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This book is the result of a series of meetings, seminars, and extended discussions that began in 2011 with the formation of the *Philosophies of History* group. Countless people facilitated these events and ultimately the production of this volume. We would especially like to thank Emily Abbey and the Schools of History and English and the Leeds Humanities Research Institute at the University of Leeds for their extensive support of those meetings and seminars, from funding, to space, to encouragement. Thank you as well to St. Mary’s University Twickenham, the University of Oulu, and to all of those who have presented and participated in *Philosophies of History*. Thank you too to Beatriz López, Emma Goode, and all the support staff at Bloomsbury for their unwavering support of this project.
Editorial Note

This volume is the product of the international project, *Philosophies of History* (*PoH*) — in affiliation with *Networks and Neighbours* — and its regular seminars, regional public history workshops, and multi-institutional relationships. Based now in New York, previously in Leeds (United Kingdom), *PoH* was founded and is still directed by “practicing” historians, many of whom are early medievalists. The latter point alone makes the group unique — as almost all theorists of history study the modern world — but our composition as a body of practicing historians also makes *PoH* anomalous, since most theorists of history are, by training and interest, philosophers. *PoH* held its inaugural seminar in the Spring of 2012 on the campus of the University of Leeds. From that, it has developed alternative avenues of enquiry, research and collaboration. Some of the contributors to this volume have been speakers in the *PoH* series, and we would like to thank them for their participation in the seminars. We are very excited to have been moving historical theory in novel directions for more than five years and we look forward to expanding our history-centered approached to theory into the next decade.
Introduction: Evental History and the Humanities

Michael J. Kelly

Lex divina triplici sentienda est modo: primo ut historice, secundo ut tropologice, tertio ut mystice intellegatur. Historice namque iuxta litteram, tropologice iuxta moralem scientiam, mystice iuxta spiritalem intellegentiam.¹

In the past few decades, scholars have celebrated the end of history and proclaimed its rebirth. Outside the walls of the academy, in the media, it is easy to find claims that readers and viewers are “witnessing” (or consuming) history, that certain events, from pie-eating contests to war catastrophes and natural phenomena, are “historical.” Governments too are part of this trend, with the US Senate, for example, establishing a formal definition of history in 2006.² This increasing interest in the historical has emerged, in large measure, from elementary and outdated notions of history, eliciting the questions that drive this volume: what role does History, the discipline and its professionals, play amidst an expanding public craving for history and revived discourses in historical theory? To what extent is History informing and leading the discussion on history and on the past? What is its impact on historical theory? These are fresh and urgent questions for the field and for the state of history publicly, and they deserve a collective and inclusive response. This volume aims to initiate that response by exploring the current relationship between History and its cognate humanistic disciplines. To develop a reflection on History itself, this volume looks at History from the perspective of the Humanities.³

The contributions to this volume, and their respective authors, represent a spectrum of humanistic inquiry: anthropology and archaeology, architecture, art, design, education and pedagogy, medieval studies, music, theater and performance, law, literature, rhetoric, and philosophy. By exploring the humanistic
fields with which History is in dialogue, as well as the institutions that correlate between them, the discussions presented can serve as a firm basis through which to elicit original discourses between History and the other Humanities. The chapters of this volume introduce complementing and common theses and have been arranged accordingly. Primary themes and topics include: facticity, facts and the event of (historical) “truth”; objectivity and subjectivity; and the disagreements, and at times apparent dissonance, between History and other humanistic fields, and the partial reconciliations between them since the linguistic turn and postmodernity.

The expanding interest in evental history, today, is largely the result of a diverse, interdisciplinary engagement with the work of Alain Badiou—corresponding to the general proposition that Philosophy presently steers historical theory (to the detriment of History). Badiou’s historical theory is more the product of scholars’ careful exposition of his writing than his own advanced historical-theoretical exposition.4 The first Being and Event (1988) develops a theory of being. The second, titled Logics of Worlds (2006), develops a theory of appearing. In Logics of Worlds, Badiou tackles the question of how a truth appears in a world, which can be read as “how history can happen”? Badiou refers to this mode of appearing as a subject-body, a new subject is born from fidelity to a trace-event, which one can call “historical becoming.” Thus, truth engenders history. For Badiou, philosophy cannot find or develop new truths. Neither can history be about finding or creating truths. Truths find history; that is to say, historical conditions develop by which a truth can (re-)emerge from the void (through, as I argue elsewhere, the antihistorian).5 In short, history is the history of truth; there is no history of the finite, only of the eternal; history is singularly associated with humanity (which is not to say the latter).

In The Rebirth of History, Badiou effectively lays out his philosophy of history, alternatively the history of truth, by analyzing recent riots around the world and schematizing the process of revolt. Here, he establishes three types of riots: immediate, latent, and historical. The immediate riot is the unexpected moment in a world, when the possibility to describe the current state of the world springs forth, announcing through its action that there is a truth that does not fit into this world: for example, the communist idea. The latent riot is the period when subjective decisions are being made, when it comes to be decided whether the immediate riot will be an event or not, and this is defined by subjective choice: faithful, reactive, or obscure (occult). The subject that is born from these riots—a subject for Badiou is almost always a group, or collection of people, or a party, or a movement—who is faithful to the event of the emergence of
the new truth inaugurates a third stage of riot: the historical riot. The historical riot occupies a space and has a unified commitment to alterity; a unified Idea, it is the rebirth of a truth.

A historical riot represents the emergence of one political truth only; fidelity to the event that brought forth the truth and is now an event-trace in the historical riot: as Badiou states in *Theory of the Subject*, “there is only one political subject for any historicization.” Accordingly, the subject is always an exception to the world, the subject is always constituted, rare, finite and dependent on an event. The subject is an exception to the situation, in a relationship to something in its world as also to something outside of it, an alternative truth, and it is in this paradoxical relationship that history becomes interesting, because it is here that the subject can touch the infinite and elicit a riot (a revolt against the norms)—a disruption that has the potential to call forth the philosophical conditions for a new truth.

Political solutions, that is, new political truths, emerge from outside history, and yet, history is fundamental to their creation. History is meant as a form of organization, a methodology. Central to Badiou’s argument is that riots, including the historical riot, are precursors to the political; *history is prepolitical*. With the birth of a subject in its fidelity in the historical riot, people who are present in the world but absent from its power begin to become present, that is, there is a “historical” awakening, or, rebirth. The so-called Arab Spring, for Badiou, ushered in a new historical sequence, a new time, the coming to the end of the current period and the beginning of an event that could lead to a new historical sequence if the riots (bodies and languages) lead to an Idea (i.e., the political truth, the “communist hypothesis”). The goal of riots and the rebirthing of history is, for Badiou, the return to the world of the communist hypothesis, which simply means: “the proposition that the subordination of labour to the dominant class is not inevitable.” The “rebirth of history” represents this universal communist potential.

Badiou’s philosophy of history maintains history as a temporal descriptor; history is a sequence of time, as historical riots open the chance for new “long-term temporalities.” History maintains, as a possibility, the reemergence of the communist hypothesis. History is thus, for Badiou, a fragmented collection (or not) of sequences defined by the subordination of labor to the dominant classes. History, in this sense, is a temporal-atemporal, double-sided line of truths, a meta-history that weaves its way alongside human existence; in certain moments the communist hypothesis exposes itself, while, mostly, an absence of history is characterized by this suppression. Sometimes history exists and
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sometimes it is inexistent, and this existence/inexistence is directly correlated to the existence/inexistence of history and politics. Historical becoming is the chance for the rebirth of politics; the rebirth of history represents the chance for a rebirth of politics, and so the communist hypothesis.

In “History and Event,” Quentin Meillassoux claims that for Badiou “there is only a history of the eternal, because only the eternal proceeds from the event.”  

Meillassoux is correct: what this means is that history can only be the history of the eternal since truths are eternal and history is only about seizing truths. Truths and history derive from the finite but are, in themselves, infinite. From this logic, Meillassoux argues, truths are both eternal and historical, which might be clarified as truths are eternal because they are historical. Truths elicit history, they are history, and they are what end an intervallic period (between history and nonhistory). They and so history are eternal and infinite and capable of being reborn perpetually. Because they are infinite, though, they cannot be repeated: we cannot repeat history. “Marxism, the workers’ movement, mass democracy, Leninism, the party of the proletariat, the socialist state—all the inventions of the 20th century—are not really useful to us any more.”

Hence Badiou’s philosophy of history is a double-sided, uneven relationship between infinity and finitude, between nonappearance and appearing, that cannot accommodate a vision of perpetual progress (or regression). History is radical potential, the grounding of a radical politics, or rather, I would say, anti-history is the grounding, the historical riot is the antihistorical event (eliciting eventual history). Badiou’s philosophy of history (re-)announces universal historical truths, in the sense that there are and must be the possibility for materially derived transcendental truths that do not fit into the logics of a world, but that can enter it through the conditions that bring forth the “riot” (antihistory), and which can start to be reborn through the historical riot. Performance reopen the past, thereby cutting a hole in the logic of the world.

Incorporating performance into historical analysis is central to History and the supplemental disciplines analyzed throughout this volume. Performance provides the basis for the unpredictable truth-event, and, in this way, is foundational to History. New musicology, as J. P. E. Harper-Scott elaborates below, instead of associating performance and text into an eventual history establishes them as dichotomous, with a privileging of the latter, the historical object. Harper-Scott’s model for showing this is the history of Beethoven. In the history of rap one can find a similar situation in the historiography of lyrics versus beats, which narrows the possibilities for rap’s historical becoming and proliferates an “end of rap” narrative. The “end of history,” Berlin-wall-fall moment
for rap happened in the mid-1990s with the suspicious deaths of leading antiestablishment—lyrics-based—rappers: Eazy-E, Tupac Shakur, Biggie Smalls, and Big L. This ended a dialectical moment in which lyrics and beats competed to perform truth-eliciting events. The formal history of rap was subsequently transfigured, imagining itself at an end because the lyricists were dead. Only recently have historians of rap, largely rappers themselves, called for the refocusing of our historical attention away from the agency of any particular rapper or style and onto the subsequent subjective situation that has occurred. Historical truth emerges not from Tupac or Beethoven, per se, but from the performances of the objective works within a subjectivation process.

“Evental History” pervades the volume’s contributions; understanding it is useful for comprehending the displacement of History (from other fields, from “objectivity,” etc.) and what it means—in a postmodern world—to speak of historical “truth,” facts, and the process of subjectivity and objectivity. This is not to say that there cannot be fair criticisms of a Badiouian-inspired historical investigation, for surely there can. For instance, Badiou’s philosophy of history rightly rejects the (Hegelian-Marxian, or historicist) chain of history and the “democratic materialist” (“there are only bodies and languages”) sublimation of truths, and so potential alterities (i.e. alternative historical sequences), into the logic of the present. However, by generalizing about the “truth” of an event and then about another event as a rebirth of this truth (e.g. the Spartacus event and its universality), Badiou, it could be argued, constructs narrative representations to impose a truth onto or into a historical sequence; this historiographical work, places the logic of the present into the event-trace subjective process, subverting radical potential. Even if so, what we should take is that history remains the history of truths elicited within the conditions for a new historical sequence and that these conditions are defined by performance and the unexpected arrival from those events of a new truth. Badiouian evental history not only influences current thinking across the Humanities, but also presents the vital concept of history as an infinite/finite set in which History involves action and thought, truth, and facts.

Another theme common throughout the volume, and one that F. R. Ankersmit particularly addresses, is the issue of facts, in this case, the shared yet oppositional reliance on facts for historians and lawyers: “But whereas facts are for the historian the basis for coming to a picture of the past, lawyers use them for pronouncing a sentence (or for disputing it). And there is a world of difference between the two.” In other words, lawyers analyze facts not according to the narrative they can construct, but rather weighed against established rules
I would argue that legal historians embrace this legalistic methodological approach in the analysis of their historical objects, leading to a relatively closed legalist-historical discourse and a discursively crippling gap between Legal History and History (akin to Art History and History [see the contribution of Javier López-Alós]).

Legal History is perhaps unique among the humanistic fields in its methodological approach to the past: in law, the past provides modes of inquiry, determination, and outcome for the present: there is no veil over the present and future function of the past and the subjectivity of legal research and defense via historical precedent. This subjective approach leaves open the past for seemingly endless interpretation, and continuous—and at times spontaneous and random—existence in the present. This exceptionality tends to isolate legal history, to make it insular, offering itself as a perfect case study for Luhmann-style social systems theory.\(^\text{13}\) This insularity is neither a model for the relationship between the Humanities and History, nor for the Humanities and society.

The idea of law as a bubble is problematic for history as for its cognate disciplines, especially literary history—its self notably aligned today (as Andre Szczawlnska Muceniecks discusses) with History. The history of the law-history-literature relationship is one of a subjective processing, an existent/non-existent open association between them. In the Middle Ages, from the seventh and eighth centuries (from the *Liber Iudiciorum* and Isidore of Seville’s *Origin of the Goths*), law and history were intertwined as narrative devices, making the boundary between legal history and literary history hard to discern (if in fact we should try to do so).\(^\text{14}\) At the turn of early modernity, the sixteenth century, some writers imagined legal history via a prism of literary history, but by (“by” because the response was directly to the sixteenth-century scholars) the early seventeenth century, a new historicist approach emerged in which legal history was isolated from literature and wider history: an “objective distancing” in its protoform. One of the best examples of this is the 1613 edition of the *Liber Iudiciorum*—an early medieval Iberian law code—produced by Friedrich Lindenbrog, who removed—from the two existing editions of the code—the literary texts from the legal compilations.\(^\text{15}\) Ernest Metzger, historian of Roman Law, maintains that this shift began in earnest in the nineteenth century, simultaneous to the rise of professional history and objectivity.\(^\text{16}\)

Modernism’s “spacing”—or splicing—of History from its cognate disciplines is another common theme in this volume. For Rik Peters, historians began distancing themselves from rhetoric in the nineteenth century, returning to it in the mid-twentieth century after the linguistic turn, which is also the moment,
as Muceniecks demonstrates, that archaeology and history begin a reconciliation precisely by their shared embrace of the linguistic turn and, later, postmodernism. A related theme flowing throughout this volume is the centrality of the linguistic turn to History and its relationship to other disciplines. Almost universally, any rapprochement that occurs does so from this moment. One of the greatest effects of the linguistic turn was to reconnect History to its cognate disciplines.

For example, as Mucenieks shows, archaeology, in its desire to “progress” into a “science,” left history behind in the mid-twentieth century by clinging to the old objectivist ideas of history. As such, it seems to me, archaeology—although claiming to be “new” and independent—was reproducing precritical historical paradigms that took the written word (history’s “matter” [see Adi Efal-Lautenschläger’s chapter]) for what it was, and, in this way, ironically, by trying to separate itself from history, archaeology actually reified its subordinate place vis-à-vis history: archaeology’s “matter” became proof enough of the past in ways history’s could no longer be. The ironic antihistoricism that emerged in archaeology led it to resent history, which was replaced in some places by anthropology. “Methodologically,” Mucenieks explains, “this schism applied a new rule on the interpretation of the past: the dominion of the “true,” of the “reality,” provided by material culture against the distortion made through the written sources.” Biblical archaeologists took on the role of “historian” in the new constellation, detached from the radical methodological changes happening in history. The former left theologians to deal with the texts and instead focused on the materiality of objects.

Not unlike this processualist drive of twentieth-century archaeology or disconnected from historicism, legal history in modern scholarship saw its historical object (and clearly not law as a subject) scientifically, as something that develops and produces “knowledge.” In contrast to an interpretive or narrative methodology, modern legal scholars imagine/d legal history as epistemological, and as an object outside of history. In this mode of analysis, law is part of the evolutionary present, tying legal history—one could say, following Ankersmit’s chapter—to juridical discourse, with its indefinite prolongation of the present according to the logics of a legal system. Early medieval legal history, for its part, provides a model for the reconciliation between legal history and history, one with a now-familiar story: the mid-twentieth-century transformations in the study of early medieval legal history came via the rethinking of history in History elicited by the linguistic turn and postmodernism. The question today is what will become of the relationships between legal history
and History, History and the Humanities, and within History, as we navigate our ways through postnarrativist, neomodernist and “speculative” turns? Moreover, in what ways can engagement with evental history help break formal logics of continuity, reground dialectical facts, and reconnect History and theory.

In “From the Extended Mind to the Anthropocene: Rethinking Scale in Literary History,” Arthur Rose reads Samuel Beckett’s *Endgame* (1957) against the variance of scale introduced to literary history by the Extended Mind Hypothesis and the Anthropocene. The purpose of this case study is to challenge the functionality of the Extended Mind and the Anthropocene for literary history. These theoretical paradigms shift the possible scope for literary history, either limiting it to presence and environment or extending it in epochal fashion. The result is a form of historicism—itself a problem that both F. R. Ankersmit and Samaila Suleiman address in their respective chapters—that eliminates the necessary historical category of present and leads to a preimaginative (historical imagination relying on the mind and human action as historical object), speculative literary history.

In his contribution, “How We Got Out of Music History, and How We Can Get Back into It,” J. P. E. Harper-Scott interrogates the relationship between the Badiouian event and music history by turning the question of “what kind of object is music” into “what kind of subject is music?” To make this move, Harper-Scott outlines the four methodologies of new musicology, as identified by James Hepokowski. Each strategy approaches music from different angles, but the core (and nondialectical) dichotomy established between them is the reading of music either as a textual object or a performative one. The primary absence shared by all the strategies is subjective, namely, the existence of a subject faithful to a music event, whether read as textual or performative. This recognition of the need for History to be the history of a truth, a subjective process in a situation, leads Harper-Scott to call for a music history grounded in evental history. Complementing the example of Beethoven, as a way to demonstrate the meaning of evental history for music, Harper-Scott frames his chapter, from the outset, around the defeat of the Soviet Union. He does so because, apropos Badiou’s theory of history, the moment from the fall of the Berlin wall until now is an intervallic one, an ahistorical period between communist situations.

In her contribution, “Humanist Matters,” Adi Efal-Lautenschläger explains the historian’s craft as fundamentally material, grounded in the examination of works, objects. To do this, Efal-Lautenschläger presents four “humanist matters” with which history is constructed: instruments, elements, documents, and
monuments. The aim is to look at how the four are collated: this will provide the humanist habitus. For Efal-Lautenschläger: instruments form the objective motor of historiography, driving the researcher to inquire and investigate; elements arise when the historian employs the revealed instruments to see the constituent parts of the historical substance (understanding elements in an Aristotelian, or Euclidean, way); the document is the evidentiary object: that which “proves” (after being conditioned into factualness, via the prescribed process of factualité of the other humanist matters); the document also presents the possibilities for a new reading, an alternative interpretation, serving as a site on which alternative historiographies, correlational to the previous, can be constructed. It is additionally a look back to a beginning, which Efal-Lautenschläger claims is the essence of humanist history; finally, monuments “immortalize the deed.” As such, Efal-Lautenschläger presents a Badiouian-style four-part procedure for the humanist habitus and the production of historical truth, from event to nomination. This humanist history Efal-Lautenschläger grafts into a discussion on memory and mnemonic content of the humanist matters. The task of the humanist is, she claims, “to remember well.” Finally, she presents the Bergsonian distinction between (historical) memory and (historical) imagination: effectively passive vs. active historical reconstruction.

How does rhetoric employ the concept of history? This is the central question of Rik Peters’s chapter, “The Rhetoric of Time and the Time of Rhetoric.” Peters introduces this question as a self-reflective device for the field of rhetorical analysis, which needs, he claims, to reimagine its relationship to history. Since the linguistic turn, historians have actively investigated the rhetorical components of History and have largely embraced rhetorical analysis as crucial to the field. Rhetorical analysis, in contrast, has not yet done the same sort of interrogation of its historical components, leading, Peters argues, to the paradoxical condition in which “rhetorical analysis does not apply its most basic assumption to itself.” Peters’s task is to refigure rhetorical discourse analysis via contemporary historical theory to reconnect to History and by which rhetoric can understand “its own historicity.”

Peters builds his argument for a rapprochement between history and rhetoric by showing that, like rhetoric, “historical interpretation is a creative reconstruction to solve problems in the present.” The historical model and theory Peters uses are the case of Admiral Horatio Nelson’s last words “in honor I won them, in honor I will die with them” and the encapsulation theory of R. G. Collingwood, which demonstrates that history is a process of rhetorical interpretation that begins with the event under analysis and carries on to the present.
Interpreters (read: historians) understand the meanings of texts as responses to contemporary rhetorical situations. The interpreter can analyze the past with a view on the future, which provides the perspective from which all speeches are reinterpreted. Thus, history and rhetoric are reunited by this, the idea that all historians and rhetoricians construct arguments with an eye to the future, and that their interpretations and their rhetorical meanings will also change because the idea of the future continuously changes, hence rhetoric is always in time, is always historical.

F. R. Ankersmit, in his chapter, “Past, Present, and Future,” sets out to preserve the historical demarcation of the past, present, future, that is, the preservation of the category of the present, against historicism’s continuity approach to the past. He does this by way of the historical theory of Reinhart Koselleck and the historical example of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs), and their association to juridical (vs. historical) discourse. According to Ankersmit, Koselleck, responding to historicism’s elimination of the present as a category (by relativizing all moments), preserved it by postulating a permanent gap between the space of experience (the past [Erfahrungsraum]) and the horizon of expectations (the future [Erwartungshorizont]). The TRCs are presented as a model case study for defending Koselleck’s theory of history (of demarcated spaces), since they “must function in a context exemplifying most clearly the present’s relationship to both the past and the future;” they need to clearly distinguish the past, present, and future. Koselleck is revolutionary by providing the present a space of its own via preserved discourse with the past and future. This recognition of the asymmetry of the past and future is crucial to preventing the past and the future from invading the present and ruining it as a space of its own—law, or juridical discourse, allows one to stretch the present indefinitely; law creates a space for the present to live.

Ankersmit contends that the category of the present is essential for historical theory, essential for historians to be able to construct arguments about the past; the present needs to be maintained as the “other,” a site from which to gaze at the past outside of it. Contemporary history is, therefore, legitimate only if the present is its own category and is recognized as such also beyond history, for example in law (and politics). Through Koselleck and the TRCs, Ankersmit presents an evental history, history as a sequence of interruptions and subjective processes instead of a continuity; historical truths remain immanent, whether actualized during a historical situation or nonappearing in an intervallic period. “Second, it cannot be denied that there are parts of the past with which we can impossibly identify ourselves any longer. Examples would be the Egypt of the
Pharaohs or the Persia of Xerxes and Darius. Although it has to be admitted that even these remote pasts can be quite persistent and tend to die off very, very slowly. Moreover, under certain circumstances they can be resuscitated and regain a prominent place in our identities.”

In dialogue with Ankersmit and the topic of the TRCs’ engagement with history and juridical discourse, Samaila Suleiman, in “The Nigerian ‘History Machine,” presents the century celebrations of Nigeria’s existence as a national entity as a case study in the state’s relationship to History. These 2012 celebrations called for the creation of a historical narrative to show that Nigeria’s existence was legitimate and “not a historical accident.” By them, Suleiman challenges the idea that Nigerian history has been insular professionally and internationally. In contrast to previous historiography, Suleiman examines Nigerian history not via its past and artifacts, but rather by the “real” institutions that are responsible for regulating historical knowledge in Nigeria, such as the National Archives, the National Commission for Museums and Monuments, the Historical Society of Nigeria, and the National Universities Commission.” This is tantamount to the History Machine, which polices the parameters of historical discourses subsequently available to professional historians; the making of history in postcolonial Nigeria, Suleiman argues, “is the function of a collaborative regime of knowledge production, which is, at least at the initial stage, essentially state-driven.” Although historians, archaeologists, and museum curators operate along distinct professional and disciplinary tracks and in separate institutional sites in Nigeria, they work, often unwittingly, in a gigantic knowledge industry.

“The chapter is based on the premise that the links between history as an academic field and the actual sites where historical knowledge is produced such as the archive, the museum, and the publishing house are grossly undertheorized.” Suleiman illustrates how history is created outside the academy, and proposes that we need a broader methodology for interpreting the generic procedure of history-making as part of state and international machines of representing, preserving, and presenting the past. It is the dialectics between the institutions that make history—academia, the state, museums, corporations, etc. (i.e. the history machine)—that represent the output and meaning of history. In contrast to the example of the South African TRC, which rejected historical discourse in favor of juridical discourse, the de-colonializing Nigerian state chose history as its primary ally in dealing with the past. This is because the TRC’s aim is “to pronounce a sentence,” while the Nigerian history machine’s aim is to legitimize a state.
In “History as a Scam: Confrontation and Resentment between Archaeology and History,” Andre Szczawinska Muceniecks critically confronts one of the most dynamic and complex interdisciplinary relationships: History versus Archaeology, which together demonstrate par excellence the humanist habitus. In his pivotal chapter, Muceniecks addresses common themes prevalent throughout the volume: the genealogy of the divide between History and other disciplines; the how and why of accord; and the tendency to antagonistic or apathetic sentiments of nonhistorians toward history, a field which Karl Popper considered particularly unintellectual. It is this particular issue, of History being considered, in this case by archaeologists, as “outdated” or unimportant, that Muceniecks interrogates. His case study is the “minimalist” (the text is useless) versus “maximalist” (trust the text more) dispute in biblical studies, a debate that revolves around different values assigned to the written text (a dichotomy not dissimilar to that Harper-Scott reveals in new musicology), in this case the Bible. The debate between the two schools, Muceniecks argues, “should be understood as part of the larger discordance between culture-historical and processual archaeology.”

Muceniecks constructs his argument by way of an extended “standard” narrative history on the growth of archaeological research in Palestine, which serves as a brilliant “occupation” of the archaeological by the historical. After the Palestine example, showing the grounding problems of archaeology: namely archaeology as supplemental to the textual evidence, Muceniecks moves into the 1960s-on growth of “new archaeology,” the turn away from history and the assertion of archaeology as both independent from History and as a hard science that understands “culture” accordingly. The result of this processualism was the creation of a schism fueled by the archaeologist, who saw history as a distorer of truth because of its shift in methodology after the linguistic turn and toward critical theory and the recognition of the subjectivity of all things. Ultimately, processualism was deconstructed by younger archaeologists who embraced the increasingly theoretical paradigms of critical theory, especially as employed in History. Whereas the processualists are “objective,” “scientific,” and firmly against history, the postprocessualists are secure enough of the independence of archaeology to open it up to postmodernist critique and have developed their own critical apparatus. In so doing, they have been able to reconcile with History and deliver to it a model for intradisciplinary theoretical development, which History needs to take seriously.

Javier López-Alós, in his chapter, “Alternative Forms of Historical Writing: Concepts and Facts in Goya’s Disasters of War,” turns the reader's
López-Alós seeks to transcend this impasse by complicating the relationship and illustrating how the former’s methodology is based on a subjective disposition that can inform the latter. His case study by which to develop this claim is the set of eighty-five etchings on the Peninsula War (la Guerra de la Independencia) drawn by Francisco de Goya and referred to as Disasters of War. These were drawn between c. 1810 and 1820, but were published only in 1863, more than three decades after Goya’s death. An analysis of the etchings and a narration of the history behind their production and publication reveal an underlying tension within them between secularization and progress, on the one hand, and religion on the other, but, more to the point, they also demonstrate an image of historical memory incommensurate with “facts,” of the (historical) truth-eliciting confrontation between aesthetics and historical writing. “The plates which conclude the war series reflect the limits in narrating the past, and impact upon the conditions of possibility of historical writing.” Thus, when considered as a historical set, the Disasters force the interpreter to question the “a priorisms” by which history operates.

In her chapter, “‘Methods of Reasoning and Imagination’: History’s Failures and Capacities in Anglophone Design Research,” Sarah Teasley shifts the reader’s focus from the problematics of Art History to an investigation of the role of History within Design Research and the potentialities a new discourse between them can elicit. As Teasley explains, “Design” refers to an array of practices that coalesce around their shared responsibilities within the creation and performance of artifacts, which include the expected tangible objects, but also mentally and socially constructed patterns of policy, action, and innovation. Taking cue from recent changes in the definition of design by the World Design Organization (WDO), she questions both the interdisciplinary commitments and the right to definition. Design pedagogy, she notes, tends to understand History as a source of critical theory and methodology, while design practice and research often engage an elementary conception of history as a receptacle of the past, one whose contents may be plucked out in the hopes of stimulating innovation. This gap between pedagogy and practice is reflected in the academic/funding tendencies of Design Research, with its historic relationship to engineering and more recent turn to social science methodologies, and distance from Arts and Humanities approaches. Teasley bridges this divide by bringing History—with its reliance on scientific analysis and rhetorical creativity—more actively into conversation with Design Research. The effect of this new dialogue is to strengthen the critical methodologies of both history and
design. In overcoming their often mutually reductive readings of one another, then, Teasley ultimately demonstrates, History and Design Research can redefine the limits of the possible for each other, and, in so doing, mutually enhance the impact of both.

In conclusion, a reading of the gaze from our fellow humanistic disciplines reveals how History is a primary field and its theoretical and methodological apparatuses crucial for the study of core existential topics in the Humanities: issues of being, time, meaning, memory, space, knowledge and identity. The chapters of this volume demonstrate that History’s discourses have set the research tone at various points across a number of humanistic fields (archaeology, rhetoric, law, etc.), while for others (literary history, musicology, art history, philosophy, etc.) its influence has been less sustaining. In all cases, it is evident that History has struggled to remain at the innovative threshold in the study of the past—in whatever way it is imagined and performed. Even for those fields for which History has had extensive theoretical and methodological impact, breaks have occurred that have forced fields in the Humanities to uncritically reproduce older historical paradigms, thereby reducing History’s capacity to influence the broader making of history. If History is to become the theoretical and methodological innovator and leading voice of its own disciplinary aims, it needs—we historians need—to make History more available to its fellow humanistic disciplines. Yet, in complementary fashion, for the imagined output of such an innovation to be delineated across the Humanities (to become “generic”), informed fairly by each of the humanistic disciplines, historical theory—historical theorists—must in turn respond.

Bibliography


Ted Underwood’s *Why Literary Periods Mattered: Historical Contrast and the Prestige of English Studies* resolves the ongoing problem of periodicity in English Departments with an unashamed endorsement of “big data.” English Studies developed a narrative of discontinuity and revolution, or “historical contrast,” between literary historical periods because it helped to divide curricula. According to Underwood, this contrast comes at the expense of a more gradualist reading of literary history, where continuities matter more than ruptures. If English Studies traditionally focused on a relatively small corpus of representative texts, this was a necessity conditioned by the limits of the reading subject. No longer, argues Underwood, who sees in the digital humanities the potential to elaborate stylistic evolution on a gradual continuum, through the computational analysis of large numbers of texts. The clumsy partitioning of periodicity by historical contrast will be replaced by a continuity, endorsed by large-scale data sets.

If the digital humanities are not the direct focus of this chapter, Underwood’s triumphalist endorsement of big data is underpinned by something that is: a preoccupation with the contingencies of scale in literary studies that affiliate with the so-called new humanities. Specifically, I want to address the Extended Mind Hypothesis and the Anthropocene as two theoretical protocols that force literary history to contract or expand its scale. I do not presume to give state-of-the-art reviews for the Extended Mind, the Anthropocene, or Literary History. Rather, I consider how literary scholars working on the Extended Mind and the Anthropocene have, implicitly or explicitly, tended toward speculative literary history as a way of offsetting increased factual contingency. Factual contingency emerges as facts are scrutinized with the contingency of scale variance.
Scale Variance has already received some attention in scholarship of the Extended Mind, more so in that of the Anthropocene. In Derek Woods’s pithy definition, “the observation and the operation of systems are subject to different constraints at different scales due to real discontinuities.” Such “variance” leads to a “scale critique”: “a means of reflexive and analytic purchase on scale difference and its mediation.” I propose to address the distortions these trends have exerted on narrative models of literary history that emerged after the linguistic turn by comparing a few of the “conventional” issues raised in the literary history of a particular text, namely Samuel Beckett’s *Endgame*, with the scalar variants introduced by the Extended Mind and the Anthropocene.

My argument for using scale to relate the Extended Mind and the Anthropocene to literary history unfolds in five stages. After a brief introduction to the Extended Mind and the Anthropocene, I return to a moment, in the mid-1990s, when, in response to the linguistic turn, a form of literary history attempted to immunize itself from historical scholarship by imposing specific constraints of scale under which a literary history might be written. Then, I consider how prominent respondents to both the Extended Mind and the Anthropocene have demonstrated how both theories disrupt these constraints. These disruptions raise problems for the apparent immunity of literary history, since the resulting historiographic “thickening” necessarily has an impact on literary scholarship, which has increasingly turned to the Extended Mind and the Anthropocene to reframe the epistemes of writing and reading. Both theories distort historiography and literary criticism, with reciprocal consequences for literary history, particularly with regard to its fairly optimistic view on the historical fact. My conclusion is not to prove or disprove the existence of facts: it is to demonstrate how the extralinguistic distortions caused by scale variation in the Extended Mind and the Anthropocene radically problematize the conventions under which facts in literary history seem to cohere.

The Extended Mind, according to the groundbreaking 1998 article by Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers, refers to “an active externalism, based on the active role of the environment in driving cognitive processes.” According to the Extended Mind, writing in a notebook no longer supplements memory; it is that memory itself. The Extended Mind quite literally extends the mind beyond the limits of the skull to its environment. The self becomes “an extended system, a coupling of biological organism and external resources.” The Anthropocene makes a similar effort to think of the self as an extended system. But rather than take that self as an individual entity with environmental extensionality, it addresses the human species as a system-changing geological
event. “To emphasize [this] central role of mankind in geology and ecology,” Paul J. Crutzen and Eugene F. Stoermer proposed the Anthropocene as a term to replace the Holocene, Charles Lyell’s descriptor for our current geological epoch (dating from 10,000 BC to the present). Crutzen and Stoermer advocate for this change in nomenclature, in part, for strategic reasons: “to develop a world-wide accepted strategy leading to sustainability of ecosystems against human induced stress will be one of the great future tasks of mankind.” The Extended Mind, by undermining easy distinctions between the mind and the written artefact, shifts the terms of our engagement with historical texts. The Anthropocene, by reimagining our entire history of integrated ecological practice, forces us to re-conceive the contexts of such engagements.

Certainly, these concerns seem quite distinct from those of Wendell V. Harris in “What Is Literary ‘History’?” Harris’s essay is a robust, yet paradigmatic, response to the linguistic turn in philosophy and the narrative turn in historiography. Its appearance before the consolidation of either the Extended Mind (1998) or the Anthropocene (2000), grants it a certain historicity, as an account of literary history particular to the mid-1990s. Harris takes historical scholarship to provide the basic data for literary history, which concerns itself with the writing of this scholarship. For Harris, historical scholarship treats those “factual questions that are for the most part open to determinate resolution,” while literary history employs these facts to determine “possible intended meaning,” write internal or external literary histories of either genre or national literatures, or “induc[e] extra-authorial meanings.” Harris is not naive to the contingency of facts. “[T]o say Paradise Lost was published in 1667 is to employ at least three conventions: the very convention of measuring time in years, the convention of Arabic numbers, and the convention of counting the years from a particular point in time.” “But,” Harris adds, “within these shared conventions, the fact is a fact, and one that can be translated into the calendars of other cultures and other numbering systems. The date 1667 may be absurd under the aspect of eternity, but that view is precisely what we don’t and can’t share.” Underpinned by a substrate of historical facts, Harris’s literary history is a historiography that must acknowledge, at least in part, its reliance on generally agreed upon conventions, for which “the aspect of eternity” remains an absurd measure. Both the Extended Mind and the Anthropocene threaten this scalar absurdity. In fact, it is my contention that the scalar implications of both the Extended Mind and the Anthropocene are so detrimental to the “we” in Harris’s account that it requires “us” to reformulate the terms and conditions under which the writing of a literary history becomes possible. Therefore, my intention is not to revisit
the narrative history debate, usefully summarized by Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen (2015), which implicates historiography in narratology. Rather, I want to show how Harris’s conventions of facticity, as generated by historical scholarship, have themselves shifted since his account was published.

For John Sutton, responding to Medieval and Renaissance memory practices (the *ars memoria*), the Extended Mind offers some help in “understanding such culturally embedded practices as these old methods of managing memory and imposing cognitive discipline.” More importantly, the history of such practices has a reciprocal effect on contemporary accounts of the Extended Mind: it affords a “vital” historical distance, “because it’s often harder to see the mutual entanglements and contaminations operating between brains, technologies, and culture in the present.” Here, Sutton offers something more tangible than the usual “stupefaction” many historians might associate with memory studies. Instead of the “presentism” usually associated with “anachronistic” theoretical revisionism, Sutton, together with Evelyn B. Tribble, is concerned with embedding an account of the Extended Mind in “the full distributed ecology of a historical setting.” Tribble and Sutton begin their meditation on distributed cognition and the Extended Mind by reframing the tendency to pathologize anachronism: “If anachronism is the mixing of times, it is not inevitably error.” Cognition may tend toward “the mixing of times,” but it remains both embedded in the context in which it emerges and partly constitutive of it. Rethinking cognitive processes as “distributed, cultural and temporal” may appear simply to bring history into the notoriously ahistorical cognitive sciences, but it has the reciprocal effect of challenging us to think more carefully about the cognitive processes through which such history was produced. In our previous example, Harris emphasized the date of publication of *Paradise Lost* (1667). But it is more than mere historical fact-sharing to prioritize “this” publication over its “other” publication, in 1674. Given the changes to the 1674 edition, we must at least reevaluate the genetic preference of one version over another in negotiating questions of facticity. These genetic differences permit some degree of historical morphology, whereby the writing process extends beyond publication as dependant on a secure date. Rethinking the publication process as itself extensive of the cognitive processes that produce the work forces us to reconsider our dependency of the “date” as a fixed point.

This might strike the reader as slipping the argument: after all, it challenges the terms of “dating” a work, rather than the date itself. Here, Anthropocene historiography, until now disconnected from the Extended Mind, serves as a supplement to this fundamental shift in literary history. If the Extended Mind
forces us to rethink the fixity of facts when cognitive processes are entangled in the writing of history, the Anthropocene radically alters the material *long durée* (Harris’s “eternity”) that underwrites its historical context as a date. This is most evident in its transformation of substances: material that has typically acted as the objective correlative of an unchanging eternity (stone; air) has recently acquired an unsettling historicity. Tobias Menely demonstrates how air, usually the ahistorical, unchangeable excess in historical materialism, becomes historical matter when rising carbon rates in the atmosphere begin to contribute to global warming. Under the sign of the Anthropocene, air “thickens” from “an infinite container inviting dispersal” to “the matter of history,” a substance whose properties “will determine the next phase of human and planetary history.” Menely’s point is precisely that those supposed “aspects of eternity” that would make 1667 arbitrary or absurd are beginning to make themselves felt in environmental terms: the air, once the vehicle for metaphors about eternity, has become saturated with humanity’s carbon emissions.

These accounts are indebted to a kind of metaphysical “forgetting,” in which material processes—cognitive and atmospheric—have been left out of historical accounts. By reintroducing these processes, Tribble, Sutton and Menely challenge historiography to include more cognitive and environmental conditions into the writing of history. At their most radical, they suggest empirical (rather than linguistic) reasons to take historical facts as contingent, rather than immutable. This pattern of challenge and inclusion is conventional enough in the expansion of historiographic concerns. But they do pose a problem for both this chapter and each other: the two theories are incommensurable at scale.

Both theories rely on notions of the human that are incommensurable for reasons of scale. The individual human is not the “single biological agent” of the Anthropocene; rather, it is “*Homo sapiens*, [that] has in short order altered the Earth’s atmosphere.” Dipesh Chakrabarty suggests that the term “biological agent” must be refined; we must “scale up our imagination of the human” and think of them as geological agents: “we can become geological agents only historically and collectively, that is, when we have reached numbers and invented technologies that are on a scale large enough to have an impact on the planet itself.” This collective “we” is foreign to the Extended Mind accounts, since it risks returning the complex interactions of cognition to the earlier accounts of evolutionary psychology, whereby “minds” are taken “out of historical time” and “construct[ed] as a fixed set of brain-bound module.” Indeed, even though Tribble and Sutton propose to “put the mind back into time and history, by theorizing cognition as itself distributed, cultural, and temporal,” they are at pains...
to insist on “the complex bridges between the embodied sensory-affective realm of individual experience and the social and material constituents of our activities of remembering.” If both theories share an interest in extension, particularly over time and space, they have radically different objects for this extensionality. Under the Anthropocene, the human species, as an entity, is granted an agency that extends into both the past and the future, and across terrestrial ecosystems, in excess to the sum of decisions by human and nonhuman subjects. For the Extended Mind, the cognitive states of the human constitute, in themselves, “a cognitive ecology,” wherein:

many cognitive states and processes are hybrids, unevenly distributed across the physical, social, and cultural environments as well as bodies and brains, hooking up in both temporary and more enduring ways with other people and with certain things—artifacts, media, technologies, or institutions—each with its own history and tendencies.

These examples demonstrate that the two theories are antithetical in their treatment of the collective. Both do disrupt the notion of an individual “I” subject; not because it is a feature of linguistic arbitrariness, discursive history, or philosophical repetition, but because it becomes a matter of scale variance. The mind, extended into external self-expression, no longer forms the basis for a discrete, autonomous subject; the body, a material contributor to the Leviathan that is Anthropos-induced climate change, has no individual control over the “scale effects” it renders after “a certain, indeterminate threshold” through its “insignificant” individual actions.

As a consequence, Harris’s literary history is challenged by three forms of deatomization. First, anachronicity, once antithesis to the historical fact, is now a supplement to grasping matters at scale (cognitively or terrestrially). Anachronism registers discrepancies between either two moments of remembered practice or two incompossible epistemic frameworks of earth science, which serves to undercut the projected certainty of historical fact. Second, “the human” is scaled up to be considered as a species or dismantled as an extensive cognitive entity. This discursive consequence is no longer reliant on a deconstruction of metaphysics: it is germane even to those empiricist epistemes that sought to deny the linguistic turn. Finally, both anachronicity and the scalar human benefit from, and influence, an account of extension that may be, on the one hand, cognitive, or, on the other, environmental. And, while it would be wrong to conflate these forms of extensionality (if anything, their incommensurability would gesture to an antinomy, rather than a synthesis), both have
consequences for writing literary history. The radical instability of facts “under
the sign of eternity” presents a need to approach literary history from a fresh
perspective: speculative literary history.

One example of this speculative literary history emerges in Timothy Clark’s
Ecocriticism on the Edge (2015). Clark’s aim is to consider the implications of the
Anthropocene for reading literary texts across deviations of scale. In order to
develop his reading of scale variance, he draws on three levels of relation, given
by Braden R. Allenby and Daniel Sarewitzi to describe human interaction with
technology. A Level I system holds that technology is simply a tool: Allenby and
Sarewitzi cite planes and automobiles as examples whose use to humans at Level
I emerges in transporting them from one place to another. A Level II system
integrates Level I technologies in “networks, systems of social and technical con-
trol, with additional complications in their own security and pricing systems,
relations to the law and so on.”30 Thus, where a Level I transport technology
focuses on moving the human from place to place, embedding it in a Level II
system would factor in optimum movement patterns for all such users, with
regard to safety, traffic flow and legal regulation. A Level III system “broadly
correspond[s] to [Timothy] Morton’s notion of the hyperobject, entities whose
physical and temporal scale and complexity overwhelm both traditional concep-
tions of what a thing is and what ‘understanding’ it could mean.”31 In Allenby
and Sarewitzi’s transport example, this would be those unforeseen emergent
properties, such as the effect transportation had on human freedoms, environ-
mental and resource systems, and the development of mass-market consumer-
ism. While the three levels are entangled, it does not suffice to compare their
effects at the different levels. Driving a motor car is not detrimental at Level I, is
only detrimental if driven badly at Level II, but has entirely deleterious effects
at Level III. In fact, Clark characterizes the Anthropocene as a threshold con-
cept by noting “more and more events and problems are emerging at Level III,
rendering obsolete modes of thought that are confined to Levels I and II, even
if those still describe the kinds of thinking almost all people try to live by.”32 It is
precisely because scale variance distorts the feasibility of historical facticity that
a new speculative literary history becomes necessary.

Clark introduces a form of speculative literary history through two, side-by-
side readings of Henry Lawson’s “Telling Mrs Baker” (1901).33 The first, modeled
on Graham Huggan’s postcolonial reading of the short story (2007), interrogates
a dominant reading of Lawson as “a white nationalist Australian icon.”34 Huggan’s
method “underline[s] the unjust, socially constructed nature of some category
of identity (whiteness, maleness, etc.) by a counter-stress on what it excludes,
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denigrates or evades in order to constitute itself.”35 In the case of “Telling Mrs Baker,” a story about two cattle hands who lie to their boss’s wife about the conditions of his death, a certain reading of Australian masculinity is developed as the hands try to protect Mrs. Baker from the news of her husband’s dissipation. Their ineptitude in presenting the lie, demonstrated when Mrs. Baker’s sister sees through their story, undermines masculinity’s presentation as dependent on its protective function. Clark’s second reading dislocates the first reading’s anthropocentrism.

Rather than focus on the centrality of the human interest story, the second reading considers the role of the Australian cattle hand in environmental degradation of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. When the narrator (one of the cow hands) mentions that they can’t simply wait for Baker to sober up, he gives as his reason the scarcity of the grass: the cattle they are herding need to keep moving. Clark unpacks this apparently innocuous reason by referring to the long history of environmental impact when domesticated species, exotic to Australia, were introduced by European colonists. The fragile grass environments were unable to sustain the impact of heavy grazing, which meant that these long cattle drives contributed to the eventual desertification of large areas of Northern Australia.

Clark, in his deceptively simple use of reader response theory, raises the possibility of a new understanding of literary history: a literary history that is implicated in the ecoletics of human-driven climate change. Clark is drawing on a paradigm of revisionist reading exemplified in Edward Said’s reading of Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park in Culture and Imperialism (1993).36 Here, Said considers the novel’s “dead silence” about the slave trade, implicitly the basis of the wealth on which its eponymous manor house relies in order to function. Critics of Said’s response take issue with his historical and literary inattentiveness. Austen, they argue, was an abolitionist, and the novel, a covert attack on supporters of slavery; Said fails, in their collective opinion, to take into account these facts. Their attacks on Said ignore two core tenets of his historiography. First, his reading of Mansfield Park forces readers to engage with the question of slavery in the novel, which implicates it, positively or negatively, in a wider sociopolitical history. By raising the question, he drives his critics to explore an important, and often occluded, literary history of slavery in canonical works, even if they do so in order to refute his work. Second, he addresses wider systemic problems that cannot be readily appreciated by simply returning to a biographical Austen. The problem with systemic inattentiveness is not that the facts are wrong; it is that these facts deviate at scale. Austen may be a conscientious
objector in her personal views, and unfairly discriminated against because of her gender, while still being the (unwilling) beneficiary of large-scale injustice. Clark might identify this as Level II complexity. Austen's personal response is possible because of her position in a wider system of relative privilege and entitlement. Said's Level II response draws out the immediate social benefits of an undiscovered slavery that dare not speak its name; it does not address other effects of the long history of trans-Atlantic slavery. Beyond those people who suffered as their bodies were turned into commodities, or those who benefitted from their exploitation, the trans-Atlantic slave trade has environmental consequences that extend beyond the individuals involved.

According to Jason W. Moore, this long history is key to understanding the systems that enabled the mass release of carbon from the 1800s onwards. Moore argues against Crutzen and Stoermer's efforts to date the beginning of the Anthropocene as 1784, with the invention of the steam engine. Rather, the systemic causes should be traced to the rise of capitalism after 1450 (hence, Moore suggests replacing the "Anthropocene" with the "Capitalocene"), and the "epochal shift in the scale, speed, and scope of landscape transformation," mostly powered by slave labor.\(^{37}\) Whether or not one endorses Moore's suggested name change, his argument does insist on Level III thinking about the consequences of social systems as they develop over the long durée. The consequence is to challenge Harris's notion of eternity, demonstrating the conventions of fact, by which literary history is agreed upon and ratified, are ceasing to have purchase. In the differentiated environmental reading that Clark proposes, the conventions are no longer possible. By challenging the basis of immutability, the certainty of a world, the conditions of facticity under which a history of writing retains any meaning are called into question.

A second example may be found in Dirk Van Hulle's *Modern Manuscripts: The Extended Mind and Creative Undoing from Darwin to Beckett and Beyond* (2014).\(^{38}\) Van Hulle's aim is to use the Extended Mind to draw together genetic criticism ("the study of writing processes, based on manuscript research") and cognitive narratology ("the mind-relevant aspects of storytelling").\(^{39}\) His starting hypothesis is that "writers' interaction with their manuscripts as part of the 'extended mind' may inform the methods of evoking fictional minds, and that such a genetically informed reading may contribute to a reassessment of the so-called 'inward turn' of literary modernism."\(^{40}\) Not only does he propose a radical revision of literary modernism's historiography, from its preoccupation with "stream-of-consciousness" and "mind-wandering" to an externalist account of "enactive cognition," Van Hulle also advocates a kind of
folding of method, where fictional minds are produced out of, while helping
to produce, the manuscripts that, themselves, function as literary extensions
of the writer’s mind.

In order to demonstrate how method develops into (revisionist) historical
trend, he analyses three stages of textual production: exogenesis, endogen-
esis, and epigenesis. Exogenesis, after Raymonde Debray Genette, draws on
textual remainders, taken as notes from other works, to argue for the influ-
ence of external source texts on a creative work. In the case of Darwin, Van
Hulle’s first case study, these jottings often provide the basis for thoughts in
progress. They are often paratactic and do not appear in the final format (here,
On the Origin of Species [1859]), except insofar as they have been elaborated
on, in syntax, as part of the writing process. This transition from exogenesis
to endogenesis, or those markings on a manuscript that designate editorial
intervention, is exemplified when, for instance, cultural stimuli are noted,
alongside the instruction: “‘Analyse this out’ (M.150).” Endogenesis does
not simply provide the evidence of a transformation of exogenetic materi-
als: it also demonstrates “an act of creative undoing.” A manuscript, given
as a protocol for making a text rather than a text itself, overlays on a process
of composition, a combinatory process of decomposition, in which what is
undone (i.e., deleted) gains a virtual importance. The disruptive force of
such editorial interventions has generally been silenced by the claim that
an integral work is marked by the date of publication, rather than the pro-
cess of its production. This would underwrite the basic facticity of Harris’s
example: whatever its exogenetic procedures (Milton’s reading of the Bible)
or endogenetic practices (Milton’s recitation of the text to his daughters),
Paradise Lost is published in 1667. Except, any revisions made to the 1672
version are no longer revisions: according to Van Hulle, these are examples of
epigenesis, or the changes that authors make to their texts after publication
(i.e., in successive editions). The comparison of multiple published versions
effectively disrupts the security of “fact by publication,” since each succes-
"
“an environmental vehicle that is part of the ‘extended mind,’” becomes hypertext, undermining the fiction of a single authoritative text, and, by extension, its pivotal role for latent facticity in literary history.

Manuscript studies disintegrates the authoritative text by populating it with alternative versions, prior and post its publication. This blending of texts implies a complete reformulation of the field of literary criticism, wherein genetic manuscripts take the place once occupied by the fiction of integrated author-figure, and subsequently dominated by the fiction of an integrated work-text. So, following the enumeration of a number of digital manuscript projects, in which the written work is presented “not only as a single published text, but as a complex interplay between completion and incompleteness,” Van Hulle concludes his study by claiming that such projects “have the potential to change the way a new generation of readers looks at literature.”44 If the ambition to change a generation’s view of literature is slightly overstated, Van Hulle certainly marks a change in the way this generation writes literary history. In the broader frame of Modernist Studies, Van Hulle’s argument against the “inward turn” is persuasive: modernist writers do seem more involved in the enaction of their thought on the external world. Their enaction is demonstrated when the preoccupation with mental processing in their fiction is compared with the processes of this fiction’s production: in their notebooks (exogenesis), working drafts (endogenesis), and revised publications (exogenesis). But Van Hulle’s point extends beyond a revisionist reading of Modernist Studies. Harris immunized literary history from the narrative turn by insisting on a distinction between the historical content and the literary process. Van Hulle’s proposal to read these as mutually implicated in a co-production renders the stability of historical empiricism virtual. It functions “as if” it were fact, not because its facticity is in doubt, but because this facticity is contingent on the scale of cognitive extension used to understand it.

Scale variance in the environmental and cognitive realms has led to two processes for historical studies: a materialization of the historical environment and a deatomization of that primary unit of historical knowledge, the historical document. But of what consequence is this for literary history, for whom the relevance of historical enquiry must always relate to literary texts? Certainly, Harris’s immunization process is no longer satisfactory; at least, current developments in literary studies seem to draw on a literary historiography that is demonstrably more speculative and contingent. I sketched out two trends in literary studies with obvious implications for the writing of literary history. Thus far, I have kept them distinct in order to suggest a parallel development of
speculative literary history. In order to demonstrate a nonidentical congruence, I would like to return to one of Van Hulle’s principal examples, Samuel Beckett, in order to demonstrate how the Extended Mind and the Anthropocene might revise a literary historiography of Beckett’s *Endgame* (1958).45

*Endgame* remains a particularly complex text for existing models of literary historiography. The text itself rejects historical location: its action takes place at a shelter whose “grey light” and “bare interior” betray no history, while the surrounding landscape is described as “zero” and “corpsed.” In this regard, it has sometimes been taken as a particularly metaphysical speculative fiction about postnuclear end times.46 It also has a tricky textual history, since *Endgame* is a “translation” of Beckett’s “earlier” play titled *Fin de partie* (1957). The translation, also by Beckett, is idiosyncratic enough to validate arguments that refer to one, the other, or both as “original.”47 *Endgame* criticism has been as likely to divide the texts with a punctuation mark (/) as exclude one text entirely from discussion. Given that it is a play, a historiographic response to *Endgame* must also consider performance history, with all manner of major or minor production details, including decisions about costume and stage design, characterization and delivery, and production and direction. Such decisions have been well chronicled in the theatrical notebooks of Beckett himself, a number of which have been published in facsimile editions for general audiences.48 Other notebooks of actors and directors, theater costings ledgers, the drawings of set designers and the programs accompanying productions are all to be found in ancillary archives.49 Of course, all this planning could vary in implementation for particular performances on particular nights; each production carries its own performance history as evidenced, more nebulously, through reviews and the memories of participants and spectators.

Attending to Beckett’s biographical history tends to privilege his authorial intervention. When Beckett directed *Endspiel* at the Schiller Theatre in 1975, his notebooks included emendations to his “original” text.50 When these were published in the 1990s, they would strongly imply an authorial endorsement of certain, “orthodox” productions. This fiction of authorial control has its own force of law in Beckett’s oft-cited legal injunction against the 1984 Mabou Mines interpretation of *Endgame*. The case of Mabou Mines together with Beckett’s notes on *Endspiel* have led performance scholars to distinctions between sanctioned and unsanctioned productions. All these examples have led to textual, translational, theatrical, performative, and authorial histories of *Endgame*. Reciprocally, *Endgame*’s “case histories” introduce important challenges to the
broader writing of history. They do so by making explicit some of the historical problems the criticism has had with realist forms of representation, clear distinctions between original and translation, and the power and privilege of authorial control. Each challenge has developed its own prodigious critical canon, but the 21st century trend toward historicism in Beckett Studies has fostered a common tendency to isolate (nonnegotiable) historical occurrence from (negotiable) literary criticism. This has occasionally met with quite bitter responses.  

In other words, the implicit drive has been toward the form of literary historiography that Harris proposes, where historical fact (what Beckett did, read and wrote) can be separated from literary production (what Beckett’s works do). And yet, as should already be apparent, the terms and conditions of the Extended Mind and the Anthropocene threaten this strict distinction of historical fact from literary production. A straightforward attempt at bringing to bear Extended Mind and the Anthropocene on the writing of Endgame’s literary history might consolidate this threat by maintaining the hitherto parallel trajectories of the two paths. An Extended Mind account of Endgame might take the manuscript “thinking” and “creative undoings” detailed in Beckett’s Theatrical Notebooks as the basis for challenging the text’s integrity. Using Van Hulle’s model of exo-, endo-, and epigenesis, these textual deviations would question any claim to an autonomous protocol for the play. At the same time, Endgame’s association with postnuclear speculative fiction, together with the vagueness with which it alludes to a prior disaster, makes it ripe for the kind of allegorical reading proposed by Timothy Clark. Its adaptation to the Climate Fiction, or “Cli-Fi,” genre would parallel other works that, in Adam Trexler’s reading of Anthropocene Fictions (2015), move between nuclear and environmental catastrophe. But reinforcing this division of reading approaches ultimately permits the concerns of one critic or another to determine the nature of the intervention, and, by extension, to undermine the problems raised by historical necessity (the Anthropocene) and the deatomized subject (the Extended Mind). A more fruitful approach would be to address the historical certainty of a particular reading, expose the contingency of its historical assumptions, and demonstrate its uncertainty in the face of the empirical onslaught of the Extended Mind and the Anthropocene. Moreover, to address this as an empirical onslaught permits me to entangle the Extended Mind and the Anthropocene, not to claim an identity between them but to show how they also undermine each other’s historical autonomy. I want to do so by returning to Adorno’s seminal essay, “Versuch, das Endspiel zu verstehen.
[Trying to Understand *Endgame*]” (1959), where I propose to try once more to understand *Endgame* through the scale variance brought about by the Extended Mind and the Anthropocene.

From the summer of 1960 to the spring of 1961, Theodor Adorno worked on his seminal *Endgame* essay. In it, he argued against trying to interpret Beckett’s work:

> The interpretation of *Endgame* therefore cannot chase the chimera of expressing its meaning with the help of philosophical mediation. Understanding it can mean nothing other than understanding its incomprehensibility, or concretely reconstructing its meaning structure—that it has none.  

Adorno’s essay, crucially an *attempt* to understand *Endgame*, is about how the play has no meaning structure. But, of course, there is also a historicity to this essay: what Adorno might call the “historico-philosophical sundial.”  

Dirk Van Hulle draws on the work of Gunzelin Schmid Noerr to explain: “The work of art is a rather immobile construction; the connection between the hand and the background—the moving shadow—is effectuated by the sun—that is, by the historically situated viewpoint of the receiver or interpreter.”  

Thanks to the work of Rolf Tiedermann (1994) and the translations of Van Hulle and Shane Weller (2010), Adorno’s notes to the essay are available “to situate the interpreter Adorno’s viewpoint historically.” But, following the work in Van Hulle’s *Modern Manuscripts*, the notes actually constitute an exogenetic and endogenetic challenge to “situating” Adorno’s viewpoint, historically or otherwise. Besides, the sundial is no longer “a rather immobile construction.” Dissection of the work’s manuscripts demands a far more contingent treatment of its protocols. Against this contingency, a key term, like “nature,” is increasingly shadowed by the threshold of the Anthropocene:

Hamm: Nature has forgotten us.
Clov: There’s no more nature.
Hamm: No more nature! You exaggerate.
Clov: In the vicinity.
Hamm: But we breathe, we change! We lose our hair, our teeth! Our bloom! Our ideals!
Clov: Then she hasn’t forgotten us.
Hamm: But you say there is none.  

I’ll return, in due course, to how this discussion about the end of nature aligns the play with the Anthropocene. For the moment, it is worth noting how Beckett’s
use of “protocol sentences” undoes any received sense of what nature means. Adorno describes the process as follows:

*Endgame* contains rapid, monosyllabic dialogues, like the earlier question-and-answer games between the blinded king and fate’s messenger. But where the bind tightened then, the speakers now grow slack. Short of breath until they almost fall silent, they no longer manage the synthesis of linguistic phrases; they stammer in protocol sentences that might stem from positivists or Expressionists.58

“Protocol sentences” are the “babbling [that] becomes nonsensical by presenting itself as sense.”59 Such protocol sentences are, if anything, more pronounced in Beckett’s manuscripts. Van Hulle observes that just such an exchange fills eight pages in the manuscript version of *En attendant Godot* (1948/49), which the published version will reduce to eight lines.60 The protocol relies on a question-and-answer routine whose iteration makes meaning less, rather than more, graspable. The success of Adorno’s essay is in successfully communicating this in a meaningful way.

Yet, Adorno’s observation has also undergone an endogenetic transformation between his notes and his published essay. Van Hulle and Weller link the passage above to this note, reproduced below:

> Parody of drama = drama in the age of its impossibility. In tragedy, stychomythia served as a tool to tighten the dramatic tension to the utmost: quintessence of antithesis. Here it turns into slackening: less and less talkative protagonists, complete regression (as in positivism: talking in short sentences).61

The essential argument remains unchanged: Beckett undoes drama by “slackening” its tension. But, with the inclusion of synthetic sentences (as opposed to paratactic notes), a new causality is introduced. “Protocol sentences” express a phatic meaninglessness undisclosed by “short sentences.” Protagonists become “short of breath” (a vitalist statement), where once they were simply “less talkative” (a structuralist statement). Of course, while these changes register a development in Adorno’s thoughts about *Endgame*, it also undercuts them. The poetic charge in the published version is more or less absent in his observational notes. For an essay that is suspicious about poetic charge, the change might also be regarded as rather suspect. When subjected to a scrutiny informed by its endogenetic changes, the meaning of Adorno’s essay is reflexively in tension with its formal appeals to characters who “stammer” and “breathe.”

If these changes appear to be rather cosmetic, they do serve to historicize Adorno's work. Once historicized, the essay does have an impact on historical
contingency, and not simply because it has been taken as a stable intellectual force for Beckett criticism. In the notes, Adorno describes the relation between *Endgame* and history as follows:

The relation to history is expressed by means of a *taboo*. The shock is such that it cannot be talked about. It is even noticeable in the way the play is composed. The catastrophe, which is clearly the pragmatic presupposition, cannot be named. Corresponds more or less to the way people in Germany in 1960 talk about the murder of the Jews in attenuating allusions.  

By the essay it has become thus:  

The violence of the unspeakable is mimicked by the timidity to mention it. Beckett keeps it nebulous. One can only speak euphemistically about what is incommensurate with all experience, just as one speaks in Germany of the murder of the Jews.  

*Endgame* occurs after a catastrophe. Although Adorno does begin by linking this undisclosed catastrophe to the “atomic age,” he shifts the correspondence to the Holocaust. The fact, for Adorno, is that a postnuclear fiction, like poetry after Auschwitz, cannot be thought: “bombed-out consciousness no longer has any position from which it could reflect on that fact.” The event necessarily “cannot be talked about,” but it expands to “the violence of the unspeakable.” A formal note on “the way the play is composed” becomes folded into the violence above, when rhetorically mimicked by a “timidity to mention it.” The qualitative differences here, and in the previous comparison, raise a scale of hyperbole between Adorno’s notes and his essay. As the notes become the published essay, the ideas become saturated in a prose designed to overwhelm its reader. *Endgame*’s “pragmatic precondition” (catastrophe) is similarly protected from “any contamination by childish science fiction” by “stylization.” Both impose “a taboo on history.”  

The taboo, when it appears in the published text, is given as a *nota bene*, a “parody of the Kierkegaardian one of the convergence of time and eternity.” But if there has been a convergence of time and eternity, this convergence occurs over the question of nature. Again, Adorno anticipates this:

The condition presented in the play is nothing other than that in which “there’s no more nature.” Indistinguishable is the phase of completed reification of the world, which leaves no remainder not made by humans; it is permanent catastrophe, along with a catastrophic event caused by humans themselves, in which nature has been extinguished and nothing grows any longer.
So Adorno explains Clov’s seeds, which will not sprout, and the corpsed world “without.” The world is completely reified: “no remainder not made by humans.” So, in a vulgar reading of the Anthropocene, the geological power of *homo faber* implies a total reformation of the environment, where “nature has been extinguished and nothing grows any longer.” However, we can no longer grant this by exerting a taboo on history. For nature is no longer extinguished through a historical materialism, in which “all that is solid turns to air.” The air, as Menely points out, has become all too historically material. Rather, it is precisely in nature’s realization, as this historical materiality, that the possibility of any such taboo is evacuated. Adorno praised Beckett for affixing to the formal abstraction of ontology a “caustic antithesis by means of acknowledged subtraction.” Here, what has been subtracted is the formalism of unhistoricized metaphor. Once reliant on the so-called eternalism of “air” or “nature,” Adorno’s language itself comes to occupy the position of ideological disavowal he himself wrote so vigorously against.

Comparative composition expands the scale of cognitive enaction when historicizing Adorno’s literary insights into Beckett. It demonstrates deviations, by means of hyperbole, in the magnitude of the claims and in the manner of their communication. These deviations have their correspondences at scale. The claim that nature has forgotten, or is no more, may support a vulgar reading of *Endgame* as an Anthropocene allegory. But it is conditioned by Adorno’s decision to “scale” up his language, in the endogenetic phase of writing. This entanglement shouldn’t distract us from the other routine effect of the language, which is to assume that, however distorted a term may become, that its material referent remains constant. If the constancy of nature is under some scrutiny, it is precisely to Adorno’s point that we could never truly “see” beyond the horizon of society’s end times, whether this is caused by nuclear fallout or human-enacted climate change. The stability of language is no longer challenged by language’s instability, but by instability of its referents.

Writing literary history has always come up against the challenge of claiming historical surety over an object that, at least, defies linguistic surety. To respond by immunizing the historical object from its literary workings is logical, under these conditions. But the historical object is no longer stable. Its external referents are in flux, whether these be the texts that form its primary historical materials, or the world against which historical mobility measures itself, immobile as a historical-philosophical sundial. The world, “nature,” may still register itself in growth, and breath, and bloom. But such things must now be regarded as qualities of scale rather than surety. The vicissitudes of scale lead inevitably to a speculative literary history.
Bibliography


How We Got Out of Music History,
and How We Can Get Back into It

J. P. E. Harper-Scott

Part I: Music history since the fall of the Berlin Wall

The style dualism

What kind of historical object is music? Is it a “work,” the product of creative labor, whose identity as a work can be fixed by its notation in a score; an autonomous object because it exists for its own internal compositional logic? Or is it some species of a sonic “event” discernible only in performance, with or without the notated trace; its salient attribute not logic but expression (of an idea, an emotion, or the joy of bodily stirring)? If music is better understood as performance, then its essence is found in the social functions it discharges and supports; if it is a “work,” then its disinterested and self-ruling inner workings are a form of cognition without representational concepts, which poses a potential danger to a social world it no longer flatters by imitation. Lurking behind the work/event binary is a more abstract and pointed question: Is it possible to critique convention, and thus become free from it, or should one find a comfortable accommodation with convention, and so remain bounden to it?

The music historian Carl Dahlhaus claimed that a new possibility for musical emancipation appeared quite suddenly around the time of the French Revolution in the form of “the emphatic concept of art, which Beethoven appropriated for music in a downright usurping grab.” This “emphatic concept” allots music the capacity to voice autonomous thought, to speak as a critical observer of the world rather than purely to entertain. Music’s aptness to muse is dynamically personified in Beethoven, whose “symphonies represent inviolable musical ‘texts’ whose meaning should be deciphered by means of interpretations which
are to be understood as ‘exegeses’ [Auslegungen].’ The claim is that Beethoven’s symphonies are, like religious or philosophical texts, competent to reveal truths about the world, and therefore demanding of their listeners as careful and meditative analysis as a proposition by Hegel.

Dahlhaus’s conception of what, following Schleiermacher, he calls “art-religion” is denominationally specific. The “truths” inhabiting the “texts” of Beethoven echo protestant traditions of Christianity, which insist on the primacy of the biblical text and on the freedom of the individual to interpret it and so to attain (theoretically) unmediated access to the “truth,” that is, God; salvation comes through faith alone, through theory rather than praxis. The opposite focus, on the performance “event” (as typified for Dahlhaus by Rossini’s operas), parallels Catholicism’s insistence on the primacy of emotional experience—through the sacraments, particularly the Eucharist and confession, and regular church attendance—and on the authority of the Church, which alone may interpret the text; salvation comes through praxis, and access to salvation is granted through the mediation of the Church. Both sides of the musical split can be argued to represent a “democratization” of culture, the Beethoven-Protestant side because it offers the individual listener a direct and unmediated communion with the truth embosomed in the music, although its high intellectual demands might exclude much of the population; the Rossini-Catholic side because it implies the need for no special intellectual training, though music is received only via the mediation of performers with privileged access to the text.

This profound aesthetic and temperamental segregation concerned Dahlhaus for the same reason that it has concerned many musicologists: by clamping the intellectual, critical, and autonomous qualities of music to Germany’s most influential nineteenth-century composer, conventional music history, which holds a special place for Beethoven, encourages an aesthetic Germanophilia which seemingly condemns the rest of Europe—to say nothing of the rest of the world—to a marginal importance. Dahlhaus’s aim was to write a history that would show that the nineteenth century could not be understood as “the age of Beethoven” but only as “the age of Beethoven and Rossini,” which is to say that musical romanticism could not be reductively interpreted as following a single course but must be grasped as a “style dualism” (Stildualismus) in which those composers act as placeholders for instrumental and vocal styles in music. The test of his theory would be whether this evenhandedness could suck the poison out of what appears to be an aesthetic division between meaningfulness (Beethoven) and empty pleasure (Rossini).
To put it mildly, views differ as to whether Dahlhaus’s goals were achieved. The trouble is of course that Dahlhaus loaded the dice, by cinching the brains to the Beethoven side. In the past quarter of a century, musicologists have put themselves to increasingly weird contortions in the attempt to show either that musical intelligence is more copiously distributed across the style dualism or else—in a forlorn gesture of scholarly self-abnegation—that enjoyment is more important than thought. Dahlhaus’s bequest to musicology, the work/performance binary, has been put to disciplinary use in the form of what James Hepokoski describes as four “methodological strategies” for wrestling with the opposition. These strategies, which I see as more ideologically marked than Hepokoski does, shape (almost) the entire field of musicology as it is currently practiced, at least apropos of music (“high” and “low”) since 1789.

**Strategy 1** can be summarized as the performance of a critique of “the presumed canon of Western European artworks, along with the ideologies that have supported and sustained them.” This strategy, in common with all four of Hepokoski’s set, is openly postmodern, viewing claims to “truth,” in art or anything else, with skepticism. To the initiates of Strategy 1, truth, its locus in the “work,” and its interpreters, must be ambushed wherever they lurk. Instead of “sacramental treatment,” musical works are denied their autonomy and thrown back into their “material-historical entanglements,” so that “Beethoven’s music becomes an event, too, replanted back in the rich, untidy soil of history.”

Methodologically, Strategy 1 is empirical, “scouring relevant books, periodicals, newspaper articles, concert or opera programs, academic regimens, and the like in order to draw forth potentially incriminating discourses and ignored subtexts, nationalist and otherwise, surrounding canonical composers and their works.” In almost all cases it solemnly abjures music analysis (which, it fancies, reinforces claims to truth and authority) in preference for a broadly conceived “criticism,” particularly reception history and the population of a “thick present” in which specifics that other historians regard as signal facts of music history—the appearance of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, say—are cast into a welter of relativizing data.

**Strategy 2** replaces the canon of masterworks, which it sees as elitist, antidemocratic, and German-centered, with “exemplars from the ‘event’ [i.e., the Rossini] side of Dahlhaus’s binary as texts to explicate in their own right: Mediterranean opera, for instance, or performer-centered compositions and virtuosity, or
nationalist potboilers, or genres of popular or commercial music.”7 Uniquely, Strategy 2 follows “traditional” musicology such as Dahlhaus’s by performing music analysis. Not only a mechanism for arraying this “peripheral” music’s attractive features, analysis is a tool for ideology critique, since Others from within the art-music tradition, from a non-Western country, or from Western popular traditions, can be extolled as sites of resistance to the supremacy of the “conservative” cultural products of the musical canon. Hence, music analysis retains its epistemic role, but the knowledge it validates is wrested free from ideology so that the subaltern may speak.

Together, Strategies 1 and 2 comprise the liberal-postmodern core of musicalological scholarship in the West where the focus sharpens on music as “text.” The two remaining of Hepokoski’s four methodological strategies, likewise postmodern, describe scholarship whose focus is on performance.

Ostensibly, interest for scholars in Strategy 3 lies “not so much in ‘Una voce poco fa’ [from] Il barbiere di Siviglia as relatively stable works somehow captured permanently in notation … but rather in the individualized performances of ‘Una voce poco fa’ and Il barbiere as the actual texts under examination.”8 In the context of early twenty-first-century ideology, it privileges the commodity form of music, the recorded object, which the last century demonstrated to be more profitable than concert tickets. But it does more than this. The really existing human subjects who perform music are subtracted from the concept of music altogether: by centering music’s ontology on recorded sound rather than embodied performer, such scholarship dissimulates the market focus, music’s “sale-ability” as sonic object, as a specious interest in real people.

Strategy 4’s most striking expression is a much-cited article by Carolyn Abbate, which contrasts thinking about music (“gnostic”) with an in-the-moment enjoyment of it (“drastic”).9 She reverses (what she takes to be) Dahlhaus’s value-laden polarity, so that work/gnostic is bad, and performance/drastic is good. The move is taken to be revolutionary, but her insistence that “our proper response to music is gratefully to accept and love it, to be filled by it as a freely bestowed gift of presence, analogous to an act of grace,”10 returns us, Hepokoski observes, to the “religion of art” hypothesis often affixed to Dahlhaus. The cunning of this discourse is its seizure on, and maligning of, the difficulty of thinking about and analyzing music, as opposed to simply listening to it. By sleight of hand it can declare itself the only modern and democratic approach to the study of music. The cost of this anti-intellectual case is prose denser with jargon than Frankfurt School critical theory, whose elitism it anathematizes as it upends its progressive
priorities. In return, its jargon-density, paradoxically, gives it a reassuringly substantial aura for musicologists.

Beethoven, modernity’s vanishing mediator

Dahlhaus’s dualism of works and performances bears a family resemblance to Protestant and Catholic sides of Christian doctrine, and his bias in favor of Beethoven’s unsentimental intellectualism grants higher value to the former. Scholars adopting Strategies 3 and 4, who esteem the latter more highly, seek to achieve a Counter-Reformation. They aim to treat the “esoteric Romanticism” of the “inviolable text,” whose mouthpiece is Beethoven, as a vanishing mediator between the feudal music of Hasse and Haydn and capitalist music, the music of pure commodity. This radical end is justified on pseudo-democratic grounds: because “everyone can own it,” commodity music must be an antielitist force. The financial benefits accrued by the infinitesimal class of people who own the means to reproduce those musical commodities—the white male owners of Motown record labels, say—are played down. Music, music history, and the modes of music’s consumption have undergone a process of reformation for the past two centuries, occasioned by the new focus—not at all unique to Beethoven, though demonstrated by him—on the “inviolable text.”

From the perspective of a capital investor, this text is difficult to sell. Modern intellectual property laws make it practically easier but not especially attractive, since satisfaction for the general, uneducated musical public’s desire is in the sound rather than in the text of music. Even intellectual property cannot fully monetize music, because its ontological status is that of an “intentional object,” a pure mental content. Intentional objects may be real (the current President of the United States) or unreal (a Muslim lesbian President of the United States), and music lies somewhere between those two positions: there is no “real” *Eroica* symphony—every score will present at least one wrong note, every performance badly realize at least one tempo or expressive indication or commit at least one error of orchestral balance, and so on. This intentional object, rather than a particular score, is the “inviolable text,” against which the acceptability of all editions is judged. The text is unsaleable. Hence, it was a moment of the greatest significance to capital when reliable means of sonic recording became available in the twentieth century. Although profit may not accrue from every performance, substantial profits can be made from their sale when recorded (these being economically more efficient than costly live performances). Since these
recordings are more attractive than scores are, capital ensures these recordings are sold in large numbers, valorizing a lack of musical education, and concomitantly lowering the prestige of musical knowledge. This “drastic” drive is, as we have seen, an explicit focus of recent disciplinary attacks on knowledge, or in Greek gnosis, the “gnostic.”¹³

Music history presents a similar problem for investors, because nobody can hear it. Until the late 1970s, musicology in universities had emphasized the study of medieval and renaissance music. Dahlhaus was pivotal in recentering the discipline in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. New musicological attacks on the limited purview of earlier scholarship successfully marginalized the study of early music. Although there is a small resurgence through the work of more critically minded younger scholars, medievalists remain on the endangered species list. The near annihilation of early music history scholars and the adoption of Strategies 1–4 have diverted attention to the modern period. Strategies 3 and 4, and the subfields of pop and jazz musicology, film musicology, and ethnomusicology, revile and usually entirely reject history, seeing no value in its study whatever. Insofar as historical artefacts—Brahms’s chamber music, say—remain the focus of such studies, it is only as commodities capable of consumption in the present: their historical sediment is discarded as an irrelevant gnostic distraction from the rapture of instantaneous drastic experience. Classical music becomes fully exchangeable with the “low” musical forms that are sold alongside it: this is the true meaning behind the qualitative equivalence of “high” and “low” music, and the chastisement of gnostic explanations of these differences. Music history, as “text,” is threatened with the scrap-heap. It does not sell well enough.

For too long, musicology has wrongly assumed that Dahlhaus proposed a “sacramental” view of musical works. In the contemporary world, it is—in an absolute reversal—the “inviolable texts” that become profane, intentional objects, resisting their reification as sacred objects. In the zealous Counter-Reformation spirit of music-as-performance, the supposedly “direct” encounter with the music is what is sacred. Its commodity form conceals an actual mediation by capital: the relations of production that shape the existential experiences of human beings that lie hidden beneath the surface gleam of the sonic commodity.¹⁴ The strategies that Hepokoski sees as active forces in contemporary musicology simply inhabit a work/performance dualism. But this dualism is essentially an empty one, since all music is partly work and partly performance. The discipline can idly occupy itself with troubling a relationship of poles; or it can set the empty dualism aside and ask a different set of questions.
I began this chapter by asking “What kind of object is music?” the main question for musicologists responding to the legacy of Dahlhaus. The results have been seen. The moment that music is considered to be an object, the discourse plummets into reification, and music is devoured by the boundless appetite of capital. A better question for a new history of music would be “What kind of subject is music?” Asking this new question will address my subsidiary ones about convention and emancipation. Before approaching these questions, a historiographical foundation is necessary for this history. Hepokoski’s four methodological strategies have clarified the focuses and emphases of current musicology, but beyond extremist revulsion to the gnostic, music history’s epistemology—its attitude toward the knowledge about that history—is entirely unknown. Dahlhaus foregrounded epistemological questions in *Foundations of Music History*. To present an equivalent epistemology of music history, it will be beneficial to consider some recent work by theorists of history.

**Part II: What is a subject of music history?**

**Genres of historical writing**

In the shadow of Hayden White’s pioneering *Metahistory* (1973), contemporary theorists of history, including F. R. Ankersmit, Keith Jenkins, and Alun Munslow, advocate a theoretically sophisticated model of history-writing to respond to a crisis of epistemology for history in the postwar West. Broadly postmodern-deconstructionist, and concomitantly antiempiricist, the theory of history in their writings requires traditional historical scholarship to respond to the “devastating” challenge represented by an assortment of intellectual repositionings that are familiar across the humanities—“the linguistic turn, deconstructionism, post-structuralism, post-feminism, post-colonialism, post-Marxism, postmodernism, etc.” The crucial doctrine of this postmodern historiography is that history-writing is *fictive*, that is, as a form of writing, it recasts the past in narrative form. This does not mean, though, that history is fictional, “for in fiction the imagined goes ‘all the way down,’” rather it is “fictive in the sense of *fictio*; that is to say, made up, fashioned, created, fabricated, figured.”

Since its assumptions are shared with contemporary, postmodern musicology, the explicit theorizing by postmodern theorists of history is invaluable in identifying how to avoid the vulgar ideologies of, on the one hand, a crypto-capitalist study of democratic, “immediately accessible” (read: commodity)
music or, on the other hand, the most reductive Marxist histories of the Cold War period.\textsuperscript{18} Jenkins’s and Munslow’s clear mapping of the conceptual space makes plain a route through post-Dahlhaus music historiography. They argue that there are only three genres of history-writing—\textit{reconstructionism}, \textit{constructionism}, and \textit{deconstructionism}—and a fourth position, \textit{endism}.\textsuperscript{19} Situating music histories within these genres of general history-writing is an illuminating enterprise, but the implied judgment that the first is least respectable and the last, most respectable, must be dismissed as a tendentious end-of-history triumphalism for postmodernism.

\textit{Reconstructionism} is empirical. Its authors believe in the possibility of reconstructing the past “as it actually was” ("wie es eigentlich gewesen ist," in the formulation of Leopold von Ranke).\textsuperscript{20} Historical truth is located in historical sources. Historical epistemology is certain: it can be known, as long as the historian reports as objectively as possible. Although today’s musicologists often scorn this approach, it remains the basis for music history syllabi in Europe and the Anglophone world, evidenced by Taruskin’s \textit{Oxford History} and textbooks such as Pearson Education’s \textit{Prentice Hall History of Music Series}.\textsuperscript{21} Similar works focus on “myth debunking,” in which a barrage of additional factual detail is believed to provide “the antidote to all historical fables,”\textsuperscript{22} and on “speaking through the sources,” that is, allowing contemporary accounts to tell the “true history.”\textsuperscript{23} The extensive citation characteristic of this genre creates what Ankersmit calls a “reality effect,” that is, a sense, eventually unassailable, that since historians are agreed that such and such is the case, it \textit{must be so}.\textsuperscript{24}

\textit{Constructionism} took its current form in the 1960s, though it has roots in nineteenth-century positivism. Its focus is on “patterns of human behaviour which, in the mid-twentieth century, the philosopher of history, Carl Hempel, called ‘covering laws’.”\textsuperscript{25} These “laws” undergird historical investigations in a new way, but the belief is still that the past can be understood in an empirically verifiable way through its traces. The truth cannot be discovered purely from sources, but “by using sophisticated conceptual tools and social theory” whose explanatory power is not bluntly employed (as in stereotyped application of Marxist determinism), it can be checked against empirical evidence.\textsuperscript{26} Although it plies many modes, its most productive is social history. The constructionist social and cultural historians whose influence has been most felt in musicology include Eric Hobsbawm and Tim Blanning.\textsuperscript{27}

\textit{Deconstructionism} emerged out of an awareness that “we can only ‘know’ the past through our concepts which, rather than being constituted out of the evidence, are created through our language use.”\textsuperscript{28} History is therefore
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as performative as it is empirical—as drastic as it is gnostic. Unlike the most extreme musicological postmodernists, the claim is not that empirical data are unreal. A postmodern historian would not make this dubious music-historical claim: “There is no music apart from the meanings it invokes and invents. There are no musical works apart from the constantly changing frameworks in which we play and hear them.”29 While the facts are real, their interpretation does not correspond to them. Interpretations emerge only “through … contrast with other interpretations; they are what they are only on the basis of what they are not. … Every historical insight, therefore, intrinsically has a paradoxical nature.”30 In deconstructive history, the writer’s role in creating the history rises in importance relative to the facts that are being interpreted. Since their claim is that the past, while real, cannot be directly interpreted, the “objective historian” imagined by modernism must be replaced by a “subjective” one whose “multi-voiced, multi-perspectival, multi-levelled, fragmented,” frequently lyrical prose “plays with the possibility of creating new ways of representing and figuring ‘the before now.’”31 One relatively straightforward answer to the question “How can we ‘do’ history in this face of this epistemological deadlock?” is to forgo narrative altogether—since narratives suggest “beginnings, middles and ends, and … an inherent meaning that the historian sets out to discover and convey”—and follow Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht’s example of writing history of a single year “in which nothing significant seems to have happened … simply to evoke what living in 1926 might have been like.”32

A second, more complex mode of deconstructionist scholarship concludes that the historians themselves must be literary wordsmiths, writers as fine and lyrical as novelists, albeit that their writing is not fictive “all the way down.” Dahlhaus advocates a modernist style of history-writing, drawing on Proust and Joyce; to write in a premodernist style would be, like Ranke, to write in the style of Scott. Since all history-writing is a form of literary narrative, all modes are marked by literary contexts, such as romanticism or modernism.33 However, Dahlhaus remains a constructionist. His vision of history-writing avoids “authoritative” (reconstructionist) statement in favor of presenting history from a range of contradictory or complementary perspectives. Nevertheless, it is committed to narration, albeit in a fragmentary, modernist manner.

Lyric expression in history-writing is found in Walter Benjamin’s famous “constellation” method.34 Jenkins and Munslow diagnose Benjamin as a deconstructionist historian but I think this is imprecise. His lyrical writing style superficially explains his inclusion in this genre; nothing else does. Far from endorsing a postmodernist epistemology, Benjamin’s theory of history, like his
insistence on the immanent truth content of artworks, is thoroughly modernist. Benjamin's objection to Rankean history “as it really was” is made not on epistemological but on ontological grounds: for all his distaste for the philosopher, his view of history is Heideggerian.

For Benjamin, the problem with historicism (Historismus)—a term that he applies to reconstructionist or constructionist history—is that, like the sciences, it stresses temporal continuity from past to present, a sequence of temporal *nows*, “in which” historical events occur—it is simply the addition of a fourth dimensional axis, *t*, to the three-dimensional spatial coordinates marked by *x*, *y*, and *z*. This concept of time, when it is taken over into historicism, stresses logical, causal connection from one moment to the next along the axis: the attitude to empirical historical data characteristic of the (re)constructionists. For Benjamin (and Heidegger), temporality is better understood as “ekstatic,” or “standing outside” this continuous sequence: human temporality projects possibilities from an individual and culturally shared past into a future which is authentically created in an act of “resoluteness” (*Entschlossenheit*). In this way, the encounter with the past “bears to the highest degree the imprint of the perilous critical moment [den Stempel des kritischen, gefährlichen Moments] on which all reading is founded;” the interpretation or reading of history is “perilous” for the present because it precipitates a realignment with that present’s potential future.

For Benjamin, then, the problem with historicism is not that it fails to establish a truth correspondence, as for deconstructionists, but that it misunderstands human temporality. The facts of history are not at issue, but Benjamin avers that we must grasp their ontological relation to the present not as fixed and linear, along the *t*-axis, but as fundamentally disruptive, antagonistic, and “spatialized” alongside the present. On the Benjamin/Heidegger view, the temporality of historical understanding embroils historical subjects (writers and readers) in an active interaction with it: history is not shut off from the present in its temporal flow, but something subjects seize on with a clear eye to the future—“in a downright ursurping grab,” to deploy Dahlhaus’s image of Beethoven—as a means to construct a subject in the present. That being so, history is not “completed,” not “past” in the sense of being “gone”: it is a clamorous disturbance that threatens presentist, postmodern worlds of commodified enjoyment.

Endists offer a final, and relatively recent, response to deconstructive attitudes to history. Endists wonder whether the practice of history-writing has reached its end point. Jean Baudrillard argues that we live in a world without meaningful events. A significant historical event should change the future course of things, but recent events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, which he calls “the last
great ‘historic’ event,” have on the contrary simply come to lay bare “an immense repentance on the part of history which, rather than heading off towards fresh perspectives, seems rather to be splintering into scattered fragments and reactivating phases of events and conflicts we had thought long gone.”  

But has it? The fall of the Berlin Wall certainly changed reality in Germany, but it comes as no surprise that it did not “function” as a historical event for Baudrillard, since it was a late-twentieth-century symptom of the triumph of neoliberalism. Alongside the collapse of the Soviet Union and the development of a command capitalist economy in China, the reunification of Germany symbolized the takeover of democratic capitalism. Recent history has been littered with “functionless” events of this kind, spectacular moments that appear to have generated no new historical motions. But they are very readily explained by another kind of “endist” thinker, one not included in the Jenkins and Munslow reader: Alain Badiou. For Badiou, the period since 1976 (the Cultural Revolution in China) can be understood as an “interval” between “communist sequences.” In such a period, the idea that an egalitarian politics is possible is dismissed as impossible fancy, and the catastrophes of its last manifestation (for us, the Soviet Union; for the belle époque, the period from the Terror to the Paris Commune) are reckoned as a guarantee of its perpetual unrealizability. In the first “interval,” from 1871 to 1917, the events of history congealed into a narrative of “the age of empire” (to borrow Hobsbawm’s denotation) that Badiou describes as “the apogee of the bourgeoisie, which occupied the whole planet, laying waste and pillaging whole continents.” In our current interval, whose action began at the raising of the Iron Curtain, there is for the first time in history only one totally dominant imperial force in the world, the United States. With the exception of this unprecedented historical development, it is difficult to imagine an intelligent and nonpartisan commentator who would not agree that Badiou’s picture of the belle époque has a close reflection in the current situation. If history seems to have “ended” (Baudrillard), it is because we are—like the composers Schoenberg, Strauss, Mahler, and Elgar—living in an interval between communist sequences. With a third sequence, history will be reborn.

Rising from the ruins

In the meantime, what remains for the writing of history? We may commit to certain resolutions, namely:
1. the facts of history are not history, since history is fictive, not empirical, and in some sense a performative construction;
2. history cannot be objectively narrated or known, and all narrative forms (even deconstructionist ones) falsify the past;
3. specifically, simple appeals to empirical verification of history “as it really was” (reconstructionism) are as untenable as more complex appeals to theorizing the empirical data by means of “covering laws” or social history (constructionism);
4. empirical evidence is an insufficient explanation of history, so archival work on primary and secondary sources is a methodologically unsound basis for history-writing.

These resolutions begin to unsnarl the problem of how to write music history after Dahlhaus. First, the question “What is a fact of music history?” (Chapter 3 of Dahlhaus’s *Foundations of Music History*) is misguided, since any answer will tend to be empirical in basis. With no way of checking the correspondence between facts and narratives in history, undertaking extensive archival work would be a potentially futile gesture. This seems to devastate Hepokoski’s four methodological strategies, all of which have empiricist Achilles heels: Strategy 1, written documents; Strategy 2, analysis of works; Strategy 3, analysis of actual performances; Strategy 4, facts of reception. It will never be possible to achieve a resolution of—or to move beyond—the tension between texts and events, so long as both text and event are approached empirically.

And yet the postmodern theory of history has a large and unresolved problem. Although the truth of history is not contained within the empirical data, it does not follow that there is no truth in history at all: the truth might be verifiable by nonempirical means. The postmodern doctrine of truth is not that it does not exist, but merely that it is hateful. Truth is, to postmodernists, a demonic presence in world history, liable to stumble into totalitarianism. But intellectually and politically there is every reason to seek the truth, for even if truth is the sole property of totalitarianism—and it is by no means demonstrated that it is—then it is an act of the purest folly to hand it over to totalitarian barbarians. Even on its own postmodernist, liberal-democratic terms, postmodernism ought to be rejected: it is the intellectual and cultural expression of capitalist ideology, which establishes thought as a commodified value-in-motion to be discursively judged by an intellectual “market” in which the ideological hegemon holds sway. All history-writing emerges from a particular political situation and is a contribution to political discourse. Therefore we must write history which, while
emanating from a leftist political viewpoint, does not miscarry as propaganda. The route out of this quagmire turns on the object/subject dualism that has been haunting this chapter.

Postmodern theorists of history prey on the discipline’s focus on empirical *objects*. Dahlhaus is sensitive to this vulnerability, and therefore asks a promisingly different question, “Does music history have a ‘subject’?” For reconstructionists, who focus on biographies, the answer is a naive *yes*: the historian (who is also a human subject) engages with the empirically recoverable historical subject. But, while Rossini was clearly a subject in that he was a living person, his treatment by historians effectively reifies him as an object, collapsing him ontologically into “the traces of the past.” The act of writing a narrative of empirical data is a process of reification, of objectifying subjectivity. To rescue history-writing from the impossible conjunction of the fictive and the empirical, it is necessary to elaborate a theory of the subject that can resist falling into objectivity by transcending the limitation of being factual without ceasing to be real.

Such a model of subjectivity has been proposed by Badiou. Before explaining what a subject is, it is useful to name two things that a subject is *not*:

(i) “A subject is not a substance” (*a res extensa*). This means (contra reconstructionism) that a subject is not a human being, a composer, performer, or listener, nor even (contra constructionism) a social individual, part of a collective. Badiou’s subject is also not a musical score, a performance, a document of reception, a genre, a style, or a cultural context in which music is written, performed, or heard.

(ii) “A subject is not a result—any more than it is an origin,” which means that it neither causes a state of affairs to exist nor is the result of a new state of affairs: “it is the *local* status of a procedure, a configuration in excess of the situation” (emphasis in original). Musically speaking, a subject is not, for instance, a work such as Wagner’s *Tristan und Isolde*, Schoenberg’s Second String Quartet, or Boulez’s *Le Marteau sans maître*, that “causes” a revolution in musical consciousness; and nor is it a work of consolidation that confirms that revolution, perhaps *Gotterdammerung*, *Das Buch der hängenden Gärten*, or *Improvisations sur Mallarmé*.

Badiou’s conception opens a clearing that is free from purely empirical definitions as well as from theories that account for empirical data. This clearing is necessary because everything which is actually the case in a given amatory, political, artistic, or scientific *situation* is the realm of empiricism, while the subject operates in the realm of *truth*—which by definition lies outside the situation
and is nonempirical. Once this subject and its truth is understood, a new historical method can emerge to set music history free from the post-Dahlhaus text/event dualism and establish a basis for historical narrative not bound to the unreliable witness of empirical data.

Subjective historical truth

History is a subjective mediation of a truth that bears witness to an event. An event in Badiou’s sense is not something like the storming of the Bastille or the signing of the Treaty of Frankfurt. Such things are empirically verifiable facts, and they belong to the real data of history. But the event is something else. Postmodern history calls into question the relation between facts and history, but it cannot take hold of the event because the event represents a truth. The facts of a situation are finite: a finite number of human beings have a finite number of thoughts and perform a finite number of actions, and those finite facts are the data of empirical history, scientific theories, and the sounds, technical features, and reception history of a musical work. In abstract form, facts may be represented by letters \(a, b, c\) which terminates in fact \(z\), the last of the set:

\[
\text{romanticism} = \{a, b, c, \ldots, z\}
\]

Unlike the finite facts of a situation, the truth is not only “outside” the situation but is infinite: universally and infinitely available to all people, in all times and places. Again it is instructive to grasp the idea conceptually before producing real-world examples. Say that the definition of my mind is that it is the set of things about which I can form an impression. This includes notebooks, roast chicken, love…, and my mind. Written abstractly, with letters again being used to represent things (with \(M\) indicating my mind itself), this set of things would be:

\[
M = \{a, b, c, \ldots, M\}
\]

Clearly, to define the human mind in this way entails infinite regress, because the last element in the set of things about which my mind can form an impression is my mind itself—which is the set of things about which I can form an impression, the last element of which is my mind—which is the set of things… (and so, infinitely). The mind is infinite, and therefore not part of the situation, but it also counts as one of the empirical facts of the situation: so it has a paradoxical quality, albeit one that is readily understood. The abstract form of the event has a similarly paradoxical form. In any given situation, say France in 1789, there are really existing empirical facts (a man called Robespierre, a prison called the
Bastille) that one can count finitely, but also the event. This element does not have a purely empirical existence, because while it appears in France in 1789, it is not only to be found there—it is, as I have already said, available at all times and in all places. In this historic instance it took the form of a call to liberty, already made by Spartacus in 73 BC, the Roundheads during the English Civil War, the Bolsheviks in 1917, and the crowds on either side of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The elements of an event \((E)\) are thus all of the empirical contents of the situation, plus the event \((E)\):

\[
E = \{a, b, c, \ldots, E\}
\]

The paradox of the event means that it is impossible to find it in a situation. Again, it is not a paradox impossible to credit: we cannot find the value of a coin or the flavor of some food by looking inside it, and yet we know the value and flavor to be true. Analogously, we know that an event is acting on a situation because it leaves a trace. The trace will differ according to the four fields of human experience (Badiou’s “conditions”). For brevity, I shall refer only to art. In art, the trace is the theoretical or formal movement from impossibility to possibility. It appears when a formal effect that was once considered an inappropriate way of achieving balance between the competing demands of expression and form (some quality of dissonance treatment, say, in musical terms) suddenly becomes appropriate, and “what seemed to partake of the formless is grasped as form.”

Subjects form when an event is recognized in a trace. As I have pointed out, subjects are not individual persons, and so to speak not “things” at all, but of course really, empirically, factually existing people like Beethoven do become involved in the process of “subjectivization.” They do so by forming a body: in art, this is a work (symphony, concerto, sonata). There is thus a theoretically finite but practically countless number of possible elements in the body of a truth, a set of empirical facts that no individual historian of politics, science, art, or love can synthesize. There can be no way of checking the facts against the narrative: so much has been demonstrated by postmodern theory. And yet despite the daunting mass of facts that compose the body, the function of the body is actually straightforward to grasp: it is “the bearer of the subjective appearance of a truth”—the carrier (an organization, a theory, an artwork, a lover) of a truth into the empirical reality of history. The desire to understand the function of the body of the French Revolution does not impose on the historian the burden of discovering all of the facts apposite to France in the period from 1789 to Napoleon’s coup in 1799 (or, on some readings, his fall in 1815). Similarly, to understand the history of music from 1789 to the present, we need to understand the make-up of the body of works that carried the nominated truth into
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the new artistic configuration. It poses no difficulty that it is not possible to account for every part of that body. What is required is to understand the three conceptually possible subjective responses in a given situation, contemporary with the event: faithful subject, reactive subject, and obscure subject.\textsuperscript{51}

The faithful subject

This “revolutionary” subject:

1. discerns a truth in some kind of trace
2. forms part of a body which is committed to the instantiation of the evental truth
3. is an operation that produces a new present in which the truth will have been manifested

The present is the creation of the faithful subject. In artworks it is a new intensity of expression, an artistic configuration enriched by the inbreaking of new possibilities for mediating expression and form (an emancipated tonic-dominant polarity emerging as a subjective necessity in a newly heightened drama within a body of musical works). The faithful subject is revolutionary because it exhibits a high degree of “fidelity” to the truth. It subordinates the body entirely to the production of the present. The subordination of a body of artworks to the faithful production of a present from the trace of a truth can lead to ridicule or rejection (Beethoven’s late quartets, Schoenberg’s free atonal music after 1908, Stockhausen’s \textit{Gesang der Jünglinge}). But it is often met by a moderate reaction, a realistic response in the form of the second subjective operation.

The reactive subject

This “realistic subject”:

1. denies that the truth which it discerns in the trace is realistic
2. distances itself from the faithful subject as a means of denying the reality of the discerned truth
3. is an operation that produces an extinguished present in which the truth is accommodated to existing modes of understanding

The reaction does not come as an abolition of the new. The reaction denies but it does not destroy, and it remains productive. The reactive subject is a majority response to an event. If the faithful subject is embodied in works that declare a
new world of artistic communication, the reactive subject is embodied in works that adopt some of the new expressive possibilities but accommodate them to existing formal archetypes. The musical reactive subject between 1789 and 1876 might recognize the expressive value of the hexatonic organization of tonal space as something that enables a response to a contemporary subjective necessity; but the tonic-dominant polarity of forms from the classical and baroque periods is not (as in the case of the faithful subject) reconstructed from the bottom up, emerging from the nature of the musical material itself. There is a heightened freedom, but not an emancipation, of melody and harmony, so that all manner of keys may be accommodated within a sonata exposition, and the drama may be appreciated more at the level of melody than of key. These are examples of what Badiou calls reactionary novelties, the inventions of the reactive subject that offer new forms of resistance to the faithfully produced present. The new expressive intensity of the faithful subject is therefore directly referenced, perhaps on the surface of the music, only to be set aside in the goals of the piece. The body of works does not advocate the radical new present. The reactive subject enjoys the chic of progressiveness, without any of the attendant dangers of losing an audience. Although the extinguished present of the reactive subject still produces something new (reactionary novelties), its energetic denial of the truth clears the way for the final subjective response.

The obscure subject

This “ideological subject”:

1. affirms and endorses that there is a hegemonic Body of supreme, transcendent power
2. flatly denies both that there is any validity at all in the trace and that it is legitimate for anybody to affirm such a trace
3. is an operation that examines and destroys the new present brought into being by the faithful subject

The obscure subject conceives the creation of the present as altogether impossible for intellectual or moral reasons. Structurally, it is recognized by its blank refusal of the present. In order to appeal to an uncontaminated, preevental form of appearance, the obscure subject proposes a pure and transcendent Body, that is to say a Body conceived as if it were natural and eternal, morally neutral, obviously “right,” and not a product of history or cultural relations of power. The assertion of this immaculate Body eradicates both the trace and the body of the
faithful subject. The idea and its spokesperson are negated by the assertion of the Body, and the present of a new enlightenment is “occulted” by the exigencies of the subjective operation.

In artistic terms, the obscure subject manifests as iconoclasm in service of the governing ideology. The physical violence of iconoclastic gestures should not becloud the metaphysical violence of the related idea, elsewhere expressed pungently by Heidegger in a vision of artworks reduced to their pure material basis: “Beethoven’s quartets lie in the publisher’s storeroom like potatoes in a cellar.” In modernity, the obscure subject’s principal goal has been to maintain the influence of capital and commodification. Thus one finds the obscure subject equally in the development from nineteenth-century “trivial music” to twentieth-century “popular music,” the shift in focus from sheet music to sound recording as the favored commodity form, and the mechanization of compositional process. Hence the playfully iconoclastic commodification of Wagner in Fauré and Messager’s *Souvenirs de Bayreuth*, and a kind of “instant mazurka manual,” Franciszek Mirecki’s *One Million Mazurs, Meaning a Method for Composing Millions of Mazurs Even for Those Who Do Not Know Music* (1828), which came with twenty-one packets of musical snippets that anybody could work up into individual compositions. To such a subject, claims to transcendence and emancipation make absolutely no sense.

**Conclusion: Subjects, strategies, and genres of history**

The riddle-character of history inheres in the difficulty of knowing what the past was. By focusing on the projection into the future of a present that is not yet realized, and will never come to be without the faithful subject’s nomination of the truth, Badiou invites a writing of history in the future perfect tense: a history of what, at any moment, *will have been* the case in the evental present of, say, Paris in 1830. At the same time, his “finally objectless subject” directs attention away from the empirical data of history, which form the trace, body, and present of a subjective process (in short, the “objects” of historical knowledge), to encompass the nonempirical realm of the subject and truth itself.

The methodological strategies and historical genres in musicology after Dahlhaus are legible in subjective terms. Strategy 1, the anticanonic focus on infinitely expanding “contexts” for musical works, holds a postmodern-liberal suspicion of truth alongside a reconstructionist confidence in the primacy of empirical data. Its scholars believe that truth is not located in the culturally and
historically contingent groupings of significant works that we call the “canon,” but they do equate truth with the historical facts themselves. If they did not, they would not attempt to counter truth-claims of “old musicology” apropos of the canonic composers by appeal to additional contextual data. They wag a finger at the constructionist basis (in Adorno, Bourdieu, Weber et al.) of older historical “metanarratives” and declare, first, that such a purported truth is unacceptable, and second, that no body of old-musicological historians can be the bearer of such a false claim. To stamp out this double error, they emphasize transcendent Facts, the vast mass of which will eradicate the false witness of alternative views. Strategy 1 therefore tends toward an obscure response.

Insofar as it shares the first strategy’s suspicion of the canon, Strategy 2 (the analytical study of “peripheral,” non-German, or non-art music) is partly obscure. While the first strategy attacks the scholars whose truth-claims it cannot abide, the second is more concerned to set out the body of musical works that compose the canon. By expanding what counts as musical value, such scholars do not eradicate the canon; they expand and otherwise reconfigure it, to accommodate the musical autonomy represented by the old canon to the situation in which the contents of a broader marketplace should be valorized. Their end is therefore a reactive one, to create an extinguished present.

Strategy 3, which focuses on performances rather than texts, is another reactive response, which partly acknowledges claims to autonomous value but denies that this is located in the text, the emphatic concept of the artwork which was Beethoven’s Promethean gift to music history. Instead, the intentional object, whose value cannot be realized, is reified and put into circulation in the sphere of public performance and recording.

Strategy 4, the drastic domain of Abbate, is the most obscure of all; it insists that there is value only in the experience, in the transcendent “original” meaning of music, against the false claims of transcendence and autonomy borne by an evental body of canonic masterworks. Strategy 4’s focus on the instantaneous pleasure of sound represents a capitalist inversion of Dahlhaus’s dualism, redirecting musical value from the works of individual humans into the hands of private capital that owns the means of distributing recordings in our present. As a mode of writing music history, it is presentist, interested in the past only insofar as its detritus might be flogged at a profit on the open market.

There is no faithful subject among the four methodological strategies identified by Hepokoski in new musicology. Only an evental history, a history based on a subjective presencing of truth, can offer a way through the epistemological deadlock. Unlike reconstructionism, evental history does not presume an
empirical basis for explaining how things happened in the past. Unlike constructionism, evental history does not suppose an empirically verifiable process at work, which can be discovered by sophisticated theoretical tools drawn from sociology, vulgar Marxism, gender studies, Orientalist studies, and so on: no empirical basis can test a theoretical explanation. Unlike Deconstructionism, evental history maintains that despite the lack of empirical basis, there is nevertheless truth. We cannot discern the event, either by finding it in an archive (reconstructionism) or in a sufficiently powerful theoretical definition (constructionism), but we know that there was an event, partly because we can see its trace, and partly because there must have been one, since the world has undergone a revolutionary change. We can be sure that truth has burst into the situation, left a trace, and been responded to by subjects. The truth of history can be known, though not empirically. Capitalism despises history, because the formerly actual cannot be sold. Despite the prognostications of capitalism's cultural logic, postmodernism, a history can be told, and in a small but nontrivial way it can contribute to a better understanding of the ideological tectonics of modernity.

An evental history offers a genuine break with old-musicological practices, a revolution rather than a reformation in thinking about music history. A focus on subjects enables the historian to avoid the error of attributing too much historical agency to a particular composer (Beethoven or Rossini), genre (symphony or opera), country (Germany or Russia), artistic register (high or low), and so on, because its organizing principle hinges on a structural relation between these empirical details and the nonempirical truth which is not part of the situation. The facts of music history are an indispensable foreground to any chronicle of music history, but they are not what reveals the truth of that history. Objects, such as these facts, do not have a history; only subjects have a history. It is on its subjects, not its objects, that a new music history should focus.

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Humanist Matters

Adi Efal-Lautenschläger

Realism in history

The humanities, before anything else, are a practice of erudition, derived from the Latin term *ex-rudis*, meaning “to bring out of the row.” The work of the humanities can be described as a process of figuring-out something from a previous raw “matter.” Yet what is that raw matter and what is that which is brought out from the raw? Perhaps it is “truth” or rather “historical truth” which is sought? The difficulty in determining the exact nature of historical truth has already commented upon.¹ One of the determinations of the historicist revolutions in the nineteenth century was that the only kind of truth that the historical sciences can aspire to attain is a one issuing from the fullest possible description of past events, a knowledge that is essentially different from the one pertaining to the natural sciences.² It seems that discussions surrounding the “event” in contemporary continental philosophy³ stem from a historicist conception of historical truth: they tend to refer to the event as fleeting and singular, yet meaningful occurrences changing the previous order of things, or creating something *ex nihilo*. In the historical study of art, we still face the challenge of defining the truth attainable by art historical inquiries. Martin Heidegger notoriously affixed truth to the origin of the artwork.⁴ More recently, Alain Badiou insisted that there is a relationship to be drawn between art and truth, determining that “a work of art is a situated inquiry about the truth that it locally actualizes or of which it is a finite fragment.”⁵ Yet, before discussing truth, one may want to examine the question of what “real” is in humanist inquiries. The passage from discussing the “truth” of the work to trying to pin down the “reality” of the work is neither a simple nor a self-evident one. Yet in both cases, one must hold to some extent a realist position regarding history. To attempt a very provisory differentiation, I would suggest that a realism regarding
The truth of works regards some scheme of meaning to be found in the examined matter. A realism tout-court, however, regarding works of all kinds, is interested in the past reality of works, in the concrete manner by which those were generated, preserved, registered, and elaborated. I suggest further that these two kinds of realism are absolutely distinguished from one another, but that nevertheless they both represent strong realist positions regarding the past. Yet in both cases, one is faced with the problem of what can be called historical correlationism. Quentin Meillassoux attempted to think about the challenges of this historical correlationism, consisting of a hermeneutical cycle existing between the researcher’s preconceived ideas and the historical thing that is being researched, and to check how one may find ways of coping with that challenge. In either case one should articulate the manner to control, minimize, or eliminate altogether the subjective, reflective element in historical inquiries.

The problem with this is that when one approaches history as an event-mental happening of a truth, one is only rarely, if at all, able to step out of a romanticist correlationism between the historical event and the historian being intermingled, affected, and infected by this event. Yet event-mental historicism is not the only methodological approach available to the historical sciences. One can be a historian without being a historicist. The question is how to define and maintain the reality of historical objects, and the first step toward doing so is to protect the material status of these objects. History’s objects are human-made things. In other words, any history is a history of works. Works, art works, monuments, and products at-large can be classified under a category of poietical things, that is, human-made, produced things.

At this point, it is worth making another statement resulting from this line of thinking on the history of works: I refer to history and to art history as one and the same science, and I cite art historians when referring to the science of history at-large. The reason for this lies in the fact that within the framework suggested here artworks are the concentrated form of works in general. One should be careful to note that I am in no way talking about an aestheticization of history here, but rather on a poieticization of history, demanding to conceive of artworks as works, as products, tout-court. Furthermore, history itself is a work, and therefore it shares poietical reality with artworks and works at-large. The reality of work covers the entire width and depth of the humanist’s domain.

The textual sources I refer to are various, yet in the opening sections an author whose name frequently appears the discussion is Michel Foucault; his historiography remains a challenge, more relevant than ever in the age of object-oriented
ontology. In the second part of this chapter I turn to Henri Bergson’s conception of memory and to the spiritualist tradition from which Bergson’s philosophy issues, in order to see how historical realism can be enhanced by the art of memory.

**History, archaeology, geology**

Recently, Alain de Libera, a historian of philosophy, made recourse to Foucault’s archaeology and developed a conception of philosophical archaeology (*archéologie philosophique*), in order to suggest an approach to the history of philosophy and in fact to history at-large, as “all history is the history of thought.”  

Obviously, the fact that any history is a history of thought does not prevent it from being first and foremost a material science, occupied with positive material utterances and deeds. Philosophical archaeology should help the historian to set aside meta-narratives of wide, repeating “answers to known problems.” Instead, de Libera wants, in the footsteps of Foucault, to furnish an “archaeology” of the conditions of reality of enunciations at a certain period. So as is evident, for Foucault, as for us here, the archaeological should lead in the direction of reality, as suggested above.

Yet if one takes seriously the archaeological approach to history and the realism suggested by it, soon enough one also encounters the element of geology, as there is always some soil in which things of the past are buried and lie dormant. What is the matter, what is the earth into which the humanist digs; and does this matter essentially differ from the matter of the natural sciences? Even if not identical, there are still decisive points of contact between the methods of the natural and the historical sciences. Art historian and ethnologist Georges Kubler suggested that both astronomers and historians collect ancient signals into compelling theories about distance and composition. “The astronomer’s position is the historian’s date; his velocity is our sequence; orbits are like durations; perturbations are analogous to causality.”

And if one sometimes hears the claim that the truth of the humanities is interpretative whereas the natural sciences are supposedly “objective,” this is of course not necessarily the case. Art historian and philosopher Edgar Wind pointed out in as early as 1936 that, as with the historian, “the physicist seeks to infer general laws of nature by instruments themselves subjects to these laws,” and therefore the natural scientist is subjugated to a similar hermeneutical circularity to that of the historical sciences.
Taking the historian’s craft to be a material one, the importance of archaeology for the understanding of the humanities should be underlined, as it is the historical science exclusively engaged with material objects. The archaeologist engages himself with a technical, concrete process of digging, wiping; restoration, classification, and exhibition of his “matters,” similar to that which happens in the laboratory of the natural science.  

This process possesses what Meillassoux may call a “factiality”: it is a necessarily contingent procedure, energized by hazard, even when organized, directed, and designed in advance.

Similar to geography, geology, and astronomy, the history of works is a spatially oriented history. It is interested in localization, charting, and placement. According to Kubler, the historian’s special contribution is the discovery of the manifold shapes of time. “The aim of the historian, regardless of his specialty in erudition, is to portray time. He is committed to the detection and description of the shapes of time.” Yet one cannot go into the domain of shapes and figures without entering the domain of space. History necessitates a spatialization of time, a transformation of time into space that allows for the shapes of time to come through. Henri Focillon remarked (somewhat critically) that chronology as such has a real monumental quality: it organizes time as if it were architecture, and distributes it, like the masses of an edifice on a known plan, within stable chronological environments. This is the “time” used in museums, allocated to rooms and exhibition cases. And even if in the next sentence Focillon insists that “deep within ourselves, we know that time is a fluid becoming,” here we would attempt a spatially oriented conception of the humanities.

In the following, I point out four kinds of “matters,” constructing the work of history as a technical craft. To the best of my understanding, all humanist inquiries involve these four “subject-matters”: instruments, elements, documents, and monuments. Each of these four humanist matters poses a different field of methodical problems, which I try briefly to describe. After the presentation of these four, I continue to suggest how the humanist recollects them. The work of recollection of these four matters establishes what can be called the humanist habitus, which is addressed at the end of the chapter.

**Instruments**

The first category of humanist matters I would like to suggest is that of instruments. The science of history has gradually developed tools and methods to decide on ways of retaining the past. Works of all kinds, including works of arts and historical processes, are technical objects, or instruments. This matter is
presented as the first of the four simply because it refers to the matter of history as a technical object. Since works are things with utility they involve a kind of engineering, and we have to ask how the work (a scroll, a hammer, a painting, a dress, a treatise) operates. Pamela H. Smith has developed a field of inquiry regarding the history of technical procedures as part of epistemological formations in early modern Europe, under the term of “artisanal epistemology.” Artisanal epistemology is interested in showing how manners of knowing are immanently and historically intertwined with ways of making. Smith touches upon an important point which was in fact articulated throughout the twentieth century by various theoreticians of history, perhaps the most important of whom was Foucault. In Foucault’s notion(s) of history, historical reality and technique cannot be separated. In his later works, Foucault used the term dispositif to refer to historical constellations aimed to “create—through a series of practices, discourses, and bodies of knowledge—docile, yet free, bodies that assume their identity and their ‘freedom’ as subjects in the very process of their desubjectification. A dispositif, then, is first of all a machine that produces subjectifications.” The character of that which is superficially conceived as subjective “freedom” is organized by dispositional constellations. This includes what one understands as works of “art” that are regarded as sovereign, singular, and liberated from conventions. Yet the technical perspective regarding the production of works combines determination and contingency. On the one hand, one should look for a preconceived model which was “implemented” or “realized” in the work. On the other hand, while not forgetting the contingent part of experimentation in the production of the work, the task is to outline the inner necessity reigning the production process. The auspicious moment of creative synthesis is hazardous. Yet the retroactive analysis of the synthetic product must strive to discern a line of necessity supplying cohesion to the unpredictable modality of generation, and this should be accomplished by the reconstruction of the procedure producing a hitherto unknown constellation of past conventions. Even if invention is a moment of grace, the producer must be technically prepared to receive this graceful occurrence—the sculptor must be familiar with the technique of his art and know everything that can be learned about it: this technique deals especially with what his work has in common with other works; it is governed by the demands of the material upon which he operates and which is imposed upon him as upon all artists; it concerns in art repetition or fabrication.

Obviously, history itself is a work with instruments. Historical instruments push forward the contents of historical research; they release the work,
like forceps or pumpers, making the certain work come into contact with the researcher in the first place and then directing the inquiry, always directed at pushing forward more than what meets the eye. History cannot be spared the burden of giving an account of the instruments with which it realizes its tasks.

**Elements**

The second matter of the humanities is elements. Elements are the grammar from which the humanist’s reality is built and gathered and from which historical instruments are constructed. Art historian Alois Riegl suggested that we construct something like a “historical grammar” of the arts. He understood the term historical grammar as answering both the structural a priori tokens of historical inquiry, and the chronological aspect that must be given to them. Elements are determined by instruments: by their functionality, aims, and workings. They are the ingredients recollected by the humanist, and making an inventory of such elements should be the task of a general theory of the humanities. Languages of all sorts are such kinds of elements, even if, to wit, one should remember that they can be also viewed under the instrumental aspect. Elements are what a Cartesian may call “simple natures,” that is, the ingredients without which one cannot begin to think about man or his history. This genre of humanist matter leads once again to thinking about a geology of the humanist’s past. Distilling historical elements demands procedures of analysis, making an inventory of the parts and principles from which the investigated work is composed. Here we have Aristotle, telling us, in the beginning of the *Physics*, that “we conceive ourselves to know about a thing when we are acquainted with its ultimate causes and first principles, and have got down to its elements.”

Reaching the level of elements demands digging-up and uncovering, amounting to a hermeneutical endeavor:

The meaning that the historian “composes” consists of making-seen a “pattern” that exists in the things excavated, yet hereto unknown or unseen. But what is the nature of this pattern? How does one attain a making-seen of this pattern?
And how does this pattern become a meaning? One may want to seek Foucault’s assistance again and review his notion of the historical a priori:

What I mean by this term is an *a priori* that is not a condition of validity for judgments, but a condition of reality for statements. It is not a question of rediscovering what might legitimize an assertion, but of freeing the *conditions of emergence* of statements, the law of their coexistence with others, the specific form of their mode of being, the *principles* according to which they survive, become transformed, and disappear.25

The historical a priori of Foucault can be seen as that pattern that Kubler demanded from the historian to discover, and as those principles that Aristotle demanded from the sciences as such. The historian aims to uncover a level of reality arranging historical factuality, a level of a proto-history. Meillassoux has poignantly spoken of something similar in his radical notion of ancestrality,26 being “any reality anterior to the emergence of the human species—or even anterior to every recognized form of life on earth.”27 Here I would like to reach a slightly more modest level of discussion: not a preliving matter, free from any correlationist imagination, but a level of proto-history, much more like a primary, transcendental level of history, lying on the outer borders of that which is not yet historical or cultural, but which is still human.

**Documents**

The third category of works of humanist inquiry is the document. “Document,” from the Latin *documentum*, and the verb *docere*, is that which *teaches* and *professes*: it is the object that is used as evidence. The document is the surface where historical contact between a researcher and his object actually occurs. In other words, documents allow historical knowing to take place. This knowing takes place when the researcher comes into contact, in a certain moment, at a certain place, with a certain work. Kubler says: “We are confronted with inner and outer historical surfaces. Of these only the outer surfaces of the completed past are accessible to historical knowledge.”28

Documents are these outer surfaces of the past. They pop-up in front of the gaze, ready to be inspected. In this sense, they are the historical objects par excellence. Documents correspond with what Foucault addressed in the *Archaeology of Knowledge* as *positivités*: positivities. The kernel of Foucault’s critique of the history of ideas in the *Archaeology of Knowledge* is the insistence on the positivity of the work of the human sciences, a positivity taking-place on an approachable
Theories of History

Discursive positivities, preceding any bare ideas coming into existence directly from the genius's forehead, construct the skeleton of the “problematization” Foucault’s archaeology undertakes to analyze.

When a researcher comes across a positive document, he or she is compelled to acknowledge not only the work itself but also what is literally and explicitly professed by the work. The document is used as an evidence, in a manner that is stronger than instruments or monuments (see below). If you find your document, at the archive, in the closet, or at the museum, then you have your evidence, you do not have to look further. All you can and should do is to begin anew. Documents, like monuments (but more strongly than elements and instruments, remaining always implicit, hidden, sometimes even clandestine), establish a tradition of transmission (think about the Christian culture of relics, where objects of “evidence” are maintained, transferred, transmitted, wrapped, copied, sometimes forged, worshipped, ascribed legends, etc.). A series of documents, transferring and professing a “truth” from generation to generation, again and again, creates a tradition. Because the document is an evidence, it does not demand from the inquisitor a special effort to push outwards something latent. All that one should do is to rewrite the message: as Foucault contends, “Archaeology is nothing else than a re-writing; that is to say, a regulated transformation of that which was already written.” Archaeology aims to rewrite an already inscribed document. In this level of documents one meets the strongest case of the problem of the hermeneutical circle, as Wind writes: “this might be termed the dialectique of the historical document: that the information which one tries to gain with the help of the document ought to be presupposed for its adequate understanding.”

There is a correlationism of evidence in the alleged straightforward factiality of the encounter with the document. The document is dogmatic: it professes rigid information corresponding with the wishes and standpoint of the reader-interpreter. Yet that stiff positivity of the document can also serve as a beginning of a work of reconstruction and recollection: everything made now is either a replica or a variant of something made a little time ago and so on back without break to the first morning of human time. The recollection of this morning, of this generation is what humanist history is about.

Monuments

The fourth and I believe the most dominant humanist matter is monuments. Monuments are works intended to immortalize a deed, to make a deed
remembered. “We depend for our extended knowledge of the human past mainly upon visible products of man’s industry.” Monuments embody the function of making one remember the past reality, and indeed we are held by the clamps of the past by the workings of monuments, binding us to the past through their call and demand to remember. All historical things that work as immortalizers are monuments. Works of all kinds are monuments, in the sense that they carry and preserve a memory of a past occurrence; however the occurrence of which the thing is a monument, or, to try a kind of a word game, the occurrence which the thing “monuments” is not limited to the historical event or to the overflowing historical, cultural, or social reality supposedly represented by the work (as the methods of new historicism or Francis Haskell’s History and Its Images demand). Rather, the occurrence that is remembered, that is monumentalized in the work is the generation of the work itself. In that sense, the better a work “monuments” its own production, the greater an (art)work it is. However, as any work is a result of it production, all works are monuments, even if some of them are mediocre monuments. Another kind of monumentalization that is contracted in the work of art is the one relating to the tradition from which the work issues and to which it belongs. The producer of the monument chooses his own ancestors, and this is most evident in the work of the artist:

To an extent that varies according to the historical situation, an artist chooses his own prototypes. He is the one who decides who his ancestors are. And, unlike a child with its two parents, he can choose as many direct progenitors as he likes. It is also characteristic of intellectual and cultural genealogy that exponents of long-extinct developments can suddenly become prototypes again, and can be enlisted as teachers, acting progenitors across vast intervals of time. This is the phenomenon universally known as a renaissance. It is here, in the choice of prototypes, the quest for sources of inspiration that creative freedom resides ….

The humanities are histories of monuments, including anything which was produced (in the past). The historical reality which is to be included in the monument is radically intermingled with the production of the monument itself, and therefore giving an account of monuments frequently demands a work of supplying or describing a context for the production of the work.

Foucault’s archaeology, following Friedrich Nietzsche, goes as far as discarding altogether the documentary task of history, on behalf of monuments: archaeology “Does not treat discourse as document, as a sign of something else … it is concerned with discourse in its own volume, as a monument.” In a Nietzschean manner, Foucault’s archaeology prefers the monument over the document. The
function of archaeology in this monumental framework is to suck into the surface, to bring outside, to express, expose, draw upwards something of the beginning of the work. And this “suction” is performed as a process of recollection, a point that brings us to the second half of this chapter.

Humanist recollection

Monuments and humanist anamnesis

The last of the four humanist matters is the monument, which is the most memorial of the four. It is aimed at reminding eternity of its own production. Yet all humanist matters are mnemonic instruments: The humanities have essentially to do with a work of memory or recollection. The practice of history, that is the inscribing of the past with the various instruments of inscription (imaging, writing, science, monuments, etc.), is an activity of recollection, it is a mnemonic activity that literally collects, again, and again, and again, past matters. One can argue against this hypothesis that it effectuates a cultural reification of memory, the latter being an operation internal to an individual mind. Yet, as Francis Yates has shown, memory was from early-on conceived as an activity that must be externally assisted by various structures and images. Recollection was never defined as belonging exclusively to the human mind. The humanities are one of the most developed and comprehensive human-made memory machines; belonging to the humanist profession means to be occupied with a work of anamnesis, of recollection and recovering past matters.

Humanist anamnesis is still, whether one likes it or not, dependent on some demand for understanding of the work in question, and therefore it cannot escape a certain hermeneutic element. An example of a hermeneutical creed can be found in the statement made by archaeologist Konrad Levezow (1834): “An artwork consists in an idea, as its spiritual essence, and from the form, the image, in which the idea, as in a body, is sensually dressed.” This expresses what hermeneutical readings often want to achieve by the interpretation of a work of art: recovering that idea which was dressed by the work. Yet how is one to reach this idea which is dressed by the specific work in question, and how does one reach the place where this idea can be recollected? The history we are conceiving here would concentrate exactly on the “dressing” (in Levezow’s quote above the idea
is “eingekleidet”) of the idea. Taking the work itself as the truth to be uncovered and exposed, recollecting the work would literally mean making a cast of the work, which is to say, putting a cover on the work rather than peeling it off from some “idea” which it is supposed to cover.

**Memory, recollection, and humanism**

Yates described the manner in which the humanist tradition from ancient times onwards bounded truth, knowing, thinking, and recalling, and the role of visual, spatial, and semi-cartographic ordering in the maintenance of the humanist tradition; humanism and memory are bounded. As Pierre-François Moreau wrote:

> Humanism is constructed on an idea of a constitutive, fundamental, memory, the only available manner to man in order to access directly that which, for him, is essential: the texts of the past appearing as founders, and the relationship with them that lies at the principles of the constitution of the self.

It was Bergson who pointed out that the most pressing task of late modern mentality is, simply, to learn how to remember. Bergson's philosophy of memory can be taken as a plea for a return to the humanities and their mnemonic content, in the sense that they are construed so that they are able to preserve knowledge about some past reality. The humanities themselves are an art of memory: an ever readdressed and refined set of mechanisms whose task is simply to remember. The concept of the art of memory is needed to be integrated in a systematic manner into the conception of the humanities, as memory is the central, if not the exclusive, faculty allowing us to approach the reality of the past. Michael Dummett, in his *Truth and the Past* (2004), says:

> It is not only the living who may report their past observations. … Dying does not deprive anyone of the status either of an observer or of an informant: the dead remain members of the community …. Admittedly, most of their messages have been obliterated by time; but many of the dead still communicate with us, not in spiritualist s é ances and only rarely in visions, but through their words that have been preserved, their writings, their works of art, and their scientific and philosophical theories.
Recollection of the past can be gathered through the memory of others. Dummett’s view of memory is neither “personal” nor “collective”: our “personal” memory is always and necessarily also collectively constructed, and vice versa. This is also why I prefer to abstain from talking about a cultural memory, suggested by Jan Assmann. Memory is a human faculty basic and elementary enough to exist beneath and beyond the personal/cultural dichotomy. It is not a “cultural” memory, but simply the work of memory that makes the task of the humanities. The agent of memory does not possess a fixed form. It takes shape always as a pluri-agent reality. It is not “personal” and not “social,” nor is it a priori national or universal. Memory happens when something is being registered, rehearsed or, as Foucault said, rewritten.

Similar to the natural sciences, the propositions of the humanities advance through true/false arguments about the past. Only that at the outer end of the humanist chain sits a special verifier, no other than our erudite, whose task is to gather the material, to recollect the transmitted material, and in the first place make seen and then drop all the hypotheses that must be wrong regarding a certain past state of affairs, again, like the archaeologist digging in his excavation site wiping away those propositions that do not carry a sufficiently demonstrable verifying element at their beginning and end. Thus, the humanist should do what she can in order to correct misconceptions about the past. The humanist’s only task is to remember well.

**Recollecting a contingent occurrence**

The historian magnetizes the past into his practice, by following a continuum binding the past to his own actions. Yet then, as Meillassoux has poignantly emphasized, one is faced with the problem of retelling a contingent occurrence. The art historian Otto Paecht wrote of the same difficulty to be found in giving a historical account of invention:

> In describing events as governed by an inner necessity, the historian falls prey to self-deception. He knows how it all ends, so he constructs an evolutionary logic that leads to that goal. Wise after the event, he assumes the air of a prophet who has fathomed the decrees of fate, and who would have predicted what actually happened.

In Paecht’s approach, evolutionism and retronnarration do not exclude each other: because evolutionary selection is hazardous, one can tell in retroaction all sorts of stories that should or may have led to the work resulting from this
process. Yet the validity of a historical scientific explanation is at risk when one admits the unavoidable element of retronarration in historical writing:

… we must check whether an established sequence of works or styles/a genealogy—is really significant, or whether we are simply using hindsight to interpret what may be a fortuitous outcome as a necessary one. In our attempt to understand the dynamics of a historical process, are we simply imagining a force that drives the wheels round …, and thus committing the vulgar error of mistaking post hoc for propter hoc?52

A possible coming to terms with this challenge could be suggested by the notion of “tinkering,” brought-up by the biologist Francois Jacob:

The tinkerer manages with odds and ends. Often without even knowing what he is going to produce, he uses whatever he finds around him … to make some kind of workable object … what the tinkerer ultimately produces is often related to no special project. … What can be said about any of these objects is just that “it could be of some use.”53

Evolution, according to Jacob, works as a tinkerer, and tinkering can be endorsed to the framework of the sciences investigating it. Utility is not altogether excluded from the tinkering process, but neither is the latter exclusively modeled in advance and nor are the instruments that cooperate in the process. Contingency is part of the humanities, yet it is a contained contingency, ordered according to certain triggers arising from specific states of affairs, found or met on the way of the productive procedure: “… In progress there is radical contingency, an incommensurability between what goes before and what follows.”54 Work, therefore, is a retroactive capacity; it demands one to be an alert keeper, tinkering one’s prototypes nevertheless knowing that no worker is absolutely “free to pick and choose their prototypes at will.”55

Recollecting and pure memory (according to Bergson)

To recollect past matters is different from imagining the past. Bergson distinguished generically between memory and imagination:

To imagine is not to remember. No doubt a recollection, as it becomes actual, tends to live in an image; however, the converse is not true, and the image, pure and simple, will not be referred to the past unless, indeed, it was in the past that
I sought it, thus following the continuous progress which brought it from darkness into light.  

Remembering, differently from imagining, has a realist tenor. It is a realization of a matter that was installed somewhere, by someone, with or without reason. How should one purge into the depths of memory and what are the characters of its kingdom? For Bergson, understanding memory has to do with differentiating between memory and pure memory. Pure memory is impotent, nonsensual, and unspatial: “Pure memory, being non-extensive and powerless, does not in any degree share the nature of sensation.” Pure memory is the memory of the reality of the past as past. Pure memory of the reality of the past is powerless, it has no task to fulfill in the present and is disconnected from any instrument, and therefore it does not express itself often, staying excluded from extended reality. Notwithstanding, pure memory is the drive behind recollection. And the suggestion of this chapter is that what drives the humanities is exactly this pure, proto-memory, leading nowhere but backwards. Pure memory is a proto-memory, a memory of the irrecoverable. Again, these concepts are closer to what Meillassoux posits in his notion of ancestrality. How does history reach its own fundament and beginning?

Bergson’s approach to the construction of memory should be differentiated from other constructivist approaches to history, like those of Robin G. Collingwood or Hayden White. Collingwood suggested the concept of “historical imagination” which White later endorsed. Collingwood went as far as stating that the historical imagination has “as its special task to imagine the past: not an object of possible perception, since it does not now exist, but able through this activity to become an object of our thought.” If for Collingwood and White one should treat history as an imaginary construct, then for Bergson acknowledging the constructive capacities of the imagination is only the first step of an inquiry regarding the past, continuing its trail in a realist direction, where proto-memory leads the way.

Habit and history

Recollection and action

Past matters grip, clamp, invade, and interfere in “present” action, thus creating a historical contraction, bringing to the surface a historical object. Getting near the historical contraction is the task of the work’s historian. The historian is then
getting-in and -out, moving between the different layers of the work’s history, the work’s habits. Bergson hints at how one can tempt past matters to move toward the surface of the present through the process of recollection:

That a recollection should reappear … it is necessary that it should descend from the heights of pure memory down to the precise point where action is taking place. In other words, it is from the present that the appeal to which memory responds comes, and it is from the sensori-motor elements of present action that a memory borrows the warmth which gives it life.\(^60\)

In other words, all that one can do in order to recollect the reality of the past is act. It is only through action that the past can be recollected. As complimentary to spontaneous, involuntary memory, pushing itself from depth to the surface, the humanist works from the outer surface inwards, or rather “downwards,” in order to uncover and recollect that which is “inside” the historical excavation site. Indeed, the direct parallel for that is the archaeologist, working in his excavation site, on the surfaces available to him, shoving away dirt and sand, in order to reach a deeper surface where his “things” lie. An infinitesimal weave of grades and layers separates between the level of action, which is the place of present-time and where the body acts through its received and preconceived ideas and schemes, and the level of pure memory, which is where some content is retained without being demanded on the behalf of no need whatsoever. “Between the place of action — … — and the place of pure memory … we can discover thousands of different places of consciousness, a thousand integral and yet diverse repetitions of the experience through which we have lived.”\(^61\)

**Habituation and fidelity**

The infinite work of recollection Bergson just described is by-and-by an infinite work of habituation, habituation to the reality of the past. We arrive here to meet the historian Gaston Roupnel, who was one of the main influences on the *Annales School*, one of the few theoreticians of history to notice literally the historiographical potential of habit:

> Actual being is nothing but an aggregation of historical habits of living substance; it is nothing but the support of the infinite multitude of gestures whose mechanism was regulated and its precision acquired by millions of ancestral experiences, by millions of exercises of repetition, each composing a birth and a life to those who are today dead. Hence we are in matter—which is memory; we are in nature—which is recollection. Replete with signification which is not
of an imagined expression, but rather ... rich in realities and precisions, we can, we have the right to say that life is the memory of matter.\textsuperscript{62}

The labor of the humanist is laden with an ethical task, which is to adhere to the work he is following. Its adherence is grave, because it realizes a loyalty to pure memory, the memory of the past as past. Historical fidelity is a “joining,” a self-annexing to a certain historical matter, frequently a document, but all the other three humanist matters demand this kind of fidelity as well. By an adherence to the work, in a process of what Badiou may be agreeing to call an ethic,\textsuperscript{63} one is engaged with a movement of habituation: a habituation to that which was already written or to the monument which was erected. Historical work is the eternal habituation to the unbearable reality of the past. The adherence to a work becomes an archaeology when its rewriting comes to dissecting enunciations, events and things, and then to place them together, ordered and systematized, to form what Foucault calls the Archive. The archive is “the first law of what can be said, the system that governs the appearance of statements are unique events. ... It is that which defines the mode of occurrence of the statement-thing; it is the system of its functioning.”\textsuperscript{64}

The archive is therefore a kind of a meta-rule, a “ruler,” ordering the statements-things of the matter of history. And therefore, to the question posed at the beginning of this chapter, the question regarding what is the “earth” in which the humanist is digging, a possible suggested answer would be: the humanist digs in the earth of habits, and his recollection is one of habits. In other words, habit is the hyle of the humanist.

**Working with habit**

Habit is a methodical engine leading the way from a work met as a document to establishing the work as a monument of its own production. As mentioned earlier, in order to recollect one has to act, adding more and more covers on one's investigated work. The that which is needed is making the cast of the work. That is in fact what habits do. The habitual layer is physicomoral; fabrics, covers, gestures, attributes, ornaments, ideas, and commentaries or any other accessory added to the work are examples of habits, and it is this dressing that we were suggesting above as the possible material approach to works. The body itself, in this framework, is conceived as a condensed cohesive conglomeration of habits, which is enacted and maintained by the rehearsal of movements and gestures. Félix Ravaisson-Mollien showed in 1838 that habit
can lead a habituating subject as close as it gets to its own corporeal reality. By working with habits, by the adherence to a habit, repeating it, rewriting it, making variations of it and experimenting with it in different situations, one weaves the instrument/s enabling one’s own extended existence. The working with habits is a dressing which is simultaneously an undressing, peeling or exfoliation into the habituating body. Habitude functions not only horizontally, that is to say, as repetition of deeds and gestures over a period of time, but also vertically, as a binder between a gesture, a work and its historical depth, returning to its beginning. A habit contracts into itself a condensed genealogy of naturalized gestures (documents, exposed historical positivities; instruments, mechanism of memory, and transmission; monuments, honored things; elements, historical a priori). It is a vertical spiral, to use the terms of Ravaisson himself, functioning simultaneously as rehearsal but also as a retroactive piercing into the history of the organism; moving up and down the habitual konus-spiral depends on how far one is willing to work with a habit in order to decompose it and to recompose it again. Remember Levezow’s search for the idea entailed in the work of art? Here is what Ravaisson has to say regarding a similar matter:

[The] state of nature to which habit leads thought back … is the condition and the primary source of any distinct thought. … How can we deliberate about grasping in the present or retrieving from the past an absent idea? … Before the distinct idea that reflection searches out, before reflection itself, there must be some kind of unreflective and indistinct idea, which occasions reflection and constitutes its matter, from where one parts, where one can lean.65

Reaching, within the infinitesimal web of habits, a surface of this quasi-idea, an indistinct idea, upon which one can lean, from which one can part, makes the craft of the humanist. Instruments, elements, documents, and monuments are her attributes and armor. Even Don Quixote moved on real earth.

Bibliography


Introduction

Since the time of the Greeks, rhetoric and history have gone hand in hand, but the nature and the history of their relationship is still unclear. In the literature on the subject there seems to be consensus that ancient rhetoricians and historians almost identified the two disciplines. Rhetoricians primarily saw history as a form of rhetoric, and historians amply used rhetorical techniques in their work. Similar relationships can be found among late antique and early medieval and medieval writers, who, imagining the ancient world, read, rewrote, and refigured the ancient rhetorical and historical texts. Later, with the rise of the universities, history was taught in the rhetoric classes of the trivium. In the Renaissance, the humanists partly broke with this tradition by writing histories outside the universities, but they never cut their ties with rhetoric.

It was only with the advent of modern “scientific” history in the nineteenth century that historians began to distance themselves from rhetoric. If history was to be a “science,” they argued, it could not be a form of rhetoric. Meanwhile, and probably also, partly, as a result of this development, historians’ interest in rhetoric rapidly declined in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It was only after the Second World War, with the simultaneous rise of the new rhetoric and the linguistic turn, that a new rapprochement between rhetoric and history set in. Since the 1960s, this rapprochement has mainly focused on the rhetorical nature of history. Historians such as Jack Hexter and Paul Veyne have explicitly acknowledged the rhetorical nature of historical writing while narrativist philosophers of history such as Walter B. Gallie, Louis Mink, Hayden White and F. R. Ankersmit, and more recently, postnarrativists such as Kalle Pihlainen and
M. Kuukkanen have intensively explored the linguistic and philosophical underpinnings of a rhetorical view of history.⁷

In contrast to these theorists of history, who all stressed the importance of rhetoric in historiography, modern rhetoricians have not yet discussed the function of the notion of history in rhetoric. Surprisingly, even though they unanimously recognize the importance of the history of rhetorical theory, they are yet to elaborate the implications of the historicity of rhetoric for their own rhetorical theories. This neglect can most readily be illustrated by the fact that under the notion of “history” all major reference works and textbooks on rhetoric either discuss the use of rhetoric in history or the history of rhetoric, but do not address the question of how rhetoric itself uses the notion of history.⁸

Another illustration of the similar neglect of the notion of history in rhetoric can be found in the works of its most representative figures such as Kenneth Burke and Chaim Perelman. Both authors contributed greatly to the discussion of the use of rhetoric in historiography, but not of the use of history in rhetoric. The five concepts of Burke’s famous pentad—act, scene, agent, agency, and purpose—are evidently closely connected to historical research and writing, but Burke never elaborated on how these notions apply to the work of rhetoricians.⁹ Likewise, Perelman, who developed his new rhetoric to meet the demands of his times, never addressed the question of how his own theory employed the concept of history. This omission comes to the fore by the fact that Perelman offers an extensive theory of the techniques by which rhetors structure reality without addressing the question of how the new rhetoric itself envisages structuring reality.¹⁰

The most recent and conspicuous neglect of the historicity of rhetoric can be found in the theory of the rhetorical situation, which forms the cornerstone of rhetorical discourse analysis since the 1960s. Advocates of this theory stress the importance of taking the historical context of speeches into account, but turn a blind eye to the historical context of their own interpretations. In contrast to modern historians, who recognize that their interpretations of past events are subject to the conditions of their own times, modern discourse analysts seem to assume that their interpretations somehow stand the test of time when they are based on a proper use of rhetorical theory. This assumption has led to the paradoxical situation that while the rhetorization of history is beginning to reach maturity, the historicization of rhetorics is still in its infancy.

The aim of this chapter is to push the rapprochement between rhetoric and history one step further by showing how a modern concept of history might be adopted by rhetorical discourse analysis. By the modern concept of history
I mean that historians describe a process of which they themselves are a part; historians are never mere outsiders to history, but insiders to it; they are never mere spectators, but participants. Elsewhere I have argued that this view of the historian’s position entails an identification of rhetoric and history; by writing about the past, historians participate in history; historians make history by writing history. In this chapter I intend to approach this identity from the perspective of rhetoric by focusing on how a modern idea of history can be used in rhetorical discourse analysis, and what this implies for the historicity of rhetorical interpretation of texts.

In order to answer this question, I first discuss the concept of history in ancient rhetoric, which, as contemporary rhetoricians acknowledge, forms the basis of modern rhetoric. Focusing on ancient rhetoric’s key concept of “kairos,” which meant the “right” or “appropriate” time, I show that it is not a truly historical concept in the modern sense of history. Second, I demonstrate that the ancient concept of kairos perseveres in modern rhetoric, by discussing the concept of the rhetorical situation in the theory of discourse analysis. After a thorough deconstruction of the objectivist and subjectivist versions of this theory, I use Robin G. Collingwood’s encapsulation theory to elaborate a modern concept of history for rhetoric. Finally, I strengthen the link between this concept of history with rhetoric by associating it with Quentin Skinner’s notion of rhetorical redescription, illustrating that the interpretation of rhetorical texts is itself a rhetorical activity.

Kairos: The necessary relation between speech and time

The notion of kairos is old and complex. Long before rhetoricians began to reflect on it, poets such as Homer and Hesiod used it in a spatial sense of “important point.” In the seventh and sixth centuries BC the notion received a temporal dimension, in the sense that action had to be “appropriate” to the occasion. The Pythagoreans connected kairos to their cosmology, which relates the laws of the universe to action and to speech. In turn, a rules-based concept of kairos influenced sophists such as Gorgias. However, kairos achieved its greatest impact on rhetorical theory through the medical treatises of Hippocrates. In these treatises, the “father of the medicine” distinguished “chronos” (time) from “kairos” (opportunity), to argue that doctors must determine the right opportunity for intervention. His central tenet was that for ailments to be cured they must be treated at the right time, that is, the time of kairos. For
example, some diseases must be treated early in the day and others later, while some treatments must be given when the patient is suffering and others routinely on bi-daily schedule.  

It was in the sense of “the right time” that the notion of kairos was adopted by Greek rhetoricians and historians. In analogy to the idea that each ailment has to be treated at the right or appropriate time, they pointed out that rhetors should speak at the right or appropriate time. In practical terms, this meant that there was only a limited space of time in which problems could be addressed by speech; if the rhetor spoke too early or too late, he would fail to seize the opportunity to convince his audience. In this sense of the “right opportunity,” kairos had a central role in the works of rhetorical theorists such as Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle and of the Greek historians Herodotus and Thucydides. In the Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War*, the notion of kairos appears no less than sixty-five times, which is illustrative of the interconnectivity of rhetoric and history in Greek historiography. In a completely different context and with an alternative meaning, the notion of kairos also frequently appears in the Septuagint, the Greek translation of the old testament. The Roman Stoics and Cicero merged an idea of kairos with the Roman notion of “decorum” thus combining the meaning of the “appropriate” with the “proper” moment. Similar, but not identical, connotations of kairos reappeared in Medieval and Renaissance rhetoric before the notion disappeared with the dwindling interest for rhetoric in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

In the twentieth century, renewed interest in the notion of kairos emerged, but it took decades before it was again connected to history and rhetoric. In the 1930s the existentialist theologian Paul Tillich presented “kairos” as the opposite of “logos.” By logos he referred to the timeless aspect of knowledge, and by “kairos” to its timefullness as it arises in “the moment in which it encounters us as fate and decision.” Interestingly, Tillich explicitly linked kairos to history, but not to rhetoric, though he must have known about the rhetorical origins of the notion. In the same vein, pragmatist philosopher John E. Smith in the late 1960s pointed out that “kairos is peculiarly relevant to historical action and to historical enquiry” because “it points to the significance and purpose of events and to the idea of constellations of events yielding results which would not have been possible at other times and under other circumstances.” In this context, however, Smith, like Tillich, did not connect kairos to rhetoric. The first to explicate the connection between kairos and rhetoric was the American rhetorician James L. Kinneavy. In 1986 he published a seminal article arguing that “kairos” is an unduly neglected concept. In a later article he argued
that the idea of kairos needs more attention because it “brings timeless ideas down into the human situations of historical time” and “thus imposes value on ideas and forces humans to make free decisions about these values.” From this perspective, Kinneavy pleaded for a reincorporation of the concept of kairos in modern rhetoric. His appeal has found many followers, and among them was Smith who in a later article on kairos stressed its rhetorical provenance.

From the perspective of modern history, however, these pleas for a revival of the concept of kairos in both history and rhetoric must be taken with caution. First, the fact that Greek historians and rhetoricians fruitfully used the notion of kairos in their works does not make it a useful analytical tool in modern history and rhetoric. Second, since the rise of historicism in the nineteenth century the idea of “timeless ideas” is no longer tenable in the humanities: after historicism, philosophers no longer believe in “eternal problems”; historians recognize that each generation rewrites history, and even some social scientists admit that theories change over time.

An important theoretical objection to the use of the notion of kairos was given by Collingwood, who argued in 1936 that it was incompatible with a modern conception of history. Citing Thucydides’ famous claim that in his account of historical speeches, he “made the speakers say what was called for by each situation.” Collingwood points out that “it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the judge of “what was appropriate” was Thucydides himself.” Collingwood rejects Thucydides’ approach to historical speeches as “antihistorical” pointing out that it was deeply rooted in the belief in “unchanging rules.” This belief was typical for the Greek concept of history, Collingwood says, rightly pointing to Hippocrates as a major influence.

One may disagree with Collingwood’s harsh judgment that Thucydides’ use of the notion of kairos was “antihistorical” but his analysis does point out that it is based on a belief in a set of unchanging rules which determine what must be said in a given situation. On the basis of these rules, historians, knowing the situation, can reconstruct what had to be said. Evidently, this reconstruction presupposes a necessary connection between speech and situation because it is the situation which ultimately determines what must be said. It was this presupposition that blinded Thucydides and other Greek historians to the fact that they did not render the speeches as they were given, but only gave their own interpretation of what probably had been said. As some interpreters have pointed out, Thucydides belief that his interpretation of past events was not bound to time itself rested on his use of kairos, as being based on unchanging rhetorical rules. As he famously stated: “my work is not a piece of writing designed to meet the
taste of an immediate public but to be read to an occasional audience, as were other histories, but was done to last for ever.”

It is this idea of writing history forever, by which Thucydides placed his own interpretation of past events out of time, that stands squarely opposed to the modern idea of history. In the wake of historicism, historians and philosophers of history no longer recognize “unchanging rules” or “timeless ideas” and recognize the historicity of the historical subject. Accordingly, the problem is no longer to establish what could appropriately be done or said, but to offer new interpretations of the facts as reconstructed from evidence. This idea of history entails that no interpretation of past events can last forever since each historian reinterprets the evidence from her or his own point of view. As I have pointed out elsewhere, this point of view also includes the historian’s intended audience because historians do not write history for the sake of history, but to offer an orientation in time for an audience in a particular situation. But this rhetorical approach to history has not yet influenced studies of modern rhetoric (see below).

Time in the rhetorical situation

The theory of the rhetorical situation is one of the cornerstones of modern rhetoric. It was most prominently introduced by Lloyd Bitzer in his 1968 article “The Rhetorical Situation.” Since then the theory has been fiercely attacked and defended in dozens of publications. Despite being contested, the theory has found its way into hundreds of courses in rhetoric and composition and still appears in the major textbooks on those subjects. In this section, I deal not with these applications of the theory, but rather focus on the philosophical underpinnings of Bitzer’s theory and that of his most ardent critic Richard E. Vatz.

The kernel of Bitzer’s theory consists of “three constituents” which comprise “everything that is relevant in a rhetorical situation:” the exigence, the audience, and the constraints. Bitzer defines the exigence as the problem of the situation that can be modified by the use of speech. The audience to which speech is directed is both capable of being influenced by discourse and of changing the situation. Finally, the term “constraints” refers to a large category of persons, events, objects, and relations in the situation that “have the power to constrain decision and action needed to modify the exigence.”

For decades, rhetoricians and composition teachers have fruitfully employed Bitzer’s ideas, stressing the importance of taking either the historical
circumstances of speeches into account in order to understand their meaning or the contemporary circumstances in order to write effective speeches. In comparison, they have paid far less attention to the philosophical underpinnings of the theory, even though Bitzer was crystal clear about them. At the beginning of his paper he explicitly claims that all rhetoric is historical in the sense that it responds to a particular situation.  

Rhetorical works belong to the class of things which obtain their character from the circumstances of the historic context in which they occur. A rhetorical work is analogous to a moral action rather than to a tree. An act is moral because it is an act performed in a situation of a certain kind; similarly, a work is rhetorical because it is a response to a situation of a certain kind.

In addition to this, Bitzer claims that “a work of rhetoric is pragmatic; it comes into existence for the sake of something beyond itself; it functions ultimately to produce action or change in the world; it performs some task.” Bitzer’s claim amounts to saying that speakers use rhetoric in historically determined situations that they seek to change. By thus defining the pragmatic aspect of rhetoric, Bitzer implicitly also recognizes a second, more practical sense of the historical aspect of rhetoric.Summing up Bitzer’s position we can say that rhetoric is used in rhetorical situations as a way to change them.

On this basis, Bitzer provides seven general characteristics of rhetoric. The most important of these is that “rhetorical discourse comes into existence as a response to a situation, in the same sense that an answer comes into existence in response to a question, or a solution in response to a problem.” Since the problem is logically prior to the solution, it follows that “the speech is given rhetorical significance by the situation.” On this basis, Bitzer develops an objectivist view of the rhetorical situation claiming that the situation exists as a necessary condition of rhetorical discourse. The source and ground of both rhetorical activity and of rhetorical criticism, he explains, is not the rhetor nor the persuasive intent but the situation.

Bitzer’s objectivism leads to a most straightforward view of the relationship between the orator and the interpreter. Since the exigence, the audience and the constraints are all given to the orator, whose main problem is to invent a speech that “responds” to the situation in the sense that it influences the audience by overcoming the existent constraints. Conversely, the main task of the interpreter is to understand how discourse responds to the situations, which amounts to reconstructing the relationship between exigence, audience, and constraints in the context of the historical circumstances. According to Bitzer, this historical
reconstruction is possible because “the exigence and the complex of persons, objects, events and relations which generate rhetorical discourse are located in reality, are objective and publicly observable historic facts in the world we experience, are therefore available for scrutiny by an observer or critic who attends to them.” In other words, if we know the historical facts of the situation, we can reconstruct the meaning of the speech.

Moreover, the historical reconstruction can be very precise because rhetorical responses “fit” the situation to which they respond. On this point, Bitzer almost literally repeats the theory of kairos, without using the term:

In any case, situations grow and come to maturity; they evolve to just the right time when a rhetorical discourse would be most fitting .... In the situation generated by the assassination of the President (Kennedy), there was a time for giving descriptive accounts of the scene in Dallas, later a time for giving eulogies. In a political campaign, there is a time for generating an issue and a time for answering a charge. Every rhetorical situation in principle evolves to a propitious moment for the fitting rhetorical response. After this moment, most situations decay; we all have the experience of creating a rhetorical response when it is too late to make it public.

This passage is crucial because it shows how the ancient notion of kairos still perseveres in Bitzer’s theory. As in ancient rhetoric, the idea behind a “fitting response” is that there is a “right time” to speak. As Bitzer says, situations “evolve just to the time” when the exigence becomes so manifest that it demands a proper response. It seems, therefore, that just like the ancient rhetoricians, Bitzer holds that there is a necessary connection between the situation and the speech in the sense that the development of the situation conditions both form and content of the rhetorical response. As shown, this was the idea that underpinned Thucydides’ claim that he could reconstruct the meaning of the speeches, and it is the same idea that underlies Bitzer’s claim that interpreters can establish the meaning of the discourse with great exactness.

Despite these similarities with ancient rhetorical theory, Bitzer differs from it by claiming that the relationship between the rhetorical discourse and the situation is similar to that of an answer to a question. Unlike the ancient rhetoricians, who presupposed a causal connection between situation and speech, Bitzer seems to assume that there is logical connection between them. However, Bitzer does not elaborate on this interesting idea, probably because he regards the problem or questions as being inherent in the situation, and therefore as “given” to the orator and the audience. For this reason, his notion of the rhetorical
situation remains largely metaphorical; after all, situations do not literally pose problems or ask questions.

Thus, in spite of his identification of the notions “situational” and “historical” and his stressing of the importance of taking historical circumstances into account in order to establish the meaning of speeches, Bitzer still clings to a premodern, unhistorical view of reality. Like Greek rhetoricians and historians, and their twentieth-century successors who plead for a revival of the notion of kairos, Bitzer believes that the “right time” is not only objectively given to the rhetor but also to the interpreter. And like the ancients, Bitzer feels no need to further analyze the rhetorical situation of rhetorical critics; when properly based on the rhetorical rules, rhetorical interpretation itself stands out of time.

With this idea of interpretation Bitzer stands squarely opposed to the modern idea of history, which holds that interpretation itself is always subject to time. Applied to rhetoric this means that interpreters do not work in the void, scribbling down their views for themselves, but they address audiences, just like the orators they study. A critic explaining the meaning of Martin Luther King’s “I have a dream” to his readers or a teacher explaining the critics commentary to her class are both in a rhetorical situation: they both try to influence their audience on an issue. Bitzer and his many followers have turned a blind eye to this. Like the ancient rhetoricians and historians, they assume that when interpreters use the right rhetorical tools in the right way they can objectively establish the meaning of the discourses they are studying. This leads to the paradox that all rhetoric is situational, with the exception of the rhetoric of the interpreter.

Interestingly, this paradox has not been noticed by Bitzer’s critics who adopted a more subjectivist perspective on rhetoric. In his 1973 article “The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation,” Richard E. Vatz, the most prominent and extreme among them, systematically rejected all of Bitzer’s assumptions. Meaning, Vatz writes, is not intrinsic in events, facts, people, or situations, and facts are not publicly observable but we learn about facts and events by communication through others. This communication involves, first, a choice of events because the world is “a scene of inexhaustible events.” Second, the chosen information must be “translated” into meaning, which is, according to Vatz, a creative, interpretative act.

On the basis of this theory of communication, Vatz turns all of Bitzer’s views upside down. Rhetoric is not situational, he holds, but situations are rhetorical. Likewise, “exigence does not invite utterance, but utterance invites exigence.” In his view, it is not true that “the situation controls the rhetorical response” because “rhetoric controls the situational response.” Finally, Vatz observes that rhetorical discourse does not “obtain its character-as-rhetorical from the
situation which generates it” and concludes that “situations obtain their charac-
ter from the rhetoric which surrounds them or creates them.”  

Along these lines, Vatz pushes his subjectivism to an extreme in his analyses of historical situations. He holds, for example, that there was never a “discrete situation” in Vietnam, nor a “reality of the situations being in or not being in our national interest” because the situation was produced rhetorically, adding that the situation could also be “exterminated rhetorically!” Likewise, the term “Cuban Missile Crisis” in 1962 was not “an event or group of events,” but it was a product of rhetorical creation. Finally, rhetoric does not reflect the “salience” of the situation, but it can be seen as “a creation of reality or salience.” From this Vatz infers the moral responsibility of the rhetor, claiming that his task is “not just the academic exercise of understanding the situation correctly,” but of assuming “responsibility for the salience he has created.”

With this use of the concept of “salience,” Vatz stands squarely opposed to both ancient rhetoric’s and Bitzer’s idea of “kairos” or “the right time.” For Vatz the “right time” is not inherent in the situation but it is created by the rhetor. Accordingly, the critic’s main task is to understand how orators give salience to the situations, that is, how they create exigence by speech. Given this subjectivist view of rhetoric, one would expect that Vatz would pay more attention to the rhetorical role of the critic than would Bitzer, for, if all communicative situations are rhetorical, as he holds, the situation of the interpreters must also be rhetorical; like the orators whose speeches they study, interpreters try to convince audiences. Moreover, like the orators they study, interpreters create salient situations. From this point of view, interpreters of rhetorical texts do not work in vacuo, so to speak, but seek to create new rhetorical situations by commenting on past rhetorical situations. But, despite his complete rejection of Bitzer’s views, Vatz seems to follow his opponent in turning a blind eye to the rhetorical situation of the critic; like Bitzer he only recognizes the rhetorical situations of orators, not of their interpreters, even though this logically follows from his own theories.

In this blind spot for the role of the interpreter, objectivism and subjectivism meet in a coincidentia oppositorum. Though they stand squarely opposed to each other’s assumptions concerning the relation between speech and situations, they are at one in leaving out the critic’s position. The objectivist fails to apply the idea that all situations are rhetorical to the situation of the interpreter, and the subjectivist fails to apply the idea that all rhetoric is situational to the rhetoric of the interpreter. Both views are grounded in the presupposition that rhetorical criticism is not rhetorical, or what amounts to the same thing, not historical.
Therefore, the theorists of the rhetorical situation have not yet freed themselves from the ancient conception of history. It is about time that rhetoric embraces the modern idea of history.

Between subjectivism and objectivism: The theory of encapsulation

In order to base modern rhetoric on a modern concept of history, one must transcend the subjectivist and objectivist views on the interpretation of texts. To this end, I employ Collingwood's theory of encapsulation. In the critical literature, this theory has most often been taken as a by-product of Collingwood's much more famous reenactment theory.\textsuperscript{58} Collingwood himself, however, regarded encapsulation theory as the solution to the most difficult problem he faced in his philosophy of history: the problem of the identity and difference between past and present thought. “When the historian re-enacts a past thought,” Collingwood explains, “he rethinks one and the same thought, and yet in some way there is not one thought, but two different thoughts.”\textsuperscript{59} From this view the question arose as to the sense in which one and the same thought can be different. After some years, Collingwood found a solution to this problem by arguing that past thought is encapsulated in a context of present thoughts which, by contradicting it, confine it to a plane different from theirs.\textsuperscript{60}

As an illustration of “encapsulation,” Collingwood presents himself in his father’s study as a “little boy in a jersey” reading an account of the Battle of Trafalgar which took place about ninety years before, thus dating the scene in approximately 1895 when he was six years old.\textsuperscript{61} Little Collingwood’s problem is to understand Nelson’s famous last words: “in honour I won them, in honour I will die with them.” In order to understand this quote, Collingwood remarks, “I have to think myself into the position of being all covered with decorations and exposed at short range to the musketeers in the enemy’s tops, and being advised to make myself a less conspicuous target. I ask myself the question, shall I change my coat? And reply in those words.”\textsuperscript{62} By asking this question, Collingwood explains, he “switches” into a “secondary dimension” in which he identifies with Nelson; he does not merely “think about” Nelson, but he is Nelson: “in thinking about Nelson I think about myself.”\textsuperscript{63} However, Collingwood remarks, this identification with Nelson does not “overflow into” his primary life, because Nelson’s thought is rethought in the context of the present which “contradicts” it. Collingwood explains this
“contradiction” by pointing out that the question “shall I take off my decorations” does not arise in the primary series of questions. No question there requires the answer “in honour I won them, in honour I will die with them.” For this reason, Nelson’s answer can be encapsulated in a context of present thoughts that contain for example “Trafalgar happened ninety years ago, I am a little boy in jersey, this is my father’s study carpet not the Atlantic, and that the study fender, not the coast of Spain.” The “real life” questions are closely connected to practice, Collingwood notes, because “ultimately, all problems arise in the plane of ‘real’ life: that to which they are referred for their solution is history.”

In order to understand how Collingwood’s theory goes beyond subjectivism and objectivism it is important to recognize two important moments in the whole process. The first is to ask the question “shall I take off my decorations?” because according to Collingwood’s logic of question and answer, it is only as an answer to a question that a proposition can be understood at all. It is therefore only as an answer to the question “shall I take off my decorations?” that the meaning of “in honour I won them, in honour I will die with them” becomes clear. The second moment takes place when Collingwood switches back to the plane of reality by placing Nelson’s answer in the context of his own real life series of questions and answers. Collingwood’s discussion of these two moments leads to two problems which must have been at the back of his mind when he developed the encapsulation theory. The first is: how can the interpreter know that he reconstructs the right question behind Nelson’s words? And the second is: how can the interpreter distinguish between his own thoughts and Nelson’s? These problems are closely related to each other, because if the historian cannot determine the right question behind Nelson’s words, he is incorrect about the meaning they had for Nelson. And if the historian cannot differentiate between Nelson’s thought and his own, he is incorrect about the meaning Nelson’s words have for himself. In the first case, he will stray into subjectivism, and in the second into objectivism. Collingwood’s solution to subjectivism was the “correlativity principle”; the solution to the second was the “encapsulation theory.”

By the correlativity principle Collingwood meant that a proposition cannot be the right answer to any question that might have been answered otherwise. Collingwood gives the example of a detailed proposition that must be the answer to a detailed question, and a more general proposition which answers a more general question. The correlativity principle thus enables interpreters to find the “right” or “correlative” questions in a sequence of answers. So, if one spends an hour to find out why the car is not going, the remark “number one plug is all right” is not the answer to the question “why won’t my car go,” but to the
question “is it because number one plug is not sparking that my car won’t go?”
Collingwood’s remark is a kind of “summary” of a sequence of more detailed
questions each of that can be reconstructed from the sequence of answers.

Evidently, the reconstruction of the series is based on a logical connection
between questions and answers. In this context, it is important to realize that
Collingwood thinks of this connection as a necessary one because each answer
correlates with only one question. On the basis of this logical necessity an inter-
preter can reconstruct the question behind the answer, which amounts to saying
that the interpreter can rethink past thought as it was thought in the past. Thus,
connected to the reenactment doctrine, the correlativity principle warrants the
objectivity of the interpretation; on the basis of the same text, two interpreters
will reconstruct the same questions behind the answers it contains.

This objectivity does not prevent two interpreters from providing two differ-
ent interpretations of the same text. Their subjectivity is warranted by encap-
sulating past thought in present thought; present thought encapsulates past
thought by switching back, so to speak, to the plane of real life. Again the logic
of question and answer is crucial here. The answer “I am a little boy in jersey”
answers the question “who am I?” and contradicts the answer “I am Nelson”; the
answer “this is my father’s study carpet” answers the question “where am I?” and
contradicts the answer “I am on the Atlantic.” From this perspective it is clear
how the answer “in honour I won them, in honour I will die with them” can be
both the one and the same thought and yet different. As Collingwood says, it is
a difference of context, and this context consists of thoughts. When the historian
thinks the answer “in honour I won them, in honour I will die with them” in the
context of Nelson’s questions and answers in 1805, he thinks the same thought,
but thought in the context of the questions and answers of his own “real life” the
same thought gets a different meaning.

From this it follows that practical problems of real life determine the meaning
of the text, for these provide the context in which thought is encapsulated. “In
honour I won them, I honour I will die with them” will therefore have a different
meaning for the young boy Collingwood, than for the adult man Collingwood;
the first may read them as a heroic answer to the question of his officers, the
second as an example exemplifying the nineteenth century’s idea of military
honor with which he disagreed. The encapsulation theory also shows why two
interpreters can give completely different readings of the same text. Depending
on the practical problems of their own “real life” situation, interpreters will give
a different meaning to Nelson’s words even if they agree that they were meant as
an answer to the request to take off his decorations. The encapsulation theory
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thus secures the subjectivity of interpretation while keeping its objectivity intact. The objectivity of interpretation lies in the correlativity principle that warrants that interpreters can reconstruct the right questions behind the answers in a text. The encapsulation theory warrants the subjectivity of this reconstruction by showing that its meaning depends on the context in which it takes place. In the end, the practical problems of “real life” decide about the meaning of texts, not because interpreters “create” meaning but because they recreate it: historical interpretation is a creative reconstruction to solve problems in the present.

Integrating history with rhetoric

In order to base rhetorical discourse analysis on a modern concept of history, Collingwood’s encapsulation theory needs to be integrated with the theory of the rhetorical situation. This integration is legitimate because for three reasons his analysis of himself as a young boy who tries to make sense of Nelson’s words is a perfect example of an interpreter who tries to understand a rhetorical situation. First, all sources mention that Nelson uttered his famous words during a conversation with his officers on the deck of the *HMS Victory* in the morning of October 21, 1805.\(^7^3\) Second, the situation was highly problematic to say the least. The French ships were approaching rapidly, and Nelson, still conspicuously wearing his decorations, ran the risk of being spotted by the enemy. Third, according to some sources, it was with a view on this problem that the officers tried to convince him to take off the medals but Nelson responded with his famous words in order to convince them of his decision to leave the decorations untouched. In short, the situation was problematic, and the problem could be solved by speech.

In order to interpret this rhetorical situation from the perspective of Collingwood’s encapsulation theory it is important to bring the interpreter into play, because, unlike Bitzer, Collingwood does not presuppose that problems are objectively given to the speakers and, unlike Vatz, he does not hold that speakers create problems. In contrast to both objectivism and subjectivism, Collingwood is interested in the question of how interpreters reconstruct how problems arise in past situations with a view to solving problems in the present. This does not mean that there are two problem situations, one in the past and one in the present, because the only problems that really exist are present problems. It is more correct to say that there is a present problem that can be solved by reconstructing a past problem by encapsulating it into the
present. Moreover, and this is crucial for implementing the concept of history in discourse analysis, Collingwood himself interprets Nelson’s words with a view of his own audience, that is, the readers of his autobiography. In this context, Collingwood uses his analysis of Nelson’s words to convince his readers of the validity of the encapsulation theory, but, as we will see, encapsulation can be used by other historians or interpreters for different persuasive goals. Collingwood’s encapsulation theory thus explains rhetorical interpretation as an ongoing encapsulation process which started on October 21, 1805 and continues until the present.

To understand this process, it is best to start with Collingwood’s solution to the problem of reconstruction. Seen from this perspective, Bitzer’s analogy that the speech stands to the situation as a solution to a problem is no longer tenable because the problem is not inherent in the situation, but it is the speakers, who, interpreting the situation from their own perspectives, raise problems. In itself, the fact that Nelson was carrying his decorations during the battle of Trafalgar was not a problem, but it was for his officers who cared about his and the crew’s safety but also realized that their Admiral was not willing to meet their demand. To deny that the problem was objectively given is not the same as agreeing with Vatz that the officers created a problem by speech where there was none; problems are not purely subjective. The correct way to interpret the rhetorical situation then is that there was a problem because two parties differed on the course of action to be taken with a view on the situation. Crucially, interpreters can reconstruct this difference of opinion on the basis of the evidence, for if there is none, he cannot reconstruct the questions to which all the words spoken were meant as an answer. The interpreters’ reconstruction is not completely subjective, because from all perspectives on the situation—that is, the officers’, Nelson’s, and the interpreters’—there is consensus that a battle was taking place and that the Admiral was indeed wearing his decorations; based on the available evidence all parties think the same about this aspect of the situation. This is shown by the fact that Nelson’s reply is perfectly “correlative” to the officers’ request: the officers could understand “in honour I won them, in honour I will die with them” because it made sense as an answer to their question to Nelson to take off his medals, and in hindsight historians can see why by studying the evidence. Evidence makes interpretations objective.

This objectivity does not prevent the interpreter from giving their own meaning to the texts they interpret. Crucially, this meaning depends on the practical problems they want to solve in the present, that is, it depends on the rhetorical situation of the interpreters themselves. In these interpretations time plays a
crucial role because according to their different views of their own rhetorical situation, interpreters will select different facts from the evidence to create different interpretations of past situations with a view on the future. The logic of these “retroactive” and “proactive” realignments can be illustrated by the historiography of the battle of Trafalgar.

In one of the first accounts, the *Authentic Narrative of the Death of Lord Nelson*, written two years after the battle by William Beatty, Nelson’s surgeon on the *HMS Victory*, the conversation between the Admiral and his men is completely lacking, even though Beatty describes Nelson’s appearance with great detail:

> His Lordship came upon deck soon after day-light: he was dressed as usual in his Admiral’s frock-coat, bearing on the left breast four stars of different orders which he always wore with his common apparel.

In a footnote, Beatty even explains why Nelson did not bring his sword to the deck, but he remains silent about the officers’ reaction to the Admiral’s appearance.

In contrast to Beatty, Robert Southey, in his classic *The Life of Horatio, Lord Viscount Nelson* published in 1813, greatly expands the scene with details that lead to Nelson’s famous words:

> He wore that day, as usual, his admiral’s frock coat, bearing on the left breast four stars of the different orders with which he was invested. Ornaments which rendered him so conspicuous a mark for the enemy, were beheld with ominous apprehensions by his officers. It was known that there were riflemen on board the French ships; and it could not be doubted but that his life would be particularly aimed at. They communicated their fears to each other; and the surgeon, Mr. Beatty, spoke to the chaplain, Dr. Scott, the public secretary, desiring that some person would entreat him to change his dress, or cover the stars: but they knew that such a request would highly displease him. “In honour I gained them,” he had said, when such a thing had been hinted to him formerly, “and in honour I will die with them.”

In comparison to Beatty, Southey stresses the danger for Nelson by describing the details of the situation around the ship and by explicitly referring to the enemy’s possible actions. This description makes the officers’ worries both plausible and urgent. By mentioning that the officers refrained from warning the Admiral because they remembered what he had said on a previous occasion, Southey stresses their humble obedience to Nelson.
Finally, in *The Naval Chronicle for 1805*, published in 1835, Nelson’s words are rendered as an answer to his men’s request:

Lord Nelson that day had put on those badges of honour he had gained “in many a hard-fought battle”; his Secretary and Chaplain requested he would take them off (fearing, but too justly, that his dress might expose him). His reply was, “No! In honour I gained them; in honour I will die in them!” and Nelson to his heroic virtue sacrificed himself. This well accords with the greatness of his character. What is not due to the memory of so great a man?

In comparison with Southey’s, this passage focuses on facts that underline Nelson’s heroism. Unlike Southey, *The Naval Chronicle* does not mention that Nelson wore the decorations on his left breast, but it does say that they were won in hard-fought battles. It does not mention the dangerous riflemen, nor the conversation between the officers, but it connects the fear for the danger to the officers’ request. Accordingly, Nelson’s words are presented as a reply, which begins with a firm “No” and the quote itself is changed from “in honour I will die with them” to the more dramatic “in honour I will die in them.” *The Naval Chronicle* thus represents Nelson’s action as “a sacrifice,” which is never to be forgotten.

These three examples clearly illustrate the intricate relationship between the interpretation of past and present rhetorical situations. Each interpreter interprets and narrates the situation of October 21, 1805 differently according to the rhetorical situation in which they find themselves. Beatty, writing only two years after the battle, was not primarily interested in portraying Nelson as hero but in giving a detailed minute-for-minute account of the events of that day. Southey, the romantic poet and historian, also portrayed Nelson as a hero, but not as one who sacrificed himself for his nation as *The Naval Chronicle* would do thirty years after the battle of Trafalgar. Each interpreter encapsulated past rhetorical situations into their own, that is, they interpreted the meaning of texts as answers to past questions with a view on answering questions in present rhetorical situations. Each interpreter gave a different answer to the question “who was Nelson?” because this question had different meanings for different audiences.

This process carries on to the present. In fact, each new contribution to the immense literature on Nelson gives a new version of the events. For example, Walter Summers’s 1926 silent movie *Nelson*, loosely based on Beatty’s and Southey’s accounts, gives many of the Admiral’s quotes but not “In honour
I lived with them, in honour I will die with them.”⁷⁹ A more recent example is Terry Coleman’s *The Nelson Touch*. This biography roughly follows Southey’s account, though without quoting the Admiral’s famous words, which is in line with Coleman’s intention to separate history and legend.⁸⁰ Finally, I have used Nelson’s quote to convince you, the reader, that present rhetorical situations continuously change, interpretations of past rhetorical situations also change. Most importantly, as we have seen above, the notion of change implies an idea of the future: speakers seek to change the audience’s interpretations of past situations with a view on future situations.

This view of a sequence of encapsulating interpretations comes close to Quentin Skinner’s theory of “rhetorical redescription” but also goes beyond it. The aim of Skinner’s theory is to explain conceptual change in terms of rhetoric.⁸¹ Its starting point is Quintilian’s analysis of the rhetorical technique of the *paradiastole*. This consists, in Skinner’s paraphrase, of “replacing a given evaluative description with a rival term that serves to picture the action no less plausibly, but serves at the same time to place it in a contrasting moral light.”⁸² Quintilian gives the example of lawyers who in response to the circumstances redescribe “prodigality” as “liberality,” “avarice” as “carefulness,” and “negligence” as “simplicity of mind.”⁸³ Skinner himself gives the example of the discussions about child abuse pointing out that “what appeared a wholesome discipline in the rearing of children in one generation may come to be viewed as cruelty in the next.”⁸⁴ Along the same lines, I hold, the sequence of interpretations of Nelson’s famous words may be viewed as a form of rhetorical redescription, because, as I have shown, each interpreter described Nelson’s words and actions in different terms. But in contrast to Skinner, I wish to stress that rhetorical redescription is not primarily done with a view on the past and the present events, but on these in relation to the future. Interpreters do not only reinterpret words in past situations, but they do so with a view on changing present situations. As I have argued, the kernel of this meaning changing process is to encapsulate past series of questions and answers into the context of new questions and answers. From this it follows that the interpreter’s main task is not to interpret speeches as answers to questions given or constructed in the past, but as evidence on the basis of which the interpreter can interpret the past with a view on the future. The future thus provides the perspective from which all speeches, past and present, are reinterpreted. And since the idea of the future changes with the proceeding of time, it follows that rhetorical interpretation does not stand out of time, but it is always in time.
Bibliography


In the much renowned year of 1968 I spent my summer vacation in Bordeaux with acquaintances of my parents. They had a summer residence at the Bay of Arcachon, where we did a lot of swimming and sailing. One weekend the master of the house’s brother paid us a visit. Self-evidently, the events of May 1968 were still very much on everyone’s mind and therefore soon the occasion for a fierce dispute between the two brothers. And then something interesting happened. For both brothers related, almost as a matter of course, the events of May 1968 to the Second World War—which had ended a mere twenty-three years before—and in which both brothers had played quite different roles. The master of the house who had been an important man in the *macquis*—the French Resistance—had shown great courage and been rewarded for this with a high French decoration. His brother, however, had been a marine-officer under Admiral François Darlan and had thus collaborated with the Vichy regime. But the discussion did not end there. For from France in the Second World War the discussion moved straight away to the French Revolution, which was warmly defended by the “macquis-brother” while the “Vichy-brother” eloquently argued in favor of the *Ancien Régime*.

The debate was a wonderful example of what has often been referred to as “les deux Frances.” These “two Frances” are on either side of the deep fissure that the French Revolution has torn in French history since 1789. One could say that this fissure has made all of French history since 1789 contemporaneous with itself, in the sense that everything that was on one side of the fissure was immediately associated with everything else on that same side, regardless of its temporal distance. Temporal markers were simply dropped, so to say. By making past and
present contemporaneous with each other it was as if the French Revolution continued to live on in the present. Put differently, the suggestion was that the present is a product of the past thanks to the past’s presence in the present. More specifically, the present is not a product of the past in the sense of having been caused by the past, but rather since events such as the French Revolution have the peculiar power of obliterating all temporal distinctions between later events. With the result that all of them, including the present, become somehow contemporary to the French Revolution and participate in its identity.¹

This is neither a new or original view. One might well say that the traditional German historicism of Johann Gottfried Herder, Leopold von Ranke, Wilhelm von Humboldt, and numerous others had argued this same claim since the end of the eighteenth century—though, admittedly, the emphases were a bit different from the French example above. Thus, Herder: “what I am, is what I have become. I have grown into what I am like a tree: the seed was there, but air, the soil and all the other elements around me had to contribute to form the seed, the fruit and the tree.”² Or think of Ranke: “in all things, at all times, it is the origin that is decisive. The first seed goes on to work continuously throughout the whole process of development, either consciously or unconsciously.”³ Or of Wilhelm Dilthey: “what a man is, only his history can tell him.”⁴ According to historicists, this is not only true of individual human beings, but also of civilizations, nations, peoples, institutions, and so on— in short of all that falls within the scope of historical investigation. Mandelbaum summarized the historicist thesis as:

Historicism is the belief that an adequate understanding of the nature of any phenomenon and an adequate assessment of its value are to be gained through considering it in terms of the place it occupied and the role it played within a process of development.⁵

This is the foundation and point of departure for all historical writing worthy of this name. And the idea always is that the past is carried along into the present—hence, it is contemporaneous with us—insofar as our past determines who we are. The past lives on in us; it is the historian’s main responsibility and assignment to show in what way this is so in individual cases. Today, one sometimes speaks about the past as travelling together with us without our being aware of it, like a “stowaway” on some ship in Eelco Runia’s powerful metaphor⁶—and this is then presented as a new and remarkable insight—but the idea is, in fact, as old as historicism itself.
It does not follow that the past should fix for once and for all who we are. For the past is open into three directions. In the first place, each year adds a new year to our past—thereby changing our identity to a smaller or greater extent. Recognizing this is all the more important now that we have to live together in our contemporary Western societies with large groups of immigrants. Under these circumstances it would be wrong to resist this necessity by saying, or implying, that our country had a fixed identity that should now be in danger of being disturbed by these newcomers. For the fact of the immigration of these newcomers and that of our wrestling with this fact are no less part of our (contemporary) history and, hence, of our national identity than things that happened to our nation in a remote past. The notion of identity is, basically, inclusivist and not exclusivist.

Second, it cannot be denied that there are parts of the past with which we cannot possibly identify ourselves any longer. Examples would be the Egypt of the Pharaohs or the Persia of Xerxes and Darius. Although it has to be admitted that even these remote pasts can be quite persistent and tend to die off very, very slowly. Moreover, under certain circumstances they can be resuscitated and regain a prominent place in our identities. Think of how the Battle on the Field of the Blackbirds (Battle of Kosovo) in 1389 was suddenly refurbished some six hundred years later during the conflicts in former Yugoslavia.

In the third place, the picture is complicated by the role that the writing of history may itself play in it. For me, I always find Burckhardt’s statement deeply moving: “what was once jubilation and despair must now become knowledge” (“was einst Jubel und Jammer war, muss nun Erkenntnis werden”). Hence, in the writing of history the happiness and the miseries of the people living in the past should be metamorphosed into objectivist knowledge of the past and must therefore be freed of its emotional content. This is where one might locate the “therapeutical value” that historical writing sometimes has. As Goethe once put it: “the writing of history is a way of getting rid of the burden of the past” (“Geschichte schreiben ist eine Art sich die Vergangenheit vom Halse zu schaffen”). The best example is French historical writing in the nineteenth century, to a large extent a continuous effort to digest the trauma of the French Revolution and its aftermath. And if François Furet is right in his Penser la Révolution Française of 1978, the assimilation of the trauma of 1789 into French history was completed only some two centuries after the event itself, that is, only in our own time. What psychoanalysis has to offer the traumatized person was thus given to the French nation by its historians.
The gap of the present

The historicist account of the past and of historical writing suggests a continuity between past, present and future. Since the past is retained in the present as what fixes our identity there can be no clear demarcation between past and present. And much the same is true for the present and the future. Our present identity will, to a large extent, determine how we shall behave in the future. The historicist conception of history tends to erase all clear boundaries between past, present, and future and to collate them into one all-encompassing continuum, a continuum denying to the present an autonomy of its own. Or, to put it metaphorically, the historicist conception of history leaves no room for there being in the guise of the present some kind of temporal vacuum, to be situated between the past and the future and itself being neither of them, but something basically different. Even more so, we could not even think of what content might be given to this notion of such a “vacuum” between past and present. Historicism thus seems to have the counterintuitive implication of making nonsense of the very notion of the present: for all we have are the past and the future, leaving no room for the present at all.

This must awaken our interest for how the German historian and philosopher of history Reinhart Koselleck succeeded in defining the present in such a way as to avoid this counterintuitive dissolution of the present into the past and the future by the historicist’s argument. His point of departure is the distinction between “Erfahrungsraum” and “Erwartungshorizont,” “the space of experience” and the “horizon of expectation”. The former is the past made present, made accessible to us here and now, thus a potential object of memory, if not more; whereas the latter is the future pulled back within the present in the guise of wishes, desires, expectations, wonder, or curiosity that we may have with regard to the future. Above all, Koselleck insists that there exists a telling asymmetry between the two of them. For when discussing the former he quite deliberately speaks of the “space of experience,” insofar as the notion of space is suggestive of a space that be filled with different contents, without there being some specific order or hierarchy between these contents. As Koselleck nicely puts it, taking in the space of experience is much like looking through the glass of a washing machine and behind which we will then see the laundry being disorderly thrown around. This is basically different with the “horizon of expectation” since there we will have a very clear-cut separation between the present and the future, even though it may be true.
that this horizon flies away from us just as fast as we approach it. It's always ahead of us.

The past thus seems to be open to the present—the borderline between them being always permeable—whereas the borderline between the present and the future is as sharp as a knife. The fact that we may well have our expectations of the future and that these will sometimes come true does not alter this. For there always exists the possibility of some unforeseen catastrophe condemning all our expectations about the future to the dustbin. However, we could not possibly think of some event radically undoing the continuity between past and present and the basic permeability of the borderline between the two of them. This is what Koselleck sees as the basic asymmetry between how we relate to the past, on the one hand, and the future, on the other. As he puts it:

... The space of experience and the horizon of expectation therefore cannot be unequivocally related to each other. When taken together they constitute the present as a temporal difference, since they present us with incommensurable characterizations of past and future. Intended or not, the relationship created by the two in their interaction, is therefore suggestive of a leap into the future.  

This quote may help explain the suggestion of a moment ago that the present, in agreement with Koselleck's conceptions, should be seen primarily as a “vacuum”: it is such a vacuum since the present is, basically, the locus of its incommensurability with the past and the future. It is an empty place of which nothing can be said in addition to the mere observation that it marks the very moment of the incommensurability of the past and the future.

But Koselleck does not stop there—as we might have expected already from his claim that the incommensurability of past and present is suggestive of a leap into the future—and can, therefore, be tied to the moment of its discovery. In this way, the discovery of the present, as a category to be distinguished between the past and the future, can be situated in the West's history itself. Koselleck thinks here primarily of what he would later call “die Sattelzeit,” the transition of the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries from an agrarian prerevolutionary society to an industrialized world taking its first uncertain steps in the direction of modern democracy. The space of experience lost much of its meaning and practical value while the horizon of expectation was now more of an unknown than ever before. A gap opened up between the two of them—and this is how the present came into being as a category irreducible to either of them.
Koselleck’s analysis is not without its paradoxes: historicism and the fascination with the past came into being simultaneously, although one would believe, following Koselleck’s argument, that history—hence, the space of experience—had lost its relevance and been reduced to mere antiquarian significance. Koselleck does not really address the problem. The closest he comes to it is when he emphasizes (with Friedrich Schlegel) that progress is faster in some areas than in others, so that the present seems to be torn apart between a persistence of the past in some places and an anticipation of the future elsewhere. But I am not sure whether this argument will be of much help. For the only conclusion one may infer from it is that the irrelevance of the past announces itself in some domains of human endeavor sooner than in others. And this gives us no hold on the perplexing question of why history could become so popular at the very moment when “the space of experience” and “the horizon of expectation” began growing apart from each other. I return to this issue below.

Truth and reconciliation commissions

All the more reason, therefore, to see whether we can find help elsewhere in our effort to deal with the problem of what is at stake when the gap of the present opens up between the past and the future. Self-evidently, it is best to focus on historical examples in which the gap of the present, hence the gap separating the space of experience and the horizon of expectation, is deepest and seems unbridgeable. The first example to come to mind, is, obviously, the French Revolution—if only since Koselleck himself so directly related the coming into being of the gap between the past and the future to it. There is, however, a peculiarity of the French Revolution that makes it a less suitable example in the present context. I have in mind here the fact that the French revolutionaries did not want to separate past and future but, instead, to simply abolish the past. Which is, of course, a far more drastic gesture. Characteristic is the revolutionary calendar adopted in October 1793, beginning retrospectively with the abolishment of the monarchy on September 22, 1792. The revolutionaries wanted to start history anew, so to say, as if there had been no history prior to Year One of the revolutionary calendar. And, as is known from Pierre Rosanvallon’s writings on French history, this was for the revolutionaries no mere manner of speaking, but their real intention. However, as commonsense—and Freud—demands us to recognize: every attempt to abolish the past is doomed to failure. The repressed past made its entry soon again into nineteenth-century French historical writing,
reflecting on what was repressed by the Revolution and why. This gave us, or, rather, the nineteenth-century French, the separation of “the space of experience” and “the horizon of expectation” that Koselleck had had in mind, and the kind of historical writing and historical consciousness belonging to it. But, again, this is a “régime d’historicité,” to use François Hartog’s terminology, that is basically different from that for which the French revolutionaries had aimed. Nevertheless, there is a lesson in all this. For it follows from the foregoing that it is possible to study the emergence of the present as the gap between the past and the future on the condition that the powers of the past are openly and candidly recognized.

This, then, is where the “régime d’historicité” at work in the so-called Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) of the recent past differs basically from the one known from the French Revolution. The French revolutionaries laid the perpetrators of what they regarded as the crimes of the past under the guillotine—and could one take the idea of the abolition of the past more literally?—whereas these Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, as their very name suggests, aimed at a reconciliation with the past.

But before getting to the issue of the “régime d’historicité” exemplified by the TRCs a few things need to be said about them. Although worldwide some two dozen of these TRCs have been at work with more or less success, and although the Argentinian effort to come to terms with the crimes of the dictatorial regime of Jorge Rafael Videla is in several respects the most interesting, the South African TRC provides the best matrix for understanding them and for how they relate to the “régime d’historicité” of traditional historical writing.

Four years after having been released from prison in February 1990, Nelson Mandela became President of South Africa and ended the apartheid regime, which had been established in 1948. The end of apartheid elicited the new problem—experienced by all as such—of how to deal with South Africa’s violent past in a way that would be acceptable to all parties, decisive for the country’s future, and that would allow the country to recover from its wounds in a relatively peaceful way. The interim Constitution of 1993 expressed the nature of the problem well:

This Constitution provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society characterized by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful coexistence and development opportunities for all South Africans irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex. The pursuit of national unity, the well being of all South African citizens and peace, require reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the reconstruction of society.
Observe, in the first sentence of this passage, the use of the metaphor of the bridge, which paradoxically combines both the recognition of distance with the promise of that distance being overcome. In fact, there is no better metaphor for expressing “the gap of the present” existing between the space of experience and the horizon of the expectation than that of the bridge. And this applies all the more so to South Africa during its transition from apartheid to a still indefinite, but hopefully better future. And between these two large continents of the past and the future—both so very different from each other—there is the narrow and shaky “bridge of the present” connecting the two of them, but no less separating them too. As may also become clear from this metaphor, we’d better not rush here, or make unexpected or pathetic movements, since this might upset the uncertain bridge on which we find ourselves, with the result that we plunge in the abyss after all. In sum, passing from the past to the future in a context like that of South Africa in the 1990s puts a premium on prolonging the present as much as possible. The longer the present can function as a kind of limbo between the past and the future—itself being part of neither of them—the better it is.

So, a plan needed to be drawn up for how to move from one end of the bridge to the other—and where the plan would not merely give the direction of the movement but be part of it as well, or, rather, its impulse-moment—which brings us to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. A first step in the direction of the South African TRC had, in fact, been made already during the negotiations between the National Party of Prime Minister F. W. de Klerk and the ANC (African National Congress). Part of these negotiations concerned the problem of what would happen to people guilty of crimes committed during the apartheid regime. Initially no progress was made with the problem. But then Joe Slovo, the leader of the South African Communist Party, suggested the possibility of postponing a final decision on the issue to a later time, on the basis of the agreement promising “a general amnesty in which those seeking to benefit [from it] will disclose in full those activities from which they require an amnesty.” Since the amnesty issue is almost always an integral part of the assignment of TRCs, the compromise suggested by Slovo was an important first step in the direction of a South African TRC. Indeed, this first step proved to be decisive and in July 1995 Nelson Mandela signed the Promotion of National and Reconciliation Act formally instituting South Africa’s TRC. It was given a threefold mandate:

first it had to draw as complete a picture as possible of the nature, causes, and extent of gross violations of human rights committed during the period from 1
March 1960\textsuperscript{16} to the cut-off date contemplated in the Constitution, second it had to grant selective amnesties to perpetrators of politically motivated crimes on the condition that the they disclosed the full truth about their crimes, and third, it had to make recommendations about appropriate reparations for the victims of apartheid.\textsuperscript{17}

The third issue of appropriate reparations was never given much attention by the South African TRC, so that leaves us with the two first ones. Needless to say, there is a clear difference between the two mandates, insofar as the former had best be entrusted to the historian while it typically is the lawyer's task to decide about amnesties. Moreover, the Reconciliation Act's very formulation already seems to favor the latter to the former. For it explicitly requires the historian to leave out of their account crimes committed prior to March 1, 1960. However, it runs up against the historian's professional mind having to consider one and the same act committed on March 1, 1960 a crime and as not being a crime if committed one day before. History is inhospitable to such abrupt transitions; everything develops gradually in history. Superannuation, with all of the abruptness implied by it, is, on the contrary, part and parcel of the lawyer's way of thinking.\textsuperscript{18}

The tendency to privilege lawyers was also clear from the fact that “no single historian was appointed commissioner or held a leading function in the TRC.”\textsuperscript{19} This gives rise to the question of to what extent this juxtaposition of the discourse of history and that of law may have determined the results of the South African TRC and—no less important—whether any negative results could have been prevented if one had chosen a different regime between the two discourses. Or, to reformulate the question: what roles must be assigned to history and law, respectively, if we need to find our way, as well as possible, on the narrow and shaky “presentist” bridge connecting the space of the experience of the past with the horizon of the expectation of the future?

History and law in the South African TRC

There is a nearly unanimous consensus that “history” did not fare well in the TRC.\textsuperscript{20} Not only were historians not invited to play a predominant role in the world of the TRC, and their contributions reduced to mere fact-finding, even more so, historians always looked at the whole enterprise with the greatest distrust. The hope of the Archbishop Desmond Tutu—who presided over the TRC—was that the TRC would offer a “road map for those who wish to travel in
our past,” they considered a naive illusion. For such road maps for the past do not exist, and people believing in them often think that simply having the facts about the past will give you such a road map. What are road maps, after all, other than the handy presentation of a number of geographical facts? But history is more than mere fact-finding, as the historians liked to point out. Moreover, the organizational structure adopted for the TRC still further marginalized the historical dimension, as will become clear from the following enumeration of its activities.

In the first place, there was the Human Rights Violation Committee (HRVC) hearing the testimonies of some 22,000 victims of the apartheid regime with a special focus on so-called window-cases and that were believed to be exemplary of the regime. Next, public hearings were organized in order to structure the collective memory of the past by forming “powerful epistemological myths about the primacy and authenticity of direct experience … in recounting truth.” Second, and most prominent of all, was the Amnesty Commission (AC) whose task was to decide on some 7,000 requests for amnesty (only about 15% were granted). Though the AC did what it could, it was commonly regarded as having failed since it prosecuted almost exclusively the executors of the apartheid regime and not the political leaders who had installed it (with the exception of Adriaan Vlok, a former minister of justice). Finally, there was the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee (R&RR) whose activities were of marginal significance. These three commissions were supported by the Investigation Unit (IU) and the Research Department (RD), manned by roughly seventy people. Originally their task was to write a new and revisionist history of South Africa since 1960, but they were soon swamped by requests for information from the HRVC and the AC and were thus unable to fulfill the task assigned to them. In fact, this is symbolic of the achievement of the TRC as a whole: no one can fail to be deeply impressed by the efforts of the TRC and, though it is hard to find hard proof for such a claim, few people will doubt that the country simply needed something like the TRC and that it reduced part of the hatred between South Africa’s black and white population. Nevertheless, even though the TRC had reconciliation in its very title, reconciliation is still a long way off, if ever it will come. Moreover, whatever the TRC actually achieved was done so by juridical rather than historical discourse. And that confronts us with the question whether the TRC did the right thing by privileging juridical to historical discourse.

In order to address that question it is best to start with the observation that both the lawyer and the historian have a professional interest for facts. Legal
cases are decided on the basis of facts. Historians use facts for creating an image or a picture of part of the past. A historical text is not a grocery list of facts, but historical facts selected, organized, and presented to the reader of the text in such a way as to suggest how we, according to the historian in question, should look at the past. In the context of the present discussion there is a peculiar ambivalence in this feature of historical writing. For, on the one hand, the historian’s proposals for how we should look at the past have the effect of objectifying the past, of placing it at some distance from us. On the other hand, as is evident from historicism, historical writing relies on a *fabula de te narratur*, presenting its audiences with identity, hence, with who we *are* as the result of our history. Historical writing must have these effects, which may be unpalatable to the aims of TRCs. For in the former case the perpetrators of past crimes may find an excuse for their crimes in the fact that they were committed under different historical circumstances. To take an example, how could we condemn sixteenth-century judges for sending elderly women to the stake when everyone believed in the existence of witches? In the latter case, the subsuming of past crimes in our very identity is a standing invitation to continue them. So, the historical approach to what is at stake in TRCs prepares us for the unpleasant dilemma of either an untoward propensity to forgiveness or persistence in the wrongdoings of the past. Whatever option one prefers, the result seems to be unfortunate from the perspective of the aims of TRCs.

This brings me to the heart of the issue. If the discourse of history is apparently less appropriate for satisfactorily doing justice to the victims of a violent and oppressive regime, had we then not better turn to juridical discourse? And would that not require us to admire the wisdom of the organizers of the South African TRC when so openly and deliberately marginalizing the role of historians? Certainly, there is common ground between the two of them, as I said a moment ago, since both historians and lawyers will insist that facts have to be established as accurately as possible. But whereas facts are for the historian the basis for coming to a picture of the past, lawyers use them for pronouncing a sentence (or for disputing it). And there is a world of difference between the two. Historians possess no fixed rules for how to move from facts to the picture of the past presented to readers. One might even say that each historical text is a mere *proposal* for what such rules should look like in individual cases; in fact, each historical text could be read as saying what rules would have to be adopted for projecting as satisfactory as possible the past itself on the plane of (historical) language. In the case of jurisdiction, however, the question is how the facts of the defendant’s behavior, under a certain description of them, should be related
to the rules for punishable behavior, as defined by the appropriate paragraph in the penal code. The historian moves from facts to something (vaguely) general, that is to say some picture of the past; the lawyer moves in the opposite direction by applying the general rules of the penal code to the facts of an individual punishable action.

If this sketch of the relationship between historical and juridical discourse is basically correct, one may see here an explanation of why historical discourse would be an inconvenient encumbrance for the well-functioning of TRCs, which will end up almost inevitably with juridical discourse, as was the case with the South African TRC. It’s like this. Historians professionally recognize the historicity of norms and values in religion, ethics, and law. They like to insist that in, for example, the Middle Ages, one thought differently about good and evil than nowadays. Think of Ian Hacking’s *Rewriting the Soul* of 1998 having as its point of departure the fact that a forty-five-year-old man marrying a girl of fourteen was completely acceptable in the 1830s, whereas such a person would nowadays immediately be accused of pedophilia and statutory rape. The recognition by historians of the historicity of norms and values may obviously be an encumbrance for the condemnation of what in our eyes went wrong in the past. This is different in jurisdiction even though, admittedly, the appeal to extenuating circumstances may have a somewhat similar effect there. The explanation is that in juridical discourse time has, in principle, no role to play. The lawyer is interested exclusively in whether the behavior of some person, under a certain description of it, falls within the scope of an article in the penal code and next, if so, what punitive measure should follow from this. Time is irrelevant in this context, with the sole, all-important exception of the issue of superannuation. The fact that superannuation is merely a matter of yes or no suggests already that time does not really enter into the considerations of the lawyer, and it concerns only the preliminary question of whether a certain case is within the lawyer’s competency or not.

It is precisely at this point that TRCs face an all-decisive complication, namely, that of so-called transitional justice. TRCs typically come into being when one moves from one regime to a later one. For example, from the South African apartheid regime to that of the legal equality of races. And then crimes committed under the previous one cannot automatically be punished with an appeal to the legislation of the new regime. For it may well be that under the previous regime these crimes were not punishable, whereas the legislation of the new regime condemning them is later than these crimes and therefore not applicable to them. So, acquittal seems to be the only option, in agreement with the old rule: “nulla poena sine lege.”
This evidently is wholly unacceptable in cases such as South Africa, Argentina or, for that matter, Hitler’s genocide of the Jews. But for cases like these, an acceptable solution is easy to think of. One might say that there are actions that each reasonable person would condemn as criminal and are, therefore, punishable, even if they were not so under certain juridical dispensations (with the consequence that such juridical dispensations would have to be characterized as criminal themselves). In such cases, we speak of “crimes against humanity.” And for three reasons not much need to be feared anymore from the argument about the historicization of norms and values mentioned a moment ago. First, if TRCs enter the scene, we always have to deal with crimes dating from a relatively recent past, and that automatically substantially minimizes the force of the historicization argument; the argument gathers strength only when large temporal differences come together with large differences in moral standards. Second, an appeal to Hans Kelsen’s so-called Grund-norm or “basic norm” may even allow us to condemn the punishment of crimes that some juridical system itself leaves unpunished (e.g., the crimes committed by the Nazis against the Jews). A juridical system’s basic norm can be defined as a basic norm that is recursively defined by all the rules of that system. From the perspective of such a basic norm such iniquities as the deprivation of the Jews of their most basic rights by the Nazi regime can be shown to involve an inconsistency between that deprivation and the rest of the legal system respecting such rights. And, lastly, there are numerous international treaties obliging criminal regimes, no less than others, to respect human rights. Against the background of these considerations the “nulla poena sine lege” argument is bound to lose much of its force.

Conclusion

Two threads can be discerned in my argument. In the first place, defining the past with Koselleck as the space of experience and the future as the horizon of expectation introduces a present that is both incompatible and incommensurable with the past and the future. In the second place, this relationship between past, present, and future can best be explored by an investigation of TRCs, since these must function in a context exemplifying most clearly the present’s relationship to both the past and the future. It is their task to define a present that will be the nation’s best guide for moving from a trouble past to a better future. Obviously, most, if not all human life, is an effort to cope with this transition from past to present and from the present to the future. But ordinarily the categories
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of past, present, and future are so intimately intertwined that it is impossible to reconstruct how they relate to each other. Many philosophies of time, like those of Aristotle, St. Augustine, Husserl, Heidegger, Ricoeur, or Jameson capitalize on this seemingly inextricable knot of past, present, and future. What is so revolutionary about Koselleck’s proposal—probably more revolutionary than he himself is aware of—is that he radically breaks with all these efforts to rob the present of its own characteristics by submerging it in one way or the other into the past and the future. Koselleck insists upon the basic asymmetry between the past and the future and is therefore able to rescue what is peculiar to the present. The task and the activities of the TRCs demonstrate how much Koselleck had been in the right about this.

More specifically, this is why TRCs consistently prefer juridical to historical discourse. The former enables them to stretch the present as much as possible, more precisely, for as long as the terms for superannuation allow them to do so. It may seem arbitrary, ridiculous, if not worse to the historian to fix the mandate of the South African TRC on March 1, 1960, but we should recognize that this is wholly in agreement with the logic of Koselleck’s argument. As soon as the failure to recognize the asymmetry between the past and the future blurs the demarcations of the present, the present will be invaded by the past and the future, and nothing will be left of it. It is, however, the law, as decreed for a period of so-called transitional justice that succeeds in digging a safe place for the present under the overwhelming onslaughts on it by the past and the future.

It also follows that from the perspective of history and in historical discourse there is no present in the proper sense of the word; there is only the past and the future. The implication is that contemporary history, or what the Germans call “Zeitgeschichte,” poses no specific problems of its own for the writing of history. It is often said that such problems should be occasioned by the fact that we can only write the history of what is at some historical distance from us. But the argument makes sense only on the assumption that there should be a “present”—as distant and distinct from the past—functioning as the perspective from which the past is seen and analyzed. If the assumption were correct, then, indeed, there would be a problem with contemporary history. For, obviously, the present cannot offer a perspective on itself. I shall not deny that the writing of contemporary history has problems of its own. But historians have found solutions to them—as is clear already from the fact that contemporary history has become over the last few decades a much respected and flourishing subdiscipline. Think, moreover, of journalism. Are their writings not the ne plus ultra of
contemporary history? And do we not consider their writings most informative, nay, even indispensable for our orientation in the complex and rapidly changing world in which we are living? And do the newspapers of today not give us the history of yesterday and those of tomorrow that of what is still the future? So, is not justifiable to spin Croce's famous dictum that “all history is contemporary history” by saying that “all contemporary history is history”—nothing more and nothing less than that?

One last problem to address: in Koselleck the present is defined as the gap between the space of experience and the horizon of expectations. According to Koselleck, the discovery of this gap was contemporaneous with the discovery of history. Obviously, this is counterintuitive, to say the least, if we recall my argument of a moment ago that the present is not a historical category and that historical, or rather historicist, thought leaves no room for it. So how could the present, as a distinct temporal category, possibly come into being at precisely the moment when it lost its theoretical raison d’être? I must confess that I don’t have a convincing explanation of this paradox right now. However, there may be two ways for dealing with the problem. One might think of the sociopsychological explanation that the loss of the present by the victory of the “régime d’historicité” of historicism causes an unconscious and subterranean yearning for the present, or for presentism. Another, more philosophical explanation could be that the most basic categories of human existence only come to us in binary opposites: life versus death, the gods versus humans, heaven and earth, good and evil, and so on. So, it might have been here: the present was discovered thanks to a conception of time leaving no room for it. Historicism eliminated the present, but precisely because of this forced it to find a refuge where it could continue to live on free from the threats of historicism. It’s the kind of argument that will undoubtedly be welcomed by the structuralists and the dialecticians among us.

Bibliography


We cannot exclude in advance any of the actors who participate in the production of history or any of the sites where that production may occur. While some of us debate what history is or was, others take it in their own hand.¹

Introduction

On June 20, 2012, the Federal Executive Council of Nigeria constituted a Cabinet Centenary Committee in preparation for the commemoration, in 2014, of Nigeria’s one hundred years of national existence since the 1914 amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Protectorates by Lord Fredrick Lugard. A presidential subcommittee, comprising the Director of National Archives, directors of the National Library, research centers, and prominent academics, was charged with drafting a centenary book. Among other things the work of the committee was to collect, develop, and select the contents of the official centenary book that would tell the history of Nigeria from 1914 to 2014, in words and pictures. To this effect, circulars were dispatched to all the state governors in the federation, directing them to collect and submit all relevant historical source materials for their respective states; and also to articulate the history of relics, events and historical facts for processing into the centenary book.² According to the Federal Government, this was designed to celebrate Nigeria’s history and unity and “to affirm the obvious truth that Nigeria is not a historical accident.”³

The assorted cultural programs designed for the centenary commemoration reflect the character of history as a hybrid knowledge regime, involving an arsenal of practitioners—historians, archaeologists, archivists, museum curators, publishers, and even policy-makers. Although these practitioners work in
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separate institutions or sites of knowledge production such as history departments, archives, museums and publishing houses, they are officially bound by the common mandate of research, documentation, and dissemination of knowledge about Nigeria's pasts.

The commemoration of Nigeria's centenary also brings to the fore issues of authority and ownership of Nigerian history, and to what extent it is contestable. This is evident in the controversy—among politicians, historians, and public commentators—surrounding the implications of these commemorations on the meaning of Nigerian history. The Governor of Lagos State Babatunde Tunde Fashola cautioned the Federal Government not to distort Nigerian history because, as he contends, “all our teachers taught us is that Nigeria became a sovereign nation on 1st October 1960.” Even the place where the Amalgamation Proclamation was made became a point of controversy. There was a feud between Niger and Kogi States over the status and rightful ownership of the colonial seat of power/administration and the venue of the amalgamation. Whereas the Kogi State Government asserts that the event took place in Lokoja (the present capital of Kogi state), Niger State claims that Lord Lugard, the architect of the amalgamation, was in Zungeru (in present-day Niger state) at the time. Responding to this historical imbroglio Adamu Simbad, a historian, argues that although Lokoja had its significance as a former colonial capital, Zungeru was the headquarters of the government and the site where the Amalgamation treaty was ratified.

Since the attainment of independence in 1960, Nigerian history has come to represent something of a shared “knowledge industry,” processing and pro-creating contesting visions and narratives of the nation. After over fifty years of independence from British colonial rule, it is somewhat eccentric that Nigerians are still debating basic historical facts such as the dates of national anniversaries and the seats of colonial government. This is not to suggest some kind of national consensus or philosophy of history to which Nigerian historians, government, and the public should subscribe, since “the problems of determining what belongs to the past multiply tenfold especially when that past is said to be collective.”

Nigeria occupies an important place in the history of modern African historiography. It is one of the birthplaces of academic history and also one of the most studied countries in Africa. However, scholarship on the production of Nigerian historiography has tended to focus exclusively on historical texts, thereby sidestepping discussions about those important institutions where history is produced and practiced—in other words, a fairly strict and conventional
concern with texts and perhaps their contexts. Nigerian historiography has been a professional discipline, a field, rather closed to the world and certainly kept within the precincts of the university.

Drawing insights from cultural anthropology, archival science, and museum studies, this chapter offers a new reading of the making of history in Nigeria by questioning the customary reading of historiography as a fairly closed system of the reading and writing of texts, and acknowledging the agency of several actors involved in the production of Nigerian history. While existing studies on historiography have focused exclusively on books about the past and their authors, articles in research journals, and debates between authors, I pay attention to the “real” institutions that are responsible for regulating historical knowledge in Nigeria such as the National Archives, the National Commission for Museums and Monuments, the Historical Society of Nigeria, and the National Universities Commission. I theorize this ensemble of institutional mechanisms as a “history machine,” defined as the interconnected system and technologies through which the Nigerian state attempts to produce a national narrative by appropriating, packaging, and presenting discrete ethnic symbols and rapporteurs as an aggregation of Nigerian history in specific national cultural institutions. The Nigerian history machine represents a complex policy regime used by the Government of Nigeria in policing the discursive parameters of history outside the exclusive control of professional historians.

The chapter is based on the premise that the links between history as an academic field and the actual sites where historical knowledge is produced such as the archive, the museum, and the publishing house are grossly undertheorized. Nigerian history—often thought of as a finite body of textual knowledge that could be unequivocally articulated—is not always written or taught in academic institutions. It is also archived, curated, performed, and published within different institutional contexts beyond the academy. Although most professional historians would admit an epistemological connection between mainstream history (as practiced within academia) and archival and museum institutions, our knowledge about the ways in which these allied practices connect and shape the direction of historical discourse leave much to be desired.

Theorizing the “history machine”

I originally approached the making of history in postcolonial Nigeria as an intervention into intellectual history. After a close engagement with an
interdisciplinary literature ranging from cultural studies to other avant-garde theoretical debates and discourses in archival studies, museum studies, and book history, I became acquainted with new methods of interpreting the ways in which history is produced beyond the academy. Seen within the rubric of cultural theory, thus, the production of historical discourse transcends the meaning of history as a literary/textual form. What I am positing in this context is that the study of Nigerian historiography calls for a “unity of approach” across a broad range of historical practices. Although these practices “have their own priorities and agendas, [and] draw on different sets of data, they have as their common thread the interpretation of past human activity.”10

My attempt at theorizing a history machine, albeit drawing from works done in critical cultural studies and cultural anthropology, is novel in the field of Nigerian historiography. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in their collaborative works conceive of the machine as a way to explain social formations and literary production. In A Thousand Plateaus, they define social formations by what they call “machinic assemblage.” The book according to Deleuze and Guattari is a kind of “literary machine”: an assemblage that is unattributable. In other words, the making of the book involves different agents and processes that cannot be solely attributed to one agent. Their use of the term ‘machine’ in Anti-Oedipus is largely mechanical and psychoanalytical. In their critique of Freudian psychoanalysis, which treats desire in terms of lack and acquisition, Deleuze and Guattari approach desire as a positive regime of production, which operates through a combination of technical and social machines. They do not make any pretention about their interpretation of the social machine in a literal sense: the social machine, they declare, “is a machine, irrespective of metaphor.” They do, however, admit it could be technical as well as social, depending on the perspective from which one is looking at it. The clock, for instance, is “a technical machine for measuring uniform time”; it is also a “social machine for reproducing canonic hours and for assuring order in the city.” In his study of the work of the French novelist Marcel Proust, Deleuze describes art as a “machine” through which signs are multiplied or manipulated to produce certain impressions about how we make meanings about objects around us. The theoretical scope of the Deleuze-Guattarian machinic frame has been extended by writers such as Jeffery Cohen and John Johnston who operationalized the idea as Medieval Identity Machines or “Vision Machine,” respectively.16

My operationalization of the term “machine” departs from its usages by the preceding scholars. While the idea of the machine is used mechanically in relation to psychoanalysis, capitalism, and literature, I am transposing it into historical
discourse to animate the processes through which history is produced in contemporary Nigeria. In this sense, the history machine is purely metaphorical. History conceived as a machine becomes the site of multiple practices connected by their shared interest in past human activities. To be sure, the production of history may involve real machines—archaeological instruments of excavation like Ground Penetrating Radar for site mapping or investigation, laboratory equipment for examining artifacts such as x-ray imaging machine, or printing machines for the production of history books. But unlike mechanical bodies, “real” machines, used in industrial manufacturing, the history machine is different. The history machine operates as a dynamic and double-jointed system, with various moving parts that are not attached to a central operating device. It is a nonlinear regime of knowledge production with various specialized components traversing the same epistemic terrain. The history machine is akin to a factory of governance that manufactures the past as a cultural commodity—as artifacts, monuments and heritage sites, archives and scholarly history texts and popular books, which, although ontologically diverse, have a common ultimate epistemological concern: the construction of knowledge about past human activity.

History as a practice means different things to practitioners in different disciplinary fields. For the conventional historian, who practices the craft within the walls of academic formations, history is the written narrative of the past, which is documented in academic monographs. By contrast, the archaeologist and museum curator see history in terms of artifacts or past material culture. Although the archivist is expected to have some knowledge of history, the prevailing view is that “an archivist is not and should not be a historian” for fear of losing their professional identity to the historical discipline. While these practitioners operate in different institutional contexts, they are epistemologically connected to the grid of history in many significant ways. When historians write history, it assumes the status of a textual product; when published, it is turned into history books or journals; when documents from the past are archived, they form an institution of source material for historical writing (archives); when curated in museums and heritage sites it becomes artifacts and monuments. These practices together constitute a dynamic ensemble of institutional machines by which the past is processed and turned into history. It is in this symbolic sense that I envision my formulation of the history machine paradigm.

The writings of Michel Foucault, particularly *The Archaeology of Knowledge* and *The Order of Things* inspired a new shift in historiography in which the past is seen as socially constructed. The cultural construction of the past, “discourse
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analysis, and the rhetorics of historical writing” itself, so central to the new cultural history, leans heavily on Foucault's archaeological and genealogical methods. History, viewed from the Foucauldian perspective, is a study in power relations. How history is written, archived, curated, and published is deeply implicated in structures of power in a given society. Thus, historical knowledge is controlled through mechanisms of power such as history departments, museums, archives, and the publishing industry. In other words, history is not only composed of discourses, but also embedded and situated in concrete institutions, which embrace the past as their discursive field, and whose operations are governed by regimes of discipline, serve as the purveyors of the history machine. All sites of historical pedagogy, whether they are history departments or museums, are run through the mechanism of “discursive policing,” defined as the “political way of maintaining or modifying the appropriation of discourses, along with the knowledges and powers which they carry.”

In Foucauldian terms, these institutions or tools of history represent the “great political and economic apparatuses” under which discourses are produced and transmitted. In academic institutions, for example, students of history are expected to work within the limits and rules established by the institution, the subject, and the department, and to acquire certain discipline with which they should practice the historical craft. In the words of Foucault, “the discipline is a principle of control over the production of discourse.” Similarly, visitors to the National Museums and searchers in the National Archives must conduct themselves according to the rules set by the National Commission for Museums and Monuments and the National Archives of Nigeria respectively. Even more importantly, curators of collections and archives follow a set of rules that determines how collections will look. These sites of history-making are the technical bodies of the history machine, or what Michel de Certeau calls “the historical institution” or the “erudite machine,” in relation to the making of archives in medieval Europe, and what Pierre Chaunu describes in another context as the “gigantic machine.”

The traditional meaning of history, as text, has been both contested and deepened by a whole range of different approaches to the “study of our changing ways of making sense of the past.” The history machine model speaks to the anthropological tradition of the production of history whereby schools, museums, heritage sites, archives, and commemorations are being examined in their own right as sites and practices of historical production. History is a practice or an operation in the sense in which de Certeau broadly defines it as a combination of a social place (history departments, museums, archives, heritage sites, etc.),
scientific practices (historiography, archaeology, anthropology, etc.), and writing. These practices involve such technical procedures as collecting, writing, discoursing, archiving, curating, and publishing, which release the practice of history to the space of the society and organize the procedures of the discipline.

I see the making of history in postcolonial Nigeria as the function of a collaborative regime of knowledge production, which is, at least at the initial stage, essentially state-driven. From this perspective, Nigerian history becomes a “collective product, not that of an individual historian, but together a result and symptom of the group which functions as a laboratory.” The idea of the history machine advances the view that historical production involves a complex and wider processes than most theorists admit. As Trouillot notes, the making of history neither starts nor terminates with academic history because the “public is quite likely to contribute to history if only by adding its own readings to—and about—the scholarly production.” This generic approach to the making of history affords us the opportunity of linking the theory and practice of Nigerian history in ways that are conceptually novel and empirically grounded. In order to track the concrete practices and conditions under which Nigerian history is produced, there is need to look beyond the academy, since historical practice involves multiple yet mutually supportive participating agents and agencies. The process of producing a national historical narrative in Nigeria involved the establishment of history departments, archives, and museums in various parts of the country.

The institutionalization of Nigerian history

Nigeria is the most populous black nation in the world with a population of about a hundred and seventy million people and over two hundred and fifty ethnicities—the major ones being the Hausa and Fulani in the north, Yoruba in the west, and the Igbo in the east. In addition to these major ethnicities, there are multiple ethnic and linguistic minorities found mainly in the Middle Belt areas of northern Nigeria and the Niger Delta region in the south. Following the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Protectorates in 1914, the various ethnicities were federated into the Nigerian state. With this development, Nigeria, as a political space, was born without a corresponding national narrative—Nigerian History. From the outset, the government of the federation recognized this epistemological lacuna as a poverty of national narrative in the Nigerian project. The task of “federating” separate ethnic histories into
a coherent national narrative was, therefore, one of the priorities of the post-colonial government. The Federal Government began a process of mobilizing institutional mechanisms and resources for nation-building. Between the 1940s and 1960s, universities, archives, museums, and other cultural institutions were founded almost concurrently. These institutions were intended to be the nucleuses of a national historical edifice: a Nigerian history machine that would process divergent material cultures and narratives into a national history. The institutional grid within which different sites for the production of Nigerian history operated—whether conventional history departments, museums or archives—revolved around the Nigerian state, which provided the moral and financial support for the initiation of the national history project. Although historians, archaeologists and museum curators operate along distinct professional and disciplinary tracks and in separate institutional sites in Nigeria, they work, often unwittingly, in a gigantic knowledge industry.

The first of these institutions of historical production was the history department founded in 1948 at the University College Ibadan, later University of Ibadan (UI). At UI there emerged a cohort of Nigerian historians whose works produced a variant of Africanist historiography popularly labeled as the Ibadan School of History. Since then, the field of Nigerian history has exploded as the number of history-offering universities and practitioners increased exponentially. Between 1948 and 2013, no less than seventy departments of history were established across Nigeria. From its origins as a cottage industry based in half a dozen universities, it now employs hundreds of practitioners and trains thousands of apprentices. The field is akin to a complex “training factory” with practicing historians and students working along different thematic fields.

Although the production of Nigerian history began as a constricted project within the academy, the alliance of historians, archaeologists, archivists, museum curators, policy-makers, and government agencies opened up the field to extra-academic influences beyond the traditional frontiers of history. From the onset, professional historians recognized the necessity of involving the services of, and collaboration with other institutions and professionals in the production of Nigerian history. Kenneth Dike (1917–1983), assisted by his colleagues in other sectors of historical production, inaugurated what can be described as the “age of documentation,” which saw the collection and preservation of an enormous number of records for Nigerian history. Working as a team they founded the Historical Society of Nigeria (HSN), the Antiquities Commission (later National Commission for Museums and Monuments), and
the National Archives of Nigeria (NAN). The various stakeholders of Nigerian history were committed to, and convinced about, the utility of the project not only because it was easy to fund, but also for the functional value attached to history as the ideological instrument of decolonization and nation-building. The role of nationalist historical discourse in charting the paths of decolonization is well documented. History provided a much-needed philosophy for decolonization. While historians, archivists and archaeologists worked hard in collecting and documenting archival records, artefacts and oral histories, the government provided the institutional context for the writing, exhibition, and documentation of different aspects of Nigeria’s pasts.

Between 1960 and the 1980s, the Nigerian state was privileged as a historical subject. The history machine was structured as a state enterprise, performing the function of manpower production and a “fuller inventory of a national cultural and intellectual property.” As early as 1952, for example, a visitation panel to the University College Ibadan underscored the significance of the discipline as a source of personnel for the public service when it recommended the introduction of honors degree in History. The visitation panel underscored the importance of the history department not only in the humanities but also in assisting the work of the faculties of science and medicine.

The production of national history, particularly in a multicultural context, is a difficult epistemological task. It requires a methodical appropriation and synthesis of separate “regimes of historicity.” In Nigeria this meant that there were over two hundred and fifty discrete ethnic histories to be processed and transformed into Nigerian history. Thus, one important feature of the early stage of modern historiography in Nigeria was that the first-generation historians wrote Nigerian history, with each focusing on one ethnic group or area—more often than not the historian’s own ethnic group or native region. The ambition was to “Nigerianize” these ethnic histories by stressing precolonial intercommunal ties across different ethnic and religious divides. In addition, it was easier for historians of different ethnic pedigree to collaborate and work on regions other than their own. A typical example are the famous historians Emmanuel Ayankanmi Ayandele and Rowland A. Adeleye, both of Yoruba ethnic extinction, but who wrote on Christian missions in Northern Nigeria and power and diplomacy from the 1804 Jihad to the dawn of formal colonialism in the 1900s, respectively. There was minimal tension between historians’ allegiance to the emerging nation and their disciplinary loyalty to the historical craft. With the growing interest in the study of Nigerian history among the new crop of historians, there also arose a need for a professional body to coordinate historical
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This was the impetus that gave birth to the Historical Society of Nigeria (HSN) in 1955.

The Historical Society of Nigeria

The Historical Society of Nigeria was the first association of academics in Nigeria to play a decisive role in the foundation and institutionalization of the Nigerian history. The work of the society was to encourage and coordinate historical research by members, especially in connection with the study of Nigerian history; assist teachers in their efforts to improve the standard of history in Nigeria; and to stimulate interest in the study of history among the general public. The HSN was to pursue these objectives through publications, congresses, lecture courses, group discussions, exhibitions, conducted visits to historical sites, and strengthening contact with other organizations for the promotion of historical studies. Irrespective of disciplinary affiliation, the membership of HSN was open to all individuals and agencies interested in the study of Nigerian history. The founding membership was drawn from an array of professional historians, archaeologists, archivists, and librarians. This multidisciplinary collaboration is crucial for the working of the machine that is the discipline of history. The premier members of the council were as follows: J. C. Anene (historian), T. C. Eneli (archivist), Bernard Fagg (archaeologist to the Nigerian government), W. J. Harris (Librarian), Malam Omaru Gwandu (clerk to the Northern Region House of Assembly), J. D. Cooper, H. F. C. Smith (later Abdullahi Smith), and W. E. Sexton. Regular membership of the HSN in March 1958 stood at 350, with 38 affiliated bodies such as the Royal Anthropological Institute, London; Columbia University Library; and King’s College Library, London. Thus, the HSN was inaugurated on a multidisciplinary platform.

The initial task confronted by the HSN was that of structuring autonomous knowledge production institutions such as universities, archives, museums, and publishing outfits. Their approach to this was to start a major process of decolonizing or “Africanizing” the dominant history curriculum, which was Eurocentric in content and approach. The Ibadan School of History spearheaded the drive toward institutionalizing Africanist curriculum in which African history was made the centerpiece of history teaching, replacing British and European history. A compulsory course module on Nigerian history, using primary documents, was also introduced for the final year undergraduate students. The
Africanist syllabus developed at Ibadan School of History eventually became a model for the universities of Lagos, Ife, and Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria. In order to incorporate schoolteachers into the Nigerian history project, the HSN organized regular workshops for teachers in schools, and handbooks were produced as source material. There was a productive synergy between professional historians, the government, and the members of the public who were interested in Nigerian history. In Northern Nigeria, the government encouraged schools and other agencies to register with the HSN. The early conferences and workshops of the HSN were organized around the theme “the teaching of History.” The theme of its second Annual Congress held in 1956 was “History Teaching in Nigeria.” During the 1950s, the central emphasis remained on the study of African history, with basic instruction to some regional histories—American, Soviet, and non-Soviet European.  

The thematic priority of Nigerian historians began to shift from Africa to Nigeria in the 1980s with the launching of a project on the teaching of Nigerian history from a national perspective. With a generous grant from the Ford Foundation, a workshop was held at the University of Lagos with a view to getting teachers of Nigerian history in the nation’s schools and colleges to see Nigerian history in a more holistic manner. It was resolved that if Nigerian history was to be adequately taught, more textbooks specifically tailored to the syllabus were required as a matter of urgency and that all those in a position to produce textbooks in Nigerian history be encouraged to do so under the auspices of the HSN. With this new drive, the number of works on Nigerian history grew each year. Yet students were increasingly faced with the problem of getting a national narrative due to the sheer number of diverse ethnic and linguistic groups. Consequently, eminent members of the historical profession were commissioned by the HSN to produce chapters on the histories of different Nigerian communities, which were published in 1980 as *The Groundwork of Nigerian History*. This was the first major attempt to publish an overview of Nigerian history by indigenous historians. 

In 1956, the *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* (JHSN) was launched in Nigeria as a means of disseminating the output of historical research on Nigeria. The editorial policy made it clear that the journal would not be limited to contributions by professional historians. Articles by amateur or traditional historians were also published in the journal. In addition, another journal titled *Tarikh* was started for schools and colleges. These publication outfits gradually “established the standards of scholarship and canons for the career of professional historians, which stood up rather well under the pressure of rapid expansion.”
both in terms of the number of practitioners and tempo of scholarly output. However, with increasing pressures of academic scholarship and demands for canonization, the JHSN was gradually turned into an “increasingly orthodox learned journal.”  

Figure 7.1 represents an interesting dynamic of the power relations of academic historical production. The dominance of expatriate historians in the field is visible from the colonial period up until 1965 during which they authored over sixty articles relative to their Nigerian counterpart who produced forty within the said period. The period between 1960s and 1970s saw the academic hegemony of expatriates in departments of history across Nigeria. There was hardly any history department in the country that had no expatriate scholar among its teaching staff, who wielded considerable influence on the direction of research and teaching. However, by the early 1980s, the number of indigenous writers had increased exponentially. The mounting concentration on colonial matters, in both their local and general contexts, between 1965 and 1966 reflects not only the shifting climate of discourse in favor of Africanist/nationalist paradigms, but also of developments associated with the emergence of National Archives.
The National Archives of Nigeria

The story of the Nigerian history machine is more than just an account of historians teaching and writing history within the comforts of the university walls. The capacity to collect, collate, store, and deploy archival documents is at the center of historical production. Such power, especially in a federal state, usually resides with the central government. Official archives represent one of the effective mechanisms through which the state controls the production of history by a process described, in Derridean terms, as the “domiciliation” or “house arrest” of records.

The National Archives of Nigeria (NAN) was established in 1957 following the enactment of the Public Archives Ordinance. In June 1959, Kenneth Dike was appointed as its National Director. From a preliminary survey of records in 1951, to a small record office in Ibadan, the archival project eventually mutated into what de Certeau describes as the “establishment of sources or the redistribution of space … of setting aside, of putting together, of transforming certain classified objects into documents.” This exercise exiles documents (sources) from the sphere of practice and confers on them the status of objects of knowledge. Such concerted activity for the “redistribution of space,” involving the ideas of historians, archivists, and government officials, with all its intrigues, in the context of a country that was bidding farewell to colonial domination, helped to establish the archival basis upon which the early Ph.D. theses at Ibadan as well as the writings of the postcolonial generation of Nigerian historians were produced.

The National Archives hold records whose provenance is both colonial and Nigerian, that is, of the regulatory authority behind them. The interest of the government in centralizing archives is tied to the objective of integrating diverse ethnicities into the Nigerian state. Once files and registers were “exiled” from the field of practice, that is, from hands of government departments and private individuals, they are made “visible” and “invisible,” and “incarcerated” in a “prison of history.” Through practices of selection and appraisal, documents are accorded visibility and invisibility. They become visible because they are selected from a multitude of documents and imbued with discursive agency as sources of history. Their invisibility is acquired once they are removed from the “site of practice” or their place of origin, and consigned to stack rooms from which searchers are barred. In other words, the process of archiving contrives, as much as it suppresses, the conditions and possibilities of historiography. Many possible,
particularly dark, chapters of colonial history were removed from national historiographies because the records were destroyed by colonial bureaucrats and were thus absent from the National Archives.

The history of NAN, and the conditions and practices under which it was constructed, reveals interesting dynamics about not only the institution’s profound influence on the direction of Nigerian historiography, but also on the power relations associated with the making of history. While documents for archivists are “seen in the light of legal, fiscal, political, and social accountability as well as the wherewithal for writing history,” historians are trained to approach archives as a repository of historical data. Archivists define the value of records in terms of their origin, circumstances of creation, and the evidence they contain that justifies permanent conservation. Archivists for some time have criticized the historians’ relative lack of interest in the origins or social function of the documents in the archives. The former believe that the scholarly purpose for which a document is consulted frequently has little or nothing to do with the purpose for which it was originally made. The expected relationship between historians and archivists is that of “professionals” and “record keepers.” Each contests a different philosophy over the preservation of historical knowledge. In Nigeria, historians usually regard archivists as “civil servants,” implying an implicit remonstration of the bureaucratic bottlenecks, which the former usually experience during archival research.

The question of access represents another sphere of friction between historians and archival institutions. While the intention of the pioneer Director of NAN, Dike, was primarily academic, the government from whose affairs the records originated had a distinct conceptualization of the purpose of the National Archives. The Archives Memorandum No. 13, titled “Records Exploitation Services,” stipulates that “records preserved in the National Archives are held in trust on behalf of the bodies that deposited them.” The legislation added that “the archives as institution must not allow the records in its custody to be put into any uses which are (not) approved by depositors.” The use of secrecy as an instrument of social control is not a new practice. Both individuals and institutions make and keep secrets. In fact, “secrecy and its cousin privacy are at the core of current debates over national security, intellectual property regimes” and the relationship between knowledge and social context.

All prospective users of archives were expected to provide reasons in writing as regards their intention, nature of search, whether it is private, academic, or official research undertaking. For academic users, the subject of their research and the covering dates must be stated. And where there is friction
between the demands of scholarship and the interest of record creators, the latter is allowed to prevail.\textsuperscript{48}

The current National Archives Act, which originated from the 1992 National Archives Decree, retains all the legislation regarding secrecy, which suggests that the records were put at the “absolute discretion” of the archivist who could restrict access to certain documents. In practice, however, it was recognized that strict adherence to principles will hamper the growth of scholarship. Therefore, restriction was compromised with regards to documents with the “traditional archival maturity” of fifty years; records of academic nature such as Intelligence, Assessments, and Annual Reports; Judicial Records; and other records for which the permission of the depositors is obtained.

Antiquities and heritage production

Although the relationships between textual history, museums, and heritage sites are usually acknowledged as resources of Nigerian history, their implicit epistemological nexuses as instruments of the history machine seldom form the subject of historiographical discourse. While historians produce textual narratives of the past, archaeology brings materiality to history, and museums organize and present it to the admiration of the viewer in a well-thought out manner.\textsuperscript{49} Reading fragmentary and dusty files on the Sokoto Caliphate, colonial conquest of Northern Nigeria, or the Nigerian Civil War in the archives, for example, is not equal to seeing the concrete material vestiges of these moments and episodes in National Museums and heritage sites.\textsuperscript{50} Underscoring the importance of materiality in the production of history, Ki-Zerbo observes that “the silent witnesses revealed by archaeology are often more eloquent than the official chroniclers.”\textsuperscript{51} But the advocates of the supremacy of archaeological artifacts over textuality ignore the fact that, like archival documents, artifacts and monuments do not speak for themselves. They have to be methodically collected, interpreted, and curated by professional archaeologists and museum curators as the case may be.

Nigerian history is heavily indebted to archaeology. In the absence of written records, particularly on precolonial history, archaeology helped in terms of dating. There were a number of Nigerian historians—the likes of Dike, Sabiru Biobaku, E. J. Alagoa, and Adiele Afigbo—who saw the importance of both archaeology and museums in trying to chart the course of Nigerian history. For Afigbo, there is an opportunity for cooperation and dialogue between the
conventional historians who deal in written and oral sources and the “unconventional historian” (or call them curators and archaeologists) who study the past mainly through artifacts. In studying the remote past of Nigerian communities, the historians depended for all his material on archaeology. Dike, in his study on the Niger Delta area, found a pamphlet published by the International African Institute titled “Study of Africa’s past,” which explained the part archaeology could play in historical writing. This had a profound effect on him, and resulted in his introduction of archaeology into the University of Ibadan when he was Vice-chancellor.  

To me, as a student of African history, the art treasures of this country form the most important surviving record of the activities of man in West Africa before the white man came and before the introduction of writing. The age, which produced some of these masterpieces, was truly inspired and we can catch a glimpse of these days only by preserving its art. It is for this reason that I regard the Commission and the Department of Antiquities as custodians of an important source of Nigerian history.

The museum movement: Rescuing and regulating Nigerian antiquities

The major impetus to the establishment of museums in Nigeria came from the growing concerns among some colonial officials with regards to the alarming rate at which Nigerian antiquities were plundered by missionaries, adventurers, traders, and colonial officials. Prior to the 1940s, there were no laws in Nigeria prohibiting the exports of antiquities. It has been estimated that 95 percent of all the known ancient Benin artworks are now in private and public museum collections abroad.  

The story of museums in Nigeria, like other institutions concerned with the production and preservation of cultural and historical objects, is a product of the concerted activities of individuals, mainly of British nationality, working in different parts of Nigeria. Whether these people were teachers, colonial administrators, or miners, they seem to have one thing in common—the desire to preserve the cultural heritage of the peoples of Nigeria. In 1927, Kenneth Murray was employed to advise on the effect of the colonial system of education on local art. In the process, he collected a large collection of Nigerian art works. By 1933, E. H. Duckworth, editor of the first Cultural Journal in Nigeria and organizer
of exhibitions in government service, had started a crusade for the establishment of museums for the preservation of Nigeria's material culture. Writing in 1937, Duckworth admonished African contributors to the Cultural Journal to research and describe Nigerian antiquities. His principal caveat was “respect the past, record its history, treasure its signposts, help build museums in Nigeria.”

This marked the beginning of the institutionalization of the heritage wing of the Nigerian History Machine.

On July 28, 1943, the Nigerian Antiquities Service was launched and Kenneth Murray was appointed as the Surveyor of Nigerian Antiquities. Between 1953 and 1954, the Antiquities Ordinance No. 17 was promulgated, establishing the Antiquities Department and Antiquities Commission respectively. The then Minister for Works, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, in his speech at the inauguration of the Antiquities Commission stressed the importance of arts and crafts in Nigerian history thus:

> In contrast to whatever we import, our antiquities and traditional arts are Nigerian … and owing to absence of written records, the old arts of Nigeria represent a large part of the evidence of our history … it is necessary to protect and preserve our history and artistic relics because of their importance to Nigeria.

The Antiquities Department, like its sister institution, the National Archives, was at various times under different ministries depending on the conception of the makers of cultural policy. In 1956, the Antiquities Commission recommended to the central government the removal of the antiquities of Nigeria from the residual list of the constitution. The commission sought to vest the control of antiquities in the central government instead of the regions. The idea was to protect Nigerian bonds of unity as it was thought that regional museums would prevent the development of National Museums, by making additions from the regions to its collections difficult.

Later promulgations, such as the Antiquities (Amendment) Decree of 1969, Antiquities Prohibition Decree No. 9 of 1974 and the National Commission for Museums and Monuments Decree No. 77 of 1979, expanded the responsibilities of the Commission to include administering antiquities and monuments and establishing and maintaining National Museums and other outlets for antiquities: science and technology; warfare; African, black, and other antiquities; arts and crafts; architecture; natural history and education services. Decree No. 99, otherwise known as the Antiquities Prohibited Transfer of 1974, banned the buying and selling of antiquities except through an accredited agent. The policy conferred on the police and customs services the power to search without
warrants, the power of seizure, compulsory purchase of antiquities, and the imposition of stricter penalties on offenders. Decree No. 77 of 1979 (which became an Act of Parliament since the return to civilian rule in 1999) dissolved both the Federal Department of Antiquities and the Antiquities Commission to establish the National Commission for Museums and Monuments (NCMM). The Commission was empowered to acquire any land and property that is considered worthy of being declared a heritage site or national monument. Where an antiquity has been declared a national monument, the owner may be compensated for the value of the date of such declaration and thereafter any estate, right, title, and interest in and to such antiquity is extinguished. On the excavation and discovery of archaeological objects, the commission established a strict regime of control, which stipulates, “no person shall by means of excavation or similar operations, search for any antiquities unless authorised by permit issued by the commission and with consent of the government of the state in whose state the search is to be carried out.” However, the production of heritage legislation in Nigeria involved the participation of many stakeholders in the heritage industry such as traditional institutions, members of the academia, and other people engaged in heritage management.

Regulating and collecting antiquities represent one of the many processes involved in heritage production. The other aspect is the preservation of the antiquities in museums. Cultural products from the past are housed usually in historical museums and contemporary art works in ethnographical museums. During the early period of museum foundation in Nigeria, the origin of collections determined the location of museums.

On September 23, 1949, the foundation stone of the Jos Museum was laid and Governor Sir MacPherson commissioned it on April 26, 1952. Despite the pessimism expressed over local patronage, the Jos Museum recorded 64,418 visitors during its first year of operation. More museums were subsequently established in rapid succession; the Ife Museum (1954), Lagos Museum (1957), Oron Museum (1958), Benin Museum (1960), Kano Museum (1960), and Owo Museum (1968). “By 2009 there were at least 35 National Museums located mainly in the Nigerian state capitals or in historic towns. State governments, academic institutions and other local communities that have developed interests in preserving their cultural properties have also established museums.” The distribution and curating of artifacts in Nigerian museums was originally dictated by the source of the materials and government policy of national integration. The museums basically house material objects of cultural and historical importance, which are exhibited for the purposes of public education and
entertainment. The more popular objects are the Nok terracotta, Ife and Benin sculptures, the Igbo-Ukwu materials, the Oron ekpu figures, and shades of pottery from across the country.

In the aftermath of the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1969), museums of national unity were created as centers of cultural enlightenment to accelerate the production of a Nigerian nationhood. A policy was put in place to establish a National Museum in each state of the federation, with wider collections regardless of provenance. Consequently, museums both in their collections and their display were expected to project nationalism. The Map of Historical Sites of Nigeria shows location of museums with a concentration in southern Nigeria and around the Jos-Plateau region.66 There are also scatterings of History Bureaus in various parts of Nigeria, which appear to house mainly museum collections with incidental archival holdings.

The NCMM has since its inception declared sixty-five heritage properties as national monuments. The Sukur Cultural Landscape and Osun-Oshogbo Sacred Groove have been enlisted by UNESCO as world heritage sites in 1999 and 2005 respectively. These monuments, comprising historical buildings, archaeological and historical sites, technological and scriptural works, paintings, inscriptions, caves, groves, temples, palaces, and landscapes, have been found to exhibit various values from the point of view, art, science, aesthetics, ethnography, archaeology, anthropology, archaeology, and other disciplines.67

Conclusion

The main conclusion that can be drawn from the foregoing discourse is that the production of Nigerian history is not the exclusive prerogative of academic historians who articulate their scholarly historical accounts in the hallowed halls of their respective universities. Rather, this study calls for a broader understanding of the complex processes of producing history, as a generic practice, outside the exclusive control of professional historians.

Beginning in the last decades of colonial rule (1950s), Nigerian history developed as a corporate venture, which involved assorted yet interconnected institutional and disciplinary regimes, resembling a kind of knowledge production machine. The advent of the Historical Society of Nigeria, the National Archives, and the National Commission for Museums and Monuments led to the institutionalization of the history machine, an asymmetric process through which documents, memories, and artifacts were converted into historical knowledge
for nation-building. Between the 1950s and 1960s, the makers of cultural and educational policies, historians, archivists, and museum officials spoke the common language of historical documentation for nation-building. The collaboration and tensions among them represent some of the nuances of the engine of historical production. We need to pay more attention to the significant roles of people who may not possess formal academic qualifications in history but are nonetheless actively involved in the production of historical knowledge in different institutional settings that collectively constitute what I call a *history machine*. The collaboration and tensions among them represent some of the nuances of the engine of historical production.

Driven by a desire for a “shared” historical narrative across ethnoreligious divides, the Nigerian history machine was ruptured in the wake of regional politics and competition in the 1950s and 1960s, and the economic crisis associated with the Structural Adjustment program (SAP) in the 1980s. The making of the Nigerian history machine depended so much on the appropriation of the individual cultures and histories of the various Nigerian communities through national institutions. But the arduous process of aggregating a large number of ethnic histories into a national narrative resulted in the breakdown of the history machine, particularly in the 1990s, thereby giving way to the powerful assertion of the historical narratives of regional and ethnic identities. There are four strategies deployed in consolidating ethnic and communal narratives by distinct regional blocks in Nigeria: the politics of jihad and Islam by the Hausa-Fulani; the politics of ethnicity by the Yoruba; the politics of genocide and war trauma by the Igbo; and the discourse of marginalization by minorities in the Middle Belt and Niger Delta region.  

**Bibliography**


History as a Scam: Confrontation and Resentment between Archaeology and History

Andre Szczawlnska Muceniecks

Archaeology of a historical period is prehistory with one more problem.¹

To begin this chapter with a short anecdote, when studying historical archaeology at a major Brazilian university in 2005, I frequently faced opposition and prejudice from other colleagues for an unexpected reason: I was a historian among archaeologists. At the end of each class or topic covered, I repeatedly encountered the criticism that historians are naive when dealing with sources, when compared to archaeologists who are better prepared to deal with evidence and the past. The reason for this naivety, I was told, is because historians read texts superficially, deprived of any critical apparatus for interrogating those sources and thus were incapable of grasping subtle meanings. Moreover, as historians deal with documents prepared by those with power, their work simply involved rhetorical exercises, while archaeologists study material culture, a class of evidence incapable of deception, and very able of demonstrating the customs and manners of the powerless, the common folk, and the underprivileged, such as women and children.

This type of critique was constant, not to mention annoying, until it was time to present our own research and to discuss texts in the seminars. One of the texts to be discussed was the article “Documento/Monumento,” written by the French medieval historian Jacques LeGoff. While making my presentation, proud of my grounding in the Annales School and in the intellectual lineage of Fernand Braudel,² although reticent to quote the multiplicity and—in Dosse’s words—“fragmentation” suffered by history in most recent times, I embodied the role of a crusader, of an advocate in defense of the aggrieved Clio. My enemies were those worshipers of Science and Progress, believers in objectivity and the
univocal truth. The reaction to the article and my analyses of it was very positive, and the mutual accusations of positivism—in the most part by anthropologists, not archaeologists, as I had been lead to believe—were rescinded, with my colleagues admitting that “History is not as outdated as we’d thought.”

This incident seems, perhaps, a bit exaggerated and disparaging to the general alumni of one of the most influential Brazilian universities. At this point, I want to emphasize that that specific class was peculiar and that my other experiences with anthropologists and archaeologists—colleagues, lecturers, or professors—was largely positive to the point that I even became one of them. Nevertheless, the experience awakened in my mind the desire to know whether I had dealt with a particularly narrow scholarly environment or whether there was some deeper issue—theoretical, methodological, and widespread—hidden behind the anecdote.

Perhaps the informed reader is aware of clues betraying theoretical schools involved in the aforementioned dispute, despite the fact that archaeological theory has received regrettably little attention from scholars of different feuds in comparison to other mainstream human sciences, such as philosophy and sociology. Anthropologists studying archaeology present a curious admixture of processualism with postprocessualism, using the criticism from the latter with a large share of the pretension of objectivity from the former. I shall briefly return to these schools and clarify their main tenets; for now, it is sufficient to note that the accusations made about history were addressed to a stereotypical history resembling the nineteenth-century Germanic and positivist discipline, summed up to classic processual resentment directed against culture-historical archaeology. Nevertheless, that episode came my mind more than once, drawing my attention to similar occurrences in other publications and regions of the world such as Israel, Scandinavia, Russia, and India. Indeed, the situation revealed a deeper issue with methodological consequences affecting interpretation and even influencing the course of an entire discipline.

This chapter intends to briefly analyze some of the aspects of the complicated relationship between archaeology and history. As case study, I intend to present the “minimalist” versus “maximalist” dispute in biblical studies, not as something doctrinaire or studied by its own merits, but as a circumstance exemplary to the issues pervading relations between history and archaeology, interpretation of the past, and different natures of primary sources. Since ultimately the main antagonism between minimalists and maximalists resided in the use of the written text—in this case, the Bible—my hypothesis is that their dispute should be understood as part of the larger discordance between culture-historical and processual archaeology.
In order to accomplish the interpretative task outlined, this chapter is divided into two main sections. In the first section, I discuss culture-historical archaeology in conjunction with the development of the Albrightean paradigm in Biblical archaeology. In the second section, I analyze the development of New Archaeology and its manifestations in Biblical archaeology—a connection that has gone unnoticed, overshadowed by the heated debate between minimalists and maximalists.

Culture-historical archaeology and Biblical archaeology: From the beginnings to the Bright-Albright paradigm

Biblical archaeology is one of the pillars of biblical scholarship, along with the history of Israel, textual criticism, and linguistic studies. A primary concern here is the relation between Biblical archaeology and the history of Israel. Studied from a larger scope, the first stages of Biblical archaeology can be understood as an example of culture-historical archaeology. Being the most common archaeological school of thought supported outside of the English-speaking world, culture-historical archaeology was considered outdated after the 1960s, mostly by archaeologists of the processual school. However, its main ideas remain strong, mostly to scholars from other fields—including, of course, historians. This school was closely associated with European nationalism and the *Kulturgeschichte*, especially in Central Europe, as it promoted the concept of identity based upon ethnic parameters. From the unification and ascension of nationalisms in Germany to the independence of central and eastern European countries, culture-historical archaeology, although subordinate to history, provided legitimacy to the study of the past.

Culture-historical archaeology through its methods developed remarkable technical developments in description, typology, and excavation methodology. In the field of theory, however, archaeologists—largely from subsequent schools of processualism and postprocessualism, or from movements such as Marxist archaeology⁸—became critics of what was called as a lack of theoretical breakthroughs.⁹ “Culture” was understood by culture-historical archaeology as something static, as the ways and customs of specific groups defined ethnically in well-delimited spaces; the proper concept of ethnicity was directly connected with pseudo-scientific theories of biological ground as racial groups. A common practice to the culture-historical archaeologists was the definition of “archaeological cultures,” a category encompassing a territory inhabited by a
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specific ethnic group to which a specific material culture and production should be related. Cultural change was explained mostly by migration and diffusion, without regard for human creativity and a capacity for change. 10 Many of the theoretical assumptions from culture-historical archaeology were shared by historians, as suggested by the nomenclature, and the existence of written sources was welcomed, even desired.

All these features can be observed in the development of Biblical archaeology: the conception of Culture, the legitimation of a supposed right of the Israeli people to the land, the technical developments, but, most of all, the special dynamics with the written sources. Palestine is considered a holy land by Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The written sources produced in the area provided material to the composition of the most widespread sacred texts of the world: the Torah, the New Testament, and the Koran. At the same time, land has been fought over for centuries, not only encompassing the use of the holy texts to legitimize contemporary land rights, but also involving the area in post-colonial disputes since the retreat/defeat of European nations, and the increase in Western support for Jewish immigration. 11 Despite the impressive number of extant Roman and medieval constructions, ancient Palestine has a relatively small number of grand monuments, such as pyramids and ziggurats, when compared to Egypt and Mesopotamia; Petra is, in this case, an exception that proves the rule. This does not mean the absence of an archaeological record. On the contrary, successive human groups have inhabited the area for millennia, leaving behind extensive evidence. 12 The principal written texts relating local history in antiquity are the aforesaid holy text texts. The absence of majestic monuments imprinted a strongly asymmetrical relation between the written source and the excavated artefact and, consequently, between the main sciences interpreting it.

Despite the popularity of Palestine as place of pilgrimage since antiquity and Middle Ages, it was only during the final stages of Ottoman control did the area became easier for travelers to explore; therefore, until the nineteenth century, geographical knowledge of the ancient land was almost restricted to the information provided by the Bible. 13 The first excavations were made in Mesopotamia between 1808 and 1820 by C. J. Rich, despite the fact that the period of great discoveries started after Paul-Émile Botta’s and Austen Henry Layard’s explorations in 1842 and 1845. Following the first attempts to decipher cuneiform as hieroglyphic writing after 1802, Egyptian archaeological exploration was carried out under the supervision of the Egyptian Department of Antiquities, whose administration by Khedive Ismail between the years of 1863 to 1879 was marked by active and engaged exploration of the past. 14 At this point, it was impossible
to separate the efforts of the linguists to decipher the ancient texts from the historian's and the archaeologist's respective work, and the beginnings of Middle Eastern studies owed much of its development to linguists and those responsible for providing texts for the reconstruction of the past.

As for Palestine, despite the relative absence of great monuments, Edward Robinson, an American explorer and congregationalist minister, was able to identify about two hundred places quoted in the Bible after trips taken in 1838 and 1852, partially due to the permanency of some of the ancient names. The Palestine Exploration Fund was created in 1865, and in the subsequent decades more Biblical archaeological societies were founded at the same time in which systematic excavations were undertaken in Egypt and Mesopotamia. Under the auspices of the Palestine Exploration Fund, the region was explored and mapped by Charles Warren, Charles William Wilson, Claude Reignier Conder, Herbert Kitchener, and others. Sir William Flinders Petrie, who had previously excavated in Egypt, also oversaw digging in Palestine, inaugurating in the late nineteenth century a proper "Biblical archaeology" in the Holy Land and initiating the use of important techniques such as the establishment of a relative chronology based upon ceramics. At this point, Biblical archaeology's main goal was to illustrate and complete the information provided by the biblical account.

Methodologically, at this point, Biblical archaeology emphasized systematic surveys of the surface-level associated with geographic and historical studies. Many ruins were identified within biblical locations.

After the First Great War, Biblical archaeology was consolidated and expanded as a discipline, but its primary focus remained the same: to confirm and corroborate a history previously known by the written and sacred texts. Besides secular developments in research, archaeology had markedly religious connections, which made it almost apologetic in its intentions. A significant number of excavators were clergymen excavating places where they had already predetermined what they would find. Nevertheless, many academic institutions and universities from across America and Europe were also involved in the archaeological and historical exploration of Palestine, and relevant excavations were carried out at Beit-Shean between 1921 and 1923 by Clarence Stanley Fisher, Gerald Mines Fitzgerald, and A. Rowe, and studied between 1921 and 1933 by Fisher, Philip Langstaffe Ord Guy, and G. Loud. The second excavation was carried out in Samaria between 1930 and 1935 by American and British institutions.

Advances in methodology permitted a great amount of information and data to be amassed, and Kathleen Kenyon's techniques in stratigraphic method started having an impact on the field of archaeological excavations. Archaeologists also
Theories of History

started exploring prehistoric sites. Despite advances in methodology and techniques, however, the period was also the age of the dominion of the written text. Histories of Israel written at the time, despite some criticism of the primary sources, remained effectively paraphrases of the Bible, following the Old Testament’s scheme of Patriarchs, Judges, united monarchy, divided monarchy, and the Exile in Mesopotamia; the role of Biblical archaeology was mainly to provide information corroborating these schemes. A paradigmatic example of this is *A History of Israel*, published in 1959 by John Bright; the fourth edition was published in 2000 (with an appendix and new introduction) and the book is still in use, mainly in confessional North American institutions. The role of archaeology in this paradigm was elaborated clearly in the works of William Foxwell Albright, prominent twentieth-century American scholar and director of the American School of Oriental Research in Jerusalem from 1919 to 1936; it can be summarized in his affirmation, conveyed in his *The Archaeology of Palestine (1949)*: “One of the principal services of the archaeologist to the biblical scholar has been in the identification of modern sites with ancient towns mentioned in the Old Testament.”

Such a statement makes clear the assumptions of Albright’s archaeology, which doesn't seriously criticize or problematize the Old Testament. Instead, its words are taken as the starting point to be confirmed by archaeological research; archaeology offers a “service” to the biblical scholar. The connection of the discipline with religious motivations is recognized by Albright:

> In one’s enthusiasm for archaeological research, one is sometimes tempted to disregard the enduring reason for any special interest in Palestine—nearly all the Hebrew Old Testament is a product of Palestinian soil and Israelite writers, while most of the events which underlie the Greek New Testament took place in the same sacred terrain.  

To the eminent scholar, however, the confessional provenience of so many excavators, archaeologists, and historians had not “impaired” the interpretation or misled the research of Palestine:

> It is frequently said that the scientific quality of Palestinian archaeology has been seriously impaired by the religious preconceptions of scholars who have excavated in the Holy Land. It is true that some archaeologists have been drawn to Palestine by their interest in the Bible, and that some of them had received their previous training mainly as biblical scholars. The writer has known many such scholars, but he recalls scarcely a single case where their religious views seriously influenced their results. Some of these scholars were radical critics; still others were more conservative critics, like Ernst Sellin; others again were...
thorough-going conservatives. But their archaeological conclusions were almost uniformly independent of their critical views.  

Archaeology in Albright’s interpretation received the upper hand in comparison with the written texts only in one specific situation, however: when dealing with the critiques developed mostly by Julius Wellhausen and assuming the “scientific” role to prove and disprove “facts”:

Turning now to the question of the way in which the Old Testament assumed its present form, we enter into a field where literary criticism based on internal evidence held the field undisputed until recently. Now we see extrinsic evidence pouring in from archaeological discoveries in all the countries around Palestine, especially Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Asia minor. Combining this evidence with other finds, including the indications of cultural relationships which have been recovered from Palestinian mounds …we are now able to paint a fairly satisfactory picture of the actual situation.

Nevertheless, the main goal of archaeology remained, in Albright’s eyes, to “to paint a fairly satisfactory picture of the actual situation,” a goal later reaffirmed in the same work by the quoted sentence: “One of the principal services of the archaeologist to the biblical scholar has been in the identification of modern sites with ancient towns mentioned in the Old Testament.”

The Bible was not used as a starting point exclusively by researchers within a religious tradition. After the Second Great War and the creation of the Israeli State in Palestine in 1948, archaeology and history were charged with the task of legitimizing the new nation, providing it a historical background, usually based upon the biblical texts. Despite this apparently religious start, Israeli archaeologists were constantly in conflict with orthodox Jews. This new, “indigenous” archaeology was conducted rather more secularly, using the scriptures chiefly as primary written sources, but not as sacred text. The principal challenge to be faced by those archaeologists was not to prove or disprove Judaic tradition, but to bring legitimacy to the state of Israel.

The advent of “New Archaeology” and “Syro-Palestinian Archaeology”

From this localized investigation leading into the mid-twentieth century, I move on to the broader perspective of archaeology and history. Influenced by the culture-historical approach, archaeology struggled until the 1960s to achieve its
own goals and to reach maturity and independence, being considered by historians as an “ancillary discipline” of history. In some parts of the world, such as the USSR, archaeology was still offered in universities as a secondary topic or a kind of specialization within history or anthropology. As demonstrated in biblical studies and the Albrightean paradigm, archaeology was used as a kind of tool to “prove,” “disprove,” or corroborate the written sources and historical interpretations of it.

After the 1960s and 1970s, the development of “New Archaeology”—also known as processualism—in North America and the United Kingdom caused a rupture between history and archaeology, which underwent a drastic transformation. The main tenets of this new approach, “New Archaeology” or “Processual Archaeology,” can be summarized as follows: (1) archaeology should be understood as an independent science, heavily grounded in philosophical positivism and explanation of complex systems; (2) this science should focus on theory derived from the exact sciences; (3) it should follow a different approach to culture, based upon anthropology and not history; (4) and, archaeologists should assume the pretension of objectivity. Cultural change was explained no longer by migration or diffusion, but rather by local evolution, which explains why the school is occasionally referred to as evolutionist or neo-evolutionist. Finally, in contrast to European archaeologists outside of the United Kingdom, North American researchers, when excavating the ground, revealed not the past of European ancestors, but the other’s—understood as the anthropological other, usually the indigenous peoples of America. American archaeology, therefore, had more to do with anthropology than with history. Gordon Willey and Philip Phillips’s famous and oft-repeated quote “American archaeology is anthropology or it is nothing” exemplifies perfectly this new paradigm of the science.

The impact of New Archaeology was diverse among the internal divisions and specializations of archaeology, yet the questions it raised were influential even within the fields in which written sources remained abundant, such as Greek and Classical archaeology. Despite its restrictive statements, processualism had its undeniable merits thanks to the critical and theoretical approach it imprinted on contemporary archaeology, in addition to the new self-consciousness acquired by its practitioners. In the United Kingdom and North America, the handful of archaeologists who stuck to the old manners were considered outdated. Archaeology would never be the same, and one of the most important—and deleterious—characteristics of this new science was its antihistoricism and resentful relationship with history. Over the years, history
became a villain, a tyrannical entity that controls, manipulates, and distorts “reality” on behalf of elites and governments. It was replaced by anthropology in some North American academic spaces. Methodologically this schism applied a new rule on the interpretation of the past: the dominion of the “true,” of the “reality,” provided by material culture against the distortion made through the written sources.

A similar rupture occurred inside Biblical archaeology in the 1970s, affecting greatly its relationship to the history of Israel to the point that the possibility of an object named “Ancient Israel” was seriously questioned. The concept of “Biblical archaeology” was in many cases replaced by the idea of a “Syro-Palestinian” Archaeology. The dominant, Albrightean paradigm was challenged, and new propositions and comprehensions regarding the formation processes in ancient Palestine were constructed. Many promoted drastic changes to the well-accepted scheme of the Biblical archaeology and History of Israel given in Albright’s and Bright’s paradigms. For instance, among many breakthrough propositions, the Israelites were understood as one of many Canaanites nations, differentiated after the collapse of Canaan, instead of an active agent of destruction of the same: the Israelites “did not come from outside Canaan—they emerged from within it.”

This revolution in biblical studies occurred also in the field of textual critics, challenging some of it main assumptions. The traditional “documentary hypothesis” arguing in favor of many sources composing the Pentateuch written in the tenth to fourth centuries BC, whose main expositor was Wellhausen, was challenged in the 1970s by Frederick Winnett and John Van Seters, and the historical-critical methodology of analysis in biblical scholarship characteristic of such approach had been opposed by many biblical scholars such as Thomas Thompson and Niels Peter Lemche in the following years. One of the main components in this drastic change was the relationship between artefact and text, between history and archaeology, although it had not necessarily been perceived as some kind of conflict between academic disciplines. A large number of scholars became increasingly aware of the issues generated by the dominance of the written text over the excavated artefact, and most of all the religious bias behind some interpretation.

Scholars from different fields and provenances, such as Lemche, Thompson, Philip Davies, and Israel Finkelstein, were labeled as “minimalists,” despite contrasts and differences between them. Nonetheless, the nickname forged by their detractors led to the oppositional group of so-called maximalists. These labels were used in connection with the space given to the written text, the Bible,
relative to the role given to archaeology in the biblical studies. For the “minimalists,” the written text should not be trusted at all; it should receive minimal space and attention in scholarship because of its later dating and composition in comparison to the actual events. Gradually, the old Albright and Bright models were deconstructed.

According to these parameters, many assumptions taken as granted by biblical scholars have been attacked and discredited. For instance, the existence of characters known most of all by the biblical text, such as the patriarch Abraham, kings David and Solomon, and the stories and events connected to them, until then considered historical reality by Biblical Albrightean archaeologists, was severely questioned, even denied; as mentioned earlier, the discussion reached the point of denying even the possibility of studying an object called “Ancient Israel,” or biblical Israel:

I have argued that the quest for origins is not an historical quest but a theological and literary question, a question about meaning. To give it an historical form is to attribute to it our own search for meaning. Biblical scholarship used to believe that we might understand the Bible if we could only get back to its origins. The question about origins, however, is not an answerable one. Not only is the Bible’s “Israel” a literary fiction, but the Bible begins as a tradition already established: a stream of stories, song and philosophical reflection: collected, discussed and debated. Our sources do not begin. They lie already in medias res.

We can say now with considerable confidence that the Bible is not a history of anyone’s past.31

Processual archaeology had a decisive role to play in this shift, although rarely is the influence of New Archaeology in the subsequent movements mentioned. William Dever, a distinguished name in the debate between minimalism and maximalism—in which he has been labeled a maximalist and even a “crypto-fundamentalist”—recognized some influence from New Archaeology into Syro-Palestinian Archaeology, but without connecting it to the minimalists.32 Phillip Davies, his “minimalist” counterpart, associated briefly the “minimalists”—a label criticized by him—to postprocessualism and not to processualism.33

The core researchers involved in such a breakthrough gathered in the United Kingdom and Scandinavia, principally in Denmark, and had been known as the “Copenhagen School.” Scholars labeled as “minimalists” or composing the Copenhagen School developed their main tenets independently, often disagreeing on significant topics.34
This new biblical scholarship was discussed in a series of seventeen international seminars, the “European Seminars on Methodology in Israel’s History,” that took place between 1996 and 2012 in several countries of Europe, directed by Lester Grabbe and not officially committed to either minimalist or maximalist positions. Despite the predominance of theologians and specialists in textual criticism in the loosely knit group, archaeology assumed a truly central role in the discussion. A quote from The Bible Unearthed: Archaeology’s New Vision of Ancient Israel and the Origin of its Sacred Texts, by Israel Finkelstein and Neil Asher Silberman, is representative of the thought from diverse scholars labeled as “minimalists,” but most of all, explicit about the main tenet of the archaeologists called as such:

For the first time, archaeologists working in the lands of Bible did not seek to use excavated finds as illustrations of the Bible; in a dramatic shift to the methods of the social sciences, they sought to examine the human realities that lay behind the text. In excavating ancient sites, emphasis was no longer put only on a site’s biblical associations.35

The central issue of Israeli archaeology connected to minimalism is parallel to New Archaeology’s: the independence of archaeology in opposition to history; not only a methodological description, the assertion assumes the demand for freedom—at this time not exactly in relation to history proper, but rather to the traditional scholarship centered on the interpretation based upon the written sources. Despite the use of boasting phrases and terms as “for the first time” and “dramatic shift to methods,” some central issues discussed by the minimalists were not new at all (although other minimalist ideas were revolutionary), or became outdated quickly. By the time Finkelstein and Silberman’s The Bible Unearthed made it to press, for instance, the main tenets of processualism had become outdated by further theoretical discussions between archaeologists and historians.

Although the traditional historical method had been outdated, some assumptions derived from its application remain. Both Finkelstein and Silberman in The Bible Unearthed, as Thomas Thompson in The Mythic Past, propose dating the composition of parts of the Old Testament to after the seventh century BC. According to this hypothesis, developed from the high critics and documentary theory of the nineteenth century, the Pentateuch and other books from Old Testament were composed or compiled in dates more recently than previously stated by the orthodox scholarship, as a result of the work from an elite of priests and scribes from the times of King Josiah, amidst a process of State foundation
in Judah, and not as result of centuries of oral tradition. This idea gradually evolved to more recent dates, to Persian or Hellenistic periods.

The most serious criticism of several of the scholars labeled as minimalists, however, and most of all toward Thomas Thompson, was not regarding natural divergences in specific propositions or datings, but in methodology: Hans Barstad and Iain Provan highlighted a perceived positivism in their methodologies and attempts to reach some objective truth:

Scholars like Lemche and Thompson have been eager to use the concept “paradigm shift” of their own contributions to biblical historiography. This, however, is far from being an adequate description of what is really going on. Lemche and Thompson, apparently unaware of the fact that what we may call a conventional concept of history today is highly problematic, still work within the parameters of historical critical research, assuming that history is a science and that one must work with “hard” facts.

Thompson’s response to critics, like Iain Provan’s “Ideologies, Literary and Critical: Reflections on Recent Writing on the History of Israel,” stems from the accusation about his lack of critical thinking on the label “neo-albrightean,” and is in some way exemplary of how the discussion between minimalists and maximalists became arid, many times personal, as in the quarrel between Philip Davies and William Dever.

Final remarks: From the predominance of archaeological interpretation in biblical studies to new conceptions of history

Perhaps the main source for the perceived positivism in Lemche, Thompson, and other minimalists did not originate from a discernible philosophical source or a methodological choice but the work of archaeologists. The scholars labeled as minimalists had their formation, in the most part, in theological schools; their expertise lay in textual criticism, not in archaeology. Their central theses, however, rely on archaeological data and interpretation, a task that many of them were not prepared to accomplish successfully without aid of specialists in archaeology. Therefore, Thompson, Lemche, and other scholars from Copenhagen School had to overrely on interpretations from the past, most of all in the established “canon” of archaeologists whose interpretations corroborated their own point of view, such as Finkelstein’s—a weak spot their detractors were eager to emphasize. Lemche’s interpretation had much in common with
Finkelstein's despite minor discordances and his interest in American anthropology provided to him the role of intermediary between the approaches of New Archaeology and the scholars of the Copenhagen School.\textsuperscript{42}

That the discourse of both minimalists and maximalists was pervaded by terms such as “historicity,” “facts,” and “proof,” and the assertion that the goals of each are addressed toward some Rankean objectivity is hard to be denied.\textsuperscript{43} Many intellectual influences can be chosen as sources for such conjecture, but our main hypothesis remains that, despite internal struggles and a long tradition of biblical scholarship, a great deal of the controversy ought to be understood in a broader, methodological manner, amidst confrontation between history and archaeology. In biblical scholarship, New Archaeology found a field in need of renovation. The complexity of the situation, with the aggravating factors of the defense of faith and nationalism involved in the debate imprinted rather complex consequences to methodological choices. Archaeologists assumed an objectivity that did not exclude other forms of inner subjectivity and had generated epistemological insecurity, culminating in an authoritative objectivity based upon very specific criteria.\textsuperscript{44} In the whole debate about historicity, few historians were listened to, as the debate was conducted between theologians and archaeologists. The functions attributed traditionally to the historian in dealing with the texts were assumed by the theologians. The historian's responsibility and objectives in interpreting the past were assumed by the archaeologists, in decades when history was rethinking and revaluating itself. Therefore, it is not surprising that reflections within the discipline of history arrived late into biblical scholarship.

Even outside the field of biblical studies, archaeology and history converged again only after an extended process of mutual criticism and self-evaluation. History became more self-critical and self-conscious, incorporating the discussion of materiality into its scope with the developments of neo-Marxism, neo-Annales, and the French “New History.” Further innovations from the linguistic turn made some historians aware of their own empiricism and lack of theory. The most serious criticism of processualism came from inside archaeology. In the 1980s and 1990s several different voices opposed the rigid standards and conceptions of processualism. Although it is common to refer to the multiplicity of ideas as one school labeled postprocessualist, it would be wiser to understand the movement as similar to the general changes in the human sciences of postmodernity, considering it in its multiplicity as “postprocessualisms.”

Processualism came to be identified with modern science and, as such, something in need of deconstruction. Most of all, the discourse of scientific objectivity suffered harsh criticism; while anthropology in the United States suffered
its historical and linguistic “turns,” the “new” archaeology remained attached to a narrow sphere of anthropology, already outdated.\textsuperscript{45} Archaeologists occupied with theory became increasingly aware of the urgent need for questioning the belief in scientism and objectivity, stressing the role of the observer in creation and production of knowledge as well as noting the impossibility of perfect neutrality. Theoretical frameworks continued to expand, however, from a narrow view of anthropology to contemporary discussion in human sciences as a whole, from gender theory to Foucault, from new Marxist approaches to philosophical concerns. History was not only rehabilitated to the eyes of archaeologists, but also was significant: written sources, when available, received renewed attention under different and critical approaches akin to the human sciences’ in general.\textsuperscript{46} Religion, mentality, and ethnicity were no longer forbidden terms.

Within this renewed and critical setting, new publications discussed the issues inherent to the historical branches of archaeology in the whole world, and the relationship between written sources and material culture in ways more balanced than had been received until then. An extremely incomplete list would quote works that tried to deal with the paradoxes created from history and archaeology working together, including thematics connected with political aims and state legitimation, produced in Greece, Scandinavia, India, Pakistan, around Latin America, and even in the United States.\textsuperscript{47} The written sources were seen both as a positive factor and as a hampering influence in archaeological studies, but at least the question moved toward the broader perspectives. With regards to Israel and the biblical studies, the situation is mixed. The uses of archaeology and history in connection to nationalism, legitimation, and in support of the Zionist movement have been studied with perspectives, but there is still dissension when the topic turns to biblical studies.\textsuperscript{48} In recent years, after the conclusion of the last European Seminar on Methodology in Israel’s History in 2012, some near consensual positions on the need for rethinking the manner in which the history of Israel ought be written, in closer dialogue with archaeology and encompassing Palestine as a whole have emerged. There are still few works published reflecting these new directions, but the perspectives are promising.\textsuperscript{49}

Bibliography


Between 1808 and 1814, the war referred to as the Peninsular War in the Anglophone world and in the Spanish as the Guerra de la Independencia took place in Spain. In the wake of this conflict, which formed part of the series of Napoleonic Wars in Europe, the Spanish artist Francisco de Goya (1746–1828) produced up to a total of eighty-five etchings known as Disasters of War. Taking these as a reference, in this chapter I wish to present some reflections on historical writing, particularly Goya’s heterodox way of narrating the war. To do so, we will also give a heterodox interpretation of these works, by reading these images as an expression of a concept rather than as art in itself.

Notwithstanding the quality and depth of the many studies dedicated to Goya’s work, the Disasters allows a reading of a historical subject which goes beyond the artistic, indeed encourages it. Taken as an expression of a concept, we may thereby understand the Disasters as an aesthetic result of a specific interpretation of this war, and as a sign of a new era. Thus, a reappraisal of the relationship between aesthetics and historical writing is proposed, thereby affecting important aspects in the theory of history, whether “source,” “fact,” “memory,” or “truth.”

Both the Peninsular War and Goya’s prints have received exhaustive attention. This chapter is particularly interested in how the conflict may be catalogued as a national and religious war, which raises a comparison with the logic of representation used in the Disasters. In these etchings, Goya represents the ravages of war as contrary to traditional rhetoric based on a final battle between

Translated by Sarah Hartley.
good and evil and without any element of religious identification. In spite of their differences, the people in arms will develop and intensify some of the features of the religious wars in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The consecration of ultimate reason and the secularization of the apocalypse are characteristic of modern warfare, especially in what has been called the first total war;⁴ and whereof Goya’s prints provide his historical account.

Taking the case of the Peninsular War, I examine narrative and rhetorical aspects of the apocalypse and the ways in which it is represented. In particular, I show the possibilities that the radical renewal of the traditional aesthetic codes in Francisco de Goya’s painting and his Disasters of War offer for history-writing. Through these prints we can see how, unlike the traditional rhetoric about the final combat of good against evil, Goya is representing, without any denominational element of religious identification, the ravages of a war that ironically contains traits of a religious war. It is often argued that these prints are a direct antecedent of photographic war reporting and even valuable documentary evidence of the horror of all war. However, this chapter reads the images as an expression of a concept and not as a proper piece of art. What Goya offers to historical writing with these Disasters is incompatible with objectivity and irreducible to the category of historical fact. This approach, in addition to the reflection on the methodological implications of the history of concepts and theory of history, seeks to contribute to a shift both in the wider fields of History and Art History toward a higher level of complexity and interdisciplinary dialogue.

Goya and history

Following Hayden White, we could say that the task of the historian is not to understand the past. Rather, the historian presents an account of the past that is comprehensible to others. In this (re-)production of the past's meaning, the historical actor’s experience of the period is essential.⁵ That is to say, the question of historical understanding, the meaning ascribed to those who experienced the events, is part of a long-term account. Here the rhetoric “the general language,” or “the code,”⁶ plays a decisive role, in the way that the assignment of meaning both shapes a typical perception of the era, and forms a central element of the ways in which this era is thought.⁷ It is at least as important to be aware of this in cases of images as of words. Images are not mere reflections of reality; they construct reality. They have indicative value, but also contribute to one experience or other of a historical era.
The case of Goya's *Disasters of War* is interesting as a threshold of modernity and in the changes evidenced by their subsequent reception. From social, political, and cultural viewpoints, their performative potential remained paralyzed, unpublished, and secret for decades, since they were not published until 1863. Their subsequent reception has drawn on this potential according to the interests or needs of the interpreter. Significantly, this expressive potential, what the work shapes or constructs, develops in tension with an indicative or informative aspect that we have traditionally called historical.

This demonstrates the difference between the way in which we assign a meaning to a historical event and the inherent meaning such events may have. As historians, it is advisable to be conscious of the impossibility of accessing the ultimate meaning of narratives or the logic and rationality behind historical actions. Anthropologically, it can be assumed that these had intention and meaning, for all their contradiction and opacity. Historical narrative consists of presenting alternatives, not solutions, to this lack of clarity. In my view, this decentralizes the primacy of historic fact in writing about the past, while recognizing interpretative subjectivity as producing a web of meanings, which, although limited in their hermeneutic capacity, remain endless and always open to new associations of meaning.

Since the eighteenth century, the tradition of historiography has limited ability to differentiate images considered as works of art from expressions of the artist's individual spirit: “The image became a timeless, ahistorical object, whose use as a historic source became impossible, if not sacrilegious. The work of art stood outside of history in a type of semiotic void.”  

In the case of the *Disasters of War*, this void has been filled with ideals that are not always mutually compatible.

Interpretations of the *Disasters* present a clear dependency on the political contexts and cultural understanding of the war. This has been the case since their publication and yet, this has not prevented these interpretations from being markedly depoliticized. For example, in his study on the reception of the first edition of the series in 1863, Allan E. Smith progresses from the “keen patriotic feeling” of the prologue to more abstract appeals about Goya's skeptical stance and his generic rejection of violence and war. This transition has not occurred without multiple contradictions about the interpretations of the etchings, or to vague explanations about the Aragonese genius's individualism. At the heart of these discrepancies lies the issue of Goya's reputation, not so much as a painter, but as a Spaniard, at once patriot and artist, during the years in which the liberal state wanted to assert its national character.
This need to morally justify the artist, but furthermore, in the process, Goya’s support or lack thereof for the cause of Joseph I or Ferdinand VII, forms the touchstone.  

Hence, it is surprising to see how important Goya scholars, who know the details of his life and works, present certain misunderstandings or simplifications when it comes to interpreting them. Historians grant absolute autonomy to the field of aesthetics, which is not only difficult to sustain but is also contradictory to the moral and political value given both to the works and the artist. Greater attention to conceptual history would not only enrich analysis of the works, but would also help to avoid certain errors. For example, in etching number 7, “What courage!,” the figure standing next to the cannon and surrounded by cadavers has been repeatedly interpreted as the popular heroine Agustina of Aragón, despite this identification being incongruous with the rest of the series and based purely on conjecture. Other depictions of women have been judged in similarly anachronistic ways. Etchings such as number 4, “The women give courage,” or number 5, “And are like wild beasts,” have come to be seen as demonstrations of generous contributions to the national cause. However, it does not appear that Goya intended to praise this new behavior. In fact, the behavior implies the complete deregulation of the violence of war, as well as a brutality inconsistent with Goya’s denunciation of the war. Fatal Consequences of Spain’s Bloody War with Bonaparte, and Other Emphatic Caprices, the title the author gave the series, is likewise ignored, as if Goya were referring to any war, and not the war that forced him to equivocate on his political loyalties. Recall that Goya, court painter for more than twenty years, did not dare to publish these etchings during his lifetime, and the first edition was made nearly half a century later, in 1863.

Goya’s role as an afrancesado, that is to say, his political alignment with the supporters of King Joseph I Bonaparte, may explain why historians have tended to underline the abstract nature of these representations. Goya does not interpret the war from an obviously patriotic perspective wished by more nationalist historians, while commentators like Bozal have pointed out the deficiencies of this reading. By not exalting the merits of war, nor glorifying triumphs or military virtues, Goya moves away from a canonical style of representing the war. This ambiguity grants the works a universality. If one considers this series as work of art, universality is associated with originality or genius. For critics such as Tzvetan Todorov, these qualities combine with a humanism that appears characterized as a moral impulse without apparent internal conflict: “It is accurate to say that life and work merge without the slightest resistance.”
contrast is rather eclipsed by an interpretation of the figure of Goya in moral terms.\textsuperscript{15}

This moralization of criticism does not rely on Spanish determinants. A contributing factor is the political imprecision in much of the analysis. Criticism that concentrates on the emotional and/or aesthetic elements depoliticizes the work and multiplies the possibilities of use. It ignores or marginalizes the conflict's historical specificity to talk about “war” in a way that does not disguise its presentism.\textsuperscript{16} This appropriation of the artwork may be legitimate. It may be useful to rhetorics of humanitarianism or pacifism. Historiographically speaking, however, this “moral approach” is less productive.\textsuperscript{17}

Ethical reflection may shed light on the meaning of the \textit{Disasters}. For example, Cascardi disputes the idea defended by Danto that Goya is antithetic to the moral cosmos represented by the art of the Enlightenment. For Cascardi, Goya’s ethical impulse is to accept the internal tensions and contradictions which the Enlightenment held as an ideal of self-regulation, for which temporal context and tradition play a vital role: “Goya recognizes those powers [the constructive powers of self-regulating subject] by acknowledging this pictorial tradition, but shows in addition that the ethical demands (of truth, authenticity, self-legislation, freedom, and autonomy) internal to the culture of the Enlightenment could not be met by the practice of representation deemed essential to their constitution.”\textsuperscript{18} Representation is determined both by internal boundaries and by contingent relationships with others: reason does not break free of the archaic substrate of beliefs and passions that evade every attempt at institutionalization.\textsuperscript{19}

Studies have been made of the Neostoic tradition in Goya’s works, through baroque emblems and highlighting his philosophical nature.\textsuperscript{20} The series should not be read merely as the moral reflections on vice and ignorance of an Enlightened philosopher, who would come to depict the war as a kind of epiphenomenon of the world’s chaos and degradation. This reading ignores: it as a matter of historical writing on specific events.

\textbf{Goya and war}

Defining the war can be seen as a strategy of political legitimation. Nationalist historiography appears to forget that Spanish people living through the war of 1808–1814 did not share a unanimous understanding of the conflict.\textsuperscript{21} Nor did those who fought against Bonaparte possess the same historical vision of this
period. For liberals, the war was a national revolution, a “sacred insurrection” against the despotism that had characterized the last decades of the Ancien Régime and an opportunity to establish a modern constitution for a sovereign nation of free citizens (e.g., Diario Mercantil de Cádiz 1813: 1006). The sanctity of this war helped to secularize the whole language of sacrifice that the fatherland and its martyrs had begun in the Revolution of 1789. For more conservative sectors, however, the battle was the natural result of a history of impiety, with obvious antecedents in the Protestant Reformation and the French Revolution. The adjective “sacred” was to create the same mobilizing effect as for liberals. However, by establishing a continuity with the body of Catholic traditions, reactionary clergy sought to a spiritual jurisdiction over the war. Military action should serve to protect preexisting privileges, and also the social and political amendments necessary to achieve a perfect double society, balanced between civil and spiritual powers. This discourse, amplified to the universal, pointed to the historic battle between good and evil, a battle that approached its final and decisive moment with the defeat of the Antichrist Napoleon. The rhetorical function can be seen in the horizon of expectations: not an end times, but the establishment of a Spain cleansed of all modern ills. This difference can be read when Goya’s images are regarded as part of the engraving tradition.

The Disasters are reminiscent of Albrecht Dürer’s illustrations of the Book of Revelation (1498). Dürer’s work still belongs to the medieval world and, despite its technical and stylistic innovations, it follows the artistic conventions of the Christianity of his time (Figure 9.1). Perhaps the greatest difference between Dürer and Goya emerges in their relationship to historical writing and narrative. Dürer produced illustrations for the Apocalypse of John. Goya instead proposed war as a secularized apocalypse, which offers no hope, and where only silence and melancholy remain. The relationship between text and image is also striking, as it reverses the explanatory function: it is not the image that, as an illustration, uses well-known codes of representation to explain the text, as in the case of the sacred medieval book. Rather, the words that accompany Goya’s drawings suggest a meaning that does not have clear codes of interpretation within the aesthetic tradition.

We can take the first plate as an example: “Sad presentiments of what must come to pass” (Figure 9.2). This etching recreates “waiting in despair” for the imminent event. In 1819, Goya would paint a similar composition with the title: “Christ on the Mount of Olives” (Figure 9.3) However, if one compares the attitude of both figures, while Christ prepares to humbly accept sacrifice,
what appears to await the other figure is catastrophe. In the engraving, the figure raises the head and looks upwards. In the picture, Jesus inclines his body forward without lifting his head as a gesture of humility and acceptance to receive from the hands of the angel the chalice sent by God.
The secularization of religious motifs in Goya, far from signifying that their deactivation, neutralization, or elimination, can be recognized in their spatial signs. As Cascardi noted, in respect to the frescoes of 1789 in the San Antonio de la Florida Chapel in Madrid, there is a redefinition of the spiritual spaces that exceed their religious content, and a recognition of the impossibility and illusory nature of a complete secularization by the Enlightenment.\textsuperscript{29} This tension is key to understanding the \textit{Disasters of War} as a historical text that moderates the Enlightenment optimism and its faith in progress. It is important to point out that secularization is not only visible in the transfer of meaning and function from the spiritual to the worldly; paradoxically, the consecration of new spaces, social practices, and historic events, like those of the nation or the war, produces similar effects in dissolving boundaries between the sacred and the profane.\textsuperscript{30} The political assumes religious characteristics, while religion is politicized as a national matter. From this point on, it will be possible to call for war in defense of the Catholic nation.\textsuperscript{31} These bases were used in different ways. For example, the constitutional protection of the Catholic religion (Article 12) was interpreted by the most traditionalist sectors as the subordination of spiritual

\textbf{Figure 9.2} Francisco de Goya, \textit{Disasters of War}, 1: “Sad presentiments of what must come to pass.”
matters to temporal sovereignty and a further step toward civil religion. These discussions extended beyond the meaning and aims of the war to the political consequences of its aftermath.

The religious pathos of this war, like that of the other wars of independence from Napoleonic expansion, exceeds the confessional to reach the national. All energies were to be given to the defense of a sacralized expression of historical life in peril. Using new aesthetic codes, Goya captures this shift in his *Disasters*, and it is here that we can relate a historical understanding of the violence to its representation. The association of *Disasters* with various motifs of religious iconography responds to artistic referents, but also to a profound historical change. The images end the understanding of war typical of European classicism. By
tying religious pathos to the political, the partisan war develops its revolutionary character. The violence in Goya’s engravings, puts an end to the clear and distinct, classical identifications discussed by Carl Schmitt: war and peace, legal and illegal, combatants and noncombatants, military and civil, enemy and criminal, regular and uniformed, neutrality and nonneutrality, the recognition of the right to war, an enemy in agreement with this right, between states. The relativization of hostility between armies bearing a ius belli was a fundamental condition of this classic law of war, which presupposed that enmity was based on strictly political grounds.  

A contemporary of Goya, Carl von Clausewitz describes how in this new form of war, which marks the step from cabinet wars to wars of the people, from a war of positions to guerrilla warfare, “the people-nation has become an essential power factor in the political running of the state.” This, together with an intensification of the conflict tending toward the absolute, implies a progressive assimilation of politics with war, from “real war” to “absolute war.” At this point we begin to speak of “total war.” In other words, the historical experience of the national-popular war moves closer to the characteristic that best defines its essence: the extreme development of its possibilities of reciprocal violence and mutual annihilation. But it is not only a question of the power to bring about the other’s destruction. Ennobling all these distinctions, the willingness toward sacrifice is an obligation of those who belong to the nation, of a people “who fight for their self-assertion against others.”

The Peninsular War can be considered both an international conflict and a civil war since it supposes a fight between sides, associated with foreign powers, defending the legitimacy of different sovereign powers. This implies the abandonment of the classic international law of the Ius Gentium Europeum that had been consecrated after the end of the wars of religion in 1648. The Peace of Westphalia established a system of equilibrium that, by limiting the conflict to a cross-state issue, was incompatible with the war to the death. The war was subject to limits, both legal and economic, that refused the annihilation of the enemy on the assumption of a iusta causa. However, as José Luis Villacañas points out, civil war involves a criterion of distinction between friends and enemies that is both theological and nonethical. Thus, violence adopts a transcendental and sacred meaning. To illustrate the force of the civil war for nationalism, Villacañas recalls Fichte: whoever is identified with the nation’s own values will be the one who can best appeal to martyrdom and sacrifice in its name.

The Peninsular War is regarded as the first conflict in which the phenomenon of the modern guerrilla appears. Nonregular forms of harrying the enemy were
already known. However, the novelty in the war against Napoleon is the association of guerrilla forces with the regular army and their identification with a side in a struggle for sovereign power. Notwithstanding the existence of hordes of bandits or violent groups of peasants showing discontent with the precariousness of their standard of living in the way, for example, of the Bagaudae revolts, in this case, guerrilla groups continued the objectives of regular warfare, to the extent that they often counted among their members individuals of the army whose units had been dispersed, as well as deserters. Authorities initially recommended the formation of guerrillas and even, through the regulation of companies and squads (*Reglamento de Partidas y Cuadrillas* of December 28, 1808), gave guerrilla fighters “the opportunity to appropriate the spoil of the enemy and granted them the consideration of heroes in the war for independence and liberty.” The profusion of regulations indicates an inability to keep these forces under control. In pursuit of this, they even invoked peculiar juridical figures like the “corsair of land” to legalize land actions previously germane to the field of maritime warfare.

In practice, especially in the early days of the conflict, the Spanish guerrillas[^41] operated according to characteristics of partisan war, which falls outside of regulation, and in which strength consists of surprise, unpredictability, and the absence of external signals that allow an attack to be predicted. In addition, the transformation of the battle into the “last war of humanity” implies a drive to annihilate the enemy which proves uncontrollable, literally impossible to reproduce in its detail and scale. The moral justification of hate requires the prior dehumanization of the other, to transform private hatred of the *inimicus* into the category of the public enemy (the *hostis*). “That is the logic of a war of *justa causa* [just cause] without recognition of a *justus hostis* [just enemy]. Thereby, the revolutionary partisan becomes the true central figure of war.”[^42]

The conventions destroyed by partisan war have their equivalent in Goya’s plastic language. The dignity with which the dead have been historically represented disappears.[^43] The deformations that the human body suffers show that “the human body is no longer a manifest ideal shape that demands respect. It becomes, instead, a vehicle for expression that can be changed about and used with an almost offhand indifference.”[^44] This transformation is not only aesthetic; it reflects a profound historical change at the specific moment of the national war, concerning the dehumanization of the enemy.[^45]

Regarding religious war and etchings, Jacques Callot provides an important precedent. If the war of a nation in arms revives and intensifies certain features of the religious wars, the *Disasters of War* radicalizes the *Miseries of War*,

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eighteen etchings published in 1633 in which the French printmaker represents the devastations of the Thirty Years’ War. I believe that the most interesting influence here is found not in the etching techniques, the contrasts, or the characteristic baroque excess, but rather in the type of violence represented and the type of warfare referred to. This is most relevant to the relationship between aesthetics and historical writings followed in this chapter. The Thirty Years’ War ended with the Peace of Westphalia, and with it the religious wars that had devastated the continent since the previous century. In 1648, a new order of balance between the European powers was established. This order would last until the Napoleonic Wars. It also regulated war, and thus provided a rationalization for the violence following the religious conflicts. These had been characterized by a level of devastation and barbarity that Callot invites us to consider as a landscape, a wide and precise panorama where the horror is clear.

Callot’s depictions of hangings (Figure 9.5) show clearly how the executed come accompanied by text in which the crime is described. We witness the “just punishment” of a number of bandits. This is in contrast to Goya titles etchings 35 and 36: “Nobody knows why” and “Not [in this case] either” (Figure 9.6)—in Goya, motives no longer matter, nor does moral reason. While the moral
reference is clear in Callot, in Goya the spectator is left uncomprehending, an ethical distance separating the unprotected bodies of the executed ones and the relaxed posture of the soldier. Moreover, the extension of space in etching 36, in which similar acts can be discerned, signals to us the mechanical repetition of the executions. In the words of Licht: “The episode is not finite, integrated, and meaningful within itself. Its significance lies precisely in the fact that it is
It should also be added that there stands a relationship between the repetition of horrors and the material nature of the plates which are designed to allow unlimited reproduction.

Following Bozal, we could say that the indeterminacy of anonymous identities together with the extension of space beyond the represented limits creates a far more intense impression for the viewer, since it lays bare that, in extending these scenes to our world, anybody may be as much a victim as an executioner. In this sense, the posture of the soldier invites further comparison with the image of Callot, in which the troops are active and occupied in establishing order. The soldier’s passive contemplation in “Not [in this case] either,” in spite of his physical closeness to the corpses, expresses a void of emotion at their death. There is no pretense of order or rationalization of barbarism: his resigned and cynical acceptance shocks us as spectators.

Both the surface and the use of space have a multiplying effect in Goya. Licht describes the novel techniques used to create a sense of the infinite: “Goya’s space no longer grows from a fixed center, and without a fixed center we cannot take our bearings in the directionless world he shows us (…) It is an abyss that stretches to all sides of us and even opens menacingly behind.” The crucial aspect, from our narrative perspective, is the fragmented nature of the images, whose possible relationship in itself calls into question our judgment and our perception: “Goya insists on making us aware of the fractional, incomplete, and ephemeral nature of all human experience.”

In a lucid analysis, which takes the Disasters of War as a work of universal calling and the war as a generic event, Stoppani shows how the material dimension of the etchings brings interpretative perspectives that are highly relevant to the spatial relationship and narrative. If in the Carceri d’Invenzione by Piranesi (1761), “the hybrid technique of etching and aquatint offers an analytical tool that focuses on the detail (the line) while obfuscating its context (surface) both to obliterate it and to universalize it,” the study of space in Goya also reveals a similar effect used to “produce a distance that is not only graphic and spatial but also a process of moral distancing and social critique.” The same fragmented, incomplete and elusive style highlighted by Licht relates to Goya’s etching technique itself, using a movement that shows the singularity of the event while rendering it intangible: “The line that surgically inscribes and the word that absolutely describes work together with the veiling acid and the darkening etched line to obliterate time and space.”

Guerrilla warfare is similarly described “as a movement of constitutive deconstruction”: the prenomic and subaltern nature of which is not only revealed in
the difficulties of identification in the specific moment of activity, but rather in that of historical and theoretical comprehension. This dual aspect can equally be applied to my reading of Goya’s *Disasters*. There is a rupture in the order of representation which consists in a resistance to interpretation or “to hegemonic appropriation.” This obliteration of time and space restricts the possibilities for a stable and sure constitution of the specific historical referent. The material characteristics of the line in the Goya’s engravings show affinity with the guerrilla in Moreiras’s terms. As in the case of the guerrilla, exteriority to the norm, opacity, indeterminacy, unpredictability, and perturbation define the discursive strategy of the series, as well as its resistance to be reduced to mere instrument or propaganda.

Goya and the truth

I have shown that the *Disasters* are historically relevant for the understanding of a new concept of war. The relationship between aesthetics and historical writing uses an analysis of transformations within the representation regime of Goya as an indicator of change of period, but also as the iconic expression of a conceptual mutation that inspired the theoretical work of Clausewitz. The historical entity of the *Disasters* as a source does not relate the facts so much as a certain perception of them and their philosophical interpretation. When taken as a historical work, the *Disasters* push us to question their canonical interpretation, as well as *apriorisms* with which we operate history.

These prints are often highlighted as a direct antecedent of photographic war reportage, and, even, as valuable documentary testimony of the horror of war *qua* war. Contra Licht, what Goya offers to historical writing with these *Disasters* is precisely their incompatibility with the objectivity and the irreducibility of the past to the category of historical fact. From this viewpoint, the potential offered by these representations is not their documentary-probative value, their ability to recount what has happened. It is their evaluative dimension that is deliberately vague and ambiguous. Against the usual principles of military or war painting, which Goya himself practiced elsewhere, there are no heroes, nor heroic events, in these works. There is no mention of dates or places. We do not know the people depicted. In the majority of cases we do not even know facial expressions. What is more, and this is something of great interest as a practice of historical writing, these etchings by Goya were not completed as a series during the war, but rather afterwards (see note 1). They do not aim
to reproduce what is happening, but are instead an image of its memory. And, like every memory, they are imprecise, hazy, incommensurable with what, in fact, may have taken place. Goya’s treatment of sources—the memory of what Goya saw, the testimonies he had access to—does not pretend to any accuracy, information, or historical evidence. Their narrative potential goes beyond this purpose: the images recreate confusion and indeterminacy as a fundamental characteristic of Goya’s vision of the Peninsular War. This vision contrasts with the narrative of clear boundaries between traitors and patriots, between good Christians and infidels, between Spanish and anti-Spanish, in short, with the antagonism of the friend-enemy as a self-sufficient explanation for what took place between 1808 and 1814. It is precisely the difficulty of defining this state of existential enmity that points to the heart of what is disastrous in war.

The power of these etchings stems from their imprecision, an incisive lack of detail. Stylistically this has been linked to subsequent artistic movements such as impressionism and expressionism. It is important to insist that Goya titled the series *Fatal Consequences of Spain’s Bloody War with Bonaparte, and Other Emphatic Caprices*, which implies an appraisal of a specific event, the Peninsular War. As historical writing, the *Disasters* do not record historic facts that are now revealed. Rather, they evoke memories and anticipations that are vague and impossible to discern clearly. This play between memory and imagination, so connected to traumatic experience and to prophetic language, is also characteristic of dreams and had been explored by Goya some years earlier. The best-known example is his *capricho* (caprice) “The sleep of reason produces monsters” (1799) (Figure 9.7). Even then, Goya’s representation of dreams moves away from the codes that the Trent Counter-Reformation had laid down and that dominated the whole of Spanish baroque painting. The Catholic rationalization of dreams was specifically intended to control any prophetic or millenarian attempts. Goya’s heterodoxy at this point is also clear, liberating dreams and hallucination from any canonical pretention, of all hermeneutic privilege.

The plates that conclude the war series reflect the limits in narrating the past, and impact upon the conditions of possibility of historical writing. Among the representations of atrocities, etching 79 states “Truth has died” (Figure 9.8). Surrounded by the shadowy presence of a crowd of spectators, we see one of the fatal consequences of this war; we do not know whether they are trying to offer aid, preparing to bury her, mourning her, or welcoming her death. The etching shown in Figure 9.9 elicits the question “Will she live again?” The image does not encourage optimism. Even less so with the penultimate etching that appears to break the narrative sequence with the interruption of “Proud monster”
(Figure 9.10) in which it is difficult to ascertain whether the creature is devouring or vomiting human cadavers.

In the whole series, as in the whole war, where nothing is assured nor can any meaning be established with absolute precision, the only certainty is pain. “This is the truth” states the title of the last image, where Truth, back turned to the sun’s rays, comes back to life after being disinterred by a dark figure who does not inspire confidence. We do not know who he is, only that he appears prepared...
Figure 9.8 Francisco de Goya, Disasters of War, 79, “Truth has died.”

Figure 9.9 Francisco de Goya, Disasters of War, 80, “Will she live again?”
to care for her. Goya concludes his trajectory through the *Fatal Consequences of Spain’s Bloody War with Bonaparte, and Other Emphatic Caprices*, through the *Disasters of War*, by returning once again to allegory and ironic distance (Figure 9.11).

Susan Sontag rightly relates the representation of pain and horror with the fact that “all the trappings of the spectacular have been eliminated: the landscape is an atmosphere, a darkness, barely sketched in.” 62 As I have argued, there is a new kind of war that defies existing genres of painting. For this reason, I feel that Licht is mistaken when using Goya’s moral stance on the subject to differentiate between Goya’s *Disasters* and previous war painting is. According to Licht, Goya limits himself to bearing witness to the facts and leaves judgment to the viewers. This constitutes one of the reasons for unease when contemplating the work: the realization of worthless sacrifice and certain brutal acts that are interchangeable and equivalent, empty of meaning. 63 In my view, these accurate observations on Goya’s modernity, including the role which the viewer is made to play, merit further debate as to the question of impartiality. 64 It could perhaps be claimed that this is political, but it is difficult to define it as moral. Goya represents the objects with impartiality, breaking with the compositional hierarchy dominant
since the Quattrocento. However, I do not believe that it would be appropriate to translate that as moral impartiality. It seems more fitting, according to Licht’s own analysis, to speak of ironic distance or questioning: “The last remnants of declamatory pathos, the last remnants of deliberately pointing a moral lesson are rejected by Goya.” It is this active rejection that does not correspond with the term impartial, and stands in need of a new pictorial syntax. In fact, I believe this is the reason why Licht himself observes that the ambiguity of the images at no point allows us to see superficiality or indifference in Goya.

This is the fundamental difference between the theoretical reflections of Clausewitz and the iconic representations of Goya. With the maximum logical rigor, Clausewitz pursues a phenomenology of war. With professional analytical distance, in the light of his military experience and his vast knowledge of war history, he defines, explains, and values in pragmatic and functional terms to the objective of victory the constituent elements of war. The logical consequences of the perfection of real war with respect to absolute war will bring total war. In the case of Goya, however, these consequences are considered from a very different perspective. They have nothing to do with the technical development of any military logic, but with those of human drives that are irreducible to reason. We

Figure 9.11 Francisco de Goya, Disasters of War, 82, “This is the truth.”
do not speak of consequences in an abstract framework of logical causality, but of fatal consequences in a concrete historical context of a war whose intensity can no longer be expressed through the known aesthetic codes. The aforementioned prints depicting the participation of women in the war are, in effect, the image of a people in arms: a topic to which Clausewitz devotes a chapter of his treaty. Unlike the military theoretician of the war, Goya does not wonder about the advantageous consequences or the effectiveness of these forces for victory. The same can be said of print number 28, not by coincidence titled “Rabble,” a pejorative name which expresses anything but impartiality, or to insist on the rejection of the patriotic interpretation, admiration. One might wonder if the Fatal consequences of this bloody war against Napoleon are not the generic disasters of all war, but rather the fatal consequences of a national war of resistance.

The artist concluded the title of this series of etchings with And Other Emphatic Caprices. The recognition of excess, of the subjectivity of representation, the explicit rejection of presenting any proof, questions his own position as witness in plate 44 “I saw it” or 47 “This is how it happened,” and undoubtedly contrasts with the historical accounts of his era determined to present a Reasoned History…, an Exact and Impartial Manifest… or an Impartial Examination… of the facts, usual formulas of the historiography of the era. In the order of representation, what has been called the Goya paradigm “presupposes that the destruction of mimesis is the most appropriate way to represent facts that elude a clear rational understanding.”

It is difficult to find here signs of the historical optimism of the Enlightenment. If eschatology offers an explanation and provides meaning to the experience of events that prove to be unbearable, Goya shows in the Disasters the tragedy of a world which already knows that behind these terrible events nothing remains but the critical and mistrustful reworking of the memory, and the ironic scrutiny of the imagination itself; in short, the tragedy of a world that already knows that after the Apocalypse no redemption will come. Only silence, perhaps.

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This chapter critically explores the place of history as concept and practice within the field of design research, past and present. Design, today, refers to a spectrum of practices varying widely in medium, scale, and application. Alongside familiar forms such as architecture, fashion, interiors, graphic, product, industrial, textile, engineering, and systems design and urban planning, practices such as interaction design, service design, social design, and speculative critical design have emerged in the past decade, alongside new forms of technology, new interfaces, new economic and political landscapes, and new ideas about the roles that design can play in society and the economy.\(^1\) In its expanded practice, design shapes, creates, and implements material and immaterial artefacts, not only the buildings, chairs, and garments familiar to us as “design” but public policy, corporate strategy, and social behavior.\(^2\)

On a more abstract level, design is both verb and noun, both action and the product of action. As such, design can be codified as a set of specific actions that, if undertaken, can lead to solutions for particular challenges. Design can also be framed—or reframed—as everyday practice. So the identity of “the designer” may be widened or “democratized” from a narrow professional sphere to include “Everyone designs who devises courses of action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred ones.”\(^3\) Together, these reframings afford practices such as codesign and social design/design for social innovation, in which designers work as facilitators and enablers, supporting communities—including professional communities such as groups of civil servants or medical practitioners—to use design techniques to address a particular situation,\(^4\) or in
which communities take the lead in designing environments, systems, and solutions based on local knowledge.\footnote{5}

This broader conception of design is currently embraced by prominent design organizations, national and international, to describe design generally and to reposition existing subdisciplines. In 2016, the World Design Organization (WDO),\footnote{6}, formerly the International Council of Societies of Industrial Design (Icsid), renewed its definition of industrial design:

> Industrial Design is a strategic problem-solving process that drives innovation, builds business success, and leads to a better quality of life through innovative products, systems, services, and experiences. Industrial Design bridges the gap between what is and what's possible. It is a trans-disciplinary profession that harnesses creativity to resolve problems and co-create solutions with the intent of making a product, system, service, experience or a business, better. At its heart, Industrial Design provides a more optimistic way of looking at the future by reframing problems as opportunities. It links innovation, technology, research, business, and customers to provide new value and competitive advantage across economic, social, and environmental spheres.

Notably, this definition not only dematerializes the product or object of industrial design practice but removes any specification of materials or techniques. Industrial designers, in this definition, work across materials as well as disciplines; design, the definition suggests, is as much a mindset as a set of processes. And the new definition neither ascribes industrial design’s core function as creating form nor limits its agency to professional designers.\footnote{7}

As the disappearance of “industrial” from the organization’s name suggests, strategic and philosophical aims underlie design’s redefinition as a far-reaching and open creative practice exceptionally suited for addressing complex social, economic, and environmental challenges. For a critical humanities scholar, this is a welcome reframing of a discipline that, in the form of practices such as packaging design, styling design, and advertising design, is deeply imbricated in the Anthropocene through its promotion of mass production and consumption. The design historian Victor Margolin has defined design as “the conception and planning of the artificial world.”\footnote{8} If we are to take the Anthropocene seriously, then to place design in relation to the entirety of social, economic, and political relations as “the artificial world” seems only just. Indeed—and even without the pressing environmental agenda—linguistic and practical reframing already facilitates design’s adoption as a management and governance technique by governments and corporate organizations. In political economies as diverse
as China, Chile, Denmark, and Canada, design as set out in the WDO™ definition is courted by policy-makers, taught in business schools and proselytized to tech firms.

Such an enlargement of design’s scope necessitates checks and balances: inquiring into how power and agency are distributed within relationships, who has the right to define terms of reference, and whether or not existing and often unequal power relationships are intentionally or accidentally replicated within new design ones. Some researcher-practitioners in social design and service design reflect publicly and critically on the politics of these practices. Practices such as speculative critical design use design tropes to incite reflection on individual and collective choices, emerging technologies, and social formations. The movement to decolonize design asks practitioners and commissioners alike to consider the impact of historical and ongoing global inequality on design decisions, and to investigate reshaping power relations for more equitable distribution.

Much of this work builds on methods and existing work in social science, not least because the economic heft of subindustries, such as user-experience design—a core hiring area for technology companies and the crux of public service design—indicates an obvious turn to ethnographic and other social science techniques. Anthropology’s critical traditions afford a similarly critical approach to articulating power relations within design practice, through design anthropology. Similarly, both “problem-solving” and “problem-posing” design employ techniques from design, art, and architecture practice and from software development—for example, rapid prototyping, iteration, and visualization—to generate creative responses and different perspectives on familiar problems.

Despite its own engagement with questions of power relations, design research in all its aspects draws less frequently on history as method. This is despite attention within the history of design—an adjacent, sometimes overlapping field concerned in part with critical self-reflection and debate around design—to issues such as globalization, cultural appropriation, disability, and sustainability, through publishing, exhibitions, and—perhaps most crucially—university education. When design research and practice refers to history, it is commonly in the form of “the history of,” which is to say history as the past. This may be as a narrative that contextualizes contemporary practice and conditions, or as a resource—heritage—whose material artefacts might serve, it is hoped, as the basis for the forms and motifs of more locally appropriate or commercially popular products in the present. History can also be a set of critical methods...
for research, analysis and interpretation, self-reflection, and communication—which might include inspection of the past but consist of the accumulation and assessment of evidence to generate and test explanations for change over time. This understanding of history appears in design pedagogy, but less frequently in design practice or design research.

This chapter focuses on the research field known first as “design methods,” subsequently as “design research,” which is concerned with the creation, communication, and application of systematic, repeatable methods to create positive and effective change through design. Design research has become an intellectual and industrial milieu for academic research and doctoral training as research funding agencies have shifted to recognize design as a research area and doctorates become increasingly required for contracted academic posts in university design departments worldwide. It is directly connected to design for the public, private and third sectors, as per the WDO™ definition. It is international: the 2016 biannual meeting of the Design Research Society (DRS) included participants from over thirty countries on five continents. And it attracts attention not only from government and enterprise, but from arts and humanities researchers and funding bodies interested variously in creativity, social impact, and community practice.

What it is not, often, is a humanities discipline. Current research funding sources illustrate this point. In the United Kingdom, for example, both the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) and Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) support research into design. This reflects the fact that design research teaching, doctoral training, and research is located both within art and design faculties or universities and in engineering faculties and specialist universities, sometimes in social science units as well. Funding and training map design research’s continuing affinities with engineering, psychology, human-computer interaction (HCI), and other applied and social sciences; somewhat confusingly, much research in design is not, in this sense, design research.

The chapter situates design research as a social practice shaped through its interactions with professional training and the academy, and as an economic practice within the university structure. It assesses how key actors within the “discourse communities or networks” that constitute design research have previously employed or understood history in two significant milieus and moments: the journal Design Issues in the 1980s and early 1990s; and interpretations of history for design in the early 2010s. It offers elements of design research that might benefit historians as well. Finally, it argues that history, as a
method that is both forensic and problem-posing, might enable design research to attend even more carefully to design's environments, impact, and power relations, and to create more effective, ethical products as a result.

Ultimately, the chapter aims to bring history and design into dialogue: not through writing histories of design or by developing designs that reference national or other pasts, but through an exchange of methods. In 1991, Victor Margolin called for a similar dialogue:

I believe that history, if brought into relation with other disciplines, can contribute much to the study of design in contemporary culture as well as to its role in the culture of the past. While I don't wish to subsume historical research under research for practice, I do believe that it can both inform and be informed by practice if the two are considered more closely.22

Joining colleagues, including Margolin, I offer history and design as two powerful approaches and bodies of practice that might benefit from mutual engagement. I am hardly the first to do so. But the fact that history—design history or otherwise—continues to call for traction within design research—and vice versa—indicates the scope for further work.

A brief history of design research, 1960–1980

Research into systematic, systematized methods for design practice emerged as a shared area of interest, research, and practice within and between academia and industry in Britain after the Second World War:23

Thus, a phase has been entered in which design, as design, is a subject for study. The goal of such a study must be to understand the nature of the design process and how its various elements can be developed and assembled, motivated and controlled to give the greatest overall benefit.24

I. M. Ross's comment at the 1962 Conference on Design Methods, held at Imperial College in London, begins to characterize design research as developed in the postwar decades. From the early 1960s, practitioners across graphic design, industrial design, engineering design, architecture, and urban planning—in sites as geographically and politically dispersed as the United States, Britain, West Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union, Brazil, and Chile—identified self-reflexivity and the conceptualization, codification, and communication of considered, articulated methods for the rational design of artefacts,
systems, and environments. Both the goal and the conceptualization of design prefigured the dematerialization and abstraction of the 2016 WDO™ definition. In Ross’s words:

The last few years have seen the beginning of a shift in emphasis in the study of design—from the end product as such and the components, materials and knowledge which come together in the evolution of its form, to the process itself and the methods of reasoning and imagination by which the form is conceived and refined.

Despite variance in ideas between individual proponents and between different local design methods communities, a common goal was to optimize effective results in any project by attending to the design process itself, including design’s context, as a designed, enacted and reproducible set of actions—a design in its own right. Proponents believed that attention to design process might enable designers to improve the outcomes of projects as diverse as precision machinery manufacturing and urban design.

As defined by British engineering design educators E. Matchett and A. H. Briggs, design was the process of deriving “the optimum solution to the sum of the true needs of the particular set of circumstances.” Broadly stated, optimizing the design process formed part of a more general interest among engineers, managers, and academics in industrialized or industrializing nations to optimize manufacturing, engineering, and planning. Design methods emerged alongside, and in many cases drew from, practices such as operations research, urban planning, and cybernetics, all of which built on wartime systems theory and developments in practice such as network flow control. Advocates such as Ross shared the desire to systematize design process as a problem-solving method, and, in so doing, position design as a rational, scientific and self-reflexive practice similar to the scientific method. As described by leading theorist and practitioner Nigel Cross, “There is, therefore, a common concern with increasing both the efficiency and the reliability of the design process in the face of the increasing complexity of design tasks.”

By the early 1970s, design methods, or design research as it was by then increasingly known, had become an academic discipline in Britain and the United States, with a university presence, national and international societies, newsletters, conferences, a profile in other more established academic disciplines’ journals and conferences and regular communication between proponents. In the United Kingdom, design research contributed to shaping design education in industrial design and engineering faculties at universities and polytechnics,
alongside more arts-oriented conceptions of design as creative practice in art schools and polytechnics.

As the field’s cultural and organizational proximity to engineering should suggest, design research in the 1960s and 1970s referred primarily to research methods in engineering and technical disciplines. When attention was accorded to context, it found itself in the social sciences, rather than in humanities disciplines such as history, or in existing histories of modern design such as Reyner Banham’s Theory and Design of the First Machine Age (1960). Methods proposed in this period demonstrate some parallels with historical practice, as in, for example, an attention to articulating change over time, the identification of factors in change, and the results of specific combinations of these factors. Many early British design research protocols specified assembling all relevant evidence to ensure accurate assessment of a situation as the first step in the design process, while demonstrating an awareness of the impossibility of gathering all relevant evidence and of knowing when one has or has not done so. However, for the most part design research’s advocates framed their processes as generating a product—a system, machine part, urban plan, or other designed artefact—rather than as describing and communicating the process through which a condition came into being.

Design methods and history also shared a cultural shift after the late 1960s, from the positivist assumption that universally applicable, rational methods might generate a systematic understanding of cause and effect toward an expectation that humans were simply messy, and that effective design and description required attending to social complexity and human scale. As early proponent J. Christopher Jones reflected several decades later: “We sought to be open minded, to make design processes that would be more sensitive to life than were the professional practices of the time. But the result was rigidity: a fixing of aims and methods to produce designs that everyone now feels to be insensitive to human needs.”

Even more strongly, Jones wrote:

I dislike the machine language, the behaviorism, the continual attempt to fix the whole of life into a logical framework. Also, there is the information overload which swamps the user of design methods (in the absence of computer aids that really do aid designing). I realize now that rational and scientific knowledge is essential for discovering the bodily limit and abilities we all share, but that mental process, the mind, is destroyed if it is encased in a fixed frame of reference.

By the 1970s, design research suffered from what Cross described as “a clash of views between those who want to develop an objective ‘design science’ and
those who want to reconstitute the design process in recognition of the ill-defined, wicked, or ill-structured nature of design problems.”

The rupture formed part of the broader shift in thinking as practice away from the modernist “science and technology” paradigm critics saw as having led to crises such as the Vietnam War to one critical of power structures and desiring to distribute decision-making agency to broader publics. In design research, this meant an exploration of participatory practices that shifted agency, as Cross describes it, “towards recognition of satisfactory or appropriate solution-types and an ‘argumentative’ participatory process in which designers are partners with the problem ‘owners’ (clients, customers, users, the community).”

Design research’s sea change paralleled the rise of approaches such as narrative history, critical history, poststructuralism, women’s history, and social history in the 1970s, as well as the emergence of critiques of technological determinism and social construction of technology theory within the history of technology.

Design history was also shaped by this cultural shift. Design history as an academic discipline in Britain emerged in the mid-1970s as a subject area within art and design education, located in art schools and in polytechnics. Catalyzed by government reforms to tertiary art and design education and by late-1960s protests at British art and design schools against what students saw as irrelevant modes and content of art history teaching, art and design schools and polytechnics in the early 1970s began offering design history as a mandatory subject for design students, delivered by lecturers with backgrounds in cognate disciplines, such as the history of art.

Design history combined approaches from cultural studies, cultural history, semiotics, visual and material culture, socioeconomic history, and the history of architecture. Some design historians focused on the history of design professions, prominent designers, and designed artefacts in twentieth-century Britain, the United States, and Western Europe, with attention primarily to modernism, an approach following that of modernist canon-creating histories such as Nikolaus Pevsner’s *Pioneers of Modern Design* (1937). Some aimed to historicize professional design practice through the lenses of cultural, political and social history. Others, some aligned with the Birmingham School in cultural studies, directed students’ attention to analyzing everyday objects such as the Vespa scooter and developed a professional discourse around artefact-based social and cultural critique.

Design research, like other engineering-based or aligned design approaches, featured rarely in this constellation. Similarly, 1970s design research developed human-centered design approaches largely without reference to humanities.
fields such as history. Writing in the inaugural issue of the DRS journal *Design Studies*, Bruce Archer, Professor of Design Research at the Royal College of Art, included history within what he calls “design methodology”: “Design methodology is alive and well, and living in the bosom of its family: design history, design philosophy, design criticism, design epistemology, design modelling, design measurement, design management, and design education.” At the 1980 DRS conference, Archer called for design researchers to attend to design’s social and cultural context as well as to cognitive methods, and noted history as one of the methods attuned to recognizing and understanding it.

Much period writing about the relationship between design research and history, however, comments on a lack of communication. In a pair of brilliant essays published in 1984, British design historian Clive Dilnot critiqued “design studies’ attempts, so far profoundly ahistorical, to analytically and logically model the design process” and argued that design research had not in fact engaged the social. As he wrote, “it is very difficult to hold simultaneously an orientation to the design professions, whose entire value system eschews the social, and to the wider, social sense of the activity and its human, rather than simply design professional, import.” Dilnot cited several factors for the gap between design history and design research, firstly historical class differences between the humanities and applied science and technology. He argued that the disconnect between humanities-based design history and design practice with its connections to business, industry, and engineering emerged from the denigration of business, industry, and technology as lesser than “pure” sciences and humanities in Britain since the nineteenth century. A difference in cultures—namely what Dilnot saw an overreliance on positivist methods within design research, stemming from its allegiance to science, technology, and engineering, and an uncritical focus on narratives of great modernist designers and designs within the history of design, stemming from similarly un-self-reflexive practice—furthered the disjuncture.

For Dilnot, these epistemological differences blocked the possibility of mutual recognition: “Discouraged from pursuing the kind of self-reflection characteristic of the humanities and sociohistorical sciences and of science itself, neither technology nor design has pursued the historical, cultural, or philosophical-analytical study of itself.” Design history research, he argued, should go beyond modernist canon formation to address broader historical issues, including questions of economics and industrial organization. This, he argued, would allow design history to contribute both to understandings of design and to design’s ability to respond to pressing social challenges.
Dilnot’s critique is unrelenting, perhaps intentionally so, in deemphasizing the self-reflexive, intellectually open practice that did exist in the fields of design research and design history. Similarly, a broader categorization of design history would include his own academic practice, which did bridge the two communities. Regardless, the critique’s possibility indicates both a lack of communication and the feeling of necessity, amongst some, to join the two practices.

Design historians within design and history: Design Issues, 1983–1995

In the 1980s, a similar vision for history’s relation with design research emerged within epistemological and institutional fields in Britain and the United States. By the early 1990s, this would lead to heated debates around design history’s instrumentalization and independence in relation to design research:

Relevant to any historian interested in the design process is the growing body of literature on what is termed “design methods.” This literature reflects the reflections of practitioners and theorists on designing. Their aim in making the methods used explicit and discussing their various strengths and weaknesses is, of course, to make designing more effective and scientific.  

Notable in design historian John Walker’s 1989 description is the effort to parse design research as relevant rather than present in design history. Dilnot’s 1984 critique suggests, similarly, that British design historians were aware of design methods, but found them intellectually alien and unhelpful. Design historians and design researchers occasionally published research or presented conference papers across disciplinary boundaries, but the two fields remained separate for the most part outside each other’s mainstreams.

American academia provided the ground for an argument for including history, theory and criticism within design research, as well as models for this practice. Dilnot’s critiques were commissioned by Margolin, an American design historian, for Design Issues, an academic journal founded in 1982 at the University of Illinois Chicago. The first issue ran Dilnot’s overview and critique of design history practice; the second his argument for change in both design research and design history practice, to address urgent social and political issues. As the reasoned ferocity of Dilnot’s critique suggests, Design Issues represented a concerted effort to generate discourse, discussion, and ideas by publishing plural ideas about design; the initial editorial stated that the journal intended “to be
provocative and raise controversial issues,” rather than seek the foundations of a science or theory of design. A second aim concerned American design education: to defuse what the editors saw as unfounded belief in pragmatism within design education by modeling history’s attention to complexity and consequent disabling of oversimplified conclusions, which they saw as endemic in American design education and academic discourse at the time. Third, the journal aimed to reposition design within culture, as counterpoint to design research’s continued focus on method. As described by Margolin, a cofounder:

The five founders identified the themes of the journal as history, theory, and criticism, thus staking out a space in the field of design research that was not occupied by any other publication or discourse community at the time. The aim of the journal, as stated in the initial editorial, was “to be provocative and raise controversial issues,” rather than seek the foundations of a science or theory of design. The editors positioned *Design Issues* as “a journal of ideas that will embrace many forms from scholarship to polemics.” Their intent was to explore design as a broad part of culture rather than an enterprise with a particular theory or methodology.

Publishing design history furthered all three aims, and in doing so created a space self-identified within design research but infused with humanities approaches. The journal thus became a key site for publishing design historical research, both by American scholars located in academic disciplines such as American studies and art history, and by British and European authors situated within design history, philosophy, and pedagogy. Book reviews stimulated American audiences by introducing design history research published elsewhere—primarily but not exclusively in the United Kingdom. Historical content appeared alongside theory and criticism, toward the journal’s aim to spur critical discourse and self-reflexivity within academic design.

Editors felt that design history should contribute to larger issues in and around design: “By asking probing questions … design history constitutes one important form of deliberation on the artifacts, events, issues, and themes intrinsic to design in the modern era.” Despite editors’ work to connect design history overtly to pressing issues in design, however, the journal’s 1980s design history articles often stayed within historical parameters, focusing on historiographical points—important for the task of strengthening design history’s academic capacity and provoking reflection for nonhistorian readers, but requiring some work on their part. Writing retrospectively in 1995, Margolin commented, “Design history … has not had much success in engaging with current practice. These
issues involve new technologies, innovative collaborative efforts among design professionals, a concern with the impact of complex products on users and the relations between the design of material objects and immaterial processes.  

Perhaps due to disciplinary and structural conventions within American universities that saw many design historians working within art history departments, the journal’s 1980s design history articles had addressed such issues thematically as conventional history articles, without overtly addressing contemporary design practice or its conditions. Paralleling Dilnot’s call in 1984, by the early 1990s Design Issues published material from areas like design management, design policy, and design pedagogy alongside the original humanities trio. This widening reflected a shift in editors’ understandings of the theoretical and critical apparatus necessary for intellectually powerful design, an assemblage that cofounder Richard Buchanan described as “design thinking as a liberal art”:

The significance of seeking a scientific basis for design does not lie in the likelihood of reducing design to one or another of the sciences—an extension of the neo-positivist project and still presented in these terms by some design theorists. Rather, it lies in a concern to connect and integrate useful knowledge from the arts and sciences alike, but in ways that are suited to the problems and purposes of the present.

Within this project, Margolin saw a particular role for design history, writing in a 1992 Design Issues article:

I therefore want to propose two locations for design history, one in relation to the discourse and particular concerns for its own practitioners and the other in relation to the wider field of design discourse, where it can contribute to the ongoing research about design and its future. Within this wider field, history can play a powerful role that is currently being neglected.

For Margolin, history was both collective experience and critical practice; in both senses, history’s “long view” would benefit design research through contextualization and comparison. Similarly, history’s attentiveness to the impact and nuances of cultural and social conditions might, he suggested, mitigate what he perceived the continued tendency toward ahistorical methods within design research:

Until now, few design historians have sought such a role. While it may be argued that design history is a relatively new field and that the historian’s energies are best turned to the development of his or her own research community, it can also be propounded that design historians are urgently needed to prevent design discourse from taking too strong a turn toward technique as the dominant topic
of research. Historians have the capacity to help shape the consciousness of the design community and to contribute to the articulation of its ideals, principles and research agendas.\(^6^1\)

Margolin called for design historians to operate within a new field namely “design studies”: “the field of inquiry that addresses questions of how we make and use products in our daily live and how we have done so in the past.”\(^6^2\) This stance reflected Margolin’s concern that design research, as it was developing particularly in the new area of doctoral training, espoused engineering, management, and social science perspectives and remained insufficiently attentive to the human. In this hierarchy, humanities—history—was insufficiently quantifiable or reproducible, and thus excluded. Margolin argued that the value and credence of history and criticism—fields seemingly “soft” in comparison with “hard” engineering-derived design theory—were simply invisible within the logic of the dominant system despite their important role in rendering socially responsible design: “When history, theory, and criticism are marginalized within design thought, the social conditions of design practice recede in importance. … it is not enough to simply readmit judgement and experience to the design imagination. These qualities require analysis and cultivation. They must be treated as subjects in their own right.”\(^6^3\)

This stance, publicized in *Design Issues* and the DRS journal *Design Studies*, engendered heated debate amongst design historians: should history be part of a larger suite of critical tools for working with/in design, “design studies,” or would this simply instrumentalize design history? Architectural and design historian Adrian Forty replied in *The Journal of Design History*, arguing, “To my mind, the main obligation of design history is to write good history—in its ends design history is no different to any other branch of history.”\(^6^4\) The issue was one of purpose: history alongside design research, or history to strengthen design research’s effectiveness and ethical claims. In sum, the issue again concerned coextant value systems both with claims on practice: history’s power to act in its own right *versus* history’s ability to intensify the impact of another practice—design—and, within the latter, qualitative humanities *versus* quantifiable applied and social science.

Arguments around history and/in/as design research, now

Today, design historians are again discussing history’s instrumentalization. For some key figures in the discipline, the concern lies with design communities’ perception of history: is design history seen an adjunct or “service” discipline to
design education and practice, rather than a discipline in its own right? Writing in 2013, design historian Kjetil Fallan asked:

Is design history becoming a field of academic scholarship in its own right, or is it the fate of design history to provide context, background, legitimacy, and inspiration to design education and practice? Despite the major advances made over the last decades, the latter rationale shows a disturbing tenacity. These are the confessions of an anti-instrumentalist.  

Fallan cited “Design History as a Tool for Better Design,” the title of a thematic track at the 2013 annual meeting of the European Academy of Design (EAD), and the call for papers that invited “interpretations that show how today’s designers will benefit from a better knowledge of design history.” Fallan noted the benefits of designers understanding the history of their field and practice:

Just as I prefer a prime minister with at least a working knowledge of political history, I fully agree that design history should form part of the intellectual framework of designers. But researching, writing, and teaching that history should be done on historians’ terms, not on those of designers (to be).  

Ultimately, Fallan expressed his concern that linking design history to design practice limits the field’s development, and argued for design history to engage increasingly and more thoroughly with other humanities and social science disciplines.  

Fallan’s points on design as historical practice are important, but the article is caught in a false dichotomy. History should not be framed as “for” design education and practice, but that does not mean that design historians cannot then work with designers or that designers cannot or should not employ history methods within their practice. Fallan is interested in the status and practice of design history as a discipline that has largely operated outside that of history “proper.” But this pertains partly to positioning—a gesture of self-marginalization on the part of design historians. Referring back to Forty’s 1993 argument, design historians could easily practice both history, and design history. Nothing should stop design historians from collaborating with design researchers, as with any interdisciplinary collaboration, even as design researchers might employ historical methods. If historians desire agency in how history is understood and deployed, then communicating history to designers could surely form an important part of history practice (as the 2013 EAD track convenors do in their professional life, through teaching, publishing, and academic community participation).
Fallan’s concerns about instrumentalization point to the continued presence of other voices—many active since the 1980s—calling for historians to work alongside designers to contribute toward addressing urgent social, political, and environmental issues. Speaking at the Design Research Society biannual meeting in 2010, Margolin posited that history facilitates the analysis and understanding of complex sociotechnical systems, and called for DRS conference attendees to create collaborations between design researchers, practitioners, and design historians:

The problem with the disconnect between discourse communities is that much design that occurs today is highly technical and as it is configured into large systems it has a significant impact on our lives. We need more research to help us understand these systems. New connections need to be made between researchers who study design’s meaning in the past, present, and potentially in the future and those who are doing the research that is generating new and unprecedented products.  

More recently, in 2015, the design philosophers and historians Tony Fry, Clive Dilnot, and Susan Stewart argued for a new use of history within design research to address the arrival of the Anthropocene. Positing that design research as a field suffers from a perpetual forgetfulness about what historically defines “design,” and somewhat selectively critiquing design history for solipicism in the face of environmental, economic, political and social crisis, they modeled modes of employing history—including art and design-led presentations of historical pasts in present everyday spaces and articulations of design shaped the dénouement of world-changing events—to reintroduce “reflection” into design thinking.

This may be more complicated than it first appears. In 2016, at the biannual DRS conference in Brighton, trustees of the Design History Society (DHS) organized a conference strand, “Design Research—History, Theory, Practice: Histories for Future-Focused Thinking.” The strand sat alongside strands devoted to case studies, methodological propositions and critiques of using design to broaden access of power: on social design and codesign, to shift agency to users and communities. Other strands addressed optimizing product usability for market share gain and user ease, with notable emphasis on ethnographic research to understand users. Yet others convened papers on design thinking/practice as a method for designing policy and other nontangible systems; on design for health and well-being; on design philosophy; and on design education.

In these examples, papers by historians are rare and history is rarely visible as method. Papers and strand themes indicate the strong presence of social science techniques and perspectives, reflecting design research’s methodological
shift. This shift is also visible in the heavy emphasis on qualitative and quantitative social science techniques in design research handbooks for researchers, students, and practitioners.\textsuperscript{71} Ostensibly, the current value placed on user-experience design and on metrics for demonstrating value and impact in research funding bids and to clients and employers serves, in part, to explain this response. The results of research employing historical approaches are less easy to measure, take far longer to produce, and remain less obviously user-centered.

In contrast, strand organizers Harriet Atkinson and Maya Oppenheimer desired to bring design history into conversation with design research, to stimulate long-term mutual dialogue and to position history as part of a broader set of open practices conducive to more effective, attentive design research. Echoing Jones, Atkinson and Oppenheimer saw history as counteracting the dangers of reductionism: “the simplification of design methods to behavior training as well as the reduction of a creative, ambiguous and evolving work to systematic, algorithmic protocols for design problem-solving.”\textsuperscript{72} If we understand Atkinson and Oppenheimer to have called for new ways of engaging in a skills-exchange between design research and design history, how might we respond?

This chapter began with the World Design Organization\textsuperscript{TM} definition of industrial design. From my perspective as a historian whose research and professional practice are enmeshed with those of design, the scale, scope, and potential for understanding, communicating and implementing design as critically effective practice offered in the WDO\textsuperscript{TM} definition is exciting. Yet these same characteristics—the optimism, the scale, the positioning of potential—concern me as well. From the WDO\textsuperscript{TM} definition to DRS 2016 papers, too many framings of design, today, express overt overoptimism and insufficient attention to trouble. All too often they employ the language and concepts of empowerment without inquiring into how power is distributed amongst stakeholders, despite the impact of power flows and imbalances on design outcomes and involvement in design processes. As design popularizes, attention to complexity, nuance, bias and to the presence and absence of agency and power within human relations and design systems remains essential. Problem-posing, skepticism, and reflection—fundamental, integral practices for the humanities, including history—could provide this.

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Chapter 1


4 Although something of the sort may be underway for the third volume of his “being and event” sequence.


11 For example, Immortal Technique, “That’s What It Is,” from the album “Third World” (Viper Records, 2008).

In addition to the seventh-century texts of Isidore and *Liber Iudiciorum* being compiled together from the eighth-century, other legal codes increasingly became framed by and within historical narrative (for an analysis, see Michael J. Kelly, “Isidore of Seville and the Meaning of the Liber Iudiciorum.” *Visigothic Symposia* 1 [2016–2017]: 110–30). For example, several manuscripts of Lombard laws include the king’s list of Rothari, as well as an origins story of the Lombards. This expressed association, in Lombard texts, between history and law goes back at least until Paul the Deacon (eighth century) (for the manuscripts with the Lombard edict and the *Origo Gentis Langobardorum* see *Leg. Lang.*, xxvii–xxviii, xxxvii–xliii, and, *The Beneventan Scriptum: A History of South Italian Minuscule*, ed. Elias Avery Lowe, 2nd edn. (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1980): 11. For Paul the Deacon, see *Pauli Historia Langobardorum*, *MGH Scriptores Rerum Langobardicarum et Italicarum*, saec. VI–IX, ed. Ludwig Bethmann and Georg Waitz [Hannover, 1878], 12–187). There are examples too amongst Frankish laws and histories, and the earliest manuscript of Alfred’s law book has been connected closely with the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, and then later with Bede’s *Ecclesiastical History*. The Scandinavian law book of Gotland was also complemented by a historical narrative, the *Historia Gotlandiae*. Law codes, first and foremost, made literary sense (on this see Patrick Wormald, “*Lex Scripta* and *Verbum Regis*: Legislation and Germanic Kingship from Euric to Cnut.” In Patrick Wormald, *Legal Culture in the Early Medieval West: Text, Image and Experience* [London: The Hambledon Press, 1999]: 1–43 [37]).

**Friedrich Lindenbrog, Codex Legum antiquarum, in quo continentur leges Wisigothorum** (Frankfurt: Johannis and Andrea Marne, 1613).


**Historically, this is particularly evident in situations in which jurists have worked or work within a legal system that also sees the law of the past—whether ancient (e.g., Roman or Biblical), medieval (e.g., English or Spanish), or modern (e.g., French or American) as a living body. For expositions and on how this has been the case within different educational and legal systems, see:** C. H. Bezemer, “Jacques de Revigny: Roman Law as a means to shape French Law.” Oxford University lecture (January 23, 2013); Frederick Pollock and Frederic Maitland, *The History of English Law before the Time of Edward I*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1895); Jocelyn N. Hillgarth, *The Visigoths in History and Legend* (Toronto: PIMS,


Chapter 2


2 Contemporary with the writing of this chapter, the Institute of Advanced Studies at Durham University had a series of lectures and seminars on the theme of “Scale.” If this work does not directly draw on these presentations, I must acknowledge the influence “in the air” at Durham.


6 Ibid.

8 Ibid., 18.
10 Ibid., 18.
12 Ibid., 438; 447.
13 Ibid., 438.
14 Ibid.; emphasis in original.
17 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 588.
22 Ibid., 97; 96.
23 Ibid., 96.
26 Ibid., 589.
28 Catherine Malabou reconciles the Anthropocene with recent developments in neuroscience by demonstrating the brain itself to be “an environment, as a metabolic place” (52). By bringing the two scales together, however, as a disruption, or “narcolepsy,” of consciousness (i.e., as a feature of thought, rather than environment), Malabou occludes the ways in which the Anthropocene may escape the constraints of her own analytic. Catherine Malabou, “The Brain of History, or, The Mentality of the Anthropocene.” *South Atlantic Quarterly* 116.1 (January 2017): 39–53.
29 On disruptions to autonomous subject by, variously, EM and the Anthropocene, see, respectively, Michael Wheeler, “A Tale of Two Dilemmas: Cognitive Kinds and the Extended Mind.” In *Natural Kinds and Classification in Scientific Practice*,


32 Ibid., 9.


35 Ibid.


39 Ibid., 2.

40 Ibid., 244.

41 Ibid., 62.

42 Ibid., 245.

43 Ibid., 65.

44 Ibid., 246.


51 The generally amicable debate between theory and historicism in Beckett Studies became particularly heated on the role of Karl Popper’s “falsifiability” in generating verifiable historical claims about Beckett’s sources and his thinking in a series of responses traded between Matthew Feldman and Garin Dowd in
Chapter 3

Gerig, 1977). References will be given to the German original of his works, with the location in the English translation in parentheses. In most cases the translations are mine. For more recent histories, see Jim Samson, ed., The Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Music (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) and Richard Taruskin, Music in the Nineteenth Century, Vol. 3 The Oxford History of Western Music (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

2 Dahlhaus, Die Musik des 19. Jahrhunderts, 6, 7 (9).


4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., 26.

7 Ibid., 28.

8 Ibid., 31.


17 Ibid., 3.

18 Five stimulating case studies of the appropriation of canonic works of the Western classical canon in the GDR, where most of the most interesting postwar Marxist musicology was written, are given in Elaine Kelly, *Composing the Canon in the German Democratic Republic: Narratives of Nineteenth-Century Music* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

19 Their schema shares a tripartite outline—to which they add a supplement—with one recently advanced by Ankersmit, who in a discussion of ‘the “new” versus the “old” historiography’ breaks the philosophy of history into the three possibilities: “historiography, speculative philosophy of history, and critical philosophy of history,” See Ankersmit, *History and Tropology*, 125.


21 See William P. Malm, *Music Cultures of the Pacific, the Near East, and Asia*, 3rd edn., Prentice Hall History of Music Series (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996). Taruskin has spent much time since the publication of the *Oxford History* policing musicology journals to defend his reconstructionist methodology, recently upbraiding a critic who “bids me acknowledge that ‘not every idea can be fully historicized’. But of course I answer this with what I call the historian’s trick: what I am prepared to admit, and do admit, is that not every idea can be fully historicized yet. That little ‘yet’ is the saving difference between scholarship and dogma” (Richard Taruskin, “Agents and Causes and Ends, Oh My.” *The Journal of Musicology* 31.2 (2014): 286).


See Dahlhaus, *Grundlagen der Musikgeschichte*, 80.


Ibid., 453.


For a compelling repudiation of the claim that truth and totalitarianism go hand in hand, which argues that the claim is normally made in order to deny the possibility of Leftist critique, see Slavoj Žižek, *Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism?* (London and New York: Verso, 2001).

Dahlhaus, *Grundlagen der Musikgeschichte*, ch. 4. My yoking of the titles of his third and fourth chapters in the title of the present section is an intentional tribute.


Badiou, *Being and Event*, 391–2, offers six such “negative delimitations,” which are a slightly amplified version of those given at Badiou, “On a Finally Objectless Subject,” 26–7.

The following equations employ the conventions of mathematical set theory, on which Badiou bases his abstract theory. The theory itself can be grasped entirely
without the mathematics, but it is useful to have some kind of visual representation of it, which it is hoped that these simple notations can provide.

47 For an accessible and very readable introduction to infinity, from which my example of the mind is drawn, see Rudy Rucker, *Infinity and the Mind: The Science and Philosophy of the Infinite* (London: Paladin, 1982).


49 Ibid., 451.


51 See Badiou, *Logics of Worlds*, 45–89.


Chapter 4


9 Ibid., 18. De Libera refers at this point to Robin George Collingwood and to his interpreter, D. H. Dray (Ibid., 25, note 26).


15 Kubler, *Shape*, 12:


17 Ibid.


27 Ibid., 10.


30 Foucault, *Archaeology*, 140; emphasis added.

32 Kubler, *Shape*, 2.
33 The search for an origin, bestowing a sense of belonging to the historian, would have been nevertheless characterized by Nietzsche as "Antiquarian." See Friedrich Nietzsche, *Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie fuer das Leben* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2005 [1874]): 30–2.
34 Kubler, *Shape*, 14
38 Ibid., 138–9.
43 Yates, *Art of Memory*.
49 Kubler, *Shape*, 83–122 ("Some Kinds of Duration").
52 Ibid., 120.
55 Paechtt, *Practice*, 118; emphasis in original.
Notes

64 Foucault, *Archaeology*, 129; emphasis in original.

Chapter 5

6 The history of the relationship between the professionalization of the historical discipline and the decline of rhetoric in historiography in the first half of the twentieth century still needs to be written, but the most important “schools” in economic, social and cultural history were certainly not promoting the use of rhetoric in historiography.


16 Ibid., 107.


18 Eskin, “Hippocrates, Kairos, and Writing in the Sciences Eskin,” 110.

19 Kinneavy and Eskin, “Kairos,” 841.

20 *Encyclopedia*, 204.

21 Ibid.

22 Paul Tillich, “Kairos und Logos.” In *Philosophie und Schicksal: Schriften zur Erkenntnislehre und Existenzphilosophie*, Gesammelte Werke, Band IV (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1961). Though Tillich was well acquainted with Heidegger’s work he does not mention him in his works on kairos and logos.

23 Tillich, “Kairos und Logos,” 46.


Ibid.


Ibid., 29.


Ibid.

Ibid., 6.

Ibid., 7.

Ibid.

Ibid., 3.

Ibid.

Ibid., 5.

Ibid.

Ibid., 6.

Ibid., 11.

Ibid., 12–13.

Ibid., 12.


Ibid.

Ibid., 157.

Ibid., 159.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., 158.
60 Ibid., 114.
61 Ibid., 113. Collingwood was born in 1889.
62 Ibid., 112.
63 Ibid., 113.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., 113–14.
66 Ibid., 114.
67 Ibid., 31.
68 Ibid., 31–32.
69 Ibid., 32.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 The correlativity principle thus forms the crucial difference between Collingwood’s and Gadamer’s hermeneutics.
75 Ibid.
78 Clarke and McArthur *The Naval Chronicle*, 463.


83 Ibid.

84 Ibid., 186.

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# Chapter 6


2 “was ich bin, bin ich geworden. Wie ein Baum bin ich gewachsen; der Keim war da; aber Luft, Erde und alle Elemente, die ich um mich setze, mussten beitragen, den Keim, die Frucht, den Baum zu bilden.” Johannes Gottfried Herder, “Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen Seele.” In *Sämtliche Werke. 33 Bände VIII*, ed. Bernhard Ludwig Suphan and Carl Christian Redlich (Berlin: Weidmann, 1877): 307. NB, all translations into English are my own unless otherwise noted.


10 Ibid., 363.


13 I especially have in mind here the refusal of the “Madres”—the mothers of those who had “disappeared” during the Videla regime—to recognize that those who had disappeared should be dead. For they were regarded by them as still being alive as long as the murderers of their beloved ones were not punished for their crimes. See Berber Bevernage, *History, Memory, and State-sponsored Violence: Time and Justice* (London: Routledge, 2012): 32–45.

14 Ibid., 56 and 57.

15 Ibid., 52.

16 That is, the day of the Sharpeville massacre

17 Bevernage, *History, Memory, and State-sponsored Violence*, 53

18 Most of the seventeen members of the TRC—all of them appointed by Mandela—were lawyers, four were religious leaders, and the remaining came from health care and NGOs. See Lyn S. Garbill, *Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa. Miracle or Model?* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publications, 2002): 4–5.


Notes


25 *History and Theory. Theme Issue 50. Historical Distance: Reflections on a Metaphor.* See especially the introduction and the contributions by Mark Salber Phillips and Jaap den Hollander.

Chapter 7


2 Office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation, Circular SGE 32/S 47/01, July 26, 2012.


5 Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*, 16.


9 The term “historical practice” as used in this context is not limited to history as practiced within academia. It is used broadly as a generic category to denote all formal kinds of epistemic pursuits such as historiography, archaeology, heritage management, archival documentation, and other curatorial platforms
that are linked together by their predilection and preoccupation with the past, notwithstanding the difference in their methodological alignments.


12 Ibid., 5.


22 Ibid., 57.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid., 64.

25 Trouillot, Silencing the Past, 25.

26 Ibid.


29 Kapteijns, African Historiography Written by Africans, 47.


33 Omer-Cooper, “The Contribution of the University of Ibadan,” 25–6.


37 Ibid., 7.

38 Omer-Cooper, “The Contribution of the University of Ibadan,” 27.


40 Ibid.

41 Falola and Aderinto, *Nigeria, Nationalism and Writing History*, 27.


44 Interview with Professor Olayemi, Akinwumi, Abuja, 2014.


46 Ibid.


62 Ibid.

63 Many of the members who served on the board of the museum commission were drawn from the university. For example, Kenneth Dike, Sabiru Biobaku and Ade Obayemi all served as chairmen of the Antiquities Commission. Dr Yaro Geilla, a historian from Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria was also Chairman of the NCMM.


66 Ibid., 5.


### Chapter 8


2 Fernand Braudel was one of the most prominent historians of the Annales School and a founding figure among Brazilian historians composing the French mission that founded the History Department of the University of São Paulo.


4 Processualism is the school of thought developed after the 1960s, chiefly in the United Kingdom and United States, which defended the independence of archaeology in relation to history, its connection to anthropology, and a methodology considered objective, neutral and scientific.

5 Postprocessualism is the theoretical school in archaeology that followed processualism and criticized it, mainly its supposition of objectivity and neutrality. Postprocessual archaeologists reestablished the relationship and cooperation of
archaeology with history, and incorporated philosophy and other human sciences in its scope, in order to develop a critical theory.

6 Culture-historical archaeology was a primary school within twentieth-century archaeology. Principal characteristics were its association with history (where written texts were available), advances in techniques, definition of a static conception of culture, and interest in thematics as ethnicity.


10 On Culture-Historical Archaeology see Trigger, A History of Archaeological Thought, 211–313.


16 Moorey, A Century of Biblical Archaeology, 44f.

17 Mazar, Archaeology of the Land of the Bible, 12.


19 Ibid., 219.

20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 224.
22 Ibid.
34 As noted by Davies (“Minimalism, Ancient Israel, and Anti-Semitism”: n.d.), one of the supposed minimalists: “I noted earlier that the so-called ‘minimalists’ do not have a term for themselves (I have used ‘minimalism’ myself when debating with opponents, but in my mind the term is always within quotation marks). ‘Minimalism’ is an invention. None of the ‘minimalist’ scholars is aware of being part of a school, or a group. There is no such common purpose (see Whitelam 2002). From what I have read and heard, the scholars most frequently identified with ‘minimalism’ are Thomas Thompson, Keith Whitelam, Niels Peter Lemche, and myself. That all four now work in either Copenhagen or Sheffield may
indeed suggest to superficial observers a ‘school.’ However, Thompson moved to Copenhagen only after his book *Early History of the Israelite People* (Brill, 1992) was published; he wrote it in Milwaukee. Keith Whitelam’s *The Invention of Ancient Israel* was written in Stirling, Scotland, before its author was appointed to a chair in Sheffield (a decision in which I played not the slightest part) in 1999. The truth is that the four scholars have indeed come to talk to each other through geographical proximity and, of course, through their shared notoriety, but not one of them developed his ideas in close contact with the others. (A much better case for a “maximalist” school can in fact be made for the students of W. F. Albright, whose temple stands in Cambridge, MA: Halpern, Freedman, and Stager provide the cover endorsements for the recent book by Dever [Dever 2001] ).


40 For example, from Dever: “I began by being skeptical about any useful dialogue with Davies, on the Internet or elsewhere. I end on the same note and do not think that I will venture again onto the Internet. Let Davies answer me in peer-reviewed journals where I will continue to publish. And let him confront the archaeological evidence, if he dares. Name-calling is not sufficient.” www.bibleinterp.com/articles/Contra_Davies.shtml.


46 Leone et al., “Toward a Critical Archaeology,” 283.

Chapter 9

1 The date of the series has long been debated. The majority of studies place the start in 1810, but differ between 1815 and 1820 as the year of their finalization. In terms of the number of plates included, this depends upon the edition: 80, 82, 83, or 85. Interestingly, they remained unpublished until 1863.

2 Indeed, the iconic turn in conceptual history has been discussed already. See Teorías y prácticas de la historia conceptual, ed. Faustino Oncina (Theoria Cum Praxi, 2009).


4 Bell dates the period of the birth of a new culture of war that breaks the limits and codes characteristic of the Ancien Régime between 1792 and 1815. Since the Battle of Valmy until the Congress of Vienna, the wars of this period will involve a concept of sovereignty and nation that, in addition to intensifying and radicalizing
hostility, will justify fighting both the external and the internal enemy. It will fight, therefore, as if it were the last war. See David Avrom Bell, *The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2007).


6 The distinction of having carried out the first systematic comparison between the “theoretical form” (Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989]) and “the visual form” (Goya) of thinking on the revolutionary war belongs to Nil Santíñez (Nil Santíñez, *Goya/Clausewitz. Paradigmas de la guerra absoluta* [Barcelona: Alpha Decay, 2009]).


9 For example, in the preface to the original edition it is said: “In it is to be found all the vigor of his fiery imagination, heightened and stimulated by keen patriotic feeling, in those terrible moments when an unjust foreign invasion attempted to crush the pride and arrogance of the name of Castile. What wonder, then, if a Spaniard, and Aragonese, and a man of Goya’s firm and independent character himself to be drawn often toward exaggeration and caricature?” (Francisco Goya, *The Disasters of War* [New York: Dover Publications, 1967]: 6).


11 Rose-Marie and Rainer Hagen at least recognize “a certain practical opportunism” (Rose Marie Hagen and Rainer Hagen, *Goya* [Cologne: Taschen, 2003]: 62). Vega, facing the indisputable fact that he lent his services to King Joseph I and was decorated for this, puts forward his health problems and age and writes: “Taking another look at Goya’s activity one understands that there are undeniable patriotic gestures” (Jesusa Vega, “Goya y el dolor de la Guerra de España.” In *Desastres de la Guerra*, ed. Francisco Goya [Madrid: Colecciones Fundación Mapfre, 2015]: 14).
12 Fatales consecuencias de la sangrienta guerra en España con Buonaparte. Y otros caprichos enfáticos, en 85 estampas. Inventadas, dibujadas y grabadas, por el pintor original D. Francisco de Goya y Lucientes. En Madrid.


15 When it comes to examining his commitment to the truth, this thinking and humanist Goya must only be treated as an artist, we are told by Todorov, Goya, 105.

16 Thus, for example: “If we look today at Goya’s one-of-a-kind work, we are struck by its significance to current events and the force and relevance of its message, which resonates in particular with modern-day humanitarian aid workers.” (Paul Bouvier, “Yo lo vi: Goya Witnessing the Disasters of War: An Appeal to the Sentiment of Humanity.” International Review of the Red Cross 93.884 [2011]: 1108).

17 A review of the exhibition Disasters of War by the brothers Jake and Dinos Chapman at the Centre for Contemporary Art, New York reads “Goya’s masterpiece, the series of 85 etchings actually titled ‘Disasters of War’ (1810–1813) [sic], was a specific response to the Napoleonic invasion of Spain in 1808. But his condemnation was general as well. He saw the atrocities it perpetrated not only as a martyring of the Spanish people but also as evidence of the evil and corruption shared by all humanity.” (Grace Glueck, “Review; The Horror: Apocalypse of Battles Past [and Maybe Future], New York Times, January 12, 2001).


19 For Cascardi, therein lies, to a great extent, the ethicality of Goya’s work: “the ethical ambition of Goya’s work is to draw us consistently outside the frame of painting (i.e., of ‘painting itself’), toward a critical reflection on history, society, politics, and desire, as the fields in terms of which the obligations bearing on the subject of enlightened modernity were constructed.” (Cascardi, “The Ethics of Enlightenment,” 207).


23 There is a profusion of interpretations that assert divine intervention (see Francisco J. Ramón Solans, “Milagros, visiones apocalípticas y profecías. Una lectura sobrenatural de la Guerra de la Independencia.” Ayer. Revista de Historia
Contemporánea 96.4 [2014]: 83–104). An example is the anonymous *La bestia de siete cabezas y diez cuernos ó Napoleon Emperador de los franceses: Exposición literal del Capítulo XIII del Apocalipsis* (The Seven-Headed and Ten-Horned Beast or Napoleon Emperor of the French: Literal Exposition of Chapter XIII of the Apocalypse).


26 While Goya’s admiration for Rembrandt’s engravings (Francisco Goya, *Caprichos-Desastres-Tauromaquia-Disparates*, intro. Alfonso Pérez Sánchez [Madrid: Fundación Juan March, 1979]: 10) is known with certainty, there is no documentary evidence regarding Dürer. However, the association is not capricious. Matilla has pointed out the influences in Goya of some of Durero’s prints to which he would have been able to access thanks to the collection of his friend and critic Ceán Bermúdez (Goya en tiempos de Guerra, ed. M. Mena Marqués [Madrid: Museo Nacional del Prado y Ediciones el Viso, 2008]: 406). It is well known that Ceán received one of the two prints from the album of the Disasters as a gift on the part of the author, currently part of the collection of the British Museum. The similarities between these etchings were displayed in the work of the Argentine artist Leon Ferrari, who made a composition titled “The Disasters of War,” Goya, 1810 + “The Apocalypse of St John,” Dürer to illustrate the atrocities of the military dictatorship his country. The *Dürero-Rembrandt-Goya* exhibition at the Museum Ibercaja Camón Aznar of Zaragoza in 2012 also suggested the affinities, and Stoppani (Teresa Stoppani, “Material Lines: Apocalypse, Capricci, War and Other Disasters.” *The Journal of Architecture* 19.4 [2014]: 511–35) raises the comparison of the *Disasters* with Durero, Piranesi, and Tiepolo. Goya traveled to Italy in his formative stage and in the artistic atmosphere of Rome became familiar with the work of both Italian engravers (see Joan Sureda, *Goya e Italia. Catálogo de exposición* [Zaragoza: Turner/Fundación Goya en Aragón, 2009]).

27 In an excellent example of decoding the images through the exploration of their theological, political, and philosophical meanings Rivera (Antonio Rivera García, “La pintura de la crisis. Albrecht Dürer y la Reforma.” *Artifícium. Revista Iberoamericanas de Estudios Culturales y Análisis Conceptual* 1 [2010]: 100–19) shows how Dürer broke the aesthetic rules and conventions of his time in “the painting of crisis” that is to say, following the Reformation.

28 “Dürer’s Apocalypse thus becomes more than a narration *cum figuris* that combines text and images, and constructs instead a new form in which the
narration is emancipated from the text, and the space from the architectural framing.” (Stoppani, “Material Lines,” 514). However, we can only agree with that emancipation to a certain extent; images still illustrate the text. The content, the text as sacred word to be communicated, is still there.


The relationships between the sacred and profane are extremely complex, and the transferences are legal, political, rhetorical, etc., not always in the same direction. Just to mention a relevant example here, the political theology explains that the main political concepts of modernity are theological concepts that have been secularized (Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, ed. George Schwab [Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2007]), and how the philosophy of history is also a secularization of the theological expectation of salvation (Löwith). But at the same time, one can speak of a worldliness of the expectations of the Church and its effective abandonment of eschatology (Blumenberg). Moreover, the apocalyptic prophecy has a propensity to violence the less time is left. The affinity between miracle and state of exception serves to illustrate the generative power of the revolution in the modern sense, after 1789, as well as the transformative dimension of a counterrevolution based on an eschatology with the same demand of sacrifices, as Joseph de Maistre showed in The St. Petersburg Dialogues. Isaiah Berlin’s analysis of the Maistrian figure of the executioner is particularly interesting on this question (Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of the Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas, ed. Henry Hardy, with a new foreword by John Banville [New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2013]: 95–185).


38 Villacañas, La nación y la guerra, 16ff.

39 Ibid., 142.


41 For more details about the issue of guerrilla warfare in the Peninsular War, see Ronald Fraser, Napoleon’s Cursed War: Popular Resistance in the Spanish Peninsula War, 1808–1814 (New York: Verso, 2008).

42 Schmitt, Theory of Partisan, 30.


44 Ibid., 156.

45 Valeriano Bozal talks of the dehumanization and the elimination of the dignity of death as “one of the most modern traits of the Aragonese Artist” (Bozal, Francisco Goya, II. 114).

46 Hagen and Hagen, Goya, 56 and Licht, Goya, 186.

47 Licht, Goya, 143.

48 Bozal, Francisco Goya, II. 117.

49 Licht, Goya, 142.

50 Ibid. Precisely because of this, it is notable that Licht refers at times to Goya’s objectivity or his documentary ambitions.


52 Ibid., 522.


54 Licht, Goya, 132ff. As an example, in 2012 an exhibition took place in Cádiz: Los desastres de la Guerra. Goya, primer reportero gráfico. This state initiative was organized by the Consorcio para la Conmemoración del Bicentenario de la Constitución de 1812 (Consortium for the Bicentenary Commemoration of the 1812 Constitution) and Acción Cultural Española (Spanish Cultural Action), in which a copy of the liberal Constitution passed in Cádiz was also exhibited.

55 On the indeterminacy of place, the telluric nature of the partisan war and the dual process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, see Santiáñez, Goya/Clausewitz, 51ff.

56 About the contemporary debates on the relationship between history and memory, and for an account of the implications of memory studies for historical theory,


58 Especially the engravings from the number 70 and the collection *Disparates* elaborated between 1815 and 1823 (Goya 1979).

59 In front of asceticism and even iconoclasm of the Reformed churches, the Counter-Reformation developed a complex iconographic program as a vehicle for education in Catholic dogma. As Stoichita (Victor Stoichita, *Visionary Experience in the Golden Age of Spanish Art* [London: Reaktion Books, 1995]) studied, in opposition to any free interpretation defended by Protestantism, there was also a corresponding codification of language in which the supernatural was expressed, “the representation of the unrepresentable.”

60 Koselleck explains how the religious Reformation was accompanied by multiple signs of the shortening of time and the end of the world. Even before, aware of their many repercussions, the Church tried to control all the visionaries by establishing the requisite of ecclesiastical authorizations to publish such visions. The idea was to extirpate postbiblical prophecies (Joachim of Fiore, Joan of Arc, Savonarola are all examples of the problems they caused). Both the future and the end of the world are part of the history of the Church, so that the unauthorized prophecies came to be regarded as heretical. So, for example, was disposed by the Fifth Lateran Council, 1512–1517 (Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time.* Series: *Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought*, trans. and intro. Keith Tribe [New York: Columbia University Press, 2004]: 11ff). The German historian has also investigated the relation between acceleration, prognosis, and secularization characteristic of the modern revolution (Reinhart Koselleck, *Aceleración, prognosis y secularización*, ed. Faustino Oncina [Valencia: Pre-textos, 2003]).

61 The credit for *Disasters* is not that the atrocities happened “exactly as pictured”—say, that the victim didn’t look just so, that it didn’t happen next to a tree … Goya’s images are a synthesis. They claim: things *like* this happened” (Susan Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others* [New York: Picador/Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003]: 47; emphasis in original).


64 Arising from the question of absorption in ca. 1750, Michael Fried explains “the demand that the artist bring about a paradoxical relationship between painting and beholder—specifically, that he find a way to neutralize or negate the beholder’s presence, to establish the fiction that no one is standing before the canvas (The paradox is that only if this is done can the beholder be stopped and held precisely

Also, it is worth it to mention that the arrangement of objects without apparent external intervention to enhance the dramatic illusion was an artifice used by French painting of the mid-eighteenth century used (Fried, Absorption and Theatricality, 81f.).

Licht, Goya, 148.

Nor does it seem to me that our aesthetic judgment (which is of course not of Goya’s era), even our aesthetic pleasure at the Desastres, should give rise to any suspension of ethical judgment (Santiáñez, Goya/Clausewitz, 51). On the contrary, I believe this is precisely what Goya comes to question. Upon contemplating the brutality, we are not positioning ourselves with the perpetrator, but rather with the victim. It is the vision of contemplative pleasure of the former, which makes us feel moral repugnance at the attack and compassion toward the victim. Although it would go beyond the scope of this work to expound on this further, the Kantian distinction between the beautiful and the sublime should be recalled here.

Vom Kriege will not be published until 1832, a year after the death of its author. The eight books that comprise the work were written between 1816 and 1830.

Clausewitz, On War, 479–84.

Josef Carnicero, Historia razonada de los principales sucesos de la gloriosa revolución de España / escrita por el doctor Josef Clemente Carnicero, 4 vols. (Madrid: Imprenta de Burgos, 1814).

Juan de Arias, Manifiesto imparcial y exacto de lo más importante ocurrido en Aranjuez, Madrid y Bayona: desde 17 de marzo hasta 15 de mayo de 1808, sobre la caída del Príncipe de la Paz, y sobre el fin de la amistad y alianza de los franceses con los españoles (Madrid: Imprenta de Repullés, 1808); and Álvaro Flórez Estrada, Examen imparcial de las disensiones de la América con la España y de los medios de su recíproco interés, y de la utilidad de los aliados de la España (London: R. Juigné, 1811).

Santiáñez, Goya/Clausewitz, 21.

Chapter 10

Notes


6 Definition agreed by the Professional Practice Committee of ICSID (now WDO™), at the 29th General Assembly in Gwangju (South Korea), 2015.

7 The shift in international positioning of industrial design practice through language is readily visible by comparing historical definitions agreed by the organization (World Design Organization™ 2017). Similar shifts can be seen in design education at undergraduate and postgraduate level, at universities internationally, and in design promotion to the public and private sectors.

8 Margolin’s full comment is as follows: “If we consider design to be the conception and planning of the artificial world, we can recognize the artificial as a mutable category that is changing rapidly as human invention repeatedly challenges its relation to the natural. To grasp the significance of artificial intelligence, genetic engineering, and nanotechnology, we must progressively enlarge our understanding of what design is while we are simultaneously occupied with establishing its historical narrative.” (Victor Margolin, *The Politics of the Artificial: Essays on Design and Design Studies* [Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2002): 227). As this chapter argues, I propose that history can engage not by establishing narratives but by making sense of them, and also by challenging or disrupting the sense made of them. Here Timothy Garton Ash’s position on contemporary history is relevant (Timothy Garton Ash, “The Last Revolution.” *New York Review of Books* [November 16, 2000]).

9 The intention here is not to elide academic design research with design thinking as a method applied in private and public sector work, but, rather, to note that systematization of design methods flowed into these two areas, with significant personnel crossover and networks, such as academics advising the government and university graduates moving between private firms and academia.

11 Another practical application of design’s decolonization is the recent establishment of the Laurentian University McEwen School of Architecture in Sudbury, Ontario, Canada, founded on the principles of Canada’s anglophone, francophone, First Nations, and Métis cultures (Laurentian University 2017).


16 Despite participants’ ability to exchange ideas in a common language—or perhaps unrelated to this—design research is a diffuse area, characterized by Margolin as follows: “However, the field of design research is much broader than most researchers recognize and it encompasses diverse actors, quite a few of whom have little or no knowledge of what others are doing. Actually, the field consists of multiple discourse communities or networks, each of which pursues its interests based on its own criteria for best practice and meaningful results.” (Victor Margolin, “Design Research: Towards a History.” *Design Research Society Proceedings* [2010]: 978). Margolin is careful to note that networks interconnect, and that actors move across and can be active in multiple networks. I understand the communities studied in each moment in this chapter not as representative
of the whole, but as communities and networks that have played an outsized contribution in shaping the development of history’s place within design research.


19 While geographically diverse, in some senses, design research participation—at least as indicated by international conference attendance—is centered in Europe, North America, and the Pacific Rim.


21 Christopher Frayling’s description of research in design as comprising “research into design” (e.g., the history of design); “research through design” (research that takes design practice as a method); and “research for design” (research that furthers design) remains extremely useful for understanding the different modes of research in relation to design (Christopher Frayling, “Research in Art and Design,” *Royal College of Art Research Paper* 1 [1993]).


29 See, for example, the 1965 symposium at Birmingham College of Advanced Technology at which, according to the coorganizer Sydney A. Gregory, “it was hoped to establish a common basis of agreement about ‘the design method’, using this phrase in the same way as ‘the scientific method’.” (*The Design Method*, ed. Sydney A. Gregory [New York: Springer, 1966]: v).

The Design Research Society was founded in Britain in 1966, and the Design Methods Group at the University of California Berkeley was created in 1967. Social scientist Herbert Simon’s 1968 Compton Lectures at MIT, “The Sciences of the Artificial,” subsequently published as a book by MIT Press, further popularized design research methods to new audiences (Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial).

C. P. Snow’s infamous “two cultures” argument about the separation of arts and sciences within the United Kingdom oversimplifies the case, but its co-temporaneity (the lectures were delivered in 1959) indicates a cultural consciousness of separation (C. P. Snow, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution. The Rede Lecture, 1959 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959]).


Jones in Developments in Design Methodology, 333.

Wicked refers to a 1973 article by the former HfG Ulm, then Berkeley mathematician and designer, Horst W. J. Rittel and urban planner and theorist Melvin W. Webber in the journal Policy Sciences. Rittel and Webber cited an overadherence to inappropriate paradigms as the downfall of “first-generation design methods,” and argued that design problems with a social aspect required a different approach: “The difficulties attached to rationality are tenacious, and we have so far been unable to get untangled from their web. This is partly because the classical paradigm of science and engineering—the paradigm that has underlain modern professionalism—is not applicable to the problems of open societal systems,” and “The kinds of problems that planners deal with—societal problems—are inherently different from the problems that scientists and perhaps some classes of engineers deal with. Planning problems are inherently wicked.” (Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy Sciences 4.2 [1973]: 160). “Wicked problems” allowed design researchers to continue theorizing codifiable design methods, but in a way that acknowledged and worked with social messiness. On Rittel, see Jean-Pierre Protzen and David J. Harris, The Universe of Design: Horst Rittel’s Theories of Design and Planning (London: Routledge, 2010). On wicked problems, see Richard Buchanan, “Wicked Problems in Design Thinking,” Design Issues 8.2 (1992): 5–21.

Cross, Developments in Design Methodology, 105. Useful sketches of the split are Margolin, The Politics of the Artificial, 246–9 and Cross, Developments in Design Methodology, 303.

Reflecting on his relationship to tumult in the period, Jones noted: “Writing the book [Design Methods] took four years, from 1966 to 1970. During that time the revolution of the 1960s took place. I emerged having written a long book while having missed that historic moment. But I guess the book reflected the same
discontents that provoked the protests and cultural changes. And it is perhaps longer lasting.” (Jones, September 22, 2004: http://www.publicwriting.net/2.2/early_days1.2.html). Cross wrote retrospectively: “The behaviourists were characterized as latter-day functionalists wanting to observe human behavior by empirical methods, to quantify it, to set up models of man/environment interactions and to use these as a basis for designing. The existentialists spoke much more about the individual, responding to his environment with feeling and free to manipulate it as he felt necessary.” (Developments in Design Methodology, 303). Cross notes that the latter “drew heavily on the literature which had become required reading in student activist circles” (Ibid., 339) and were heavily inspired by Marxism, did not want to be part of selling capitalism to workers and increasing the amount of capital available to capitalism. Analyses of this sea change in related areas such as technology, engineering, and industrial design and resulting splits in disciplinary communities between scientific/modernist practice and individualistic/social practice include Alice Twemlow, “I Can’t Talk to You If You Say That: An Ideological Collision at the Aspen Design Conference.” Design and Culture 1.1 (2009): 23–50; Ruth Schwartz Cowan, “Looking Back in Order to Move Forward: John McDermott, “Technology: The Opiate of the Intellectuals.” Technology and Culture 51.1 (2010): 199–215; and Matthew Wisnioski, Engineers for Change: Competing Visions of Technology in 1960s America (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012).


40 See Rintoul, Integrating Critical and Contextual Studies in Art and Design Education.


43 Archer in Cross, Developments in Design Methodology, 349.


45 For the impact of Dilnot’s essays on design history research, see Cowan, “Looking Back in Order to Move Forward,” 31.

47 For a fictional account of this relationship see David Lodge, *Nice Work*

48 Dilnot focuses his critique of design history on “histories of design” and does not
address the cultural studies approach described above.


50 “Attention must turn to issues of design organization, and to the relation of design
to the wider manufacturing and consuming process, as well as to economics for
evidence that can account for these kinds of design developments.” (Dilnot, “The

51 John A. Walker and Judy Attfield, *Design History and the History of Design*

52 Dilnot cites Roger Newport’s 1980 report for the Design Council: “As this discipline
stands at the moment, I am of the opinion that we are not only in danger of
becoming less relevant to our core subject than successive governments have
hoped, but we are in danger of enabling design historians to talk a completely
different language from designers; in danger of setting permanent precedents for
our subject which will enable criteria for criticism to specialize away from criteria
Dilnot then comments, “it is uncomfortable, but true that organizing the concepts
of design history does not, at present, lend itself to the sort of pedagogic work we,
as design historians, should be doing. In this sense, Roger Newport’s argument is
only too accurate (Ibid.).

53 On the first twenty years of Design Issues, see Richard Buchanan, Dennis Doordan,

54 Margolin, “Design Research: Towards a History.” *Design Research Society
Proceedings.*

55 Ibid., 981.

56 For an overview of design history in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s see
design historians had not been a stated aim of the journal, *Design Issues* helped to
create a trans-Atlantic discursive community—different academic, industrial and
sociocultural contexts for the relationship between engineering, history, and art
and design but common professional dialogue.

57 Dennis P. Doordan, *Design History: An Anthology* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,


Ibid., 228.

Margolin later broadened the definition, but made even clearer the opposition to science and engineering-based approaches. “I am broadening my earlier proposal for ‘design studies’ as an interpretive practice, rooted firmly in the techniques of the humanities and the social sciences rather than in the natural sciences.” (Ibid., 257, note 3).


Ibid., 2.

Ibid., 14.

Ibid., 17.


Fry, Dilnot and Stewart’s critique of design history as disengaged with pressing issues overlooks much highly engaged scholarship. While it occurred several years following the publication of their book, see for example the 2017 Design History Society annual meeting, on the theme of ‘making and unmaking the environment’. http://www.makingandunmaking.net/, last accessed November 18, 2017.

This shift is also visible in the heavy emphasis on qualitative and quantitative social science techniques in design research handbooks for researchers, students, and practitioners. See, for example, Paul A. Rodgers and Joyce Yee, *The Routledge Companion to Design Research* (London: Routledge, 2015) and Gjoko Muratovski, *Research for Designers: A Guide to Methods and Practices* (Washington, DC: Sage, 2016). Muratovski, unusually for the genre, includes history as a research and analytical method, in a chapter on qualitative research, alongside case studies, ethnographic research, phenomenology, historical research (91–7), and grounded theory. Design history reappears in the chapter on visual research, in a section on “visual and material culture studies” (159–83).

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