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Edited by Julia Wilker

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Maintaining Peace and Interstate Stability in Archaic and Classical Greece

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Ernst Baltrusch, Kai Brodersen, Peter Funke,
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Studien zur Alten Geschichte

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JW

Abbreviations

- ABC *Assyrian and Babylonian Chronicles*, ed. A.K. Grayson, Locust Valley, N.Y. 1975.
- CIG *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum*, Berlin 1828-1877.
- CPG *Clavis Patrum Graecorum*, ed. M. Geerard, Turnhout 1974-1987.
- DK *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, eds. H. Diels and W. Kranz, Berlin ¹¹1964.
- FGrH *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, ed. Felix Jacoby, Leiden 1923-1958.
- IG *Inscriptiones Graecae*, Berlin 1873ff.
- ML *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.*, eds. Russell Meiggs and David Lewis, Oxford ²1988.
- RO *Greek Historical Inscriptions: 404-323 BC*, eds. Peter J. Rhodes and Robin Osborne, Oxford 2003.
- SIG *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*, ed. Wilhelm Dittenberger, Leipzig ²1898-1909.
- StV *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums. Vol. 2: Die Verträge der griechisch-römischen Welt von 700 bis 338*, eds. Hermann Bengtson and Robert Werner, Munich – Berlin ²1975.
- Tod *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century BC*, ed. Marcus N. Tod, Oxford ²1946-1950.

Introduction

Julia Wilker

The topic of war and peace has come into the focus of scholarly discussions again in recent years.¹ This volume presents the contributions to a symposium held on May 9th, 2009 at the Humanities Center at Harvard and was generously funded by the Volkswagen Foundation.² The symposium focused on the question of how peace was established and kept as well as the ways and means the ancient Greeks developed to prevent war and maintain interstate stability. In this context, different perspectives and approaches, ranging from pragmatic political goals and the definition and interpretation of key terms such as *eirene* to the underlying norms and their relevance for the *realpolitik*, were discussed.

“No one is so foolish as to choose war over peace. In peace sons bury their fathers, in war fathers bury their sons.”³

This basic truth is ascribed by Herodotus to Croesus who – after his devastating defeat against the Persians – finally realizes the foolishness and unjustness of his previous actions. War in general is depicted here as a perversion of the right order – and one might conclude that avoidance, even abomination of war is not only advisable, but inherent in human qualities in general.⁴ That peace was highly valued in ancient Greece is evident already in the earliest texts available to us. Although the *Iliad* abundantly glorifies the belligerent ideal, the horrors of war are not concealed either, as it is most prominently demonstrated by Zeus, who insults Ares:

1 Cf. i.a. Ostwald 1996. Momigliano 1998. Raaflaub – Rosenstein (eds.) 1999. Amouretti et al. (eds.) 2000. Sordi (ed.) 2001. van Wees 2001. Chanotis 2005. Meißner – Schmitt – Sommer (eds.) 2005. Raaflaub (ed.) 2007. Rocchi (ed.) 2007. Raaflaub 2009. Raaflaub 2010. See also Keil 1916. Caldwell 1919. Nestle 1938. Bickerman 1944. Zampaglione 1973. Arnould 1981. Melko – Weigel 1981. Schmitt 1983. Grassl 1984. Kienast 1985. Sordi (ed.) 1985. Erxleben (ed.) 1987. Binder – Effe (eds.) 1989. Spiegel 1990. Whitby 1991. Graeber 1992.

2 The paper by Kurt Raaflaub was published elsewhere, cf. Raaflaub 2009. Raaflaub 2010.

3 Hdt. 1.87.4. οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὕτω ἀνόητος ἐστὶ ὅστις πόλεμον πρὸ εἰρήνης αἰρέεται: ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῇ οἱ παῖδες τοὺς πατέρας θάπτουσι, ἐν δὲ τῷ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας. Translation A.D. Goodley. Cf. also Hermocrates in Polyb. 12.26.8 (apud Timaios).

4 For similar sayings cf. Hdt. 8.3.1; Thuc. 1.80-85, 2.61.1, 4.59.2, 62.2. Cf. Cobet 1986, 7.

“Most hateful to me art thou of all gods that hold Olympus, for ever is strife dear to thee and wars and fightings.”⁵

In contrast, eulogies of peace are widespread in the literature of the archaic period. In the *Odyssey*, for instance, Achilles confesses to Odysseus that he would gladly trade the glory of a dead hero for a bare life among the lowest social ranks, thus underlining the value of life *per se*. Shortly afterwards, however, the hero cannot resist to ask the visiting Odysseus if his son Neoptolemus succeeds in meeting the high expectations on the son of the warrior Achilles.⁶

Peace is praised even more explicitly by Hesiod. In the *Theogony*, Eirene is presented as one of the Horai together with Dike and Eunomia and is therefore shown as a requirement as well as a guarantee of a good life.⁷ This conjunction between peace and justice can also be seen in the *Works and Days*, where Zeus and Dike reward the just city with peace and prosperity.⁸ Pindar accordingly describes Eirene as “guardian of wealth for men”.⁹ These few examples already demonstrate that the ancient Greeks draw a clear difference between war and peace and considered this difference as crucial for the well being of the individual as well as for the success of a community. Equally evident, however, is the ambivalence of the very term *eirene* that was used to describe peace inside a community as well as peaceful relations and co-existence with other *poleis* and could imply both the simple absence of war and violence as well as a more idyllic state comprising and entailing prosperity and justice.

The Greeks, of course, were fully aware of the power of war to shape interstate relations and the significant impact it could have on communities, as is famously demonstrated by Heraclitus’ dictum that war is the father of all things.¹⁰ However, the appreciation of peace and the reality of wars also nudged the Greeks to develop a whole set of instruments to prevent, to limit and to end violent conflicts. In fact, already both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* depict

⁵ *Il.* 5.890. ἔχθιστος δέ μοί ἐσσι θεῶν οἱ Ὀλυμπον ἔχουσιν: αἰεὶ γὰρ τοι ἔρις τε φίλη πόλεμοί τε μάχαι τε. Translation A.T. Murray. For Ares see also *Il.* 5.757-763, 830-835, 9.63-64. Cf. also the description of the horrors of war by Hector and Andromache in *Il.* 6.407-460 and the comparison between the city in peace and the city in war on the shield of Achilles (*Il.* 18.490-540).

⁶ *Od.* 11. 488-494. For more critical traditions regarding the Trojan War cf. Scodel 2008.

⁷ Hes. *Theog.* 901-903.

⁸ Hes. *Op.* 224-228. Raaflaub 2010, 598.

⁹ Pindar, *Ol.* 13,7-8. ταμί ἀνδράσι πλούτου. Cf. also *Od.* 24,486. *Anth. Lyr.*² *Carm. Pop.* frg. 1 (Diehl). Bacchyl. frg. 4, 61-72 (Snell).

¹⁰ Heraclitus frg. 53 (Diels/Kranz). Cf. also Cleinias in Plato’s *Nomoi* (626a) on permanent, but undeclared war between all *poleis*.

a variety of solutions to settle a conflict, even though on different levels and under different circumstances.¹¹ From earliest Greek history on, duels, negotiations and truces were used to limit the sorrows of war, and treaties and alliances were concluded in order to restore peace and to prevent future conflicts either by stipulations or by deterrence.¹² Other states tried to maintain security by pursuing a policy of neutrality.¹³ While these instruments neither could nor were intended to ban war altogether from the Greek world, they nevertheless constituted a basic framework of rules and instruments explicitly or implicitly designed to prevent or to end the most violent and harmful conflicts.

However, new developments in the fifth century changed the rule of politics to an extent previously unknown. The Persian campaign under Xerxes posed a new kind of threat to many Greek communities and thus caused an equally uncommon response. When some of the Greek *poleis* decided to join forces in order to counter the Persian aggression under Xerxes and founded the Hellenic League, the cities concluded individual treaties with Sparta as the leading power, but they also agreed to abandon or at least defer all conflicts with other members of the League, as Herodotus attests for the case of Aegina and Athens.¹⁴ Peace among the Greek cities thus became and was understood as a prerequisite to prevailing against a common and superior enemy. While this united movement was proudly celebrated in the aftermath of Xerxes' defeat, the emergence of Athens and Sparta as new superpowers in the wake of the Persian Wars changed the Greek world even more profoundly. The rise of the Delian League brought forth an alliance that constituted a novelty both in its form as a hegemonic *symmachia* as well as in regard to Athens' domination over its allies. The increasing conflict with Sparta that culminated in the Peloponnesian War caused even more significant changes.

For the Greek thinking about war and peace, the Peloponnesian War proved to be a pivotal experience. Due to their widespread alliances, most parts of Greece were drawn into the war between Athens and Sparta that hence went far beyond the geographic scope of former conflicts. The rapidly developing military technique and the long duration of the conflict caused major consequences for the general population, and the increasing ruthlessness and the

¹¹ Cf. the private settlement between Priam and Achilles in the *Iliad* and the re-establishment of peaceful order in Ithaca based on Odysseus' reconciliation with the relatives of the killed suitors in the *Odyssey*. Cf. Alonso 2007, 207.

¹² Cf., inter alia, Kiechle 1958. Piccirilli 1973. Adcock – Mosley 1975. Olshausen (ed.) 1979. Tausend 1992. Baltrusch 1994. Raaflaub 1997. Piccirilli 2002. Raaflaub 2009, esp. 239. Elmer and Bershadsky in this volume.

¹³ Alonso 2007, 208. For concepts of neutrality in later periods see Alonso 1987 and 2001.

¹⁴ Hdt. 7.145.1.

abundantly reported cruelties surpassed all previous experiences.¹⁵ In reaction to these experiences, yearning for peace spread, as it is most impressively evident in the Attic drama of these times. Thus, Euripides praises the eagerly awaited peace in his *Cresphontes*:

“Peace, with your depth of wealth, fairest of the blessed gods, I pine for you, so long you are in coming; I fear old age may overwhelm me with hardships before I can look upon your graceful beauty, your songs adorned with dancing, your garland-loving revels. Come, mistress, to my city! Ban from our homes the hateful Discord, and raging Strife that delights in whetted iron”.¹⁶

The same theme is explained in more detail by the Theban herald in his *Hiketides*:

“For whenever the city has to vote on the question of war, no man ever takes his own death into account, but shifts this misfortune on to another; but if death were before their eyes when they were giving their votes, Hellas would never rush to her doom in mad desire for battle. And yet each man among us knows which of the two to prefer, the good or ill, and how much better peace is for mankind than war, peace, the Muses’ dearest friend, the foe of Sorrow, whose joy is in glad throngs of children, and its delight in prosperity. These are the blessings we cast away and wickedly embark on war, man enslaving his weaker brother, and cities following suit.”¹⁷

¹⁵ Cf. Thuc. 1.231-232.

¹⁶ Eur. frg. 453 (*Cresphontes*). Εἰρήνα βαθύπλουτε καὶ καλλίστα μακάρων θεῶν, ζῆλος μοι σέθεν ὡς χρονίζεις, δέδοικα δὲ μὴ πρὶν πόνοις ὑπερβάλλῃ με γῆρας, πρὶν σὰν χαρίεσσαν προσιδεῖν ὄραν καὶ καλλιχόρους αἰοιδᾶς φιλοστεφάνους τε κόμους. ἴθι μοι, πότνα, πόλιν. τὰν δ’ ἐχθρὰν στάσιν εἶργ’ ἀπ’ οἴκων τὰν μαινομένην τ’ ἔριν θηκτῶ τερπομένην σιδάρῳ. Translation Chr. Collard – M. Cropp. Although this passage refers especially to internal strife and civil war, the general praise of peace was clearly understood as a comment on the current situation during the Archidamian War as well, cf. Harder 1985, 3f. 102f.

¹⁷ Eur. *Suppl.* 481-492. ὅταν γὰρ ἔλθῃ πόλεμος ἐς ψῆφον λεῶ, οὐδεὶς ἔθ’ αὐτοῦ θάνατον ἐκλογίζεται, τὸ δυστυχεὲς δὲ τοῦτ’ ἐς ἄλλον ἐκτρέπει· εἰ δ’ ἦν παρ’ ὄμμα θάνατος ἐν ψῆφου φορᾶ, οὐκ ἂν ποθ’ Ἑλλάς δοριμανῆς ἀπόλλυτο. καίτοι δυοῖν γε πάντες ἄνθρωποι λόγῳ τὸν κρείσσον ἴσμεν, καὶ τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ κακὰ, ὅσῳ τε πολέμου κρείσσον εἰρήνην βροτοῖς· ἢ πρῶτα μὲν Μούσαισι προσφιλεστάτη. Ποινάισι δ’ ἐχθρά, τέρπεται δ’ εὐπαιδία, χαίρει δὲ πλούτῳ. ταῦτ’ ἀφέντες οἱ κακοὶ πολέμου ἀναιρούμεσθα καὶ τὸν ἴσσονα δουλούμεθ’, ἄνδρες ἄνδρα καὶ πόλις πόλιν. Translation E.P. Coleridge. Cf. also Eur. *Tro.* 95-97. *Hel.* 1151-1160. For war and peace in drama in general see Zampaglione 1973, 71-82. Erxleben (ed.) 1987. Spiegel 1990, 93-111. Raaflaub 2001, 334-339.

This laudation of peace clearly takes up and expands the earlier traditions of praising *eirene* cited above; but Euripides also explicitly mentions the enticements that continuously mislead the citizens to ignore potential dangers and to strive for war. The same problems are addressed in an even more pointed manner in the comedies of Aristophanes. Dicaeopolis, the comic hero of the *Acharnians* (performed 425 BC), concludes a separate peace treaty with Sparta, while in Aristophanes' *Peace* even the gods leave Olympus to Polemos who holds the goddess Eirene captive.¹⁸ This widespread and intensive discussion about the issue of peace in Attic drama thus proves that the topic arose the interest of the public and was subject to heated debates among the citizens. And despite the fact that our evidence is rather limited, there is no compelling reason to assume that these thoughts and debates were confined to Athens.¹⁹

But even though peace had thus been established as a desirable value, the Greeks were reluctant to transform it into a political concept and implement it as a major goal of interstate politics. Even the devastating experiences of the Peloponnesian War had no immediate impact, neither in political actions nor in regard to the development of more effective instruments to avoid war in the future. Less than ten years after the capitulation of Athens in 404 BC, Sparta was again at war not only against the Persian Empire in Asia Minor, but also against a coalition led by Athens, Thebes and Corinth. And it is not until 392 BC that we hear of any serious attempts to end the war and to establish a more stable order of interstate relations. Eventually, in 386 BC the King's Peace was concluded as the first *koine eirene*²⁰ and peace was finally recognized as a legal status in interstate relations.²¹ The invention of the *koine eirene* was a watershed moment in the development of Greek thinking on peace and the combination of key terms such as *eirene*, *eleutheria* and *autonomia* continued to dominate the inter-political discourse and propaganda for the following decades. The increased significance of peace was also reflected in the establishment of a formal cult in Athens, presumably after peace agreement of 375 BC.²² The famous

¹⁸ See also the debates about peace in Aristoph. *Equ.* 634-673. 792-819. *Vesp.* 472-476. 666-685. 698-712, the joint lamentations of Athenians and Spartans in frg. 415, 420 (*Holkades*) and, of course, the *Lysistrata* of 411 BC; cf. Zampaglione 1973, 82-90. Exleben (ed.) 1987. Spiegel 1990, 112-125. Raaflaub 2001, 329-334.

¹⁹ Raaflaub 2010, 596f.

²⁰ For the *koine eirene* see esp. Ryder 1965. Jehne 1994. Wilker in this volume.

²¹ Cf. Polly Low in this volume.

²² Philochorus FGrH 328 F 151; Isocr. 15.109-110; Nep. *Timotheos* 2.2. Cf. also *SEG* 16.55 (29.88) and its discussion by Robert 1979 and Jehne 1994, 63 Anm. 93. The account of Plutarch (*Cimon* 13,6) that a cult for Eirene had already been established in the mid of the fifth century in order to celebrate the Peace of Callias has to be rejected; cf. Jacoby FGrH IIIb Suppl. I. 522-526. Suppl. II. 420-422.

statue of Cephisodotus in the Agora shows the goddess Eirene bearing the infant Ploutos, taking up the earlier traditions of the interdependence of peace and prosperity.²³

However, from its very beginning of existence the *koine eirene* as well as related prominent catchwords such as peace and autonomy were employed and misused by the hegemonic and ambitious *poleis* in order to establish or strengthen their dominant position in power politics.²⁴ Despite the recognition of peace not only as a legal, but also as the preferable relationship between states,²⁵ war continued to be understood as an inevitable element of interstate relations,²⁶ as it was already stated by Herodotus' Croesus who ends his lamentation cited at the very beginning with the verdict:

“But I suppose it was dear to the divinity that this be so.”²⁷

It is therefore by no surprise that these ambivalences in ideology, meaning and pragmatic power politics are reflected in contemporary political theory. While Plato and Aristotle are mostly concerned with peace and justice inside the *polis*, a comprehensive approach to peace in inter-political affairs is virtually absent from their writings. Both philosophers regarded a world without war as entirely utopian and only offer some thoughts on how armed conflicts could be temporarily avoided or limited in scope.²⁸ Nevertheless, our sources do offer some traces of new perspectives on peace that went beyond the scope of the tradi-

²³ Paus. 1.8.2, 9.16.2. La Rocca 1974. Jung 1976. Simon 1986, 702 no. 8. Simon 1988, 12-16.

²⁴ For the ambivalence of the term *eirene* esp. in fourth century BC see Polly Low in this volume.

²⁵ For war as a deviation from the just and good order see already Solon frg. 4 (West). Anonymus Iamblichi frg. 89.6.4 (Diels/Kranz), cf. Raaflaub 2010, 598-600.

²⁶ Heraclitus frg. 67 (Diels/Kranz).

²⁷ Hdt. 1.87.4. ἀλλὰ τὰυτὰ δαίμοσι κου φίλον ἦν οὕτω γενέσθαι. Translation A.D. Godley.

²⁸ See, for instance, Plat. *Leg.* 628d-e: “With regard to the well-being of a state or an individual, that man will never make a genuine statesman who pays attention primarily solely to the needs of foreign warfare, nor will he make a finished lawgiver unless he designs his legislation for peace rather than his peace legislation for war.” (πρὸς πόλεως εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ καὶ ἰδιώτου διανοοῦμενος οὕτω τις οὐτ’ ἂν ποτε πολιτικὸς γένοιτο ὀρθῶς, πρὸς τὰ ἔξωθεν πολεμικὰ ἀποβλέπων μόνον καὶ πρῶτον, οὐτ’ ἂν νομοθέτης ἀκριβής, εἰ μὴ χάριν εἰρήνης τὰ πολέμου νομοθετοῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολεμικῶν ἕνεκα τὰ τῆς εἰρήνης. Translation R.G. Bury. Cf. also the states not affected by war in Plato *Rep.* 2,372d1-3 (“city of pigs”) und Aristot. *Pol.* 7.2.1324b41-1325a5. For Plato and Aristotle on war and peace see Nestle 1938, 28-31. Zampaglione 1973, 54-64. Cambiano 1985. Spiegel 1990, 190-210. Ostwald 1996.

tional praises of *eirene*. While peace in general, as we have seen, was positively connoted throughout Greek history, the definition and meaning of the term did change over the course of the centuries and was subject to the political and/or economic objectives implicitly or explicitly tied to it.²⁹ And although the benefits of peace in general were never disputed,³⁰ the relevance attributed to maintaining or creating peace differed compared to other ambitions.³¹ On the other hand, the explanations why peace, in fact, has to be regarded as a state worth striving for, multiplied and became increasingly elaborate. The benefits of peace for the individual as well as for the community were given more and more priority and a utilitarian approach towards peace was promoted, like the one Xenophon presented in his *Poroi*:

“For I presume that those states are reckoned the happiest that enjoy the longest period of unbroken peace; and of all states Athens is by nature most suited to flourish in peace. For if the state is tranquil, what class of men will not need her? Ship-owners and merchants will head the list. Then there will be those rich in corn and wine and oil and cattle; men possessed of brains and money to invest; craftsmen and professors and philosophers; poets and the people who make use of their works; those to whom anything sacred or secular appeals that is worth seeing or hearing. Besides, where will those who want to buy or sell many things quickly meet with better success in their efforts than at Athens? (...) If, on the other hand, any one supposes that financially war is more profitable to the state than peace, I really do not know how the truth of this can be tested better than by considering once more what has been the experience of our state in the past. He will find that in old days a very great amount of money was paid into the treasury in time of peace, and that the whole of it was spent in time of war.”³²

²⁹ Cf. Polly Low and Maria Brosius in this volume.

³⁰ Cf. the differentiation between a real peace (*εἰρήνη*) and a truce (*σπονδαί*) by Andocides; see Julia Wilker in this volume.

³¹ So (explicitly) Polybios 4.31.3-4: “I admit, indeed, that war is a terrible thing; but it is less terrible than to submit to anything whatever in order to avoid it. For what is the meaning of our fine talk about equality of rights, freedom of speech, and liberty, if the one important thing is peace?” (*ἐγὼ γὰρ φοβερὸν μὲν εἶναί φημι τὸν πόλεμον, οὐ μὴν οὕτω γε φοβερὸν ὥστε πᾶν ὑπομένειν χάριν τοῦ μὴ προσδέξασθαι πόλεμον. ἐπεὶ τί καὶ θρασύνομεν τὴν ἰσηγορίαν καὶ παρρησίαν καὶ τὸ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ὄνομα πάντες, εἰ μὴδὲν ἔσται προυργαίτερον τῆς εἰρήνης;* Translation E.S. Shuckburgh). Similar thoughts can be found in Eur. *Troad*. 400-403, cf. Kienast 1985, 14f.

³² Xen. *Poroi* 5.2-4, 11-12. *εὐδαιμονέσταται μὲν γὰρ δήπου πόλεις λέγονται, αἱ ἂν πλεῖστον χρόνον ἐν εἰρήνῃ διατελώσι: πασῶν δὲ πόλεων Ἀθηναίη μάλιστα πεφύκασιν ἐν εἰρήνῃ αὐξεσθαι. τίνες γὰρ ἡσυχίαν ἀγούσης τῆς πόλεως οὐ προσδέονται ἂν αὐτῆς ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ ναυκλήρων καὶ ἐμπόρων; οὐχ οἱ πολύστιτοι, οὐχ οἱ πολύτινοι [οὐχ οἱ*

In the following, Xenophon argues that a more active policy of peace could help Athens to regain its leading role in Greece as well as the goodwill of the other *poleis* – and even spare the massive expenses an expansion based upon force would cost.³³ Peace therefore gained further legitimacy and was not regarded as a hindrance to the success in foreign policy anymore.³⁴ Alternative approaches to ban war at least from mainland Greece were also brought forward by the growing panhellenic movement.³⁵ However, appeals to common values and norms, references to written and/or unwritten laws and treaties³⁶ as well as common or individual benefits³⁷ were not mutually exclusive, but rather complemented each other in the public discourse.

As it has been demonstrated, peace was recognized as a significantly positive value from the early Greek history on. While the Greeks considered war as a constituent of politics, modern scholarship has in recent decades almost unanimously and rightly rejected the thesis that war was the normal, even the natural state of interstate relations in ancient history.³⁸ Even in antiquity war was only one option among many.³⁹ Therefore, “peace” has to be regarded as an equally important factor – as a political catchword, a value open to a whole variety of definitions, and a goal, that was hard to achieve, but worth a try. The ambivalence and wide range of possible meanings and employments of the term *εirene*, the precariousness of peace and the very fact that based on our sources, war sometimes seems to have been a ubiquitous factor in ancient politics make it even more difficult to assess “peace” as a topic in modern scholarship. The present volume therefore aims to focus on the ways and means the

ἡδύοινοι; τί δὲ οἱ πολυέλατοι, τί δὲ οἱ πολυπρόβατοι, οἱ δὲ γνώμη καὶ ἀργυρίῳ δυνάμενοι χρηματίζεσθαι; καὶ μὴν χειροτέχναι τε καὶ σοφισταὶ καὶ φιλόσοφοι, οἱ δὲ ποιηταί, οἱ δὲ τὰ τούτων μεταχειριζόμενοι, οἱ δὲ ἀξιουθεάτων ἢ ἀξιακούστων ἱερῶν ἢ ὀσίων ἐπιθυμοῦντες; ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οἱ δεόμενοι πολλὰ ταχὺ ἀποδίδοσθαι ἢ πρίασθαι ποῦ τούτων μᾶλλον ἂν τύχοιεν ἢ Ἀθήνησιν; (...) εἰ δέ τις αὖ εἰς χρήματα κερδαλέωτερον νομίζει εἶναι τῆ πόλει πόλεμον ἢ εἰρήνην, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἶδα πῶς ἂν ἄμεινον ταῦτα κριθεῖη ἢ εἴ τις τὰ προγεγενημένα ἐπανασκοπήῃ τῆ πόλει πῶς ἀποβέβηκεν. εὐρήσει γὰρ τό τε παλαιὸν ἐν εἰρήνῃ μὲν πάνυ πολλὰ χρήματα εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἀνερχθέντα, ἐν πολέμῳ δὲ πάντα ταῦτα καταδαπανηθέντα. Translation E.C. Marchant.

³³ Xen. *Poroi* 5.5-10. A similar argument is brought forward by Isocrates in his *On the Peace* (esp. Isocr. 8.19-26).

³⁴ Cf. Polly Low in this volume.

³⁵ Flower 2000.

³⁶ Cf. Peter Hunt in this volume.

³⁷ See above; Xen. *Vect.* 5.5-10; Isocr. 8.19-26.

³⁸ See Keil 1916, esp. S. 7-9; cf. also Vernant 1987, 31f. 45. Momigliano 1998, 243f. Bernand 1999, 214f.

³⁹ Cf. especially Santi Amantini 1979-1980. Schmitt 1983, 33. Meier 1990, 561f. 588. Baltrusch 2008, 7. 22-23. 103.

Greeks developed and employed in order to prevent wars, to stabilize interstate relations and to keep peace during the archaic and classical periods. In this context, emphasis is given to the premises, contents and relevance of such policies as well as the political discourse related to the issues at stake. In order to understand the forms and modes of Greek peace policies, the various strategies and ways of implementation have to be analyzed – ranging from a restriction of military actions⁴⁰ and diplomatic efforts⁴¹ to legally binding agreements and more comprehensive concepts of peacekeeping and inter-political stabilization.⁴² In this context, shared values and commonly accepted terms are of special importance as they are essential for a settlement between conflicting parties.⁴³

As it is only appropriate for a volume dealing with questions of war and peace in the Greek world, the first contribution by David Elmer deals with the *Iliad* and analyzes the famous duel of Menelaos and Alexander in the third and fourth book that was aimed to end the conflict and to prevent further bloodshed. In this context, the poet vividly describes the soldiers' hopes for an end of the war regardless of their origin, thus merging the two parties into one community of shared interest. This new community is symbolized in particular by the ritual oath made by Priam and Agamemnon, where the obligatory sanctionary clause is attributed not to Agamemnon, but anonymously to "someone" (*tis*) from the ranks of the Trojans and the Achaeans. In the framework of the Homeric narrative, such a *tis*-speech signifies a collective bipartisan statement, thus underlining the unity created by the shared hope for peace. However, the community across the battle lines was only temporary and the peaceful consensus broke up immediately as Alexander was secretly carried away by Aphrodite leaving the parties in disagreement about the outcome of the duel.

While the *Iliad* undoubtedly ranks among the most influential epos regarding heroic war traditions even beyond the scope of classical antiquity, the following article also deals with the development and revitalization of traditions. Natasha Bershadsky examines the relations between Sparta and Argos. She argues that in the archaic period, these relations were constructed around a myth of an Argive-Spartan conflict over the Thyreatis. The accompanying practice of recurrent ritual battles is reflected in Herodotus' description of a battle between the two *poleis* (Hdt. 1.82). This ritual fell into oblivion after the Spartan annexation of Cynuria in the sixth century, but the Argives asked for its

⁴⁰ See David Elmer and Natasha Bershadsky in this volume.

⁴¹ See Sarah Bolmarcich in this volume.

⁴² See Peter Hunt, Julia Wilker and Maria Brosius in this volume.

⁴³ See David Elmer, Polly Low and Peter Hunt in this volume.

reinstatement during the peace negotiations of 420 BC. The reactivation of this ritual suited the interest of the oligarchic party in Argos that hoped to gain further legitimacy in the internal conflicts and to counter the anti-Spartan propaganda of the democratic faction.

The role of diplomacy in the Peloponnesian War is in the focus of Sarah Bolmarcich's contribution. She shows that, according to Thucydides' account, the negotiations between Sparta and Athens right before the outbreak of the war oscillated between unrealistic and more pragmatic claims of both parties. Due to the process of the argument, however, both sides must in fact have been sure that their demands would not be met and thus inevitably headed for war. The Melian Dialogue, on the other hand, demonstrates how diplomatic negotiations were run under the overwhelming military dominance of Athens. Here, the self-confidence and arrogance of the Athenians declared real negotiations doomed to failure from the very beginning. In this context, diplomacy is therefore not a way to prevent war, but only suitable to delay its outbreak.

My own article deals with the emergence of the *koine eirene*-idea and the first attempt to establish an interstate agreement based on the principles of a Common Peace in the negotiations of 392/391 BC. Although the Athenian assembly rejected the peace proposal at that time, the idea of a Common Peace, based on the right of autonomy for all *poleis* and intended to last forever, revolutionized Greek interstate relations. However, the emergence of this idea was not only a result of an increasing war-weariness on all sides. The Athenian *arche*, the Peloponnesian War and Sparta's hegemonic policy in its aftermath had made clear that a comprehensive order was necessary to maintain interstate stability. As a multi-party peace treaty of unlimited term the proposal of 392/391 BC constituted an innovative approach, but also has to be regarded as a consequence of previous experiences.

Polly Low focuses on the question what *eirene* in fact meant for the Greeks in the late classical period. In an inscription probably dated to 362/361 BC (RO 42), the Greeks justify their negative answer to a request for help by the rebellious Persian satraps with a praise of peace. This praise emphasizes the benefits of peace including happiness and prosperity for their own cities as well as political strength and the ability to help one's friends, thus demonstrating the ambiguity of the term peace and the significant differences between an idealized value and a legal status. Therefore, a peace treaty could well be regarded and favored as the basis of a new war against an outside party. Therefore, in Athens the newly established cult of Eirene was not seen as a contradiction to the revitalized military ambitions. On the other hand, several sources show that such a strictly functionalist interpretation of peace was not left unchallenged, thus proving an ongoing and vivid public debate about the meaning of peace

and its relevance as well as the relationship between policies of peace and power politics.

Peter Hunt discusses the role of legalism in interstate relations in the late classical period. Based upon the evidence of especially the symbouleutic speeches, he shows that legal regulations and clauses of treaties in particular bore more significance in the political discourse than it has been usually assumed in modern scholarship. The citation of clauses and treaties were of special importance in public debates; war could only be waged if a former treaty was nullified. At the same time, the Greeks were well aware that interstate conflicts could be resolved peacefully based upon legal considerations and in fact considered these solutions as superior to war. This approach offers new perspectives on the character of Greek interstate relations in general and shows that war was by far not as ubiquitous and dominant as it is often assumed.

Finally, Maria Brosius focuses on the Greco-Persian relationship. In this context, an analysis of the relations inside the Achaemenid Empire between the Great King and the satraps helps to understand the Persian policy towards the Greek *poleis* especially in Ionia. While internal rebellions and other threats to the central power and the stability of the empire in general were subdued immediately, revolts in more remote provinces were mostly brought to an end by diplomatic means and mediators. A similar pattern applies to the Greco-Persian relations in general: while severe threats to the *Pax Persica* were countered by immediate military actions, a certain degree of autonomy and independence was granted to provinces at the fringes of the empire as long as they accepted the superiority of the Great King. The example of the city of Erythrae shows that under these circumstances, for the Greek *poleis* in Ionia it was worth considering Persian authority instead of Athenian hegemonic rule.

The contributions to this volume thus deal with a great variety of problems, political situations and interests from Homeric times to the very end of the classical period. Nevertheless, they do present a coherent picture of the general strive for peace and interstate stability, although these aims could well be interpreted in different terms and had to be brought in line with the political interest and ideologies of their times.

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Building Community Across the Battle-Lines The Truce in *Iliad* 3 and 4

David F. Elmer

Recent work on interstate relations in early Greece has produced two major revisions of established positions. The first is a welcome reassessment of Bruno Keil's often-cited characterization of peace as "a contractual interruption of a (natural) state of war."¹ As Victor Alonso has stressed, war was only one possible mode of interaction for early Greek communities, and no more the default than either friendship or the lack of a relationship altogether.² The second major development is represented by Polly Low's reconsideration of the widespread assumption that "a strict line can be drawn between domestic and international life": her work reveals the many ways in which Greek political life blurred the boundaries between intra- and inter-*polis* relationships.³ From a certain point of view, these two reconfigurations can be seen to be mutually reinforcing. The notion of a default state of war presupposes a clear line of demarcation between the community and its enemies. Thus, if the Athena of Aeschylus' *Eumenides* can promote the idea of an Athens more or less perpetually at war ("let there be foreign war, without stint")⁴, it is in the context of the play's construction of a civic body that is both internally cohesive and distinct from all others. The vision of the *polis* as a self-contained entity makes it possible to imagine a permanent, natural state of war. If, however, the boundaries of early Greek communities are not as clearly articulated as Aeschylus' vision implies, then the prospect of a default relationship between communities becomes correspondingly more elusive.

In fact, the *Iliad* speaks both to the vigor with which early Greek thought explored the possibility of alternatives to war, and to the fluid conception of community that supported such thinking. The poem expresses a discernible longing for peace, particularly in Books 3 and 4, when the Achaeans and Trojans struggle to establish and maintain *philotês* ("friendship") amongst themselves. This episode provides one of the principal examples exploited by Alonso in his critique of Keil. Alonso nevertheless holds to a conception of *philotês* as a "bond with a bilateral character," that is, as a reciprocal relationship

¹ Keil 1916, 8.

² Alonso 2007. See also Baltrusch 1994, 94, with references.

³ See Low 2007, esp. ch. 3; my quotation is from pp. 129-130.

⁴ Aesch. *Eum.* 864. θυραῖος ἔστω πόλεμος, οὐ μὲν παρών. "Without stint" is the translation of Smyth 1999 (1926).

between distinct groups.⁵ In so doing, he loses sight of the most distinctive feature of the Argive-Trojan *entente*: what is at stake is not so much the reconfiguration of a relationship between communities as the establishment of a new, higher-order community, one which incorporates both sides. Although this community ultimately proves unsustainable, for a short period of time it provides a framework for the peaceful interaction of its members. The present contribution seeks to delineate the terms in which the emergence of this broader community is expressed, and to provide some reflection on the meaning of its ultimate non-viability.

Speaking with a common voice

When the Trojans and Achaeans are finally on the verge of joining battle, at the beginning of Book 3, Hector rebukes Alexander for shrinking from the fight. Shamed, Alexander offers to engage Menelaos in single combat, with the victor taking uncontested possession of Helen and the wealth she brought to Troy. As far as the wider conflict is concerned, Alexander envisions a negotiated settlement: once the duel is resolved, the disputants' respective communities will establish *philotés* through oaths, and the Argives will return peacefully to their homeland (3.73-75). Hector steps forward to present Alexander's offer, and Menelaos, accepting, calls for sacrificial victims so that the leaders of the armies may swear an oath to abide by the terms of the treaty. These ritual preparations represent the first concrete step toward a reconfiguration of the relationship between the warring parties. The assembled soldiers of both sides respond with collective sentiments of joy and hope:

“So he spoke, and both the Achaeans and the Trojans rejoiced,
hoping for an end to toilsome war.”⁶

The fact that Trojans and Achaeans respond as a group, as the collective subject of the verb “rejoiced” (ἐχάρησαν), marks an important moment of social adjustment, an incremental step toward the fusion of discrete entities.

The full significance of this response emerges more clearly when viewed against the background of the set of formulas the *Iliad* employs to describe the responses of audiences in deliberative contexts. A superficial reading of the collective reaction of Achaeans and Trojans might register it simply as the

⁵ Alonso 2007, 212.

⁶ *Il.* 3.111-112. ὡς ἔφαθ', οἱ δ' ἐχάρησαν Ἀχαιοὶ τε Τρωῆς τε | ἐλπόμενοι παύσασθαι
οἴζυροῦ πολέμοιο.

mechanical consequence of a unique situation, namely, the formulation of a proposal addressed jointly to both sides. Such a reading, however, goes against the grain of a textual strategy aimed at constructing broad distinctions between Greek and Trojan collective behaviors.⁷ Nowhere is this strategy more evident than in the system of formulas for audience response in scenes of collective decision-making, what might be called the poem's "grammar of reception."⁸ The *Iliad* employs a fairly restricted set of such formulas. Generally speaking, Iliadic audiences display one of five reactions to deliberative proposals, expressed in the following five ways (with variations)⁹:

1. ὣς ἔφαθ', οἱ δ' ἄρα πάντες ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο σιωπῇ
He spoke thus, and they were all silent
(3.95, 7.398, 8.28, 9.29, etc.)
2. ἔνθ' ἄλλοι μὲν πάντες ἐπευφήμησαν Ἀχαιοί
Thereupon all the other Achaeans expressed approval
(1.22, 1.376)
3. ὣς ἔφαθ', οἱ δ' ἄρα πάντες ἐπίαχον υἱες Ἀχαιῶν
He spoke thus, and all the sons of the Achaeans shouted in response
(7.403, 9.50; variants at 2.333, 2.394)
4. ὣς Ἴκτωρ ἀγόρευ', ἐπὶ δὲ Τρῶες κελάδησαν
Hector spoke thus, and the Trojans roared in response
(8.542, 18.310)
5. ὣς ἔφαθ', οἱ δ' ἄρα πάντες ἐπήνησαν βασιλῆες
He spoke thus, and all the kings approved
(7.344, 9.710; variants at 3.461, 23.539; cf. 2.335, 4.29, 4.380, 16.443, 18.312, 22.181)

The essential thing to note about this formulaic system is the rigor with which it distinguishes between the behaviors of different communities. The first and

⁷ On the ways in which the *Iliad* distinguishes between the Greek and Trojan communities, particularly with regard to speech, see Mackie 1996.

⁸ I explore this grammar in detail in a forthcoming book (Elmer 2013). See esp. chapter 1.

⁹ This list omits another formula frequently used to indicate that a proposal has been accepted: ὣς ἔφαθ', οἱ δ' ἄρα τοῦ μάλα μὲν κλύον ἢδ' ἐπίθοντο (7.379, 9.79, 14.133, etc.). This formula is not, strictly speaking, part of the "grammar of response," since it refers not to the reaction of the audience but merely to the efficacy of the proposal. *Il.* 2.142 and 9.173 both represent complex exceptions to the system, which can be explained in terms of an emphasis, at moments of crisis, on social atomization, as opposed to the solidarity ideally operative in collective decision-making (Elmer 2013).

last of these responses occur among both Greek and Trojan audiences, but the other three are strictly limited to one or the other group. Moreover, the single instance in which a Trojan audience responds with a version of the fifth reaction (18.312) acquires its significance from the fact that this response is otherwise restricted to the Achaeans (and the Olympians): at a climactic moment in the narrative, the Trojans suddenly adopt a mode of collective decision-making more typical of their enemies, and opt for a course of action (camping on the battlefield to press their advantage in the morning) that leads ultimately to their demise.

Against this background, the peculiarity of the collective reaction of Achaeans and Trojans comes more clearly into view. The response formulas reviewed above focus on the presence or absence of a discernible sign of approval. In this case, however, the narrator refers simply to the affective disposition of the audience (joy mixed with hope), without specifying whether that disposition was expressed. The unambiguous disclosure of group sentiment is obviously essential to true collective deliberation. The narrator's lack of specificity on this occasion contributes to a certain ambiguity as to the nature of the proceedings. In spite of the obvious importance of a possible agreement to all those involved, we are entitled to wonder whether Alexander's proposal is a matter of group action or a purely private arrangement between himself and Menelaos. It has characteristics of both, but this is not, evidently, a scene of true collective decision-making; at least, the audience does not behave as though it were. The more important peculiarity for our purposes, however, concerns the simple fact that the same response is predicated simultaneously of two groups whose behaviors the *Iliad* is elsewhere at pains to distinguish. By violating the overall tendency of the poem's formulaic system, these lines offer a striking indication that the boundary separating the two sides is beginning to break down.

The text specifies not only that Greeks and Trojans responded in the same way, but that they did so for the same reason: both groups were "hoping for an end to toilsome war." The prospect of a negotiated agreement therefore corresponds to the emergence of a unified sentiment among the warring parties. The poem seems to suggest that the very possibility of a treaty requires a coincidence of interests and attitudes. This in itself may not seem very significant: without a doubt, some common interest in seeking a resolution is always necessary to bring the parties to a conflict to the negotiating table. Be that as it may, the narrator goes to considerable lengths to stress this new community of spirit, tying it explicitly to the formal conclusion of the treaty. When Priam arrives from the city with the *borokia*, the sacrificial victims for the oath, Agamemnon

pronounces the terms of the agreement.¹⁰ The *horkia* are then slaughtered and *spondai* poured. The sacrifice and libations formally inaugurate a new relationship between Greeks and Trojans, a relationship that is marked not only ritually, but also, once again, by a notable response on the part of the audience. If Menelaos' proposal of an oath was followed by the first suggestion of an emerging concord, the actual execution of the oath sacrifice results in a striking indication that Trojans and Greeks are now unified not only in sentiment but also in speech:

“[Agamemnon] spoke, and he cut the necks of the lambs with the pitiless bronze.

And he laid them on the ground gasping
and wanting for life, for the bronze had taken their strength.

And drawing wine from the mixing-bowl with cups,
they poured it out, and prayed to the eternal gods.

And someone of the Achaeans and Trojans was speaking thus:

‘Most powerful and greatest Zeus, and you other immortal gods,
whoever should first violate the oath-sacrifices,
may their brains flow on the ground just like this wine,
their own and their children’s, and may their wives be taken by others.’”¹¹

The prayer expressed in this collective manner – a prayer that, in itself, does not indicate anything more substantive than a common commitment to observing the terms of the treaty – is less striking than the fact that Trojans and Greeks here speak with a single voice, represented as the words of an anonymous “someone” (*tis*). The significance of this gesture must once again be elucidated with reference to the broader conventions of Homeric narrative.

There is, of course, nothing unusual in the introduction of such an anonymous statement into the narrative. Such passages, often called “*tis*-speeches”

¹⁰ When Agamemnon reformulates the agreement, he makes an important addition to the terms: in the event of Alexander's defeat, the Trojans are to surrender not just Helen and her property, but also a “fitting” penalty “that will be remembered even among future generations” (*Il.* 3.286-287). Although there is no indication of any objection to Agamemnon's addendum, it undoubtedly makes it more difficult for the Trojans to accept his eventual judgment on the outcome of the duel (see below).

¹¹ *Il.* 3.292-301. ἦ, καὶ ἀπὸ στομάχου ἀρνῶν τάμε νηλεῖ χαλκῷ· | καὶ τοὺς μὲν κατέθηκεν ἐπὶ χθονὸς ἀσπαίροντας | θυμοῦ δευομένους· ἀπὸ γὰρ μένος εἴλετο χαλκός· | οἶνον δ' ἐκ κρητῆρος ἀφυσσόμενοι δεπέεσσιν | ἔκχεον, ἦδ' εὐχοντο θεοῖς αἰειγενέτησιν. | ὧδε δὲ τις εἶπεσκεν Ἀχαιῶν τε Τρώων τε· | Ζεῦ κύδιστε μέγιστε καὶ ἀθάνατοι θεοὶ ἄλλοι | ὀπότεροι πρότεροι ὑπὲρ ὄρκια πημήνεια | ὧδε σφ' ἐγκέφαλος χαμάδις ῥέει ὡς ὄδε οἶνος | αὐτῶν καὶ τεκέων, ἄλοχοι δ' ἄλλοισι δαμῆτεν.

after the characteristic indefinite pronoun, or *Chorreden* in reference to their collective aspect, are widespread.¹² There are 17 such speeches in the *Iliad*, nine of them transcribing, as here, what was actually said on a particular occasion, and 8 more describing the potential words of imagined speakers. The device is not, however, simply a way of indicating what isolated or scattered individuals said or might have said, as though the Homeric narrator were a reporter stopping passers-by for a “man-on-the-street” perspective. On the contrary, speeches attributed to an anonymous *tis* are the way the Homeric narrator introduces a *collective* sentiment, a view that characterizes a distinct social group. In the *Odyssey*, for example, the attitudes and intentions of the suitors are several times registered by means of such speeches; the discreditable sentiments expressed on these occasions are clearly meant to reflect on the suitors as a group.¹³ Moreover, the formulation of a collective attitude in a *tis*-speech highlights the cohesion of the group to which it is ascribed. It thereby comes to function as a narrative index of social solidarity. The clearest example of this technique is in the Achaean assembly of Book 2. After the near-disintegration of the army, Odysseus manages to restore order. A crucial step in his reconstitution of the army as a cohesive group is the forceful silencing of Thersites; this scene is capped by the words of the *pléthus*, the mass of soldiers, as expressed in an anonymous *tis*-speech:

“And [the Achaeans], though distressed, laughed at him with pleasure.
 And thus someone was saying, looking at another near by:
 ‘Well! Truly Odysseus has done countless good things
 as author of good counsels and leader in war;
 but now this is the best thing he has done among the Argives,
 in that he has stopped that wordy slanderer from speaking in public.
 His over-proud heart will surely not stir him again
 to antagonize kings with words of blame.’”¹⁴

¹² For recent scholarship on Homeric *tis*-speeches, see Wilson 1979, de Jong 1987, and Létoublon 1995. For the term *Chorreden*, see Hentze 1905. De Jong 1987, 71 emphasizes that, in the passage quoted above, Greeks and Trojans are “presented as a *collective*” (emphasis original).

¹³ See, for example, *Od.* 2.324-336, 4.769-771.

¹⁴ *Il.* 2.270-277. οἱ δὲ καὶ ἀχνόμενοι περ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ ἠδὺ γέλασσαν· ἦδε δέ τις εἵπεσκεν ἰδὼν ἐς πλησίον ἄλλον· ἢ πόποι ἦ δὴ μυρὶ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐσθλὰ ἔοργε ἢ βουλὰς τ’ ἐξάρχων ἀγαθὰς πόλεμόν τε κορύσσω· ἢ νῦν δὲ τόδε μέγ’ ἄριστον ἐν Ἀργείοισιν ἔρεξεν, ἢ ὃς τὸν λωβητήρα ἐπεσβόλον ἔσχ’ ἀγοράων· ἢ οὐ θῆν μιν πάλιν αὐτὶς ἀνήσει θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ ἢ νεικεῖν βασιλῆας ὄνειδείους ἐπέεσσιν.

Speeches such as this one are evidently meant to express some kind of pervasive social force, a collective feeling that defines or even constructs a group.¹⁵ The attitude of the Achaean *pléthos* towards Thersites is one of the chief indicators in this scene that a social bond has been restored.

The anonymous speech that caps the oath-sacrifice in Book 3 serves the same function. The words spoken in common by Trojans and Achaeans make manifest the social bond the treaty has created (or perhaps the bond that such a treaty requires). Not coincidentally, this manifestation of solidarity occurs at the very moment of sacrifice, the moment when the wine is poured out on the ground.¹⁶ The conjunction here of sacrifice and collective utterance recalls the importance of sacrifice generally in Homer as a socially meaningful act. Sacrificial meals frequently mark the establishment or reaffirmation of connections between members of a group.¹⁷ But this is not a sacrificial meal: as in the case of the *Iliad*'s other oath-sacrifice (19.266-268), the victims are evidently disposed of without being consumed. The social significance of this sacrifice derives strictly from its relation to the treaty, from the fact that it is the ritual complement to the oath pronounced by Agamemnon.

The words of the anonymous representative of the "Achaeans and Trojans" likewise stand in a complementary relationship to the oath. In addition to its typological function as an expression of the solidarity of a newly-constituted group, the *tis*-speech is also the event that collectivizes the obligations imposed by the treaty. It is essential to recognize the public force of this utterance, which is not simply, as Irene de Jong has it, "a *private* prayer of Greek and Trojan *soldiers*" that "forms an interesting contrast to Agamemnon's official prayer."¹⁸ The contrast, if there is one, is simply a matter of the discrete role played by this speech in the overall logic of the treaty ritual. Agamemnon's oath formulates the terms of the treaty, but it is the anonymous prayer of Achaeans and Trojans that stipulates the sanction for violating it, and thus creates a collective

¹⁵ Cf. Létoublon 1995, 2.

¹⁶ Cf. de Jong 1987, 70.

¹⁷ Cf. Seaford 1994, 42-53. Notable examples are the sacrifice that concludes *Iliad* Book 1, the meal Agamemnon serves to the *gerontes* at *Il.* 9.90, the meal shared by Achilles and Priam in Book 24, and the meal on Laertes' farm in *Od.* 24. Conversely, irregular meals or sacrifices indicate some disruption of the community. For example, when Achilles is visited by the Embassy, he serves the meat of animals that have already been slaughtered (Patroklos burns *thnēlai*, but the sacrificial killing is omitted: *Il.* 9.206-221). The many scenes depicting the feasting of the Suitors are also part of the portrayal of their group as a dysfunctional community.

¹⁸ De Jong 1987, 70 (emphasis original). Hentze 1905, 257 and Bergold 1977, 102 both emphasize the connection between the anonymous prayer and the oath ceremony.

lective obligation to uphold it.¹⁹ There is no break or discontinuity between the oath ceremony and the anonymous speech of those who witness it; on the contrary, the latter is a vital part of the former.

Comparison with the inscriptional records of historical treaties helps to clarify this point. The organization of the Iliadic passage in fact bears a striking resemblance to what we find in many treaty-inscriptions, in which the terms of the treaty are regularly followed by the text of the oaths to be sworn by representatives of the communities in question. Notably, the oaths are often composed in the first-person singular, as in the case of a 4th-century *summakbia* treaty, from which I excerpt below:

“Alliance of the Corcyreans and Athenians for all time: if anyone should attack the land or the people of the Corcyreans, the Athenians are to come to their aid in full strength, according to the request of the Corcyreans, as they are able. And if anyone should attack the people or the land of the Athenians either by land or by sea, the Corcyreans are to come to their aid in full strength, as they are able, according to the request of the Athenians. (...) The oath: ‘I will aid the people of the Corcyreans in full strength, as I am able, if anyone should attack the land of the Corcyreans either by land or by sea, according to the request of the Corcyreans. (...) These things are true by Zeus and Apollo and Demeter; if I keep my oath, may I enjoy many good things, and if not, the opposite.’ ‘I will aid the people of the Athenians in full strength as I am able, if anyone attacks the land of the Athenians either by land or by sea, according to the request of the Athenians. (...) These things are true by Zeus and Apollo and Demeter; if I keep my oath, may I enjoy many good things, and if not, the opposite.’”²⁰

¹⁹ Cf. *Il.* 19.264-265 (with Bergold 1977, 102): when swearing, by means of a similar oath sacrifice, that he has not touched Briseis, Agamemnon concludes by stipulating the sanction for perjury. The statement of the terms of the oath and the stipulation of the sanction here occur in the same prayer; in Book 3, these two components are distributed between Agamemnon and his audience.

²⁰ *IG* ii² 97 (375 BC): συμμαχία Κορκυραίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων εἰς τὸν αἰεὶ χρόνον. εἴαν τις ἦτι ἐπι πολέμῳ εἰς τῆς γῆς χωρὰν τῆς Κορκυραίων ἢ ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον τοῦ Κορκυραίων, βοηθεῖν Ἀθηναῖος παντὶ σθένει καθότι ἂν ἐπαγγέλλωσιν Κορκυραῖοι κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· καὶ εἴαν τις ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων ἢ ἐπὶ τῆς χωρὰς τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ πολέμῳ ἦτι ἢ κατὰ γῆν ἢ κατὰ θάλατταν, βοηθεῖν Κορκυραῖος παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, καθότι ἂν ἐπαγγέλλωσιν Ἀθηναῖοι. (...) ὄρκος· vacat βοηθήσω Κορκυραίων τῷ δήμῳ παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, εἴαν τις ἦτι ἐπὶ πολέμῳ ἢ κατὰ γῆν ἢ κατὰ θάλατταν ἐπὶ τῆς χωρὰς τῆς Κορκυραίων καθ’ ὅτι ἂν ἐπαγγέλλωσι Κορκυραῖοι (...) ἀληθῆ ταῦτα νῆ τὸν Δία καὶ τὸν Απόλλω καὶ τὴν Δήμητρα· ἐβδωρῶντι μέμ μοι εἴη πολ|λὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ, εἰ δὲ [μή], τάναντία. vacat [βοηθήσω Ἀθηναίων τῷ δ]ήμῳ παντὶ σθέν[ει κατὰ τὸ δυν]ατόν, αἶ κά τις ἐπίητι ἐπὶ πο|λέμῳ ἢ κατὰ γῆν ἢ κατὰ θάλασσαν

The oaths recorded in this inscription represent the words of *individuals* who are binding themselves to abide by an agreement made between groups. As in the *Iliad*, the sanction for violation of the treaty (εἰ δὲ μὴ, τᾶναντία) is included not among the formal terms of the agreement, but as a prayer pronounced by representatives of the communities in question. The resolution of the collective obligations of the group into the individual obligations of its members is one of the more curious and persistent features of Greek diplomacy.²¹ It is evidently the reflex of tendencies rooted deeply enough in Greek culture to find expression also in the *Iliad*, where the collective force of the sanction is formulated in the speech of a singular *tis*. There is a continuity of mindset underlying these two representations of collective commitments. The practices reflected in the treaty oaths provide a valuable context for understanding not only the logic of the treaty scene in *Iliad* 3, but also the more general Homeric tendency to delineate the attitudes and investments of a community as a whole in terms of the superficially singular pronouncement of an anonymous *tis*.

There is, however, an important discrepancy between the oaths transcribed in treaty inscriptions and the collective prayer of Greeks and Trojans. The inscriptions record different oaths for the citizens of each state; the differences might be substantial, with different clauses and provisions prescribed for each side, but at the very least the name of one state must be substituted for the other, depending on the party in question.²² In the case of the treaty quoted above, the text even transcribes dialectal differences, faithfully reproducing certain Doricisms typical of the local speech of Corcyra, a Corinthian colony.²³ In the *Iliad*, on the other hand, Achaeans and Trojans utter the *same* prayer. The

ἐ[πί τῆγ] [χώραν τὴν Ἀθην]αίων, καθ' ὅτι κ' ἐπαγ[γέ]λλω[ντι Ἀθηναῖ]οι (...) ἀληθῆ δὲ ταῦ]τα να[ῖ] τῶν Δία [καῖ] τῶν Ἀπόλλωνα καὶ τᾶν Δά[ματ]ρα· εὐορκ[έ]ο[ντι] μέμ μοι εἶη πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθ]ά, εἰ δὲ μὴ, [τά]ν[αν]τία.

- ²¹ Cf. Bolmarcich 2007, 26 and Plescia 1970, 60. The individuals swearing the oaths might sometimes be the officials responsible for the execution of the treaty, and sometimes significantly larger groups.
- ²² For an example of substantial differences, see *IG* i³ 76, a treaty between Athens and the Bottiaioi dated to 422. The differences in this case are doubtless due to an asymmetrical power relationship. Thucydides 5.47 gives a single oath for both parties in the case of a treaty between Athens and the Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, but includes also the stipulation that “they shall each swear the oath that is most binding in their own country.”
- ²³ Cf. with their Attic counterparts in the oath of the Athenians αἱ κά τις (Attic εἰάν τις), ναί (Attic νή), Δάματρα (Attic Δήμητρα), εὐορκέοντι (Attic εὐορκοῦντι). Given that the typical Doric $\bar{\alpha}$ for Attic η is only inconsistently observed, it is tempting to think that the composer of the inscription has been particularly scrupulous in rendering the names of the gods called to witness the oath (Δάματρα vs. Δήμητρα), i.e. the ritually most significant part of the oath.

disparity is telling: while the treaties literally inscribe the distinction between communities by distinguishing the words spoken by their respective representatives, the narrative of the *Iliad* works to elide this distinction by constructing a single community of speech. The negotiation of an agreement to end the Trojan conflict is represented not, as in the inscriptions, as a matter of the relationship between groups whose independent identities are rigorously maintained, but as the merging of groups into a new super-community, centered around common interests that can be expressed in words available to one and all.

Shortly after the oath sacrifice and the accompanying collective prayer, a second *tiis*-speech reinforces the connection between the negotiation of a truce and the creation of a temporary community, united in sentiment and speech. As Hector and Odysseus cast lots to determine whether Alexander or Menelaos will have the first spear-cast, the narrator reports another prayer uttered by both sides in common:

“And someone of the Achaeans and Trojans was speaking thus:
 ‘Father Zeus, ruling from Ida, most powerful and greatest,
 whoever it was that brought these trials to both peoples,
 let him perish and enter the house of Hades,
 but let us have friendship and steadfast oaths.’”²⁴

The openness with which the question of responsibility is posed emphasizes the re-centering of Greek and Trojan relations around a kind of common denominator of shared interest. In spite of the general acknowledgement of Alexander’s guilt elsewhere in the poem, even among his own countrymen, this prayer remains open to the possibility that Menelaos might bear responsibility, a point of view that seems patently calculated for universal acceptability.²⁵

The duel ends inconclusively when Aphrodite spirits Alexander away from the battlefield and saves him from imminent death. The ambiguous outcome, unforeseen by the terms of the agreement, initiates a period of uncertainty, but the treaty still holds, for a time. And so long as the treaty holds – so long, that is, as the Trojans and Achaeans enjoy a relationship that is not simply one of hostility – so too does their ability to speak with a single voice. Book 4 opens with a brief discussion among the gods about whether or not to permit a negotiated conclusion to the war (I will have more to say about this scene in a moment). They resolve to initiate a new phase of fighting, but when Athena de-

²⁴ *Il.* 3.319-323. ὦδε δὲ τις εἶπεσεν Ἀχαιῶν τε Τρώων τε· | Ζεῦ πάτερ Ἴδηθεν μεδέων
 κύδιστε μέγιστε | ὀππότερος τάδε ἔργα μετ’ ἀμφοτέροισιν ἔθηκε, | τὸν δὸς ἀποφθίμενον
 δῶναι δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω, | ἡμῖν δ’ αὖ φιλότητα καὶ ὄρκια πιστὰ γενέσθαι.

²⁵ Cf. the comments of Kirk 1985 on l. 321.

scends from Olympus to implement their decision, a third and final corporate utterance uniting Greeks and Trojans signals that, as yet, the truce holding together the fragile Greco-Trojan community still stands:

“Just like a star that the son of wily Kronos sends,
as a sign for sailors or for a broad host of fighting men,
shining, and trailing many sparks –
just so did Pallas Athena dash to the earth,
and she leapt into the middle; and wonder held those looking on,
horse-taming Trojans and well-greaved Achaeans.
And thus someone was saying, looking at another close by:
‘Surely we will again have evil war and terrible slaughter –
or Zeus is establishing friendship among both peoples,
Zeus who is the steward of war for men.’
Thus someone of the Achaeans and Trojans was saying.”²⁶

Even as they contemplate the possible dissolution of the treaty that binds them, the two groups still manage to speak as one; the imminent shift that will redefine their relationship has not yet been realized.

These are, however, the last words pronounced in a collective voice. They provide a final statement of the common perspective embodied in the Greek and Trojan super-community, and they are situated in such a way as to provide a striking point of contrast for the moment at which the community is in fact dissolved. After her meteoric arrival at Troy, Athena instigates Pandaros to shoot an arrow at Menelaos. Menelaos is struck, but the wound proves to be fatal only to the delicate peace agreement, which is effectively ended by this breach of the truce. Agamemnon marks its demise rhetorically in his response to the calamity. In voicing his distress at Trojan perfidy and the near loss of his brother, he uses a potential *is*-speech to construct a Trojan voice that is unambiguously hostile:

“And one of the haughty Trojans will speak thus,
leaping on the tomb of glorious Menelaos:

²⁶ *Il.* 4.75-85. οἶον δ' ἀστέρα ἦκε Κρόνου πάϊς ἀγκυλομήτεω | ἢ ναύτησι τέρας ἢ ἐ στρατῶ
εὐρέϊ λαῶν | λαμπρόν· τοῦ δέ τε πολλοὶ ἀπὸ σπινθήρης ἔνται· | τῷ ἔϊκυϊ' ἦϊξεν ἐπὶ
χθόνα Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη, | καὶ δ' ἔθορ' ἐς μέσσον· θάμβος δ' ἔχεν εἰσορόωντας | Τρώας
θ' ἵπποδάμους καὶ εὐκνήμιδας Ἀχαιοῦς· | ὄδε δέ τις εἶπεσκεν ἰδὼν ἐς πλησίον ἄλλον· |
ἦ ῥ' αὐτίς πόλεμός τε κακός καὶ φύλοπις αἰνὴ | ἔσσειται, ἢ φιλότητα μετ' ἀμφοτέροισι
τίθησι | Ζεὺς, ὅς τ' ἀνθρώπων ταμίης πολέμοιο τέτυκται. | ὧς ἄρα τις εἶπεσκεν Ἀχαιῶν
τε Τρώων τε.

‘May Agamemnon vent his anger on all this way,
 as even now he brought here a host of Achaeans in vain,
 and he went home again to his fatherland
 with empty ships, having left behind good Menelaos.’
 Thus will someone speak; then let the wide earth open for me.’²⁷

This anonymous voice, projected onto an exclusively Trojan landscape devoid of a living Achaean presence, could not be more different from the voices that have populated the scene up to this point. Agamemnon seems almost deliberately to be marking the end of the community of speech by re-imagining Trojan sentiment as irreconcilably inimical to the Greeks. His imagined utterance reinstates the divide that separates the two communities.

We do not encounter the anonymous speech device again until the conclusion of the duel between Hector and Ajax in Book 7, a passage that, incidentally, also offers the poem’s only other instance of a speech attributed jointly to both Greeks and Trojans. Hector imagines a remark that will be spoken by warriors on both sides when they observe that he and Ajax have exchanged gifts.²⁸ This remark consists of an explicit acknowledgment of the *philotês* of which the gifts themselves are a material token. Although we cannot speak here of a proper community – this *philotês* binds only Hector and Ajax, and evidently only to a limited extent, since they will later take up arms against each other again – nevertheless we again observe a correlation between the possibility of a common utterance and the existence of a social bond that traverses the gap between Trojans and Achaeans.

There is clearly a connection between Hector’s hypothetical speech of Achaeans and Trojans, marking the relatively amicable conclusion of his duel, and the imagined speech with which Agamemnon punctuates the disastrous results of the previous one.²⁹ Nevertheless, the Trojan boast constructed by Agamemnon stands in a much closer relationship to the other anonymous speeches in Books 3 and 4. It brings to a close a remarkably dense sequence of such speeches that, as we have seen, coincides precisely with the period of the

²⁷ *Il.* 4.176-182. καί κέ τις ὄδ’ ἐρέει Τρώων ὑπερῆγορέοντων | τύμβω ἐπιθρόσκω
 Μενελάου κυδαλίμοιο· | αἶθ’ οὕτως ἐπὶ πάσι χόλον τελέσει’ Ἀγαμέμνων, | ὡς καὶ νῦν
 ἄλιον στρατὸν ἤγαγεν ἐνθάδ’ Ἀχαιῶν, | καὶ δὴ ἔβη οἶκον δὲ φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαίαν |
 σὺν κεινήσιν νηυσὶ λιπῶν ἀγαθὸν Μενέλαον. | ὡς ποτὲ τις ἐρέει· τότε μοι χάνοι εὐρεῖα
 χθῶν.

²⁸ *Il.* 7.299-302.

²⁹ There are a number of connections between the duels in Books 3 and 7, on which see Kirk 1978. The relationship between these scenes cannot, however, be adequately appreciated in terms of Kirk’s scheme of primary use and secondary reworking or imitation.

truce. Four of the *Iliad's* 17 *tis*-speeches, or nearly one quarter, cluster around Book 3 and the beginning of Book 4. The concentrated exploitation of this technique bears all the hallmarks of a deliberate strategy designed to set off the period of the truce as a time when the differences between the Greek and Trojan communities are temporarily bridged.³⁰ To the extent that the anonymous *tis*-speech implies a cohesive group partaking of a common sentiment, this strategy insists on the correlation of the existence of an agreement with the existence of a single community to which the parties to the agreement belong. That is, in terms of the *Iliad's* conceptual apparatus, an agreement is thought of not as something between groups but as something that unites the members of a single group. The *Iliad's* word for the treaty is *philotês*; and *philotês* is *philotês*, whether it binds Achaeans and Trojans, Hector and Ajax, or the Achaeans as a whole.

Finding common ground

The use of anonymous speeches to suggest the construction of a Greek and Trojan super-community is complemented by a parallel strategy focusing not on the behavior of the constituents but on their spatial organization. Corresponding to the emergence of a verbal discourse shared by Trojans and Achaeans is the establishment of a common space, a center or *mes(s)on* around which the two groups can arrange themselves. The formal act of fixing this central space – which also serves as the field of battle for Menelaos and Alexander (cf. 3.341) – is performed by Hector and Odysseus as they measure off the dueling ground.³¹ The *meson* appears, however, to be already identifiable from the moment that Hector steps forward to propose a negotiated settlement (ἐς μέσσον ἰὼν, 3.77). In a sense, this central space is necessary if Hector is to address the Greeks and Trojans as a whole, and if his words are to have their intended effect of binding the two sides in agreement. Marcel Detienne has demonstrated the importance archaic Greek thought ascribes to the *meson* as a point of orientation for the community, as the locus for the definition of common property and the common good, and, finally, as the foundation for politically

³⁰ With this technique, contrast the juxtaposition of two opposed *tis*-speeches, one attributed to “someone of the Achaeans,” the other to “someone of the Trojans,” at 17.414-422. These juxtaposed speeches express the hardening of the battle lines in the conflict over Patroklos’ corpse.

³¹ Odysseus’ involvement in this procedure is not without significance: his own ship is at the center of the Achaean camp (8.223), which is an index of his role as a proponent of solidarity among the Achaeans.

efficacious speech.³² Speech oriented toward the establishment or maintenance of the community must proceed from the *meson*. A middle point appears to be necessary in Greek thinking for the conceptualization of a community at any level: the *oikos* has its hearth, the *polis* its *agora*, and even supra-*polis* associations such as the confederated cities of Lesbos organize themselves around a center.³³ Accordingly, the ability of Greeks and Trojans to constitute themselves as a single group with common interests expressed in common words goes hand in hand with the existence of a central space in which those words can be spoken, a space belonging equally to both sides.

From this perspective, it is no surprise to find a consistent link between the communal utterances of Books 3 and 4 and the spatial center around which the events of the episode are organized. Each of the *tis*-speeches I have examined is connected to some event happening at the *meson*. In the case of the collective prayer that initiates the series, that event is the oath-sacrifice, which is situated specifically at the center (3.266). The second prayer follows immediately on the delimitation of the central dueling ground and the drawing of lots that takes place there. And the third and final joint speech responds directly to Athena's divine manifestation as she leaps "into the middle" of the Trojans and Achaeans (4.79). In each case, events at the center provide the referent for an utterance that indexes the social bond uniting Greeks and Trojans. This center is, therefore, an indispensable component of the conceptual and narrative apparatus that serves to delineate the transitory Greco-Trojan community: without it there would be no collective utterance, and no space within which such an utterance could emerge. Moreover, when that community ultimately dissolves, its disintegration must be marked spatially as well as in speech. Just as Agamemnon asserts the demise of the community of speech by substituting a hostile Trojan utterance for a collective voice, so the narrator seems compelled to re-reflect the *meson* not as a space of convergence around common interests but as one of difference and conflict. After Menelaos has been wounded but before the general *mêlée* begins, Eris, personified strife, sets *neikos homoiion*, conflict common to all, "in the middle":

“Ares stirred the one side, and grey-eyed Athena the other,
and Fear and Flight and Strife, full of insatiable longing,
the sister and companion of man-slaying Ares,
who is small when she first takes up arms, but thereafter

³² Detienne 1965 and 1996 (1967), 90-102, building on Vernant 1982 (1962) and Lévy and Vidal-Naquet 1996 (1964).

³³ See Detienne 1996, 101 on Messon, the centrally-located, federal sanctuary on Lesbos.

walks the earth with her head fixed in the heavens;
 and at that time she set in their midst conflict shared by all,
 and she went through the throng increasing the groans of men.
 But when they came together, gathering in one place,
 they threw against each other their shields, their spears, and men's fury"³⁴

As the two armies advance into the space that divides them, all they have in common is their hostility.³⁵

The limits of community

The discussion thus far has focused on the two interlocking techniques by means of which the *Iliad* represents the treaty of Books 3 and 4 as a convergence of two hostile groups and their reconstitution as a single super-community united in space, speech, and sentiment. The Iliadic tradition seems unwilling or unable to conceive of an agreement as a bond between distinct groups: the very notion of a bond appears, in this mentality, to imply the existence of a single group. The question remains, how viable is that bond and the community it implies in the case of the Greeks and Trojans? The treaty is ultimately voided as a result of divine intervention. Does that mean that it might have remained in force in the absence of interference? There are indications in the text of a profound skepticism about such a possibility. In particular, the end of Book 3 and the transition to Book 4 are structured in such a way as to suggest that, in spite of their new-found ability to organize themselves as a cohesive group, the Trojans and Achaeans still face severe limitations on their ability to maintain the integrity of their association in circumstances that are less than fully straightforward.

At the end of Book 3, the duel has come to an ambiguous conclusion with the disappearance of Alexander. Menelaos has succeeded in despoiling his opponent of at least part of his armor (his helmet), and the narrator makes him the clear moral victor, stating that "he would have won untold *keudos*" if Aphrodite had not taken action (3.373). On the basis, presumably, of Menelaos' supe-

³⁴ *Il.* 4.439-447. ὄρσε δὲ τοὺς μὲν Ἄρης, τοὺς δὲ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη | Δεῖμός τ' ἠδὲ Φόβος
 καὶ Ἴρις ἄμοτον μεμανῖα, | Ἄρεος ἀνδροφόνοιο κασιγνήτη ἑτάρη τε, | ἦ τ' ὀλίγη μὲν
 πρῶτα κορύσσεται, αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα | οὐρανῷ ἐστήριξε κάρη καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ βαίνει· | ἦ
 σφιν καὶ τότε νεικὸς ὁμοῖον ἔμβαλε μέσσω | ἐρχομένη καθ' ὄμιλον ὀφέλλουσα στόνον
 ἀνδρῶν. | οἱ δ' ὅτε δῆ ῥ' ἐς χῶρον ἕνα ξυνιόντες ἴκοντο, | σύν ῥ' ἔβαλον ῥινοῦς, σύν δ'
 ἔγχεα καὶ μένε' ἀνδρῶν.

³⁵ Nenci 1981, 153 emphasizes the potential ambiguity of the *meson*, which can be a space either of cooperation or of conflict.

rior performance and the fact that Alexander is no longer anywhere to be seen, Agamemnon declares that Menelaos' victory is "evident" (νίκη μὲν δὴ φαίνεται),³⁶ and enjoins the Trojans to hand over Helen and the penalty he had stipulated in the case of Alexander's defeat. Agamemnon's interpretation lays claim to being an objective assessment of the available evidence – the "evidential" particle *δέ* signals that his statement is based on direct perceptions that he assumes to be available to his audience as well³⁷ – but it is, nevertheless, tendentious. The treaty had defined victory with respect to the killing of one party by the other (καταπέφνη, 3.281; κτείνη, 3.284); in the absence of a corpse, therefore, there are no grounds for determining the victor. As it stands, the duel has resulted in a situation unforeseen by the original agreement, and undecidable on its terms. Agamemnon's judgment represents an extension of the treaty's provisions to cover a situation that lies beyond their scope, an extension that is perhaps not unjustified, but certainly motivated by self-interest.

It is not surprising, then, that only a portion of Agamemnon's audience approves his verdict – the portion that stands most to gain by such a result. Book 3 ends with the notice that Agamemnon's pronouncement receives approval, but it is an approval that is strictly limited to the Achaeans (ὡς ἔφατ' Ἀτρεΐδης, ἐπὶ δ' ἦνεον ἄλλοι Ἀχαιοί, 3.461). Nothing is said about any response on the part of the Trojans. The significance of the Achaean reaction must again be elucidated with reference to the "grammar of reception" outlined above. The approval of the Achaeans is expressed with a variant of the fifth of the *Iliad's* response formulas, which is characterized by the verb *epainein*. This formula represents the most decisive form of approval that an Iliadic audience can bestow on a deliberative proposal. Elsewhere, I argue that this key-verb can be correlated with the concept of "consensus".³⁸ It signals not just support for a speaker's remarks, but the effective ratification of them. Louis Gernet detected in the verb *epainein* the idea of a "quasi-judicial efficaciousness," and, as a rule, any proposal that meets with *epainos* is immediately put into effect.³⁹ Here, however, this general rule runs up against an interesting complication. The

³⁶ *Il.* 3.457.

³⁷ On *δέ* as a "marker of evidentiality," see Bakker 1997, 75: "the *δέ* clause, being directed to an addressee, signals that the speaker assumes that the hearer is capable of witnessing the same evidence." For certain historical audiences of the *Iliad*, Alexander's helmet was still available as evidence for Menelaos' mastery in the duel: the Lindos chronicle records that the helmet was on display in Athena's great Rhodian temple (see Higbie 2003, 87-88 and 223-226).

³⁸ Elmer 2013.

³⁹ Gernet 1948, 186. Note that the noun *epainos* does not occur in the Homeric poems; I use it here as convenient shorthand for the uniquely decisive response signaled by *epainein*.

notionally efficacious response of a single constituency is embedded in a context that stresses an expanded notion of community involving commitment from both sides. In such a context, what value can be ascribed to the support, no matter how decisive, of only one of the concerned groups? The text has arrived at a kind of aporia, an impasse in which a rule of the poem's formulaic grammar is pitted against a more localized trend. The Achaeans may be able to express a unified will, but they are only one part of a larger group. That larger group, in the meantime, seems unable to formulate a collective response to the situation. The duel and its aftermath thus expose the limits of Greco-Trojan solidarity and suggest a skepticism about the possibility of establishing a functioning super-community.

It might be thought that the problem lies not with the project of creating an expanded community, but with the ambiguous conclusion of the duel, a situation problematic enough to create difficulties for any community, no matter how cohesive. Such an understanding, however, disregards the fact that the cohesiveness of a community cannot be judged in the absence of some test of its solidarity. The strength of a social bond remains only a potentiality until it is subjected to stress. The *Iliad* repeatedly uses complex or ambiguous situations – Agamemnon's insincere proposal to decamp in Book 2, for instance, or the challenge of maintaining solidarity in spite of the absence of Achilles – to examine the sturdiness of Achaean society. The present occasion is no different: the point of the episode is that the Greco-Trojan community has been tested, and found wanting.

The failure of Greeks and Trojans to constitute themselves as a fully cohesive group is highlighted by juxtaposition with the divine community, which successfully negotiates a response to the same uncertain situation. With the articulation of an approval limited to the Achaeans, the narrative reaches a dead end; the discussion on the plain of Troy is abandoned with the last line of Book 3, and the scene switches suddenly to Olympus at the start of Book 4. There, the gods take up the issue of how to resolve the ambiguities of the duel, even as the force of a limited and partial *epainos* is left an open question. It is as if, having raised the specter of an irreconcilable conflict at the heart of the Greco-Trojan accord, the narrator must have recourse to a whole and uncompromised social group in order to move the action forward. To be sure, the divine community is not a unified one. It includes entrenched partisans of both sides represented at Troy, whose differences seem at times no less insurmountable than those of their human protégés; in Book 20, the gods even take up arms against each other. Nevertheless, in spite of their differences in Book 4, they are able to arrive at a course of coordinated action. Moreover, they do so by appealing to

epainos, the very mechanism that indexes the limits of social coordination at Troy.

Zeus opens deliberations among the Olympians by seconding Agamemnon's judgment that victory lies with Menelaos.⁴⁰ He invites the gods to consider whether they will, accordingly, allow a negotiated settlement to the war, or whether they will instead prompt a renewal of hostilities. He himself proposes that the war be settled according to the terms of the treaty.⁴¹ The narrator characterizes this suggestion as an insincere attempt to provoke Hera rather than a straightforward proposal,⁴² but the question of Zeus' sincerity is irrelevant to the subsequent debate, which exposes genuine differences between Zeus and his consort.⁴³ Unable to contain her anger, Hera expresses her firm opposition to any negotiated outcome in terms of the withholding of *epainos*:

“Most terrible son of Kronos, what a speech you have spoken!
How can you wish to render my labor vain and unfulfilled,
and the sweat my toil has brought me; my horses have grown weary
while I gathered the host, an evil thing for Priam and his children.
Do what you like: but we other gods do not all approve.”⁴⁴

This formulation of the restricted support Zeus' proposal would receive establishes an interesting parallel between the situation at Troy and the unfolding debate among the gods. Sincerely or not, Zeus has put forward the same proposition that Agamemnon presented to the assembled Achaeans and Trojans. In Agamemnon's case, that proposal met with only limited approval. Hera predicts precisely the same result on Olympus: *epainos* for Zeus' proposed course of action will be only partial, attenuated, and therefore of questionable efficacy. She implies, menacingly, that the same impasse that now confounds

⁴⁰ *Il.* 4.13.

⁴¹ *Il.* 4.17-19.

⁴² *Il.* 4.5-6.

⁴³ As Kirk 1985, 331-332 notes, the narrator must do something to explain Zeus' proposal, since the prospect of peace would appear to run counter to the promise he has made to Thetis. Wilamowitz connected Zeus' "attempt" (*ἐπειράτο*, 4.5) to nettle Hera with the *diapseira* of Agamemnon in Book 2 (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1920, 298; cf. *πειρήσομαι*, 2.73). As in the case of Agamemnon's testing of the troops, Zeus' provocation leads ultimately to the confirmation of the traditional course of events on the part of the larger community.

⁴⁴ *Il.* 4.25-29. αἰνότατε Κρονίδη ποῖον τὸν μῦθον ἔειπες · | πῶς ἐθέλεις ἄλιον θείναι πόνον ἢδ' ἀτέλεστον, | ἰδρῶ θ' ὄν ἰδρωσα μόγῳ, καμέτην δέ μοι ἵπποι | λαὸν ἀγειρούσῃ, Πριάμῳ κακὰ τοιό τε παισίν. | ἔρδ' ἀτὰρ οὐ τοι πάντες ἐπαινέομεν θεοὶ ἄλλοι.

the Trojans and Greeks might afflict the gods as well, with herself and Athena playing the role of dissenters. Her threat to withhold her consent places her in curious alignment with the Trojan position, an alignment that can only be considered ironic in light of her hunger for Troy's destruction.

In the event, however, the gods manage to avoid deadlock in a manner that points up simultaneously the strengths of the divine community and the corresponding weaknesses of the temporary coalition at Troy. Zeus expresses frustration at Hera's bitter intractability, but he nevertheless declares his intention to forego a quarrel (νεῖκος, 4.37) over Troy, now or in the future. He therefore relents, and agrees to Troy's destruction – but only on condition that Hera will reciprocally yield if and when Zeus wishes to destroy a city dear to her. For Hera, this balancing of present and future claims not only resolves the quarrel with her spouse, it also provides the foundation for widespread agreement among the gods as a group:

“Let us yield to each other, I to you and you to me, and the other immortal gods will follow in course” (ἐπὶ δ' ἔπονται θεοὶ ἄλλοι ἰσθάνατοι).⁴⁵

The last part of her remark, which echoes her earlier warning (οὗτοι πάντες ἐπαινέομεν θεοὶ ἄλλοι), figures the gods' response to the compromise as the reversal of the threatened withholding of *epainos* for Zeus' initial proposal. Moreover, as Egon Flaig has argued, this vision of the equalization of distinct preferences, predicated as it is on a continuing context for interaction, corresponds to one of the basic requirements for consensus-based decision-making: the principle of “delayed return.”⁴⁶ This principle ensures that anyone who momentarily sacrifices his own interests in consenting to a decision will receive suitable compensation, or will have his interests protected, in future decisions. It requires that consenting individuals understand their losses and gains, first, as fundamentally comparable, and, second, as part of a continuum with both a past and a future – not as isolated, *sui generis* interests. That is to say, it requires that individuals understand themselves as members of a persistent community. These are the conditions that Zeus sets on his acquiescing to the destruction of Troy: his agreement is to be registered as part of an ongoing negotiation of preferences among the gods. While there is no positive statement of *epainos* to punctuate the transaction with Hera, the discussion nevertheless pivots on this crucial concept, and Zeus explicitly frames the negotiations in terms of the mechanisms of consensus.

⁴⁵ *Il.* 4.62-64.

⁴⁶ See Flaig 1993, 141 and 1994, 16 and 25 for “das Prinzip der vertagten Gegenleistung”; cf. Graham 1984, 105 on delayed return as the “mystique” of democracy.

The gods therefore succeed where the Greeks and Trojans fail: they manage to overcome significant differences and arrive at an executable course of action by exploiting the framework of *epainos*. The key to their success, and the crucial distinction that sets them apart from the Greco-Trojan community, is the existence of a persistent context of interaction extending beyond the present moment in time. Such a context is unavailable to the human actors attempting to settle the outcome of the duel. No matter how the war ends, once it is over the Achaeans' departure will put an end to the possibility of recuperating present loss with future gain. When Agamemnon uses the boast of an anonymous Trojan to encapsulate his vision of an Achaean defeat, he imagines a landscape totally devoid of any Achaean presence apart from the bones of his brother Menelaos.⁴⁷ The immobility of those bones in a funeral mound that will serve eternally as the locus for the Trojans' boastful exultation expresses the petrification of the Trojan-Greek relationship in a state of permanent disadvantage to the Achaean side. By the same token, the negotiated settlement proposed by Agamemnon will likewise perpetuate a permanently asymmetrical relationship, formulated in terms of a "*timé* that will be remembered even among future generations."⁴⁸ The decision to bring about such a relationship simply cannot be made communally, that is, through a consensus involving both sides, since the result would effectively foreclose the contextual field on which consensus rests.

The Achaeans and Trojans therefore revert to a relationship of hostility, even as their respective partisans on Olympus manage (for a time) to reassert their collective identity. What is remarkable about this picture is that the alternative to hostility is not friendship, conceived as a relationship between two distinct, autonomous groups, but the construction of a larger community of interests that subsumes distinct groups. Such a community persists only so long as the framework that sustains its internal relationships remains functional.

No doubt, to assert that a community survives only so long as its facilitating framework amounts to a tautology. It is a useful tautology, however, insofar as it grounds the idea of community in a pragmatic context of interaction – rather than, say, in the more abstract concept of "identity." The Greco-Trojan community comes into being, in spite of obvious differences at the level of identity, because of the availability of such a context. By the same token, even a shared identity may not be sufficient to guarantee the viability of a community in the absence of opportunities for the ongoing negotiation of interests. That is to say, the breakdown of the Greco-Trojan community is not necessarily an idiosyn-

⁴⁷ *Il.* 4.172-175.

⁴⁸ *Il.* 3.287 = 3.460.

cratic development, tied to the peculiar nature of this association of natural adversaries, but may well be indicative of the inherent weaknesses of any collective entity. The flipside of the fluidity that allows even enemies to reconstitute themselves as a single group is an instability even in apparently secure associations.

This instability is a major theme of the *Iliad*, which, for all its interest in the conflict between the Greeks and the Trojans, is equally or even more interested in the conflicts that divide the Achaeans themselves. Their internal disputes (also over a woman, in the first instance) are not qualitatively different from those that drive the war. And as the Achaeans seek to restore some measure of solidarity in the later books of the poem, they do so under the shadow of the failed truce of Books 3 and 4. In fact, the formal reconciliation between Achilles and Agamemnon unfolds almost as a replay of the earlier scene. When Achilles declares his readiness to put an end to his anger, the assembled Achaeans experience the same *kharis* they felt, along with the Trojans, in Book 3:

“So he spoke, and the well-greaved Achaeans rejoiced
as the great-hearted son of Peleus renounced his anger.”⁴⁹

As in Book 3, the use of a formula that does not belong to the normal “grammar of reception” signals the ambiguous nature of a *rapprochement* that is fundamentally private, but fraught with consequences for the community. The echo of the truce is reinforced a short while later, when Agamemnon summons *borkia* and conducts an oath-sacrifice, the only other example of an oath-sacrifice in the *Iliad*.⁵⁰

What are we to make of the convergences between these two scenes? Certainly they emphasize the extent to which Achilles has been alienated from his confederates: his reconciliation with Agamemnon is conducted as though it were a treaty between battlefield foes. The specter of the failed truce, however, also suggests that the restoration of Achaean solidarity remains precarious, and invites us to wonder just how long the Achaeans will be able to maintain their cohesiveness as a community. Achilles, it should be noted, does not partake of the meal that follows the sacrifice: he continues to be isolated, in important

⁴⁹ *Il.* 19.74-75. ὡς ἔφαθ', οἱ δ' ἐχάρησαν εὐκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοὶ ἰ μῆνιν ἀπειπόντος μεγαθύμου Πηλεΐωνος.

⁵⁰ *Il.* 19.250-268. At 19.191, Agamemnon refers to this sacrifice as ὄρκια πιστά, a formula that elsewhere refers only to a real or hypothetical agreement between Trojans and Achaeans. For a detailed examination of the parallels between these two scenes of sacrifice, see Kitts 2005, 115-156.

respects, from the community.⁵¹ And if the situation of the Achaean community at Troy is so precarious, what then will become of it after the end of the war, when Agamemnon's coalition breaks up and the various contingents return to their respective homes in Hellas? What will happen, that is, when the returning heroes enter history as the ancestors of the various local communities to which the poem's audiences belong? The failure of the Greco-Trojan experiment in community-building raises an anxiety about the prospect for collective solidarity in the absence of a persistent context of interaction. This anxiety points beyond the *Iliad* to the problems faced by the poem's real-life audiences, who inhabit a world in which such contexts must constantly be renegotiated.

⁵¹ Scaford 1994, 159-160.

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The Border of War and Peace Myth and Ritual in Argive-Spartan Dispute over Thyreatis

Natasha Bershadsky

“I was especially inclined to laugh at the people who quarreled about boundary-lines (...). And when I looked toward the Peloponnese and caught sight of Cynuria, I noted what a tiny region, no bigger in any way than an Egyptian bean, had caused so many Argives and Spartans to fall in a single day.”¹

Thus speaks Menippus, Lucian’s character who soared to the Moon on an eagle’s wings and looked back at the Earth. The fact that in the second century AD an ancient conflict between the Argives and the Spartans over a strip of borderland is picked out by the satirical writer as a memorable demonstration of human absurdity may give us an initial hint of the evocative power of the subject. This paper explores the evolving ideology of the conflict over Cynuria and the shifting networks of ritual, mythological and political associations this conflict was embedded in throughout its history. This inquiry will cause us to probe the boundaries of the ancient Greek conceptions of war and peace, ritual confrontations and real hostilities.

The Argive proposal

The starting point of this paper is a consideration of seemingly eccentric terms of a peace treaty, regulating the issue of Cynuria, put forward by the Argives to the Spartans. It is the year four hundred twenty BC. An unstable peace between Sparta and Athens is teetering. In addition, a thirty-year truce between Sparta and Argos has expired, and the Spartans are anxious to renew it in order to avoid fighting with both Argos and Athens. The Argives, on the other hand, worriedly imagine that they are about to confront a coalition between the Spartans, Athenians, Boeotians and Tegeans.² They curb their aspirations to head an

¹ Lucian. *Icaromenippus* 18.1-2, 11-16. Μάλιστα δὲ ἐπ’ ἐκείνους ἐπήει μοι γελᾶν τοῖς περὶ γῆς ὄρων ἐρίζουσι (...). ἀποβλέψας δὲ δὴ καὶ ἐς τὴν Πελοπόννησον, εἶτα τὴν Κυνουρίαν γῆν ἰδὼν ἀνεμνήσθην περὶ ὅσου χωρίου, κατ’ οὐδὲν Αἰγυπτίου φακοῦ πλατυτέρου, τοσοῦτοι ἔπεσον Ἀργείων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων μίας ἡμέρας. Translation A.M. Harmon.

² Thuc. 5.36.1, 5.40.3.

alliance of city-states independent of Sparta, and send envoys to Sparta with the goal of obtaining peace on the best possible terms. Thucydides describes the negotiations:

“What the Argives first demanded was that they might be allowed to refer to the arbitration of some state or private person the question of the Cynurian land, a borderland about which they have always been disputing, which contains the cities of Thyrea and Anthene, and which is occupied by the Spartans. The Spartans at first said that they could not allow this point to be discussed, but were ready to conclude upon the old terms. Eventually, however, the Argive ambassadors succeeded in obtaining from them this concession: For the present there was to be a truce for fifty years, but it should be competent for either party, there being neither plague nor war in Sparta or Argos, to give a formal challenge and decide the question of this territory by battle, as on a former occasion, when both sides claimed the victory; pursuit not being allowed beyond the frontier of Argos or Sparta. The Spartans at first thought this mere folly; but at last, anxious at any cost to have the friendship of Argos, they agreed to the terms demanded, and committed them to writing. However, before any of this should become binding, the ambassadors were to return to Argos and communicate with their people, and in the event of their approval, to come at the feast of the Hyacinthia and take the oaths.”³

At this point the relations between Sparta and Athens become even more strained, owing to Alcibiades’ intrigues. Alcibiades then orchestrates a treaty

³ Thuc. 5.41.2-3. καὶ οἱ πρέσβεις ἀφικόμενοι αὐτῶν λόγους ἐποιοῦντο πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐφ’ ᾧ ἂν σφίσιν αἱ σπονδαὶ γίνοντο. καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἠξίουσαν δίκης ἐπιτροπὴν σφίσι γενέσθαι ἢ ἐς πόλιν τινὰ ἢ ἰδιώτην περὶ τῆς Κυνουρίας γῆς, ἣς αἰεὶ περὶ διαφέροντα μεθορίας οὐσης (ἔχει δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ Θυρέαν καὶ Ἀνθήνην πόλιν, νέμονται δ’ αὐτὴν Λακεδαιμόνιοι)· ἔπειτα δ’ οὐκ ἐόντων Λακεδαιμονίων μεμνήσθαι περὶ αὐτῆς, ἀλλ’ εἰ βούλονται σπένδεσθαι ὡσπερ πρότερον, ἐτοῖμοι εἶναι, οἱ Ἀργεῖοι πρέσβεις τὰδε ὅμως ἐπηγάγοντο τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ζυγχορήσασαι, ἐν μὲν τῷ παρόντι σπονδὰς ποιήσασθαι ἔτη πεντήκοντα, ἐξεῖναι δ’ ὁποτεροισὺν προκαλεσαμένους, μήτε νόσου οὐσης μήτε πολέμου Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἀργεῖοι, διαμάχεσθαι περὶ τῆς γῆς ταύτης, ὡσπερ καὶ πρότερόν ποτε ὅτε αὐτοὶ ἑκάτεροι ἠξίωσαν νικᾶν, διώκειν δὲ μὴ ἐξεῖναι περαιτέρω τῶν πρὸς Ἄργος καὶ Λακεδαιμόνα ὄρων. τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐδόκει μωρία εἶναι ταῦτα, ἔπειτα (ἐπεθύμουν γὰρ τὸ Ἄργος πάντως φίλιον ἔχειν) ζυγχορήσαν ἐφ’ οἷς ἠξίουσαν καὶ ζυνεγράψαντο. ἐκέλευον δ’ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, πρὶν τέλος τι αὐτῶν ἔχειν, ἐς τὸ Ἄργος πρῶτον ἐπαναχωρήσαντας αὐτοὺς δεῖξαι τῷ πλήθει, καὶ ἦν ἀρέσκοντα ἦ· ἦκειν ἐς τὰ Ὑακίνθια τοὺς ὄρκους ποιησομένους, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀνεχώρησαν· Translation R. Crawley, modified.

between Athens and Argos, persuading the Argives to abandon their agreement with the Spartans. In the following summer (419 BC) Argos enters into a war with the Spartan ally Epidaurus; in another year, the Spartans defeat the Argives in the battle of Mantinea.⁴ The Peloponnesian War rolls on, and we are left to ponder the significance of the fleeting and idiosyncratic vision of peace that featured a battle for the disputed territory. What advantage did the Argives seek by proposing to replay the battle for Cynuria? In the modern scholarship, the Argive suggestion is interpreted as an indulgence in nostalgic archaizing at the cost of realistic engagement with the political situation.⁵ However, dismissing the Argive move as an outmoded oddity runs a serious risk of overlooking any pragmatic objectives that the Argives might have had. This paper endeavors to find such objectives. I also believe that a careful analysis of the ways in which the issue of Cynuria was handled would produce a new information about the mechanisms through which the relations of peace were established between city-states.

An attempt to understand the motivation that drove the Argives to propose the rerun of the battle has to start from the question about the nature of the conflict for Cynuria. Why was Cynuria so central in the negotiations between Sparta and Argos? It is unlikely that the importance of Cynuria derived from its economic or strategic worth.⁶ Cynuria is an isolated mountainous area.⁷ The mountain range of Parnon and the ridges of Mt Partheneion separate it, respectively, from both Sparta and Argos. Cynuria's economic value must have been insignificant:⁸ it is not rich in natural resources, and poorly suited for agriculture – there are only two plains in it (one of them near the city of Thyrea, on the coast of the Argolic Gulf). Furthermore, the conflict between the Spartans and the Argives, referred to by Thucydides and Lucian, is regularly described in other sources as a conflict over Thyreatis, the plain near Thyrea:⁹ thus, the confrontation apparently focused on only a small piece of Lucian's "Egyptian bean."

A striking feature of Thucydides' concise presentation of the confrontation over Cynuria/Thyreatis is that the description of the course of the conflict

⁴ Thuc. 5.43-47, 5.53, 5.66-74.

⁵ Hanson 2005, 344, n.37; Hornblower (2002 (1983), 84) describes the Argive proposal as a "comic moment."

⁶ See below the discussion of Cynuria's value as a "buffer zone" (Kelly 1970b, 980) between Argos and Sparta.

⁷ On the isolation of Cynuria, see Kelly 1970b, 979-980.

⁸ Brelich 1961, 22; Kelly 1970b, 980; cf. Robertson 1992, 191.

⁹ The ancient authors use the appellations Thyrea, Thyrae and Thyreatis to describe the area. I employ "Thyreatis" throughout this paper, to distinguish the region from the city of Thyrea.

supersedes the account of its causes. We learn a great deal about the conflict's temporal complexity. In the present moment of Thucydides' narrative, Cynuria is inhabited by the Spartans. However, Thucydides also portrays the Argives and the Spartans as *always* disputing over Cynuria, which is called a "borderland"¹⁰ despite having been under Sparta's control from the middle of the sixth century BC.¹¹ A further temporal reference is introduced: a certain past occasion on which both Sparta and Argos considered themselves victors. This past occasion is put forward as a blueprint for a future battle for Cynuria.

The mentions of the earlier battle and of the conflict's perpetual nature indicate that the traditional history of the conflict played an important role in the conflict's present. Interestingly, the Argive proposal seeks to remove the issue of Cynuria from history into the safe space of a ritual. The condition that in the battle for Cynuria the pursuit cannot proceed beyond the frontiers of Argos and Sparta disconnects the question of Cynuria's possession from the possibility of a wider territorial conquest. Moreover, the fight for this territory becomes the manifestation of concord between Argos and Sparta. It follows from the prominence of the history and ritual in the Argive proposal that the key to understanding of the importance of Cynuria/Thyreatis in the Argive-Spartan relationship should be sought not in the economic and strategic factors but in the ideology of the conflict over this territory. By the "ideology of the conflict" I mean a conceptual framework, including the past course of the conflict as conceived by each side, that informed the perception of the conflict's meaning. In the course of my argument, I will attempt to elucidate the particular visions of the past that the Argives and the Spartans might have operated with at the moment of the treaty. After reconstructing the ideology of the conflict, we will be in a better position to identify the ways in which this ideology was utilized and manipulated by the Argive proposal to ritualize the confrontation over Cynuria. This, in turn, should help us to answer the question concerning the synchronic practical gains the Argives were hoping to achieve by the treaty.

Sources

Our most important source concerning the conflict over Cynuria/Thyreatis is Herodotus' description of the so-called Battle of Champions (1.82). This battle is commonly identified with the "former occasion, when both sides claimed the

¹⁰ γῆς...μεθορίας. Thuc. 5.41.2; also 2.27.2. Figueira (1993, 528-529) points out the peculiarity of Thucydides' definition of Cynuria/Thyreatis as a borderland.

¹¹ On the dating of the Spartan annexation of Cynuria, see below.

victory,” mentioned by Thucydides.¹² Herodotus dates the battle by the time of Croesus’ appeal to the Spartans for help against the Persians (in 546 BC, by our reckoning). The Spartans, Herodotus tells us, had just seized the territory of Thyreatis from the Argives, who were ready to fight for the return of their land. The warring sides agreed that in lieu of a full-scale battle, only three hundred men from each side should fight. The rest of the two armies departed to avoid involvement in the battle. In the course of fighting, only three men were left alive, two Argives and a Spartan. The Argives returned to Argos, believing that they had won, but the Spartan stripped the enemy corpses of armor and returned to his post in the Spartan camp. The next day, when both armies came back to learn the outcome, a disagreement broke out over who should be considered the victor; the argument turned into a fight, and after both sides had suffered many casualties, the Spartans defeated the Argives. This confrontation, Herodotus says, led to changes in both the Spartan and the Argive customs concerning their hairstyles: the Argives resolved to cut their hair short till they had won Thyreatis back, while the Spartans began to grow their hair long.

The Battle of Champions is not the only attested military clash focused on Cynuria/Thyreatis. Thucydides’ assertion that the Argives and the Spartans “always dispute” for Cynuria is matched by Pausanias’ account, portraying Cynuria as a primordial conflict zone. Pausanias dates the first Spartan military involvement in Cynuria by the reign of Echestratus, the son of eponymous Agis, and even prior to the reign of Prytanis, the son of eponymous Eurypion.¹³ He also refers to a struggle for Thyreatis between the Spartans and Argives in the reign of Theopompus.¹⁴ Furthermore, Plutarch mentions a speech of Polydorus (the Agiad king contemporary with Theopompus, according to the inherited tradition), made on the occasion of the Spartan victory over the Argives, “after the battle of the three hundred.”¹⁵ Plutarch’s wording is interesting: he says that in the battle of the three hundred the Argives were “again” (πάλιν) defeated by the Spartans, suggesting a previous Spartan victory over the Argives in a battle of three hundred.¹⁶ The sources portray the dispute over Cynuria as remaining unresolved for a long time after the episode during the Peloponnesian War described by Thucydides: Pausanias mentions an arbitration

¹² Thuc. 5.41.2. Hornblower 2008, 97 with further references.

¹³ Paus. 3.2.2, 3.7.2.

¹⁴ Paus. 3.7.5. In addition, Pausanias transmits a tradition of the Spartan defeat by the Argives at Hysiai (Paus. 2.24.7), which is often connected to the conflict over Cynuria in the modern literature (Wade-Gery 1949, 80; Brelich 1961, 23, n.29 gives other references); however, see Kelly 1970a.

¹⁵ Plut. *Apophthegmata Laconica* 231c.

¹⁶ Brelich 1961, 25.

of the disputed territory between Sparta and Argos by Philip and then again, by the Roman senator Gallus.¹⁷

Conflicting interpretations of the dispute over Thyreatis

A major advance in the understanding of the ideological underpinnings of the conflict over Thyreatis was made by Angelo Brelich in his classic study *Guerra, agoni e culti nella Grecia arcaica*. Brelich called attention to the long duration of the conflict, the reports of its inception in the legendary antiquity, and the incommensurability between the value of the disputed territory and the scale of the conflict.¹⁸ He also emphasized the repeated appearance of regulations, mitigating the magnitude of the fighting.¹⁹ Brelich observed that the dispute over Thyreatis shared these features with another ancient conflict over a border territory, the war for the Lelantine Plain between Eretria and Chalcis. He noticed a resemblance between the aetiology of the Spartan and Argive hairstyles given by Herodotus, and a tradition associating a particular hairstyle with the Lelantine War,²⁰ and suggested that the references to hair-cutting tied these border conflicts to ritual initiations of young men into adulthood.²¹

Brelich also reconstructed some religious connotations of the conflict over Thyreatis. The conflict was linked with one of the most important Spartan festivals, the Gymnopaediae. The festival featured choruses of *paides* in honor of the Spartans who fell at Thyrea; the choral leaders wore wreaths called *thyreatikoi*, commemorating the victory at Thyrea.²² The ritual celebration of the battle for Thyreatis during the Gymnopaediae occurred in the framework of the cult of Apollo Pythaeus,²³ a divine figure important in Laconia, and at the same time strongly associated with Argos.²⁴ Brelich remarked that Apollo Pythaeus

¹⁷ Paus. 7.11.1-2.

¹⁸ Brelich 1961, 22, 29, 29-30, n.38.

¹⁹ Ibid., 29. The examples include the restriction of the number of the participants to three hundred on each side (Hdt. 1.82.3); the Argive proposal that the pursuit in a future battle for Cynuria should not go beyond the borders of Argos and Sparta (Thuc. 5.41.2); Polydorus' insistence in that the aim of the battle was solely the possession of the disputed territory and not the conquest of the enemy's city (Plut. *Apophthegmata Laconica* 231e).

²⁰ Ibid., 30.

²¹ Ibid., 80-81.

²² Ibid., 30-31. Sosibius via Athenaeus 15.678b-c, *Anecd. Bekk.* 1, 32, *Suda* s.v. Γυμνοπαΐδια.

²³ Paus. 3.11.9; Brelich 1961, 31.

²⁴ Brelich 1961, 32, 34. Ancient sources (Telesilla via Paus. 2.35.2) claim that the epithet Pythaeus is originally Argive.

was connected to the confrontation between Argos and Sparta,²⁵ and also apparently once united the two city-states in some sort of federal cult.²⁶ Brelich concluded that the dispute over Thyreatis (as well as the Lelantine War) originated as a ritual combat for the border territory, during which the participants transitioned from the status of ephebes to adulthood. Over time, these ritual combats were transformed into real wars, leaving only an “aura” of cultic and ritual associations.²⁷ However, Brelich himself admitted that such an explanation left some problems unresolved. The relation between the ritual limitation of violence and apparent cases of severe bloodshed is perplexing. For example, in Herodotus’ narrative, the regulation limiting the number of the combatants to three hundreds on each side is combined with the annihilation of all but three participants.²⁸ A further and major problem is that Brelich’s “ritual aura” does not explain the nature of fighting over Thyreatis once the ritual combats, according to Brelich’s model, were transformed into real confrontations. Brelich perceived the cultic and ritual details, cropping up in our sources in connection to the dispute over Thyreatis, as synchronically inconsequential, stripped of their “original” initiatory context in the distant past.²⁹ However, the perpetuation of a ritual at a given moment in time tends to endow it with a range of current functions and significances.³⁰ A proper reconstruction of a ritual therefore ought to consider its successive modifications in form, content and function over a span of time: the rituals connected to the confrontation over Thyreatis need to be embedded in their historical contexts. Finally, Brelich’s analysis presents an additional methodological problem in that Brelich uses the sources in an undifferentiated fashion, without distinguishing between earlier and later ones.

Indeed, Thomas Kelly, who carefully examined the ancient sources on the history of the strife between Sparta and Argos in a chronological manner, came to the following unsettling conclusion: “the later the writer the more he pro-

²⁵ According to a tradition reported by Pausanias, the cult of Apollo Pythaeus in Asine figured in an ancient episode of the Spartan-Argive hostilities. Paus. 2.36.4. Brelich 1961, 32.

²⁶ Thuc. 5.53.1, Diod. 12.78.1. Brelich 1961, 33-34. The evidence for the federal cult of Apollo Pythaeus that included both Argos and Sparta is complicated and can be only briefly considered in the current presentation. See below n.108.

²⁷ Brelich 1961, 83-84.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 79.

²⁹ Thus, for example, Brelich mentions the Argive proposal to the Spartans of replaying the battle for Thyreatis (Brelich 1961, 17), but he does not offer any remarks on the import of this suggestion in 420 BC.

³⁰ Kowalzig 2007, 34.

fesses to know about the early warfare between the two states.³¹ Kelly asserts that the centuries-long struggle between Argos and Sparta, stemming from the earliest times, was invented in the fourth century BC and then elaborated on by the later historians.³² The gist of Kelly's argument is as follows. The earliest mention of the conflict between Argos and Sparta is Herodotus' description of the Battle of Champions; the passage of Thucydides about the Argive suggestion to replay the battle is the next oldest reference.³³ Both sources portray the conflict as focused solely on the issue of the territory of Cynuria/Thyreatis.³⁴ On this subject Kelly observes that the accessible road from Sparta to Cynuria passed through the territory of Tegea; the alternative mountainous route was very difficult. Kelly infers that a precondition for Sparta's being strategically interested in the occupation of Cynuria (as a buffer zone protecting the Spartans from a potential Argive attack and making a Spartan attack on the Argive plain possible) was Spartan dominance over Tegea.³⁵ Sparta gained control of Tegea sometime in the middle of the sixth century,³⁶ which therefore must provide a *terminus post quem* for the Spartan military interest in Cynuria. This date fits well with the date of the Battle of Champions derived from Herodotus (546 BC); after that point there is an unambiguous record of continual hostilities between Sparta and Argos.³⁷

Kelly argues that the ancient writers coming after Herodotus and Thucydides were influenced by the post-mid-sixth-century hostile relations between Sparta and Argos and assumed that the two states were antagonistic throughout their history.³⁸ The first mention of a specific conflict between Sparta and Argos predating the Battle of Champions is found in Ephorus, whom Kelly credits with the introduction of the idea of the strife between Argos and Sparta as the defining theme of the early Peloponnesian history.³⁹ For Pausanias the traditional enmity between the two states was a given. Pausanias makes numer-

³¹ Kelly 1970b, 1000.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Tyrtaios' fragment P. Oxy. 3316 (not yet discovered at the time of Kelly's article) is sometimes cited as an archaic evidence of the war between Sparta and Argos. Cartledge 2002, 109. However, a rarely acknowledged feature of the poem is that it is written in the future tense, which opens the possibility that the poem does not portray to a historical event. Indeed, the description of military events in the future tense finds parallels in Archilochus fr. 3 and *Hymn. Hom. Dem.* 265-267, both of which, as I plan to argue in a different paper, refer to rituals.

³⁴ Kelly 1970b, 974, 979-980.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 980-981.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 975, n.16 with further references.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 984.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 985.

ous references to it, providing, for example, a list of six early Spartan kings who engaged in confrontations with the Argives. Kelly remarks that the kings on the list belong to such remote past that their historicity is highly unlikely; for him, the list is an example of a later baroque embellishment on the theme of primordial Argive-Spartan strife.⁴⁰

Kelly's analysis seems to undercut several points of Brelich's argument, such as the early inception of the conflict for Thyreatis and the long duration of the conflict. However, at this point a crucial distinction must be made between the historical reality of the centuries-long confrontation over Cynuria/Thyreatis and the historical reality of the *tradition* describing such confrontation. I consider Kelly's argument about the mid-sixth century inception of Sparta's military involvement in Cynuria to be persuasive; however, his claim that the tradition of the ancient conflict between Argos and Sparta was invented in the fourth century is less convincing. While it is plausible that the specific details concerning the early confrontation are a later elaboration, already Thucydides states that the two states were "always disputing" over Cynuria.⁴¹ Plato and Xenophon also share belief in a tradition of the primordial conflict between Sparta and Argos.⁴² Further, our earliest source, Herodotus' account, contains elements such as the equal numbers of the battle participants on each side, or the aetiology of haircuts, highly evocative of ritual. Thus, Herodotus does not provide us with a dry military report of the Battle of Champions in 546 BC as an inception of Argive-Spartan conflict: rather, his description suggests that he is familiar with the tradition of the conflict, endowed with ritual overtones. Let us attempt to reconstruct the various stages of the development of this tradition. The starting point for this reconstruction should obviously be a closer examination of our earliest source, Herodotus.

Myth, ritual, history: What Herodotus has joined together

As we have seen, the date of the Battle of Champions (546 BC) matches Kelly's reconstruction of the Spartans becoming interested in the annexation of Cynuria after they have gained control of Tegea. While we lack a literary source, contemporary or earlier than Herodotus, that would corroborate Herodotus' dating of the Spartan conquest, an archaeologically attested explosive appear-

⁴⁰ Ibid., 994-995.

⁴¹ αἰεὶ ... διαφέρονται, Thuc. 5.41.2. Thucydides' wording elicits Kelly's objection, not backed up by any evidence, that αἰεὶ "cannot be taken in temporal sense." Kelly 1970b, 974, n.10.

⁴² Plato *Leg.* 3.686b, Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.11. Kelly 1970b, 985, nn.53,54.

ance of the Spartan settlements in Cynuria in the middle of the sixth century fits the date provided by Herodotus.⁴³ Thus, it is likely that Herodotus' account of the Spartan annexation of Cynuria in the middle of the sixth century has some foundation in reality.

However, one should observe that the connection between the Battle of Champions and Croesus' appeal for help against the Persians, on which the precise dating of the battle is founded, is extremely flimsy. The story of the battle appears in a vignette that turns to have no causal relation with the Spartan assistance for Croesus:⁴⁴ the Spartans decide to help Croesus "despite their conflict with the Argives,"⁴⁵ but then the news of Croesus' capture arrive as they are ready to sail out, so they cancel the expedition. This lack of causal relation elicits a suspicion that Herodotus attached the description of the Battle of Champions to Croesus' appeal on some other grounds than his rigorous knowledge of the historical link between the two events. The fragility of the battle's dating compels us to examine the historicity of the rest of the passage, which is commonly interpreted as a straightforward chronological account of the past.⁴⁶ However, a more careful look at the episode reveals disturbing anachronisms and aberrations. First, it was long ago observed that Herodotus' description of the Argive supremacy in the Peloponnese at the time of the Spartan attack⁴⁷ brings to mind the legendary past of Agamemnon's rule over the islands rather than the realia of the sixth century.⁴⁸ Further, 546 BC seems late for the Spartan adoption of the long hair: representations of long-haired Spartan youths are attested much earlier.⁴⁹ Finally, the outcome of the Battle of Champions – the death of all but three participants – is extraordinary.⁵⁰ A hoplite battle in which all of the participants are killed off is easier accommodated in the world of myth than in the world of military history.

⁴³ Kennell 2010, 52. Cartledge 2002, 123 also supports this date for the Spartan annexation of Thyreatis.

⁴⁴ Dillery 1996, 221.

⁴⁵ Hdt. 1.83.

⁴⁶ As recently as Kennell 2010, 52.

⁴⁷ "At this time the land as far as Malis in the west belonged to the Argives, both the mainland and the islands, including Cythera and the rest." Hdt. 1.82.2. All translations from Herodotus are by A.L. Purvis.

⁴⁸ Beloch 1912, 204, n.1; Kelly 1970b, 977-978; Tomlinson 1972, 88; tentatively, Asheri et al. 2007, 139. Cf. Hdt. 1.1.2.

⁴⁹ Tomlinson 1972, 89; Lipka 2002, 194. For Plutarch, this custom possessed the antiquity of Lycurgus' ordinance. Plut. *Lys.* 1.2-3. David 1992, 14.

⁵⁰ The rate of mortality in a hoplite battle has been assessed as three to ten percent for the winning side, and ten to twenty percent for the defeated one. Krentz 1985, 18; Hanson 1995, 306-307.

A reasonable explanation of these peculiarities is that Herodotus incorporated a legendary tradition of a lethal battle into his account of the fighting over Thyreatis. Suggestions along these lines have been made in the past by Richard Tomlinson and Noel Robertson.⁵¹ Yet both these scholars, in different ways, underestimate the potential significance of such a legend. Tomlinson's focus of interest is the historical reality of the interactions between Argos and Sparta in the sixth century BC. Thus, while he notices the "romanticizing" in Herodotus' account and posits a question concerning its causes, he leaves the question unanswered.⁵² Robertson's assertion is that the story of the battle of Champions was "invented" as an aetiology of a certain festival.⁵³ However, such a privileging of the ritual at the expense of the affiliated myth disregards the interactions between the ritual and the myth, which are arguably central in the generation of messages.⁵⁴ My argument will attempt to examine the historical implications of the mythical tradition about the battle for Thyreatis considered jointly with its allied rituals.

Ritual connotations, as we have already observed, are conspicuous in the description of the Battle of Champions. The aetiology of the Spartan and Argive hairstyles suggests an association with rites of passage.⁵⁵ For Sparta, in particular, we have Xenophon's statement that the men were allowed to grow long hair after they left the age grade of *hébôntes*.⁵⁶ A subtler point, also indicative of a ritual, is a paradoxical pattern of cooperation between Sparta and Argos, emerging from Herodotus' phrasing. Herodotus reports that the Spartan custom of wearing long hair was established as an opposite of the Argive adoption of the short hair.⁵⁷ The Argives and the Spartans appear to define themselves through their antagonism; their hair-related customs are contrasting and complementary, operating in one system of signification.

Thus, even a relatively rapid examination of the passage uncovers interlocking elements of history, myth and ritual. The joining together of such elements,

⁵¹ Tomlinson 1972, 89; Robertson 1992, 184; Kōiv 2003, 131.

⁵² Tomlinson 1972, 89.

⁵³ Robertson 1992, 207.

⁵⁴ The definition of myth with which I operate is "a given society's codification of its own traditional values in narrative and dramatic form." Nagy 1990, 436. Similarly, Lincoln 1999, 147. On the relation between myth and ritual, see the discussion in Kowalzig 2007, 22-23.

⁵⁵ Brelich 1961, 80-81; Robertson 1992, 206.

⁵⁶ Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 11.3. Ducat 2006a, 109-111. Cf. Pettersson 1992, 85. *Hébôntes* were the oldest age group that did not have full citizen status (despite their prominence in military service). Ducat 2006a, 104-112.

⁵⁷ Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τὰ ἐναντία τούτων ἔθεντο νόμον. "The Spartans established a contrary regulation." Hdt. 1.82.8.

often stemming from different sources, is at the heart of Herodotus' historical method.⁵⁸ Sometimes Herodotus identifies his sources; at other times different narrative strands are amalgamated. Moreover, in many cases it is possible to pinpoint the modifications that Herodotus made in the traditional accounts included in his *History*.⁵⁹ The following discussion attempts to determine the outlines of the constituent traditions that Herodotus merged in his description of the dispute over Thyreatis, and to identify the adjustments that he introduced.

Beautiful death in Thyreatis

My working hypothesis so far is that Herodotus combined the mythical tale of a deadly battle for Thyreatis and some ritual elements (whose nature we will discuss later) with the historically veracious story of a large-scale confrontation between Sparta and Argos that resulted in the Spartan appropriation of Cynuria. The idea that Herodotus combined the myth of a lethal battle and an account of a historical confrontation receives some support from the existence of a version in which the battle of six hundred champions is unaccompanied by further military conflict. Plutarch, citing the *Peloponnesian History* by Chrysermus, reports that when, after the deadly battle of the six hundred champions, both sides still claimed victory,⁶⁰ “the Amphictyonic Assembly, after a personal inspection of the battlefield, decided in favor of the Spartans.”⁶¹ We will return to the peculiar detail of the Amphictyonic Assembly arbitrating between the Spartans and the Argives. Now let us examine another difference between the versions of Herodotus and Plutarch/Chrysermus: the fate and function of the last Spartan to remain alive, Othryades.

Herodotus ends the story of the battle by telling that Othryades “was ashamed to return to Sparta because his comrades had died; he killed himself there in Thyrea.”⁶² No shame figures in Plutarch's rendering: Othryades, the Spartan general, is wounded mortally, summons the remaining strength to build a trophy, and writes upon it a victory dedication in his own blood.⁶³ The same story reoccurs in several other sources, including an epigram attributed to Si-

⁵⁸ Bakker 2002, 15, 18-19, 29; cf. Dewald 2002, 283, 286-287; Griffiths 2006, 140.

⁵⁹ Burkert 1965; Griffith 1989; Calame 2003 (1996), 86-108; Giangulio 2001; Giangulio 2005; Griffiths 2006, 140-141.

⁶⁰ Compare Thuc. 5.41.2: “when both sides claimed the victory.”

⁶¹ Plut. *Parallela Minora* 306b. Translation F.C. Babbitt.

⁶² Hdt. 1.82.8.

⁶³ Plut. *Parallela Minora* 306a-b.

monides.⁶⁴ Herodotus' account is our earliest attestation of the tale of Thyrea, since the attribution of *Anth. Pal.* 7.431 to Simonides is tentative.⁶⁵ However, we cannot automatically assume the absolute chronological primacy of Herodotus' version. The question is, could the suicide of Othryades have featured in the mythical tradition about the lethal battle that ended with the Argive-Spartan dispute over the victory?

We can answer this question in part, I believe: this episode is unlikely to be stemming from the *Spartan* version of the myth, since the suicide of the last Spartan survivor does nothing to bolster the Spartan claim of victory.⁶⁶ Conversely, the heroic death of Othryades as presented by Plutarch and the epigrams perfectly fits the Spartan ideology of a beautiful death, i.e. the death in battle that brings salvation and glory to the city.⁶⁷ Thus, this version, despite its later attestation, is possibly more similar than Herodotus' version to the variant of the myth prevalent in Sparta.

Interestingly, we also have traces of an Argive variant of the mythical battle for Thyreatis. Pausanias reports that the Argives considered themselves victors in the contest for Thyreatis with the Spartans.⁶⁸ In another passage, he describes seeing in the theater in Argos "a representation of a man killing another, namely the Argive Perilaus, the son of Alcenor, killing the Spartan Othryades."⁶⁹ Thus, it appears that the Argives at some point presented the death of Othryades as their own victory.⁷⁰

Why did Herodotus incorporate the suicide of Othryades, rather than the episode of Othryades' glorious death, into his narrative? Herodotus' variant can be at least partially explained as the result of the joining of two tales, the mythi-

⁶⁴ *Anth. Pal.* 7.431 (attributed to Simonides); 7.430; 7.741; Theseus via Stob. *Flor.* 3.7.68 (= *FGrH* 453 F 2), on which see Corcella 1996, 263, with n.15 for further literature. Only one epigram (*Anth. Pal.* 7.526) speaks of Othryades' suicide (following the erection of the trophy).

⁶⁵ See Bravi 2006, 89-90, with bibliography.

⁶⁶ It is noteworthy that Plutarch vehemently disagrees with the Herodotean version of Othryades' death: "Notice how roughly he has handled Othryades, whom they [the Spartans] particularly admired and honored." Plutarch, *De Herodoti malignitate* 858d. Translation L. Pearson. On the anomalous nature of Herodotus' motivation of Othryades' suicide see Dillery 1996, 227; Robertson 1992, 201; Tomlinson 1972, 89.

⁶⁷ Loraux 1977. On the heroization of the Spartans fallen at Thyrea, see Currie 2005, 99, n.59 with further references.

⁶⁸ Paus. 10.9.12.

⁶⁹ Paus. 2.20.7. Translation W.H.S. Jones. In Herodotus, Alcenor is the name of one of the two Argive survivors; Plutarch gives the name of Agenor instead.

⁷⁰ Asheri et al. 2007, 140.

cal battle and the historical confrontation.⁷¹ In the process of joining, the figure of Othryades, pivotal in the traditional story, becomes marginalized.⁷²

While Herodotus' story of Othryades' suicide somewhat departs from the conventional ideology of the glorious death, the theme of the beautiful death emerges forcefully in a different episode, which turns to be implicitly connected with the battle for Thyrea. I refer to the famous scene when before the battle of Thermopylae a messenger reports to Xerxes that the Spartans are engaged in combing their long hair. Demaratus explains to the astonished Xerxes that it is a custom for the Spartans to arrange their hair when they are about to risk their lives.⁷³ At this point we may remember Herodotus' statement that the Spartans adopted long hair in commemoration of the victory at Thyrea. This custom turns out to be not only a joyful sign of triumph and a tribute to the heroic dead, but a preparation for becoming a beautiful corpse,⁷⁴ if need be, in emulation of the three hundred at Thyrea.⁷⁵

The ritual battle

The Spartan annexation of Cynuria probably dates to the middle of the sixth century BC, as we have discussed. Can we date the mythical tale of the conflict over Thyreatis? While living, changing myths are notoriously difficult to date, the detail of the strangely cooperative attitude of the Argives and the Spartans, expressed in the equal number of the battle participants on each side, is unlikely to have been first conceived after the Spartan takeover of Cynuria: it probably

⁷¹ The story of Othryades' suicide out of shame to be the only survivor may also in part have been motivated by Herodotus' sympathy toward Aristodemus, the sole survivor of Thermopylae, who was dishonored at Sparta as a "trembler", and then fell at Plataea after proving himself one of the bravest fighters. On Herodotus' sympathy toward Aristodemus, see Ducat 2006b, 34-38.

⁷² The placement of the suicide of Othryades at the very end of Herodotus' account of the confrontation over Thyreatis intensifies the impression of the episode's marginalization in Herodotus' rendering.

⁷³ Hdt. 7.208.3, 7.209.3.

⁷⁴ On the Spartan hair arrangement in preparation to dying beautifully, see David 1992, 16.

⁷⁵ On the similarities between Herodotus' descriptions of the battles of Thyrea and Thermopylae see Dillery 1996. All the potential explanations of these similarities that Dillery considers involve Herodotus, consciously or unconsciously, patterning the accounts of Thyrea and Thermopylae after one another. Dillery 1996, 234. However, a qualitatively different scenario is also imaginable: the tradition of Thyrea could have molded the tradition of Thermopylae independently and prior to Herodotus.

derives from the earlier period, when Sparta and Argos, as Kelly argues, were not yet enemies.⁷⁶

We arrive at a paradox: the myth of the confrontation between Argos and Sparta, focused on the issue of Thyreatis, appears to predate any real clash of interests between Argos and Sparta in that area. What was the significance of the myth of the confrontation before there was a real confrontation? And how do we account for the traces of cooperation and ritual, noticeable in Herodotus' description of the conflict over Thyreatis? As a solution, I propose to adopt a modified form of Brelich's hypothesis that the Argives and the Spartans engaged in ritual combats for the border territory of Thyreatis. In contrast to Brelich, I do not consign the ritual confrontations to the prehistoric past, but rather suggest that they took place in the archaic period until Sparta disrupted the tradition by the annexation of Cynuria.⁷⁷ The outcome of each battle determined to which city-state the border territory of the Thyreatis would belong till the next encounter.⁷⁸ I submit that these ritual battles commemorated and reenacted (in an attenuated form) the mythical deadly battle of the six hundred champions.

The idea of the ritual reenactments of the battle for Thyreatis helps to explain why Herodotus merged the myth of the battle with the story of the Spartan conquest of Cynuria, which happened only about a hundred years before Herodotus' time.⁷⁹ While Herodotus probably was not aware of the past practice of the ritual battles, the reenactments that occurred till the middle of the sixth century could have "modernized" the myth, creating an impression that it was situated not in the legendary past, but in a relatively recent historical time.

Herodotus' mention of the Spartan adoption of the long hair in his account of the confrontation over Thyreatis indicates that the long hair may have been linked to the participation in the ritual battle. In Sparta in the classical period the right to wear long hair coincided with the attainment of full citizenship.⁸⁰ If we assume that it was the same in the archaic period, we can infer that the

⁷⁶ Kelly 1970b, 1001.

⁷⁷ Brelich very cautiously considered a possibility that battles with limited number of participants, analogous to the Battle of Champions, were fought in Thyreatis "in tutte le epoche." Brelich 29-30, n.38. See also Köiv 2003, 132.

⁷⁸ The mechanism of such variable possession is obscure, but possibly it concerned the revenue from the territory.

⁷⁹ Tomlinson remarks that the "folk-tale versions of events," reported by Herodotus, such as the story of Cypselus, typically "belong to remoter times than the mid-sixth century." Tomlinson 1972, 89.

⁸⁰ See above n. 56.

(hypothetical) ritual battle functioned as a rite of coming of age for its participants, marking their transition into full citizen status.⁸¹

Fighting at the *Gymnopaediae*

I hypothesized that in the archaic period the Argives and the Spartans fought in ritual battles for the territory of Thyreatis. What follows is an attempt to reconstruct further details concerning the setting and organization of such battles. We have already mentioned Brelich's observation of the connection between the tale of battle for Thyreatis and an important Spartan festival, the *Gymnopaediae*,⁸² which involved choruses in honor of the Spartans fallen at Thyrea, as well as wreaths, called *thyreatikoi*, worn by the choral leaders in the memory of the Spartan victory at Thyrea.⁸³ The current *communis opinio* is that the commemoration of the battle for Thyreatis is a later addition to the festival. A detail, reported by Athenaeus on the authority of Sosibius, of choruses at the *Gymnopaediae* performing songs of Alcman and Thaletas,⁸⁴ creates an impression of the festival practices that predate 546 BC (the accepted date of the battle at Thyrea).⁸⁵ However, as I have argued, the myth of the battle of the six hundred champions should be detached from the date of 546 BC; when it is

⁸¹ The hypothesis that there was an archaic Spartan tradition of ritual battles, serving as rites of passage, finds a typological parallel in the later attestation of Spartan group combats, bearing initiatory overtones, such as the *Platanistas* (Paus. 3.14.8-10; Ducat 2006a, 208-209; Kennell 1995, 55-59) and the ball games. Kennell (1995, 40) shows that, at least in the Roman period, the Spartan ball game was "a type of graduation ceremony, marking the transition from ephebe to adult." It was organized as a tournament, in which pairs of ephebic teams (*sphairis*), representing five *ôbai*, the ancient constituent villages of Sparta, competed against each other (Kennell 1995, 40). The Spartan ball game probably was the same as the game of *episkuros* (Kennell 1995, 61; cf. Crowther 1997, 6; the main source on *episkuros* is Pollux 9.103-107). In a recent article, Elmer (2008, 420) interprets *episkuros* as "a symbolization of a boundary dispute." The nexus of the boundary dispute and a rite of passage strikingly resembles my suggestion of the ritual battle.

⁸² Brelich 1961, 30-31. The *Gymnopaediae* was one of the principal Spartan festivals, as attested by Paus. 3.11.9. Its importance is also apparent in earlier periods: Ducat 2006a, 266; Nagy 1990, 348, n. 56. The festival was attended by strangers at least from the Classical period on: Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.61, Plut. *Ages.* 29.1, Plut. *Cimon* 10.6. My presentation is based on the recent discussion of the *Gymnopaediae* by Ducat 2006a, 265-274; see also Pettersson 1992, 42-56; Robertson 1992, 147-165; Richer 2005.

⁸³ See above n. 22.

⁸⁴ Athen. 15.678c. Translation Ducat 2006a, 269.

⁸⁵ Wade-Gery 1949, 80; Ducat 2006a, 271; cf. Kōiv 2003, 130-131.

done, nothing prevents us from assuming that the myth of the battle at Thyreatis was a primary component of the Gymnopaediae. I propose that this myth, with its underlying ideology of the beautiful death, was the *aition*⁸⁶ of the Gymnopaediae.⁸⁷ Further, I suggest, as a working hypothesis, that the archaic predecessor of the Gymnopaediae (which I will call the “proto-Gymnopaediae”) constituted for the Spartans the framework in which the ritual battles between the Spartans and the Argives took place.⁸⁸

The conjectured role of the ritual battles as coming-of-age rites matches the “initiatory themes”⁸⁹ perceptible in the accounts of the Gymnopaediae from the Classical period on. It seems that the age-group of ephebes played a particularly prominent part at the Gymnopaediae.⁹⁰ The festival’s name suggests that the participating *paides* (whom we probably can identify as the ephebes⁹¹) were naked – an impression confirmed by ancient texts.⁹² The nakedness strengthens the resemblance to an initiation ritual.⁹³ A Spartan speaker in Plato’s *Laws* describes the Gymnopaediae as “a fearful act of endurance practiced in our own community, where people have to fight [*diamakbomenōn*]

⁸⁶ I adopt Nagy’s definition of an *aition*: “a myth that *traditionally* motivates an institution, such as a ritual.” Nagy 1999 (1979), 279 §2, n.2. Nagy stresses that the aetiological tradition is not derivative, but parallel to the ritual.

⁸⁷ At present, no convincing hypothesis exists concerning the aetiology of the Gymnopaediae. Previously, the accepted position was Wade-Gery’s suggestion that the festival was instituted by the Spartans in 668 BC (the traditional date of the Gymnopaediae, deriving from Eusebius) as a morale-boosting measure following their defeat by the Argives at Hysiai in 669 BC (Wade-Gery 1949, 80-81). However, this idea has been criticized by Kelly, who contends that Paus. 2.4.7 is the only mention of the battle of Hysiai; moreover, the battle’s date (669 BC) is a result of a modern emendation (Kelly 1970a, 32, 34).

⁸⁸ On the Argive festival associated with the ritual battles, see below.

⁸⁹ Ducat 2006a, 274; cf. Pettersson 1992, 55.

⁹⁰ Paus. 3.11.9. See Kennell 1995, 68-69 (who thinks it is a late feature).

⁹¹ Ducat (2006a, 268) remarks that the *paides*, frequently mentioned in the ancient sources as the participants of the Gymnopaediae, must have been *paidiskoi*, adolescents in their late teens. (He comments, however, that *-παῖδια* probably is not derived from *παῖς* “child”, but is rather related to *παίζειν* “to play, to dance”. Ducat 2006a, 266.)

⁹² Athen. 14.631b; Hesych. s. v. Γυμνοπαῖδια. Ducat 2006a, 272-273.

⁹³ Ducat 2006a, 274. One more indication of the connection between the Gymnopaediae and the rituals of coming of age can be derived from a peculiar Spartan law, which excluded the Spartans who failed to marry at the proper age from watching the Gymnopaediae, but compelled them to march naked around the agora in the winter, singing a self-imprecating song (Plut. *Lyc.* 15.1). Ferrari (2002, 120) interprets this chastisement as a disgraceful parody of the Gymnopaediae, “a perversion of the ritual through which they [the bachelors] had attained manhood.”

against fierce and stifling heat.”⁹⁴ This portrayal of the festival as an ordeal is particularly reminiscent of an initiation rite.

A question arises concerning the location of the proto-Gymnopaediae. If this festival featured the ritual battle, then it must have comprised a procession from Sparta to the battle site in the territory of Thyreatis. The historical Gymnopaediae, in contrast, was celebrated solely in Sparta. How do we explain this difference between the conjectural proto-form of the festival and its attested form? We know of one Spartan festival that was connected to the battle for Thyreatis and celebrated in the territory of Thyreatis: the Parparonia.⁹⁵ Georgius Choeroboscus mentions Parparos as a site of a battle between the Argives and the Spartans in Thyreatis;⁹⁶ Hesychius speaks of *agôn* and *choroi* established at that site.⁹⁷ The festival of Parparonia, attested in the famous Damonon inscription (5 c. BC), included athletic competitions.⁹⁸ The situation in which both the Gymnopaediae and the Parparonia were connected to the myth of the confrontation over Thyreatis is explicable if the proto-Gymnopaediae, previously celebrated both in Sparta and in Thyreatis, was restructured following the elimination of the ritual battle in the sixth century. In the absence of the ritual battle, the part of the Gymnopaediae taking place in Sparta would have probably gained prominence. Subsequently, the celebration in Thyreatis could have become detached from the festival of the Gymnopaediae, turning into a separate festival.

A partnership between Argos and Sparta

The idea of a ritual (as opposed to a real) confrontation between Sparta and Argos presupposes the existence of an amicable, cooperative relationship between the two states. Below I review some evidence, centered around the traditional theme of the Argive-Spartan confrontation over Thyreatis, that suggests a presence of such partnership between Argos and Sparta in the archaic period.

We have noted earlier an arresting detail in Plutarch’s account of the Battle of Champions: the battle was managed by the body called the Amphictyonic

⁹⁴ Pl. *Leg.* 1.633c. Translation Ducat 2006a, 273, modified. I am particularly interested in Plato’s use of the military language in the figure of “battling with the heat.” While such representation of the festival as an endurance test is unique in our sources (Ducat 2006a, 273-274), it must be taken seriously as an early evidence.

⁹⁵ Wade-Gery 1949, 79, n.7; Brelich 1961, 31, n.42; Phaklares 1990, 226-227; Billot 1992, 87-88; Robertson 1992, 179-207; Polignac 1995, 55, n.54; Kōiv 2003, 127-128.

⁹⁶ Choerob. in Theodos. 297, 4-6.

⁹⁷ Hesych. s.v. Πάρπαρος.

⁹⁸ *JG* v 1, 213 lines 44-49, 62-64.

Assembly (οἱ Ἀμφικτύονες).⁹⁹ Plutarch (on the authority of Chrysermus) credits the Amphictyonic Assembly both with setting up the battle of the six hundred as a solution of the Argive-Spartan dispute over Thyreatis, and with the authoritative ruling of the Spartan victory. While many elements of Plutarch's account, such as the story of the death of Othryades, clearly stem from the myth of the battle for Thyrea, it is tempting to interpret the reference to the Amphictyonic Assembly (whose exact identity requires further research) as a vestigial memory of the supervision of the Argive-Spartan ritual battles by an alliance of city-states.¹⁰⁰

Another hint concerning the association between Argos and Sparta comes from the passage in Pseudo-Plutarch's treatise *On Music* recounting the establishment of the Gymnopaediae, the festival that we hypothetically linked with the ritual battles:

“Now music was first organized at Sparta, under the direction of Terpan-der; for its second organization Thaletas of Gortyn, Xenodamus of Cythera, Xenocritus of Locri, Polymnestus of Colophon, and Sacadas of Argos are said to have been chiefly responsible, since it was at their suggestion that the festival of the Gymnopaediae at Lacedaemon was instituted and so too the Apodeixeis in Arcadia and the so-called Endymatia [festival of Apparel-ling] at Argos.”¹⁰¹

There are several noteworthy features in the passage. The linkage of the poets from different parts of Greece to the inception of the Gymnopaediae depicts the festival as characterized by a strong Pan-Hellenic trend. It is particularly remarkable to find an *Argive* poet, Sacadas, connected to the foundation of the Spartan festival. *On Music* presents Sacadas as a quintessential Pan-Hellenic figure: in addition to crediting Sacadas with a series of victories at the inception of the Pythian games, the treatise also attributes to him the composition of a chorus that combined three systems of tuning – the Dorian, the Phrygian, and

⁹⁹ Plut. *Parallela Minora* 306a-b.

¹⁰⁰ See below n.108.

¹⁰¹ Ps.-Plutarch, *On Music* 1134b-c. Ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη κατάστασις τῶν περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν ἐν τῇ Σπάρτῃ, Τερπάνδρου καταστήσαντος, γένηται· τῆς δὲ δευτέρας Θαλήτας τε ὁ Γορτύνιος καὶ Ξενοδάμος ὁ Κυθήριος καὶ Ξενοκρίτος ὁ Λοκρὸς καὶ Πολύμνηστος ὁ Κολοφώνιος καὶ Σακάδας ὁ Ἀργεῖος μάλιστα αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν ἡγεμόνες γενέσθαι· τούτων γὰρ εἰσηγησαμένων τὰ περὶ τὰς Γυμνοπαιδίας τὰς ἐν Λακεδαίμονι λέγεται κατασταθῆναι, <καὶ> τὰ περὶ τὰς Ἀποδείξεις τὰς ἐν Ἀρκαδίᾳ, τῶν τε ἐν Ἄργει τὰ Ἐνδυμάτια καλούμενα. Translation B. Einarson and P.H. de Lacy.

the Lydian.¹⁰² Another figure connected to the foundation of the Gymnopaediae, Polymnestus of Colophon, is similarly Pan-Hellenic, described by Pindar as “the voice common to all.”¹⁰³

The story of the institution of three Peloponnesian festivals on the advice of the same “committee” suggests a possibility of a historical connection between the festivals. Moreover, Gregory Nagy observes a semantic link between the names of the Spartan Gymnopaediae and the Argive Endymatia: they contain “opposite notions of ritual undressing and dressing.”¹⁰⁴ Such opposition strikingly recalls Herodotus’ report of the Spartan decision to wear long hair in contrast to the short hair of the Argives.¹⁰⁵ Pseudo-Plutarch’s account seems to contain traces of the same cooperation-in-opposition as does Herodotus’ aetiology of the hairstyles. It is plausible that the Endymatia was the festival associated with the ritual battle on the Argive side.¹⁰⁶

A consideration of the figure of Apollo Pythaeus, the deity presiding over the Gymnopaediae, further illuminates the paradoxical antagonistic concord between Argos and Sparta. We have briefly reviewed Brelich’s findings about the worship of this deity in both Argos and Sparta,¹⁰⁷ the association between Apollo Pythaeus and the tradition of the Argive-Spartan confrontation, and the existence of a federal cult of Apollo Pythaeus that apparently counted both Argos and Sparta as members.¹⁰⁸ However, how do these separate pieces of evidence coalesce into a historically nuanced understanding of the Argive-

¹⁰² Ps.-Plutarch, *On Music* 1134a. Compare Nagy 1990, 89-91. Pausanias (2.22.8) also ascribes to Sacadas the distinction of inventing the Pythian *nomos*.

¹⁰³ Strabo 14.1.28.

¹⁰⁴ Nagy 1990, 344; also Ducat 2006a, 187-188.

¹⁰⁵ Hdt. 1.82.7.

¹⁰⁶ Leitao (1995, 143) suggests that the Endymatia was “the occasion on which young men in Argos assumed warrior garb for the first time.” Similarly, Robertson 1992, 207, who connects the festival to the tradition of the battle for Thyreatis; Ceccarelli 1998, 119.

¹⁰⁷ Kowalzig (2007, 145-146) gives a concise summary of the literary and epigraphic attestation of the cult of Apollo Pythaeus in the Argolid and around the Argolic Gulf, including Cynuria, where two sixth-century inscriptions to Apollo Pythaeus were found in Tyras and Kosmas. The sanctuaries of Apollo in these two locales produced numerous dedications of weapons (both full-sized and miniature) and a bronze sixth-century statuette of a hoplite. Phaklares 1990, 176, 179-182; Polignac 1995, 54. On the cult of Apollo Pythaeus see also Billot 1992; Kōiv 2003, 304-308; and Kowalzig 2007, 132-154 (discussed below).

¹⁰⁸ See above nn. 24,25,26. Kowalzig (2007, 149-153) connects the worship of Apollo Pythaeus with the archaic Calaurian amphictyony. Kōiv (2003, 304-310) similarly proposes the existence of an archaic amphictyony around the cult of Apollo Pythaeus.

Spartan relations in the archaic period, and how do they clarify the nature of the dispute over Thyreatis?

Barbara Kowalzig makes a major step forward in answering these questions. Kowalzig notices the frequent association between the cult of Apollo Pythaeus and inter-*polis* boundaries.¹⁰⁹ She proposes that the archaic cult of Apollo Pythaeus at Asine¹¹⁰ had the function of mediating between communities of the Argolid in their long-standing territorial disputes. Importantly, Kowalzig argues that the cult operated not by resolving the conflicts but by embracing the competing versions of the disputing sides and commemorating their irreducible variance through recurrent rituals.¹¹¹ Kowalzig also notes the prominence of Apollo Pythaeus in the conflict over Thyreatis,¹¹² but she considers the deity to be an embodiment of the *real* hostility between the two states.¹¹³ However, Kowalzig's reconstruction of the character of archaic Apollo Pythaeus as a mediator between communities at variance perfectly fits the idea that this deity oversaw the ritual battles between Argos and Sparta in the framework of the Gymnopaediae, uniting the two *poleis* in their confrontation.¹¹⁴

The metamorphosis of the *Hippeis*

I have suggested that the ritual battle happened in Sparta in the framework of the Gymnopaediae (and perhaps in the framework of the Endymatia in Argos), and served as a coming of age rite for its participants. But who were these participants – whose rite of passage was it? A consideration of the Spartan institution of *hippeis*, which has not been taken into account until now, can help us to answer this question.

¹⁰⁹ Kowalzig 2007, 147-148; similarly, Polignac 1995, 54, n.52.

¹¹⁰ See above n. 25.

¹¹¹ Kowalzig 2007, 132-154, esp. 147-149, 153-154.

¹¹² Kowalzig 2007, 155-157.

¹¹³ "Apollo Pythaeus stood for what separated Argives and Spartans, imbued with connotations of the Spartano-Argive conflict." Kowalzig 2007, 156.

¹¹⁴ There is an indication that the territory of Thyreatis could at some point have been defined as a federal space of ritual, called μέσον. The attestation comes an enigmatic pronouncement: Ἄκρον λάβε καὶ μέσον ἔξεις ("Take the *akron*, and you will have the *meson*"). Apparently, this was an oracle that the Aeginetans received from Delphi in 431 BC, when they were expelled from Aegina by the Athenians, and given Thyreatis by the Spartans to settle (Zenobius 1,57, *CPG* 1.22-23; Apostolius 1,97, *CPG* 2.264; Thuc. 2.27; Figueira 1993, 535-538). I propose that *meson* may have referred to the territory of Thyreatis as a sacred communal space once shared by Argos and Sparta. This sense of the word *meson* is attested on Lesbos (*Messon*): see Nagy 2007, 24.

The Spartan *hippeis* were an elite corps of hoplites (their equestrian appellation notwithstanding), who numbered three hundreds. In the Classical period, the *hippeis* fought in close proximity to the king and had the task of protecting him. They also served as the Spartan “emergency force” in cases of internal or external danger.¹¹⁵ The *hippeis* were chosen on the basis of their excellence from the body of *hēbōntes*.¹¹⁶ The relevance of the *hippeis* to the present discussion stems from their character as picked troops and from their number, coinciding with the number of the Spartan warriors at Thyrea. In a recent article, Thomas Figueira suggests that the three hundred Spartans who fought in the Battle of Champions must have been *hippeis*.¹¹⁷ In the light of the previous discussion, we can modify Figueira’s suggestion: the battle, in which all the Spartan participants die heroically, can be construed as a foundation myth of the *hippeis*, setting a benchmark for their fighting conduct.

Here, however, a question arises. I have hypothesized previously that the Battle of Champions is a foundation myth for the Gymnopaediae; now the battle seems to fit also as a foundation myth for the institution of *hippeis*. Are the Gymnopaediae and the *hippeis* related to each other, and if yes, what is the nature of their connection? My first observation is that the festival and the military unit show similarities with the non-overlapping aspects of the myth.¹¹⁸ This fact opens the possibility that the Gymnopaediae and the *hippeis* are two distinct institutions resulting from a split of their common predecessor, which prior to the split fully matched the myth of the battle. How can we imagine the entity uniting the *hippeis* and the Gymnopaediae? The easiest solution would be to conceive of a festival (the proto-Gymnopaediae) in which the proto-*hippeis* took part. Their role, I propose, would be fighting in the ritual battle. Thus, I reconstruct the ritual battle as an initiation into the category of the proto-*hippeis*.

The idea that the proto-*hippeis* played the key role in the ritual of coming of age entails an assumption that they were an age grade.¹¹⁹ The historical institution of *hippeis* was certainly not an age grade. While the *hippeis* were chosen from the age grade of *hēbōntes*, only some of the *hēbōntes* were promoted to the status of *hippeis*. Age-grade transition, on the contrary, involves all members of

¹¹⁵ Figueira 2006, 58-60.

¹¹⁶ Xen. *Lac.* 4.3-4. Figueira 2006, 62-67.

¹¹⁷ “It would be incongruous for the Spartans to choose another elite group of the same size, inasmuch as the *hippeis* probably already existed.” Figueira 2006, 60.

¹¹⁸ The resemblance between the *hippeis* and the myth of the battle lies, as we have observed, in the number of the warriors, and in their elite status. In contrast, the basis of the Gymnopaediae’s link to the myth of the battle for Thyreatis is the explicit ancient attestation that the festival featured “thyreatic crowns” and hymns honoring the fallen at Thyrea.

¹¹⁹ My use of the term “age grade” is based on the discussion by Bernardi 1985, 2-4.

a particular age-class. However, while the historical *hippeis* did not constitute an age grade, they apparently were sometimes perceived as such. Aristophanes of Byzantium in his treatise on the terms describing age categories, charts the following progression of the ages: *meirakion*, *meirax*, *neaniskos*, *neanias*. Concerning the latter he says: “The Spartans called these *hippeis*, and those who manage them *hippagretai*.”¹²⁰ This “flavor” of an age grade displayed by the historical *hippeis* might be an echo of the prehistory of this institution.

Let us now attempt to sketch the trajectory of the development and obliteration of the ritual battles between Argos and Sparta alongside with the changes in the character of the proto-*hippeis*. The comparative evidence from other Greek city-states indicates that the Spartan *hippeis* at first must have been a body of aristocratic horsemen.¹²¹ It is possible that the practice of the ritual battles with the Argives existed already in that period, as an elite activity, but we cannot say anything about its organization or function. Next, at the historical stage when a homogenizing restructuring of the Spartan society took place, the aristocratic group of “ur-*hippeis*” must have been subsumed into the new social framework.¹²² Eventually, the age-grade of hoplite proto-*hippeis* emerged from this process. I believe that the practice of the ritual battles as reconstructed in this paper started in that period. For the archaic period a rough demographic estimation shows that the number of the Spartiates born in the same year by their mid-twenties would be 100-200 men.¹²³ Thus, if we presume that the number of the participants in the ritual battle approximated the number of the three hundred champions, it follows that the older *hébôntes* were assembled for the ritual battle every two or three years. The ritual battles must have been abolished at the latest in the middle of the sixth century, when Sparta adopted more aggressive expansionist politics in the Peloponnese and annexed Cynuria. The age-grade of *hippeis* was at some point transformed into an elite military unit; the details of this makeover are unclear. However, one can envisage a scenario in which the transformation would be precipitated by the very practice of the ritual battles: the strategy of choosing the best soldiers among all of the available young men, instead of manning the field indiscriminately with particu-

¹²⁰ Arist. Byz. *Nomina aetatum* (fragmenta) 275.8-9. Figueira 2006, 64.

¹²¹ Figueira 2006, 68, and nn. 95,96 with further references.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ I omit the calculation here for the brevity of the presentation. I follow Figueira 1986, 168, n. 10 in using the Male Mortality Level 4 of the “South” populations (Coale and Demeny 1966, 782-783) as an approximation of the Greek population pattern, and also in assuming that the number of 5000 of the Spartan *Homoioi* participating in the campaign of 479 BC (Hdt. 9.10.1, 9.11.3, 9.28.2) included men 20-49 years old. Figueira 1986, 167-168.

lar two or three age-classes, would result in a much stronger fighting force with higher chances of victory.¹²⁴

The Argive proposal again

Let us now return to the starting point of this exploration, the Argive proposal to the Spartans in 420 BC to conclude a peace treaty, accompanied by a ritualized rerun of the battle for Cynuria.¹²⁵ The preceding discussion suggests that this proposal derived from the historical antecedent of the archaic Argive-Spartan ritual battles for the territory of Thyreatis. But what were the synchronic goals of the Argives in resurrecting the practice of the ritual battles? My answer to this question can be only previewed in the framework of this exposition; I plan to present it at length in a different publication.

In Argos in 421-417 BC there was a strong political tension, eventually developing into an open strife, between the oligarchic and democratic factions. In general, the oligarchic party advocated peace with Sparta, while the democratic party endorsed the war with Sparta (and an alliance with Athens).¹²⁶ The struggle between the factions resulted in abrupt shifts in the Argive foreign policy, oscillating in its alignment between Sparta and Athens. I submit that the Argive suggestion of replaying the Battle of Champions in the framework of a peace treaty with Sparta was a motion promoted by the oligarchic faction.¹²⁷ Who were the Argive oligarchs? One group that we can identify is the thousand picked warriors – an elite force resembling the Spartan *hippeis* – who, assisted by the Spartans, carried out an oligarchic coup in Argos in 418 BC.¹²⁸ According to Diodorus, the Argives instituted the unit of the Thousand, to be trained at public expense, in 421 BC. The Thousand consisted of the “younger citizens who were at the same time the most vigorous in body and the most wealthy.”¹²⁹ I argue that these thousand aristocratic young supporters of oligarchy were intended to fight with the Spartans in the rerun of the Battle of Champions.¹³⁰

¹²⁴ Such selectivity is more likely to develop closer to the point of the disintegration of the tradition of the ritual battles, when the perception of the battle as a rite of passage would be attenuated.

¹²⁵ Thuc. 5.41.2-3.

¹²⁶ Thuc. 5.76.2-3. Hornblower 2002, 84; Kagan 1962.

¹²⁷ So already Kagan 1962, 210. Characteristically, this proposal of the peace with Sparta was abruptly abandoned by the Argives in favor of an alliance with Athens, called in the context “a sister democracy.” Thuc. 5.44.1.

¹²⁸ Thuc. 5.81.2, Diod. 12.80.2-3.

¹²⁹ Diod. 12.75.7. Translation C.H. Oldfather.

¹³⁰ Piérart (2009, 278) makes a similar suggestion.

Thus, the reintroduction of the practice of the ritual battles would have greatly strengthened the position of the Argive oligarchic faction. Even though the ritual battles were not reinstated in 420 BC, in the Thousand the oligarchs acquired the backing of a highly trained military force, which was later put to use in the oligarchic coup of 418 BC.

In the heated political atmosphere of Argos between 421 and 417 BC, with its volatile foreign policy and the oligarchic and the democratic factions vying for popularity, both factions appealed to the authority of the tradition. Generally, the democrats put emphasis on the myth of the war for Thyreatis and presented the perspective of fighting with Sparta as the extension of that myth.¹³¹ The oligarchs, interested in the peace with Sparta, advanced the possibility of the ritual resolution of the dispute over Thyreatis.

However, the oligarchs' drive for power apparently required a more flexible attitude than an unrelenting promotion of the peace with Sparta. For example, the Argive Thousand made some spectacular switches in their attitude to Sparta: in between the plan to fight in the ritual battle in 420 BC and the Spartan-assisted coup of 418 BC, the Thousand heroically confronted the Spartans in the battle of Mantinea (summer 418 BC), which earned them a great popularity in Argos.¹³² I propose that the propagandistic device that assisted the Thousand in switching fluently between the pro-Spartan and anti-Spartan orientation was their adroitness in emphasizing or obscuring the connection between the myth of the ancient struggle for Thyreatis and the ritual battle for that territory. By substituting the exhortation to battle with an exhortation to ritual battle, a spokesman of the Thousand could have kept employing the charismatic rhetoric of military valor and struggle for the primordially Argive land, even if the underlying message was of peace with Sparta; this belligerent diction also would smooth the transition when it became necessary to maneuver toward backing the war with Sparta.

A comparison of the archaic practice of the ritual battles for Thyreatis, and the manipulations of the myth-ritual complex of the confrontation over Thyreatis in the Argive politics of 421-417 BC highlights the extremely variable and

¹³¹ However, the pretext under which Argos set out to war with Epidaurus in 419 BC – that the Epidaurians failed to deliver a sacrificial victim that they owed to Apollo Pythaeus (Thuc. 5.53.1) – shows that the Argive democrats (who apparently were behind the Epidaurian war) could also use references to ritual to their political advantage. Interestingly, Diodorus (12.78.1) states that the Argives accused the *Spartans* of not delivering the victim to Apollo Pythaeus. I see in the Argive accusation another reverberation of the theme of the confrontation over Thyreatis, now used by the democratic faction. See Brelich 1961, 32-34; Kowalzig 2007, 154-160 on the Argive attempts to appropriate the cult of Apollo Pythaeus in the fifth century BC.

¹³² Thuc. 5.72.3; 5.73.4; Diod. 12.79.4-7; Arist. *Pol.* 1304a25-26.

and adaptable relations between the myth and ritual, and their embeddedness in the political and social circumstances of the day. The ritual morphs into a real conflict, and then mutates back into a ritual, according to the aspirations of the participants and their preference for war or peace.

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Thucydides' Theory of Negotiation

Sarah Bolmarich

The Greeks, for all their concern with war, peace, and international relations, did not have what we would call today a proper theory of diplomatic negotiation; while Demetrius of Phalerum wrote a now-lost *Presbeutikos*, “On Ambassadorship,” which might have told us much, instead we must examine our sources that deal with negotiation and diplomacy carefully to arrive at any sort of theory of negotiation among the Greeks. I wish to look at several key negotiation-scenes in Thucydides’ *History*: the final pre-war negotiations at the end of Book 1 and the Melian Dialogue. These should give us pointers as to what Thucydides, and presumably his readers, believed about the principles of negotiation in the fifth and early fourth centuries BC and the keys to creating peace and stability in ancient Greece. In the first negotiation-scene, Thucydides shows two states roughly equal in power – Athens and Sparta – negotiating purely in their own self-interest, to delay the imminent Peloponnesian War, but not eliminate the possibility of its occurrence. In the second, the so-called “Athenian thesis”, the idea that the strong naturally rule the weaker, is propounded and the dialogue reflects the profound change on diplomatic negotiation that this has. Readers of Thucydides know him well as a cynical, pessimistic, proto-Realist, but here I wish to suggest that Thucydides is not just stating his world-view in these scenes; rather, he is drawing attention to a serious and increasing problem in Greek diplomacy, the interference of power and self-interest in negotiations and the barriers these presented to peace and stability in ancient Greece.

The outbreak of the Peloponnesian War

Before the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans and the Athenians engaged in complex negotiations.¹ The nature of these negotiations has not been closely examined from a diplomatic point of view. The Spartans first demanded that the Athenians expiate the Curse of the Alcmaeonidae; the Athenians in turn demanded that the curses of Taenarum and the Brazen House be expunged. These demands allow Thucydides to digress at some

¹ Thuc. 1.126-146.

length on the Spartan regent Pausanias and the Athenian statesman Themistocles. When he returns to the narrative, the negotiations continue:

“The first embassy of the Spartans was as I have described [1.126]: they demanded that those under the curse [of the Alcmaeonidae] should be driven out, and they received a counter demand from Athens in the same terms [1.128, the curses of Taenarum and the Brazen House]. Later they sent another embassy to demand that Athens should abandon the siege of Potidaea and should give Aegina her independence. But the chief point and the one that they made most clear was that war could be avoided if Athens would revoke the Megarian Decree which excluded the Megarians from all ports in the Athenian Empire and from the market in Attica herself. The Athenians would not give in on the first points, nor would they revoke the decree. They accused Megara of cultivating consecrated ground, of cultivating land that did not belong to them, and of giving shelter to slaves who had escaped from Athens. Finally an embassy arrived with the Spartan ultimatum...[t]hey made no reference to the usual subjects that had been spoken of before, but said simply, ‘Sparta wants peace. Peace is still possible if you will give the Hellenes their freedom.’”²

Pericles responds to the Spartan ultimatum with the suggestion that the Spartans should grant autonomy to their own allies and eliminate their practice of *xenelasia*, the ritual expulsion of foreigners.³ Ultimately, Book 1 of Thucydides concludes with the sentence, “There was still communication between the two

2 Thuc. 1.139. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς πρώτης πρεσβείας τοιαῦτα ἐπέταξαν τε καὶ ἀντεκελεύσθησαν περὶ τῶν ἐναγῶν τῆς ἐλάσεως: ὕστερον δὲ φοιτῶντες παρ’ Ἀθηναίους Ποτειδαίας τε ἀπανίστασθαι ἐκέλευον καὶ Αἴγινα αὐτόνομον ἀφίεσαι, καὶ μάλιστα γὰρ πάντων καὶ ἐνδηλότατα προύλεγον τὸ περὶ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα καθελούσι μὴ ἂν γίνεσθαι πόλεμον, ἐν ᾧ εἰρήτη αὐτοὺς μὴ χρῆσθαι τοῖς λιμέσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀρχῇ μηδὲ τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἀγορᾷ. [2] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι οὔτε τάλλα ὑπήκουον οὔτε τὸ ψήφισμα καθήρουν, ἐπικαλοῦντες ἐπεργασίαν Μεγαρεῦσι τῆς γῆς τῆς ἱεράς καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου καὶ ἀνδραπόδων ὑποδοχῆν τῶν ἀφισταμένων. [3] τέλος δὲ ἀφικομένων τῶν τελευταίων πρέσβων ἐκ Λακεδαιμόνος ... καὶ λεγόντων ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν ἢ πρότερον εἴδοσαν, αὐτὰ δὲ τάδε ὅτι ‘Λακεδαιμόνιοι βούλονται τὴν εἰρήνην εἶναι, εἴη δ’ ἂν εἰ τοὺς Ἕλληνας αὐτονόμους ἀρεῖτε,’ ποιήσαντες ἐκκλησίαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι γνώμας σφίσι αὐτοῖς προυτίθεσαν, καὶ ἐδόκει ἅπαξ περὶ πάντων βουλευσαμένους ἀποκρίνασθαι. [4] καὶ παριόντες ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ ἔλεγον ἐπ’ ἀμφοτέρα γινόμενοι ταῖς γνώμας καὶ ὡς χρὴ πολεμεῖν καὶ ὡς μὴ ἐμπόδιον εἶναι τὸ ψήφισμα εἰρήνης, ἀλλὰ καθελεῖν, καὶ παρελθὼν Περικλῆς ὁ Ξανθίπου, ἀνὴρ κατ’ ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον πρῶτος Ἀθηναίων, λέγειν τε καὶ πράσσειν δυνατώτατος, παρήνει τοιάδε. All translations are from R. Warner’s Penguin edition unless otherwise noted.

3 Thuc. 1.144.2. On *xenelasia*, see Figueira 2003; Gomme, *HCT ad loc.*

states, and people traveled to and fro without heralds, though with considerable suspicion, since events were going on which amounted to a cancellation of the treaty and an excuse for open war”.⁴ Book 2 then begins with the actual commencement of hostilities.⁵

Within Thucydides’ narrative, these negotiations provide several valuable functions. First, the narrative of the negotiations gives Thucydides an occasion to embark upon the biographical digression on the Spartan Pausanias and the Athenian Themistocles, the two great Greek leaders of the Persian War era.⁶ The Pausanias excursus is introduced by the demand about the curse of the Brazen House, and the Themistocles excursus picks up at the end of Pausanias’s tale. Thucydides resumes the main narrative at 1.139, describes the remaining negotiations, and then uses the final sentence of 1.139 to introduce the first speech of his hero Pericles, “the leading man of his time among the Athenians and the most powerful both in action and in debate.”⁷ Pericles had already been formally introduced in the *History* at 1.127.3 in the context of the Spartan demand about the Curse of the Alcmaeonidae as “one of the most able men of his day and the leading man of the state.”⁸

The negotiation-scene also contributes to the historical puzzle of the causes of the Peloponnesian War; 1.139 is one of the only two points in the *History* at which Thucydides mentions the Megarian Decree,⁹ often taken by scholars today as a major cause of the war, but largely excluded by Thucydides, perhaps because it may have reflected poorly on Pericles.¹⁰ But beyond those points, what do these demands and counter-demands tell us about the expectations of negotiations in classical Greece and within Thucydides’ narrative? Thucydides’ account of the negotiations is presumably largely historical, since the grievances to which he refers are confirmed by other sources or his own earlier narrative.¹¹

⁴ Thuc. 1.146. ἐπεμείγνυτο δὲ ὅμως ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ παρ’ ἀλλήλους ἐφοίτων ἀκηρύκτως μὲν, ἀνυπόπτως δὲ οὐ: σπονδῶν γὰρ ζύγχυσις τὰ γιγνόμενα ἦν καὶ πρόφασις τοῦ πολεμεῖν.

⁵ Thuc. 2.2 ff.

⁶ Thuc. 1.128-138.

⁷ Περικλῆς ὁ Χανθίππου, ἀνὴρ κατ’ ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον πρῶτος Ἀθηναῖον, λέγειν τε καὶ πράσσειν δυνατώτατος.

⁸ ὧν γὰρ δυνατώτατος τῶν καθ’ ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἄγων τὴν πολιτείαν.

⁹ Cf. Thuc. 1.67.4.

¹⁰ The main proponent of this theory is de Ste. Croix 1972, but see Hornblower *ad* 1.67.4.

¹¹ Cf. Gomme *ad loc.* and Hornblower *ad loc.*

The actual exchange of demands in the negotiation process runs as follows:

	<i>Spartans</i>	<i>Athenians</i>
1)	Expunge the Curse of the Alcmaeonidae	Expunge the Curse of Taenarum Expunge the Curse of the Brazen House
2)	Abandon the siege of Potidaea Free Aegina Repeal the Megarian Decrees	No counter-demand Accusations against the Megarians
3)	Give the Greeks their freedom	Make the Peloponnesian allies autonomous End <i>xenelasia</i>

Figure 1. Exchange of Athenian-Spartan Demands at Thuc. 1.126-146

The first round of negotiations belongs to the realm of the improbable. The demand about the Curse of the Alcmaeonidae is clearly aimed at Pericles, related to the family through his mother.¹² And, although the Curse of the Alcmaeonidae had been incurred in 632, the demand to expiate it had first been made by the Spartans in 508, when their aim was to remove the Alcmaeonid reformer Cleisthenes from Athens.¹³ The Athenians had ultimately resisted the Spartans then, and it was a foregone conclusion that they would do so again with this demand. Pericles had been introduced at Thuc. 1.127 and will be introduced again at 1.139 as the Athenian leader. If he was as pro-war as other ancient sources and many modern scholars believe, his removal might well have had the effect of stymieing the war, or it might have solidified Athenian hostility towards the Spartans.¹⁴ In either event, the Spartans were gambling with this demand.

Likewise, the initial Athenian demands mimic the Spartan demands. The curse of Taenarum is given short shrift by Thucydides; it involved the Spartans

¹² Thuc. 1.127.1.

¹³ Hdt. 5.72.

¹⁴ On the inevitability of the Archidamian War, see Hornblower *ad* 1.23.6.

killing helot suppliants at the altar of Poseidon at Taenarum.¹⁵ The curse of the Brazen House is given in more detail; the Spartans had again violated divine sanctuary by starving the regent Pausanias to death as he hid in the Temple of Athena Chalkioikos on the Spartan acropolis. The Spartans had already taken steps to expiate this curse by dedicating bronze statues to the goddess, and they believed that they had been punished for the violation of Taenarum with the great earthquake of 465, which devastated the Spartan population.¹⁶ Neither of these Athenian demands is especially effective, as neither would have altered the build-up to war, as the expulsion of Pericles from Athens might have done. The only advantage that might accrue to them from these demands is that by doubling the Spartans' demand about expiating curses, they make a point about Spartan internal affairs as well – their treatment of helots and their sacrilege in Pausanias' death. But this moral currency will do them little good in these negotiations.

We have here in the initial stage of the negotiations two demands that balance each other; all involve violations of divine sanctuaries with bloodshed. These are serious crimes in ancient Greece, but none of the demands address the matter at hand in these negotiations: preventing the outbreak of war. The Spartans attempt to address the issue of Pericles' leadership, but it is not clear historically whether his expulsion would have prevented war, and the unimaginative means by which the Spartans pursue this goal, thinking that what temporarily worked with Cleisthenes in 508 would work with Pericles in 432, as well as their claim that his expulsion would “honor the gods” (1.127), only led the Athenians to make a silly counter-demand, with no relevance to the situation at all.

The second round of negotiations brought more concrete demands from the Spartans about the Peloponnesian allies Megara, Aegina, and Potidaea. The complaints of the Megarians and the Aeginetans had been noted before by Thucydides during the first Congress at Sparta.¹⁷ The Corinthians had also complained about Potidaea then, so none of these complaints are unexpected – in fact, Thucydides uses the verb “to be accustomed”¹⁸ to describe these demands. The Athenians do not respond with a counteroffer, but simply defend themselves against the Megarians.

Although the demands were “customary,” would Athenian fulfillment of them have averted the war? It seems unlikely; these requests had been made

¹⁵ Thuc. 1.128.1.

¹⁶ Thuc. 1.128.2, 134.

¹⁷ Thuc. 1.67.2-4.

¹⁸ εἰώθεσαν, 1.139.3.

before,¹⁹ and the Athenian lack of response shows their lack of regard for them. The mention of Potidaea in particular stresses this fact: the siege was one of the two *aitiae* that Thucydides gives for the war, and his description of it indicates the determination of both the Athenians and the Corinthians to hold the place.²⁰ These demands, likewise, are not really interested in stopping the war, but on getting the arguments of each side on record. The Spartans first claimed to be interested in honoring the gods; now they show that they are honoring their allies by taking their side against the Athenians. Likewise, the Athenians get their arguments against the Megarians on record.

The final Spartan demand is clearly the most serious. They state firmly that they want peace, and it can be achieved if the Athenians allow their allies to be autonomous. Pericles then demands in his subsequent speech that the Spartans give up their habit of expelling foreigners from Laconia and allow their own allies to be autonomous. These demands are as implausible as the preceding two; giving up their empire and their allies is impossible for the Athenians. Their democracy and their economy were tied incredibly closely to their empire and their allies' contributions of tribute.²¹ It is an impossible demand, just as Pericles' counter-demands strike at the heart of Spartan culture: giving up *xenelasia* would permit forbidden foreign influence in Sparta, endangering (in the Spartans' eyes) their culture, and giving up their political control over their allies would endanger the defensive benefits Sparta received from the Peloponnesian League,²² especially against a helot revolt or trouble from Argos, which would also endanger Sparta. So the final demands of each side suggest a lack of practical concern for the other side fulfilling the conditions asked for. The wording of the final Spartan demand – directly quoted by Thucydides – suggests too a propaganda aspect. The Spartans had built themselves up throughout the fifth century as the liberators of Greece,²³ and having seen off the Persians, will now take on the Athenians.

What can we learn from these negotiations? First, the demands after the first round are generally taken as historical by scholars, as they speak to some of the tensions that led up to war. They may represent negotiations over a longer course of time than the few weeks or months that Thucydides suggests. From the Spartan perspective, the conditions they ask for – the removal of Pericles, better treatment for their allies, the dissolution of the Athenian *arche* – would all

¹⁹ See previous note.

²⁰ Thuc. 1.23.6, 56-66.

²¹ Cf. Rhodes 2007.

²² Cf. Bolmarcich 2005, nn. 1-2 for full bibliography on the defensive nature of the Peloponnesian League.

²³ See Hornblower *ad* 1.69.1 for this Spartan meme.

have prevented war, or should have prevented war. Yet Thucydides states quite clearly that the Spartans negotiated “so that there should be a good pretext for making war if the Athenians paid no attention to them.”²⁴ The Athenians, of course, did pay attention, but only to make their own counter-demands, none of which would have eliminated the threat of war. Even if Thucydides has altered his description of the negotiations for the larger literary purposes of his work, for instance by compressing the timeframe of the negotiations, the account he gives must have been a familiar story to his readers to be accepted by them.

These are not diplomatic negotiations intended to be successful. Serious diplomacy relies on the concept of mutual gains by both sides; states must therefore make, first of all, reasonable demands (not demands that strike at the heart of the other state’s government and society, as the Athenians and Spartans do), and, second of all, be prepared to concede some of their own desires. Neither the Spartans nor the Athenians are doing this here. Their goal is not to prevent war; it is to prolong the advent of war in order to prepare for it best. The American humorist Will Rogers once observed, “Diplomats are just as essential to starting a war as soldiers are for finishing it (...). You take [the] diplomacy out of war, and the thing would fall flat in a week.” The Spartan-Athenian negotiations and the type of demands they make are key to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, as their position at the end of Book 1, the introduction of Pericles, and the Theban attack on Plataea early in Book 2 make clear.

The Melian Dialogue²⁵

Now, these are hardly the only negotiations Thucydides makes note of. The most famous, naturally, is the Melian Dialogue, to which I now turn. It is difficult to judge the historicity of the dialogue itself, of course; Thucydides may be reporting actual arguments made by Athenians and Melians in 416 BC, but he may also have added or embellished the arguments himself. What is very striking about the dialogue is that it is a dialogue in form only; it is not a dialogue in terms of a meeting of the minds. Its purpose is, rather, to air the various viewpoints available in an informal diplomatic discussion. And, tellingly, it enters Thucydides’ narrative after Book 5, a long tale of failed treaties and negotiations from 421-416 BC. Those treaties and negotiations had been quite tradi-

²⁴ Thuc. 1.126. ὅπως σφίσιν ὅτι μεγίστη πρόφασις εἶη τοῦ πολεμεῖν, ἦν μὴ τι ἔσακούωσιν.

²⁵ There is a vast bibliography on the Melian Dialogue. For a summary, see Hornblower 3.216-225.

tional in the Greek sense, but the Melian Dialogue and its conduct transform those customary procedures of diplomacy.

Why Melos provoked an attack from Athens in 416 is not entirely certain: was it because she had resisted Athens in 426,²⁶ or because she was a delinquent member of the Athenian Empire,²⁷ or simply because she was a Spartan colony, and supported her financially in the war, as the inscription recording contributions to the Spartan war fund tells us²⁸? What is certain is that she provoked Athenian wrath, and the dialogue occurs while Athenian troops were on Melos, but had not yet attacked the city. The dialogue is Melos' chance to stave off an attack by either acceding to Athenian demands, or to convince the Athenians to spare her.

The Melians take the initiative in the discourse, making the issue at hand either war between Athens and Melos or slavery for the Melians if they join the Athenian Empire. They immediately accuse the Athenians of setting themselves up as judges: "We see that you have come prepared to judge the argument yourselves, and that the likely end of it all will be either war, if we prove that we are in the right, and so refuse to surrender, or else slavery."²⁹ This is an extraordinarily stark statement: admitting the Athenians' greater power, the Melians draw attention to their plight – if they negotiate successfully, they will be at war with Athens, and if they fail, they will become subject to Athens. These sort of polarized goals make the dialogue a lose-lose situation for the Melians, and it highlights starkly the problems of negotiation in classical Greece: just as the failure of negotiations in Book 1 meant war, so the success of the same negotiations would have meant that either Athens or Sparta or both altering themselves in a significant way and in effect subordinating themselves to the other party. Here, the opposite of "normal" diplomacy occurs – success means war, and failure means subjection. In the Melian Dialogue, then, Thucydides may be drawing our attention to other problems with classical diplomacy.

The Athenians respond to the Melian summary by reiterating it: "or if you have met here for any other reason except to look the facts in the face and on the basis of these facts to consider how you can save your city from destruc-

²⁶ Thuc. 3.91.1.

²⁷ Her name appears on the Athenian tribute reassessment of 425, *IG* i³ 71.I.65.

²⁸ *IG* v.1.1.1-2, 14 side.

²⁹ Thuc. 5.86. ὁρῶμεν γὰρ αὐτούς τε κριτὰς ἦκοντας ἡμᾶς τῶν λεχθησομένων καὶ τὴν τελευτήν ἐξ αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς περιγενομένοις μὲν τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ δι' αὐτὸ μὴ ἐνδοῦσι πόλεμον ἡμῖν φέρουσαν, πεισθεῖσι δὲ δουλείαν.

tion, there is no point in our going on with the discussion.”³⁰ The Athenians recast the Melian statement into a pro-Athenian light, just as the Melians had cast their statement in an anti-Athenian light. It is the Melians, in the Athenian version, who are holding up the negotiations; in the Melian version it is the Athenians who thwart the negotiations.

The Melians acknowledge the Athenians’ point about the purpose of the dialogue in their response: “It is natural and understandable that people who are placed as we are should have recourse to all kinds of arguments and different points of view. However, you are right in saying that we are met together here to discuss the safety of our country.”³¹ The Melians concede the Athenians’ point; but they also take the negotiations off-point by saying that any arguments – not necessarily those that have to do with the situation at hand or the interests of Athenians and Melians – are acceptable in this formerly diplomatic discourse, just as in Book 1 some off-point demands were part of the Spartan-Athenian negotiations. And indeed the dialogue within a few chapters will become a consideration of much larger issues like justice and self-interest, not a diplomatic give-and-take over the fate of Melos.

The Athenians for their part respond to the Melians’ attack on the subject of their negotiations with an attack on the type of rhetoric that accompanies negotiations:

“Then we on our side will use no fine phrases saying, for example, that we have a right to our empire because we defeated the Persians, or that we have come against you now because of the injuries you have done us – a great mass of words that nobody would believe. And we ask you on your side not to imagine that you will influence us by saying that you, though a colony of Sparta, have not joined Sparta in the war, or that you have never done us any harm. Instead we recommend that you should try to get what is possible for you to get, taking into consideration what we both really do think; since you know as well as we do that, when these matters are discussed by practical people, the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.”³²

³⁰ Thuc. 5.87. ἢ ἄλλο τι ζυγήκετε ἢ ἐκ τῶν παρόντων καὶ ὧν ὄρατε περὶ σωτηρίας βουλευόμενοι τῇ πόλει.

³¹ Thuc. 5.88. εἰκὸς μὲν καὶ ζυγνῶμη ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε καθεστῶτας ἐπὶ πολλὰ καὶ λέγοντας καὶ δοκοῦντας τρέπεσθαι: ἢ μὲντοι ζύνοδος καὶ περὶ σωτηρίας ἤδη πάρεστι.

³² Thuc. 5.89. ἡμεῖς τοίνυν οὔτε αὐτοὶ μετ’ ὀνομάτων καλῶν, ὡς ἢ δικαίως τὸν Μῆδον καταλύσαντες ἄρχομεν ἢ ἀδικούμενοι νῦν ἐπεξερχόμεθα, λόγων μῆκος ἄπιστον παρέξομεν, οὔθ’ ὑμᾶς ἀξιούμεν ἢ ὅτι Λακεδαιμονίων ἄποικοι ὄντες οὐ ζυνεστρατεύσατε ἢ ὡς ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν ἡδικήκατε λέγοντας οἴεσθαι πείσειν, τὰ δυνατὰ δ’

In the previous passage, the Melians had created a new rule for negotiations: anything goes in terms of arguments. The Athenians create their own new rule: negotiators should speak straight to the point, not of the issues at hand, but of the underlying causes of the conflict. All the types of arguments they mention had been used earlier in the *History* in negotiations or conferences: the Athenians themselves, as well as the Plataeans, had made much of their former service to Greece in the Peloponnesian Wars in Books 1 and 3.³³ In Book 3 the Plataeans had been unable to answer the question “Have you been of any aid to the Spartans in this war?” affirmatively, just as the Melians could not answer it affirmatively for the Athenians; and Melian neutrality is as anathematic to the Athenians as Plataean neutrality was to the Spartans in Books 2 and 3. Rather, the Athenians offer in place of traditional negotiation the so-called “Athenian thesis”: “the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.” The ultimate import of this thesis is that negotiation is pointless; in any conflict of state interests, the more powerful party should immediately be given preference and authority, while the weaker state should try to salvage what crumbs it can. This is what the Athenians would like to see, but Greece had not yet reached this state, as the very dialogue between the Melians and the Athenians proves.

Later, the Athenians do make some attempt to relate to the Melians and explain themselves to them: “What we shall do now is to show you that it is for the good of our own empire that we are here and that it is for the preservation of your city that we shall say what we are going to say. We do not want any trouble in bringing you into our empire, and we want you to be spared for the good both of yourselves and of ourselves.”³⁴ This is more like it; the Athenians claim they want to explain their position, as a state would in traditional diplomatic negotiations. The Athenians have the goal of making the least trouble possible, and to achieve that they must communicate better with the Melians.

The Melians do not believe it and are not in the mood to communicate further:

ἐξ ὧν ἑκάτεροι ἀληθῶς φρονοῦμεν διαπράσσεσθαι, ἐπισταμένους πρὸς εἰδότας ὅτι δίκαια μὲν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἀνάγκης κρίνεται, δυνατὰ δὲ οἱ προύχοντες πράσσοσι καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ξυγχωροῦσιν.

³³ Cf. the Athenian speech at Sparta (Thuc. 1.73-78) and the Plataean defense speech to the Spartans (Thuc. 3.53-59).

³⁴ Thuc. 5.91. ὡς δὲ ἐπ’ ὠφελίᾳ τε πάρεσμεν τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ νῦν τοὺς λόγους ἐροῦμεν τῆς ὑμετέρας πόλεως, ταῦτα δηλώσομεν, βουλόμενοι ἀπόνους μὲν ὑμῶν ἄρξαι, χρησίμως δ’ ὑμᾶς ἀμφοτέροις σωθῆναι.

“Melians: And how could it be just as good for us to be the slaves as for you to be the masters?”

Athenians: You, by giving in, would save yourselves from disaster; we, by not destroying you, would be able to profit from you.

Melians: So you would not agree to our being neutral, friends instead of enemies, but allies of neither side?

Athenians: No, because it is not so much your hostility that injures us; it is rather the case that, if we were on friendly terms with you, our subjects would regard that as a sign of weakness in us, whereas your hatred is evidence of our power.”³⁵

The way in which the Athenians now imagine diplomacy, as more focussed with the more powerful party, changes the entire idea of negotiating. “Not being destroyed” is a basic right of states; the Athenians are attempting to make their interests equal to another state’s right to self-preservation, an equation so skewed that it eliminates any idea of diplomacy at all. This is the sort of demand the Athenians appear to make outside of Thucydides’ *History* as well; for instance, in their regulations for the subdued Chalcidians after their revolt in 446, the Athenians and the Chalcidians swear oaths.³⁶ The Chalcidians swear near-absolute fealty to the Athenians; the Athenians by contrast promise not to destroy or kill the Chalcidians or harm them in any other way. The Melians’ seemingly reasonable compromise, a position of neutrality, is rejected by the Athenians because their failure to control every island state would appear to be weakness. Once power enters the picture, negotiation becomes increasingly useless, not because the powerful naturally dominate the weak, as the Athenians have it, but because power and its maintenance come with an entirely different set of rules than the rules for negotiation that exist between states that consider themselves equal in premise if not in fact. The Athenian development of their power skews not only their ability to negotiate successfully, but also that of other states like Melos. It makes war more likely and peace less likely, because of the conditions powerful states must meet to fulfill their own self-interest and protection. This does not mean that power is bad, necessarily, or that the Athe-

³⁵ Thuc. 5.92-95. ΜΗΛ. καὶ πῶς χρήσιμον ἂν ξυμβαίῃ ἡμῖν δουλεῦσαι, ὥσπερ καὶ ὑμῖν ἄρξαι;

ΑΘ. ὅτι ὑμῖν μὲν πρὸ τοῦ τὰ δεινότατα παθεῖν ὑπακούσαι ἂν γένοιτο, ἡμεῖς δὲ μὴ διαφθείραντες ὑμᾶς κερδαίνοιμεν ἄν.

ΜΗΛ. ὥστε [δὲ] ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας ἡμᾶς φίλους μὲν εἶναι ἀντὶ πολεμίων, ξυμμάχους δὲ μηδετέρων, οὐκ ἂν δέξαισθε;

ΑΘ. οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ἡμᾶς βλάπτει ἢ ἔχθρα ὑμῶν ὅσον ἢ φιλία μὲν ἀσθενείας, τὸ δὲ μῖσος δυνάμεως παράδειγμα τοῖς ἀρχομένοις δηλούμενον.

³⁶ *JG* i³ 40.4-32.

nians are; it does mean that powerful states are required by their very nature to operate differently from other, “normal” states.

There is a significant difference between the negotiations in Book 1 and the Melian Dialogue. The negotiations in Book 1 begin from a premise of equality; although the demands each side makes are unlikely to be fulfilled by the other side, they are roughly equivalent. Under the duress of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians' interest in maintaining a fiction at least of equality with other states appears to have disappeared. Although these two scenes are far from the only negotiations in Thucydides, they are two major episodes. Other scenes of negotiation back up Thucydides' presentation of these two scenes; the Plataean-Spartan negotiations of Book 3, for instance, have the Plataeans reminding the Spartans of their glorious past and service to Greece in the Persian Wars, while Archidamus and the Spartans are more interested in their “reasonable demand” that the Plataeans help them here and now.³⁷ The negotiations for a truce during the siege of Sphacteria have the Spartans offering the Athenians “peace, alliance, friendly and neighbourly relations”³⁸ in exchange for some very specific demands, specifically the release of the Spartans on Sphacteria. Negotiations quickly fall through once specific demands are exchanged by both sides: in return for the men on the island, the Athenians want several clauses of the Thirty Years' Peace to be abrogated and the return of Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea. Negotiation in Thucydides' *History* is often a fruitless affair, for one reason or another.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Thucydides takes a view of negotiations, especially those undertaken to avert war or hostilities, that could – perhaps not surprisingly – be read as cynical, pessimistic, or proto-Realist. It is sometimes tempting to dismiss Thucydides because he often speaks in what seems like a very modern voice; but he represents at least one point in Greek thought on interstate relations. Neither of the scenes discussed here *need* to be present in the *History*; they draw attention to themselves. His basic points in these two negotiation-scenes appear to be that states will act inflexibly in their own self-interest, that negotiations are often a delaying tactic to prepare for war or assault, and that the respective power of states must always be taken into account. It is the first and last points that are the most surprising in terms of Greek diplomatic history: these are

³⁷ Thuc. 3.52-68.

³⁸ Thuc. 4.19. (...) δίδόντες μὲν εἰρήνην καὶ ξυμμαχίαν καὶ ἄλλην φιλίαν πολλὴν καὶ οἰκειότητα.

some of the first and most bald statements to that effect in Greek literature. archaic and early classical Greek diplomacy often appears to have been predicated upon equality or at least a pretense of equality between city-states; Persian and Athenian imperialism change that irrevocably, and Thucydides chronicles the transformation for us in his *History*. Whether or not one subscribes to Thucydides' theory of international relations, the Athenians were right at least about the fact that power and self-interest mattered most in negotiations, and until the Greeks took that into account, peace and stability would be impossible.

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War and Peace at the Beginning of the Fourth Century The Emergence of the *Koine Eirene*

Julia Wilker

“After this, Lysander sailed into the harbor of the Piraeus, and the exiles returned. With great zeal they dismantled the walls, to the accompaniment of music provided by flute girls, and they believed that that day would be the beginning of freedom for all of Greece.”¹

This is how Xenophon famously describes the situation after the capitulation of Athens in 404 BC in his *Hellenica*, thus clearly characterizing the end of the Peloponnesian War as a turning point in Greek history. The military conflicts that had affected virtually all of Greece for decades were over, and the yearning for peace articulated time after time throughout the war seemed to finally have been fulfilled.² Sparta’s clear victory and the end of the Athenian Empire revived hopes that the promises of autonomy constantly articulated especially by Sparta would now be implemented and that “just order” would be restored once again in the community of free *poleis* throughout Greece.³ But very soon after the capitulation of Athens, it became clear that the long-awaited time of peace and universal Greek freedom had not yet been attained. Thus, the laconic brevity of the passage cited above also makes evident that for Xenophon, the frustration, and indeed, the naiveté of these hopes had become manifest. But of course, he was writing with knowledge of how internal Greek warfare had persisted throughout the decades that followed.⁴

For Sparta the end of the war created a position of power unprecedented in Greek history. Sparta stood out against all the other Greek states as the sole remaining hegemonic power. Not one among them could challenge its status as the leading city in Hellas.⁵ However, despite Sparta’s clear preeminence, efforts

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.23. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Λύσανδρός τε κατέπλει εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ καὶ οἱ φοιγάδες κατήσαν καὶ τὰ τεῖχη κατέσκαπτον ὑπ’ αὐλητρίδων πολλῇ προθυμίᾳ, νομίζοντες ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἄρχειν τῆς ἐλευθερίας. Translation J. Marincola; cf. Plut. *Lys.* 15,4.

² Cf. Murray 1944, 1. Zampaglione 1973. Spiegel 1990. Raaflaub 2001. Raaflaub 2009.

³ For the propaganda for autonomy and freedom cf. Raaflaub 1981, esp. 216. For the situation after the Peloponnesian War cf. Hamilton 1979, 17. Buckler 2003, 1: “In short, victory had not brought peace. Rather, it caused more problems as it had supposedly solved.”

⁴ Cf. Buckler – Beck 2008, 1.

⁵ Hamilton 1979, 17.

to establish stability in the relationship between the Greek states failed, and a mere ten years after the fall of the walls of Athens, Sparta not only found itself at war with Persia, but also against a coalition of Greek states including Athens, Thebes, Corinth and Argos. Not until 386 BC was the attempt finally made, with the King's Peace, to seek a long-term stabilization of conditions in Greece and to establish a lasting framework for peace.

As is commonly known, this treaty also failed to lead to the "Common Peace" (*koine eirene*) envisaged between autonomous Greek states, but was misused instead as an instrument of Spartan power politics for the purpose of safeguarding and augmenting its hegemony. Since this phenomenon was also repeated in the case of ensuing *koinai eirenai* by alternately predominant *poleis*, modern studies have been dominated by an emphasis on the use of Common Peace treaties as an instrument of power politics.⁶ In this paper, by contrast, the emergence of the *koine eirene* will be investigated as an idea, concept and a new form of interstate agreement, as it encompasses a number of significant new developments in Greek interstate relations: for the first time, treaties were concluded between multiple parties, and moreover, they were set up to remain in force indefinitely. Yet in terms of their substance, Common Peace treaties represented an even more far-reaching innovation. For the first time, a comprehensive regulating principle was codified through a general guarantee of autonomy. At the same time, peace (*eirene*) was now introduced into Greek international law as a positive legal condition.⁷

The concept of the *koine eirene* was, however, initially emerged not in 386 BC, but rather in the course of peace negotiations in 392/391 BC. Even though these efforts failed, in large part because of Athens' negative vote, it is in these negotiations that one can find the birth of the idea of a *koine eirene*. In the following, its emergence will be examined in its specific historical context and against the backdrop of Greek traditions of foreign policy and interstate relations.

The Spartan hegemony and the Corinthian War to 392/391 BC

Right after the end of the Peloponnesian War, Sparta was recognized by all parties as the only hegemonic power in Greece – and the Lacedaemonians

⁶ Ryder 1965. Jehne 1992. Jehne 1994.

⁷ Ryder 1965, 1. Quass 1991, 33. Jehne 1992, 99-100. The exact wording of the King's Peace has to be reconstructed especially based upon Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31; Diod. 14.110.3; cf. *StV* 242. For the historical relevance of the period between 404 and 386 BC for the late classical period in general cf. Hamilton 1979, 9.

themselves were quite aware of their unique power.⁸ This resulted in an ambiguous situation: through its war propaganda, Sparta had contributed significantly to the dissemination and general acceptance of the principles of autonomy and freedom, and their implementation must have seemed like a clear duty in the wake of Sparta's victory over Athens.⁹ At the same time, however, in many parts of the Aegean the ruling system created by Lysander based on decarchies and harmosts was still in operation, although these had now lost their official reason for existence.¹⁰ Finally, it appears that in view of the undisputed supremacy of the Spartans and despite their rhetoric of freedom, certain small and medium-sized *poleis* were keenly aware of their dependency upon the new power, and accepted Spartan hegemony or rushed ahead to quickly demonstrate their obedience and allegiance.¹¹

In Sparta itself there was a sense of being overextended by the expectations now placed on the remaining superpower, and the Spartans had no generally accepted idea of how Greece should be organized. On the one hand, Sparta took advantage of the situation and continued Lysander's power politics. It expelled the Messenians from Naupactus and Cephallenia,¹² and waged war against Elis on specious grounds.¹³ However, one faction (in modern scholarship usually associated with Pausanias) favored a more reserved and, in the Spartan sense, more "conservative" approach to foreign policy. The abolition of the decarchies at the beginning of the fourth century was clearly the work of

⁸ The Spartans felt so confident that they even denied their allies their due portion of the spoils of the war against Athens, Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.8, 3.5.12; Iust. 5.10.12. It seems that the Thebans in the Deceliea only could secure the tithe for Delphi, Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.5; Hamilton 1979, 65-66.

⁹ Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.23. Raaflaub 1981, 216.

¹⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.2, 7; Diod. 14.3.4, 10.1-2, 13.1; Plut. *Lys.* 13.3-14.1.

¹¹ Cf. Xen. *Anab.* 6.6.12: "The Lacedaemonians stand as the leaders of Greece, and they are able, nay, any single Lacedaemonian is able, to accomplish in the cities whatever he pleases." (τῆς δὲ Ἑλλάδος Λακεδαιμόνιοι προεστήκασιν: ἱκανοὶ δὲ εἰσι καὶ εἰς ἕκαστος Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὅτι βούλονται διαπράττεσθαι. Translation C.L. Brownson); cf. also Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.5. For the cult established for Lysander in various *poleis* see Plut. *Lys.* 18 including a paean of Duris (fr. 65, cf. Ath. 15.696e); Hesych. *s.v.* *Lysandreia*; Paus. 6.3.14.

¹² Diod. 14.34.2, cf. 14.78.5; Paus. 4.26.2. Buckler 2003, 19-20.

¹³ Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.21-23; Diod. 14.17.4-6 (wrongly naming Pausanias instead of Agis); Polyae. 6.36; Paus. 3.8.3. Hamilton 1979, 110-111. Buckler 2003, 15. Welwei 2007, 276. For the "Lysandrian" policy in general see Lotze 1964. Hamilton 1979, esp. 56-68. Hamilton 1982, 72-73.

this group, but they were unable to define Spartan policy for a longer period of time.¹⁴

More often, the demeanor of Sparta was perceived as hegemonic and presumptuous by many of its former anti-Athenian allies, so Thebes and Corinth in particular were quick to withdraw from the previous coalition¹⁵ and their relationship with Sparta was strained. The other *poleis* in Greece also reacted with disappointment to the discrepancy between their great hopes following the end of the war and the realities of Spartan power politics. Accordingly, the comic poet Theopompus likened the Lacedaemonians to tavern-women, because they gave the Greeks a very pleasant sip of freedom, and then dashed the wine with vinegar.¹⁶

¹⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.2, 7; Plut. *Lys.* 14.2, cf. *Ages.* 6.1; Nep. *Lys.* 3.1. Hamilton 1982, 73. Welwei 2007, 276.

¹⁵ Tensions were already manifest at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War, as only Sparta's protests held back Thebes and Corinth from the destruction of Athens (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.19-20, cf. 3.5.8, 6.5.35, 46; Plut. *Lys.* 15.2-3; Andoc. 1.142; 3.21; Isoc. 14.31-32, 18.29; Demosth. 19.65; Iustin. 5.8.4; Ael. *VH* 4.6; Parke – Wormell 1956, no. 171). In addition, Sparta's previously cited refusal to share its portion of the booty acquired in the victory over Athens with its allies strengthened the split between the former confederates (Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.8, 3.5.12; Iustin. 5.10.12). Thebes and Argos thus turned unequivocally against the Spartan decree not to take in democratic exiles from Athens. Megara, Elis and Chalkis in Euboea also appear to have resisted the order, at least de facto (Lys. 12.17, 24.25; Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.1; Isoc. 18.49; Demosth. 15.22; Din. 1.25; Dion. Hal. *De Isaeo* 6; Diod. 14.6.1-3, 32.1, 15.25.4; Plut. *Pelop.* 6.2; *mor.* 835A, F; Iustin. 5.9.3-5). Shortly afterwards, both Thebes and Corinth refused the call to send armed forces when Sparta turned once more against Athens to put down the civil war and Sparta also had to undertake its subsequent campaign against Elis without their assistance (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.30, 3.2.25; Diod. 14.17.7). Thebes, on the other hand, took steps to expand its own regional influence and reintegrated Oropos into the Boeotian League, but it must have felt constrained and controlled by the new Spartan garrison in Heraclea Trachinia (Diod. 14.38.4-5; cf. 82.6-7; Polyacn. 2.21). After the Spartans had responded to a call for help from the *poleis* in Asia Minor, the war against Persia offered an opportunity to reestablish Sparta's increasingly tarnished reputation and at the same time to forge a coalition of Greek states under Spartan leadership. The Boeotian disruption of Agesilaus' sacrifice in Aulis, imitating Agamemnon, was probably only left unpunished because the king wanted to carry on waging war in Asia Minor (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.3-4; Plut. *Ages.* 6.5-6; Paus. 3.9.3-5).

¹⁶ Theopompus com. fr. 65 (apud Plut. *Lys.* 13.5). Plutarch, however, criticized this statement because he did not see a change in Sparta's policy (ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ κωμικὸς Θεόπομπος ἔοικε ληρεῖν ἀπεικάζων τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ταῖς καπηλίαις, ὅτι τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἥδιστον ποτὸν τῆς ἐλευθερίας γεύσαντες ὄξος ἐνέχεαν: εὐθὺς γὰρ ἦν τὸ γεῦμα δυσχερὲς καὶ πικρὸν, οὐτε τοὺς δήμους κυρίους τῶν πραγμάτων ἔωντος εἶναι τοῦ Λυσάνδρου, καὶ τῶν ὀλίγων τοῖς θρασυτάτοις καὶ φιλονεικοτάτοις τὰς πόλεις ἐγχειρίζοντος). Cf. also Theodoros Metochites, *Miscellanea* p. 792 (Millier), who

Thus, in the years after the capitulation of Athens, Sparta had proved to be incapable of implementing a stable and universally accepted post-war order in Greece, one that would be considered legal and reasonable by the other Greek states that had also fought against Athens, especially Thebes and Corinth. Thus, Spartan supremacy was clearly accepted as a reality, and yet the behavior of the hegemonic power generated profound mistrust, a sentiment that remained powerful in the period that followed and without which it is impossible to understand the developments that took place in subsequent decades.¹⁷

However, the war between Sparta and the Persian Empire, which escalated considerably in intensity and seriousness following Agesilaus' assumption of command, changed the long-term strategic situation in Greece. The increasing burdens placed on Sparta by the war in Asia Minor and the offer on the part of the Persians to support any of the Greek states which turned against the enemy changed this situation. On behalf of the Great King, Timocrates of Rhodes offered a number of Greek *poleis* and anti-Spartan factions money to encourage them to wage war against Sparta. The actual influence of these payments and promises of further financial assistance cannot be fully assessed on the basis of our sources, which tend to be partisan in different directions.¹⁸ However, mounting successes, especially on the part of the Persian fleet under the command of Conon, strongly influenced public opinion in Greece, and demonstrated for the first time the prospects that a joint campaign with Persia against Sparta might be successful.¹⁹ Thus, after internal conflicts, the anti-Spartan group around Ismenias prevailed in Thebes²⁰ and in 395 BC the conflict flared up in the course of a local dispute between the Phocians and the Locrians.²¹ In Athens, the *ekklesia* voted to accept the ensuing Theban offer of an alliance, although it must have been clear to every citizen that this would mean war with Sparta.²² As a result, Sparta and its allies ultimately were up against a coalition that was led by Thebes, Athens, Corinth and Argos and openly supported by the Persians.

wrongly attributes the quote to the historian Theopompus; for this possibility see Bruce 1987, 3-4.

¹⁷ Jehne 1992, 99. Baltrusch 1994, 198. Welwei 2007, 281.

¹⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1-2; *Hell.Oxy.* (ed. Behrwald) 10.2; Plut. *Ages.* 15.6; *Lys.* 27.1; Paus. 3.9.8.

¹⁹ For the victory at Cnidus as a turning point see Isoc. 5.62-64, 129; 7.65; 9.54-56; 12.56; Demosth. 20.68. Hamilton 1982, 69.

²⁰ *Hell.Oxy.* (ed. Behrwald) 20.1-2, 21.1; Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1-2.

²¹ *Hell.Oxy.* (ed. Behrwald) 21.2-5; Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.3-6.

²² RO 6; Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.7-16; Andoc. 3.25; *Lys.* 16.13; Philochorus FGh 328 F 148; *StV* 223. For the debates and factions in Athens in general cf. Funke 1980. Strauss 1986.

It is impossible to reconstruct the debates that took place in the involved *poleis* prior to the outbreak of the conflict and during the first years of the war, but there is no evidence suggesting the existence of an explicit peace party in any city, or for a yearning for peace similar to that which existed during the Peloponnesian War. Early on, the ambiguous military situation – in which, despite individual successes for each side, neither warring party could achieve a clear advantage – may have contributed to the preference for an approach that emphasized victory rather than peace or a willingness to compromise. True war-weariness was therefore demonstrated for the first time in this conflict in 392/391 BC when an attempt was risked to achieve a lasting peace through diplomatic means.

The peace negotiations of 392/391 BC

The negotiations that took place in 392/391 BC may be divided into two parts, according to where they took place (Sardis and Sparta), who negotiated and what their respective goals were. Nevertheless, they should be considered together as they were causally connected. The basic problem in studying these negotiations is the inadequacy of the sources. While Xenophon reports on the meeting in Sardis, he remains silent concerning the ensuing negotiations in Sparta.²³ These are accessible to us primarily through the peace oration delivered by Andocides, who personally took part in the conference and who afterwards publicly spoke in favor of the proposal in the Athenian *ekklesia*.²⁴ His speech can be supplemented by additional sources. Although the significance of the negotiations of 392/391 BC has been frequently underestimated in modern scholarship, there are a number of studies on the question of sources, chronology and the events in general. As a result, there is now a well-grounded general consensus that the conference in Sparta emerged from the negotiations in Sardis and that it was the failure of the latter that led to the invitation of the Greek warring parties to the Peloponnese.²⁵

²³ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.12-16.

²⁴ Andoc. 3 (*De Pace*).

²⁵ For the chronology see esp. Ryder 1965, 165-169. Aucello 1965, 341-342. Hamilton 1979, 252-253. De Voto 1986, 196. Jehne 1991. The reverse order, i.e. that the meeting in Sparta took place before the gathering at Sardis, was suggested in particular by Wilcken 1941, 4-11, followed by Bengtson 1977, 268; Wilcken's thesis was refuted especially by Martin 1949, 128-131.

The negotiations in Sardis

The point of departure for the negotiations in Sardis was established by Sparta's attempt to achieve peace with the Persians. In 392 BC, the war was in a state of deadlock, both in Asia Minor and in Greece, and none of the warring parties had shown itself to be generally dominant during the preceding years. In Sparta, the recognition had spread that waging war on two widely disparate fronts exceeded its own capacities.²⁶ Quite rightly then, the conflict in Greece was accorded more importance than the quest for supremacy in Asia Minor.

The only source we have regarding the peace negotiations in Sardis is Xenophon's brief report in the *Hellenica*. According to his account, in the spring or the summer of 392 BC, the Spartans sent Antalcidas to the satrap Tiribazus in Sardis bearing the message

“that he had come to ask for peace between his city and the King, a peace that the King himself desired: for the Spartans would now lay no claim against the King to the cities in Asia and would be content that all the islands and the Greek cities in general should be independent.”²⁷

For Sparta, the primary goal was to secure an agreement with Persia, and for this purpose, it was even willing to accept the Great King's claim to power over Asia Minor, including the Greek *poleis* in Ionia.²⁸ As a second element, the Spartan offer of peace included general autonomy for the Greek motherland and the entire Aegean. This proposal already bears resemblance to the autonomy guarantee as a key element of the later *koine eirene* treaties, but such an interpretation misjudges the structure and the intention of the Spartan peace plan.²⁹ The goal of Antalcidas' mission was a “separate peace” between Sparta and Persia, and the war with Sparta's Greek enemies was not the subject of the negotiations, but only arose as a secondary issue because Sparta hoped that this would be a way to stop Persian support for the Corinthian alliance. In this context, the provision of autonomy did not represent a peace plan for Greece,

²⁶ Cf. Hamilton 1979, 243. Hamilton 1982, 76. De Voto 1986, 191-192. Buckler 2003, 128; 139.

²⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.14. (...) ὅτι εἰρήνης δεόμενος ἦκοι τῇ πόλει πρὸς βασιλέα, καὶ ταύτης οἴασπερ βασιλεὺς πάλαι ἐπεθύμει, τῶν τε γὰρ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων Λακεδαιμονίους βασιλεῖ οὐκ ἀντιποιεῖσθαι, τὰς τε νήσους ἀπάσας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἀρκεῖν σφίσιν αὐτονόμους εἶναι. Translation J. Marincola.

²⁸ Zahrt 2000, 300.

²⁹ Wilcken 1941, 4-6. Seager 1967, 104-105. De Voto 1986, 193. In contrast, the Spartan proposal is interpreted as a direct forerunner of the later *koinei eirenai* by Hampl 1938, 86. Martin 1944, 19-20. Ryder 1965, 28. Quass 1991, 37.

but instead, was primarily conceived as a guarantee of security. The Great King was to renounce any expansion beyond the coast of Asia Minor, and in return, the Spartans would refrain from building a hegemonic structure in Greece that would pose a potential threat to the Persian Empire. This is also clear in Xenophon's report, where he has Antalcidas say:

“And if we (...) would accept such terms, why should the King continue to make war against us or spend his money? For the Athenians could not possibly make war against the King if we did not take the lead, nor would it be possible for us to do that if the cities were autonomous.”³⁰

It is evident from this passage that the autonomy clause was intended first and foremost as a guarantee for the Persian Empire. Given the Persians' previous experiences with Spartan treaty partners, such a security clause seems entirely appropriate. The previous Spartan-Persian treaty of 411 BC, which had brought critical Persian support for Sparta in its war against Athens, had also recognized the Great King's dominion over Asia Minor, but had been broken only a decade later.³¹

In addition, it becomes clear that Sparta was in no way seeking a comprehensive peace, but simply the termination of hostilities with the Persian Empire. The Persians were to end their support for the Corinthian alliance in compensation for the acceptance of their rule over Asia, and Antalcidas' discrete warning that a reinvigorated Athens could also develop into a menace for Persia was intended to further undermine the current unity among Sparta's enemies.³²

For Sparta, a successful conclusion of Antalcidas' mission would have meant not only that it could once again concentrate its attention on the Greek military theater, but that it could also entertain a reasonable hope of bringing the anti-Spartan coalition to its knees once the Persian subsidies had ceased. With the end of the war in Asia Minor, a secure agreement with the Persian Empire and victory over its Greek opponents, Sparta would thus have restored its hegemony in the Greek motherland and secured its long-term future. Of course, a hegemonic policy à la Lysander would no longer be possible on ac-

³⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.14. καίτοι, ἔφη, τοιαῦτα ἐθελόντων ἡμῶν, τίνος ἂν ἕνεκα πρὸς ἡμᾶς οἱ Ἕλληνες ἢ βασιλεὺς πολεμίῃ ἢ χρήματα δαπανῶν; καὶ γὰρ οὐδ' ἐπὶ βασιλεῖα στρατεῦεσθαι δυνατὸν οὔτε Ἀθηναίοις μὴ ἡγουμένων ἡμῶν οὔθ' ἡμῖν αὐτονόμων οὐσῶν τῶν πόλεων. Translation J. Marincola.

³¹ Thuc. 8.58.1-7; cf. 8.18.1-3; 37.1-5. Ryder 1965, 27. Quass 1991, 37. Zahrt 2000, 300. Welwei 2007, 285-286.

³² Jehne 1994, 31-32. Zahrt 2000, 300-301.

count of the autonomy clause, but for those Spartans who were proponents of a more restrained foreign policy such an outcome would have seemed worth striving for.³³ The treaty envisaged between Sparta and Persia thus implied quite significant effects upon the interstate political order in Greece as well; however, the peace plan only acquired a truly regulatory character as a consequence of an unforeseen shift in the negotiations – the intervention of the Corinthian alliance.

In the meantime, Sparta's Greek opponents had learned of Antalcidas' mission and immediately recognized the threat a possible Spartan-Persian agreement might pose. Therefore, they quickly dispatched delegations to Sardis, so they would arrive there before Antalcidas could come to an agreement with Tiribazus.³⁴ As current military partners of the Persians, they then had to be included in the consultations. Although they were not empowered with comprehensive diplomatic authority, their goal was to prevent an agreement between Antalcidas and Tiribazus. Their presence, however, made it necessary to talk about potential options to end the war in Greece as well. The precise course of these consultations remains unknown, since Xenophon only provides us with a summary.³⁵ However, based upon these conditions, Antalcidas' recommendations unintentionally took on a new character and now opened up a possibility for a comprehensive plan, one that was intended to bring peace to Greece as well.³⁶

And yet, the autonomy clause proposed by Antalcidas provoked intense opposition on the part of the Athenian, Argive and Theban delegates. According to Xenophon's report, the Athenians were worried about their recently regained domain over Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros, whereas the Thebans saw their leadership in the Boeotian League threatened. In addition, the Argives refused to give up their close relationship with Corinth.³⁷ Not least on account of the resistance of the allies, but also because of the overall scope of the decision, Tiribazus could do nothing more than to present himself in Susa to deliver the offer to Artaxerxes.³⁸ However, he demonstrated the fact that he personally favored the proposals in that he detained Conon, who had traveled to

³³ Cf. De Voto 1986, 193-194. Urban 1991, 66. Welwei 2007, 286.

³⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.13.

³⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.14-16.

³⁶ Buckler 2003, 142-143.

³⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.15. Since according to Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.13 Corinthian ambassadors were present at Sardis, the *synoikismos* had not taken place yet, but close relations had already been put into effect.

³⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.16.

Sardis as an Athenian delegate, and, in addition, secretly sent Antalcidas funds for the Spartan fleet.³⁹

Despite all efforts, however, the Spartan attempt to settle the conflict with Persia failed. In contrast to Tiribazus, the Great King was not ready to conclude peace with the Spartans, and he probably did not trust their offer following their violation of the treaty of 411 BC and their support of Cyrus. In fact, Artaxerxes did not simply deny the request by rejecting it, but instead removed the peace-seeking Tiribazus and replaced him with Struthas, who was known to be a friend of Athens.⁴⁰ Even before the news of this had reached Greece, the decision had to be considered tabled, and yet on account of discussions concerning the autonomy provision in Sardis, a new peace solution hung in the air.

The negotiations in Sparta

Despite the postponement resulting from Tiribazus' journey to Susa, and despite the rejection of the Spartan proposals by the emissaries of the Corinthian alliance, there was ongoing discussion about the potential for a peace treaty. Clearly, exhaustion and war-weariness were spreading. In Thebes, a waning degree of commitment to the battle had already been evident for some time. For Athens, some passages in Aristophanes' *Ekklesiazusai*, probably performed in 391/390 BC, might hint at increasing economic problems.⁴¹ In Sparta, a decision to sound out the possibilities for peace in Greece was apparently reached very soon after the return of Antalcidas from Sardis, and so the Spartans invited the warring parties to a peace congress.⁴² This general readiness for serious negotiations is demonstrated not only by the very broad participation in this conference in Sparta but also by the fact that the leading *poleis* did not send only ambassadors for a mere exchange of opinions, but empowered their delegates with decision-making power as *presbeis autokratores*.⁴³ Hence, discussions had already taken place about a peace treaty and its possible conditions in order

³⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.16. Conon's arrest (without any allusions to the negotiations) is also mentioned in Isoc. 4.154; Diod. 14.85.4; Nep. *Con.* 5.3-4.

⁴⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.17.

⁴¹ Aristoph. *Ekkel.* 814-825; cf. also Isoc. 17.41. Aristoph. *Ekkel.* 233-235 might be read as a hint to a growing war-weariness as well; Strauss 1986, 140.

⁴² Ryder 1965, 31-32. Aucello 1965, 366-367. Jehne 1994, 33. Hamilton 1979, 252-254 instead argues that the Athenian "peace party" initiated the meeting at Sparta.

⁴³ Andoc. 3.33, 34; Philochorus FGrH 328 F 149b. For *presbeis autokratores* in general see also Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.17-19; Andoc. 3.39; Diod. 11.24.3-4. Pownall 1995. Buckler 2003, 150-151.

to establish the negotiating positions and decision frameworks for their own representatives.⁴⁴

In his *Hellenica*, Xenophon does not mention the negotiations in Sparta;⁴⁵ our main source is therefore the third oration of Andocides, in which he seeks to move the Athenians to accept the peace proposal. The Athenian delegation consisted of Andocides, together with Epicrates, Cratinus and Eubulides;⁴⁶ in addition, the presence of negotiators from Thebes and Argos is well documented.⁴⁷ It is probable, although far from certain, that there were also representatives from other smaller warring parties who took part in the negotiations, especially on the side of Sparta's opponents.⁴⁸ The nature of Sparta's own proposal, which it must have presented in its capacity as initiator of the negotiations, is not known, but it can be assumed that it was based upon the earlier discussions in Sardis. The precise text of the draft treaty that was agreed upon in Sparta has not been preserved either, but it is possible to reconstruct at least its most important points.

It appears that a proposal for future peace in Greece was presented in terms of a general guaranty of autonomy for all the Greek *poleis*. The islands of Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros were made explicit exceptions, and were to remain in the possession of Athens.⁴⁹ The Spartans also offered an accommodation to Thebes by accepting the continued existence of the Boeotian League under Theban leadership. In return, Thebes would only be required to forego the recovery of Orchomenos, which had seceded.⁵⁰ However, the Spartan side considered the close alliance between Corinth and Argos as unacceptable, since

⁴⁴ Other sources can possibly support the notion of a growing public discourse on peace among the Greek states. In the *Olympiakos*, which can be dated either to 408 or 392 BC, Gorgias urged the Greeks to be united against the Persian Empire (DK 82 B 7. 8a), cf. Blass 1886, 58-61. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1893, I 172-173. Funke 1980, 39. Flower 2000, 92-93. A date around 392/391 BC has been also suggested for Lysias' *Epitaphios* which contains some similar arguments in regard to Persian-Greek relations, Kartes 2000, 117-125, cf. Grethlein 2010, 107.

⁴⁵ For Xenophon's silence on the gathering at Sparta cf. Tuplin 1993, 77. Zahrnt 2000, 302-303; cf. also famously Cawkwell 1973, 57-58 (with regard to the foundation of the Second Athenian League): "(...) the silences of Xenophon can never prove that what he does not recount did not happen."

⁴⁶ Andoc. 3.33; Philochorus FGrH 328 F 149a; Dem. 19.277.

⁴⁷ Cf. Andoc. 3.13, 20, 24-25, 26-28, 41.

⁴⁸ On the possibility that observers from *poleis* that were not actively involved in the Corinthian War, but had a vital interest in the success of the conference were present in Sparta see Jehne 1994, 34. Less probable is the presence of other members of the Peloponnesian League, cf. Rhodes 1999, 37.

⁴⁹ Andoc. 3.12, 14.

⁵⁰ Andoc. 3.13, 20.

the union of its two rivals would have seriously threatened the Spartan supremacy over the Peloponnese.⁵¹

At first glance, we are inclined to think that this proposal was only a modification of Antalcidas' offer from Sardis including some concessions on the part of Sparta, but in fact, the new composition of potential treaty partners had substantially altered the intent and the orientation of the negotiations. Now, the object of discussion was a peace solution for Greece. Therefore, the autonomy clause no longer served as a security guarantee for the Persian Empire, but instead, was to be codified as a permanent, valid structuring principle for interstate relations in Greece. This represented a critical transformation and, for the first time, formulated what would be a key element of all later Common Peace treaties: a general autonomy guarantee of unlimited term that, at least in principle, would involve all of the Greek states. As a direct consequence, a new type of treaty was discussed that broke with traditions of international law by providing for a pure peace treaty, concluded between multiple parties and set up to have permanent legal force. Thus, it was not in the negotiations in Sardis but rather in the ensuing discussions in Sparta that the foundations for the *koine eirene* were formulated for the first time.

While there is no evidence for a direct participation by Persian envoys in the consultations in Sparta, it is unclear whether the news of Artaxerxes' rejection of the Spartan peace offer had reached Greece at the time of the negotiations. However, Martin Jehne has persuasively shown that it is more than probable that the Greeks were well aware of the Persian plans to continue waging war.⁵² The Spartan willingness to accommodate especially Athens and Thebes indicates that they were feeling pressed; they probably would have behaved much more confidently if they had not already learned of the disillusioning news from Susa. In addition, the negative attitude shown by the Athenians, which will be discussed in more detail later, suggests that they, too, had already heard about Tiribazus being replaced by Struthas, an avowed friend of the Athenians. Thus, some knowledge about the Persian king's decision can be assumed, but it is no prerequisite for explaining the new initiative now directed towards Greece.⁵³

The negotiating parties in Sparta were manifestly aware of the new elements in the proposed treaty, yet their demands and decisions were primarily determined by the concrete political and military situation and the aims that had been mandated by their respective *poleis*. In Sparta, a positive reaction to the peace proposal developed. For even though it meant that Sparta would have to

⁵¹ Jehne 1994, 37. Buckler 2003, 148. Welwei 2007, 278.

⁵² Jehne 1991.

⁵³ Hamilton 1969, 256. Jehne 1991. Jehne 1994, 34-35.

renounce Lysandrian power politics, the offer of long-term autonomy assured that Sparta would nonetheless remain the strongest and most powerful *polis* in Greece. The treaty provided a way to stop the renewed emergence of Athens as a great power, and at least those factions in Sparta that argued for a more restrained foreign policy could now hope to see their ideal become reality.⁵⁴ The Boeotians had already begun pulling back from the war prior to the negotiations in Sparta. For Thebes, after years of war without significant progress or victory, the main goal was to affirm and secure their own leadership position in the Boeotian League, so it is not surprising that the Theban emissaries readily embraced the proposal in Sparta.⁵⁵ By contrast, for Argos the targeted or already completed union with Corinth was too important to relinquish, and for this reason, the Argive and Corinthian representatives apparently rejected the peace proposal right on the spot.⁵⁶

The situation was more problematic for the Athenian delegates. Athens had acquired a decisive role in the current negotiations based upon its real and intended leadership position among Sparta's opponents, something that the negotiators were keenly aware of. The Athenian delegates themselves were quite positively disposed to the draft treaty, but as the presented proposals deviated from the mandate they had been given, they decided to return to Athens and leave the decision to the *ekklesia*. However, before we consider the debates that ultimately led to the Athenian rejection of the peace plan, we should first analyze the proposal in greater detail with regard to its most important substantive and formal elements.

The main features of the peace proposal

With its basic character as a peace treaty, its multilateral design and its aim to implement a permanent and stable order throughout Greece, the peace proposal negotiated at Sparta contained some revolutionary innovations. However, these new stipulations were not totally unforeseeable. At the core of the peace proposal is the principle of *autonomia*, the fundamental right of all Greek *poleis* for autonomy. In according such a central role to *autonomia*, the proposal is a reflection of a political trend that dates back to the middle of the fifth century BC. Extensive research in recent decades has shown how the concept of autonomy arose in the context of struggles against Athenian power politics in

⁵⁴ Ryder 1965, 33.

⁵⁵ Andoc. 3.13, 20, 24-25, 28, 32. Jehne 1994, 34.

⁵⁶ Andoc. 3.26-28, 32, 41. Jehne 1994, 34. Welwei 2007, 278.

the Delian League.⁵⁷ *Autonomia* was formulated as a right and a value, which allies, contrary to convention and unwritten law, had only enjoyed to a limited degree or been entirely robbed of during the period of the Athenian *arche*. The term, which emerged in the course of protests and resistance against the Athenian policy, then acquired increasing relevance during the Peloponnesian War, not least because Sparta ostentatiously advocated “freedom for the Hellenes” and made the promotion of autonomy part of its own propaganda.

After 404 BC, however, Sparta found itself rapidly becoming the target of the rallying cry for autonomy because of its hegemonic policy. The Eleans accused the Spartans of “enslaving the Greeks”, and Sparta’s violation of the right of autonomy played a prominent role in the propaganda of the Corinthian alliance as well.⁵⁸ In this way, the concept of autonomy definitively disengaged itself from resistance against Athenian imperialism to find general acceptance as a fundamental right and a significant characteristic feature of a Greek *polis*. This did not prevent *autonomia* from becoming blatantly instrumentalized as a profitable and legitimizing slogan in interstate disputes.⁵⁹ It is, however, precisely the omnipresence of the autonomy slogan over the entire span of the fourth century that illustrates that the right of autonomy was now generally recognized, so that no powerful *polis* could officially oppose it any longer.⁶⁰ This becomes already evident in the negotiations of 392/391 BC, where none of the parties called the autonomy principle as such into question. Instead, only specific individual cases and questions of detail were brought into contention. Thus, at least in the context of a public forum, no Greek power could deny the principle of autonomy anymore.

By its nature, the autonomy principle represented a conservative concept. The sense of its permanence and its intrinsic political value arose for the first time when people saw the rights and freedoms associated with it menaced or even lost during the Athenian *arche* in the middle of the fifth century.⁶¹ Hence, *autonomia* became something to be preserved, not something to be created anew; the struggle was to restore a former (and often idealized) condition. Yet the revolutionary innovation in the peace proposal of 392/391 BC was that it

⁵⁷ Cf., for instance, Bickerman 1958. Ostwald 1982. Raaflaub 1981. Raaflaub 1985. Baltrusch 1994.

⁵⁸ Diod. 14.17.6 (προσεγκαλούντων ὅτι τοὺς Ἕλληνας καταδουλοῦνται); cf. also Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.13; Diod. 14.82.2-4; Lys. 2.68. Raaflaub 1981, 321.

⁵⁹ See especially the discussion in Karavites 1984. Bosworth 1992. Rhodes 1999.

⁶⁰ Cf. Hansen 1995; Hansen 1998, esp. 80-82, who argues that, in fact, the general concept of the autonomous *polis per definitionem* can only be applied to the fourth century.

⁶¹ Ostwald 1982, 45; Raaflaub 1985, 185-207; Baltrusch 1994, esp. 68-70; 163-167; 174.

formally established autonomy for the first time as an organizing principle for Greek interstate relations – a step that was now clearly considered necessary because of the experiences of the preceding decades. Under changing circumstances, the vindication of their own right to *autonomia* had thus become a central question for all of the Greek *poleis*. In the understanding of interstate relations at the beginning of the fourth century, *autonomia* therefore constituted not only a general but also a generally threatened right, one that needed durable and contractual protection, regardless of which power in Greece held the dominant position or wished to claim hegemony for itself.

And yet, for (potentially) hegemonic cities, such a codified autonomy principle must have had some appeal that went beyond the mere restriction of their own ambitions as well. The principle also provided them with protection from rivals who might become excessively powerful, something that both the hard-pressed power, Sparta, and Athens, with its rising fortunes, might well have interpreted as a security guarantee in the context of actual conditions prevailing in 392/391 BC.

Even this perspective regarding the autonomy clause did not represent a complete novelty. The analysis of the Spartan offer to Tiribazus in Sardis already showed that in the framework of the hoped-for Spartan-Persian agreement, the autonomy clause was understood as a security guarantee for the Persian Empire.⁶² And in the Greek realm as well, such use of autonomy was not unknown: according to Thucydides, the treaty between Sparta and Argos in 418 BC already required both partners to allow the cities of the Peloponnese to remain autonomous.⁶³ In the context of the evolution of treaties, this was a critical innovation, because autonomy was not granted only to individual *poleis*, but instead, was guaranteed by both parties to the cities of an entire region. Thus, the goal of the agreement was not only to secure the legal status of weaker *poleis*, but in essence, to fulfill the security imperatives of both treaty partners.⁶⁴ On the other hand – and in contrast to 392/391 BC – *autonomia* was here still regarded as a privilege granted by the powerful, not as a general right of all *poleis* in general.⁶⁵

The central codification of the autonomy principle in the peace proposal of 392/391 BC can therefore only be understood from the perspective of the

⁶² See above.

⁶³ Thuc. 5.77.5.

⁶⁴ Ryder 1965, 13-14. Rhodes 1999, 34; 38. Buckler 2003, 173. That the Spartan-Argive treaty of 418 BC served as a model for the peace proposal of 392/391 BC has especially been argued by Payrau 1961.

⁶⁵ Ostwald 1982, 4-7. Jehne 1992, 110-111. Baltrusch 1994, 182-183. Jehne 1994, 44. Rhodes 1999, 34. Buckler 2003, 144. Buckler – Beck 2008, 10-11.

experiences in the fifth century with the Athenian *arche* and the changes that had taken place in the first decade of the fourth century BC. Since these events were regarded as undesirable developments, the goal was now to take counter-measures acceptable to all parties and thereby to develop a novel legal instrument.⁶⁶ It should be noted, however, that like all subsequent Common Peace treaties, the proposal of 392/391 BC did not contain a precise definition of *autonomia*. Whereas it explicitly sanctioned the Athenian possession of Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros, the constitution of the Peloponnesian League certainly was not up for discussion at any time. What provisions may have been made for the Boeotian League, whose ongoing existence was guaranteed for the Thebans, can no longer be determined in detail.

The form of the peace proposal

The proposal was built on the idea that peace in Greece could only be established on the basis of *autonomia*, thus representing the first draft of a real peace treaty in Greek history. Up to this time, Greek international law had only known treaties that either founded an alliance (*symmachia*) or *philia*, or *spondai*, which established a truce of fixed duration. Had it been ratified, the treaty of 392/391 BC would have defined peace as a positive legal condition between states for the very first time.⁶⁷ Unlike the *spondai* of the era, this new peace was set up, at least implicitly, with the idea of permanence.⁶⁸ Yet even this innovation can be traced back to the changes that had occurred during previous decades. From the middle of the fifth century on, one begins to find more and more *spondai* with terms of 30 or 50 years, thus defying the definitional logic of a “truce”.⁶⁹ Therefore, it was only consequent that the next step was to recog-

⁶⁶ Baltrusch 1997, 36.

⁶⁷ For the usage of the term *eirene* in interstate agreements in the second half of the fifth century BC see Santi Amantini 1985. Giovannini 2007, 225-227.

⁶⁸ Baltrusch 1994, 157-158. No time limit is mentioned either by Andocides or by other sources. Later examples, such as the King's Peace and the subsequent *koinali eirenai* also suggest that already in 392/391 BC the goal was a treaty that would remain in effect forever.

⁶⁹ Cf. the treaty between Athens and Sparta of 446/445 BC (30 years, Thuc. 1.115.1; Andoc. 3.6. Plut. *Pericl.* 24.1; Justin. 3.7.1; Diod. 12.7.1; Paus. 5.23.4. Baltrusch 1994, 158-169); the Peace of Nicias of 421 BC (50 years, Thuc. 5.18.3; Diod. 12.74.5; Baltrusch 1994, 169-185). Jehne 1994, 28.

nize peace as a positive legal status and to move toward the development of a corresponding treaty form.⁷⁰

Finally, the peace proposal of 392/391 BC was formulated with the view that it would be concluded between multiple partners, thus breaking with the traditional bipartite principle of interstate treaties. This new “multilateralism” was incorporated right from the outset, since invitations to Sparta were apparently sent out at least to all the warring parties in Greece. Given the lack of a formal hierarchy in the Corinthian alliance, its individual representatives would each have had to conclude their own separate treaties with Sparta anyway. However, the general concept and the autonomy principle furthered the idea of a multilateral treaty; indeed, it even made such a treaty a requirement. Yet, in this area as well, it is possible to document earlier attempts. Thus, even though the Peace of Nicias of 421 BC was concluded bilaterally between Athens and Sparta and their current confederates, at least the members of the Peloponnesian League were compelled to swear to the accompanying oath *kata poleis*.⁷¹

Since we do not have the verbatim text, the exploration of the individual substantive and formal elements of the treaty must remain incomplete, but the analysis has nevertheless shown that the peace proposal of 392/391 BC must be explained as a consequence of the experiences of the fifth century. The unwritten conventions in force up to that time had proved incapable of managing the stresses of Athenian power politics, thus promoting the emergence of the autonomy doctrine. However, after the end of the Peloponnesian War, the hopes previously described for a new period of peace and freedom were abruptly disappointed, and due to Sparta’s hegemonic policy the autonomy doctrine was now propagated beyond the specific context of anti-Athenian resistance. The experiences of a new war less than a decade after the capitulation of Athens ultimately led to the need for a comprehensive, enduring, and above all, stable order. The proposal, which included the first-ever formulation of the idea of a *koine eirene*, can thus be traced back to changes that had occurred during the previous decades, and seen as a reaction to those experiences. In the process, the individual elements of the proposal represented an expansion and further development of the range of policy instruments available in

⁷⁰ This significant development was analyzed for the first time by Bruno Keil (1916, esp. 5-9, 17-22), cf. also Ryder 1965, xv. Baltrusch 1994, 157-158. At the beginning of the fourth century, however, the terminology had not yet been clearly differentiated and was still under development. Thus, Andocides also blurs the terminology, although at one point, he explicitly points to the difference between “true peace” and earlier *spondai* (Andoc. 3.11). Albini (1964, 22-23; comm. ad Andoc. 3.11) assumes that Andocides only differentiates between *spondai* and *eirene* if necessary for his argument. Cf. already Blass 1886, 327.

⁷¹ Thuc. 5.18.9; Baltrusch 1994, 174-177, cf. 162.

international law, elements which were tailored to the specific content and intent of the agreement. As a whole, the draft thus represents a revolutionary innovation in Greek treaty making.

The Athenian debate and the failure of the peace proposal

At the same time, one could certainly understand the treaty from a more pragmatic perspective as the best possible outcome that could be achieved after debilitating years of continuous conflict without a decisive outcome. It would end the war and improve the status of *poleis* like Sparta and Thebes or at least made that status more secure. Nevertheless, the debates that took place in Athens following the negotiations in Sparta showed that, especially for a *polis* with hegemonic ambitions, it was difficult to accept these insights and to adopt the principles set down in the peace proposal.

Although it is impossible to reconstruct the precise mandate of the Athenian delegation to Sparta, the treaty certainly did not deviate so extensively from the compromise achieved in the negotiations to compel the four ambassadors to come to a swift rejection. On the other hand, there were doubtless some profound differences, leading the Athenian representatives to refer the decision back to the assembly, despite their clear authorization as *presbeis autokratōres*.⁷² At their request, a 40-day extension was granted, and so they proceeded to return to Athens to transmit the treaty proposal and their own recommendation to the *ekklesia*.⁷³

It is Andocides' third speech that has survived as our primary source of the debate in the Athenian assembly.⁷⁴ Its arrangement and contents suggest that it was not part of the initial remarks from the delegation that opened the debate, since Andocides foregoes a precise depiction of the negotiations and the proposal, and also does not lucidly detail the arguments favoring his opinion that the treaty should be adopted. Instead, he begins with a comprehensive response to the opponents of the treaty, and his entire presentation is marked by a rather defensive style; the speech thus seems to be a rebuttal to the voices of the op-

⁷² Andoc. 3.33, 34; cf. Philochorus FGGrH 328 F 149b. Funke 1980, 143.

⁷³ Andoc. 3.33, 40.

⁷⁴ Although it remains unclear by whom and with what intent the speech was published (cf. Grethlein 2010, 128), there is no compelling reason to doubt its authenticity (cf. esp. Harris 2000; the authenticity of the speech is defended i.a. by Kennedy 1977, 104-105. Edwards 1995, 107-108. Grethlein 2010, 128-129).

position in the debate.⁷⁵ These basic features of the oration certainly make the reconstruction of events, the course of the negotiations and the details of the proposal more difficult to discern, but it offers a glimpse into the discussion that took place in Athens. While a detailed analysis of the speech lies beyond the scope of this paper, at least its main arguments should be summarized briefly.

Andocides begins his speech with a response to the opponents of the proposal that addresses their strongest argument, namely that peace with Sparta would bring no advantages to Athens, but, quite the contrary, would actually endanger the democracy.⁷⁶ Clearly, the audience recalled the Athenian-Spartan treaty of 404 BC, so Andocides presents a whole series of historical counter-examples, in which peace with Sparta had allowed Athens to blossom and democracy to achieve its fullest development.⁷⁷

Despite his extensive use of arguments drawn from history, the orator was well aware of the innovations and the far-reaching implications contained in the proposal. In fact, he makes clear to his listeners that they are not only casting a vote with respect to Athens, but that they are deciding about peace for all of Greece and names the goal of a *koine eirene*,⁷⁸ of course without yet using the term in its technical sense.⁷⁹ Andocides consistently emphasizes the innovations in the proposed peace treaty in comparison to the treaty of 404 BC, and he specifically makes the distinction between peace (*eirene*) and an enforced truce (*spoudai*).⁸⁰

⁷⁵ Cf. Kennedy 1977, 104. Funke 1980, 144-146. Missiou 1992, 56. Hochschulz 2007, 41.

⁷⁶ Andoc. 3.1-12.

⁷⁷ Andoc. 3.3-12. In this context, the historical errors in this account are only of secondary importance.

⁷⁸ Andoc. 3.17: “Do not overlook another thing, gentlemen; you are negotiating today for the common peace and independence of all Greeks alike: you are giving them all the opportunity of sharing in every advantage.” (σκέψασθε δέ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τόδε, ὅτι νυνὶ πᾶσι τοῖς Ἑλλήσι κοινὴν εἰρήνην καὶ ἐλευθερίαν πράττετε, καὶ μετέχειν ἅπασι πάντων ἐξουσίαν ποιεῖτε. Translation K.J. Maidment).

⁷⁹ Ryder 1965, xv.

⁸⁰ Andoc. 3.11: “There is a wide difference between a peace and a truce. A peace is a settlement of differences between equals: a truce is the dictation of terms to the conquered by the conquerors after victory in war.” (εἰρήνη γὰρ καὶ σπονδαὶ πολλὰ διαφέρουσι σφῶν αὐτῶν. εἰρήνην μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἴσου ποιοῦνται πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁμολογήσαντες περὶ ὧν ἂν διαφέρωνται· σπονδὰς δέ, ὅταν κρατήσωσι κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, οἱ κρείττους τοῖς ἥττοσιν ἐξ ἐπιταγμάτων ποιοῦνται. Translation K.J. Maidment).

These reflections, however, did not occupy the central place in his speech, and apparently they were not at the center of the debates in Athens, either.⁸¹ First and foremost, Andocides claims not only that any hopes for a Spartan defeat are unrealistic,⁸² but also stresses that a continuation of the war would be unjustified since its main reasons had been voided. Athens had become free (*eleuthera*) again, and the reconstruction of the walls and the rebuilding of the fleet would be guaranteed by the peace together with the possession of Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros.⁸³ Andocides explicitly points out that of all the warring parties, Athens stands to gain the most from peace, whereas the Boeotians even had to accept the secession of Orchomenos, and the Spartans had to renounce their hegemony.⁸⁴ At the end, the orator confesses that not nearly all the hoped-for successes had been accomplished. Yet he does not object to these far-fetched goals, but instead cites the current peace proposal as a much likelier foundation for achieving additional success for Athens in the future.⁸⁵ Thus, it is evident from Andocides' speech that (besides the worry about falling back under Sparta's dictate) it was mainly Athens' own war aims that defined the discussion.

Hence, the determining factor for the *ekklesia's* decision about the peace was the widespread view that Athens could achieve further victories in the current war, and as a result, its citizens were unwilling to be satisfied with the rights assured by the draft treaty. Despite the ambassadors' support for the peace proposal, their opponents prevailed in the *ekklesia*, and as a consequence of Athens' rejection, the peace of 392/391 BC failed.⁸⁶ Yet, the discussions in Athens continued and the public mood remained tense even after this decision. In fact, the opponents of the treaty were not contented with their electoral victory, but the four ambassadors were tried on charges of *paraprosbeia* at the behest of Callistratus and went into exile.⁸⁷

⁸¹ Ryder 1965, 33.

⁸² Andoc. 3.15-16, 24-28.

⁸³ Andoc. 3.12-14, 16, 20.

⁸⁴ Andoc. 3.17-23. Schmitz 1988, 234-237.

⁸⁵ Andoc. 3.36, 40-41.

⁸⁶ Philochorus FGrH 328 F 149a. If Aristoph. *Ekk.* 200-203, 354-357 alludes to this rejection, Thrasybulus might have been one of the main opponents.

⁸⁷ Philochorus FGrH 328 F 149a; Dem. 19.277; Plut. *mor.* 835A. Perlman 1968, 263-264; Funke 1980, 63-64. 145-146; Jehne 1991, 275. Hochschulz 2007, esp. 34-40. The account of Philochorus FGrH 328 F 149a that the Athenians rejected the peace because "here had been written in it that the Greeks who were inhabiting Asia were all to be accounted members in the King's household" (... διότι ἐγγράπτο ἐν αὐτῇ τοὺς τὴν Ἀσίαν οἰκοῦντας Ἕλληνας ἐν βασιλείῳσ οἴκῳ πάντας εἶναι συννευνημένους, Didym. in Demosth. 10, 34 col. 7,19-22), clearly refers to the King's Peace of 386 BC, cf. Hamilton 1979, 237-239; 318. Schmitz 1988, 237. Jehne

Conclusion

As it has been shown the idea of a *koine eirene* was not invented in 386 BC with the King's Peace, but formulated for the first time in the course of the negotiations that took place in 392/391 BC. This process began with a Spartan peace offer to Persia that was aimed to bring the conflict in Asia Minor to an end and thereby to terminate Persian support for Sparta's enemies in Greece. However, as a consequence of the unanticipated involvement of the Corinthian alliance, the discussions extended to a consideration of ending the war in Greece as well. Despite the failure of the consultations in Sardis, they provoked early glimmers of a Greek debate about a peace solution, and may even have led them to begin in earnest. As a consequence, the ensuing conference in Sparta had the sole aim of finding a solution for the Greek conflicts. The proposal drawn up at this meeting contained all the essential components of a Common Peace treaty: it was based upon a general guarantee of autonomy and constituted a veritable peace treaty that was intended to be concluded between several states and (at least implicitly) having a limitless term.

These provisions can only be understood by considering the experiences of the fifth century and the changes that took place in the subsequent years. In the period following the Peloponnesian War, it became clear that, although the fundamental crisis in Greek interstate relations may have begun with the expansion of Athenian power and the formation of its *arche*, it had not been resolved by the capitulation of Athens. Instead, the Spartan hegemonic policy had demonstrated that Athens was not the only *polis* to pose a threat to autonomy and that the right to *autonomia* therefore needed to be protected. In order to implement such a comprehensive political order the existing legal instruments had to be significantly expanded, and these innovations ultimately gave birth to a new form of treaty.

Although the peace proposal of 392/391 BC thereby represented a revolutionary innovation in the world of Greek interstate relations, it was hardly motivated or initiated from the perspective of a superior, lofty ideology of peace. First and foremost, it was inspired by growing war-weariness and hopelessness, the wish to bring the conflicts to a rapid end for one's own benefit, and an increasing political, military and economic exhaustion on every side. In Athens, however, the hope still persisted for additional gains, and thus ultimately led to the failure of the peace process. Only a few years later, Athens finally had to agree to quite similar conditions. This time, however, the peace was supported

1991, 271-273. Urban 1991, 60. Keen 1995. Keen 1998. Bruce 2001. Buckler 2003, 141-142. Harding 2006, comm. ad fr. 183a. For a comprehensive overview of the discussion see Keen 1995 and 1998.

and sanctioned by the Great King. The peace treaty of 386 BC certainly did bring the Corinthian War to an end, and yet it failed to bring success, peace and stability to Greece, not at all unlike the *koine eirene* treaties that followed. Hence, although the right to *autonomia* was at least in theory irreversibly established as the fundament of a stable interstate order throughout Greece, the words with which Andocides chided his fellow-citizens in 392/391 BC applied not only to Athens but also to the majority of the other *poleis*:

“If it is your duty to go to war, you want peace; if peace is arranged for you, you count up the benefits which war has brought you.”⁸⁸

⁸⁸ Andoc. 3.35. κὰν μὲν πολεμῆν δέη, τῆς εἰρήνης ἐπιθυμεῖτε, ἐὰν δέ τις ὑμῖν τὴν εἰρήνην πράττη, λογίζεσθε τὸν πόλεμον ὅσα ἀγαθὰ ὑμῖν κατηγοράσατο. Translation K.J. Maidment.

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Peace, Common Peace, and War in Mid-Fourth-Century Greece

Polly Low

In 362/361 BC, a representative of the Persian satraps (who were then in rebellion against the Persian King) arrived in mainland Greece, seeking Greek support for a war against Persia. The Greeks – in what might be seen as a rare outbreak of common sense – replied that they would rather not get involved in this particular suicidal scheme, preferring instead to maintain their “quiet” (*hesychia*):

“They are not aware that the King has any war against them. If, therefore, he keeps quiet and does not embroil the Greeks, and does not attempt to break up the peace that has come into being for us by any craft or contrivance, we too shall keep quiet in matters with regard to the King.”¹

This response is preserved in an epigraphically odd document,² of indeterminate status,³ and uncertain authorship. The text was found in Argos, but is written in Attic dialect and Attic-Ionic script; in spite of its claim to speak for

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- 1 RO 42, lines 8-12. βασιλεῖ δὲ οὐδένα πόλεμον οἶδασιν ὄντα πρὸς αὐτούς. ἐὰν οἱδὺν ἡσυχίαν ἔχει καὶ μὴ συνβάλλῃ τοὺς Ἑλληνας, μηδὲ τὴν ν[ὺν] γεγενημένην ἡμῖν εἰρήνην ἐπιχειρῆ[ι] διαλύειν τέχνη μ[η]δημιᾶι μηδὲ μηχανῆι, ἔξομεν καὶ ἡμεῖς [ἡσυχίαν τὰ πρὸς Β][α]σιλέα.
 - 2 RO 42 (also published as *IG* iv 556, although RO’s restorations follow (for the most part) those suggested by Wilhelm 1901; his text also forms the basis for the editions in *SIG*³ 182, Tod 145, *StV* 292). The inscription was seen and transcribed by Fourmont (“Argis in horto quodam”: Boeckh *ap. CIG* i 1118) and by de Pouqueville (1826-27, vol.5, 205), but is now lost. The date of 362/361 is inferred only from the text’s contents (above all, its allusions to a period of unrest within the Persian Empire); alternative dates have been proposed ranging from the first common peace of 386 (Boeckh *ap. CIG* i 1118), via 371/370 (Momigliano 1934, 494-498; Dusanic 1979, 336), to the period around Chaeronea (Koehler 1876, 15, n.1). Absolute certainty is impossible, but 362/361 does seem, on the basis of our current knowledge of the period, to provide the best fit between this text and the political situation within and beyond Greece.
 - 3 The stone included (at least) two different documents: the “reply” which will be the focus of discussion here (lines 1-17), and a second, very fragmentary, text, which seems to refer to foreign judges. Charneux 1983, 251, n.3 suggests (very briefly) that the first document at least is best understood as a letter; RO object that lines 2-3 of the document imply that the man to whom the response is being given is present. Perhaps the text could be understood as a letter from Athens to Argos? In the absence of the opening formula, certainty is again impossible.

“the Greeks” (lines 3, 12, 14), it should probably be seen as an essentially Athenian creation.⁴

In historical terms, this response is not particularly hard to explain: if Xenophon’s account of the battle of Mantinea of 362 and its consequences is reliable, then the Greek world at this time was in a state of utter exhaustion.⁵ Becoming embroiled in another war at this point might not even have been logistically possible, even if it had been strategically sensible. What is more odd, though, is the way in which this preference for *hesychia* is justified and explained. The Greeks, it is said (at lines 4-7),

“have resolved their disputes towards a common peace, so that, being freed from the war against themselves, they may each make their own cities as great as possible and happy (*eudaimonas*), and remain useful (*chresimoi*) to their friends and strong (*ischyroi*).”⁶

My aim in what follows is twofold. First, I hope to try to explain the reasons for, and implications of, this epigraphically unparalleled proclamation of the benefits of peace. That explanation will require contextualisation, and a second aim of this chapter is to undertake a wider exploration of the diplomatic and theoretical representations and discussions of peace which are visible in our mid-fourth-century sources. In doing so, I hope to contribute to a long-running

4 Buck 1913, 158f must be right to reject the suggestion of Wilhelm (1900, 159) that Attic script and dialect had, by this period, become simply the standard language of diplomatic exchange. His suggestion (*ibid*; accepted by Lalonde 1971, 212, and, with some reservations, by Jehne 1994, 102-105) that the text should be seen as an Athenian creation, or at least subject to strong Athenian influence in its formulation, seems likely to be correct. The text would then have been disseminated by the Athenians to other participants in the 362/361 Common Peace (see Lalonde 1971, 189-202 for further discussion and examples of the retention of non-local dialects in diplomatic texts of this sort). That this particular copy of the text was an Argive creation, however, is suggested by the fact that the second decree on the stone (at lines 18ff) appears to be Doric, although this part of the text is so fragmentary that an absolutely firm judgement on its dialect is not possible.

5 Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.26f.

6 διαλέλυνται τὰ <δ>[ιάφορα πρὸς] κ]οινὴν εἰρήνην, ὅπως ἀπαλλαγέντες τοῦ π[ρὸς αὐτοὺς πολ] [έ]μου τὰς πόλεις ἕκαστοι τὰς αὐτῶν ὡς μεγί[στας καὶ εὐδαιμόν] [ια]ς ποιῶσιν, καὶ χρήσιμοι μένωσιν τοῖς φίλο[ις καὶ ἰσχυροῖ]. The supplement [εὐδαιμόνια] was suggested by Wilhelm 1901, and has generally been accepted, although it is worth noting that Wilhelm’s justification for this supplement was based primarily on the connection between *eudaimonia* and *eirene* in literary sources of the period.

debate over the nature and role of *eirene* in fourth-century Greece (and particularly in fourth-century Athens).

It is generally accepted that this period sees important developments in both technical and more general approaches to *eirene*, although the precise nature and significance of those developments is still disputed. A long-standing orthodoxy held that this development was visible above all in a shift in vocabulary: in the fifth century and the first 15 years of the fourth century, it was argued, *eirene* was used only in the non-technical sense (to mean “an absence of war”); the use of *eirene* to mean a specific peace treaty was thought to be an innovation of the 380s, and one which could be directly linked to the *koinai eirenai*.⁷ The Common Peaces could, therefore, be seen as marking a distinctive shift in the diplomatic vocabulary of the Greek world. Moreover (the argument continues), these *koinai eirenai* might also represent a more deep-seated shift in Greek attitudes to the function of such peace treaties. It has been suggested that to declare an interstate agreement an *eirene* (rather than, for example, *spondai* or *synthekai*), is to make an important (and perhaps novel) assertion that one is not simply (and temporarily) interrupting a universal, default “state of war”; but rather instituting a potentially limitless state of peace.⁸ A consequence of this, and the culmination of the argument, is that it might be possible to see in the fourth century a shift from a model of interstate politics in which war is the default relationship between states and peace only an abstract ideal, to one in which peace becomes a serious (if still elusive) alternative to war.⁹

The specifically linguistic element of this argument is no longer as strong as it once seemed, because subsequent (and particularly epigraphic) discoveries have shown that *eirene* was already being used in its technical diplomatic sense in fifth-century interstate documents.¹⁰ Nevertheless, the wider problem still remains. It is clear that *eirenai*, in the technical sense of peace treaties, start to take significant new forms in fourth-century diplomacy (above all in the context of the *koinai eirenai*); and it is also clear that more general attitudes to peace – as a social, cultural and religious concept – also undergo important developments in this period. What is much less clear is how (if at all) those two processes are

⁷ Keil 1916 (followed by Zampaglione 1973, 26-28; Ryder 1965, 5f).

⁸ Alonso 2007, 221. Ryder 1965, 6 floats a similar view, but is less whole-hearted in endorsing it.

⁹ Tritle 2007, 181.

¹⁰ See especially Santi-Amantini 1985, 1997; further discussion in Giovannini 2007, 225-227. Pre-386 epigraphic references to *eirene* (in the sense of “treaty”) include ML 67bis (Spartan treaty with Aetolians: see below); IG i³ 56, line 30 (decree relating to Eleusis, 430s); IG i³ 86, line 12 (treaty between Athens and Argos, 417/416); it is restored in IG i³ 75 (treaty between Athens and Halicis, 424/423). On *eirene* as peace treaty in fifth-century literary sources, see Santi-Amantini 1986.

connected, and it is in answering that question that RO 42 is a particularly useful starting-point, precisely because the terms in which *eirene* is described in this text seem – at least superficially – to straddle this divide between the narrowly diplomatic and the more abstract senses of the word. A better understanding of the praise of peace in RO 42 might, then, lead to a better understanding of the wider role of peace in fourth-century Athenian thought and practice.

Peace and prosperity

The first and most important question which therefore needs to be asked about RO 42's declaration of the merits of peace is: what sort of peace is being praised in this document? Is it *eirene* as a general concept; *eirene* in the specific sense of a peace agreement; or both at the same time? The most recent commentary on this text chooses the first of those three options, observing that:

“lines 5-7 are striking for their praise of peace, not just as the absence of war but as a foundation for prosperity and co-operation between cities.”¹¹

I will return later in this chapter to the question of whether that reading of the semantic scope of *eirene* is legitimate. For now, however, it is worth exploring what might follow if that reading is correct: why, and how, might peace (in the general sense) be praised, and is such praise as striking as Rhodes and Osborne suggest?

The proposition that peace is, in general, a desirable state is, of course, neither novel nor controversial:

“no-one is fool enough to choose war instead of peace”,

according to Herodotus' Croesus;¹² for Aristophanes' Trygaeus in the *Peace*, Peace (here, strictly speaking, the goddess) has

“the odour of sweet fruits, of festivals, of the Dionysia, of the harmony of flutes, of the tragic poets, of the verses of Sophocles, of the phrases of Euripides (...) of ivy, of straining-bags for wine, of bleating ewes, of provision-

¹¹ RO, p. 217.

¹² Hdt. 1.87.

laden women hastening to the kitchen, of the tipsy servant wench, of the upturned wine-jar, and of a whole heap of other good things".¹³

This generalised portrayal of peace as an uncomplicated benefit continues in some respects unchanged down into the fourth century. It is interestingly visible, for example, in Theopompus' utopian vision of the *Eusebeis*, who live a blissfully happy life, free from war.¹⁴ What does seem to be new in this period, however, is the appearance in our sources of a more thoroughly and rigorously developed rationale for this general approbation. A particularly well-worked version of the argument is visible in Xenophon's *Poroi*: Athens should (Xenophon argues) avoid all war, and make a deliberate effort to cultivate and preserve peace; they should even appoint *eirenoophylakes* to make sure the job is done properly.¹⁵ The result will be to boost trade, enhance prosperity, cut expenditure, and generally foster the wellbeing of Athens, and, by extension, of all the other Greeks too:

“were you to show also that you are striving for peace in every land and on every sea, I do think that, next to the safety of their own country, all men would put the safety of Athens first in their prayers.”¹⁶

In his *On the Peace*, Isocrates puts forward a similar argument. Embracing peace, he suggests, will not only bring about an end to the specific unpleasantness of war, but will also make possible, and even stimulate, a whole set of other bene-

¹³ Aristoph. *Pax* 530-538. ταύτης δ' ὀπώρας, ὑποδοχῆς, Διονυσίων, ἰαυλῶν, τραγοῦδῶν, Σοφοκλέους μελῶν, κιχλῶν, ἰ ἐπυλλίων Εὐριπίδου ἰ ...κιττοῦ, τρυγοίπου, προβατίων βληχωμένων, ἰ ἱκόλπου ἰ γυναικῶν διατρεχουσῶν εἰς ἀγρόν, ἰ δούλης μεθυσσῆς, ἀνατετραμμένου χοῦς, ἰ ἄλλων τε πολλῶν κάγαθῶν. Generally on representations of peace in fifth-century texts, see Caldwell 1919, chs 3-4; Zampaglione 1973, 64-100; Slater 1981 (focussing on poetry and the symposium).

¹⁴ *FGrH* 115 F 75C. On the depiction of peace and war in this fragment, see Dillery 1995, 45-48.

¹⁵ Xen. *Poroi* 5.1: the term seems to be a Xenophontic coinage, and is perhaps intended to be a pun on the *Hellespontophylakes* of the fifth-century empire (and therefore intended to contribute to Xenophon's agenda of setting up an alternative model of interstate behaviour – and interstate success – to that of Athens' imperial past). An alternative reading would see this as a nod towards the common peaces: Jansen 2007, 261 notes that the Persian King is described by Isocrates (4.175) as *phylax* of the common peaces, and suggests that Xenophon might here be envisaging a more specific diplomatic role for Athens, as defender of these peace treaties.

¹⁶ Xen. *Poroi* 5.10. εἰ δὲ καὶ ὅπως ἀνά πᾶσαν γῆν καὶ θάλατταν εἰρήνην ἔσται φανεροῖ εἴητε ἐπιμελόμενοι, ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι πάντας ἂν εὐχεσθαι μετὰ τὰς ἑαυτῶν πατρίδας Ἀθῆνας μάλιστα σφῆσθαι.

fits: fewer expenses, particularly for the liturgical class; increased opportunities for trade; greater domestic, as well as panhellenic, stability.¹⁷

The general link between *eirene* and wellbeing is, therefore, quite well established in the Greek world even before 362, and the more specific idea that peace could be a basis for collective, and particularly panhellenic, benefit is also visible in texts other than RO 42 (particularly the *Poroi*). But Rhodes and Osborne are not necessarily therefore wrong to categorise its appearance in RO 42 as “striking”. RO 42 is, of course, substantially earlier than some of the most extensive fourth-century praises of peace, but what might be even more important than chronology is context. Whatever view is taken of the authorship of RO 42, it certainly seems to have a slightly more official, public status than the disgruntled pamphleteering of Xenophon and Isocrates. What this inscription might preserve, therefore, is a rather rare example of the praise of peace finding its way beyond the marginal (and often more or less oligarchic) realm of discourse. By extension, it could serve as a useful corrective to the view that expressions of the value of peace are typically driven more by anti-democratic animus (or at least oligarchic self-interest) than any fundamental conviction.¹⁸

Peace treaties and war

But does all this run the risk of missing the point? As was noted at the start of the previous section, an assumption which underpins that reading of RO 42 is that the *eirene* of line 5 is equivalent to the *eirene* extolled by Xenophon (and the other literary sources discussed above): that is, *eirene* as a general “state of peace” rather than a specific peace agreement. But of course l.5 does not talk only of *eirene* but of *koine eirene* – and that qualification should perhaps encourage that praise of peace to be set in a more technical, and narrowly diplomatic, context: would this justification of peace would make better sense if it were read as the justification of a specific peace *treaty*: that is to say, the “Common Peace” of 362.

It might seem idiotic to ask whether the Greeks made peace treaties because they hoped such agreements would actively enhance their happiness, strength, and usefulness to their allies (since what other reason would they have for making them?). But the question is not (I would argue) quite as simple-minded as it might initially appear. At the heart of the problem is the issue of how an

¹⁷ The argument pervades the speech, but is summed up at Isocr. 8.18-21. On Isocrates’ attitude to war and peace, see briefly Betalli 1992, and see also below.

¹⁸ On opposition to war as a characteristic of those opposed to radical (or any) democracy, see de Romilly 1954, 344-353; Bearzot 1985; Missiou 1992, 82.

eirene – in the narrow, juridical sense of “peace treaty” – should be categorised. Interstate agreements in classical Greece might be divided into two (broad) categories: in one group, positive, prospective agreements, involving some sort of (usually mutual) obligation between the contracting parties (that is, *symmachiai* or *philiai*); in the other group, agreements which are more negative in content, and whose main function is to guarantee that the parties involved will refrain from some sort of action (this category would include truces: *spondai*, *diallagai*, and so on). That second category of agreement does not promise any new benefit to the states involved, but rather allows simply for a reversion to whatever the *status quo ante* might have been. It promises, in short, an absence of war, rather than the presence of anything positively new.

Into which of those categories should the *koinai eirenai* be placed? The most recent analysis of the Common Peaces has suggested that these agreements should be considered under the same general heading as *spondai*,¹⁹ and this interpretation does have several points in its favour. The basic obligation of an *eirene*, like that of *spondai*, is negative: the participants in the agreement should stop fighting each other. The same is true of the core features of the *koinai eirenai*, whose obligations are admittedly more extensive, but essentially no more positive than those of more simple truces: participants undertake not to infringe autonomy or *eleutheria*, not to install garrisons, and so on.²⁰ To be sure, referring to an agreement as an *eirene* rather than (for example) *spondai* does involve a shift in emphasis away from the act of making peace to the outcome of that act – the state of peace which results.²¹ But it does not necessarily follow that the outcome of an *eirene* is qualitatively different from, or need necessarily offer any more positive tangible benefits than, the outcome of *spondai*.

Such a reading would, I think, make it hard to explain why or how a peace might make any state *chresimos* (or *ischyros*). That is: there is still an unfilled explanatory gap between RO 42’s reference to the *koinai eirene* and its description of the various advantages which the peace has brought. But that reading is also, of course, far too simplistic, certainly in the case of the later *koinai eirenai*. Even if attention is restricted to the formal terms of those agreements, more positive obligations soon start to emerge. The second Common Peace of 371 includes

¹⁹ Alonso 2007, 219–221; Giovannini 2007, 353. Cf. Jehne 1994, who is more willing to emphasise the positive obligations entailed in *koinai eirenai*.

²⁰ See Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31 for the terms of the Peace of Antalcidas (which includes only a commitment to autonomy). Removal of garrisons may have been implied in the autonomy clause of the Peace of Antalcidas (Diod. Sic. 15.5.1; Ryder 1967, 123), but explicitly appears only in the Peace of 375 (Diod. Sic. 15.38). The first Peace of 371 requires withdrawal of governors and demobilisation of armies (Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.18).

²¹ Giovannini 2007, 226f, 363.

the option (although not, apparently, the requirement) for states to use military action against those who violate the peace agreement.²² In 338, the League of Corinth more explicitly merges the negative undertakings of a Common Peace with the positive obligations of an alliance. If the restoration of the (very fragmentary) text is accepted, members undertake not only to abide by an *eirene* but also to fight wars, and, if necessary, to do both at the same time:

“If anyone does commit any breach of treaty concerning the agreements, I shall go in support as called on by those who are wronged (?), and I shall make war against the one who transgresses the common peace (?) as decided by the common council and called on by the *hegemon*”.²³

RO 42 can be read as fitting into that pattern in its combination of negative obligations and positive commitments. Although it is not clear whether the Common Peace of 362 was accompanied by a formal *symmachia*,²⁴ this particular inscription leaves no doubt that the *koine eirene* could be closely associated with the prospect of combined military action by the Greek states. The threat is most obvious in the latter part of the inscription: if the Persian King, or anyone from Persia, starts to destabilise the peace then retaliatory action will be taken:

“if he makes war on any who have sworn the oath, or provides money for the breaking up of this peace, either himself in opposition to the Greeks who have made this peace or anyone else of those from his territory, we shall all resist in common, worthily of the peace that has now come into being and of what we have done before now.”²⁵

But it is also possible to read this potential for military action as being the real concern of lines 5-7. What exactly does it mean to say, as these lines do, that

²² Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.18

²³ RO 76, lines 19-22. [ἄν τις ποῖε τι] παράσπονδον πε[ρὶ τὰς συνθήκας, βοηθήσω] καθότι ἂν παραγ[γέλλωσιν οἱ ἀδικούμενοι (?)], καὶ πολεμήσω τῶ[ι τὴν κοινὴν εἰρήνην (?)] παρ[αβαίνοντι καθότι] | [ἂν δοκῆι τῷ κοινῷ συνεδ]ρίῳ καὶ ὁ ἡγεμῶ[ν παραγγέλλη]. The reference to *koine eirene* in line 20 is a supplement proposed by Wilhelm 1894, 36 and generally accepted since (but cf. Buckler 1994, 113f).

²⁴ Diodorus (15.89.1) and Polybius (4.33.9) report that the common peace was accompanied by a *symmachia*, although it has been suggested that they have confused the enforcement clause (attested for the 371/370 Peace, although not for the Peace of 362) with a formal *symmachia*: see Ryder 1967, 141f; cf. Taeger 1930; Jehne 1994, 97f.

²⁵ Lines 12-17. ἐὰν δὲ πολεμήῃ πρὸς τινὰς τῶν[ὁμοσάντων τὸν ὄρκον ἢ χ]||[ρῆ]ματὰ τισὶ παρέχη| ἐπὶ διαλύσει τῆς εἰρή[νης] τῆσδε. ἢ αὐ|[τὸς] ἐναντίον τοῖς Ἕλλησιν τοῖς τήνδε [τὴν εἰρήνην ποιήσα]||[σιν] ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἐκενοῦ χώρ[ας, ἀμυνοῦμεν κοινῆι]||[πάντε]ς ἀξίως τῆς τε νῦν γεγενημένης εἰρήνης καὶ ἂν πρὸ τ[ι]||[οῦ] ἐπράξα[μεν].

the Greeks will be *chresimoi* to their *philoi*? *Chresimos* does not form part of the normal vocabulary of interstate agreements, but it is a more common feature of the language of honorific decrees, where it carries a strong implication of practical aid or specific services performed.²⁶ In an interstate context, those services will, perhaps unsurprisingly, often involve military assistance of some sort.²⁷ There is therefore a strong hint (at least) in these lines that the benefit of this peace will not be the sort of widespread withdrawal from conflict envisaged by Xenophon, but rather an enhanced ability to engage in other wars (a hint which becomes even stronger if the restoration of *ischyroí* is accepted at the end of line 7).²⁸ This *koine eirene* therefore becomes something which is praiseworthy not because it is a straightforward opposite to war, and not because it allows for an absolute absence of war, but rather because it enforces a better balance between peace (or perhaps better: stability)²⁹ and war.

This sort of attitude to the relationship between *eirene* and war is not specific to the Common Peaces. The Spartan treaty with the Aetolians (ML 67bis) provides an earlier, and more explicit, example of this combination of peace and belligerence.³⁰ The whole agreement is described as a *synthekai*, but under that general heading the Spartans commit three to more specific sorts of relationship with the Aetolians: *philia*, *eirene*, and also *symmachia* (lines 1-3).³¹ The rest of the treaty goes on to set out the (extensive) circumstances in which the Aetolians and Spartans will take advantage of their “peace” – here, quite clearly, an extremely limited sort of *eirene* – in order to fight wars:

“They shall follow wherever the Spartans lead both by land and by sea, having the same friend and the same enemy as the Spartans. They will not put an end to the war without the Spartans, and shall send fighters to the same opponent as the Spartans. They shall not receive exiles who have participated in crimes. If anyone leads an expedition against the land of the Erxadieis for the purpose of making war, the Spartans shall assist them with

²⁶ Veligianni-Terzi 1997, 203f, 268.

²⁷ For example: RO 98, lines 28f (Athenian honours for Memnon of Rhodes, 327/326): Memnon’s ancestors are praised for having been “*chresimoi* to the Athenian *demoi* in the wars” (χρήσιμοι ὄντες ἐν [τ]ῶις πολέμοις τῶι δήμῳ).

²⁸ The supplement is highly conjectural: Wilhelm (1900, 153) included it “lediglich beispielsweise” (and printed it with a query); the query had disappeared by the edition of Wilhelm 1901, and the supplement has been generally accepted since, but Wilhelm’s initial caution seems worth re-emphasising.

²⁹ On stability as the real goal of the Common Peaces, see Jehne 1986, esp. 7-19.

³⁰ ML 67bis.

³¹ [συνθῆκ]αι Αἰτολοῖς κ[αττάδε] | [φιλί]αν καὶ ἡράναν ἔμεν ποτ] | [Αἰτο]λος καὶ συνμα[χίαν].

all the strength in their power; and if anyone leads an expedition against the land of the Spartans for the purpose of making war, the Erxadieis shall assist them with all the strength in their power”.³²

Another example, the Prospectus of the Second Athenian League, shows how such a combination might function in a multilateral alliance (and also provides a closer parallel for the phraseology of RO 42).³³ The substantive part of this decree opens (like RO 42) with a purpose clause: the function of the league is to allow the Greeks to preserve (among other things) their *heguchia* (line 10), and to maintain “the *eirēne* and the *philia* sworn by the Greeks and the King” (lines 12-14) – that is, the Peace of Antalcidas.³⁴ Here too this assertion of the importance of maintaining *eirēne* is apparently entirely consistent with the later provisions for (defensive) military action in support of the *symmachia* (lines 46-50). This combination of *eirēne* and war is even made the basis for the assertion of a general principle of international politics by Isocrates in the *Panegyricus*. According to Isocrates, not only is *eirēne* not incompatible with fighting wars, fighting wars is in fact a requirement for a successful *eirēne* (with the proviso that the fighting must directed against Persia):

“For as matters now stand, it is in vain that we make our treaties of peace; for we do not settle our wars, but only postpone them and wait for the opportune moment when we shall have the power to inflict some irreparable disaster upon each other. We must clear from our path these treacherous designs and pursue that course of action which will enable us to dwell in our several cities with greater security and to feel greater confidence in each other. What I have to say on these points is simple and easy: it is not possible for us to cement an enduring peace unless we join together in a war against the barbarians, nor for the Hellenes to attain to concord until we

³² Lines 4-23, tr. Dillon. *ἡπο[μ]μένος ἡόποι κα Λα[κεδαιμόνι]οι|οι| χαγίονται καὶ κα[τὰ γὰν] |[κ]αὶ καθάλαθαν, τ[ὸν αὐτὸν] | φίλον καὶ τὸν αὐτ[ὸν ἐχθρόν] | ἔχοντες ἡόν περ [καὶ Λακε]δαμονίοι. μεδὲ κ[ατάλυθιν] | ποιῆσθαι ἄνευ Λα[κεδαιμονίων] | μεδενί, ἀντιέμε[ν δὲ μαχομένους] | ἐπὶ ταῦτόν πόθ' ὁ Λ[ακεδαι]μονίος. φεύγον[τας μὲ δεκέθ]ο|ἡαν κεκοινανεκ[ότας ἀδικε]μάτων. ἀέ δέ τις κα [ἐπὶ τὰν τόν] | Ἐρχαδιέον χόραν [στρατεύει] | ἐπὶ πολέμοι, ἐπικο[ρῆν Λακεδαιμο]νίος παντὶ σθένει| κα τὸ δύνατον| |αὶ δέ τις κα ἐπὶ τὰ[ν Λακεδαιμο]νίον χόραν στρ[ατεύει ἐπὶ πολέ]μοι, ἐπικορῆν Ἐ[ρξαδιε]ς παντὶ| |σθένει κα τὸ δύνατον]*

³³ RO 22.

³⁴ [κα]ὶ [ὄπ]ω[ς κ]υβ[ε]ρά[ν]η| ἢ κ[α]ὶ| δ[ι]αμ[ε]νή| ἢ τε εἰρήνη καὶ ἡ φιλία ἦν ἄμοσ[α]ν οἱ Ἑλληνας| καὶ [β]α[σι]λεὺς. (The reference to the Peace of Antalcidas was deliberately erased, probably in the 360s, but read by Accame 1941, 54; more recent studies have supported his restorations: see RO *ad loc.*)

wrest our material advantages from one and the same source and wage our wars against one and the same enemy.”³⁵

Only when peace is combined with war in this way, according to Isocrates, will *eirenai* actually become qualitatively different from *synthekai* and entail a genuine solution to conflict, rather than just a means of delaying it.

Eirene and *eirenai* in mid-fourth century Athens

When viewed in this context, therefore, the praise of peace in RO 42 begins to seem both less revolutionary and less idealistic. *Eirene*, on this reading, is something which is useful in the context only of this specific peace agreement, and, moreover, useful primarily because it creates a more stable basis from which to undertake further wars. Moreover, that perception of usefulness is not something which is particularly novel, or specific to the *koinai eirenai* (or even specific to multilateral peace agreements).

Such a reading is, I would argue, an important corrective to the more optimistic views of a fourth-century revolution in attitudes to peace which were outlined above. Nevertheless, I would not want to insist on the absolute irrelevance of those approaches to peace and pacifism in this period. In fact, I would like to suggest that there might be a third way between the two readings which I have (misleadingly) so far presented as mutually exclusive.

This third way is based on treating the ambiguity in the semantic scope of *eirene* as an opportunity to be exploited rather than a problem to be resolved. There are grounds for believing that fourth-century Greeks were no less aware than modern scholars of the potential double meaning of this term, and, more importantly, that they were alert to the potential for creative manipulation of that ambiguity. In the *On the Peace*, for example, Isocrates initially seems to be engaged in a specific argument, about one particular peace treaty: his opening gambit is to claim that

³⁵ Isocr. 4.172f. νῦν μὲν γὰρ μάτην ποιούμεθα τὰς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης συνθήκας· οὐ γὰρ διαλυόμεθα τοὺς πολέμους, ἀλλ’ ἀναβαλλόμεθα καὶ περιμένομεν τοὺς καιροὺς ἐν οἷς ἀνήκεστόν τι κακὸν ἀλλήλους ἐργάσασθαι δυνασόμεθα. δεῖ δὲ ταύτας τὰς ἐπιβουλάς ἐκποδὸν ποιησαμένους ἐκείνοις τοῖς ἔργοις ἐπιχειρεῖν ἐξ ὧν τὰς τε πόλεις ἀσφαλέστερον οἰκήσομεν καὶ πιστότερον διακεισόμεθα πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς. ἔστι δ’ ἄπλους καὶ ῥάδιος ὁ λόγος ὁ περὶ τούτων· οὐτε γὰρ εἰρήνην οἶόν τε βεβαίαν ἀγαγεῖν ἢν μὴ κοινῇ τοῖς βαρβάροις πολεμήσωμεν, οὐθ’ ὁμοιοῦσαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας πρὶν ἂν καὶ τὰς ὠφελείας ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους πρὸς τοὺς αὐτούς ποιησώμεθα. Translation Norlin.

“we should make a peace (*eirene*) not only with the Chians and Rhodians and Byzantians, but with all mankind.”³⁶

But his focus soon shifts from the specific to the general, and before very long (as was noted above) he is enmeshed in an argument which echoes the Aristophanic vision of peace as a universal bringer of good things: it will allow the Athenians

“to dwell in our city secure from danger ... provided more abundantly with the necessities of life ... of one mind amongst ourselves ... completely happy.”³⁷

And again – very soon after – the emphasis shifts very subtly once more, as it becomes clear that this vision of a beneficent, beneficial state of *eirene* is certainly not one which rules out all recourse to war: one of the most important consequences of embracing this sort of peace, according to Isocrates, is that Athens will acquire “all mankind as our military allies (*symmachoi*)”.³⁸ *Eirene* for Isocrates can therefore be used to imply a specific peace treaty, a general state of peace, and a platform for future military action, and it is the very ambiguity of the term which enables him to construct such a (superficially, at least) plausible argument here.

Of course this is exactly the sort of argumentative sleight of hand which might be expected from Isocrates, but it is possible to find other – and perhaps more representative – evidence of the possibility of conflating the two varieties of *eirene* (and their connotations). The best, and most complex, evidence comes in Athens’ worship of the goddess *Eirene*. On the one hand, the image of that goddess, particularly as represented after about 375/374 BC, seems to correspond most closely to the idealising, generalising Aristophanic or Xenophontic vision of peace as a source of wealth and plenty – a relationship which is famously literalised in Cephisodotus’ statue of Peace holding the infant Wealth, and which also recurs in other representations of the goddess.³⁹ On the other

³⁶ Isocr. 8.16. χρήναι ποιείσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην μὴ μόνον πρὸς Χίους καὶ Ῥοδίους καὶ Βυζαντίους καὶ Κήφους ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀνθρώπους.

³⁷ Isocr. 8.19. εἰ τὴν τε πόλιν ἀσφαλῶς οἰκοῖμεν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν βίον εὐπορότεροι γιγνοίμεθα καὶ τὰ τε πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὁμονοοῖμεν ... τελέως τὴν πόλιν εὐδαμονήσειν.

³⁸ Isocr. 8.21. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, συμμάχους ἔξομεν ἅπαντας ἀνθρώπους.

³⁹ The statue was located in the Agora (near the Bouleuterion; Pausanias 1.8.2). On the location and its significance, see Knell 2000, 73-80; on this depiction of Peace, see Smith 2003, 11; and on other representations of Peace holding an infant Wealth, *LIMC s.v. Eirene*, Section C. Earlier Athenian depictions of *Eirene* seem to have por-

hand, however, the impetus for the creation of this image (and the introduction of formal worship of *Eirene* to Athens) is generally agreed to have been very specific – the Common Peace of 375 – and the context in which it was introduced was, as Parker observes, “not that of a nascent pacifism”:⁴⁰ the peace followed on from (and was closely connected with) Timotheus’ conquest of Corcyra and victories over the Spartans.⁴¹

It is, of course, not entirely unreasonable that peace could be represented as a consequence (or a product) of war. What must also be significant, though, and what is perhaps less predictable, is that the connection between war and peace seems to have been regularly revived and reaffirmed as a programmatic rather than a purely historic feature of the cult. This is visible above all in the fact that it is the Athenian generals who appear to have been responsible for performing the annual sacrifices to Peace.⁴² Those sacrifices were offered on 16th Hekatombeion, so were presumably one of the first duties which a general would have performed after taking up his office in the new year. This Athenian festival of *Eirene* seems, therefore, to be simultaneously a celebration of the benefits of peace, a commemoration of a specific victory (and a specific peace treaty), and an integral part of the city’s continued military activities.⁴³

trayed her as one of the *Horai* rather than the wealth-nurturing figure into which she develops in the fourth century: on these fifth-century depictions, see Drougou 2000, Pappas-Delmonsou 2003.

⁴⁰ The evidence is summarised by Parker 1997, 229f.

⁴¹ Isocr. 15.109f. Note also *FD* III.4.462, a dedication made by Timotheus at Delphi which has been read as claiming that he “made a new *synoikismos* of Victory and the Athenian *demoi*” (ν[έ]||ον συν|ου|κ|ισμὸν ποι|ῶ|ν Ν[ι]κῆ|ς||καὶ τοῦ δῆ|μ|ου τὸν Ἀθηναί|ων|: see Vatin 1983). The first fourth-century appearance of gold Victories in the inventories of the Treasurers of Athena (*IG* ii² 1424, lines 31ff [374/373]) has also been connected with these campaigns and the peace which followed (Parker 1997, 230).

⁴² Knell 2000, 74; Pappas-Delmonsou 2003, 97. The evidence for these sacrifices appears only in the 330s (*IG* ii² 1496, lines 94f [334/333], 127f [332/331]), and it is possible that their introduction should be seen as a later move, perhaps to be associated with the apparent re-organisation (and expansion?) of the festival in the second half of the fourth century (*SEG* 16.55, with Robert 1977; Sosin 2004).

⁴³ The Athenian fondness for calling their warships *Eirene* might be seen as a different manifestation of the same basic phenomenon (that is: celebration of Peace in the context of continuing warfare). *Eirene* appears four times in the naval lists: *IG* ii² 1604, line 43 (377/376); 1607, line 4 (373/372); 1611, lines 66, 149 (357/356).

Conclusion

Eirene has (at least) two quite different connotations in mid fourth-century thought. When it is used in strictly diplomatic context, it seems usually to imply a very limited sort of peace agreement, which will always allow for (and sometimes require) war against those not involved in the agreement. It is this view of *eirene*, I would argue, which remains dominant in this period.

It is tempting, indeed, to speculate that this functionalist view of *eirene* even starts to over-run the more abstract, idealising conception of the term. It is attractive to see in Athens' creation of its cult of *Eirene* an attempt to appropriate the genuinely peaceful-Peace in the service of the more functionalist (and belligerent) version of the concept. And – at the risk of indulging in one speculation too far – it is perhaps even possible to read Xenophon's *Poroi* as a reaction against that appropriation, and as an attempt to reclaim peace (in its functional, instrumental form) as something which really does not have to have anything to do with war.

If so, it was an attempt which was clearly doomed to failure: the future of *eirene* in fourth-century Greece lay not in Xenophon's vision of prosperous calm, but rather in the much more aggressive ambitions of the League of Corinth. J.A.O. Larsen (writing during World War II) raised the possibility that, in the Greek world of the classical period, "peace is possible only when a war is actually being waged".⁴⁴ He rejected that possibility as too pessimistic, but I am inclined to think that the pessimistic view might, in this instance, be not too far from the truth. The praise of peace in RO 42 reveals more, I would argue, about the Greek states' continued commitment to war than it does about their idealisation of the prospect of peace.

⁴⁴ Larsen 1944, 162.

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Legalism and Peace in Classical Greece

Peter Hunt

The Greek city-states of the classical period have acquired a bleak reputation for fighting wars all the time.¹ Historians have tended to blame this state of affairs on two aspects of the way that Greeks thought about interstate relations. First, drawing their conclusions largely from Thucydides, more traditional scholars stress the amoral calculations that they believe determined Greek foreign policy. There were thus no moral curbs to prevent, for example, an imperial state, like Athens, from destroying a weaker state, like Melos, in hopes that such brutality would demonstrate its resolve and power. Second and more recently, historians have criticized this approach as modernizing. We are used to leaders calmly and amorally calculating their state's interests – or so this argument runs – and have thus overemphasized the rational and calculating strain in Greek thinking about war, peace, and the relations of states. These historians investigate and stress the emotional side of Greek foreign policy, in particular the touchy sense of honor and hyper-competitiveness that they see as the root cause of Greek warfare. An additional methodological insight typically informs their work: Greeks understood the relations of states, which were necessarily somewhat abstract, in terms deriving from the concrete and well-known relations between individuals within the state – they thought in terms of what is called the “domestic analogy.”²

So J.E. Lendon and Hans Van Wees, for example, invoke the domestic analogy to explain what they find otherwise inexplicable, the frequency of war among Greek city-states.³ I agree with these scholars that focusing on the domestic analogy can help us to understand Greek thinking about the relations of states. But an acute sense of honor and a competitive ethos were not the entirety of Greek culture and values. Nor did these individual traits provide the only value-laden analogy that the Greeks applied to their foreign policy. States could be like slaves or friends, like brothers, like a man defending his home. Rather than being bound by a single model to apply to the relation of states, that of a sulky, vengeful, and violent Homeric hero – a model that might seem to doom them to irrational wars – Greek society provided a broad repertoire of

¹ This chapter is based on and develops parts of my chapter on “Legalism” in Hunt 2010.

² The domestic analogy has long been used in theories of international law: Vattel 1793: liv, section 18; Dickinson 1920, 29-31.

³ Lendon 2000, 2007; Van Wees 2004.

analogies that could be applied to the world of states. Some of these tended indeed to encourage the recourse to war – Pericles famously likened any concession to Sparta with slavery⁴ – but others had the opposite effect: they tended towards the resolution of disputes without violence. I will consider here one of these more pacific domestic analogies: the world of states, like that of individuals, could be and ought to be subject to laws instead of being a realm of force and violence.

To put this another way, Lendon wants us to picture the Athenians as reacting to an insult or injury in the interstate realm as if they were characters in the *Iliad*.⁵ But there were also ways in which the Athenians in their foreign relations more closely resembled the un-heroic, quotidian Athenians parodied in Aristophanes. When an Aristophanic character is attacked or mistreated, he or she is more likely to call upon witnesses and threaten a lawsuit than to take personal revenge to repair his or her honor.⁶ New Comedy is, if anything, even more replete with legal terms, references, and analogies.⁷ And, of course, this way of thinking is not limited to comedy: copious evidence in virtually every literary genre confirms the importance of law to classical Athenian culture and ideals. If the Athenians applied the attitudes and approaches of their everyday life to the relation of states, they might be just as likely to think of legal redress as of violent retaliation when Athens had suffered insult or injury. They would merely be thinking about the relationships between states in one of the ways they thought about individual relationships.

So the main arguments of this paper are two. First, the Greeks did indeed talk and think about the relations of states as if they were subject to law just as the relations of individuals were. In particular, the terms of treaties played a crucial role in foreign policy deliberations, a role similar to that played by written laws and contracts in the decisions of Athenian courts. Second, I will show that the legal and peaceful resolution of interstate disputes was contrasted with the recourse to violence, which was considered to be a great accomplishment of law within a community.

⁴ Thuc. 1.141.1; cf. Isoc. 6.51.

⁵ E.g., Lendon 2000, 13; Van Wees 2004, 22-26.

⁶ E.g. Ar. *Nub.* 1222, 1255, 1277-1278, 1297; *Vesp.* 1332-1334, 1406-1408, 1415-1419.

⁷ The catalogue in Scafuro 1997, 424-467 on the threat of lawsuits (and legal self-help) in New Comedy includes many similar cases.

Evidence of legalism

The evidence for what I shall be calling the legal analogy – the habit of thinking about states as if they were individuals subject to laws – falls into two categories: references to legal processes among states; references to things like laws among states.

Interstate arbitration provides an obvious example of a legalistic process among states.⁸ Within the city, arbitration was a long-established procedure by the classical period. In classical Athens disputants could agree to submit to binding arbitration to settle their differences. By the fourth century private cases involving more than ten drachmas were required to go first to arbitration – although in these cases either side could appeal and demand a trial.⁹ Starting at the latest in the mid-fifth century many treaties between states included the clause that differences between the parties should be settled by arbitration. Although the English translation “arbitration” is often used and best conveys the procedure to be used, the Greeks typically used a form of *dike*, best translated here as “legal process,” to denote arbitration between states. When treaties between states specify that disputes are to be resolved by arbitration rather than war, they often use expressions such as “by oath and justice” or “to refer to legal judgment”. Although in many cases we know that these implied arbitration, these words are indistinguishable from the words used to describe any recourse to law within the state.¹⁰

Analogs among states to domestic law come in two flavors. First some general rules of war and diplomacy are explicitly described as the “laws of the Greeks,” although they were usually unwritten. Several scholars point out that among these almost universally accepted laws belongs the rule that states need to abide by their treaty obligations. This meant that the terms of treaties also acquired a legalistic status in arguments for or against wars. They thus supplemented the unwritten “law of the Greeks” and constitute the second flavor of law-like things, the one I will be focusing on here. Treaties are written documents, but they are too specific to be considered parallel to written law within the state.¹¹ Rather treaties are more like contracts. Within a Greek city state, private contracts served to impose more specific requirements than the laws

⁸ Ager 1996, 33; Roebuck 2001, 159.

⁹ Roebuck 2001, 352-358; Thür 2005, 156-157; Thür 2007.

¹⁰ E.g., Hdt. 6.42; Thuc. 1.78.4, 80.1, 85.2, 140.2, 141.1, 144.2, 145, 4.79.1, 118.8, 5.18.4, 41.2, 79.1; [Dem.] 7.7, 36-37, 41, 43-44. See Roebuck 2001, 156.

¹¹ Gagarin 1986, 81 n. 1.

but generally had the full force of the law behind their enforcement.¹² Thus they supplemented domestic law. Among states treaties stood alone in the absence of generalized written laws of conduct.¹³ So while the unwritten laws of the Greeks, that is *flavor one*, typically limited the conduct of war and allowed diplomacy even between enemies, it was by reference to the terms of treaties that Greeks could argue for or against the recourse to war in a legalistic way. Such arguments were ubiquitous. In particular, if one looks at the assembly speeches of fourth-century Athens – our best evidence if not necessarily representative of the rest of Greece – one finds that virtually every speech either explicitly states or implicitly assumes that the terms of treaties should be obeyed and thus should guide Athens' actions.¹⁴

A pattern in these assembly speeches suggests that even such a catalogue may under-represent the significance of treaties in Athenian foreign-policy deliberations. While Demosthenes' orations dominate this body of evidence, it is actually the three non-Demosthenic speeches that are the most legalistic, Andocides, *On the Peace*, and the pseudo-Demosthenic *On Halonnesus* – which Raphael Sealey calls “legalistic and tiresome”¹⁵ – and *On the Treaty with Alexander*. It may be that most orators relied heavily on legalistic arguments, while Demosthenes preferred to deal with the big picture in a more emotional and generally moral way. That even Demosthenes referred to treaty obligations in his speeches reveals the large role they played in Athenian discourse about war and peace.

In contrast, other speakers sometimes argued that legal procedures and ways of thinking were not appropriate between states. For example, on the eve of the Peloponnesian War, Sthenolaidas is represented as arguing against arbitration:

“These things should not be decided by lawsuits and speeches since we are not being injured in word alone.”¹⁶

¹² On the legal enforceability of contracts see E. Cohen 2005, 299, who cites Dem. 47.77, 56.2; Din. 3.4; Pl. *Symp.* 196c; Arist. *Rh.* 1375n9-10.

¹³ Treaties could be referred to by the same word *synthekai* as contracts sometimes were (Isoc. 17. 20).

¹⁴ Andocides 3.34; Dem. 2.5-7, 3.16, 5.13, 6.1, 8.5-6, 39, 9.6, 9.16, 10.18, 16.9; [Dem.] 7.24-5 and *passim*; [Dem.] 17.1-2, 4, 16, 20-21, 26, 30. See D. Cohen 1984 on appeals to law in Thucydides.

¹⁵ Cf. Sealey 1993, 178.

¹⁶ Thuc. 1.86.3. οὐδὲ δίκαις καὶ λόγους διακριτέα μὴ λόγῳ καὶ αὐτοὺς βλαπτομένους. See also Thuc. 1.73.1, 3.44.4; [Dem.] 7.7-8, 36-37, 41, 44; Dem. 8.28, 16.26-28.

These rejections of legalistic categories and processes reveal that the contrary opinion, that states should act legally, was possible and was indeed common enough to require refutation or pre-emption. They thus underscore the positive evidence that legalism was an important part of Athenian foreign policy thinking.

The power of treaties

I have been using the soft terms, legalistic and legalism, advisedly. Speakers in the assembly could not invoke law in the sense of “a rule of conduct imposed by authority.”¹⁷ There was not then and is not now any world-state or sovereign authority over states to judge competing legal claims, make and enforce its decisions, and to reserve the use of violence to itself. Modern international law has been hobbled by the anarchy of the international regime. So too the ancient hope that states could be restrained by treaties was limited by the lack of authoritative sanctions against treaty-breakers.

The Greeks were well aware of this problem.¹⁸ They took steps to combat it. City states often insisted that copies of their treaties be publicly displayed at Panhellenic centers. This practice reveals the hope that the opinions of the Greek city-states, and the actions consequent on these, could provide some sanction against breaking treaties. It also ensured that treaty terms were widely known. The Greek cities, of course, formed opinions about all sorts of behavior or misbehavior by states, but their judgments about the adherence to or the breaking of treaties may have possessed a higher degree of coherence: the specific written terms of treaties provided an agreed upon standard to judge the actions of its parties. Otherwise, state’s actions could be construed according to any number of different standards: were the Thebans just helping their friends in the Peloponnese (as they claimed) or were they just trying to palliate their imperial ambitions (as Xenophon thought)?¹⁹ When Sparta attacked Mantinea, was it just punishing a disloyal ally (as it claimed) or destroying a small state despite the general peace treaty, which had just been concluded?²⁰ Written treaties have the potential to lessen, though they certainly do not destroy, the ability of states to justify in specious moral terms whatever actions their self-interest dictates. Last and most important, diplomacy was crucial to Greek city-states: it allowed them to make alliances and to end wars. A reputation for

¹⁷ “Law” 1 in the OED².

¹⁸ E.g., Dem. 15.26-29 with Hunt 2010, 159-160.

¹⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.40, 7.5.1-2.

²⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.2; Isoc. 4.126.

sticking to treaties was a prerequisite for either of these extremely advantageous diplomatic procedures.

But the Greeks did not rest content with written terms and publicity to encourage adherence to treaties. All treaties were sanctioned by oaths that called on gods, not only as witnesses, but also as enforcers who were asked to take action against whichever party broke a treaty.²¹ Indeed, the Greek words for treaty include *spondai*, after the libations made to the gods at the ratification ceremony and *horkeoi*, after the oaths that were sworn.²² A number of passages show confidence, to a greater or lesser degree, that the gods do, in fact, punish states for disregarding the oaths they swore. To take just one example out of many, the Spartans refused to go to arbitration before the Peloponnesian War. According to Thucydides the Spartans later felt that their culpability on this score had been the cause of their misfortunes in the Archidamian War.²³ Even if the gods did not intervene, to break a treaty without excuse was to show impiety and contempt for the gods, qualities hardly approved or conducive to high standing among the Greeks.²⁴

Another diplomatic practice, somewhat paradoxically, provides more evidence of the force of treaties and the oaths that sanctified them. Everett Wheeler has brought attention to a number of treaties that included an “anti-deceit” clause. This was a phrase or just a word indicating that agreement was to be upheld without verbal trickery. That states – especially Athens it turns out – would try to come up with an excuse or verbal trick to avoid fulfilling their side of a treaty makes it clear that the alternative, simply to ignore their treaty obligations, was even less palatable. Wheeler emphasizes that fear of the gods might motivate a state to try to wriggle out of its obligations in whatever way it could rather than openly to break a sworn agreement; states also wanted to avoid a reputation for bad faith among the Greeks – which was apparently even less desirable than one for sophistry.

If the gods were powerful and if they took their invocation in treaties seriously, we might have found a rule of law among Greek states, based on their treaties. It might even have been more perfect than the law within a state – for who can fool the gods? But, it does not require the thesis of a loss of faith in fourth-century Athens, an implausible proposition, to explain that the gods were not completely trusted to enforce treaty obligations. Among other diffi-

²¹ Lonis 1980, 267.

²² Adcock and Mosley 1975, 229.

²³ Thuc. 7.18.2. See Tritle 2007, 175 for a skeptical view of Thucydides’ account here. For other evidence of the belief or hope that the gods may punish treaty-breakers see Thuc. 1.78.4; Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.11, 5.4.1, 5.4.17, 6.4.3.

²⁴ See the judgment of Plutarch on Lysander (Plut. *Lys.* 8).

culties it was unclear whether state representatives can actually swear on behalf of anybody but themselves.²⁵ And which side broke a treaty and thus deserved divine wrath was often a disputed issue. Nevertheless, the practical difficulties of imposing a rule of law, in the strong sense, do not make the legal analogy unimportant or void of force. A parallel will clarify my claim. The application of the requirements of individual honor and the code of reciprocity to states – as per Lendon and Van Wees – did not in fact ensure either revenge on enemies or gratitude and assistance to friends; indeed, failures to reciprocate were frequent. Like interstate reciprocity, legalism was one of several important systems of thinking according to which Athenians judged other states and which influenced but did not fully determine their own actions.

In fact, I think we can go further than this. One body of evidence suggests that treaties, a crucial manifestation of legalism, did possess a special force in the Greek world and, in some respects, stood above the mass of other moral claims, emotional appeals, and cold calculations that seem to have driven Athenian foreign policy. We may grant that speeches about whether to go to war included all sorts of arguments, honorific appeals, considerations of advantages, admissions of the general superiority of peace or, on the other hand, a variety of bellicose domestic analogies. But the question put to a vote seems often to have been whether a treaty had been broken and was thus void. At the outset of the Peloponnesian War, the Spartan assembly was told to divide and to vote depending on whether they thought that “the treaty has been broken and that the Athenians are acting unjustly”; an affirmative vote was a vote for war.²⁶ An important, perhaps crucial step in the breakdown of the Peace of Nicias was taken when the Athenians voted that the Spartans had not kept their oaths and had this inscribed at the bottom of the treaty stele.²⁷ So, too, the war of Chaeronea began, on the Athenian side, when they voted to destroy the stele of the Peace of Philocrates with Philip.²⁸ Such physical abrogation of treaties was not necessarily standard practice – as Sarah Bolmarcich has shown²⁹ – but when it did occur, it seems to have amounted to a declaration of war. That the declaration of war, aimed to justify the war to the citizens of the declaring state and to the wider Greek world, was described in terms of treaty obligations or the failure to uphold them shows the importance of legalism among states.

²⁵ Lonis 1980, esp. 278.

²⁶ Thuc. 1.87.2.

²⁷ Thuc. 5.56.3; Ar. *Lys.* 513-414.

²⁸ Philochorus in Didymus col. I.67-74; Dion. Hal. *Ad. Ann.* 1.11; FGrHist 328 F54. See Harding 2006, 114-115. See also *IG* ii² 116 = RO 44.

²⁹ Bolmarcich 2007.

This practice had both an internal and external rationale. Within Athens, for example, a treaty was a decree of the assembly, a *psephisma*, and thus had the force of law.³⁰ In this respect, it is too weak to speak of the “legal analogy”: treaties were legally binding. Before somebody could propose an action contrary to a treaty – or perhaps in conjunction with such a proposal – the Athenians had to vote to declare the treaty void; they sometimes publicized this by the physical destruction of the public copy of the treaty. This action also served to reassure those Athenians, sometimes a large number of prominent men, who had sworn to the treaty that the god’s wrath would not pursue them.³¹ The official abrogation of a treaty was also directed at an external audience, the opinions of the Greek world at large. This audience could not be expected to sympathize with many of the arguments made in the assembly: Athens’ self-interest or its need for preeminence in the Greek world would have left them cold. That another state had broken its treaty was a justification for war with general rather than a partial appeal. For all these reasons, if a speaker could convince the Athenians that a certain course of action was required by or forbidden by a treaty, he was well on his way to winning them over. Legalism mattered.

Interstate legalism and ancient law

The definition of law as “generalized commands backed by authoritative sanctions” is not the only one possible. According to some modern definitions Greece possessed a system of international law – Sheets, for example, invokes the notion of “horizontal law.”³² I don’t think that we should forget entirely about sanctions – especially given the Greeks’ own attempt to enlist the Gods to punish treaty-breakers. I also do not wish to enter into a discussion of different definitions of law, something outside of my field. But the legal analogy probably involved less of a stretch in its ancient context; for the legal system and thinking that the Athenians possessed and applied to the realm of states was not the same as a modern system. These differences make Athenian domestic law unsatisfactory by modern standards, but they made it more easily

³⁰ Hansen 1991, 172 points out that even treaties of explicitly unlimited duration were still *psephismata*, decrees, rather than *nomoi*, laws.

³¹ See Lonis 1980.

³² Sheets 1994; cf. Low 2007, 103. Scholars have long argued for the existence of international law among the Greeks: e.g., Phillipson 1911; Bederman 2001; Alonso 2007; Lanni 2008.

applicable to the relations between states; legalism among states is necessarily more like Athenian legal system than it is like that of a modern nation state.

The Athenian legal system depended to a large extent on self-help in the execution of court decisions or even in lieu of a jury trial.³³ For example, the winning plaintiff in a property suit was expected to take control of the property awarded him on his own. It was eventually possible to have the state appropriate the award, but this process might require further lawsuits. Given this context, the notion, for example, that whoever wanted to could act as an enforcer of a Common Peace, would have seemed more legalistic to a classical Athenian than it does to us today; legal decisions were not as closely connected to their enforcement by a separate, sovereign authority.

As I have already mentioned, binding arbitration played a large role in the legal resolution of disputes in Athens.³⁴ Hence the recourse to arbitration between states would have seemed a more familiar and legal process than it does today. Arbitration probably preceded state control of the resolution of disputes.³⁵ Its somewhat primitive nature might have made it particularly suitable to the relationship of states, another realm lacking a sovereign power.

The ideal that a trial should focus narrowly on the application of the law to the facts of the case was much less strong in classical Athens than it is in a modern court.³⁶ Even a charitable view admits that Athenian courts took into account the “larger picture” and history of the case and wanted to preserve flexibility.³⁷ In any case, a portion, sometimes a large one, of a law court speech might treat the general moral character of the litigants, their past crimes or good deeds, and attempts to magnify the issues at stake. We saw that assembly speeches on foreign policy often made legalistic arguments and referred to treaties, but that they vary greatly in the extent to which they focus on these. That approach is paralleled in actual law court speeches; the application of the law is just one part of the case. In both cases, the general merits and status of the two parties, the interests of the audience, and the past history of the dispute all play as large a role as specific laws or treaty terms.

A final feature of Athenian law courts is also worth considering. The Athenian law courts did not have judges to direct deliberations, instruct the jury, and limit what might be said. Athenians were tried by their peers and nobody else.

³³ Herman 1993, 411; D. Cohen 2005, 226-229; cf. Wolff 2007, 95-96. See the suggestions of Pl. *Leg.* 12.958a-c.

³⁴ Todd 1993, 123-125, 128-129.

³⁵ Paulus 2007; Gagarin 1986, 42-43.

³⁶ E. Harris 1994 has argued against this consensus, but see Yunis 2005, 197 n.13; cf. Lanni 2006, 41-74.

³⁷ E.g., Rhodes 2004.

Thus, in the realm of states, they felt no need for the equivalent of a modern judge to make decisions. A non-hierarchical conference of state representatives, such as the Delphic Amphictyons, would have seemed quite familiar and a perfectly good way to legislate, to interpret the laws, and decree sanctions, whose imposition could either be assumed or assigned to whichever state was willing to take on the task.

Peace and law

So far law; but what about peace? Thomas Krüger explains the Jewish prophecies of peace established by God as a “judge of nations” in terms of the analogy between states and individuals:

“The most important condition (...) for a vision of overcoming violence in the international realm through justice and peaceful settlement of conflicts, seems to have been the fact that analogous developments had already taken place successfully within individual peoples and communities – in simplified terms: the overcoming of revenge through law.”³⁸

Did the legal analogy have a similar irenic appeal when deployed in classical Greece? I think it did, but two complexities must be acknowledged from the start. In practice treaties of alliance could require a state to go to war: for example, the Argives in 419/418 BC use legalistic language when they say that they will consider that the Athenians are doing them an injustice unless the Athenians take hostile action against the Spartans as per their treaty obligations.³⁹ In addition, some Common Peace treaties authorized war against states breaking their terms; this process was legalistic but not peaceful.⁴⁰ These caveats notwithstanding, we often see *dike*, usually implemented by arbitration and often paired with *horkeos*, oath, as an alternative to the recourse to war. This dichotomy appears in a number of treaties, in several speeches, and in a witticism preserved in Plutarch: in this last Phocion criticized the Athenians’ desire to go to war with Thebes rather than to resolve legally, *dikazesthai*, their quarrel.

³⁸ Krüger 2007, 170 on Micah 4:1-5 and Isaiah 2:2-5.

³⁹ Thuc. 5.56.2.

⁴⁰ See Low 2007, 185 on the Common Peace of 371.

He advised that they should fight the Thebans with words, in which they had the edge, rather than with arms in which the Thebans were superior.⁴¹

Historically the recourse to law had replaced the blood feud as a way of resolving or, according to another account, conducting individual conflicts within the city; the Greeks were aware of and celebrated this advance.⁴² Since the peaceful resolution of conflicts was manifestly a desideratum among Greek states, they naturally thought in terms of laws operable among states as a substitute for – or limit upon – the violence of war. And just as in Old Testament prophesy we find in Greek culture religious expressions of the association of peace and legal justice – although not of course the notion of God as a judge of nations. For example, in the *Theogony* Hesiod has Eunomia, Dike, and Eirene as sisters, the Horai, who guard the works of mortal men.⁴³ His famous description of Dike in the *Works and Days* associates her repeatedly with legal judgments (rather than justice in general) and insists that Dike, if practiced with foreigners, will ensure peace.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Plut. *Phoc.* 9.6. For the contrast between war and arbitration, e.g., Hdt. 6.42; Thuc. 1.78.4, 80.1, 85.2, 140.2, 141.1, 144.2, 145, 4.79.1, 118.8, 5.18.4, 41.2, 79.1; [Dem.] 7.7, 36-37, 41, 43-44.

⁴² E.g., Gagarin 1986, 46-50.

⁴³ Hesiod, *Theogony* 901-903. The association is also found in Pindar *Olympian* 13.7-10 and the *Hymn of the Kouretes* line 37-40. Pindar makes *Hesuchia* — peace but probably within a city - the daughter of Justice (*Pythian* 8.1-5).

⁴⁴ Hesiod, *Works and Days* 225-229, 276-280. Gagarin 1973 argues for an exclusively judicial sense of *dike* in Hesiod. Although scholars such as Dickie 1978 and Beall 2005-2006, 176-177 have countered that it also has a more generally moral force, the associations with law are certainly strong enough for my argument.

This early reference to Dike and peace suggest another way of thinking about legalism among states. We have so far considered legalism as parasitical upon a prior and more powerful legalism within the state. This does seem to reflect the relative strength of law within and among states in the classical period: the recourse to law within the state was a potent threat; among states it was a hope. But historically legalistic procedures antedated written law and state curbs on violence (Gagarin 2008, 13-36). Before these developments, similar procedures of conflict resolution may have been applied both within communities and between members of different communities – hence the practice of *dike* with foreigners in Hesiod. This is necessarily speculative, but it may be that it was only with the advent of written law, state enforcement, and the elimination of the feud that the interstate realm became so different from the domestic world that legality there was merely analogous to justice within the state.

Conclusion

This paper may seem merely to have proved the obvious. After all, the examination of treaty terms has long been a staple of the diplomatic history of Greece. One of the possible implications of my inquiry, however, is more likely to provoke indignation than command bland assent. If legalism played a large role in Greek foreign policy thinking and if the resolution of conflict by *dike* was seen as an alternative to war, then how can the Greeks have been doomed by their culture, by the model of Achilles for example, to frequent and unnecessary wars? For example, most Greek historians are familiar with Yvon Garlan's tabulation that from the beginning of the fifth century to the Lamian War, the Athenians were at war 2 out of 3 years and never enjoyed a decade of peace; I have cited it myself.⁴⁵ I now wonder whether this leads to an exaggerated view of Athenian belligerence and consequently an over-enthusiastic embrace of cultural theories, specific to Greece, purporting to explain it.

The fifth century was marked by many fierce wars, but in the fourth century, Athens spent long periods "at war" with other states, but without doing anything about it. Thus, Demosthenes can query the Athenians in 351 BC, "Are you at war with Philip?"⁴⁶ His implication was that it did not seem like they were and this implication was accurate. Or consider Athens and Thebes, neighbors who spent decades at war without ever marching out to fight a pitched battle? It may not be that the Athenians were egregiously bellicose, but rather that we are particularly sensitive to the wars of the Athenians – and the Greeks in general – and consequently tend to exaggerate their number and severity. First, they shared a language and culture and thus seem a counterexample to any theory that puts too much stress on cultural difference and "othering" as a cause of war. Their sophisticated culture with its artistic, intellectual, and literary accomplishments also adds to this sense of shocked disappointment. Second, the Greek states in the fourth century are often seen as a failed Greek nation state: why couldn't they see this, unite, and, at least, fight somebody other than each other. The anachronism of this view hardly needs stating. Greek cities were extremely happy to decide their own policies on a local level in what T. T. B. Ryder sees as the golden age of city-state autonomy, the middle fourth century.⁴⁷ Third, the small size of city-states makes them vulnerable to the ridiculous charge of "squabbling" even when they were succeeded by Hellenistic Kingdoms and Rome, neither of whom were a whit more peaceful, but merely larger than the city-states that had fought wars before.

⁴⁵ Garlan 1975, 15 cited by Hunt 1998, 7.

⁴⁶ Dem. 4.25-26.

⁴⁷ Ryder 1965, 120-121.

If the classical Greeks did not fight an exceptional number of wars, then we should feel no need to seek out and to stress only the aspects of their culture that might explain these wars; on occasion we may feel free to linger on legalism and peace.

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Persian Diplomacy Between “Pax Persica” and “Zero-Tolerance”

Maria Brosius

A discussion on Persian diplomacy invariably focuses on Persia’s relationship with Greece.¹ That is not surprising, as this is where the exclusively Greek literary and epigraphical evidence takes us. Ever since Greece came into the peripheral vision of the Persian king in ca. 508/507 BC, when Athens sent an embassy to Persia requesting aid against a possible Spartan attack after Sparta’s failed support for Isagoras (and accepting it with the tokens of submission, Earth and Water),² Greek city-states, especially Athens and Sparta, and in the fourth century, Thebes, regarded Persia as a potential ally to support one Greek *polis* to her own political and military advantage against another. Following the events connected with the Persian Wars, and the development of Athens into an empire based on naval supremacy, Greek interest in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean added to the complexities of the fight of the Greek city-states for political dominance into which Persia was drawn as these geographical regions affected her own political sphere of influence, foremost Egypt and Cyprus, but also Ionia. Athens and Sparta took any opportunity to get in on upheavals within the empire, with plenty of opportunities presenting themselves especially in the fourth century, while Persia, too, for her part, enjoyed flexing her muscle in front of the Greeks. Ionian cities rebelling from Athenian or Spartan heavy-handedness found ready support from the Persian king and neighbouring satraps. And the Persians must have felt rather smug when, in 393 BC, their fleet took Melos and Cythera – the first time since 480/479 BC that Persian ships were back in Greek waters.³

It is probably fair to say that the relationship between the Greek states and the Persian Empire constantly wavered between mutual loathing and unavoidable co-operation borne out of political and military necessity. Against the need of Greek city-states to seek Persian aid against another Greek *polis* stood the Persian prerogative to regain control over Egypt, as well as Cyprus, which meant stopping Greek naval activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. Diplomatic missions between Persia and the Greek city-states were numerous, reaching their zenith with the Peace of Callias of 449 BC⁴ and the King’s Peace of

¹ For the most recent discussion see Rung 2008.

² Hdt. 5.73.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 8.7-8. Cf. Rhodes 2006, 210; Seager 1988, 104.

⁴ Renewed in 424/423 BC; ML 70 with 1998 Addenda; cf. Rhodes 2006, 113-114.

386 BC.⁵ From the first Athenian attempt to find an ally in the Persian king in 508/507 BC to the last two, the penultimate undertaken in 341 BC to get Persian support against Philip II,⁶ and the final one ten years later, in 331 BC, when an Athenian delegation was sent to Darius III in the hope to receive funds for their war against Alexander,⁷ Persia held the unchallenged position as the only world power whose seemingly unlimited military and financial potential was eagerly plugged into.

Yet it is worth reminding ourselves that Persian diplomatic relationships with Greek city-states constitutes but one aspect of Persian diplomacy. Diplomatic relations must have been maintained with other peoples beyond the borders of the Achaemenid Empire, such as the Odrysian kingdom, the nomadic Scythians of the Russian steppes, or the peoples beyond the Indus River. We possess no written sources for these, but the occasional archaeological find from well beyond the borders, such as the superb silver vessel from Thrace crafted in Achaemenid style⁸ or the grave finds from Pazyryk in southern Siberia⁹, give but a glimpse of the courtly practice of gift-giving to ruling elites outside the Persian Empire, which may have been part of a diplomatic exchange.¹⁰

Likewise, if we want to understand the way in which Persia conducted her diplomatic relations with Greece and be able to place it within its historical context, we need to consider the diplomatic relations within the Persian Empire itself, namely those between the Persian king and the ruling elites of the satrapies. Rather than regarding the Persian Empire as a homogenous entity, it is worth emphasising the fact that it included former kingdoms and semi-independent city-states which all had their own social structures, foremost a ruling elite. It was especially the latter for whom a constant effort was required to ensure their support and loyalty to the Persian king. Their inclusion into the imperial political structure was needed to ensure a smooth, peaceful running of the local administration, politics, law, economy and trade.¹¹ Any resentment fostered by that elite could lead to rebellion, and that was to be prevented by assuring them of a place within the Persian system. From the reign of Cyrus II, the Persian kings succeeded largely in maintaining peaceful relationships with

⁵ Renewed in 375 BC; Philochorus FGrH 328 F 151; Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.1; cf. Rhodes 2006, 196.

⁶ Dem. 10.31-34.

⁷ Diod. Sic. 17.62.1-3.

⁸ For a depiction see the exhibition catalogue *Die alten Zivilisationen Bulgariens. Das Gold der Thraker, Antikenmuseum Basel und Sammlung Ludwig*, Basel 2007, fig. 124a.

⁹ See for example a detail of a Pazyryk tapestry in Girshman 1963, fig. 468. A complete drawing is provided by Wiesner 1976, 59.

¹⁰ On gift-giving see Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1989.

¹¹ See Brosius 2007; Brosius 2009.

these lands pursuing a policy which scholars have come to define in the term *Pax Persica*, Persian Peace.¹²

Persian diplomacy within the empire

Persian diplomacy was conducted from the top down. We grasp its beginnings in the treaties concluded between the conqueror and a defeated king which formally handed the power – and the legitimacy to rule – over to the new king. They were confirmed with a marriage alliance between the victorious king and a daughter of the defeated king, a practice familiar from the ancient Near East.¹³ The next level of diplomatic activities was aimed at the ruling elite of a conquered society, and were part of a set of actions determined by the concept of the Persian Peace. Its terms and conditions, however, were set by the king, and failure to accept his offer of a peaceful relationship was met with severe punishment. Persian diplomacy within the Persian Empire therefore was set between the perimeters of two extremes: Persian Peace and Zero-Tolerance.

To give a brief description of this policy: After Cyrus' conquest of Lydia in the 540s¹⁴ the Ionians and Aeolians sent messengers (Gr. *aggelous*) to Sardis to obtain from him the same terms they had when they were under the overlordship of Croesus. Cyrus responded with an allegoric tale: There once was a flute player who saw some fish in the sea and played his flute to them in the hope that they would come ashore. When they refused to do so, he took a net, netted a large catch, and hauled them in. Seeing the fish jumping about he said to them: 'You had best cease from your dancing now; you would not come out and dance then, when I played to you.' The moral of the tale was to demonstrate to the Ionians and Aeolians that they were ready to obey him only after Cyrus' victory, but had refused beforehand when Cyrus had asked them to revolt from Croesus. Thereupon, the Ionian cities began to prepare their defense against a Persian attack, except for Miletus, which had accepted the conqueror's terms in good time.¹⁵

¹² The concept of Persian Peace was first discussed by Root 1979; cf. Brosius 2005.

¹³ It can be glimpsed in Alyattes of Lydia giving his daughter Aryenis to Astyages of Media (Hdt. 1.74). According to Ctesias, Cyrus II married the Median princess Amytis after Astyages' defeat (Ctesias FGrH 688 F 9 (2)). Cambyses II is said to have married an Egyptian princess (Hdt. 3.2). For Cyrus' arrangement with Croesus see Ctesias FGrH 688 F 9 (5).

¹⁴ On the uncertainty of an accurate date for the Lydian conquest see Rollinger 2003, 314 with n.124. Rollinger 1993, 188-197.

¹⁵ Hdt. 1.141.

The story expresses rather succinctly the Persian king’s attitude towards diplomacy: It worked, as long as the other party played according to the king’s tune. If one did so, things went swimmingly. If one did not, or, as in the case of the Ionians and Aeolians, came round to accepting the king’s demands too late, military action replaced diplomatic negotiations. In 539 BC the people of Babylon reaped the fruits of adhering to this kind of diplomacy when Cyrus spared their city and entered as a peaceful conqueror:

“On the sixteenth day, (= 12 October 539 BC) Ugbaru, governor of the Gutī, and the army of Cyrus entered Babylon without a battle ... Until the end of the month, the shield-(bearing troops) of the Gutī surrounded the gates of Esagil. (But) there was no interruption (of rites) in Esagil or the (other) temples and no date (for a performance) was missed. On the third day of Arahshamnu (= 29 October 539 BC) Cyrus entered Babylon. ... were filled with ... before him. There was peace in the city while Cyrus spoke (his) greeting to all of Babylon.”¹⁶

The “peaceful” conquest of Babylon was a staged event which - in the absence of the Babylonian king Nabonidus himself - had involved high officials and the ruling elite of Babylon. It must have been preceded by negotiations between Cyrus and representatives of the Babylonian elite in order to ensure the smooth transition of power, and must have included the securing of high positions of that elite in the new regime. Ugbaru had already been put in charge of managing Cyrus’ ceremonial entry into Babylon, and he was to appoint the local governors immediately after the takeover.¹⁷ Cyrus II himself emphasised the peaceful conquest in his inscription, the Cyrus-Cylinder, in which the political act gained a religious dimension, since it claimed that Bel-Marduk literally had invited Cyrus to take Babylon and to restore the worship for the city-god neglected under Nabonidus.¹⁸

Cyrus’ idea of political diplomacy found another outlet on this occasion. The return of the exiled Jews to Jerusalem and Cyrus’ assurance that the temple in Jerusalem was to be rebuilt under Persian protection ensured him a place in history as the benign ruler who seemed to be able to combine two mutually exclusive traits: to be a conqueror and an enlightened king at the same time. But, as scholars such as Amélie Kuhrt, have pointed out, we should not be deceived by Cyrus’ image of the humane ruler.¹⁹ Behind his actions stood un-

¹⁶ ABC 7, col. III, ll. 12-19.

¹⁷ ABC 7, col. III, l. 20.

¹⁸ For the text of the Cyrus-Cylinder see Brosius 2000, no. 12.

¹⁹ Cf. Kuhrt 1983.

disguised pragmatism and political expediency, and, as will be argued here, it was both these attitudes which determined Persian diplomacy throughout Achaemenid rule.

The Ionians and Aeolians had missed their chance to accept the Persian king's offer when he first sent messengers to request their submission prior to the defeat of Croesus. Had they done so, the transition of their status from Lydian to Persian subjects would have gone smoothly. By rejecting his offer, they had expressed their resistance to Persian rule, and resistance was to be met with punishment. Slightly different, but following the same principle, the 'peaceful' conquest of Babylon undoubtedly was to some extent the result of Cyrus' brutal conquest of Opis:

“In the month Tishri (= *September/October*), when Cyrus did battle at Opis on the [bank of] the Tigris against the army of Akkad, the people of Akkad retreated. He carried off the plunder and slaughtered the people. On the fourteenth day Sippar was captured without a battle. Nabonidus fled.”²⁰

Neighbouring Sippar reacted by not even offering battle but surrender immediately. Babylon learned the same lesson: Resistance to Persian rule would be punished severely and without mercy.

Thus, while on the one hand the king endeavoured to convey an image of the peace-loving and peace-keeping ruler, on the other stood a pragmatic king who showed no tolerance whatsoever towards those unwilling to accept the king's terms of surrender or towards rebellions within the empire, and who eliminated in the severest possible manner those responsible for a revolt. Only in exceptional cases (e.g., Evagoras, Tachos, Rheomithres) did rebels survive their attempts at staging an uprising. In others, negotiations between the king and a rebel were merely a means to an end, with no chance for the rebel to escape punishment (e.g., Tennes of Sidon).

As early as Darius I his subjects received a warning against opposition to Persian rule as stated in the final paragraph of Darius' inscription of Naqsh-e Rostam:

“O man, that which is the command of Ahuramazda, let it not seem repugnant to you. Do not leave the right path, do not rise in rebellion!”²¹

²⁰ ABC 7, col. III, ll. 12-15.

²¹ DNā §6 (Darius, Inscription of Naqsh-e Rostam (a), Brosius 2000, no. 48).

Likewise a passage in Xerxes’ Daiva-inscription leaves no doubt about the king’s rigorous dealing with a rebellion:

“Xerxes the king says: When I became king there was one among these countries which are inscribed above, (one which) was in commotion. Afterwards Ahuramazda brought me aid. By the favour of Ahuramazda I struck that country and subdued it.”²²

These sentiments leave nothing to the imagination as to how the Persian kings were to handle rebellions within the empire: Instant military action replaced any diplomatic negotiations to resolve a critical political situation.

Persian rebellions

When looking at Persian rebellions we can distinguish between palace revolutions which are played out in close vicinity of the king, and rebellions in the empire aimed at gaining independence from Persian rule. While the former type leaves no room for diplomatic manoeuvre whatsoever, the latter can involve diplomatic solutions, sometimes achieved through the aid of a mediator.

Palace revolts and rebellions close to the king

The first palace revolt in the reign of Darius I was that of Intaphernes, one of the seven Persian nobles, who had entered the king’s private chambers. Accused of conspiracy Intaphernes and other male members of his family were put to death.²³ Similarly, Xerxes’ brother Masistes paid with his life for staging a rebellion against the king with Bactrian and Scythian forces.²⁴ The list of rebellions against the king continues under their successors: Artaxerxes I eliminated those connected to the palace revolt in which Xerxes I had been killed, including his brother Darius;²⁵ Cyrus the Younger was killed at Kunaxa in the battle against his brother Artaxerxes II,²⁶ and Darius, his designated heir to the throne was killed after he rebelled against his father²⁷. Under Darius II Ochus both the

²² XPh §4 (Inscription from Persepolis (h), Brosius 2000, no. 191).

²³ Hdt. 3.119.

²⁴ Hdt. 9.114.

²⁵ Ctesias FGrH 688 F 14 (34).

²⁶ Xen. *An.* 1.8.27-29; Ctesias FGrH 688 F 16 (64); Plut. *Art.* 11.4-6.

²⁷ Plut. *Art.* 29.4-7.

rebellion of his brother Arsites and that of Pissouthnes of 420 BC, ended with their deaths.²⁸ The common denominator in these cases is that the rebellions arose directly from a member of the royal family or a Persian noble – figures in the immediate vicinity of the king who made an attempt on his life. Their direct threat to the person of the king meant that their link with the court had been severed irretrievably and that they had to be eliminated.

Rebellions in the empire

Slightly more differentiated is the king's dealing with rebellions staged within the empire. Though most were handled with equally drastic action as the direct attacks on the person of the king, occasionally we observe efforts of resolving matters in a diplomatic manner. From the nine rebels opposed to Darius' kingship in 522/521 BC to the sack of Miletus in 494 BC for her involvement in the Ionian revolt, the Babylonian revolt of Belshimanni in 482/481 BC²⁹ which was met with direct military action led by Xerxes himself, Artaxerxes I's military actions against Bactria and Egypt (464-454 BC), for which Inaros, leader of the Egyptian revolt, was subsequently killed, to the killings of Datames and Ariobarzanes for their rebellions in Mysia and Hellespontine Phrygia respectively, do we recognise a consistent handling of rebellions, often with the king leading the counter-offensive himself.³⁰

Yet, there are also exceptions to the rule. Under Artaxerxes I his brother-in-law, Megabyxos, staged a rebellion, probably in his satrapy Syria, after the Egyptian rebellion of 464-454 BC,³¹ but, through a mediator, Artarios, satrap of Babylon, he was advised to enter a treaty with the king. Megabyxos, however, insisted on negotiating with the king directly, though he did so from the safety

²⁸ Ctesias FGrH 688 F 15 (52). According to Ctesias Arsites was his full brother. Pissouthnes was most likely the son of Hystaspes, full brother of Xerxes I. Cf. Lewis 1977, 55.

²⁹ *Vorderasiatische Schriftendekmäler der kgl. Museen zu Berlin* VI 331 = Brosius 2000, no. 66. For the possible involvement of a second rebel, Shamash-eriba, see Kuhrt 1988, 74.

³⁰ Datames' rebellion took place in the early 370s. He was killed in c. 362 BC by his father-in-law Mithrobarzanes (Diod. Sic. 15.91.7). Ariobarzanes rebelled in c. 366 BC and was betrayed by his son-in-law Mithradates in c. 360 BC. Artabazus went into Macedonian exile, and Orontes survived his revolt after being pardoned by the king. For a discussion of the events of the so-called Great Satraps' revolt see Weiskopf 1989.

³¹ Ctesias FGrH 688 F 14 (40).

of his satrapy rather than appearing at the royal court.³² He was pardoned by the king and allowed back at court. Even more astonishing, he survived a second estrangement from the king, when he was sent into exile after a hunting incident, but allowed to return once again to the court some time later.³³

Mediators

The point of note here is the use of a mediator and the choice between negotiating with the king directly or through an arbitrator. According to Diodorus, Tachos the Egyptian rebel king of 361/360 BC-359 BC, also sought to negotiate directly with the king to save his life, after his own son, Nectanebo II, had usurped the Egyptian throne in Tachos' absence. But his survival came at a price: Artaxerxes II put him in charge of the Persian force against Egypt – a cruel twist which must have punished Tachos doubly.³⁴

Indirect negotiations between a rebel and the king occurred in the cases of Evagoras and Tennes of Sidon, with rather different results. Evagoras not only survived his rebellion, but he also remained king of Salamis.³⁵ Evagoras' survival may be understood as part of a change of policy towards the western satrapies and the city-kings of Western Asia Minor and the Eastern Mediterranean, where local dynasts had been able to establish their power. Such a policy change may have been linked to the complexities of the political situation in the Eastern Mediterranean involving the Ionian cities as well as Cyprus, Egypt and Phoenicia which had drawn in the Greek city-states as well, resulting in a difficult diplomatic obstacle course for all parties involved. Certainly Egypt can be identified as the key factor in determining Persian policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. A triangle of rebellious support was being established between Egypt and Cypriote and Phoenician cities, with Egypt eager to keep stirring up trouble elsewhere to divert the king's attention and his army away from Egypt. But perhaps it was merely a local issue, and as such a contained problem: Cyprus had not been unanimous in the revolt; the Cypriote city-kings were opposed to

³² Ctesias FGrH 688 F 14 (42).

³³ Ctesias FGrH 688 F 14 (43).

³⁴ Diod. Sic. 15.92.4-5.

³⁵ Evagoras (411 BC-374/373 BC) failed to take control of the whole island, and Persian forces were sent against him staging a siege of Salamis. Eventually Evagoras agreed to the peace terms delivered first by Tiribazus and then by Orontes (Diod. Sic. 15.2.1-2, 15.8, 15.9.2) in c. 380/379 BC. They postulated that he abandoned his claim to rule over Cyprus, released the cities under his control, and agreed to pay tribute to the Persian king. He kept his title as king of Salamis and reigned until his death in 374/373 BC.

Evagoras' attempt of sovereignty over the island, and thus Artaxerxes II could be certain that Evagoras' ambitions could never been fulfilled. Salamis was punished for her role in the rebellion. The case makes clear that the Persian king defended cities under Persian control when threatened, and thus would ensure their semi-autonomy. It contrasts with the absence of Persian intervention when Evagoras usurped the throne of Salamis in 411 BC deposing Abde-mon – presumably, because this was an internal political matter for the city-state alone, and as long as a usurpation was contained and tribute continued to be paid, the king saw no need to interfere with local politics.

A different fate was in stall for Tennes of Sidon who rebelled in c. 345 BC but when faced with the Persian army led by Artaxerxes III himself, Tennes abandoned his plans and through the mediator Thettalion, informed the king that he would betray Sidon and offer his expertise on Egypt to the king. The one hundred Sidonians in his company were indeed betrayed to Artaxerxes II, as were a further five hundred Sidonians. The city was sacked, its population taken prisoner and resettled.³⁶ But despite his efforts at reconciliation with the king, Tennes was killed.³⁷ Turncoats did not get far in Persia.

Persian diplomacy with Greece in action

When we now turn to Persian diplomacy with Greece we see that it is in line with Persia's own internal political diplomacy. Vestiges of the policy of a "peaceful" conquest may be found in the Earth and Water symbolism applied to Macedon³⁸ and the Greek city-states by Darius and Xerxes.³⁹ The marriage alliance between Bubares, son of Megabazus and the Macedonian princess Gygea plays out the political acceptance of Persian overlordship at Persian aristocratic level.⁴⁰ The sackings of Miletus in 494 BC, Eretria in 490 BC and Athens in 480/479 BC were the punishment for cities which had shown, directly or indirectly, support for the revolt in Ionia. Attempting to resolve matters peacefully or to do a damage-limitation by eliminating city-states from the Persian 'list of cities-to-fight', accepting the king's offer meant that the cities and their population were spared and a peaceful Persian take-over could be claimed.

³⁶ ABC 9. Diodorus does not specify who the Sidonians in Tennes' company were but we may surmise that they were high-ranking members of the Sidonian society.

³⁷ Diod. Sic. 16.45.4.

³⁸ Hdt. 5.17.

³⁹ Hdt. 6.48, 7.32.

⁴⁰ Hdt. 5.21.

Even the use of mediators is attested: Most famously, Alexander I of Macedon and Murychides acted as go-betweens for Mardonius and the Athenians in the Persian War.⁴¹ The treaty of Lichas of 411 BC was negotiated between the Spartans and her allies and the satrap Tissaphernes, while the terms of the King’s Peace were delivered to the Greeks via Tiribazus satrap of Sardis.⁴²

RO 21⁴³ reminds us that city-kings, much like satraps, were important figures through whom to reach the king. The inscription attests to the fact the Strato of Sidon (c. 376-360 BC) mediated between Athens and the Persian king, for which he was honoured as *proxenos*. When precisely this is to be dated is difficult to determine; a plausible date could be the occasion of the renewal of the King’s Peace in 375 BC.

“--- of the Athenians, and has taken care that the envoys to the King whom the people sent should travel as finely as possible.

And reply to the man who has come from the king of Sidon that if in the time to come he is a good man with regard to the people of Athens there is no possibility that he will fail to obtain whatever he needs from the Athenians. Also Strato the king of Sidon shall be *proxenos* of the people of Athens, himself and his descendants.”⁴⁴

Persian diplomacy with Greece is probably best captured when it deals with the Ionian cities. The inscription of Erythrae of 453/452 BC,⁴⁵ records regulations imposed by Athens on the city, including the establishment of a Council of 120, under the auspices of Athenian *episkopoi*, overseers, and a *phrouarchos*, a garrison commander. The regulations included an oath of allegiance for that council,⁴⁶ with a commitment not to revolt and not to take back those who had fled to

⁴¹ Hdt. 8.140-144, 9.4.

⁴² The treaty of Lichas (Thuc. 8.58) was the agreement between Sparta and her allies with Tissaphernes, Hieramenes, and the sons of Pharnaces, “concerning the interest of the king”. For the previous versions of the treaty (Treaty of Chalcidæus: the agreement between Sparta and her allies with the King and Tissaphernes; Treaty of Therimenes: the agreement between Sparta and her allies with King Darius, the King’s sons, and Tissaphernes) see Thuc. 8.18 and 8.36-37.

⁴³ Tod 139; Harding 40.

⁴⁴ RO 21, ll. 1-12: --- Ἀθηναί[ων, κ]αὶ ἐπεμελ[ήθη] ὅπως ὡς κάλλιστα πορευθήσονται οἱ πρέσβεις ὡς βασιλέα οὐς ὁ δῆμος ἔπεμψεν. καὶ ἀποκρίνασθαι τῷ ἤκοντι παρὰ τῷ Σιδωνίων βασιλέως ὅτι καὶ ἐς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ὦν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς περὶ τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων οὐκ ἔστι ὅτι ἀτυχήσει παρὰ Ἀθηναίων ὧν ἂν δέηται. εἶναι δὲ καὶ πρόξενον τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων Στράτωνα τὸν Σιδῶνος βασιλέα, καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἐγγόνος.

⁴⁵ This was the first year of tribute collection in Athens (ML 40; Fornara 71). Cf. Rhodes 2006, 46.

⁴⁶ Rhodes 2006, 47.

the ‘Medes’. It was a reaction to previous events during which a pro-Persian faction had revolted with Persian support, and sought refuge in Persian territory when Athens had regained control over Erythrae. The city paid for this attempt with an imposed democracy under the watchful eye of the Athenian officials there. Persia seems to have offered merely passive support for the rebellion, but this nevertheless shows that Persia was willing to support those rebelling from Athenian imperial power.

“Nor shall I desert either on my own initiative nor shall I be persuaded by anyone else, not anyone. Nor shall I receive back any of the exiles either on my own initiative nor shall I be persuaded by anyone else. Of those who fled to the Medes without the assent of the Athenians and of the People, I shall not banish those who remained in Erythrae without the assent of the Athenians and the People.”⁴⁷

Erythrae had been a member of the Delian League, but, as the inscription of 453/452 BC makes amply clear, in it was an unhappy ally. In 413/412 BC Erythrae was one of the first cities to rebel against Athens.⁴⁸ Coming under pressure from the new Spartan hegemony, the city then accepted the offer of autonomy (from Sparta) from Pharnabazus and Conon in 394 BC.⁴⁹ In this context Erythrae honoured Conon as benefactor and *proxenos*.⁵⁰ By c. 390 BC however, Athens had gained control over the Aegean and over Erythrae once again.⁵¹

⁴⁷ ML 40, ll. 23-29: [κ]αὶ οὐκ [ἀποσ]τέσομαι Ἀθηναίον τῷ π[λ]έθρῳ οὐδὲ [τῶν] χυνημάχων τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὔτ’ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ οἴτ’ ἄλλοι περὶ [ἴ]σομαι οὐδ’ οὔτ’ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ οὔτ’ ἄλλοι περὶ [ἴ]σομαι ----- οὔτ’ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ οὔτ’ ἄλλοι περὶ [ἴ]σομαι ----- τὸν φ[υ]γάδων [κατ]αδέχομαι οὐδ[ὲ] ἡένα οὔτ[-----] ἄλλοι πείσομαι [α] τὸν ἐς Μέδος φε[υ]γόντων ἄνευ τ[ῆ]ς βο[λ]ῆς τ[ῆ]ς Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῷ [δέ]μο [ο]ὐδὲ τὸν μενόντων ἐχσελῶ [ἄ]ν[ευ] τ[ῆ]ς β[ο]λῆς τ[ῆ]ς Ἀθηναίων καὶ [τῶ] δέμο. A similar situation is found in Samos. In 441 BC a conflict between Miletus and Samos forced Samian exiles to seek refuge with Pissouthnes, satrap of Sardis. With 700 troops he restored order in Samos (Thuc. 1.115.2-5). When Samos revolted from Athens, (c. 440/439 BC) she handed over Athenian officials from Samos to Pissouthnes. In the end Samos was defeated by the Athenian navy, but both Erythrae and Samos show that there were Greeks ready to go over to Persia.

For a statue of Conon on Samos see RO 46; Paus. 6.3.16.

⁴⁸ Thuc. 8.5.4-6.14.2.

⁴⁹ Diod. Sic. 14.84.3-4; Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.1-2.

⁵⁰ RO 8.

⁵¹ The Athenian Thrasybulus was responsible for Athens’ imperial revival in 390, though he was killed a year later (Rhodes 2006, 193).

“It shall not be permitted to any of the generals to make a reconciliation with those on the Acropolis without the consent of the people of Athens; nor shall it be permitted to any one to reinstate in Erythrae any of the exiles whom the Erythraeans drive out, without the consent of the people of Erythrae.

Concerning not giving up Erythrae to the barbarians, reply to the Erythraeans that it has been resolved by the people of Athens ---⁵²

Athens was setting the terms of political negotiations. Of particular interest here is the last section, which has been interpreted by Rhodes/Osborne to mean that “Athens responds to Erythraeans who did not want to be ‘given up to the barbarians’”.⁵³ But in my view this is an interpretation based on a mere *assumption* that there was such a request by a faction of Erythraeans to Athens. Such a plea does not square with the evidence gathered so far, namely that Erythrae had been an unwilling member of the Delian League, resulting in the rebellion of a pro-Persian faction before 453 BC to which Athens reacted with the imposition of *episkopoi* and a *pbrouarchos*. It rebelled again from Athens in 413/412 BC and in 394 BC even honoured Conon for his part in Persia’s aid against Spartan control. Under these circumstances it does not seem very likely that Erythrae would have welcomed Athenian control when it reappeared in 390 BC. In contrast, there is no evidence which would suggest pressure from Persia for which it sought protection. Resentment for Athenian/Spartan control was more explicitly expressed than for any involvement with “the barbarian”. Perhaps we would be better advised to read the phrase, “not giving up Erythrae to the barbarians” differently: Had the Erythraeans *requested* from Athens to be allowed to go over to Persia, and had Athens responded by saying that they were not going to handing Erythrae over to “the barbarians”, and that the present text provided further arguments to that effect?⁵⁴

A case in support of the argument that there was no resentment of political involvement with Persia, and that collaboration with Persia was a viable option can be made: Persian handling of Ionian matters and respect for the status of

⁵² RO 17. μὴ ἐξεῖνα[ι τ]ῶν στρατηγῶν διαλλάξαι μηδὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει ἄνευ τοῦ δήμου τῷ Ἀθηναίων· μηδὲ τῶμ φυγάδων, οὓς ἂν ἐξελάσσωσιν Ἐρυθραῖοι, μηδὲν ἐξεῖνα καταγείν ἐς Ἐρυθρὰς ἄνευ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἐρυθραίων. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μὴ ἐκδίδοσθαι Ἐρυθραίους τοῖς βαρβάροις, ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς Ἐρυθραίοις ὅτι δέδοκται [τῶ]ι δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων ---.

⁵³ RO 76.

⁵⁴ Rather than translating ἐκδωδεμ as “to give up”, it could be read as “to give in charge of”, i.e., placing the Erythraeans under Persian control, a meaning which would make more positive reading than the defeatist “to give up”.

Athens, of course, ceded Erythrae (and Clazomenae) to Persia in 386 BC.

the Ionian city-states seems to have been guided by peaceful diplomacy. An inscription dated to the same period, sometime between 391 BC and 388 BC, records a lawsuit with the involvement of the Persian authority only at the point of solving an impasse. Within Greek-Persian diplomatic relations this inscription probably shows Persian diplomacy at its best. It records a conflict over borderland between Miletus and Myus, but when Myus abandoned the suit, the matter was relegated to the Persian satrap of Ionia, Struses.⁵⁵ The jurors were representatives from Erythrae, Clazomenae, Lebedos and Ephesos:

“When the Mysians had abandoned the suit, Struses, the satrap of Ionia heard the Ionians’ jurors and made the final decision that the land should belong to the Milesians.”⁵⁶

It is a rare example of diplomacy operating on a small scale and in a non-rebelling context: While the legal set-up followed the practice of Greek law-courts, the Ionian jurors sought the final verdict on the case by appealing to the legal institution at next level higher up, the Persian satrap of Ionia. The inscription lends support to the argument made here, namely that Persia’s dealing with the Ionian cities, including Erythrae, seems to have been low key. This weakens the case for an Erythraean pleading with Athens not to hand her to the barbarian, for which we need reasons for resentment – political pressure, interference in local politics, fear – traits we find in Erythrae’s relationship with Athens (and Sparta), but which we cannot discern from the literary and epigraphical records for Erythrae’s relationship with Persia.

Conclusion

The reason why Persia pursued such a moderate policy in regard to the Ionian cities can be found in Persia’s general attitude towards her subject peoples guided by the principle of the Persian Peace: Persian diplomatic practice meant that Persia did not interfere with local matters any more than it had to. Within the Persian Empire it adhered to that policy by allowing the subject peoples to keep their own language, religion, culture, and law. This is what made the Persian Peace work. It did not interfere with political upheaval at local level, as cases such as the toppling of Abdemon in 411 BC, or the dynastic struggles of the Hekatomnid dynasty show but it got involved as soon as an individual ruler

⁵⁵ RO 16.

⁵⁶ RO 16, ll. 40-44. ἐπεὶ δὲ Μυήσιοι τὴν δίκην ἔλιπον, Στρούσης ἀκούσας τῶν Ἰωνίης, [τέ]λος ἐποίησε τῆ γῆν εἶναι Μιλησ[ί]ων.

threatened to unbalance the Persian Peace. Once other cities or lands were drawn into a rebellious conflict, rebels and rebelling cities were dealt with severely. The same policy can be observed in Persia’s dealing with the Greek states and the cities of Ionia. Rebellions of Greek cities which threatened the Persian Peace suffered immediate punishment, but otherwise the cities were left to govern themselves. This is precisely what we can observe in Persia’s treatment of the Ionian cities. They were left to pursue their own way of life as far as possible. As the case of Erythrea or the conflict between Miletus and Myus shows, political support or interference came only when invited to do so. An Ionian city forced to choose between being under the dictate of Athens or living under Persian rule might decide that “being given in charge of the barbarian” was not such a bad thing: at least you could be your political self – as long as you danced to the king’s tune!

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Kurzzusammenfassungen

David F. Elmer: Building Community Across the Battle-Lines. The Truce in *Iliad* 3 and 4

Der Beitrag behandelt den im dritten und vierten Gesang der *Ilias* beschriebenen Zweikampf zwischen Alexander und Menelaos, mit dem der Konflikt und das Blutvergießen auf beiden Seiten beendet werden sollte. In diesem Zusammenhang fügt Homer die Hoffnungen der Soldaten beider Parteien ein, die den übergreifenden Wunsch auf ein baldiges Ende des Krieges durch diesen (vermeintlichen) Weg der Entscheidungsfindung deutlich machen. Beide Seiten werden in dieser Hoffnung vereint, so dass aus den Feinden eine vorübergehende Gemeinschaft entsteht. Dieses verbindende Element wird vom Dichter bewusst aufgegriffen und der Gemeinschaft Ausdruck verliehen, indem die Hoffnungen von einem unbestimmten Sprecher (*tis*) formuliert werden. Das Scheitern des Zweikampfes als Entscheidungsinstrument löst diese temporäre Gemeinschaft jedoch wieder auf, die so erneut in zwei sich unerbittlich gegenüberstehende Kriegsparteien zerfällt.

Natasha Bershady: The Border of War and Peace. Myth and Ritual in Argive-Spartan Dispute over Thyreatis

Die Beziehungen zwischen Sparta und Argos sind in der archaischen Zeit als weitgehend friedlich anzusehen, wurden aber maßgeblich von einem mythischen Konflikt um die Thyreatis bestimmt. Dieser Mythos begründete wiederkehrende ritualisierte Kämpfe zwischen beiden Poleis, die Herodot in seiner Beschreibung einer Schlacht zwischen Argos und Sparta (Hdt. 1,28) reflektiert. Nach der spartanischen Annexion von Kynouria Mitte des 6. Jahrhunderts v.Chr. geriet die Tradition in Vergessenheit, jedoch wurde in den Friedensverhandlungen von 420 v.Chr. von argivischer Seite vorgeschlagen, dieses Ritual wiederzubeleben. Dabei waren es v.a. oligarchische Kräfte in Argos, die sich von einer so ostentativen Berufung auf archaische Traditionen eine Stärkung der eigenen Legitimation erhofften. Darüber hinaus sollte durch die Wiederaufnahme des rituellen Kampfes um die Thyreatis der antispartanischen Propaganda der demokratischen Gegenfaktion der Boden entzogen werden.

Sarah Bolmarcich: Thucydides' Theory of Negotiation

Diplomatische Verhandlungen zwischen den Kriegsparteien nehmen in dem Geschichtswerk des Thukydides eine bedeutende Rolle ein. Eine nähere Analyse der athenisch-spartanischen Verhandlungen kurz vor dem Ausbruch des

Krieges zeigt dabei, dass beide Parteien von Beginn sicher davon ausgehen konnten, dass ihre Forderungen von der Gegenseite abgelehnt werden würden - der Krieg war damit unvermeidbar. Ebenfalls ohne Ergebnis blieben Jahre später die Verhandlungen zwischen Athen und Melos, in denen Athen deutlich demonstrierte, dass es aufgrund seiner Selbstgewissheit und der klaren Überlegenheit gleichfalls kein Interesse an offenen und ergebnisorientierten Verhandlungen hatte. Thukydides präsentiert damit ein Bild, in dem die Diplomatie im Vorfeld und während des Peloponnesischen Krieges nicht als lösungsorientiert und offen erscheint, sondern allenfalls ein Mittel darstellt, die militärische Eskalation zu verzögern.

Julia Wilker: War and Peace at the Beginning of the Fourth Century. The Emergence of the *Koine Eirene*

Die Idee einer *koine eirene* ist zum ersten Mal in den Verhandlungen in Sparta 392/391 v.Chr. greifbar, enthielt der hier erarbeitete Vertragsentwurf doch alle wesentlichen Bestandteile eines Allgemeinen Friedensschlusses. Dabei wird deutlich, dass das Aufkommen der *koine eirene*-Idee in erster Linie mit der Erschöpfung aller am Korinthischen Krieg beteiligten Parteien zu erklären ist. Zum anderen zeigt eine Analyse der einzelnen Bestandteile, dass der Vertragsentwurf die Erfahrungen aus dem Peloponnesischen Krieg reflektierte und eine konsequente Weiterentwicklung der zwischenstaatlichen Verträge des 5. Jahrhunderts v.Chr. darstellte. Die Idee der *koine eirene* ist damit sowohl als innovative Neuerung als auch als Konsequenz aus dem Scheitern früherer Friedensbemühungen zu begreifen. Scheiterte der Friedensplan von Sparta zunächst noch an der Ablehnung Athens, bildeten die hier formulierten Regelungen doch die Grundlage für den Königsfrieden von 386 v.Chr.

Polly Low: Peace, Common Peace, and War in Mid-Fourth-Century Greece

In den außenpolitischen Entwicklungen des 4. Jahrhunderts v.Chr. trat die Spannweite des Begriffes *eirene* besonders deutlich zutage. Neben einem idealisierenden Ansatz, der Frieden als Wert ins Zentrum rückte, konnte *eirene* auch als Vertragsform verstanden werden, die kriegerische Unternehmungen gegen nicht in das Vertragsverhältnis eingebundene Gemeinwesen ermöglichte. Eine sorgfältige Analyse der griechischen Antwort auf ein Unterstützungersuchen der aufständischen Satrapen 362/361 v.Chr. (RO 42) macht so deutlich, dass auch das hier enthaltene Lob des Friedens der zeitgenössischen expansiven Politik v.a. Athens nicht entgegensteht. Ähnlich wie der 375 v.Chr. in Athen eingerichtete Kult der Eirene konnte ein so verstandener *eirene*-Begriff damit

sowohl die Vorteile des Friedens als auch die Möglichkeit zu neuen militärischer Aktivitäten vereinigen.

Peter Hunt: Legalism and Peace in Classical Greece

Der Einhaltung von Abkommen und Berufung auf bestehende Vertragsverhältnisse kam in den zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen in Griechenland eine weitaus größere Bedeutung zu als zumeist in der Forschung angenommen. Der Beitrag beschäftigt sich insbesondere mit dem spätclassischen Athen und zeigt, dass in den außenpolitischen Diskussionen Vertragsklauseln einen zentralen Platz einnahmen. So konnte ein Vertrag nicht einfach gebrochen, sondern musste formal aufgelöst und für nichtig erklärt werden. Vertragliche Bindungen und Rechtsverhältnisse zu anderen Gemeinwesen bestimmten damit maßgeblich sowohl die Diskussionen innerhalb der Polis als auch ihr außenpolitisches Handeln. Dabei wurde eine friedliche Lösung von Konflikten auf der Basis vertraglicher Regelungen einer militärischen Eskalation vorgezogen, so dass das Bild einer von kriegerischen Auseinandersetzungen dominierten Außenpolitik revidiert werden muss.

Maria Brosius: Persian Diplomacy Between “Pax Persica” and “Zero-Tolerance”

Der Beitrag behandelt die griechisch-persischen Beziehungen und ordnet diese in die Gesamtstruktur des Achaemenidenreiches und den Umgang mit rebellierenden Untertanen ein. Dabei wird deutlich, dass der Großkönig mit Nachdruck und Härte gegen Rebellionen vorging, die die Stabilität des Gesamtreiches und die Autorität der Zentralmacht gefährdeten, während lokale Revolten an der Peripherie vorzugsweise mit diplomatischen Mitteln und Verhandlungen befriedet wurden. Dieses Vorgehen spiegelt sich im griechisch-persischen Verhältnis, so dass als bedrohlich eingeschätzte Gefährdungen der *Pax Persica* umgehend militärisch beantwortet wurden, Gemeinden in den Randgebieten dagegen einen höheren Grad an Autonomie genossen. Der Fall der Stadt Erythrae macht dabei deutlich, dass unter diesen Umständen einige der griechischen Poleis in Ionien die persische Herrschaft einer Kontrolle durch Athen durchaus vorzogen.

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