Regional Economic Communities and Peacebuilding in Africa

This book outlines challenges to the effective operation of regional economic communities (RECs) with regards to peacebuilding in Africa.

Critically examining these issues from an interdisciplinary perspective, with a focus on comparative analysis of the status, role, and performances of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), it examines particular constraints to their effective participation in regional initiatives. Focussing on inadequate technical capabilities, the complicity of state and non-state actors in conflicts within a region, and the domestic politics of member states, it additionally addresses related theories and practices of peacekeeping, security, development, and the peacebuilding nexus. It also engages provisioning, regionalism, and regional peacekeeping interventions, the legal and institutional framework of RECs, and civil society and peacebuilding. Fundamentally, the book asks how effective the alliances and partnerships are in promoting regional peace and security and how much they are compromised by the intervention of external powers and actors, exploring new ideas and actions that may strengthen capacities to address the peacebuilding challenges on the continent effectively.

This book will be of key interest to scholars and students of African politics and studies, peace and security studies, regionalism studies, policy practitioners in the field of African peacebuilding, and more broadly to international relations.

Victor Adetula is a Professor of International Relations and Development Studies at the University of Jos, Nigeria.

Redie Bereketeab is an Associate Professor of Sociology at the Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala, Sweden.

Cyril Obi is a Program Director at the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), New York, USA.
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Regional Economic Communities and Peacebuilding in Africa
Lessons from ECOWAS and IGAD

Edited by
Victor Adetula, Redie Bereketeab, and Cyril Obi
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Contributors

Editors

**Victor Adetula** is a Professor of International Relations and Development Studies at the University of Jos-Nigeria. He was most recently the Head of Research at The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala-Sweden (2015–2019), and previously a Claude Ake Visiting Professor in the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, University of Uppsala, Sweden (2013), a Professor & Head of Africa and Regional Integration Unit at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos (2012), and a Nelson Mandela Visiting Professor of African Studies at the Centre for International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi (2011). His current research areas include comparative regional integration systems, Europe–Africa relations, Africa’s international relations, and peace and conflict.


**Cyril Obi**, PhD, is currently a program director at the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), New York. He leads the African Peacebuilding Network (APN) and Next Generation Social Sciences in Africa (Next Gen) programs at the SSRC. In 2004, Dr Obi was awarded the Claude Ake Visiting Chair
at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research (DPCR) at the University of Uppsala, Sweden. From 2005 to 2011, he was a senior researcher and led the research cluster on “Conflict, Displacement and Transformation” at the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI) in Uppsala. Dr Obi is currently a research associate of the Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, South Africa. He was a visiting scholar to the Institute of African Studies (IAS), Columbia University; and an adjunct professor at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York (CUNY). He is well-published in the fields of Africa’s political economy, environmental politics, conflict, peace, and security. He recently received the 2020 Distinguished Scholar Award in recognition of his work by the Peace Studies Section of the International Studies Association (ISA).

**Contributors**

**Aderemi Ajibewa** is the Director of Political Affairs at the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS). He holds a PhD in Politics and International Relations from the University of Lancaster in 1994. He is an expert in regional security, conflict resolution, and diplomatic relations with regional experience in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the USA. He was previously an Adjunct/Visiting Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Bloomington, USA (1998–1999), and an Associate Professor of International Relations at the Universiti Malaysia Sarawak (UNIMAS 1995–1997).

**Kassahun Berhanu Alemu** is a Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Addis Ababa University where he has served in different administrative/academic positions over the last 30 years. In addition to his affiliation with different professional societies related to his career, Kassahun is widely published on different issues covering decentralisation and governance, state-civil society relations, peacebuilding and conflict, higher education management, political economy of agricultural policy, electoral systems, and migration and refugee resettlement.


**Senai W. Andemariam** is a former judge and now an assistant professor at the School of Law in Asmara, Eritrea. He earned his LL.B. from the University of
Asmara, his LL.M. from Georgetown University as a Fulbright Scholar, and is now a PhD candidate at Maastricht University. He is a member of the editorial team of the *Journal of Eritrean Studies* and an advisor to the Minister of Justice of Eritrea. He has published with reputable journals.

**Kasaija Phillip Apuuli** is an Associate Professor of Political Science in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Makerere University. He holds a DPhil degree in International Law from University of Sussex. He was a 2010 British Academy Visiting Scholar at the African Studies Centre, University of Oxford, and a Fulbright Scholar-in-Residence, University of South Florida (St Petersburg) and Stetson School of Law (Gulfport), Florida, USA. He has also served in different capacities at the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Secretariat in the Republic of Djibouti. His most recent publications include a journal article, “The ‘speculated’ intervention of the East African Standby Force (EASF) in the Sudan: Lessons from its failed deployment in Burundi” (2020), published in the *African Security Review*; and a book chapter, “Uganda’s citizens’ Sovereignty, National Constitution and the EAC Treaty Nexus” (2020).

**Jacob D. Chol** is a political scientist and former Head of Department of Political Science, University of Juba, South Sudan. He did his graduate studies at the London School of Economic and Political Science (LSE), and specialises in Comparative Politics. Dr Chol has published widely on ethnicity and spiritual mythology, peacebuilding, mediation and negotiations, regional integration, and the politics of oil and gas. He is also the founder and the Executive Director of Centre for Democracy and International Analysis (CDIA). He is also a member of the Development Policy Forum (DPF), the Council for Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), the American Political Science Association (APSA), and the International Political Science Association (IPSA), amongst others.

**Chukwuemeka B. Eze** is the Executive Director of West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP). He holds a PhD in Peace and Strategic Studies with Bias in Conflict Early Warning Systems and has about two decades of experience in peacebuilding, political dialogue, and conflict assessment. His published works include these articles: “Consolidating ECOWAS Peace and Security Agenda in West Africa” (2019); “Role of CSOs in Promoting Human Rights Protection, Mass Atrocities Prevention” (2016); “Civilian Protection in Conflict, Conflict Monitoring in Nigeria” (2016); and “Developing Civil Society action for Early Warning and Early Response, Resolving the Protracted Political Crises in Guinea-Bissau” (2017).

**Mohamed Haji Ingiriis** is a PhD (DPhil) Candidate in History and African Studies at the University of Oxford. He is also a research associate at the African Leadership Centre (ALC), King’s College London. He has written on cultural, historical, intellectual, legal, maritime, political, and social aspects of Somali society. He locates his work at the intersection of state systems and structures

**Olugbemi Jaiyebo** teaches at the College of Law, Achievers University, and Owo, Nigeria. He is admitted to practice law in the Supreme Court of Nigeria, the First Department of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, and in the United States District Court, Southern District of New York. His research interests include business and human rights, and international law. He has also co-authored publications such as “Electoral Democracy, Foreign Capital Flows and the Human Rights Infrastructure in Nigeria” (2019) and “African Union and its Supranational Institutions: Analysis, Opportunities and Challenges of the Pan-African Parliament” (2013).

**Kehinde Olusola Olayode** is a Professor at and the current Head of the Department of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University (OAU), Ile-Ife, Nigeria. Professor Olayode specialises in governance and developmental issues in Africa and has teaching and research experience of over 20 years. He has attended several academic conferences both locally and outside Nigeria and also published extensively in his areas of specialisation.


**Kizito Sabala** holds a PhD in International Studies from the University of Nairobi. He has more than 18 years’ accumulated experience on matters of peace and security in the Horn and Great Lakes regions of Africa. He held a Social Science Research Council’s African Peacebuilding Network (APN) Collaborative Working Group Fellowship from 2016 to 2018. Currently, he teaches at several universities and military colleges in Kenya in addition to serving as a consultant to various regional and international organisations. Recent assignments include Head of IGAD Liaison offices in Juba, South Sudan and Nairobi, Kenya. His recently published research papers include “Retracing Pan-Africanism: African Continental Unity, Dignity and Development,” “Re-Emerging Pan-Africanism: Implications for Foreign and Security Policy in Africa,” (2019), and “Elites, Academics and the Diaspora: Exploring the Missing Link for African Unity” (2019).
Nureldin Satti is a retired diplomat and Senior Regional Advisor at Conflict Management Initiative, Helsinki. He holds a PhD in Literature from the University of Paris-Sorbonne, and taught French language and literature at the University of Khartoum before he joined the diplomatic service. He served as Sudan’s ambassador to France, the Vatican, Portugal, and Switzerland and as Sudan Permanent Delegate to UNESCO. He joined UNESCO in 1996 and served as the Director of UNESCO’s Regional Program for Emergency Education and Culture of Peace, as well as the UNESCO Representative to Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Somalia, Tanzania, the African Union, the ECA, and IGAD. He was appointed as the United Nations Deputy Special Representative for Burundi. He is a Global Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson Center.

Amadu Sesay is a Professor of International Relations at the National Institute for Security Studies (NISS), Abuja-Nigeria. He holds BSc and PhD degrees in International Relations, 1974 and 1978 respectively, from The London School of Economics and Political Science. His areas of specialisation include integration, conflict analysis, and peace support operations. His most recent book is an edited volume titled African Perspectives on ACP–EU Relations (2020).

Jubril Agbolade Shittu is a Deputy Director at the Nigeria INGO Forum – a body which brings together 54 International NGOs providing development, humanitarian, and peacebuilding interventions in Nigeria. He holds a master’s degree in Political Science (International Relations) and a Cum Laude bachelor’s in International Law and Diplomacy, both from Babcock University, Nigeria. His main areas of research include civil society and development, peace and conflict, democracy, and governance.
The growing complexity of conflict dynamics and security challenges in the post-Cold War world require greater cooperation and coordination among states within regions. Current trends in globalisation and its consequences are increasingly generating consensus formation and coordination on a regional basis. Many national governments are coming together to address problems with cross-border, transboundary, or transnational dimensions such as conflicts, pandemics, desertification, drought, climate change, drug, arms, and human trafficking. This has further influenced many states to embrace regionalist norms, approaches, and mechanisms.

The emergence of the African Union (AU) as an important peace and security actor represents a renewed commitment of African states to the regionalist approach in this context. The AU’s primary mechanism for promoting peace and security is the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), designed to function in collaboration with the regional economic communities (RECs) and regional mechanisms. However, the RECs, mostly set up to promote economic integration, have increasingly taken up a prominent role in conflict resolution and peace support operations as evident in the recent peace processes across the continent.

The intervention of the ECOWAS in the Liberian crisis was the first successful one by the sub-regional organisation in post-Cold War Africa. It is interesting to note that the lessons learned from the peacekeeping and mediation efforts of ECOWAS in the early years of the ECOMOG contributed to the consolidation of mechanisms for conflict prevention and peacebuilding in West Africa.

More recently, other RECs on the continent have replicated the ECOWAS “success story” in conflict mediation, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping. For example, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has played important roles in the resolution of conflicts in the greater Horn of Africa (GHOA). IGAD, set up initially to address environmental degradation, drought, desertification, and famine, has now taken on board development, regional integration, conflict management, peace, and security roles on a regional basis. The records of IGAD and ECOWAS on promoting peace, stability, and development in their respective regions are mixed. The lessons from ECOWAS intervention in West Africa as well as IGAD’s experiences in conflict mediation and peacebuilding in the Horn
Preface and acknowledgements

of Africa aptly show that the involvement of RECs in regional peace and security processes face some challenges. Notwithstanding, RECs are well-positioned to play vital roles in the maintenance of peace and security in their respective regions and as well in the world at large.

Chapter Eight of the United Nations Charter recognises the option of regional institutions taking appropriate action on matters relating to international peace and security, provided such institutions and/or their activities are consistent with the purpose and principles of the UN. Africa since the end of the Cold War has recorded increased involvement of its regional economic communities (RECs) in the peacebuilding process. African countries have responded to the challenges of the post-Cold War international system mostly by collectively promoting sub-regional and continent-wide initiatives on conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The broadening of the role and functions of African regional organisations to include responsibility for peacebuilding and conflict management adds credence to the efficacy of regional integration. However, many issues present themselves in the RECs’ engagement with the regional integration and peacebuilding processes in Africa. This calls for an examination of the structure, roles, and performances of ECOWAS and IGAD concerning regional peace and security in West Africa as well as the GHOA, and for exploring new ideas and proffering recommendations that are likely to strengthen their capacity to address the peacebuilding challenges facing both regions effectively.

It was against this background that the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI) and the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) in collaboration with Social Science Research Council’s Africa Peacebuilding Network (SSRC-APN) held a two-day policy dialogue on RECs and peacebuilding in Africa on 1–2 September 2016, in Abuja, Nigeria, with particular focus on lessons learnt from the experiences of IGAD and ECOWAS. This book consists of carefully selected and edited papers from the policy dialogue on the roles and performance of two African regional economic communities, ECOWAS and IGAD, in peacebuilding and regional integration in West Africa, and the Greater Horn of Africa. The event featured a broad spectrum of stakeholders, including policy experts, policymakers, scholars, and representatives of civil society drawn from West Africa and the Greater Horn.

The Nordic Africa Institute and Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution acknowledge the support of the African Peacebuilding Network (APN) programme of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) which partnered with us and supported in executing the “RECs and Peacebuilding in Africa” project in five countries in Africa, namely Nigeria, Morocco, Cameroon, Uganda, and Botswana. Also, we express our heartfelt gratitude to the academic, research, and policy institutions in Africa that we collaborated with to organise policy dialogues and workshops. In this regard, we acknowledge the support and cooperation received from the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), Abuja; the Department of Political Science Makerere University, Kampala; the International Relations Institute of Cameroon (IRIC), Yaoundé; the Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Botswana, Gabarone; and
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Victor Adetula, Redie Bereketeab, and Cyril Obi
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## Abbreviations

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<td>ACRISS</td>
<td>Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>African Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>AfCFTA</td>
<td>African Continental Free Trade Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFISMA</td>
<td>Africa-led International Support Mission in Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRC/SLA</td>
<td>Armed Forces Revolutionary Council/Sierra Leone Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>AISOL</td>
<td>“African Solutions to African Problems”</td>
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<tr>
<td>AHSG</td>
<td>Assembly of Heads of State and Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIPECT</td>
<td>African Institute for Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation</td>
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<td>ALC</td>
<td>African Leadership Centre</td>
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<td>AMISON</td>
<td>AU Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
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<td>APN</td>
<td>African Peacebuilding Network</td>
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<td>APP</td>
<td>Africa Programme for Peace</td>
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<td>APRCT</td>
<td>Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>American Political Science Association</td>
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<td>AQIM</td>
<td>al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARCISS</td>
<td>Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<td>ATM</td>
<td>Automated Teller Machine</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AUPSC</td>
<td>AU Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>Central Bank of Nigeria</td>
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<td>CDD</td>
<td>Centre for Democracy and Development</td>
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<td>CDF</td>
<td>Civil Defence Forces</td>
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<td>CDIA</td>
<td>Centre for Democracy and International Analysis</td>
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<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td>Community of Sahel-Saharan States</td>
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<td>CEWARN</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning System</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CODESRIA</td>
<td>Council for Development of Social Science Research in Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoM</td>
<td>Council of Ministers</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>COPAX</td>
<td>Security Council in Central Africa</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>CSF</td>
<td>Community Strategic Framework</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
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<td>CTSAMMM</td>
<td>Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission and Ceasefire and the Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism</td>
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<td>CUNY</td>
<td>City University of New York</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Agency</td>
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<td>DDRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration, and Rehabilitation</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DOP</td>
<td>Declaration of Principles</td>
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<td>DPCR</td>
<td>Department of Peace and Conflict Research, University of Uppsala</td>
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<td>DPF</td>
<td>Development Policy Forum</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>EACJ</td>
<td>East African Court of Justice</td>
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<td>EALA</td>
<td>East African Legislative Assembly</td>
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<td>EASBRIG</td>
<td>Eastern Africa Standby Brigade</td>
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<td>EASF</td>
<td>East African Standby Force</td>
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<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<td>ECOMIL</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Peace Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council – United Nations</td>
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<td>Economic Community of West African States – Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
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<td>Economic Community of West African States – West Africa Civil Society Institute</td>
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<td>ECOWAS-WANEP</td>
<td>ECOWAS–West Africa Network for Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECPF</td>
<td>ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEBC</td>
<td>Eritrea–Ethiopia Border Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMP</td>
<td>“Ecole de Maintien de la Paix”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>ECOWAS Standby Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHOA</td>
<td>Greater Horn of Africa</td>
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</table>
GRSS  Government of the Republic of South Sudan
IAS    Institute of African Studies
IBSA   India, Brazil, and the South Africa forum
ICC    International Criminal Court
ICT    Information and Communication Technology
IDPs   Internally Displaced People
IGAD   Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD  Intergovernmental Authority of Drought and Development
IMF    International Monetary Fund
INGO   International Non-Governmental Organization
IPCR   Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution
IPF    IGAD Partners Forum
IPSA   International Political Science Association
IRIC   International Relations Institute of Cameroon
ISA    International Studies Association
ISS    Islamic State in Syria
J-PERM Joint Platform for Election Result Monitoring
KAIPTC Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
KDA    Karamoja Development Agency
KIDDPP Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme
LAPSSET Lamu Port–South Sudan–Ethiopia Transport
LPA    Lagos Plan of Action
LSE    London School of Economics
MCIA   Ministry of Cooperation and Integration in Africa
MDP    Mutual Defence Pact
MFD    Mediation Facilitation Directorate
MINUSMA Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali (UN)
MNLA   National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MOU    Memorandum of Understanding
MPCI   Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire
MUJAO  Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa
MVM    Monitoring and Verification Mechanism
NAI    Nordic Africa Institute
NAPE   Nonviolence and Peace Education Program
NCP    National Congress Party
NDA    Sudan National Democratic Alliance
NDC    National Democratic Congress – Ghana
NEWS   National Early Warning System
Next Gen Next Generation Social Sciences in Africa
NGOs   Non-Governmental Organisations
NIPSSS National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies
NISS   National Institute for Security Studies
NNDP   Nigeria National Defence Policy
NPFL   National Patriotic Front of Liberia
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NPP</td>
<td>New Patriotic Party – Ghana</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRM/A</td>
<td>National Resistance Movement/Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Salvation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Obafemi Awolowo University</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iron Fist</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSSESS</td>
<td>Office of the Special Envoys on South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Presidential Advisory Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBC</td>
<td>UN Peacebuilding Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCRD</td>
<td>Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLANELEM</td>
<td>The Planning Element</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMAD</td>
<td>Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PoW</td>
<td>Panel of the Wise</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSOs</td>
<td>peace support operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCI-LRA</td>
<td>Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA</td>
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<tr>
<td>RECs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTTC</td>
<td>Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTD</td>
<td>Djibouti Television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUf</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SADCPOL</td>
<td>SADC Protocol on Politics</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programmes</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFG</td>
<td>Somali Federal Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLA</td>
<td>Sudan Liberation Army</td>
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<td>SPLM</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLM-IO</td>
<td>SPLM – in the Opposition</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRF</td>
<td>Sudan Revolutionary Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSRC</td>
<td>Social Science Research Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSRC-APN</td>
<td>Social Science Research Council’s Africa Peacebuilding Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>The Carter Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>TGF</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>TGNU</td>
<td>Transitional Government of National Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>TMG</td>
<td>Transition Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<tr>
<td>UIC</td>
<td>Union of Islamic Courts</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>Union United Nations – African Union Mission in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>UN Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UN Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNECA</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIMAS</td>
<td>Universiti Malaysia Sarawak</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNISFA</td>
<td>UN Interim Security Force for Abyei</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>UN Mission in Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>UN Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>UN Observer Mission in Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>UN Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>UN Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>UNSGPC</td>
<td>UN Secretary-General’s Policy Committee</td>
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<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Uganda People’s Defence Forces</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>WACSI</td>
<td>West Africa Civil Society Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>WACSOF</td>
<td>West Africa Civil Society Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>WANEP</td>
<td>West Africa Network for Peacebuilding</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAPI</td>
<td>West Africa Peacebuilding Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>WARN</td>
<td>West Africa Early Warning and Response Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WIPNET</td>
<td>Women in Peacebuilding Network</td>
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1 Introduction

Regional economic communities and peacebuilding in West Africa and the Horn of Africa

Victor Adetula, Redie Bereketeab, and Cyril Obi

Introduction

The view that peace and development are intrinsically linked has continued to feature prominently in mainstream discourses about global governance and conflict transformation. Many African countries are either dealing with internal conflicts or have just come out from civil war which has far-reaching consequences for development. In 2019, there were active armed conflicts in 15 countries in sub-Saharan Africa: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan (SIPRI, 2020, 8). Most of these conflicts were internationalised and overlapped across states and regions “as a result of the transnational activities of violent Islamist groups, other armed groups and criminal networks” (SIPRI, 2020, 8). The complexity of conflict dynamics and emerging security challenges at the regional and global levels require greater cooperation and coordination among states and non-state actors. The current waves of globalisation, coupled with other compelling cross-cutting issues such as the global campaign against terrorism and the impact of climate change, are already feeding into consensus formation and international coordination on a regional basis. Admittedly, there are growing signs of pushback from populist and nationalist groups in some countries. Notwithstanding, the realities on the ground across Africa have contributed to the need and desire for regional collective security systems and conflict management mechanisms on the continent.

Regional efforts to address threats with transnational dimensions such as cross-border conflicts, pandemics, erratic weather changes leading to droughts or flooding, natural disasters, and transnational crimes have led to the adoption of coordinated approaches and mechanisms. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established in 1975, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), established in 1996, are the cases used in this book to examine the structures, roles, and performance of African regional economic communities (RECs) in peacebuilding. ECOWAS comprises Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo; and
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) comprises Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda. IGAD was created as a successor to the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) which had initially been set up in 1986 to address natural resource management and development issues in the Horn of Africa.

The use of comparative analysis and case study approach to assess the performance of the RECs regarding peacebuilding is desirable both in universal and specific contexts. Reference to the global context is in terms of the imperative of regionalist solutions in a world that has become increasingly interconnected, characterised by the changing dynamics of violent conflict, and driven by less altruistic motives. Most of the global powers have been increasingly retreating from active engagement outside their immediate geographical locations. Also, traditional global platforms for the maintenance of international security such as the United Nations (UN) are overstretched, even as multilateralism is in retreat because of growing populism and nationalism in some of the world’s hegemonic states. Consequently, regional institutions have become increasingly relevant and visible.

This relevance has also resonated with the idea of “African solutions to African problems” which underpins the notion of the African Renaissance. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni the concept of an African Renaissance is based on the idea of “African struggles against colonialism and imperialism as well as within the terrain of African initiatives to unite Africa, and set Afro-modernity afoot” (2020, 2). It cohered with early pan-Africanist thinking, and more recently, the thoughts of scholars like Ayittey (2014), who referred to “African solutions to African problems” as being aimed at stopping the imitation of models from outside the continent, and at looking inwards for solutions based on African experiences and traditions. In the view of Fantu Cheru (2002), the concept had to do with abandoning dogmatic approaches to development and governance, learning from local/homegrown successes and a new kind of African politics.

In the 1990s, former South African President Thabo Mbeki advanced the concept of an African Renaissance and promoted its integration into the thinking that informed a pan-African effort to reposition the continent in an emerging post-Cold War order. This thinking was key to the establishment of the New Partnership for African Development in 2001, the (re)birth of the African Union (AU) in 2002, and the launching of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in 2002 – all initiatives encapsulating the collective search for an Africa-initiated and -driven response to the depredations of colonialism, imperialism, and globalisation. In the words of Lobakeng (2017), “African solutions to African problems” was marked by the search for “a viable solution towards a united, prosperous and peaceful Africa.” It emphasised the centrality of African solidarity, norms, institutions, and mechanisms as solutions to the structural and emerging challenges facing African peace, governance, and development, and in placing the continent on a path towards greater global reckoning in the 21st century.

Thus, the emergence of the AU as an important actor represented a renewed commitment of African states to the regionalist approach to peace and security
on the continent. The AU’s main mechanism for promoting peace and security is the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which involved decision-making on issues related to “prevention, management and resolution of crisis, conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction, and development.” The APSA also represented a significant paradigm shift in the AU’s normative framework from “non-interference to non-indifference,” paving the way for the AU to intervene in any member state where genocide, human right violations, and crimes against humanity are committed. The AU officially recognises the RECs as the representative regional associations of African states. Initially, African RECs were established to promote economic integration. But they have increasingly taken up a prominent role in conflict resolution and peace interventions as evident in the recent peace and security processes across the continent. This recognition of RECS as the “building blocks” for African continental integration was formally acknowledged in the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty) of 1991 and the AU Constitutive Act of 2000. APSA was designed to function in collaboration with the RECs and Regional Mechanisms (RMs).

**Conceptualising regional integration and peacebuilding**

**Regional integration**

Integration simply refers to units coming together to satisfy objectives which they cannot meet when they act independently. It is, therefore, a process that hastens the achievement of certain objectives in the interest of a larger body. Regional integration is a process of cooperation by countries drawing on historical and geographic commonalities to come together to achieve a set of shared goals: economic and political. Usually, regional integration entails a formal agreement laying out the principles, goals, and targets of such cooperation arrangements. As a process, integration involves the shifting of loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new and larger centre whose institutions and processes demand some jurisdiction over those of the national states. The extent of such a transfer of loyalties and authority enjoyed by the new centre depends on the level and goals of integration schemes, as well as the socio-economic and political ramifications that the implementation of integrative policies generate within and between the integrating units (Adetula, 2014, 193).

Often, “regional integration” and “regional cooperation” have been used interchangeably. However, there is a difference between the two in qualitative and quantitative contexts. While “cooperation” may be employed to identify loose forms of interstate activity designed to meet some commonly experienced needs, “integration” refers to a much more formal arrangement that involves some political and economic sacrifices, as well as commitments, concessions, processes, and political will, to redefine participation in the international economy (Axline, 1977; Ihonvbere, 1983). It is within this context that regional integration is conceptualised as a dialectical unity of social, economic, and political processes (Cocks, 1980). Even at that, the debate among scholars
about the similarity and difference between the two notions continues to this
day. However, there seems to be an agreement that regional integration can be
regarded as a process or as a state of affairs reached by that process. According
to Fritz Machlup, the more difficult question is what is being integrated – peo-
ple, areas, markets, production, goods, resources, policies, or something else?
(Machlup, 1976, 63). The conception of economic integration as the progressive
elimination of trade and tariff discrimination between national borders shows it
as a state of affairs and a process. The foregoing notion and many concepts, mod-
els, and theoretical formulations that derived from the experience of European
integration have long dominated the principle and practice of regional integra-
tion. Based on these restrictive conceptualisations and formulations on regional
integration, many self-styled common markets, federations, unions, and com-
munities have emerged with their motives, agendas, contents, and mechanisms
of operation. Many organisations are pursuing regional integration as strictly an
“economic agenda” or “tariff matter” which leaves out some critical issues of
development broadly defined.

In the context of the global South, regional integration is an extremely com-
plicated and varied phenomenon which is conditioned by socio-economic and
political dynamics different from those in the global North. In other words, the
experience of European integration is significantly different from that of the regions
of the global South. The universalist claim that the European theories of regional
integration are applicable on a worldwide basis without regard for regional differ-
ences is deficient. Similarly, the failure to engage the worldwide setting in which
regional integration takes place, while nevertheless recognising the importance of
exogenous factors as contributing variables, constitutes a contradiction.

As Daniel and Nagar (2014, 9) observe,

Although an institutional framework towards regional integration exists in
Africa, implementation of many of the protocols signed over the past five
decades has often been hampered by ineffective coordination between the
African Union – and before then, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) –
and Africa’s “sub-regional bodies.”

Beyond this, they have faced challenges linked to the leveraging of national
sovereignty over regional interests, weak institutions, poor governance, com-
petitive rather than complementary intra-African trade, poor funding, inter-REC
competition, and low levels of domestication of regional policies, standards, and
regulations. Gill (2009, 702) offers a critical theoretical perspective to regional
integration. He is critical of the role of the West in “imposing and sustaining
a discursive hegemony over regionalism” in the global South, which drives a
“modernist” conception of regional integration. He argues that “African regional-
ism has been pursued, both theoretically and empirically, in terms of a neoliberal,
free market and Westphalian state model built upon the experiences, values and
norms of European integration,” which is “limited and structurally inappropriate”
for Africa’s realities.
While the critique above has some merit, it does not address the role of regionalism in Africa adequately, particularly since the end of the Cold War, and within the context of the growing importance of the peace, security, and development nexus. We argue in support of a new perspective that requires broadening the conceptual and theoretical treatment of regional integration to include areas and dimensions neglected by the orthodox approaches to regional integration based mostly on the processes and experiences of regional integration in the global North.

The discourse on regional integration generally has been influenced by history, and by the connection of regionalism to political and socio-economic development, and to security processes. Regional integration as a strategy of development has Western roots connected to the vision of a post-Second World War order, in which regional organisations, working with the United Nations, were expected to play a critical role in the maintenance of international peace and security (see Chapter 2). Admittedly, this global setting may have influenced the discourse about development in Africa where regional integration as a development strategy became appealing to the elites, and where by the 1950s it was incorporated into anti-colonial struggles and efforts towards some forms of “African unity” (Adetula, 1999).

Upon gaining independence, many African countries, in the pursuit of regional integration, acknowledged development as a strategy for reducing dependency and underdevelopment. Many African leaders invested their energies in working for African unity by building pan-African institutions and seeking to defend Africa’s political and economic independence. In this regard, motives for regional cooperation and continental integration included broad economic, social, and political interests, the need for greater international bargaining power, economic prosperity by pooling resources and by connecting markets across national frontiers on a regional scale, and the quest for “African unity” fired by the ideals of Pan-Africanism. Many African countries favoured the gradualist approach to African unity, which subsequently resulted in the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. Since its creation in 1958, the United Nations Economic Commission of Africa (UNECA) has played a significant role in the discourse on African development. The OAU and UNECA worked together towards promoting African development and economic integration through sub-regional groupings (Adetula, 1993). These developments are part of the background of the emergence of the African RECs, such as the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), ECOWAS, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as well as laudable regional economic initiatives such as the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), the Final Act of Lagos, the African Economic Community (AEC), and, more recently, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

The AU replaced the OAU in 2002 when the Consultative Act of the African Union came into force. The AU promotes common African positions, democratic
institutions, popular participation, and good governance. It also protects human rights and promotes sustainable development and the integration of Africa. The AU seeks effective collaboration and partnership with the RECs in the execution of its mandates. In this regard, the AU has formally acknowledged the eight African RECs as building blocks for African continental integration under the 1991 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC). However, the performance of several intergovernmental organisations in Africa in relation to regional cooperation has not been impressive.

At the African continental level, there have been noticeable movements towards increased integration including the efforts of its countries as well as the renewed interest in pan-Africanism, which culminated first in the establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC) and later in the inauguration of the AU. Beyond this, the institutional innovativeness of ECOWAS since the 1990s has demonstrated the ways regionalism has flexibly responded to threats to peace and security in West Africa, enabled collaboration with non-state actors, and envisioned an “ECOWAS of the Peoples” (see Chapters 3, 4, and 5). In the same way, some of the challenges faced by IGAD also point to the limits of state-led regional integration efforts and their implications for peace and security in the Horn of Africa (see Chapters 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15). It is within the continuum between conflict, its prevention, its management, and its resolution that African RECs engage and connect to a project of peacebuilding.

**Peacebuilding**

At different times in history, societies have experienced peacebuilding practices in multiple forms. However, peacebuilding as a theoretical construct and development practice assumed prominence only recently, and its early development is often associated with Johan Galtung (1976). Conceptually, peacebuilding links security and development “to offer an integrated approach to understanding and dealing with the full range of issues that threatened peace and security” (Tschirgi, 2003, 1). Thus, the peacebuilding process includes the prevention and resolution of violent conflicts, consolidation of peace once violence has been reduced, and post-conflict reconstruction to avoid a relapse into violent conflict. Conceived in this way, peacebuilding addresses “the proximate and root causes of contemporary conflicts including structural, political, socio-cultural, economic and environmental factors” (Tschirgi, 2003, 1). The UN with its emphasis on such issues as disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR); rule of law; security sector reform (SSR); and refugee return and reintegration is regarded in some circles as aligning with some of the critical elements of peacebuilding, if not with a broader context that underscores inclusive development with a focus on human security. This perspective presents peacebuilding practices beyond the cessation of violence and hostilities to include deep consideration for the key indicators of sustainable peace and development (see Diehl, 2006; Mason and Meernik, 2006; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, 2009; and Bjorkdah, 2012).
The UN’s *An Agenda for Peace* is a significant landmark in global consciousness on peacebuilding enterprises within the human security framework. The former Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros-Ghali, referred to peacebuilding as “actions to identify and support structures which will tend to solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict” (United Nations, 1992). Thus, peacebuilding is associated with the “construction of a new environment,” most probably in a post-conflict environment (UN General Assembly, 1993). However, the seeming restriction of peacebuilding to actions and activities that promote peace in the post-conflict phase began to wane within the UN circle in 1995 when Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, in the *Supplement to the Agenda for Peace*, expanded the notion of peacebuilding to include preventive actions. The *Brahimi Report* further improved on the conceptualisation of peacebuilding by presenting it as “activities undertaken on the far side of the conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide tools for the building of those foundations on something more than just the absence of war”. The submission made by the UN Secretary-General’s Policy Committee (UNSGPC) in May 2007 further advanced the conceptual treatment of peacebuilding by declaring that peacebuilding practice within the UN system involves “a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management and to lay the foundations for a sustainable peace and development” (2007).

As part of the Western hegemonic agenda, peacebuilding is constructed as a post-conflict project connected to an integral part of universalising neoliberal values and norms. Additionally, peacebuilding interventions offer excellent opportunities for hegemonic states, as well as international and regional organisations, to convert post-conflict societies and other societies under stress into “modern” cultures guided by liberal or neoliberal values. According to Omeje (2019, 4),

> modern post-conflict peacebuilding involves mobilisation of efforts and resources to rebuild social life at three inter-related levels: (a) rebuilding the state and its governance and service delivery institutions, (b) rebuilding the economy to support the state and society, (c) rebuilding the society to resuscitate the fabric of social and community life.

He goes on to observe that many critics observe the “one-size-fits-all” bias inherent in neoliberal peacebuilding, and its macro-level perspectives on conflict and peace (Omeje, 2019, 5).

The direct contrast to the neoliberal approach to peacebuilding is the “popular progressive” model, which is based on the culture, history, and social and political structures and forces of conflict and post-conflict societies (see Chapter 3). This is also a departure from mainstream peacebuilding and its focus on post-conflict societies. Its approach to peacebuilding is “maximalist” (Omeje, 2019, 5), spanning the “entire conflict spectrum,” including pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict phases. Accordingly, peacebuilding is better conceptualised and practised as an “integrated process whose elements include prevention and resolution of
conflict, consolidation of peace, once violence has been reduced through systematic mediation and reconciliation, and post-conflict reconstruction, with a view to avoiding lapses that lead to violent conflict” (Adetula, 2015, 57).

The regional integration and peacebuilding nexus

The idea that regional organisations have a key role to play in maintaining peace and security is not a recent development. The founding fathers of the United Nations proposed an international collective security system that allows regional organisations to manage conflicts in their respective regions. Thus, Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations provides for such regional arrangements to complement the UN Security Council, which has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. However, no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council, except for measures against an enemy state. Also, regional arrangements and agencies are expected to have adequate capacity to undertake such action, which of course should either be on the initiative of the states concerned or referred by the Security Council.

The strategic withdrawal of Western powers from Africa in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War had its consequences. The outbreak of violent conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the shock generated by the Rwandan genocide, which could have been prevented had the world paid more considerable attention, convinced African leaders that the time had come to take the continent’s destiny into their own hands. As earlier noted, this spurred them to create a new set of innovative norms, principles, and mechanisms aimed at connecting African unity, self-reliance, and regional integration to the quest for collective peace, security, and development.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established in 1975, pioneered the first regional peace intervention by an African regional economic community when civil war broke out in Liberia in 1989 (Adetula, 2005; Obi, 2009, 121). ECOWAS established a regional peacekeeping force, the ECOWAS Peace Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), to bring an end to the conflict in Liberia, and has since continued to link regional integration to peace and security in other countries in the West Africa sub-region: Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, and Mali (see Chapters 6, 7, and 8). This laid the foundation for building some of the most sophisticated regional conflict prevention and peacebuilding norms, mechanisms, and frameworks on the continent. Currently, there is variation in conflict management performances by the African RECs generally. Their relative success helped in recognising the complex and multiple linkages in African conflicts and contributed towards regional approaches to peacebuilding imperatives.

Usually, regional organisations have acted as first responders during peacekeeping missions before UN forces have intervened. They share in the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. For example, regional organisations and alliances were responsible for 32 of the 63 multilateral peace
operations active in 2017 (SIPRI, 2018, 103). During that year, African regional organisations conducted seven multilateral peace operations: four by the AU and three by the RECs (SIPRI, 2018, 107). Fewer multilateral peace operations were recorded in 2018, with 60 missions and operations globally, out of which 33 were conducted by regional organisations (SIPRI, 2019, 147–148). In 2019, there were 61 active multilateral peace operations, 20 of them in sub-Saharan Africa (SIPRI, 2020, 3, 8). The strategic importance of continental and regional organisations in the chain of global responses to threats to peace and security is fast gaining recognition.

Most of the conflicts in the Sahelian region, particularly those in Mali, are recent examples of how the conflict in one place can spread through the mobility of fighters and the proliferation of arms. The flow of armed men and resources from a post-Ghaddafi Libya into northern Mali transformed a Tuareg campaign into a massive separatist movement. Arguably, the jihadists, insurgents, and other militant groups in the Sahel benefitted from the inflow of disbanded fighters and arms from Libya. For instance, at the outbreak of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, there was concern that the conflict in Mali would spill over into the country. In 2012, President Idriss Déby of Chad expressed his fears that Boko Haram could destabilise the Lake Chad basin. He called on countries adjoining northern Nigeria to institute a joint military force to tackle the militants. In 2013, when Mali faced a similar situation, Chad sent troops to support French troops to drive al-Qaeda allies out of northern Mali.

In relation to IGAD and the Horn of Africa, the regional dimension of the conflict in Somalia is further complicated by the fact that Somalis are spread across the Horn but most noticeably in Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and of course Somalia. It is plausible to argue that developments in Somalia at any given time are likely to provoke responses and reactions from “the Somali nations” scattered across East Africa in solidarity. Also, conflicts and instability in the Great Lakes region, particularly the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Sudan, and neighbouring South Sudan, have had implications for the countries of the Horn. IGAD has played an active role in conflict prevention and mediation in various conflicts in the region (see Chapters 9, 10, 14, and 15) and remains active in restoring peace to Somalia, as well as in ongoing negotiations directed towards bringing about peace between the warring factions in South Sudan. The physical and demographic features of Africa and the porosity of its borders make it easy for insurgencies, and environment-induced conflicts, to assume a regional character. It is in this context, for instance, that climate change, desertification, famine, and drought are considered threats to regional peace and security in West, East, and Central Africa – and have become the focus of RECs’ efforts towards conflict prevention and the restoration of peace.

The foregoing underscores the point that while most post-Cold War conflicts in Africa have been intra-state in nature, they had much broader ramifications. These include the destabilisation of neighbouring states and sub-regions because of the mobility of fighters, the proliferation of arms, disruption of economic activities, instability, internal displacement, and massive inflows and outflows of refugees.
The complex and multiple linkages in African conflicts have made regional approaches to peacebuilding imperative. Most of the conflicts in the Sahelian region, the Lake Chad basin, the Horn of Africa, and the Great Lakes region have regional dimensions. It is within this context that African RECs, working with African leaders and civil society groups, and with the support of international partners, have directed their energies towards peacebuilding as a critical component of regional integration and development. Of note in this regard is the collaboration between the UN, AU, international donors, and RECs, which despite existing challenges has recorded some modest successes in West Africa and the Horn of Africa. As the chapters of this volume aptly demonstrate, there is a lot that African RECs can learn from each other’s experiences in relation to the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the nexus of peace and regional integration.

**ECOWAS and IGAD in comparative perspective**

The case studies in the book examine two African RECs: ECOWAS and IGAD. Both have in place programmes and activities for promoting peace and security in their respective regions. While ECOWAS started out in 1975 (and adopted a revised treaty in July 1993) as a regional economic integration program of 16 West African states, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) was initially established in January 1986 to “combat desertification and the effects of drought on food security and rural livelihoods” (Bereketeab, 2019, 139). Following changes attendant to the end of the Cold War, the emerging peace, and the security challenges on the continent, both organisations expanded their mandates to cover peace and security-related issues (Adetula, Bereketeab, and Jaiyebo, 2016, 21, 29–30; Obi, 2009, 120).

In July 1993, ECOWAS leaders endorsed the ECOWAS Revised Treaty which extended economic and political cooperation, including the creation of new institutions: a court, an economic and security council, and a parliament. Of note was the introduction of a structure for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) – with 14 components, including early warning, democracy, and political governance – as well as the ECOWAS Standby Force. ECPF has contributed to the success of ECOWAS both in terms of the ways it aligns with the AU’s APSA, and the ways it has partnered with the AU and the UN in mediating conflicts in the region and restoring peace to Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Cote d’Ivoire, and Mali.

The lessons learned from the ECOWAS intervention and the ECOMOG peacekeeping efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone contributed to the consolidation of mechanisms for conflict prevention and peacebuilding in West Africa. More recently, other regional economic communities (RECs) on the continent have replicated the example of the ECOWAS “success story” in mediation, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding. Of note is the role IGAD has played in mediating and resolving conflicts in the Horn of Africa. IGAD, along the lines of ECOWAS, expanded the basis of its regional integration agenda to include conflict management, peace, and security. Much like the experience of ECOWAS in West Africa,
IGAD’s role in the Horn of Africa underscores some of the successes, as well as the challenges, RECs face in the promotion of regional peace and security.

In the case of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), which was formed in 1986 with the responsibility for coordinating regional resource issues – tackling drought, desertification, and food security-related issues in the Horn of Africa – the heads of state amended the organisation’s charter, and changed its name to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in March 1996. They also expanded its mandate to include “conflict prevention and resolution, economic cooperation and integration” (Bereketeab, 2019, 139; also see Chapter 11). Bereketeab further notes that IGAD focused on three overarching objectives, “food security and environmental protection; promotion and maintenance of peace and security; and humanitarian affairs, economic cooperation and integration” (Bereketeab, 2019, 139). IGAD’s membership now consists of eight countries that include Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda.

The experiences and the challenges facing ECOWAS and IGAD in the quest for sustainable regional peacebuilding examined in this book relate to the lack of adequate resources and capacity in logistics, weaponry, and technical and professional expertise. Others include the lack of political will among decision-makers of member states, competing national interests, and external interference. The book interrogates the claim that resource and capacity deficits partly explain the tendency of African RECs to rely on external funding and technical support. Dependence on external funding may compromise the integrity, legitimacy, and ownership of peace mediation, peace operations, and peacebuilding processes. Also, the divergence of interests among member states, coupled with the strategic interests of powerful donor states, can undermine the consensus necessary for the effectiveness of the RECs in their respective regions.

The records of IGAD and ECOWAS in promoting peace, stability, and development in their respective regions are mixed. The chapters in this book offer a balanced analysis of the successes and challenges facing both organisations. Both RECs play critical roles in peace mediation, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. Apart from examining the status, roles, and performances of ECOWAS and IGAD in regional peace and security, the book explores new ideas and actions that are likely to strengthen their capacity to address the challenges facing both regions effectively.

From the foregoing, while ECOWAS and IGAD have expanded their mandates in response to emerging changes in their regional contexts, they have also experienced certain challenges that have limited their capacity to effectively deliver on all aspects of their expanded mandates. In the case of ECOWAS, several commentators and analysts have identified institutional and financial weaknesses as among the factors hobbling the organisation (Adetula, Bereketeab, and Jaiyebo 2016, 24; Obi, 2009, 120). This creates a level of dependency on external sources of funding and support, and provides an opportunity for external hegemonic actors such as France, the UK, the US, and the EU to leverage their influence over ECOWAS’s decisions and actions (see Chapters 6 and 7).
It has also been pointed out that ECOWAS has achieved its successes in terms of conflict management, peace, and security at the expense of economic integration and development (see Chapter 6). As pointed out by Sesay,

the neglect of the economic integration aspects of ECOWAS, evidenced in its failure to meet vital community targets and in particular, its inability to execute community-wide projects, has left West Africa behind other regions in economic development and human development index.

(Sesay, 2016)

Another challenge is the weak political will of some of the leaders, who also tend to leverage personal, national, or external relationships over regional interests. This in many ways undermines the cohesion of the organisation, including its capacity to pool internal resources and to act decisively in the face of crises or emergencies within the region.

IGAD has also not been without weaknesses of its own. According to Bereketeab (2019, 140), the factors that contribute to its challenges include “its structure, dependence on external funding, the lack of capacity to achieve optimal results in relation to its stated goals, and Ethiopia’s dominance of the organisation” (also see chapters 9, 13, 14, and 15). He goes on to identify the structural problems facing IGAD, including how these adversely affect its “flexibility, performance and efficiency,” and the influence of donors, operating under the rubric of the IGAD Partners Forum (Italy, Canada, UK, the Netherlands, Norway, and the US), over the organisation. In his view, external involvement undermines IGAD’s autonomy and legitimacy, and like ECOWAS its capacity to embark on certain actions. Also like the case of ECOWAS, IGAD’s effectiveness is constrained by the lack of political will on the part of some political leaders. As Bereketeab (2019, 144) explains,

IGAD is only as strong as the leaders of a state allow it to be and can engage in peace mediation only where the member-states are willing. Evidence of this can be seen in the way Ethiopia blocked IGAD from engaging in the Eritrea–Ethiopia conflict.

Also, IGAD’s weaknesses have accounted for some of the inconsistencies and limited successes in mediation efforts in several countries of the region, including Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia (see Chapters 9, 10, 13, and 14).

While Ethiopia may be perceived as a hegemonic player in the IGAD region (and Uganda and Kenya to a lesser extent), the same cannot be said of Nigeria, which is ECOWAS’s largest donor, but which does not exert hegemonic influence over the regional organisation (Udo and Ekott 2013). Also while ECOWAS has been able to build a strong partnership with civil society organisations in setting up a sophisticated early warning system and election monitoring processes (see Chapters 4 and 5), “IGAD is perceived as a weak link with regard to civil society engagement and activities in an organised and institutionalised peacebuilding
process” (Bereketeab, 2019, 148). However, many analysts are of the view that, in spite of the relative successes of ECOWAS and IGAD in the area of peace and security – ECOWAS in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Cote d’Ivoire, and IGAD in Somalia and the Sudan–South Sudan War – both RECs seem to have achieved this at the expense of effective economic integration. However, it has also been observed that ECOWAS has during the same period developed a more sophisticated peace and security architecture, as well as stronger mechanisms and connections with civil society, while IGAD has yet to overcome external interventions, build strong mechanisms, and foster an effective level of participation by civil society in its peace and security institutions and processes. As the chapters of this volume aptly show, both organisations have a lot to learn about, and from, each other, and have great potential to expand the frontiers of peacebuilding in their respective regions.

Structure and organisation of the book

This book is structured in four parts. Part I focuses on the introductory overview and conceptual dimensions, legal and theoretical, of peacebuilding in West Africa and the Horn of Africa, and its relevance to the regional integration–peacebuilding nexus. It is followed by Part II, which explores ECOWAS’s evolving approach to regional peacebuilding in West Africa, particularly the shift from a state to a participatory, and people-centred, paradigm. In Part III, the chapters provide analyses of institutional approaches to ECOWAS peacebuilding, one exploring the role of a regional power, and the other exploring the role of international cooperation partners. In Part IV, which is the largest section of the book, there are case studies based on analyses of how ECOWAS–member state and IGAD–member state relations impact and shape peacebuilding, peace, and security in West Africa and the Horn of Africa, as well as the prospects for the future.

In Chapter 2, “RECs and peacebuilding in Africa: analysis of legal framework and concerns for international law,” Olugbemi Jaiyebo and Victor Adetula analyse the legal challenges that RECs face in expanding their original mandates beyond economic development to include peacebuilding roles. In this regard, the authors also interrogate “the legal impetus that supranationality gives the African Union and other RECs in furtherance of their peacebuilding mandate,” and show how “the existing legal infrastructure puts the RECs at an advantage over the UN and other external actors in the areas of right of access to the theatre of conflict, enforcement of ceasefire agreements, discipline, and oversight of international personnel.”

In Chapter 3, “Peacebuilding in Africa: popular–progressive versus neoliberal approaches,” Redie Bereketeab critiques the conceptual underpinnings of neoliberal peacebuilding, and makes a case for a progressive alternative. The chapter discusses neoliberal peacebuilding as an interventionist paradigm designed to rebuild post-conflict societies along the lines of liberal/modern societies based on the universalisation of Western values, norms, and models. It notes that neoliberal peacebuilding is “unsustainable and dysfunctional as it is an external imposition
and fails to cohere with specific realities of the particular society,” and calls for a more viable option that should ideally utilise “domestic resources and infrastructures such as cultural, social, historical, structural, institutional, indigenous, etc. authorities” of African societies. On this basis the chapter makes a case for progressive peacebuilding as an alternative to the imposition of interventionist neoliberal policies on Africa’s conflict-affected states.

In Chapter 4, “Towards a human security-centred approach to peacebuilding: ECOWAS’s experiences and lessons,” Remi Ajibewa and Jubril Agbolade Shittu provide an in-depth analysis of ECOWAS’s efforts to transition from a state-centred to a people-centred approach to regional peace and security. The chapter provides a clear explanation of the introduction of institutional, structural, and human security approaches to regional peacebuilding, consistent with the tenets of the ECOWAS Vision 2020, which was adopted in 2007, to transform the organisation from an “ECOWAS of States, to an ECOWAS of Peoples.” The authors engage with some of the challenges ECOWAS has faced in this regard and propose some solutions for addressing them. They conclude that these experiences and lessons, particularly those regarding its inclusion of civil society organisations in its agenda for human security and people-centred integration, should be shared with other African RECs.

Following this, Chapter 5, by Chukwuemeka Eze, “Civil society organisations and the ECOWAS Peace and Security Agenda: a case study of the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP),” is based on a case study of WANEP’s engagement and partnership with ECOWAS in the areas of people-centred conflict prevention, conflict management, and mediation. It unpacks the factors that drive civil society engagement with ECOWAS in West Africa. The chapter examines the ECOWAS–civil society partnership in the context of the successful realisation of ECOWAS’s Vision 2020 but notes that much work still needs to be done.

In Chapter 6, Amadu Sesay, writing on “ECOWAS and the limits of peace-making in West Africa,” provides a succinct analysis of the organisation in relation to “the significant progress in the areas of conflict prevention, management, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement in West Africa.” The chapter also provides a historical perspective on the evolution of ECOWAS, and notes that ECOWAS’s “venture into the realm of peacemaking and peace support operations is in many ways fortuitous,” and concludes that, while it turned out to be a “successful security community,” it “failed to promote economic development in the member-states.”

Chapter 7, “ECOWAS and triangular cooperation for peacebuilding in West Africa: challenges and prospects from the Liberian and Sierra Leonean experiences,” by Kehinde Olusola Olayode, provides critical insights into how the contributions of partnerships framed within a South–South triangular cooperation framework impacted peacebuilding in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The chapter examines the experiences (and prospects) of bilateral and multilateral partnerships for international peacebuilding support in West Africa, against a background of the overstretching of ECOWAS’s limited capacities and resources. Drawing on ECOWAS relations with the United Nations, the African Union, India, Brazil, and
the South Africa forum (IBSA), as well as other Western powers and non-Western emerging powers, the author unpacks the challenges facing South–South triangular cooperation with Liberia and Sierra Leone. While noting the bright prospects of triangular cooperation, a compelling case is made for better coordination by donor states and organisations. More fundamentally, the author proposes greater ownership, capacity, and control by ECOWAS member states over the region’s peacebuilding agenda.

Oshita A. Oshita and Warisu Oyesina Alli, in Chapter 8, “Nigeria’s role in the ECOWAS Peace and Security Agenda for West Africa,” explore Nigeria’s pivotal role in shaping the organisation’s role in promoting peace and security in West Africa. They examine Nigeria’s regional leadership credentials and how they played into its provision of the human and material resources necessary for ECOWAS’s peace interventions across the region. After reviewing Nigeria’s immense contributions to ECOWAS’s mediation peacekeeping, peace support operations, and peace and security architecture, they argue that, given the country’s economic challenges, the burden of mobilising human and material resources needs to be equitably shared among member states.

In Chapter 9, “The IGAD–Eritrea impasse: future prospects in light of recent developments,” Senai W. Andemariam explores the tensions underpinning Eritrea–IGAD–AU relations, and attributes these to Eritrea’s view that Ethiopia had used its dominance of IGAD to marginalise the country, hence the decision to suspend its membership of the organisation. Thus, while Eritrea was able to return to the AU in 2011, the same effort to reactivate its membership of IGAD was rebuffed, partly due to Ethiopia’s opposition. The author engages with Eritrea, making a case for economic integration as a step towards resolving the political issues preventing the reactivation of its membership of IGAD.

Chapter 10, by Nureldin Satti, “Lessons to be learned from IGAD’s involvement in the Sudan peace process (1993–2005),” critically examines the various aspects of IGAD’s mediation and peacemaking efforts in Sudan, and how this impacted the outcome of the peace process. It analyses the context within which IGAD mediation engaged the two conflicting sides, the government of Sudan and the South Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, as well as international partners, culminating in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The author unpacks the role of the various stakeholders which eventually contributed to the secession and independence of South Sudan in 2011. Drawing on lessons from IGAD’s involvement, he argues for minimising external influences “by ensuring the financial, technical and intellectual independence of IGAD.”

In Chapter 11, Kizito Sabala, writing on “Kenya’s diplomacy and international relations within the IGAD region on matters of peace and security: growth, development, and prospects,” focuses on the country’s contribution to IGAD’s peace and security agenda. The author addresses the evolution of Kenya’s engagement with IGAD in relation to peace and security, zeroing in on the conflict in Somalia, the Sudan–South Sudan War, the CPA followed by the independence of South Sudan, and the conflict that engulfed Africa’s youngest state. The chapter
concludes by examining the prospects of Kenya’s diplomacy noting its strategic interests in peacebuilding and stabilisation efforts in the IGAD region.

This is followed by Chapter 12, “Uganda and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD),” in which Kasaija Phillip Apuuli provides an in-depth analysis of Uganda–IGAD relations, with an emphasis on the latter’s peace and security programs. Of note is the attention paid to Uganda’s involvement in peace processes in Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan, and the IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning System (CEWARN). The chapter also provides explanations for IGAD’s non-intervention in conflicts in Uganda, the accumulated arrears of Uganda’s IGAD membership dues, as well as the country’s ambivalent relationship with Sudan and Ethiopia and its unilateral involvement in the war in South Sudan. This also suggests how divisions within IGAD member states weaken the organisation, and how Uganda’s membership of the East African Community may also undermine its commitment to IGAD.

In Chapter 13, “Peacebuilding in the context of Ethiopia–IGAD relations,” Kassahun Berhanu unpacks this complex relationship, particularly Ethiopia’s position as a pivotal state within the region, and how the perception of the state as a US ally has made it a target of terrorist and extremist groups in the region. The chapter argues that such perceptions have wider implications for regional peacebuilding efforts, particularly for those who question Ethiopia’s motives within the Horn. The author highlights some of Ethiopia’s contributions towards strengthening IGAD’s peacebuilding roles but notes the challenges that the Ethiopia–Eritrea rivalry pose for the organisation.

Mohammed Haji Ingiris, in Chapter 14, “The big elephant in the room: the meddling and machinations of IGAD and Ethiopia in Somalia,” interrogates what he describes as the “Ethiopianisation of IGAD.” The author unpacks the role of Ethiopia as a hegemonic regional actor in the Horn of Africa, and its “intrusion into Somali affairs,” using the politics of IGAD peacebuilding. He provides an overview of the changing relationship between Somalia and IGAD, and the evolution of Ethiopia’s influence over the latter during the various mediations, conflict management, peace operations, and peacebuilding processes in Somalia. In concluding, the author does not foreclose the possibility that the Somali people will someday regain control of the politics of nationhood and peacebuilding in their country.

Jacob D. Chol explores in Chapter 15, “‘You don’t own peace’: the coward state, South Sudan, and IGAD relations,” the relationship between IGAD and the government of South Sudan. The chapter provides an overview of IGAD’s mediation in the South Sudan conflict, including the complications arising from this, the weakness of the South Sudanese state, as well as the competing interests of neighbouring countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda. The author then explores ways for improving relations between IGAD and the government of South Sudan based on confidence and trust-building.

There is a consensus by all the contributors to this volume that although ECOWAS and IGAD have achieved some levels of success, both RECs have a lot to learn from each other in their quest to connect peace and security to their
regional integration projects. There is a concern in some circles that regional peace and security gains have eclipsed regional economic integration in Africa. The challenge, therefore, is to continue to strengthen existing regional peace and security mechanisms and processes, while equally prioritising the consolidation of regional economic integration by ECOWAS and IGAD in West Africa and the Horn of Africa. African RECs will for the foreseeable future play a key role in addressing the structural, economic, political, and institutional challenges that militate against peace and development in Africa. Addressing these challenges in West Africa and the Horn of Africa will require not just an “ECOWAS of the People” and “IGAD of the People,” but an “Africa of the People,” consistent with vision underpinning Agenda 2063.

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Introduction

The original mandates of African regional economic communities (RECs) were tilted towards economic objectives with less attention to peacebuilding. However, the hardcore purpose of the RECs could only be realised if the regions were peaceful and secure. Prevalence of violent conflicts in Africa, particularly since the end of the Cold War, as well as growing awareness about peace as a precondition for development, motivated African states to expand the mandates of the RECs to include responsibility for ensuring regional peace and security. Also, the changes and developments in the international system, such as the seeming retreat of the great powers from active involvement outside their immediate regions, played a crucial role. An apparent shift in the strategic interests of the global North away from Africa reinforced the necessity for African solutions to African problems.

RECs now function as part of the continent-wide peace and security architecture that is managed essentially by the African Union (AU) within the United Nations’ mandate to promote global peace and security. This function spans the entire peace process spectrum from conflict prevention to peacebuilding, pertaining to matters such as effective delivery of public goods to citizens and measures to achieve sustainable peace between parties in conflicts that ordinarily should be the responsibility of the state. Adherence to international law is a precondition for generating political and moral legitimacy. Consequently, the involvement of external actors in the domestic affairs of the conflict-affected countries requires definite legal frameworks and clear normative standards. What are the legal frameworks for the new roles of RECs, and what is the extent of compliance with international law? With a focus on the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), this chapter examines the legal frameworks through which the African Union and African RECs engage the complexities of peacebuilding. Additionally, the chapter demonstrates how the existing legal infrastructure puts the RECs at an advantage over the UN and other external actors in the areas of right of access to the theatre of conflict, enforcement of ceasefire agreements, discipline, and oversight of international personnel. The chapter concludes that the future of
peacebuilding in Africa depends on the transformation of Africans RECs into functional supranational institutions.

Frameworks for continental and regional interventions

When initially incorporated into the lexicon of international law, “peacebuilding” encapsulated actions supporting processes and structures that strengthen and consolidate peace to avoid a relapse into conflict (United Nations, 1992). Peacebuilding is closely associated with the purpose of the UN to maintain global peace, which prioritises conflict prevention (United Nations, 2015). Attempts to harmonise the UN peacebuilding components gave rise to the idea of a peacebuilding architecture for the UN. Eventually, the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was created by concurrent resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly to coordinate and reinforce the UN peacebuilding architecture.1

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is the AU’s primary mechanism for promoting peace and security. APSA has the mandate to promote and develop strong partnerships for peace and security with the AU, the United Nations, and other international organisations. Vital elements of APSA include the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), the Panel of the Wise (PoW), and the Peace Fund. The PSC serves as a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflicts and crises in Africa. Its mandate includes the development of policies and action required to ensure that any external initiative in the field of peace and security on the continent takes place within the framework of the Union’s objectives and priorities.

The PSC promulgated the African Union Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) to guide improvements in the timeliness, effectiveness, and coordination of activities in post-conflict countries, and to lay the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace. The PCRD is a product of wide consultation that involved all African RECs and their state members. It acknowledges the dependence of its successful implementation on the active engagement of regional groupings and their institutions and envisages regional guidelines for its implementation and regional focal points to support its processes.

The PCDR is a tool to: a) consolidate peace and prevent relapses into violence; b) address the root causes of conflict; c) encourage and fast-track the planning and implementation of reconstruction activities; and d) enhance complementarities and coordination between and among diverse actors engaged in PCDR processes.2 The end state of the PCDR is one where peace, law, and order prevail; the humanitarian situation has stabilised and populations are able to meet their basic needs; political mechanisms and institutions have been established to prevent and manage conflict through peaceful means and to institutionalise equitable participation in political and socioeconomic life; and access to justice is ensured and human rights are guaranteed.

Paragraph 4 (b) of the African Union’s PCDR states that the intervention process commences when the AU mechanisms, in line with the relevant provisions
of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, determine that a situation warrants attention, or when parties to a conflict have demonstrated the political will to resolve differences through political negotiation, or have ceased hostilities, or have signed a peace agreement. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union gave official recognition to eight sub-regional economic communities: the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the East African Community (EAC); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The peace and security infrastructure of the AU has continental application and each of the eight RECs has endeavoured to align the contents and provisions of their legal frameworks with the AU’s framework.4

The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) is the platform for peacebuilding in the ECOWAS region.5 The ECPF is a comprehensive operational conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategy that enables the ECOWAS system and member states to draw upon human and financial resources at the regional (including civil society and the private sector) and international levels in their efforts to creatively transform conflict.

(ECOWAS, 2008, Article 7)

It places primary responsibility for peace and security on ECOWAS member states (ECOWAS, 2008, Preamble). It comprises 14 components that span a chain of initiatives designed to strengthen human security and incorporate conflict prevention activities (operational and structural), as well as aspects of peacebuilding (ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, para. 42). The 14 components are early-warning; preventive diplomacy; democracy and political governance; human rights and the rule of law; media; natural resource governance; cross-border initiatives; security governance; practical disarmament; women, peace, and security; youth empowerment; the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF); humanitarian assistance; and peace education (the Culture of Peace).6

ECOWAS has embarked on several peace initiatives since the ECPF came into effect, without any reference to the application or implementation of the framework. For example, ECOWAS recognises that the increasing incidence of clashes between farmers and pastoralists, rural banditry, electoral violence, and ethnic and religious violence in Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, and Mali are matters of urgent concern that require preventive interventions (ECOWAS, 2016). However, there is no record or at best very little evidence of ECOWAS’s involvement at the level of mediation or active negotiation or physical deployment, for instance, in conflicts in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region, northern Ghana, the Tuareg uprising in Niger, or the separatist agitations in the Casamance region in Senegal. These problem areas are rationalised as internal affairs of member
RECs and peacebuilding in Africa

states, thereby revealing the weak commitment of ECOWAS member states to the normative elements of human security enshrined in the ECPF (Ismail, 2011).

The supranational status of ECOWAS integrates the ECPF into the laws of ECOWAS member states and therefore has the potential to resolve the contradictions inherent in the interface of peacebuilding and sovereignty. The ECPF incorporates the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security (1999), and the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001). “Without prejudice to other regional and international legal instruments, the Mechanism and the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance provide the principal basis and justification for the ECPF” (ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, paras 36–39).

Article 53 of the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security abrogated incompatible provisions of the 1981 ECOWAS Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance in Defence and the 1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression. The ECPF resolved, at least theoretically, the contention between regime security and human security in favour of the latter, thereby negating the propositions that the defence and military protocols were mere “regime protection” strategies to serve the interests of ECOWAS leaders and “insure” them against external and internal security threats (Francis, 2009).

ECOWAS is imbued with the necessary supranational powers (acting on behalf of and in conjunction with member states, the AU, and the UN), as well as the legitimacy to intervene to protect human security in three distinct ways, namely:

a. The Responsibility to prevent – actions taken to address the direct and root causes of conflicts that put populations at risk.

b. The Responsibility to react – actions taken in response to grave and compelling humanitarian disasters.

c. The Responsibility to rebuild – actions taken to ensure recovery, reconstruction, rehabilitation, and reconciliation in the aftermath of violent conflicts, humanitarian or natural disasters.

(ECOWAS, 2008)

In their search for a mandate and legitimacy to intervene to protect human security, the drafters of the ECPF took refuge in “moral obligations” that are “beyond legal instruments and guidelines.” The regulation should have equipped the moral imperatives with legality and transitioned morality to law. Predicating the mandate and legitimacy on morals rather than law undermines the very legitimacy the ECPF seeks to establish. ECOWAS’s ability to generate consensus on its moral imperatives would have added momentum to the process of recognising Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as a legal duty of member states in the West African sub-region. R2P adjusts state sovereignty by declaring that for a state’s sovereignty to be respected, the state must demonstrate responsibility to its citizens. A logical consequence is that interpretations of laws of occupation must be revised. On one hand, international law continues to presume the
inappropriateness in all circumstances of coercive use of force to effect political change in another state; while on the other, there is evidence that where the use of force does occur, there is an emerging obligation to intervene and contribute to reconstruction (Arcila, 2007).

IGAD has the primary task of coordinating efforts to address regional resource issues. It was formed in 1996 to replace the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). Its membership consists of six countries: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda. In Article 6A of the “Agreement Establishing the Intergovernmental Authority on Development” (IGAD Agreement), there is a solemn reaffirmation of the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, the peaceful settlement of inter-and intra-state conflicts through dialogue, and maintenance of regional peace, stability, and security. The principles in Article 6 of the IGAD Agreement are patterned after the OAU model in vogue during the Cold War era. The IGAD principles of non-interference and resolution of inter- and intra-state conflicts only through dialogue stand in conflict with the AU Constitutive Act which is designed to meet contemporary challenges of peace and security on the African continent. The Horn of Africa is bedevilled by serious inter- and intrastate conflicts. The IGAD Secretariat established a peace and security division and, in 2003, the IGAD Heads of State tasked the Secretariat with developing a comprehensive peace and security strategy.

In April 2005, IGAD adopted the memorandum of understanding and budget for the establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG). IGAD is confronted with the problem of lack of funding. None of the member states is rich enough to provide support in the way that Nigeria supported the operations of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Hence, the accomplishments of IGAD have been marginal compared with either the ECOWAS or the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Notwithstanding its challenges, IGAD has been engaged in complex reconciliation work in the region and cooperates closely with APSA.

The SADC’s security infrastructure is provided for in the Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security. The Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) provides a framework for defence cooperation and lays a foundation for establishing a security community. In response to the African Union’s efforts to establish an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the SADC has established a standby brigade (SADCBRIG) with policing (SADCPOL) and civilian components. The SADCBRIG is designed with capabilities to rapidly undertake the following types of operations: observation missions, peacekeeping and peacebuilding including complex multidimensional peace operations, peace enforcement, robust peace support operations, and humanitarian interventions in grave circumstances. The brigade was formally launched, and troop requirements have been met, and they have agreed on a common peace support doctrine. A permanent planning element (PLANELM) has been established at the SADC Secretariat for coordination purposes with a Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) (Malebang, 2012).
The strengthening of peace, security, stability, and good governance is specified in the aims and objectives of COMESA. In 1999, COMESA Authority mandated its Ministers of Foreign Affairs to meet annually to deliberate on matters regarding the promotion of peace, security, and stability in the regional economic community (May 1999 Fourth Summit). The Union of the Arab Maghreb (AMU) had no explicit mandate on peace and security in its Constitutive Treaty, but the objectives of the treaty include ensuring regional stability and enhancing policy coordination. In 2012 member states began developing strategies to combat terrorism and organised crime, and to enhance cooperation in the region (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2013). To date, the AMU has not engaged in substantive conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities. While the goal of CEN-SAD is the creation of an open market and an area of freedom and solidarity, it has also instituted the Mechanism for Prevention, Management, and Resolution of the Conflicts (CENSAD Report, 2011).

In January 2012, the EAC adopted the Protocol on Peace and Security as well as the EAC Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution Mechanism. The EAC Peace and Security Protocol identified over 20 objectives for fostering regional peace and security, including combating terrorism and piracy; peace support operations; prevention of genocide; disaster management and crisis response; management of refugees; control of proliferation of small arms and light weapons; and combating transnational and cross-border crimes. The EAC Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution Mechanism also includes initiatives for the prevention of conflicts where early-warning systems are an integral part of the peace and security workings of EAC. The EAC infrastructure has yet to be tested.


Of the 54 member states of the AU, 30 belong to two of the eight AU-recognised RECs, ten are parties to three RECs, and 14 have obligations to only one of the eight AU-recognised RECs. Membership of multiple RECs was an initial hindrance to the attainment of peace on the continent. ECCAS, for example, is formed by states that are also members of the SADC, EAC, COMESA, and CEN-SAD. Over time, however, there has been increasing collaboration between RECs and the AU and between RECs within and across regions. In July 2008, the Multinational Force in the Central African Republic (established by CEMAC in 2002 to promote peace and security in the conflict-inflicted Central African
Republic) was transferred to ECCAS, a parallel organisation within the region, and made a part of COPAX (Meyer, 2015). The General Secretariat of CEN-SAD has cooperation agreements with COMESA and ECOWAS on security, among other issues. The CEN-SAD Secretariat General and ECOWAS Commission are expected to invite each other, as observers, to their meetings (CENSAD Report, 2011). EAC, IGAD, COMESA, the European Union, and the Indian Ocean Commission established a regional action plan against piracy to ensure regional maritime security (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2013). The AU recognises RECs as official representatives of regional associations of African states that have increasingly taken up prominent roles in conflict resolution and peace support operations. Admittedly, African RECs have different degrees of engagement and success in the peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes. The deepening economic and social crises in many African countries, as well as the frequency, intractability, and spill-over effects of violent conflicts, place massive moral obligations on the RECs to act. In the not-too-distant future, these developments might stimulate the emergence of new African international law.

Humanitarian intervention as a legal framework and a political tool used by the international community is still a controversial issue in world politics and has been criticised as a new form of imperialism by the global North to exploit the global South (Halistoprak, 2015). The principle of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states is central to the UN; how will it be reconciled with the exigencies of the principle of R2P as enshrined in the ECOWAS and AU conflict management frameworks? The differences in the approaches to the principle of R2P adopted by these organisations could generate problems when logistics and resource constraints demand a handover by ECOWAS and/or the AU to the UN.

Coordination among RECs, the AU, and the UN

A review of the legal instruments of the UN, the AU, and RECs shows the possibilities of coordination and cooperation on peacebuilding. In 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/61/296 on cooperation between the UN and the AU, requesting the UN system to intensify its assistance to the AU, especially in terms of putting into operation its PSC. The UN seconded a staff member to provide support for the AU’s Panel of the Wise. Since 2008, the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission have progressively enhanced interaction with regular consultative meetings. On 1 July 2010, the General Assembly consolidated and upgraded UN’s interface with the AU by creating the UN Office to the AU, headed by an Assistant Secretary-General. The office was formally inaugurated on 22 February 2011 and integrated the peace and security presences in Addis Ababa: the UN Liaison Office, the AU Peace and Support Team, the UN Planning Team for AMISOM, and the administrative functions of the Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism of the AU–UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (Security Council Report, 2011). These culminated in the 2017 Joint UN–AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security. The partnership between the UN Secretariat and AU Commission is underpinned by institutional
mechanisms such as the Joint Task Force on Peace and Security, the UN–AU Annual Conference, the AU Permanent Observer Mission to the UN, and the UN Office to the AU. There is, on the one hand, the cordial working relationship between the UN Secretary-General and AU Commission Chairperson and, on the other hand, functional day-to-day working relationships between special envoys, focal points, and other staff. Cooperation on mediation is particularly advanced, and relationships on electoral support and the “Silencing the Guns” initiative are growing, but the partnership is weakest on peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction (Forti and Singh, 2019).

The founding document of the PBC envisaged a role for regional and sub-regional organisations in the work of the commission and anticipated that the PBC would serve as a vehicle to develop REC capacity in peacebuilding processes. The PBC is engaged in six IGAD and ECOWAS member states: Sierra Leone, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, the Central African Republic, and Guinea, with Sierra Leone and Burundi being the first two PBC focus countries. The experience has been that the approach to peacebuilding continues to be compartmentalised and the first decade of the PBC’s existence has made minimal contributions to the peacebuilding capabilities of the regional and sub-regional organisations of the focus countries.

Effective global–regional partnership is possible through increased consultation, cooperation, and collaboration but the dominant actors must change their orientations and become more supportive of a regionalist approach in the pursuit of international security and peace (Adetula, 2015). The UN Security Council (UNSC) and the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) relationship has been quite dynamic to say the least. The case of Côte d’Ivoire was revealing in some respects. African states were generally uncomfortable with the way UN and French forces carried out the military operations that resulted in the arrest of President Laurent Gbagbo. Both the chair of the AU and Thabo Mbeki, former President of South Africa and AU mediator for Côte d’Ivoire, declared the military intervention as unjustified. For Mbeki, what happened in Côte d’Ivoire was simply “the UN entrenching former colonial powers on our continent” (Mbeki, 2011). UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon defended the UN intervention, claiming that the forces acted strictly within the framework of the responsibility to protect (R2P), based on UNSC Resolution 1975 of 30 March 2011 (Schori, 2015).

The case of Libya demonstrated how a lack of consultation could hamper the development and consolidation of a global–regional partnership on peace. The UN and AU had different perceptions and interpretations of the issues involved in the conflict, and made no effort to coordinate their conflict-resolution strategies. Ultimately, the AU felt deliberately side-lined and this was interpreted as a conspiracy to ignore African efforts to resolve the conflict. The response to the military coup in Guinea-Bissau also pitched the AU, European Union (EU), and the UN against ECOWAS, whose mediation resulted in the setting up of a transitional government that the other organisations would not recognise (Adetula, 2015). The indications are that the AU wants to be recognised as the leading regional organ for collective security in Africa. This may bring the AU into a confrontation with
the UN Security Council, which does not appear prepared to cede its mandate of maintaining global peace and security to regional organisations (Bam, 2012, 8). Additionally, the UN’s post-conflict peacekeeping approach, which requires a ceasefire agreement and prior consent of parties to the conflict, does not lend itself easily to the realities of African conflicts, as was experienced in Rwanda, Darfur, and Somalia (Adetula, 2015). Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act gives the AU the right to intervene in a member state according to “a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” These provisions give the AU a right of access to theatres of conflict that other external actors do not have. The AU is also uniquely enabled to implement strategies for the prevention of violent conflicts. It is a radical departure from the principle of non-interference embodied in the United Nations Charter.

Other areas of growing tension that may impact continuous cooperation between African countries and the UN system include the unrepresentativeness of the UN Security Council and the misuse of prosecutorial discretion at the International Criminal Court (ICC). Further to UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 1593 (2005) and 1970 (2011), arrest warrants were issued for Omar Al Bashir, Sudan’s Head of State, in 2009 for war crimes and crimes against humanity and in 2010 for genocide, and Muammar Gaddafi, the Head of State of Libya, in 2011 for crimes against humanity. The AU passed a resolution of non-cooperation with respect to the arrest warrants. The ICC filed findings of non-compliance against the African states that received the Heads of States. In rejecting the ICC’s findings of non-compliance, the AU reaffirmed that by receiving President Bashir, the Republic of Chad, Kenya, and Djibouti were discharging their obligations under Article 23 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union and Article 98 of the Rome Statute as well as acting in pursuit of peace and stability in their respective regions (African Union, 2011). The tipping point was when the prosecutor filed charges against the President and Vice President of Kenya. The AU condemned the move and fiercely asserted immunity for all serving Heads of State on the continent (African Union, 2013).

African leaders have sought to address some of the asymmetries in UN–Africa relations by demanding for the reform of the security council by making it more representative of all regions of the world. However, the resistance of the permanent members of the Security Council to demands for the restructuring exemplifies the desire for the preservation of the status quo by the P5 that dominates the UNSC, and by extension the architecture of global security (Adetula, 2015). It should, however, be acknowledged that concerted continuous efforts have been made to streamline and enhance the effectiveness of international peacebuilding processes.

**Conclusion and lessons learned**

Regional economic communities, particularly the AU, have been increasingly involved with the maintenance of international peace and security. This represents
a renewed commitment of African states to the regionalist approach to peace and security. However, while the dominant international relations discourse in the post-Cold War era acknowledges complex interdependence as one of the defining characteristics of the global system and tends to favour the regionalist approach in the management of inter-state relations, states are still generally protective of their sovereignty despite the overwhelming impact of globalisation processes (Jaiyebo and Adetula, 2013).

African regional organisations have made appreciable progress in ensuring peace and security in Africa. In 2017, African continental and regional organisations deployed seven multilateral peace operations on the continent (SIPRI, 2018, 107). Each of these operations had its own success stories and challenges. Some of the main lessons include the need to strengthen the legal and institutional frameworks for regional collective peace and security systems, clarify roles, and guide the harmonisation of existing strategies and programmes. International regulations, such as the requirement of a formal invitation in the case of the United Nations and the rule of engagement that peace troops must remain neutral and only exercise a minimum of violence, limit the effectiveness of multilateral peace operations and need to be reviewed.

The interface of sovereignty with peacebuilding interventions by external actors is a slippery terrain. Peacekeepers and other personnel deployed to provide essential services in the conflict zones sometimes have to relate to the population in much the same way that governmental actors do within a country. This becomes a critical consideration with transitional administration, where the international operation acts as a state (Zwanenburg, 2004). With governmental functions upheld only with the assistance of external actors, pragmatism drives questions of sovereignty to the rear. The government is in a state of extreme vulnerability and the only restraint on external actors is their sense of self-restraint. The vital question of how to ensure accountability at all levels must be attended to.

There is considerable clarity in international law on the responsibility of the state for its actions, for the actions of organs acting on its behalf, including international organisations, and for the actions of organs of other states placed at its disposal. Article 6 of the International Law Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility (Draft Articles) provides that the conduct of an organ placed at the disposal of a state by another state shall be considered an act of the former under international law if the organ is acting in the exercise of elements of the governmental authority of the state at whose disposal it is placed. Article 7 of the Draft Articles states that the conduct of an organ of a state or of a person or entity empowered to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the state under international law if the organ, person, or entity acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions. Within the context of peacebuilding, the host state bears residual responsibility for the actions of the entire peacebuilding team. For the avoidance of all doubts, Article 8 of the Draft Articles states that the conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a state under international law if the person or group of persons is acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control
of, that state in carrying out the conduct. The direct responsibility of international organisations in international law is in its formative stages. The Drafting Committee of the International Law Commission has considered Draft Articles on Responsibility of International organisations. See UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.632 of 4 June 2003.\textsuperscript{13}

The responsibilities of private companies and consultants for illegal acts committed in the course of peacebuilding are also becoming clearer. Unlike international responsibility, which is legal, the accountability of international organisations can present itself in different forms: legal, political, administrative, or financial (Zwanenburg, 2004). The accountability of international organisations is said to comprise three interrelated and mutually supportive components: (i) the extent to which international organisations, in the fulfillment of their responsibilities as established in their constituent instruments, are and should be subject to or exercise forms of internal and external scrutiny and monitoring, irrespective of potential and subsequent liability and responsibility; (ii) tortious liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts or omissions not involving a breach of any rule or norm of international and institutional law (e.g., environmental damage as a result of lawful nuclear or space activities); and (iii) responsibility arising out of acts or omissions which constitute a breach of a rule or norm of international and institutional law (International Law Association, 1998). Since the 1965 agreement between the United Nations and Belgium relating to the settlement of claims filed against the United Nations in the Congo by Belgian nationals,\textsuperscript{14} the United Nations has developed protocols for when and how claims can be made against it for wrongs committed in the course of its mission.\textsuperscript{15}

The AU under APSA has the mandate to “develop policies and action required to ensure that any external initiative in the field of peace and security on the continent takes place within the framework of AU’s objectives and priorities.” The critical point to note is the supranational legal implication of these policies. In terms of effective oversight and discipline of peacebuilding personnel, the policies will affect the national law of the host state that is enforceable within the legal system of the host state or the community legal framework. The international mechanisms and protocols regulating the liabilities of continental and regional organisations in peacebuilding on the African continent have barely been tested.

Closely related is the involvement of civil society in peacebuilding activities. The African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (Arusha Declaration) characterises Africa as having an “over-centralisation of power and impediments to the effective participation of the overwhelming majority [in decisions regarding] social, political, and economic development” and calls for “the full and effective participation of the people in charting their development policies, programs, and processes” (UNECA, 2016b). Both AU and ECOWAS peace and security infrastructure make liberal accommodation for civil society organisations. Article 20 of the PSC protocol gives a broad role to civil society in supporting the work of the PSC. Civil society organisations accredited to the AU’s Economic Social and Cultural Commission can submit
reports to the PSC via the AU Commission, provide information to AU field missions, and address the PSC on invitation. Civil society involvement helps to bring a broad range of social and political interests to the negotiating table, making the process more inclusive and participatory. However, if governance above the level of the nation-state is to be legitimate in a democratic era, mechanisms for appropriate accountability need to be institutionalised (Grant and Keohane, 2005).

Other challenges include the lack of adequate resources. Peace operations are costly, and the AU and RECs lack adequate financial resources for effective interventions. In the case of the AU, there are three sources of funding generally: ordinary budget funds, voluntary contributions from member states, and other sources, notably support from international donors and partners. Operationalising APSA has mainly been dependent on partner support. This has severe implications for sustainability, predictability, and flexibility. The AU budget faces arrears in contributions. In the past, rich and powerful countries, notably Algeria, Angola, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa, contributed a significant proportion of the AU budget.

Dependence on external funding for peacebuilding interventions by the AU and RECs may compromise the integrity, legitimacy, and ownership of the peacebuilding processes. In 2012, the AU Commission chairperson, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, pushed for a more self-sufficient AU to end the dependence on external funding. The proposed recommendations by the AU Reform Committee, which include the establishment of the jointly financed peace fund and reform in the areas of AU administration, infrastructures, and logistics, represent positive developments.

Peace and security are inextricably linked to development. The slogan “African solutions to African problems” should be applied to financing peacebuilding initiatives from within the continent. The legal frameworks favour African RECs as first responders to trouble spots on the continent but the resources to actualise the lofty ideals must be readily available.

Notes

1 Article 7(b) of S/RES/1645 (20 December 2005), and Article 7(b) of A/RES/60/180 (30 December 2005) provide for the participation of regional and sub-regional organisations in the PBC.


3 See Assembly/AU/Dec.112 (VII) Doc. EX.CL/278 (IX)

4 For example, the ECCAS protocol establishing COPAX was formally ratified in January 2004 to include defense and security mechanisms aligned with the African Union’s Peace and Security Architecture. Also the ECOWAS ECPF is consistent with the AU’s Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development.

5 ECOWAS Regulation MSC/REG.1/01/08.

6 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, para. 42. The 14 components are: early-warning; preventive diplomacy; democracy and political governance; human rights and the rule of law; media; natural resource governance; cross-border initiatives; security governance; practical disarmament; women, peace, and security; youth empowerment;
the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF); humanitarian assistance; and peace education (the Culture of Peace).

7 Preamble to the Agreement Establishing the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (1986).
8 Article 3(d) of the treaty establishing COMESA.
9 Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Kingdom of Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
10 Angola, Burundi, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda.
11 Algeria, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, the Kingdom of Lesotho, Liberia, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, and South Africa.
12 Article 4(1) of the International Law Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility states that the conduct of any state organ shall be considered an act of that state under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial, or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organisation of the state, and whatever its character as an organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of the state. Article 6 provides that the conduct of an organ placed at the disposal of a state by another state shall be considered an act of the former under international law if the organ is acting in the exercise of elements of the governmental authority of the state at whose disposal it is placed.
14 Agreement between the United Nations and Belgium relating to the settlement of claims filed against the United Nations in the Congo by Belgian nationals of 20 February 1965, 535 UNTS 199.

References


3 Peacebuilding in Africa

Popular progressive versus neoliberal peacebuilding

Redie Bereketeab

Introduction

This chapter examines two approaches to the theoretical framing of peacebuilding and its implications for Africa. The first is short-term peacebuilding that follows a war. The second is long-term peacebuilding that relates to the gradual construction of the socio-economic and political institutions of societies. Drawing from critical analysis, this chapter makes a case for progressive peacebuilding as an alternative to the neoliberal peacebuilding dominant in Africa. It examines the two strands of peacebuilding: popular progressive and neoliberal. Popular progressive peacebuilding is historical, contemporary, and futuristic. In this trajectory and evolution there exists a continuous time horizon of connecting the past, present, and future. Peacebuilding as a theoretical and empirical notion has assumed growing prominence following the collapse of the Cold War (Curtis and Gwinyayi, 2012; Call and Wyeth, 2008; Harrison, 2010). The reason for the growing prominence of peacebuilding is related to the rise of the neoliberal interventionist ideology that replaced Cold War order (Harrison 2010). Neoliberal triumphalist disposition embarked on a proselytising mission of humanity along neoliberal values and norms. Western values and norms were elevated to universal ones that every member of humanity should strive for (Tom 2017). This proselytisation propelled an aggressive, interventionist approach to peacebuilding. Peacebuilding not in tune with neoliberal ideology was perceived not only as untenable but also as a danger to world peace (Zaum, 2012, 47; Hutchful, 2012, 81).

Peacebuilding intervention offered an excellent opportunity to convert societies under stress into liberal societies geared along a Western model. Referring to this, Roland Paris (2002, 638) notes, “Without exception, peacebuilding missions in the post-Cold War period have attempted to ‘transplant’ the values and institutions of the liberal democratic core into the domestic affairs of peripheral host states.” He also designates it “mission civilisatrice,” reminiscent of the European imperial powers’ duty to civilise dependent populations. Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South Sudan are cases of the neoliberal peacebuilding and statebuilding intervention (Paffenholz, 2015; Tom, 2017; Call and Vanessa, 2008; Nhema and Zeleza, 2008). The source of the ensuing problems in these countries
was considered to be that their dose of “universal” values and norms was too low. The remedy for the dysfunctionality of fragile societies was an international intervention with the intention of restructuring and rebuilding post-conflict countries along the lines of neoliberal values and norms.

Critics argue that neoliberal peacebuilding is unsustainable and dysfunctional as it is an external imposition and fails to cohere with the specific social, cultural, historical, economic, political, and ethnic realities of the particular society (Harrison, 2010; Paffenholz, 2015; Mac Ginty, 2011; Lederach, 1997). Functional and sustainable peacebuilding rests on the culture, history, social and political structures, and forces of the respective society (Tom, 2017). It should draw on proven domestic institutions, mechanisms, and authorities (Richmond, 2011).

This chapter consists of seven sections. The following section provides an overview of peacebuilding. Section three analyses neoliberal peacebuilding. Section four discusses popular progressive peacebuilding. Section five analyses state emancipation and societal pacification. Section six discusses state-building and peacebuilding drawing upon some African cases. Finally, section seven provides concluding thoughts about how to deepen sustainable peacebuilding in Africa.

**Peacebuilding: a broad overview**

Peacebuilding is perennial and gradual. It is intimately and dialectically connected with culture, history, socio-economics, structures, institutions, traditions, the authority of the particular society, and moral and ethical imperatives. It is about integration, cohesion, and developing commonalities and peaceful coexistence within a limited territory under the umbrella of a common state. Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined peacebuilding as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict” (quoted in Barnet, 2006, 87).³ Four theoretical conceptualisations of peacebuilding run through the mainstream literature: (i) structural violence theory, (ii) transformation relationship theory, (iii) protracted social conflict theory, and (iv) relationship-building (conflict resolution) theory (Paffenholz, 2015, 859). Peacebuilding is often defined as “efforts at national, local, or international levels to consolidate peace in war-torn societies” (Call, 2008, 6). Ultimately, durable peacebuilding concerns the development of the will to live together based on shared overarching values, interests, emotions, cognitions, goals, and expectations, as well as mutual acceptance, cooperative interaction, common security, complementarity, and the institutionalisation of mechanisms for problem-solving (Gawerc, 2006, 442). In other words, it concerns the protracted process and project of state- and nation-building (Mazrui and Wiafe-Amoako, 2016; Zaum, 2012).

Post-Cold War and post-conflict neoliberal interventionist peacebuilding on the other hand attempts to shape and reshape African societies along the Western model of societal formation. This neoliberal conception, instead of bringing peace, however, produced more conflicts and instabilities (Steinberg, 2012; Harrison, 2010; Call and Wyeth, 2008; Call, 2008; Tom, 2017). The reason why
rebuilding post-conflict African societies along liberal/neoliberal models and formations failed is because these models disconnect societies from their historical and social foundations. Similar to how uprooted trees with exposed roots face difficulties to grow again, post-conflict societies disconnected from their foundations find it difficult to build peace and stability. In this context, connecting to one’s roots is a *sine qua non* for peace, stability, and development (Mazrui and Wiafe-Amoako, 2016). Therefore, the proposition is to seek alternative models based on the idiosyncratic specificities of societies in Africa as a prerequisite to durable peacebuilding. This might sound anachronistic in the era of globalisation. Note should be taken, however, that “globalization is increasingly becoming more synonymous with re-colonisation” (Shittu, 2015, 44).

Peacebuilding is more than the absence of war, known as negative peace (Oda, 2007; Gawerc, 2006). Positive peacebuilding is concerned with multidimensional non-war-related social issues such as provision of services, equitable distribution of resources, development, building ethnic relations, and poverty alleviation. The rights to education and health, mutual respect, and recognition are other dimensions of positive peacebuilding (Curtis, 2012; Maiese, 2003). Positive peace is a step further than negative peace; that is, if negative peace constitutes the necessary conditions, positive peace constitutes the sufficient conditions for functional and sustainable peace and peacebuilding.

The Westphalian order with its basic tenets of respect of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference brought relative peace and stability in the state world system (Watson, 1990; Osiander, 2001; Teschke, 2002). The post-Cold War order that disrupted the Westphalian order, on the other hand, spurred uncertainty, disorder, inequality, social rupture, conflicts, and wars as evidenced in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia (Cordesman, 2016; Held and Urlichsen, 2011). In the post-Cold War and post-Westphalian eras state sovereignty, non-interference, and territorial integrity were (and are) presumed to be eroded. Hence, “there are indications of a gradual shift away from horizontal, and thus intergovernmental or Westphalian, to a more vertical, and thus supranational or post-Westphalian, structure of the global order” (Kreuder-Sonnen and Zangl, 2014, 570; Tuluianu, 2013). This order-induced Western hegemony has so far proven to be a recipe for intrusion, conflicts, wars, and instability. The defining characteristics of the new world order have become rather chaotic, induced by disequilibrium in global humanity as a result of domination by certain sections of that global humanity as defined by mono-polarity (Harrison, 2010).

Profound and sustainable peacebuilding requires going beyond administrative, technical, and legal subscriptions; and endorsing the basic sociological dimension of societal construction of state- and nation-building in Africa. It is through evolutionary (without subscribing to unilinearity) protracted societal formation that durable and genuine peacebuilding can be achieved. It is also certain that this profound societal construction could not be undertaken by external intervention. Africa is in need of genuine domestic nation and state construction that ensures enduring peace and peacebuilding.
Neoliberal peacebuilding

The literature of peacebuilding connects peacebuilding with liberal and democratic values (Call and Wyeth, 2008; Call, 2008). Two core values of liberal democracy are liberal formal elections and a market economy (Paris, 2002). A growing body of evidence testifies that neoliberal peacebuilding is not working (Richmond, 2006; Barnet, 2006; Paris, 1997; Jarstad and Belloni, 2012; Tom, 2017), particularly in Africa. Neoliberal peacebuilding rests on premises of reconstructing war-damaged societies of non-Western societies along the lines of a Western model (Harrison, 2010; Newman, Paris, and Richmond, 2009; Tom, 2017). The spread of neoliberal values and norms in the post-Cold War world is the main preoccupation of Western powers. The sociological concepts of socialisation, internationalisation, and externalisation, as an epistemological frame, may help to depict the universalisation process (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Appelrouth and Edles, 2008; Easa and Fincham, 2012). Socialisation refers to the “in-learning” process of socially accepted and established knowledge, information, norms, values, and praxis; while internalisation relates to the internal assimilation of the “learned-in”. This pertains to the “I, me” distinction. Externalisation, on the other hand, relates to bringing out what has been internalised. The latter refers to the objectification of the subjective, inter-subjectivity. Once it is externalised or objectified, it assumes universality whereby no singular person or society could claim ownership. At a global systemic level, this socialisation works in the same vein as at a social–psychological level, through operations of learning, internalising, and externalising Western values and norms so that they become global or universal values and norms.

This is translated into what is today commonly known as liberal peacebuilding. Roland Paris (1997, 56) notes that it

is in effect an enormous experiment in social engineering – an experiment that involves transplanting Western models of social, political, and economic organisation into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflicts: in other words, pacification through political and economic liberalisation.

He further notes:

To the extent that peacebuilding agencies transmit such ideas [about what a state should look like and how it should act] from the core to the periphery of the international system, these agencies are, in effect, involved in an effort to remake parts of the periphery in the image of the core.

(Paris, 2002, 639)

International organisations including the UN, INGOs, NGOs, donors, the WB, and the IMF are agents engaged in the transmission and diffusion of neoliberal values and norms (Chandler, 2013, 19). They are part of what is called the liberal NGO peacebuilding enterprise (Paffenholz, 2015, 860) who mediate neoliberal ideology through training, capacity-building, toolbox blueprints, and advising
local and international peacebuilding practitioners. Post-conflict constitution is drafted by Western experts and usually contains concepts such as free and fair elections, civil liberties, judicial independence and due process, etc. and is later endorsed by national legislation (Paris, 2002, 644). Accordingly, the restructuring and reconfiguration of the state takes place. Local peacebuilders are to be socialised in these neoliberal norms and values, and to ultimately internalise them as universal values and norms.

In short, the successful processing of the trinity – socialisation, internalisation, and externalisation – eventually produces universality. Once the processing is complete, it assumes the status of “taken for granted” whereby no one will be able to question it. It is considered sacrosanct and questioning it is tantamount of committing a sacrilegious act. Neoliberalism, since the end of the Cold War, has been engaged in a systematic and concerted universalisation, through peaceful and coercive means, of Western norms and values, making them uncontested, universal epistemic bodies (Tom, 2017). The effort is not only limited to theoretical or ideological dissemination, but also to practical operation through, for instance, structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and in some cases military invasions that aim to limit the state (Barnet, 2006, 89), or to bring regime change using and supporting centrifugal forces (Chetaïl and Jutersonke, 2015, 7).

The pervasiveness of the neoliberal ideology in the post-Cold War era has led some to talk about neoliberal revolution (Harrison, 2010). The connotation of revolution is intended to express the profound change it seeks to bring about, as Harrison notes:

This is the essence of social engineering: neoliberal intervention aims to destabilise existing habits (expressed within neoliberal discourse as a hostility to bureaucracy and a desire for good governance, for example) and to produce notions of conduct based on efficiency, transparency and utility.

(Harrison, 2010, 75)

The peacebuilding project as prescribed by liberalism is expected to promote market economy and electoral multiparty democracy. The year 1990 was a watershed moment in the triumphant neoliberal discourse. Liberal discourse was replaced by aggressive neoliberal discourse. This aggressive discourse picked up momentum and currency following the September 11 attack on the United States (Harrison, 2010; Barnet, 2006, 87). Some also call the aggressive interventionist venture a “post-modern imperialist scheme” (Henderson, 2015, 256–257).

Post-Cold War peacebuilding was based on neoliberal democracy and market economy norms and values. Now a range of non-state actors – IOs, NGOs, CS, opposition, etc. (Newman, Paris, and Richmond, 2009, 7; Barnet, 2006) – have been mandated to play active roles in neoliberal peacebuilding. This is so because the state is not to be trusted (Tom, 2017, 66). A concerted assault against the state was therefore unleashed, and concepts such as predator state, criminal state, patrimonial state, etc. were popularised (cf. Hyden, 2013; Englebert, 2000; Herbest, 2000; Bratton and de Walle, 1997; Chabal and Daloz, 1999). Some of
the characteristic features of neoliberal peacebuilding are formalist, technical, and administrative by nature (Chandler, 2013). As formalist, it is grounded on predetermined and imported premises. It usually includes in its shopping lists actions such as reforming the security forces, police, intelligence, and army, while demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegreation (DDR) are also prominent (Conteh-Morgan, 2004; Curtis and Dzinesa, 2012; Barnet, 2006). This reformist approach focuses on technical and temporary post-conflict solutions. It neglects the profound political nature of conflicts and the concomitant peacebuilding. Emphasising this, Thania Paffenholz (2015, 861) notes “International liberal peacebuilding becomes an inherently conservative undertaking, which seeks managerial solutions to fundamental conflicts over resources and power.” Admitting the political nature of conflict and peacebuilding would mean seeking political and enduring measures as solutions instead of technical and temporary ones, as well as indulging in the root causes of the conflicts. A peacebuilding that follows peace agreements is constrained by the need to consolidate and institutionalise the deal, even if it is deficient in certain aspects. In addition, overdependence on external experts that devalue indigenous knowledge, experts, and authorities characterises the process. External actors’ prerogatives of defining issues and deciding who should be included and involved in the peace process are other constraints of neoliberal peacebuilding. This denies ownership and agency to the subjects (Curtis, 2012).

Donors have increasingly assumed prominence as a mechanism of bringing together needed resources to achieve peacebuilding. There is no irrefutable evidence, however, that donors and external resources will guarantee peace and peacebuilding. This is another indication of the neoliberal intervener’s concern with conflict and post-conflict situations where the attention is on prevention of the resumption or escalation of violent conflict. This short-term focus of neoliberal peacebuilding is an indication of the unsustainability of neoliberal-driven peace (Tom, 2017).

Failed or unstable societies are perceived to be a threat to international security (Newman, Paris, and Richmond, 2009, 3; Barnet, 2006, 87; Tom, 2017). Dealing with this security threat presupposes mending of the failed societies; regime change is followed by imposed nation-building (Downes, 2011; Caplan, 2007). This conceptualisation provides Western powers with legitimate rights to intervene. The interventionist measures come with and foster their own conceptions and models of peacebuilding. No attention is paid to indigenous conceptions, institutions, mechanisms, and practices of peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Even if attempts to pay attention are made, they fall short of meeting the imperatives of indigenous instruments of peacebuilding to achieve sustainable peace.

Another dimension of the shopping list is that it is usually facilitated by external actors. The preoccupation of external mediators is chiefly with short-term security and stability. The serious consequence of the imposition of an external solution is that it is selective. It is selective in choosing agendas, issues, and domestic actors to be involved (Newnan, Paris, and Richmond, 2009, 4). This certainly makes it incomprehensive, inconclusive, and short-lived. It avoids
addressing root causes; instead, it treats proximate causes and may end up dealing with symptoms (Young, 2012). It focuses only on the combatants (Young, 2012); therefore, a range of actors and interests that undermine the sustainability of the peace deal, or post-war reconstruction, are excluded, thereby producing regimes devoid of wide legitimacy (Barnet, 2006, 103–104; Menkhause, 2012). Elements that will ensure lasting solutions such as social reconciliation, broad participation, inclusiveness transformation, and democratisation are paid scant attention. The welfare of citizens and development are markedly absent from the solutions (Newman, Paris, and Richmond, 2009; Conteh-Morgan, 2004). Above all, it is criticised of being driven by and promoting self-interests and alien ideologies and perspectives, at the expense of indigenous mechanisms, institutions, perspectives, and authorities. The post-Cold War neoliberalism is also criticised of dissociation with classical liberalism; noting this, Issa Shivji writes that

Margaret Thatcher [claimed] “there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families.” The individualism of neoliberalism is narcissist. It is not even the enlightened individualism of liberalism which stood for individual freedom and the flowering of the individual. Neoliberalism knows only one freedom – freedom to choose from commodities on offer.³

Finally, it is uncertain if neoliberal peacebuilding addresses issues such as power, legitimacy, representation, and participation (Newman, Paris, and Richmond, 2009) that are vital for enduring peace and functional peacebuilding. Neoliberalism’s drive of a globalism that engenders totalitarian universalism, without the corollary benefits for non-Western societies, only produces a segmentary hierarchised unequal global citizenry. This will not lead to peace, stability, and security in Africa.

Popular progressive peacebuilding

Now I will examine an alternative to neoliberal peacebuilding: popular progressive peacebuilding. Popular progressive peacebuilding relates to a long-term evolutionary development of peace. Peace, in this conception, is historical, contemporary, and future-oriented. It strides along the past–present–future continuum. Furthermore, in a broad and fundamental way, it concerns the profound project of nation and state formation. In this sense, it is an antithesis of neoliberal peacebuilding. Basically, popular progressive peacebuilding deals with the evolutionary construction and reconstruction of society. The concepts of popular and progressive denote the dialectics between popular and progress. The “popular” expresses the people-centred nature of peacebuilding, while “progressive” connotes the long-term, continuous, and future-oriented nature of peace and peacebuilding. There are a number of dimensions that need to be taken into consideration, in order for popular progressive peacebuilding to fulfil its aims.
The basic premises of popular progressive peacebuilding are the embracing of holistic, national, regional, and local ownership; indigenous institutions, authorities, and mechanisms; and inclusive bottom-up and top-down strategies (cf. Richmond, 2011; Lederach, 1997; Mac Ginty, 2011). Local ownership of the agendas, processes, solutions, long-term institution-building, negotiations, bargaining, compromises, reconciliation, participation, and transformation are other aspects of popular progressive peacebuilding. It is a domestic process, home-grown, not oriented towards a winner or loser outcome. According to Isaac O. Albert, peacebuilding in Africa rests on the “commitment to cultural values, beliefs, and norms as the people on the one hand and role expectation on the other” (Albert, 2008, 40). This confers legitimacy on the process (Jackson and Rosberg, 1984).

These are fundamental prerequisites for functional and sustainable peace. Peacebuilding from this perspective is exclusively domestic or home-grown (cf. Paffenholz, 2015). Any external involvement could only serve as an additional supporting toolkit. Neoliberal peacebuilding is proving to be the antithesis of popular progressive peacebuilding because its interventionist policies lead to state fragility, failure, and collapse. Popular progressive peacebuilding endorses the view that “actors are shaped by the socio-cultural milieu in which they live” (Conteh-Morgan, 2004, 234). In other words it is culture- and context-contingent.

Popular progressive peacebuilding initiated after a bloody war should aim at society-building. Society-building/reconstruction necessarily involves restoring destroyed values, norms, institutions, structures, and relations (Curtis, 2012, 4–5). Society-building/reconstruction cannot rest on borrowed values and norms (as per neoliberal subscriptions). If the state of anomaly is replaced by a state of normalcy, only then could sustainable and functional peacebuilding be ensured (Tom, 2017). A grassroots-based peacebuilding would celebrate the defining of societal structures, norms, and values such as communalism, collectivism, and solidarity (Conteh-Morgan 2004, Gawerc 2006). Methodological collectivism instead of methodological individualism is the imperative of peacebuilding as a popular progressive alternative. It aims at restoring the balance, the equilibrium. “Among African societies, symbols and rituals are key to an effective and permanent peacebuilding/reconstruction process” (Conteh-Morgan, 2004, 241). A characteristic feature of popular progressive peacebuilding is engagement in a protracted discussion until consensus is reached among all citizens. The social fabric of peace rests on the moral authority and wisdom of elders whose guidance, oversight, decisions, and leadership propelled by time immemorial, by proven praxis and ethos, are accepted and obeyed. Mediations and verdicts handed down by elders are binding and fully implemented. The reason they are accepted and obeyed is because they strive to restore social cohesion, harmony, and equilibrium; not to punish, isolate, and marginalise the guilty. Guilt is not an individual act, but rather a collective one, and punishment and reward are also collective acts that aim at restorative justice (Tom, 2017, 78–82).

The focus is a restorative instead of a retributive peace. In this focus cultural resources of peacemaking are of great significance (Conteh-Morgan, 2004).
Familial connections, community networks, trust, dignity, integrity, and respect are variables that create cohesion. These elements strongly contribute to the success of conflict mediation and abide by the verdicts passed by mediators. Both the mediators and the mediated are required to show impeccable social and moral integrity; otherwise they lose face in the community.

Neoliberal [liberal] peacebuilding “may be socially atomizing, hegemonic and lead to the valorization of predatory state elite who gain easy access to an international economic and political cartography” (Oliver P. Richmond quoted in Curtis, 2012, 16). It therefore runs against the aggregating, egalitarian, and collective African values and norms. These values and norms certainly reinforce functional and sustainable peace.

Neoliberal peacebuilding, as state-centred, is confined to global and national state levels. This ignores the sub-national, the marginalised, the peripheries, the indigenous, and the traditional and cultural context of common people. Popular progressive peacebuilding, on the other hand, is people-centred, pervasively inclusive, and straddles all social strata.

**State emancipation and societal pacification as requisites for peacebuilding**

It took several hundred years for the predecessor of the post-colonial state to emancipate itself and pacify the society under its control (Young, 1994, 15–16). The major challenge for the post-colonial state, in its formation, has been to emancipate itself and pacify its societies. Emancipation means ensuring sovereignty. A sovereign state enjoys both internal and external legitimacy in governing citizens in its domain and in dealing with other states (Young, 1994, 28–29). Legitimacy has sociological and legal dimensions. While sociologically it may refer to the internal, legally it refers to the external (Schaar, 2000; Jackson and Rosberg, 1984; Henderson, 2015). Nevertheless, the hard reality is that the situation in post-colonial Africa, far from mono-sovereignty where the state has the benefit of absolute sovereignty, is characterised by duality of sovereignty. The emancipation of a state demonstrates the emergence of a matured, developed, peaceful state; a state that is capable of building the society and societal institutions, the mechanisms and infrastructures, that foster peace and thrust peacebuilding forward. Peacebuilding in this sense may presuppose the pacification of societal groups.

The premise of the emancipation of the state relates to the emergence of three interrelated situations: (i) autonomy of the state, (ii) that the state stands above societal groups, (iii) establishment of state hegemony over society (Bereketeab, 2011). State autonomy means the independence of the state to exercise legitimate authority and control over society without interference from other societal agencies. The legitimate exercise of authority in turn presupposes the standing of the state above societal groups where it proves its neutrality and equal treatment of societal groups: class, ethnic, religious, gender, generational, linguistic groups, etc. The establishment of an uncontested hegemonic state position over
society arising through the instrumentality of coercive and administrative apparatuses (Callaghy, 1984; Weber, 1948) is arguably perceived as an indication of the evolvement of a modern state. Yet, its hegemonic position should serve society. Ultimate power lies in society. In sum, then, the three situations constituting emancipation characterise an evolved modern state. The evolution of a modern state, in turn, is an outcome of the pacification of society and the emancipation of a state that heralds peace and enhances peacebuilding; after all the state is *prima facie* a peacebuilder.

State-building presupposes the emancipation of the state from society in that societal groups need to be subordinate to an omnipresent and omnipotent state. State emancipation engenders submission of society to the will of the former. The state assumes its hegemonic position by subordinating centrifugal societal forces. A state that has not gone through this process is presumed to be weak, because it still shares its authority with other centrifugal forces. “The development of a modern state depends above all on the gradual emancipation of established political structures from society” (Chabal and Daloz, 1999, 4–5). According to this understanding, a properly emancipated state could easily be institutionalised, lack of proper institutionalisation being another source of state weakness and source of conflict and instability.

The non-emancipation of states in Africa is attributed partly to the nature of the colonial state – a state both arbitrarily and poorly bureaucratised (Chabal and Daloz, 1994, 4). Rightly, Chabal and Daloz trace the non-emancipation of the state to its colonial foundation. They contend that the non-emancipation is because the state did not sprout from the womb of society. Being an alien body, it simply floated above society. It did not spring from the local society as such; therefore, the issue of its emancipation was rendered irrelevant. Hence, a non-emancipated state cannot engender peace, and peacebuilding encounters unsurmountable hurdles. As an instrument of oppression and exploitation the colonial state had, as its *reason d’etre*, the extraction of resources on behalf of the society back at home, and not concern in the institutionalisation and bureaucratisation of local institutions and structures which are salient pre-requisites for state emancipation and peacebuilding.

The concept of dual sovereignty (Tilly, 1978) appropriately captures the condition in many states in Africa. Duality of sovereignty implies the prevalence of parallel loci of power competing for legitimate dominance, and existing side-by-side, impeding the emergence of conditions that lead to the absolute hegemony of a central state. The prevalence of mutually exclusive centrifugal forces that engender parity (symmetry) between state and society render the state-building process highly feeble. The state–society relation in Africa, broadly expressed, could be defined as still, both functionally and structurally infused. There is also no clear delineation and differentiation between society and state, which is a characterising feature of a modern state. The clear delineation between state and society in the process of peacebuilding fulfils two objectives. The first objective is that the state as both war-maker and peacemaker is checked and counter-checked by society. The second objective is that society as the ultimate powerholder carves its
own space without the meddling of the state unlike the case where state–society fusion prevails. This space is then used by society to make sure peacebuilding is advanced through the generation of a harmonious, pacified, integrated, and amicable relationship (Paffenholz, 2015, 859).

In the conventional view, the evolvement of a modern state therefore presupposes, among other things, the separation of the state from society (Young, 1994; Chabal and Daloz, 1999). The process of separation duly involves two interrelated processes, notably state emancipation and societal pacification. This clear delineation is presumed to have a contributing effect to peace and peacebuilding.

Meanwhile, the pacification of society entails two dimensions, internal and external. In the internal dimension, the most salient condition of the evolution of the state deals with the domination of the state which presupposes the submission of society. The variables of domination and submission as expressions of an evolved modern state progressively have to be couched in emergent national institutions and structures in order to ensure their sustainability. The development of such state institutions and structures coupled with the disarming of centrifugal societal forces produces a matured state. This state coheres peacefully with society. The history of ideas treat the emergence of a state as fundamentally resting on the process of pacification where the state of nature was transformed.

Classical social contract theorists such as Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and John Lock were very much puzzled by the process of transformation from the state of nature to the state of culture, pre-society, or simply state. To these scholars of social contract, the state of nature represented an absence of government and regulating laws (Laskar, 2013). For Hobbes the state of nature represented a dark age of human history where “war of all against all” predominated. To escape the chaos state of nature humanity had to invent a political organisation called a state (Hobbes, 1962). To gain certain common benefits people had to voluntarily surrender some of their sovereignty. Based on the covenant the state assumed the legitimate right to exercise violence within the territory it controls on behalf of society (Weber, 1948).

For Lock, on the other hand, the state of nature represented the absolute freedom of the individual, a state of liberty, albeit with some critical deficiency. For Lock the state of nature was a golden age (Laskar, 2013, 3). It was pre-political. In order to remedy the deficiency, the state was invented. The state needs to protect life and property. To equilibrate the relation between society and state there has to be a social contract. The social contract regulates state–society relations. Social contract theorists argued that to overcome the state of nature, human society entered two agreements: Pactum Unionis and Pactum Subjectionis. While the first pact sought to ensure protection of their life and property through the construction of society, the latter was an agreement that enabled them to submit to an authority and surrender their freedom and rights to an authority (Ritchie, 1891; Mouritz, 2010). Accordingly, they agreed to form a society by collectively and reciprocally renouncing the rights they had in the state of nature. They had to agree to live together under common laws and create an enforcement mechanism for the social contract and the laws that constituted it. For Rousseau, the state of
nature was about happiness and equality. The invention of property, however, heralded humankind’s fall from grace. To correct the fall they needed to surrender their right to the “general will” embedded in the social contract.

In short, “the authority or the government or the sovereign or the state came into being because of the two agreements” (Laskar, 2013, 1). This concerns the legitimacy of power. Power is construed as legitimate depending on its origin and the manner it is exercised (Zaum, 2012, 51; Wiafe-Amoako, 2016, 78). In this regard, it is driven by certain values, norms, belief systems, shared goals, expectations, institutions, and mechanisms over which broad consensus reigns. Sources of legitimacy are presumed to be both domestic and external (Coggins, 2014; Oslander, 2001; Jackson and Rosberg, 1984). In an ideal situation state legitimacy conflates domestic and external sources equally. Most of the time, however, one dominates over the other.

The external dimension of pacification relates to ensuring territorial integrity, sovereignty, security, and international relations reminiscent of the Westphalian state (Oslander, 2001, 261; Evans and Newnham, 1990; Morgenthau, 1985; Coggins, 2014, 8). The contemporary post-Cold War period, which some designate post-Westphalian (Newman, Paris, and Richmond, 2009, 6–7; Kreuder-Sonnen and Zangl, 2014), a neoliberal-ideology-driven campaign has disrupted the status quo in international relations leading to serious conflict and instability all over the world. The neoliberal-induced mobilisation of non-state actors, including armed groups that compete with the state over the monopoly of violence, undermines societal pacification. Supporting and arming anti-Sadam forces in Iraq, anti-Gaddafi forces in Libya, and anti-Assad forces in Syria (Held and Urlichsen, 2011), or arming warlords against the Union of Islamic Courts in Somalia (Samatar, 2013; Muller, 2013), are good illustrations. The push to limit the state and in turn replace its roles with civil society, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and other non-state actors is an indication of the hostile position of neoliberal ideology towards the African state (Tom, 2017, 32–34). The post-Cold War and post-Westphalian push of non-state actors with the aim of challenging the state for the purpose of democratisation encourages centrifugal forces. This, in turn, instead of pacification may lead to militarism in society thereby countering peace and peacebuilding. The upshot of this, particularly in Africa, is the disruption of the pacification process with dire consequences. A pacified society is presumed to be one that has surrendered to the state. Otherwise, “The state may be viewed as a ruling organization that competes for power with other political, economic, and social organizations and groups” (Callaghy, 1984, 90). The competition eventually must be resolved in favour of the state for centrifugal forces be pacified and tamed. The state is an abstract concept as an institution that is empirically concretised in its expression through its component entities – executive, legislative, judiciary, and administrative – which receive societal legitimacy. This development enhances peace and peacebuilding.

In this regard, the state gains the autonomy it deserves, an autonomy that would enable it to exercise power above class, ethnic, religious, and regional societal groups. This autonomy would also enable the state to pacify societal centrifugal
groups. According to this conception state emancipation and societal pacification gradually consolidate the autonomy of the state. Societal pacification also emancipates the state in order to fulfil its external functional tasks, defending the integrity and security of society from external forces. The lack of state emancipation means that sectarian social groups dominate power, which gives rise to a real or imagined sense of marginalisation of groups. This sense of marginalisation further leads to ethnic and clan-based conflict resulting in chronic civil wars. On the other hand, lack of emancipation and pacification would also imply the absence of a consensual and contractual relationship between state and society, a prerequisite for peace and peacebuilding.

State-building and peacebuilding: harmony and discordance

The common understanding among donors, think-tanks, IFIs, and analysts is that there exists harmony between state-building and peacebuilding (Zaum, 2012, 47). Indeed, the perception is that they complement each other. The one is a presupposition for the other. This is expressed by the book, edited by Charles T. Call and Vanessa Wyeth (2008), titled Building a State to Build Peace. It is this perception of complementarity that lies behind neoliberal peacebuilding in the form of international intervention in state-building (Tom, 2017). Peacebuilding, in a neoliberal regime, often follows peace deals between the fighting parties and aims at institutionalisation and consolidation of the deal (Paris, 2002; Heathershaw, 2013). Drawing on this neoliberal perception of the harmony between state-building and peacebuilding its proponents, in recent years, have demonstrated extreme interventionist tendencies to mid-wife state-building and peacebuilding in conflict-affected societies. This conviction is predicated on the assumption that state-building and peacebuilding are necessary conditions for democratic peace (Tom, 2017, 59–60). The democratic peace thesis is out there to reconfigure Africa (Call, 2008; Curtis, 2012). By extension, the democratic peace thesis therefore serves the globalisation scheme that ensures Western domination through inclusive but unequal global integration.

The contention of this chapter is that there exists some discordance between state-building and peacebuilding, at least initially. This contention is supported by scholars such Call (2008, 3), Curtis (2012), and Robert (2012). The underpinning view of this contention of the discordance involves the different premises that govern state-building and peacebuilding. State-building by its very nature is political. Politics deals with power, with how power is allocated, and with who takes what, how, and when (Hyden, 2013; Harrison, 2012, 167; Schaar, 2000, 206). Moreover, politics generates winners and losers. Losers then seek alternative mechanisms to address their grievances which leads to conflict and in some situations to war (Zaum, 2012, 48). In this manner state-building and peacebuilding go their separate ways.

State-building, perceived as institution-building, is a long-term process that may take several generations (Poggi, 1978; Kamrava, 2000; Mamdani, 1996; Mazrui and Wiafe-Amoako, 2016). Institution-building and institutionalisation
also need to be transformed into a political culture if they are to be recognised, accepted, and appreciated by citizens. The gestation of institutions as routinised, entrenched political practices requires a lapse of a considerable period. Political institutions as political culture are established as a result of protracted struggles that include negotiations, bargains, compromises, etc. that are ultimately, reflectively, and discursively expressed in transparency, predictability, openness, accountability in the rule of the game, and expectations recognised and hopefully accepted by citizens.

State-building is also by its very nature domestic. As domestic process, state-building is contingent on continuous negotiations, interpretations, bargains, trade-offs, compromises, dealings, and expectations between multiple stakeholders. These stakeholders, in poly-ethnic, polyglottic, and poly-religious societies are numerous. This numerosity in turn presupposes complex and intriguing arrangements and treatments. In this context, state-building concerns society’s construction and ownership by, and legitimacy in the eyes of, citizens (Zaum, 2012; Tom, 2017).

The so-called state fragility, weakness, and collapse that presumably makes state–society relations amenable to radicalism and terrorism, and subjects the West to security risks, “reinforced the association between state-building and peacebuilding” (Zaum, 2012, 47). The state-building and peacebuilding intervention driven by the neoliberal ideology aims at ameliorating the risk involved in state fragility. Facts on the ground, however, do not corroborate the assumed amelioration. If recent developments could be an indication, neoliberal intervention has rather thrown the world into an extremely precarious situation. Neoliberal state-building seeks to build Western-style states in non-Western post-conflict societies, in which “strong institutions” define strong states that are able to ensure internal security and stability, in ways that also eliminate threats to global security and prosperity (Barnet, 2006).

It should be noted that this is a narrow conceptualisation of peacebuilding advocated by donors, INGOs, the WB, and the UN (Barnet, 2006, 88). In this context, neoliberal peacebuilding is, relatively speaking, short-term. As discussed above, neoliberal peacebuilding is concerned chiefly with the technical and administrative managerial nature of conflicts such as DDR, security sector reform, and transforming security institutions, armed forces, police and intelligence apparatuses, the judiciary, etc. (Mac Ginty, 2008; Robert, 2012; Call, 2008). Moreover, as Harrison (2012, 167) notes, “building states is concrete, building peace is abstract, peacebuilding does not signify a specific agency to build.” As alluded to earlier in this chapter, the kind of peacebuilding that is in harmony with state-building is one that is based on popular progressive, rather than neoliberal, peacebuilding.

Since state-building as a political project is concerned with power and generates winners and losers that may lead to conflict and war, at least initially, then it will antagonise peacebuilding. In the long run, however, state-building is a necessary requisite for peace and peacebuilding. The state being an agent of war and peace, a matured state would create the necessary conditions for peace. Eventually, there will come a time where the state becomes inexorably
imperative for the harmony between state-building and peacebuilding. Until that time comes a discursive segregation of the two processes is a well-deserved action.

**Conclusion**

This chapter set out to examine two theoretical approaches to peacebuilding in Africa. These are neoliberal peacebuilding and popular progressive peacebuilding. Following the collapse of the Cold War, neoliberalism emerged as the dominant ideology. Soon, however, neoliberal peacebuilding drew immense criticism. The criticism pivots around the main concern that neoliberal peacebuilding is primarily externally imposed, technical, managerial, and short-term. It also concerns the post-war external reconstruction of societies. Informed by this criticism this chapter sought to advance an alternative to neoliberal peacebuilding.

Popular progressive peacebuilding is superior to neoliberal peacebuilding for several reasons. First, it is by its very nature domestic and goes beyond post-conflict reconstruction. Second, it utilises domestic resources and infrastructures such as cultural, social, historical, structural, institutional, indigenous, etc. authorities. Third, society-building, in modern terminology nation-building, is an outcome of several generations’ work and social processes. The conflation of state-building and nation-building exemplifies a simultaneous dual process of integration and separation. The integration and cohesion of state and nation imply that the state should fit a particular nation or a nation should be represented by its own state. Separation, on the other hand, denotes delimitation between two dialectically interwoven entities. The notions of pacification and emancipation appropriately describe the process of integration and separation in the evolution of nation state formation. The organic process of integration and separation as the evolution of nation- and state-building in Africa, in history, was continuously disrupted by external intervention. This disruption also affected the organic domestic process of peacebuilding as conceptualised by popular progressive peacebuilding.

It is argued the popular progressive peacebuilding will bring sustainable peace in Africa. The protracted evolutionary processes, dynamics, and mechanisms of nation and state formation that are founded on the idiosyncratic specificities of a particular society will ensure a sustainable, functional, permanent, comprehensive peace. This is so because the process is an outcome of protracted negotiations, bargains, compromises, and representation among societal groups that foster agency and ownership, and is sealed by the growth of the will to live together. This in turn rests on the construction of domestic institutions and structures; economic, social, and political transformations; and ethnolinguistic harmony, cohesion, social equitability, etc.

In multi-ethnic societies, fostering the will to live together among members is of great significance for sustainable and functional peace. The will to live together results from the harmonisation of the processes and mechanisms of state and nation formation. Moreover, it is the outcome of historical, cultural, political, and institutional accumulations over generations. Ultimately, this will foster a genuine
social contract between society and state, and the legitimacy of the state, which is a mainstay for peace and peacebuilding.

To summarise, the imposing of neoliberal peacebuilding and state-building programmes on Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) regions from the outside would adversely affects the peace process in these regions rather than leading to enduring peace. Conversely, the popular progressive peacebuilding model would result in peace and development. This is because the popular progressive model is by its very nature evolutionary; as a peacebuilding approach it not only addresses the root causes of conflicts but also considers the historical, cultural, and socio-economic contexts of the conflict environments including the structure, agents, and actors in the ECOWAS and IGAD regions.

Notes

1 What I have called here “popular progressive peacebuilding” is referred to in the general literature, invariably, as local (Lederach, 1997; Mac Ginty, 2011; Chandler, 2013), indigenous, or bottom-up (Richmond, 2011; Reno, 2008). Michael Barnet (2006) distinguishes between liberal peacebuilding and republican peacebuilding which is close to what I have called in this chapter popular progressive versus neoliberal. According to Barnet, while liberalism refers to the creation of a post-conflict state defined by rule of law, markets, and democracy, republicanism refers to principles of deliberation, constitutionalism, and representation that help a state recovering from war foster stability and legitimacy. A legitimate state must be organised around liberal democratic principles (Barnet, 2006, 88–89).

2 A plethora of definitions abound in the literature of peacebuilding. This chapter is, however, not concerned with definitions of peacebuilding, but is rather concerned with the distinction of the two theoretical strands identified here.


References


Towards a human security-centred approach to peacebuilding

ECOWAS’s experiences and lessons

Aderemi Ajibewa and Jubril Agbolade Shittu

Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the Economic Community of West African States’s (ECOWAS’s) peacebuilding experiences, focusing on the human security-centred peacebuilding objectives enumerated in its Vision 2020 Strategy and the practical approach which emphasises the increased participation of civil society in early-warning, conflict prevention, and resolution. Debates about long-term initiatives which recognise institutional and structural approaches to peacebuilding have evolved to include actions aimed at building social relationships and the participation of the people in the governance process. ECOWAS, in furtherance of its human security and strategic objectives, has adopted a bottom-up approach which seeks to transform the region from “an ECOWAS of states” to “an ECOWAS of peoples.” This chapter commences by briefly documenting the shift from state-centric to community-based approaches to peacebuilding in West Africa. It then discusses ECOWAS’s experience in pursuing its Vision 2020 human security-centred objectives. This is followed by a discussion of ECOWAS’s approach to peacebuilding, including lessons learned from its partnership with CSOs to achieve human security-centred regional peacebuilding, and how these can be shared with other African Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

From state-centric to community-based approaches

The current strategic vision of ECOWAS is to create a peaceful, prosperous, and cohesive West Africa based on a people-centred vision. Barely a decade after the creation of ECOWAS in 1975, conflicts emerged starting from 1989 within and across the borders of ECOWAS member states. These conflicts assumed dimensions that the existing ECOWAS framework, which had its primary focus on economic integration, could not manage. The need to respond to the conflicts, as well as a global push for preventive diplomacy, precipitated a gradual evolution of the ECOWAS peace and security framework towards the introduction of institutional, structural, and human security approaches to regional peacebuilding (Adebajo and Rashid, 2004; Musah, 2009, 1–5).
ECOWAS needed a functional peacebuilding and security mandate in recognition of the nexus between peace and security and economic development in West Africa. The ECOWAS Treaty articles of establishment were revised in 1992 to reflect the demand for peace and security in the integration process. However, the peacebuilding interventions during that period were state-centric in approach. These include the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) interventions between 1990 and 2003, and numerous high-level mediation missions by heads of state. These approaches were generally criticised for their short-term focus, militarised approaches, neglect of human rights, and lack of inclusiveness.

Global events, including the end of the Cold War and the global push for preventive diplomacy outlined in the 1992 UN “Agenda for Peace” and a wave of democratisation, signalled gradual ECOWAS departure from state-centric approaches towards broader approaches involving a wider range of actors. Conflict management transitioned to preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacebuilding. The revised ECOWAS Treaty was complemented by several frameworks which promoted these broader approaches, including the 1999 Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security; the 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance; and the 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF). These frameworks supported the broader participation of actors at various levels in peacebuilding, notably civil society organisations (CSOs). Civil society since then has increasingly been recognised as key to the transformative participatory processes of peacebuilding and conflict prevention. As highlighted by Ekiyor (2008, 27), “Over 3,000 CSOs work at different levels within West Africa. Organisations work on various conflict prevention issues including human rights, education, promoting dialogue, security sector reform, conflict-sensitive development, election monitoring, gender equality and post-conflict reconstruction.”

**Conceptualising a human security approach**

The concept of community peacebuilding is relevant to the subject of human security within the context of ECOWAS. While it is important to note that what peacebuilding entails and its practical application, vis-à-vis the role of the relevant actors, remain an ongoing debate, Lederach, Culbertson, and Neufeld (2007, 9) define peacebuilding as

> the development of constructive personal, group, and political relationships across ethnic, religious, class, national, and racial boundaries. It aims to resolve injustice in nonviolent ways and to transform the structural conditions that generate deadly conflict. Conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution and transformation, and post-conflict reconciliation are all part of peacebuilding.

(Lederach et al., 2007, 9)
Lederach’s “peacebuilding pyramid,” complemented by Pearce’s (2005, 45–49) identification of several phases at which peacebuilding has manifested globally, provides an overview of the levels in which peacebuilding has developed and the range of actors involved. Both Lederach (1997) and Pearce (2005) acknowledge the role and expansion of the “community” or grassroots where the conditions of a peaceful society are best generated. Community participation supports local ownership of the peacebuilding process, promotion of sustainable outcomes in the long term, improvement in social cohesion towards addressing common challenges, and strengthening of the global public sphere. Community participation is also important because of the integration of development and peace approaches.

Local ownership is hinged on the community as the object of peace interventions and preventive engagement. Lederach (1997, 4) proposed a grassroots approach where local leaders, NGOs, and international players take part in creating peace. The limitations on the duration of the international community’s effort at sustaining peacekeeping implies that peacebuilding efforts should be viewed as an investment in sustainability in which the communities are direct beneficiaries and should have a stake. Community participation in peacebuilding is also a socialisation process that should consider the indigenous knowledge and practices of the concerned communities, promoting social cohesion and cross-learning and peer review. In just the same way as peacebuilding intervention models are applicable though not entirely wholesale, communities should be able to learn from other experiences and consider other models. This resocialisation of peacebuilding is consistent with arguments on structural transformation promoted by Galtung (1996).

The notion of a public sphere has gained momentum among various groups and its relevance continues to increase, especially where the human rights and lives of people are concerned. Globalisation, the spread of information, and the growth of technology have ensured that events do not remain boxed within the traditional boundaries of the state. Communities and civil society organisations (CSOs) have networks whose influence cuts across sovereign state borders. Indeed, one may argue that there is a supranational voice through which citizens in one state rely on networks of global public opinion to highlight issues affecting them, as well as evoke a response. Lessons from the Arab Spring, and global reaction and support for several causes including the “#MeToo movement” and “Justice for George Floyd” campaigns reveal a trend where events in one part of the globe spark reactions in other places.

ECOWAS peacebuilding is aimed at promoting sustainable peace, which is complemented by preventive diplomacy and peace-making. While ECOWAS peacekeeping efforts over the years has expanded to include election-monitoring and humanitarian assistance, it has been confronted with some limitations including funding and resource constraints, a lack of consensus among member states on priorities, a lack of decisive action, and a state-centric approach. Relevant ECOWAS frameworks, especially the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) and the Vision 2020 strategy, therefore had to be introduced to address these gaps. The ECPF consists of 15 components that underpin ECOWAS’s
approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and these emphasise the role of a wide range of actors.

The arguments for a change in approach have been noted by Sen (2013, 26–27) who frames the human security-centred approach thus:

A human security-centred approach recognises the limitations of a state-centric notion of security, arguing for a holistic approach that involves coordination of different capacities and actors in the peace process. The state remains the fundamental purveyor of security. Yet it often fails to fulfil its security obligations – and at times has even become a source of threat to its own people. That is why attention must now shift from the security of the state to the security of the people – to human security [...] Human security thus brings together the human elements of security, of rights, of development.

(Sen, 2013, 26–27)

ECOWAS has also been involved in initiatives focused on building the capacity of community actors in peacebuilding. It has designated various research institutions as training centres, which have been certified as centres of excellence: the National Defence College Nigeria, KAIPTC in Ghana, and the “Ecole de Maintien de la Paix” Alioune Blondin Beye (EMP) in Mali. ECOWAS has developed technical collaboration with these institutions (ECOWAS-KAIPTC, ECOWAS-WACSI, ECOWAS-WANEP) to work on thematic areas and investigate areas of synergy and cooperation. ECOWAS also developed agreements with King’s College London and the latter has deployed some of its researchers to serve in the ECOWAS Political Affairs Directorate.

ECOWAS’s and community-based peacebuilding

The strategic vision of ECOWAS focuses on development processes that are people-oriented and people-driven. The objectives of ECOWAS Vision 2020, as adopted in Abuja on 15 June 2007, aim to address four main challenges:

- Peace-building and security, promotion of the principle of good governance and democracy;
- Deepening of the integration process via the establishment of the ECOWAS common market and the interconnectivity of the markets through appropriate infrastructure;
- Integration into the global economy through improved regional competitiveness and the definition of common response strategies in particular as a way of addressing the different crises relating to the international economic situation; and
- Pursuit of the institutional reform of our organisation by providing it with resources to perform effectively and to carry out its mandate.

(ECOWAS, 2009, 3)
In a bid to meet these different challenges, the ECOWAS Commission in 2009 elected to focus its action on six priority areas, one of which is the promotion of peace and security, dialogue, and preventive diplomacy and the establishment of peacekeeping support structures through greater involvement of member states. It was predicted that if these short-term objectives were achieved, they would certainly strengthen the regional integration process and political stability in the region. In achieving the strategic goals, civil society remains an important partner and must be heavily involved in the promotion of good governance and regional integration. In this regard, the ECOWAS Vision 2020 strategy seeks to transform the region from an ECOWAS of states into an ECOWAS of peoples.

The participation of civil society is a key input in achieving the strategic vision of ECOWAS. ECOWAS’s relationship with CSOs, stipulated in the ECPF and supported by ECOWAS Vision 2020, is defined in terms of creating awareness and strengthening capacity within member states and civil society to enhance their role as principal constituencies and actors in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. For example, the West Africa Network for Peace (WANEP)’s partnership with ECOWAS, which was formalised through a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in 2003, reviewed on several occasions and renewed in 2014 for a further five years, is derived from this mandate. Under this MOU, WANEP works in close collaboration with ECOWAS in conceptualising and implementing activities leading to the promotion of peace and security in the region, and is currently the civil society partner of ECOWAS in the operationalisation of the ECOWAS Early Warning Network (ECOWARN). Other examples of community participation include the engagement, dialogue forums, research, and capacity-building undertaken by ECOWAS-recognised CSOs who have formalised relationships with the various directorates in ECOWAS.

CSOs can mobilise wide support for a common cause, influence the implementation of policies, participate in transitions and electoral processes, and serve as a vehicle for the dissemination of credible information and ideas. ECOWAS has recognised the importance of establishing comprehensive dialogue and partnership for agenda-shaping in collaboration with CSOs within West Africa. It has built and formalised partnerships with civil society through agreements, which makes collaboration easier and more effective. Furthermore, ECOWAS policies are not adopted without inputs from civil society platforms. In pursuance of the goals of increased engagement with civil society, ECOWAS supported the formation of the West Africa Civil Society Forum (WACSOF). In December 2014, over 50 civil society delegates representing the 15 ECOWAS countries attended the First Annual West Africa Civil Society Conference in Accra, Ghana. Part of the deliberations included engaging ECOWAS in achieving Vision 2020 in areas including promoting education and health; democratic governance, including transparency and accountability; women’s political participation and representation; natural resource management; youth development; and free movement of people and goods.
The ECOWAS Mediation Facilitation Division under the Directorate of Political Affairs was established in 2015 to support the work of ECOWAS’s mediators; generate, document, and disseminate knowledge; and ensure active civil society collaboration in the area of peace mediation in West Africa. The coming into being of this division was in fulfilment of the preventive diplomacy component of the ECPF and one of the key recommendations that emanated from the 2010 ECOWAS International Conference in Monrovia, Liberia, known as the Monrovia Declaration. Subsequently, the Mali After-Action Review, which was held in Accra in 2013 to review and draw lessons from ECOWAS’s intervention in Mali, in the aftermath of the conflict in that country, also echoed what had been recommended at the Monrovia conference. The challenge now is for ECOWAS to actively engage West African civil society in consolidating peace mediation interventions to fulfil the objective of the Mediation Facilitation Division. To do that, WACSOF needs to be strengthened.

CSO participation in the election-monitoring process has also proved to be valuable. In addition to sensitising the general public and educating the electorate on convergence principles (e.g. human rights, term limits, and governance issues), CSOs provide independent observation of the electoral process and can also alert authorities of the potential for outbreaks of violence. Recent trends show the involvement of coalitions of CSOs in monitoring electoral transition processes in West African countries. The Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), a coalition made up of over 500 CSOs, was for instance involved in monitoring Nigeria’s 2015 general election. The TMG has observers in every local government of the Nigerian federation and transmits election-related information using information technologies to a command centre, known as the “situation room.” Thus, the TMG provides independent verification of elections in Nigeria.

Apart from capacity-building activities by ECOWAS institutions, the organisation also engages in inclusion strategies aimed at building the networks and capacity of civil society through experience-sharing. Activities include involving community experts in the areas of peace, security, and elections, as well as gender experts from the training centres of excellence on technical teams and in election observation missions. For instance, ECOWAS allocates a quota for experts from training centres of excellence to participate in election observation and monitoring. During missions, civil society experts from WANEP, the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) West Africa, WACSOF, and other similar organisations are able to share knowledge with their counterparts in the country where they have been deployed on mission, while also learning about best practices. For instance, in elections in Niger (2016), Cape Verde (2017), and Ghana (2016), experts independently learned about the workings of the media and how the respective countries’ regulatory authorities were able to maintain the transparency and independence of the media. The experts were also able to individually share some of their experiences on how female participation in politics could be enhanced by including women’s associations.
Challenges of community participation
peacebuilding in ECOWAS

Despite the instrumentality of civil society in achieving the ECOWAS peacebuilding agenda as outlined in Vision 2020, it still faces challenges. These challenges include funding, documentation of successes, institutional and technical capacity, information flow, and coordination between vital CSO groups and ECOWAS. In addressing these issues, ECOWAS has devised innovative approaches within its existing capabilities and relationships to improve community participation in peacebuilding. This has been mainly through partnerships, networking, lessons learned, and the promotion of experience-sharing among community actors.

The funding challenges faced by CSOs have impacted their ability to contribute to peacebuilding efforts. Competition for donor funding among organisations undermines cooperation and coordination leading to duplication of effort and initiatives. To resolve the funding challenges, ECOWAS devised two strategies: incorporating provisions into the ECOWAS line budget to fund CSOs, and channelling donor funds to West African CSOs for their capacity-building activities. In June 2016, ECOWAS and CSOs in Accra, Ghana, discussed the Community Strategic Framework (CSF) 2016–2020 and the dedication of a portion of the ECOWAS community levy to ensure sustainable financing of the CSF’s implementation activities by CSOs. This includes the provision of a budget line for CSOs within the ECOWAS annual budget which will complement donated funds from emerging African foundations, indigenous philanthropists, and the diaspora. ECOWAS also channeled external donor funding to CSO programs. An example is the 2014–2017 Kingdom of Denmark’s Africa Programme for Peace (APP), through which WANEP and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) received direct financial support for their activities.

Funding and the prioritisation of resources play a huge role in achieving ECOWAS’s community objectives. Although ECOWAS in 2003 created the Peace Fund, to ensure a timely response to urgent peace and security challenges, very little of its resources are used for non-emergency peace and security activities, such as policy development work and engagement with the broader policy community. Peacebuilding activities are to be emphasised rather than mitigation efforts, which requires much effort and attention as the stakes are higher.

Documentation of ECOWAS successes in peacebuilding has not been followed up over the years. ECOWAS convened conferences in 2005, 2010, and 2014 to discuss progress made by the broader peace and security policy community in the sphere of peace and security in the region and to review ECOWAS’s peace and security activities. These conferences have only been held periodically. They do not follow the same themes and it is unclear if conference proceedings are kept for future reference. On the civil society side, its contribution to conflict prevention needs to be further strengthened by the development of a documentation culture among CSOs. The West Africa Civil Society Institute (WACSI) is positioning itself to become a civil society knowledge-sharing hub and a credible centre for learning, with international recognition and accreditation.
There is also a need for improved cohesiveness with CSOs playing a more active role in ECOWAS early-warning to early-response efforts. CSOs constitute the lower level of the early-warning architecture, feeding into the information shared with the ECOWAS leadership through Zonal Bureaus. CSOs also issue regular declarations on the political situation in West Africa. For instance, in 2011 CSOs voiced their concern over the fragility of the transition process, prompting action on the part of ECOWAS to intervene following Laurent Gbagbo’s refusal to leave power despite losing the November 2010 presidential elections of Cote d’Ivoire. While there has been a decentralisation of the early-warning system, CSOs only feed information and recommend action-oriented interventions into the ECPF, not necessarily reflecting ECOWAS decisions which are still centred on the ECOWAS Commission and authority.

ECOWAS is taking steps to create courses and training modules on the major challenges in institutional and capacity-building. According to Ismail (2013, 28):

On the supply side, the [training centre of excellence], mainstream academic and research institutions, and civil society coalitions in West Africa could explore and create specialised modules and training courses focused on ECOWAS as an institution and broaden and improve existing courses on peace and security issues (for example, electoral management, disarmament, and demobilisation and reintegration).

The ECOWAS Directorate of Political Affairs is slowly taking steps in this direction, an example being the workshop on the Review and Validation of Training Modules for Political Parties in ECOWAS Member States. The workshop, which had inputs from CSOs and experts across the region, aimed to produce training modules to address challenges in financial management, administrative structures, and democracy at the level of political parties in the region. Some of the course modules developed during the same workshop were used at a training workshop in July 2016. The training, held in Ghana, was organised with the objective of enhancing the capacity of political parties in Ghana in the areas of media relations and effective campaign strategies, internal party democracy and administrative processes, political party financing, and mainstreaming youth and women in political party activities. Youth across West Africa have not been left out of the process of capacity-building. ECOWAS in 2016 collaborated with the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation to organise a working session with journalists from member states. The training provided an opportunity for participants to gain insights into the role of the media in nation-building and development in West Africa.

Conclusion and policy recommendations

The increased role of regional organisations and communities in peacebuilding are important features of the emerging post-Cold War system. However, more important is the inclusion of civil society in consultations and that help shape
their peacebuilding efforts and outcomes. The initiatives by CSOs like CDD, WANEP, and WACSOF in promoting people-centred approaches to peacebuilding are commendable but need to be supported and built upon by ECOWAS and the wider community. Increased efforts towards ensuring capacity-building and documentation should pay equal attention to improvements in early-warning and response, funding and peer-learning, and the potential for the exchange of ideas with other African regional economic communities (RECs).

CSOs should be better integrated into the early-warning and response action. Their contributions should go beyond feeding into the early warning mechanisms to joint analysis and planning of response efforts. Mainstreaming gender, youth, and the inputs of marginalised groups and analysing the impact of interventions on group dynamics will help improve outcomes. Response efforts should also include provisions for after-action reviews involving civil society so that lessons learned from the process can help inform future actions.

Funding challenges could be addressed with the active contributions of ECOWAS member states to the ECOWAS levy. Also, the people should recognise they need to play a greater role towards building the future ECOWAS of their dreams. The need for localised sources of funding including from local businesses, the private sector, and willing volunteers should be encouraged. Funding limitations should also be mitigated with increased investments in the use of technology to promote communication, cross-learning, and coordination of efforts.

The lessons of ECOWAS’s efforts towards a human security and people-centred approach to regional peacebuilding are relevant to other African RECs, particularly against the background of efforts to facilitate inter-REC collaboration over the past decade. In 2008, the Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue facilitated a working exchange between ECOWAS and IGAD, with a focus on peace and security matters. Both organisations held fruitful exchanges and agreed to seek areas of future collaboration. The AU in 2012 held a retreat of the Panel of the Wise which brought together intergovernmental organisations, regional economic communities (RECs), civil society organisations (CSOs), governments, and experts to discuss the peace and security landscape in Africa. The meeting also highlighted the nexus between security and development. Similarly, during the July 2016 AU Summit held in Kigali, Rwanda, ECOWAS pledged to host an inaugural inter-REC Retreat towards the end of 2017 to advance a culture of experience-sharing and cooperation among African RECs though this is yet to take place.

Notes
1 Liberia and Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Burkina Faso.
2 Notwithstanding the fact that ECOWAS had by 1978 adopted the Protocol on Non-Aggression, followed in 1981 by the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence, it was also evident by the end of the 1980s that there was a missing link in the equation for regional integration: peace and security.
In August 1990, ECOMOG deployed for its first intervention in Liberia, and as of 2003 ECOMOG had been deployed on five missions in Liberia, Guinea Bissau, and Sierra Leone.

The agenda recommended the continual dispatch of fact-finding missions and use of eminent and qualified experts in fact-finding and other missions, selected on as wide a geographical basis as possible, taking into account candidates with the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity.


These Protocols have given ECOWAS a mandate to intervene in issues of elections and accession to power, decentralisation of power and participatory democracy, poverty alleviation, human rights, and education. In this vein, ECOWAS has successfully contributed to violence-free and fair elections in the region.

The ECPF, with its 14 components and the 15th being enabling mechanisms. The second definition of civil society fits the West African context. This school of thought defines civil society as the arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market, where people associate to advance common interests. In West Africa, these actors may include women’s organisations, traditional rulers, queen mother associations, youth organisations, faith-based organisations, trade unions, the media, and academia.

First phase is the Agenda for Peace, which saw the role of multilateral institutions in peacekeeping and maintaining world order, second phase is the post-war reconstruction focus on development as a way of maintaining peace. This phase focused on institution-building and democratic enhancement, despite the attendant criticisms of this approach as fostering a Cold War pro-democracy agenda. The third phase is peacebuilding from below expounded by Lederach’s multi-track and multi-dimensional approaches which emphasise the grassroots approach to peacebuilding.

The public sphere is crucial to identifying the public good and to shaping both public and private strategies for pursuing it. The public sphere is also important where civil society is seen mainly in terms of the direct action of citizens — organized informally in communities or more formally in voluntary associations. Public communication shapes what civil society organizations […] address, from poverty to the environment. Not only do issues go in or out of fashion, the very forms and strategies of civil society organizations are matters of public knowledge, circulating in the media and first-hand reports, and offering a repertoire of models to each new organizing effort. Public discussion is also vital to evaluating the extent to which different civil society organizations — or social movements — do in fact serve the public good. The public sphere takes on its most specifically political import when civil society is seen as centrally related to the state. Calhoun.

ECPF has operational and structural preventive approaches. Operational prevention focuses on methods such as early warning/response, mediation, conciliation, disarmament, and peacekeeping through the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF). Structural prevention, on the other hand, focuses on peacebuilding through political and institutional reforms, capacity building, justice and the rule of law, reconciliation and reintegration, and peace education.

These frameworks include provisions for early-warning; preventive diplomacy; democracy and political governance; human rights and rule of law; media; natural resource governance; cross-border initiatives; youth empowerment; the ESF; humanitarian assistance; peace education (culture of peace); and the enabling mechanism (with
A human security-centred approach

The relationship covers the provision of technical advice and support, support for capacity building, and incorporating findings from peace and security research and analysis into ECOWAS activities. For instance, researchers at the Conflict, Security, and Development Group (CSDG) contributed to the development of the ECPF and its activity plans, especially thematic strands on security sector reform, natural resource management, and women, peace, and security. Also, since 2008, the CSDG has consistently deployed young West African professionals in peace and security to ECOWAS to support its operational efficiency; ECOWAS has absorbed some of them into its service. Similarly, in 2013, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue supported ECOWAS’s creation of a Mediation Facilitation Division in the Political Affairs Directorate by deploying consultants to undertake background research and develop operational mandates, procedures, and staff profiles.

Others include: the establishment of the customs union; facilitation of the signing of an equitable, balanced, and development-oriented Economic Partnership Agreement; pursuit of the agricultural and environment policy; implementation of adopted action plans; regional infrastructure; making the free trade area function effectively by establishing the common external tariff; and encouraging member states to honour their commitments to effectively implement the provisions of the protocol relating to the community levy.

This is captured by Aryeetey (2001). In narrating the experience of CSOs: “The revised 1993 ECOWAS Treaty called on the regional community to co-operate with regional CSOs and encourage the broad participation of citizens in the integration process.”

WANEPI builds the capacity of peacebuilding, development, and human rights practitioners in Africa and worldwide on peace and security issues to promote and protect human security through context-specific tools and indigenous techniques.

Other initiatives have been formed, which are discussed in brief by Ekiyor (2008). They include the West African CSO Forum (WACSOF) Forum of Associations Recognized by ECOWAS (FARE), the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), the West Africa Network for Peace (WANEPI), the Foundation for Security and Development in Africa, and the West Africa Women’s Association, working with ECOWAS on issues of governance, early-warning, small arms proliferation, and gender, respectively.

Civil society can put pressure on states to implement policies through close monitoring of the ratification and implementation of agreements that have been signed by the states. One way CSOs influence policy is through the mobilisation of the public in providing a common voice concerning issues affecting the welfare of citizens in a particular state and in the region. The role of civil society in early-warning cannot be overemphasised.

Created in 2003, WACSOF is the umbrella body of civil society organisations created as the institutionalised channel of dialogue between ECOWAS and civil society organisations. http://wacsof.net/index.php/en/who-we-are/about-wacsof.


Elections are among the most important barometers of democracy. However, they are also a potential source of conflict and threat to peace and security. In line with the ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance and in
accordance with the Decision of Heads of State and Government at the 26th session held in Dakar, Senegal, on 31 January 2003, the ECOWAS Commission dispatched fact-finding missions to relevant countries in advance of elections, in order to ascertain the status of preparations.


29 In March 2010, a conference on “Two Decades of Peace Processes in West Africa: Achievement, Failures, and Lessons” in Monrovia, Liberia, included over 150 participants, including former heads of state, ministers, government officials, researchers, media members, civil society activists, and policy actors from within and outside the region.

30 The February 2014 “Experts’ After-Action Review of ECOWAS’s Intervention in Mali,” held in Akosombo, Ghana, was organised to assess and draw lessons and recommendations from ECOWAS’s role in Mali’s multidimensional crises. Participants included researchers and experts in political, military, and security issues, civil society organisations, research institutions, and training centres of excellence.

31 https://www.wacsi.org/reports.


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5 Civil society organisations and the ECOWAS peace and security agenda
A case study of the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP)

Chukwuemeka B. Eze

Introduction

West African civil society organisations (CSOs) have played important roles in the promotion and implementation of the ECOWAS’ peace and security agenda. There is increasing recognition that CSOs often have unfettered access to conflict zones and are in direct contact with perpetrators as well as victims, allowing them to provide unique types of information needed in conflict prevention, management, and transformation. Conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone marked a watershed for the specialisation and professionalisation of West African CSOs in the field of peace and security (Beck, 2001). Community leaders, women’s groups, media actors and the private sector, including businessmen and -women, have demonstrated their influence in waging conflict and seeking peace and stability as pre-conditions for sustainable development. These actions include addressing the structural and immediate causes of conflict, building the capacity of actors to prevent and mitigate violence, and support the rebuilding of societies after conflict. They also engage in peacebuilding activities before, during and after violence. These have been achieved largely through, among other things, advocacy, capacity building, policy and programmatic interventions, and research. Despite these achievements, the emergence of new threats such as terrorism, pandemics, cybercrime, transnational organised crime and climate change continue to threaten the region. Addressing them requires enhanced collaborative approaches by all stakeholders including CSOs. In this regard, the collaboration between CSOs and ECOWAS is germane.

ECOWAS Vision 2020, which seeks to deliver meaningful development and promote an ‘ECOWAS of the Peoples’, provides an even greater impetus to engage CSOs on issues of peace and human security in the region. This chapter assesses the contributions of CSOs towards the consolidation of the ECOWAS Peace and Security Agenda, based on a case study of the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP). It argues that the significance of CSOs in peace and security goes beyond traditional activities of monitoring and policing governments, although influencing policy is a key factor in realising the ECOWAS vision of the peoples and bridging the gap between policymakers and their constituencies.
West Africa’s peace and security context

West Africa has been one of the most politically dynamic and challenging regions of Africa. Since the 1960s, the region has registered one of the highest rates of coup d’états in the world. Violent conflicts occasioned by civil wars, ethno-religious conflicts, political crises, etc., have led to instability and reversals in the developmental gains made by several countries. In recent decades, the region has experienced some of the most horrendous fratricidal conflicts. Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau witnessed civil wars that have brought untold hardships to millions of people, destroyed property and infrastructure, resulting in the near-collapse of the state, while threatening the stability of neighbouring countries (Obi 2009). Huge amounts of scarce resources meant for human and economic development have been diverted to peacekeeping efforts through the combined efforts of ECOWAS, the United Nations (UN) and the international community.

Most recently, West Africa has become synonymous with rising levels of radicalisation and violent extremism. Across the Sahel–Sahara zone, countries such as Nigeria, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso are burdened with high levels of insecurity emanating from the activities of extremist groups such as Boko Haram, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), etc. Continued attacks on local and trans-border communities in Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon by Boko Haram and the attacks in Mali, the Grand Bassam area of Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, indicate the expanding nature of the threat and its destabilizing consequences. AQIM and Boko Haram are two of the deadliest groups currently operating in the region.

Despite efforts to prevent violent extremism and counter-terrorist activities across the region, new groups such as the Ansar ul Islam in Burkina Faso are operating with a level of sophistication that increases in ferocity with each attack. This has been further exacerbated by declarations of affiliation by these groups to Islamic State (ISIS). Terrorist groups in West Africa have access to weapons such as plastic explosives, rocket-propelled grenades, surface-to-air missiles and light anti-aircraft artillery believed to have been sourced from Libya following the toppling of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi regime (Aning, Okyere & Abdallah, 2012).

The presence of large caches of weapons has contributed to the high level of violence in West Africa. Out of an estimated 500 million arms in circulation in the global market, about 7 million have reportedly made their way into Africa (GIABA, 2013) in addition to locally manufactured arms in West Africa. This can be attributed to the aftermath of the Cold War, civil wars, armed conflicts, and the proliferation of weapons from the Arab spring. Mali was instrumental to a negotiation process within the institutional framework of ECOWAS for a regional freeze on the import, export and manufacture of small arms and light weapons in West Africa. However, the country has since regressed significantly since the outbreak of an insurgency in 2012.
Additionally, transnational organised crimes such as fraud, drug and human trafficking, money laundering, smuggling, piracy, hostage taking and kidnapping are also common. These crimes are facilitated by porous borders, corruption, weak or fragile states and lack of institutional capacity. West Africa is a key transit hub for narcotics (cocaine and heroin) from South America and destined for European and North American markets, and as a re-distribution and consumption point. In some countries, such as Guinea-Bissau, narco-enterprises have succeeded in corrupting state officials, leading to the disintegration of state institutions and their authority. Another area of concern relates to the spate of cybercrime. According to Adeniran (2011), the modernisation of criminality among Nigerian cybercriminal groups, for example, has been enabled by the internet and youth unemployment, lack of social support and a general deterioration of conditions of living in the country. The most prevalent forms of cybercrime include fraud, Automated Teller Machine (ATM) spoofing, hacking, impersonation, identity theft and so-called ‘419’ scams, also known as advance-fee fraud.

Challenges to peace and security emerge during democratic transitions and in West Africa. Elections are characterised by deep tensions fueled by factors such as ethnicity, which candidates often exploit; winner-takes-all political contests, which makes parties and candidates want to win at all cost; relative lack of confidence in the neutrality of election management bodies and allegations of electoral malpractice. Election disputes across the region are often marked by outbreaks of violence – as witnessed in Burkina Faso, 2014, and 2015, Benin 2019, Côte d’Ivoire 2011, Guinea 2012-2013 and 2018, and Nigeria 2015, and 2019 – with elections often causing great anxiety among the populace. Regrettably, a few leaders still nurse ambitions of long-term rule, even if that means manipulating and influencing constitutional changes to extend their stay in power beyond constitutional term limits. Such practices are exacerbating the crisis of political stability and undermining good governance in a few countries across the region.

On the human security front, conflict arising out of struggles between competing groups for access to, and control over natural resources continue to pose new threats. Droughts, linked to climate change have led to increasing migration of individuals and communities from drier zones, in search of farming and grazing land and water resources. Consequently, farmer-herder conflicts have become a common feature, threatening the peace and security landscape. Also, meningitis, cholera, and Lassa fever are endemic in the region, and epidemics and pandemics such as Ebola and most recently Covid-19 have exhibited the region’s vulnerability in the face of widespread disease outbreaks. Given the fragile state of health infrastructures and shortages of vaccines and medications, the outbreak of epidemics and diseases pose formidable threats to the lives of West Africans.

Despite the provisions of ECOWAS’s Conflict Prevention Mechanism and emphasis on detecting conflicts early, before they lead to incalculable consequences, organised violence, and the looming threats of a breakdown of law and order are evident. Realising that issues of governance have been one of the roots of conflicts in West Africa, ECOWAS leaders signed a Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001) to specifically address
matters relating to democratisation and governance. However, these remain a major challenge in most member states because of wide gaps between signing protocols, ratifying and implementing them. Events in the Gambia in 2017 when ECOWAS insisted that Yahya Jammeh hand over to the winner of the December 2016 elections, Adama Barrow, despite the former’s initial refusal to do so, demonstrated ECOWAS’s continued zero-tolerance for unconstitutional changes of government in the region.

The Principle of an ‘ECOWAS of the peoples’

Since its inauguration on 28 May 1975, ECOWAS has been promoting economic cooperation and regional integration among its 15 member states. Also, from the early 1990s, it progressively created Africa’s most sophisticated mechanisms of regional peace and security (Obi 2009). Member states recognised that peace and security were necessary ingredients for economic development and that economic strategies had to be complemented by initiatives that addressed human development, social infrastructure, health, the environment, and ethnic and political conflicts. The Liberian war of 1989-1996 was largely responsible for bringing regional security to the core of ECOWAS’s integration agenda. By August 1990, there were 225,000 Liberian refugees in Guinea, 150,000 in Côte d’Ivoire, and 69,000 in Sierra Leone. Furthermore, 5,000 people had been killed and about 3,000 Nigerian, Ghanaian and Sierra Leonean citizens were held hostage by the rebel National Patriotic Front of Liberia led by Charles Taylor (Aboagye, 1999).

In June 2007, the Authority of Heads of State and Government adopted a landmark resolution through its Vision 2020, which aimed to transform the organisation from an ECOWAS of States to an ECOWAS of the Peoples (see chapter 4 in this volume). The resolution resonates with the spirit behind the formation of the organisation, seeking to create a borderless region where populations have access to its abundant resources and can exploit them through the creation of opportunities under a stable environment. The peace and security pillar of Vision 2020 is aptly captured in the ECOWAS Strategic Plan. It envisions a secure and socially cohesive West Africa devoid of conflicts, whose leaders and people place a high premium on peace and collective regional security; and the effective operation of an ECOWAS regional defence and security system that will combat the proliferation of SALWs and illicit drugs. There will be conscious and sustained collective effort to eliminate social discrimination or exclusion; and a demonstrably strong drive to inculcate acceptance of the socio-cultural diversity as a positive factor that enriches life in the region.

ECOWAS has advanced a paradigm shift from a unilateral and state-centric approach to peace, security, and development, to multi-stakeholder participation working in partnership with civil society (See chapters 4 and 7 in this volume). The revised 1993 ECOWAS treaty called on the regional community to co-operate with regional CSOs and encourage the broad participation of citizens in the integration process. This marked an important change in both the structure and character of West African cooperation marked by a shift towards a more
people-centred agenda as opposed to the “overly state-centric approach of the past” (WACSI, 2009). To ensure its collaboration with CSOs and bring to fruition the spirit behind an ECOWAS of the Peoples, the organisation created a platform for interaction with CSOs, the Forum of Associations Recognized by ECOWAS (FARE). The association has a membership base of about 30 CSOs, representing different expertise and constituents of civil society in the region, and tries to bridge the gap between ECOWAS and the citizens of the community.

Similarly, in 2003 ECOWAS spearheaded the creation of the West African Civil Society Forum (WACSOF). WACSOF is a network of CSOs and operates at the national level, with a regional coordinating secretariat in Abuja, Nigeria. The logic for creating a regional civil society forum was based on the need to ensure the input of community citizens in ECOWAS policy formulation processes and increase dialogue between CSOs and ECOWAS. CSOs from within the region have been working with ECOWAS in implementing various instruments including, the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, signed in Lomé on the 10 December 1999 (1999 Mechanism); and the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) of January 2008. The framework seeks to address operational and structural conflict prevention and provides entry points for civil society participation. This resonates with the global shift in the focus of peace and security from a state-centric to a human security agenda, and consistent with operationalising the principle of an ECOWAS of the Peoples.

This principle undergirds WANEP’s partnership with ECOWAS and shows the possibilities and prospects for improved civil society engagements with Regional Economic Communities (RECs). In line with this partnership, WANEP maintains a liaison office in the ECOWAS Commission in Abuja to facilitate the interface between ECOWAS and civil society on matters relating to conflict prevention and mitigation. This is an opportunity that has enabled CSOs to contribute to the peace and security agenda of the region. WANEP has influenced policymaking to end violence and deadly conflicts in the region through its numerous analytical policy briefs, which provide incisive ideas on what the threats and vulnerabilities are; who the actors are and what their agenda and undeclared intentions are; and what needs to be done by whom, how and why.

**WANEP-ECOWAS Partnership**

In West Africa, community-based organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and CSOs at large working for peace and development have demonstrated their passion and perhaps their capacity to complement government efforts. Unfortunately, these organisations in the past were side-lined in peace processes, especially at the peace negotiation table. However, due to significant contributions by CSOs in the areas of the environment and sustainable development, human rights and women’s issues, conflict prevention and peace building, governments and international actors are increasingly recognising the role of civil society in governance and have even started to build partnerships with civil society. There
are many CSOs with experience in grassroots development, engaging in political processes, policy formulation, influence and effecting change, which also requires political leverage (WANEP, 2012). However, WANEP became an obvious choice for ECOWAS, considering its expertise in peace and security, its structure and wide coverage of the region.

WANEP was formally launched in 1998, with a vision of a West Africa at the pinnacle of justice and peaceful coexistence. The mission of WANEP is to enable and facilitate the development of mechanisms for cooperation among civil society-based peacebuilding practitioners and organisations in West Africa by promoting cooperative responses to violent conflicts. It also provides the structure through which these practitioners and institutions regularly exchange experiences and information on issues of peacebuilding, conflict transformation, social, religious, and political reconciliation; and promoting West Africa’s values as resources for peacebuilding (WANEP, 2016a).

With a network of community-based, national, and regional networks in various peace and security thematic issues, WANEP has continued to build strong synergies with stakeholders and partners to ensure a transformation and paradigm shift from reaction to prevention of violent conflicts. In 2002, it entered into a formal agreement with ECOWAS through the Capacity Building Program in Conflict Prevention and Good Governance. The aim of the partnership was to mobilise civil society in West Africa in salient thematic areas that affect regional peace and stability. ECOWAS and WANEP share the conviction that CSOs can make governments and state structures more responsive through participation in political processes, policy dialogue, monitoring, and advocacy campaigns. CSOs can also help share and collate information/data on early warning of emerging crises via monitoring, analysis, and communication strategies. This will help raise awareness, as well as develop options and strategies for early response. In this regard, political will for response through lobbying and campaigns is mobilised and domestic audiences sensitised.

The challenges, failures and shortcomings in resolving West Africa’s multifaceted crises, and the quest to right the wrongs and errors of the past were the driving force behind the elaboration of the framework document that provides the opportunity for collaboration between ECOWAS and WANEP. The partnership between WANEP and ECOWAS was sealed by a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in 2004. The MOU had three broad objectives: a) to enhance the conflict prevention capacity of CSOs in West Africa; b) to enhance the conflict prevention capacity of ECOWAS, and c) to build and enhance collaboration between CSOs in West Africa and ECOWAS in matters of conflict prevention. WANEP’s primary focus was the operationalisation of the ECOWAS Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN). The MOU has been consistently renewed\(^\text{1}\), with the most recent targeting the decentralization of early warning, being for five years, ending in 2019. This experience of collaboration between WANEP and ECOWAS has been highlighted as the best practice for building alliances with CSOs in conflict prevention; and is a point of reference currently being examined by other RECs such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (WANEP, 2017).
ECOWARN is an important component of the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, especially on preventive measures. It is made up of an observation and monitoring system located at the ECOWAS Commission, with four zonal information and reporting bureaus in Cotonou (covering Benin, Nigeria and Togo); Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger); Monrovia (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Ghana); and Banjul (the Gambia, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal).

To further strengthen and complement ECOWARN, WANEP launched its West Africa Early Warning and Response Network (WARN) in 2010 as an integral part of its peacebuilding strategy. Subsequently WANEP developed the National Early Warning System (NEWS) in all the 15 ECOWAS member states. NEWS strives to respond to critical demands for pertinent information relating to human security and violent conflicts, especially at community level. Through NEWS, CSOs are involved in filtering, monitoring and analysing information on possible threats to human security at the community and national levels. Early warning information is shared with ECOWAS and other stakeholders on a regular basis; for example, as daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly reports, as well as conflict censuses and assessments. WARN and NEWS have been of immense value in the promotion of peace and security in the region.

In support of ECOWAS’s mediation and peacekeeping efforts in Sierra Leone during the war, a comprehensive impact assessment of the conflict was conducted shortly after Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels attacked Freetown in January 1999. The assessment provided an opportunity to hold discussions with civil society groups and key stakeholders in Sierra Leone to build a common strategy for the peacebuilding process. Arguably, these activities influenced key leaders and other key actors in the Sierra Leone conflicts to disband their forces in preference for negotiated peace through dialogue. For example, the leader of Armed Forces Revolutionary Council/Sierra Leone Army (AFRC/SLA), Johnny Paul Koroma, disbanded the AFRC/SLA. Similarly the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) proposed a joint conflict resolution committee, where politicians were engaged in a deep reflection about what type of Sierra Leone should result from post-war rebuilding efforts, and what type of vision and leadership were needed to bring this forth. The collaborative approach to peacebuilding encouraged NGOs to come together and to form the Network for Collaborative Peace Building, which allows for efficient coordination. WANEP-Sierra Leone continues to facilitate the activities of the Network for Collaborative Peace Building representing CSOs at the level of the UN Peacebuilding Commission.

The West Africa Peacebuilding Institute (WAPI) was established in 2002 as the official training platform of WANEP to provide additional training for ECOWAS Commission staff, ECOWAS citizens, relevant agencies, peacebuilding practitioners, organisations and businesses in the area of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. It strives to overcome the gap in practice, knowledge, and skills in peacebuilding in the region and increase the number of competent, active peacebuilding practitioners. Since 2002, WAPI has trained over 500 practitioners
from ECOWAS, the AU, UN, state institutions, CSOs and corporate bodies in peacebuilding paradigms; natural resource governance and conflict management; human security and development; dialogue and mediation; youth and peace education; gender and peacebuilding; and early warning and early response. WAPI currently holds a training program annually at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana, with which WANEP has signed an MOU. The MOU affirms the commitment of the two institutions to work together with ECOWAS in pursuit of peace and stability in West Africa through research, training, education, and mentoring.

In support of ECOWAS’s dialogue and mediation efforts in West Africa, WANEP undertakes special interventions in dialogue and mediation with the aim of promoting inter- and intra-communal dialogue and peaceful coexistence, as well as to enhance the mediating capacities of communities and other relevant state and inter-governmental bodies. In addition, WANEP is a strong advocate for national peace architectures as a national and decentralised mechanism for responding to conflicts and mitigating their effects. In this regard, WANEP played a crucial role in the establishment of the National Peace Council of Ghana and is currently supporting the establishment of peace architectures in Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Nigeria, and Niger (WANEP, 2007).

WANEP has contributed to the mediation of disputes at the communal and national levels in several countries, notably Ghana, Benin, Guinea, Nigeria, and Niger. An example of this was during the 2012 general elections in Ghana, where through the Joint Platform for Election Result Monitoring (J-PERM), results coming in from polling centres were jointly accessed in a coordinated situation room by the major political parties and representatives of the Electoral Commission, National Peace Council and other strategic stakeholders. Rising tensions were immediately defused where it became evident that the situation was going to deteriorate. With WANEP’s support, the National Peace Council of Ghana convened a meeting with the two major parties (NDC and NPP), and Electoral Commission to brainstorm a way forward in order to allow the Electoral Commission to proceed to declare the results.

WANEP also supports the ECOWAS electoral unit and its commitment to peaceful transitions in West Africa, via its Civil Society Coordination and Democratic Governance programme. The programme provides an integrated platform for WANEP’s engagement with diverse stakeholders to promote peaceful democratic transition and conflict-resolving processes/programs. It specifically collaborates with other CSOs to monitor and mitigate election-related conflicts with a view to promoting dialogue and peaceful elections. WANEP has developed a practice guide and training manual on managing election disputes in West Africa, which is in use in throughout the region.

In Côte d’Ivoire, WANEP was able to mobilise CSOs, including religious and traditional leaders, in campaigning against the ethnically divisive politics deployed by some politicians, which literally divided the country into the government-controlled south and rebel-held north. WANEP-Côte d’Ivoire played a key role in facilitating CSOs’ participation in the Flame of Peace ceremony that
symbolised the cessation of fighting and respect for the Ouagadougou Agreement between President Laurent Gbagbo and Guillaume Soro of FN, on March 4, 2007. A monitoring committee was set up with other CSOs to provide quarterly reports on the implementation of the agreement.

Through its Women in Peacebuilding Program (WIPNET), which was launched in 2001, WANEP builds the capacity of women to enhance their roles in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction in West Africa. It also supports the ECOWAS Gender Directorate in the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security component of the ECPF, and promotes gender mainstreaming into peacebuilding and conflict prevention frameworks at the community, national and regional levels. WIPNET seeks to promote the involvement and participation of women in peace processes, following their enormous suffering in wars; and the under-valued and under-utilised conflict prevention skills of women and their leadership prowess, which is key in reversing their marginalization in the rebuilding of war-torn societies. The programme mobilised Liberian women as a pressure group to force the warring parties into signing the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement or Accra Peace Agreement for the resolution of the Liberian crises in August 2003 during the ECOWAS-led mediation process. The outcome of the Liberian peace process and the role of WIPNET have been widely acknowledged (WANEP, 2017). It led to the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, the former president of Liberia and former chair of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, and Leymah Gbowee, the former WANEP-Liberia coordinator for the WIPNET programme.

The WIPNET initiative preceded UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, demonstrating the flexibility and foresight of CSOs in promoting women’s participation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in West Africa. In collaboration with the ECOWAS Gender Directorate and the Women Peace and Security Institute of the KAIPTC, WANEP launched guidelines for the development and implementation of national action plans on UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions in October 2012. Since then, over 90 percent – 13- out of the 15 ECOWAS member states have developed and continued to implement their national plans on UNSCR 1325.

Children and youth in West Africa constitute a significant percentage of actors or victims directly affected by various conflicts that have bedevilled the region in the past three decades, as witnessed in Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and more recently the violent extremism and religious fundamentalism ravaging northern regions of Mali, Niger and Nigeria. This has had physical and psychological impacts on children and young people, who have suffered massive abuse at the hands of armed militia groups and insurgents, as child soldiers or orphans, or as victims of sexual slavery, displacement, and torture. In this regard, WANEP launched the Nonviolence and Peace Education Program (NAPE) in May 2000 to address rising levels of children and youths’ involvement in violent conflicts.

This is based on the conviction that the youth hold the key to future stability and development of West Africa. NAPE aims to promote the culture of non-violence
and peace within West African communities, with a focus on children and youth in schools and the informal sector. The programme works in harmony with the vision of the ECOWAS Council of Ministers of Education of institutionalising peace education in the region’s schools. It promotes peer mediation and peace clubs, as well as peace education curriculums either as integrated or independent subjects at various levels such as schools, colleges, teacher training colleges and universities, and at the policy level.

WANEP sees peacebuilding not as an event but rather a process; when properly inculcated in the minds and comportment of children, youths, and adults, they will become agents of change. The acceptability and impact of the project motivated WANEP to capture its experiences through a practice guide that is now a referral document to institutionalise peace education policy and practice in West Africa (WANEP, 2001).

Challenges and prospects of CSOs contribution to the ECOWAS Peace and Security agenda in West Africa

In analysing the activities of CSO globally, Frerks (2006) noted eight sets of challenges that tend to undermine the activities of CSOs, especially in the field of peacebuilding, namely: 1) the problem of staying impartial during or after conflict; 2) representation or the problem of the democratic deficit; 3) the issue of quality and the question of institutional strengthening and partnering; 4) the complex nature of peacebuilding; 5) transparency and accountability; 6) measurability of impact, macro issues and power elites; 7) sustainability; and 8) “securitisation” of development. In looking at the West African context of civil society’s role in conflict prevention, Ekiyor (2008) highlighted the many valuable contributions of West African CSOs, but focused on six areas of concern: 1) state-civil society relations; 2) narrow focus on NGOs; 3) weak and underfunded coordination mechanisms; 4) limited conflict prevention skills; 5) lack of policy influence; and 6) lack of documentation. Be that as it may, there are major challenges hindering the effective contribution of CSOs to the actualisation of the ECOWAS Peace and Security Agenda.

Insufficient funding

This has greatly inhibited the contributions of CSOs to the promotion of peace and security in the region. Moreover, a large portion of funding for conflict resolution and peacebuilding comes from external partners such as the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), USAID, the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), and Austrian Development Cooperation, etc (see chapter 7 in this volume). Funds are usually short-term in duration and limited in scope, considering that some foreign partners are wary of CSOs in West Africa. With limited funds, external partners demand results within noticeably short and unrealistic timeframes, especially given the complex nature of conflicts in the region. However, there is little support for peacebuilding from the private
and business sectors in West Africa. Their contributions in the peace process have not been significant towards the consolidation of peace and security in the region (Eze and Suifon, 2012).

**Unskilled workforce**

While the number of peacebuilding practitioners in the region has grown, there is still a shortage of skilled personnel. In some instances, the situation can be exacerbated, especially when personnel intervene in conflict situations without requisite knowledge of the context and required skills to engage in the circumstance.

**State-CSOs’ relationship**

In comparison with other RECs in Africa, ECOWAS has demonstrated leadership through its well-thought-out normative frameworks and involvement of CSOs in its peace and security agenda. However, some member states still perceive issues of peace and security as the sole responsibility of the state. To this end, many governments are suspicious of the motives of CSOs and see their activities as being tantamount to political opposition.

**Weak coordination**

There is weak collaboration among some CSOs, which often leads to duplication of efforts and lack of synergy necessary for advancing partnerships. This could be due to adversarial relationships between organisations over funding opportunities, rather than disagreements over collaboration for the collective promotion of human security.

Specifically, the challenge for WANEP in the promotion of peace and security stems from the fact that many state institutions and security apparatuses in the region are unable or slow in confronting emerging threats to peace, due to lack of resources or political will. In addition, corrupt and ineffective governance mechanisms in some ECOWAS member states undermine the gains of WANEP and ECOWAS in ensuring human security and development. This weak link between early warning and early response continues to threaten the sustained effectiveness of WANEP, as collecting, analysing, and reporting conflict early warning information is meaningless unless it is properly connected to early response.

**Conclusion and recommendations**

Civil society has emerged as an indispensable partner in peacebuilding in West Africa. It remains a critical factor in regional stability, peace, and economic development. In several countries, state legitimacy is either being undermined or contested, and citizens’ trust in government has been eroded due to poor governance expressed mostly in the failure to provide social services. Also, the states in some ECOWAS member countries no longer have monopoly of the use of force.
Civil society has been at the forefront of rebuilding broken relations, especially in the crucial phase of post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation (Suifon, 2014). There have been significant improvements in the role of CSOs in the areas of conflict resolution and regional peacebuilding. Responses to conflict by ECOWAS and CSOs are improving in terms of speed and effectiveness. The ECOWAS-WANEP partnership is an emerging success story in relation to the capacity to detect and predict security threats in the region. While far-reaching steps have been taken towards implementing the “ECOWAS of the Peoples,” the prevalence of new and ongoing conflicts suggests that more work needs to be done. The involvement of civil society in the operationalisation of ECOWARN is an innovation that reflects global recognition of civil society in building peace and security. So far, the partnership has led to the establishment of an early warning system that draws its strength from information gathering. However, the challenge remains ECOWAS’s inability to effectively link early warning to early response (Opoku, 2007).

In charting a path for civil society collaboration with the state and intergovernmental organisations, and promoting its contribution to the ECOWAS Peace and Security Agenda, member states need to further interrogate the notion that peace and security should remain the sole responsibility of the state. This would entail an expansion of the notion beyond its current state-centric focus to embrace a people-centered ‘endogenous’ insistence on good governance and a renewed international commitment to greater egalitarianism in global decision-making. In this regard, emphasis on multi-disciplinary approaches involving a range of governmental and non-governmental actors in understanding their respective roles, and reliance on a broad partnership – including local communities, civil society, media, the private sector, humanitarian organisations and others – is key. Here are some recommendations:

- Expansion of partnerships with relevant CSOs to include directorates of the ECOWAS Commission other than Political Affairs Peace and Security.
- Annual contributions from the ECOWAS Peace Fund and other sources to regional CSOs in formal partnerships with the Commission.
- Organisation of an annual meeting between the Commission and CSOs on thematic issues to promote synergy and accountability.
- A review of ECOWARN indicators to ensure they capture current dynamics including violent extremism, piracy, and cybercrimes.
- ECOWAS member states should domesticate the ECPF as well as other ECOWAS strategic documents and ensure national ownership.
- The ECOWAS Commission should serve as an entry point for engaging national governments on key regional peace and security initiatives.
- CSOs should increase capacity building in conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
- CSOs should collaborate with relevant national and community stakeholders to ensure synergy and optimise results.
- CSOs involved in conflict prevention, mediation and peacebuilding should intensify their advocacy and insistence on preventive mechanisms, since they are cheaper (than mediating full-blown conflict) and less complex.
CSOs should be engaged in the decentralisation of ECOWARN through the development and operationalisation of the ECOWAS National Early Warning Mechanisms and the establishment of peace architectures as aptly articulated in the policy document adopted by the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government in Accra in 2014.

Notes
1 Both ECOWAS and WANEP renewed MOU for the sustenance of Regional Early Warning and Response Mechanism Available online: https://wanep.org/wanep/attachments/article/658/pr_sept_2014_WANEP-ECOWAS_mou.pdf
2 The Ouagadougou Political Agreement 4 March 2007 Available: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/ouagadougou-political-agreement-opa

References


6 ECOWAS and the limits of peacemaking in West Africa

Amadu Sesay

Introduction

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is arguably the single most important achievement of West Africa’s post-independence leaders. The project was aimed at bridging the tangible and intangible legacies of the colonial powers, often referred to as the “Anglophone and Francophone divide in West Africa.” A retrospective glimpse at the region before the creation of ECOWAS reveals a geographical space that was replete with “sit-tight leaders,” “presidents for life,” one-party dictatorships, and tyrannical, retrogressive, plundering civilian and military regimes; it was a severely asphyxiated political space that had little or no respect for basic human rights, human dignity, or security of life. There was absence of region-wide opprobrium and sanctions for those who obtained power through the barrel of a gun or by other unconstitutional means.

The establishment of ECOWAS in 1975 changed the governance, peace, and security landscape in West Africa significantly. ECOWAS was able to noticeably mitigate the debilitating effects of the East–West Cold War rivalry in the region through the deliberate use of “good offices” and “presidential mediation,” which resulted in significant fence-mending between and among some of its members, including those that were not on talking terms with one another. To its credit, ECOWAS has, in the past four decades and a half, facilitated political reconciliation and prevented an outbreak out of hostilities between its members. The huge success of the European Union (EU), often seen as ECOWAS’s “mentor,” undoubtedly played an important role in encouraging the leaders in the region to move ahead with the integration project despite the enormous challenges. There was also encouragement from the relative economic success of the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – in that regard (Cheru and Obi, 2010; Southall and Melber, 2009; Vines, Wong, Weimer, and Campos, 2009).

An accidental peace enforcer?

In assessing the now widely acknowledged success of ECOWAS in restoring relative/peace and stability in West Africa, it is often forgotten that the organisation started its peacemaking role in the region by routinely brokering peace
between its feuding leaders. It was, however, the cataclysmic post-Cold War conflicts in some member states – most especially Liberia and Sierra Leone – that led to their interconnected “uncivil” wars and the deepening of ECOWAS’s involvement in peace support operations in the region. The new preoccupation was codified in the 1999 Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security (“the Mechanism”), which aimed to change responses to domestic peace and security challenges. Another significant development was the involvement in, and support of, key external state and non-state actors to ECOWAS’s peacemaking efforts in West Africa in diverse ways: funding meetings and conferences; providing technical expertise through the secondment of senior military personnel at the ECOWAS Commission’s headquarters in Abuja; and providing logistics support using development partners, especially during military deployments. Such partnerships with donor countries have been an indispensable catalyst in the implementation of ECOWAS’s “expanded mandate” and institution-building, which have also underlined the interconnectedness of economic and politico-security issues in the region.

ECOWAS capitalised on the commitment of regional leaders to stealthily challenge and tone down the emphasis hitherto placed on national sovereignty. Slowly and incrementally, ECOWAS has made important inroads into the traditional preserves of member states and the almost exclusive right to make laws for peace and security, all of which underscored its evolution into a regional security community. This concentration on security is arguably at the expense of growing the economies of member states, wealth creation, and even economic integration, with negative consequences for the organisation’s ability to undertake, and sustainably, what I call “hard or lethal peacemaking” activities. ECOWAS presents a salient theoretical and practical innovation and change in integration schemes, most especially in Africa, an unorthodox route to integration in which peace, security, and stability are the most notable catalysts for political and economic integration.

Of particular interest were the extremely inhumane civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the early 1990s, which inspired unparalleled improvisation by ECOWAS, most notably the deployment of the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), a precipitate military operation that was believed to have been authorised by the still little-known Community Standing Mediation Committee. ECOMOG troop deployments in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau, and then in Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and the Gambia, symbolised at a level of analysis a bold attempt to operationalise contemporary pan-Africanism or what has been described as “try Africa first” (Sesay and Omotosho, 2011), which emphasises collective problem-solving at continental and regional levels as an approach to multilateral cooperation and integration. At another level, the deployment of ECOMOG, now institutionalised as the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), was a practical expression of the popular phrase “African solutions to African problems” (AfSOL) (Sesay and Omotosho, 2011; Sesay, 2016) in peace and security matters, which is being vigorously promoted by the African Union (AU).
The ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture is in tandem with the AU’s mechanism, an institutional reflection of the continental body’s own expanded mandate. The ESF’s capacity is being strengthened for effective deployment within and outside the region at the request of the AU, the United Nations (UN), or any other international organisation. This is why the ESF has been acknowledged as a model for other Regional Economic Communities (RECs) on the continent. It is arguable that ECOWAS has mastered, consciously and instinctively, what international relations scholars describe as “disjointed incrementalism” in its approach to peacemaking in West Africa, by turning the huge challenges and threats in the region that resulted from the collapse of some member states and the hostile immediate post-Cold War global environment into enormous opportunities for putting in place institutions, mechanisms, and processes for peacemaking and peace enforcement operations that were never anticipated, even in the revised 1993 Treaty. In the process, it engendered irreversible behavioural change among West Africa’s leaders and citizens, through institution-building. Some of the more notable landmarks are worthy of a brief mention.

First is the 1978 Protocol on Non-aggression, which aimed to build confidence and discourage interstate conflict in the region. In 1981, the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence (PMAD) was unanimously adopted to compel the organisation to defend any member state that was the victim of external military aggression. President Samuel Doe of Liberia invoked Article 16 of the Protocol in July 1990 in the wake of relentless attempts by Charles Taylor to take over the country by force of arms. A lot has been written on the legality of Doe’s letter. Much of the controversy centred on whether, at the time he sent the letter to the ECOWAS Executive Secretary, he was still the country’s de jure leader (Aboagye, 1999). Unfortunately, ECOWAS never commented on Doe’s letter, which would have given us a fuller background to the decision-making processes that culminated in the deployment of the ECOMOG force in Liberia. The Standing Mediation Committee, however, justified ECOMOG’s deployment on the ground as a needed response to the challenging and complex humanitarian emergency in the country, especially in Monrovia.

Other relevant landmarks in mapping ECOWAS’s foray into regional peacemaking and peace enforcement include the Mechanism, which placed overwhelming emphasis on multi-track approaches in tackling conflicts in the West Africa region. The Mechanism provided the template for creating other key conflict prevention and peacemaking instruments, such as the Early Warning System, the Council of Elders, the wide-ranging ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, Election Observation, the ECOWAS Court and Parliament, and the ESF. In January 2016, ECOWAS set up the Mediation Facilitation Directorate (MFD) as part of its efforts to consolidate and institutionalise its peacemaking efforts in the region. The broad mandate of the MFD is to “support the Political Affairs Directorate in the coordination and monitoring of mediation efforts by ECOWAS institutions and organs, Member States and non-state actors” (ECOWAS Commission, n.d., 7), and to organise bi-annual exchange programmes to enhance learning, sharing of experiences, and research in dialogue and mediation (ECOWAS Commission, n.d., 8, 11).
The ECOMOG military operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and the Gambia are eloquent testimonies to the strong political will and commitment of West African leaders to engage conflicts in the region head-on. It is irrelevant if deployments and interventions were carried with or without external support. What is more important is that ECOWAS’s huge investment in peacemaking mechanisms and initiatives in West Africa reflects a consciousness by the region’s leaders of the unquantifiable costs of violent conflicts on the one hand, and, on the other, the reality that “conflict prevention and peacemaking efforts are not only necessary but imperative if the integration project is to succeed”.

The Liberian intervention is particularly significant in tracking the evolution and consolidation of the ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture. It was the first attempt by a sub-regional organisation in Africa to deploy a peace enforcement force without the explicit approval of the UN Security Council. Second, the subsequent deployment of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) several years later presaged the formal involvement of the world body in such a joint venture as a “junior” partner. Third, the intense political and diplomatic shuttles, tensions, negotiations, disagreements, and compromises that characterised the formation and deployment of ECOMOG significantly enhanced political communication between member states as well as their commitment to the expanded ECOWAS project.

These developments become much more meaningful and potent in the context of the perceived Anglophone–Francophone divide; and associated fears of Nigeria’s hegemonic intentions in West Africa – what Adebajo has called “pax Nigeriana” (2002; 2004b). ECOWAS’s commitment to promoting peace and security in West Africa underscored the paradoxes between the region’s appalling levels of poverty and underdevelopment, and its strong commitment to put together and deploy complex peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the political capital generated by the success of ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone translated into unprecedented changes in the mandate, objectives, institutional structure, and ideological foundations of not only ECOWAS in West Africa but also of other regional bodies in Africa, especially the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This significant emotional, ideological, and political shift – and even activism – led to the transformation of the essentially redundant OAU into the more pro-active African Union (AU) in July 2002.

Not surprisingly, SADC and similar RECs have made conflict management, including peacekeeping and peace enforcement, a cardinal concern. The mandates of regional and continental bodies in Africa are now more intrusive, while member states are unwittingly surrendering increasing aspects of their sovereignty to continental and regional bodies to enhance the achievement of common goals, especially in the area of peace and security. The restoration of peace and stability in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and the Gambia has enabled those countries to face the more daunting challenges of nation-building
and post-conflict reconstruction with some measure of success. Liberia and Sierra Leone have consolidated post-civil war governance gains, and successfully organised a series of presidential and general elections certified as peaceful, free, and fair by ECOWAS, the AU, the EU, the UN, and other international bodies. Notwithstanding the daunting operational limitations and inevitable intra-organisational geopolitical competition, ECOWAS has since the 1990s emerged as the leading and most-experienced actor in peacemaking in Africa. ECOWAS has become an invaluable and indispensable partner of the AU and the UN in promoting peace and security in West Africa. Under the subsidiarity principle, it is ECOWAS, not the AU or the UN, that has primary responsibility for peace and security in the West Africa region.

**Irony of success and limits of peacemaking**

A lot has been written on ECOWAS’s peacemaking activities (see Adeshina, 2002; Adisa, 1993; Aning, 1994, 1999; Asante, 2004; and Bach, 2004). However, there is a scarcity of literature on the link between ECOWAS’s relative success in conflict prevention, management, peacemaking, and security on the one hand, and, on the other hand, its poor record in creating wealth and prosperity among its members through effective economic integration. According to Article 2(1) of the Treaty of Lagos, ECOWAS was set up “to promote cooperation and development in all fields […] for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its people, fostering closer relations among its members and contributing to the progress and development of the African continent.” Through cooperation on socio-economic policies and processes, ECOWAS was to facilitate timely standardisation of tariffs and trade procedures among member states to eventually create a common market, common commercial policy, and external tariffs (Article 58 of the 1975 Treaty).

Another central objective of the organisation was to facilitate the progressive liberalisation of trade within the community, through the elimination of customs duties and administrative and infrastructural barriers to trade among members. The abolition of restrictions on the free movement of people, services, and capital within the sub-region became a critical component of ECOWAS’s mandate, which is encapsulated in the 1979 Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and Services. ECOWAS was also to harmonise member states’ agricultural and industrial policies; promote joint projects in marketing, research, and agro-industrial enterprises; harmonise planning and implementation of schemes in transportation, communication, and energy sectors; and promote even development among member states through the establishment of a Fund for Cooperation, Compensation, and Development (Article 2[2] 1975 Treaty).

To underline this rather ambitious programme, the founding treaty of ECOWAS implicitly provided for the establishment of a customs union within ten years. As a regional integration scheme, it aimed to enhance the region’s development potential by expanding intra-community trade and improving essential physical infrastructure; strengthening members’ weak production capacities;
and promoting monetary and financial cooperation to achieve a single currency. However, Article 58 of the revised 1993 Treaty did not hide the new emphasis on security matters and ECOWAS’s unwitting transmutation into a complex security community.

Neglect of the economic integration components of ECOWAS, evidenced by its failure to meet vital community targets and, in particular, its inability to execute community-wide industrial projects, left West Africa far behind other regions in the UN’s Human Development Index, with negative consequences for its peacemaking agenda. The failure of the 1987 Economic Recovery Plan, which was already apparent in 1990, pointed to the stagnation as well as the decreasing political commitment of the organisation to its economic targets.

This failure became more pronounced after the 1990s, a period that also coincided with the expansion of its agenda in the non-economic sphere. During this period, most of the development indicators were negative for West Africa (Adedeji, 2004). The unimpressive performance of ECOWAS as an economic integration scheme drew attention from critical stakeholders and official platforms, notably the 21st ECOWAS Council of Ministers. In 2000, ECOWAS’s Executive Secretary lamented that, after 25 years, “ECOWAS has shown a poor record with regard to the community programmes” (ECOWAS, 2000).

This is reflected in its inability to fulfil its six cardinal goals, most notably trade liberalisation, well after the 1990 target date; its inability to evolve a common external tariff scheme as a prerequisite for a customs union; limited progress in harmonising economic and fiscal policies among member states; and the continued absence of a single monetary zone across the region. More than four decades after its creation, intra-regional trade was still less than 15 percent of the regional total (Sesay and Akinrinade, 1996; Shuaibu, 2015). In April 2017, no significant progress had been made either in promoting integration in trade and production or in creating practicable region-wide structures for economic transformation and wealth creation. The modest gains made in the organisation’s visa-free policy for community citizens have been bogged down by veiled politico-security restrictions, which are further compounded by terrorism and insurgency in some key member states including Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire. Continued terrorist threats from Boko Haram in Nigeria have increasingly directed the attention of ECOWAS’s most powerful member inwards (Runsewe, 2016).

It is apposite therefore to start with a brief look at Nigeria, the most populous member and its biggest economy, which now accounts for 75 percent of West Africa’s total GDP and is the biggest economy in Africa ahead of South Africa (UNECA, 2015). Retrospectively, and to its credit, Nigeria led and provided more than 75 per cent of the human and financial resources needed for the Liberia and Sierra Leone operations in the 1990s. Nigeria is presently among those member countries that have been hardest hit by the global economic downturn caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Crude oil production was already at its lowest level in 30 years between 2016 and the first quarter of 2017 due to the activities of militant groups in the oil-rich Niger Delta.
Nigeria’s shaky economy had far-reaching implications for the country as well as the entire ECOWAS region, notably the resultant financial challenges for the regional body. The instability in the price of oil and the effect of insecurity in the Niger Delta on oil production were risk factors for national wealth. The significance of this for Nigeria and ECOWAS lies in the fact oil sales receipts constitute the biggest chunk of the country’s revenue and account for more than 80 percent of total earnings. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) confirmed in July 2016 that crude oil earnings had dropped by as much as NGN 41 billion in one month, and by as much as 18.01 percent in April 2016. Not surprisingly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) warned that Nigeria’s economy would contract by 1.8 percent in 2016 due to unprecedentedly low oil prices (Vanguard, 2016a).

The significance of this brief politico-economic profile of Nigeria is that, as the region’s biggest economy and the most important contributor to ECOWAS’s annual budget, the gloomy statistics are directly and indirectly tied to the organisation’s financial fortunes and its capacity to undertake autonomous force deployments in the region.

The success of the ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone was mainly due to the total commitment of Nigeria to the project and its relatively buoyant economy at the time. The present poor health of the Nigerian economy, coupled with constitutional checks and balances, makes it difficult for the president to engage in “foreign ventures” like those in Liberia. Another new dimension is the increasingly isolationist tendencies of the Nigerian elite, who openly complain that previous costly foreign adventures in Liberia and Sierra Leone did not yield commensurate dividends in terms of improved welfare for the citizens, or even political support for Nigeria’s foreign policy goals in the region, the AU, and the wider international community (Sesay, 2016). The ongoing insurgency in the northeast of the country, coupled with the disruptive militancy in the Niger Delta, presented security and socio-economic challenges that will make it hard for Nigeria to engage decisively in any future ECOWAS-led military missions in West Africa. The former President of the ECOWAS Commission, Marcel de Souza, admitted that the organisation was facing challenges including a “financial situation that has become quite precarious and the precarious situation is tied to the economic situation in the Member States and the fact that the price of oil has dropped” (Financial Watch, n.d.; Blank News Online, n.d.). Mr de Souza regretted that the Community Levy, which accounts for 90 percent of ECOWAS’s funding, is no longer regularly paid by most member states. The Commission was particularly concerned with the economic fortunes of Nigeria, its “richest” member, stressing that the poor financial state of ECOWAS was undermining its credibility in the region. He appealed to Nigeria to pay up its outstanding bills (Financial Watch, n.d.; Blank News Online, n.d.). The ECOWAS Commission’s new political head revealed, openly for the first time, that “the bills of peacebuilding troops sent to Mali and Guinea Bissau were yet to be paid […] peace comes with a cost that must be paid” (Financial Watch, n.d.; Blank News Online, n.d.). The Commission’s success and failure are intricately tied to the political and economic fortunes of Nigeria, more than any other member state.
Unfortunately for ECOWAS and its peacemaking efforts in West Africa, the prospects for the rest of the members are no better. According to the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA, 2015, xiii), “in terms of human development, with an average development index of 0.450 for West Africa, most of the countries in the region fall within the category of countries ‘with low human development,’ besides Cape Verde and Ghana” (UNECA, xiii). Consequently, the chances of attracting significant investment into the region are slim because of its low ranking in the **Doing Business Report for 2018**. Except for Ghana, which ranked 120th out of 190 countries listed, most West African countries were in the bottom half of the rankings. The low rating of countries in the region in **Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index for 2018** shows most countries in West Africa as grappling with major corruption-related challenges. The **Ibrahim Index of African Governance** also drew attention to the key indicators of poor governance in most of these countries.

Unconstitutional changes of government and coups d’état have significantly receded in the region. Nonetheless, religious extremism and terrorism in some key countries as pointed out earlier remain potent threats to state stability and prosperity in West Africa. Another very compelling threat ECOWAS has yet to find an answer to is the youth bulge, and massive youth unemployment and under-employment in all member states. More than four decades of regional integration have failed to promote inclusive development in the member states, a situation that does not augur well for sustainable peace and stability, given the direct link between youth unemployment, violence, political instability, insurgency, and civil wars.16

The Boko Haram insurgency in northeast Nigeria is partially blamed on youth exclusion, massive youth unemployment, and illiteracy. Intricately linked to that is the conclusion by the **Ibrahim Index of African Governance** that West Africa’s democratic institutions and governance systems are weak and could unravel under the weight of youth mass unemployment. The quality of institutions and mechanisms of the organisation are themselves a function of the quality of democratic governance in the member states. Although ECOWAS scores high on the proven political commitment of its members to peacemaking in the region, and has the “blood” – the military and allied personnel for peace enforcement operations – it is severely constrained by its weak “treasury” or fragile financial base. As the Mali After-Action Review (ECOWAS, 2014) eloquently testifies, “ECOWAS lacks the requisite strategic, military, logistical and financial base for autonomous action during violent conflicts in a non-permissive environment” (ECOWAS, 2014, 25). The Africa-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), which was co-sponsored by the AU and ECOWAS, was eventually taken over by the UN, although the mission was undertaken in “ECOWAS’s backyard.”

The Mali After-Action Review starkly revealed that the combined efforts of ECOWAS and the AU could not sustain the local funding and ownership of AFISMA, necessitating its re-hatting to create the United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). ECOWAS’s poor finances and lack of capacity had resulted in a crisis of self-confidence in its ability to initiate, own,
and successfully see through military deployments in the region. The Mali After-Action Review candidly admitted: “the conviction among the ECOWAS Member States that the Region could not intervene militarily in Mali on its own without substantial international logistical and financial support compromised any autonomous military planning from the start” (ECOWAS, 2014, 23). In spite of spirited efforts to institutionalise the ESF, there is no guarantee that the mechanism will be deployed efficiently in a member state. Few members can support their contingents in future military deployments for the statutory 90-day period and ECOWAS may not be able to take over funding such missions in line with global practices. As the Mali After-Action Review poignantly highlighted, “voluntarism and goodwill are not sufficient conditions for the success of a modern Peace Support Operation. Pledges must be backed by redemption” (ECOWAS, 2014, 31). Another serious hurdle to effective future military deployments is the absence of “an effective multidisciplinary Peace Support Operations Division to plan and coordinate operations” at the ECOWAS Commission. In Mali, the functions of this strategic organ were performed by a “cross-departmental Mali Working Group, which was a poor substitute” (ECOWAS, 2014, 31). More than four decades after its formation, ECOWAS has failed to develop the region’s “real sectors” upon which national and regional economic development and prosperity hinge (Bach, 1993, 606).

ECOWAS’s relative success in peacemaking ventures and initiatives in West Africa has inadvertently led it to adopt a static classical, rather than a robust, dynamic, and pragmatic approach to economic integration. Consequently, it has not been able to build and sustain its capacity to engage decisively in “lethal” peace support operations in West Africa. This shortcoming is compounded by its tendency to mirror similar experiments in Western Europe, notwithstanding the vast differences in their historical, socio-economic, geographical, and political dynamics; a situation that Sesay (2008b) described as “symbolism and impersonation.” The structural changes in ECOWAS, including the switch from an ECOWAS Community to an ECOWAS Commission complete with an executive President and Commissioners, underlined the symbolism and impersonation phenomenon on the part of West Africa’s flagship regional organisation.

**Conclusion**

The central argument in this chapter is that peacemaking and peace support operations are expensive, and presently beyond the means of ECOWAS, because of the appalling economic and security conditions in its members. Of concern is the weak economy in Nigeria, the region’s powerhouse and regional hub. Abuja, which had almost singlehandedly led and financed the ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone, is no longer in a position to do so. There is a need for both member states and the organisation to rededicate themselves to the original principles of the organisation.

Economic diversification and good governance must go hand in hand with sustained, inclusive development policies and programmes aimed at redistributing
wealth and income, in favour of disadvantaged groups that constitute the majority, to give every citizen a voice in decision-making processes that affect their lives. At the institutional level, ECOWAS should encourage members to put in place transparent and effective strategies beyond their formal Youth Policy Documents. It should nudge members to undertake the following measures, among many others: first, they should revamp outmoded curricula in all sectors of their educational systems, so that young school leavers and graduates will possess the requisite skills and be employable, and expose them to vocational life skills training for self-employment. Sadly, while the ICT revolution has catapulted states in the global North into the fourth industrial revolution, West Africa and sub-Saharan Africa are yet to embrace the first one successfully.17

Second, ECOWAS should rededicate itself to the pursuit of a two-track approach to regional integration, promoting economic development and wealth, and consolidating the creation of a security community to attract desperately needed foreign investment into the region. Third, ECOWAS should encourage member states to implement “tax incentive measures and programmes for the employability of young graduates by companies and the acquisition of first work experience” (UNECA, 2015, xiv). ECOWAS should set an example in spearheading genuine reform of agriculture by increasing investment in this vital sector, providing transport infrastructure that will open up remote rural areas, to choke off the urban–rural drift of young and largely illiterate youth. Effective investment in the agricultural sector could lead to genuine income redistribution through enhanced earnings for farmers, in a way that would checkmate the vicious cycle of what sociologists call “transmission of poverty” from one generation to another. It is remarkable in this regard that the Southeast Asian “economic miracle” was driven by substantial investment in the agricultural sector, which in some instances was as high as 25 percent of national budgets, among other pro-people measures and policies (Eyinla, 2012, 1).

Fourth, ECOWAS must establish a department at its headquarters in Abuja that is exclusively responsible for coordinating regional integration issues. It should encourage effective mechanisms at the national level to coordinate regional programmes and policies. There is real need for the re-establishment of vital links between member states and citizens to deepen economic integration in the region. ECOWAS should also encourage members to adhere to the protocol on terrorism as well as the 2006 ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition, and other Related Matters, especially after the collapse of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya in 2011, and its ramifications for peace and security in West Africa. ECOWAS must, therefore, work closely with other stakeholders to fully operationalise the “Sahel Strategy and strengthen crisis management mechanisms to contain the security and terrorism risks” (UNECA, 2015, xiv). ECOWAS needs to be actively involved in coordinating the actions and responses of critical non-member countries such as Algeria, Chad, Libya, Mauritania, and Morocco and important development partners, including the AU, the US, and the EU, to fast-track the operationalisation of the Sahel Strategy.
Fifth, ECOWAS should work towards the full establishment and operationalisation of a logistics depot to enhance its response capacity and facilitate the standardisation of equipment for enhanced local ownership. Closely related is the need for financial self-sufficiency, which is critical to sustainability and local ownership of peace support operations. The Mali After-Action Review rightly noted: “to ensure its rapidity and flexibility, safeguard secrecy and confidentiality to achieve successful outcomes, a PSO [peace support operation] must be endowed with an autonomous, consolidated and dedicated fund.” ECOWAS should seriously consider holding annual fundraising activities within and outside the region every year to celebrate “ECOWAS Day.” “ECOWAS Day” should be used to raise money for the ECOWAS Peace Fund. ECOWAS should encourage successful local and foreign corporate entities such as banks and oil companies, which are among the major beneficiaries of peace and stability in the region, to donate to the Fund. The West African Diaspora and friends of ECOWAS should be encouraged to donate generously. A Board of Trustees comprising notable individuals in and outside of the region should manage ECOWAS Day donations (ECOWAS, 2014, 31).

The need for effective communication during peace support operations cannot be overstated. Poor or even lack of efficient communication channels has been the bane of ECOWAS military missions dating back to Liberia in 1990. It was also a major challenge in the Mali mission. There is urgent need to put in place a “dedicated and secure communications, and simple administrative and procurement procedures (for such purpose) outside the normal (ECOWAS) bureaucracy” (ECOWAS, 2014, 31). A good starting point is to sufficiently fund the Communications Directorate at the headquarters in Abuja, to build its capacity to drive the new orientation. Finally, ECOWAS must work towards the realisation of Vision 2020 in line with its determination to transform “an ECOWAS of States into an ECOWAS of People Democratic and Prosperous” (ECOWAS, 2011). The organisation should, therefore, continue to engage closely and continuously with civil society forces and organisations in the region to benefit from their invaluable support in marketing its programmes and policies.18

Notes

1 President Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea was noted for having very frosty relations with some of his Francophone and Anglophone neighbours
2 The last border skirmish between ECOWAS members occurred in 1984 between Mali and Burkina Faso but was quickly brought under control through the timely intervention of Nigeria’s former foreign minister Bolaji Akinyemi.
3 In the 2015 revised 1999 Mechanism.
4 Hundreds of civilians, including ECOWAS nationals who took refuge in holy places and in diplomatic missions, were being massacred indiscriminately by all sides in the uncivil war. Most of the more comprehensive literature on the intervention in Liberia discussed this aspect.
5 The UN took over the Mali Mission from the AU and ECOWAS less than two years into the operation due to funding and logistical challenges.
6 Interview with Mr Osei, former director, economic planning and research department, ECOWAS Commission, Abuja, June 2007.
Adekeye Adebajo has made this point forcefully, directly, and indirectly, in some of his works. See, for instance, Adebajo (2002, 2004a, 2004b).

8 See, for example, Sesay and Akinrinade (1996) and Shuaibu (2015).

9 Sabotage of oil production facilities so disruptive that the Nigerian government is alleged to have reached an agreement with them, which at one point involved the release of the Okah brothers, who were sentenced in connection with bombings in Abuja in October 2010. In April 2020 crude oil price was $16.46 less than the production cost of $30.

10 Various national newspapers ran stories on the recession; for example The Nation (2016) and Vanguard (2016).

11 For instance, the price of crude oil, the country’s major foreign exchange earner, was only USD $27 a barrel in January 2016, while the budget was pegged at USD $38, with a daily production rate of 2.2 million barrels. Production dropped steeply to 1.2 million in July 2016 due to the activities of the Niger Delta Avengers.

12 See Vanguard, 20 July 2016.

13 For more on this argument see, Sesay (2016).

14 Nigeria pulled out of the Mali Mission unexpectedly blaming it on the need to concentrate on the war against Boko Haram in its northeast.

15 The visit led to the release of Nigeria’s contributions to the ECOWAS budget for 2015 and 2016, totaling USD $694,000. The minister also promised to provide the ECOWAS president with accommodation to save costs. It has been alleged that the money was deliberately withheld in protest at the Commission’s profligacy, especially during his predecessor’s tenure, which left it virtually bankrupt.

16 The most notorious examples are perhaps Liberia and Sierra Leone, which imploded in the early 1990s.

17 This is why African states and citizens are referred to as “ICT migrants” as opposed to “ICT citizens” as is the case in technologically developed countries.

18 I am not sure of the percentage of ECOWAS citizens that presently know of its existence, even after four decades of its existence, having been founded in July 1975.

References


ECOWAS and triangular cooperation for peacebuilding in West Africa
Challenges and prospects from the Liberian and Sierra Leonean experiences

Kehinde Olusola Olayode

Introduction

The expansion of the role of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) from being an organisation primarily focused on economic integration to include conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities in the 1990s exemplified the changing security environment across Africa and the convergence of development and security issues in the post-Cold War era. The outbreak of civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and unconstitutional changes in power in other West African countries, and accompanying humanitarian crises necessitated a review of ECOWAS’s foundational statutes to accommodate peacekeeping and peacebuilding interventions. ECOWAS-led peacebuilding in Liberia and Sierra Leone involved responses to multiple complex emergencies arising from the collapse of central administration and its attendant consequences. These included the collapse of various administrative organs of the state and institutions; refugee crises and internal displacement-related issues; resettlement and post-war rehabilitation and economic reconstruction. Others include rehabilitation of infrastructure, democratic transitions, and elections; reconciliation; disarmament and arms destruction; security sector reforms; and justice and restitution (truth and reconciliation). Given resource limitations and capacity deficiencies, ECOWAS-led peace initiatives were supported by multilateral agencies, South–South partners, and Western powers in a triangular pattern of cooperation for peacebuilding in West Africa.

South–South cooperation as a development framework has a long history. It is based on the building of shared histories and mutual economic, political, and cultural interests. The pivotal role of several emerging powers in the global South have created a compelling context for mainstreaming South–South cooperation framework peacebuilding efforts in developing countries. It seeks to shift the paradigm of development cooperation away from dominant asymmetrical donor–recipient, North–South, neo-colonial relationships, towards global “partnerships” with an emphasis on national and community ownership, equity, sustainability, inclusiveness, regional solutions, cost-effectiveness, and affordability. These principles are relevant to peacebuilding and resonate with the core principles of South–South cooperation (Sesay, Olayode, and Omotosho, 2013, 97). The
recognition of the immense potential of South–South development cooperation in
the context of shared interests in sustainable peacebuilding is a recent develop-
ment (United Nations, 2009).

Triangular cooperation refers to a version of South–South cooperation involv-
ing collaboration between Southern aid providers and Northern donors for the
benefit of a third Southern recipient country. It can find expression either in tri-
lateral, regional, or multilateral arrangements. Incorporating triangular coopera-
tion into peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction resonates with the United
Nations (UN) agenda for peacebuilding, which emphasises the importance of
cooperation between the UN and regional organisations for preventive diplomacy
within their respective areas of competence.

This chapter examines the prospects and challenges of triangular cooperation
in peacebuilding projects, using post-conflict Liberia and Sierra Leone as case
studies. It addresses the following questions: (1) What are the political and eco-
nomic constraints that have hampered ECOWAS initiatives in peacebuilding
in West Africa? (2) What are the lessons that can be learned from the Liberian
and Sierra Leonean cases in relation to ECOWAS’s experience with triangular
cooperation for building sustainable peace in West Africa? and (3) Can triangular
cooperation (multilateral and bilateral) be instituted as a permanent framework
for peacebuilding in West Africa?

Conceptual framework

Triangular cooperation involves Southern-driven partnerships between two or
more developing countries, supported by developed countries or multilateral
organisations to implement development programmes and projects. It has been
described by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) as “partnerships between Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
donors and Pivotal Countries (providers of South–South Cooperation) to imple-
ment development cooperation projects in beneficiary countries” (OECD, 2009).1
Thus, “triangular cooperation is South–South cooperation with the added dimen-
sion of Northern support to the southern partner assisting other developing coun-
tries” (ECA, 2011, 1). It, however, can also be undertaken by Southern partners
only as pivotal countries (ECOSOC, 2008; OECD, 2009).

Pivotal countries are Southern countries that have capacity and experience in
promoting South–South cooperation and are thus well-placed to promote technical
cooperation among developing countries by “sharing their capacities and experi-
ences with other developing countries in their regions or in other regions” (ECA,
2011, 2). In Liberia and Sierra Leone, various versions of triangular cooperation
manifested in trilateral, regional, and multilateral arrangements. For example, the
India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA) funds could be seen as a trilateral arrange-
ment, in support of ECOWAS peacebuilding initiatives in the two countries. In
addition, the participation of several UN agencies and other multilateral institu-
tions in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding is another example of a
multilateral triangular cooperation.
Peacebuilding as conceived by the UN Secretary-General’s Report in the 1992 Agenda for Peace involves “action to identify and support structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (UN, 1992, 21). This definition was further elaborated upon by two subsequent UN documents: the 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (known as the Brahimi Report), and the UN Secretary-General’s Policy Committee in the 2007 Report.

According to Ismail (2008, 13), some essential features of post-conflict peacebuilding include:

Disarmament, guarding and destruction of weapons, repatriating and resettling refugees, advising and retraining security actors, monitoring elections and protection of human rights, reforming and strengthening government institutions, police and judicial systems, [and] reforms and economic development.

The concept of peacebuilding is also intrinsically related to state-building in the context of collapse of state institutions during the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars. Peacebuilding in West Africa usually involves multiple complex emergencies associated with the collapse of central administration (failed state phenomenon) and its attendant consequences. As noted earlier, the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone contributed to the ascendancy of politico-security issues in ECOWAS’s agenda of economic integration as a strategy of regional development.

**Wars and attendant complex emergencies**

The interconnectedness of conflicts in West Africa should be in the context of strong historical and cultural ties between the peoples of the sub-region. This is further reinforced by artificial boundary demarcations that have aided unrestricted movements across borders. The porosity of borders has enabled dissident elements from one country to cross over into neighbouring ones to wage insurrections. The ECOWAS peacekeeping intervention started as a regional response to the Liberian civil war in late 1989, which later spilled over into Sierra Leone in 1991, triggering a brutal ten-year armed conflict (Obi, 2009). The first Liberian civil war commenced in December 1989 and lasted until 1997. The war started when Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) crossed the border from Côte d’Ivoire into Liberia with a small band of Libya-trained rebels, seeking to overthrow the repressive regime of Samuel Doe. The insurgency initially started in Nimba county and gradually gained ground due to the support that Taylor obtained from neighbouring countries and many dissident groups that opposed Doe’s brutal regime. The fighting later escalated into civil war, with different factions struggling for the control of central power.

The civil war in Sierra Leone was arguably a direct fall-out of the Liberian civil war. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was led by the aging Foday Sankoh, who had received training with Taylor in Libya and fought on the side
of NPFL in Liberia. Taylor found a willing ally in Sankoh in his desire to explore the lucrative illegal diamond trade in Sierra Leone to fund his insurgency. Taylor also claimed that by allowing its territory to be used as an operational base for the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), Sierra Leone had indirectly declared war against the NPFL and thus became a legitimate target for the NPFL. The RUF commenced its attack from the eastern and southern Sierra Leone border areas with Liberia in March 1991, claiming a desire to overthrow President Joseph Saidu Momoh because of corruption and repressive leadership. The RUF campaigns in Sierra Leone were characterised by wanton brutality against civilians, destruction of property, and savage plunder of mineral resources. The collapse of central state authorities was accompanied by massive dislocation, widespread human rights abuses, bloodshed, outbreaks of epidemics, looting, and arms trafficking. The Report of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee of 1990, where a decision was taken to dispatch the ECOMOG peacekeeping force to Liberia, highlighted the attendant security emergencies triggered by state collapse in Liberia (ECOWAS 1990, 3–4). The ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee on 7 August 1990 established ECOMOG in Liberia “to halt the wanton destruction of human life and property and massive damage being caused the armed conflict to the stability and survival of the entire Liberian nation” (ECOWAS, 1990, 3).

Referring to the connections between conflicts and regional security in West Africa, an analyst for an international humanitarian organisation noted:

The arc of instability in West Africa is linked together. The violence is interwoven. War in Liberia begat war in Sierra Leone, which in turn begat attacks in Guinea and prolonged the civil war in Cote d’Ivoire. The recognised borders do not mean anything to many of the hardcore combatants. When a country finally achieves a peace treaty, the guys who make a living through the barrel of their guns seep across the border to the next country.

(Drumtra, 2003, 1)

The Liberian civil war, which roughly lasted for 14 years, can be typically divided into two phases, the first spanning 1989–1997 and the second 1999–2003 (Shilue and Fagen, 2014, 1). The civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone provided vivid examples of state collapse and attendant humanitarian crises, which justified the creation of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Mechanism. ECOWAS peacekeeping interventions began with the Liberian civil war in 1989 and continued in Sierra Leone in 1997; Guinea-Bissau in 1998; the second Liberian civil war in 1999; Côte d’Ivoire in 2002; the second Côte d’Ivoire civil war in 2011; Mali in 2012; and the second Guinea-Bissau crisis in 2012 (Ukeje and Olayode, 2015, 9).

**ECOWAS’s initiatives for peacebuilding in Liberia and Sierra Leone**

In the context of an unprecedented humanitarian crisis and global powers’ disengagement from African conflicts after the Cold War, the Liberian crisis was
a turning point in ECOWAS’s agenda of promoting economic development and regional integration, to taking responsibility for collective security and conflict management in the sub-region.

Following a protracted and unproductive dialogue with various faction leaders in Liberia, the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee in August 1990, took the bold step of establishing and deploying ECOMOG amid bitter opposition from then rebel leader Taylor and some West African leaders. ECOMOG was charged with both mediating between the warring factions and neutralising them through forceful disarmament, if necessary. It also had peace enforcement and peacekeeping objectives. The deployment of ECOMOG to Liberia faced many difficulties. The deployment was opposed by Taylor, who was the dominant rebel leader in Liberia. Personal interests and ideological differences between Francophone and Anglophone members of ECOWAS made the task of peace restoration difficult in Liberia. In addition, procedural and operational disagreement among ECOWAS members also frustrated the deployment of troops by ECOMOG to Liberia.

ECOMOG’s military intervention in Sierra Leone was predominantly undertaken by Nigeria-led troops to restore the democratically elected government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, who was deposed in a military coup led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma on 25 May 1997. The coup was undertaken by a segment of the Sierra Leone Army that supported the RUF. Koroma established the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and made Sankoh vice-chairman. After the restoration of Kabbah, under the Lomé Agreement, a power-sharing arrangement saw Sankoh emerge as the vice president and head of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Mineral Resources, National Reconstruction, and Development (Ismail, 2015). With the withdrawal of Nigerian troops from the ECOWAS peacekeeping force in Sierra Leone and relentless attacks by the RUF, the UN Security Council eventually established the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

ECOWAS multilateral peacekeeping initiatives have been repeatedly criticised for being ineffective and for exacerbating the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone because of inadequate resources, lack of broad political support, and limited knowledge of the conflict terrains (Howe, 1997, 168–169; Obi, 2009, 8–9; Ismail, 2015, 4–5). However, Draman and Carmen (2003, 17) have argued that ECOMOG’s operations, though largely ineffective, “succeeded in containing the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts in the short term and also prevented the situation from degenerating into genocide as witnessed in Rwanda in 1994.”

Although initially conceived as a peacekeeping force, ECOMOG’s actual mission “bordered on peace-making and peace-enforcement, which was a clear departure from its original mandate” (Whiteman, 1990, 28). Resource constraints also limited the effectiveness of ECOMOG operations. While provision was made for the deployment of over 12,000 troops, inadequate funds and lack of military materials and equipment only permitted mobilisation of a limited number of soldiers, which was grossly inadequate for an effective peacekeeping operation.

As stated earlier, ECOWAS’s multilateral peacekeeping operations, though imperfect, taking into consideration the Liberian and Sierra Leonean experiences, were the first to be undertaken by an African sub-regional organisation.
The intervention also reflected an African attempt to resolve an African conflict through regional cooperation. Thus, without previous experience to draw from, the modest achievements recorded in Liberia were significant. While ECOWAS indeed faced enormous challenges in peace intervention, its military and diplomatic engagements paved the way for subsequent international efforts that finally ended devastating conflicts in the Mano River Basin region between 1990 and 2003. Although critics may point to its limited effectiveness, the ECOMOG intervention could be seen as “as a harbinger of potential African solutions to some of Africa’s pressing security problems” (Pitts, 1999, 1).

On the humanitarian front, ECOMOG was successful in reducing casualties and wanton destruction and provided safe passage for trapped civilians to be evacuated out of troublesome war zones. In addition, by securing the port and airport essential relief supplies were obtained for thousands of displaced civilians in dire need. In the context of state collapse and absence of administrative functions, ECOMOG in effect functioned as a police and defence force within its occupational zone (Scott, 1998, 19).

Triangular cooperation for peacebuilding

Faced with resource and capacity limitations, ECOWAS’s multilateral peace initiatives paved the way for the subsequent intervention of UN and Western powers in a triangular cooperation framework for peacebuilding. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, ECOMOG co-deployed peacekeepers with UN observer missions, while ECOWAS missions in Liberia (ECOMIL) and Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) provided rapid deployment forces that were transformed into UN peacekeepers. Despite problems of coordination and logistics, and differences in mandate, the cooperation between the UN and ECOWAS allowed each organisation to maximise its comparative advantage while working together to resolve the conflicts. Lessons learned from these missions provided a blueprint for how the UN and regional organisations could work together (Kabia, 2011, 2–4).

While the notion of “African solutions to African problems” is a highly commendable aspiration, the capacity for sustainability required in post-conflict peacebuilding is currently weak within ECOWAS because of inadequate funding, poor logistics, ideological differences, and weak capacity, among other things. A consequence of some of these deficiencies was that Nigeria pulled out from direct ECOMOG peacekeeping operations due to the heavy financial cost incurred in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean operations. This paved the way for the United Kingdom, the UN, France, and the African Union (AU) to become more substantially involved in post-conflict reconstruction in Sierra Leone and Liberia through triangular cooperation arrangement. A triangular South–South cooperation was also adopted in Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali, with France playing a leading role, supported by the AU and ECOWAS. The challenges of sustaining peacekeeping operations faced by ECOWAS also led to the “rehabbing” of ECOMOG forces as UN peacekeepers in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire.
In Liberia and Sierra Leone, the checklist of tasks involved in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction included deployment of peacekeepers; undertaking disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of ex-fighters; judicial and security sector reform; economic reconstruction reforms to facilitate development aid and assistance packages; and elections.

(ICC, 2004, 1)

In undertaking these various tasks, a combination of regional, trilateral, and multilateral arrangements involving various state and non-state actors were involved in both Liberia and Sierra Leone.

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established by the UN Security Council Resolution 1509 in 2003 to assist the National Transitional Government of Liberia to establish the rule of law and undertake post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. The international donor community provided considerable financial support to the Liberian peacebuilding process and post-conflict recovery efforts. A National Commission for Disarmament Demobilisation, Reintegration, and Rehabilitation was established to implement the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the various warring factions in August 2003. Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration, and Rehabilitation (DDRR) activities in Liberia were strictly donor-driven, with disarmament and demobilisation undertaken by UNMIL while reintegration and rehabilitation were coordinated by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) as mandated by international partners through a memorandum of understanding. The Japanese government provided financial support for the overall disarmament component of the DDRR programme. Security reforms of the Liberia National Police were undertaken with help from UN Police and support from the United States (US), Belgium, India, Ghana, Norway, the European Union (EU), Ghana, Egypt, and various UN agencies. For the armed forces, the United States (US) through the private security firm DynCorp led the process of restructuring of the Armed Forces of Liberia. Other countries that supported this process were Ghana, China, Nigeria, the United Kingdom (UK), and France.

Another major international stakeholder involved in DDRR activities in Liberia was UNICEF, which focused on disarming, demobilising, and reintegrating former child-soldiers. A partnership was forged between UNDP and UNICEF for the national rehabilitation of children. The Carter Centre in the US was invited by President Charles Taylor of Liberia to undertake justice sector reform. The World Bank was also actively involved in post-war reconstruction and infrastructure development.

In Sierra Leone, post-conflict reconstruction has ranged from security sector reform to economic reform. Bilateral and multilateral support was received from donor governments and organisations. The World Bank supported the Poverty Reduction Strategy, while the British government through the Ministry of Defence and DFID assisted in the security sector and civil service reforms.
Other international organisations that supported the post-war reconstruction in Liberia were Oxfam, World Vision, and the Norwegian Refugee Council, which have set up country offices; the National Endowment for Democracy, based in the US; and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, based in the UK. The latter two have given financial support to local organisations for work on human rights and governance issues.

In Sierra Leone, the UK assumed responsibility for security sector reform through the British Military Advisory and Training Team, while India, Brazil, and South Africa undertook a project on leadership development and institutional capacity building for human development and poverty reduction. The project was undertaken under the framework of triangular cooperation involving India, Brazil, and South Africa in partnership with UNDP. The World Bank has played a significant role in post-war peacebuilding, notably through its focus on the plight of internally displaced peoples (IDPs), and the provision of basic infrastructural faculties and social amenities destroyed in the civil war.

ECOWAS also benefited from triangular cooperation in peacebuilding through training activities for the military forces of its member states to improve operational capacities for peacekeeping. The US and France were actively involved in this capacity-building project on the protection of refugees, command and control, and negotiation techniques, among others (Ismail, 2015, 14). For example, the US established the African Crisis Response Initiative for the purpose of training and enhancing the capacity and efficiency of West African militaries in diverse humanitarian and peacekeeping activities (Howe, 2001, 19).

**Challenges of triangular cooperation for peacebuilding**

The challenges experienced in triangular cooperation in peacebuilding operations in West Africa are like those of other modalities of development cooperation. Some of these challenges include lack of proper coordination among different actors operating in the field, which sometimes results in duplication of efforts and conflicts. Other challenges identified were high implementation costs due to excess reliance on using experts from the global North; the existence of distinct procedures and institutions from different countries; lack of agreement on harmonised common standards and procedures for measurement and evaluation; weak local content due to problems of adaptation; and unclear division of roles and responsibilities (OECD, 2009, 4–5).

The logic behind triangulation in development cooperation involving developing countries is the belief that Southern developing partners are better placed, and possess relevant experience, to respond to the needs of beneficiary countries that are developing themselves. It is expected that these Southern development partners should take the lead in implementing development projects, with the necessary support from Northern donors, where required. However, the peacebuilding operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone did not follow the “normal” structure of South–South triangular relations, but displayed characteristics of mainstream donor-dependent, North–South relations. The key actors involved in
implementation of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding projects were from the North, while Southern partners were relegated to background and supportive roles.

The strategic structure and direction of the peacebuilding processes in Liberia and Sierra Leone were fundamentally flawed and hindered the effective operation of South–South partnerships. The trend displayed in the two cases was an informal arrangement whereby ECOWAS/ECOMOG provided the human resources for peacekeeping but were side-lined in critical components of the peacebuilding decision-making efforts. Critical issues relating to entry and exit strategies, coordination, finance, and timing were decided by Western institutions and actors. However, during conflicts, regional and sub-regional entities bring long-standing relationships, depth of understanding and determination, and often a willingness to respond to complex humanitarian emergencies.

The bitter rivalries between ECOMOG and the UN over leadership positions in UNAMSIL, which resulted in a verbal war between Nigeria and UNAMSIL, exemplified the disagreement over ownership. India contributed the largest contingent to UNAMSIL and thus assumed the overall command. However, ECOWAS asserted that the Indian commander, being unfamiliar with West African conditions, should be replaced by a commander from West Africa. The ECOWAS resolution even suggested that the multinational peacekeeping force should be replaced by a regional West African peacekeeping force. The tension generated by this appointment forced India to announce its withdrawal from peacekeeping responsibilities in UNAMSIL.

Another contentious issue was the ownership, control, and implementation of peacebuilding processes. National governments are best positioned to respond effectively to the non-military elements of peacebuilding (Haze, 2007). In a post-conflict context, long-term interventions linked to capacity-building initiatives require national ownership. Also, an inclusive reintegration and rehabilitation process may be difficult to achieve in the absence of national ownership. The likelihood of exclusion may lead critical actors in the war to withdraw from the peacebuilding processes to take up arms against the government.

However, in most cases post-conflict states are characterised by a weakened institutional base, thus making it difficult for them to undertake peacebuilding activities without external support. Again, regional arrangements sometimes suffer from crises of trust and legitimacy, especially when pivotal actors in the arrangements are parties to the conflicts. They also bring their own interests, some of which carry potential risks to managing conflict impartially. This was the situation in Liberia and Sierra Leone that hindered ECOWAS in the peacebuilding and conflict resolution processes. External support is also needed to forge inclusive peacebuilding arrangements in a war-torn environment to prevent the isolation of critical opponents by incumbent governments that may want to use peacebuilding processes to shore up their political positions.

Funding is a critical constraint in the operation of regional cooperation for peacebuilding in West Africa. The modest successes recorded by ECOWAS in peacekeeping operations through ECOMOG were largely due to the
financial, logistical, and diplomatic support of Nigeria. As one of the founders of ECOWAS, Nigeria provided politico-economic leadership to the organisation in an effort to develop a collective regional peace and security mechanism in West Africa (Francis, 2006, 147). Nigeria has provided about 60 percent of the ECOWAS budget; there is no doubt that multilateral peacebuilding under the auspices of ECOWAS is intimately linked to Nigeria’s active cooperation and contributions. This was evidently demonstrated in Liberia and Sierra Leone, where Nigeria was the major provider of military and other resources for peacekeeping operations. At the peak of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean crises in the 1990s, Nigeria provided over 70 percent of ECOMOG’s military and civilian personnel, as well as logistical support (Hamman and Omojuwa, 2013, 4–5). Many ECOWAS member states cannot make significant financial contributions to peace missions due to domestic economic and development challenges. Funding is a major challenge for the AU, ECOWAS, and other African sub-regional organisations. Given the enormous resources committed to peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone through ECOMOG, domestic pressures and internal security challenges compelled Nigeria from 1999 to shift focus from leading military peacekeeping operations to conflict prevention initiatives.

**Prospects for triangular cooperation for peacebuilding in West Africa**

The prospects for triangular cooperation for peacebuilding are very promising in West Africa, given the institutional reforms undertaken by ECOWAS. Dictatorial governments are now the exception rather than the rule in the sub-region due to ECOWAS’s zero-tolerance for unconstitutional changes in government. There is also increasing involvement and engagement with civil society organisations in the areas of conflict resolution, post-conflict reconstruction, and peacebuilding (see Chapter 5). ECOWAS has evolved – in capacity and sophistication in the areas of regional security and peacebuilding. Several legal and institutional frameworks have been established to address the challenges of human security, governance, and sustainable development (see Chapter 4). However, to consolidate these achievements, West African leaders must continue to deepen democratisation. Civil society actors must also remain vigilant and act as watchdogs to expose corruption, dictatorial leaders, and political excesses. Sustainable economic growth and institutional reforms are also needed to diversify national economies, catalyse economic growth, and improve quality of life, which will prevent relapses into resource-starved and poverty-induced conflicts.

Furthermore, the valuable experience of the different UN agencies, especially the UNDP, in integrating South–South cooperation into their different activities could be an important asset for the UN Secretariat, especially the agencies responsible for peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations – the Department of Political Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and the Peacebuilding Support Office. They can utilise existing institutional structures to also incorporate
triangular and South–South cooperation into conflict prevention and peace operations in Africa.

The new development environment as conceptualised in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agenda prioritised the nexus between security and development; for example, SDG 10, which focuses on reduction of inequality, and SDG 16 on peace, justice, and strong institutions resonate well with ECOWAS’s agenda of West African development. The new SDGs and the broader sustainability agenda go much further than the Millennium Development Goals in “addressing the root causes of poverty and conflicts, and the universal need for development that works for all people” (Olayode, 2015, 8). The SDG framework has underscored the need for wider application of developmentally focused South–South cooperation across the peace and security pillar of the UN’s work.

In contemporary global peacebuilding strategies, regional and sub-regional arrangements have become prominent elements. The UN Agenda for Peace, the AU’s Africa Peace and Security Architecture, and ECOWAS’s peace and security mechanisms have all highlighted the significance of regional initiatives in preventing conflict and in peacebuilding. The UN’s regional partnerships in Africa must be strengthened by creating effective mechanisms for effective partnership.

**Conclusion and recommendations**

South–South cooperation, with its emphasis on demand-driven, context-specific, long-term partnerships among equals, and involving the sharing of relevant expertise and experiences between developing countries, has shown its potential to become a catalyst for successful peacebuilding efforts.

While regional and sub-regional organisations like ECOWAS may not have the required resources to undertake post-conflict reconstruction singlehandedly, Western multilateral agencies also lack adequate knowledge and the necessary expertise to undertake peacebuilding alone. Triangular cooperation involving partnerships between ECOWAS and multilateral organisations is thus required to achieve the desired results in peacebuilding. For the partnership to be effective, a clear definition of roles and capacity-building should be agreed on to enhance the ability of the partnering countries both at regional and sub-regional levels. The multilateral agencies involved in triangular cooperation should therefore focus more on building local capacities rather than simply acting as “delivering agencies” (Ajayi, 2008, 5). This would enhance local ownership and promote sustainable human security.

Contemporary security threats and challenges, especially those relating to Islamist terrorism across the Sahel–Sahara belt and in the Gulf of Guinea, require collaborative efforts from member states in those regions, ECOWAS, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and the AU. Apart from regional initiatives, international assistance is needed for logistics, surveillance, training, funding, and technical support.

To conclude, for South–South and triangular cooperation to become a potent force in peacebuilding, recipient or beneficiary states in the developing world
should take ownership of, and raise their own, resources, and actively participate in the process. They should also translate and adapt programmes to suit local realities. Similarly, South–South cooperation partners and DAC donor countries must also harmonise and coordinate their activities and strategies with beneficiary countries by dividing and allocating responsibilities based on their areas of expertise (OECD, 2009).

**Note**

1 Examples of Pivotal countries are China, India, South Africa, Malaysia, Thailand, Brazil, Nigeria, and Egypt.

**References**


8 Nigeria’s role in the ECOWAS Peace and Security Agenda for West Africa

Oshita O. Oshita and Warisu Oyesina Alli

Introduction

The West Africa sub-region has faced a lot of security challenges, particularly in the past three decades. The first major security challenge was the Liberian crisis which rapidly deteriorated into a civil war that threatened the entire sub-region. While the Liberian civil war was going on, the political crisis in neighbouring Sierra Leone quickly grew into a civil war, influenced no doubt by the events in Liberia. Guinea also experienced grave political upheaval. Not far away, Côte d’Ivoire also had its national political conflict, which developed out of a protracted political succession crisis. Guinea-Bissau, Togo, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali, one after the other, were consumed by political conflicts that, in most cases, ended in major internal disturbances and in some cases civil wars. Indeed, the Mano River Union region, in particular, was in the form of a political conflagration. The occurrence of so many violent conflicts in the sub-region, particularly in the last decade, would suggest that the conflict prevention mechanisms and preventive diplomacy of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have mostly been ineffective.

In all cases, ECOWAS’s peace and conflict resolution mechanisms were activated in response to such developments. However, ECOWAS’s interventions, which would necessarily begin with mediation and were mostly diplomatic, were found to be inadequate and in need of military support in terms of peace support operations (PSOs), provision of humanitarian assistance, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding efforts. These are tasks the sub-regional organisation has not been well equipped to carry out successfully, mainly because of its weak resource base. It is therefore almost inevitable that Nigeria, which has a gross domestic product (GDP) that is much more than the GDP of all the other ECOWAS members combined, has had to shoulder a lot of responsibilities in providing the leadership, as well as the human and material resources, needed for ECOWAS interventions in the many conflicts in the sub-region. Nigeria’s regional leadership is also defined and determined by its demography and possession of many critical elements of power, including a strong military, moral imperatives, and the political will to take on the challenge. There are also the security concerns of the country for sub-regional peace.
Conflicts and development of peace support operations

ECOWAS was established in 1975 as a regional organisation for the promotion of economic cooperation and integration. The organisation comprised at inception 16 countries, which have now been reduced to 15 since the withdrawal of Mauritania in 2000. The sub-region has a diverse colonial history, with the countries being either former British, French, or Portuguese colonies. Also, the sub-region has had the highest incidence of military coups and interventions in civilian politics in Africa.

As West Africa experiences rapid transformation, democratisation, and population growth, security challenges have continued to threaten its progress. Even though the original mandate of ECOWAS focused on regional economic integration as a way to enhance economic stability and development, it was, however, immediately apparent to ECOWAS members that the organisation’s lofty goals could only be achieved in an atmosphere of peace and stability. Accordingly, two protocols on defence were signed shortly after the creation of the community. These were the Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978) and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence (1978). The two documents were designed to address the understanding at the time that threats to security could only emanate from the external environment. The documents empowered ECOWAS to intervene in armed conflict in any of its member states if the conflict was likely to endanger peace and security in the entire community.

The collapse of the economies of many West African countries in the wake of the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) in the 1980s, the end of the Cold War, and negative effects of globalisation, coupled with the nature of authoritarian domestic politics, led to political crises in many West African states, leading to state collapse and civil wars and conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Côte d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso.

The Liberian crisis, which started in 1989, provided an opportunity for ECOWAS members to demonstrate their commitment to the ideals of the mutual assistance protocol, especially on the request of Liberian President Samuel Doe for intervention. ECOWAS could not accede to this request because of the different positions of Francophone and Anglophone states. While the Francophone countries supported the rebel leader, Charles Taylor, the Anglophone countries supported Doe. To overcome this stalemate, the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, which was dominated by the Anglophone countries, with Nigeria in the lead, met in Banjul, the Gambia, and agreed to send an intervention force, the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), to Liberia.

In the absence of any response from the international community to the conflict and massive violations of human rights in the country, ECOMOG came to save the day. The idea of deploying ECOWAS troops in Liberia was mooted by Nigeria, against the wishes of many other members, particularly Francophone countries.

In August 1997, ECOMOG’s mandate was extended to Sierra Leone to reinstate the democratically elected government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah,
which was overthrown by the military, and to restore peace, security, and democracy in that country.

In 1998, ECOMOG foreign ministers recommended that ECOMOG formally become responsible for peacekeeping operations in the region. ECOWAS subsequently enhanced its capacity and slowly transformed ECOMOG from a series of ad hoc initiatives to a more permanent structure for sustained military cooperation and operation.

The lessons learned from intervention in Liberia (1990–1997), Sierra Leone (1997–2000), and Guinea-Bissau (1999) were later to shape the creation of the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security in 1999, also referred to as “the Mechanism,” which went beyond the earlier protocols of 1978 and 1981 in that it allowed a situation whereby ECOWAS could intervene in internal conflicts that posed security threats to the region, including the overthrow of, or threats to, democratically elected governments. ECOWAS has had to intervene in Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and several other crisis situations across the sub-region. ECOWAS has been designated as one of the five regional pillars of the African Economic Community (AEC), together with the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

In 2001, ECOWAS member countries signed the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Government, which complements the Mechanism in addressing the root causes of conflict, instability, and insecurity. Earlier, in July 1993, a revised ECOWAS treaty, designed to accelerate cooperation, was signed, while in January 2007 the ECOWAS Secretariat was transformed into the ECOWAS Commission as part of a wider institutional reform of the community.

Notwithstanding the challenges of ECOWAS’s economic integration, the 1990s saw the development and institutionalisation of a formal peace and security architecture to facilitate regional peacekeeping, PSOs, and conflict management interventions. The Mechanism was the realisation of this objective and was also aimed at shifting emphasis from conflict management, which is a reactive intervention, to a proactive conflict prevention framework.

Role of Nigeria

The role of Nigeria in PSOs in West Africa has largely been determined by its size and resources, as well as its security concerns. Thus, it has played a prominent leadership role in ECOWAS and a significant role in ECOMOG, contributing significant numbers of troops for peacekeeping deployments to Liberia (1990–1997), Sierra Leone (1997–2003), Guinea-Bissau (1998), Côte d’Ivoire (2003), and Mali (2014). Nigeria also led a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) with Niger and Chad (2015) to tackle the insurgency by the Islamic group Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal Jihad [People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad], better known as Boko Haram.
One of the realities of the political landscape of West Africa is the clear, unquestionable, and transparent preponderance of Nigeria as the leading and hegemonic local actor in the sub-region (Akindele, 2003). This has informed the development of its military capability. The consequence has been aggressive investment and modernisation to improve the nation’s military power, including its composition, equipment, leadership, and doctrine (Bassey, 1993). This capability of Nigeria in the military and economic spheres defines the role it plays in regional security policy and operations.

Adebajo (2002) has described Nigeria’s role in West Africa as hegemonic. Even ECOWAS member states which have benefitted from its generosity only grudgingly accept its leadership (Adebajo, 2008, 3). There is a dilemma for Nigeria in that West African states are not prepared to replace a colonial yoke with a Nigerian one. As pointed out by Fawole (2008), even though President Ibrahim Babangida declared that Nigeria was one country that every other country in West Africa and Africa in general looked up to, to provide the desired leadership, the Francophone states, in particular, and other states in the sub-region, in general, view Nigeria with suspicion. They therefore enter into other forms of security arrangements – for their self-pride and protection (Danjuma, 2012). Hence, the view expressed by Adebajo (2002) that Nigeria’s leadership position has become a kind of affliction. And the fear and suspicion that Nigeria has imperialist designs on its neighbours seem to be another challenge to Nigeria’s West Africa policy (Akindele, 2003, 287).

Considering all the problems facing West African states, there is a need to establish a security regime in the area and a hegemon is required to propel the security regime and Nigeria fits that description. But there are still other problems, because Nigeria is yet to develop the capacity and legitimacy to influence the sub-region and fail sometimes to convince other states to follow its lead on vital political and security and economic issues. Of course, it is not as simple as that because there are other forces at work; for example, other regional powerhouses, such as Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and others, and even extra-sub-regional interests competing for influence in West Africa.

Generally, however, by whatever yardstick sub-regional leadership is measured, Nigeria is a core state, defined as a state whose economic size is sufficiently large to be capable of successfully going it alone in industrialisation and economic development. Its population, natural resource endowments, and market size and intensity make economy of scale realisable; and Nigeria is recognised by its neighbours as the economic, financial, and diplomatic centre of the sub-region (Akindele, 2003, 282).

Nonetheless, Nigeria’s role is also determined by its interests, which are strategic in nature. These interests are also linked to the fact that a sizable number of its citizens reside in other African states and it has undertaken to protect the lives of its nationals anywhere as part of its defence policy objectives, since regional crises impact directly on Nigeria and Nigerians. There are also social and economic interests, which include the resources it has invested in maintaining peace (Adedeji, 2007, 199).
Nigeria’s security, according to former minister of foreign affairs Ojo Maduekwe (2008, 6), is therefore inexorably linked to a more secure Africa; a continent that is peaceful and prosperous, a continent that is respected and courted, not just for its previous contributions to world civilisation, but for the advancement of humankind into the twenty-first century and beyond. Hence, Nigeria could find justification to not only contribute but to also provide leadership, including the use of its military, to control any instability in the sub-region, as a way of protecting its own interests.

It thus became imperative for Nigeria to organise and develop an effective diplomatic and military backbone with which to support its national objectives, taking account of the risks (FGN, 2006, 3). As part of this commitment to sub-regional security, Nigeria created the Ministry of Cooperation and Integration in Africa (MCIA) in 1999 with a Department of Collective Defence and Security and Department of Regional Economic Integration. The MCIA, under which the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution also functioned, was also made the focal point for ECOWAS, thus showing the high level of the nation’s commitment to West African integration. This arrangement allowed more attention to be given ECOWAS peace and security matters than used to be the case. However, in 2007 as part of the civil service reforms, President Olusegun Obasanjo merged the MCIA with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Nigeria’s geostrategic location also plays a role in defining the nation’s security focus. Situated in a region of comparatively much smaller and weaker states, in terms of size, human, and material resources, Nigeria’s security focus could be said to have been pre-determined (Alli, 2012). As a result, all Nigerian leaders have come to accept that responsibility for sub-regional security rests on their shoulders.

In common with most members of the United Nations (UN), Nigeria subscribes to the ideals of “collective security” at global, continental, and sub-regional levels. Accordingly, West African security, Nigeria believes, can only be guaranteed by policies of cooperation, economic integration, and adoption of consensus (Ajibewa, 2007, 18).

Justifying Nigeria’s involvement in PSOs and in regional security policy, Gambari (2010) observed that

in Africa, lack of sustainable development has been linked directly to the proliferation and intensity of conflict situations and war which in turn have hampered development efforts […] threats to peace in a neighbouring country, if not carefully managed and resolved could lead to massive exodus of refugees, weapons proliferation and trans-border crimes and general insecurity that could threaten other stable polities and compromise national economies.

Thus, Nigeria could be appropriately considered a driver of security policy in West Africa. This is because, as argued by Adedeji (2007, 198), in this loosely structured defence system only Nigeria has the size, experience, and logistical
resources to serve as the core of an ECOWAS rapid deployment force with broad objectives.

The personal diplomatic efforts of Nigerian leaders, from Generals Yakubu Gowon, Ibrahim Babangida, Sani Abacha, and Abdusalam Abubakar to Presidents Obasanjo, Umar Yar’Adua, Goodluck Jonathan, and Muhammadu Buhari, have been quite significant. Obasanjo, as civilian president (1999–2007), was active in these conflict resolution efforts. President Umar Yar’Adua followed Nigeria’s traditional role and at the same time furthered what Ojo Maduekwe, his foreign minister, called citizen diplomacy, but with a more audacious rendition of the perspective, guided by diplomacy of consequence, which means reciprocity (Akinterinwa, 2010). Jonathan also continued to shoulder this self-imposed responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in West Africa, getting very involved in the Mali crisis.

The general direction of Nigerian involvement is informed by a broadly defined foreign policy objective built on a national role perception, articulated and documented in the National Defence Policy (2006). It is informed by a conventional perspective on security threats, and the capacity for rapid response and deployment (Bamali, 2007, 96).

The main features of Nigeria’s West Africa policy derive from the paradigms of Nigerian foreign policy, including African centrepiece perspective, the concentric circle model, and the beneficial concentricism. The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, as amended in Section 19, projects a dynamic foreign policy for Nigeria through the promotion of economic development, integration and unity, and peace and security in Africa and the world. Accordingly, Nigeria’s involvement in West African security affairs and any role it might have played in the past few decades have been the result of strongly held opinions by its successive leaderships. Generally, it has been a role that acknowledges the nation’s responsibility for Africa, which the public has come to accept, though with reservations. This was the basis for Babangida’s famous declaration in 1985, as quoted by Ajulo (1998, 18), that “Africa’s problems and their solution, should constitute the premise of Nigeria’s foreign policy.” This idea was echoed by Jonathan (2011), who, at the opening of a National Conference on the Review of Nigerian Foreign Policy organised by the Presidential Advisory Council (PAC) in August 2011, noted that

In the era of globalisation, at a time of grave challenges to national and international security such as we face from terrorism and transnational criminal networks, our commitment to regional and international peace and security must remain as strong as ever.

In line with this, the Federal government Vision:2020 prescribes an elaborate mandate for the Nigerian Foreign Service including ensuring that Nigeria’s leading role in Africa and in the West African sub-region is sustained and safeguarded.

Ironically, the establishment of ECOWAS remains one of the greatest achievements of Nigerian diplomacy up to 1990 and has remained the embodiment of “Pax Nigeriana” (Adebajo, 2008, 1).
In furtherance of its security management capabilities, Nigeria has finally developed what is considered a comprehensive National Defence Policy. The high-powered committee on national defence policy, headed by the late Gen. Joe Garba, director-general of the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), was empanelled in 2000 by Gen. T. Y. Danjuma, then defence minister. Though work on the Nigeria National Defence Policy (NNDP) started immediately, it was only finally adopted in 2006.

The NNDP enunciates general guidelines for the employment of the armed forces, in particular, and national resources, generally, to maintain the country’s territorial integrity and protect it from external aggression. It is aimed at providing compact, flexible, and above all battle-winning armed forces. It provides direction for the development of defence organisations, together with other elements of power for the security of Nigeria (FGN, 2006, 2), and is well integrated and managed in order to serve national security objectives in response to perceived threats.

Notwithstanding what Nigeria may have put in place, there are institutional weaknesses within ECOWAS including inadequate resources, lack of administrative and military capability, and poor political will and commitment by members, all of which militate against and indeed undermine Nigeria’s leadership role. While it appears the military components are being progressively addressed, the non-military components have not been properly articulated in a manner that is responsive to the emerging security challenges at home and in the sub-region. In addition, the use of militarism instead of socio-economic and political engineering to address security matters is no longer appropriate for the kind of security challenges being faced domestically and in the sub-region as a whole.

**Peacekeeping and peace support operations**

About half of the West Africa population is Nigerian; the GDP of Nigeria amounts to about 60 per cent of the sub-region’s regional GDP. According to Deng (2009, 26),

Leadership of the regional organisation and lead nations, in particular the dominant state, Nigeria, is key to the effectiveness of ECOWAS in peace and security. General Yakubu’s leadership of Nigeria in the 1970s was crucial to the establishment of ECOWAS. In the 1990s, the then Nigeria military leader, General Babangida, made it possible for ECOWAS to intervene in regional peace, conflict and security.

Nigeria is globally recognised as a major troop-contributing nation to UN peacekeeping operations around the world because of its readiness and commitment, which started even before the nation had gained independence, participating in UN peacekeeping operations in Congo in 1960. Since then, Nigeria has deployed troops for PSOs at bilateral, African Union (AU), ECOWAS, and UN levels, participating in Lebanon, Chad, Angola, Namibia, Cambodia, Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, Sudan (Darfur), and of course Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali, and
others—and also in observer missions. According to Gambari (2010), peacekeeping operations or PSOs have become for Nigeria a veritable instrument of foreign policy, an accent of the imperative to deter abroad acts that threaten its security, peace, and development.

Babangida, whose regime was confronted with the Liberia conflict, argued then that

The ECOWAS region completes what has been termed the three concentric circles governing Nigerian foreign and defence policies—There is therefore no gain saying [sic] the fact that when certain events occur in this region depending upon their intensity and magnitude, which are bound to affect Nigeria’s politico-military and socio-economic environment, we should not stand-by as hapless and helpless spectators.

Nigeria in collaboration with others, in this sub-region, is duty bound to react or respond in an appropriate manner, necessary to either avert the disaster or to take adequate measures to ensure peace, tranquillity and harmony.

(Bassey, 2011, 7)

With ECOMOG’s efforts under Nigeria’s leadership, the Liberia conflict was eventually resolved and in August 1997 Charles Taylor was sworn in as president.

In many respects, the Sierra Leone conflict was a spill-over of the civil war in Liberia. On 25 May 1997, the Sierra Leonian military overthrew the government of President Tejan Kabbah. The UN, the AU, and ECOWAS were united in their demand for the Junta to return power back to the overthrown government. Rather than heed this call, the Junta went ahead and announced its cabinet. At ECOWAS meetings in Abidjan in June–July 1997, sanctions were imposed and some embargoes were also applied. ECOWAS was to formally approve the extension of the ECOMOG mandate to include Sierra Leone. Subsequently, the Nigerian government, which later became impatient with the pace of compliance with the various resolutions, ordered its troops to overthrow the coup (Adeshina, 2002, 14). Nigerian troops were deployed, and they removed the Major Koromah Junta and Kabbah was reinstated in office in 1998. It was therefore Nigeria’s immense contribution in troops, money, and material that made it possible for ECOWAS to achieve its objectives in the two countries. After ECOMOG’s success in Sierra Leone, the UN established the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in October 1999 as a peace-enforcement operation.

By 1999, it was estimated that Nigeria had committed over USD $13 billion to peacekeeping operations in West Africa (Bamali, 2007, 100), since the beginning of the Liberian conflict in 1989. Over the years, there has been public outcry over the way and manner the Nigerian leadership waded into trouble spots in the sub-region without any tangible benefit to the country. Because of this, in 1998 Nigeria decided not to contribute troops to the ECOMOG mission in Guinea-Bissau (Galadima, 2011, 322). However, without Nigeria’s participation, it was not surprising that the operation collapsed.
After his inauguration as president in 1999, Obasanjo wanted to scale back Nigeria’s commitment to sub-regional military engagements. In a speech to the 54th UN General Assembly in 1999, Obasanjo (2007, 40), noted that

For too long, the burden of preserving international peace and security in West Africa has been left almost entirely to a few states in the sub-region. Nigeria’s continued burden in Sierra Leone is unacceptably draining Nigeria financially. For our economy to take off, this bleeding has to stop.

In the ECOMOG operation in Sierra Leone, Nigeria provided virtually everything ranging from aircraft hiring to the supply of food items.

A contingency operational allowance of $150 per person was paid on a monthly basis to more than 10,000 soldiers throughout the period the operation lasted (i.e. from May 1997 to April 2000 when the UN took over the operation from Nigeria).

(Adeshina, 2002, 182)

Subsequently, Nigeria had to scale down rather than withdraw its troops in Sierra Leone, because of the strong pressure on the country to remain. General Abubakar, former military head of state, noted that Nigeria can claim a fair share of the glory for winning the peace that Sierra Leone went on to enjoy (Abubakar, 2009, 95). Nigeria participated in the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) from 2003 until its completion in 2018. In this operation, according to Gen. Nuhu Bamali, Nigeria was left to transport its own troops and those of Gambia and Guinea for the ECOMOG operation in the capital Monrovia (Bamali, 2007).

The Côte d’Ivoire crisis presented a different kind of security challenge to ECOWAS. The keenly contested elections of October 2000 led to an intense power struggle between Laurent Gbagbo and his allies, on the one hand, and Gen. Robert Guéï on the other. After several years of prevarications, in 2010 another presidential election was conducted between Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara and his supporters. This was against the background of an intense debate over ivoirité or “Ivorianness.” The identity crisis turned violent following gun battles in the economic capital of Abidjan and elsewhere in the country in 2002. President Obasanjo despatched Nigerian Alfa fighter planes to foil a military coup d’état against Gbagbo, only to withdraw them soon thereafter. A rebellion led by disgruntled soldiers, under the name of the Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI), soon made the situation worse, splitting the country into two. Nigeria was to provide buffer troops to separate the two warring groups, now identified as the Northern and Southern forces. This early intervention helped to dictate the direction of ECOWAS policy on the very complicated crisis.

At the request of President Gbagbo, ECOWAS deployed a peacekeeping force to monitor a ceasefire agreement between the warring forces. Nigeria was to contribute troops for the ECOWAS ceasefire monitoring assignment in the country in
Throughout 2003, Obasanjo undertook several missions across West Africa to ensure a unified approach to the Ivorian crisis.

In early February 2004, the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1527 approved the efforts of ECOWAS and France to “promote a peaceful settlement of the conflict” and also empowered the ECOWAS mission in Côte d’Ivoire to stabilise the nation. Later in the same month, UNSC Resolution 1528 established the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) into which ECOWAS troops were later integrated. Meanwhile, Nigeria also contributed military observers to the Côte d’Ivoire operations just as Ambassador Ralph Uwechue of Nigeria was appointed the Special Representative of the ECOWAS Executive Secretary in Côte d’Ivoire to monitor and coordinate ECOWAS efforts in the country.

The complexity of the Ivorian crisis, according to Sanda (2003), “taught the Nigerian government to learn to take the backstage, and adopt a multilateral diplomatic approach instead.” Hitherto, Nigeria used to wade into sub-regional internal political crises with a lot of enthusiasm, as demonstrated by Nigeria’s role in Sierra Leone, which as Adeshina (2002, 154) points out was essentially a unilateral mission that was costly in terms of operation, finance, and human resources, and lost the country goodwill within the sub-region.

Nigeria has been able to provide logistics and funding at crucial moments in the organisation’s history of conflict management, resolution, peace-keeping, and peacebuilding (Akindele, 2003). Over 70 per cent of ECOMOG troops and 80 per cent of the mission’s funds were provided by Nigeria (Abubakar, 2009, 195). Agwai (2010, 132) observes that the major accolades the Nigerian army won in the cause of participating in some of the PSOs helped to project Nigeria’s image as an emerging power in Africa and were an important factor in international politics, while Malu (2009, 174) asserts that without Nigeria’s involvement and leadership, it is doubtful that peace could have been achieved.

However, Adeshina (2002, 154) cautions that

The decision by Nigeria to embark on the Sierra Leonean operation all alone was unnecessarily altruistic and unwise. Ghana and other countries that took active part during the various peace negotiations between the Junta Forces and government of Sierra Leone backed out when it came to the issue of using their Forces to remove the rebels from Freetown and the entire country.

In March 2012, junior officers of the Malian army under Capt. Ahmadou Sanogo executed a coup to overthrow the democratically elected government of President Amadou Toumani Touré. The rebel officers accused the government of failing to equip the military adequately for the fight against a Tuareg insurgency in the north of the country. Following this coup, the Tuareg rebels in the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and their allies in militant Islamist group Ansar Dine, backed by Al-Qaeda in the Magreb (AQIM), declared the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Azawad.
ECOWAS immediately imposed a comprehensive embargo on the new Malian military regime, which, according to ECOWAS Chair and President of Côte d’Ivoire Alassane Ouattara, would only be lifted when constitutional order was restored in the country. When ECOWAS military chiefs met on 5 April at Abidjan to discuss the Malian crisis, it was agreed to activate the process for deployment of ECOWAS troops to “protect the unity and territorial integrity of Mali.” The AU supported this decision of ECOWAS.

After overcoming several setbacks, the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) was launched in January 2013 with 3,300 troops. Nigeria provided 1,200 of them, while others came from Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. Maj.-Gen. Shehu Abdulkadir of Nigeria was appointed force commander. It is important to note that without the significant Nigerian contingent, the ECOWAS stabilisation force in Mali would have suffered from a lack of personnel (Pryce, 2013, 29). AFISMA faced many logistical challenges from the beginning, including securing food, fuel, and water (Oluwadare, 2013, 116). In fact, France, which had been reluctant to intervene in the Malian crisis, had to move in when AFISMA troops were overrun by the rebels.

In May 2013, just a few months after AFISMA was deployed, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon announced the reconstitution of AFISMA into the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) with Maj.-Gen. Jean-Bosco Kazura of Rwanda as the new force commander. No Nigerian officer was appointed to the MINUSMA posts of deputy force commander, head of mission, or deputy head of mission. Also interestingly, MINUSMA received enormous logistical support from Belgium, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. According to Oluwadare (2013, 118), AFISMA was a phantom force that was dead on arrival because of poor funding and inadequate troops, and was only resuscitated by MINUSMA.

Shortly thereafter, Nigeria announced the withdrawal of its troops from Mali. It was argued in some quarters that Nigeria withdrew its troops from Mali because the UN did not appoint a Nigerian as the force commander or in any of the leading positions in MINUSMA. However, the ECOWAS chair said he received a letter from President Jonathan that the withdrawal was in response to the need for the infantry to cope with a domestic situation in Nigeria (McGregor, 2013, 4). Truly, Nigeria was at that period in 2013 facing very serious challenges from the asymmetric Boko Haram insurgency. It should be noted, however, that although Nigeria pulled out its infantry from Mali, it left behind engineers and other specialist officers. Nigeria also withdrew two battalions from the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The country, however, retained its troops in Guinea-Bissau as part of the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL), a 620-strong contingent drawn from Nigeria, Senegal, and Burkina Faso (McGregor, 2013, 4).

The ECOMOG experience in regional peacekeeping and conflict management – and the enduring role of Nigeria in it – demonstrates the relevance of the role and contributions of sub-regional hegemons in the maintenance of regional
peace and security. Despite reservations about Nigeria’s preponderance, its presence in enforcement operations has contributed to the management of conflicts and restoration of stability. In general, the majority of West African states tend to accept Nigeria’s leadership in regional peacekeeping, even though they are suspicious of it, and equally resent its unilateral military interventions. This illustrates that a sub-regional hegemon has to be sensitive to reservations among smaller member states in a collective security mechanism.

In fact, some ECOWAS members, particularly the Francophone states, perceiving ECOMOG as an instrument of Nigerian foreign and security policy, provided opportunities for extra-regional actors with strategic interests in West Africa to discourage some ECOWAS states from participating in the Nigeria-led regional peacekeeping force, hence undermining the effectiveness of ECOWAS in peace and security.

Initially, ECOMOG was a peacekeeping force. However, as conflicts became more intractable, its mission was re-designated, at the insistence of Nigeria, as a peace enforcement force. This was a historical development in the sense that it was clearly the first time such an initiative had been undertaken on the African continent. Nevertheless, it was an ad hoc mechanism. However, because of its success and usefulness, the framework was institutionalised in the Mechanism. ECOMOG became an intervention force under Article 17. It also provided for the composition of ECOMOG as a structure of “several stand-by multi-purpose modules (civilian and military) in their countries of origin and ready for immediate deployment.” This is what is referred to as the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF). The ESF has continued to undergo modifications to enhance its capability, mobility, and effectiveness when the need arises for deployment.

Conclusion

Nigeria has played an important role in the maintenance of peace and security in West Africa and particularly in the development and institutionalisation of a regional peace and security architecture and the commitment to collective security. However, Nigeria has its own domestic challenges due to unresolved socio-economic, political, and security issues. These domestic challenges constitute serious limitations to Nigeria’s ability to continuously exert its influence in regional peace and security issues. A certain sense of clumsiness is also observed in the nation’s intervention in security matters in West Africa because officials are sometimes lackadaisical and casual about issues.

With Nigeria’s dependence on an economy based solely on crude oil exports and given the global crisis in oil prices, the need has arisen for new and creative strategies for more inclusive, proactive, multilateral, and sustainable peace and security planning and operations in West Africa. This will ensure that the burden of PSOs is equitably shared in order to strengthen collective ownership among the member states of ECOWAS. However, Nigeria’s critical role in the establishment of ECOMOG and ensuring its effectiveness in its many interventions are some of
the good examples from which other sub-regional organisations, such as IGAD, could learn.

References


9 The IGAD–Eritrea impasse
Future prospects in light of recent developments

Senai W. Andemariam

Introduction

Eritrea, for some years, suspended its participation in the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In 2011, the country decided to go back to these two organisations only to receive opposite responses: while the AU immediately welcomed Eritrea back, IGAD was not ready to open its doors to the country. This chapter aims at proving that Eritrea’s re-entry into the regional organisation (IGAD) was contingent on the settlement of Eritrea–Ethiopia animosity. The evidence of the truth of this assumption materialised when Eritrea was fully welcomed, following the signing of the Eritrea–Ethiopia rapprochement in July 2018, where IGAD showed great willingness to receive back Eritrea. Eritrea is, however, still reluctant to reactivate its membership in IGAD. Eritrea resents the way IGAD treated it and thus abhors the regional organisation.

Eritrea’s relations with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), IGAD, and its neighbours in the 29 years since its independence (1991–2020) have not been free from tension and conflicts (Reid, 2009; Clapham, 2007). Regarding its relationship with the OAU, Eritreans have a bitter memory. This memory was expressed by the president of the newly independent Eritrea in a scathing critique he delivered at the OAU Summit of 1993, where he virtually accused the continental organisation of being worthless (Wrong, 2005, 358). This criticism pertains to how the OAU treated the Eritrean liberation struggle. The sense of bitterness was further reinforced because of the role of the OAU during the second Eritrea–Ethiopia war (1998–2000) and the subsequent no-war no-peace situation and UN Security Council-imposed sanctions (Bogale, 2014). IGAD and the AU were behind the 2009 UNSC-imposed sanction on Eritrea, both organisations, according to Eritrea, acting on behalf of Ethiopia.

Eritrea’s relation with neighbouring countries was also characterised by tensions and conflicts. In Sudan, influenced by the ideologue Dr Hassan Abd-Allah al-Turabi, the government of Omar al-Bashir aggressively supported the consolidation of radical Islam and its expansion into neighbouring countries. Sudan helped in the establishment and support of the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, which pestered the western Eritrean lowlands. Soon, Eritrea and Sudan became
engaged in a series of battles and broke off diplomatic relations; and Eritrea aligned itself with Ethiopia and Uganda in supporting the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) (Bogale, 2014; Healy, 2009). While Eritrea supported the Sudan National Democratic Alliance (NDA) fighting the regime in Khartoum, Sudan supported Eritrean opposition groups. Therefore, throughout the post-liberation period, Sudan–Eritrea relations showed serious difficulties that had implications on IGAD as the two are members.

A treaty between two colonial powers, France and Italy, created the boundary between Eritrea and Djibouti. Following Eritrea’s de jure independence in 1993, some tensions pivoting around the boundary began to simmer. Until 2008, no notable border dispute occurred between the two countries except for a skirmish and a two-month standoff in 1996. In February 2008, regional Djiboutian officials observed Eritrea was constructing earthworks close to the border on the Ras Doumeira ridge. Djibouti alleged – and Eritrea denied – that on 7 April 2008, Eritrean armed forces penetrated Djiboutian territory, dug trenches on both sides of the border, and occupied Ras Doumeira. Several rounds of negotiations were held, but were halted when Djibouti sent troops, on 22 April, to the border area. It is highly possible that this tension was connected to the Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict, which at the time was experiencing additional tension around the common border of the three countries. On 5 May, Djibouti took the case to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the AU, and the Arab League, all of which urged Djibouti and Eritrea to exercise restraint. Consequently, until August 2018, all diplomatic relations between Eritrea and Djibouti were severed.

The Somalia–Eritrea relation has a historical dimension. The former was one of the few countries in Africa that consistently supported Eritrea’s independence. Eritreans, therefore, are grateful for the various forms of support – particularly the provision of passports and offices – they received from Somalia during their liberation struggle, and feel indebted to, and obliged to contribute to peace and stability in, Somalia. Ostensibly, they see their role in Somalia from that vantage point. Through IGAD, Eritrea continued to participate in the Somali peace process that finally led to the establishment of a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia. With the subsequent outbreak of clashes between the TFG and Islamist groups in Mogadishu and beyond, and Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia in 2006, things changed. While Ethiopia stood on the side of the TFG, Eritrea found itself supporting factions opposing the TFG. This led scholars to maintain that Somalia fall victim to a proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Lyon, 2009; Abbink, 2003). The Eritrean government took the position that only Somalis, without external intervention, could resolve their problem. This Eritrean position antagonised powerful actors, particularly the US and Ethiopia, who accused Eritrea of supporting terrorist groups.

In December 2009, through IGAD’s request and AU’s endorsement, the UNSC imposed arms and travel sanctions against Eritrea for its alleged involvement in Somalia and its conflict with Djibouti (Sabala in Sharamo and Mesfin, 2011; Bogale, 2014). The fact that the imposition of sanctions was initiated by IGAD created a bitter resentment in Eritrea towards the regional organisation,
The IGAD–Eritrea impasse

such that Eritrea, even after sanctions were lifted, found it difficult to reactivate its membership in IGAD.

The Eritrean and Ethiopian relation is long and complex. Following 30 years of liberation struggle, Eritrea got its independence from Ethiopia in 1991. The relationship between the post-liberation Eritrean government and the post-Dergue Ethiopian government was highly praised, until the second war (1998–2000) broke out in May 1998, seemingly sparked by border dispute. The end of the war was replaced by a no-war no-peace situation that lasted until July 2018. The unconditional acceptance and readiness to implement the Algiers Agreement by the new Ethiopian leader paved the way for the signing of the Ethiopian–Eritrean rapprochement on 9 July 2018, ending the 20-year state of war between the two countries. Following the rapprochement, also as part of the package they signed, the countries renewed their diplomatic relations; opened embassies in their respective capitals; reinstated sea, air, land, and telecommunication links; began trading; etc. Yet, the village of Badme, the flashpoint of the war, remains under Ethiopian control, which casts a dark cloud on the relationship.

Briefly, Eritrea’s relationship with IGAD, the OAU/AU, neighbouring countries, and the larger world is defined by the history and experiences of the last 70-plus years. Understanding these relationships requires unpacking and having an adequate grasp of the difficult experiences of the last several decades.

The sections below will show that IGAD and Eritrea have been at odds with each other – mainly due to the Ethiopian factor.


Intensive peace efforts in 1998 and 1999 showed to intermediaries – the US, the UN, the OAU, and Algeria – that neither country was ready to fully commit to the peace process. Fighting resumed in May 2000 around the village of Badme, the flashpoint of the war. The war, sparked apparently by a border dispute, raged for two years. With Bouteflika’s personal input and under the auspices of the OAU, both countries agreed to a cessation of hostilities (18 June 2000), with the UN and the AU as its guarantors, followed by a comprehensive peace agreement (12 December 2000) signed in Algiers with the Algerian government, the US, the European Union (EU), the OAU, and the UN as witnesses.

Despite the claim by Demeke (2014) that IGAD attempted to mediate between Ethiopia and Eritrea during the 1998–2000 war, IGAD played no discernible role in the peace process that stopped the border war. Nor did IGAD or the guarantors and witnesses of the Algiers Agreement make any notable and persistent attempt to normalise the relationship between the two countries following the stalemate that arose after Ethiopia refused to be bound by the April 2002 decision of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC), which awarded Badme to Eritrea. Ethiopia continues to occupy Badme, even after the signing of the Eritrea–Ethiopia rapprochement in July 2018. After referring to the Eritrea–Ethiopia and Eritrea–Djibouti conflicts, Frank (2015, 115) notes: “Regarding conflict mediation, the failure of the regional organisations, notably [IGAD], to initiate such
action calls into question the ability of these regional security brokers to accomplish one of their fundamental tasks.” As many observers allude to, IGAD, under the spell of Ethiopia, was unable to play any role in the Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict (Mengisteab, 2014).

The Eritrea–Djibouti border conflict

In a similar manner to how it failed to be involved in the Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict, IGAD did not develop a notable peace initiative to resolve the Eritrea–Djibouti conflict. During the 12th Summit of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (AHSG) on 14 June 2008, IGAD expressed serious concern over “Eritrea’s military attack” and reprimanded Eritrea for attacking Djibouti.1 It should be noted that the communiqué of this summit was passed in Addis Ababa during Eritrea’s self-imposed absence from IGAD. A series of IGAD communiqués on the Eritrea–Djibouti dispute called on Eritrea to release Djiboutian prisoners of war and to be bound by the UN Security Council Resolution 1862 of 14 January 2009 to withdraw from Djibouti’s territory. The author has seen no IGAD communiqué to date taking note of the fact that in March 2016, the Government of Eritrea released four Djiboutian prisoners of war. Hence, IGAD’s statements castigating only Eritrea could be easily interpreted as taking sides. It is hard – or not hard – to understand why IGAD, which had for years insisted on the release of the prisoners, failed to take note of, or appreciate, Eritrea’s action.3

The UN Security Council took relatively quick initiatives. From 28 July to 6 August 2008, a fact-finding mission visited the region and presented its report to the Council on 17 September. On 14 January 2009, UNSC Resolution 1862 demanded that within five weeks of the resolution’s adoption Eritrea withdraw its forces to the status quo ante (i.e. to positions they occupied before their deployment to the ridge in April 2008). Eritrea rejected the resolution the next day. It alleged that Ethiopia’s setting up of long-range artillery on Eritrean territory at the tri-border on Musa Ali was proof that the Eritrea–Djibouti conflict was a continuation of the Eritrea–Ethiopia dispute and the UN’s failure to enforce the EEBC decision (Frank, 2015). The Council continued to receive reports on a mediation process initiated by Qatar. On 20 July 2010, the Council held a meeting to discuss Eritrea’s compliance with Resolution 1907 regarding the border dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea. The Council’s uneven-handed treatment of the Eritrea–Djibouti and Ethiopia–Eritrea disputes is disturbing, and seriously undermines its credibility, not to mention further exacerbating its relation with Eritrea.

The most important and fruitful intervention in ameliorating the dispute has been Qatar’s efforts. Frank (2015) refers to Qatar’s “reputation as a fair and honest mediator over a number of [previous] conflicts” such as those in Sudan, Yemen, and Lebanon, a reputation which it brought to the Eritrea–Djibouti conflict without “agendas and ulterior motives.” Djibouti had requested the intervention of Qatar’s “good offices” prior to the Ras Doumeira incident; and Eritrea’s previous good working relations with Qatar – including mediating between Eritrea
and Sudan and Eritrean–Qatari efforts to resolve the conflict in Darfur and East Sudan – made it easier for Eritrea to also accept Qatari mediation.

Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, the emir of Qatar, took personal charge of the mediation process and Presidents Isaias Afwerki and Ismail Omar Guelleh, of Eritrea and Djibouti, respectively, by an agreement they signed in Doha on 6 June 2010, entrusted him “with full powers to issue a document containing legal and technical actions as well as mechanisms as he deems fit for a final and mutually binding resolution of this border dispute.” A six-article executive document was signed and a committee of three established to resolve the boundary dispute. The committee was authorised to receive necessary documents and information and ensure the demarcation of the frontiers between the two countries by a world-renowned company. Moreover, it was agreed that each party would provide Qatar with a list containing the number and names of prisoners of war they had detained, if any, and also a list containing the number and names of missing persons. In a letter sent to the UN Security Council on the same day, Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al-Thani, who chaired the committee, confirmed that Eritrea had withdrawn its forces from the disputed border areas. Qatari soldiers would continue to monitor the border area until the final demarcation (Awate Team).

**Eritrea’s pull-out and return to IGAD and the AU**

On 13 April 2005, IGAD’s CoM resolved to support Ethiopia’s military intervention in Somalia. Eritrea’s objection to the resolution for the next two years had two sides to it: Eritrea objected to the use of the military of one member state in the territory of another; as an undercurrent running the other way, however, was the constant competition between Eritrea and Ethiopia to assert influence in the region. Somalia was allegedly a territory for a proxy war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Finally, the Eritrean minister of foreign affairs sent a letter to the then AHSG chair notifying him that Eritrea had “temporarily suspended its membership in [IGAD] effective 21st April 2007 […] in reaction to a number of resolutions passed pertaining to the worsening situation in Somalia” (Andemariam, 2015, 364).

Eritrea has not been pleased with the AU either. Since Ethiopia’s failure to abide by the decision of the EEBC, Eritrea had been developing grudges against the guarantors and witnesses of the Algiers Agreement and had continuously aired its grievance against the US-led collusion with Ethiopia to discredit Eritrea’s independence and stability. Following numerous reminders to the AU to implement the EEBC’s ruling, Eritrea recalled its ambassador from the AU in November 2003.

However, both IGAD and the AU continued to encourage Eritrea to come back to them. In meetings held on 12 and 14 June 2008 (although more than a year after Eritrea’s self-suspension) IGAD’s CoM and AHSG respectively made known their intent to welcome Eritrea back. To unite IGAD and AU efforts, the communiqué of the 14 June IGAD AHSG Summit endorsed the CoM recommendation
for the establishment of a task force that would engage Eritrea in the succeeding the 11th African Union summit, “with a view to convincing Eritrea to reconsider her decision to suspend her membership in IGAD” (Andemariam, 2015, 366).

At the invitation of Eritrea’s president, a delegation led by Kenyan Foreign Minister Moses Wetangula, Sudanese Foreign Minister Deng Alor, and IGAD Executive Secretary Mahboub Maalim made an official visit to Eritrea on 14–15 August 2008, where the delegation invited Eritrea back to the organisation. During the meeting, Afwerki noted his government’s displeasure at IGAD for not living up to its expectation in resolving the Somalis, Sudan, Eritrea–Ethiopia, and Eritrea–Djibouti disputes, but nevertheless welcomed IGAD’s request for his country to resume its participation in IGAD and appointed his minister of agriculture as Eritrea’s IGAD focal person.

In January 2011, Eritrea reopened its Permanent Mission to the AU and its representative, Girma Asmerom, was well received by Jean Ping, chair of the AU Commission, who said that he was delighted and that Eritrea’s return to the AU had been a priority since he took office three years previously (Andemariam, 2015). Following the welcome ceremony, Eritrea continued to participate fully in all activities of the AU in Addis Ababa through its representatives. In fact, during a national conference in Asmara on 11 June 2016, to launch the end of a campaign of child marriage in Eritrea, the conference was attended by an AU delegation led by Dr Mustapha Sidiki, the AU commissioner for social affairs, who also exchanged ideas during the conference.

However, a different state of affairs was unfolding in Djibouti at IGAD’s headquarters. In a letter to Mahboub Maalim, dated 25 July 2009, Eritrea’s foreign minister notified IGAD of his government’s intention to reactivate its membership in the organisation. A subsequent letter sent to Jean Ping described the reason for Eritrea’s decision to rejoin IGAD:

In recognition and appreciation of the consistent and frequent requests and appeals made by IGAD Ministerial Delegation, AU and International Development Partners such as EU; and in the spirit of reconciliation, peace and security and regional integration; as well as in recognition of the current economic and political dynamics of the world, Eritrea has finally decided to reactivate its membership to IGAD effective 25th July 2011.

(Andemariam, 2015, 368)

Maalim reacted positively to Eritrea’s “historic letter” and circulated copies to all IGAD Members. On 30 July 2011 Eritrea’s Foreign Minister Osman Saleh sent a letter to Maalim notifying him that Ambassador Asmerom would represent Eritrea in IGAD. Andemariam (2015, 371) narrates a regrettable incident that occurred subsequently:

On 24 August 2011, the 40th extraordinary session of the CoM was to convene at the Sheraton Addis in Addis Ababa. The chargé d’affaires of the State of Eritrea to the AU and ECA, who had been delegated to attend the meeting,
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was, however, informed that he would not be allowed to sit at the meeting and, following a brief altercation, was escorted out of the meeting hall by the hotel’s security personnel. The meeting then proceeded without Eritrea’s representative.

The communiqué of the meeting referred to Eritrea’s application to reactivate its membership, stating that the CoM

[r]eaffirms the credibility of IGAD as a regional organisation governed by established rules and procedures, and urges that these be followed in the conduct of its business; further underscores that the application of Eritrea for re-admission to IGAD should follow appropriate rules and procedures including consideration of the summit of the IGAD Heads of State and Government.

(IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 2011)

The incident provoked a series of condemnations from Eritrea. However, IGAD, mainly through its executive secretary – until at least as late as 2013, during a speech he made at Chatham House, London (Maalim, 2013) – continued to maintain that there were formalities that needed to be carried out before Eritrea could resume its participation in IGAD: specifically, a formal decision by the AHSG to welcome Eritrea back. Andemariam (2015) tried to show why IGAD’s position did not make sense under international law nor by IGAD’s own constitutive agreement. Since August 2011, when the 40th Extraordinary Session of the CoM met, and 25 November 2011, when the 19th AHSG Extraordinary Session was held, no AHSG or CoM communiqué had raised the case of Eritrea’s coming back to IGAD. The most recent meetings on record that the author could find were the communiqué of the 56th Extraordinary Session of the CoM in July 2016, which was the CoM’s 16th extraordinary meeting since August 2011; and the communiqué of the 29th Extraordinary Session of the AHSG in December 2016, which was the AHSG’s 10th extraordinary session since November 2011. In none of these at least 26 meetings of IGAD’s organs was the question of Eritrea’s re-entry into the organisation raised. However, as is described in the next section, Eritrea was discussed in these post-August 2011 IGAD meetings, among other reasons, to condemn its detention of Djiboutian prisoners of war and to welcome and call for additional UN sanctions against Eritrea.

The impasse continues and Eritrea has yet to be welcomed back into IGAD. Eritrea blames no other IGAD member but Ethiopia for the impasse (Permanent Mission of Eritrea to the UN, 2012, 2). According to Mulugeta (2014, 3), “Ethiopia has also managed to drive regional agendas through the existing regional and continental organizations, namely [IGAD] and the African Union.”

It is regrettable, indeed, that Ethiopia continues to hold – or refuses to abdicate, according to some observers – the chair of the AHSG, a position it has held since June 2008 (TesfaNews, 2013). Such a position has, it appears, helped Ethiopia block the question of Eritrea’s re-entry into IGAD from being discussed in any
of IGAD’s organs. The reluctance of the other IGAD members to raise Eritrea’s case will, moreover, be counted as providing tacit support to Ethiopia’s alleged efforts not to welcome Eritrea back into IGAD. Following a change of government in April 2018, and after ten years of incumbency, Ethiopia handed over the chairmanship of IGAD to Sudan in November 2019.

Eritrea’s self-suspension from IGAD had – or could have – negative consequences. The most notable of these was IGAD’s request, during Eritrea’s absence, for the UN Security Council to sanction Eritrea for its involvement in Somalia and the conflict with Djibouti. The Security Council in December 2009 issued a sanction to that effect. Eritrea’s inability to rejoin IGAD has also kept it outside the organisation’s area of influence in situations where IGAD has been active in matters concerning the Horn of Africa. For instance, Eritrea has not been able to join the IGAD effort to resolve the conflict in South Sudan, a country in the creation of which Eritrea made a significant contribution. Finally, Eritrea’s being away from the IGAD table will deny it active participation in shaping discussions involving the use and allocation of resources provided by the international community to IGAD. For instance, in October 2014 a consortium of donors – the World Bank, the EU, the African Development Bank, and the Islamic Development Bank – announced it would provide USD $8 billion in assistance to the Horn of Africa to support numerous social, educational, and development efforts. IGAD will be at the heart of the implementation of these ambitious projects (World Bank Group, 2014). It is difficult to see how, being “on the outside,” Eritrea can actively cooperate in harnessing the benefits of this initiative. Nevertheless, the role played by IGAD to isolate and marginalise it has left such an indelible impact on Eritrea that, having now the possibility to reactivate its membership, the country is still reluctant to do so and sees no worth in rejoining.

**UN sanctions against Eritrea**

On 23 December 2009, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1907, which stipulated an arms embargo, travel sanctions, and asset freezes on Eritrea and on select political and military officials for providing support to armed groups that were undermining peace and reconciliation in Somalia – in particular, Al-Shabaab – and for not withdrawing its forces from Djibouti.5

The narrations of these sanctions constitute a reminder, from the AU and the US, to Eritrea to desist from supporting terrorist groups in Somalia and to peacefully resolve its dispute with Djibouti, as well as a refusal from Eritrea to heed to such reminders. Finally, IGAD called upon the AU and the UN to work on imposing sanctions on Eritrea (Sharamo and Mesfin, 2011). For the first time in the history of the UN, a continental organisation – the AU Peace and Security Council – called on the UN Security Council to sanction one of its own member states (Eritrea) (Bogale, 2014). Eritrea, for its part, has referred to cable messages leaked by WikiLeaks in which the former US ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, made known her intention to support a UN sanction initiated by IGAD and
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proposed to the Security Council by Uganda, which was exactly what happened (Permanent Mission of Eritrea to the UN, 2012).

Once again IGAD, during the 18th extraordinary session of AHSG in Addis Ababa on 4 July 2011, called on

the AU and the UNSC to fully implement the existing sanctions [of December 2009] and impose additional Sanctions selectively on the Eritrean Regime specially on those economic and mining sectors that the regime draws on including the Eritrean Diaspora as well as ensuring compliance with previous decisions of the UN.

(IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 2011)

Although this wish was not granted, the UN Security Council slightly toughened its 2009 sanction through Resolution 2023 (December 2011), urging companies involved in mining ventures in Eritrea to exercise further vigilance and due diligence to ensure that money generated from mining is not used to destabilise the region. The AHSG, during its 19th Extraordinary Session (27 January 2012), “welcome[d] the resolution on additional sanctions against Eritrea for its continued destabilisation activities in the region and calls for the expeditious implementation of the enhanced sanctions.” Mulugeta (2014, 29) states that, throughout the period of the sanctions, “Ethiopia was instrumental in the imposition of sanctions against Eritrea. It skilfully used its diplomacy to mobilize the support of the states in the region, the AU, and the UN Security Council to impose the sanctions.”

Mosley (2014, 3) adds:

Eritrea, a small state with limited resources, is using the Horn of Africa’s tried and trusted methods to undermine its perceived adversary. Meanwhile, Ethiopia, a much larger state on the path to unlocking its economic potential, is not only using traditional methods, but is also exploiting its international diplomatic position strategically in an effort to keep Eritrea (and the threat of instability that it poses to Ethiopia) isolated and contained.

The experience of Eritrea’s dispute with Djibouti, which ended in peace at the border and the release of Djiboutian prisoners of war; Eritrea’s self-suspension from IGAD, which ended in Eritrea notifying IGAD of its intention to resume its participation in the organisation; as well as the UN Security Council sanctions, monitoring of which has shown that Eritrea’s involvement with Al-Shabaab has been discontinued, show a pattern whereby IGAD continues to put pressure on, or denounce, Eritrea whenever it takes actions contrary to peace and security in the region; but, ironically, keeps silent whenever Eritrea takes steps to remedy those actions. Moreover, IGAD or the UNSC have never attempted to put pressure on Ethiopia for not abiding by the International Court of Arbitration decision and thereby withdrawing from the Eritrean territories that it still occupies. This double standard infuriates Eritreans.
Eritrea–Ethiopia rivalry in IGAD

Since 1997, when Eritrea and Ethiopia parted ways and engaged in a conflict that involved a bloody border war, Eritrea’s relationship with IGAD – narrated in the previous sections – has been defined by three key factors.

Firstly, due to Eritrea’s continued clashes with its neighbours and the country’s resultant perception as a “geopolitical pariah in the Horn of Africa,” “prickly and difficult to deal with” (Müller, 2015), and a “bad neighbour” and “exporter of instability” (Mosley, 2014), it has become relatively easier for Ethiopia to use its influence against Eritrea through IGAD and the AU.

Secondly, it should be mentioned that Ethiopia’s rise as a regional player had an impact on Eritrea–IGAD relations. Ethiopia’s military and economic strength has given it added leverage to use IGAD in the exercise of its policies against Eritrea. Similarly, Eritrea believes that IGAD is used as a Trojan horse by Ethiopia (Mulugeta, 2014) and that “Ethiopia is singlehandedly and illegally blocking, to date, Eritrea’s return to [IGAD]” (Permanent Mission of Eritrea to the UN, 2012, 2). Bereketeab (2012, 185–186) concurs:

the most conspicuous factor of [IGAD’s] negligence [to address the Eritrea–Ethiopian conflict] can be found in the fact that Ethiopia occupies a dominant position in the regional organization [i.e. IGAD]. Therefore any discussion, let alone decision, that would offend Ethiopia could not be entertained within IGAD […] Ethiopia persuaded IGAD to initiate a UN sanctions on Eritrea […] This seriously taints the credibility and integrity of IGAD, since it has been deadly silent regarding the verdict of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) on the border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia which has been stalled for the last [13] years due to Ethiopia’s rejection while it invoked a border dispute with Djibouti to punish Eritrea.

Thirdly, although of lesser significance, is the fact that since around 2010 most IGAD meetings have been held in Addis Ababa, not in Djibouti, which may have put additional pressure on Eritrean representatives to freely participate in IGAD meetings. The weakness of this observation may lie in the fact that Eritrea’s mission to the AU, which is also mandated to attend IGAD meetings, is based in Addis Ababa and has been freely attending AU meetings. The author invites further inquiry into why Ethiopia did not care to stop Eritrea from rejoining the AU. Why focus on IGAD only and not also the AU?

IGAD cannot present itself as an effective regional peacemaker unless it takes a hand in resolving the animosity between Eritrea and Ethiopia. It has been repeatedly noted that solving the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia is a litmus test for IGAD’s role as a regional peacemaker. Bereketeab (2012, 85) observes:

The most glaring failure of IGAD regarding peace and security concerns the Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict. In spite of the fact that Article 18A on Conflict Resolution states that Member States shall “accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before they
are referred to other regional or international organizations,” IGAD has not been able to do anything. IGAD has not been able to seriously, objectively and neutrally discuss the issue in spite of the fact that the conflict has been described as the epicentre of most of the conflicts in the region. Strangely, the IGAD conflict resolution mechanism was not even invoked.

Healy (2009, 12–13) has also observed that:

The region’s most enduring failure since the establishment of IGAD’s peace and security mandate has been the inability to dissuade Ethiopia and Eritrea from settling their differences on the battlefield in 1999 and 2000 […] IGAD has been powerless to persuade Ethiopia and Eritrea to normalise relations or to finalise a peace settlement. Their intense mutual hostility continues to poison regional relations and exacerbate other conflicts. It remains the key obstacle to any progress towards developing an improved regional security framework.

Dersso (2014, 4) comments, “The resultant tension between [Eritrea and Ethiopia] not only spilled over into the existing conflicts in the region (primarily the Somali conflict), but it also has become a major stumbling block for IGAD’s regional integration mandate.” As Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, in Chapter 12 of this volume, notes, the president of Uganda, for instance, has repeatedly stated that Uganda would not allow itself to be drawn into the constant quarrels between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Indeed, Uganda has increasingly been looking towards the East African Economic Community (EAC).

The statements quoted above were selected to give context to the line of argument in this paper that Eritrea’s recent relations with IGAD have essentially been the reflection of its hostile, post-1998 relation with Ethiopia. In contravention of its statute, Ethiopia has occupied the chairpersonship of IGAD from 2008 to 2019, inducing suspicion and mistrust among member states that the organisation became a tool of Ethiopia (see Berhanu’s chapter in this volume), while others opine that Ethiopia’s reluctance to hand over the chairpersonship was intended to block the Eritrean case from appearing in the agenda of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.

Despite Ethiopia’s rise in regional influence, Eritrea has not totally gone into the darkness of irrelevance. Since 2016, Eritrea has been actively engaged in Yemen in a 34-state military coalition against Houthi rebels, allowing Saudi and Emirati warships and fighter planes to make use of its ports, airports, and airspace, as well as to build new military bases (Gridneff, 2015). Ethiopia had made known its dislike of Eritrea’s military alliance with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (Geeskaafrika, 2016), since Eritrea’s new move could be interpreted as an action aimed at garnering more influence in and around the Horn. Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn in 2015 warned Saudi Arabia and the UAE of the consequences should Eritrea use its new relations with them to destabilise the region (African Globe, 2015; Ngaish, 2015). Seen in light of a
July 2016 visit to Ethiopia by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016), the Eritrea–Ethiopia dispute has probably been elevated to an across-the-Red-Sea, if not a global, level. Despite being a sub-regional bloc immediately affected not only by the Yemeni conflict, but also the alliances mentioned above, IGAD’s continued silence on the Eritrea–Ethiopia dispute has damaged its reputation.

Conclusion

The change of government in Ethiopia in April 2018 was a landmark in the Horn of Africa region. It not only ended the 20 years of state of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, but it also restructured inter-state relations in the Horn of Africa. Somalia and Eritrea opened diplomatic relations, the president of Eritrea and Djibouti met for the first time in ten years. Subsequently, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea convened several summits and agreed to work together on common issues of security, development, and regional integration. These are issues that are of central concern to IGAD, which could be facilitated under amicable relations among member states.

IGAD has been pursuing regional integration since 1996 (IGAD, 2009, 2010) and has adopted its own Minimum Integration Plan that covers transport, industry, information and communications technology, peace and security, agriculture, livestock and food security, environment and natural resources sectors, as well as cross-cutting sectors such as gender and health (Dersso, 2014). However, IGAD has been consistently identified as a low-performing regional economic community in the African integration strategy, particularly in the economic/trade integration plan (Abdi and Seid, 2013; Gebeyehu, 2015; Abraha, 2013; Dersso 2014). This is partly due to festering conflicts among member states.

Events and developments in the past few years have highlighted Eritrea as a country with huge mineral and agricultural resources (Thomas, 2012), signalling the potential for economic and trade development for the country. However, most of Eritrea’s exports have been to countries outside Africa. Since trade cooperation has proven to be a catalyst to solving political conflict, engaging Eritrea in IGAD’s economic integration activities is an ineluctable solution. Moreover, it is imperative for IGAD to address peace, security, and development in the entire region. In order to do that IGAD needs to stay neutral and impartial with regard to treating its member states. Its treatment of Eritrea has tainted the image of IGAD. It is vital Eritrea is incorporated in the regional organisation, and for that to happen IGAD needs to earn Eritrea’s confidence.

Following the Eritrea–Ethiopia rapprochement in 2018, the door is open for Eritrea to reactivate its membership. But, so far, Eritrea seems very reluctant to reinstate its membership. It might take a while for IGAD to gain the trust of Eritrea, but at the end, it is only through organic, mutual trust and genuine integration that the region will be able to deal with the convoluted problems the region faces. The image of IGAD has very much been tainted; populations in the region have a very low opinion of the organisation. The new landmark, however, opens
a golden opportunity for IGAD to revitalise itself, make itself meaningful, and change its image.

Notes

1 See the communiqué of the 12th Ordinary Summit of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), held at the Sheraton Hotel Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 14 June 2008.
2 See, for example, IGAD Council of Ministers (2009, 2012); IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government (2011).
3 In fact, the Commission of Inquiry established to investigate human rights abuses in Eritrea took note of the release of the prisoners of war in a report in June 2015 (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2015).
4 See the unofficial translation of the letter by His Excellency Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al-Thani, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, dated 6 June 2010.
5 A monitoring group working under the Sanctions Committee has issued reports following implementation of the sanctions; its reports are available at https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/751/work-and-mandate/reports.

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10 Lessons to be learned from IGAD’s involvement in the Sudan peace process (1993–2005)

Nureldin Satti

Introduction

This chapter examines the circumstances that led to IGAD’s involvement in the Sudanese peace process; how that involvement was conducted; what challenges were encountered; how they were dealt with; and with what results and consequences for Sudan and, later, for South Sudan. The objective is to better understand the various facets of IGAD’s involvement, including the geopolitical context; the roles and positions of the IGAD member states; how IGAD mediation was structured and in what circumstances; and how it was conducted to achieve the declared or sometimes undeclared objectives. The dynamic of the interactions between the two belligerents, the Government of Sudan and the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), and how that interaction affected the evolution and conclusion of the peace process are examined. The role of international actors, particularly the United States (US) and other members of the “Troika Plus,” namely the United Kingdom (UK), Norway, and Italy; as well as how the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in Nairobi, Kenya, on 9 January 2005 was negotiated and concluded are interrogated. Finally, it examines the pitfalls of the implementation process and the reasons that led to a truncated implementation of the agreement, which led to the secession/independence of South Sudan.

How IGAD became involved

It was the government of Sudan that requested IGAD to mediate in the conflict between it and the SPLM/A. Very quickly, it became evident that the government of Sudan and other IGAD members – particularly Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda – did not see eye to eye as to the root causes of the conflict and ways to resolve it. The disagreement became evident as early as 1993 when those countries proposed a Declaration of Principles (DOP), signed by the government of Kenya and the leadership of the SPLM/A in May 1994, with the government of Sudan refusing to sign it until it was practically coerced to in 1998 (El-Affendi, 2001; Apuuli, 2015). The DOP epitomised all the issues that the Khartoum regime refused to recognise at that time, namely: clauses 2, 3, and 4 of the DOP relating to the right of self-determination for the people of southern Sudan; the seven
conditionalities linked to maintaining the unity of Sudan (curiously, the issue of self-determination was given precedence in the text over the unity of the country, which was nonetheless said to be a priority); and separation between religion and the state, an issue which has yet to be accepted by the government of Sudan. While seeking to find a compromise and to accommodate as much as possible the positions of the two belligerents, the DOP seemed to be more inclined to give preference to the SPLM/A’s demands. This is not to minimise the value of the DOP as a document in its own right but to say that it might have contributed to sowing the seeds of a methodology that had thrown a spanner into the peace process even before its inception. The methodology consisted of putting pressure on the Khartoum delegation to accept what was obviously unacceptable to them, with the delegation feigning to accept what it intended to find a way of circumventing in the future.

Consistent with this approach to the negotiating process, Khartoum refused to sign the DOP, and when it did in 1998 it was obvious that it did so under pressure and against its own will. Actually, it accepted it, but did not believe in it. Thus, it was not meant to implement it. It was nothing more than a game that proved to be detrimental to the peace process. Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo recounted how Kenya’s President Daniel Arap Moi managed to “convince” al-Bashir to sign the DOP: as the elder statesman, Moi, guided Bashir to his office and tried to make him see reason. “These young men [meaning the relatively younger President of Uganda, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, and the Eritrean President] mean what they are saying. They will do this to you, and this will only stoke the conflict,” Moi told Bashir. When he considered those words, he feared that the Heads of State whom he considered excitable could as well make good their threat (of invading Sudan). Bashir calmed down and decided to play along (Waihenya, 2006, 38).

It was then, in July 1997, that the Heads of State present at State House in Nairobi decided to establish the IGAD Peace Process for Sudan and special envoys were appointed representing the IGAD member states. Gen. Sumbeiywo was appointed chair of the Technical Committee. Kenya’s Foreign Minister Kalonzo Musyoka was the chair of the Council of Ministers, as Kenya was the chair of the IGAD Sub-committee on Sudan (Woodward, 2013, 171; Young, 2012, 84).

At the international level, following the end of the Cold War, the advent of George W. Bush coming to power in the US and the events of 9/11, the international environment had changed and an aggressive push for the resolution of the problem of southern Sudan started (El-Affendi, 2001, 35). Senator John Danforth was appointed as the US Special Envoy to the Sudan Peace Process and the Sudan Peace Act was adopted by the US Congress in 1997 (Woodward, 2013, 171). The Peace Act clearly identified the culprit as being the Sudan government, or the NIF regime as it was customarily called in international media. For different reasons, the US Christian right and the Congressional Black Caucus lobbied for sanctions against Sudan and viewed the conflict as angels on one side and devils on the other, in line with the habitual Hollywood vision of conflict (Young, 2012, 89).

Within Sudan itself, the opposition to the regime had organised itself, since the days of the regime of Gaafar Nimeiri into a National Democratic Alliance (NDA)
which comprised northern and southern forces opposed to the regime, including the National Democratic Union, the Umma Party, the SPLM/A, and other parties (Johnson, 2016, 143). The SPLM/A, when it came to the negotiating table, completely ignored its fellow members in the NDA and engaged single-handedly in negotiations with the government of Sudan, represented by the National Congress Party (NCP). As a matter of fact, the NCP and the SPLM/A carefully excluded any other political forces from the north or the south from the talks, which gave the talks the aspect of a bilateral discussion between two belligerents who did not represent the totality of the forces in play in the country. This exclusionary attitude proved to have dire consequences on the future of the peace process and on the course of events in the country, both before and after the independence of South Sudan.

**From Machacos to Naivasha**

In 1993, Sudan first requested that IGAD mediate in the civil war between its northern and southern parts (Johnson, 2016, 145), and in 1994 the DOP was concluded. It was signed by the SPLM/A in May 1994 but only by the government of Sudan four years later (Johnson, 2016, 157). The disagreement over the DOP was to foretell what was to come and probably carried the ingredients of the imminent failure of the peace process, despite the notable success in concluding the CPA in Naivasha, Kenya, on 31 December 2004 and its signing in a grand ceremony at Nyayo stadium in Nairobi on 9 January 2005 (Young, 2012).

It was only in 2001 that that mediation, led by Kenya, started to bear fruit. President Moi visited Sudan in July 2001 and the late Bonaya Godana, then minister of foreign affairs of Kenya, who accompanied the president on that visit, recounted that a few days later on the return flight from Khartoum, President Moi said that it was the first time he believed in peace in Sudan and the unity of Sudan. In his visit to Sudan, President Moi presented a seven-point proposal for peace in Sudan, dubbed by the Sudanese media “The President Moi Peace Plan” (Editorial by Mahgoub Irwan in Al-Sudan newspaper, July 2001).

In June 2002, the first round of direct talks between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A took place in Machacos. Waihenya (2006, 84) had this to say about Gen. Sumbeiywo’s first encounter with the negotiating environment:

Sumbeiywo was also to realize that the negotiations had to be done in a situation where some parties, other than the two protagonists, were all suspicious of one another. There were envoys whose countries were not particularly at peace with others. The Ugandans, for instance, were at conflict with the Sudanese Government over the Lord Resistance Army which was fighting the Ugandan Government from its base in Sudan, and Eritrea and Ethiopia had just ended a war with each other. There was then a quiet internal conflict within the mediation team. There was also the international community which wanted to hijack the negotiations, and there was the IGAD Secretariat to take care of. Sumbeiywo had to balance all that within what he was later to call “a spider’s web.”
In 2005, the CPA between the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A was signed. It ultimately and inadvertently paved the way for the separation of South Sudan and its formation as an independent state on 9 July 2011. As mentioned earlier, the IGAD-led Sudan peace process revealed the strengths and weaknesses of IGAD as an intergovernmental organisation, the sometimes fierce competition for influence and prestige among its member states, and the intrusive role played by international partners.

Judging by what it achieved in comparison to its declared objectives, the Naivasha CPA can be considered a success for IGAD (Young, 2012, 129). But like all successes in such complicated circumstances, it was a success the consequences of which could only be measured in relation to the unfolding situation in Sudan, as well as in the new country created as a result of that same “success,” which is to say, South Sudan. It could be said that Naivasha, particularly the way it was implemented, succeeded in helping South Sudan to gain its independence while failing to keep Sudan together. But to be fair to IGAD and to the mediation team, even if some of them may have worked for the secession of South Sudan, they gave the belligerents an agreement that, if implemented differently, might have led to a united, democratic, and secular Sudan.

IGAD’s mediation

It is to be noted that when IGAD got involved in the Sudan peace process it had no prior experience in mediation or conflict resolution. As indicated above, it had barely reformed itself into a regional cooperation organisation and its mediation and conflict resolution capabilities were quite limited at the time. The IGAD Secretariat was under-resourced and understaffed, and ill-adapted to undertake the daunting task of mediating the various conflicts that were then starting to sprout in the IGAD sub-region: Somalia in the early 1990s; the LRA problem in Uganda; the Ethiopia–Eritrea war in 1998; and, of course, the Sudanese civil war in its second phase, which erupted in 1983 (Johnson, 2016). The intra-IGAD politics made it difficult for the organisation to play a role in the Somali conflict, that of the LRA, or the Ethiopia–Eritrea war. Interestingly, in the case of the Sudan civil war, it was the government of Sudan itself that invited IGAD to help find a solution to the conflict. This request came at a time when many of the IGAD member states were hostile to Sudan, mainly because they felt threatened by its radical Islamist activities (Woodward, 2013, 161). In doing so, Sudan put its fate in the hands of its fellow IGAD member states, who seized the opportunity to put an end to a conflict that was affecting the whole region, but also to coerce the Sudan regime into changing its ways, even if the price was to be the division of the country.

The choice of Kenya to lead the negotiating process was dictated by the intra-IGAD relations at that time. Kenya was the only country that had reasonably acceptable relations with both belligerents. It was not too far from the Sudanese government and not too close to the SPLM/A, while at the same time having enough leverage with the latter to bring it to – and keep it at – the negotiating table.
The choice of Gen. Sumbeiywo as chief mediator was a judicious one. He was known to be a man of integrity, a military man who would understand the intricacies of the conflict but at the same time had the requisite skills to lead the negotiating process. The structure of the negotiating process was also done in such a way that the IGAD member states, mainly Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda, would be represented through their envoys to the process to provide support to the chief negotiator and see to it that their interests were being observed.

The regional and international setting prevailing at the time did not allow for a different structure for a peace process. The various stakeholders and interested parties needed to be represented in one way or another in the mechanisms that dealt with mediation. This included the member states represented at the level of heads of state, to guide the process and take strategic decisions; the ministerial level, which ensured the link between the technical level and the higher decision level and prepared the decisions to be taken at that level; the technical mediation level, the advisors and experts who provided technical, diplomatic, or academic advice; and the Secretariat, which ensured the smooth functioning of the whole process and provided support at all levels.

The process excluded Sudan’s northern neighbours, in particular Egypt and Libya, who had their own peace initiative, judged by some observers as being more comprehensive as it included other political parties from northern and southern Sudan (Young, 2012, 87). It was probably for this reason that it was not accepted by the two belligerents, who were seeking to ensure their full monopoly and control of the process. This approach was supported by the mediating IGAD member states, who wanted to keep IGAD’s control over the process and to preserve the “African” nature of the mediation. Critics of the CPA process, and of similar processes for that matter, argued that the model was flawed and described it as “a liberal peacemaking model” (Young, 2015).

The Sudan peace process was initiated in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, when a triumphant West was entertaining ideas about the “End of History” (Fukuyama, 1992) and the “Clash of Civilizations” (Huntington, 1993) and when the so-called “neocons” and the Christian right were carrying the day in the US. The conflict resolution model that was being promoted at that time was inevitably a liberal one based on the premises of human rights, democratic change, and the right to self-determination, which was an amended version of the model exercised during the era of decolonisation. IGAD member states had neither the resources nor the political or economic clout to challenge or even amend that model to suit the realities of their region. They exercised a copy-and-paste approach to the resolution of conflict in Sudan that sought to introduce democratic transformation and human rights in isolation from the real will of the people. The result was an accommodation of two anti-democratic and totalitarian bodies, the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A, who sought the same objective, albeit by different means, which was consolidation of their grip on power and resources, regardless of the will of the people.

However, we must give the mediator, Gen. Sumbeiywo, his dues. He realised early on the necessity to go into the “field” to listen to people in both northern and
southern Sudan and see for himself the tragic effects of the war. This was a step in the right direction, but it was not enough. No mediation or conflict resolution model had succeeded thus far in achieving the requisites of systematically and thoroughly bringing the views and concerns of the people into the peace process. Surprisingly, the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A agreed to apply the concept of “popular consultation” to the two areas – South Kordofan and the Blue Nile states – but did not want to apply them more widely in northern and southern Sudan (Grawert, 2010; Wassara, 2010, 89). Popular consultation is perhaps the closest you can get to achieving the democratisation of a peace process. But popular consultation must be done as part and parcel of the peace process itself, as a mechanism of mediation and conflict resolution rather than an afterthought or an appendix to a peace agreement. But, of course, the question is how this can be done when you are dealing with those who are unwilling to listen to the will of the people.

The conflict between the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A was unique in many ways. It opposed an Islamist regime, seeking to spread its ideology beyond its borders to a movement initially inspired by Marxist–Leninist ideology, but reformed itself into what was perceived to be a liberation movement with an opportunistic leadership with unclear objectives, ranging from creating a New Sudan to seeking the independence of South Sudan (Young, 2012, 62f). The agenda pursued by the government of Sudan at that time was resisted not only by the SPLM/A but also by a sizeable part of the Sudanese people and by the traditional political parties allied to the SPLM/A within the NDA. The problem of radical Islam is not only of concern to the Sudanese, but to the whole of the IGAD sub-region, to Africa, and to the world at large. A wider analysis was needed, and still is, to identify the inter-linkages and ramifications of the Sudan peace process and its medium- and long-term impact on regional peace and stability, as well as on the two Sudans. Western media, think tanks, and interest groups channelled the attention of the elite and decision-makers in the IGAD sub-region in one direction, which served the immediate interests and concerns of these circles and of their reading of the situation from a Western perspective, while ignoring the medium- and long-term ramifications that are now visible to all.

**Interaction between the two belligerents**

As indicated earlier, the two parties, the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A, had one goal in mind: to reinforce their positions and legitimise themselves in the eyes of the regional and international communities. The government was keen to preserve the Islamist nature of the regime while making minimal concessions to the regional and international communities. As it turned out later, the government was prepared to sacrifice the unity of the country rather than compromise its hardline position. There was, of course, a constituency within the regime that would have preferred to keep the country together, whatever the cost, but it was the hardliners who carried the day. The SPLM/A, for its part, was not much different from the government: many years before the beginning of the Naivasha
talks, a struggle had started between unionists and separatists within the SPLM/A. Garang was said to be a unionist and had elaborated the vision of a New Sudan, which would be secular, democratic, and egalitarian. Another constituency within the SPLM/A, presumably led by the present president, Kiir, worked for the secession of South Sudan. This trend was supported by influential lobby groups in the US, led by the infamous “Friends of South Sudan,” who saw the future of South Sudan as a separate country. As we shall see later, there was no agreed policy within the US as to the future of South Sudan. Waihenya (2006) quotes an interesting exchange of views and words between Gen. Sumbeiywo and Danforth on the issue of self-determination:

A more feasible, and, I think, preferable view of self-determination would ensure the right of the people of Southern Sudan to live under a government that respects their religion and culture. Such a system would require robust internal and external guarantees so that any promises made by the government in peace negotiations could not be ignored in practice.

This view was not shared by the southerners. The SPLM/A had all along insisted that the southerners must be accorded a right to determine their future status in a referendum. But Danforth was trying to water down the meaning of self-determination as it related to the cause of Southern Sudan (Waihenya, 2006, 89).

Was this prophetic? At that same time, there were other constituencies who considered the secession of South Sudan not only a preferred option but an objective they had been working to achieve for many years. In the aftermath of the Naivasha Agreement, former US ambassador to Sudan Tim Carney wrote:

In 2001 and 2002 no great sophistication was needed to recognize that the United States did not have a unified position on how to deal with Sudan. Opposing views in the Congress, the National Security Council staff, and the State Department made it difficult for the United States to articulate a coherent policy. U.S. agencies viewed Sudan through different lenses. Although the State Department had moved Sudan to its Africa Bureau in the late 1950s, other U.S. agencies kept it in their Middle East offices.

Moreover, American non-governmental organisations (NGOs), churches, and journalists held strong views, often informed by only one party. Some lacked an understanding or willingness to try to grasp complicated Sudanese realities. Former President Jimmy Carter did, however, use his ties with evangelical Christians to ensure some breathing space for Senator Danforth’s efforts (Carney, 2007, 5).

This is probably another lesson to be learned: to what extent should we trust bigger powers to resolve our own conflicts when they themselves do not agree about the way to go about it? Too many conflicts around the world give us sufficient evidence, if it were needed, that we better serve ourselves and should seek to resolve our own conflicts before they become intractable and require the
interference of the bigger powers. Their role should be a supportive one, giving us the right push at the right time.

Arguably, South Sudan already had its self-determination during the interim period. It was governing itself, while participating in the government of the north with 32 percent share of power. The oil was flowing and the south was exempted from the application of Sharia legal code. This was as controversial in the north as it was in the south. People in the north developed the habit of living with it because even if that brand of political Islam was resisted in its own right, the real problem was the totalitarian police state hiding behind it. Proponents of political Islam now themselves recognise the failure of their project, which was based on rhetoric and empty slogans.

The hardliners in the Islamist movement imagined that the south was an obstacle in the way of consolidating their grip on the country and achieving their dream of a radical Islamist state in the Sudan. By getting rid of the south they imagined that they could make that dream come true. They were wrong: they have been able neither to consolidate their grip on power nor to fulfil their dream of an Islamist state because the basic premise was flawed.

The CPA negotiations became associated with two names: Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, the former first vice president of Sudan, and the late Dr John Garang, former leader of the SPLM/A. Garang died in a helicopter crash in July 2005 and Taha has lost his position in the government. The opponents of the CPA option for unity saw to it that the CPA did not achieve its two objectives of peace and unity. Taha and Garang became the scapegoats in the nightmarish worst-case scenario that we are living through now. South Sudan had an option to live in peace and harmony with (North) Sudan, but some of its leaders and their friends did not want that to happen. Making the north bleed was more important for some than making the south prosper. But this is not to absolve the hardliners in Khartoum of the responsibility, which is a shared one, as indicated earlier.

The role of international partners

The IGAD Partners Forum played an important role in providing support to the peace process. Most of the funding came from the EU and European countries, which also provided diplomatic support to the process. The Troika Plus, led by the US, the UK, Norway, and Italy equally provided considerable support to the process (El-Affendi, 2001; El-Battahani, 2013, 35; Ahmed, 2010, 7). In this process, as in other African peace processes, questions about the role of international partners keep re-surfacing all the time. How can their influence on the process be controlled when their financial and diplomatic support to the process is sometimes vitally needed? How can we keep the independence of the mediation process and protect it from the interference of the bigger powers? The formula of African solutions to African problems was introduced many years ago without Africans being able to gain full control of their own destiny or resolve their problems and conflicts without assistance or interference, sometimes robust, from the bigger powers. At most, what Africa and IGAD can do at this stage is to try and gain financial
independence by funding conflict resolution initiatives themselves and build their own technical, logistical, and intellectual mediation and conflict resolution capacities. This will be a first necessary step in the right direction. The AU launched such a process at its summit of Heads of State and Government in Kigali, Rwanda, on 18 July 2016, thus emulating the funding mechanism put in place by countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) many years ago. This is necessary, but not enough.

Reinforcing IGAD’s mediation capacities

I had the privilege of taking part in a meeting for the formulation of the mediation strategy in Nairobi and was happy to see that some profoundly serious thinking and planning was put into the process. The strategy was to include an IGAD mediation and peacemaking model based on the realities, needs, and aspirations of the people of the region. This further required putting together a “brains trust” that would develop the mediation and conflict resolution model and keep updating it and adapting it to changing regional situations.

In the current conditions of international relations, the role of bigger powers should never be underestimated. If you cannot have them with you, you should at least see to it that they are not working against you. The best you can do is try to maximise their benefits and minimise their harm. This is one of the hard realities of international relations today. Whether we want it or not, there is an international order structured around the United Nations (UN) and its funds and specialised agencies, continental and regional cooperation, and peace and security organisations. IGAD and its member states must find their niche within this complex array of bodies, organisations, and institutions. The experience of the Naivasha peace process has shown that IGAD member states should do more to align their relations, concerns, and interests at the bilateral, regional, and international levels. They need to agree on how to help a member of their family who is experiencing problems or in a state of turmoil or failure; and how to minimise competition over who will lead peace processes.

Sudan was assisted in splitting apart, even when the writing on the wall was only too clear. IGAD midwifed the process that led to this parting of ways. As the saying goes, “You cannot blame the midwife for the sex or colour of the baby.” But this is precisely the point: does IGAD’s role stop at the delivery of the baby, or should it follow the process of its development and growth? In other words, what was IGAD’s role in the implementation of the CPA? The answer is, very little. The baby was taken out of IGAD’s hands and reared by others. But it is a well-known fact that while reaching an agreement is important, implementing that agreement on the ground is equally if not more important. In the case of Sudan, as in many other conflict situations, implementation is handled by those who have the financial, technical, and logistical resources to do it. But they may not always garner the necessary political consensus to do it or may not have correctly read local political or sociocultural intricacies. The established format is that of a pledging conference to which are invited major donors, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, UN agencies, and other funding and/or implementing partners. Implementing structures
are put in place, comprising a ceasefire commission, a monitoring and observation commission, an assessment and evaluation commission, and other commissions according to the various areas of concern of the peace agreement.

In the case of South Sudan, as in the case of many other countries in conflict, pledges have rarely been met: USD $7 billion dollars was pledged for a reconstruction and development fund, only 20 percent of which was paid. Additionally, the international community seems to have run out of ideas as to how to deal with certain categories of conflict such as those plaguing the IGAD region. The usual recipe is that of financial and economic sanctions, which have little effect on the governing elite but add to the suffering of the population; or arms embargos, which are difficult to monitor or enforce in the current environment where the whole world is awash with all kinds of arms and when it is easier to get a gun in certain areas than to find a piece of bread. Human rights and democratisation are indeed noble ideals that need to be upheld, but in today’s world you can get away with crime if you have the right kind of connections. Is there here an issue of double standards? Probably, yes.

Conclusions and lessons learned

IGAD decided to involve itself in the conflict between the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A at the request of the former. That was the first experience of IGAD in mediation and conflict resolution. The agreement of the IGAD member states to designate a single mediator supported by envoys from some of the member countries and to dedicate a technical secretariat facilitated the successful conclusion of the process. This was mainly due to the fact that there was minimal competition among the member states as to who should lead the process, as all those involved shared varying degrees of sympathy with the cause pursued by the SPLM/A and the common objective of putting pressure on the government of Sudan to change its ways.

The methodology adopted by the mediator and his team turned out to be judicious, in the sense that he was able to get together, face to face, the two people who were considered to be the decision-makers on either side, Garang and Taha. This method was helpful in reaching an agreement, despite the highly contentious issues and the mistrust that prevailed between the two sides. Paradoxically, what was seen as a positive aspect of the methodology of the talks turned into a disadvantage in the implementation phase, particularly after the death of Garang in 2005 and the resistance of hardliners on both sides to the full implementation of the agreement, particularly the clauses on “Making Unity Attractive.”

This highlights the importance of involving all stakeholders in peace talks, which has been difficult to achieve in the case of the CPA due to the refusal of the two belligerents to include other parties. This attitude continued into the implementation phase, where the two parties never sought to explain the agreement to the people or involve them in its implementation. On the contrary, they did everything they could to render unity unattractive.

Too many contentious issues were left unresolved during the interim period (2005–2011), such as that of the borders between north and south; the issue of
the oil-rich border area of Abyei and the popular consultations in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states; security arrangements and the development of the south; as well as passing some of the laws that were crucial for the implementation process, such as the National Security Law. Even though the CPA included detailed implementation protocols, IGAD’s role in the implementation phase was minimal. This poses the question as to whether more should have been done to ensure better integration and continuity between the negotiation phase and that of the implementation. This also takes us back to questions over the all-inclusiveness of the peace process, a better reading of the prevailing political situation, and a better assessment of the potential negative impact of the spoilers.

The CPA talks have once more brought to the forefront the dependency of IGAD on external financial, technical, and intellectual assistance and attempts by IGAD partners to control or influence the process. While political influence is inevitable, whatever we do, due to the interlinkages between local, regional, and international affairs, all should be done to minimise that influence, particularly by ensuring the financial, technical, and intellectual independence of IGAD.

References


11 Kenya’s diplomacy and international relations within the IGAD region on matters of peace and security
Growth, development, and prospects

Kizito Sabala

Introduction

This chapter discusses the role and contributions of the Kenyan government on matters of peace and security within the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) region. Though it deliberately omits bilateral relations with individual IGAD member states, it acknowledges that they do play out within the collective decisions at the level of IGAD. The chapter largely utilises secondary information in discussing relations with IGAD on matters of peace and security, particularly in relation to Somalia, Sudan, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM) (looking at the future of the cou/A) conflict, and presently South Sudan. It concludes by iontry’s diplomacy and international relations with international organisations in a highly globalised but equally competitive world, with emerging and more complex and sophisticated security threats, as the country hopes to assert its influence among the community of nations.

The creation of Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) in 1986 should be viewed as a response to larger integration efforts across the continent. The IGADD organisation was the brainchild of East African leaders from Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia in response to the shared problems associated with perennial ecological problems in the region, though almost three decades later, droughts, famine, floods, and desertification still abound. The change of IGADD to IGAD in 1996 was accompanied by an expansion of the organisation’s mandate to include engagement in peace and security matters. Since then, Kenya has not only been an active member, having been a founder of IGAD, but has been influential in helping to transform the organisation to respond to a myriad of challenges, among them peace and security in the region. Although the organisation has engaged in other related peace and security challenges, such as transnational crimes, maritime security, and the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), among others, the most pronounced has been its role and contribution to the search for peace and security in war-torn Somalia, Sudan, and presently South Sudan.
Kenya and the IGAD peace and security norms and institutions

The role and contributions of Kenya have been in tandem with the ever-changing peace and security architecture of the sub-region but also across the continent. Across the continent, Kenyans have been part of the UN peacekeeping operations in Namibia and Sierra Leone, and on the Eritrea–Ethiopia border. To be effectively engaged in peace and security, Kenya has been part and parcel of the development of relevant norms and institutions, including regional programmes. This includes the IGAD Security Sector Program (formerly the IGAD Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism), the 2002 Protocol on CEWARN, and the Mediation Support Unit (Sabala, 2013). In addition, Kenya has been involved in decisions at the highest policymaking level of the organisation to establish peace agreement implementation follow-up offices in Juba, Khartoum, and Mogadishu (IGAD Heads of State and Government Communiqués, 2008), following the realisation that on many occasions there was no sustained follow-up on the peace agreements once they have been signed.

Apart from being an active member in norm- and institution-building at continental and regional levels, Kenya, under the astute and able leadership of President Daniel arap Moi, was active in resolving the long-standing and protracted political conflict between the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A. During the 25-year civil war between the National Congress Party and the SPLM/A, following the abrogation of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement in 1983 by Sudanese President Gaffar Nimeiri, Kenya chaired the IGAD Sub-Committee on Sudan that pushed for the acceptance of the Declaration of Principles (DOP), which defined the broad agenda for negotiations between the two principal parties to the conflict. Together with other regional leaders who were members of the sub-committee – namely, Presidents Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea, and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda – ensured the sustainability of the peace talks. According to Lesch and Wöndu (2000), the DOP moved negotiations in a different direction from Abuja, inasmuch as the issue of self-determination for the South Sudanese was concerned. The Abuja process that took place between May 1992 and May 1993 is significant in two ways. First, it laid the foundation upon which the IGAD mediation proceeded, and secondly it brought the conflict in Sudan into international limelight. Odera adds that until the formulation of the DOP, it appeared that the IGAD mediation would be a tool for the parties.

The fact that mediators through the DOP had the courage to identify contentious issues such as self-determination, unity, and separation of state and religion showed that there was a clear intention to delve deeper into the fundamental issues at the heart of the conflict. The sub-committee was supported by, among others, Friends of IGAD and the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF), which initially comprised the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Austria, Italy, Canada, the United States (US), and the United Kingdom. The main purpose of the IPF was to generate and galvanise international support for the IGAD-led mediation, but it was also instrumental in financing the process. After that, Kenya not only hosted a series of protracted talks in various parts of the country, such as Machakos, Naivasha,
and Lake Bogoria, but also provided the special envoys – Dr Zachary Onyonka, Ambassador Daniel Mboya and Gen. Lazarus Sumbeiywo – who mediated the process on behalf of IGAD. The result of these efforts was the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 that ended one of the longest-standing civil wars in Africa. Before the process that led to the CPA, which officially and de facto ended the civil war in Sudan, there were numerous attempts at peace-making in Sudan. These included negotiations in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (August 1989); Nairobi, Kenya (September 1989); Abuja, Nigeria (May–June 1992, April–May 1993); Nairobi (1993), and Frankfurt, Germany (January 1992) (Public Affairs Council, 2002). In 1993, the government of Sudan requested IGAD to mediate in the conflict following the collapse of the Abuja process which was attributed to what was termed the irreconcilable position of the two parties on the question of state and religion (Odera, 2002). According to Odera (2002), the mediators at Abuja performed a diagnostic role and were able to tease out the main issues on which resolution depended.

Kenya was instrumental in preparing the ground for the IGAD mediation in Sudan (Communiqué, 1993). In its engagement in the Sudan–SPLM/A conflict, the country was guided by the principle of good neighbourliness, providing assistance to its neighbours to be at peace with itself and with its neighbours, and seeking peaceful means such as dialogue to resolve disputes. In this regard, Kenya held meetings with Hassan El Turabi and Omar al-Bashir as the leaders of the National Congress Party (NCP) in Sudan and John Garang of SLPM/A in Addis Ababa and Nairobi where the latter was urged not to put all his “eggs in one basket,” a specific reference to the use of the military option alone, which he had sworn to employ in liberating the Southern Sudanese. Instead, Garang was convinced to embrace both military action and dialogue to resolve the conflict. Kenya took it upon itself to raise awareness on the plight of the South Sudanese under discriminatory treatment by the NCP-led government in Khartoum at national, regional, and international levels. The IGAD Peace Initiative was established in September 1993 and launched in March 1994 to assist in bringing the conflict to an end.

According to the interview the writer of this chapter had with Peter Marwa, the former IGAD Head of Conflict Resolution and Bethwel Kiplagat in Nairobi, in 2012, President Moi, in his capacity as the chair of the IGAD Sub-Committee on Peace in Sudan was instrumental in ensuring that the process was sustained. He convened numerous IGAD summits on Sudan, made several personal visits to Khartoum, and met with Garang and Bashir to stress the importance of dialogue to resolve the conflict. Moi’s personal commitment to the process negated the accusations levelled against IGAD that it was a dishonest and partial broker. His personal dedication also helped to galvanise and mobilise international partners to support the process. Furthermore, he ensured that the conflict and suffering of Sudan were kept alive on both regional and international agendas. Even at the lowest point in the process, when some actors were being accused of either bias or undermining the process, Garang and Bashir had something good to say about Moi.
President Moi maintained the unswerving support of the Kenya government to the peace process to resolve the conflict between the government of Sudan and SPLM/A. For instance, when the development partners questioned the transparency and accountability of the financial resources that were supporting the peace process and suspended funding, the Kenyan government injected USD $66 million to sustain the process until it was resumed (Sabala, 2012). Throughout the entire process, Moi supported the IGAD special envoys and personally took over leadership when the need arose to give it impetus. During the negotiations, Moi ensured he was well equipped and informed with the latest accurate developments regarding the process, a situation that earned him respect and trust when he proposed interventions to overcome any impasse. Even when he left power in 2002, not only did he continue to work on Sudan through the Moi Foundation, but his successor Mwai Kibaki appointed him as his special envoy on Sudanese matters. Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat noted that Moi was passionate about peace in Sudan. His religious belief inspired this virtue in promoting peace and a strong belief in the principle of African solutions to African problems and prestige.¹

At some point during negotiations, when frustration-gripped infighting intensified in parts of Sudan, and there was no significant progress on the mediation front, and the humanitarian situation was worsening, Moi sent a message to the two parties indicating that unless there was meaningful progress, he was not going to preside over the process. The statement, which carried both an appeal to the parties and a threat to withdraw, did not achieve its intended goal as the session ended in a stalemate. The CPA is a conglomeration of six protocols on various issues that include security arrangements, power and wealth sharing, and the question of the oil-rich border area of Abyei, among other things, and two annexes. Furthermore, the Kenyan government provided financial resources to keep the process afloat when development partners delayed their support.

**Kenya and the South Sudan conflict**

During the crisis that broke out in South Sudan on 15 December 2013, Kenya hosted the first IGAD summit on 27 December on the matter, following a flurry of shuttle diplomacy that involved the country’s cabinet secretary for foreign affairs and the Ethiopian minister for foreign affairs. The summit laid the foundation for the commencement of negotiations between the SPLM in the Government and the SPLM in the Opposition (SPLM-IO), former detainees, and other political parties. The former detainees were, namely, Deng Alor Kuol, Gier Chuang, Kosti Manibe, Chol Tong Mayay, Cirino Hiteng, Madut Biar Yel, and John Luk Jok. The others were Pagan Amum Okiech, Majak D’Agoot, Oyai Deng Ajak, and Ezekiel Lol Gatkuoth. They were detained in Juba by the South Sudan government because they were accused of being part of the (Riek Machar of SPLM-IO) plot to overthrow the government of Salva Kiir. When the crisis broke out on 15 December 2013, the South Sudan government accused Riek Machar of plotting to overthrow the government though the latter denied the accusations.
The negotiations took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, led by three special envoys – namely, Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin of Ethiopia, Gen. Mohammed Ahmed Mustafa al-Dhabi of Sudan, and Gen. Lazarus Sumbeiywo of Kenya – culminated in the final Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ACRISS) in August 2015. During the negotiation process, the regional organisation in which Kenya served as the rapporteur and Ethiopia as the chair convened more than ten Extraordinary Summits of Heads of State and Governments on the question of South Sudan.

The IGAD mediation process on South Sudan was structured as follows: the summit, which is the highest decision-making policy organ of the organisation and set the overall direction of the talks, met more than ten times – a clear demonstration of its political commitment to see the conflict end peacefully. With Kenya as the rapporteur and Ethiopia the chair, the involvement of Ugandan military and allegations that Sudan was siding with the opposition, the region’s collective voice had been undermined. The Council of Ministers consisted of the ministers of foreign affairs of the member states, and their meetings preceded every summit and the differences at summit level reflected what transpired at the council level.

The Office of the Special Envoys on South Sudan (OSSESS) was the most critical organ in the mediation process. It oversaw day-to-day negotiations and reported to the council and the summit. It was created at the Nairobi summit of 27 December 2013 (IGAD, 2013) and comprised the three special envoys, chaired by Ambassador Mesfin. The IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) was provided for at the 23rd Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State. It had headquarters in Juba, with teams in selected conflict zones, whose mandate was to monitor and verify violations of the cessation of hostilities agreement and report to the OSSESS. MVM was also responsible for monitoring and verification of humanitarian access, protection of civilians, and cessation of hostile propaganda. Moreover, the teams had the leverage to use their discretion and deploy verification missions on the basis of credible information, complaints submitted by the parties to the conflict, and/or direct requests from the IGAD special envoys; and monitor the activities of the parties and acts associated with their forces and armed groups and allied forces invited by either side. The final organ was the IGAD Secretariat, which continued to play a very peripheral role, despite having seconded the director of peace and security to be fully engaged in the process, while the whole mediation was supposed to be anchored within the newly established Mediation Support Unit.

Kenya is part of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission and Ceasefire and the Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM), which are transitional structures that were expected to nurture and support the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) in South Sudan in navigating through a transitional period. CTSAMM replaced the former Joint Technical Committee/MVM, which was monitoring the ceasefire agreements signed by the two parties before the 2015 agreement in which Kenya was participating.

Furthermore, when a dispute broke out between soldiers allied to President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar on 7 July 2016 within the TGNU,
Kenya hosted the First Extraordinary IGAD Council of Ministers on the situation in South Sudan to try and resolve the matter. Kenya was part of subsequent meetings on the same matter on the side-lines of the AU summit in Kigali, Rwanda, in July and Addis Ababa in August. Even when violence broke out in Juba in July between the two factions, Kenya hosted the extraordinary IGAD council meeting. The council’s hard-hitting communiqué (IGAD, 2016) was not only adopted by the AU Peace and Security Council but was further improved at the IGAD Extraordinary Summit in Kigali.

In addition to the foregoing, Kenya contributed more than 1,300 peacekeepers to the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and provided the force commander. A spat occurred following the dismissal from that role of Lt. General Johnson Ondiek. A UN investigation panel blamed poor leadership and judgment for attacks on Terrain Camp, a UN facility in the capital, Juba, which led to several deaths. Although the UN promptly requested that Kenya appoint a replacement, the country considered it unnecessarily punitive and refused. However, following consultations with the new UN Secretary-General António Guterres, the country, as an important interlocutor in drawn-out efforts to rescue South Sudan, recommitted itself to supporting peace efforts there.

Bilaterally, Kenya continued to engage and encourage the TGNU to respect the institutions that were established during this period. Kenya has continued to closely monitor the implementation of this agreement through Track II (back-channel) diplomacy and ensure that that the parties to the agreements respected the accord reached in August in Addis Ababa.

Kenya in Somalia

Just as in South Sudan, Kenya has been an important player in trying to resolve the Somali conflict. The search for sustainable peace and security in that country, which has been without an effective government since the fall of Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991, has been particularly challenging and difficult. Against this backdrop, Kenya has been at the forefront of efforts to deal with more than two decades of state failure and political anarchy that allowed a culture of warlordism to become entrenched. This has since been replaced by Al-Shabaab’s militant Islamist extremism, which continues to make Somalia ungovernable; a situation that has been conducive to creating an environment where lawlessness, criminal activities, trafficking, and smuggling thrive.

Kenya hosted, mediated, and led the process in Nairobi in 2004 that created the first semblance of a government in the post-Said Barre era. It provided the chief mediators, Elijah Mwangale and Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, who spearheaded the process. The country contributed 3,664 troops in Somalia (Daily Nation, 2016) as part of the 22,000-strong African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) created in 2007 to help stabilise the war-torn country. Uganda had the highest contingent (6,223 troops), followed by Burundi (5,432), Ethiopia (4,395), and Djibouti (2,000), though lately there were concerns about the effectiveness of AMISOM in dealing with Al-Shabaab.
However, there seems to be a need to re-examine Kenya’s military venture into Somalia, dubbed *Operation Linda Nchi*, given the heavy casualties that the country has sustained since its entry in 2011. Kenya has witnessed increased terrorist attacks by the Al-Shabaab militant group on its soil, since the intervention of Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) in Somalia in 2011. The worst attack happened in 2016 when the Kenyan base at El Ade was attacked resulting in the death of more than 150 Kenyan soldiers (BBC 2016).

Part of AMISOM, the presence of the Kenyan soldiers should be re-evaluated against the backdrop of allegations of its involvement in sugar and charcoal smuggling in Somalia. Its losses to Al-Shabaab, the implications of frequent terrorist attacks on the Kenyan economy, and the need for a reconstructed AMISOM also need evaluation. The UN report (Kelley, 2017) on the charcoal and sugar smuggling and its implications for the country’s military relationship – if any – with Al-Shabaab, requires crafting a face-saving policy of withdrawal or an exit strategy.

Kenya hosts about 600,000 Somali refugees (Huffington Post, 2016) in Kakuma and Dadaab camps as it did southern Sudanese during the 21 years of the liberation struggle in that country. In the recent past, Kenya has raised serious concerns about links between Somali refugees and national security and resolved to start a process of repatriation to their country. Discussions took place between the government and the UN on this issue. In response to perceived threats posed by the Somali refugees, Kenya hosted an IGAD summit on 26 and 27 March 2017 that discussed ways and means of addressing their problems within the confines of the international conventions relating to the protection, treatment, and repatriation of displaced persons.

During the special summit, the IGAD Heads of State and Government, which included the then newly elected Somali President Mohammed Abdullahi “Farmajo” Mohamed and the AU Commission Chair Moussa Faki Mahamat, agreed to collectively pursue a comprehensive regional approach to deliver durable solutions to the issues regarding Somali refugees. The summit also appealed for the protection of refugees to respond effectively to the ravaging drought situation in the sub-region, mobilise resources, and coordinate international efforts.

Kenya played a role in the formation of regional states or federal states in Somalia and supported capacity-building in various fields. It occasionally hosted various inter-community dialogues that led to the formation of the Jubaland Transitional Government. At bilateral and multilateral levels Kenya provided capacity-building to both Somalia and South Sudan using its institutions and seconding civil servants in the areas of policing, banking, military intelligence, and ICT, among others. However, its efforts to resolve the Ugandan conflict was a failure. Before Kenya’s engagement in the Sudan–SPLM/A conflict, the country had tried to mediate in Uganda in the conflict between the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and the government of Gen. Basilio Olara Okello. This process did not see the light of the day, as the NRM took power in Uganda in 1985 on the eve of negotiations in Nairobi.
Kenya and IGAD

After the post-electoral violence in 2007–2008 in the country and the eventual confirmation of charges (crimes against humanity) against President Uhuru Kenyatta and Vice President William Ruto, by the International Criminal Court (ICC), which held that they had a case to answer, Kenya was able to lobby, mobilise, and rally not only IGAD member states but also the AU on the question of the ICC. This should be situated within the broader debate of Africa–West relations and the whole notion of neo-colonialism, but also the specific context that Kenya was experiencing at that point in time. The country, through IGAD and the AU, successfully piled pressure on the ICC that later terminated the cases against Kenyatta, Ruto, and journalist Joshua Arap Sang, terming it a mistrial. Though the mobilisation kept the issue of Africa–ICC relations alive on the international and continental agenda, it received a blow during the July 2016 AU Summit in Kigali, which was sharply divided on the proposal for a mass withdrawal from the Rome Statute by the continent’s member states if it was not revised.

Challenges and opportunities for Kenya’s diplomatic engagement

One of the main challenges undermining the country’s path towards reclaiming its politically dominant space in the region is the fractured and deep-seated ethnically based political differences that continue to undermine the fabric of the country’s economy. The country’s political chessboard is highly ethnicised and built on unresolved historical injustices relating to land and political marginalisation in the pursuit of political power (Government Printer, 2008b). These issues that cloud and mask the country’s political scene have been swept under the carpet for political greed and unless addressed could plunge the country into political and economic instability and turmoil. These issues have polarised the country’s political landscape, particularly during the period heading into elections, a situation that potentially scares away long-term investors.

A second challenge that impacts on the country’s international relations and diplomacy is occasional terrorist attacks. Apart from Somalia, the bedrock of the Al-Shabab militants in the Horn of Africa, Kenya has been hardest hit by terror attacks. This is attributed to weak institutional and capacity deficits to deal with the problem, though other reasons are a large Somali population that has kin and kith across the long, expansive border; and unemployment and high levels of poverty, which make it easy for extremist groups to find recruits.

There is also the problem of belonging to several regional groupings in the same geographical location with similar mandates and aspirations. For instance, the country belongs to the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the EAC, and IGAD. The problem arises when states have to split their financial contributions to remain active in the affairs of these groupings, a fact that partly explains why so many of them are in arrears, but also why significant funding of programmes is at the benevolence of development partners. Another
challenge relates to the fact that Kenya’s relations with IGAD as an organisation must take into account the foreign policies and behaviour of individual member states, particularly where an individual member state seems to be driven by its own interests, unlike the collective ones as a regional grouping.

Despite the challenges, there are several opportunities that the country can exploit to improve its regional and international engagement with the rest of the world. The main opportunity for addressing these fissures is the 2010 constitution that has come with various institutions; but the notion of the “tyranny of numbers” in a National Assembly allied to whoever assumes power in the country remains a serious threat to its implementation. This is because they use their numbers in the National Assembly to amend some of the clauses in the constitution to suit the ruling elite.

The days when political elites will just make foreign policy decisions without convincing the populace that it is the right thing to do are over. In short, the country’s diplomacy and international relations must be a function of domestic politics and aspirations. This is partly due to a highly educated and active middle class, and a politically sensitive population that includes a strong civil society, religious community, and private sector, including a strong clique of Western diplomats who are ever vocal on matters that may threaten the stability of the nation.

Kenya, with its extensive experience in regional, African, and global peace-keeping missions and peace-making, remains a critical player in the East African security equation. It not only has massive experience in mediation, but also the country’s armed forces have been part of UN peacekeeping missions in Angola, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the former Yugoslavia, to mention but a few.

**Concluding remarks**

There is no doubt that the country will continue playing a pivotal role in East Africa, given not only its strategic location but, more importantly, a relatively developed economy and a wealth of experience that it has culminated in hosting the Sudanese, South Sudanese, and Somalia peace talks and refugees. As a founding member of IGAD, Kenya is a major player in the sub-region’s peace and security architecture. Until recently, East Africa’s most advanced economy serves as a rapporteur of IGAD, which is mediating conflicts in the Horn of Africa, most recently during the strenuous negotiations between the warring parties in South Sudan. The country has also invested in South Sudanese service industries, such as insurance, banking, ICT, and hospitality. Also, there are many students not only in Kenya’s institutions of higher learning but also in basic education.

The country needs to revisit its approach to regional and international politics, diplomacy, and international relations, but more importantly knock out sectarian considerations from foreign relations. The country’s embassies should not be polarised on ethnic and sectarian lines if they are to take advantage of the tremendous academic and intellectual resources of Kenyans abroad. The process of building solid and effective diplomacy and international relations is seldom a smooth one and sometimes it is marred by terrible disappointments. Kenyans in
key positions in various international organisations such as the EAC, COMESA, IGAD, the AU, and the World Trade Organization, among others, need to be the country’s ambassadors to support the president and career diplomats to steer the country in international and regional arenas.

The country’s relations with its neighbours have been premised on the principle of good neighbourliness and resolving disputes through dialogue and peaceful means. These principles and values are reiterated and reinforced in the country’s two documents on diplomacy and international relations, namely Kenya’s Foreign Policy (2014) and the Kenya Diaspora Policy (2014), the first of their kind to have been written and which elaborate how the nation has conducted international affairs since independence. The documents reaffirm the long-standing practice of promoting sub-regional and regional integration and cooperation, enhancing regional and global peace and security, and promoting international cooperation and multilateralism. This recognises that the country is an integral part of the African continent, whose national interests are intrinsically linked to Africa’s stability, unity, and prosperity.

The above is aptly captured in the documents, the guiding value among them being the resolution of conflicts by peaceful means, which speaks to the peace and diplomacy pillar. Other pillars are economic, diaspora, environmental, and cultural. The objectives of the peace and diplomacy pillar are: (1) to promote the resolution of conflicts by peaceful means; (2) to collaborate with other African countries to strengthen the conflict prevention, management, and resolution capacity of regional institutions, including the EAC, IGAD, COMESA, and the AU (with the aim of promoting sustainable peace and development; (3) to support peace efforts by the AU and the UN through contributing troops and providing leadership in peacekeeping missions within the continent and globally; and (4) to create conflict analysis and prevention capacity nationally and in the region through the Foreign Service Academy. These values and principles should be the cornerstone of the country’s diplomacy and international relations in the next decade and beyond.

Finally, this chapter concludes that the country’s foreign relations within the IGAD sub-region since independence, as with other actors in the international system, have been influenced by mainly six interrelated factors. These are colonialism; Cold War politics; the principle of non-interference; good neighbourliness; the emerging globalisation; and the post-Cold War political climate, including the idiosyncratic beliefs and world views of the political elite that have dominated the county’s political terrain. The country’s foreign relations in the next decade and beyond will also be a function of the foreign policies and behaviour not only of its immediate neighbours within IGAD and the EAC but also the effect of globalisation and emerging actors in African affairs such as China, Japan, and India. This will be in addition to the political elite in the country and the 2014 Foreign Policy document.

Kenya is a major interlocutor in the drawn-out efforts to rescue South Sudan and Somalia, having hosted numerous IGAD summits to set the stage for several peace agreements, but it has also provided mediators. The country has also
contributed troops to AMISOM, as it has done to UNMISS, as well as to the UN mission in Darfur. In the case of Somalia, Kenya has remained a centre for coordinating and delivering much-needed relief to Somalis and some level of reconstruction and rebuilding programmes in the country. Kenya should continue engaging in the search for sustainable stability in the IGAD region to address both the challenges of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. These challenges in countries that have experienced long periods of civil war and destruction are enormous and include demilitarisation, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, economic reconstruction, and social cohesion, and require both regional and international support.

Note
1 Author’s interview with Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat.

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Introduction

Uganda is a founding member of both the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) and its successor the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). This chapter discusses Uganda’s membership of and relations with IGAD. While Uganda has benefitted from the organisation’s programmes, such as the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), and participated in the peace processes in Sudan, Somalia, and South Sudan, in recent years the country has not been enthusiastic about its membership of IGAD. Firstly, IGAD has been absent in finding resolutions to the numerous conflicts that have rocked Uganda especially the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency in the north of the country that lasted more than 20 years. Secondly, Uganda has accumulated arrears in the form of membership fees running to millions of US dollars. Thirdly, Uganda’s unilateral intervention in the South Sudan conflict in December 2013 resulted in tensions with other members of the organisation. Fourthly, Uganda has had a cat and mouse relationship with Sudan over accusations that the two countries support rebels in each other’s territory, with IGAD not doing much about the arising tensions. Lastly, increasingly Uganda has focused on its membership of other regional economic communities (RECs), in particular the East African Community (EAC). Uganda’s stance on IGAD is possibly explained by two reasons: first, President Yoweri Museveni’s view that Uganda should not be party to the perennial quarrels between Ethiopia and Eritrea that continue to rock the organisation; and second, that the EAC, which Museveni is rumoured to wish to head when it is finally established, promises more to Uganda in the form of a political federation.

IGAD and Uganda

The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN)

As a founding member of IGAD, Uganda has been at the centre of the activities of the organisation. Specifically, IGAD has since 2003 been running the CEWARN project in the Karamoja Cluster. The Karamoja Cluster refers to an area of land that straddles the borders between southwestern Ethiopia, northwestern Kenya,
The area is populated by 15 pastoralist communities who share a common language, culture, and way of life. The Cluster is defined by the dominant mode of production practised by its people: pastoralism, or the use of rangeland for extensive livestock grazing by semi- or wholly nomadic communities. Rainfall is generally unpredictable and localised, making agriculture an unreliable subsistence strategy. The main economic activity in the Karamoja Cluster is livestock herding and thus conflicts that present in the area are mainly about pastures and water points. The situation in the Cluster is exacerbated by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), which are used by the population to protect their livestock and to engage in cattle rustling in other communities. The conflicts are often cross-border, at times planned in one country and executed in another. At other times, the conflicts are also internal to one country, but tension can seep into neighbouring countries. In general, the Karamoja Cluster is a marginalised zone, receiving proportionally less consideration in mainstream development programmes from the states of the region. While governments have pursued policies that tend to brutalise and marginalise pastoralists, making pastoralists view state policies with serious misgivings, the pastoralist groups feel that their needs and interests are not adequately addressed in the general planning of national mainstream development.

It is within the context of ameliorating the situation in the Karamoja Cluster that CEWARN was designed as a system to cover both early warning and response with regard to conflicts that affect the people living in the Cluster. CEWARN is, among other things, aimed at gathering, verifying, processing, and analysing information about conflicts in the region; and communicating all such information and analyses to the decision-makers of IGAD policy organs and national governments of member states. Upon receipt, policymakers are meant to craft responses to the conflicts that are brewing.

Of all the conflict early warning systems that are being developed on the African continent, only CEWARN is building an integrated response mechanism to include elements of mediation at local level. This regard, it has worked with the Karamoja Development Agency (KDA), which has been succeeded by the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP) and the Ministry of Karamoja Affairs, and the Lutheran World Federation and World Vision, among others, to manage conflicts, especially pastoral ones within the Karamoja Cluster. Over the years, CEWARN has been producing quarterly reports analysing the nature, characteristics, and dynamics of national and cross-border pastoral and related conflicts, through data and analysis in the Karamoja Cluster. The reports highlight the incidence and outcomes of violence in the Cluster, and outline the driving factors exacerbating and de-escalating conflicts therein. The mechanism uses a set of 52 socio-political indicators for two types of reports: (1) violent incident reports, with indicators on armed clashes, raids, protest demonstrations, and other crimes; and (2) indicators for reports on
the presence and status of communal relations, civil society activities, economic activities, governance and media, natural disasters, safety and security, and social services (Wulf and Diebel, 2009, 19). The main contributions of the reports are two-fold: first, recommendations to key stakeholders (governments, civil society organisations, and community-based organisations) contribute to mitigating and de-escalating conflicts; and second, they help to build confidence and collaboration among the named stakeholders. Generally, CEWARN reports have provided a good basis for developing intervention options and mechanisms for response (CEWARN, 2006, 20).

The main drawbacks of the mechanism include the fact that it has not yet managed to link its capacity of early warning with an effective mechanism for prevention of conflict or response to mitigate conflicts after they have broken out (CEWARN, 2006, 20). The mechanism lacks a response component or arrangement to avert imminent conflicts. The gap between early warning and early response has been glaringly exposed by the mechanism’s operations in the Karamoja Cluster. While the mechanism has excelled at providing timely, constant, and accurate information on cross-border pastoralist conflicts in the Cluster, it has not managed to build response devices such as information-sharing, communication, and cooperation between the various actors concerned. Conflict prevention, as the mechanism has realised, requires much more cooperation and input of stakeholders at the local, national, and regional levels, both in terms of information provision and implementation of responses (CEWARN, 2006, 21).

Also, the mechanism’s activities have remained largely unknown, partly due to the remoteness and inaccessibility of the pilot areas (including the Karamoja Cluster). CEWARN has itself acknowledged that “the mechanism remains unknown in the member states, in the region, and most importantly, among the local communities who are supposed to be the direct beneficiaries of the early warning and early response functions” (CEWARN, 2006, 21). In Uganda, for example, the government only became interested in the mechanism after the president’s wife became the Minister for Karamoja Affairs (Apuuli, 2013, 18).

**IGAD as a mechanism for conflict resolution in Sudan, Somalia, and South Sudan**

The agreement establishing IGAD declares that the organisation’s key aim is to “promote peace and stability in the sub-region, and [create] mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-state conflicts through dialogue” (IGAD, 1996, Article 7g). To test the efficacy of this mandate, the organisation became a mechanism for resolving conflicts in the member states of Sudan (2002), Somalia (2004), and South Sudan (2014–2015). The agreements reached to end the conflicts respectively have endured, albeit with challenges. These are: the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (2005); the Agreement on Somalia Peace and National Reconciliation (2004); and the Agreement to resolve the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) (2015). Uganda has been part of all the IGAD peace processes in the three countries, either as an observer or active
participant. For example, when IGADD launched its peace initiative for Sudan in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in September 1993, it appointed a peace committee comprising the heads of state of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya (the chair), and Uganda (Apuuli, 2011, 352). This committee of heads of state guided a mediation committee made up of foreign ministers from the same countries. In the case of Somalia, the IGAD facilitation committee comprising of the special envoys of Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, and Uganda performed the day-to-day running of the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference in Nairobi, Kenya (Apuuli, 2011, 357). Later on, when a decision was taken to deploy an African Union (AU) peace support mission to Somalia, Uganda became the initial contributor to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in March 2007.

**Uganda’s unilateral intervention in the South Sudan conflict**

In South Sudan in mid-December 2013, tensions that had been simmering between President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar broke out into open violence. The fighting pitted factions of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) aligned to the two men. In the immediate aftermath of the outbreak of fighting in Juba, Uganda deployed elements of the army, the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF), to secure Juba International Airport to enable foreigners to evacuate from South Sudan. As the conflict escalated, the Ugandan army became sucked into the fighting on the side of the South Sudan government (the Kiir forces). Ugandan troops were gradually increased up to an estimated level of between 2,000 and 5,000 soldiers (IRIN, 2014).³ Uganda’s military support to the Kiir forces included air support and tanks.

Uganda’s strong links with the SPLM/A includes decades of joint military deployments (International Crisis Group, 2014, 22). When the rebel National Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/A) government came to power in Uganda, it faced an insurgency in the north. The remnants of the defeated Ugandan army, who had taken refuge in Sudan, subsequently launched attacks in Uganda from their bases in Sudan. While the NRM/A was able to defeat a number of these militia groups using military and peace talk strategies, including the Uganda People’s Democratic Army and the Holy Spirit Movement I and II, the most virulent insurgent group was the LRA led by Joseph Kony, which took root in northern Uganda.

Following the collapse of peace talks between the LRA and the Ugandan government around 1993–1994, the LRA started getting military assistance from the Khartoum government. According to Dunn,

> the Sudanese government was instrumental in transforming [the] rag-tag group of rebels [of the LRA] into a coherent, well supplied military force, largely though training, sharing of logistics and the introduction of more powerful and sophisticated weaponry such as land mines and rocket propelled grenades. (2010, 49)
What prompted Khartoum’s support of the LRA was the support that the NRM/A government had extended to the SPLM/A. While Omach (2010, 294) has noted that the NRM/A government was sympathetic to the SPLA/M, Tripp (2010, 158) states that on 29 March 1989, a secret military cooperation agreement was signed between Uganda and Col. John Garang committing Uganda to provide equipment and training to the SPLA, as well as passports for travel abroad. Uganda also committed to providing the SPLA with free passage through the country while conducting its operations.

When the LRA was forced to leave northern Uganda in the mid-2000s, it first relocated to South Sudan and then moved to Garamba National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Later on, the remnants of the LRA moved to and started operating in the Central African Republic (CAR). Because of the regionalisation of the LRA problem, the AU formally designated the LRA as a terrorist group and authorised the establishment of the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA (RCI-LRA) in November 2011 (AU, 2014). Member countries affected by the LRA, namely Uganda, South Sudan, the DRC, and the CAR, contributing to the RCI-LRA, were authorised to conduct counter-LRA operations to protect the local people. The mandated strength of the RCI-LRA in 2013 was 5,000 troops, with Uganda contributing 2,000, the DRC 500, South Sudan 500, and the CAR 350 (Dersso, 2014, 61). The RCI-RTF was reinforced by United States military advisors.

So when the South Sudan conflict broke out in December 2013, the UPDF was in a position to intervene as a result of long-standing engagements with the SPLA.

**Disagreements in IGAD on Uganda’s unilateral intervention**

Uganda’s military intervention in South Sudan was not welcomed by all IGAD countries. The first IGAD summit that was held in late December 2013 in the aftermath of Uganda’s intervention neither authorised nor endorsed Uganda’s intervention. The summit “commended Uganda’s efforts in securing critical infrastructure and installations in South Sudan and pledge[d] its support to these efforts” (IGAD, 2013, para. 13). When it was officially announced that Ugandan troops were fighting on behalf of South Sudan government forces against the rebels, a spokesperson of Ethiopia’s then Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn noted that Ugandan troops engaging in combat in South Sudan were “absolutely unwarranted” (The Daily Monitor, 2014, 4–14). Kenya, which was holding the chair of the EAC, also distanced itself from Uganda’s intervention, with Cabinet Secretary Phyllis Kandie noting that “Uganda’s decision to engage militarily in South Sudan was political and not supported by the EAC” (South Sudan News Agency, 2014).

The intervention also exacerbated already strained relations between Uganda and the Sudan. In 1995, in the wake of failed peace talks between the LRA and the Ugandan government, and amid accusations of supporting dissidents in each other’s country, Uganda and Sudan broke off diplomatic relations (Papa, Mapendere, and Dillon, 2010, 350). Subsequently, the NRM/A government intensified its
support for the SPLA with, at one point, the group sharing military facilities with the Ugandan army (Omach, 2010, 298). In addition, Ugandan troops made periodic incursions into Sudan in pursuit of the LRA and two other Ugandan rebel groups, the West Nile Bank Front and the Uganda National Rescue Front II, and also in support of the SPLA (Omach, 2010, 298).

In 1999, the Sudan–Uganda peace process was initiated, following a request for assistance from the Carter Centre (TCC) by Museveni (Papa et al., 2010, 350). The process resulted in the signing of the December 1999 Nairobi Agreement (Carter Centre, 1999), which resulted in the normalisation of relations between the two countries. In March 2002, the government of Sudan allowed the Ugandan army to pursue the LRA rebels onto its territory in Operation Iron Fist (OIF). In July 2002, the Sudanese president announced his country’s forces would actively cooperate in joint military actions with the Ugandan army against the LRA (Feldman, 2008, 48). OIF had the effect of uprooting the LRA from its bases in South Sudan. The signing of the CPA between the SPLA/M and the Sudan government in 2005 did not result in an end to the involvement of Ugandan troops in that part of Sudan. According to LeRiche and Arnold (2012, 204), “during the first years of the CPA’s interim period, Uganda was allowed to use its army, the UPDF, inside Southern Sudan to conduct counter-insurgency operations against the LRA.”

It is against this background that, at the 28th IGAD Extraordinary Summit meeting, Sudan threatened to enter the South Sudan conflict if Uganda did not withdraw from there (Foreign Service officer, 2014). The bad blood between Uganda and Sudan appears to have been precipitated by the presence in Kampala of rebels of the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) who were fighting the Khartoum government. When President Omar al-Bashir requested Museveni to expel the SRF, Museveni argued that Bashir should first address the rebels’ problems so that Uganda would not have any reason to give them sanctuary (Foreign Service officer, 2014).

Relations between Uganda and Sudan were further strained by the presence of rebels opposed to the Khartoum government in South Sudan supported by Uganda. In his report of February 2015 on the conflict in South Sudan to the UN Security Council, the UN Secretary-General pointed out that the regionalisation of the South Sudan conflict had been caused by the presence of a number of non-South Sudanese militia groups in the border areas between Sudan and South Sudan (Western Bahr el-Ghazal, Unity, and Upper Nile States), including cadres belonging to SPLM-North, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) factions (UN Security Council, 2015, para. 23).

In December 2014, the national security director of Sudan had warned that, if required, the government would pursue Sudanese armed groups into South Sudanese territory (UN Security Council, 2015, para. 23). In February 2015, Sudanese Vice President Hasabo Mohammed Abdalla visited Uganda and held talks with President Museveni (New Vision, 2015). Abdalla also met members of parliament of the ruling NRM party and proposed an exchange of visits between them and members of the National Congress Party (NCP), “in order to strengthen
the African solidarity and cooperation for the good of the people of the continent” (New Vision, 2015). In September 2015, Museveni visited Khartoum and held talks with Bashir (Sudan Tribune, 2015) in the aftermath of the signing of the IGAD-mediated Agreement for the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS). Under the terms of the agreement, Ugandan troops withdrew from South Sudan.

On the surface, it appears Uganda has patched up its relations with the other IGAD members in the aftermath of its unilateral military intervention in South Sudan. Even Ethiopia which was initially critical of Uganda’s fighting alongside SPLA forces against the rebels appears to have toned down its criticism, with Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn making a state visit to Uganda (Uganda Today, 2017).

**Uganda’s stance towards IGAD**

**Conflict in Uganda**

When Museveni took over power in Uganda in January 1986, many rebel groups were established to fight his government. While the government militarily defeated most of them, the LRA became a hard nut to crack. The LRA leader, Joseph Kony, proclaimed himself a messianic prophet and stated that he aimed to overthrow the Museveni regime and rule Uganda according to the biblical Ten Commandments. At no time during the LRA insurgency, which lasted slightly more than 20 years, did IGAD consider intervening to resolve the conflict in northern Uganda. Even when the government of Uganda started peace talks with the LRA in Juba in June 2006, IGAD was nowhere to be seen. The reason for this could be that Uganda argued that it was an internal affair that it had to deal with itself. But Healy (2009, 12) provides an explanation for IGAD’s no-show when she observes that the “authoritarian political culture of the regional leaders, militates against organizations [such as IGAD] playing a proactive role in peace and security [issues].”

**Membership financial contributions**

Uganda provided the second executive secretary of the IGADD, and a number of Ugandan nationals have been or are currently part of the staff of the organisation. However, over the years Uganda’s financial contribution to IGAD has been dismal. In fact, in the mid-2000s the organisation quietly refused to recruit Ugandan nationals due to the country’s non-payment of its membership dues. By the end of 2008, Uganda was one of the member states that had accumulated arrears in membership contributions running to millions of US dollars (Apuuli, 2011, 367). As of 2016, the financial arrears owed by Uganda had accumulated to over USD $8 million (Foreign Service officer, 2016). Uganda’s failure to pay its membership contributions to IGAD is partly explained by the unofficial stance adopted by Museveni, who argued that the country should concentrate on building the EAC. This point is further explained below.
Uganda and the East African Community

The integration of the East Africa region (Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda) started with the building of the Uganda Railway by British colonialists during the second half of 1890s. In the subsequent years up to 1961, the political economy of the region was integrated, with the establishment of an East African customs union, a common market, a single currency, high commission (comprising the colonial governors then ruling the three territories), and a common services organisation. Following the attainment of independence by the three countries, there was a proposal to establish a federation; but the proposal did not gain traction in Uganda. In 1967, the three countries established the EAC, which unfortunately collapsed in 1977. While still fighting to capture power, Museveni and his NRM/A put the revival of East African integration among the top priorities if they captured power. Indeed, at his swearing-in ceremony in January 1986, Museveni observed:

originally we had an East African market but it was messed up by the Excellences and Honourable ministers. It will be a cardinal point in our programme to ensure that we encourage co-operation in economic matters, especially in transport and communication within the East African region.

(Ugandan Diaspora, 2015)

Indeed, beginning in the early 1990s, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda embarked on the revival of the EAC. The EAC Treaty came into force in 2000. Since then, a number of institutions have been established including the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), the East African Court of Justice (EACJ), and the East African Community Secretariat. These institutions have been given powers affecting the member states to varying degrees.

Museveni has been at the forefront of arguing for the political integration of the East African countries. In this regard, in a paper titled “Towards a closer cooperation in Africa” (Museveni, 1998), which was published when the draft EAC Treaty was being debated, he made a number of arguments suggesting that the region should deepen its integration into a political federation. First, he argued that economic integration could not take place in a context of political fragmentation. Thus, East African integration could not reach far since there was a lack of political superstructure necessary for the integration process to proceed. Given the present economically weak conditions of the regional countries, Museveni concluded that no single state could impose discipline on the others by economic or other forms of pressure.

Second, a union would command more defence potential to guard African interests against encroachment by foreigners as “the present small African states individually, do not possess much defense capacity” (Museveni 1998).

Thirdly, there were already basic linkages in Africa, in general, and in East Africa, in particular, through languages and culture. With regard to language, Museveni cited the example of the Luo language, which is spoken by Nilotic peoples, who are found in Kenya, Uganda, Sudan Tanzania, and parts of Ethiopia and the DRC. In terms of culture, he argued that Bantu culture straddles East, Central,
and Southern Africa. He further argued that Africa must create a centre of gravity, just as the United States is a centre of gravity for Anglo-Saxon–Latin civilisation. The countries that would establish the initial vanguard of the union would be Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi, because of the advantage of being geographically contiguous and sharing – to a certain degree – a common language (Swahili) and culture, he argued. Other countries would be encouraged to join, as long as they were geographically contiguous to the union. According to Museveni, the union would be that of East and Central African states, with power being shared between the union government and the national governments. While the union government would be responsible for external defence, foreign affairs, common market affairs, common services – such as railways, harbours, and posts and telecommunications – and scientific research, the national governments would share responsibility with districts in the areas of justice, education, health, internal security, roads, wildlife, tourism, and agriculture, among others.

Lastly, a union of Central and Eastern Africa states would command more respect from the world. For example, “an investor would be more attracted to invest in a united East Africa than in just Uganda because of the bigger market the former offers” (Museveni, 1998), he argued.

Since first making the arguments for the integration of the East African region in 1998, Museveni has for the last 20 years been amplifying his vision for the region. In various speeches, and at different fora, he has made the case for deepening the integration of the region. For example, while addressing the 16th COMESA summit meeting in 2012, he observed that “the people of East Africa have, for decades, been yearning for an East African Federation that would deal with both political and economic integration. This is the ultimate goal of EAC” (Museveni, 2012). More recently, Museveni noted that the revival of the EAC had created a bigger market for Ugandan products such as milk (Museveni, 2016). He added that the bigger market had enabled East Africa “to better negotiate for market access to other foreign markets e.g. USA, EU, China, India, Japan, Russia, the Gulf, etc. This is where the future of our prosperity lies” (Museveni, 2016). In summary, Museveni argued that

regional integration, especially for the EAC, is crucial because of our strategic security and survival as a free people […] The EAC, in its present state, is about the size of India in land area with a population of 160 million people. This is a good nucleus for a very powerful, in global terms, African State that would be the centre of gravity of the African people’s destiny as free peoples. (Museveni, 2016)

Museveni’s enthusiasm for an integrated East African region has, however, raised suspicion about his intentions. For example, his 1998 paper referred to above was greeted with consternation at home and in regional capitals. At the time, Ugandan troops were preparing to invade the DRC for the second time, having helped install Laurent Kabila as president following the 1996–1997 civil war in what was then Zaire. In July 2007, Museveni undertook a road trip to Kenya and Tanzania,
where he awarded medals to then vice president of Kenya Moody Awori, and the first president of Tanzania, the late Mwalimu Julius Nyerere (Gyezaho and Muggaga, 2007; Kalinge-Nnyago, 2007). To some, the road trip was suspicious, and they construed it as the start of his campaign to become federal president of East Africa (Gyezaho and Muggaga, 2007). In its editorial of 15 July 2007, the Daily Nation newspaper of Kenya observed that Museveni’s move was being watched with puzzled interest in that country (Daily Nation, 2007).

In the end, the seeming lack of interest in IGAD by Uganda (Museveni) should be seen within the above context. It suffices to note that only the EAC has a clear goal in mind for the end product of its integration (i.e. political federation). In contrast, IGAD has been struggling to even define its minimum integration plan. Thus, the EAC seems to be more attractive to Uganda (Museveni) than IGAD.

Conclusion

Over the years, Uganda has exhibited an ambivalent stance towards IGAD. While the organisation afforded Uganda the opportunity to participate in the peace processes in Sudan, Somalia, and South Sudan, it played no role in resolving the long-running insurgency by the LRA in northern Uganda. This could have diminished IGAD’s image in the eyes of the Ugandan leadership.

Uganda has in the past fallen behind in paying its membership contributions to IGAD, which resulted in accumulated arrears running into several million US dollars. Uganda’s failure to pay is explained firstly by the sentiment expressed by Museveni that the organisation is preoccupied with the Ethiopia–Eritrea quarrels that Uganda should not be part of; and, secondly, Museveni’s view that Uganda should concentrate on building the EAC. On the latter point, it is rumoured that Museveni wants an integrated East African region because he wants to lead it.

Lastly, Uganda’s unilateral military intervention in the South Sudan conflict divided IGAD as an organisation. The intervention precipitated criticism of Uganda from IGAD members such as Ethiopia and Kenya, while at the same exacerbating already strained relations with Sudan. Following the signing of the ARCSS in 2015, however, it seems IGAD members have patched up their differences.

Notes

1 They are: the Nyangatom and Merille of Ethiopia; Toposa and Didinga of South Sudan; Pokot and Turkana of Kenya; Jie, Pian, Matheniko, Tepeth, Dodoth, Nyaakwae, Bokora, Labwor, and Pokot of Uganda.

2 The KIDDP harmonises the various development interventions by the government, bilateral and multilateral development partners, and international and national non-governmental and community-based organisations. It represents an attempt by the government of Uganda to integrate gun collection (disarmament) with development interventions; conflict management; and peace building.

3 Note that there was no official Ugandan government figure for the number of troops the country deployed in South Sudan.
In February 2015, reports started filtering through that Uganda was expelling rebels opposed to the Khartoum government from its territory.

See, for example, UN Security Council (2016) detailing the steps the government had taken to end the conflict.

Dr David Muduuli was appointed in 1991.

This author was a conflict prevention, management, and resolution advisor at the IGAD Secretariat in 2008, and assistant to the IGAD Facilitator for Somalia Peace and National Reconciliation in 2009. Other Ugandan nationals employed by IGAD included: Dr Were, Translator; Juliet Kamara, Programme Manager for Documentation; and Dr Ziwa, Programme Manager for Agriculture.

The membership of the EAC has increased with Burundi and Rwanda being admitted in 2007, and South Sudan in 2016.

The author knows this very well, as in 2008 he was asked to write a position paper on the same.

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13 Peacebuilding in the context of Ethiopia–IGAD relations
Kassahun Berhanu

Introduction
During the Cold War, intense superpower rivalry hindered peaceful settlement of conflicts intractable on the African continent generally. However, since the end of the Cold War, hope has risen that conflicts in the region would be resolved through forging cooperation and sustained partnership among stakeholders. According to de Waal (2007, 1), extricating the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) region out of a predicament characterised by an absence of peace calls for credible and sustained democratisation, resolution of intra-state conflicts, a stable inter-state order, autonomous and capable institutions, and benevolent engagement in peacebuilding. The end of the protracted conflicts that had ravaged Ethiopia and Somalia and the termination of prolonged armed insurgencies in Eritrea and Sudan from the early to mid-1990s gave the initial impression that the logic of mutual intervention-cum-destabilisation could be done away with through fostering possibilities for a concerted and institutionalised mechanism for conflict management. This was bolstered by IGAD’s expanded mandate for dealing with outstanding issues surrounding peaceful settlement of recurrent intra- and inter-state conflicts that rocked the fabric of societal life in several member countries. Emerging new developments, notwithstanding, opportunities that paved the way for developing a common security framework, which was expected to entrench stability and overall normalcy, were not captured and taken advantage of for a variety of reasons. These included the 1998–2000 border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the persistent absence of peace in Somalia which subsequently entailed Ethiopia’s unilateral intervention. As a consequence, the vacuum that resulted from the subsiding superpower rivalry has now spurred competition between state actors who pursued divergent and contradictory aspirations that affected the workings of IGAD. Ethiopia was foremost among those endeavouring to exert their influence on IGAD’s mode of executing its conflict resolution mandate.

Conflicts that affect Ethiopia easily assume regional dimensions and often get internationalised. The ongoing conflict in Somalia between the Somali Federal Government (SFG) and Islamist insurgents has implications for Ethiopia’s role in peace-making within the purview of IGAD, pitting it against forces such as
disaffected protagonists from the Somali civil war, who suspect Ethiopia’s intentions are driven by ulterior motives and self-interest. The prevailing situation in Somalia, underpinned by polarisation among Somali belligerents, entailed Ethiopia’s unilateral intervention in 2006. The intervention put Ethiopia at loggerheads with Somali Islamist insurgents and prompted Eritrea to view Ethiopia’s stance as doing the bidding of extra-regional powers such as the United States (US), bent on influencing developments in the Horn of Africa to their liking. Eritrea’s disposition, in this regard, became highly visible following its 1998–2000 unresolved boundary conflict with Ethiopia. It is to be recalled that the regimes in Ethiopia and Eritrea pursued policies aimed at weakening each other by resorting to mutual and reciprocal subversion and forging alliances presumed to promote their respective goals. This was to be changed.

In April 2018, a change of leadership occurred in Ethiopia sparked by months of resilient youth uprising. The new leadership conducted sweeping political changes in the country. These changes included declaring general amnesty, releasing prisoners, allowing political parties to operate freely, allowing rebel movements that were declared terrorist to return and operate as legal political parties, and easing restrictions on internet, media, gathering, demonstration, etc. These internal changes were reinforced by changes in external relations. The most significant change in external relation occurred in Ethiopia–Eritrea relations. The new leader extended an olive branch to archenemy Eritrea that received positive response from the latter. The Prime Minister announced that his government accepted and would implement the Algiers Agreement entirely and unconditionally and appealed to the Eritrean government to accept his invitation and end the state of war that existed between the countries for the previous 20 years. The positive response from the Eritrean side led to visits by leaders of the two countries and the signing of the Ethiopia–Eritrean rapprochement in July 2018. The agreement’s central five points are:

1. The state of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea has come to an end. A new era of peace and friendship has been opened;
2. The two governments will endeavor to forge intimate political, economic, social, cultural and security cooperation that serves and advances the vital interests of their peoples;
3. Transport, trade and communications links between the two countries will resume; diplomatic ties and activities will restart;
4. The decision on the boundary between the two countries will be implemented;
5. Both countries will jointly endeavor to ensure regional peace, development and cooperation.

(Joint Declaration 2018)

The agreement was a game-changer in the region. The Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict was perceived to be the epicentre of conflicts in the Horn of Africa. The veracity of the perception was evidenced in the rapid changes in the inter-state relations in the region. The bilateral Ethiopia–Eritrea agreement was followed by a
The president of Djibouti and Eritrea met for the first time in ten years. Generally, it could be said, a reconfiguration of relations took place in the Horn of Africa. Yet, serious challenges remain to be addressed. One of these challenges pertain to the Ethiopia–Eritrea border issue. The flashpoint of the war, the village of Badme, remains under Ethiopian control, casting a dark shadow on the rapprochement. A great hope is placed on the Ethiopia–Eritrea rapprochement that it will revitalise IGAD thereby contributing to security, peace, regional integration, and development in the region.

This chapter examines relations between Ethiopia and IGAD and their ramifications for peacebuilding in the sub-region. Based on a review of relevant secondary sources, an attempt is made to address the following issues that are in line with the theme under study:

- The implications of IGAD’s failure to dissuade Ethiopia and some member states from making unilateral interventions in conflict situations in the sub-region in a manner that undermines concerted efforts aimed at entrenching peace and security;
- The impact of Ethiopia’s assertive stances and roles in the activities of IGAD on the efficacy and credibility of the organisation; and
- An exploration of the means and ways through which Ethiopia can ensure trust and acceptance as a potentially genuine agent of peace in the sub-region in the eyes of IGAD member states.

**Major trajectories of Ethiopia–IGAD relations in peacebuilding**

IGAD has embarked on several peacebuilding initiatives in recent years to resolve conflicts between countries that include Eritrea and Ethiopia, and within member states such as Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan. Nevertheless, the complexity of conflicts in the sub-region and disagreements over a range of issues among the mainstream actors in IGAD have tended to undermine the organisation’s potential capacity in terms of promoting an agenda for comprehensive peace (El-Affendi, 2001). The failed Somali reconciliation process sponsored by Djibouti in 2001, flaws that underpin the mediation process in Sudan and South Sudan, and the stalemate between Eritrea and Ethiopia over the contested boundary issue, all of which IGAD is involved in to varying degrees, are cases in point in this regard.

Taking note of the aforementioned and other similar factors militating against conflict resolution efforts, Samatar and Manchaka (2006, 51) argue that the quality of leadership and system of governance prevalent in each member country are important elements in dealing effectively with lack of peace at local, national, and regional levels. This is stated on the presumption that peacebuilding efforts in the geographic area where the IGAD region is located could be advanced only through stewardship of effective and legitimate political regimes that are ready to act in concert to attain shared goals pertaining to peacebuilding. Hence, peacebuilding endeavours are believed to materialise by according primacy to the wellbeing and
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legitimate interests of societies that are adversely affected by the outcomes of conflict episodes. The question then is whether political regimes in the IGAD sub-region, including Ethiopia, qualify as ones that are endowed with such attributes that could enable them to meaningfully contribute to peacebuilding efforts either by themselves or working in tandem with IGAD as a collective entity. For example, in spite of the potential strength that the Ethiopian government commands, a number of evolving developments have tended to make achieving the wellbeing and legitimate interests of societies unrealistic, and labelling the peacebuilding efforts effective and acceptable impossible.

If the core area of the Horn of Africa is limited to constituting IGAD member countries such as Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti, Ethiopia’s significance would be considerable when viewed in terms of territorial and population size, and military prowess. Theoretically, the country’s endowments in these terms could present it as a potentially dominant actor that could influence developments in the region. In practice, however, this may not be easy to attain given a plethora of factors that militate against stabilisation efforts taking place in the Horn of Africa. Notably, the IGAD region comprises states whose borders are often contested and intra- and inter-state conflicts persist. According to Kłosowicz (2015), Ethiopia stands as a formidable actor in the Horn of Africa, in general, and the IGAD sub-region, in particular, due to the aforementioned factors. This is buttressed by the wide recognition it enjoys resulting from its proactive engagement in regional and continental peacekeeping and the fast economic growth that it has registered during the past decade. It is also worth noting that Ethiopia is viewed as one of the most important international actors in the region, particularly following the arrival on the scene of an urge to combat terrorism and Islamist extremism. As a result, it enjoys the backing of Western powers, notably the European Union and the US, as allies in the fight against forces labelled as extremists, whose drivers are taken as inimical to the overriding interests of powerful actors in the international system.

Nonetheless, Ethiopia has not qualified yet to emerge as a regional hegemon in the same fashion as others, such as Nigeria and South Africa, which are influencing peacebuilding initiatives in their own sub-regional organisations, like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), respectively. Nevertheless, apart from its role as one of those who facilitated IGAD’s formation, Ethiopia plays significant roles in the organisation’s major activities in the area of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. This is propelled by a number of factors that are also driven by self-interest: the country’s sharing of boundaries with all IGAD member countries (except Uganda); the perpetual simmering of intra- and inter-state conflicts in a number of IGAD countries, with the potential of spilling over across common borders; contested security issues shaping Ethiopia’s relations with member countries such as Somalia and Eritrea; and ongoing domestic conflicts between the government and a plethora of insurgent groups of varying persuasions. Hence Ethiopia–IGAD relations need to be examined taking all the above-mentioned factors into account.
Ethiopia’s role in peacebuilding and inter-state relations within IGAD

As mentioned, conflict dynamics in the Horn of Africa have often posed challenges in the quest for potential candidates to assume a hegemonic position in the IGAD region. Conflicts in the sub-region are often interlinked, as a result of which security interdependence is viewed as an overriding imperative. In the context of the prevalent complex conflict system that characterises the state of affairs in the IGAD sub-region, smaller state actors often attempt to forge alliances and counter-alliances by supporting proxies opposed to the regime in Ethiopia, with a view to challenging its aspiration to qualify as a dominant player (Dehez, 2008, 10). In this connection, Ethiopia’s relations with a number of member countries following the revitalisation of IGADD in 1996 are worth considering in arriving at an understanding of its role in peacebuilding in the region.

It is to be recalled that Ethiopia fought two full-scale wars against the irredentist moves of neighbouring Somalia (in 1963–1964 and in 1977–1978) and Eritrea (in 1998–2000). In December 2006, Ethiopia deployed armed contingents in Somalia to defend the beleaguered TFG from impending threats from the UIC, which culminated in the emergence of the radical Islamist insurgent group Al-Shabaab. At the same time, Ethiopia has been active in working towards resolution of the post-1991 conflict in Somalia, as signified by its hosting of successive peace conferences bringing together different parties to the conflict. Despite security threats from insurgent groups in Somalia, Ethiopia has persistently endeavoured to ensure stability in that country in anticipation that a friendly group could assume power and spearhead the process of reinstating a responsible government. It is to be recalled that following Ethiopia’s unilateral intervention in Somalia in December 2006, the security situation in Mogadishu deteriorated sharply as Islamist insurgents mobilised against the Ethiopian presence. Ethiopia responded with massive military operations, which US-based Human Rights Watch (2007) claims resulted in the killing of hundreds of people and displacement of tens of thousands.

At the height of turbulence in the failed state, hundreds of thousands of refugees from Somalia found a safe haven in Ethiopia. Amid the intensified extremist threat against its security in the mid-2000s originating from Somalia, the Ethiopian government embarked on a military intervention in December 2006 to rescue the TFG from being unseated by the UIC, which controlled several territories. This intervention culminated in the ousting of the UIC, which was forced to abandon most of the areas under its control, thereby paving the way for the TFG to move to the capital Mogadishu (Kidist, 2008). The issue then is whether Ethiopia could be viewed as a neutral actor in mediating peacebuilding in Somalia, in the face of its partisan position favouring some factions at the expense of others that remain disaffected by its unilateral intervention.

It should also be noted that the response of IGAD member countries to the emergence of the UIC as a de facto and effective power in Somalia diverged. While Sudan and Djibouti were implicitly supportive of the UIC’s ascendance, the Ethiopian regime had invested heavily in the formation of the TFG and was
intensely apprehensive of its (TFG’s) leverage as a belligerent to be reckoned with. It is also worth mentioning that the UIC also gambled when it threatened to wage jihad against Ethiopia and called for the return of Somali-inhabited parts of Ethiopia to Somalia. In doing so, it provided Ethiopia with the excuse to militarily intervene. Though the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia in December 2006 was “legitimised” by the invitation of the weak TFG, the UIC’s preponderance prompted a feeling in Ethiopian and Western policy circles that if Somalia remained under the control of this group, foreign Al-Qaeda operatives could use it as a base for embarking on terrorist activities that were detrimental to their interests (Bryden, 2007, 16). Moreover, Ethiopia’s quick military victory over the UIC did not translate into political victory, as its radical wing, Al-Shabaab, continued to wage guerrilla warfare against Ethiopia, TFG forces, and AU contingents deployed at a later stage. Concurrently, the TFG, which had survived the UIC’s onslaught, was affected by endless internal divisions over political power, thereby rendering Ethiopia’s peacebuilding position in Somalia precarious. Menkhaus (2007) observed that Islamist insurgency grew in violence and popularity as a manifestation of a nationalist reaction to what was portrayed as Ethiopian occupation.

The subsequent resistance of Al-Shabaab, in Somalia as well as the 1998–2000 Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict, and the continued engagement of the two in proxy wars, is evidence of instances where smaller and weaker states and non-state actors, either separately or working in tandem, strive to counterbalance Ethiopia’s desire to influence developments in the region (Kidist, 2014). Another round of Ethiopian military intervention in 2011 boosted prospects for peacebuilding in Somalia by pushing Al-Shabaab from its main strongholds. Reportedly, the Ethiopian Air Force inflicted serious damage on Al-Shabaab forces, which resulted in the liberation of a number of rural areas and urban centres in south-central Somalia where local administrations were formed in the localities abandoned by the insurgents (The East African, 2012). However, progress in this regard appears to be slow and reverses have at times been experienced. In light of this, Ethiopia’s peacebuilding efforts in the country seem unlikely to materialise in the short run.

Following the outbreak of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998, the two countries continued to engage in proxy wars, not only in and around their common borders but also in other areas such as Somalia and reportedly South Sudan. It is alleged that Eritrea even went to the extent of supporting militant Islamist Somali groups such as Al-Shabaab in their bid to undermine Ethiopia’s influence, anticipating that it could take advantage of any weakening of its adversary resulting therefrom. That is why Eritrea was designated as a “regional spoiler” that sought to take advantage of any possible Ethiopian fragility in the Somali conflict. In this connection, it should be remembered that the Eritrean regime also supported the formation of a Somali opposition group known as the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia in the aftermath of the 2006 Ethiopian intervention (Clapham, 2007) in the name of supporting the TFG, which was recognised by the UN, the AU, and IGAD. According to the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (2006), Eritrea’s support of forces pitted against the TFG increased from
2005 onwards, reaching a peak prior to Ethiopia’s intervention. Hence, two IGAD member states were actively engaged in undermining the IGAD peace process.

According to Healy (2008, 14), Eritrea in particular found it difficult to accept the reality on the ground regarding its weak international standing compared with the position that its adversary, Ethiopia, enjoyed. It is to be recalled that ever since the independent state of Eritrea was founded in the early 1990s, in general, and following the outbreak of the 1998 Ethiopia–Eritrea war, in particular, the country became one of the few most populous countries without access to the sea. This became one of the determinants of the country’s foreign policy, driven by the urge to secure port services (Tafesse, 2009, 15–16). By way of reciprocating Eritrea’s belligerent stance on a wide range of issues, the Ethiopian regime repeatedly vowed to pursue a tougher policy towards Eritrea. This was concretely expressed by supporting the Eritrean opposition, which aspired to effect regime change, which Eritrea likewise reciprocated. By and large, there has been no change for the better in relations between the two countries; and the internal conflict in South Sudan is becoming a new area of rivalry between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Plaut, 2013). Healy (2008) is of the view that IGAD remained powerless to convince Ethiopia and Eritrea to normalise relations or implement a peace settlement on the basis of adhering to the 2000 Algiers Agreement that established the EEBC, whose rulings on the contested boundary issue were to be final and binding. Intense mutual hostility between the two countries continued to adversely impact on regional relations and exacerbate other conflicts. As a result, the situation became a key obstacle to any progress towards developing an improved regional security framework. Eritrea, disillusioned by IGAD’s indifference in inducing Ethiopia to adhere to the terms of the Algiers Agreement and its subservience to Ethiopia’s unilateral intervention in Somalia, announced the suspension of its membership of IGAD in 2007.

Ethiopia–Sudan relations between the mid-1990s and 1998 were far from amicable and cordial. Ethiopia accused Sudan on various occasions of exporting Islamic radicalism, which it presented as the greatest security threat to stability in the country. This prompted Ethiopia to respond by enhancing its support of the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, joining Eritrea and Uganda in a US-led coalition of frontline states against Sudan (Shinn, 2004, 6). During the period in question, Ethiopia and Eritrea were among the few African states the US identified as major post-Cold War partners on the continent. The animosity that characterised Ethiopia–Sudan relations thus adversely impacted on IGAD’s peacebuilding initiatives and Ethiopia’s proactive engagement in the organisation’s activities. Ethiopia and Eritrea contributed troops and artillery that were transported to join the Ugandan contingent aimed at boosting operations to attack Sudanese government defence forces (Asnake, 2015).

It was amid this that the Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict erupted on 12 May 1998. This was at a time when the Sudanese government was seeking opportunities to improve its relations with Ethiopia in particular. Meanwhile, however, both Ethiopia and Eritrea were striving to curry Sudan’s favour in anticipation of advancing their respective positions. Molla (2002) opined that the protagonists in
the Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict were forced to relax their previously hard-line position against Sudan in order to at least neutralise its stance against them. On top of this, the Ethiopian government, having become extremely occupied by its dispute with Eritrea, could not devote much time and energy to settling issues with Sudan. The new developments in Ethiopia–Eritrea relations are thus believed to have served as a turning point in easing and ultimately normalising Ethiopia–Sudan relations.

Ethiopia and Djibouti, whose bilateral relations are largely cordial and amicable, got into a row over the outcomes of the Arta Conference in 2000, allegedly sponsored by Egypt, resulting in the formation of Somalia’s short-lived Transitional National Government in 2001. Nevertheless, Ethiopia–Djibouti relations remained intact due to a number of factors including geographic contiguity, common affinity, close economic cooperation, and the alleged threats posed by their common enemy, the Eritrean regime.

The turbulence and bloodletting caused by conflict between different factions of South Sudan’s leadership around the end of 2013 appears to have resulted in divergent interests among IGAD member states, including Ethiopia. According to IRIN (2014), although Ethiopia’s economic interests in South Sudan are less pronounced than those of Uganda and Kenya, it has security and strategic interests that could be best served by resolution of the underlying causes that led to the fighting in the new polity. Ethiopia has enough on its hands dealing with problems in Somalia on its eastern border and hence is keen to avoid the same thing happening in another adjacent locality in the west. It is worth noting in this regard that Ethiopia’s western border region of Gambella is home to the same ethnic groups that inhabit South Sudan. Among these are the Nuer, who are purportedly supporting opposition leader Riek Machar’s faction in the struggle against Kiir’s group, which controls the government in South Sudan. Hence, Ethiopia’s concern in this regard is understandable given that some of its citizens could provide support or shelter to South Sudanese rebels or even join the fight. Moreover, the 2013 conflict in South Sudan has already produced more than 60,000 refugees (currently reaching hundreds of thousands), who fled to Ethiopia across their shared border.

There are allegations that Eritrea and Sudan are covertly providing support to South Sudanese opposition forces, whereas Uganda has openly intervened on the side of the Kiir regime, deploying armed contingents. Ethiopia claimed to be neutral and embarked on mediation efforts under the auspices of IGAD in the course of which it has emphatically called on Uganda to withdraw its troops. The Ethiopian prime minister, in his capacity as current chair of IGAD, also publicly demanded that Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni should withdraw the troops he unilaterally deployed in South Sudan in support of the government (Daily Nation, 2014). For its part, Uganda indirectly responded to this by stating that it was concerned with the possibility of rebel group the Lord’s Resistance Army taking advantage of state failure in South Sudan to continue with its armed insurgency against the Museveni regime. It is, therefore, envisaged that unhealthy developments in South Sudan could set the stage for possible Ethiopia–Uganda
competition, which could complicate the role of IGAD, in general, and Ethiopia, in particular, in brokering a peace agreement in South Sudan. Moreover, Ethiopia’s neutrality in the conflict could be questioned by the Kiir regime, rendering the acceptance of Ethiopia as a genuine mediator susceptible to mistrust due to the latter’s insistence on withdrawal of Ugandan support.

**Misgivings in Ethiopia’s peacebuilding initiatives**

Ethiopia’s proactive involvement in IGAD’s activities pertaining to peacebuilding in the sub-region is perceived by some as aimed at promoting self-interest to the detriment of others. This perception is prompted by a host of factors that include its holding of the position of chair of IGAD and the IGAD Executive Council since 2008. Ethiopia’s perpetuation as IGAD’s chair was precipitated, among other things, by the international isolation of President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, resulting from his indictment by the International Criminal Court, and continued instability in Somalia and South Sudan. Other IGAD members, such as Eritrea, view this as part of a trend, with the organisation increasingly becoming an arm for expediting Ethiopia’s foreign policy and increasingly subservient to doing Ethiopia’s bidding. Such a trend also seems to have strengthened existing mistrust and scepticism among other members, compounded by associated occurrences such as Ethiopian nationals successively holding leadership positions in IGAD’s Peace and Security Division; and the location of different agencies of the organisation – the Peace and Security Division, the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism, the Facilitator’s Office for Somalia, and the IGAD Parliamentary Union – in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa. Moreover, the appointment of Ethiopia’s ex-foreign minister, Seyoum Mesfin, as IGAD’s special envoy to lead the mediation between South Sudan’s warring factions may have fuelled existing apprehension regarding Ethiopia’s role. It is widely believed that all these factors give Ethiopia leverage to exert considerable influence as regards regional security matters, including peacebuilding, within the framework of the organisation.

In view of the fact that no member country has yet managed to single-handedly play dominant and hegemonic roles in IGAD, there exists implicit competition between Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya, each of which commands different strengths and comparative advantages in various areas. Ethiopia’s military action in 2006 to oust the UIC and its subsequent engagement against Al-Shabaab demonstrate that it harbours undeclared ambitions to behave as a regional hegemon by deploying peacekeepers to trouble spots in the sub-region under the auspices of either international and continental (UN and AU) or sub-regional (IGAD) initiatives. These actions imply that Ethiopia continues to be an influential actor in IGAD’s peacebuilding efforts by making use of its multifaceted leverages.

It is also worth noting that Ethiopia is mistakenly perceived to be a Christian enclave despite its population comprising a large number of Muslim citizens. This has led to Ethiopia’s acceptance as a dominant regional power by Muslim-dominated IGAD member countries such as Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia. The
above-discussed reservations on the part of other IGAD members regarding the role of Ethiopia are further exacerbated by the disposition of extra-regional actors such as Egypt, which enjoys intimate relations with IGAD member countries such as Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, and some Somali factions that view Ethiopia’s peace-building initiatives warily. Worthy of note in this regard is that Egypt is obsessed with a belief that an unstable and weakened Ethiopia is a sine qua non for maintaining the status quo in respect of the utilisation of the water from the River Nile, to which Ethiopia is opposed (Kidist, 2014).

Another factor that poses challenges to Ethiopia’s peacebuilding role within the framework of IGAD pertains to dual and conflicting membership of several member states in other regional organisations. Of the eight current IGAD members, Kenya, Uganda, and South Sudan are also members of the East African Community (EAC), while Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti hold membership in the Arab League. As a result, IGAD members have competing loyalties and areas of focus. Ethiopia is one of the very few IGAD member countries that does not belong to other regional groupings, which partly explains why it was at the forefront of the few that endeavoured to ensure the revitalisation of IGADD in 1996.

In light of the foregoing, it could be argued that the foreign policy issues with which Ethiopia is grappling in the short and medium terms are closely tied up with its interests in a manner that could relegate its contribution to IGAD’s peacebuilding initiatives to the background. The problem in Somalia; the intra-state conflict in South Sudan; a border dispute over the oil-rich Abyei area located between Sudan and South Sudan; the controversy surrounding the utilisation of the Nile waters, particularly in relation to Egypt; the quest for a secure and sustained access to ports in Djibouti, Somaliland, and Kenya; and the persistent standoff with Eritrea (Asnake, 2015) are some of the primary areas with which Ethiopia’s foreign policy direction is primarily concerned. Hence, there is a need for Ethiopia to actively strive to foster trust and nurture a sense of common belonging among IGAD member states. This serves as an entry point to induce a collective endeavour to transform the sub-regional organisation into a viable institution that could broker peace with relative ease and convenience. Expediting peacebuilding ventures in this manner calls for sincere engagement that is free from exerting undue influence aimed at attaining short-term objectives that militate against the efficacy and credibility of ongoing efforts of peacebuilding. Short of this, perceived and actual scepticism of Ethiopia’s role on the part of those affected due to a plethora of short-sighted manoeuvrings by Ethiopia would likely result in weakening IGAD, which does not benefit anyone in the long run.

Concluding remarks

The IGAD region continues to be rocked by instability, despite relative improvements experienced in recent years. There is widespread crisis propelled by conflicts in the different member countries, including Ethiopia itself, which is compounded by soured relations between the regime in power and other IGAD members. As has often been the case, conflicts in the region continue to be interconnected,
feeding into each other and assuming sub-regional, regional, and international dimensions. The maxim “My enemy’s enemy is my friend” has often shaped intra- and inter-state politics in the Horn of Africa. This appears still to be very much at work in a manner that is reminiscent of the state of affairs during the Cold War era. By and large, such a mindset among political regimes in the sub-region is bound to render futile efforts aimed at peacebuilding and drives towards political and socio-economic transformation. As things stand, the absence of peace and stability in individual countries is mainly driven by the imperatives of regime perpetuation and survival that tend to preoccupy state actors in the sub-region, with the resultant effect of often deploying the energy, focus, and resources of member countries in a manner that shapes the direction of their engagements and interventions. By and large, such dispositions have proved inimical to expediting peacebuilding initiatives that are underway. Hopefully, the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea will contribute to a better peace, stability, regional integration, and development.

The unabated persistence of complexities and intricacies surrounding peacebuilding ventures that characterise the existing state of affairs in the sub-region has the propensity to make Ethiopia’s contribution to the peaceful settlement of conflicts on the domestic front and beyond a daunting task. It is believed that developments experienced in this regard are underpinned by the entrenchment of mistrust and scepticism caused by the quest to enhance vested interests to the detriment of other stakeholders and protagonists. Under the prevailing circumstances in the IGAD sub-region, what is in store during the years to come is uncertain, given the aspects of change and continuity that surround the dynamic nature of conflicts and alignment and realignment of forces in the Horn of Africa. There is no doubt that Ethiopia is one of the key players in terms of spearheading peacebuilding initiatives in the IGAD sub-region and beyond, due to leverage that it commands. However, building sustainable peace can be successful only under conditions characterised by enhanced trust, and by proven acceptance and legitimation of its role. It is hoped that progress will be made in this regard that enables stakeholders to erase doubts and misconceptions that ulterior motives and self-aggrandisement constitute the drivers behind Ethiopia’s interventions in resolving conflicts under the auspices of IGAD.

Notes

1 By the Ethiopian government’s own admission, emerging trends of governance failure, corruption, intergroup rivalry, communal unrest, and the taking shape of a legitimacy crisis could undermine prospects for its effectiveness.
2 Since the mid-1990s, Ethiopia has deployed peacekeeping missions in conflict-ridden countries in the IGAD sub-region (Sudan, Somalia, South Sudan), East Africa (Rwanda, Burundi), and West Africa (Liberia).
3 The government of South Sudan reportedly questioned Ethiopia’s neutrality and requested the peace talks be moved to Kenya (Daily Nation, 2015). It was also reported that South Sudan rebels accused IGAD of “confusing” the peace process (Sudan Tribune, 2015).
References


14 The big elephant in the room

The meddling and machinations of IGAD and Ethiopia in Somalia

Mohamed Haji Ingiriis

Introduction

The Horn of Africa is probably the most challenging region for close cooperation between neighbouring states due to various lateral layers of prolonged armed conflicts, continual political contestations, and chronic intra- and inter-state military confrontations. Sudanese scholar Abdelwahab El-Affendi has boldly asserted that “the Horn of Africa is not the best area for testing the potential of regional co-operation” (El-Affendi, 2001, 581). Relations between Horn of Africa countries have been overshadowed by long-term conflicts between Somalia and Ethiopia on one hand and Eritrea and Ethiopia on the other. Any cooperation between the Horn countries has been particularly and profoundly hampered by the fact that Somalia remains a battleground for Ethiopia and Eritrea. Only when those two countries come to a peaceful resolution of their differences can peace return to Somalia and elsewhere in the sub-region. Ethiopia, with the assistance of the United States (US), acts as a regional partner in the Western project of the “war on terror.” In contrast, Eritrea holds another perspective shared by Egypt and several Arab states, based on their view of Somalia’s geostrategic value as a potential partner in the Horn regarding resistance to Ethiopian domination. Not only Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Egypt, but also Djibouti, Kenya, and Sudan have followed Somalia in applying closer scrutiny to protecting their security and strategic interests in the Horn.

Ever since the collapse of the central Somali state structures in 1991, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has played a critical role in the reconciliation processes in post-Cold War Somalia. With mixed feelings about whether it is a hindrance or offers help (Healy, 2015), IGAD’s involvement has been politicised and is popularly considered locally as having much more destructive long-term political consequences than any other regional organisation. Previous scholarship has not sufficiently shown how the expansion of IGAD has contributed to the regional political projects and security strategies concerning Somalia. Some have examined IGAD’s role in the Sudan and South Sudan (Abbink, 2003; Apuuli, 2015; Tekle, 2010), as well as its role in Somalia and Sudan (Malito and Ylönen, 2013; Murithi, 2009). As in West Africa, where Nigeria played a pivotal role in the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) military mission in Liberia, Ethiopia laboured to lead the IGAD political (and military) project in Somalia. Even as Nigeria, blamed for its hegemonic interest in ECOWAS (Adibe, 1997; Aning, 1999; Ofuatey-Kodjoe, 1994), has shaped the course of ECOWAS’s activities, Ethiopia endeavoured to own the IGAD mission in the Horn.

IGAD and Ethiopia became two intertwined political power machines and the organisation has become an instrument for Ethiopian rulers to resolve their security concerns in Somalia and secure predominance in the Horn. Under the banner of IGAD, Ethiopian rulers have heavily influenced – and continue to influence – the regional political space to by seeking to establish remote-controlled states in Somalia and Eritrea. During the Cold War, the role of IGAD in Somalia was limited to the development sector, but since the total collapse of a unitary national Somali state it has broadened its mandate and added a political component. Although the name of IGAD has not been used in the Ethiopian military interventions in Somalia, Ethiopia has managed to project itself as a hegemonic regional power through IGAD. The pursuit of hegemonic regional power in the Horn by current rulers in Ethiopia is intensely contested by Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan. Examining Ethiopian foreign policies since the regime of Mengistu Halie Mariam illustrates how IGAD as a regional organisation has become useful to Ethiopian rulers in legitimising their involvement in peacebuilding projects in Somalia and South Sudan. Reflecting on international relations and political science theories that suggest “shared sovereignty” (Krasner, 2004, 2005) is necessary for the reconstruction of post-conflict countries; it is not unusual that the relationship between Somalia and IGAD has recently transformed into a patron–client relationship.

This chapter addresses the changing relationship between Somalia and IGAD from a new perspective. It seeks to understand the interplay between the politics of peacebuilding, the lenses of regional power dynamics from which the notion of hegemony cannot be taken out. The chapter approaches the concept of shared sovereignty from a regional perspective, defining the IGAD mission in Somalia as a politically contingent hegemony marred by contestation and conflict that serves Ethiopian interests in Somalia. To unpack these complex dynamics beyond IGAD as an organisation, the chapter critically evaluates how Ethiopian interests in Somalia have overtaken the IGAD political project in the country. The chapter traces the unexplored issue of Ethiopia as a regional actor and its intrusion into Somali affairs through an empirical analysis, using the politics of peacebuilding in the IGAD regional organisation as a lens through which it is possible to approach the question of hegemonic power in post-Cold War Africa (Bamfo, 2010; Seifert, 2008). By specifically analysing the regional political dynamics, new insights into the nature of recurrent conflict in the Horn are gained by assessing the extent to which Ethiopia remains a riparian state which cannot be isolated from the auspices of IGAD. Drawing on ethnographic historical research in Somalia, as well as interviews with senior Somali government officials and IGAD sources, this chapter is the product of more than two decades of research and writing in and on Somalia.¹
**Ethiopianisation in the name of IGAD**

With the immediacy and imminent adoption of an instrument of power, what do we consider “regional power” to mean in the Horn of Africa sub-region? Given the long territorial disputes within the region (Keller, 1991; Yuusuf, 1976), Kenya and Ethiopia have succeeded in advancing their interests more than other countries, despite their contested neighbourliness with Somalia. Each has preserved – and continues to preserve – its own interest in Somalia peace projects through close cooperation, to lead such processes for its own benefit. The two common factors and features of recent Somali reconciliation projects are internal politics and external intervention. As Apuuli (2010, 277) observed,

> every peace initiative in Somalia has been carefully watched by immediate and far-afield neighbours to make sure that any Somali administration that emerges does not damage their interests. Efforts to rebuild the Somali state have thus been marred by both brutal internal opportunists and external actors who can act as spoilers.

It was within this contrapuntal context that, in June 1991, Djibouti organised the first reconciliation conference for Somalia without involving other Horn of Africa countries. Barely two years later, Ethiopia, in partnership with the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), hosted another conference for Somalia, with the involvement of the international community. In the name of IGAD, Ethiopia has organised – and continues to organise – numerous peace conferences for Somalia and for Sudan and South Sudan.

The existence of IGAD, albeit remote from regional political dynamics, helped Ethiopia ensure the protection for its interests in Somalia. In the 1980s, IGAD was formed at a time Somalia was going through a brutal (un)civil war between the military regime and armed resistance groups. IGAD was not initially an effective organisation capable of politically and militarily intervening in Somalia when the central state disintegrated in 1991. The end of the Cold War led to a change of military regimes in Somalia and Ethiopia. Both countries underwent a process of political upheaval: the dictatorial regimes of Mohamed Siad Barre and Mengistu were forcefully overthrown in 1991, in January and May, respectively. The political transition that Ethiopia went through was profoundly distinct from Somalia’s: while Ethiopia was “saved” by the West (Orizio and Bardoni, 2001), in Somalia, a seamless progression of violence followed Siad Barre’s ouster (Ingiriis, 2016a). Like Liberia, Somalia became a “forgotten country” fighting a “forgotten war” (West Africa, cited in Aning, 1999, 336). This meant that, where Ethiopia evaded outside interference in maintaining its statehood, Somalia was drawn into a long process of peacebuilding and state-building projects initiated from outside. The US assisted in tense transitional peacebuilding processes in Ethiopia, which saw the safe departure of Mengistu from Addis Ababa. The US never attempted to facilitate mediation between Siad Barre and the Somali armed movements, as it had done during the negotiation period between Mengistu and Ethiopian armed groups.
In 1992, four years prior to the restructuring of IGAD as a reformed organisation, Ethiopia convinced both the OAU and IGAD to designate the new authorities in Addis Ababa as the main coordinators of the Somali peace processes (Xildhiban Publications, 2012). In addition, Ethiopia obtained the approval of the regional heads of states to be the chair of the Horn of Africa Standing Committee on Somalia. This move “formed the basis of Ethiopia’s mandate to broker peace in Somalia” (Apuuli, 2010, 263). The Ethiopian rulers emerged immediately as mediators between the non-state Somali armed groups. IGAD was instrumentalised to apply in practice the long-held Ethiopian foreign policy action plan for Somalia set in motion during the Haile Selassie years and violently pursued during the Mengistu regime. In other words, IGAD as an organisation formed the basis of and became a political platform for Ethiopia to advance its interests in Somalia (Elmi and Barise, 2006). While IGAD’s efforts at peacebuilding in Somalia were superseded by the Ethiopian agenda, IGAD policymakers failed to articulate a clear and coherent policy of their own for Somalia. Instead, they adopted the Ethiopian policy towards Somalia to deal with the ongoing armed conflict in the country. Although Ethiopia was part of the Somali political conflicts well before the fall of the Siad Barre regime (Lewis, 1987), by the mid-1990s it had become the main engine driving the Somali peace processes in a direction beneficial to its own security interests. To entrust Ethiopia with the restoration of peace to Somalia was seen by many Somalis, echoing the animosity between the two countries, as entrusting a hyena with the task of guarding the sheep (Field interviews, Mogadishu, April–July, 2016).

**IGAD: tool or electricity?**

From early on, IGAD adopted the Ethiopian policy of dealing with the leaders of Somali political factions – the so-called “warlords” – as state actors. There were more factional contenders for power in Somalia than in the rest of the Horn. Rather than isolating them, IGAD accommodated these factional leaders and recognised them as the official representatives of the Somali people, based on the fact that many had been army generals and former members of the Siad Barre regime (Ingiriis, 2016). Ethiopia, by this time, had nothing much to worry about, as it had full control of IGAD. As one Somali official aptly put it, “IGAD has always been an envelope of Ethiopia” and “Ethiopia is the elephant behind IGAD” (Interview with a Somali government official, A. R. B., Mogadishu, 2 July 2016). In 1996, Ethiopia used IGAD’s auspices to authorise itself as the only caretaker for peace and reconciliation in Somalia. A caretaker, Ethiopia would not allow any other power (e.g. Egypt) to enter the Somali political landscape to play a pivotal role as a patron in the Somali peace processes or act as a benevolent parent. In January 1997, at the Ethiopian resort town of Sodere, Somali political factions formed the National Salvation Council (NSC), which was tasked with the establishment of a transitional central authority in Somalia. The NSC was discredited because it was remote-controlled by Ethiopia, and operated out of Addis Ababa, which led many Somalis to consider it as an “instrument of Ethiopia” (Apuuli, 2010,
The formation of this council was the first success of the Ethiopian rulers in exerting their influence on Somali politics under IGAD auspices. This was not the case in Eritrea, as Ethiopia did not find the time to use IGAD against the regime of Isaias Afwerki after the outbreak of war in 1998. Reconciliation conferences for Somalia held in Addis Ababa since the 1990s have always been structured through the faction-based peace process. At no point has Ethiopia facilitated the formation of a Somali government – whether transitional or interim – to be established in Addis Ababa. Indeed, all Somali governments formed outside the country have been announced in either Djibouti or Kenya.

Somalia was proving to be a real albatross around everyone’s neck by the late 1990s and remained a disconcerting reminder to the UN and other international bodies, due in large part to the failure of most – if not all – the numerous (international and regional) peace and reconciliation attempts. In September 1999, newly elected President of Djibouti Ismail Omar Geelle went to the UN General Assembly to urge the world not to abandon Somalia (Anonymous, 2002; Lortan, 2000). Geelle’s historic speech revived the lost confidence that Somalis could ever come together to reconcile by themselves. In the summer of 2000, in the small hot town of Arte, the Djibouti government hosted a well-attended peace and reconciliation conference for Somalia – or, as two Somali scholars observed, the largest Somali-owned peace conference ever to have been held (Elmi and Barise, 2006, 40; Anonymous, 2002; Lortan, 2000). The Arte Conference was a watershed and game changer in Somali politics. With the direct advice of Somali intellectuals and indirect advice from non-Somali academics such as British anthropologist Ioan M. Lewis (Lewis and Mayall, 1995), Djibouti mobilised traditional clan leaders to form a government of Somalia by selecting a national parliament, which would in turn elect a president. Although this alternative approach of involving civil society groups in Somali peace conferences was first attempted by Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Somalia (Sahnoun 1994), Djibouti adopted it with a particularly rigorous attempt at building peace without armed factions.

The election of Abdikassim Salaad Hassan as the first internationally recognised president of Somalia sparked anxiety in the inner circles of the Ethiopian regime, unlike in other IGAD member states – Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda – which welcomed the outcome (AFP 2000a, 2000b). Ethiopia considered Salaad and the new government members as remnants of the former Siad Barre regime intent on renewing the idea of Greater Somalia (Pan-Somalism). To discredit the new Somali leadership in the eyes of the suspicious US authorities, the Ethiopian authorities branded Salaad and his government members as “Islamists,” adamant they would align with Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya, with whom they shared the common Somali belief that the Somali state was incomplete; which is to say, there are lost Somali lands occupied by Ethiopia and Kenya. Salaad and his government unwittingly substantiated Ethiopian apprehension by using nationalist rhetoric, reminding Meles Zenawi and other Ethiopian rulers of the fact that Somalia belongs to all Somalis. Like Eritrea’s Afwerki, Zenawi attended Salaad’s inauguration ceremony in Djibouti, but his facial expression,
as shown on Djibouti television (RTD), suggested that Zenawi was becoming increasingly unhappy about the new development. Amid growing suspicion, Salaad initially attempted to appease Ethiopia and asked his presidential rival Ambassador Abdullahi Ahmed Addow to lead a delegation of high-ranking officials, including presidential adviser Col. Omar Haashi Aden and then ambassador to Egypt Abdullahi Hassan Mohamoud, to travel to Addis Ababa to persuade Zenawi and his regime to maintain good relations with the new Somali government. In a memorandum of understanding signed at the end of meetings with the Somali delegation, the Ethiopian authorities included a clause pledging that they would continue supporting the Somali political factions. This was a clear sign that Ambassador Addow’s diplomatic efforts had not borne fruit. In an interview between the author and Salaad in his makeshift presidential palace near the former Banaadir Secondary School in the capital Mogadishu, soon after the delegation had returned, Salaad insisted, with a bit of optimism, that supporting armed political factions opposed to his government would not mean Ethiopia was not bound by the memorandum of understanding. Instead of appreciating the friendly gesture, Zenawi responded by providing support to disparate armed groups to form the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) in opposition to Salaad’s government. The leadership structure of the SRRC was based on co-chairs, one of whom was Hussein Mohamed Aideed, son of the once powerful Gen. Mohamed Farah Aideed. Anyone familiar with factional Somali politics might not have been surprised to learn that Hussein Aideed, once aligned with Eritrea because Ethiopia had supported his rivals, went to Addis Ababa, for the first time, to join the Ethiopia-backed SSRC.

The aftermath of the Arte Conference

The Ethiopian rulers learned a lesson from the Djibouti peace process: that they must change their strategy of exploiting non-state Somali actors. Drawing on the Djibouti experiment on Somalia, the Ethiopian rulers had to attempt another route from now on to move from shaker to shaper to manufacture the future state of Somalia, instead of remaining the main stakeholder (The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 2006). In doing so, they proved to be successful in restructuring the type of Somali government by which Somalia was going to be ruled, while formulating for themselves the form and the face of the Somali state. This was intrinsically aimed at re-engineering the systemic state structure and even re-designing what the state should look like. By realising that, sooner or later, a group most likely hostile to their policies on the Horn could rise to the top of Somali politics, the Ethiopian rulers had to act swiftly. The Addis Ababa policymakers approved the formation of a weak Somali state for Ethiopia by Ethiopia, principally a pro-Ethiopian one led by pro-Ethiopian elements. The issue of restructuring the Somali state to suit Ethiopian interests was made easier by Somali actors seeking to seize power and resources. The weak state structure put in place could force any Somali leader to be a pro-Ethiopian political sycophant. To proceed with the actual implementation of this project, Ethiopia hijacked the Somali peace conference in Kenya and
ensured it would have a strong hand in selecting delegates for the event, first held in Eldoret and later in Mbagathi from 2002 until 2004. The conference resulted in the selection of a certain group of factional leaders attached to the Ethiopian regime. This was the policy behind a carefully planned arrangement that culminated in the election of Col. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as president. The election result outraged many Somalis who might have anticipated a less war-weary president than a “warlord” backed by – and heavily reliant on – Ethiopian patronage (International Crisis Group, 2004). Not only was Yusuf not an ally of Ethiopia in its war on the Salaad government, he was also a member of the armed opposition groups fighting against Ethiopia. In his first trip to Addis Ababa, Yusuf asked for aggressive military support from the IGAD countries, known as the “front-line states” (Interviews with a former minister of the Abdullahi Yusuf government, Mogadishu, 7 July 2016; BBC World Service, 2005). Apart from splitting the Somali parliament into pro-Ethiopian elements versus anti-Ethiopian advocates, the move led to a movie-style parliamentary brawl in March 2005, when both camps used their chairs to hit each other. This was an interesting political drama and the chair-throwing brawl was widely watched on television.

The crucial advice Yusuf had received from Ethiopian authorities was to appeal to IGAD countries for a 20,000-strong force to establish his government in the capital Mogadishu, then ruled by opposing armed Hawiye clan-group factions. In less than three months after Yusuf had been declared president, Ethiopia immediately lobbied on his behalf at the African Union (AU) meeting held in Abuja, Nigeria, in January 2005. On the sidelines of the AU conference, the IGAD heads of states decided “to provide security to enable the newly established government of Somalia to relocate back home” (IGAD, 2005). It was agreed that the IGAD military mission to Somalia should be named the IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM). No time was lost in assembling the IGAD ministers of defence at Entebbe, Uganda, to draw up a deployment plan for the military mission (The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 2005). The AU was always in line with the IGAD plan and immediately authorised:

the deployment of IGASOM to provide support to the Yusuf government to ensure its relocation to Somalia, guarantee the sustenance of the IGAD peace process, and assist with the re-establishment of peace and security by helping in the formation of the Somalia police and army.

(African Union, 2005)

Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, who served as a conflict prevention, management, and resolution advisor at the IGAD Secretariat, explains three legal and structural difficulties that IGASOM encountered:

First, the fact that the Agreement that establishes IGAD did not provide authority for the organisation to undertake a peace support mission in a member state. Secondly, the IGAD Secretariat lacked the capacity (both human and financial) to handle a peace support operation. Thirdly, and most
importantly, IGAD member state Eritrea, in tense relations with co-member Ethiopia after their 1998–2000 border war, objected to the deployment.

(Apuuli, 2010, 264)

The unusual political manoeuvre to deploy military forces in the name of IGAD was driven by two political developments that occurred in Mogadishu: (1) the emerging power in 2005 of the clan-based Islamic courts, which united under the banner of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in reaction to a US hijack-and-kill campaign against Somali and non-Somali Afghanistan war veterans the UIC was hosting in Mogadishu; and (2) the declaration in February 2006 of the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism (APRCT), a motley coalition of nine Hawiye political players, brokers, and businesspeople who profited from the war economy in and around Mogadishu, including Bashir Raage Shiiraar, Abdi Hassan Awale “Qaybdiid,” Muuse Suudi Yalahow, Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, Omar Mohamoud Mohamed “Omar Finish,” Bootaan Iise Aalin, Abdi Nuurre Siyaad, Abdirashid Shire Ilqeyte, Abdi-Shukri Ali Hersi, and Ibrahim Jeebe. They were later reinforced by Mohamed Omar Habeeb “Mohamed Dheere,” who at first had condemned but later apologised and joined them, apparently under pressure from US and Ethiopian intelligence agencies (Ingiriis, 2006a, 2006b; Menkhaus, 2007).

The rise of the UIC proved profoundly significant in shaping the Somali political scene. Taking advantage of intense public grievances against the APRCT members to get rid of them, the UIC leaders attracted sympathy among influential opinion shapers from the British Conservative Party who blasted 10 Downing Street for not having known better than to follow US policy on Somalia (Dowden, 2011). However, the Ethiopian authorities successfully managed to exploit the US power machinery to destroy two major Somali-owned peacebuilding and state-building initiatives – which is to say, the evolution of the Salaad government and the emergence of the UIC. Ethiopian threats against both initiatives later turned out to be propaganda (Warbrick and Yihdego, 2007, 674). The UIC authorities acted like political novices and deserve their own share of the blame. In addition to reverting to reckless military acts and making thoughtless political speeches on the media, they failed not only to critically rethink global political dimensions, but to consider regional political dynamics when making life-and-death decisions. Worst of all, they embraced emotional proposals by Somali diaspora academics in the US, who gave them radical guidance on standing up to Ethiopia (Field notes, Minneapolis, May–August 2008).7

IGAD and the AU, having invested in the unpopular Yusuf government, were unwilling to recognise the UIC as a government, unlike the European Union, which ostensibly did, sending a high-level delegation, led by European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid Louis Michel, to Mogadishu for serious negotiations (BBC News, 2006). Michel managed to convince the UIC leaders, especially those labelled “hardliners” such as Sheikh Col. Hassan Dahir Aweys, to sign a nine-point memorandum of understanding and agree to hold talks with Yusuf’s government “without preconditions” in order to ensure “a negotiated settlement of
The big elephant in the room

The Ethiopians attacked the UIC forces while Michel was mediating between competing Somali forces in Mogadishu and Baydhabo.

Militarisation of IGAD: the notion of IGASOM

The peace-making element of IGAD was reinvigorated by the US authorities, who wanted local partners in their “war on terror.” As one Somali government official highlighted, other than socio-economic development programmes, a military mandate was never included in IGAD’s legal obligations (Interview with a Somali government official, A. R. B., Mogadishu, 2 July 2016). On top of the military mandate, politics and diplomacy, which were not uncommonly used in the regional body to manipulate Somali factional groups, were also included in the IGAD operations. The AU echoed the same IGAD proposal directed by Ethiopia (The Ethiopian Herald, 2007a). In a special session in September 2006, the AU approved a peacekeeping mission to Somalia in the name of IGAD (Seifert, 2008, 36). The UN Security Council, by lifting an arms embargo imposed on Somalia since 1992, joined the AU and IGAD in December 2006 to authorise the deployment of military force to support the Yusuf government. While the IGAD charter does not stipulate the conduct of military deployment, the backing of the UN Security Council was sought to provide the necessary legitimisation to deploy forces in IGAD’s name. Ethiopia did not wait for the bureaucratic UN system and soon sent a strong force to Somalia to face the UIC threat. When the tension between the Yusuf government and the UIC quickly escalated in late 2006 (Africa Confidential, 2006), it was agreed that the IGASOM project be discarded altogether and replaced by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Assisted by Ethiopian forces, the AMISOM forces were enlarged to protect a government seen by most Somalis as a puppet of Ethiopia (Bamfo, 2010).

When an insurgency and a series of uprisings were sparked in the capital Mogadishu in 2007 and 2008, the US authorities acknowledged the need to legitimise the Somali government Ethiopia’s rulers were trying to install in Somalia. Aside from using IGAD, which was seen as an Ethiopia-dominated organisation, the US authorities tasked the UN office in Somalia with organising a reconciliation conference in Djibouti for leaders of the UIC and the Transitional Federal Government, who had failed to resolve their political conflict at a conference in Khartoum, Sudan, and Sana’a, Yemen. The shift in US diplomacy in Somalia forced Ethiopia to accept the participation of the “moderate” wing of the UIC in a new political power-sharing arrangement with the Ethiopia-backed government. Yusuf refused to accept the new conciliatory approach, but the IGAD Council of Ministers meeting in Addis Ababa on 18 November 2008 threatened him with the imposition of “targeted sanctions including travel bans and freezing of assets among others, on all those in and outside Somalia who had become obstacles to the achievement of peace in Somalia” (IGAD, 2008). Yusuf had only three options: (1) to accept the outcome of the conference without interference; (2) to dismiss Prime Minister Nuur Hassan Hussein “Nuur Adde,” who was delegated to lead
the government delegation to the Djibouti conference; or (3) to resign from the presidency. Yusuf decided to sack Nuur Adde, appointing Mohamed Mohamoud Guuleed “Ga’madheere” instead. This did not work out the way it had done when Yusuf had insisted on the departure of Ali Mohamed Geeddi as prime minister in October 2007. As a consequence of his decision, which went against US and Ethiopian interests, Yusuf was himself pressed to resign in December 2008 (Interview with Mohamed Mohamoud Guuleed “Ga’madheere,” Mogadishu, 22 April 2016). It was thought likely that Yusuf’s successor would be a hardliner from the UIC like Sheikh Aweys, but Ethiopia as the chief orchestrator of IGAD would never have accepted him as president of Somalia because of his previous Islamist links (Interview with senior IGAD diplomat, Abuja, 2 September 2016).

It should be noted that the label “Islamist” is a broad term in Somali politics, which makes it easy to target political enemies to attack and eliminate them.

The Djibouti conference ended with the election of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as president in January 2009. The prediction of many Somalis and the international community was that Nuur Adde would be president. Even though they could not dictate the outcome, the Ethiopian rulers favoured Sheikh Sharif for the sole reason that he would be able to separate the “moderates” from the “extremists.” His election officially divided the disjointed groups of the UIC into three warring factions: the group-turned-government led by Sheikh Sharif himself; Hisbul Islam led by Sheikh Aweys; and Al-Shabaab, the most powerful of all. Sheikh Sharif’s tenure ended while he was still busy with deal with the Al-Shabaab particularly following it full retreat from the capital (Discussions with Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, Oxford, November 2014 to March 2015). The fragile new government led by Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud, who came to power in September 2012, was increasingly unable to deal with Al-Shabaab and became dependent on Ethiopia and AMISOM for protection and assistance. The new regime went as far as to intertwine the military policies of Somalia and Ethiopia (Ethiopian News Agency, 2016). Under IGAD’s auspices, Ethiopia restarted the unending mediation sessions between the warring Somali groups, including the government. The Ethiopian military forces in Somalia began using a different military and political approach than other AMISOM forces (Qaranimo Online, 2016; AMISOM, 2016). From 2012, the rumour in Mogadishu was that the Ethiopian representative of the IGAD mission in Mogadishu, Gen. Gabre Adhana, was more powerful and influential than the Ethiopian ambassador to Somalia (Field notes, Mogadishu, April to August 2016; Shabelle News 2016).

Conclusion

The election of Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmaajo” as president in Somalia in February 2017 was clear evidence that the Ethiopian policy towards Somalia cannot be successful when it comes to supporting backing a favourite candidate to sit the Villa Somalia, the presidential palace. In Mogadishu, Farmajo campaigned on a slogan of reviving lost Somali nationalism, which would create unease with Addis Ababa. The Ethiopian rulers’ political manoeuvres should
not be underestimated. At best, they are politically adept at influencing things to their own advantage, regardless of whoever comes to power in Somalia. At worst, although they are now in a weaker position owing to the recent domestic political challenges, they are still militarily capable of sabotaging any Somali leadership that attempts to challenge their broader regional interests.

Two power structures are helpful for Ethiopia to ensure preservation of its objectives in Somalia in this regard. Apart from IGAD, the “republican” federal system in Somalia, where each major clan demands its own state, gives Ethiopia influence over the Somali leadership. Ethiopia has benefitted directly and indirectly as the IGAD gatekeeper in Somalia and remains the main beneficiary of the federal system in Somalia. Over four years (2012–2016), IGAD played a leading role in the facilitation of state-building processes in south-central Somalia. The prevailing political perception is that those areas most likely will continue even when “federalism” is abolished.

The current federal state structure of Somalia has stemmed from the Ethiopian conception of federalising Somalia into various discrete mini-state entities. As an IGAD press release (2014, 1) plainly revealed: “We support the ongoing efforts of the FGS [Federal Government of Somalia] in ensuring the establishment of the pillars for the federal system of the country.” The government in Mogadishu was directed to concentrate on forming new states “in a manner that does not undermine the existing federal states” (IGAD, 2014, 1). The suggestion and the support were in line with the “building block approach” project proposed by Ethiopia in 1998, which was first applied in northeast Somalia and resulted in the formation of Puntland State (Bryden, 1999). According to the IGAD press release: “The IGAD Special Envoy added that the country was indeed moving towards attaining the goals of federalism as enshrined in the vision of 2016 aimed at building a strong, peaceful, prosperous, united and sovereign Somalia” (IGAD, 2014, 1). Even though the system of federalism was clearly stipulated in the provincial constitution for Somalia, the IGAD press statement was used to make its point more relevant to the present political reality by referring to the so-called Vision 2016, a new deal project for Somalia supported by international donors. One Somali elder has posed some critical questions worthy of further study:

Who has given Ethiopia [permission] to federate Somalia without a public referendum? Basically, without asking people whether they prefer a federal system or centralised state system? How do they impose undefined federalism on a people who had not asked for [it] in the first place?

(Discussions with B. H. D., Mogadishu, 29 May 2016).

The answer is buried in the Ethiopianisation of IGAD.

Notes

1 This chapter was first presented as a paper at the conference titled “Policy Dialogue on Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa” at the Institute for Peace and
Conflict Resolution, Abuja, Nigeria, 1–2 September 2016. I thank the attendees for their positive comments and encouragement. I am also grateful to Nordic Africa Institute for the invitation to attend the conference.

Between 0m:20s and 1m:24s.

Eritrea suspended its IGAD membership temporarily on 27 April 2007 but tried with no avail to reactivate it on 25 July 2011. For more on the Eritrean “in” and “out” relationship with IGAD, see Andemariam (2015); for the Ethiopia–Eritrea proxy war in Somalia, see Menkhaus (2007).

Geelle invited 30 Somali intellectuals from around the world. At the time of the conference, a series of publications by Lewis suggested the restoration of traditional leaders in contrast with the so-called “warlords” (Lewis and Mayall, 1995).

For an overview of the Mbagathi conference, see Webersik (2014).

Days later, influential MPs who were opposed to Col. Yusuf won a vote in parliament that compelled the new president to select the prime minister from within parliament.

For a discussion of the “ebb and flow” of the UIC, see Abbink (2009).

It should be noted that, despite a UN monitoring group’s revelations, the Ethiopian authorities continued to violate an arms embargo imposed on Somalia by the UN Security Council in 1992 (Associated Press, 2006).

There were also calls from Djibouti urging Ethiopia to pull its troops out to ease tension (Shabelle Media Network, 2007). The Ethiopian government position was that “threat not ambition drove it into war” (Ethiopian News Agency, 2007).

For celebratory accounts of AMISOM, see Fahlén (2015) and Freear and de Coning (2013). For critical analysis, see Anderson (2014); Fisher (2012); Hesse (2015); Williams (2009, 2013a, 2013b, 2014).

The official name of the government was the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). In a joint operation between Ethiopia and Kenya, the TFG was used as a legitimising device to extradite alleged foreign supporters of the UIC (The Ethiopian Herald, 2007b).

A document released by Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdisalam Hadliye states that

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Investment Promotion of the Federal Republic of Somalia is working tirelessly to establish, renew and strengthen all partnerships of mutual interest which serves our interests and that of our neighbours and allies across the globe.

Press Release, for Immediate Release, 6 July 2016, Mogadishu, Somalia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

Puntland followed a similar yet dissimilar pattern from Somaliland by allowing itself to be part of Somalia under a federal system. For the differences between Somaliland and Puntland, see Hesse (2010, 343–362).

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“You don’t own peace”
The coward state, South Sudan, and IGAD relations

Jacob D. Chol

Introduction

On 15 December 2013, South Sudan descended into bitter political violence and chaos, emanating from the disputes within the leadership of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) over political power and wealth. According to Amnesty International, the violence led to the deaths of over 100,000 people, particularly in the Juba, Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Unity states. Many pundits and political analysts have pointed to the root cause of violence as a power struggle within the SPLM family. However, the government line is that the political violence was triggered by a failed coup d’état led by Vice President Riek Machar and his apologists, thirsty for power and prestige. However, the government anecdote of a foiled coup has been highly discredited by the international community and the 2013 African Union (AU) Commission of Inquiry Report.

As the result of the civil strife, a delegation representing the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Council of Ministers flew to the capital of South Sudan, Juba, on 19 December 2013, for an emergency three-day visit in order to get a first-hand impression of the political crisis and violence that had rocked the country since the night of 15 December. The move led to a subsequent meeting of the IGAD Heads of State and Government in Nairobi, Kenya, on 27 December, culminating in the establishment of IGAD’s peace mediation. Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin of Ethiopia, Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo of Kenya, and Ambassador Gen. Mohammed Ahmed El-Dabi of Sudan were nominated as IGAD envoys.

Given the complex and tiring mediation process, having missed a 5 March 2015 deadline, the IGAD Heads of State and Government consented to the expansion of IGAD to IGAD-Plus to include the AU Commission, China, the European Union, Norway, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), and the United Nations (UN). With regional and international pressures, IGAD-Plus convinced the conflicting parties to sign the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCISS) on 17 and 26 August 2015, respectively. However, the implementation of the ARCISS has sharply exposed the working relations between the Transitional Government of South Sudan and IGAD. While many political scientists and peace scholars have been examining
The role of IGAD in South Sudan’s peace mediation and the challenges bedevilling the organisation, none of the scholars has studied the relationship between IGAD and the government of South Sudan (GRSS). This chapter aims to fill this gap in knowledge.

The chapter argues that South Sudan is a “coward state” in its relations with IGAD. In expounding this central argument, the chapter is organised as follows: section one explores and explains the concept of the “coward state” and advances neoliberal peace theory in analysing the relations of South Sudan with IGAD; section two examines the friendly and unfriendly relations between IGAD and South Sudan. In explaining this, the chapter unpacks the delicate and intractable links between IGAD and its member states. In doing so, it discusses the Ugandan military intervention at the behest of the Kiir faction in the conflicts in December 2013 and its impact on South Sudan–IGAD relations. Section three tackles the suspicious and ambiguous relations between IGAD and South Sudan in implementing the ARCISS. Section four analyses the roles played by Ethiopia, Sudan, and Kenya in South Sudan’s efforts directed towards resolving the political crisis. Section five concludes by pointing to areas for further research and offering policy recommendations for managing South Sudan–IGAD relations.

South Sudan, the coward state

The concept of a coward state concept is derived from Murphy’s (2011) seminal proposition of a “courageous state.” He argues that to have a courageous state, a coward state must also exist. Murphy notes that a coward state is one that forces poor citizens who have never been part of an economic or political crisis to pay for it while the rich and powerful who created it from within benefit from the mess (Murphy, 2011, 4). While this state squeezes out the poor, it does not grant a future to the next generation. This is a state that is failing its young population by putting them in crisis by not securing their education and socio-economic wellbeing, which could enhance their prosperity (Murphy, 2011, 5). Richard Murphy continues to lament that a coward state does not have the courage to provide its young people with jobs, its old people with secure care, its population with protection against unemployment and unforeseen events, or its children with decent schools (Murphy, 2011, 5). A coward state is a state that instigates chaos and violence and fails to bring order, security, and tranquillity. In essence, a coward state roars loudly and fails to take important diplomatic, political, and economic steps, particularly towards building peace.

As Murphy argues, South Sudan perfectly fits the prescription of a coward state. It is a state that loudly announces its plans but fails to provide services to its citizens including public security. To unpack the complexities of failed coward states, Kraxberger (2012) characterises them under two main categories: effectiveness and legitimacy of political institutions. By “effectiveness,” Kraxberger refers to the degree to which governments fulfil minimal expectations for delivering public goods and services; “legitimacy of political institutions” addresses the amount of respect that citizens of a state have for state institutions (Kraxberger,
Fulfilment of minimal expectations and legitimacy depend on physical security, which is a core problem for fragile coward states. Failed coward states are extremely violent places, though violence can come in different forms. Rebels or warlords may control large chunks of territory or engage in fighting with government forces; and government security personnel may prey upon ordinary citizens, whether due to greed, organised repression, or poor training (Kraxberger, 2012, 1).

Also, failed coward states do not have functioning social services. Kraxberger argues that these states provide little in the field of education, for instance. Educational systems suffer from quantitative and qualitative deficiencies (Kraxberger, 2012, 1). Staff are not paid and are routinely absent from their posts; school buildings are in varying states of neglect or are often abandoned; school fees serve as an accessibility barrier and may be squandered once collected; and those students who do attend school often receive only a rudimentary primary education, with few learning resources (Kraxberger, 2012, 1).

Apart from deficiencies in the areas of education, health, and economic and environmental degradation, as well as the failure of public security, South Sudan has exhibited cowardice in its relationship with IGAD. After signing the ARCISS, the GRSS argued for a list of reservations in the peace text. These reservations have been used to either reject or delay the implementation of the ARCISS. The outcome has been the suspicion of IGAD and IGAD-Plus, which are blamed for allegedly championing regime change in the nascent state. This attitude shows that South Sudan is a coward state. It is a state that shouted about providing services to the citizens, voluntarily signed the ARCISS, and blamed its failure on IGAD and IGAD-Plus member states. It is a state that proclaims its responsibility and runs away from it (Murphy, 2011, 6).

Liberal peacebuilding associates state security and peace with democratic development and institutions, the rule of law, human rights, and a market economy, which are usually undertaken or established by international organisations or actors, mainly the UN and/or others (Franks and Richmond, 2008). The idea is that if these post-conflict states manage to successfully develop and maintain a functional democracy – at least to a certain extent – they will then become part of the greater family of interdependent democracies around the world, and thus have more chances for peace, security, and economic growth, and fewer chances for instability and underdevelopment. Therefore, the theory goes, this model works not only as a peace builder but also as a conflict preventer (Ramsbotham et al., 2010, 116).

In the context of South Sudan–IGAD relations, neoliberal peace theory helps in analysing the GRSS’s conundrum in the implementation of the ARCISS. Although rule of law, equality, institutionalism, economic development, and, above all, democracy should have existed for South Sudan to realise meaningful peace, the GRSS has eschewed providing these ingredients and in lieu developed a tendency towards cowardice that has hampered relations with IGAD. Thus, the undoing of South Sudan’s peace deal is the suspicion in the country’s relations with IGAD, which is what has instilled a sense of cowardly behaviour of the nascent state.
The neoliberal approach has not successfully helped in advancing sustainable peace in the Greater Horn of Africa. Other alternative approaches, such as traditional peace initiatives and conflict resolution mechanisms, have been advanced and South Sudan has benefited from these efforts so far. The stitching together of a social fabric between the Nuer and Dinka peoples after the 1991 SPLM split was addressed through the Wunlit Peace Accord of 1999. This accord was mostly mediated and negotiated by traditional leaders and the clergy. It is probable that Dinka and Nuer ethnic feuds would require traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and not the neoliberal approach.

Outbreak of violence and early efforts at peace-making

The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) was established in 1986, with a focus on drought and desertification; and relaunched in 1996 as IGAD, with an expanded mandate that included conflict resolution (Adar, 2000, 43). It comprises Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, South Sudan, and Eritrea, although Eritrea is currently suspended. The decision to revitalise IGAD was made by the IGAD Heads of State and Government at a meeting held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 18 April 1995. At the 12th Ordinary Summit in 2008, the Heads of State and Government again expanded IGAD’s mandate to include regional economic integration (Medhane, 2004, 121). The expansion of the mandate was due in part to IGAD member states’ long history of cooperation and conflict with one another. IGAD’s involvement in conflict resolution has historically focused on the north–south conflict in Sudan – and now the south–south conflict – and various conflicts in Somalia (Healy, 2011, 54). An IGAD peace process to resolve Sudan’s long-running second civil war (1983–2005) was launched in the early 1990s and gained traction in the late 1990s when Kenya held the IGAD chair. IGAD’s mediation, led by Gen. Sumbeiywo, received significant support from the “Troika” (the US, the UK, and Norway), particularly at the end of the process. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005 and paved the way for South Sudan’s independence in 2011.

In December 2013 when violence broke out in South Sudan, IGAD responded quickly and its first-hand reading of the situation culminated in the establishment of South Sudan’s IGAD peace mediation. The complex and tiring mediation process and unsuccessful negotiations made the IGAD Heads of State and Government consent to expanding IGAD to IGAD-Plus to include the AU Commission, China, the EU, Norway, the UK, the US, the UN, and the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF). With regional and international pressures, IGAD-Plus reined in the warring parties to sign the ARCISS. Thus, the former vice president, Riek Machar and President Salva Kiir eventually signed the peace agreement on 17 and 26 August 2015, respectively. Yet, South Sudan relations with IGAD have been a bitter-sweet puzzle, as the former views the latter as a friend, enemy, and suspicious agent of regime change. Given the South Sudanese government’s mixed view of IGAD, relations between the two bodies have been defined by cowardice.

Before 2013, the GRSS had regarded IGAD as a buddy and a caring organisation. However, the events of 15 December 2013 and the overwhelming of
government troops by the rebels, the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), which made the GRSS call in the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), significantly changed the context of GRSS–IGAD relations. President Salva Kiir later admitted to Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni that “Uganda is a friend indeed and that without your intervention, my government would have gone, and I sincerely thank you for this.”

Uganda’s role as interested party

As violence intensified in South Sudan, Museveni sent troops to support Kiir. Uganda has remained a staunch ally and has often sought to benefit financially and politically from foreign military activities. Therefore, its deployment of soldiers to South Sudan should be seen in the same context (Schomerus, 2012, 114). Uganda’s intervention, which appeared initially as a one-off event with the dispatch of a company of UPDF soldiers to South Sudan to secure the evacuation of Ugandan citizens from the country (Kasaija, 2014, 1), turned out to be detailed and comprehensive and involved securing critical infrastructures, protecting Ugandan nationals (Clottey, 2014), and fighting the rebels in and around Bor, the capital of Jonglei. Controversial methods were used, including aerial bombardment involving the use of cluster bombs. The UPDF fought alongside the government army, the SPLA, but Uganda’s intervention was associated with attempted rebel advances from South Bor towards Juba city. Also, the UPDF provided the GRSS with advisers and logistical support. Its main base was near Juba airport, but soldiers were also stationed in Bor and Nisitu to guard vital installations, including the main trade route to Uganda, the Juba–Nimule highway (Sudan Tribune, 2014). However, as the conflict escalated, Ugandan troops were increased to an estimated level of between 2,000 and 5,000 soldiers.

Uganda’s link to the conflict in South Sudan has made Kampala a belligerent party who is more focused on securing its interests in-country than on the Addis Ababa peace talks (Crisis Group, 2015). It therefore had no representative among the special envoys (from Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan) appointed by the IGAD Council of Ministers in December 2013. Uganda is seen by many as the kingmaker in Juba (Vlassenroot et al., 2012, 236). However, political indecisiveness, displeasure with the options on the table, and relative acceptance of the status quo meant that Uganda’s military influence did not translate into the regional political leadership needed to end a conflict that could not be won on the battlefield (Crisis Group, 2015). Uganda’s posture is shaped by deep animosity towards Sudan and visceral dislike of former South Sudan vice president and head of the SPLM/A-IO, Dr Riek Machar. At the same time, officials would often disparage Kiir’s government. While the intervention was an endeavour of military friendship, it involved a lot of economic interests, as the GRSS is alleged to have paid USD $800 million to the government of Uganda for the intervention package.

The UPDF’s involvement in South Sudan’s bloody civil war raises enormous questions over whether it was a legitimate undertaking or driven by other parochial interests. The Ugandan government argues that it intervened to secure vital
installations to rescue its nationals, who were trapped in the conflict. However, the same Uganda government argues it was invited by the GRSS to intervene, with authorisation from IGAD. The claim that the actions were taken to “rescue trapped Ugandans” (Kasaija, 2014, 7) was popular in Uganda especially in the official circles (Mugerwa and Nalugo, 2014; Walusimbi, 2014).

There is no basis in existing international protocol or treaty that authorises a foreign country to just send troops to another country to rescue its nationals. The UN Charter provides some leeway for military intervention to be done by members of the UN after it has been sanctioned by the UN Security Council. In the case of South Sudan, Uganda’s intervention seems to have gone beyond rescuing Ugandans caught up in the fighting. The announcement that the UPDF was fighting alongside GRSS forces against the rebel troops supporting Machar clearly violates the requirement of proportionality, which demands that action taken must not be excessive. The UPDF fighting on behalf of one of the factions in the conflict points to an abuse of this state practice, as there exists no right of states to rescue their nationals caught up in conflicts mainly because such a right is subject to abuse.

A democratically elected government such as South Sudan’s has the legitimate authority to carry out state functions, including inviting another country’s forces to come to its aid if its legitimacy is challenged (Kasaija, 2014, 6). However, in such a situation the agreement to be of any legal effect must be clearly established; really expressed (which precludes merely presumed consent); internationally attributable to the state; and anterior to the commission of the act to which it refers (United Nations, 1999, para. 234). In the case of South Sudan, the GRSS had been democratically elected and is the only legitimate government. Wherever the incumbent government controls the political apparatus of the state, it may request external assistance or even military intervention to assist it in maintaining control of the state (Wippman, 1996, 228). Shaw (2003, 23) has observed: “It would appear that in general, aid to the government authorities to repress a revolt is perfectly legitimate, provided of course it was requested by the government.” The example of France’s intervention in Mali in 2013, upon the invitation of the interim transitional government of Mali, to halt the advance of the Islamic jihadists who were threatening to take over the capital Bamako came in handy (Bannelier and Christakis, 2013, 856; Coco, Kaboré, and Maillart, 2013, 91).

The UN General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the UN states that “No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State” (United Nations General Assembly, 1970, 123). This would presuppose that a state’s intervention in a civil war in another state is prohibited. However, while there exists the suggestion that intervention in a civil war on the side of the government at its request is unlawful, there is little support for this in practice (Chatham House, 2007). However, under the 1975 Wiesbaden Resolution on the Principle of Non-Intervention in Civil Wars (1975) of the Institute of International Law (IDI), which is non-binding, Uganda’s intervention in South Sudan was
illegal, as the resolution, in particular, prohibits third-party states from assisting parties to a civil war, such as “sending armed forces […] to any party to a civil war, or allowing them to be sent or to set out.” However, in practice, it only seems to prohibit intervention on the side of those opposing the government. Since Uganda intervened on the side of the GRSS, its intervention was viewed as legal.

The debate about the justification for the intervention of Ugandan troops in South Sudan continues. There are claims and counterclaims about the purported letter from Kiir to Museveni requesting the intervention (Arinaitwe, 2014; Tajuba, 2014). Also, there has been a reference to the military pact signed by GRSS Uganda, which came after the UPDF had already started fighting in South Sudan alongside the troops of President Salva Kiir. However, the interesting twist is the claim by the Ugandan government officials that the invitation was with IGAD’s approval, and consent of the member states of IGAD (Mukisa, 2014, 5). Closely related is the claim that Uganda’s intervention in South Sudan was justified under the IGAD Peace and Security Mechanism (Musisi, 2014, 8). Arguably, IGAD commended Uganda’s intervention only to help secure critical infrastructure and installations but did not authorise it to intervene in the bloody conflict. The wording of IGAD’s 27 December 2013 communiqué does not suggest that the organisation intended to support Uganda’s intervention in South Sudan beyond what was stated (Kasaija, 2014, 10). It is a requirement of international law that agreements between states should be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of a treaty (United Nations, 1969). If IGAD had intended to support Uganda’s efforts beyond those stated in the communiqué, it should have stated so (Kasaija, 2014, 10).

Roles of IGAD and IGAD-Plus

South Sudan is the eighth member of the regional organisation. But the GRSS views IGAD as an enemy that is working for regime change in the nascent state. The expansion of the IGAD mediation initiative to the US, the UK, and Norway, known as the “Troika,” further complicated the relationship between the GRSS and IGAD. The GRSS views Western countries as yearning for regime change in the young nation. This view has been held for a very long time by the GRSS. Although the GRSS signed the peace deal on 26 August 2015, ending nearly three years of protracted war, it immediately backed out arguing that it had not signed the agreement willingly and in good faith which led to the continuation of the conflict. The president’s statement after signing the deal points to the existence of 22 reservations in the text that were to be attached to the agreement as an addendum. However, the US rightly rejected all the reservations after signing. Susan Rice, then the US national security adviser, was reported as saying “we do not recognize any reservations or addendums to that agreement” (Guardian, 2015).

With its rejection of the reservations to the peace agreement, the GRSS singled out the US as championing regime change. This allegation has led to worsening relations between the two countries and many ugly incidents have taken place at the US Embassy. In May 2016 “unknown gunmen” attacked the embassy
residence, killing the longest-serving security guard. On 7 July, a group of SPLA soldiers shot at a US diplomatic car, which was carrying seven diplomats, in the capital Juba. Luckily, the diplomats survived because the car was armoured and bulletproof (Radio Tamazuj, 2016).

The GRSS views Western nations as advocates of regime change in South Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 2016; Alfonse, 2016). The regime change phobia is dominantly present in the GRSS’s perception of IGAD’s role. For example, the IGAD Council of Ministers met in Nairobi on 11 July at the 56th extraordinary session on South Sudan, and demanded, among other things, the re-opening of Juba International Airport to be protected by regional forces. It also asked for urgent revision of the UNMISS mandate to establish an intervention brigade and increase numbers of troops from the region to secure Juba (Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 2016). This resolution sent a wave of protests against placing South Sudan under trusteeship to the GRSS, leading Kiir to sack the deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr Cirino Hiteng, arguing that he failed to reject IGAD’s demands. Hiteng was nominated as deputy minister on an SPLM Former Political Detainees (FPDs) ticket, in accordance with the ARCISS power-sharing formula. His sacking by Kiir contradicted the peace deal. But it is imperative to note that Kiir’s swift action was influenced by the thinking that IGAD was slowly taking over South Sudan to manage it as a trustee. Kiir revealed this in an interview with Al Jazeera on 12 July 2016. “I am just like a child being ordered by everybody” (Ndushabandi, 2016), he said, referring to IGAD’s strongly worded communiqué. Furthermore, Kiir expressed fears and frustrations on the survivability of the peace agreement after the July 2016 skirmishes (Ndushabandi, 2016).

However, the IGAD Heads of State and Government meeting in Kigali, Rwanda, resolved to send regional troops to South Sudan to help protect civilians and vital installations. This final resolution of IGAD Heads of State and Government reiterated what the 56th extraordinary session of Council of Ministers had said. Nonetheless, the GRSS argued that it had been let down by IGAD and felt isolated as a member state. Makuei accused IGAD member states of supporting military intervention in South Sudan. He argued that IGAD had been supporting Machar, with whom they were in daily contact. Makuei warned that South Sudan was also capable of supporting proxy rebellions in IGAD member states and of causing havoc. Above all, he indicated that all IGAD member states had their problems and their own rebels, not just South Sudan (Wol, 2016).

Role(s) of regional actors

Ethiopia is an important player in regional politics, has military power, and can be a stabilising and potentially destabilising factor. The country has long-standing ties with the SPLM but also links through shared border communities (e.g. the Nuer–Nuer relationship in the Gambella region) and hosts South Sudanese refugees. Not only did Ethiopia host the negotiations on the South Sudan political crisis and ensure the ARCISS was signed, it remains a key player, given its hegemonic drive, including being chair of IGAD, a position it has held since 2006.
In the same vein, it chairs the IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism and the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). Ambassador Mesfin, the chair of the three special envoys, is an Ethiopian and Tedros Adanhom, the country’s foreign minister, was on the IGAD fact-finding mission that visited Juba immediately after the outbreak of violence in 2013. Ethiopia hosted Machar but backed away from hosting him after the July 2016 political violence. Ethiopia is a major troop-contributing country in peacekeeping missions for Sudan and South Sudan, UNISFA, and the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Ethiopia is also the leader of the Regional Protection Force that was sanctioned by UNSC Resolution Number 2304 to stabilise South Sudan.

Ethiopia has economic, security, and strategic interests in South Sudan that relate partly to power generation from a dam 40 km from the border and an oil refinery that should supply Ethiopia with refined fuels from Pagak in South Sudan. There are also other projects such as the construction of the Gambella–Pagak–Paloch road to connect the two countries, in particular, to ferry fuels to Ethiopia. Whether these projects will be viable or not it will depend on the resources the two countries commit. Moreover, the nexus between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the question of Islamic extremists infiltrating the region, will remain of interest not only to Ethiopia but also to IGAD and Western countries, and Ethiopia will be a key player in the fight against terror.

However, Ethiopia must deal with the growing perception that it supports Machar’s rebellion and should make sure that resolution of South Sudanese political impasse is not only seen as an Ethiopia-led initiative but an IGAD-Plus one by encouraging consensus among the parties through reassuring statements. Ethiopians have numerous investments in South Sudan, particularly in the hospitality sector. However, Ethiopia would be acting in South Sudan’s interests – and particularly the GRSS’s broad interests – when it supports the Ethiopian stand on the Grand Renaissance Dam. This is a long-running standoff in hydro-politics between Egypt and Ethiopia.

Sudan is regarded as the “mother” of all the problems relating to the independence of South Sudan. It has been alleged that since its independence, Sudan has endeavoured to ensure South Sudan has been in a state of perpetual instability to demonstrate that it cannot govern itself. Following the outbreak of violence in South Sudan, the Sudanese president, Omar al- Bashir, visited Juba in what analysts described as a ritual act rather than one of substance. With vast knowledge of the country, Sudan has the potential to play both positive and negative role(s).

Sudan has expertise and military resilience, but also great economic interest related to the flow of oil, because it hosts oil infrastructure. The Abyei issue is one of the outstanding post-referendum issues. The country has genuine political and security interests that relate to the un-demarcated border and proxy wars involving various armed opposition groups in both South Sudan and Sudan.

Sudan’s role is of course contingent on links between and among political groupings of the National Congress Party, SPLA, SPLM, M23, and the Sudanese Revolutionary Force – the opposition force in Sudan. In short, Sudan has
unfinished business with South Sudan, emanating from the CPA and, ironically, it now hosts numerous South Sudanese refugees.

Sudan has played a critical role in conflict resolution in South Sudan. Gen. El-Dabi, the retired Sudanese diplomat-cum-military officer, is serving as a third special envoy in IGAD’s mediation initiative. On several occasions, South Sudan officials have called for the expulsion of Khartoum’s representatives from peace talks, claiming that South Sudanese rebels are being trained, armed, and controlled by Sudan.5

Kenya has political, security, economic, and cultural interests and historical links with South Sudan and the whole push for a regional integration process in the sub-region. The country remains important, having hosted the CPA process; but, also, the first IGAD summit on the crisis was held at the country’s state house on 27 December 2013. Apart from Gen. Sumbeiywo, the country has a special envoy to South Sudan, Dalmas Otieno. The former minister was among the first international delegation that called on Juba when the conflict broke out on 15 December. The country is also the IGAD rapporteur.

Kenya is a troop-contributing country to UNMISS. About 1,000 Kenyan soldiers serve in the mission, deployed in Bhar el Ghazal in South Sudan. Kenya is willing to contribute more soldiers for the mission. Kenya not only has a regional integration, economic, trade, and business agenda in Juba, including the Lamu Port–South Sudan–Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor Project, but also Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta wishes to portray himself as a regional powerbroker. Kenyatta was not only instrumental in the release of 11 political detainees, but he was also ready to receive and host them at the state house upon their release. At present, some of the FPDs are hosted in Kenya, in addition to hosting numerous South Sudanese refugees. Several high-ranking officials in South Sudan not only have their families living in Nairobi but also businesses located in the city. South Sudanese elites also patronise health facilities in Nairobi. Furthermore, there are a lot of South Sudanese in Kenya’s institutions of higher learning, including refugees, in addition to having cultural links through shared border communities.

Conclusion

Relations between the GRSS and IGAD have been characterised by cowardly action on the part of the former. Relations have been characterised by blame, tension, and suspicion. South Sudan’s behaviour is one of a coward state. It agreed to sign a peace agreement and immediately backtracked, pointing the finger at the international community for pressuring its president into signing. South Sudan’s relations with IGAD are rather ambivalent, friendly but characterised by suspicion and tension. According to the GRSS, IGAD is a friend indeed because of Uganda’s intervention in South Sudan’s conflicts, with soldiers fighting alongside Kiir in December 2013. However, the GRSS views the same relationship with suspicion, given perceptions that IGAD-Plus is allegedly seeking regime change in South Sudan. Moreover, regional powers such
as Ethiopia, Sudan, and Kenya have their own varied interests in the South Sudanese political debacle.

With South Sudan being far from an ideal neoliberal peace implementation case, relations between South Sudan and IGAD could get worse. The best way to improve working relations between South Sudan and IGAD is for South Sudan to develop trust mechanisms and build confidence within itself to relate on a sincere basis with both IGAD and IGAD-Plus. Given that IGAD or IGAD-Plus mediate in South Sudan’s conflicts, the GRSS should avoid its cowardly perspective to their relationship and implement the provisions of ARCISS to the letter and spirit. At the same time, IGAD or IGAD-Plus should close loopholes where the GRSS views it as not impartial. For instance, the intervention of UPDF soldiers during the political crisis of 15 December, with the blessings of the IGAD Heads of State and Government, brought into question the credibility and impartiality of the IGAD member states. Although this seems to be a positive achievement for the GRSS, the intervention is seriously detested by South Sudanese people. The chapter hereby recommends further research to exhaustively document and analyse the relationship between the GRSS and the Troika countries in the voyage of implementing the August 2015 peace agreement.

Notes

1 The IPF largely comprises IGAD’s donor partners and has three levels of membership: ministerial, ambassadorial, and technical. The IPF is currently co-chaired by the Italian government and comprises the following members: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, the US, the European Commission, the International Organization for Migration, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the World Bank.

2 Kiir’s Speech during the third anniversary of independence, 9 July 2014, at Dr John Garang’s Mausoleum.

3 The full text of the non-intervention resolution can be found at http://www.idi iil.org/id i/resolutionsE/1975_wies_03_en.pdf.

4 Senior Presidential Advisor, Nhial Deng Nhial’s press statement after Kigali’s meeting.

5 South Sudan’s Deputy Ambassador to Kenya James P. Morgan claimed in an interview with the Kenyan newspaper Daily Nation [What is the full reference for this?] that South Sudanese rebels were being trained, armed, and controlled by Khartoum. The diplomat also called for its [What does its refer to?] expulsion from the IGAD mediation team.

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