2013–16 she co-convened The Australian Sociological Association’s Sociology of Emotion and Affect Thematic Group. In 2015, she co-edited two special sections on methodological innovations in the sociology of emotions in the esteemed journal, *Emotion Review*.

Sukhmani Khorana is Senior Lecturer in Cultural Studies, and Academic Program Leader (South West Sydney) at the University of Wollongong, Australia. She is the editor of a Routledge anthology titled *Crossover Cinema* (2013). Sukhmani has published extensively on transnational media, and the politics of empathy in refugee narratives. With Professors Kate Darian-Smith and Sue Turnbull, she holds an ARC Linkage grant (partners Museum of Victoria and The Australian Centre for the Moving Image) examining the role of television in the experience of migration to Australia. Sukhmani is the author of *The Tastes and Politics of Inter-cultural Food in Australia* (RLI, 2018).

Jordan McKenzie completed his PhD at Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia and is now a lecturer in Sociology at the University of Wollongong, Australia. He is a convener of the Contemporary Emotions Research Network at the University of Wollongong and the Social Theory Thematic Group for The Australian Sociological Association. Jordan’s work critically engages with the current cultural fascination with happiness and the good life in order to better understand how emotional experience reflects modernisation and social change. This research has culminated in his most recent monograph *Deconstructing Happiness: Critical Sociology and the Good Life* (Routledge, 2016).

Michelle Peterie is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of Queensland, and current co-convener of The Australian Sociological Association’s Sociology of Emotions and Affect Thematic Group. Michelle’s research combines interests in social justice, emotional wellbeing and institutional affect. Her work on bureaucratic violence in immigration detention facilities has been published in Australian and international journals, and submitted as evidence at Administrative Appeals Tribunal hearings. Michelle’s current research concerns the socio-emotional impacts of punitive policies and discourses, including those targeting welfare recipients. She won the biennial award for the Best Paper in the *Journal of Sociology* in 2017–18.

**Chapter authors**

Jack Barbalet is Professor of Sociology in the Institute for Religion, Politics, and Society at the Australian Catholic University, Brisbane, Australia, and concurrently Research Professor in Sociology at Hong Kong Baptist

**Barbara Barbosa Neves** is Lecturer/Assistant Professor in Sociology at the University of Melbourne, Australia. Prior to this appointment, she was Associate Director and Researcher at the ‘Technologies for Aging Gracefully Lab’, University of Toronto, Canada. Her research focuses on determinants and social effects of adoption and non- adoption of digital technologies in a life course perspective. She is interested in the links between digital and social inequalities. Recently, Barbara has been studying the role of digital technologies in addressing social isolation and loneliness in later life. Her work has been published in several top-tier outlets in sociology and computer science.

**Georgina Barton** is an Associate Professor of Literacies and Pedagogy at the University of Southern Queensland, Brisbane, Australia where she teaches English and Literacy Education. Before being an academic, Georgina taught in schools for over 20 years and has been an acting principal and a lead teacher in the area of literacy. Georgina also has extensive experience in teaching the arts in schools and universities and uses the arts to support students’ literacy learning outcomes. She has over 90 publications in the areas of the arts and literacy including a book titled *Developing Literacy in the Secondary Classroom* (SAGE, 2017).

**Thomas Bristow** joined English studies at Durham University in 2017 and the Institute of English Studies, London in 2018. He is the author of *The Anthropocene Lyric: An Affective Geography of Poetry, Politics, Place* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), co-editor of *A Cultural History of Climate Change* (Routledge, 2016), editor-in-chief for the journal *Philosophy Activism Nature*, and Environmental Humanities series editor ‘Literature, Media, Culture’ (Routledge). Formerly ARC research fellow at the Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotions (University of Melbourne), Tom remains an honorary researcher at the University of Western Australia.

**Ann Dadich** is an Associate Professor; she is also a registered psychologist, a full member of the Australian Psychological Society, and a Justice of the Peace in New South Wales, Australia. She has accumulated considerable expertise in health service management. Specifically, Dadich focuses on knowledge translation to clarify how different knowledges coalesce to influence healthcare, particularly that which is brilliant. This is aided by her use of innovative methodologies. Her expertise is demonstrated by her publishing record, which includes approximately 150 refereed publications; the grants she has secured; and the awards she has received to date.
James P. Davis is both a Lecturer in STEM Education and the Entrepreneurship Leader for the Faculty of Education at the Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia. His research focuses on the interplay between emotional experiences and social cognition in localised situations of teaching and learning. James’ program of research contributes to the microsociology of emotions in educational contexts with a particular focus on emotional energy as an individual and collective lived phenomenon. Currently he is exploring the treatment of emotional energy as a sense-making resource in studies in ethnomethodology, which is an under-explored methodological issue.


Jennifer Harding is Professor in Cultural Studies and Communications at London Metropolitan University, UK. She teaches media and cultural theory, research methods, and oral history. She has researched and written about emotions, gender, and sexuality, and been involved in a number of community based oral history projects. She is co-editor with E. Deidre Pribram of Emotions: A Cultural Studies Reader (Routledge, 2009).

Nicholas Hookway is Lecturer in Sociology in the School of Social Sciences at the University of Tasmania, Australia. His research focuses on how morality, identity, and social bonds are being reshaped by wider social change. Nick has published in top international sociology journals, including Sociology and British Journal of Sociology. His book Everyday Morality: Doing it Ourselves in an Age of Uncertainty (Routledge) is due for publication in early 2019. Nick is an Associate Editorial Board member of the journal Sociology and an Executive Committee member of The Australian Sociological Association.

Susanne Karstedt is a Professor in the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Griffith University, Australia. She held chairs in criminology at the Universities of Keele and Leeds, United Kingdom. She has researched and written widely on emotions, crime, and justice, most recently combining it with her interest in atrocity crimes and transitional justice. She edited Emotions, Crime and Justice (Bloomsbury, 2011, with Ian Loader and Heather Strang). Her work has been recognised by a number of awards, including
the Sellin–Glueck Award of the American Society of Criminology and the European Criminology Award of the European Society of Criminology.

Kathryn J. Lively is a Professor of Sociology. Her areas of interest lie in the nexus of identity, emotion, and gender. She is currently engaged in two strands of research. The first examines identity transformations among individuals with Alzheimer’s disease – in particular, this work reveals what remains of the self as cognitive functioning declines. A second project examines the emotional and social psychological mechanisms – including identity – that underlie successful long-term weight loss and maintenance. Her scholarship has appeared in such outlets as *American Journal of Sociology*, *Work and Occupations*, *Social Forces*, *Social Psychology Quarterly*, and *Emotion Review*.

Andrew Lynch is Emeritus Professor of English and Literary Studies at The University of Western Australia, and a former Director of the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotions (CE11000101). His recent and forthcoming publications include: ‘Feeling for the Premodern’ (*Exemplaria*); *Writing War in England and France, 1370–1854: A History of Emotions* (Routledge, 2019); and *The Routledge History Handbook to Emotions in Europe, 1100–1700* (Routledge, 2019). He is also a general editor of *A Cultural History of Emotions*, 6 vols (Bloomsbury, 2019).

Kathy Mack is Emerita Professor, Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia. She received her BA (Magna cum Laude) from Rice University (Texas, USA) and JD from Stanford Law School (California, USA) and later a LLM from the University of Adelaide, Australia. Before coming to Australia, Kathy practiced law in California, mainly criminal law. She has taught Civil and Criminal Procedure, Evidence, Criminal Law and Procedure, Civil Procedure, and Dispute Resolution, including interviewing and negotiation at the University of Adelaide Law School as well as at Flinders. With Matthew Flinders Distinguished Professor Sharyn Roach Anleu, she is currently engaged in socio-legal research into the Australian judiciary and their courts.

Kathy A. Mills is Professor of Literacies and Digital Cultures, Institute for Learning Sciences and Teacher Education, Australian Catholic University, Brisbane, Australia. A prolific, award-winning academic author, ethnographer, and Future Fellow of the Australian Research Council, she has won five Australian Research Council grants and published over 90 scholarly works that generate new knowledge of digital practices in schooling and society. Mills is also Chair of the American Educational Research Association Writing and Literacies Special Interest Group and serves on a number of international journal editorial boards.

Reinhard Pekrun is Professor for Personality and Educational Psychology at the University of Munich, Germany and Professorial Fellow at the Australian Catholic University, Brisbane, Australia. His research areas are achievement motivation and emotion, personality development, and educational
assessment and evaluation. Pekrun is a highly cited scientist who pioneered research on emotions in education and originated the Control-Value Theory of Achievement Emotions. He has authored 23 books and more than 250 articles and chapters. Pekrun is recipient of the Diefenbaker Award 2015, the Sylvia Scribner Award 2017, the EARLI Oeuvre Award 2017, and the Lifetime Achievement Award 2018 from the German Psychological Society.

E. Deidre Pribram is, most recently, the author of *A Cultural Approach to Emotional Disorders: Psychological and Aesthetic Interpretations* (Routledge, 2016) and *Emotions, Genre, Justice in Film and Television: Detecting Feeling* (Routledge, 2013), as well as multiple book chapters and articles on cultural emotion studies, film and television studies, gender, and popular culture. She is Professor in the Communications Department of Molloy College, New York, USA.

Sharyn Roach Anleu is a Matthew Flinders Distinguished Professor of Sociology in the College of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences at Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia and a Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Social Sciences. She is a past president of The Australian Sociological Association and the author of *Law and Social Change* (SAGE, 2009) and four editions of *Deviance, Conformity and Control* (Longman). She has contributed to the Master’s Program at the International Institute for the Sociology of Law, Oñati, Spain. With Emerita Professor Kathy Mack, Flinders University, she is currently engaged in socio-legal research into the Australian judiciary and their courts.

Sarah Sorial is an Associate Professor in Law at Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia. Her research specialisation is primarily at the intersection of philosophy and law. Specifically, she is interested in how philosophical concepts can be utilised to address various and persistent legal dilemmas, including dilemmas about the limits of speech, the importance of democratic deliberation, the place of rights in liberal democracies, and more recently, the place of emotions in law. She is the author of *Sedition and the Advocacy of Violence: Free Speech and Counter-terrorism* (Routledge, 2011) and has published extensively in law and philosophy, and philosophy of law journals.

Elizabeth Stephens is an Australian Research Council Future Fellow and Associate Professor of Cultural Studies in the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities at the University of Queensland. She is the author of three monographs: *A Critical Genealogy of Normality* (University of Chicago Press, 2017, co-authored with Peter Cryle); *Anatomy as Spectacle: Public Exhibitions of the Body from 1700 to the Present* (Liverpool University Press, 2011); and *Queer Writing: Homoeroticism in Jean Genet’s Fiction* (Palgrave, 2009).

Jonathan H. Turner is the 38th University Professor of the University of California, USA, as well as Research Professor at University of California,
Santa Barbara, USA and University of California, Riverside, USA. He received his PhD from Cornell University, New York, USA in 1968. Since that time, he has been primarily a sociological theorist, theorising at all levels of social organisation. He is author or co-author of 42 books, 8 edited books, and several hundred research articles and chapters. The present chapter in this volume reflects his recent interest in bringing primatology, evolutionary biology, and neurology into sociological explanations.

Christian von Scheve is Professor of Sociology at the Department of Political and Social Sciences, Freie Universität, Berlin, Germany. He is head of the Research Group Sociology of Emotion and Research Fellow at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) Berlin. His research focuses on the sociology of emotion, cultural sociology, economic sociology, and social psychology. Recent publications include ‘Emotional Roots of Right-Wing Political Populism’ (with M. Salmela, Social Science Information) and ‘Feeling Europe: Political Emotion, Knowledge, and Support for the European Union’ (with M. Verbalyte, European Journal of Social Science Research).

Len Unsworth is Professor in English and Literacies Education in the Institute for Learning Sciences and Teacher Education (ILSTE) at the Australian Catholic University in Sydney, Australia. His recent books include Functional Grammatics: Reconceptualising Knowledge about Language and Image for School English (Routledge, 2017, with Mary Macken-Horarik, Kristina Love and Carmel Sandiford); Reading Visual Narratives (Equinox, 2013, with Clare Painter and Jim Martin); and English Teaching and New Literacies Pedagogy: Interpreting and authoring digital multimedia narratives (Peter Lang Publishing, 2014, with Angela Thomas).

Nur Yasemin Ural studied in Turkey, Germany, France, and Canada. She obtained her PhD in Sociology at EHESS Paris, France. Her thesis focused on Muslim minorities and politisation of religion in France and Germany. She has taught on immigration, secularity, and Islam in Europe. Since 2015, she is working as a postdoctoral researcher in the collaborative research centre Affective Societies in a subproject ‘Feelings of Religious Belonging and Rhetorics of Injury in Public and in Art’ at the Free University of Berlin, Germany.

Åsa Wettergren is Professor in Sociology at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. She researches emotions in bureaucratic organisations, in social movements, and in the field of migration. Among the recent publications are ‘Fear, hope, anger, and guilt in climate activism’ (Social Movement Studies), the collected volume Climate Action in a Globalizing World (Routledge, 2017) and the monograph Professional Emotions in Court: A Sociological Perspective (Routledge, 2018). Wettergren is Co-Chief Editor and one of the founders of the new scientific journal Emotions and Society.
The notion of modernity as a summary term for a distinctive form of society and a corresponding set of experiences, including emotional experiences, is now commonplace in sociological discussion. Indeed, the association of modernity with emotions is similarly established through a number of different but converging routes (Dixon 2003; Stearns 1994; William 1998). In an earlier specification of modernity, Berman (1982, pp. 16–17) indicates a periodisation of three phases: first, from the sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth century; second, the period of revolution from 1790 to the end of the nineteenth century; and, finally, the twentieth century. It is not entirely clear what unifies these periods as variant forms of modernity in Berman’s account, except that one historically succeeds the other. The final stage of modernity is described by Berman (1982, p. 17) as both global in its reach and comprising a public that ‘shatters into a multitude of fragments’. These two elements, conjoined and complimentary, are now widely regarded as forming the constitution of late modernity (Giddens 1990; Bauman 2000; Beck & Beck-Gensheim 2002), and although Berman himself projects no further than the twentieth century these conditions are widely held to uniquely characterise the present period of the twenty-first century as well.

Although the description of late modernity in terms of globalisation and individualisation is widely accepted, the idea that globalisation typifies the social world from the mid-twentieth century ignores the fact that forces of world integration have operated over a much longer time span (Bhambra 2007; Hopkins 2002). Similarly, the idea of modernity ‘as a release of individuality and a search for (or despair of) an authenticity made possible by this foundation’ (Luhmann 1998, p. 4) cannot be confined to a period from the late twentieth century, nor even from the sixteenth century, to go back to the beginning of modernity in Berman’s scheme. There is evidence that the ‘majority of ordinary people in England from at least the 13th century were rampant individualists’ (Macfarlane 1978, p. 163) and literary evidence from China shows that individuals interested in their own identity and agents of their own concerns existed from the sixth century BC (Elvin 1985, p. 159). With apologies to Bruno Latour (1993), it might be said on this basis that we have always been modern. A specification of late modernity and its attendant emotions therefore requires closer attention.
The notion that individuation is a dominating form of sociality in the twenty-first century has been qualified in interesting ways. Acknowledging that late modernity can be characterised for the vast majority of individuals in terms of increasingly personalised, individualised and privatised life experiences, two texts can be mentioned here which show that this state of affairs, paradoxically, does not detract from an essential sociality, and they do this in different ways via the emotions. Maffesoli (1996) argues that marketisation and consumer culture not only atomise individuals from their prior social bonds, but at the same time reassemble them into identity tribes, an outcome achieved by what he teasingly calls an ‘affectual nebula’. In this way Maffesoli harks back to Durkheim’s (1995) ‘collective effervescence’ and points forward to Collins’ (2004) ‘interaction ritual chains’ and their ‘emotional energy’. A quite different approach is developed by Lawler et al. (2009), who argue that in a depersonalised world, social commitments nevertheless persist. The argument here is not that individuation leads to a rights-based solidarity, as with Beck, but instead holds that individualised commitments derive from emotional experiences. In their social interactions, persons adjust their own behaviour in terms of the behaviour of others; such interaction leads to emotional experiences that have behavioural consequences insofar as positive emotions are enjoyed and people seek to repeat or locate interactions that provide them, though they dislike negative emotions with corresponding consequences. According to this argument, then, these positive and also negative emotions are understood by those who experience them with reference to the social units within which these emotions are had, and in this way an individual’s social commitments are formed.

These and similar approaches encourage us to appreciate the importance of emotions in late modernity and the ways in which individuation is a form of sociality, rather than its denial. They also implicitly say something about the type, quality and range of emotions that are likely to be associated with late modernity, namely emotions related to personal identity and individual satisfactions – what might be called ‘ego’ emotions. These have always existed, of course, but it is important to appreciate that late modern individuation not only encourages a particular type of emotional formation and experience, but also tends to diminish others. Rather than elaborate this point, which has been discussed elsewhere (Barbalet 2001, pp. 171–6), a related matter will be indicated that allows us to understand the nature of the collectivities that are associated with late modern individuation drawn to our attention by Maffesoli, Lawler and others. It is important to show, as these authors and others have, that individualised persons may aggregate to collective forces through emotionally generated solidarities. But these accounts can only form one part of any endeavour to indicate the nature of emotions in late modernity.

It was noted above that we have always been modern in the sense that human society, no matter how constraining the institutions comprising it, is
made up of persons who experience themselves through their own needs or interests (see Barbalet 2012; 2013; 2014). One significant distinction between what might be called pre-late modernity and late modernity is not the fact of individuation, which is common to both, but the direction of the relationship between the individualised person and the collective aggregation that their emotions-sponsored solidarity generates. In pre-late modernity, persons individuated through labour market commodification formed industrial combinations, unions, designed to protect and advance their interests as workers. In late modernity, on the other hand, it is difficult to identify similar instances of individuals aware of their interests as vulnerable persons who can form representative solidarities of their own. In late modernity, such individuals are more likely to turn to a Donald Trump or a Nigel Farage to serve as a proxy representative of their interests, as they perceive them, and also possibly turn to social media to identify a common cause, but neglect to generate a leadership and a membership of an enduring collectivity through this means.

The difference here is one of authentic as opposed to careless representation, but it is much more than this. The key to these concerns is the scope and content of the emotional engagements that are involved. In the late modern patterns described by Maffesoli and Lawler, for instance, the collectives of identity and commitment respectively are incidental consequences of social processes. The emotions involved reflect the feelings individuals experience in their relations with markets or social organisation, and at the same time express the way in which the individual relates to the subsequent collective as a resource they may utilise for individual satisfactions. The purposively formed collectives of pre-late modernity, on the other hand, include emotional attachments to the collective that not only transcended ego-emotions, but may also contradict them. Trade unions express the interests of their individual members collectively, but they can do so effectively only when the individual interests of their members are subordinate to the interests of the collectivity. This latter requires individual discipline and sacrifice when the collective is involved in strike action, say, and this involves emotions such as loyalty overriding narrower ego emotions.

The suggestion here, then, is that in specifying the nature of late modernity and its associated emotional patterns, it is necessary to not simply notice the apparently paradoxical mix of individuation and social solidarity, but more importantly to pay attention to the scope and direction of emotional appraisal. In late modernity, the predominant emotions are not simply individuated, but reflect an institutional context that can be described as neoliberal. It could be held that the term neoliberal more exactly captures late modernity and its emotional patterns than any other. It is not simply that neoliberal governance shifts the focus from the public to the private sector; indeed, neoliberal governance is an instrument of public institutions and is not market promoting, as usually assumed, so much as market destroying, in the broad sense. Neoliberal governance favours corporations and aligns them with political power; ego
emotions of the privileged sponsor this move, which has the consequence of promoting ego emotions of self-preservation in the disadvantaged, and both emerge in a social formation in which corporate privilege guides social as well as economic policy and colours the prospects of everyone.

These remarks are not intended to be either exhaustive of or prescriptive for reflections on late modernity and its attendant emotions and their forms. One thing that emerges from a dominance of ego-emotions is self-reflection, a person’s consciousness of their emotional reactions to their own emotions. This, in turn, provides a sense of both emotional complexity and also of emotion management, that persons have proprietorial and thus instrumental relations with their own emotions. These, and many other aspects of emotional experience in late modernity, are explored in the chapters to follow. Indeed, *Emotions in Late Modernity* is a cornucopia of insight, analysis and exploration of emotions, emotions studies and reflections on emotions from the perspective of sociological and allied disciplines. From different theoretical perspectives and from within different institutional and organisational contexts, emotions in their variety are considered and related to processes and outcomes that make up the social world. *Emotions in Late Modernity* is indeed an invaluable resource for anyone with an interest in the present time and its emotional complexions.

**References**


We thank the Routledge Sociology of Emotions series editors, Dr Mary Holmes and Dr Julie Brownlie, for their support and encouragement in preparing this collection, and Professor Jack Barbalet for his thoughtful foreword. We acknowledge the following groups for providing support in organising the 2016 Contemporary and Historical Approaches to Emotions (CHAE) conference, which helped to inspire this volume: the Contemporary Emotions Research Network (CERN) at the University of Wollongong (UOW); the Australian Sociological Association’s Sociology and Emotions and Affect thematic group (TASA-SEA); and the Australian Research Council (ARC) Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotions (CHE), with particular thanks to Professor Andrew Lynch and Dr Katie Barclay. Finally, we thank Ms Elena Chiu from Routledge and Ms Kai Ruo Soh from UOW for their assistance in preparing the collection for publication.
Introduction

Roger Patulny, Rebecca E. Olson, Sukhmani Khorana, Jordan McKenzie, Alberto Bellocchi and Michelle Peterie

We live in highly emotional times. This statement might seem prosaic, obvious or contestable, given that emotions have always been fundamental to the human experience. Indeed, the social turmoil and conflict of previous centuries might make the early twenty-first century seem comparatively banal. However, a contradiction worth considering is that while we live in a period that thrives on rational and technocratic principles – where there is more education, surveillance, (digital) information, measurement, calculation and expert-driven decision making than ever before – we also live in a world teeming with displays of emotion in everyday communication, interaction and decision making. Contemporary scholars point to the role of emotions such as anger and fear in the election of populist demagogues (Rico et al. 2017), in the empathic or shameful treatment of refugees (Goodman 2009), in public anxiety around climate change (Hamilton 2010), in the transformation of intimate relationships and love in the era of online dating (Illouz 2012; Hobbs et al. 2016) and in the rise of the ubiquitous ‘happiness’ industry (Davies 2015; Ahmed 2010). They also demonstrate that emotions now need to be carefully managed in a multiplicity of contexts, including at work (Hochschild 2012), in schools (Tomas, Rigano & Ritchie 2016), in hospitals (Erickson & Grove 2008) and in courtrooms (Bergman Blix & Wettergren 2016).

It is not our intention, in pointing out such contradictions, to pit emotion against reason or rationality. Such simple (and tired) dichotomies are characteristic of past debates that cast emotions as simple motivators of human and social action, or else as destructive forces that undermine superior thinking and ‘rational’ social organisation. These ideas dominated the early modern periods that Simon Williams (1998) described as ‘display[ing] an “irrational passion for dispassionate rationality”’ (Rieff 1979), the contradictions of which are only now becoming fully apparent’.

Rather, it is our intention to reveal the complex emotional dynamics that are recognisably present in so many social spheres in contemporary times, and to look for the common social themes that connect them. Sociological research on emotions has grown enormously in the last few decades (Olson et al. 2017), and a recent review of this body of work by Bericat (2016) identifies various
social qualities of emotions: their *appraisal* value, signalling and marking social events as important or threatening (Brody 1999); their *attributions*, in changing emotional responses dependent on the perceived (self/other) cause of the emotion (Lawler et al. 2008); their sensitivity to social *expectations* (Turner and Stets 2006); their validation of personal *identities* (Stryker 2004); their capacity to be shared and magnified *collectively* (von Scheve & Salmela 2014); their communicative and *expressive* function (Marinetti et al. 2011); and their culturally derived *labels* (Thoits 1989).

It is timely to bring holistic sociological theories about contemporary society to the study of emotions, and likewise consider emotions as a necessary component of any such sociological ‘grand theory’. It is particularly apt that we revitalise a key concept of extreme relevance to an increasingly individualised, commercialised and reflexive age: *late modernity*. The idea of late modernity derives from Anthony Giddens’ (1991) argument that the citizens of developed societies live in an era that is distinctly different from those of the past. Further to the widely discussed globalised and consumption-oriented economic relationships that characterise the neoliberal era, Giddens (1991) argues that the conditions of late modernity have produced people who are increasingly *individualised* and *reflexive* (Elliott & Lemert 2006) and favour individual choice and freedom – but also self-responsibility – over adherence to traditional forms of authority (church, state, family etc.) (Davis 2008; Archer 2012). Such theories are central to many contemporary sociological ideas. According to Archer (2012, pp. 64–5), the unprecedented pace of contemporary change prompts ‘variety to spawn more variety’, and continuous self-reflection and ‘self-revision [is] now necessary’. Bauman (1996, p. 18) similarly notes that in a fluid and precarious world, reflexively driven revision of one’s identity becomes essential: ‘If the modern “problem of identity” was how to construct an identity and keep it solid and stable, the post-modern “problem of identity” is primarily how to avoid fixation and keep the options open’.

Such theories further suggest that modern lives are becoming more tightly bound into the constraints of neoliberal globalised capitalistic production, consumption and commodification (Bauman 2004), and are increasingly mediated through technology, particularly digital communication (Turkle 2011). Transitions of this kind have many consequences for the experience, structuring and management of emotions in social contexts, and could constitute an entire change in *emotional regime*, or in the experience and allowable displays of emotions in our times (Reddy 2001). While the ‘late modern’ concept might be contestable, it forms a useful shorthand for capturing many real and important social changes in our times (at a minimum), and its impact on the experience of emotions is well worth exploring.

We note as well that a great range of humanities scholars are now engaged in the study of emotions, and there are overlaps and interactions that can be gained by contrasting their work against that of the sociology discipline. Although this book primarily focuses on sociological concerns related to emotion and affect
in late modernity, it includes works from disciplines such as history, cultural studies, literature studies, education and legal studies. It reflects the porous boundaries of sociology and the benefits of its ‘parasitic’ tendencies (Urry 2005), in terms of the cross-fertilisation across disciplinary divides that has seen concepts, such as affect, take root in many fields simultaneously. In this edited collection, we offer a selection of chapters that exemplify a range of positions both for and against our suppositions on late modern emotions.

The framing chapter for the collection, by Roger Patulny and Rebecca E. Olson (Chapter 1), identifies five main emotional themes emerging in connection with late modernity: i) an increasing awareness and experience of emotional complexity; ii) the tension between collectivised and individualised emotions; which are iii) increasingly privately consumed emotions; iv) an increasing mediation of emotions through primarily digital technology; and v) an increasing propensity to manage and re-interpret emotions at both the micro-individual and macro-social scale. These issues are revealed in various contemporary sociological examinations of emotions, yet they have not been adequately integrated within a comprehensive, overarching theoretical framework as such – one that we argue can be provided by the late modernity concept. Given the strong interconnection between the second and third themes – individualisation and private consumption – we collapse them together to arrive at four major themes worth considering, and divide the book into sections that speak to each of these four themes.

The first section of the book examines the complexity of late modern emotions, and presents a series of chapters that speak in some way to the theme of emotions as non-dualistic, complex phenomena, with new emotions – such as intimate ‘pure relations’ and ambivalence – emerging. It begins by tackling the emotion-rationality dichotomy head-on. Åsa Wettergren (Chapter 2) challenges the status of legal, objective, instrumental rationality in law and migration courts by arguing that rationality and emotion are intertwined rather than dualistic – that emotions are recognised and managed depending on whether they are conscious/unconscious objects that support/disrupt legal action. She also notes that micro-interactions in the legal sphere maintain the strong divide between rationality and emotion, as a requirement to ‘cynically’ maintain the illusion of reason.

The other chapters in the first section go on to reveal both the complexity of late modern emotions, and the more complex understandings of emotions in late modernity. Alberto Belloccchi and Jonathan Turner (Chapter 3) show the contextual complexity and multi-dimensionality inherent in emotions by critiquing the Western philosophical basis that supports a conventional ‘positive/negative’ dichotomy of emotional valence. Jordan McKenzie (Chapter 4) examines sociological and philosophical perspectives on emotion and morality, to develop common ground between the disciplines and emphasise the significance of emotion in moral judgements in modernity. Kathryn J. Lively (Chapter 5) looks at gender and emotion in the USA, and the usefulness of affect
control theory for bridging the gap between sociology and social psychology. Nick Hookway, Barbara Barbosa Neves, Adrian Franklin and Roger Patulny (Chapter 6) examine how loneliness and love are changing in late modernity. They look at how loneliness in particular is conceived, managed and resisted in a variety of contexts and by various means, including in everyday intimate relationships, in new online digital connections and in the embodied closeness of human-animal relationships.

The second section of the book presents chapters that speak to the tension between emotions as collective versus individualised phenomena, and between emotions as public or private responsibility and consumption practice. The first two chapters argue that there are numerous situations in which collectivised emotions dominate. Susanne Karstedt (Chapter 7) gives an overview of the theory and research on the tension between reason and emotion in the legal context, and contrasts the emotional regulation and emotion sharing frameworks for dealing with this tension. She notes how the sharing of emotion helps the regulation of emotion both privately and collectively, and notes that courtrooms enable and legitimate – and even expect – victims to share trauma emotions, but discourage perpetrators from sharing ‘self-conscious’ (guilt, shame) emotions. James P. Davis and Alberto Bellocchi (Chapter 8) extend Collins’ interaction ritual theory, where emotional energy is conceived as both an individual and collective phenomenon, by theorising and modelling undramatic emotional energy.

The other chapters in this section describe emotions as the more individualised private responsibility of citizens. Sarah Sorial (Chapter 9) uses examinations of anger from social psychology and cognitive science to argue that anger is a ‘trainable’ emotion that does not constitute an adequate self-defence as a loss of self-control in criminal justice cases; the implication from her research is that anger can be moral or dispositional, and that individuals (particularly males) should hold more responsibility for managing dispositional anger in a number of legal contexts. Reinhard Pekrun (Chapter 10) notes that evidence on teaching practices shows that individualised ‘achievement emotions’ are central to both individual and collective productivity, and investigates their individual and social derivations in the teaching sphere.

The third section of the book presents chapters that deal with the idea that emotions are increasingly mediated by mass (passive) broadcasting and micro (interactive) social-media networks. Scholars from the history of emotions open with the important point that emotions have, to some extent, always been mediated. Andrew Lynch (Chapter 11) analyses historical literary text to describe the gendered emotional regime characteristic of medieval England, and in so doing demonstrates that emotions have always been mediated. Elizabeth Stephens (Chapter 12) develops the idea of an ‘affective genealogy’ approach to understanding the historical fascination and fear with the machine–human interface, and describes emotions as having been historically mediated not just through written text, but through records of embodied affective experiences and sensations.
The other chapters in this section highlight dramatic changes in the way emotions are mediated, through the rise in digital media in educational, cultural and political circumstances. Kathy A. Mills, Len Unsworth and Georgina Barton (Chapter 13) note that there has been a huge surge of interest in emotions in digital media and teaching, and the broad reach of digital texts throughout globally networked learning environments affords new meanings and new bodily ways to express and convey emotion. They argue that the mediation of emotion has clearly changed, digitally and in an embodied/multi-sensorial way. Jennifer Harding (Chapter 14) notes that media technology has changed the speed and way in which vast numbers of people and their collective/shared emotions are mobilised, and points to the role of affect in events such as the 2011 London riots. She notes that emotions are collectively mobilised, but then also take on new collective, affective forms; she navigates a space between theories of emotional atmosphere and collective emotions. E Deidre Pribram (Chapter 15) argues, with reference to the films Saving Private Ryan and American Beauty, that whilst various screen texts are subject to systemic content analysis, their emotional content is less well examined. She details how mediated storytelling can encompass the pleasures of felt recognition for the audience. In effect, her chapter is a contribution to how mass-mediated affective experiences are vital to the late modern period. And Sukhmani Khorana (Chapter 16) analyses the use of refugee-themed documentaries in evoking empathy in audiences as a point of departure to understand the formation of emotional communities. She argues that the performance of emotion in certain contexts is a defining feature of late modernity.

The final section of the book presents chapters that argue that emotions now require continuous reflexive monitoring, feedback and management, as part of the process of crafting individual identities, and ‘macro-reflexively’ defining and contesting emotive global phenomena (for example, terrorism). The first chapter in this section points to how late modern emotions are reflexively managed at the micro level. Sharyn Roach Anleu and Kathy Mack (Chapter 17) look at the work practices undertaken by judicial officers to manage their own and others’ emotions whilst trying to remain committed to impartial decision-making; management is now a careful and complex part of legal working life. Rebecca E. Olson and Ann Dadich (Chapter 18) note that healthcare involves interpersonal emotion management, not only of the feelings of patients and families, but also of colleagues within and across health professions and hierarchies. They argue that emotion management and reflexivity are now integral to health work.

The final chapters in this section reveal how late modern emotions are also ‘macro-reflexively’ managed (see Patulny and Olson, Chapter 1) in defining and contesting emotive global phenomena (e.g., friends and enemies, terrorism, risks and threats). Michelle Peterie (Chapter 19) highlights the ‘politics of fear’ that surrounds irregular migration in late modernity, but also shows how government discourses and policies can inspire counter-emotions and thus inform
political dissent. Her work demonstrates that there are power disparities in relationships of care and compassion, such as those between citizens and asylum seekers, but that these relationships also present new opportunities for reflexivity and solidarity. Christian von Scheve and Nur Yasemin Ural (Chapter 20) identify recent inequalities that have opened up in the way we treat others on the basis of race, particularly in the rising persecution of Muslims, and notes that the contemporary secular subject is associated with ‘passion and devotion’, whilst the religious subject is associated with ‘outrage and anger’. Their work shows a new, clearly structural divide between secular and non-secular, and discusses the impact on freedom of public speech. And Thomas Bristow (Chapter 21) uses theories of emotion and affect to examine how models/narratives of science and climate engender a public, collective commitment to climate change action beyond scientific fact. Engaging notions of empathy, understanding, hope and catastrophe, he shows that emotions and the values they link can transcend rational facts, and posits this as a reaction to ‘toxic capitalism’.

In all, this collection will serve both to illuminate the major emotional dynamics present in contemporary times, and also serve to make the character of the times themselves much clearer. Emotions have always been fundamental to human experience, but their relegation to a secondary status behind reason and rationality has obscured their important role in the functioning of late modern society, and in surviving its contradictions. Our hope is that this collection will help to correct this imbalance, and inspire further research into emotions, encouraging a better understanding of the consequences of late modernity for emotions – and of the consequences of emotions for late modernity.

References
Ahmed, S 2010, The promise of happiness, Duke University Press, Durham, NC.

Hamilton, C 2010, Requiem for a species: why we resist the truth about climate change, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW.


Turkle, S 2011, Alone together: why we expect more from technology and less from each other, Basic Books, New York.


Introduction

Over the past four decades, sociologists have argued the myriad of ways in which emotions are relational and socially constructed. Socialisation, varying across cultures, teaches us how to attribute names to feelings and how to ‘calibrate’ our expressions accordingly (Burkitt 2012; Robinson 2014; Smith & Schneider 2009; von Scheve 2012). In recognising this, sociologists (see Lupton 1998; Thoits 1989) have pushed for more expansive conceptualisations of emotions. To individual-centric definitions of emotion – centred on (i) bodily feelings, (ii) expressions, (iii) physiological changes and (iv) motivations to act (Fridja 2000) – sociologists add socially and culturally shaped factors. These include (v) situational cues, (vi) social labels (e.g., happy, sad, envious, jealous or lonely), (vii) rules about which emotions should be felt and displayed in which social/relational situations and (viii) the work required to manage one’s own and others’ emotions to meet socio-cultural and organisational expectations (Hochschild 1983). These additions imply that social relations in any given historical era have a powerful impact upon emotions. For example, most professional (middle-class, white-collar) and service jobs now require a basic mastery of the ‘soft’ skills of emotional awareness and management, and the regular exercise of emotional intelligence (Nickson et al. 2011) – skills that were rarely recognised by (let alone demanded of) their industrial, factory-working predecessors.

The purpose of this chapter is to identify the unique characteristics of emotional experiences in the present, contemporary period, which has been described by Anthony Giddens (1991) as the late modern era. This is an imperfect label; it captures a time period with multiple alternative titles (liquid modernity, post-modernity, post-industrial society etc.), potentially porous boundaries and no definitive date separating it from the previous, modern period. We acknowledge that the flow of history is often divided artificially and retrospectively into any number of schisms. However, we also recognise that history can cohere into identifiably stable periods, characterised not just by unique social, economic and cultural conditions, but also by observably different codes of emotional conduct and expectation. Compare ‘cheerfully informal yet professional’ twenty-first-century
office workers with angry, striking, nineteenth-century industrial factory workers and fourteenth-century medieval peasants shamelessly relieving themselves in the street. Historian William Reddy (2001) would describe such phenomena as indicative of emotional regimes: social codes for allowable emotional expressions and repression in a particular historical space. We argue that the late modern era is characterised by a unique emotional regime, with emotional dynamics that differ substantially from prior periods.

We acknowledge that the geographical scope of this collection does not extend much beyond the Western-centric Global North (within which we include culturally similar countries such as Australia), and that the alternative ‘multiple modernities’ thesis (Eisenstadt 2000) characterises many parts of the Global South. Despite this, several chapters here deal with diversity within OECD nations, and immigration (for humanitarian or economic reasons) cannot be understood without taking into account the broader forces of globalisation that are not entirely one-directional or Eurocentric. Moreover, this collection is global in its approaches to studying emotions and affect, applying the work of scholars who are working in vastly different social and cultural contexts. We hope that this can lead to more comparative and collaborative work between sociology of emotions researchers in the Global North and the Global South.

Our focus on late modernity reflects core concerns within sociology. Following Giddens (1991) and numerous other key authors (Bauman 1990; Archer 2012), we identify how contemporary social conditions have changed in critical ways in the late modern era, beginning with the decline in industrial production and institutions in the 1970s, and accelerating with the rise of a flexible service economy and the Digital Age into the new millennium. Collectively, scholars characterise late modern life on the basis of continuous and increasingly rapid social, cultural and technological change; de-traditionalisation; individualisation; mediated interaction; and rampant consumerism. We argue that such phenomena also permeate how feelings are experienced today.

To identify the emotional characteristics of late modernity, it is necessary to distinguish it from previous times. Although there are several candidates for potential analysis – Classical Greek, Roman, medieval Christian, Renaissance and modern industrial times (see Lynch, this volume, Chapter 11 and Stephens, this volume, Chapter 12) – we argue that it is particularly important to distinguish and understand the Modern Industrial period out of which late modernity (and, for that matter, sociology) flowed. Many of the changed conditions in late modernity represent accelerations (or digital extensions) of distinctly modern phenomenon, such as the individualisation and commodification of feelings, and the scientific civilising of bodies and emotions. To properly render the modern era, we need (in turn) to distinguish it from prior periods, but the scope of the present study allows for only a brief look at a few important phenomena across a large and diverse time period. We use the term ‘classical/pre-industrial’ as shorthand for these prior eras, and make no claim to definitively analysing or capturing all the rich and complex dynamics that characterise them.
We therefore examine three broad time periods with notably different emotional regimes that can be discerned in Western history: 1) the pre-industrial/modern classical era; ii) (industrial) modernity; and – picking up sociologically from where historical research on emotion often leaves off – iii) late modernity. We examine key aspects of the emotional regimes of these three broad historical eras to reveal how the conditions of late modernity have led to five key emotional changes related to the i) complexity, ii) individualisation, iii) commodification, iv) mediation and v) reflexive management of social emotions in late modernity.

**Emotions across history**

**Classical emotions**

By ‘the classical era’, we mean the time before industrial capitalism, characterised by two particularly noteworthy emotional features: i) dualistic conceptualisations of mind and body, reason and emotion; and ii) the internalisation of socio-emotional norms, initiated by etiquette manuals.

The idea of dualism, or the separation of mind from body/emotion, has its origins in Ancient Greek thinking. The Greeks respected the influence of emotions in their veneration of the body (*soma*), but had schools of thought ranging from materialist beliefs in the power and importance of emotions and bodies in human action (e.g., Hippocrates, Hedonists, Epicureans, Aristotle) to ascetic beliefs in the supremacy of mind over body and feeling (e.g., Socrates, Plato, Orphists; see Synnott 1993). It was Plato’s philosophy – famously characterised by his suggestion that ‘The body is the tomb of the soul’ (Plato 1963, p. 437) – that largely persuaded classical scholars that the body and its discordant emotions were an ‘imperfection, constantly interrupting, disturbing, distracting and preventing us from getting a glimpse of the truth’ (Plato 1963, p. 66).

This dualistic hierarchy was affirmed in Roman society through Stoic philosophy (Synnott 1993, pp. 83–4), and amongst medieval Christians who engaged in ‘religious denunciation of the slimy desires of the flesh’ (Williams 1998, p. 753), and sought to position the soul (mind) above body (temptation) (Reddy 2001). This duality continued into the Renaissance times (Williams 1998), and was most famously reified by Descartes’ ‘Cogito, ergo sum’ (Stearns 1994), which argued that without thinking, there is no soul, and that to not think – that is, to be undone by emotion (Barbalet 1998) – is akin to self-destruction.

The importance of dualism lies in the impetus it gives to conceiving of emotions and the body as inferior, disturbing entities that needed to be controlled with appropriate social comportment and etiquette, often prescribed and mediated through written discourse. The Christian Bible, for example, contains parables and commandments concerning the containment of lust, greed, wrath and envy. During strictly puritanical times, satisfactions were subject to (preferably) indefinite delays (Carleheden 2008), and envy and greed were condemned as sin.
Much of the impetus towards bodily/emotional control, however, was likely driven by a general religious fear of God’s punishment, which manifested in the many plagues, wars and famines that afflicted people during this time (Beaglehole & Bonita 2004).

A more systematic attempt to mediate emotions emerged during the later medieval period, with the rising popularity of etiquette books. In The civilising process, Norbert Elias (1982) analysed historical ‘manners books’, which prescribed changing standards of bodily behaviour amongst notables in the medieval ages. These treatises demonstrate a deliberate attempt towards the end of the classical era to change fairly simple emotional responses into more complex, internalised feelings. They point to an evolution of simple or ‘basic’ feelings, such as fear and disgust, into more complex social forms. ‘Self-reproach’ emotions (Lively 2008, p. 927) such as shame, guilt and embarrassment started to become more important for maintaining collective social and moral order, and were grafted onto a shared etiquette on the comportment of bodies and awareness of the appropriateness of feelings. The consequence of this change is unmistakeable today in the disgust and embarrassment experienced by modern readers learning of medieval persons’ lack of shame in the way they comported their bodies: urinating or defecating in public, or at the dinner table (Dunning & Hughes 2013, p. 90).

Modern emotions

By ‘modernity’, we refer to the period characterised by the rise and consolidation of industrial capitalism, where a more complicated experience of emotions emerged. Williams (1998) notes that modernity is characterised by the simultaneous experience of – and tension between – stability and change, and identifies this tension in modern depictions of emotions, whereby the ‘fetish’ for rationality starts to give way to a more emotionally based order (a process we argue is fully realised in the late modern period).

In modernity, the original mediation of emotions through devices such as manners-books expanded into a more general acceptance of the need for individuals to control and manage their bodies and emotions according to different social contexts. As Synnott (1993, p. 2) notes, while the Renaissance marked a reversion to admiration of the body and saw the beginning of secularisation and personal control of bodily functions, it also started a movement away from the body as ‘enemy to the soul’ towards the body as ‘private responsibility’.

These changes accelerated during the Industrial Revolution. This period was characterised by political revolutions and change, the application of new technologies (steam, gas, coal, electricity), the rise in capitalism and a shift in economic thinking from the collectivist ‘moral economy’ of ‘getting by’ to the more individualist ‘supply-and-demand’ cycle of competing, building, reinvesting and consuming a surplus (Polanyi 2001). It also saw the rise in mass production using Taylorist and Fordist techniques, factories and a division of labour paid for in wages (Manning & Holmes 2014).
Such transformations brought great changes to the prevalent emotional regime in Western societies (Reddy 2001), and an acceleration of the ‘civilising’ process. Increasing market competition and class-based interdependence reinforced an ever-more elaborate system of manners and emotion norms (Wouters 1991, 1995). This interdependence, Wouters asserts, led to greater mutual identification, sympathy towards suffering and aversion toward dangerous symbols (such as the use of hunting knives at the dinner table, or the slaughtering of animals in plain sight before food preparation). Into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Wouters (2007) argues, the reinforcement of manners and emotions increasingly became the responsibility of the individual, rather than an external Other (or God).

The modern era also saw a shift towards the scientific investigation of most phenomena, including emotions (Lupton 1998). Granted, this line of modern scientific investigation was shaped by a positivist tradition that ‘neutralised the values and emotions of its disembodied practitioners’ (Williams 1998, p. 749). Nevertheless, modern scientific investigations into emotions started to break down the strict binaries separating mind and body. Evolutionary and psychodynamic aspects of emotions provide examples: Darwin’s theories about the evolution of human emotions; Freud and James’ early psychological conceptions of the subconscious role of emotions in human action.

There was also greater scientific and institutional interest in understanding the complexities of emotions for the purposes of managing them. Stearns (1994) argues that a more restrained, dispassionate form of behaviour emerged in the twentieth century, characterised by Taylorised work practices. Furthermore, the groundwork for the sociological study of emotions was laid in the mid-twentieth century, with the emergence of theories about the development of the self in social interaction with others. Mead’s (2000) and Cooley’s (1998) conception of a self formed by interacting socially with others – reflecting back upon those interactions and imagining how others see oneself through the well-known ‘looking glass’ metaphor – formed a prelude for understanding changes characteristic of late modernity, flagged much later by Giddens (1991). Being able to understand how others perceive us in society and adapt our actions accordingly – or being socially aware – becomes increasingly important in a social world characterised by change and decreasing reliance on tradition.

**Late Modernity**

We use late modernity to describe the present period of globalised and networked capitalism: the post-industrial era beginning in the late twentieth century and continuing into the early twenty-first century, which we argue is characterised by an emotional regime comprised of complex, individualised, mediated, reflexively managed and commodified emotions. We argue that there have been several important social changes that distinguish this era from its modern predecessor: a global economy, increasing distrust of – but
reliance on – science and technology, de-traditionalisation and rapid change, the increasing secularisation of Western society and a growing reliance on a more autonomous form of reflexivity.

**Social changes in late modernity**

Modern capitalism was characterised by production-based economies that were – to differing extents – moderated by governments; the current global economy is characterised by deregulation, consumption and service orientation. This ‘global’ economy, often conceived as a singular construct, is more pervasive than any of the national economies that preceded it, with Bauman (2004, p. 6) noting that the ‘processes of the commodification, commercialisation and monetisation of human livelihoods have penetrated every nook and cranny of the globe’. This has seen a shift away from the factory-based mass production of the industrial era to service-oriented ‘micro-production’ in de-centred (increasingly informal, often home-based) workplaces, with more flexible work production schedules (Kugelmass 1995).

With these changes has come a paradoxical rise in citizens being both more distrustful of and simultaneously more reliant on science and technology. Beck (1992) notes that the optimism of modernity has been replaced by sentiments of risk and uncertainty. As public faith in science and technology to resolve collective problems (e.g., poverty, climate change) is diminishing, late modern citizens seem to place more trust in science and technology to solve individual problems. There is greater reliance on experts within the social sciences – especially psychology and sociology – to resolve (inter)personal troubles (Hochschild 2012; Manning & Holmes 2014; Poder 2008), and many aspects of human health, wealth and social interaction have become mediated by text- or screen-based applications (Lupton & Jutel 2015). Digital technology and social media are embraced, facilitating exposure to an even greater number of ideas, peoples and cultures at a speed that has profoundly altered perceptions of time and space (Davis 2008).

Under such circumstances of rapid change and interconnection, late modern citizens are increasingly left to craft their own identities through informed introspection into and modification of their individual practices. Western societies in particular are becoming increasingly *individualised* and *reflexive*. While acknowledging that people in all eras have reflected on their circumstances, we argue that this process has become commonplace, continuous and more internal in late modernity. Whether cast as liberating (Giddens 1991) or atomising (Bauman 2005), late modern citizens favour individual choice, change, freedom and ultimately self-responsibility rather than compliance to (but also support from) traditional authorities (e.g., church, state, family) (Davis 2008; Archer 2012). Reflexivity has taken on a new form and importance for late modern individuals (Giddens 1991; Hazleden 2003), in that it is more (i) individually oriented, (ii) continuous, (iii) mediated by technology and consumption and (iv) oriented
to navigating ‘the novelty of their circumstances’ (Archer 2012, p. 1), rather than
reinterpreting and clarifying tradition, as it was in earlier periods.

Such changes, however, can be emotionally unsettling, and often require
reassurance from scientific experts (Campain 2008). Late modern reflexives
consult career counsellors, take Myers-Briggs tests and regularly seek help from
psychologists and counsellors about their family, sexual and relationship diffi-
culties, trying to tap into a vast array of expert research and literature (Giddens
1990). The market is a source of advice (and comfort) (Riggs & Turner 1997)
but also inequality; ‘market-mediated’ reflexivity is, of course, only available to
those who can afford it (Blackshaw 2008, p. 117).

Overall, the characteristics of late modernity point to a society that has
 accelerated in many ways. We now look at the profound and far-reaching
impact these changes have had on the contemporary emotional landscape.

**Emotions in late modernity**

We argue that emotions and their social dynamics have changed substantially
from the classical to the late modern era in five important ways. (i) Emotions
are more complex. Conceptualisations have moved beyond dualistic notions of
emotion and reason, to acknowledge the centrality of emotional motivations
and awareness to reasoning. New emotional constructs, such as late modern
intimacy and ambivalence, evidence this complexity. (ii) Emotions are viewed as
more individualistic. With traditional social structures dissolving, emotions are
perceived to be an individual’s private responsibility (and expense). (iii) Emotion
and consumption are intertwined more intimately now than at any other point in
history. (iv) Instead of religious texts or etiquette books, emotions are now medi-
ated through mass media and interactive social media digital platforms. (v) Emotions
in this context require continuous reflexive monitoring, feedback and management – a
process of central importance to that other key individual responsibility of late
modernity: crafting identities. And, as a society, we reflexively use emotions to
define late modernity, in applying emotional labels to widespread social phe-
nomena (e.g., the War on Terror).

**Complexity of emotions, and newly complex emotions**

Understanding of the complexities of emotions has expanded in late modernity.
A critical inversion has been the realisation of the interrelatedness of – rather
than opposition between – emotion and reasoning. Illouz (2018) writes of
the centrality of reasoning and rationality, especially through consumption,
to intimate emotional pursuits. Research from neuroscience (Damasio 1994;
Davidson 2012; Feldman-Barrett 2017) shows that brain processes surrounding
emotion and reason are intimately connected, and that emotions motivate and
‘tag’ cognitions. Barbalet poses a ‘critical’ view emphasising the important role
of emotion within the reasoning process:
If emotions distract persons from their purposes, then, at the same time, emotions establish afresh what their purposes are to be. Viewed from this perspective, emotions need not oppose reason so much as give it direction. . . (Barbalet 2001, p. 31)

Late modern emotional complexity also manifests in multifaceted and sometimes completely new emotions that emerge as combinations of others. Ekman (1999) identifies a limited number of ‘basic’ emotions in all cultures based on unique facial expressions: fear, anger, sadness, happiness, disgust and surprise. While neuroscientists have challenged this claim (Feldman-Barrett 2017), sociologists have suggested that basic emotions combine in socially constituted ways to form more complex emotions, such as shame and guilt (Kemper 1987; Turner 2000), and even distinctly new emotions. These include feelings such as ambiguity (Burkitt 2002), disconnected ambivalence (Bauman 2000; Sennett 1998), and the playful creation of new emotional labels, such as frubbles, referring to the joy experienced by poly-amorous persons in one’s partner finding another partner (Ritchie & Barker 2006). New research investigates more general and less-structured forms of emotional and feeling experience, such as affect. von Scheve (2018) identifies the overlap between contemporary views of emotion as discretely labelled entities, and conceptions of affect in psychology and post-turn cultural studies. He identifies that while affect is a broader, embodied, non-discrete and more unconscious feeling phenomenon than emotion, it shares social ‘relational’ qualities in common, in that it manifests in the social interrelationships between bodies; it is the ‘raw material’ (p. 55) from which more discrete emotions and their labels are shaped.

Another complex emotional experience is the transformation of intimacy and love described by Giddens (1992) and Illouz (2012; 2018), associated with individualisation in late modernity. While Giddens (1992) asserts that emancipatory ‘pure’ relationships – characterised by intimate internal-love, rather than traditional external-material rewards – are becoming more common in late modernity, others point to the temporary nature of relationships amongst late modern citizens, and the disconnection and loneliness this implies (see Hookway et al., this volume, Chapter 6). Bauman (perhaps cynically) reconceptualises this as love being replaced by lust cast as just another ‘sensation’ for ‘gathering’ (Bauman 2005, p. 105). Additionally, there is rising research interest in the highly complex emotion of ambivalence, the sensation of experiencing too many feelings at once or not understanding what one is feeling or why. Junge (2008) asserts that this emotion defines late modernity. Faced with so many identity-making opportunities, feelings of ambivalence characterise the uncertain path forward (Archer 2012).

**Individualised emotions**

Given an inability to change a world characterised by temporary, seasonal, insecure contract employment and issues of security and terror, late modernity
has witnessed a refocus on the micro aspects of the self. Emotions have taken on renewed significance as pathological diagnoses and are treated as a private responsibility. School children labelled as emotionally at-risk are offered training in emotional literacy and mindfulness (Reid 2009; Mendelson et al. 2013). Having ‘poor emotional well-being’ (or, worse, ‘emotional issues’) may offer a temporary excuse from the requirement to maintain and manage one’s emotions (Ecclestone 2011, pp. 98, 105); overall, good (emotional) health is generally viewed as a ‘personal responsibility’ (Lupton 2013, p. 240). Self-help books promote hyper-vigilance over pathological emotions, instructing people to master negative emotions as a pathway to greater control over themselves and their relationships (Hazelden 2012).

This ‘practice of psychologising social problems’, ‘transform[s] political and economic fragility’ into a personal, emotional responsibility (Ecclestone 2011, p. 107), and is sold as an ‘opportunity’ to take control of one’s life. The rise in ‘The Happiness Industry’ is a case in point (Davies 2015), whereby late modern citizens are ‘promised’ happiness through individual efforts at exercise, diet, medication, accumulation and lifestyle (Ahmed 2010). This industry propels ongoing reflexive examination of individual feelings and satisfaction, and is intrinsically linked to an increase in consumption oriented to this task (McCarthy 2002), in ignorance of the social class and privileges that constrain or enable ‘happy’ pursuits (Ahmed 2010).

**Commodified emotions**

De-traditionalisation and individualisation have opened a space for identity, lifestyle, comportment and, consequently, emotion to be formed by consumption patterns. Giddens (1991) notes that in late modernity ‘the consumption of ever-novel goods becomes in some part a substitute for the genuine development of the self’ (p. 198). Emotions fuel this process and are thus more commodified now than in any other era. Late modern consumption has opened endless opportunities to pursue emotions as commodities, such as risk and excitement (Illouz 2018; Poder 2008; Zinn 2006). Paradoxically, boredom, as Barbalet (1999) asserts, has become endemic. Though many still rely on ‘ordinary’, non-commercial relationships (Brownlie 2014), people can now outsource oversight of emotional aspects of their private lives to therapy, care and self-help industries, and have created new careers not only in the fields of health, learning and wellbeing (as noted above), but in a vast array of new consumption areas; wedding planners, scrapbook makers and ‘rent-a-friends’ can all be hired (Hochschild 2012).

In an era of consumption-driven ‘sensation-gathering’ (Bauman 2005), emotions stem increasingly from how well (pride, esteem, happiness) or poorly (shame, envy) people consume. Emotions such as envy and greed – once condemned as sin associated with avarice – are now socially approved and encouraged for the contribution they make to economic growth (Fiske 2011).
Late modern feelings are increasingly classed along lines of ‘emotional capital’ (Reid 2009), with those less able to consume re-cast as emotionally vulnerable or emotionally irresponsible. The failure to craft an identity and capitalise on the plethora of consumption opportunities late modernity provides has been tied to narratives of ‘fractured reflexivity’ (Archer 2012) or a failure to consume (Blackshaw 2008). The shame that is central to this narrative has even been linked to suicide (Fullagar 2003). Interestingly, thrill-seeking has been linked to engagement in petty theft, a deviant act (Katz 1989), which may reflect new forms of emotional resistance to the emotional hegemony of capitalist late modernity.

We recognise that the individualisation and commodification theses – and by extension the idea of individualised and commodified emotions – have their critics. Smart and Shipman (2004), for example, reject the homogenising and sometimes ‘apocalyptic’ (p. 493) depictions of rampant individualisation with regards to the family, by noting that a continuum of motivations for marriages exists across different cultures and religious groups, ranging from traditional kin-based to individualised self-actualisation. And the collection by von Scheve and Salmela (2014) describes the various ways in which collective, rather than individualised, emotions manifest in contemporary times. However, we argue here that the extension of the market and commodification into so many everyday emotional experiences and aspects of identity provides clear evidence of the widespread commercially driven individualisation of feelings in Western society today. This could be translated into a slow shift towards the individualisation end of Smart and Shipman’s continuum (at least in Global North countries) and provides a counterpoint to explain the rise in collective, deviant emotions, as a protest against a ‘blasé’, individualised and commercialised affective world.

**Mediated emotions**

In late modernity, corporate media (whether mass television or digital micro-social media) has displaced and replaced traditional institutions shaping our emotions. The 24-hour mass media and entertainment cycle – accompanied by the echo chamber of trending social media – forms a background to many current emotions. Emotions increasingly exist only for the purpose and duration of the experience (Mestrovic 1997; West-Newman 2008, p. 107), which is nowhere more evident than in the million ‘liked’ moments that flow through the social media worlds of Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and Snapchat. At the same time, digital technologies are shifting civic engagement from the public to the private realm (Papacharissi & Papacharissi 2010). Further, Papacharissi’s influential work in this area argues that such media should be gauged not on the basis of how effective they are, but on the basis of their affective intensities (2015). In other words, while mediated emotions are more prevalent in late modernity, they have also changed the nature of political participation, and of everyday life and private consumption. The flood of images and advertisements leaves
modern consumers ‘weighed down’ by ‘delightful purchases’, too distracted by their excitement (Blackshaw 2008, p. 125) or overwhelmed by their anxiety (Hamilton 2010) to feel sustained anger about political, economic or environmental injustices. Instead, anger associated with wars on terror and insecurity becomes prevalent and serves to divide national sentiment (Holmes 2004).

Micro-interactive social media has also changed our emotional relations. Face-to-face interaction is decreasing in favour of more digitally mediated forms of social interaction (Patulny & Seaman 2017; and see Hookway et al., this volume, Chapter 6 and Pribram, this volume, Chapter 15). New technologies open up novel forms of intimacy between geographically separated couples (Holmes 2014) and enable emotional support through, for instance, online message boards for people facing chronic illnesses (Godbold 2015). New digital platforms create new emotional connotations and etiquette (e.g., emphasis based on CAPITALISATION or the appropriate use of emoticons 😊), but also open new avenues for control and emotional manipulation. The Facebook 2012 Emotion Manipulation Study (Glance 2014) demonstrated the ability of a large corporation to directly manipulate the emotions of hundreds of thousands of late modern users/consumers/citizens, as well as Facebook’s questionable ethics and disturbing potential to generate population-level emotional contagions.

**Reflexively managed emotions**

The requirement to reflexively construct an identity and manage emotions to keep up with an ever-changing society is the final key aspect of late modern emotional life. Though earlier conceptualisations of reflexivity overlooked the affective dimensions of this process, emotions have now been identified as imperative to reflexively managing one’s concerns and pathway – amidst the many and changing possibilities – through the contemporary era (Burkitt 2012; Deslandes & King 2006; Holmes 2010).

We argue that emotions and reflexivity are now interlinked in three ways. First, emotions aid the reflexive process itself by serving as a vital heuristic device for navigating late modernity. In a world where the demands of keeping up with an ever-expanding knowledge-base require specialist training – and systematic, rationalised assessments based on evidence and reviews of the literature is time-intensive and often fraught – emotions serve as our ‘moorings’ or ‘touchstone’ (Manning & Holmes 2014; McCarthy 2002, pp. 40, 43). They offer a comforting and consistent source of information on what we feel and how we should choose to position ourselves in an overly complex world. Being reflexive involves interpretation and judgement, and engenders ‘self-reproach’ emotions – pride, shame – that are increasingly internalised as an individual responsibility in late modernity (Scheff 2003; Probyn 2004; Burkitt 2012).

Second, we are increasingly reflexive about our emotions. The requirement to monitor and adjust our emotions to suit the workplace (Hochschild 1983)
is a well-recognised facet of late modernity. However, late modernity is also characterised by a therapeutic culture (Illouz 2008) and a Happiness Industry (Ahmed 2010; Davies 2015) that sells the desirability – and ultimately the obligation – to manage our feelings to be positive regardless of our social and life circumstances. Late modernity obligates us to manage emotions as individual consumers, healthy citizens and parents (Montgomery 2008).

Third, we put forward the idea of ‘macro-reflexivity’ – that we are reflexive about emotions (and emotional in our reflexivity) on an individual, and a larger social, scale. Collectively, we use emotions to label the great challenges of late modernity, and reinforce or resist the primary anxiety-based emotional regime of our age. Terms such as ‘Risk Society’ and the ‘War on Terror’, propagated by journalists and commentators sensationalising the latest issue, emotionally define phenomena, producing a ‘culture of fear’ (Furedi 2002) and leading a continuous ‘low grade, niggling anxiety’ and widespread perceptions of vulnerability (West-Newman 2008, p. 110) which characterise late modern life. This macro-reflexivity can erode the collective empathy we feel for others, as we manage collective feelings into an allowable set of ‘post-emotional’, pre-packaged forms (Mestrovic 1997, p. 150) and create:

a neo-Marcusean society of ‘happy consciousness’ [where] feeling becomes separated from action, and ‘compassion fatigue’ looms large: a ‘viscerated compassion’ churned out by the culture industry which is really more like pity.

(Williams 1998, p. 755)

However, we note that macro-reflexivity also allows for the creation (as well as undermining) of new forms of connection, sympathy and empathy with strangers, as can be seen in the mixed attitudes to the plight of refugees and asylum seekers around the world (see Khorana, this volume, Chapter 16 and Peterie this volume, Chapter 19).

**Conclusion**

In sum, there is growing anxiety, loneliness and ambivalence in late modernity, created by societies in endless flux where social and political problems are pushed back onto individuals to manage. Continuous reflexive management is becoming the norm, with policies and a popular culture dedicated to positive psychology even while those with more ‘emotional capital’ are better positioned to manage this private responsibility. Furthermore, we have moved into a digitally mediated era, where interactions and their concordant emotions are more public, fleeting and vulnerable to corporate manipulation (Kramer et al. 2014). Online communication and the international exchange of information is also more rapid, speeding up the pace of change and the rate at which we must respond and adapt to new emotional climates and cultures.
The sum of these examinations shows that new emotional dynamics characterise late modernity. We have arrived at an extraordinary time marked by many new constraints but also many new opportunities to be reflexive and change not only our thoughts and actions, but our feelings as well.

**Note**

1 The focus here is on emotions in Western history and in contemporary Western society. There are substantial differences in the way emotions have been conceptualised historically across Asian and European societies. Brevity dictates that we narrow our focus.

**References**


Fiske, S 2011, Envy up, scorn down, Russell Sage Foundation, New York.


Glance, D 2014, ‘Should Facebook have experimented on 689,000 users and tried to make them sad?’, The Conversation, 30 June, viewed 19 July 2018, https://theconversation.com/should-facebook-have-experimented-on-689-000-users-and-tried-to-make-them-sad-28485.


Hamilton, C 2010, Requiem for a species: why we resist the truth about climate change, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest.


Kemper, T 1987, ‘How many emotions are there? Wedding the social and the autonomic components’, *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 93, no. 2, pp. 263–89.


Lupton, D 2013, ‘It’s a terrible thing when your children are sick’: motherhood and home healthcare work’, *Health Sociology Review*, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 234–42.


Emotions in late modernity


Patulny, R & Seaman, C 2017, ‘“I’ll just text you”: is face-to-face social contact declining in a mediated world?’, *Journal of Sociology*, vol. 53, no. 2, pp. 285–302.


Ritchie, A & Barker, M 2006, ‘“There aren’t words for what we do or how we feel so we have to make them up”: constructing polyamorous languages in a culture of compulsory monogamy’, *Sexualities*, vol. 9, no. 5, pp. 584–601.


Part I

Emotional complexity and complex understandings of emotions
Chapter 2

Emotive-cognitive rationality, background emotions and emotion work

Åsa Wettergren

Introduction

In spite of recent growing interest in emotions in popular and scientific discourses (Patulny & Olson, this volume, Chapter 1), the perception of emotion and reason as strictly separate still dominates in late modernity. The aim of this chapter is to argue that instead of emotion and reason as separate phenomena in social science we need to understand them as entwined and inseparable (see also McKenzie, this volume, Chapter 4). If we do so, we will be able to better understand and explain the social phenomena we study. I will begin by discussing some general different perspectives on the relationship between reason and emotion. Thereafter, I will present a model that serves as a theoretical framework in my own empirical research on the role of emotions in bureaucratic and legal decision making and courtroom practices. In the discussion of the model I will draw on examples from my research on the Swedish courts. I will then revisit an old study of mine on the Swedish Migration Board to further illustrate how the framework functions.

Emotion and reason

The conventional perspective on the relationship between emotion and reason seems to be deeply rooted in the process of Western thinking (see Patulny & Olson, this volume, Chapter 1). It postulates emotion and reason as opposites, one oppositional pair among many in the binary discursive conceptualisation of the world, so typical of modern classificatory systems (Foucault 1971; Jacob 1988; von Wright 1986). Emotion is sorted along with female, nature, body and private, and reason is sorted along with male, civilisation, mind and public.\(^1\) Reddy’s (2001) historical analysis of emotional regimes in France in 1700–1850 corroborates this argument as his findings demonstrate the shift in emotional regime from sentimentalism to ‘a new democratized code of honour [. . . ] to create a new male sphere of public endeavour and private enrichment’ (2001, p. 327).

Furthermore, by the turn of the twentieth century, as noted by Laclau in his book On Populist Reason (2005), theories of the crowd associated collective
action (the crowd) with emotional contagion, pathology and irrationality, while the individual became associated with rationality and normality. In this way, emotional control was emphasised as an individual faculty, as if collectives were inherently emotionally unstable. Linguistic studies, like Kövecses’ (2000) inquiry into emotions and metaphors in different languages, further accentuate the focus on control in the Western world. Kövecses thus suggests that the cross-cultural use of the metaphor of anger as a hot fluid in a container (the body) points to a universal experience of anger-emotions. But he also points out that the metaphorical association of emotions with control, difficulty or harm seems to pertain uniquely to ‘the general Western emphasis on controlling emotion and regarding emotions as things that are harmful to the proper functioning of the Western ideal of a rational person’ (Kövecses 2001, p. 48).

The strict separation of reason and emotion has been increasingly challenged over the past four to five decades, in both scientific and popular knowledge. The critique of the conventional separation between emotion and reason tallies with an interest in the instrumental use of emotions as conducive for the purposes of capitalism and the market in late modernity, as noted, for instance, by Hochschild (Baumeler 2010; Hochschild 1983; Hochschild 2003; see also Mestrovic 1997; Stearns 1994). This ‘critical approach’ (Barbalet 1998, p. 38) questions the assumption that emotion is necessarily opposed to reason. Some emotions may be uncontrollable and harmful, namely the primary emotions (fear, anger, sadness etc.; see Ekman 1999). Secondary (social) emotions (see Damasio 1994) instead may support rationality and may also be subject to cognitive regulation or control. According to Barbalet, the critical perspective still maintains the idea that there are purely rational – or unemotional – phenomena, for instance, instrumental rationality. Even if scholars admit emotion as sometimes supportive of rationality, and loosen up the idea of emotions as forces of nature not to be trusted in order to maintain rationality, emotion is still seen as separate from reason.

Contrasting the conventional and the critical perspective, Barbalet (1998, p. 45) coins ‘the radical approach’, that is, the understanding of emotion and reason as continuous, entwined and inseparable. Demonstrating how emotion conveys information that human beings would not be able to collect, compile and to assess merely by cognition (see also Damasio 1994), Barbalet argues that emotion is necessary for all action. Emotions assess information about the landscape in which we move in order for us to act wisely in this landscape (Hochschild 1983; 1990). Instrumental rationality is thus also emotional.

In order to perform instrumental tasks effectively, human actors must not only be committed to the purposes intrinsic to them, but also committed to avoiding extrinsic and distracting purposes. Thus in addition to the particular facilitating emotions which function to motivate instrumental action, such as pride in one’s expertise and skill, satisfaction in one’s work, distaste for waste of material and time [. . .] there is also a need for emotional distance from potentially disruptive emotions which a wider
involvement with others might bring. That is to say that in instrumental rationality there is a need for what Simmel called the blasé feeling.

(Barbalet 1998, p. 60)

In this quote, emotions of commitment (pride, satisfaction and distaste) and emotional distance (blasé feeling) are suggested to motivate and orient the very performance of instrumental reason. These emotions do not disturb, but rather inform, rational action. Barbalet discusses these emotions as calm and quiet, just below consciousness (Barbalet 2009) and labels them backgrounded emotions (Barbalet 2011). Backgrounded emotions ‘function by giving attention to external but not internal objects of emotional apprehension’ (Barbalet 2011, p. 39). This is to say, they are there and they are fundamental to the task in which we are involved, but as they are conducive to the task, they do not become an object of cognitive reflection.

Based on the radical perspective, I argue that rational action is emotional but linked to a particular performance and management of emotions. This perspective also brings to the fore the notion of emotions about emotions, as suggested in the quote above that the blasé feeling is a filter against distracting emotions. This is to say that we can feel that we do not want to feel a particular thing (see Morton 2013, pp. 53–5) and adapt our emotive-cognitive orientation accordingly. I suggest that emotion is not unitary in its action-orientation; different emotions pertaining to mutually exclusive actions may be experienced simultaneously. We can harbour a good deal of contradictive emotions at the same time, but we cannot physically engage in more than one action at a time, unless we deplete our focus and with that our emotional commitment.

Collapsing the separation of emotion and reason thus opens up for consideration the emotionality of actions and dispositions that are not conventionally seen as emotional. It also dismisses the rather fruitless effort to categorise and sort discrete emotions into positive versus negative emotions, or primary versus secondary, and instead considers emotion’s relation to action and action outcomes (Barbalet 1998). This is not to say that some specific rational emotions are conducive to the rational type of action; at stake is instead the intensity and orientation of the emotions informing action.

Emotion’s relation to action has been discussed in numerous studies across social-scientific disciplines and perspectives; for instance, emotion is practice (Scheer 2012), emotion is relation (Burkitt 2014), emotion produces surfaces and boundaries between bodies, emotions move and stick to bodies and thereby orient action and reaction between bodies (Ahmed 2004), emotion assesses and evaluates action (Archer 2000). Emotions induce – motivate, orient – action (Collins 1993). Considering then emotion’s relation to action, our moral evaluations (positive/negative, controllable/uncontrollable) pertain to the thrust, interpretation and outcome of action, our physical involvement in the world, not to the emotions that fuel and inform the action (Barbalet 1998). All emotions may be conducive to rational action, just like all emotions
may also be disruptive. And all emotions can be backgrounded as well as foregrounded. Meanwhile, we almost always have the capacity to self-govern what we feel, because feeling is so fundamentally tied to behaviour, and thereby to behavioural norms and social recognition. Turning this argument around, behind every behavioural norm there are assumptions and norms about emotions, what we should feel and how to express it. In the following section, I will suggest a model for how to combine action, reason, emotion and emotion work (regulation of emotions).

**Emotion, action and emotion work**

Figure 2.1 (below) visualises the basis of the theoretical framework that I work with to conceptualise how emotion and reason intertwine yet sometimes collide in relation to a specific action/task. It is a synthesis of primarily Hochschild’s (1983) theory of emotion work (feeling/display rules) and Barbalet’s (1998) backgrounded/foregrounded emotions. Hochschild’s (1979; 1983) theory of emotion work should be familiar to most readers as it has been groundbreaking in sociology and related disciplines and the inquiry into the social relevance of emotions. Here, I prefer to use the term

![Figure 2.1 Emotion, action and emotion work](image-url)
emotion work instead of emotion management as the former, in my view, is more generic and refers to the regulation of emotions in all settings and in relation to all types of emotional regimes, be it that of the workplace, the peer-group or the family.

The vertical axis represents the degree of emotion’s conduciveness versus disruption in relation to a specific action/task. The horizontal axis displays the degree of consciousness of the emotion, going from the foreground – where emotion itself becomes the object of action – to the background – where emotion is conventionally ignored. If emotion is action and emotions orient our attention (and thus action) then we might say that emotions that are conducive to our present ongoing action are likely not noticed (Box 1), while emotions that call our attention to a different action will potentially be experienced as disruptive (Box 4). Then again, we may attempt to perform multiple tasks simultaneously and we often move between arrays of different ongoing tasks without necessarily reflecting on what we feel, so obviously these emotive-cognitive shifts between different actions can also take place in the background (Box 2). Sometimes we need to consciously evoke a particular emotion in order to get the energy and motivation to perform a specific action (Box 3).

To clarify, let me give some examples from the project Emotions in Court (Bergman Blix & Wettergren 2018).

Box 1) The judge in the Swedish court acts on calm background emotions when she chairs a hearing and listens to the parties, keeping her attention on the process and its rules. Her background emotions are (among others) interest, self-confidence and professional pride, and they are conducive to her task as an attentive chair.

Box 2) The judge is startled when she notices that the accused is staring at the victim while telling his version of the story. She then tells the accused to not look at the victim but at her (the judge), and keep talking. The background emotion leading to this shift from listening to correcting the accused is emotional apprehension (worry) that confrontation between the accused and the victim might flare up emotions and disturb the court process. The preventive measure she takes momentarily disrupts her act of listening, but she can then reassume the task without further ado. In an interview, she would be highly unlikely to recall this event as emotional, which is characteristic for background emotions.

Box 4) The accused gets worked up and quite noisy and rude while he is talking. The judge gradually becomes aware of her own feelings of irritation and anger at the accused’s lack of appropriate demeanour and deference. The emotional regime of the Swedish court rules out all emotional expressions by professionals, particularly by judges. The judge therefore focuses on her display – keeping it neutral – and on averting her growing emotions of
contempt and anger in order to not be disturbed in her (impartial) listening. She becomes aware of her own disruptive emotions and she is consciously working on them in relation to the regime’s feeling and display rules. But she is, simultaneously, also [. . .]

Box 3) [. . .] working up her conducive emotions of (non-judgemental) calm and interest to continue perform the listening (she tries to stay focused). In the Swedish context we have seen that in this situation a sometimes disruptive emotion reported by judges is the insecurity they feel around the decision to act/not act on their irritation by reproaching the accused.

A less complex example of Box 3 is as follows: prior to a very ordinary and boring small trial, the judge chitchats with the three lay judges to summon curiosity and direct their focus towards interesting aspects of the case at hand. Just before opening the trial s/he cheerfully shouts ‘Alright?! Is everybody on board? Then let’s roll!’ In this example the judge counteracts disinterest and boredom that may be attached to this type of trial (called grey-hearings in Swedish), trying to evoke instead a good-humoured curiosity in petty crime.

Assumptions and implications of the model

The model in Figure 2.1 is – as models tend to be – static. Some of its underlying assumptions and inherent consequences therefore need to be explicated. First, it should be clear that we are always emotional; there is no such thing as an unemotional (living) human being, as emotions constitute the condition for being in the world. We feel because we have bodies and our bodies are inserted into the physical world and convey information to us through emotions (Damasio 2000).

Second, what I call background emotions are undefined – they are bundles of emotions or emotional processes, or what Reddy (2001, pp. 102–105) would call ‘thought material’. They are at the outskirts of consciousness. It is only when we reflect upon them that they become emotions with distinct cultural labels, norms and beliefs attached to them (Thoits 1989). Whether we reflect upon them or not, they fuel and orient our actions. Third, it follows that we feel many things at the same time but when we reflect upon what we feel we settle the emotion with the help of culturally available language and knowledge. The emotion word we settle for is performative – that is, it helps in creating the emotion we express. This is essential to Reddy’s theory about ‘emotives’ (Reddy 2001, p. 128; see also Hochschild 1983).

Fourth, emotion work takes place in relation to a social context and its feeling and display rules, which are often just tacit norms, and just like every other norm-conforming behaviour it is sanctioned by feelings of shame and pride. In other words: we feel about what we feel. So we can feel that we do not want to feel a particular thing. For example, Bergman Blix and I (Wettergren & Bergman
Blix 2016) have argued that prosecutors’ empathy is a prerequisite for their professional and objective work but that their empathic scope is limited by what we call the emotive-cognitive judicial frame (see below), preventing them from being overwhelmed (and disrupted in their professional tasks) by the tragedy and horror of crime. The orientation of the emotive-cognitive judicial frame in this regard is performed by feeling. The prosecutors feel aversion against feeling outrage, sorrow, sympathy, horror and pain every time they read the protocol about a murder or child abuse. And they certainly feel aversion against feeling the weight of guilt when the case cannot be prosecuted due to lack of evidence (see Törnqvist 2017). None of these feelings would be conducive to performing the prosecutors’ work. Aversion to these feelings is built into the emotive-cognitive judicial frame, enabling prosecutors to navigate around these feelings. When they talk about, reflect upon, their feelings – for example, in an interview – they use emotives (Reddy 2001) to create desired feeling-states of professional pride and satisfaction (Törnqvist 2017). Furthermore, the narratives they draw from circulate in collective emotion management at the prosecution office, that is, an ongoing dialogue and exchange of emotions in interactions with colleagues, under the auspices of the emotive-cognitive judicial frame.

Fifth, through primary and secondary socialisation – through the repetition and training of child-rearing, education, re-education – we habituate emotion work. This brings us to the interesting conclusion that emotion work can also become backgrounded – and, therefore, habituated. In other words, emotional regimes – learnt feeling and expression rules – become natural. They become embodied and internalised. Bergman Blix (2010) has shown in detail how habituation takes place in stage actors’ repetition of a character – in the end mere cues such as standing on a particular spot on the stage evoke a particular emotional expression. Similarly, when experienced judges put on the costume, take seat in court and open the trial, their faces become sternly neutral – equal-ling no emotional expression. As stated by Monique Scheer (2012, p. 205) in her article about emotional practice: ‘The habitus specifies what is “feelable” in a specific setting, orients the mind/body in a certain direction’.

**Emotional regime vs emotive-cognitive frame**

The examples discussed in relation to the model above mention the concepts emotional regime and emotive-cognitive frame and imply a difference between them. As defined by Reddy (2001, p. 129) an emotional regime is ‘a set of normative emotions and the official rituals, practices, and emotives that express and inculcate them’. In earlier work, I have defined an emotional regime as ‘the set of tacit and explicit knowledge about emotion, including when certain emotions are appropriate and how they should be displayed, embedded in behavioural norms pertinent to given social groups’ (Wettergren & Jansson 2013, p. 426). In our research on the Swedish courts, we have worked with ‘judicial emotional regime’ as an overarching concept (Bergman Blix & Wettergren 2016).
similar to Maroney’s *script of judicial dispassion* (Maroney 2011). An emotional regime in this regard may be something one consciously moves in and out of, while regulating emotions accordingly; it does not need to be embodied. Through our empirical analysis, however, emerged a need to further emphasise both that emotion and cognition were inseparable, and that the norms governing thoughts, feelings, expressions and behaviour in our participant judges and prosecutors were indeed embodied. The emotion work of shifting between different contexts at work associated with stricter or laxer alignment with the dispassionate emotional regime was entirely backgrounded.

The notion of frame derives from Goffman (1974) and in his later writing refers to something deeper and more internalised than norms (see also Bergman Blix & Wettergren 2018). A frame consists of social constraints.

These [social constraints] are not rules that people have learned to carry around in their heads, but are ways in which situations unfold, so that participants feel they have to behave in a certain way, or make amends for not doing so. It is the frames that are the constraints. Even when they are broken, the situation that emerges remains constraining in a predictable transformed way. (Collins 1988, p. 57)

Bergman Blix and I (2018, p. 22) thus argue that ‘the emotive-cognitive judicial frame is [. . .] a restricted behavioural script or habitus for law professionals’. The notion of emotive-cognitive captures the entwined emotional and cognitive process of habituating and sustaining the frame; it is not merely a process of *learning to feel* but simultaneously *learning to think* in particular ways (and the reverse). In the case of legal professionals, they have been implicitly trained, for years and years, how to feel and how to perform their professional emotions by explicitly learning how to think – therefore, by focusing merely on learning the cognitive skills of judicial encoding and judicial expertise.

In the next section I will revisit my work on the Swedish Migration Board (Wettergren 2010) in order to illustrate this theoretical framework with a case in which the emotive-cognitive judicial frame has not been habituated as profoundly as in the case of the Swedish law professionals.

**The Migration Board: procedural correctness**

The Swedish Migration Board is a public bureaucracy and part of the Swedish law enforcement system in the sense that it is occupied (among many things) with the implementation and effectuation of the Aliens’ Act. In this sense the board is governed by an overall emotional regime of bureaucratic dispassion pertinent to legal institutions. As we will see, however, the emotive-cognitive judicial frame does not really apply here.

The case officers in my study worked at the department of asylum assessments, and their work was to investigate asylum applications and present a
proposal to the decision maker – usually a senior employee at the department. I did ethnographic field work at one of the departments for the assessment of asylum applications in 2007 (for more information on method and material, see Wettergren 2010; 2013). The staff at the department were relatively young, and most held degrees in various social-scientific disciplines, with the rare exception of holding a degree in law. This is important because the habituation of the emotive-cognitive judicial frame begins in law school (see Flower 2014), and although it takes many years of additional training before the professional emotion work of lawyers actually becomes habituated and backgrounded, graduates from law school have habituated a sense of pride in judicial skills and an aesthetic pleasure in the method of legal evaluations that were rather superficial in the young case officers working at the department.

Nevertheless, my findings suggested that officers collectively upheld the idea of the perfect law (the Aliens Act), allowing them to feel that it was possible to carry out the assessment of asylum applications in a good and just way, if only the officers adhered to the law and to procedural correctness (compare Weber 1948). Thereby, they could preserve their sense of being good people. That they had to struggle to make ends meet in this regard had to do with i) lacking the habituated emotional orientation of legal expertise, and ii) the fact that the migration board is not a court and the assessments of the case officers were not purely concerned with the application of the law, even if they argued so (see below).

Emotions were said to have no relevance at all for their decisions – their work was strictly regulated by the law. But in my observations at the department (including the officers’ hearings of asylum seekers) and in interviews with the officers, there was ambiguity. The adaptation of formal legal paragraphs to the complexity of asylum seekers’ situation had to be done by the officers themselves. Most applications had to begin with an assessment of the individual asylum seeker’s trustworthiness; only after facts like identity and country of origin were proven (e.g., with identity documents) could the story of the asylum seeker be assessed in relation to the law. The story itself had to be credible and the burden of evidence was on the asylum seeker, who often had very little or rather vague evidence to support an application (see also Wettergren & Wikström 2013).

The participant officers in my study said that most of the time the work was routine (and, as they saw it, unemotional). But they also told of occasions when it felt really bad to deny someone asylum because they felt sympathetic to that person. Paradoxically, these were occasions when they truly felt that they acted professionally because they consciously had to put their regret and sympathy aside, so these were proud stories mixed with regret. In these cases, officers talked about how they imagined that the procedural correctness of the asylum assessment ought to comfort the rejected asylum seeker; he or she would feel that the process had been fair, that he or she was treated respectfully and that the decision was transparent and logical. They also told of situations when their gut feeling of distrust in someone had put them on the track to expose him or her as a false asylum seeker; these were stories of proud professionalism
where emotions had been conducive to acting professionally. Most interesting was that participants also told of occasions when ‘grey-zones’ in the law had enabled them to argue in favour of someone they felt really should have the right to receive asylum. These were stories of joy because they were stories of professional satisfaction and personal sympathies united (Wettergren 2010).

In terms of the theoretical framework presented earlier, it is these foreground-emotional incidents that are of interest (the background emotions pertain to the ‘un-emotional’ routine) because they highlight the conscious effort to align with the feeling rules of the dispassionate emotional regime at work.

I argue that even when emotions are silenced because they are perceived as unprofessional, the very performance of this professional script requires emotion work in order to silence emotions. In the department studied, part of this work was performed individually, but there were also numerous meetings and workshops when the staff was trained in how to apply the law and how to behave in the hearings, client treatment and so on. Even if these meetings did not mention emotions, they tacitly conveyed emotion norms of professional behaviour and procedural correctness.

The fact that emotions continued to orient the work even when – according to the participants – there were no emotions was seen in the assessments of trustworthiness of asylum seekers. The ‘gut feeling’ mentioned above can be seen here as a way to speak about the background emotion of accumulated experience (Damasio 2009) – the sense that an asylum seeker’s story requires further investigation. Yet reflecting on the gut feeling makes it a foreground emotion, an emotion that disturbs and thus calls for conscious reflection. The gut feeling was heeded and allowed to orient further investigation because it was conducive to professional goals.

Although the migration board staff emphasised that emotions were not involved in their assessments, we see that this emotive-cognitive frame of the workplace was barely habituated and emotions surfaced in the ways described above. This may be due to the fact that none of the staff had been working for more than a couple of years with asylum assessments. It was fairly easy to observe the laborious conscious effort to hide emotion behind an unemotional façade or stone-face in the hearings with asylum seekers. The officers also easily described or displayed emotions in interviews and as we have seen they admitted feeling ambivalent in relation to many of the rejections they made; they felt both professional pride and regret. In this sense, the emotion work they needed to do was still conscious and foregrounded. As they clung to the idea of procedural correctness, it could be seen more as a comfort to them than to the asylum seekers. That it was really essential for the officers to believe that procedural correctness made a difference is illustrated in the quote below, about evidence to the contrary.

The strength of the idea may be illustrated by an incident retold by one officer, where an asylum seeker who he had rejected telephoned to say that he was about to commit suicide. The officer was ‘completely shocked!’
and engaged in a desperate effort to talk the applicant out of it by means of explaining the law: ‘Has it not been explained to you? Then I want to do it now’. The incident ruined the officer’s weekend and though he was confident that the local social welfare office was dealing with the case, he did not want to know the end of the story: ‘I could have found out what happened after that but, I don’t know, I didn’t. I just [snaps fingers] blocked it there and then’.

(Wettergren 2010, pp. 409–10)

The blocking in this quote represents emotion work in order to not feel the emotions that might follow from realising what rejection meant to the asylum seeker, regardless of procedural correctness. We also gather that it was a foreground effort; the fact that the weekend was ruined is telling of how focus was shifted from things the officer had planned to do to the conscious and laborious effort of controlling and adapting his disruptive emotions.

**Conclusion**

In late modernity there is a growing awareness that the sharp distinction between emotion and reason – fundamental to Western modernity – does not really hold. There is also a growing interest in the study of emotions in social science. The perspective that I have embraced here asserts that emotions are fundamental to all human action, be it rational or irrational, and my contribution consists in emphasising that they are learnt and habituated through continuous interactions with specific social contexts or frames. With inspiration from emotion-sociological theories, I presented a model arguing that foreground emotion can be experienced both as conducive and as disruptive to rational goal-oriented action, depending on whether the emotion is internal or external to the desired action. In both cases, it demands conscious emotion work. However, in the former, an emotion is consciously summoned to help a desired action; in the latter it is consciously put aside or changed to not interrupt a desired action. Importantly, both conducive and disruptive action can be backgrounded as well. In the former case, emotion goes unnoticed as a background emotion, and in the latter the disturbance is contained enough to be managed by habituated emotion work. This is where my model attempts to make a contribution to existing theory and research; not only emotions but also emotion work becomes trained and, over time, embodied and backgrounded.

When this habituation (embodiment and backgrounding) takes place, we are likely to feel that our emotive-cognitive behaviour is ‘natural and spontaneous’ (for instance, the emotive-cognitive frame of private life) or ‘self-evidently professional’ – even ‘objective’, as is the case with the legal professionals and the emotive-cognitive judicial frame. In contrast, I argued that the case officers at the migration board struggled to acquire an emotive-cognitive frame
pertaining to the overall regime of judicial dispassion. In the example of the migration board officers, both emotions conducive to professional behaviour and those disruptive of it were still in the foreground.

In this chapter I have argued for doing away with the separation of emotion and reason altogether. This is arguably difficult in practice due to – among other things – the fact that the bifurcation of emotion and reason is deeply embedded in Western conceptual thinking, in philosophy and science as well as in everyday language and practice. The emerging critique of this Western thinking, seen in late modernity, moreover seems to go different ways. For instance, as some emotions become recognised as conducive to some action, there is a widely spread idea – in therapeutic contexts, in self-help literature and so on – that by an instrumental attitude to their emotions, individuals can alter their life chances and influence their own health. This critique of the separation between emotion and reason feeds into processes of governing and responsibilisation fundamental to the \textit{radical individualism} (Mitchell 2005) of late modernity. The approach to emotion and reason suggested in this chapter avoids such neoliberal co-optation by undoing the categorisation of emotions into useful versus non-useful emotions, instead focusing on the intensity and orientation of emotion as it fuels and informs action.

**Notes**

1. In the history and philosophy of ideas, the scientific revolution is considered to be the origin of the thought patterns that subjected nature, body, femininity and eventually emotions to civilisation, mind, masculinity and reason (von Wright 1994, pp. 44–65; Jacob 1988, pp. 31–6, 54–72; see also Barbalet 1998, pp. 11–20). René Descartes is seen as the most influential thinker in this vein, particularly, as noted by Damasio (1994), for the juxtaposition of emotion and reason. But he was preceded and accompanied by many others, most notably Lord Francis Bacon, who was among the first to advocate induction as a scientific method. On the domination of nature as a woman, von Wright writes about the foundation of the scientific academy The Royal Society (established in 1660), which was inspired by Bacon’s ideas.

   It is striking that the language on which both Bacon himself and the founders of The Royal Society describe their program is permeated by sexual symbolism. Nature is the \textit{woman} that the \textit{man} of science shall subject. He shall systematically unveil Mother Nature, expose her secrets, penetrate her womb and thereby force her to complete subjection. The new scientific attitude is thereby given a strong masculine image from the beginning.

   (von Wright 1999, p. 65, author’s translation from Swedish)

   The subjection of emotion is tied to the subjection of women, as femininity according to this logic becomes associated with sentimentality and the private sphere, while masculinity is associated with reason and the public sphere (Jónasdóttir 1988).

2. According to the participants in the study, employee turnover was rather high at the department and they emphasised that this was good as it prevented them from
becoming ‘cynical’ (Wettergren 2010, pp. 404–405). There were stories circulating about case officers at other asylum assessment departments who had worked too long and who had stopped listening to the asylum seekers, believing that most of them were liars (Wettergren 2010; 2013). It may be that the emotive-cognitive frame of the migration board asylum investigation officers was in fact a cynical one, but this would need further investigation.

References


Scheer, M 2012, ‘Are emotions a kind of practice (and is that what makes them have a history)? A Bourdieuan approach to understanding emotion’, *History and Theory*, vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 193–220.


Chapter 3

Conceptualising valences in emotion theories
A sociological approach

Alberto Bellocchi and Jonathan H. Turner

Conceptualisations of emotional valences

Psychological notions of valence focus on everyday linguistic usage of positive and negative valence (i.e., anger is negative, happiness is positive), their everyday effects (a painful emotion is negative) and the use of emotion in evaluating a situation or object as negative or positive (e.g., ‘that’s disgusting!’) (cf. Kristjánsson 2003). Philosophical perspectives include whether or not an emotion is morally justifiable, and whether an emotional disposition (e.g., showing one’s anger in public) is morally justified (ibid.). Sociological ideas about valence seem to have been influenced by the psychologist Plutchik, who theorised emotions as having both valence and polarity, or opposites (Thamm 2007). Scholars in psychology (Charland 2005; Colombetti 2005; Solomon & Stone 2002) and philosophy (see de Sousa 2014; Kristjánsson 2003) have challenged the view that valence is an intrinsic property of emotion and affect. Notwithstanding the insights from these critiques, directions for improving existing constructs of valence are not presented. In this chapter, we summarise key critiques of valence constructs before proposing a revised perspective for informing sociological understandings of human emotional dynamics. Drawing on the sociology of emotion, we develop a working definition that enables us to explain valence dynamics, which takes into account a diverse range of fields and contexts of emotion research. Our conceptualisation of emotional valence is consistent with a late modern recognition by researchers that emotions are highly complex phenomena (see Chapter 2, this volume).

What is an emotional valence?

Scholars have contemplated what exactly is meant by valence for some time (Charland 2005; Colombetti 2005; Kristjánsson 2003). Etymological roots of valence from Latin offer a different meaning from the present metaphor of positive and negative charges (Colombetti 2005). Valence derives from *valentia*, meaning strength or capacity, which is in turn drawn from *valentem*, meaning strong, stout, vigorous, powerful (Harper 2001–2016).
During the 1930s, psychologists used valence synonymously with positive or negative charge (Colombetti 2005). An English translation of the German Aufforderungscharaktere, which refers to the attractive and repulsive forces exerted by objects that ultimately shape behaviour, appears to be the source of this meaning. This make-do English translation, however, was not capable of capturing the German meaning. A more direct translation of Aufforderungscharaktere would be the ‘affordance character’ possessed by an object (Colombetti 2005). Even within these broad guidelines, conceptualisations of what is important about valence have varied historically and continue to influence contemporary conceptions about emotional valence, as we will show next. We consider a range of conceptualisations of valence by addressing hedonicity, polarity, solidarity, health and biology.

**Valence and hedonicity**

Hedonicity or hedonic tone presents one lineage of valence in Western philosophy (Charland 2005). Hedonicity refers to the pleasure or displeasure raised by a feeling. Distinguishing between the first-order phenomenological aspects of an emotion and second-order awareness, Charland (2005) argues that emotional valence is a property of second-order awareness. When we attend to our feelings through second-order awareness, we evaluate them as either pleasant or unpleasant; hedonic tone is not an inherent property of an emotion. Affect, the general sense of feeling we experience daily (Feldman-Barrett 2017), is indeed characterised by pleasant and unpleasant valences. What may have happened historically in the study of emotion is that this understanding of affective valence became conflated with ideas about emotional valence. Although different emotions can indeed feel more or less pleasant or unpleasant, there is no way of fixing positive and negative valence such that a particular emotion is only ever positive and a different one negative. This enables us to explain that, in any investigation or experience of emotion, one is always required to elicit or conduct an appraisal of some object, person, situation or an emotion. When this evaluative judgement is made, and when contextual features of an emotional experience are accounted for, an experience may then be labelled as having a positive or negative hedonic tone.

An experience of anger can be either pleasant or unpleasant depending on the context in which it occurs (cf. Kristjánsson 2003). For example, if a mob of protesters wants to achieve their goal of breaking down a police barrier in order to drive their point across to a politician (see Yang 2005 for related examples), their angry outbursts may lead to a pleasant outcome for the mob if they achieve success. However, from the police officers’ point of view, the mob anger is an unpleasant experience because it could lead to harm for others or for the officers.
Valence and polarity

Solomon and Stone (2002) argued that the origins of valence and polarity were derived from the field of ethics, where every virtue was considered to have an opposing vice. This view can be found in Aristotle and within works of medieval Christian scholars (cf. Pope Gregory). Further in history, Plato, Socrates and Heraclitus also offered ideas of valence (Gardiner et al. 1936). These perspectives were concerned with aspects of pleasure, pain and passion, holding distinctly biological views of these matters as they pertained to health. At the time, few philosophers had specified the conditions, nature and effects of pleasure and pain, leading subsequent schools of thought to begin this process (Gardiner et al. 1936). The Cynics for example, classified pleasure as negative because it was taken to represent the end or negation of pain (ibid.). Debate was fuelled on the exact nature of pleasure and pain, with the Cyrenaics refuting the Cynics and instead arguing that pleasure was always good (i.e., positive) and pain always bad (i.e., negative).

In late modern terms, the above propositions are based on normative experiences of pleasure and pain. Drawing on wider discourses and subcultures, such as practitioners of bondage, discipline and sadomasochism (BDSM; see Glick & Meyers 1988; Herron & Herron 1982; Tamir 2016), or sporting culture (e.g., ‘no pain, no gain’ mantra; de Sousa 2014), it is understood that there is a fine line between pleasure and pain and whether they constitute positive or negative experiences. As Tamir (2016) speculates, if sadomasochists can experience physical pain as pleasant, then some people may experience emotional pain as pleasant. BDSM practices help to understand that any specific emotion experienced by its practitioners can have both a physiological pain element (that some experience as sexual pleasure) and it may also have a cultural element where practitioners learn how to feel. Based on the rules of BDSM communities, the same practices that are experienced as physically painful by non-practitioners may be considered pleasurable by practitioners.

The examples of BDSM and sporting contexts help in deconstructing the historical view of valence that draws on moralistic accounts of the goodness (i.e., positive) or badness (i.e., negative) of an emotion, and the account presented earlier pertaining to hedonic tone. Moralistic and hedonic views arose again more recently, in the works of Hume, Spinoza and Frijda, for example, demonstrating the long-standing legacy of moralistic conceptions of emotional valence (Solomon & Stone 2002). Examples such as BDSM and sporting culture are consistent with a trend towards conflicting values and alternative feeling structures that characterise modern to late modern sociological understandings of emotion (Eyerman 2005) and, as we argue, emotional valence.

Valence and solidarity

Examples from the activities of protesters offer further scope for clarifying the valence construct (cf. Yang 2005; Eyerman 2005). If a mob formed because of
shared anger at government policy, then an individual member’s anger is one of the precursors for the formation of solidarity to protest against the policy. The anger of individuals that becomes the mob’s anger has the positive benefit of establishing solidarity within the protesting group, which may assist the group in staging a protest in the short term, and potentially in the long term, to succeed in overturning a policy.

Whether or not the policy makers’ emotions are considered negative or positive depends on how individuals act on those feelings or how observers appraise those actions (cf. Yang 2005). Factions within a government may form through shared experiences of shame/anger/frustration directed at the unpopular policy linked to the faction that brought it to fruition. Through solidarity, the rival faction may work against the governing faction that had developed the offending policy. If the rival faction overturns the governing faction to lead government, then this is a positive outcome for the rival faction (probably leading to satisfaction, happiness, joy, relief) and a negative outcome for the governing faction.

In this way, we can see that spirals of positive and negative outcomes of different actions, fuelled by various emotions, can go on for extended periods of time, serving as antecedents of new situations and new emotional experiences. We cannot say that the mob’s anger was negative for the mob or the rival faction, but it may have had negative consequences for the governing faction (e.g., loss in popularity, shame/embarrassment). Again, this interaction among what are seemingly opposed valences – anger and solidarity, based on the perspective we are developing – are only understandable by viewing the larger context in which these emotions are involved and how appraisals, attributions and, at times, defence mechanisms shift the polarity of the emotions from having a negative effect to having a positive effect on collective action. This shift can flip back and forth, and it is one of the reasons that crowd behaviour is not only unpredictable but also frequently dangerous as appraisals and attributions cause a re-mixing of emotional valences.

**Valence and health**

Studies have established connections between negative emotions and negative health effects (Consedine 2010; Turner 2015). The most researched examples include longitudinal effects of anger, anxiety and depression on cardiovascular disease. The reverse has been shown to be the case, with positive emotions having benefits for different aspects of health. In this context, emotions such as anger and anxiety may be classed as negative emotions and emotions including happiness and joy classed as positive due to their respective negative and positive health effects. Health effects associated with different emotions reinforce, theoretically, that we appraise valence depending on health outcomes for individuals and groups, and not from some inherent property of the emotion.
Valence and biology

Although the line of argument presented in most preceding sections illustrates the constructed nature of valence, it under-emphasises the biological dimensions. Our aim here is to illustrate examples of valence based on human evolution, and to explain how conscious appraisals (Charland 2005) are possible in humans. Our position stands in contrast to pure forms of constructionist arguments. In our eclectic view, valences not only involve social constructions, but also varying states of emotional arousal caused by the activation of key biological systems in humans: the autonomic nervous system, musculoskeletal system, neurotransmitter system, neuro-active peptide system and more general body hormonal system (Turner 2007; 2015). To deny these neurological systems and to assert that neocortical processes of thought (e.g., appraisal) somehow are more important is simply to ignore biological reality. What we propose is that valences also shift and change as biological responses are appraised, as social context is assessed, as causal attributions are ascertained and as biological and social defence mechanisms are activated.

Emotions have been associated with action tendencies of organisms such as fighting, fleeing, feeding and procreating (Turner 2007). The ancient centre for flight (aversion-fear) and fight (aggression-anger), the amygdala, was the first emotion system evolved from the terrestrial amphibious vertebrates, from which reptiles/birds and mammals evolved separately. Early vertebrates did not have a neocortex, but they possessed other brain systems, probably including the emotion system revolving around fear and anger. This system may have assisted early reptiles to avoid danger and engage in defensive aggression. For reptiles, actions tendencies, designated fear and anger, were always directed at achieving positive outcomes, enabling reptiles to survive, but reptiles do not experience anything close to what we would consider to be positive emotions in mammals; reptiles do not make such attributions.

Mammals also appear to have inherited this system from early vertebrates (for a critique, see Feldman-Barrett 2017) and, like reptiles, early mammals did not have a neocortex. The neocortex had to evolve, and it is currently unclear how or when this process of evolution was initiated. Part of the initial growth was probably in the emergence of the cingulate cortex, a layer of semi-cortical tissue surrounding the older subcortex, and where new emotions appear among mammals, such as those in the anterior sections of the cingulate gyrus that are associated with play (commonly associated with happiness), those associated with bonds to mothers (separation cry) and perhaps the first evidence of emotions like sadness in the posterior part of the cingulate. Once the neocortex developed, more cognitive processes like conscious appraisals and attributions became possible, thus enabling humans to interpret fight and flight responses as ‘positive’ if, for example, they lead to survival or safety. In this way, there are positive outcomes (survival, safety) for the individual, and if the encounter is a predator-prey relationship, the species benefits from the success of the
individual, who may survive an encounter and thereby pass on genes to future generations. From the perspective of the loser in this predator-prey interaction, their own aggression or anger has no positive outcome if they die or lose the contest for food, territory or, in the case of procreation, a mate.

As our examples show, it is not possible to consider non-human animal behaviour associated with anger as inherently positive or negative, because the valence changes with the standpoint of individual outcomes and the observer. Fear, an emotion commonly associated with the flight response, may also freeze the individual on the spot and lead to their death (cf. Bouton 2005). Depending on the context and perspective taken to interpret such encounters, fear can be regarded as both beneficial (positive) and detrimental (negative).

**Clarifying emotional valence for a sociology of emotions**

Having canvassed examples that lead us to problematise the valence as charge metaphor and the fixed valence view of specific emotions (i.e., anger is negative), we now offer a new conceptualisation of emotional valence. This is achieved by outlining broadly the conditions in which particular kinds of appraisals – or valence-labelling and discourse – can lead individuals and groups, including researchers and non-researchers, to reconstruct emotional experiences and, thereby, shift the valence of any given emotion. First it is necessary to specify what constitutes an emotion. We accept that emotions involve biological and physiological phenomena that have an evolutionary history, and some human emotions, which can be called primary, are elicited through activation of brain centres shared with non-human ancestors (Turner 2007). Our approach also considers that any effort by researchers and non-researchers to account for their emotional experiences implies consciousness (Charland 2005).

Through second-order awareness (cf. Charland 2005), the social context shapes a person’s expression and conceptualisation of the valence(s) attributed to specific emotions, or emotional experiences. We also acknowledge that management of emotional expressions involves a great deal of emotion work (Hochschild 2012), as individuals try to manipulate emotions in their presentation of self to others (Goffman 1969) and to themselves (Hochschild 2012; Turner 2002; 2007). Emotional displays, whether conscious or spontaneous, will be appraised during interactions, and valences are likely to be attributed, either during the event, or later when it is recounted.

The reason that managing emotions is so much work is that humans are regularly in conflict with their biology as they try to manage emotions for presentation within a social context. How, then, should we conceptualise what occurs as humans work at adjudicating their biological arousal within the sociocultural context? Figure 3.1 outlines some of the key dynamics involved. Temporality is represented initially by moving from left to right across the figure as emotions are first experienced. Feedback loops represent the more
Figure 3.1 Dynamics of emotional arousal and interactions with socio-cultural context
complex shifts in valence that can be appraised over time. From a sociological perspective, all human action, behaviour and interaction occurs within a societal-level structural and cultural system.

The most important properties of societal structures are the levels of differentiation, individualisation of action and mediation of actions. For culture within a society, key properties include the existence of emotion ideologies about what emotions people should experience in diverse situations, emotion rules about what persons should feel, what emotions they should display to others in a situation, the clarity of emotion labels for cognitive reflection and discourse about emotions that a person is experiencing in a situation (Hochschild 2012). When differentiation, individualisation of actions and mediation by technologies is high, as it is in late modern and capitalist societies, the level of self-reflexivity is high (Turner 2002; 2007). That is, individuals are always thinking about self, vis-à-vis others in situations; while such is always the case, the number of versions of self and identities that people present in late modern societies is much greater than in simpler societies (Patulny & Olson [Chapter 1], this volume). The result is that the variety of situations and the identities tied to each type of situation are very complex, presenting novel challenges in efforts to verify a particular identity. In these situations, negative (i.e., unpleasant/unfavourable) emotions may be aroused. When verified, individuals experience positive (pleasant/favourable) emotions about self and, to a lesser extent, about others who have verified a particular identity. Situations involve sanctioning by others, and when others provide positive sanctions for actions and self-presentations, individuals experience pleasant/favourable emotions about self. Unpleasant/unfavourable emotions may be experienced when an individual receives negative sanctions from others. These valancing dynamics are qualified and run through the kinds of expectations that individuals had about the situation; therefore, the more people’s expectations are met and realised, the more positive the emotional valences experienced, whereas, to the degree that expectations are not realised, negative valences are attributed to experienced emotions. Thus, a person’s initial emotional reaction, even as it seemingly emanates from their body, is filtered through definitions of self and how self is expected to be treated and through the expectations for how others will sanction, positively or negatively, a person’s self-presentations.

An initial emotional valence is not necessarily the final valence along the positive-to-negative pole, because of the activation of defence mechanisms (e.g., repression, reaction formation, displacement) that change people’s perceptions of themselves and their feelings as they try to protect self from emotions such as hurt, shame and humiliation. Moreover, people are always appraising situational emotions in light of expectations constrained by structural and cultural constraints (Turner 2007). However, activation of defence mechanisms can occur simultaneously as initial emotional reactions are being formed, with the result that the initial valence of an emotion, such as fear or anger, will often not
be fully experienced consciously, even if a considerable amount of appraisal of emotions is occurring. Repression of emotions commonly labelled as negative (e.g., anger, fear, disappointment) to protect self is basic to human neuroanatomy, as we are able to block consciousness of negative feelings about self. The most important defence mechanisms are (1) repression of negative emotions about self and (2) attributions for the cause of the negative emotions being experienced. Even without repression of negative emotions, attribution is a basic cognitive process that follows from expectations and appraisals; people generally attribute a causal source, and whether it is accurate or not is less important than making the attribution.

Attribution is also a mechanism that can protect self from negative feelings about self. Individuals can always make negative self-attributions about their emotional experiences, but there are biases built into this process in human neuroanatomy. If individuals make self-attributions for meeting expectations and for receiving positive sanctions, they will experience positive valences; indeed, there is a proximal bias inherent in humans to do so (Lawler 2002; Turner 2002). The converse is true: individuals tend to make external attributions to others, situations and objects in situations (such as ideas in the culture and structure of situations), blaming these sources for failures to meet expectations or issuing negative sanctions, thereby shielding self from experiencing negatively valenced (e.g., shame, embarrassment, humiliation) self-related emotions. There is also a distal bias inherent in the activation of negative emotions, and/or the hint that a person is responsible for failures to meet expectations and for negative sanctions from self.

In addition to, and indeed intertwined among, the dynamics outlined in Figure 3.1 and the discussion above, valences are also influenced by the types or objects of appraisals. Table 3.1 lists generic types of appraisals; that is, what is the nature of the positive or negative valences with respect to varying situations. In the table, we list situation types (left column), whereby people appraise their emotional experiences with respect to social structure, expectations, sanctions, morality, ethics, hedonic needs, health and evolutionary considerations. In the appraisal types in Table 3.1, persons generally make reference to external objects listed in the far-right-hand column. The valences (represented as polarities in the middle column) that emerge are, however, influenced by the objects that are attributed to causing a particular emotion; here is where the proximal and distal biases outlined earlier become important. If appraisals of any situation generate the positive polarities outlined for each appraisal type in Table 3.1, then defensive mechanisms are not activated. Individuals can feel a generalised emotion such as pride – a highly intensive pleasant/favourable emotion about self – as being positive in this context. For example, to meet expectations leads to pride in self (favourable evaluation of self), and to other such positive polarities like being a supportive person, good and moral person, virtuous person, adaptive person, beneficial (to self) person and as having rights to experience pleasure.
Table 3.1 Elaboration of appraisal types in relation to context of emotional experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation types</th>
<th>Polarity (positive/negative)</th>
<th>Targets of attribution processes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interactional</td>
<td>Solidarity/breach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commitment/alienation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural</td>
<td>Reproduction/disintegration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expectation</td>
<td>Favourable/unfavourable</td>
<td>Self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanction</td>
<td>Supportive/unsupportive</td>
<td>Others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>Good/bad, right/wrong</td>
<td>Local situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethic</td>
<td>Virtue/vice</td>
<td>Social structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonic</td>
<td>Pleasure/displeasure</td>
<td>Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Beneficial/detrimental</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evolutionary</td>
<td>Adaptive/maladaptive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In contrast, an individual who blames others, situation, social structure or culture is likely to experience the negative dimensions of polarity in Table 3.1. They will see more distal objects as responsible for their emotions arising from, for example, a breach in solidarity. For instance, if others or the situation were blamed, a person would perhaps experience alienation, and so on for the other polarities—others in the situation, or the situation itself, could be labelled as unfavourable for not meeting expectations. Similarly, those who sanction negatively are seen as unsupportive; those who are blamed for moral breaches are seen as bad and/or wrong; adopting ethical appraisals, others could be seen as unethical and full of vice. If defence mechanisms are activated to protect self, then these kinds of appraisals and attributions to others or situations are almost assured. Conflict often results, because others may not see themselves in this negative light and will view the negative attributions being directed at them as negative sanctions that, in turn, activate their defences. Yet, when an individual makes self-attributions for negative emotional experiences and, in essence, blames themselves, the negative valences of emotions about self are dramatically intensified, because now one has failed to meet expectations of self or other inhering in the broader normative structure and the moral and ethical codes of the culture attached to this structure.

As we are suggesting, valences of emotions are very much affected by how individuals and researchers view the social context in which emotions are experienced. The nature of the positive or negative valences is mediated by how a person (1) appraises their (2) physiological arousal against (3) the socio-cultural context within which this appraisal occurs as it affects (4) generalised
Conceptualising valence in emotion theory

expectations; as the appraisal process continues, as (5) defence mechanisms are activated and (6) attributions made as to who or what is responsible for initial emotions, the emotional valences can shift in light of the (7) distal and proximal biases leading to (8) positive or negative polarities being attributed to emotions inherent in different situations. There is, then, a lot in play in the model outlined in Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1.

Yet, the dynamics are somewhat simplified by the fact that individuals generally engage in appraisals of their arousal relative to the immediate social context. Individuals are most immediately influenced by (1) the expectations for what will transpire in an interpersonal encounter and (2) the sanctioning of others in the immediate encounter. Thus, initial appraisals of emotional arousal will be local, revolving around (a) self, (b) others, (c) situation, (d) expectation states of persons, (e) the nature of sanctioning that activated or failed to activate (f) defence mechanisms and the (g) distal or (h) proximal biases. When expectations are realised and sanctions are positive, the valence of the emotional experiences will generally be positive towards self and these positive emotions will also radiate out towards others and the situation (Turner 2002). When expectations are not realised and/or sanctions from others are negative, an individual will appraise the situation as negative and target emotions (e.g., anger) at distal sources such as situation, social structure or culture. Other persons involved in the encounter may not become the target of these emotions because they have the capacity to fight back and issue negative sanctions to the individual who is issuing blame. However, if the blaming individual has power over the blamed individual, then this person will often also blame others for the situation or blame the social structure that gives them power.

The list presented in Table 3.1 may not be exhaustive, and in future more appraisal types may need to be included. Our appraisal types also do not imply that only one option is used to capture emotional experience. Rather, in recognising that emotions are complex, several appraisal types may describe emotional experiences concurrently. In combination with Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1, we should emphasise that, although an initial experience may be appraised through a moral valence, subsequent iterative cycles could lead to new appraisal mechanisms, such as sanctions, ethics and expectations, and may influence subsequent emotional experiences and valence attributions. The iterative process represented in Figure 3.1 builds in the complexity of emotional experience because it allows us to represent the temporal nature of any single appraisal as one loop in the cycle. As the dynamics in Figure 3.1 unfold, redefinition and re-perception of the sociocultural context can occur, thus altering expectations, emotions, activation of defence mechanisms, appraisals and attributions. Thus, valences can be constantly shifting in dynamic social contexts.

Emotions in late modern societies

Some scholars emphasise historical regimes of emotions and that in the late modern era changes in culture and social structure have made fundamental changes in emotional dynamics (see Patulny & Olson [Chapter 1], this volume). Societies
have become more complex and differentiated, fracturing the social contexts of individuals. Indeed, persons no longer live in a few social contexts; their daily lives involve a constant movement across different types of social structures and cultures. As a result, it is considered that persons have become more individualistic as the inclusive power of traditional socio-cultural formations has declined (Archer 2012; Davis 2008). Individuals increasingly live in relations and group affiliations regulated by markets, which furthers their sense of individualism. Living with markets has brought more dramatic increases in consumption than at any other point in history, leading individuals to evaluate each other in terms of their patterns and capacities for consumption. Recent changes in communication technologies have increased mediated relations through mass media and social media (Hepp, Hajarvard & Lundby 2015). Individualism accompanied by shifting identities across varying types of social structures and mediated social relations may have also increased self-reflexivity and, as a result, involvement in continuous monitoring of emotional experiences, feedback from responses of others and emotion management. There are, we believe, some problems with these conceptualisations, but the historical trend is clear, even at this cursory level of summary.

The more interesting question is this: have these dramatic social transformations in social structure and culture fundamentally changed the nature of emotions in humans and the processes by which emotional valences form and change? We think here that arguments about late modernity are overdrawn, for several reasons. First, although emotions are very much related to social context, they are also biologically formed and activated. Human biology has not changed, and so, to the degree that emotions are evolved biological mechanisms for adaptation to resource niches, their fundamental dynamics have not changed. Because the biology of emotions is interwoven with – and dramatically affected by – social contexts, late modernity has certainly added more complexity to the flow of emotional valences within persons and between persons than previous models of valence can account for.

The modern world involves a constant movement across different types of social structures and their attendant cultures, and late modernity certainly increases self-reflection and the formation of many different identities tied to diverse structural locations and roles constrained by diverse cultural codings. It should not be surprising that the valence processes that we have outlined may now be considered more dynamic, if not volatile. The nature of the forces in play has not changed so much from what we outline in Figure 3.1, but the loadings for the forces involved have changed towards more differentiation and complexity, more mobility, more individualism, more reflexivity, more identities to accompany a greater number of roles, more mediated social relations and more selling of self in markets (e.g., labour) and quasi-markets (e.g., social media, marriage, friendship, clubs).

In such a social world, expectations vary and are constantly changing; initial emotional valences shift through constant appraisals and reappraisals, through
activation of defences to protect self and identities and through attribution dynamics. Life is more work, emotionally, because social contexts vary and change, requiring individuals constantly to adjust expectations, appraisals and attributions in order to sustain identities in more complex contexts. It may be conjectured that individuals in late modernity have taken to texting as a substitute for face-to-face interaction (cf. Patulny & Seaman 2016) in which emotions are specified through graphic smiles and frowns and where individuals do not have to engage in fine-tuned monitoring of each other’s emotions and the valences of these emotions. They can interact without the need for emotion work represented by the dynamics of face-to-face interactions. Alternatively, we could see that upheavals in concepts of valence, beyond those offered here, may be on the horizon as shifting socio-cultural factors shape appraisals in novel ways.

Chapter summary and concluding remarks

The analysis of emotions in general is difficult and complex because it is affected by the evolved biology of humans and by their capacity to create highly dynamic societies in constant change. Accounting for biological and social/cultural forces is very difficult, and such is particularly the case for a subject as historically thorny as valence. What are valences and how do they operate? For us, a valence is a shift in positive-negative polarity of emotions, but problems immediately emerge with this seemingly simple conception. Perhaps the most vexing problem is: positive or negative for whom, or for what? Is there not a kind of functionalism here, with positive valences being functional and negative being dysfunctional? Our answer is that if we focus on the mechanisms by which individuals activate and channel their emotional responses, we can avoid being overly functionalist, and we can sort through the complexity of the biological and socio-cultural basis of valenced emotional responses. We have outlined a conception of how valences form and change, and this conception implies a theory of emotions that is not fully developed – but neither is it simplistic and crude. It lays out the key dynamics involved and specifies at least some of their relationships. With further development, this preliminary conceptualisation can increase understanding of how emotions among humans constantly shift in their valences, especially under late modern conditions.

Acknowledgement

An Australian Research Council Discovery Early Career Grant (DE160101053) awarded to Alberto Bellocchi supported this work. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Australian Research Council.
References


Chapter 4

Emotion and morality
A sociological reading of the philosophy of emotion

Jordan McKenzie

Introduction
There are paradigmatic differences in the study of morality between the disciplines of philosophy and sociology. On the surface, this could be understood as a distinction over the study of what ethics are in the former (Prinz 2004b; Rawls 1971), from what they do in the latter (Bauman 1994; Durkheim 1973; Turner & Stets 2006). A similar claim could be made about the study of emotion in late modernity in these disciplines, as philosophers have generally focused on questions about what emotions are and where they come from, while sociologists have given greater attention to the impact and role of emotion in matters of social interaction, power and identity. When bringing together questions about emotions and morality, a number of important genealogical differences between sociology and philosophy surface. Enlightenment philosophers like Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham have historically treated emotions as an encumbrance to ethical theory, as emotionality has been associated with irrationality and clouded judgement. One resulting narrative has treated emotion as something to overcome, as an untrustworthy and hot-headed co-pilot to the logical and rational mind. While these views were common among the Classical and Enlightenment era philosophers, they no longer stand up against contemporary understandings of the mind and emotion in late modernity (Denzin 1980; Holmes 2010; Prinz 2006).

Although the theoretical literature in the sociology of emotion draws from both micro/interactional perspectives (Hochschild 1979; Shott 1979) and macro perspectives (Barbalet 1998; Burkitt 2002; Denzin 1984), this chapter contends that there is a reluctance to engage with questions of ethics and morality in the sub-discipline as a whole. While both sociologists and philosophers have much to gain from exploring common ground on emotion, this chapter will focus on the sociological benefits of adopting philosophical material on emotion as a motivation for moral judgement. Researchers within philosophy and sociology of emotion have been eager to demonstrate the inseparability of emotion and reason (Cairns 2000; Prinz 2003), and yet the range of work in the sub-discipline engaging with the role of emotion in moral judgements is limited. By drawing
from the well-developed philosophical literature in the field of emotion in moral judgements, this chapter will provide useful insights for sociologists interested in links between praxis, emotion and morality. This chapter will evaluate a number of perspectives on emotion and morality from sociologists (Calhoun 1991; Denzin 1980; Durkheim 1973; Turner & Stets 2006) and philosophers (Greenspan 1995; Prinz 2004a; Smith 2002 [1759]) in order to demonstrate common ground and facilitate greater interaction between the disciplines.

Interestingly, William James’ seminal work *What is an Emotion?* (2003 [1890]) features as a starting point in both disciplines for a contemporary focus on emotion, whereby emotion is embodied and can be intentional or interactional rather than simply reactionary. I argue in this chapter that the literature on ethics from the philosophy of emotion deserves greater recognition among sociologists, although there are justified reasons for reluctance based on some characteristically sociological concerns. The dominant forms of interactionist research in the sociology of emotion have arguably led to a field that resists philosophical positions that would allow for an analysis of emotional sources of moral conduct. This chapter will draw from philosophical literature on moral sentiments where the role of guilt, empathy and shame (typically understood as social emotions) inform ethical positions.

It is useful to note the practical distinction between morality and ethics at this juncture. For Bauman, ethics refers to pure forms of judgement, typically made by experts and authorities, regarding ought statements in an ideal abstract sense (Bauman 1994). Meanwhile, morality involves the actions, identities and emotions of people in practical, day-to-day social life. There is an almost mathematical search for consistency and truth in ethical debates that is impractical at the level of moral judgements, which for Bauman are rooted in cultural and social practice. An analysis of both ethics and morality is not within the scope of this chapter, and, given the relevance of moral judgements to the sociology of emotion, morality will be the focus of this analysis. The emotional weight of moral judgements in social interaction is an important matter for both philosophers and sociologists, and this chapter will shed light on the need for collaboration in this field.

### On emotion and morality: philosophy

The study of ethics in philosophy has traditionally sought to remove emotion from logical or rational judgement. From Mill’s Utilitarianism, to Rawls’ Veil of Ignorance, to Kant’s Categorical Imperative, philosophers have sought to remove emotion from moral judgements in order to maximise fairness, consistency and diplomacy over anger, greed and frustration. Meanwhile, Epicurean attempts at *Ataraxia* have aimed to eliminate emotional fluctuations from everyday life based on the inference that intense emotions (positive or negative) are not good for the wellbeing of individuals. Finally, a number of other perspectives ranging from Plato to the Stoics have aimed to place
emotional experiences within the control of the thinking and feeling subject, such that individuals decide how or whether to let emotions affect them simply by focusing on virtue or allowing themselves to be consumed by emotion. As a collection, these philosophical claims do not hold a generally favourable view of emotion.

In the present day, philosophical perspectives on emotion have become rather more progressive. They are noticeably more interdisciplinary than their sociological counterparts, yet there remains a shortage of meaningful engagement with the social and cultural factors that mediate and influence emotion. Meanwhile, more philosophically focused positions might accuse sociological/interactionist perspectives of alienating people from the authenticity of emotional actions through an emphasis on performativity, acting and learned behaviour. In highly influential studies such as Hochschild’s *The managed heart* (1983), it becomes difficult for the individual to know which emotions originate within the self (such as emotions that could be attributable to personality) and which emotions are triggered by exchanges with power structures, gender roles and commercialisation. Yet arguments regarding sentiment and judgement in philosophy can invert these questions. In a line of argument tracing from Adam Smith’s *Theory of moral sentiments* (1759) to Jesse Prinz’s *Gut reactions* (2004), philosophers have argued that there is knowledge about moral judgements in emotions.

Smith begins his version of this argument by describing the self-evident role of sympathy in moral judgements and emotional experiences, effectively supporting altruistic ethical claims about human action. This intriguingly sociological position references the interaction between a perpetrator, a victim and an audience that clearly demonstrates sympathy, empathy and compassion when immoral behaviour takes place. He writes

*The cruelest insult [...] which can be offered to the unfortunate, is to appear to make light of their calamities. To seem not to be affected with the joy of our companions is but want of politeness; but not to wear a serious countenance when they tell us their afflictions, is real and gross inhumanity.*

(2002, p. 19)

The feeling of disgust one feels when witnessing acts of cruelty connects to usable information about justice, and this is not simply a cognitive process, but one deeply embedded in our sociality. Furthermore, by relating to the experiences of another through sympathy, individuals support and reaffirm the collective moral positions between them. There is an important emotional difference between conducting immoral acts and witnessing them, yet in both cases useful information about the sensibility of moral judgements can be extracted from emotional experience. In a similar line of argument to Smith’s explanation of sympathy, Prinz (2006) more recently uses the example of an experiment in social psychology where able-bodied postgraduate students were instructed to ask commuters
on the subway to forfeit their seat to them. This rather simple task turned out to be incredibly unpleasant as participants felt ashamed and disgusted by the selfishness of the request. The point for Prinz is that ‘It is emotionally taxing to violate social and moral rules’ (2006, p. 29) and, in this claim, Prinz sets out an important space for sociology and philosophy to collaborate.

As witnesses to morally challenging circumstances, individuals face similar kinds of emotional responses. Consider footage of animal cruelty or a sexual assault; people feel strong emotional reactions of anger, disgust and shame about these violations of basic moral standards. Rather than attempting to reason unemotionally in response to cruelty, Smith (2002) argues that the emotional response is itself a source of knowledge about ethical judgements and it should be utilised to affirm systems of morality and practical ethics. To sympathise with the suffering of another is to recognise the wrongdoing that led to an immoral act. This common-sense approach to moral conduct is not a simplification whereby complex rules are reduced to personal feelings; rather, Smith acknowledges that black-and-white moral principles are unsustainable when applied to everyday conduct. Moral principles can be developed out of experiences; they are not simply applied to experiences.

Barbalet’s macrosociological reading of the Theory of moral sentiments insists that by moral, Smith more or less means normal. Moral principles are therefore not part of the physical or metaphysical world; they are effectively cultural (2005, p. 172). In Barbalet’s terms, Smith’s account of ethics in the Theory of moral sentiments is less about determining what ethical principles are, and more about unpacking how they function in cultural settings. This is important as it defies the distinction between sociology and philosophy set out at the beginning of this chapter, and places Smith in the company of sociologists. According to Barbalet, Smith shuns philosophy in this text in favour of ‘playwrights, poets, and historians’ (2005, p. 173). The important question here is whether Smith’s claim regarding sentiments and the power of sympathy/empathy is more a matter of answering the question why be moral? than what should I do in order to be ethical?, thereby adopting empathy as a justification or motivation for moral principles. Yet this view understates the claims made by Smith in the text. For Smith, a moral framework can be construed from human experiences and even emotions. This does not mean that there is a golden principle that can serve as a foundation for all moral rules (such as a Utilitarian calculation of consequence), rather that moral principles are enacted and experienced phenomena.

For Smith, self-love and self-interest are part of the experience of sympathy (Smith 2002; Barbalet 2012). Smith’s approach adopts the notion of self-interest within the framework of a socially constructed self, and therefore prevents allowing self-interest from becoming anomie – which would effectively nullify the need for moral conduct. Rather, the experience of shame that occurs when an individual has failed to appropriately empathise with those in need would result in an inability to favourably view one’s self, and this is not in one’s best interests. Ergo, there is a motivation to empathise with those in need that is driven by self-interest
so long as the self is understood as dependent on interaction). This theoretical shift is significant, as it emphasises a distinction between witnessing immoral acts and committing them, although the failure to act upon injustice may have similar emotional consequences as performing the acts. For Barbalet, this is where Smith’s more sociological leanings come to the fore, and where the reputation of his work as a justification for individualism and the free market with an invisible hand are blatantly false (Barbalet 2012, p. 415). Smith is not advocating morality for the sake of self-interest; rather, he insists that being moral and feeling moral are intrinsically derived through social interaction and collective forms of selfhood.

This association between emotion and moral judgements is currently represented in the philosophical literature by Jesse Prinz. For Prinz, there is no reasonable way to separate natural or evolutionary emotions from socially constructed or reflexive emotions; rather, ‘Every emotion that we have a name for is the product of both nature and nurture’ (2004b, p. 1). In addition, Prinz (2007) considers morality to be a culturally constructed phenomenon, and this has important consequences for his theory of emotion and morality. From the very outset of his approach, Prinz appears to sit outside of traditional philosophical, sociological and psychological theories of emotion. Furthermore, Prinz argues that emotions are necessary for moral judgements to occur. This is not identical to the claim made by Smith that links certain emotions to truth claims about morality; rather, Prinz argues that emotion serves as motivation for moral judgements and that the latter cannot occur without the former (Prinz 2006). According to this view, moral questions are distinct from non-moral questions in that they specifically involve emotion in the act of offering an answer (Prinz 2007). Yet Prinz (2006, p. 30) extends this line of argument beyond the claim that emotions and moral judgements co-occur; he insists that emotions play an influential role in determining the type and severity of the moral judgements that individuals make. Emotions are therefore ‘necessary and sufficient’ for moral judgements to occur (ibid.).

This sociological or anthropological approach claims that moral judgements must be rooted in emotional experiences rather than based on reason as the former tends to gravitate towards a unifying answer, while moral sentiments remain radically different around the world. According to Prinz, if moral judgements were drawn from reason rather than emotion, we could expect to find greater consistency in moral practices across cultures. Prinz (2007, p. 173) makes this point in a number of ways, though it is perhaps the discussion of cannibalism that best explains how moral judgements can differ between cultures and across time periods. The key here is not that some cultures are more or less moral than others as a result of varied applications of sentiment, but that morality is determined in cultural or intersubjective practice. This understanding of reason and consensus alludes to similar (although better-elaborated) concepts in Habermas’ Theory of communicative action (1984), whereby illogical and contradictory ideas are inevitably pulled apart and superseded through balanced and open discourse. Prinz suggests here that emotions
are culturally specific, but reason is not. While critical theorists like Habermas (1984), Honneth (1995) and Horkheimer (1947) would argue that reason is a human capability with some consistency between various communities and cultures, each of these thinkers alludes to the potential for cultural conditions to distort or even manipulate concepts of reason and even common sense. While Prinz’s conception of reason is useful, there is cause for some scepticism regarding the purity – and therefore trustworthiness – of reason. What passes for reason in the process of developing consensus is open to manipulation, much like emotion.

However, there remain unresolved questions concerning the interplay between culture, emotion and morality. Consider the following example: how do we adopt Smith’s or Prinz’s approach in order to understand people who are disgusted by homosexuality or interracial marriage? Can legitimate and illegitimate forms of disgust be distinguished from one another? It would appear that disgust can be the result of culturally constructed narratives and exposure to behaviour that may be seen as shocking or unusual. The Habermasian approach would suggest that homophobic and racist claims do not meet the standards of rational discourse, and are often based on falsified and contradictory information. Sociological approaches might tell us that the feeling of disgust is the result of habitus or ideology and has no basis in logic, rationality or truth. There are clearly problems associated with over- or understating the extent to which emotional experiences are constructed, mediated and understood through social interaction. Prinz is not claiming that the feeling of disgust can provide access to moral truth, only that disgust in this instance would serve as motivation for an individual to condemn these acts as immoral. The greater point here is that since emotion is part of the reasoning process (i.e., in making assessments), both reason and emotion are susceptible to ideology and cultural norms, and therefore collaboration between sociological and philosophical perspectives are necessary. Returning to the distinction between what ethics are and what they do, the social bonds that are reaffirmed by shared ethical positions are not based on the truth of what ethics are; this can be entirely irrelevant. We can determine that emotion is a motivation for moral judgements, but it is not reducible to this role. Emotions also guide moral judgements in one direction or another. There is useful information about morality to be found in our emotional experiences and our gut reactions (Prinz 2004a), but this does not equate to the claim that there is moral truth in emotion that somehow trumps reason. The intense feelings that arise in response to witnessing a violent crime or a slaughterhouse killing floor ought to be recognised by processes of moral judgements, but it does not follow that all emotions are evidence of moral truth.

A useful counterpoint can be found in Patricia Greenspan’s work on guilt and morality. Examples such as violent crime or animal abuse are relatively straightforward and more or less unproblematic, but Greenspan considers circumstances where emotion and reason appear to contradict one another in irreducible ways. She writes, ‘Guilt may be thought to be irrational in a case where, through no
fault of his own, the agent cannot avoid doing wrong, on the assumption that the reaction can be justified only if one is guilty’ (1995, p. 14). More specifically, Greenspan asks how we can understand the moral significance of guilt, when it remains for individuals who have chosen to do the right thing. Greenspan explains, ‘The dispute concerns not what to do in such cases but whether the action one must do, morally speaking, can still be wrong’ (1995, p. 9). Central to this approach is the view that moral dilemmas are the key to understanding the relationship between ethics and emotion. This is still an ethical framework where emotions ‘motivate’ moral judgement, but Greenspan is interested in cases that are more complex than just gut reactions. The value given to social emotions like guilt and blame in this approach allows for moral emotions to be construed in social or intersubjective connections. For Greenspan, a moral position is accepted as dominant when it is ‘held in force by shared emotions of moral assessment’ (1995, p. 187). Emotions like guilt and blame are motivators for individuals to conform to a set of moral values, but this is based on a desire to belong within a set of shared values, rather than an individual moral litmus test based on gut feeling. This more reflexive sociological approach to the philosophy of emotion takes social constructions seriously and ties them to emotional experiences that lead to action. This recognition of moral and emotional antinomies signifies a remarkable break from rationalist ethical frameworks, while managing to bypass strictly realist approaches to morality. It also creates a space where sociological analyses of emotion and morality can provide useful contributions that unpack cultural and intersubjective phenomena. The question that remains is whether researchers in the sociology of emotion have successfully occupied this significant and important intellectual space.

On emotion and morality: sociology

The sociological study of morality undoubtedly begins with the work of Émile Durkheim. In Durkheim’s collectivist theory of social bonds, morality plays a pivotal role in connecting members of a given community in meaningful and long-lasting ways. In contrast, the dangers of anomie can be understood as the loss of these bonds, as a group of individuals who are unable agree to, and live within, a shared set of moral values will inevitably experience deteriorating social networks (Turner 1993). However, Durkheim’s keen interest in Kantian philosophy (Durkheim 2004) resulted in a series of reflections about morality that traverse sociological and philosophical boundaries (understandably, as these boundaries were not formalised during his lifetime). In an essay on The dualism of human nature, Durkheim separates sensory experience from moral activity as distinct and opposed forms of intellectual activity (1973, p. 151). Durkheim is contrasting one’s individuality – which is understood to be embedded in the social – with the body, and concludes that the contradictions and tensions between the two are irresolvable. In a moment that resembles Freudian notions of repression, Durkheim claims that moral acts necessarily demand that
individuals deny their bodily instincts. From this, we can extract the notion that, for Durkheim, emotions and morality are in conflict with one another such that one inevitably limits or denies the other. While Durkheim is eager to establish the social function and generation of moral principles, moral acts must remain independent from bodily sensations and emotions.

More recently, Bauman has developed sociological perspectives on morality in order to capture the unique and constantly changing ways that individuals make sense of the world around them. More specifically, Bauman describes the impact of postmodernism (1991) and eventually liquefaction (2000) in order to demonstrate how fragmentation and rapid social change has led to murky moral relations between individuals. For Bauman, the lack of fixed moral structures once upheld by religious tradition places demands on cultural values to provide guidance in previously unexplored ways. As individuals are increasingly expected to make moral decisions that might have previously been considered fixed and unalterable, they are now forced to consider the nature of their relationships with others and this can lead to a newfound awareness of confusion, contradiction and ambivalence as an unavoidable normality (See Hookway et al. [Chapter 6], this volume).

Meanwhile, the sociological analysis of morality has arguably neglected emotion as a means to understand culturally informed moral conduct. Hookway (2012) rightly highlights how sociologists offering a theory of modernity (or postmodernity) as a process of moral decline have consistently ignored or rejected emotion as a legitimate source for moral judgements. Conservative sociological arguments from thinkers like Bell, Reiff and Lasch consider the individualistic and narcissistic transformations away from traditional social structures to be fed by moral decisions within the self (Hookway 2012) – a process that essentially leads to forms of hedonism and, therefore, to a decline in values, decency and authenticity.

The prominence of moral systems has waned in sociological discourse, arguably leaving its analysis to the discipline of philosophy. This led Craig Calhoun to claim that the potential for sociology to understand identity and agency to its fullest potential has been limited by its unwillingness to engage meaningfully with debates about morality. Calhoun goes on to state that ‘[W]e (sociologists) have lost sight of the philosophical problems Durkheim thought sociology could solve’ (1991, p. 232). These criticisms demonstrate the potential for collaboration between sociological approaches and the position held by Adam Smith. In a statement that echoes the role of sympathy in Smith’s work, Calhoun writes that the self ‘is constituted in and through the taking of moral stances’ (1991, p. 233). The need for moral principles to affirm positive aspects of the self corresponds with sociological positions from Hochschild and Stets, to Denzin and Bauman. Smith’s approach (and, to some degree, Prinz could be included here) is clearly valuable to sociological discourse, although the diversity of approaches in philosophy means that much of the discipline’s work on emotion is difficult to translate into sociological debates.
In contrast to the work of Adam Smith and Jesse Prinz, who suggest that emotions and sentiments are more relevant to moral judgements than they are to pure ethics, Turner and Stets (2006) describe morality as embedded within cultural values, ideology and various layers of normativity such that moral positions can be ranked from fixed rules to negotiable preferences. Sociological research on emotion has been reluctant to describe experience in dichotomies regarding health or rationality; instead, emotions are commonly presented as interactional, constructed and intersubjective. Any attempt by researchers to question the legitimacy of one’s emotions tends to be rejected as assertions of power. It should be no surprise then that while there are examples of the emotional impact of immoral or unjust circumstances (Ahmed 2010; Holmes 2004), the links between moral judgements and emotional experiences are not well developed in sociology.

Turner and Stets set out a category of moral emotions that includes a broad spectrum of both positive and negative emotions that are ‘connected to morality, even if a person and others do not fully recognize this connection’ (2006, p. 544). Interestingly, their approach inverts the approach set out in the philosophical literature above. Turner and Stets aim to uncover how emotional experiences are ‘fuelled’ by morality (2006, p. 544), which involves a reversal of the philosophical question above. This suggests that while emotions and morality are related, in contrast to the work of philosophers, the sociological approach is primarily interested in the former rather than the latter. This may provide some insight into the lack of theoretical interrogation of moral judgements in the sociology of emotion. The challenge with the sociological approach is that it leaves the definition of morality – in sociological terms – only vaguely formulated and therefore focuses on emotions that are driven by moral positions (or, at the very least, experienced as such), such as shame and guilt. Turner and Stets go on to describe shame and guilt as second-order ‘moral emotions’ that at their primary basis are biologically ‘hardwired’ (2006, p. 547). These second-order emotions are considered to be made up of a mix of primary emotions (in this case, sadness, anger and fear), as opposed to alternate uses of the term secondary emotion, where the object of an emotion is based in social interaction. This relational method might consider guilt to be a secondary emotion as it involves a failure to meet community standards for moral conduct. But Turner and Stets warn against resigning exclusively to constructivist perspectives and choose to highlight the traditional sociological reluctance to acknowledge the biological dimensions of human behaviour (2006, p. 547). While the need to consider physiology in the study of emotion is an important dimension of sociological analyses, these references to Turner’s earlier work fail to account for the breadth of cultural variance in moral norms.

Stets and Carter’s (2012) work on moral emotions shifts the focus to moral tensions that are linked to the legitimacy or authenticity of personal identity. This approach suggests that individuals experience positive and negative emotions about morality because actions (and perceptions of actions) either challenge or reaffirm a meaningful sense of self. In an example such as stealing,
the individual will experience the moral emotion (guilt) as the act of theft contradicts their belief that they are a decent person. In doing so, Stets and Carter potentially reduce moral emotions to a matter of identity authenticity. What each of these approaches lack is a sufficient sense that these are emotions that are experienced by a feeling subject. The focus on emotions as simply interational or intentional overlooks the extent to which these emotions are felt by a subject who is affected by these feelings and experiences.

These perspectives are typical of the work on emotions and ethics in sociology, and they could be read as a product of a specific paradigm in sociological thought. One explanation for how the sociology of emotion came to this position is offered by Norman Denzin. In A phenomenology of emotion and deviance (1980), Denzin argues that the sociological literature on emotion has neglected existing philosophic and phenomenological perspectives in favour of largely symbolic interactionist perspectives. This is interesting for a number of reasons. For one, this chapter was published at a time when the sociology of emotion was barely formed as the distinct field that it is today, and so Denzin’s criticisms demonstrate remarkable foresight considering the contemporary direction of the area. But Denzin’s chapter also highlights a fork in the road in emotions research, where the gap between philosophy and sociology could have just as easily been avoided. Denzin draws heavily from the American philosophers Charles Cooley and William James, as well as the European phenomenologists Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Edmund Husserl. He also identifies Sigmund Freud as a thinker that sociologists have hastily discarded from emotions research. Denzin argues that emotion is essential to understanding interaction, and therefore must be included in sociological analysis. Yet sociological approaches that focus on interaction and intentionality risk separating emotion and feeling from an authentic self. The cause of the problem is traced back to the influence of George Herbert Mead’s differentiation between the I and the Me, whereby the performative self is separated from the feeling self, and, according to Denzin, too much emphasis is placed on the intentionality of emotion and not enough is given to the experience of it. In contrast to the popularity of Goffman’s work in emotions research (see Hochschild 1983; Shott 1979), Denzin argues that the emphasis on rules is unnecessarily structural and leaves ‘little place for selves and feelings’ (1980, p. 252). Instead, we should remember Freud’s approach to emotion and the subconscious, where selves are often irrational, inconsistent and unpredictable.

Denzin’s ambitious claims and firm criticisms appear to blend the strengths of sociological and philosophical perspectives, such that the study of what emotions are and what they do are interwoven rather than pulled apart. While the theoretical literature in the sociology of emotion draws from both micro/interaction perspectives as well as macro/theoretical perspectives, the bulk of sociological material favours the former over the latter. Consequently, there appears to be a reluctance to engage with themes that are generally more common among our philosophical counterparts. Topics such as reason, rationality, morality, knowledge and subjectivity receive more attention
among philosophers of emotion, and while there are a number of legiti-
mate discipline-specific barriers that prevent sociologists from adopting these
approaches, both parties have much to gain from finding common ground.
Revisiting Denzin’s fork in the road is just one way of doing this.

**Conclusion**

What is it that a sociologist might object to in the philosophy of emotion? The
possibility of finding truth in emotions comes to mind, as does the evaluation of
emotions as either rational or irrational. Through a sociological reading of moral
sentiments, it seems likely that sociologists can work with the first possibility, but
not the second. Furthermore, philosophical approaches to emotion often lack
a sufficient focus on power dynamics involved in emotion, and this is arguably
one of the key strengths of the sociological approach. If we consider Barbalet’s
work on class resentment (1992), or Hochschild’s analysis of gender and feeling
rules (1983), it is clear that sociological approaches are capable of uncovering
unique perspectives on emotion, each with important contributions to the
role of morality, justice and inequality. So, what might a philosopher deem
problematic about the sociology of emotion? The empirical emphasis in both
microsociological approaches and large-scale quantitative approaches comes to
mind, but this is evidence of a more paradigmatic difference. While many socio-
ological thinkers have offered definitions of what constitutes emotions (see Stets
and Turner 2006), the sociology of emotion does not depend on finding con-
crete answers to this question. This is not the case in the philosophy of emotion,
whereby an understanding of what the phenomenon is must act as a precursor to
the investigation into what emotions do. Similarly, sociologists have asked *what
do moral systems do?* From Durkheim’s functionalism to Bauman’s *Liquid moder-
nity*, the answer has been to maintain the fabric of society through social bonds.
From a sociological perspective, this is a challenge for late modernity, where the
public dissemination of moral outrage is no longer bound to local communities
or perspectives. The philosophical question, on the other hand, needs to unpack
sources of truth for ethical claims in ways that are not relevant to a sociological
analysis or morality. Yet the analysis of sentiments and gut reactions does share
an important feature with sociological perspectives; sentiments inseparably place
emotion with morality, praxis, reason and the swelf. Furthermore, emotion plays
a role when we employ reason to make ethical judgements. Importantly, the
perspectives set out in this chapter can present this as a strength, not a weakness.

**References**

Ahmed, S 2010, ‘Killing joy: feminism and the history of happiness’, *Signs: Journal of
Women in Culture and Society*, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 571–94.
vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 150–63.


Chapter 5

Sociological approaches to the study of gender and emotion in late modernity

Culture, structure and identity

*Kathryn J. Lively*

---

**Introduction**

One of the prevailing understandings in the sociology of emotion is that emotions are shaped, in large part, by the cultural and structural conditions of our time. For instance, in the period some social historians have dubbed the modern age or modernity (Giddens 1991), which was marked by a considerably more traditional division of labour, men, who spent much of their days toiling in factories, were typically viewed as unemotional and rational. In contrast, women, who spent the bulk of their time tending to the emotional needs of their children and creating a *safe haven* for their husbands, were seen as nurturing and caring on their best days and overly emotional and irrational on their worst. During this period, and even the decades following, women were held to different emotional norms than men. For instance, given the fairly rigid gender roles, it was commonly held that women were *naturally* more emotional than men, a notion that still persists – albeit in a much more relaxed form – today.

Over the last 50 years, however, the economic means of production have pushed many workers in many parts of the world out of manufacturing jobs and out of the sanctuary of home into more public-facing service-oriented occupations. Service occupations, unlike manufacturing jobs, require workers to engage in more face-to-face or voice-to-voice client contact, both of which require a greater ability to attenuate and to manage emotions (Wharton 1993). Indeed, the mass migration of workers out of factories and homes and into shops and other forms of service work has fundamentally altered our understanding of emotion.

Given the deep interconnection between culture, structure and emotion, it is not surprising that this period of *late modernity* (Giddens 1991; see also Patulny & Olson [Chapter 1], this volume) is also marked by a fundamental shift in the way that emotions are thought about in everyday life. Notably, this shift is captured in the prevailing sociological approaches to the study of emotion. One could argue that the sociology of emotion arose when it did as a result of the transition from modernity to late modernity. Because even though emotions had long been of interest to sociologists (e.g., Marx, Simmel, Weber
and Durkheim), it wasn’t until the late 1970s that sociologists from a variety of theoretical and methodological traditions converged on the important role that emotion played in everyday life (Smith-Lovin 1995). Taken together, these more concentrated approaches seem to reflect the relatively new understandings of emotion that also arose in late modernity – that is, 1) emotions are much more complex than they were once believed to be, 2) emotions and emotion management are ubiquitous components of everyday life and 3) our emotional responses and the strategies we use to manage those responses are inextricably linked to our fundamental sense of self-identity. These changes are particularly visible with regards to the ways that different traditions of emotional scholarship have approached gender.

In this chapter, I introduce four theoretical and methodological traditions that capture these historically, culturally and structurally bound understandings of emotion in modern life. I focus, in particular, on how each of these traditions deals with gender differences in emotion – not only in terms of its experience – but also its expression, its management and its relationship to self-identity. Over the last four decades, the sociological understanding of the relationship between gender and emotion has become increasingly sophisticated. In some ways, these recent re-imaginings of both gender and emotion are simply indicative of the current historical moment in which we find ourselves.

Notably, these four perspectives do not represent the totality of sociological scholarship on gender and emotion. Instead, they represent a very US-centred perspective, which was born out of perspectives and theories originating from what US sociologist James House (1977) once referred to as the three faces of social psychology.

Regardless of their theoretical or substantive foci, sociologists, as a group, have tended to, and continue to, approach the study of gender and emotion in one of four ways. The first and probably most well-known approach stems primarily from Herbert Blumer’s early formulation of classic symbolic interaction (1937) and Goffman’s (1959) theory of dramaturgy. This approach relies disproportionately on qualitative methods, including ethnography, in-depth interviews and participant observation. This group focuses on the emergent nature of interaction, with particular attention to gendered emotion norms (e.g., women are naturally more sympathetic than men or big boys don’t cry) that govern both the experience and expression of feeling and how norms are negotiated, sustained and resisted within particular contexts.

Although much of this work originated from the study of women in largely female-dominated service occupations (see Hochschild 1983), emotional reflexivity and emotion management now seem to be nearly ubiquitous in modern life. Over the last decade, there has been a spate of studies that focus on men’s (and women’s) emotional experiences in a wider range of occupations (e.g., Pierce 1995), voluntary activities (e.g., Lois 2003; Vacarro et al. 2011) and associations (e.g., Schrock, Holden & Reid 2004) – many of which have been historically associated with men (but see Cottingham 2015). Scholars
have also begun to problematise their understandings of gender, by taking into consideration the ways in which gender interacts with other such characteristics as race, ethnicity, sexuality, social class, education and so on.

A second approach, the group processes approach, is drawn primarily from the early insights of Theodore Kemper (1978) and Robert Bales (1950). This body of scholarship tends to rely on experimental methods and typically uses small convenience samples – often of college students. In a recent introduction to the group processes literature, Huey and Lucas (2007) suggest that unlike symbolic interactionists, group process theorists are much more interested in the process than they are the group – let alone the contexts in which those groups are embedded. Generally speaking, group process scholars are interested primarily in the roles that status and power play in small-task-oriented groups. Thus, their attention to gender is couched predominantly in terms of status characteristics (Ridgeway 2011). From this perspective, women, just like other racial, ethnic and sexual minorities, engage in more emotion management, including the suppression of negative emotions and the expression of positive emotion, as a result of their weaker status position vis-à-vis the dominant groups (e.g., men, non-Hispanic Whites and heterosexuals [also see Cahill & Eggleston 1994]).

The third perspective stems from the social structure and personality paradigm (House 1977). Unlike the previous two approaches, which tend to rely on small convenience samples, this approach tends to favour large-scale nationally representative or community-representative survey data. The utilisation of large samples and increasingly sophisticated quantitative methods allows scholars working in these traditions to control for a variety of individual and contextual variables – including sex, which is often construed as gender – as well as interactions between variables.

Although simple group difference analyses of the self-reported experiences of women and men fail to capture the complex ways in which gendered processes and meanings of emotion unfold over time, they do lend themselves to tests of the generalisability of the claims made by their qualitative and/or experimentalist peers (e.g., Lively, Steelman & Powell 2008). These approaches also allow for the modelling of the effects of culture and structure simultaneously in order to provide a more complete picture of the social forces affecting the relationship between gender and emotion.

The final approach is affect control theory (Heise 1979). Sitting at the nexus of symbolic interaction and group processes (Heise 2007), affect control theory – like the other more survey-based approaches to the study of emotion – also has the ability to model culture and structure simultaneously. However, instead of using static, large-scale datasets, affect control theory relies on a dynamic computer simulation programme, Interact, to model theoretical predictions, which have then been substantiated among scholars using a variety of methods, including ethnography, surveys, experiments and, most recently, content analysis.

Affect control theory is somewhat unique among theories of emotion, because it has the capacity to generate contextually specific, hierarchical
interactions across a variety of settings. The theory also provides a unique multi-prong strategy for understanding the relationship between sex, gender and emotion. Unlike other theories of emotion, which tend to think of emotion predominantly as a signal function (Hochschild 1983) or a social construct (Lofland 1985), affect control theory leverages insight from decades of research on semantic differentials (Osgood 1964) to highlight systematically gendered meanings within culturally shared lexicons of identities, behaviours, attributes and settings, as well as systematic differences in men’s and women’s affective understandings of particular identities and attributes that are typically invoked in discussions of gender and gender inequality (e.g., male, female, woman, man, feminine, masculine [Lively & Heise 2014]). Affect control theory uses the content of these affective lexicons – also known as sentiment dictionaries (Heise 2007) – to make predictions not only about emotions, but also behaviours and attributions.

In this chapter, I offer basic overviews of these four different perspectives in order to present a more holistic understanding of the sociological study of emotion and gender. As evident in the above, questions of culture and structure exist throughout all of these perspectives. The true distinction lies in matter of degree. Qualitative scholars associated with classic theories of symbolic interaction and dramaturgy tend to put a disproportionate weight on culture, whereas group processes scholars tend to put an even more disproportionate focus on structure. Those who approach this topic from a social structure and personality perspective and affect control theory have been somewhat more successful at balancing the two; however, they currently do so at the expense of the specificity or fine-grained detail apparent in the more focused approaches.

Again, this chapter is not meant as an exhaustive review on the sociological literature of emotion and gender. Rather, its purpose is to illustrate these four fundamentally different, yet still complementary, sociological approaches to the question at hand. Despite their origins some four decades ago, these approaches still lend themselves to answering even the most modern and pressing questions facing emotions scholars today. They do so because of their breadth and depth, and also because of their reliance on core sociological concepts and social psychological principles that transcend any particular context or historical epoch. This chapter also seeks to illustrate how sociological studies of gender and emotion have become more complex, in part to address the changing nature of gender, emotional experience, emotional expression and emotion management and the role they play in a rapidly changing world where our ability to comport – and even to know – ourselves has become increasing challenging and consequent.

**Symbolic interaction/dramaturgy**

Cultural approaches to the sociological study of gendered emotions are related most closely with the theoretical traditions of symbolic interaction (Blumer
1937; Mead 1934) and dramaturgy (Goffman 1959). They are typically couched in terms in gender differences in terms of emotion culture (e.g., Cancian & Gordon 1988), emotion norms (e.g., Hochschild 1979), emotion management (ibid.), interpersonal emotion management (e.g., Lois 2003), emotional labour (e.g., Pierce 1995) and emotional deviance (e.g., Lois 2013).

One of the strengths of these particular variants of symbolic interaction is their focus on the emergent and somewhat unpredictable nature of social interaction. Both perspectives, relying on a common metaphor of life as theatre, assume that actors interact with one another symbolically in ways that allow them to construct shared meaning. Actors adopt roles (e.g., attorney-paralegal, husband-wife) that shape, but do not determine, their behaviours and emotions. Much of this work illustrates how emotion rules – that is, norms that govern the experience and expression of emotion – are created, reified and resisted. A growing number of studies reveal how individuals come to be socialised to these norms both by individuals and institutions (e.g., Jackson & Wingfield 2013).

Taking gender into account, interactionist and dramaturgical studies reveal that women continue to be held to a different set of norms than men when it comes to emotional experience, emotional expression and emotion management, across a variety of settings. Although it was initially assumed that women were more emotional than men, more likely to be subject to display rules and, as a result, engage in more emotion management than men – both in their private lives and in the workplace – that view is beginning to change. In fact, by the mid-1990s, studies began to reveal that men, too, often experienced emotions subject to feeling and display rules and also engaged in emotional labour – albeit by different means and often towards different ends (Pierce 1995). This new understanding of men, as well as women, as emotion managers, is consistent with theoretical accounts of the late twentieth century, during which emotion management has become a ubiquitous, if not a necessary, aspect of everyday life.

That said, women are still likely to be expected to be more caring and nurturing than men across a range of settings (e.g., Lois 2013), and find themselves facing situations where they feel obliged to mask feelings of anger, frustration or irritation – the form of emotional labour that carries with it the heaviest psychosocial costs (Erickson & Ritter 2001). In contrast, men are still more likely than women to be held to a higher standard of affective neutrality and professionalism (e.g., Pierce 1995; Cottingham 2015) and enjoy higher status shields (Hochschild 1983; Lois 2003), which protect them from the misplaced anger of others.

While this perspective acknowledges that the rules governing social interaction – and, subsequently, emotional experience, expression and socialisation – differ by gender (e.g., Cancian & Gordon 1988), only recently have scholars examined how gender interacts with other social factors, such as race and social class. However, Durr and Wingfield’s (2011) work on African-American professional women and Jackson and Wingfield’s (2013) study of Black men in predominantly White colleges highlight intersectionality as an important new area for emotions scholars to continue to explore.
Additionally, sociologists who study emotion and gender are slowly turning their attention to the emotional lives of individuals living outside of the traditional gender binary. Schrock, Boyd and Leaf’s (2009) analysis of the emotion management strategies of male-to-female transsexuals, for one, documents the emotional pitfalls of passing as well as a temporal aspect of emotion management that, for the most part, had been overlooked in other qualitative studies; Nordmarken (2011) used autoethnography in order to analyse very comprehensively the interpersonal aspects of transgender life. In a series of deeply personal vignettes, Nordmarken’s personal narrative details what it felt like and what it meant to navigate everyday interactions in a gender-ambiguous body in ways that resulted in moments of both social rejection and connection.

**Group processes**

Unlike the cultural perspective, which focuses on the role of culture and norms, the structural perspective focuses almost exclusively on the effects of structure. Much of this tradition can be traced back to Robert Bales’ (1950) early work on group processes, as well as Theodore Kemper’s (1978) social interactional theory of emotion. An early pioneer in the sociological study of emotion, Kemper posited that most emotions could be determined by two fundamental dimensions governing social interactions: power and status. Power refers to one’s ability to get someone to do something against their will (Weber 2010), while status has more to do with issues of deference and demeanour (Goffman 1959).

Many of the theories that arose from Kemper’s early observations of power and status – known as group process theories – were developed in laboratory settings, relying on undergraduate students. This methodology allows researchers to hold culture constant and to focus on the more structural mechanisms underlying emotional experience (e.g., Kemper 1978) and expression (Huey & Lucas 2007). Just like many cultural theorists tend to under-theorise structure, more structural theorists tend to under-theorise when it comes to culture (but see Ridgeway & Johnson 1990). That said, in recent years, many of the basic tenets of group research have been replicated – if not problematised – in more naturalistic settings (see below).

Because group processes scholars tend to focus on status and power, their explanations of gender stem from the differences of power and status between women and men. As a result, these scholars are less likely to theorise about gender, per se. Indeed, most of the theories in this tradition, much like more psychological approaches, assume that when anyone – male or female – does not get their expectations met, fails to receive their fair share, perceives an unjust distribution of rewards and punishments or feels like they got the short (or long) end of an exchange, they respond in ways that are patterned and predictable (but see Cecilia Ridgeway’s [2006] theory of socio-emotional behaviour and status, which draws heavily from Hochschild’s [1979] notion of feelings rules).
More recently, von Scheve and colleagues (2013) have begun developing a multidisciplinary theory on collective emotions, which has the potential to run the gamut from small groups, such as those described here, to larger-scale collective action and social movements. They define collective emotions as ‘the synchronous convergence in affective responding across individuals towards a specific event or object’ (von Scheve & Ismer 2013, p. 406, emphasis original). Given that this perspective takes into account face-to-face encounters, culture and shared knowledge and identification with a social collective, this approach provides a valuable lens through which to better understand the myriad of ways in which gender shapes emotional response in an increasingly complex and interconnected world (see Kivran-Swain & Naaman 2014 for one example).

**Social structure and personality**

Unlike the group processes literature, which relies mostly on experimental data collected from college students, those who approach gender differences in emotion from a social structure and personality framework tend to rely on large-scale, nationally representative data. Again, this approach allows scholars to control for numerous factors simultaneously, such as sex, race and various markers of socio-economic standing, as well as important social roles.

This approach also allows scholars to tease apart different types of emotional and individual outcomes (Erickson & Ritter 2001) that may be obscured when using other methods. Whereas most of the quantitative work in this tradition conflates gender with sex out of necessity (e.g., Simon & Lively 2010; Simon & Nath 2004), some scholars have successfully incorporated other markers of gender into their analyses, including self-reports of femininity, masculinity and feminist-orientation (e.g., Erickson 2005; also see Kroska 1997).

Using data from the 1996 General Social Survey (GSS) emotion module, Simon and Nath (2004) tested cultural and structural theories of emotion. Their multivariate analysis revealed that women and men were more similar than they were different when it came to emotional experience. Once a range of socio-demographic factors (e.g., race, age, education, family income) and significant social statuses (e.g., employment, marital and parental) were held constant, there were very few significant differences in women’s and men’s self-reported emotional experiences. The only significant differences in men’s and women’s emotions, once structural conditions were held constant, were women’s higher rates of self-reported distress and anger. Notably, anger is an emotion that cultural sociologists typically associate with males (Simon & Nath 2004; see also Sorial [Chapter 9], this volume). They also found significant differences in the ways that women and men chose to manage their anger. These findings, taken together, shifted the conversation on gender and emotion by drawing sociological attention to men’s previously undocumented emotional experiences, and to their unique and, in some ways, gendered means
of emotion management (see also Simon & Lively’s [2010] investigation of the relationship between women’s more intense and enduring anger and self-reported distress; using the same data, they found that women’s higher rates of distress disappeared once intensity and duration of anger were controlled).

Also leveraging the 1996 GSS, Lively and Powell (2006) examined the relative effects of setting, status and sex on emotional expression. They found that individuals are more likely to express anger directly to family members, rather than people from work; they are also more likely to express anger directly to those of lower status, regardless of the context in which their anger occurred. Notably, the effects of context and status on emotional expression were roughly the same. They also found that once the constraining effects of setting and status were controlled, sex differences disappeared.

Turning their attention to the emotional costs of inequity in the home, Lively, Steelman and Powell (2010) examined the effects of perceived inequity in the household division of labour on a range of emotional states (e.g., tranquillity, pride, self-reproach, anger, fear and distress [Lively & Heise 2004]). In keeping with basic tenets of equity theory, which predicts that individuals are likely to experience rather undifferentiated negative emotions when they experience an inequity in either direction (Walster et al. 1978), they also found that emotional responses to perceived inequity were dependent upon the direction of the perceived inequity, and the emotion under consideration (Kemper 1978), as well as sex.

More specifically, under-benefiting is positively associated with distress, rage and anger, whereas over-benefiting is positively associated with distress, fear and self-reproach. Moreover, men were more likely to experience feelings of anger or rage when experiencing perceptions of under-benefiting, whereas women were more likely to experience feelings of fear and self-reproach when experiencing perceptions of over-benefiting. These findings speak to the complexity of emotional experience – even those related to basic social psychological processes – in contexts where structural and cultural changes may be occurring at differential rates.

In a more recent analysis of population-based findings – this time those from Kahneman and Krueger’s (2006) Princeton Time and Affect Control Survey – Patulny (2015) argues that the choice of emotions measured in surveys matters in determining subjective wellbeing in proximal contexts such as those in which gender is known to play an important role. Patulny’s case study analysis reveals that tiredness and interest (emotions that are excluded from Kahneman and Krueger’s wellbeing construct and did not fit within Ortony, Collins and Clore’s (1988) classification of emotion, which served as gatekeeper for which emotions were included in the aforementioned GSS emotions module [1996]) explain a large part of US women’s, but not men’s, dissatisfaction within the domains of education, unpaid housework and childcare. Patulny’s work suggests that scholars in this tradition perhaps should incorporate more audit studies of emotions, instead of simply relying on a priori – albeit theoretically based – classifications of emotion.
Affect control theory

Perhaps more than any other sociological theory of emotion, affect control theory (ACT) spans the theoretical and empirical gap between the cultural and structural perspectives. It also has one of the most highly developed understandings of the complexity of emotion and affect (Heise 2007; Heise & McKinnon 2010). Generally speaking, ACT assumes that individuals are motivated to create events that affirm their affective meanings about the key elements of social events – that is, actors, behaviours, settings, traits and emotion (Heise 2007). The theory posits that each individual involved in social interaction carries two affective meanings: a stable fundamental sentiment, based on the individual’s identity in the situation (combined with the individual’s salient traits and mood), and a transient impression that varies with events. The theory assumes that fundamental sentiments are culturally shared, although studies reveal some subcultural variations among specific identities (e.g., Hunt 2010).

For instance, a mother interacting with a child is motivated to engage in behaviours or thoughts that confirm her fundamental sentiments about mothers as well as her fundamental sentiments about children. Individuals achieve this by acting or cognitively reframing events in ways that move transient sentiments closer to fundamental sentiments. The theory is based on a necessary assumption concerning semantic differentials (Heise 1979; Osgood 1964). The essence of roles, behaviours, settings and emotions can be captured in three-dimensional ratings of words, gathered into culturally specific dictionaries. Roles, behaviours, settings and emotions are all rated on three dimensions – evaluation, potency and activity (EPA) – using the scale −4 to +4, with neutral. For example, a mother has an EPA (evaluation-potency-activity) profile of 3.12, 2.98, 1.44, meaning that the identity is viewed as extremely good, quite potent and slightly inactive. In contrast, feeling enraged has an EPA profile of 1.89, 0.76, 1.98, meaning that this emotion feels quite bad, slightly potent and quite active.

Although affect control theory was developed initially as a theory of identity, where discrete emotion was deemed an interactional by-product of identity confirmation processes, several theoretical innovations moved the consideration of emotion front-and-centre (Smith-Lovin & Heise 1988), including the recent specification of an emotion model (Lively & Heise 2014). Affect control theory’s emotion model allows for predictions of a wide range of specific, discrete emotions based on the evaluation, potency and activation of one’s identity, coupled with the valence of one’s transient sentiment in any given event (Lively & Heise 2014).

Affect control theory offers currently underutilised insight to important group differences in emotionality in several ways (Lively & Heise 2014). For example, although the majority of the identities, behaviours, attributes and emotions are culturally shared, there are significant sex differences in the EPA profiles of particular identities, behaviours, attributes, settings and emotions, including those that are most often gendered (e.g., waiter versus waitress), as well as those that
deal specifically with gender (e.g., men versus women). For instance, women are more likely to hold more positive and powerful affective sentiments towards the identity of ‘woman’ or ‘female’ compared to those held by men.

Another way that affect control theory allows us to explore gender differences in affect and emotion is through a consideration of gendered roles. For instance, many of the social role identities that are culturally associated with women, whether they are in the private or public sphere, are viewed as slightly more positive, less powerful and more active than their counterparts that are culturally associated with men (e.g., grandmother versus grandfather, mother versus father, daughter versus son, waitress versus waiter, hostess versus host etc.). Finally, even marking an identity that has historically been occupied by men as being held by a female increases the evaluation and reduces the potency of the role. For instance, the EPA profile for an attorney is 0.30, 2.45, 1.92, whereas the EPA profile for a female attorney is 2.94, 1.69, 1.67. This change in profile alters the types of emotion that the individual is expected to feel (Lively & Heise, 2004), and also the amount of emotional labour they are likely to engage in, in order to maintain the fundamental sentiments associated with their role.1

Perhaps the most explicitly gendered analysis of emotion that has arisen from this perspective is Lively’s discussion of gendered differences in emotional segueing (2008). Building off previous work with David Heise (2004), Lively presents a map of emotional segues (paths of emotion management) for women and men. She found that women’s shortest paths between the most negative (e.g., distress, fear and anger) and most positive emotions (e.g., tranquillity and joy) are longer and more complicated than those most common to men. That is, the majority of women’s shortest paths require transitioning through segueing emotions – sometimes more than one – and typically rely on emotions that have been culturally associated with women or seen, historically, as feminine (see Lively 2008 for more detail). Lively’s analysis also revealed that emotional segues occurred along the three affective dimensions – evaluation, potency and activation – upon which affect control theory (Heise 2007) is based, providing an important empirical and theoretical link to Hochschild’s (1983) theory of emotion management (also see Boyle & McKinzie 2015). This work also reveals a more nuanced understanding of the underlying affective structure of men’s and women’s emotions and why it is that women’s emotion management tends to be more externalised, long-lasting and difficult compared to that of their male counterparts.

**Conclusion**

Since its inception nearly 40 years ago, the sociology of emotion has been attuned to the fact that women and men occupy different emotional realities that are shaped, in large part, by the structural, cultural and historical moment in which they live. Whereas women’s and men’s emotional lives were once seen as rigidly demarcated due to their embeddedness in separate spheres of
daily life, more modern assessments reflect the understanding that men and women are now more similar than they used to be. They also reflect a growing appreciation for the ubiquity of emotion and its management in everyday life, as well as its inextricable relationship with identity. This is especially true in light of changing norms about gender, as well as gender itself, and its intersections with other equally important socio-demographic characteristics (e.g., race and social class) and ways of being.

The sociological approach to this topic, which occurred contemporaneously with the shift from modernity to late modernity, was developed as an attempt to understand how historically specific cultural norms around gender and social structural arrangements shape emotional experience. As might be expected, some have focused disproportionately on the cultural end of the continuum, providing rich, detailed accounts of individuals’ lives within specific social settings, while others have focused more on structural differences, by specifying interactional processes that are generalisable across contexts. Others, still, have attempted to theorise and model the effects of both culture and structure simultaneously. This latter group, in particular, offer compelling support for Ridgeway’s (2011) claims that gender differences in interaction – of which emotional experience and expression is a small but integral part – are, in fact, cultural responses to ongoing structural conditions.

Over the last few decades, some scholars have argued that as our society changes at an increasing rate, be it through mobilisation, hyper-connectivity, demographic shifts or the changing nature of institutions – including the very notion of gender itself – current sociological theories of gender and emotions may no longer be equipped to capture the growing complexity of individuals’ emotional lives (see Heise & MacKinnon [2010] for a recent review). While it is true that the genesis of many of these sociological theories occurred in the 1970s, before the shift from modernity to late modernity was truly underway, nothing could be further from the truth.

The theoretical underpinnings of sociological studies of gender and emotion are based in a deep understanding of culture, structure and basic social psychological processes that are simultaneously specific and generalisable. In other words, the social psychological process of the ways in which individuals take on the role of the other and attempt to manage their own and others’ emotions in ways that confirm both their fundamental sense of self is the same whether it happens in face-to-face interactions or in online communities. To be sure, the details of that process might look different if that individual is a Black cis-gender woman or a Latinx transgender man, but those are empirical questions. And, when answered, they will undoubtedly advance current understandings of intersectionality and emotion in a way that shifts or expands our theoretical perspectives and deepens our appreciation of the basic processes associated with identity, equity, exchange and group behaviour.

And while it may be true that the foundational institutions that sociologists have studied for decades – including work, family and gender itself – are also
changing at a rate unprecedented in modern history, they will undoubtedly continue to have norms associated with them that will continue to guide emotions and emotional expressions, just as they continue to have – and likely will always have – status hierarchies based on socially agreed upon status characteristics, which allow some people greater freedom over their emotional expressions while simultaneously denying similar rights to others. And there will always be individuals who adhere to those norms perfectly in ways that reify whatever status structure exists at the time, and some who rail against and reshape them in both subtle and not-so-subtle acts of resistance.

Note

1 These values are based on the female data, collected at Indiana University in 2002–2004.

References


Loneliness and love in late modernity
Sites of tension and resistance

Nicholas Hookway, Barbara Barbosa Neves, Adrian Franklin and Roger Patulny

Introduction
Loneliness is one of the most important emotions to be impacted by the rise of late modernity. As noted in Chapter 1 (Patulny & Olson), late modernity is transforming the way people relate to each other, not only in terms of separating them from each other, but in creating novel spaces to form new connections. Anthony Giddens (1991; 1992) describes the transformation of intimacy, and Zygmunt Bauman (2005) the liquefaction of traditional ties and social bonds. However, inasmuch as these changes might render us lonelier than ever, they also offer the opportunity for acts of resistance, and to form new social connections that may reduce loneliness. To understand this, we must recognise the difference between social and emotional loneliness (Weiss 1982), which has been conceptualised as the difference between actual contact with others versus a perceived lack of sufficient contact with others. Loneliness is more likely to be ameliorated from the making and maintaining of good quality connections with others than from merely building more social connections (Franklin 2012).

It is in observing this qualitative difference between contact and connection, and between the social and emotional conceptions of loneliness, that the complexity of late modern loneliness starts to become apparent. Patulny and Olson (Chapter 1) argue that late modernity is characterised by emotional complexity, whereby we have new understandings of older emotions, and we have the advent of new complex emotions and emotional dynamics. This complexity is revealed in the recognition that the experience and emotional management of loneliness are shaped by social-structural conditions such as gender and age (Franklin & Tranter 2011; Patulny & Wong 2012; Flood 2005; Stanley et al. 2010), but are also improved by increasing reflexive analysis and new forms of agency. Emotional reflexivity is a key element of late modernity, both for individuals seeking to understand and manage their emotions (Holmes 2010; Burkitt 2012) and within the greater macro-reflexive discourse of society about emotions as a whole (Patulny & Olson, this volume, Chapter 1).

Loneliness, in both these senses, is beginning to lose its stigma. We now recognise it as a social condition in need of de-stigmatisation, and in need of
new and innovative treatment methods. In this chapter, we consider three key sites that highlight the complexity of loneliness in late modernity. More specifically, we address how loneliness is being reshaped by wider social changes in love and intimacy, within digital media and within human-animal relations. We show how these sites are spaces of tension, both enabling the conditions of loneliness, but also offering new means of connection and agency for dealing with loneliness. Cutting through the discussion is a wider recognition of the complexity of late modern loneliness, as it is reshaped by wider processes of individualisation, consumerism, mediatisation and increasing reflexivity (Patulny & Olson, this volume, Chapter 1).

**Love and loneliness in late modernity**

Changes in love and intimacy provide a central site to explore the emotional complexity of loneliness in late modern life. Contemporary theorists such as Bauman (2003; 2007) and Illouz (2012) declare that loneliness is endemic as intimate relationships become the focus of self-fulfilment and take on an individualistic and consumeristic quality. Bauman argues that the consumer endeavour ‘for new and improved attractions’ means contemporary relationships have a limited shelf life, being always vulnerable to the urge to ‘upgrade’ in the search for the next ‘peak’ or ‘big bang’ moment (Bauman 2007, p. 106). The result is that people become more vulnerable to loneliness as relationships are uprooted and love becomes a vehicle for sensation and pleasure rather than enduring commitment and living for the Other (Bauman 2003).

Illouz (2012) is equally pessimistic about finding and making meaningful love bonds in contemporary life, particularly for women. Illouz (2012, p. 247) argues that romantic love in late modernity is not just a cultural ideal, but has become ‘a social foundation for the self’. Love is a key site in which the self is validated and valued, especially for women who may not have had the same opportunities for identity and meaning through career and paid work. Illouz (2012, p. 163) claims that love has become ‘the object of endless investigation, self-knowledge and self-scrutiny’, mediated via a constant supply of media and expert advice. The problem for Illouz is that while love is set up as a path to self-fulfilment – to finding yourself – the intensive, reflexive introspection and self-analysis creates ambivalence and a distrust of one’s own feelings and desires. Ambivalence is thus a new and defining emotional characteristic of contemporary love relationships.

Following Bauman (2003) and Illouz (2007), we theorise two main ways that emotions of ambivalence in love are transforming the late modern experience of loneliness. First, the consumer framing and intensive self-scrutiny that now characterises intimacy can heighten feelings of restlessness, ambivalence and loneliness within relationships. Contemporary subjects may rejoice in the freedom of relationships ‘loosely tied’ but face the anxiety not only of their own disposability but of overlooking relationship ‘use-by dates’
Ambivalence may not necessarily trigger a relationship termination, but it may be enough to destabilise the perceived quality of the partnership and thus create feelings of disconnection and loneliness.

Second, while ambivalence may create desires to leave a partner, fears of loneliness may handbrake such decisions. Bauman’s theory of liquid love insists on a relentless culture of moving on, but this overlooks how people may choose not to leave relationships due to concerns about impending loneliness. It is well established that partners may choose to stay together for the sake of children – even to the point of creating parenting marriages (Larson 2015) – but what is less well known is how partners may choose not to end unions due to ambient fears of loneliness. Following Bauman (2003), we argue that late modern relationships are beset by an emotional tension between risk and reward, between consumer desire for new sensations and pleasures and social risks of loneliness and isolation.

Although Bauman (2003) and Illouz (2012) theorise love as a source of lonely ambivalence, recent transformations in intimacy also provide hope for pure relationships to be a source of greater social and emotional connection. Giddens is arguably the spokesperson for this more positive assessment of relationship change, suggesting less rather than more loneliness as an outcome of changing practices of intimacy. If we cast a critical eye back on the modern period, though, with its abundance of traditional social connections, we can wonder about the degree to which these networks fostered meaningful connections. Giddens (1992) argues that the pure relationship offers emancipation from oppressive, alienating and often materially dependent institutions such as marriage, particularly for women and those of diverse sexualities. Increasing mutual self-disclosure and an enjoyment of each other’s unique talents, albeit in tension with the voluntary nature of the union, creates the possibility for closer, more connected and less lonely relationships. The in-built fragility of the relationship is read not as the cause for anxiety and ambivalence as in Bauman, but optimistically as part of the very promise of intimacy and openness in changing social conditions. While Giddens has been critiqued on a number of levels, including overplaying the emancipation of women from traditionally gendered roles (Jameison 1999) and missing how ‘pure relations’ still benefit men more than women (Illouz 2012), he deserves attention in terms of thinking through how changes in relationships are reshaping expressions and experiences of loneliness.

Further, by coupling Giddens with theorists such as Charles Taylor (1992), we can more optimistically theorise how love may resist loneliness through the identity work of mutual care and intimacy. Rather than the shift to personal relationships as a site for self-exploration being read as selfish or disappointing, we can see this as a positive development, which enables the creation of more satisfying, democratic, equal and trusting connections. Taylor (1992), for example, suggests that love is a centrepoint for self-fulfilment in a culture of authenticity. Rather than an example of narcissism or disappointment,
Taylor underlines the social, relational and moral dimensions of love relationships and its links to identity-formation (Hookway 2017). Unlike the callous presentation by Bauman – deleting, moving on, forgetting – the search for intimacy is crucial to people’s lives and even if a relationship ends, this is a painful and morally fraught process. Love helps us discover our self, but it is a discovery performed in evaluative relationships about how others are faring and whether they are suffering or flourishing (Taylor 1992; Sayer 2011). One might argue that the feeling of love provides an instinctive signal as to the important quality of a relationship, and the need to maintain it so as to avoid emotional (if not social) loneliness. It is this shift from Bauman’s consumer ‘connection’ to deep and sacrificial ‘relationships’ that offers solutions to emotional loneliness (Bauman 2013, p. 62).

There is also a wider literature that critiques reflexive modernist arguments that love has become increasingly short-term and ‘until-further-notice’ (Holmes 2016, p. 74; Smart 2007) based on empirical and theoretical grounds. A significant portion of empirical research shows that people still do largely remain in long-term committed partnerships and seek enduring, caring and committed relationships (Hobbs, Owen & Gerber 2017; Holmes 2017; Smart 2007). The more evident churn is concentrated in the early part of the life-course, with younger people more likely to explore and experiment with intimate relationships and identity than older age groups (Halpern-Meekin, Manning, Giordano & Longmore 2013). Furthermore, theorists suggest the contemporary West is still enthralled by the idea of soul-mate love (Carroll 2001). This refers to the idea that there is the one out there, our other half, who will complete us and make us whole. While the search for the elusive grand amour can feed a liquid culture of moving-on, it also resonates with recent critiques of the individualisation thesis (Holmes 2010; Smart 2007). Theorists such as Holmes (2016) and Smart (2007) argue that intimate relationships have changed, but remain central to people’s lives. As Holmes (2016) points out, change does not mean decline and a pessimistic assessment that relationships now are simply about self-satisfaction. As intimate, social beings, we rely on care and support from others to buffer us against loneliness, but this now occurs within diverse family and intimate arrangements, and manifests through new digitally mediated relational interfaces. We turn now to examine how the rise of Internet-based forms of communication – and more recently social media networks – are re-shaping the practices of intimacy, and the potential role they may play in exacerbating or ameliorating loneliness.

**Social media and loneliness**

The proliferation of digital devices and social media platforms play a key role in debates about increasing loneliness in late modernity. The rise of user-generated communication technologies dovetail with broader analyses of the changing contours of identity and community in late modern times.
For theorists like Bauman (2007) and Turkle (2013; 2015), social media is a worrying trend that is making us lonelier. Bauman argues that the consumer quality of new communications sees connections replace relationships as social bonds become short-term and brittle. In Bauman’s terms, the Internet is a ‘disconnection-on-demand’ service that is part of a wider story about how processes of individualisation and consumption are weakening contemporary social bonds (p. 107). Similarly, Turkle (2011) argues we are alone together as technology makes it easier to remain apart and offers the illusion of companionship without the demands. In our ‘robotic moment’, machinery is replacing human labour, including ‘love’s labour’ (Turkle, p. 106), and weakening relationships: ‘[. . .] we are together but so lessen our expectations of other people that we can feel utterly alone’ (p. 154).

How social, then, is social media? Is it making us lonelier? We need to be wary, here, of technological determinism (Mauthner & Kazimierczak 2018; Wyatt 2008), whereby technology is over-empowered to direct social change, with little room for human agency and it ‘absolves us from responsibility for the technology we make and use’ (Wyatt 2008, p. 169). Sociologists of technology have been critical of dystopian and utopian approaches to technology on these grounds. While the Internet has been blamed for creating loneliness, isolation and weakening social bonds (Bauman 2007; Turkle 2011; Twenge 2017), empirical research points to a more complex picture of the relationship between the Internet, social media and loneliness.

Arguments that the Internet causes loneliness have become almost academic folklore, despite mixed findings. Much of this can be traced to Kraut et al.’s (1998) longitudinal study of American households in 1995–1996, who advanced the so-called Internet paradox based on findings that online communication was associated with declines in face-to-face communication with household members, reductions in social network size and an increase in depression and loneliness. Despite the limitations of the original study (derived from a sample of university students at a time of low Internet penetration) and the fact that following studies – including by the same authors in 1998–1999 (Kraut et al. 2002) – did not reveal the same negative effects, the association between loneliness and the Internet remained a concern for scholars, media pundits and politicians, leading to studies specifically on this relationship (Amichai-Hamburger & Hayat 2011).

Further research challenges this isolating thesis of digital life, and provides contrary evidence that the Internet can serve as a mechanism for producing new forms of agency for those who feel lonely, and for those who want to maintain/supplement their social connectedness. For example, Amichai-Hamburger and Ben–Artzi (2003) reveal that lonely people use the Internet more regularly than non-lonely people, concluding that it is lonely people who are attracted to using the Internet, rather than Internet usage that causes loneliness. Morahan–Martin and Schumacher (2003) have also shown that lonely individuals used the Internet more for emotional support than non-lonely individuals, as they are more likely to make friends online and use the Internet to cope with negative
experiences – though they were also more likely to report that the Internet disrupted their daily lives. These overall findings were further corroborated by nationally and internationally representative studies demonstrating that the Internet improves the social lives of users (Amichai-Hamburger & Hayat 2011; Rainie & Wellman 2012). The general theme of this research was that rather than seeing the online world as supplanting offline relationships, it can enhance them by adding another layer of social interactivity.

However, richer understandings of types of use and socio-technical contexts that can both facilitate and inhibit loneliness remain underexplored. It is important, then, that we pay attention to specific Internet use, such as social media or social networking sites, which uncovers convergent and divergent patterns. On the one hand, similar to general Internet use, a recent meta-analysis supports a causal model whereby loneliness significantly increases Facebook use (Song et al. 2014). Lonely people, in several Western and East Asian countries, use Facebook for social compensation, coping and social needs (Lee, Noh & Koo 2013; Song et al. 2014). On the other hand, data on young people shows inconsistent findings and complexity based on levels of loneliness and types of social media use (Frison & Eggermont 2015). The research needs to be nuanced to how people are using platforms such as Facebook, rather than talking about the Internet in blanket terms, to best understand the relationship between social media use and loneliness.

For example, Frison and Eggermont (2015) found in a longitudinal study investigating passive and active Facebook use (i.e., viewing content without direct exchanges between users versus interactions between users) that loneliness among young people predicted both types of use but with different consequences over time. Active Facebook use resulted in positive outcomes for lonely people, whereas passive viewing led to harmful effects on wellbeing, originating poor-get-richer and poor-get-poorer effects (Frison & Eggermont 2015). Active use seems to address both emotional and social loneliness, while passive use helps with social loneliness (e.g., number of contacts/relationships) but not necessarily with securing quality relationships and, thus, with alleviating emotional loneliness. This explains why the authors find a decreased perceived level of friend support over time for those engaged in passive Facebook use (Frison & Eggermont 2015). Other studies also reveal that different levels of social inclusion and gratification are attained from social media depending on the initial loneliness of the user (López et al. 2017). Types of social media can also play a differential role among young people; image-based social media, such as Instagram, are associated with less-lonely users (Pittman & Reich 2016). There is also a significant decrease in loneliness for users of image-based social media, as these platforms seem to provide a sense of immediacy and intimacy through images/videos that facilitate social presence and communication; text-based platforms (Twitter) seem to provide immediacy, but not intimacy (Pittman & Reich 2016).

Although research on the topic has been mainly on young people, interest in older adults has increased because these age groups are more likely to experience
loneliness (Wright-Bevans 2018; Neves et al. 2017). Such studies are still inconclusive, but scholars agree that targeted and co-designed technology seems critical for adoption and success of communication technologies to address loneliness in old age (Khosravi, Rezvani & Wiewiora 2016; Neves, Waycott & Malta 2018).

In contrast to the sweeping and one-sided positions that scholars such as Bauman and Turkle provide, there is an emerging consensus on the importance of a comprehensive and contextualised understanding of technology and loneliness. We argue that there is strong evidence that social media and digital technologies can work as a site to counter loneliness, but we need to nuance our claims. People progressively use technology to be/stay more connected, but that connectedness depends on socio-technical affordances (positive or negative, contingent on context), types of use, frequency of use, gratifications derived from usage, circumstances of loneliness and quality of relationships. As such, we argue that it is essential to deconstruct the technological determinism surrounding the links between sociotechnical systems, loneliness and social connectedness. Understanding how humans use technology invites us to consider the assemblage of human and non-human actions, how humans interface with the ‘distributed agency’ (Bennett 2010, p. 38) of things and objects to produce different configurations of sociability and loneliness. Considering the non-human leads us to consider our final site, in which both loneliness is registered and potentially resisted in late modernity – changing human-animal relations, more specifically the growth of companion animals.

**Companion animals and loneliness**

Sociology has increasingly recognised animals as new and significant social and moral actors in the contemporary West. New emotional relationships with animals can be located as part of a widescale de-centring of human-animal relations in conditions of late modernity. While modern human-animal relations were based on relations of instrumentality and measures of industrial progress, late modernity created new opportunities for intimate and close relations based on a diverse set of ‘de-differentiated’ sentiment, affection and emotional care (Franklin 1999, p. 45; Macnaghten 2004). In late modernity, humans increasingly entered into close and emotional relationships with animals (Franklin 1999), shining a spotlight on changing human bonds and an entirely new way to address loneliness.

Franklin (1998) argued that companion animal ownership has been rising dramatically since the 1960s, and that a large number of people have spontaneously changed the nature of their relationship with animals as a result of the weakening of human social bonds. In retrospect, we can understand this as a means of resisting the onset or the persistence of rising levels of loneliness. From the humanisation of animal naming strategies to funerals, burial practices and loss counselling for companion species, these shifts appeared to track a progressive weakening and fragility of human social bonds, growing levels of loneliness (Flood 2005) and the

Growing human-animal closeness can be interpreted as a symptom of weakening social relationships, but can it also be read as a way to counteract loneliness? Could the mere company of animals ameliorate human loneliness, an emotional condition so often defined by the loss of human social affirmation and belonging (Mellor et al. 2008)? We are social animals and so are companion animals, and together we are social symbiotes, but to what extent are we interchangeable socially, such that human loneliness might be alleviated or even cancelled by companionate relationships with other animals?

Part of the answer to these questions concerns whether bonds with companion animals provides a sense of belonging to a social entity. When asked what motivated people to obtain companion species and whether they regarded their (cat, dog, bird) ‘as a member of your family?’ (Franklin 2006, p. ??), most respondents indicated that they selected pets for companionship for themselves and children, and ascribed them family membership. To see whether this was more than anthropomorphic sentimentality – and was in fact a case of the formation of meaningful human-animal family households – respondents were also asked whether their companion animals were allowed into the more intimate, familial spaces typically restricted to non-human family members. Many respondents claimed that companion animals were allowed in their bedroom (over 50%); in their children’s bedroom (35%), on their furniture (48%), in the family room or lounge (66%), in the room where they eat (62%) and into the kitchen (66%). There was also evidence that more socially vulnerable groups (under-20s; singles; divorced and separated; those aged 70+) were more liberal in their sharing of household space. This was a dramatic shift from times when, for example, dogs were ‘kennelled’ outside the home.

The symbolism of household space needs to be emphasised here. Bedrooms are largely highly private spaces, the inner sanctum of privatised societies. Partners, close friends and siblings and other close family members form the restricted group of intimates use bedrooms together. So, in this sense, when people in our survey stated that an animal was both a member of the family and allowed into their bedroom, it was a refined answer indicating that they are very intimate family members. Sitting rooms in modern homes are places of social gathering and communal activities. Chairs symbolise both belonging and status in Western cultures and to be seated together means to be equally ranked. The discovery that half of those interviewed allowed their animals on furniture represents a major shift in the emotional social space of human-animal relations, and it is hard not to see some kind of substitution being played out (Franklin 2006).

Because human social bonds and belonging are often expressed and affirmed through embodied sensual/emotional modalities, and that many of these engagements have been compromised by weaker social bonds (Dahlberg 2007) and quantum over quality of connections, it is likely that more people have turned to
companion species to address their fear and experience of emotional loneliness. After all, companion animals are social animals that also affirm and strengthen bonds through close and embodied attention, constant eye contact, haptic communication and extended periods of attentiveness (Haraway et al. 1998; Franklin 2016). As Bauman (2000), Mellor et al. (2008) and Franklin et al. (2018) argue, loneliness has been caused largely by a reduction in the quality rather than the quantity of human social bonds, and it is these embodied forms of attention and the time given over to them that lonely people consistently lack, rather than social contact per se. More significantly, dogs and cats have co-evolved alongside humans, and have developed communicative and physiological connections with humans that provided adaptive possibilities for the changing conditions of human intimacy in late modernity (Nicastro 2004; Haraway 2008; Kikusui 2017). As social bonds became increasingly fugitive and ‘until-further-notice’ (Bauman 2000, p. 82), companion species became a putative source of unconditional love and embodied attention that people craved. But did their pets really love them? While anthropomorphism has a real enough basis in human imaginaries, it is no longer accepted that close bonds between humans, cats, dogs and birds are merely imaginary or fanciful (Salmon & Salmon 1983; Soares 1985; Haraway 2016; Berkoff 2017).

More-focused research on loneliness in recent years has targeted animals’ therapeutic use against the ravages of loneliness and its significantly harmful mental and physiological effects (Cacioppo et al. 2005; Franklin et al. 2007). Qualitative and quantitative evidence for companion animals being used as an intervention to obviate/alleviate loneliness is well established (Pikhartova et al. 2014; see also Garrity et al. 1988; 1998). Pikhartova et al.’s research was based on the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing database of 5210 men and women, in which loneliness among women but not men was found to be alleviated by companion animals between Wave 0 and Wave 1 of the study. They also discovered that women are statistically more likely than men to acquire a companion animal when they become lonely.

Innumerable qualitative studies report that companion animals do ameliorate human loneliness, among them Rew et al.’s (2000) findings in respect of companion dogs and homeless youths. Gilbey and Tani’s (2015) systematic review of these findings is less sanguine, but their findings were influenced by their use of the UCLA Loneliness Scale, in which 15 of the 20 proxy questions related to the quality and quantity of respondents’ human relationships and was therefore of little use in testing whether animals alone could have an impact. The studies seem to be testing not whether companion animals are fitting social subjects, alternatives for humans maybe, but whether their presence among lonely people repairs problematic social relationships between humans (Franklin 2015).

Conclusion

Loneliness provides an exemplar of how emotions have been reshaped in a de-traditionalised, reflexive and individualised global social order. The chapter
considered the complexity of loneliness as an emotion against the backdrop of social change in three spaces: transformations in intimacy and love; social and digital media; and with companion animals. The first two sites were treated as both sources and sites of agency in managing loneliness in late modernity, while growing human-animal closeness was treated as symptomatic of weakening social bonds but also a space where loneliness can be offset.

Drawing upon Bauman and Illouz, the chapter argued that transformations in intimacy, driven by processes of individualisation, consumption and intensive self-reflexivity, are creating more ambivalent love bonds. People can become lonelier in relationships, distracted by ‘new and improved attractions’ at the same time as fears of loneliness may handbrake decisions to end relationships. On the other hand, the move to pure relationships highlights possibilities for less loneliness, as relationships become more open, trusting and based on mutual disclosure. New technologies such as online dating apps, promising technological solutions to finding a soul-mate, offer possibilities for offsetting social loneliness balanced by concerns about increased emotional loneliness. While Bauman identifies more callous emotional tendencies, Giddens (1992), Taylor (1992) and Carroll (2001) show how love can be theorised as a complex emotional space of resistance to loneliness, a space where identity is forged in loving and caring relationships with others. How gender, age and other social constellations shape leave-making decisions and how fears of loneliness figure in these decision making processes must be addressed by future work.

Second, the chapter considered the new communicational bonds powered by digital and social media as both a source and antidote to contemporary experiences of loneliness. Theoretically, there are strong arguments that our increasingly digitally mediated lives are making us lonelier (Bauman 2012; Turkle 2013). Westerners have a surfeit of connections, but a shortage of relationships, as the digital provides the illusion of companionship with the commitment and the sacrifice. There are concerns that late modern relationships, increasingly mediated and digitised, are removing humans from necessary embodied and face-to-face relations. We suggest that while these theorists may explain aspects of contemporary loneliness in the digital age, we need to also be wary of technological determinism and pay attention to the technological tensions, possibilities and its interplay to provide a contextualised understanding of sociotechnical systems and loneliness. While there is strong empirical evidence that new technologies may help mediate and even mitigate loneliness, we need to nuance our claims to socio-technical contexts, platform affordances, frequency of use, type of loneliness and different types of gratification. Further research is needed, as we still lack knowledge on types of loneliness, differences between social isolation and loneliness (used interchangeably in some studies) and ways to overcome approaches based on digital dualism (offline versus online) in a world where the online and offline increasingly blur. Most literature departs from a psychological standpoint,
which means that sociology has a vital role in bridging micro, meso and macro perspectives in the study of loneliness and sociotechnical systems (Neves et al. 2017; Franklin et al. 2018).

Finally, we considered growing human–animal closeness as a window in which to examine changing social bonds. In this instance, we asked how the rise of companionship with animals and their changing social status since the 1990s is symptomatic of weakening social bonds and human loneliness. Our growing closeness with animals reflects how we have turned to animals for social affirmation and the amelioration of emotional loneliness. In this instance, our relationships with animals both highlight the human problem of loneliness, but are also sites in which people can enact agency and manage loneliness, especially those shown to be vulnerable, such as the elderly, the homeless, the mentally ill and men. Considering evidence that men experience loneliness in different ways to women and are less equipped to do something about it, further research is needed to determine how the loneliness assuaging effects of companion animals can be strengthened. There are also wider considerations about introducing policies and practices, such as allowing housing tenants and aged facilities to have access to companion animals, as part of global strategies to ameliorate the effects of loneliness, particularly in the context of ageing societies.

It is important to note that we have revealed some of the complexity of loneliness as an emotion in this chapter. However, as indicated in each of the spaces considered, there is a need for much more research on this topic. It is not enough to just separate the emotional from the social variant of loneliness, and analyse each as uncontested categories. There is an urgent need for in-depth qualitative investigation into the emotional experience of loneliness, and the many further means by which it is actively resisted and managed.

References


Baker, D 2012, All the lonely people. Institute Paper 9, The Australia Institute, Canberra.


Turkle, S 2011, *Alone together: why we expect more from technology and less from each other*, Basic Books, New York.

Twenge, J M 2017, *IGen: why today’s super-connected kids are growing up less rebellious, more tolerant, less happy – and completely unprepared for adulthood – and what that means for the rest of us*, Simon and Schuster, New York.


Part II

Individualised emotions as private responsibility
Emotions and criminal law
New perspectives on an enduring presence

Susanne Karstedt

Introduction
At the beginning of the 1990s, the secular movement and modern project of the rationalisation and de-emotionalisation of criminal justice (see Pratt 2000; 2002) came to a surprising end. A re-emotionalisation of law (de Haan & Loader 2002; Laster & O’Malley 1996) had become visible in several signal events and processes: the return of shame into criminal justice procedures, in particular through restorative justice (Braithwaite 1989; Rossner 2017); a stronger focus on victims and their emotional needs, as evidenced in victim impact statements in courts; and highly emotionalised public discourses on crime and justice (Karstedt 2002; 2011). The return of emotions was linked to three movements that changed criminal justice over the past decades: the victims’ movement, restorative justice and the emergence of a punitive climate in public and political discourse.

The re-emotionalisation of law is embedded in and part of an emotional turn in post-modern societies (Barbalet 2002), which Cas Wouters (2004, p. 204) described as an ‘emancipation of emotions’. Emotions that had been increasingly disciplined and controlled en route to modernity re-entered both individual consciousness and public discussion. Emotions became valuable assets in social exchange, and required recognition as expressions of individual identity. However, the emancipation of emotions gave rise to subtle and overt rules of feeling and the display of emotions (Hochschild 2003; Vandekerckhove et al. 2008), and pressures to adopt procedures of managing and regulating emotions mounted (Gross & Thompson 2007).

The conventional story of modern penal law portrays a narrowly delineated list of, and proper roles for, emotions in the legal realm (Bandes 1999; Maroney 2006). As Nussbaum (2004, p. 46) argues, emotions have entered into penal law under the disguise of ‘reasonable emotions’. They are acknowledged as far as they represent a reasonable evaluation and reaction, as in mitigating circumstances for crimes of passion (Wiener 2004). Judges and other legal professionals have to restrain their emotions in court in order not to impede unbiased and rational decision making (Bergmann Blix & Wettergren 2016; Maroney & Gross 2014; Roach Anleu & Mack 2005; 2013). Consequently, the intrusion
of emotions into the realm of criminal justice and its institutions was watched with considerable concern, as it seemingly turned the clock back towards those allegedly pre-modern forms of emotive punishment (Karstedt 2006; Pratt 2000).

Both narratives of re-emotionalisation and reason ignore the actual presence and role of emotions in crime, law and legal procedures (Douglas 1993). As Maroney (2006, p. 120) states, ‘the law always has taken account of emotion. [. . .] Criminal law [. . .] reflects fear, grief, and remorse’. Anthropologist Jared Diamond (2008, p. 18) writes that modern criminal justice ignores the ‘thirst for vengeance’ that is ‘among the strongest human emotions’. He points to a paradox in the return of emotions in late modern societies, as they ‘permit and encourage us to express our love, anger and grief, and fear, but not our thirst for vengeance’ (ibid.). Modern criminal justice alienates us from deep-rooted feelings and moral emotions, which in fact are the foundations of justice.

Diamond is in agreement with researchers from disciplines like evolutionary psychology and behavioural economics in stating that criminal justice emerged from evolved cognitive-emotional processes (Eisner et al. 2017). Emotions like vengeance and anger are driving moral intuitions on what behaviours should be punished and who should be punished. The institutions of criminal justice as they evolved in human history offer a space for the most intensely felt emotions – of individuals as well as collectives – while simultaneously providing mechanisms that are capable of cooling off emotions (Booth 2012; Karstedt 2002). The diversity among institutions of criminal justice throughout human history and across human societies testifies to humanity’s efforts to contain the emotions that inevitably flare up in spaces where victims, offenders and bystanders meet (Bohm 2012).

These foundations of law and justice in cognitive-emotional processes help to explain the enduring and strong presence of emotions in contemporary criminal justice (Maroney 2006). However, late modern criminal justice systems have to find new answers to the presence of emotions in police stations, courts and restorative justice circles. Criminal justice has to accommodate the demands of victims to tell their stories and express their emotions, and justice officials have to present themselves with empathy (Pemberton 2016). Balancing shame, blame and forgiveness has been identified as a major challenge not only for restorative justice (Braithwaite 2016), but also for criminal justice procedures more generally (Lacey & Picard 2016) as well as for transitional justice mechanisms (Jeffery 2008). Feeling rules and display rules (Hochschild 2003) represent a broader culture of emotions and society’s expressive values in courts. Victims express their emotions in victims’ statements, which are granted in cases involving violent crime, including capital punishment cases in the USA, in homicide cases in the UK and also increasingly in international criminal justice (Lens et al. 2013; 2015; Rose, Nadler & Clark 2006; Sarat 2001).

While giving space to the expression of emotions, late modern institutions of criminal justice are attacked for restraining emotions and discouraging their expression. What role is there for emotions in criminal justice settings and
procedures? What can reasonably be expected from a re-emotionalisation of law and justice; what might be the potential outcomes for victims? In order to get a deeper understanding of emotion dynamics in legal settings more generally, I turn to processes of emotion sharing (Rimé 2007; 2009). The social sharing of emotion is part of encompassing processes of emotion regulation in human beings, and a natural condition of social life. The field of emotion sharing situated in social psychology provides a theoretically rich and empirically promising framework for understanding universal emotional dynamics as they play out in contemporary late modern criminal justice institutions (Conway & Stannard 2016; Rimé 2007; 2009), and the framework of emotion sharing provides a tool for analysing the cognitive-emotional processes that unfold in various criminal justice settings. In the following sections I explore the ways in which the legal setting and procedures impact upon the processes of emotion sharing, and what this implies for individual victims, offenders and justice professionals.

I will draw on research from a variety of settings, including domestic courts and in particular victim statements, as well as transitional justice settings. Victim statements represent a specific process of sharing emotions in court settings. As they epitomise the tensions between the expression of emotions and the reason of justice, they have elicited considerable disquiet among criminal justice professionals (Erez & Laster 1999; Erez & Roeger 1995; Herlihy & Turner 2016; Kool & Moerings 2004; Pemberton 2016; Schuster & Propen 2011). Given the nature of the crimes adjudicated, transitional justice settings represent extremes of emotions and emotion sharing (Karstedt 2016a; 2016b). According to the 2004 Report of the United Nations Secretary to the Security Council (p. 2), transitional justice includes the full range of processes and mechanisms to ‘ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation’ after large-scale past abuses. These may comprise ‘prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof’ (UN Security Council 2004, p. 4); here I mainly use material from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and from gacaca courts dealing with the genocide in Rwanda; these community courts were more informal local procedures, which were remotely modelled on traditional justice mechanisms.

**Emotion sharing: universal dynamics in criminal justice settings**

**Emotion sharing: the framework**

The social sharing of emotion is part of the interdependent processes through which human beings experience and regulate emotions. As any emotion leaves long-lasting cognitive and social consequences, emotional experiences ‘open upon social interaction and emotion sharing’ (Rimé 2009, p. 60). The social sharing of emotion ‘occurs in discourse, when individuals communicate openly
with one or more persons about the circumstances of the emotion eliciting event and about their own feelings and emotional reactions’ (Rimé 2009, p. 65). Interpersonal contacts, social exchange and collective constructions about emotional experiences facilitate interdependent practices of emotion regulation; these include, for example, stimulating cognitive processing of emotional experiences, coping with emotions or strengthening of interpersonal relationships and social integration. Above all, processes of sharing emotions in networks and social circles ‘nourish the production of meaning pursued collectively in every culture’ (Rimé 2009, p. 62). The social sharing of emotions constitutes the interface between private, interactive and collective emotions, and the propagation of emotions ultimately contributes to the construction of emotional climates (for an overview, see Rimé 2007; von Scheve & Ismer 2013). In particular, this is the case when an emotional event strikes collectively, for example, the terror attack of 9/11 in New York, as sharing reactivates felt emotions among those affected (Rimé 2007)

Research on emotion sharing provides a rich empirical foundation for understanding universal processes of emotion sharing and offers potential applications in legal and criminal justice settings. People share emotions independent of age and gender, education, status and cultural practices, thus corroborating the universality of emotion sharing (Rimé 2009). Emotion sharing is initiated early after an experience; however, the need for sharing lasts as long as the memory of the emotion maintains its impact, when, for example, the memory is evoked as in a court room (Curci & Rimé 2012). Sharing affects the individual who experienced the emotion and those who are the recipients (targets) of the shared emotion. Individuals share all types of emotions, both positive and negative. Negative emotions are elicited by loss, threats and other negative experiences and include anger, fear, sadness, shame and guilt; remorse or anxiety are also in this category. Sadness, vengeance and anger are shared as much as happiness and joy; further, the experience of sharing even very negative emotions is not perceived as uncomfortable or painful by a majority of subjects and, consequently, traumatic emotional experiences are frequently shared, and victims also express a need to do so (Rimé 2009).

The social sharing of emotions leads on to emotional reactions among the listeners, the targets of sharing. Two types of reactions from listeners are observed. Socio-affective reactions are often non-verbal, and offer emotional support like comfort, consolation, empathy and bonding; they convey a sense of recognition and validation of the suffering and emotional experience. Emotion sharing initially favours socio-affective responses, and listeners respond with more socio-affective reactions the more intense the related episode and emotions are, in particular with non-verbal responses. ‘Cognitive responses’, in contrast, include a (re)-framing and (re)-appraisal of the episode, which ultimately should lead the narrator to a process of coping with the emotion and regaining control over the emotions and the situation (Rimé 2009, pp. 71–6).
The initial socio-affective responses to shared emotions have an immediate impact as they generate stronger bonds, convey a sense of belonging and can enhance a person’s social integration into groups and wider social circles. People feel spontaneously relieved after sharing their emotions, and generally benefit from sharing, as feelings of insecurity, loneliness and helplessness are alleviated (Zech & Rimé 2005). Sharing potentially reduces distress through both socio-affective and cognitive responses; it addresses immediate needs for comfort and consolation, validates negative emotions and enhances the adaptation to emotional experiences. Sharing protects individuals from the impact of emotions and can promote long-term recovery (Rimé 2009).

The application of universal characteristics of emotion sharing focuses on questions of critical importance for late modern criminal justice settings, be they courts or tribunals, restorative justice or mediating circles. First, in which ways do these settings restrain and limit the sharing of emotions, and thus thwart potentially positive outcomes of emotion sharing? Second, in which way does the process of emotion sharing evolve between victims, defendants and the wider community, audiences and the public? Presently, only a small knowledge base of empirical research exists, mostly for transitional justice settings (Kanyangara et al. 2007; Rimé et al. 2011; Stockwell 2014), but also for domestic courts (Lens et al. 2015). In addition, research on victim impact statements provides insights into processes of emotion sharing without explicitly using the framework.

The legal setting: restraining or enabling?

In principle, the framework of emotion sharing largely supports the role that is assigned to the presence of victims, their statements and their expressions of emotions. A systematic review of research on transitional justice settings (Karstedt 2016a) provides compelling insights into how victims or perpetrators perceive procedures in courts, tribunals or truth commissions as a space to share emotions, and actively engage in the process. Victims are motivated by the search for emotional support like meaning, recognition and validation. Lens and her colleagues’ (2015) report for a Dutch court on domestic violence cases suggests that those victims who are still traumatised and feel a high level of anger are more willing to deliver written victim impact statements to the court than those who are less affected by such emotions; they feel a continuous need to share their emotions. This is exactly what the universal emotions sharing framework would predict (Curci & Rimé 2012).

The mostly negative emotions shared in criminal courts (of all types) nonetheless instigate social interaction by story-telling and conversation, as suggested by the emotion sharing framework (Rimé 2009). Highly emotional representations of victims of serious crimes (in this case domestic violence) enhance their credibility and the sympathy for them, while those with a non-emotional presentation encounter the opposite reactions. Accordingly, if victims violate
susanne karstedt

expectations as to their emotions or if these are not deemed congruent with the crime experienced, they receive fewer responses expressing empathy or sympathy (Lens et al. 2014). In a similar vein, legal professionals react differently to emotions expressed by victims. Schuster and Propen (2011) found in a study of judicial reactions to victim impact statements that judges appreciate expressions of compassion and tolerate expressions of grief but are uncomfortable with expressions of anger, which they might interpret as an interference with the requirements of court procedures (also Lens et al. 2013).

The legal setting of a criminal trial is not by default inimical to the recognition and validation of victims’ suffering; to the contrary, it actually legitimises such suffering within an institutional and authoritative context. This might explain the general willingness of victims of crime to share their suffering in domestic courts (Lens et al. 2013), and the wish of victims to testify before international tribunals and truth commissions in transitional justice procedures (Karstedt 2016a). The initially high hopes and optimism of victims who look forward to sharing their stories in courts as well as in truth commissions reflect universal processes of emotion sharing, as do their reports of initial relief (Gobodo-Madikizela 2002, for the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission).

Legal settings also provide a more cognitive mode of response. Besides socio-affective responses, narrators expect cognitive responses that help them to re-frame and re-appraise the emotional event, in particular if it has been distressing. A comparison of socio-affective and cognitive modes of responses found that ‘sharing situations which prompt cognitive responses can produce the recovery effect’, while mere social sharing by the narrator and a predominantly socio-affective response by listeners fail to generate such an effect (Rimé 2009, p. 80). Victims of human rights abuses who participate in transitional justice procedures express a demand for (cognitive) understanding of the violent events, often in highly emotional language (Karstedt 2016a). Expectations are directed towards the legal setting to provide such responses of explanation and framing, which could hardly be obtained without the cachet and authority of legal and quasi-legal procedures. The legal setting and the language of justice create a unique environment that is capable of delivering the cognitive responses that victims strive for. Lens and her colleagues (2015) show that it is not the expression of emotions per se in victim statements, but the experience of procedural justice – that is, the extent to which victims have a voice and feel recognised – that facilitates the framing and validation of suffering, and reduces feelings of anger and anxiety.

However, the formal legal setting constrains socio-affective modes of responses. In all courts, including truth commissions, judges, chairs and other legal personnel are restricted with regard to the expression of emotions (Maroney & Gross 2014). Victims who testified in international courts and tribunals mostly felt that their initially high hopes had been thwarted, and sharing their emotions was not met with appropriate responses or fell on deaf ears (Human Rights Centre 2014; Stover 2004). Similarly, victims in cases of
domestic abuse felt that their expressions of emotions were often neglected or ‘normalised’ within legal discourse (Propen & Schuster 2011, p. 57). This might account for the overall disappointment that victims often express in transitional justice (see Karstedt 2016a). In some cases, reactions from judges, which might have been well-meant as a socio-affective response, failed to recognise the suffering (for the ICTY: Dembour & Haslam 2004).

Justice settings and mechanisms ostensibly differ with regard to the space and encouragement they give to emotion sharing. Restorative justice practices encourage emotion sharing, which might account for the higher emotional satisfaction of victims in such settings (Sherman & Strang 2011). Similarly, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission were exemplary in encouraging the sharing of emotions. This might account for victims’ reports of initial relief, and feelings of being recognised (Gobodo-Madikizela 2002). Likewise, the presence and involvement of a large group of victims, as at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, where perpetrators of the genocide stand trial, seem to provide an environment where emotion sharing is facilitated and socio-affective responses can flourish, particularly within the group of victims present at the trial (Stover et al. 2011). In contrast, the audiences in the local and more informal gacaca courts in Rwanda represented divided communities, with non-sympathetic members of the perpetrator group. Sharing of emotions became a negative emotional experience for victims, who were distressed, angered and scared by negative and stigmatising reactions from the audience, and the denial of recognition of their plight (Brounéus 2008). Rimé and his colleagues (2011) found that emotional wellbeing of victims was significantly reduced, notwithstanding gains in the overall collective emotional climate.

Disjunctions: emotion sharing between victims, perpetrators and audiences

The legal setting is a space where defendants and victims meet, though not always in person. Victims come with anger, sadness and memories of traumatic emotional experiences, while perpetrators feel anger, shame, guilt and remorse. All justice mechanisms give space to extremely negative emotions and distressing emotional experiences that are shared between members of antagonistic groups, and with legal professionals (Ellsworth & Dougherty 2016). What are the specific qualifications and limitations for sharing such emotions in courts and other legal fora? Three conditions inhibiting emotion sharing have been identified that are of importance in legal settings: extreme trauma; emotions of guilt and shame; and an unreceptive environment.

Traumatic emotions are frequently shared, and people who are most affected by an event share their emotion as often as those who are less affected. Yet, individuals will refrain from mentioning the most sensitive issues, thus leaving definite blanks in their narrative (Rimé 2009). Lens et al. (2013) find that victims generally participate in delivering victim impact statements if they still
suffer from the consequences of the crime. However, those with the most intensive symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are more reluctant about sharing all emotional aspects of their experience, and in particular do not want to share the most distressing ones; increased levels of PTSD-driven anxiety reduce the ability to confront the offender (Lens et al. 2013). Victims fear and experience negative consequences for their own wellbeing; this applies to domestic courts (Lens et al. 2013) as well as to transitional justice settings (Cilliers et al. 2016; Rimé et al. 2011).

When listeners are confronted with extreme trauma, atrocious events or severe illness, they tend to react with less empathy and even attempt to constrain the victim in the expression of emotions. Bystanders and non-victims severely underestimate the victim’s situation, react with anxiety and respond with simplistic interventions that cannot do justice to the complex consequences of the negative emotional experience (Rimé 2009). The response of the judge at the ICTY to a victim whose father presumably had been killed – ‘I hope your father will come back’ – illustrates this (Dembour & Haslam 2004, p. 160). Brounéus (2008) reports several cases of women who, after having given highly emotional testimony of their trauma in gacaca courts in Rwanda, were shunned by neighbours or other community members who had been present (see also Karstedt 2016a).

Perpetrators generally are restrained in sharing their emotions of shame, guilt or remorse. Both emotions are defined as ‘self-conscious emotions’ (Lewis 2010, p. 305) or ‘retractive emotions’, that is, emotions experienced when an individual tries to retreat from or reject a certain action and to dissociate it from the self (Proeve & Tudor 2010). Individuals tend not to share events that elicit feelings of shame and guilt, and in particular they keep those experiences secret that involve a greater responsibility for the event. Perpetrators generally should be inhibited to actually share these emotions and be very reticent in expressing them (Finkenauer & Rimé 1998).

These limitations of sharing both traumatic and self-conscious emotions seemingly account for the general and widespread disappointment among victims after experiencing courts or transitional justice mechanisms (overview: Karstedt 2016a). Victims interpret the invisibility of signs of shame or remorse as a lack of such emotions, even if perpetrators experience them. This might feed into the reported perceptions of leniency and impunity for the offender, which for victims corroborate the lack of validation and recognition of their traumatic experiences in domestic courts (Lens et al. 2015) and transitional justice (for the ICTY: Başoğlu et al. 2005)).

Victims demand that expressions of guilt, remorse and shame are authentic and represent true emotions. Victims of gross human rights violations in South Africa, whether they had participated in the TRC proceedings or not, and whether they had given public or closed testimony to a TRC investigator, were not willing to forgive when only guilt was admitted, or an apology made by the perpetrator. They requested to see signs of true sorrows from the perpetrator.
The gap between offenders, who will hardly fully share their emotions of guilt and shame, and traumatised victims, who are unable to share the full amount of their emotional distress, constitutes a built-in dilemma for late modern criminal justice fora (see also Braithwaite 2016).

The discrepancy between emotions expressed by victims and hidden by offenders might also affect legal professionals who are part of the procedures. In particular, the genuine and authentic expression of remorse poses severe problems to judges and others present (Bandes 2016, p. 17). When judges and jurors react to sharing emotions from both victims and offenders, their emotional responses will shape their ‘moral intuitions’ (Feigenson 2016, p. 29; Haidt 2007) and thus their ultimate judgments of responsibility and blame. However, legal decision making is as much amenable to the influence of deliberation, different assessments and legal reasoning as to emotions and moral intuitions, and ultimate sentencing protected against emotional bias (see Roach Anleu & Mack 2005; 2013). In particular, victim impact statements are ‘neutralised’ by professionals and selectively framed as reasonable (Erez & Laster 1999) and little effect on sentencing has been found (Erez & Roeger 1995). Booth (2012) shows from the delivery of victim impact statements that cooling-out processes effectively contained emotions in the courtroom, and assisted victims to adjust to the requirements of the legal setting.

**Conclusion: enhancing the emotional capacity of criminal justice**

Late modern criminal justice mechanisms have increased the space for emotions and expression of emotions. What comes to the fore (and fora) are the primordial emotions of anger and vengeance (see Sorial, this volume, Chapter 9), but also shame and remorse, and forgiveness, on which human justice and punishment is built. As late modern criminal justice relates back to the cognitive-emotional processes that have shaped institutions and procedures throughout human history, we need to enhance our understanding of emotion dynamics and develop new ways of regulating emotions that take into account universal processes of emotions in criminal justice.

Universal processes shape the ways in which emotions are shared and received, how different parties react and how emotions impact on outcomes, in social as well as in legal settings. In contrast to prevalent assumptions, it would be wrong to see the criminal justice model and its focus on reason and emotional restraint as inimical to the sharing of emotions in its diverse settings. Criminal justice has evolved from cognitive-emotional processes, and both are present when emotions are shared. The framework of emotion sharing lends support to the importance of the legal setting and its specific features, and more generally to what can be termed the emotional capacity of criminal justice institutions. Theory and research corroborate the presence and participation of victims and the encouragement of expressing emotions. The unique features

(Kaminer et al. 2001).
of the legal setting, such as testifying, giving evidence and examination of offenders, address victims’ cognitive needs for re-framing and re-appraisal of traumatic events. The rules of procedural justice and the authority of the law give recognition and validation to the victims’ suffering, as well as to the expression of emotions by the defendant, and simultaneously restrain moral intuitions of judges and jurors. The emotion sharing framework might help in identifying those criminal justice settings that have comparative advantages for sharing emotions, and developing moderating and mediating tools for criminal justice professionals that improve emotional experiences of victims and offenders. In this way we might move – as in the words of Lawrence Sherman (2003) – towards emotionally intelligent justice.

References


Diamond, J 2008, “‘Vengeance is ours’: What can tribal societies tell us about our need to get even?’, The New Yorker, 21 April, viewed on 15 February 2018, www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/04/21/vengeance-is-ours.


Human Rights Centre 2014, Bearing witness at the International Criminal Court, UC Berkeley School of Law, Berkeley, CA.


Proeve, M & Tudor, S 2010, Remorse: psychological and jurisprudential perspectives, Ashgate, Farnham.

Proven, A D & Schuster, M L 2011, Victim advocacy in the courtroom: persuasive practices in domestic violence and child protection cases, Northeastern University Press, Boston, MA.


Emotions and criminal law


Chapter 8

Undramatic emotions in learning
A sociological model

James P. Davis and Alberto Bellocchi

Introduction

In this chapter we describe a sociological model that illustrates the increasing complexity in our understandings of emotion, as it unfolds in late modernity (cf. Patulny & Olson, this volume, Chapter 1), which better illustrates the character of emotional experiences. The ontological foundation of our work connects with ideas that were present but often neglected throughout modernity. For example, our thinking resonates with Hume’s (1777/2007) notion of the mind as being composed of many particular perceptions (cf. Davis 2017). Our thinking also resonates with Durkheim’s (1915) neglected social epistemology (cf. Bellocchi 2017), identified through the analysis of non-euro-centric cultures beyond the classical-modern lineage of thought. Rawls (2004) describes Durkheim’s (1915) epistemology as being neglected by sociology scholars over the past century, and we argue that his re-vitalised epistemology now contributes to more complex understandings of emotion in late modernity. With this foundation, our focus on the complexity about understandings of emotion emphasises the interdependence of emotion and reasoning through micro-social experiences of our intertwined existence, as both biological and social beings (Davis 2016).

The experiences of emotion at the focus of our work may be described as forms of emotion that are often taken for granted. In the context of sociological studies of science education, such emotions were described previously as backgrounded emotions (Barbalet 2002) and background emotions (Damasio 1999), and are cited as examples of the complexity in understanding emotion as represented in late modernity. This complexity is evident in the way Barbalet (2002) and Damasio (1999) both use a similar term to describe different but inter-related phenomena. Barbalet’s (2002) notion of backgrounded emotions involves forms of self-regulation in a moral context, where the interplay between performed self-regulation and emotional experience of those performances are evident in social interaction. We interpret Barbalet’s (2011) notion of backgrounded emotion as being similar to what Collins (2004) describes as subdued and taken-for-granted undramatic emotional energy, which is the focus of this chapter. In contrast, Damasio (1999) describes background emotions as a fundamental neurophysiological sensation or feeling of being that is
always with us, but most often taken for granted. In psychology, such feelings are described as the physical basis of emotion by James (1894), and more recently as core affect (Russell & Barrett 1999; Yik, Russell & Steiger 2011). To avoid confusion in our modelling of emotional experiences, we refer to Damasio’s background emotions as feelings that are a constituent element of the emotional experiences that we describe as emotional energy (Collins 2004).

Emotional energy (EE) is an individual–collective experience of emotion as an outcome of successful social interaction, evident in the self-coordinating quality of the interaction, rather than the valence of experiences (i.e., positive or negative; see Bellocchi & Turner, this volume, Chapter 3). These emotional experiences are described as an energy because they bind society together, meaning that EE exists in the biology of the individual and in the interactions of groups, beyond individual bodies. For this reason, successful social interaction is evident in the subsequent re-grouping of participants; in the maintenance of continuity and fluency in collective practices; in symbolic representations that are collectively produced or reproduced from an earlier interaction; or in emotional experiences focused around shared symbols and/or the collective practices of others. Emotional energy becomes evident in an undramatic form, where there is a high degree of fluency within a social interaction (i.e., a successful interaction), but the participants tend not to be aware of the fluency of their experience; the experience just is. That is, members of the interaction take the experience for granted by treating it as part of their ordinary, everyday interaction without pausing to reflect on the nature of the interaction as it unfolds.

The terms dramatic and undramatic in relation to emotional energy refer to the character of bodily movements (internal and external) that form a constituent element of the experience of emotional energy. Although Collins (2004) identified undramatic emotional energy as central to micro-sociological understandings of social interaction, much of his work identified more dramatic examples of EE. For example, Collins (2004, p. 134) suggested participants could self-report their experience ‘on a continuum from enthusiasm, confidence, and initiative at the high end, down to passivity and depression at the low end’. This presumes emotional self-awareness that tends to enable dramatic EE to be reported, as distinct from taken-for-granted undramatic EE. It follows that Collins (2004) over-emphasised dramatic experiences that could be more easily subject to self-report. A possible explanation for this focus is the ease with which more dramatic emotions (e.g., angry outbursts, euphoric displays of pride) can be identified empirically. Collins went on to suggest a methodology, particularly ethnomethodology, for the empirical study of undramatic emotion energy (UEE), but did not elaborate how this may be achieved in practice. The present study extends the notion of UEE in learning contexts by proposing a model to describe taken-for-granted experiences. This model was originally developed via the empirical study of micro-social practices (i.e., ethnomethods) through which emotional energy is experienced.
The recognition of an ethnomethodological orientation is important in empirical studies of UEE because it enables us to explore taken-for-granted, emotional experiences within and across moments of interaction. Ethnomethodology is the study of micro-social practices (i.e., bodily gestures and speech gestures) as a way of understanding how ideas and symbols are constructed to become a social reality in localised occasions of experience (Garfinkel 1967). In this present, theoretical study, we highlight a key assumption within ethnomethodology because it makes possible an understanding of feelings as a constituent part of emotional experiences. Through Garfinkel’s (1967) work, our present study foregrounds Schütz’s (1972) sociological phenomenology, which becomes important when later interpreting experiences of feelings as a constituent of emotion. Essentially, our methodological orientation is important for making internal feelings visible within our analysis of UEE in social interaction. We foreground the particularities of social interaction being experienced that we may understand by describing and analysing evidence of bodily movements (i.e., physiological and gestural), ideas and feelings (cf. Dewey 1894). The aim of this chapter is to explain the character of these three intertwined elements of emotional experience by synthesising the ideas of Collins (2004), Dewey (1894; 1895), Durkheim (1915), Garfinkel (1967) and Schütz (1972).

Next, we discuss the conceptualisation of EE, and the notions of dramatic and undramatic emotional energy developed by Collins. We identify the affordances and constraints of Collins’s approach to UEE. Then we present our novel conceptualisation, which clarifies terminology and explicates the dynamic dramatic-undramatic qualities of emotional experiences across a collective-idiosyncratic continuum. We then draw on examples from learning contexts to briefly illustrate the empirical approach we have used in the development of our model.

**Conceptualisation of emotional energy**

The present study arises from our experiences of researching social interaction where we have come to appreciate the heterogeneous quality of EE as conceptualised by Collins (2004). The heterogeneity of EE is evident in the way Collins (2004, p. 105) defines EE in order to ‘widen our conception of emotion’. Through both formalised descriptions and examples, Collins (2004) defines EE as an experience that may be associated with *dramatic* emotion, about which participants may be aware and capable of making self-reports, using labels such as anger, fear or joy. In contrast, he also describes the possibility for experiencing ‘emotions that are undramatic’ (Collins 2004, p. 106) where participants may not conceive of their experience as being emotive (cf. Davis & Bellocchi 2018). Unravelling the distinction between dramatic and undramatic emotions within a conceptualisation of EE is the focus of our present chapter, because of its possible relevance to understanding emotions and reasoning in learning situations.
Emotional energy, both dramatic and undramatic, may be described as a durable experience originating through smoothly flowing, successful social interaction. It involves a physiological, rhythmic entrainment where participants may experience a feeling of being ‘caught up in the swing of things’ (Collins 2004, p. 108). High, or intense, EE may be associated with ‘a feeling of confidence or enthusiasm for social interaction’ (Collins 2004, p. 108). Despite using language such as enthusiasm to illustrate EE, Collins (2004) explicitly describes the experience as being mostly neutral in terms of valence. On the use of valence and other descriptive labels in relation to EE, Collins (2004) makes a distinction between transient discrete emotions and experiences of EE by describing discrete emotions as the possible ingredients of social interaction. These may be evident contemporaneously with EE, but they are not viewed as essential to EE. On this basis, Collins conceptualises EE as having a neutral valence, as a durable tone that underlies the possible co-existence of other emotions that are positive, negative or attributable with a particular, discrete label. We adopt a more explicit approach than Collins by treating the valence attributed to emotion in a similar way to his treatment of discrete emotions. That is, we set them aside as possibly co-existing with EE, but not essential to EE (cf. Bellocchi & Turner, this volume, Chapter 3).

We acknowledge the possibility for emotional energy to co-exist with discrete emotions, which may contribute to the visibility of EE in what we describe as dramatic situations. But making a distinction between discrete emotion and EE is complicated by Collins’s terminological and descriptive methods. Unravelling Collins’s description of EE is challenging because he does not use ethnomethodological examples to illustrate UEE. The problem is further exacerbated with the use of dramatic examples such as a hockey match or a terrorist attack to illustrate the intensity of EE (Collins 2004). By using these types of examples, it is possible that readers of Collins’s work may associate intensity with dramatic situations only. As we clarify later with our model, bodily movements are only one indicator of emotional intensity.

Because of the over-emphasis on pronounced bodily actions, we focus now on explicating undramatic emotional energy, which is the less developed part of Collins’s (2004) conceptualisation. To explain the undramatic possibility of EE, Collins refers to Goffman (1967) and Garfinkel’s (1967) studies where emotion tends to be evident as the smooth, disjuncture-free (i.e., flowing without disruption) experience of ethnomethods (i.e., social practices). Such forms of emotional experience are not captured by the idea of discrete emotion that is typically labelled in everyday situations. Instead, UEE is marked by a sense of the ordinary, unremarkable experience of successful social interaction. Collins (2004, p. 106) accounts for this by using Garfinkel’s (1967) description of such experiences as a sense that ‘nothing out of the ordinary is happening here’. On the basis of this description, EE may be conceptualised as the embodied experience of ethnomethods that we identify as micro-social practices in the form of subtle physical gestures and speech gestures. This may explain why UEE may present
as ‘uninteresting’ (Collins 2004, p. 106) to people who experience it. Like the embodied ethnomethods that carry the experience, UEE tends to be taken for granted. For this reason, the methods we use in any study of EE must enable the recognition of both dramatic and undramatic occasions of emotional experience.

Collins (2004) operationalised the enduring tone of emotional energy (dramatic and undramatic), recognising it as a mutual focus on objects or ideas. The experience of EE may be described as a sense of social cohesion or solidarity. This is explained as the rhythmic entrainment of embodied micro-social practices that extend contemporaneously from the collective experience, through and into the individual biological experience. This socio-biological experience of cohesion characterises the outcome of successful interaction. Collins (2004) explains that identifying EE involves observation of coordinated bodily movements such as facial actions or hand gestures as well as speech gestures in terms of what is said, and how things are said (i.e., prosodic features of speech). These forms of observable actions are identified as evidence of EE as the self-organising directedness of social interaction over time. In this sense, EE may be observed as a collective attunement throughout social interaction that may also be evident after the initial interaction where it arises. During an interaction, EE is evident as the reflexive experience of being engrossed in performing the interaction, rather than pausing and overtly reflecting on it. Social practices unfold smoothly until a disruption to this flow occurs and the situation needs to be repaired. At such points the work of members to sustain interaction becomes evident to an observer. Collins (2004) suggested EE may also direct the attunement of individuals, as evident through their self-directedness, high levels of concentration and a smooth flow of thoughts during occasions of asynchronous interaction.

Throughout his description of EE, Collins (2004) uses the term high level or low level to differentiate the intensity of emotional experiences, which is distinct from the notion of valence. As an experience of social cohesion, Collins (2004, p. 106) specifically described EE as having a neutral quality in terms of emotional valence, and he cited ‘Garfinkelian mundanity’ as a primary example. He described this neutrality as ‘a generic emotional quality at the middle of the plus-minus scale’ (ibid.) of emotional experience. This conceptualisation of EE with a neutral valence was then described as having high and low levels of intensity. Collins’s (2004) description of EE then becomes contradictory in the way he uses categories such as enthusiasm and depression (which are not neutral) to describe different levels of intensity in EE. To illustrate the high–low continuum of intensity in solidarity (EE), Collins (2004) described the high in terms of confidence and enthusiasm (p. 109) towards social situations, and the low in terms of a depressed tone (p. 106) towards social situations. To contradict the perception that high–low intensity is associated with positive–negative valence, Collins (2004, p. 108) explicitly used the example of a funeral, where participants may typically experience sadness as a dramatic transient emotion with a negative valence. However, the social cohesion typically experienced at a funeral, contemporaneous with sadness, may be indicative of highly intense EE.
Collins (2004) made an effort to describe a case of high-intensity EE with a neutral quality in terms of valence, even in a situation where the contemporaneously experienced discrete emotions may involve a negative valence. However, this example was often overlooked in subsequent research, leading to confusion and contradiction about intensity in EE that we aim to address in the definition of our model in this chapter. In essence, the way to think about the intensity of EE is in relation to the fluency and social cohesion of interaction. High levels of EE may be evident during moments of strong social cohesion, and low levels of EE may be evident where social interaction involves disjunction with an absence of interactional repair, indicative of disunity or dis-fluency. It is important to note that during low-intensity EE, it is possible for high-intensity discrete emotions to co-exist, due to the biological-social interplay.

**A graphical model of emotional energy**

In this section we specify the dimensions and variables of EE in the form of a graphical model that is explored throughout this chapter in relation to different experiences of EE in learning contexts. The graphical model represents three dimensions of EE in the form of feelings, ideas and bodily movements (cf. Dewey 1894; 1895). Although we describe these as dimensions, they are inseparable as parts of the empirically observable phenomenon of social interaction. These contemporaneous, interdependent dimensions are each represented along an axis that makes a visual representation of intensity in emotional energy. To define different levels of emotional intensity across these dimensions, we

![Figure 8.1 A graphical model of emotional energy](image)
identify variables that may be recognisable in situations of social interaction. These variables are described in relation to each dimension of the graphical representation as shown in Figure 8.1.

**Feelings**

Feelings may be described as the affective, internal sensation of the emotion that can only ever be directly validated as an individual’s reflective perspective of experiencing EE, in cases where they are made aware of the experience. Indirectly, feelings may be validated via the analysis of social interaction. Within our model of EE, feelings are typically unlabelled experiences that relate to a sense of social cohesion or confidence to perform actions within a localised situation. Through these situations, internal feelings become social as they form the basis for the ‘We-relationship’ described by Schütz (1972, p. 163). In the context of social interaction, the We-relationship is a taken-for-granted sense that other people within contemporaneous moments of the interaction experience events in a similar way to the self. This does not mean that one person understands what is going on in the other person’s mind. It is that people tend to make a presumption that in sharing a situation, the sense of reality from the perspective of the self is similar to the sense of reality experienced by others. The basis of this internal experience is a physiological sensation (Damasio 1999) defined as feelings in our model of EE. It is through subsequent social interaction that such presumptions about each other’s feelings are either confirmed or disconfirmed.

Confirmation or disconfirmation of feelings becomes empirically evident from the observer’s perspective, through the fluency or dis-fluency of social interaction. As feelings are acted upon through the performance of gesture (physical and speech), the degree to which feelings are idiosyncratic or collective becomes evident through the fluency and continuity of the interaction. If the interaction is fluent and continues to maintain and build fluency, we may interpret the feelings of individuals within the interaction as being collective because of their ongoing successful confirmation. In contrast, situations involving some disjuncture, ongoing disjuncture or a total breakdown in the interaction may be interpreted as idiosyncratic feelings being experienced by individuals. The intensity of feelings is therefore measured in Figure 8.1 on an idiosyncratic-collective continuum. This is an important feature of the model, because it is not necessary to specify feelings with labels in order to determine their collective status. It is sufficient to study the fluency of the social interaction as an indicator of the feelings about, and within, the We-relationship.

This method for identifying the collectivity of feelings is important because feelings are commonly unlabelled and taken for granted, even from an observer’s perspective. Garfinkel (1967) and his students made this taken-for-granted quality visible in everyday situations, using demonstrations to purposely breach the presumption of a shared reality (the We-relationship), thereby challenging fluency of internal feelings about a situation that were held by others. In highly dramatic
situations, the sense of the *We-relationship* may become obvious to participants to the extent that they could label their feelings and share these labels with each other or with an interested observer. Collins (2004, p. 58) illustrates these experiences with a group of fans at a hockey match who provide their ‘own resonance for building up shared excitement’. Such ritualistic experiences of high-intensity dramatic EE involve participant awareness in the *We-relationship*, and it is this awareness that leads to an expectation for future experiences to draw spectators back to future hockey matches. This capacity to label some feelings transforms them from being simply internal feelings to being externalised (i.e., expressed) emotions with valence or discrete labels. For this reason, we acknowledge in our model in Figure 8.1 that feelings could remain neutral and taken for granted or they could be described with valence or other labels, but these descriptions are not essential to the intensity or collectivity of the *We-relationship* experience.

**Ideas**

Ideas form one of the dimensions of EE because emotions are always about something (Dewey 1894; 1895). Although that *something* may be a physical object, it is the idea or ideas we experience about the physical object that are integral to the emotional experience (Durkheim 1915). The contribution that ideas make to the intensity of EE is indicated by the degree to which ideas may be considered collective. We therefore identify ideas along the dimension as being of low intensity when they are idiosyncratic, and of high intensity when they are strongly upheld by a group. The idiosyncratic-collectivity continuum for determining the intensity of entrainment around ideas contributes to a degree of co-relatedness between ideas and feelings.

Along this dimension, ideas may also be vague or formal, which relates to the strength of the symbols and structures in place that are associated with ideas. In the context of science education, formal ideas may be recognised as scientific concepts collectively accepted by the scientific community. In particular situations where a scientific concept is agreed upon, it may be treated as a collective, formal idea. In a different situation where a scientific concept is proposed by a participant but rejected by others, we may recognise this as an idiosyncratic, formal idea. Vague ideas are also possible in science education contexts, especially in situations such as authentic science inquiry where participants may be exploring an unfamiliar phenomenon.

**Bodily movements**

Bodily movements comprise all of the motions and sounds of the body that become available for the self, and others, to interpret during social interaction. We include facial actions and bodily gestures, as well as less-visible physiological movements, in bodily movements. We also include speech gestures, which include both the content and prosodic features of speech. The intensity of EE attributed to bodily
movements is defined in Figure 8.1 along a continuum from idiosyncratic to collective bodily movements. Along this dimension, bodily movements may also be dramatic or undramatic. Dramatic bodily movements (whether collective or idiosyncratic) are typically associated with verbal utterances that may involve physical measures of sound energy such as high volume, pitch and power-in-the-air (Roth & Tobin 2010) or large physical gestures that draw group members together around a shared focus. Undramatic bodily movements typically involve slowness, stillness, silence, eye contact without verbal utterances, people being quietly spoken or coordinated acts of self-prohibition (Davis & Bellocchi 2018). What constitutes dramatic and undramatic bodily movements is an area requiring further research in the context of emotional energy, particularly in relation to facial expressions (Collins 2004). Furthermore, the relationship between bodily movements and intensity of EE is more complex and nuanced than the situations portrayed in previous studies (Ritchie et al. 2011; Tobin 2006). For this reason, our model recognises that both idiosyncratic (disfluent) and collective (fluent) bodily movements may vary in their dramatic or undramatic character. Given that the focus of our model is in the social cohesion that brings about a shared sense of reality, collective bodily movements are considered higher in intensity than idiosyncratic movements. This is because idiosyncratic movements set the individual’s actions apart from the coordinated activities of the group. This complexity becomes evident as we discuss some empirical data later in this chapter.

**Intensity of emotional energy**

As discussed above, each of the three contemporaneous, intertwined and dependent dimensions of EE contribute to the level of intensity, both directly and via the indirect co-relatedness of these dimensions. This will become more evident as we describe permutations of the model, using descriptions of social interaction. In the graphical model shown in Figure 8.1, if we locate a point on each dimension it is then possible to join these points to form a triangulated surface that defines the intensity of EE across a short series of moments in time. An example of this triangulated surface is shown in Figure 8.2 below, as part of our data analyses. We will call this triangulated surface an *intensity sail* because of its shape, and tendency to move, via enlargement and/or contraction over the duration of an interaction. We use the intensity sail to represent the intensity of emotional energy, because it captures the simultaneous interplay between the constituent elements of the emotional experience.

**Separating notions of intensity, drama and valence**

As discussed earlier, some interpretations of intensity and valence in Collins’s (2004) description of EE may lead to confusion between these two qualities of EE. Similarly, the emphasis by Collins (2004) on dramatic examples of EE may lead to a similar view that intensity arises from the dramatic bodily movements
Undramatic emotions in learning

Figure 8.2 The intensity sail

of EE alone, while excluding the possibility of intense experiences of undramatic emotion. The strength of our model is the inclusion of both dramatic and undramatic EE, represented through the constituent elements of the experience, which give rise to a measure of intensity in a three-dimensional representation. This representation of the experience captures the contemporaneous quality of all three constituent elements and their contribution to intensity. To illustrate the benefits of this model in understanding the different forms of EE, we focus below on two permutations of this model that address the tendency to conflate EE intensity with dramatic bodily movements and valence. The permutations we focus on are high-intensity UEE and low-intensity, dramatic EE. Due to the length limitations of this chapter, we use secondary, empirical data from science education contexts to briefly illustrate these examples.

High-intensity, undramatic emotional energy

In this section we provide evidence of a case where high-intensity feeling and ideas remain evident while bodily movements are interpreted as both high-intensity (collective) and undramatic. As shown in Figure 8.3, below, the intensity sail remains large, indicating highly intense emotional energy despite the undramatic quality of bodily movements.

This example of high-intensity undramatic emotional energy was originally described in a study of emotional climate, which is emotional energy interpreted at a class-wide level of analysis (Bellocchi et al. 2013). This case involves a pre-service
teacher, by the pseudonym of Charles, doing a class presentation. Bellocchi et al. (2013, pp. 539–40) used electronic devices to record class self-ratings of EE, and these measures were compared with researcher observation of micro-social interaction. Immediately preceding Charles, another student had presented in a style that involved yelling and joking, with a power-in-the-air measure of 0.4 micro-watts per square metre (µW/m²). Power-in-the-air is a measure of the physical power of sound energy generated by the verbal utterances of speakers in a particular situation. In contrast to the other student, Charles presented in a soft voice with a power-in-the-air measure of 0.2µW/m². The researchers observed that despite this low power-intensity measure, the EE was intense because of ‘the melodic nature of his voice, his hand gestures, use of humour, and eye contact he made with the audience’ (Bellocchi et al. 2013, p. 540). Supporting this view, the researchers also noted the self-report of EE experienced by the class was at one of the highest levels for the day when Charles was presenting.

In the study of Charles, the researchers were not looking for undramatic emotional energy, and for this reason they note, as an anomaly, the intense fluency of the interaction as contrasting with the low power intensity of Charles’s utterances. This contrast was notable because in previous studies power intensity in verbal utterances had been associated with the intensity of EE (Roth & Tobin 2010). We have returned to the study by Bellocchi et al. (2013) because we now recognise the experience by Charles as an example of high-intensity but undramatic EE because of the collective quality of his movements in coordinating group attentiveness and shared focus.
Our analysis of this situation as high-intensity undramatic EE is based on the low power intensity of Charles’s utterances, his use of eye contact and a melodic rhythm in his voice. These elements placed his bodily movements at the collective end of the bodily movement dimension with an undramatic quality. This was evident in the way that audience participation – through coordinated smiles and physical entrainment – contributed to the fluency of the interaction throughout his presentation, indicative of collective entrainment (e.g., intense focus, sustained attention). In addition to this corporeal undramatic intensity, collective feelings and collectivity around the ideas that Charles was presenting were inferred. With reference to Figure 8.3, we described the interaction involving Charles in terms of a large intensity sail drawn between undramatic bodily movements that maintain the intensity of EE, with the fluency of bodily movements contributing to high collectivity in feelings and ideas, which increases intensity. Thus, it is possible to describe an experience as high-intensity, undramatic emotional energy.

Low-intensity, dramatic emotional energy

Experiences of EE that may be characterised as low intensity but dramatic may unfold where there is limited evidence of collective ideas, but much dramatic conversation and bodily movements. As shown in Figure 8.4, below, low-intensity, dramatic EE may be represented as an idiosyncratic rating on bodily

Figure 8.4 Low-intensity, dramatic emotional energy
movements and low-intensity ratings on the ideas and feelings dimensions, providing an intensity sail that is very small. This is a complex permutation because dramatic bodily movements typically contribute to emotional intensity, but the dis-fluency of the movements co-relates with idiosyncratic feelings and ideas, thus reducing the overall intensity of EE. It may be possible that the idiosyncratic dramatic bodily movements in this type of situation could be explained as being concurrent with some form of intense discrete emotion such as anger or anxiety. In such cases the discrete emotion may act as an ingredient to the situation, with the possibility that it counteracts against the intensity of EE at the social level because of its impact on cohesion and fluency, thus reducing the overall intensity of the EE.

Our example of low-intensity, dramatic EE draws from situations of classroom conflict that are described by Roth and Tobin (2010). In these situations, the bodily movements of group members may shift to the extreme idiosyncratic end of the dimension, with a dramatic quality, because of speech gestures being louder, faster and at a higher pitch. Roth and Tobin (2010) observed these conditions by measuring voice pitch, amplitude and power-in-the-air during science classroom interactions. As indicators of dramatic bodily movements these actions would typically contribute to the intensity of EE. However, in situations of conflict, dramatic bodily movements typically lack fluency, which impacts on the collectivity of movements. The lack of fluency in dramatic bodily movements co-relates with the feelings and ideas dimensions that both rely on fluency as evidence of the degree of collectivity across these dimensions. In situations of conflict, the lack of fluency in dramatic bodily movements may involve gestures that re-direct the interaction away from the other person’s ideological stance. This may be anticipated because in situations of conflict, ideas and feelings within the group tend to be the source of conflict and are therefore typically not shared (cf. Garfinkel 1967). For these reasons, throughout moments of conflict, we may typically observe dramatic, dis-fluent bodily movements along with idiosyncratic ideas, where both of these dimensions (body and ideas) are co-related with idiosyncratic feelings.

Implications and future research

This study outlines the theoretical dimensions of emotional energy as part of a collection of empirical studies in science education contexts. This theoretical explication of our model illustrates our understanding about how experiences of EE are intertwined with reasoning, cognition and learning in late modernity. These connections have been indicated for centuries (cf. Durkheim 1915; Hume 2007), but not explored in fine-grained detail until very recently. By studying the complexities of particular experiences, we are able to see how experiences of emotional energy are focused around ideas, enabling us to acknowledge these experiences as being essential to cognition and learning. This chapter contributes to understanding emotions in late modernity as we extend Collins’s (2004) ideas
of undramatic and dramatic EE by operationalising these ideas in an empirically grounded micro-social model. This has been achieved by exploring the connection between the works of Collins (2004) and Garfinkel (1967), enabling us to operationalise the concept of internal feelings evident, and measurable in an ordinal sense, as the fluency of social interaction. This we have explained in terms of the fluency of a We-relationship that is evident in the work of Schütz (1972) and applied in ethnomethodology by Garfinkel (1967). Importantly, this model also provides a visualisation of the constituent elements of EE and the contribution these elements make to understanding the intensity of EE experiences.

Throughout this study we have focused on the particularities of experience consistent with the empiricist ontology of Hume (2007) and social epistemology of Durkheim (1915). The tension between the individual and the social are ever-present as we seek to unravel empirically observable phenomena (individuals and society) that are intertwined and inseparable. As we are positioned on the precipice of late modernity, our approach to understanding emotions promises to contribute to a comprehensive micro-sociological theorisation of emotion and cognition in educational contexts (cf. Bellocchi 2017).

**Acknowledgements**

The Australian Research Council Discovery Early Career Grant (DE160101053) awarded to Alberto Bellocchi partly supported this work. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Australian Research Council.

**Note**

1 Clearly within the scientific community there are multiple concepts signalling also a lack of central consensus. Here we refer to the long traditions of generally accepted theories and laws that are accepted widely until such a time as when they are replaced by more sophisticated alternatives.

**References**


Roth, W M & Tobin, K 2010, ‘Solidarity and conflict: aligned and misaligned prosody as a transactional resource in intra- and intercultural communication involving power differences’, *Cultural Studies of Science Education*, vol. 5, pp. 807–47.


Introduction

The defence of provocation is a partial defence to murder. If successful, it reduces a potential murder conviction to one of manslaughter. At the heart of the defence is the idea of loss of self-control. Defendants often describe the experience of losing self-control as one where they snap or crack in response to the provocation and explode into violence. They also claim that they came to their senses, to find themselves with a gun or a knife in their hand and the victim dead before them. The triggers for this loss of control are emotions like anger, but more recently the law has also recognised fear as a legitimate trigger for loss of self-control (UK Justice & Coroners Act 2009). These descriptions of the experience of anger and its effects on reason draw on and perpetuate classical understandings of the emotions as irrational and uncontrollable, and these ideas have had some surprising traction in the common law.

The provocation defence historically has been used by men who kill their wives or partners for reasons of separation or alleged infidelity, and to a lesser extent (and less successfully) by women who kill their abusive partners (Fitz-Gibbon 2012). In 2010, the UK Government abolished the partial defence of provocation and replaced it with a new partial defence of loss of self-control. The new defence is designed to better cater for the circumstances that cause abused women to kill and to exclude defendants who kill for reasons of sexual infidelity (UK Justice and Coroners Act 2009). Yet the concept of loss of self-control is retained and the law also still allows for anger as a trigger for losing it. Moreover, the first case to be tried under the new legislation – R v Clinton – appealed to and affirmed classical ideas of anger and self-control to explain why the defendant killed his wife.

Despite the evolving conceptions of the emotions in disciplines such as philosophy, psychology and sociology, the common law has strangely adhered to a very classical idea of the emotions, including the emotion of anger. Ideas about the emotions that emerge in the modern era demonstrate the ways in which emotions are socially constituted and expressed, and the ways in which individuals are responsible for managing and controlling their emotions.
In late modernity, there has been emerging evidence about the complexity of the emotions and their relationship and centrality to reasoning processes, challenging the idea that emotions are unstable and unruly forces that undermine reasoning (Damasio 1994). However, these new understandings of the emotions have had a mixed response in common law. While legislators have attempted to incorporate these new insights into legislation, their uptake in the courts has been mixed, with many judges continuing to adopt and apply classical views of emotions like anger in how they interpret the new loss-of-self-control defence.

Drawing on recent research in philosophy, social psychology and the sociology of emotions, this chapter argues that the common law continues to operate with an outdated and erroneous view of the emotions. Some key features to emerge from this research are: anger, like other emotions, is not an irrational response, but often emerges in response to some rational judgement; while we might not be able to control feeling emotions, we do have significant control in how we express our emotions, including whether we express them in violent ways; emotions are highly trainable; the ways they are trained are deeply gendered. Until these insights are incorporated in legal judgements, the laudable intentions motivating law reform in this area may not get the relevant uptake.

The law of provocation/loss of self-control

The defence of provocation is a common law creation. It emerged during the seventeenth century as a concession to human frailty at a time when the sentence for a murder conviction was capital punishment.¹ The defence has three elements: the act of provocation, the subjective element and the objective element. King CJ described the elements as such:

To amount to provocation the acts or words must satisfy the following tests: (1) they must be done or said by the deceased to or in the presence of the killer; (2) they must have caused in the killer a sudden and temporary loss of self-control rendering the killer so subject to passion as to make him for the moment not the master of his mind; (3) they must be of such a character as might cause an ordinary person to lose his self-control to such an extent as to act as the killer has acted.

(R v The Queen 1981, pp. 321–2)

Historically, the common law has accepted the understanding of anger as an emotion that unseats reason, causing people (mostly men) to lose their self-control and kill. In a series of pre-reform cases in the UK, male defendants appealed to classical descriptions of the experience of anger as undermining their reason and self-control. The cases of R v Suratan², R v Humes, and R v Wilkinson all involved intimate partner killings, and were heard together on
appeal for lenient sentences. The Court of Appeal upheld the sentences and accepted the defendant’s descriptions of their experience of anger and the effects it had on their actions.3

Leslie Humes was an overworked solicitor, who was unable to accept his wife’s decision to leave him. He claimed his wife had big-style feelings for another man, and disclosed that she was planning to sleep with him. Humes attacked her with a bread knife in front of their three children. In police interviews, Humes said that in the days before the attack, he had convinced himself that his marriage had failed because he was a bad father and husband, only to discover that his wife had someone else. He could not explain exactly how he felt but ‘he had lost it totally. It’s like they say you can see a red mist. I was bellowing like a bull’ (at 57–8).

Mark Paul Wilkinson found it difficult to accept his partner Nicole’s decision to leave and to take their children with her. He claims that during a conversation she said: ‘I’ve got the kids. You have only got photographs of them’. He told the jury that he ‘just boiled over, red haze, gripped hold of her, adrenaline really going, heart pounding’. He killed Nicole by asphyxiation, while telling her to ‘shut up’ and ‘do me a favour and die’ (at 69). The trial judge believed that the offender had intended to kill his partner, but that it was not pre-planned; instead, it was a ‘violent, emotional reaction to the situation in which the offender eventually found himself’ (at 73).

In response to public outrage about lenient sentences for intimate partner killings (Wilkinson was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment, Humes to seven years, and Suratan to three-and-a-half years), the UK Government undertook significant reforms to the defence, abolishing the defence of provocation and replacing it with the new partial defence of loss of self-control. This new defence was designed to better cater for the circumstances that cause abused women to kill and to exclude defendants who kill for reasons of separation or sexual infidelity.

The new provisions differ significantly from the common law interpretation of the defence in three important ways: first, they remove the suddenness requirement; second, they expressly exclude disclosures of sexual infidelity as legitimate triggers; and third, they redefine the objective standard as based on tolerance and restraint rather than the reasonable person. These changes not only mark a significant departure from the previous law, but also attempt to incorporate late modern understandings of the emotions, in particular questioning the circumstances under which people experience anger, whether it causes them to lose self-control and in what ways.

For example, abolishing the suddenness requirement acknowledges the different and gendered ways in which men and women lose control and kill. Men have claimed that they killed in response to feelings of anger, which caused them to snap and act in the heat of the moment. Women, by contrast, kill their partners under different circumstances, typically in response to being subjected to years of violence and abuse, and kill out of
fear when their partner is sleeping or otherwise not threatening (Edwards 2011). Abolishing the suddenness requirement and including fear as a qualifying trigger recognises that loss of self-control can occur in response to emotions like fear, and that self-control can be eroded over a long period of time, not just in the moment.

Replacing the reasonable person with tolerance and self-restraint will exclude those with an unusually short fuse or who are prone to anger (Taylor 2011, p. 54). This clause will also exclude those who are bigoted or prejudiced against others from minority or vulnerable groups in society, or those who are unacceptably intolerant in other ways, such as those who are excessively jealous or possessive, or who hold unacceptable attitudes, such as those that justify ‘honour killings’ (Taylor 2011, p. 54).

While these reforms will and have made it difficult for defendants who kill for reasons of separation or alleged infidelity to plead provocation, the reforms still retain the concept of loss of self-control, and the subjective and objective elements, albeit in modified forms. Moreover, the first case to be tried under the UK provisions – R v Clinton – did allow (on appeal) for evidence of sexual infidelity to explain what caused the defendant to kill his wife, demonstrating that classical understandings of what the emotions are and how they undermine self-control continue to have traction in the ways the new laws are interpreted.

In R v Clinton, the defendant, Clinton, obtained access to his wife’s Facebook page and saw photographs of his wife and her new lover posing together. There he also found messages containing sexual innuendos. He confronted her about these comments and images, and her responses were used as evidence of triggering events. Clinton claimed that his wife said a number of hurtful things and became very spiteful towards him, that she taunted him about his threat to commit suicide, and that she began to recount in graphic detail her sexual encounters with up to five other men. He described how he felt as follows:

> With that the walls and ceiling just seemed to close in. She was talking but he could not hear what she was saying. He could see her mouth opening and closing. He could hear a noise, like the distant sea. He wanted everything to stop. He wanted everything to slow down. He then reached out and grabbed the piece of wood. The attack on her followed. (at 75)

At trial, Judge Smith did not find evidence that loss of self-control was the result of one of the qualifying triggers identified in the statute. Because she was to disregard specifically anything said or done that constituted sexual infidelity, she did not consider the comments made by the defendant’s wife as evidence.

On appeal, the court acknowledged that sexual infidelity on its own cannot qualify as a trigger, but raised the question of whether sexual infidelity is also excluded when it arises in the context of another or a number of other features of a case which can constitute qualifying triggers (at 21). The court held that
the ‘idea that [. . .] the context in which such words are used should be ignored represents an artificiality which the administration of criminal justice should do without’ (at 23).

It concluded:

The starting point is that it has been recognised for centuries that sexual infidelity may produce a loss of control in men, and, more recently in women as well as men who are confronted with sexual infidelity. The exclusion created by section 55(6) cannot and does not eradicate the fact that on occasions sexual infidelity and loss of control are linked, often with the one followed immediately by the other.

(at 36)

Clinton reproduces classical understandings of anger and its relation to loss of control, stymieing government attempts to change the law by legislative means. For these reasons, it is worth considering the place of anger in law in late modernity, whether it really does cause people to lose it in the ways described and whether it should function as an excuse in the ways that it does.

Emotions and late modernity: anger and self-control

The philosophical literature

The philosophical study of the emotions was largely neglected until Robert Solomon’s ground-breaking book The Passions was published in 1976. Solomon argued against William James’s famous definition of emotion as the feeling of physiological changes provoked by the perception of an exciting event (Solomon 1973, p. 1). One of the consequences of this view, Solomon argues, is that it becomes a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’; the more we think our emotions are things that happen to us, and which are entirely beyond our control, the more we come to think of ourselves as victims, lacking in responsibility for how we behave when we are experiencing an emotion (Solomon 1973, p. 126).

Instead, Solomon argues that not only are we responsible for our emotions and our emotional choices, but that emotions are also cognitive in nature. By this, he means that they are more than feelings, sensations or physiological reactions; they are also judgements (Solomon 1973, p. 126). Emotions, for Solomon, are intentional states of mind which disclose the subject’s personal world and all that matters in it. They emerge because an agent judges the world and things in it to be characterised in a certain way and to have certain meanings.4

The main features to emerge from the philosophical discussion in the last 20 years are that, first, emotions are intentional in the sense that they are about something. Second, emotions typically have a felt dimension, but this is not a
necessary condition to having an emotion. Third, that emotions are socialised in specific (and gendered/cultural) ways. While there is still some disagreement about the moral aspects of the emotions, there is broad consensus that we are, to varying degrees, responsible for our emotions. In the following sections, I elaborate on these three features of the emotions with specific reference to the emotion of anger, and then draw out some of the implications of this research for the defence of loss of self-control.

Anger typically arises in response to a judgement that a person or someone close to them has been wronged. These judgements are also bound up with an agent’s beliefs in complex ways (Nussbaum 2001, p. 28). In anger, the person must believe that some damage has been done to her or someone close to her, that the damage was significant, and that it was done intentionally (Ibid.). Of course, we can be mistaken about our belief, and the corresponding judgement, or we may be wrong about the source of our emotions. I may be angry because of a mistaken belief that I have been wronged, but subsequently discover that it was simply an accident on the part of the other person. In these cases, I would need to abandon my anger. I might also discover, on reflection, that the source of the anger was lack of sleep, and this impaired my judgement. Again, I would have to correct my emotion accordingly.

The fact that our emotions are amenable to a degree of correction and regulation on reflection and new evidence suggests that emotions are not simply forces that take us by surprise and over which we have no control. As Solomon argues: ‘if emotions are judgments and can be “defused” (and also instigated) by considerations of other judgments, it is clear how our emotions are in a sense our doing, and how we are responsible for them’ (Solomon 1973, p. 10). Normative judgements can be changed through influence, argument, persuasion and evidence, and so can our emotions. ‘I can be convinced that my anger is baseless and abandon it, but I can also make myself angry by focusing on how I have been wronged, or by dwelling on minor behaviour, building it up into a pattern of deceit and abuse’ (Solomon 1973, p. 10). Emotions can thus be abandoned, corrected or indulged.

Emotions often do involve feelings or have a physiological aspect. However, they need not. For example, one can feel angry in the sense that she feels her blood is boiling, or that she is shaking with anger. But a person can also have an emotion like anger without feeling angry. As Nussbaum notes, many women feel continuous anger at the domestic injustice that is part of their day-to-day existence, but the anger will only surface under certain conditions (Nussbaum 2001, p. 70). This suggests that there is a difference between feeling an emotion, having an emotion and expressing an emotion. A person may feel (in the physiological sense) angry, but she can also be angry without any discernible feelings. She may express that anger in different ways; she might calmly explain why she is angry to rectify the wrongdoing (for example, she may explain to her husband that she is angry because of inequitable childcare arrangements), or she might shout, kick the door or engage in other acts of violence.
While it is the case that a person may have little control over feeling certain emotions, they do have significant control over how those emotions are expressed. In this respect, emotions can take us by surprise or seem to disrupt our lives. This is because emotions are, to quote Solomon, ‘urgent judgments’, or emergency responses to difficult situations, but they are nevertheless rational.

Emotions are rational responses to unusual situations. They differ from ‘cool’ judgments and normal, rational, deliberate action in that they are promoted in urgency and in contexts in which one’s usual repertoire of actions and considered judgments will not suffice. An emotion is a necessary hasty judgment in response to a difficult situation.

(Solomon 1973, p. 13)

Feelings of anger and their expression thus typically arise in response to some perceived wrongdoing or injustice committed against an agent, although they need not. For example, irascible agents may often feel angry at trivial things that have nothing or little to do with any genuine wrongdoing. Others may feel angry in response to an erroneous judgement that they have been wronged. For these reasons, it is important to distinguish between moral anger and what I will call dispositional anger.

Moral anger arises in response to legitimate instances of injustice or wrongdoing, while dispositional anger arises because the agent has not trained his or her emotional responses in the right kinds of ways. In the case of dispositional anger, the agent may be quick to anger over minor things, or because she has made an incorrect judgement about the demands of morality in any given situation. A person can also indulge her anger, working herself into a state by focusing on perceived slights or offence. Moral anger, on the other hand, is supported or underwritten by a normative moral framework, which determines whether the anger is justified in any given context, whereas dispositional anger is not.

To summarise the core features of anger to emerge from the philosophical discussion: anger is an emotion that arises in response to injustice or perceived injustice. In this respect, it is a judgement based on a belief. There is a difference between moral anger, which arises in response to legitimate injustice, and dispositional anger, which arises because an agent habitually misjudges situations, feeling anger even though it may not be rational to do so. There is also a difference between feeling anger and expressing that anger in various ways.

**The empirical evidence**

These features of anger have been affirmed by recent research in social psychology. The empirical evidence supports the theory that anger is intimately connected to injustice. Anger has been found to be associated with a sense or perception that the self (or someone close to the self) has been wronged, offended or injured in some way. The feeling of anger is also associated with
a sense of certainty or confidence about what has happened and the belief that another person (not a random situation or the self) was responsible for the injury (Lerner & Tiedens 2006, p. 117). By contrast, negative events that are caused by forces outside an agent’s control tend to evoke feelings of sadness rather than anger, and negative events caused by the self tend to evoke feelings of guilt or shame. When people feel uncertain or lack confidence about the cause of negative events, they are more likely to feel fear and anxiety rather than anger (Lerner & Tiedens 2006, p. 117).

This research also affirms the view that emotions are not reflexive events; they are not things that simply happen to us. They arise for rational reasons, and we have control over how we express and train them. William Lyons, for example, argues that if an emotional state makes acting on that state more likely, and a person deliberately abandons herself to that state, she may also be abandoning what control she has over that state.

When angry, for example, one might feel like indulging in physical violence, which usually turns out to be morally reprehensible. Now if one fosters anger, savouring the outraged feelings and aggressive impulses, knowing that one normally acts on them quite implosively, one can be said to be deliberately loosening one’s aggressive impulses.

(Lyons 1980, p. 205)

Whatever the origins of extreme emotions, psychologists tend to agree that emotions always involve an element of choice. As Reilly writes:

Since there is always an element of choice, there may never be a loss of self-control. If a person’s reaction in an extreme emotional state is chosen, the element of excuse may disappear altogether. With no loss of self-control, there is only a state of violence which is at all times connected in a complicated way to a series of choices: a choice not to get angry; a choice whether or not to translate the anger into aggression [. . .].

(Reilly 1997, p. 320)

Lundy Bancroft, a therapist specialising in counselling abusive men, affirms this view that an agent has a choice in how he expresses his emotions. Bancroft asks his clients who claim loss of control why they did not do something worse to their victim. The most frequent response he receives is ‘Jesus, I wouldn’t do that. I would never do something like that to her’ (Bancroft 2002, pp. 34–5, emphasis original). He claims that in his clinical experience, clients always give him a reason; they do not say ‘I do not know’ or ‘I can’t recall’. He concludes that an ‘abuser almost never does anything that he himself considers morally unacceptable’ (Bancroft 2002, pp. 34–5). Despite claiming to have lost control, abusers still exercise judgement, in some cases, believing it to be a (mistaken) moral judgement that they have been wronged.
This view of emotions and choice was also evident in the 2004 Law Commission interviews with psychiatrists, many of whom claimed that those who strike out and lose control in anger can usually afford to do so, claiming that: ‘an angry strong man is much less likely to “lose self-control” and attack another person in circumstances in which he or she is likely to come off worse by doing so’ (Law Commission 2004, 3.28). This suggests that even when agents lose it, they are still able to make rational assessments of a situation, including assessments about their chances of success in committing acts of violence and whether there will be adverse consequences for them.

The fact that we also have some choice in how we express our emotions suggests that we also know what we are doing when in the grip of strong emotions. Emotions are thus amenable to a high degree of regulation. While individuals are largely responsible for how this regulation occurs, they do not regulate their emotions independently of cultural norms associated with the expression and management of emotions.

**Socialisation of emotions**

Cultures create norms to regulate emotions and motivate appropriate behaviour. Norms are guidelines for expected behaviours, thinking and feeling. They identify a range of permissible behaviour that enables groups to function effectively. As Hwang and Matsumoto explain:

Cultures encourage adherence to norms and create sanctions against infractions, which aids individuals and groups in negotiating the complexity of human social life. By regulating emotions via norms, cultures ensure that behaviours follow culturally proscribed scripts, increasing socially appropriate behaviour and thus facilitating social coordination and decreasing social chaos.

(Hwang & Matsumoto 2016, p. 149)

These cultural display rules are learnt early in life. They function to regulate expressive behaviour depending on the social context. For example, they assist us in determining and managing the appropriate emotional displays in social situations where there is a need to manage particular emotions. It is these rules that dictate the inappropriateness of crying through a meeting or a lecture, displaying elation or joy at a funeral or expressing anger by throwing objects at colleagues and so on.

These display rules are also deeply gendered. They regulate the emotional expression of men and women in very different ways. For example, while men and women experience anger with the same frequency, there are significant differences in how that anger is expressed. These differences are attributable to how men and women learn and internalise cultural display rules. For example, women and girls are more likely to express their emotions verbally, while men and boys tend to use physical and aggressive means (Parmley & Cunningham 2014).
Boys are more likely to report expressing their anger by hitting, kicking and other forms of physical aggression, while girls reported ‘sulking and pouting’ (Parmley & Cunningham 2014, p. 324). Women and girls also report crying in response to anger more than boys and men (ibid.).

These results are also apparent in young children, confirming the suggestion that cultural display rules are learnt early in life. The evidence also suggests that as boys get older, they tend to mask their feelings of sadness, while girls conceal their expressions of anger (ibid.). Cultural display rules thus regulate the expression of anger in different ways for men and women; they tacitly allow men’s expression of anger in violent or aggressive ways, and require women to conceal or suppress their feelings of anger. These rules are enforced through rewards and punishments of various kinds.

This evidence suggests that anger is a complex emotion, one that is deeply gendered, often in problematic ways, but nevertheless amenable to a high degree of regulation. It also suggests that the legal understanding of anger as both a trigger for aggressive behaviour and an out-of-control emotion is a very masculine understanding of anger and aggression. Anger does not undermine reason in the ways we think and it is expressed in many different ways, not exclusively through violence. The law’s recognition and privileging of this particular way of losing control (i.e., because of anger) is both limited and simplistic. It is limited because alternative experiences (such as those of women) about loss of control remain ‘submerged and silenced’ (Edwards 2011, p. 88).

As Edwards argues:

[the battered woman’s] state of mind and manifestation of behaviour at the time of the killing are not a loss of self-control in the traditionally masculinist sense at all. Nor is she in the period before the killing in a state of anger. She is in a state of fearful contemplation.

(Edwards 2011, p. 88)

Even though significant law reform has meant that this defence is now open to women, and that the law seems to recognise the different circumstances in which women kill, it still nevertheless expects women to conform to this way of losing control. According to Edwards:

Even within the new law the cumulative and chronic state of mind of the battered woman will still need to be established as a loss of control shaped in anger’s template [. . . ] it is this inherent contradiction within the fear defence which threatens and undermines its very purpose and potential.

(Edwards 2011, p. 89)

The legal understanding of anger is also simplistic. There are many ways in which anger is expressed, and how it is expressed will often depend on who the agent is, the circumstances in which they find themselves and the cultural display
rules the agent has internalised. Men and boys have a greater tendency to express their anger in violent ways, while women tend to either suppress their anger or express it by either crying, pouting or being unhappy, despite the fact that both men and women experience the feeling of anger with the same frequency. While new legislative provisions do recognise the significance of cultural display rules, and the ways in which men and women are socialised into different emotional regimes, the common law understanding of anger still perceives of anger as an out-of-control emotion. It may well be that some men experience anger in this way; however, this could be attributable to the cultural (and legal) concessions made to male expressions of anger. If men are out of control when angry, perhaps this is because they know they may get away with behaving as they do.

**Conclusion**

The simple, classical and dualistic understanding of emotions like anger in legal contexts has several troubling legal consequences: first, it has prevented the law from appreciating the complexity of emotions considering new evidence from philosophy, social psychology and sociology, and the ways the expression of emotion is gendered. Second, the common law understanding of anger has blocked government attempts to reform the law of provocation by legislative means. Courtroom practices have continued to use classical understandings of anger to interpret new law. Third, adopting this gendered view of anger as linked to violence may prevent women who kill from fear from utilising the new defence, as they may need to demonstrate they lost it in ways men traditionally have.

In this chapter, I have defended a late modern view of the emotions (Patulny & Olson, this volume, Chapter 1). I argue that they are complex, they do not undermine reason, that they are amenable to a high degree of control and that agents have a responsibility – both legal and moral – to control their emotions in non-violent ways. This chapter has not advocated for the abolition of the defence of provocation, or for the new defence of loss of self-control; however, this late modernity view of the emotions does put pressure on law reformers to either abolish or reform such defences. Given what we know about the emotions, it is perhaps a mischaracterisation to suggest that a defendant ‘lost self-control’ in acting as he or she did, and perhaps more accurate to focus on their reasons for acting in the face of emotions, and whether such actions could be justifiable or explainable given the circumstances.

**Notes**

1 While this remains the case in some US jurisdictions, it is no longer the case in the UK, Australia and New Zealand, strengthening the case for the abolition or substantial reform in these jurisdictions.

2 While Humes and Wilkinson succeeded with a defence of provocation, Suratan was convicted of involuntary manslaughter on the basis that there was insufficient evidence of the mens rea for murder.
While I only refer to two cases in this chapter as representative, the ways in which defendants describe their experience of anger and subsequent loss of self-control is consistent across common law jurisdictions. See also cases including *R v Ramage* [2004] VSC 508; *R v Singh* [2012] NSWSC 637, 7 June 2012; *R v Butay* [2001] VSC 417.

See also Hochschild’s work in sociology on ‘emotion work’ and ‘feeling rules’ to explain these ways in which we manage and control our emotions in ways consistent with cultural norms and expectations.


### References

#### Cases

*R v Clinton* [2012] EWCA Crim 2 (Court of Appeal).


*R v Singh* [2012] NSWSC 637, 7 June 2012.


#### Texts


Chapter 10

Achievement emotions
A control-value theory perspective

Reinhard Pekrun

Introduction

Achievement emotions are ubiquitous in educational settings. Students frequently experience emotions such as enjoyment, hope for success, pride about accomplishments, anger, frustration, anxiety, shame, or boredom at school. These emotions can be very intense, and today we know that they can exert profound effects on learning, performance, and well-being (Pekrun et al. 2002; Quinlan 2016). Nevertheless, they have received little attention from researchers until recently.

Throughout modern time, schooling and students’ learning have primarily been seen as rational pursuits. Policy-makers, teachers, and researchers alike defined the goals of academic learning in terms of acquiring declarative knowledge about the contents of curricula and procedural knowledge of how to read, write, and calculate. The process of reaching these goals was also conceptualised in cognitive terms. Theories of learning focused on conceptualising the cognitive foundations of formal learning and human memory. Even behaviourist theories, despite their neglect of psychological processes, conceived the learning student as a rationally acting individual, although rationality was framed in terms of behaviour following the laws of conditioning (see Altman & Linton 1971).

As such, cognitive research dominated inquiry on academic learning throughout the twentieth century. The situation changed slowly when researchers and practitioners began recognising that achievement-related anxiety before and during tests and exams had become a major problem at school and university. There were a few early attempts to conceptualise exam anxiety, based on traditions in psychoanalysis and personality theory (see Brown 1938; Stengel 1936), but the notion of test anxiety gained popularity when it was couched in neo-behaviourist and cognitive terms that matched the Zeitgeist during the 1950s and 1960s (see Mandler & Sarason 1952). With these concepts and the newly developed questionnaire measures of test anxiety (see Test Anxiety Questionnaire, TAQ; Mandler & Sarason 1952), the anxiety construct gained popularity in the decades to follow.
For quite a long time, anxiety remained the only emotion construct that received educational researchers’ attention (for an exception, see B. Weiner’s [1985] attributional approach to various achievement emotions). During the past 20 years, however, there has been growing recognition that emotions are more complex and manifold (Patulny & Olson, this volume, Chapter 1), and that both negative and positive emotions are central to human achievement strivings. Emotions are no longer regarded as epiphenomena that may occur in achievement settings but lack any instrumental relevance. Instead, in this nascent research, it is recognised that various emotions are critically important for performance and the productivity of individuals, organisations, and cultures (Ashkanasy & Humphrey 2011; Pekrun & Linnenbrink-Garcia 2014).

In this chapter, I consider such emotions, with a specific focus on emotions in education. To begin, I define emotion and achievement emotions. I then review research on the origins and functions of achievement emotions, using Pekrun’s (2006; Pekrun & Perry 2014) control-value theory (CVT) of achievement emotions as a conceptual framework. In conclusion, I address regulation and modification of achievement emotions and their relative universality across genders, achievement settings, and social-cultural and historical contexts.

**Emotion and achievement emotions**

*Emotions* are multifaceted phenomena involving affective, cognitive, physiological, motivational, and expressive components (Scherer 2009). For example, a student’s anxiety before an exam can be comprised of nervous, uneasy feelings (affective); worries about failing the exam (cognitive); increased cardiovascular activation (physiological); impulses to escape the situation (motivation); and anxious facial expression (expressive). *Achievement emotions* are emotions that are tied to achievement activities (e.g., studying) or achievement outcomes (success and failure; Table 10.1). Most emotions arising from studying, working, or participating in sports are seen as achievement emotions, since they relate to activities and outcomes that are typically judged according to competence-based standards of quality. However, not all of the emotions experienced in achievement settings are designated the label *achievement emotions*. For example, social emotions are frequently experienced in these same settings. Achievement and social emotions can overlap, as in emotions directed towards the achievement of others (e.g., admiration, empathy, contempt, or envy).

Past research focused on emotions induced by achievement outcomes, such as hope and pride related to success, or anxiety and shame related to failure (Weiner 1985; Zeidner 2014). Although outcome emotions are of critical importance for achievement strivings, emotions directly pertaining to the activities performed in achievement settings are of equal relevance. The excitement arising from the commencement of a new project, boredom experienced when performing monotonous routine tasks, or anger felt when task demands seem unreasonable are examples of activity-related emotions.
Recent studies have broadened the scope of research to include this important class of emotions (see, e.g., Tze, Daniels & Klassen 2016).

In the three-dimensional taxonomy of achievement emotions that is part of the CVT (Table 10.1), the differentiation of outcome versus activity emotions pertains to the object focus of these emotions. In addition, as with emotions more generally, achievement emotions can be grouped according to their valence and to the degree of activation implied. In terms of valence, positive (i.e., pleasant) emotions can be distinguished from negative (i.e., unpleasant) emotions, such as enjoyment versus anxiety. In terms of activation, physiologically activating emotions can be distinguished from deactivating emotions, such as excitement versus relaxation.

Exploratory research has documented that the emotions organised in this taxonomy are experienced frequently in achievement settings. For example, in a series of interview studies with high school and university students, we found that anxiety was the emotion reported most often across various academic situations (e.g., attending class, studying, and taking tests and exams; Pekrun et al. 2002). Despite the prevalence of anxiety, however, the vast majority of emotions pertained to emotion categories other than anxiety, with episodes of enjoyment, satisfaction, hope, pride, relief, anger, boredom, and shame also reported frequently.

### Origins of achievement emotions

Emotions can be caused and modulated by numerous individual factors, including situational perceptions, cognitive appraisals, neuro-hormonal processes, and sensory feedback from expressive behaviour. Among these variables, cognitive appraisals of situational demands, personal competences, the probability of success and failure, and the value of these outcomes likely play a major role in the arousal of achievement emotions. In contrast to
Achievement emotions

emotions induced in phylogenetically older and more constrained situations (e.g., enjoyment of physiological need fulfilment; fear of falling; Campos, Bertenthal & Kermoian 1992), achievement emotions pertain to culturally defined demands in settings that are a recent product of civilisation. In these settings, people have to learn how to adapt to situational demands while preserving individual autonomy – inevitably a process guided by appraisals. Thus, researchers have focused on appraisals as the proximal determinants of achievement emotions.

Appraisals as proximal individual antecedents

Appraisals concerning a lack of control over performance and the threat of failure have been addressed as causing achievement-related anxiety. The findings from various studies confirm that students’ control beliefs, self-concept of ability, and self-efficacy expectations negatively correlate with their test anxiety (Pekrun et al. 2011; Zeidner 1998; 2014). In addition, the subjective importance of failure predicts achievement anxiety (Pekrun & Perry 2014). In attributional theories explaining emotions following success and failure, perceived control plays a central role as well. In Weiner’s (1985) approach, attributions of success and failure to various causes are held to be primary determinants of these emotions. For example, attributions of success to internal causes (i.e., causes located within the person, such as ability and effort) are thought to arouse pride. Shame is seen to be instigated by failure attributed to internal causes that are uncontrollable (like lack of ability), and gratitude and anger by attributions of success and failure, respectively, to external causes controlled by others.

While test anxiety theories and attributional theories have addressed outcome emotions, they have neglected activity-related achievement emotions. The CVT has revised and expanded core propositions of test anxiety and attributional theories to explain a wider variety of achievement emotions (Pekrun 2006; Pekrun & Perry 2014). The theory posits that achievement emotions are induced when the individual feels in control of, or out of control of, activities and outcomes that are subjectively important. Thus, appraisals of control and value are thought to generate these emotions. Control appraisals pertain to the perceived controllability of achievement-related actions and outcomes, as implied by causal expectations (self-efficacy expectations and outcome expectancies), causal attributions of achievement, and competence appraisals (e.g., self-concepts of ability). Value appraisals relate to the subjective importance of these activities and outcomes. These appraisals can pertain to characteristics of achievement activities themselves (intrinsic values) or to their instrument value for obtaining outcomes (extrinsic values).

Different control and value appraisals are thought to prompt different achievement emotions (Table 10.1). Prospective joy and hopelessness are expected to be triggered when there is high perceived control (joy) or a complete lack of perceived control (hopelessness). For example, a student who believes she has
Reinhard Pekrun

prepared well for an exam (high control) may feel joyous about the prospect of receiving a good grade. Conversely, a student who believes he is incapable of mastering the exam (lack of control) may experience hopelessness. Prospective hope and anxiety are triggered when there is uncertainty about control, the atten-
tional focus being on anticipated success in the case of hope, and on anticipated failure in the case of anxiety. A student who is unsure about being able to master an important exam may hope for success, fear failure, or both (Pekrun 1992).

Retrospective joy and sadness are considered control-independent emotions that immediately follow perceived success and failure, further cognitive elaboration being unnecessary (also see Weiner 1985). In contrast, disappointment and relief depend on the perceived match between expectations and the actual outcome. Disappointment is aroused when anticipated success does not occur, and relief when anticipated failure does not occur. Finally, causal attributions of success and failure to oneself or others induce pride, shame, gratitude, and anger, respectively. For example, a sports student who wins an important race will feel pride, provided that he attributes the victory to his own ability or effort.

Furthermore, the theory proposes that these outcome emotions also depend on the subjective importance of achievement outcomes, implying that they are a joint function of perceived control and value. For instance, a student should feel worried if she judges herself incapable of mastering the learning material (low controllability) in an important course (high value). In contrast, if she feels that she is able to learn the material (high controllability), or is indifferent about the course (low value), her anxiety should be low.

Regarding activity emotions (Table 10.1), enjoyment of achievement activi-
ties is proposed to depend on a combination of positive competence appraisals and positive appraisals of the intrinsic value of the action (e.g., studying) and its reference object (e.g., learning material). For example, a student is expected to enjoy learning if he feels competent to meet the demands of the task and values the learning material. When the intrinsic value of the action is negative (e.g., when working on a difficult project is perceived as taking too much effort), anger and frustration are expected to be aroused. Boredom is predicted when the activity lacks any intrinsic incentive value.

Empirical studies confirm that perceived control over achievement relates positively to students’ enjoyment, hope, and pride, and negatively to their anger, anxiety, shame, hopelessness, and boredom (Pekrun & Perry 2014). Furthermore, research has shown that the perceived value of achievement relates positively to both positive and negative achievement emotions except boredom, indicating that the importance of success and failure amplifies these emotions. For boredom, negative links with value have been found, corroborating that boredom is reduced when individuals value achievement (Pekrun et al. 2010). Recent studies have also confirmed that control and value interact in the arousal of achievement emotions. Positive emotions are especially pronounced when both control and value are high, and negative emotions are pronounced when value is high but control is lacking (Goetz et al. 2010; Lauerman, Eccles & Pekrun 2017).
Distal individual antecedents: the role of achievement goals

The CVT implies that more distal individual antecedents, such as gender or achievement-related beliefs, should affect emotions by first influencing appraisals (Figure 10.1; Pekrun 2006). A case in point is the influence of achievement goals, which are of prime importance for human achievement strivings. These goals may be focused on personal mastery, in which one judges one’s performance against one’s own prior performance or some
absolute standard (mastery goals). Alternatively, one might compare one’s performance to others (performance goals). Within those goals, one may focus either on approaching success or on avoiding failure, yielding four types of goals (mastery-approach, mastery-avoidance, performance-approach, performance-avoidance; Elliot & McGregor 2001; also see Elliot, Murayama & Pekrun 2011).

In a theoretical model linking goals to emotions, Pekrun et al. (2006, 2009) explained that mastery-approach goals focus attention on the ongoing mastery and positive value of the activity. By implication, they should foster positive activity emotions such as enjoyment of learning and reduce negative activity emotions such as boredom. In contrast, performance-approach goals focus attention on the perceived controllability and positive value of success outcomes, implying that they facilitate positive outcome emotions such as hope and pride. Performance-avoidance goals focus attention on the perceived uncontrollability and negative value of failure, suggesting they evoke negative outcome emotions such as anxiety, shame, and hopelessness. In empirical studies, the relation between performance-avoidance goals and test anxiety has been best documented, but there also are clear relations for mastery-approach goals and activity emotions (positive for enjoyment, negative for boredom), and for performance goals and pride, shame, and hopelessness (Huang 2011; Pekrun et al. 2006; 2009).

The influence of tasks and social environments

The impact of task design and social contexts has been explored in research on test anxiety (Zeidner 1998, 2014). Lack of structure and clarity in classroom instruction and exams, as well as excessively high task demands, increase students’ test anxiety. These effects are likely mediated by students’ expectancies of failure and perceptions of low control (Pekrun 1992). The format of tasks also matters. Open-ended formats (e.g., essay questions) seem to induce more anxiety than multiple-choice formats. In contrast, giving individuals the choice between tasks, relaxing time constraints, and giving second chances in terms of retaking tests reduces anxiety, presumably because perceived control is enhanced under these conditions (Zeidner 1998; 2014).

Regarding social environments, high achievement expectancies from important others, negative feedback after performance, and negative consequences of poor performance (e.g., public humiliation) correlate positively with students’ test anxiety (Pekrun 1992; Zeidner 1998). Also, individual competition in classrooms is positively related to students’ anxiety, presumably because competition reduces expectancies for success and increases the importance of avoiding failure (Zeidner 1998). From the perspective of the CVT, the following factors may be generally relevant to the development of achievement emotions (Figure 10.1).
Achievement emotions

(1) **Cognitive quality.** The cognitive quality of tasks as defined by their structure, clarity, and potential for cognitive stimulation likely has a positive influence on perceived control and the perceived value of tasks, thus positively influencing achievement emotions. In addition, the relative difficulty of tasks can also influence perceived control, and the match between task demands and competences can influence perceived task value. If demands are too high or too low, the incentive value of tasks may be reduced to the extent that boredom is experienced (Csikszentmihalyi 1975; Pekrun et al. 2010).

(2) **Motivational quality.** Teachers, parents, and peers deliver messages conveying achievement values in two important ways. First, if tasks are shaped such that they meet individual needs, positive activity emotions should be fostered. For example, classroom environments that support cooperation should help students fulfil their needs for social relatedness, thus making classes more enjoyable. Second, teachers’ own enthusiasm in dealing with tasks can facilitate students’ adoption of achievement values and related emotions (Frenzel et al. 2009; 2017).

(3) **Autonomy support.** Tasks and environments supporting autonomy can increase perceived control and, by meeting needs for autonomy, the value of related achievement activities (Tsai et al. 2008). These beneficial effects likely also depend on the match between individual competences and need for academic autonomy, on the one hand, and the affordances of the environment, on the other. If there is a mismatch, loss of control and negative emotions could result.

(4) **Goal structures and social expectations.** Different standards for defining achievement can imply individualistic (mastery), competitive (normative performance), or cooperative goal structures (Johnson & Johnson 1974). These goal structures influence individual achievement goals and the emotions mediated by these goals. Furthermore, they determine relative opportunities for experiencing success and perceiving control. More specifically, competitive structures imply that there are winners and losers, so that some people necessarily have to experience failure and the associated emotions such as anxiety and hopelessness. Similarly, the demands implied by an important other’s unrealistic expectancies for achievement can lead to negative emotions resulting from reduced subjective control.

(5) **Composition of student groups.** Chances for performing well compared to one’s classmates are reduced in a high-achieving class, thus students’ perceived competence and control also tends to be reduced. Because perceptions of control prompt achievement emotions, being in a high-achieving class can reduce students’ positive emotions (e.g., enjoyment) and exacerbate their negative emotions (Pekrun et al. in press). Counter to a popular belief, the negative compositional effect of class-average achievement on emotional well-being is not reliably compensated by beneficial effects
on learning. When controlling for measurement error, the effects of class-average achievement on individual achievement can be negative as well (Dicke et al. 2018).

(6) Feedback and consequences of achievement. Success can strengthen perceived control, and cumulative failure undermines control. In environments involving frequent assessments, performance feedback is central to the arousal of achievement emotions. In addition, the consequences of success and failure are important, since they affect the instrumental value of achievement. Positive outcome emotions (e.g., hope for success) can be increased if success produces beneficial outcomes (e.g., future career opportunities), given sufficient contingency between one’s own efforts, success, and these outcomes. Negative consequences of failure (e.g., unemployment), on the other hand, may increase achievement-related anxiety and hopelessness (Pekrun 1992).

Functions of emotions for learning and achievement

Experimental research has shown that emotions affect a wide range of cognitive processes that are relevant for learning, including attention, memory storage, and cognitive problem solving (Clore & Huntsinger 2009). It has been shown that both positive and negative emotions consume cognitive resources by focusing attention on the object of emotion (Ellis & Ashbrook 1988). Consumption of cognitive resources for task-irrelevant purposes implies that fewer resources are available for task completion (Meinhardt & Pekrun 2003). Furthermore, mood can enhance mood-congruent memory recall, with positive mood facilitating retrieval of positive self-related information, and negative mood facilitating the retrieval of negative information (e.g., Olafson & Ferraro 2001). Finally, mood and emotions influence cognitive problem solving, with positive mood promoting flexible and creative ways of solving problems, and negative mood more focused, detail-oriented, and analytical thinking (Clore & Huntsinger 2009).

This experimental research has largely been conducted in laboratory settings. It is open to question whether laboratory findings are generalisable to the more intense emotions experienced in regular classrooms. In contrast, field research has directly analysed links between emotions and real-life performance. Most of this research has focused on test anxiety, but a few studies have analysed other emotions. The valence and activation dimensions of emotions may be most important for explaining the findings, implying that it is useful to distinguish between positive activating, positive deactivating, negative activating, and negative deactivating emotions (Table 10.1). In the CVT, emotions from these categories are posited to influence the following mechanisms of learning: (a) the availability of cognitive resources enabling individuals to focus attention on achievement tasks; (b) interest and motivation to perform these tasks; and (c) use of learning strategies and self-regulation of learning.
Positive emotions: enjoyment, hope, pride, and relief

In experimental research, it was traditionally assumed that positive emotions are often maladaptive as a result of inducing unrealistic appraisals, fostering superficial information processing, and reducing motivation to pursue challenging goals (Aspinwall 1998). However, positive emotion has typically been regarded as a unitary construct in experimental research, instead of distinguishing between activating versus deactivating emotions. According to the CVT, deactivating positive emotions, like relief or relaxation, may well have negative motivational effects, whereas activating positive emotions, such as task enjoyment or pride, may have positive effects. Such a nuanced view is aligned with increasing recognition that emotions are more complex than previously thought (Patulny & Olson, this volume, Chapter 1).

More specifically, task enjoyment is posited to focus attention on the task, promote interest and intrinsic motivation, and facilitate the use of flexible learning strategies and self-regulation, thus exerting positive effects on overall performance. In contrast, deactivating positive emotions, such as relief and relaxation, are thought to reduce task attention, can have ambiguous motivational effects by undermining current motivation while at the same time reinforcing motivation to reengage with the task, and can lead to superficial information processing, thus likely making effects on overall performance more variable.

Empirical evidence confirms that activating positive emotions such as enjoyment of learning are positively correlated with learning and performance, including positive relations with students’ interest, effort invested in studying, elaboration of learning material, self-regulation of learning, grades, and test scores (Linnenbrink 2007; Pekrun et al. 2002; 2011). However, caution should be exercised in interpreting the reported correlations. Emotions probably affect performance, but performance attainment can reciprocally influence the arousal of emotion, making causation reciprocal rather than unidirectional (Pekrun et al. 2017). Considering reciprocal rather than unidirectional causation is another example of how we can acknowledge that emotions are more complex than researchers have assumed in the past (Patulny & Olson, this volume, Chapter 1).

Negative activating emotions: anxiety, shame, anger, and confusion

Negative activating emotions are expected to produce task-irrelevant thinking (e.g., worrying about test failure), thus reducing cognitive resources available for task purposes, and to undermine interest and intrinsic motivation. On the other hand, these emotions can induce motivation to avoid failure and facilitate the use of rigid learning strategies such as simple rehearsal of learning material. As such, the effects on resulting performance depend on task conditions and may be variable, similar to the effects of positive deactivating emotions.
The available evidence supports this position. More specifically, test anxiety impairs performance on complex or difficult tasks that demand cognitive resources, whereas performance on easy and less complex tasks may not suffer or is even enhanced (Zeidner 1998). In line with these findings, test anxiety correlates moderately negatively with students’ academic achievement (*ibid.*). Again, in explaining the evidence, reciprocal causation needs to be considered. The relations between anxiety and achievement may be caused by effects of success and failure on the development of test anxiety, in addition to effects of anxiety on performance. A few longitudinal studies confirm that test anxiety and students’ achievement are linked by reciprocal linkages across time (Meece, Wigfield & Eccles 1990; Pekrun 1992; Pekrun et al. 2017).

Similar to anxiety, shame related to failure shows negative overall correlations with students’ effort and achievement (Pekrun et al. 2011). However, like anxiety, shame probably exerts variable motivational effects. Turner and Schallert (2001) have shown that students who experienced shame following negative exam feedback increased their motivation when they continued to be committed to future academic goals. Similarly, while achievement-related anger correlated positively with task-irrelevant thinking and negatively with academic self-efficacy, interest, self-regulation of learning, and performance in a few studies (Boekaerts 1993; Pekrun et al. 2011), the underlying mechanisms may be complex. For example, depressed mood interacted with anger experienced before an academic exam, such that anger was related to improved performance in students who reported no depressive mood symptoms – presumably because they were able to maintain motivation and invest effort (Lane et al. 2005). Confusion can also be beneficial for learning if students are able to resolve the problem causing the confusion (D’Mello et al. 2014). In sum, the findings confirm that the performance effects of negative activating emotions are complex, in line with our increasing understanding of the complexity of human emotion. However, the relations with overall achievement are often negative, suggesting that educators should invest effort in minimising these emotions in students.

**Negative deactivating emotions: boredom and hopelessness**

Negative deactivating emotions (e.g., boredom and hopelessness) are posited to uniformly impair performance by reducing cognitive resources, undermining both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and promoting superficial information processing (Pekrun 2006). Despite the frequency of boredom experienced by many students in school, this emotion has received scant attention, as has the less frequent, but devastating emotion of achievement-related hopelessness. The available evidence confirms that boredom and hopelessness relate uniformly negatively to measures of students’ motivation, study behaviour, and achievement (Pekrun et al. 2002; 2011; Tze et al. 2016).
Reciprocal causation, emotion regulation, and therapy

Emotions influence motivation and achievement, but achievement outcomes can reciprocally influence appraisals, emotions, and the environment (Pekrun 2006; see Figure 10.1). By implication, emotions, their antecedents, and their effects can be linked by reciprocal causation over time. Reciprocal causation can take different forms and can extend over fractions of seconds (e.g., in linkages between appraisals and emotions), days, weeks, months, or years. Positive feedback loops likely are commonplace (e.g., teachers’ and students’ anger reinforcing each other), but negative feedback loops also matter (e.g., when a failed exam induces anxiety in a student, and anxiety motivates the student to successfully avoid failing again in the next exam).

Since emotions, their antecedents, and their effects can be reciprocally linked over time, addressing any of the elements involved in these cyclic feedback processes can regulate emotions. Regulation and treatment can target (a) the emotion itself (emotion-oriented regulation and treatment, such as using drugs and relaxation techniques to cope with anxiety); (b) the control and value appraisals underlying emotions (appraisal-oriented regulation and treatment; e.g., attributional retraining; Perry et al. 2014); (c) the competences determining individual agency (competence-oriented regulation and treatment; e.g., training of learning skills); and (d) tasks and achievement-relevant social environments (situation-oriented regulation). Related studies are scarce, except for research on therapy treating test anxiety (Zeidner 1998).

Relative universality of achievement emotions

The CVT posits that the general functional mechanisms of achievement emotions are bound to universal, species-specific characteristics of the human mind. In contrast, the contents of these emotions, their frequency, and their process parameters (e.g., emotional intensity) may be specific to different individuals, genders, achievement settings, cultures, and historical times. The basic structures and causal mechanisms of achievement emotions are expected to follow nomothetic principles, whereas objects, frequency, intensity, and duration of emotions can differ, implying that their description may require the use of idiographic principles (Pekrun 2009). For example, in a cross-cultural comparison of students’ math emotions, we found that mean levels of emotions differed between cultures, with Chinese students reporting more enjoyment, pride, anxiety, and shame, and less anger than German students. Nevertheless, the functional linkages with perceived control and academic achievement were equivalent across cultures (Frenzel et al. 2007).

Following this logic, it can be assumed that the basic mechanisms of achievement emotions were also the same across historical epochs, including
modern times. At the same time, the specific objects of different emotions, their frequency and situational embeddedness likely changed dramatically, especially since the introduction of obligatory schooling during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries globally. Achievement emotions likely play a more important role in children’s and adolescents’ lives in the late modern age (Giddens, 1991) as compared with earlier historical periods. However, data that could support this speculative assertion are not available.

Concluding comments

Achievement emotions are among the most frequently occurring and functionally most important kinds of emotions in education and modern society more generally, including society in the late modern age. Nevertheless, research on achievement emotions is clearly still in a nascent stage. Psychologists, sociologists, and researchers in applied fields such as education, work and sports are just beginning to acknowledge the importance of achievement emotions. The fragmented research efforts in these different disciplines need more integration, and researchers need to attend to the functions of emotions not only for achievement, but also for well-being and health.

Educational practitioners and policy-makers often did not take much care of students’ emotions either (with the possible exception of their test anxiety). Fortunately, this situation is changing, as evidenced, for example, in the consideration of social-emotional learning (SEL) programmes across schools in many countries around the world (Brackett & Rivers 2014). However, these programmes, although applied in schools, typically do not consider the design of achievement settings and tasks in the classroom. The few attempts to redesign academic environments to foster positive emotions have met with partial success at best (Schukajlow et al. 2012). Little is known to date about regulation, treatment, and design of achievement settings targeting emotions other than test anxiety. The success story of test anxiety interventions suggests, however, that future research can be successful in developing ways to shape achievement settings and educational institutions such that adaptive achievement emotions are promoted and maladaptive emotions prevented.

References


Part III

Mediated emotions
Chapter 11

Mediating English historical evolution in Charles Kingsley’s *Hereward the Wake* (1866)

Andrew Lynch

**Englishness and ‘the spirit of freedom’**

Charles Kingsley’s novel *Hereward the Wake* (1866), set around the period of the Norman Conquest 800 years earlier, is subtitled ‘the Last of the English’, yet its outlook is prospective, tracing a line from a failed East Anglian resistance – seen as ‘the germs of our British liberty’ (Kingsley 1902, I. p. 4) – to the later growth of ‘a great nation’ and empire under ‘the spirit of Freedom’ (Kingsley 1902, II. p. 258). Kingsley, a polemical Low Church minister, novelist, professor of history at Cambridge and supporter of Charles Darwin, bases his fictional account of England’s historical evolution on fundamental factors of race, ‘blood’, religion and environment. All of these factors are also mediated through discourses of gender, specifically of masculinity. In turn, *Hereward the Wake’s* gender politics are closely related to a long historiographical tradition which made the Middle Ages a cultural and religious battlefield, and a testing-ground for models of English masculinity and for the gendering of history writing itself. Within this tradition, Kingsley represents emotions as laws of nature that help to drive historical evolution in accordance with a providential pattern.

This chapter establishes the broader ideological and intellectual context in which *Hereward the Wake’s* view of English medieval history takes its place, and examines in detail how in a fictional form it participates in contemporary discussions of race, religion, gender and emotion. Kingsley’s novel is of great interest as an example of the output of a popular mid-Victorian public intellectual operating, like his modern equivalents, across multiple media – articles, reviews and literary criticism in newspapers and magazines, university lectures, public addresses, sermons, polemical essays and disputes, novels, short stories, poetry, a play and a vast private correspondence (Chitty 1974). In subject, content and form, *Hereward the Wake* resounds most amply within that wider cultural project. Confronting the mid-century break-up of long-standing cultural authorities and collective allegiances, and an increasing diversity of emotional attachments that was signalled to him by revisionist histories and the growing prominence of religious views other than his own, Kingsley strategically promotes his hero’s resistance to authority and his stubborn individualism as
actually essential common features of Englishness, around which past national, racial and religious traditions should rally and re-unite. As I note in a brief conclusion to this chapter, pride in English exceptionalism, hostility to immigrants and fear of external European control have also made themselves evident in the present day. Such traces of continuity offer some challenge to the idea put forward in this collection (Patulny & Olson, this volume, Chapter 1) that late modernity represents a significant emotional departure from modernity and earlier periods. The ideological grounds of political emotions such as fear, anger and anxiety have necessarily changed, and their main means of cultural propagation are different, but the emotional mobilisation of ideas of true Englishness remains similar in effect and as powerful as it was before.

**Degenerate monks and manly Protestants**

The Middle Ages were a hot topic in the mid-nineteenth-century intellectual world. In the story of the development of England into a modern nation and a world empire, they often featured as a time of superstition and violence, before religious Reformation, scientific discovery and constitutional government had made ‘Great’ Britain (Lynch 2016; 2017). Negativity towards the Middle Ages often centred on the role of religion – Roman Catholicism – in medieval society. This negativity was exacerbated in the nineteenth century by anxiety over Catholic Emancipation in 1829, the progress in the 1830s and 1840s of the Tractarian Movement, which stressed long-term continuities in English religious life, and the re-establishment of the English Catholic hierarchy in 1850. An 1855 selection from Foxe’s *Acts and Monuments* (1563) begins: ‘Popery is increasing in Protestant England’, and continues ‘Popery, liberty, and a British constitution, could not co-exist in a state of equality in this or any other country’. Yet readers are reassured that ‘the awakened zeal and aroused fears of Protestant Englishmen betoken the dawning of the old Protestant spirit’, ‘the spirit of our Protestant forefathers’ (Foxe 1855, pp. 3–4). Such rhetoric is typical of many works of the period. It does much more than re-assert the English religious settlement and constitutional arrangements of 1688. It teaches that Protestantism is inherently English, is male and is ‘old’, in the sense of ‘ancestral’, handed down from the past, but young (‘dawn’-ing) and virile in its zealous intolerance of ‘Popery’ as the enemy of liberty. Catholicism is shown as having always been alien and unnatural to the English ‘spirit’, even when it was the religion of the entire land. Disquiet at the celibacy of Catholic clergy also contributed to this impression of the unnatural. Protestantism laid claim to the true, ‘old’ and manly English past. The medieval era of England’s pre-Reformation history becomes therefore a kind of strange aberration, in which Englishness has not yet properly found itself, except in the victims of Church tyranny, and through perceived glimmerings of Protestantism in the aspirations of chivalry (Norman 1987, p. 52).

In that overall context, a question arose for Protestant historiography whether pre-Conquest England should be regarded retrospectively in a different light.
from the later medieval period. Around the time of John Foxe’s *Acts and monuments*, first published in 1563, there was some idealisation of England before 1066, in contrast to ‘the last 500 years’ in which ‘Sathan broke loose’ (Foxe 1563, I. p. 17). But there was still considerable hostility towards medieval monastic culture, in the aftermath of the dissolution of the monasteries around 1540. Michael Rodman Jones points out that Reformation intellectuals like Matthew Parker treated pre-Conquest Viking raids on monasteries as divine punishment for ‘monkery’: ‘the religion or rather superstition & hipocrisie of monkes [. . .] by the justice judgment of God, utterly abolished, the Danes spoylling them, and cruelly burning them vp in there houses’ (Parker 1566, p. 7; Jones 2018, p. 196). In this Reformation ‘selective reading’ of the later tenth-century scholar Ælfric, ‘monasticism is roundly condemned whilst the intellectual product of it is held to be authoritative and idealised to the point of fetishisation’ (Jones 2018, p. 196). Overall, opinions on the Anglo-Saxons remained divided. The influence of Tacitus’s *Germania* from the Renaissance onwards ‘provided a rationale for a totalising vision of the Germanic world, a national character both generous and belligerent, and especially the dream of a free and elected political structure’ (Toswell 2010, p. 36). There was also a long tradition of respect for the ‘liberty’ and ‘principles of independence’ that David Hume (1778) perceived in Anglo-Saxon secular laws and institutions (Hume 1983, vol. 1, appendix 1). These had been cited in resistance to royal absolutism from the time of Magna Carta onwards (Vincent 2015, pp. 26–7). ‘Scientific’ racial studies would employ the *Germania* to misrepresent the Teutonic peoples as both autochthonous and racially pure (Krebs 2011), as Kingsley himself would assert about them.

But there was another tradition which stressed the decline of the Anglo-Saxons, especially in their later period of rule, and scorned them on interrelated racial, gender, cultural and religious lines. Oliver Goldsmith in 1764 was scathing: ‘The bravest blood of the English had been already exhausted in civil war, under the dissensions of the Saxon heptarchy; and, when those wars were terminated, pilgrimages, penances, cloisters, and superstitions, served to enfeeble the remainder.’ ‘[U]nequal to make opposition against the Danes’, the Saxons ‘therefore bought off their invaders with money, a remarkable instance how much they had degenerated from their warlike ancestors’ (Goldsmith 1764, vol. 1, letter 7). Specifically, these evils also arose because ‘the Monks acquired such power, as served to retard the vigour of every future operation against the Danes’ (Goldsmith 1764, vol. 1, letter 8). To Joseph Ritson, writing in 1802, King Alfred was ‘a wretched bigot’ and Anglo-Saxon poetry ‘a kind of bombaste or insane prose’. Furthermore, ‘while they [the Anglo-Saxons] continued pagans, they were unquestionably a brave and warlike nation; but, upon their conversion to Christianity, their kings became monks, their people cowards and slaves, unable to defend themselves, and a prey to every invader’ (Ritson 1891, p. 33). Ritson transfers a version of Gibbon’s thesis on the fall of Rome after Constantine to the Romanised, hence feminised, Anglo-Saxons.
Out of the friction between these separate traditions came a hybrid view: the love of liberty and independence were natural and inherent qualities in the English from the earliest times, whether or not Englishness was considered to have been later improved by Norman influence, but the ‘Romish’ church, and especially its monastic orders, viewed as an alien power, had always sought to suppress these qualities for its own power and profit. In this view, Catholics of any period were not seen as being in adult control of either their consciences or their emotions because these were managed and manipulated by the clergy, who fed their flocks on superstition and demanded blind obedience. In a common usage, the Catholic laity was considered ‘childish or childlike’ (Ward 1879, p. 42). In Kingsley’s times, popular histories employed aggressive rhetoric against the Anglo-Saxon Church, especially monasticism, as a force that had infantilised and unmanned England. Charles Dickens in the early 1850s scorns ‘EDWARD, afterwards called by the monks THE CONFESSOR’, who neglected ‘his unoffending wife, whom all who saw her (her husband and his monks excepted) loved’, and who ‘had no children’. ‘The King was [...] as blind and stubborn as kings usually have been whersoever they have been in the hands of monks’. ‘As he had put himself entirely in the hands of the monks when he was alive, they praised him lustily when he was dead.’ (Dickens 1870, pp. 28–32). Dickens seeks to expose celibate monkish ‘sanctity’ as trickery, and intimately connects monastic influence with unnatural masculinity, physical and political incapability and historiographical deceit.

Dickens was following, at a popular level, in an anti-monastic tradition of historians featuring David Hume, Edward Gibbon (1776), Thomas Fosbroke (1802) and others. In this tradition, monks tell false history because they are monks, and therefore not real men: ‘the monks, who were the only annalists during those ages [...] were strongly infected with credulity, with the love of wonder, and with a propensity to imposture; vices almost inseparable from their profession and manner of life’ (Hume 1983, vol. 1, p. 27). ‘[W]e must supply the silence of antiquity by those legends which avarice or superstition long afterwards dictated to the monks in the lazy gloom of their convents’ (Gibbon 1820, p. 202); ‘Whenever the spirit of Fanaticism, at once credulous and crafty, has insinuated itself, even into a noble mind, it inevitably corrodes the vital principles of Virtue and Veracity’ (Fosbroke 1843, p. 3). For these writers it is not just true history, but the industrious, rational and virtuous manliness of the historian himself that is at stake in attacking the monk. In this respect, the atheist Hume, Gibbon the religious sceptic and the Anglican priest Fosbroke are of one mind.

Much as Kingsley differed in temperament, belief and outlook from Hume and Gibbon, he shared their views of medieval historiography, and blended them with his own combative form of anti-Catholicism. His earlier novels, Hypatia (1853) and Westward Ho! (1855), feature corrupt and treacherous priests, monks and Inquisitors. He also initiated a famous controversy by a review in Macmillan’s Magazine (1864) of two volumes of J A Froude’s History
of England (1850–1870) where he asserted that ‘Father [John Henry] Newman informs us that truth for its own sake need not be, and on the whole ought not to be, a virtue of the Roman clergy’ (Kingsley 1864, pp. 216–17). Kingsley’s long-term view of English religious history was simple: ‘the whole course of the British mind since the Reformation, and [. . .] its whole course before the Reformation [. . .] was one of steady struggle against the Papacy and its anti-national pretensions’ (Kingsley 1890, p. 221). Histories more favourable to the pre-Reformation Church, or less impressed by its replacement, he regards as ‘the outcome of an utterly un-English tone of thought’ that is wilfully blind to medieval ‘priestly abominations’ and ‘the rottenness of the whole system’ (Kingsley, 1890, p. 222).

To ignore wilfully facts like these, which were patent all along to the British nation, facts on which the British laity acted, till they finally conquered at the Reformation, and on which they are acting still, and will, probably, act for ever, is not to have any real reverence for the opinions or virtues of our forefathers.

(Kingsley 1890, p. 222)

Kingsley’s focus here is more on the dangerous national effects of slack historiographical mediation of the past to the present than on the history itself, which he wants to take for granted as a self-evident ‘course’ of ‘facts’. He is determined to win the battle to control the popular mediation of emotions through English historiography. The very nature and essence of Englishness are at stake in maintaining the right kind of historical memory and its associated emotions in the lay public. Yet there is a peculiar anxiety in the writing, audible in its one note of qualification – ‘probably’ – amongst so much apparent certainty. Protestantism and contempt for Catholicism are totally natural to the English, yet they always need to be kept reminded of that.

**Hereward: avatar of English racial evolution**

In this long and complex context, Kingsley’s choice of Hereward the Wake, a legendary eleventh-century outlaw, as his avatar of English racial qualities solves a problem for him. This ‘rough-mannered Teuton’ of a hero belongs, to some extent, to a wider English movement claiming ‘an indigenous, non-classicist cultural base’ in ‘a rejection [of] elitism of caste and temperament’ and of ‘the privileging of Rome and the classical tradition introduced by the Normans’ (Simmons 1990, p. 168). Hereward is presented initially as an artless, uncouth, archaic figure, a layman without intellectual pretensions – a perfect contrast to Edward the Confessor. He is an unsophisticated man, of straightforward masculine instincts and strong passions. Above all, he is by birth not an Anglo-Saxon, but a Dane, an East Anglian descendant of Viking invaders, and intensely virile. Kingsley asserts that unlike the ‘priest-ridden’
men of Wessex, ‘the tools of [. . .] prelates’ (Kingsley 1902, I. p. 5), the East Anglians ‘never really bent their necks to the Norman yoke; they kept alive in their hearts that proud spirit of personal independence’ (Kingsley 1902, I. p. 4). As an East Anglian (of the area’s more northern regions), and a stronger strain of the ‘Teuton’, Hereward maintains the supposed English traditions of independence and freedom that Hume and many others had noted, but avoids the contempt aimed at the degenerate Anglo-Saxons, who ‘quailed before the free Norsemen, among whom was not a single serf’ (Kingsley 1902, I. p. 5). These men of Viking descent are the ‘true Englishmen’ (Kingsley 1902, I. p. 4).

In Kingsley’s view, England, by retaining ‘the old Teuton laws’, had ‘escaped, more than any other land, the effete Roman civilisation’ and ‘she therefore first of the lands, in the twelfth century, rebelled against, and, and first of them, in the sixteenth century, threw off the Ultramontane yoke’ (Kingsley 1877, p. 165). He was writing at a time when ‘racial attitudes in Britain, Germany and elsewhere in Northern Europe began to reify previous ethnic and linguistic differences and subsume them under the category of race’, ‘as Teutonic qualities became valorized as closest to Aryan origin’ (Ganim 2005, p. 30). Race, gender and religion are intimately fused in his ambitious long-range connection of the English Reformation with Henry II’s twelfth-century attempts to assert the Crown’s authority against the pope’s, focussed on his confrontation with Thomas Becket (Simmons 1990, pp. 113–39), and before that with the world of early Scandinavian Christianity, ‘when the old fierceness of the worshippers of Thor and Odin was tempered, without being effeminated, by the Faith of the “White Christ”’ (Kingsley 1875, p. 66). The accession of Henry II in 1154 is the last historical event in Kingsley’s novel, well after Hereward’s death, c. 1072. Henry is hailed by Hereward’s Norman successor, another descendant of northern sea-rovers, as ‘an English king [to] head the English people’, one who will ‘understand these Englishmen, and know what stout and trusty prudhommes they are all, down to the meanest serf, when once one can humor their sturdy independent tempers’ (Kingsley 1902, II. p. 262). In Kingsley’s master narrative of European history, outlined in many essays, the ‘Teuton honesty and courage of the English mitigate the dangerous effects of their necessary exposure to ‘Roman’ learning and artfulness, as part of a providential plan for the nation and the world.

Kingsley’s view of the role of God in world history is stronger than for most commentators of the period, but the racialised discourse through which it is mediated, as set out in his essay ‘The strategy of providence’, published as Lecture XII in The Roman and the Teuton, was quite commonplace (Kingsley 1877; Oergel 1998, pp. 158–71). In his account, God, working through ‘the laws of Nature’, but involved in the slightest accidents of history, ‘enabled our race [the Teutons] to conquer in the most vast and important campaign the world has ever seen’ (Kingsley 1877, p. 292). Teutons were permitted
to conquer the Western Roman Empire, but the effort left them exhausted and disunited for centuries, until the time of Charlemagne. In this dangerous period the rise of Islam and the ‘Saracenic invasion’ prevented the Eastern Roman Empire from asserting its power over them, and so ‘saved Europe and our race’ – a vital matter, because ‘the welfare of the Teutonic race is the welfare of the world’ (Kingsley 1875, p. 305).

It is in this overall racial context, which is simultaneously a religious context, that Kingsley’s personal adaptation of Darwinian evolutionary theory in Hereward has greatest cultural and political resonance. In effect, Kingsley’s application of the theory reduced the complications Darwin caused to traditional forms and understandings of human emotional development, because in it ‘the laws of nature’ still operate in direct obedience to an omnipotent Creator. As Kingsley wrote to Darwin in 1859:

I have gradually learnt to see that it is just as noble a conception of Deity, to believe that he created primal forms capable of self-development into all forms needful pro tempore & pro loco, as to believe that He required a fresh act of inter-vention to supply the lacunas wth he himself had made. I question whether the former be not the loftier thought.

(DCP, LETT 2534)

Applying this belief to human history, Hereward the Wake treats long-term historical developments as part of an inevitable and natural process in which all behaviour is symptomatic of the confluence of racial and environmental forces. A further ‘struggle’, it is implied, is to balance the benefits of civilisation, which are both civil and moral, with its inherent degenerative dangers for the race:

In the savage struggle for life, none but the strongest, healthiest, cunningest, have a chance of living, prospering, and propagating their race. In the civilized state, on the contrary, the weaklest and the silliest, protected by law, religion, and humanity, have chance likewise, and transmit to their offspring their own weakness or silliness.

(Kingsley 1902, I. pp. 1–2)

Kingsley’s acceptance of evolutionary theory as an enhancement of traditional creationist beliefs provides a modern discourse for his existing views on race, land and gender, but in articulating that he resists the biological and physiological universalism of emotional origins and expression, in both humans and animals, that had been suggested in Darwin’s earlier work. (The expression of the emotions in man and animals would not appear till 1872, six years after Hereward). Kingsley’s initial description of Hereward emphasises instead his specialness – the ‘race’ and strength that give him right to rule – and also introduces a specifically cultural factor, Hereward’s lack of a certain grace, both human and divine:
His face was of extraordinary beauty, save that the lower jaw was too long and heavy, and that his eyes wore a strange and almost sinister expression. He was short, but of immense breadth of chest and strength of limb; while his delicate hands and feet and long locks of golden hair marked him of most noble, and even, as he really was, of ancient royal race.

(Kingsley 1902, I. pp. 25–6)

Kingsley’s emphasis on ‘royal race’ reflects the former Christian Socialist’s greater class conservatism by the time of the novel’s writing (Norman 1987, pp. 53–7). Yet Hereward faces challenges. As a lowlander, of the more settled Britain, he ‘knows of no natural force greater than himself’, so his greatest danger is the lack of broadening experiences (which the plot soon offers him) because ‘he has little or nothing around him to refine or lift up his soul, and unless he meet with a religion and with a civilisation which can deliver him, he may sink into [. . .] dull brutality’ (Kingsley 1902, I. p. 3).

Hereward moves naively at first, more cannily later on, but always naturally, through a political landscape in which violence is constant, impossible to tame or to avoid, and where the strong man must make his own rules. Contact with continental civilisation, learned the hard way through mercenary wars and the Norman invasion, benefits the young man as it eventually does the whole nation: ‘Perhaps by no other method could England, and, with England, Scotland, and in due time Ireland, have become partakers of that classic civilisation and learning, the fount whereof, for good and for evil, was Rome and the Pope of Rome’ (Kingsley 1902, I. p. 9). Kingsley despises celibate monastic culture on religious and gender grounds, and Ireland on racial and religious grounds, and so blanks here the existence of the pre-Conquest insular Latinate culture that had seen Celts convert his Teutons to Christianity. So although he considers William’s taking of England, backed by the pope, an evil in itself, military invasion, whether of England by the Normans, or of Scotland and Ireland by post-Conquest England, is seen as the necessary method to transmit new and beneficial cultural influences. Nevertheless, there is a constant need to assert English exceptionalism – ‘sturdy independent tempers’ – within the sphere of wider continental influence. Unlike the earlier twelfth-century Gesta Herewardi, Kingsley’s main source, his novel allows little sense of ‘Hereward’s final integration into the political, legal and social, multi-ethnic community’ (Bremner 2007, p. 42) because it defines and privileges a narrower ‘real’ English community on specific racial, and incipiently religious, grounds. Certainly, Englishness has obtained a broader political, cultural and emotional repertoire than before, but has kept the essential old and innate characteristics that will keep its true nature mono-ethnic and mono-confessional.

Hereward the Wake can be seen as an attempt to reconcile two contrary demands in Kingsley’s mind – the evolutionary need for raw strength and vitality, and the civilisational and moral need for order and social utility – by mapping a vision of large-scale historical change onto the youth, maturity
and old age of the hero, as he progresses from Viking brat into life as a more cultured and sensitive married man, and finally into obsolescence, unfit for the changed requirements of the times and the new environment. Hereward registers evolutionary change on a personal level. His non-reflexive, instinctual emotional life is slowly modified into a set of more self-consciously managed and discriminating behaviours. As a young man he is ‘a true pattern of the half-savage hero of those rough times, capable of all vices except cowardice, and capable, too, of all virtues save humility’ (Kingsley 1902, I. p. 61). Then, as his life experience keeps on course with the development of the English race, he learns French refinement through love, and finds

a purpose more noble in life than ranging land and sea, a ruffian among ruffians, seeking for glory amid blood and flame. The idea of chivalry, of succoring the weak and the opprest [. . .] the dim dawn of purity, gentleness, and the conquest of his own fierce passions.

(Kingsley 1902, I. p. 89)

As the active helper of the weak, and as one who can be conquered only by himself, Hereward, in learning love and gentleness, avoids the possible stigma of effeminacy. Kingsley may ‘question [. . .] the foundations upon which the military code is built’ (Peck 1998, p. 127), but he embraces its violence processually – both as the training ground of manly strength, and as the indirect means by which the nation’s avatar can broaden his horizons and receive an emotional education, finally tending towards ‘a conquest of his own fierce passions’ that is a feature of many a Victorian Bildungsroman. The process recreates him as a proto-modern man.

By the end of the novel, Hereward is a superannuated figure, his stage in the civilising process played out. A change has come in the requirements of the race: ‘war and disorder, ruin and death, cannot last forever [. . .] And then the true laws of God’s universe, peace and order, usefulness and life, will reassert themselves’ (Kingsley 1902, II. p. 259). Kingsley may also have in mind here the post-Conquest growth of professionalised central administrative and judicial systems that eventually directed English emotional loyalties to the state rather than the individual lord (Strayer 1970, p. 36–46). But although Hereward makes his peace with William, he is not fitted to be a courtier or state agent, as if anticipating Norbert Elias’s civilising trajectory (Elias 1978). In the end he ‘serves his people better in death’ (Wawn 2000, p. 319), but his ‘spirit’ remains in legend to guide following ages:

above them, and around them, and in them, destined [. . .] to mould them into a great nation, and the parents of still greater nations in lands as yet unknown, brooded the immortal spirit of Hereward, now purged from all earthly dross, even the spirit of Freedom, which can never die.

(Kingsley 1902, II. p. 258)
Seen in this light, the violence of the Middle Ages, often condemned by Enlightenment and nineteenth-century historians as barbaric, is saluted as part of the vital youth of the nation, made acceptable when it has later been ‘purged’. Hereward’s violent career shows the English ‘going through a stage’, crude in itself, needing development, but manly and necessary if a free country and an empire are going to be the end results.

A comforting implication of that evolutionary view of history is that later British ages must have actually solved and superseded, along with the effete monks, the opposite problem of unruly violence that Hereward has exemplified in his own times. A further outcome is a denial of Walter Scott’s influential idea, as promoted in Ivanhoe (1819), and with contemporary Scottish–English relations in mind, that post-Conquest England eventually achieved a successful racial mixture, like the English language itself, ‘in which the speech of the victors and the vanquished have been so happily blended together’ (Scott 2000, p. 17, emphasis added). For Kingsley, instead, the ‘race’ and language of the ‘Teuton’ English have conquered others and left them behind. There is even ‘a positioning of virility in the language itself’, especially through Nordic influences (Stitt 1999, p. 34). Even though the invasion has brought educational benefits, ‘Latin does not belong’ in English, and ‘Norman French, too, appears to be superimposed, unnatural’ (Stitt 1999, p. 32). In emotional terms, the prompt to readers is to be proud of their racial achievement but justly to fear foreign influence from regions and spheres of influence classed as ‘Roman’ (Catholic, learned and crafty) rather than ‘Teuton’ (proto-Protestant, instinctual, true-hearted and manly).

Kingsley’s triple appeal to race, religion and gender in interpreting history extends to his attitude to historical sources, which he values, more or less, according to how they mediate the ‘facts’ that ‘all along were patent to the British nation’. While he makes some allowance for the credulity and superstition of earlier ages, and admits a necessary recourse to imagination where the record does not survive, his complete confidence in the existence of continuing racial and religious types makes the process of filling in the gaps easy. Because the passage of time makes so little difference to the basic picture, Kingsley himself, as true English mediator of history, can be a fully competent judge of the medieval world, as of the modern world. There are frequent moves from the Middle Ages to the nineteenth century to note modern instances of continuing racial characteristics, including the age-old superiority of the Teuton to the Celt. On Hereward’s travels amongst the Cornish, whom Kingsley imagines as descended from ‘ancient Phoenecian colonists’, his ‘hot old Punic’ host, named Hannibal, has ‘thin Punic lips’ and ‘the old Punic treachery in his heart’ (Kingsley 1902, I. p. 109). Kingsley also argues that the defeat of the Danes by Brian Boru at Clontarf in 1014 – a key event in Irish nationalist consciousness – was simply a matter of one Norse family overcoming another, and that Ireland had greatly benefited from its Viking visitors (Kingsley 1902, I. pp. 91–3). To discredit the favoured Irish (‘Milesian’) version of Clontarf, he invents in
Hereward a bard, Teague Macmurrough – ‘teague’ being a term of abuse for an Irish Catholic – with a scornful comparison to the work of Thomas Moore (1779–1852), ‘another Irish bard whose song was even more sweet, and his notions of Irish history even more grotesque’ (Kingsley 1902, I. p. 94). The argument over historiography has a wider political scope: that the Irish can never be trusted to tell their own history accurately supports the continuing necessity for them to be ruled by a superior people.

The partisan nature of Kingsley’s application of evolutionary theory in Hereward becomes apparent in this context. Only Teutons, ‘our race’, have the power to evolve, and to possess their ‘old’ qualities in a good sense while suitably adapting to their present circumstances. Everyone else just remains the same. Their failure to change explains their subjection, or even extinction. Writing in the devastating aftermath of the mid-century Irish famine, Kingsley coolly describes the ‘inveterate fashion of lawless feuds which makes the history of Celtic Ireland from the earliest times one dull and aimless catalogue of murder and devastation, followed by famine and disease’ (Kingsley 1902, I. p. 98). Venturing into English and insular history, with its massive ideological freight, brought out these tendencies in Kingsley much more than when he wrote as a naturalist, where his imagination is much freer from racial and religious anxiety. Gillian Beer, writing of The water babies (1863), speaks movingly of Kingsley’s ‘particular delight in the processes of transformation’, and in ‘the value of change, mutation, the new beginning—and this is part both of his Darwinian and of his socialist thinking’ (Beer 2000, p. 124). ‘Kingsley, like Darwin, enjoys the enlargement of kinship – the great family which must, in human terms, include the chimneyboy and the scientist’ (Beer 2000, p. 121). Hereward, under the pressure of religious and racialised demands to keep its story ‘on-message’, breathes a very different spirit. Its version of evolution as applied to Kingsley’s version of long-range history actively suppresses the role of specific political, social and economic factors in historical causality – his take on the Irish famine is an example – and restricts a sense of kinship and the power of transformation to one chosen people. He actively resists diversity and complication of emotional attachment in these matters: non–Teutons simply cannot have a ‘new beginning’. In effect, there is little interest in specific scientific observation in Hereward. Since everything in history is held to be symptomatic of continuing laws of nature, evolution features mainly as an analogy for long-term racial success and failure in terms already drawn from other existing areas of ideology. Non–White races also had their evolutionary place, and some also exhibited a failure to change which doomed them to extinction: ‘The Black People of Australia cannot take in the Gospel [. . .] All attempts to bring them to a knowledge of the true God have as yet failed utterly [. . .] Poor brutes in human shape [. . .] they must perish off the face of the earth like brute beasts’ (Kingsley 1880, pp. 414–17).

In making Hereward, Kingsley drew on a version of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, as well as the Domesday Book, and other histories, chronicles
and romances in English, Latin and French. The early twelfth-century *Gesta Herewardi* by Leofric the priest, more a romance than a history, was the chief source (Roffe 2004; *Gesta* 2000, pp. 634–5). But Kingsley changed the emphases of the text to a large extent, especially in relation to monasticism. Most contrary to his gender and religious politics, the *Gesta* details reports made to King William of free-spirited monks in the Isle of Ely who have ‘risked endangering themselves rather than be reduced to servitude’ and ‘although monks, [. . .] had frequently undertaken deeds of valour with Hereward’ (Swanton 2000, pp. 651–3). Kingsley blanks this material. He does take from the *Gesta* the story that Hereward seeks knighthood from a monk, Brand, Abbot of Peterborough, because ‘he wished almost all those serving him and under his rule to be knighted by monks’ (Swanton 2000, p. 643); but quite independently of the source he introduces earlier episodes that colour this episode very differently. In his version, Abbot Brand is Hereward’s uncle, a fiery former Norse warrior, whom he treats as totally different from all other monks. The boy Hereward vows future vengeance on Peterborough Abbey because the monks try to discipline him:

they would have flogged us,—me, the Earl’s son,—me, the Viking’s son,—me, the champion, as I will be yet, and make all lands ring with the fame of my deeds, as they rung with the fame of my forefathers, before they became the slaves of monks [. . .] Do you think I would not have burned Peterborough minster over your head before now, had it not been for Uncle Brand’s sake?

(Kingsley 1902, I. p. 28)

All this backstory is set up by Kingsley as a transformative context for one of the few widely agreed historical facts of Hereward’s life: that he forced Peterborough Abbey by burning, and looted it with Danish allies, who took much of the property back to Denmark. The *Gesta* merely says: ‘And laying waste the whole town with fire, they plundered all the treasures of the church and chased the abbot, although he and his men managed to escape by hiding themselves’ (Swanton 2000, p. 661). In Kingsley, the episode is heavily mediated through the related discourses of religion and masculinity. Hereward’s long-promised vengeance strikes the monastery, but Hereward himself acts as the protector of the cowardly monks, now ruled by an arrogant and treacherous Norman abbot, whom he still saves from murder by the wild Danes: ‘In the midst of the great court were all the monks, huddled together like a flock of sheep, some kneeling, most weeping bitterly, after the fashion of monks’ (Kingsley 1902, II. p. 62). As a whole this course of incidents allows Hereward to model proper contempt for the Church of Rome and monkish unmanliness, but distinguishes him from both old Northern violence and Norman tyranny. He thus provides a model of the free and independent English proto-Protestant man that has grown from the wild East Anglian boy, keeping his good natural instincts but learning to moderate his passions.
In Kingsley’s ‘selective reading’ of a medieval document, just as in Matthew Parker’s view 300 years before (Parker 1566), the monks deserve all they get, as a judgement of God. A difference is that for Parker the deep motivation is religious, while for Kingsley ethnic concerns about ‘true’ Englishness are at least as important. As a Protestant English historian, Kingsley stages himself as a better mediator of the medieval past than Leofric the priest was able to be, improving on the Gesta by emphasising the enduring features of birth, race, religion and gender which must have been operative, according to his views, and which in his mind made the subsequent evolution of Protestant England’s history an inevitable affair. In the face of the massive social, technological and ideological changes facing mid-Victorian England, including the impact of evolutionary science on traditional religion, Hereward the Wake is part of Kingsley’s own struggle, both authoritative and anxious, against an invasion of ideas, to assert the continuance of an essential Englishness.

Emotion and the resilience of English separatism

One could easily think of Kingsley as a Victorian dinosaur, whose like has been left behind by radical changes in the cultural environment. Of his books only The water babies is still read; his assumption that a particular form of religion is the basis of all civil society no longer holds in his own country; the English language is acknowledged and celebrated for its continuing enrichment from other tongues. Yet I would argue that Kingsley is also surprisingly contemporary, as a multi-media publicist who promoted a popular image of English exceptionalism and cultural separatism from continental Europe that survives to the present day, and found full-throated voice in the victorious Brexit campaign of 2017. In the face of changing political reality, fierce Victorian and Edwardian emotional commitment to empire eventually declined into a mild nostalgia, but English hostility towards immigrants and suspicion of control from external entities have kept their intensity. ‘Brussels’ has replaced Kingsley’s ‘Rome’ as the feared hidden hand on England’s destiny, and ‘Euorocrats’ have replaced monks and priests but the emotional processes of fear and anger that surround ideas of Englishness have remained much the same.

Some of these feelings find expression in Paul Kingsnorth’s novel The Wake (2013), which can be understood in part as a new version of Kingsley’s story. The Wake voices its protagonist Buckmaster’s hatred of the Norman ‘ingengas’ – incomers/invaders – in a synthetic Old English that also rejects the heritage of contact with French, and asserts a Kingsleyan investment in the essential identity of earth, place and name – ‘erce [earth] was this ground itself was angland’ (Kingsnorth 2015, p. 53). Buckmaster, like Hereward, spends his life in search of the feeling of English ‘freedom’; ‘no man was ofer me no man will be ofer me’ (Kingsnorth 2015, p. 11). But his nostalgia for a pre-Christian natural religion and a pre-political version of English identity comes to look increasingly like a desperate underclass fantasy of superior belonging, based on an absolute
(and very Kingsleyan) association of ‘erce’ (earth) with ‘folc’ (people); ‘folcs has
their place what was set when the world was macd and when they gan from
that place to others then erce is ired [angered] (Kingsnorth 2015, p. 208).

Nevertheless, even in Buckmaster’s extreme xenophobia, there are exceptions
made, especially for the Danes:

an ingenga a denisc [Danish] man. and his men they set many fyrs and
hams and tuns was beorned lic now and yet cnut [Cnut, reigned 1016–
1035] when he cum he cum as an anglisc cyng and locd ofer us as one and
he done well by us [. . .] but frenc [French] men they is not the same mor
lic hunds they is than men.

(Kingsnorth 2015, p. 126)

At least in Buckmaster’s unreliable mind, a hierarchy of races and a pattern of
racial likenesses exist which strongly recall Kingsley’s own views. One sees too
an antagonism towards the ‘fuccan preostes’ that matches Kingsley’s disdain
for the Catholic clergy. Ultimately, what distinguishes the two books, cre-
ated 150 years apart, is that Kingsley’s racial and environmental essentialism
is made a prolegomena to the rise of English institutions and empire, whereas
Kingsnorth, abandoning traditional politics and alienated from the contem-
porary English mainstream, looks to the earth itself for meaning, identity, and
consolation. Kingsley sees the pre-Conquest era as a raw but vital beginning,
Kingsnorth as the site of a violated integrity. Yet in terms of the emotions – the
particular attachments of love, hate, hope and fear that colour their mediation
of the English past – the resemblances between their books are as striking as the
differences. At least in these respects, it may be that late modernity has not made
a great difference to popular nationalism, and that earlier emotional apprehen-
sions of Englishness can readily re-emerge when circumstances permit.

References
Bremner, R 2007, ‘The Gesta Hereward: transforming an Anglo-Saxon into an
Englishman’, in T Summerfield and K Busby (ed.), People and texts: relationships in
medieval literature. Studies presented to Erik Kooper, Rodopi, Amsterdam and New York.
Fosbroke, T 1843, British monachism, in J B Nichols (ed.), London, original work
published 1802.
Foxe, J 1855, Foxes’s Protestant martyrs, Allman and Son, London.
Ganim, J 2005, Medievalism and orientalism, three essays on literature, architecture and cultural


Kingsley, C 1875, Lectures delivered in America in 1874, Longmans, London.


Kingsley, C 1890, Plays and puritans and other historical essays, Macmillan, London.


Parker, M 1566, A testimonie of antiquitie, London.


Ritson, J 1891, A dissertation on romance and minstrelsy, E and G Goldsmid, Edinburgh, original work published 1802.


Affect and automation
A critical genealogy of the emotions

Elizabeth Stephens

Introduction

The mediation of emotions in late modernity by technological devices, automated systems and algorithmic logics has been well recognised (Gershon 2010; Gregg 2011; Malin 2014; Pettman 2006; Smith, Atwood & McNair 2018). While it may appear we are currently witnessing a radical increase or reconfiguration of the emotions under the conditions of late modernity, in fact the technological mediation of the emotions is not a recent occurrence but rather part of a longer history in which affect and automation have become entwined. In considering this longer history, this chapter thus contextualises the study of emotions within, or in relation to, that of affect.

Some scholars have been careful to differentiate between emotions, defined as social, feelings, defined as ‘personal,’ and affect defined as ‘prepersonal’ (Shouse 2005). This chapter follows recent work in feminist philosophy and affect studies in arguing that these categories are most usefully understood as interrelated rather than distinct. In so doing, this chapter will not approach the relationship between affect and automation from the perspective of a history of the emotions, but from that of a genealogy of affect. For Foucault, a genealogy differed from traditional methods of historical inquiry in two key ways. The first was that it was comprised of a series of ‘accidents’ and ‘deviations’ (Foucault 1977, p. 81), rather than a linear or unbroken narrative. It ‘disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself’ (Foucault 1977, p. 82). The second was that it approached history not simply through the study of texts or documents but as something inscribed ‘in the nervous system, in temperament, in the digestive apparatus; it appears in faulty respiration, in improper diets, in the debilitated and prostrate bodies of those whose ancestors committed errors’ (Foucault 1977, p. 82). A genealogy hence provides the means to recover not simply a history of the body, but a bodily history: ‘Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by history’ (Foucault 1977, p. 83).

Drawing on and extending Foucault’s understanding of genealogy, this chapter examines how experiences of emotions and affect, feelings and
sensation are mediated by their cultural, historical, subjective and physical specificity. It will move between consideration of affect and emotions, focusing on the social and somatic dimensions of both, first by returning to a key moment of first encounter between human bodies and machines that took place at the very start of the Industrial Revolution, second by contextualising that individual case study within the wider history of automata and automation that unfurled over this period, and third by demonstrating what light this history has to cast on how emotions are understood in the present.

The strange sad tale of James Tilly Matthews and the Air Loom

This history begins in the final years of the eighteenth century, when the English spy James Tilly Matthews was committed to the Bedlam lunatic asylum in London, claiming that a secret band of saboteurs and spies were using a machine he called the Air Loom to direct the course of political events in England, by controlling the bodies and minds of men (including his own). The Air Loom was operated by ‘pneumatic chemistry’, Matthews claimed. It emitted magnetic rays that could be used to control the thoughts and will of the government. Matthews had served as a double agent for the English and French during the French Revolution, and it has been claimed that he was a political prisoner as much as a psychiatric inmate (Jay 2003). The apothecary of Bedlam, John Haslan, published a study of Matthew’s case in 1810, under the title *Illustrations of madness: exhibiting a singular case of insanity*, which included an illustration of the Air Loom drawn by Matthews himself, depicting his body under the influence of its magnetic rays. The text also included a lengthy account of the operation and effects of the Air Loom in Matthew’s own words, providing what may be the only first-person account written by an eighteenth-century inmate of Bedlam.

Matthews’ experience of the Air Loom was one of great suffering and subjugation; it produced a ‘list of calamities hitherto unheard of, and for which no remedy has yet been discovered’, reported Haslan (1810, pp. 29–30). These included: ‘locking fluid in the tongue’, which impeded Matthews’ ability to speak; ‘cutting soul from sense’, in which a magnetic warp was used to fragment perception; ‘brain-sayings’, in which information was conveyed directly into the auditory nerves; ‘thigh talking’, in which the sense of hearing and perception was relocated to the thigh; and ‘bomb bursting’, experienced as a sudden convulsion of pain (Haslan 1810, pp. 28–37). For Matthews, the effect of the Air Loom was as a sort of affective explosion or sensorial shattering as his sensorium was rearranged. The Air Loom did not simply control Matthews’ body or brain, it also extended and reordered his senses by creating new affective and sensorial circuits between body and machine, so that Matthews was able to hear through his thigh or perceive through
vibrations in the air. In this way, unique as it may seem, Matthews’ case was also representative of the transformation of the human sensorium, or what Rancière (2000) has called the ‘redistribution of the sensible’, at the start of the Industrial Age.

Matthews is, to the best of my knowledge, the first known instance of a man who believed that his body and brain were being remotely controlled or influenced by a machine. To believe this is quite distinct from believing the body is a machine, as Descartes (1647) and La Mettrie (1748) had contended. Yet the effects of the Air Loom on Matthews also elided this difference. Under the influence of the Air Loom, Matthews ‘was reduced to a puppet, an automaton, a thing of pumps and levers. This is the greater significance of the Air Loom: the machine has mechanized the man’, argues the cultural critic Mike Jay (2003, p. 193).

In this respect, Matthews’ case is representative of an increasing fear about the loss of human autonomy caused by the rise of machines, which would come to characterise cultural responses to the Industrial Revolution. As early as 1829, the Scottish philosopher Thomas Carlyle announced the emergence of a new ‘Mechanical Age’. This was an age in which human intelligence, along with traditional handcrafted artisanship, was rapidly being displaced by the relentless efficacy of machines: ‘Nothing is now done directly, or by hand; all is by rule and calculated contrivance’ (Carlyle 1838, p. 144). As a result, he argued, a profound transformation had taken place, in which ‘Men are grown mechanical in head and in heart, as well as in hand’ (Carlyle 1838, p. 150). Practices such as teaching, which had previously been highly individuated, had been standardised along with manual labour – effectively automating mental as well as physical work. This mechanisation only intensified in the following decades, as the industrial factory came to replace the manual workshop. Marx and Engels, writing 20 years after Carlyle in *The communist manifesto*, decried the way the nineteenth-century factory had transformed the workman into a mere ‘appendage of the machine’, so that it was ‘only the most simple, most monotonous, and most easily acquired knack, that is required of him’ (Marx & Engels 2012, p. 43). Not only physical labour but also cognitive processes were being transformed and mediated by machines, setting the foundations for the increasingly complex technological mediation of emotions in late modernity.

By the start of the twentieth century, human reason and psychology were also recognised to have fallen under the influence of machine. For the psychoanalyst Victor Tausk (1988), writing in his 1919 chapter ‘On the origin of the “influencing machine”’, the belief that one’s brain was being controlled remotely by a machine was a key symptom of paranoid schizophrenia:

The schizophrenic influencing machine is a machine of mystical nature. The patients are able to give only vague hints of its construction. It consists
of boxes, cranks, levers, wheels, buttons, wires, batteries, and the like. Patients endeavor to discover the construction of the apparatus by means of their technical knowledge [. . . ] All the discoveries of mankind, however, are regarded as inadequate to explain the marvelous powers of this machine, by which the patients feel themselves persecuted.

(Tausk 1988, p. 50)

Matthews’ description of the Air Loom strikingly anticipates this description of the influencing machine. And, indeed, the medical historian Roy Porter has identified Matthews as the first case of paranoid schizophrenia (1991, p. 64). This retrospective diagnosis, like that which sees Matthews’ as a puppet of the machine, frames Matthews as a passive victim of the Air Loom, and the relationship between man and machine as one of domination.

However, such a reading forecloses the more intimate and reciprocal relationship between automation and affect suggested by Matthews’ own account of his experience of the Air Loom. Matthews’ experience and account of the Air Loom were less a passive response to an Industrial Age already underway than they were the imagining into existence of a technology that did not yet exist. Matthews’ account of the Air Loom predates the period in which the automated loom – that great driver of early industrialisation – came into widespread use. The Jacquard loom, one of the first automated looms to be used in the industrial factories that would flourish from the 1820s onwards, was not developed until 1804, for instance. Similarly, the Air Loom’s mode of operation – magnetic rays and pneumatic chemistry – preceded the commercial use of, or capacity to store, electro-magnetic power, as the first device to produce a large electric current was constructed by Alessandro Volta in 1800.

It is also striking that Matthews’ descriptions of the Air Loom were characterised by expressions of desire and libidinality, in which the machine was understood to run on bodily extractions, including ‘seminal fluid’ and an ‘extraction of gas from the anus’ (Haslan 1810, p. 66), while its operators spent their free time cross-dressing or participating in orgies. In this respect, the operation of the Air Loom anticipates the French post-structuralist theorist Jean-François Lyotard’s description of capitalism as a ‘libidinal economy’, one propelled by drives and intensities – affective states – rather than the circulation of currency or goods (Lyotard 1974). Affect, following Lyotard’s account, is the driver of capitalist systems, including automation, not passively controlled by it. Capitalism, and with it late modernity, is characterised by the entwining of automation and affect, in which the somatic and social, the personal and prepersonal, exist in reciprocal and mutually constitutive relation. The relation between affect and automation is in this way both a surprisingly intimate history of the relation between human bodies and machines, and a history of intimacy itself, and its highly mediated conditions of possibility in late modernity.
Automata as wonder machines: entanglements of intimacy and industrialisation

We can see this by expanding consideration of automation from that of industrial automation to the less-known history of automata, and their cultural role as objects of public display and wonder. During the eighteenth century, automata played a key role in the development of mechanical technologies, and thus help us identify the cultural mechanisms by which automation and affect became entwined, so that automation would come to shape the conditions of possibility of affect and affect to drive automation.

Lifelike automata, combining a lifelike appearance with mechanical movements of great precision and which could be programmed to perform different tasks, were widely produced and celebrated as technological marvels throughout the eighteenth century. Two of the earliest and most famous of these were produced in 1737, by the French inventor Jacques de Vaucanson. The first of these, ‘The Flute Player’, was an android that could be programmed to play any one of six airs, producing music by actually exhaling through the flute and moving its articulated fingers along its length. Ingenuous as ‘The Flute Player’ was, the second automaton Vaucanson produced in 1737 became even more famous. ‘The Defecating Duck’ was an automaton duck which was ‘fed’ in public, mechanically digested its food and then defecated onto a silver tray which was passed about to be admired by its aristocratic audience (Riskin 2003). ‘The Defecating Duck’ was considered Vaucanson’s masterpiece, the fulfilment of the promise of the Enlightenment, representing the rational mastery of the natural world through the manufacture of a wholly artificial biology. With over 400 moving parts in each wing alone, it could also flap its wings and digest water. Where nineteenth-century commentators feared man had become subjected to the automated industrial machine, eighteenth-century philosophers celebrated the invention of these automata as proof of man’s mastery over nature and apparently limitless technological capabilities. However, Vaucanson’s Duck was actually an ingenious joke. Not only did it mobilise this technological mastery, this triumph of Enlightenment reason, in the service of the manufacture of the basest of products, faeces, it was fraudulent faeces to boot; there was a secret compartment of ‘digested food’ from which the duck mechanically defecated. Although it was indisputably a technological marvel, simulating actual biological processes mechanically proved beyond the automata makers of the eighteenth century.

Just as artificial biology was an object of both fascination and fraud in the eighteenth century, so was artificial intelligence. Wolfgang von Kempelen’s ‘Mechanical Turk’, or ‘Automaton Chess Player’, was made in 1770 and exhibited until its destruction by fire in 1854. Like ‘The Defecating Duck’, this was a genuine, and very impressive, automaton, which could mechanically move chess pieces around the board. However, Kempelen claimed the figure itself decided the moves of the chess pieces. This claim was a hoax; there was a person
hiding in the compartment beneath the figure, watching the game and deciding the moves via mirrors (Wood 2007). Automata occupied a place at the limits of technological capability and human ingenuity in the mid-century, and the hoaxes at the century of this history call attention to that limit even as they try to efface it. What drove and enabled the development of these automata was the intensely lucrative public fascination with their display, which we can see by turning to consider the best-preserved examples of automata from this period.

Where Vaucanson’s and Kempelen’s automata have been lost to time, three automata made by the master clock maker Pierre Jaquet-Droz still exist in perfect working order. The ‘Draftsman’ produces finely detailed sketches of a variety of different objects, including a portrait of Marie-Antoinette. The ‘Writer’ can be programmed to write a variety of sentences in an elegant script – including, teasingly, ‘I think therefore I am’. The ‘Musical Lady’ can be programmed to play any one of half-a-dozen original airs on a keyboard. In the final decades of the eighteenth century, Jaquet-Droz toured Europe continuously with his automata, with tens of thousands of people queuing to see them. Like Vaucanson’s and Kempelen’s automata, Jaquet-Droz’s were designed as marvels; they were machines intended to provoke wonder and amazement in the spectator. In simulating artificial biology and intelligence, in seeming to be alive, they established an affective bond with the viewer. The public fascination they elicited was not simply a product of their technological ingenuity: rather, they were also designed to provoke an affective response in the spectator by simulating affective arousal. For instance, as the ‘Musical Lady’ plays, her chest rises and falls, so that she appears not only alive, but also affected by the music she plays; that is, she was designed not only to move mechanically, but to appear moved by the music she plays. In this way, she established an affective rapport with the viewer, linking them in a reciprocal and reciprocated expression of emotion. After Jaquet-Droz’s retirement, his automata were featured at the Paris Exposition of 1825, before being acquired by a nineteenth-century travelling show, the Museum of Illusions. In 1906, they were purchased by the Swiss Government and given to the Musée d’art et d’histoire at Neuchâtel in Switzerland, where they remain on display. Although they are occasionally cleaned, and the original clothes disintegrated, their mechanisms have never required repair.

For eighteenth-century viewers, Jaquet-Droz’s automata, like Vaucanson’s, represented the very embodiment of the promise of the Enlightenment: the capacity of human reason to decipher and master the laws of nature. As such, they were not simply popular – and lucrative – objects of public display. As Simon Schaffer (1994, p. 16) has argued, they were ‘arguments as well as amusements’. The cultural critic Gaby Wood (2007) has shown that for eighteenth-century audiences, automata were potent cultural symbols of the controversial materialist and mechanistic philosophies that had begun to emerge in the previous century, most famously in the work of Descartes. Automata suggested that animation was the product of mechanical processes, rather than the result of vital spirits or divine forces. The historian of science
Jessica Riskin (2003) argues that they were more complex than this, and did not simply represent the triumph of mechanistic philosophy. Rather, they were troubling objects, evidence of ontological uncertainty about the relationship between the mechanical and the human.

The ontological question of whether natural and physiological processes were essentially mechanistic, and the accompanying epistemological question of whether philosophical mechanism was the right approach to take to understand the nature of life, preoccupied philosophers, academicians, monarchs, ministers, and consumers of the emerging popular science industry during the middle decades of the eighteenth century. Neither mechanist nor anti-mechanist conviction, then, but rather a deep-seated ambivalence about mechanism and mechanist explanation produced the context for the emergence of artificial life. [Eighteenth-century automata] commanded such attention, at such a moment, because they dramatized two contradictory claims at once: that living creatures were essentially machines and that living creatures were the antithesis of machines.

(Riskin 2003, pp. 611–12)

It is precisely this ambiguity to which the hoaxes that accompanied the display of Vaucanson’s and von Kempelen’s automata call attention; this instability at the heart of their function and display reflects the instability of their cultural significance. However, it is also important to recognise that if automata so often became the focal point for philosophical debates in the eighteenth century, it is precisely because, as charming and whimsical objects of public display, they were able to pose questions and embody new knowledge in ways that were much more difficult, even dangerous, to pursue in other contexts.

We have only to contrast the fate of Jaquet-Droz – celebrated and admired throughout his life for his technical achievement – with that of the philosopher Julien Offray de La Mettrie, to understand this. La Mettrie was forced to flee the liberal Netherlands after the publication of his *L’Homme machine* [Man a machine] (1748), in which he argued that the operation of human biology was the result of mechanical processes. Jaquet-Droz, who undertook actual experiments in human physiology and demonstrated a capacity to simulate biological processes mechanically, not only escaped such censure but also was widely acclaimed for his work. The difference between these is that Jaquet-Droz’s automata were wondrous machines able to elicit an affective sympathy in the public.

The important role affection played in the cultural reception of automata can be more clearly seen if we compare this to that of industrial automation at the same time. In the 1830s, the increasing use of automated looms in the weaving industry depressed wages for silk workers and threatened to make a generation of weavers redundant, thereby provoking what are often identified as the first workers’ uprisings of the Industrial Revolution in France (Woods 2007). Even as new technologies began to automate labour practices, with devastating effects
for workers, automata continued to be popular objects of public exhibition. Yet the actual technologies driving industrial automation were the same as those used to manufacture automata; Jacques Vaucanson, for instance, used the same mechanism he devised for his automata ‘The Flute Player’ and ‘The Defecating Duck’ to invent the automated loom. As the effects of industrialisation took hold, nineteenth-century fun fairs, penny arcades and other sites of popular entertainment became populated by new mechanical figures like the coin-operated ‘Laugh with Jolly Jack’. ‘Jolly Jack’ was a mechanical figure dressed as a sailor, who can still be seen in older funfairs. When a coin was placed in the slot in his booth, he would begin to laugh, his body moving around and shaking with amusement. The name ‘Laugh with Jolly Jack’ is as much an imperative as an invitation. It was designed to establish an affective economy, in the most literal sense, between the mechanical figure and the human viewer.

Automata and automation aroused very different feelings and emotions in the respective publics that came in contact with them, despite their use of the same technology. Automata were associated with an emerging market of commercial exhibitions and leisure industries. They were celebrated as marvels and wonders; they were fun. Automation, on the other hand, was associated with the transformation of labour practices, with dreariness and the increasing mechanisation of the human body. It inspired suspicion and fear. This affective complexity reflects the increasing prominence of automation in the cultural imaginary and social life of the nineteenth century, which would only intensify in the late modern period.

For the German philosophers Adorno and Horkheimer, writing in the *Dialectic of enlightenment* in 1944, the purpose of the leisure industries, or what they referred to as the Culture Industry, was industrial automation by stealth. The Culture Industry used amusement to covertly train human bodies to lead increasingly automated lives.

> Amusement under late capitalism is the prolongation of work. It is sought after as an escape from the mechanized work process, and to recruit strength in order to be able to cope with it again. But at the same time mechanisation has such power over a man’s leisure and happiness, and so profoundly determines the manufacture of amusement goods, that his experiences are inevitably afterimages of the work process itself.

(1997, p. 137)

What had previously been understood in the popular imaginary as two distinct traditions – one of marvels and amusements, on the one hand, and machine and work, on the other – is here seen to be driven by a single imperative. What the history of affect and automation reveals, however, is not a narrative of the mechanical control of the human body and brain, but something more complex: the history of our intimate lives with machines, our embodied entanglements with and transformations by the increasingly technologised
world in which we find ourselves. This has important consequences for how we understand the cultural, historical and subjective specificity of affect and the emotions as they are experienced in late modernity.

**Affect: autonomic vs automated**

Affect and automation in late modernity are closely entwined as part of a dense network of somatic and social relations established over the course of the long history described above. To say emotions are mediated by technological devices and automated systems in late modernity does not mean they are simply manipulated or controlled; rather, the relationship between affect and automation that subtends this needs to be understood as reciprocal, and mutually transformative. To argue this is to go against the grain of how affect is understood in much contemporary philosophy and critical theory. As Greg Seigworth and Melissa Gregg explain in their introduction to *The affect theory reader*, affect is often taken to refer to a ‘passage of forces and intensities’ which “emerges out of an unmediated relatedness” (2011, p. 4). Understood as a spontaneous and unmediated bodily sensation, affect is taken to operate outside of, or prior to, perception and cognition. It is situated: ‘beneath, alongside, or generally other than conscious knowing’ (Seigworth & Gregg 2011, p. 1). This view is articulated in Brian Massumi’s assertion that affect is ‘irreducibly bodily and autonomic’, a product of ‘non-cognitive corporeal processes or states’ (2002, p. 437). Affect here is understood as a bodily sensation that enables forms of knowledge of a fundamentally different order to those of language, representation and conscious cognition. For this reason, it is often understood to operate outside of existing power structures: ‘circulating not primarily as a mode of discursive regulation but rather as the potential to “become otherwise”’, as Pedwell and Whitehead (2012, p. 116) put it. It is prepersonal or immanent, neither personal like feelings, nor social like emotions.

The assumption underpinning this understanding of affect – that there is an ontological distinction between affect and meaning, experience and representation, sense and significance – is one that has been examined and problematised at considerable length in feminist philosophy and critical theory. For many feminist scholars, these registers cannot be held apart, but rather operate in interrelated and mutually constitutive ways. The feminist focus on what Lauren Berlant (2004, 2008) and Ann Cvetkovich (2003, 2012) have termed ‘public feelings’ problematises the conceptualisation of feelings as personal and emotions as social. Feelings, they argue, are simultaneously the individual internalisation and public or social manifestation of specific cultural formations or conditions. Their focus is thus on the political and lived entanglement of feelings, emotions and affects, rather than the philosophical distinction between these terms. Moreover, as Greg Seigworth (2011) explains, the Spinozist concept of affect is itself comprised of three related aspects: *affectio*, ‘an affection of one body by or upon another’; *affectus*, ‘a line
of continuous variation in the passage of intensities’; and affect, a condition of ‘pure immanence or virtuality’ (Seigworth 2011, pp. 166–7). That is, the definition of affect itself already incorporates elements that map onto how feelings and emotions are often understood in the present, and on which basis they are often differentiated from affect.

This can be seen in Sara Ahmed’s *The promise of happiness* (2010). Happiness is not simply the personal or physical sensation or the unmediated experience of good feelings, Ahmed insists; it is also a (social) emotion produced by underlying conditions of possibility, in which affective positivity itself is the product of specific historical and cultural contexts. Sensation and signification here are thus closely interlinked rather than distinct. Happiness is a ‘disciplinary technology’ (Ahmed 2010, p. 8), in the Foucauldian sense of the term; it is one of the mechanisms by which disciplinary societies construct subjects by orienting them around cultural norms. Happiness is ‘used as a technology or instrument, which allows the reorientation of individual desire towards a common good’ (2010, p. 59). It is not by happenstance that emotions and feelings are entangled here, or that both are understood as disciplinary technologies, caught up in cultural systems of automation. The happy family, for instance, ‘is both a myth of happiness, of where and how happiness takes place, and a powerful legislative device, a way of distributing time, energy and resources’ (Ahmed 2010, p. 22). There is no ‘pure’ affect here, no unmediated sensations, no neat distinctions between the somatic and social, the autonomic and automatic. It is the messy and mutual relations between these terms and states that is the focus of analysis.

A similar argument and approach underpins Lauren Berlant’s *Cruel optimism* (2011), which examines how an arousal of a surge of joy and hope can also be toxic or serve to grind us down. Here again there are no pure categories; the putative distinction between the autonomic and automatic is problematised rather than reinforced: a ‘visceral response is a trained thing’, as Berlant insists in *The female complaint*, ‘not just autonomic activity’ (2008, p. 52). This problematisation of affect as autonomic is a common thread in much feminist critical theory, which focuses on the way affect circulates and is driven by wider cultural systems in ways that automate its effects. Teresa Brennan (2004) has examined the way affect is ‘transmitted’ or spreads between and across populations, while Anna Gibbs (2011) has argued affect is ‘contagious’. As Eugenie Brinkema (2014) recognises in *The forms of the affects* (2014), the focus on affect as a generalised state of pure force obscures the particularity of its expression in ways that unhelpfully mute what it has to reveal about cultural conditions or individual experience.

In the end, ethics, politics, aesthetics—indeed, lives—must be enacted in the definite particular. There is no reason to assume that affects are identical aesthetically, politically, ethically, experientially, and formally. The one way out for affect is via a way into its specificities.

(Brinkema 2014, p. xv)
Defining affect as an undifferentiated pure or prepersonal intensity has hampered recognition of particularities and the ambivalence or equivocality with which this is negotiated by those whose embodied experiences might be quite different.

Sianne Ngai (2005) makes a similar point in her book *Ugly feelings*, in which the terms ‘feelings’ and ‘affects’ are often used interchangeably. Ngai examines the aesthetics of negative affects as represented in literature and film, and experienced in the ‘fully administered’ world of late modernity, which are characterised by what Ngai (2005, p. 11) refers to as ‘ambivalent states and suspended agency’. Ngai takes as her exemplary figure Herman Melville’s character Bartleby the scrivener. Bartleby, having started out his employment (as a copyist in a law office) churning out work of the highest quality with impressive speed and energy, gradually succumbs to a strange lassitude and negativity. To all requests, he responds: ‘I prefer not to’. This passive but obstinate refusal, and the obstruction of capitalist productivity this represents, is for Ngai exemplary of the affective and political ambivalence with which her book is centrally concerned.

In this way, Ngai’s book contributes to the recent negative turn in affect studies (Stephens 2016) by focusing on minor affects rather than grand passions; not anger, grief or despair, but anxiety, paranoia, irritation, boredom and stupefaction are the subject of her book: ‘If *Ugly Feelings* is a bestiary of affects, it is one filled with rats and possums rather than lions, its categories of feeling generally being, well, weaker and nastier’ (Ngai 2005, p. 7). Minor affects are important to Ngai because they are ambivalent, equivocal, and in this way they have the potential to obstruct, to create a blockage in the catharsis-machine of literature or film: ‘the feelings I examine here are explicitly amoral and noncathartic, offering no satisfactions of virtue, however oblique, nor any therapeutic or purifying release’ (Ngai 2005, p. 6). The ‘ugly feelings’ Ngai examines, like the ‘public feelings’ examined by Berlant (2004; 2008) and Cvetkovich (2003; 2012), and happiness as understood by Ahmed (2010), are ways of thinking about the entanglement between the subjective, somatic and social. Rather than distinguishing between sensation and signification, the autonomic and automatic, their studies focus on the points of interface or overlap between these registers. Affect here is not pure but contaminated by both social and somatic elements.

**Conclusion**

The relationship between affect and automation has a long history that allows us to better understand their mutual mediation in late modernity by contextualising the forms of digital mediation so central to it within the longer history of mechanical mediation from which this relationship arises. As the case of James Tilly Matthews demonstrates, the reconfiguration of the human sensorium at the start of the industrial age, and the sorts of institutional contexts in which this was mediated, reinforces the recent feminist critique of affect as an unmediated or pure force that exists outside of cultural, subjective or physical specificity. What we see so vividly above in Matthews’ account of the
Air Loom is the reconstruction of the viscera as a site of cultural training and affective mediation recognised by Berlant (2008), and which would come to define the field of possibility in which affect and sensation were experienced in late modernity. Donna Haraway (1985) has influentially described the human in the late modern period as a cyborg, but the longer history examined in this chapter reveals the role of human agency and affect in this long process of becoming-cyborg, which has been driven by a strong but ambivalent combination of fascination and fear. The reconfiguration of the human sensorium that dates back to the start of the Industrial Age is suggestive of an alternate history of automation to that in which human bodies are the passive objects of mechanisation, revealing one in which they have willingly entered into intimate, and sometimes perverse, relationships with machines.

This history draws our attention to two key points. First, the affective responses and sensations produced by automated technologies are not unmediated, but are rather sites of sensory training (Stephens 2012). Second, that mediation has been driven, at least in part, by our affective responses to new technologies, whether positive or negative. To say that affect is mediated by automated technologies in the modern period, as I have attempted to show in this chapter, is to recognise the importance of the historical and cultural contexts in which it is experienced and understood. This does not foreclose on the complexities of the possible relations between affect and automation, but rather allows us to see this relationship in new ways. Whether we are considering the mechanical automation of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries or the digital automation of the twenty-first, the simulated artificial intelligence of von Kempelen’s ‘Mechanical Turk’ or the apparently imminent emergence of computational artificial intelligence in the present, the relationship between automation and affect is complex, but the mediation between the two is a consistent feature over time. We can thus better understand the complexity and mediation of the emotions in late modernity if we focus on the relationality or entwining of affect and automation, on the various ways they influence and constitute one another as part of an affective genealogy, rather than the distinctions between them.

References

Ahmed, S 2010, The promise of happiness, Duke University Press, Durham, NC.
Berlant, L 2011, Cruel optimism, Duke University Press, Durham, NC.
Brinkema, E 2014, The forms of the affects, Duke University Press, Durham, NC.


Cvetkovich, A 2012, Depression: a public feeling, Duke University Press, Durham, NC.


Haslan, J 1810, Illustrations of madness: exhibiting a singular case of insanity, G. Hayden London.


La Mettrie, J 1748, L’Homme machine, D’Elie Luzac Fils, Leyde.


Massumi, B 2002, Parables for the virtual, Duke University Press, Durham, NC.


Seigworth, G & Gregg M 2011, The affect theory reader, Duke University Press, Durham, NC.


Chapter 13

The digital mediation of emotions in late modernity

Kathy A. Mills, Len Unsworth and Georgina Barton

Introduction

Late modernity has seen profound changes in the communication of emotion. Emotions are mediated through an array of communication technologies, through the mass media, multimedia and the Internet. Using social media, emotions can be socially constructed more rapidly, often interactively and in ways that are typically less bounded by traditional time-space constraints (on time-space, see Giddens 1991). Emotive symbols can become remixed, reused and made explicit through emoticons, memes, vlogs, blogs, clips, short music video, lip-syncing and graphic interchange formats (gifs) to potentially large audiences in online communities, or through back channels to individuals or groups. The texts of late modernity are, for the most part, multimodal – combining two or more modes of meaning.

The transformed mediation of emotions through technology is increasingly ubiquitous – for example, through mobile devices attached to the body like an appendage – in public and private spaces, and the hybrid spaces in between (Mills 2016a). There is a paradoxical acceleration of both globalised, hyper-sensitised emotive media that bombards the senses and the mind, and a proliferation of personal dispositions shared in micro-interactions online through likes, retweets and thumbs up (on micro-interactions, see Patulny & Olson, this volume, Chapter 1; and Harding, this volume, Chapter 14). These, and many other technological transformations, have given rise to a renewed interest in emotions in sociology and in applied fields of research, such as education, adolescent literacies, applied linguistics and communication studies.

This chapter outlines a multimodal semiotic framework to analyse the communication of emotions in filmic media. This work is a response to the emerging needs of children and youth to interpret and communicate emotions in ways that extend well beyond verbal and linguistic forms to encompass everyday digital media production. For example, adolescents today use instant messaging and related online practices as a form of emotional relief, practices that are often multimodal (Best, Manktelow & Taylor 2014). These issues are central within the emergence of cultural and subcultural contexts that support the ease of production, consumption and rapid distribution of media.
The multiplicity and reach of digital texts in a globally networked communication environment affords more accessible multimodal configurations of emotional expression in late modernity, but also demands a new kind of reflexivity (Mills 2016a; Giddens 1991). This is a reflexivity that is less about tradition, and more about continuously revising and monitoring the self (Archer 2012), both online and offline. Students need different competencies than previous generations to reflexively manage multimodal representations of self and identity owing to the rise in technology-mediated communication (on reflexivity, see Patulny & Olson this volume, Chapter 1). Part of this reflexivity involves understanding how identities and emotions are constructed for different audiences, markets and social purposes in digital space, and to what effect.

In this Web 2.0 world in which video and music sharing sites such as YouTube, Facebook and Blip.fm dominate the Internet viewing habits of youth, school curricula that purport to develop twenty-first-century communication skills need to begin to invest in building knowledge repertoires for the communication of emotions in multimodal ways (Mills & Dreamson 2015). There is an urgent need for students to acquire metalanguages to describe, design and critique the kineikonic texts – moving image texts – that pervade their everyday textual environment (Mills 2011). They need to know the secrets behind the creative and persuasive orchestration of words, images, sounds, bodily communication and other modes that manipulate emotions across varied media in late modernity – an era that is also marked by greater freedom for the expression of emotions (see Patulny & Olson, this volume, Chapter 1). Educators need to teach a broader range of meaning-making resources to strengthen students’ emotional language across multiple modes and media, because this language is now necessary for full participation in higher education, workplaces and other civic forms of engagement.

**Depicting and evoking emotions in images**

In the analysis, we address focalisation in images, that is, whether the viewer is positioned as an outside observer of the depicted scene, or as having the point of view of a participant within the scene, or a view along with a represented participant within the scene (Painter, Martin & Unsworth 2013). Within focalisation, we principally address the use of contact images, where the represented participant gazes directly at the viewer. This contrasts with observe images, where the gaze of the represented participant is not directed at the viewer, and each has an affective component.

Affect – which denotes the visceral and aesthetic experiences of the body (see Pribram, this volume, Chapter 15 for further discussion) – can be invoked through ambience, ‘regarded as a visual meaning system for creating an emotional mood or atmosphere, principally through the use of colour’ (Painter, Martin & Unsworth 2013, pp. 35–6). Ambience invokes a general emotional tone. The main meaning-making systems within ambience
are: (a) vibrancy – depth of saturation of colours, (b) warmth – with positive effects created by warmer colours, such as red and yellow, and cooler colours, such as blues and greys used for neutral and negative effects, and (c) familiarity, which is realised by the amount of colour differentiation in the image – the more colours, the greater the sense of familiarity. The use of colour can serve ideational meanings, such as green for grass or blue for sky. Colour can be used compositionally, such as to highlight or foreground objects to make them more salient. However, in this analysis we give priority to the interpersonal role of colour, particularly its significance in terms of its emotional effect on the viewer (Painter, Martin & Unsworth 2013). Interpreting the depiction of subtle emotional moods, such as those created through naturalistic or scenic images, often requires other contextual information provided by written language, music or other images in the sequence, with particular physiological and social/cultural features.

Music, emotions and multimodality

It has long been acknowledged that music impacts profoundly on the emotions (Balkwill & Thompson 1999). Filmic and musical stimuli can elicit physiological changes in the listener or viewer that accompany emotions. An additive relationship exists between simultaneously presented film and music stimuli on some self-report measures of emotion. Music supports the visual narrative of a film to modulate the emotional response of the audience (Ellis & Simons 2005).

Specific musical elements, such as tonal and rhythmic features and tempo, align with distinct emotional effects. For example, faster tempo, irregular rhythms, increased volume and higher pitches can intensify emotions – unhappiness, dissatisfaction, uncertainty and stress – and elicit physiological responses, such as changes to facial muscles, heart rate and electro-dermal activity (Parke, Chew & Kyriakakis 2007). Table 13.1 outlines other relations between music and emotion. Music may not trigger the same emotional responses in listeners from different social and cultural backgrounds, though research has shown some common patterns that hold even across cultural contexts (Balkwill & Thompson 1999).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural features</th>
<th>Emotion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major key, consonant harmonies</td>
<td>Positive valence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor key, dissonant harmonies</td>
<td>Negative valence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slow tempo, regular rhythm or meter</td>
<td>Low arousal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast tempo, irregular rhythm</td>
<td>High arousal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Other musical elements can be manipulated to influence different emotions of varying intensity. These include timbral features (such as the tonal quality of the instruments), expressive qualities (such as dynamics or volume levels) and articulation (e.g., smooth or rough rhythmic features) and melodic and harmonic compositional devices (such as arrow pitch range, dissonance, harmony and repetition) (Barton & Unsworth 2014).

This original synthesis of principles from linguistics, multimodal semiotics and musicology highlights the powerful communicative potentials for youth to evoke emotions through filmic media in contemporary times. Filmic media are not new in late modernity, but the consumption and production of user-generated podcasts or vlogs (video logs) has rapidly become one of the most visible everyday textual practices for youth today (Garcia 2015), both in and out of formal teaching contexts, and the impact on the mediated experience and expression of emotions and affect amongst late modern youth is likely to have been substantial.

**Research description**

The findings are part of a project that aimed to develop the multimodal expression of emotions of primary school children across three school sites located in a low socio-economic region of Queensland, Australia. The book trailer selected for analysis from a class set of films was produced by two female, middle-primary students (ages 9–10 years). The book trailer promoted the popular novel, *Rowan of Rin*, by Emily Rodda (2005). The movie can be viewed by typing this link into a browser: http://tiny.cc/gtrk0y. To prepare students for the learning task, a professional media artist taught a series of seven, two-hour lessons over the duration of one school term, or quarter. The unit of work was preceded by reading and discussing the novel *Rowan of Rin*, led by the classroom teacher over a number of weeks, and by developing the students’ knowledge of narrative technique in novels and their understanding of the genre of the book trailer.

The lessons by the media artist over the course of one school quarter introduced the students to specialist knowledge of how to interpret animated films and other media, and how to represent emotion through vocabulary, intermodal relations, visual images, facial expressions, body language, colour and music. Students were taught technical and composition skills for film trailer design, such as using video cameras, shooting films and editing movies. To overcome the issue of downloading large files from the school server, students could combine their filmed footage with a wide selection of pre-prepared music, stock video animations, background images and scene imagery to suit their book trailer. The students selected the segments of music and edited them in the iMovie software to fit the mood of the image sequence and transitions.

Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with the students during the film editing to clarify the students’ intended affect meanings in the
images and sound. Sample questions included: When you created this scene, what facial expressions did you choose to show different feelings and why? What backgrounds did you choose and why? When you added the audio track, what sort of music did you choose for this part and why? The point of this analysis is to reveal the emotional/affective associates between particular choices – or repertoire – of images chosen by students.

Analysis: extending the appraisal framework to the moving image

Our multimodal analysis extends the appraisal framework formulated by Martin and White (2005) to investigate the multimodal communication of affect in students’ book trailer movies. It extends beyond the original theorisation of appraisal as an account of the evaluative resources of written and spoken language. We chose the appraisal framework because it remains one of the foremost systematic approaches to mapping feelings or attitude in applied linguistics (Mills 2016b). Of particular relevance is the application of the appraisal framework to the study of affect in visual images, such as Economou’s (2012) analysis of large verbal-visual displays. Unsworth (2013) has conducted an analysis of evaluative images in children’s picture books and animated movies. More recently, Mills (2016b) and Mills, Bellocchi, Patulny and Dooley (2017) have examined how children represent affect, judgement and appreciation in photography at school.

Appraisal here refers to the language resources used to negotiate emotions, judgements and appreciation or valuation of phenomena, and to amplify and engage with these evaluations (Martin & White 2005). The work reported here focuses on one area of the appraisal framework that deals with emotions. In brief, affect is about positive or negative feelings. Martin and White (2005) use the following broad categories of affect – un/happiness, dis/satisfaction, in/security – and suggest a range of interpersonal meanings and dispositions within these categories. For example, unhappiness can include feelings of misery (e.g., down, sad, miserable) or antipathy (e.g., dislike, hate, abhor), and happiness can include cheer (e.g., cheerful, buoyant, jubilant) or affection (e.g., fond of, love, adore). There is a fourth category called dis/inclination, which is irrealis affect implicating a trigger, which describes fear (e.g., wary, fearful, terrorised) or desire (e.g., miss, long for, yearn for).

Each of the aforementioned categories of affect may be descriptions of emotional states (e.g., I was petrified) or behaviours that indicate emotional states (e.g., his hands trembled with fear). The framework addresses the funds of language through which authors overtly encode what they present as attitudes, but also how they indirectly or directly communicate feelings (Mills et al. 2014). Different intensities of the same emotion can also be expressed grammatically using different lexical terms. For example, graduations of scared from low to high could be expressed as disquieted (low), anxious (median) or distraught (high).
An additional theoretical dimension of use here is the notion of the reflexive ‘image repertoire’ developed by sociologist Ian Burkitt (2002). He argues that emotions involve positive and negative dimensions of empowerment (euphoria) and disempowerment (dysphoria), and (from Spinoza) that they can be tied to images and imaginings beyond the immediate encounter. From Barthes, he describes this as an image repertoire, or visual fragments of others that are used to construct and feel internal conceptions of, and metaphors for, emotions. Given the links made to Burkitt’s work by Patulny and Olson (see this volume, Chapter 1), these ideas combined with the present analysis might open up new ways of looking at Burkitt’s conceptions of reflexivity.

**Findings: a multimodal analysis of film**

In this section, we conduct a multimodal analysis of Emily and Isabella’s book trailer for *Rowan of Rin* to elaborate the embodied representation of positive and negative emotions. While at times we focus predominantly on one mode at a time, such as visual elements or music for the purpose of analysis, we acknowledge the role of the interrelationships between the modes to communicate emotion (Unsworth 2006).

The opening scene of the trailer presents a picture of a mystical village, providing a setting for the action to follow. The ambient light in the centre contrasts with the darkness of the rocky cliffs, and the warmth of the brightly lit village contrasts with the cooler, foreboding darkness of the overhanging rocks on the left. The scene invokes the sense that the village is a safe place surrounded by a hostile and barren external environment. It locates the setting and establishes the scene for the narrative, while implicitly foreshadowing adversity and hardship.

In this segment of the digital narrative, the music accompanying the opening scene creates an ominous feeling due to the low-pitched note that is rapidly repeated. This technique in composition, both the intense rhythmic pattern that drives the action forward as well as the low pitch, creates a feeling of insecurity and indicates that something is about to happen. A slight ‘sshhhh’ sound (white noise) appears as the transition occurs, moving to the next section, which begins with a cymbal crash and accent. The overall effect generates a feeling of suspense.

The second scene continues the traditional story beginning, locating the story in time using general terms (i.e., once) and place (Figure 13.1). This provides essential contextual information for the viewer. Bright light sweeps across the image and the dark, shadowy frame functions to name the village with the word ‘RIN’. The dull or gloomy colour choice contrasts with the bright light of the previous village scene, suggestive of the impending gloom. The light merging into the dark in this transition and then merging back into the light creates an ambience that contrasts positive and negative emotional mood, or a sense of emotional ambivalence (Burkitt 2002) in connection with the images as a prelude to further actions.
The visuals are accompanied by dark music in a minor key, which begins at a crucial point in the narrative, and which intensifies the ambience. The same low tone is maintained with the addition of strings an octave higher.

Figure 13.1 Opening screen text: setting

Figure 13.2 Musical notation: syncopation
Both the low-pitched rhythm and the strings change from a constant semi-quaver repeated beat to a syncopated effect – where the accent is off the beat (see Figure 13.2).

An irregular rhythm, such as used here, indicates insecurity and dissatisfaction. In addition, the soundtrack now includes a narrow pitch range, rather than the same note. The strings play a repeated motif on G that ascends one tone to A, followed by a descending semitone to F#, similarly functioning to indicate insecurity. This melody creates the emotion of insecurity building, due to the fast tempo and rhythm as well as the narrow pitch range. There is certainly a feeling that this section will transition to a new section in the narrative because of a sense of urgency. The use of tone – and not just image – extends Burkitt’s ideas of the ‘image repertoire’ to show a more extensive multi-model repertoire of effects.

The next scene invokes insecurity through the divergent meanings communicated through the image and the language. The bold news inscribed in the screen text, ‘ONE DAY THE STREAM DRIED UP’ in capital letters, is divergently coupled with images of flowing and powerful white water, suggesting its former abundance and power. Stark emotional impact can be created when image and written language diverge (Painter, Martin & Unsworth 2013). This counterpointing or juxtaposing of text and image reinforces the tension in the narrative, suggesting catastrophic change for the village and potentially provoking a sense of insecurity in the viewer (Martin & White 2005). The music remains largely the same as the previous section with this transition, maintaining the sense of insecurity and discontent.

The next transition depicts in the foreground a wooly beast in a lush rural scene, marked by the bright light of the village. The experiential peacefulness of this image and the warm ambience of the colour of the beast, given further emphasis by the bright light, invites a positive emotional mood that suggests normality and contentment and the normalcy of the village; but this quickly takes a dramatic turn with a bleak overlay. With the contrasting light and dark noted above, this again reinforces as a sense of emotional ambivalence (Burkitt 2002).

The greying of the background and the eerie shadowing of the text over the silhouette of the wooly beasts is similar to earlier techniques used, with the text inscribing the fateful news that, ‘THERE WAS NOTHING LEFT FOR THE GREAT HUMPED WOOLY BEASTS’. This intensifies the first complication of the narrative by showing the negative outcome of the dried-up stream. It invokes what Martin and White (2005) refer to as negative appreciation as a reaction to an event, with potential harm. The cool ambience of the dull, dark-grey hue evokes complementary negative affect (Painter, Martin & Unsworth 2013).

The change in the soundtrack evokes a similarly uncertain and intensifying mood as in the previous transition scene. The accompanying percussion and electric guitar sections add to the suspense. The students reported in the interviews that they selected ‘dramatic’ music segments. This is created by the percussion
accenting every beat and particularly beat one of every measured bar of four. The electric guitar plays distorted chords of an interval of a fifth (i.e., with the tonic, G, and dominant, D), so it seems as though the music is played in G minor even though the Bb (median) is not present. A minor key typically evokes feelings of unhappiness and discomfort (Ellis & Simons 2005).

After the foregoing introduction, the narrative introduces the characters for the first time, as seen in Figure 13.3. This shifts the viewer perspective on the narrative from impersonal observation of an impending disaster to a perspective mediated by the viewer’s personal connection with a village character. Figure 13.3 introduces the main character, Rowan of Rin, played by a female, who establishes interpersonal contact with the viewers through her direct gaze toward them (Painter, Martin & Unsworth 2013).

The girl’s expression is one of concentration and a mixture of satisfaction, interest and attentiveness. The contact image engages the audience directly, combined with a medium-close-up view, which makes the depicted emotional experience of the central character more readily accessible to readers (Unsworth 2013).

The actor shifts her gaze to look downward at the object in her hand, indicating her conscious attention or reaction to it. Stars appear in the transition slide, inviting a positive mood, perhaps pointing metaphorically to the main character or star of the narrative and hence visually invoking a positive judgement of the capacity of the character. The camera has a sustained focus on the character as the actor moves through her important journey. The music is intensified and the music soundtrack changes with only rhythmic, not tonal, features present. It is purely percussive.
In Figure 13.4 there is an interesting use of the camera view taken over the shoulders of the main character and towards the antagonist. This type of mediated focalisation from behind the character is used in film to show solidarity with the main character, as if viewing alongside the character’s point of view (Painter, Martin & Unsworth 2013). The lighting is very bright on the characters and the expression on the second character’s face indicates happiness, leading the viewer to infer that the interaction could potentially be positive, but this is still uncertain. The harmonic features of the accompanying music are decreased in this section, and only percussive sounds and a drone effect are used. Timbral features include rim shots on a snare drum, opening and closing cymbal sounds and irregular, off-beat rhythms. This creates even more suspense as the regular features of the music have been ruptured. More than images, sound and irregular rhythm form a repertoire of affective experiences that move the viewer.

The characters interact verbally, as indicated by the girl’s moving lips, and she casts her gaze downward for a few moments as Rowan awaits the reaction, creating suspense. The girl’s hand suddenly strikes, provoking insecurity, her arm creating a vector that indicates the striking movement. The rapid shifts in affect between the frames – from security and happiness in the previous scene, to insecurity and dissatisfaction – create a sense of drama. The continued percussive track invites surprise and alarm as the negative outcome of the negotiation is now certain. The rhythms are in alignment with the action of the girl’s throwing of the parchment.

The girl’s tossing head, striking arm and seeming evil swagger in the next scene can invoke interpretations of power and satisfaction, and, potentially, the
viewer’s negative judgements of social sanction – the character seems mean and arrogant (Martin & White 2005). The students explained, ‘When they [Sheba the witch] throw the stick and it hits Rowan [...] I want them to feel [...] what type of people they are’. The camera angle creates a disjuncture between the apparent display of power in the posturing, because it is taken from a high angle which evokes the viewer position as more powerful, instead of what would have been a more appropriate low-angle view to reflect the powerful display of head tossing and laughter (Kress & van Leeuwen 2006). As the students explained in the interview, they included this important scene, ‘Because it gives them a clue how [...] Rowan ended up going on the quest’. The scene cuts to Rowan lying slumped, face concealed from view in a posture of defeat. To create suspense, Rowan’s hands are shown slowly unravelling a mysterious scroll.

In this scene, depicted in Figure 13.5, the camera angle captures the face of the actor who shows a facial expression of surprise or fear (one of several possible ‘basic’ emotions; Ekman 2007), her gaze directed at the unfurled scroll. The camera angle could have been lowered in this shot to gain a closer view of the eyes and mouth, to be able to discern intensity of affect. We cannot discern whether this is positive or negative surprise from the facial expression alone. However, as the students explained in the interview, they wanted to show that Rowan was, ‘scared . . . terrified . . . like, with his mouth open and his eyes wide’. In the music, a distorted guitar part is introduced here moving from a low pitch to an octave higher and back to the low pitch. It ends with a wave (white noise) sound that increases in intensity with the strings section once again. This creates an overall ternary or three-part musical form, with the first and third phrases of the melody being the same.
In the trailer, Rowan stands up to indicate a move to action, with a glimpse of a smile, perhaps hinting at hope. A transition, shown in Figure 13.6, then shows a page turning, becoming one with the scroll, symbolically introducing the next ‘chapter’ of the narrative. The next scene contrasts the brightness and positive ambience of the daylight, as the images shift to a bleak, darkened forest scene. This provokes a sense of insecurity, challenge, fear and danger.

Fear is intensified, as the screen text, ‘ROWAN WAS WEAK AND NOT BRAVE’, makes a judgement of Rowan’s negative capacity (weak) and tenacity (brave). At the same time, the students explained in the interview that, despite this, ‘He didn’t give up’ – a positive judgement of social esteem (perseverance; Martin & White 2005). The selection of upper-case font adds textual salience, making the message appear to be stronger and more powerful, consistent with many of the other scenes in the trailer. This emphasis, along with the negative ambience of the background image, intensifies the sense of foreboding.

The music in this section utilises a range of features, including harmonic, rhythmic, timbral and expressive qualities to intensify the overall mood of uncertainty and dissatisfaction. A similar rhythmic pattern to the previous section is used, featuring a new melody played by stringed instruments. Accents in the melody are placed off the beat, creating a feeling of tension and suspense. Further, the strings are no longer playing in unison, but harmonising within close distance of each other. The first interval is a minor third which then descends to a major second. This creates a clashing of sounds or dissonance which contributes to the uncertainty, dissatisfaction and even fear. The percussive accompaniment also contributes to the tense feelings as the rhythm is syncopated with accents also occurring on the off-beat.
The repeated motif of the bright light, which appeared earlier in the visual narrative in the introductory segment of the trailer, returns, perhaps signifying the restoration of the original state of the village and the wooly beasts, which are depicted in the background (see Figure 13.7). This use of light as visual rhyme links different parts of the narrative like a cohesive device, and is a compositional or textual resource (Painter, Martin & Unsworth 2013). The use of the screen text, ‘WILL ROWAN SAVE HIS THIRSTY HUMPED WOOLY BEASTS?’, is significant, directly addressing the audience and coupled with the camera zooming in. The uncertain fate of the wooly beasts is invoked by the greying or blurring of the animals in the background.

In the early parts of the trailer, there is dark ambience to hint at impending doom, but in Figure 13.8, the fire moving across the black background intensifies this more dynamically and dramatically. The screen text, ‘LOOK INTO THE FIERY JAWS OF FEAR’, quoted from the book, is accompanied by the image of the moving fireball. This creates a co-patterning of the image and text to flag fear, terror and intensified danger. The text hints at the survival of only one character, who must demonstrate determination, bravery and tenacity, to persist against impending doom. As the students indicated in the interviews, ‘I want them to feel that they need to find out how it ends’.

The fire continues to move slowly across the screen behind the text as the viewer is afforded sufficient time to read the rhyming verse. The music reaches a climax with the fiery image as the rhythmic features increase in intensity with faster repeated motifs. The dynamics increase in volume with more accented
notes appearing. A new melodic theme appears that indicates a glimpse of hope as it modulates briefly to Eb major – the relative key to G minor (Figure 13.9).

The scene transitions to a barren and dark cave, with lonely figures seemingly overwhelmed by the treacherous landscape. This is confirmed by the students, who explained in interviews that, ‘he’s scared when he goes up the [mountain], there’s something that he is scared of, and no one will save Rin’.

The last embers of the fire from the previous scene burn away slowly on the left side of the cave, like a visual cohesive device between the current and previous scenes, before the image gradually fades.

The cool colour of the cave complements the other visual features, invoking a sense of the difficult journey ahead, while a turn in the cave and misty tunnel leads to the unknown, creating a sense of uncertainty; however, bright light is suggestive of a more positive pathway. This is aligned to the music, as the soundtrack intensifies by repeating the melody an octave higher.
on the stringed instruments. The same background music continues for the next few scenes, again providing cohesion across the junctures of the visual image sequence.

The repeating bright-light motif or visual rhyme in the centre of the next transition flashes again, used as a cohesive device, perhaps signifying the ongoing quest or hope. Using capital letters and the zooming screen text, the words, ‘WHO WILL BE THE SEVEN VILLAGERS TO GO ON THE SPECIAL QUEST?’, function to personalise the difficult decision that the village must make and arouse curiosity (Figure 13.10).

The next scene transition, like a page turning from bottom-right to top-left, and a bleak, grey snowy scene creates a continuing ambience of uncertainty and chilling insecurity. The question, ‘WILL THEY SURVIVE THE JOURNEY?’ appears in capital letters, growing larger until they are illegible and disappearing to leave the bleak, grey background. The students explained in the interviews that they used techniques such as these, ‘because I don’t want to give away the ending of it, like what’s at the end and if they’ll save them or not’. This is an important feature of film, where lines of interpretation are deliberately not closed off. The Ken Burns effect – slowly zooming in – intensifies the viewer’s sense of being drawn into the story (Mills 2011).

The next scene transitions with a heart-shaped break in the grey background. This is perhaps an intertextual reference to the seven hearts mentioned earlier. A red-eyed dragon is depicted in a moving fire, which is also an intertextual reference to the fire in the earlier scene and the words in the poem, ‘FIERY JAWS OF FEAR’. The dragon gazes directly at the
viewer – a contact image – establishing direct interpersonal engagement (Painter, Martin & Unsworth 2013). The text appears as, ‘ROWAN OF RIN’, which is both the title of the book and the name of the main character. This is done with dramatic pauses between each word, as each word appears on screen. These features intensify the enormity of the journey, the sense of challenge and the evoked sense of fear.

The movie ends with a black cross that intersects the title to indicate complete darkness. The final timing of the music is aligned with the large font that reads ‘ROWAN OF RIN’. An unsteady ending with a distorted electric guitar chord is unresolved. This is because it does not finish on the tonic of the key, but rather the dominant or fifth D. In this way, both images and music evoke a sense of an unfinished narrative, inviting the viewer to read the book to resolve the tension. Burkitt (2002) notes that the use of language and the labelling of affective and emotional experiences are important for recognising the presence of emotions, which are coupled with the use of music to evoke an emotional response.

### Conclusion and recommendations for research and educational practice

Late modernity is an era in which YouTube channels produced by youth now rival television channels as key sites for entertainment and learning. The ability to communicate emotions powerfully through film and vlogging warrants more serious attention in educational research. This research has highlighted the ability of young students to utilise the multimodal affordances of film for communicating emotions in synchronised and orchestrated ways through film. The multimodal semiotic analysis of interpersonal meanings in film has demonstrated the pattern of semiotic resources used by young students to communicate affect in nuanced and sophisticated ways. Affective meanings can be interpreted from the visual design of children’s filmic narratives, including the students’ use of ambience through the selection of image colour, visual rhyme (e.g., repeated light), focalisation and social distance.

Written language can be used to inscribe or evoke emotional responses and judgement with varied typographic effects (capitalisation, shadows), use of the interrogative mood (questions), intertextual use of poetry and the Ken Burns effect (zooming in). The divergent coupling of words and image can heighten meaning, using powerful intermodal connections between images and words. Intermodal meanings are created through the music-image interface, with intensification of the music to indicate climactic points in filmic narratives.

Embodied meanings can portray affect and judgement experienced by characters, utilising facial expression, gaze, gesture and other bodily movement to develop interpersonal meanings. This diverse repertoire of multimodal resources within the interpersonal semantic systems is quite encompassing, and requires significant capabilities with a complex ensemble of modes. Such a complex of production and interpretation reinforces the importance
of non-verbal image repertoires (Burkitt 2002) that go beyond language in conveying emotional meaning.

A recommendation arising from the research is that the teaching of the multimodal language of emotions, through film and other popular media, deserves systematic attention in the curriculum, beginning in the early years and extending through high school. In the current global context of late modernity – where images proliferate across an array of networked communication platforms – film design and its multimodal ensembles are rarely considered core components of the English curriculum in primary school, nor addressed with specificity or attention to sequential development (e.g., Council of Chief State School Officers & National Governors Association 2013; ACARA 2017).

There is a need to build these understandings more cumulatively in the curriculum, creating a pathway for the sequential trajectory for negotiating interpersonal, ideational and compositional meanings and their development over time. Likewise, this recommendation for multimodal knowledge and skills can be extended to other related audio-visual media – such as other genres of film, podcasts, vodcasts and animations – so that students can compare and contrast the affordances of each medium.

To conclude, viewing and sharing videos is an everyday literacy practice for youth and adolescents in late modernity. The communication of emotions is technology-mediated and multimodal. Young people today need apprenticeship into the multimodal communication of emotions through video and media design. The reflexive task of emotional communication in late modernity is thus demonstrated to undergo ever-more-complex forms of mediation and to develop more complex audio-visual repertoires of meaning. Teachers have a key role to teach sophisticated interpersonal meaning systems that are necessary to enact reflexive social relationships in digitally dominated worlds. Students also need guidance to exercise self-reflexivity, monitoring their digital consumption of emotions and the flux and multiplicity of digitally edited selves – because with increased opportunities are the increased risks and consequences of the ‘darker side of modernity’ (Giddens 1990, p. 7).

**Note**

1 Music track sourced from Lisi, A 2015, *Helipad siege* [royalty-free, original mp3 file], viewed 6 April 2017, www.youtube.com/watch?v=9LCkSXPorLU.

**Acknowledgement**

This research is supported by industry partners, the Department of Education and Training (Qld), Big Picture Industries Inc., Flagstone State School, Marsden State School, Yugumbir State School and an Australian Research
Council Linkage Grant (LP 150100030) funded by the Australian Government. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Australian Government or the Australian Research Council. Special thanks are given here to Joshua Darrah, the talented graphic designer, illustrator and media artist who taught filmmaking and multimodal emotive language to the students in this project. We also thank Lesley Friend for her editing of the author versions of this chapter.

References


Mills, K A 2016a, Literacy theories for the digital age: social, critical, multimodal, spatial, material and sensory lenses, Multilingual Matters, Bristol.

Mills, K A 2016b, ‘What children’s photography can teach us about affect, judgement and appreciation’, Australian Systemic Functional Linguistics Association, 27–29 September, Learning Sciences Institute Australia, Australian Catholic University, North Sydney, NSW.


Rodda, E 2005, Rowan of Rin: the journey, Scholastic, Australia.


Unsworth, L 2013, ‘Persuasive narratives: evaluative images in picture books and animated movies’, Appraisal symposium: current issues in appraisal analysis, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW.
Chapter 14

Public feeling
The entanglement of emotion and technology in the 2011 riots

Jennifer Harding

Introduction

In August 2011, the UK experienced arguably the worst display of civil unrest in a generation (Lewis et al. 2011). Some politicians were keen to locate clear causes of the disturbance: in criminality, moral collapse amidst disadvantaged communities and poor parenting. Numerous commentators claimed that the 2011 riots were distinguished from previous instances of disorder by: gang culture, the extent of looting and the widespread use of social media (Newburn 2015). Some academics have sought to contextualise the 2011 riots in relation to structural changes in post-industrial British race, class, and consumer culture (Bauman 2011; Cooper 2012; Moxon 2011; Treadwell et al. 2013). Yet, various explanatory discourses fail to capture the complexity of the riots and their development. Relatively little attention has been paid to how emotion and media figured in the unfolding of disturbance and its interpretation (see Khorana, this volume, Chapter 16; and von Scheve & Ural, this volume, Chapter 20 for more on the interaction between media, emotion and public perceptions).

This chapter is mainly concerned with the problem of how to conceptualise the entanglement of emotion and media in the process of rioting. It begins by discussing attempts to contextualise the riots. It then considers how emotions and media technologies have figured in attempts to explain the motivation and momentum of the riots: in mainstream media, accounts provided by rioters and some academic analyses. It reflects on the advantages of deploying affect and assemblage in analysis of relations between feeling, technology and acting in the riots.

The 2011 riots were defined by various attempts to represent them. It was widely reported in mainstream media that a peaceful protest at the police shooting of Mark Duggan developed into a riot on 6 August 2011 in North London. Family and friends of Duggan gathered outside Tottenham police station at 5pm, waiting to speak with a senior police officer, who never arrived. Many of the original protestors left when the crowd swelled and began attacking police property. Images of burning police cars circulated via the Internet and, shortly after, people from neighbouring boroughs began arriving to join the disturbance.
The next day, a headline in *The Observer* newspaper proclaimed ‘Tottenham in flames as riot follows protest’.

Over the course of the next four days, disorder spread to other London boroughs and UK cities. Up to 15,000 people (as participants or observers) took to the streets, with almost 4,000 arrested by early September, marking a serious episode of civil unrest. Police struggled and failed to contain lawlessness. Rioters attacked police buildings and vehicles but looting was the most common unlawful activity (Lewis et al. 2011). It was estimated that approximately 2,500 shops and businesses were looted during the riots (Lewis et al. 2011, p. 27). Fashion retailers and stores containing high-value electrical goods were the most popular targets for looters, although some broke into cheap supermarkets to steal everyday basics such as washing powder, nappies and baby food (Guardian et al. 2011, pp. 43, 50).

**Context of disturbance**

Newburn (2015) suggests that the riots of 2011 shared with those of the 1980s a similar structural, political and cultural context: ‘an economic downturn, relatively high levels of unemployment, a right of centre government embarking on fairly radical reform, and rising levels of general social inequality’ (p. 50). In both instances, rioting occurred in ‘relatively impoverished, inner-city communities with sizeable minority ethnic communities’ (Newburn 2015, p. 59).

However, Newburn (2015) argues, the events of August 2011 were distinguished from earlier riots by: their fluidity and the pace with which they spread from location to location, possibly aided by communications technologies; the extent of looting; the failure of politicians to offer wholesale support to the police; and the nature and scale of the response of the penal system. Although race was played down in accounts of the 2011 riots – partly because they were not ‘race riots’ – race has been an overriding theme in post-war riots in Britain (Newburn 2015, p. 50). Since the 1980s, disturbances have tended to ‘coalesce around conflict with the police’, with race ‘at the heart of the grievances’ (Newburn 2015, pp. 50–1). The perception of police misuse of power has been (as in the case of Mark Duggan) a significant trigger for disturbance. But, Newburn (2015) argues, this is only one of several factors, as riots are multifaceted and fluid. Indeed, more attention might be focused on the complex intersections of race, class and age.

Cooper (2012) argues that explanatory discourses (in mainstream media and political discourse) have centred on the ‘problem’ of ‘culturally-deficient communities’ (related to age, ‘race’ and the ‘underclass’) and ‘failing public services’ (police and education) (pp. 8–9). More liberal commentators have focused on conflict between a racist police system and ‘(largely black) marginalised communities’ (*ibid.*, p. 9). However, neither explanation acknowledges the broader socio-cultural context of the 2011 riots and how this has impacted
young people marginalised by ‘race’ and class growing up in England (ibid., p. 11). Cooper argues that three decades of neoliberal restructuring in Britain have ‘hollowed out the social protections, educational opportunities, job prospects, and spaces for political engagement that previous generations could access’ (p. 13).

Others have argued that the 2011 riots were distinguished primarily by looting and that consumer culture, and feverish conformity to consumerist values together with rising inequalities, go a long way towards explaining this disturbance (Treadwell et al. 2013; Moxon 2011). Bauman (2011) described the riots as ‘a mutiny of defective and disqualified consumers’. However, Newburn et al. (2015) point out that looting is common in major contemporary urban violence and the elevation of consumer culture as a primary differentiating factor ignores the expressive, violent and political character of looting. They argue that looting ‘is not an undifferentiated set of activities but rather a set of social acts capable of harbouring multiple meanings, motivations and understandings’ (p. 992). Indeed, while some rioters were engaged in appropriating goods to engage in high-end individual consumerism, others were taking basic goods to make ends meet; some looting was organised, much was opportunistic. Looting can be viewed as a form of violence and one means of expressing discontent (Newburn et al. 2015).

The looting in 2011 was perhaps distinguished by its extent. And, whilst it is always a public action, looting was made more visible by the circulation of mobile photograph and video footage, rolling news and CCTV everywhere (Newburn et al. 2015). The affective dimensions of looting (anxiety, excitement, the thrill of seizing an opportunity) were also intensified in a highly mediatised environment. However, these elements, emotions and media technologies, and their part in the unfolding of the 2011 riots, including the politically pertinent expression of anger and resentment, have been underexplored. Next, I consider how media and emotions have figured in interpretations of the riots.

**Mainstream media response to the riots**

As Britons ask themselves what changed in their country that might have caused these riots, one obvious answer stands out: technology.

* (The Economist 2011)

Commentators (police, politicians, journalists) generally identified communications technologies as a cause of unrest. Mainstream media reporting focused on the scale, speed and intensity of the crowd as it amassed through online social networking (Baker 2011). Prime Minister David Cameron asked in the House of Commons whether people should be prevented from communicating via social media ‘when we know they are plotting violence, disorder and criminality’ (Cellan-Jones 2011). Facebook and BlackBerry Messenger (BBM)
services were the key means of communication, enabling rioters to connect and organise. At that time, BBM provided the cheapest social networking facility and was especially popular among those from economically deprived communities across England, with a 37% share of the youth market (Guardian et al. 2011). It was an extraordinarily efficient tool for sharing information on where the riots were, safe routes home and what police were doing (Guardian et al. 2011). However – despite the attention paid to social media by government and the press – television and the dramatic nature of its coverage played a large part in mobilising rioters (Lewis et al. 2011).

A notable feature of mainstream media coverage of the riots was reference to emotion. That is, emotions were part of a process of reflecting on and shaping a major series of events. Journalists used specific emotion words (disgust, anger, fear, shock, sadness) to describe the response of police, politicians and the public to the riots and other emotion words (anger, frustration, lack of hope, grievance) to describe the motivations of rioters. Tom Lawrence (2011) wrote in The Independent, ‘Anger and frustration at police drove summer riots’, whilst Andy Dangerfield (BBC News 2011) stated, ‘London riots: Teenagers “lack hope”’. Here, emotions signal some acknowledgement of social inequalities in Britain and possible grounds for grievance. However, the emotions most discussed were those attributed to the public, politicians and the police. These were invariably strong emotions (anger, fear, disgust) and worked to define a clear boundary between the law-abiding and the lawless, the rational and the irrational, reasonable and unreasonable anger, thereby aligning a pro-social majority against an anti-social minority and invalidating the concerns of the latter. On Tuesday, 9 August, a number of newspaper headlines expressed alarm at the unpredictability and escalating force of gathering crowds, or, more specifically, ‘the mob: The rule of the mob’ (The Daily Telegraph); ‘Mob rule: police and politicians powerless as London burns for a third night and riots spread’ (The Independent); ‘The anarchy spreads’ (Daily Mail); ‘Out of control: riots reach crisis point’ (i). Here, ‘the mob’ is characterised by strong emotion (specifically, anger), which is seen as uncontrolled, destructive and contagious. Indeed, palpable concern about the crowd – its force, intensity and effects – suffused public debate about the riots.

Negative thinking about crowds has roots in the work of nineteenth-century psychologist Gustave Le Bon, who argued that individuals gathering in large groups begin to lose individuality and free will, becoming part of a single collective mind, guided not by reason, but by instinct (Le Bon [1895] 2007). According to Le Bon, the ‘psychological crowd’ is always intellectually inferior to the isolated individual, suggestible and impulsive (pp. 15–19); ideas and emotions can spread like disease in crowds with ‘a contagious power as intense as that of microbes’ (p. 80). Some social groups are seen as more susceptible to transmitted affects, and the irrationality of the crowd, than others: namely, those already regarded as socially inferior and weak, such as lower social classes, women, children, minority ethnic groups (Blackman & Walkerdine 2001).
Despite its tenuous foundations, the idea of affective or emotional contagion has endured over time in popular discourse on people in groups and collective action. And, in the 2011 riots, the ‘mob’ was widely assumed to be largely young, Black and male, despite Ministry of Justice statistics, which indicate that a more diverse population appeared in court on riot-related criminal charges. An understanding of the crowd, or mob, as driven by emotion and necessarily irrational worked to subordinate already marginalised subjects and de-legitimise grievance. Digital media were considered responsible for the speed, intensity and violence of the crowd. And so, overall, mainstream media coverage tended to attribute the causes of rioting to a mix of emotion, digital technologies and (pre-existing) social identity.

**A politics of resentment**

Journalists from the Guardian newspaper and researchers from the London School of Economics (LSE) conducted 270 in-depth qualitative interviews in order to explore the riots from participants’ perspectives (Lewis et al. 2011). Their sample was mixed in terms of ‘self-identified ethnicity’ and included women and girls and those aged 13–57, although it was predominantly male and young.

Interviewees cited poverty and policing as the two most important causes of the riots, with 86% and 85% of respondents respectively saying the causes were important or very important. They spoke in detail about their everyday lived experience of marginalisation and sense of resentment. Interview participants articulated resentment towards the police, but also towards large corporations and the government. They resented the way police treated them: more specifically, through the everyday practices of ‘stop and search’, mainly targeted at Black young men, and frequent insults giving rise to feelings of harassment, disrespect and humiliation. Participants resented big business and advertising corporations and media generally, for fuelling a consumerist culture from which the jobless felt excluded. Some, particularly young looters, spoke of the pressure and ‘hunger’ for the ‘right’ goods and brands names and said that the riots enabled them to exercise a kind of ‘freedom’ by acquiring such things for themselves (Guardian et al. 2011, pp. 46–7). Participants resented the government and its austerity policies, which had led to benefits cuts and unemployment. Of respondents who were of working age and not in education at the time of the riots, a little over half were unemployed. For many, the central issue was not having a job or any prospect of a job (Guardian et al. 2011). They resented the disparity between the jobless and bankers receiving huge bonuses. Younger interviewees specifically mentioned the removal of the Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA), increased university fees and the lack of job opportunities.

Researchers write that the rioters felt ‘dislocated from the opportunities they saw were available to others’ and felt that they had little stake in the social order. Asked if they felt ‘part of British society’, only 51% of those interviewed said that they did, compared with 92% of the population as a whole.
Jennifer Harding (Guardian et al. 2011, p. 75). Interviewees talked about being invisible, their voices not being heard and no one caring 'because you are poor' (Guardian et al. 2011, pp. 76–7). Some felt despised for their poverty.

People look at us and once they take one look at us we can’t afford clothes to look good for [a job] interview and once they take a look at how we’re dressed and that they just automatically look down on us and it’s annoying. People hate it. That’s where a lot of the hate comes from.

(Guardian et al. 2011, pp. 77–8)

The authors of Reading the riots suggest that an outpouring of anti-police and anti–authority attitudes was for some a five-day catharsis. Many spoke of feeling empowered, liberated and euphoric. Repeatedly, they said confrontations with the police made them feel ‘powerful’ (Guardian et al. 2011, p. 91). Such statements further underlined rioters’ everyday feelings of powerlessness and hopelessness, which rioting, and specifically looting, temporarily reversed. Seventeen-year-old Denise said, ‘People were just passing fags from the counters’ and ‘You know what? For once it felt like you had so much power’ (Guardian et al. 2011, p. 21). Others described a sense of disbelief at the inability of police to stop them. A 16-year-old said: ‘People were smiling. It was just everyone was smiling. It was literally a festival with no food, no dancing, no music but a free shopping trip for everyone’ (Guardian et al. 2011, pp. 51–2). Others described a happy atmosphere or vibe, with laughing and giggling (Guardian et al. 2011, p. 52).

Such accounts convey clearly joy, excitement and exhilaration at what rioters could do – transgress and feel unstoppable – and show how the disturbance gathered and sustained momentum through emotion. Systematic and opportunistic looting are presented as a way of acting back (materially, symbolically) against lack of (economic, social, educational) opportunity, as looters seized what other people had (high-end goods, everyday basics) and with them a sense of self–worth and power. Participants describe feeling empowered through the process of violent consumerism.

Digital media played a vital part in sharing information on how to get to specific locations, safe routes home and police activity. They were used to display goods taken, and intensified the symbolic importance of collective action; the circulation of images of police cars ablaze and police unable to contain rioting were affectively potent and emblematic of standing up to authority and large corporations. The display of goods seized invoked (previously unarticulated) feelings of resentment at systemic unfairness and signalled (temporary) affective empowerment through taking decisive action.

However, this is not to imply that all participants in the riots felt the same way or that their feelings were unambiguous and static. Indeed, some rioters wanted to march to Downing Street to protest at austerity measures and sought to distance themselves from looting; others resented materialism but stole high–end goods. Some of those interviewed reflected on their actions with pride,
others with regret and shame. Nevertheless, their articulation of feeling can be seen as politically potent and a critical comment on lived experience at the margins of late modern society, characterised by increased individualisation, responsibility for self, insecurity (focused around lack of opportunity for education and employment and social protection) and reflexivity mediated by consumption and technology.

**Digital society and mediated emotion**

Late modernity is digital society; digitally networked communication tools and platforms have become thoroughly entangled in everyday activities, interactions and relationships. Digital media have transformed social and emotional life, partly by expanding and intensifying the processes of reflexivity.

Following media theorists (such as McLuhan, Poster, Castells), any medium can be understood as a symbolic structure or social environment that shapes human interaction and the production of culture (Lindgren 2017). The Internet and social media, characterised by increased connectivity and interactivity, afford more extensive and frequent opportunities for social interaction, including sharing, performing and displaying emotion (Lindgren 2017). Yet, digital technologies are distinguished not by enabling something completely new but rather by the proliferation, speed and intensity they afford communication. And, as with other media, the possibilities afforded by the Internet are shaped by the relational and contextual aspects of social interaction and the cultural political context in which its tools and platforms are used (Lindgren 2017).

Manuel Castells (2012) discusses the role of digital communications and emotion in the emergence of new social movements. He argues that, whilst their roots lie in various manifestations of injustice and their structural causes, contemporary social movements (from the Arab Spring to Occupy Wall Street) start with the emotions of individuals angered or outraged by specific (unbearable) events: financial crisis, food crisis, poverty, rampant inequalities, undemocratic polity and so on. Emotions are transformed into collective action as individuals reflect, connect and share feelings with others via an effective channel of communication. Digital communication provides distinctive opportunities for forging a sense of togetherness and mobilising collective action. Indeed, ‘[t]he faster and more interactive the process of communication is, the more likely the formation of a process of collective action becomes’ (Castells 2012, p. 15).13 So, Castells argues, the origins of social movements are found in the emotions of individuals and in their networking on the basis of cognitive empathy. They develop in a hybrid social space consisting of social media, mainstream media, people’s pre-existing social networks and the occupation of urban space (Castells 2012, pp. 10, 59). Yet, Castells insists that social media – or any technology – do not determine social movements but are more than mere tools (Castells 2012, p. 229). Rather, communications technologies are part of the materialisation of cultural practices (including emotions).
Stephanie Baker (2011) examines the role of digital media and emotion in the 2011 riots. She argues that despite parallels with the social conditions (government cuts, poverty, discrimination) in which riots took place in the past, the 2011 riots are distinguished by the emergence of the ‘mediated crowd’. The mediated crowd is formed through affective reflexive communication in the virtual public sphere in a context where, Baker argues, digital media technologies have helped to intensify the reflexive processes pervading modern social life (as theorised by Beck, Giddens, Lash and others).

Baker states that the police shooting of Mark Duggan provided a focus for collective reflexive consciousness and action in Tottenham, and further unrest across the country. Individuals felt empowered to act together when they recognised that they shared feelings in common with others (Baker 2011). Affective reflexivity communicated via social media became a major factor in mobilising the mediated crowd and creating new forms of collectivity (Baker 2011). Baker makes the point that, whilst crowds may appear homogeneous and monolithic entities acting in unison, individuals decide to engage in collective action and this decision making reflects the agent’s judgement and ‘disposition to act’.

In attempting to specify the role of emotion in the riots, Baker draws on social psychologist Joseph de Rivera’s concepts emotional atmosphere (a transitory mood) and emotional climate (a longer-term environment). She suggests that the initial unrest in Tottenham in 2011 reflects an emotional atmosphere of anger and resentment towards the police following the shooting of Mark Duggan. The subsequent riots, and their escalation, indicate an emotional climate consisting of ‘deeper structural conditions of political and social inequality’, together with related feelings of anger and resentment, which facilitated disturbance (Baker 2011, p. 3). Emotional climate, Baker points out, refers to a common structural environment that influences how individual and collectives experience the social world but does not predetermine action or infer that participants experience the same emotions or operate as a homogeneous group (Baker 2011). This analysis is helpful in showing how emotions might be considered collective phenomena. However, it treats environments and subjects as external to one another and fails to specify their relationship. Anger and resentment feature as both atmosphere and climate, and are undifferentiated in terms of their qualities, intensities and effects. Perhaps, as I argue below, anger and resentment are better viewed as qualitatively and quantitatively different, and subjects and environments as not only interactive but also co-constitutive. Also, resentment might be seen as a complex emotion, differently experienced in relation to the police and government (clear-cut) and consumer culture and large corporations (ambivalent).

Both Baker and Castells view emotion as an individual response to particular (socio-economic-political) stimuli, which may then lead the subject to think and act differently. From this perspective, emotions are viewed as largely cognitively controlled and located in individual bodies and biographies, even
though they are recognised and develop in social interaction. Both authors emphasise individual reflexivity, judgement and choice, and imply a linear connection between emotion and (collective) action, facilitated by communications technologies. This approach successfully rejects a notion of emotional contagion (implying involuntary, irrational processes), in accounting for collective emotion and action. However, it tends to present an understanding of the individual as overly rational and atomised, embodying an accentuated, albeit networked, individualism. And, a focus on subject positions and origins fails to capture theoretically the complex dynamics of movement and the process of affective empowerment. Additionally, more work is needed to understand how feelings, technologies, subjects and (social, emotional) environments combined in the 2011 riots. Here, I suggest, it is worth considering the analytical power of affect and assemblage.

**Affect and assemblage**

Affect theory presents a way of thinking beyond overly rational and goal-oriented understandings of human action and viewing experiences as connected with process rather than position, movement rather than stasis, as collective and external, rather than individual and internal (Seigworth & Gregg 2010, p. 7).

Cultural theorists have used the term affect to refer to sensible experience beyond signification (Grossberg 1992; Massumi 2002). Affect is seen as ‘unstructured and unformed’ (Massumi 2002, p. 260). It does not require a subject and, indeed, precedes the individual. Emotion, on the other hand, is viewed as inevitably personal: experience recognised, organised and expressed. That is, emotion functions in the realms of meaning and ideology through ‘the sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of an experience which is from that point onward defined as personal’ (Massumi 2002, p. 28).

Deleuze, drawing on Spinoza, understands affect as a body’s capacity to affect and be affected (Deleuze 1988). For Deleuze, affect is ‘transitive’; it refers to the change or variation that results when bodies (human, non-human, organic, inorganic, conceptual, social) come into contact and is ‘experienced in a lived duration that involves the difference between two states’ (Deleuze 1988, p. 49). That is, affect is the force or intensity of an encounter, involving process, change and possibility.

Understanding the riots through the above-mentioned elements of affect theory foregrounds intensities in encounters between bodies (human and non-human) on urban streets. It directs attention to inarticulate sensible experience, a developing atmosphere, temporary affective alignments, possibility, transformation and movement. It enables us to see how inarticulate feelings of resentment (quantity) may become recognised and expressed (qualified) as anger, and so have impact. By focusing on *in-between-ness* as people and messages encounter one another, affect offers a way of thinking how the riots took place. This avoids the
issue of identifying a single causal agent (particular individuals or technologies) and problematising the susceptibility of certain social groups. It presumes relationality, and sidesteps a bifurcation of the individual and the social.

However, Grossberg cautions that affect – used to refer to all non-semantic effects – may cover ‘too much ground’ (Grossberg 2010, p. 314). Work on affect often assumes its immediate effectivity whereas affect, in order to produce specific effects, needs to ‘go through’ regimes and discourses that organise the body and everyday life (Grossberg 2010, p. 316), recreating the unequal (economic, social, educational, political) relations of a particular historical conjuncture.

The place of digital media in the relationality of the particular historical conjuncture in which rioting occurred can be examined using the concept ‘assemblage’. Assemblage captures the interaction of human and non-human elements, seeking to avoid determinisms (technological or social) and viewing technologies and humans as external to one another (Deleuze & Guattari 1987; Macgregor Wise 2005, p. 81). Deleuze and Guattari use assemblage to refer to a ‘constellation of singularities and traits’ (1987, p. 406). These can be diverse entities such as people, technologies, things, social institutions, concepts, ideas, words, images, emotions and so on. Assemblage includes specific entities and also qualities, affects and effects, directing attention to not only what an assemblage is but also what it does (Macgregor Wise 2005), and so to movement and change. Assemblages create territories and stake a claim; they are not fixed but are constantly being made and unmade (Macgregor Wise 2005). Assemblage provides a way of thinking about how feelings, technologies and ideas were entangled in particular ways to make a protesting assemblage that became a series of looting assemblages through the encounters of numerous bodies.

An initial protesting assemblage comprised: a gathering of people on a street (protesters, commentators, spectators), symbols of authority (police personnel, buildings and cars), the practice of protesting, ideas of (in)justice, emotions (expressions of grief by family and friends and solidarity by supporters), affects (a sense of grievance) and various communications (between those physically co-present and virtually present others). This assemblage claimed a new territory: the right to protest at perceived injustice and seek answers to questions about what happened and why.

The protesting assemblage was gradually dismantled as family and close friends left and remade as others arrived. A new assemblage formed consisting of some of the original protestors, incomers, affects (a sense of unfairness, resentment, excitement, togetherness), emotions (anger, solidarity, pride), buildings and the circulation of images of acts of lawlessness (in particular the destruction of property and looting) via social media and broadcast television, and social institutions (criminal justice system, government, media). This assemblage claimed a new territory: the possibility of affective empowerment through taking revenge against authorities (police, government, large corporations) over social inequalities.
These assemblages created affective alignments and made things happen because of the way in which different entities were ‘brought together in particular relations’ (Macgregor Wise 2005, p. 78). The influence of digital media technologies cannot be separated from their interactions with other elements in the assemblage.

Conclusion

The 2011 UK riots signalled a public articulation of feeling that deserves to be understood in part as political. Participants identified policing and poverty as the main causes of the riots. They reported feeling insecure and excluded from the social order. Public discussion (led by police, politicians and journalists) focused mainly on the capacity of digital media technologies to accelerate, multiply and intensify the communication of negative emotions fuelling the violence of the crowd. This interpretation presented technology as determining social action, emotion as contagious and certain social groups as undiscerning and irrational, thereby de-legitimising a sense of grievance and obscuring its structural and political roots. Subordinate groups were further subjugated and unvoiced through this discourse. Sociologists analysing the role of digital communication technologies and emotion in social movements (Castells) and the UK riots (Baker) have tended to understand individuals as overly rational, focusing on cognitively controlled emotions, and technologies and subjects as external to each other.

In contrast, I have argued that certain analytical tools – affect and assemblage – are especially useful in exploring a sense of movement and the entanglement of emotion and technology in the riots and sidestepping the bifurcation of subjects and technologies, subject and environments. I have argued for an analytical focus on process and movement, rather than position, in order to grasp some of the complexity of the riots and the possibilities they offered for transitory affective empowerment.

Notes

1 See, for example, Prime Minister David Cameron’s statement on violence in England on 10 August 2010; and Home Secretary Theresa May’s speech in the House of Commons on 11 August 2011, specifically focusing on criminality and gang culture.
2 A 29-year-old British man shot and killed by police in Tottenham, North London, England, on 4 August 2011. At the time, the Metropolitan Police stated that officers were attempting to arrest him on suspicion of planning an attack, and that he was in possession of a handgun.
3 There were fewer than 100 people at the original gathering (Lewis at al. 2011).
4 See the final report of the Riots, Communities and Victims Panel (2012).
5 Statistics produced by the UK Ministry of Justice (2012) show that: 5,175 offences were recorded by the police; 4,000 people were arrested by early September; and 3,103 had appeared before courts by 10 August 2012.
6 For example, in Brixton (London), Handsworth (Birmingham), Moss Side (Manchester) and Toxteth (Liverpool).
7 Specifically, the numbers arrested and prosecuted (aided by all-night court sittings), the scale of sentencing imposed, the use of CCTV and the extensive resources put into locating and arresting perpetrators (Newburn 2015, pp. 59–60).
8 According to Ministry of Justice statistics, 37% of those appearing in court on riot-related charges were White, 40% were Black and 6% Asian. There was some geographical variation, with 37% White in London and 79% White in Merseyside (Lewis et al. 2011, p. 3).
9 The 270 participants were from London, Birmingham, Manchester, Salford, Nottingham and Liverpool.
10 79% of those interviewed were under 24 years old and 21% were women and girls (Lewis et al. 2011). ‘In terms of self-identified ethnicity, 26% of the sample were white, 47% black, 5% Asian, and 17% “mixed/other”’ (Lewis et al. 2011, p. 3).
11 Participants were asked to say which of a list of causes of the riots they regarded as most significant and these same factors were also put to 1,001 adults across the UK by ICM, the Guardian pollsters. Participants in the ICM survey cited poor parenting (86%) and criminality (86%) as leading causes of the riots (Lewis et al. 2011, p. 11).
12 According to an ICM survey of 1,001 adults across the UK (Lewis et al. 2011, p. 11).
13 Castells’ consideration of the significance of emotion and digital communications in propelling new social movements draws on a theory of affective intelligence, his ‘network theory of power’ (2011) and his conceptualisation of ‘mass-self communication’ (2009).
14 During the 1980s and early 2000s (for example, in Brixton in 1981 and in Brixton and Birmingham in 1985; in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford in 2001).
15 de Rivera defines ‘emotional climate’ as an objective measurable environment, relating to underlying social structures, social relations and the exercise of political control (de Rivera 1992, pp. 2–3, 7).
16 Rainie and Wellman (2012) outline the concept ‘networked individualism’ as feature of late modernity. Here, networks replace more traditional social groups and communities and each individual resides at the centre of his/her own set of networks in a social world marked by increased individualism (Lindgren 2017, p. 101).
17 According to Massumi (2002), affect can be qualified and potentially transformed into emotion.
18 Deleuze distinguishes between Spinoza’s conceptualisation of affectio (‘the state of the affected body’, which ‘implies the presence of the affecting body’) and affectus (‘the passage from one state to another’) (Deleuze 1988, p. 49).

References


Deleuze, G & Guattari, F 1987, *A thousand plateaus: capitalism and schizophrenia*, University of Minnesota Press, Minnesota.


Introduction

In Chapter 1 of this collection, Patulny and Olson describe late modernity as, on the one hand, ‘increasingly individualised and reflexive’ (p. xx; italics in original). Such growing atomisation and self-managed introspection also alters emotions, which ‘are more individualistic in late modernity’ (p. ??; italics in original). On the other hand, late modern identities are increasingly filtered through media, which have ‘replaced the traditional institutions directing our emotions’, so that ‘emotions are now mediated through mass media’ (pp. ??, ??; italics in original). I suggest that an inherent tension exists between these two broad paths – individualisation and mediation – used to characterise late modernity.

Rather than individualistic, by definition mass media imply collective, shared cultural sites, experienced as important social spaces by late modern subjects. Many media scholars have described the spread of mass media as a defining feature of modernity, beginning first with newspapers and, subsequently, film. Miriam Hansen has argued that cinema epitomises ‘a specifically modern type of public sphere’, born of the mechanisms of modernity and emerging along with modernism (Hansen 2000, p. 342). Cinema’s qualities of mass production and consumption reflected modernity’s new technological and industrial processes fabricating reproducible commodities – movies – in which numerous publics could partake, regardless of how dispersed or diverse such populaces were. Arguably, its own mass-based conditions of emergence rendered early cinema, and Hollywood in particular, well situated to express the preoccupations and experiences of modern times. Developing generic forms such as slapstick comedy and action-adventure, the movies quickly became adept at entertaining the sensibilities of twentieth-century modernity, approximating both its democratic processes of ‘abundance’ as well as its crises and dislocations (Hansen 2000, p. 341).

Contentions about the centrality of mass media for modernity include the notion that, in the face of declining historical sources of community, media came to play an increasingly complex and significant role in the shaping of sociocultural existence. In the late modern era of intensifying global mass information and communications, film, television and computerised media
continue as pivotal sites for collective experience and public exchange. Certainly, changing mass media technologies demand careful analyses of their particular functions and outcomes, each new form altering individual and social life in divergent ways. However, ever-changing technologies should not cause us to overlook mass media’s broad public function as sites for negotiating shared cultural values or exploring contemporaneous social realities.

Although current audiences may be more fragmented than in previous decades, mass media continues to rely on substantial numbers of co-existing consumers, even as niche marketing and narrowcasting have emerged to address the diversity of late modern subjects. Further, beyond shared consumption, all mass media require collective socio-cultural and aesthetic competencies in order for viewers, readers or listeners to understand and appreciate mediated programming.

This chapter considers narrative media as ‘a public space of social imaginings within a culturally conditioned aesthetic framework’ (Gledhill 2000, p. 232). Mediated stories serve as public sites through which we attempt to recognise, make sense of, reject or revise our contemporary social circumstances and identities. Narrative media express social relations aesthetically, by means of historically and culturally developed techniques that, to varying degrees of success, perform everything from the vast to the most intricate aspects of contemporaneous lived experience. One of the functions of fictional media, partly accounting for why we turn to it with such avidity, rests in its ability to bring into recognition aspects of lived existence that would otherwise remain unmarked or inexpressible. Prominent among the most resistant to articulation, emotions constitute a range of experience rendered expressible by narrative media, as ‘a public space of social imaginings’.

Indeed, nowhere is late modern theory’s contradiction between self-reflexive individualisation and collective mediated experience more evident than in the arena of emotionality. The view of late modernity as dominated by individually managed emotions attributes a curiously large degree of autonomy to the otherwise extensive commodification of late modern citizenry. The danger in tying emotions too narrowly with atomised self-reflexivity is that we reinforce emotionality as private and personal, instead of exploring its manifestations as social and public practices. In contrast, how emotionality functions in mediated forms offers entry points for exploring emotions as broadly felt sociocultural events. Especially in popular cultural modes, narrative media comprise spaces where emotions are exercised in shared configurations via specific aesthetic processes.

Borrowing from contemporary affect theory, I outline emotions as felt experiences thoroughly entangled with the socio-cultural. However, I argue that a productive conceptualisation of emotionality within socio-cultural terms has been largely overlooked in contemporary affective and cognitive theories, which tend to pursue individually harboured versions of emotions, whether embodied or in mind. In subsequent sections, I trace ways emotions are activated aesthetically in films, in order to express collectively recognisable feelings towards depicted social circumstances. This is not to argue that audiences
respond emotionally to represented events in uniform ways; that would no more occur in mediated conditions than in ‘real’ life. But mediated emotional experiences afford opportunities to recognise the ways we might, ought or fail to feel towards aspects of social worlds we share in common.

**Sociocultural emotionality**

One of the motivations for the turn to affect theory has been to counter the conceptualisations provided by linguistic, psychoanalytical and ideological theories in past decades. Affect theory serves to refocus attention on the material body – in particular on its visceral, autonomic, non-cognitive functions. Concentrating on embodied aspects of existence avoids post-structuralist conclusions that human activity can be reduced to language, discourse and signification.

For example, in Brian Massumi’s influential account, affect is equated with intensity and vitality in ways that are ‘irreducibly bodily and autonomic’ in nature, manifesting primarily in the skin, ‘at the surface of the body, at its interface with things’ (Massumi 2002, pp. 28, 25). Affect is a non-conscious state that registers the intensity of experience – its strength and duration – for a being that is not yet a subject.² Similarly, Deborah Gould considers affect as a ‘noncognitive, nonconscious, nonlinguistic, and nonrational’ state that manifests as ‘unnamed, but nevertheless registered, experiences of bodily energy and intensity’ (Gould 2010, pp. 25–6).

Massumi identifies emotions, in contrast, as the quality or content of an experience achieved by passing through semantic or semiotic processes, which include language, ideology, narrativity and other forms of signification (ibid., pp. 26–7). In this view, emotions occur in the realm of meaning production through the ‘sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of an experience’ (ibid., p. 28). The problem with signification for Massumi is that it freezes pre-subjective fluid processes into fixed, socially determinate positions. For her part, Gould argues that emotions are constituted when affective bodily intensities become transformed, through cultural mediation, into ‘conventionally known and fixed’ phenomena (ibid., p. 27). The result is that emotion ‘squeezes’ affect ‘into the realm of cultural meanings and normativity’ (ibid.). Thus, the new materiality remains ‘relatively autonomous from the sociocultural’ (ibid., p. 31).

Rather than a drawback, I argue much value exists in affect theory’s conceptualisation of emotionality as socio-culturally informed experience. The potential in affect theory’s rendering of emotionality can be located, precisely, in emotions’ presence in the ‘realm of cultural meanings’. Relationality with the socio-cultural evades historical limitations in which emotions are connected too exclusively with either the mind as cognition or the sensating body. Affect theory’s schema of emotionality, although intended as critique, works towards circumventing radically biological, psychological or individualistic accounts of emotionality.

As noted, Massumi identifies narrative as a dominant system of signification. And indeed, emotions are pivotal to most forms of popular storytelling
Compensating for the limitations of rational, articulable explanation remains a reason we occupy narrative worlds, with their emotionally resonant images, sounds, characters and stories. Although not taken up to the degree merited, film and television exist as productive sites for detailed analyses of emotions as socio-cultural phenomena. Popular culture’s complex narratives rely on intricate emotional appeals in order to create their impacts and meanings, enabling people to recognise aspects of what they feel and, therefore, who they are. Conversely, popular narratives may be used to constrain or refuse various ways of feeling. One purpose of popular narrative is to move us by providing, through felt recognition, access to the quality, content or force of an experience assessed as ‘emotional’.

In defence of narrativity

One of the examples Massumi turns to, in order to differentiate affect from emotion, is narrative film. He proposes that the affective surplus of images can be located by bracketing out all narrative elements, because affect ‘resonates to the exact degree to which it is in excess of any narration or functional line’ (p. 26). While the content that serves a film’s narrative purposes relies on emotion, pure intensity manifests in images that exist tangentially to storytelling demands. In contrast, emotion occurs among people, learned from social practices via cultural content: ‘indexing to conventional meanings in an inter-subjective context’ (ibid., p. 24). Narrative operations rely on emotional effects because they activate ‘conventional meanings’ received from social others (‘inter-subjective context’). Similarly, Patricia Pisters identifies affect in film as that which has ‘no narrative or logical function’ (Pisters 2003, p. 75). Once narrative functions are circumvented, we encounter what remains as ‘pure affect’ (ibid.).

However, affect theory underestimates the complexity of mediated narrative processes, first, because it is based on a reductive conceptualisation associated primarily with plot and, second, because it assumes that aesthetic elements (image, sound) can be detached from narrative factors with near-surgical precision. To the degree affect is identified prior to the exhaustion of narrative functions, the mediated feeling experience constitutes emotion, not affect. At stake is much more than a semantic distinction. If we accept the proposition that emotions are feeling experiences activated in cultural realms, then narrativity moves us by accessing felt recognition to the qualities of our social experiences. Exploration of emotions in mediated narrativity reveals the profound traces of inter-subjective (social, historical) contexts. However, I dispute that mediated emotions are as invariably conventional, fixed or normative as affect theory proposes.

Mediated pleasure

In the category of narrative function, Massumi includes elements such as sequencing, continuity, linear causality and temporality, action and reaction
While most narrative film and television encompass these elements, their deployment is neither fixed nor prescribed. For example, forms of temporality and sequencing are likely to be present; but they need not, and in many instances do not, take shape in linear fashion. Further, the elements Massumi singles out are, for the most part, linked to plot. Although emplotment (actions, events) may be the first property that comes to many minds when thinking about mediated stories, narrativity encompasses considerably more attributes, including characters, structure (the mode in which the story is told), geography (setting and spatial mobility), themes, genres and tone.

Massumi turns to a 28-minute narrative film that aired on German television in the 1970s, which he summarises as follows (p. 23):

A man builds a snowman on his roof garden. It starts to melt in the afternoon sun. He watches. After a time, he takes the snowman to the cool of the mountains where it stops melting. He bids it good-bye and leaves.

Massumi finds the film interesting because, at the time it aired, the snowman story frightened a number of young viewers, prompting a group of researchers to study children’s emotional responses to it (Sturm & Grewe-Partsch 1987). The researchers evaluated nine-year-olds’ physiological and verbal responses to the film, determining, amongst other results, that the young respondents found the saddest scenes to be the most pleasant (ibid., pp. 32–3). Massumi points to a disjuncture here; on the one hand, sadness as emotional response to the narrative; on the other hand, pleasure as autonomic, visceral reaction to the intensity of the experience. Because sadness can be regarded as paradoxical to pleasure, Massumi believes he has located an instance in which an affective surplus, in the form of pleasure, can be distinguished from the emotional effects of the narrative (sadness, fear).

Leys (2011) offers a detailed critique of Massumi’s interpretation of the scientific results of Sturm and Grewe-Partsch’s study. Here, I focus on the implications from a media studies perspective. At the outset, cinematic emotion and affect need to be differentiated from their social counterparts. Media do not identically replicate our lived felt experiences, nor is that their cultural usefulness. For audiences who seek out cinematic varieties of felt experience, a greater number of emotions register as being more pleasurable than in many socially experienced situations (fear and horror films, anxiety from suspense thrillers, sadness with the dramatic romance). One of the pleasures found at the movies is to be emotionally moved by experiences that would register as unenjoyable if encountered in our lived circumstances. Instead of a paradox, pleasant sadness can be understood as part and parcel of the snowman film’s narrative operations. Dramatic structure guides emotional shifts. If fright is instigated by the snowman’s threatened demise – melting – fear is alleviated through rescue by human benefactor. Subsequently, sadness is evoked when its human protector must leave
the snowman behind because the two survive in different environments. Dramatic adversity is resolved, in that the snowman’s demise ceases, but at the narrative cost of separation from its human companion.

The evocation of sadness depends on cultural inflections that infuse the narrative dilemma. Emotional impact relies upon viewers’ culturally constituted ability to endow the snowman with an anthropomorphised identity and then link ‘his’ melting to death. Viewers of all ages also engage with the inevitability of separation between snowman and human protector; the characters have no option but to remain in the environments in which the film has established each belongs. The narrative dilemma draws viewers into a negotiation, exchanging the snowman’s continued survival for estrangement. Pleasurable sadness, in storied terms, results when the pain of emotional loss at separation from a loved being co-mingles with the satisfaction that one’s sacrifice ensures the survival of that which is beloved.

The snowman narrative illustrates that mediated feelings may register as pleasurable even when arising out of what is emotionally painful or conflictual. Instead of pointing to ‘the primacy of the affective in image reception’ (Massumi 2002, p. 24; italics in original), the snowman film challenges the notion that mediated pleasure can be extracted from its narrative contents or cultural contexts. Mediated emotions rely on communal comprehension of storytelling operations and felt commonalities created by social locatedness; in this instance, anthropomorphism, symbolism, weather phenomena and ecological knowledge among nine-year-olds.

**Sound**

Certain affect theory presupposes the divisibility of aesthetic elements from storytelling activities. Aesthetic elements reference modes of expression, which for film and television include the work of the camera, sound, editing and mise-en-scène. The supposition that modes of expression can be treated in isolation from substantive matter has a long history for various artistic practices, frequently formulated as a polarised ‘form’ versus ‘content’ relationship. In media studies, such debates sometimes take shape as an aesthetics–contra–narrative opposition, in which particular historical moments have tended to prioritise one over the other. However, the introduction of ‘culture’ into the theoretical mix complicates matters.

For affect theory, narrativity (including its emotional effects) exists in the realm of signification and, thereby, is compromised by normativity and stasis. In contrast, specific aesthetic elements are conjectured to have affective impact by functioning in a direct manner upon the embodied recipient. Thus, mediated affect, surfacing as bodily intensities, remains unfiltered by narrative operations. For its part, cultural theory argues the indivisibility of content and form because both are products of – and as such, suffused with – cultural implications. To ‘divorce meaning from form’ suggests that cultural processes do not shape aesthetics, which is to imagine them as somehow intrinsic and
timeless (Bhaskar 1999, p. 399). Citing Bakhtin, Ira Bhaskar argues that the ‘powerful deep currents of culture’ are given palpable materiality through aesthetics (p. 401). Narrativity can only take shape by means of aesthetic treatment, calling into question any notion that style functions independently, because aesthetics carries with it the cultural values of its times. Cultural theory, then, insists on the indissolubility of aesthetics and narrativity, while affect theory searches for aesthetic escape routes from narrative conventionalities.

In his discussion of the snowman film, Massumi describes it as ‘[j]ust images, no words, very simple’ (p. 23). However, the researchers who conducted the original study indicate that it was ‘produced with sound but without words’, although they do not specify if the accompanying audio consisted of music, ambient sound or a combination (Sturm & Grewe-Partsch 1987, p. 30). Although the film involves no dialogue or voiceover, it cannot consequently be described as constituted solely by imagery. Linguistic elements such as dialogue do not mark the limits of audio-visual narrativity, which encompasses non-articulated meanings that take form through the auditory, as well as visual, aesthetics of media – for instance, in the widespread use of musical scores. As Laura Marks notes, it is within ‘the power of nonverbal sound to have meaning in ways that cannot be reduced to simple signification’ (Marks 2000, p. xv). That nonverbal audio possesses the capacity to create meaning beyond ‘simple signification’ suggests emotions evoked by music or ambient sound bring into being feelings that are not necessarily conventionally known nor fixed. Simultaneously, when meanings are elicited we find ourselves located not solely in relation to affect, but experiencing emotion in the meaning-generating realm of culture. We turn to aesthetic forms because they comprise modes of expression for that which, otherwise, would go unrecognised or remain inexpressible, including large swaths of emotional experience and relations. One of the purposes of stories is to locate other means of conveying that which exists outside articulation and, as such, eludes named familiarity but, nonetheless, bears meaning, value and import.

To illustrate how audio conveys the inexpressibly emotional, I focus on an example of ambient sound from Saving Private Ryan (1998). Its director, Steven Spielberg, emblematises, and is partly responsible for, the most conventional forms of contemporary Hollywood cinema. Even so, his films display moments that exceed conventionality, opening us up to felt recognition of that for which we lack a name. Further, the film’s early, graphic, 24-minute battle sequence is explicitly set in a very specific narrative and historical context: the Normandy invasion of Omaha Beach on 6 June 1944. At the same time, the prolonged landing sequence is clearly intended to have visceral, sensate impact, with both audio and visual elements designed to overwhelm the recipient with feelings of horror.

Accompanied by some dialogue but no musical soundtrack till near its end, sound effects predominantly drive the landing sequence audio. The noise is chaotic, immersive, unrelenting; endless machine gun fire punctuated by the screams or moans of pain and death, as bullets repeatedly hit their targets. Ships arrive
under a barrage of shots; soldiers jump overboard hoping to make it ashore alive. In the midst of this, a 28-second underwater sequence takes place, in which the noises of war give way to the monotonous hum of submerged hearing, muffling to almost inaudible the sounds of carnage. Underwater, soldiers jettison their rifles and helmets, struggling to get free of equipment now weighting them from resurfacing. The 28-second underwater sequence is followed by quick camera moves in which, three times, we briefly resurface, only to go under again. Each time the camera rises above waterline, the assailment of noises abruptly recurs, then disappears as we sink once more. Camera movement and sound mimic the struggle for survival as some men resurface while two are shot underwater, turning the sea red, and we watch one soldier quietly drown.

The above-water assault of unrelenting noise sets audience nerves on edge, providing a haptic effect clearly intended to analogise the barrage of bullets, slaughter and fear soldiers encounter. Additionally, however, the movement between two audio spaces, above or below the waterline – one deafening, the other eerily hushed – creates emotional complexity that reverberates due to the established narrative and historical context. If, most fundamentally, the sequence depicts an imperative for survival, in which soldiers struggle to re-emerge from the ocean, it also emphasises the conditions for continued existence. Remaining in the quiet of the ocean guarantees certain death; returning to the cacophonous living means re-emergence into the brutality of the battlefield, itself a world of death. The 28-second underwater sequence fashions a release from the relentless sounds of cruelty, the stench of slaughter and fear. The jarring juxtaposition presented by camera and sound, as we oscillate above and beneath the waterline, probes whether that relief will be temporary or permanent. Hearing the remorseless audio as we re-emerge creates a plea for escape from the clamour of war, so that death may seem the more peaceful prospect. And so we watch the soldier who drowns give up his struggle quietly, in a moment of horrific peace. The dislocations created by two distinct audio spaces express the conflicting conditions of death as quietude and lived existence as death, in this specific historical and narrative context.

Popular media are replete with instances such as these, moments of emotional value conveyed through aesthetics. If much of emotional life remains submerged from the expressible, audio-visual narrativity seeks means by which emotion may be glimpsed, overheard or otherwise felt. Marks observes that cinema occurs ‘on the threshold of language’ (2000, p. xvi). Indeed, much of mediated experience takes shape well removed from that threshold. Making sense of emotions exceeds tracking ideological positions or rational, cognitive activities with which, as in much affect theory, emotionality has been too exclusively aligned. Accepting such a limited conceptualisation means losing grasp of valuable social and mediated narratives of emotion when they do not appear in overt or easily accessible articulated form.

Although emotions are activated, negotiated and exchanged in socio-cultural realms, they do not require articulation. We access emotions – feel
them and express them – through pathways other than the specifically spoken, written or thought. We experience emotions nonverbally as well as verbally, through images, audio, tone, texture, movement and gestures more than they are retrieved as conscious awareness or partner with rational, contemplative thought. Sue Campbell (1997, pp. 2–3, 6) contends that a handful of what she calls ‘classic’ emotions, such as love, fear, anger and pity, are taken as paradigmatic of all emotional experience, although, she strenuously argues, they are not. Instead, the bulk of our emotions exist in ‘nuanced, complex, or inchoate’ forms that remain unspecified, in the sense of lacking labels or being available to articulation (ibid., p. 3). Campbell offers up an alternative version to that of affect theory, one in which emotions signal intricate, elusive and, as their etymology suggests, constantly moving events, as they take shape, shift, combine, separate, disperse and reform in boundless, fluctuating constellations.

Images

Strands of affect theory that rely on film to elaborate their arguments predicate a good deal on the nature of ‘the image’. Here again, how one performs the subtraction of an image, or elements within an image, from the narrative environment in which it nests, in order to arrive at a moment of pure affect, proves challenging. Even a still image may encompass narrative aspects. For instance, Wendy Steiner (2004) outlines the ways medieval Italian paintings incorporated narrativity prior to the advent of the Renaissance. Repeating the appearance of a particular character staged along a singular, unifying landscape such as a winding path and, later, using rooms within a single building to indicate ‘the co-presence of temporally distinct moments’, painters created ‘the multi-episodic narratives of pre-Renaissance art’ (Steiner 2004, pp. 160, 164). The invention of vanishing-point perspective disrupted such narrative pictorial practices, because the Renaissance model of perceptual realism demands a viewer who observes a scene ‘from a fixed vantage point at one moment in time’ (Steiner 2004, p. 158; italics in original). Thus, Steiner argues that historical conventions, not medium necessity, led to exchanging ‘the non-realist narrativity of the Middle Ages’ for the ‘non-narrative realism’ of much Western art, until the late nineteenth century (p. 162).

For film and television, it becomes even more difficult to imagine the absence of narrative inflection, except in the most experimental modes, given the embeddedness of an image in the context of all surrounding shots. Usually the basic unit of ‘image’ in film is regarded as the single camera shot. Yet even a still shot in the absence of camera movement exists as part of a series of images, instigating viewers to search for sequential, temporal, spatial, causal, symbolic or other relationality to the shots that precede and follow. Moving images, whether by movement of figures within the frame or via camera movement, are even more difficult to distinguish from storytelling aspects because, by
definition, they involve passage across space over a temporal duration. At its most fundamental, narrativity may be defined as a peregrination, a journey from one place to another over a period of time, however small the journey or brief the temporal moment.

Discussing the film, *American Beauty* (Sam Mendes 1999), Pisters finds it unoriginal in story terms but more intriguing in its use of video footage associated with the teenage character Ricky Fitts (Wes Bentley) (Pisters 2004, p. 1). She argues the video sequences serve as ‘a database of memories and impressions with no (narrative) coherence or logical development’, thereby liberating the video images from the cause-and-effect dynamics of narrativity and, in turn, freeing Ricky from the weight of typical characterisation (pp. 1–2). Instead, he arrives at something akin to a pure gaze and a new, non-personal ‘mode of individuation’ (p. 2). I, too, found the film’s home video footage haunting and evocative, lingering with me long after I first encountered it, especially the sequence in which the wind blows about a white plastic bag. Here, I revisit that scene but, in contrast to Pisters, I do so to consider the ways the plastic bag sequence is narratively and culturally informed so that it expresses the otherwise emotionally inexpressible, in a cinematic context that works to release the image and its emotional associations from stasis.

The floating plastic bag sequence surfaces twice in the film, both times positioned and supported by narrative aspects. On the first occasion, the scene plays on a video monitor in Ricky’s bedroom for a minute and 25 seconds. It is anchored narratively by the presence, in the frame, of Ricky and 16-year-old Jane Burnham (Thora Birch), as the two sit in front of the monitor, their backs to us. The video plays in the background space between them, their figures in the foreground serving to bookend the sequence, while Ricky explains the footage’s importance to him. On the second occasion, at the end of the film, the plastic bag sequence runs again for 21 seconds, situated narratively by a voiceover from Jane’s father, the now-dead Lester Burnham (Kevin Spacey). This time we view the scene directly, that is, without the intermediating presence of video monitor or characters, but with audio contextualisation provided by Lester’s voiceover. The reprisal of the floating plastic bag carries the key story function of coda, intended to encapsulate the entire film’s emotional impact.

On both occasions, the sequence comprises a cinematic single image, shown without edits (with the exception of an eight-second close-up of Ricky in the midst of the first shot). Yet the image also exhibits continuous figure movement – the nonstop floating of the plastic bag, leaves swirling on the sidewalk – along with unceasing camera movement, constantly reframing in order to follow the bag’s actions. Movement often renders a richer, more complex image than a still shot, in this case performing a peregrination that emphasises the spatial features of location and mobility, as the bag tries to take flight or attempts escape. In its first showing, the bag appears to rise upward against the red brick wall, only to quickly fall back down to the ground, as if trapped. On its second attempt, at the end of the film, the bag manages to
scale the red brick wall, rising to the top of the frame before the image fades out, this time breaking free of its environs.

However, if one considers the bag’s journey insufficient storyline to justify narrative status, the sequence has also been aligned, through visuals and audio, with at least three characters (Ricky, Jane, Lester). Additionally, cultural inflection permeates the scene in a manner fundamental to its evocative, haunting quality. Cultural suffusion occurs through one narrative property in particular: setting. Initially, the choice of location seems odd for something meant to be achingly beautiful. We view an apparently urban site, no horizon of sky visible, only a grey concrete sidewalk in front of a red brick wall. Dead, brown leaves twirl about on the concrete, although no trees are in sight. Against the familiar building materials of urban public space, the white plastic bag dances, as Ricky characterises its movement. Of course, the plastic bag also belongs to this urbanised environment, a piece of litter carelessly discarded on the street, awaiting removal along with the dead leaves. The scene’s efficacy depends on cultural recognition of public objects and environments we routinely associate with waste and paucity.

That we are intended, paradoxically, to view the sequence as beautiful is made clear by Ricky’s introduction to the video, in which he asks Jane, ‘You want to see the most beautiful thing I’ve ever filmed?’ The scene’s intended appeal is further reinforced by Ricky’s description as it plays on the monitor, his words closely echoed in Lester’s later voiceover, in which they speak of feeling so much beauty in the world it overwhelms their hearts. Elsewhere in the film, Ricky references finding beauty in the ugly, boring and ordinary rather than mistaking the ugly, boring and ordinary for beautiful. We can appreciate the dependency on cultural context in making such a distinction if we imagine replacing the blustery plastic bag with a video sequence that follows a butterfly as it travels amongst the red roses of the Burnham’s carefully tended garden. Related to the film’s title, and associated most closely with Jane’s mother, Carolyn Burnham (Annette Bening), the rose garden would not function in the same manner as Ricky’s video because the narrative has activated social associations of the flowers in their suburban setting with sentimentality, façade and denial. Instead, in the home video images we are presented with beauty located in life’s less-inviting, trivial and discarded matter, which includes a number of the film’s characters.

The process by which we see, and feel, the beauty in the wind-driven plastic bag commences from the normative, the clichéd, in order to reach a less-familiar or ‘already known’ experiential quality. The red roses in the garden, set against an affluent suburban home with white picket fence, feel stultified, rigid, dead. An alternative version of American beauty is the correspondingly clichéd image of a naked, teenaged woman (Mena Suvari), served up on a bed of rose petals. This alternate American beauty turns out to be an equally empty fantasy, in this instance, linked to Lester’s disastrously erroneous perceptions. Only by journeying through these versions – a peregrination across conventional, false notions of beauty – are we able to grasp and appreciate Ricky’s vision.
Pister’s contention that Ricky’s video footage is original, that he recognises things differently, is correct. However, his home images do not function as some sort of pure gaze, as she suggests; rather, they work in conjunction with other narrative and aesthetic elements. Ricky’s experience achieves expression by moving from static, rejected images of beauty to finally reaching a visualization – his dancing plastic bag against a red brick wall – that is less well known, less familiar and, thus, freshly felt. Yet, it’s not clear what that emotion should be called: beauty-in-waste; beauty-in-the-ugly. As Campbell suggests, we must turn to neologisms to point towards the expansive wealth of cognitively uncultivated terrain that our emotional experiences encompass. Even ‘classic’ emotions, such as fear and sadness, which we possess the cognitive competency to name, do not exist as singularities. Instead, they are complex systems that can incorporate a near-infinite variety of felt experiences, contradicting the idea that we point to something specific, bounded or static when we reference emotionality.

The effectiveness of the plastic bag video cannot rely on Ricky or Lester telling us, in linguistic terms, that the sequence evokes an aching beauty. Their words may point the way, but the success or failure of accomplishing that objective depends on whether audience members directly feel its beauty. The notion of ‘felt recognition’ is activated in the study of melodrama as narrative and aesthetic modality (Gledhill & Williams 2018). The felt of felt recognition references audiences undergoing an emotional experience, rather than registering solely an intellectual understanding. Popular mediated narrativity involves processes of coming to care, of feeling the impact of something brought home. The recognition in felt recognition involves encountering aesthetic realisations, in the doubled sense of enacted and acknowledged. Mediated narratives ideally, and often enough in practice, offer up opportunities to engage with what feels fresh, unfamiliar, inarticulable. Amidst the ‘functional lines’ of accustomed plots and other conventions, we also seek out and consistently make new discoveries. Indeed, familiar narrative and aesthetic landscapes provide the groundwork for moments of unexpected felt recognition to emerge.

Conclusion

The examples explored from Saving Private Ryan and American Beauty represent brief excerpts from the totality of the films. Yet, they signal that moving pictures and sound hold the power to initiate an abundance of such moments. Audiences who co-exist in shared socio-cultural worlds carry the competencies to recognise the emotional conflicts being staged or the emotional stakes under strain, even as individually felt responses vary.

Audiences seek out occasions to encounter unanticipated felt recognitions, contributing to the pleasures of mediated experience. Cultural meanings dominated by normative phenomena in stasis allows little room for the shocks, surprises, excitement and thrills that draw audiences to popular storytelling.
Yet, mediated felt experiences like excitement need to be accounted for: what do we care about, how do we come to care about it and which emotions are enabled or excluded in that process? Freshly discovered feelings provide audiences with cinematic pleasures, even when the emotions engaged are deemed painful, as in the cases of fear and sadness.

Excerpts from all three films discussed – the snowman story, the extract from Saving Private Ryan and American Beauty’s floating plastic bag – share narrative conflict as emotional dilemma in common. Whether taking shape as pleasurable sadness, peaceful horror or discarded beauty, the three peregrinations encourage audiences to engage with emotions as complex forms of cultural existence. Mediated storytelling encompasses the pleasures of felt recognition – the moments that make us cry as well as laugh or smile – that we might not otherwise grasp about the worlds we occupy, the identities available for us to take up, and the social relations we enjoy or fail to attain. Narrative media create collective spaces which enable late modern subjects to entertain their socioemotional imaginings.

Notes
1 For the complexity of mediated emotions as socio-cultural events, see ‘How 9/11 changed the movies: the Tony Scott barometer’ (Pribram 2016).
2 Usually affect is described as non-conscious, beyond acts of ‘mind’, whether conscious or unconscious.

References
Massumi, B 2002, Parables for the virtual: movement, affect, sensation, Duke University Press, Durham, NC.


Chapter 16

Screening the refugee

*Freedom Stories* and the performance of empathy in an ‘emotional community’

*Sukhmani Khorana*

In this chapter, I use the public question-and-answer (Q&A) session after a screening of the Australian documentary, *Freedom Stories*, to unpack the performance of empathy in the context of advocacy for asylum seekers. The affective as well as performative aspects of this empathy demonstrate how ‘emotional communities’ are formed, the manner in which they function and their mediation in late modernity. Beginning with an overview of Australia’s bipartisan political support for mandatory detention of boat arrivals, I emphasise the importance of media narratives to shift public debate and the role of empathy in this process, as well as the need to transcend beyond empathy and into the realm of responsibility and action.

Asylum seeker policy in Australia

In Australia, public debate on the issue of asylum seekers has been vexed and polarising. However, what distinguishes Australian policy from other nations of the Global North is that despite being a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, ‘it is the only country where there is mandatory immigration detention for all unlawful non-citizens’ (Brown 2013). According to the Refugee Council of Australia, mandatory detention is used as more than a risk-management tool. This is because until recently, ‘asylum seekers arriving without authorisation were detained for the entire time it took to determine whether or not they were refugees – regardless of whether they posed any health or security risks to the community’ (2014). Such a policy has resulted from a consensus on both sides of politics that ‘asylum seekers pose a threat to the integrity of Australia’s borders or to its social fabric; that fear of asylum seekers is legitimate; and that a policy of deterrence is an appropriate response’ (Neumann 2012). Neumann (2012) notes that this policy of deterrence is occasionally questioned when the courts insist that it must not violate Australian law, or when the public sporadically shows compassion for individual asylum seekers, especially children. In the most recent of such cases, the Victorian Supreme Court approved a $70m (AUS) compensation payout to current and former Manus Island asylum seekers over their illegal detention in dangerous
conditions (Doherty 2017). This has been reported to be the largest human rights class action settlement in Australia, though it has not impacted federal government policy.

In addition to the legal resistance, the power of narrative to invoke a response to the asylum seeker issue amongst the broader Australian public merits attention. Such a response is often articulated as a feeling of empathy or compassion for humanitarian reasons, and seldom crosses over into the realm of responsibility or action. It is due to such limitations of empathy that Carolyn Pedwell has observed that this particular emotion ‘has become a Euro-American political obsession […] within the contemporary “western” socio-political sphere, empathy is framed as a “solution” to a very wide range of social ills and as a central component of building cross-cultural and transnational social justice’ (2014, p. ix–x). In this way, it is similar to Sara Ahmed’s (2010) postulation on happiness being an end-point. To elucidate, Pedwell (2014, p. ix–x) suggests that in many contemporary narratives of global social justice, empathy can be a conceptual stoppage in terms of carrying on a conversation or analysis. It is no surprise, then, that many refugee-themed narratives (in Australia and elsewhere) grapple with the problem of invoking the compassion of their audiences by calling on the discourse of a ‘shared humanity’, while also trying to ensure this affective response is not transient and/or depoliticised (see Khorana 2015).

**Empathy as the ‘correct’ response**

The mainstream news narratives of asylum seekers in Australia can be comprehended in terms of the political and editorial stance of the outlet in question. In the case of most conservative media outlets, research has demonstrated that there is a tendency to dehumanise refugees. This results from editorial tactics such as visual framing, not portraying individual asylum seekers but only showing them as members of groups or collectives and associating them with threats to border security rather than humanitarian crises (Bleiker et al. 2013). In other words, the picture of the refugee invoked by such narratives is that of a distant and potentially threatening other, thereby diminishing any capacity for invoking an empathetic response.

When it comes to the nation’s less ideologically conservative media outlets, editorials and features attempt to humanise refugees in order to evoke empathy in the reader/viewer. ‘Is Australia losing its empathy?’ (Krznaric 2014), ‘Australians lack empathy for plight of asylum seekers’ (Ireland 2013), ‘What happened to our compassion, Australia?’ (Reilly 2014), ‘Compassion is the new radicalism’ (Naidoo 2014); these are a handful of headlines and statements that manifest the self-identified ethical response to asylum seeker issues in Australia. Moreover, feeling empathy or compassion is established as the morally correct reaction to witnessing asylum seeker testimony in the form of news stories or creative storytelling, such as film or visual art. In other words, the mainstream
media narratives that aim to effect social change often stop short of conflating humanisation with the evocation of empathy.

Despite the above, invoking empathy in refugee-themed narratives is sometimes accompanied by a depoliticisation of systemic issues. This takes place by shifting responsibility onto the feelings of the ethical citizen, rather than the imperative of international obligations or the power imbalance in regional relationships. Moreover, particular figures such as children may be more likely to inspire an empathetic response. This has been noted in the case of the Syrian toddler Aylan Kurdi, whose body was washed up at a Turkish beach. This led to a worldwide surge in public compassion for refugees, as seen in the popularity of the hashtag #CouldBeMyChild on social media. However, El-Enany (2016) observes that images of the bodies of Black African men who had died trying to cross the Mediterranean did not create a positive response from Europe, and instead invoked fear. In a similar vein, Kirkwood conducted a discourse analysis of UK parliamentary debates on the European refugee crisis, and found that while refugees were presented as being within ‘our’ moral community, ‘some forms of “humanisation” appear to reinforce paternalistic relations between those who need and those who provide asylum’ (2017, p. 122). In the Australian context, Peterie (2017) used discourse analysis of press statements from political leaders to establish that since 2001, governments have constructed varying objects of compassion in the asylum seeker debate, and depicted maritime arrivals as either unworthy or dependent. Also, evoking empathy and challenging entrenched attitudes has become the pre-occupation of several self- and institutionally funded documentaries on the subject, as will be detailed in the next section.

Refugee documentaries and mediated community screenings

When I first watched the documentary *Mary Meets Mohammad* in 2013, I became interested in writer-director Heather Kirkpatrick’s account of its screenings. As someone who was located outside of the film festival circuit in Australia, and primarily interested in the film as a contribution to public debate on the issue of asylum seekers, she circumvented the conventional viewing venues for documentaries of this kind. Rather, through the film’s website and all of its screenings in spaces such as university film clubs, advocacy groups like Red Cross and Amnesty and even detention centres, the notion of ‘community screenings’ was encouraged. This was usually facilitated through a small screening fee and a hosting information pack. In the wake of this, there has been a spate of refugee-themed documentaries produced and released in Australia. These include: *Freedom Stories* (Thomas 2015), *Chasing Asylum* (Orner 2016), *Constance on the Edge* (Mason 2016) and *Cast from the Storm* (Mason 2016).

All of the above films are classified as documentaries, and have links to ‘community screenings’ (in varied forms) on their official websites. For instance, in the case of *Chasing Asylum*, there is a tab on the homepage called
‘Take Action’, and this takes visitors to yet another page with options such as 
‘Host a Screening’, ‘Sign a Petition’, ‘Sign the Pledge’, ‘Write to your MP’, 
‘Volunteer’ and ‘Donate’. In other words, the emphasis is explicitly on asylum 
seeker advocacy, and political actions related to the same. Similar to this, the 
website of Constance on the Edge has a navigation bar with links to sections 
like ‘Act Now’ and ‘Screenings’. While the former leads to information on 
the ‘impact strategy’ for the film, it also has tabs for hosting a screening and 
donating to the campaign (via the Documentary Australia Foundation web-
site). The latter tab lists past and upcoming screenings throughout the country, 
and contains details on how to obtain a screening licence (with cinema and 
community options). Finally, the homepage of Cast from the Storm also has 
links for ‘Screenings’ and ‘Host a Screening’. Moreover, the latter page has 
an embedded video which appears to be an edited version of a range of audi-
ence reactions to screenings of the film. It is not clear from the video, or 
the information accompanying it, whether this was recorded at one particular 
screening or at a number of them. However, what stands out are both the 
responses themselves, and the production team’s interest in documenting and 
(re)presenting them. While most respondents mention the word ‘moving’ in 
relation to the film, they also note that what made it so was the featuring of 
refugee children and their stories. Only one respondent featured in the video 
explicitly said that the film made her want to do something (presumably about 
the refugee situation in Australia). Yet another interviewee reported being so 
moved that she wanted to cry, and added that she couldn’t imagine what these 
kids had gone through.

Witnessing and the performance of empathy

In this section, I recount the Q&A session that took place at the end of a 
community screening of Freedom Stories. This screening was organised on 
the evening of 10 June 2016 in the Hope Theatre at the University of 
Wollongong (UOW) as part of a pilot study project (with Associate Professor 
Tanja Dreher and Professor Bronwyn Carlson) funded by the Faculty of Law, 
Humanities and the Arts. The project, titled ‘Community and Alternative 
Media in the Illawarra: A Participatory Approach to Fostering Inter-
Community Responsiveness’, aimed to analyse the potential for community 
and alternative media to contribute to solidarities between communities that 
experience racism in the mainstream media. The film itself documents the 
later-life experiences of former ‘boat people’ who arrived in Australia in 
2001. It had already been screened at a number of cinemas and community 
spaces around Australia. At the Illawarra-based public event, we used several 
methods to collect data on inter-group understandings of refugee issues. We 
observed the conversations people were having about the film via a relevant 
Twitter hashtag, and also audio-recorded the post-screening Q&A with 
director Steve Thomas and ex-refugee participant Amir Javan. In addition,
a qualitative questionnaire consisting of eight questions, largely centred on responses to the film, use of media for refugee advocacy and avenues for changing attitudes was distributed amongst viewers at the beginning of the screening. I have analysed these questionnaire responses as a means to understand witnessing through ‘proper distance’ elsewhere (Khorana 2018). In the subsequent sections, my focus is on the Q&A itself, and how it works to perform empathy and thereby facilitate the formation of a mediated emotional community in late modernity.

Attendees of mainstream and niche film festivals will be aware of the Q&A format at the end of certain screenings. This is usually a chat between a facilitator and members of the filmmaking team, and includes questions from the audience. As such, a Q&A session is deemed to add extra-textual ‘value’ to the experience of the film. Also, what happens more broadly with regards to audience reception in film festival settings (especially when social justice-oriented films are screened) is transposed onto the context of the community screening. According to Chan in her book on cosmopolitan cinema, ‘Serendipity is very much a part of the affective cosmopolitanism of a festival’ (Chan 2017, p. 99). She adds that such an affective experience of encounters with other cultures is of three overlapping kinds.

Firstly, there is the encounter with the films. Secondly, there is the encounter with the spaces of the festival: such as the venues, buildings, outdoor screenings, alternative site screenings and so on. And thirdly, there is the encounter with a particular form of ‘imagined community’ that runs concurrent to the kind of imagined community first introduced by Benedict Anderson [. . .] a community of participants drawn together by a kind of common cultural literacy and shared practice.

(Chan 2017, pp. 99–100)

The imagined community described above is akin to the affective community that gathers for a ‘community screening’, especially if the subject (such as advocacy for asylum seekers) is made explicit in the publicity material. This was certainly the case for the screening of Freedom Stories at UOW, as audience members were drawn from staff and students, members of the Refugee Action Coalition (Illawarra branch) and Wollongong residents who had come across advertising by the local city council. While this community may be regarded as self-selecting and already interested in the issue to varying degrees, it is still worth examining their interaction and affect during the Q&A. This is because heightened moments of performative empathy may be telling in terms of the accelerated emotional shifts within late modernity, as well as the potential to harness empathy for wider social change.

The cosmopolitan encounters that take place in a film festival setting are often indicative of the beginnings of intercultural understanding, and the affective discomfort or empathy that it invokes. According to Chan, ‘It is this feeling of taking
pleasure in partial comprehension that evokes a cosmopolitan affect, one which signals an equal desire to be at ease with difference while accepting the limits of restricted perspectives’ (2017, p. 102). While such acceptance of the limits of comprehending a different culture or experience is key to moving beyond a notion of empathy based primarily on similarities, it also signals the potential for action that is latent in affect. In his work on the mediated affect that takes place in relation to politicised Twitter hashtags, Papacharissi notes this potentiality of affect:

Its in-the-making, not-yet-fully-formed nature is what invites many to associate affect with potentiality [. . . ] It is present in the rhythm and pace of storytelling, which is instant, emotive and phatic, frequently taking the form of a nod, a clap, a nudge, and other forms of affective expression. (2016, pp. 316–17)

The above-mentioned potential was evident in the case of the community film screening in terms of its articulation by the ex-refugee participant, Amir Javan. When asked about the capacity of the documentary to change minds (on Australia’s asylum seeker policies), Amir responded that he became interested in the project in the first place because ‘if this thing can change one opinion in 23-and-a-half million in Australia, it’s worth it to be made’.

While empathy is often understood in popular discourse as something that arises in the face of witnessing another’s distress, the disciplines of moral psychology and philosophy add another dimension that is crucial to understanding how an ‘emotional community’ may be formed. For instance, in Moral sentimentalism, Slote argues that, on the one hand, parents use moral principles to ‘induct’ empathetic concern for others into the young child (2010, p. 20). At the same time, the child can also learn empathy when it is demonstrated by the parent, thereby showing that moral attitudes can spread by contagion (ibid. 2010, p. 20). The latter aspect of acquired empathy is crucial for understanding both why it is ‘performed’ at screenings of social justice-oriented films, and also how it may lead to a sort of empathic osmosis. Moreover, the existence of social media, as well as 24/7 news media, in later modernity amplifies the potential of this affect, and its repeated performance leading to further affect by contagion.

In addition to the potentiality of affect at screenings such as the one being examined here, the impact is also notably symbolic in the manner in which hegemonic ways of being and power relationships are questioned. This takes place both through the choice of the content that is screened, and in the modality of the Q&A sessions. According to Papacharissi (2016, pp. 316–17), such symbolic impact on media publics should not be underestimated because, ‘In order to make revolutions and change institutions, we must reimagine them first’. He adds that such a process of ‘reimagining society cannot occur without first negotiating and redefining what societal institutions represent and what their role should be’ (Papacharissi 2016, p. 320). In the affective responses observed during the Q&A at the end of the screening of Freedom Stories, such an interest
in re-imagining current policy and talking back to power was especially evident in individual queries addressed to the filmmaking team about what to do next. The following dialogue teases out this symbolic aspect in detail (emphasis mine):

**Questioner:** My question is more about what do we do now? We’ve watched this film. It’s inspired me to do more. So, from your point of view, what can regular people of Australia do to share this message or to assist people who may have been in your situation? Sorry for crying!

**Amir Javan:** No, no please . . . Thank you for your question. In fact, what we can do is, it is my personal opinion . . . what Steve did, and people like Steve have already changed a huge number of opinions, because in the last two days I realised that this movie was on in Wollongong and was screened three times . . . So I’m sure that, for example, you have got a hundred friends, I’ve got a hundred, each one of us, if we are a hundred, if we get the message to a hundred [each], it’s going to be 10,000 in the next 15 days, in the next week. And this is the way that the message is spread out.

The symbolic element of affect is therefore made explicit in Amir’s reiteration of the ability of the message of the film to ‘spread’ via online media, word of mouth and further community screenings. Such spreading, in turn, is reliant on the performance of the affect which was generated by the screening, and not merely a re-telling of its content.

As noted in the dialogue above, the audience member is not only expressing her concern and grief at the treatment of asylum seekers, but also finds it necessary to tell Amir that she is crying. It is the contention of this chapter that in addition to mobilising individual emotions, late modernity calls for a performance of them (sometimes individually, and often collectively). In their research on news coverage of bushfires in Victoria (a state in Australia), Duffy and Yell (2014, p. 112) similarly found that there has been a marked shift in the public demonstration of private grief:

While grief is a personal and private process in 1983, and is not portrayed at all in 1939, in 2009 it is not only acceptable but expected that private individuals will publicly display their grief. What is more, audiences are included in the grieving process [. . .] the witnessing of trauma through photography facilitates public responsiveness.

This expectation of display, and the media’s interest in facilitating a performance of affect, is central to understanding the role that both can play in turning empathy to responsibility in the contemporary era. In the subsequent section, I will therefore relate the emotional rules of late modernity to the performativity of an empathetic public during the community screening.
Mediated affect and publics in late modernity

In the first chapter of this volume, Patulny and Olson list the defining characteristics of emotions in late modernity, remarking that they denote ‘increased change and complexity; a decline in traditional social structures; an increasing mediation of human activity through technology and digital mediums; and growing flexibility, freedom and autonomy – but also self-responsibility and reflexivity’ (2018, p. 12). In effect, these shifts mark a change in the very ‘emotional rules’ that historians of emotions have been observing as multivalent in any given historical epoch. In her well-known article on ‘worrying about emotions in history’, Rosenwein notes that emotional rules tend to be a combination of individual and cultural attributes, and hence that we need to consider the approaches of both cognitivists and social constructionists (2002, p. 837). She adds that this combination points towards a history of the emotions that ‘does not postulate “restraint” as its one variable, but looks rather at two complementary issues: what people consider (both consciously and unconsciously) conducive to their weal or woe, and what possibilities cultures provide for the expression and representation of their feelings’ (Rosenwein 2002, p. 837).

Given the above understanding of emotional rules, it is my contention in this chapter that advocacy communities increasingly need to display their empathy and related emotions to mobilise apathetic individuals and, sometimes, even institutions. During the Q&A at the end of the community screening of Freedom Stories, for instance, film director Steve Thomas emphasised that former refugees who participated in the documentary were also a self-selecting group who were happy to re-tell, and thereby perform their stories for Australian audiences. When asked about how he recruited interviewees for the film, Thomas responded:

And I guess I found three kinds of people: there were those who had the experience, but wanted to put it behind them and not talk about it anymore and get on with their lives. And a lot of them just didn’t want to be associated with the ‘refugee’ tag anymore. At the other end of the spectrum, there were people who’d been through the experience and it was so bad for them that they can’t lead a normal life, and it would have been very difficult for them to participate in a film. And in between were people like Amir [Javan] who has suffered greatly through the process of detention and so on but has managed to transcend that and has an interest in telling his story.

Thomas’s testimony on the group of ex-refugees unequivocally interested in sharing their story on screen is also in line with Duffy and Yell’s research on the Victorian bushfires mentioned in the section above. They found that contemporary media has a particular role in amplifying (and sometimes commodifying) emotions, and this has accelerated a shift towards public sharing of private emotions (Duffy & Yell 2014). Moreover, they conclude that, ‘Public
emotional display – and the act of bearing witness to this – is becoming the new form of emotional regulation’ (Duffy & Yell 2014, p. 113).

If emotional regulation is now being replaced with public display, especially in the presence of traditional or social media, we then have to consider what kind of publics or communities it is interpellating, and perhaps even helping form. In her work on the history of the emotions, Rosenwein has defined ‘emotional communities’ in the following terms:

People lived – and live – in what I propose to call ‘emotional communities’. These are precisely the same as social communities – families, neighbourhoods, parliaments, guilds, monasteries, parish church memberships – but the researcher looking at them seeks above all to uncover systems of feeling: what these communities (and the individuals within them) define and assess as valuable or harmful to them; the evaluations that they make about others’ emotions; the nature of the affective bonds between people that they recognise; and the modes of emotional expression that they expect, encourage, tolerate, and deplore.

(Rosenwein 2002, p. 842)

What does this say about the individuals involved in refugee advocacy communities, especially as it pertains to their consumption of related media, and exposing (apathetic) others to such mediated communication? What forms of expression do they aim to elicit? What if this is met with resistance?

At least in terms of their communication with refugees (especially those in detention), such communities aim to exhibit and share messages of solidarity and goodwill. According to Steve Thomas during the Q&A, this may have political or apolitical motivations, but it is expressed clearly through affective gestures:

my experience with people like Amir, is that even though they were in detention, people know that it’s a political thing and they also know that many Australians disagree with it. And one of the reasons they know that is because **people write to them, they send them cards, they send them credit for their phone cards, they send them mobile phones, they send them Christmas presents.** Social media. Those are the things I think that help people get through the detention experience – knowing that ordinary Australians are not like the government. And I remember when we were with Reyhana [Akhyand] and her daughter, Mariam, and we’d finished filming but Reyhana said, ‘hang on a moment’. . . *she went out the back and she came back with this big pile of cards and these were well-wisher cards that had been sent to them from when they were in Woomera, from kids in primary schools, people in churches, ordinary individuals and 13 years after coming out of detention, Reyhana still had those cards and that was an indication of how much those messages meant to her.*
Thomas’ recounting of Reyhana’s (one of the documentary participants) story indicates that ex-refugees who wanted to re-tell and perform their narrative of seeking refuge and being in detention were affectively assisted in this by advocates, through meaningful and supportive expressions. In this way, the loose emotional community that is refugee advocates reinforced the experiences of the refugees, and it is this effacing that facilitated a degree of resilience, if not widespread social change. The term ‘resilience’ here does not imply an expectation for refugee communities to live up to (in the eyes of governments or individual advocates). Rather, its usage here is derived from Bourbeau’s work on migration, where he defines resilience as ‘the ability to recover from or adjust easily to misfortune, adversity, unease, conflict, failure and/or change [and is] the internal or external […] qualities that help people to bounce back and to adapt positively in the face of profound adversity’ (2013, p. 6). In other words, the gestures and gifts from refugee advocates assist refugees (especially in detention) with the capacity to cope and carry on.

In terms of the role of the media in facilitating emotional communities, and not just displaying individual emotions, Papacharissi is of the view that there is a definitional function at play. Using politicised Twitter hashtags such as #ThisIsACoup as examples, he explains that they are open to definition, redefinition and re-appropriation, and therefore serve as ‘framing devices that allow crowds to be rendered into publics; networked publics that want to tell their story collaboratively and on their own terms’ (Papacharissi 2016, p. 308). He adds that the implications of such a framing role are that the media may not make or break revolutions, yet they lend a distinct ‘mediality’ to emerging publics, and the resulting affect keeps them going (Papacharissi 2016, p. 308). What is therefore produced is not a well-defined community, but rather ‘feelings of community’:

Driven by an ambient, self-sustaining mode of reflexivity, generated and re-generated by accumulating and imbricated digital layers of expression, affective traces persist and bind networked publics long after the initial events that called them into being […] while affective attachments to media cannot produce communities, they may produce ‘feelings of community’. (Papacharissi 2016, p. 310)

While the traces of affect produced by movements on social media may be different to feelings generated by a community film screening and a Q&A, there is a marked similarity in terms of queries about what happens when one leaves the online realm or screening venue. The mediality generated might persist if the affect itself has intensity, and not just potentiality. For instance, one of the stories that stood out at the community screening under examination is Amir’s account of running into former Australian prime minister John Howard, and the subsequent strong response from the audience. It is listed verbatim below:
I said Mr. Howard, maybe you don’t know me, but I’m Amir Javan. I was in the detention centre for four-and-a-half years. And immediately, his face is changed because he didn’t expect that, in the Liberal Party meeting, to be stonewalled –

[audience applause]

– by someone from the detention centre.

[audience laughter]

And then I told him immediately, because I knew that it was a short time that I could talk. I said, Mr Howard, you mentioned to Australians that I was a queue-jumper, that I was an illegal immigrant, I was a boat people [sic] and we all come to take Australian jobs. And you accuse me of that back in 2001 that might be terrorist come by boat to Australia. Just . . . here is my card –

[audience laughter and clapping]

– here is my business card, I work in Chatswood as a real estate agent.

The audience laughter and clapping during the narration of Amir’s encounter with Howard had the affective intensity of a highly charged political rally where a politician delivers an emotive speech. That these words came from an unlikely source – that is, a former refugee – perhaps made them more evocative for the responding audience.

Despite the above, it is crucial that I end on a note of caution on the effectiveness of these affective communities, especially in terms of being catalysts for sustainable social movements. For instance, Papacharissi observes that such mediated affective attachments may either ‘self-propagate a movement to generate community, and/or entrap people in a loop of sustained spectatorship’ (2016, p. 311). She further argues that social media platforms may serve as conduits for momentary connection, but may not assist with the negotiation of collective identity (Papacharissis 2016, p. 314). In a similar vein, in her work on the ‘affective turn’, Brooks noted the differing schools of thought on the kinds of bonds formed in late modernity:

Turner conceptualizes a sense of belonging and solidarity as either ‘hot’ or ‘cool’ and predicts that the close sense of solidarity and commitment, which he describes as ‘hot’ solidarity, will be replaced with ‘cool’ solidarity [...] Craig Calhoun maintains that globalisation actually establishes new identities and solidarities. He argues that there is no reason to assume that the new sets of relations will be ‘thin’ as Turner and Chris Rojek contend but could still be ‘thick’ in terms of synergies and interests.

(2014, p. 57)
As such, it is unclear whether the solidarities and synergies that are emerging amongst publics – usually in a mediated form or facilitated by the media – will lead to lasting efforts for community building and/or social change. However, the reflexivity that is now a distinctive feature of late modernity (see Patulny & Olson, this volume, Chapter 1) will certainly aid in our understanding of how to be better individual advocates, and how to channel mediated affect more collaboratively.

References

Ahmed, S 2010, The promise of happiness, Duke University Press, Durham, NC.
Cast from the Storm 2016, motion picture, Missing Archive Productions, Australia. Directed by David Mason.
Chasing Asylum 2016, motion picture, Nerdy Girl Films, USA. Directed by Eva Orner.
Constance on the Edge 2016, motion picture, Constance on the Edge Pty Ltd, Australia. Directed by Belinda Mason.


Mary Meets Mohammad 2013, motion picture, Waratah Films, Australia. Directed by Heather Kirkpatrick.


Part IV

Micro- and macro-reflexively managed emotions
Introduction

Impartiality is a foundational legal value. It expresses the judicial obligation to be unbiased in relation to any party or issue, and to be independent, especially of the government, in rendering a decision (American Bar Association 2011; Geyh 2013; 2014; Judiciary of England & Wales 2013; Lee 2014; The Council of Chief Justices of Australia & New Zealand 2017). These obligations of judicial attitude, role and practice (Lucy 2005) are central to law as a modern institution. Despite the myriad changes prompting many to cast the present era as late modernity, the legal system remains ambivalent about emotion and continues to aspire to entrenched modern values of rationality, objectivity and impersonality (Weber 1978; also see this volume, Chapters 1 and 2).

The conventional judicial role casts impartiality as requiring judicial practices to be without emotion. Emotion is assumed to be political, unstable, personal and irrational, therefore jeopardising the impartial exercise of judicial authority (Bandes 2009; Bandes & Blumenthal 2012; Conway & Stannard 2016; Maroney 2011; 2012). The exclusion of emotion is implicit in the judicial oath of office that provides for the administration of the law: ‘without fear or favour, affection or ill-will’ (Campbell 1999, p. 146). This parallels the dominance of impersonality in Weber’s ideal-type bureaucracy, which expects officials to act ‘without hatred or passion, and hence without affection or enthusiasm’ (1978, p. 225). As emotion and feelings are associated with particular, personal and private relationships, they are thought to result in bias (positive and negative), and are thus inconsistent with disinterested, detached decision making and legal process (Conway & Stannard 2016; Dixon 2012; McKenzie 2016; Wettergren 2010).

Even so, impartiality must be realised in practice. Judicial officers must embody and perform impartial legal authority as part of their everyday judicial work, often in circumstances of considerable emotion. Research involving in-depth interviews with judicial officers finds that, when defining impartiality, they stress their obligation to listen to both sides and their limited role, to wait until the evidence has been heard and then apply law to the facts. They describe putting aside excluded evidence or a personal attitude that might amount to bias or prejudice or an emotion in order to make a legal, rational and non-emotional decision.
While some judicial officers use the language of emotion and feelings, or identify particular emotions, many do not. Several individual judicial officers see emotion work as a necessary, albeit circumscribed, component of their judicial work, which includes reflexively monitoring and self-regulating their own feelings (Holmes 2010). It also entails adopting an emotional state compatible with the conventional model of judicial authority. Emotionlessness – or non-emotion – can entail considerable emotion work (see Wettergren, this volume, Chapter 2).

This chapter examines how contemporary judicial officers articulate impartiality and investigates the ways they frame and perform it in light of the emotional demands that need management in their everyday judicial practice. The conventional judicial role that disavows emotion is the touchstone for judicial officers’ reflexive monitoring of the myriad of emotions they experience. Their emotion management strategies entail recognising, not denying, a place for emotion apart from the logical reason of law.

The performance of impartiality

Despite the disavowal of judicial emotion, recent scholarship and institutional changes point to the important role of emotions and emotion management (Bandes 2009; Bandes & Blumenthal 2012; Bergman Blix & Wettergren 2016; Maroney 2011; Maroney & Gross 2014; Roach Anleu & Mack 2005). In some circumstances, judicial officers must be more emotionally engaged and expressive than anticipated by the conventional model. However, these developments do not appear to displace impartiality conventionally understood as dispassionate, detached and impersonal. While emotion, in and of itself, may not be inconsistent with impartiality, the incursion of certain emotions into the judicial decision making process can be experienced as a marker or signal of bias against or partiality for a party or a claim.

After a description of the research design and interview research method, the ways judicial officers articulate, understand and perform impartiality are discussed in light of several overlapping themes which emerge from the interviews. These include: reliance on the terms of the oath itself; the concept of an open mind; and the need and capacity to put aside information, attitudes or emotional thought to be inconsistent with achieving impartiality. A few interviewees reflect on the practicality of maintaining impartiality, whether understood as putting aside feelings or attitudes, or keeping an open mind. While not all judicial officers interviewed explicitly mention emotions or emotion management, the consistent image of impartial judging they describe is one where emotion can and should be excluded from the judicial process.

Research design

Interviews were undertaken with 38 judicial officers throughout Australia, between August 2012 and December 2013, ranging in length from
Impartiality in everyday judicial practice

Table 17.1 Number of interviewees by court level and gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Court level</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total interviewees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supreme</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District/County</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magistrates</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


25 minutes to 1 hour and 33 minutes. Most were conducted in the judicial officer’s chambers. Table 17.1 describes characteristics of the 38 interviewees.

Interview questions were open-ended, allowing interviewees to discuss a full range of issues from their own perspective and in their own words, based on their experiences and knowledge. Judicial officers were asked what they understand by the concept of impartiality and how they would describe this in lay person’s terms. As the aim was to conduct the interviews more as a conversation than a question-and-answer process, there was ample scope for probing responses and seeking further information (Silverman 2011).

During the interview, consent was sought from the interviewee to record audio and to write notes. All but two interviewees consented to being recorded, and all interviewees agreed to note taking. After each interview, handwritten notes taken during or after the interview, including observations about the court building or location of the interview, were more fully written up. Interviews that were audio-recorded have been fully transcribed within the Project to maximise accuracy and confidentiality. The computer software package NVivo was used to organise, analyse and examine relationships in this rich text-based, non-numerical data.

Judicial officers’ understanding(s) of impartiality

Several strong, overlapping themes emerge from the ways judicial officers explain their understanding of impartiality. First, many rely primarily on the words of the judicial oath. Second, several refer to their duty to decide on the facts or the evidence, being open-minded and not pre-judging, in line with the adversarial model of legal decision making (Gillman 2001). Third, some mention experiencing specific emotions and feelings in response to features of the substance of a case or qualities displayed by the participants – defendants, litigants, counsel, victims – especially when experienced face to face in the courtroom. They emphasise their understanding of the need to put these attitudes, emotions or feelings aside, and their capacity to do so, drawing an image of judicial practice uninfluenced by emotion (Maroney & Gross 2014).
The judicial oath

When asked to define impartiality in lay terms, several responded by referring to or quoting the judicial oath.

I’m sure I’ve thought about this from time to time or I’ve had to give myself a good talking to but I, look I think we all and I certainly do strive to do it, umm, you know it’s what our oath of office is all about, umm, so look I’m sure from time to time I’ve had to really, you know, think it through, umm, but you know I certainly think I’ve always managed to come to a matter genuinely impartially as much as I, you know, conceive that to be.

(I 33, female judge)

This comment implies that impartiality is not necessarily a fixed state, but rather a goal, something that she ‘strive[s]’ to achieve, and may entail some degree of self-talk (Goffman 1981). This judicial officer concludes that she has ‘managed to come to a matter genuinely impartially’, in terms of how she ‘conceive[s] that to be’, acknowledging that other judicial officers might conceive of impartiality somewhat differently.

Interviewees who associate their understanding of impartiality with the oath often do so as part of identifying other elements of or ways of achieving impartiality.

Oh I would explain impartiality as meaning that the judicial officer cannot take or even appear to take sides or I was going to say appear to favour one side over another but that’s probably not lay language, um, must decide the case without, again I’m erring on the side of the judicial oath, fear or favour affection or ill-will, which translates into giving both sides a fair go – that’s the very base [sic] lay language if I can put it like that.

(I 01, female judge)

This judge restates parts of the judicial oath by describing impartiality as ‘meaning that the judicial officer cannot take or even appear to take sides’, translating the requirement into very ordinary Australian language: ‘giving both sides a fair go’.

Keeping/maintaining an open mind

Some judicial officers concretely frame their understanding of impartiality in terms of legal method, and their central judicial role of applying law to facts, emphasising keeping an open mind while hearing all the evidence. Some interviewees recognise that impartiality can be understood as a practice or process, rather than solely or exclusively as a static or achieved mental state. Interviewees also comment on the relative ease or difficulty of achieving impartiality. One magistrate points to legal process as central to accomplishing impartiality.
Impartiality in everyday judicial practice

I 26: Umm, you’re nobody’s friend. You’re not there to serve the police or the plaintiff. You’re there to apply the law. That sounds simplistic. It’s hard to –

Interviewer: Is it difficult at times to do that?
I 26: Yes, it is. Absolutely. It is very difficult because applying the law is determining what the facts are and then applying the law to the facts.

(I 26 male magistrate)

The emphasis on a limited judicial role aligns with the adversarial model of judicial decision making. However, this magistrate, along with other interviewees, finds doing this ‘very difficult’. A judge describes being impartial as requiring waiting to hear both sides and all the evidence; she also finds this difficult:

I think it would be having an open mind. Not making a decision until you’ve heard all of the material to be placed before you, umm, and having an enquiring mind [...] I found it the most difficult part – to, umm, not want to rush ahead and get to the point and to be able to sit there and to let others develop the point [...] To be impartial and to listen and to consider what’s put rather than the assumptions you have.

(I 35, female judge)

Some judicial officers describe keeping an open mind as easy, straightforward and natural, even intuitive, or an automatic consequence of legal training and socialisation:

Well that at its core is, umm, the ability not to pre-judge issues. Keeping an open mind. Umm, and I think you know even if you do have some sort of view, I mean you often have the papers about a case before you actually go into court, umm, to have the ability to put that aside. Now there’s no doubt being I suppose both a lawyer and judicial officer for some time, you do develop, umm, the ability to do that. I mean as a magistrate you have cases where you rule on confessions and they go out the window and then you still have to judge the case, umm. Interestingly it’s easier to do than perhaps a lot of people think, you know, because in fact you don’t want your mind clouded by other issues. It’s hard enough just dealing with the technical/legal matters that you need to deal with so you know it’s quite, you have to put something out of your mind and I really do think you do do it.

(I 33, female judge)

This judge describes impartial judicial decision making as keeping an open mind, not ‘clouded’, and identifies the obligation to ignore information that has been legally excluded, of which she is aware. Many interviewees identify the need to set aside or put aside material, including attitudes or emotions, so that the judgment is restricted to the law and the facts presented in court.
Several judicial officers elaborate on their understanding of an open mind as setting aside biases and emotions. Interviewee I 01 (quoted above) elaborates her approach to impartiality by continuing:

You know you are to put out of your mind, when dealing with the case before you, any personal prejudices or beliefs or sympathies or hostilities you may have of a preconceived nature but just to decide the case on the factors and on the evidence as presented to you.

(I 01, female judge)

This judge operationalises the normative and practical requirements of the judicial oath: ‘to put out of your mind [. . .] any personal prejudices or beliefs, or sympathies or hostilities’. This list of elements includes emotions, which are characterised as internal, individual, personal and removable. She also elaborates on the importance of deciding on the evidence, reflecting the formal judicial role of applying the law to the facts to reach a legally valid result.

Another judge pinpoints practical steps in achieving impartiality in the face of pre-existing attitudes, which may be emotionally driven.

It’s the quality of being able to identify and overcome, umm, your biases and prejudices [. . .] We all as judges come to umm a decision making with biases and prejudices but umm so long as you come willing to change your bias to recognise what it is and to change it or to make a decision despite it then you have that quality of impartiality. So far from denying the biases it’s best to identify them to yourself and by identifying them and putting them aside as best you can. I’m not suggesting it’s easy or that we do it well always but that’s what impartiality is, impartiality is identifying it and putting it aside.

(I 23, male judge)

This judge elaborates on the considerable effort involved in seeking impartiality: first, recognise any bias or prejudice and, second, change it or make the decision ‘despite it’. Impartiality is the capacity to ‘overcome’ biases and prejudices which has to be done ‘as best you can’, implying that it may not be possible to achieve completely: ‘I’m not suggesting it’s easy or that we do it well’. The quest for impartiality, for this judge, requires considerable and difficult emotion management (see Wettergren, this volume, Chapter 2).

Impartiality and emotion management

Emotions emerge in the interactive context of the courtroom, for example, annoyance or anger at a lawyer or litigant, distress stemming from the nature or facts of a crime or a response to the grief or sadness of others (Baillot,
Cowan & Munro 2013; Booth 2016). Many judicial officers interviewed explicitly identify emotion as inconsistent with the demands of impartial decision making, which requires keeping an open mind. They deploy specific strategies to limit what they describe as the impact of emotion in their daily work. These strategies are examples of emotion work, emotion regulation or emotion management (Hochschild 1979; Lively 2008).

The next judge explicitly links being impartial and keeping an open mind as entailing management of her own emotions. This involves ‘being self-aware’, practising ‘self-reflection’ – a kind of auto-correction – as part of emotion work, both of the experience of emotion and the outward display.

Well, umm, you have to start with an open mind. So to start with an open mind you have to listen, umm, you have to you know, look at and listen to everything that can properly be put before you and if you’re not going to look at something you’ve got to explain why, umm, and umm, you have to be clear in your reasons for decision as to why you have gone one way or the other particularly, not so much on the law but particularly in factual findings where you’re having to rely upon, umm, well you’re drawing conclusions, umm, as to whether you should accept the evidence of one person rather than another, that’s very challenging to explain that, umm, carefully. Umm, something that I don’t think is immediately obvious to, umm, the reader of a decision or somebody watching you do your job is self-awareness [. . .] of how you’re responding to people in your process and to, if you’re finding that the way a particular person is behaving makes you feel a little hostile or prickly about them, you know, what is that, what’s that trigger, is it actually them or is it something else about you. So that self-reflection, umm, I think is helpful. [. . .] That’s the essential aspect of impartiality is that you’re focussed on your, umm, any inherent bias or emotional response or whatever it is.

(I 37, female judge)

This comment underscores listening as part of an open mind, especially as ‘factual findings’ are ‘very challenging to explain’. Perhaps she is implicitly aware that findings of fact can entail judgment which can be perceived by others as lacking objectivity or impartiality. She proposes that ‘you have to be clear in your reasons for decision’. Giving reasons can be an important opportunity for the performance of impartiality, including the suppression of some emotions on the part of the judicial officer. Thomas suggests that requiring a statement of reasons would avoid ‘[t]he danger of sentences based on an immediate emotional reaction to some particular feature of the offence’ (1963, p. 247). This could be especially important in lower courts, where sentencing decisions are often given ex tempore, as part of interacting directly with the defendant. The judge above (I 37) also refers to ‘self-awareness’ and ‘self-reflection’, both of
which relate to emotion regulation and management of own emotions including identification of emotion as a trigger: feeling ‘a little hostile or prickly’. Such an ‘emotional response’ might be an indicator that a judge is not being impartial; locating the source or trigger can facilitate regulating the emotion experience and expression.

One magistrate describes a more active method of emotion management to maintain the ability to hear both sides and decide impartially, in the face of an emotion such as anger.

I know sometimes you can feel sometimes the anger or something coming up and you just have to go okay this is the time to get off the bench and just walk around for five minutes because of what’s been said or the manner in which something’s been said and I think most colleagues are aware of those issues.

(I 12, female magistrate)

This is an example of situation modification (Maroney & Gross 2014) where the judge attempts to manage her own emotions by leaving the bench for a few minutes. Such a strategy is limited. The exigencies of a busy courtroom reduce the opportunities for a judicial officer to adjourn matters or to leave the bench for lengthy periods (Mack & Roach Anleu 2007).

A more commonly expressed approach is to put aside whatever emotion is thought to be inconsistent with the central legal method of deciding cases, and focus on this judicial obligation. As the following judicial officer explains:

I think in terms of impartiality, I think, it is picking up that case and looking at, looking at the facts that come before you and deciding it on nothing but the evidence that you have before you and not what the person looks like, is wearing, or whether their lawyer is good or bad, and I think often we would not be human if we didn’t pre-judge people and make an assumption [. . .] It’s about putting all of that to one side as well and no matter how dreadful or unpleasant their lawyer is or they are – it’s about looking at the facts that you have before you and making a decision on the facts and as they apply to the law. [. . .] maybe it’s different in the higher courts because you don’t, you do more law than, we’re not really doing a lot of law, we’re doing really more fact finding and maybe you’re doing more law and so you have the longer cases and maybe you don’t experience it as much, I would be surprised if any magistrate didn’t have to remind themselves because you get some so seriously unpleasant people and doing dreadful things that you’ve got to go stop.

(I 03, female magistrate)

This magistrate views decision making as founded on objective facts and legally determined evidence, and so she excludes emotion and feeling from the process. If case details evoke or trigger emotions, these must and can be
put aside. This magistrate also highlights feelings – negative and positive – that can emerge in interchanges with ‘accused persons [. . .] and their lawyers’. She distinguishes the magistrates courts from higher courts which ‘do more law [. . .] we’re [magistrates] doing really more fact finding’. This resonates with Abbott’s (1981) concept of professional purification: in Anglo-American legal systems, higher courts typically deal with problems or disputes translated into legal argument by legal professionals (barristers), where emotion and human complexity are removed, whereas lower courts do not deal with this level of purification but with cases where legal, social and human issues meld.

By characterising their practices as having an open mind, judicial officers associate their work with thinking, as a cognitive process, rather than as an emotional or affective experience. However, thinking and feeling are not completely separate processes or practices, but can interact.

Well I mean impartiality means that you are deciding the case, you know, without fear or favour to one party or another [. . .] and you know I mean I think this often comes to – well this should come to lawyers and judges almost instinctively. [. . .] I see people who I feel sorry for, I occasionally see people who I think you know are really not very deserving, you know you do feel some antagonism towards them either because of what they’ve done or sometimes how they conduct themselves but I think, you know, I know for myself that if ever I begin to sort of feel that way I consciously say look just, forget it, put it out of your mind because if, you know I’m mindful that it’s just folly, just gets you into so much trouble.

(I 06, male judge)

Beginning to feel certain emotions, such as anger or frustration, might signal that the quest for impartiality and adherence to the conventional mode of judicial authority could be at risk. The capacity for self-regulation, including managing one’s own emotions, comes from a judicial officer’s legal training, enabling self-talk as an emotional management strategy: ‘I consciously say look just, forget it, put it out of your mind’. This internal self-talk is a conversation between the judge as ordinary person and the judge qua judge.

The following female magistrate also describes the ways evidence can trigger emotional responses and the importance of managing her own emotions.

I can remember when I did my first Care List, I had no concept that parents did such atrocious things to their children in this day and age, and I can remember one of the first files I looked at, the house was just appalling, the fridge, I thought I was going to be sick, umm, and my, looking at it in chambers before I went on the bench, my blood pressure, anger, everything was just running rife [. . .] and so I had to pull myself back and walk on the bench and think you’re not here to judge this person on your own standards, you’re here to deal with it on the evidence and only the
evidence, umm, and I find it easy when you do that. If you don’t look for what might be behind something else or speculate on why they’re doing this, you just go straight down the line, there’s the evidence. [ . . . ] If you start to find people guilty or not guilty based on your personal views of things well the justice system’s going to go to rack and ruin and you know, umm, so I haven’t found it that hard actually. Sometimes I find it hard, the decision I have to make, but actually just dealing with it on the evidence I haven’t found – as hard as I thought I might.

(I 19, female magistrate)

In this excerpt the magistrate describes her emotional reaction to the facts of a case and refers to the physical manifestation of emotion: ‘I thought I was going to be sick [. . .] my blood pressure, anger, everything was just running rife’. The evidence – the things she saw and heard during the case – triggered an emotional response. She describes managing her own emotions: ‘I had to pull myself back’. This is a specific example of the ‘kinds of transitions involved in emotion work’ (Lively & Heise 2004, p. 1112). This reflection also suggests the idea of a performance; she had to ‘walk on the bench’ (the stage) and put her feelings into the personal realm (offstage) reminding herself of her judicial role (part) and responsibilities: ‘you’re not here to judge this person on your own standards’. She invokes the conventional model of judicial authority, through talking to herself: ‘you’re here to deal with it on the evidence and only the evidence’. Importantly, the issues are institutional not personal: ‘if you start to find people guilty or not guilty based on your personal views of things well the justice system’s going to go to rack and ruin’. The judicial officer reframes the way she assesses information, shifting from a personal reaction to a professional, dispassionate stance. ‘[C]ompetent judges learn to treat vivid stimuli as professionally relevant rather than personally provocative’ (Maroney & Gross 2014, p. 146).

**Conclusion**

Although Patulny and Olson (this volume, Chapter 1) argue that late modernity is ushering in a new emotional regime, the emotional legacy of modernity continues within the judiciary. The notion of emotion-free rational action underpins the conventional model of judging (Weber 1978). ‘[I]nsistence on emotionless judging –that is on judicial dispassion – is a cultural script of unusual longevity and potency’ (Maroney 2011, p. 630). The focus on putting emotions aside, before turning to reasoned (rational) decision making based on the facts and the law, requires internal human processes such as self-awareness, or self-talk or ‘setting aside’. These are all forms of emotion management (Hochschild 1979). Some judicial officers find meeting these expectations relatively easy, learned as a part of legal training and practice as well as a formal judicial obligation. Others are more challenged by these demands. Considerable research establishes that cognitive and emotion processes are difficult, even impossible to disentangle
Impartiality in everyday judicial practice

in practice (Barrett 2006a; 2006b; Reddy 2009). More significantly: ‘Emotion and reason are mutually dependent and informed by one another in ways that blur the distinction’ (Wettergren & Bergman Blix 2016, p. 22), so that the claimed absence of emotion, or the suppression of all emotions anticipated by the conventional understanding, is somewhat illusory. The question becomes: in everyday judicial practice in court, ‘which particular emotions are implicated in distinct types of social interaction or processes?’ (Barbalet 2011, p. 41).

Understanding impartiality and emotion in judicial work requires deeper understanding of emotions and emotional processes, including those that tend to have low expressivity. ‘[T]he majority of emotional experiences, and certainly some of the most important for social interactions and outcomes, are had without the emoting subjects being consciously aware of them’ (Barbalet 2011, p. 39); these are background emotions. While observable states associated with emotion that are seen as ‘spontaneous, unruly and disorganising’ (Barbalet 2000, p. 336) might threaten rational action and judicial impartiality, background emotions might facilitate or advance the performance of impartiality.

In the context of the judiciary, collateral or background emotions might include a sense of loyalty to the judicial role, feeling ready to decide and deliver a sentence or feelings of satisfaction that they are implementing legal or social values, such as justice, fairness and impartiality. While some judicial officers identify some emotions they put aside (e.g. anger, frustration, sympathy) deemed as inappropriate for the judicial role, many do not explicitly recognise other emotions they may rely on when they invoke the rule of law or the oath of judicial office to describe their practices. In this sense, the judiciary can be understood as being part of an emotional community (Rosenwein 2006) or having an emotional style (Gammerl 2012), which entails distinct feeling rules acquired through training and experience.

The quest to accomplish impartiality – to be impartial – requires judicial officers to undertake considerable emotion work. In this sense, the script of judicial dispassion (Maroney 2011) ‘is emotionally sustained’ (Wettergren & Bergman Blix 2016, p. 31). Yet these norms of judicial practice and institutional requirements are not completely determinative. Not all judicial officers approach or think about their work in the same ways; they do not understand impartiality identically, nor do they experience and display the same emotions. Emotion work undertaken by judicial officers entails reminding themselves of their judicial role – what they are there for – and its requirements: to decide cases on law and facts. In late modernity, judicial officers may have to be more emotionally engaged, departing from the conventional model of judicial authority, though this does not appear to shift the dominant conceptualisation of impartiality as dispassionate, detached and impersonal. The continuing quest for impartiality, whether understood as detached impersonality or entailing some emotion engagement, inevitably requires emotion work and reflexivity on the part of individual judicial officers, demonstrating the complex intersections between rationality and emotion in the legal system.
Notes

1 Impartiality and objectivity are associated concepts; both are aspirational ideals, values and processes, as well as practical accomplishments. Specifying the relationship between the two is beyond the scope of this chapter (see Jacobsson 2008).

2 In this chapter, the term ‘judicial officer’ refers to any member of the judiciary, regardless of court level or type. Generally, in Australia, the term magistrate refers to judicial officers in lower courts and judge refers to those who preside in the higher (intermediate and supreme) state and territory courts or national courts.

3 The interviews are labelled by the code ‘I ##’, in which I indicates this is interview data and ## refers to an individual interviewee. Quotes are given verbatim, with any identifying details deleted. For more information, see Roach Anleu and Mack (2017).

Acknowledgements

Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at: ARC Centre for the History of Emotions collaborator, University of Sydney, 26–28 September 2016, and the 1st International Conference on Contemporary and Historical Approaches to Emotions [CHAE], 5–7 December 2016, UOW Sydney Campus. We appreciate funding, financial and other support from the Australian Research Council (LP0210306, LP0669168, DP0665198, DP1096888, and DP150103663) and Flinders University as well as the Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, the Association of Australian Magistrates and many courts and their judicial officers. We are grateful to several research and administrative assistants over the course of the research, and most recently to Colleen deLaine, Rhiannon Davies, Jordan Tutton and Rae Wood. All phases of this research involving human subjects have been approved by the Flinders University Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee. We thank Professor Kathryn Temple for detailed comments on an earlier version of this chapter and the reviewers for helpful feedback.

References


Jacobsson K 2008, ‘“We can’t just do it any which way”: objectivity work among Swedish prosecutors’, *Qualitative Sociology Review*, vol. IV, no. 1, pp. 46–68.


Chapter 18

Power, (com)passion and trust in interprofessional healthcare

Rebecca E. Olson and Ann Dadich

Introduction

Most formal healthcare systems are hierarchical, with some professions, notably medicine and physiotherapy, holding more influence than others. Hofling and colleagues’ (1966) oft-cited experiment illustrates power inequity between medicine and nursing; 22 hospital-based nurses were telephoned by a researcher, claiming to be ‘Dr Smith’, who instructed them to administer 20 milligrams of a fake medication to a patient in their care. This dose was twice that permitted, as per the label. Although protocol should have prevented the nurses from heeding telephone directions from this unknown doctor, 21 nurses nonetheless had to be stopped from administering the fictional drug. This classic study suggests healthcare hierarchies can affect medical errors and adverse events, compromising patient safety.

Revised care models were introduced, partly to address the patient safety issues associated with healthcare system hierarchies. Since the late 1980s, first multidisciplinary and then interprofessional models of care have featured in healthcare reforms, receiving widespread support (Ackland et al. 2005; WHO 1988). Rather than working separately within professional silos, interprofessional practice aims to create ‘high-functioning teams that communicate and collaborate efficiently and effectively’ (Dow et al. 2017, p. 1). Interprofessional clinicians work together within and across disciplinary boundaries to integrate and coordinate holistic care that awards primacy to patients and carers (McCallin 2001). Given its overarching aim and the ethos that it emanates, interprofessional practice might help to redress the negative effects of the power imbalances within healthcare hierarchies, fostering a more egalitarian professional landscape (Olson 2015a; Paradis & Whitehead 2015).

Seminal theoretical and empirical work within medical sociology elucidates the foundations of healthcare hierarchies and their effects. A growing body of scholarship examines interprofessional practice sociologically, but emotions are largely absent from these works. This is an important omission, as emotions imbue and ‘constitute the bases of social life’ (Barbalet 1996, p. 75), particularly within healthcare. Healthcare – where trained professionals monitor, diagnose,
resuscitate, care for and usher in and out human lives – represents a social space of heightened emotion. The emotional labour and care work performed in interactions between clinicians – especially nurses – and patients has been acknowledged in sociological research (James 1992). By comparison, the way emotions colour and structure interactions between different health professions is under-researched and under-theorised.

This chapter examines the affective bases of traditional, hierarchical models and interprofessional models of healthcare. Overall, we explicate the emotional elements of healthcare work, and how emotions sustain or undermine different models of care. Accordingly, we define emotions as physiological, structural and cultural, experienced individually and collectively, consciously and unconsciously (thus, we use emotion and affect interchangeably) and capable of ‘do[ing] things’ at a structural level (Ahmed 2004, p. 119; Barbalet 2006). We draw on theories from Collins (1990), Foucault (1972) and Holmes (2010) to conceptualise how hierarchies and emotions intersect. And we conceptualise interprofessional practice as illustrative of broader trends in late modernity.

As detailed earlier in this book (Patulny & Olson (Chapter 1)), late modernity is an era where change typically occurs too fast for habits or routines to solidify. Healthcare reform is now routine (Brunsson 2009; Dadich & Hosseinzadeh 2013; Dadich et al. 2013); multidisciplinary and then interprofessional care models have replaced traditional structures. Training to prepare students for these frequently revised care models speaks to this increasing pace of change. Socialisation into roles for work within older, silo-based care models is of less value. What was previously acceptable and/or feasible has limited fit with the present. To ascertain how to act during late modernity, individuals and those they work with are likely to find value in reflexivity: an almost continuous process of reflecting on reflections and questioning the self and environment fit. It involves ‘monitoring [. . .] sensory input from the environment [. . .] and bodily dispositions’ (Giddens 1991, p. 77), while using ‘information about the conditions of activity as a means of regularly ordering and redefining what that activity is’ (1994, p. 86).

To inform our examination of emotions in late-modern, interprofessional healthcare interactions, we draw on our Australian research, based on data collected between 2012 and 2015. Primary data were sourced from interviews and focus groups with health professional students (e.g., undergraduate physiotherapy, occupational therapy, exercise physiology, nursing and speech pathology students) in New South Wales and Queensland who completed clinical placements and interprofessional education. These data were thematically analysed, supported by qualitative research software NVivo. Secondary data were sourced from the Twitter accounts of organisations dedicated to cancer care – one nursing, one medical and one interprofessional (Dadich & Olson 2017; Olson 2015b). For comparative value, a critical affective analysis was conducted on these data (Dadich & Olson 2014).

We posit that healthcare hierarchies are sustained by an emotional discourse that casts emotion as a threat to objectivity, and also work to elicit
negative emotional energy among subordinates. Interprofessional models of care might disrupt this negative emotional energy flow, as this form of practice depends on clinicians who reflexively foster trust. First, we describe professional hierarchies within Australian healthcare systems, which are based on gendered and epistemological differences; we then explicate the emotional discourses that inform, and the emotional experiences affected by these hierarchies. Second, we examine the emotional dimensions of interprofessional models of care and health professional education to question how this way of organising health professionals disrupts or reinforces healthcare hierarchies. Third, we theorise interprofessional practice as illustrative of broader late modern trends, requiring health professionals to engage in ongoing reflection on their reflections and emotions, as they learn how to interact in a rapidly changing social and professional landscape. Finally, we outline the main emotional challenges of interprofessional practice and how these might be addressed.

**Healthcare hierarchy**

The uneven social terrain in healthcare systems is widely acknowledged. The medical profession’s prime positioning remains unchanged, despite recent trends: the surge of malpractice lawsuits, the rise of defensive medicine, insurers’ limitations and the increasing role of the pharmaceutical industry (Timmermans & Oh 2010). Medical professionals retain their authority, explicitly through resource control (Kenny & Duckett 2004), and implicitly as knowledge gatekeepers (Crowe, Clarke & Brugha 2017). Understanding what underpins the hierarchy within health systems has been a primary focus of medical sociology. In this section, we outline scholarship on the hierarchical relationship across medicine and nursing, and then the allied health professions.

Sociological research on the unequal relationship between doctors and nurses has emphasised medicine’s alliance with scientific knowledge, medicine’s desired autonomy over its work and the reverberations of broader gendered and class divisions of labour within healthcare. Turner (1995) asserted that medicine’s alignment with scientific knowledge in the late nineteenth century shaped its professional status, as compared to its competitors: namely, barbers and surgeons. Similarly, Freidson (1988) argued that alignment with a distinct body of knowledge is central to what distinguishes professions, such as medicine and law, from semi-proessions, like nursing. Most important for Freidson, however, is a profession’s sovereignty over its own work, professional standards and the work of subordinate semi-professions. The importance of this state-sanctioned authority was echoed by Willis’ (1989) concept of medical dominance. However, Willis (1994, p. 24) argued that relationships between doctors, nurses and other clinicians (e.g., allied health professionals – defined later) also reflect ‘the social division of labour in the wider society – a society stratified along class, gender and other lines’.
Patriarchal binaries that have remained relatively constant are evident in the division of labour between doctors and nurses. Traditionally, a female nurse was described as the ‘physician’s hand’, implying that nurses provided physical and care (not intellectual) work, that they are handmaidens and that they report to physicians. As Larson (1995, p. 180) explained, ‘virtues such as duty, discipline, self-control, and obedience were extolled’. In short, medicine is associated with higher-status intellectual work. Caring, linked with lower-status women’s work, is central to nursing (Kelleher, Gabe & Williams 1994).

Epistemological and gendered divisions also underpin the hierarchy across female-dominated allied health professions. Allied health encompasses a range of health professions, such as social work, occupational therapy, speech pathology, physiotherapy and psychology. These professions occupy the middle-ground of healthcare hierarchies, sandwiched between medicine above, and nursing and healthcare assistants below (Williams & Lawlis 2014). Within allied health, particular disciplines dominate, like physiotherapy and psychology, both of which align more with scientific knowledge than maternalistic or emotional definitions of care (Murray 2017; Short 1986). Although occupational therapy historically, ‘achieved legitimacy [by] backing [. . .] women’s charity networks’ (Linker 2005, p. 106), physiotherapy emphasised its scientific-basis and the ‘brawn’ it requires, bestowing physiotherapists with ‘authority over the disabled body’. The birth of psychology as a discipline and a practice was wedded to science and the use of scientific methods to demonstrate legitimacy (Kantor 1963). These efforts can be interpreted as a strategic distancing of both physiotherapy and psychology from the emotional dimensions of care.

**Emotions in healthcare hierarchies**

While ‘the social structure of health care’ has sustained the attention of medical sociologists since the subdiscipline’s inception (Willis 1994, p. 12), the emotional dimensions of clinician care, and the emotional implications within this social structure, have only received regular attention since the 1990s. James (1992) highlighted this more-difficult-to-explain aspect of hospice nurses’ roles, relative to their physical and organisational work. As part of their formal role, nurses were understood to work to change their emotions, and those of patients and carers. James and Gabe (1996) speculated that delayed acknowledgement of the emotional dimensions of health and healthcare might reflect wider omissions in sociological history that favoured the rational, masculine and objective over the emotional, feminine and subjective.

Although clinicians’ emotional labour is recognized – particularly during patient interactions – theorisation of, and research on, the significance of emotions to the social structure of healthcare is limited. Next, we outline Durkheimian and Foucauldian theories on the organising role of emotions in interprofessional
interactions in healthcare. We then apply these theories to our own data to consider how emotions sustain healthcare hierarchies. We draw first from interview and focus group data collected from a study into allied health and nursing students’ experiences of interprofessional education (Olson 2015b), and second from a systematic and critical analysis of tweets from three cancer care organisations – one medical, one nursing and one interprofessional (Dadich & Olson 2017).

**Interaction rituals**

Williams (2000), drawing on Collins (1990), offers a Durkheimian reading of the importance of emotions in interaction rituals and in the social order of the medical system. In large organisations, like hospitals, higher-status ‘order-givers’, like senior doctors, draw positive ‘emotional energy’ from interactions, while lower-status ‘order-takers’, like junior nurses, can experience diminished emotional engagement (Williams 2000, p. 301). Over time, these repeated interactions and emotional-energy patterns accrue and work to: (1) increase the probability that lower-status players experience negative emotions, while higher-status players experience positive emotions; and (2) reinforce organisational stratification.

Olson’s (2015b) findings support Williams’ (2000) conceptualisation. In her study, pre-licensure nursing and allied health professionals positioned doctors and senior nurses as ‘order-givers’, and junior or student nurses as frustrated ‘order-takers’. Krystal, a nursing student in her twenties, described her frustration at receiving orders from a senior male doctor while on placement. She hinted at a hierarchy underpinned by patriarchal and epistemological distinctions with affective reverberations:

They might know more in an area . . . That doesn’t mean we should be ducking our heads and putting our tails between our knees because the doctor’s walked in. That’s something that frustrates me a lot . . . They don’t let females catheterise males . . . I walked in to watch this doctor catheterise and he literally put his sterilised gloves straight on and went, ‘Set it up’ . . . I was very, ‘Really mate?’

Speaking on behalf of her nursing colleagues, Krystal recalled instances of ‘ducking our heads and putting our tails between our knees’ when interacting with doctors. This alludes to a collective and an embodied emotional response to the subordinate positioning of nurses, relative to physicians. Her critique and frustration to this response is demonstrated by her non-verbalised response to the male doctor – ‘Really mate?’ – following his directive. The ironic use of the Australian term ‘mate’ suggests limited comradery and the excerpt speaks to nurses’ negative emotions when positioned as subordinates in healthcare hierarchies.

Healthcare hierarchies are both inter- and intra-professional. Harriet, a nursing student in her forties with relevant experience, described the hierarchy within nursing, partly based on qualification:
You go into the hospital and say, ‘I’m an AIN [Assistant in Nursing]’ and someone goes, ‘Oh, I’m a double EN [Enrolled Nurse]’. . . ‘Well I’ve got a Diploma in Nursing’ and the next person will go, ‘Oh, I’ve got a Degree in Nursing’ and somebody goes, ‘Oh, I’ve got a Masters’ and someone else will say ‘I’ve got a Doctorate’ and people will put you down the whole time. When you are a student [ . . . ] you are nothing and it doesn’t matter how old you are, it doesn’t matter how much experience you’ve got.

Harriet depicted qualifications as a way nurses repeatedly ‘put you down’ and exercise authority over other nurses. This can elicit a sense of ‘you are nothing’, which has the effect of reducing positive emotional energy.

Harriet and Krystal illustrated the negative emotional-energy pattern experienced by subordinates within healthcare (e.g., junior nurses). This supports Williams’ (2000) account of the emotional basis of the social order of healthcare. Other scholarship on the significance of emotions to healthcare hierarchies, which draws on the Foucauldian concept of discourse, explicates how emotions, power and knowledge converge to imbue and legitimate subjects and positions.

**Emotional discourses**

Discourse speaks to the knowledge and power nexus that is central to Foucauldian scholarship. It represents ‘practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak’ (Foucault 1972, p. 49); it refers to a particular way, based in a particular form of knowledge, of conceptualising something. Conceptualising a thing, person or role in a particular way informs its relative and relational position. In other words, discourse denotes how the competing ways that we understand the world and ourselves shape subjectivities – consider, for instance, how research practices, and the value awarded to particular knowledges, are based on (and help to promote) dominant philosophies and ideologies.

In the context of emotions, a Cartesian dualist discourse dominates. Derived from Ancient Greek philosophies (e.g., Plato and Socrates), the Enlightenment era (e.g., Descartes) and (masculine) European philosophies of knowledge, this discourse depicts the mind and body, reason and emotion, as separate (see this volume, Chapter 1). Feminist scholars have critiqued such binary views for furthering patriarchal ways of seeing, knowing and being – where the experienced world differs from a world that is constructed using philosophies of knowledge that manifest via dominant, patriarchal and science-based discourses (Hekman 1990; Smith 1990). Such dualist conceptualisations of emotions have been debunked by empirical research depicting the similarities in men’s and women’s emotions (Patulny, Smith & Soh 2017), by research demonstrating how emotions and the body influence reasoning (Damasio 2003), as well as sociological scholarship asserting that emotions are not solely contained within individual bodies, but work across people.
through relationships (Barbalet 2002). Yet, a dualist discourse still underpins two of our most powerful social structures – namely, law (Roach Anleu et al. 2016) and, as this section shows, medicine.

Our own analysis of tweets from three cancer care organisations – one medical, one nursing and one interprofessional – speaks to the different cultures and emotional discourses across medicine and nursing (Dadich & Olson 2017). Tweets from the nursing organisation were optimistic, and filled with both ‘sadness and joy’ (p. 73):

Cancer clue gives hope for older mothers

The #Welcome to country of course made me cry. Heart Warming

The tweets from the interprofessional organisation were comparatively devoid of emotions, with few to no references to emotions or messages aiming to inspire affective responses. Tweets from the medical organisation used research findings to evoke emotional responses, like fear or hope:

Radiation fears prompt new guidelines – baby monitors should be placed 1 metre away from cots

These findings suggest that there are distinct emotional discourses in nursing and medicine. In nursing, emotions are treated as commonplace, experienced by clinicians and patients and implicated in most social interactions. Perhaps this is not surprising, given the centrality of emotional labour in nursing care (James 1992). In contrast, medicine treats emotion as less relevant, and only helpful for health promotion in order to evoke behaviour change.

These findings extend McNaughton’s (2013) analysis of emotions in medical education. McNaughton outlined three central discourses of emotion – namely, ‘Emotion as physiology’, where they are thought to be a universal phenomenon based in one’s biology, but also a potential symptom of pathology; ‘Emotion as skills’, where emotions are conceived as psychological, physiological, observable and open to change through skilled performances, reflecting understandings of emotional labour and emotional intelligence; and ‘Emotion as a socio-cultural mediator’, where emotions are thought to be socially, collaboratively, culturally and politically constructed and even treated as valid knowledge (McNaughton 2013, p. 73). Despite the role of emotions in reasoning and relationships, and although emotions are shaped by sociocultural and political forces, most medical education depicts emotions as physiological and something clinicians should suppress, get over or get used to. This framework echoes the outdated yet still pervasive view of emotions as pathological, problematic and separate from reason and objectivity.

Law and medicine, as examples *par excellence* of professions, follow physiological and dualistic understandings of emotion. This treatment of emotions underpins their legitimacy, as based in ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ knowledge
In addition to patriarchal and knowledge divisions, the health system hierarchy, with the superior positioning of medicine, is underpinned by an emotional discourse. Those at the top – (specialist) doctors, (and to some extent) physiotherapists and psychologists – partly gain legitimacy by treating emotions as physiological and biochemical elements that can be partitioned and managed, if not restrained. Conversely, those at the bottom more often employ skills-based conceptualisations of emotions as part of their work with patients and their carers.

Interprofessional care models and emotion

Having identified the place of emotions in healthcare hierarchies through their gendered and epistemological connotations, we examine the emotions implicated in different approaches to healthcare and healthcare education, which have gained significant momentum – interprofessional practice and interprofessional education. Following interprofessional practice’s shared model of care, interprofessional education involves learning where, ‘students of two or more professions learn with, from and about each other to improve collaboration and the quality of care and services’ (CAIPE 2018, para. 1). Changes to university-based, pre-licensure training and socialisation enacted in the name of interprofessional education, along with changes in the practical organisational of care, have catalysed interprofessional healthcare system changes (Olson 2015a).

Sociological theorisation of interprofessional education is under-developed (Kitto et al. 2011; Michalec & Hafferty 2015), and relationships between interprofessional practice (and the associated education), emotions and healthcare hierarchies are rarely acknowledged. Here we explore how interprofessional practice and interprofessional education influence relationships across (and within) health professions, affecting the often-overlooked emotional dimensions of collaborative healthcare. To inform our analysis, we again use Collins’ (1990) theory of stratification and emotional energy. We re-examine interview and focus group data collected for a study of healthcare students’ experiences of interprofessional education (Dadich & Olson 2017). Overall, we suggest that interprofessional practice relies on trust, and can improve how (pre-licensure) clinicians feel about the hierarchy, with limited effect on the hierarchy itself or other social forces that shape it.

Despite the paucity of attention on emotion in this area, our analysis points to the importance of emotion – notably, pride and trust – to interprofessional practice (Dadich & Olson 2017). Students indicated that interprofessional care can lead to the best patient outcomes, enabling them to take pride in their (future) work and profession.

Between the professions and in yourself . . . you feel like, yes, you’re giving the best care. You can provide the best care to the patient.

(male nursing student, p. 72)
Pride is a foundational pro-social emotion (Scheff 2014) – yet, within interprofessional practice, it can be mediated by trust. Trust is another primary social emotion (Barbalet 1996). Although characterised by a ‘low feeling state’, trust is necessary for cooperation (p. 81). To be proud of their interprofessional work, students, such as the nurse quoted earlier, highlighted the need to have faith in their clinical colleagues. But a lack of familiarity with the person and the profession often made trusting other professions/als difficult.

I’ve got one patient. He needs something to be addressed, which is something related to feet. So just refer to podiatrist. But we don’t know what podiatrists do . . . [It is important to] know what they are doing . . . for the sake of the patient, so you know that this is the outcome the patient is going to get.

(p. 72)

These (and other) findings affirm the role of emotions in interprofessional practice. Despite this role, the study demonstrated the seeming robustness of the health system hierarchy – and this was met with both resentment and relief (Dadich & Olson 2017). For instance, in acknowledging a persistent chain of command, based on knowledge differences and decision-making authority, the male nursing student noted:

some people . . . [are] kind of dominant – they say ‘Hey, I’m in medicine . . . so I should lead’ . . . that’s it . . . As a nurse, you’re supposed to not know everything. You’re supposed to not do the doctor’s job.

(p. 71)

Yet for the allied health students, discussion of medical dominance was tinged with appreciation and acceptance:

it’s accepted that the doctor is in that position and they do have that right to make certain decisions that we don’t. So I don’t think there was any clash . . . Everyone kind of knew where they sat.

(fourth-year podiatry student, p. 72)

If each team member was treated fairly, and listened to – that is, not given orders – these allied health participants accepted the hierarchy and did not display negative emotional energy or emotional disengagement.

This evidence suggests that while interprofessional models might assuage – if not reduce – the negative emotions and the depletion of emotional energy experienced by ‘order-takers’ (Collins 1990), they do little to challenge (let alone restructure) other forces underpinning the health system hierarchy.

Findings highlight two key points. First, emotions are implicated in the success (or otherwise) of interprofessional practices – particularly pride and trust. Second, interprofessional models do not necessarily (and perhaps cannot) flatten
enduring healthcare hierarchies. Instead, interprofessional practice shapes how this hierarchy is perceived, experienced and felt, especially during interprofessional interactions. Collins’ (1990) theory enables us to see how shared decision making can counter the negative emotional energy of the ‘order-taker’ and ‘order-giver’ effect – yet the codified (Friedson 2001), epistemological, gendered, discursive and emotionally imbued (or neutral) nature of other healthcare practices might remain unchanged, or only slightly altered.

**Late modern, emotionally reflexive clinicians**

Finally, we draw on Barbalet (1996) and Holmes (2010) to theorise that cooperation based on trust, on which interprofessional practice depends, requires health professionals to work more reflexively to cultivate trust within teams. We conclude by considering the challenges of fostering trust within interprofessional teams, given the late modern context.

Following Barbalet’s (1996, p. 77) exegesis on social emotions, we consider trust to be ‘the emotional basis of cooperation’. Organised action depends on trust, but this dependence can be direct or indirect. Under silo-based and more hierarchical care models, cooperation is *indirectly* dependent on trust. It is, we speculate, achieved via one’s ‘trust that coercion will be used against them if they fail to cooperate’ (p. 78). Interprofessional practice depends *directly* on trust. Cooperation under interprofessional models relies on each health professional’s familiarity with and confidence in others’ specialisations and work. This way of working, we argue, requires reflexivity.

Interprofessional practice assumes that no one profession/al is sufficient to provide holistic care. This view of knowledges and practices is typical of late modernity, where uncertainty imbues rapid changes, specialisation and multiplicities. Faced with different options, interprofessional practitioners must be reflexive. Rather than rely on habit or one discipline’s best-practice guidelines, health professionals must question the best course of action for each patient in each situation, given available information, resources and health professionals. Emotional responses to these questions – the health professionals’ emotional reflexivity – guide collective decision making. As Burkitt (2012 p. 469, original italics) explains, ‘feelings and emotions are not just *attendents* to reflexivity; they are the *basis* and *motive* for reflexive thought’. Faced with ever-present competing knowledge claims, and limited ‘knowledge . . . to make a fully reasoned decision’ (Holmes 2010, p. 149), individuals must rely on emotion to proceed – which includes the emotions of other health professionals within and beyond the interprofessional team. Maximising professional resources requires the team to: be confident in and trust the knowledges and abilities of fellow health professionals. This entails a relational form of ‘emotional reflexivity’, whereby all health professionals, not just the ‘order-takers’, reflect on their interactions with colleagues – and their feelings about these reflections – in forging the trust, confidence and cooperation that interprofessional practice requires.
The main challenge is that, right when familiarity becomes more important – for its role in fostering trust and cooperation – it becomes more difficult to sustain. Late modernity is marked by escalating change, expanding complexity and an increasing need for flexibility (Kuhn 2006). Just as a health professional becomes sufficiently familiar with a colleague and their practices, they are likely to change. Barbalet (1996) referred to this as a trust paradox. As social complexity increases, we must rely more on trust in decision making; yet, as social complexity increases, ‘the possibilities for familiarity on which individual trust rests’ also decrease (Barbalet 1996, p. 80).

In summation, more hierarchical ‘order-giver’ and ‘order-taker’ care models can elicit cooperation between health professionals via their trust in sanctions. Interprofessional care models require health professionals to rely more on their own emotional reflexivity to make collective decisions based on trust. Yet, just when trust becomes more directly implicated, the familiarity on which it depends becomes more difficult, as late modernity entails complexity and change.

Conclusion

This chapter describes longstanding healthcare hierarchies, based on gendered and epistemological differences. It goes on to illuminate the dynamic relationship between hierarchies and emotion – namely, emotional practices and emotional discourses. It considers how interprofessional healthcare shapes emotion-based hierarchies: a change in how clinicians feel about the hierarchy and an increasing reliance on trust for cooperative decision making. Following this, and guided by Holmes’ (2010) conceptualisation of emotional reflexivity, we argue that interprofessional healthcare requires emotional reflexivity.

The exploration of emotions, their discursive conceptualisation, how they are treated within health professions and how they are acknowledged during interprofessional interactions speaks to the theme of this book. The focus of this chapter – namely, the need for emotional reflexivity in interprofessional healthcare – demonstrates: the rise of emotional complexity; the tensions between collectivised and individualised emotions; and an increasing propensity to reflexively manage and reinterpret emotions as organisational and cultural expectations change (see Patulny & Olson, this volume, Chapter 1).

This focus has important implications for scholars of the sociology of emotions, interprofessional practice and health sociology. Although it recognises that the ‘interpretation of others’ and one’s own emotions has become more central’ to reflexive practices in late modernity (Holmes 2010, p. 145), further empirical evidence – though difficult to acquire – is needed.

Our chapter also suggests a need for theoretical and methodological development to capture and clarify the dynamic and structured relationships between interprofessional healthcare, emotional practices and emotional discourses.
The need for such research is amplified, given the relative dearth of research that advances interprofessional healthcare theory (Parker-Tomlin et al. 2017; Zwarenstein, Goldman, & Reeves 2009).

**Note**

1 Although Descartes' philosophy has been widely interpreted as perpetuating binaries (mind versus body; men versus women; reason versus emotion), many (see Gobert 2013) argue that this is a pervasive misinterpretation of Descartes' work.

**Acknowledgements**

Research presented here was supported by grants from the School of Social Science at the University of Queensland, the Health Education and Training Institute (NSW) and Health Workforce Australia. All research involving primary data collection was approved by the relevant university’s human research ethics committees. We thank Associate Professor Alberto Bellocchi, Dr Michelle Peterie and Professor Sharyn Roach Anleu for feedback on earlier versions of this paper.

**References**

Ahmed, S 2004, ‘Collective feelings or, the impressions left by others’, *Theory, Culture and Society*, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 25–42.


Kantor, J R 1963, The scientific evolution of psychology (Vol. 1), Principia Press, Bloomington, IN.


Willis, E 1994, *Illness and social relations: issues in the sociology of health care*, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, NSW.

Chapter 19

Compassion and power
(Emotional) reflexivity in asylum seeker friendship programmes

Michelle Peterie

Introduction

As a motivation for social justice-oriented action, compassion has been criticised for presupposing an unequal power relationship between a privileged giver of compassion and a disadvantaged subject (Berlant 2004). Reflecting broader debates within the academic literature regarding care work and humanitarianism, critics argue that ‘compassionate’ relationships all too often reinforce and reproduce inequalities; they also imply that care givers derive emotional gratification both from the privileged benefactor roles that these programmes afford them, and from the sense of moral virtue that they achieve as a result (Korf 2007; Hutchinson 2014; Gosden 2007). In making these arguments, scholars in this tradition charge volunteers with a failure of reflexivity. They suggest that many volunteers are either insufficiently reflexive concerning their position in these programmes, or reflexive in the wrong way. That is, they suggest that when these volunteers do engage in introspection, they focus not on the moral complexities of their positions, but on maintaining their preferred public images.

This chapter interrogates these ideas through an empirical study of volunteer reflexivity in asylum seeker friendship programs. It draws on in-depth interviews with 30 volunteers who support asylum seekers in Australia’s onshore immigration detention facilities, and foregrounds the role of reflexivity in this work. This chapter provides evidence (a) that reflexively managed moral emotions concerning Australia’s ‘politics of fear’ (Wodak 2015) inspire volunteers to begin visiting detention facilities; (b) that reflexively managed guilt and identity dislodgement regarding the structural injustices that they encounter in detention inform their volunteer relationships; and (c) that mutual exercises in emotion work (Hochschild 1979) – where asylum seekers and volunteers work together to create small pockets of normality – are common in these affective institutional settings. In presenting these findings, this chapter contests the previously described understanding of care-based volunteer work. It also provides evidence to support Patulny and Olson’s (this volume, Chapter 1) argument regarding the central role that micro- and macro-reflexivity play in late modernity.
The politics of fear

Australia’s detention system has been described as one of the strictest in the world (AHRC 2011) and has frequently been accused of breaching Australia’s international human rights obligations. Australia’s Migration Act 1958 (‘Migration Act’) requires the detention of all non-citizens who are in Australia without authorisation, regardless of their personal circumstances or whether they pose a security threat. Individuals who are detained under the Migration Act are not permitted to challenge their detention in court. They are imprisoned without charge or trial, and must remain in detention until they are granted a visa or removed from the country (AHRC 2017, p. 12).

This policy has often seen maritime asylum seekers physically excluded from the Australian community (McLoughlin & Warin 2008; Fleay & Hoffman 2014; McAdam & Chong 2014; Fleay & Briskman 2013). This has been particularly true since 2001, when offshore processing was introduced in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the USA. Australia’s detention policies have seen asylum seekers incarcerated ‘on the fringes of capital cities; lost within semi-arid and desert regions, and [with the introduction of offshore processing] on small Pacific islands’ (McLoughlin & Warin 2008, p. 255). Secrecy and inaccessibility have thus played a central role in Australia’s detention system, with maritime asylum seekers kept ‘out of sight, out of mind’. This situation has all but precluded the formation of organic friendships between detained asylum seekers and members of the Australian community. The physical boundaries that these policies have produced have also served at least two communicative functions. First, they have sent a message to the asylum seekers themselves, contributing to Australia’s ‘deterrence’ objectives by telling them that they are not welcome in the Australian community. Second, the imprisonment of asylum seekers in prison–like facilities has contributed to the (politically expedient) perception that asylum seekers are dangerous criminals.

Researchers working in this space have also drawn attention to the importance of discourse in contributing to this portrayal. In particular, scholars have used Cohen’s language of ‘folk devils’ and ‘moral panic’ (2011) – as well as Hall and colleagues’ related notion of the ‘signification spiral’ (1978) – to describe the discursive construction of asylum seekers as threatening Others (Said 2003). As Procter explains, folk devils are ‘scapegoats onto which internal social anxieties are displaced in order that they can be dealt with’ (2004, p. 80); they are screens onto which concerns can be projected (Garland 2008, p. 15). Moral panics, on the other hand, are the public frenzies that develop around these folk devils and their apparent risk to public morality (Cohen 2011).

In their 1978 book Policing the crisis, Hall et al. coined the term ‘signification spiral’ to describe the conflation and intensification of discrete moral panics through discourse. Hall et al. were interested in the way that the statistically unremarkable phenomenon of ‘muggings’ had become the focus of a moral panic in 1970s Britain, and their book described the process by which this
panic had been amplified through a discursive process that linked the muggings with other distinct panics. According to Poynting et al. (2004), several distinct moral panics have also been mapped together in contemporary Australia, forming a signification spiral and thus inflaming public concern. Poynting et al. argue that discrete moral panics surrounding issues such as ‘ethnic crime’, ‘Islamic terrorism’ and ‘boat people’ have been brought together through the identification of a single (confounded and homogenised) folk devil at the centre of the panics – namely, ‘Muslims’, ‘Arabs’ and ‘Middle Easterners’ (2004, p. 6). Poynting et al. note that disparate communities throughout Australia have been tarnished as this signification spiral has developed; not only has ‘Middle Eastern […] become conflated with Arab, [and] Arab with Muslim’ (2004, p. 59), but ‘Muslim with rapist, rapist with gang, gang with terrorist, terrorist with “boat people”, “boat people” with barbaric, and so on in interminable permutations’ (2004, p. 49). As such, the mere appearance of belonging to one of these groups has come to be seen as evidence of immorality and, indeed, criminality.

The portrayal of asylum seekers as criminals has been a significant dimension of the politics of fear (in which fear is fuelled and manufactured for political purposes (Wodak 2015, p. 1)) that has developed in Australia surrounding maritime asylum seekers. This construction has been most clearly visible in the portrayal of asylum seekers as ‘illegal immigrants’, despite the reality (much cited in the literature) that seeking asylum is legal under international law (McAdam & Chong 2014). At times the portrayal of asylum seekers as people engaging in unlawful transactions – that is, paying people smugglers to take them to Australia – has further contributed to their characterisation as criminals (McCleary 2011, p. 31). Accusations of criminality have also taken less-explicit forms, as is evident in the (often oblique) conflation of asylum seekers with terrorists through the aforementioned signification spiral. As Poynting et al. explain, ‘juxtapositions are more powerful than any claim, easily disproved, of real links between terrorists and refugees’ (2004, p. 37), and while Australian governments have at times explicitly connected asylum seekers with the threat of international terrorism (Klocker & Dunn 2003, p. 71), this conflation has often occurred more subtly, as when hardline asylum seeker policies have been justified using the lexis of ‘national security’ (Peterie 2016). When combined with allegations of cultural incompatibility (Clyne 2005; Dunn et al. 2007; Every & Augoustinos 2007; Martin 2015) and alarmist language regarding the magnitude and disorder of the inflows of asylum seekers to Australia – metaphors such as ‘flood’ and ‘invasion’ have been common (Bleasdale 2008, p. 7) – the perceived threat posed by the (in reality quite small numbers of) asylum seekers has been amplified.

While lines of causation are complex and contemporary politicians arguably respond to community fears as much as they fuel them (Papastergiadis 2004; McMaster 2002), Australia’s asylum seeker policies and discourses have been implicated in the production and reproduction of public fear and hostility.
regarding asylum seekers. Indeed, when asked to justify negative opinions regarding asylum seekers, members of the Australian community typically cite political tropes such as those described above (Pedersen et al. 2006).

This politics of fear – which has seen Australia building and bolstering both physical and symbolic barriers to keep out the Other – speaks to a broader global trend. In late modernity, the conflicting (yet inherently connected) forces of globalisation and securitisation have seen walls erected between people, even as capital continues to flow, largely uninhibited, from the Global South to the Global North. As Dallmayr observes, a notable feature of the current global system has been ‘the return to fences, check-points, and dividing walls’.

We witness today the ominous resurgence of dividing barriers: the fence between the United States and Mexico, the gates between Europe and North Africa, and the wall between Israel and Palestine. By themselves, the barriers are only physical constructs; but their presence testifies to deep-seated motivations: the prevalence of fear and distrust; the desire to exclude the unfamiliar or alien; and the obsession with being free from intrusions.

(Dallmayr 2011, p. 4)

It is against the backdrop of these fears and fences that this chapter considers the micro- and macro-reflexive practices of volunteers who support asylum seekers in Australian immigration detention facilities.

Asylum seeker friendship programmes

In Chapter 1 of this collection, Patulny and Olson coin the term ‘macro-reflexivity’ to argue that, in late modernity, people are reflexive not only at the micro level of their individual feelings, but also with respect to larger (often emotionally defined) social phenomena. Late modernity, they argue, sees people increasingly exposed to sensationalised media reporting and political discourses surrounding, for example, the threat of terrorism. The above discussion of the moral panic (and associated signification spiral) that has developed around asylum seekers in Australia speaks to this phenomenon. As Patulny and Olson imply, however, late modern politics has also been implicated in the production of counter-emotions that see people both recoiling from and finding ways to contest the global politics of fear.

This phenomenon of emotionally informed resistance is observable in Australia, where the strategies of exclusion and dehumanisation described above have inspired a range of voluntary programmes which see members of the community visiting asylum seekers in Australia’s onshore immigration detention facilities. Additional (often overlapping) networks of volunteers also exist to support asylum seekers in the Australian community, and to help these asylum seekers to build lives in Australia if and when their refugee
claims are substantiated. These ‘friendship programmes’ reflect the diversity of Australia’s asylum seeker support movement (Gosden 2012): they are formal and informal, large and small, rural and urban, religious and secular, explicitly activist and purportedly apolitical, flat-structured and hierarchical. What these programmes have in common is a commitment to supporting asylum seekers through personal relationships and associated acts of care.

Friendship programmes that involve volunteers visiting asylum seekers in Australia’s onshore immigration detention facilities take advantage of a provision that allows individual detainees to receive private visitors. While this provision qualifies the above argument regarding the physical separation of detained asylum seekers from the Australian community, gaining entrance to detention facilities is difficult. In a 2017 report titled ‘Unwelcome visitors’, the Refugee Council of Australia found that visitors to Australia’s onshore immigration detention centres are required to negotiate increasingly strict and capricious entrance procedures, including ‘paperwork, body searches and drug testing’ (2017, p. 14). Furthermore, the report drew attention to the ‘inconsistent and rapidly changing rules and regulations’ that volunteers face inside the facilities. These rules, the report noted, ‘are often applied inconsistently, not only between different detention facilities but even within the same centre, depending on the staff implementing the rules’ (2017, p. 13). These constantly shifting controls, Neil and Peterie argue, function to assert ‘a radical asymmetry of power’ (2018); they also produce anguish in detention centre visitors, and discourage volunteers from continuing in their work (Peterie 2018a).

**The dark side of compassion**

Qualitative studies concerning the experiences of asylum seekers in immigration detention attest to the important role that volunteer visitors play within these facilities. Detention is isolating, and many detained asylum seekers feel abandoned and bored (Coffey et al. 2010; Fleay & Briskman 2013). The friendships that develop between asylum seekers and volunteer visitors are important because they provide some relief from the mundanity of detention centre life. In a 2010 study of previously detained asylum seekers, Coffey et al. found that ‘the majority of participants highlighted the paramount significance for their morale of contact with visitors as “relieving the gloom of life while detained”’ (2010, p. 2074). Volunteers puncture the isolation of detention and show the detained asylum seekers (as well as those who detain them (Fleay & Briskman 2013)) that they are not forgotten.

Despite the value that friendship programme volunteers provide, work of this kind has not been immune from critique. One criticism – frequently evoked within the existing literature – concerns the power dynamics that structure these activities. This critique resembles and reproduces broader debates in the academic literature regarding care work and the politics of compassion. The concern here is that activities of this kind draw a hard line
between care providers (in this case volunteers) and care recipients (in this case asylum seekers), empowering the former group while disempowering the later (Darling 2011).

Humanitarianism and equivalent forms of care work have often been understood as ‘arising from a sense of compassion, to act to alleviate human suffering’ (Gosden 2007, p. 150; emphasis added). For some scholars working in this area, this motivation is highly problematic. ‘Compassion’, Berlant argues, refers first and foremost to ‘a particular kind of social relation’ (2004, p. 9); it suggests an association in which ‘the sufferer is over there. You, the compassionate one, have a resource that would alleviate someone else’s suffering’ (2004, p. 4; emphasis in the original). In this way, compassion-based relationships have been seen as necessarily unequal. Regardless of the conscious intentions of the caregiver, the underlying logic of compassion has been said to produce a mode of relating that all too often disempowers care recipients (Korf 2007). The racial, class and at times religious contours of Australia’s asylum seeker support movement (many volunteers and activists are White, middle-class and/or nominally Christian) further problematises these dynamics. As Banki and Schonell observe with respect to ‘voluntourism’, many of the critiques surrounding this kind of work ‘focus on power imbalances, colonial legacies and structural white privilege’ (2017, p. 3).

An associated critique concerns the sense of moral virtue that has been associated with ‘altruistic’ feelings like compassion. As Hutchinson observes, such emotions can be seen as a Western privilege in and of themselves (2014). Emotions, like most resources, are not distributed equally in society; rather, emotional inequalities exist and often follow the contours of other social inequalities, particularly those concerning socio-economic status (Barbalet 1998; Stets & Turner 2008). In this way, care-based volunteering has been charged with allowing care givers to feel good about themselves even as they reproduce the social, political and emotional hierarchies that oppress those they seek to help. Scholars in this tradition follow Nietzsche (2006) in suggesting that ‘ulterior motives and material interests’ (Snaider 1998, p. 118) underlie moral ideals such as compassion, even if these motives are not transparent to those who possess them. Compassion-based volunteering is thus redefined not as altruism, but as a ‘kind of feel-good consumption that leads to our satisfaction’ (Pavlasek 2016).

Comparable critiques have been made regarding the concentration of power with non-refugees in Australia’s asylum seeker support movement. Refugees, Survivors and Ex-detainees (RISE) – ‘the first refugee and asylum seeker organisation in Australia to be run and governed by refugees, asylum seekers and ex-detainees’ (2017) – insists that only those who have been directly impacted by Australia’s detention policies should lead the movement opposing them. Alfayadh and Shah (2017) have similarly written about the need to not only hold governments to account, but to also scrutinise ‘the people who claim to be there for the most vulnerable’.
Structural imbalances lie within the refugee advocacy space. There is a lack of representation of those with lived experiences, and the individuals at the helm of refugee organisations who act largely in self-interest. These are the issues that are in need of urgent reform.

(Alfayadh and Shah 2017)

Supporters from non-refugee backgrounds, these authors caution, should ‘always consider the space [they] are occupying and the privilege [they] bring’ (ibid. 2017); put differently, supporters should be reflexive about their motivations, positions and actions.

These concerns about the politics of compassion have been central to contemporary debates about care and volunteer work in the social sciences and humanities. Significantly, however, they are also present in traditional philosophical discussions of the emotion. Aristotle (2010) identified moral equality as a pre-condition for compassion. For those following in this Aristotelian tradition, compassion is premised on ‘the belief that the pitier’s own possibilities are similar to those of the sufferer’ (Nussbaum 1996, p. 31); that is, on the understanding that the self may experience undeserved suffering of a similar nature in the future. This notion of shared possibilities affords compassion a political imperative. The compassionate person – recognising that ‘this could happen to me’ – must redress the structural causes of the other’s suffering if they are to secure their own future security. From this perspective, the mode of paternalistic and self-aggrandising relating to asylum seekers that is described in much of the contemporary scholarship is not ‘compassion’ but something else entirely (Peterie 2017). ‘True’ compassion does not reproduce privilege so much as denaturalise it.

Empirical investigations

Having discussed the socio-political context in which asylum seeker friendship programmes take place, and the existing scholarship regarding reflexivity and emotion within these programmes, this chapter will now turn to present findings from an empirical study of 30 volunteer visitors to Australian immigration detention facilities. The study involved in-depth, semi-structured interviews, which were conducted in person in 2015 and 2016 as part of a larger study concerning the experiences of volunteers who support asylum seekers in Australian immigration detention centres and within the Australian community. These 30 volunteers were affiliated with a broad range of asylum seeker support groups, and visited detention facilities in different parts of Australia. The findings presented here underline the importance that they placed on the reflexive management of their emotions, and highlight the Aristotelian qualities (Nussbaum 1996; Peterie 2017) of their expressions of compassion.
The imperative to act

For the majority of the detention centre volunteers who participated in this study, visiting detention represented a direct and deliberate response to the political situation described above. Interviewees uniformly believed that the government’s policies were wrong and that popular (emotion-laden) representations of asylum seekers were factually incorrect. In condemning these policies, interviewees described the empathy and compassion that they felt for those that Australia’s policies affected; they also emphasised the anger that they felt concerning the harms that their country had inflicted. This phenomenon of emotions animating moral judgements and moving people to action is well-documented in the sociology-of-emotions literature, as well as in interdisciplinary work regarding social movements. As Jasper notes, ‘emotions make us care about the world around us’ (2006, p. 21); they give force and passion to our cognitive judgements.

In addition to these feelings of compassion and anger, volunteers also described the guilt that they felt as Australians. Interviewees commonly described their sense of responsibility – and in many cases moral complicity – regarding the fact that harms were being inflicted by their country, in their name. This idea of being morally implicated in a situation of injustice resonates with Jaspers’ (1947) work concerning ‘German guilt’ in the wake of the Holocaust. Rackley describes Jaspers’ concept of ‘metaphysical guilt’ as the moral responsibility that individuals feel when they fail to intervene in ‘wrong’ or immoral situations. To experience metaphysical guilt, Rackley summarises, is to feel

‘co-responsible for every wrong and every injustice in the world,’ because we have done nothing or not enough to alleviate the misfortune of others, or to avert their tragedy. Our passivity and inaction regarding the tragedy of others entails ‘moral bystander,’ a kind of complicity […] The logic of metaphysical guilt is charged with an ethical responsibility to act in the face of suffering, for passivity means complicity.

(2002, p. 57)

Many of the volunteers who participated in this study described a similar sense of ethical responsibility regarding Australia’s treatment of maritime asylum seekers. Indeed, their decisions to commence their volunteer work were born, in part, of a need to escape this position of complicit bystander by actively ‘doing something’. While volunteers were thus motivated by their emotion-informed judgements regarding the morality (or otherwise) of Australia’s asylum policies, they were also aware of and reflexively concerned with their own moral identities within this space. As one volunteer reflected with respect to her own infant daughter, ‘at some point [she] is going to grow up and ask me what I did when our governments were locking up children […] I can’t have her grow [up] and ask me and for me to respond with “nothing”’. 
**Negotiating privilege**

Participants in this study testified to the Kafkaesque nature of immigration detention. Detention, as they experienced it, was a scheme of constantly shifting permissions and prohibitions – a world in which unpredictable rules dictated the small details of asylum seekers’ lives (Peterie 2018a; 2018b; Neil & Peterie 2018). These visitors also underlined the human costs associated with the scheme, offering vivid examples of the anguish that detention produced in the asylum seekers they visited. In addition to describing the impacts that detention had on their detained asylum seeker friends, however, interviewees also talked about the way that visiting detention affected them personally. The pain associated with witnessing suffering has been well documented, and it has been shown that this pain is even more pronounced when the suffering in question is that of a loved one (Figley 2012). It was not just the fact of their friends’ suffering that the participants in this study found so difficult, however. Rather, their anguish was in part a result of their own positions within the detention space.

In drawing comparisons between their own lives and those of the asylum seekers they visited, participants in this study highlighted the similarities that they had found between themselves and their detainee friends, and explained how these similarities connected them through bonds of empathy and mutual recognition. Several interviewees described the deep connection they felt when they met asylum seekers who were their own age, and came to understand what detention really meant by comparing their own experiences of, for example, youth, with those of their friends. One interviewee, for instance, recalled his shock when he learnt that Australia had been detaining his asylum seeker friend for six years.

> When he told me that it had been that long, I didn’t even, I *couldn’t even* imagine what it would be like to go six years without ever being outside. Ever being able to start your life. ‘Cause he’s the same age as I am. So to know that he’s 26 and knowing how much I’ve grown from being 20 to 26. He hasn’t had that chance to experience all the things that I’ve experienced in six years [. . .] Getting your licence, travelling around. All those kinds of little things. Even just making friends, being in relationships [. . .] He’s missed out on a lot.

Another interviewee, a teacher and mother, alluded to her own experiences struggling with a newborn baby as she reflected on what detention meant for the parents she visited. ‘I know how hard it was to have a new born with lots of support’, she said, ‘We’re causing these mums to have postnatal depression. I find that really difficult to bear’.

The interviewees often expressed distress as they drew these comparisons. Their juxtapositions illuminated many small everyday injustices, but they also spoke to broader structural inequalities, and they made the visitors aware of their comparative advantage.
I found it really hard that those mums couldn’t look after their kids properly. That they had children going to school in the mornings – they couldn’t see their school. They couldn’t talk to their teachers. They couldn’t go to P&C night. They couldn’t go to the athletics carnival. They couldn’t engage with their children and to watch mums not be able to parent their children – and dads – but as a mum myself to see that. I just found it incredibly distressing.

Sorry [crying]. Yeah, it’s very upsetting to see that. To know that I could go home to my beautiful house with my beautiful family and live my very middle-class life, and to know that those children were not able to do that.

For this volunteer, as for many others, the striking disparities that she saw between her own life and those of the asylum seekers were important. They highlighted the many rights that her asylum seeker friends were denied, and made these injustices personal. These juxtapositions, however, also added to the volunteers’ feelings of ‘metaphysical guilt’ (Jaspers 1947; Rackley 2002); as one volunteer explained in tears, ‘I feel ashamed of being here and free’.

The discomfort that the interviewees experienced surrounding their own comparative privilege was particularly apparent in the way that they reflected on the question of whether their relationships were equal. While almost all interviewees characterised their relationships as genuine friendships, some nonetheless suggested that the institutional context in which these friendships took place precluded equal interactions. As one interviewee reflected, ‘me going through there for two hours and then walking off and getting in my car? What can be equal [about that] if the other person’s locked up and bored and frightened?’ In this context, interviewees expressed fear that their visits might be perceived as ‘pervy’ or patronising, and actively sought to avoid this dynamic by allowing the asylum seekers that they visited to ‘drive’ their interactions. The volunteers thus noticed, were confronted by and at times endeavoured to disavow their own comparative privilege. In contrast to what the social scientific literature concerning compassion might predict, these volunteers derived not emotional gratification but emotional discomfort from their social advantage, as their reflexive processes made them acutely aware of the arbitrariness and injustice of their own good fortune.

**Shared performances**

Visiting detention had a significant impact on the participants in this study. The volunteers cared about their asylum seeker friends and – notwithstanding the distressing scenes that they encountered within detention – they enjoyed seeing them. During their visits, the volunteers drank tea and coffee, shared food, played cards or board games and talked with the asylum seekers. Those who visited detained families played with the children, and some visitors offered assistance to asylum seekers who were working on legal submissions or other
aspects of their protection claims. The relationships that developed between
the volunteers and the people that they visited were (as previous studies have
documented (Fleay 2016)) both intimate and intense.

While detention has been described as a traumatising environment (Peterie
2018b; Newman & Steel 2008), the asylum seekers and volunteers nonetheless
enjoyed some moments of happiness. The volunteers noted, however, that these
moments were often somewhat choreographed. While visiting their detainee
friends, the volunteers usually tried to be cheerful and optimistic. They chose
not to show the asylum seekers their own despair as it felt insignificant and self-
indulgent beside the greater anguish that the asylum seekers were experiencing.
The visitors thus managed, masked and at times deferred their negative emotions,
repressing their own feelings of anguish until after their visits.

Equally, the volunteers observed that the asylum seekers engaged in similar
acts of emotion work in order to protect their visitors from the full force of
their despair. One volunteer, for instance, described a conversation that he
had with an asylum seeker who had recently attempted suicide. The man had
appeared to be his usual ‘happy’ self, but when the volunteer was alone with
his friend, he asked him how he really was.

He said he couldn’t keep going on, he’s never going to get out. He said he
doesn’t have anywhere to go. He can’t go home because they’re going to
kill him. He can’t stay here because he doesn’t want to live here. Doesn’t
want to live [. . .] And as soon as the boys came back he kind of snapped
back to being happy again.

Another interviewee explained that there were times when she would go
through the ritual of drinking tea and sharing cake with an asylum seeker,
knowing that his mind was occupied with thoughts of his imminent depor-
tation. The asylum seekers and volunteers, these stories suggested, worked
together to create small pockets of normality in which all parties could find
temporary reprieve from the confronting realities of detention.

**Reflexivity in late modernity**

As noted earlier, the academic literature regarding care-based volunteer work in
general, and asylum seeker friendship programmes in particular, has at times taken
issue with the power dynamics that these programmes entail. Scholars have sug-
gested that work of this type all too often reduces to an exercise in privilege and
emotional gratification. In doing so, they have charged volunteers with either
failing to be reflexive concerning their motivations and actions, or with being
reflexive in the wrong way – that is, with reflexively managing their own per-
formed identities, but failing to interrogate their intentions and subject positions.

The evidence presented here problematises this portrayal by painting a
markedly different (empirically informed) picture of the reflexive processes of
volunteers. While questions of identity – and, in particular, questions of moral
Compassion and power

identity – were very present in volunteer accounts of their activities, interviewees engaged with these ideas with more sophistication than the literature allows. In particular, volunteers were reflexive at both the micro and the macro level. They monitored, managed and were often guided by their emotions not only in their individual volunteer relationships, but also in their broader appraisals of the discourses and policies that comprise Australia’s politics of fear surrounding asylum seekers. For participants in this study, efforts at identity construction went far beyond the performance of virtue through emotionally gratifying altruism; indeed, volunteers grappled with issues of institutional affect, undeserved privilege and national guilt, and struggled to understand their own position in relation to structural injustices and harms. The mode of relating that these volunteers described resonated not with the contemporary scholarship regarding the pitfalls of paternalistic compassion, but with the older philosophical tradition that recognises the structural and political critique that ‘true’ compassion entails.

Taken together, these findings lend support to Patulny and Olson’s argument (this volume, Chapter 1) that efforts to ‘reflexively construct an identity and manage emotions’ are a key aspect of late modern emotional life. While it is beyond the scope of this study to consider whether such reflexivity was equally required in previous historical periods, it is clear that – for the participants in this study as well as for scholars in the politics of compassion – micro- and macro-reflexivity is now essential.

Acknowledgement

This research was funded by a Commonwealth Government Research Training Program Stipend Scholarship, and a travel grant from the University of Sydney. The empirical aspects of the study were approved by the University of Sydney’s Human Research Ethics Committee.

The author thanks Dr Susan Banki, Prof Stephen Castles and Dr David Neil for their support during the research process, and the editors and reviewers for their valuable feedback regarding earlier versions of the chapter.

Note

1 For a detailed discussion of this policy – which sees asylum seekers processed on small Pacific Islands, beyond the jurisdiction of Australia’s courts – see Gleeson 2016.

References


AHRC 2011, Immigration detention at Curtin: observations from visit to Curtin Immigration Detention Centre and key concerns across the detention network, Australian Human Rights Commission, Australia.


Gleeson, M 2016, Offshore: behind the wire on Manus and Nauru, NewSouth Publishing, Australia.


McAdam, J & Chong, F 2014, Refugees: why seeking asylum is legal and Australia’s policies are not, UNSW Press, Australia.
Chapter 20

Affective dynamics of conflicts between religious practice and secular self-understanding

Insights from the male circumcision and ‘Burkini’ debates

Christian von Scheve and Nur Yasemin Ural

Introduction

In 2012, many countries across the globe witnessed protests against the release of the film *The Innocence of Muslims*, an anti-Islamic film produced by Nakoula Basseley Nakoula. The film was widely perceived as being offensive to Muslims and has stirred both violent and non-violent outrage. Muslim protesters complained that the film ridiculed their belief, was deeply injurious and perceived as dishonouring, and demanded the film be removed from the online platform YouTube. The controversy was further aroused when Western commentators claimed the film should be protected by the right to freedom of speech and expression. Contrary protesters claimed that the freedom of speech should not include the freedom to insult and offend. Similar patterns of outrage and debate over the limits of the freedom of speech *vis-à-vis* religious sensibilities can be found in the publication of Rushdie’s *Satanic verses* in 1988, which provoked riots in Pakistan in 1989, after which the Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa calling for the death of Rushdie; the publication of Muhammad caricatures in the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* in 2005, which stirred massive worldwide protests in early 2006; or the publication of *Charlie Hebdo*’s Muhammad cartoons in 2015, which drew tens of thousands of Muslim protesters to the streets across the globe. How do these publications become related to emotions of irritation, dishonor, insult, injury, offense and outrage? Is there anything specifically ‘religious’ or ‘Muslim’ about these emotions, as some of these examples might suggest, and indeed many in the public debates surrounding these controversies claim? And what are the consequences of these emotions for the dynamics of minority/majority and secular/religious relations in late modern societies?

We may find some of the answers when interpreting the abovementioned artworks and publications within the larger context of the status of feelings, affect and emotion in controversies arising between religious convictions and worldviews on the one hand and the principles and self-understandings of liberal-secular states on the other. They are but the most prominent examples
of the way in which ‘hurtfulness’, ‘emotionality’ and ‘injury’ have come to play central roles in the discourse on and the treatment of religious practices and claims for recognition in liberal secular democracies over the past decades. Although many disciplines have investigated these lines of conflict from normative, judicial and political perspectives (e.g., Asad 2003; Mahmood 2015; Nussbaum 2012), feelings and emotions have only recently attracted attention as an important dimension of systematic inquiry (e.g., Mahmood 2009). The language of emotionality, hurtfulness and injury forms both the limits of free speech and religious practice on the one hand, and their legibility, acceptability and legitimacy within a liberal secular state on the other. Claims and demands made in the name of religion are constantly interpreted and labelled as highly affective and emotional, whereas claims regarding secular principles, for example, that of free speech, are usually portrayed as reasoned, deliberate and even ‘affect-neutral’.

Looking at these debates, it is almost exclusively religious subjects who either self-categorise as or are portrayed by others to be hurt and injured. Much less do we find references to emotions in defence of secular subjects and positions. For instance, outbursts of disbelief, astonishment, contempt and anger in many Western media outlets over the violent protests of Muslims in response to *The Innocence of Muslims* are hardly ever framed in emotional terms, but rather as rational responses to irrational religious behavior. Religious minorities – in this case Muslims in the Western world – are equally held responsible for rendering their injury intelligible and credible to a secular public and/or religious majority (Agrama 2012), which essentially amounts to a request to de-emotionalise, at least in rhetoric.

How can we understand these emotional dynamics that go hand-in-hand with discursive conflicts between religion and the self-understanding of secular publics as one of the main dividing lines in many contemporary Western societies? And what do they imply for the social relations between different societal groups and the recognition and accommodation of cultural difference, which has proven to be a key challenge of many late modern societies? In this chapter, we suggest a perspective that is not primarily concerned with the careful elucidation of people’s actual phenomenal feelings vis-à-vis these debates, but rather with the discursive construction and political strategies at evoking emotions as well as with the potential social ramifications of these religious and secular emotions. Analysing these constructions and strategies, we argue, is essential for an understanding of emotions in late modernity more generally, given that attempts at the management of public emotion, at political emotionalisation and at the incitement or suppression of specific emotions are key to this condition (e.g., George 2016; Pankaj 2017).

‘Religious’ emotions in historical perspective

It is interesting to note that although ‘religious feelings’ or ‘religious emotions’ are frequently mentioned in public debate, the more established
Conflicts between religion and secularity

meaning is different from its use in discourse. Traditionally, religious emotions can be characterised according to their ‘cognitive objects’, a ‘depth condition’ and a ‘pragmatic condition’, as suggested by Järveläinen (2008). The cognitive object would refer to the objects of religious experience, which basically represent the intentionality of religious emotion. The depth condition takes up ideas from Schleiermacher and Otto, emphasising the relatingness of religious emotion, therefore the idea that they rest upon a perception of relatedness between the emoting subject and another entity. The pragmatic condition highlights that religious emotions depend on religious practices and culture.

When religious emotions are mentioned in controversies over religious practices and the principles of the liberal-secular state, they tend to assume a different meaning. As shown in our introductory examples, the notion of religious emotions refers to experiences of injury, harm, ridicule and vilification that result from being in one or another way linked to a particular faith, religious practice or community. One of the central questions related to this understanding of religious emotions is whether there should be legally guaranteed protection from this kind of harm, which was a controversial issue throughout Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Frevert 2016). At times, the protection of religious sentiment was considered essential because it was considered part of one’s individual rights to wellbeing and freedom from harm. At other times, religious feelings were to be protected in order to secure the collective order and prevent public outrage (ibid., p. 34).

Outside the legal sphere, the regulation of the freedom of expression to accommodate religious sensibilities is frequently discussed by civil society organisations who criticise ‘blasphemy laws’ – laws protecting a (majority) religion from irreverence and offence – as incompatible with the principles of the secular state and demand they be abolished. For example, a consortium of NGOs launched the campaign ‘End Blasphemy Laws’ in 2015 (International Humanist and Ethical Union 2015). Also, certain public intellectuals (Fourest 2015) and scholars (Bouldoires 2016) in France have demanded a ‘right to blasphemy’ in Europe, as part of the freedom of expression that should be protected within the democratic polity. Paralleling recent demands within the public sphere, some European countries have abandoned their blasphemy laws, for instance Denmark, in favour of anti-discrimination laws that also cover non-religious forms of offence. This move can be interpreted with reference to specific secular sensibilities which basically form a counterpart to religious emotions in late modern controversies between the religious and the secular.

These historical and legal constellations indicate that religious feelings and emotions are a peculiar and analytically misleading category, because they tend to suggest that emotions are exclusively on the side of the religious and it is exclusively religious subjects that are affected by these debates. Empirically, this is most likely an untenable position. To understand better these debates and controversies, we not only need to understand how, precisely, the attributions
of emotions towards religious subjects work, but also to comprehend the feel-
ings and emotions on the side of secular subjects.

**Emotions and emotional regimes**

To uncover the role of emotions in the religious-secular divide more effectively, a promising initial step is to look at how emotions are explicitly mentioned in discourse using emotions terms and labels. For example, the controversy over a genuinely ‘German’ culture (*Leitkultur*) *vis-à-vis* other, in particular Islamic, cultures in 1998 and 2015, the debate over the Mohammed caricatures in 2006 or discussions about whether Islam is an integral part of German society in 2010 all make reference to specific emotion words. The Mohammed caricatures in *Jyllands-Posten* and the *Innocence of Muslims* film and the recurrent controversies show the significance that speakers in a discourse ascribe to emotions and to their potential injury. The debate concerning a German *Leitkultur*, that is, the search for dominant and genuinely German values, worldviews and practices that make up German collective identity, is rife with fear and anxiety over the corrosion of this *Leitkultur* in wake of globalisation and immigration (e.g., Saleh 2017; Thierse 2017).

Furthermore, the articulation of these emotions, in particular feeling offended and insulted, frequently becomes an essential part of collective mobilisation, as is evident in the manifold protests against these artworks and political state-
ments (‘Protests in Cairo and Benghazi’ 2012; ‘Protests over anti-Muslim film’ 2012; Kovaleski & Barnes 2012). Importantly, discursively articulated and thus ‘collectivised’ emotions tell us little about how individuals actually feel towards certain artworks. On the contrary, one might speculate that emotions in late modernity are characterised by the drifting apart of (medially) articulated and experienced emotions.

Emotions in these debates are often attributed to (collective) religious sub-
jects as being (unduly) affected and suffering from hurt ‘religious feelings’. Likewise, discussions regarding the adequacy and the legal status of certain religious practices, such as the wearing of headscarves, ritual slaughtering or circumcision, are often framed referring to notions of anger, indignation and resentment amongst those being confronted with and opposing these actions, as well as notions of anger and injury in the defendants of these practices. The social repercussions of this discursive construction of emotion are manifold, and in the following we aim to emphasise two of them.

First, recourse to ‘religious feelings’ to some extent constitutes a novel discourse beyond established political language and contributes to the con-
struction of (symbolic) boundaries, and cultural identities and the formation of affective communities based on religious and secular beliefs; the possible emer-
gence of communal bonds based on similar ways of feeling and being affected in view of specific events and situations. Discourse on conflicts between reli-
gious convictions and secular self-understandings hence strives towards the
establishment of particular—and antagonistic—\textquoteleft emotional regimes\textquoteright (Reddy 2001) through which the complexity of emotional life is replaced by an almost Cartesian dualism between religious and secular emotions.

Importantly, these regimes also provide insights into the mutual constitution of \textquoteleft the religious\textquoteright and \textquoteleft the secular\textquoteright within discourse. It becomes obvious how \textquoteleft the religious\textquoteright is viewed and constructed only in conjunction with \textquoteleft the secular\textquoteright (Mahmood 2015; Asad 2003). Accepting the view that secularism is no culturally or religiously \textquoteleft neutral\textquoteright baseline from which a secular public appraises and evaluates religious practices and beliefs, but instead is in itself an outcome of specific historical constellations that have led to ideas of the separation of state and religion, mostly in the Christian world (Asad 2003), this discourse can be interpreted from at least two different angles.

On the one hand, when speakers in the discourse, representatives of Muslim communities or organisations as well as the secular critics of religion and Islam, ascribe religious pain and injury to \textquoteleft the Muslims\textquoteright, they do so in view of some secular \textquoteleft Other\textquoteright, either subjects or institutions, who are portrayed as calm, rational, deliberate and free of affect. In contrast, the Muslim subject is constructed as one with undue religious sensibilities from the perspective of representatives of the secular state. Affect and emotion are cast as characteristic of the religious subject, which, looking at the history of Western thought, would exclude reason and rationality.

On the other hand, it is remarkable to see that in cases where representatives of certain faiths demand changes in legal regulations, in particular concerning freedom of expression that put religious sensibilities under special protection, secular subjects as well speak and act in a highly emotional manner. Politicians as well as self-proclaimed representatives of the liberal state tend to voice outrage, indignation and anger in view of these demands. This likewise applies to cases in which certain religious practices shall be recognised, even though they might clash with legal rulings and existing religious privileges in some cases, such as the wearing of certain kinds of headscarves by public servants, ritual circumcision of underage males or the construction of mosques. The German \textit{Leitkultur} debate is an example at hand. It is firmly rooted in fears and anxieties over the loss of this alleged culture, and these fears and anxieties are essential to the emotional regimes of right-wing populist parties and movements, many of them mobilising against the \textquoteleft Islamisation\textquoteright of the Occident. They create emotional repertoires of fear that in themselves become sources of community and demarcation.

**The religious-secular divide as an affective arrangement**

Discourse about emotions and the attribution of specific emotions to individuals and social groups through emotion words reveal the highly politicised emotional regimes and repertoires of the religious-secular divide that operate through symbols and language. We suggest that the religious contestations of the secular
and liberal order constitute a specific affective arrangement (Slaby, Mühlhoff & Wüschner 2017) consisting of affective relations amongst discourses, practices, actors and collectives, which we explain in more detail below. Capitalising on explicit references to feelings and emotions in discourse provides insights on what is said and written about contested religious-secular constellations in predominantly secular publics, and about the emotions and sensibilities that go along with these constellations. However, this says very little about what individuals actually feel and experience in view of these debates. Analysing discourse reveals what speakers say about how people are (or should be) affected by these debates. In fact, these statements and attributions can be interpreted first and foremost as political strategies to legitimate or de-legitimate certain claims. This might be an effective political strategy in two ways. First, an audience might take these attributions of emotions for granted and make decisions or take actions based on these appraisals and modes of making sense of the world. Second, an audience might take up the attributions of emotions and make them, performatively, their very own emotions. In the sociology of emotion, this ‘taking up’ of emotions has been discussed in theories of collective emotions (von Scheve & Ismer 2013) and collective emotional orientations (Bar-Tal 2001). This speaks directly to the relation between emotions that people actually experience and publicly negotiated, collectivised emotions, and their consequences for different forms of social action, for instance related to integration, belonging or participation in social movements.

An alternative reading would we be more substantially geared towards a Foucauldian understanding of discourse and subjectivation. In this understanding, one need not exclusively focus on explicit statements concerning emotions that individuals might or might not experience, but on the consequences discourse brings about for forms of self-understanding and self-relatedness. In this regard, it is imperative that forms of subjectivation also encompass a bodily dimension, for which it is not only conceptual thought that matters, but ways of being affected in a non-conceptual and non-symbolic sense (e.g., von Scheve 2017; Slaby 2016).

For this reading, the concept of affect can be instructive. Although this concept has many meanings in different disciplines, works within cultural studies conceive of affect as a counterpart to language and discourse and emphasise the critical importance of bodies and their interrelations for the social world. Much of affect theory subscribes to the post-structuralist critique of the liberal, transcendental and autonomous individual, but departs not from language and discourse – as most post-structuralists would do. Rather, it starts from relations between bodies to suggest a theoretical and process-ontological alternative (Blackman et al. 2008).

The understanding of affect proposed here, however, is more compatible with social science theory and methodology. We understand affect as a ‘mode of being’ and a continuous bodily orientation towards the world that has meaningful evaluative qualities (cf. von Scheve 2017). The orientation that affect provides is not achieved primarily through linguistic representation and deliberative
Conflicts between religion and secularity

thought, but through basic cognitive capabilities of the body. Because affect is ubiquitous and continuous (like perception), it is best thought of not as something episodic, but rather in terms of steady fluctuations or in terms of changes in the modes of being and the sensibilities and capacities to act.

Affect works primarily through altering bodies’ capacities to act (whereas emotions would include conceptual knowledge, object directedness etc.). This can happen in various ways, through alterations to cognitive and perceptual processing, to the endocrine and hormonal system or to autonomous and peripheral nervous system activity. Affect is often – though not necessarily – associated with emotions (and vice versa) and can be conceived of as object-directed ‘affective comportments’ that are categorised into culturally established and linguistically labelled prototypes, for instance fear, anger or happiness. The notion of affect proposed here is in some ways related to what others have called ‘background emotions’ (Barbalet 1998) or ‘existential feelings’ (Ratcliffe 2009).

An affective arrangement then is a:

material-discursive formation as part of which affect is patterned, channeled and modulated in recurrent and repeatable ways. Such arrangements usually bring multiple actors into a dynamic conjunction, so that these actors’ mutual affecting and being-affected becomes a vital part of the arrangement itself.

(Slaby, Mühlhoff & Wüschner 2017, p. 7)

These notions of affect and affective arrangements therefore seem fruitful for an alternative understanding of the contested constellations of the religious-secular divide in many contemporary Western societies, because they open up a possibility to come to terms with their non-linguistic and non-significational dimensions. Analysing the role of language in an affective arrangement is of course a non-trivial endeavor, since affect is positioned as in some sense being beyond language and conceptual thought. However, a number of theories are instructive here. Butler’s (1997) work on excitable speech offers ways of understanding the performative rather than the conceptual and structural aspects of language and how they contribute to arousing, exciting and affecting bodies.

Aside from the difficulties of linking affect to language, affective arrangements are also comprised of actions, objects or images, and their potential to affect bodies in different ways still has to be theorised more comprehensively. Whether caricatures of Mohammed or the artistic ridiculing of the pope during the Cologne carnival actually elicit specific (religious) emotions is debatable. However, that these portrayals affect bodies in specific ways can hardly be questioned. Needless to say, different bodies will be affected in different ways, but as Wetherell (2012) and Seyfert (2011) have suggested, bodies ‘learn’, during enculturation and socialisation, to be affected in specific ways. These ‘ways of being affected’ (as a dimension of subjectivation) form the backdrop for any political or strategic attempt at inciting collective (religious) emotions and
are essential elements for thoroughly understanding political cleavages such as contested constellations of the religious and the secular. In the following, we discuss two concrete examples of how controversies between the religious and the secular can meaningfully be investigated using concepts of emotions, affect and affective arrangements.

**Cases and discourses**

In this section we discuss two legal cases in France and Germany that concern Muslim cultural practices. Contrary to many studies that focus on the offense of religious sentiments of Muslims, for example, in the search of comprehension and prevention of religious injury, we seek to focus on the legislative processes related to Muslim practices in Europe to better understand the public sentiments and the underlying affective arrangements associated with said controversies. We will look at two controversies in Germany and in France, those over male circumcision and the wearing of ‘Burkinis’.

Our choice of controversies is motivated by the fact that the legal bans on the specific practices they involved were implemented over the course of the controversies, but then rapidly repealed. One of our theses is that these revocations resulted from conflicting emotional regimes and affective registers with respect to the bans. Affects generated in these examples certainly are not detached from previous legal rules concerning Muslims that are still in effect or in preparation in Europe. Yet, the rapid alteration of certain rules helps to unveil the paradoxes related to the freedom of religion and core liberal principles in relation to the public order and collective sentiments, which are key concepts in the legal justifications of the bans.

The controversy of ritual male circumcision was sparked in 2012 when the district court (Landgericht) in Cologne, Germany issued a decree rendering ‘religiously motivated’ circumcision illegal. The court declared ritual circumcision to be a form of ‘bodily injury’ following a judicial case of a Muslim boy who, after circumcision was carried out, suffered from medical complications. The court ruling has incited a lively discussion involving various actors, for instance politicians, religious representatives, NGOs and political representatives from Muslim countries and Israel alike. The debate thus was not only prominent in Germany, but also in Turkey and Israel where people expressed concerns regarding the rights of Muslims and Jews in Germany. In countless TV shows, pros and cons of ritual male circumcision were discussed with medical doctors, psychologists, lawyers, religious dignitaries and secular Muslim public figures as defenders and opponents of the court’s ruling. In these discussions, defenders of the ban plead for religious actors to think and act rationally and not emotionally for once. On the other hand, religious representatives, who are usually considered the only legitimate opponents of the ban, were constantly asked within mainstream media in talk shows, journal articles and magazines to account for their (Muslim) feelings, experiences and immediate reactions to
Conflicts between religion and secularity

the court’s decision. Regarding these debates, to which we will return further in this section, Amir-Moazami (2016) argues that the ‘secular bodies’ operate through a ‘self-differentiation as a mode of unmarking the secular through the gaze on the marked body of the other’, the religious one (p. 166).

Contrary to the circumcision debate that focused on religious practices involving infant male bodies, the ban on the Burkini in France was concerned with adolescent and adult female bodies and their clothing. In July 2016, David Lisnard, mayor of Cannes in France, issued a municipal decree temporarily banning the Burkini from the city’s beaches, describing the garment as being ‘of a certain nature that would create risks of disturbances to the public order (crowding, skirmishes, etc.)’. He justified his decision as part of the state of exception measures in France, drawing parallels between the terrorist attacks that had taken place in Nice two weeks earlier, leaving 86 dead, and the Burkini, denouncing the latter as a political symbol and a provocation. The Burkini was a ‘beachwear ostentatiously showing a religious affiliation while France and places of religious significance are the target of terror attacks’, Lisnard held (Sims 2016). The Cannes decree was adopted in approximately 30 other French municipalities, not only by conservative mayors but also by socialist ones.

Contrary to many of the legal regulations that go largely unnoticed, the bans on circumcision and the Burkini rapidly became national and even international affairs involving high-ranking politicians and government officials and the engagement of international media commenting on the (il)legitimacy of the bans. Manuel Valls, then prime minister of France, expressed his understanding and support for the mayor of Cannes and other municipalities. At the same time, however, he emphasised that there would be no application of these rules for the entire French republic. German chancellor Angela Merkel was also involved in the circumcision debate, although, contrary to Valls, she was not supportive of the ban, the implications of which we will discuss shortly. In both debates, secularism as a fundamental value of both states was placed at the core of the controversies. Two prominent intellectuals in both countries reacted to the discussion, Jürgen Habermas and Jean Baubérot, criticising the ban and repeatedly emphasising the necessity for dialogue and public discussion.

Despite many ambitions to construct ‘the secular’ as a religiously neutral practice or a way of being in the world that is free of affect and emotion, in the circumcision debate and the Burkini affair, bans were usually justified through dominant feelings of love and fear at the same time. ‘If my Jewish education leads to a point that my son asks me one day as a mature and convinced Jew to get him finally circumcised, I will then fulfil his wish with love, pride and pain. But not before’, commented Gil Yaron, in his own words ‘a non-religious Jewish doctor’, in an article on the circumcision ritual. This article was written as a response to his sister, who desired to go against tradition, not letting her son be circumcised (Yaron 2012).

This example provides important insights towards an understanding of how emotions such as love, pride and pain play a crucial role not only in
‘religious’ reasoning, but also in secular accounts of certain religious practices enacted on the body. According to Yaron, it is through sensing love and with pride and pain with regard to a mature decision of becoming a convinced Jew – which can only come after a certain age – that he can truly exercise his duty as a father. Obviously, love and respect for the bodily integrity and the autonomy of the son also appeared as common secular and liberal arguments during the debate.

Contrary to emotions of love and respect, the Burkini ban revolved mainly around the collective emotions that were expressed in France after the terrorist attacks in Nice. As an example for public intellectuals’ involvement, Jean Baubérot – the most prominent expert of French secularism – in an interview takes it for granted that citizens are appalled by seeing women wearing Burkinis at beaches, but this cannot be a reason to legally ban the Burkini. At the same time, however, many commentators have acknowledged that the Burkini has stirred debate for a long time and that one needs to take into account the emotional climate of fear, anxiety and mistrust that dominated the French public and political discourse after the Nice attacks. Under the impression of these collective ‘secular’ emotions, the Burkini is easily seen as a political symbol and provocation rather than an expression of specific religious beliefs. The ban can thus be interpreted more as an outcome of emotions like fear, anxiety and mistrust rather than as a consequence of rational deliberation. It also points at the complex ways in which emotions in the late modern age become sources of (collective) self-understanding and objects of political debate and strategic management at the same time.

These sentimental registers of the secular, as the love and desire for personal autonomy and bodily integrity of liberal subjects, along with an expressed fear of and mistrust in Islam, become fragile in France and Germany through the introduction of elements that belong to other affective and memorial orders. They produce dissonance in relation to the former historical project: the German-Jewish history and women’s emancipation in France. In both cases, the initial legal rulings have quickly been revoked. We suggest that this revoking was in part due to the increasing salience of conflict and dissonance between present and historical emotional regimes, an ambivalence in emotions that might be dubbed characteristic of late modernity.

In Germany, the circumcision ban was revoked only a month after the court’s ruling. The prohibition of ritual circumcision rapidly shifted its terrain and increasingly involved not only Muslim but also Jewish religious practice. Some commentators interpreted the ban as an indication of a revival of a dormant German anti-Semitism and it became, even if only implicitly, associated with the Shoah (Brumlik 2012). The ban of circumcision and the debate that followed therefore began to resonate with the collective trauma and affective registers of Nazi Germany and the Holocaust. German chancellor Angela Merkel said that Germany was ridiculing itself as a ‘comedian nation’ (‘Merkel spricht’ 2012) and she did not want Germany to be the only nation where Jews cannot live their tradition.
In France, on the other hand, and although the ban was strongly criticised by international media from the very beginning, the turning point towards the revoking of the decree was an infamous image of armed police standing next to a woman wearing a Burkini on a beach in Nice and forcing her to remove the garment. Social and mass media were quick to link those images to those of a police officer issuing a reprimand to a woman at an Italian beach in 1957 because of her wearing a bikini. Through references to and connections with feminism and the discrimination of women, the controversy gained legitimacy as an issue of women’s rights while partially freeing itself from the language of terrorism, political symbolism and provocation. In the Burkini affair, shame played a prominent role in the emotional vocabulary from then on. ‘They want to take her clothes off. But they should take off their uniforms! The police of shame’ commented the president of the CCIF (Collective Against Islamophobia in France), Marwan Muhammed, on Twitter, gaining broad support.

Both of these alternative framings and interpretations that ultimately lead to the revoking of the legal rulings are indicative of the powerful yet often unarticulated affective relations between actors, symbols, images and discourses. The change in direction these controversies took can be conceived of as changes in an affective arrangement, that is, changes in the material-discursive formations that pattern and channel affect in specific and recurrent ways and include actors’ mutual affecting and being-affected. Interestingly, the two cases also reveal the historicity and deep-seated embodied nature that affective arrangements can take. The conjuring and emphasising of affective relations that disturb and run counter to a dominant arrangement evoke the strong emotional reactions expressed in the above cases. Mistrust, fear and anger in response to terrorist attacks and the public visibility of religious symbols become concurrent with shame and embarrassment over the legal regulations regarding these symbols and, eventually, lead to alterations in the social world. These competing emotional regimes that are established and negotiated through media and public discourse can be considered politically motivated attempts at establishing sovereignty over citizens’ emotions.

**Conclusion**

Controversies surrounding the place of religion and in particular of Islam in contemporary Western societies are fueled with references to feelings and emotions. More specifically, the hurting and injury of religious feelings and emotions have for some time been at the core of these controversies. Not only hurt religious feelings, but also more mundane emotions such as outrage, anger and fear characterise debates over, for instance, the principles of the freedom of expression or the wearing of Islamic attire in public. Although a brief historical contextualisation has shown that neither discussions over the injury of religious feelings nor the invocation of blasphemy laws in response to certain transgressions are particularly recent phenomena, it is striking that affect and emotion
are predominantly attributed to (or expressed by) religious subjects – hardly do we find attributions of emotions to non-religious or secular subjects. We have argued that this is, empirically speaking, an untenable position and that there is a need to understand better the emotional dynamics of these kinds of controversies, on the sides of religious subjects as well as for secular subjects. We have argued, on the one hand, that an analysis of articulations of emotions in discourse can provide insights into the collective emotional dynamics of these (and other) controversies and help understand processes of group formation and antagonising. In particular, we suggested that articulations and attributions of emotions in discourse contribute to the formation of specific emotional regimes that are supposed to serve the political interests of the different actors involved in such a controversy. Subsequently, we suggested to not only look at specific emotion words and labels in a text, but to try to come to terms with the more subtle, unarticulated and bodily affective arrangements that said controversies constitute. Using empirical examples of the ritual male circumcision debate in Germany in 2012 and the Burkini ban in France in 2016, we have proposed that dissonant and even conflicting affective arrangements that are associated with alternative interpretations of both controversies can in fact contribute to the revoking of changes in legal regulations that emanated from the controversies.

More generally, our proposed approach at reading these and other conflicts takes their emotional and affective dimension seriously, without merely reproducing what is said and articulated by the different parties in discourse. Instead, treating affect and emotion as fundamental building blocks of social coexistence, they can never be on only one side of any conflict. However, actors articulate and make use of emotions in very different ways and are part of different (historical) affective arrangements that need to be investigated and understood to achieve better comprehension regarding present lines of controversy and antagonism. On a more general account, the changes in and contestations of affective arrangements and emotional regimes we discussed might be interpreted as epitomes of larger patterns of societal change that are evident in late modernity. This would certainly include a multiplicity of appropriations of emotions, from intimate lives to global political struggles and the mediatisation of emotional practices and repertoires, as well as the entanglement of private emotional experience and collectivised emotion. Our approach is first and foremost intended as a methodological position that can be implemented using existing qualitative research methods informed by theorising in the sociology of emotion as well as in affect studies.

References
Amir-Moazami, S 2016, ‘Investigating the secular body: the politics of the male circumcision debate in Germany’, *ReOrient*, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 147–70.


310  Christian von Scheve and Nur Yasemin Ural


Chapter 21

Towards ‘keystone feelings’
An affective architectonics for climate grief

*Thomas Bristow*

The chiasmus of hope and catastrophe is what saves hope from being unmasked as only catastrophe; as an illusion or unsatisfied movement of desire that wrecks everything.

Geoffrey Hartman

Just as we cannot understand bird flight by studying only feathers […] we cannot understand emotional experience by studying only the face, the eyeball, the ear, the brain.

Daniel Gross

Ambivalence lies at the heart of our post-modern consciousness; anxiety regarding the management of emotions is embodied in the question of whether we ‘should’ induce behaviour change collectively at a macro scale or leverage small groups and individuals. Furthermore, the politics of individual mobilisation is rhetorically charged in social media and political fora by a lurid poetics of morality. This curious example of emotional governance in late modernity is cast in the guise of self-reproach in the neoliberal discourse of the Anthropocene, alerting us to the necessity for self-reflection coupled with a better sense of collective shame and guilt. Necessary not only for the grief work required in our climatic present (Head 2016) but in our climatic futures (Head 2016; Cunsolo Willox 2012). In light of this model of governance and the modes of feeling and mediation it generates and exploits, I propose that we begin to evaluate whether morality and ambivalence are keystone feelings in our period of history. As a counterpoint to the implicit scribal suggestion that this moment in history can be unpacked, critiqued and developed via *logos*, I offer an array of NASA images in this chapter that enforce us to feel out the ways we comprehend the Earth, to rethink questions of fragility and wholeness.
Global affect as an oxymoron, or the question of scale

Climate crisis is a huge external force placing unprecedented pressure on our emotional wellbeing. If our culture is alert to and anxious about such a global phenomenon, might it withdraw into an homogenised public space of grieving? In processing irreversible environmental damage of the sixth great extinction owing to human agency on a geological scale, might we temper culturally specific emotions to this new epistemic mode? How might we best account for the birth of a new cultural norm implying regret and sorrow: climate grief (Randall 2009; Cunsolo Willox 2012; Head 2016)?

Our governance systems are national, but our human affairs in late modernity – health, economy, technology and the environment, for example – have global sources and international reach. Our affairs are coloured by our practices within which our feelings are private until shared at familial, communal, national or bioregional scales. Our sense of self is conflicted in the Anthropocene, raised to new levels of hubris while autonomy is scaled back. Grief, however, is not consistent across cultures and history; “we” must do well to remember, Timothy Clark argues, that “Humanity” is not the same grand mega-subject or unitary agent in the sense this trope implies’ (Clark 2012, p. 152). In terms of cultural ecology, how can we adapt to this new metaphoric perception of our agency within the physical environment while remaining sensitive to social and cultural processes that contradict this status in their emphasis on disaggregated practices? How might personal, felt experience come into play here when grief work meets with global phenomena to suggest only the impossibility for resolution, consolation and quietude (Roelvink & Zolkos 2011; Cunsolo Willox 2012)? Is climate grief, therefore, best understood as an emotional practice watermarked by overwhelming emotions that render us powerless to act (Hamilton 2010)?

Birgitte Johansen understands emotions as personally and corporeally felt but socially and spatially produced phenomena – the ‘internalisation and embodiment of community norms’ (2015, p. 50). Moreover, as the intensification of the relevance of something to us registers profoundly (our food supplies, our family, today’s weather), emotions become a part of the process through which ‘the sense of the “me” or “us” harbouring the emotion’ is generated, consolidated or verified (ibid.). Here, the unavoidable issue of proximity and experience turns our thoughts away from inter-level cause and effect (part of the local–global ethical dilemma, where action at one scale registers in another) and into practice – that is, into social, performative, embodied practices that we do (Kuby 2016; Scheer 2012).

Contemporary emotions theory considers affects as primary physiological expressions that are biological and innate with the species; emotions are more biographically conceived, as fully integrated experiences of feeling within the subject’s social meaning structure and private life history (Wetherell 2012; Scheer 2012). This model of feeling depends upon the alignment of emotion
with subjectivity. Alongside this biographical dualism lies a biological dualism. Environmental philosophy has argued that separating humans and the material basis for their life is part of the world picture that supports the pursuits of our economies and the sense of freedom that arises within them. There are two challenges within this problem-space that might help us to understand a climate-literate architectonics of affect in our epoch: a shift in thinking away from individualistic rights-based notions of personhood, and cultural support for collective feelings privatised at bottom. Hans Jonas has outlined the ways that our post-enlightenment models of planning and neoliberal values still rest on a fallacy of ‘non-accumulative behaviour’ (1984, p. 7), which was common currency in economic and health discourses before environmental issues entered the national imaginaries of the West and posited the ethical consequences of our energy consumption practices alongside the need to think beyond individualisation. Recently, thinking on economies and emotion, at least within the humanities, has been upgraded to consider relational, interdependent understandings of reality. These follow on from the sense of an unstable subject over a sovereign self, but they often come up short in imagining ‘radical non-duality’ implicating a ‘unitive dimension of being’ (Spretnak 1997, p. 425).

Right now, the difficulty of dealing with difference within unity (individual agents in the face of the need for collective action on global crises) might
be addressed by an ecological perception of life; such a view might yield the reframing of life within a restricted field of immanence to help us organise our responses to the ways materiality exhibits affectivity. And that issue, I intuit, is key to reorganising our thoughts around affective commitments to climate change, especially if it were mobilised to articulate what we might term ‘keystone feelings’ – emotional dispositions upon which other affects depend, potentially viewed as survival mechanisms upon which our culture at large rests precariously. From here we could attend to the difficulty of situating our self-reflective practices as generative of other practices, not merely descriptions of our state.

**The (affective) politics of commitment**

With respect to the distinct challenges to current models and modes of communication and representation (above), Barbara Adam as understood by Richard Kerridge, notes that ‘environmental problems are frequently invisible, deferred, gradual, too small, too large, and subject to radical uncertainty. As such, they are un-representable by our customary forms of narrative, verbal and visual’ (2006, p. 534). As Kerridge explains, Adam argues that culture, lacking the complex multiple perspectives of time and space these hazards call for, cannot find symbols, visual images or stories of individual lives to give them adequate representation. For Kerridge (2000, p. 243), ‘consequences such as global warming do not register as immediate changes in life around us, but must be projected, uncertainly, onto the world fifty years hence’. Emotions theorists might have something to say here: to project, ‘uncertainly’ is more than a curious turn of phrase.²

To act uncertainly, is to act without full confidence; this meaning is implied within ‘uncertain’, which from the fourteenth century onwards suggests an indeterminate time or occurrence. Uncertainty is part of the affective spectrum within anxiety: the emotional state characterised by concern about the future (Grupe & Nitschke 2013). Worry is anxiety’s cousin, as is fear; like trust, they are both bedfellows of confidence. Confidence has positive connotations in respect of action and thus is valuable for both our inquiry into emotional practices and the interdependent relationship between these practices and environmental morality as we are on the way to defining keystone feelings.

Confidence in one’s judgment is inflected by degrees of positivity as an aspect of one’s sense of self; as with a climate scientist, a professional depended upon by people, confidence is a keystone emotion: present in their sense of self like letters running through a stick of rock (candy). However, in the case of individuals picking up on the science through their everyday contact with the media, confidence is something different; it places pressure on domestic practices, amplifying our sense of ‘muddling through’; it can lead to different senses and uses of confidence than in professional arenas. For example, confidence about something bad happening in the future allows one to fear it in the present; if one is uncertain about its eventuality, one is anxious about it.
And climate change, even for the professional scientist, exerts anxiety upon us. Research shows that given the high uncertainty and future-bound orientation of many climate change impacts, anxiety is a common affective response to climate change (Brugger et al. 2013; Cunsolo Willox et al. 2013; Ojala 2012; Weintrobe 2013; Wright & Nyberg 2012). Furthermore, climate change is highly unpredictable, due to the non-linear intra-acting agencies of the hydrosphere, lithosphere, cryosphere, atmosphere and biosphere, including the wide-ranging possibilities of what our fossil burning practices might entail (Harrison 2013); thus, climate futures are expressed in terms of probabilities (Mastrandrea et al. 2010). The alt-right and climate change denial lobbyists have exploited the emphasis on probability.

**Practices, moods and modes**

Emotional tension between humans as adaptive on one hand and goal-oriented on the other is understated in the literature on cultures of climate change. In social science studies this tension has been bifurcated into distinct modes of practices: between resilience and activism, which are based on a curious politics of representation:

[Anticipatory representations] can have a motivational, axiological, or deontic nature. In fact, these representations can be used as goals and drive the behaviour of the organism. Whereas a merely *adaptive* organism may tend to adjust its epistemic representations (knowledge, beliefs) to the world, to make them as accurate as possible, a goal-directed system tries to adjust the external world to its endogenous representations (which also paves the way for both hallucinations and utopias).

(Castlefranchi & Miceli 2005, p. 484)

Climate change challenges us to consider multiple timescales simultaneously – from the prevailing pattern of weather in a region over days, months and years, to a view on average seasonal temperatures this century. One’s feelings for the impacts of climate change largely depend upon the capacity to exercise a historical and comparative lens to read these data taken since the Great Acceleration last century, and since industrialisation in the nineteenth century; additionally, we must contrast this with even more long-term climate-dominated eras such as the Little Ice Age and how they fit into Earth’s long story (Williams 2016). Emotions scholars are to undertake this work while noting how the function and process of emotions has changed over time, particularly late modernity’s critical inflection with regard to uncertainty, anxiety and potentiality. It is a lot to ask. Fortunately, climate justice draws from our endogenous sense of being human and caring for others. We have long internalised these as keystone feelings for society and only last century reframed these as cornerstones of moral pedagogy, but we are yet to broadcast these as survival mechanisms for our
species and other species. Equilibrium is a strange notion to bring into climate change discourse as it denotes stability when climate changes and evolves; however, it is a useful ideal to have in view as it brings into relief our emotional practices. Rather than ‘revenge’ (of activists, moralists and government taxation policies on carbon emitters, the petro-chemical industry and nuclear lobbyists, for example) resolving an equilibrium that has been displaced by offensive acts, ‘climate justice’ seeks retribution and balance driven by a sense of injustice; it pursues our desire to address the differential affects of climate change and settle things more equitably whenever possible, drawing from a central Western belief of equality under the sign of justice.3

**Anthropocene anxiety and anticipation**

Cognitive theory understands that emotions can trigger anticipatory behaviours; an example might be storing food owing to anxiety over access to dependable supplies in the near future. Additionally, the experience of emotions (or a certain emotion) may induce anticipatory belief, such as that a feeling of anxiety being somewhat negated by storing food might make us feel safe and secure in this particular mode of domesticity. In the first case, preparatory emotions can be understood to mediate relationships between a stimulus and a response; in the second, premonitory emotions ‘accomplish the function of signalling underlying states’ (Castelfranchi & Miceli 2005, p. 483). Kerridge (2000) explicitly refers to legible warning signs that are not easily represented within a narrative of behavioural change; in so doing he implicitly invokes the breakdown or instability of preparatory emotions in late modernity (the mediation between climate change and pro-environmental behaviour) while explicitly naming the premonitory state as ‘uncertain’. From this we ascertain that if we experienced more secure emotions, we might take these as motivation to more clearly defined action.

Adam’s ‘timescape perspective’ offers curious light on the problem of anticipation: ‘the timespans of ordinary life, onto which we map our personal hopes and plans, are viewed alongside drastically longer and shorter distances’ (the instantaneous reception of an infection as well as the drawn-out process of its incubation) (Kerridge 2000, p. 243). We return to public understanding of science hamstrung by representational problems of ‘potentiality [rather] than of actuality’, the emphasis on ‘tomorrow rather than now’, ‘elsewhere rather than here’ and ‘crisis building rather than revealed’. For Kerridge, all these intangible elements undermine preparatory emotions and goal-oriented action; emotional practices in this context can be ‘postponed’ (2000, p. 244), he writes, and thus climate action deferred.

Sheldon Ungar (2000, p. 298) further proposed that the difference in the public’s ethical response to the issues of ozone depletion and climate change crisis were due to issues of metaphor and risk. Studies on the speed and depth by which chlorofluorocarbon release was substantially reduced during the 1970s
and 1980s suggest that ozone was easy to understand as it mobilised bridging metaphors from popular culture, and it proposed immediate and concrete risk with everyday relevance.

The bridging metaphors of the ozone – most notably the penetration metaphor consonant with science fiction movies and computer games – offered low-entry costs to understanding: ‘encompassed in common sense understandings that are deeply ingrained and widely shared’ (Ungar 2000, p. 305); its success owing to this fact, that it was linked in the cultural psyche to the theory of a comet wiping out the dinosaurs, and as a ‘hot crisis’ to exposure and skin cancer. On the other hand, climate change was viewed as ‘future-oriented’, less-immediate and ‘not readily tied to concrete events capable of operating as a beacon or sustaining a hot-crisis’ (Ungar 2000, p. 307); while the greenhouse effect appears benign, the ozone hole is easily cognised as an aberration. This lack of critical purchase on the cultural imaginary for long-term, deferred events was compounded by the ‘hedging and uncertainty’ of the scientific community regarding a consensus on whether or not current weather is linked to climate change last century (Ungar 2000, p. 308), despite consensus on anthropogenic climate change since 1995.4

*Figure 21.2* ‘Flood image after Hurricane Katrina’, International Space Station (copyright NASA)
The uses and disadvantages of metaphor for life

The metaphor ‘carbon footprint’ attempts to bring to mind planetary injustice dispersed over great distances and time while bringing its effects back to the body. Overuse without emotion in news media has transformed this once-exciting visual and bodily meme into a dead metaphor. A subtle advance on this is the term ‘ecological footprint’, which also speaks to a ‘load’: ‘imposed by a given population on nature or, in other words, the amount of nature that humans are thought to occupy in order to live using existing technologies’ (Wackernagel & Rees 1996, p. 4). While a static snapshot in time, the footprint metaphor for Karlsson, ‘flows from an ecologically subtractive logic by which pre-human nature is thought to have been in a state of ecological balance’ (2016, p. 28), thus registering something more than a unidirectional black mark on the planet’s surface in its emphasis on change. Change suggests the potential for new futures, and thus might trigger survival instincts and governance mechanisms for well-established emotions. In the context of Princen (2011), both footprint images lend themselves to radical consumption critiques and to ‘learn to tread softly on the Earth by reducing their aggregate environmental impact’ (Karlsson 2016, p. 27); they also veil the political and sociological barriers to new economies. Karlsson remarks that ‘metaphorical reasoning is widely recognised for its fundamental role in policy-making and public debates’ (2016, p. 23; cf. Schlesinger & Lau 2000) but it is also known for its role in shaping the possibilities for sustainable development or even science itself (Brown 2003; Larson 2011).

For today’s emotions theorists it might be useful to see how, at the turn of the century, cultural studies of climate change negotiated pro-environmental behaviour change agendas (largely underwritten by late modernity’s individualism bequeathing the privatisation of environmental morality), concluding that information ‘in’ the system does not necessarily lead to good behaviour ‘out’ of the system (Coope 2008). Moreover, research in the public understanding of science suggests that the volume of information in the knowledge economy mitigates the acquisition of scientific knowledge – that there is a ratio of the information the human individual and society can handle to the volume of information available. It is worth making a blunt comment here: a lot depends upon our understanding of the capacity of society to process data. This problem was evident before the proliferation of social media platforms in recent decades; however, the rise in the cultural economy of these platforms might not only exacerbate one problem of late modernity that we have identified here; the system neither dynamically responding to information nor rebooting moral consciousness in response to affective pedagogical images invoking our plight. Our collective failure to trigger an appropriate survival response, these studies argue, is related to personal and social motivations as well as technological developments, which impact on the types of knowledge people are likely to acquire, avoid, resist and overlook. The Anthropocene is one case in point.
The ‘age of humans’ is a contested narrative in which figurative and literal uses of words engage in a battle to best articulate a coherent sense of humans as a geological force. For Noel Castree, the Anthropocene metaphor is ‘a new, more graphic way’ to frame global environmental change (2014, p. 6). Summarising Clive Hamilton’s position on the word, Lauren Rickards reads a ‘radical idea’ in his understanding of the Anthropocene, which is the converse of Castree’s understanding owing to Hamilton ‘stem[ming] away from “global environmental change” towards thinking in terms of a single dynamic and phase-shifted Earth System’ (Rickards 2015, p. 281; Hamilton 2015; Hamilton & Grinevald 2015). Extended mind scholars, continental philosophers and emotions scholars alike might find it interesting that Earth as a body or organ is coming into view. Likewise for Robbins, the metaphor ‘invert[s] our perspective about human life and environmental order’ (2013, p. 307). More alarmingly, Wilkinson asserts: ‘humans are now an order of magnitude more important at moving sediment than the sum of all other natural processes operating on the surface of the planet’ (2005, p. 161) and ‘the most important geomorphic agent on the planet’s surface’ (Wilkinson & McElroy 2007, p. 140).

Rickards’ study on the work of the Anthropocene metaphor within sustainability discourse contributes to sociology’s attempts to understand and chart some basic categories with which to think about the social imaginaries of climate change. Rickards discloses numerous variations of meaning depending on the interpretations of the word ‘human’, ‘geological’ and ‘force’, the extent to which the focus is on ‘materiality or immateriality’ and the ways that stratigraphy and Earth system science are deployed:

variations stem from whether the phrase [Anthropocene] is read: as empirical fact (relying on metaphorical explanation) or purely metaphorical; as an observation about the contemporary period or as a (newly exposed) universal truth about the world; and as a statement about human effects or about humans themselves and their cosmological significance.

(2015, p. 283)

It is of use to locate groups of persons unified by distinctive and systematic sets of normative relations within our climate futures, as there must be something in this that trumps the hyper-individualised emotions of late modernity, or privatised environmental morality. From within the world of geosciences, fluency and precision are not always maintained when it comes to the Anthropocene. Linguistic habits reaching for heuristic models that might make sense with a little pathos, however, do appear. And yet, science’s appeal to the emotions ordinarily triggers polar responses, as suggested by Hamilton (2010), above: guilt for what we have done (Ferguson & Branscombe 2014) or hope for what we can do (Head 2016; Ojala 2012). Might there not be an alternative approach that thinks through the question of bodies for understanding our feelings at scale?
Towards a conclusion

At present, climate change models neither consider transpersonal affect nor address questions of risk and choice that sit within states of anxiety and anticipation. Over the last ten years we have come to learn that fluctuations in ecological conditions can be experienced affectively (Albrecht et al. 2007; Cunsolo Willox et al. 2013; Head 2016; Cunsolo Willox 2012) leading to feelings of sorrow (Roelvink & Zolkos 2011), loss (Drew 2013) and anxiety (Brugger, Dunbar, Jurt & Orlove 2013). Moreover, fear, sadness, anger, frustration, helplessness, uncertainty, depression and worry all register in the cultural climate of environmental crises. Ambivalence dominates the way we frame emotions (Hamilton, above), and how we respond to representations of the crises on earth (Adam, Kerridge, Lowe, Rickards, Ungar; cf. NASA images). To say that emotions and affect are therefore direct impacts of phenomena such as climate change (Cunsolo Willox et al. 2013, p. 17) is to make a large claim; however, this might be one of many starting points up for consideration as we approach new emotions theories for our Anthropocene futures. Might we draw some hope from evidence of this project coming into maturity: (i) the locus of the problem of representation having shifted from deferred events (Adam 1988; Buser 2014; Kerridge 2000) to new imaginaries of material events and discourse on bodily metaphors (Rickards 2015; Karlsson 2016; Larson 2011); (ii) that rational behaviourist models interfacing with cultural studies (Lowe 2006; Lowe et. al. 2005) are finding ways to argue for greater research into emotion (Coope 2008; Cunsolo Willox 2012; Head 2016; Ojala 2012; Wright & Nyberg 2012); and (iii) the historical emphasis that grips the academy’s understanding of human culture has been spatialised and opened up for a conversation with Indigenous knowledges (Abram 1997; Graham 2009; Morris 2015; Rose 2004; Spretnak 1997) that might entail a shift from private emotion to public affect, which would help with the problem of scale in climate change discourse.

Perhaps, as we move towards better understanding of adaptation to our environmental futures, we will feel more comfortable with the view that sometimes deliberately, sometimes accidentally, human adjustment appears to be subject to the ways that each culture is able to construct more-than-human imaginaries that match geological time and the chronology of human history. The problem that I outline in this chapter is the way we currently respond to cultural apprehension and anxiety, which does not seem to address the problem of channelling our affective commitments. Our moods and our practices could be analysed within a climate change context to understand better ‘where they might go and what potential modes of knowing, relating, and attending to things are already somehow present in them in a state of potentiality and resonance’ (Stewart 2007, p. 3). From here, we could construct idiosyncratic maps detailing connections between others, the interdependencies between singularities, weather and governments, in a range of affective fields where we witness and contribute to the ‘intensity of circuits, surges and sensations’ (Stewart 2007, p. 7) across society and species.
Postscript (a word on keystone feelings)

Now, as we unpack and apply a new metaphor for the age of humans, our criticism is tasked with directly pointing to the historical time of one species’ technological advantage over nature – a force on the planet turned toxic since the plough and amplified in the Great Acceleration.\textsuperscript{6} As Larson argues: ‘The metaphors we adopt today have significant repercussions for our current and future approaches to environmental sustainability’ (2011, p. 20). One avenue of inquiry that might counteract this fall: to consider a dialogue between what I have tentatively framed as keystone feelings with the metaphor ‘keystone species’, the latter taking the focus away from humans as the dominant force of the Anthropocene and positioning us within a co-dependent system. This metaphor for a species’ effect on its environment, relative to its abundance, speaks clearly to the structure of an ecological community and it might invoke a sense of global climate affect. This in turn might attune our psychology to keystone emotions identified above. Analogous to the role of a keystone in an arch, the abundant species is under the least pressure of any of the components in the structure, but the community/arch collapses without it. A broader affective understanding of ‘keystone species’ – already popular in both conservation discourse and the science of ecology – could help with an imaginary struggling to accumulate...
our local actions within a vision of emergent, spatially broad transactions of our continents’ ecosystems over many thousands of years. And it might help us rethink the current position in mainstream psychology and emotions theory that posits co-dependency as a form of entrapment and fixed role definition underpinning dysfunctional helping relationships that affect an individual’s ability to have a healthy, mutually satisfying relationship.

With interdisciplinary emotions scholarship, we can clarify how our keystone species’ emotional makeup might not only point to co-dependency relevant for climate change discourse but underline the need to draw emotions theory away from anthropocentric models of feeling. This new front for emotions theory, while shifting our sense of what constitutes health for the individual to the scale of species wellbeing. Might this ultimately realise the representation of affect as required for climate change discourse – one relationally produced through assemblages, and active at different scales (Watkins 2016), producing new and emergent embodied connections and relationships (Gregg & Seigworth 2010; Mulcahy 2012)? The ontological dimensions articulated here disrupt the desire for control that models of post-enlightenment selfhood has cemented deep in our psyches (Head 2016; Randall 2009; Robbins & Moore 2013; Weintrobe 2013). This chapter has taken a step towards asking whether macro-reflexively managed emotions can link environmental crisis and the governance of self and transpersonal affect, particularly in the context of Western cultural representations of climate change, a phenomenon that is anticipated and present but not always seen and felt.

I take a telephone call from the Royal Society of the Protection of Birds as I edit this chapter; the starvation of puffins in the British Isles owing to numerous ecological impacts of climate change is the topic of conversation. The hope that it is possible to reverse the decline of species visiting our locales not only animates the Society and its receptive public; it reminds us of the effective measures we can take in an age of uncertainty about the future. There is doubt as to whether this work will be enough; perplexity over the best way forward casts its shadow over our conversation; yet within the gap between the present and the future, the practice of affective commitment persists.

Notes
2 For example, trust as a ‘primary emotion for coping with uncertainties about the intentions, honesty, ability and promises of officials’ in private and public sectors (Pixley 2012, p. 17), and trust and distrust as ways to project (financial) futures as controllable within the state of economic disequilibrium (Pixley, McCarthy & Wilson 2014).
3 Class, race and gender, alongside political representation and economic stability, impact on populations’ abilities to adapt to and mitigate climate change. See Article 18
of Bali Principles of Climate Justice (August 2002); see also the People’s Agreement, World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, Bolivia (April 2010).


7 These ideas are inspired by Bruce Pascoe’s reading of Tim Flannery. See Flannery, T 2010, Here on Earth, Text Publishing, Melbourne, p. 100; Pascoe, B 2014, Dark emu: black Seeds, agriculture or accident, Magbala Books, Broome, p. 122. The planet’s longest-lasting pan-continental stability of Indigenous Australians is also known as ‘the great Australian peace’ (Pascoe 2014, p. 132).


Acknowledgement

This work was supported by the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotions (project number CE110001011) and the Institute of Advanced Studies (COFUND), Durham. The author thanks Jeremy Baskin, Geoff Berry, Jan Hendrik Brueggemeier, Jonathan Coope, Peter Cudmore, Blanche Higgins, Anne McKendry, Fiannuala Morgan, Lauren Rickards and the editors of this collection.

References


Burn, S M 2016, Unhealthy helping: a psychological guide to overcoming codependence, enabling, and other dysfunctional giving, Createspace Independent Publishing.


Darnston, A 2006, Shaping the energy-related behaviour of future consumers, Andrew Darnton for the Energy Savings Trust.


Hemfelt, R, Hawkins, D, Paul, M 1989, Love is a choice: recovery for codependent relationships, Thomas Nelson, Nashville, TN.

Towards ‘keystone feelings’ 325


Lancer, D 2015, Codependency for dummies, John Wiley and Sons, Hoboken, NJ.

Larson, B 2011, Metaphors for environmental sustainability: redefining our relationship with nature, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.


Roelvink, G & Zolkos, M 2011, ‘Climate change as experience of affect’, *Angelaki*, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 43–57.
Scheer, M 2012, ‘Are emotions a kind of practice (and is that what makes them have a history)? A Bourdieuan approach to understanding emotion’, *History and Theory*, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 193–220.
Conclusion

Emotions in late modernity

Roger Patulny, Rebecca E. Olson, Sukhmani Khorana, Jordan McKenzie, Alberto Bellocchi and Michelle Peterie

This collection is evidence that the theoretical tools used by sociologists to make sense of contemporary times can be used effectively to understand the social dynamics of emotions in late modernity.

The chapters in this collection are drawn from sociology and cognate disciplines, and they provide evidence both for and against the idea that emotions are experienced and operate differently in late modernity. For example, working against the late modernity thesis, some authors suggest that emotions are still often perceived in simplistic terms in opposition to rationality (Wettergren). Others point out how many feelings remain public and collectivised in areas such as legal settings (Karstedt) and classrooms (Davis & Bellocchi). Others still imply emotions have always been mediated, as demonstrated through an analysis of gender and emotion in medieval texts (Lynch) or in describing ‘affective genealogy’ approaches to understanding history and society and the mediation of emotions and affect through bodies (Stephens).

On the other hand, supporting the late modernity thesis, the collection showcases a number of sociological theories and studies identifying substantial complexity in contemporary understandings of emotions (Hookway et al.; McKenzie; Bellocchi & Turner; Lively). There are also chapters identifying a rise in individualisation in teaching practices supporting individualised ‘achievement emotions’ (Pekrun) and in legal arguments about taking self-responsibility for angry behaviour (Sorial). Other contributions identify the increasing mediation of emotions, including the investigation of emotions through the use of new technologies (Mills et al.) and the use of digital media and film to convey and influence emotions (Harding; Pribram; Khorana). And numerous chapters point to the increasing reflexivity and requirement to manage emotions, both as individuals in legal contexts (Roach Anleu & Mack) and in the health profession (Olson & Dadich) and in the macro-social world in the contexts of migration (Peterie), religion (von Scheve) and the environmental movement (Bristow).

Although these chapters as a whole do not demonstrate complete consensus around the late modern idea, they do (for the most part) support arguments that contemporary society has witnessed greatly increased change and complexity; a decline in traditional social structures; an increasing mediation of human
activity through technology and digital mediums; and growing flexibility, freedom and autonomy – but also self-responsibility and increased reflexivity – in relation to one’s role as a social actor and a consumer. Reflexivity has become part of the fabric of late modernity, as the institutional touchstones to which identities attach have rapidly multiplied and changed. These changes have had a far-reaching impact on emotions, and the chapters herein have identified and challenged many instances in which this is the case. Also, whilst primarily sociological, the chapters canvass a diverse range of topics and disciplines. They not only engage with the core theoretical concept of ‘late modernity’ from sociology, but also open up the consequences of transitioning into this era for emotions researchers across the broader social sciences and humanities.

This collection represents a timely contribution to emotions research. The popularity of emotions research has exploded in recent years across a range of disciplines, and no single theoretical paradigm has been successful in bringing together these differing perspectives and research in the manner undertaken here. This collection begins to advance this process of understanding the transformation of emotions in late modernity, though it does not claim to have the final word on the topic.
Abbott, A. 261
achievement emotions 4, 142–157; appraisals 145–147; goals 147–148; negative 151–152; positive 151; reciprocal causation 152, 153; tasks and social environment 148–150; taxonomy of 144; universality of 153–154
ACT see affect control theory
action 29–30, 31, 37, 45
activation 144
activism 315
Adam, Barbara 314, 316
Adorno, T.W. 183
affect 15, 184–186, 220n17; affect theory 217–218, 224–225, 228–229, 231, 302; affectio and affectus 184–185, 220n18; ambience 191–192; automation and 179, 180, 183–184, 186–187; bodies 302–303; categories of 194; climate change 320, 322; core 115; definition of 184–185; mediated 176–177, 246, 247–248; multimodal communication of 194, 206; non-conscious 235n2; performance of 242, 243; refugee narratives 242–243; religious and secular emotions 301–304, 307–308; social media 246
affect control theory (ACT) 71–72, 77–78
affective commitment 314
affective genealogy 4, 176, 187, 327
agency 187, 312; achievement emotions 153; loneliness 83, 84, 92, 93; technology 87, 89
aggression 136, 137–138
Ahmed, Sara 185, 186, 238
Air Loom 177–178, 179, 186–187
Alfayadh, F. 287–288
ambience 191–192, 195, 197, 202, 205
ambivalence 14, 15, 19; environmental crises 320; film analysis 197; love 84–85, 92; post-modern consciousness 311
Amichi-Hamburger, Y. 87
Amir-Moazami, S. 305
Anderson, Benedict 241
anger 1, 102, 135–137, 231; achievement-related 142, 143–144, 146, 152, 153; animals 45, 46; attributions of failure 145; as basic emotion 15; climate change 320; criminal justice and emotion sharing 104, 106, 107, 109; dramatic emotions 115; emotional energy 116; Englishness 162; gender differences 73, 75–76, 78, 137–139; health effects 44; hedonicity 42; judgement involved in 130, 134, 135; judicial officers 106, 261, 262, 263; legal understanding of 138–139; metaphors 28; modern consumers 18; moral and dispositional 135; morality 59; as primary emotion 64; provocation defence 4, 129, 130–131, 133; religious and secular emotions 300, 301, 307; social movements 215; solidarity 43–44; UK riots 212, 216, 217, 218; valence 41, 48–49; volunteers 289
animals: animal behaviour 45–46; companion animals 89–91, 92, 93
Anthropocene 311, 312, 318–319, 320, 321
anxiety: achievement-related 142–144, 145–146, 148, 150, 152, 153, 154; anticipatory beliefs 316; climate change 1, 315, 320; culture of fear 19; Englishness 162; French Burkini ban 306; health effects 44; minor affects 186; modern consumers 18; negative events 136; sharing emotions 104; uncertainty 314
Index

appraisals 2; achievement emotions 145–147, 153; hedonicity 42; positive emotions 151; types of 49–50, 51; valence 46, 47, 48–51, 52–53; visual images 194

Archer, M. 2

Aristotle 43, 288

arousal 46, 47, 50, 51, 192

art 231

artificial intelligence 187

assemblages 218–219, 322

asylum seekers and refugees 1, 5, 6, 237–249; friendship programs 282, 285–293; mixed attitudes towards 19; politics of fear 283–285; Swedish Migration Board 34–37, 39n2

attributions 2; achievement emotions 145, 147; valence 47, 49–51, 52–53

Australia: asylum seekers and refugees 237–247, 282, 283–293; healthcare 268, 269, 271; judicial officers 254–255, 256, 264n2

automata 180–183


autonomy 147, 149, 178, 224, 244, 328

background emotions 30–32, 36, 37, 114–115, 263, 303

backgrounded emotions 29, 30, 34, 35, 37, 114

Bacon, Francis 38n1

Baker, Stephanie 216–217, 219

Bales, Robert 71, 74

Bancroft, Lundy 136

Banki, S. 287


Bacon, Francis 38n1

Baker, Stephanie 216–217, 219

Bales, Robert 71, 74

Bancroft, Lundy 136

Banki, S. 287


Bacon, Francis

Baker, Stephanie

Bales, Robert

Bancroft, Lundy

Banki, S.

Barbalet, J.M.

Bacon, Francis

Baker, Stephanie

Bales, Robert

Bancroft, Lundy

Banki, S.

Barbalet, J.M.

Bacon, Francis

Baker, Stephanie

Bales, Robert

Bancroft, Lundy

Banki, S.

Barbalet, J.M.

Bacon, Francis

Baker, Stephanie

Bales, Robert

Bancroft, Lundy

Banki, S.

Barbalet, J.M.

Bacon, Francis

Baker, Stephanie

Bales, Robert

Bancroft, Lundy

Banki, S.

Barbalet, J.M.

Bacon, Francis

Baker, Stephanie

Bales, Robert

Bancroft, Lundy

Banki, S.

Barbalet, J.M.

Bacon, Francis

Baker, Stephanie

Bales, Robert

Bancroft, Lundy

Banki, S.

Barbalet, J.M.

Bacon, Francis

Baker, Stephanie

Bales, Robert

Bancroft, Lundy

Banki, S.

Barbalet, J.M.

Bacon, Francis

Baker, Stephanie

Bales, Robert

Bancroft, Lundy

Banki, S.

Barbalet, J.M.

Bacon, Francis

Baker, Stephanie

Bales, Robert

Bancroft, Lundy

Banki, S.

Barbalet, J.M.

Bacon, Francis

Baker, Stephanie

Bales, Robert

Bancroft, Lundy

Banki, S.

Barbalet, J.M.

Bacon, Francis

Baker, Stephanie

Bales, Robert

Bancroft, Lundy

Banki, S.

Barbalet, J.M.

Bacon, Francis

Baker, Stephanie

Bales, Robert

Bancroft, Lundy

Banki, S.

Barbalet, J.M.

Bacon, Francis

Baker, Stephanie

Bales, Robert

Bancroft, Lundy

Banki, S.

Barbalet, J.M.

Bacon, Francis

Baker, Stephanie

Bales, Robert

Bancroft, Lundy

Banki, S.

Barbalet, J.M.

Bacon, Francis

Baker, Stephanie

Bales, Robert

Bancroft, Lundy

Banki, S.

Barbalet, J.M.

Bacon, Francis

Baker, Stephanie

Bales, Robert

Bancroft, Lundy

Banki, S.

Barbalet, J.M.

Bacon, Francis

Baker, Stephanie

Bales, Robert

Bancroft, Lundy

Banki, S.

Barbalet, J.M.

Bacon, Francis

Baker, Stephanie

Bales, Robert

Bancroft, Lundy

Banki, S.

Barbalet, J.M.

Bacon, Francis

Baker, Stephanie

Bales, Robert

Bancroft, Lundy

Banki, S.

Barbalet, J.M.

Bacon, Francis

Baker, Stephanie

Bales, Robert

Bancroft, Lundy

Banki, S.

Barbalet, J.M.

Bacon, Francis

Baker, Stephanie

Bales, Robert

Bancroft, Lundy

Banki, S.

Barbalet, J.M.

Bacon, Francis

Baker, Stephanie

Bales, Robert

Bancroft, Lundy

Banki, S.
Index

Chan, F. 241–242
Charland, L.C. 42
Charlie Hebdo 297
Chasing Asylum (2016) 239–240
choice 2, 13, 136–137, 217
Christianity 10, 162–164, 165, 168, 301
circumcision 304–305, 306, 308
Clark, Timothy 312
classical era 9, 10–11
climate change 1, 6, 312, 314–320, 322
Clinton, R v Clinton 132–133
Clore, A. 76
Coffey, G.J. 286
cognitive quality 147, 149
cognitive resources 150, 151–152
Cohen, S. 283
collective bodily movements 122, 123–126
collective emotions 2, 3, 4, 5, 17, 217;
emotional energy 119, 120–121, 123–125; France 306; healthcare 277;
multidisciplinary theory 75; protests against artworks 300; religious 303–304;
sharing emotions 104; ‘taking up’ 302
Collins, G.L. 76
constraints 34
colour 192
commitment, affective 314
commodification 13, 16–17, 224
companion animals 92, 93
compassion 282; compassion fatigue 19;
dark side of 286–288; judges 106; moral
judgements 58; refugees 238, 239;
volunteers 288, 289, 291, 293
complexity 3, 14–15, 70, 114, 244, 327;
loneliness 83; trust paradox 277; valence
52, 53
confidence 31, 115, 117, 120, 314
consciousness 31, 32
Constance on the Edge (2016) 239, 240
consumerism 9, 211, 213, 214, 216
consumption 3, 13, 14, 16–17; cinema 223;
love and intimacy 92; markets 52; UK
riots 215
contagion 27–28, 212–213, 217, 219, 242
contentment 144
control-value theory (CVT) 144, 145–153
Cooley, Charles 12, 65
Cooper, C. 210–211
cooperation 276, 277
core affect 115
cosmopolitan encounters 241–242
criminal law: impartiality 253–266;
provocation defence 4, 129–133, 138, 139; role of emotions in 101–113; see also
legal issues
‘critical approach’ 28
critical theory 184, 185
crowds 27–28, 44, 212, 216
cultural display rules 137–139; see also
display rules
cultural theory 217, 228–229
culture 47, 69, 228; appraisals 50; gender
and emotion 71, 72–73, 79; German
300, 301; group processes approach 74;
moral judgements 60–61; universality of
achievement emotions 153
Culture Industry 183
curiosity 32
Cvetkovich, Ann 184, 186
CVT see control-value theory
Cynics 43
Cyrenaics 43
Dadich, Ann 5, 267–281, 327
Dallmayr, F. 285
Damasio, A.R. 38n1, 114–115
Dangerfield, Andy 212
Darwin, Charles 12, 161, 167, 171
Davis, James P. 4, 114–128, 327
de Rivera, Joseph 216, 220n15
de-traditionalisation 9, 13, 16
decision making: healthcare 276, 277;
judicial 101, 253–254, 257–258, 259–261
defence mechanisms 47, 48–49, 50, 51,
52–53
Deleuze, G. 217, 218, 220n18
Denmark 299
Denzin, Norman 63, 65–66
depression 115, 118, 152, 320
Descartes, René 10, 38n1, 178, 181, 272,
278n1
deviance 73
Dewey, J. 116
Diamond, Jared 102
Dickens, Charles 164
differentiation 47, 48, 52
digital technology 2, 13, 215–217;
assemblages 218, 219; loneliness 86–87,
89, 92–93; mediation of emotions 3, 5,
etiquette 11, 18
evaluation, potency and activity (EPA) 77, 78
evolutionary theory 167, 171, 173
expectations 2, 8, 51, 52, 140n4;
achievement emotions 145, 147, 149;
emotion sharing by victims of crime
105–106; healthcare 277; socio-cultural
context 47; valence 48, 50–51
expression of emotion 2, 8, 134, 191;
control over 130, 135, 137; criminal
justice 102, 106–107, 109, 110; gender
differences 137–139; multimodal 193

Facebook 17, 18, 88, 191, 211–212
fear 1, 194, 231, 314; animals 45;
automation 183; as basic emotion
15; cinematic pleasure 235; climate
change 320; criminal justice
and emotion sharing 102, 104; culture of
19; emotional energy 116; Englishness
162; felt experiences 234; film analysis
200, 201; freezing 46; French Burkini
ban 306, 307; gender differences 76,
78; of 'Islamicisation' 301; medieval era
11; politics of 5–6, 282, 283–285, 293;
as primary emotion 64; provocation
defence 129, 131–132, 138; UK riots
212; valence 48–49
feedback 5, 14, 52, 147, 150
feeling rules 30, 32, 48, 66, 74, 101, 102,
140n4, 263
feelings: emotional energy 115, 116,
119–121, 123–126, 127; 'feelings of
community' 246; 'keystone' 311, 314,
315, 321; public 184, 186; 'ugly' 186
'felt recognition' 234, 235
femininity 38n1, 75, 270
feminist philosophy 176, 184, 185, 186,
272
film 5, 223, 224–225; book trailer project
193–206; music in 192; narrative 226–235;
refugee documentaries 239–243, 244
focalisation 191–192, 199, 205
‘folk devils’ 283
foregrounded emotions 30, 36–37, 38
forgiveness 102, 108, 109
Fosbroke, Thomas 164
Foucault, M. 176, 272
Foxe, John 162, 163
frames 34
France 27, 182, 299, 304, 305–307, 308
Franklin, Adrian 4, 83–97
freedom of expression 299, 301, 307

freedom of speech 6, 297, 298
Freedom Stories (2015) 237, 239, 240–243, 244
Freidson, E. 269
Freud, Sigmund 12, 65
Frijda, N.H. 43
Frison, E. 88
frubbles 15
frustration: achievement-related 142, 144;
climate change 320; judicial officers 263;
solidarity 44; women 73
fundamental sentiments 77, 78

Gabe, J. 270
Garfinkel, H. 116, 117, 120, 127
gender 69–82; affect control theory 71–72,
77–78; climate change 322n3; display
rules 137–139; group processes approach
71, 74–75; healthcare 270; Hereward
the Wake 161, 170; loneliness 83; social
division of labour 269; social structure and
personality paradigm 71, 75–76; symbolic
interactionism 70–71, 72–74; trainability
of emotions 130; see also men; women
genealogy 4, 176, 187, 327
General Social Survey (GSS) 75–76
Germany 300, 301, 304–305, 306, 308
gestures 116, 117–118, 120, 121–122, 126;
see also bodily movements
Gibbon, Edward 163, 164
Gibbs, Anna 185
Giddens, Anthony: consumption 16;
‘darker side of modernity’ 206; intimacy
15, 83, 85, 92; late modernity 2, 8, 9,
12; reflexivity 216, 268
Gilbey, Andrew 91
Gledhill, C. 224
global affect 312
global economy 13
globalisation 9, 247, 300
goals 147–148, 149
Goffman, E. 34, 65, 70, 117
Goldsmith, Oliver 163
Gosden, D. 287
Gould, Deborah 225
gratitude 144, 145, 146
greed 10, 16
Greeks, ancient 10, 272
Greenspan, Patricia 61–62
Gregg, Melissa 184
Grewe-Partsch, M. 227
grief: climate 311, 312; criminal justice
102; judicial officers 106, 258; public
demonstration of private 243
Gross, Daniel 311
Gross, J.J. 262
Grossberg, L. 218
group processes approach 71, 72, 74–75
GSS see General Social Survey
Guattari, F. 218
guilt: climate change 319; collective 311; complexity 15; emotive-cognitive judicial frame 33; medieval era 11; morality 57, 61–62, 64–65; negative events 136; perpetrators 107, 108–109; sharing emotions 4, 104; volunteers 282, 289, 291
gut feeling 35, 36, 62
Habermas, Jürgen 60–61, 305
habituation 33, 35, 37
Hall, S. 283–284
Hamilton, Clive 319
Hansen, Miriam 223
happiness 185, 186, 194, 238; asylum seeker friendship program 292; as basic emotion 15; brain regions associated with 45; ‘Happiness Industry’ 1, 16, 19; health effects 44; sharing emotions 104; valence 41
Haraway, Donna 187
Harding, Jennifer 5, 209–222, 327
Hartman, Geoffrey 311
Haslan, John 177
health effects 44
healthcare 5, 267–281
hedonicity 42
Heise, David 78, 262
Heraclitus 43
_Hereward the Wake_ (1866) 161–162, 165–174
hierarchies 80, 267, 268–274, 275–276, 277
Hochschild, A. 28, 58, 63; emotion management 78; feeling rules 30, 66, 74, 140n4
Hoffling, C.K. 267
Holmes, M. 86, 276, 277
homophobia 61
Honneth, A. 61
Hookway, Nick 4, 63, 83–97
hope 142, 144, 146, 185
hopelessness 144, 145–146, 148, 150, 152, 214
Horkheimer, M. 61, 183
House, James 70
household space 90
Howard, John 246–247
Huey, W.S. 71
human-animal relationships 89–91, 92, 93
humanitarianism 287
Hume, David 43, 114, 127, 163, 164, 166
Humes, Leslie 131, 139n2
humiliation 48, 49
hurtfulness 297–298, 307
Husserl, Edmund 65
Hutchinson, E. 287
Hwang, H.C. 137
ICTY see International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
ideas 116, 119, 121, 123–126
identity 2, 48, 56, 70, 79; affect control theory 77, 78; ‘emancipation of emotions’ 101; German 300; love 92; reflexivity 191; UK riots 213; volunteers 282, 293; see also self
ideologies 47, 48, 61, 64
Illoz, E. 14, 15, 84, 85, 92
image repertoires 195, 197, 205–206
images 191–192, 194, 226, 231–234
immigrants, hostility to 162, 173; see also asylum seekers and refugees
immigration 9, 300
impartiality 5, 253–266; emotion management 258–262; judicial oath 256; open mindedness 256–257; performance of 254; putting aside biases 258
individualisation 2, 3, 9, 13, 15–16, 223; critiques of concept 17, 86; love and intimacy 92; self-reflexive 224; socio-cultural context 47, 48; UK riots 215
individualism 14, 52, 217, 318; _Hereward the Wake_ 161–162; Industrial Revolution 11; moral decisions 63; networked 220n16; radical 38; Smith 60
industrial modernity 10, 11–12
Industrial Revolution 178, 179, 182, 187 inequalities 6, 14; asylum seeker friendship program 291; ‘compassionate’ relationships 282, 287; UK riots 212, 216, 218
injury 297–298, 299, 301, 307
_The Innocence of Muslims_ (2012) 297, 298, 300
Instagram 17, 88
intensity sail 122, 123–126
interaction rituals 4, 271–272
interactionism 57, 58; symbolic 65, 70
internalisation 33
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 103, 108
Internet 87–88, 92–93, 190, 215; see also social media
interprofessional practice 267, 269, 271, 274–276, 277–278
intersectionality 73, 79
intimacy 14, 15, 83, 84–86, 92; automation and affect 179; companion animals 91; social media 18, 88; see also love
Ireland 170–171
Islam 300, 301, 306, 307; see also Muslims
Ismer, S. 75
Israel 304
Jackson, B.A. 73
James, N. 270
James, V. 270
James, William 12, 57, 65, 115, 133
Jaquet-Droz, Pierre 181, 182
Järveläinen, P. 299
Jasper, J.M. 289
Javan, Amir 240, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246–247
Jay, Mike 178
Jews 304, 305–306
Johansen, Birgitte 312
Jonas, Hans 313
Jones, Michael Rodman 163
joy: achievement-related 144, 145–146; emotional energy 116; health effects 44; rioters 214; sharing emotions 104; toxic 185
judgements, emotions as 130, 133–134, 135, 136
judges/judicial officers 31–32, 33; emotion sharing 101, 106, 109, 110; impartiality 5, 253–264; provocation defence 130
judicial oath 256, 258
Junge, M. 15
Jyllands-Posten 297, 300
Kahneman, D. 76
Kant, Immanuel 56, 57
Karlsson, R. 318
Karstedt, Susanne 4, 101–113, 327
Kempelen, Wolfgang von 180–181, 182, 187
Kemper, Theodore 71, 74
Kerridge, Richard 314, 316
‘keystone’ feelings 311, 314, 315, 321
keystone species 321–322
Khorana, Sukhmani 1–7, 237–249, 327–328
Kingsley, Charles 161–162, 163, 164–174
Kingsnorth, Paul 173–174
Kirkpatrick, Heather 239
Kirkwood, S. 239
Kövecses, Z. 28
Kraut, R. 87
Krueger, A. 76
Kurdi, Aylan 239
La Mettrie, Julien Offray de 178, 182
labels 2, 8, 16; background emotions 32; emotional energy 121; socio-cultural context 47, 48
Laclau, E. 27–28
language 225, 302, 303
Larson, B. 321
Larson, E. 270
Lasch, C. 63
Lash 216
late modernity 2, 6, 8–10, 12–20, 56, 327–328; achievement emotions 154; automation and affect 179, 184, 187; bonds in 247; characteristics of emotions in 244; companion animals 89; complex understandings of emotions 114, 130; emotion and reason 37, 38; empathy 241; Englishness 162, 174; filmic media 205, 206; gender 79; global affect 312; healthcare 268, 276, 277; individualisation 223; judicial officers 263; loneliness 83, 84–86, 92; mediation of emotions 176, 178, 187, 190–191, 223, 224; morality 66; new emotional regime 262; performance of emotion 5, 243; privatised environmental morality 318, 319; provocation defence 139; reflexivity 83, 248, 277, 282, 285, 293, 328; religious and secular emotions 298; shift in thinking about emotions 69–70; societal change 51–52, 308; uncertainty 315; valence 52–53
law profession 273–274
Lawrence, Tom 212
Le Bon, Gustave 212
Leaf, M. 74
learning strategies 150
legal issues 3; blasphemy laws 299, 307; emotional regimes 33–34; Emotions in Court project 31–32; emotive-cognitive judicial frame 32–33, 34, 35, 37–38;
freedom of expression 301; impartiality 5, 253–266; provocation defence 4, 129–133, 138, 139; religious practices 304; sharing emotions 4, 101–113; Swedish Migration Board 34–37
Lens, K.M.E. 105, 106, 107–108
Leys, R. 227
life as theatre metaphor 73
Linker, B. 270
Lisnard, David 305
Lively, Katheryn J. 3–4, 69–82, 262
London School of Economics (LSE) 213
loneliness 4, 15, 19, 83–97; companion animals 89–91, 93; love and 84–86, 92; sharing emotions 105; social media 86–89, 92–93
looting 210, 211, 214, 218
loss 320
love 1, 4, 15, 102, 231; loneliness and 84–86, 92; religious and secular emotions 305–306
LSE see London School of Economics
Lucas, J.W. 71
Lynch, Andrew 4, 161–175, 327
Lyons, William 136
Lyotard, Jean-François 179
Macgregor Wise, J. 219
Mack, Kathy 5, 253–266, 327
macro-reflexivity 5, 19, 83, 282, 285, 293, 322
male circumcision 304–305, 306, 308
mammals 45
manslaughter 129, 139n2
markets 52
Marks, Laura 229, 230
Maroney, T.A. 33–34, 102, 262
Martin, J.R. 191, 194, 197
Marx, Karl 178
Mary Meets Mohammad (2013) 239
masculinity 38n1, 75, 138, 161, 172, 270
Massumi, Brian 184, 217, 220n17, 225–228, 229
mastery goals 147–148
Matsumoto, D. 137
Matthews, James Tilly 177–178, 179, 186–187
McElroy, B.J. 319
McKenzie, Jordan 1–7, 56–68, 327–328
McLoughlin, P. 283
McNaughton, N. 273
Mead, George Herbert 12, 65
media 5, 14, 17–18, 52, 190, 223–224; emotional communities 246; narrative 224, 225–225; public sharing of emotions 244–245; refugee narratives 237, 238–239; sensationalism 285; socio-cultural context 47; UK riots 209, 211–213, 218; Victorian era 161; see also film; social media
mediation 4–5, 9, 190–208, 244, 327–328; mass media 14, 17–18, 223; socio-cultural context 47, 48; technological 3, 176–177, 178, 187
Mellor, D. 91
Melville, Herman 186
men 69, 70, 78–79, 272; affect control theory 72, 77–78; companion animals 91; expression of emotion 137–139; group processes approach 74; loneliness 93; provocation defence 129, 130–131, 132–133, 139; social structure and personality paradigm 75–76; symbolic interactionism 73
Merkel, Angela 305, 306
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice 65
metaphors 28, 321
‘metaphysical guilt’ 289, 291
Miceli, M. 315, 316
micro-social practices 115–116, 117–118
Middle Ages 11, 162–164, 170, 231
Mill, John Stuart 57
Mills, Kathy A. 5, 190–208, 327
mindfulness 16
‘mobs’ 42, 43–44, 212–213
Modern Industrial period 9
modernity 11–12, 63; ‘darker side of’ 206; emotion legacy of 262; gender division of labour 69; mass media 223–224; see also late modernity
monitoring 5, 14, 18–19, 52, 254, 268
mood 150, 152, 195, 197
Moore, Thomas 171
Morahan-Martin, J. 87–88
morality 3, 56–68; politics of mobilisation 311; privatised environmental 318, 319; valence 41
motivation 147, 149, 150, 151–153
Muhammed, Marwan 307
Mühlhoff, R. 303
multimodality 190, 191, 193–194, 195–205, 206
murder 129, 130–133, 138, 139n2
music 192–193, 195–199, 200–201, 202–204, 205, 229
Muslims 6, 284, 297, 298, 300, 301, 304–307

Nakoula, Nakoula Basseley 297
narrative media 224, 225–235
Nath, L.E. 75
nationalism 174
Neil, D. 286
neoliberalism 2, 211, 311, 313
networked individualism 220n16
Neumann, K. 237
neuroscience 14
Neves, Barbara Barbosa 4, 83–97
Newburn, T. 210, 211
Ngai, Sianne 186
Nietzsche, F. 287
Nordmarken, S. 74
norms 30, 80; background emotions 32; community 312; cultural 61, 79, 137, 140n4; emotional regimes 34; gender 69, 70, 73, 79; Swedish Migration Board 36; symbolic interactionism 73
Nussbaum, M. 101, 134, 288

occupational therapy 270
offense 297, 300
older people 88–89, 93
Olson, Rebecca E. 1–7, 195, 244, 262, 327–328; complexity 83; healthcare 5, 267–281; individualisation 223; late modernity 3, 8–24; reflexivity 282, 285, 293
open mindedness 256–257, 259
Ortony, A. 76
outrage 66, 215, 297, 299, 301, 307
ozone depletion 316–317

pain 43, 290, 305–306
Painter, C. 191
Papacharissi, Z.A. 17, 242, 246, 247
Parker, Matthew 163, 173
patriarchy 270, 271, 272
Patulny, Roger 1–7, 195, 244, 262, 327–328; children 194; complexity 83; gender and emotion 76; individualisation 223; late modernity 3, 8–24; loneliness and love 4, 83–97; reflexivity 282, 285, 293

Pavlasek, M. 287
Peck, J. 169
Pedwell, Carolyn 184, 238
Pekrun, Reinhard 4, 142–157, 327
performance goals 147–148
performativity 243, 303, 312
Peterie, Michelle 1–7, 239, 282–296, 327–328
philosophy 56–62, 63, 64, 65–66
physiotherapy 270
Pikhartova, Jitka 91
Pisters, Patricia 226, 232, 234
pity 231
Plato 10, 43, 57–58, 272
pleasure 42, 43, 49–50, 84, 227–228, 235
Plutchik, R. 41
polarity 43, 44, 47, 50, 51, 53
political emotions 162
politics: of fear 5–6, 282, 283–285, 293; of resentment 213–215
populism 1, 301
Porter, Roy 179
positivism 12
post-structuralism 179, 225, 302
post-traumatic stress disorder (PSTD) 108
postmodernism 63
poverty 213, 214, 216, 219
Powell, B. 76
power: asylum seeker support movement 6, 286, 287, 292; discourse 272; group processes approach 71, 74; healthcare 267; sociology 56
Poynting, S. 284
pre-industrial era 9
Pribram, E. Deidre 5, 223–236, 327
pride: achievement-related 142, 144, 146, 148, 151; consumption 16; dramatic emotions 115; Emotions in Court project 31; English exceptionalism 162; instrumental reason 29; interprofessional practice in healthcare 274–275; reflexivity 18; religious and secular emotions 305–306; Swedish Migration Board 36; UK riots 214, 218; valence 49
primary emotions 28, 29, 46, 64
Princen, T. 318
Prinz, Jesse 58–59, 60–61, 63–64
private consumption 3
problem solving 150
procedural justice 106, 110
Procter, J. 283
professional status 269
Propen, A.D. 106
provision defence 4, 129–133, 138, 139
PSTD see post-traumatic stress disorder
psychology 178, 270; see also social psychology
race 6; asylum seeker support movement 287; climate change 322n3; interaction of gender with 71; intersectionality 73; Kingsley’s English history 163, 166–168, 170, 171, 173, 174; UK riots 209, 210–211; see also ethnicity
racism 61
Rackley, E.B. 289
‘radical approach’ 28–29
Rainie, H. 220n16
Rancière, J. 178
rationality 1, 3, 6, 14, 65–66, 327; behaviourism 142; instrumental 28–29; legal system 253, 263; modernity 11; religious subjects 301; see also reason
Rawls, John 57, 114
re-emotionalisation 101, 102, 103
reason 27–29, 38, 56, 65–66, 114, 178; criminal justice 103, 109, 263; moral judgements 60–61, 66; provocation defence 130–131; religious subjects 301; see also rationality
reasoning 14–15
Reddy, William 9, 27, 32, 33
Rees, W. 318
reflexivity 2, 3, 18–19, 217, 223, 244, 328; advocacy and social change 248; autonomous forms of 13; ‘feelings of community’ 246; ‘fractured’ 17; healthcare 5, 268, 276, 277; image repertoires 195; judicial officers 263; loneliness 83; macro-reflexivity 5, 19, 83, 282, 285, 293, 322; ‘mediated crowd’ 216; new form of 13–14; self-reflexivity 52, 92, 206, 224, 259–260, 311; socio-cultural context 47, 48; technology-mediated communication 191; UK riots 215; valence 52; volunteers 282, 288, 291, 292–293
Refugee Council of Australia 286
refugees and asylum seekers 1, 5, 6, 237–249; friendship programs 282, 285–293; mixed attitudes towards 19; politics of fear 283–285; Swedish Migration Board 34–37, 39n2
regret 36, 214–215, 312
regulation of emotions 30–31, 34, 104, 137; achievement emotions 153, 154; ‘emancipation of emotions’ 101; judicial officers 259–260; public display of emotion 244–245
Reif, P. 63
Reilly, M. 136
relaxation 144, 151
relief 144, 146, 151, 190
religion 6, 10–11, 63, 297–310; affective arrangements 301–304; asylum seeker support movement 287; emotional regimes 300–301; Hereward the Wake 161, 165, 168, 170, 172–173; historical perspective on ‘religious’ emotions 298–300; Middle Ages 162–164; see also Christianity; Islam
remorse 102, 104, 107, 108–109
Renaissance 10, 11, 231
repression 49, 62
resentment 213–215, 216, 217, 218, 300
resilience 246, 315
responsibility 16, 133–134, 139; criminal justice 109; emotion regulation 137; ‘metaphysical guilt’ 289; ‘private’ 11, 14; self-responsibility 2, 13, 215, 244, 328
restorative justice 101, 102, 107
Rew, Lynn 91
Rickards, Lauren 319
Ridgeway, Cecilia 74, 79
Rimé, B. 103–104, 106, 107
riots 209–222
Riskin, Jessica 181–182
Ritson, Joseph 163
Roach Anleu, Sharyn 5, 253–266, 327
Robbins, P. 319
Rojek, Chris 247
Romans 10
Rosenwein, B.H. 244, 245
Roth, W.M. 126
Rowan of Rin 193, 195–205
rules 8, 65, 244; display 30, 31–32, 48, 73, 101, 102, 137–139; ‘emancipation of emotions’ 101; feeling 30, 32, 48, 66, 74, 101, 102, 140n4, 263; procedural justice 110; socio-cultural context 47, 48; violation of moral 59
Rushdie, Salman 297
Rwanda 103, 107, 108
sadness: achievement-related 144; as basic emotion 15; cinematic pleasure 235; climate change 320; emotional energy 118; felt experiences 234; film narratives
227–228; gender and cultural display rules 138; judicial officers 258; negative events 136; as primary emotion 64; retrospective 146; sharing emotions 104; valence 118; victims of crime 107
sado-masochism 43
Salmela, M. 17
satisfaction 29
Schaffer, Simon 181
Schallert, D.L. 152
Scheer, Monique 33
schizophrenia 178–179
Schonell, R. 287
Schrock, D.P. 74
Schumacher, P. 87–88
Schuster, M.L. 106
Schütz, A. 116, 120, 127
science 12–13, 121, 318
Scott, Walter 170
secondary emotions 28, 29, 64
secularism 6, 13, 298, 299, 300–308
segues 78
Seigworth, Greg 184–185
self 12, 48, 65; moral stances 63; negative emotions 48, 49, 50; positive emotions 51; see also identity
self-awareness 115, 259–260, 262
self-confidence 31; see also confidence
self-conscious emotions 4, 108
self-control 4, 129, 130–135, 136–138, 139
self-help 16, 38
self-interest 59–60, 288
self-reflexivity 52, 92, 206, 224, 259–260, 311; see also reflexivity
self-regulation 114, 151; judicial officers 254, 261; learning 150, 152
self-reproach emotions 18; see also guilt; shame
self-talk 256, 261, 262
sentiment dictionaries 72
service work 69, 70
sexual infidelity 129, 131, 132–133
Seyfert, R. 303
Shah, S. 287–288
shame: achievement-related 142, 143–144, 146, 148, 152; attributions of failure 145; collective 311; complexity 15; consumption 16; criminal justice and emotion sharing 4, 102, 104, 107, 108–109; defence mechanisms 48; French Burkini ban 307; medieval era 11; morality 57, 59, 64; negative events 136; reflexivity 18; refugees 1; religious and secular emotions 307; rioters 214–215; self-attributions 49; solidarity 44
sharing of emotion 4, 103–110, 244–245
Sherman, Lawrence 110
Shipman, B. 17
’signification spiral’ 283–284
Simmel, Georg 29
Simon, R.W. 75
situational cues 8
Slaby, J. 303
Slote, M. 242
Smart, C. 17, 86
Smith, Adam 58, 59–60, 61, 63–64
Snapchat 17
social bonds: companion animals 89–90, 91, 92, 93; impact of Internet use on 87; liquefaction of 83; morality 61, 62, 66
social class: asylum seeker support movement 287; climate change 322n3; happiness 16; interaction of gender with 71; intersectionality 73; irrationality of the crowd 212; social division of labour 269; UK riots 209, 210–211
social cohesion 118, 119, 120
social context 46, 50, 51, 52, 53, 148–150
social emotions 28, 57, 143, 276
social interaction: emotional energy 114, 115, 116–120, 127; healthcare 273; interaction rituals 4, 271–272; judicial practice 263; morality 61
social justice 238, 242, 282
social labels see labels
social media 13, 190, 215, 307, 318; affective communities 246, 247; contagion 242; loneliness 86–89, 92–93; mediation of emotions 14, 17–18, 52; politics of mobilisation 311; public display of emotion 245; UK riots 209, 212, 216, 218
social movements 215, 219, 302
social psychology 70, 79, 103, 135
social structure and personality paradigm 71, 72, 75–76
socialisation 8, 33, 137–139; healthcare 268, 274; judicial officers 257
societal structures 47, 48, 51–52
socio-cultural context 46–48, 50, 51, 210–211
sociocultural emotionality 225–226
sociology 2–3, 69–70, 327; gender 79; healthcare 267–268, 269; loneliness 93; morality 56–57, 59, 60, 62–66
Socrates 43, 272
soft skills 8
solidarity 6, 43–44, 50, 118, 218, 247
Solomon, Robert 43, 133–135
Sorial, Sarah 4, 129–141, 327
sorrow 320
sound 228, 229–230
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 103, 107, 108–109
Spielberg, Steven 229
Spinoza, Benedict de 43, 195, 217, 220n18
status: group processes approach 71, 74; healthcare 271; hierarchies 80; men 73; professional 269; social structure and personality paradigm 76
Stearns, P.N. 12
Steelman, L.C. 76
Steiner, Wendy 231
Stephens, Elizabeth 4, 176–189, 327
Stets, J.E. 63, 64–65
Stewart, K. 320
Stoicism 10, 57–58
Stone, L.D. 43
storytelling 225–226, 228, 231, 234–235, 242
structure 72, 74, 79
Sturm, H. 227
Suratan 131, 139n2
surprise 15
Swedish Migration Board 34–38
symbolic interactionism 65, 70, 72–74
sympathy 12, 19, 35, 58, 263
Synnott, A. 11
Tamir, M. 43
Tani, Kawtar 91
Tausk, Victor 178–179
Taylor, Charles 85–86, 92
technology 2, 12–13; loneliness 86–87, 89, 92–93; mediation of emotions 3, 5, 176, 178, 187, 190, 244, 327–328; reflexivity 191; technological determinism 87, 89; UK riots 211, 215, 219; see also automation; Internet terrorism 104, 117, 284, 285, 305, 306, 307 test anxiety 142, 144, 150, 154; control-value theory 145; reciprocal causation 152, 153; social environments 148
Thomas, D.A. 259
Thomas, Steve 240, 243, 244, 245–246
thrill-seeking 17
Tobin, K. 126
Toswell, M. 163
trainability of emotions 130
transient impressions 77
transitional justice 102, 103, 105, 106–107, 108
transsexuals 74
trauma 4, 107–108, 243
trust 274–275, 276, 277, 314, 322n2
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 103, 107, 108–109
Turkey 304
Turkle, S. 86–87, 89
Turner, B. 247
Turner, B.S. 269
Turner, J.E. 152
Turner, Jonathan H. 3, 41–55, 64
Twitter 17, 88, 242, 246, 273
uncertainty 13, 314, 315, 316, 320
undramatic emotional energy (UEE) 4, 114–116, 117–118, 119, 122–125
unemployment 213
 Ungar, Sheldon 316–317
United Kingdom 209–222, 239, 283–284
United States 70, 76, 87, 285
Unsworth, Len 5, 190–208
Ural, Nur Yasemin 6, 297–310
valence 3, 41–55; achievement emotions 144; biology 45–46; definition of 41–42; emotional energy 117, 118–119, 121, 122–123; health 44; hedonicity 42; music 192; polarity 43; solidarity 43–44
Valls, Manuel 305
values: control-value theory 145, 147; cultural 64, 229; German 300; mass media 224
Vaucanson, Jacques de 180, 182, 183
vengeance 102, 104, 109
victim impact statements 101, 102–103, 105–109
Victorian era 161, 173
volunteers 282, 285–293
von Scheve, Christian 6, 15, 17, 75, 297–310, 327
von Wright, G.H. 38n1
Wackernagel, M. 318
Warin, M. 283
‘We-relationship’ 120–121, 127
Weber, M. 253
Weiner, B. 145
Wellman, B. 220n16
Wetherell, M. 303
Wettergren, Åsa 3, 27–40, 263, 327
White, P.R.R. 194, 197
Whitehead, A. 184
Wilkinson, B.H. 319
Wilkinson, Mark Paul 131, 139n2
Williams, Simon 1, 11, 12, 19, 271, 272
Willis, E. 269
Wingfield, A.H. 73
women 38n1, 69, 70, 78–79, 272;
affect control theory 72; companion
animals 91; expression of emotion
134, 137–139; French Burkiní ban
307; group processes approach 71, 74;
healthcare 270; irrationality of the crowd
212; loneliness 93; love and intimate
relationships 84, 85; provocation
defence 129, 131–132, 133, 138, 139;
social structure and personality paradigm
75–76; symbolic interactionism 73; UK
riots 213; see also gender
Wood, Gaby 181
work 8–9, 13; automation 178, 182–183;
gender division of labour 69
Wouters, C. 12
Wüschner, P. 303
Yaron, Gil 305–306
Yell, S. 243, 244–245
young people 88, 190, 193–205, 206
YouTube 191, 205
Taylor & Francis eBooks

www.taylorfrancis.com

A single destination for eBooks from Taylor & Francis with increased functionality and an improved user experience to meet the needs of our customers.

90,000+ eBooks of award-winning academic content in Humanities, Social Science, Science, Technology, Engineering, and Medical written by a global network of editors and authors.

TAYLOR & FRANCIS EBOOKS OFFERS:

A streamlined experience for our library customers
A single point of discovery for all of our eBook content
Improved search and discovery of content at both book and chapter level

REQUEST A FREE TRIAL
support@taylorfrancis.com