The Invasion of the South: Army Air Force Operations, and the Invasion of Northern and Central Sumatra

Compiled by
The War History Office of the
National Defense College of Japan

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The Invasion of the South: Army Air Force Operations, and the Invasion of Northern and Central Sumatra
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This publication is part of a project of the Corts Foundation (www.cortsfoundation.org) that aims to translate into English several volumes of the Senshi Sōsho series concerning the former Dutch East Indies.

The publication of this volume was made possible by grants from the Isaac Alfred Ailion Foundation, Prins Bernard Cultuurfonds: Engelbert van Bevervoorde-van Heyst Fonds, M.A.O.C. Gravin van Bylandt Stichting, the Stichting dr. Hendrik Muller’s Vaderlands Fonds, and the Netherlands Institute of Military History (NIMH). Their logos may be found at the back of this volume.

ビルマ攻略作戦、第四章 [Biruma Kōryaku Sakusen, Dai-yon shō], idem, Tokyo 1967
© National Defense College of Japan [National Institute for Defense Studies], 1970

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Cover design: Geert de Koning
ISBN 978 90 8728 366 7
e-ISBN 978 94 0060 410 0 (e-pdf)
NUR 686

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This book is distributed in North America by the University of Chicago Press (www.press.uchicago.edu).
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The history of Japan’s involvement in the Second World War is still a matter of great controversy, not least in Japan itself. There, scholars, the public and politicians cannot even agree on what to call the war, the Pacific War, the Greater East Asia War, the Fifteen Years War, the Asia-Pacific War, to name just a few examples, each with its dedicated partisan following. Successive Japanese governments have avoided the use of any of these names out of context, and the war is usually referred to as “The Late War” (Sakijō no Sensō/Taisen). Even though the Imperial Household Agency denies any specific intent, in practice the late Emperor, too, only referred to the war as “the late war,” or used expressions such as “that unfortunate war” and “that unfortunate period,” unless he was speaking in an international context about the “Second World War.”¹

Not surprisingly, the same controversy affected the 102-volume War History Series (Senshi Sōsho), of which The Invasion of the South: Army Air Force Operations constitutes Volume 34, and the previously published The Invasion of the Dutch East Indies, and The Operations of the Navy in the Dutch East Indies and the Bay of Bengal, Volume 3, and Volume 26 respectively. Here, a compromise was finally found by allowing the use of the term “Greater East Asia War” in the main text, but avoiding it in titles, forewords and explanatory notes, although this did not prevent the publisher, Asagumo Newspaper Inc., from prominently putting the term on its flyers.² The foreign reader, who is mostly unaware of the enormous controversy still surrounding Japan’s involvement in the Second World War and the vigorous, if not acrimonious, debate within Japan, is often left nonplussed by the vague official expressions used in Japan to refer to the war to paper over fundamental differences that all sides seem unable or unwilling to resolve. Moreover, to foreign readers, used to official war histories, as for example in the case of Britain and Australia, that are commissioned and endorsed by the government, or at least commissioned, even if the contents are left to the responsibility of the author, as in the case of the Netherlands, the Japanese example of a war history that is neither commissioned nor endorsed, but nevertheless compiled by a government agency, seems an anomaly and raises the question of whose view it represents.

The foreword to the present book is clear about it: the contents are the sole responsibility of the author and the head of the War History Office. But, as Professor Tobe shows in his introduction, it is not that simple. The text went through a great many study sessions and numerous revisions, and although great care was taken to present the facts and the oral testimonies as objectively as possible, the resulting text does to a large extent represent a view shared by Imperial Army and Navy veterans. But even here we should be careful. In the flyer supplied by the publisher for Volume 3, Major Okamura, a former staff officer of

² Idem, pp. 75-76.
Imperial General Headquarters sent out to Singapore to join the invasion of the Dutch East Indies, explicitly denies the claim made in all three volumes that the war was all about oil. For such a vulgar materialistic matter, the Imperial Army did not go to war. It went to war with the idealistic idea of establishing a new order in Asia and freeing the Western colonies of the Western colonizers. This, incidentally, is an argument often heard in Japan to justify Japan’s entry into the war. In its most minimal form, it asserts that something good came out of something bad, after all.

When even the name of your subject is a matter of controversy, it becomes very hard to write an authoritative, let alone academically sound, historical narrative. Not being academically trained historians, the authors of the Senshi Sōsho may not be expected to handle their material with all the conventions of the historian’s craft regarding primary sources, secondary sources, the literature, references, etc. But in these respects, the Senshi Sōsho do not differ much from most of the older Western military histories. In the official histories compiled by the Allied powers after the war almost simultaneously with the compilation of the Senshi Sōsho, the role of the home side is typically emphasized, and they serve to give an account of, if not to account for, the actions of their own forces. A certain bias and one-sidedness is inherent; the Senshi Sōsho are no exception. The professionalization of the field of military history is a comparatively recent phenomenon. Also the Dutch counterpart, Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, compiled by the War History Section of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL) and completed by the Military History Section of the Royal Netherlands Army, is a case in point. However, there is a difference. The Dutch narrative spends no less than two of its seven volumes on the events leading up to the war. The authors of The Invasion of the Dutch East Indies, The Operations of the Navy in the Dutch East Indies and the Bay of Bengal, and The Invasion of the South: Army Air Force Operations only need a few pages to hop, step and jump to the opening of hostilities. This seems to be a deliberate choice. Other volumes in the series — eventually no less than seven — would be dedicated to the circumstances that led to the opening of hostilities. Moreover, the authors’ primary task was to provide educational and research material for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, so not surprisingly they opted for the simplest explanation of the war, the quest for oil, and jumped as quickly as possible into the nitty-gritty details of the planning and execution of the operations.

It has been remarked that the Senshi Sōsho “… provide a great treasure of data and fact. Yet they often omit discussion of questions of primary interest to the Western historian.” That the Senshi Sōsho and many other Japanese sources are often “maddeningly silent” on such matters, however, does not take away their immense value as a treasure trove of data and fact. As Professor Tobe remarks in his introduction: “It is virtually impossible to examine how Japanese forces fought in the Pacific War without referring to the Senshi Sōsho series.” For the student of the Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies, the present translations will fill a large gap in his knowledge, even though he may not find answers to some of his most fundamental questions. With the publication of this final volume, we have completed

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6 Idem, p. xxiv.
the Imperial Army, Navy, and Army Air Force’s account of their operations against the Dutch East Indies. Historians of military aviation will be disappointed that the present volume is not complete. The articles of association of the Corts Foundation, the initiator and main sponsor of the project, prevent it from subsidizing projects that exceed the boundaries of the former Dutch East Indies. So, regretfully we had to skip those parts of the book that specifically deal with the operations in the Philippines, Malaya, and Burma. Even so, we have retained enough of the general description to keep the argument understandable. The table of contents has been translated in full to allow the reader to see which parts have been skipped.

As an addendum, we have included chapter 4 of Senshi Sōsho volume 5, The Invasion of Burma, since it deals with the invasion of northern and central Sumatra, a subject that was not dealt with in The Invasion of the Dutch East Indies. The latter volume ends with the Dutch East Indies surrender at Kalijati on 8 March 1942. The invasion of northern and central Sumatra occurred after that date under the responsibility of the Japanese Twenty-fifth Army in Singapore which executed it as part of its Burma campaign.

The three translated volumes together provide an unparalleled insight into the Japanese military campaign against southeast Asia and the men who executed it. Moreover, we hope it will answer some of the questions of those who still wonder how it all could have happened, and who often still bear the scars of defeat and the subsequent years in prison or internment camps. A look over the hill, or the horizon, to see what was done and thought on the side of the former enemy, may not excuse anything, but it may explain many things.

The translation of military terms: Although the organization of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), including its Air Force, and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) was similar to those of Western armies and navies, there is often no one-to-one correspondence in the names and functions of their constituent parts. Some translators have chosen to emphasize the differences by not translating specific military terms, while others prefer literal translations in some form or another. For example, we might find hikō sentai (飛行戦隊) simply as “sentai” or translated more literally as “air regiment.” Others again try to find designations in Western armies and navies that most closely resemble their Japanese counterpart in function, resulting in translations such as “group,” “air group,” “air combat group,” or even “wing.” In this book, we have generally followed the third option without being too dogmatic. “Gun” (軍) as in “daijūrokun gun” (第十六軍 [Sixteenth Army]) remains “army,” even though “army corps” would be more correct in terms of size and function. At the same time, we have tried to avoid British or Commonwealth terminology and generally followed American usage common in the U.S. Army and Navy during World War II. This limitation precludes the use of terms such as “wing” in the example above because the term “wing” was not officially adopted in the U.S. (Army) Air Force until after the war. The same applies to the terms “sentai” (戦隊) and “kōkū sentai” (航空戦隊) in the IJN. Since American World War II usage reserves “squadron” for destroyer and submarine squadrons, we turned the other fleet “sentai” / “kōkū sentai” into “divisions,” and the IJN land-based air “sentai” into air “flotillas.” However, we did not try to reinvent the wheel and based our translations mainly on the 1944 U.S. Army manual “A Handbook on Japanese Military Forces” [https://archive.org/details/TME30-480] for the IJA, and Japanese Monograph No. 116 for the IJN [http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/Monos/JM-116/index.html], and “Japanese Military and Technical Terms”
(CINCPAC • CINCPA Bulletin No. 18-45, 1945) for both. As not everyone may agree with our choices, we have made them explicit in the glossary at the end of the book.

Japanese names: The characters used in Japanese names can often be read in more than one way. In the text we have used the readings from the name lists of the IJA and IJN, if given and unless pointed out otherwise by later research. If no reading is given in these lists, we have used readings found in bibliographical dictionaries and other sources. In all other cases, we have adopted the most common reading. In the Index of Personal Names, we have added a question mark behind the family and/or personal name whenever the reading remains open to interpretation. In the translated text, Japanese names are given in Japanese order, i.e. the family name first, followed by the personal name without a comma in between.

Place names: In the Japanese text, foreign place names are either written in characters, as in the case of Chinese place names, or in the Japanese phonetic katakana script. Especially in the latter case, this has led to a great number of hard to identify place names. We think that we managed to identify most of them. With the exception of Hong Kong and Saigon, all place names are given in their modern, local readings, e.g. Guangdong instead of Canton, and Gaoxiong instead of Takao. An exception has been made for the names of Japanese naval air groups that take their name from their home bases outside Japan proper. These are given with their Japanese names, for example, Takao Air Group from Gaoxiong (Taiwan), Genzan Air Group from Wonsan (North Korea), and Toko Air Group from Donggang (Taiwan). In the case of the Dutch East Indies, colonial era names such as Batavia and Buitenzorg have been preserved, but their modern names, Jakarta and Bogor, have been added in the Index of Place Names. The spelling of Indonesian place names is rather inconsistent and differs from atlas to atlas. We have followed what seems to be the most commonly accepted spelling.

Maps: We have reproduced all the maps in the translated parts of the book and provided them with English legends. A list of the symbols and abbreviations used in the maps may be found on page 386. The separately attached maps of the original Japanese edition, however, proved too large for the confines of the English edition. Moreover, they did not add much to the understanding.

Editorial notes and emendations: Respecting the wishes of the copyright holder, the National Institute for Defense Studies of Japan, the translation is full and unabridged, except that for this volume we received permission to skip the parts not directly dealing with the Dutch East Indies, as explained above. Although the text invites comparison with foreign sources, we have generally refrained from adding external material. The author himself, however, adds several addenda in which he summarizes some of his Western sources, mainly S. Woodburn Kirby, *The War Against Japan*. We have translated these summaries as they are in Japanese. Since the author cites neither the original titles nor page numbers, it proved virtually impossible to trace his sources. The editorial emendations and notes within brackets or in the form of footnotes are only meant to make the text more readable, to indicate misprints,
contradictory descriptions within the text itself, or occasionally differences with the descriptions in other volumes of the Senshi Sōsho series. Obvious misprints and errata pointed out in the list of errata compiled by NIDS in 2005 have been silently corrected. Parentheses are as used in the Japanese text.

The translation: The present translation is the joint effort of Willem Remmelink and Yumi Miyazaki. The latter also conducted almost all the background research in Japanese sources. We wish that more time could have been given to the solution of remaining problems. However, in the interest of making this translation quickly available to the public, we had to limit ourselves to the most obvious problems. We hope that other researchers will pick up the threads where we left off.

Acknowledgements: I would like to thank the National Institute for Defense Studies for granting us the copyright to publish this translation. Many other institutions and persons helped us with the background research. I would especially like to thank the Military Archives of the National Institute for Defense Studies. The expanding website of JACAR [Japan Center for Asian Historical Records: https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp] was of great help in quickly checking many of the underlying sources.

The advisory board read and commented upon the translation. I am grateful to the members of the board for their many helpful comments and suggestions. I would especially like to thank Lt. Gen. (ret.) Dr. Dirk Starink for his comments, corrections, and the short “Note on Japanese Military Aviation,” which he provided to put Japanese military aviation and the campaign described in international perspective. The final responsibility for the translation, however, rests solely with the editor.

This volume concludes the trilogy of the Japanese Imperial Army, Navy, and Army Air Force’s campaign against the former Dutch East Indies, a project we started about eight years ago. During these years, we enjoyed the unstinting support of Nick Elston of Asahi Media International Inc. in reproducing the complicated maps and fitting them with English legends. Leiden University Press generously allowed me to reproduce the basic layout of the Japanese originals and smoothed the production process. Last but not least, I would like to thank Kaoru Yanagisawa of the Leiden University Office Tokyo and Joan Snellen van Vollenhoven of the Corts Foundation who kept the project on track in Japan and The Netherlands.

October 2020

Willem G. J. Remmelink
The Senshi Sōsho is a series of 102 volumes (to which two supplementary volumes were later added) on the military history of the Pacific War (including the Sino-Japanese War). These volumes contain the results of research conducted at the then War History Office (renamed the Military History Department, and later reorganized into the Center for Military History) of the National Defense College (later renamed the National Institute for Defense Studies) of the Defense Agency, or the Ministry of Defense as we know it today. The series was published by Asagumo Shimbunsha [Asagumo Newspaper Inc.] between 1966 and 1980. Although the series is usually called an “official” war history, the fact that it was published by a private publisher and not the government shows the official stance of the government that, although the series contains the results of research conducted by a branch of a governmental institution (i.e. the War History Office of the National Defense College), it does not express the official view of the Japanese government on the Pacific War. As mentioned in the foreword, “the main purpose of the publication of this series is to serve as educational and research material for the Self-Defense Forces,” but that “its public use has been taken into consideration as well.”

A study of the history of the Pacific War and a compilation of the results by a Japanese governmental institution had been planned since the days of the occupation right after the defeat. However, it was not until 1955, after the end of the occupation, when the War History Office was established within the Defense Agency, that the plan was put into effect in earnest. At the War History Office, dozens of veterans were appointed to compile the materials. They held meeting after meeting to write materials for educational and research purposes, revised these materials based on the discussions in these study meetings, and prepared manuscripts. For the research, the War History Office gathered about 70,000 documents, which were scattered and lost after the defeat, interviewed about 15,000 veterans, and collected about 10,000 documents transferred from the Ministry of Health and Welfare, which had taken over the demobilization of the Army and the Navy, and about 30,000 documents that had been collected by the occupation forces and were subsequently returned from the United States.

In 1965, the Defense Agency set forth a plan to publish the research results of the War History Office as the Senshi Sōsho series. Publication was started the next year; the study meetings at the War History Office, as many as 3,500 in ten years, and the results of some 240,000 pages of prepared manuscripts provided the basis for the series. The number of authors and researchers who participated in the compilation was 134. The entire 102-volume series can be subdivided in various ways. In one way, they can be divided into seven volumes on the circumstances which led to the opening of hostilities, ten volumes on the Army Department of IGHQ, seven volumes on the Navy Department of IGHQ and the Combined
Fleet, ten volumes on the military preparations, nine volumes on the invasion operations, ten volumes on the operations in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea, five volumes on the operations in the central Pacific theater, three volumes on the defensive operations in the southwestern theater, four volumes on the operations in Burma, three volumes on the operations in the northeastern theater, three volumes on the operations in Manchuria, fifteen volumes on the operations in China, five volumes on the decisive battles in the Philippines, three volumes on the decisive battles on Okinawa, four volumes on the operations in the homeland, three volumes on the history of special operations (vessel escorting, submarine warfare, etc.) and one volume with a chronological table and a glossary of technical terms. The series can also be subdivided in a different way, e.g. twenty-four volumes on the general conduct of the war, ten volumes on military preparations, sixty-seven volumes on the operations themselves, and one volume on other matters. Finally, the series could be divided into sixty-nine volumes on the Army and thirty-two volumes on the Navy, and one volume common to both (the chronological table). The present book, Volume 34: The Invasion of the South: Army Air Force Operations, as the previously published Volume 3, The Invasion of the Dutch East Indies, would belong to the category of invasion operations conducted by the Army whereas Volume 26: The Operations of the Navy in the Dutch East Indies and the Bay of Bengal, would then fall into the category of invasion operations conducted by the Navy.

The published Senshi Sōsho series was on the whole favorably received by historians of modern and contemporary Japan. It was because the series filled a gap at a time when objective data on the history of the Pacific War were scarce. Also, the attitude of the authors who strove to be objective and ideologically unbiased was well thought of.

Needless to say, there was harsh criticism as well. For example, from a historiographical point of view, the series was criticized that its academic level was not necessarily high, which was only natural, for it was written not by academically trained researchers but by veterans. However, I doubt whether there were more suitable persons at that point to write the war history series than these veterans. Even if it had been possible to commission university-level professional researchers to do the writing, without sufficient military knowledge they would not have had the competence to do the work. I should also add that even though there were more than 120,000 historical documents available at the time of publication, their number was limited compared to the current number of available documents.

The authors of the Senshi Sōsho series were consistent in their attitude that they should just convey as faithfully as possible the facts based on the documents and the oral evidence from the interviews, and leave analyses and interpretation to the reader or the specialist, rather than on the basis of their research results publish their own analyses or interpretations. This is even reflected in the title of the series. By choosing the title “War History Series,” they consciously tried to steer clear of the political and ideological controversies that surrounded such titles as “History of the Greater East Asia War,” or “History of the Pacific War.” As a result, many researchers regarded the series as a kind of primary historical source and tried to utilize the information extracted from the series in their own research. In that sense, even if indices and notes were insufficient, it can be said that the authors successfully achieved in their own way their intention to just convey the facts and the evidence. Moreover, not all of the 102 volumes did necessarily fall short of the required academic level. Of the 102 volumes, quite a few did attain a considerably high research level.
Another criticism was that the authors, as veterans, might be biased towards the organization to which they once belonged and in their evaluation of the record might have become lenient with it or its members. As I mentioned above, the texts of each author were discussed at study meetings, attended by the whole group, and revised. We cannot tell whether in the reviews at the study meetings, any criticism of their fellow soldiers was toned down or actually reinforced. But at least it is clear that the reviews at the study meetings must have put as much restraint as possible on prejudices or feelings of favor or disapproval. In that sense, we may say that objectivity and impartiality were to a large extent guaranteed in the series.

The criticism that the series was written by a group of insiders was also leveled at the fact that the inter-service rivalry between the Army and the Navy sometimes resurfaced in this series. A typical example is the fact that different Army and Navy versions were written, with considerable differences in interpretation, about the circumstances that led to the opening of hostilities. The Senshi Sōsho series can be divided into those volumes of which the Army was in charge and those of which the Navy was in charge. In other words, the parallel tracks that the Army and the Navy had pursued from the time of their foundation in the early Meiji period onwards extended to the issue of who would take charge of certain volumes. However, the difference in interpretation and views between the Army and the Navy mainly occurred in the descriptions of the general conduct of the war; only a few cases show traces of this rivalry in the description of operations. Whereas Volume 3 and Volume 34, of which the Army was in charge, mainly deal with the history of operations and engagements with a focus on Army land and aerial engagements, Volume 26, of which the Navy was in charge, describes the history of operations and engagements with a focus on Navy sea and aerial engagements. We may say that in these volumes the influence of a Army-Navy rivalry is hardly seen.

Another criticism of the Senshi Sōsho series was that it focused on operations, and that the analysis and description of subjects such as the line of communications (logistics), intelligence, and medical matters were extremely few. Other criticism was that the descriptions were too flat and often offered nothing but a list of facts. Many parts of Volume 3, 26, and 34 may fall under the latter criticism in particular. However, as I mentioned, this could be the result of the efforts of the authors to just convey the facts or the oral evidence, obtained in the process of their research and writing, while leaving out their subjective judgments as much as possible.

After publication, a considerable number of misprints and factual mistakes were found. Apart from the misprints, factual misunderstandings have been clarified by newly found material and through progress in research. The Military History Department (or the Center for Military History) is said to be working on an updated list of errata. However, at this stage much work still needs to be done.

Despite the above criticisms and shortcomings, there is no doubt that the Senshi Sōsho series is the first basic reference work to turn to when studying the history of the Pacific War; it is a rich and indispensable source for all future research. It is virtually impossible to examine how Japanese forces fought in the Pacific War without referring to the Senshi Sōsho series.

October 2020
References


Id., ‘Senshi Sōsho ni okeru Riku-Kaigun Tairitsu ni kansuru Ichigayadai no Senshi-bu to Senshi Sōsho’ (同「『戦史叢書』における陸海軍対立に関する一考察—開戦経緯を中心にとして—」『戦史研究年報』第12号 (2009年3月) [Id., ‘A study on the rivalry between the Army and the Navy in the Senshi Sōsho series, which with a focus on the circumstances which led to the opening of hostilities,’ NIDS Military History Studies Annual Report No. 13, Mar. 2009]).


Ichiki Toshio, ‘Senshi Sōsho Senjinka no Omoide’ (内木義雄「『戦史叢書』編さん当時の思い出」『戦史研究年報』第13号 (2010年3月) [Ichiki Toshio, ‘Memories of my time at the Military History Department,’ NIDS Military History Studies Annual Report No. 13, Mar. 2010]).


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編纂—防衛研修所戦史室と『戦史叢書』に至る経緯を中心に—『軍事史学』第54巻第1号 (2018年6月) [Hasegawa Yūya, 'The compilation of a military history at the Army and Navy demobilization offices, with a focus on the War History Office of the National Defense College and the circumstances in which “Senshi Sōsho” series [took shape],’ The Journal of Military History, Vol.54 No. 1, June 2018]).

This volume completes the history of the Southern operation in relation to the conquest of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies along the western invasion route. It focuses mainly on the air operations by the Japanese army as they were of crucial importance for the advance of the ground forces. Japan’s air operations by its Navy in the Philippines and towards eastern Java have already been described in volume 26 of this series.

As in many other countries, military aviation in Japan originated in balloon trials by a joint army-navy Provisional Command with the army in the lead, established in 1909. As Japan was not actively involved in the heavy fighting on the Western Front of World War I, it was eager to learn from Western countries about the enormous development that military aviation, and the airplane in particular, had undergone in that war. Whereas the army invited a French team in 1919 with French aircraft for instructions, the Navy drew on the experiences of the Royal Navy in 1921. As a result of these exchanges both services built up their air forces along different lines and had different aircraft designed and produced by Japanese industry. All companies had started with licence production of western aircraft types, but with the help of British, French and German engineers they were able to develop indigenous designs for large-scale production during the 1920s, making Japan self-supporting in both military and civil aviation.

In the interwar years Japanese military aviation was organized as directly supporting forces to the ground troops and the fleet. Unlike Great Britain and the United States, Japanese air doctrine did not allow for “independent air operations” like strategic bombing. The army air force thinking closely resembled German Luftwaffe characteristics, with multi-engined bombers to destroy enemy air forces at their airfields and support ground troop advances. From 1931 onwards the Japanese air forces were involved in combat in Manchuria and the Chinese continent. Before the start of the Southern operation the army could digest the Blitzkrieg in Western Europe.

The Navy was different from Western naval air services in that it comprised a large land-based offensive component to support fleet operations or ground troops. Moreover, the Japanese Navy early recognized the importance of carrier-based air power to cover the fleet from the air as well as project offensive power, as it did in Pearl Harbor. In addition, large flying boats and cruiser-launched floatplanes were used for reconnaissance.

What made the air operations against Malaya, the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies unique was the enormous distances that had to be covered both along the eastern and western paths of advance to Java. These so-called “stepping stones operations” were based on the lessons from the Battle of Britain that no invasion from the sea was to succeed unless air superiority could be established over the enemy air force. Thus the task of the air forces in
the Southern operation was two-fold: (1) neutralize the widely spread enemy air forces on the ground and in the air, as well as (2) give support to the advance of the ground troops in addition to and at longer ranges than the artillery.

Thus attacks on enemy airfields were the prime targets for the Japanese air forces, so that the distance that could be covered in the invasion was limited by the operational combat range of the fighter aircraft. Because of the importance of the seizure of forward enemy airfields and preparing them quickly for the next move, even advance army parties were landed to secure and repair these airfields for the next step. To secure the all-important airfield of Palembang and the oil installations nearby, even a Parachute Raiding unit was successfully employed. Given fighter combat ranges of about 500 kilometres, it took about five subsequent steps to advance from the French Indo-Chinese base area to move all the way up to Java. Later in the war these stepping-stones operations were copied by General MacArthur’s air and ground forces advancing along the north coast of New Guinea and the island hopping towards the Philippines.

Although the air operations described in this volume are mainly those by the army air forces, there was nevertheless substantial support from naval ground-based air power. Because of the lack of an overarching authority over both air services, there had to be co-operating agreements on case-by-case basis negotiated by the various staffs involved.

A good deal of this volume addresses the enormous logistics requirements involved in the air operations, the quick preparation of seized enemy airfield and the advancing of fuel, munitions and repair facilities and stocks. A final chapter in this volume gives the results of a thorough self-evaluation of the air operations with a view to future operations against the Allied nations.

October 2020
The Palembang Paratroop Operation

The Singapore Invasion Operation
Commanders and Staff of the Third Air Force Units

Commanders and Staff of the Fifth Air Force Units

Commanders and Chiefs of Staff of the Southern Army Units with Chief of Army General Staff Sugiyama at the Center, Right After the Passing Down of the Order of Battle
Type–99 Single-Engine Light Bomber

Type–99 Twin-Engine Light Bomber

Type–97 Heavy Bomber

Type–98 Direct Support Aircraft

Type–97 Fighter Plane

Type–1 Fighter Plane

Type–2 Fighter Plane

Type–99 Tactical Reconnaissance Aircraft
More than a decade after the establishment of the War History Office, we have published some of the results of our research one after another, and as the thirty-fourth volume [of the series], we now publish this book. Although the main purpose of the publication [of this series] is to serve as educational and research material for the Self-Defense Forces, its public use has been taken into consideration as well.

As enormous quantities of documents were destroyed, scattered or lost at the end of the war and, moreover, there was a gap of ten years before the establishment of the War History Office, the difficulties of compiling a history of the war were, compared to past war history compilations in Japan as well as overseas, beyond description. Yet fortunately, the understanding of all concerned and the enthusiastic support by a great many veterans helped realize the publication of this work. Here, once again, we would like to express our deep gratitude.

Due to space limitations, not a few parts have been omitted in the account. It is also expected that some parts will need further revision in the future because of newly added collections of historical materials. We earnestly solicit the cooperation and comments of all of you, in or outside the War History Office.

This volume was completed by historiographer Horikawa Tatsumi, who succeeded and continued the extensive research of historiographer Okamoto Takeyoshi after his sudden passing away right after his start on this volume.

Further, we would especially like to add that the head of the War History Office and the author are solely responsible for the contents of this volume.

March 1970

National Defense College
Head of the War History Office
Nishiura Susumu
Preface

This volume primarily deals with the Army air operations during the different stages of the invasion operation against the South, particularly against the Philippines, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and Burma, conducted from December 1941 until June 1942.

The Army started studying this operation in earnest when the sudden changes in the war situation in Europe in the spring of 1940 presented an opportunity. Against the backdrop of complicated and serious discussions on how to conduct the war, the plan of southern operation was decided on in late October 1941. The mission or aim of the operation was to launch simultaneous operations both in the Philippines and Malaya, destroy the major bases of the United States, Britain and The Netherlands in east Asia in a short period of time and occupy the key areas of the South.

For the most part, the vast theater [of this operation], which stretched from east to west and north to south for some four thousand kilometers in both directions, consisted of underdeveloped, wild tropical areas. Most of the oilfields and the politically or strategically important places were located in the middle or southern parts of the key areas of the South. [The operation to] capture these places would inevitably involve complicated maritime and land operations, for which exceptionally long lines of supply and replenishment were indispensable.

Moreover, even though they were just colonial forces, engaging in full-scale battles with U.S., British, or Dutch forces and accomplishing the mission in a short period of time required exceptional arrangements, which included the concealment of plans, bringing the combined forces of the Army, Navy and their Air Services into full play, in particular, the organic employment of the Army and Navy air power, especially at the opening of hostilities, and the advance of air supremacy by means of the stepping-stone tactics.

The shift to the southern operation and adapting to it was not easy for the Army Air Service, which had expected Manchuria as its battlefield and which had basically been trained for operations in that theater. Particularly, its ability to carry out large air transport, replenishment and line of communications operations, or the ability to fly over the oceans or to attack naval vessels, all necessary for large mobile operations in the tropics which would likely involve maritime operations, was inadequate. The short combat range of army aircraft had a great impact on the entire prosecution of the war, too.

Nevertheless, along with the success of the surprise attack on Hawai‘i, the southern invasion operation was successful in every theater, making more-than-expected progress. The Army air service, too, produced enormous results in its air campaign to destroy enemy air power, its support of the ground operations, and its cover for the convoys, to say nothing of the Palembang paradrop operation. The [enemy’s] destruction of the oil refining facilities, which [the Army] had feared, was small and the oilfields in the south came into Japanese
possession, which seemingly suggested that Japan had succeeded in establishing a long-term invincible position in prosecuting the war.

Aggressive views, which went beyond the planning, that invasion [operations] against Australia and Ceylon should be conducted, surfaced in [the arguments over] the conduct of the war in the final stage of the [southern] invasion. However, in June 1942, the IGHQ Army Department decided on a policy of operations, where the main goal was set on securing the stability of the key areas in the South. It also decided to extract a powerful element of operational strength for the theaters in the north and China.

IGHQ’s judgment of the situation at that time was a serious issue, just as serious as the one made at the time of deciding on the opening of hostilities.

In this volume, we made efforts to fundamentally clarify as much as possible the historical facts during this period.

About the Navy air units and the situation of the ground combat, only relevant outlines are given. Also, the war situation on the sea is only mentioned when specifically necessary.

As for the situation of the allied forces, excerpts from the official histories of the countries in question have been attached at [the end of] the relevant chapters and sections. Although some military results, etc. [there] don’t match those in the Japanese records, we put them in as they are as a means for further study. (See Illustration No. 1)

Explanatory Notes

1. In general, date and time are indicated in Japan Standard Time [JST] unless otherwise specified.
2. Time of day, such as 8.30 p.m. is expressed as 0830.
3. [Concerns the original Japanese text. Not relevant to the translation. Omitted by the editor.]
4. [Concerns the original Japanese text. Not relevant to the translation. Omitted by the editor.]
5. The names and brief military careers ([with the] main [aim of] clarifying their experience in the air service) of the key officers of the Army Air Service, who appear in this volume, are listed in the attached table. As for those not included in the table, the graduate class of the Army academy has been added [to the name in the main text] if considered necessary.
6. The numbers within parentheses refer to the historical source materials. These are shown together at the end of each extracted volume.
7. The signs and abbreviations of the [relevant] main units are also shown together at the end of this volume.
Illustration No. 1 — Map of the Southern Invasion Operation Theater
Introduction: The Army’s Strategy for the Areas to the South [of Japan] and the Changes in the Employment of Aviation
(Until the Spring of 1941)

The strategic areas in the South, which became invasion targets of Japan in the initial period of the last war, were colonies of Britain, the Netherlands and the United States. They were the product of a centuries-long history of domination over Asia by the major [Western] powers. Since there was no noticeable expansion of Japan as a nation in the Edo and the early Meiji periods, because of its seclusion policy during the former and the policy of giving priority to domestic reforms during the latter, no [particular] problems over the southern areas, which might have caused a clash of interests with the major [Western] powers, occurred for a long time.

However, in the late Meiji period, [especially] from around 1895, when Japan got in possession of Taiwan after the Sino-Japanese War, Taiwan, Hong Kong and the Philippines, namely, the territories of Japan, Britain and the United States, came to face each other across the South China Sea. Hong Kong had become a British possession in 1842 after the Opium War, and the Philippines became an American possession in 1898 after the Spanish-American War.

Nevertheless, the three countries enjoyed friendly relations until the end of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) and there were no conflicts between them in the Far East. It was at the end of the Meiji period that diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan started to cool off, and it was after the First World War (1914-1918) that a clash of interests between the three countries became obvious. In the last years of Meiji, the United States had already regarded Japan as a hypothetical enemy, while Japan started working on a plan of operations against the United States from around 1918.

The Army operations in this plan consisted of invasions against the Philippines and Guam, and the strength to be employed for these operations was two to three divisions for the former and one regiment as the core for the latter. Along with the developments in aeronautical technology, the army’s air mission in the operations against the United States changed from reconnaissance in the Taishō period to direct support of the landing operations in the early Shōwa period, and from 1937 onwards to campaigns to destroy enemy air power.

It was in fiscal year 1937 that the Japanese high command included Britain among its hypothetical enemies and started working on a plan to capture Hong Kong, Singapore as well as key places in British Borneo and Malaya.

Then, the global situation changed drastically. Triggered by the German and Soviet invasions of Poland in September 1939, the Second World War broke out at last. While Japan at
first declared a policy of nonintervention in the wars in Europe, in the “Principles of Foreign Policy,” decided by the three ministers of War, Navy, and Foreign Affairs at the end of 1939, it made clear its intention to establish “A New Order in East Asia” including the areas to its south.

Around that time, on account of the experiences gained in the China Incident and the Nomonhan Incident and in order to prepare for changes in the new global situation, the Army revised its armament plan that had been in place since 1937 to upgrade and strengthen its air arm. And at the end of 1939, the Japanese [Army] high command drew up a new plan of operations for fiscal year 1940, which newly included the capture of key places in French Indochina.

Then for about half a year, a state of cold war referred to as the “Twilight War” [Phoney War] continued in Europe. However, in the spring of 1940, Germany swept across northern and western Europe with a blitz-like operation in almost no time. The British forces’ total withdrawal from the European continent, the surrender of the French government led by Pétain, and the Dutch government’s exile in Britain gave the impression of an epoch-making crucial turning point in history, and German military power was highly regarded.

In July 1940, IGHQ and the government decided on the “Outline of the Main Principles for Coping with the Changing World Situation” and made clear that at a favorable opportunity military force might be employed to settle the southern question.

Based on this outline, the Army and the Navy high command started a serious and comprehensive study of the entire operation to invade the key areas in the South.

In the plans of the southern operation in general, the employment of aviation, which had been making rapid progress, naturally became an important factor. And whether out of profound awareness or not, command of the air became increasingly prioritized. In order to successively expand and push forward the range [of air supremacy], the tactics of ‘advancing air bases by way of stepping stones’ were worked out.

The Army and Navy air services, working closely together, were supposed to constitute the core strength of these tactics. However, for the Army air units, which had been trained in, and for, a continental environment, the southern invasion operation and the preparations for it, which would most likely include a switch to maritime operations, were far from easy.

1. The First Initiatives for a Strategy Against the U.S. Forces in the Philippines and the Army Air Service

The Origin of the Southern Question as a Strategic Problem

Japan’s southern question as a strategic problem can be considered as having started from Japan-U.S. relations over the Philippines. Diplomatic relations between both countries had rapidly cooled off after the Russo-Japanese war. In 1907, the United States started drawing up [War] Plan Orange, which assumed operations against Japan, and also in the same year Japan decided on a national defense policy and its fundamental principles of strategy, which counted the United States as a hypothetical enemy next to the Russia and France.

However, Japan’s plan of operations against the United States at that time was nothing more than intercepting and destroying the U.S. fleet on the sea near mainland Japan. The
plan did not include such offensive intentions as an invasion of the Philippines, it rather focused on the defense of its coastal areas, particularly those near Taiwan.

In the First World War (1914-1918), in conformity with the Anglo-Japan Alliance (concluded in 1902) Japan declared war against Germany, invaded Qingdao and seized the Marshall, Caroline and Mariana Islands.

Although after the war as a result of the Treaty of Versailles (1919), these islands were mandated to Japan [by the League of Nations], this situation had a great impact on the strategies of Japan and the United States, because these territories under Japanese mandate could cut off the U.S. lines of communications to the Philippines and Guam.

From 1921 until 1922, the Washington Naval Conference was held and [in the treaty concluded,] the tonnage of capital ships kept by the United States, Britain and Japan was limited to a ratio of 5:5:3. At the same time, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was dissolved.

Nevertheless, as far as the offensive and defensive position of the Philippines was concerned, Japan had a strategic advantage over the United States. Of course, the fact that the equatorial Pacific islands had become a Japanese mandate was of great importance as previously told, but above all else, the fundamental factor was the great difference in distance [to the Philippines] from both respective mainlands. The distance from the west coast of the United States is 13,000 kilometers and that from Hawaii 9,000 kilometers, whereas that from mainland Japan is about 2,000 kilometers and that from Taiwan just a few hundred kilometers.

The United States strategy for the Philippines was in a serious predicament. Although securing the islands in the initial period of the hostilities was extremely difficult and strategically not necessarily a good plan, from the political point of view of maintaining its national prestige in the colony, the country could not simply abandon the islands. [Therefore,] it was, as a matter of course, important to strengthen the defense [of the Philippines] in peacetime, and once hostilities were opened, a large reinforcement operation was required.

Consequently, Japan’s invasion operation of the Philippines had to be conducted in such a way as to completely destroy the U.S. operational bases in as short a period as possible, and then be ready against the [counter] attack by U.S. forces.(1, 2)

The Birth of the Philippines Invasion Operation Plan

From around 1918 onwards, the Army started working on a Philippines invasion operation plan, giving it concrete form around 1923, its outline was as follows:

At the opening of hostilities, the Navy shall destroy the U.S. Navy in the waters of the Philippines, block its advance bases, Manila Bay and Subic Bay (on the west coast of Bataan Peninsula), and at the same time seize Aparri in northern Luzon with one element.

The Army shall capture Manila with the strength of one and a half division as the core, by putting ashore the main force at Lingayen and one element at Lamon Bay. [However,] it shall avoid an assault by force on the naval port of Olongapo in Subic Bay, and the stronghold of Corregidor at the mouth of Manila Bay.

Concerning the landing [points] on Luzon, apart from the above, various [scenarios], such as [landings at] the Batangas area on the southwest coast, Baler Bay at the north-central part on the east coast, and Legaspi on southeast coast, were also examined.
The problem [for the Army] was getting information, particularly the gathering of military topographical data necessary for operations. In general, the Army was not able to collect sufficient information.

Around that time, the arrival of the U.S. main fleet in the western Pacific area was estimated to take seventy-five days from the opening of hostilities.\(^{(3)}\)

The Philippines invasion operation plan of fiscal year 1926 was expanded in scale. Subsequent studies showed that it was possible for the U.S. main fleet to arrive in western Pacific area in forty-five days after the opening of the hostilities, which meant that it was necessary [for the Japanese forces] to capture Manila and seize the naval port of Cavite along the bay by that time.

The forces to be employed were increased to three divisions as the core. It was [also] decided that in addition to [the landings at] Lingayen Gulf and Lamon Bay in the previous [plan], one powerful element should be advanced from the Batangas area and another element should be put ashore in Subic Bay, to seize the U.S. naval base at Olongapo.

The plan for the stronghold of Corregidor was changed in such a way that at first it should only be blocked but that at a favorable opportunity it should be captured along with Bataan Peninsula.

Furthermore, [the new plan] included the capture of Mindanao (primarily Davao) in the southern Philippines, the Visayan area (Iloilo, the San Bernardino and Surigao Straits) in the central Philippines after the completion of the above operations.

The plan for the Army Air Service in the above period was to have one element of reconnaissance units transported by sea to support the ground combat of the main force [of the invasion unit]. However, by the end of the Taishō period [mid 1920s], [lack of] cover from the air at the time of the landing operations of the main force came to be considered a problem. Consequently, studies of surprise landings of small detachments at the outset of the war on Batan Island and some key places on northern Luzon to seize airfields were begun.\(^{(4)}\)

The Growth of the Army Air Service and Its Participation in the Philippines Invasion Operation

**The Armaments of the Army Air Service in the Taishō Period [1912-1926]**

The first stirrings to form an Army Air Service had begun in the late Meiji period, and the first air units were born in the early Taishō period.

In the First World War, the Army Air Service participated with a small number of aircraft both in the invasion operation of Qingdao (1914) and the Siberian Intervention from 1918 onwards, and in both some lessons of war were learned. However, since Japanese aviation did not experience full-scale air combat or the bombing of cities, etc., which had developed in Europe during the war, its progress lagged far behind.

While the world entered an era of arms reductions after the world war, innovation in aviation technology was making rapid progress. In the initial stages, the Army Air Service put efforts into introducing French aircraft technology.

At the end of the Taishō period [mid 1920s], the Japanese Army resolutely carried out an upgrading of its air service and an improvement of the equipment for the ground units, by abolishing four [infantry] divisions.
It was in 1925 that the aviation branch of the Army was made independent [within the Army], and the Army Aviation Headquarters was established. At that time, the operational air units amounted to twenty-six squadrons in total, consisting of eleven squadrons each of reconnaissance planes and fighter planes, and two squadrons each of light and heavy bombers. Military aviation, which had started off in the field of reconnaissance aircraft, made rapid progress during the First World War in the field of fighter planes, and in succession, the field of bombers was about to make dramatic progress.

Around that time, [the establishment of independent] air forces was enthusiastically discussed by the major Western powers. The British and Italian Air Forces became independent in the late Taishō period [the early 1920s]. Also in Japan in 1921, [from the point of view of] pure war tactics, Lt. Gen. Inoue Ikutarō, Chief of Army Aviation Department (the former body of the Army Aviation Headquarters) submitted a proposal that the air forces should be made independent, which was said to be at least approved by War Minister Tanaka Giichi and Chief of General Staff Uehara Yūsaku, but which is said to have fizzled out due to opposition by the top echelon of the Navy.

In any case, the employment of aircraft in the Philippines invasion operation [plan] developed along with the progress in aviation, marking multiple stages.

The Army Air Service Support in Reconnaissance

Around 1923, when the Philippines invasion operation plan had taken shape, the Army Air Service mainly employed Salmson Model–I aircraft for reconnaissance aircraft, Type–A Model–III or Model–IV aircraft for fighter planes, and Farman Type–D Model–I for bombers. The combat ranges of these aircraft were so short that it was impossible for them to cross the four hundred kilometers wide Bashi Channel [between Taiwan and the Philippines] and accomplish their mission.

At first, the Army Air Service was supposed to participate in the Philippines invasion operation only with reconnaissance aircraft. The idea was to transport disassembled and crated aircraft by sea, reassemble them at an airfield set up near the coast and after the landing of the ground troops, have them support the ground combat.

This idea was put into effect in the Qingdao operation in 1914, and the experience gained had shown the problems of seizing and setting up such airfields.

Although the military topography of Luzon was still very much unclear, it was judged that landing strips might be relatively easily set up somewhere along the coast of the Bashi Channel and Lingayen Gulf.

The Army Air Service Support of the Philippines Invasion Operation

For the next several years, almost no changes were made to the [Army’s] plan for the Philippines invasion operation. However, from 1932 onwards after the Manchurian Incident had occurred, [the Army] limited the scope of the Philippines invasion [operation] to Luzon, and gradually attached more importance to the capture of the Bataan Peninsula and the stronghold of Corregidor.

Around that time, the Army General Staff estimated the strength of U.S. Air Forces in the Philippines at about four squadrons of reconnaissance bombers and about two squadrons of fighter planes based on the Clark and Nichols fields. Although their real war potential was
not clear, the rapid developments in aeronautical technology meant that the capability of aircraft to attack naval surface vessels should not be underestimated. It was around that time that the tactics of having aircraft provide support for the landing operations were introduced in the Philippines operation plan."(8)

The Army aircraft around 1932 and 1933 were mainly Type–92 and Type–93 aircraft, and the range of action of the fighter planes was three hundred kilometers or less."(9) From the southern part of Taiwan it is about seven hundred kilometers to Lingayen and about nine hundred kilometers to Manila. In order to advance fighter planes to these areas and have them establish command of the air, their bases would need to be advanced in two or three leaps. In order to cover the convoy for the Lingayen landing, Ibahos Island (southwest of Batan Island in the Bashi Channel), as well as Aparri, Laoag and Vigan, etc. on the northern or northwestern coast of Luzon were selected as candidates for setting up airfields. For the setting up [of airfields] it was desirable that these places were suitable enough to allow the take-off and landing of aircraft within five to seven days. Although usable and suitable grounds such as pastures were found at places in northern Luzon, it was questionable whether the marshy areas near Aparri as well as the small Ibahos Island could be turned into airfields in such a short time.

The covert and rapid construction of simple landing strips became an important issue, and research on it was started (note: as will be mentioned later).

In any case, the Philippines invasion operation plan of around 1932 or 1933 was drawn up in such a way that right at the opening of hostilities, detachments of about one infantry battalion each were supposed to make surprise landings on Ibahos Island, Aparri, Laoag, Baler Bay, etc., and set up landing strips for the advance of fighter planes and other aircraft, which should cover the landing of the main force of ground troops from the air.

At that time, no air campaigns to destroy enemy air power (attacks on [enemy] airfields) by army aircraft at the opening of hostilities were planned, [because] aircraft suitable for such [campaigns] were not yet available.

Although the Japanese Navy possessed aircraft carriers since the end of the Taishō period [mid 1920s], they were meant for decisive battles against enemy fleets and not included in the forces for its Philippines operation plans drawn up in peacetime.(15, 44)

In short, the use of the army air service around that time was strongly colored by its support of the ground operations with a focus on covering the landing [operations]; it was not meant to gain command of the air by prior air campaigns to destroy the air power of the enemy.

The army air strength planned to be employed around that time for the Philippines operation was about one battalion (two squadrons) of fighter planes and one battalion (two squadrons) of reconnaissance bombers. Apart from cases where heavy bombers were particularly needed such as in attacks on a stronghold, the employment of heavy bombers was not included in its plans of operation drawn up in peacetime.(8, 9)

Very heavy bombers kept by the Army around that time and their [expected] role in the Philippines operation plan shall be described below all together.
Very Heavy Bombers, Launching/Arresting Devices, etc.

Type–92 Very Heavy Bombers (Four-Engine Very Heavy Bombers)

The radius of action of heavy bombers in the early Shōwa period [late 1920s], such as Type–D Model–II or Type–87 aircraft, was three to four hundred kilometers, and their attacking capacity was also poor.

In 1928, based on a proposal offered by Maj. Gen. Koiso Kuniaki, chief of the General Affairs Division of the Army Aviation Headquarters, the chief of the department, Gen. Inoue Ikutarō, proposed to develop a very heavy bomber which could attack Manila and vicinity from Taiwan.

With that as a start, the Army purchased a manufacturing license for the Model G–38 aircraft from the German firm Junkers and had the Mitsubishi Aircraft Company remodel it into a bomber and make a prototype.

For the research of the aircraft and making a prototype, the Army Air Service (with Col. Kazumi Kensuke, technical chief of the Army for this project) and the technical staff at the Mitsubishi Aircraft Company participated in the project en masse. After having spent enormous time and costs, the aircraft successfully made its first flight at Kakamigahara in October 1931, after which it was officially employed as the Type–92 heavy bomber; a total of seven aircraft (including the prototype) were manufactured by 1935.

Although there were many problems with its performance, its radius of action of one thousand kilometers raised the hope [of the Army], since [the distance] from southern Taiwan to Manila was a little less than nine hundred kilometers.

In June 1933, the training of personnel for a special mission unit (Squadron E) equipped with the aircraft was started. The trainers included Capt. Ogawa Kojirō, who had been in charge of the aircraft from the days when it was still under study, and the trainees consisted of several personnel each for flying, bombing, reconnaissance and servicing. Day after day, they carried out basic training, while conducting test drops of 500kg bombs against a 2.5-meter-thick concrete cover constructed at the Irago Firing Test Site, made to resemble the stronghold of Corregidor. However, with no hits scored and no effects achieved [even] in stationary blasting tests, the experiment was unsuccessful.(10)

After that, the training of Squadron E was continued after a fashion by having it prepare for operations in Manchuria. However, the performance of Type–92 heavy bomber was so poor that it was never included in the [Army’s] operation plan against the Philippines. In peacetime, the squadron was not formed and the study of and the training for the Type–92 heavy bombers were continued mainly at the Hamamatsu Flying School. However, by 1937 when the China Incident occurred, [even study and trainings were] suspended, and the aircraft were put in hangars at the Kakamigahara Aircraft Depot.

Then, in the autumn of 1938, four of the aircraft were assigned to one squadron of the 7th Air Group, which repeatedly conducted trainings near mainland Japan up until the spring of 1940.

Type–92 heavy bombers were eventually never used in operations at all. [It was partly because] the research and training for the aircraft were sacrificed to [the Army’s] policy of keeping them top secret, aiming to deliver a surprise attack [on the enemy] in a technological sense. Nevertheless, the aircraft soon failed to keep pace with the striking innovations in
Introduction / The Army’s Strategy for the Areas to the South and the Changes in the Employment of Aviation

China

Taiwan

Guangdong

Hong Kong

Taiwan

Gaoxiong

Tainan

N

LN

Taipei

Jiayi

Pingdong

Tainan

Gaoxiong

Arm Air Service

2 Sqdns of fighters

2 Sqdns of recon/bombers

Day X (opening of hostilities)

Surprise landing

Day X + 5-7

Landing of the main force

Laoag

Aparri

Bagbag?

Baler Bay

Clark Field

Manila

 Nichols Field

Estimate U.S. Air Strength

2 Sqdns of fighters

2 Sqdns of recon/bombers

Army Air Service 2 Sqdns of fighters

2 Sqdns of recon/bombers

Lingayen Gulf

Baler Bay

Surigao

Legaspi

Puerto Princesa

Palawan

Mindanao

Mindoro

Negros

Panay

Iloilo

Davao

Negros

Cebu

Surigao

Puerto Princesa

Palawan

Mindanao

Negros

Cebu

Surigao

Remarks

1. The Army was studying [a possibility] to employ [aircraft] at the surprise landing points, including Ibahos Isl, by launching them by catapult [from ships] or having them [land with] arresting devices.

2. Several Type-92 heavy bombers (with four engines), which would be able to attack Manila and vicinity from Taiwan, had been readied.

Illustration No. 2 — Outline of the Employment of Aviation in the [Army’s] Philippines Invasion [Operation Plan] of 1932 and 1933
In 1935, the B–17, the so-called ‘flying fortress,’ had already made its maiden flight [in the United States].

Although the aircraft offered various lessons to the Army, the research on very heavy bombers was discontinued thereafter.9, 10, 11, 79 (Note: An Army-Navy joint research project on a very heavy bomber (the Fugaku) in 1943 also ended in failure.)

Aircraft Launching Device (Ke Model-1) and Arresting Device (Ke Model-2)

In relation to the employment of aircraft in the Philippines invasion operation, the Army General Staff had felt for a long time the need for an ability to condition runways under pressing conditions, or an ability for aircraft to take off and land on cramped airfields.

Around 1931, Kayaba Manufacturing, which had manufactured landing gears with hydraulic dampers for army aircraft, came up with an idea to adapt the launching and arresting devices on warships for use on land, and proposed the idea to the Army Aviation Headquarters.

The Army, while starting to research the idea, also investigated other ideas. Maj. Imagawa Issaku, chief of the Aviation Group of the [Army] Aero-technical Research Institute, as the main investigator, visited Naval sites and extensively studied the situation at the Navy.

It was in October 1935 that the launching catapult and the hydraulic arresting device, which had been repeatedly tested since 1933, were adopted as official equipment of the Army. Apart from [these devices], a simple arresting device (made up of arresting wire[s] with sandbags tied [to the wire]) was invented by Major Imagawa.
The aircraft, on which [those devices] were tested in the first place, included Type–88 reconnaissance aircraft, Type–91 fighter planes and Type–92 reconnaissance aircraft; using [only] about thirty meters for take off and about sixty meters for landing, the devices successfully passed the tests.

After that, [the devices] were also tested with Type–93 twin-engine light bombers, Type–97 fighter planes, Type–98 light bombers and other aircraft. It became clear that a level ground of about three hundred meters square would allow a concentrated use by a large number of aircraft. Keeping these schemes strictly confidential, the Army informally formed a plan of employing the idea in the Philippines and the border areas of Manchuria.

In the meantime, the Army had [also] been studying methods to launch aircraft from ships. Around 1934, it concocted a plan to put aircraft (such as nine Type–88 reconnaissance aircraft or twelve Type–91 fighter planes) on the Shinshū-maru, which had been designed as a mothership for landing craft (with a bow that could open to launch landing craft), and launch aircraft using catapults.

The test to launch [aircraft] from the Shinshū-maru was carried out in 1936. Under the command of Major Imagawa, several aircraft, which were launched from the ship off Kure in the Inland Sea, safely landed on the drill ground in Hiroshima.

These uses of aviation, which had been intended for [the operations against] the Philippines and the coastal areas of China, were [studied] on the assumption that [operations should be conducted as] surprise attacks from the air and the sea. The launched aircraft were supposed to attack enemy airfields or support landings, after which they were supposed to land on the sandy areas or level grounds along the coast as designated after prior surveys. Needless to say, they were supposed to land on airfields if available ones had been seized prior to the operation.

These Model-Ke devices were treated as top secret, and almost no trainings were conducted.\(^8, 12, 13\)

Study of Takeoff and Landing of Aircraft on Soft Ground

In relation to the employment of aviation in the Philippines operation, soft ground was a matter of concern in setting up airfields on Luzon in the rainy season, particularly at Aparri. Since the occurrence of the Manchurian Incident, the Army Air Service had been worried about the muddy [ground] of the airfields in the northern Manchuria.

Since 1933, the Army had studied measures to quickly set up airfields on soft ground. [Led by] Major Imagawa of the Aero-technical Research Institute [then the Technological Department of the Army Aviation Headquarters], who was in charge, various methods such as the use of wire nets, canvas, thick boards and even the use of coagulating agents to set [soft] soil were tested at places in mainland Japan. As a result, it found that the most reliable way was to cover [the ground] with two-meter-square perforated iron sheets. Laying such sheets on a three-hundred-meter-square area would require about fifty hours of work by about thirty personnel, and a total of two hundred trucks for transportation.

Although the method was judged to be useful by the Army Aviation Headquarters, it was eventually not designated as official operational equipment by the central command of the Army, due to the difficulty in obtaining the materials.\(^12, 13\)

In later years, the U.S. Army used this method in its counterattack operation against Japan to quickly set up airfields.
2. Incorporating the Strategies Against Britain in Malaya and the Army Air Service

The First Initiatives for a Plan of Operations Against Britain

The inclusion of Britain as a hypothetical enemy dated from the Army and Navy plan of operations for fiscal year 1937, decided on in August 1936. Around that time, information reached [Tokyo] that the defenses of Hong Kong and Singapore had been strengthened, while also Anglo-Japanese relations gradually worsened over the China problem. [As a result,] the Japanese high command started to consider operations against strategic British points in the Far East.

Hong Kong was [just] a little more than six hundred kilometers to the southwest of Taiwan, and it was becoming possible for Japanese heavy bombers, which had gradually been improved, to conduct transoceanic attacks on the place. Moreover, judging from a comparison between the war capabilities of the Japanese and British forces in the Far East as well as from the distances to their mainland, an invasion of Hong Kong was considered not so difficult.

However, British Malaya and Borneo were distant, and their military topography was unknown, which posed a serious problem. [Consequently,] in the plans for that fiscal year, the outlines of an operation against Britain were merely described as “to be decided when the circumstances should arise.”(14, 15)

The Army Air Service’s Long-Term Military Preparation Plan and the Employment [of Army Aviation] in the Philippines [Operation]

Composition and Employment [of the Army Air Service] in the Years Between 1935 and 1937

Around 1935, most of the world powers had independent air forces [separate from the other services]. Not only Britain and Italy [whose air forces had become independent] from about right after the First World War, but also France and Germany made their air forces independent respectively in 1934 and in 1935, while in the same year the Army air service of the United States gained a half-independent status as the Army Air Force.(2, 59, 222)

The international reactions toward Japan after the Manchurian Incident were very severe, and the remarkable increase in Soviet forces in the Far East, particularly the strengthening of its air forces, posed a serious threat.

Intending a full-scale expansion of armaments, the Army made a plan to increase between fiscal years 1937 and 1942 its air strength from about fifty squadrons at that time to 142 squadrons (of which bombers constituted 50%, fighter planes 30% and reconnaissance aircraft 20%).(5)

The global trend in military aviation around that time was that through the remarkable improvements in bomber performance bombers formed the main component in armaments. In its employment, the idea to giving priority to air campaigns to destroy the enemy air power and gain air supremacy became predominant.

The Army’s thoughts about the composition and employment of its air forces developed mostly along this line, too. The employment of air forces in Manchuria had shifted from
around 1935 onwards in such a way that gradually more importance was attached to air campaigns to destroy enemy air power, and around 1937, the policy to thoroughly implement such air campaigns was adopted.\textsuperscript{8,16}

**The Beginning of the Idea to Use an Air Campaign to Destroy the Enemy Air Power in the Philippines**

From around 1925 onwards, the Japanese high command had been collecting intelligence on the U.S. Filipino Army’s strengthening of the ground defenses in the Philippines. However, the most important subject of its study concerning the Philippines invasion operation plan was the impact which the developments in aviation would have on the landing operations.

In 1936, the Japanese Navy equipped its air force with Type–96 land-based attack planes, which were able to conduct attacks on the Philippines straight from Taiwan, and in 1937, the Army, too, officially adopted the Type –97 heavy bomber, which had a radius of action of seven to eight hundred kilometers.

From the [Army] plan of operations for fiscal year 1937 onwards, the idea of employing a kind of air campaign to destroy enemy air power was adopted in the Philippines invasion plan of operations. However, it was impossible to conduct from Taiwan at a stroke, right at the outset of the war, air campaigns over the air bases of the U.S. air units, such as Nichols and Clarke Field, because [it was too far] for fighter planes to accompany [and escort the bombers], and also because the bombing power was not sufficient, either. That was why the aforementioned plan, to secure air bases in northern Luzon and conduct an air campaign to destroy the enemy air power by using these bases to facilitate the landing operations of the main ground force, was adopted. Needless to say, employing aircraft carriers for an air campaign to destroy enemy air power could have been considered. However, because of their special characteristics, the capabilities of the carriers were in principle supposed to be employed for decisive battles against [enemy] fleets.\textsuperscript{5,8,15}

Meanwhile, in connection with the intelligence obtained in the spring of 1936 concerning the strengthening of the strongholds in Corregidor and on the neighboring islets by the U.S. forces, the point was emphasized in the outline of the ground operations of the Philippines invasion [operation] that if enemy [troops] should take cover in the Bataan Peninsula and the stronghold there, they should be caught and destroyed without missing an opportunity.

Nevertheless, the primary targets of the ground operations remained the [enemy] naval bases in Manila and its vicinity.

Around that time, there was also intelligence concerning the construction of air and naval bases in the central and southern Philippines [by the United States]. The Army, which was going to employ only two divisions, hoped to avoid dispersion of its own forces to those areas and planned in such a way that the Navy should seize these [bases] with one element of its special landing force.\textsuperscript{14,15}

**The Planning in Earnest of Employing an Air Campaign to Destroy the Enemy Air Power in the Philippines**

Thereafter, no precise information concerning the U.S. reinforcements of its air forces in the Philippines was obtained. However, in view of the general military situation of the world powers, it was judged that powerful elements were being advanced in succession.
It was from the [operation] plan of fiscal year 1938 onwards that the air campaign from Taiwan to destroy the enemy air power in the Philippines right at the outset of war was clearly included in the plan. The Navy determined that the first move which [Japan] should make in the operations against the United States should be the following:

Right at the outset of war, [the Navy shall] in the first place carry out sudden attacks on the enemy fleets and air power in the Philippines and Guam and completely destroy them.

The Army in general tended to overstress the air campaigns to destroy enemy air power. For example, in the plan of fiscal year 1938, it designated the tasks of its air units in the Philippines operation in the following way:

The main force of the air division shall be concentrated in Taiwan, from where it shall support the landing and subsequent operations of the advance detachments, and after quickly advancing to the Luzon area, it shall destroy the enemy air power prior to the landing of the main force of the Tenth Army (note by the author: the Philippines invasion force, consisting of two divisions as the core).

However, the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in the Philippines was mainly assigned to the Navy, and the Army Air Service was supposed to support it. The planned strength of the Army Air Service to be employed for the Philippines [operation] in [the plan of] that fiscal year consisted of one air division made up of one air group and one squadron of fighter planes, two air groups of light bombers, one air group and one squadron of heavy bombers, and one squadron of reconnaissance planes, as well as the required ground service units (one air-ground support headquarters, four airfield battalions, two airfield companies, one element each of an air signal unit, air intelligence unit and field airfield construction unit).

The air division, which was to be put under the direct control of IGHQ along with the advance detachments in the initial stages, was supposed to be put under the command of the Tenth Army commander at an appropriate moment after the latter’s advance to Luzon.

In the outline of the Philippines invasion plan of the Tenth Army, which is as shown in Illustration No. 3, major importance was given to the air operations. The number of airfields planned to be seized and prepared by the advance detachments amounted to about ten.(8,15)

At that time, the Navy General Staff estimated that the U.S. air forces in the Philippines consisted of one squadron each of fighter planes, reconnaissance planes and bombers, which, together with about ten civilian aircraft, added up to about seventy aircraft. It also estimated that along with the reinforcements of about fifty aircraft from Hawaii and one element of carrier-based aircraft, [both of] which were available at any time, it would make a total of about 140 aircraft (excluding reserve carrier aircraft but including some heavy bombers).(15)

According to the Army plan of operations of fiscal year 1939 drawn up in February of that year, the Army, too, decided to employ its air service from right at the outset of the war for air strikes against the Philippines, as specified in the plan as follows:

The air division shall be concentrated in Taiwan and, from right at the outset of war [onwards], destroy the enemy air power in the Luzon area. It shall also support the landing and the subsequent operations of the advance parties, while quickly advancing to Luzon.
Partial Progress Made in the Plan of Operations Against Britain

The plan of operations of fiscal year 1937, which took up an operation against Britain for the first time, only listed an agenda such as destroying the [British] Fleet in the East and its operational bases as well as intercepting the British main fleet on the Eastern waters.

Then in the plan of fiscal year 1938, it was clarified that in the beginning of the operation, not only the [British] fleet in the East but also its air forces should be destroyed, that Hong Kong and Singapore should be captured and key places in British Malaya and Borneo should be seized. Concerning the outline of operation, the Navy General Staff had its own internal version of the scheme, which was as follows:

Right at the outset of the war, [Japanese forces shall] carry out sudden attacks on the British fleet in the East as well as its air forces and destroy them, and also conduct sudden attacks on Miri and Brunei on Borneo and occupy them. If Guangdong is already occupied, Hong Kong shall swiftly be captured. Then [Japanese forces shall] strive to set up an advance base in Brunei Bay [to be ready for] their plan to occupy the Malay Peninsula and capture Singapore.

In the summer of 1938, the Navy judged that the British air forces in the Far East consisted of sixty-six aircraft in Singapore (first line aircraft; also applies to the numbers below), sixteen aircraft in Hong Kong, and about forty carrier-based aircraft apart from the above. It also estimated that reinforcements of about 210 aircraft were available within a week, and about 150 aircraft and about 100 aircraft respectively in the second and the third week.\(^{(15)}\)

However, a [definite] outline of operations against Britain was not yet included in the plan of operations of fiscal year 1938, and it was only mentioned that [the outline of operations] should be decided when the circumstances should arise.

It was from the plan [of operations] of fiscal year 1939 (decided on in February of that year) onwards that somewhat concrete outlines of operations were included in the plan, a summary of which is as follows:

1. The composition of the forces to be employed and their tasks
   The Fifteenth Army (consisting of two divisions as the core) shall, in conjunction with the Navy, capture Singapore, and seize key places in British Borneo and Malaya.
   The Twenty-first Army shall, in conjunction with the Navy, capture Hong Kong with one element (about one division).
2. The outline of operations [to capture] the Singapore area
   Right at the start of the operation, Detachment H (one infantry regiment as the core) shall land in Kuching (the northwestern point of Borneo) and prepare the airfield there.
   Circumstances permitting, one detachment shall land in Singora ([in] Thai Malaya), prepare the airfield [there] and secure necessary footholds, so as to facilitate the operations of the main force of the Fifteenth Army.
   The main force of the Fifteenth Army shall land in the vicinity of Mersing in British Malaya and capture Singapore.
   Depending on the circumstances, the main force or one element of [the Fifteenth] Army shall land in Singora, and advance into British Malaya to conduct operations.
   One element may [directly] land in Singapore.
3. The outline of operations in the Hong Kong area
   One element of the Twenty-first Army shall capture Hong Kong from the land front of Kowloon Peninsula. Depending on the circumstances, it may land at a point closer to Hong Kong.
The Army's Strategy for the Areas to the South and the Changes in the Employment of Aviation

**The Mission of the Army Air Service:**

The main force of the Army Air Division shall concentrate in Taiwan, support the landing of the advance detachment and its subsequent operations. At the same time, it shall rapidly advance to the Luzon area and destroy the enemy air power prior to the landing of the main force of the 10th Army.

**10th Army:**

- **1 elem 10th Army**
- **Main force**
- **1 elem**

**Taiwan Army Det:**

- **Det C**
- **Det D**
- **Det E**
- **Det F**

**Airfield:**

- **Taipei**
- **Taiwan**
- **Luzon**
- **Mindanao**
- **Negros**
- **Leyte**
- **Laguna**

**Aircraft:**

- 1 Air Gp of fighters
- 1 Sqdn of fighters
- 2 Air Gps of light bombers
- 1 Air Gp of heavy bombers
- 1 Sqdn of very heavy bombers
- 1 Sqdn of recon aircraft

**HQ:**

- 1 Air-ground support HQ
- 4 Airfield Bns
- 2 Airfield Cos
- 1 Element of air signal unit
- 1 Air intelligence unit
- 1 Field airfield construction unit

**Remarks:**

- 10th Army shall consist of two divs as the core, and shall be further increased depending on the situation. Each det shall consist of one inf rgt as the core.
- Depending on the season, the main force of the 10th Army may land on the east coast of the Philippines (Tai). Right at the launch of the operation, it shall destroy the enemy fleet and air power in the Luzon area. At the same time, it shall escort the Army and in conjunction with the latter, completely destroy the enemy naval base in the Manila Bay, incapacitate the enemy from using its capital ships and capture Luzon.
- In the Plan of the Imperial [Japanese Army] operations of fiscal year 1938, the operations against Britain (capture of Hong Kong, Singapore, and key places in Borneo and Malaya) were also at least considered.

**Illustration No. 3 — The Outline of the Imperial Army Plan of Fiscal Year 1938 for the Philippines Invasion Operation**
Right at the outset of war, the air unit shall strive to destroy the enemy air power and naval vessels at anchor in Hong Kong and vicinity.

Thus, some parts of the plan of operations against Britain took a concrete shape. However, setting aside the operations against Hong Kong, the landings on Borneo or the Malaya Peninsula with the aim of attacking Singapore itself would greatly depend on how the Philippines (and the United States) and French Indochina (and France) were dealt with.

Although [operations] against multiple countries were [already] more or less considered in the plans of operations of fiscal year 1938 and thereafter, no comprehensive plans of operations against the three countries of Britain, France and the United States were figured out yet.

It was very clear, however, that bases in French Indochina were absolutely indispensable in an air campaign to capture Singapore. The staff officers in charge at the Army General Staff were of course well aware of it, however, the situation in early 1939 did not allow the subject to be seriously discussed yet.\(^{15, 21}\)

3. Incorporating the Strategies Against France in French Indochina and the Army Air Service

Sudden Changes in the Situation of Eastern Europe, and [Japan’s] Aspirations to [Achieve] a New Order in the South

From 1935, unrest began to surface all over the world, to wit Germany’s rearmament declaration and Italy’s advance into Ethiopia in that year, the Spanish Civil War in 1936, the China Incident in 1937, the Changkufeng Incident [the Battle of Lake Khasan], and Germany’s Annexation of Austria in 1938.

In 1938, the flames of war in China spread to the southern part of China. In May 1939, in a northern corner of Manchuria, the Nomonhan incident broke out. In Europe, Germany entered Czechoslovakia in March, and along with the Soviet Union, it invaded Poland in September. The British and French declarations of war against Germany raised the curtain on the second European war.

In September, the Japanese Government declared its policy of non-intervention in the war in Europe, [and] the Army, which had for several months repeatedly fought fierce battles at Nomonhan, gave priority to settling that incident as well as dealing with the China Incident.

However, the Japanese Government and the high command studied Japan’s national policy to deal with these changes in the global situation, and in December, the Ministers of War, Navy and Foreign Affairs decided on the Principles of Foreign Policy, which stated:\(^{17}\)

\[\ldots\text{[the foregoing part omitted]}\ldots\text{for the present, in conformity to the principle of nonintervention, [the Empire shall] take measures so as to make the most of its neutrality and lead the global situation in a favorable manner to help facilitate [Japan’s] settlement of the China Incident, and at the same time create a situation advantageous to the construction of a New Order in East Asia including the South.}\]

In the meantime, in mid-October 1939, the IGHQ Army Department planned to capture the areas of Nanning (about 550 kilometers west of Guangdong) and Longzhou (about 130
kilometers west of Nanning), aiming to cut off the supply and support to Chiang Kai-shek, [Jiang Jieshi] from northern French Indochina.\(^{(18, 19)}\)

There were quite a few land transport routes from French Indochina into Chinese territory. In particular, there was the railway between Lao Cai and Kunming. Although it was impossible to accomplish the aim of completely cutting off the supply and support to Chiang only with the above operation, if [the Army] could advance air bases to Nanning and make use of them, it would be able to conduct air attacks not only on Kunming but also over the supply routes from Burma. But even then, it was impossible to have fighter planes cover the long-distance bombing [missions], which meant that the air campaign to cut off the supplies [to Chiang] only had a limited effect.

Despite much opposition even in the Army, this operational plan was resolutely pushed through by the enthusiasm of Maj. Gen. Tominaga Kyōji, the newly-appointed chief of the 1st Bureau of the Army General Staff.

In late November, the Twenty-first Army in Guangdong, defeated part of the resistance of the enemy with a force consisting of the 5th Division as the core, and occupied Nanning and Longzhou.

Afterwards, the enemy on this front fought back on a larger scale than expected, which made Japan to successively increase its strength in this area.

As will be mentioned later, this operation became the first stage of advancing forces into northern French Indochina.\(^{(20, 21, 22)}\)

The Plan of Operations Against Multiple Countries Including the Occupation of French Indochina

For the plans of operations against key places in British Malaya and Borneo, particularly the invasion of Singapore, which had gradually taken shape since 1937, air bases in French Indochina and Thailand were at the minimum indispensable, because the distance from southern China to Singapore was about 2,500 kilometers, and because the current developments in aviation made a large-scale invasion operation without the support of land-based aircraft out of the question.\(^{(15)}\)

In December 1939, assuming a case of advancing into French Indochina by force of arms, the Japanese high command incorporated a plan for such a scenario into the plan of operations of fiscal year 1940, the main points of which were as follows:

The force to be employed shall be the Sixteenth Army, consisting of two divisions as the core, and their mission is to seize key places in French Indochina in conjunction with the Navy.

Right at the outset of the war, the Sixteenth Army shall advance into French Indochina with one division from the direction of the Lang Son (about 130 kilometers northeast of Hanoi) and seize Hanoi.

The army shall have one detachment land near Tourane (Da Nang) (on the east coast in the central French Indochina) to seize the air base and cut the communications between Hanoi and Saigon.

The army shall [also] put another division ashore on the coast south of Saigon right at the outset of the war, and have it seize Cam Ranh Bay as swiftly as possible.
The above is a part of the Army plan of operations of fiscal year 1940. In the operation plan, cases were considered where out of the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and France two to four countries would wage war against Japan while the latter was conducting operations against China. The outline of the operations “in case the United States, Britain and France should participate in the war while [Japan’s] operations against China are under way” was as follows: (15)

Operations against these several countries shall as far as possible be conducted one by one, depending on the situation.

The aim of the initial operations of the Army is to destroy the bases of the U.S., British and French forces in East Asia in conjunction with the Navy, and facilitate the implementation of the subsequent operations of the Army, while generally continuing the ongoing operations against China.

The outline of the operation of the Army is, in conjunction with the Navy, to capture Hong Kong, Luzon, and Guam, seize key places in and near Luzon as well as in northern French Indochina, and also, as far as possible, occupy key places in southern French Indochina.

After that, when the situation permits, the Army shall occupy key places in British Borneo and British Malaya and seize Singapore.

The [outline of] the respective operations against the United States and Britain followed that of [the plan of operations of] the previous year while the operations against France were as described above. (See Illustration No. 4)

The Army Air Service’s Revision of Its Preparations and Employment in the South

In the Army Plan of Operations of fiscal year 1940, the Army Air Service participation in the Philippines invasion [operation] followed the plan of the previous fiscal year, i.e. one air division consisting of four air groups (one air group of fighter planes, two air groups of light bombers and one air group of heavy bombers), three independent air squadrons (one each of fighter planes, strategic reconnaissance planes and tactical reconnaissance planes) as the core, and the necessary ground service units. They were supposed to destroy the enemy air power in Luzon right at the outset of the war.

[The plan also specified that] the strength of the Army Air Service to be employed in the attacks on Hong Kong and French Indochina should be determined depending on the situation. It was judged that the strength of the British air forces in Hong Kong was about 50 aircraft and that of the French air forces in French Indochina was about 150 aircraft. The Army air units stationed in China were supposed to mainly take care of the air operations against those aircraft with one element or their main force.

As for the Malaya area, it was anticipated that the air operations there would require at least one powerful numbered air force, [since] it was judged that British air forces consisted of about three hundred aircraft in the area.

At the end of 1939, in view of the lessons of war of the Nomonhan Incident and the changes in the world situation, the Army revised and scaled up its previous military preparation plans. As for its Air Service, it particularly focused on increasing the depth of providing supply and replenishment. While the operational air units were [only slightly increased]
The Army’s Strategy for the Areas to the South and the Changes in the Employment of Aviation

Introduction

The Changes in the Employment of Aviation

Illustration No. 4 — The Outline of the Army Plan of Operations of Fiscal Year 1940 (Decided on in December 1939) (In Case the United States, Britain or France Should Wage War Against Japan While the Latter’s Operations Against China Are Under Way.)
from 142 squadrons to 162 squadrons, a considerable number of reserve aircraft were added to the formation of each air unit.\(^{(5, 15, 21, 23)}\)

4. The Army Air Service and the Overall Strategy for the South Including the Invasion of the Dutch East Indies

Sudden Changes in the Situation in Western Europe and [Japan’s] Judgment of the Situation to Employ Force of Arms Toward the South at a Favorable Opportunity

Outline of the Main Principles [for Coping with the Changing World Situation]

In April 1940, Germany, which had bided its time after the partition and occupation of Poland together with the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1939, carried out a sudden attack on Denmark and Norway, occupied them, and on 10 May, launched a full-scale attack on western Europe.

The combined land and air, blitz-like operation instantly defeated the allied forces made up of France, Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, etc., and broke through the Maginot Line, which was said to be impregnable. Around the end of May, the British Expeditionary Force on the continent retreated to mainland Britain from Dunkirk, while the Dutch government went into exile in Britain. In mid-June, Paris fell, and the French Pétain Government surrendered. The IGHQ Army Department was of the general opinion that it might not be long before Germany would carry out a landing on mainland Britain.\(^{(24)}\)

Having judged the situation to be a significant historic turning point, IGHQ and the Government of Japan decided on 27 July on the Outline of the Main Principles for Coping with the Changing World Situation. The policy was: “The Empire shall deal with the crisis in the world situation by remedying the state of affairs in and outside Japan, and accelerate the settlement of the China Incident. At the same time, [the Empire] shall seize a favorable opportunity to resolve the southern question. If the focus [needs] to be shifted to measures for the South while the China Incident has not yet been settled, these measures shall be decided in consideration with the various circumstances in and outside Japan.” Meanwhile, the conditions that would meet the employment of force of arms toward the South were stated as follows: \(^{(21, 24, 25)}\)

1. In case the China Incident has by and large been settled, [the Empire shall] seize a favorable opportunity and use force of arms in order to resolve the southern question, in as far as various conditions in and outside Japan permit.
2. If the China Incident has not yet been settled, [the Empire] shall take measures within the bounds of not being led into a war against third countries. However, if various conditions in and outside Japan progress particularly favorably, it may use force of arms to resolve the southern question.
3. When, where and how the force of arms [mentioned] in the previous two items should be employed shall be decided depending on the situation.
4. When employing force of arms, [the Empire] shall make every effort to limit the opponent in the war to Britain only. Nevertheless, even in such a case, it shall resolve to be faultlessly prepared for a war against the United States, since it may be inevitable.
Although the above text leaves considerable latitude for interpretation, the gist of the judgment of the situation of the top leaders of the IGHQ Army Department was that Japan should take advantage of a favorable opportunity, such as Germany succeeding in a landing operation on mainland Britain, and invade the key areas in the South.\(^{(26)}\)

### The Value of French Indochina and Thailand in the Strategy of the [Army] Air Service

Then, as IGHQ’s study on the Malaya and Sumatra operations progressed, the strategic value of French Indochina and Thailand became ever clearer.

From June 1940 onwards when the defeat of France was almost definite, the IGHQ Army Department started to show interest in measures against French Indochina and studied ways to immediately cut off the supply to Chiang [Kai Shek], as well as plans for obtaining bases for a future invasion of the South.

The strategic value of the Philippines in an invasion operation against Malaya was substantially similar to that of French Indochina. However, around that time, the IGHQ Army Department [still] saw a possibility of [dealing with] Britain separately from the United States, that is, to knock out Britain in an early stage while preventing the United States from participating in the war. So, it also studied plans to invade deep into the South, leaving the Philippines untouched.

In the summer of 1940, it was judged that the air strength of French Indochina, whose mother country had already fallen, consisted of a total of no more than one hundred aircraft, and that although some new and powerful fighter planes were among them, the majority was outdated. Moreover, given the difficulty of their replenishment as well, the confrontation with the French air force units was not such a serious problem.

The air bases in French Indochina were not only of absolute value for Japan’s implementation of a southern operation, but they were also useful in dealing with the current China Incident. Although the airfields in northern French Indochina would require considerable repair work before Japan could make use of them, they were considered effective in attacking the routes in the Kunming area, which were used for the support of the Chiang [regime].\(^{(21)}\)

[On the other hand,] it required deft political maneuvering to make use of air bases in Thailand, a very much pro-British independent country. From the beginning of 1940 onwards, the Army had sold some of its aircraft to Thailand with an intention to form a partnership in aviation through training, etc. At that time, Thailand mainly used U.S. aircraft. [Having] about two hundred front line aircraft [ready], the country was at first reluctant to purchase Japanese aircraft. However, soon afterward an agreement was made to introduce a regular airline between Japan and Thailand, and the traffic over French Indochina was about to be approved by France. However, in protest against Japan’s bombing of the Yunnan-[Haiphong] railway, French Indochina withdrew its approval and did not easily change its decision.

The regular flights between Japan and Thailand started in late June; the flight from Hainan Island to Bangkok detouring along the southeastern coast of French Indochina became a nine-hour nonstop flight. In early July, Capt. Ōhira Yoshikata, staff officer of the Southern China Area Army, flew along the coast of French Indochina to reach Bangkok on the regular flight, where he contacted the military attaché's.

It was on 4 July that the governor-general of French Indochina informally gave approval to the regular airline between Japan and Thailand to extend its service to Hanoi. On the 5th, he gave conditional approval to flights of Japanese military aircraft between Guangdong and
Hanoi, and on the 16th, he [also] approved a regular airline between Japan and French Indochina. However, he kept refusing to provide airfields for military use until early September.\(^{(9, 22, 27, 28)}\)

The Air Operation Accompanying the Stationing of Troops in Northern French Indochina

The Origin of the Question of Stationing Troops in Northern French Indochina

In the aforementioned Outline of the Main Principles for Coping with the Changing World Situation, decided on in late July, it was specified that: “Concerning French Indochina (including Guangzhouwan), [the Empire] shall resolve to thoroughly cut off the movements to support the Chiang [regime] and have the territory quickly accept the provision of supplies to the Japanese forces and approve their passage through its territory or their use of airfields there, while the Empire shall strive to obtain the resources required. Depending on the circumstances, it may use force of arms.”

While the main goal was to primarily contribute to the settlement of the China Incident by cutting off the routes of support for the Chiang [regime], on the other hand, [the policy] also included the intention to prepare an advance to the South. The latter was strongly supported by part of the Army high command. Furthermore, although the stationing of troops without the use of force of arms was principally intended in the outline for the stationing of troops, the idea that an advance with force of arms would be more advantageous was shared below the surface, particularly among the chief of the 1st Bureau of the [IGHQ] Army Department and his colleagues.

In any case, around 20 June 1940, along with the cease-fire with Germany, France accepted Japan’s request to stop supporting the Chiang [regime] and approved the latter’s dispatch of a monitoring team to northern French Indochina.

By 2 July, the monitoring team led by Maj. Gen. Nishihara Issaku (the team, which hereafter is also called the Nishihara Kikan (Party) in short, also contained naval officers and was put under the command of chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs) advanced to Hanoi. Its mission consisted not only in monitoring the stopping of acts in support of the Chiang [regime], but also in conducting negotiations about the passage of troops, the use of airfields and the stationing of forces necessitated thereby.\(^{(21, 24, 28)}\)

The Situation of the 21st Independent Air Unit in the Southern China Area

In mid June 1940, when IGHQ was considering the stationing of troops in French Indochina, the 21st Independent Air Unit of the Third Air Force of the Army Air Service was stationed in southern China. The unit consisted of the 82d Independent Air Squadron (reconnaissance aircraft), the 84th Independent Air Squadron (fighter planes), the 2d Squadron of the 31st Air Group (light bombers), the 1st Squadron of the 64th Air Group (fighter planes) and some strategic reconnaissance aircraft, led by Col. Ishikawa Ai (graduate of the 27th class [of the Imperial Japanese Army Academy]).\(^{(22)}\)

Around that time, the Southern China Area Army proposed to capture Kunming by using northern French Indochina as the supply route. Although IGHQ did not approve the pro-
posal, it agreed with the Southern China Area Army on the intensification of attacks on Kun-
ming from northern French Indochina.(27)

In early and mid July, the Southern China Area Army headquarters advanced the main
force of the 5th Division of the Twenty-second Army in Nanning to Longzhou and Zhennan-
guan, and while striving to cut off the supply and support for the Chiang [regime], made
preparations for an advance into French Indochina.

During that period, while providing defense over Guangdong or attacking the supply
routes from Fujian Province to the Chiang [regime], the independent air unit supported the
operations of the 5th Division. Since flights over the territory of French Indochina were pro-
hibited, the air unit widely conducted reconnaissance attacks, closely flying along the border
of French Indochina.\textsuperscript{(22, 29, 30)}

Reinforcing the Air Unit in Southern China

In early and mid July, the Nishihara Party’s negotiations with French Indochina reached a
stalemate, except for the cessation of support for the Chiang [regime].

On 23 July, the IGHQ [Army Department] put the Southern China Area Army under its
direct control and gave orders to occupy the areas along the road connecting Nanning and
Longzhou, cut off the enemy routes of supply and communications in conjunction with the
Navy, and make the necessary operational preparations against a third country (French In-
dochina).

In the Central Agreement on the Air Operations of the Army and the Navy of the same
date, the Army air strength in southern China was set at the level mentioned above, while
the air strength of the Navy consisted of the 3d Combined Air Unit (twenty-seven carrier-
based fighter planes and nine carrier-based bombers of the 14th Air Group, twenty-seven
mid-sized land-based attack planes, six land-based reconnaissance planes of the 15th Air
Group and sixteen reconnaissance seaplanes of other units).

On the 26th, the IGHQ [Army Department] put the 1st Squadron of the 10th Air Group
(strategic reconnaissance), the 14th, the 58th and the 98th Air Groups (all [consisting of] heavy
bombers) from Manchuria or Taiwan temporarily under the command of the Southern China
Area Army. The aim of the transfer was to train them for flights over sea, flights in the tropics,
and long-distance formation flights so as to have them prepared for future operations in the
South, such as attacks on Singapore from southern French Indochina. At the same time, it
was also expected that this would have a supporting effect on the negotiations about the sta-
tioning of troops in French Indochina.\textsuperscript{(18, 19, 27)}

On the 30th, the IGHQ [Army Department] also transferred the 1st Air Division head-
quar ters, the 59th Air Group (fighter planes), the 90th Air Group (light bombers) and others
from eastern and northern China to southern China.

Having advanced to southern China in early August, all air units in the above other than
the heavy bombers and strategic reconnaissance aircraft units came under the command of
the 1st Air Division commander. Col. Akiyama Bunji (graduate of the 27th Class), who was
newly appointed commander of the division in early August, arrived in Guangdong in the
middle of the month, deployed the 59th and the 90th Air Groups under his direct command
to Qinxian in succession, while having the 21st Independent Air Unit maintain its former
formation mainly in the Nanning area and continue its previous tasks. The commander of
the [21st Independent Air] Unit was replaced by Col. Kumabe Masami (graduate of the 30th class) in early August.\(^{(31)}\)

[In the meantime,] the 14th and the 98th Air Groups of heavy bombers were deployed at Haikou to repeatedly conduct trainings for flights over sea towards the coast east of Haiphong, while the 58th Air Group, deployed in Guangdong, carried out reconnaissance attacks over the coastal areas of Fujian Province as well as on the supply routes to the Chiang [regime] leading from those areas.

The Navy air unit was deployed to Hainan Island; while directly supporting the army operations with one element, it conducted attacks on the supply routes to the Chiang [regime] in coastal areas or inland areas with its main force.\(^{(18, 19, 22, 186)}\)

The Situation of the [Army] Air Service at the Time of the Advance of the Ground Units

(See Illustration No. 5)

In early September, the negotiations about the stationing of troops in French Indochina, which had dragged along, at last came to a conclusion, and an agreement was made about Japan’s use of three airfields in Lao Cai, Phu Tho, Vinh Yen and the stationing of 5,000 troops or less to guard them.

The Japanese air forces to be stationed there consisted of one squadron each of fighter planes and light bombers of the 21st Independent Air Unit for the Army, and the 14th Air Group for the Navy, the main body of which was made up of carrier-based fighter planes and carrier-based bombers. And it was decided that an Indochina Expeditionary Army of one infantry regiment as the core, led by Maj. Gen. Nishimura Takuma, should advance from the sea under the pretext of guarding the airfields.

However, on 6 September, due to an ill-defined border line, the Japanese garrison unit at Zhennanguan carelessly crossed the border, on which grounds French Indochina refused on the 7th the implementation of the previously arranged agreement about the stationing of [Japanese] troops in French Indochina. On 14 September, IGHQ made the dispositions for a hostile advance into northern French Indochina from the 22d onwards and put the Third Air Force headquarters, the 60th Air Group (heavy bombers), the 18th Independent Air Squadron (strategic reconnaissance planes) in eastern China under the command of the Southern China Area Army commander. Around that time, the air strength of the French Indochina Army consisted of no more than sixty aircraft of mainly outdated models in actual operation, but they seemed to be frequently conducting nighttime trainings, which led Japan to judge that it should need to be on the alert for counterattacks.\(^{(8, 9, 21, 22, 33)}\)

On the 14th, the Army-Navy Central Agreement on Air [Operations] was issued. It stipulated that the Army should be in charge of supporting the ground operations and conduct air campaigns to destroy the enemy air power in Tonkin Province with two squadrons of reconnaissance aircraft, four squadrons of fighter planes and three squadrons each of light bombers and heavy bombers, while the Navy should take charge of attacks on enemy vessels and air campaigns to destroy the enemy air power in the area from Vinh southwards as far as Tourane (Da Nang) with land-based air forces mainly consisting of the 3d Combined Air Unit, as well as with the main force of the 2d Carrier Division, the Kamikawa-maru, and others.
On the 17th, while leaving one element of the headquarters in eastern China, Third Air Force Commander Lt. Gen. Kinoshita Hayashi advanced to Haikou and assumed command of all Army air units in southern China.

The new outline for the stationing of troops in French Indochina consisted in the 5th Division and the Indochina Expeditionary Army launching operations respectively from Zhennanguan and Haiphong, and although [the Army should] make efforts to amicably carry out the stationing, it should use force of arms if the French Indochina army should resist.

On the 19th, as if by ultimatum, Japan notified French Indochina of its intentions for a hostile advance from the 23d onwards and stubbornly negotiated with the latter. As a result, at 1630 on the 22d, Japan eventually won an on-the-spot agreement.

However, the order to call off the [hostile] advance in the border area did not reach the 5th Division units, which were already deployed there and had completed their preparations to attack. On the morning of the 23d, hostilities broke out in the area of Dong Dang.

On that day, upon the request of the Southern China Area Army, the Third Air Force distributed from the air leaflets of a written message (according to the records of 1st Air Division Commander Col. Akiyama Bunji), [notifying] the 5th Division to cease hostilities and withdraw into Chinese territory.

Nevertheless, hostilities continued until the 5th Division’s capture of [the town of] Lang Son on the 25th, and the [Third] Air Force ended up providing direct support for the ground combat with one element.
During this period, one element of the French air forces conducted counterattacks with fighter planes (Morane-Saulnier).(22, 32, 33, 186)

**The Situation of the Air Forces Around the Time of the Advance from the Sea**

At first, the advances to Haiphong and Thanh Hoa from the sea were scheduled for 24 September. However, due to the occurrence of hostilities at Zhennanguan, French Indochina requested a postponement of the landings. On the 25th, the Army and the Navy Departments of IGHQ made a special agreement for this and gave instructions that the landings should be amicably conducted from the 27th onwards.(19) However, the Nishimura Regiment failed to thoroughly observe the instructions. On the 26th, despite the disapproval of the Navy on site, the regiment carried out landings near the battery of Do Son and advanced to Haiphong. While no engagements occurred since the French Indochina [army] did not put up resistance, some accidental bombings on the early morning of that day did occur. What had happened was that one aircraft of the light bomber squadron on duty in the air over Haiphong, ready [to support] the Nishimura Regiment in the landing combat, mistook some moves of the wings of the commander’s plane, which were [actually] caused by some treacherous air currents, for the sign to launch an attack, and carried out a bombing attack. Although the loss was limited to several casualties among the local people, it became a big problem [in the high command] in Tokyo, because the latter had no idea about the detailed situation.(30, 186)

On the 26th, an informal order was conveyed to remove the Southern China Area Army commander, and on the 27th, the IGHQ Army Department banned bombings during the stationing of troops in northern French Indochina until specifically ordered otherwise.(18, 19, 31)

The advance of air units into northern French Indochina was first [carried out] by the previously-mentioned designated units. The Army [advanced] during 5 to 9 October and the Navy from 3 October onwards, both to Gia Lam. The other airfields in French Indochina required considerable repairs, or expansion and conditioning, in order to be used by Japanese aircraft.(22)

**Assessment of the Preparations of the Air Arms in the Hostile Countries to the South**

It was in the spring of 1940, after the war situation in Europe had more and more escalated that the Army in earnest started collecting information for [future] operations in the South. Key staff officers of central command were sent respectively to Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Australia and other areas. The following shows how the assessment by IGHQ of [the enemy] air power [in the South] progressed.(15)

**The [Air] Forces of Britain and the Dutch [East Indies]**

In the autumn of 1939, the British air strength in the Far East was assumed to be four hundred and several dozens of aircraft, totaling those in India, Malaya and Australia, and [apart from those,] a few in Hong Kong.

Around October 1940, it was judged that 150 aircraft were deployed in India, three hundred aircraft in Malaya (some intelligence reported the number [of aircraft in Malaya] to be five hundred when mobilized), 150 in Australia, and a few in Hong Kong.
Around March 1941, it was judged that about two hundred aircraft each were deployed in India, Malaya, and Australia, along with fifteen aircraft in Hong Kong. It is unclear whether the decrease in the number of aircraft in Malaya reflected the war situation in Europe, or the old number was [misinformation] from [allied] propaganda, or whether the standard by which the number of aircraft was calculated was inconsistent. The information on their makeup was also [mixed]; some reported that [the forces were] well-equipped and well-trained, and that [even] Spitfires, the fighter planes which the British forces were proud of, had been advanced [to the area]. However, others reported that being colonial forces, their actual war potential was poor and low.\(^{(21,35)}\)

Around that time, the Navy General Staff estimated the strength ([of] the front-line aircraft) of British air forces in the Far East at the end of 1941 as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Aircraft Types</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>32 torpedo bombers (2 sqdns)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32 fighter planes (2 sqdns)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Malaya</td>
<td>64 bombers (4 sqdns)</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32 fighter planes (2 sqdns)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East coast of Malaya</td>
<td>42 reconnaissance planes (2 sqdns)</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 flying boats (1 sqdn)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>42 land-based reconnaissance planes (2 sqdns)</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andaman Islands</td>
<td>12 flying boats (2 sqdns)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borneo</td>
<td>32 bombers (2 sqdns)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42 land-based reconnaissance planes (2 sqdns)</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>336 aircraft (21 sqdns)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Apart from the above, reinforcements of some two aircraft carriers (about one hundred aircraft) were expected.

As for British ground forces, it seemed that as of April 1941, there were 43,000 troops, who were deployed to strengthen the defenses of Singapore, northern Malaya and the east coast of Malaya.

As for the Dutch air strength in Java and Sumatra, it was reported that [it had] 184 aircraft as of August 1940. In an estimate around February 1941, the air strength was expected to be increased to about four hundred aircraft by the end of that year.\(^{(15)}\)

The U.S. [Air] Forces

In February 1941, the Navy General Staff judged the U.S. air power in the Philippines as follows:\(^{(15,35)}\) \(\text{(See Illustration No. 6)}\)

1. Reinforcement of forces
   Between late November and mid-December of 1940, two squadrons of fighter planes (twenty-seven aircraft per [squadron] for regular use) and one squadron of patrol aircraft (twelve aircraft for regular use) were added.
2. Expansion of airfields
   It was planned to expand airfields such as Clark, Nichols, Bagang and Legaspi, deploy air units also to the Legaspi airfield, and construct a new base for patrol aircraft at Los Baños.
3. U.S. aircraft in the Philippines are recently being upgraded to the latest models.
4. When a Japanese ship put in the port of San Fernando, six U.S. aircraft came flying out of the blue.
Illustration No. 6 — Map Indicating the Names of Airfields, etc. on Luzon
5. The U.S. Navy Air Unit consisted of two squadrons of patrol aircraft stationed in the naval port of Cavite.

6. The U.S. Army air units consisted of one group of fighter planes (eighty-one aircraft for regular use) on Nichols Field, and one squadron each (thirteen aircraft each for regular use) of observation aircraft and bombers on Clark Field. Along with reserve aircraft and outdated models, they would make a total of about 150 (or 200) aircraft.

7. Apart from the above, units designated the Philippine Army Air Corps, an observation (training) unit (consisting of) about forty aircraft) were stationed in Zablan, and one observation squadron (with ten aircraft for regular use) in Lahug.

8. By April 1941, approximately twenty-seven to fifty-four fighter planes and twelve to twenty-four patrol aircraft would be added to the air strength.

Subjects for Comprehensive Research in Employing the Air Arms Against the South

The Order in Which to Proceed with the Invasion of the South

The southern operation was comprised of four [major] operations; the Philippines operation (against the United States), the Malaya, etc. operation (against Britain), the Sumatra and Java operations (against the Netherlands), and the French Indochina operation (against France). Plans of operations for each operation were drawn up every year purely from a supreme command point of view. However, the [overall] plan combining these plans was deficient. That problem was to some extent worked out in the plan of 1940, however, that plan was still limited to nothing more than general principles. Now, the question of how to deal with the new real world situation and give concrete form to these plans became the major subject to work on.

Although there were quite a few problems concerning the aim, the nature, and the outline of the operations in the southern operation as a whole, the top priority was the choice of countries [to wage war on], since this would affect every aspect of the conduct of the war. In the Outline of the Main Principles [for Coping with the Changing World Situation] decided on in late July 1940, the original intention of the use of force in the southern areas was that although preparations for an operation against the United States should be made, the operation should be limited to one against Britain only. This intention probably originated from the anticipation of Britain’s impending decisive defeat, to be caused by a German landing on mainland Britain. And it was based on a situational assessment that if such a situation should occur, the United States would probably not plunge into war as one body with Britain.

In mid-August 1940, the Army and the Navy Departments of IGHQ jointly studied the combined plan of operations against the South, which had been drawn up by the Operations Section of the Army Department. The plan focused on seizing resource areas in the Dutch East Indies and key places in British Malaya. Its real intention was that, although they should make efforts to prepare for the operations against the United States, they should limit the operations [in the South] to those against the Dutch East Indies and Britain as best as they could. The assessment that the United States and Britain were separable formed the basis. However, the Navy was of the strong opinion that the operations should be conducted only against the Netherlands. Its judgment at that time was that the United States and Britain were essentially inseparable and that the Navy was not sure [of victory] if a war against Britain should develop into a war against the United States. In mid-August, while starting
to intensify in earnest the preparations for a war against the United States, the Navy maintained a cautious attitude toward an advance to the South at a favorable opportunity.

In late November, the Navy conducted a map simulation of the southern operation, presided over by the Combined Fleet. Taking into consideration the results of this simulation and the subsequent war situation in Europe, the IGHQ Navy Department became even more inclined to believe that the United States and Britain were inseparable. That is, the Navy thought that preemptively launching an attack on the Dutch East Indies, hoping to conduct the operation against the Netherlands only should be limited to such cases, where serious delay in the war preparations of the United States and Britain’s decisive disadvantage in its war against Germany would make it certain that [the attack would not] lead Japan and the United States into war. If not, it was very much likely that a war against the Netherlands would [eventually] develop into a war against the United States and Britain. The Navy also thought that if an invasion of the southern areas with force of arms should be inevitable, [Japan] should from the start thoroughly focus on the operation against the United States and attack the Philippines in the first place. However, the Army did not give up hope that Britain and the United States were [still] separable and continued the study on an operation to first attack Malaya. (21, 27, 35)

Recognition of the Value of the Air Forces and the Creation of the Stepping-Stone Tactics

The key areas in the South in question were located in a vast tropical region stretching three to four thousand kilometers in each direction, and the key resource areas which Japanese forces intended to capture were situated in the deepest part of the region.

Although it was a combined sea and land operation, the invasion had, on the whole, strongly the character of a maritime operation, in which long-range sea maneuvers and distant maritime supply lines were essential.

With such a strategic topography and under such prospective operational conditions, how did IGHQ value its air power and how did it plan to employ it?

Among the studies of conducting a preemptive attack on the Dutch East Indies, there was a plan to send large landing convoys straight to Sumatra and Java. In terms of strategic conditions for the air forces, such a plan was only thought feasible if the U.S, British and French air forces in the Philippines, French Indochina, Malaya and other areas would take no hostile actions, and that powerful Japanese aircraft carriers could support the convoys at all times. However, one could never expect such one-sided conditions would continue for long; evidently, it was necessary to advance land-based air units and, using their support, push forward the sea and ground forces.

Pushing air bases forward and expanding the areas of [Japan’s] air supremacy was included in the aims of [the operations to] capture key places in the Philippines, southern French Indochina, Malaya, and other places. Whether IGHQ was very much aware of it or not, the stepping-stone tactics, which General MacArthur later praised and employed for the counterattack against Japan in the Pacific area, were already about to be adopted by the [Japanese] Army at that time as a result of these strategic studies. (21, 27)
The Short Combat Range of Army Aircraft and the Plan of Advancing Air Bases

The distance to Sumatra and Java by way of Singapore from northern French Indochina, where [Japanese] troops had been stationed since the autumn of 1940, is about three thousand kilometers. In order to securely push forward the areas under Japan’s command of the air, air bases had to be advanced in hops on the basis of the action radius of the fighter planes, but the very short combat ranges of the Army planes were a major worry.

In order to advance into Malaya, air bases in southern French Indochina were indispensable. However, [even then,] the action radius of the Type–97 fighter planes of that time was [merely] about four hundred kilometers, and it was impossible for them to cover the landings of the convoys sailing for about six hundred kilometers across the Gulf of Thailand. In addition, from French Indochina, an air campaign with bombers to destroy enemy air power would also be limited to northern Malaya.

The Army immediately started on readying fighter planes (Type–1) with a long combat range.(12, 21) (Note: A summary of the development of the Type–1 fighter plane shall be given later.)

The short action radius of the Army planes meant an increase in the number of hops to push the air bases forward. In the outline of the Malay Peninsula invasion for the capture of Singapore, one could have thought of putting ashore the main force of the invasion forces near the southern point of the peninsula at a stroke straight from southern French Indochina, but it was not feasible, because with army aircraft alone support for the operation was impossible. This was indeed the primary factor why the plan of a ground operation advancing southward for as long as one thousand kilometers along the Malay Peninsula was later adopted.

Navy aircraft generally had longer combat ranges than Army aircraft. Its Type–0 carrier-based fighter plane developed around that time was an outstanding aircraft, and the Navy was [further] studying the extension of its action radius to one thousand kilometers. By employing the aircraft, the clockwise operation of attacking the Philippines first, which the Navy had pressed for, enabled it [to advance] the stepping-stone tactics with longer steps than the counterclockwise Malaya first operation, which was advocated by the Army.(21, 23)

The First Air Strike at the Opening of Hostilities

The way of employing air forces at the opening of hostilities was a major issue. Without breaching international law, the effect of a surprise attack had to be maximized. [So,] how to combine the launch of attacks by ground, naval, and air forces, particularly, the question which should be conducted first, a first strike by the air forces or the start of landing operations from the convoys, became an issue.

In the general military thinking of that time, the argument that hostilities should be opened with air strikes was widely supported, while prior air campaigns to destroy enemy air power were considered indispensable in landing operations. However, the question was whether such a textbook example of tactics could really be applied just like that to the upcoming actual operations in Malaya and the Philippines. Although there were very complicated relevant factors [to be considered], it eventually boiled down to a [compromise] plan that a surprise landing by one element (to seize airfields) should precede [the first air strikes]
in Malaya, while air attacks would mostly precede [the landing operations] on the Philip-
pines.\textsuperscript{(21, 23)}

The Actual State of the Army Air Service and Its Assessment of the U.S. Air
Force’s Preparedness for War

The Progress in the Army Air Service’s Military Preparations

The military preparations plan of the Army Air Service, revised at the end of 1939, was to in-
crease its operational air strength to 162 squadrons by fiscal year 1943. In the summer of 1940,
when the decision to advance to the South at a favorable opportunity was made, the strength
consisted of twenty squadrons of reconnaissance aircraft, thirty-six squadrons of fighter
planes, twenty-eight squadrons of light bombers and twenty-two squadrons of heavy
bombers, totaling 106 squadrons.

The scheduled strength, which the IGHQ Army Department thought in November 1940
to employ in the southern operation, consisted of a total of fifty-four squadrons, of which
thirty-one squadrons were to be employed for Malaya, twenty-one squadrons for the Philip-
pines, and two squadrons for the Dutch East Indies (at the start). Although quantitativelv
they constituted about one half of its total strength, qualitatively they were picked elite units
and obviously the main force of the Army Air Service.

The production of army aircraft as of the autumn of 1940 was about one hundred and
fifty aircraft per month on average, and the total annual manufacturing capacity was a little
less than two thousand aircraft.\textsuperscript{(35)}

Of the types of aircraft in use, Type–97 aircraft (officially adopted in 1937) comprised the
major part, and the latest types were Type–99 and Type–100 aircraft.\textsuperscript{(57)}

As for the training of flight personnel at that time, on the basis of building up 162
squadrons, at any rate a regular number of 5,112 pilots were needed. And the planning was
that 1,742 pilots should make their maiden flight in fiscal year 1940.\textsuperscript{(5, 9)}

Such being the case, the Army Air Service’s in-depth strength barely allowed it to fulfill
the military preparation plans that had been decided on, while at the same time prosecuting
the China Incident. Needless to say, [the Army] should be able to count on future reinforce-
ments of its air strength [to compensate for the expected] huge losses in full-scale operations
against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, etc. However, with the obviously
weak war potential of its air power, such a problem was not easy for Japan to solve. With
various [other] preparations for the operations becoming increasingly urgent, no particular
measures were taken at that moment to increase the Army Air Service’s in-depth war poten-
tial.\textsuperscript{(34)}

About the military preparedness of the United States, particularly the reinforcement plan
of its air forces, [the Army] had received such intelligence as mentioned below. However, in
reality the Army, whose main interest was ground combat, was not overly concerned about
the comparative differences between the Japanese and U.S. air forces as such.

Meanwhile, there was a general belief within the IGHQ Army Department that the south-
ern operation as such against the colonial armies could be successfully conducted with sud-
den attack operations. However, the Army had not made an in-depth study whether it would
ever be able to successfully carry on its air operations for a longer period against the full-
scale counterattacks by the allies that were expected to follow. It was mainly because [the
Army] tended to think that it could rely on the Navy to intercept and destroy the U.S. counterattacks at sea.\(^{(21,35)}\)

[The Navy’s] Assessment of the U.S. Air Forces’ Arms Buildup

In February 1941, the Navy General Staff judged the U.S. air forces’ arms buildup as follows:\(^{(15)}\)

1. The current strength

   [The number of] the front-line aircraft was about 3,500 for the Army and 2,200 for the Navy. The current production capacity of U.S. military aircraft is 15,000 to 20,000 aircraft per year.

2. The current plan

   (1) Army and Navy front-line air units of a total of 50,000 aircraft shall be formed and maintained by around July 1945. The target of the annual manufacturing capacity of aircraft shall be set at 50,000, and by April 1942, the annual manufacturing [capacity] shall be increased to 35,000 aircraft.

   (2) The Navy’s goal in war preparation of its air service is to form an air strength of 15,000 front-line aircraft. For a start, the number of pilots shall be [increased to] 18,500, and an air force of 10,000 aircraft shall be organized by June 1944.

   (3) The Army shall for a start [increase] its number of pilots to 36,000 men, and form a force with 25,000 aircraft by the end of 1942.

   (4) The current number of civilian pilots is 42,000, and in fiscal year 1941, 45,000 new pilots shall be trained.

3. The outlook for the air power buildup

   (1) The increase in manufacturing [capacity] of aircraft is possible as planned. So is the increase of pilots; the current number of 3,850 men will be increased to 25,000 men in July 1945.

   (2) The production of [military] aircraft for supporting Britain will greatly hamper the increase in the manufacture of Army aircraft. [Conducting] the training of flight personnel [as planned] seems considerably difficult, too; the plan of [forming an air unit of] 25,000 aircraft by the end of 1942 will be delayed by about one year.

   (3) Despite a number of difficulties, the expansion of the manufacturing capacity of aircraft will progress more or less as planned.

4. The construction of air bases on the Pacific Islands

   The following air routes are expected to be completed within a year or two:

   The central air route: Hawaii, Midway Island, Wake Island, Guam, Manila, Hong Kong, and Singapore

   The southern air route: Hawaii, Palmyra Atoll, Kanton Island, Tutuila Island, Port Moresby, Port Darwin, and Singapore

   The preparation of bases on Hawaii and other Pacific islands has steadily progressed, and by 1944, Hawaii will have been turned into a center of operations for a large fleet, and other Pacific Islands, too, will have been turned into air and naval bases.

Changes in the Aviation Fuel Situation of the Army

For a long time, Japan relied for liquid fuels on imports from the United States. It was after the Manchurian Incident that the Army started to have misgivings about the fuel supply and started storing. Particularly in late 1937, when the China Incident occurred, [the Army] imported considerably large amounts of fuel by pressing private companies into service.
The United States put into effect the first restrictions on the export of fuel to Japan at the end of 1939, first of all by banning the export of production equipment, production technology and the patents on aviation gasoline. Having anticipated the tightening of the restrictions by the United States, the Japanese government and the military desperately struggled to increase the import of petroleum [products], particularly aviation fuel, by making good use of business deals with U.S. private companies.

The United States imposed a second round of restrictions in August 1940, when high-octane aviation gasoline, its raw materials, tetraethyllead and others were subjected to a license system for export to Japan. Nonetheless, imports through commercial trade between Japan and the United States still continued. Since Japan was short of oil storing facilities around that time, instructions were given to import the oil just in drums. In August 1940, the Japanese government also decided to send a mission led by Kobayashi Ichizō to the Dutch East Indies. Since the Dutch East Indies had an annual oil production of about eight million kiloliters (of which 3.75 million kiloliters was produced at Palembang), the mission negotiated for an annual export of over three million kiloliters [of oil] to Japan for the next five years or so. However, acting in concert with and under pressure from Britain and the United States, the Dutch East Indies did not agree to export high-octane aviation gasoline, and only approved export of a fraction of other products demanded by Japan.

The amount of aviation fuel stored for the operations of the Army, which Tanaka Shin’ichi, chief of the 1st Bureau (in charge of operations) of the IGHQ Army Department gave in his
briefing to War Minister Tōjō Hideki in November 1940, was [the amount] for a full-strength [operation] of eleven months, and it was expected [to increase] to an amount [for full-strength operations] of about twelve months to 405,000 kiloliters in around March 1941 (the monthly amount for full-strength operations [was estimated at] 33,800 kiloliters).

It led to the following assumptions: If the two-thirds of the full strength of the Army Air Service should be employed in the southern operation for six months, it would require an amount of 135,000 kiloliters, and given that an amount of 30,000 kiloliters would be required for other purposes, about 240,000 kiloliters would remain. If the operations after completion of the first phase of the southern operation were assumed to be relatively slack, the storage of 240,000 kiloliters of oil would allow [the forces to conduct] operations for about one and a half year ([consumption calculated on a basis of] 15,000 [kiloliters] per month). Even if a northern operation should occur following the southern operation, the storage would [still] allow the forces to conduct war for about eight months ([consumption calculated on a basis of] about 30,000 [kiloliters] per month).

Despite great apprehensions, oil storage gradually increased during the year 1940. However, in 1941, the U.S. government’s license restrictions became very strict. The [highest] octane rating of oils [permitted to be exported to Japan] was lowered from ninety-two to eighty-seven, and then to eighty-five, and the amount [for export] was sharply reduced, too.(35, 36)

[Meanwhile], the Resources Section ([which became] the Fuel Section from April 1941 onwards) of the Ministry of War endeavored to study the [expected amount of] fuel to be obtained when important resource areas in the South were occupied. Its rough estimation, whose details are omitted [here], was that, on the assumption that all oil refineries had been destroyed, 0.3 million kiloliters of crude oil would be obtainable for the first year, about 1 million kiloliters for the second year and 2.5 million kiloliters for the third year.

It meant that even if the oilfields in the Dutch East Indies were occupied, a fuel crisis would still occur in the second year.

In the reports which Col. Okada Kikusaburō, chief of the War Preparation Section [of the Ministry of War] submitted in mid-January and late March 1941, he, too, indicated similar points with regard to the fuel problem and offered an opinion in his conclusion that while accelerating the negotiations with the Dutch East Indies, [Japan] should strive to obtain resources from the U.S. and British bloc until the very last minute.

The trade negotiations with the Dutch East Indies to obtain oil had been continued by Ambassador Yoshizawa Kenkichi from December 1940 onwards.(35, 38)

5. Acceleration of the [Army] Air Service’s War Preparations for [the Operation in] the South

Extension of the Combat Range of the Army Fighter Planes and Adoption of the Type–1 Fighter Plane

In the summer of 1940, Lt. Col. Tanikawa Kazuo, chief of the Aviation Group of the Operations Section of the IGHQ Army Department, started on a concrete study of an outline for the air operations in the Malaya area, taking into account the results of his own recent survey of the area as well.
Among the various problems, the short combat range of Army aircraft, particularly its fighter planes, was the biggest cause for worry. Lieutenant Colonel [Tanikawa] secretly sought the opinion of Col. Imagawa Issaku, chief of the [Army] Flight Test Group of the Flight Test Department (led by Maj. Gen. Sakaguchi Yoshitarō) on ways to prepare by next March about two squadrons of Army fighter planes with an action radius of about one thousand kilometers, to be employed for an attack on Singapore.

After some research, Colonel [Imagawa] proposed three ideas: To equip the Ki–43 (which later became the Type-1 fighter plane) with additional drop fuel tanks, to equip the strategic reconnaissance aircraft with additional armaments, or to equip the Type–99 twin-engine light bombers with additional drop fuel tanks. The Army central command hurriedly examined the proposals and decided on proceeding with the first idea.

The Ki–43 was made [on an experimental basis] by improving the speed and armaments of the Type–97 fighter plane, while maintaining its maneuverability, which was light and easy. The first prototype had been completed at the Nakajima Aircraft Company in January 1939, but after operational suitability screening at the Akeno Flying School, it was about to be rejected.

The grounds, on which Colonel Imagawa recommended the aircraft, was that its engine (Ha–25) was the same as that of the Type–0 fighter plane, the masterpiece of the Navy (Model Sakae–12 engine, officially adopted in July 1940 on the Type–0 fighter plane), and that also the body of the aircraft was almost the same as that of the Navy, which made him think that further tests were worth conducting. He became the first chief of the Flight Test Group at the end of 1939, and from early 1940 onwards, he thoroughly retested the aircraft.

The main reason why the Akeno Flying School had regarded the aircraft as unfit was that compared to Type–97 fighter planes, the aircraft was markedly inferior in aerial combat. However, Colonel Imagawa found out that the aircraft could sufficiently match the Type–97 fighter planes [in performance] by taking advantage of its enhanced climbing power, which was due to the increase in horse power of the engine, and the tactics of vertical maneuvering (the dog fight) while making good use of the air combat maneuver flaps.

The method of extending the combat range by using drop tanks was already known from experience with the Type–97 fighter plane. Later studies revealed that the action radius of the plane could not be extended to one thousand kilometers. But, unfortunately, the Army had no other suitable fighter planes any more that could be adopted in such a short period.

In May 1941, the aircraft was officially adopted [by the Army] as the Type–1 fighter plane. By the time of the opening of hostilities in December that year, the aircraft was employed by two air groups as an upgrade. Although at first some broke apart midair and wrinkles developed on the wings, after quick-fix repairs and reinforcing the parts, the aircraft were readied in time for the opening of hostilities.

Its combat action radius, which considerably varied depending on the units equipped with the aircraft, was more or less six to seven hundred kilometers, which covered the distance from southern French Indochina to the Malay Peninsula crossing the Gulf of Thailand.(5, 12, 21)
Exercises to Study the Malaya Invasion Air Operation

The Problem of Training for Flights over Sea

Since the Army Air Service was basically trained for operations on the continent, its ability to conduct maritime operations was low, and it had generally no experience of operations in the tropics.

As previously told, around the time of [the Army’s] advance into the northern French Indochina, the IGHQ [Army department] dispatched five air groups of heavy bombers to southern China. Although supporting the advance [of the Army units] was [among] the aims, the primary objective was to improve the groups’ skills for flights over sea, the servicing [of aircraft] for tropical [operations], long-distance flights in formation and the like, which obviously assumed attacks on Malaya or the Philippines. [Following them,] the [air] units stationed in Manchuria and Korea, too, one after another started on trainings for flights over sea from the beginning of 1941 onwards.(21, 23)

A War Game of the Malaya Invasion Air Operation

In January 1941, a war game of the Malaya invasion operation was conducted according to the plan of the Army General Staff with War College students specializing in aviation as the players. The simulation was planned by Lt. Col. Tanikawa Kazuo, a teacher of strategy at the War College, who had been a staff officer of the Army General Staff until recently, and the umpire was Col. Miyoshi Yasuyuki (graduate of the 31st class [of the Army Academy]), who was also a teacher there.

The assumption of the exercise was that one army (consisting of four divisions) and one [numbered] air force (a total of thirty-one squadrons, consisting of eleven fighter plane squadrons, five light bomber squadrons, nine heavy bomber squadrons and six reconnaissance aircraft squadrons) were to invade the Malay Peninsula from southern China and northern French Indochina by way of southern French Indochina and Thailand. The British forces in the area were assumed to consist of about two hundred aircraft including one element of Spitfires, and a ground force that was about one half of the Japanese force.

The course of the exercise was that [the Japanese forces] were to seize air bases in the Bangkok and Saigon areas in about one month, put ashore the main force [of the ground troops] in northern Malaya and one element in the Mersing area to capture Singapore in about four months.

One of the plans which the players studied was to occupy air bases in northern Malaya with one element, and after conducting air campaigns to destroy the enemy air power from the said area, put ashore the main force of the army in the Mersing area to the northeast of Singapore, with the support of a powerful fleet. Although it corresponded to the outline of the operation against Britain in the Plan of Operations of the Imperial Army of fiscal year 1940, Colonel Miyoshi [dismissed the plan] and continued the simulation according to the other operation plan to land [the troops] at Singora and have them march southward along the Malay Peninsula overland, because of the instability of the gained air and naval supremacy. His assumption was that no support by aircraft carriers was available.

Although there were some arguments about in what order to have the ground, naval and air forces deliver their first strikes against Britain, it was decided that priority should be given to the launch of surprise landings [by ground troops] from the convoys and that no prior air
campaigns to destroy the enemy air power nor attacks on [enemy] naval fleets should be conducted. The plan was to deceive the enemy by making the convoy look like sailing toward Bangkok and [then instead] carry out surprise landings. The advance of air bases into Thailand and southern French Indochina was a major problem. It was decided that [the conclusion of] a military treaty with Thailand to obtain an advance air base equipped with repair and supply facilities in Bangkok and the use of airfields in Thai-Malaya should be accelerated. Advancing military forces into southern French Indochina might not be difficult, however, the construction within about one month of air bases, which would enable large operations in the Malay area, was a big question.

Along with Type–97 fighter planes, the fighter planes of a latest model (Ki–43) were also considered to be employed to cover the landing of [the ground troops] from the convoys sailing across the Gulf of Thailand. However, the short action radius of the army aircraft remained a major worry in [planning] the operations.

Being colonial forces, the British air units were generally regarded as qualitatively not altogether excellent. Nevertheless, it was considered that [the Japanese forces] should be on the alert for Spitfires and that [if the latter were spotted], top-of-the-line aircraft should be dispatched even in small number.

The logistics and supplies for the air operations in this operation were a serious problem. The study yielded the following lessons:

1. The [expected] number of flights of the aircraft
   (1) During the operations against southern French Indochina
      One flight per day for about ten days
   (2) During the the Malaya operation
      First month:        Fighter planes Two flights per day for thirty days
                          Other types       One flight per day for thirty days
      Second month:      One half of the first month
      Third month:       One third of the first month

2. An estimate of losses during the Malaya operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of air units</th>
<th>Fighter planes and heavy bombers</th>
<th>Light bombers and reconnaissance planes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First month</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second month</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third and fourth months</td>
<td>10% each</td>
<td>10% each</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Stockpiling of operational matériel in Thailand and French Indochina is required. It is important to concentrate as forward as possible the same number of reserve aircraft as frontline aircraft.

Aviation fuel to an amount of forty thousand kiloliters is required for the four-month operation.

4. It is effectual to convert ships and form shipboard aircraft depots for repairing [aircraft] engines.

5. Reinforcements of flight personnel to make up for losses
   Pilots:   210 men (of whom 78 men in the first month)
   Others:   300 men (of whom 110 men in the first month)
The exercise was inspected by Chief of Army General Staff General Sugiyama Hajime, War
Minister Gen. Tōjō Hideki, as well as by chiefs, section chiefs and staff officers of the Army
high command within the IGHQ [Army Department]. Although a number of misgivings
arose concerning individual problems, the exercise created confidence that the Malaya op-
eration would be feasible if preparations were duly made.

A problem was the case of all-out military operations including those against the United
States, in particular the case of a drawn-out war, as pointed out by Minister Tōjō at that time.
However, that was outside the scope of this exercise. Chief of the Army General Staff
Sugiyama recognized the significance of this exercise and demanded that further serious
study should be continued and that it should be kept classified. (23, 27, 35, 39, 145)

Joint Landing Operation Exercise by the Army and the Navy

From March to April 1941, an Army-Navy joint exercise assuming an attack on Singapore
was conducted between Shanghai and northern Kyūshū.

[In the exercise,] the blue force, consisting of the 5th Division as the core, launched con-
voys from Zhoushan Islands and vicinity, forced back the red force’s air and naval attacks,
sailed for about seven hundred kilometers, landed in northern Kyūshū and attacked the
stronghold of Sasebo.

The course of the exercise prescribed that the Fifth Air Force, stationed in Manchuria,
should cover the convoys and support the landings from airfields in Korea as the air unit of
the blue force, and then dash to the airfields in northern Kyūshū.

In this exercise, the Fifth Air Force for the first time experienced the task of supporting a
landing operation of a large force, and it was felt that the main point of covering convoys re-
quired further detailed study and exercise. The Type–97 fighter planes employed in the ex-
ercise had too short a combat range which caused grave concern about the implementation
of this task.

However, all in all it was concluded that a landing operation conducted along these lines
was feasible if [the forces were] well-prepared and well-trained. (21, 141, 152)

Stepping Up the Air Service’s Military Preparations and the Study of Opera-
tions in the Tropics in Taiwan

In August 1940, the Army central command decided on the Outline of Advancing Supply
Bases for the South[ern Operation], and sent a large amount of military supplies to Taiwan.
Matériel for the air operations stockpiled in Pingdong, Gaoxiong, Fengshan and Xiaogang
and their vicinities around the end of that year amounted to those required [in operations]
for four air divisions during one month.

Around that time, of the army air units, the 4th Air Division headquarters and the 8th Air
Group (consisting of light bombers and strategic reconnaissance aircraft) were stationed in
Pingdong, the 14th Air Group ([consisting of] heavy bombers) in Jiayi, and the 50th Air Group
([of] fighter planes) in Taizhong. The bases of the Navy Air Unit in southern Taiwan were in
Gangshan, Donggang, etc., and apart from these, there were airfields mainly for civilian use
in Taizhong, Tainan, and Taidong.
[The Army] was short of airfields in southern Taiwan. While expanding and conditioning the airfields in current use, it started on preparations to newly construct airfields in Fengshan, Jiadong, Chaozhou, Hengchun and other places.

The need was also felt to upgrade and reinforce by the spring of 1941 the Air Service’s preparations concerning intelligence, communications and meteorological information.

Regular flights by way of Taiwan were intensified, and as previously mentioned, regular flights to Thailand by way of French Indochina began their operation from July 1940 onwards. It was of great significance in terms of securing and preparing the flying routes, which were indispensable for the concentrated mobilization of air units for the invasion of the South.\(9, 34, 35\)

In mid-December 1940, the IGHQ [Army Department] established the Taiwan Army Research Department (about twenty members including officers) in Taipei as the core institution to study operations in the tropics. Its tasks were to conduct practical surveys, research and experiments on the composition [of units] for various duties, equipment, tactics, front duties, provisions, medicines, quarantine as well as the military situation and topography of the southern countries and provisionally report the results by March 1941.

The upper echelons of the [Army] Air Service were not included in the Research Department. Aviation experiments required a dedicated air unit to be in charge. [So,] in mid-January 1941, the IGHQ [Army Department] assigned the army air unit in Taiwan to cooperate with the Research Department.

[Also] in mid-January, the IGHQ [Army Department] ordered the Southern China Area Army to conduct research on engagements (including landing operations) and front duties to be expected in the southern operation as well as on the employment of divisions with motor vehicles in the tropics, and had the army closely cooperate with the Taiwan Army Research Department.\(18, 19, 78\)

During the above period, from the end of 1940 to early February 1941, led by Maj. Murata Kingo (graduate of the 41st class of the Army Academy) of the Army Affairs Section of the War Ministry, Maj. Satō Katsuō (graduate of the 42d class) of the Army Aviation Headquarters, Capt. Maruta Fumio (graduate of the 44th class) attached to the 64th Air Group and several other personnel in charge of the composition [of air units], supply, communications and facilities of the Air Service inspected [facilities in] Okinawa, Taiwan, Guangdong and northern French Indochina, and strove to urgently accelerate the concrete operational preparations in order to have the Air Service ready for sudden changes in the situation expected in the spring or summer of 1941.\(22, 34\)

The Measures Taken to Advance Air Bases to Southern French Indochina and Thailand

**Mediation of the Border Dispute Between Thailand and French Indochina**

In the autumn of 1940, as the study on southern operation at the IGHQ [Army Department] progressed, the strategic value of air bases in Thailand and southern French Indochina became clearer than ever.

Since the chaotic stationing of troops in northern French Indochina had previously led to export restrictions by the United States, the subsequent steps against French Indochina and Thailand required prudence.
It so happened that around that time a border dispute had arisen between Thailand and French Indochina. This time, Thailand was trying to solve at a stroke the return of lost territories, such as those in Laos and Cambodia, which it had been demanding from France for many years. After France’s rejection of the demand, the situation reached in October crisis proportions when ground forces of both countries were deployed along the border between Thailand and French Indochina and confronted each other.

Although Japan had generally been friendly to Thailand, it was not sensible to be hostile to French Indochina, either. So, it planned to mediate the dispute and by taking advantage of it to militarily infiltrate both countries.

In January 1941, the Thai army’s invasion of Cambodia triggered the opening of hostilities between both armies. On 20 January, Japan offered mediation, which was immediately accepted by Thailand, but refused by French Indochina.

In late January, in order to put coercive pressure on French Indochina, Japan sent a powerful fleet to the coastal waters of southern French Indochina. On 21 January, the IGHQ [Army Department] removed the ban on bombing attacks by the Southern China Area Army over French Indochina, and advanced the 90th Air Group (light bombers) to Hanoi, to be ready for changes in the situation.

On 27 January, French Indochina accepted Japan’s mediation, and a ceasefire between both forces was realized by around the end of the month.

However, the settlement of the border dispute was not simple. Diplomatic negotiations between both countries were held in Tokyo, and after many twists and turns, an agreement was finally reached on 31 March. Although part of the key areas became Thai territory, this did not satisfy Thailand, to say nothing of the dissatisfaction on the French Indochinese side. Both countries just yielded to Japan’s high-handed mediation.

Although the demand on both countries to conclude a military treaty with Japan was not specifically brought up, the way for it was successfully paved.\(^{(17, 35)}\)

The Sale of Army Aircraft to Thailand and the Training for Their Operation

Prior to this, in January 1940, the Army central command had heard that some high-ranking officials in Thailand were hoping to purchase Japanese military aircraft and started to contact them. It was judged strategically advantageous to establish an air force alliance with Thailand. However, the real state of affairs in the country, which was fairly pro-British, and which was using U.S. aircraft, was complicated, and things did not progress easily.

In the summer of 1940, the Army central command upgraded the military attaché office in Thailand and started preparing the ground to form a military alliance with the country. Sales promotion of army aircraft to Thailand and the already-mentioned launch of a regular airline service were part of the plan.

In November the sales contract for the aircraft was concluded, and in mid-December, as the first part [of the deal], ten Type–97 fighter planes and twelve Type–97 heavy bombers were airlifted and handed over to Thailand in Bangkok. A small team consisting of Maj. Onishi Hiroshi (graduate of the 34th class [of the Army Academy]) and a few others, led by Col. Tanaka Tomomichi (graduate of the 27th class), were dispatched to the country to take charge of the operational training. Then in late February 1941, the team was joined by Maj. Kuroda Hisafumi (graduate of the 33d class) and several others, and Col. Tanaka Tomomichi returned to Japan.\(^{(40)}\)
In the second aircraft deal, nine Type–97 heavy bombers were purchased at the urging of Japan, and were handed over [to Thailand] in mid-March at Don Mueang Airfield. Maj. Iizuka Hiroshi (graduate of the 43d class) and several men were dispatched to join Major Kuroda and his team [to provide] the training.

Quite extensive aviation training was provided, which covered firing, bombing, and navigation practices, to say nothing of piloting.

The situation of the airfields in Thailand became clear. The airfields in Singora, Nakhon and other places in Thai Malaya, namely, those along the west coast of the Gulf of Thailand were no better than landing strips for relays and emergencies. However, the airfields in the Bangkok plain were fit for use by heavy bombers mostly without problems. The sold ammunition was stockpiled at the training airfields.

The fact that Japan had formed an air force alliance with Thailand later greatly helped the operations of the Japanese Army Air Service.

Thailand used some of its Japanese aircraft in its dispute with French Indochina, which had arisen at that time. This gave French Indochina an excuse to reject Japan’s mediation of the dispute. Nevertheless, as a manifestation of the strengthened alliance between Japan and Thailand, it gave Japan an advantage in terms of its overall leadership in the political maneuvering. (9, 35, 40, 78, 107)

The Formation and Training of a Paratrooper Unit

The First World War already saw examples of paradrop operations to attack the enemy on the ground from the air. In the early Shōwa period [late 1920s], the Soviet Army adopted the maneuver as [one of] its tactics, formed a unit specialized in such missions and gradually expanded it. Its large-scale military exercises aroused the [Western] powers and also surprised Japan.

In May 1940, the German forces implemented large-scale paradrop operations in their advance on the west and achieved lightning operational results. With this example as motivation, the [Japanese] Army, which had taken a relatively cautious stance on such tactics, seriously started studying them. Japan’s judgment of the general situation with an eye on [advancing] to the South with force of arms at a favorable opportunity was also behind this move.

By chance, Lt. Col. Itoda Isamu (graduate of the 35th class), who had returned from service as an officer resident in Europe, was appointed staff officer at the Inspectorate General of Army Aviation. He was assigned to take charge of the planning and formation of a [paratrooper] unit and the training of its personnel. From October to November 1940, about two hundred personnel were selected from the whole army for the first group [of the unit], and in December, the Training Department [for paradrop operations] of the Army Hamamatsu Flying School was established at Mikatagahara (Shizuoka Pref.). The first director of the department was Lt. Col. Kawashima Keigo (graduate of the 33d class).

After a ground training of about one month at the Army Toyama [Training] School (school for gymnastics and physical training) in Ushigome, Tokyo, Lieutenant Colonel Kawashima and other leaders carried out basic trainings in descending, making use of a paradrop [experience] tower of the Yomiuri Amusement Park at Futako Tamagawa.
Following them, the training assistants, too, completed these trainings in Tokyo, after which they moved to Mikatagahara and started flights to master the skills.

The parachute trainings of the key leading officers were conducted using Fokker aircraft at first, and then with AT [Nakajima] and MC [Mitsubishi] aircraft, all from an altitude of about one thousand meters.

Since it was considered that Mikatagahara was unsuitable to smoothly conduct the training of a large number of personnel while keeping the plans secret, the Training Department was in May 1941 moved to Baichengzi in Manchuria. About four hundred men including those selected for the second [group] started training there.\(^{21,34,41}\)

Changes in the Expectations About the Southern Advance — The Army and Navy’s Outline of Policy Toward the South

During the above period of operational preparations, IGHQ’s assessment of the general situation with regard to [the advance toward] the South changed several times.

In late July 1940, when the Outline of the Main Principles for Coping with the [Changing World] Situation was decided on, it was expected that a situation where [Japan should] employ force of arms [to advance toward] the South at a favorable opportunity, namely when a German landing on the British mainland would have caused the fall of Britain, would arise relatively soon.

However, in that autumn, the German landing on the British mainland did not materialize. Moreover, after the Japanese Army’s advance into northern French Indochina, the United States tightened the restrictions on exports to Japan, while U.S., British and Dutch economic pressure on Japan was gradually increased. IGHQ, particularly its Navy Department judged that, while [Japan] should speed up the build-up of its forces, [the decision to] use force of arms against the South should be made prudently. Even then, expectations still remained [in the Army] that major changes in the world situation, such as those caused by a German landing on mainland Britain, might occur in the spring of 1941.\(^{24,35}\)

However, the situation in Europe in the spring of 1941 showed that a German landing on mainland Britain seemed rather difficult. Bolstered by U.S. produced and supplied aircraft, the Royal Air Force was recovering air supremacy over its mainland. The losses of the German Luftwaffe began to rise markedly.\(^{220}\)

In the meantime, as the IGHQ [Army Department’s] operational studies, particularly its comprehensive study of the overall southern operation, progressed, the [Army’s] initial wishful, but not necessarily unlikely judgement that the United States and Britain were separable, turned out to be improbable. The department found itself in the situation that it had no choice but to agree to the Navy’s view that the United States and Britain were inseparable.

The world situation after these changes was so markedly different from the assumptions made at the time of the decision on the Outline of the Main Principles for Coping with the Changing World Situation in the summer of 1940, that in mid-March 1941, Chief of Army General Staff Sugiyama warned [his staff] not to be taken up too much with the southern question.\(^{24}\)

After that, the IGHQ Army and Navy Departments kept examining [the situation], and on 6 June they decided on the Outline of Policy Toward the South. The purpose of it was to make the enlargement of [Japan’s] aggregate national power for the sake of its self-preserva-
tion and self-defence the aim of the policy for the South and that in principle this aim should be accomplished through diplomatic means. Force of arms should only be resorted to if U.S., British and Dutch oil embargoes against Japan, or increased U.S. and allied pressure, should make the situation intolerable for Japan in terms of its national defense.(24)

6. The Composition and Equipment of the Army Air Service

The Outline of the Composition of the Military Units

The Types and Components of the Unit

The organization of the Army Air Service generally corresponded to that of the Army. [The entire service] was roughly divided into three: administrative offices, schools, and military units, of which the latter were divided into air units and ground service units.

The air units were grouped into sections by their type of equipment such as reconnaissance aircraft, fighter planes, bombers, etc., while the ground service units were grouped according to their type of duty into units for airfield operation, intelligence, communications, navigation, meteorology, supply, repair, airfield construction, air routes, etc.

At the time of the opening of hostilities, squadrons, air groups, and air divisions formed successively from the bottom up the higher echelons. This system was adopted from 1937 onwards. Since the main force of the air units was in principle supposed to be shifted from place to place by air, [the number of] service personnel was kept limited to the minimum required for emergency services.

As the commanding units controlling [both] the air and ground service units together there were the numbered air force (hikō shidan renamed hikō shidan from April 1942 onwards) and the independent air division, and again as a still higher unit the air corps (air army from June 1942 onwards) was formed.(5,45)

The Air Unit Sections and Their Ratios

About right before the opening of hostilities, the sections of the air unit consisted of a strategic reconnaissance section (provided with strategic reconnaissance aircraft), a tactical reconnaissance section (provided with tactical reconnaissance aircraft), a direct support section (provided with reconnaissance aircraft to directly support [ground troops]), a fighter plane section (provided with fighter planes), a light bomber section (provided with light bombers or assault planes), a heavy bomber section (provided with heavy bombers), etc.

The ratios of these sections were an important factor in determining air armaments. Aviation developed from reconnaissance aircraft to fighter planes to bombers in that order, but whether to put more emphasis on fighter planes or bombers in the total air power mix was intricately related to other aspects such as employment methods and tactics as viewed by the high command, technology and production as viewed by the military administration, or other aspects such as training, replenishment etc.

As mentioned previously, from about 1937 to 1939, when the Army planned a major expansion of its air service, there was a remarkable progress in bomber development. Accordingly, in the plans of operations of both years, the emphasis in armaments was put on bombers (bombers would comprise 50% of the force, fighter planes 30% and reconnaissance aircraft 20%).
Air Groups and Independent Air Squadrons

In 1938, the former air regiment was separated into air units and ground units. Air groups belonged to the former, while airfield battalions, which will be mentioned below, and detached depots of aircraft depots, belonged to the ground service units.

This was the first adoption of the so-called “separation of air and ground [units]” of the Army Air Service. Its main goal was to enable air units to exert their power anytime anywhere by rapidly shifting by air.

An air group consisted of a headquarters and three squadrons under the command of an air group commander (a colonel or major). A fighter plane air group had squadrons consisting of twelve aircraft, while air groups of other types had squadrons consisting of nine aircraft. In addition, an air group other than reconnaissance air groups had one headquarter aircraft (for the air group commander) attached to it. Since these front-line aircraft were supposed to be able to operate at any time, reserve aircraft amounting to one third of the number of the front-line aircraft were supposed to be kept at each air group and rear reserve aircraft amounting to another one third at the aircraft depot. However, this was nothing but a formal rule in terms of formation, if anything, the actual number of aircraft always fell short of the regular number.

An independent air squadron performed its duty on its own, without being incorporated in an air group. It was more or less [the same as] a squadron in an air group with somewhat upgraded headquarters, commanded by a major or captain.(5, 45)

Air Divisions

An air division consisted of a headquarters and two to three air groups. Some air divisions only consisted of fighter units and others were made up of a combination of groups of different types. In wartime, air groups in air divisions were flexibly combined each time [as necessitated] by orders of the high command, not by imperial military edicts, which established fixed formations. Because the total [air] strength was not sufficient, forces were frequently transferred and employed in units of air groups.

The commander of an air division was a major general or colonel. Air divisions consisting of fighter planes had a formation [consisting of] a headquarters, which enabled the air division commander to command in the air, while other air division headquarters had transport aircraft and communication aircraft, which made it possible to shift at a minimum by air.(5, 39, 45)

Airfield Battalions and Airfield Companies

As previously told, in 1938 the airfield battalions were separated [from the air units]. In terms of composition, they were in principle supposed to support the air groups that had separated from the same air regiment by taking charge of the airfield operations, such as providing the air groups with servicing, supplies, quarters, provisions and guards. They were also supposed to flexibly provide temporary support for other air units that might occasionally fly
in. In other words, they were not only supposed to be capable of servicing the aircraft of the same type of the air groups they had been with, in a so-called “husband-wife relationship,” but they were also supposed to be more or less able to deal with aircraft of other types.

An airfield battalion at the time of the opening of hostilities consisted of a headquarters, two servicing companies and one guarding company, and it was led by a major or captain.

An airfield company had its composition and functions compressed to about one-third the size of an airfield battalion. Usually it was assigned to a specific independent airfield.

The system to separate air and ground [units] was made on the basis of the operations on the continent, particularly in Manchuria. In principle, when the air groups in a husband-wife relationship were transferred for engagements to other fronts for a long period, [the partner ground service units] were supposed to follow them.

Whether this system [of separating] air and ground [units] would really work in the large-scale mobile operations in the South, where sea transport was indispensable, was about to be tested.\(^{(5, 39)}\)

### Air-Ground Support Headquarters

The basic tasks of the air-ground support headquarters were to command the airfield battalions and companies, and in cooperation with the air divisions, assign them to duty at the airfield[s] in a certain area.

Although a colonel or a lieutenant colonel was assigned as commander, he was especially given the title of air-ground support headquarters commander, and in principle put under the direct control of the commander of a numbered air force, or the commanding officer at a higher level.

Other than supervising airfield battalions, the air-ground support headquarters were often assigned to set up airfields and other tasks.\(^{(5, 9, 45)}\)

### Numbered Air Forces

A numbered air force consisted of air divisions, air groups under its direct control, air-ground support units, and units in charge of intelligence, communication, navigation (to guide aircraft in the air), meteorology, supply, repair and other tasks. Put under the full control of the commander of an air corps, an area army, or a higher level of command, it took charge of the air operations on one front. In other words, a numbered air force was a command unit to [control] in a unified way the various units separated into air and ground units.

In April 1942, numbered air forces changed in name (\(hikō shidan\) \(\rightarrow\) \(hikō shidan\)),* and their commanders became lieutenant generals appointed by the emperor.\(^{(5, 9)}\)

### Air Corps \([Kōkū heidan]\) (Air Army \([Kōkū gun]\)/Theater Air Force)

An air corps had existed in Manchuria [from] before the opening of hostilities. Consisting of a numbered air force and the units under its direct control, the air corps was itself put under the full control of the Kwantung Army commander. In June 1942, the air corps was renamed air army, and simultaneously more air armies were formed in mainland Japan and in the southern areas, too. Their fundamental tasks were to take charge of operations in one area

* To maintain consistency with the previously translated volumes we kept the designation “numbered air force.”
under the full control of the commander of the area army or a higher level of command. Generals or lieutenant generals were appointed as commanders of the air armies by imperial decree.\(^{5,9,45}\)

### Preparations for the Aeronautical Technology War

The Army’s interest in new technology was relatively keen, and in the later years of the Meiji period (1868-1912), the Army enthusiastically studied balloons and aircraft. However, it had to totally depend on foreign technology. In the beginning the Army followed the example of France, and after many twists and turns, it made use of the example of Germany, the United States and Italy, too. [However,] technologically Japan could not catch up easily with Europe and the United States.

Most Japanese military aircraft were designed and manufactured by private companies. Needless to say, the Army specified the performance requirements based on its needs in terms of operations and its assumptions about the advances in technology. Around 1933, the Army drew up the Outline of Research on Air Armaments, which was to be used as a guideline. This outline was coordinated by a committee made up of representatives of the Army departments and sections concerned, and by order of the war minister, the chief of the Army Aviation Headquarters requested private companies to research and produce prototypes in conformity to this guideline. Although the competitive production of prototypes was continued between private companies until around 1935, the competitors in aeronautical technology, which had from the beginning required governmental support, were short in resources at that time, so the competition was eventually called off.

The center of aeronautical technology in the Army was the Technology Department and its related subdepartments within the Army Aviation Headquarters. The Aviation Headquarters was established in 1925, from which, in 1936, the Army Aero-technical Research Institute was separated and subsequently expanded in 1940. While its institutional structure was gradually strengthened, lack of experience made it difficult to upgrade its contents, and there was a lack of senior technology officers.

Although Japanese aeronautical technology had gradually started pioneering its own ways in the beginning of the Shōwa period [late 1920s], it showed apart from a few exceptions hardly any originality. As before, foreign technology continued to be introduced. However, the international situation after the China Incident gradually made the introduction of [new] technology difficult.

Aeronautical technology was making rapid progress. The major powers competed against one another, striving to improve their current models or develop state-of-the-art aircraft. Being superior or not had an immediate, decisive impact on victory in air operations. It really was a competition in technology and could be called a technology war.

Its core element was a competition in aircraft performance (including armaments), namely, the competition in upgrading the aircraft of the air units. And some other related problems had an impact on it.\(^{5,46}\)

Air armaments were the fruits of a country’s technology. Japan, too, implemented various policies to concentrate the technological strength of the military, governmental and private sectors, however, it was not possible to produce an immediate effect. Regrettably, Japan lacked the underlying technological strength, and its technological foundation was weak.
Aircraft Types, and Armaments and Munitions (See p. 402)

Army Aircraft Right Before the Opening of Hostilities

The army used the following aircraft right before the opening of hostilities:

- **Fighter planes**: Type–97, Type–1
- **Light bombers**: Type–97, Type–98, Type–99 twin-engine
- **Assault planes**: Type–99
- **Heavy bombers**: Type–97, Type–100
- **Reconnaissance aircraft**: Type–97 strategic [reconnaissance plane], Type–100 strategic [reconnaissance plane], Type–99 tactical [reconnaissance plane], Type–98 direct support [plane]

In the above designation, “Type–97” meant that its official adoption [as army aircraft] was decided in 1937 (the 2597th year of the Imperial reign), “Type–98” meant that its official adoption was in 1938, and the rest in the same manner.

The main army aircraft at the time of the opening of hostilities were Type–97, which were designed around 1935 for use on the continent, particularly in Manchuria. This was the root cause of its short combat range and insufficient fighting performance over sea.\(^{(5, 46)}\)

Aircraft Armaments and Munitions

Until about 1937, army aircraft were mainly equipped with 7.7-mm [aircraft] machine guns (Type89 fixed and flexible aircraft machine guns), [the former of] which was modeled after a Vickers aircraft machine gun employed by the British air forces. About 1938, some aircraft were equipped with 7.9-mm [aircraft] machine guns (Type98 fixed and flexible aircraft machine guns), built on the basis of the Rheinmetall [aircraft] machine guns employed by the German air forces.

Around that time, the major [Western] powers were already eagerly increasing the caliber of their [aircraft] machine guns, however, the Japanese Army was reluctant to do so.

As for aircraft armaments, rapidity of fire, accuracy rate, amount of bullets carried, easiness of handling, impact on the aircraft control, etc. were basically considered of greater importance than the effect of a single bullet, even though that was considered important as well. At that time, the mainstream opinion within the Army fighter units followed and stressed the precedent of agile, single-aircraft dogfights, while shunning heavy equipment such as machine guns or cannons with larger calibers, since it carried the risk of making the aircraft slow and heavy.

It was [only] in 1941 that the Army adopted the 12.7-mm [aircraft] machine gun (Ho-103), which was mounted for the first time on Ki–43 (Type–1 fighter planes).

Around that time, aircraft equipped with 20-mm machine guns already began to appear not only among the aircraft of the major [Western] powers but also among the fighter planes.
of the Japanese Navy. Nevertheless, it was not until 1943 that the Army adopted the Mauser-type 20-mm [aircraft] machine gun of the Luftwaffe.\(^{(5, 46)}\)

The above history of aircraft armaments was emblematic of the predicament of the development of the Japanese Army Air Service. Almost all [aircraft] armaments were imitations of foreign examples, and there were problems with the system of research, design, screening and decision-making on the official adoption of such aircraft armaments, as well. Until about 1937, the Ordnance Administration Headquarters (an institution in charge of the research and manufacture of surface weapons under the control of the war minister) had taken charge of everything.* Although the screening [of aircraft armaments] was then placed under the control of the Aviation Headquarters, the other processes remained unchanged. The intention was that the expertise of the Ordnance Administration Headquarters,* which had a long tradition in procuring surface weapons, should also be put to good use in the field of aircraft [armaments]. However, the habit of not easily changing surface weapons, once they had been officially adopted, tended not to follow in the wake of the ever progressing advances in aircraft technology, which led to ceaseless arguments over the armament [procurement] system between the aeronautical and surface departments.

For the Ho-103, three types of bullets, i.e. normal, armor-piercing and incendiary bullets were available; the armor-piercing bullets were of two types, the Ma-103, fused fragmentation bullets (13-mm high explosive prototype bullets) and the Ma-102, fuseless fragmentation bullets. The latter made use of explosion on impact, which was unique to the Japanese Army.

The types of bombs used by [Japanese] Army aircraft before the opening of hostilities were fragmentation bombs to give damage, including fatal damage, to men or horses (15 kilograms and 50 kilograms), armor-piercing bombs to destroy facilities (30 kilograms, 50 kilograms, 100 kilograms, 250 kilograms, 500 kilograms and 1,000 kilograms), incendiary bombs (50 kilograms), etc. It is worth noting that [the Army] did not specifically take attacks on naval vessels into account.\(^{(46, 47)}\)

**Equipment for Intelligence, Communications and Other Purposes**

Before the war, the [Army] air intelligence unit in charge of predicting enemy aircraft attacks had no radar equipment. Since its establishment in 1938, the unit did not operate beyond the limits of its audio-visual capacities, using telescopes and acoustic locators.

In 1936, the Army started on the study of radar, and in February 1939, the radio wave reflection of an aircraft was for the first time captured at the training grounds of Kanemaruhome (Tochigi Prefecture). In 1940, the prototype of a device called Radio Wave Guarding System A was developed. The device was to give a signal when an aircraft crossed [the space] between a transmitting and a receiving station located at an appropriate distance, [causing abnormalities] in the curtain of radio waves. However, it was impossible with this method to detect enemy aircraft at a far distance. It was in the autumn of 1941 that (two) prototypes of a device called Radio Wave Guarding System B, which used pulse waves, were successfully

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* The Ordnance Administration Headquarters as such was actually not established until October 1942, when the Ordnance Bureau of the Ministry of War, the Army Technological Headquarters, and the Army Ordnance Headquarters were merged into one. The Army Ordnance Headquarters had been established in April 1940 by merging the Army Arsenal and the Army Ordnance Depot. See Vol. 87, p. 337 (in the Japanese text).
made. However, the initial equipment had so many breakdowns and was so difficult to handle that it was not used in the southern invasion operation.\(^{(48, 49)}\)

It may be said that the importance of communications in aviation was recognized [for the first time] by the Army in the revised, scaled-up, plan of military preparations of 1939. With the aim to bring the special features of aviation communications into full play, and in particular to improve on-board communication devices as much as possible, the aviation communications [sector] was separated from the communications [sector] between the ground [units]; the research and production of equipment was assigned to the [Army] Aviation Headquarters, while the training of personnel was assigned to the Inspectorate General of Army Aviation (at the Army Air Service Signal School, etc.).

However, the development of on-board radio sets did not make as much progress as expected. The Type96 Tobi Mark2 radio set fitted on Type–97 fighter planes barely allowed telephonic communications at a very close range, and the Type99 Tobi Mark3 radio set, developed in an attempt to improve its predecessor, did neither show great progress nor improvement. Despite a considerable expansion of its communication range, even the Type4 Tobi Mark3 radio set, which was developed after a series of prototypes and was fitted on Type–1 fighter planes and later aircraft, could still not overcome the fact that it frequently tended to break down. This was due to the general weakness of Japanese technology, however, it was also directly due to the fact that, despite its lack of superior [aircraft] engines, [the Army Air Service] strongly felt that flight performance could beat everything, and demanded the aircraft radio sets to be light and small in the extreme.

As for the ground radio sets for [communication with] aircraft, the Mark1 Radio Set for Aircraft [Communications] (fixed; 1 kilowatt), which was officially adopted [as Army equipment] in 1939, and the Mark2 Radio Set for Aircraft [Communications] (for mobile use, 200 watts) appeared, which enabled both ground-to-ground and ground-to-air communications over long distances (1,000 kilometers or more) and middle distances (several hundred kilometers).

From 1940 onwards, the Chi Mark3 Radio Set (for mobile use; 50 watts) was officially adopted to be used by the [air] intelligence units on the front line and by paratrooper units.

All in all, the wireless radio sets for ground use were passable, and the wired communication equipment was nothing special.

As navigation equipment, direction finders to be used on the ground and by aircraft were [also] officially adopted and used by some heavy bombers.

Although research on blind landing equipment was underway, it did not reach the level of practical use; the capabilities for instrument flying were poor, too.\(^{(46)}\)
Part I  The Army Air Service’s Preparations for the Southern Invasion Operation  
(May – November 1941)

In the middle of 1941, as the international situation for Japan was getting tense, the previously mentioned plan of having the Army Air Service participate in a southern operation finally got concrete shape on a full-scale.

As for the situation of the South thereafter, the armaments buildup by hostile forces became conspicuous, and the tightening pressure of the encirclement of Japan, led by the United States, was keenly felt. The measures that Japan had taken to forge military bonds with Thailand and French Indochina came to a standstill and failed, and Japan’s trade negotiations with the Dutch East Indies, primarily intended to purchase oil resources, failed as well.

In late June, [while Japan was stuck] in such circumstances, Germany and the Soviet Union started an all-out war. While the Army realized that it should on this occasion concentrate more efforts on the northern question, too, so as not to bungle it, it felt that this marked a key turning point to make a breakthrough in the difficult situation in the South.

Having decided to make operational preparations to be ready for changes in the situation on both the southern and northern fronts, the IGHQ [Army Department] implemented a large-scale reinforcement of the northern front, called the KANTOKUEN exercise, while separately stationing military forces in southern French Indochina on the southern front.

The stationing of forces in southern French Indochina was carried out in late July in a very deliberate way and completed without use of force of arms. However, taking this opportunity, the United States imposed a total embargo against Japan, which was followed by the other allies.

Since Japan depended for its necessary resources for building and maintaining its armed forces on overseas imports, the situation became extremely serious. In August, after comprehensively examining the plans for a southern operation, the IGHQ [Army Department] shifted the focus of preparations for all operations to an operation in the South.

In early September, IGHQ and the government decided on the Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy, which was brought about by the changing situation, saying that “For the sake of its self-preservation and self-defense, the Empire shall complete war preparations by and large by late October, based on the resolve not to flinch from war against the United States (Britain and the Netherlands).”

The IGHQ Army Department accelerated the extensive preparations for a southern operation, and the [Army] Air Service strove to upgrade the strength of the units planned to be employed and give them maritime navigation training, while building up military preparations in southern French Indochina and Taiwan.
The [negotiations to] improve diplomatic relations with the United States thereafter did not go well at all. In mid-October, the third Konoe Cabinet resigned en masse, and the TōJō cabinet, which succeeded it, re-evaluated the national policy. Nevertheless, in early November, IGHQ and the government eventually decided to make war against the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands, and set the date to resort to arms in the beginning of December.

During this period, the plans for the southern operation were completed, and the outline was decided on in such a way that the Army Air Service should have the Third Air Force (with about 450 front-line aircraft) operate in Malaya, Sumatra and Java, and the Fifth Air Force (with about 170 front-line aircraft) in the beginning in the Philippines and then in Burma.
1. The Intelligence of the Opening of Hostilities Between Germany and the Soviet Union; the Worsening Situation in the South for the [Japanese] Air Forces

The Tightening of the Encirclement of Japan; the Buildup of Hostile Air Armaments in the South

From the spring of 1941 onwards, IGHQ felt that the U.S., British, Dutch and Chinese encirclement of Japan was tightening. Particularly, the signs of a strengthening of the military alliance between the United States, Britain and the Netherlands in the southern area had become ubiquitous. It was also judged that the U.S. and Britain were intensifying their obstruction of Japan’s trade negotiations with the Netherlands as well as their anti-Japanese manipulation of Thailand and French Indochina and maneuvering to estrange them from Japan.

In early June, IGHQ made an assessment of the U.S., British and Dutch military preparations in the key areas in the South and judged that whereas their naval surface strength had not changed much, substantial reinforcements had been made to their ground forces in Malaya and the Philippines. And concerning the situation of their air power, it made the following observations:\(^{(50)}\)

**The Philippines:**
The United States is expanding its air bases in the Philippines, and their capacity will become half as many again or twice as large as the current capacity in three or four months. The current number of the U.S. front-line aircraft are 166 (note: another source indicated the number as 132 including eighty fighter planes), of which about one hundred aircraft seem to be of a superior type.

**British Malaya:**
British air forces in the Malaya areas with Singapore as its center have currently 248 front-line aircraft (sixty-eight bombers, twenty-eight torpedo bombers, fifty-six fighter planes, ten flying boats and eighty-six land-based reconnaissance planes), and the numbers will increase half as many again [as the current numbers] in three months.
The Dutch East Indies:
There are currently 249 front-line aircraft in the Dutch East Indies (eighty-one bombers, twelve torpedo bombers, sixty-six fighter planes, thirty flying boats and sixty reconnaissance planes). About one hundred U.S. aircraft will be added in the three months from now. (Note: another source reported that there were five hundred aircraft in the Dutch East Indies.)

Other areas:
It is estimated that the number of the aircraft of the British air forces in Burma is about fifty, that in India about two hundred, that in Australia about four hundred (of which 150 aircraft has been deployed overseas), and that in New Zealand about one hundred.

[Note:] Around that time, it was assumed that there were about two hundred aircraft in Thailand, and one hundred and fifty in French Indochina.

The above numbers aggregated to about two thousand, which meant an increase of about seven hundred aircraft compared to the number in July of the previous year.

The Question of an Air Force Alliance with French Indochina and Thailand

In March 1941, Japan’s mediation of the [border] dispute between French Indochina and Thailand went well; on 9 May, a peace treaty was concluded between Thailand and French Indochina and a protocol [to enhance] good-neighbor and friendship relations as well as close economic relations was concluded between Thailand and Japan, and between French Indochina and Japan. However, what the IGHQ [Army Department] craved for at that time was the strengthening of military bonds.\(^\text{(17)}\)

Thereafter, as the study on the operations progressed, the value of operational air bases in southern French Indochina or Thailand for the Malaya invasion operation was more and more felt to be of vital importance. Theoretically, it was conceivable that in time of emergency [a large unit of the Army Air Service] could make a lightening[-speed] advance to these important areas from northern French Indochina to conduct operations in the Malaya area. However, the conditioning of bases for air operations involving a large force, which might as well be called the main force of the Army Air Service, would require at least about one month, thus making it impossible to conduct preemptive sudden attacks on Malaya. Apart from that, it was judged that recent U.S. and British anti-Japanese manipulation of Thailand and French Indochina or the maneuvering to estrange them from Japan should not be thought of lightly. French Indochina became reluctant to export resources to Japan, while training for the army aircraft [provided by Japan] in Thailand was suspended in mid-June.\(^\text{(108)}\)

IGHQ made efforts to fulfill the national policy by first of all constructing air bases, etc. in southern French Indochina and stationing one element of its forces there.\(^\text{(21, 23, 50)}\)

The Failure of Japan’s Trade Negotiations with the Netherlands —

The Critical Situation of the Aviation Fuel Reserves

Ambassador Yoshizawa Kenkichi, who had succeeded Kobayashi Ichizō as special envoy to the Dutch East Indies from December 1940 onwards, persistently continued the negotiations to purchase resources, mainly oil. However, using some pretext or other, the Dutch East Indies prevented Japan from obtaining substantial results, and on 11 June, the Japanese government in the end decided to recall Ambassador Yoshizawa.\(^\text{(24)}\)
In 1941, along with the U.S. government’s tightening of the restrictions on oil exports, the Army’s oil reserve, which had, though only slightly, increased throughout 1940, started to rapidly decrease. The quality of aircraft gasoline also significantly worsened.

In June 1941, the aircraft gasoline reserve in the hands of the Army was 385,000 kiloliters. That amount would enable the army to operate for twenty-five or twenty-six months if it would patiently and prudently avoid expanding the current scale of operations. However, if the Army conducted a full-scale operation, it would not last a year.

At that time, there were still ways by which nominally U.S. oil could be exported to Japan in meager quantities, and IGHQ had anticipated that depending on the circumstances, the restrictions would be decisively tightened. However, it had never occurred to them that the stationing of forces in southern French Indochina would cause such a situation.(37, 43, 50)

2. The Army Air Service’s War Preparation After the Opening of Hostilities Between Germany and the Soviet Union

The IGHQ [Army Department]’s Judgment of the Situation Around the Time of the Opening of Hostilities Between Germany and the Soviet Union

The cooling off of the diplomatic relations between Germany and the Soviet Union, which had concluded a nonaggression pact in the summer of 1939 and jointly occupied and divided Poland, gradually came to the surface after that. Already in mid-May in 1941, the relations developed into such a [serious] situation that the Army military attaché in Germany reported to the Army central command his judgment that hostilities between the two countries would be inevitable.

The Army central command studied the possibilities and the measures to be taken. However, it could not form a clear definite judgment, just leaving the majority with a view that [the Army] should intensify its war preparedness on both the northern and the southern fronts of Greater East Asia to be ready for the changes in the situation.(24, 35)

Nevertheless, the opening of hostilities between Germany and the Soviet Union on 22 June came as a shock to the Army central command. The Army once again examined the measures to take, and around the 24th, it roughly decided to make preparations so that it could deal with both the North and the South according to the situation. The Outline of National Policies in View of the Changing Situation, decided on by IGHQ and the government on 2 July, followed the same line of reasoning. Its main policy was that “The Empire shall continue to strive to settle the China Incident, while taking steps to advance toward the South in order to establish the basis for its self-preservation and self-defense. And if the changes in the situation require it, it shall also resolve the northern question.”(24)

The Measures for Advancing the Southern Policy (Obtainment of Air Bases in Southern French Indochina)

In this period, on 25 June, IGHQ and the government decided on the following measures focusing on the stationing [of forces] in southern French Indochina.
Measures for [Advancing] the Southern Policy

1. In view of all present circumstances, the Empire shall, in conformity with the already approved policy, advance its policy toward French Indochina and Thailand. Particularly, in connection with the return of the ambassador dispatched to the Dutch East Indies, [the Empire] shall quickly establish a military bond with French Indochina aiming at the stability and defense of East Asia.

By establishing a military bond with French Indochina the Empire shall seize the following necessary conditions:
(a) The establishment or use of air bases and [naval] port facilities in designated areas of French Indochina and the stationing of necessary military forces in southern French Indochina
(b) The provision of facilities for the stationing of the Imperial forces

2. In order to attain the preceding items, diplomatic negotiations shall be commenced.

3. If the French government or the authorities in French Indochina do not comply with our demands, the Empire shall achieve its aims by force of arms.

4. In order to implement the preceding items, preparations for the dispatch of forces shall be started.

Although the factors which led to the decision on these measures were not simple, the main factor was the aforementioned worsening of the southern situation. The reasoning was that the United States, Britain and the Netherlands had recently been intensifying their anti-Japan measures in the southern areas, areas which should be called Japan’s lifeline, and thus increased the possibility that Japan might need to resort to force in its southern key area for the sake of its self-defense. And that in such a case, southern French Indochina would be a crucial point in the strategy.

Note: The following arguments relating to the air situation are reported among the military grounds for the absolute necessity of stationing troops in southern French Indochina, drafted on 23 June 1941 by the IGHQ [Army Department]:

In the war against Britain and the United States, [the Empire] shall in the early stages of the operation capture the Philippines, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies and other places in order to strengthen its strategic readiness and at the same time complete the groundwork for obtaining military resources, by means of which it must prepare itself for a drawn-out war. However, it is anticipated that if an operation in the Pacific should take place in parallel with the above capture operations and if [the Empire should have to fight] with the only aircraft currently in its possession, it would face quite an uphill battle, even under the present circumstances.

Since the defenses of the places to be captured are being strengthened day by day, in half a year, the capture operations will become extremely difficult and the chances of certain victory in a war against Britain and the United States will become small. Therefore, once such circumstances should arise, the Empire would no longer be able to defy situations such as a total oil embargo by the United States against Japan or Britain’s pressure on Thailand, and it would eventually have no other choice but to submit to Britain and the United States.

Contrary to the above, if [the Empire] obtains military bases in southern French Indochina and stations the necessary forces there at this moment, the execution of the Singapore operation, the most difficult part in the [southern] operation, shall become relatively easy, and the stage-one operation will likely make smooth progress. In other words, the Empire’s stationing of troops in southern French Indochina is the only peaceful measure to counter the intensifying strategic preparations of the U.S., Britain and others in the southern areas. Only by taking this measure, the Empire can make the preparations, which will enable it to deal with the changing situation.
The Order for the KANTOKUEN Exercise

In conformity with the intent of the Outline of National Policies [in View of the Changing Situation] decided on 2 July, the Army started a large-scale mobilization in early July to double the forces in Manchuria to about 850,000 men by the beginning of September. This was what was called the “Special Grand Maneuvers of the Kwantung Army (KANTOKUEN).”(9)

At that time, the Army Air Service was in principle supposed to be ready both in peace and war, and no particular mobilization was put into effect, except for special units. The Army Air Service transferred two squadrons of heavy bombers, two air units of direct support [aircraft], and a few ground service units from mainland Japan. It [also] formed two squadrons each of light bombers and reconnaissance planes at Baichengzi Army Flying School. In the end, the Army Air Service units participating in the KANTOKUEN amounted to a total of seventy-one squadrons, consisting of twenty-four fighter plane squadrons, twenty light bomber squadrons, fourteen heavy bomber squadrons and thirteen reconnaissance plane squadrons, along with two air units of direct support. The number of the first-line aircraft was about 750, which at that time constituted almost half of all Army Air Service units.(5, 18, 35)

When implementing the KANTOKUEN, the [Army] entertained misgivings that the superior Soviet air forces in the Primorsky Kray (Maritime Province) area might conduct air strikes on mainland Japan or obstruct the transport of forces. In mid-July, the Army newly organized a General Defense Command to take charge of the defense, taking the commanders of the Armies on mainland Japan and designated air units under its command. The immediate urgent problem of this General Defense Command being the preparations for the air defense of the mainland, it took the necessary measures concerning the upgrading, deployment and disposition of the air defense units.(5, 18, 35)

3. The Stationing of Forces in Southern French Indochina

(See Illustration No. 7)

The Preparations for the Stationing

Research on the preparations to station [Japanese] forces in southern French Indochina was already started from around 10 June within the Army and the Navy Departments of IGHQ. On the 24th, the Army issued an order to form the Twenty-fifth Army headquarters (commander: Lt. Gen. Iida Shōjirō) as the commanding body to implement [the stationing].

Then on 3 July, the IGHQ Army Department gave orders to the Twenty-fifth Army to prepare for the stationing, and on the 5th, issued the order of battle (the disposition of units under its full control). The units to be stationed consisted of the Imperial Guard Division, the 21st Independent Mixed Brigade and the 21st Independent Air Unit ([made up of] one squadron each of fighter planes and reconnaissance planes, led by Col. Narita Mitsugu) as the core (a total of about 40,000 men) under the command of the Twenty-fifth Army commander. Apart from [the above], the 7th Air Division headquarters (commander: Maj. Gen. Yamamoto Kenji), the 64th Air Group (fighter planes), the 27th Air Group (light bombers), the 14th Air Group (heavy bombers) and one squadron of the 15th Air Group (strategic reconnaissance planes), etc. were also put under the command of the Twenty-fifth Army on the same day.
Part I, Chapter 1 / The War Preparedness of the Air Forces in the South Around the Opening of Hostilities Between Germany and the Soviet Union

Chinese
Hainan
French
Indochina
Thailand

\begin{align*}
\text{Notes: Outline of the Airfields}\\
\begin{array}{|l|l|l|}
\hline
\text{Nha Trang} & 300\text{m x 800m} & \text{Has a windbreak forest of 30m high} \\
\text{Saigon} & \text{Runway (40m x 650m)} & \text{Asphalted} \\
\text{Phnom Penh} & 700\text{m x 700m} & \text{Low wetlands} \\
\text{Kampong Trach} & 2 \text{runways of 750m x 100m} & \text{Very hilly terrain} \\
\text{Kampong Chhnang} & 600\text{m x 600m} & \text{Poor ground} \\
\text{Krakor} & 800\text{m x 700m} & \text{Poor ground} \\
\hline
\end{array}
\end{align*}

\begin{itemize}
\item Remark: \# indicates newly constructed airfields.
\item Airfield
\end{itemize}

Illustration No. 7 — A Sketch Map of the Main Airfields in French Indochina (September 1941)
As for the stationing of forces in southern French Indochina, based on the bitter experience from the stationing of forces in northern French Indochina, it was decided in principle to clearly differentiate the cases of a stationing with or without force of arms, to start the implementation of the stationing only after IGHQ had decided how it should be carried out, and not to change the decision thereafter.

The Army designated eight air bases in Siem Reap, Phnom Penh, Tourane (Da Nang), Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, Saigon, Soc Trang, and Kampong Trach as required air bases, and planned to first of all prepare [those in] Nha Trang, Saigon, Kampong Trach, Phnom Penh, etc. after the stationing.

It was [also] planned that of the ground units of the Twenty-fifth Army, the main force should be stationed in Saigon and vicinity, and some elements in Nha Trang, Phnom Penh, and other places.

The major part of the aforementioned Army air units, which were to be put under the command of the Twenty-fifth Army commander, were deployed in Guangdong. The strategic reconnaissance squadron transferred from Manchuria arrived in Guangdong on 11 July, while the heavy bomber air group, which had been deployed in Taiwan, advanced to Haikou on the Hainan Island on the 13th. These units made preparations under the command of the 7th Air Division Commander Yamamoto Kenji so that they could launch operations at any time.\(^{(18, 19, 116)}\)

Needless to say, the 21st Independent Air Unit, which was deployed in Hanoi, had [also] gathered information for the stationing of forces in southern French Indochina, apart from its reconnaissance attacks on China conducted from Hanoi.

In addition to the above, the Twenty-fifth Army had a number of air units (mainly ground service units) under its full control or command.\(^{(18, 19)}\)

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**The List of the Air Units Under the Full Control or Command of the Twenty-fifth Army**
(as of Mid-July 1941)

**The units in the order of battle**
- 21st Independent Air Unit
  - 82d Independent Air Sqdn (reconnaissance planes)
  - 84th Independent Air Sqdn (fighter planes)
  - 96th Airfield Bn
  - 3d, 85th, and 88th Airfield Co
  - 16th Field Aircraft Depot 21st Detached Depot
- 25th Air Signal Unit
- 5th and 6th Field Airfield Construction Units
- 12th Air Transport Sqdn
- 25th Field Meteorological Unit

**The units under the command [of the army]**
- 7th Air Division HQ
- 14th Air Gp (heavy bombers)
- 27th Air Gp (light bombers)
- 64th Air Gp (fighter planes)
- One sqdn of the 15th Air Gp (strategic reconnaissance planes)
The Successful Stationing Without the Use of Force of Arms and the Total Oil Embargo Against Japan

Although there were some twists and turns in Japan’s diplomatic negotiations with the French Vichy government during the above period concerning the stationing of its forces, on 21 July, France totally accepted Japan’s demands.

On the 23d, the IGHQ [Army Department] issued orders to the Twenty-fifth Army to advance into southern French Indochina, departing from the port of Sanya from the 24th onwards. (18)

On the afternoon of 25 July, escorted by a powerful naval escort, the Twenty-fifth Army left the port of Sanya in thirty-nine army transport ships and sailed southward. On the 28th, the detachment for Nha Trang successfully completed its landings, which was followed by the entry of the convoy of the main force into the port of Cap Saint Jacques on the 29th. From the 30th onwards, the landing of the units of the main force in Saigon was smoothly completed.

Seventh Air Division Commander Yamamoto, while assigning one element to cover the convoy, advanced nine fighter planes and six light bombers to Nha Trang on the 30th and had them cover the landing of the main force of the Twenty-fifth Army in Saigon from there. And on the afternoon of 1 August, Air Division Commander Yamamoto advanced to Saigon, he himself leading a total of twenty-four aircraft, consisting of five heavy bombers, three light bombers, ten fighter planes, and six strategic reconnaissance planes. (116)

The 7th Air Division commander watched the developments of the situation there for a while. However, since no particular changes occurred, he returned to Guangdong with his main force in mid-August. (18, 68, 89)

Thus, the stationing of [ground] forces in southern French Indochina was completed without the use of force of arms. Nevertheless, it lead to the grave situation of a total oil embargo against Japan by the allies.

It was not that IGHQ and the government were totally unconcerned about the risk that the stationing might incur a total oil embargo by the United States. However, IGHQ’s prior judgement had been that that was very improbable if the stationing was successfully completed without the use of force of arms. (24, 50)

Through intelligence the United States had known by the minute the steps Japan would take. On 24 July, the U.S. urged Japan to call off its stationing of forces in southern French Indochina, and on the 25th, froze Japanese assets in the United States (effective from the 26th onwards). On the 26th and the 27th, Britain and the Dutch East Indies followed suit, and on 1 August, the United States imposed a total oil embargo.

It was a bitter blow to Japan. At that time, imports from Europe or central or south America could hardly be expected, and economically Japan became effectively isolated from almost the whole world. (17)
On 8 August, the IGHQ [Army Department] pulled back the 7th Air Division headquarters and its subordinate units, which it had put under the command of the Twenty-fifth Army for the stationing of forces in southern French Indochina, and placed it under the command of the Twenty-third Army in southern China. However, one element of the South China Meteorological Unit was still kept in French Indochina.(18, 19)

4. The Shift in Focus to the South of the Preparations of the [Army] Air Service

The Assessment of the Situation of the Air Forces in the Manchuria Area and the Extraction of Some of the Air Units from Manchuria

Significant changes had occurred in the circumstances surrounding the aforementioned KANTOKUEN maneuver, which had been ordered in early July, triggered by the opening of hostilities between Germany and the Soviet Union.

Although Germany generally had the upper hand in its offensive against the Soviets, according to an assessment of IGHQ around the end of July, it became increasingly clear that the Soviet Army was not going to collapse easily. The strength of the Soviet forces in the Far East did not markedly decrease; particularly, its air strength was strong. Of the Soviet air strength in the Far East, which had been estimated at about 2,800 aircraft since the end of 1940, only about three hundred aircraft had been transferred to the western [front] in the one month after the opening of hostilities between Germany and the Soviet Union.

Over against this, Japan’s Army air units in Manchuria and Korea as of the end of July consisted of the Second and the Fifth Air Force under the full control of the Air Corps and units under the latter’s direct control, but the strength of the air units just amounted to about seven hundred front-line aircraft in over seventy squadrons. The annual plans of operations from around 1938 onwards provided that, in case of emergency, the main force, or a powerful element, of the Navy air unit would participate in the operations in Manchuria. However, due to the tense situation in the South, it was impossible to count on the Navy air unit’s participation in a Manchuria operation.

Particularly in late July, in the grave situation in which the allies had imposed a total oil embargo, Japan needed to be cautious about aggressive operations toward the North.

Around 10 August, the IGHQ Army Department shifted the focus of its operational preparations toward the South. The basis [for the decision] was its judgment that although the KANTOKUEN maneuver in the Manchuria area was not ended, no particular circumstances would occur that year which would lead to a war against the Soviet Union.(35)

On 17 August, the IGHQ [Army Department] transferred the 12th and the 98th Air Groups, consisting of heavy bombers, and other units, from Manchuria to northern China and put them under the command of the China Expeditionary Army commander. From late August until the beginning of September, those heavy bomber units carried out attacks in conjunction with the Navy on cities such as Chongqing and Lanzhou in the interior, and then [set to] prepare themselves for the southern operation.(18, 51)
The Information on the U.S., British, and Dutch Air Forces

Concerning the information on the U.S., British, and Dutch air forces in the South and in China, which IGHQ had obtained by August, the following reports are found among the documents kept by Maj. Gen. Hattori Takeshi (chief of the Technical Department of the air arm of the Southern [Army] as of the opening of hostilities). (69)

The Air Forces in British Malaya ([as of] 31 July 1941)

1. The air forces in British Malaya known until today are as follows:
   - About two hundred aircraft of the following two types:
     - Consolidated PBY twin-engine patrol-bomber flying boats (Catalina)
   - A considerably large number of Brewster F2A-I (single-seat fighter planes, Buffalo)
   - North-American [Model] NA–33 advanced (dive bombers; manufactured in Australia) for the Australian forces
   - Bristol-Blenheim (bombers): a hundred or more aircraft were transported by air via India last year.
   - Hawker-Hurricane (single-seat fighter planes)
     Rumor has it that about three hundred aircraft have been hidden in hangers in the hillsides of Singapore.
     In view of the fact that the aircraft have also been deployed on Malta, the rumor is considered very much likely.

2. Other than the above, it is said that Spitfire fighter planes and Short Sunderland long-distance bomber seaplanes have been deployed.
Also, there is a rumor that Boeing B–17B heavy bombers, too, were transported by air, which is very doubtful.

The Situation of the Air Forces in the Dutch East Indies ([as of] 30 July 1941)

1. The number of aircraft held by its air forces
   The current number of aircraft is about five hundred, taking together those manufactured in the Netherlands, Germany, Britain and the United States, of which the relatively superior types are as follows [names and designations as in the text; not necessarily the official ones]:
   - Bombers: Martin Model 139W and Model 167
     Lockheed Model 212 and Hudson
   - Fighter planes: Douglas Model 8A–3N
     Curtis-Hawk III and Model 75A
The main airfields are the air bases in Bandung and Surabaya, to which the majority of the aircraft have been deployed. In particular, a hundred Curtis fighter planes and a few each of the Martin and Lockheed bombers have been deployed to Bandung.

The rest have been deployed at forty or more airfields, located all over the Dutch East Indies. The military authorities of the Dutch East Indies boast that they can successively dispatch four hundred or more front-line aircraft from the air bases in Bandung and Surabaya in a coordinated way.

It is said that the authorities of the Dutch East Indies have ordered 360 aircraft from the United States, consisting of Ryan PT (training aircraft), Consolidated PBY (patrol-bomber flying boats) and others. However, their delivery has been delayed except for the Ryan aircraft.

2. The aircraft industries
The Dutch East Indies does not have the ability to build even a glider. However, it has repair yards with excellent facilities in Bandung and Surabaya, and a total of twenty-five hundred in-
3. The line-up of KNILM (Royal Dutch Indies Airways)

   The KNILM has the following aircraft:
   - Three Douglas DC–3s
   - Four Lockheed Electras
   - Three Douglas DC–2s
   - Five outdated Fokkers
   - One twin-engine de Havilland Dragon Rapide
   - Two Grumman amphibious aircraft

### New Aircraft Models of U.S. Origin Recently Provided to the Chinese Army as Reinforcements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Number of aircraft</th>
<th>Time [of deployment]</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Curtis P–40</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Around February this year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boeing B–17B</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Around April this year</td>
<td>Called “flying fortress”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curtis P–40</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Dispatched in July this year</td>
<td>As the allotment to be supplied in July in conformity with the agreement between the United States and the Chiang regime; supposed to be mainly employed for the defense of the Burma route [to support the regime].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Aircraft</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>August this year</td>
<td>To be employed for the transport of military supplies to support the Chiang regime by way of Burma. It has the transport capacity equivalent to 850 trucks [employed] on the Burma route.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All of the above [aircraft] are the newest state-of-the-art [military] aircraft from the United States, which shows the U.S. enthusiasm for supporting China. Before, even though [the United States] was said to have sent Curtis P–36 aircraft [to China], due to the lack of available planes, it is believed that [in reality] it supplied outdated aircraft, particularly pre-P–36 models.

As for Russian aircraft, a large number of not only [Polikarpov] I–15 and I–16 but also aircraft of the latest-models such as the I–19, I–17, TsKB and [Ilyushin] DB–iii seem to have flowed [into China]. However, it is believed that from the opening of the Soviet-German War onwards, the Soviets do not have [aircraft] to spare for supporting China.

### Assessment of the U.S. and British State-of-the-Art Aircraft

Apart from the above, it was judged that the numbers of new state-of-the-art models, including the B–17B and P–40, were gradually increased in the Philippines.\(^{(52)}\)

By September, the IGHQ Army Department had formed a general view that the B–17B had a top speed of 420 kilometers [per hour] and a combat range of about six thousand kilo-
meters, and that it was [not only] equipped with five machineguns, but [could also] carry one to four tons of bombs.(69, 96)

Note: An excerpt from the journal kept by Maj. Inatome Katsuhiko, staff officer of Section 4 (in charge of mainland defense) of the Army General Staff (on 16 October 1941)

The action radiuses of

B–17 (carrying one ton of bombs) 1,600 km
(carrying four tons of bombs) 800km
B–24 (carrying one ton of bombs) 1,600km

The intelligence that B–17s had been advanced to China was a serious matter for the defense of mainland Japan. However, it was difficult to obtain information about this aircraft, called “flying fortress,” and therefore there were almost no reports that concluded that it was practically impossible for Japanese fighter planes to bring down this aircraft.

It was also concluded that the purpose of the dispatch of P–40s to China was to defend the routes to support the Chiang regime and that the reinforcements of U.S. large aircraft to the area was to intensify the air transport between Burma and Chongqing.

Along with the previously reported intelligence on the advance of Hurricanes, the Army central command paid close attention to the intelligence on the recent advance of Spitfires to British Malaya as well.(21, 39)

The Outline of the Overall Southern Operation Roughly Decided

The Difference Between the Plans of Operations of the Army and the Navy — the Clockwise Versus the Counterclockwise [Operation]

There was no difference of opinion between the Army and the Navy about the aim of the operations against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, i.e. that by first capturing the key areas in the South and securing vital resources, the conditions should be established for sustaining a drawn-out [war]. However, when it came down to the order in which to capture the key areas in the South, their opinions were divided. The Army had a plan for a counterclockwise advance, in which Malaya should be invaded first to reach the Dutch East Indies, whereas the Navy advocated a clockwise-advance plan to reach the Dutch East Indies and Malaya by way of the Philippines.

The grounds, on which the Army insisted that Malaya should be captured first, came from its great concern about the continent: if counterattacks from the Chongqing Army and an advance of the British Indian Army from the direction of India are assumed, it would be necessary to first stabilize the continent and the Indochina peninsula. When taking into account that sooner or later [the Army] would have to shift to operations against the Soviets, it would be preferable to first finish the operation in Malaya, which is difficult to capture, so that it could shift to an operation against the Soviets at any time.

Furthermore, depending on the movements of the U.S. Navy, the Japanese Navy might have to direct its front eastward to the Pacific Ocean in the middle of the operation to capture the key areas in the South, which gave the Army cause for concern that, in a clockwise operation, it might be possible in some circumstances that the operations on the continent, the Indochina peninsula, and in Malaya might have to be abandoned unresolved.(35)

On the other hand, the Navy insisted that the Philippines should be captured first on the following grounds: if Japan should attack Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, it would in-
Part I, Chapter 1 / The War Preparedness of the Air Forces in the South Around the Opening of Hostilities Between Germany and the Soviet Union

B–17

B–24

P–40 fighter plane
eventually lead to a war against the United States. Once hostilities were opened, a postponement of the Philippines [operation] would not only allow the U.S. forces [there] to be reinforced, which would not only make it difficult [for Japan] to capture the Philippines, but it would also be natural to expect that the U.S. Navy would advance westward, and, obviously, [Japan’s] lines of communications to the South would be cut off. Therefore, it was of vital importance to conduct the Philippines operation before invading Celebes and Java, and thus the operations should be designed in a clockwise way. (56)

The Navy assumed that if it was inevitable to open hostilities, [Japan] should be determined to wage war against the United States from the very beginning, and it was separately examining a surprise attack operation against Hawaii. (56)

In late July, air bases were advanced to southern French Indochina, which made it possible to conduct the Malaya operation by having army aircraft with their insufficient combat ranges use the bases. Eventually, the IGHQ Army and Navy departments decided to simultaneously launch the operations against the Philippines and Malaya. On 14, 15 and 23 August, the Army conducted war games for the southern operation, which were designed in line with the plan of simultaneously launching both the Philippines and Malaya operations. (23, 58)

The outlines of the clockwise and the counterclockwise operations studied by the Navy and the Army in mid-August were as shown in Illustration No. 8. (56, 58)

The Developments Until the Plans of Operations Were for the Most Part Completed

On 14 and 15 August, a war game was conducted at the Army General Staff with Hattori Takushirō, chief of the Operations Section, as the umpire.

The outline of the plan of the southern operation employed in the war game was as follows: (35, 52)

1. Assessment of the enemy situation
   (1) The Philippines area
      Army: A regular army of about 40,000 men and about 160 aircraft
   (2) The Malaya area
      Army: A regular army of about 60,000-70,000 men, a voluntary army of about 20,000 men and about 200 aircraft
   (3) The Dutch East Indies area
      Army: About 70,000 men and about 200 aircraft

2. Forces to be employed
   (1) The Army
      About ten divisions and two numbered air forces (about 600 aircraft)
   (2) Forces to be employed to each area
      French Indochina: one division
      Malaya: five divisions and one numbered air force
      The Philippines: two divisions and one numbered air force
      The Dutch East Indies: three divisions (of which one division shall be employed for the second time)

3. The outline of the operations
   (1) The operations against the Philippines and Malaya shall be launched simultaneously.
   (2) The air strength to be employed shall be twice or three times as large as that of the enemy which it will directly confront. For that reason, [the number of] the aircraft to be allotted to
Illustration No. 8 —
The Army Plan (Mid-August 1941) with Malaya as the Primary Target (Counterclockwise Operation)
The Navy Plan (Mid-August 1941) with the Philippines as the Primary Target (Clockwise Operation)
the different areas shall roughly be estimated at about 390 for Manchuria, about seventy to one hundred for China, and about 670 for the South.

(3) The operations against the Philippines shall be launched from Taiwan. Firstly, Luzon shall be captured, and Manila shall be made to surrender in about one and a half month.

(4) [The units for the operation in] the Malaya area shall land in southern Thailand and capture Singapore in about one hundred days.

(5) The operation against the Dutch East Indies shall be conducted from both the southern Philippines and Sumatra. [The operation] aims at accomplishing the capture of Java in about five months from the opening of hostilities.

(6) The areas to be captured shall be set by and large as the Philippines, British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. [The operations in] Burma shall be limited to air operations and operations to capture parts of southern Burma, in line with the purpose [of the Burma operation] to eliminate [enemy] interference with the Malaya operation.

4. The employment of air forces

(1) The Malaya area

   About 350 aircraft of the Third Air Force, about 100 aircraft of one element of the [Navy] Eleventh Air Fleet (one air group each of mid-sized land-based attack planes and fighter planes)

(2) The Philippines area

   About 250 aircraft of the Fifth Air Force and about 200 aircraft of the [Navy] Eleventh Air Fleet (minus two air groups of land-based attack planes and one air group of fighter planes)

(3) The outlines of the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in Malaya and the Philippines are yet to be arranged.

Although a rough invasion schedule was set for this war game, the game raised expectations that depending on the way it was executed, the operation could be completed in a shorter period, and this led to a decision to further studies.

Also, it was informally decided that in the Sumatra and the Java operations, a paratrooper unit should be employed for Palembang prior to the ground unit’s landing on western Java.

On 8 September, based on this plan, Chief of General Staff Sugiyama reported to the Emperor the outlook for an overall southern operation and the forces to be employed.\(^{(52)}\)

Note: During the above period, the buildup of the bases for the air operations were started on a full scale in southern French Indochina and Taiwan (which will be mentioned later).
Chapter 2  The War Preparations of the Army Air Service After the Plan for the Southern Invasion Had Been Roughly Decided
(August – October, 1941)

1. The Decision on a National Policy with the Determination Not to Flinch from War

The Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy of 6 September

The total U.S. oil embargo against Japan in late July came as a severe shock to IGHQ, for the reserve of liquid fuels indispensable for modern armaments was dwindling by the minute.

Within the IGHQ Army Department, which had already in early August shifted the focus of its operational preparations to the South, it was expected that, on this occasion, after having made clear its national determination to open hostilities, [Japan] should properly prepare for full-scale operational preparations such as a [general] mobilization. Although it was unlikely that the possibility of an operation against the North would arise before the end of the year, the situation after the next spring was unknown, which meant that one needed to deal with the South before then. [The IGHQ Army Department] concluded that although it went without saying that in the days ahead further efforts should be made to find a peaceful solution, a decision to make war should be taken if by early October at the latest those efforts should be fruitless, and operational preparations would then have to be completed by late October.

However, the Navy, which had started on war preparations as a precaution since the autumn of 1940 in the form of a “preparatory fleet mobilization,” was cautious about expressly including the determination to make war [in the national policy]. After bitter arguments between the Army and the Navy over this matter, both reached a settlement in early October.\(^{[54, 55]}\) (Note: For details, see Senshi Sōsho Volume 20 “IGHQ Army Department Part 2,” [pp. 419 ff].)

On 6 September, the government and IGHQ decided on the Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy, the outline of which was as follows:\(^{[50]}\)

In view of the current critical situation, particularly the offensive [posture], which the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, and others have adopted against Japan, the situation of the Soviet Union, and the resilience of the Empire’ national strength, [the Empire] shall carry out the policies against the South stipulated in the Outline of National Policies in View of the Changing Situation in the following way:
1. For the sake of its self-preservation and self-defense, the Empire shall complete war preparations by and large by late October, based on the resolve not to flinch from war against the United States (Britain and the Netherlands).

2. Concurrently with the above, the Empire shall strive to attain its demands by exhausting all possible diplomatic means vis-à-vis the United States and Britain.

   The minimum demands the Empire shall attain in the negotiations with the United States (Britain) and the limits on what it can agree to in connection with those are as shown in the separate sheet. (Note by the author: Details omitted; the outline shall be mentioned below.)

3. In case there is by early October still no prospect of achieving the demands through the diplomatic negotiations in the preceding item, [the Empire] shall promptly resolve to go to war with the United States (Britain and the Netherlands).

   Policies other than those against the South shall be implemented in conformity with the previously stipulated national policy. In particular, every effort shall be made not to let the United States and the Soviet Union form a united front against Japan.

The particulars of the minimum demands which the Empire should attain in the above-mentioned negotiations with the United States (Britain) were (in outline) as follows: “The United States and Britain shall not interfere with or obstruct the Empire’s settlement of the China Incident.” “The United States and Britain shall not engage in actions in the Far East that threaten the national defense of the Empire.” And, “The United States and Britain shall cooperate in the Empire’s acquisition of necessary resources.”

   And if these demands were to be met, the limits on what it could agree to were decided on as follows: “The Empire will not use French Indochina as a base to advance with force of arms into neighboring areas other than China.” “The Empire is prepared to withdraw its forces from French Indochina after a just peace has been established in the Far East.” “The Empire is prepared to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines.”

The Assessment of the Situation by the Chiefs of the Navy General Staff and the Army General Staff

At the Imperial Conference on 6 September, where the aforementioned Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy were discussed, Chief of Navy General Staff Nagano Osami explained from the Navy’s operational point of view his judgment of the circumstances in which there was no way to solve the crisis peacefully, and there would be no other choice but to resort to force. The following is an outline of his explanation:(50)

In today’s Empire, essential military matériel such as oil and others are steadily draining away day by day. Unless something is done, Japan will not be able to escape the sorry plight of being crippled in a short space of time. The war preparations of the [world] powers, particularly those of the United States, are rapidly being built up, and it will become difficult for Japan to deal with them by the latter half of next year. Therefore, if a war becomes unavoidable, we should without missing any opportunity push ahead with aggressive operations to find a way out of this fatal predicament.

   As for the prospects for the operations, I am certain that our chances of victory are particularly good if the United States comes for an attack into the waters where we plan to conduct a decisive battle. However, such a victory [alone] will not end the war; it will probably become a drawn-out war.
Although we do not want such a drawn-out war, the primary requirement to survive it is to seize right at the outset of the war the enemy’s strategic points and important resource areas. If it works, despite the anticipated progress in the war preparations of the United States, Japan will [successfully be able to] establish the foundations to hold out a drawn-out operation. Thereafter, the [war] situation will progress largely depending on the tangible and intangible total national power and the world situation.

In order to make the stage-one operations successful, it is important to swiftly decide on the opening of hostilities and conduct preemptive strikes on the enemy before he does, while paying due attention to the weather conditions in the places of operation.

A peaceful solution of the current crisis must be persistently sought. At the same time, for the sake of the perennial existence of the Empire, we will not choose a course that will lead to a situation where we will have to resume the fight in disadvantageous circumstances, as happened in the winter siege of Osaka [in 1614], where after a [temporary] peace, they had to resume the fight the next summer in a totally impotent state.

Next, Chief of Army General Staff Sugiyama Hajime expressed his total agreement with the aforementioned explanation of Chief of Navy General Staff Nagano, and in particular added some explanations concerning the interconnections between the war preparations and the diplomatic negotiations.\(^{(50, 52)}\)

The gist of it was as follows: It is necessary to complete the war preparations by late October, for which the opening of hostilities has to be decided on in early October. Wasting time by doing nothing in the current circumstances will put Japan in danger of playing into the hands of the United States and Britain. If war should eventually be inescapable, it is necessary to open hostilities while we are confident [of victory] in a war against the United States and Britain. The above conclusions have been arrived at by taking into account the weather conditions on the expected battlefields (in terms of the monsoon, it is difficult to conduct landing operations in the Malaya areas from December onwards) and the time required for the mobilization, the requisition of ships and the concentration and deployment of forces.

The Situation of the Hostile Air Forces in the South

Around 6 September, when the Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy were decided on, the IGHQ Army Department formed the following judgment about the hostile war preparations in the South, in particular those concerning the air forces:\(^{(50)}\)

(1) The areas in the South (as shown in the following table)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Ground forces</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Changes after [Japan’s] stationing of troops in southern French Indochina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Regular army: 42,000</td>
<td>About 160 aircraft by putting together those of the Army and the Navy (100 superior aircraft) (air bases being expanded)</td>
<td>1. The Philippine Army was put under the full control of the commander of the United States Army Forces in the Far East.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. [U.S.] Marine [Corps]: 900</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. About 20,000 men of the Philippine Army were put in the indigenous unit of the regular forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Philippine Army 140,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
After the Plan for the Southern Invasion Had Been Roughly Decided

| The Philippines | | 3. The Philippine Constabulary was put under the full control of the commander of the United States Army Forces in the Far East. |
| Malaya | 1. Regular army: about 60,000 Troops from mainland Britain: about 11,000 Australian troops: about 15,000 Indian troops: about 35,000 2. Voluntary army: 20,000  "Separately, 1,000 men of the regular army and 2,500 men of the voluntary army are stationed in British Borneo. | 1. 4,000 to 5,000 Australian troops will be added (in mid-August). 2. [Also,] the number of the Indian troops seems to be increasing considerably, though their exact number is unclear. | 200 to 250 aircraft by putting together those of the Army and the Navy |
| Dutch East Indies | 1. Regular army: 70,000 (50,000 men in Java and 20,000 men in the outer territories) | About 200 aircraft by putting together those of the Army and the Navy | 1. The first conscription was brought into effect in conformity with the order to draft indigenous people. Although [the drafted troops were] said to be 150,000 men, it is judged exaggerated. Armed trainings are scheduled to be started from late September. |

(2) British forces in the outer territories of the South (aircraft only)
1. India 200 aircraft, Australia 250 aircraft, New Zealand 100 aircraft, and Burma 50 aircraft.
2. It seems that in early August about 150 pilots and ground service personnel arrived in Burma from Singapore and Calcutta.

In the meantime, the IGHQ Navy Department drew the following conclusions from information about the U.S. air forces.\(^{(50)}\)

(1) The United States has about 3,500 front-line army aircraft on its mainland ([as of] the end of August 1941).
(2) The United States has successively sent aircraft and pilots to China and has been conducting joint operations with China, using bases there.
(3) The U.S. forces in the Far East have recently been dramatically reinforced.
(4) The number of aircraft carriers (including seaplane tenders and flying boat tenders):
A total of thirteen carriers, consisting of four in the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, seven in the U.S. Pacific Fleet (in Hawaii) and two in the British China and East India Stations.
2. A Comprehensive Study of the Employment of the Army and Navy Air Services

The General Completion of the Plan of Operations for the Southern Operation by IGHQ’s Army Department and Its Prior Communication to the Front-Line Troops

In August, the IGHQ Army Department, which had decided to focus on the preparations for the southern operation, started drawing up a plan of operations on the premise that the operations against the Philippines and Malaya should be launched simultaneously, as previously told. In September, the Army High Command attached Maj. Gen. Aoki Shigemasa (graduate of the 25th class [of the Army Academy]) and Maj. Gen. Sakaguchi Yoshitarō (ditto), the prospective vice chiefs of staff, and other requisite staff officers of the Southern Army, which was going to be formed in the [near] future, to the IGHQ Army Department, and had them study for about one month a plan of operations for the Southern Army in close communication with those in charge of operations at IGHQ’s Army Department.

On 18 September, the first draft of the plan for the southern operation was drawn up. The [IGHQ] Army Department continued studying it, and from 1 to 5 October, with the prospective chiefs of staff of the armies and [numbered] air forces of the southern operation in attendance, a war game of the invasion of the South was conducted at the War College with Lt. Gen. Tsukada Osamu (graduate of the 19th class) as umpire.*

In that study, the department explained the outline of the course of the operation by using the form of a war game, and held discussions, focusing on the communications between the units concerned. Through this study, the IGHQ [Army Department] was able to have the chiefs of staff of the armies, etc. thoroughly understand the scheme of the operation.\(^{(60)}\)

It was conducted as follows:\(^{(61)}\)

(1) The outline of the operational directives:
   - The first stage: With preemptive air strikes on the Philippines, Malaya and Hong Kong, operations shall be simultaneously launched in each area, and key points in Dutch Borneo, Celebes, Timor, etc. shall swiftly be seized. As the Malaya operation makes progress, key places in southern Sumatra shall be seized as well.
   - The second stage: Java and northern Sumatra shall be captured.
   - The third stage: After the completion of the second stage, the key areas shall be secured.

(2) The composition of the force:
   - The Fourteenth Army (consisting of two divisions as the core)
   - The Twenty-fifth Army (consisting of four divisions as the core)
   - The Sixteenth Army (consisting of three divisions as the core)
   - The units under the direct control [of the prospective Southern Army]: two divisions and two [numbered] air forces

(3) The outline of the operation (for the first stage only)
   - The actions shall take the air unit’s completion of the preemptive strikes as their starting point. At the time of the landing of the main force of the Army, the air unit shall be assigned to support it.
   - The dates of the landings: (See Illustration No. 9)

\(^{*}\) See also Vol. 3, pp 29-32.
The Fourteenth Army
- Aparri, Vigan, and Laoag: Day X + 2
- Davao: Day X + 3
- Legaspi: Day X + 5

When the enemy air power in the Philippines has been destroyed, the Fifth Air Force shall be diverted to the Thailand area on about Day X + 30.

The Twenty-fifth Army
- Kota Bharu and Singora: Day X
- Capture of Singapore: Day X + 95

The 55th Division shall seize the air bases in southern Burma.

The 33d Division shall land in Bangkok on about Day X + 40 and relieve the 55th Division.

After the main force of the Fourteenth Army’s landing on the Philippines, the Southern Army headquarters shall head for Saigon as swiftly as possible (around Day X + 15) and put the units in French Indochina under its direct control.

Detachment I shall capture Ambon from Palau.

(4) The draft of the Army-Navy Central Agreement

Even during the above operations, the Combined Fleet may shift its deployment, depending on the movements of the main fleet of the United States, in order to intercept it and conduct a decisive battle. Nevertheless, this shift shall pose no hindrance to the operations currently underway, or at least to the Army’s operations during the first stage.

The [entire] operation shall be launched with Operation Z (note: the sudden attack operation on Hawaii). The unit for the capture of Guam shall after its capture head for the Bismarck Archipelago. Around the time of the capture of Manila, the Army and the Navy shall, as soon as they are ready, capture Balikpapan, Banjarmasin, Ambon, Makassar, and Kupang, while the Navy shall single-handedly capture Menado, Tarakan and Kendari, and prepare the airfields there.

The General Completion of the Navy’s Plan of Operations

The Map Exercise at the Naval College in Mid-September*

In mid-September, the Navy conducted a map exercise at the Naval College with Combined Fleet Commander in chief Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku as umpire.

In this map exercise, the general southern operation and the attack on Hawaii were studied separately. The outline of the southern operation, in which great importance was attached to the U.S. [Army] Air Force’s advance to the western Pacific and the U.S. Navy’s movements, assumed that the operation should be launched from both the Philippines and the Malaya areas, and that the Java invasion [operation] should be completed in as short a period as possible to be ready against an attack by the U.S. main fleet.

Concerning the attack on the U.S. air forces in the Philippines, the idea of employing land-based air units in Taiwan along with support of aircraft [from carriers] on the surrounding waters was studied because the [short] combat range of the Type–0 carrier-based fighter planes did not allow an attack on the Manila area from Taiwan. So, it was necessary to have fighter aircraft, carried on three carriers, take off on the waters near Manila on the day of the opening of hostilities, and operate in concert with the attack planes, which would make the sortie from Taiwan.

The Combined Fleet originally had the plan to throw the whole strength of the main force of the carriers into [the attack] on Hawaii. However, the conditions were such that, besides

* See also Vol. 3, p. 27; Vol. 26, pp. 27-31.
After the Plan for the Southern Invasion Had Been Roughly Decided

Illustration No. 9 — The Outline of Progress of the Operation in the War Game at the War College (1-5 October, 1941)
small carriers, it had to detach one element of the main carriers for [the operations in] the Philippines area, as well.

The Navy also judged that the airfield in Kuching at the western tip of Borneo was suitable for conducting the air operation against the Singapore area. Planning to seize the place at an early stage, it requested the Army to dispatch a unit.

After that map exercise, it was informally decided to implement the Hawaii operation.

Apart from capturing Kuching, the Navy also requested the Army to dispatch troops to secure Rabaul, as well as to send and land troops in Miri, an oil producing area on Borneo. At first the Army objected to sending troops to Rabaul, however, eventually it accepted both.\(^{35,56}\)

**The Map Exercise on the Nagato in Mid-October***

From the 11th to the 13th of October, the Navy conducted a map exercise on the flagship of the Combined Fleet Nagato, at anchor off Murozumi [Yamaguchi Pref.].

From the [IGHQ] Army Department, Lt. Col. Kumon Aribumi (graduate of the 36th class), chief of the Aviation Group, and Staff Officer Maj. Prince Takeda-no-miya Tsuneyoshi (graduate of the 42d class) were present as observers.\(^{35}\)

The plan of the map exercise was to employ for the Hawaii [operation] six carriers, the Kaga, the Shōkaku, the Akagi, the Sōryū, the Hiryū, as well as the Zuikaku, a large carrier that had [just] been commissioned on 25 September.

The outline of the plans relevant to the southern operation was as follows: \(^{35,56}\)

1. The day of the opening of hostilities shall be set in early December (precisely on 8 December), taking into account the Army and Navy’s preparations for the opening of hostilities.

   At that time, due to doubts about the Army and Navy’s [capacity], particularly that of the Army, to complete operational preparations by late October, [the date of] the opening of hostilities was tentatively set in early December.

   Although landing operations on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula were expected to be difficult in December, when the northeastern monsoon starts blowing in the South China Sea, priority was given to the surprise attack on Hawaii right at the outset of war, and the date to launch the operation was set on 8 December [Japan time].

   That day was a Sunday in the western hemisphere, when the U.S. fleet was likely to be at anchor in Pearl Harbor. Besides, with the moon in its nineteenth lunar day, it was judged to be easy to reconnoiter the enemy in the middle of the previous night.

2. With Day X set on 8 December, the landing days of the landings on the [other] key places shall be set as follows:

   The advance party on Malaya on Day X; [The units on] northern Luzon and Miri on Day X + 1; [The unit on] Kuching on Day X + 5; The main force of the Twenty-fifth Army in Malaya on Day X + 42; [The units on] eastern Java on Day X + 70; [The units on] Bangka, [off] southern Sumatra on Day X + 83.

3. The employment of the Navy air units in the southern operation

   The Navy air units shall be mainly [employed in] the Philippines.

   The Navy air units to be employed in the Philippines operation shall continuously be employed, throughout the operations in Borneo and Celebes up to the capture of the Dutch East Indies. The losses of fighter planes and land-based attack planes during this period are expected to be

* See also Vol. 3, pp. 32-33; Vol. 26, pp. 31-32.
respectively 160% and 40% [of the numbers of aircraft employed at the beginning], from which we can conclude that two-thirds [of the aircraft] shall be lost in about three months before the end of the Java operation.

4. The air campaigns to destroy the enemy air power [on the ground] in Malaya shall entirely be entrusted to the Army.

[Although] one element of the Eleventh Air Fleet, i.e. seventy-two land-based attack planes of the 22d Air Flotilla shall be employed for [the operation in] Malaya, their primary purpose is to destroy the British Fleet.

The main force of the air fleet (the 21st and the 23d Air Flotillas and others) shall be employed in a concentrated way in the Philippines area.

The Outline of the Navy’s Preparations for the Operation

In mid-November 1940, the Navy had [already] issued the order to put a preparatory fleet mobilization into motion. A preparatory fleet mobilization meant the preparations and work required to shift the Naval forces and systems to a state of war and [also] to maintain that state during a war, for which meticulous plans had been prepared in peacetime.

The Navy steadily beefed up its war preparations. By the end of August 1941, it had newly formed successively the Eleventh Air Fleet (consisting of [land-based] air units of the 21st, the 22d and the 24th Air Flotillas as the main body), the First Air Fleet (consisting of the carrier divisions, which were made up of aircraft carriers as the main body with destroyers attached to it; this fleet formed the main body of the carrier operations), and the Southern Expeditionary Fleet (an independent fleet which operated in the southern French Indochina area after the stationing [of Japanese forces] there), as well as the Third, the Fifth and the Sixth Fleets.*

On 1 September, the IGHQ Navy Department issued orders to the entire Navy to [shift to] a full wartime formation and made earnest efforts to complete the operational preparations by late October, which progressed smoothly.

The full number of aircraft to be incorporated in the Combined Fleet reached 1,461 (of which about one quarter were reserve aircraft), almost doubling the number compared to November of the previous year. By updating the aircraft to the new models such as Type–0 fighter planes, Type–1 land-based attack planes, Type–0 reconnaissance seaplanes and Type–0 observation seaplanes, the air component was dramatically strengthened, qualitatively as well as quantitatively.\(^{44, 56}\)

The performance of the main Navy aircraft is shown on p. 404.

The Major Problems in the Employment of the Air Services in the South

Thus, by October 1941, the Army and Navy had for the most part completed their plans for the southern operation. However, here still remained problems concerning the employment of their air [units], of which major ones were as follows.\(^{52, 59, 60, 61, 94}\)

1. The cover for the convoy carrying the advance landing troops to Malaya

   The Army examined how to let the transport convoys for the landings in Malaya, which had gathered in Sanya, sail safely to the landing points on the Malay Peninsula ahead of the opening

* The 23d Air Flotilla is missing in this list and the order in which these fleets were formed is not necessarily as stated.
of hostilities, while remaining unnoticed by the enemy or [if noticed] eliminating interference by enemy air or naval forces.

The Army air strength planned to be employed in the Malaya operation consisted of about 350 aircraft (which included about 140 fighter planes, of which one half were Type–1 and the rest were Type–97 fighter planes). On the other hand, the Navy, which in the beginning had planned to employ one air group each of mid-sized land-based attack planes and fighter planes, gave priority to the Philippines operation, changed the plan and decided to employ merely two air groups of mid-sized land-based attack planes.

On the other hand, the enemy air strength in Malaya consisted of about two hundred or more aircraft, while further reinforcements were expected. The Japanese Army’s [air] strength directed [to the area] was supposed to be about twice as strong as that of the enemy by force ratio, however, in terms of disposition, the Japanese [Army aircraft] were deployed at places five to seven hundred kilometers away from the landing points, whereas the enemy possessed a number of airfields close by. Consequently, the cover of the convoy carrying the landing troops, particularly the cover from the air on the afternoon of the day before the landing was considered be extremely difficult, since the area was the farthest away from southern French Indochina.

It was not just a matter of disposition. Japanese Type–97 and Type–1 fighter planes had short action radii of respectively four hundred kilometers and six hundred kilometers (both of which were performance goals after training). Furthermore, there had not been adequate training for covering convoys (or flights over sea), much less training for the key aircraft, the Type–1 fighter planes themselves, because of the alterations recently made to them. Moreover, the units employed for covering the convoys had to be again employed the next dawn for the air campaign to destroy enemy air power and for covering the anchorages.

Therefore, those in charge at the IGHQ Army Department negotiated with the Navy about committing one element of fighter planes for the cover of the convoy. However, the Navy evaded any definite answer concerning the diversion of its fighter planes, because at that time, it gave priority to the success of the Hawaii operation, as previously told, while also the production of its Type–0 fighter plane was still not going smoothly, which made it rack its brains over how to conduct the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in the Philippines.

Considering that the success of the sailing of the convoy [to the landing points] was a crucial issue that would affect the results of the Malay operation as well as the [whole] southern operation, the Army General Staff decided to carry it out on its own at any cost.

[However] in mid-October, the production of Type–0 fighter planes suddenly picked up at the Navy side, and test results showed that combat ranges of five hundred nautical miles (about 930 kilometers) were attainable.

[As a result,] in November, twenty-seven Type–0 fighter planes and other aircraft were diverted from the Philippines to the Malaya area.

2. The landing procedures of the Malaya landing forces

Two plans were conceived for the landing procedure. Plan B was to implement the landings after conducting an air campaign to destroy enemy air power, while Plan A was to have, right at the opening of hostilities, powerful advance forces make a surprise landing on southern Thailand without conducting a [prior] air campaign to destroy enemy air power, and seize the air bases there, after which the landing of the main force of the army should be conducted.

Plan B was the basic fighting procedure according to the book, while Plan A was a practical fighting procedure applied to the circumstances.

Whereas the Army General Staff was at first reluctant to adopt Plan A, the persons concerned in the Southern Army and its subordinate units who were supposed to implement the operation strongly insisted on Plan A, and in early October, the Army decided to adopt Plan A as the principle of the scheme.
However, having set its mind on adopting the orthodox approach also in the Malaya operation, the Navy strongly insisted on Plan B until mid-October.

Subsequently, after the Army’s earnest persuasion and explanations, the Navy agreed in mid-October with the Army’s plan, and it was settled in such a way that the final decision should be made at the time of the decision to open hostilities.

3. The simultaneous landing at Kota Bharu

Situated at the northernmost point of the east coast of British Malaya, Kota Bharu is only about 370 kilometers from Cape Ca Mau in French territory and about 460 kilometers from the southern point of Pho Kok, and it was also within a short distance, about 220 kilometers and 140 kilometers respectively, from Singora and Pattani, where the Japanese advance forces were supposed to go ashore. According to intelligence, as one of the key points of the front line defense of British Malaya, the British Army deployed a powerful ground unit as well as torpedo bombers there.

It meant that, if Japan should choose landing plan A, Kota Bharu would become a key point from where Britain would be able to attack both flanks of the Japanese Singora and Pattani landing units.

The Army discussed with the Navy to seize the place in a surprise attack, conducted simultaneously with the landing in Singora. However, at first, the Navy opposed a surprise landing there, on the grounds that counterattacks by British aircraft could obviously be expected and that it could also be concluded that the coastal defenses must have been strengthened.

The Army even went so far as considering a plan to put ashore a suicide squad there. However, unable to reach a decision, the Army was for the moment about to give up the plan to seize the place.

In the meantime, the Twenty-fifth Army headquarters (the Malaya Operation Army), which was drawing up its plan for the Malaya operation in Saigon, came to the conclusion that in view of the disposition of the enemy bases in Malaya, and as long as forces were going to be put ashore in Singora, Kota Bharu would need to be simultaneously neutralized. Moreover, after their landings, the forces should continue charging ahead to seize as many air bases as possible. On 24 October, Tsuji Masanobu, staff officer of the Twenty-fifth Army, visited Tokyo and conveyed the army’s views.

After that, the IGHQ Army Department’s plan became fixed on a simultaneous landing in Kota Bharu [along with Singora]. However, [the Army] was not able to come to an agreement with the Navy, and in the [Army-Navy] Central Agreement the decision on whether to adopt [the plan] or not was left to the commanders concerned on site.

4. The air strength to be allocated to [the operations in] Malaya and the Philippines

About September, the thinking in the Army was that in the initial stage of the operations, it should allocate an air strength of about thirty-six squadrons to Malaya and about twenty-five squadrons to the Philippines, and that when the air campaign in the Philippines was for the most part over, it should divert the main force of those employed for the Philippines operation to Malaya, while separately keeping five squadrons under its direct control.

In contrast, the Navy plan gave all-out priority to the Philippines operation, and the prevailing thought was that the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in the Malaya area or support for the ground operations there should solely be handled by Army. The mid-sized land-based attack planes, which the Navy was going to deploy in Kuching or southern French Indochina, were mainly intended for destroying the British fleet.

Considering the various misgivings about the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in northern Malaya in the initial stage of the [Malaya] operation, the Army was worried about a shortage of air strength in the Malaya area. However, in mid-October, the Army and the Navy more or less agreed on adopting Plan A as the principle for the Malaya landing plan. [Then,] because of intelligence about enemy air power reinforcements in the Malaya area, the Army de-
cided to divert one air division (about ninety aircraft in nine squadrons) of the Fifth Air Force, which it had previously decided to employ in the Philippines area, to the Malaya area.

About that time, the prospects for the extension of the combat range and the increase in production of Type-0 fighter planes turned out right. The Navy agreed to the Army’s extraction of one division [of its air forces from the Philippines] to be diverted to Malaya, while informally deciding to employ six aircraft carriers for the Hawaii [operation].

When the Navy saw that both the operations in Hawaii and in the Philippines were on target, it added in November twenty-seven Type-0 fighter planes and others to the Malaya area. Meanwhile, the Army put the 24th Air Group operating in Manchuria under the command of the Southern Army for the Philippines operation.

Eventually, it was decided that the Army air units should deploy forty-eight squadrons (including those for direct support) for the Malaya operation and nineteen squadrons for the Philippines [operation], while separately five squadrons under the direct control of the Southern Army were allocated to northern French Indochina.

The key areas in the South initially envisioned to be captured were Malaya, Sumatra, Java, Celebes, Borneo, the Philippines, Guam, Wake Island and Hong Kong, from the point of view that capturing them was within Japan’s national power, particularly its military power, and necessary to sustain Japan in a drawn-out war.

Later, it was reported that enemy reinforcements were also being sent to the Burma area. Because of the necessity to strengthen the right flank of the to-be-occupied areas and cut off the support for the Chiang [regime], it was decided that, if necessary, Burma should be invaded after the southern operation was for the most part completed. However, no details were studied yet.

On the other hand, as previously told, the Navy stressed that Rabaul should be occupied and secured in order to eliminate the threat toward the [Japanese administered] equatorial Pacific Islands. In the end, the Army agreed to the Navy’s plan.

The IGHQ Army Department’s pre-war operational studies hardly went beyond the stages of the [initial] invasion operations. They barely included studies on full-scale counterattacks by the allies. They had no time or capacity left for that.\(^{(6, 21, 27)}\)

3. The Army Air Service’s Full-Scale Preparations for the Southern Operation

The Reformation of the Air Arm and the Formation of Special Units

The Acceleration of the Established Plan

The situation in Europe from the middle of 1940 onwards looked like a once-in-a-lifetime historic turning point [for Japan], which made the Army central command staff officers involved in the air service want to complete as quickly as possible the established armaments plan, which meant to prepare 162 squadrons by [the end of] fiscal year 1943.\(^*\) However, when the acquisition of personnel, the production of aircraft, and the losses in the China Incident at that time were taken into account, the plan already represented the maximum effort, with no margins left.\(^{(80)}\)

\(^*\) See also p. 32.
In the end, they merely moved up by respectively several months the formation schedule of forty-odd new squadrons, which were planned to be formed and added [to the air service] in fiscal year 1941, so that the total number of squadrons amounted to about 150 by the autumn of 1941, which was quantitatively equivalent to about ninety percent of the squadrons foreseen in the established plan.

In October 1941, the southern operation plan of [the Army Department of] IGHQ was largely completed, and sixty-six squadrons (to be increased to sixty-nine squadrons in November) of the Army Air Service were designated to be employed [in the operation]. Although quantitatively they represented a little less than a half of the entire force [of the air service], qualitatively they were evidently the main force. While giving priority to the upgrading of the fighting power of these southern operation units, the Army central command formed some special units, as well.\(^\text{5, 77}\)

**The Formation of the Army Air Service Transport Department and the 1st Air Route Regiment**

In September 1941, the Army central command established the Army Air Service Transport Department, which would conduct replenishment and transport of aircraft, under the full control of the chief of the Main Aircraft Depot (a body of the [Army] Aviation Headquarters to implement replenishment). The Transport Department had its headquarters in Tokyo and ten branches in east Asia, and the chief of Aircraft Depot at the location of a branch also became the chief of the branch.

As for the South, although there were branches in Pingdong and Guangdong, such facilities were not yet set up in French Indochina.

In October 1941, the 1st Air Route Regiment was formed, and started providing services for air routes toward the French Indochina area, at first under the control of the Twenty-fifth Army commander and from November onwards under the full control of the commander in chief of the Southern Army. Its operational area was supposed to be expanded to the Malaya area as the situation progressed.\(^\text{18}\)

The duties of the air route service, which consisted of securing communications and airfield operations (replenishment, servicing, providing supplies and provisions), were very complicated. It required considerable time for the regiment, which mainly engaged in the first-mentioned duty, to appropriately carry out its duties in cooperation with the various airfield operation units on site. Moreover, in the beginning, the communications with the air units or transport units which should use its services was not smooth, either.

The air transport system or the air route service in this area [of the South], which required the concentration of large air units or the advancement of many replenishment aircraft toward the front, had taken shape, but when hostilities opened, its substance was still not well developed.\(^\text{5, 18, 19, 42}\)

**The Formation of the 1st Field Replenishment Air Unit**

In the Army, the custom was that in the case of officers the replenishment of air crew was implemented by Imperial order (which was given on the advice of the [war] minister and issued by the War Ministry), and in the case of non-commissioned officers and warrant officers by disposition of the [highest] commander in charge (such as the commander in chief of the
Southern Army), and that the positions would be filled by graduates of the flying schools or those who had completed [training in] the training air regiment.

However, in the coming southern operation, in which fierce battles were expected in remote places, it was feared that this procedure would cause gaps in the replenishment. The Army central command came up with the idea of sending forward the required reserve personnel in advance to key places near the front line and keep them on standby while conducting training. The unit formed in November 1941 for that purpose was the 1st Field Replenishment Air Unit.

Led by Lt. Col. Tsubouchi Yoshinao, the unit consisted of a headquarters, a Reconnaissance Unit (personnel and aircraft of about one squadron, as well as [a total of] thirty reserve personnel including officers), a Fighter Unit (ditto, with thirty-five reserve personnel), a Light Bomber Unit (ditto, with fifty reserve personnel), a Heavy Bomber Unit (ditto, with seventy reserve personnel), and others.

The unit, which completed its formation in Hamamatsu at the end of November, advanced to Taiwan in December, where it assumed its duties. (Note: Its transfer to southern French Indochina occurred in early February 1942.)

The Mobilization of the Special Air Transport Unit

For a long time, the Army had held the traditional view that, in time of war, it should mobilize the personnel and equipment of civilian airlines for Army air transport. The airlines around that time were Dai Nippon Kōkū [Kaisha, Greater Japan Airlines], Manchukuo National Airways, and China Air Transport. Considering them as its reserve forces, the Army supported and promoted their development and enhancement.

The Special Air Transport Unit had been prepared from peacetime as part of the Army mobilization plan. [In the unit,] the commanders were the drafted top echelons of the companies, and the crew consisted of the employees, who were also given the status of civilian employees attached to the army. The intention was to utilize as much as possible the peacetime functions of the airlines. In reality, the hierarchical status of the personnel of the companies and those of the military did not exactly match, which, involving issues of provisions, created delicate problems in the relations between them.

While the Army employed the Special Air Transport Unit primarily to maintain regular airline services, it [also] aimed at assigning the unit to conduct the urgent and concentrated transportation of forces and military supplies when needed. Moreover, replenishment was supposed to be taken care of by the companies themselves. Although the Special Air Transport Unit took charge of various duties with experienced skill, it had problems with the training to become united as a genuine military unit. Moreover, the Special Air Transport Unit that was prepared for the southern operation consisted of only about four to five squadrons. The Army’s pre-war understanding of the significance of air transport was far from adequate. (39, 207)

The Formation of the 17th and the 18th Shipboard Aircraft Depots

The idea of shipboard aircraft depots, which Col. Miyoshi Yasuyuki, a teacher of military science at the War College, had proposed after the war game of the Malaya operation conducted
at the college in January 1941, was adopted by the [Army] central command, and the 17th
and the 18th Shipboard Aircraft Depots were formed.\footnote{39, 145}

The 17th Shipboard Aircraft Depot, which was formed under the supervision of the Py-
ongyang Aircraft Depot in July that year, consisted of thirty-six officers and non-commis-
sioned officers, led by Maj. Takamori Shinkichi. Apart from them, there were about twenty
employees and about two hundred workers. The competency of all, including the officers,
was relatively superior. The ship employed was the \textit{Yahiko-maru} (7,850 tons).\footnote{51, 64}

The duty was to repair aircraft engines on the vessel, and it was possible to overhaul at
least forty to fifty engines onboard per month. Also, propellers could be repaired. The 18th
Shipboard Aircraft Depot was formed in Kakamigahara in late October 1941. Led by com-
mander Maj. Noguchi Shichirō, it employed the \textit{Olympia-maru} (5,737 tons). Its formation and
capacity corresponded to the first ship.

Both shipboard aircraft depots left mainland Japan in late October; the former arrived in
Saigon around 10 November and the latter around 4 December, where both started their op-
erations with great enthusiasm. From 15 November onwards, they were put under the full
control of the commander in chief of the Southern Army.\footnote{51, 65}

\section*{The Formation of the Technical Department of the Air Arm of the Southern [Army]}

On 15 November 1941, the Army central command formed the Technical Department of the
air arm of the Southern [Army], which was supposed to provide technical aeronautical guid-
ance and support for the front-line units as well as to conduct research in aeronautical tech-
nology. The department was led by Maj. Gen. Hattori Takeshi.

The department was established with the aim of quickly grasping the technological les-
sons of war gained in front-line air engagements against its technologically advanced adver-
saries, the United States and Britain, and promptly and aptly deal with not only the problems
on site but also provide countermeasures for central command. Needless to say, the research
in the technology required [in operations] in the tropics was supposed to be continued, as
well.

The formation of the department was completed in Tachikawa on 25 November. In the
beginning of December, its top echelon advanced to Saigon in its own aircraft, while the bulk
of the department sailed in ships, to start operations under the full control of the Southern
Army commander in chief. The department’s tasks were divided into sections for aircraft
bodies, engines, firearms, electronic precision devices, fuel, and medicine.\footnote{57, 69, 78}

\section*{Upgrading the Aircraft}

\subsection*{Type–1 Fighter Planes (Ki–43) and the 59th and 64th Air Groups}

As research on the southern operation progressed, [it was found that the Army] needed a
fighter plane, which would have a longer combat range than the current Type–97 fighter
planes (with an action radius of about four hundred kilometers), and in the spring of 1941,
the Ki–43 was formally adopted as the Type–1 fighter plane, as previously told. However,
the aircraft, which two years before in operational suitability screenings had at one time been
informally rejected because of a perceived lack of nimble maneuverability, had a bad reputa-
tion among pilots who attached more importance to performance in dog fights.\footnote{12, 21}
In June 1941, the production of Type–1 fighter plane aircraft merely amounted to about forty planes in total. Nevertheless, as a start, [the Army] had at least the 59th Air Group (led by Maj. Tanimura Reinosuke) of the 3d Air Division in eastern China replace its Type–97 fighter planes with Type–1 fighter planes.

However, around that time, the performance of Type–1 fighter plane was unstable, the on-board 12.7-mm machineguns often malfunctioned in the air, and the radio quality was poor. Although they were equipped with flaps, which could be used in aerial combats as well, the structure of the wings was fragile, and there were even accidents in which parts of the plane tore apart during normal flight in midair.\(^{(101, 105, 120)}\)

In late September, it was decided to upgrade next the aircraft of the 64th Air Group in southern China. The group sent one squadron after another to the Fussa airfield and had the aircraft replaced. Around that time, the performance of the Type–1 fighter plane was getting somewhat more stable, but it had not yet completely improved.

Maj. Kato Tateo, the commander of the group, emphasized that despite the aircraft’s deficiencies, the crew should bring its power into full play and make efforts to carry out their task, and he took the lead in starting to hone their flying skills.\(^{(21, 120)}\)

The 59th Air Group, which had made strenuous efforts to bring the power of the aircraft into full play, eventually sent its main force back to Tachikawa right before the opening of hostilities, and after having the aircraft replaced, advanced to the South.\(^{(21, 77, 101, 105)}\)

What was most expected of the Type–1 fighter plane at that time in the southern operation was that it would facilitate the Malaya operation by fully demonstrating its combat range. In order to realize that, a study had been conducted to extend the combat range of the aircraft to up to about two thousand kilometers by using drop tanks. However, if air engagements of about thirty minutes over enemy territory were set as the standard, the action radii of the air groups were about six to seven hundred kilometers. Needless to say, the skills of the units would cause large differences in the lengths of the radii. The action radius of the Kato Air Group, which was regarded as the top elite unit, was about seven hundred kilometers. In any case, the drop tanks of the Type–1 fighter plane were the main point.\(^{(12, 65)}\)

The Ki–44 (Type–2 fighter plane) and the 47th Independent Air Squadron

In June 1940, the first prototype of the Ki–44, the first-ever heavy fighter plane of the Army, was produced. The results of the operational suitability screenings revealed that despite its excellent speed and armaments, its maneuverability was markedly poor, and thus it was generally given low marks. However, reluctant to give up the aircraft ahead of a war against the U.S. and Britain, [the Army] decided to make the decision of whether to formally adopt the aircraft or not, based on the results of a test match with a state-of-the-art Messerschmitt aircraft imported from Germany and flown by a German pilot, while having [the Ki–44] flown by a Japanese pilot. However, since the test in July 1941 showed that the Ki–44 was rather superior in speed, it was yet again decided that tests and improvements of the aircraft should be continued.

Then at the time of the opening of hostilities, it was decided that in order to achieve the effect of a surprise attack in terms of technology, one squadron, equipped with additionally
produced prototype aircraft, was specially formed and made to participate in the initial engagements. The personnel of the [Army] Flight Test Department and other top guns were assigned as crew, with Maj. Sakagawa Toshio (graduate of the 43d class), the person in charge of the tests of the aircraft, as commander. The unit was named the 47th Independent Air Squadron after the forty-seven loyal rōnin of the Akō clan, and also informally called the “Shinsengumi in the Sky.”* Anyhow, the tests of the aircraft were not yet adequately conducted and so was the training for service and maintenance, which raised doubts whether the squadron could really accomplish the expected results. Another [problem] was that the aircraft had a short combat range, and particularly its combat action radius was [merely] four hundred kilometers or less. (12, 46, 47)

The Type–100 Strategic Reconnaissance Aircraft

In February 1937, the Army adopted the Type–97 strategic reconnaissance aircraft, which had been radically designed for speed and combat range, with the main aim of reconnoitering the situation in the air. The aircraft did extremely well in the China Incident and the Nomonhan Incident. In August 1940, a descendant of the aircraft, the Type–100 strategic reconnaissance aircraft, emerged. In the autumn of 1941, ahead of the opening of hostilities against the United States and Britain, the Army strategic reconnaissance units participating in the southern operation had a mixed equipment of both Type–97 and Type–100 aircraft.

The top speeds of Type–100 strategic reconnaissance aircraft were 540 km [per hour] for Model I and 604 km [per hour] for Model II (completed in March 1941), and they were considered to match the P–40s, the Hurricanes and the Spitfires, which were said to have been put onto the southern front, and whose top speeds were respectively 570 km, 540 km, and 590 km [per hour]. The action radius of Type–100 strategic reconnaissance aircraft was over one thousand kilometers and its ceiling reached as high as 10,800 meters. (9, 69, 97)

Other Types of Aircraft

Needless to say, each air unit section prepared to go into the great war with its aircraft replaced with the latest types (models) as much as possible. The majority of the light bomber units were equipped with Type–99 twin-engine light bombers, which were formally adopted in July 1940. [However,] all heavy bomber units still used Type–97 (Models I or II) heavy bombers, [because] the engines of the Type–100 heavy bomber, which was formally adopted in August 1940, were unstable and not yet widely employed. (5)

The Special Trainings of the Units Scheduled for the Southern Operation

On 16 September, the IGHQ [Army Department] instructed the units scheduled to participate in the southern operation to conduct special trainings for about one month, the outline of which was as follows: (19)

* These references to different groups of masterless samurai in Japanese history, often associated with loyalty, patriotism, and fearlessness in the face of death, indicate the Army’s intention to bolster the morale of the squadron, which was given a special status with not yet fully tested aircraft.
1. Flights

[Trainings for] flights over sea including the night flights, and the standard lengths of the flights shall be set as follows:

[Units with]

Type–97 strategic reconnaissance aircraft: 600 km and back
Type–100 strategic reconnaissance aircraft: 800 km and back
Type–97 fighter planes: 400 km and back
Type–1 fighter planes: 600 km and back
Type–97 light bombers: 500 km and back
Type–99 light bombers: 700 km and back
Type–97 heavy bombers: 900 km and back

2. Communications

[How to] use and service the newly formally adopted devices, swift and certain communications between the ground and aircraft, and communications with the Navy air unit shall be trained.

3. Servicing

Mainly the use and the servicing of newly formally adopted equipment [shall be trained].

On 9 November, the Third Air Force commander submitted the following report concerning the results of the special trainings of about one month. (35, 77)

The Third Air Force’s Report on the Results of the Trainings (as of late October 1941)

1. Training

(1) The trainings for both the night flights and the flights over sea are [yet] insufficient. We are [still] conducting trainings so that our units can operate at night during the tenth to the twentieth lunar day. Only three to six aircraft of a squadron are able to fly on a moonless night.

(2) [Concerning] the action radius of fighter units, currently, the Katō Air Group has been able to [extend] its action radius to 650 kilometers, while the action radius of the Tanimura Air Group is still no more than 600 kilometers.

(3) Due to its high take-off and landing speed, it takes skill to make Type–100 strategic reconnaissance aircraft take off and land. However, the aircraft is mostly available these days, and at least two men of the air group (note by the author: the 81st Air Group) were so excellent that they can reconnoiter under any circumstances.

2. Pilots

(1) Some units have a few more reserve pilots than their quota, while other units can barely fill their quota.

(2) About one third [of pilots] barely have C-level skills.

Note by the author: C-levels were given to those who had not yet completed the training within the unit for firing, bombing, or night flights, or to those who had completed the training, but who were unfit for operations due to injuries or illness.

3. Equipment

(1) The Model II heavy bombers are good, and we have no complaints.

(2) Although Type–99 twin-engine light bombers had lubricant leaks because of broken pipes, they were improved after switching to flexible pipes.

(3) The Type–1 fighter planes are not only weak against drag causing wrinkles on the surface of the wings, but also the rivets on particular parts get loose. Out of the twenty aircraft tested, problems were found with four to five aircraft.

Fuel from the [two] extra tanks is consumed unevenly.

Considering such circumstances, it is unreasonable to expect the Type–1 fighter plane to be the upgrade.
This report provided by Third Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Sugawara described the actual situation of the collective strength [of his force].

These data were the actual situation of the combat capabilities of the Army Air Service units just before the launch of the southern operation, including the capabilities of long distance flights, flights over sea as well as the skill in flying the latest-model aircraft. The data showed that the units needed further efforts to improve their skills. (21, 23)

Note: The recollections of Imagawa [Issaku] concerning the action radius of the Type–97 fighter planes

It is seriously wrong to think that the action radius of an aircraft can be calculated from its list of specifications.

Besides the fact that the action radii differed depending on whether the aircraft flew on their own or in formation, in operational units, the skills of the unit, the character of the commander and other factors made a great difference.

During the eastern China operation, Air Corps Commander Tokugawa [Yoshitoshi] asked the commanders of three air groups equipped with Type–97 planes about their possible action radii, but they gave different answers about their own air groups, even though all were equipped with the same Type–97 fighter planes.

Since cautious air groups applied safety risks to all matters, such as the condition of the airfield, peculiar weather, the [expected] duration of air combat, the skills of the pilots, particularly, the intervals between the landings of each plane, the service conditions of the aircraft and the existence of the emergency landing strips, they estimated the action radii at a shorter range.

On the other hand, confident air groups, which intensely examined [their flights] and planned [bold] attempts, did their best to [extend their action radius] close to the maximum as an air group. It was no surprise that the action radii of the operational units did differ according to the units.

The Study and Training of the Paratrooper Unit

The [Paratroop] Raiding Training Department, which had moved in May 1941 from Hamamatsu to Baichengzi in Manchuria, had by summer given paradrop trainings to three to four hundred men.

The department was transferred to Manchuria with the primary intention of maintaining secrecy. However, since it was the first special unit, many study results concerning the unit, such as its composition, employment, training, equipment and maintenance of the equipment, were required to be urgently dealt with at the Army central command, and [keeping the department in] such a remote place as Baichengzi often caused great inconvenience. It was also evident that conducting paradrop trainings in northern Manchuria during winter was difficult.

At the end of August, the [Paratroop] Raiding Training Department moved to Nyūtabaru in Miyazaki prefecture. At the department, the formation of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group (consisting of the 1st and the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiments and the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit) was studied and prepared for an emergency.

On 8 October, the IGHQ [Army Department] gave instructions concerning the training of the [Paratroop] Raiding Unit which was to be formed shortly. The training was very much intended for the paradrop [operation] in Palembang. (Note: will be mentioned below.)
In late October at Karasebaru (to the north of Nyūtabaru), a comprehensive paradrop exercise was conducted in front of a large audience, which included General Terauchi Hisaichi and others involved in the Southern Army headquarters. The exercise was a success. Although it was not yet decided for what operation the high command was going to employ a paradrop, it was decided that the department should continue to study and exercise the details of a paradrop operation at Palembang. (19, 21, 34, 41, 205)

[The IGHQ Army Department's] Instructions Concerning the Training of the Paradrop Raiding Unit

(Outline)

The training of the Paradrop Raiding Unit shall be [conducted] in conformity with the Main Points Concerning the Employment of the [Paradrop] Raiding Unit in the separate volume (omitted by the author). Particularly in the training in fiscal year 1941, the following items shall be taken into consideration:

1. Attack targets: Airfields and other strategic places (bridges, large factories, etc.)
2. The strength to be dropped at one point: One regiment shall normally be dropped at one point.
3. The enemy situation near the dropping points:
   a. Although the enemy strength will be a little superior to that of our paratrooper unit, its quality is poor. Nevertheless, they are equipped with light tanks or light armored vehicles.
   b. Airfields, large factories, and large bridges will be equipped with several concrete-covered firing positions, and not a few airfields and vacant lots will be equipped with chevaux-de-frise and trenches to prevent airdrops.
4. The topography near the dropping points: Since the surrounding areas are mostly covered with jungle, the places for paradrop landings shall be limited to airfields or pastures.
5. The distance between the base and the dropping point: Within six hundred kilometers.
6. The actions after the drop: In attacking key point[s], one may attack or exclusively focus on defense after passing through forests or marshy grounds for two to three kilometers.
7. A prompt and proper cutoff of the enemy lines of communications
8. Ammunition and provisions for three days shall always be carried.

The Construction of Air Bases from Where to Launch the Operation

The Construction of Airfields in Southern French Indochina (See Illustration No. 7)

On 12 August, the IGHQ [Army Department] assigned the following tasks to the Twenty-fifth Army commander: (18)

The Twenty-fifth Army shall station one element in northern French Indochina and its main force in southern French Indochina and carry out the following tasks:

1. To establish military bases for the southern operation and secure them.
2. To make preparations for operations against a third country in order to quickly respond to changes in the situation.
3. To intensify the blockade against China.
4. In case an air operation to invade China should be conducted from the Indochina area, the China Expeditionary Army and the [Navy] China Area Fleet shall closely cooperate in the operation.
Instructions were given that the construction of military bases should be conducted in conformity with the instructions given at the time of the stationing [of forces] in southern French Indochina in July. A number of officers from the air service were additionally allocated to the Twenty-fifth Army headquarters, including staff officers Lt. Col. Suzuki Takashi and Lt. Col. Nishioka Shigeru, Maj. Hamu Keitarō and Maj. Tsukushi Jirō, as well as others attached to the staff department.

The Twenty-fifth Army allocated the 5th and the 6th Field Airfield Construction Units and the 93d and the 94th Airfield Battalions to 7th Air-Ground Support headquarters Commander Col. Taniuchi Seiichi, who was under its command, and gave him orders to condition the airfields.\(^{(18, 19, 68, 89)}\)

In principle, an airfield construction unit at that time was supposed to mainly employ local labor in Manchuria. It consisted of about one hundred men and was equipped with about nine hundred shovels, about ninety pickaxes and several rollers.\(^{(89, 91)}\)

Although [the Japanese Army] was permitted to use eight [designated] airfields by the French Indochina Army, as previously told, most of them were small and situated in low marshy areas. They had to be expanded and conditioned before being used by the large Japanese army units. The French Indochina Army authorities were essentially uncooperative. On top of that, a shortage of necessary matériel, rubble in particular, as well as the inconvenient locations and heavy rainfall made the conditioning work difficult. Fortunately, the local people were very much well-disposed towards the Japanese Army and provided a plentiful workforce, which enabled [the Army] to work around the clock.\(^{(68, 89, 199, 200)}\)

On 14 September, in addition to the airfields it had originally designated, the IGHQ [Army Department] instructed the Twenty-fifth Army to expand the airfields in Kampong Chhnang and Krakor and construct two new airfields near Takeo for heavy bomber units.\(^{(19)}\)

At the end of September, the IGHQ [Army Department] further demanded [the Twenty-fifth Army] to construct [an] airfield for fighter planes on Phu Quoc Island situated at the southwestern tip of French Indochina, for which the army in October constructed an airfield at Duong Dong. However, since it was too small, the army [additionally] prepared another airfield for fighter planes on a pasture near Cua Can to the north [of Duong Dong] after construction work of about ten days. These airfields were indispensable for Army fighter planes with a limited range to conduct operations in the Malaya area, and therefore of great significance.\(^{(89, 94)}\)

During this period, [the Army also] conditioned airfields near the border with Thailand, such as those in Siem Reap and Krakor, while conducting a propaganda drive to give hostile countries the impression as if Japan was preparing for an invasion of Thailand.\(^{(89)}\)

At the end of October, Col. Iketani Hanjirō, staff officer of the Twenty-fifth Army, gave the following report to IGHQ about the readiness of the airfields in southern French Indochina.\(^{(35)}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hanoi</td>
<td>in operation</td>
<td>Available for two air gps of heavy bombers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Repair of the main runway to be completed on 1 November.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiphong</td>
<td>in operation</td>
<td>One air gp of light bombers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Runway being compressed with rollers; already extended from 1,000 meters to 1,200 meters.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tourane (Da Nang) in operation: One air gp of heavy bombers. Expansion of warming-up line expected to be completed on 10 November.


Saigon in operation: Two air gps of heavy bombers. Expansion work completed.

Phnom Penh in operation: Two air gps of heavy bombers. Expansion work completed.

Tani No. 1 newly established: One and a half air gps of heavy bombers. [Construction of] the main runway completed; expected to be available around 10 November.

Tani No. 2 newly established: Two air gps of heavy bombers. Only available in the dry season; available by early December.

Kampong Trach in operation: Two air gps of fighter planes and heavy bombers. Expansion work completed.

Phu Quoc No. 1 newly established: One air gp of fighter planes. Airfield for rapid operations.

Phu Quoc No. 2 newly established: Two air gps of fighter planes. [Landing strip] cleared and almost completed for emergency landings; four kilometers to the north of Phu Quoc No. 1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kampong Chhnang</td>
<td>in operation</td>
<td>One air gp of light bombers; 50% of the construction plan completed; expected to be available in early December.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krakor</td>
<td>in operation</td>
<td>One air gp of light bombers; 70% of the construction plan completed; expected to be available in early December.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siem Reap</td>
<td>in operation</td>
<td>[blank]; 50% of the construction plan completed; expected to be available for transport aircraft around 10 November</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reinforcement of the Air Units in French Indochina**

From August onwards, the 51st Independent Air Squadron (strategic reconnaissance aircraft), the 25th Field Meteorological Unit (led by Maj. Mitani Tarō; graduate of the 39th class) and other units advanced to Saigon and started gathering information.

On 18 September, the IGHQ [Army Department] issued orders to dispatch the following units to French Indochina:

- **Air unit**
  - 15th Independent Air Unit HQ and 50th Independent Air Sqdn (strategic reconnaissance aircraft) (Note: [the latter] had two Type-100 strategic reconnaissance aircraft as of the end of September)

- **Intelligence unit**
  - 16th Air Intelligence Unit

- **Meteorological unit**
  - 1st Field Meteorological Bn HQ, 1st and 2d Meteorological Cos

- **Signal unit**
  - 15th Air Signal Unit (minus one element)

- **Supply and transport unit**
  - Two independent motor transport cos, one line-of-communications motor transport co, 42d Line-of-Communications Area Unit, fourteen railway depot hqs and 2d Railway Unit

- **Airfield operation unit**
  - 15th Air-Ground Support HQ, four airfield bns, three airfield cos and one construction duty co

**The Construction of Airfields in Southern Taiwan and the Reinforcement of the Units to Be Dispatched [There]**

As previously told [pp. 39-40], at the end of 1940, the construction of new airfields and the expansion of the airfields in use in southern Taiwan had been investigated.

While [the conditions of the airfields in] Jiayi and Gangshan were comparatively satisfactory, the others required expansion.

In line with the instructions of the IGHQ [Army Department], from July 1941 onwards, the Taiwan Army started on the construction of new airfields in Fengshan, Chaozhou, Jia-dong and Hengchun as well as the expansion of existing airfields in southern Taiwan.\(^{(148, 149, 151)}\)

On 3 September, the IGHQ [Army Department] gave instructions to the First Air Force commander to support the airfield construction work assigned to the Taiwan Army.\(^{(16)}\)

On 6 September, the IGHQ [Army Department] gave instructions to the 4th [Field] Airfield Construction Unit (consisting of ninety-one men after completing its formation), which had been newly formed for the KANTOKUEN maneuvers, to advance to Taiwan for transfer
training purposes. Along with the 9th [Field] Airfield Construction Unit, which had also shifted from Manchuria, on 18 September, the unit entered the port of Gaoxiong and received instructions from the 4th Air Division commander, to start on the construction of the airfields at Hengchun and Fengshan.\(^{(167)}\)

The situation of the airfields in Taiwan at that time was as shown in **Illustration No. 10**.

On 18 September, the IGHQ [Army Department] issued orders to send the following units from Manchuria to Taiwan.\(^{(18)}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air unit</th>
<th>10th Independent Air Unit HQ, 70th Independent Air Sqdn (strategic reconnaissance aircraft), 74th Independent Air Sqdn (aircraft for the direct support [of ground units]) and 76th Independent Air Sqdn (strategic reconnaissance aircraft)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence unit</td>
<td>One element of the 3d Air Intelligence Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meteorological unit</td>
<td>2d Field Meteorological Bn HQ, 3d and 4th Meteorological Cos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal unit</td>
<td>1st Air Signal Rgt (minus two wire cos)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airfield operation unit</td>
<td>Three airfield bns and one construction duty co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air defense unit</td>
<td>One field antiaircraft artillery bn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In early October, the units for Taiwan which had left Manchuria at the end of September, reached Taiwan and prepared for the operation as disposed by the 4th Air Division commander.

At the end of October, the 70th Independent Air Squadron was transferred to southern French Indochina.\(^{(51)}\)

### The Arrangements for Replenishment and Repair

Around that time, the units assigned to replenishment and repair in the Army Air Service consisted of the following: \(^{(5, 42)}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field aircraft supply depots</th>
<th>[in charge of] the supply of fuel and ammunition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field aircraft repair depots</td>
<td>[in charge of] the replenishment and repair of aircraft equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft depots, field aircraft depots, and detached depots of aircraft depots</td>
<td>while covering both above-mentioned duties, they could also form mobile repair details.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of the autumn of 1941, the Army Air Service had made the following arrangements for replenishment and repair for [its operation] in the South:

The operations of the main force of the Fifth Air Force in the Philippines should be taken care of by the aircraft [branch] depot at Pingdong, which operated also in peacetime, and the replenishment and repair to be provided by the depot should be commanded by the Southern Army. A mobile repair detail should be advanced to the Philippines at an appropriate moment.

The operations of the Third Air Force in the Malaya area should be taken care of by the 16th Field Aircraft Depot (formed in Guangdong in April 1941) and the 25th [Aircraft
After the Plan for the Southern Invasion Had Been Roughly Decided

Taipei (Songshan) (1,400m)
Taizhong (Xitun) (50th Air Gp (fighters))
Lugang
Yushan (Niitakayama) (1,000m) available for heavy bombers
Jiayi 14th Air Gp (heavy bombers)
Tainan
Gangshan (Navy)
Gaoxiong (Seaplane base) (600X150)
Donggang (Seaplane base) (1,600X350) (2 runways) converted a bombing field into an airfield
Chaozhou (2,000X2,000)
Hengchun (1,000X200)
Taihong (Xilun) (50th Air Gp (fighters))

Notes:
1. : airfields in operation (except for civilian airfields)
2. : civilian airfields in operation
3. : newly constructed or expanded airfields
4. Units names at the airfield indicate stationing units.
5. There was an emergency landing strip at Eluanbi, the southern point of Taiwan.

Illustration No. 10 — The Airfields in Taiwan Before the Opening of Hostilities
Depot's] Detached Depot (formed in Saigon in October 1941), which should first of all advance to French Indochina and then to Malaya.

The operations of the Fifth Air Force in Burma (after its transfer from the Philippines) should be taken care of by the 19th Field Aircraft Repair Depot (formed in Manchuria in October 1941) after its advance into Bangkok.

The 17th and the 18th Shipboard Aircraft Depots and the 20th Field Aircraft Supply Depot should take charge of the replenishment and repair in general in Saigon (where all [three depots] should arrive by the beginning of December). Depending on the circumstances, the shipboard depots should move to Malaya or Burma.\(^{51,70}\)

Among the above replenishment and repair units, some detached depots and mobile repair details should be attached to the \([numbered\] air forces, while the bulk of the others should in principle be put under the direct control of the Southern Army.

The Line of Communications Plan of the air arm of the Southern Army, which the Southern Army had been working on in early November with the above aims, was in outline as follows:\(^{61,65}\)

### The Line of Communications Plan of the Air Arm of the Southern Army

[The Southern Army shall] give priority to maintaining and sustaining the fighting power of the air units in the Malaya area in terms of equipment. Particularly, it shall see to it that the biggest operations, which will be conducted in the first two months after the opening of hostilities, will go off smoothly. In view of the characteristics of the operations, [the Southern Army shall] see to it that the aircraft repair units shall promptly bring their capabilities into full play, that the line-of-communications operations involving the air arm shall promptly and smoothly be executed, that the attrition rates in the initial engagements shall promptly be investigated and preventive measures shall be put in place, that countermeasures shall be taken against enemy air strikes, and that local industries and matériel shall be procured and put to use.

Outline

1. The 16th Field Aircraft Depot, the 19th Field Aircraft Repair Depot and the 20th Field Aircraft Supply Depot shall be put under the direct control of the Southern Army, while the 25th Aircraft Detached Depot shall at the beginning be put under the command of the Third Air Force commander.

   The Pingdong Army Aircraft Branch Depot shall cooperate with the Fourteenth Army.

   At the beginning, supply points shall be set at Pingdong, Guangdong and Saigon, which, when the operation makes progress, shall be advanced to Singapore. The 19th Field Aircraft Repair Depot shall, without missing an opportunity, advance into Bangkok. When the Fifth Air Force shifts to the Thailand area, one detached depot each of the Pingdong Army Aircraft Branch Depot and the 16th Field Aircraft Depot shall be attached to it. Once Singapore is captured, the industrial facilities there for aircraft [maintenance] shall be requisitioned and one element of the aircraft repair unit shall be advanced there.

2. The replenishment aircraft allotted to the Philippines area shall be transported by air to Pingdong, and those allotted to the Malaya area to Guangdong, and if required to Saigon.

   In principle, aircraft shall be repaired at air-ground support units or mobile repair details, while the field aircraft depots (and detached depots) as well as field aircraft repair depots shall mainly take charge of regular servicing. The replenishment and repair to be provided to the air units under the direct control of the Southern Army shall be assigned to the Pingdong Army Aircraft Branch Depot, the 16th Field Aircraft Depot and the 25th Aircraft Detached Depot. The
regular servicing of the aircraft of air transport units shall mainly be conducted at the aircraft repair facilities in mainland Japan or northern or eastern China.

Research on the improvement of armaments based on the experience gained in engagements and prompt modifications based on such research shall be taken care of by the Technical Department [of the air arm of the Southern Army] under the control of the Southern Army headquarters, with the cooperation of the aircraft repair facilities. The supply and repair of the aircraft communications equipment shall mainly be taken care of by the 25th Aircraft Detached Depot, with the support of the air route regiment if required.

3. As for the supply of goods other than ammunition, fuel and armaments, those which the IGHQ [Army Department] has accumulated in Taiwan and southern French Indochina by the launch of the operations and those which shall be sent forward to southern Thailand along with the advance forces of the Twenty-fifth Army shall be allocated [to the air arm of the Southern Army]. At the Fifteenth Army’s advance into central Thailand, [the supply of goods] equivalent to [that required by] the strength of the Fifth Air Force for its consumption of about a half month shall be accumulated in southern French Indochina. Also, the Fifth Air Force shall, when advancing into the Philippines, send forward as much fuel and ammunition as possible from the stock provided in Taiwan for a consumption of about one and a half months. Concerning the supply of oxygen, the oxygen [produced at] the fixed oxygen generation device[s] in Guangdong shall be allotted to fill the demands [of the operation] in Malaya, and apart from that, mobile oxygen generation device[s] shall be provided to both [the Fifth and Third] Air Forces. In addition, both air forces shall be provided with onboard oxygen generators and the oxygen generation agent [cylinders], and the agent shall then be successively supplied to them.

4. In the initial period after the opening of hostilities, the means of transport on the Mekong River shall be allocated to the Third Air Force for the transport [of supplies] for the air force in French Indochina, and when the units under the command of the air force dash from French Indochina to southern Thailand, a sea transport capacity of about five thousand tons shall [also] be allocated to it. In the initial period of the operation, the bulk of the air transport squadron shall be attached to the Third Air Force. [Then,] the squadron shall cooperate with the main force of the Fifth Air Force when the latter shifts from the Philippines to Thailand. After that, one element each of the air transport squadron shall be attached to both air forces, while the main force of the squadron shall be put under the direct control of the Southern Army.

5. The local industrial capacity shall be put to use under the control of the commanders of the air forces. While swiftly put to use, seized items shall also be made available for technological research. For that purpose, the Southern Army headquarters shall dispatch [personnel of] the Technical Department of the air arm and other necessary parties to those theaters where necessary, while the air units shall support them in their research.

Note 1. In the above period, aviation fuel and ammunition were successively advanced and stored in Taiwan and French Indochina, which generally went smoothly. However, the ammunition and drop tanks of the Type-1 fighter planes had major defects, the details of which will be given later.

Note 2. The supply of general armaments and ammunition other than those for aircraft, provision as well as clothing was supposed to be provided by the ground line-of-communications units.

Note 3. In the order issued by the Southern Army on 6 November, one element each of the 9th and the 12th Field Aircraft Repair Depots were made to participate in the invasion operations. The former was assigned to the repair of aircraft in the Philippines, the latter in Malaya.
The Collection and Distribution of Meteorological Data

The Collection of Data About French Indochina and Malaya

Since the Malaya area was not included among the subjects of the Army Plan of Operations until fiscal year 1939, as previously told, almost no collection and processing of military meteorological data on the South other than Luzon Island in the Philippines was carried out until the middle of 1940.

In the middle of 1940, the rise of the southern question led to a sudden start of collecting and processing military meteorological data in the South. However, [organizing] meteorological information required years of actual fundamental data, and by then, the countries [in the South] already used for about three years codes for their weather broadcasts, which meant that [the Army’s meteorological] information on the southern areas was left blank. Although the rough meteorological outline of the prospective operational areas in the South came to be known from the beginning of 1941 onwards through the cooperation from various quarters such as meteorological observatories, airlines, and shipping companies, it was far from enough to forecast the weather conditions at the prospective landing points, or the weather conditions, which would be timely required for the air operations.

The Army [continued] collecting data and conducting research, giving priority to the judgment on the weather conditions which would make a success of the landings and the first air strikes on Malaya, the key operations at the very beginning of the hostilities.(63)

General Meteorological Conditions in the South, Collected [by the Army]

As the result of successively obtaining the actual conditions of the weather and the real data of atmospheric patterns through the cooperation from various quarters, [the Army] was able to sort out and distribute the following general information on the meteorological conditions in the South.(72, 73, 74)

General conditions:
Besides the air masses over Mongolia, also those over the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean, Tibet, and Australia decide the wind directions in the key areas of the South. Particularly, the rise and fall of the air masses over Mongolia and the Pacific Ocean decide [the directions of] the monsoons blowing towards the Philippines, French Indochina, Thailand, Malaya, Borneo, etc.

The winter season (October-April):
Since the atmospheric pressure of the air mass over Mongolia becomes high while that on the Pacific Ocean becomes low, strong winds blow southward. Although the wind direction differs depending on the places, by and large northeastern wind blows toward Luzon Island, the east coast of French Indochina and the east coast of the Malay Peninsula, and bad weather continues in the eastern half of Luzon Island, the east coast of French Indochina and the east coast of the Malay Peninsula.

The summer season (May-September):
In summer, the monsoon blows in the opposite direction from the southwest, and the weather generally shows the conditions opposite to that of the winter.

The characteristics:
All in all, the southern areas belong to the tropics, and generally possess a tropical climate. The temperature scarcely changes and remains high with an average high of thirty-five to thirty-six degrees Celsius and an average low of twenty degrees Celsius, while the whole area has a high level of rainfall. Cumuli, which constitute most of the low-level clouds, generally rise to a higher
altitude than those in the midlatitudes, and often develop to an altitude of five thousand meters or more.

Due to the monsoons, along with the effect of geographical features, on the windward side of mountain ranges, strong winds and heavy rainfall may be expected, causing bad weather and low visibility, on the other hand, calm [conditions may be expected] on the downwind side.

The weather changes unexpectedly in small areas. Often, it suddenly turns [bad]. In general, rain falls in tropical squalls, which commonly come at a certain time of the day.

Heat thunderstorms frequently occur. Particularly at the time when the monsoon is reversing, giant cumulonimbi develop, usually accompanying heavy rainfall and gusty winds. Moreover, the area fulfills the conditions in which mist easily occurs. Attention must be paid to typhoons and tornados, too.

Therefore, when flying in the region, it is important to [appropriately] select the flying routes, the departure time and the flight altitude, and it is necessary to take every precaution against the local weather peculiarities.

Typhoons frequently pass over the Philippine Islands, particularly the northern part of it, the east coast of French Indochina, the South China Sea, the waters to the east of the Philippines, and the northeastern and the northwestern coasts of Australia, and sometimes cause enormous damage. Typhoons most frequently form in the areas between three to twelve degrees north and between 130-135 degrees east, and two-thirds of them appear between July and October.

Such meteorological peculiarities not only directly affect the flights, but the gusts and heavy rainfalls also affect the airfield facilities. Moreover, one needs to be careful to keep the air armaments proofed against damp and rust.
Chapter 3  The Operational Preparations of the 
Army Air Service After the Determination 
to Open Hostilities  
(October – November 1941)

1. The Problems Facing the Air Service at the Time of the 
Reexamination of the National Policy

Reexamination of the Situation by IGHQ and the Government

On 16 October, the third Konoe Cabinet, which was pressed to decide on war or peace 
in conformity with the Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial National Pol-
icy decided upon on 6 September, resigned en masse, and on the 18th, a cabinet was 
established with General Tōjō Hideki (who remained on active-duty in the Army by special 
Imperial favor) as prime minister (and also war minister).

The Tōjō Cabinet decided to start again from scratch and begin with a reexamination of 
the situation. The main subjects to be reexamined were the outlook of the war situation in 
Europe, the outlook of [Japan’s] initial operations and the following operations over the [next] 
years in a war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, as well as the various 
relevant political situations, which a war against the United States, Britain and the Nether-
lands would entail inside and outside Japan.

For about one week from 23 October, IGHQ and the government held a liaison conference 
and formed a conclusion, giving decisions and explanations for every question.\(^{(25)}\)

The outlook of the war situation in Europe [re]examined on the 23d was given as follows: 
“In the present circumstances, peace is unlikely to be made between Britain and Germany 
and between Germany and the Soviet Union; it is probable that both [wars] will become 
drawn-out wars. However, since Germany hopes to conclude peace at an early date, depend-
ing on the changes in the war situation and the attitudes of Britain and the Soviet Union, an 
unexpected achievement of peace is not totally impossible.”

IGHQ’s Outlook on the Operations

The [IGHQ] Army Department’s [View on] the Probability [of Success] in the Implemen-
tation of the Southern Operation

Already from early October onwards, the IGHQ Army Department had been preparing the 
answers and explanations to [possible] Imperial questions concerning the outlook of the
The Operational Preparations of the Army Air Service After the Determination to Open Hostilities

[prospective] southern operation. The purpose was to stress that since [Japan] had now reached the stage to decide on war or peace in conformity with the Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy decided upon on 6 September, it was necessary to set the date of the opening of hostilities as soon as possible. Setting aside the details, [the Army Department] considered that success in the southern operation was probable, and gave the following grounds:(52)

The Grounds for Probable [Success] in the [Prospective] Southern Operation
1. To simultaneously conduct sudden attacks on the United States, Britain, the Netherlands and the Soviet Union separately and defeat them before they essentially form an alliance with each other. (Details omitted by the author.)
2. To thoroughly conduct preemptive sudden attacks. (Details omitted by the author.)
3. The probability of [success of] the Navy operations and the operations of the air forces
   In the southern operation, much is expected from the Navy and [both] air forces doing extremely well. As far as [the strength of] the Navy and [both] air forces of the Empire and that of the enemy are concerned, it is highly probable now that the Empire [will win], though we judge that the positions [of the Empire and the enemy] will gradually reverse with the lapse of time. Nevertheless, since it is a landing operation to be conducted in front of the enemy after a long-distance sea transport, we must to some degree be prepared for losses before the landings.
   In order to provide cover during the sea transport as well as at the anchorages, the Army itself, too, has been preparing several key antiaircraft defense ships to be completely ready to defend [the convoys].
4. Concerning the ground operations
   As for the operations after the landing, taking the composition, the equipment, the quality and the strength of our forces and those of the enemy into account, we have absolute confidence in [the successful operations of the Japanese] forces, and we think no worries are needed at all about accomplishing the planned objectives of the operation as well as about carrying out a drawn-out war after that.

Conclusion
To summarize the above, [the current overall situation in and outside Japan]* necessitates that hostilities against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands should be initiated as swiftly as possible. If we open hostilities as soon as the time is ripe, we are not only confident of success in terms of [the present] operations, but, even if the war should become protracted, it is also highly probable that we can [successfully] carry out a drawn-out war by overcoming the difficulties in the initial period.

Particularly, the point which we would not hesitate to reiterate and humbly ask Your Majesty to take into consideration is that a one-day delay [in making decisions] would increase the difficulties in the operation day by day, and the probability of success will gradually decrease. We already passed yesterday the crossroads to decide between war or peace. Today, it seems that there is no other way left than to resort to the means of force to break through [the situation].
(The rest omitted by the author)

The Operational Outlook for a War Against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands
On 24 October, IGHQ and the government [re]examined the outlook for a war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands in terms of operations. From the IGHQ Army Department, Vice Chief of Staff Tsukada Osamu, stated the above-mentioned outline as the op-

* Added from the original document.
The Operational Outlook for Several Years

[Even] when the operations against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands are for the most part completed, [Japan] must then expect [the possibility of] a drawn-out war against them. During that period, efforts must be made to completely settle the China Incident, while striving as much as possible to keep the Soviets from participating in the war. If worst comes to worst, the possibility must be expected that [Japan] shall open hostilities against the Soviets with the necessary forces to remove the concerns in the North.

1. The outlook for our military strength in terms of resources
Once the Empire has secured Manchuria, China and the resource areas in the South as it has planned, the military, the government and civilians shall work together and devote all their efforts to developing and making use of the various resources, which will make [the Empire] self-supporting and self-sufficient, and thus enable it to by and large establish an economically un defeatable position. By occupying every military base in east Asia, [the Empire] can cut off the traffic and communications between the U.S. and British mainlands and Australia, the Far East, the Indian Ocean, and the southwestern Pacific, and hence gradually reduce the actual power of the enemy [in the latter region], at which point the Empire can be seen as having mostly completed the basis for carrying out a large-scale drawn-out war and established a strategically un defeatable position as well.

During this period, [the Empire] must be prepared that at first it will face considerable difficulties in terms of resources due to the U.S. and British air operations and their operations to destroy [Japan’s] commerce. However, it is believed to be possible [for the Empire] to gradually improve the situation, and in the final stages [of a war], fight with no misgivings at all while nurturing its strength. In contrast, [the shortage of] resources including tin, rubber, and tungsten will have an enormous impact on both the United States and Britain. We are confident that, even when compared with the enemy in terms of resources, [the Empire] is likely to successfully carry out a great drawn-out war. (Details omitted by the author; the items concerning the [army] air service shall be mentioned later.)

2. The measures to be taken against China and the North during the southern operation and their outlook. (Omitted by the author.)

In a summarized way, the above outlook on the initial operation and the following operations stretching over several years in a war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands were recorded as a decision of the Liaison Conference between IGHQ and the Government as follows: (25)
and that [the success of] a protracted war depends on how [the Navy] can appropriately maintain its war potential, while dealing with a U.S. military buildup. The war situation will be decided largely by the total power of the countries, including various tangible and intangible factors, as well as by the changes in the world situation.

The Judgment on the Changes in the Army Air Service’s Material War Potential

The above outlook for the operations over several years was formed mainly on the basis of observations on the changes in the [Empire’s] material war potential. On 24 October, at the aforementioned liaison conference, Vice Chief of Army General Staff Tsukada had explained the outlook for changes in the material war potential based on the premise that a northern operation would occur following the southern operation.\(^{25, 52}\)

At that time, the traditional way of thinking about the basic responsibilities of the Army and the Navy was that “the Navy shall be responsible for the Pacific area, and the Army for the continent.” The fact that he examined the situation while focusing on a scenario where a northern operation would be implemented following the southern operation, reflected such thinking and showed that the Army’s was seriously concerned about the North.

The Judgement on the Material War Potential in Case a Northern Operation Should Be Implemented Following the Southern Operation

1. Aircraft

The supply of aircraft shall be no impediment to a northern operation following the southern operation. Each fiscal year, the number of aircraft held [by the Army] shall actually slightly increase.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>Equipped (number of aircraft)</th>
<th>Expended (number of aircraft)</th>
<th>Remaining (number of aircraft)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>5,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>1,870</td>
<td>5,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>1,240</td>
<td>6,950</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note) The current number held ([as of] 1 August 1941): 4,400

Note by the author: Besides the number of expected to be expended aircraft, 1,900, 1,450 and 2,000 aircraft may respectively supposed to be deducted [from the remaining number of aircraft] of fiscal years 1941, 1942, and 1943 for upgrading and training purposes.

2. Bombs

The supply of bombs shall be no impediment to a northern operation following the southern operation. Not only that, even at the end of fiscal year 1942, when the number of bombs held [by the Army] was reduced to a minimum, the retention rate would still be 60% of the current number of bombs.
3. Liquid fuel (aircraft gasoline only)
   (1) In case an offensive toward the South shall be launched
       Judgement: no impediment to a southern operation
       The amount held by the Army (as of 1 August 1941): 488,000 kiloliters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>Equipped*</th>
<th>Expended*</th>
<th>Remaining*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   * The number of months in stock when consumed by one air division.
   (Note) The current amount of bombs held [by the Army] ([as of] 1 August 1941): seventy months when consumed by one air division.

(2) In case offensive operations toward the North shall be conducted right after the offensive operations toward the South
       Judgement
       If it is possible to complete a northern operation in the first half of fiscal year 1942, there will be no impediment to its realization; although a 10% shortage is anticipated compared to the expected loss in the latter half of fiscal year 1942, and a 30% shortage compared to that in fiscal year 1943, the situation will gradually improve in fiscal year 1944.

       The [expected] amount held by the Army (as of 1 May 1942): 250,000 kiloliters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>Prospective consumption in operations</th>
<th>Lost in enemy bombings, etc.</th>
<th>Prospective amount to be supplied</th>
<th>Remaining amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30 (10)</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>225</td>
<td></td>
<td>140 (72)</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>204</td>
<td></td>
<td>230 (152)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>204</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   Remarks: numbers in parentheses are expected to be obtained in the Dutch East Indies. Unit: 1,000 kiloliters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>Prospective consumption in operations</th>
<th>Lost in enemy bombings, etc.</th>
<th>Prospective amount to be supplied</th>
<th>Remaining amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>first half 174 second half 90</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>30 (10)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>● 11 (10% short)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>194</td>
<td></td>
<td>140 (72)</td>
<td>● 30% short</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>192</td>
<td></td>
<td>230 (152)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   Remarks: ● indicates the amount short. Unit: 1,000 kiloliters

Note by the author: The numbers in the table were copied from the original table as they were, despite some doubts about them.
By presenting such an outlook for the material war potential, the Army ultimately concluded that although considerable operational and material difficulties would arise in 1942 and 1943, the war potential would gradually increase after overcoming these difficulties, by which enough reserve power would be accumulated to conduct operations against Australia and others in the South, and that, on the other hand, with the China Incident completely settled and the defenses against the North strengthened, depending on the situation, an opportunity to completely deal with the North in alliance with the German army might still arise. \(^{(24, 25)}\)

Although the Army extensively examined before the opening of hostilities its material war potential, also of tanks, ground ammunitions and shipping tonnage along with the above, the basic tone of the examination was very optimistic.

In particular, the Army did not carefully study a war against the United States. Taking for granted that the Navy should play the leading part, it left a war against the United States entirely to the Navy.

Concerning the outlook for a war against the United States, the Army and Navy should have seriously studied together at least the air operations in a comprehensive way. However, the air units of the Army and Navy separately belonged to each force, which were not fully conscious of the value of aviation in a war against the United States.

Although the Army and the Navy placed considerable emphasis on the value of aviation in the Greater East Asia war, they did not think that it would decide the outcome of the operations in general. It seems that they judged that whether to win or lose in the Pacific Ocean would depend on the power of the respective fleets.

2. The Dispositions of the IGHQ [Army Department] About the Operational Preparations Brought About by the Determination to Open the Hostilities

The Decision on the New Imperial National Policy of 5 November

From 18 October onwards, the Tōjō Cabinet reexamined the situation, trying to find a way to break through the crisis. Concerning the air arm, the outlook for a war with a focus on the material war potential was described as in the aforementioned judgment. [The Empire] was now standing at the crossroads to either persevere without a fight as it was, or to initiate hostilities without missing an opportunity.

Thus, on 5 November, the Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy with a determination to go to war was finally adopted at the Imperial Conference. On the employment of force it said:

In order to break through the current crisis, achieve its self-preservation and self-defense, and establish a new order in Greater East Asia, the Empire is now determined to go to war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands. The time to initiate the above military action shall be set in early December.

It was added that the initiation of military action be cancelled if the negotiations with the United States should become successful by 0000 on 1 December. \(^{(50)}\)
The Plan for the Southern Operation and the Central Agreement Between the Army and the Navy

General

Meanwhile, the Army plan of operations for a war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands was finally completed near the end of October. On 3 November, the chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs together explained their plans of operations to the Emperor. And after going through the Supreme War Council on the 4th and the Imperial Conference on the 5th, the chief of the Army General Staff again explained on that afternoon the Imperial Army’s plan of operations for a war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands to the Emperor and asked for his approval.

The Army’s plan of operations included not only the southern operations, which should be conducted jointly by the Army and Navy against the key areas in the South, but also covered the operations against China after the launch of the above operations, as well as the case when Russia should join the war while these operations were under way.

[On the other hand,] the Navy had, besides the southern operation, drawn up a surprise attack operation against Hawaii, as well as stage-two operations after the completion of the southern operation.

The Army-Navy Central Agreement was restricted to the southern operation (or the stage of invasion).

As for the air operations, the Army-Navy Central Agreement on the Air Operation in the Southern Operation was concluded [and attached] as a separate volume, because the problems had become increasingly crucial and complicated.(18, 19, 21, 52)

The Army’s Plan of Operations

The outline of the Army’s plan of operations approved on 5 November was as follows:(61)

The Imperial [Japanese] Army Plan of Operations for a War Against the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands*

I. Southern Operation

1. Operational objective:
   The objective of the southern operation is to destroy the major bases of the United States, Britain and the Dutch East Indies in East Asia and to occupy and secure the key areas of the South. The areas intended to be occupied in this operation are the Philippines, Guam, Hong Kong, British Malaya, Burma, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, the Bismarck Archipelago, Dutch Timor, etc.

2. Mission:
   The Army and Navy, in close cooperation, shall simultaneously start operations with the preemptive sudden attacks on the Philippines and British Malaya, and strive to accomplish the operational objectives as quickly as possible.

3. Operational directives:
   (1) The operation shall start with the landing of advance forces in Malaya and air strikes on the Philippines, and taking advantage of the results of the air operations, the main forces

* See also Vol. 3, pp. 44-49. There may be some differences in wording, partly caused by the fact that Vol. 3 and Vol. 34 quote from multiple archival sources, and the authors omitted different parts.
of the armies in charge of each place] shall be put ashore in the Philippines first, then in Malaya, and promptly capture the Philippines and Malaya.

Apart from this, in the early stages of the operation, the strategic points of Guam, Hong Kong and British Borneo shall be captured and stability in Thailand and Indochina shall be secured.

Meanwhile, the strategic points of the Bismarck Archipelago, Dutch Borneo and Celebes shall be [captured] as quickly as possible, and, as the Malaya operation progresses, the strategic points in southern Sumatra shall be occupied and, while making preparations for operations [to capture] Java, the key resource areas shall be secured. The strategic points of the Moluccas and Timor shall [also] be occupied.

(2) While the air bases for the Java [operation] are conditioned, superiority shall be gained over the enemy’s air power and Java shall be captured. After Singapore has been occupied, strategic areas in northern Sumatra shall be occupied in a timely manner.

(3) Even when the Combined Fleet shifts to an interception position in response to an action of the U.S. main fleet, or when the Soviets join the war during the above operations, the Philippine and Malaya operations shall be continued and the previously-defined objectives of the operation shall be accomplished as quickly as possible.

(4) During the above [operations], air bases in southern Burma shall be seized at favorable opportunities, and when most of the operations are wound up, operations to deal with Burma shall be carried out in as far as the situation permits.

(5) In principle, the landing operations shall be carried out in the face of the enemy while clearing away attacks of its ground, naval and air forces.

(6) In case the British army invades Thailand ahead of us while we are preparing for the operations, one element shall, without missing an opportunity, advance into Thailand by land or by sea, and while securing Bangkok, obtain air base[s] in the areas as far to the south as possible. If the above circumstances occur after the advance forces’ departure from the assembly points, the operations shall be carried out in line with the previously-defined plan, however, if they occur before the advance forces’ departure, the landing of the main force of the advance forces shall be postponed. It shall forcefully be conducted after air campaigns produce results.

(7) If coming under preemptive attacks of the enemy while preparing for operations, the units on location shall intercept the enemy at the right moment. If this [attack] should be made after the issue of the order of the start of the operation, an invasion operation shall be launched immediately.

4. Strength employed:

The army strength to be employed for this operation shall consist of ten divisions, nine tank regiments, two numbered air forces, and other necessary units under the direct control of the [Southern] Army as the core. The distribution of these forces and target areas is planned as follows:

The Southern Army

The Fourteenth Army shall consist of two divisions as its core and conduct operations in the Philippines area.

The Fifteenth Army shall consist of two divisions as its core and conduct operations in the Thailand and Burma areas.

The Sixteenth Army shall consist of three divisions (of which two divisions shall be diverted from other operations after their completion) as its core and conduct operations in the Dutch East Indies area.

The Twenty-fifth Army shall consist of four divisions as its core and conduct operations in the Malaya area.
The unit under the direct control of the Southern Army shall consist of one division, one mixed brigade, and two numbered air forces as its core.

The Twenty-third Army (under the full control of the China Expeditionary Army) shall conduct operations in the Hong Kong area with a force of one division as its core.

The South Seas Detachment (under the direct control of [the Army Department of] IGHQ) shall consist of three infantry battalions as its core and conduct operations in Guam, the Bismarck Archipelago, etc.

5. Launch of the operation:
   (1) The date to launch the operation (the first day of the operation) shall be specified separately.
   (2) The [southern] operation shall be launched with sudden landings (preemptive strikes depending on the circumstances) on Malaya and preemptive air strikes on the Philippines on the first day of operations.
   (3) Even if it is impossible to carry out the air strikes on the Philippines and British Malaya on the first day of the operation due to bad weather, etc., the sudden landings on Malaya shall be resolutely carried out, whereas the landings of the advance parties in the Philippines shall be postponed according to the day when the air operations in the area are launched.
   (4) The attack on Hong Kong shall be launched after confirming the [Imperial Army’s] landings or air strikes on Malaya, and that on Guam shall be launched after confirming its air strikes against the United States on the Philippines, etc.
   (5) In case [the Imperial forces] come under serious preemptive attacks by the enemy prior to the first day of operations: if it is after the issuance of the Imperial order to launch the operation, the invasion operations shall timely be launched. However, if it is before the issuance of the order, [the launch of invasion operations] shall be implemented by separate order[s].

6. Outline of the operations:
   (1) Operation against the Philippines
      The objective of the operation against the Philippines is to defeat the enemy in the Philippines and destroy its major bases. Right at the outset of the war, the air forces of the Army and Navy, in conjunction, shall carry out air strikes on the air power and the naval vessels of the enemy in the Philippines from Taiwan and Palau as well as from the sea, while the Navy units shall make a sudden attack on Batan Island and immediately get the airfield ready for use.
      Advance parties shall leave the assembly points after the evening of the day before the first air strike against the Philippines, and with the Army and Navy in conjunction land in or around Aparri, Vigan (and then Laoag), Legaspi, and Davao, occupy the air bases first and get them ready for use. Then they shall occupy Jolo Island as quickly as possible, and get the air base ready for use.
      Along with the above operations, the air units of the Army and Navy shall advance the air bases and continue the air operations. Exploiting the results of these operations, the Fourteenth Army shall, escorted by a [naval] unit consisting of the Third Fleet as its core, start landing its main force around Lingayen Gulf and [another] part of its force around Lamon Bay by around the 15th day of the operations at the latest. It shall promptly capture Manila and then occupy key places in the islands.
      After the landing of the main force of the army, a mixed brigade shall advance on Luzon Island at the right moment. When the objective of the operation is almost achieved, the 48th Division shall assemble in or around Manila [to be redeployed] as [part of] the force for the capture of the Dutch East Indies.
(2) Operation against British Malaya
The objective of the operation against British Malaya is to defeat the enemy in this area, capture its strategic points, Singapore in particular, and destroy the British bases in East Asia.

A force, consisting of the Twenty-fifth Army, the Third Air Force and the Southern Expeditionary Fleet as its core, shall make surprise landings in or around Ban Don, Nakhon, Singora and Pattani with advance forces on the first day of the operation, promptly occupy airfields, and get them ready for use, while air units of the Army and Navy, on and after the first day of the operation, carry out preemptive air strikes against the air power and naval vessels of the enemy mainly in British Malaya from southern Indochina.

In case Britain should tighten its guard and its powerful naval vessels should appear in the Gulf of Thailand, making it less likely [for the Imperial Army] to [successfully] make [sudden] landings, the air units of the Army and Navy in conjunction shall attack the air power and the naval vessels [of the enemy] on the first day of the operation and thereafter. The advance force shall have surprise attack units as small in number as possible depart from the west coast of Indochina, enter into the anchorage as covertly as possible at 0000 on the first day of the operations, carry out surprise landings near Nakhon, as well as near Singora and Pattani if required, and strive to seize airfields and get them ready for use, while having its main force start landing on the second day of the operation and thereafter to expand the results of the surprise attack units. The landing on Kota Bharu shall be implemented as soon as the circumstances of escort and [the progress of] the conditioning of the air bases permit after the landing of the advance force. However, it shall be expected that, depending on the circumstances, after the due consultation between the commanders concerned, units as small in number as possible may conduct sudden landings simultaneously with the landing of the main force of the advance force.

When some of the ships that have escorted the main force of the Fourteenth Army [for the invasion of the Philippines] arrive, the main force of the Twenty-fifth Army shall be put ashore in southern Thailand in quick succession, and expanding on the military gains achieved by the advance landing force in Malaya, it shall promptly capture Singapore. As the operation progresses, one force shall seize an opportunity and shall land on the east coast of Malaya at a point as far to the south as possible.

(3) Operation against British Borneo
The objective of the operation against British Borneo is to occupy and secure key resource areas and air bases. Right at the opening of hostilities, an element of the unit under the direct control of the Southern Army shall carry out a sudden attack on Miri, occupy the place, and secure its key resource areas and its air base. Once Miri is occupied, it shall occupy Kuching, secure its air base and get it ready for use in order to let the Navy advance its air units.

(4) Operation against Hong Kong
The objective of the operation against Hong Kong is to defeat the enemy and capture Hong Kong. (The rest omitted by the author.)

(5) Operation against Guam and the Bismarck Archipelago
(Omitted by the author.)

(6) Operation against the Dutch East Indies
The objective of the operation against the Dutch East Indies is to defeat the enemy in the Dutch East Indies, capture their bases, and occupy and secure key resource areas.

While the Philippines operation is underway, the Army and Navy, in conjunction, shall [support] an element of the Sixteenth Army to capture Tarakan as quickly as possible. Then, depending on the situation of the Philippines and Malaya operations, they
shall successively capture Balikpapan and Banjarmasin, and seizing an opportunity [in the course of the above operations or] after their completion, capture Ambon and Kupang, get the necessary air bases ready for use, and secure key resource areas as well. Meanwhile about the same time as the capture of Tarakan, the Navy on its own account shall occupy and secure Menado first, then Kendari and Makassar.

The guarding of Tarakan and Ambon shall be taken over by the Navy as quickly as possible when the major part of each operation in these areas is finished. Apart from [this], as the operations against British Malaya progress, another element of the Sixteenth Army shall seize an opportunity to occupy the strategic points of Bangka Island and Palembang, get the air bases ready for use, and secure the key resource areas as well. After having neutralized the air power of the enemy in the Java area while preparing the air bases, the main force of the Sixteenth Army and a force diverted from the Philippine Islands shall land in the vicinity of Batavia in western Java and in the vicinity of Surabaya in eastern Java respectively. They shall promptly occupy Batavia, Bandung and Surabaya, and continue to mop up [other] key areas on Java.

Once it becomes possible to neutralize the Strait of Malacca after the occupation of Singapore, an element of the Twenty-fifth Army shall land at the right moment in the vicinity of Medan from the west coast of the Malay Peninsula to occupy key areas in the Aceh region and, seizing an opportunity, Sabang Island.

(7) Operations against Thailand and Burma

The objective of the initial operations against Thailand and Burma is to secure the stability of Thailand, facilitate the operations in Malaya, and prepare for subsequent operations against Burma.

Right at the opening of hostilities, the Fifteenth Army shall have an element of its force make its way into central and southern Thailand from southern Indochina by land and by sea, and secure key places in these areas, while occupying with part of this force the vicinity of Victoria Point. One force of the main force of the Fifteenth Army shall leave Indochina mainly by land right after the opening of hostilities, while another regiment shall leave port in northern China after the opening of hostilities. Each force shall advance toward the vicinity of Bangkok from around the 40th day of the operation, and occupy key places in Thailand. As the main force of the Fifteenth Army arrives, an element of the Twenty-fifth Army shall be diverted toward the area of its main force by land and by sea as soon as possible. The Fifteenth Army shall seize an opportunity to occupy Moulmein and other air bases with a part of its force.

(8) In addition, the mission of one force under the direct control of the Southern Army (concerns the securing of stability in Indochina; omitted by the author).

7. Outline of the air operation

(1) Mission: The air units of the Army, in conjunction with those of the Navy, shall carry out preemptive air strikes on enemy air bases right at the outset of the war, gain command of the air and facilitate the landing operations of the landing troops, after which they shall support ground operations.

(2) Outline

[1] The air operation of the Army shall give priority to the Malaya area.

[2] Before the start of the war, air bases shall be advanced as follows:
  To southern Taiwan for [the attack on] the Philippines;
  To southern Indochina for [the attack on] Malaya.

[3] Air strike operations shall start on Day X, i.e. the day of the start of the landings by the ground troops. However, if [our units] are seriously attacked by the enemy on Day X or before, [the air units] shall start advancing at the right moment in conjunction with those of the Navy.
Also, if enemy planes seem to repeatedly reconnoiter our important bases and convoys, they shall be shot down.

[4] The Army air units shall mainly take charge of covering the convoys of the landing troops, to which they are assigned on Days X – 1 and X – 2.

[5] Air strike operations shall start at dawn on Day X; [the units] shall pin down the enemy’s [ability for] action by surprise attacks on their main bases all at once and facilitate the operations of the landing troops. For this purpose, the strikes shall be focused on airfields where bombers, torpedo bombers in particular, of the enemy are stationed.

[6] Once the landing troops have landed, [the air units] shall promptly advance their bases [to the enemy’s territory] and closely cooperate with the ground operations. For this, about half of the ground service units shall accompany the first landing units, occupy the airfields and get them ready for use.

(3) Disposition of forces:

[1] The Third Air Force (consisting of five fighter air groups, four light bomber air groups, four heavy bomber air groups, and one reconnaissance air group as its core, including one air group each out of the Fifth Air Force’s fighter, light bomber, and heavy bomber air groups) shall first create a diversion through a Kunming operation by temporarily deploying in southern China and northern Indochina, and then advance rapidly to deploy in southern Indochina just before the opening of hostilities to take charge of covering the convoy of the advance force of the Twenty-fifth Army in the Gulf of Thailand. On Day X, it shall carry out preemptive air strikes on air bases in northern Malaya with its main force and those in southern Thailand with part of its force in order to facilitate the landing operations. After that, [the Third Air Force] shall advance its main force to Malaya and part of its force to Thailand as rapidly as possible and directly support the ground operations while continuing to destroy the air power of the enemy.

[2] The Fifth Air Force (consisting of one fighter air group, two light bomber air groups, one heavy bomber air group, and one reconnaissance plane air group as its core, since one fighter, light bomber and heavy bomber air group each [had been temporarily assigned to the Third Air Force] shall deploy in southern Taiwan, and in conjunction with Navy air units, carry out preemptive air strikes on the air bases located at latitude 16º north and northward on Luzon Island to facilitate the landing operations.

After that, it shall take charge of covering the convoy of the main force of the Fourteenth Army, and advance its main force to Luzon Island as rapidly as possible to directly support the ground operations while continuing to destroy the air power of the enemy. Just before the opening of hostilities, one fighter air group shall be added.

8. Outline of the lines of communications

(1) Southern French Indochina shall be designated as the main line-of-communications relay point for the southern operation as a whole; Taiwan shall be designated as a supply transfer base, and Guangdong as an auxiliary supply transfer base.

(2) Line-of-communications units required in the South shall mainly be provided by diverting units from Manchuria, while all the units in China shall be kept in reserve without being diverted.

(3) Based on the principle that most of the military power of the nation shall be committed to the southern operation, operation materials in the homeland as well as in Manchuria shall be gathered and appropriated for the southern operation, and [all] the matériel required by the Southern Army for one campaign shall be sent in the first [transport] simultaneously with the transport for the landing operation or immediately [after] that.
II. Operations against China in the wake of the start of the Southern Operation (Omitted by the author)

III. Operations against Russia in the wake of the start of the Southern Operation (Omitted by the author)

The Army-Navy Central Agreement for the Southern Operation

On the Army side, the Central Agreement between the Army and Navy was approved by the chief of the Army General Staff on 29 October and issued as his instruction on 6 November.\(^{(19)}\)

In this agreement, the southern operation was defined as “the combined Army and Navy operations against the South in a war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands.”

The Outline of the Army-Navy Central Agreement for the Southern Operation

The agreement arranged for the forces to be employed in the operation. The Army and Navy forces to be employed were as shown in Tables No. 2 and No 3.

Local ground operations conducted by Army units and Navy special landing forces at the same place, except for those in which both forces might be put under a unified command if required, were in principle supposed to be conducted by the Army and Navy in conjunction [under separate command], and in order to conduct air operations in conjunction, [the Army and Navy] separately concluded a central agreement on the air operations.

The assembly points of the Army transport convoys, the standard date and time [to calculate] the operation dates, the outline of arrangements to be made between the [Army and Navy] commanders on site, and the code names of the operations were specified as follows:

1. The assembly points of the transport convoys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guam Invasion Unit</th>
<th>Bonin Islands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines Invasion Unit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advance parties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Northern Luzon: The Penghu Islands (Pescadores) or Gaoxiong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Davao and Legaspi: Palau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lingayen: The Penghu Islands (Pescadores)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lamon Bay: Southwest Islands (Nakagusuku Bay)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British Malaya Invasion Unit</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advance forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st group: Hainan Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2d group: Southern Indochina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Main force]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st group: Taiwan and Guangdong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2d group: Hainan Island, southern Indochina*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Inserted on the basis of the original document.
2. Standard dates of operation
   (1) Dates of operations: shall be calculated based on the date to launch the operation given by Imperial Order
   (2) Time: shall be indicated in Japan Standard Time.
3. The arrangements to be made between the Army and Navy commanders [on site]
   After the decision to open hostilities is made, the following commanders and prospective commanders of the Army and Navy shall, at the earliest opportunity in Tokyo or at an appropriate location, make arrangements for their operations:

   Southern Army commander in chief
   Combined Fleet commander in chief
   Second Fleet commander in chief
   Second Fleet commander in chief
   Southern Expeditionary Fleet commander in chief
   Southern Expeditionary Fleet commander in chief
   Southern Expeditionary Fleet commander in chief
   Southern Expeditionary Fleet commander in chief
   [Third Air Force commander
   Eleventh Air Fleet commander in chief]
   Fifth Air Force commander
   Southern Expeditionary Fleet commander in chief
   Southern Expeditionary Fleet commander in chief
   Southern Expeditionary Fleet commander in chief
   Second Air Flotilla commander

4. The code names of the operations shall be set as follows:
   The general code name of the overall southern operation: Operation A-Go
   The Philippines Operation: Operation M
   The Malaya Operation: Operation E
   The Dutch East Indies Operation: Operation H
   The Guam Operation: Operation G
   The British Borneo Operation: Operation B
   The Hong Kong Operation: Operation C
   The Bismarck [Archipelago] Operation: Operation R

* Inserted on the basis of the original document.
### Table No. 2 *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Southern Army</th>
<th>Units under direct control of Southern Army</th>
<th>23d Army</th>
<th>South Seas Det</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14th Army</td>
<td>Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16th Div; 48th Div; 2 tank rgts; 44 antiaircraft guns; 6 bns of artillery men under direct control of the army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Army</td>
<td>33d Div; 55th Div (minus one element)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th Army</td>
<td>2d Div; (58th Div); (48th Div); (56th Mixed Inf Gp); (South Seas Det); 3 tank rgts; 88 antiaircraft guns; 5 bns of artillery men under direct control of the army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Army</td>
<td>Imperial Guard Div; 5th Div; 18th Div; 1 tank gp (4 rgts); 11 bns of artillery men under direct control of the army; 60 antiaircraft guns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21st Div; 21st Independent Mixed Bde; 3d Air Force; 9th Air Force; 48 antiaircraft guns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38th Div; 1 air group of light bombers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55th Mixed Inf Gp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment area</th>
<th>Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand and Burma</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Dutch East Indies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Islands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Remarks**

1. Only major units are indicated.
2. In early stages of the operations, the South Seas Detachment shall be put under the direct control of IGHQ.
3. The forces to be employed twice are shown in parentheses.

* See also Vol. 26, p. 37.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Areas of operation</th>
<th>Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Part of the strength shall be increased or reduced depending on the situation.</td>
<td>11th Seaplane Tender Div: the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies; Submarine Sqdns: the entire South Pacific area</td>
<td>Combined Fleet HQ; 4th Submarine Sqdn; 5th Submarine Sqdn; 11th Seaplane Tender Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. * Indicates forces whose strength may be partly employed depending on the situation.</td>
<td>3d Destroyer Sqdn: Malaya area; others: in areas where necessary</td>
<td>One element of 3d Battleship Div; 3d Destroyer Sqdn; One element of 3d Carrier Div; *6th Cruiser Div; One element of 1st Destroyer Sqdn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>At the outset, main force: the Philippines, one element: Malaya. Then, one element: Malaya as reinforcements; bulk: the Dutch East Indies</td>
<td>4th Cruiser Div; 5th Cruiser Div; 7th Cruiser Div; 2d Destroyer Sqdn; 4th Destroyer Sqdn; *8th Cruiser Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>At the outset, main force: mainly the Philippines; one element: Malaya; [then]: the Dutch East Indies</td>
<td>16th Cruiser Div; 17th Minelayer Div; 5th Destroyer Sqdn; 6th Submarine Sqdn; 12th Seaplane Tender Div; 1st Base force; 2d Base Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pacific Islands</td>
<td>One element of 18th Cruiser Div; One element of 6th Destroyer Sqdn; One element of base force[s]; One auxiliary seaplane tender; 24th Air Flotilla; (One element of a powerful unit shall be added if required)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Where required</td>
<td>1st Carrier Div; 2d Carrier Div; 4th Carrier Div; 5th Carrier Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entire area of operations</td>
<td>21st Air Flotilla; 22d Air Flotilla; 23d Air Flotilla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malaya, British Borneo, and Sumatra areas</td>
<td>Kashii; Shimushu; 9th Base Force; (At the outset of the operation, one cruiser div and one destroyer sqdn each, as well as one aircraft carrier and two seaplane tenders shall be attached)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hong Kong and vicinity</td>
<td>Bulk of the 2d China Expeditionary Fleet; One element of the China Area Fleet; One element of the Combined Fleet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*See also Vol. 26, p. 38.*
The Army-Navy Central Agreement on the Air [Operations] for the Southern Operation

As a separate volume of the Army-Navy Central Agreement for the Southern Operation, the following central agreement on the air operation was concluded.\(^{53}\)

The Army-Navy Central Agreement on the Air Operation in the Southern Operation

Table of Contents (Omitted by the author)

I. Mission

1. The air units of the Army and Navy in conjunction shall swiftly destroy firstly the U.S. and British air power, and then the Dutch air power in east Asia and support the operations of landing forces.

2. The Navy air unit shall also destroy enemy naval vessels.

II. The forces to be employed*

2. The Philippines operation

The Navy

(1) The forces of roughly the following numbers under the command of the commander in chief of the Eleventh Air Fleet

- 9 land-based reconnaissance aircraft
- 108 land-based fighter planes
- 144 land-based attack planes
- 18 flying boats
- 279 aircraft in total

Depending on the situation, some forces may temporarily be employed as reinforcements for other areas.

(2) The following forces under the command of the commander in chief of the Third Fleet

About 60 reconnaissance seaplanes (about 40 reconnaissance seaplanes at the outset)

(3) Other than the above, a few small aircraft as well as about twenty fighter planes employed for the antiaircraft defenses of Taiwan.

The Army

The forces of roughly the following numbers under the command of the Fifth Air Force commander

- 36 reconnaissance aircraft
- 36 fighter planes
- 54 light bombers
- 18 heavy bombers
- 144 aircraft in total

Apart from the above, about thirty fighter planes shall be employed for the antiaircraft defenses of Taiwan.

3. The Malaya, Burma, and Borneo operations

The Navy

(1) The forces of roughly the following numbers under the command of the commander of the 22d Air Flotilla

- 9 land-based reconnaissance aircraft
- 36 land-based fighter planes
- 72 land-based attack planes
- 117 aircraft in total

* See also Vol. 26, p. 41.
The following forces under the command of the commander in chief of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet

About 7 reconnaissance seaplanes (about 20 reconnaissance seaplanes at the outset)

The Army
The forces of roughly the following numbers under the command of the Third Air Force commander

- 72 reconnaissance aircraft
- 168 fighter planes
- 108 light bombers
- 99 heavy bombers
- 447 aircraft in total

When the Philippines operation is roughly completed, the main force of the Fifth Air Force shall be shifted to the Malaya, Burma, and Borneo areas.

4. The Dutch East Indies operation

The Navy
The bulk of the forces assigned to the operations in Philippines and Malaya shall be shifted. Depending on the circumstances, one element of the First Air Fleet shall be added.

The Army
After the Malaya operation is for the most part completed or the fate of Singapore is sealed, if the situation should permit it, forces as large as possible shall be transferred from the Malaya area.

5. The Guam operation

About 13 reconnaissance seaplanes under the command of the commander in chief of the Fourth Fleet.

6. The Bismarck Archipelago operation

About 17 reconnaissance seaplanes under the command of the commander in chief of the Fourth Fleet.

In addition to the above, depending on the situation, aircraft carriers or the forces of land-based air units shall appropriately be employed.

III. The outline of the operation

7. The outline of the implementation of the first strike in the air operations against the United States and Britain

(1) The attacks [against both countries] shall almost simultaneously be commenced with the preemptive sudden strikes on the Philippines, Malaya, etc., and the [launch of] attacks of the Army and Navy air units in each area, too, shall be conducted almost at the same time. However, depending on the weather and other circumstances, both shall appropriately choose [a plan] to maximize the combined war results.

If they cannot launch operations against the Philippines and Malaya areas on the same day due to bad weather, etc, attacks shall be initiated where they are possible.

(2) Preemptive attacks by the enemy shall immediately be intercepted. However, the advance shall be conducted in the following way:

(a) If [enemy attacks] should come before the issuance of the Imperial Order to launch the operations (and permit the use of force of arms), the advance shall be conducted according to new orders to be [separately] given.

(b) If [the enemy attacks] should come after the issuance of the Imperial Order to launch the operations (and permit the use of force of arms), advance shall be launched at an appropriate time. In such a case, the Army and Navy air units shall, in close coordination, strive to attack in conjunction.

(3) Before the opening of hostilities, [the air units] shall strive to check the reconnaissance by the aircraft of the United States, Britain or the Netherlands. If [enemy aircraft] should
repeatedly reconnoiter our important bases, convoys and others after the issuance of the separate orders, they shall be brought down.

8. The Philippines operation

(1) The distribution of bases in Taiwan shall be as follows:

The bases to be shared between the Army and the Navy
Hengchun, Taidong, Jiayi, Hualien Harbor, and Taipei

The bases mainly used by the Navy
Gaoxiong, Donggang, Tainan (Navy [airfield]), Taizhong (civilian [airfield]), Xinzhu, and Magong (Zhumushui)

The bases mainly used by the Army
Jiadong, Chaozhou, Pingdong, Fengshan, Tainan (civilian [airfield]), Taizhong (Army [airfield])

(2) The air defense of Taiwan to be provided by aircraft

The Navy air unit shall be responsible for the anchorage at Magong, while other anchorages in Taiwan than Magong shall be assigned to the Army.

Other [air defense in Taiwan] than the above shall be assigned in conformity with the Army-Navy Agreement for the Assignment of Tasks Concerning the Defense of Mainland [Japan].

(3) The attacks on enemy air forces and naval vessels shall mainly be assigned to the Navy air unit, while the Army air unit shall support the air campaign to destroy enemy air power on Luzon Island.

(4) Right at the outset of war, the Army and Navy air unit in conjunction shall almost simultaneously launch preemptive air strikes from Taiwan, Palau and from [carriers on] the sea.

(5) The support to be provided for advance parties’ landings and subsequent operations shall be distributed as follows:

Aparri, Laoag and Vigan: Army and one element from the Navy
Davao and Legaspi: Navy

The Navy air unit shall support the [operation to] seize Jolo.

(6) After the advance parties have seized and conditioned the air bases, necessary forces shall be advanced to thoroughly conduct the air operations.

(7) In the initial stages of the operation, the conditioning [work] and the use of the seized bases shall be assigned as follows:

The Army: Aparri, Laoag and Vigan
The Navy: Davao, Legaspi and Jolo Island

Whereas Batan Island, which shall be seized right at the outset of war, shall be shared as an emergency landing strip both by the Army and Navy, the Navy air unit shall, for a brief period, use Aparri or Laoag as its advance or relay base.

(8) The support for the landing and the subsequent operations of the main force of the Fourteenth Army shall be assigned as follows:

Lingayen Gulf: Army and one element from the Navy
Lamon Bay: Navy

After the advance of the Army air unit, the support for the ground operations and the guard of the anchorage from the air shall mainly be assigned to the Army air unit, while the guard on the waters shall mainly be assigned to the Navy air unit. However, as for the Lamon Bay area, the Navy air unit shall be assigned to [conduct] the necessary air operations until the Army air unit will be ready for support.

(9) The Army and Navy air units shall timely support the Hong Kong operation with the required forces.
(10) When the air campaign to destroy enemy air power in the Philippines is for the most part completed, the main force of the Navy air unit shall be shifted to the operations in the Dutch East Indies and other areas.

(11) When the Fourteenth Army has by and large accomplished its operational objectives, the main force of the Army air unit shall be shifted to the operations in the Malaya area.

9. The Guam and the Bismarck Archipelago operations (Omitted by the author)

10. The Malaya, the Burma, and the British Borneo operations

(1) The distribution of bases during the preparation and the initial stages of the operations are as follows:
- The bases to be shared between the Army and the Navy
  - Haikou, Sanya, Huangliu, Saigon, Nha Trang, and Tourane (Da Nang)
- The bases mainly used by the Army
  - Phnom Penh, Kampong Trach, Tani, Kampong Chhnang, Krakor, Siem Reap, Phu Quoc and others
- The bases mainly used by the Navy
  - Thu Dau Mot, Soc Trang ([or] Bien Hoa), and depending on the situation, Phu Quoc and Kampong Trach shall be used for a brief period.

(2) The air campaign to destroy enemy air power and the support of the ground operations in the Malaya area shall mainly be assigned to the Army air unit. The Navy air unit shall, while supporting the above, search for and attack enemy surface vessels.

The air operations in the Burma and Thailand areas shall be assigned to the Army air unit, while those in the British Borneo area shall be assigned to the Navy air unit.

(3) Right at the outset of the war, the Army and Navy air unit in conjunction shall almost simultaneously launch preemptive air strikes against the Malaya area from southern Indochina. The Navy air unit shall at appropriate moments conduct air operations in the Singapore and British Borneo areas with the necessary forces from the start of the operations, while the Army air unit shall [start] attacks on the Singapore area from the time when it is ready.

(4) If the British Army occupies key places in southern Thailand ahead of us, tightens the defense of the places and makes the landing [of the Japanese] advance forces extremely difficult, the Army and Navy air units on site shall conduct air operations, while one element of the Navy air unit, which is kept in the Philippines for the operations after the rough completion of the air campaign to destroy enemy air power there, shall temporarily be shifted to the Malaya area, where it shall conduct the air campaign to destroy enemy air power and support the landing operation of the advance forces.

(5) The Navy and Army shall support the landing operations of the [Army] advance forces on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula.

- The guard of the anchorages shall be assigned in the following way:
  - Singora and Ban Don: Navy
  - Singora, Pattani, Nakhon, and Kota Bharu: Army

(6) The Army shall take charge of the preparation of the air bases in Malaya, Thailand and Burma, while the Navy shall take charge of the preparation of the air base[s] in British Borneo. The Navy shall [also] take charge of the preparation of the seaplane bases.

- The bases in Ban Don, Nakhon, Singora, and Pattani shall be quickly prepared so that they shall be available for fighter planes by the end of the day of the landing of the advance forces.

(7) When the air bases on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula are ready for use, the Army air unit shall successively dash to them, while one element of the Navy air unit shall appropriately use them to thoroughly conduct its air operations.

The bases to be used by the Navy air unit shall be as follows:
Ban Don: to be shared with the Army
Singora and Pattani: to be used temporarily
When the operation progresses, the Navy air unit shall appropriately use the bases in British Malaya.

(8) The Army and Navy air units shall support the landing of the main force of the Twenty-fifth Army on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula and that of the one force on the southern part of the peninsula.

11. The Hong Kong operation

(1) The Army air unit shall mainly take charge of the air operations in the Hong Kong area. The Army and Navy [units] currently assigned to the operations against China shall provide the necessary forces. Depending on the situation, one element of the Army and Navy air units assigned to the Philippines operation shall support this operation.

(2) The Army air unit shall mainly take charge of attacks on the key points and support for the ground operations, while the Navy air unit shall mainly take charge of searching for and attacking [enemy] naval surface vessels. However, both shall cooperate with each other depending on the situation.

(3) The first air strike shall be conducted after the launch of operations against the Malaya area.

12. The Dutch East Indies operation

(1) The Navy air unit shall mainly take charge of the air operations against the Dutch East Indies, while the Army air unit shall mainly take charge of the operations against northern Sumatra. The operations in southern Sumatra and in western Java shall be conducted by the Army and Navy in conjunction.

(2) The Navy air unit shall, after the air campaign to destroy enemy air power in the Philippines is mostly completed, shift its main force to the Dutch East Indies operation, and [also] timely shift the necessary forces out of the air unit assigned to the Malaya and British Borneo operation to the Dutch East Indies operation, depending on the war situation in both areas.

After the Malaya operation is for the most part completed or when the fate of Singapore is sealed, the Army air unit shall support the Dutch East Indies operation with as large a force as possible. In particular, even while engaging in the Malaya operation, it shall timely destroy enemy air power in northern Sumatra.

(3) The preparation and the use of the seized air bases shall generally be assigned as follows:

The bases in the Sumatra area shall mainly be prepared and used by the Army, while the Mentok or the Palembang base shall be shared with the Navy.

The preparation and the use of the bases on Java shall be arranged between the Army and the Navy, taking the situation at the time into consideration.

The bases other than the above areas shall mainly be prepared and used by the Navy.

13. The air operations, after the operations against the Philippines, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies areas are mostly completed, shall be roughly set as follows, although they shall depend on the situation at that time.

(1) The main force of the Navy air unit shall be shifted to the operations against the United States and those in the Australia area. Depending on the movements of the U.S. main fleet, the necessary forces may temporarily be shifted even before the rough completion of the operations. [However,] even in such a case, no hindrance shall be caused to the continuation of the Philippines and Malaya operations.

(2) The main force or one element of the Army air unit shall be shifted to China or Manchuria. If the situation of the North should require it, the necessary forces shall be
shifted to Manchuria from the Philippines or Malaya after the completion of the operations [there].

(3) The air operation against Burma shall mainly be assigned to the Army air unit.

(4) The ground air defense against air units and ground forces of the enemy in the occupied areas in the Philippines, Malaya, Sumatra, and Java shall mainly be assigned to the Army air unit, while the guard against enemy naval vessels shall mainly be assigned to the Navy air unit. The guard of the seized areas in the Pacific other than the above shall be assigned to the Navy.

14. The guard of air bases shall in principle be conducted in the following way. However, depending on the situation, the Army and Navy commanders on site shall appropriately make arrangements and implement them.

(1) The guard on the ground shall be assigned to the Army, except for the bases seized and secured by Navy units.

(2) Each force is responsible for the direct guard of its own units on the bases.

(3) The antiaircraft guard of the air bases, which are shared between the Army and the Navy, shall be jointly provided, while that of other air bases shall be assigned to the force that shall use the base.

(4) In principle, the Army and the Navy shall be responsible for keeping watch against enemy aircraft on the front where their own forces shall be deployed. However, in the areas where [the fronts of] both forces overlap, both shall cooperate with each other to keep a thorough watch.

Concerning the watch against [enemy] aircraft in southern Indochina, the area east of Cape Ca Mau shall be assigned to the Navy, while the area to its west shall be assigned to the Army.

15. In the seized areas, if required, the Army on site shall support the Navy in preparing the air bases in charge of the Navy.

IV. Signals and communications (Omitted by the author)

V. Identification of friends, etc. (Omitted by the author)

Further, on 7 November, the following agreement concerning the actions to be taken against Thailand in case the enemy should invade Thailand or [the Japanese forces] should come under preemptive attacks of the enemy during its preparations for the operation was settled in a separate volume of the central agreement.

Separate Volume of the Central Agreement Between the Army and the Navy for the Southern Operation

7 November 1941
IGHQ Army Department
IGHQ Navy Department

The agreement concerning the actions to be taken against Thailand in case the enemy should invade Thailand or [the Japanese forces] should come under preemptive attacks of the enemy during its preparations for the operation

Note: This agreement stipulates the outline of particulars in conformity with paragraph (1) of Article No. 5 of the Army-Navy Central Agreement for the Southern Operation.

1. The actions to be taken if the British Army should invade Thailand

(1) If it occurs before the issuance of the Imperial orders concerning [the date of] the launch of the operation (Day X), [the Japanese forces shall] not advance [into Thailand] until separate orders [about the launch of the operations shall newly be issued].
If it occurs after the issuance of the above Imperial orders, the Japanese forces shall timely advance into Thailand in conformity with the agreements made between the commanders in chief of the Southern Army and the Combined Fleet. However, when advancing into Thailand, the forces shall carefully consider the actions they shall take against the British Army, so that the operations shall be implemented according to plan as much as possible.

(2) In principle, the advance shall be conducted by the Army and Navy in conjunction, and an agreement on the outline of the particulars shall be made between the commanders in chief of the Southern Army and the Combined Fleet.

The Issuance of Orders to Prepare for the Invasion of Key Areas in the South

The Order of Battle for the Southern Operation

Thus, on 6 November 1941, the IGHQ Army Department issued a series of dispositions for the southern operation. Even though the use of force would be called off if diplomatic negotiations should become successful, the Army had to make doubly sure that it was prepared for a war that could determine the fate of the country. Having only one month to go, from the IGHQ Army Department on down, all units started to work desperately on the preparations for the operations.

To begin with, on the 6th, the IGHQ Army Department issued the order of battle of the units to be involved in the southern operation. Their main components consisted of the Southern Army ([in charge of the operations in] the South in general), the Fourteenth Army ([in charge of those in] the Philippines), the Fifteenth Army (Thailand), the Sixteenth Army (the Dutch East Indies), the Twenty-fifth Army (Malaya), and so on.

The Army Air Service [units to be involved in the southern operation] were put under the direct control of the Southern Army, and divided into the Third Air Force ([in charge of the operations in] the Malaya, Sumatra, and Java areas), the Fifth Air Force ([in charge of the operations in] the Philippines and, after that, Thailand), and those units to be directly controlled by the Southern Army. The components of the Twenty-fifth Army, which had been stationed in French Indochina, were drastically changed and the air units under its full control or command were transferred to the above-mentioned air units.

The date when these units were supposed to gain control of the large number of units that would be transferred from mainland Japan, Manchuria, and various areas of China, and to start taking command of them (the transfer of command and control) was set on 15 November. However, it was also decided that the units, which would still be in eastern and northern China even after that date, should be put under the full control of their new commanders as of the time of their departure from the ports in the key areas where they had been stationed.\(^{18, 19}\)

The Order to Start Preparations for the Invasion of the Key Areas in the South

Following that, [also] on the 6th, the IGHQ [Army Department] issued the following orders to the commander in chief of the Southern Army and others:

IGHQ Army Department Order No. 556 [See also Vol. 3, p. 51.]
1. IGHQ shall prepare for the seizure of strategic regions in the South.
2. The commander in chief of the Southern Army shall, in conjunction with the Navy, concentrate the main force of his army in Indochina, southern China, Taiwan, the Southwest Islands [stretch-
ing between the south of Kyūshū and the north of Taiwan], and the [Japanese administered] equatorial Pacific Islands and prepare to seize strategic areas in the South. Separate orders shall be issued for offensive operations.

3. The commander in chief of the Southern Army shall take over the current tasks of the Twenty-fifth Army commander concerning the intensification of the blockade against China.

4. If [his army] comes under the attack of forces of the United States, Britain and the Netherlands or any single one of them, the commander in chief of the Southern Army may intercept the [enemy] forces with the units on site for the sake of self defense. When dealing with the above situation, he shall strive to settle it locally as much as possible.

5. The commanders in chief of the China Expeditionary Army and the General Defense Command, and the commander of the Taiwan Army shall support the operational preparations stated in Item No. 2.

IGHQ Army Department Instruction No. 991 (6 November) [See also Vol. 3, p. 52.]
Based on IGHQ Army Department Order No. 556, I instruct you as follows:

1. Summary of the operations of the Southern Army and the Army-Navy Central Agreement for the Southern Operation to which the commander in chief of the Southern Army shall conform in making preparations for the southern operation are specified in the separate volume. (Note by the author: the former not extant, the latter as previously told.)

2. The commander in chief of the Southern Army shall finish preparations for the operation by around the end of November.

3. Friendly relations with Indochina and Thailand shall be maintained as much as possible. As for local negotiations for military requisitions with Indochina and other matters, the items stated in IGHQ Army Department Instructions No. 982, which was given to the Twenty-fifth Army commander on 1 November 1941 (note by the author: concerning the quartering and provision of the [Japanese] forces and the use of air bases and facilities, as well as matters related to the joint defense of French Indochina) shall continued to be observed.

4. The commander in chief of the General Defense Command shall have the defense units in Taiwan and the Southwest Islands support the units under the full control of the commander in chief of the Southern Army that shall be concentrating there in conducting their antiaircraft self defense and guard.

5. Operational preparations shall be made while keeping the plans concealed as much as possible.

The Order of Battle of the Air Arm [of the Southern Army]
In the order of battle of the Air Arm of the Southern Army, the units of the air arm consisted of the following:(61)

1. Third Air Force
   Third Air Force HQ
   3d Air Div
      3d Air Div HQ
      59th Air Gp (Type–1 fighter planes)
      27th Air Gp (Type–99 assault planes)
      75th Air Gp (Type–99 twin engine light bombers)
      90th Air Gp (Type–99 twin engine light bombers)
   7th Air Div
      7th Air Div HQ
      64th Air Gp (Type–1 fighter planes)
      12th Air Gp (Type–97 Model II heavy bombers)
      60th Air Gp (Type–97 Model II heavy bombers)
      98th Air Gp (Type–97 Model II heavy bombers)
12th Air Div
   12th Air Div HQ
      1st Air Gp (Type–97 fighter planes)
      11th Air Gp (Type–97 fighter planes)
   81st Air Gp (Type–100 and Type–97 strategic reconnaissance aircraft)
15th Independent Air Unit
   15th Independent Air Unit HQ
   50th Independent Air Sqdn (Type–100 and Type–97 strategic reconnaissance aircraft)
   51st Independent Air Sqdn (Type–100 and Type–97 strategic reconnaissance aircraft)
1st, 7th, 12th, 15th and 18th Air-Ground Support HQs
   36th, 82d, 15th, 21st, 22d, 41st, 94th, 27th, 35th, 91st, 93d, 17th, 23d, 92d, and 96th Airfield Bns
   29th, 3d, 5th, 33d, 6th, 12th, 7th and 9th Airfield Cos
   15th Air Signal Unit (minus one element)
   25th Air Signal Unit
   One element of the 1st Air Intelligence Unit
   16th Air Intelligence Unit
   17th Direction Finder Unit
   12th Air Transport Sqn
   5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Field Airfield Construction Units
   One element of the 12th Field Aircraft Repair Depot
   One element of the 15th Field Aircraft Depot
   20th Antiaircraft Artillery Rgt
   32d Field Antiaircraft Artillery Bn (B)
   36th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Bn (B)
   280th and 281st Independent Motor Transport Cos
   1st and 86th Line-of-Communications Motor Transport Cos
   67th, 68th, 69th, 70th, 80th and 81st Ground Duty Cos
   43d and 48th Construction Duty Cos

2. Fifth Air Force
   Fifth Air Force HQ
   4th Air Div
      4th Air Division HQ
      50th Air Gp (Type–97 fighter planes)
      8th Air Gp (One squadron [consisting] of Type–97 and Type–100 strategic reconnaissance aircraft and three squadrons of Type–99 twin engine light bombers)
      16th Air Gp (Type–97 light bombers)
      14th Air Gp (Type–97 Model I heavy bombers)
   10th Air Div
      10th Air Div HQ
      70th Independent Air Sqdn (Type–97 strategic reconnaissance aircraft)
      77th Air Gp (Type–97 fighter planes)
      31st Air Gp (Type–97 light bombers)
      62d Air Gp (Type–97 Model I heavy bombers)
      76th Independent Air Sqdn (Type–97 strategic reconnaissance aircraft)
   4th and 11th Air-Ground Support HQs
   48th, 24th, 40th, 18th, 97th and 28th Airfield Bns
   32d Airfield Co
   1st Air Signal Rgt (minus one element)
   One element of the 3d Air Intelligence Unit
11th Air Transport Sqdn
4th and 9th Field Airfield Construction Units
One element of the 9th Field Aircraft Repair Depot
40th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Bn (B)
297th and 298th Independent Motor Transport Cos
111th and 123d Ground Duty Cos
55th [56th?] Construction Duty Co

3. The air units under the direct control of the Southern Army

Third Air Force
Fifth Air Force
10th Independent Air Unit
   10th Independent Air Unit HQ
   52d Independent Air Sqdn (Type–99 tactical reconnaissance aircraft)
   74th Independent Air Sqdn (Type–98 direct support aircraft)
   13th Airfield Co
21st Independent Air Unit
   21st Independent Air Unit HQ
   84th Independent Air Sqdn (Type–97 fighter planes)
   82d Independent Air Sqdn (Type–97 light bombers)
   85th and 88th Airfield Cos
83d Independent Air Unit
   83d Independent Air Unit HQ
   71st Independent Air Sqdn (tactical reconnaissance aircraft)
   73d Independent Air Sqdn (tactical reconnaissance aircraft)
   89th Independent Air Sqdn (direct support aircraft)
   84th Airfield Bn
7th Air Transport Unit
   7th Air Transport Unit HQ
   1st and 2d Air Transport Units
1st Air Route Rgt (minus 3d and 4th Air Route Cos)
13th and 15th Special Air Transport Units
1st and 2d Field Meteorological Bn HQs
1st, 2d, 3d and 4th Meteorological Cos
25th Field Meteorological Unit
16th Field Aircraft Depot
25th Aircraft Detached Depot
19th Field Aircraft Repair Depot
20th Field Aircraft Supply Depot
* Technological Dept of air arm of Southern Army
* 1st Field Replenishment Air Unit
* 24th Air Cp

Note: The units with an asterisk (*) on their left were additionally mobilized on the 15th and the 27th of November.
3. The Southern Army Assuming Command and the Employment of Its Air Arm

The Chain of Command of the Air Arm of the Southern Army

The Southern Army Headquarters Was Provided with the Trappings of an Air Corps Headquarters

As mentioned previously, for committing the main force of the Army Air Service to the southern operation it was, in view of the vast operational front, natural to assume that two or more numbered air forces would be necessary.

As the strategic value of the air arm increased, the tendency in military aviation at that time was to employ it in a way as concentrated as possible so as to bring its special qualities into full play. In order to employ two or more numbered air forces in a unified way, it was natural to set up a headquarters [on the level of] an air corps (later: air army) as the higher-ranking headquarters. However, at that time, there was only one air corps headquarters, which was in Manchuria, and in terms of [the Army’s] policy against the North, it was impossible to transfer this headquarters [to the South]. Moreover, the number of commanders and staff officers familiar with aviation was too small to establish a new air corps headquarters, let alone that it usually required some time before a newly established headquarters could fully function.

In the end, it was decided to adjust the composition of the Southern Army headquarters so that it could also serve as an air corps headquarters. The main points were to put in a [second] vice chief of staff exclusively in charge of the air arm, and set up an independent aviation section, which would comprehensively deal with the operations, intelligence, rear [support] and facilities related to the air arm. The main purpose was to employ the air arm in a way that suited its specific nature. (39, 91)

A Southern Army headquarters with an aviation specific function had already been in preparation since October. On 5 November, General Terauchi Hisaichi was personally appointed commander in chief by the Emperor, and the formation of his headquarters was completed on the 13th of the month. The main officers of the top echelon were as follows: (61)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Lt. Gen. Tsukada Osamu ([graduate] 19th class)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Lt. Gen. Aoki Shigemasa ([graduate] 25th class)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Chief of Staff (air arm)</td>
<td>Lt. Gen. Sakaguchi Yoshitarō ([graduate] 25th class)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Section (Overall Operations)</td>
<td>Col. Ishii Masayoshi ([graduate] 30th class) and three other officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Section (Intelligence)</td>
<td>Col. Obata Nobuyoshi ([graduate] 30th class) and three other officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Section (Rear [Support])</td>
<td>Col. Ishii Akiho ([graduate] 34th class) and four other officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Section (air arm)</td>
<td>Col. Tanikawa Kazuo ([graduate] 33d class)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General control of the section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lt. Col. Saitō Tomoo ([graduate] 34th class)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Line of communications, signal communications and meteorology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lt. Col. Suzuki Takashi ([graduate] 35th class)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Disposition of Forces of the Air Arm

The air units included in the order of battle of the Southern Army were the Third and the Fifth Air Force, the 10th, the 21st and the 83rd Independent Air Unit and a great many other units under its direct control.

Having acquired the function of an air corps headquarters, the Southern Army headquarters decided the detailed dispositions of these units, too, which was in outline as follows:

The Third Air Force shall be assigned to the operations in the Malaya, Sumatra, and Java areas. It shall take charge of the fronts to which the Southern Army gives priority, and along with the 10th Air Division of the Fifth Air Force (to be employed in the Thailand area), the 83rd Independent Air Unit and others attached to it, it shall conduct operations under the direct control of the Southern Army.

The main force of the Fifth Air Force (reinforced with the 10th Independent Air Unit), which is assigned to the operations in the Philippines, shall be attached to the Fourteenth Army. When the offensive operations in the Philippines are completed, [some elements] extracted from the force shall be transferred to Thailand, while the 10th Air Division shall be returned to the Fifth Air Force to conduct operations in Burma.

Depending on the situation, the 83d Independent Air Unit shall be attached to the Twenty-fifth Army during the Malaya operation.

The 21st Independent Air Unit shall be assigned to the actions in northern French Indochina under the direct control of the Southern Army.

The Problem of Whether to Attach Army Air Service Units to Ground Forces

Thus, while putting the Fifth Air Force under the command of the Fourteenth Army during the initial period, the Southern Army kept the Third Air Force under its direct control. The reasoning behind it was as follows: \(^{(21)}\)

The Fifth Air Force, which will conduct operations in the Philippines area, shall be put under the command of the Fourteenth Army, because, small in size and separated from the main force [of the air arm], it provides support and conducts engagements only for the Fourteenth Army.

However, the Third Air Force, which is supposed to support not only the Twenty-fifth Army but also the Fifteenth Army (in charge of the Burma [operation]) and the Sixteenth Army (in charge of the Sumatra and Java [operations]), has many units under its command.

Since it may [need to] shift, depending on the movements of the enemy, the focus of its air campaigns to destroy enemy air power also to the Burma areas, it cannot swiftly be mobilized...
and employed if exclusively attached to the Twenty-fifth Army, which will conduct the Malaya operation only.

At some point, when the Philippines operation is for the most part completed, the Fifth Air Force assigned to the Philippines shall be shifted to Thailand. Then the Southern Army will put both air forces under its direct control, employing the Fifth Air Force for the Burma area and the Third Air Force for the Malaya, Sumatra, and Java areas.

Even if the Third Air Force were to be attached to the Twenty-fifth Army, the latter does not have the system of command, replenishment and supply to make the best use of the force, because the force’s composition is too complex. If the Third Air Force were to be attached to the Twenty-fifth Army, it is very likely that the army will force an excessive use on it, so that its strength will be expended in the Malaya operation only, causing hindrance to the operations in Sumatra, Java and Burma.

On the basis of these ideas, the Southern Army issued later ([on] 15 November) the orders for the transfer of control or command of the following units: (61)

1. The units under the direct control of the Southern Army to be put under the command of the Third Air Force commander:
   - 83d Independent Air Unit
   - 1st Field Meteorological Bn HQ
   - 1st and 2d Meteorological Cos
   - 25th Field Meteorological Unit
   - *13th Special Air Transport Unit 2d Sqdn
   - 15th Special Air Transport Unit
   - 7th Air Transport Unit
   - 25th Aircraft Detached Depot
   - *160th, 167th, 184th, 190th Line-of-Communications Motor Transport Cos
   The 17th and the 18th Shipboard Aircraft Depot, which had been under the command of the Southern Army, were put under the command of the Third Air Force commander.

2. The units under the full control of the Fifth Air Force commander to be put under the command of the Third Air Force commander:
   - 10th Air Div
   - 40th and 97th Airfield Bns

3. The units to be brought under the command of the Fifth Air Force commander:
   - 10th Independent Air Unit
   - 2d Field Meteorological Bn HQ

Remarks
1. * indicates units, which were given [transfer] orders in Southern Army Operational Order A, No. 2 on 20 November.
2. Right before the opening of hostilities, the 83d Independent Air Unit was [further] put under the command of the Twenty-fifth Army.
The Agreements with the Combined Fleet and the Second Fleet

As previously told, the memorandum of the agreement between the Southern Army and the Combined Fleet concluded on 10 November was as follows:

General Agreement No. 1 10 November 1941

Memorandum of Agreement Between the Combined Fleet and the Southern Army*

I. The operations shall be launched in the following manner:
   1. At the time of the launch of Operation A-GO (on Day X), the Combined Fleet shall carry out preemptive attacks on an enemy fleet in another area.
   2. In case [the Japanese forces] shall come under serious preemptive attacks of the enemy before Day X
      If it occurs after the issuance of the Imperial order to launch the operation, the Navy shall immediately go into the state of war and launch its operations.

II. Agreements concerning the plan of Operation A-GO (except for the operations against Guam, Hong Kong and the Bismarck Archipelago) other than this agreement and other arrangements during the implementation of operations shall be made between the commanders in chief of the Southern Army and the Second Fleet. However, if the commander in chief of the Second Fleet is engaged in the operation to intercept a U.S. fleet, the arrangements concerning the implementation of the operations shall be made with the commander in chief of the Third Fleet.

On the same day, in the wake of the above agreement, the following agreement was concluded.(61)

General Agreement No. 2 10 November 1941

Memorandum of Agreement Between the Commander in Chief of the Navy in the Southern Area and the Commander in Chief of the Southern Army*

Table of contents (Omitted by the author)

I. Policy of the joint operations
   In conformity with the “Army-Navy Central Agreement for the Southern Operation” of 6 November 1941 (hereinafter referred to as the “Central Agreement”), the Navy Southern Task Force and the Southern Army shall accomplish the objective of the southern operation within a short period of time in close and proper cooperation.

II. The launch of the operation
   1. The designated date of the launch of the operation (Day X) cannot be changed between the commander in chief of the Navy in the Southern Area, the commander in chief of the Southern Army or other commanders. However, until the issuance of the [exact] date of Day X, the commanders in chief of the Navy in the Southern Area and the Southern Army can, after due consultation between them, offer their views concerning the issuance of the date of Day X.
   2. In Operations M and E, both the air strikes and the landing operations shall be launched on Day X as much as possible. Even if [one of them should be] hindered by local bad weather, etc., the due launch [of other operations] as single operations shall not be

* See also Vol. 3, pp. 57, 60-62; Vol. 26, pp. 62-69. Since the authors of Vol. 3, Vol. 26, and Vol. 34 focused on different aspects, there are differences in redaction.
stopped. However, concerning Operation M, the invasion schedule of the advance parties (including those on Batan Island) shall be put off according to the date of the launch of the air operations in the area.

3. The postponement of the first air strike in Area M or the new date and time shall be decided between the commander in chief of the Navy in the Southern Area and the Fourteenth Army commander after due consideration.

4. If the landing date of the main force of the advance forces for Area E shall need to be changed due to [bad] weather, the Navy Malaya Unit commander and the Twenty-fifth Army commander shall make a decision after due consideration.

III. Standard dates [to implement] the capture [operations]

The key areas which the Army and Navy in conjunction shall capture as well as the starting dates of the landings (along with assembly points and the key areas which the Navy shall capture unassisted as well as the starting dates of the landings)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of the start of the landings</th>
<th>Key areas to capture (*stands for the areas which the Navy will capture unassisted)</th>
<th>Assembly points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operation M</td>
<td>Vicinities of Ban Don, Nakhon, Singora, Pattani</td>
<td>Op M: Magong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation E</td>
<td>Vicinities of Kota Bharu</td>
<td>Op E: Sanya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation B</td>
<td>Vicinity of Kota Bharu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation H</td>
<td>Vicinity of Legaspi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day X</td>
<td>*Batan Isl.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day X + 1</td>
<td>Vicinity of Vigan or vicinity of Laoag, and vicinity of Aparri</td>
<td>Magong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depending on the proviso of 5.2.a)</td>
<td>Vicinity of Kota Bharu</td>
<td>Sanya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Day X + 4</td>
<td>Vicinity of Legaspi</td>
<td>Palau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Day X + 6</td>
<td>Vicinity of Davao</td>
<td>Palau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Around Day X + 8</td>
<td>2d [landing] Vicinities of Singora and Pattani</td>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By around Day X + 14</td>
<td>Lingayen Gulf Vicinity of Lamon Bay</td>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Around Day X + 13</td>
<td>Vicinity of Miri</td>
<td>Miri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Around Day X + 13</td>
<td>Vicinity of Kuching</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Around Day X + 13</td>
<td>Jolo</td>
<td>Davao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By around Day X + 14</td>
<td>依然 [landing] Vicinity of Loman Bay</td>
<td>Penghu Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Around Day X + 23</td>
<td>*Vicinity of Menado</td>
<td>Palau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Location Description</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By around Day X + 25</td>
<td>Southern Thailand or east coast of Malaya (for the first [landing] of the main force)</td>
<td>Vicinity of Tarakan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Op E: Penghu Islands (Guangdong) Op H: Palau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Around Day X + 35</td>
<td></td>
<td>*Vicinity of Kendari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Menado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Around Day X + 35</td>
<td></td>
<td>Vicinity of Balikpapan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tarakan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Around Day X + 45</td>
<td></td>
<td>*Vicinity of Makassar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kendari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By and large around Day X + 50</td>
<td>Vicinity of Banjarmasin</td>
<td>Balikpapan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Around Day X + 60</td>
<td>Southern Thailand or east coast of Malaya (for the second [landing] of the main force)</td>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay (Sanya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By around Day X + 60</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ambon and Kupang as far as possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By and large around Day X + 80</td>
<td></td>
<td>Java, Sumatra</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Particulars for] other [targets] shall be decided on in arrangements between the highest commanders of the Army and Navy of each area.
### IV. The disposition of forces

#### 1. Southern Army

**Commander in chief:** General Terauchi Hisaichi  
*(Chief of Staff: Lt Gen Tsukada Osamu)*  
*(Vice Chiefs of Staff: Lt Gen Aoki Shigemasa, Lt Gen Sakaguchi Yoshitarō)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area Unit</th>
<th>Commander (Chief of staff)</th>
<th>Forces (Chief of staff)</th>
<th>Area Unit (Commander)</th>
<th>Outline of tasks in the initial stage of the operations</th>
<th>Forces (Assembly point at the time of the opening of hostilities)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thailand, Burma, and E</td>
<td>Lt Gen Sugawara Michiō</td>
<td>3d Air Div (French Indochina), 7th Air Div (ditto), 10th Air Div (ditto) and 12th Air Div (ditto) as the core.</td>
<td>Imperial Guard Div (French Indochina), 5th Div (Advance units in Sanya, the rest in Taiwan) and 18th Div (Advance units in Sanya, main force in Guangdong) as the core.</td>
<td>In principle, it shall advance its bases as swiftly as possible and destroy enemy air power.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Army</td>
<td>Lt Gen Yamashita Tomoyuki (Lt Gen Suzuki Sōsaku)</td>
<td>3d Air Force</td>
<td>Imperial Guard Div (French Indochina), 5th Div (Advance units in Sanya, the rest in Taiwan) and 18th Div (Advance units in Sanya, main force in Guangdong) as the core.</td>
<td>In order to facilitate the operation of the 25th Army, in conjunction with the Navy, it shall advance into the central part of Thailand right at the opening of hostilities and secure the stability of the country while landing in Prachuap Khiri Khan, Ban Don, Nakhon simultaneously with the advance party of the 25th Army, to seize and ready the airfields there. At the same time, it shall land in Chumphon and seize Victoria Point as swiftly as possible. [It shall also] prepare for the subsequent Burma operation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Army</td>
<td>Lt Gen Iida Shōjirō (Maj Gen Isayama Haruki)</td>
<td>15th Army</td>
<td>55th Div (French Indochina) and 33d Div (north China) as the core.</td>
<td>In conjunction with the Navy, it shall launch the operation with preemptive strikes against M. Leaving the assembly points from the previous evening of the day of the first air strikes onwards, the advance parties shall land in the vicinities of Aparri and Vigan or Laoag as well as Legaspi and Davao with the Army and Navy in conjunction, and seize air bases first. After that, air units shall advance their air bases to continue the air operation. The bulk of the army shall at the latest start landing around Lingayen gulf with its main force and around Lamon Bay with one element by around the 15th day of the operation and swiftly capture Manila.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th Army</td>
<td>Lt Gen Homma Masaharu (Lt Gen Maeda Masami)</td>
<td>14th Army</td>
<td>16th Div (Southwest Isl.) and 48th Div (its main force in Taiwan) as the core; 5th Air Force (Taiwan) shall be attached.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Outline of tasks in the initial stage of the operations

1. **Outline of tasks in the initial stage of the operations**
   - **3d Air Force**
     - Imperial Guard Div (French Indochina), 5th Div (Advance units in Sanya, the rest in Taiwan) and 18th Div (Advance units in Sanya, main force in Guangdong) as the core.
     - In order to facilitate the operation of the 25th Army, in conjunction with the Navy, it shall advance into the central part of Thailand right at the opening of hostilities and secure the stability of the country while landing in Prachuap Khiri Khan, Ban Don, Nakhon simultaneously with the advance party of the 25th Army, to seize and ready the airfields there. At the same time, it shall land in Chumphon and seize Victoria Point as swiftly as possible. [It shall also] prepare for the subsequent Burma operation.
   - **14th Army**
     - 16th Div (Southwest Isl.) and 48th Div (its main force in Taiwan) as the core; 5th Air Force (Taiwan) shall be attached.
     - In conjunction with the Navy, it shall launch the operation with preemptive strikes against M. Leaving the assembly points from the previous evening of the day of the first air strikes onwards, the advance parties shall land in the vicinities of Aparri and Vigan or Laoag as well as Legaspi and Davao with the Army and Navy in conjunction, and seize air bases first. After that, air units shall advance their air bases to continue the air operation. The bulk of the army shall at the latest start landing around Lingayen gulf with its main force and around Lamon Bay with one element by around the 15th day of the operation and swiftly capture Manila.

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**Notes:**

- The table provides a summary of the disposition of forces for the Southern Army, including units, commanders, and outline of tasks in the initial stage of the operations.
- The focus is on the southern part of the country, including Thailand, Burma, and Indochina.
- The table includes details on the assembly points and the opening of hostilities, highlighting the strategic planning and operations of the army during the war.
Remarks:

(1) The outline of the distribution of the first transport of the landing operations and the landing dates is as shown in Attached Table No. 1 [of the agreement]. (Omitted by the author.)

(2) The outline of units other than those in the previous item, i.e. those which are on standby for embarkation at the time of the opening of hostilities, and the employment of ships [for them] is as shown in Attached Table No. 2 [of the agreement]. (Omitted by the author.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French Indochina</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initial period: 25th Army; later: 21st Div</td>
<td>16th Army</td>
<td>Kawaguchi Det</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Div Cdr Lt Gen Tanaka Hisakazu</td>
<td>Lt Gen Imamura Hitoshi (Maj Gen Okazaki Seizaburō)</td>
<td>Maj Gen Kawaguchi Kiyotake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Div (northern China), 21st Mixed Bde (French Indochina) and 4th Independent Mixed Rgt (French Indochina)</td>
<td>2d Div (mainland Japan), 38th Div (assigned to Op C in the initial period), 48th Div (assigned to Op M in the initial period), 56th Mixed Inf Gp (Palau), South Seas Det (assigned to Ops G and R in the initial period)</td>
<td>One inf rgt of 18th Div as the core. (French Indochina)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It shall be assigned to securing the stability of French Indochina, while guarding the area against the invasion of the Chinese Army.

In conjunction with the Navy, it shall seize Jolo and Tarakan as quickly as possible, and after that land in Balikpapan and Banjarmasin to seize the airfields there.

In conjunction with the Navy, it shall seize Miri, Seria and vicinities as quickly as possible, while seizing the airfield in Kuching and condition it so as to let the Navy air unit advance there. Then it shall seize Brunei and vicinity.
## Operational Preparation for the Navy’s Southern Task Force

### Part I, Chapter 3: The Operational Preparations of the Army Air Service After the Determination to Open Hostilities

**Southern Task Force Cdr V Adm Kondō Nobutake (Chief of Staff: R Adm Shiraishi Kazutaka)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Philippines then the Dutch East Indies</th>
<th>The Philippines area and the South China Sea</th>
<th>Operational areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Philippines Unit, The Dutch East Indies Unit</strong> ([The latter] shall be formed with the bulk of the Philippines Unit after the Philippines operation is for the most part completed.)</td>
<td><strong>Southern Task Force Main Body</strong></td>
<td>Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Eastern Support Unit</strong></td>
<td><strong>Main Unit</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Commander</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chief of staff</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Fleet Cdr in chief V Adm Takahashi Ibō (R Adm Nakamura Toshihisa)</td>
<td><strong>Under direct command</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Haruna, Maya, and 2 destroyers</strong> (waters northeast of Luzon)</td>
<td><strong>4th Cruiser Div (minus Maya)</strong> (at Magong), <strong>Kongō and 6 destroyers</strong> (at Magong)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>5 minelayers, 1 aircraft carrier, 3 seaplane tenders. Air strength: 12 fighter planes, 18 attack planes, 40 recon. seaplanes</strong></td>
<td><strong>Main Unit</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forces (Locations at the time of the opening of hostilities)</th>
<th><strong>Outline of assignments around [the Navy’s] First Phase operations</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Philippines Unit, The Dutch East Indies</strong></td>
<td><strong>It shall be at Magong right at the opening of hostilities, and then appropriately advance depending on the enemy movements and progress of the operation. It shall support the entire operation, while always prepared to respond to appearances of powerful enemy vessels.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3d Fleet Cdr in chief V Adm Takahashi Ibō (R Adm Nakamura Toshihisa)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Taking positions on the waters off the east coast of the Philippines, it shall support the operations in the area. Then, it shall gradually sail southward to support the Dutch East Indies operation.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 battleship, 1 heavy cruiser, 2 destroyers, 7 recon. seaplanes</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5 minelayers, 1 aircraft carrier, 3 seaplane tenders. Air strength: 12 fighter planes, 18 attack planes, 40 recon. seaplanes</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*See also Vol. 25, pp. 66-67. There are some differences.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Philippines and the Dutch East Indies areas</th>
<th>The Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, and Borneo areas</th>
<th>Southern French Indochina and Malaya areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Submarine Unit</strong></td>
<td><strong>Air Unit</strong></td>
<td><strong>Malaya Unit</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Submarine Sqdn Cdr</td>
<td>11th Air Fleet Cdr in chief</td>
<td>Southern Expeditionary Fleet Cdr in chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R Adm Marquis Daigo Tadashige</td>
<td>V Adm Tsukahara Nishiō (R Adm Ōnishi Takijirō)</td>
<td>V Adm Ozawa Jisaburō (R Adm Sawada Torao)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Submarine Sqdn, 6th Submarine Sqdn (minus one element) as the core. (In the Philippines area.)</td>
<td>Bulk of the 11th Air Fleet as the core. (Main force in Taiwan; one element in Palau.)</td>
<td>Southern Expeditionary Fleet, 7th Cruiser Div, Chōkai, 3d Destroyer Sqdn, 4th Submarine Sqdn, one element of 6th Submarine Sqdn, 2d Section of 17th Minelayer Div, 12th Seaplane Tender Div (to be returned to the Philippines Unit in the middle of the operation), and 22d Air Flotilla as the core. Bulk of surface vessels at Sanya, one element in southern French Indochina; Submarines in the Singapore area; Air unit in southern French Indochina.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 light cruiser, 8 submarines</td>
<td>Air strength: 72 fighter planes, 144 mid-sized land-based attack planes, 18 flying boats, 12 land-based recon. planes</td>
<td>5 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 16 destroyers, 8 submarines, 3 seaplane tenders, Air strength: 36 fighter planes, 72 mid-sized land-based attack planes, 6 land-based recon. planes, 24 recon. seaplanes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies areas, [it shall] (1) patrol and watch key points and main waterways, (2) conduct surprise attacks on enemy naval vessels, (3) lay mines, and (4) sever enemy submarine cables.

(1) It shall launch operations with preemptive air strikes against the Philippines and swiftly destroy enemy air power in the area. (2) As the progress of the operations, it shall gradually advance its bases and destroy enemy air power in the Dutch East Indies. (3) It shall continuously search for the enemy on the operational waters, and on spotting enemy vessels, catch up and destroy them. (4) When [the air bases in] Miri and Kuching are seized, one element of the force shall be advanced there to participate in the air operation against Malaya.

(1) It shall destroy enemy vessels in the assigned areas. (2) Right at the outset of the war, it shall put ashore the 15th Army and one element of the 25th Army in southern Thailand (Ban Don, Nakhon, Singora and Pattani depending on the situation, including Kota Bharu), swiftly seize air bases, and in conjunction with the Army, conduct air operations against Malaya. (3) After the opening of hostilities, in conjunction with the Army, it shall seize Miri and Kuching as quickly as possible, rapidly ready air bases there so that one element of Navy air unit shall be advance there. (4) Around Day X + 25, it shall put ashore the main force of the 25th Army on southern Thailand. (Part of the escorting forces shall be provided by the Philippines Unit.) (5) It shall lay mines and conduct submarine warfare in the Malaya and Borneo areas.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Southern Army</th>
<th>Navy Southern Task Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mid- and late November</td>
<td>If the [Imperial] order has been issued, one element of the 15th Army (about 6 inf bns of the Imperial Guard Div) and one element of the 3d Air Force shall, without missing an opportunity, advance into central Thailand. And one element (about 1 inf bn of the Imperial Guard Div) shall seize Prachuap Khiri Khan by sea and ready the airfield there.</td>
<td>It shall support the operation with the forces already deployed in the area of Op E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late November early December</td>
<td>If the [Imperial] order has been issued, one element of the 15th Army (about 6 inf bns of the Imperial Guard Div) and one element of the 3d Air Force shall, without missing an opportunity, advance into central Thailand. One element (about 3 inf bns of the 55th Div) shall advance to Nakhon, Ban Don, Chumphon and Prachuap Khiri Khan by sea. Apart from the above, about 1 inf bn of the Imperial Guard Div shall advance into central Thailand by sea.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through November</td>
<td>(1) While the Army and Navy on each site in conjunction shall intercept the invading country’s forces, [the Army and Navy] shall conduct the operations specified in “If the British army should advance into Thailand.” (2) The implementation of attack and advance operations shall separately be given in other orders.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From early December onwards</td>
<td>(1) While the Army and Navy on site in conjunction shall intercept the the invading country’s forces, [the Army and Navy] shall conduct the operations specified in “If the British army should advance into Thailand” in the area of Op E. (2) [The Army and Navy] shall immediately make ready to advance, and after concluding an agreement between the commanders in chief of the Navy in the Southern Area and the Southern Army, launch the invasion operations as quickly as possible. However, the Navy Malaya Unit commander shall discuss the date and time to launch the air advancing operation in Area E with the commander in chief of the Southern Army, and the commander in chief of the Navy in the Southern Area shall discuss that for Area M with the 14th Army commander. (3) If [the exact date of] Day X were yet to be issued in the previous two items, the launch of the advancing operation shall be separately given in other orders.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td>Whether to advance into Thailand or not if [Japanese forces] should come under preemptive attacks of the U.S. forces shall separately be given in other orders.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. Reconnaissance of enemy movements
   Before the opening of the hostilities, both the Army and Navy shall covertly recon-
   noiter and obtain intelligence concerning enemy movements. Especially they shall
   strive to swiftly share the obtained intelligence.

c. Restrictions of radio communications
   Both the Army and Navy shall strictly control the radio communications within each
   force, and the radio communication traffic between both forces shall be kept to the
   minimum.

2. General operational outline
   a. The operation to capture key areas shall be carried out in conformity with [section]
   III. Standard dates [to implement] the capture [operations]. However, concerning the
   date for the advance forces of Operation E to land in Kota Bharu shall be decided by
   the Navy Malaya Unit commander and the Twenty-fifth Army commander after due
   consultation between them, taking weather conditions and situation of the defense
   into consideration. Other particulars of arrangements shall be made between com-
   manders of lower echelons.
   b. Escort at sea (Omitted by the author)
   c. Transfer [of Army forces] and replacement of Army forces by Naval forces (Omitted
      by the author)

3. The outline of the air operations
   Separate volume No. 1 (Note by the author: not extant)

VI. Signal communications
   Separate volume No. 2 (Note by the author: not extant)

VII. Setting up of supply bases
   The Navy Southern Task Force shall set up supply bases in seized places (and shift [one el-
   ement] there) to provide replenishment mainly to small naval vessels by and large in the
   following way:
   1. In the areas of Operations M and H
      a. Moro Gulf (southern Mindanao)
      b. Menado and vicinity
      c. Tarakan and vicinity
      d. Ambon
   2. In the areas of Operations E and B
      Brunei and vicinity

VIII. Exchanges of information
   1. Information shall swiftly be exchanged between each other.
   2. Information shall be shared between the following combinations of [units]:

   Combined Fleet HQ
   Second Fleet HQ
   and Southern Expeditionary Fleet HQ

   Second Fleet HQ (meteorology)
   Third Fleet HQ
   and
   { Fourteenth Army HQ
     Sixteenth Army HQ
   }

   Southern Expeditionary Fleet HQ and
   { Fifteenth Army HQ
     Sixteenth Army HQ
     Twenty-fifth Army HQ
   }

   Eleventh Air Fleet HQ and
   { Third Air Force HQ
     Fifth Air Force HQ
   }
The above combinations of sharing information can be altered if required by the Army and Navy commanders concerned after due consultation between them.

3. The exchange of [information on] meteorological factors between meteorological units shall be arranged between the commander in chief of the Third Fleet and the Fourteenth Army commander, as well as between the commander in chief of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet, the Twenty-fifth Army commander and the Third Air Force commander.

IX. Arrangements and communication

1. The details of Article 24 of the Central Agreement shall be specified as follows:
   The commander in chief of the Third Fleet, the commander in chief of the Eleventh Air Fleet, the Fourteenth Army commander and the Fifth Air Force commander shall jointly make arrangements. ([at] Iwakuni)
   The commander in chief of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet, the Fifteenth Army commander, the Twenty-fifth Army commander, the Third Air Force commander and the 22d Air Flotilla commander shall jointly make arrangements. ([at] Saigon)

The Order to Prepare for Capture of Key Areas in the South

On 10 November, Commander in chief Terauchi [of the Southern Army] approved the plan of operations of the Southern Army and the Army and Navy agreement [for the southern operation], after which he signed the operational agreement between the Army and Navy at the War College along with Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, commander in chief of the Combined Fleet and V. Adm. Kondō Nobutake, commander in chief of the Second Fleet and the commander in chief of the Navy in the Southern Area.*

On the same afternoon, having the commanders of the armies and numbered air forces under [the command of] the Southern Army gathered together in a hall, the commander in chief [of the Southern Army] gave instructions and passed down the following Southern Army Order No. 1:61

Southern Army Operation Order A, No. 1.1**

Southern Army Order

Tokyo, 15 November

1. In conjunction with the Navy, I intend to swiftly prepare to invade the strategic areas in the South, [concerning which,] I have taken over the task of intensifying the blockade against China in Indochina. The distribution of forces of the Southern Army is as given in the separate volume. (Note by the author: the separate volume omitted).

2. Preparations for the operation shall be completed by approx. [month] [day] (note by the author: left blank in the original document; orally instructed to be completed by the end of November). Excerpts of the operation plan of the Southern Army are as given in the separate volume. In making preparations for the operation, strictly see to it that the plan shall be kept concealed.

3. The commander in chief of the China Expeditionary Army and the Taiwan Army commander shall support the operational preparations of the [Southern] Army.

* See also Vol. 3, pp. 57, 62-63; Vol. 26, p. 62.
** See also Vol. 3, p. 63.
The commander in chief of the General Defense Command shall support the operations of the [Southern] Army by having the defense units in Taiwan and the Southwest Islands support the units [of the Southern Army] that shall be concentrating there in conducting their antiaircraft self-defense and guard.

4. The commanders of the Fourteenth, the Fifteenth, the Sixteenth and the Twenty-fifth Armies, the commander of the Third Air Force and Commander Kawaguchi of the Kawaguchi Detachment shall make arrangements on operations with the Navy commanders concerned, based on the excerpts of the Army-Navy Central Agreement in a separate volume, and General Agreement No. 2, i.e. the Memorandum of Agreement between the commander in chief of the Navy in the Southern Area and the commander in chief of the Southern Army. (Note by the author: Excerpts of the central agreement omitted.)

5. The commander of the Fourteenth Army shall prepare for Operation M. (Note by the author: The code names of the operations are as shown in the Army-Navy Central Agreement; the same hereafter.)

6. The commander of the Fifteenth Army shall prepare for the operation to advance into Thailand, while taking charge of intensifying the blockade against China as well as securing the stability of Indochina. Particularly, in case the British army invades Thailand, he shall, without missing an opportunity, advance into the country by land and by sea to secure Bangkok, while making preparations to secure air bases as far to the south as possible. In case the Fifteenth Army advances into Thailand by sea, the movements of its ships shall be arranged by the Twenty-fifth Army commander. The order to implement the advance into Thailand shall be given separately.

7. The commander of the Twenty-fifth Army shall prepare for Operation E. He shall support the preparations for Operation B to be conducted by Kawaguchi Detachment Commander Kawaguchi and arrange the formation and assembly of the detachment. Also, if the units of the Fifteenth Army advance into Thailand by sea, he shall determine the movements of the ships [to be employed] for them.

8. The commander of the Fifteenth Army shall also assume the tasks and responsibilities of the Twenty-fifth Army commander on his behalf until his arrival in Indochina.

9. Closely cooperating with commanders of the Twenty-fifth Army and the Fifteenth Army, the Third Air Force commander shall prepare for [the support of] Operation E and the operation to advance into Thailand.

10. The commanders of the Fifteenth Army, the Twenty-fifth Army and the Third Air Force shall closely cooperate and support each other in the preparations for the operations in Indochina. The guarding, quartering and provision of the units in Indochina shall be determined by the Fifteenth Army commander.

11. (Concerning the units stationed in Indochina: omitted by the author.)

12. The commander of the Sixteenth Army shall prepare for the occupation of Jolo Island and Tarakan as well as the subsequent operations against the eastern outer territories of the Dutch East Indies.

13. In the event of an attack by the United States, Britain and the Netherlands or any single one of them, the commanders of the Fourteenth, the Fifteenth, the Sixteenth and the Twenty-fifth Armies and the commander of the Third Air Force shall intercept the attack with the forces on site for the sake of self-defense. When dealing with the above situation, they shall strive to settle it locally as much as possible. Separate orders shall be issued for the execution of the advance operations.

14. Commander Kawaguchi of the Kawaguchi Detachment shall prepare for Operation B.

15. I shall be in Tokyo.

The intelligence posts of the Southern Army shall be set up in Saigon and Gaoxiong from 20 November onwards.
The plan of operations of the Southern Army shown in one of the separate volumes of Southern Army Operational Order A No. 1.1 was as follows:

**The Plan of Operations of the Southern Army** (Excerpt)*

Section 1: Operational objective

(Note by the author: almost the same as in the plan of IGHQ.)

Section 2: Mission

Section 3: Operational directives

Article 4: The operations shall be conducted in accordance with the previous sections in the following manner:

Phase-one operations

1. Operations shall start with a sudden landing of an advance force (or a preemptive air strike depending on the situation) against Malaya and a preemptive air strike against the U.S. [forces] in the Philippines. Then, taking advantage of the results of the air operations, the main force of each invasion force shall be put ashore first in the Philippines, then in Malaya, and swiftly capture the Philippines and British Malaya. Apart from this, strategic locations in British Borneo shall be occupied right at the opening of hostilities, and stability in Thailand and Indochina shall be secured.

2. The date for the start of the operations (Day 1 of operations) shall be given by separate order. Even if the air strikes both in the Philippines and in Malaya on Day 1 of operations are impossible to execute due to the weather, the sudden landing in Malaya shall be carried through as long as sea conditions permit. However, the landing of the advance parties in the Philippines shall be postponed depending on the launch of the air operations in the area.

3. During the above operations, key locations in Dutch Borneo shall be occupied as quickly as possible, followed by key areas in southern Sumatra as the Malaya operation progresses, where vital resource areas shall be secured and preparations for operations against Java shall be made. During or after this, key locations in the Moluccas as well as on Timor shall be occupied at favorable opportunities.

Phase-two operations

As preparations for the above-mentioned operations make progress, enemy air power in the Java area shall be swiftly neutralized to seize the island. Also, key areas of northern Sumatra shall be occupied at the right moment after the capture of Singapore. During phase-one and phase-two operations, air bases in southern Burma shall be captured at favorable opportunities.

Phase-three operations

The occupied areas shall be stabilized and secured. Further, as far as circumstances permit, an operation for dealing with Burma shall be carried out. Separate orders shall be issued for implementation of this operation.

Section 4: Outline of the distribution of forces and their mission

Article 5: The outline of the distribution of forces of the Southern Army and their mission for phase-one operations is as follows:

The Philippines

The Fourteenth Army (consisting of two divisions as its core), in conjunction with the Navy, shall swiftly capture Manila, and then occupy key locations within the archipelago. After the capture of Manila, a unit with the 48th Division as its core shall be assembled in Manila or its vicinity and prepared for its transfer to the Sixteenth Army.

* See also Vol. 3, pp. 63-66.
Malaya
The Twenty-fifth Army (consisting of four divisions as its core), in conjunction with the Navy, shall swiftly capture Singapore.

Thailand and Burma
The Fifteenth Army (consisting of two divisions as its core), in conjunction with the Navy, shall secure the stability of Thailand, facilitate the operations in Malaya, and [at the same time] prepare for subsequent operations against Burma.

The Dutch East Indies
The Sixteenth Army (consisting of three divisions as its core, of which two divisions as the core shall be transferred from the Fourteenth Army and the Twenty-third Army), in conjunction with the Navy, shall occupy vital resource areas of Dutch Borneo, the Moluccas, Timor and southern Sumatra, secure air bases and make them ready for use.

Forces under the direct control of the Southern Army shall consist of one division, two numbered air forces and other units. The division concerned shall be charged to stabilize and secure Indochina. Right at the launch of the operations, an element of the Twenty-fifth Army shall be brought under the direct control [of the Southern Army] to occupy key locations in British Borneo.

The numbered air forces, in conjunction with the Navy air unit, shall first destroy enemy air power in the Philippines, Malaya and Burma, while supporting the operations of the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth Armies with an element of each [air force], and the operations of the Twenty-fifth Army with their main force. Then, they shall support the Sixteenth Army in its operation in southern Sumatra. Furthermore, they shall be charged to cut off the enemy’s rear lines of communications as well as to attack locations of strategic (and political) importance at the right moments.

Article 6: The outline of the distribution of forces of the Southern Army and their mission for phase-two operations is planned as follows:

The Philippines
The Fourteenth Army (consisting of one division and one mixed brigade as its core), in conjunction with the Navy, shall stabilize and secure key areas within the Philippine Archipelago. At the arrival of another mixed brigade, the division and other units shall get ready for their transfer.

British Malaya and Northern Sumatra
The Twenty-fifth Army, in conjunction with the Navy, shall secure key locations in Malaya such as Singapore and Penang, and [at the same time] have one element of its force occupy key areas of northern Sumatra. In the meantime, preparations shall be made so that the unit under the direct control of the army can be transferred to the Sixteenth Army as quickly as possible, and also the extraction of about one division shall be prepared.

Java
The Sixteenth Army, in conjunction with the Navy, shall occupy Java.

The numbered air forces, in conjunction with the Navy air unit, shall support the operations of the Fourteenth, the Fifteenth and the Twenty-fifth Armies with one element of each [air force], and the operations of the Sixteenth Army in Java with a force as large as possible. The rest shall operate largely in the same way as in phase-one operations.

Article 7: The outline of the distribution of forces of the Southern Army and their mission for phase-three operations is roughly set as follows:

The Philippines
The mission of the Fourteenth Army (consisting of two mixed brigades as its core) shall be the same as in phase-two.
British Malaya

The Twenty-fifth Army (consisting of three divisions as its core) shall stabilize and secure the key areas in British Malaya, British Borneo as well as in northern Sumatra.

The Dutch East Indies

The Sixteenth Army (consisting of two divisions as its core) shall stabilize and secure the key areas of the Dutch East Indies (excluding northern Sumatra).

When implementing the Burma operation, the Fifteenth Army (with part of its strength reinforced), in conjunction with the Navy, shall occupy key areas of Burma.

The numbered air forces, in conjunction with the Navy air unit, shall support the operations of the Fourteenth, the Sixteenth and the Twenty-fifth Armies with one element of each [force], and with a powerful element support the Fifteenth Army in its Burma operation.

The Iwakuni Agreement — The Arrangement for the Philippines Operation Between the Army and Navy on Site

From the 14th to the 16th of November, the Fourteenth Army, the Fifth Air Force, the Third Fleet, and the Eleventh Air Fleet, which were to take charge of the Philippines operation, concluded the operational arrangement between the Army and Navy units on site at the Navy Iwakuni Air Group [base] in Yamaguchi Prefecture.⁶¹

In this agreement, the outline of the items related to the air operation were specified as follows:

I. Forces to be employed

(1) Navy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Type of aircraft</th>
<th>Number of aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy Kanoya Air Gp</td>
<td>Type–1 land-based attack planes</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Air Gp</td>
<td>Type–96 land-based attack planes (and its air transport unit)</td>
<td>36 (…)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Tōkō Air Group*</td>
<td>Flying boats</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Takao Air Gp</td>
<td>Type–1 land-based attack planes</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Tainan Air Gp</td>
<td>Type–0 carrier-based fighter planes</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land-based reconnaissance aircraft</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type–96 carrier-based attack planes</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Air Gp</td>
<td>Type–0 carrier-based fighter planes</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land-based reconnaissance aircraft</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type–96 carrier-based aircraft</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Carrier Div</td>
<td>Ryūjō</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type–96 carrier-based fighter planes</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Carrier-based attack planes</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Row inserted on the basis of the original document.
II. The outline of the operation

1. Deployment and engagements during deployment
   a. The deployment and the disposition of the Army and Navy air units in Taiwan is as shown in Attached Table No. 1. (Note by the author: attached table not extant.)
   b. In case of coming under enemy preemptive air strikes, the Army and Navy units shall, while immediately intercepting [the enemy] at their own locations, especially [see to it that] they should speedily exchange intelligence. If they are to advance into hostile countries, they shall implement it roughly in conformity to the disposition of the first strike and inform each other about the time to launch the attacks.

2. Air campaigns to destroy enemy air power
   a. [The Army and Navy shall] strive to gain the results of air campaigns to destroy enemy air power by around Day X + 9. The outline of the attacks in the first strike shall be decided after due consultation after the announcement of Day X.
b. The distribution of the seized air bases for use in the early stages of the operation shall be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base</th>
<th>Standard forces to be deployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aparri</td>
<td>About one half each of fighter plane and land-based reconnaissance aircraft units of 23d Air Flotilla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laoag</td>
<td>In case Aparri cannot be used right at the launch of the operation, one element of the fighter plane unit shall be advanced there.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vigan</td>
<td>Kanoya Air Gp Tokō Air Gp About one half each of the fighter plane and land-based reconnaissance aircraft units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davao</td>
<td>Legaspi About one half each of the fighter plane and land-based reconnaissance aircraft units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jolo</td>
<td>About one air gp of land-based attack planes One element each of the fighter plane and land-based reconnaissance aircraft units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batan</td>
<td>Shared as a relay base (mobilization base)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Support for the advance parties
   a. The Navy air units shall provide cover for the convoys under sail in the following way:

   Det C \{ One element of the land-based attack plane unit of the 1st Air Gp \\
   \{ One element of the fighter plane unit of the 23d Air Flotilla \\
   The reconnaissance seaplane unit of the Sanuki-maru \\

   Det D \{ The carrier-based fighter plane unit and the carrier-based attack plane unit of the Ryūjō of the 4th Carrier Div \\
   The reconnaissance seaplane unit of the Mizuho \\

   Det E The reconnaissance seaplane unit of the Chitose of the 11th Seaplane Tender Div

   However, the Army 50th Air Group shall cover Detachment C against enemy aircraft while the latter sails within two hundred kilometers from the coast of Taiwan.

   b. The cover of the anchorages shall be provided in the following way by the Navy air unit.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anchorage</th>
<th>Forces to be employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aparri</td>
<td>About nine fighter planes of 23d Air Flotilla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laoag</td>
<td>Recon. seaplane unit of the Chitose of 11th Seaplane Tender Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vigan</td>
<td>Recon. seaplane unit of the Mizuho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davao</td>
<td>Recon. seaplane unit of the Chitose of 11th Seaplane Tender Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legaspi</td>
<td>Recon. seaplane unit of the Mizuho</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, if [the airfield on] Batan Island is made available, or the Army fighter plane unit has advanced to northern Luzon, the cover [of the anchorages] at Aparri, Laoag and Vigan from the air shall mainly be assigned to the Army.

c. [The Army and Navy air units] shall support the landing operations and the operations right after the landing in the following way.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Landing points</th>
<th>Supporting forces</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aparri</td>
<td>One element of land-based attack plane unit of 1st Air Gp</td>
<td>14th Air Gp</td>
<td>16th Air Gp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>One element of the fighter plane unit of 23d Air Flotilla</td>
<td>50th Air Gp</td>
<td>52d Independent Air Sqdn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recon. seaplane unit of the Sanuki-maru</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laoag</td>
<td></td>
<td>14th Air Gp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vigan</td>
<td></td>
<td>8th Air Gp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davao</td>
<td>Recon. seaplane unit of the Chitose of 11th Seaplane Tender Div</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legaspi</td>
<td>Recon. seaplane unit of the Mizuho</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Support for the main force of the Fourteenth Army
   a. Lingayen area
      1. The air defense of the convoys sailing on the waters within two hundred kilometers from the coast of Luzon Island, shall mainly be assigned to the Army 50th Air Group, and depending on the situation, the Navy fighter plane unit shall support it. The cover [of the convoys] on the waters other than the above (and also that on the waters within two hundred kilometers from the coast of Taiwan) shall be assigned to one element of the Navy fighter plane unit as well as to the reconnaissance seaplane unit of the San’yō-maru and the Sanuki-maru.
      2. The guard in the air of the anchorages shall be assigned to the Army 50th Air Group. Depending on the situation, one element of the Navy fighter plane unit shall support it. The guard of the anchorages on the sea shall be assigned to the reconnaissance seaplane unit of the San’yō-maru and the Sanuki-maru.
      3. Combat support during the landings or right after the landings shall be assigned to the main force of the Fifth Air Force, and depending on the situation, the main force of the Navy 1st Air Group, the reconnaissance seaplane unit of the San’yō-maru and the Sanuki-maru shall support it.
   b. The Lamon Bay areas
      The cover for the convoys under sail, the cover of the anchorage as well as combat support during the landings and right after the landings shall mainly be assigned to one element each of the [Navy] land-based attack plane unit and the fighter plane unit, as well as the 4th Carrier Division. The Army air unit shall provide combat support after the landings with one element each of the 8th and the 14th Air Groups.

5. Reconnaissance of the landing points
   [Reconnaissance of the landing points] to the north of 16ºN shall mainly be assigned to the Army, and that to the south of it shall mainly be assigned to the Navy.

III. The air defense of the Taiwan area and the guard of the seized air bases
   1. The air defense of the Taiwan area
a. The Army and Navy air unit shall be responsible for air defense in the vicinity of their own stations.
b. The cover of anchorages shall be assigned in the following way:
   Magong (The air unit attached to the [Navy] Makō Guard District [in Magong])
   Gaoxiong (The Army 50th Air Gp; after its dash to Luzon, [the cover of the anchorage] shall be assigned to the air group for [the air defense of] Taiwan.)
c. The intelligence obtained by the air-raid wardens to be stationed by the Taiwan Army and the Makō Guard District [in Magong] shall be made use of as much as possible.
d. The air defense of Hengchun shall be assigned to one squadron of the Army 50th Air Group.

2. The seized air bases shall be guarded in the following way:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base</th>
<th>Guard on the ground</th>
<th>Antiaircraft watch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Batan</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aparri</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laoag</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vigan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davao</td>
<td>The Army shall be assigned the indirect guard, whereas the Navy shall be assigned the direct guard.</td>
<td>The Navy shall be mainly in charge, while the Army shall support it with its ground unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legaspi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The guard of the bases other than the above shall be decided after due consultation between both forces.

IV. Communications (omitted by the author)

V. Others

The items of the plan of the Philippines operation that were directly affected by the Iwakuni Agreement were as follows:⁶¹, ⁶⁴, ⁹¹

1. Reinforcements of the Army fighter plane unit to be employed for the Philippines operation
   As the result of the Iwakuni Agreement, the air defense of the transport convoys sailing within two hundred kilometers from the coast of Taiwan was assigned to the Army. Intelligence, which indicated [U.S.] reinforcements of B–17s in the Philippines area, also made the strengthening of the air defense in Taiwan a problem.
   Meanwhile, responding to the request of the Army, the Navy transferred twenty-seven Type–0 fighter planes to the Malaya area. Since the Southern Army had changed the disposition of the 10th Air Division and put it under the command of the Third Air Force commander, the 50th Air Group became the only Army fighter plane unit to be employed for the Philippines operation, which caused misgivings about a shortage of fighter plane units in the Philippines area. Satō Masaichi, chief of staff of the Fifth Air Force placed great emphasis on this point, for which, on 15 November, the IGHQ [Army Department] issued an order to shift the 24th Air Group [to the Philippines area].¹⁸, ¹⁴⁰

2. The estimation of the development of the air operation and the decision on the landing date
The outline of the landings of the advance units of the Fourteenth Army in the Philippines areas was set in such a way that the units should land in Aparri, Vigan and Laoag before dawn of the third day of the operation, and in Davao and Legaspi around the fifth day, while the main force should go ashore around Lingayen Gulf about Day X + 15.

[It was based on the following calculation:] The air unit had to roughly complete the air campaigns to destroy enemy air power before the landings of the advance units, and by the time of the landings of the main force of the army, clean up remaining [enemy] aircraft, while advancing its air base to northern Luzon. The Fourteenth Army estimated the time required to complete the advance parties’ landings on northern Luzon at two days, time to secure airfields after the landings at two to three days, time to condition the airfields at three to four days, time to have the air units dash [to the airfields] and clean up remaining enemy [aircraft] at about one week, totaling fourteen to sixteen days. Thus, the army roughly set the landing date of its main force around Day X + 15.

The date of the landings at the Lingayen Gulf areas was set on the fifteenth day of the operation, and that of one element of the army at Lamon Bay was set around the seventeenth day.

Other than the landings at Lamon Bay, the Army also considered a plan of conducting a landing in Batangas, a hundred kilometers to the south of Manila. However, it was cancelled in accordance with the assessment that due to the reinforcements of B–17s to the U.S. Air Forces in the Philippines and movements of [enemy] submarines, a landing in Batangas was hazardous.

3. The decision on the disposition of the landing forces after prioritizing the airfield to the south of Aparri

In the central agreement, the landing points of the advance parties in northern Luzon were set at Aparri, Laoag, and Vigan. Then, raising the problem of a shortage of surface escort forces, and also on the grounds that a landing in Aparri would possibly be impracticable due to the strong northeastern winds along its coast, the Navy offered a proposal that the landing points should be limited to the two points of Laoag and Vigan.

However, the Fourteenth Army, which attached more importance to the Aparri airfield and intended to secure the airfield right after the landing and to have the main force of the Fifth Air Force dash there, earnestly demanded to keep the landing at Aparri as in the original plan. Eventually, the landing points [remained] scheduled for Aparri and Vigan or Laoag, but in the end, it was decided to land [only] in Aparri and Vigan.

4. Concentration of the Army Air Service in the South

The Disposition of Forces Issued by the IGHQ [Army Department]

The Deployment of Seaborne Units to Southern China

On 31 October, prior to the decision of 5 November [to open] hostilities against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, the chief of Army General Staff gave the following instructions concerning which air units among those scheduled to be employed in the operations in the Malaya area should be sent southward by sea.(19)
1. The units, which shall be sent to the area off the coast of Hainan Island by the Kwangtung Army commander and which shall be kept on standby on board:
10th Air Div HQ; one element of 12th Air Div HQ; 77th Air Gp (fighter planes); 31st Air Gp (minus one element; light bombers); 83d Independent Air Unit HQ; 71st and 73d Independent Air Sqdns ([both] tactical reconnaissance aircraft); 89th Independent Air Sqdn (direct support aircraft); 1st Air-Ground Support HQ; 40th Airfield Bn ([in charge of] fighter planes); one element of the 97th Airfield Bn ([in charge of] light bombers); 29th Airfield Co ([in charge of] strategic reconnaissance aircraft); 9th Airfield Co ([in charge of] heavy bombers); 36th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Bn (B).

2. The units, which shall be sent by the Kwangtung Army commander to Hainan Island, and stationed on location:
7th Airfield Co ([in charge of] heavy bombers): Sanya
1st and 2d Air Transport Units: Haikou

3. The units, which shall be sent to the area off the coast of Hainan Island by the commander in chief of the China Expeditionary Army and which shall be kept on standby on board:
3d Air Force HQ; 3d Air Div HQ; 81st Air Gp (strategic reconnaissance aircraft); 59th Air Gp (minus one element; fighter planes); 90th and 75th Air Gps ([both] light bombers); 60th Air Gp (heavy bombers, except for those dispatched to mainland Japan); 98th Air Gp (heavy bombers); one element each of 82d Airfield Bn ([in charge of] strategic reconnaissance aircraft), 41st Airfield Bn ([in charge of] fighter planes), 35th Airfield Bn ([in charge of] light bombers), 23d and 92d Airfield Bns ([both in charge of] heavy bombers); 91st Airfield Bn ([in charge of] light bombers); 12th Air Transport Sqdn; 15th Special Air Transport Unit; one element of 15th Field Aircraft Depot (two mobile repair details); 17th Direction Finder Unit.

The Deployment of Air Units to Southern China, Northern French Indochina (Part of Them to Southern French Indochina) and Taiwan

Since the air units that were to participate in the southern operation were stationed over a vast area of the entire northern sphere of greater East Asia, it was not easy to swiftly and safely concentrate them in the French Indochina and Taiwan areas, while concealing the intention as much as possible. The distances they [had to] travel for the mobilization from northern Manchuria and Hokkaidō ranged from 4,000 to 5,000 kilometers, and the weather in Okinawa, Taiwan and southern China frequently changed. [Moreover,] as previously told, the Army central command was [still] working out the air routes.

The IGHQ [Army Department’s] plan for the concentrated deployment of the Third Air Force was to divide [the entire deployment] into two stages, (whereas [the deployment of] the Fifth Air Force [was to be implemented] in one stage). The idea was to advance [the Third Air Force] as far as southern China and northern French Indochina in the first stage, and in the second stage, have it deploy to the positions from where to launch the offensive right before the opening of hostilities, so as to be ready in time.

On 8 November, the orders concerning the overall first-stage concentrated [deployment] of the air force involved were issued, the outline of which was as follows:s ([18, 19])

1. The air units, which shall be transferred from the full control of the Kwangtung Army commander, the commander in chief of the China Expeditionary Army and the First Air Force commander to the full control of the commander in chief of the Southern Army, and those to be transferred from the full control of the First Air Force commander to the full control of the commander in chief of the China Expeditionary Army, can leave part of their personnel and matériel behind if required.
The above personnel and matériel shall be under the command of the Kwangtung Army commander, the commander in chief of the China Expeditionary Army and the First Air Force commander.

2. The flight units of the Third and the Fifth Air Forces shall be concentrated by the end of November as shown in the separate sheet. On implementing the above concentration, the Third Air Force commander shall take control of the air units to be put in the Order of Battle of the Southern Army from the full control of the Kwangtung Army commander and the First Air Force commander (except for the units already stationed in Taiwan).

3. The First Air Force commander and the chief of the Army Aviation Headquarters shall respectively have the 7th Air Transport Unit headquarters (flight unit) and the 13th Special Air Transport Unit 2d Squadron (flight unit) proceed to Beijing and temporarily put them at the disposal of the Third Air Force commander.

4. The matters concerning the 45th Air Group’s passing of the border between Manchuria and China. (Omitted by the author.)

5. The commander in chief of the China Expeditionary Army shall make arrangements for the units under the full control of the commander in chief of the Southern Army, which are stationed in southern China, concerning their guarding, quartering, and provisions. And he shall also support the concentration of the Third and the Fifth Air Forces.

6. The commander in chief of the Southern Army shall have the sailing operations of the ships carrying the 17th and the 18th Shipboard Aircraft Depot be arranged by the captain general of the Shipping Transport Command.

### Separate Sheet

#### The List of Concentration Points of the Third and the Fifth Air Force (Flight Units)

**Third Air Force**

- **3d Air Div**
  - 59th Air Gp (fighter planes)  
  - 27th Air Gp (light bombers)  
  - 75th Air Gp (light bombers)  
  - 90th Air Gp (light bombers)  
- **7th Air Div**
  - 64th Air Gp (fighter planes)  
  - 12th Air Gp (heavy bombers)  
  - 60th Air Gp (heavy bombers)  
  - 98th Air Gp (heavy bombers)  
- **12th Air Div**
  - 1st Air Gp (fighter planes)  
  - 11th Air Gp (fighter planes)

**Fifth Air Force**

- **4th Air Div**
  - 50th Air Gp (fighter planes)  
  - 8th Air Gp (strategic recon. aircraft and light bombers)  
  - 16th Air Gp (light bombers)  
  - 14th Air Gp (heavy bombers)  
- **10th Air Div**
  - 70th Independent Air Sqdn (strategic recon. aircraft)  
  - 77th Air Gp (fighter planes)  
  - 31st Air Gp (light bombers)  
  - 62d Air Gp (heavy bombers)  
- **83d Independent Air Unit**
Suggestions for Air Units Other Than Those Shown in the Table

1. Decisions about air units other than those shown in the table shall appropriately be made by the numbered air force commander.

2. The [concentration] points shown in this table can partially be changed according to the condition of the airfields and other conditions.\(^{(4, 5)}\)

Instructions on the Armaments and Matériel to Bring Along

On 6 November, the IGHQ [Army Department] gave instructions about the equipment of the units to be sent to the South.\(^{(19)}\)

1. Aircraft and associated armaments
   Air groups ([land] squadrons) shall bring along the full number of aircraft (including reserve aircraft) and associated armaments that will meet the mobilization plan of fiscal year 1941. The airfield battalions ([land] companies) shall bring along the full number of armaments which is specified.
   2. Parts, matériel and expendable supplies
   Air groups ([land] squadrons) shall bring along [the parts, matériel and expendables] required for their tasks.
   Airfield battalions ([land] companies) shall bring along the quantity [to be spent] in a month by the units they are responsible for as a basis. The armaments for the operation of the 19th Field Aircraft Repair Depot shall be supplied from those kept by the 9th Field Aircraft Repair Depot. The 19th Field Aircraft Repair Depot shall bring along the quantity of parts, matériel and expendables to be spent in a month by two air divisions as a basis.
   3. General armaments etc.
   Airfield battalions ([land] companies) shall bring extra equipment and armaments [increased to] airfield battalions ([land] companies) based on War Ministry Issued and Received Classified Documents Concerning China, Year 1941 No. 2521 along with them.
   4. Airfield battalions ([land] companies) shall take as many oxygen masks, oxygen tanks, drop [fuel] tanks and extra magazines, which are kept at the air corps, as possible along with them.

On 8 November, the IGHQ [Army Department] reorganized the air forces in China, from which the main force of the Third Air Force had been extracted, and assigned the First Air Force commander to take command of both flight units and ground units stationed in the whole of China.

As previously told, the 17th and the 18th Shipboard Aircraft Depots were put under the full control of the Southern Army as of the same day.\(^{(18, 19)}\)

The Directives of the Southern Army

Simultaneously with the previously mentioned* Southern Army Operational Order A No. 1 of 10 November, the Southern Army also passed down the following order concerning the concentration of its air unit.\(^{(61, 64)}\)

* See pp. 136-137.
Southern Army Order

1. The Third Air Force shall take charge of the following [tasks] other than those specified in Southern Army Operational Order A No. 1.
   (1) The force shall continue the concentration [of forces] and operational transport designated in IGHQ Army Department Instructions Nos. 988 and 996. (Note by the author: the above instructions not extant.)
   (2) The main force shall dash into southern Indochina and deploy [there] by approx. [month] [day].
   (3) One element shall deploy in southern Indochina by approx. [month] [day] to take charge of the air defense of our main bases. It shall also covertly reconnoiter the movements of the British forces, particularly its air forces.
   (4) During the concentration, one element shall provide the air defense of the anchorages near Sanya and another shall conduct attacks on the Kunming area. Another element shall get ready roughly by 20 November so that, if necessary, it will be able to dash toward southern Indochina without missing an opportunity.
   (5) The guarding, quartering and provision of the air units to be stationed in southern China shall be arranged by the commander in chief of the China Expeditionary Army.
   (6) The sailing operations of the aircraft repair ships carrying the 17th and the 18th Shipboard Aircraft Depots shall be arranged by the captain general of the Shipping Transport Command.

The time to implement the attacks on Kunming in Item No. 4 shall be given in separate orders. The outline of the operations of the Third Air Force is as shown in the separate volume. (Note by the author: the separate volume not extant.)

2. The 21st Independent Air Unit shall mainly be stationed in northern Indochina and set up defense against the Indochina Army and the Chinese Army. It shall also support the concentration and deployment of the Third Air Force, and at the same time provide the air defense of southern Indochina until the fighter plane unit [of the Third Air Force] arrives.

3. The 1st Air Route Regiment shall promptly establish an air route connecting Guangdong, Haikou, Sanya, Tourane (Da Nang), Nha Trang and Saigon, and a route connecting Guangdong, Hanoi, Saigon, and Phnom Penh, and also set up wireless communication networks between Saigon and Pingdong. Particularly, it shall gather as large [a part] as possible of its force in the vicinity of Saigon to make preparations for the subsequent extension of air routes. (Note by the author: The main force of the regiment was stationed in Phnom Penh.)

4. The 16th Field Aircraft Depot shall be assigned to provide servicing and supply to the Third Air Force, the air units under the direct control of the Southern Army, and the air units under the command of the China Expeditionary Army that operate with Guangdong as their base.

5. The 20th Field Aircraft Supply Depot shall deploy its main force in Saigon and one element in Phnom Penh and take charge of supplying the Third Air Force after the latter’s deployment [there].

6. The 19th Field Aircraft Repair Depot shall first of all advance toward Saigon in conformity with the instructions of the IGHQ [Army Department].

7. When making operational preparations, [units] shall strive to strictly conceal the plan.

The Concentration of the Third Air Force

The Concentration Plan and Orders

On 10 November, the Third Air Force drew up a plan for the (first-stage) concentration of the units involved in the southern operation (Table No. 4), and informally announced it to
the units concerned. In the plan, no detailed consideration was given to the situation of each unit, the particulars of the condition of the air routes, the air situation at the concentration points, or the weather conditions there. It was because time was pressing and the [Third] Air Force intended to give more time to the front-line units for their own preparations.

It was not easy to take command of scores of units coming under the full control of the [Third] Air Force from mainland Japan or Manchuria. However, since the whole Army Air Service was still small in size at that time, the units involved more or less knew each other. Moreover, many of those involved shared a long experience in the air service. The Third Air Force felt that emotional bonds spontaneously formed between them and did not worry too much about it. (77, 80)

It was planned that the units from northern Manchuria should part with their coldproof equipment at Beijing or Nanjing during their shift [to the South] with the support of the nearest aircraft depots. (79, 80)

On 15 November, the Third Air Force issued the following orders concerning its concentration. (81)

**Third Air Force Order**

Nanjing, 15 November

1. The Southern Army, in conjunction with the Navy, shall swiftly prepare for the capture of the key areas in the South. The units on the separate sheet shall come under my command as of 0000 on 15 November.

2. In conformity with the outline of the concentration in the separate volume, the [units of the Third] Air Force shall be concentrated and deployed in southern China and Indochina, to prepare for the subsequent operations. [I] have been assigned to arrange the concentration of the air units, which will join the order of battle of the Southern Army from the control of the Kwantung Army commander or the First Air Force commander (except for the units already stationed in Taiwan). (The separate volume omitted by the author).

3. While the 15th Independent Air Unit (minus the 51st Independent Air Squadron) shall more or less maintain its current position, the 81st Air Group shall, in conformity with Attached Table No. 1 in the separate volume, be concentrated and deployed in southern Indochina, where both shall prepare for subsequent operations together. Separate orders shall be given concerning the particulars of the operational preparations.

4. The 12th Air Division shall be concentrated and deployed in southern Indochina in conformity with Attached Table No. 1 in the separate volume, where it shall take charge of the air defense of southern Indochina and vicinity. The outline of the air defense shall be given in separate orders.

5. The 7th Air Division (to which the 51st Independent Air Squadron shall be attached) shall more or less from its current positions prepare for deception attacks against key areas in southern China with the aim of concealing the [overall] plan, while the 3d Air Division shall do the same [after] having been concentrated and deployed in southern China and northern Indochina in conformity with Attached Table No. 1 in the separate volume. The implementation of the attacks shall be given in separate orders.

6. The 10th Air Division shall, in conformity with Attached Table No. 1 in the separate volume, be concentrated and deployed on Hainan Island and in central Indochina to prepare for the subsequent operations. It shall also have one element assigned to the air defense of the anchorage[s] near Sanya. Separate orders shall be given concerning the operational preparations and the outline of the air defense.

7. The 83d Independent Air Unit (minus the 89th Independent Air Squadron) shall, in conformity with Attached Table No. 1 in the separate volume, be concentrated in Taizhong to prepare for
the subsequent operations. Separate orders shall be given concerning the particulars of the op-
erational preparations.

8. In order [to implement] the concentration, air transport units shall be attached in the following
manner. The time of the attachment shall be given in separate orders, except for those specified
[in the following].

81st Air Gp: One element of the 15th Special Air Transport Unit (six Type-Ro aircraft or MC air-
craft) [shall be attached] at Nanjing.

3d Air Div: The 15th Special Air Transport Unit (the element in the previous item shall join after
providing transport for the 81st Air Gp) [shall be attached] at Dachang Zhen and the 12th
Air Transport Squadron [shall be attached] at Nanjing.

10th Air Div: One sqdn of the 13th Special Air Transport Unit [shall be attached] at Nanyuan
after its arrival [there].

12th Air Div: The 7th Air Transport Unit headquarters [shall be attached] at Nanyuan. The 1st
and the 2d Sqdns [shall be attached] at the location specified by the Kwantung Army com-
mmander.

9. The 10th and the 12th Air Divisions shall strive to shorten their concentration schedule.

10. The remaining units shall support the concentration of the units in the previous items, while
preparing for subsequent operations. Their command and control, and other matters shall be
given in separate orders.

11. The units in the previous items shall be provided with the following arrangements or support
for their concentrated deployment:

1. In China, from 0000 on 15 November onwards, the First Air Force commander shall provide
support in communications, meteorology, service and repair, supply, assistance for emer-
gency landings, quartering and provision as long as they do not interfere his own operations.
The Twenty-third Army commander shall arrange intendance, quartering and provision for
the air units in southern China, while providing support in communications, meteorology,
service and repair, supply, and assistance for emergency landings using the air-ground sup-
port units [there].

2. In mainland Japan (including Taiwan), support shall be provided by the units under the full
control of the First Air Force commander or the units ([aviation] schools) [under the full con-
trol] of the inspector general of Army Aviation.

3. In Indochina, the guarding, quartering and provision shall be arranged by the Fifteenth
Army commander, while support for communications, meteorology, service and repair, supply
and assistance for emergency landings shall be provided by the 21st Independent Air
Unit commander.

12. The personnel remaining in China, who were mentioned in Third Air Force Operational Order
No. 430 Article 13, No. 432 Article No. 15, etc., shall come under the command of the First Air
Force commander as of 0000 on 15 November.

13. I shall leave Nanjing on 15 November and advance toward Saigon by air. From 16 November
onwards, a command post shall be set up in Saigon.

Note by the author: Attached Table No. 1 in the separate volume [above] is shown as Table No.
4.

The Progress of the First-Stage Concentration of the Third Air Force

Each unit of the Third Air Force implemented the first-stage concentration in the following
way:
1. △ indicates quartering and refueling points and ○ refueling points. (The same applies below.)

2. •••••••••• indicates the work to remove coldproof equipment from aircraft, which shall be done at a nearest aircraft depot, (detached or branch depot).

3. — — — indicates reserve periods in case of (bad) weather. The top and the bottom of the (dashed) line indicate the standard (dates) of the launch and completion of the concentration. For example, the first concentration of the 1st Air Gp shall be launched from the 12th onwards and shall be completed by the evening of the 2d. Although the reserve periods for weather can be spent during the concentration (indicated in this chart with solid lines), it shall be used after communicating relevant units so that it will not conflict with the concentration of other units as much as possible.

4. •••••••••• indicates the outline of concentration. (The same applies below.)

5. Boxed unit numbers indicate they shall be accompanied by about one sqdn of transport aircraft.

6. Other than this chart, 60th Air Gp and 98th Air Gp shall dash to Haikou so that they will be able to be deployed as quickly as possible after 15 November. The outline of the dash is as shown in the following chart.

7. In this chart, 16th Air Gp, 52d Indep. Air Sqn and 45th Air Gp shall be given directions from the units related to Fifth Air Force, 14th Army and 23d Army. The HQ's shift by air in the concentration other than this chart shall be conducted as shown in the following chart.

8. About 3 sqdns of transport aircraft other than designated in this chart shall remove their coldproof equipment at Nanyuan.

9. If the situation does not allow to carry on in line with charts, directions shall be given to suit the occasion.

Table No. 4 — The Plan of the First-Stage Concentration of the Main Force of the Flight Units of the Third Air Force (10 November 1941)
The Third Air Force Headquarters

At 0915 on 15 November, the Third Air Force commander left the Nanjing airfield along with Chief of Operations Lieutenant Colonel Miyashi and Chief of Intelligence Lieutenant Colonel Sasao, in three transport aircraft and arrived at the Guangdong airfield at 1300.

After having been greeted by 7th Air Division Commander Yamamoto and his subordinates, he met 3d Air Division Commander Maj. Gen. Endō Saburō, 75th Air Group Commander Lt. Col. Kameyama Kazue and others, who had just then advanced from Hankou for the concentration. Then, he left Guangdong at 1430, arrived in Tourane a little after 1800, and reached Saigon around 1300 on the next day, the 16th, where he provisionally set up the [Third] Air Force headquarters within the 7th Air-Ground Support headquarters. After his visit to the Fifteenth Army commander, the Twenty-fifth Army commander, the commander in chief of the [Navy] Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the 22d Air Flotilla commander on the 17th, he attended on the afternoon of the next day, the 18th, the conclusion of the Saigon Agreement. On 20 November, Lt. Col. Hamu Keitarō, who was attached to the Twenty-fifth Army headquarters and had been in Saigon since August, was appointed to the Third Air Force as staff officer in charge of the rear [support]. Meanwhile, as of 18 November, Maj. Kawamoto Hiroshi was [also] appointed to the air force as staff officer. He arrived in Saigon on the 23d and became assistant of operations. In the meantime, the chief of staff and Chief of the Rear [Support] Lt. Col. Shiraiishi Noboru, who had remained in Nanjing to give instructions concerning the concentration, advanced to Saigon respectively on the 27th, and the 25th of November.\(^{(76, 79, 82, 83, 84)}\)

The 81st Air Group (commander: Lt. Col. Yanagimoto Eiki)

The 81st Air Group was formed in Zhangde in northern China on 20 September 1941 as a reconnaissance unit mainly consisting of new strategic reconnaissance aircraft. Although the unit had conducted trainings for Type–100 strategic reconnaissance aircraft from August onwards, only a few pilots [could] fly the new aircraft, which allowed the air group to form only two squadrons (consisting [in total] of six Type–100 strategic reconnaissance aircraft and twenty Type-97 strategic reconnaissance aircraft). In early November, the air group commander had first of all seven Type–100 strategic reconnaissance aircraft transported by air to Guangdong. On 14 November, the air group left Nanjing and stopped for a night at Guangdong. On the next day, the 15th, it [flew] at an altitude of five thousand meters, straight to Phnom Penh, where it gathered and immediately began reconnaissance flights.\(^{(97, 98)}\)

The 3d Air Division (commander: Maj. Gen. Endō Saburō)

Having been unofficially informed of [the orders] concerning the concentration on 28 October, [the commander] sent earlier on 12 November six light bombers of the 75th Air Group and three transport aircraft from Hankou to Guangdong. On the evening of the 13th, Kanzaki Kiyoshi, staff officer of the air division, returned to Hankou with the order to implement the concentration, and the first-stage concentration was finally started on the 15th. At 0800 on the 15th, the air division headquarters de-
parted Hankou in AT aircraft, and by way of Guangdong, arrived in Hanoi at 1300 on the 16th.

The main force of the 75th Air Group (commander: Lt. Col. Kameyama Kazue), which accompanied [the headquarters], also arrived in Hanoi without problems. However, due to bad weather in the area around Leizhou Peninsula, one element of the 75th Air Group and its transport aircraft, which flew along with it up to Guangdong, as well as the 59th Air Group (commander: Maj. Tanimura Reinosuke) which had left Hankou on the 16th, were not able to advance from Guangdong even on the 17th. Seven aircraft of the 59th Air Group and six aircraft of the 75th Air Group finally arrived in Hanoi on the evening of the 18th, and it was not until 23 November that all air groups [of the division] [completed] their concentration in Hanoi.

The 59th Air Group (commander: Lt. Col. Seto Katsumi), which was newly put under the full control of the 3d Air Division commander, left the control of the First Air Force commander on the 15th, departed from Jinan on the 22d, and concentrated in Haiphong on the 25th by way of Nanjing, Hangzhou and Guangdong.(76, 80, 100, 106)

The 27th Air Group (commander: Lt. Col. Sakurai Hajime), which had advanced to Guangdong after changing its aircraft to Type–99 assault planes in September 1941, was conducting training and servicing its aircraft under the command of the 7th Air Division commander. On 15 November, while stationed there, it was put under the full control of the 3d Air Division commander.(108, 109)

The 7th Air Division (commander: Maj. Gen. Yamamoto Kenji)

The 7th Air Division headquarters, the 64th Air Group (commander: Maj. Katō Tateo), the 12th Air Group (commander: Col. Kitajima Kumao) and the 51st Independent Air Squadron were stationed in Guangdong and did not shift in the first-stage concentration.(116, 125, 127, 128)

The 60th Air Group (commander: Col. Ogawa Kojirō) had been in the course of having its aircraft changed to Type–97 Model II heavy bombers in Hamamatsu since September. Having completed the servicing of the aircraft, the group was about to leave when right before their departure it was found that on the whole the propellers of the aircraft were faulty. With the support of the Hamamatsu Musical Instruments [Company] it had the propellers repaired in two nights of continuous work, left Hamamatsu on 14 November with forty aircraft, and by way of Nyūtabaru and Jiayi, advanced to Haikou on the 17th. One aircraft went down to the west of Haikou just before landing.(130)

The 98th Air Group (commander: Col. Usui Shigeki) was ordered in mid-August 1941 to shift to northern China from Manchuria along with the 12th Air Group. After having its aircraft changed to Type–97 Model II heavy bombers from mid-September onwards, the group had been engaging in servicing and training at Nanyuan.

On 16 November, the air group left Nanyuan with forty-three aircraft, and by way of Nanjing and Jiayi, concentrated in Haikou.(64, 133, 134)
The 10th Air Division (commander: Maj. Gen. Hirota Yutaka)

Of the 10th Air Division, the headquarters and the 31st Air Group were stationed in Nenjiang, Manchuria, while the 77th Air Group was stationed in Longzhen. On 12 November, on receiving the order to concentrate in the South, the air division quickly made preparations and decided to shift air group by air group first of all to Tourane as destination.

On 15 November, the headquarters left Nenjiang, and by way of Mukden and Beijing advanced to Nanjing, where after parting with its coldproof equipment, it waited until the weather improved. On the 26th, it left Nanjing and by way of Taipei and Guangdong advanced to Tourane on 1 December. However, the air division [headquarters] was unable to get a grip on the movements of its air groups, which, along with the continuous bad weather in eastern China, caused great concern.\(^{(164)}\)

The 31st Air Group (commander: Lt. Col. Hayashi Jun’ji) left Nenjiang, Manchuria, on 15 November and arrived in Mukden. It left Mukden on the 19th and arrived in Beijing; it left Beijing on the 22d and arrived in Jinan, and on the 24th in Nanjing, where it parted with its coldproof equipment. Then it advanced to Jiayi on 1 December, Guangdong on the 2d, and Tourane on the 3d. One aircraft met with an accident at Mukden on its way.\(^{(169, 170)}\)

The 77th Air Group (commander: Maj. Yoshioka Hiroshi), after leaving Longzhen, arrived in Mukden on the 18th, Beijing on the 19th, and Nanjing on the 21st, where it parted with its coldproof equipment. Then the air group went on to Jiayi on the 29th, Guangdong on the 30th, and advanced to Tourane on 3 December.\(^{(51, 71, 81)}\)

In the meantime, the 62d Air Group (commander: Col. Hatano Takeo), which was put under the command of the 10th Air Division from the control of the First Air Force commander, left its station in Obihiro in late October and shifted to Kakamigahara where it stayed for a month to service its aircraft. During this period, key staff members moved to Jiayi for special training. After receiving the concentration orders, the air group left the Kakamigahara [base] relatively late, and by way of Kikuchi, Hangzhou and Jiayi, concentrated in Haikou on 4 December.\(^{(172)}\)

The 70th Independent Air Squadron (commander: Capt. Ōhira Tadao), which had already shifted to Taiwan in early October and been conducting flight training with strategic reconnaissance aircraft, was put under the command of the 10th Air Division, and advanced to Krakor on 25 November.\(^{(51, 80)}\)

The 12th Air Division (commander: Col. Aoki Takezō)

The 12th Air Division headquarters and the 11th Air Group (commander: Lt. Col. Okabe Tadashi) were stationed at Harbin, and the 1st Air Group (commander: Maj. Takeda Kinshirō) in Sunjia. Around 19 November, the air division departed from Harbin in two echelons. After staying for two nights in Mukden, the air division left Mukden on the 21st. The echelon consisting of the headquarters and the 1st Air Group advanced to Beijing, while another consisting of the 11th Air Group advanced to Nanjing, where respectively they parted with their coldproof equipment. Then the headquarters and the 11th Air Group left Nanjing on the 23d and ad-
vanced to Jiayi, then to Sanya on the 25th, and [finally] to Saigon on the 28th. During the shift, one aircraft of the 11th Air Group went missing. Meanwhile, the 1st Air Group left Beijing on the 23d, and by way of Jinan, Nanjing, Hangzhou and Jiayi, advanced to Guangdong on the 28th.\(^{(71, 76, 136)}\)

**The 15th Independent Air Unit** (commander: Lt. Col. Nakahama Gosuke)

On 2 August [1941], the 15th Air Group, which since July 1941 had been under the command of the Twenty-fifth Army, was reorganized into the 15th Independent Air Unit (its 1st Squadron became the 50th Independent Air Squadron, and its 2d Squadron the 51st Independent Air Squadron).

From 18 September onwards, the 15th Independent Air Unit (minus the 2d Squadron) was in southern French Indochina, engaging in operations along with two Type–100 strategic reconnaissance aircraft, which were added to it.

On 15 November, the 15th Independent Air Unit was put under the full control of the Third Air Force commander, and conducted reconnaissance along with the 81st Air Group, which had concentrated in Phnom Penh on that day.\(^{(76, 97, 98)}\)

**The 83d Independent Air Unit** (commander: Col. Nitahara Kenjirō)

The 83d Independent Air Unit, which apart from its headquarters consisted of three squadrons, i.e. the 71st and 73d Independent Air Squadron (of both tactical reconnaissance aircraft), and the 89th Independent Air Squadron (of direct support aircraft), was the only air unit that was attached to the Twenty-fifth Army by order of the Southern Army. However, it was decided that in terms of command the unit should during its shift from northern Manchuria for the concentration [in the South] be under the command of the Third Air Force commander.\(^{(187, 188, 190, 191)}\)

Although Tourane was at first designated as the concentration point, anticipating congestion there, the Third Air Force offered a proposal and changed it to Taizhong.\(^{(23)}\)

It was [also] decided that the aircraft of its direct support aircraft squadron should be transported by sea with bodies and the wings detached and put ashore at Nha Trang.

On 22 November, the 83d Independent Air Unit headquarters, the 71st and the 73d Independent Air Squadrons left Hailin, and advanced to Beijing on the 24th, Jinan on the 28th and Nanjing on the 29th.\(^{(64, 71, 81)}\)

The positions of [the units of] the Third Air Force as of 29 November were as shown in *Illustration No. 11*.\(^{(64, 81)}\)

**The Concentration of the Fifth Air Force**

**The Fifth Air Force Headquarters**

The main force of the headquarters of the [Fifth] Air Force left Qiqihar on 8 November for Taiwan. In the meantime, Commander Obata had left on 7 November to attend the meeting of the Air Corps at Xinjing (Changchun), after which he flew to Tokyo to participate in some functions there, and also participated in the meetings to conclude the agreement with Navy units held at Iwakuni from the 13th to the 16th of November. Meanwhile on the 17th, Chief of Staff Satō and Chief of Operations Staff Ishikawa advanced to Pingdong by air, where they
were informed of the situation on site by Chief of Intelligence Staff Tanaka Midori and Staff Officer Dōba Kotoshi in charge of the rear [support] who had gone there ahead, and started on the preparations for the operation straightaway.\(^{140, 141}\)

All in all, their study on the tactics of the U.S. air forces and the performance of their aircraft was inadequate.\(^{140}\) After finishing cleaning up after the shift of the [Fifth] Air Force, Chief of Rear [Support] Staff Mizutani Tsutomu left Qiqihar on 14 November and advanced to Pingdong on the 26th.\(^{142, 143, 147}\)

The 4th Air Division (commander: Maj. Gen. Kawara Toshiaki)

Since November 1939, the 4th Air Division headquarters had been situated in Pingdong under the full control of the First Air Force commander. Having received the order of mobilization in July 1941, the headquarters completed its formation on 1 August, and from the
mid-September onwards, with a small staff took charge of receiving the units which one after another shifted to Taiwan. Particularly, the shifts of the units from Manchuria were conducted in a thoroughly concealed way, which made it impossible to contact them until just before their entry into port and thus confused the reception work of the headquarters.\(^{(148)}\)

Except for the 16th Air Group, which was newly brought under the command of the 4th Air Division, the units under its command or control, namely, the 8th Air Group (commander: Col. Honda Kazuo), the 14th Air Group (commander: Col. Hironaka Magoroku), and the 50th Air Group (commander: Maj. Makino Yasuo) were all permanently stationed in Taiwan, and did not shift anywhere.\(^{(51)}\)

**The 16th Air Group** (commander: Lt. Col. Yanase Kengo)

On 29 October, the 16th Air Group, which had mainly been stationed in Hailang under the full control of the Second Air Force and which had conducted trainings for flights over water in Dalian from 27 September to 15 October, received the order to prepare for the concentration.

On 8 November, the ground transport unit of eighty-two personnel led by 1st Lt. Takeshima Nobuo left their station for Dalian, while the flight unit (thirty-two aircraft) left Hailang on 20 November along with four transport aircraft, and by way of Mukden, Nanyuan and Nanjing, reached Pingdong on the 29th, and advanced to the Jiadong airfield on the afternoon of the 30th. During the shift, one aircraft went down in Mukden.\(^{(51,174)}\)

**The 52d Independent Air Squadron** (commander: Capt. [?]Maj.] Ōmori Shigeru)

The 52d Independent Air Squadron (consisting of thirteen tactical reconnaissance aircraft) left Baichengzi around 21 November and concentrated in Pingdong by the beginning of December by way of Mukden, Beijing and Nanjing.\(^{(51,179)}\)

The 28th and the 48th Airfield Battalions, the 32d Airfield Company, the 40th Field Anti-aircraft Battalion, the 4th and the 9th Field Airfield Constructions Units, the 56th Construction Duty Company and others, which had shifted to Taiwan prior to the flight units, had advanced and deployed to various [bases] in Taiwan from the beginning of November.\(^{(51)}\)
Part II  The Operations of the Army Air Service at the Time of the Invasion of the Key Areas in the South (up to March 1942)

The preparations for the southern operation in conformity with the determination to open hostilities against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands of 5 November 1941 made smooth progress in general.

On 1 December, the imperial decision was finally given, and the date to open hostilities was set on the 8th. The date to open the hostilities, which was a Sunday in the western hemisphere, was selected with an eye on maximizing the tactical effect of the attack on Hawaii. The long-term weather forecast for the implementation of the southern operation was also taken into account.

From the standpoint of the front-line units, the Army Air Service’s preparations for the southern operation, which was pressed for time, made some mistakes in the mobilization for the concentrated deployment and the sea transport of ammunition and equipment. However, with some impromptu adaptations to the circumstances, the first strike at the opening of hostilities was carried out without hindrance.

The intention was that the Carrier Task Force’s air strike against Hawaii should be given priority as the first strike in the opening of hostilities. However, as a matter of fact the sudden landings in Kota Bharu in the Malaya area marginally preceded it.

As for the arguments whether prior air campaigns to destroy enemy air power or sudden landings should be adopted for the plan of the landing operations in the Philippines and the Malaya areas, it was settled in such a way that the standard tactics of having the main force land after having gained command of the air was set as the main [plan] for the Philippines [operations], while, conversely, the tactics, which might very much involve sudden attacks, was adopted for [the plan of] the Malaya [operations].

Although hampered by some local [bad] weather, the air campaigns to destroy enemy air power right at the outset of the war in the South were successful. The command of the air over Luzon and northern Malaya fell into the hands of the Japanese forces in [just] a couple of days.

In the Twenty-fifth Army’s landings in the Malaya area, counterattacks by enemy aircraft inflicted some losses at the Kota Bharu front, but did not significantly affect the entire [operation]. The army’s operation to traverse the Malay Peninsula, which was conducted while overcoming the persistent resistance by British air and ground forces, made good progress, and by the end of January, the army had occupied the major part of the peninsula.

In conjunction with the Navy, the Third Air Force did very well in the air campaign to destroy enemy air power, in covering the convoys and in supporting the ground operations in the area.
Meanwhile, in late December, the landing operations of the main force of the Fourteenth Army in the Philippines were completed smoothly, and [the army] seized Manila early in January.

Following the campaign to destroy enemy air power, the Fifth Air Force accomplished its task to support the ground operations in conjunction with the Navy. And in accordance with the previously drawn up plan, in mid-January, the main force of the [Fifth] Air Force shifted to French Indochina and Thailand to prepare for the Burma air operations.

In the first half of February, it became likely that the attack on Singapore and the paradrop operation on Palembang would be conducted at the same time, which made the allocation of air strength to be employed on each operation a problem. On the 14th, the Third Air Force carried out the first-ever paradrop operation of the Army with its main force and successfully seized the oil refineries and the airfield at Palembang. At the same time, it carried out fierce air strikes on the stronghold of Singapore with a powerful element and contributed to the surrender of the British forces on the next day, the 15th. Although during these operations, arguments arose between the Twenty-fifth Army and the Third Air Force over [the possibilities of] the air arm’s direct support of ground operations and attaching part of the air units to the ground forces, as well as about the priority of supply and replenishment between the air arm and the ground forces, the operations as a whole progressed more smoothly than expected.

The capture of Java was the final goal of the stepping-stone tactics conducted along both routes via Malaya and the Philippines. In the latter half of February, the Third Air Force, which had advanced to southern Sumatra, completed the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in Java from the west, in cooperation with the Navy units, which had advanced to Borneo and the eastern front, and accomplished the same from the east. In the beginning of March, the Sixteenth Army landed in Java and made the Dutch East Indies Garrison Army surrender in about one week.

The operations against Burma was successively started from January onwards by the Fifteenth Army, which seized Rangoon in early March. The Fifth Air Force, which had shifted from the Philippines, supported the Fifteenth Army well by neutralizing the superior British air forces in the Burma area.

Thus, the capture of the key areas in the South in the plan drawn up before the opening of hostilities was for the most part completed in early March. The operations had progressed more than one month ahead of the plan.
Chapter 5 The Air Operations in Preparation of the Capture of Singapore and Palembang (January 1942)

1. The Speeding-up of the Invasion Operation of the South and the New Plan of Employment of the Air Arm

The Shortening of the Invasion Schedule of the South

Since the opening of hostilities, the southern operation had progressed smoother than expected. In late December, the Southern Army estimated that it was possible to shorten the schedule of the invasion operations, and on 1 January, after discussing it with the Second Fleet, an agreement was reached in Cam Ranh.

The agreement, the details of which shall be described later, was designed to advance the whole operational schedule by about one month. That is, based on the assessment that the capture of Singapore could be implemented in early February, the schedule for the attack on Palembang was advanced to around 6 February, preceding [the capture of Singapore], and that for the start of landing on Java to around the 16th. And by successively pushing forward the air bases with these dates as the basis, the aim was to extend the range of [Japanese] air supremacy and to carry out the landing and invasion [operations] under that umbrella.

With the fall of Manila on 2 January, the operations [of the air arm] in the Philippines were for the most part completed. As planned, the Southern Army instructed the main force of the Fifth Air Force to shift to the Thai area in order to prepare for the operation against Burma, while allowing the Third Air Force to focus on the operation to advance southward toward Malaya, Sumatra and Java.\(^{(61, 64)}\)

Revision of the Southern Army’s Air Operations Plan

On 10 January, Southern Army Staff Section 4 drew up a supplement to its air operations plan, which will be inserted below. The main points at issue in this supplement are the following:\(^{(61, 64)}\)

In the [new] schedule of operations, the dates set as the basis for the launch of the ground operations, i.e. around the 6th of February for Palembang (the paratroop operation), around the 10th for the capture of Singapore, around the 16th for the landings on Java, and from the 25th onwards for the operation against northern Burma, became the new basis. And from several days ahead of these dates onwards, air attacks in support of each operation were supposed to be intensified.
The thinking behind the air deployment was that, chiefly under the unified command of the Southern Army, the air arm should consistently strive to destroy enemy air power, while at the same time providing adequate support to the ground operations and, moreover, find ways to attack key places and enemy lines of communications to the rear. It was not strictly the usual way to use an air force, for it essentially put the highest priority on gaining air supremacy. Consequently, seizing [enemy] air bases and conditioning them was crucial, and the advance of air bases as if by stepping stones was deliberately designed in clear operational stages: Ipoh and Kuantan by 10 January, Kluang and Kahang by the end of the month, and southern Sumatra by early February.

The regional scope of this plan was not limited to the key areas to be captured in the pre-war plans but also extended to northern Burma, and even expanded to ideas on air attacks on the India-China route and on Calcutta. Furthermore, the time frame was lengthened to two months or more, and even the distribution of the air forces after the southern operation was mostly completed was touched upon.

**Supplement to the Southern Army Air Operations Plan**  
10 January

**I. Mission**

1. The air arm of the Southern Army shall meet the rapid progress in all stages of the operations, expand the military gains from the beginning of hostilities in conjunction with the Navy air forces, and closely support the operations of each army by quickly pursuing the British and Dutch air forces and destroying them so as not to allow them time to recover.

2. In the Philippines area, it shall support with one element the cleaning-up operations of the army and strictly watch against a resurgence of the U.S. air forces.

3. It shall make efforts to faultlessly manage the line of communications of the air [arm] so as to enable the successive rapid advance of bases and the unremitting air operations.

4. After the capture of Singapore, it shall gradually shift its positions so as to facilitate the air operations and support for securing stability in the coming long, drawn-out war.

**II. Outline for conducting the operations**

5. For the period until the capture of Singapore and the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in Sumatra (from around 10 January until around 5 February)

   (1) The Third Air Force shall, while destroying enemy air power in Malaya and northern Sumatra, attack key military facilities in Singapore and vicinity with its main force, and at the same time directly support the operations of the Twenty-fifth Army with one element. It shall expect the possibility that, at the time of the Twenty-fifth Army’s attack on Singapore, it may temporarily support the latter’s operation with its full strength. When Singapore is captured, one element each of the intelligence and line-of-communications units shall be transferred to the Fifth Air Force.

   (2) The Fifth Air Force shall first of all quickly destroy the enemy air power in the Burma area and directly support the operations of the Fifteenth Army. At the time of the Third Air Force’s attacks on Singapore, it shall support these attacks with its heavy bomber units if required.

   (3) When Singapore is captured, [plans] for its future [use] shall swiftly be considered, and work on its facilities shall be started so as to create, along with Hong Kong, two major operational bases of repair and replenishment for the air units.

   (4) The Navy air unit is supposed to rapidly advance its main force to bases near Kuching or Ledo in western Borneo and one element to northern Malaya, from where they are expected to strive to destroy the enemy air power in the Singapore, eastern Sumatra and Java areas. The details shall be provided in separate arrangements [with the Navy].
6. For the period until the capture of Sumatra and Java (from around 1 February until around 25 February)
   
   (1) The Third Air Force shall swiftly destroy the enemy air power in Sumatra and, when one element of the Sixteenth Army has prepared air bases in Bangka and southern Sumatra, it shall advance, without missing an opportunity, as much strength as possible [there] to swiftly destroy the enemy air power in western Java. At the same time, [it shall] also closely provide direct support for the landing operation of the main force of the Sixteenth Army, and by pushing forward its bases one after another into Java, support the latter’s subsequent operations. [The Third Air Force] shall support the Twenty-fifth Army’s operation in northern Sumatra with units that are not participating in the Java operation.

   (2) The Fifth Air Force shall, while continuing its efforts to destroy enemy air power with its main force, directly support the Fifteenth Army’s operations. It shall timely cut off the Burma Road and attack enemy transport convoys on the Andaman Sea. Apart from that, it shall with one element support the northern Sumatra operation, which will be conducted by one element of the Twenty-fifth Army.

   (3) (a) The Navy air unit is supposed to keep its main force in western Borneo and one element in northern Malaya and strive to destroy enemy surface vessels and air power in the western Sumatra and Java areas, while striving to timely attack enemy surface vessels on the Andaman Sea with one element.

   (b) The Sixteenth Army, the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the Third Air Force shall make arrangements directly concerning the air operations in the southern Sumatra operation.

   (c) The [Navy] Eleventh Air Fleet is supposed to advance its bases to the Celebes and western Borneo areas, strive to destroy enemy surface vessels and air power in eastern Java, and support the landing operations of one element of the Sixteenth Army in eastern Java.

   (d) Arrangements on the air [operations] to support the Sixteenth Army’s operations in western Java shall be made directly between the Third Air Force and the [Navy] 22d Air Flotilla, and those on the air [operations] to support the [army’s] landing operations in eastern Java shall be made directly between the Sixteenth Army and the [Navy] Eleventh Air Fleet.

7. For the period of the northern Burma operation (from 25 February onwards)
   
   (1) The Third Air Force shall support the army’s [operation to] secure stability in Sumatra and Java with one element each [of its subordinate air units] and [also] prepare for subsequent operations, while cooperating with one element or the main force of its fighter plane and bomber units in the operations of the Fifth Air Force if required.

   (2) The Fifth Air Force shall take charge of destroying enemy air power in India and Yunnan as much as possible, while directly supporting the operations of the Fifteenth Army.

   In the final stage of the operation, it shall deliver a serious blow to the enemy air units in Calcutta and Kunming so as to contain their subsequent resurgence. During this period, one element of the Third Air Force shall be shifted to this area.

8. The Navy air unit shall primarily be assigned to the operations against Australia. The [Army] 21st Independent Air Unit shall, while striving to neutralize the Chinese air forces in Guangxi and Yunnan, support the 21st Division in executing its operations.

   It shall be put under the command of the Fifth Air Force if necessary at the time of the latter’s air campaign to destroy enemy air power in the Kunming area.

9. From March onwards, while carrying out operations, [the air arm] shall make preparations to be ready for sudden changes in the situation in the North at any time and at the same time gradually shift to positions that will be convenient for securing stability in the key areas in the South in case of a large-scale, drawn-out war, as well as for implementing air operations in the Burma area.
III. The disposition of forces and outline of operations

10. For the period until the capture of Singapore and the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in Sumatra

(1) In order to implement the air campaign to destroy enemy air power in Singapore and vicinity, the airfields in Ipoh and Kuantan shall be conditioned roughly by 10 January.

(2) If necessary, two heavy bomber air groups of the Fifth Air Force shall be shifted to cooperate in the attack on key locations in Singapore.

(3) If necessary, the Third Air Force shall support with its full strength the Twenty-fifth Army’s crossing of Johor Strait.

(4) In consideration of subsequent operations, air transport units and Type–1 fighter plane units shall at appropriate moments be shifted for servicing in order to preserve strength.

(5) Right after the capture of Singapore, dispositions shall be shifted in the following manner:

(a) From the Twenty-fifth Army

   The 83d Independent Air Unit headquarters, the 71st Independent Air Squadron and the 84th Airfield Battalion (minus two-thirds) shall be transferred to the Fifteenth Army, while the 73d Independent Air Squadron and one-third of the 84th Airfield Battalion shall make preparations for their transfer to the Sixteenth Army.

(b) From the Third Air Force

   The 47th Independent Air Squadron, the main force of the 16th Air Intelligence Unit and one motor transport company shall be transferred to the Fifth Air Force.

(6) The conditioning of the airfields in Kluang and Kahang shall be completed by around 31 January for the southern Sumatra operation.

(7) The shift of the main force of the Fifth Air Force from the Philippines to Thailand shall be completed roughly by 25 January.

11. For the period until the capture of Sumatra and Java

(1) The outline of support to be provided for the capture [operation] of southern Sumatra [to be conducted] by one element of the Sixteenth Army

(a) By 31 January, the fighter plane air groups shall complete their deployment in Kluang, Kahang and Batu Pahat, the light bomber air groups in Ipoh and Kuala Lumpur, and heavy bomber air groups in Ketil, Alor Setar and Ayer Tawar.

(b) Forces to be employed

   Nine strategic reconnaissance aircraft, forty Type–1 fighter planes, thirty Type–97 fighter planes, nine assault planes, twenty twin-engine light [bombers] and thirty heavy bombers

(c) When the airfields in southern Sumatra are readied, the units in the previous item other than the heavy bombers shall be advanced [there].

(d) When the conditioning of bases [in Sumatra] is completed, the air-ground support units, which shall land in Sumatra under the command of the Sixteenth Army, shall be transferred to the Third Air Force.

(e) The detailed arrangements with the Navy shall be made between the Sixteenth Army, the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the Third Air Force.

(2) The outline of support to be provided for the Java invasion operation [to be conducted] by the main force of the Sixteenth Army

(a) The bases to be used [in the operation, particularly,] Mentok, Palembang and Tanjungkarang shall swiftly be seized and readied.

(b) The forces to be employed shall be the same as those in the previous item.

(c) When the bases in Java are conditioned, air units shall successively advance their bases. At this stage, the air-ground support units under the command of the Sixteenth Army shall be transferred to the Third Air Force.
(d) During this period, the 73d Independent Air Squadron and one third of the 84th Airfield Battalion shall be transferred from the Twenty-fifth Army to the Sixteenth Army.
(e) The arrangements for the air operations to be conducted in western Java shall directly be made between the Third Air Force and the [Navy] 22d Air Flotilla by the end of January.
(f) The support for the landing operations in eastern Java shall be assigned to the [Navy] Eleventh Air Fleet and the Third Fleet. The detailed arrangements for the support shall directly be made between the Sixteenth Army and the Navy units involved.
(g) The subsequent air campaigns to destroy enemy air power in Australia shall be assigned to the [Navy] Eleventh Air Fleet and the Third Fleet. The detailed arrangements for the support shall directly be made between the Sixteenth Army and the Navy units involved.

(3) The support for the operation to capture northern Sumatra [to be conducted] by one element of the Twenty-fifth Army
(a) Bases to be used
[Those in] Ayer Tawar, Sungai Petani, Alor Setar, Taiping and Ipoh
(b) Forces to be employed
The Third Air Force shall take charge of this operation; it shall support it with the units not supporting the Java operations as well as the necessary strength of the Fifth Air Force. (However, the air-ground support units shall not accompany the forces.)

(4) The outline of the support for the Burma operation [to be conducted] by the Fifteenth Army
(a) The bases in Chiang Mai, Lampang, Rahaeng and Phitsanulok shall mainly be used until the operations in the areas near Rangoon and Toungoo, after which the bases shall swiftly be advanced to Mergui and Rangoon.
(b) When supporting ground operations, attention must be paid to the selection of bombing targets, in consideration of political maneuverings in Burma and the customs of the Burmese people.

12. The outline of [the plan of] the air operations in the final stages of the Burma operation
The 7th Air Division or one element of the 3d Air Division of the Third Air Force shall be put under the command of the Fifth Air Force, and [along the Fifth Air Force] shall, in concert with [the forces in] northern Indochina, destroy enemy air power in the Yunnan area and deliver a heavy blow on the enemy in the Calcutta area in order to crush their resurgence in the future.

13. Although the primary target of the employment of the paratroop unit shall be to support the invasion operation of XXXXXX (note by the author: Palembang), its employment shall be decided according to the state of the enemy air forces, the time of arrival of the paratroop unit and the condition of our bases.

14. The distribution of the air units in the final stage of Operation A-Go shall be planned as follows:
(note by the author: as shown in the following table)
(The basic disposition of forces at the time when the operation is for the most part completed shall be studied separately.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>74th Independent Air Sqdn (a sqdn of direct support aircraft), 16th Air Gp (3 sqdns of single-engine light bombers), 10th Independent Air Unit HQ, 76th Independent Air Sqdn (a sqdn of strategic recon. aircraft) and 52d Independent Air Sqdn (a sqdn of tactical recon. aircraft)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Indochina</td>
<td>84th Independent Air Sqdn (a sqdn of fighter planes), 82d Independent Air Sqdn (a sqdn of single-engine light bombers) and 21st Independent Air Unit HQ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above supplement to the Southern Army Air Operation Plan was given as an instruction to each air force, etc.

Based on this plan, the air forces and others were able to work on informal ideas or plans of operations.\(^{(21, 76)}\)

The replenishment plan was eventually never drawn up, because that required a major involvement of central command, and the Southern Army alone could not plan it. However, gathering from the actual results of the first month after the opening of hostilities, it was assumed that replenishment would generally be possible.\(^{(21)}\)

### Revision of the Distribution of Air Bases Between the Army and Navy

On 11 January, IGHQ drastically changed the Army-Navy Central Agreement concluded before the war concerning the allocation of air bases after the capture of key areas in the South, and announced [a revision of] the Army-Navy Central Agreement, which stipulated that the Navy air unit should properly be stationed in key areas in the South.

On the whole, the [revised] agreement focused on securing stability in key areas in the South, but was not designed to seriously prepare against full-scale counterattacks by U.S. and British forces.

Among others, the Army had originally planned to establish a large aircraft depot in a sector of the Seletar airfield in Singapore and shift to there the main force of the 16th Field Aircraft Depot from Guangdong. However, in this revision, the air base was allocated to the Navy on the grounds that the airfield was attached to the Naval port.
It dissatisfied the Army air unit on site because it would make their original plan unrealizable.\(^{(21, 63, 65, 68)}\) Among the airfields in Malaya, the bases at Penang (the sea base), Ayer Tawar and Batu Pahat were designated to be used by the Navy, while those at Kuantan, Kota Bharu, and Penang (the land base) were designated as bases mainly for use by the Navy, though shared by Army and Navy. It was the allocation the Navy had been eagerly asking for, because it [reflected the Navy’s] plans for guarding against and neutralizing British fleets, which were supposed to come for counterattacks from the sea, particularly the Indian Ocean.\(^{(205)}\)

The allocation of the air bases shown in the [revised] agreement was as follows:

Addendum No. 1 to the Army-Navy Central Agreement on the Air Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Shared (mainly used by)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Kai Tak (sea base)</td>
<td>Kam Tin</td>
<td>Kai Tak (land base)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>Nichols field, Cavite, Iba, Olongapo, Cebu, Davao (sea base), Zamboanga, Puerto Princesa and Jolo</td>
<td>The other bases</td>
<td>Legaspi (Navy), Davao (land base, Navy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Borneo</td>
<td>Labuan</td>
<td>The other bases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Malaya</td>
<td>Seletar (land and sea bases), Kallang (sea base), Penang (sea base), Ayer Tawar and Batu Pahat</td>
<td>The other bases</td>
<td>Kuantan (Navy), Kota Bharu (Navy), Penang (land base, Navy), Sembawang (shared), Kallang (land base, shared)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>Rangoon (sea base), Akyab (sea base)</td>
<td>The other bases</td>
<td>Victoria Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumatra</td>
<td>Sabang, Kutaraja</td>
<td>The other bases</td>
<td>Padang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Java</td>
<td>Batavia (sea base), Cililitan, Serang or Anyer Kidul, Kediri or Madiun, and Tanjung Perak (Surabaya)</td>
<td>The other bases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Borneo</td>
<td>Banjarmasin</td>
<td>The other bases</td>
<td>Tarakan (land) (Navy), Balikpapan (land) (Navy)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The bases on the [equatorial] Pacific Islands other than the above shall mainly be used by the Navy.
The Preparation for the Paratroop Operations: The Shipwreck of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment

On 4 December 1941, the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group completed the formation of its headquarters, the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment and the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit at Nyūtabaru in Miyazaki Prefecture, and on the 19th, the headquarters and the main force of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment left for the South by sea.

However, on 3 January 1942, the Meikō-maru, which carried them, sank off Sanya due to a spontaneous combustion of incendiary bombs, which were also on board. Although the men were rescued by three destroyers and put ashore in Bangkok, they lost all the weapons and equipment they needed for the [paradrop] raiding operation.\(^{(87, 93)}\)

Col. Kume Seiichi, commander of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group, who had directed the preparations of the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit at Nyūtabaru, arranged the advance to the South of the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment, which had been formed on 5 January after the report of the accident at sea, and also arranged the procurement of paradrop equipment and its dispatch to the front. Then, after entrusting matters after his leave to Lt. Col. Kawashima Keigo (graduate of the 33d class), director of the [Paratroop] Raiding Training Department, he left Nyūtabaru on 8 January along with two squadrons (twenty-two Type–Ro transport aircraft) of the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit and advanced to Phnom Penh on the 19th.\(^{(87)}\)

Having been formed in a hurry, the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment merely had the skills that could be acquired from only four or less [paradrop] experiences at best. A skeleton group of about sixty men of the regiment immediately began special trainings. The regiment did its best to prepare the training equipment, and having received the equipment for two regiments, left the port of Moji on 15 January. Of their equipment, the parachutes, products of Fujikura Sangyō,\(^*\) were brought just in time for departure thanks to the round-the-clock work at the company.\(^{(61, 70)}\)

In the meantime, many of the six hundred men of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group (consisting of four companies of 160 men each) had come down with dysentery and still needed care [even] after recovery. From the time of the shipwreck accident, the [paratroop] raiding group had been making preparations in spite of the many difficulties by having the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment and the 3d Squadron (consisting of twelve MC aircraft) of the air unit catch up [with the advance regiment], while urging the 11th and the 12th Air Transport Squadrons, which had been updating its aircraft in mainland Japan, to advance to the South [sooner].

The Outline of the formation of the [Paratroop] Raiding Group was as follows:\(^{(87, 93)}\)

Outline of the Formation of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group

Formation

Headquarters (Gp Cdr: Col Kume Seiichi; graduate of the 31st class)
1st [Paratroop] Raiding Rgt (Rgt Cdr: Maj Takeda Takeo; graduate of the 35th class)
2d [Paratroop] Raiding Rgt (Rgt Cdr: Maj Kōmura Takeo; graduate of the 38th class)
[Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit (Cdr: Maj Niihara Sueto; graduate of the 40th class)

\(^*\) Probably Fujikura Kōkū Kōgyō, now known as The Fujikura Parachute Co., Ltd.
[Paratroop] Raiding Regiment

Headquarters                             Command Squad

1st Co                                 1st Platoon      Divided into four squads; the 1st, 2d and 3d squad shall be equipped with one light machinegun each; the 4th squad shall be equipped with two to three grenade launchers.
2d Co                                 2d Platoon
3d Co                                 3d Platoon

Machinegun Platoon

In addition to two heavy machineguns, it shall be equipped with either one 37mm antitank gun, 20mm automatic gun or TypeⅠⅠ infantry gun.

4th Co has the capacity of an engineering company and has two flame throwers in a platoon.

[Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit

Headquarters

1st Sqdn
2d Sqdn
3d Sqdn
4th Sqdn
Service Co

(a sqdn consists of 12 Type–Ro aircraft or MC aircraft)

– Capacity of the Aircraft
1. A Type–Ro aircraft or MC aircraft of the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit can respectively carry up to ten and thirteen paratroopers.
2. In principle, the drop of the matériel and equipment were assigned to the heavy bomber unit in support.
   Note: Type–Ro aircraft was an alias for the Type–1 [Freight] Transport aircraft,* and MC was an alias for the Type–100 transport aircraft. (See p. 403)

2. The Plan of the Air Operations Against Singapore and Palembang

The Relation Between the Singapore Operation and the Paradrop Operation in Palembang (See Illustration No. 37)

Singapore, which is situated at the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula, was the basis of British domination over the East for centuries, and the island had been fortified of old. Although at the end of 1941 the British forces on the Malay Peninsula were clearly heading for defeat, the Japanese forces generally anticipated that in the end the British units on the peninsula would entrench themselves in Singapore and put up a stubborn resistance.\(^{64,81,88}\)

It was a matter of course that the Twenty-fifth Army, which was assigned to capture Singapore, planned to hotly pursue the defeated enemy on the Malay Peninsula, catch and destroy them there, and taking advantage of the tide of the war, capture the Singapore stronghold at an early date.

On the other hand, the Southern Army, which had to conduct operations throughout the whole theater, including the Sumatra, Java and Burma operations, let alone the Malaya in-

* Actually, the Type–Ro was the direct precursor of the Type–1 [Freight] Transport aircraft. Both were based on the Lockheed L–14 Super Electra design.
vasion [operation], naturally judged the employment of its air arm from a broader perspective.

In the beginning of January, Colonel Tanikawa, senior staff officer of Section 4 of the Southern Army, judged that the critical moment of the entire southern operation would probably come in February. He considered that the Army and Navy [should] exert their full powers by combining their fighting power in close conjunction, and that the paradrop operation in Palembang should be made the principal target of the moment.

The reason why the Southern Army attached such importance to the Palembang paradrop operation was that, from the point of view of obtaining fuel, which was the primary cause of the opening of hostilities, the Palembang oilfields, its oil refineries in particular, should be secured as intact as possible by conducting a sudden attack and seizing them. The importance of acquiring an air base [to be used] in supporting the Java invasion [operation] was also part of the reason.

In order to achieve that, it was judged advisable that [the paradrop operation] should be resolutely carried out at the earliest opportunity as soon as the launching air bases, such as Kluang, Kahang and others, which were necessary for the implementation of the paradrop operation, were seized and conditioned, without waiting for the capture of Singapore.

Needless to say, securing air supremacy was a prerequisite, for the sake of which [the air arm] had to conduct air campaigns to destroy enemy air power as far and deeply back [into enemy territory] as possible, so as to prevent the enemy from skillfully using their rearmost bases. [Japanese forces] were [also] put on the alert for the dispatch by the allies of considerably powerful reinforcements [of aircraft] to Sumatra and Java from Australia and India.

From such a viewpoint, the capture operation of Singapore should be implemented under the umbrella of [Japanese] air supremacy which included Sumatra.

The above assessment was the general consensus on the situation of air forces between the Southern Army staff in charge of the air arm and the top echelon of the Third Air Force.(21, 77, 79, 80)

The Singapore Air Operation Plan of the Third Air Force

(See Illustrations Nos. 38 and 39)

Earlier on 30 December, the Third Air Force had drawn up a plan of full-scale air operations against Singapore.

On 6 January, it gathered the chiefs of operations of its [subordinate] units in its headquarters in Sungai Petani, explained the plan of the air operations (which will be mentioned later), and studied and discussed the outline of the attack.(76)

At that time, thirty to forty aircraft had been spotted in each of the Sembawang, the Kallang, the Seletar and the Tengah airfields in the Singapore area, which led [the Third Air Force] to judge that evidently [the enemy] had reinforcements from somewhere. It also had a report that seventy searchlights and 120 to 200 antiaircraft guns were deployed in the area.

The following matters were brought into question in this meeting:

The Disposition for Conducting the First [Air] Strike

In view of the attacks on Rangoon [where unexpected damage was sustained], the majority shared the view that it would be advantageous to reduce the bombing power [in the first
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Notes
Standard action radii of Army aircraft
Type-97 fighter: 400km
Type-1 fighter: 550-600km
Type-97 heavy bomber: 700-900km
Type-100 strategic recon. aircraft: 800-1,000km

Illustration No. 37 — The Malaya and Sumatra Air Operations
strike] and attack enemy fighter planes with fighter units only, and then carry out the bombings. In the end, it was decided to position the fighter planes in the lead and the bombers secondary [in the first air strike].

Also, the heavy bomber units hoped to fly at a high altitude as long as it did not affect the precision of the bombings in order to avoid enemy anti-aircraft fire, while the 12th Air Division commander requested that the main fighting altitude should be set at three to four thousand meters so that the fighter units would be able to bring their fighting power into full play.

The Chain of Command

Having examined the chain of command, some proposed that the 12th Air Division commander should command all the fighter plane units along with one element of the heavy bombers in a unified way. However, due to the view of others, who emphasized the solidarity and prestige within an air division, it was decided that the 7th and the 12th Air Divisions should conduct the attacks in conjunction. Nevertheless, it was also decided that the 59th Air Group (a fighter unit) belonging to the 3d Air Division, which was not to participate in the Singapore operation, should be deployed on the Kuantan [airfield] and directed by the 12th Air Division commander.\(^{(76, 85, 100)}\)

The bombing sectors and the main targets in the city in the bombing [plan] of Singapore were set as shown in Illustration No. 39.\(^{(61)}\)

The Outline of the Singapore Air Operation

Third Air Force headquarters, 30 December 1941

I. Mission

1. Prior to the Twenty-fifth Army’s [operation to] capture Singapore, the enemy air forces in British Malaya shall be destroyed and their movements shall be completely contained.
2. Following [the operations in] the previous item, key targets in Singapore shall be attacked, and the enemy’s will to resist shall be crushed.

II. Outline of deployment

1. In cooperation with the Takumi Detachment, the air-ground support unit for the Kuantan [airfield] shall swiftly be advanced to the airfield for its rapid conditioning. [The airfield] shall be roughly readied by 7 January and completed by around 10 January at the latest.
2. Personnel and equipment necessary for the Kuala Lumpur and the Kallang [Klang?] airfields shall accompany the 5th Division. Once the airfields [there] are seized, [the personnel] shall swiftly take charge of acquiring aircraft matériel and the conditioning of the airfields. Then, one element of the 18th Air-Ground Support Unit shall be advanced there.
3. When Items 1 and 2 are roughly completed, the 12th Air Division and the 64th Air Group (depending on the situation, the 59th Air Group) shall be advanced to the Kuantan airfield, and one element of the 3d Air Division to the Kuala Lumpur airfield.
4. The main force of the 7th Air Division shall complete its deployment to the airfields in Kota Bharu and the airfields in the Kedah area by the end of the first day of the [air] strike [on Singapore]. Among the airfields in the Kedah area, the airfields in Alor Setar and Ayer Tawar are available.

III. Outline of the attack

1. The enemy air power in Singapore, firstly its fighter plane unit in particular, shall be searched for and swiftly destroyed, and then the remaining enemy air power shall be destroyed.
The launch of the [air] strike shall be scheduled for 8 January but given in separate orders. The air campaigns to destroy enemy air power are scheduled to be roughly completed in two to three days.

2. Following the [air] strike specified in Item 1, by alternately employing both hard-hitting [air] strikes with large forces and psychological attacks consisting of surprise raids, the key targets shall be completely destroyed before the capture [operation] of Singapore, (which is scheduled for early February) so as to crush the enemy’s will to resist.

3. When conducting the [air] strikes in Items 1 and 2, [the units shall] strive to degrade the power of the enemy antiaircraft fire.

IV. Preparations for Operation H

During the Singapore operation, preparations for Operation H shall be undertaken in the following manner:

1. In connection to the Singapore operation, depending on the circumstances, the enemy air power in Sumatra may be destroyed.

2. [As a preparation] for the [air] strikes on southern Sumatra, airfields in Kluang and Kahang shall be quickly conditioned, and made ready as bases for Type–1 fighter plane units and heavy bomber units.

Note by the author: Operation H is the code name for the Java operation, as designated in the central agreement between the Army and Navy.

The Army-Navy Arrangements on Site on the Air [Operations] for the Singapore Operation and Operation S

On 7 January, at the Third Air Force headquarters, joined by Staff Officer Mase of the [Navy] 22d Air Flotilla as well as with Staff Officer Matsumae of the Southern Army and Staff Officer Inoguchi of the [First] Southern Expeditionary Fleet in attendance, the following arrangements concerning the Singapore air operation and Operation S were concluded. (64, 216)

Operation S was to put ashore the main force of the 18th Division near Endau and Mersing, which were situated about one hundred kilometers to the south of Kuantan, in concert with the operation of the main force of the Twenty-fifth Army to advance southward along the Malay Peninsula.

The Memorandum of the Arrangements for the Singapore Operation (and) Operation S Between the Third Air Force and the 22d Air Flotilla

7 January 1942

I. The forces to be employed

Army

3d Air Div (about 15 aircraft)

59th Air Gp: 2 Sqdns of Type–1 fighter planes

7th Air Div (50 to 80 aircraft)

50th Independent Air Sqdn: 1 Sqdn of strategic reconnaissance aircraft

64th Air Gp: 3 Sqdns of Type–1 fighter planes

12th Air Gp:

60th Air Gp: { heavy bombers; at first, three to six sqdns from these forces

98th Air Gp:

12th Air Div (70 to 80 aircraft)

47th Independent Air Sqdn: 1 Sqdn of Ki–44

1st Air Gp: 3 Sqdns of Type–97 fighter planes

11th Air Gp: 3 Sqdns of Type–97 fighter planes

81st Air Gp: 2 Sqdns of strategic reconnaissance aircraft (10 to 20 aircraft)
Navy
22d Air Flotilla
Mid-sized land-based attack planes: 2 units, 54 aircraft (depending on the situation, Type-1 land-based attack planes shall be employed in place of the mid-sized land-based attack planes)

Type-0 carrier-based fighter planes: 1 unit, 20 aircraft
Land-based reconnaissance aircraft: 5 aircraft

II. The bases to be used
Army
3d Air Div: Ipoh or Kuantan
7th Air Div
Heavy bomber unit: Kuala Besut, Tanah Merah, Ayer Tawar and Alor Setar
Fighter plane unit: Ipoh
Strategic reconnaissance aircraft unit: Ayer Tawar
12th Air Div: Kuantan
81st Air Gp: Sungai Petani and Alor Setar

Navy
Mid-sized land-based attack plane unit: Saigon, Sungai Petani and Kota Bharu
Fighter plane unit and land-based reconnaissance aircraft unit: Kota Bharu, depending on the situation Kuala Besut

III. The distribution of the attack targets
Although the targets shall be roughly designated as follows, depending on the situation [the Army and Navy air units] may attack other airfields than those assigned to each of them.
Army: The Tengah and the Kallang airfields
Navy: The Sembawang and the Seletar airfields as well as enemy naval vessels near Singapore

IV. The outline of attack
The outline of [air] strikes up to the second day of the [air] strike shall be roughly designated as follows, though a few changes may be expected, depending on the results of each [air] strike.
1. While the [air] strikes shall be carried out in close conjunction between the Army and Navy, the first [air] strike shall be conducted solely by the Army.
2. The first day of the [air] strike shall be scheduled for 11 January. However, it shall be discussed [before the final decision].
   1st [air] strike: 1000 on the first day of the [air] strike (Time-A)
   2d [air] strike: 1430 on the first day of the [air] strike (Time-B)
   3d [air] strike: 1100 on the second day of the [air] strike (Time-C)
3. The outline of the first [air] strike
The following forces shall be employed:
Heavy bombers (about 30 aircraft), Type-97 fighter planes (about 70 aircraft), Type-1 fighter planes (about 40 aircraft) and Ki-44 (7 aircraft).
[They shall] depart from the Kuantan airfield and the airfields in Kedah Province, and directly enter into [the air of] Singapore by way of the front [between] Kluang and Kahang.
The time for the units of both [sections] to enter into the air of the Tengah airfield shall be set at 1000.
4. The outline of the second [air] strike
   (1) Army: About 70 Type-97 fighter planes, about 7 Ki-44 aircraft (which shall use the Kuantan airfield as the base.)
   Navy: 54 mid-sized land-based attack planes (27 aircraft shall use the Kota Bharu airfield as the base, and [another] 27 aircraft the Saigon airfield as the base.)
   20 Type-0 fighter planes ([which shall] use the Kota Bharu airfield as the base.)
   2 land-based reconnaissance aircraft (ditto)
Part II, Chapter 5     /     The Air Operations in Preparation of the Capture of Singapore and Palembang

The Kallang Airfield

The Seletar Airfield
5. The outline of the third [air] strike

(1) The forces to be employed

Army: About 60 heavy bombers: Alor Setar and Ayer Tawar
About 40 Type–1 fighter planes: Ipoh
About 70 Type–97 fighter planes: Kuantan
About 7 Ki–44 aircraft

Navy: 27 mid-sized land-based attack planes: Kota Bharu
20 Type–0 fighter planes: ditto

(2) The time [to launch] the [air] strike: 1100

(3) [A] Navy reconnaissance aircraft shall communicate the situation of the sortie of the Navy aircraft to the [Army] unit stationed in the Kuantan [airfield].

6. The fourth [air] strike and thereafter

The Army shall conduct [air] strikes at odd-numbered hours and the Navy at even hours through the day and night, and the targets shall appropriately [be decided on].
V. Intelligence
1. Intelligence shall be exchanged [between the Army and Navy]. Particularly, [the information on] the number of enemy aircraft destroyed shall swiftly be exchanged every day.
2. The Army shall appropriately inform the Navy of the meteorological conditions in Singapore and vicinity.

VI. Use of airfields
If [aircraft of] the Navy air units [need to] land on the airfields in Kedah Province due to [bad] weather or other circumstances, they shall use the Sungai Petani [airfield] unless it is inevitable to use other airfields.
The Army units shall provide support to the above aircraft making emergency landings.

VII. Friendly identification
1. On top of the friendly identification [moves] in the air over Singapore as already specified, the aircraft, which comes to face friendly aircraft within two thousand meters, shall rock its wings several times. After the [opposite] friendly aircraft answers by returning the moves, it shall approach the aircraft.
2. Prior [to the air strikes], an aircraft shall be dispatched in the following manner so that [the Army and Navy] fighter planes can mutually identify friendly aircraft.
   8 January  a Ki–44 aircraft shall be dispatched to Kota Bharu
   9 January  a Type–0 carrier-based fighter plane to Ipoh
   10 January a Type–0 carrier-based fighter plane to Kuantan
(Changes of schedule shall be notified.)
VIII. Others

If the situation should require alterations to these arrangements, it shall swiftly be notified or discussed anew.

The 10th Air Division and Others Returned to Their Original [Numbered] Air Force

On 8 January, the Southern Army relieved the Third Air Force commander of the tasks of the air campaign to destroy enemy air power in the Burma area and its support for the Fifteenth Army’s operations. [Accordingly,] it was decided that the 10th Air Division, the 40th and the 97th Airfield Battalions, one element of the 1st Air Signal Regiment (one each of the Wired and the Wireless Companies), which had been attached to the Third Air Force, should be returned to the command of the Fifth Air Force, which was to be shifted from the Philippines to Thailand, along with the 7th Air-Ground Support headquarters, the 15th Airfield Battalion, the 9th and the 29th Airfield Companies, the 36th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, the 90th* Line-of-Communications Motor Transport Company and the 80th Ground Duty Company, which should [also] be transferred from the full control of the Third Air Force to the command of the Fifth Air Force, and that these units transferred to the Fifth Air Force were supposed to participate in the air operations in the Burma area.\(^{(61)}\)

This [order] released the Third Air Force commander from the task of the air campaign to destroy enemy air units in Burma, which had been assigned to him from the opening of hostilities, and enabled him to focus on the operations to advance southward, such as [supporting the operations to] capture Singapore or invade Java as well as conducting the paradrop [operation] in Palembang.

3. The Air Operations of the Third Air Force in Southern Malaya and Sumatra

The Dispositions of Forces for the Air Campaign to Destroy Enemy Air Power in Singapore

The first day of the [air] strike on Singapore was set on 11 January in the previously arranged plan.

On 7 January, having been informed of the progress of the conditioning of the Kuantan airfield, Third Air Force Commander Sugawara judged that the fuel and ammunition for the air campaign to destroy enemy air power in Singapore were ready, and on the same day, he ordered the 7th Air Division to again dash from southern French Indochina and deploy to the airfields in the northern part of the Malay Peninsula.

On the same day, 7th Air Division Commander Yamamoto himself dashed to Ayer Tawar and made dispositions for the 60th Air Group (thirty-seven aircraft) and the 98th Air Group (thirty-eight aircraft) to shift respectively to [Ayer Tawar] and Ketil by around 10 January, the 12th Air Group (twenty-eight aircraft) to remain in Alor Setar and the 64th Air Group (thirty-two aircraft) to advance from Kota Bharu to Ipoh.\(^{(66, 76, 100, 119, 127, 130)}\)

* On p. 126: 190th.
Illustration No. 39 —
The Areas and their Codes for Bombings
The Key Targets in the City of Singapore
This figure was shown on the separate sheet of the order to attack Singapore.
++ Airfield

Part II, Chapter 5 / The Air Operations in Preparation of the Capture of Singapore and Palembang
[In the meantime,] it was [also] decided that the 12th Air Division, which had been deployed to the Singora [airfield] for already about one month since 8 December, should dash to the Kuantan [airfield] as soon as its conditioning was completed, and that the 47th Independent Air Squadron, which had already dashed from Saigon to Ketil, was to be deployed to the Kuantan [airfield] along with the 12th Air Division.

On 8 January, [Third] Air Force Commander Sugawara passed down the following order to attack Singapore.\(^{[81]}\)

**Third Air Force Order [A, No. 174] (Summary)**

Sungai Petani, at 1000 on 8 January

1. (omitted by the author)
2. The [Third] Air Force shall in the first place destroy enemy air power in the Singapore sector. The first day of the [air] strike shall be set on 11 January, and separate orders shall be given for the [air] strike.
   
   The outline of the Singapore air operation is shown as in the separate volume.
3. The 7th Air Division commander and the 12th Air Division commander shall, respectively with a powerful unit consisting of fighter planes and bombers and with full strength, attack the enemy airfields in Singapore in close coordination with each other. First of all, they shall quickly search for enemy fighter units and destroy them.

   The [air] strikes shall be [conducted] in conformity with the Army-Navy Arrangement in the separate volume, and for the present [the air strikes] up to the third [air] strike shall be implemented.

   Details of the coordinated attacks shall be arranged between them.

   Urgent operational communications shall be conducted as shown in the separate sheet.
4. The Third Air Division commander shall continue his current tasks.
5. The 81st Air Group shall reconnoiter the weather conditions in the Singapore sector at 0700 on both the 11th and the 12th and report the results by radio. It shall also investigate the situation in the air right before and right after the [air] strikes as well as the retreat of enemy aircraft.

   Details shall be announced through the staff officer in charge.
6. In order to [successfully] coordinate the [air] strikes, the 7th and the 12th Air Division commanders shall promptly report the weather conditions at each air base at 0630 on both the first and the second day of the [air] strikes to the [Third] Air Force commander.
7. The commanders of the 12th and the 18th Air-Ground Support headquarters and the commander of the Air-Ground Support headquarters in charge of the Kuantan [airfield] shall be assigned to the ground services for the flight units at the respective airfields of which they are in charge, and [also] support the supply and replenishment, quartering and provision of the Navy air unit.
8. I shall be in Sungai Petani.

   This order shall be passed down:
   
   To the 7th and the 12th Air Divisions in print [brought] by the staff officers dispatched, and to others in print.

**Separate Sheet of Third Air Force Operational Order A, No. 174**

1. For urgent communications concerning the Singapore operation, the designation *POSAKU*\(^*\) shall be reserved when sending telegraphic messages, and they shall be dealt with at a higher priority level than [those only designated as] SAKU.

   (1) The available period [of the designation]: During the period from the first day until the third day of the air strikes.

\(^*\) "Po": code name for the Singapore operation.
(2) Authorized originators: Chief of staff of the [Third] Air Force, air division commanders, air group commanders, independent air unit commanders and independent air squadron commanders.

(3) The telegraphic messages with [designation] POSAKU shall be limited to the following subjects:
   a. Launch or cancellation of [air] strikes
   b. Urgent weather reports
   c. Enemy movements
   d. Results of [air] strikes

2. The results of the reconnaissance of the weather conditions conducted by the 81st Air Group shall be reported to the [Third] Air Force commander according to the following transmission specifications. Each unit shall monitor the report between 0630 and 0800.

   Frequency: 7,604 kilocycle
   Call signs
     Aircraft: “Chikita”
     Aircraft Communications Section of the Third Air Force: “Nomani”

3. Each unit shall open the ground communications system in the following way and make sure that urgent communications shall never fail to be delivered.

   (1) For the first [air] strike on the first day of the attack: between 0630 and 0830.
   (2) For the second [air] strike on the first day of the attack: between 1200 and 1330.
   (3) For the third [air] strike on the second day of the attack: between 0630 and 0900.

4. For [the communication of] the launch of the first air strike or its cancellation, the following urgent codes from the simple code set shall be repeatedly sent out, and recipients shall return them.

   000: The sortie shall be made as scheduled for the first [air] strike.
   888: The first air strike shall be suspended or called off.

(The codes from the simple code set for numbers shall be sent unencrypted.)

Note: The wireless and wired networks of the [Third] Air Force as of 7 January 1941 were as shown in Illustrations Nos. 40 and 41.

The Hurried Conditioning of the Kuantan Airfield and the Deployment of Fighter Units There

The Capture of the Kuantan [Airfield] by the Takumi Detachment and the Conditioning of the Base by the [Third] Air Force

Kuantan is situated at a distance of 250 kilometers from Singapore as the crow flies, which, if fighter units were to be deployed there, would enable [the air arm] to conduct [air] strikes against Singapore by fighter planes and bombers in conjunction. With the intention of quickly conditioning the airfield, the [Third] Air Force sent Staff Officer Hamu Keitarō to direct [the conditioning].

On the last day of December, the staff officer flew to Singora, where, after giving the necessary instructions to one line-of-communications motor transport company under the command of the [Third] Air Force, he himself left Kota Bharu on 1 January, went southward by land along the east coast, and arrived in Kuantan on the 3d.\(^{64, 65, 83}\)

One element of the 12th Air-Ground Support Unit (namely, the 5th Airfield Company, one element each of the 21st and the 41st Airfield Battalions, and the 8th Field Airfield Construction Unit), which was deployed in the Kota Bharu area, as well as the ground service personnel of the 12th Air Division also shifted to Kuantan in succession by land.\(^{81, 83}\)
Illustration No. 40 — Outline of the Wireless Networks of the 2d Air Signal Unit of the [Third] Air Force (7 January 1942)
In the meantime, after having defeated persistent [local] enemy [resistance] since 28 December, the Takumi Detachment seized the Kuantan airfield on the night of 3 January, where the detachment commander immediately and energetically undertook the conditioning of the airfield with one battalion of the Nasu Regiment. However, since the airfield was thoroughly destroyed, the 8th Field Airfield Construction Unit, which had followed [the detachment] ahead [of other ground units], managed to roughly complete on 6 January after round-the-clock work a runway of thirty meters in width and six hundred meters in length with the help of local people.

The Transport of Aviation Fuel by Motor-Powered Sailing Boat

Since the Kuantan landing operation had been called off, the transportation of aircraft matériel to Kuantan became an issue. The Southern Army made a plan to transport them by sea in [small] boats, and on 2 January sent Staff Officer Suzuki Takashi to Kota Bharu. [There,] the staff officer negotiated [for boats] with Colonel Nakamura, director of the 49th Anchorage headquarters, while asking for escort two submarine-chasers through negotiations with the Navy on site. And having fully loaded aviation fuel on the motor-powered sailing boats Shin’ei-maru and Unkai-maru No. 13 and ammunition and provisions on the motor-powered sailing boats Suzuya-maru and Nagaragawa-maru, two hundred tons in total, he himself leading the boats left the port of Kota Bharu on the evening of the 5th.
Although there were large-sized motorized landing craft in Kota Bharu, motor-powered sailing boats were chosen, because the distance of three hundred kilometers to Kuantan was too far for the [large-sized motorized landing craft] to sail, and moreover, they were not equipped with derricks.\(^{(68)}\)

Having been informed on 6 January that the Kuantan [airfield] had been made ready for landing, the 64th Air Group immediately had one element dash there and cover the motor-powered sailing boats, which were sailing southward along the coast. On the 6th, heavy rainfall made it difficult for Type–1 fighter planes to provide cover over the Kuantan [airfield] and vicinity. One enemy bomber came for an attack on the Kuantan airfield at a very low altitude.\(^{(119)}\)

Before dawn of the 7th, the motor-powered sailing boats reached the vicinity of the promontory at the mouth of the Kuantan River. [Having spotted] obstacles set at the mouth of the river, the crew of the submarine chasers started on removing them. However, since day broke, the motor-powered sailing boats threw the drums into the sea and temporarily took cover in an area to the north. The drums, which had been thrown into the sea, were [later] collected and put ashore with the help of about five thousand local people and rolled along the road to the airfield. The motor-powered sailing boats, which had temporarily taken cover, [later] on the 9th came under attack of three enemy bombers while engaging in disembarkation work off Kemaman sixty kilometers to the north of Kuantan, where one of them was sunk.\(^{(68, 76, 137)}\)

Days later, the brave crew of the motor-powered sailing boats, who had participated in this operation, were awarded a citation of praise from the Southern Army commander in chief.\(^{(68)}\)

On the 7th, one element of the 2d Air Signal Unit of the [Third] Air Force established a communications system between Kuantan and Sungai Petani. Staff Officer Hamu used the system to report that the preparation of the Kuantan [airfield] would be completed by around the 12th or the 13th.\(^{(83)}\)

Since the hurried transportation of about two hundred tons of air operation matériel was successfully carried out, the Kuantan base was all ready, waiting for the deployment of flight units, which enabled [the army] to implement as scheduled the Singapore air operation due to be launched soon.

The 12th Air Division’s Advance to the Kuantan [Airfield]

Thereafter, the conditioning of the Kuantan airfield was energetically continued in preparation for the dash of the 12th Air Division.

On the 9th, the 64th Air Group in Kota Bharu dashed to Ipoh, flying through thick clouds. Having received the order to dash to Kuantan, the 12th Air Division in Singora (one element in Pattani and another in Sungai Petani) too, had tried to advance to Kuantan again and again, but due to a spell of bad weather along the east coast of the Malay Peninsula, the division could not readily dash there.\(^{(135, 138)}\)

[Third] Air Force Commander Sugawara, who on 8 January had already given orders to implement the [air] strikes on Singapore and set the first day of the strike on the 11th, prayed for the fighter plane units’ swift advance to the Kuantan [airfield].\(^{(76)}\)
Knowing that there is no use in praying,
I cannot help but pray.
Since the war is a sacred endeavor,
God of heaven and earth, please turn the weather for the better

In the meantime, the main force of the 18th Division (commander: Lt. Gen. Mutaguchi Ren’ya; minus the Kawaguchi, the Takumi and the Koba Detachments), which, in conformity with the arrangements for Operation S, was supposed to be put ashore near Endau around 17 January, had reached Cam Ranh Bay at 1600 on 10 January.\(^{(88)}\)

On 10 January, the [Navy] 22d Air Flotilla inquired of the Third Air Force about the launch of the first [air] strike on Singapore on the next day, the 11th. Based on the incoming telegraphic message at 1240 that the 12th Air Division would advance to Kuantan, [the Third] Air Force replied by telegraph at 1600 on the 10th that the first [air] strike should be carried out on the next day, the 11th, as scheduled.\(^{(80)}\)

However, again on that day, bad weather on the route frustrated the main force of the 12th Air Division’s dash to the Kuantan [airfield]. Having received the report in the evening, the [Third] Air Force commander sent telegraphs at 2045 to the units involved to postpone the first [air] strike on Singapore to the day after next, the 12th.

On the 11th, the 12th Air Division [finally] dashed to the Kuantan [airfield].\(^{(76, 135)}\)

The Progress of the First [Air] Strike

On the early morning of the 12th, [a] strategic reconnaissance aircraft of the 81st Air Group reconnoitered the weather conditions over Singapore and reported that it was possible to conduct an air strike. At 0715, having received a report from the 12th Air Division commander that seventy-two aircraft would be able to make a sortie, [Third] Air Force Commander Sugawara immediately ordered the sortie for the first strike against Singapore.\(^{(76, 81)}\)

At 0820, the fighter plane units at the Kuantan airfield started taking off.

Led in the air by Maj. Ishikawa Tadashi (graduate of the 40th class), the flight units of the [12th] Air Division entered into [the sky over] Singapore around 1000, at almost the same time as the 7th Air Division. The air division encountered more than a dozen Buffalos, but the 11th Air Group brought down ten of them and returned safely.\(^{(135, 154)}\)

It had been decided that the 59th Air Group would be deployed at the Ipoh airfield, instead of advancing to the Kuantan [airfield], and the group was supposed to conduct the attack in conjunction with the 64th Air Group at Ipoh under the command of the latter’s commander.

In the early morning on that day at the Ipoh airfield, forty-two Type–1 fighter planes (of both the 64th and the 59th Air Groups) were standing by, ready to take off. However, the [Third] Air Force’s order for the [air] strike was slow to come down.

As dawn approached, 64th Air Group Commander Katō, who was concerned about preemptive attacks by enemy aircraft, decided by himself to make the sortie and starting with the 59th Air Group, which had been brought under his command, had his units successively take off. At the time of the takeoff, one aircraft of the 59th Air Group got disorientated after
takeoff, collided into the line of the 64th Air Group, which as a precaution against an enemy raid happened to be flying with their wing tip lights turned off, and caused an accident in which two men were killed, two seriously wounded, and four aircraft seriously damaged.\(\text{61, 85, 100, 120}\)

However, the Type–1 fighter plane unit, which had assembled above Ipoh despite [the accident], advanced straight into the sky over Singapore, escorting about thirty heavy bombers of the 60th Air Group. The heavy bomber unit carried out bombings over the Tengah airfield from an altitude of six thousand meters, and after strafing and bombing the facilities at the northern end of the airfield and several large aircraft [on the ground], returned.\(\text{225}\)

On that day, there was [another] accident at the Ayer Tawar [airfield] where [a] strategic reconnaissance aircraft, which took off early that morning, crashed right after takeoff.\(\text{61}\)

**The Progress of the Second [Air] Strike**

After returning from the first [air] strike, the 7th and the 12th Air Divisions made the second sortie without a break. Thirty heavy bombers advanced over the Tengah airfield along with Type–1 fighter planes and carried out bombing from above the clouds. The 3d Squadron of the 11th Air Group engaged six Buffalos and brought down three.\(\text{66, 137}\)

Eighty-one Navy mid-sized land-based attack planes, which [had taken off from] Saigon, called off their air strike, hindered by dense clouds en route.\(\text{76, 122}\)

The [Third] Air Force commander, who had flown to Kuantan to direct the operations there and back to Sungai Petani on the same day, judged from the unexpectedly small military gains that the enemy was trying to avoid decisive battles. He gave instructions that after conducting the third [air] strike as scheduled, attacks on key locations in Singapore should also be conducted in parallel with the air campaign to destroy enemy air power.\(\text{76, 81}\)

**The Progress of the Third [Air] Strike and Thereafter**

It drizzled in Kuantan and vicinity on the 12th, and the weather did not improve even on 13 January, for which the third [air] strike was scheduled.

At 0715 on that day, one light bomber of the 75th Air Group of the 3d Air Division entered into the air over the Tengah airfield at an altitude of five hundred meters, bombed the warming-up line on the west side and set fire to two aircraft.\(\text{21}\)

The 7th Air Division entered the sky over Singapore with [a total of] about seventy aircraft consisting of one heavy bomber air group and two Type–1 fighter air groups around 1300. However, due to low-level clouds, it directed the bombings at the city areas, while the fighter unit spotted six Buffalos and brought down four of them.\(\text{76, 119, 122, 137}\)

In the meantime, although eighty mid-sized land-based attack planes, twenty-one Type–0 fighter planes and four land-based reconnaissance aircraft of the [Navy] 22d Air Flotilla advanced into the air over Singapore, due to bad weather, only one element (one squadron) of the Kanoya Air Group carried out bombings at the city area. The main force carried out bombings over Kota Tinggi and vicinity and the Mihoro Air Group on Sebarok Island [instead], and the Genzan Air Group turned back halfway. The Mihoro Air Group spotted about ten Buffalos and brought down one of three aircraft, which challenged it.\(\text{55, 56}\)

From the evening of the 13th through until midday on the 14th, it rained in Sungai Petani and vicinity, which made both the 3d and the 7th Air Divisions call off the attack on Singapore.\(\text{100}\)
On the 14th, the 11th Air Group stationed on the Kuantan [airfield] entered into the air
over Singapore despite the bad weather. Although it did not spot enemy aircraft, around
1025 it spotted between clouds from an altitude of four thousand meters a large [enemy] airc-
raft carrier (with no enemy aircraft on the deck) at anchor in the Seletar Naval port.

The Third Air Force commander received the report at 1900 from the 12th Air Division
commander about a large aircraft carrier at anchor, but he refrained [from sending out] any
reports or announcements concerning this information on the grounds that it would require
further investigation. However, Navy Liaison Officer Inoguchi, who had heard the report in
the staff room, reported it to the [First] Southern Expeditionary Fleet.

The Navy took a serious view of this information and for about one week from then
searched for the enemy aircraft carrier, but eventually without success.(85, 206)

The Cancellation of the Landing Operations in Endau and Mersing
( Operation S)

The Southern Army had concluded arrangements with the [First] Southern Expeditionary
Fleet concerning Operations Q [Kuantan] and S [Endau / Mersing].

Although Operation Q had been cancelled following the quick advance of the Takumi
Detachment, Operation S remained effective.

In the arrangements for Operation S, the date of the landing of the 18th Division and other
forces in Endau had been set on 17 January. However, since the launch of the first air strike
against Singapore had subsequently been postponed by one day, the landing date itself was
also changed to the 18th.

Meanwhile, the main force of the Twenty-fifth Army had advanced quite smoothly. On
11 January, it had advanced into Kuala Lumpur and closed in on Gemas on the 14th, while
the Koba Detachment, which had marched southward along the east coast, too, advanced to
a point two kilometers north of Endau on the same day, the 14th.(88)

On 14 January, judging that there was now no longer a need for the 18th Division and
other forces to land on the coast of Endau, the commander of the Twenty-fifth Army offered
a proposal to cancel Operation S.(88, 94)

The view of the Twenty-fifth Army headquarters was communicated to the [First] South-
ern Expeditionary Fleet through Liaison Staff Officer Nagai, who had been dispatched by
the Navy.

[In the meantime,] [First] Southern Expeditionary Fleet Commander in Chief Vice Admiral
Ozawa had concluded that in view of the inadequate results of the air strikes on Singapore
until 14 January, it was [still] dangerous to carry out the landings at Endau on the 18th as
scheduled, since [the convoys] would have to sail mainly at the pace of the slowest ships.
On the same day, he, [too,] offered a proposal to the Southern Army that the date of the land-
ing should be postponed by one day until the 19th.(56)

At that time, [the Navy had suffered the following losses:] the Myōkō, the flagship of the
5th Cruiser Division, had sustained damage in an attack by enemy aircraft on 4 January;* in
the landing operations on Menado and Tarakan on 11 January, which had been very fierce,
two minesweepers were sunk.** Following that, the Akita-maru, carrying five hundred

* Vol. 26, p. 110.
** Vol. 26, pp. 137-141.
drop tanks, fourteen ultrashort wave guarding systems and other equipment on board, had been torpedoed by an enemy submarine* and sunk Singora on 13 January.(61)

On the other hand, the Southern Army headquarters, which had received the proposal from the Twenty-fifth Army, considered that it was not appropriate to change Operation S on the basis of the proposal from the Twenty-fifth Army alone, because the operation was not only for the capture of Singapore but also had the purpose of transporting matériel for the air operations against Palembang.(61, 67)

However, as the result of a reexamination of the postponement of the schedule on 15 January, the Southern Army headquarters decided on that day at 1500 to postpone the operation by one day.(61)

During this time, the [Navy] 22th Air Flotilla, which took a serious view of the information on the spotting of an [enemy] aircraft carrier on 14 January, dispatched twenty-seven mid-sized, land-based attack planes of the Kanoya Air Group and three Type–0 fighter planes to attack the [alleged] carrier a little after 1200 on the 15th. However, due to dense clouds they were unable to locate the Seletar naval port sector and returned after bombing the east side of the Tengah airfield and other areas [instead].(55)

On the 15th, the Third Air Force attacked Singapore with its whole strength, and reported military gains of bringing down fifteen Buffalos, setting fire to one mid-sized aircraft and strafing and inflicting damage to six mid-sized aircraft [on the ground].(61) (The details will be given later [pp. 193-194].)

[Army] strategic reconnaissance aircraft had spotted forty large [enemy] aircraft, which were retreating to Palembang. On the 16th, putting various sources of information together, the Navy concluded that the British fleet, including the large aircraft carrier, had evacuated from the port of Singapore, and decided to concentrate all its strength on destroying this [fleet]. [Therefore,] at 1750 on the 16th, [the Navy] further proposed [to the Southern Army] that while it would execute the operation to disembark the aircraft matériel in the Endau area as in the arrangement, it would prefer to call off the disembarkation of one division of ground units.

Having received the Navy’s proposal, the Southern Army after some examination agreed to the Navy’s idea; it cancelled the landing of a ground division, and roughly designated that the disembarkation operation of aircraft matériel should be implemented around 26 January.(61, 64)

On 19 January, the official decision to cancel the Endau operation was made, and on the 20th, an arrangement concerning the disembarkation of matériel for air operations and other matters was concluded between the Southern Army and the [Navy First] Southern Expeditionary Fleet at Cam Ranh Bay.(62, 63)

For reference:

Journal of 20 January, kept by Colonel Tanikawa, senior staff officer of Section 4 of the Southern Army

My comments on the recent leadership of the Southern Army

1. The relationship between leadership and strategy and tactics

Leadership is to manage the vertical and horizontal teamwork in order to [effectively] implement strategy and tactics. Leadership deals with people, while strategy and tactics deal with ideas. Since it deals with people, leadership must be ultrapractical and constant.

Concerning the successive cancellations of Operations Q and S, the attitude of the Twenty-fifth Army may be said to have been reasonable in a practical and strategical sense. However, I wonder whether it was really the most appropriate decision from a leadership point of view of the Southern Army. We must keep in mind that, even if [operations] may be strategically or tactically disadvantageous [in the short term], by determinedly implementing them from a leadership point of view, you will often accomplish the objective in a more permanent and broader sense.

2. My observations on subsidiary operations

Failures often occur in subsidiary operations. Probably, they occur because in some cases [people] tend to think that subsidiary operations are easy to handle and become careless.

I wonder whether the air strikes on Rangoon (note by the author: 23 and 25 December) and the Fifth Air Force’s air strikes against China en route of its shift (note by the author: the air strike on 17 January) were an example. We need [to be vigilant] so that [such imprudence] will not cause unexpected stalemates in subsidiary operations, and in their turn change the direction of the main operation in general.

3. My observations on the essence of air campaigns to destroy enemy air power

We must be aware that unless there is an absolute difference in military strength, all air campaigns to destroy enemy air power contain the following two elements. They are of the essence in air campaigns to destroy enemy air power.

The first element is that the results of air campaigns to destroy enemy air power are uncertain. In some cases, air campaigns to destroy enemy air power can produce better results than expected, but in other cases they cannot. They are utterly ruled by chance. I do not mean to deny the value of air campaigns, but I do mean to stress that the results of air campaigns are uncertain. The second is that it is not always possible to timely know the results of the air campaigns to destroy enemy air power.

Taking these two elements into account, we must realize that operations conducted on the premise that they depend on the results of air campaigns to destroy enemy air power, will have a built-in uncertainty. If we stipulate that landings shall [only] be carried out after enemy air power has been destroyed, we will never really know on what date and time we can expect these landings to be conducted.

Direct Support of the Ground Operations in the Southern Malaya Area

The Third Air Force’s Direct Support of the Ground Operations and Its Advance to Kuala Lumpur

Contrary to expectations, the air campaign to destroy enemy air power in Singapore, which was carried out on 12 January while committing the main force of the [Third] Air Force, had not produced noticeable results. It was judged that the enemy had gotten wind of the Japanese attacks beforehand and taken shelter.

In the meantime, the 3d Air Division, which did not take part in the air campaign to destroy enemy air power in Singapore, continued its direct support of the ground combat. Apart from providing support focusing on the main railway lines, the air division also provided support from the 13th onwards for the operations of the Koba Detachment, which was rushing toward Mersing along the east coast.
The main force of the 27th Air Group (assault planes) had shifted to the Kuantan [airfield] and supported the operations of the Koba Detachment. At 1500 on the 13th, the 3d Air Division commander advanced his command post from Sungai Petani to Kuala Lumpur.\(^{(100)}\)

Kuala Lumpur was situated closer to the front of the ground divisions and it was [also] a strategic point at a distance of three hundred kilometers from Singapore and eight hundred kilometers from Palembang. For the operations of the [Third] Air Force it was an extremely advantageous position as shown in Illustration No. 42. However, it was just after the 5th Division had captured the place, and [3d] Air Division Commander Endō temporarily had to command his units by wireless communications relayed through Ipoh or by using message tubes [dropped from aircraft].\(^{(61, 100, 103)}\)

On the 14th, the 3d Air Division attacked the defeated enemy in front of the 5th Division. On that afternoon, the enemy put up persistent resistance to the west of Gemas, where more than twenty enemy fighter planes and bombers in total came for an attack on the [Japanese] ground units. It was the first time that enemy aircraft conducted a direct attack on Japanese ground units in close support of their ground units on such a [large] scale.\(^{(88)}\)

In the meantime, the Imperial Guard Division, which was advancing along the west coast of the Malay Peninsula, entered into Malacca and Alor Gajah, and finally pushed southward along the Muar River, while at the same time rushing ahead by maneuvering craft by sea.

The 3d Air Division carried out an air strike on the Batu Pahat airfield with one element; apart from destroying three small aircraft, which had been skillfully camouflaged, it neutralized four anti-aircraft guns.

Judging that the enemy aircraft which had flown in over the ground combat front were reinforcements, [3d] Air Division Commander Endō planned to thoroughly destroy the enemy air units in Singapore before they could be reinforced.

Among the flight units of the 3d Air Division, which had been ordered to rapidly advance to the Kuala Lumpur [airfield], the 2d Squadron of the 27th Air Group rushed into the airfield at 1000 on the 16th, followed by five Type–1 fighter planes of the 59th Air Group, led by Maj. Muta Hirokuni (graduate of the 43d class), and the strategic reconnaissance aircraft of the 15th Independent Air Unit.\(^{(80, 100, 105)}\)

The 83d Independent Air Unit, which was attached to the Twenty-fifth Army, was [also] deployed there.\(^{(188)}\)

### The Support for the Invasion Operations Along the West Coast of the Malay Peninsula

On 15 January, one element of the Twenty-fifth Army seized Malacca on the west coast. Aiming at cutting off the escape routes of the enemy, the army planned to land one element of the Imperial Guard Division in Batu Pahat by maneuvering [large-sized motorized landing] craft by way of the sea.

In order to closely support the operation to cut off the enemy escape routes, the 3d Air Division, which had carried out air strikes on Singapore with its main force on both the 15th and the 16th (to be mentioned later [pp. 193-194]), wound up its support for the 5th Division from the 18th onwards, and directly supported with its full strength the battles of the Imperial Guard Division, which headed southward along the west coast.
The enemy forces, which appeared on the ground combat front around that time, were Australian or Indian, and they were judged definitely to be reinforcements. Furthermore, intelligence was reported that about fifty P-40s were being assembled in Singapore.\(^{(61)}\)

On 19 January, the 3d Air Division focused its attacks on the enemy lines of communications at the rear.

At 0900, three aircraft of the 27th Air Group in support of the ground combat engaged six Buffalos, which came for an attack in conjunction with four Blenheims, sustained the loss of one aircraft, which crashed itself, and another, which did not return.\(^{(61, 100)}\)

In the meantime, at 0950, a flight of five aircraft of the 59th Air Group led by [Major] Muta, which was in charge of securing air supremacy over the ground combat front, spotted three Martins and two Buffalos of the Dutch East Indies Army Air Force flying low and aiming at the Japanese units in [large-sized motorized landing] craft sailing near the mouth of the Muar River. [The Muta Flight] attacked them and, except for one Buffalo, brought down four. Then, at 1600, while in charge of securing command of the air over Batu Pahat at an altitude of about three hundred meters, the Muta Flight unexpectedly encountered twelve Buffalos, which approached it at the same altitude. The unit immediately started an aerial fight and brought down four of them. One of the Japanese aircraft crashed itself.\(^{(61, 76, 100, 105)}\)

After the air engagement, the aircraft of the flight returned individually.

On his return, the flight commander spotted about thirty to forty Buffalos flying southward and learned about the enemy’s persistent attempts to counterattack in the area.\(^{(105)}\)
Around 1200 on the 19th, having received intelligence that the enemy appeared to have shifted to a counterattack from the Kahang area with ground and air units in tandem, 12th Air Division Commander Aoki had the 1st and the 11th Air Groups stand by [in the air] around Kahang. However, no enemy aircraft showed up.\(^\text{76, 137}\)

[In the meantime,] the 3rd Air Division airlifted bullets and ammunition for rifles and machineguns to one element of the Imperial Guard Division, which had landed to the south of Batu Pahat [from the sea] by maneuvering [large-sized motorized landing craft].\(^\text{100}\)

On 20 January, the 3rd Air Division carried out air strikes on the Batu Pahat airfield with assault plane and light bomber units. They destroyed five Buffalos with bombs and also destroyed the bridge[s] of Yong Peng to the rear [of Batu Pahat]. Six aircraft of the 90th Air Group came under attack of enemy fighter planes during the action and sustained the loss of one aircraft, which did not return, and two seriously damaged.

Around that time, hindered by enemy counterattacks, the operations of the Imperial Guard Division made no progress at all, whereas that of the 5th Division made more progress than expected, and the point of the division had reached a place thirty kilometers north of the Kluang airfield.

The 3rd Air Division commander redirected the focus of its direct support of ground troops to the front of the 5th Division in Kluang.

By always giving priority of support to those areas where the ground combat was making advantageous progress, the air division deliberately used that situation as a breakthrough to make the entire war situation progress.\(^\text{100, 214}\)

**[Enemy] Bombings on the Kuala Lumpur and Kuantan Airfields**

At 2350 on 19 January, several enemy bombers came for an attack on the Kuala Lumpur [airfield], dropping flares and conducting bombings. However, they only inflicted slight damage on one transport aircraft of the 3rd Air Division headquarters.\(^\text{100}\)

Around noon on the next day, the 20th, one enemy aircraft reconnoitered the Kuala Lumpur airfield. Just before sunset on that day, when [the Japanese troops were] unwinding in a relaxed mood after supper at the airfield, they were suddenly strafed and then bombed. The airfield was hit by a total surprise attack and one aircraft of the 59th Air Group went up in flames. Air Group Commander Nakao, who was going to intercept them, had his foot strafed, which delayed the sortie of the air group. However, following 1st Lt. Inaba Shōhei (graduate of the 53d class) of the air group, two aircraft of the Muta Flight took off and brought down one Blenheim. Then, Major Muta pursued the enemy aircraft, caught up with it and fired at it at close range, however, the enemy aircraft disappeared in the gathering dusk. Although unconfirmed, he judged that he had brought it down.

After that, the airfield came under bombing attacks of another aircraft just after sunset, and then again another around 2200, the latter of which used flares. Apart from one Type–I fighter plane, a transport aircraft went up in flames, and two other aircraft sustained some damage, three men were killed and and many wounded.\(^\text{61, 100, 105, 188}\)

On the same day, the enemy also came for a raid on the Kuantan airfield on the east coast. From 2030 onwards, one or two enemy bombers [at a time] raided the Kuantan airfield for eight times, set fire to one Ki–44 (Type–2 single-seat fighter plane) and inflicted damage to six other ones, which reduced the available aircraft of the 47th Independent Air Squadron to three. The aircraft, which came for the attacks, were judged to have been Lockheeds.\(^\text{65}\)
Near both airfields, pyrotechnic signals were set off in concert with [the approach of] the raiding enemy aircraft, which were definitely considered as signals of spies. From the next day onwards, spy hunts were conducted but bore no results. (135, 137, 180, 188)

It was only from 25 January onwards that searchlights were put into operation at the Kuantan airfield. (188)

**The Intensification of the Air Strikes on Singapore and the Start of the Attacks on Palembang**

**The Employment of Air Strikes on Key Areas in Parallel [with the Air Campaign] and the Intensification of the Air Campaign to Destroy Enemy Air Power**

Around 14 January, having judged that it was difficult to catch [and destroy] enemy air units in Singapore because of their tactical retreat, Third Air Force Commander Sugawara decided to catch [and destroy] the enemy by also conducting air strikes on key places in the area.

On the 15th, the Third Air Force carried out air strikes on Singapore with its main force, with the 3d Air Division included.

Both twin-engine light bomber air groups of the 3d Air Division carried out bombings on the Sembawang and Tengah airfields. While directly escorting the light bombers, the 59th Air Group of Type–1 fighter planes brought down six Buffalos. The 1st Air Group of Type–97 fighter planes, which was assigned to secure command of the air there, spotted thirteen Buffalos and brought down seven. (76, 100, 102, 137)
At 1145, the full strength of the 7th Air Division, too, flew into the air of Singapore and carried out bombings by guesswork over the center of the city and the Seletar airfield from an altitude of six thousand meters.\(^{(225)}\)

The 64th Air Group commander, who accompanied the 7th Air Division with Type–1 fighter planes, spotted more than a dozen aircraft on the runway of the Tengah airfield, strafed them and produced the military gains of setting ablaze one of the mid-sized aircraft, and inflicting damage to six of them. One aircraft of the air group sustained hits and made an emergency landing on the coast near Klang.\(^{(76, 119, 122)}\)

At 1300, having received a report from a strategic reconnaissance aircraft that about thirty large enemy aircraft were fleeing toward Palembang, and about another ten toward Pekanbaru, the [Third] Air Force was going to have the 7th Air Division immediately make a sortie but failed due to a disruption of communications.

At 1500, five Blenheims came for a raid over the Sungai Petani airfield at an altitude of six thousand meters and dropped bombs. However, no loss was sustained.\(^{(76)}\)

On the 16th, the Third Air Force intended to conduct attacks on Pekanbaru in retaliation for the enemy attacks of the previous day. However, since the 7th Air Division was grounded for service on that day, the attack was not implemented after all.\(^{(80, 116, 117)}\)

On the 16th, the Navy air unit attacked Singapore with twenty-three mid-sized land-based attack planes of the Genzan Air Group and twelve Type–0 fighter planes and carried out bombings over the western sector of the naval port. The Type–0 fighter unit brought down ten enemy Buffalo’s (one of which unconfirmed).\(^{(55)}\)

[Meanwhile,] having received a report of a strategic reconnaissance aircraft that forty-six mid-sized enemy aircraft were spotted on the Medan airfield, the 3d Air Division commander sent the 90th Air Group into the sky of Medan at 1330. However, the latter did not spot mid-sized aircraft. It was a mistake in interpreting the photographs, in which chevaux-de-frise (obstacles) set up on the airfield were misjudged for mid-sized aircraft.\(^{(76, 97, 100)}\)

At 0540 on 17 January, the 7th Air Division flew into the air over Singapore with twelve heavy bombers of the 98th Air Group and carried out bombings on the central part of the city. It was already the fourteenth surprise air strike since the night bombing conducted by Captain [1st Lieutenant?] Moritani [of the 75th Air Group] in late December.

Around 1030 on the same day, the 59th, the 75th and the 90th Air Groups of the 3d Air Division flew into the sky over Singapore and carried out air strikes on the key places in the city. It was already the fourteenth surprise air strike since the night bombing conducted by Captain [1st Lieutenant?] Moritani [of the 75th Air Group] in late December.

At 1215, the 64th and the 60th Air Groups entered into the air over the city of Singapore, bombed the headquarters of the British Forces in the Far East, the offices of the governor-general and others, strafed the Seletar Water Base from a low altitude, set ablaze four Short Sunderlands and inflicted serious damage to one.

Meanwhile at 1125, nine aircraft of the 64th Air Group and thirty-two aircraft of the 12th Air Group conducted a sudden air strike on the Pekanbaru airfield in Sumatra. By strafing and bombing, they produced military gains of setting ablaze five aircraft on the ground and
two warehouses and destroyed another five aircraft. However, one aircraft of the 64th Air Group crashed itself.\(^{[61, 76, 119]}\)

The Navy air unit attacked the Sembawang airfield with mid-sized land-based attack planes of the Mihoro Air Group and Type–0 fighter planes, set fire to one enemy aircraft, inflicted damage to several and brought down one, while the fighter plane unit strafed eleven [enemy] aircraft on the ground at the Tengah airfield.

Nine mid-sized land-based attack planes of the Mihoro Air Group advanced to the Sungai Petani airfield, and started to search [for the enemy] over the Malacca Strait.\(^{[55]}\)

While the air units of the Army and Navy were intensifying their air campaign to destroy enemy air power in the Singapore sector, more and more enemy aircraft came for direct attacks on Japanese ground units, making use of unguarded moments between the [Japanese] air campaigns. On the 17th, the total number of [enemy] aircraft coming for a raid [on Japanese ground units] reached fifty.\(^{[61]}\)

The immediate enemy were Australian forces, which had been newly added as reinforcements.

Around that time, the 5th Division was preparing to break through the enemy lines near Gemas, while the main force of the Imperial Guard Division was engaging a stubborn enemy near Bakri.\(^{[88]}\)

On the 17th, [a] strategic reconnaissance aircraft reconnoitered Singapore and spotted thirteen large aircraft, six mid-sized and small aircraft on the ground of the Sembawang [airfield], and eleven large and mid-sized aircraft on the ground of the Tengah [airfield].
At 1330 on the 18th, the 7th Air Division with full strength flew into [the air over] Singapore, carried out bombings over the central part of the city and the Seletar airfield, while black smoke rose high up into the sky. The 3d Squadron of the 64th Air Group spotted more than a dozen Buffalos above the city and brought down ten.\(^{61, 76, 119, 225}\)

The 12th Air Division, which in coordination with the attack of the 7th Air Division flew into [the air over] Singapore, spotted five Buffalos and engaged them but failed to bring them down. [Instead,] a Ki–44 (Type–2 single-seat fighter plane) of the 47th Independent Air Squadron brought down one of them.\(^{137}\)

On the 18th, the main force of the 3d Air Division was engaged in supporting the ground operations. On that day, while securing command of the air and leading four Type–1 fighter planes, Major Muta of the 59th Air Group brought down one Blenheim near the Kuala Lumpur airfield. Then in the afternoon, he attacked three Lockheeds escorted by two Buffalos over Batu Pahat and brought down one of the Buffalos. Major Muta further pursued the Lockheeds into the sky over Singapore and reported having brought down two of them.\(^{100, 105}\)

On the same day, the 18th, the fighter units escorting the Navy Kanoya Air Group (mid-sized land-based attack planes), which carried out attacks on Singapore, engaged with four Buffalos and about two dozens of aircraft in formation, both of which pursued [the Japanese aircraft] up to the sky over Kota Bharu. They brought down fifteen aircraft (of which five were unconfirmed) but missed two of them.\(^{56}\)

Three mid-sized land-based attack planes of the Navy Mihoro Air Group, which had advanced to the Sungai Petani [airfield], attacked Sabang. The Navy ended its search for the enemy aircraft carrier as of that day.\(^{76, 206}\)

**The Military Gains of the Air Campaign to Destroy Enemy Air Power Until the 18th**

The Third Air Force headquarters reported the aggregated military gains between 12 and 18 January of the Army and Navy together as having brought down (or inflicting damage on) about 110 aircraft as shown in Table No. 19. The Third Air Force [also] judged that it had inflicted definite damage on the reinforcements of the enemy air units, which had become operational from the 15th onwards.\(^{76, 81, 100}\)

**Table No. 19**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Third Air Force</th>
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<td>Singapore</td>
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<td>15th</td>
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<td>16th</td>
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The Appearance of the Hurricane Fighter

On 19 January, both the [Navy] Mihoro and Genzan Air Groups entered into [the sky over] Singapore with forty-two mid-sized land-based attack planes and conducted bombings over the Sembawang airfield and the naval port area. (55)

On the next day, the 20th, the [Army] 7th Air Division advanced into [the sky over] Singapore employing the 64th, the 12th, and the 60th Air Groups. The 12th Air Group carried out bombings at 1049 over the aircraft assembly factory in Seletar, while the 60th Air Group over the northeastern sector of the city of Singapore. (61)

The 64th Air Group, which covered [them] in the air at an altitude of six thousand meters, spotted ten [enemy] small aircraft flying low, attacked them and brought down seven (two of which unconfirmed). One aircraft of the air group did not return. Furthermore, the enemy aircraft spotted on that day were Hurricanes, which appeared for the first time on the Malaya front. Equipped with excellent arms, the aircraft was faster than the Type–1 fighter plane, which made the air group’s way of engagement far less controlled, unlike in everyday trainings.

On 20 and 21 January, the 7th Air Division carried out air strikes over Singapore with its full strength and reported considerable military gains. (61)

The 98th Air Group’s Solo Attack on Palembang

On 21 January, a Type–100 strategic reconnaissance aircraft of the 81st Air Group reconnoitered the Palembang airfield. After spotting eight large aircraft, which seemed to be Martin or Douglas aircraft, and four very large four-engine aircraft on the ground, extension work on the runway, sidetracks, and newly constructed gun emplacements, it returned. The Third Air Force immediately planned a sortie of the 7th Air Division.

However, since the 7th Air Division showed reluctance to conduct a solo attack with heavy bombers alone from the Sungai Petani sector with no escort of fighters for two to three hundred kilometers on both ways, (117) the [Third] Air Force commander implored it to implement the plan, emphasizing the urgency and necessity of a surprise air raid on Palembang.

On the 22d, the 7th Air Division informally decided to have the 98th Air Group ([in] Ketil) attack Palembang on the next day, the 23d, and reported it to the [Third] Air Force.
On the 22d, one unit each of the mid-sized land-based attack planes of the [Navy] Genzan and the Kanoya Air Group entered [the sky over] Singapore and carried out bombings over the aircraft on the ground on the Kallang and the Sembawang airfields, while the fighter units engaged about twenty Hurricanes, Buffalos and other enemy aircraft, and brought down twelve of them.\(^{55}\)

At 0800 on the 23d, conform to the expectations of the [Third] Air Force, the 98th Air Group made a sortie in one body, led by the squadron commanders Atsumi, Kodama and Shibata under the command of Air Group Commander Ōsaka. At 1145, the air group advanced into [the sky over] the Palembang airfield, and after the bombings, returned while engaging enemy fighter planes. Met by escorting fighter planes at the mouth of the Kampar River, the air group returned to Ketil and Sungai Petani around 1515. It produced the military gains of strafing and bombing fourteen large aircraft including some very large ones (B–17s). Although it spotted two aircraft ablaze, the details were unknown due to low-altitude clouds. On its way back, the air group came under the attack of sixteen U.S. Curtis P–36 fighter planes for fifty minutes but brought down five (of which two were unconfirmed). Although three crew members of the air group were injured and more than a dozen aircraft sustained hits, all returned without problems. On the next day, the Southern Army commander in chief sent by telegraph his high praise, in which he expressed respect for the fighting spirit and the record-breaking military gains of the 98th Air Group.

On the 23d, while the 98th Air Group carried out its long distance bombing raid on Palembang, the 12th Air Group (twenty-four heavy bombers) were carrying out an [air] strike on the Seletar airfield along with the 64th Air Group. Apart from strafing and bombing the aircraft assembly factory and the runway at 1117, the air groups set ablaze two large aircraft and inflicted serious damage on another aircraft. During this attack, out of twelve enemy fighter planes, which intercepted the air groups, they brought down eleven aircraft (three of which were unconfirmed). In addition, one element of the 64th Air Group engaged six Hurricanes and brought down one.\(^{61, 64, 76}\)

4. The Third Air Force’s Advance of Bases Toward Southern Malaya

The Seizure of the Airfields in Kluang and Kahang and the Advance of the Air Units

On the 23d, the point of the 5th Division reached a place thirty kilometers to the north of Kluang, while the Koba Detachment crossed the Endau River and was approaching Mersing.

On the 23d, [3d] Air Division Commander Endō attacked with his main force the enemy vehicles taking flight in the Kluang area, as well as the Paloh train station and vicinity, while having the main force of the 27th Air Group ([stationed in] Kuantan) support the operations of the Koba Detachment. Around then, the appearances of enemy aircraft suddenly decreased in number. Around midnight of the 25th, the 5th Division seized the airfield to the north of Kluang.\(^{61, 100}\)

On the 26th, the 3d Air Division supported the pursuit of the 5th Division and carried out bombings on trains and units in vehicles [trying to] escape.
On that day, matériel for the air operations was successfully disembarked at the coast of Endau. Around noon of the 26th, three enemy four-engine bombers in formation flew over the Kuala Lumpur airfield. [The Japanese troops at] the airfield braced themselves for enemy bombings, but the aircraft only reconnoitered [the airfield].

On the 27th, the Saeki Detachment, which took a left turn at Kluang, seized the Kahang airfield and on the 28th linked up with the Koba Detachment, which had advanced southward along the east coast.

Commander Nitahara of the 83d Independent Air Unit, who had advanced to the Kluang airfield on the 28th, immediately set out to reconnoiter the crossing points of the Johor Strait and the strongholds on Singapore Island, in preparation for the Singapore operation of the Twenty-fifth Army.

Commander Endō of the 3d Air Division offered to the Third Air Force commander a proposal to have the fighter and assault planes [of his division] dash to the Kluang [airfield], which was approved. From the 30th onwards, they rapidly advanced to the airfield.

The Transport of Matériel to Mersing and the Air Combat Above the Town

The Plan to Transport Matériel for the Air Operations to Mersing by Sea

Although the landing operation of the main force of the 18th Division in Endau and Mersing ([Operation] S) was cancelled as previously told [pp. 187-188], the disembarkation of matériel for the air operations, which had been scheduled simultaneously, was absolutely indispensable for the subsequent operations. Therefore, the Army and Navy on site concluded new arrangements at Cam Ranh Bay concerning the sea transport of matériel to the vicinity of Mersing on 20 January, as mentioned previously.

That is, 4,500 drums of fuel, 80 tons of bombs (300 100-kg bombs and 1,000 50-kg bombs), 200 drums of mineral oil, 150 drums of castor oil, 1,000 Ka-4 [incendiary] bombs, 100,000 armor-piercing bullets for machineguns, and 30,000 incendiary bullets for machineguns were supposed to be disembarked by 26 January. This [amount of] operational matériel was mainly destined for the Kluang, Kahang and other airfields, and they were scheduled to leave Singora by around 24 or 25 January. From the 21st onwards, Staff Officer Saitō of the Southern Army flew to Sungai Petani and Singora to direct the transportation of the matériel.

The Air Cover of the Convoy Transporting the Matériel

Two ships, the Kansai-maru and the Canberra-maru, which had left the port of Singora at 2300 on 24 January, loaded with matériel for the air operations, sailed straight southward to the disembarkation point of Endau, under the escort of seven ships of the main force of the 3d Destroyer Squadron of the Navy 1st Escort Unit.

Endau is situated at 160 kilometers to the northeast of Singapore, and [hence] counterattacks by enemy air units and fleets were naturally expected.

The Navy assigned the almost the same strength for the escort as should have been assigned for Operation S so that it would be ready against a sally by the British fleet.

As for the [Third] Air Force, the 11th Air Group based in Kota Bharu started to provide air cover from the 25th onwards, which was taken over as the convoy sailed southward by the 1st Air Group stationed in Kuantan. Around 1750 on the 25th, the Koyanagi Flight of the
1st Air Group spotted two Lockheed Hudsons flying southward at an altitude of two hundred meters in the vicinity of the convoy to the south of Terengganu. The flight tried to pursue and attack the aircraft but was not able to bring them down.\(^{(61, 136, 137)}\)

**The Cover of the Anchorage on the 26th**

At dawn of the 26th, the convoy reached a point twenty-odd kilometers off Endau, and the Navy began to sweep the area. At 0936, two Hudsons approached the area from the south. The fighter plane unit, which had guarded the air from 0750 on that day, immediately attacked them and pursued them up to the air over Tioman Island, about fifty kilometers northeast of Mersing, but was not able to bring them down.\(^{(61, 81, 136)}\)

After completion of the minesweeping a little after 1100, the convoy entered into the anchorage and started on the disembarkation straight away, completing the first disembarkation at 1300.

Although the efforts for the disembarkation of matériel were continued at the coast of Endau, the work took much time due to the shallowness of the sea for some distance from the shore.

The weather at the anchorage was calm, with a cloud cover of five to six, and stratocumuli moving in two layers.\(^{(61)}\)

At 1635, a large group of [enemy] aircraft in formation, consisting of nine Lockheed Hudsons, fifteen to sixteen biplane bombers and four to five Buffalos, approached the air above the anchorage, escorted by three to four Hurricanes and one Consolidated [flying boat?].

Nine aircraft of the 2d Squadron of the 11th Air Group, which were covering the air, immediately attacked them, and joined by ten aircraft led by Capt. Koyanagi Takejirō of the 1st Air Group, which timely arrived at the scene to take turns and take over [the cover], fought a fierce air fight with about thirty-four fighter planes and bombers of the British air forces.

The Koyanagi Squadron first of all took positions ahead of the British flight of biplane bombers at a lower altitude and effectively raked them while gaining altitude. The 11th Air Group also engaged the [enemy] unit of fighter planes and bombers, which continued until 1712.

The 11th Air Group brought down three Lockheed Hudsons (of which one unconfirmed), six biplane bombers (of which, three made emergency landings, and one was unconfirmed), five Buffalos and three Hurricanes (of which one unconfirmed), seventeen aircraft in total, while one aircraft of the air group also sustained some damage.

The Koyanagi Squadron of the 1st Air Group brought down six biplane bombers and one Consolidated [flying boat?] (the latter unconfirmed), and also engaged with ten enemy fighter planes, which joined in the middle of the fight. During the air fight, the aircraft of 1st Lieutenant Kubotani of the 1st Air Group, who had brought down the first enemy aircraft on 7 December, sustained hits. He parachuted and was rescued by friendly forces.

Since all the aircraft of the Koyanagi Squadron had used up all their ammunition, they hurriedly returned to the Kuantan [airfield] for another sortie.\(^{(136)}\)

In the meantime, Captain Kuroe of the 47th Independent Air Squadron (Type–2 single-seat fighter planes), who was in the air to collect information, hurriedly returned to the Kuantan [airfield] to report the situation of the air fight.\(^{(123)}\)

[12th] Air Division Commander Aoki at the Kuantan [airfield] immediately sent off the squadron standing by.\(^{(135)}\)
Around 1900, the enemy again entered the anchorage with fifteen to eighteen biplane bombers and three Hurricanes. The 1st Air Group (ten aircraft), in cooperation with two Type–2 single-seat fighter planes, brought down fourteen biplane bombers (of which two were the military gains of the Type–2 single-seat fighter planes) and one Hurricane (the military gain of a Type–2 single-seat fighter plane), while a few Japanese aircraft sustained some hits.

During this period, the disembarkation work continued, although the transport ships sustained slight damage. Dusk fell on the coast of Endau. The [12th] Air Division discussed the cover of the anchorage during the night, and taking up a proposal offered by Air Group Com-
manders Takeda and Okabe as well as by 47th Independent Air Squadron Commander Sakagawa, [12th] Air Division Commander Aoki continued covering the anchorage.

A little before 2000, three Lockheed Hudsons intruded into [the air over anchorage] at an altitude of two thousand meters. The 11th Air Group (nine aircraft) immediately attacked the [enemy] flight. Right after that, another flight of three aircraft came for an air attack on the convoy at a very low altitude. The 1st Air Group, which was next to take over the watch, had been monitoring the situation of the engagement and immediately sent up one flight of six aircraft to participate in the engagement in order to have them catch and destroy [the enemy]. However, using their [high] speed, [the enemy aircraft] broke away from the pursuing Type–97 fighters, and only one [enemy] aircraft was brought down (unconfirmed).

The transport ship Canberra-maru sustained several hits on its hull, and eight men were killed and about ten wounded. A projection was made that the disembarkation work would be completed on the morning of the 28th. Although the [12th] Air Division kept some flights standing by until moonset ([at] 0319), there were no enemy raids anymore.\(^{135, 136, 137}\)

**The Results of the Disembarkation Operation**

Around 0410 on the 27th, making use of the moonlight, two enemy destroyers raided the anchorage. Japanese vessels on guard shelled them, sank one and inflicted damage on another.\(^{55}\)

On the 27th, the 12th Air Division covered the anchorage with a total of 126 aircraft. However, possibly due to the blow received in the engagements on the day before, no enemy aircraft came for an attack.

Thus, the fuel, ammunition and other items disembarked at the coast of Endau by the noon of the 28th were transported to the Kluang and the Kahang sectors and contributed to the Singapore operation and the paratroop operation in Palembang.

This disembarkation operation was, after all, intended as an operation to disembark matériel for the air operations. But lured by the Japanese convoy, the enemy successively sent out fifty to sixty remaining aircraft kept hidden in Singapore to obstruct the disembarkation work of the convoy. However, the initiation of the attack was too late, and due to the lack of fighter planes in the escort, the [enemy] attacks were not conducted in a thorough way. Instead, it made [the enemy aircraft] an easy prey to the 12th Air Division, which was able to fight to its advantage above friendly forces by employing its forces in a united way, and inflicted huge losses [to the enemy].

As the result of the decisive air engagements in Endau, no enemy aircraft showed up in the Twenty-fifth Army’s Singapore operation thereafter, which allowed the army to turn the battle to its overwhelming advantage.\(^{61, 81, 135, 136, 137}\)

Since the enemy did not employ Blenheim bombers in this engagement, the [Third] Air Force judged that the enemy had sustained considerable losses. There was [even] a view that the Ki–44 (Type–2 single-seat fighter plane) of the 47th Independent Air Squadron was superior to Hurricanes in terms of speed and combat capability, and [therefore] it was easy to bring them down.\(^{62}\)
The B–17s’ Raid on the Kuantan [Airfield]

At 0315 on the 28th, one enemy bomber came for a raid on the Kuantan [airfield]. However, with no damage sustained, the main force of the 12th Air Division conducted servicing on that day.

On that day at the Kuantan [airfield], the ceiling was about 1,000 meters with a cloud cover of eight to ten. The 12th Air Division headquarters had received a report that Navy units of mid-sized land-based attack planes would fly over in the afternoon en route from their attack on Singapore.

At 1425, when the roars of a flight of large aircraft heading northward above the clouds at an altitude of about 2,000 to 3,000 meters over the Kuantan [airfield] was heard, two aircraft of the 1st Air Group standing by immediately took off.

Following them, the 2d Squadron of the 11th Air Group also started the engines, but having no idea of the situation, they did not take off. However, in a moment, the roars, which had passed by in the sky [over the airfield] suddenly reversed course. The airfield came under a bombing attack with huge explosive sounds, and instantly sustained a loss of two men, who were killed, twenty-seven wounded, nine aircraft that went up in flames, three with serious damage and six with some or slight damage.

[Particularly,] the damage to the 1st Air Group, which was [queuing] along the warm-up line was so serious that the air group had to operate as a squadron, not as an air group. The bombing also inflicted a loss of Type–2 single seat fighters, which reduced the number of operational aircraft to one.\(^{(102, 123, 135)}\)

For reference:

Journal kept by 1st Lt. Tazaki Tsugio, then attached to the 11th Air Group (28 January, Kuantan)

At 1425, when the 2d Squadron, which had been standing to arms from 0750 till 1400, was about to finish its watch and start servicing its aircraft, suddenly at the cry of “Enemy attack,” all men jumped out of their tents to look up to the sky. However, the aircraft flew at too high an altitude to spot. While everyone was unable to judge whether they were the mid-sized land-based attack planes of the Navy or enemy aircraft, two aircraft of the 1st Air Group took off. Although our 2d Squadron, too, started [the engines] to take off, not knowing the situation, we stopped [our takeoff]. Just when we were about to go back to our tents with a sense of relief, we heard again the cry of “Enemy aircraft” and jumped outside. Again, we could not spot the aircraft. While we kept watching the sky, [we saw] a couple of objects shining in the sunlight falling down. No sooner than we heard a cry of “They are bombs!”, [we heard] the sound of explosions in a forest far away to the north. I was relieved to learn that they were dropped that far away. Nevertheless, [seeing that] the air group commander and three to four other men [of the top echelon] had gone into the air-raid shelter, I followed them for no particular reason. In a second or two, no sooner than 2d Lieutenant Ōtsuka and two other men ran into the shelter, I heard horrendously thundering explosions. [I counted] five, six, ... ten, eleven, ... more than a dozen bombs and wondered whether what fell on the shelter were fragments [of bombs] or soil. When the explosions stopped, I took a look to see the ground covered with bellowing columns of black smoke. Barely thinking that they might be terrible clouds of dust, 2d Lieutenant Ōtsuka cried that the aircraft were ablaze. I jumped out to see a horrible sight. More than a half of the aircraft on the warm-up line were completely on fire, and it were these columns of black smoke that we had seen earlier [from the shelter] as the several columns of black smoke rising high up into the sky, [thinking that] they might be clouds of dust. There was already nothing we could do, other than...
to avoid subsequent danger. Meaning to take refuge in the forest, [everyone] went one after another and stayed around its periphery for a while. [I think] it happened in about five or ten minutes. It seemed that satisfied with the results, the enemy had left the air over the airfield. (The rest omitted by the author)

It was judged that the aircraft, which came for the raid, were six B–17s from the direction of Sumatra, the same model as the planes that had conducted the air reconnaissance of the Kuala Lumpur [airfield] on the 26th. The two Type–97 fighter planes of the 1st Air Group, which had intercepted the enemy aircraft, pursued them at full speed, but were not able to bring them down.\(^{(104, 136)}\)

On the early morning of 30 January, the 60th Air Group stationed at Ayer Tawar carried out night bombings over Singapore.\(^{(216)}\)

As the result of the aggregated loss of aircraft during January, out of thirty-two Type–97 fighter planes and twenty-three Type–1 fighter planes, or fifty-five in total that engaged in the Malaya operation, 60\% of them were lost in action, of which the majority were destroyed on the ground.\(^{(70)}\) There were also a number of accidents during takeoffs and landings, and due to the inadequate repair of bomb craters and other factors, unexpected accidents were caused on the ground.\(^{(214)}\)

For reference:

A fragment of the statement of a captain of the Australian air forces, who was a crew member of a Hudson brought down in the engagement near Endau and who was taken prisoner, [quoted] from the journal kept by Saitō Tomoo, staff officer of the Southern Army (4 February)
The pilot[s] of the British and the Australian air forces do not have a sense of defeat at all. Japanese fighter planes are excellent in fighting capabilities but are still inferior to Spitfires. The bombing attacks by the bomber units are dispersed and do not inflict significant loss. He believes that Singapore will never fall. Currently there are four hundred aircraft in Australia. They are supplied by the United States and assembled at factories in Sydney. The Australian air force sent in only two squadrons of Hudsons (forty-eight aircraft) for the support of the Malaya operation. Other than the above, aircrew are replenished from Australia. In Australia, pilots are provided with fifty to sixty hours (four months) of training on the elementary level and fifty to sixty hours (five months) on the intermediate level.

The Accumulation of Fuel and Ammunition in the Kluang and Kahang Sectors

The Amount of Fuel and Ammunition Necessary for the Palembang Operation

The 4,500 [drums] of fuel, eighty tons of bombs and other matériel, which were disembarked at Endau on 27 January, were immediately transported to the Kluang and Kahang airfields. At that time, the [Third] Air Force roughly estimated the amount of fuel and ammunition necessary for the attacks on Palembang as follows:

The Kluang Airfield

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of aircraft</th>
<th>Number of aircraft</th>
<th>Necessary amount per aircraft per sortie</th>
<th>Number of sorties</th>
<th>Necessary amount</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy bombers</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10.5 (drums)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,415 (drums)</td>
<td>3,536 (drums)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twin-engine light bombers</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7.3 (drums)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,281 (drums)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type-1 fighter planes</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4 (drums)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>560 (drums)</td>
<td>280 (drums)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic recon. aircraft</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7 (drums)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy bombers</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.5 (tons)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>67.5 (tons)</td>
<td>120 (tons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light bombers</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.3 (tons)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>52.5 (tons)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Kahang Airfield

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of aircraft</th>
<th>Number of aircraft</th>
<th>Necessary amount per aircraft per sortie</th>
<th>Number of sorties</th>
<th>Necessary amount</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type-1 fighter planes</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4 (drums)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>480 (drums)</td>
<td>960 (drums)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport aircraft</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8 (drums)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>480 (drums)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this rough estimate, the fuel and the bombs for the Palembang operation were totaled up respectively to 4,500 drums and 120 tons, which were almost the same as the total amount of matériel disembarked at Endau. It meant that, in order to conduct the Singapore operation from the Kluang and Kahang sectors, other than the fuel and ammunition disembarked and
transported, the fuel and ammunition currently accumulated in northern Malaya had to be urgently sent down.\(^{(65, 79, 83)}\)

The fuel and ammunition accumulated in the northern Malaya sector at the end of January were as shown in Table No. 20.\(^{(65)}\)

**Table No. 20: The Amount of Fuel and Ammunition Accumulated in the Northern Sector of the Malay Peninsula at the End of January**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>West coast</th>
<th>East coast</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>As of 17 January</td>
<td>Disembarked at Singora on 22 January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91 Octane gasoline (drums)</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87 Octane gasoline (drums)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500-kg bombs</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>350-kg bombs</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-kg bombs</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-kg bombs</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-kg bombs</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ka-4 [incendiary] bombs</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td>30,000 Ma-101 bullets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>400,000 (incendiary) bullets for Machineguns</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The Transportation over Land of Matériel for the Operations**

As the Singapore and the Palembang operations drew near, the transport [of operational matériel] from the northern Malaya sector to the Kluang and Kahang sectors became most urgent.

At that time, there were about two hundred motor vehicles available for the [Third] Air Force (120 motor vehicles at the 18th Air-Ground Support Unit, and eighty vehicles at the 15th Air-Ground Support Unit) on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula.

On 20 January, the [Third] Air Force commander sent Chief of Staff Kawashima to the Southern Army headquarters to explain the current situation.

The Southern Army sent the 35th Independent Motor Transport Battalion (consisting of six companies) to Singora and also dispatched the 20th Independent Engineer Unit to Endau by sea to repair the road between Endau, Kluang and Kahang.\(^{(61)}\)

Thus, the transportation over land of operational matériel made a brisk start, and the motor vehicles of the Twenty-fifth Army, which rushed to send southward river-crossing matériel and heavy equipment from the north to the south along the long and narrow Malay
Peninsula, and those of the [Third] Air Force, which continued sending forward fuel and ammunition, raced to secure the few transport routes, causing at some places rivalries between the lines of communications [of the Third Air Force] and those of ground forces.\(^{100, 203}\)

The Twenty-fifth Army emphasized that the highest priority should be given to the Singapore [operation], whereas, though understanding the importance of the Singapore operation, the Third Air Force put a higher priority on the Palembang operation. The Twenty-fifth Army headquarters had a feeling that the [Third] Air Force was uncooperative about [the operation to] capture Singapore, and some [officers] even said that the paradrop operation [on Palembang] should be called off.\(^{94}\)

The circumstances during this period were recorded in the Journal of Classified Operations of the Third Air Force in the following way:\(^{85}\)

On the emotional alienation between the Twenty-fifth Army and the [Third] Air Force arising from the replenishment [problems] at the time of [the operation to] capture Singapore, particularly those stemming from the lack of transportation capacity

a) Despite the imminent fall of Singapore, the transportation of supplementary matériel for the capture [operation] has not progressed as much as the army had expected. Particularly, this is the case with shells for the Twenty-fifth Army and fuel and ammunition for the [Third] Air Force.

b) Around 12 or 13 February, the Kluang airfield was supposed to be used by the main force of the 3d and 7th Air Divisions. Especially, the 7th Air Division was supposed to display its power to the fullest extent to accelerate the fall of Singapore because it was the most suitable for attacks on key places.

However, the amount of fuel and ammunition required was enormous. On 13 February, it became finally impossible to continue supplying replenishments. Although air-ground support units and line-of-communications motor transport units desperately operated all through the night, they were unable to keep up [supplying the required amount]. On top of that, the Palembang operation had to be carried out.

c) Under such circumstances, a struggle to secure transport capacity naturally occurred between the Twenty-fifth Army and the Third Air Force.

One of the staff officers of the Twenty-fifth Army even went so far as to say that the transport capacity should not be allowed to be used [to forward] even one drop of fuel or one bullet, unless it was fuel and ammunition for the purpose of supporting the Twenty-fifth Army, and that it would be better to cancel an action like the paradrop operation in Palembang.

d) Needless to say that they had little understanding of the significance of the Palembang operation, however, the above is considered to have come from the concern that due to the Palembang operation to be launched before the fall of Singapore, air power to support the Twenty-fifth Army would be lacking.

Although this journal speaks about the day after the launch of the operation to capture [Singapore], we may say that the feelings held by both [the Twenty-fifth Army and the Third Air force toward each other] were not always good throughout the entire Malaya operation.

**The Deployment of the 15th Air-Ground Support Unit**

On 6 January, the units under the command of 1st Air-Ground Support headquarters Commander Kawamoto Kizō, which had been deployed in French Indochina, was brought under the direct control of the Southern Army from the command of the Third Air Force Com-
mander, while on 9 January, the 15th Air-Ground Support Unit, which had been deployed in the Phnom Penh sector in southern French Indochina, handed over its duties in that sector to the 1st Air-Ground Support Unit and assembled its main force in Sungai Petani on 18 January.\(^{203}\)

At that time, the Sungai Petani sector was assigned to the 18th Air-Ground Support headquarters Commander Fujioka Fumio, while the Kota Bahru sector was assigned to the 12th Air-Ground Support headquarters Commander Mizushima Jusuke.

On 18 January, the [Third] Air Force commander newly designated the sector to the south of [the line connecting] Cape Gelang to Cape Rachado [Cape Tuan] for the 15th Air-Ground Support Unit, and gave orders to the 15th Air-Ground Support headquarters Commander Matsuzaki Kesamatsu to deploy to the Kahang, Kluang and Batu Pahat airfields right away once they were seized by the advancing front line troops, and take charge of the ground services on those airfields.\(^{81}\)

Also, the Kuantan Air-Ground Support Unit, which had closely supported the engagements of the 12th Air Division at the Kuantan [airfield], was incorporated into the 15th Air-Ground Support Unit on 31 January.

The disposition of the forces of the Third Air Force as of 31 January and the outline of its wireless communication network were as shown respectively in Illustrations Nos. 44 and 45.\(^{81}\)

The operational preparations at the Kluang and Kahang airfields were completed by 2 February.\(^{76, 80}\)

**Addendum: The British Air Forces’ Defense of Southern Malaya**

**The British Air Forces Expect Reinforcements**

The British air forces, which intended to delay the Japanese advance as much as possible, had been chased into the Singapore area at the end of December and been conducting guerilla warfare, using Kuala Lumpur and Kuantan with part of their forces.

Around that time, there were 113 operational aircraft on the airfields of the British air forces in Malaya, where twenty-nine Buffalos, twenty-nine Beauforts [sic], nineteen Blenheim, seventeen Hudsons and nineteen other aircraft were deployed. Apart from them, there were twenty-four Martins and five Buffalos of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army Air Force.

On 25 December, six Hudson Type-II aircraft and seven Blenheim Type-IV aircraft came respectively from Australia and the Middle East.
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1.1 elem each of 17th, 41st, 82d Airfield Bns and 1 elem of 35th Independent Motor Transport Bn [under the command of] the 18th Air-Ground Support HQ was advancing toward Kluang, while 1 elem of 93rd Airfield Bn was advancing toward Kuantan.

2.18th Shipboard Aircraft Depot and a mobile repair detail were deployed at Saigon.

3.13th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment was advancing toward Kluang.

4. Main force of 15th [Special] Air Transport Unit was deployed at Saigon.

5. 11th and 12th Air Transport Sqdns were upgrading their aircraft in mainland Japan.

6. Main force of 83d Independent Air Unit were deployed at Kluang, and 1 elem at Kulai.

Illustration No. 44 — The Disposition of Forces of the Third Air Force (at the End of January 1942)
Illustration No. 45 — The Outline of the Wireless Network of the [Third] Air Force 2d Air Signal Unit (1300, 27 January 1942)
Moreover, on 20 December, a report was received that fifty-two Hudson Type-III aircraft had departed from mainland Britain while fifty-one Hurricanes and twenty-four pilots were under sail and would arrive within two weeks.

At that time, the British air forces were mainly assigned to cover the convoys carrying reinforcements, and other than that, they searched for Japanese convoys directed for Kuantan or Mersing on the east coast or [large-sized motorized landing] craft maneuvering along the west coast. The Dutch Air Force was in charge of guarding the area from Sabang to Medan to a distance of fifty miles out to sea.

On 27 December, there was a report that about 120 Japanese aircraft had gathered at the Sungai Petani airfield. On that night, six Blenheims of 345th [34th(B)?] Squadron departed from Singapore, carried out bombings at the Sungai Petani airfield, and all returned safely after inflicting enormous damage. [Photographic reconnaissance] confirmed that twelve fighter aircraft and three bombers [of the Japanese forces] had been destroyed. On the next night, an attack on the Sungai Petani [airfield] was again carried out, which caused a number of fires and inflicted damage. However, one of the Blenheims did not return.

From late December to early January, the ground units in Malaya came under relentless Japanese air strikes. Having their sleep disturbed in the daytime, the troops [had to] shift at night, stuffed in freight cars or motor vehicles, trying to catch some sleep, which demoralized them.

It was on 3 January, the same day when the first convoy with reinforcements arrived in Singapore that the 11th Division withdrew from the stronghold of Kampar. Japanese forces captured Ipoh on the 4th of January and Kuantan on the 9th. It was the 45th Indian Infantry Brigade that arrived in Singapore on 3 January. (218, 219, 220)

ABDA Command

On 3 January, according to a proposal by the U.S. and British leaders, ABDA Command in the Far East was established, and General Wavell, then commander of the British Indian Army, was appointed supreme commander.

The area of operation included Burma, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines, (later northern Australia was also included). Its general headquarters was situated in Bandung, and Lieutenant General Ter Poorten (The Netherlands), Admiral Hart (U.S.) and Air Chief Marshal [?Air Marshal] Peirse (Britain) were respectively appointed commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The existing British Forces in the Far East [Command] was dissolved, while the U.S. Filipino Army had virtually nothing to do with it.

On 15 January, General Wavell assumed command. At that time, the main points of the plan of operations of the command were “to secure as many key places as possible, turn the tide of the war with the reinforcements sent to Singapore, and stop the advance of the Japanese forces by gaining local air supremacy through securing the airfields in Sumatra, and by securing the lines of communications in ABDA.”

Accordingly, he allotted only a small naval strength and submarines [to fight against] the Japanese Navy, while employing the main force of his air power to cover the convoys carrying reinforcements or to watch the shipping of the Japanese forces, and one element to conduct attacks on airfields and support the combat of the ground units in Malaya.
Concerning the reinforcement plan of the allied air strength, apart from the reinforcements from mainland Britain, one thousand or more aircraft were supposed to be sent from the United States in the two months of February and March 1942.

While expecting the plan to be implemented, General Wavell wished to swiftly make up for wastage and conduct a counterattack.

In the meantime, the British Chiefs of Staff Committee planned in such a way that the transfer of forces from the Middle East area should be completed by early January. The strength to be shifted to the Malaya area consisted of eighteen squadrons (about 280 aircraft), two infantry divisions and one armored brigade.

It was also decided that two infantry divisions should be sent to the Dutch East Indies from Australia, while two infantry divisions (of the Indian Army) and twelve squadrons of air forces (about two hundred aircraft) should be sent to Burma. \[218, 219, 220\]

Note: The 7th Armored Brigade, which was being transported toward Malaya, had its destination changed to Rangoon in early February to operate in the Burma theater.

The Sorties of the British Air Force Reinforcement Units

On 12 January, the Japanese air forces launched their daytime bombings over Singapore Island. With observer corps posts in Malaya lost and insufficient radar networks, the British air forces in Malaya were unable to give timely air raid warnings. Moreover, the Japanese aircraft conducted bombings at an altitude of twenty-four thousand feet (six thousand meters). In order to let Buffalos climb to that altitude, it was necessary to obtain the information at least thirty minutes in advance. Moreover, the Buffalos were inferior to Type-1 fighters in performance. Furthermore, only 3.7-inch antiaircraft guns, about forty of which were placed, could fire at aircraft flying at an altitude of five thousand meters or more.

On 12 January, three bombing raids were conducted over the Tengah airfield. On that day, the Dutch air force (one squadron) and the British air force (four squadrons), a total of about fifty-six aircraft joined to intercept [the Japanese aircraft]. Although they brought down six Japanese fighters, five Buffalos were brought down.

On 13 January, the second convoy of reinforcements including a few large U.S. transport ships arrived in Singapore despite the bad weather. Although about eighty aircraft of Japanese fighters and bombers came for a raid again on that day, they scored no military gains because they dropped their bombs from above the clouds. Meanwhile, one brigade, two antiaircraft gun regiments, one antitank gun regiment were disembarked from the convoy. Also, fifty-one Hurricanes packed in crates and twenty-four pilots were successfully disembarked.

The crated Hurricanes were immediately brought to hidden assembly factories. The British headquarters in Singapore held great expectations that with these state-of-the-art fighter planes they could definitely stop the advance of the Japanese forces and regain command of the air over Malaya.

On the 13th, the Japanese conducted a raid with eighty aircraft; twenty British aircraft intercepted them, but three were brought down.

Around 15 January, the air strength of the allied forces consisted of twenty-eight fighter aircraft and seventy-four bombers and reconnaissance aircraft in total. Although they were in principle supposed to be employed in a concentrated way, the air force headquarters had to meet the request for air support from various theaters. On top of covering convoys carrying
reinforcements, they provided support for the ground [combat] at both the Segamat and Muar fronts.

On 15 January, a small team of bombers escorted by Buffalo fighters carried out attacks on Japanese motor vehicle units along the road connecting Taiping and Gemas. In the same period, a small bomber unit of mixed aircraft (including six Dutch Glenn Martins) escorted by fighter planes attacked Japanese motor transport units and troops advancing southward from Muar and Gemas. Also, several night bombings were determinedly carried out by Hudsons, Blenheims and Beauforts [sic] against the Kuala Lumpur and Kuantan airfields just after their capture by Japanese forces.

A few heavy bombers of the U.S. Air Force based in Java also attacked airfields in Malaya seized by the Japanese forces, by using the Palembang [airfield] as their advance base. Apparently, seven of them carried out an attack on the Sungai Petani [airfield].

When the ground units began to withdraw from Segamat, the air force headquarters judged that the remaining airfields in Malaya would soon become untenable and gave orders to prepare for their demolition. Soon after the Japanese forces reached Muar, the small airfield near Batu Pahat was destroyed.

On 21 January, the ground service personnel and matériel at the Kahang airfield were withdrawn to Singapore, and [the facilities of] the airfield were destroyed on the next day. On the 23d, similar measures were taken at the Kluang airfield.

Thereafter, the allied air forces in Malaya were confined to the four airfields on Singapore Island, and the immediate issue was to disperse them outside the island in order to limit the damage as much as possible.

On 18 January, 223d Group, which was supposed to direct the air operations from Sumatra was established in Palembang, while almost simultaneously a fighter group headquarters for the defense of the island was established in Singapore.

In conformity with the agreement, the Dutch air units stationed in Malaya withdrew to Java between the 18th and the 22d. Three squadrons of Blenheims and two squadrons of Hudsons shifted between the 23d and the 27th along with service and other units, while the units of flying boats headed for Java on the 28th. Thus, all bomber units were dispersed to places outside Malaya by the end of January.

In late January, Japanese air strikes against Singapore became more and more intense, and other than buildings, facilities and aircraft on the ground that were destroyed, the civilian population [also] got affected. The known civilian casualties in January were about six hundred people killed, and about fifteen hundred people wounded.

During this period, efforts were continued to reinforce the air units equipped with Buffalos and strengthen the air defense with the Hurricanes that had newly arrived on 13 January. Around 20 January, 232d Squadron joined [the lineup of defense] with eighteen aircraft as its fixed number of aircraft.

On 20 January, about ninety Japanese fighters and bombers carried out air strikes in two raids.

Of the Hurricanes, which intercepted [the Japanese aircraft], three were brought down, and two [pilots] including the squadron commander were killed. On the next day the 21st, [the island] again came under the air strikes by about one hundred aircraft, and six [?] Hurricanes were lost. The hope pinned on the Hurricanes that they might improve the war situation was mercilessly crushed.
The Hurricane’s performance at high altitudes was superior. However, air combats often took place at lower altitudes, and moreover, [still] equipped with air-intake filters for the Middle Eastern theater, its speed was reduced by about thirty miles [per hour].

On 22 January, Japanese Navy bomber units conducted air raids in two waves.

In the air combats on that day, apart from losing five Hurricanes and four Buffalos, a number of aircraft were destroyed on the ground. Since the Japanese escort fighters fought always from an advantageous position, it was almost impossible to attack the Japanese bombers.

From 21 to 23 January [the air forces] were also carrying out the important mission of escorting the convoys carrying reinforcements with a small air strength. Hudsons and Glenn Martins conducted patrols as far as the Natuna Islands from dawn until sunset, while at the same time Catalina flying boats conducted patrols against [Japanese] submarines to the south of Singapore. And as the convoys were approaching the home waters of Singapore, six Buffalos provided the air cover, while the attack unit of bombers and torpedo bombers were always kept standing by.

The 44th Indian Infantry Brigade and seven thousand Indian reinforcements safely arrived in Singapore on the 22d, about nineteen hundred Australian reinforcements and one Australian machinegun battalion on the 24th, and the main force of the 18th British Division [on the 29th].

In the meantime, following successive days of air strikes, around that time the [Singapore] City Government Authorities [finally] started on erecting air-raid shelters, which, as a matter of course, should have been started months earlier. The initial evacuation plan the City Government had drawn up instructed the residents to abandon their houses and go to an evacuation camp set up in the surrounding areas. However, after the first air strike, it turned out that the instructions were unfeasible. Moreover, as the air strikes intensified, it became difficult to gather laborers. Particularly, laborers more and more avoided airfields, naval bases, and the Keppel Harbor, because they were the bombing targets of the Japanese forces.

The air defense radar observation posts of the Singapore [airfields] were closed down one after another, while the number of the Japanese air raids increased day by day. (218, 219, 220)

The Failed Attacks on the [Japanese] Convoy in the Endau and Mersing Area

After the withdrawal from the Kuantan [airfield], patrol aircraft had conducted reconnaissance day after day to watch for the Japanese forces advancing southward along the east coast. On the 24th, they encountered Japanese fighter aircraft and lost two of their own.

Note: The 24th is judged to be a mistake for the 25th.

At 0915 on the 26th, the patrol aircraft spotted the Japanese forces and reported two cruisers, twelve destroyers, two transport ships at twenty miles northeast of Endau. However, due to jamming, the report did not reach air force headquarters. It was after the landing of the aircraft in Singapore at 1050 when the report was communicated at last.

At that time, there were thirty-six available aircraft in Singapore, of which the Beauforts [sic] of the 36th and the 100th Squadrons had not finished refueling and rearming after their attack on Japanese concentration points and motor transport units in Jhore on the previous night. Therefore, air force headquarters ordered 225th Bomber Group in Sumatra to have all bombers sortie against [the Japanese forces] in Endau, while requesting ABDA Command to send U.S. bombers.
Since it was reported that Japanese naval vessels were [at anchor] in shallow waters, where torpedoes would be useless, an instruction was given to the Beauforts [sic] in Singapore to rearm with 250-pound bombs instead of torpedoes. It took time for the unit to switch arms, and it was not until the afternoon of the 26th that the first wave of the attacks departed.

The first wave of attacks against [the Japanese forces in] Endau consisted of nine Hudsons and twelve Beauforts [sic] bombers, escorted by fifteen Buffalos and eight Hurricanes. The formation flew northward along the coastline at an altitude of three thousand meters right below the clouds. Amid the fierce resistance of [Japanese] fighters and antiaircraft fire, the first strike was determinedly conducted around 1630, and delivered hits on two transport ships and one of the cruisers. (note by the author: in fact, the cruiser did not sustain hits.) They conducted attacks on troops and storing places on the shore, too. However, five Beauforts [sic] were brought down, and the aircraft of Squadron Commander Rowland was one of them.

Following that, as the second wave, nine Beauforts [sic], three Airacobras [sic] and twelve fighter aircraft carried out an attack around 1900. Without a cloud in the sky over the target area, they were intercepted by a large number of Japanese fighters, and five Beauforts [sic], two Airacobras [sic] and one fighter were brought down. However, they delivered hits on one of the transport ships.

The Hudsons, which flew from Sumatra in the evening, attacked the landing units and disembarkation points and returned without loss. However, the 36th and 100th Squadrons in Singapore lost more than a half of their bombers in the engagements on the 26th. Both squadron commanders were killed in action, and many of the remaining aircraft were seriously damaged and their crews wounded. Although these two squadrons consisted of excellent torpedo bombers, when their time had finally come, they [had to] fight with bombs instead of torpedoes. Although the escort fighters, too, fought their best to expel the Japanese fighters, the allied air forces were overwhelmed in quantity and quality. The aircraft of the British air forces in Malaya had become too outdated. Letting the Japanese forces land in Endau meant that it had already become out of the question to defend the Malay Peninsula. The exhausted units of Percival crossed the bridge connecting Malaya and Singapore from the 28th to the 31st, pressed by the overwhelming power of the Japanese forces.

Meanwhile on 27 January, forty-eight Hurricanes were rushed in from the Middle East on the aircraft carrier *Indomitable*. However, the majority of them were sent for the defense of Palembang, and only a part of them were for Singapore.

Following the bombings by Japanese aircraft, the airfields on Singapore soon came under artillery shelling, [too].\(^{218, 219, 220}\)
Chapter 6  The Palembang Paradrop Operation and Support for the Capture of Singapore

1. Establishing the Conditions for Launching the Operations

Assessment of the Situation of the Air Forces Around the End of January

At the end of January, the disembarkation operation of matériel for the air operations on the coast of Endau was safely completed, producing better results than expected. Around that time, the 7th Air Division in the Sungai Petani sector, located about 550 kilometers from Singapore and disadvantageous in terms of distance, advanced day after day into [the sky over] Singapore to carry out bombings over the airfields and the city.

In every attack, the enemy in high fighting spirits vigorously fought back with antiaircraft guns and by intercepting [Japanese aircraft] with state-of-the-art Hurricanes. However, their way of fighting was not particularly outstanding; above all, the loss of systematic intelligence networks became the weakest point of the British forces. On the 31st, the Twenty-fifth Army already rushed into Johor Bahru.\(^{(81)}\)

On the 31st, strategic reconnaissance aircraft, which reconnoitered the Singapore and Sumatra areas, reported the [results of] their reconnaissance of the situation of [enemy] aircraft on the four airfields on Singapore Island as follows:\(^{(61)}\)

- **Tengah [airfield]:** Three large aircraft, and eight mid- and small-sized aircraft (two unconfirmed)
- **Seletar [airfield]:** Three large aircraft, and thirteen mid- and small-sized aircraft (two unconfirmed)
- **Sembawang [airfield]:** Two large aircraft, and five mid- and small-sized aircraft
- **Kallang [airfield]:** One large aircraft, and three (?) mid- and small-sized aircraft

A strategic reconnaissance aircraft [also] reconnoitered the Palembang airfield where the British air forces seemed to have evacuated; it spotted one very large four-engine aircraft, nine large aircraft, eleven mid-sized aircraft and nine small aircraft.

The Southern Army judged that enemy aircraft were rapidly being reinforced in the Sumatra area.\(^{(61)}\)

On the other hand, [the Southern Army also] concluded that the air strength in Singapore had already lost its main force in the air strikes at the coast of Endau and thereafter, and fixed its immediate concern on the strength of the defensive positions on Singapore Island.

As the operations progressed, the defensive positions on Singapore Island became gradually known. About late January, the Southern Army judged the enemy movements there in the following way.\(^{(61)}\)
1. In Singapore priority is given to covering the Seletar naval port and the commercial port, which have fortifications that face towards the east and the south. The area facing the Strait of Johor corresponds to the rear defense front of the island; the facilities there seem to have been very much strengthened after the opening of hostilities.
2. Along with the newly included reinforcements, the British forces are expected to put up stubborn resistance. In particular, they are expected to resist by setting up field positions with pillboxes and barbed wire entanglements, by placing searchlights and laying mines along the shore of the strait, and by setting fire to spilled oil.
3. The fortress gun batteries at Changi and on Blakang Mati Island are concealed batteries with semicircular openings, and some are considered to be able to fire at us at the time of our advance.

The Third Air Force’s Deployment to Southern Malaya

The Advance of the [Third] Air Force’s Command Post to Kluang

On 31 January, when the Twenty-fifth Army seized Johor Bahru, both the assault and fighter air groups of the 3rd Air Division had one element of each dash to the Kluang airfield. As previously told, the urgent transport of operational matériel to the Kluang and Kahang sectors was continued. Using these airfields, located about one hundred kilometers from Singapore, as footholds, the [Third] Air Force launched repetitive attacks on Singapore and conducted air operations against southern Sumatra.

Around 1 February, a large number of transport ships were spotted near the port of Singapore. On the next day, the 2d, strategic reconnaissance aircraft of the 81st Air Group reconnoitered the planned landing points of the main force of the Sixteenth Army at the northwestern tip of Java.

On 2 February, the 3rd Air Division had its main force dash to the Kluang airfield, and the [Third] Air Force also advanced its command post to the Kluang [airfield] on the 4th.

Eventually, the support for the attack on Singapore and the paradrop operations against Palembang came to be directed from the command post at Kluang.

The Southern Army’s Operational Dispositions and the Arrangements of the Army and Navy on Site

As previously told, while the Army Air Service units gradually intensified their attacks on Singapore as the Malaya operation progressed, the Southern Army had from the beginning of the operations watched the enemy movements on the whole of Sumatra, which was closely connected to the Malaya operation as the rear reinforcement base of the British air forces in Malaya, and carried out attacks as far as the combat range [of its aircraft] permitted. Particularly, on 23 January, heavy bombers flew a great distance to attack Palembang. Thereafter, the Southern Army, in parallel with the preparations to capture Singapore, switched quickly to make all the specific preparations for the paradrop operation on Palembang. Even so, this air operation, which was to be conducted by flying over the equator in one dash from bases on the Malay Peninsula, was a big challenge for the Army Air Service.
The Southern Army’s Cautious Plan of a [Safer Paradrop] Raiding Operation

Earlier on 23 January, the Southern Army headquarters in Saigon had examined the paradrop operation together with [Paratroop] Raiding Group Commander Kume Seiichi, Staff Officer Itoda Isamu of the Sixteenth Army, and Staff Officer Miyashi Minoru of the Third Air Force.

At that time, a paradrop operation against Palembang from the Kluang or Kahang [airfields] in the southern part of the Malay Peninsula at an attack distance of six hundred kilometers was not at all impossible to implement. However, a number of serious problems, which would require [careful] examination, were found in the details of the implementation plan. First of all, there was the concern about accommodating both the transport aircraft of [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit and the heavy bombers, etc., which were supposed to airlift the equipment (arms, radio sets, etc.) of the [paratroop] raiding units, simultaneously in the limited [space of the] airfields in southern Malaya. Moreover, recently the enemy had rapidly increased the number of Hurricanes and other aircraft, which led to an assessment that its air units in Sumatra might be quite superior. (61)

[In the meantime,] having examined recent engagements, the Navy Eleventh Air Fleet relayed the following information about U.S. large-sized aircraft: (61)

**Information from the Eleventh Air Fleet**

On 17 January, three B–24s and two B–17s came for a raid over Menado. The Navy Type–0 fighters, which intercepted them, fired at a close range all the 20-mm bullets they carried, but failed to bring them down. It is expected that, from now on, making use of their [long] combat range, the enemy will conduct attacks from somewhere beyond the area where our fighter planes hold command of the air.

It is necessary to make available armor-piercing ammunition and large attack planes.

This information on U.S. aircraft was very important in the sense that it conveyed the fact that the enemy aircraft’s bullet-proof armor and fire-prevention gear had been upgraded.

However, it was not until the advance of the Japanese Army and Navy air units to Rabaul that they experienced overwhelming difficulty in dealing with the B–17 Flying Fortresses, and situations occurred that Japanese Army and Navy fighters, unable to shoot down the B–17s, went so far as carrying out suicide attacks. (39)

The Southern Army could not ignore such information.

On the other hand, [Paratroop] Raiding Group Commander Kume was confident about [his group’s] ground combat prowess after the paradrop and boasted that his group would be able to defeat an enemy five or six times as large as his group. However, the troops scheduled to be dropped amounted to [barely] three hundred men, which meant that there was a risk that if they should come under enveloping attacks by a superior enemy, their action would be self-destructive. (80, 87, 161) Inherently, fate is an unavoidable factor in the outcome of battles. However, if the first ever paradrop operation of the Army should fail, it would be a matter of eternal regret. The Southern Army thought that it might be better to have [the group] gain confidence by dropping them on the Pekanbaru or Jambi airfields, which were relatively safer, rather than conducting a high-risk paradrop operation on the Palembang airfield from the start, and drew up the following deployment plan as shown in Table No. 21, which was approved by the chief of staff of the Southern Army. (21 64) The relative positions of Palembang, Pekanbaru, Jambi, etc. are as shown in *Illustration No. 46*. 
However, Staff Officer Itoda of the Sixteenth Army, who had been involved in the training of the [paratroop] raiding unit when he was assigned to the Inspectorate General of [Army] Aviation, strongly supported the plan to conduct a paradrop right into Palembang, opposing the Southern Army’s cautious plan, in which [the paratroop] raiding unit was supposed to advance about 250 kilometers southward by land after having been dropped in Jambi.

Staff Officer Itoda stressed that employing the [Paratroop Raiding Group was] not all that difficult, and maintained that the Sixteenth Army had done its utmost to prepare for it, considering the [paradrop] raiding operation as the core of the southern Sumatra operation (Op-
Illustration No. 46 —
Sketch Map of the Vicinity of the Palembang Airfield
Outline of the Palembang [Paradrop] Raiding Operation
eration L), and that it held great expectations and absolute confidence in the success of the operation.\(^{80, 161}\)

In [the arrangements of] the Manila Conference at the end of January, the paradrop [operation] in Palembang was [re-]scheduled for 10 February, which afforded more time compared to the original plan [p. 161], though only by four or five days.

On 27 January, the Southern Army commander in chief dispatched Staff Officer Matsumae to Sungai Petani and had him arrange the concrete plan of the [paradrop] raiding operation with the Third Air Force, including the allotment of bases in the southern Malay Peninsula, which newly had become a problem by the arrangements of the Manila Conference.\(^{62, 64}\)

The Third Air Force reaffirmed that it could not think of dropping the [Paratroop] Raiding Group on any other place than right into Palembang, an oil resource area, since momentum brings victory. Also having gathered minute knowledge about the enemy movements in Sumatra, the [Third] Air Force had drawn up a detailed outline of the [paradrop] raiding operation (which will be mentioned later).

The Army-Navy Arrangement for the Air Operation in Operation L

While the way to use the [paratroop] raiding unit gradually took shape, the Twenty-fifth Army seized the Kluang airfield on the 25th of January and the Kahang airfield on the 27th, and almost at the same time, the matériel for the air operation of Operation L was disem-
barked at the coast of Endau, on which occasion, moreover, the remaining aircraft in Singapore could [unexpectedly] be lured out and for the most part destroyed, as previously told. In the meantime, in parallel with the disembarkation [operation] at Endau, the Navy units seized the communication post of the British forces on the Anambas Islands, while the [Army] Kawaguchi Detachment, which had been dispatched to Kuching on the west coast of Borneo, seized the Ledo airfield (one hundred kilometers southwest of Kuching), as an alternative to the Kuching [airfield].

On 28 January, the Third Air Force commander signed the following memorandum of arrangements for the air [operations] with the commander in chief of the [Navy First] Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the Sixteenth Army commander.(61, 87)

Arrangements for the Air [Operations] in Operation L Between the [First] Southern Expeditionary Fleet Commander in Chief, the Sixteenth Army Commander and the Third Air Force Commander*

[First] Southern Expeditionary Fleet Commander in Chief, V. Adm. Ozawa Jisaburō
Sixteenth Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Imamura Hitoshi
Third Air Force Commander, Lt. Gen. Sugawara Michiō

I. Name of operation and standard dates
1. The operations against Bangka Island and Palembang shall be called Operation L.
2. The day when the advance party of the 38th Division lands in Mentok shall be indicated as Day L, and is scheduled for 10 February. In case a change of date for Day L is required due to the progress of the air operations, weather conditions or enemy movements, a decision shall be made by 1200 on Day L – 6 upon deliberation between the [First] Southern Expeditionary Fleet commander in chief and the Sixteenth Army commander. However, regarding [matters involving] air operations, the Sixteenth Army commander shall consult the Third Air Force commander.

II. Forces to be employed
1. Navy
   1st Air Unit: About 100 land-based attack planes, about 30 fighter planes, and 6 land-based reconnaissance planes
   Malaya Unit: About 40 seaplanes
2. Army
   About 9 strategic reconnaissance planes,† about 40 Type–1 fighter planes,† about 30 Type–97 fighter planes,† about 9 assault planes,† about 20 twin-engine light [bombers],† and about 30 heavy bombers
   †Indicates aircraft to be advanced to the airfield[s] in southern Sumatra. Depending on the condition of the airfields, the above number of aircraft shall be slightly changed.

III. [Air] bases to be used and distribution of forces
1. Navy
   (a) When the Ledo [airfield] is fit for use:
      Ledo and Kuching [airfields]: 2 air groups of land-based attack planes, about 30 fighter planes and 6 land-based reconnaissance aircraft
      Kuantan: about 30 land-based attack planes
      Sungai Petani: about 10 aircraft
   (b) When [the airfields in] Ledo and Kuching are unusable, [aircraft] shall be advanced in the following way:

Kuantan: about 60 land-based attack planes and one element of the fighter planes
Kahang: about 30 fighter planes
About 30 land-based attack planes may use [the airfield] as an advance base for refueling.
If the XX Unit (note by the author: the [Paratroop] Raiding Group) should use [the airfield], [the use by the land-based attack planes] shall be [limited to] only until and including Day L – 3 or on Day L + 7 [L + 1?] and onwards.
Sungai Petani: about 10 land-based attack planes
Kota Bharu: about 40 land-based attack planes

2. Army
Kahang: about 25 Type–1 fighter planes and about 45 transport aircraft
The remaining units to be employed for Operation L shall use the Kluang, Batu Pahat, Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh, Ketil and other airfields. Depending on the readiness and other circumstances of the airfields, the above disposition and the forces to be deployed may be changed.

3. The Army shall be charged with readying the Mentok and the Palembang [air] bases. In the preparation of the Mentok [air base], the Navy shall cooperate with the Army.
In the initial days after the seizure of the Mentok and the Palembang [air] bases, Mentok shall be shared [by the Army and Navy] in the following way, whereas the Palembang [air base] shall be used by the Army:
Navy fighter planes and other aircraft: about 30 aircraft
Army fighter planes: about 30 aircraft
When possible, the Army shall assist the Navy in the transport of its aviation fuel.
The later use of this [air] base shall be newly arranged between the Army and Navy commanders concerned.

IV. Outline of the operation
1. We shall be determined to swiftly destroy the enemy air power in Sumatra as well as neutralize the enemy air power in Java. The areas assigned to [the Army and the Navy] are roughly designated as follows. However, [both] shall attack the enemy in the other’s area as occasion may require.
   Navy: [the area] east of the line connecting Mentok and Palembang ([the line] included)
   Army: [the area] west of the above-mentioned line ([the line] included)
2. The Navy shall be in charge of attacking enemy naval ships.
3. Cover of the transport convoy
   (1) Under sail
      (a) Direct cover on Day L – 1 by [both] Army and Navy fighter planes in conjunction shall be provided as follows:
         Until 1400: the Navy
         From 1400 onwards: the Army. In case XX Unit is used, the cover [will be started] roughly from 1700 onwards.
         In case XX Unit is used, the Navy fighter planes shall provide cover [for the convoy] on their own as much as possible.
      (b) The guarding under sail other than the above shall be charged to the Navy.
   (2) At the Mentok and the Palembang anchorages and while sailing upstream
      The guarding against enemy aircraft after the Army and Navy fighter planes’ advance in the area shall be provided by both forces in conjunction; the guarding other than the above shall be assigned to the Navy.
   (3) Support for ground [operations] and for the operations to sail upstream
      Support for the operations to sail upstream to Palembang shall mainly be assigned to the Navy. Support for ground operations after that shall be assigned to the Army. However, the Navy shall assume this [task] until the Army aircraft are advanced to the area.

V. Exchange of information
The Army shall make efforts to reconnoiter the movements of the enemy air forces in the Batavia area and provide the Navy with the information as much as possible.

In this arrangement, Day L was scheduled for 10 February, and it was planned that Palembang should be secured with the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group on the day before Day L.

The Southern Army’s Order Concerning the Execution of the [Paratroop] Raiding Operation

On 31 January, the commander in chief of the Southern Army put the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group under the command of the Third Air Force commander, and passed down the order to carry out the [paratroop] raiding operation, the outline of which is as shown in the following:

Southern Army Order*

Saigon, 31 January

1. Hereafter the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group shall be put under the command of the Third Air Force commander.

2. The Third Air Force commander shall employ the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group for the purpose of Operation [L] in the following way:
   (1) The 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group shall seize the Palembang airfield in order to facilitate Operations L and H, and if possible, it shall [further] seize and secure the oil refineries in Palembang before the enemy destroys them.
   (2) Time of execution of the first drop or landing shall be the morning of Day L – 1. If weather conditions do not allow this, execution shall be aborted.
   (3) The parachute unit or landing unit shall be put under the command of the Sixteenth Army commander on the arrival of the main force of the 38th Division in Palembang.
   (4) When Operation L is completed, the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group (with the exception of the parachute or landing unit) shall be returned to its original unit without separate orders.
   (5) When executing the operation, close communication with the Sixteenth Army commander shall be maintained.

In this Southern Army Order, the [Paratroop] Raiding Group was put under the command of the Third Air Force commander. The arrangement was made based on a proposal offered by the [Third] Air Force that it was appropriate to put the group under the command of the [Third] Air Force commander in order to accurately provide the group with cover during its flight and drop.

[On the other hand,] the designation of the [Palembang] airfield as the main dropping point was decided by the commander in chief of the Southern Army himself, after comprehensively [considering] the movements of enemy air units, the strength and capacity of the [Paratroop] Raiding Group, as well as the [Third] Air Force’s capacity to support it.

For the timing of the drop of the [Paratroop] Raiding Group, the morning of the day before Day L or the day of the landing of the landing troops was selected. It followed from the judgment that, if conducted on Day L – 2, it would be too early and expose the plan of the landing operation, which raised the concern that the convoy [of the landing troops] could be destroyed at sea, while if conducted on Day L, considering the expected position of the convoy at the time of the drop, the raiding operation would encounter huge difficulties.

* See also Vol. 3, p. 273.
On top of the above, the selection of the execution of the drop in the morning was decided after studying the local meteorological conditions of Palembang and vicinity, concerning which Kusakabe Fumio, the major of aviation technology in charge of meteorology, had offered the following view:\(^{(72, 73, 80)}\)

**A View on the Best Time to Execute the Paradrop Based on Meteorological Observations**

(\textbf{Summary})

Low-altitude regions such as Palembang and vicinity are not directly affected by the monsoon. Therefore, the meteorological changes are very slow, and similar daily cycles of [meteorological] changes continue for several days.

As for the daily [meteorological] changes, the mist, which covers the whole surface in the early hours, rises as the sun rises, and forms strati at an altitude of fifty to one hundred meters. Then, stratocumuli are formed at higher altitudes, which will become cumuli from ten in the morning onwards.

In the afternoon, the cumuli become massive cumulonimbi, which finally cause thunderstorms. At night, the thunderclouds disappear, and again mist covers the whole surface the next morning. Thus, similar daily cycles of [meteorological] changes are repeated.

Moreover, the areas along the Musi River of Sumatra have a distinctive feature that openings are formed in some parts of the low clouds.

Therefore, in the morning when the clouds have not yet developed into massive cumulonimbi, it is relatively practicable (or easy) to fly, and particularly when flying into the air over Palembang, one can safely and surely reach the destination by just flying along the Musi River from the sea.

The Third Air Force’s Plans for Both Operations

\textbf{The Intelligence on Palembang Obtained by the Third Air Force}

From the beginning of the Malaya operation, the Third Air Force had continuously been watching Sumatra and, from the 3d Air Division’s attack on Medan in late December on, it had been neutralizing the [enemy] air power on Sumatra one by one. From mid-January onwards, the [Third] Air Force conducted attacks on [the airfields of] Pekanbaru and Palembang from the Alor Setar and Ketil bases and obtained a good knowledge of the actual situation of the enemy air units on Sumatra.

It was expected that the Palembang airfield would be the key airfield base in the sector. Reconnaissance results [also] showed that from early January onwards extension work on the runway as well as the construction of sidetracks and gun emplacements was speeded up [p. 197].

On 21 January, [a] strategic reconnaissance aircraft, which had flown over Palembang, reported that it had spotted, along with four B–17s and five large aircraft (Martins) on the ground, antiaircraft guns, pill boxes, etc. on the airfield, and ships of five or six thousandtons sailing upstream from the lower reaches of the Musi River, which flows on the northern side of the Palembang oil refineries, and that guard ship[s] were deployed near the refineries.

It was concluded that the areas surrounding the Palembang airfield were mostly wetlands, rubber forest and jungle, which were generally difficult to pass through, and that there were only a limited number of pastures, which would be suitable for a paradrop.\(^{(61)}\)
The reconnaissance results as of the end of January showed a rapid increase in the number of large and small aircraft on the ground, which amounted to thirty aircraft in total, as mentioned previously [p. 216].

The Process of Drawing up a Plan of the [Paradrop] Operation

As previously told [p. 221], on 27 January, the Third Air Force’s headquarters at Sungai Petani examined the outline of the [paradrop] raiding operation together with Staff Officer Matsumae of the Southern Army and the top echelon of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group. While the Southern Army was very cautious about the execution of the [paradrop] raiding operation, as mentioned previously, the Third Air Force insisted that the [paratroop] raiding group should be committed precisely to such tactically key positions as Palembang and drew up aggressive plans as shown below.

One of the Plans of the Outline of the [Paradrop] Raiding Operation Drawn Up by the Third Air Force

(27 January)

1. The launching airfields of the [paratroop] raiding units shall be the Kluang and Kahang airfields.

   Although [the Army] is supposed to share the airfields with the Navy in conformity with the Manila Agreement, it should be arranged that the Navy’s use of the airfields prior to Day L shall be limited as much as possible and that priority should be given to the realization of the Palembang operation.

2. Prior to the paradrop raiding [operation], the safety of the operation shall be secured by thoroughly destroying enemy aircraft on the Palembang [airfield].

   On top of that, on the day of implementation, the [paradrop] raiding operation shall be covered by skilled Type–1 fighter pilots. On the same afternoon, Type–1 fighters shall also make a second sortie to cover the convoy of the Sixteenth Army heading for Palembang by sea.

   About forty Type–1 fighter aircraft are available.

3. Right after the paradrop, Type–97 fighter planes shall be advanced to the Palembang airfield, while light bomber units shall directly support the ground combat of the [paratroop] raiding unit.

   In the Southern Army’s plan to drop [the paratroopers] on the Jambi [airfield], there is a risk that the [paratrooper] unit might be left on its own without support, while there will be no chance that the unit would be left to its destruction if dropped on the Palembang airfield.

Moreover, the following results of a study conducted by the Third Air Force and the [Paratroop] Raiding Group were also presented, in which both appealed to the Southern Army to change its mind about its cautious plan for the [paradrop] raiding operation.

The Results of a Study on the Implementation of the [Paradrop] Raiding Operation

1. It is impossible to conduct a [paradrop] raiding operation against Palembang twice in one day, because of the difficulty in refueling after the first raiding operation due to the shortage of fuel service trucks in the Kluang and Kahang sectors.

2. Although the weight of the transport aircraft has slightly increased after having been coated with paint, it does not affect the combat range. The aircraft is [still] able to conduct operations [at a distance of] six hundred kilometers.
3. It was found to be possible for the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Units to fly in a formation consisting of nine aircraft. Compared to [flying all the transport aircraft] in groups of three aircraft for each formation, it will shorten the length of formation flight by two kilometers, which makes it very much easier to cover [the aircraft] in the air.

4. The planned drop zone on the Palembang airfield was thought to be wetlands all over, and the paradrop was considered impossible unless executed from aircraft flying in a single file consisting of flight formations of three aircraft each. However, after the [Third] Air Force had reexamined the aerial photographs, it was concluded that there were fewer wetlands, but pastures [instead], where the aircraft could execute the drop while maintaining a formation of nine aircraft each.

5. If it is judged impossible to carry out the operation due to bad weather or [matters involving] the river-ascending ground units, the operation shall be aborted or changed to the second target (Jambi).

6. The enemy ground strength is estimated to be about three hundred men. If two companies of the elite [paratroop] raiding unit are employed, they will have a solid chance of winning.

After hearing the views from the units [involved] and their explanation of the results of their specific studies, Staff Officer Matsumae returned to Saigon on the 28th, having become more confident that the [paradrop] raiding operation would be successful if the [Third] Air force was put in charge of the [paratroop] unit.

The Southern Army realized that if the Type–1 fighters were to make a second sortie to cover the convoy of the landing units of the Sixteenth Army, it would need to adjust the time frame [of the operations] with the Navy. It made a request to the Navy that if the paradrop operation was to be executed, it would like Navy fighters to provide cover for the convoy as much as possible from 1400 on Day L – 1 onwards. The Navy gave its consent, and the matter was laid down in the previously mentioned arrangement with the Navy as “Navy fighters shall on their own provide air cover for the convoy of the Sixteenth Army as much as possible.”

On 31 January, as previously told [p. 224], the Southern Army gave orders to the Third Air Force to take command of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group and carry out the [paradrop] raiding operation in Palembang.


At the end of January, the Third Air force had drawn up the outline of the air operations [for Operation] L (the southern Sumatra operation), which was as follows.
The Outline of the Air Operations [for Operation] L*  

25 January

I. Mission

1. [The Third Air Force shall] expand the military gains of the Singapore operation and while constraining the Dutch East Indies Air Force from sending reinforcements to or gathering strength in southern Sumatra, closely support the Sixteenth Army in the latter’s Bangka and Palembang operations.

2. While conducting this operation, [the Third Air Force shall] at the right moment launch the air operations against western Java and prepare [to give] direct support in the landing operation of the main force of the Sixteenth Army in western Java.

II. Directives

1. For the period of [the operation to] capture Singapore

   (1) Prior to the landing (or disembarkation) operation in or near Endau, a Singapore air operation shall be conducted, [in which] the remaining enemy air power shall be mopped up, and through attacks on vital targets in the Singapore sector, efforts shall be made to crush the enemy’s will to resist.

   (2) At the time of the Twenty-fifth Army’s [operation to] capture Singapore, we shall accelerate the capture [operation] by bombing vital points on the island along with the bombardment by the army.

   (3) When the Kluang, Kahang and Batu Pahat airfields are seized and made ready for use, preparations for [the operation to] capture Singapore and Operation L shall be swiftly completed. The deployment plan of the forces is as shown in Supplement No. 1. (Note by the author: the contents of Supplement No. 1 are as shown in Illustration No. 47)

   (4) During this period, [the Third Air Force shall be] assigned to timely conduct attacks on the airfields in Sumatra, cut off the line of retreat of the enemy air power in the Singapore sector and pursue them. It shall also constrain the Dutch East Indies Air Force from reinforcing or gathering strength, so that the [operation to] capture Singapore as well as the execution of Operation L will be facilitated.

2. For the period of [the operation to] capture southern Sumatra

   (1) [The Third Air Force shall], in conjunction with the Navy air unit, be assigned to support the operations of the Sixteenth Army’s Bangka and Palembang landing units.

   (2) Between Day L – 4 and Day L – 2, [the Third Air Force shall] destroy the enemy air power in Palembang mainly with the fighter units of the 3d Air Division.

   (3) On Day L – 1, the [Paratroop] Raiding Group shall be dropped in Palembang. On this occasion [the Third Air Force shall have] one element facilitate this action.

   (4) When the airfields in southern Sumatra are seized and made ready for use, a powerful element shall be advanced [there] without missing an opportunity. The major part of it shall swiftly destroy the enemy air power in western Java, while one element of it shall support the Sixteenth Army’s operation to mop up [the enemy in] southern Sumatra. Meanwhile, in order to give direct support to the main force of the Sixteenth Army in its western Java landing operation, conditioning of the Tanjungkarang airfield shall be accelerated.

   (5) The outline of the cooperation between the Army and Navy air units in Operation L shall be arranged separately.

   (6) Around the time of [the operation to] capture Singapore and right at the launch of Operation L, the remaining force of the [Third] Air Force may also search for enemy ships near Singapore and in the Malacca Strait and attack them.

3. Others

* See also Vol. 3, pp. 259-262.
(1) Forces not involved in Operation L or the Java operation shall directly support one element of the Twenty-fifth Army in northern Sumatra. The details shall be planned separately.

(2) One element of the fighter unit may be charged with the air defense of the Singapore sector.

III. Disposition of forces to be employed and outline of operations

1. The attack on Singapore

(1) The outline of the attack before the capture of Singapore by the Twenty-fifth Army is as shown in Third Air Force Operation Order A, No. 174 [p. 180] separate volume “The Outline of the Singapore Air Operation.”

(2) Once the Kluang, Kahang and Batu Pahat airfields are seized, the 15th Air-Ground Support Unit shall be advanced to southern Malaya with the aim of accelerating the conditioning of air bases and the accumulation of matériel for Operation L.

(3) Prior to the start of Operation L, the distribution of air units shall be changed as follows:

| 3d Air Div: 15th Independent Air Unit (minus 51st Independent Air Sqdn), 59th Air Gp, 64th Air Gp, 75th Air Gp, 90th Air Gp, and 27th Air Gp |
| 7th Air Div: 51st Independent Air Sqdn, 12th Air Gp, and 60th Air Gp |
| 12th Air Div: 1st Air Gp, 11th Air Gp, and 47th Independent Air Sqdn |

(4) Missions of each unit based on the distribution above are as follows:

(a) 81st Air Group

Shall be assigned to general reconnaissance in Sumatra, Java and other locations, especially reconnaissance that will serve as preparation for the invasion of Java. For this purpose, the airfields in Kuching or Ledo in Borneo may be used temporarily. One element of the group shall directly support the [Paratroop] Raiding Group in its operation.

(b) 3d Air Division

Shall support the Twenty-fifth Army and also support Operation L.

(c) 7th Air Division

Shall support the operation to capture Singapore. If required, it shall be employed as reinforcement in Operation L ([and] make preparations to [support] the northern Sumatra operation).

(d) 12th Air Division

In cooperation with the 3d Air Division, shall take charge of gaining command of the air in and around Singapore, conducting surveillance of the Pekanbaru airfield, and destroy [enemy aircraft] when opportunities arise. If possible, it shall provide the air defense of the anchorage of the units for Operation L, and [also] make preparations to support the Java operations.

2. Direct support in Operation L

(1) From 1700 until the evening of the day before Day L (scheduled for 10 February), one element of the fighter [unit] of the 3d Air Division shall be charged with covering the transport convoy of Operation L under sail.

(2) Concurrently with Item (1), support shall be provided to the [Paratroop] Raiding Group’s execution of its raiding mission. For this purpose, the strategic reconnaissance unit shall be charged with reconnaissance around the drop zone in Palembang before and after the drop. [Further,] Type–1 fighter units shall be charged with direct cover of the [Paratroop] Raiding Air (Transport) Unit.

(3) After the drop of the [Paratroop] Raiding Group until the arrival of the landing units of Operation L, the fighting power of the [Paratroop Raiding Group] shall be maintained.
Diagram illustrating the disposition plan of air units in British Malaya, including locations such as Alor Setar, Ayer Tawar, Sungai Petani, Ipoh, Kuala Lumpur, Batu Pahat, Labis, Kluang, and Kahang. The diagram details specific air force units, including air groups and squadrons, and highlights the roles of staging bases and supporting units.
and nurtured, if necessary [with supplies provided] by descending ([or] landing) airlift units or by airdrops. Along with this, direct support shall [also] be given to the [Paratroop] Raiding Group during its ground combat, if required.

(4) When the Palembang airfield is seized and made ready for use, one element each of the 12th Air Division and the 3d Air Division will swiftly advance to the airfield to provide direct support for the landing units of Operation L (including the [Paratroop] Raiding Group) in their ground operations. Further, at an opportune moment, the [air] operations for the Java [operation] shall be launched. For this purpose, preparation of the Tanjungkarang airfield shall be accelerated so that assault plane units and Type–97 fighter units can be advanced.


The [Third] Air Force drew up the outline of the [paradrop] raiding operation on Palembang simultaneously with the outline of the air operations [for Operation] L, the outline of which was as follows:

**Outline of the [Paradrop] Raiding Operation [in Operation] L**

3 February

1. Mission
   [The Third Air Force shall] seize the Palembang airfield to facilitate Operation L and the Java operation, and [also] seize and secure the oil refineries in Palembang before the enemy destroys them.

2. Outline of the operations
   (1) Prior to Day L – 1, the 3d Air Division (including the attached units) shall destroy the enemy air power in Palembang.
   (2) The first (paradrop) raid shall be set at 1130 on Day L – 1. However, the execution shall be aborted by separate order(s) if inevitable due to weather or other conditions.
   (3) By the evening of Day L – 2, the first echelon shall be deployed to Kahang, the second echelon and one air group of light bombers of the 3d Air Division to Kluang, to be ready for the launch of the raiding [operation].
   (4) The first and the second echelons shall operate separately. The first echelon shall drop [paratroopers] on the Palembang airfield and its vicinity, and the second echelon on the Palembang oil refineries and their vicinity. Both [units] shall mop up the enemy in the surroundings, seize and secure the objectives of their respective operations until the arrival of the 38th Division.
      The paratrooper unit of the first echelon shall [also] attack the barracks in Palembang, circumstances permitting.
   (5) The light bomber air group of the 3d Air Division shall in general accompany the first or the second echelon, and attack the barracks in Palembang city right before the parachuting [operation].
   (6) [Some aircraft of] the strategic reconnaissance unit under the direct control of the [Third] Air Force shall fly ahead of the echelons while others shall accompany them, to conduct surveillance of the battle site.
   (7) After the drop, the first and the second echelons as well as the light bomber air group shall assemble and return as quickly as possible. The heavy bomber unit shall [directly] return to their bases, while the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit ([and] the Air Transport Unit) shall return

* See also Vol. 3, pp. 288-289.
to their bases after refueling at the Kluang or Kahang airfields. However, units that can directly return to their bases shall not conduct the above-mentioned refueling.

(8) After providing cover for the execution of the first [paradrop] raiding operation, one element of the fighter unit of the 3d Air Division shall provide air cover [also] for the convoy roughly from 1700 onwards. Further, if required, it shall provide support for the ground combat, while checking up on the progress of the Japanese troops.

(9) The 3d Air Division will timely have its strategic reconnaissance unit conduct surveillance of the combat site of the paratrooper unit.

(10) The second [paradrop] raid shall be prepared, set for 1500 on the day after that of the first raid.

The forces to be employed in [the second] paradrop ([or] landing) [raid] shall be about two squadrons of the air transport unit as the standard, and its drop zone shall be set at the Palembang airfield.

3. The disposition of the forces to be employed and the operation schedule
As shown on Separate Sheet (note by the author: Table No. 22).

4. The basic standard for the joint operations
The 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group commander shall decide on the details, such as the drop zones of the echelons, and the dispositions during the flight.

Table No. 22
Separate Sheet*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Disposition of forces</th>
<th>Operational objectives (tasks)</th>
<th>Outline of actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Day L – 4 – Day L – 1</td>
<td>Fighter unit of 3d Air Div (including units attached to the division)</td>
<td>To destroy enemy aircraft on the Palembang airfield</td>
<td>Attacks shall be made at a good opportunity. The launching bases shall be the Kluang and Kahang airfields.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day L – 2</td>
<td>Required forces of 12th Air Div</td>
<td>To take command of the air over the Singapore sector; to watch on the Pekanbaru airfield; and to destroy enemy aircraft on the airfield, if required.</td>
<td>Attacks shall be made at a good opportunity. The launching base shall be the Batu Pahat [airfield].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day L – 2</td>
<td>The first raiding unit of [1st Paratroop] Raiding Gp; 98th, 59th and 64th Air Gps, 3 aircraft of 81st Air Gp, 1 air gp of light bombers of 3d Air Div</td>
<td>For the first [paradrop] raid, each echelon will assemble by the evening at the Kluang or Kahang [airfields], to prepare for the sortie on Day L – 1.</td>
<td>1. The first raiding unit of the [Paratroop] Raiding Gp shall depart from Sungai Petani and advance to the Kluang or the Kahang [airfields]. 2. 98th Air Gp shall depart from the Ketil [airfield], and assemble two sqdns at the Kahang [airfield], and another at the Kluang [airfield].</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See also Vol. 3, pp. 290-291.
### Day L–1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Echelon:</th>
<th>2d Echelon:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Another aircraft of 81st Air Gp (shall go in advance).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **1st Echelon:** To execute the [paradrop] raid at the Palembang airfield and its vicinity, secure the airfield, and quickly make it ready for use by Type–97 fighter planes.
2. **2d Echelon:** To execute the [paradrop] raid at the oil refineries in Palembang and their vicinity, seize and secure these refineries before destruction by the enemy.
3. 98th Air Gp shall transport the arms and matériel respectively for each transport sqdn of both echelons, and [also] provide cover fire against antiaircraft fire at the rear of the transport sqdns.
4. The fighter air groups shall provide direct cover for each echelon respectively.
5. The strategic reconnaissance aircraft shall [fly] right ahead of the echelons or accompany them to conduct reconnaissance and provide guidance.

| 1. Execution of the [paradrop] raid shall be at 1130. |
| 2. The 1st echelon shall depart from the Kahang [base], and the 2d from the Kluang base. |
| 3. [All units] shall return to their advance base(s). However, units that have sufficient combat ranges shall directly return to their original base(s). |
| 4. If it is impossible to operate in this [way] due to the situation of the transport aircraft, the number of units shall not be reduced even if a reduction in the number of men should be necessary. |

| One element of the light bomber unit of 3d Air Div | Attacks on the barracks in the city of Palembang. |
| One element of the fighter plane unit of 3d Air Div (including units attached to the div) | Air cover for the convoy of 38th Div |

1. [The operation] shall be carried out right before the execution of the first [paradrop] raid. [The element] shall operate along with one of the echelons as long as it can.
2. [It] shall launch from the Kluang base.

1. After returning from [the task] to cover the first [paradrop] raid, it shall swiftly go into the air above the convoy, to provide cover from roughly 1700 onwards.
2. It shall suspend the task so that [the unit] can return and land at dusk.
The [Third] Air Force’s Plan for Supporting the Singapore Operation

In late January, the Third Air Force drew up a plan for supporting the operation to capture Singapore. It was as follows:\(^{[81]}\)

Outline of the Support for the Operation to Capture Singapore

I. Mission

1. In conformity with the Twenty-fifth Army’s outline of [its operation to] capture Singapore, [the Third Air Force shall,] while completely containing the movements of the enemy air forces over the sector and attacking strategic points on the island, facilitate the army’s capture [operation] by directly supporting the front line troops in their ground combat.

   The launch of the offensive is set on the night of 7 February (Day X).

II. Outline of the Twenty-fifth Army’s plan of [operations to] capture Singapore

   Part 1 Mission

2. After defeating the enemy north of the Johor Strait, the [Twenty-fifth] Army shall make thorough preparations, and while containing the enemy into the sector to the east of the causeway as much as possible, carry out an assault on the enemy with its full force from the sector to the west [of the causeway]. [Then], [the army] shall first of all swiftly advance to the strate-
gic important line near Bukit Timah. If the enemy will not surrender even then, it shall storm and capture the entire island.

Part 2 Outline

The first period: The period during the preparation for the offensive

3. When the enemy in Johor and vicinity is defeated, each division shall have one element seize the riverbanks, mop up the sector to the north of the Johor Strait, have the local residents evacuate to the sectors to the north of Pontian Kecil, Kulai, and Kota Tinggi, cover the deployment of the artillery, while reconnoitering the enemy movements as well as the [military] topography. [In the meantime], the main force [of each division] shall assemble in the following way and prepare for the subsequent offensive. However, the Imperial Guard Division shall aggressively conduct diversions in a wide area so as to contain the enemy into the sector to the east of the causeway.

   Imperial Guard Division: [The area] near Tebrau and Masai
   5th Division: [The sector] on the east side of Skudai
   18th Division: [The sector] on the east side of the highland and the reservoirs.

4. The artillery under the direct command of the army shall secure positions in the sector north of Johor Bahru with the main force and [areas] around Highland 572 with one element, and along with the divisional artillery, fire at the Tengah and the Sembawang [airfields], the oil tanks in Pasir Panjang, etc., so as to prevent the enemy from using the airfields, while destroying important military facilities and timely neutralizing the enemy artillery. During the above period, it shall prepare a position for its main force in the sector upriver of the Malayu River, and shift to the new position during the night on Day X – 2 and Day X – 1.

5. The preparatory period after advancing to the line of the Johor Strait until the launch of the offensive [against Singapore] shall be about five days.

The second period (During the period of the offensive against Singapore)

6. As soon as the preparations for the offensive are ready, the preliminary fire for the offensive shall be started from the morning of Day X onwards by the whole artillery, in coordination with bombings by the air unit.

7. The main force of the 5th and the 18th Divisions shall advance to the sector on the north bank of the Johor Strait on the night of Day X – 1 and complete the preparations for the offensive.

   The Imperial Guard Division shall still continue its diversionary actions on the night of Day X – 1, but after midnight on Day X, leaving one element behind, assemble its forces both in the east and west sectors of Johor Bahru.

8. At 2430 on Day X, the first landing units of the 5th and the 18th Divisions shall land all at once, each unit closely coordinating with the fire supporting the dash. One element of the 18th Division shall check the enemy naval vessels, which may sally into the strait from its western end.

9. The landing units, which [successfully] go ashore on the enemy coast shall gain footholds as forward as possible and advance to the line crossing the southern end of the Tengah airfield. [Then] they shall continue their advance to the line connecting the Jurong River and the highland of Bukit Mandai. After assembling their forces at the line and prepare for the attack on the highland of Bukit Timah, they shall bring the combined power of infantry, tanks and artillery into play and with [the support of] the air unit in close conjunction break through the enemy position and advance to the line to the east of the [Bukit Timah] highland.

   The Imperial Guard Division shall assemble at the rear of the 5th Division, and at the appropriate moment, advance from the Mandai area to the sector to the east of the reservoirs.
10. If the enemy should not surrender even after the [Japanese] advance to the lines in the previous item, the city and the strongholds in its neighborhood shall be stormed and seized. On that occasion, the 18th Division shall have one element guard against the Blakang Mati and Ranjang[?] strongholds, and if necessary, seize them.

III. Outline of the air operations [of the Third Air Force]

The first period: The period during the preparation for the offensive

11. [The Third Air Force shall] expand the military gains of the Singapore air operations, and in parallel and harmony with the preparations for the Palembang operation, first of all, completely contain the actions of enemy aircraft in the air over the Singapore sector.

12. The fighter unit shall repeatedly conduct attacks on Singapore, and mop up the [remaining] enemy aircraft. From roughly Day X – 1 onwards, it shall provide guard in the air mainly over the 5th and the 18th Divisions as well as the main force of the army artillery unit and cover them while they are preparing for the offensive.

13. The heavy bomber unit shall repeatedly conduct attacks mainly on the following targets until Day X - 1, neutralize the core of the enemy defense facilities and at the same time strive to break the enemy’s will to fight back.

   (a) Sectors F and I (note by the author: eastern and northern sectors of the city of Singapore)  
      [See also Illustration No. 39, p. 179]

   (b) Airfield D (note by the author: the Kallang airfield)

   (c) The defense installations on the highland of Bukit Timah and vicinity

14. The light bomber (and assault plane) units shall support the preparations for the offensive with one element, while their main force shall make preparations for the support [of the ground troops] after the launch of the offensive (including Day X).

The second period: During the period of the offensive against Singapore

15. The fighter plane unit shall support the attacks of the heavy bomber and light bomber units with one element, and while taking command of the air over the battlefield, it shall gradually shift to the preparation for Operation L.

16. From the evening of Day X onwards, the light bomber (and assault plane) units shall with their main force support the front-line divisions in crossing the strait and their combats after the crossing. For that purpose, they shall neutralize from Day X onwards the enemy on the north coast of the Singapore island in coordination with the artillery fire of the army. As the main force of the army crosses the strait and advances, they shall neutralize the enemy on site, [operating] closely ahead of the main force. Particularly, from the early morning of Day X + 1 onwards, around [the time of] the advance to the Tengah airfield, they shall closely support the front-line troops, neutralize the enemy in front of the latter and timely crush enemy counterattacks at the same time.

After the army artillery unit advances, they shall in coordination with the artillery fire appropriately shift their targets and neutralize mainly the enemy on the highland of Bukit Timah and vicinity.

17. In conformity with the advance of the 5th and the 18th Divisions, the heavy bomber unit shall appropriately continue their attacks on the targets designated in Item 13, (c) in particular (note by the author: the highland of Bukit Timah).

   Also, it shall strive to detect enemy attempts [to attack] the right flank of the main force of the army (interference from the stronghold in the western part of Singapore Island) and, if required, timely neutralize it.

18. In addition to the above, the unit shall watch the movements of enemy surface vessels around the time of crossing the strait, and in cooperation with one element of the 18th Division, timely neutralize and destroy them.

* The Japanese maps show a “Ranjang stronghold” in the southwestern corner of Singapore Island. We have not been able to identify this name on any of the British maps.
19. After the capture of the highland of Bukit Timah, it shall conduct attacks mainly on the city area of Singapore, while neutralizing with one element the enemy at the flank of the main force of the army, which may interfere with the charge of the latter. Also, it may timely attack enemy vessels evacuating [from the island].

20. The forces to be employed are as follows:
   - 3d Air Division (except for the units to be involved in Operation L)
   - 7th Air Division: The 12th Air Group and the 60th Air Group
   - 12th Air Division (except for the units to be involved in Operation L)

The commanders of the 3d and the 12th Air Divisions may appropriately employ even the forces allocated for Operation L for these attacks.

21. The tasks of each unit are as follows:
   - 3d Air Division (except for the units to be involved in Operation L): Direct support for the invasion operation
   - 7th Air Division (other than the lacking units): Destruction of strategic points on Singapore Island and targeted defensive installations in the rear as well as crushing the enemy’s will to fight back
   - 12th Air Division: (except for the units to be involved in Operation L): Clearing the air over the Singapore sector of enemy aircraft, providing cover for the Twenty-fifth Army during the latter’s preparation for the offensive or the initial stages after the launch of the offensive, and providing support for the 3d and the 7th Air Divisions

22. The airfields to be used
   - As shown in separate volume No. 2 (Illustration attached to the Outline of Operation L)
   - However, the 7th Air Division may use the Kluang airfield as its advance base with one element except for Day L – 1.

The Process of Drawing up the Plan for Supporting the Capture Operation

The Third Air Force, which presented the plans for its support for the Singapore operation and the air operation for Operation L both at the same time as previously told, particularly took the following matters into consideration in drawing up the plan for the former.\(^{77, 79, 80}\)

1. The distribution of the air strength to be employed
   - Under instruction of the Southern Army that air operations should be executed while maintaining [sufficient] depth, the [Third] Air Force put more strength into the operations in southern Sumatra than those for the operation to capture Singapore.
   - When [the respective operations] are compared only on a strength basis, the heavy bombers were to be mainly employed for the Singapore operation; the operation was supposed to be conducted with about fifty to sixty heavy bombers, along with twenty light bombers, fifteen assault planes, and about forty fighters. On the other hand, [the Third Air Force] intended to employ fifty-four heavy bombers, fifty light bombers, fifty Type–1 fighter planes, thirty transport aircraft and ten strategic reconnaissance aircraft for the southern Sumatra operation, which clearly showed that it gave priority to the southern Sumatra operation for the purpose of securing oil resources and as a strategic move in the Java operation.

2. Taking command of the air and neutralizing the enemy artillery in the attack on the strongholds
   - Since the landing on Malaya, the Twenty-fifth Army had experienced persistent attacks by the British air forces, and it anticipated that also in the Singapore invasion operation the British forces would likely put up stubborn resistance with the army and air force operating in one body. Therefore, it intended to [firstly] employ its artillery in a concentrated way, and after the landing capture [the island] with infantry, tank and artillery units operating in one body with the support of the [Third] Air Force.\(^{88}\)
At the beginning of the offensive operation, the Japanese artillery took up positions in the Johor Bahru sector, and as the ground divisions crossed river and advanced in the course of operation, it was supposed to be timely advanced, [too]. Expecting [the possibility of] separation of the infantry and artillery units and [enemy] artillery fire from the strongholds in the western part of Singapore, the Twenty-fifth Army requested the [Third] Air Force to continuously provide support from the air and neutralize [the enemy].

[The Third] Air Force promised its close support and accumulated fuel and ammunition on such airfields as Kluang and Kahang in the southernmost part of the peninsula, so that it could repeatedly make sorties.

[However,] since the [Third] Air Force was going to support the capture of the strongholds while at the same time conducting the air operations in southern Sumatra and Palembang, the Twenty-fifth Army feared that the air strength would be dispersed, which might hinder the crucial attacks on the strongholds.

The Third Air Force explained to the Twenty-fifth Army that it would be able to deal with the Palembang [paradrop] raiding operation in about two days and that it could meet [the demands] of the plan of the Twenty-fifth Army, giving its word to go all out [to meet the demands]. Nevertheless, it maintained its position that priority should be given to the paradrop operation on Palembang, over focusing on the support for the [Singapore] invasion operation. [To the Third Air Force,] the significance of making a surprise attack on the oil refineries there and seize them was extremely great.

The Third Air Force’s Order to Implement Both Operations

At 0800 on 4 February, the [Third] Air Force commander issued the following orders concerning the implementation of the operation to capture Singapore and the Palembang operation. (87)

**Third Air Force Order**

[Sunag Petani, 0800, 4 February]

1. Information on Palembang and its vicinity is as shown in Information Record No. 67 in a separate volume (note by the author: original document missing).

2. The [Third] Air Force shall continue its cooperation with the Twenty-fifth Army and at the same time execute Operation L in conjunction with the Sixteenth Army and the Navy.

   The launch of the offensive against Singapore has been scheduled for the night of 7 February, and Day L for 10 February; for both separate orders shall be issued. The outline of the support [operation] for the Twenty-fifth Army’s operation to capture Singapore is as shown in separate volume No. 1, the outline of the air operations [for Operation L in separate volume No. 2, the memorandum of the arrangements for the air [operations] in Operation L between the Army and Navy in separate volume No. 3, and the outline of the [paradrop] raiding operation [in Operation L in separate volume No. 4. (Note by the author: these separate volumes have been described earlier**)

3. The 7th Air Division commander shall [in conformity with separate volume No. 1] mainly cooperate in the Twenty-fifth Army’s operation to capture Singapore. He may use the Kluang air-

* See also Vol. 3, pp. 287-288.

** Respectively pp. 234-237, 228-231, 222-224, 231-234.
field as an advance base for one element of his force except on the day before the launch of the southern Sumatra operation [L – 1].

Further, from 2400 on 5 February onwards, he shall temporarily put the 64th Air Group under the command of the 3d Air Division commander at Kahang.

4. The 3d Air Division commander shall discharge the tasks stated below:
   (1) Continue his cooperation with the Twenty-fifth Army in its operation.
   (2) Search for enemy aircraft in Palembang and its vicinity and destroy them, mainly with his fighter plane unit between Day L – 4 and Day L – 2.
   (3) Carry out the [paradrop] raiding operation against Palembang and its vicinity in conformity with separate volume No. 4.
   (4) Provide cover for the convoy of the 38th Division under sail, with one element of his fighter plane unit from 1700 of Day L – 1 until about the evening [of the same day].
   (5) Make preparations to advance one element of his force to the Palembang airfield when it is seized and ready for use in order to cooperate with the Sixteenth Army.

[Also,] he shall temporarily put the 64th Air Group under his command at Kahang at 2400 on 5 February.

5. The 12th Air Division commander shall discharge the tasks stated below:
   (1) Continue the tasks stated in Item 5 of Third Air Force Operation Order A, No. 230, particularly the cooperation with the 3d and the 7th Air Divisions in their combat in the air over the Singapore sector between Day L – 4 and Day L – 2.
   (2) Keep watch on the Pekanbaru airfield during Operation L and seize the opportunity to search for enemy aircraft appearing at the airfield and destroy them.
   (3) Make preparations to advance one element to the Palembang airfield on Day L and onwards, so that it can provide air defense for the place and its vicinity.

   The 1st Squadron of the 11th Air Group shall [first] provide cover for the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit during the latter’s rapid advance to the Kluang and the Kahang airfields, after which it shall return to its original command.

6. The 1st Raiding Group commander shall, in conformity with separate volume No. 4, carry out a paratroop raid on or around the Palembang airfield and the oil refineries at 1130 on the day before the launch of the operation [L – 1], seize and secure them and their surroundings, while facilitating the attacks of the [Third] Air Force and the 38th Division.

   Until the completion of the [paradrop] raiding operation [in Operation] L [pp. 231-234], [the commander] shall temporarily put the 12th Air Transport Squadron under his command and have the 3d Air Division, the 81st and the 98th Air Groups cooperate in the execution of the [paradrop] raiding [operation].

   He shall give instructions to the 98th Air Group commander regarding the details of the raiding operation.

   The parachuting or landing units shall come under the command of the Sixteenth Army commander from the moment of the landing of the 38th Division at Palembang. The other units under [the command of] the group shall, without separate orders, return to their original command after completion of Operation L.

7. The 81st and the 98th Air Groups shall, in conformity with separate volume No. 4, be assigned to the [paradrop] raiding operation along with the units mentioned in the previous items. The 98th Air Group commander shall receive instructions from the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group commander regarding the details of the [paradrop] raiding operation.

8. The 1st Squadron of the 11th Air Group shall cover the rapid advance of the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit to the Kluang and the Kahang airfields on Day L – 2, after which it shall return to its original command.

9. I shall be in Kluang.
2. The Execution of the Paradrop Raiding Operation Against Palembang

The Third Air Force’s Disposition of Forces Committed to the Operation and the Decision on the Date of the Drop

**The Directives of the Third Air Force**

Earlier on 31 January, by the aforementioned order of the Southern Army [p. 224], it had finally been decided that the Third Air Force should implement the operation, employing the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group.

On 2 February, Staff Officer Miyashi in charge of operations and Staff Officer Shiraishi in charge of the line of communications checked on the accumulation of fuel and ammunition in the Kluang and Kahang sectors and concluded that the preparations to support the Singapore operation and the execution of Operation L were completed.

On 4 February at Sungai Petani, the [Third] Air Force commander passed down the orders concerning the implementation of both operations, as previously told [pp. 238-239]. The [Third] Air Force took meticulous care in concealing the intention to implement a paradrop operation; it not only instructed not to conduct parachute training until the day of the execution of the operation, but also paid attention not to let the [paratroop] raiding unit advance too early to the Sungai Petani or Kahang sectors. Although the Navy had [already] carried out a drop of its paratroopers on Menado on 11 January, its announcement was also withheld in order to conceal the intention [of the paradrop operation on Palembang] until the day of the latter’s execution.

In the meantime, the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment and the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group completed their joint training with the supporting heavy bomber unit (the 98th Air Group) in Phnom Penh, and the troops of the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment dashed to Sungai Petani on 6 February.\(^{(87)}\)

On that day, the [Third] Air Force commander gave directions concerning the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in Palembang.

Meanwhile, the [Third] Air Force gave the two following instructions to the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group, which was studying and drawing up the plan of the [paradrop] raiding attack on Palembang and the outline of the [paradrop] raiding operation.\(^{(80)}\)

1. Keeping reserve troops for the second raiding unit

   The [Paratroop] Raiding Group, which had an absolute confidence in the battles after the drop, had considered it unnecessary to form a second raiding unit. However, considering the possibility that the first raiding operation could be unsuccessful, the [Third] Air Force had the raiding group prepare a second raiding unit, which could immediately reinforce [the first unit], and provisionally set the schedule of its drop for 1500 on [Day L] the 15th.

2. Decision on the outline of [paradrop] raiding operation, particularly its flight formation

   The 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group commander had drawn up an outline for forty aircraft of the [paratroop] raiding air unit (of which twenty-seven aircraft [destined] for [the drop on] the airfield area) and twenty-seven supporting heavy bombers. Since there was no precedent for an “outline of a [paradrop] raiding operation” in the Army, [all particulars such as] the arrangements on the assembly in the air with the covering fighter
unit and accompanying light bomber unit, the flight path, the flight altitude, the flight formation, the approaching route and the outline of drop [had to] be carefully decided.

The [Third] Air Force referred to Staff Officer Miyashi’s “Notes on My Inspection [Tour] of Germany,” and incorporated examples of the operations of the German forces in the western Europe operation in deciding on the flight formation and other matters.

Note: The Navy transport aircraft, which were used in its paradrop operations on the Lan-gaan airfield to the south of Menado on 11 January, were refitted bombers. They carried paratroopers (twelve men) and provisions (in two packages) inside the aircraft and arms (in five packages) on the bomber’s bomb rack, which made it possible to airdrop the arms and paratroopers in that order from the same aircraft.

Since the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group did not have the transport aircraft to airdrop arms, etc., it employed the supporting heavy bombers for airdropping materials and instructed them to drop the cargo parachutes at the same drop zones as the paratroopers.\(^{(210)}\)

**The Decision on the Day of the Paradrop**

On 5 February, the Navy requested a postponement of Day L by two days on the grounds of a delay in the conditioning of the Ledo airfield, and the paradrop operation on Palembang was [re-]set for 10 February. On the morning of the next day, the 6th, the Navy requested a further postponement of Day L on the grounds of the unfinished conditioning of the Kuantan airfield.
The Kuantan airfield was designated in the [Army-Navy] arrangement as the airfield to be used by the Navy mid-sized land-based attack planes in case the airfields in Ledo and Kuching were not fit for use. The Navy had surmised that since the Kuantan airfield was currently used by Army aircraft, the airfield should naturally be fit for use by its own aircraft. And without conducting a preliminary inspection, when it was about to use the Kuantan [airfield] at last, it realized for the first time that the high trees surrounding the airfield would be an obstacle to the takeoff and landing of its mid-sized land-based attack planes, and immediately started on felling the trees. However, the felling of the high trees unexpectedly took much time, and it was not able to get the airfield ready by Day L.

Shovels and pickaxes were used to fell the trees. However, it was inefficient. [The Army and Navy] should from the start have examined the organization or ways of conditioning airfields in the dense forest areas of the South. Later in the Solomon sector, the rapid conditioning of airfields in the jungle became a problem. On the part of both the Army and Navy, the inefficient primitive engineering methods without the power of machines were a major shortcoming.

The Navy airlifted three tons of dynamite for felling the trees and completed the work on 9 February with the support of Army engineering units.

The [Third] Air Force provided fuel and made preparations for the advance of the Navy mid-sized land-based attack planes. Then, the Navy requested that in view of the movements of enemy naval vessels, it would like to station another unit of mid-sized land-based attack planes on the Kuantan airfield, and that it would like the Army aircraft in Kuantan be temporarily shifted to other airfields. At this request, the [Third] Air Force hurriedly shifted the entire 12th Air Division to the Batu Pahat [airfield]. However, after the Army aircraft had been shifted, merely one element of [the attack planes of] the Navy used the Kuantan [airfield].

For reference:

From the journal of Staff Officer Inoguchi Kaneo dispatched from the [First] Southern Expeditionary Fleet (11 February):

Received an inquiry from the First Air Fleet and went to the Kuantan [airfield]. My conclusion is that [the airfield is] too cramped for Type-1 land-based attack planes, and difficult to be used.

On 9 February, Day L was finally set on Day X + 69 (15 February). At 1900 on the 9th, the transport convoy of eight ships carrying the advance party of the 38th Division departed from Cam Ranh Bay.

The War Preparations of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group

On 3 February, the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment assembled in Phnom Penh, and the [Paratroop] Raiding Group commander for the first time took command of the men of both his regiments. The equipment to be carried was also provided, and now they were ready to execute the operation at any time when ordered.

Having received the orders to execute the [paradrop] raiding operation, the [Paratroop] Raiding Group commander had to designate the forces to be employed in the operation. However, both the 1st Regiment consisting of elite troops and the 2d regiment, whose [for-
[Paratroop] Raiding Group Commander Kume racked his brains to make the [appropriate] decision in terms of command and finally decided to use the 2d Regiment on the grounds that the 1st Regiment would still need to convalesce after their illness. At that time, the execution of the [paratroop] raid was [still set] on 9 February, which meant that he was pressed for time. Group Commander Kume gave instructions that [a unit of] 260 men for [the attack on] the airfield and another of 130 men for [the attack on] the oil refineries (including thirty specially trained men) should hurriedly be formed, and that forty transport aircraft should be made ready.

The [Paratroop] Raiding Group had piles of operational preparations to be made before the paradrop, such as the arrangements with the 98th Air Group about the cargos to be airlifted, the drawing up of the plan of the [paratroop] raiding operation, the checking up and readying of arms and equipment, the training for ground combat, and the training for flying in formation.

[Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit Commander Major Niihara had [already] formed a group of thirty-four aircraft by adding the 3d Squadron, made up of twelve MC transport aircraft that had caught up at the end of January, to the twenty-two Type–Ro aircraft of the 1st and the 2d Squadrons. The plan was to make a unit of forty aircraft after the arrival of the aircraft of the 12th Air Transport Squadron (nine Type–Ro [aircraft]), which was reported to be despatched soon after updating the aircraft in mainland Japan.

The long-awaited seven Type–Ro aircraft finally arrived in Sungai Petani on 10 February. The aircraft were immediately coated with paint. Since the pilots of the air transport squadron had not joined the [joint] training to take [part in a paratroop] raiding air unit, one of the officers of the [paratroop] raiding air unit replaced the pilot of the commander aircraft.

The Preliminary Air Campaign to Destroy Enemy Air Power

The Air Campaign on 6 February

On 5 February, strategic reconnaissance aircraft of the [Third] Air Force reconnoitered the Palembang airfield and spotted six large and fifty mid-sized aircraft on the ground. The Third Air Force commander issued an order to conduct an air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in Palembang with the full force of the 3d Air Division on the next day, the 6th.

In conformity with the [Third] Air Force’s order of the 5th, the 3d Air Division commander ordered the 64th Air Group, which had newly been put under his command, to dash to the Kahang [airfield], and assigned it to attack Palembang on the afternoon of the next day, the 6th, in conjunction with the bombers. At 1400 on the 6th, the 64th Air Group (about eighteen aircraft, which had dashed to the Kahang airfield in the morning of that day) took off from the airfield, and along with the 59th Air Group (about fourteen aircraft) headed for the air over Cape Kukub for their rendezvous with the thirty-three light bombers of the 75th and the 90th Air Groups, which had taken off from Ipoh.

However, due to the mass of clouds over the meeting point, only the 64th and the 75th Air Groups successfully rendezvoused. The other air groups advanced individually.

Both the 64th and the 75th Air Groups flew over Cape Jabung and headed straight for Palembang. However, the black smoke rising from Singapore Island drifted as far as the
vicinity of Singkep Island more than two hundred kilometers away, causing low visibility. Moreover, as they approached Sumatra, the amount of clouds gradually increased. While these air groups gradually descended and reached a point forty kilometers from the target ahead, the light bomber unit was unable to break through the clouds after all. Having no choice, it ended up bombing the Mentok airfield on Bangka Island and returned.

The 64th Air Group commander decided to attack Palembang solely with his own group, flew low just above the top of the trees of the rubber plantations and a little after 1700 reached the eastern sector of the airfield. However, the mass of clouds hindered the air group from making an approach. The air group flew around to the south trying to find an approach, but was unable to find one. Just when it flew northward above the clouds, it spotted part of the runway and immediately attacked the sixty aircraft on the ground twice before returning.

It reported military gains of eleven aircraft destroyed (including one, which went up in flames, and five unconfirmed).¹⁰⁰, ¹¹⁹, ¹²²

Meanwhile, the 59th Air Group, which entered into the air over the airfield about fifteen minutes later than the 64th Air Group, engaged with some enemy aircraft in the air, brought down eight Hurricanes (of which three unconfirmed), four Blenheims (of which one unconfirmed), one Beaufort (unconfirmed), and destroyed three Blenheims and one Lockheed Hudson on the ground before returning.¹⁰⁰

The 90th Air Group, like the 77th [75th?] Air Group, carried out bombings on the Mentok airfield.¹⁰⁰

The Attack on 7 February

On the early morning of the 7th, a Type–100 strategic reconnaissance aircraft reconnoitered the Palembang [airfield] and spotted thirty-odd remaining aircraft.

On that afternoon, the 3d Air Division commander had thirty-one Type–1 fighters and six aircraft of the 90th Air Group attack the Palembang [airfield]. At 1437, when flying toward there, the unit of fighter planes and bombers brought down four out of six Blenheims, which were covering an [enemy] convoy, at a point north of Cape Jabung.

At 1530, the light bomber unit, which had entered into the sky over the Palembang [airfield], bombed and strafed fourteen [enemy] aircraft on the ground and set ablaze four of them, while the fighter unit made the military gain of bringing down fifteen Hurricanes (of which five were unconfirmed), four Blenheims, two Lockheeds (of which one unconfirmed), and [also] setting ablaze ten and destroying six in further attacks [on the enemy aircraft] on the ground, after which [both units] returned.⁶¹

During the attack, the pilots of the Katō [64th] Air Group suffered from acute stomachaches. It was because the cooks [had to] cook wild grass; due to the rapid advance to the Kahang [airfield], the provisions had not been able to catch up.⁷⁹, ¹²⁰

The Attack on 8 February

On the 8th, twenty-five fighter planes of the 3d Air Division entered into the air over the Palembang [airfield] along with seventeen aircraft of the 90th Air Group. At 1130, the light bomber unit carried out minimum altitude bombings on about fifteen aircraft on the ground and set nine aircraft ablaze, while the fighter unit engaged with four Hurricanes and brought down two.
Thus, [the Third Air Force] was able to neutralize a major part of the enemy air forces in the Palembang sector in the attacks conducted until 8 February.\(^{61,100,120}\)

The Success of the [Paratroop] Raiding Operation

**The [Paratroop] Raiding Group’s Order to Execute the Raiding [Operation]**

On 9 February, the final decision was made to set Day L on 15 February.

On the next day, the 10th, the Third Air Force commander passed down the orders to execute Operation L, and finally directed that the [paratroop] raiding air unit should be launched from the Kahang [airfield]. On that day, as previously told, the seven aircraft of the 12th Air Transport Squadron arrived, and the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group commander took the command of the forty transport aircraft, including the squadron.

On the next day, the 11th, the [Paratroop] Raiding Group commander finally passed down the order to execute the paradrop raid. It was decided that he, too, would board one of the transport aircraft along with Staff Officer Itoda of the Sixteenth Army and others, take along an antitank gun, and make a forced landing near Palembang.\(^{93,161}\)

The following are the main points of the outline of the [paratroop] raiding operation designated in [the separate volume of] the order for the execution of the raid:\(^{61,64,211}\)

**The Outline of the [Paratroop] Raiding [Operation] with Other Supporting Air Groups**

1. Deployment to the launching bases
   - By 1900 on Day L – 2, each squadron shall respectively be deployed at the Kahang airfield.
   - One squadron of the 11th Air Group in Sungai Petani shall accompany the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit and cover it up to the Kahang airfield, and then go to the Batu Pahat airfield.
   - The heavy bomber air group shall be deployed at the Kluang airfield by the evening of Day L – 2.

2. Outline of the flight
   a. Departure: Completion of the preparation for the sortie: 0730 on Day L - 1; takeoff: 0830
   b. Assembly in the air: as shown in the chart (Omitted by the author)
   c. Flight path and altitude: as shown in the chart (Omitted by the author)
   d. Standard speed (instrument speed)
      (a) Climbing: 230 km/h; rate of climb: 1m/sec
      (b) Level flight: 250 km/h
      (c) Descending: 280 km/h; rate of descent: 1m/sec
      (d) Drop of paratroopers (airdrop): 200-210 km/h
   e. Outline of the supporting air groups
      (a) Fighter plane unit (the 59th and the 64th Air Groups)
         The fighter plane unit shall accompany the [paratroop] raiding unit and provide direct cover.
         While the paratroopers arm themselves after the drop, the unit shall cover them with its main force.
      (b) Light bomber unit
         The unit shall conduct bombing attacks on the guns on the airfield, barracks, etc.
      (c) Strategic reconnaissance unit
         The unit shall support the officers of the [paratroop] raiding air unit in their preliminary topographical reconnaissance of Palembang and vicinity and in their acquaintance [with the topography].
Illustration No. 48 — Outline of the Flight Path and Formation of the [Paratroop] Raiding Group
– [The unit shall] have one of its aircraft reconnoiter the weather of Palembang and report it by 0900 on Day L – 1.
– [The unit shall] have two other aircraft guide the paradrop unit and reconnoiter the situation after the drop.

f. Outline of return
– After the attack, the aircraft shall return straight to the Kahang airfield.
– If circumstances permit, MC [aircraft] shall, after leaving the formation, return straight to Sungai Petani by order of the air unit commander.
– If there is no concern about enemy aircraft, the heavy bomber unit shall leave the [paratroop] raiding air unit and return to the Ketil airfield.
– The [paratroop] raiding air unit shall refuel at the Kahang airfield, after which each squadron shall return to Sungai Petani respectively.

The graphical outline of the flight path of the [Paratroop] Raiding Group is as shown in Illustration No. 48.

The Attack on Palembang on 13 February

In parallel with the support for the Singapore operation, the Third Air Force commander attacked the Palembang airfield three times from 6 February onwards and destroyed a major part of the [enemy] air forces there. However, since the day of execution of the [paradrop] raid was postponed for reasons of the Navy as previously told, the [Third] Air Force once again on the 13th, the day before the execution of the paradrop, attacked the Palembang airfield.

Twenty-nine Type–1 fighter planes and seven light bombers of the 3d Air Division, which advanced into the air over Palembang at 1030 and 1130 on the 13th, engaged with five Hurricanes and one Spitfire, brought down five Hurricanes (of which two unconfirmed), and destroyed four large aircraft on the ground. On that day, 1stLt. Kunii Masafumi, the outstanding unit leader of the 64th Air Group, who had distinguished himself in battle since covering the convoy right at the outset of the war, died a heroic death in action.

[Later] on 29 April, [Third] Air Force Commander Sugawara conferred on him a citation of individual merit (which reads in part) as follows:

You always took the initiative, willingly rose to a crisis, dauntlessly confronted the enemy, dared to strafe the ground with determination despite fierce [enemy] gunfire, or caught the enemy in the air and directed fire that might bring the enemy down with one bullet, by which you have destroyed many enemy aircraft. There is no doubt that your excellent skills and eminent ability to see opportunities in fights and exploit them [made it possible], however, they were attributed to your fighting spirit, so fierce that it made demons avoid you, and your sense of responsibility that made you disregard even the perils to your own life. You were a model air fighter.

Completion of the Preparations to Execute the [Paradrop] Raid

The 3d Air Division, which had attacked the Palembang [airfield] on the 13th, judged that there were still ten odd enemy aircraft remaining. With the paradrop operation imminent on
the next day, the 14th, the fact that new and powerful enemy aircraft still remained on the Palembang [airfield] made the [Third] Air Force somewhat concerned.\(^{61,100,102}\)

Meanwhile at 1500 on the 13th, the paratroopers of the first raiding unit, who had completed loading their arms, etc. on the supporting heavy bombers at the Sungai Petani [airfield], shifted to the Kahang airfield, while the heavy bomber unit dashed to the Kluang airfield.

At 1700 on the 13th, [Third] Air Force Commander Sugawara gave instructions concerning the execution of the [paradrop] raiding operation to the 59th, the 90th, the 98th, and the 81st Air Groups and the 15th Independent Air Unit stationed at the Kluang [airfield]. In the evening, Chief of Staff Kawashima headed for the Kahang airfield to see off the [paratroop] raiding unit.

The Army’s first-ever paradrop operation against Palembang, located about six hundred kilometers to the south of Singapore was about to be executed on the next day, the 14th, before the fall of the city.

The [Third] Air Force commander wrote in his journal on that day as follows:

A giant figure in the sky, who sets his foot on the stronghold of Singapore and is about to stretch his giant arms to the strategic point of Palembang farther across the equator – that is our Third Air Force! During recent attacks on Singapore, no enemy aircraft have appeared in the sky over there, and only wrecks of aircraft remain on the Palembang [airfield], which seems to be their [main] base. It feels great to have gained a complete command of the air.

The morning of the 14th, the day of the implementation of the daring attempt, [came].

At 0700 on that day, all men of the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment and the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit, who got up at 0500, assembled at the Kahang airfield. After instructions by [Paratroop] Raiding Group Commander Kume and just before their departure, they toasted [to their success] and bowed toward the first gray light of dawn [to the direction of the imperial palace] afar.

**The Flight**

At 0840, the first aircraft of the [paratroop] raiding air unit took off from the Kahang airfield in the dim light of dawn. Forty Type–Ro and MC transport aircraft took off one by one from the airfield and hurried into the sky over Batu Pahat, where they formed a designated flight formation with the twenty-seven heavy bombers of the 98th Air Group, which had taken off from the Kluang [airfield], and at 0920 started to fly toward the mouth of the Musi River. The flight altitude was three thousand meters, and Type–1 fighters covered them from above. Black smoke rising from Singapore Island lying below in the distance to the left in its death throes right before the fall, enveloped the flight formation. The belts of smoke trailed far toward the mouth of the Musi River and visibility was very poor.

The strategic reconnaissance aircraft, which had flown ahead to reconnoiter the weather and enemy movements in Palembang, reported that the ceiling over the airfield was two hundred meters and that [it spotted] ten large and thirty small aircraft on the airfield. One of the transport aircraft had developed engine trouble soon after leaving the base, but deter-

* See also Vol. 3, pp. 325-333, which differs in detail and gives a fuller description of the ground combat.
mined to conduct a forced landing, continued its flight behind the formation.

The formation of the main force sustained some antiaircraft fire when flying over Cape Jabung, but did not suffer damage. After flying over Bangka Island, the formation [noticed] strati gradually increasing, lowered its flight altitude over the sea, and flew below the clouds after that. At 1109, having flown over the mouth of the Musi River at an altitude eight hundred meters, the unit flew along the river and around 1120 separated into the assault unit for the oil refineries and the one for the airfield, which respectively flew straight to the sky over each planned drop zone.(61, 211)

In the meantime, on the evening of the 13th, the advance party of the 38th Division, which was supposed to land in Palembang by sea, was raided by enemy aircraft, but fortunately its transport ships sustained no damage. After the party had sailed southward to a point about eighty kilometers east of Cape Jang on Lingga Island around 0600 on the 14th, it came under attack of three enemy aircraft around 0830 and of six enemy aircraft around 1230. From 1000 onwards the convoy continued its planned sail under the cover provided by Navy fighter units. On the 14th, while the [paratroop] raiding unit was flying straight toward Palembang, the convoy of the landing unit also single-mindedly sailed toward Palembang.(65)
The Drop Succeeds (See Illustration No. 49)

The [Paratroop] Raiding Unit, which had separated into the airfield raiding unit and the raiding unit for the oil refineries, descended threading through scattered white clouds and slowed down to the designated speed by lowering landing gears and using flaps. The instrument speed at the time of the drop of the paratroopers was 200 to 210 kilometers [per hour] and the altitude was about 200 to 250 meters.

At 1126, although having spotted ten odd small aircraft on the airfield, the airfield raiding unit started dropping. Soon, numerous white parachutes dropped down dispersed over a wide area, covering the airfield surrounded by thick greens. Fierce antiaircraft fire opened up from the ground. The heavy bombers carrying the cargos conducted their drop while strafing the antiaircraft fire on the airfield, and also brought down one of the Hurricanes that attacked them.

The 90th Air Group entered [the sky] almost simultaneously with the drop of the paratroopers, neutralized the antiaircraft guns and bombed the barracks. The 64th Air Group attacked five Hurricanes, which were about to attack the heavy bomber unit at an altitude of about eight hundred meters, and brought down one of them. Then, while further covering the operation at an altitude of two thousand meters, the air group engaged with about ten enemy aircraft mainly consisting of Hurricanes, brought down two of them and at 1255 withdrew from Palembang.

The one aircraft of the 12th Air Transport Squadron that had continued its flight after developing engine trouble conducted a forced landing near the western side of the airfield about one hour behind schedule.

The raiding unit for the oil refineries carried out its paradrop at the same time as the airfield raiding unit, around 1130. One of the heavy bombers of the 98th Air Group (flown by 1st Lt. Sudo Naohiko; graduate of the 53d class), which supported the airdrop of the cargo, was hit by antiaircraft fire and caught fire. After dropping its cargo, it crashed itself about two hundred meters southwest of the western oil refinery.

The Muta unit of the 59th Air Group, which was assigned to cover the air over the area, did not encounter enemy aircraft and, after strafing the antiaircraft guns, returned.

After searching for an area suitable for landing, the aircraft with the [Paradrop Raiding] Group commander on board carried out a body landing on the wetlands near the Musi River.

[64th] Air Group Commander Katō, on his return from Palembang, [had his group] refuel and rearm, and took off from the Kahang airfield right away to hurry to the air over the transport convoy of the Sixteenth Army. Around 1545, the Navy Type–0 fighter unit pulled back its aircraft, which had brought down two [enemy] aircraft while providing direct cover.

The Ground Combat After the Paradrop (See Illustration No. 50)

The Battle in the Airfield Area

The main force (180 men) of the 2d [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment, which were to raid the Palembang airfield, landed in an area of about eight hundred meters wide and fifteen hundred meters long about three to four kilometers to the southeast of the airfield, while the 2d Company (sixty men) landed on the west side of the airfield.
Illustration No. 49 — The Outline of the [Paradrop] Raid in Palembang and Vicinity
As instructed earlier, the paratroopers headed for the airfield as soon as [at least] three men got together. However, the area they had descended on unexpectedly consisted of overgrown wetlands, which made it quite difficult [for the commanders] to take command of their men and retrieve the cargos.

On the other hand, 4th Company 2d Platoon Commander, 1st Lt. Okumoto Minoru (graduate of the 54th class), who, due to a delay in the opening of the aircraft door at the time of the paradrop, had descended near the road connecting the airfield and the city of Palembang, took command of four men before advancing onto the road. Around 1200, when stepping onto the road, 1st Lieutenant Okumoto spotted four motor vehicles heading for the city of Palembang, took cover by the roadside, carried out a surprise attack, and routed the enemy.

When about fifteen men of the platoon had gathered, they encountered four vehicles ([with] about 150 enemy troops), which were hurrying from the city of Palembang to bring relief to the airfield.

The platoon commander again conducted a surprise attack, and after an engagement [which continued] until around 1220, he completely routed the enemy men. Three men of the platoon were killed in action and five wounded.

In the meantime, 1st Lt. Hirose Nobutaka (voluntarily enlisted reserve officer), commander of the 2d Company, who had landed on the west side of the airfield, took command of two of his men and advanced to the barracks sector on the west side of the airfield around

Illustration No. 50 — The Course of the Engagements at the Airfield
1400. However, having spotted too many enemy there, he stopped once to rally his men, after which around 1700 he rushed into the barracks and seized them.

Platoon Commander Gamō Seiji of the same company took command of twenty-four men. Having been blocked by fire from an antiaircraft gun position near the barracks, he took a detour, attacked the barracks and set them on fire. The platoon in succession advanced to the north western point of the airfield.

During this period, Regimental Commander Kōmura led the regimental headquarters and the 4th Company with Commander Mitani, and pressed ahead to attack the airfield. Around 1430, 4th Company 1st Platoon Commander 1st Lt. Ōki Takashi (graduate of the 54th class), who was advancing at the point of the troops, attacked about ten motor trucks, and further encountered some thirty vehicles, which came advancing after the first. First Lieutenant Ōki got on a light armored vehicle he had seized, charged toward the enemy vehicles, and while the five or six vehicles at the front got disarrayed, about sixty men of the main force of the 4th Company attacked the flanks of about three hundred enemy troops and defeated them in an engagement which lasted until around 1730.

Coming everywhere under surprise attacks, the enemy became totally upset and was not able to put up organized resistance.

A little after 1920, the regiment seized the airfield office building, and the 2d Company, which had descended on the west side of the airfield, was able to join the regimental headquarters at 2100.
On the night of the 14th, Regimental Commander Kōmura took command of 133 men, which constituted about sixty percent of those who had descended, set up his headquarters in the airfield office building, and got hold of fifty rifles and five light machineguns (about forty percent). However, the regiment had not [yet] been able to retrieve its communication equipment, and the situation at the oil refineries was unknown.

The Battle at the Oil Refineries

Eighty-nine men led by 1st Lt. Nakao Kikuo (voluntarily enlisted reserve officer), who had descended on the west side of the western oil refinery, attacked the enemy who put up resistance using pill-box positions, and at 1410 completely secured the central distillation tower of the western oil refinery.

The platoon led by Hasebe Masayoshi, which had descended in the sector to the south of the eastern oil refinery advanced along the road leading to the barracks at 1230. However, since the enemy defense was stiff, it was impossible to advance by daylight. [Instead], the platoon seized the pill box position[s] on the southeast side of the barracks in a night raid at 2300, and in a further advance, seized the eastern oil refinery at 0100 on the 15th. Although the eastern oil refinery was blown up with a loud noise by time bombs at 0600, the main oil refining facilities were intact.

Those on board of the same aircraft as [Paratroop] Raiding Group Commander Kume, which had conducted a body landing on the wetlands near the Musi River to the south of the airfield, encountered enemy cordons at various places. Moreover, hampered from moving around by the jungle, they were not able to join the main force of the paratrooper unit until the morning of the 15th.\(^64, 161\)

The Third Air Force’s Dash to the Palembang [Airfield]

The Situation on the 15th

Although [Third] Air Force Commander Sugawara at the Kluang [airfield] had received a report of the success of the paradrop on the 14th, he had not been briefed on the situation of the ground combat thereafter at all, which seriously worried him, along with the fluctuating war situation on Singapore Island at that time.

On the afternoon of the 14th, the [Third] Air Force commander ordered the ninety-six men including Company Commander Morisawa Tōru (voluntarily enlisted reserve officer), who were supposed to descend in the second raid on the afternoon of the next day, the 15th, to move up the schedule and execute [their drop] on the morning of the 15th.\(^77, 80\)

On the 15th at dawn, 15th Independent Air Unit Commander Lieutenant Colonel Nakahama took off from the Kluang [airfield] and at 1030 landed on the Palembang [airfield], [the target of the paratroopers] about whose safety there was so much worry. Staff Officer Kawamoto of the [Third] Air Force, who had boarded one of the aircraft along with Staff Officer Sato Hiroo (graduate of the 35th class) of the Southern Army, and the officers in charge of the intendance and the medical department of the [Third] Air Force, taking along radio sets, landed in Palembang, [too]. [On his arrival], Staff Officer Kawamoto immediately send a report to the [Third] Air Force commander about the situation in Palembang, particularly the fact that it was impossible to retrieve most of the radio sets, arms and ammunition.\(^76, 81\)
On reception of the report, the [Third] Air Force commander gathered rifles, light machineguns and ammunition from the ground service units, etc. in the Kahang sector as much as possible, loaded them onto two heavy bombers, and airlifted them to the Palembang [airfield] on the evening of the 15th. He also gave instructions that one element of the 12th Air Division should dash to the airfield.\(^{(76)}\)

Also, Staff Officer Matsumae of the Southern Army flew to Palembang, grasped the general situation of the airfield and returned to Saigon on the evening of the 15th to report to the Southern Army commander in chief. Although the commander in chief was most concerned about securing the oil refineries, the situation of that area was not included in the report.\(^{(21, 64)}\)

In the meantime, eight aircraft of the 11th Air Group (accompanied by Maj. Satō Takeo (graduate of the 36th class), staff officer of the 12th Air Division) dashed to the Palembang [airfield] on the afternoon of the 15th, and took charge of the air defense straight away, using the fuel seized there.

On the early morning of the 15th, the second raiding unit advanced from the Sungai Petani [airfield] to the Kahang [airfield]. After refueling there, it took off at 1130, and covered by one element each of the fighter and the light bomber units of the 3d Division, parachuted down on the Palembang airfield at 1340.\(^{(81)}\)

On that day, four Buffalos on aggregate conducted three air raids. The 11th Air Group brought down two of them, however, two Japanese aircraft sustained damage, too. Since the enemy aircraft came for the raids without being equipped with drop tanks, the 11th Air Group conjectured that there must be an airfield nearby where the enemy had taken off. However, it had no idea at all where that airfield was.\(^{(81)}\)

At 1820, the ground personnel of the 11th Air Group, too, arrived at the Palembang [airfield] and immediately [started on] the conditioning of the airfield. The main force of the air group dashed there by dusk, [too].

The advance party of the 38th Division entered into the anchorage of Mentok on the 15th. At 0830 on that day, it started sailing up the Musi River and reached the port of Palembang at 1900 that evening. Around 2100, the [Paratroop] Raiding Group was [finally] able to make contact with the advance party.\(^{(87, 90, 211)}\)

### The 3d Air Division’s Dash to the Palembang [Airfield]

The 11th Air Group, which had dashed to the Palembang airfield on the 15th, took charge of the air defense of Palembang from the dawn of the next day, the 16th, and drove away six enemy aircraft in four raids in the morning and three aircraft in the evening.

On the 16th, the advance party of the 38th Division (and the ground service units of the air arm) reported that there was a concealed airfield in Gelumbang about fifty kilometers southwest of Palembang.\(^{(84, 161)}\)

In the meantime, in order to prepare for the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in western Java due to be launched shortly, the 3d Air Division commander at the Kluang [airfield] ordered the units under his command to dash to the Palembang [airfield] on the afternoon of the 16th. He himself advanced to Palembang a little before 1200 on the 17th. In the air over the Palembang airfield, nine [enemy] P–40s and the 2d Squadron of the 11th Air Group were just in the middle of an air battle. Three P–40s were brought down, while one of the Type–97 fighters caught fire, but the pilot bailed out.\(^{(100)}\)
By noon of the 18th, other than the sixteen Type–97 fighters, about twenty aircraft of the main force of the 64th Air Group and one element of the 27th Air Group had advanced to the Palembang [airfield], and the remaining forces of the [3d] Air Division advanced one by one on that afternoon. [The launch of] the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in western Java was postponed by one day to the 19th.\(^{100, 108, 121, 122, 137}\)

For reference:

**Journal kept by Katō Tateo** (16 February)

Received an order to shift yesterday evening in order to immediately expedite the offensive against Java. It seems that that is also the intention of [3d] Air Division Commander Endō. The advance [unit] dashed [there] before nine, and the main force at 0930.

Reported to headquarters (part omitted by the author) and offered a proposal that [we should] aim to immediately conduct attacks today and repeat them several times, then I waited on standby. However, the other units were slow; and some didn’t [even] consider an attack tomorrow morning. [The campaign was] forced to be postponed to the 19th.

On the 16th, about two companies of the advance party of the 38th Division departed from Palembang in requisitioned vehicles and headed for the Tanjungkarang airfield, overcoming a distance of about three hundred kilometers.\(^{61}\)

The Casualties of the [Paratroop] Raiding Unit and the Conferment of Citations of Merit

Of the 329 men who parachuted down on the 14th, thirty-seven men were killed in action (including two, whose parachutes did not open; apart [from the paratroopers], two men of the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit were [also] killed in action), forty-seven men wounded (of which thirty-six were hospitalized). The casualties reached twenty-five percent of the participants in the operation.

By unit the casualties were as follows:\(^{61, 211, 212}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Killed in action</th>
<th>Wounded in action</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hospitalized</td>
<td>With unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Paratroop] Raiding Gp HQ</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Rgt Signal Unit</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Co</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Co</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Co</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Co</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thus, in its first-ever [paradrop] raiding operation, the Army was able to overcome the difficulties, execute a surprise attack on Palembang and seize and secure the airfield and the oil refineries there before they were destroyed by the enemy.

Southern Army Commander in Chief Terauchi conferred a citation of merit on the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group, which took part in the Palembang operation, and the air units which directly supported it.\(^{(61)}\)

On 15 April, the Third Air Force commander conferred a citation of merit on 1st Lt. Okumoto Minoru and four other men, who rendered outstanding service in the ground combat.\(^{(76)}\)

From investigations after the combat, it became clear that [the enemy, who defended] the airfield, consisted of about 530 British, Dutch and Australian men led by a Dutch colonel, and the [enemy] garrison of the oil refineries consisted of 550 men led by a captain.\(^{(61)}\)

**Citation of Merit*\(^{*}\)**

The Palembang Attack Unit of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group
The Air Units which directly supported the unit and executed the raid
As the Army’s first parachute unit and its supporting units, the above units on 14 and 15 February flew a great distance and jumped into the midst of the enemy with a small force in defiance of death, and while smashing [enemy] resistance on the ground and in the air, they carried out a surprise attack on Palembang, a strategically important point in southern Sumatra, and seized the enemy airfield base before it could be destroyed.

With this unprecedented action, the units, as the vanguard of the Southern Army, expertly seized the opportunity for making an attack, severed the Dutch East Indies from Malaya, and secured the key to the coming operations of the entire [Southern] Army; their feats of arms were outstanding.

Therefore, I will confer on them a citation of merit and announce it to the entire [Southern] Army under my command.

15 February 1942
Southern Army Commander in Chief Count Terauchi Hisaichi

**Citation of Merit**\(^{**}\)**

2d [Para] Raiding Regiment First Lieutenant Okumoto Minoru
2d [Para] Raiding Regiment Sergeant Kawahara Masao
2d [Para] Raiding Regiment Senior Private Katano Saburô
2d [Para] Raiding Regiment Senior Private Tsushima Shûsuke
2d [Para] Raiding Regiment Paymaster Sergeant Major Kikuchi Kiyoji

When on 14 February 1942 these men had been dropped as part of the airfield raiding unit of the Palembang [paradrop] raiding operation, they encountered an [enemy] vehicle unit, which suddenly came rushing from the airfield. They boldly attacked and disarmed it, during which they happened to spot an enemy unit of some 150 men in four motor trucks with a light armored vehicle in front, heading northward to reinforce the airfield from the city of Palembang in response to an emergency. [Immediately] shifting their position and without missing an opportunity, they attacked this [unit] with pistols and hand grenades. Once [they saw] the enemy step out of the vehicles, they bravely rushed at the enemy without fearing death or injury, and finally routed the enemy, leaving many weapons and dead bodies behind.

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\⁽*⁽\⁾ See also Vol. 3, pp. 332-333.

\⁽**⁽\⁾ See also Vol. 3, p. 333.
The above action was a display of a fierce attacking spirit, and at the critical moment when the main force of our unit was not yet fully prepared, they frustrated the intention of the enemy by aggressively and steadfastly forestalling the enemy with a small force and cutting off the reinforcements to the airfield, which constituted a factor for the success of this operation. It is a demonstration of the fighting spirit of paratroopers and their feats of arms were outstanding. Therefore, I will confer a citation of merit on them.

15 April 1942
Third Air Force Commander Sugawara Michiō
3. The Air Operation to Support the Singapore Operation

(See Illustration No. 51)

Preliminary Attacks on Key Places and the Air Campaign to Destroy the Enemy Air Power

Since the first strike on the 8th [of December, the day] of the opening of hostilities, the Army and Navy air units had repeatedly attacked many a time Singapore, the final target of the Malaya operation. The airfields from where the planes for the attacks were launched had gradually shifted southward, and the attacks had [also] changed in form from surprise attacks at night to air strikes by daylight, and from once a day to several times a day.

At the end of January, the British [air] forces were finally compressed into the four airfields of Singapore Island. Meanwhile, on 4 February, the Third Air Force commander passed down the order [to implement] both the [paradrop] raiding operations against Palembang and the support [operation] for the Singapore operation [pp. 238-239].

In this order, the launch of the offensive against Singapore was scheduled for the night of 7 February.

From 1 February onwards, in preparation for the launch of the offensive against Singapore, the Third Air Force continued every day its attacks on key places and the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power on the island.
The Situation on 1 February

On 1 February, the 7th Air Division attacked Singapore with the 60th Air Group and one element of the 64th Air Group. Although the heavy bomber unit aimed at the oil tanks in Sembawang, the bulk of the bombs hit the facilities attached to the naval base, where fires broke out at several places. Meanwhile, the fighter unit, which had accompanied [the bomber unit] and controlled the air, spotted four Buffalos and reported that it had brought down one of them.225

On that day, there was remarkably little antiaircraft fire, while some twenty 4,000 to 5,000-ton-class ships, six 10,000-ton-class ships and numerous small boats were spotted near the commercial port, which made the air division wonder whether the enemy had decided to give up Singapore.

Before dawn on that day, three heavy bombers of the division carried out a surprise attack on the Kallang [airfield] and vicinity and reported that it had caused a fire.61, 81

The Situation on 2 February

Before dawn on 2 February, the 3d Air Division carried out attacks on the oil tanks at Seletar with three twin-engine light bombers and caused fires all over the place. The black smoke trailed toward [the city of] Singapore throughout the day.

About 1030 on that day, two enemy aircraft raided the Kluang airfield but inflicted no damage. [Meanwhile] around 1000, a strategic reconnaissance aircraft spotted four four-engine very large aircraft and ten mid-sized aircraft on the Seletar airfield, and five large, and six mid-sized and small aircraft on the Tengah airfield. Based on the report of that strategic reconnaissance aircraft, the 3d Air Division commander attacked at 1530 the Seletar airfield with a combination of fighters and light bombers (the number of aircraft is unclear). However, with the four-engine aircraft already gone, [the combined unit] carried out bombings on six mid-sized aircraft on the ground and returned.

At 1314, the 7th Air Division carried out bombings with the 12th Air Group and one element each of the 60th and 64th Air Groups on the southwestern part of the city of Singapore and the wharfs, causing big fires at three places. Although the antiaircraft fire from the vicinity of the wharfs was fierce, no enemy fighter planes appeared.

The 12th Air Division controlled the air over Singapore between 1054 and 1500 with ninety-seven aircraft on aggregate. However, other than two to three large aircraft and four to five small aircraft of the enemy on the ground of the Tengah airfield, no enemy aircraft were spotted in the air or on the ground.61

The Situation on 3 February

Before dawn on the 3d, the 3d Air Division conducted a surprise night attack on Singapore with three light bombers and bombed the oil tanks in Seletar and Kranji, which made the fires from the previous day burning even stronger.

At 1100, the 3d Air Division further attacked on the oil tanks in Kranji with four aircraft of the 75th Air Group and seven aircraft of the 90th Air Group, bombed and set ablaze sixty-two oil tanks and cut off the railway bridge and roads on their east side. In the evening, five aircraft each of the 27th and the 59th Air Groups sortied at the report of enemy vessels sailing near Bintan Island. However, both air groups could not spot the target. Instead, the as-
Illustration No. 51 — The Course of the [Twenty-fifth Army's] Offensive against Singapore
sault plane unit spotted three enemy destroyers and three transport ships sailing northward in the vicinity, attacked them, and reported that it had set ablaze two large transport ships.\(^{(61,100)}\)

At 1222, the 7th Air Division conducted attacks on the city and the wharfs of Singapore with fighters and bombers in combination (one element [each] of the 60th and the 64th Air Groups), scored many hits on mid-sized and small steam ships, and set ablaze the warehouses on the wharfs. Again at 1530, a combination of fighters and bombers (of the 12th Air Group) attacked the wharfs of Singapore, scored two direct hits on two steam ships and set warehouses ablaze.

The 12th Air Division controlled the air over Singapore between 1150 and 1520, but did not encounter enemy aircraft.\(^{(119,127)}\)

**The Situation on 4 February**

At 0800 on the 4th, five Lockheeds covered by two Buffalos raided the Kluang airfield and dropped 500kg bombs. One element of the 59th Air Group, which was patrolling in the air, attacked them and brought down two Lockheeds (of which one unconfirmed) and one Buffalo (unconfirmed).\(^{(61,100,102,188)}\)

The 3d Air Division conducted bombings at the fuel depot to the west of the Johor causeway with six aircraft of the 75th Air Group and scored a number of hits.

[A combination of] six aircraft of the 59th Air Group and five aircraft of the 90th Air Group, and [another of] five aircraft of the 59th Air Group and five aircraft of the 27th Air Group respectively sortied to attack transport ships, and reported that they scored two to three hits and caused fires.\(^{(61)}\)

At 1120, the 7th Air Division conducted attacks on the ships in the east sector of the port of Singapore with one element each of the 60th and 64th Air Groups, and reported that they scored hits on one large and four mid-sized ships and set them ablaze. Then at 1333, with one element each of the 12th and 64th Air Groups, it again dropped two hundred 50kg bombs and seventy-two Ka4 [incendiary] bombs on enemy units and military facilities to the northwest of the city of Singapore, which were hit for certain.

The 12th Air Division controlled the air but did not spot enemy aircraft.

On that day, the [Third] Air Force commander passed down the order to support the offensive against Singapore, while advancing his command post to the Kluang airfield, as previously told [pp. 238-239]. At 2300 on that night, an air raid warning was given again, but nothing happened.\(^{(61)}\)

**The Situation on 5 February**

On the 5th, the 3d Air Division attacked enemy naval vessels on the sea south of Singapore with one element, and reported that it had sunk one 10,000-ton-class ship, set ablaze one 6,000-ton-class ship, which became unable to sail, and scored several hits on three 3,000-ton-class ships.\(^{(113)}\)

On that day, the 3d Air Division commander assigned the attack on the Palembang airfield on the next day [to his units], as previously told [p. 243].

The 7th Air Division carried out bombings on the Kallang airfield with one element each of the 60th and 64th Air Groups and reported that it had blown up five mid-sized aircraft and set some facilities ablaze.
The 12th Air Division spotted three Hurricanes while controlling the air over Singapore and two Hurricanes while controlling the air over Batu Pahat. However, it failed to bring them down.\textsuperscript{(61)}

The Situation on 6 February

On the early morning of the 6th, the 7th Air Division carried out a surprise attack on Singapore with three aircraft of the 60th Air Group, bombed the sector on the north side of the Kallang airfield, as well as the Caucasian residential areas to the east of the sector and military facilities in the city center of Singapore. The main force made preparations for the strikes on Singapore from the 7th onwards, while the [7th] Air Division Commander Yamamoto advanced his command post to the Kahang airfield in the afternoon.\textsuperscript{(61, 100, 119)}

The surprise attack on Singapore on the early morning of the 6th was the thirty-third and final surprise attack since the first one conducted by 1st Lieutenant Moritani of the 75th Air Group on 29 December 1941.

Around 1030, while controlling the air over Seletar, the 12th Air Division engaged with six Hurricanes and reported that it had brought down one of them. Meanwhile, while controlling the air over Singapore between 1000 and 1940, the main force of the air division encountered eleven Hurricanes on aggregate and reported that it had brought down five (of which four unconfirmed). Two aircraft of the 1st Air Group did not return.

On that day, seven replenishment aircraft for the 11th Air Group arrived at the Batu Pahat [airfield].\textsuperscript{(61, 137)}

The 12th Air Division shifted from the Kuantan [airfield] to the Batu Pahat [airfield] for two days on the 6th and the 7th to let the Navy air unit advance to Kuantan.\textsuperscript{(61, 76, 137)}

The Situation on 7 February

On the 7th, the 3d Air Division bombed the enemy position[s] on Ubin Island in support of the diversion of the Imperial Guard Division of the Twenty-fifth Army with one squadron of light bombers, while the 7th Air Division bombed the runway sector of the Kallang airfield and its attached facilities in the northwestern part with the 12th Air Group, rendering the runway temporarily beyond use. Then at 1530, it bombed the Changi stronghold in the eastern part of Singapore and reported that it set it ablaze at several places.

During the above strikes, three Hurricanes came for an interception but the air group brought down two of them.
The 12th Air Division controlled the air over Singapore. Meanwhile, [having received] information about enemy aircraft on the Pekanbaru airfield around 1500, the 11th Air Group rushed to that airfield around 1800 with ten aircraft led by the air group commander, strafed three Blenheims and one Lockheed on the ground, and reported that it had set one Lockheed ablaze.\(^{(61, 137)}\)

**The Situation on 8 February**

On the early morning of the 8th, one element of the Imperial Guard Division went ashore on Ubin Island and launched a diversionary action, while tactical reconnaissance aircraft supporting the diversion flew frequently over them.\(^{(190)}\)

On element of the 3d Air Division bombed the enemy searchlight and artillery positions on the coast opposite the front of the 18th Division, which was going to cross the strait.

The 12th Air Division controlled the air with a total of seventy-five Type–97 fighter planes and six Ki–44s, while the 7th Air Division attacked the Changi stronghold in addition to the enemy positions in the vicinities of Bukit Panjang and Mandai. The total of number of aircraft sorties reached 102.\(^{(61)}\)

**The Direct Support for the Twenty-fifth Army’s Offensive**

**The Situation on 9 February**

The Third Air Force commander had launched the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in Palembang from 6 February onwards, and on the same day, the Twenty-fifth Army had decided that the landing operation on Singapore should be launched at 2400 on the 8th.\(^{(81, 88)}\)

On the early morning of 8 February, one element of the Imperial Guard Division had launched its diversionary action, as mentioned above.\(^{(190)}\)

Meanwhile on the 8th, the 5th and 18th Divisions, which had advanced to their preparatory positions to the west of Johor Bahru, started their forced passage of the waterway all at once at 2400. The landing units broke through obstacles and mine fields, continuously expanding their military gains, and at 1400 on the 9th advanced to the northern point of the Tengah airfield. During this period, the 27th Air Group of the 3d Air Division advanced one element to the Labis airfield (forty kilometers north of the Kluang [airfield]), and continued its support for the ground operations, while the 75th Air Group mainly supported the 18th Division on the right flank and the 90th Air Group mainly the 5th Division on the left flank. The 59th Air Group provided air cover and brought down one of the eleven Hurricanes, which appeared.\(^{(61, 100)}\) Capt. Ogata Susumu (graduate of the 48th class) attached to the 75th Air Group accompanied the ground troops and took charge of communications with the air group.

In the meantime, on the 9th, the 12th Air Division, which had shifted to the Batu Pahat [airfield], continuously controlled the air with 141 Type–97 fighter planes and eight Type–2 fighter planes on aggregate [each]. During this period, it spotted fourteen Hurricanes on aggregate and attacked five of them, but it could not bring them down because the enemy aircraft escaped at high speed.\(^{(81, 135, 137, 138)}\)
Meanwhile, the 7th Air Division commander had one element each of the 12th and the 60th Air Groups dash to the Kluang airfield from 6 February onwards. The commanders of both groups, Kitajima and Ogawa, also advanced there to direct the actions.\(^{132}\)

The use of the Kluang [airfield] as an advance airfield enabled the heavy bomber unit to repeatedly bomb Singapore by having each aircraft make three or four sorties from dawn to dusk.\(^{116}\)

On the 9th, a total of 105 [heavy bomber] sorties were made against the enemy positions near Panjang at 0930, Bukit Mandai at 1130, the artillery near Panjang at 1356, Jurong and vicinity at 1528, and the stronghold in the eastern part at 1745. The total amount of bombs dropped reached seventy-three tons.\(^{61, 76, 130}\)

The artillery of the Twenty-fifth Army neutralized the enemy artillery and other positions, based on observations from the independent balloon company and the direct support aircraft of the 83d Independent Air Unit, while the army antiaircraft defense unit brought down four out of the twelve enemy aircraft, which came for a raid.\(^{88, 187}\)

**The Situation on 10 February**

At 0600 on 10 February, three enemy bombers raided the Kluang airfield, taking advantage of the drizzling rain. The antiaircraft artillery unit opened fire with the support of the searchlight unit and brought down one of them.

The enemy aircraft was a Lockheed Hudson equipped with four moveable machineguns, and it was learned from the price lists of mess halls at various places in the possession of an officer killed in the engagement that the aircraft had departed from mainland Britain in mid-December and arrived in Palembang several days before by air.\(^{61, 76, 80, 100, 188}\)

In the meantime, on the early morning of the 10th, the Twenty-fifth Army advanced its command post to the area north of the Tengah airfield, and from there directed the attack on the Bukit Timah position.\(^{88, 94}\)

On the 10th, the 3d Air Division supported the ground combat, employing thirty assault planes and light bombers on aggregate each and twenty fighter planes on aggregate, while the 12th Air Division controlled the air over the front line from 0800 until 2020 with 110 Type–97 fighter planes on aggregate and five Type–2 fighter planes on aggregate. Since the bombing targets were close, the 7th Air Division mounted more bombs by reducing the amount of fuel, and bombed the enemy positions, units, stations, and wharfs five times. The total number of aircraft sorties reached ninety-three and the total amount of bombs dropped fifty-eight tons.\(^{81}\)

[Third] Air Force Commander Sugawara advanced one element of the 15th Air-Ground Support Unit to the Tengah airfield.\(^{81}\)

Staff Officer Hamu of the [Third] Air Force, too, advanced to the airfield, and Staff Officer Suzuki of the Southern Army accompanied him as well.\(^{68, 83}\)

One element [each] of the direct support aircraft and tactical reconnaissance aircraft of the 83d Independent Air Unit also advanced to the Tengah airfield.\(^{188, 189, 190}\)

Three of the heavy oil tanks on the island went up in flames, and the black smoke rose as high as five thousand meters and cast a gloomy hue over the entire island, which was quite spectacular.
The Progress of the Attacks on 11 February

On the 11th, the [Twenty-fifth] Army Commander Yamashita at the Tengah airfield dropped by means of the 71st Independent Air Squadron (tactical reconnaissance aircraft) twenty-nine copies of a summons to surrender over the enemy positions. However, the enemy did not show signs of surrender. (190)

The Third Air Force commander sent Staff Officer Miyashi to the 90th Air Group and had him help steering the attack on Bukit Mandai, while sending Staff Officer Kawamoto into the Tengah airfield to take charge of giving directions there.

The 7th Air Division neutralized enemy artillery positions and attacked the wharf and [enemy] ships with a total of 115 aircraft sorties; the [total] amount of bombs dropped reached seventy-eight tons. From the 9th onwards, the heavy bomber air division made seventeen sorties, employing a total of 313 individual aircraft sorties and dropping 209 tons of bombs in total. The air division, led by Commander Yamamoto, literally put its whole strength into the attack. (81, 116, 132)

For reference:

An excerpt from “Tidbits of the 7th Air Division’s attack on Malaya” by Ogawa Kojirō, commander of the 60th Air Group

The airfield was scorching hot. After landing, most flight crew [stayed] below the wings with their eyes closed and their heads drooping. Meanwhile fuel was loaded and bombs mounted. Once the mountings were completed, the air crew had to be roused to take off. I checked on the flight crew before their take off and picked out [and grounded] those with lifeless eyes. However, after they took off, none of those, whom I must have picked out, were seen around. They were so eager that they, too, sortied along with others. (Part omitted by the author.) The antiaircraft fire of Singapore Island was fierce. … During my service [as commander] of the 60th Air Group, the group was subjected to concentrated antiaircraft fire for at least 120 to 130 times (omitted by the author), during which, eighty-nine shells pierced the aircraft, but only twice did they explode when hitting the aircraft. (Omitted by the author.) In the course [of such continuous operations], the bombs stored on the Kluang [airfield] were running out. We could no longer choose the types of bombs to mount at all. The bombs, which were mounted on the aircraft straight from the trucks coming in, were mostly limited to 50kg bombs.

The light bombers of the 3d Air Division conducted attacks on Singapore twice. While carrying out strikes on enemy artillery positions on the highlands of Mandai and Bukit Timah, they also attacked the enemy naval vessels trying to evacuate. (113, 214)

The Situation on 12 February

On 12 February, the forward provision of ammunition did not catch up with the front of the Twenty-fifth Army, and the infantry and artillery got separated. Meanwhile, from the previous midnight onwards, enemy resistance had become more stubborn.

On the early morning of that day, two to three enemy aircraft came for a raid on the Kluang [airfield], but unable to spot it, they returned. (188)

The Twenty-fifth Army had supposed that the [coastal] fortress batteries were only directed toward the sea. However, to the surprise of the army, they could be directed toward the land front, too, and fight back. Particularly, those in the stronghold of Blakang Mati
fiercely fired at the flank of the 18th Division on the right flank of the army, which completely pinned down the advance of the 18th Division.\(^88\)

During his visit to the Twenty-fifth Army headquarters, Chief of Staff Kawashima of the [Third] Air Force came to know the predicament of the ground combat.

The [Third] Air Force commander ordered the 7th Air Division to bomb the coastal batteries. The 7th Air Division bombed the strongholds of Blakang Mati, Changi and Pasir Panjung, employing a total of 105 aircraft sorties in ten waves and dropped [a total amount of] about seventy tons of bombs.

The 60th Air Group, which was ordered to particularly bomb the Blakang Mati stronghold to the south of the city of Singapore, neutralized the stronghold with the entire force of the air group.

On that day, the 12th Air Division controlled the air with a total of sixty-four aircraft sorties. Meanwhile, the 3d Air Division directly supported the ground operations with one element, while attacking with its main force [enemy] ships evacuating from the island.

The [3d] Air Division sank one 10,000-ton-class transport ship, set ablaze two others, and also set ablaze one 3,000-ton-class ship, [all of] which were carrying troops to their full capacity. The air division also scored hits on a number of [smaller] boats.\(^61, 100, 214\)

On the 12th, Staff Officer Shibuya of the Southern Army landed on the Tengah airfield in a transport aircraft. Although having been under concentrated fire of [enemy] long-range guns on the previous night, the airfield sustained no major damage, and the 5th [Field] Airfield Construction Unit was conditioning it.\(^200\) Staff Officer Shibuya learned that [the army had] seized 270 drums of aviation fuel there and some 2,500 drums of fuel at other places.\(^66\)
The Situation on 13 February

On the 13th, with the Palembang [paradrop] raiding operation imminent on the next day, the Third Air Force carried out an air campaign to destroy the enemy air power on the Palembang [airfield], as previously told.

On that afternoon, the 12th Air Division commander advanced his command post to the Tengah airfield, while having shifted the 11th Air Group from the Kuantan [airfield] to the Batu Pahat [airfield], so as to make the Kuantan [airfield] available for the Navy mid-sized land-based attack plane units (two units) at any time.\(^{(66)}\)

On the 13th, the 7th Air Division shifted its bombing targets directly to the enemy positions around the city of Singapore. From 1014 until 1524, it mainly bombed the northwestern side of the Empire Dock, the Governor General’s residence, the artillery positions to the southwest of the city, and the wharf and its surrounding areas. The aircraft of the 12th and the 60th Air Groups made a total ninety-four sorties, and the total amount of bombs dropped reached sixty tons.\(^{(61)}\)

From the previous day onwards, the Navy Air Unit had operated in the area of the Bangka and Singapore Straits. On the 13th, as on the day before, a total of about eighty mid-sized land-based attack planes made sorties and reported that they had sunk two merchantmen and one cruiser.\(^{(55)}\)

On that day, with the Palembang paradrop operation imminent on the next day, the [Third] Air Force Commander Sugawara inspected the [paratroop] raiding unit, which had advanced to the Kluang [airfield], and gave instructions. The preparations for the paradrop operation, which would be carried out before the fall of Singapore by flying a great distance beyond the equator, were completed, and the [Third] Air Force commander described his
deep emotions on the night before the execution of the operation, as previously quoted [p. 248].

The Situation on 14 February

Staff Officer Nishioka of the Twenty-fifth Army visited the [Third] Air Force headquarters in Kluang on the early morning of the 14th and related the situation at the land front, which did not yet allow for any optimism, and explained that since the enemy artillery continued its furious shelling, cleverly using the hills in the sector west of the city, it was necessary to neutralize those positions.

Although the Johor causeway had been finally repaired by then, the passing and deployment of the army artillery made slow progress, which left the front of the ground unit still exposed to the concentrated fire by enemy artillery.

Despite the execution of the paradrop operation in Palembang that day, the [Third] Air Force assigned the main force of the 7th Air Division to attack Singapore.

The air division attacked the enemy heavy gun positions in the sector west of the city of Singapore and the wharf and vicinity seven times.(76)

The 12th Air Division advanced one element of the 1st Air Group to the Tengah airfield to control the air over Singapore Island. [Another] element of the air division conducted attacks on the Pekanbaru airfield on Sumatra and destroyed four Blenheims and one small two-seater aircraft. (61, 200)

The Navy mid-sized land-based attack plane unit mainly attacked [enemy] naval vessels; they [also] spotted sixteen merchantmen and other ships and reported as military gains the sinking of three and inflicting some or slight damage to eight ships. (55)

The Fall of Singapore

The Surrender of the British Forces

During his visit to the command post of the Twenty-fifth Army on the Tengah airfield on 15 February, [3d] Air Division Commander Endō found the atmosphere at the army headquarters very gloomy and gathered that the army was in the middle of an uphill battle, before returning. (100)

On that day, the 3d Air Division supported the ground combat with thirty-two assault planes and ten odd light bombers, while the 7th Air Division bombed the Blakang Mati stronghold and other places by sending off a total of 108 sorties in ten waves, and dropping eighty-five tons of bombs [in total]. The total number of aircraft sorties [of the air division] from early February onwards amounted to a total of 1,018, and the total amount of bombs dropped reached 773 tons. (61)

The British Indian Army on Singapore [Island] was said to have fifty-four fortress guns, five hundred field and mountain guns, about one hundred antiaircraft guns, and some 110,000 ground troops. However, having been under one-sided attacks by Japanese air units day after day, and moreover, having the Palembang [airfield], which they depended on as a rear base, seized on the 14th by the [paratroop] raiding unit of a mere three hundred men, the British forces [had to] completely give up the hope of reinforcements from the rear.

Meanwhile, more than a few transport ships trying to evacuate from Singapore Island were caught on the sea or destroyed.
Despite continued desperate resistance, the cornered enemy was helpless after losing the command of the air.

At 1950 on 15 February, Twenty-fifth Army Commander Lieutenant General Yamashita formally received an offer of surrender from Lieutenant General Percival, commander of the British Army in Malaya. Then, a ceasefire came into effect as of 2200 and the capture operation of Singapore was completed.\(^{(88, 89)}\)

The news of the fall of Singapore was announced to the whole nation by IGHQ at 2210 on the 15th.

**The Appellation “Shōnan”**

On 17 February, IGHQ announced that it had been decided that Singapore should be called “Shōnan” from then on.

It was the expression of a genuine wish that “By ‘Shō,’ which means to lighten up, i.e. lifting the dark clouds that had been hanging over the area for a long time, and let the light and grace of the sun stream to all without discrimination, the very place of ‘Shōnan’ [Lighten up the South] shall, as shown in the name, definitely become the island (port) that will be a great pivot from where the rays of hope will radiate in this area.”\(^{(25)}\)

The name Singapore, which had been used for more than 120 years, was changed. Singapore had fallen. However, the air operations still had a long way to go and would require further strenuous efforts.\(^{(76)}\)
The 83d Independent Air Unit (commander: Col. Nitahara Kenjiro), which having been attached to the Twenty-fifth Army and closely supported its operations, was conferred a citation of merit by [Twenty-fifth] Army Commander Yamashita.(88)

Addendum: The Air Defense of Palembang and Singapore by the Dutch and British Air Forces*

The Air Defense Battle in the Palembang Sector

The Deployment for the Air Defense of the Palembang Sector

There existed in Palembang two airfields: Palembang Airfield No. 1 and Palembang Airfield No. 2, the latter was hidden in the jungle about sixty kilometers southwest of the city of Palembang. The unit deployed was the 226th Group, which was formed on 1 February and led by Air Commodore Vincent.

On the Palembang airfield, apart from the thirty-three Hurricanes from the British aircraft carrier Indomitable, which had arrived in Sumatra on 26 January, the aircraft, which had escaped from Singapore, were [also] deployed.

(Note:)
Out of the forty-eight Hurricanes [carried by] the aircraft carrier Indomitable, fifteen were advanced to Singapore, while the others headed for the Palembang airfield, where five of them crashed at the time of landing.

Around the same time, thirty-nine Hurricanes were brought to Batavia by the Athene, while ten U.S. fighter planes also arrived in Surabaya on 6 February.

On 5 February, in order to strengthen the defenses of southern Sumatra, [General] Wavell dispatched two battalions stationed at Batavia and Cimahi on Java to Palembang as well as the islands of Bangka and Belitung. Particularly, he sent to Palembang some airmen, who had received anti-paradrop training and two antiaircraft batteries.

From 23 January onwards, Japanese air units started air strikes against the Palembang airfield, which gradually increased in scale and intensity. Since both the alerting system and the antiaircraft guns of Palembang Airfield No. 1 were defective, the damage gradually increased. However, Palembang Airfield No. 2 was totally hidden. Since the Japanese attacks were conducted more or less at a fixed time of the day, aircraft were evacuated from Palembang Airfield No. 1 to Palembang Airfield No. 2, using the intervals between the attacks. However, on 6 and 8 February, the Japanese forces successfully conducted surprise attacks, in which sixteen Hurricanes and five Blenheims were destroyed at a stroke.(218, 219, 220)

The Attack on the [Japanese] Convoy

On 10 February, ABDA Command received intelligence that the Japanese intended an invasion of Sumatra and were already using the Anambas Islands.

From the reconnaissance results until the 11th, it appeared that the Japanese transport ships constituted a large convoy along with fourteen warships and many small boats, and that air units were being concentrated in Borneo, which led to the judgment that [the Japanese would] conduct attacks on Palembang within several days.

* See also the note on p. 208. The same caveats apply. It is a hopeless task to identify the author’s sources.
[General] Wavell ordered all ships on the Musi River to evacuate, and in order to attack the ships of the Japanese forces, he also gave orders to the Navy unit under the command of Admiral Doorman to assemble his naval ships off the western point of Java and destroy the convoys of the Japanese forces on spotting them.

On the night of the 11th, a total of twenty-one Hudsons and Blenheims sortied to attack the [Japanese] convoy, but without success. [Instead,] when taking off from Palembang Airfield No. 2, three sustained damage.

On the evening of the 13th, one Hudson of the Australian air force [sent] to reconnoiter the convoy of the Japanese forces spotted a number of transport ships sailing southward escorted by warships at a point north of Bangka Island. Although all bombers immediately sortied at the intelligence, they achieved no results due to bad weather.

On the morning of the 14th, reconnaissance aircraft spotted the convoy of the Japanese forces in the Bangka Strait, at which bombers made sorties along with the Hurricanes. Although hampered by Japanese fighter planes and antiaircraft fire, they scored some hits on a few ships, but they only sank one ship. During this attack, they lost eight aircraft.\(^{(218, 219, 220)}\)

**The Antiairborne Battle**

In the meantime, a ground force of some 530 British, Dutch, and Australian troops in total, under the command of Colonel Nāboru [? Lt. Col. L.N.W. Vogelesang] of the Dutch [East Indies] Army, were deployed on Palembang Airfield No. 1 (one element in the city of Palembang), equipped with thirteen antiaircraft guns and five antiaircraft machineguns. At the oil refineries, where there were about twenty pill-box positions, some 550 men under the command of a captain were deployed along with ten antiaircraft guns and five antiaircraft machineguns. At Palembang Airfield No. 2 (Gelumbang), about two reserve companies were posted.

Before noon on the 14th, a lookout post reported that a large formation of Japanese aircraft was approaching Palembang. At that time, all aircraft on the airfield had already sortied for an attack on the convoy sailing southward in the Bangka Strait.

After several minutes, along with a bombardment, the aircraft on Palembang Airfield No. 1 were strafed, right after which, numerous parachutes descended on the jungle surrounding the airfield. The paratroopers also descended [near] the oil refineries. Palembang Airfield No. 1 [successfully] defeated the first attack of the unit, which had descended, and also successfully evacuated some of the aircraft, while sending off [airfield] personnel toward the city of Palembang.

Since the [Japanese] assault unit cut off the road connecting the airfield and the city of Palembang right after the drop, the two attempts at rescuing the airfield on the 14th were both unsuccessful.

During that time, close combat went on at the airfield; the antiaircraft unit, which fired at the paratroopers point blank, was attacked by the Japanese troops, who repeatedly came for attacks with small arms and hand grenades. Both forces sustained serious losses.

Just then, the airfield received communication from the Hurricanes that they would return from the attack on the convoy. Although it immediately directed the aircraft in the air to land on Palembang Airfield No. 2, it was not able to reach a few of them, which landed on Palembang Airfield No. 1 and hastily took off again. Thirty-five Benheims, twenty-two Hurricanes, and three Hudsons gathered on Palembang Airfield No. 2. On the afternoon of the 14th, the
garrison army was running short of ammunition, while the military situation at the oil refineries was unclear.\textsuperscript{(218, 219, 220)}

The Withdrawal from Palembang

On the 14th, a report came that Japanese reinforcements were at the mouth of the Musi River. That evening, having given up further defensive battles [for the airfield], the garrison army destroyed the aircraft and equipment on Palembang Airfield No. 1 themselves and retreated to Palembang Airfield No. 2. The Japanese forces in the oil refineries’ area swiftly seized the oil refineries.

On the 15th, the British and Australian forces planned a counterattack. However, since more Japanese forces descended on Palembang Airfield No. 1, and other units in boats were sailing up the Musi River, the British and Australian forces retreated southwestward on their own judgment.

At that time, thirty-eight bombers and twenty-one Hurricanes were on Palembang Airfield No. 2. They repeatedly sortied from dawn of the 15th onwards to attack the anchorage and [Palembang] Airfield No. 1.

The British and Dutch troops, who had withdrawn from the Palembang sector on the evening of the 14th, fled toward Oosthaven on Lampung Bay by rail and road, and ended up withdrawing to Java by crossing the Sunda Strait.

On the 15th, most aircraft on Palembang Airfield No. 2 withdrew to Java. The withdrawal from Palembang and Oosthaven might have been made too early. However, being a mixed force, the British and Dutch troops were badly coordinated and poorly led, which, along with the fear that paratroopers might cut off their escape route at any time, made them retreat too early.\textsuperscript{(218, 219, 220)}

The Air Battle in Support of the Defense of Singapore

At the end of January, the British forces in Singapore allowed the Japanese forces to land on the coast of Endau and further lost the main force of the air unit remaining on the island, which reduced the remaining aircraft on the island to twenty-one Hurricanes and six Buffalos. The major part of the aircraft evacuated to Palembang.

Due to the bombings, the four airfields on the island lost their function.

At 1800 on 5 February, the Japanese artillery suddenly opened up with a fierce barrage of fire. Although it was particularly directed at the sector to the south of the causeway, the Malaya Command, which believed that the real attack would be directed far more eastward, assumed that the barrage was just a diversionary action of the Japanese forces.

During the barrage, on the night of 7 February, the Japanese forces launched a sudden landing on Ubin Island.

At first the Malaya Command thought that the Japanese attack on Ubin Island was a diversion, but on the morning of the 8th, it changed its view. Since the Japanese army was enlarging its footing on Ubin Island, the defense force on Singapore opened up a fierce barrage of fire toward Ubin Island.

Then, while the attention of the British forces was directed to Ubin Island, the main force of the Japanese army launched a full-scale offensive from the direction of the northwestern sector of Singapore.
The attack by the Japanese forces in the middle of the night on 8 February was fierce, and [particularly] the attack on the defense line of the Australian Army was impressive.

On 8 February, Japanese artillery fire and air strikes neutralized the strait, and the bombings completely contained the British forces on the island. The Japanese forces successfully landed. They seized the northwestern quarter of the island within twenty-four hours of the landing, and closed in on Bukit Timah, which was the heart of the island.

On 9 February, the military situation became more and more unfavorable; the southern defense line was moved back to the sector west of Bukit Timah. It was decided that in the new defense plan, the whole area including the sector of Bukit Timah, both the north and south reservoir areas, and the Kallang airfield sector should be defended.

The Bukit Timah sector was the key point, from where the whole surrounding battlefield could be overlooked. The Japanese army’s pressure from the west caused confusion and fear in part of the defense line of this key point.

At dawn on 10 February, [the British forces] withdrew to Highland 145 to the northwestern side of the T-junction at Bukit Panjang. The enemy in their front was the [Japanese] 5th Division. The aircraft, which took off from the Kallang airfield on that day, became the last aircraft launched from Singapore.

On the night of the 10th, it was reported that the Japanese forces were approaching the unit at Bukit Timah. They attacked with tanks and the military situation only worsened.

On 11 February, the military situation became critical. It was judged that Japanese Army’s charge into the city would be just a matter of time. With no support of aircraft available, all attempts at counterattacks failed, and the 44th Indian Brigade, which was exposed to bombings, lost one third of its strength.

In the meantime, in the north, the strategic point Nee Soon came under threat by the penetration of the Imperial Guard Division through the rubber plantations northeast of Mandai Road. The units in charge of the northern sector withdrew, and the Malaya Command had to shrink the defense line to an area within a five to six-mile radius from the city of Singapore.

On 13 February, whilst the British forces not only worried about water and provisions but also suffered from days and nights of accumulated fatigue, the Japanese Army directed the focus of its attack on the forces in the area along the ridgeline of Pasir Panjang. It was the [Japanese] 18th Division that charged toward the area.

On 14 February, the military situation in Singapore was approaching its last stage. Units were cut off [from each other] and they were [also] running out of ammunition. Despite calculations that water would last for forty-eight hours, there was only enough for twenty-four hours.

On 15 February, Japanese attacks in the east continued in the sector to the south of Paya Lebar, those in the north in the sector to the east of the south reservoir, those in the west in the sector to the south of the south reservoir and those in the coastal areas along the ridgeline of Pasir Panjang.

The strength of the British forces gave out at last, and at 1130 the bearers of a flag of truce were dispatched to the Japanese headquarters.\(^{218, 220}\)
Chapter 7  The Invasion of Java: The Success of the Stepping-Stone Tactics

1. Acceleration of the Preparations for the Java Invasion Operation

The Moving Up of the Invasion Operation Schedule

The Outline of the New Schedule

In late December 1941, taking advantage of the favorable development of the war since the opening of hostilities, the Southern Army planned to move up the schedule of the invasion of the South by almost one month, as already mentioned.

At that time, on the west coast of Borneo, [the Army] had captured the oil field area of Miri on 16 December and was advancing the plan of the Kuching landing [operation] scheduled for the 21st as well. Kuching was considered a key point in the area, and the plan was that the Navy would advance its air units there and use it as the base for its air operations against Sumatra, Singapore and western Java.

Also, the Arrangements for Operations Q and S, [which aimed] to seize at an early moment the east coast sector of the Malay Peninsula and advance bases there, were concluded, as previously told.\(^{(61)}\)

On 21 December, Colonel Hattori, chief of Section 2 of the IGHQ Army Department, visited Saigon carrying a proposal for the outline of operations against Burma. The Southern Army, taking this opportunity, showed its plan for moving up the Java operation to Coronel Hattori and received his approval.

Then, the Southern Army quickly put together the plan of the Java operation, and on 1 January 1942, the commander in chief of the Southern Army and the commander of the [Navy] Southern Task Force concluded, in Cam Ranh Bay, the Army-Navy on-site agreement concerning the speeding up of the southern operation. In this agreement, the date of the fall of Singapore, which IGHQ had at first expected to be around 10 March, was moved up by about one month to around 10 February.

And with the date of 10 February as a basis, the landing in Palembang and vicinity was set on Day X + 60 (around 6 February), the advance to the line connecting Balikpapan, Kendari and Ambon between Day X + 43 and Day X + 48 (20 to 25 January), the landing on Kupang on Day X + 65 (11 February) and the landing on Java on Day X + 70 (16 February).

On 5 January, the Southern Army ordered the Sixteenth Army to prepare for the Java invasion. It also ordered the Third Air Force to destroy the enemy air power on Sumatra.\(^{(61)}\)
The Delay in the Conditioning of the Tarakan and Kuching Airfields

The Army-Navy agreement, which had been informally decided on in Cam Ranh Bay on 29 December and concluded on 1 January 1942, adopted as outline for the Java invasion the plan to envelop Java from both the eastern and western flanks, and roughly set the Navy units’ main direction of attack from Borneo and the areas further east.\(^{(61)}\)

Beginning its southward advance operation with Davao and Jolo Island in the southern Philippines as its bases, the Navy carried out the landing operations on Tarakan and Menado.

The Sakaguchi Detachment (commander: Maj. Gen. Sakaguchi Shizuo, commander of the 56th Mixed Infantry Group) of the Sixteenth Army landed on Tarakan on 11 January and seized the airfield in the western part of the island on the 12th.\(^{(61)}\)

On 11 January, the same day as the Army Sakaguchi Detachment landed on Tarakan Island, the Navy seized Menado with its special landing forces and a parachute unit (consisting of about four hundred paratroopers of the 1001 Unit).\(^{(55)}\)

However, the Tarakan airfield, which had been secured on 12 January, was unexpectedly small and thoroughly destroyed. Furthermore, the minesweeping of the whole waterway made little progress, which delayed the transport of matériel, etc., and the rapid advance of the mid-sized land-based attack plane units was successively delayed.

The paradrop operation executed [on the airfield] in Menado on 11 January was the first-ever paradrop operation by Japanese forces.

The Army, which had planned a paradrop operation against Palembang from early on, raised objections against the Navy’s execution of a paradrop operation against Menado ahead [of the Army]. In the Army’s view, since Menado was not such a significant place [to be seized] with a paradrop operation, it was inappropriate to employ a paradrop operation on such a place and put the allies on their guard. However, the Navy refused to postpone the operation. [The Army and the Navy] ended up by settling on a strange arrangement that the announcement of the execution of the Menado paradrop operation should be made after the Palembang paradrop operation had been successfully concluded.\(^{(21, 39)}\)

Earlier on 24 December, the Kawaguchi Detachment (commander: Maj. Gen. Kawaguchi Kiyotake, commander of the 35th Infantry Brigade) under the direct control of the Southern Army, had seized the Kuching airfield on the southwestern point of Borneo. However, contrary to expectations, that airfield, too, was small, and it was judged that [construction] work of about fifty days would be required to make the airfield large enough to allow [Navy] mid-sized land-based attack planes take off and land when loaded to their full twelve-tons capacity.\(^{(61)}\)

As a substitute [for the Kuching airfield], the Navy requested [the Army] to seize the Ledo airfield about one hundred kilometers to the southwest of Kuching. On 6 January, the Southern Army ordered the Kawaguchi Detachment to seize Ledo.

However, due to a long spell of rain in the Kuching area at that time, the preparations of the Kawaguchi Detachment for the Ledo operation did not make progress.

At that point, the construction of a base in the Kuching area got stalled. On 19 January, the Navy requested that the invasion schedule in the agreement of 1 January be postponed by ten days, and that it would like to discuss the details in [talks for new] arrangements between the commanders on site [to be held] in Manila from 21 January onwards.

On 20 January, Senior Staff Officers Ishii Masayoshi and Tanikawa Kazuo of the Southern Army flew to Cam Ranh Bay and made arrangements with the staff officers of the Navy...
Malaya Unit concerning the operation to disembark air operation matériel on the coast of Endau, as previously told. While promising to cover the transport ships with all its strength, the Navy informed them during the meeting that the conditioning of the airfields in Tarakan and Kuching was making little progress.\(^{(61, 63)}\)

**The Manila Conference\(^*\)**

From 21 to 23 January, an on-site agreement concerning the Java operation was discussed in Manila between the Sixteenth Army, the Third Air Force, the Third Fleet and the Eleventh Air Fleet.

The Southern Army requested that the invasion schedule not be changed and be based on the previous agreement concluded at the beginning of the year in Cam Ranh Bay. However, the Navy requested a postponement of the launch of the operation until the construction of air bases could be completed. The Third Air Force requested that the invasion schedule

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\(^*\) See also Vol. 3, pp. 190ff, 209ff; Vol. 26, pp. 205ff.
should be kept as much as possible by letting the Navy aircraft temporarily deploy to the
airfields in the southern part of the Malay Peninsula such as Kuantan, Kota Bharu, Sungai
Petani, Kahang and others, if the airfields in Kuching and Ledo were unfit for use. However,
apart from Kuching and Ledo, the Navy also explained the situation in Makassar as well as
Balikpapan, etc. on the east coast of Borneo and further east, and described the difficulties in
securing the Banjarmasin airfield, while demanding a ten-day delay.

In the end, it was decided that Banjarmasin should be seized by land by the Sakaguchi
Detachment on its own, and that in the invasion schedule, the landing on Palembang should be [changed] to 10 February (Day X + 64) and the landing on western Java to 21 February
(Day X + 75).

Also, the plan as shown in Illustration No. 52 was presented as an outline of the allotment
of the airfields in the southern part of the Malay Peninsula in case [the airfields in] Kuching
and Ledo were unfit for use.

Both the allotment of the airfields in the southern part of the Malay Peninsula and the in-
vansion schedule were changed several times, affected by the plans of operations of the Army
and Navy and the progress of the operations, etc. The changes in the [invasion] schedule,
which were made seven or eight times from the Central Agreement onwards, were as shown
in Table No. 23.(61)

Table No. 23

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<td>21 January</td>
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<td>Day X + 64</td>
<td>Eastern Java: Day X + 77 (23 February)</td>
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The Third Air Force’s Plan for Supporting the Landing [Operation] on Western Java

The Army-Navy Arrangement on Site for the Air Operations in the Invasion of Java

On 23 January at the Manila Conference, a (draft) memorandum of the arrangements for the western Java landing operation was exchanged between the Sixteenth Army, the Third Air Force, the Third Fleet and the Eleventh Air Fleet.

In the (draft) memorandum, which was formally concluded on 30 January, the employment of the air units was stipulated as follows:(61)

Memorandum of the Arrangements for Operation H between the Sixteenth Army, the Third Air Force, the Third Fleet and the Eleventh Air Fleet (Excerpt)*

The employment of the air units

I. The forces to be employed
   1. The Eleventh Air Fleet
      About 80 Type–1 land-based attack planes
      About 35 Type–96 land-based attack planes
      About 70 Type–0 fighter planes
      About 5 land-based reconnaissance planes
   2. The Third Fleet
      About 50 reconnaissance seaplanes
   3. The Third Air Force
      About 15 strategic reconnaissance aircraft
      About 4 tactical reconnaissance aircraft
      About 40 Type–1 fighter planes
      About 50 Type–97 fighter planes
      About 20 assault planes
      About 20 twin-engine light bombers
      About 30 heavy bombers
      Depending on the situation, the strength of the above forces may slightly change.

II. The bases to be used
   1. [The airfields] in Sumatra, Borneo, etc.
      (1) The Army shall condition and use the Palembang [airfield].
         The Navy may use this [airfield] by advancing several land-based attack planes or as a staging base for about thirty-six land-based attack planes when attacks on enemy surface forces in the Indian Ocean are necessary.
      (2) The Mentok [airfield] shall be conditioned mainly by the Army with the support of the Navy.
         The Army and Navy shall share the airfield with about thirty fighter planes each. However, when the Army starts using the Tanjungkarang airfield, the Navy shall exclusively use the Mentok [airfield].
      (3) The Ledo [airfield] shall be used by the Navy. However, the Army may advance several strategic reconnaissance aircraft there.
      (4) As for the airfields other than the above, those in Sumatra shall be used by the Army and those in Borneo by the Navy.
   2. [The airfields] in Java

* See also Vol. 3, pp. 226ff; Vol. 26, pp. 374ff.
The airfields in Batavia and Cililitan shall be conditioned by the Army and shared by the Army and Navy in the following way:

The Navy: about 36 land-based attack planes
about 27 fighter planes

The Army: about 20 twin-engine light bombers
about 15 strategic reconnaissance aircraft

(2) The airfields in Buitenzorg [Bogor] and Kalijati shall be conditioned and used by the Army. However, if the airfields in Batavia and Cililitan are unfit for use or the conditioning of the airfields should be delayed, the Navy shall advance about twenty-seven fighter planes to the Kalijati [airfield].

III. The outline of the operations

1. The Army and Navy shall promptly destroy the enemy air power in Java. The areas assigned to the Army or the Navy in particular are as follows:

   (1) The areas assigned after the advance of the Army air unit to the Palembang [airfield] shall be roughly set as follows:
   The Navy: [the area] east of 108ºE
   The Army: [the area] west of 108ºE

   (2) Roughly from the time of the Army’s landing, the tasks to destroy the remnants of the enemy air power shall mainly be assigned to the Navy.

2. The attack on enemy naval vessels shall mainly be assigned to the Navy.

3. The cover of the convoy[s] under sail and at anchorage

   (1) The area of the main force of the Sixteenth Army
   (a) The cover before and on Day H – 2 shall be assigned to the Navy.
   Note: The cover in the area to the north of 5ºN shall be assigned to the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet.
   (b) The cover of the transport convoys up to the point of separation of the Shōji Detachment from the main force of the army on Day H – 1 shall be assigned to the Navy. After that, the Navy shall be assigned to the cover of the Shōji Detachment, and the Army to the cover of the rest of the main force of the [Sixteenth] Army. However, guarding against [enemy] submarines shall be wholly assigned to the Navy.

   (2) The area of the 48th Division
   The Third Fleet shall provide guard against [enemy] submarines. It shall also provide guard in the air [over the anchorage] from the time of the transport convoy’s entry into the anchorage until the advance of the fighter plane unit of the Eleventh Air Fleet there.
   The guard other than the above shall be assigned to the Eleventh Air Fleet.

   (3) The air defense over the anchorage
   The Army shall take charge of the air defense all the time until sunset each day over the anchorage for the units landing in Bantam until Day H + 2, and over that for the units landing in Merak until Day H + 1. After that, depending on the situation, it shall provide the cover in the air as needed.

4. The support for the ground operations

   (1) The area of the main force of the Sixteenth Army
   (a) The direct support for the ground operations shall be assigned to the Army.
   (b) The Navy shall take charge of cutting off the enemy transport routes in the Cilacap area. It shall also take charge of attacks on enemy reinforcements or forces in retreat when requested by the Army.

   (2) The area of the 48th Division
The Third Fleet shall take charge of the direct support for the ground operations, while the Eleventh Air Fleet shall appropriately provide support at the request of the Army. If possible, the Army [air unit] shall join [in the direct support operation.]

IV. Information
1. Military gains of the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power, the reconnaissance results of enemy airfields, weather information, etc. shall promptly be shared between the Army and Navy air units.
2. Other intelligence on enemy movements shall be exchanged every time [it is obtained].

V. The allotment [of facilities] and rules about the use of the shared airfields
The allotment [of facilities] and rules about the use of the airfields shared by the Army and Navy shall be arranged between senior commanding officers of the Army and Navy [units], which [actually] use the airfield.

VI. The identification of friends
Conforms to the agreement between the Southern Army and the Combined Fleet.

Article XIII of the main text of the memorandum of the arrangements stipulated the following points:
1. With the aim of advancing a Navy air base, the 48th Division shall seize and condition the airfield on Bali with one element in conjunction with the Navy no later than Day I - 2.
   Note by the author: Day I indicates the day of the landing on eastern Java.
2. In concert with the ground operations, the Navy shall neutralize [the enemy on] the waters south of Java and block the enemy’s retreat.
3. Details other than the above shall be discussed and decided between the commanders of landing troops, escort units and air units concerned.

The Intelligence Concerning the Air Arm of the British and Dutch Forces Before the Java Invasion [Operation]
When the Army and Navy on site were working on the arrangements for the Java invasion operation in Manila, the Army General Staff informed them of the following increase in enemy air power, which led the Southern Army to anticipate that encounter battles with allied air units would soon occur in the Java area.(61, 63)

The Situation of [Enemy] Reinforcements to Its Air Forces in the Far East (Army General Staff)
1. Already added
   100 Aircraft [to the forces] in Burma, 110 aircraft in Malaya, 10 aircraft in the Dutch East Indies, and 100 aircraft in India, aggregating to 320 aircraft (including 40 aircraft transferred from Chongqing).
2. Shifted within east Asia
   40 Aircraft from India to Burma, 40 aircraft from the Dutch East Indies to Malaya, 50 aircraft from Australia to Malaya, and 30 aircraft from Australia to the Dutch East Indies.
3. Aircraft to be shortly added to the forces in east Asia
   245 Aircraft from mainland Britain and Egypt (64 bombers and 181 fighter planes), 40 aircraft from the United States to the Dutch East Indies (fighter planes), and 80 aircraft of the Australian air forces, which will return from mainland Britain and north Africa (three bomber squadrons and two fighter squadrons), aggregating to 365 aircraft.
4. 240 Aircraft were added to [the forces in] Egypt from mainland Britain.
5. The increase of U.S. aircraft in the above
Already increased: 90 aircraft in Malaya, 10 aircraft in the Dutch East Indies, aggregating to 100 aircraft (60 fighter planes and 40 very heavy bombers).
To be increased shortly: 40 aircraft in the Dutch East Indies.

In the meantime, the Third Air Force, which had reconnoitered the airfields in Medan, Pekanbaru, Palembang and Mentok from mid-December onwards, [started] earnestly reconnoitering the Palembang airfield from the beginning of January.

The 81st Air Group, consisting of Type–100 strategic reconnaissance aircraft, took photographs of the landing areas of the main force of the Sixteenth Army, and reconnoitered the enemy movements in Java. [Particularly,] on 2 February, the 2d Squadron of the air group (commander: Capt. Moriya Masahiro: graduate of the 48th class) took off from the Kuala Lumpur [airfield] and successfully took sequence photographs of the coast where the main force of the Sixteenth Army was scheduled to go ashore.\(^{(98)}\)

The squadron advanced to the Kluang airfield from 3 February onwards, expanded the area of reconnaissance and confirmed around 10 February that as many as ninety-eight aircraft in total of various types, namely, twelve very large (four-engine) aircraft, twenty-eight large (twin-engine) aircraft, twenty mid-sized (single-engine) aircraft and thirty-eight small aircraft were in western Java.

The airfields, which the enemy clearly intended to use, were the civilian airfield in Batavia, the airfields in Batavia, Cililitan, Buitenzorg [Bogor], Kalijati, and the Bandung west airfield, along with the seaplane base in Batavia.

The layouts of the airfields were judged to be as shown in Illustration No. 53, and it was concluded that the main force of the U.S. and Dutch air units was assembling in the area where the Army Air Unit was assigned to conduct its air campaign to destroy enemy air power.\(^{(61, 87)}\)

**The Plan of Operations of the Third Air Force**

The Third Air Force went ahead with its plan and preparations for the Java operations in parallel with the preparations for the Singapore and the southern Sumatra operations. On 14 February, it decided on the following plan for the western Java air operation.\(^{(97)}\)

**The Outline of Air Operations Against Western Java**

1. **14 February 1942**
   Third Air Force headquarters

### I. The mission

1. In conjunction with the navy, [the Third Air Force shall], in the wake of Operation L, swiftly destroy the enemy air power in western Java, and closely support the Sixteenth Army’s operations in western Java.

2. In order to attain the aims in the previous item, it shall quickly advance its bases to southern Sumatra and then to western Java.

3. [The Third Air Force shall] expect that, from the final stage of this operation, [the general operation] may be shifted to a large-scale drawn-out war, where the seized areas shall be secured, and that forces may be transferred to other theaters.

### II. The outline of directives

* See also Vol. 3, p. 447.
Illustration No. 53 — The Situation of Enemy Air Forces in the Java area (Around 10 February 1942)

Notes:
1. Numbers in ( ) were spotted on 5 Feb.
2. Sizes of airfields were based on the pre-war information of the Navy General Staff.
1. When the airfields in Palembang and Tanjungkarang are seized and conditioned, first of all, the enemy air power in western Java (the area west of 108°E) shall be destroyed.

2. On the day before the landing of the main force of the Sixteenth Army (indicated by Day H and scheduled for 26 February), [the Third Air Force shall] be assigned to the cover of the transport convoys and then the air defense of their anchorages. As for the cover of the convoy under sail, it shall provide the antiaircraft guard for the main force of the 2d Division after [its passing] the point of the separation of the Shōji Detachment (Point J). Note by the author: Day H had been changed in accordance with the change of Day L.

3. When the enemy airfields in western Java are seized and conditioned after the landing of the main force of the Sixteenth Army, [air] bases shall swiftly be advanced [there]. At the same time, it shall be expected that air-ground support unit[s] put [under the command of] the Sixteenth Army* may be attached to the [Third] Air Force.

4. [The Third Air Force shall] provide direct support for the ground combat of the Sixteenth Army after the latter’s landing.

5. [The actions of] the Army and Navy in conjunction shall be conducted in conformity to the arrangements separately made [between them].

6. Depending on the circumstances, [the Third Air Force] may directly support the 48th Division’s operations in eastern Java.

III. Forces to be employed

1. The distribution of forces shall be planned as follows:
   - The unit under the direct control [of the Third Air Force]
     - The 81st Air Group
   - The 12th Air Division
     - One squadron of the 1st Air Group
     - The 11th Air Group
   - The 3d Air Division
     - The 15th Independent Air Unit (minus the 51st Independent Air Squadron)
     - The 59th Air Group
   - The 64th Air Group
   - The 27th Air Group (minus one squadron)
   - The 90th Air Group
   - The 75th Air Group

2. The tasks of each unit based on the above distribution of forces shall roughly be planned as follows:
   (1) The 81st Air Group
       Reconnoitering the situation of the enemy airfields, searching for the location of the convoys, photographing the landing points, and other general reconnaissance.
   (2) The 12th Air Division
       Conducting the air campaign to destroy enemy air power, providing cover for the convoy under sail, providing air defense over the anchorages, and as needed, providing air defense over the key places.
   (3) The 3d Air Division
       Conducting the air campaign to destroy enemy air power, providing [direct] support for the ground operations, and as needed, providing cover for the convoys.

3. Other than the above, one element of the 7th Air Division may be employed.

IV. Others

* See also Vol. 3, p. 469.
1. During Operation H, the 7th Air Division and one element each of the 3d and 12th Air Divisions may be employed to support the Twenty-fifth Army in the latter’s northern Sumatra operation.

2. During this operation, one element of the 12th Air Division may be assigned to the air defense of key places in the occupied areas of Singapore and other places if required.

3. [The Third Air Force] shall expect that, from the final stages of this operation onwards, [its forces] may be [employed for] the support of mop-up operations, shifted to dispositions for a drawn-out war (permanent stationings should be considered) or transferred to other theaters.

The Plan of Operations of the Sixteenth Army (See Illustration No. 54)

The Outline of the Plan of Operations of the Sixteenth Army

The Sixteenth Army (commander: Lt. Gen. Imamura Hitoshi), which was tasked with the invasion of the Dutch East Indies, consisted of three divisions, the 2d, the 38th and the 48th Divisions, and one mixed infantry group as the core. On 5 January, it was ordered to prepare for the invasion of Java, after which the army worked on the plan of operations for the invasion of Java.

The Sixteenth Army’s plan of the Java invasion operation was roughly fixed around the time of the Manila Conference, and was revised and supplemented after that.* The outline of operations, which was finally decided on, was as follows.(93)

The mission of the operation in this plan clearly specified that [the operation was] premised on securing the command of the air, which was a matter of course, but unusual as a plan of operations drawn up by a ground army.

1. **Mission**

   After the Army and Navy air units have destroyed the enemy air power and secured command of the air over Java, the [Sixteenth] Army shall, on 26 February, force simultaneous landings at both the eastern and western fronts on mainland Java under the cover of the Navy and capture the whole island in a short period of time.

2. **Disposition [of forces]**

   (1) The 48th Division shall embark at Lingayen, and under the cover of the Navy, it shall land in or near Rembang and Kragan in eastern Java, seize Surabaya first and then Malang, and mop up [the enemy in] eastern Java. Prior to the landing of the main force, one element shall conduct a surprise attack on Bali and seize it.

   (2) The Sakaguchi Detachment shall sail along with the 48th Division from Borneo, capture central Java and charge toward Cilacap in one go.

   (3) The 2d Division shall depart from Cam Ranh Bay along with the main force of the [Sixteenth] Army, land in or near Merak with one element and at Bantam Bay with the main force, and seize Batavia and Buitenzorg first.

   (4) The Shōji Detachment shall, after advancing along with the convoy of the main force of the [Sixteenth] Army, separate from it, go ashore in or near Eretan, seize the Kalijati airfield with a surprise attack and cut off the communication between Batavia and Cirebon.

   (5) After capturing Batavia, [the Sixteenth Army] shall seize the Bandung stronghold with the Shōji Detachment and the 2d Division.

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* See also Vol. 3, p. 433.

** See also Vol. 3, p. 434.
Illustration No. 54 — The Course of the Sixteenth Army's Offensive Against Java (February- March 1942)
The Plan of the Third Air Force for the Constructing and Conditioning of Bases

In the Sixteenth Army’s plan, it was stated that the Shōji Detachment and the 2d Division should be assigned to the capture of [the airfields in] Kalijati, Batavia and Buitenzorg, and the air-ground support units assigned to the construction and conditioning of each airfield, were supposed to respectively accompany them.

On 12 February, the Third Air Force drew up a plan for the construction and conditioning of its air bases, in which the allotment of ships to the units in charge of conditioning was as shown in Table No. 24.\(^{87}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Airfield to be conditioned</th>
<th>Kalijati</th>
<th>Batavia and Buitenzorg [Bogor]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scheduled date to advance to the airfield</td>
<td>Day H (the day of the landing of the main force of the 16th Army)</td>
<td>(Day H + 4) [for Batavia], (Day H + 3) [for Buitenzorg]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground unit to accompany</td>
<td>Shōji Det</td>
<td>2d Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of ships</td>
<td><em>Yamazuki-maru</em></td>
<td><em>Shinanogawa-maru</em> and <em>Toyooka-maru</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The units under the command of 4th Air-Ground Support headquarters Commander Lt. Col. Sugimura Takayoshi, which were tasked with the construction and conditioning of these air bases, had participated in the Philippines operations at the time of the opening of hostilities and, from early January onwards, had been preparing for the shift to Java.

** Probably a misprint: 340 (5).
The Employment [Plan] of the [Paratroop] Raiding Group Examined Right After the Capture of Palembang

The Employment of the [Paratroop] Raiding Unit [in] the Plan of the Java Operation [Examined]

On 14 February, the Third Air Force drew up the plan of its operations against western Java as stated in the above, however, it did not include the employment of the [Paratroop] Raiding Group.

On 17 February, right after the Palembang operation, the [Third] Air Force sounded out the Southern Army on whether to employ the [paratroop] raiding unit in the Java operation.

At that time, the Southern Army had not [yet] definitely decided the [next] employment plan of the [paratroop] raiding unit, and it was examining the following three plans.

1. To employ [the paratroop raiding unit] for the attack on the stronghold of Cilacap in the invasion operation on mainland Java in order to block the enemy retreat.
2. To employ [the paratroop raiding unit] in the attack on the stronghold of Sabang in northern Sumatra.
3. To employ [the paratroop raiding unit] in the capture operation of the Andaman Islands.

Meanwhile on the 17th, Staff Officer Lieutenant Colonel Itoda of the Sixteenth Army reported the following to the Sixteenth Army headquarters from Palembang:

In this operation, it is impossible to speak without tears about the brave and strenuous fight of all the officers and men of the [Paratroop] Raiding Group. Since only a [small] part of each company of the 2d Regiment did not participate in this operation, we have no choice but to employ as the main body the same men who were employed for the Palembang operation, if the [Paratroop] Raiding Group were to be employed in [an operation against] Cilacap. Since I have witnessed the fighting, I don’t have the heart to urge them into another such action. I propose that you call off the employment of the [Paratroop] Raiding Group against Cilacap.

At that time, about five hundred men of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment were stationed in Sungai Petani, while the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit (twenty-four or twenty-five aircraft) and the 12th Air Transport Squadron (five or six aircraft) were supporting the Third Air Force’s advance to the Palembang [airfield]. Their aircraft needed to be serviced after these tasks.

On 20 February, the Southern Army was instructed by the IGHQ [Army Department] to aggressively employ the [Paratroop] Raiding Group in securing oil resources.

The Southern Army immediately examined the employment of the 1st Paratroop Raiding Group and on 24 February it informally decided to employ the group in the northern Sumatra operation against Pangkalan Brandan, a storage center of refined oil, and communicated the plan to the units concerned.

The northern Sumatra operation was scheduled to be conducted in the wake of the Java operation, and Pangkalan Brandan was known for its production of high-grade gasoline.

Receiving this directive, the Third Air Force was worried that, by the time the paratroop operation against Pangkalan Brandan should be implemented, the availability ratio of fighter planes, which was [already] low at that time, would further worsen to the point that provid-
ing sufficient support for the [paradrop] raiding operation might become impossible. Besides, it was judged that now the enemy had found out about the [Japanese paratroop] raiding unit, it would no longer be easy to conduct a surprise attack.

On the afternoon of the 24th, Lt. Col. Kinoshita Hideaki (graduate of the 35th class) attached to the [Paradrop] Raiding Group, who was examining the [paradrop] raiding operation, obtained intelligence that the facilities in Pangkalan Brandan had already been destroyed by the enemy, and reported it to the Southern Army.

The [Third] Air Force immediately reconnoitered the area and confirmed on the 26th that about eighty percent of the oil refining equipment, power station[s], etc. had been destroyed.

On that day, the Southern Army canceled the employment of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group for [the operation against] Pangkalan Brandan, and also decided not to use the group in the Java operation, either.\(^{(61, 64, 76, 210)}\)

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**War Lessons Learned from the Palembang [Paradrop] Raiding Operation**

After the Palembang operation, the [1st Paratroop] Raiding Group reviewed the operation and reported its findings to the Southern Army as follows:\(^{(61, 211)}\)

**Review of the Palembang Operation**

1. Matters concerning the employment
   1. Observations concerning the reasons for the success of the surprise attack
      
      The reasons for the success of this operation can be summerized in the following five points:
      
      1. The officers and men of the [paratroop] Raiding Group had truly internalized the raiding spirit and were motivated by a sincere devotion to the emperor.
      2. The display of a dedicated, self-sacrificing, cooperative spirit by the supporting air units.
      3. The appropriateness of the use and tactics of the [Paratroop] Raiding Group. (Details will be given later.)
      4. The poor morale of the enemy.
      5. Meteorological effects. (Details will be given later.)
   2. The targets (objectives) of the operation
      
      At first the [Paratroop] Raiding Group had expected nothing more than an attack on static targets with the acquisition of resources in view. However, the Southern Army showed [the significance of] the objectives in terms of not only the operation against Sumatra but also that against Java, which made the targets ideal operational objectives for the [Paratroop] Raiding Unit.
   3. The timing of the operation
      
      One of the factors of the success of the tactical surprise attack was that the enemy had focused on the preparations for resistance in the Singapore area, which made the preparations for [resistance in] the Palembang area insufficient. Although the enemy had prepared a large amount of yellow powder on the bank of the Musi River opposite [to the oil refineries] to blow them up, taken by surprise by the attack, it had no opportunity to use it.
   4. The results of the air campaign to destroy enemy air power and the employment of the [Paratroop] Raiding Group
      
      Despite the fact that the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power had been conducted several times over, about a dozen large and small enemy aircraft were still on the ground, even on the day of the execution of the raiding [operation]. As just described, it is normal that the air campaign to destroy enemy air power prior to the execution of a [paradrop] raiding operation cannot always be perfect. Since also in the future a [paradrop] raiding opera-
tion may often [have to] be conducted before the completion of the air campaign to destroy enemy air power, it is necessary to not only cover the group with a powerful unit of fighters and bombers, but also upgrade the armament of the [paratroop] raiding air unit itself.

(5) The process from concentration to deployment

In this [paradrop] raiding operation, [the Paratroop Raiding Group] had [had to] take three steps of deployment before executing the [paradrop] raiding operation, i.e. [the deployment at] Phnom Penh (the stationing base), [that at] Sungai Petani (the operational base) and [that at] Kahang (the launching base). This was desirable in terms of concealing the plan, but it required the ground personnel to be separately assigned to each base, which was a weak point.

(6) The training before the implementation of the operation

The air transport unit went into the operation without adequate training in parachute drops. In the future, it is necessary that the air unit dedicated to the [paradrop] raiding [operation] shall be constantly trained, and that the pilots should be trained and given adequate training hours before being employed.

Since [more] importance was attached to the concealment of the plan, no drills in airlifting and parachuting were allowed.

2. Matters concerning the attack

(1) The reasons for the success of the tactical surprise attack

The aircraft descended below the clouds after taking a 180 degrees turn in the sky over Mentok. However, [seeing] strati all over in the Palembang area and some openings between the clouds at places, the aircraft climbed a little to fly above the clouds again, which fortunately enabled them to conceal the plan by flying above the clouds up to the sky over the target.

It was not until about half of the paratroopers had descended that the enemy antiaircraft fire opened up on them. The enemy later testified that they had judged [the operation] to be a large-scale bombing attack by the Japanese air forces, and that all of them had jumped into bomb shelters, just when the parachute drop started.

(2) The preliminary reconnaissance

The assessment of the photos of the paradrop zone was inadequate. The zone, which was judged to be suitable for descending, consisted of places with grass a little taller than a man’s height, or of wetlands. While the officers of the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit had conducted preliminary reconnaissances from strategic reconnaissance aircraft, the officers of the [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment need to conduct preliminary reconnaissances as well.

(3) The battles after the parachute drop

- The study and drill of combat methods under circumstances where taking command [of troops] is difficult is urgently needed. The allocation of aircraft based on the original formation of the unit also needs to be reconsidered.
- It is most essential for a para unit consisting of a small number of paratroopers to drum into every single man a strong offensive spirit.
- The priority in training should not be the paradrop training but the ground combat [training].
- The ground combat [training] should be focussed on close combat [training].
- A wide-ranging training (for example in the use of seized arms, steering [seized] vehicles, or [getting familiar with enemy] languages, etc.) is necessary so that [the paratroopers] can fight under any circumstances after their drop.

Among the views concerning formation and equipment, the following points were raised:

1. In the formation of the [Paratroop] Raiding Regiment, priority should be given to firepower that is suitable for close combat. Personnel with great talent should be assembled as members
of the regiment, and those with special skills should be included in the formation down to squad level.

2. The transport aircraft of the [Paratroop] Raiding Air Unit should be improved so that the personnel and their gear can be dropped from the same aircraft at the same time.

   Also, in [operations against] oil refineries etc., the concept of simultaneously airlifting the necessary antiaircraft armaments needs to be included, so that antiaircraft measures can be taken right after the drop.

3. Parachutes should be standardized on the fifty-five square meters size. [In this operation] two different sizes of fifty-five square meters and forty square meters were used.

4. The radio sets, medical matériel, etc. need to be packed in a waterproofed (damp-proofed) way.

   (Details omitted by the author)

On 1 March, the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group was removed from the command of the Third Air Force and put under the direct control of the Southern Army, and in preparation for an operation in the Burma theater, the whole group was briefly concentrated in Phnom Penh in mid-March to start training. (61, 211)

The Third Air Force’s Disposition of Forces for the Air Campaign to Destroy the Enemy Air Power in Western Java

On 16 February, Third Air Force Commander Sugawara announced the following disposition of forces concerning the air operation against western Java in the wake of the capture of Singapore and Palembang. (87)

1. When the Palembang airfield is conditioned, the 3d Air Division commander shall successively advance the necessary forces to Palembang.

   For the time being the 3d Air Division shall be assigned the following tasks:

   (1) To destroy the enemy air power in western Java to the west of 108°E.

   (2) To provide direct support with the necessary strength to the 38th Division in its engagements in southern Sumatra.

   (3) To prepare for supporting the Twenty-fifth Army’s operation on and near Bintan Island with one element.

   After the conditioning of the Tengah airfield, it shall advance one element [there].

2. The 7th Air Division commander shall prepare to reinforce the southern Sumatra operation unit with about one air group of heavy bombers. The main force of the air division is scheduled to be stationed at the airfields in the Kedah sector to support the Twenty-fifth Army’s northern Sumatra operation.

   It shall condition the Sembawang airfield and use it as an operational air base along with the Kluang airfield.

3. The 12th Air Division commander shall support the Twenty-fifth Army’s operation on and near Bintan Island with one element, while successively advancing its main force to the Palembang airfield and continuing the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power.

   After the conditioning of the Kallang airfield, it shall advance one element [there].

4. The 81st Air Group commander shall use the Palembang airfield as his operational air base.

On 15 February, the main force of the 11th Air Group and one squadron of the 27th Air Group advanced to the Palembang airfield, which was followed by the advance of the main force of the 3d Air Division (except for the 75th Air Group) by the 18th.
From 19 February onwards, the 3rd Air Division launched the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in Java.\textsuperscript{(61, 87)}

2. Finishing the Preparations for the Java Invasion [Operation]

The Advance of the Air Bases \textit{(See Illustration No. 55)}

\textbf{Pioneering the Stepping-Stone Tactics}

The key to the success of the Java landing operation was securing command of the air, for which the advance of Japanese air bases to the areas surrounding the island was indispensable.

At that time, the action radius of a combination of Japanese bombers and fighters was less than one thousand kilometers. In order to execute this operation crossing about three thousand kilometers over the ocean from French Indochina or the Philippines necessarily required several air base leaps.

The rapid advance of air bases was [attained by] repeating the sequence of ‘securing command of the air — landing [troops by] convoys — conditioning airfields — rapidly advancing air units — and push forward the command of the air.’ It might well be called a precursor of the stepping-stone (leapfrogging) tactics, which were later praised and employed by General MacArthur in his operations in the South Pacific theater.

The stepping-stones were placed roughly along four lines from north to south along Malaya, the west coast of Borneo, the east coast of Borneo and the areas further east. The Malaya operation, which was [in one view] an overland operation with an original operational objective of capturing strategic places and destroying the military potential of the enemy [there], can also be seen, from the viewpoint of the Sumatra and the Java operations, as an operation to advance the bases for air operations.

\textbf{The Situation at the End of January}

At the end of January, the airfields in Kluang and Kahang in the southern part of the Malay Peninsula were seized. On the west coast of Borneo, the airfield in Ledo was seized on 27 January as an alternative to the Kuching airfield.

On the east coast of Borneo and the area further east, Balikpapan as well as Kendari on Celebes were captured on 24 January, and Ambon near Ceram Island was captured on 30 January.\textsuperscript{(93)}

While the conditioning of both the Kuching and Ledo airfields by the Navy 22nd Air Flotilla was making little progress, that of the bases in Celebes progressed relatively smoothly and allowed the 23rd Air Flotilla to deploy in Balikpapan and the 21st Air Flotilla in Kendari.

Particularly, the air unit in Kendari was able to successfully secure a quite advantageous position for providing air support to the Java invasion [operation] from the Banda Sea area, by also timely using the airfield on Ambon.\textsuperscript{(55, 56)}
Illustration No. 55 — The Outline of the Positions Taken for the Java Invasion [Operation] (December 1941 – February 1942)
The Situation until Mid-February

On 6 February, the Third Air Force ([with] its command post at Kluang) launched air strikes against southern Sumatra.* (61)

On the 10th, the main force of the Sixteenth Army, which was to land in western Java, assembled in Cam Ranh Bay, while on the same day, the Sakaguchi Detachment seized Banjarmasin from Balikpapan by land.** (61, 93)

On the 14th, the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group carried out a [paradrop] raid on Palembang. This operation was of great significance in the sense that from then on direct air strikes on western Java became possible from Palembang, which rapidly enlarged the readiness to conduct air attacks on western Java.

On the 18th, the Navy Air Unit attacked the enemy naval base in Surabaya, a strategic point in eastern Java, and inflicted damage to enemy destroyers and other [vessels,] which had taken refuge there, and also brought down U.S. aircraft. Then on the 19th, the Army aircraft on the Palembang airfield finally launched the air campaign to destroy enemy air power in western Java.*** On the same day, the 19th, the Navy landed on Bali, while the Carrier Task Force conducted air strikes on Port Darwin in large numbers.

On the 20th, the Navy unit [once again] employed a parachute unit and an Army-Navy [joint] unit [in the attack] on Kupang, a relay airfield connecting Java and Australia on Timor Island, and seized it.****

On the 19th, the Navy returned the 22d Air Flotilla, which had operated under the command of the [Navy] Malaya Unit from the opening of hostilities onwards, to its original unit (the Eleventh Air Fleet).

The commander in chief of the Eleventh Air Fleet, V. Adm. Tsukahara Nishizō, designated the 22d Air Flotilla at Kuching as the 3d Air Raid Unit, and along with the 1st Air Raid Unit (consisting of the 21st Air Flotilla as the core, with its headquarters at Kendari) and the 2d Air Raid Unit (consisting of the 23d Air Flotilla, with its headquarters at Balikpapan), he took command of these three units and launched the full-scale air operations against Java. (56)

On the 20th, the 22d Air Flotilla commander in Kuching gave up on the conditioning of the Ledo airfield as the alternative base to the Kuching airfield and requested the Third Air Force to let the air flotilla share the Palembang airfield. However, because of its [limited] capacity, it was decided that the Navy mid-sized land-based attack plane unit should advance to the Gelumbang airfield, which was newly discovered near Palembang, to conduct the air strikes against Java. (55)

While the frustration of the conditioning of the Kuching and Ledo airfields in the west coast sector of Borneo was no doubt also caused by inadequate preliminary gathering of information about the sector and the unexpected [heavy] rainfall, it was very much attributable to the Navy’s inability to [efficiently conduct] its construction work. Although this became invisible behind the smooth progress of the entire [southern] operation and did not become an issue, the situation at the Army was substantially the same, and this deficiency was later fully exposed in [the operations] in the South Pacific theater.

* See also p. 243.
** See also Vol. 3, pp. 391ff; Vol. 26, pp. 256ff.
*** See also p. 256.
**** See also Vol. 3, pp. 408ff; Vol. 26, pp. 351ff.
The Conditioning of the Tanjungkarang Airfield

On 17 February, along with the advance landing unit of the 38th Division, the 7th Airfield Company and one element of the 33d Airfield Company sailed upstream the Musi River and advanced to the Palembang airfield, where they took charge of the ground service of the airfield in cooperation with one squad of the wireless unit, an aerology detail, and others. Meanwhile, Staff Officer Itoda of the Sixteenth Army, who had advanced to the Palembang along with the [1st Paratroop] Raiding Group commander, directed about two companies of the advance party of the 38th Division, which had arrived in Palembang at 0000 on 16 February, to quickly charge toward Martapura and Tanjungkarang. The detachment pursued the enemy on the run southward along a poor road for about three hundred kilometers, spotted the Tanjungkarang airfield (an unfinished runway of 150 meters in width and 700 meters in length) on the 21st and immediately started on conditioning it. The main force of the ground service personnel of the 11th Air Group immediately started from Palembang to follow them.

On the afternoon of the 23d, Staff Officer Miyashi of the [Third] Air Force reconnoitered the airfield and tried a landing, but unable to land because it was unfinished, he returned. At 1300 on the 24th, the ground service personnel of the 11th Air Group finally reached Tanjungkarang, and immediately started conditioning the airfield. On that evening, the main force of the flight unit of the 12th Air Division rapidly advanced to the airfield and worked on the preparations for the operation to cover the convoys from the 25th onwards.
The Remarkable Service of the 7th Airfield Company

The unit, which was tasked with the service of the Palembang airfield, was the 7th Airfield Company (commander: Capt. Nakanishi Takio). The company, which had been stationed in Sanya at the time of the opening of hostilities, landed in Palembang on the night of 16 February along with the 38th Division to participate in the southern Sumatra operation.

After the landing, the company took charge of the airfield service with a small number of personnel, which, right after the capture, was challenging, and by supporting the 3d and the 12th Air Divisions’ air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in western Java and enabling the flight units to display their military might, it became the great power behind the scenes. As for aviation fuel, it moved gasoline from the oil refineries sector to the airfield. From 21 February onwards, the company advanced one element to the Tanjungkarang airfield and serviced the airfield there, too.

After the completion of the Java operation, the company was conferred on a citation of merit by Third Air Force Commander Sugawara.

The Air Campaign to Destroy the Enemy Air Power in Western Java

The Launch of the Attack by the Army Air Unit

The first air strike against western Java was conducted against Batavia on 9 February by a Navy fighter plane unit (consisting of sixteen Type–0 fighters, which had been advanced to the Kuching airfield).* On 11 February, when the Third Air Force was supporting the Singapore invasion operation while conducting the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power on Palembang, twenty-seven Navy land-based attack planes, which had been advanced to the Kuantan airfield, made a sortie to conduct air strikes on western Java, but, due to bad weather, only attacked enemy ships near Bangka Island instead.

Since then, the Navy air unit shifted to attacking enemy naval vessels evacuating from Singapore, and its air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in western Java was suspended.**

The full-scale air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in Java was launched after the capture of Palembang.

The First Strike of the 3d Air Division — the Attack on [the Airfield in] Buitenzorg

On 15 February, Third Air Force Commander Sugawara assigned the 3d and the 12th Air Division commanders to advance the necessary forces to the Palembang airfield to launch the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in western Java.

Third Air Division Commander Endō had his main force rapidly advance to the Palembang airfield and started the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in western Java on the 19th.

At 0900 on the 19th, leading nineteen Type–1 fighter planes including those of the 59th Air Group, 64th Air Group Commander Katō** took off from the Palembang airfield along with five light bombers of the 90th Air Group. At 1015, the fighter plane unit spotted nine

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* See also Vol. 26, pp. 402ff.
** See also p. 256.
U.S. Army Air Force Curtiss fighters (P–36s) at an altitude of about 2,500 meters at a point north of the target, the Buitenzorg airfield, immediately attacked them and brought down seven. During this period, the light bomber unit conducted a bombardment on sixteen large and four small aircraft on the ground. It bombed and strafed at nine large aircraft, set ablaze four of them, and all returned safely.

**The Second Strike — the Attack on the Bandung Sector**

At 1525, twenty-eight fighter planes and nine light bombers again departed from the Palembang [airfield] to carry out an attack on the Bandung airfield.

Around 1640, the unit of fighters and bombers encountered about twenty P–43 enemy fighters in the sky over the Bandung west airfield and engaged them in air combat. During this period, the light bombers bombed eight large and nine small aircraft on the ground and set ablaze five large aircraft.

In the air combat, the fighter unit brought down ten aircraft (of which three were unconfirmed). While heading back, it spotted two B–17s in the sky over the mountains between Bandung and Batavia, attacked them in turn, and brought them down (unconfirmed). One aircraft each of both air groups did not return.\(^{(100, 103, 105, 122, 214)}\)

The situation at the time of bringing down the two B–17s was as follows:

While heading back, the twenty-eight aircraft of the 59th and the 64th Air Groups, which had raided the Bandung west airfield at 1640 on 19 February, spotted two B–17s in the sky over the mountains northwest of Bandung, which seemed to be evacuating by air.

Although both air groups fired at [both] B–17s in turn, the latter calmly continued their flight. Before long, their crews successively bailed out, but the B–17s, which had possibly been set on autopilot, continued flying. From the number of crew, who bailed out from the aircraft, the air groups concluded that the B–17s had been brought down, though unconfirmed, and returned.\(^{(109)}\)

**The Third Strike — The Raid on the Kalijati [Airfield]**

Around 1430 on the next day, the 20th, the 3d Air Division raided the Kalijati airfield with ten light bombers of the 90th Air Group and twenty-four fighter planes, bombed and strafed the bulk of twenty-five large and thirteen mid-sized and small aircraft on the ground and set ablaze eight large aircraft.\(^{(100, 103)}\)

**The Fourth Strike — The Raids on the Bandung and the Kalijati [Airfields]**

Following the [first] three strikes, on 21 February, the 3d Air Division commander planned to execute an attack on the Bandung [airfield] again. On that day, [64th] Air Group Commander Katō decided to carry out a raid in combination with fifteen [aircraft] of the 90th Air Group, he himself leading fifteen [aircraft] of the 59th Air Group and fourteen [aircraft] of the 64th Air Group. Right before departure, the 90th Air Group received a report that the weather in Bandung and vicinity was poor, and changed its target to the Kalijati [airfield]. Commander Katō of the [64th] Air Group had the 59th Air Group accompany the light bombers of the 90th Air Group, while having his 64th Air Group carry out a raid on Bandung on its own.\(^{(61, 87)}\)
Around 1235, when the Katō Air Group entered the sky over the Bandung area at an altitude of about six thousand meters, seven enemy P-43s were already patrolling the sky. The enemy aircraft persistently attacked the air group from higher altitudes, which forced the air group into a hard fight, but finally it got out of its predicament. Then, the air group spotted four enemy fighters over Bandung and carried out a surprise attack, but could not confirm the results due to clouds. While the air group brought down one [enemy aircraft] in the surprise attack (unconfirmed), one aircraft of the air group did not return, either.\(^{119, 122}\)

Meanwhile, the unit, which attacked the Kalijati [airfield], conducted strikes on twenty-three large aircraft on the ground, bombed and strafed all of them and set ablaze six.\(^{87, 103}\)

The Katō Air Group, which fought the air battle in the sky over Bandung and vicinity on that day, was once again impressed by the strong bullet-proof armor of the U.S. aircraft.\(^{119}\)

For reference: An excerpt from the journal kept by Hinoki Yohei (21 February)

Attempted a surprise attack [on the enemy aircraft]. Although their wings were chipped by high explosive shells, they did not catch fire. I hate the enemy’s bullet-proof armor!

Palembang Bombed

The Damage to the Palembang Oil Refineries

While the preparations for the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in western Java was making steady progress, the enemy persistently raided Palembang with a small number of aircraft.

Four enemy aircraft on aggregate came for raids in three waves on 15 February, which was followed by nine aircraft on aggregate in three waves on the afternoon of the 16th, and on the 17th, twelve fighters including Hurricanes came for a raid all together.\(^{87}\)

Following the 11th Air Group, which had advanced to the Palembang [airfield] on the 17th, the 3d Squadron of the 1st Air Group also participated in the air defense of Palembang from the 19th onwards.

However, the enemy came every time for raids with a small number of aircraft and approached from a low altitude, while making use of the black smoke arising from the oil refineries, which made the air defense quite difficult.

On 18 February, Staff Officer Satō Hiroo of the Southern Army, who had advanced to the Palembang oil refineries on the morning of the 16th, submitted the following report on the prospects for the acquisition of oil to the Southern Army headquarters:

It is expected that we will be able to secure about 150,000 tons of crude oil and about 400,000 tons of refined oil at the BPM oil refinery (the British oil refinery in the Plaju sector) and seventy thousand to eighty thousand tons of refined oil at the NKPM oil refinery (note by the author: the oil refinery in the Sungaigerong sector). An allocation of tankers and the urgent dispatch of a large number of engineers is required.

On the 19th, single enemy Blenheims raided [the Palembang area] in three waves at an interval of five minutes from 1530, and set ablaze one Type–97 fighter plane and inflicted some damage to two on the airfield. Furthermore, the aviation fuel tanks on the western oil refinery were hit and began to burn, resulting in about forty-eight hundred kiloliters of fuel destroyed by fire. Two enemy aircraft (one unconfirmed) were brought down.
On the afternoon of the 20th, the Palembang oil refineries again came under a raid by one enemy aircraft, which made the tanks at the BPM Refinery burn even more fiercely. Moreover, on the afternoon of the 21st, the distillation equipment of the BPM Refinery was hit and destroyed.\(^{(87, 103, 104)}\)

The Southern Army belatedly set about further strengthening the air defenses at the Palembang oil refineries.

**The Delay in the Air Defense of Palembang**

The Southern Army had previously made the observation that [problems with] the air defense of Palembang could be solved by the Third Air Force’s air defense efforts.\(^{(61, 67)}\)

However, at Palembang, where no air air raid warning system nor antiaircraft artillery were at all available, and the quality of communications within the base was [also] poor, it was extremely difficult to appropriately clear away enemy aircraft, which skillfully approached [the facilities]. Even if fighter planes had been adequately deployed for air defense, it was impossible to expect a perfect air defense and there was no winning trick.

Furthermore, with the advance [of the ground forces] still under way, it would take a long time before intelligence units were to advance to the place, and it was not before the 23d that an antiaircraft artillery unit attached to the 38th Division ([equipped with] two antiaircraft guns, four antiaircraft machineguns, but without searchlights) was deployed to the sector of the oil refineries.\(^{(93)}\)

Although protective measures against enemy aircraft raids had already been studied in relation to [the airfield in] Sungai Petani in northern Malaya, no particular solutions had been found other than attacking enemy airfield bases with Japanese forces.

Since Palembang was a storehouse of oil resources, in terms of future changes in the material war potential of Japan, the air defense of the place should not have been neglected.

**The Citation of Merit Conferred on the 3d Air Division**

On the 21st, the [Third] Air Force commander shifted his command post to Palembang.

On that evening, [Third] Air Force Commander Sugawara conferred a citation of merit on the 3d Air Division for the latter’s outstanding services during the Malay operation.\(^{(100)}\)

[The circumstances leading up the conferment were as follows:] On the 15th, the Twenty-fifth Army had proposed to the Southern Army to confer a citation of merit on the 3d Air Division in particular. However, after receiving the proposal, the Southern Army [instead] entrusted it to the [Third] Air Force commander, on the grounds that the latter was empowered to do so in special cases.\(^{(77)}\)
3. The Progress of the Java Invasion Operation

The Assessment of the Situation of the Air Forces over Java and the Question of Securing Command of the Air

The Navy’s Request to Postpone the Landings

On 22 February, the Southern Army received by telegram a proposal from the Navy that judging from the movements of the enemy naval vessels and aircraft in the Java area and the military results of the Navy aircraft, the day to launch the landing should be postponed by two days until 28 February. Then, the Southern Army received an additional telegram requesting that since [the Navy] would advance its air unit to the Gelumbang airfield southwest of Palembang, it would like [the Army] to condition the airfield and support the transportation of matériel. Some in the Southern Army criticized the proposal on the grounds that by delaying the schedule the right opportunity for making the attack would be missed. However, now that the landing unit of the Sixteenth Army was already under sail under the escort of the Navy and [the Army] had left the navigation of the ships to the Navy, [the Army] was unable to strongly oppose the request. It ended up agreeing to the two-day postponement on the condition that no more postponements of the landing date would be called for.

The Southern Army gave instructions to the 38th Division that since the Navy [aircraft] would be deployed to the Gelumbang [airfield], the division should support the Navy in the transportation [of matériel] and the conditioning of the airfield.

At that time, the Southern Army judged that the enemy air power on Java consisted of a total of about eighty aircraft of which a relatively small number was stationed in eastern Java, while fourteen small aircraft, two twin-engine aircraft, six very large aircraft and two flying boats were stationed in central Java, and thirty-six large and nineteen small aircraft in western Java. It was also judged that since the Third Air Force’s air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in its area was steadily producing results, it would be possible to roughly complete the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power by the date of the landings.

The Rough Completion of the Air Campaign to Destroy the Enemy Air Power

On 23 February, fifteen [Navy] Type–0 fighter planes advanced from the Kuching [airfield] to the Mentok airfield, and on the next day, the 24th, twenty-seven [Navy] mid-sized land-based attack planes of the Genzan Air Group of the 22d Air Flotilla advanced to the Gelumbang airfield. During this advance, an accident occurred when the antiaircraft artillery unit on the Palembang airfield mistook the formation of the Navy aircraft, which flew right over the airfield at low altitude, for enemy aircraft, fired at them and caused one mid-sized land-based attack plane to make an emergency landing.

On the 24th, the [Army] 3d Air Division attacked the Bandung [airfield] with the 59th Air Group (fourteen aircraft) and the 90th Air Group (seventeen aircraft) and also the Kalijati [airfield] with the 64th Air Group (thirteen aircraft) and the 75th Air Group (sixteen aircraft).

Around 1030, both fighter air groups entered into the sky over Java ahead of the light bomber air groups, engaged with seven Hurricanes and two P–43s and brought down five.
The light bomber air groups set ablaze three large and three mid-sized aircraft on the Bandung airfield and seven large and three small aircraft on the Kalijati airfield, while inflicting some damage to nine large and five small aircraft.

[Again] on that afternoon, the 59th Air Group (thirteen aircraft) and the 90th Air Group (seventeen aircraft) attacked the Cililitan [airfield], while the 64th Air Group (thirteen aircraft) and the 75th Air Group (five aircraft) attacked the Batavia [airfield]. At Cililitan, the air groups encountered about ten Hurricanes and brought down two, while setting ablaze one large and three small aircraft. Meanwhile, the 64th Air Group brought down two four-engine flying boats while heading back.\(^{87, 115}\)

On that day, following the enemy raid on Palembang in broad daylight by three aircraft on aggregate in two waves, two enemy bombers came for a raid around 2000. On the airfield, one Type–97 fighter caught fire, while another aircraft sustained serious damage and two minor damage. Both [bombers] were brought down by the 11th Air Group and the 59th Air Group, which were patrolling in the air.\(^{100}\)

On the afternoon of the 25th, the 3d Air Division had twenty-four fighters and thirty-two light bombers [on aggregate] attack the Kalijati [airfield] in two waves, set ablaze seven aircraft on the ground, scored near misses at fifteen aircraft on the ground, after which all returned safely. The fighter plane unit engaged with eight enemy fighter planes and bought down four.\(^{120, 122}\)

In the meantime, the 12th Air Division was deployed at the Tanjungkarang airfield, where the ground conditions were very poor, and [finally] started controlling the air over the airfield from the early morning of the 25th. While executing that task, the Aoyagi Unit spotted four Lockheed bombers flying northward. It repulsed three and chased one of them buzzing over the airfield, finally bringing it down into the forest about one thousand meters southwest of the airfield.\(^{135}\)

On the 25th, the [Third] Air Force tallied up the military results from the 19th onwards. The result was a recorded 345 sorties [on aggregate] (of which 203 fighter sorties [on aggregate]), with confirmed losses inflicted on the enemy of 33 aircraft brought down and 53 aircraft destroyed, and other than the above, an estimated 150 or more enemy aircraft having sustained damage.

[However,] the [Third] Air Force commander was fully aware that the tallied numbers needed to be assessed. The losses of Japanese aircraft were three.\(^{61, 76}\)

The Cover of the Convoy

On 26 February, the [Third] Air Force planned to conduct a joint attack by the 3d and 12th Air Divisions. However, due to the poor ground conditions at the Tanjungkarang airfield, the 12th Air Division was not able to join.

The 12th Air Division [instead] serviced its planes in preparation for the air cover of the convoy of the landing [troops] of the Sixteenth Army, which was supposed to start from the next day, the 27th.\(^{138}\)

Judging that the poor condition of the Tanjungkarang airfield could possibly hinder the 12th Air Division from operating again on the next day, the 27th, the [Third] Air Force commander ordered the 3d Air Division commander to cover the convoy on the 27th, in conjunction with the 12th Air Division.\(^{87}\)
At 0925 on 27 February, strategic reconnaissance aircraft of the 81st Air Group spotted the transport convoy consisting of fifty-one ships, to which the 12th Air Division provided cover by sending off forty-eight aircraft on aggregate. During the direct cover in the air over the convoy, the [12th] Air Division brought down one Consolidated flying boat. Around 1300, the [Third] Air Force obtained intelligence that three enemy cruisers and four destroyers were spotted on the sea north of Batavia at 1030, and immediately informed the Navy air unit in Gelumbang.

Although the Navy air unit had advanced to the Gelumbang [airfield] on the 24th, the transport of its bombs had not caught up, which allowed only eight land-based attack planes to sortie at the report of the sighting of an enemy fleet. Learning about the situation of the [Navy] sortie, the 3d Air Division commander made up his mind to attack the enemy fleet with the full strength of his air division, even though it was beyond the scope of his tasks. He had both light bomber air groups, which had returned at 1400 from the strikes on Batavia, conduct an attack on the fleet. On the morning of the 28th, the Navy fighter unit on the Mentok [airfield] notified [the Army] of a one-day postponement of Day H until 1 March. It was because the Navy, judging that the remaining strength of the enemy naval fleet was still quite superior, had some misgivings about the cover of the transport convoy if the landing operations was to be conducted as scheduled. On 28 February, the 12th Air Division covered the convoy until 2000 with fifty-five aircraft on aggregate. On [that] evening, the convoy was sailing smoothly, approaching a point thirty-odd kilometers off the coast of Java.

The 3d Air Division was mainly tasked with the direct support of the operations of the main force of the 2d Division and the Shōji Detachment, while the 12th Air Division was to continue the cover of the convoys at the anchorages.

The Support for the Western Java Landing Operation

The Circumstances of the Landing of the Main Force of the Sixteenth Army

On 1 March, it was exceptionally fair over the Tanjungkarang airfield and vicinity, where the 12th Air Division was deployed. From the early morning on, the [12th] Air Division was sent off to cover the anchorage of Bantam Bay, the landing area of the [Sixteenth] Army commander and that of Merak, where one element of the 2d Division had landed.

In order to support the ground operations of the Sixteenth Army after its landing, the 3d Air Division commander at the Palembang [airfield] directed his units to go into action and he himself headed for the landing points in a strategic reconnaissance aircraft. Spotting thirty-odd transport ships at the anchorage, the [3d] Air Division commander judged that the landings were a success and returned to the Palembang airfield. On receiving the report from [3d] Air Division Commander Endō after the latter’s return, [Third] Air Force Commander Sugawara gave at 1200 orders to one element to prepare for advancing to the Kalijati [airfield].

[Earlier], soon after the successful first landing at 0030 on 1 March in the Bantam Bay area, the landing area of the main force of the 2d Division, a sea engagement between Japanese
and enemy fleets had broken out near the anchorage. Simultaneously, six enemy aircraft had come for a raid, which had been followed by the raid by enemy vessels.*

A navy destroyer had put up smoke screens and covered the convoy. Fierce fire and torpedoes of the Japanese and enemy fleets had crisscrossed in the dark of the night.

During this period, the Army sustained the loss of the Ryūjō-maru with [Sixteenth] Army Commander Lt. Gen. Imamura Hitoshi on board, which was hit by a torpedo, started to list, and ran aground, the Sakura-maru, which was sunk, the Tatsuno-maru and the hospital ship Hōrai-maru, which were seriously damaged. Although the [Sixteenth] Army commander and majority of those on board were fortunately able to go ashore, radio sets and code books were lost, which hampered the communications between the units the whole day.(93)

Meanwhile, the Shōji Detachment (commander: 230th Infantry Regiment Commander Col. Shōji Toshishige),** which had entered the anchorage at Eretan, successfully landed at 0315 without interference. While the anchorage was continuously raided by enemy aircraft in waves from before dawn onwards, the landing unit charged in one go toward its target, the Kalijati [airfield]. At 1230 on the 1st, the 2d Battalion [led by] Maj. Wakamatsu Minoru seized the airfield, immediately started on its conditioning, and at 1750 communicated to the Third Air Force headquarters that the conditioning was roughly completed. Despite interference by enemy aircraft on their way, the air-ground support unit heading for Kalijati reached the airfield at 1900, and after sunset did its utmost to forward the disembarked matériel to the airfield. At 0730 on the 2d, fuel and ammunition to an amount that would allow one air group each of fighter planes and assault planes to make two sorties, were accumulated at the Kalijati [airfield].(93, 103)

On 1 March, with ninety sorties, the 12th Air Division covered the anchorages of Merak and Bantam, where the main force of the Sixteenth Army had landed.(87, 135)

The 3d Air Division’s Rapid Advance to the Kalijati [Airfield]***

At 0500 on the 2d, the Shōji Detachment headquarters advanced to Subang, south[east] of Kalijati. Following a raid by two to three enemy aircraft around 0900, it further suffered around 1100 an assault by about twenty-five enemy armored vehicles, which came charging from the Bandung area. (93)

Meanwhile on 2 March, with a plan in his mind to advance [his air groups] to the Kalijati airfield, the 3d Air Division commander in Palembang dispatched first of all Staff Officer Kanzaki Kiyoshi of the air division to the airfield. (100) Staff Officer Kanzaki, who had boarded a twin-engine light bomber of the 75th Air Group, approached the Kalijati airfield from the sea, and landed safely around 1400. Simultaneously with the landing, he came under a raid by three [enemy] Martins. However, escaping any hits, Staff Officer Kanzaki, took command of the ground service unit there and gave directions about the reception of flight units. The light bomber flew back to Palembang and reported the situation at the Kalijati [airfield], particularly the fact that there was seized fuel.(102) Informed of the situation, the [3d] Air Division commander planned to advance the main force of his air division. However, [then] receiving intelligence from the [Third] Air Force that there were twenty-four large and five small enemy vehicles.

* See also Vol. 3, pp. 470ff; Vol. 26, pp. 465ff.
** See also Vol. 3, pp. 505ff.
*** See also Vol. 3, pp. 521ff.
aircraft on the Bandung airfield, the commander changed part of his plan, advanced one element (twelve aircraft) of the 59th Air Group and the main force of the 27th Air Group [to the Kalijati airfield] first, while sending off the main force of the air division to strike the Bandung [airfield]. Due to bad weather en route, the light bomber air groups of the Bandung attack unit returned, and only the fighter unit carried out the attack. Whereas the 64th Air Group did not encounter enemy aircraft, the 59th Air Group engaged with six Buffalos and brought down two. The air group lost one aircraft.\(^{(108, 110)}\)

In the meantime, one element of the 59th Air Group, which had advanced to the Kalijati [airfield] on 2 March, attacked the Bandung airfield with three aircraft straight away, while also taking charge of the air defense over the Kalijati airfield, and inflicted damage to one Martin and one Hurricane.\(^{(104)}\) On that day, the Kalijati airfield was raided by one Martin at 1600, by six Hurricanes at 1900, and by one bomber at night, which set ablaze one transport aircraft.\(^{(103, 110)}\)

Meanwhile, continuing its tasks of the previous day, the 12th Air Group again covered the anchorages for Bantam Bay and Merak with seventy-four aircraft on aggregate.

A little after 0800 on the 3d, the 3d Air Division commander ordered the main force of the 59th Air Group as well as the 75th and 27th Air Groups to quickly advance to the Kalijati [airfield], while having the 64th and 90th Air Groups attack Bandung and vicinity.\(^{(100, 112)}\)

The Fierce Battle for Kalijati Airfield and Vicinity — Securing the Airfield*\(^{\ast}\)

Meanwhile around 0730 on the 3d, about twenty enemy armored vehicles came for a raid toward the Kalijati airfield from the west, but they were driven back. Then at 0800, four Hurricanes and one Buffalo raided and strafed [the airfield], which was followed by bombings by one B–17. One Type–97 heavy bomber caught fire.

At 0830, another Hurricane came for a raid. However, then between around 1000 and 1100, the 59th and the 75th Air Groups flew in, and the [3d] Air Division commander also arrived on the Kalijati airfield around 1130.\(^{(100, 107)}\)

On the afternoon of the 3d, in order to support the 2d Division charging toward [both] Batavia and the sector west of Buitenzorg, the 27th Air Group sent off two assault planes. On their return, the flight spotted an enemy mechanized unit advancing toward the airfield along the road connecting Purwakarta and Kalijati, sped to the airfield, dropped a message tube and reported the enemy position twenty kilometers west of the airfield.\(^{(104, 108)}\) On receiving the report, Air Group Commanders Kuroda and Tokunaga promptly sortied, first of all destroyed the bridge to the west of the airfield to block the march of the vehicles, and then bombed and destroyed the vehicles in the front and and the rear of the column. Due to the paddy fields on both sides, it totally immobilized the enemy on the narrow five-kilometers stretch of road.

During this period until 1810, the [3d] Air Division had the assault plane unit ([consisting of] sixteen aircraft) make a total of twenty-seven aircraft sorties in six waves, and light bomber unit a total of nineteen aircraft sorties in four waves. On that day, the air division reported that it destroyed and set ablaze 179 vehicles of the enemy vehicle unit, while the [Army’s] 2d Division seized fifty motor vehicles.\(^{(102, 108, 115, 139)}\)

* See also Vol. 3, pp. 511ff.
In the meantime, the 64th and the 90th Air Groups, which had headed for an attack on Bandung, approached the Bandung airfield around 1200, attacked three enemy aircraft just taking off, and set ablaze one North American.

The 64th Air Group flew further south, strafed and set ablaze two aircraft on the ground on the Pameungpeuk airfield along the coast to the south of Bandung. However, thereafter [while heading back], Commander Kato’s aircraft was persistently chased from the Bandung area by Navy Type–0 fighters, sustained major damage and barely managed to carry out an emergency landing on the Kalijati [airfield].

Note: The Type-0 fighter planes, which chased Commander Kato, belonged to the Navy 3d Air Group. They had taken off from [the airfield on] Bali to cover the land-based attack planes attacking the Bandung [airfield].

From 3 to 4 March, sixteen fighters, thirty light bombers, sixteen assault planes and four strategic reconnaissance aircraft were advanced to the Kalijati [airfield].

**Direct Support for the Ground Advance Towards Bandung**

Around 1600 on 3 March, near Subang, the Shōji Detachment engaged with an enemy force of more than a dozen tanks and one hundred motor vehicles, which had advanced from the direction of Bandung. The 3d Air Division provided direct support for the ground combat [of the detachment] with twenty-four sorties of the assault plane and light bomber air groups. Although 3d Air Division Commander Endō was aware of the slow progress of the attack by the main force of the 2d Division, he judged that supporting the combat of the Shōji Detachment, which was actually taking aggressive action, was the best way to accelerate the entire operation.

From the 4th onwards, the 3d Air Division directed its focus of support to the area of [operations of] the Shōji Detachment.

On the 4th, following a raid by three Hurricanes at 0820, seven Hurricanes raided the Kalijati airfield at 1030 at very low altitude and strafed [the aircraft] on the ground. Although having brought down five of the raiding aircraft, a loss was sustained of one assault plane, which caught fire, two assault planes and one strategic reconnaissance aircraft, which sustained serious damage, and one assault plane, one strategic reconnaissance aircraft and one twin-engine light bomber, which sustained some damage.

From 0900 onwards, the 3d Air Division made sorties in six waves employing twelve aircraft, thoroughly bombed the enemy motor vehicle unit, while supporting the operation to mop up enemy remnants in Purwakarta and vicinity.

On the 4th, the 90th and the 64th Air Groups advanced to the Kalijati [airfield]. At 1540, the 75th and the 90th Air Groups carried out a raid on the Bandung airfield and succeeded in setting ablaze five aircraft.

Five Navy fighter planes [also] advanced to the Kalijati [airfield] to provide air defense over the anchorage.* The convoy at the anchorage completed all disembarkations on the afternoon of the 4th.

* See also Vol. 26, p. 498.
On that night, Detachment Commander Shōji (at Subang) decided to attack and advance up to the mountain area to the north of Bandung with his main force on the next day, the 5th. (See Illustration No. 56)\(^\text{100}\)

**The Direct Support for the Shōji Detachment’s Attack on Bandung**

On the 5th, the enemy raided the Kalijati airfield with a single aircraft each at 0500 and at 0545; in these raids one strategic reconnaissance aircraft sustained damage.\(^\text{139}\)

On that day, the 3d Air Division raided the Bandung airfield at 0800 with six aircraft each of the 75th and the 59th Air Groups, and bombed and strafed seventeen [enemy] aircraft on the ground.* Around 0900, [3d] Air Division Commander Endō was contacted by the Shōji Detachment that the latter would advance with the aim of capturing Bandung and that it requested support from the air division. Commander Endō communicated that his air division would support the advance of the detachment with all its might.\(^\text{100}\) On the 5th, the air division supported the operation of the Shōji Detachment by sending off forty-eight assault planes and light bombers on aggregate as well as twenty-eight fighters on aggregate.\(^\text{139}\)

On that day, there was no enemy raid on the Kalijati airfield. At 1730, with the aim of destroying the remaining enemy aircraft, the [3d] Air Division raided the Tasikmalaya airfield with sixteen fighter planes and bombers, carried out bombings over the runway before returning.

At dawn on the 6th, four aircraft of the 64th Air Group and five aircraft of the 90th Air Group again raided the Tasikmalaya airfield. On that day, the Shōji Detachment carried out attacks on the enemy positions near the pass to the south of Ciater, located about fifteen kilometers north of Bandung. The 3d Air Division actively supported [the detachment] by sending off twenty-one aircraft on aggregate (in ten waves) of the 27th Air Group, twenty-eight aircraft of the 75th Air Group and twenty-one aircraft of the 90th Air Group both on aggregate, and the situation of the ground combat made smooth progress.\(^\text{113}\)**

At 0700 on the 7th, the 3d Air Division again raided the Tasikmalaya airfield with six aircraft of the 59th Air Group and ten aircraft of the 75th Air Group, and produced the military gains of setting ablaze two large aircraft and inflicting damage on eight. The air division also sent off, continuously [from the previous day], twenty-five fighters, twenty assault planes and forty-five light bombers all on aggregate, and directly supported the operations of the Shōji Detachment by attacking the enemy in Lembang and vicinity and on the east side of Mt. Putri. Fourteen aircraft on aggregate of the 75th Air Group attacked the city of Bandung.\(^\text{112, 139}\)

Thus, on the evening of the 7th, the Shōji Detachment took control of the highland to the south of Lembang, which overlooked the [town of] Bandung.

A little before 2100 that night, a bearer of a flag of truce of the Dutch East Indies Army appeared on the front line of the detachment. The detachment commander, who met him at 2330, immediately sought instructions from the Sixteenth Army commander concerning the enemy’s offer of surrender.\(^\text{100, 102}\) **

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\* See also Vol. 3, p. 523.
** See also Vol. 3, p. 526.
*** See also Vol. 3, p. 528.
Part II, Chapter 7 / The Invasion of Java: The Success of the Stepping-Stone Tactics

Illustration No. 56 — The Course of the Western Java Operation (1-6 March 1942)
The End of the Java Operation

The Surrender of the Dutch East Indies Army*

On 8 March, while the 3d Air Division was preparing for sorties from the early morning onwards in continuation of their actions of the previous day in order to support the operations of the Shōji Detachment, telegrams to cancel the bombings came in from Capt. Ogata Susumu, who was attached to the 75th Air Group and had been dispatched to the front line, and also from Commander Shōji. They were followed by Commander Shōji’s telegram that a ceasefire had been proposed.\(^{(102, 115)}\)

While instructing his units to conduct demoralizing flights, [3d] Air Division Commander Endō communicated to Detachment Commander Shōji his view that the Kalijati airfield would be an appropriate place to meet with the leaders of the enemy.\(^{(100)}\)

The [3d] Air Division drew up the demands of the air unit to be made in the ceasefire talks, which in outline included a ban on the destruction of all kinds of aviation facilities, the surrender of all weapons and matériel to the Japanese Army and a ban on the destruction or concealment of them, the standby of allied personnel in charge of aviation at each airfield, and a total ban on flights of allied aircraft.\(^{(104)}\)

From around 1000, the 3d Air Division carried out demoralizing flights over the city of Bandung with about fifty aircraft.\(^{(87)}\) On that day, the 64th Air Group transferred its best aircraft to the 59th Air Group and returned to Sungai Petani, where it reverted to [the command of] its original [air division].\(^{(120)}\) The 90th Air Group returned to Kluang.\(^{(113)}\)

At 1500, Dutch East Indies Governor-General Tjarda [van Starkenborgh Stachouwer] and his party arrived at the Kalijati airfield, and from 1800, the first meeting was held between Commander Imamura and the Dutch East Indies side with the command post of the 3d Air Division as the conference room.\(^{(104, 139)}\) **

At 2000, the enemy leaders’ party left after promising that [the announcement of] the unconditional surrender would be broadcast to all the Dutch East Indies forces at 1200 on the next day.\(^{(104)}\)

On the 9th, the [Japanese] ground unit closed in on the city of Bandung, while the 3d Air Division carried out demoralizing flights again with its full force.\(^{(139)}\) At 1200, the broadcast station in Bandung aired the following announcement by [Major General] Pesman on behalf of the chief of the Dutch East Indies Army Department.

The Japanese Army succeeded in breaking through into the intermountain area of Bandung. It has taken complete command of the air, which made it impossible for us to put up resistance for long in the intermountain area of Bandung. Therefore, we had no choice but to hold ceasefire negotiations. (The rest omitted by the author.)***

At 1430, Chief of the Dutch East Indies Army Department Ter Poorten and the other top echelons of the Dutch East Indies forces again presented themselves at the Kalijati airfield and signed the documents of their unconditional surrender.\(^{(93)}\) ****

On 11 March, the requisitioning of aviation [equipment and matériel] was started.

* See also Vol. 3, p. 529.
** See also Vol. 3, pp. 531ff.
*** See also Vol. 3, pp. 534ff.
**** See also Vol. 3, pp. 535ff.
The Southern Army’s Directives in the Wake of the Completion of the Java Operation

On 8 March, judging that the Java operation was approaching its end, the Southern Army launched the northern Sumatra operation.*

The northern Sumatra operation was based on IGHQ’s idea to facilitate the sea transport to the Burma theater and its chief aim was to secure the sea transport routes from Singapore to Rangoon, in parallel with the capture operation of the Andaman Islands, the order for which had been issued by IGHQ on 7 February.

In the order concerning the northern Sumatra operation, which was issued on 27 February, the 7th Air Division, which was deployed in Malaya, as well as one element each of the 12th and the 3d Air Divisions were supposed to participate in the operation.

In the meantime, the Southern Army gave instructions to reinforce the 3d Air Division (minus the 27th Air Group), which was supposed to remain in the Java area.

On 10 March, the Third Air Force commander put the 81st Air Group (minus the 1st Squadron) and the 4th Air-Ground Support Unit under the command of the 3d Air Division commander, while putting the 15th Independent Air Unit (strategic reconnaissance aircraft; minus the 51st Independent Air Squadron) under the direct control of the [Third] Air Force.

* See also Vol. 26, pp. 576ff.; and this volume pp. 405ff.
The Southern Army, on the other hand, was planning to reinforce the forces for the Philippines operation. It was about that time that the shift of the 60th Air Group of the 7th Air Division to the Philippines was decided.\textsuperscript{(61, 100)}

Conferment of Citations of Merit after the Completion of the Operation

On 12 March, [Third] Air Force Commander Sugawara again conferred a citation of merit on the 3d Air Division [led by Major General] Endō and the units attached to it (the 64th Air Group and the main force of the 15th Independent Air Unit) for their services in the invasion of the Dutch East Indies.\textsuperscript{(61, 76)} It read as follows:*

\begin{quote}
\textbf{Citation of Merit}

The 3d Air Division

The units attached to the air division (64th Air Group and 15th Independent Air Unit (minus 51st Independent Air Squadron))

With the Palembang airfield as their base, the 3d Air Division and the units attached to it, under the command of the 3d Air Division commander, destroyed the superior enemy air power in western Java with a small force, overcoming every kind of difficulty. In the landing [operations] of the main force of the Sixteenth Army in western Java, they willingly took charge of attacking enemy warships, covered the convoy of the main force of the troops and thus facilitated the landing. Upon the seizure of the Kalijati airfield by the Shōji Unit, they fearlessly advanced their base there without missing opportunities, eliminated the persistent enemy counterattacks by air and land, and boldly and actively secured a dominant position all the time by destroying the remaining enemy aircraft and supporting the ground forces in their advance, which completely shattered the enemy’s will to put up resistance in a very short period of time, and eventually led to the overall surrender of the Dutch East Indies. Of course, their military gains were great, but their achievements, which contributed to the operational direction of the entire army, were indeed even greater; their military merit is outstanding.

Therefore, we here award this citation of merit.

12 March 1942

[Army] Third Air Force Commander Sugawara Michiō
\end{quote}

On the 15th, the [Third] Air Force commander conferred a citation of merit on the 81st Air Group (commander: Lt. Col. Yanagimoto Eiki), consisting of Type–100 strategic reconnaissance aircraft, for having constantly achieved great results in reconnaissance flights in various theaters from the opening of hostilities onwards.\textsuperscript{(76)}

The Military Gains of the Java Operation

The 3d Air Division requisitioned weapons and matériel from the Dutch East Indies forces. As a result, about three hundred aircraft including 130 still operable, 11,319 drums (295 liters per drum) of fuel, the bulk of which was 90 octane or higher, were seized. On top of

* See also Vol. 3, p. 536.
that, a great amount of equipment, such as 195 machine tools for aviation, 108 vehicles for conditioning airfields and four hundred civilian cars were seized as well.\(^{(61)}\)

During the period of the operation, the [Third] Air Force reported military gains of bringing down fifty-two enemy aircraft (of which ten unconfirmed), bombing and strafing 210 aircraft (of which sixty caught fire), strafing and raking forty-five aircraft (of which four caught fire). According to statements by officers of the Dutch East Indies Army Air Force, who were taken prisoner, the loss sustained by the enemy were sixty Martins and sixty P–36s and Buffalos of the Dutch East Indies Army Air Force, thirty-six Blenheims, twenty-six Lockheeds and fifty Hurricanes of the British air forces, twenty Boeing B–17s (including those evacuated to Australia), and forty Liberators and P–40Es of U.S. Army Air Force, totaling about 290 aircraft.\(^{(61, 64)}\)

Prior to the start of the requisitioning, Chief of Staff Kawashima of the [Third] Air Force promptly flew to Bandung almost at the same time with Maj. Iizuka Hiroshi of the Technical Department of the air arm of the Southern Army and tried to seize equipment related to radar but failed, probably because it had been destroyed by the enemy.\(^{(78, 79)}\)

The Survey of the Actual Reinforcements of the Enemy

After that, using the testimonies of [captured] officers of the Dutch East Indies Army Air Force and others for reference, the 3d Air Division conducted a survey of the air power reinforcements by the allies before the [Japanese] launch of the Java invasion operation.\(^{(104, 139)}\)
The results of the survey were as shown in the following table. It made clear that the air unit was rapidly reinforced in early February by both the United States and Britain, which led to the judgment that [the timing of] the launch of the Java operation was appropriate.

During this operation, the disinformation broadcasting detail did a very good job as a powerful asset behind the scenes, which accelerated the surrender of the enemy by cleverly using the interval of the broadcast from the Bandung station and continue their broadcast [with disinformation] from the broadcasting station in Saigon.*

These broadcasts offered another excellent example from military history, whereby the enemy’s decision to surrender was accelerated by cleverly catching the wavering mind of the enemy in combination with the overwhelming power of the Japanese Army and Navy air units.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Before the opening of hostilities</th>
<th>After the opening of hostilities</th>
<th>British and U.S. reinforcements in early February</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Batavia (Kemayoran)</td>
<td>KLM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cililitan</td>
<td>2 Sqdns of bombers</td>
<td>1 Sqdn of recon. aircraft</td>
<td>About 8 Hurricanes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Buitenzorg</td>
<td>2 Sqdns of fighters</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 Lockheeds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cibadak</td>
<td>1 Sqdn of recon. aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>2 Sqdns of bombers</td>
<td>Same as left 1 Sqdn of fighters</td>
<td>8 Hurricanes (Br) 8 Bombers (Br) 3 Bombers (US)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kalijati</td>
<td>[Flying] school 1 Sqdn of bombers</td>
<td>1 Sqdn of bombers</td>
<td>20 Blenheim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tasikmalaya</td>
<td>[Flying] school</td>
<td></td>
<td>Evacuated to Australia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See also Vol. 3, pp. 574ff.
4. The General Situation in Malaya, Sumatra and Java After the Java Operation

The General Situation of the Third Air Force

After the completion of the Java operation, the focus of operations shifted to the Burma theater and it was decided that the main force of the 3d Air Division should remain in Java. Now that no enemy aircraft remained in northern Sumatra anymore, the Southern Army judged that the sea transport route to Rangoon was safe, and transferred a number of ground service units to Burma by air and by sea, starting with the 7th and the 12th Air Divisions and the 27th Air Group.

From April onwards, there were no noteworthy air operations in the Malaya and Java areas. The main force of the 81st Air Group, the 3d Air Division (the 59th, the 75th and the 90th Air Groups), the 12th Air Transport Squadron, one element of the 11th Air Group and others were deployed in Sumatra and Java, where they peacefully engaged in training and servicing.

At the end of April, the 90th Air Group was transferred to the Guangdong theater. The outline of deployment of the air units in the area from Malaya to Java around that time and the disposition of the ground service units on Java proper were as shown respectively in Illustrations Nos. 57 and 58.

In early May, the situation of the air units of the Third Air Force was as shown in Table No. 25. (On 15 April, “Hikō Shūdan” was renamed “Hikō Shidan.” In this translation we maintain “Numbered Air Force” for both.)

Yogyakarta        1 Sqdn of recon. aircraft
Madiun            2 Sqdns of fighters     3 Sqdns of fighters
Malang            [Flying] school       2 Sqdns of bombers
Cikampek          KLM                    1 Sqdn of recon. aircraft
                  2 Beauforts*
Total             7 Sqdns of bombers     7 Sqdns of bombers
                  4 Sqdns of fighters      6 Sqdns of fighters
                  3 Sqdns of recon. aircraft 3 Sqdns of recon. aircraft

Boeing B–17        20
Navy flying school

20-30 Hurricanes
60 Bombers

* Actually Vildebeests.
Above: Illustration No. 57 — The Outline of Deployment of the Air Units in Malaya, Sumatra and Java (Late April 1942)

Below: Illustration No. 58 — The Disposition of the Ground Service Units for the Air Arm in Java (Early and Mid-April 1942)
Commander Sugawara of the Third Air Force issued a new disposition of the ground service units, which was in outline as follows:

1. 15th Air-Ground Support Unit (Malaya)
2. 12th Air-Ground Support Unit (Sumatra)
3. 4th Air-Ground Support Unit (Java)
4. The Units under the direct control of the [Third] Air Force
   Repair Depots
   16th Field Aircraft Depot (Malaya)
   One element of 15th Field Aircraft Depot (Malaya)
   One element of 9th Field Aircraft Depot (Java)
   18th Shipboard Aircraft Depot ([expected to] shift between Palembang and Batavia)
   Meteorological Units
   1st Meteorological Battalion headquarters (Malaya)
   1st Meteorological Company (Malaya)
   2d Meteorological Company (Sumatra)
   4th Meteorological Company (Java)

### Table No. 25

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current situation of aircraft (1 May 1942)</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Full number</th>
<th>Current number</th>
<th>Breakdown</th>
<th>Number of personnel sent to mainland Japan to receive aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type–97 Model I strategic recon. aircraft</td>
<td>81st Air Gp</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type–100 strategic recon. aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type–99 tactical recon. aircraft</td>
<td>73d Independent Air Sqdn</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type–97 fighter</td>
<td>11th Air Gp</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type–1 fighter</td>
<td>59th Air Gp</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type–99 twin-engine light bomber</td>
<td>75th Air Gp</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type–97 Model I heavy bomber</td>
<td>12th Air Transport Sqdn</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type–Ro transport aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>119</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note: The 4th Meteorological Company (commander: Maj. Shigetate Hiroshi, graduate of the 43d class) was deployed in Taiwan at the time of the opening of hostilities.

The Support for Pacification Operations on Java and Lesser Sunda Islands

The 3d Air Division, which was deployed in the Java area, took charge of constructing and conditioning bases in the area, while supporting the operations of the Sixteenth Army.

On 11 April, Major General Endō was appointed vice-principal of the Army Air Academy. Succeeding him, Maj. Gen. Tsukada Rikichi set up his headquarters in Bandung and started training with the aim of attacking Port Darwin in Australia.\(^{100, 104}\)

In May, the 3d Air Division supported with one element the Sixteenth Army’s operation to pacify the Sumbawa, Flores and Lombok islands in the Lesser Sunda Islands chain (other than Timor). In mid-May, one squadron of the 59th Air Group was dispatched to Palembang to take charge of the air defense there, replacing the 11th Air Group (which was to be sent back to mainland Japan to upgrade its aircraft).\(^{64, 181}\)

Although central command and the Southern Army attached importance to the [Lesser] Sunda Islands as key places for the defense of the South, they did not post a defense unit of the Sixteenth Army there because the defense of the islands was assigned to the Navy.\(^{61}\)

Addendum: The Allied Air Operation to Defend Java*

The Allied Organization for the Defense of Java

At the end of December 1941, ABDA Command was established. On 4 January of the next year, [General] Wavell (British Army), as supreme commander, set up his headquarters in Lembang to the north of Bandung and on 15 January assummed command. Accordingly, the command of the Dutch East Indies Army, customarily held by the Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies Tjarda [van Starkenborgh Stachouwer], was transferred to [General] Wavell (British). Although Lieutenant General Ter Poorten, chief of the Dutch East Indies Army Department, became commander of the Army forces under ABDA Command and also commander of the troops in the Dutch East Indies, which included Java, Sumatra, Borneo, New Guinea, etc., Major General Playfair, whom [General] Wavell had taken along from Singapore, took charge of the actual work, acting as deputy of [Lieutenant General] Ter Poorten and chief of staff.

All allied naval forces within the ABDA area were commanded by Admiral Hart of the U.S. Navy, and the navy unit of each of the allies, the Netherlands, Australia, the United States and Britain operated under the command of their own commanders.

The air unit was commanded by Air Marshall Peirse of the Royal Air Force.\(^{218, 219}\)

The Loss of the Forward Airfields

After 20 January, the Japanese Army launched an offensive against the Tennasserim sector (Moulmein and the area to its south) in preparation for its advance into southern Burma. Although the [Japanese] operations in this area did not have a direct impact on the defense of

\* See also the footnote on pp. 208 and 271. This Addendum is based on S. Woodburn Kirby, but the same caveats apply. The selection is rather random, and the translation not always correct.
Malaya and Dutch East Indies, the allotment of air reinforcements that could be directed to the ABDA area became a significant matter. On 24 January, [General] Wavell flew to Rangoon to have talks with General Hutton, where he observed that [the situation in] the Burma theater was calmer than expected and returned to Bandung on the 25th.

In the meantime, the general headquarters, particularly the Dutch and U.S. staff officers proposed that [the airfields in] Ambon, Kendari, Balikpapan and Sabang, the forward airfields for the defense of Java, should be reinforced. [However,] judging that dispersion of the limited air power would lead to piecemeal defeat, [General] Wavell did not take up this proposal.

On 20 January, [ABDA] Command received intelligence that a Japanese convoy was sailing southward in the Makassar Strait. Based on this intelligence, the U.S. and Dutch submarines were assembled in the Balikpapan area, while an order for a night attack on the Japanese convoy was given to the U.S. Navy unit (consisting of two light cruisers and four destroyers) in Kupang Bay. On the night of the 23d, the destroyers carried out a night raid on the Japanese convoy off Balikpapan and reported sinking of one patrol boat and three transport ships.

On the night of the 24th, the Japanese forces occupied Balikpapan and also Kendari on the same day. The loss of Kendari rendered not only Java but also Timor exposed to a threat from the air.

Note: On 25 January, the Navy 21st Air Flotilla (thirty aircraft) had advanced from Menado to Kendari.

Keenly aware that, in order to stop the Japanese offensive, it was absolutely necessary to secure air supremacy, [General] Wavell made up his mind to particularly secure the Kupang airfield on Timor Island as a staging base for short-range aircraft, the more so because it was on the air reinforcements route from Australia. On 27 January, [General] Wavell requested Lieutenant General Sturdee, the Australian chief of general staff, to dispatch one Australian Army battalion and others to Timor. However, Lieutenant General Sturdee turned down the request concerned about the weakness of the defense of Darwin itself and the Japanese offensive towards Rabaul. However, [General] Wavell again requested the dispatch of reinforcements to Timor, suggesting that he himself would send some light antiaircraft guns from Java. He further proposed that as soon as the six squadrons of the U.S. air units currently being concentrated in Australia completed their assembling, he would dispatch a combination of one squadron each of fighter planes and bombers to Java, Timor and Darwin in that order. Although the Australian government did not agree at first, on 7 February, it decided on sending one battalion; the unit to be dispatched sailed out from Darwin on 15 February. However, it came under the attack of Japanese aircraft on the 16th and returned to Darwin on the 18th.

On 28 January, Air Marshall Peirse took command of the air unit, replacing Major General Brereton [who had temporarily held command until the arrival of Peirse]. On 4 February, the Japanese forces seized Ambon meeting with no [air] resistance at all.

The Last Effort in the Defense of Java (Early – Mid-February)

In early February, the Japanese forces overwhelmingly gained the upper hand in every area of ABDA. On 27 January, forty-eight Hurricanes had taken off from the British aircraft carrier Indomitable, of which one element was deployed in Singapore, while the main force was de-
ployed in Palembang, though both were not sufficient as reinforcements. Furthermore, about that time, Australia, which attached more importance to its own defense, was worried about the [future] allocation of the U.S. military aircraft, which were supposed to be allotted to the [various] areas of ABDA and assembled near Brisbane. [General] Wavell’s last hope was that [Lieutenant General] Percival in Singapore could somehow hold on to the island for some months. For the time being, he could [only] try to slow down the advance of the Japanese forces by reorganizing his remaining aircraft and warships and attacking the Japanese forces. He gave directions to repeat the air attacks against the Japanese convoy assembling off Balikpapan, however, they only produced unremarkable results due to bad weather.

[General] Wavell decided to secure the airfields in Surabaya and Malang as bases for reinforcements from Australia and transferred antiaircraft guns from Palembang and Batavia to these bases, while requesting the transport of fifty U.S. P–40 fighters, which were expected to be available in Brisbane by 15 February, to Java on an aircraft carrier.

However, on 3 and 5 February, the air unit of the Japanese Navy, which took off from Balikpapan and Kendari, attacked the airfields in eastern Java and the naval base in Surabaya, destroying a number of U.S. heavy bombers under repair. Meanwhile, a naval striking force consisting of a combination of U.S. and Dutch forces was finally formed on 2 February and sailed out for attacks on the Japanese convoy off Balikpapan. However, having sustained an air attack en route at a point to the north of Bali on 4 February, it withdrew to the port of Cilacap.

On 6 February, ten U.S. fighter planes arrived in Surabaya. On 9 February, the Japanese [Navy] seized the town and the airfield of Makassar at the southern point of Celebes.

In mid-February, thirty-nine Hurricanes arrived in Batavia on the British aircraft carrier *Athene*, to be used for the replenishment of losses. Southern Sumatra, the loss of which had been considered to render the defense of Java impossible, was captured by the Japanese Army in mid-February, simultaneously with Singapore Island.\(^{(218, 219)}\)

The Dissolution of ABDA Command — The Predicament of the Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies

With the loss of Palembang and southern Sumatra, the hope of retaining Java for a longer period was gone.

Evacuees flooded out from Surabaya and Batavia. The outflow of evacuees [from Java] collided with the inflow of exhausted units and evacuees fleeing from Singapore and Sumatra, which created chaos in Tanjung Priok, the port of Batavia.

Although a considerable number of aircraft had evacuated to the airfields in western Java after the loss sustained in the defense of Palembang, the strength of the British and other allied air forces was reduced to twenty-seven reconnaissance aircraft, twenty-six bombers, nine torpedo-bombers, and twenty-five fighter planes, and [of these aircraft] those operable were only eighteen fighter planes, and only about thirty percent for other aircraft. On 14 February, British Air [Vice-] Marshal Maltby and his staff arrived in western Java, and started on reorganizing the units, after setting up his headquarters in Sukabumi, west of Bandung.

Aircraft were formed into squadrons by type, and deployed to the airfields in western Java, such as Cililitan, Buitenzorg, Cikampek, and Kalijati. The headquarters for groups of fighter planes and bombers were temporarily set up, and communication networks connect-
ing the operation rooms [of the headquarters], airfields, the Dutch observer unit, the anti-aircraft defense unit in Batavia, and the air operations room in Bandung were established. Further, two radar sets were also set up in the Batavia sector.

Although the Dutch [East Indies] air force had three squadrons of fighter planes, five squadrons of bombers and two squadrons of reconnaissance aircraft in Java, due to the losses sustained in the battles until then, most of the squadrons were under strength. The U.S. air force had about twenty heavy bombers and about twenty-four fighters.

On 19 February, Bali was captured and on the next day the 20th, the Japanese forces landed on Timor, part of them by means of a paradrop operation. As a result, the replenishment by air from Australia was totally cut off. On 19 February, the Japanese Navy air unit conducted strikes on Port Darwin, which put the allied air forces on Java finally in an extremely precarious position.

On 21 February, it was decided to remove Burma from the ABDA area and put it in the operational area of the commander in chief of India, and to turn the army reinforcements directed to Java from the west to other areas. On the same day, the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington instructed [General] Wavell to shift ABDA Command headquarters as he saw fit, inside or outside its operational area. [General] Wavell proposed that since Burma had been put in the operational area of India, nothing was practically left to command inside the ABDA area, that the local defense of Java should be assigned to its original organization formed by Dutch East Indies forces as its main body, and that therefore ABDA Command should be dissolved. On 25 February, he dissolved the command. The command of about eighty thousand men of all forces remaining in the Dutch East Indies was handed over to the Dutch East Indies Governor-General Tjarda [van Starkenborgh Stachouwer].

In the meantime, the U.S. fighter planes at Port Darwin had been destroyed in an air strike on the place conducted [by the Japanese Navy] on 19 February. The U.S. seaplane tender Langley (carrying pilots and servicemen, along with thirty-two P–40s on board), which had been heading for Ceylon from Australia at that time, was told to change its destination to reinforce the fighter units on Java, but was sunk by an attack of Japanese Navy aircraft on the 27th. Although the cargo ship Seawitch safely arrived in Cilacap, carrying fighter planes, with no time to build the [crated] aircraft, they were sunk when the port was abandoned.

Thus, after the [Japanese force’s] capture of southern Sumatra and Bali, the [allied] air unit in Java accumulated losses day after day.

The Japanese forces, which landed on 1 March on both the eastern and western points [of Java] all at once, captured Batavia and Surabaya in a week, drove a powerful wedge from the air and the ground into [the defense line] north of Bandung and closed in on Bandung straightaway. During this period, counterattacks were attempted on 2 and 3 March. However, they were totally destroyed by the Japanese air unit, which used the Kalijati [airfield] as its base. Having given up resistance on the 7th, all forces of the Dutch East Indies surrendered on the afternoon of the 8th. (218, 219)
Part III  The Air Operations in the Final Period of the Invasion of Key Areas in the South (Until June 1942)

In early March 1942, the capture of the areas in the South that were scheduled for occupation in the pre-war plans was achieved with better results than expected. However, in the Philippines, the capture of the Bataan Peninsula and the Corregidor stronghold was not yet completed, and in Burma, [the army] was newly facing a capture operation of the central part of the country.

As for the Bataan Peninsula, as a result of a second well-prepared attack, [the Army] seized the peninsula in early April, and the Corregidor stronghold in early May. During this period, the [Army] 22d Air Division, reinforced with heavy bombers and others, took charge of the Army air operations and devoted itself to the direct support of the ground operations and the bombings of the stronghold.

From late March until early May, the Fifteenth Army fought battles in the Mandalay area of central Burma. Although the army failed to completely envelop and destroy the enemy ground forces, it quickly captured the strategic areas of the vast region.

In the meantime, in late March, the Fifth Air Force successfully destroyed the enemy air power in Magwe and vicinity, secured command of the air [there], and directly supported the ground operations of the [Fifteenth] Army, thereby facilitating its battles. However, the paratroop operation at the end of April against Lashio, which aimed to cut off of escape routes of the Chongqing Army, had to be called off due to bad weather.

From May to June 1942, the Japanese forces had practically complete command of the air in the Burma theater. However, it was obvious that the allied forces would try to recover and reinforce their military strength in an attempt to retake air supremacy in the theater.

The Japanese preparations for the air defense in Burma focused on employing air power in a concentrated and mobile way by constructing a number of airfields in different places, while regaining and maintaining its war potential by taking advantage of the width and depth of the key areas. According to this plan, the [Fifth] Air Force successively started preparations.

The persistent guerilla-like attacks of the allied air forces still continued. The interceptions [by the air arm of the Southern Army] were not entirely successful; it encountered difficulties in defending the sky of Rangoon. One of the reasons was the inferior performance of its equipment.

The air strikes on strategic places in Calcutta, which the Fifth Air Force had planned to conduct in May, were cancelled due to the incomplete servicing of its heavy bombers.

In late June, IGHQ issued orders to officially shift to a defensive position with a focus on securing the stability of the South. [IGHQ still] maintained its view, dating from March, that
the allies would not launch all-out counter offensives before 1943. One powerful element of the air arm of the [Southern] Army was transferred to the North. The Third Air Army was newly established in the South to take charge of the army air operations in the entire area apart from the Philippines.

The invasion operation of the South had been smoothly completed and the future for the operations seemed bright.
Chapter 1 Evaluation of the [Military] Gains and Examination of a Policy for Subsequent Operations
(March – April 1942)

1. The Evaluation of the Situation from a Higher Strategic Perspective

The Prospect of Probable U.S. and British Counter Offensives Against Japan

In early March 1942, the Liaison Conference between IGHQ and the Government examined the world situation and assessed the future measures of the world powers. Details aside, the main points concerning U.S. and British counter offensives against Japan were in outline as follows.\(^{(25)}\)

For the time being, Britain will in collaboration with the United States and the Soviet Union (part omitted by the author) try to secure the Mediterranean Sea and west Asia, and try to interfere with the cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy. Moreover, Britain will strive to secure as much as possible the command of the sea in the Indian Ocean as well as secure India and Australia for the sake of counterattacks against Japan and the unity of the British Empire.

For the time being, the United States will, in collaboration with Britain and the Soviet Union, first of all attempt to quickly crush the military strength of Germany and Italy, while striving to secure and strengthen the bases for counter offensives against Japan in Australia and the Indian Ocean. Further, it will concentrate powerful naval and air forces in the Pacific Ocean theater and with one element of them try to conduct various guerilla-type actions including the obstruction of Japanese sea traffic, or surprise attacks on the central sector of Japan.

The United States and Britain will make every effort to support the Soviet Union and Chiang [Kai-shek] in high hopes that the Soviet Union will contain Japan with its actions or participate in the war against Japan. While [the United States and Britain will] strive to realize their hopes as much as they can, they will, for the time being, secretly plan to secure bases in the eastern Soviet Union from where to attack Japan.

In order to shift to large-scale offensives against the Axis [countries] at a favorable opportunity after improving their military strength, it is very likely that, while striving to directly strike at the center of Japan from the continent in cooperation with the Soviet Union and China, the United States and Britain shall make counterattacks [against Japan] with their main force from Australia and the Indian Ocean by gradually regaining strategic points one by one.

However, the opportunity when they will be able to implement large-scale offensives will not occur before 1943.
In the above assessment, the main reasons why the conference formed the view that the allies’ large-scale offensives would not be implemented before 1943, were the observations that the United States and Britain in reality focused on their operations against Germany in Europe, and that it would take almost another year from that time until the United States could build up its armaments, particularly reinforce its air and naval strength.

Furthermore, the overall observation made concerning the war capability of the United States and Britain concluded that though they could build up superior military power in general and maintain a powerful capacity for prolonged wars, they also had numerous weak spots. Pointed out were: insufficient human war potential, inadequate readiness for action, the loss of bases from which to launch counter offensives, the relative shortage of sea transportation capacity, and doubts about their peoples’ endurance against austerity.\(^{(25)}\)

The General Evaluation of Achievements in the Initial Operations

**The Evaluation by the Liaison Conference [between IGHQ and the Government]**

Following the above, IGHQ and the government reviewed the achievements of the initial operations in comparison with the plan of operations, which was in outline as follows;\(^{(25)}\)

1. Military Affairs
   
   Both the Army and Navy achieved greater military results than expected in the initial operations, which, as a result, for the time being forced the United States and Britain on the defensive and created a situation advantageous for the defense of the Japanese realm and the security of its main lines of communications. Moreover, by taking advantage of the current tide of war, the opportunity has now come [for Japan] to shift to an offensive strategic position, contrary to the earlier expectation that [Japan] would have to inevitably take a defensive strategic position in order to carry on a drawn-out war.

   **Explanation**

   (1) Apart from the Philippines area, where some delays were observed, the Army operations made [good] progress, shortening the operation schedule by about one month. The losses [sustained by the Army] were also unexpectedly slight. In particular, it has already been able to launch the Burma operation, which was expected [to be launched] after the southern operation was for the most part completed, with the reserve strength that came earlier available in the South.

   (2) The Navy operations delivered a serious blow to the main force of the U.S. and British fleets in the Pacific in the initial battles and destroyed most of the enemy surface strength in the East, whereas the losses [the Navy] sustained were fewer than expected, which enabled it to turn the tables on the enemy in the military power balance in the Pacific and Indian Oceans for the time being.

   (3) In the air operations, the Army and Navy [air units], too, sustained relatively small losses while destroying a huge number of enemy air forces, and produced more military results than expected. Therefore, as far as being able to contain the future deployment of a large enemy air power in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, they are ready and able to cope with a rapid reinforcement of the enemy air power.

   (4) When having rebuilt their future war capabilities, the United States and Britain will be able to plan large-scale offensives by making use of their remaining counter-offensive bases.

   (5) Especially, the mental blow inflicted on the enemy forces in the initial battles must be huge.
2. Politics

When compared with our prewar expectations centered on the [Japanese] Empire, the current political world situation does not show perceptible differences from the changes that we had expected in the beginning. [In fact,] the overall situation has developed more advantageously to the [Japanese] Empire than expected.

3. Economy

Owing to the large military gains in the initial battles,

1. The securing of resources in the areas [designated] in the prearranged plan and the cutoff of supplies of important matériel to the United States and Britain were on the whole attained at an early stage.

2. Sea transportation was on the whole conducted at planned capacity.

3. Concerning the acquisition of matériel, that of oil in particular, there is a definite prospect that quite excellent results will be achieved in comparison with the plan.

As seen in the above, [Japan's] material war capability in general is expected to be more strengthened than planned, however, food security still needs to be given more consideration.

In that conference, the following questions and answers were made concerning the above evaluation.(25)

1. By a “shift to an offensive strategic position” in the future, how far is the Navy going to advance?

   [Answer:] Whereas the Navy’s [operations] have in the past been limited to a passive role, it is now considered to be able to execute active operations. However, an offensive does not include an advance to the mainland of the United States.

2. The comparison of aircraft wastage sustained by the Army and Navy

   The loss of Army aircraft (in the southern operation only) amounts to 440 aircraft as of the end of February, while that of the Navy aircraft amounts to 122 aircraft as of 7 March, adding those which had crashed themselves and those which did not return.

   One of the factors that the Army lost more aircraft was its lack of experience in operations over sea, which led to a number of losses during the period of concentration. However, what could be regarded as the largest factor was that due to its unremitting direct support for the continuous and protracted ground operations, [the Army air unit] genuinely could not afford to [properly] service its fighting power, the details of which will be separately described.

The Aggregated Military Gains of the Army Air Service and Their Evaluation

On Army Day, 10 March 1942, the IGHQ Army Department announced the military results achieved since the opening of hostilities until 7 March.

Although the military results in the Dutch East Indies operation were not [yet] included in the numbers, the enemy losses of aircraft were recorded as 1,200 aircraft, including those brought down, destroyed or seized, the details of which are as shown in Table No. 28.(52)

Since the evaluation of military results would have a great influence on the subsequent planning of operations, the Army had as a matter of course cautioned against exaggerated reports. However, in reality, it was quite difficult to confirm military results. Strict commanders would carefully examine the contents of the reports from their men [to keep them] as accurate as possible. Nevertheless, feeling they could not flatly dismiss the reports from their
men, they only excluded obvious overlaps at best. Naturally, as a result, not a few exaggerated reports were submitted.

It was advantageous to also use photography when assessing military results in air engagements. However, [the Army Air Service] could not afford to send off aircraft only for the purpose of confirming military results. Moreover, with the aircraft not yet equipped with gun cameras for air engagements at that time either, the Army’s evaluation of military results was far from perfect.

Table No. 28

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Malaya</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Burma</th>
<th>Dutch East Indies</th>
<th>British New Guinea</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
<th>Guam</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>Brought down</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(46)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(72)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(147)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Destroyed</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(88)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seized</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td></td>
<td>476</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns</td>
<td>Seized</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor vehicles</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,940</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>16,543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships and boats</td>
<td>Seized</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sunk [(or] destroyed</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>134</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>Prisoners</td>
<td>97,800</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>1,706</td>
<td>5,947</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>11,241</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>119,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abandoned dead bodies</td>
<td>8,210</td>
<td>12,187</td>
<td>57,062</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1,555</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>80,099</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remarks
1. The abandoned dead bodies in Malaya only include the number up to the charge into Johor Bahru.
2. The numbers in parentheses in the rows of brought-down or destroyed aircraft indicate that they are unconfirmed, and not included in the numbers right above.
2. Air Strength’s Wastage and Replenishment, and the Countermeasures

The Actual Situation of the Aircraft Wastage and Replenishment

Aircraft wastage and replenishment in the southern operation were in summary as shown in the following table. The replenishment [of aircraft] during the [first] two months after the opening of hostilities was particularly a big problem.\(^{(35)}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total number of aircraft</th>
<th>Wastage</th>
<th>Replenishment</th>
<th>Production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st month</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd month</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd month</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th month (estimate)</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>1,090</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table was as provided in a report of the Inspectorate General of Line of Communications.

During this period, the Army allotted most of the newly-built aircraft to the replenishment of aircraft wastage.

The actual monthly aircraft wastage and replenishments in the course of the operations until February based on a memorandum by Maj. Nagaishi Masahisa, attached to the staff of the Southern Army headquarters, may be presented as follows:\(^{(70)}\)

The Concentration and Situation in December

During the concentration, the Southern Army lost forty aircraft in Malaya and three aircraft in the Philippines. Furthermore, during the period from the opening of hostilities until the end of December, it lost 176 aircraft, which was equivalent to 20% of the about 870 aircraft, which in total were brought into the southern theater, including the aircraft of the unit under the direct control of the Southern Army.

The cause of most losses were losses in action; the poor conditions of the airfields particularly accounted for the majority of losses in Malaya, which was followed by poor flying skills and poor weather conditions. Having anticipated such losses, the IGHQ [Army Department] had already successively sent off in mid-November a total of 148 aircraft of various types to Pingdong, Jiayi, Guangdong, Hanoi, Saigon and other places as replenishment aircraft for a period of about half a month starting from the opening of hostilities. In the middle of transporting these aircraft, hostilities were opened and [the IGHQ Army Department] in succession sent from mid-December onwards [another] 151 aircraft in a second batch to Saigon.
Of the above, 166 aircraft were allotted to units as replenishment by the end of December. They made up about 75% of some 220 to 230 aircraft, which had been lost from the beginning of the concentration until the end of December. However, [the number of replenishments] of each aircraft type created many problems. For example, only nineteen Type–1 fighter planes were allotted as replenishment for the thirty-four losses out of sixty-four aircraft (brought to the theater).

The time to transport an aircraft from dispatch to a concentration point was roughly ten days on average. The Army Air Service Transport Department (formed in the summer of 1941)* was tasked with the transportation. Due to the [yet] insufficient communication network facilities and air routes as well as the shortage of personnel specifically [assigned to] air transport, the transport department barely managed to accomplish its tasks with support that was mostly provided by personnel of the [flying] schools in mainland Japan as well as personnel of the units. The Southern Army requested central command to transport [replenishments] to Saigon by air.

The Situation in January

In January, the focus of air operations was directed to the Malaya front. The air operation in the Philippines was roughly completed, and the Fifth Air Force was shifted to Thailand.

The losses [of aircraft] in January numbered 153 aircraft in total, of which 60%, namely 99 aircraft were lost in direct engagements.

The replenishments allotted to units during this period were 153 aircraft, including 24 aircraft repaired on site, which enabled them to continuously maintain their strength for the first full month after the opening of hostilities.

However, a closer look at [the replenishment numbers] in terms of aircraft types showed the same problems as in December [1941]. Col. Harada Sadanori (graduate of the 31st class), chief of the General Affairs Section of the Army Aviation Headquarters, who inspected the sites in early January, reported the situation at the sites in the following telegram of 6 January:

The following main [equipment and matériel] require replenishment:

1. [Required to] arrive by 15 January: 48 Type–1 fighter planes and 31 Type–99 assault planes
2. [Required to] arrive before February:
   33,000 Drums of 87-octane gasoline (the rest omitted by the author)
3. [Required to] arrive by the end of January: 300 Aircraft
   [Required to] arrive by the end of February: 250 Aircraft

Concerning the ships required for the transportation, the Southern Army has already specifically proposed to the IGHQ [Army Department] that the allocation of ships to the air arm should be given priority by reducing [the transportation] required by others.

Although the request made in the telegram outnumbered the production of aircraft at that time, the report frankly reflected the actual circumstances at the front.
The Situation in February

In February, air operations shifted from the Malay Peninsula to Sumatra and to Java, while the operations to advance into Burma also became gradually more aggressive.

The losses in February were 124 aircraft. The Army air unit had already lost some 490 aircraft since the concentration.\(^{(86)}\)

Note: The current situation of the aircraft of the Third Air Force as of 10 February ([from] the data of the situation report)

The total number of aircraft currently held [by the Third Air Force] (excluding headquarters, liaison, or transportation aircraft) are about four hundred aircraft, of which about 250 aircraft are operable while 60 aircraft are currently under repair. The aircraft losses since the concentration number about 310 aircraft.

Although [the air arm] made every effort to repair repairable aircraft among the losses, due to the successive advances, it [had to] go on with the operations solely relying on replenishment aircraft sent from mainland Japan, leaving behind on various airfields a number of aircraft that needed to be repaired. However, [the arrival of] replenishments was hampered by a spate of bad weather in the vicinities of Guangdong and Taipei. [Moreover,] the replenishment aircraft [often] fell out at [relay airfields] such as Tachiarai, Nyūtabaru, Naha, Taipei and Guangdong. Particularly the drop-out rate of small aircraft was high. As of 17 February, the number of aircraft tied up at such places amounted to sixty-five aircraft in total.

The current situation of aircraft at each air force at the end of February was as shown in Table No. 29. Thirty to forty percent of the aircraft currently held [by each force] were unfit for operations. One of the reasons for the slow progress of repairs was a shortage of spare parts.

The losses and replenishments of each type of aircraft since the concentration were as shown in Tables Nos. 30 and 31. The numbers of fighter planes and assault planes were large, which was followed by those of light bombers.

**Table No. 29**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>3d Air Force</th>
<th>5th Air Force</th>
<th>14th Army</th>
<th>Units under direct control [of the Southern Army]</th>
<th>(Field Replenishment Air Unit)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Regular number</td>
<td>Current number</td>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Regular number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–97 strat. recon. aircraft</td>
<td>81st Air Gp, 50th, 51st Indep. Air Sqdn</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8th Air Gp, 70th Indep. Air Sqdn</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Part III, Chapter 1 / Evaluation of the [Military] Gains and Examination of a Policy for Subsequent Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>3d Air Force</th>
<th>5th Air Force</th>
<th>14th Army</th>
<th>Units under direct control [of the Southern Army]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Field Replenishment Air Unit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–100 strat. recon. aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81st Air Gp, 50th Indep. Air Sqdn, 51st Indep. Air Sqdn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–1 fighter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59th Air Gp, 64th Air Gp</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–97 fighter</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Air Gp, 11th Air Gp</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–99 assault plane</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Air Gp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–99 twin-engine light bomber</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th Air Gp, 90th Air Gp</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Units under direct control of the Southern Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–97 (Model I)</td>
<td>3rd Air Force</td>
<td>(Field Replenishment Air Unit)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>heavy bomber</td>
<td>14th Air Gp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–2 single-seat fighter</td>
<td>47th Indep. Air Sqdn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–98 direct support aircraft</td>
<td>70th Indep. Air Sqdn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–99 tact. recon. aircraft</td>
<td>74th Indep. Air Sqdn</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Type–2 (Model I)</td>
<td>5th Air Force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>heavy bomber</td>
<td>14th Air Gp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–97 (Model II)</td>
<td>62d Air Gp</td>
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### Aircraft Specifications

<table>
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<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Unit</th>
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<td>9th Indep. Air Sqdn</td>
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<td></td>
<td>14th Indep. Air Sqdn</td>
<td>102</td>
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<td>73rd Indep. Air Sqdn</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75th Indep. Air Sqdn</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>76th Indep. Air Sqdn</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>Type–88 direct support aircraft</td>
<td>77th Indep. Air Sqdn</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td></td>
<td>78th Indep. Air Sqdn</td>
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<td></td>
<td>79th Indep. Air Sqdn</td>
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<td></td>
<td>81st Indep. Air Sqdn</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>82nd Indep. Air Sqdn</td>
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### Part III, Chapter 1 / Evaluation of the [Military] Gains and Examination of a Policy for Subsequent Operations

#### Table No. 30

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>3d Air Force</th>
<th>5th Air Force</th>
<th>14th Army</th>
<th>Units under direct control [of the Southern Army]</th>
<th>(Field Replenishment Air Unit)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Regular number</td>
<td>Current number</td>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Regular number</td>
<td>Current number</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Remarks**
1. The regular numbers on aggregate: 862, the current numbers on aggregate: 631 [634?]; the lack of aircraft on aggregate: 231 [228?].
2. Other [than the above], there were 42 replenishment aircraft in Pingdong, Guangdong, and Saigon.
3. The current numbers include the number of aircraft under repair.
4. The transport aircraft, etc. are omitted.

### Table No. 30

#### Aircraft losses (from the concentration until March 1942)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>3d Air Force</th>
<th>5th Air Force</th>
<th>14th Army</th>
<th>Units under direct control [of the Southern Army]</th>
<th>(Field Replenishment Air Unit)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Losses</td>
<td>Losses</td>
<td>Losses</td>
<td>Losses</td>
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<td>Brought along</td>
<td>Concentration</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>33</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>3d Air Force</td>
<td>5th Air Force</td>
<td>14th Army air unit and units under the direct control [of the Southern Army]</td>
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<tr>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Losses</td>
<td>Losses</td>
<td>Losses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Concentration</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type-100 str. recon. aircraft</td>
<td>20 3 5 2 3 15</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type-99 tact. recon. aircraft</td>
<td>20 9 8 2 22 11</td>
<td>4 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type-98 direct support aircraft</td>
<td>13 3 2 1 6 10</td>
<td>3 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type-97 fighter</td>
<td>132 3 16 14 2 67 77 1</td>
<td>1 17 11 16 21 66 2 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type-1 fighter</td>
<td>64 34 23 16 7 80 2</td>
<td>2 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type-97 light bomber</td>
<td>42 1 3 1 5 34 1</td>
<td>4 2 14 22 4 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type-99 twin-engine light bomber</td>
<td>82 3 12 15 21 7 58 32</td>
<td>7 1 3 3 14</td>
<td>2 3 11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Evaluation of the [Military] Gains and Examination of a Policy for Subsequent Operations

### Unit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>3d Air Force</th>
<th>5th Air Force</th>
<th>14th Army air unit and units under the direct control [of the Southern Army]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loses</td>
<td>Losses</td>
<td>Losses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brought along</td>
<td>Brought along</td>
<td>Losses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–99 assault plane</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–97 (Model I) heavy bomber</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–97 (Model II) heavy bomber</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–2 fighter</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–97 transport aircraft</td>
<td>(55)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–100 transport aircraft</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–Ro transport aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note:
1. Transport aircraft were not included in the number of aircraft brought along by the Fifth Air Force.
2. The numbers of aircraft losses of the Third Air Force during its concentration are considered to be limited to the numbers after the first-stage concentration.

Table No. 31

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>3d Air Force</th>
<th>5th Air Force</th>
<th>14th Army air unit and units under direct control [of the Southern Army]</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–97 strat. recon. aircraft</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–100 strat. recon. aircraft</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–99 tact. recon. aircraft</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–98 direct support aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–97 fighter</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Part III, Chapter 1 / Evaluation of the [Military] Gains and Examination of a Policy for Subsequent Operations

#### Unit 3rd Air Force 5th Air Force 14th Army air unit and units under direct control [of the Southern Army] Total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>3d Air Force</th>
<th>5th Air Force</th>
<th>14th Army air unit and units under direct control [of the Southern Army]</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–1 fighter</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–97 light bomber</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–99 twin-engine light bomber</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–97 Model I heavy bomber</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–97 Model II heavy bomber</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type–2 two-seater fighter</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Actual Situation of the Losses and Replenishments of Personnel

The General Situation of the Personnel Losses and Replenishments

The personnel losses were by far the largest at the Third Air Force (consisting of about 1,200 officers, 4,400 non-commissioned officers and 19,300 privates as of 8 February) in the Malaya theater. Particularly in the four months from 12 November before the opening of hostilities until 11 March [1942], it lost 511 personnel, of whom eighty-two officers. The details were as shown in Table No. 32. [Almost] half of the 511 losses, namely 243 men (of whom 120 men were pilots and 123 men with other tasks), were flight crew, and only eighty-three (fifty-six pilots and twenty-seven other crews), or some 30% [of the losses] were replenished during this period.

The current numbers of losses and replenishments of flight crew in each unit of the Third Air Force as of 8 February 1942, that is, two months after the opening of hostilities, were as shown in Tables Nos. 33 and 34.(86)

The Actual Situation of the Field Replenishment Air Unit

On 30 November [1941], the [1st] Field Replenishment Air Unit,* which was set up to appropriately and timely replenish flight crew of the flight units at the front, completed its formation. The unit left Hamamatsu and concentrated in Taiwan from 15 December onwards in groups of reconnaissance aircraft (six Type–97 strategic reconnaissance aircraft, three Type–99 tactical reconnaissance aircraft and three Type–98 direct support aircraft), fighter planes (nine Type–97 fighter planes), light bombers (five Type–98 light bombers), and heavy bombers (nine Type–97 Model I and five Type–97 Model II heavy bombers).

* See pp. 81-82.
During this concentration, five Type–97 fighter planes, five Type–97 Model I and three Type–97 Model II heavy bombers had to be ditched or crash-landed, and [even] the transport aircraft carrying Lt. Col. Tsubouchi Yoshinao, commander of the unit, itself had to be ditched off Naze Bay on Amami Ōshima due to engine trouble. [These accidents] resulted in quite a few personnel killed or missing. The flying skills of the personnel and the poor servicing of the aircraft presented a serious obstacle in the concentration of the air unit.

At the end of December, the Southern Army took command of the air unit. [However,] the air unit, still in Taiwan then, could not meet the replenishment needs in mid-December, right after the opening of hostilities, when the largest number of losses of flight crew occurred.

At the end of December, bombings by British aircraft inflicted heavy losses to the assault plane unit at the Sungai Petani [airfield], which led to emergency replenishments from the [1st] Replenishment Air Unit.\(^{(111)}\)

At the end of January, the [1st Replenishment] Air Unit advanced to [the airfields of] Phnom Penh and Kampong Trach, where it started training. However, it was not easy due to the low skills of the personnel, many of whom had only two to three hundred hours of flight experience, while the quality of the trainers and servicemen was also very uneven. Nevertheless, due to the strong requests from the front to replenish losses, quite a few were sent in without sufficient training.

It was after the operations were for the most part completed when Type–1 fighters and Type–100 strategic reconnaissance aircraft were provided as training aircraft.\(^{(65, 77, 80, 209)}\)

The Comparison of Losses in Malaya and in the Philippines

In the Malaya theater, the rate of losses of flight crew in the first month after the opening of hostilities was 13-14%, and in the second month, the rate reached 19.5\%.\(^{(81)}\)

On the other hand, in the Philippines, the losses in the first two months after the opening of hostilities were eighty-one men (of which thirty-five were killed, forty wounded, and six missing).

In January 1942, the Fifth Air Force, which had been engaged in the Philippines operation, was shifted to the Thai theater. After its transfer to that theater, [the Fifth] Air Force for the first time faced the problem of losses.

In the initial stages after the opening of hostilities, both [the Third and the Fifth] Air Forces were swamped with handling personnel affairs, such as getting a grasp on the replenishment situation, processing formalities, or urgently transporting personnel. It took a while before these processes were standardized and put on track.

Although [the rule was that] officer appointments of the [1st] Replenishment Air Unit should be applied for first to the [war] minister, in reality, [officers were appointed] on an ex post facto basis.\(^{(209)}\)
Table No. 32

Personnel losses of the Third Air Force (from 12 November 1941 until 11 March 1942)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Field officer</th>
<th>Company officer</th>
<th>Warrant officer</th>
<th>Non-commissioned officer</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Grand total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Pilot</td>
<td>Recon. aircraft</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>120</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fighters</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Light bombers</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Heavy bombers</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Scout</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Bombardier</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Combat specialist</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Gunner</td>
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<td>52</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Bomb specialist</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Antiaircraft machinegun (AAA) gunner</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wired operator</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gas specialist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Others</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Engineering Dept.</td>
<td>Aviation engineering</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Precision equipment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ordnance engineering</td>
<td>Pyrotechnics</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table No. 33†

Current numbers of flight crew of the Third Air Force as of 8 February 1942

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Pilot</th>
<th>Scout</th>
<th>Bombardier</th>
<th>Combat specialist</th>
<th>Gunner</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Total A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Air Force HQ</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Air Div HQ</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Air Div HQ</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Air Div HQ</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† Some numbers have been corrected on the basis of the original documents.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pilot</th>
<th>Scout</th>
<th>Bombardier</th>
<th>Combat specialist</th>
<th>Gunner</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Part III, Chapter 1 / Evaluation of the [Military] Gains and Examination of a Policy for Subsequent Operations
### Table No. 34

#### Losses and replenishments of flight crew of the Third Air Force as of 8 February 1942

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pilot</th>
<th>Scout</th>
<th>Bombardier</th>
<th>Combat specialist</th>
<th>Gunner</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loss</td>
<td>Requested</td>
<td>Replenished</td>
<td>Loss</td>
<td>Requested</td>
<td>Replenished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Air Gp</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Remarks**

1. Those who have special skills but are engaged in other posts and those who are dispatched to [flying] schools are not included in this table.
2. In this table, numbers in parentheses indicate those who hold major other positions. The numbers in parentheses in the scout columns also serve as pilots, those in the bombardier columns also serve as pilots, and those in the gunner columns are also in charge of engines, and not included in the numbers [of other posts].
3. The numbers in the table include junior airmen.
### Part III, Chapter 1 / Evaluation of the [Military] Gains and Examination of a Policy for Subsequent Operations

#### Pilot Scout Bombardier Combat specialist Gunner Total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pilot</th>
<th>Scout</th>
<th>Bombardier</th>
<th>Combat specialist</th>
<th>Gunner</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loss</td>
<td>Requested</td>
<td>Replenished</td>
<td>Loss</td>
<td>Requested</td>
<td>Replenished</td>
<td>Loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Air Gp</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Air Gp</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Air Gp</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59th Air Gp</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60th Air Gp</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64th Air Gp</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th Air Gp</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81st Air Gp</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90th Air Gp</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98th Air Gp</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50th Indep. Air Sqdn</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51st Indep. Air Sqdn</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Remarks

1. The numbers of losses [in this table only] include those sustained from 12 November [1941] onwards, excluding those who were killed in action, unknown whether dead or alive, or sent back to mainland Japan.
2. The numbers within parentheses in the total numbers are the number of officers included in the number right above.
3. The ground crew losses were 307 men (as of 10 February) and not replenished at all.
The Operations of the Repair and Replenishment Units

Actual Repairs in December and January

Concerning the repair and replenishment of the air units, the Southern Army gave priority to the Malaya operation and saw to it that the execution of the operation went off without a hitch, particularly for the first two months after the opening of hostilities.\(^{(61)}\)

The actual performance of the repair units in the first month after the opening of hostilities was as shown in Table No. 35. Among the repair units, all units which had recently been newly formed failed to produce satisfactory results.\(^{(65, 70)}\) It was because it took time before the newly formed units received their tools and matériel, which hampered the working details in displaying their competence. In that respect, the repair detail led by Lt. Col. Yoshida Takashi (graduate of the 30th class) attached to the 15th Field Aircraft Depot, which had gained abundant experience in China and, moreover, carried along repair parts for about two months when deployed to the airfield[s] in southern Thailand, promptly handled emergency repairs on site with the support of one element of the 12th Field Aircraft Repair Depot and achieved [good] results.\(^{(65, 70, 77)}\)

In late January, in order to supplement the repair capacity of the 25th Aircraft Detached Depot in Saigon and the 1st Mobile Aircraft Repair Detail (under the control of the chief of the Army Aviation Headquarters) operating in the Philippines, the Army Aviation Headquarters dispatched about 250 engineers from various branch depots in mainland Japan with a limit of two to three months to support the work on location.\(^{(70)}\)
Apart from the above, the Southern Army requested engineers with special skills for the repair of mobile oxygen generators, aircraft for the paratroop raiding group, wireless equipment, and machineguns in order to service these armaments.\(^{65,70}\)

**Problems in the Repair of Aircraft from February Onwards**

From early February onwards, the bottleneck in the repair of aircraft was the lack of matériel and parts.

Around that time, an increasing number of aircraft of the units in operation flew beyond the regular servicing schedule of both their airframes and engines. Although the standard [servicing schedule] was set as shown in Table No. 36, [some types of] aircraft including Type–99 twin-engine light bombers and Type–97 fighter planes had been continuously employed from the opening of hostilities onwards, and their airframes were coming loose in many places.\(^{86}\)

**Table No. 35**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Commander and personnel</th>
<th>Airframe (S: single engine; T: twin engine)</th>
<th>Engine</th>
<th>Propeller</th>
<th>Machinegun</th>
<th>Motor vehicle</th>
<th>Radio set</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pingdong Army Aircraft Branch Depot</td>
<td>Col Hayashi Yutaka</td>
<td>S: 3</td>
<td>Ha-13A: 4</td>
<td>Ha-15: 2</td>
<td>Ha-5: 3</td>
<td>Ha-1B: 2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>T: 29</td>
<td>Ha-9: 5</td>
<td>Ha-1B: 1</td>
<td>Ha-5: 2</td>
<td>Ha-1B: 4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiayi Detached Depot</td>
<td>Capt Matsuo Kyōji</td>
<td>S: 10</td>
<td>Ha-5: 10</td>
<td>Ha-1B: 1</td>
<td>Ha-9: 10</td>
<td>Ha-1B: 1</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taizhong Detached Depot</td>
<td>Maj Sakanomoto</td>
<td>S: 7</td>
<td>Ha-13: 7</td>
<td>Ha-1B: 1</td>
<td>Ha-9: 10</td>
<td>Ha-1B: 1</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th Field Aircraft Depot</td>
<td>Col Yasuda Rikio; some 700 men</td>
<td>S: 5</td>
<td>Ha-5: 7</td>
<td>Ha-1B: 4</td>
<td>Ha-9: 10</td>
<td>Ha-1B: 1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>T: 7</td>
<td>Ha-26: 1</td>
<td>Ha-1B: 1</td>
<td>Ha-9: 10</td>
<td>Ha-1B: 1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Detached Depot (Hanoi)</td>
<td>Lt Col Ichimaru Sakuma; some 280 men</td>
<td>S: 2</td>
<td>Ha-1B: 2</td>
<td>Ha-5: 1</td>
<td>Ha-9: 10</td>
<td>Ha-1B: 1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>T: 7</td>
<td>Ha-25: 6</td>
<td>Ha-1B: 1</td>
<td>Ha-9: 10</td>
<td>Ha-1B: 1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Aircraft Detached Depot (Saigon)</td>
<td>Lt Col Tokuda Yasaku; some 450 men</td>
<td>S: 5</td>
<td>Ha-5: 1</td>
<td>Ha-9: 10</td>
<td>Ha-1B: 1</td>
<td>Ha-1B: 1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Evaluation of the [Military] Gains and Examination of a Policy for Subsequent Operations

### Part III, Chapter 1

## Unit Commander and personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>and personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19th Field Aircraft Repair Depot (Bangkok)</td>
<td>Maj Saka-guchi</td>
<td>Masashi; some 630 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Shipboard Aircraft Depot (Yahiko-maru)</td>
<td>Maj Takamori</td>
<td>Shin-kichi; some 180 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th Shipboard Aircraft Depot (Olympia-maru)</td>
<td>Maj Noguchi</td>
<td>Shichirō; some 170 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Mobile Aircraft Repair Detail (The Philippines)</td>
<td>Lt Col Yoshida</td>
<td>Takashi; some 1,000 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One element of 15th Field Aircraft Depot (Main Depot at Nanyuan)</td>
<td>Lt Col Yoshida</td>
<td>Takashi; some 1,000 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One element of 12th Field Aircraft Repair Depot (Main Depot at Harbin)</td>
<td>Sgt Maj Kadoguchi</td>
<td>and some 70 men</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>and personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19th Field Aircraft Repair Depot (Bangkok)</td>
<td>Maj Saka-guchi</td>
<td>Masashi; some 630 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Shipboard Aircraft Depot (Yahiko-maru)</td>
<td>Maj Takamori</td>
<td>Shin-kichi; some 180 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th Shipboard Aircraft Depot (Olympia-maru)</td>
<td>Maj Noguchi</td>
<td>Shichirō; some 170 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Mobile Aircraft Repair Detail (The Philippines)</td>
<td>Lt Col Yoshida</td>
<td>Takashi; some 1,000 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One element of 15th Field Aircraft Depot (Main Depot at Nanyuan)</td>
<td>Lt Col Yoshida</td>
<td>Takashi; some 1,000 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One element of 12th Field Aircraft Repair Depot (Main Depot at Harbin)</td>
<td>Sgt Maj Kadoguchi</td>
<td>and some 70 men</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engine</th>
<th>Propeller</th>
<th>Machinegun</th>
<th>Motor vehicle</th>
<th>Radio set</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ha-101: 1</td>
<td>Ha-25: 1</td>
<td>Ha-25: 1</td>
<td>Ha-25: 1</td>
<td>Ha-1B: 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ha-5: 4</td>
<td>Ha-5: 1</td>
<td>Ha-1B: 2</td>
<td>Ha-1B: 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ha-101: 2</td>
<td>Ha-8: 1</td>
<td>Ha-5: 2</td>
<td>Ha-101: 32</td>
<td>Ha-1B: 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Remarks:

1. The 19th Field Aircraft Repair Depot was in the middle of its shift to Saigon; it came under the command of the Southern Army at the end of December. Its capacity for the first two months after the opening of hostilities was to conduct regular servicing of no more than five engines and the airframes of one large, two mid-sized and three small aircraft.

2. The actual results of servicing conducted by the 17th Shipboard Aircraft Depot other than that of engines are unclear.

3. The Third Air Force commander formed the 1st Moving Repair Details (for heavy bombers), the 2d Moving Repair Details (for heavy bombers and reconnaissance aircraft), the 3d Moving Repair Details (Type–1 fighter planes and twin-engine light bombers), and the 4th Moving Repair Details (for Type–99 assault planes) with
personnel dispatched from the 12th Field Aircraft Repair Depot and the 15th Field Aircraft Depot, and had them land in southern Thailand.

4. The Pingdong Aircraft Branch Depot was put under the command of the Southern Army to take charge of the servicing and replenishment of the Fifth Air Force and the air unit under the command of the Taiwan Army commander.

Table No. 36

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Servicing</th>
<th>Regular checking/servicing [intervals] (hrs)</th>
<th>Regular maintenance [intervals] (hrs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Minor servicing</td>
<td>Intermediate servicing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airframe</td>
<td>Large [aircraft]</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mid-sized [aircraft]</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small [aircraft]</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engine</td>
<td>Large aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mid-sized aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remarks

1. In this table, large aircraft indicates heavy bombers and transport aircraft, mid-sized aircraft indicates twin-engine aircraft such as light bombers, strategic reconnaissance aircraft and two-seat fighter planes, and small aircraft indicates single-engine aircraft such as fighter planes and assault planes.
2. The regular checking/servicing of engines and propellers and the regular maintenance of propellers shall be conducted along with the airframes they are mounted on.
3. The times shown in regular maintenance intervals of airframes of this table are calculated from an estimated wear and tear of airframes. In reality, maintenance of airframes is often conducted along with engines mounted on them at the time of the regular maintenance of the latter.
4. The intervals shown in this table should be appropriately adjusted depending on the mutual effects of the conditions in which the aircraft is used, the types of aircraft, and seasonal climate conditions, particularly sandstorms.

From mid-February until early March, the progress of the war both in Malaya and Burma accelerated. The Fifth Air Force, which was deployed in Thailand, requested the support of the 25th Aircraft Detached Depot and the 18th Shipboard Aircraft Depot, however, due to the large number of aircraft in the Malaya and Sumatra areas that needed repair, both aircraft depots could not afford to allot repair capacity to the [Fifth] Air Force.\(^{(143)}\)

The 19th Field Aircraft Repair Depot under the command of the Fifth Air Force, whose repair capacity increased to about fifteen airframes and engines each (per month) at the end of February, still needed further enhancement of its capacity.\(^{(70)}\) The fact that various kinds of aircraft were currently in service not only complicated production and replenishment, but also impacted the matériel needed for conducting repairs and the repair capacity.\(^{(61)}\)
[In addition to the above], the replenishment and servicing of [aircraft] machineguns, and meteorological and communication equipment [for the Air Force] were controlled at the Ordnance Administration Headquarters* in the same way as other general surface armaments.\(^{(61)}\)

Note: Aircraft machineguns, meteorological and communication equipment, etc. were controlled altogether by the Ordnance Administration Headquarters,** irrespective of their use as aircraft or surface [armaments]. Therefore, the [Army] Aviation Headquarters, which was in charge of replenishment and servicing of air armaments in general, had no authority to direct or inspect the production of these armaments. The system could not easily respond in a timely and quick fashion to the requests of the air units, whose circumstances changed suddenly and drastically as previously told, and in which the measures against troubles should swiftly be taken.

Consequently, the production, replenishment and servicing of automatic guns (machine-guns), etc. tended to lag behind, and also in terms of technology, the requests of the air units were not appropriately reflected.

[The air arm] did request that automatic guns (machineguns), etc., including the ammunition for them, should altogether be assigned to the Aviation Headquarters.\(^{(61)}\)

### The Repair Unit’s Advance to Singapore

On 25 February, the Southern Army ordered 16th Field Aircraft Depot Commander Yasuda Rikio (at Guangdong) to advance the main force of the depot to Singapore Island and construct a large facility to extensively take charge of repair and replenishment of the Army air units deployed in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.\(^{(81)}\)

In this order, the following directions were given concerning the construction of a repair and replenishment facility.\(^{(70)}\)

1. The shops and warehouses: The shops and buildings at the Kallang airfield and the vicinity shall be used.
2. The plants to be prepared so as to swiftly [start] operations: [An] oxygen production plant, [a] drum manufacturing plant and [a] fuel oil testing station.
3. The fuel storage: shall be set in Kranji; the British facilities [there] shall be recovered and used.
4. The wharf warehouses: Four warehouses at the Empire Dock shall be used.
5. Ammunition storage facility: The British aircraft building plant near Keat Hong shall be recovered and used.
6. As an attached facility of the aircraft depot, preparations shall be made to construct a basic aircraft engineering plant with the following monthly capacity standard:
   - Repair capacity: 105 airframes and 210 engines
   - Building capacity: 105 airframes and 250 engines

[The idea of] establishing a large repair and replenishment facility in the Singapore sector was based on the intention of the Army central command to reduce the replenishment from mainland Japan by building up the Army Air Service’s on-site, self-supporting capacity in terms of aviation equipment as much as possible.

However, the idea was not coordinated with the Navy; a scramble for facilities started off on site between the Army and the Navy, or [even] between the ground and air units of the

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* See footnote p. 49.
** Idem.
Army, which left the Army Air Service without appropriate facilities for an aircraft repair depot. Furthermore, due to the subsequent changes in the war situation and others, the production remained limited to some simple parts only.

In early March in Singapore, problems about the construction of bases, their guarding and quartering occurred between the Twenty-fifth Army and the Third Air Force.

The journal kept by Senior Staff Officer Tanikawa of Section 4 of the Southern Army, who visited the Twenty-fifth Army headquarters in Singapore on 4 March to solve the problems about the construction of air bases on the island, reads as follows:(63)

The sentiment of the Twenty-fifth Army has worsened mainly over the problem of the construction of air bases in Singapore. It [even] proposed that the guarding and quartering of the Third Air Force in Singapore should be left to its discretion.

Although the Southern Army had in a fashion arranged orders concerning the above, since [the problem] involved complicated sentiments, someone needed to personally communicate [the orders] and handle the situation. (Part omitted by the author) It is not necessarily a pleasant task to intervene on one’s own...

Carrying the single volume of My Belief [by Kiyozawa Manshi], I arrived in Singapore on the 4th, first spoke with Staff Officers Iketani and Tsuji [of the Twenty-fifth Army], [then] talked with Kawashima and Miyashi, [staff officers of the Third Air Force], and sent a telegram offering my proposal to the Southern Army. That night, I had dinner with [Twenty-fifth] Army Commander Yamashita...

The Southern Army’s Direction of the Supply Units and the Actual Consumption of Fuel and Ammunition

On 11 December, the Southern Army had the 20th Field Aircraft Supply Depot in Saigon set up local depots in Bangkok and Singora.

On 19 January, both local depots were upgraded to branch depots, and another local depot was set up in Alor Setar, which was followed by the setup of local depots in Kluang and Sawankhalok, too, in early February.

On 19 February, the Southern Army set up a supply branch depot in Singapore and downgraded the branch depot in Singora to a local depot. In such a way, the [Southern Army] advanced supply depots as the front moved forward. For the Southern Army, the biggest difficulty in the replenishment operation was the transportation of fuel and ammunition in the Malaya theater, as previously told.

In the [first] two months after the opening of hostilities, the flight units in Malaya consumed the amounts of fuel and ammunition shown in Table No. 37. During this period, the dispersion [of units] in southern French Indochina and the uneven supply of fuel to Malaya inevitably limited part of the operations [of the heavy bomber units]. Seized fuel was invaluable for getting through the difficulties.(87)

In contrast, in the Philippines, due to the smaller [air] strength [employed] and closeness to the Pingdong Branch Depot, [the air unit there] enjoyed various advantages in supplies.(70)

The standard [amount] of fuel and ammunition required per month by one air division was as shown in Table No. 38.(86)
### Table No. 37

#### Consumption of aircraft fuel and ammunition (from 8 December 1941 until 15 February 1942)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Fuel (kiloliters)</th>
<th>Lubricant (kiloliters)</th>
<th>Bombs (dropped)</th>
<th>Machinegun (bullets)</th>
<th>12.7-mm machinegun (bullets)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>500 [kg]</td>
<td>250 [kg]</td>
<td>100 [kg]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Air Gp</td>
<td>394.9</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>58,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Air Gp</td>
<td>342.4</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>39,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Air Gp</td>
<td>1392.2</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>74,400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Air Gp</td>
<td>538.7</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>93,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60th Air Gp</td>
<td>1925.5</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59th Air Gp</td>
<td>502.3</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>61,700</td>
<td></td>
<td>39,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64th Air Gp</td>
<td>487.2</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>27,600</td>
<td></td>
<td>48,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th Air Gp</td>
<td>1067.5</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81st Air Gp</td>
<td>216.4</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90th Air Gp</td>
<td>1,106.3</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>26,700</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98th Air Gp</td>
<td>888.8</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>53,800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83d Indep. Air Unit</td>
<td>147.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Indep. Air Unit 50th Sqdn</td>
<td>169.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto 51st Sqdn</td>
<td>126.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Remarks:** Strategic [recon.] aircraft, communication aircraft, transport aircraft and Ki-44 are not included in this table.

### Table No. 38

#### Standard [amount] of matériel required per month by one air division (3,360 tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Numbers per package</th>
<th>Weight per package (kgs)</th>
<th>Amount necessary for one month (pcs)</th>
<th>Total number of packages</th>
<th>Total weight (kgs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15kg</td>
<td>Bombs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50kg</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>6,030</td>
<td>6,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100kg</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>3,450</td>
<td>3,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250kg</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Items</td>
<td>Numbers per package</td>
<td>Weight per package (kgs)</td>
<td>Amount necessary for one month (pcs)</td>
<td>Total number of packages</td>
<td>Total weight (kgs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500kg Bombs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>33,858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50kg Incendiary bombs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>88,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12kg</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>17,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illumination flares</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Machinegun [bullets]</th>
<th>Numbers per package</th>
<th>Weight per package (kgs)</th>
<th>Amount necessary for one month (pcs)</th>
<th>Total number of packages</th>
<th>Total weight (kgs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armor piercing</td>
<td>1,380</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>669,300</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>23,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incendiary</td>
<td>1,380</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>223,560</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>7,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clips</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>605,800</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>6,524</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instantaneous fuses</th>
<th>Numbers per package</th>
<th>Weight per package (kgs)</th>
<th>Amount necessary for one month (pcs)</th>
<th>Total number of packages</th>
<th>Total weight (kgs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instantaneous short delay fuses</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>11,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tail fuses</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9,480</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>12,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy bomb nose fuses</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1,127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy bomb tail fuses</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-powder high-explosive instantaneous-short delay fuses</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1,150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gasoline</th>
<th>Numbers per package</th>
<th>Amount necessary for one month (pcs)</th>
<th>Total number of packages</th>
<th>Total weight (kgs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>87 Octane</td>
<td>200 (liters)</td>
<td>1,000 (kiloliters)</td>
<td>5,000 (drums)</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91 Octane</td>
<td>200 (liters)</td>
<td>1,000 (kiloliters)</td>
<td>5,000 (drums)</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mineral oil</th>
<th>Numbers per package</th>
<th>Amount necessary for one month (pcs)</th>
<th>Total number of packages</th>
<th>Total weight (kgs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>200 (liters)</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>77 (kiloliters)</td>
<td>385 (drums)</td>
<td>80,850</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Castor oil</th>
<th>Numbers per package</th>
<th>Amount necessary for one month (pcs)</th>
<th>Total number of packages</th>
<th>Total weight (kgs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>180 (liters)</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>73 (kiloliters)</td>
<td>405 (drums)</td>
<td>83,025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Remarks**

These standards are calculated based on the amounts of matériel required monthly by an air division consisting of one air group each of fighter planes, light bombers and heavy bombers and one squadron of strategic reconnaissance aircraft in combination, when it executes fifteen sorties of heavy bombers, twenty sorties each of light bombers and strategic reconnaissance aircraft and thirty sorties of fighter planes per month.
The Operations of the Air Transport Units

Air transport units were assigned to various kinds of tasks such as shifting [other] units, unexpected urgent transport of matériel, and the communication of instructions. In the [paradrop] raiding operation, they [even] directly participated in combat along with the air units at the front.

Despite their small number of aircraft, the units performed their various tasks well. The operations of the air transport units as of the end of April were as shown in Table No. 39.

Table No. 39

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Regular number of aircraft</th>
<th>Current number of aircraft</th>
<th>Current situation</th>
<th>Employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Air Transport Unit</td>
<td>Maj Kashima</td>
<td>12 Type–97 transport aircraft</td>
<td>12 Type–97 transport aircraft</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Masateru</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Type–97 heavy bomber</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Air Transport Unit</td>
<td>Capt Matsubuchi</td>
<td>12 Type–Ro transport aircraft</td>
<td>11 Type–Ro transport aircraft</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Osamu</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 Type–97 heavy bombers</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Air Transport Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td>12 Type–Ro transport aircraft</td>
<td>7 Type–Ro transport aircraft</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th Special Air Transport Unit</td>
<td>Lt Col Mori</td>
<td>9 Type–Ro transport aircraft</td>
<td>9 Type–Ro transport aircraft</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shigeki</td>
<td></td>
<td>7 Type–97 transport aircraft</td>
<td>9 Type–97 transport aircraft</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 MC–20 aircraft</td>
<td>5 MC–20 aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Earlier, from the end of January onwards, the air transport units provided regular flights on two routes: one connecting Saigon, Kuantan, Kuching and Miri and another connecting Pingdong, Sanya and Saigon.

In early March, another flight route connecting Saigon, Singapore and Palembang was established. At the end of March, the flight routes were renewed and two [new] routes, namely one connecting Singapore, Palembang, Batavia, Bandung and Surabaya (three times a week) and another connecting Singapore and Saigon (once a week) were opened.

The Army’s Interest in the Buildup of Its Air Strength

The Army central command as a matter of course supported and promoted with all its might the air arm of the Southern Army during the heavy fighting described above. While the supply and replenishment for the operational units were carried out by the Inspectorate General of Line of Communications of the IGHQ [Army Department] (the vice chief of Army General Staff served concurrently as the inspector general), those related to the air service were dealt with by the Office of the Chief of Field Air Ordnance (chief: Lt. Gen. Kawabe Torashirō, chief of General Affairs Division of Army Aviation Headquarters; graduate of the 24th Class) within the Inspectorate General, which meant that it was essentially handled by the Army Aviation Headquarters.

The remarkable service of the Army Air Service from the opening of hostilities onwards was widely recognized within the Army in general, which raised the value of air force, and also intensified the interest in building up the strength of the Air Service.

On 17 February, Chief of the General Affairs Division of the Army Aviation Headquarters Lt. Gen. Kawabe Torashirō gave the following explanations about the Army Air Service’s material war potential to bureau chiefs of the War Ministry and the Army General Staff.\(^{(35)}\)
(1) Aircraft production and other related measures

The actual production of Army aircraft until the end of March this year will be some 4,800 aircraft per year, and its capacity is supposed to increase to some 6,300 aircraft per year by the end of 1942.

The southern operations are expected to intensify in 1943, moreover, in order to be [also] prepared for the emergence of a new situation in the North as was assumed at the time of “Kantokuen” (Special Grand Maneuvers of the Kwantung Army), it is necessary to increase the [annual] aircraft production capacity to some 9,000 aircraft by the end of 1942, which means [measures to] increase the [annual production] capacity by 2,700 aircraft that are still short must urgently be taken.

In order to increase production, the following measures are of great urgency, and if they are dealt with immediately, the aforementioned production target is attainable.
- To improve the efficiency of the aircraft production plants (by longer working hours and a larger supply of matériel)
- To involve aircraft branch depots, units and schools
- To build up fuel depots
- To preferentially secure resources related to aviation
- To take appropriate measures about personnel matters
- Exchange of personnel between the Ordnance Headquarters and Aviation Headquarters
- Problems relating to machine tools
- Increases in budget, electricity, and motive power

(2) The outlook for aviation fuel

If aviation fuel continues to be consumed at the current amount, storage will be exhausted by November 1943. The annual consumption is [now] estimated at 276,000 kiloliters.

Note: Before the opening of hostilities, the annual consumption [of aviation fuel] for 1942 was estimated at 225,000 kiloliters.

(3) It is necessary to take measures to increase the production of air weapons and ammunition (note: in relation to the Ordnance Administration Headquarters*).

(4) The skills of the air units need to be improved.

On 24 February, Chief of Operations Hattori requested a buildup of the strength of the Army Air Service at the section chiefs meeting of the Army General Staff. Although it was beyond his official capacity, he also touched upon to the production of aircraft, and even further inquired about the plans of the Navy Air Service for a large-scale increase in production.\(^{(35)}\)

3. The General Principles for Conducting the Future Operations

Coordination of the Army and Navy’s Strategic Thinking: The General Principles for Conducting the War from Now on

From the launch of the southern operation onwards, there was a huge gap in fundamental operational thinking between the Army and Navy. The Navy considered that in order to have a chance of victory in the operations against the United States, there was no other way than to keep on trying to force decisive battles. The Army, however, judged this anyhow impossible and attached more importance to [conducting] a long drawn-out war. It was also a natural result of the fact that the Army gave priority to operations on the continent, while the Navy gave priority to operations in the Pacific Ocean.

\(^{*}\) See footnote p. 49.
IGHQ, which in early 1942 foresaw that the initial invasion operations were going to succeed almost as scheduled, started to study more aggressive operations than planned. Among the many places that were taken up as operational targets at that time, Australia and India (Ceylon and other places) became subjects of study in the South.

The tentative conclusion, which the IGHQ Army Department drew by around early March was that operations against those outer key areas should be limited more or less to the neutralization [of enemy forces] and that large-scale invasion operations should be avoided.

However, the [IGHQ] Navy Department was more enthusiastic about operations against the outer key points. Since the losses sustained by the Navy in the southern operation were smaller than expected, it desperately wanted to expand the military gains, making use of the current advantageous war situation.

The Liaison Conference between IGHQ and the Government, which from late February until early March examined the key issues in conducting the war, came on 7 March to a conclusion, which was in outline as follows:\(^{(50)}\)

**The General Principles for Conducting the War from Now on**

In order to make Britain yield and deprive the United States of its will to fight, [the Empire shall] expand the military gains it has already achieved and prepare a lasting, invincible political and strategic position, while readily taking aggressive steps at opportune moments.

Although this policy was unclear on whether more importance should be attached to offense or defense, an invasion operation of Australia, which the Navy stressed [to be implemented], was left pending, particularly by the Army’s argument that such an operation would go beyond the limits of Japan’s national strength. However, it did not mean the Army and Navy were able to fully adjust [the differences in] their strategic thinking; [these differences] would resurface in the conduct of the subsequent operations in the South Pacific.\(^{(24, 50)}\)

**The Outline of the IGHQ Army Department’s Operational Directives**

While the IGHQ Army Department was still earnestly examining the outline of the general operational directives based on the aforementioned intentions of the General Principles for Conducting the War from Now on, which was decided on 7 March, Chief of Army General Staff Sugiyama reported in mid-March the following to the Emperor (excerpt):\(^{(52)}\)

1. [The Army shall] swiftly complete the mop-up [operations] in the occupied areas and shift to a defensive position. While expanding the military administration [in those areas], [the Army shall] secure stability and a lasting, invincible strategic position.
2. Key areas in central Burma shall be seized, during which [the Army shall] strive to destroy the enemy, particularly the Chongqing Army in Burma.
3. [The Army shall] expand the strategically superior position, which it has gained in the initial operations, and prepare a lasting, invincible strategic position, while trapping the United States and Britain in a passive and defensive position. Simultaneously, in order to speed up the end of war, [the Army shall] carry out or prepare necessary operations against key places in areas outside the already occupied places.
4. While strengthening the resilience of the national defense, the forces dispatched to the South shall timely be equipped so as to be suitable for the aforementioned operations, and the necessary military preparations shall be made.

5. By making use of the results in the southern operation and by using strategic, political as well as clandestine [operations] in parallel as long as the circumstances permit, [the Army shall] strive to swiftly solve the China Incident.

6. As for the Soviet Union, while preventing as much as possible the emergence of a new situation, [the Army shall] step up its guard and build up war preparations in order to deal with changes in the circumstances.

The above outline of operational directives obviously focused on the establishment of defensive arrangements. As previously told, the Army judged that the war would likely be a long, drawn-out war. [Its thinking was that] although a victory through short decisive battles would be desirable, [Japan] should give up such an idea because it would not be possible to adopt a decisive strategy that would enable it to force the United States and Britain into such battles, and that therefore it would need to establish an invincible position in preparation for a long drawn-out war and maintain the resilience of Japan’s national power and war potential. The main point was that, since Japan had been fortunate in being able to capture the key areas in the South more smoothly than expected, and would still have about one year to spare before full-scale allied counterattacks, [it should] make the most of this period by upgrading and strengthening the war potential of its entire military force. This would become the fundamental thought behind the “Reformation of the System and Armaments of the Army,” which the Army central command would advocate later.

However, [the Army prepared] not only for consistently taking a defensive position, it also made preparations to implement some aggressive operations, if necessary, against key areas outside the occupied lands in the South.

Concerning Manchuria, the Army took into account that changes in the war situation between Germany and the Soviet Union, or the circumstances of the cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union might cause considerable changes in the situation there, but it set the general policy of focusing on strengthening its protective and defensive war preparations, lest it should get trapped in a dreadful war on two-fronts by causing some careless incident.\(^{24, 52}\)

4. Preparation of the Air Defense Arrangements of the South

The Plan for the Disposition of Air Forces in Key Areas in the South After the Rough Completion of the Invasion Operation

Earlier, the IGHQ [Army Department] had examined the disposition of the entire Army Air Service after the southern operation was for the most part completed. In early March, it sent Maj. Takagi Sakuyuki, staff of the Operations Section of the IGHQ [Army Department] to the Southern Army and informally communicated the following plan:\(^{23, 64}\)

1. For the purpose of strengthening the defense of Manchuria, the Air Corps [there] shall be reorganized at the end of March, and for that purpose, the 60th Air Group (heavy bombers) shall be transferred to Manchuria. Instead, the 7th Air Division (minus the 60th Air Group) shall be kept
in the South as long as possible, and another air group of heavy bombers is scheduled to be newly formed in fiscal year 1942.

2. In the Philippines, the 22d Air Division shall be newly formed, and the 52d Independent Air Squadron (tactical reconnaissance aircraft) there is scheduled to be transferred [to another area] after the pacification operations are completed.

3. In Java, an air group of fighter planes shall be newly formed, [which will allow] the air division [there] to have six fighter and three light bomber squadrons.

4. In Sumatra, six fighter and three light bomber squadrons shall be stationed. [However,] the defense of Palembang shall for the time being be conducted by 12th Air Division [alone].

5. The Burma theater

   The components of the Fifth Air Force shall be the 7th, the 10th and the 12th Air Divisions; the 4th Air Division shall be kept in Burma.

   In April, the aircraft of the 14th Air Group (Type-97 Model I heavy bomber) shall be upgraded to Type-100 heavy bombers, while the aircraft of the 50th Air Group (Type-97 fighters) shall be upgraded to Type-1 fighters.

6. When the Burma operation is completed, the 21st Independent Air Unit will be able to be shifted from northern French Indochina to Sumatra.

The details of the above notification by Takagi were as shown in Table No. 40. [The plan was that] the Third Air Force headquarters and fourteen air squadrons were to be extracted at the end of April 1942, reducing the forces in the South to fifty-three squadrons, then at the end of July of that year, the Fifth Air Force headquarters and another thirteen squadrons [were to be] taken out while two squadrons were to be newly established. [Furthermore, the IGHQ Army Department] even planned to newly establish another fourteen squadrons in early Spring of 1943 and extract twelve squadrons instead, which meant that it planned to conduct the air defense in the key areas of the South with about fifty squadrons.

Table No. 40 The Disposition Plan of the Air Units in the Southern Area (7 March)
### Time Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>April 1942</th>
<th>End of 1942</th>
<th>Early spring 1943</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>(fighter plane)&lt;br&gt;(light bomber)</td>
<td>(fighter plane)&lt;br&gt;(light bomber)&lt;br&gt;(heavy bomber)</td>
<td>(tactical recon.)&lt;br&gt;(tactical recon.)&lt;br&gt;(tactical recon.)&lt;br&gt;(fighter plane)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indochina</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma,</td>
<td>(fighter plane)&lt;br&gt;(fighter plane)&lt;br&gt;(fighter plane)&lt;br&gt;(heavy bomber)</td>
<td>(fighter plane)&lt;br&gt;(fighter plane)&lt;br&gt;(light bomber)&lt;br&gt;(heavy bomber)</td>
<td>(tactical recon.)&lt;br&gt;(tactical recon.)&lt;br&gt;(tactical recon.)&lt;br&gt;(fighter plane)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaya</td>
<td>Air Gp (tactical recon.)&lt;br&gt;83d Indep. Air Unit: 1 Sqdn of 81st Air Gp</td>
<td>(tactical recon.)&lt;br&gt;71st Indep. Air Sqdn&lt;br&gt;73d Indep. Air Sqdn&lt;br&gt;89th Indep.</td>
<td>(tactical recon.)&lt;br&gt;71st Indep. Air Sqdn&lt;br&gt;73d Indep. Air Sqdn&lt;br&gt;89th Indep. Air Sqdn&lt;br&gt;47th Air Gp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(fighter plane)&lt;br&gt;(assault plane)&lt;br&gt;(light bomber)&lt;br&gt;(strategic recon.)</td>
<td>(tactical recon.)&lt;br&gt;71st Indep. Air Sqdn&lt;br&gt;73d Indep. Air Sqdn&lt;br&gt;89th Indep.</td>
<td>(tactical recon.)&lt;br&gt;71st Indep. Air Sqdn&lt;br&gt;73d Indep. Air Sqdn&lt;br&gt;89th Indep. Air Sqdn&lt;br&gt;47th Air Gp</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(tactical recon.)&lt;br&gt;71st Indep. Air Sqdn&lt;br&gt;73d Indep. Air Sqdn&lt;br&gt;89th Indep.</td>
<td>(tactical recon.)&lt;br&gt;71st Indep. Air Sqdn&lt;br&gt;73d Indep. Air Sqdn&lt;br&gt;89th Indep. Air Sqdn&lt;br&gt;47th Air Gp</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(tactical recon.)&lt;br&gt;71st Indep. Air Sqdn&lt;br&gt;73d Indep. Air Sqdn&lt;br&gt;89th Indep.</td>
<td>(tactical recon.)&lt;br&gt;71st Indep. Air Sqdn&lt;br&gt;73d Indep. Air Sqdn&lt;br&gt;89th Indep. Air Sqdn&lt;br&gt;47th Air Gp</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(tactical recon.)&lt;br&gt;71st Indep. Air Sqdn&lt;br&gt;73d Indep. Air Sqdn&lt;br&gt;89th Indep.</td>
<td>(tactical recon.)&lt;br&gt;71st Indep. Air Sqdn&lt;br&gt;73d Indep. Air Sqdn&lt;br&gt;89th Indep. Air Sqdn&lt;br&gt;47th Air Gp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Java and</td>
<td>3d Air Div:&lt;br&gt;59th Air Gp (fighter plane)&lt;br&gt;75th Air Gp (light bomber)</td>
<td>3d Air Div:&lt;br&gt;59th Air Gp (fighter plane)&lt;br&gt;75th Air Gp (light bomber)</td>
<td>3d Air Div:&lt;br&gt;59th Air Gp (fighter plane)&lt;br&gt;75th Air Gp (light bomber)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumatra</td>
<td>1 Sqdn of 81st Air Gp (strategic recon.) 73d Indep. Air Sqdn (tactical</td>
<td>3d Air Div:&lt;br&gt;59th Air Gp (fighter plane)&lt;br&gt;75th Air Gp (light bomber)</td>
<td>3d Air Div:&lt;br&gt;59th Air Gp (fighter plane)&lt;br&gt;75th Air Gp (light bomber)</td>
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<td>recon.)</td>
<td>(strategic recon.)</td>
<td>(strategic recon.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Concerning the above plan of the IGHQ [Army Department], the Southern Army offered the following opinion:

- No objections to the strength at the end of April.
- An air corps (air army) headquarters should be established [in the South] as soon as possible.
- An air force headquarters to take charge of [the operations in] the Thai, Burma and Malaya theaters should be established by the end of 1942 (to replace the Fifth Air Force headquarters, which will be extracted.)
- [The IGHQ Army Department] should arrange for some strength in northern French Indochina in 1943, taking the situation in China into consideration.

The Formation of the 22d Air Division; Extraction of Part of the Air Arm of the Southern Army

On 20 March, the IGHQ [Army Department] issued the orders concerning the reorganization of the Air Corps in Manchuria and, on the same day, also issued the orders to form the 22d Air Division to be posted in the Philippines.

By forming the air division, it set up, as part of the defensive disposition in the South, an independent-air-division-like organization in the Philippines.

Along with the reorganization of the Air Corps on 20 March, the following units that had participated in the invasion operation were transferred from the South to Manchuria: the 15th Independent Air Unit, the 60th Air Group, the 36th Airfield Battalion, one element of the 1st Air Intelligence Unit, and the 70th Ground Duty Company.

Chief of the Army General Staff Sugiyama’s Inspection Tour of the South

From 21 March until 8 April, Chief of Army General Staff Sugiyama extensively inspected the key areas in the South, stopping at Taiwan, Guangdong, Saigon, Singapore, Palembang, Batavia, Surabaya, Kuala Lumpur, Medan, Bangkok, Rangoon, Phnom Penh and Manila, and on 9 April, he reported the situation to the Emperor.

On 25 March [during the tour], the chief of the Army General Staff heard in Singapore Third Air Force Commander Sugawara’s situation report. (However, according to the recol-
lections of Lieutenant General Sugawara, due to Twenty-fifth Army Commander Yamashita’s situation report, etc., he was not able to orally present the important situation report directly, which seemed to have very much disappointed him.)

[Chief of Army General Staff Sugiyama] also heard the report of 3d Air Division Commander Endō at Batavia on 29 March, that of Fifth Air Force Commander Obata at Rangoon on the 31st, and encouraged [1st Paratroop] Raiding Group Commander Kume and his men at Phnom Penh on 1 April.

[Chief of Army General Staff Sugiyama] in outline reported the following to the Emperor concerning the air service:

After the completion of the Malaya and the Dutch East Indies operations, the Third Air Force has transferred one element to Burma, and it would from that time on mainly take charge of the defense of the key resource areas in Sumatra and Java.

The Fifth Air Force, after its successful air campaign to destroy the enemy air power at the end of March was in the middle of supporting the Fifteenth Army.

The General Plan for the Construction of Air Bases in Key Areas of the South

Based on IGHQ [Army Department]’s plan of disposition of the [air] units, the Southern Army considered an outline for the construction of bases and, on 3 April, decided on a general plan for the construction of air bases in the South.

The plan was to use the current facilities as much as possible, and [build] some facilities, which would last, to meet the needs of subsequent air operations. The conditioning of these bases was scheduled to be completed by the end of 1942, which reflected the thinking of IGHQ that the United States and Britain would not launch counter offensives earlier than 1943.

Judging that the [enemy] counter offensives would mainly be launched from Australia and the Indian Ocean, [the Southern Army] designated Java and Burma as high-priority defense fronts and generally designated Malaya and Thailand as rear base zones. The disposition and allotment of conditioning ([and] control) of the bases were as shown in Table No. 41.\(^{(18, 61)}\)

In constructing such air bases, it was necessary to comprehensively examine the location, the size and quality [of the airfields] not only in terms of the operations of the Army Air Service but also from the wider point of view of the ground and maritime operations. However, it was quite difficult to predict the future war situation. Without time to spare for a detailed examination of its tactics at all, [the IGHQ Army Department] designated the key airfields by rule of thumb and gave directions [for their construction]. The relatively small scale of the airfields and the late completion of the facilities indicate that the Japanese judgment about [the scale and time of] the allied counter offensives was overoptimistic.
### Table No. 41

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Unit in charge</th>
<th>Facility</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>14th Army</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nielson [Field]</td>
<td>X Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Camp Murphy</td>
<td>X Y</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stotsenberg</td>
<td>X Y</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cabanatuan</td>
<td>X Y</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Laoag</td>
<td>X Y</td>
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<td>San Jose</td>
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<td>Legaspi</td>
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<td>Iloilo</td>
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<td>Fabrica</td>
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<td>Davao</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cagayan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malaya</td>
<td>3d Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kallang</td>
<td>X Y</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tengah</td>
<td>X Y</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sembawang</td>
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<td>Kluang</td>
<td>X Y</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sungai Petani</td>
<td>X Y</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Alor Setar</td>
<td>X Y</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kota Bharu</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sebarok Island and vicinity</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Army</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
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<td>Taiping</td>
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<td>Ipoh</td>
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</table>
### Evaluation of the [Military] Gains and Examination of a Policy for Subsequent Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Unit in charge</th>
<th>Facility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>(Southern Army)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Don Mueang</td>
<td>X Y</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nakhon Sawan</td>
<td>X Y</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Chiang Mai</td>
<td>X Y</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Singora</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Lampang</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Udon [Thani]</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ubon [Ratchathani]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sumatra</td>
<td>3d Air Force</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Palembang</td>
<td>X Y</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medan</td>
<td>X Y</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labuhanruku</td>
<td>X Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25th Army</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Padang</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jambi</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Pekanbaru</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tanjungkarang</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Java</td>
<td>16th Army</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kali jati</td>
<td>X Y</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malang</td>
<td>X Y</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Batavia</td>
<td>X Y</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Semarang</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Surabaya</td>
<td>X Y</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>X Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>5th Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rangoon</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mingaladon</td>
<td>X Y</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Hlegu</td>
<td>X Y</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Toungoo</td>
<td>X Y</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mandalay</td>
<td>X Y</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lashio</td>
<td>X Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15th Army</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Magwe</td>
<td>X Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bassein</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Akyab</td>
<td>X Y</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Victoria Point</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. The Southern Army’s Lessons of War Concerning Its Air Arm

From 10 until 12 April 1942, taking the rough completion of the Army air operations in the southern invasion operation as an opportunity, the Southern Army headquarters held a review conference concerning the operation, which was also attended by many of those involved in the air service at the Army central command.

Among the attendants were: Lt. Gen. Kawabe Torashirō, chief of General Affairs Division of the Inspectorate General of Army Aviation (and Army Aviation Headquarters) atop the list, Maj. Murata Kingo (graduate of the 41st class), member of the Army Affairs Section, [the Military Affairs Bureau,] the Ministry of War, Lt. Col. Kumon Aribumi (graduate of the 36th class), chief of the Aviation Group of the Operations Section of the Army General Staff, Maj. Matsuda Masao (graduate of the 41st class), member of the Aviation Group of the Organization Section of the Army General Staff, and the attendants from the Inspectorate General of Army Aviation were, Col. Yamaguchi Tsuchio (graduate of the 30th class), chief of the Training Section, Lt. Col. Shimizu Hisashi (graduate of the 36th class) of the Supply and Replen-
ishment Section, Maj. Satō Katsuo (graduate of the 42d class), Maj. Hatao Takashi (graduate of the 44th class) and Capt. Kondō Susumu (graduate of the 46th class) of the General Affairs Section.


The conference, with Lt. Gen. Sakaguchi Yoshitarō, vice chief of staff [of the Southern Army] presiding, was attended by all staff officers in charge of the air arm at the Southern Army, and its proceedings were expedited by Col. Tanikawa Kazuo, senior staff officer of Section 4 [of the Southern Army].

The conference extensively covered such subjects as the structure, system, organization, training, operation, replenishment, and the technological aspects of the Army Air Service, and day after day many arguments were developed. In the conference, the aforementioned losses of aircraft and personnel as well as the actual replenishment results were used as fundamental data.

The observations concerning the characteristics of the southern invasion operation made by Section 4 of the Southern Army headquarters and the problems of organization, training, replenishment at the rear, and aeronautical technology, which constituted the agenda of the conference, were as follows:

The View [Held by Section 4 of the Southern Army Headquarters] on the Characteristics of the Air [Operation] of the Southern Invasion Operation

The Southern Army decided to use about one month for the preparation of the conference and had its [subordinate] units sort out the data for the review during this period.

At the beginning of the conference, Section 4 [of the Southern Army] made the following observations about the characteristics of the southern operation:

Observations About the Characteristics of the Southern Invasion Operation

Although an unprecedented operation in the military history of the Army Air Service in terms of scale, concept and contents, the [current] invasion operation was, from the point of view of the entire air operations of the Japanese forces, just an air operation in one local theater. The characteristics of this operation were in detail as follows:

1. It was a huge mobile operation by air forces conducted on an unprecedented scale.
   - An extreme speedup of operation was demanded. (The speed of the air operation decided the speed of the entire Southern Army operation.)
   - The theater of war was quite extensive.
   - The operation was conducted while constructing and advancing bases in third countries and enemy countries.
   - It was quite difficult for the line of communications [operations], such as replenishment, repair and transport, to keep up and they were insufficient.
   - Due to [the vastness of] the theater, it was impossible to destroy the enemy air power in one swoop.

2. Being an air operation in tandem with landing operations, it had a strong tendency toward a maritime air operation.
3. The preparations for the operation were quite insufficient, and there were numerous adverse conditions including the climate.
4. The operation was carried out in close conjunction with the Navy.
5. The enemy put up resistance mainly with its air power, which consisted of colonial and allied air forces.
6. During the operations, [various types of actions, such as] destroying enemy air power, providing cover for convoys, or direct support for ground operations, and attacks on key places, had to be alternately carried out, without any priority attached.
7. The quite clear cause of the war raised the morale of the units.
8. The strong operational demand far exceeded [what could be done based on] the operational preparations and training.
9. It was an air operation in the tropics to provide support for the ground combat, which was conducted along narrow defiles over long distances.
10. The demand for surprise attacks was extreme.
11. The air route between Japan and Indochina is a dangerous route, notorious in the world for its bad weather conditions. Even so, the southern operation used this dangerous route as its replenishments route from the rear.

The Problems of Organization and Training

The View that Fighters Should be Primary and Bombers Secondary

In this invasion operation, an extreme speedup of operations was demanded, and the bases were frequently advanced, which demanded that the units had to deal rapidly and cheerfully with various kinds of tasks that arose in a conflicting way.

Throughout the operation, fighter units very well met the demand. Always operating at the point of the action, the [fighter] units gained satisfactory military results by bringing down or destroying enemy aircraft.

In contrast, due to the limited availability of airfields, fuel and ammunition, the heavy bomber units were not able to move quickly and efficiently. Moreover, it was practically impossible for them to carry out attacks without the cover of fighter planes.

In the conference, it was cogently argued that in future war preparations, the Army Air Service should give priority to fighters. Particularly Lieutenant Colonel Kumon of the Operations Section of the Army General Staff strongly expressed this view.

However, Colonel Tanikawa emphasized that putting an excessively high priority on fighter units would reduce the attack ability of the air force, and therefore should not be lightly decided on.

The person in charge of organization at central command [also] held the view that, in view of the state of the heavy bombers, the fighter ratio in the force should gradually be increased. However, he maintained his stance that such a problem should be carefully dealt with. As a matter of course, not only due consideration should be given to its effects on other military administrative matters such as production, replenishment and training, but it should also fit the future [needs] in battle.\(^{(39, 80)}\)

The Views Concerning the Current Composition of Separated Flight and Ground Units

The fundamental aim in separating flight and ground [components] was to enable the air units to be lightly and quickly mobilized and put into operation. In the past operation, [even
though] flight units were frequently advanced and employed in a mobile way, ground service units, [too,] pretty much smoothly carried out their tasks, without fatal delays in their transport. The conference came to the conclusion that the current composition of separated flight and ground components was appropriate and that it should be continued in the future.

A fairly strong voice argued that some of the medical, intendance, servicing and communication functions of the air groups should be increased, but it was not strong enough to lead to a revision of the current composition of separated flight and ground units.

It was not until the autumn of 1943 that the composition of separated flight and ground units was partly revised after the advance of the Army air units into the South Pacific theater where sea transport became extremely difficult and the dissemination of servicing [methods] of new models to the airfield battalions on the fronts to train them became impossible.\(^{(39, 80)}\)

The Issue of the Abolition of Section 4 of the Staff of the Southern Army

In early spring of 1942, when the southern invasion operation achieved success, the personnel in charge of aviation at the Army central command in general highly regarded the performance and results of Section 4 (air operations) of the Staff of the Southern Army.

However, at the Southern Army headquarters, the working arrangements between Section 1 (operations in general) and Section 4 of the Staff Department were not smooth, and the argument that the situation would split the command of the Southern Army into air and ground operations and lead to a lack of unity was gradually getting stronger.

This problem was much affected by the personal relations between those concerned, and the conflict of views between the Twenty-fifth Army and the Third Air Force in the Malaya operation. However, the most fundamental element could be boiled down to a conflict between one school of thought which maintained that bringing the qualities unique to the air arm into play to the fullest extent was the key to win the war, and another which maintained that victory or defeat would depend on the success of the ground operations and that the air arm should set its primary goal at contributing to the success of the ground operations.

Setting aside the question of who was right, in early April of 1942, an atmosphere to abolish Section 4 [of the Southern Army] was getting stronger at the Army central command.\(^{(39)}\)

Col. Tanikawa Kazuo, senior staff officer of Section 4 [of the Southern Army], was appointed as staff officer of the Air Corps (the Second Air Army) as of 14 April, however, no successor replaced him.\(^{(31)}\)

Note: Section 4 [of the Southern Army] was eventually abolished simultaneously with the new establishment of the Third Air Army.

For reference: An excerpt from the journal kept by Col. Tanikawa Kazuo

Miscellaneous thoughts on a starry night, 10 April [1942]

Sitting on the rooftop of my quarters on a starry night in a southern land, I let my thoughts drift far away [in time and space]. Polaris is [visible] near the horizon, while the Southern Cross shines bright.

Very fortunately, this operation has progressed smoothly [and is about to be completed] with only [the operations in] the Bataan [Peninsula] and Burma left. [Seizing] the Bataan [Peninsula] will be a matter of time, and the only thing we [need to] care about concerning Burma is how to skillfully and efficiently direct the campaign to destroy [the enemy] in Mandalay.
[I wonder] what will be the Empire’s statecraft in the future? What will be the plan for the conduct of war next? Are invasions of Australia, India and Hawaii necessary? Are they [even] possible? What are the views about the Soviets in the North? What is the meaning of the China Incident in the perspective of today, and how will it be solved?

Staring at the map, I am quite amazed that in a mere three months with this operation as a turning point, the trend of the times has completely turned, the scene has shifted, and an unprecedented change has been brought about in the state of things that had lasted through a history of three thousand years. Yet something sad overwhelms my heart. Everything constantly changes, nothing in the world lasts forever, and those who prosper must decline, which is an invariable principle shown in history.

(omitted by the author)

[To consider] what immortality is and what eternity is simply brings sorrow. You must not forget to think of times of adversity, all the more when things go smoothly.

A commander who never knows defeat will never be a good commander.

(omitted by the author)

The operation is about to be completed smoothly. However, I cannot help feeling desolation and grief.

(The rest omitted by the author.)

The Views Concerning the Training of Flight Crews, etc.

The majority of the flight crew of the air units, which participated in this operation, had seven to eight hundred hours of flight experience on average. The flight experience of the British pilots was considered to be inferior to those of the Japanese [pilots].

In the review conference, the value of excellent combat techniques in combats was recognized, and it was stressed that while following the present outline of training and replenishment, the flight crew should devote themselves to [acquiring] excellent combat techniques.

While the enemy in the Burma theater had already adopted the so-called Rotte [formation], a combat method conducted by pairs of aircraft as a team and attached more importance to speed and firepower, the Japanese Army had little interest in it. The [world] trend in aerial warfare had been shifting from [aerial] combats between two single aircraft to those between teams (units) and fighters had been changed to heavily armed aircraft with higher speeds. However, such aspects were not deeply examined.

Also, the necessity of replenishment of pilots on the front, the urgent training of large numbers of replenishments, or how to implement these measures were not carefully reviewed.

Finally, in the review conference, opinions were collected about the revision of regulations such as the Essentials of Air Operations, the Flight Crew Manual, and the Rules for the Ground Service of Air Units, issued in 1939.(39, 61, 80)

The Problems of Supply and Replenishment at the Rear

It was observed that in this operation the preparations at the rear were quite insufficient. And it was [also] concluded that the supply and replenishment to be conducted overseas for a relatively longer period should be drastically reexamined.

In the memorandum of Major Nagaishi attached to the Staff of the Southern Army headquarters, who attended the workshop concerning the line of communications operations, the following discussions were recorded:(70)
1. When employing air units, the replenishment of units that are at the designated place and time should be given priority. It is inappropriate to try to equally replenish the strength of all units.

2. It is necessary to separate the line of communications for the air unit. That is, the air unit should have motor transport companies, ground duty companies, etc. inclusively attached to it. It should have the exclusively designated use of vessels for the transport of air equipment and be given priority in the allotment of railway transport. What this all boils down to is that the importance of the line of communications of the air unit must be recognized by the entire Army.

3. The line of communications of the air unit includes not only supply and replenishment but also repair and conditioning of facilities.

   The plan for the line of communications must take in the insights into the changes in the air operations over a longer period of time.

4. The replenishment and repair of aircraft depend very much on the production in and dispatch from mainland Japan; both are inseparable. Constructing facilities for aircraft, repair plants in particular, and putting them into operation requires enormous time, manpower, and matériel, for which, in particular, advance preparations are necessary.

5. The air unit must be equipped with some transport aircraft exclusively for its cargos. Three times as many aircraft as those of the air transport units that are currently attached to the air unit are necessary.

   The repair and replenishment of the transport aircraft must be improved and enhanced, too.

Notes:

1. In the shipping arrangement meeting before the opening of hostilities, the fact that the Army air unit would require a more-than-expected number of vessels for its sea transport became an issue for the first time. (61)

2. In the disembarkation operations in the Philippines, as much as 25% of the operational matériel was lost due to high waves. (61)

3. The transport of cargo by transport aircraft was never considered in the rear replenishment plan before the opening of hostilities and was not included in the replenishment plan. (65)

Although those in charge of replenishment in the rear at that time stressed the importance of the line of communications in the rear of the air unit, the tasks of the line of communications for the air service were not yet sufficiently studied or taught in general.

An excerpt from the Outline of the Tasks of Line of Communications for the Air Service, compiled in April 1945, reads as follows:

**Tasks of Line of Communications for the Air Service**

1. Replenishment, repair and modification of the weapons for air [warfare] (the weapons for air warfare genetically indicates air weapons and general weapons for aircraft; the same applies hereinafter,).

2. Replenishment and repair of the matériel for air [warfare] (the matériel for air warfare genetically indicates the weapons for air [warfare] and other matériel used in air units; the same applies hereinafter) except for the weapons for air [warfare].

3. Collection, sending back to mainland Japan, investigation and use of broken weapons of the air units and seized weapons for air [warfare].

4. Technical instructions to be given so as to have the functions of the weapons for air [warfare] put to full use.

5. Construction and conditioning of airfields and other facilities necessary for operations and quartering of the air units.
The Issue of Aeronautical Technology

The Value of the Seized Weapons in Terms of Technology

At the time of the southern operation, the British and the U.S. air units deployed second-class weapons in Malaya and the Philippines.

In the Malaya and Sumatra operations, [the Japanese Army] seized Buffalos, Lockheed Hudsons, Beauforts [?Vildebeests], Hurricanes, Blenheims and others.

[The Army] seized P–35A (Republic) fighters in the Philippines and forty-five large, forty mid-sized and forty small aircraft of various kinds in Java, among which the B–17 was special.

On 1 April, the Southern Army decided to send back a part of the seized aircraft to mainland Japan in order to contribute to the research and production of aircraft in Japan.

As for the B–17 and the Douglas DC–5, [the Southern Army] serviced them with the help of technical experts from mainland Japan and minutely tested their performance.

The B–17, which had been brought back to Japan, was used to build a prototype of a four-engine aircraft, and the [Army] Flight Test Department and schools also strove to gather data for research and training.

The performance of the B–17, particularly its bullet-proof and fire-proof equipment surprised the persons concerned. However, the aircraft had not produced remarkable military results in the past southern operation, which left [those concerned in the Army] in general with the impression that the flying fortresses were not worth worrying about, and it did not lead to particular studies of counter measures.

It was not until the end of 1942, after the Army Air Service had been vexed by the enemy in direct, difficult fights with B–17s in the South Pacific theater, that the Army set up a task force to study countermeasures against B–17s.

[Also,] the quality of bullet-proof equipment of the P–40 gained some attention.

Among the weapons other than aircraft were life preservers, pyrotechnic signals, aircraft ammunition, etc., though their technological value [was considered] low. The Army strove to obtain fire control radars (the [Army] Technological Laboratory called them “radio locators”). However, the allied forces had made sure that at least the electronic weapons were destroyed.

[The Army] did not even know the names of seized engineering machines and matériel such as bulldozers and carry-all [scrapers]. Although surprised at their power, it never thought of their significant value in operations.

It could be argued that since the Army on the whole did not face critical cases [in this operation], which would require drastic innovation of its aeronautical technology, it failed to come up with concrete points of view [to direct] its improvement efforts.
Suggestions on the Currently Used Air Weapons in General

In the above review conference about the air [service], the following suggestions were summarized concerning improvements of the air armaments currently in use.\(^{(70)}\)

1. The action radii of aircraft need to be extended.
2. The 7.7-mm [machine]guns ([attached to] fighters, etc.) should be abolished and guns with larger calibers should be adopted.
3. The light bombers need a [better] capability for nosediving.
4. The weapons of the heavy bombers should be changed to [machineguns with] larger calibers, and their minimal action radii should attain 1,500 kilometers.
5. From the viewpoint of replenishment and supply, the types of fuel and ammunition should be sorted out and reduced.
6. Bombs of irregular or delayed detonation shall be put to practical use. Also, it is necessary to research bombs with a power of surprise attacks, such as incendiary bombs with time fuses to be used for attacks on airfields.

The Technical Department of the air arm of the Southern Army pointed out as a result of the technological survey of the weapons currently used in the tropical climate that [the Army Air Service] should pay attention to accidents, such as the fuel vapor lock, the decrease in the precision of instruments, or the spontaneous explosion of machineguns, all of which were caused by the high temperature and humidity on the ground.

The vapor lock is [a phenomenon] where the water contained in the fuel would vaporize, stop [the flow in] the pipes etc. of the fuel system, and cause a glitch in an engine. While it occurred at an altitude of about six thousand meters, in many cases it would disappear if [the aircraft] lowered its altitude.\(^{(78)}\)

Technological Demands Made by Air Group Commanders, etc.

On 3 April at Chiang Mai, Col. [Maj. Gen.] Hattori Takeshi, chief of the Technical Department of the air arm of the Southern Army conducted a hearing on the opinions of the units.

The views of air group commanders etc. in the memorandum of Colonel [Major General] Hattori were in summary as follows:

**64th Air Group Commander Lieutenant Colonel Katō (Type–1 Model I fighter plane)**

1. The recently replenished Type–1 fighter planes seem to be of somewhat inferior quality.
2. Formerly we greatly trusted [the quality of] the engines. However, metallic shavings were found in the engines of as many as four of the recently replenished aircraft.
3. Landing gears are still weak.
4. As for the machineguns of a larger caliber, the elimination of crippled bullets does not work properly.
5. The airframes are still too weak to be used to the fullest.
6. Not a few replenishment aircraft lack on-board equipment, clocks, etc. Replenished aircraft cannot be put to use until considerably serviced.
7. While the performance of a Hawker Hurricane is more or less equivalent to that of the Type–1 fighter, its combat capability is inferior to our aircraft. However, its airframe is strong. It is not comfortable to fly in.

   The structure of its airframe is relatively simple.
47th Independent Air Squadron Commander Major Sakagawa (Ki–44)

(1) So far, the performance of Ki–44 (Type–2 single-seat fighter plane) is superior to that of the enemy aircraft in the Burma theater.

(2) The landing gear of the Ki–44 is still weak, and the aircraft requires landings at high speed, which makes it not easy to take off and land on small airfields such as those in the operational areas in the South. We are slightly against the adoption of Ki–44 as an operational aircraft, since the defects found in the operational suitability tests will remain persistent problems.

(3) The Ki–44 needs to be improved so that the [required] landing speed will be reduced and its controllability will be improved. Even if for this purpose the wing load would be slightly increased, resulting in a decrease in the speed of the aircraft, it would cause no inconvenience.

About that time, Chief of the Technical Department [of the air arm of the Southern Army] Hattori visited the 12th Air Group (equipped with Type–97 Model II heavy bombers). Commander Colonel Kitajima of the air group stated that the engines of the Type–97 Model II heavy bombers were reliable and that his air group was confident that the regular servicing interval [of the aircraft] could be extended to more than four hundred flight hours.

As shown in the above, technological views would vary depending on the units and the types of aircraft used. [Aircraft] would become reliable air armaments only after going through many improvements from the stage of prototypes to that of operational aircraft.

Type–97 heavy bombers had already been used in operations for four years, and Type–1 fighters for half a year, while the Type–2 single-seat fighter (Ki–44) was still in the middle of a reviewing process.

It was quite important that technological views were actively exchanged between the basic department, where the aircraft were designed, researched and produced, and the units that actually used them in their areas of operation.
Conclusion

1. A Review of the Employment of Air Power in the Opening of Hostilities

Considering the fact that air operations decided the outcome of the Greater East Asia War, Japan should have examined more seriously the future shifts in air strength between it and the enemy in its prewar studies on the decision to make war or not. So, instead of exclusively focussing on calculations of winning decisive battles between fleets, comprehensive assessments of the chances of success that included the expansion of air operations by means of [advancing] bases should have been closely examined.

In the decision to wage war that committed the fate of the country, assessments from a broader perspective of operational aspects, particularly that of the value of air power, were by far insufficient. The war preparations of the Army Air Service at the time of the opening of hostilities consisted of nothing more than moving up part of the plans for the fiscal years 1937 through 1939; the foundation was weak and [the Army Air Service] plunged into war, leaving its weakness in strength and depth unattended. Therefore, the air power should have been employed more cautiously.

The mission of the air operations in the South in the initial stage after the opening of hostilities was simply to destroy first of all the allied air power in key areas in the South while supporting the operations of landing forces; as stated above, they were just local battles in the air operations against the United States and Britain.

In connection with this use of air power, contrasting outlines for the landing operations were laid out for the Philippines and Malaya [operations]; while air strikes preceded them in the former, surprise landing attacks preceded them in the latter. However, both were unexpectedly successful on the whole.

2. The Conditions of Advancing Air Supremacy and the Judgment on Its Value

Despite some confusion caused by local bad weather, the Japanese air campaigns to destroy the enemy air power at the outset of the hostilities were generally successful, and in several days, [the air arm] roughly succeeded in gaining air supremacy over Luzon and northern Malaya.

However, the capture of the vast key areas in the South, as a matter of course, required advancing and expanding air supremacy by successively pushing forward the air bases. During the advance over three to four thousand kilometers from Taiwan or French Indochina to Java, [the Japanese Army] pushed forward its air bases five or six times, whereby the action
radii of its fighter planes became the standard distance of the advance. This pattern could be regarded as the first instance of the “stepping-stone tactics,” which General MacArthur later employed in the operations in the New Guinea theater.

During this period, the counterattacks of the allied air forces were persistent; they inflicted some losses on the Japanese convoys and harassed its ground forces, too. However, they did not cause a major hindrance to the entire [Japanese] operation.

The lessons of war, which the southern invasion operation left concerning [securing] air supremacy, were complex. Whereas the value of air supremacy in maritime operations was incontestable, as shown in the Japanese Navy Air Unit’s sinking of the British warships off Malaya, the value of air supremacy in ground operations was not necessarily regarded as important, possibly due to the successive [ground] victories during the invasion operation. It was not until the allied launch of counter offensives in the South Pacific theater that the mainstream of the Army fully became awake to the realities of modern warfare, particularly the absolute value of air warfare.

3. Bringing Integrated Strength into Full Play with Air Power at the Core

It was not easy to align the Army and Navy’s thinking on the operations in the southern invasion plan. The alignment of the Navy’s plan to first attack the Philippines, in which priority was given to the operations against the United States, or decisive battles between the fleets in particular, with the Army’s plan to first attack Malaya, which attached more importance to the operations conducted along the continent, ended up in a compromise plan where the focus [of the operation] was blurred.

Considerable research and effort was spent on bringing the integrated strength of the air power of the Army and Navy into full play. The Navy fighter units and the Army attack plane units operated while making full use of their [long] action radii. Moreover, the Army seized and conditioned airfields for the Navy air unit or supported the latter’s ground service, thereby supplementing the latter’s capacity for land-based operations.

Concerning the cooperation between the air and ground forces within the Army, starting from issues in Malaya [with the ground force’s wish to] have the air unit under its control or attached to it, the air and ground forces were dissatisfied with each other over the direct support for ground operations, and the allotment of transport for supplies and replenishments. However, all in all they cooperated well.

Generally speaking, the cooperation between the land, sea and air operations in the southern invasion operation was a success from a broader point of view. Especially, the aforementioned stepping-stone tactic was a unique and epoch-making tactic as a precursor of integrated operations with air power at the core.

4. The [Army’s] Awareness of Technological Warfare Centering on Air Power

In the Army’s prior studies of [possible] developments in the last war, almost no projection of the respective competitiveness and progress of Japan and the enemy in military technology
centering on air power was taken into account. Awareness of the importance of this problem was not yet fully developed.

Although the southern invasion operation had progressed more smoothly than expected, it left [unexplored] important research subjects in terms of its technological aspects.

While the majority of the allied air forces, namely the colonial forces, consisted of second-class, outdated aircraft, they also included some new and powerful aircraft. Although the Japanese Army conditioned a seized B–17, which was advertised as the “Flying Fortress,” sent it back to mainland Japan and used it for research and training, it failed to recognize the seriousness of the power of this aircraft. [The Army] also conducted research and collected data on the Spitfire and other new and powerful aircraft, however, the data collected were not reflected in the research plans for Japanese fighter planes.

The Army failed to collect actual radars or special sighting devices.

Despite seizing a large amount of matériel and equipment for airfield conditioning such as bulldozers, due to the rapid progress in the war situation and the easily available existing airfields during the invasion operation, [the Army] was not quick in thinking about using them or developing [such equipment] in anticipation of the future war situation.

As for the Japanese aircraft, apart from the fighter planes, the weakness of the bullet-proof armor and fire-prevention gear of the heavy bombers came to light. However, hidden in the shadow of the success of the initial battles, such research subjects were neglected for the time being.

5. The Replenishment of Air Armaments

The Army air operations during the southern invasion operation were also a large replenishment operation, something it had never experienced. Although the distance [ratios] between the front and the respective mainlands of the enemy and Japan were roughly three to one, the allied forces were superior in both national and military strength. If they should launch a full-scale reinforcement [operation], Japan could not be optimistic about its advantage in distance. The replenishment operation during the southern invasion operation was, of course, supposed to enable the operation to be accomplished in the shortest period of time possible. In accordance with this intention, measures were taken, such as the prior replenishment of the units at the front, the new formation of a field replenishment air unit and its dispatch, and the preparations to provide replenishments at a higher rate (about 30% for the monthly replenishment of fighter planes) for the first three months.

The southern operation progressed smoothly, and the replenishment measures mostly worked well, however, internally important matters for further research subjects did arise.

The first matter was measures against the massive losses. The wastage of equipment and matériel of the fighter plane units in three months reached about 100%, and the reserve strength that [the Army] had planned for [and prepared] was running out. It gave [the Army] important clues as to the replenishment rate required for full-scale operations.

The next matter was the problem of increasing the transport of replenishments to the air units at the front. This problem, which [particularly] created complications in the Malaya area, was one of the matters concerning the replenishment system of the air service that [should] have been a research subject for the entire army.
Furthermore, there was the problem of increasing the air transport capacity, for which an increase in the air transport units and the preparation of air routes were indispensable.

In summary, the Army air operations during the southern invasion operation were a great success. The primary cause was that the Army swiftly expanded the military gains of sudden assaults in the initial battles conducted in conjunction with the Navy air unit and overcame the allied forces at a stroke. The more-than-expected military gains, particularly the fact that Japan had seized the key resource areas in the South almost intact, seemingly suggested that Japan had already successfully established a long-term invincible position.

Although the Army central command strictly warned against becoming intoxicated by victory and strove to prepare for the subsequent operations, the lack of comprehensiveness and seriousness in its assessment of the expected outline of the allied counter offensives led to an overoptimistic judgment that allied full-scale counter offensives would not be conducted before 1943.

As mentioned previously, the weakness of its air strength, which became a fatal flaw of the Japanese forces throughout the entire period of the war after that, was not clearly apparent from this invasion operation. Although the value of air power was generally stressed, it did not go beyond the bounds of conventional thinking.

One wonders why at the time of achieving brilliant victories it was so difficult to take a long view of what the subsequent operations might look like, find out and grasp substantial flaws in the present state of things to timely and appropriately make good use of them in subsequent operations.
Notes

1. Hata Shunroku Gensui no Sambō Hombu Sakusenka-buin Tōji no Kaisō (畑俊六元帥の参謀本部作戰課部員当時の回想 [Recollections of Marshal Hata Shunroku about the time when he served as a staff member of the Operations Section of the Army General Staff]).
3. Shimomura Sadamu Taishō no Sambō Hombu Sakusenka-buin Tōji no Kaisō (下村定大将の参謀本部作戰課部員当時の回想 [Recollections of Gen. Shimomura Sadamu about the time when he served as a staff member of the Operations Section of the Army General Staff]).
4. Endō Saburō Chūō no Sambō Hombu Sakusenka-buin Tōji no Kaisō (遠藤三郎中将の参謀本部作戰課部員当時の回想 [Recollections of Lt. Gen. Endō Saburō about the time when he served as a staff member of the Operations Section of the Army General Staff]).
5. ‘Rikugun Kōkū Gaishi;’ Akiyama Monjirō Taisa Sengo no Shippitsu (「陸軍航空概史」秋山俊次郎大佐戦後の執筆 [‘Summary of the history of the Army Air Service,’ written by Col. Akiyama Monjirō after the war]).
6. Hattori Takushirō Taisa no Sambō Hombu Sakusenka-chō Tōji no Kaisō (服部卓四郎大佐の参謀本部作戰課長当時の回想 [Recollections of Col. Hattori Takushirō about the time when he served as chief of the Operations Section of the Army General Staff]).
7. Inoue Ikutarō Taishō no Rikugun Kōkū Hombu Gijutsubu-buin Tōji no Kaisō (井上光太郎大将の陸軍航空本部技術部部員当時の回想 [Recollections of Maj. Gen. Inoue Ikutarō about the time when he served as a staff member of the Operations Section of the Army General Staff]).
8. Harada Sadanori Shōshū no Sambō Hombu Sakusenka-buin Tōji no Kaisō (原田貞憲少将の参謀本部作戰課部員当時の回想 [Recollections of Maj. Gen. Harada Sadanori about the time when he served as a staff member of the Operations Section of the Army General Staff]).
9. ‘Dainikki’: Rikugunshō Kambō no Toriatsukatta Kiroku-tsuzuri (「大日記」陸軍省官房の取り扱った記録経 [‘Dainikki’: Files of [incoming and outgoing] documents dealt by the Secretariat of the Ministry of War]).
10. Ogawa Kojirō Shōshū no Rikugun Kōkū Hombu Gijutsubu-buin Tōji no Kaisō (小川小二郎少将の陸軍航空本部技術部部員当時の回想 [Recollections of Maj. Gen. Ogawa Kojirō about the time when he served as a member of the Technological Division of the Army Aviation Headquarters]).
12. Imagawa Issaku Shōshū no Kōkū Gijutsu Kenkyūjo Hikōhan-chō Tōji no Kaisō (今川一策少将の航空技術研究所飛行班長当時の回想 [Recollections of Maj. Gen. Imagawa Issaku about the time when he served as chief of the Aviation Group of the Army Aero-technical Research Institute]).
about the time when he was president of the Kayaba Seisakusho [Kayaba Manufacturing Co., published in *Kōkō Jōhō* (Airview)].

14. Shimanuki Takeharu Taisa no Sambō Hombu Sakusenka-buin no Tōji no Kaisō (島村武治大佐の参謀本部作戦課部長当時の回想 [Recollections of Col. Shimanuki Takeharu, about the time when he served as a staff member of the Operations Section of the Army General Staff]).

15. ‘Kasumigaseki Shirō’: Gunrei-bu Hokan no Teikoku Rikukaigin Sakusen Keikaku nado (「霞ヶ関資料」軍令部第官帝国陸海軍作戦計画等 [Kasumigaseki Shirō: Documents of plans of operations, etc. of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, kept in the Navy General Staff]).


18. ‘Tairikumei-tsuzuri’: Sambō Sōchō no Densen-shita Taimei-tsuzuri (「陸軍大命」参謀総長の伝達した大命 [The files of IGHQ Army Department orders: Files of the Imperial Orders passed down by the chief of the Army General Staff]).

19. ‘Tairikushi-tsuzuri’: Taimei ni motozaku Sambō Sōchō no Shiji-tsuzuri (「陸軍指揮」大命に基づく参謀総長の指示録 [The files of IGHQ Army Department Instructions: Files of the instructions given by the chief of Army General Staff in accordance with the Imperial Orders]).

20. Nishiura Susumu Taisa no Rikugunshō Gunjika-kain, dō ka-chō Tōji no Kaisō (西浦進大佐の陸軍省軍事課課長、同課長當時の回想 [Recollections of Col. Nishiura Susumu about the time when he served as a member and chief of the Army Affairs Section of the Ministry of War]).

21. Matsumae Misoo Taisa no Sambō Hombu Sakusenka-buin, Nampō-gun Sambō Tōji no Kaisō (松前未曾雄大佐の参謀本部作戦課部門、南方軍參謀當時の回想 [Recollections of Col. Matsumae Misoo about the time when he served as a member of the Operations Section of the Army General Staff and [later] staff officer of the Southern Army]).

22. Dai-san Hiko Shūdan Sambō, Minami Shina Hōmen-gun Sambō, Kokū Hombu-buin de atta Ōhira Yoshikata Chūsa no Kaisō (第三飛行集団参謀、南支那方面軍参謀、航空本部部長であつ大平義賢中佐の回想 [Recollections of Lt. Col. Ōhira Yoshikata about the time when he served as a staff officer of the Third Air Force, a staff officer of the Southern China Area Army and a staff member of the Army Aviation Headquarters]).

23. Sambō Hombu Sakusenka-buin de atta Takagi Sakuyuki Chūsa no Kaisō (参謀本部作戦課部長であつ高木作之中佐の回想 [Recollections of Lt. Col. Takagi Sakuyuki, who served as a member of the Operations Section of the Army General Staff]).

24. ‘Daihon’ei Kimitsu Sensō Nisshī’: Sambō Hombu no Sensō Shidō-han (Dai-nijuppan) Shunin-sha no Memo (「大本営機密作戦日誌」参謀本部の作戦指導班（第二十班）主任者のメモ [The classified war journal of IGHQ: Memoranda kept by the person in charge of the War Conduct Group (20th Group) of the Army General Staff]).

25. ‘Daihon’ei - Seifu Renraku Kaigi Gijiroku (Utusshi)’ (「大本営政府連絡会議議事録（書）」 [The minutes of the Liaison Conferences between IGHQ and the Government, (dup.)]).

26. Sawada Shigeru Chūjo no Sambō-jicho Tōji no Kaisō (澤田茂中将の参謀次長当時の回想 [Recollections of Lt. Gen. Sawada Shigeru about the time when he served as vice chief of staff of the Army General Staff]).

27. ‘Imoto Nisshi’: Sambō Hombu Sakusenka-buin de atta Imoto Kumao Taisa no Nisshi (「井本日誌」參謀本部作戦課部長であった井本熊男大佐の日誌 [Imoto Journal,’ kept by Col.
Imoto Kumao, who served as a staff member of the Operations Section of the Army General Staff).

28. 'Futsuin Mondai Tsuzuri': Gunreibu Shiryō ['The files of the French Indochina question,' kept by the Navy General Staff].

29. Ishikawa Ai Chūjō no Dai-nijūichi Dokuritsu Hikōtai-chō Tōji no Kaisō (石川愛中将の第二十一独立飛行隊長当時の回想 [Recollections of Lt. Gen. Ishikawa Ai about the time he served as commander of the 21st Independent Air Unit]).

30. Yamaguchi Tsuchio Shōshō no Hikō Dai-kyūjōSentai-chō Tōji no Kaisō (山口達夫少将の飛行第九十戦隊長当時の回想 [Recollections of Maj. Gen. Yamaguchi Tsuchio about the time he served as commander of the 90th Air Group]).

31. 'Teinen Meibo' Sonota no 'Jinji Kiroku' (['The truth of the advance into French Indochina'] provided by Lt. Gen. Nakamura Aketo about the time when he served as 5th Division commander).

32. Akiyama Bunji Chūjō no Dai-ichi Gunjikakai-chō Tōji no Kaisō (秋山豊次中将の第一飛行団長当時の回想 [Recollections of Lt. Col. Akiyama Bunji about the time when he served as 1st Air Division commander]).

33. 'Futsuin Shinchō no Shinshō': Nakamura Aketo Chūjō no Dai-go Shidan-chō Tōji no Kijutsu (['佛印進駐の真相'] 中村明中将の第五師団長当時の記述 ['The truth of the advance into French Indochina': A description provided by Lt. Gen. Nakamura Aketo about the time when he served as 5th Division commander]).

34. Murata Kingo Chūsa no Rikugunshō Gunjika-kain Tōji no Kaisō (村田謙吾中佐の陸海軍軍事課課長当時の回想 [Recollections of Lt. Col. Murata Kingo about the time he served as a staff member of the Army Affairs Section of the Ministry of War]).

35. 'Sambō Hombu Dai-ichibu-chō Tanaka Shin'ichi Chūjō Shuki' (['参謀本部第一部長田中新一中将手記'] ['A personal account of Lt. Gen. Tanaka Shin'ichi, chief of the 1st Bureau of the Army General Staff']).

36. 'Daitō Senso Rikugun Kōkū Nenryō ni kansuru Kiroku': Kōkū Hombu-buin Tsukushi Jirō Chūsa Shuki (['大東亜戦争陸軍航空燃料に関する記録'] 航空本部部員筑紫二郎中佐手記 ['Records of the Army aviation fuel in the Greater East Asia War': A personal account of Lt. Col. Tsukushi Jirō, who served as a staff member of the Army Aviation Headquarters]).

37. 'Daitō Senso ni okeru Rikugun Kōkū Nenryō Seibī': Rikugunshō Seibī-kyoku-kain Takahashi Nobuo Gijutsu Shōsa Shuki (['大東亜戦争における陸軍航空燃料整備'] 陸軍省整備局課員高橋信夫技術少佐手記 ['The preparation of Army aviation fuel in the Greater East Asia War': A personal account of Takahashi Nobuo, major of engineering, staff member of the Economic Mobilization Bureau of the Ministry of War]).

38. Okada Kikusaburō Shōshō no Rikugunshō Sembika-chō Tōji no Kaisō (岡田菊三郎少将の陸海軍戦備課長当時の回想 [Recollections of Maj. Gen. Okada Kikusaburō about the time when he served as chief of the War Preparation Section of the Ministry of War]).

39. Matsuda Masao Chūsa no Sambō Hombu Henseika-buin Tōji no Kaisō (松田正雄中佐の参謀本部編制課課長当時の回想 [Recollections of Lt. Col. Matsuda Masao about the time when he served as a staff member of the Organization Section of the Army General Staff]).

40. Tanaka Tomomichi Chūjo no Tai-koku Haken Kōkū Kyōkandanchō Tōji no Kaisō (田中友道中将の泰国派遣航空教官団長当時の回想 [Recollections of Lt. Col. Tanaka Tomomichi about the time when he served as chief of the aircraft instructor group dispatched to Thailand]).

41. Kawashima Keigo Taisa no Teishin Renshūbu-chō, Dai-ichi Teishindan-chō Tōji no Kaisō (河島貴夫大佐の挺進練習部長・第一挺進団長当時の回想 [Recollections of Col. Kawashima Keigo about the time when he served as director of the [Paratroop] Raiding Training Department and [later] commander of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group]).
42. ‘Rikugun Kōkū Kohō Gyōmu Enkakushi,’ Dai-ichi Fukuiinkyoku Chōsei (‘The history of the development of rear operations of the Army Air Service,’ prepared by the 1st Demobilization Bureau).

43. Hara Shirō Chūsa no Sambō Hombu Dai-nijuppan-buin Tōji no Kaisō (原四郎中佐の参謀本部第二十班部員当時の回想 [Recollections of Lt. Col. Hara Shirō about the time when he served as a staff member of the 20th Group of the Army General Staff]).

44. ‘Kaigun Sembali Kiroku’ (海軍戦備記録 [Navy records of war preparations]).

45. ‘Rikugun Seiki Ruijōshō’ (軍事戦時臨時 [Army book of codes]).

46. ‘Rikugun Kō seiso (軍事戦時組織 [Army book of codes]).

47. ‘Rikugun Kō seira Kōshō’ (軍事戦時組織 [Army book of codes]).

48. ‘Tama Gijutsu Kenkyū Shō’ (大マガジンュス [Army book of codes]).

49. ‘Rikugun Kō seira Kōshō’ (軍事戦時組織 [Army book of codes]).

50. ‘Gozen Kaigi Gijiroku (Utsushi)’ (御前会議議事録 (書) [The minutes of the Imperial Conferences (dup.)]).

51. ‘Butai Ryakurekibo’: Kōseishō Engoyoku no Rikugun Sakusen Butai Kōdō Chōsa (「部隊略歴簿」厚生省援護局の陸軍作戦部隊行動調査 [Book of brief military histories of the units]: Survey of actions of Army operational units, conducted by the War Victims Relief Bureau of the Ministry of Health and Welfare).

52. ‘Sakusen Kankei Jōkai-nen Bunsho o Chushutsu shi, Ikkatsu shita Bun yō Sakusen Kankei no Jyō’ (作戦関係関係者用文書・一部作戦関係重要文書のうち上奏文や作戦関係の重要文書を抽出し、一括した編 [Files of important documents concerning operations]: Files compiled by extracting memorials to the Emperor or important documents in terms of operations out of the files of the Classified Journal of Operations of the IGHQ Army Department).

53. ‘Daikaishi-tsuzuri’ (大戦時組織 [The files of IGHQ Navy Department Instructions]).

54. ‘Kaigun Kansen matawa Rikusentai no Kōdō Chōshō’ (海軍艦隊又は陸戦隊などの行動調書 [Action records of Naval vessels, [special] landing forces, etc.]).

55. ‘Taiheiyō-seisō Nihon Kaigun Senshi’ (太平洋戦争日本海軍戦史 [The history of the composition and organization of the Japanese Navy [in] the Pacific War, prepared by the 2d Demobilization Bureau]).

56. ‘Kōkū Hensei Seido Enkakushi’ (航空編制制度沿革史 [The history of the composition and organization of the [Army] Air Service, prepared by the 1st Demobilization Bureau]).

57. ‘Kōkū Hensei Seido Enkakushi’ (航空編制制度沿革史 [The history of the composition and organization of the [Army] Air Service, prepared by the 1st Demobilization Bureau]).

58. Sambō Hombu Sakusenka-buin de atta Okamura Masayuki Taisa no Kaisō (参謀本部作戦部員であった岡村誠之大佐の回想 [Recollections of Col. Okamura Masayuki about the time when he served as a staff member of Operations Section of the Army General Staff]).

Notes

60. Sakaguchi Yoshitarō Shōshō no Nampō-gun Sambō-fuku-chō Tōjī no Kaisō (阪口芳太郎少将)の南方軍参謀副長当時との回想 [Recollections of Lt. Gen. Sakaguchi Yoshitarō, about the time when he served as vice chief of staff of the Southern Army].

61. 'Ishii Masayoshi Shōshō no Hoki shiteitā Nampō-gun Dai-ikka Kōkyū Sambō Tōjī no Shiryo' (「石井正美少将の保管していた南方軍第一課高級参謀当時の資料」[The documents kept by Maj. Gen. Ishii Masayoshi of the time when he served as senior staff officer of Section 1 of the Southern Army]).

62. 'Tanikawa Kazuo Shōshō no Nampō-gun Dai-yonka Kōkyū Sambō Tōjī no Kaisōki' (「谷川一男少将の南方軍第四課高級参謀当時の回想記」[Maj. Gen. Tanikawa Kazuo’s Memoir about the time when he served as senior staff officer of Section 4 of the Southern Army]).

63. 'Dō-migi Tanikawa Kazuo Nissi' (「同右谷川一男日誌」[Journal kept by Tanikawa Kazuo, as in the above]).

64. 'Nampō-gun Dai-yonka Sambō Matsumae Chūša no Nissi' (「南方第四課参謀松前未曾中佐の日誌」[Journal kept by [then] Lt. Col. Matsumae Chūša, staff officer of Section 4 of the Southern Army]).

65. 'Nampō-gun Dai-yonka Sambō Saitō Tomoo Chūša no Nissi' (「南方第四課参謀齋藤朋雄中佐の日誌」[Journal kept by [then] Lt. Col. Saitō Tomoo, staff officer of Section 4 of the Southern Army]).

66. 'Nampō-gun Dai-ikka Sambō Arao Okikatsu Chūsa no Nissun Nissi' (「南方軍第一課参謀荒尾興功中佐の作戰日誌」[Operations Journal, kept by [then] Lt. Col. Arao Okikatsu, staff officer of Section 1 of the Southern Army]).

67. Suzuki Takashi Chūsa no Nampō-gun Dai-yonka Sambō Tōjī no Kaisō (鈴木京中佐の南方軍第四課参謀当時の回想 [Recollections of [then] Lt. Col. Suzuki Takashi about the time when he served as staff officer of Section 4 of the Southern Army]).

68. 'Nampō-gun Kōkū Gijutsu-shō Hattori Takeshi Taisa no Nissi' (「南方軍航空技術部長部下・大佐 [少将]の日誌」[Journal kept by [then] Maj. Gen. Hattori Takeshi, chief of the Technical Department of the air arm of the Southern Army, and other documents [in his possession]]).

69. 'Nampō-gun Sōshireibu-zuki Nagaishi Masahisa Shōsa no Kōhō Kankei Shiryo' (「南方軍総司令部附長石正久少佐の後方関係資料」[Documents concerning the rear operations kept by [then] Maj. Nagaishi Masahisa, attached to the Southern Army headquarters]).

70. 'Nampō-gun Kankei Dempō Tsuzuri' (「南方軍関係電報類」[Files of telegrams related to the Southern Army]).

71. 'Kishō ni kansuru Senshiteki Kansatsu', 'Nampō-gun Sakusei (「気象に関する戦史的観察」南方軍作成 [Meteorological observations from the viewpoint of military history, prepared by the Southern Army]).

72. Chūto Kishō-bu-zuki Kusakabe Fumio Shōsa no Kishō Kankei Memo (「中央気象局附下部文書長助理の気象関係メモ」[Memoranda relating to meteorological matters, kept by [then] Maj. Kusakabe Fumio, attached to the Central Meteorological Department]).

73. Kyūjoku Michio Shōsa (Kishō) no Nampō-gun Sōshireibu-zuki Tōjī no Kaisō (久徳通夫少佐 (気象)の南方軍総司令部附当時の回想 [Recollections of [then] Maj. Kyūjoku Michio (meteorology) about the time when he was attached to the Southern Army headquarters]).

74. 'Dai-san Kishō Shūdan-chō Sugawara Michiō Chujo no Nissi' (「第三飛行集団長谷原道大中将の日誌」[Journal kept by Lt. Gen. Sugawara Michiō, commander of the Third Air Force]).
77. Sugawara Michiō Kaisō (菅原道大回想 [Recollections of Sugawara Michiō]).
78. Iizuka Hiroshi Shōsa no Nampō-gun Kōtō Gijutsushū Hikōki-han-chō Tōji no Kaisō (飯塚重少佐の南方軍航空技術部飛行機班長時の回想 [Recollections of [then] Maj. Iizuka Hiroshi about the time when he served as commander of the aircraft group of the Technical Department of the air arm of the Southern Army]).
79. Kawashima Toranosuke Shōshō no Kōtō Hombu-bu-in oyobi Dai-san Hikō Shūdan Sambō-chō Tōji no Kaisō (川崎虎之輔少佐の航空本部部員および第三飛行集団参謀長当時の回想 [Recollections of Maj. Gen. Kawashima Toranosuke, who served as a staff member of the Army Aviation Headquarters and chief of staff of the Third Air Force]).
80. Miyashi Minoru Taisa no Sambō Hombu-bu-in oyobi Dai-san Hikō Shūdan Sakusen Shunin Sambō Tōji no Kaisō (宮田真少佐の参謀本部部員および第三飛行集団作戦主任参謀当時の回想 [Col. Miyashi Minoru’s recollections about the time when he served as a staff member of the Army General Staff and chief of operations of the Third Air Force]).
81. ‘Marē Kōkū Sakusen Kiroku’: Dō-migī Miyashi Minoru Chūsa no Rikugun Daigakkō ni okeru Kyōiku Shiryo (「マレー航空作戦記録」同右宮子真中佐の陸軍大学校における教育資料 ['Records of the Malaya air operation,' education material prepared by [then] Lt. Col. Miyashi Minoru, as in the above, for the Army War College]).
82. Sasao Hiroshi Chūsa no Dai-san Hikō Shūdan Sambō Tōji no Kaisō (笹尾宏中佐の第三飛行集団参謀当時の回想 [Recollections of [then] Lt. Col. Sasao Hiroshi about the time when he served as a staff officer of the Third Air Force]).
83. Hamu Keitarō Chūsa no Dai-san Hikō Shūdan Sambō Tōji no Kaisō (羽住慶太郎中佐の第三飛行集団参謀当時の回想 [Recollections of [then] Lt. Col. Hamu Keitarō about the time when he served as a staff officer of the Third Air Force]).
84. Kawamoto Hiroshi Shōsa no Dai-san Hikō Shūdan Sambō Tōji no Kaisō (川村浩少佐の第三飛行集団参謀当時の回想 [Recollections of [then] Maj. Kawamoto Hiroshi about the time when he served as a staff officer of the Third Air Force]).
85. ‘Dai-san Hikō Shūdan Kimitsu Sakusen Nisshi’ (「第三飛行集団機密作戦日誌」 ['The classified journal of operations of the Third Air Force']).
86. ‘Dai-san Hikō Shūdan Jōkyō Hōkoku’ (「第三飛行集団状況報告」 ['A situation report of the Third Air Force']).
87. ‘Jawa, Sumatora Hōmen Kōkū Sakusen Kiroku’: Miyashi Taisa Zōho no Rikugun Daigakkō Kōgi Shiryo (「ジャワ、スマトラ方面航空作戦記録」宮田真佐助補の陸軍大学校講義資料 ['Records of the air operations in the Java and Sumatra theater:', Lecture materials of the Army War College enlarged by Colonel Miyashi]).
88. ‘Dai-nijū-go-gun Sakusen Kiroku,’ Fukuninkyoku Sakusei (「第二十五軍作戦記録」復員局作成 ['Records of the Twenty-fifth Army’s operations,' compiled by the Demobilization Bureau]).
89. Tsukushi Jirō Shōsa no Dai-nijū-go-gun Sambō-bu-zuki Tōji no Kaisō (筑紫二郎少佐の第二十五軍参謀部附当時の回想 [Recollections of [then] Maj. Tsukushi Jirō about the time when he was attached to the staff of the Twenty-fifth Army]).
90. Akiyama Monjirō Taisa no Sambō Hombu Henseika-bu-in, Dai-jūyōn-gun Sambō Tōji no Kaisō (秋山義四郎中佐の参謀本部編制課部員、第十四軍參謀当時の回想 [Col. Akiyama Monjirō’s recollections about the time when he served as a staff member of the Organization Section of the Army General Staff and a staff officer of the Fourteenth Army]).
91. ‘Ran’in Sakusen Kiroku,’ Fukuninkyoku Chōsei (「蘭印作戦記録」復員局調製 ['Records of the Dutch East Indies operations,' prepared by the Demobilization Bureau]).
92. Tsuji Masanobu Taisa no Dai-nijū-go-gun Sambō Tōji no Kaisō (辻政信大佐の第二十五軍参謀当時の回想 [Col. Tsuji Masanobu’s recollections about the time when he served as a staff officer of the Twenty-fifth Army]).
96. ‘Sambō Hombu Dai-yonka Inatome Katsuhiko Shōsa no Nisshi’ (‘Journal kept by [then] Maj. Inatome Katsuhiko, staff member of Section 4 of the Army General Staff’).

97. Yanagimoto Eiki Chūsa no Hikō Dai-hachijūichi Sentai-chō Tōji no Kaisō (柳本榮喜中佐的飛行第八十一戰隊長當時的回想 [Recollections of [then] Lt. Col. Yanagimoto Eiki, commander of the 81st Air Group]).

98. Moriya Masahiro Taii no Hikō Dai-hachijūichi Sentai Dai-ni Chūtaï-chō Tōji no Kaisō (森屋正博大尉的飛行第八十一戰隊第二中隊長當時的回想 [Recollections of [then] Capt. Moriya Masahiro, 2d Squadron commander of the 81st Air Group]).

99. ‘Dai-san Hikōsa no Nisshi’ (‘第三飛行團長遠藤三郎少将的日誌’ [Recollections of Lt. Gen. Endō Saburō, commander of the 3d Air Division]).

100. ‘Muta Hirokuni Chūsa no Hikō Dai-gojyūkū Sentai Chūtaï-chō Tōji no Kaisō (牟田弘國中佐の飛行第五十九戰隊中隊長當時的回想 [Lt. Col. Muta Hirokuni’s recollections about the time when he served as a squadron commander of the 59th Air Group]).

101. ‘Kanzaki Kiyoshi Memo’ (‘神崎清梅モノ’ [Memoranda kept by Kanzaki Kiyoshi]).

102. ‘Kanzaki Kiyoshi Kaisō’ (神崎清回憶 [Recollections of Kanzaki Kiyoshi]).

103. ‘Recollections of Lt. Col. Yanagimoto Eiki, commander of the 7th Air Division’.

104. ‘Recollections of Kuroda Hisafumi, who served as an instructor at the Mito Flying School (and was also dispatched to Thailand), as a staff member of the 7th Air Division’.

105. ‘Recollections of Col. Kuroda Hisafumi Taisa no Shuki’ (‘A personal account of Col. Kuroda Hisafumi, who served as an instructor at the Mito Flying School (and was also dispatched to Thailand), as a staff member of the 7th Air Division and as commander of the 27th Air Group’).

106. ‘Recollections of [then] Maj. Inatome Katsuhiko, staff member of Section 4 of the Army General Staff’.


108. ‘Recollections of [then] 1st Lt. Oshikawa Shizuo, attached to the 27th Air Group’.

109. ‘Recollections of [then] Capt. Misumi Yoshihiro, attached to the 27th Air Group’.

110. ‘Recollections of [then] 1st Lt. Kawakubo Hirotaka, attached to the 27th Air Group’.

111. ‘Recollections of [then] 1st Lt. Oshikawa Shizuo, attached to the 27th Air Group’.

112. ‘Recollections of Lt. Col. Tokunaga Kenji, commander of the 75th Air Group’.

113. ‘Recollections of [then] Capt. Shirakawa Motoharu, attached to the 90th Air Group’.

114. ‘Recollections of [then] Capt. Ogata Susumu, who was attached to the 75th Air Group and who then served as a staff member of the 7th Air Division’.
116. Dai-nana Hikōdan-chō Yamamoto Kenji Shōshō no Kaisō (第七飛行団長山本健児少将の回想 [Recollections of then Maj. Gen. Yamamoto Kenji, commander of the 7th Air Division]).
117. Kōka Hombu-in, Dai-nana Hikōdan-buin de atta Narasaki Ioto Taiso no Kaisō (航空本部員、第七飛行団部員であった堀崎五百刀大佐の回想 [Recollections of Col. Narasaki Ioto about the time when he served as a staff member of the Army Aviation Headquarters and [then] a staff member of the 7th Air Division]).
119. ‘Hikō Dai-rokujučō Sentai-zuki Hinoki Yohei Chūi no Nisshi’ (「飛行第六十四戦隊附樫與平中尉の日誌」 ['Journal kept by [then] 1st Lt. Hinoki Yohei, attached to the 64th Air Group']).
120. Hinoki Yohei Kaisō (樫與平回想 [Recollections of Hinoki Yohei]).
121. ‘Kurenai no Tsubasa’: Hinoki Yohei Kaisō (紅の翼 [Crimson wings': A memoir by Hinoki Yohei]).
122. ‘Yōkyū no Tsubasa’: Hikō Dai-rokujučō Sentai-chō Katō Tateo Chūsa no Nisshi (「悠久の翼」飛行第六十四戦隊長加藤健夫中佐の日誌 ['Wings of eternity': Journal kept by [then] Lt. Col. Katō Tateo, commander of the 64th Air Group]).
123. Dokuritsu Hikō Dai-yonjūnana Chūtai-zuki oyobi Hikō Dai-rokujučō Sentai Chūtai-chō Kuroe Yasuhiko Shōsa no Kaisō (独立飛行第四十七中隊及び飛行第六十四戦隊中隊長黒江保彦少佐の回想 [Recollections of Maj. Kuroe Yasuhiko about the time when he was attached to the 47th Independent Air Squadron and when he served as a squadron commander of the 64th Air Group]).
125. Hikō Dai-rokujučō Sentai-zuki Yasuda Yoshito Ōsā no Kaisō (飛行第六十四戦隊附安田義人曹長の回想 [Recollections of Sgt. Maj. Yasuda Yoshito, attached to the 64th Air Group]).
126. Hikō Dai-jūni Sentai-chō Kitajima Kumao Taisa no Kaisō (飛行第十二戦隊長北島熊男大佐の回想 [Recollections of [then] Col. Kitajima Kumao, commander of the 12th Air Group]).
128. ‘Dai-nana Hikōdan Marē Shinkō Yowa’: Ogawa Kojirō Taisa no Kaisō (「第七飛行团マレー進攻余話」小川小二郎大佐回想記 ['Anecdotes about the 7th Air Division’s advance into Malaya': A memoir of [then] Col. Ogawa Kojirō]).
130. ‘Hikō Dai-kyūjūhachi Sentai-zuki Ōnishi Toyokichi Shōsa no Kaisō (飛行第九十八戦隊附大西豐吉少佐の回想 [Recollections of [then] Maj. Ōnishi Toyokichi, attached to the 98th Air Group]).
133. Hikō Dai-ichibyūjūhachi Sentai-zuki Ōnishi Toyokichi Shōsa no Kaisō (飛行第九十八戦隊附大西豐吉少佐の回想 [Recollections of [then] Maj. Ōnishi Toyokichi, attached to the 98th Air Group]).
135. Dai-jūni Hikōdan-chō Aoki Takezō Taisa no Kaisō (第十二飛行団長青木武三大佐の回想 [Recollections of [then] Col. Aoki Takezō, commander of the 12th Air Division]).

140. Dai-go Hikō Shūdan Sambō-chō Satō Masaichi Taisa no Kaisō (第五飛行集団参謀長佐藤正一大佐の回想 [Recollections of [then] Col. Satō Masaichi, chief of staff of the Fifth Air Force]).
141. Dai-go Hikō Shūdan Sambō Ishikawa Susumu Chūsa no Kaisō (第五飛行集団参謀石川晋中佐の回想 [Recollections of [then] Lt. Col. Ishikawa Susumu, staff officer of the Fifth Air Force]).
142. ‘Dai-go Hikō Shūdan Sambō Mizutani Tsutomu Shōsa no Nisshi’ (「第五飛行集団参謀水谷勉少佐の日誌」 ['Journal kept by [then] Maj. Mizutani Tsutomu, staff officer of the Fifth Air Force']).
143. Mizutani Tsutomu Kaisō (水谷勉回想 [Recollections of Mizutani Tsutomu]).
144. ‘Dai-go Hikō Shūdan Sambō Dōba Kotoshi Shōsa no Nisshi’ (「第五飛行集団参謀道場行道止少佐の日誌」 ['Journal kept by [then] Maj. Dōba Kotoshi, staff officer of the Fifth Air Force']).
145. Rikugun Daigakkō Heigaku Kyōkan oyobi Dai-go Hikō Shūdan Sambō-chō Miyoshi Yasayuki Taisa no Kaisō (陸軍大学校兵学教官及び第五飛行集団参謀長吉野康之大佐の回想 [Recollections of [then] Col. Miyoshi Yasuyuki, instructor of military science at the Army War College and [then] chief of staff of the Fifth Air Force]).
146. ‘Dai-go Hikō Shidaid Shōkuninhyō,’ Kaisen-ji no mono (「第五飛行師団職員表」開戦時のもの ['A list of the staff of the Fifth Air Force, produced at the time of the opening of hostilities]).
147. Dai-yan Hikōdan-buin Ashiwara Takekazu Shōsa no Kaisō (第四飛行団部員足原武一大佐の回想 [Recollections of [then] Maj. Ashiwara Takekazu, staff member of the 4th Air Division]).
148. Dai-yan Hikōdan-buin Nakano Matsura Shōsa no Kaisō (第四飛行団部員中野松良少佐の回想 [Recollections of [then] Maj. Nakano Matsura, staff member of the 4th Air Division]).
149. Dai-yan Hikōdan-buin Shireibu-zuki Amagai Toranosuke Shōsa no Kaisō (第四飛行団司令部附天原虎之助少尉の回想 [Recollections of [then] 2d Lt. Amagai Toranosuke, attached to the 4th Air Division Headquarters]).
150. Dai-yan Hikō Shūdan Sambō Tanaka Midori Shōsa no Kaisō (第五飛行集団参謀田中敏文少佐の回想 [Recollections of [then] Maj. Tanaka Midori, staff officer of the Fifth Air Force]).
151. Dai-yan Hikōdan-buin oyobi Hikō Dai-jiyon Sentai-chō Ishikawa Tadashi Chūsa no Kaisō (第十二飛行団部員および飛行第五十戦隊長であった石川正中佐の回想 [Recollections of Lt. Col. Ishikawa Tadashi, who served as a staff member of the 12th Air Division and commander of the 50th Air Group]).
152. Kōka Hombu-buin, Dai-jiyon Sambō oyobi Hikō Dai-jiyon Sentai-chō Itoda Isamu Taisa no Kaisō (航空本部部員、第十六軍參謀及び飛行第十四戰隊長井田信勇少佐の回想 [Recollections of Col. Itoda Isamu about the time when he served as a staff member at the Army Aviation Headquarters, a staff officer of the Sixteenth Army and commander of the 14th Air Group]).
154. Norita Sadakata Kaisō (乗田貞剛回想 [Recollections of Norita Sadakata ]).
155. Hikō Dai-sanjūichibun Hayashi Junji Chūsa no Kaisō (飛行第三十戰隊長林順二中佐の回想 [Recollections of [then] Lt. Col. Hayashi Junji, commander of the 31st Air Group]).
156. Hikō Dai-sanjūichibun Sentai-zukki Tajiri Kiyoshi Shōsa no Kaisō (飛行第三十戰隊附田純清少佐の回想 [Recollections of Maj. Tajiri Kiyoshi, attached to the 31st Air Group]).
174. 'Hikō Dai-jūroku Sentai-chō Yanase Kengo Chūsha no Nisshi' (「飛行第十六戦隊長梁瀨健吾中佐の日誌」[Journal kept by [then] Lt. Col. Yanase Kengo, commander of the 16th Air Group']).

175. Dokuritsu Hikō Dai-gojū-ni Chūtai-chō Ōmori Shigeru Shōsa no Kaisō (独立飛行第52中隊長大森茂少佐の回想 [Recollections of Maj. Ōmori Shigeru about the time when he served as 52d Air Squadron commander]).

176. Dokuritsu Hikō Dai-nanajūichi Chūtai-zuki Shimizu Masakazu Chūō no Kaisō (独立飛行第71中隊附清水正一中尉の回想 [Recollections of [then] 1st Lt. Shimizu Masakazu, attached to the 71st Independent Air Squadron]).

177. Dokuritsu Hikō Dai-nana-jū-san Chūtai-zuki Harunari Kanemasa Chūō no Kaisō (独立飛行第73中隊附春成兼正中尉の回想 [Recollections of [then] 1st Lt. Harunari Kanemasa, attached to the 73d Independent Air Squadron]).

178. Hikō Dai-rokujū-yon Sentai Dai-i Chi Chūtai-chō de atta Maruta Fumio Shōsa no Kaisō (飛行第六十四戦隊第一中隊長であった丸田文雄少佐の回想 [Recollections of Maj. Maruta Fumio about the time when he served as 1st Squadron commander of the 64th Air Group]).

179. Dokuritsu Hikō Dai-hachijū-sannichi Chūtai-chō Nitahara Kenjirō Taisa no Kaisō (第八十三独立飛行隊長二田原憲治郎大佐の回想 [Recollections of [then] Col. Nitahara Kenjirō, commander of the 83d Independent Air Unit]).

180. 'Dai-hachijū-sannichi Chūtai-chō Kobayashi Ken’ichi Shōsei no Nisshin' (「第八十中隊附北原健一中尉の日記」 [Journal kept by [then] 2d Lt. Kobayashi Ken’ichi, attached to the 83d Independent Air Unit headquarters']).

181. 'Dokuritsu Hikō Dai-hachijūnyū Chūtai-zuki Kasahara Minoru Gunso Memo' (「独立飛行第八十九中隊附笠原軍曹メモ」 [Memoranda kept by Sgt. Kasahara Minoru, attached to the 89th Independent Air Squadron]).


183. Dokuritsu Hikō Dai-hachijūnyū Chūtai-zuki Takahashi Shigeru Chūō no Kaisō (独立飛行第八十九中隊附田橋茂中尉の回想 [Recollections of [then] 1st Lt. Takahashi Shigeru, attached to the 89th Independent Air Squadron]).

184. Rikujiro Kimmu Dai-hachijū Chūtai Furuya Seinosuke Shōi no Kaisō (陸上勤務第八十中隊古谷清之助少尉の回想 [Recollections of 2d Lt. Furuya Seinosuke of the 80th Ground Duty Company]).

185. 'Dai-go Hikōjō Settei-tai Terasaki Takeshi Shōsa Memo' (「第五飛行場設置空戦場司佐顧問メモ」 [Memoranda kept by [then] Maj. Terasaki Takeshi of the 5th [Field] Airfield Construction Unit']).

186. Dai-jūgo Kōkū Chikō Shirei-kan Matsuzaki Kamesatsu Taisa no Kaisō (第十五航空地区司令官松崎今朝松大佐の回想 [Recollections of Col. Matsuzaki Kamesatsu about the time when he served as 15th Air-Ground Support headquarters commander]).

187. Yokosuka Kōkū-tai, Dai-jūichi Kōkū Kantei Shireibu Tsunoda Hitoshi Kaimu Taii (横須賀航空隊、第11航空司令部角田喜上軍大尉（のち中佐）の回想 [Recollections of [Navy] Lt. Tsunoda Hitoshi, who served at the Yokosuka Air Unit and the Eleventh Air Fleet headquarters (later [promoted to] commander)).

188. 'Nankan Kantei kara Dai-san Hikō Shūdan ni Haken sarae Inouchi Kaneo Kaigun Shōsa Nisshin' (「南遣艦隊から第三飛行団に派遣された井口兼夫海軍少佐日誌」 [Journal kept by [then] [Navy] Lt. Cdr. Inouchi Kaneo, seconded from the Southern Expeditionary Fleet to the 'Third Air Force']).

189. 'Nihon Minkan Kōkū Yūsō Shōshi,' Nihon Kōkū Kabushiki Kaisha Chōsei (「日本民間航空輸送小史」日本航空株式会社調製 [A brief history of civil air transport in Japan,' prepared
by Japan Air Lines]).
209. Yasen Hojū Hikōtai Kodama Shin’ichi Taii no Kaisō (野戦補充飛行隊隊長真一大尉の回想 [Recollections of [then] Capt. Kodama Shin’ichi of the [1st] Field Replenishment Air Unit]).
211. ‘Dai-ichi Teishindan Kankeisha ni yoru Paremban Kōdō Chōsho’ (第一挺進団関係者によるパレバン行動調書 ['Action records of the Palembang [operation], [compiled by] those related to the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group']).
212. ‘Rashio Teishin Sakusen Sentō Shōho’ (ラシオ挺進作戦調詳報 ['Action report of the Lashio [paratroop] raiding operation']).
214. ‘Hikō Dai-kyūjū Sentai-zuki Murai Nobukata Chū no Nisshi’ (飛行第九十戦隊中尉の日誌 ['Journal kept by [then] 1st Lt. Murai Nobukata, attached to the 90th Air Group']).
216. ‘Hikō Dai-rokujū Sentai Suzuki Ichizō Gunsō no Nisshi’ (飛行第六十戦隊銃手三等曹の日誌 ['Journal kept by Sgt. Suzuki Ichizō of the 60th Air Group']).
218. [S. Woodburn Kirby,] War against Japan [Vol: I], London: HMSO.
220. N. Macmillan, Royal Air Force in World War II ?.
225. ‘Hikō Dai-rokujū Sentai Satō Shigeyoshi Taii Nisshi’ (飛行第六十戦隊佐藤重由大尉日誌 ['Journal kept by [then] Capt. Satō Shigeyoshi of the 60th Air Group']).
### List of Signs and Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbrev. /Sign</th>
<th>Represents</th>
<th>Abbrev. /Sign</th>
<th>Represents</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>FW</td>
<td>Field airfield construction unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Division</td>
<td>AE</td>
<td>Field meteorological unit(regiment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Brigade or infantry group</td>
<td>FS</td>
<td>Field aircraft repair depot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>Infantry regiment</td>
<td>FH</td>
<td>Field aircraft supply depot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>Air army</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Fighter unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FD</td>
<td>[Numbered] air force</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Single-engine light bomber unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Air division HQ</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Twin-engine light bomber unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fs</td>
<td>Independent air unit</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>Heavy bomber unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fcs</td>
<td>Independent air squadron</td>
<td>△</td>
<td>Assault plane unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aB</td>
<td>Air-ground support unit</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Strategic reconnaissance aircraft unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aB</td>
<td>Air-ground support HQ</td>
<td>✖</td>
<td>Tactical reconnaissance aircraft unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ab</td>
<td>Airfield battalion</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Direct support aircraft unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>ac</td>
<td>Airfield company</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Transport aircraft unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>Air intelligence unit (regiment)</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>Airfield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTL</td>
<td>Air signal unit (regiment)</td>
<td>Fis</td>
<td>Mobile repair detail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FV</td>
<td>Direction finder unit</td>
<td>Fu</td>
<td>Air transport unit</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MTc</td>
<td>Motor transport company</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>ro</td>
<td>Ground duty company</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Kc</td>
<td>Construction duty company</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>AA</td>
<td>Antiaircraft artillery unit</td>
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</table>
### List of Brief [Career] Histories of Key Air Service Personnel in the Army’s Southern Air Operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Title (Period)</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Graduate class of the Army</th>
<th>Specialty / Special skills</th>
<th>Brief [Career] History</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern Army</td>
<td>Vice Chief of Staff Nov ’41-May ’42</td>
<td>Lt Gen Sakaguchi Yoshitarō</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>WC</td>
<td>Feb 1927: Capt of Aviation; Jan 1928: 2d Air Rgt Sqdn Cdr; Dec 1928: Staff member, Army Aviation HQ; Aug 1931: Instructor, War College; Mar 1935: Staff member, Army Aviation HQ; Mar 1936: 12th Air Gp Cdr; July 1938: Instructor, War College</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>Section 4 Nov ’41-Apr ’42</td>
<td>Col Tanikawa Kazuo</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>WC, Rec</td>
<td>Dec 1926: 1st Lt of Aviation; Dec 1930: Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch; Mar 1932: Staff member, Army General Staff; Aug 1932: Staff member, Military Affairs Bureau; Jan 1936: Staff member, Army General Staff; Dec 1940: Instructor, War College</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>Staff officer Nov ’41-May ’42</td>
<td>Lt Col Suzuki Takashi 鈴木京</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>WC</td>
<td>Oct 1923: 2d Lt of Infantry, attached to 18th Inf Rgt; Aug 1936: Attached to the staff of Japanese Garrison Army in China; July 1938: Attached to Army Technological HQ; Jan 1939: Attached to Army Ordnance Main Depot; Aug 1939: Staff member, Army General Staff; Mar 1941: Staff member, Army Aviation HQ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>ditto Nov ’41-Mar ’43</td>
<td>Col Saitō Tomoo 齋藤頭雄</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>WC, Rec</td>
<td>Dec 1934: Capt of Aviation; Dec 1935: Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch and staff member, Research Dept of the school; Apr 1938: Instructor, War College; Mar 1941: Staff officer, [Numbered] Air Force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>ditto Nov ’41-Oct ’42</td>
<td>Lt Col Matsumae Misoo 松前未曾雄</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>WC, Pil</td>
<td>Oct 1937: Capt of Aviation, attached to 4th Air Gp; June 1939: Staff member, Army General Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>ditto Nov ’41-Apr ’42</td>
<td>Maj Shibuya Masanari 渋谷正成</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>WC, Pil</td>
<td>Oct 1933: 2d Lt of Aviation; Oct 1934: 7th Air Rgt; June 1940: Instructor, Army Air Academy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>ditto Nov ’41-Mar ’44</td>
<td>Maj Adachi Seiichi 足立誠一</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>WC, Pil</td>
<td>Oct 1928: 2d Lt of Aviation, attached to 5th Air Rgt</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Title (Period)</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Graduate class of the Army</td>
<td>Specialty/Special skills</td>
<td>Brief [Career] History</td>
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<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>Chief of Staff June ’41-Apr ’42</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Kawashima Toranosuke</td>
<td>31 WC, Rec</td>
<td>Dec 1925: 1st Lt of Aviation, Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch; Dec 1931: 5th Air Rgt Sqdn Cdr; Apr 1933: Staff officer, 3d Div; Dec 1934: Staff member, Economic Mobilization Bureau; Apr 1937: Staff member, Army Aviation HQ; Aug 1939: Section chief, Army Aviation HQ</td>
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<td>Col</td>
<td>Morimoto Gunzō</td>
<td>30 WC, Bom</td>
<td>Dec 1926: 1st Lt of Aviation (Infantry), attached to 7th Air Rgt; Mar 1929: Staff member, Army General Staff; Dec 1934: Staff member, Army Aviation HQ; Dec 1938: Chief, General Clerical Section, Army Aviation HQ; July 1941: Staff officer, General Defense Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>Staff officer Aug ’40-Apr ’42</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Shiraishi Noboru</td>
<td>34 Ser</td>
<td>May 1925: 2d Lt of Aviation, attached to 4th Air Rgt; Nov 1929: Instructor, Army Tokorozawa Flying Sch; Aug 1933: Chief of servicing, Material Depot, 8th Air Rgt; Aug 1935: Instructor, Army Aero-technical Sch and Sqdn Cdr of its student units; Aug 1937: Staff member, Ordnance Dpt, 2d Air Div; May 1938: Staff member, Army Aviation HQ; July 1941: Staff member, Office of the Chief of Field Air Ordnance</td>
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<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Miyashi Minoru</td>
<td>36 WC, Pil</td>
<td>Apr 1925: 2d Lt of Aviation; Mar 1931: Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch; Nov 1935: 7th Air Rgt Sqdn Cdr; Dec 1937: Div Chief [Staff member], Army General Staff; Aug 1939: Staff officer, Kwantung Army; July 1941: Staff member, Army Aviation HQ and Inspectorate General of Army Aviation</td>
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<td>ditto</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Saso Hiroshi</td>
<td>36 WC, Pil</td>
<td>May 1925: 2d Lt of Aviation; Aug 1933: Instructor, Army Hamamatsu Flying Sch; Aug 1935: Instructor, Army Hamamatsu Flying Sch and Superintendent, Research Dept of the school; Aug 1936: 6th Air Bn Sqdn Cdr; July 1937: 9th Air Bn Sqdn Cdr</td>
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<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Watanabe Mitsuhiko</td>
<td>41 WC, Rec</td>
<td>Nov 1939: Capt of Aviation (converted from Infantry); June 1940: Attached to 32d Air Gp</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Title (Period)</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Graduate class of the Army</td>
<td>Specialty/Special skills</td>
<td>Brief [Career] History</td>
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<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Kawamoto Hiroshi</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>WC, Pil</td>
<td>Apr 1934: 1st Lt of Aviation (Infantry), attached to 1st Air Rgt; July 1939: Staff officer, 3d Air Army [sic]; Aug 1941: Staff officer, Kwantung Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth Air Force</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Lt Gen</td>
<td>Obata Hideyoshi</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>WC</td>
<td>Aug 1937: Col of Aviation; Nov 1937: Vice-Principal, Army Akeno Flying Sch; Mar 1938: Principal, Army Akeno Flying Sch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Maj Gen</td>
<td>Satô Masaichi</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>WC</td>
<td>May 1925: 1st Lt of Aviation, attached to 3d Air Rgt; Nov 1930: 1st Air Rgt Sqdn Cdr; Dec 1932: Staff member, Army General Staff; Aug 1936: Instructor, Army Hamamatsu Flying Sch and Superintendent, Research Dept of the school; Nov 1937: Staff officer, IGHQ; Aug 1939: Staff officer, Air Corps; Aug 1940: Instructor, War College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>Maj Gen</td>
<td>Miyoshi Yasuyuki</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>WC, Pil</td>
<td>Oct 1926: 2d Lt of Aviation, attached to 3d Air Rgt; Aug 1930: Instructor, Army Tokorozawa Flying Sch; Mar 1934: Instructor, Army Akeno Flying Sch; June 1938: Army Air Academy Sqdn Cdr; Apr 1940: Attached to 3d Air Gp; Dec 1940: Staff officer, 5th Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>Staff officer</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Ishikawa Susumu</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>WC</td>
<td>Aug 1937: Capt of Aviation; Aug 1939: Instructor, Army Hamamatsu Flying Sch; Sept 1940: Attached to IGHQ; June 1941: Instructor, Army Hamamatsu Flying Sch</td>
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<td>Maj</td>
<td>Mizutani Tsutomu</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>WC, Pil</td>
<td>Oct 1928: 2d Lt of Aviation, attached to 6th Air Rgt; Sept 1931: Attached to 8th Indep Air Sqdn; Aug 1934: Instructor, Army Hamamatsu Flying Sch; Mar 1935: 14th Air Rg Sqdn Cdr; Oct 1935: Attached to 15th Indep Air Sqdn; Aug 1938: Instructor, Army Hamamatsu Flying Sch; Mar 1940: Attached to 60th Air Gp</td>
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<td>ditto</td>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Tanaka Midori</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>WC</td>
<td>Nov 1939: Attached to 45th Air Gp (Inf); Mar 1941: Instructor, Army Air Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Dôba Kotoshi</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>WC, Pil</td>
<td>Oct 1937: Col of Aviation; Nov 1937: Vice-Principal, Army Akeno Flying Sch; Mar 1938: Principal, Army Akeno Flying Sch</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Graduate class of the Army and Specialty/Special skills are marked with WC (War College) and Pil (Pilot).*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Title (Period)</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Graduate class of the Army</th>
<th>Specialty/Special skills</th>
<th>Brief [Career] History</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3d Air Div</td>
<td>Commander Aug ’40-</td>
<td>Maj Gen</td>
<td>Endō Saburō</td>
<td>26 WC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dec 1937: Col of Aviation; July 1938: Staff officer, IGHQ; July 1939: Attached to Army Hamamatsu Flying Sch; Sept 1939: Vice Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army; Mar 1940: Attached to Army Hamamatsu Flying Sch</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Apr ‘42</td>
<td></td>
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<td>ditto Apr ’42-Feb ’44</td>
<td>Maj Gen</td>
<td>Tsukada Rikichi</td>
<td>28 WC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aug 1926: Capt of Aviation (Infantry); Jul 1927: Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch; Aug 1930: Staff officer, 20th Div; Feb 1932: Staff officer, Kwantung Army; Mar 1933: Attached to 7th Air Rgt; Aug 1933: Instructor, Army Hamamatsu Flying Sch; Aug 1937: Staff officer, Northern China Area Army; July 1938: 7th Air Cp Cdr; Dec 1939: Chief of Staff, 1st Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th Air Div</td>
<td>Commander July ’41-</td>
<td>Maj Gen</td>
<td>Yamamoto Kenji</td>
<td>28 WC</td>
<td></td>
<td>May 1925: 1st Lt of Aviation (Infantry), attached to 6th Air Rgt; Sept 1931: Attached to 8th Indep Air Sqdn; Dec 1933: Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch; Aug 1936: 4th Air Rgt Sqdn Cdr; Aug 1937: Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch</td>
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<td>Mar ’42</td>
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<td>10th Air Div</td>
<td>Commander Dec ’40-</td>
<td>Maj Gen</td>
<td>Hirota Yutaka</td>
<td>27 WC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aug 1937: Lt Col of Aviation; Sept 1937: Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch; May 1938: Staff officer, Eastern China Expeditionary Army; Apr 1939: 27th Air Cp Cdr; Oct 1940: Attached to Air Corps</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jan ’43</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Staff officer July ’41-</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Kawahara Hachirō</td>
<td>34 Pil</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dec 1926: 1st Lt of Aviation; Aug 1930: Instructor, Army Tokorozawa Flying Sch; Sept 1934: 11th Air Bn Sqdn Cdr; July 1938: Attached to 11th Air Cp; Dec 1938: 77th Air Cp Cdr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Short List of Key Air Service Personnel in the Southern Operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Title (Period)</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Graduate class of the Army</th>
<th>Specialty/Special skills</th>
<th>Brief [Career] History</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12th Air Div</td>
<td>Commander Aug ’40-May ‘42</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Aoki Takezō 青木武三</td>
<td>27 Pil</td>
<td>May 1925: Capt of Aviation (Infantry), 3d Air Rgt Sqdn Cdr; Aug 1926: Instructor, Army Akeno Flying Sch; Aug 1933: Staff member, Army Aviation HQ; Sept 1937: Staff officer, 2d Air Force; Sept 1938: 33d Air Gp Cdr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>Staff officer Apr ’41-May ’44</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Satō Takeo 佐藤猛夫</td>
<td>36 Pil</td>
<td>Oct 1926: 2d Lt of Aviation; Feb 1932: Instructor, Army Tokorozawa Flying Sch</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Air Div</td>
<td>Commander July ’41-Aug ’42</td>
<td>Maj Gen</td>
<td>Kawara Toshiaki 河原利明</td>
<td>24 WC</td>
<td>May 1925: Capt of Aviation; Mar 1927: Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch and Superintendent, Research Dept of the school; Aug 1931: Staff member, Army Aviation HQ; Aug 1934: Attached to 7th Air Rgt; Dec 1935: 9th Air Rgt Cdr</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>Staff officer Aug ’41-Apr ’42</td>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Ashiwara Takekazu 足原武一</td>
<td>40 WC</td>
<td>Sept 1933: 1st Lt of Aviation; Dec 1935: 9th Air Rgt Sqdn Cdr; Mar 1938: Attached to Army Academy Branch Campus Student Unit; Oct 1939: Army Air Academy Student Unit Sqdn Cdr; Dec 1940: Instructor, Army Air Academy</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>22d Air Div</td>
<td>Commander Mar ’42-Aug ’43</td>
<td>Maj Gen</td>
<td>Mikami Kizō 三上喜三</td>
<td>27 WC</td>
<td>Dec 1919: 1st Lt of Engineering, attached to Air Balloon Unit; June 1922: Staff member, Research Dept Army Air Service Sch; May 1925: Capt of Aviation; July 1927: Air Balloon Unit Sqdn Cdr; Mar 1930: Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch and staff member, Research Dept of the school; Aug 1935: Staff member, 1st Air Div; Dec 1938: 61st Air Gp Cdr; July 1941: Chief, Central Meteorology Dept</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>Staff officer Mar ’42-July ’42</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Furukawa Kazuharu 古川一治</td>
<td>37 WC, Rec</td>
<td>Dec 1936: Capt of Aviation (Infantry); Dec 1938: Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch; Dec 1940: Staff officer, 5th Air Force; Sept 1941: Staff officer, Taiwan Army</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>59th Air Gp</td>
<td>Commander Sept ’41-Dec ’41</td>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Tanimura Reinosuke 谷村禮之助</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Oct 1926: 2d Lt of Aviation (Infantry), attached to 6th Air Rgt; Dec 1933: Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch; Dec 1935: Instructor, Army Kumagaya Flying Sch</td>
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<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>Staff officer Dec ’41-Feb ’43</td>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Nakao Jiroku 中尾次六</td>
<td>40 Pil</td>
<td>Oct 1928: 2d Lt of Aviation; Oct 1931: Attached to Air Rgt; Dec 1935: Instructor, Army Tokorozawa Flying Sch</td>
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<tr>
<td>75th Air Gp</td>
<td>Commander Aug ’41-Dec ’41</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Kameyama Kazue 龜山計衛</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>May 1925: 1st Lt of Aviation; Mar 1934: Instructor, Army Tokorozawa Flying Sch and staff member, Research Dept of the school; Dec 1935: Instructor, Army Kumagaya Flying Sch and Student Unit Sqdn Cdr of the school</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>ditto Dec '41-Jun '43</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Tokunaga Kenji</td>
<td>33 WC, Pil</td>
<td>May 1925: 1st Lt of Aviation (Infantry); Mar 1928: Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch; Oct 1932: 1st Air Rgt Sqdn Cdr; Nov 1934: Instructor, Army Hamamatsu Flying Sch; Sept 1938: Staff member, 1st Air Division; Aug 1940: Instructor, Army Air Academy; Aug 1941: Attached to IGHQ Army Dept</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>90th Air Gp</td>
<td>Commander Dec '40-Mar '43</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Seto Katsumi</td>
<td>32 WC, Pil</td>
<td>Dec 1925: 1st Lt of Aviation, attached to 3d Air Rgt; Jan 1933: 11th Air Bn Sqdn Cdr; Aug 1935: Attached to Army Aviation HQ; Nov 1935: Simultaneously served as Instructor, Army Academy; May 1938: Staff member, Army Aviation HQ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Air Gp</td>
<td>Commander Sept '40-Dec '41</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Sakurai Hajime</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>May 1925: 1st Lt of Aviation; June 1928: Attached to 7th Indep Air Sqdn; Dec 1932: Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch and staff member, Research Dept of the school; Mar 1935: Attached to 12th Air Rgt</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>ditto Dec '41-Aug '43</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Kuroda Hisafumi</td>
<td>33 Pil</td>
<td>May 1925: 1st Lt of Aviation, attached to 7th Air Rgt; Sept 1932: 7th Air Rgt Sqdn Cdr; Aug 1934: Staff member, Army Aviation HQ; June 1938: Attached to 16th Air Rgt; Mar 1939: Instructor, Army Hamamatsu Flying Sch; Dec 1940: Instructor, Army Mito Flying Sch; July 1941: Staff member, 7th Air Div</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Indep Air Unit</td>
<td>Commander July '41-Mar '43</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Nakahama Gosuke</td>
<td>31 Rec</td>
<td>May 1925: 1st Lt of Aviation; July 1926: Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch; Feb 1932: Staff member, Research Dept, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch; June 1934: 3d Air Rgt Sqdn Cdr; Aug 1936: Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch and staff member, Research Dept of the school; Aug 1937: Attached to 8th Air Army [sic]; Mar 1939: Attached to Staff of Kwangtung Army; July 1941: 15th Air Gp Cdr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64th Air Gp</td>
<td>Commander Apr '41-May '42</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Katō Tateo</td>
<td>37 WC, Pil</td>
<td>Oct 1925: 2d Lt of Aviation, attached to 6th Air Rgt; Mar 1928: Instructor, Army Tokorozawa Flying Sch; Aug 1932: Instructor, Army Akeno Flying Sch; Dec 1936: 5th Air Rgt Sqdn Cdr; July 1937: Air Corps Sqdn Cdr; Mar 1939: Staff member, Army Aviation HQ and Inspectorate General of Army Aviation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Title (Period)</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Graduate class of the Army</td>
<td>Specialty/Special skills</td>
<td>Brief [Career] History</td>
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<tr>
<td>12th Air Gp</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Kitajima Kumao</td>
<td>29 WC, Pil</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mar 1926: Capt of Aviation (Cavalry); attached to 6th Air Rgt; Dec 1928: 6th Air Rgt Sqn Cdr; Mar 1930: Instructor, Army Tokorozawa Flying Sch; Oct 1934: 12th Air Gp Sqn Cdr; Mar 1936: Staff officer, Taiwan Army; Dec 1938: Instructor, War College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60th Air Gp</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Ogawa Kojirō</td>
<td>30 Pil</td>
<td></td>
<td>May 1925: 1st Lt of Aviation; June 1925: Staff member, Army Aviation HQ; May 1927: 7th Air Rgt Sqn Cdr; Mar 1931: [Dispatched as] teaching staff, Manchurian North Eastern Defense Air Force; Mar 1935: Resident official in Italy; Apr 1938: Instructor, Army Hamamatsu Flying Sch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98th Air Gp</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Usui Shigeki</td>
<td>31 WC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aug 1937: Lt Col of Aviation; Dec 1937: Attached to IGHQ Army Dept; July 1938: Staff member, Army General Staff and Instructor, War College; Aug 1938: Information officer, Information Dept of Cabinet; Mar 1939: Staff officer, IGHQ, and attached to Army General Staff; Aug 1940: Section chief, Army General Staff; Mar 1941: Instructor, Army Hamamatsu Flying Sch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77th Air Gp</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Osaka Junji</td>
<td>35 WC</td>
<td></td>
<td>May 1925: 2d Lt of Aviation (Infantry); Dec 1925: Attached to 1st Air Rgt; Dec 1934: 4th Air Rgt Sqn Cdr; Dec 1935: Attached to 4th Air Rgt (served at Military Affairs Bureau); 1941: Staff member, Army Aviation HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st Air Gp</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Yoshioka Hiroshi</td>
<td>37 Pil</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oct 1925: 2d Lt of Aviation (Infantry); Aug 1930: Instructor, Army Tokorozawa Flying Sch; Aug 1935: 4th Air Rgt Sqn Cdr; Mar 1939: Staff member, Inspectorate General of Army Aviation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Hayashi Junji</td>
<td>32 WC, Pil</td>
<td></td>
<td>May 1925: 1st Lt of Aviation (Transport); Aug 1926: Instructor, Army Akeno Flying Sch; Aug 1931: 6th Air Rgt Sqn Cdr; Sept 1931: 9th Indep Air Sqn Cdr; Aug 1933: Instructor, Army Academy; Oct 1936: Instructor, Army Tokorozawa Flying Sch Branch Campus; May 1939: Instructor, Army Air Academy; Oct 1940: Head, Army Utsunomiya Flying Sch Training Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
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<td>Rank</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Graduate class of the Army</td>
<td>Specialty/ Special skills</td>
<td>Brief [Career] History</td>
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<tr>
<td>62d Air Gp</td>
<td>Commander Nov ‘41-Dec ‘41</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Hatano Takeo</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td>May 1925: 1st Lt of Aviation (Gunnery); Oct 1926: Staff member, Army Aviation HQ; Aug 1935: Attached to Army Academy; Aug 1936: 7th Air Rgt Bn Cdr</td>
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<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>ditto Dec ‘41-Oct ‘42</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Onishi Hiroshi</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>WC, Rec</td>
<td>Mar 1927: 1st Lt of Aviation (Gunnery); Oct 1928: Attached to 7th Air Rgt; Sept 1933: 12th Air Bn Sqdn Cdr; Mar 1934: Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch; Apr 1935: Instructor, Army Hamamatsu Flying Sch; June 1938: Staff member, Army Aviation HQ; Mar 1940: Instructor, Army Baichengzi Flying Sch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Air Gp</td>
<td>Commander Sept ’40-Mar ‘43</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Takeda Kinshirō</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Pil</td>
<td>May 1925: 2d Lt of Aviation (Infantry), attached to 6th Air Rgt; Aug 1927: Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch; Aug 1933: 6th Air Rgt Sqdn Cdr; Mar 1935: Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch</td>
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<tr>
<td>11th Air Gp</td>
<td>Commander Sept ’39-Mar ‘42</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Okabe Tadashi</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dec 1925: 2d Lt of Aviation (Infantry), attached to 3d Air Rgt; Dec 1931: Instructor, Army Akeno Flying Sch; Aug 1934: Attached to 11th Air Bn; Aug 1936: Instructor, Army Tokorozawa Flying Sch; Oct 1937: Instructor, Army Academy Branch Campus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>ditto Mar ‘42-Feb ‘43</td>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Sugiura Katsuji</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Pil</td>
<td>Oct 1929: 2d Lt of Aviation, attached to 5th Air Rgt; July 1937: 8th Air Bn Sqdn Cdr; July 1938: Instructor, Army Akeno Flying Sch</td>
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<tr>
<td>81st Air Gp</td>
<td>Commander Oct ‘41-Mar ‘43</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Yanagimoto Eiki</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>WC, Pil</td>
<td>Nov 1928: 1st Lt of Aviation (Cavalry), Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying School; Aug 1932: 4th Air Rgt Sqdn Cdr; Mar 1938: Staff member, Inspectorate General of Army Aviation; Mar 1939: Staff member, 8th Air Div; Aug 1939: Staff officer, 2d Air Force; June 1940: Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch</td>
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<tr>
<td>21st Indep Air Unit</td>
<td>Commander July ‘41-Oct ‘42</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Narita Mitsugu</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>WC, Bom</td>
<td>Dec 1938: Staff member, Army Aviation HQ (Maj of Infantry); Jan 1939: Attached to Army General Staff; Aug 1940: Staff officer, Air Corps; Dec 1940: Staff officer, 5th Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>83d Indep Air Unit</td>
<td>Commander July ‘41-Aug ‘43</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Nitahara Kenjirō</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Pil</td>
<td>Dec 1925: 1st Lt of Aviation (Infantry); Apr 1929: 6th Air Rgt Sqdn Cdr; Apr 1932: Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch; Dec 1933: Instructor, Army Academy; Sept 1937: Staff member, Inspectorate General of Military Training; July 1939: Attached to Kwantung Army HQ</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
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<td>Name</td>
<td>Graduate class of the Army</td>
<td>Specialty/Special skills</td>
<td>Brief [Career] History</td>
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<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>Mar ‘42-Aug ‘43</td>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Ishikawa Tadashi 石川正</td>
<td>40 Pil</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oct 1928: 2d Lt of Aviation, attached to 4th Air Rgt; Oct 1934: Instructor, Army Tokorozawa Flying Sch; Dec 1937: 16th Air Rgt Sqdn Cdr; Sept 1938: 33d Air Gp Sqdn Cdr; Dec 1941: Staff member, 12th Air Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Air Gp</td>
<td>Commander Mar ‘38-June ’42</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Honda Kazuo 本多三男</td>
<td>32 WC, Pil</td>
<td></td>
<td>May 1925: 1st Lt of Aviation (Infantry), 3d Air Rgt; Mar 1933: Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch and Superintendent, Research Dept of the school; Aug 1936: Instructor, Army Akeno Flying Sch and Superintendent, Research Dept of the school</td>
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<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>June ‘42-Aug ‘43</td>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Shiota Kaname 塩田要</td>
<td>37 Rec, Pil</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aug 1935: Capt of Aviation (Gunnery), attached to 7th Air Rgt; Aug 1939: Instructor, Army Hamamatsu Flying Sch; Dec 1939: Instructor, Army Air Academy; Mar 1941: Staff member, Coaching Gp, Army Baichengzi Flying Sch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th Air Gp</td>
<td>Commander Sept ‘41-Mar ‘42</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Yanase Kengo 梶瀬健吾</td>
<td>33 WC, Pil</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dec 1925: 1st Lt of Aviation (Infantry), Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch; Feb 1932: Attached to 9th Div HQ; Oct 1933: Staff member, Army Aviation HQ; Mar 1934: 12th Air Bn Sqdn Cdr; Nov 1935: 16th Air Gp Sqdn Cdr; Aug 1938: Staff officer, 2d Air Force; Dec 1940: Instructor, Army Hokota Flying Sch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>Mar ‘42-Dec ‘42</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Kawamorita Shoijiro 川守田庄治郎</td>
<td>36 WC, Pil</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dec 1925: 2d Lt of Aviation (Engineering), attached to 6th Air Rgt; Aug 1933: 6th Air Rgt Sqdn Cdr; Aug 1936: Staff member, 2d Air Div; Aug 1939, Army Air Academy Student Unit Sqdn Cdr; Dec 1941: Staff member, 7th Air Div</td>
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<tr>
<td>14th Air Gp</td>
<td>Commander Aug ‘38-Apr ’42</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Hironaka Magoroku 弘中孫六</td>
<td>28 Pil</td>
<td></td>
<td>May 1925: 1st Lt of Aviation (Infantry), July 1927: Attached to 7th Air Rgt; Aug 1934: 7th Air Rgt Bn Cdr; Aug 1936: Staff member, 3d Air Div</td>
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<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>Apr ‘42-Apr ’43</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Itoda Isamu 井戸田勇</td>
<td>35 WC, Pil</td>
<td></td>
<td>May 1925: 2d Lt of Aviation (Infantry), attached to Air Balloon Unit; Mar 1931: Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch; Dec 1934: Staff member, Army Aviation HQ; July 1937: Staff officer, Air Corps; Aug 1940: Instructor, War College; Nov 1941: Staff officer, 16th Army</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Short List of Key Air Service Personnel in the Southern Operation

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<th>Unit</th>
<th>Title (Period)</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Graduate class of the Army</th>
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<th>Brief [Career] History</th>
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<tr>
<td>24th Air Gp</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Takahashi Takeshi</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Pil</td>
<td>Oct 1926: 2d Lt of Aviation (Infantry), attached to 3d Air Rgt; Aug 1933: Attached to 5th Air Rgt; Mar 1934: Adjutant, 5th Air Rgt Bn</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sept ’40-Mar ’43</td>
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<td>Nov 1937: Lt Col of Gunnery; May 1938: Staff member, Army General Staff; Mar 1940: Instructor; Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch; Aug 1940: 10th Air Gp Cdr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Indep Air Unit</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Hoshi Komataro</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>WC, Rec</td>
<td>Dec 1931: 1st Lt of Aviation (Infantry), attached to 4th Air Rgt; Dec 1934: 10th Air Gp Sqdn Cdr; Dec 1938: Instructor, Army Hamamatsu Flying Sch; Aug 1939: Chief, Training Dept, 3d Air Rgt; Apr 1940: Army Kumagaya Flying Sch Training Bn Cdr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Air Transport Unit</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Kashima Masateru</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Pil, Rec</td>
<td>May 1925: 2d Lt of Aviation (Infantry), attached to 1st Air Rgt; June 1926: Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch; Aug 1931: 8th Air Rgt Sqdn Cdr; Dec 1936: Instructor, Army Kumagaya Flying Sch; Mar 1939: Attached to 2d Air Div HQ; Sept 1939: Staff officer, 3d Air Force; Aug 1940: Instructor, Army Air Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Field Replenishment Air Unit</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Tsubouchi Yoshinao</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>WC, Pil</td>
<td>Aug 1935: Maj of Aviation (Infantry), attached to 3d Air Rgt; Aug 1937: Adjutant, [Numbered] Air Force; Oct 1939: Head, 5th Aviation Training Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Air-Ground Support [HQ]</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Mizushima Jusuke</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Rec</td>
<td>Aug 1935: Maj of Aviation (Gunnery), attached to 7th Air Rgt; July 1937: 7th Air Rgt Cdr</td>
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<td>ditto</td>
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<td>Col</td>
<td>Madachi Bumei</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aug 1925: 1st Lt of Aviation (Infantry); July 1927: 3d Air Rgt Sqdn Cdr; Aug 1932: Staff member, Army Aviation HQ; Mar 1936: Attached to Kwantung Army Field Aircraft Depot; Oct 1940: Head, Tokyo Airfield (Aviation officer, [Civil] Aviation Bureau)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th Air-Ground Support [HQ]</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Fujioka Fumio</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Pil</td>
<td>May 1925: 1st Lt of Aviation (Infantry); July 1927: 3d Air Rgt Sqdn Cdr; Aug 1932: Staff member, Army Aviation HQ; Mar 1936: Attached to Kwantung Army Field Aircraft Depot; Oct 1940: Head, Tokyo Airfield (Aviation officer, [Civil] Aviation Bureau)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Title (Period)</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Graduate class of the Army</td>
<td>Specialty/Special skills</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Air-Ground Support [HQ]</td>
<td>Commander Oct ‘41-Mar ‘42</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Sugimura Takayoshi</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Pil</td>
<td>May 1925: 1st Lt of Aviation (Gunnery); Aug 1925: Attached to 7th Air Rgt; Aug 1933: 7th Air Rgt Sqdn Cdr; Dec 1936: Adjutant, 14th Air Gp; Aug 1939: Attached to Staff of Air Corps; Aug 1940: Head, Aviation Training Unit, Army Mito Flying Sch; July 1941: Staff member, 4th Air Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>ditto Mar ‘42-Dec ‘44</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Jōgo Kumakichi</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Com</td>
<td>Aug 1937: Maj of Aviation (Infantry), attached to 5th Air Rgt; June 1938: Staff member, Research Dept, Army Kumagaya Flying Sch; Aug 1939: Instructor, Army Mito Flying Sch; Mar 1940: 3d Air Intelligence Unit Cdr; Apr 1941: Attached to Army Baichengzi Flying Sch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Air Signal Rgt</td>
<td>Commander Aug ‘40-Aug ‘42</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Horiuchi Asahi</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>WC, Com</td>
<td>Aug 1937: Maj of Aviation (Infantry), Instructor, War College; Mar 1939: Instructor, Army Mito Flying Sch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Air Signal Unit</td>
<td>Commander July ‘41-Apr ‘42</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Tasaka Kunizō</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Com, Rec</td>
<td>Sept 1933: Capt of Aviation (Infantry), Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch; Aug 1934: Attached to 2d Air Rgt; Aug 1937: 10th Air Rgt Bn Cdr; Dec 1937: Head, 9th Flight Training Unit; Mar 1939: Instructor, Army Air Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>ditto Apr ‘42-Mar ‘43</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Horiuchi Chōjirō</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Com</td>
<td>Dec 1925: 2d Lt of Infantry, attached to 53d Inf Rgt; Feb 1938: Attached to Northern China Area Army HQ; Mar 1938: 4th Indep Mixed Bde Signal Unit Cdr; Aug 1940: 2d Signal Rgt Bn Cdr; July 1941: 2d Air Signal Bn Cdr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Direction Finder Unit</td>
<td>Commander Sept ‘41-Sept ‘44</td>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>Oishi Eishirō</td>
<td>15 (2d Lt candidate)</td>
<td>Com</td>
<td>Mar 1936: 2d Lt of Aviation; Aug 1938: Attached to 15th Air Signal Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Title (Period)</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Graduate class of the Army</td>
<td>Specialty / Special skills</td>
<td>Brief [Career] History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Air Route Rgt</td>
<td>Commander Nov ’41-Jan ‘43</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Noguchi Susumu 野口進</td>
<td>30 WC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aug 1937: Lt Col of Aviation (Infantry); Mar 1938: Instructor, Army Mito Flying Sch; Aug 1939: 1st Air Signal Rgt Cdr; Aug 1940: Chief, Com Section, Army Aviation HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Field Aircraft Depot</td>
<td>Commander Aug ‘41-Nov ‘42</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Aiba Kakuhei 相場角平</td>
<td>27 Rec, Bom</td>
<td></td>
<td>May 1925: Capt of Aviation (Infantry); Aug 1928: Staff member, Army Aviation HQ; Aug 1933: Adjutant, Army Tokorozawa Flying Sch; Aug 1935: Adjutant, Army Aero-technical Sch; Mar 1940: 5th Field Aircraft Depot Cdr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th Field Aircraft Depot</td>
<td>Commander Mar ‘41-Feb ‘45</td>
<td>Maj Gen</td>
<td>Yasuda Rikio 安田利雄</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td>May 1925: Capt of Aviation (Infantry); July 1927: Attached to 5th Air Rgt; July 1933: 7th Air Rgt Material Depot Cdr; Mar 1935: Instructor, Army Hamamatsu Flying Sch and Head, Material Depo of the school</td>
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<tr>
<td>13th Special Air Transport Unit</td>
<td>Commander Oct ‘41-Sept ‘42</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Mori Shigeki 森繁樹</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td>May 1925: Capt of Aviation (Gunnery); Oct 1940: Staff member, Military Affairs Bureau, attached to Army Aviation HQ; Dec 1928: Aviation officer; June 1937: First reserve officer; Nov 1938: Head of department, Dai Nippon Kōkū Kabushiki Kaisha [Japan Airlines, Ltd]</td>
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<tr>
<td>19th Field Aircraft Repair Depot</td>
<td>Commander Oct ‘41-Mar ‘42</td>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Sakaguchi Masashi 坂口正</td>
<td>35 Pil</td>
<td></td>
<td>May 1925: 2d Lt of Aviation (Cavalry), attached to 3d Air Rgt; Mar 1931: Superintendent, Research Dept, Army AkenoFlying Sch; July 1933: 1st Air Rgt Servicing Unit Cdr; Aug 1935: Instructor, Army Aero-technical Sch; Dec 1939: Attached to staff, 5th Air Force [sic]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>ditto Mar ‘42-Aug ‘43</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Abe Shūichi 阿部修一</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td>May 1925: Capt of Aviation (Infantry); Aug 1935: Instructor, Army Akeno Flying Sch; Aug 1936: Adjutant, Air Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pingdong Aircraft Branch Depot</td>
<td>Commander Aug ‘41-Feb ‘42</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Hayashi Yutaka 林豊</td>
<td>24 Rec</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aug 1935: Lt Col of Aviation (Engineering), attached to 3d Air Rgt; Aug 1936: Staff member, Material Depot, 3d Air Rgt; June 1938: Staff member, Pingdong Aircraft Branch Depot</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Short List of Key Air Service Personnel in the Southern Operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Title (Period)</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Graduate class of the Army</th>
<th>Specialty/Special skills</th>
<th>Brief [Career] History</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>ditto Feb '42-Oct '43</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Fukutake Yoshio 福武義雄</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td>May 1925: 1st Lt of Aviation (Gunnery); Aug 1926: Attached to 5th Air Rgt; Jan 1929: Staff member, Army Aviation HQ; Aug 1935: 6th Air Rgt Material Depot Cdr; Apr 1938: Inspector, Army Aviation HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Field Aircraft Supply Depot</td>
<td>Commander Nov ‘41-Feb ‘44</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Miki Kametarō 三木健太郎</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Pil</td>
<td>May 1925: 1st Lt of Aviation (Infantry); Aug 1928: Instructor, Army Shimoshizu Flying Sch; Aug 1932: Staff member, Aircraft Main Depot; June 1938: Attached to 12th Field Aircraft Depot, Kwantung Army; Dec 1940: Staff member, Tachikawa Aircraft Branch Depot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Shipboard Aircraft Depot</td>
<td>Commander July ‘41-Nov ‘42</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Takamori Shinkichi 高森信吉</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Pil</td>
<td>May 1925: 2d Lt of Aviation (Transport), attached to 6th Air Rgt; Dec 1932: Attached to 12th Air Rgt; Dec 1935: Instructor and Student Unit Sqn Cdr, Army Aero-technical Sch; July 1937: Attached to Air Corps HQ; Dec 1940: Attached to Army Tachikawa Aero-technical Sch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th Shipboard Aircraft Depot</td>
<td>Commander Oct ‘41-July ‘45</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Noguchi Shichirō 野口七郎</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aug 1935: Capt of Aviation (Gunnery), 8th Air Rgt Material Depot Servicing Unit Cdr; May 1939: 8th Air Gp Airfield Bn Cdr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Field Meteorological Bn</td>
<td>Commander July ‘41-Aug ‘43</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Mutō Takeharu 武藤武治</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Oct 1924: 2d Lt of Gunnery, attached to 1st Field Artillery Rgt; Apr 1932: Instructor, Army Engineering Sch; Aug 1936: 3d Artillery Rgt Btry Cdr; July 1937: Attached to Field Meteorological Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Field Meteorological Bn</td>
<td>Commander July ‘41-Feb ‘42</td>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Hamasaki Sunao 滝崎淳</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Aug 1937: Capt of Aviation (Infantry); Mar 1939: Instructor, Army Air Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Field Meteorological Unit</td>
<td>Commander July ‘41-Sept ‘42</td>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Mitani Taro 三谷太郎</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Met</td>
<td>Oct 1927: 2d Lt of Engineering, attached to 1st Engineering Bn; Dec 1927: Attached to 1st Telegraph Rgt; Mar 1937: 1st Telegraph Rgt Co Cdr; July 1937: Signal Unit Cdr, 4th Field Meteorological Unit; Apr 1938: Instructor and staff member, Meteorological Dept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Dept of the air arm of the Southern Army</td>
<td>Commander Nov ‘41-Oct ‘42</td>
<td>Maj Gen</td>
<td>Hattori Takeshi 服部武士</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>WC</td>
<td>May 1925: Capt of Aviation (Infantry); Mar 1928: Instructor, Army Akeno Flying Sch and Superintendent, Research Dept of the school; Oct 1931: Staff member, Army Aviation HQ; Apr 1934: Staff officer, Taiwan Army; Mar 1938: Staff member, 3d Air Div; Aug 1938: 98th Air Gp Cdr; Sept 1939: Chief of Staff, 3d Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Title (Period)</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Graduate class of the Army</td>
<td>Specialty/Special skills</td>
<td>Brief [Career] History</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st [Paratroop]</td>
<td>Commander Dec '41-June '43</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Kume Seiichi 久米精一</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>WC</td>
<td>Dec 1919: 2d Lt of Gunnery; Dec 1932: Attached to 11th Mountain Art Rgt; Aug 1934: Staff member, Military Affairs Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raiding Gp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st [Paratroop]</td>
<td>Commander Dec '41-May '44</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Takeda Takeo 武田丈夫</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Inf, Com</td>
<td>Oct 1923: 2d Lt of Infantry; Mar 1927: Attached to 2d Indep Defense Inf Bn; Dec 1932: Attached to Kwantung Army HQ; June 1933: Staff officer, 56th Indep Mix Bde; Aug 1936: 36th Inf Rgt Co Cdr; Sept 1937: Adjutant, 18th Inf Bde; Mar 1939: 36th Inf Rgt Bn Cdr; Sept 1941: Attached to Inspectorate General of Army Aviation; Nov 1941: 1st [Paratroop] Training Raiding Rgt Cdr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raiding Rgt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d [Paratroop]</td>
<td>Commander Jan '42-June '44</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Kōmura Takeo 甲村武雄</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Inf, Com</td>
<td>Oct 1926: 2d Lt of Infantry; Mar 1930: Attached to 3d Imperial Guard Inf Rgt; Mar 1935: 6th Inf Rgt Co Cdr; Dec 1940: Attached to Staff of Northern China Area Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raiding Rgt</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGHQ</td>
<td>Staff officer Dec '40-Oct '42</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Kumon Aribumi 久門有文</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>WC</td>
<td>Oct 1924: 2d Lt of Infantry; Mar 1934: Staff member, Military Affairs Bureau; Nov 1937: Attached to IGHQ Army Dept; Mar 1938: Staff member, Personnel Bureau and also attached to Army Ordnance Main Depot; Sept 1938: Attached to Staff of 21st Army; Feb 1939: Staff member, Army Aviation HQ and Inspectorate General of Army Aviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>ditto July '41-Aug '42</td>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Takagi Sakuyuki 高木作之</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>WC, Rec</td>
<td>Nov 1939: Attached to 27th Air Gp (Capt of Cavalry); July 1941: Staff member, Army General Staff; Aug 1942: Staff officer, 5th Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ditto</td>
<td>ditto Mar '41-Sept '42</td>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Tanaka Kōji 田中耕二</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>WC, Pil</td>
<td>Oct 1933: 2d Lt of Aviation; Apr 1935: Attached to 7th Air Rgt; Nov 1939: Staff officer, Air Corps; Mar 1941: Staff member, Military Affairs Bureau; Sept 1942: Staff officer, 17th Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourteenth Army</td>
<td>Staff officer Nov '41-July '42</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Akiyama Monjirō 秋山篤次郎</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>WC, Pil</td>
<td>Oct 1925: 2d Lt of Aviation (Infantry), attached to 5th Air Rgt; Nov 1936: 3d Air Rgt Sqdn Cdr; Oct 1937: Staff officer, 2d Air Force; Oct 1938: Staff member, Army Aviation HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifteenth Army</td>
<td>ditto Nov '41-July '42</td>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Arinuma Gen’ichirō 有沼源一郎</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>WC, Pil</td>
<td>Nov 1939: Attached to Army Ordnance HQ (Main Depot), (Infantry); Dec 1940: Staff member, Economic Mobilization Bureau; Apr 1941: Attached to Army Air Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenty-fifth Army</td>
<td>ditto June '41-Feb '42</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Nishioka Shigeru 西岡繁</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>WC</td>
<td>Oct 1926: 2d Lt of Aviation (Infantry), attached to 6th Air Rgt; Dec 1933: Attached to 3d Air Rgt; Aug 1935: 3d Air Rgt Sqdn Cdr; Dec 1935: Attached to 3d Air Rgt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Short List of Key Air Service Personnel in the Southern Operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Title (Period)</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Graduate class of the Army</th>
<th>Specialty/Special skills</th>
<th>Brief [Career] History</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sixteenth Army</td>
<td>ditto Sept '41-June '42</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Oda Akimitsu</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>WC</td>
<td>Aug 1937: Capt of Aviation (Gunnery), Instructor, Army Hamamatsu Flying Sch; June 1940: Instructor, War College; June 1941: Attached to Northern District Army HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Field Anti-aircraft Artillery Rgt</td>
<td>Commander Nov '41-June '44</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Nakada Zengo</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dec 1920: 2d Lt of Gunnery; Aug 1930: 25th Field Art Rgt Btry Cdr; Mar 1935: Attached to 9th Field Heavy Art Rgt; Dec 1937: 6th Anti-aircraft Art Rgt Bn Cdr; July 1941: 1st Field Searchlight Bn Cdr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th Field Anti-aircraft Artillery Bn</td>
<td>Commander July '41-Feb '43</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Okamura Takamasa</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Gun</td>
<td>Oct 1922: 2d Lt of Gunnery; Dec 1937: 3d Indep Mountain Art Rgt Btry Cdr; Mar 1937: Attached to Kwantung Army HQ; Aug 1936: 4th Mountain Art Rgt Bn Cdr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Special Air Transport Unit</td>
<td>Commander Nov '41-Sept '42</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Naritomi Hirome</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td>May 1925: 1st Lt of Aviation (Infantry); Dec 1925: Attached to 2d Air Rgt; 1933: Army Aviation HQ Replenishment Div Tachikawa Branch; Aug 1935: Staff member, Tachikawa Army Aircraft Branch Depot; 1941: China Air Transport</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remarks:
- This list was made based on the regimental rolls (prepared in September 1928, September 1933, September 1935, and September 1942), transfer notifications and military record cards (prepared by the 1st Demobilization Bureau after the war), also using the recollections of some of the persons concerned.
- The personnel in the air services selected for this list were commanders and staff officers of air groups or the units equivalent to them or higher levels, while those in the ground services were anti-aircraft artillery regiment/battalion commanders, air-ground support headquarters commanders and other particularly relevant commanders. They were sorted in the order of unit.
- Most of the graduate classes indicated in this list were those of the Army Academy. Many of graduates of the 30th class of the Army Academy (most of whom were born in 1896 or 1897) were between 40 and 45 years of age [at the time of this operation].
- The specialty and special skills, which were very much relevant to the air service, were mentioned in the list, while those unconfirmed were omitted.
- The ranks indicated in the list were the final rank of the person during the period [of the operation].
- The items of the brief [career] histories were selected mainly with the aim of clarifying the experiences in the field of air service. [Editor’s note: Some probable mistakes have been indicated by a question mark. In some cases the unit mentioned did not yet exist in the year indicated. These cases have been marked by sic.]

Specialty and special skills:
- Pil: Pilot
- Rec: Reconnaissance
- Bom: Bombing
- Com: Signal communication
- Met: Meteorology
- WC: [graduated from] War College
- Ser: Servicing
- Inf: Infantry
- Gun: Gunnery
### Specifications of the Japanese Army and Navy Aircraft [Employed in] the Southern Invasion Operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of aircraft</th>
<th>Fighters and Bombers (Army)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type-97 fighter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Engine (Name) Horsepower</strong></td>
<td>Type-97 (Ha-1A) 680/4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wingspan (m)</td>
<td>11.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length (m)</td>
<td>7.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Weight (kg)</td>
<td>1,547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum speed km/h alt. (m)</td>
<td>470 3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceiling (m)</td>
<td>12,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Range (km) Climbing Time min, sec / (m)</td>
<td>1,200 5’22”/5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>7.7mm x 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombs (kg)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>Nakajima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Source</td>
<td>CD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**

CD: The documents at the time of the Army’s decision of official adoption as an armament at the Munitions Council, included in the ‘Classified files of [incoming and outgoing] documents [dealt by the Secretariat of the Ministry of War].’

AT: The materials for the meetings at the Army Aero-technical Research Institute, or the regulations for the flying training, the standard for servicing or operating manuals prepared by the Inspectorate General of Aviation (or Army Aviation Headquarters).

AO: Files of Army Orders
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of aircraft</th>
<th>Engine (Name)</th>
<th>Horsepower</th>
<th>Wingspan (m)</th>
<th>Length (m)</th>
<th>Gross Weight (kg)</th>
<th>Maximum speed km/h</th>
<th>Ceiling (m)</th>
<th>Combat Range (km)</th>
<th>Climbing Time min, sec/(m)</th>
<th>Armament</th>
<th>Bombs (kg)</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Main Source</th>
<th>Source: The same as above.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Reconnaissance Aircraft, Tactical Reconnaissance Aircraft, Direct Support Aircraft and Transport Aircraft (Army)</td>
<td>Type-97 Strategic Recon.</td>
<td>Type-100 (Model I) Strategic Recon.</td>
<td>Type-100 (Model II) Strategic Recon.</td>
<td>Type-99 Direct Support</td>
<td>Type-97 Transport (AT)</td>
<td>Type-100 Transport (MC-20)</td>
<td>Type-1 [Freight] Transport (Type-Ro)*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Type-94 (Ha-8)</td>
<td>Type-99 (Ha-26-1) 900 [Model]</td>
<td>(Ha-102) 1,060 x 2</td>
<td>(Ha-26II) 880</td>
<td>Type-98 (Ha-13A Model-I) 450</td>
<td>Type-97 (Ha-1B) 500 x 2</td>
<td>(Ha-102) 1,060 x 2</td>
<td>Type-99 (Ha-25) 950 x 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>730/4,300</td>
<td>14.70</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>5,050</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>11,340</td>
<td>2,131</td>
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<tr>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>14.70</td>
<td>14.70</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>5,050</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>10,830</td>
<td>4,820</td>
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<tr>
<td>900</td>
<td>12.10</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>5,800</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>8,150</td>
<td>8,49</td>
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Sources: The same as above.
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Addendum: War History Series Volume 5, Chapter 4
Editor’s Note

The Invasion of the Dutch East Indies, volume 3 of the War History Series (Senshi Sōsho), ends with the surrender of the Dutch colonial army on 8 March 1942. At that time, the Imperial Army had not yet occupied northern and central Sumatra. The Dutch troops on site did not obey the general surrender order conform to previous instructions not to obey such an order. Eventually, their resistance was futile and they surrendered on 27 March 1942.

The invasion of northern and central Sumatra was executed by the Imperial Guard Division under the command of the Japanese Twenty-fifth Army in Singapore, which was also responsible for the Burma operation. For that reason, the northern and central Sumatra operation is dealt with in volume 5 of the Senshi Sōsho, The Invasion of Burma, compiled by Fuwa Hiroshi.

Students of Indonesian history will be surprised that no mention whatsoever is made of the activities of the so-called F. Kikan, the clandestine Japanese organization set up by Major Fujiwara Iwaichi to incite the indigenous people of Southeast Asia to rise up against their colonial masters. Although mainly aimed at inciting British Indian Army soldiers to defect by setting up the so-called Indian National Army in Malaya, the operation found an enthusiastic response in Aceh where it linked up with the PUSA (Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh/All Aceh Union of Islamic Scholars).

Thanks to the lasting, postwar influence of PUSA in Acehnese politics, and the fact that Fujiwara’s description of his exploits was translated into English,* the activities of the F. Kikan do receive ample attention in books and articles on the history of Aceh. The Japanese military, however, took a less sanguine view of the value of the F. Kikan. Its activities are merely mentioned in passing in volume 1 of the Senshi Sōsho, The Invasion of Malaya, while the present chapter does not mention them at all. After the war, a polemic flared up between Fujiwara and his successors and former superiors about the actual value of the F. Kikan, but this is beyond the scope of the present translation.

Chapter 4*  

The Invasion Operations Against Both Central and Northern Sumatra and the Andaman Islands, as well as the Transport Operation to Burma

1. Circumstances and Preparations Until the Implementation of the Invasion Operations

Circumstances of the Implementation of the Invasion Operations

The task IGHQ had given to the Southern Army before the opening of hostilities was “to capture key areas of the Philippines, British Malaya, and Dutch East Indies as well as a part of Burma,” in which the capture of the Andaman Islands was not included.

In IGHQ’s initial plan, unlike [the plan of the operations] against southern Sumatra, the plans for the operations against central and northern Sumatra were only very summarily stated as “to timely occupy key areas in northern Sumatra after the capture of Singapore.”

On the other hand, the Twenty-fifth Army, which was supposed to execute the Sumatra operation, knew from the time of the opening of hostilities that the central and northern Sumatra operations were among its responsibilities; accordingly, it had informally told the 18th Division that the latter was to carry it out following the capture of Singapore. (66)

From the beginning, the Twenty-fifth Army had set the capture of Singapore as its primary goal and directed almost all efforts to its capture, making light of an operation such as the Sumatra operation.

On 27 January, when staff officer Arao of the Southern Army flew to Gemas to liaise with the headquarters of the Twenty-fifth Army, the latter described its ideas about the Sumatra operation as follows: (53)

The capture of northern Sumatra shall be carried out with one infantry regiment and one artillery battalion of the 18th Division two weeks after the conclusion of the Singapore operation, using seventy large and twenty small motorized [landing] craft and one or two armored vessels.

For this [operation], the 11th Independent Engineer Regiment shall be concentrated by 15 February at Lumut and Port Swettenham [Port Klang] (note by the author: both on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula).

Staff officer Asaeda Shigeharu of the Twenty-fifth Army, who had at the time taken a major part in drawing up the informal plan for the Sumatra operation, too, related that the initial

* War History Series Volume 5, *The Invasion of Burma*, Chapter 4.
plan was to conduct a simple surprise landing on northern Sumatra by crossing the Malacca Strait in landing craft. However, a later study showed that the plan was too risky, which led to a reexamination of the plan, and eventually it was decided to conduct a landing operation, which was larger in scale compared to that in the initial plan.

Although the Southern Army had on 23 December ordered the Twenty-fifth Army to capture Singapore, it was not until 19 February after the fall of Singapore that an order to capture the key areas of central and northern Sumatra and the Andaman Islands was issued.

As for the Andaman Islands, the necessity to capture these islands was for the first time specifically taken up in relation to the Burma operation.

The intention to capture the Andaman Islands was made clear for the first time by Colonel Hattori, chief of the Operations Section of IGHQ, in late December, when he visited the Southern Army and exchanged views on the future plans for the Burma operation with the persons in charge at the Southern Army.

The Burma operation was linked to the Andaman Islands in the following way:

After having studied what to do with Burma, [the Army] came to accept the necessity of launching a full-scale operation in the near future and capture strategic places in the whole of Burma, for which the Fifteenth Army had to be reinforced, but above all, the problem was how to secure the rear supply routes to Burma.

Since not much could be expected of the overland routes through the border areas between Thailand and Burma, [the army] had after all no choice but to rely on seaborne supply routes through the Andaman Sea from Singapore and Penang. In such a case, the Andaman Islands would become of tremendous value.

In addition, the enemy air bases in southern Burma, such as Toungoo, Magwe and Akyab, were very active, and it was likely that [enemy] aircraft would operate not only over the waters to the south of Burma but also farther in the Andaman Islands area. Moreover, although its exact strength was unclear, it was judged that a British fleet consisting of two battleships, one aircraft carrier, two or three class-A cruisers, five or six class-B cruisers, and four or five destroyers was operating in the Indian Ocean centered on Colombo and Bombay.

Since enemy submarines were of course expected to operate in the Malacca Strait and vicinity, it was necessary to swiftly seize the Andaman Islands and prepare air bases there, so as to secure the sea transport along the west coast of Malaya.

When Colonel Hattori suggested the operation to capture the Andaman Islands, the Southern Army expressed its view that it would require the support of the Combined Fleet.\(^{63}\)

After that, the problem of capturing the Andaman Islands was left undiscussed. However, on 7 February, IGHQ issued the following orders:

**IGHQ Army Department Order No. 598** (30) (7 February 1942)

1. The Commander in Chief of the Southern Army shall in conjunction with the Navy timely capture key places in the Andaman Islands.
2. Particulars shall be given by the Chief of the Army General Staff.

**IGHQ Army Department Instruction No. 110** (7 February 1942)

1. The outline of the operation against the Andaman and Nicobar Islands shall be discussed and decided between the commanders in chief of the Southern Army and the Combined Fleet.
In conformity with the above orders, on 19 February, well after the fall of Singapore, the Southern Army issued orders to the Twenty-fifth Army to proceed to capture central and northern Sumatra as well as the Andaman Islands.

**Southern Army Order**

1. IGHQ intends to conduct a new operation against the Andaman Islands.
2. In conjunction with the Navy, I shall swiftly seize the key areas of central and northern Sumatra as well as of the Andaman Islands.
3. The Twenty-fifth Army commander shall, in conjunction with the commander in chief of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet, secure the key areas of former British Malaya, and capture the key areas of central and northern Sumatra as well as of the Andaman Islands in the following way:
   (a) By swiftly restoring public order and installing a military administration all over the former British Malaya, he shall facilitate the acquisition of resources important to national defense and secure the means by which the army shall be able to support itself. In particular, he shall swiftly capture the islets near Singapore and set up sea transport bases there. Part of the sea transport bases shall be set up on Penang.
   (b) When conducting the central and northern Sumatra operations, he shall defeat the enemy and first of all seize and secure the key resource areas in Aceh (note by the author: northern Sumatra), and at the same time swiftly seize Sabang. Then he shall clear and destroy the enemy in the Padang area.
   (c) In mid-March, he shall capture the key areas in the Andaman Islands, particularly Port Blair and vicinity.
   (d) During the operations mentioned in the above two items, he shall [also] take charge of seizing and preparing the necessary airfield[s] for the Army, and at the same time swiftly prepare airfields on Sabang and Kutaraja [in Aceh], and the Andaman Islands, so as to facilitate subsequent navy air operations.
   (e) He shall have the main force of the 18th Division and also the 5th Division ready for transfer to other areas respectively in early March and in mid-March.
4. The Third Air Force commander shall, while continuing his current tasks for Operations L and H (note by the author: Operation L is the southern Sumatra operation, Operation H the Java operation), support the (a) and (b) operations in the previous article, which are to be conducted by the Twenty-fifth Army commander. One element of its air base forces shall be advanced to northern Sumatra as required.
5. The Fifth Air Force commander shall, while continuing his current tasks for the Burma operation, support operation (c) in Article 3,* which is to be conducted by the Twenty-fifth Army commander.
6. The captain general of the Shipping Transport Command and the Southern Army Railway Unit commander shall support the operations in the previous three articles and at the same time prepare transportation for Operation U (note by the author: the sea transport operation carrying reinforcements for the Burma [operation]), which will use Singapore and Penang as ports of departure.
7. The Army-Navy agreement concerning Operation U and the Andaman operation is as shown in General Agreement No. 7.
8. I am [commanding from] Saigon.

   Southern Army Commander in Chief Count Terauchi Hisaichi

* The text and the original document mistakenly say 2.
General Agreement No. 7 (note: the agreement between the Southern Army and the commander of Navy unit concerned) in the above orders has not been found among the documents so far, but General Agreement No. 8 (note: the agreement between the Southern Army and the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet) was concluded two days later on 21 February and reflects its contents as will be described later.

Moreover, based on General Agreement No. 8, the Twenty-fifth Army, the Third Air Force and the First Expeditionary Fleet exchanged on 28 February memoranda of further detailed arrangements.

The fact that the preparations for the sea transport for the Burma [operation] were simultaneously ordered along with capture of Sumatra and the Andaman Islands in the above Southern Army orders indicates that both the transport of forces for the Burma [operation] and the capture operations of these areas were inextricably linked together.

**Forces to Be Employed in the Operation and the Preparations for the Operation**

The Southern Army initially thought of the 56th Division as the army force to be employed in the Sumatra operation, as is shown in the following telegram:

**Southern Army Staff Section 1, Telegram No. 247**

(22 December 1941)

To 1st Bureau Chief Tanaka from Colonel Hattori

Arrived in Saigon yesterday, on the 21st. Although details will be reported by staff officers Kushida, Kumon, and Shudo, who will leave here for Tokyo today, I will report for now the most important points.

1. Operational directives in the Malaya area (first part omitted by the author)
   Concerning the employment of the 56th Division, the Southern Army currently considers to have the division land near Singora at the designated time (note by the author: in early February) to be timely employed in the northern Sumatra operation.
2. (The rest omitted by the author.)

However, soon thereafter, Colonel Hattori again sent the following telegram to the vice chief of the Army General Staff concerning the change in employment of the 56th Division.

As mentioned previously, this change in employment seems to have been made because of the reply from the Twenty-fifth Army to Colonel Hattori’s soundings about offering forces for the Burma operation that it had no objections if it was to give up the 56th Division.

**Southern Army Staff Section 1, Telegram No. 314**

(30 December 1941)

To Vice Chief of Army General Staff from Colonel Hattori

Returned from Cam Ranh Bay.

The Southern Army has drawn up the following plans concerning the conduct of subsequent operations.

1. Cancellation of Operation Q and implementation of Operation S [instead] (omitted by the author)
2. Operation H (omitted by the author)
3. The main force and one element of the 21st Division shall embark (note by the author: in northern China) respectively around 13 and around 25 January and reach northern French Indochina.
The 56th Division shall embark (note by the author: at Moji) around 3 February, reach southern French Indochina or Thailand, and become the reserve of the Southern Army.

After these changes, the Southern Army decided to set aside the 56th Division as reserve for the Burma operation, and assigned the 18th Division once again for the Sumatra operation. Until around late January, the Twenty-fifth Army, too, had harbored the plan to employ mainly the 18th Division for the Sumatra operation. However, around late January, it was decided that the main force of the division should be employed for the [operations] in Burma after the fall of Singapore.

Therefore, on 18 February, the Twenty-fifth Army outlined a new plan of operations that the Sumatra operation should be executed with the main force of the Imperial Guard Division along with one element of the 18th Division (the 114th Infantry Regiment or the Kohisa Regiment as the core).(28)

However, further changes were made to the plans; taking away a large amount of strength from the 18th Division that was to be transferred to Burma demanded careful consideration, so in the end the decision was made to carry out the Sumatra operation with only the Imperial Guard Division, and the forces to be taken from the 18th Division were reduced to one infantry battalion, which was supposed to be employed for the Andaman operation.

The Twenty-fifth Army reported the above circumstances to the Southern Army in the following way:

To Chief of Staff Tsukada, from the Chief of Staff of the Twenty-fifth Army

TOMI-SHUDAN Staff Telegram No. 369(28) (23 February)

The Sumatra operation is planned to be conducted in the following way:
The details shall be reported after having been arranged between the Army and the Navy.
1. The full strength of the Imperial Guard Division shall be employed, about four battalions of which shall be put ashore in the north [of northern Sumatra] and the main force in the south [of northern Sumatra].
2. The Kohisa Detachment shall be returned to the 18th Division, and one infantry battalion as the core of the 18th Division shall, after capturing the Andaman Islands, be returned to the division.
3. The above [changes] have been made because, in view of the current decrease in fighting power of the 18th Division, components of the division should be replenished to cope with the plans of the division, and thereby give the division commander an opportunity to render distinguished services.
4. The 5th Division shall with its full force enforce order in the Malay Peninsula.

On 21 February, the Army-Navy agreement between the Southern Army and the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet concerning the Sumatra and the Andaman operations as well as the transport operation of the reinforcements for Burma (General Agreement No. 8) was concluded in Saigon attended by [Navy] Capt. Terasaki Takaji, staff of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet from the Navy and staff officer Kunitake Teruhito of the Twenty-fifth Army.(53)

Then on 28 February, detailed arrangements for the Sumatra and the Andaman operations were concluded between the Twenty-fifth Army, the Third Air Force and the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet.
Preparations for the Andaman Operation

The Andaman operation was assigned to the detached force of the 12th Special Base Force and one element of the 9th Special Base Force led by [Navy] Capt. Kawasaki Harumi for the Navy, and the 2d Battalion (battalion commander: [Army] Capt. Hayashi Reizō) of the 56th Infantry Regiment of the 18th Division for the Army. Their escort was assigned to the 1st Escort Unit ([consisting of] 3d Destroyer Squadron as the core, with the 1st Minesweeper Division added), led by R. Adm. Hashimoto Shintarō.

The Navy invasion unit was a combined unit, and its commander (Captain Kawasaki), who was specifically appointed for this operation, arrived at the site right before [the start of] the operation.

Although small in scale, this operation was an Army-Navy joint operation, and it was arranged that Captain Kawasaki of the Navy should for the sake of convenience also take command of the army units in the landing operation.

It was on 23 February that Capt. Hayashi Reizō was appointed commander of the detachment for this operation. Then on 1 March, meetings were held between the Army and the Navy to arrange details on the [cruiser] Sendai in the naval port of Seletar, attended by many who would be involved in the Sumatra and the Andaman operations, including Imperial Guard Division Commander Lt. Gen. Nishimura Takuma, Navy Captain Kawasaki, and Army Capt. Hayashi Reizō.

Then on 17 March, the Hayashi Battalion embarked on the Hirokawa-maru at Singapore, left the port at 1900 on that day, sailed the Malacca Strait northward, and reached the port of Penang on 19 March, where joined by the Kinugasa-maru with the naval units on board, it waited for the departure on the next day, the 20th.*(76)

Preparations for the Sumatra Operation

In view of its [poor] war results in the Singapore operation, Imperial Guard Division Commander Lieutenant General Nishimura hoped to fully display his division’s true worth in the coming Sumatra operation.

On 17 February, he gathered the commanders under his command, announced his views, and requested them to rouse their units.(54)

Subsequently, all units stationed themselves at various places in Singapore and earnestly conducted exercises (particularly landing combats). Around that time, the main force of the 3d Infantry Regiment (commander: Col. Oinuma Yoshio) of the Imperial Guard [Division], which was trying to hurriedly catch up with the main force of the division by railway from Indochina having been slowed down due to delays in the operation of the railway on the way, finally reached Johor Bahru on 18 February, and joined the main force of the division in preparing for the Sumatra operation.(77)

The last combined exercise of the division [before the operation] was conducted at the assembly point of the convoys to the west of Blakang Mati Island (south of the port of Singapore) by each convoy.

* Vol. 26, p. 585 mistakenly says 10 March.
The Army-Navy Agreement (See Illustration No. 24)

General Agreement No. 8 (Memoranda of the Agreement Between the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the Southern Army)(28) (21 February, 1942)

1. The standard date [to calculate] the implementation date of the operation*
   (1) The operation schedule shall be calculated from the day when the clearing of mines in the Malacca Strait is roughly completed (Day W), which is expected to be by and large at the end of February or the beginning of March.
   (2) The standard date [to start] landing in each operation (and the code for each operation) shall be set as in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Standard date of landing</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sumatra Operation</td>
<td>Operation T</td>
<td>About early March</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andaman Operation</td>
<td>Operation D</td>
<td>Around Day W + 20</td>
<td>The availability of naval air units after their advance to Bangkok is a requirement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma Operation</td>
<td>Operation U</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td></td>
<td>The assembly points for Operation U shall be the ports of Singapore and Penang, and the landing point shall be Rangoon.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The distribution in the transport of Operation U (Omitted by the author)
3. The [schedule of] the detailed arrangements between the army and navy units involved
   (1) Place: The port of Singapore
   (2) Date: Around 28 February
   (3) The Army and Navy [units] involved
       First Southern Expeditionary Fleet
       Eleventh Air Fleet
       (25) Twenty-fifth Army
       (25) Third Air Force
       (25) Fifth Air Force

4. Guard [Units]
   (1) Sabang Island: The Army and the Navy in conjunction
   (2) The Andaman Islands: The Army and the Navy in conjunction
   (3) Rangoon: The Navy shall mainly deploy the forces to be assigned to guard the surface waters and the rivers.
       Details shall be discussed and decided between the commander in chief of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the commander of the Fifteenth Army.

The Arrangements for the Joint [Operation] Between the Forces on Site
(for the central and the northern Sumatra operations)

Memoranda of the Arrangements for the Joint [Operation] Concluded Between the Twenty-fifth Army Commander, the Third Air Force Commander and the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet Commander in Chief(28) (28 February 1942)

1. The objectives of the operation
   The objectives are to capture the key areas of northern Sumatra to quickly seize [enemy] naval bases as well as airfields, and at the same time secure the key resource places.
2. The operation schedule
   (1) Day W shall be set on 3 March** and the schedule shall be calculated from this date.

* See also Vol. 26, p. 568.
** Volume 26, p. 576 as well as the original document say 2 March.
Changes of the landing dates shall be discussed and decided between the Twenty-fifth Army commander and the commander in chief of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet and notified to the Third Air Force commander.

3. Landing points and reconnaissance
   (1) Landing points

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Landing points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kobayashi Det</td>
<td>1 inf bn as the core</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 inf bns and 1 field artillery bn as the core</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoshida Det</td>
<td>1 inf bn as the core</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main force of the div</td>
<td>Main force of the div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 inf bns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 tank sqdn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 field art batteries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 mortar batteries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 engineer cos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>one element of the air unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The remaining units of the Imp Guard Div</td>
<td>The remaining units of the Imp Guard Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 tank sqdns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 field artillery bn as the core</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One element each of the line of communications unit, the air unit and the railway unit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Reconnaissance
No reconnaissance of the landing points of the army units from the sea shall be conducted. Air reconnaissance shall appropriately be conducted if required.

4. Disposition of forces
First [landing group]

**Kobayashi Det**
Commander: Imperial Guard [Div] Inf Gp Cdr Maj Gen Kobayashi Takashi
Imperial Guard [Div] Inf Gp HQ
Imperial Guard [Div] 3d Inf Rgt
Imperial Guard [Div] 1st Field Artillery Bn and the 7th Field Artillery Battery
One company of the Imperial Guard [Div] Engineer Rgt
One element of the [Twenty-fifth] Army Signal Unit (Mark-2 and Mark-3 [radio] sets, one each)
One third of the Medical Unit
One half of the 1st Field Hospital
One quarter of the 12th Water Supply and Purification Dept
One element of the 6th Div 21st River-crossing Material Co

Tasks:
The detachment shall seize Sabang with one element and the airfield of Kutaraja with its main force. Then it shall have its main force charge toward Idi while driving back the enemy in each location.
Chapter IV / The Invasion Operations Against Both Central and Northern Sumatra and the Andaman Islands

Yoshida Det
Commander: Imperial Guard [Div] 4th Inf Rgt 3d Bn Cdr Lt Col Yoshida Masaru
Imperial Guard [Div] 4th Inf Rgt 3d Bn
One half each of the Inf Artillery and Antitank Artillery Units
One element of the Rgt Signal Unit
26th Independent Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battery
One battery of the 5th Mortar Bn
One company of the 15th Independent Engineer Rgt
One element of the [Twenty-fifth] Army Signal Unit (Mark-2 and Mark-3 [radio] sets, one each)
Two combat relief squads
One quarter of the 12th Water Supply and Purification Dept
One element of the 6th Div 21st River-crossing Material Co
One element of the Oil-drilling Squad

Tasks:
[The detachment] shall swiftly secure the oil field areas of Langsa and Pangkalan Brandan. Then it shall advance toward Medan.

Kunishi Det
Commander: Imperial Guard [Div] 4th Inf Rgt Cdr Col Kunishi Kentarō
Imperial Guard [Div] 4th Inf Rgt (minus the 1st, the 3d, and the 5th Cos and the 3d Bn, and minus one half each of rgt artillery and antitank artillery units)
7th Independent Antitank Artillery Battery
6th Tank Rgt 1st Sqdn
5th Mortar Bn (minus one battery)
[15th Independent Engineer Rgt (minus one co)]*
One squad of Div Radio Unit
One element of the [Twenty-fifth] Army Signal Unit (one Mark-2 [radio] set)
One third of the Medical Unit
One quarter of the 12th Water Supply and Purification Dept
One element of the 6th Div 21st River-crossing Material Co

Tasks:
[The detachment] shall advance along the road [connecting] Pematangsiantar and Balige toward Tarutung, cut off the retreat of the enemy in the Medan area. If possible, it shall advance towards Padang, while attacking the enemy.

The main force of the division
Div HQ (minus about one half)
Imperial Guard [Div] 5th Inf Rgt
Imperial Guard [Div] 4th Inf Rgt 5th Co
12th Independent Antitank Artillery Battery
Imperial Guard [Div] Reconnaissance Rgt
Imperial Guard [Div] Field Artillery Rgt (minus the 1st and the 2d Bns and minus the 7th Battery)
35th Independent Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battery
Imperial Guard [Div] Engineer Rgt (minus the 1st Co)
Div Signal Unit (minus one element)
One element of the [Twenty-fifth] Army Signal Unit
Medical Unit (minus two-thirds of it)
1st Field Hospital (minus one half of it)

* Not in the text, but in the original document.
12th Water Supply and Purification Dept (minus two-fourths of it)
One co of the Imperial Guard [Div] Transport Rgt

Tasks:
[The force] shall charge toward Medan and swiftly seize Medan and the airfield there.
The units under the direct control of the [Twenty-fifth] Army
One element each of the 83d Independent Air Sqdn and the 84th Airfield Bn

Supporting units
One element of the Third Air Force

Second [Transport Group]
[Twenty-fifth] Army Command Post
One half of the Div HQ
6th Tank Rgt (minus 1st Sqdn)
Imperial Guard [Div] 2d Field Artillery Bn
4th Field Hospital
Ordnance Service Unit
[Imperial Guard Div] Transport Rgt (minus one co)
One bn of the 9th Railway Rgt (one element of its Material Depot included)
Remaining elements of both the 83d Independent Air Sqdn and the 84th Airfield Bn
One element of the Third Air Force
47th Line-of-Communications Area Unit
42d Independent Motor Transport Bn
34th Field Road Unit (minus one third of it)
68th Line-of-Communications Hospital (minus one quarter of it)
75th Shore Duty Co
11th* and 15th Field Well-drilling Cos
33d Independent Motor Transport Co
Remaining elements of Oil-drilling Unit

5. Embarkation, assembly and departure of transport ships, and programs [at the assembly points]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transports</th>
<th>First [transport]</th>
<th>Second [transport]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Units</td>
<td>Kobayashi Det</td>
<td>Yoshida Det</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of transport ships</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embarkation</td>
<td>Place</td>
<td>Port of Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>W+4; W+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembly</td>
<td>Place</td>
<td>[West of Blakang Mati Island]**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>W+4; W+5***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>W+6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programs</td>
<td>Combined exercises shall be conducted by each group of ships at the assembly point.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No combined exercises shall be conducted.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The original document says 10th.
** Inserted on the basis of the original document.
*** The original document says W+5 and W+6.
6. The starting dates and times of the landings and the landing schedule

(1) Entering into the anchorages and the launch of the landing [operations] shall by and large be started at the following times as the standard:

Kobayashi and Yoshida Detachments’ areas:
- Entry into the anchorages: 0100 on Day W + 10
- Launch of the landing operation: 0430 on Day W + 10

The area of the main force of the division:
- Entry into the anchorages: 0300 on Day W + 10
- Launch of the landing operation: 0600 on Day W + 10

(2) The rough periods for the landings are as follows:
- Kobayashi Detachment area: two days
- Yoshida Detachment area: three days
- The main force of the division: four days

7. The distribution of ships to the transport groups of ships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transports</th>
<th>First [transport]</th>
<th>Second [transport]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Units</td>
<td>Kobayashi Det</td>
<td>Yoshida Det</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>1st Section</td>
<td>2d Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships</td>
<td>An’yō-maru, Kinugawa-maru, Gin’yō-maru, Rakuyō-maru</td>
<td>Argun-maru,* Lima-maru</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Escort at sea

The disposition of forces for the escort at sea shall be as shown in the separate sheet. [Particulars] other than the above shall be arranged between the commanders of the escort and landing units.

9. Air operations

(1) The air units of the Army and the Navy shall cover the sailing of the transport ships and their landing operations against enemy aircraft and vessels.

(2) No prior bombings on the coast of landing [points] shall be conducted except for those on Sabang. [The air units] shall timely carry out bombings on enemy key rear points and surface vessels, break his will to fight, and at the same time cut off his reinforcements. If possible, they shall directly support ground combats with one element.

(3) The army shall support the conditioning of seized airfields in the following way:
- Sabang: With the whole strength of the landing units
- Kutaraja: With one infantry battalion and one engineer platoon for three days
- Medan: With one infantry battalion and two engineer platoons [for three days]

(4) Particulars of the outline of execution at each phase shall be arranged each time.

Accordingly, the Third Air Force shall attach its liaison officer (along with [one in charge of] communications) to the Imperial Guard Division.

* Name according to the original document.
(5) The distribution of airfields between the Army and Navy air units to be used for this operation shall be designated in the following way:
The Army: Medan, Alor Setar, Ketil, Ayer Tawar, Sungai Petani, Ipoh, and Kallang
The Navy: Sabang, Kutaraja, Sungai Petani, Penang, Seletar, and Sembawang

(6) Tasks
(a) The Army:
   [1] To provide antiaircraft cover for the convoy of the units to land in Idi and Labuhanruku and direct support for the units’ landing operations.
   [2] To provide direct support for their ground combat thereafter.
(b) The Navy:
   [1] To provide antiaircraft guard for the units to land in Sabang and Kutaraja and direct support for their landing operations.
   [2] To provide guard against enemy submarines and surface vessels.

(7) Forces to be employed
The Army
   About nine Type–97 fighter planes
   About five command reconnaissance planes
   About six assault planes
   About fifty-four heavy bombers
The Navy
   About thirty-six mid-sized [land-based] attack planes
   About ten Type–96 fighter planes
   About eighteen reconnaissance seaplanes
   About eight carrier-based attack planes
The above forces may change depending on circumstances.

(8) The main points of the implementation of the air operations
(a) [The units] shall preliminarily reconnoiter the increase or decrease of enemy air power in northern Sumatra and the Andaman Islands and destroy it if required.
   The above reconnaissance [operation] shall be carried out by the Army and the subsequent air campaigns to destroy enemy air power shall be assigned in the following way:
   The Navy: [the area] to the west of 98ºE
   The Army: [the area] to the east of 98ºE
   Note by the author: 98ºE is to the west of Pangkalan Brandan.
(b) No bombings on the landing points except for those on Sabang shall be carried out prior to the landing [operations].
   The attack on the landing points of Sabang shall mainly be assigned to the Navy; reinforcements shall be provided by the Army if required.
(c) The priority in covering the convoy of the landing units shall be given to the units landing on Sabang and the main force, particularly at the time of departure from the port of Singapore.

10. Diversions
   No [diversions] shall be conducted.

11. Landing combats, cover for the landing and support for disembarkation operations
   (1) It [has to] be expected that the landing operation shall be executed while clearing off attacks by enemy land, naval and air forces.
   (2) Cover for the landing
      (a) As for [the landing operation on] Sabang, preliminary bombings shall be carried out and also after sunrise the Navy shall be ready for shelling at the time of landing.
         However, no shelling shall be started unless requested by the Army landing units.
(b) [As for the landing operations] in other areas, no shelling shall be conducted unless requested by the Army.

(3) Support for the disembarkation operation

The army shall take charge of this [task] and the Navy shall support it with one element if required.

12. Defense facilities at the landing points and landing bases

(1) The Army shall set up landing bases in Belawan and, if necessary, Labuhanruku.

(2) The Army shall provide support for the Navy’s operations, guard, quartering and provisions as much as possible.

13. The Army-Navy cooperation after the landing

(1) The Navy shall escort the first landing units until they complete disembarkation.

The returning ships shall sail back to the port of Singapore one after another in small groups of several ships when they have completed disembarkation.

The Navy shall escort them if required.

(2) The Navy shall escort the second landing units more or less in conformity with the first landing units.
(3) It shall [also] take charge of escorting the transport of supplies and patients after the landing of the first landing units as much as possible.

14. Intelligence
Information on the following items shall swiftly be exchanged.
(1) The situation of enemy naval and air forces, particularly of [enemy] submarines.
(2) Enemy movements on Sabang and the Andaman Islands.
(3) Topographical features, existence of obstacles and their conditions near the planned landing points.

15. Detailed arrangements between the Army and the Navy commanders concerned
The detailed arrangements between the Army and the Navy commanders concerned shall be made on the warship Sendai, [starting] from 1500 on 1 March.

Separate Sheet
The Outline of the Disposition of the Surface Escort Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution</th>
<th>[Main Unit]</th>
<th>1st Escort Unit</th>
<th>2d Escort Unit</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>1st Southern Expeditionary Fleet Cdr in Chief</td>
<td>3d Destroyer Sqdn Cdr</td>
<td>9th Special Base Force Cdr</td>
<td>[The disposition] shall partly be changed depending on the situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forces</td>
<td>Chōkai, 7th Cruiser Div, 4 destroyers, Mihoro Air Group, 40th Air Group, Sagara-maru</td>
<td>Sendai, 6 destroyers, Kashii, 1st Minesweeper Div, 2 submarine chasers of the 11th Subchaser Div. Yura shall be added depending on the situation.</td>
<td>Hatsutaka, Shimushu, Chōsa-maru, Eiō-maru, 41st Minesweeper Div, 44th Minesweeper Div, 1 submarine chaser of the 11th Subchaser Div, 4 auxiliary cutters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main tasks</td>
<td>1. Support for all operations 2 Air operations</td>
<td>Escort of the Army units for Sabang and Kutaraja</td>
<td>Escort of the landing units for Idi and Labuhanruku</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Arrangement Between the Forces on Site (for the Andaman Operation)
(Note by the author: See Illustration No. 25)

Memoranda of the Arrangements Between the Twenty-fifth Army Commander and the Commander in Chief of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet (28 February 1942)

1. The objectives of the operation*
   To seize key places in the Andaman [Islands] and vicinity to swiftly secure naval bases and airfields.

2. Forces to be employed
   (1) The Army
       Commander: 56th Inf Rgt 2d Bn Cdr Capt Hayashi Reizō
       56th Inf Rgt 2d Bn

* See also Vol. 26, p. 581. We have adjusted the following based on the original documents.
56th Inf Rgt Regimental Artillery Battery [(minus one half)]
One half of the 56th Inf Rgt Antitank Artillery Battery
[One] Combat Relief Squad
One element of the Rgt Signal Squad
One engineer platoon
One platoon of the 1st Telegram Rgt 7th Co (minus one squad) [(Mark-1, Mark-2, and Mark-3 [Radio] Sets, one each)]

(2) The Navy
Detached Unit of the 12th Special Base Force

3. Landing points
The west coast of Ross Island, the sandy [beach] two kilometers west of Ross Island and others;
after that, Havelock, Stewart Sound, Port Cornwallis, etc. shall be seized in succession in conformity with the request of the Navy.

4. Embarkation, assembly, departure and landing
(1) Ships to be employed
The Army: Hirokawa-maru (6,850 tons, 16 knots)
The Navy: Kinugasa-maru (16 knots)
(2) Place of embarkation: Port of Singapore
(3) Assembly point and date of assembly
Assembly point: Penang
Date of assembly: Day W + 18, by when [each vessel] shall sail [to the assembly point] on their own

5. Chain of command
From the assembly at Penang until ordered otherwise by specific orders, the Army landing units shall come under the operational command of the Navy landing unit commander.

6. Escort at sea
(1) Surface escort forces
(a) The bulk of the Malaya Unit
(b) One element of the Eleventh Air Fleet ([consisting of] the 22d Air Flotilla as the core)
(2) Details shall be decided by the commanders in chief of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the Eleventh Air Fleet.

7. Others
(1) The Navy shall support the army units with signal communications, interpretation, collecting materials, supply, transport and others after the landing.
(2) The guard, military administration, etc. of the Andaman Islands shall be assigned to the Navy commander, who shall also take command of the Army units.

2. Implementation of the Invasion Operation

Implementation of the Central and Northern Sumatra Invasion Operation

Situation of the Dutch East Indies Army (See Illustration No. 26)

According to the accounts of Lieutenant General Ter Poorten, chief of the Dutch East Indies Army, the disposition of the Dutch East Indies Army at the time of the opening of hostilities was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army Command Districts</th>
<th>Location of Headquarters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aceh and east coast of Sumatra</td>
<td>Kutaraja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West coast of Sumatra</td>
<td>Padang</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter IV / The Invasion Operations Against Both Central and Northern Sumatra and the Andaman Islands

Illustration No. 25 — Sketch Maps of the Andaman Islands
Among the above deployed forces, the Dutch East Indies Army in Java was the best and had modern equipment.

On the other hand, the main task of the [garrison] units in the territories outside Java was basically to maintain public order. In a manner the units were like police, yet some units like those in Tarakan and Balikpapan had infantry units equipped with automatic weapons.

Nevertheless, they were also bound to fight back if attacked by foreign forces. The [garrison] commanders of outer territory units had the authority [to decide of their own accord] the outline of defense against foreign enemies, which, unlike [the defense of] Java, did not require the approval of the War Ministry of the home country.

As for the deployment on Sumatra, a chart showing the deployment on Java and Sumatra was included in the documents seized by the Sakaguchi Detachment on Tarakan (east coast of Borneo), according to which the outline of [the deployment on] Sumatra may be sorted out in the following way: (Illustration No. 26)

---

**Aceh and East Sumatra**
- **Territorial Commmend**
  - 1st Aceh Garrison Bn (HQ: Kutaraja; detachments were stationed at ten places)
  - 2d Aceh Garrison Bn (HQ: Kutaraja; detachments at two places)
  - 3d Aceh Garrison Bn (HQ: Kutaraja; detachments at eight places)
  - 4th Aceh Garrison Bn (HQ, 1st and 2d Cos: Kutaraja)
- **Military Police Unit** (HQ: Kutaraja; detachments at five places)

**West Sumatra and Tapanuli**
- **Territorial Commmend** (HQ: Padang)
  - 1st West Sumatra and Tapanuli Garrison Bn (HQ: Padang; detachments were stationed at seven places)
  - 2d West Sumatra and Tapanuli Garrison Bn (HQ: unclear, detachments at four places)

Other than the above, two companies were stationed at Padang. However, it was unclear to which they belonged.

**Palembang and Jambi**
- **Territorial Command** (HQ: Palembang)
  - Palembang and Jambi Garrison Bn (HQ: Palembang; detachments were stationed at five places)

**Riouw Territorial Command** (HQ: Tanjungpinang)
  - Riouw Territory Garrison Bn (HQ: Tanjungpinang; detachments were stationed at two places)

As in the accounts of Lieutenant General Ter Poorten, these forces were nothing more than police forces for maintaining public order in their territories. Therefore, it was considered
that by nature they did not possess a war potential strong enough to fight back a Japanese invasion, if at all possible.

Moreover, on 1 March the Sixteenth Army had already landed at places in Java, and the war situation was progressing very much in favor of the [Japanese] army, while in this period, almost all enemy air and surface forces had been destroyed. Since the central and the northern Sumatra operations were to be carried out in such [favorable] circumstances, not much concern was required in executing operations other than enemy mines and submarines at the landing points.

On top of that, while the landing operation units were sailing north in the Malacca Strait, having departed from the bay of Singapore on 8 March, the allied forces in Java accepted an unconditioned surrender. Since Java had already surrendered, it was not too much to say that the Sumatra operations were already over, before the [scheduled] landing on the 12th.

Staff officer Arao [of the Southern Army] described the movements during this period as follows:

Illustration No. 26 — Sketch Map of the Garrison Army Districts of Sumatra Before the Opening of Hostilities
11 March
A telegram came from Tokyo, [inquiring] whether we wish the Sumatra operation to be conducted as an advance without the use of armed forces. What a stupid telegram.

1. The Sumatra operation shall be executed tomorrow morning.
   It is absolutely indispensable for the Burma operation as well as for the Navy operations in the Indian Ocean.
   In particular this applies to the capture of Sabang.
2. [Even if we were ordered to advance without using armed forces, I wonder] to what extent the orders of the Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies have been enforced.
3. [And I wonder] how we can afford to moor the ships and wait for a favorable occasion at such a late moment.

It should be added that southern Sumatra has already been captured by the 38th Division in mid-February and such main points as Palembang, Bengkulu and Jambi have been secured by units of that division.

The Launch of the Invasion Operation
The Navy unit in charge of the Sumatra operation was led by the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet Commander in Chief V. Adm. Ozawa Jisaburō. It consisted of the main force (the Chōkai, 7th Cruiser Division, six destroyers of the 3d Destroyer Squadron, the Mihoro Air Group, the 40th Air Group, the 4th Carrier Division, the Sagara-maru, the Kamikawa-maru, and the 91st [Auxiliary] Subchaser* Division), the 1st Escort Unit (the main force of the 3d Destroyer Squadron, the Kashii, the Yura, the 1st Minesweeper Division, and two submarine chasers), and the 2d Escort Unit (the Hatsutaka, the Shimushu, the Chōsa-maru, the Eikō-maru, one section of the 41st Minesweeper Division, one section of the 44th Minesweeper Division and one submarine chaser under the command of the 9th Special Base Force commander), which was a somewhat larger force than the one indicated in the arrangements with the Twenty-fifth Army commander.(79) **

At 1600 on 8 March, the Kobayashi Detachment left the port of Singapore (Keppel West) in four transport ships (the An'yo-maru, the Kinugawa-maru, the Gin'yo-maru and the Rakuyō-maru) and sailed the Malacca Strait northward toward Sabang and Kutaraja.

The minesweeping of the Malacca Strait had been completed in advance by 5 March by some naval vessels.

The 1st Escort Unit continued the sailing during the night, escorting a total of eight ships including four navy transport ships, which had joined later.

After sunrise of the 9th, the Navy Mihoro Air Group launched its operations with Penang as its base, and attacked enemy ground facilities on Sabang until the 11th.

Also, the 40th Air Group and the Sagara-maru actively engaged in reconnoitering the enemy and providing guard against submarines.

* The text mistakenly says Destroyer.
** See also Vol. 26, pp. 576ff.
On 11 March, the main unit of the Navy escort unit sailed past the transport convoy to advance ahead to the waters northwest of Sabang and get ready against any appearance of the enemy.

At 2300 on that day, the ships separated into those for the bay of Balohan on Sabang and those for the Kutaraja anchorage and advanced separately. Between 0010 and 0015 on the 12th, each entered its designated anchorage to launch the landings. Meeting with no resistance, both the unit for Sabang and that for Kutaraja successfully landed at 0235 and 0330 respectively.\(^8\)

The unit that landed on Sabang consisted of the Imperial Guard Division’s 3d Infantry Regiment 2d Battalion (commander: Maj. Taka Tsutomu) as the core. After the landing, it seized the airfield on the island and other key places.

In the meantime, the unit consisting of the main force of the Imperial Guard Division’s 3d Infantry Regiment (commander: Col. Oinuma Yoshio) as the core, which had landed [near] Kutaraja, sent its 1st Battalion (commander: Maj. Itsui Hiroshi) on a single-minded dash toward Kutaraja on foot without waiting for the disembarkation of vehicles. The latter entered Kutaraja around 1300 amid the welcoming cheers of the residents.

From the early morning on the next day, the 13th, the 1st Battalion pursued (partly using railway) the enemy, which had fled in the direction of Sigli. It encountered the enemy to the south of Sigli, where 3d Company Commander 1st Lieutenant Yamauchi was killed. The battalion seized Sigli around 1400.

Regimental Commander Colonel Oinuma advanced to Sigli that night, and [further] advanced to Bireuën on the next day the 14th.

[Meanwhile,] the 2d Battalion, which had completed the clearing of Sabang, sailed over to the main island in more than a dozen large-sized motorized [landing] craft, followed the main force of the regiment and reached Bireuën.

According to intelligence, the enemy in Bireuën and vicinity seemed to have fled in the direction of Takengon in the mountains sixty kilometers to the west.\(^*\) The regimental commander immediately sent the 2d Battalion to clear the enemy there.

While provisionally repairing destroyed bridges on the way, the battalion continued its advance, and on the evening of the 15th, reached a point fifteen kilometers to the east of Takengon.

From there Battalion Commander Taka advised by phone the enemy in Takengon to surrender, to which the [enemy] commander in the area (a major of the Dutch army) agreed and accepted an unconditional surrender.

Accordingly, on the next day the 16th, [the battalion] disarmed the enemy in Takengon, and apart from them, also interned one-hundred and several scores of Caucasians.

According to some accounts, the main force of the Dutch Army seemed to have fled into the central mountain system, which sent the 2d Battalion again into the mountains without a break, pursuing the enemy.

Around that time, the Reconnaissance Regiment of the division and the Yoshida Detachment were making their way in the middle of the central mountain system northward from

\(^*\) This paragraph and the following are unclear. The author or his sources apparently confuse the places Taken- gon (Takingeun), south of Bireuën, and Tangse, south of Sigli. He conflates two separate operations, one from Sigli southward to Tangse where part of the Aceh garrison surrendered, and the operation from Bireuën southward to Takengon where another part of the Aceh garrison surrendered.
the south, pursuing the fleeing enemy. Thus, the main force of the Dutch forces was caught
between the attacks from both the south and the north.

In the meantime, the 3d Battalion (commander: Maj. Nakajima Masakiyo), who had been
left behind in Kutaraja to guard the vicinity, then advanced along the west coast, and while
clearing part of the enemy on their way, advanced into Meulaboh on 21 March.\(^{(77)}\)

The Yoshida Detachment left the port of Keppel West at 1000 on 9 March in two transport
ships (the *Argun-maru* and the *Lima-maru*), and headed for its landing point, Idi. One element
of the 2d Escort Unit (the *Shimushu* and one section of a minesweeper division) sailed along,
escorting these ships. The detachment successfully landed at Idi at 0540 on the 12th.

After that, while seizing oil fields in Kuala Simpang, Pangkalan Brandan, etc., the detach-
ment advanced to Balige on 18 March, by way of Medan, Tebingtinggi and Pematangsiantar.

On the early morning of the next day the 19th, the detachment left Balige. Having cleared
the enemy on) Samosir Island (an island in Lake Toba) with one platoon on the way, it
headed northward while driving back elements of the enemy along its way and entered into
Sidikalang on the night of the 21st.

From that location, the detachment commander sent the main force of the 9th Company
to Singkil on the coast of the Indian Ocean and had it seize the place (26 March), while having
the main force of the detachment continue its northward advance. He advanced to Lau Be-
lang on the 24th.

Prior to this, the Reconnaissance Regiment of the division had encountered a powerful
(element of] the enemy near Pematangsiantar and driven it away, which will be mentioned
later. When the defeated enemy reached the vicinity of Lau Belang via Kabanjahe, it [also]
ran into the Yoshida Detachment advancing northward. The Reconnaissance Regiment in
pursuit of the enemy advanced there, too.

The main force of the enemy was again defeated by the Yoshida Detachment in an en-
gagement on the 24th and fled into the mountains in the direction of Kutacane. The Recon-
naissance Regiment immediately shifted to pursue the enemy, and the Yoshida Detachment
also continued advancing northward in tandem.

On the evening of 26 March, the Yoshida Detachment reached Kutacane. On the evening
of the next day the 27th, the main force of the enemy on its front at last surrendered to the
Reconnaissance Regiment commander.\(^{(92)}\)

[As for] the main force of the division, it sailed toward its landing point Labuhanruku in
eight transport ships (the *Tacoma-maru*, the *Alaska-maru*, the *Shinkyō-maru*, the *Yoshino-maru*,
the *Shinsei-maru No. 1*, the *Buyō-maru*, the *Singapore-maru*, and the *Hirokawa-maru*).

These transport ships were escorted by the main force of the 2d Escort Unit (the *Hatsutaka*,
the *Eikō-maru*, one* submarine chaser and one section of a minesweeper division). At 0700
on the 12th, the main force of the division completed its landing near Labuhanruku without
meeting with any resistance at all.

After the landing, the Kunishi Detachment rushed toward Tarutung along the road con-
necting Pematangsiantar and Balige. The [other] units with the Imperial Guard Division’s
5th Infantry Regiment (commander: Col. Sawamura Shunsuke) as the core headed for
Medan, while the Reconnaissance Regiment advanced along the road connecting Pematang-
siantar, Kabanjahe and Kutacane.

* The text says *seven*. Probably a misreading of *Submarine Chaser No. 7*. The unit only counted one submarine
   chaser, see also p. 425 above.
After the landing, the Sawamura Regiment had its advance unit in motor vehicles (one company led by the 3d Battalion commander) charge toward Medan, while the main force of the regiment followed the unit on bicycles. The force continued its advance by repairing destroyed bridges on the way, and around 0830 on the next day, the 13th, when it reached a point about thirteen kilometers east of Medan, it received from the advance unit a report of the capture of Medan.

From the landing onwards, the troops were welcomed with cheers by residents in every village, and the town of Medan was also filled by a crowd who had gathered to welcome them.

After arriving in Medan, Regimental Commander Sawamura summoned the governor of northern Sumatra and the upper echelons of his administration to the police station to announce the instructions of the divisional commander and took the necessary measures to maintain public order.

Then, while sending one element to Belawan (a port on the coast north of Medan) to occupy it, the regimental commander deployed his unit for the guarding of Medan and vicinity. Around 1500 on that day, Division Commander Lt. Gen. Nishimura Takuma, Chief of Staff Col. Obata Nobuyoshi and others arrived in Medan in succession, and received Colonel Sawamura’s report on the situation.\footnote{85}

After landing, the Reconnaissance Regiment had rushed to Pematangsiantar, where it encountered a powerful enemy [unit] in the vicinity; it engaged and took about one-hundred prisoners in the end.

Afterwards, the regiment further pursued the enemy and rushed to an area north of Kutaracane by way of Kabanjahe. On 27 March, the main force of the enemy eventually surrendered near Blangkejeren.

The surrendered enemy troops counted about three thousand men of the Central and Northern Sumatra Garrison Armies, who had fled into the central mountain system. [The regiment also] seized four guns, 1.2 million rifle bullets and seven hundred automobiles.

Among those who surrendered were Central Sumatra Garrison Army Commander Major General [R.T.] Overakker and Northern Sumatra Garrison Army Commander Colonel [G.F.V.] Gosenson.\footnote{54}

Note: The movements of the Reconnaissance Regiment were described based on the recollections of Regimental Commander Col. Kitayama Yūzō. Although the dispositions of the Central and Northern Sumatra Garrison Armies was different from that in the aforementioned documents seized on Tarakan, it is thought that the disposition of forces was changed after the opening of hostilities.

The Kunishi Detachment, which immediately shifted to charge after the landing, advanced to Pematangsiantar on the morning of the 13th, from where the detachment dashed through the mountains and reached the shore of Lake Toba that night. An enemy [unit] of about 300 troops held a position near Porsea on the southeastern shore of the lake. While driving away the enemy by simultaneously employing boats in a waterborne maneuver on the lake, the detachment seized the bridge at Porsea, entered [the town of] Balige around 1400 on the 14th, further [advanced] by way of Tarutung and before dawn on the 15th seized Sibolga, a commercial port on the west coast.
Then, the detachment again started southward, passed through [the town of] Padang Sidempuan at 1800 on the 15th, forced across the bridge to the south of the town just before the enemy could blow it up, and advanced to an area near Lubuk Sikaping on the afternoon of the 16th, where part of the enemy in front surrendered, raising a white flag.

The detachment took three-hundred and several scores of Dutch troops prisoner in the town of Fort de Kock, continued its dash, and finally at 0330 on the 17th, charged into Padang, one of the strategic points on the west coast. The regiment took about eight-hundred and several scores of British Army troops and more than nine-hundred men of the Dutch East Indies Garrison Army prisoner.

During this operation, the main force of the 15th Independent Engineer Regiment, led by Col. Yokoyama Yosuke, was attached to the Kunishi Detachment and engaged in repairing roads and bridges during the latter’s advance.

Following the route of the Kunishi Detachment, Division Commander Lieutenant General Nishimura advanced to Padang, arriving there on 17 March and returning to Medan on the 21st of the month. As seen in the above, the Sumatra operation more or less completed in only four or five days after the landing the planned capture of key places; what is more, in late March, when the main force of the defeated enemy surrendered in mountains of northern Sumatra, the operation was finished in a short period, indeed.

The guarding of Sabang was assigned to the Sabang Island Base Unit (one platoon) of the [Navy] 9th Special Base Force, while the defense of the mainland of Sumatra was assigned to the Army.

In the following are given the place of deployment and an outline of the movements of the regiments of the Imperial Guard Division after the completion of the central and northern Sumatra operations:

**Divisional headquarters: Medan**

Imperial Guard [Div] 3d Inf Rgt

Regimental headquarters: Lhokseumawe

1st Bn: Stationed in Medan. However, in mid-May, the battalion was detached and made to lead about four thousand prisoners of war to Thailand to take part in the construction of the Thai-Burma Railway, after which, it was assigned to independent tasks in that area and experienced many hardships.

2d Bn: Langsa (One company was detached and stationed in Pangkalan Brandan.)

3d Bn: Kutaraja (One company was detached and stationed at the coast opposite Sabang.)

Imperial Guard [Div] 4th Inf Rgt

Regimental headquarters: Bukittinggi (Fort de Kock)

1st Bn: Bukittinggi (Fort de Kock)

2d Bn: Padang

3d Bn: Tarutung

Note: Later, when the main force of the 38th Division in southern Sumatra assembled its force for training, the 1st Battalion was transferred to Palembang and vicinity to take over the guard there.

Imperial Guard [Div] 5th Inf Rgt
After the completion of the invasion operation, the regiment was put under the direct control of the Twenty-fifth Army. It left the port of Belawan on 27 March, landed in Singapore on the 29th, and took over the 18th Division’s duty of guarding Johor Province.

Regimental headquarters: Kluang
1st Bn: Johor Bahru
2d Bn: Batu Pahat
3d Bn: Muar

For reference:
Although the main force of the Imperial Guard Division was assigned to guard northern Sumatra for a long time, only the 5th Regiment was separated from the main force; it was moved to various places and assigned various tasks.

Much earlier (on 9 March), the Twenty-fifth Army commander had received an order from the Southern Army that the whole of Sumatra would become the operational area of the Twenty-fifth Army. In conformity with the order, he issued an order to the 38th Division in southern Sumatra to have one element dash to Padang and seize it.

Accordingly, the 38th Division had one infantry battalion as the core dash toward Padang. The battalion entered the place at about the same time as the Kunishi Detachment.

On 25 March, the Twenty-fifth Army headquarters landed at Tebingtinggi (about sixty kilometers southeast of Medan) and advanced to Medan, but before long, it returned to Singapore.

Concerning the securing of stability in Sumatra, the Southern Army issued on 16 March the following order:

**Southern Army Order, 16 March [at] Saigon (28)**
1. Concerning subsequent operations in Sumatra, the Twenty-fifth Army commander shall take charge of securing stability in the said area in the following way in conjunction with the Navy.
   (1) He shall swiftly seize key places, establish public order, and spread the military administration so as to obtain resources important to the national defense, and at the same time secure the means by which the army can support itself.
   (2) Particularly taking future air and sea operations into consideration, he shall support the construction of air bases, etc. for the Army and the Navy.
2. The Third Air Force commander shall with one element continue his support for the operation carried out by the Twenty-fifth Army commander.
   For the air defense of Palembang, he shall keep one element of his force there.

Southern Army Commander in Chief Count Terauchi Hisaichi

**Implementation of the Operation to Capture the Andaman Islands**

**The British Forces’ Defense of the Andaman Islands**

In the Andaman Islands, the strategic place of Port Blair had a landing strip fit for use by fighter planes, and its port fulfilled all conditions as an excellent base for flying boats and submarines.

At first, one company of the British Army had defend the place, but in January 1942, they were replaced by one Gurkha battalion.
However, after that, because the defense of Rangoon became impossible due to the Japanese forces’ launch of their Burma invasion operation, General Wavell decided to withdraw all guards from the Andaman Islands.

On 12 March after the fall of Rangoon, he finally implemented the withdrawal. Therefore, by the time the Japanese Andaman invasion unit resolutely carried out their landings on 23 March, no substantial strength was left on the islands.\(^{(25)}\)

**The Capture of the Andaman Islands (See Illustration No. 25)**

On 17 March, the Army unit for the capture [operation] of the Andamans, consisting of the Hayashi Battalion (18th Division 56th Infantry Regiment 2d Battalion, commander: Capt. Hayashi Reizō) as the core, embarked on the Hirokawa-maru in Singapore, left the port at 1900 and sailed the Malacca Strait northward for Penang. Two days later on 19 March, it reached the port of Penang and joined the Navy units, which had waited for the Army unit there.\(^{(76)}\)

The Navy units, which had waited in Penang, consisted of a detached unit of the 12th Special Base Force and one element of the 9th Special Base Force led by [Navy] Capt. Kawasaki Harumi as the landing force, and of the 1st Escort Unit (the 3d Destroyer Squadron as the core with the 1st Minesweeper Division attached), led by R. Adm. Hashimoto Shintarō, as guard.

At 0800 on 20 March, the next day, the 1st Minesweeper Division (four minesweepers) left the port of Penang to sail ahead to sweep the sea of mines.

On the evening of that day, the 1st Escort Unit left the port in the order of the Yūgiri, the Amagiri,\(^{*}\) the Uranami, the Isonami, Submarine Chaser No. 7,\(^{**}\) the Yura and the Sendai. At their rear, three transport ships (the Hirokawa-maru, the Kinugasa-maru, and the Kunikawa-maru) followed, guided by the Asagiri.

After sailing for two days without being reconnoitered or attacked by enemy aircraft or submarines, the transport ships safely arrived at 0250 on 23 March at the planned anchorage off Port Blair.

The Hayashi Battalion immediately shifted to the [landing] craft and at 0630 landed on the coast to the west of Snake Island, while the Navy units landed on the coast to the west of Ross Island.\(^{***}\)

[The Army and Navy] met with no resistance of the enemy on either front during the landing, and seized the airfield and the entire southern area of the port of Port Blair at one go.

Although one element was dispatched to liberate Indian prisoners held on Viper Island, the prisoners had been moved to Madras in India more than two months before.

Then the units thoroughly removed mines and obstacles set in the water courses of Port Blair during three days of operation and completed the sweeping of the waterways on the 25th.

After that, the invasion unit and the escort unit cleared the key points on the islands in conjunction.

On the 24th, escorted by the Yura, the Uranami and the Isonami, an army unit (in three large motorized [landing] craft) headed for Havelock Island in order to clear the island of

\(^{*}\) According to the original documents, the Shirakumo also took part.

\(^{**}\) Probably a mistake for Submarine Chaser No. 9.

\(^{***}\) According to Vol. 26, p. 586-7, they landed on Ross Island itself as well.
the enemy. However, since there were no private houses nor an airfield, the unit called off the landing and returned.

On the next day, the 25th, the *Isonami* escorted an army unit to a point south of Colebrooke Island and covered its clearing of [the islands in] the Elphinstone [passage].

Meanwhile, on the 25th the *Sendai* and the 20th Destroyer Division (minus the *Asagiri*) left Port Blair escorting navy units, carried out a clearing operation on Stewart [Sound] and Port Cornwallis on the 26th, and returned to Port Blair on the 27th.

During this period, vessels of the 1st Escort Unit took charge of patrolling the waters to the east of the Andaman Islands, with Port Blair as the center. Although they were reconnoitered by one or two Lockheed aircraft day after day, they spotted no maneuvers of submarines.

Since the major part of the operations in this area was thus completed, vessels other than those of the 3d Destroyer Squadron departed one after another for Singapore from 27 March onwards.

It had been decided that the 3d Destroyer Squadron should, while continuing its guard over the area with Port Blair as its base, make preparations for the Navy Carrier Task Force’s operation in the Indian Ocean to be conducted in early April [See Vol. 26].

First Southern Expeditionary Fleet Commander in Chief Ozawa, in charge of the overall support for the Andaman operation and the transport operation [of reinforcements] to Burma, left Penang on the afternoon of 21 March, leading the *Chōkai*, the *Ayanami*, the Murakumo, the *Sagara-maru* and *Shōnan-maru* No. 10.* After joining the 7th Cruiser Division, the 11th Destroyer Division and the 4th Carrier Division (minus the 2d Section), which had started westward from Seletar naval port on the previous morning, he operated on the waters east of Port Blair, and on the 24th, advanced to the waters to the south of Burma.

On the evening of the 25th, after confirming that no special operational concern was required in both areas, he left those waters and returned to Singapore by way of Mergui.

Earlier, the 40th Air Group had advanced to Penang, and from the launch of the operation onward provided cover for the escorted convoy and conducted patrols over the Malacca Strait.(76, 84)

Concerning the further actions of the Hayashi Battallion, as will be told later, the main force of the 18th Division was being transported by sea from Singapore to Rangoon in order to reinforce the Burma front. While en route, Brigade Commander Takumi and Regimental Commander Fujimura (Masuzō) (of the 56th Infantry Regiment, who was the successor of Col. Nasu Yoshio) called at Port Blair to show their appreciation for Battallion Commander Hayashi’s effort.

The following is a summary of [the relevant part of] the diaries of Capt. Hayashi Reizō.

6 April
1000: The *Hirokawa-maru* put in port. I went to meet them in a motor boat.
1200: On the ship, greeted His Honor Takumi and Regimental Commander Fujimura.
1300: Showed His Honor and the regimental commander the barracks and gave a report on the situation. After lunch, they left to pay their respects to the naval commander.
1900: The *Hirokawa-maru* departed.

* Actually No. 7.
12 April
Since Navy Capt. Kawasaki Harumi was about to return to Japan, a farewell dinner was held in the grand hall of the town hall of Ross Island starting in the evening. Its luxurious interior once again reminded me how powerful Britain had been. Although Ross Island is small, houses are packed together, almost without an inch of land in between.

13 April
Got up at 0630. Saw Captain Kawasaki off. Decided that we, too, should leave the Andaman Islands on the 15th.

14 April
Both the Kotohira-maru and the Naples-maru called at [Port Blair] to pick us up, exactly when, two enemy aircraft came for an attack. Although the battalion fired at them using all its power, the enemy aircraft flew low at an altitude of about thirty meters above sea level and fired at our flying boats. To our regret, we could not bring them down. Our side sustained considerable damage.
Started embarkation in the afternoon.

15 April
1100: Boarding; 2000: Departure

17 April
1500: Reached the mouth of the Rangoon River and started sailing upstream. The water was completely muddy and yellow. The heat is so terrible that I can easily imagine [how difficult] the battles in the future will be.
1900: Arrived at the wharf.

The Hayashi Battalion was returned to its original unit in conformity with the following Southern Army order, while the guarding of the the Andaman Islands was assigned to the Navy.

Southern Army Operational Order Classified No. 99<sup>(28)</sup>

**Southern Army Order, 3 April [at] Saigon**

1. From this time onwards, the guard of the Andaman Islands shall be assigned to the Navy.
2. Article No.1 of Southern Army Operational Order Classified No. 72 shall be deleted.

Note by the author: Article No.1 of Southern Army Operational Order Classified No. 72, The Fifteenth Army commander shall put the unit consisting of the 56th Infantry Regiment 2d Battalion as the core to operate in the Andaman Islands, under the command of the Twenty-fifth Army commander from the time of the 18th Division commander’s arrival in Burma.

3. The Captain General of the Shipping Transport Command shall take care of the transport of the units operating on the Andaman Islands to Rangoon and Malaya.

Count Terauchi Hisaichi, Commander in Chief of the Southern Army

3. The Operation to Transport Reinforcements to Burma
   (the 56th and the 18th Divisions, the Sakaguchi Detachment and the Units of the 33d Division Left Behind in Eastern China)

The Burma Operation and the Shipping Problems

In the Army-Navy Central Agreement for the Southern Operation at the opening of hostilities, the outline of a plan of shipping operations up to the invasion of Java was formulated,
in which specific assumptions were made about the complex shipping operations to meet military operations in all areas during that period.

However, in this shipping operations plan, a special allocation of ships for the Burma operation was not taken into account.

The reason is that when the southern operation would for the most part be completed, the ships requisitioned by the Army and the Navy, those by the Army in particular, had to be substantially derequisitioned one after another from April onwards, so that they could be employed for the transport of supplies [required] for the general mobilization and the transport of a minimum amount of supplies for civilian demand.

That is to say, in the Imperial Conference on 5 November 1941, the above was agreed on in the following way (only the ships requisitioned by the Army are mentioned [here]):

The [total] tonnage of ships specially required for the southern operation and the time:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Tonnage Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First month</td>
<td>2,100,000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second month</td>
<td>2,100,000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third month</td>
<td>2,100,000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth month</td>
<td>2,100,000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth month</td>
<td>1,700,000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth month</td>
<td>1,650,000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh month</td>
<td>1,500,000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth month and thereafter</td>
<td>1,000,000 tons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the above, with the derequisitioning of a total tonnage of 400,000 tons starting in the beginning of the fifth month (the calendar month of April), a considerable amount of tonnage had to be derequisitioned every month from then on. However, if the Burma operation was to be implemented, it would require a total tonnage of about 500,000 tons for the concentration of forces in Burma, which would be followed by an ongoing requirement of a total tonnage of 300,000 tons, making the above derequisitioning impossible.

For the sake of building up national strength, the military administration authorities pressed the high command that the latter should implement the derequisitioning of the vessels without fail as decided on before the opening of hostilities. [From the viewpoint of the military administration], the decision to go ahead and open hostilities would not have been made unless the government and the high command had agreed on the view that with a total tonnage of 3,000,000 tons at the minimum for civilian demand allowed by the above derequisitioning of ships, the supply of essential materials in the materials mobilization plan for fiscal year 1941 would somehow for the most part be secured.

Therefore, [the military administration authorities] stressed that, if [the supply of] even the aforesaid minimum amount of materials could not be secured at an early moment after the opening of such a large-scale, and presumably protracted war, they could not guarantee the future ability to continue the war.
However, on the pretext of operational requirements the high command was not willing to agree to the derequisitioning of the designated tonnage. Now, before describing this problem, I will give a summary of the actual situation of the loss and capture of ships since the opening of hostilities. Although the numbers slightly differ depending on the source, they are shown as they appear.

1. The change in the number of ships in the first four months of war (prepared by the Navy Ministry’s Naval Preparation Bureau on 10 April, 1942)(38)
   (1) Loss of ships (including shipwrecks)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sunk or seriously damaged</th>
<th>Damaged/repairable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy ships</td>
<td>41 ships (103,000 tons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army ships</td>
<td>22 ships (112,000 tons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian ships</td>
<td>8 ships (23,000 tons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>71 ships (238,000 tons)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
   (2) Captured ships (except for those requisitioned before the opening of hostilities and those turned to military use)
   | Brought to mainland Japan (handed over to the Maritime Affairs Agency) | 21 ships (56,000 tons) |
   | In local employment (handed over to companies) | 22 ships (50,000 tons) |
   | Total                     | 43 ships (106,000 tons) |
(3) Refloatation of sunken ships
   | Already refloated | 3 ships (6,000 tons) |
   | In the process of refloatation | 6 ships (20,000 tons) |
   | Yet to be worked on | 240 ships (about 550,000 tons) |

2. The reports submitted by the [Army] Shipping Transport Command on the damage to ships from the opening of hostilities until 15 March 1942(28)
   Concerning the damage to ships in the Greater East Asia War
   (1) According to the survey as of 15 March 1942, the damage to ships consisted of fifty-five vessels or about 315,000 tons since the opening of hostilities.
   Of the above, twelve ships or about 70,000 tons have been [repaired and] again put to use.
   (2) Twenty-four ships or 120,000 tons were completely sunk.
   (3) [The most common] cause for the damage to ships was submarines, comprising twenty-seven ships out of fifty-five ships, which is about 50%.

   **Numbers of damaged ships by month**
   | November | 1 ship 4,020 tons |
   | December | 15 ships 108,432 tons |
   | January  | 16 ships 66,211 tons |
   | February | 12 ships 72,344 tons |
   | March    | 11 ships 62,470 tons |

3. The reports submitted by the [Army] Shipping Transport Command on the captured ships from the opening of hostilities until 24 March(53)

   **500 tons or more**
   | Southern China area: | 10 ships (about 15,000 tons) |
   | Eastern China area:  | 9 ships (about 24,000 tons) |
   | French Indochina area: | 1 ship (about 1,500 tons) |
   | Thailand area:       | 4 ships (about 6,700 tons) |
   | Malaya area:         | 9 ships (about 35,000 tons) |

   **500 tons or less**
   | (other than the above, 4 ships are still on the slipway) | 132 ships |
   | unclear | 5 ships |
   | 32 ships | about 220 ships |
The Philippines area: unclear  
Borneo area: unclear  
Total: 33 ships (about 82,000 tons) about 605* ships (4 ships yet to be completed)

4. A summary of the explanations given by the chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau at the Liaison Conference [between IGHQ and the Government] on 2 March

(1) Captured ships can be divided into four categories: those dealt with by central [command], those to be locally dealt with, and those dealt with by the Navy and those by the Army.**

(a) Those dealt with by central [command]: 25 ships (55,000 tons)  
Of the above, six ships have been, and one is about to be, put into service, while the other eighteen ships are [in various states].

(b) Those locally dealt with: 18 ships (40,000 tons)  
These have been put into service between Qingdao, Shanghai, Dalian and Tianjin.

(c) Those dealt with by the Navy: 17 ships (21,000 tons)

5. The report of military results by the Navy minister at the Imperial Diet on 12 March

The Navy has captured 502 merchantmen (210,000 tons) of the enemy.

According to the previously decided plan, the Army was supposed to cut the [tonnage of] requisitioned ships [for the Southern operation] from 2,100,000 tons at the opening of hostilities (note: the Army actually had 2,144,400 tons when the hostilities were opened.) to 1,000,000 tons from the eighth month (July) onwards, by gradually derequisitioning from the fifth month (April) onwards, as previously told.

To be precise, since the derequisition had to be put into effect at the beginning of each month, [the total tonnage in service in the Army’s southern operation] had to be reduced to 1,000,000 tons by the end of June.

However, in April, when derequisitioning (of a total of 400,000 tons) had to be started, it so happened that Operation U (the maritime transport operation of reinforcements for the Burma [operation]) was to be launched.

Therefore, Army high command stubbornly opposed, arguing that the above derequisitioning plan was unacceptable.

Against this, the Cabinet Planning Board strongly demanded a derequisitioning conform to the previously decided plan.

IGHQ’s Classified War Journal put the course of events during this period in the following way:

2 March
The Cabinet Planning Board sent us its demands concerning the derequisitioning of ships.

The Army has not been able to easily decide how to respond to the demands.

That is, the Ministry of War turned down the Army General Staff’s proposal to revise and change [the phrase] “to be returned at the start of the month in question” into “[to be returned] as much as possible at an early stage in the month in question” and to delete the matter that 100,000 tons of army supplies should be included in the total tonnage of 1,000,000 tons [allotted to the Army] from June onwards.

* Number does not add up.
** The original document adds: “While those dealt with by the Army are unclear to us, the status of the others is as follows:”
Insisting that the derequisitioning of ships had been mentioned in the war minister’s report to the Emperor last September, [the ministry] persisted in its own view of that time and pressed the high command [to accept the previous derequisitioning plan], ignoring the current situation and using sophistry that ships for the northern [operation] had also been included in the [tonnage of the derequisitioning] plan.

After discussing the matter the whole day, it was put up for negotiation between the chiefs of the 1st Bureau and the Economic Mobilization Bureau, but it has not been settled.

Thus, the problem of the derequisitioning of ships was not easily settled due to the strong demand of the Army high command, and it ended up being referred to the the Liaison Conference between IGHQ and the Government on 7 March.

The arguments at the conference were recorded in the following way in the Minutes of the Liaison Conferences (memoranda taken by Chief of Army General Staff Sugiyama).

Chief of Army General Staff (note by the author: Gen. Sugiyama Hajime):

As for the derequisitioning of ships requisitioned by the Army, we cannot have you thoughtlessly make a fuss about that (note by the author: the previous derequisitioning plan). The minister of Agriculture and Forestry says that rice for civilian consumption is running short these months. However, in terms of operational aspects, as I stated just now, [Japan is] currently in the final stage of the initial operations and in a crucial period because we must complete the Burma operation before May.

It is impossible to derequisition ships at such a critical moment. The Army knows that provisions are running low. In fact, it has sent the chief of the Third Bureau down to the field [of the operations] to strive to cut down on transport for the army so that commodities can be brought back [to mainland Japan] as much as possible.

Let me underscore that you should not bring up the derequisitioning problem and thoughtlessly try to push it through at this particular moment.

Vice Chief of Army General Staff (note by the author: Lt. Gen. Tanabe Moritake):

The total tonnage of 1,040,000 tons [after derequisitioning] from July onwards is utterly unacceptable.

In terms of the current situation of the Burma operation and the actual transportation conditions in the border area between Thailand and Burma, another 300,000 tons [in shipping tonnage] are by any means necessary [also] from July onwards.

President of Cabinet Planning Board (note by the author: Lt. Gen. Suzuki Teiichi):

It is absolutely impossible to set aside 300,000 tons [of shipping].

Vice Chief of Army General Staff:

Then we have no choice but to call off the Burma operation.

Do you want us to cancel the Burma operation? Do you not care if the front should get bogged down in Burma?

President of Cabinet Planning Board:

[If we allot to the army] another 300,000 tons, it is actually impossible to carry out the materials mobilization plan. Could you make do with 200,000 tons?
Prime Minister [Tōjō]:
How about for the time being setting the total tonnage at 1,040,000 tons, [leaving the exact number] to be decided later?

Chief of Army General Staff:
That will not do.∗

President of Cabinet Planning Board:
By excluding salvaged ships, wooden ships and captured ships from the numbers, and making these ships available, we will make effort to meet your demands somehow. Could you please give your approval with this understanding?

Chief of Army General Staff:
We should not make an agreement on this matter unless the numbers are clearly given.

Prime Minister:
We should make unsparing efforts [to reach an agreement].

Navy Minister (note by the author: Adm. Shimada Shigetarō)
If the Army shipping is in such [dire] circumstances, the Navy shall make efforts in some way or other, too.

Note: Thus, having decided to insert the remarks, “Since the Army has a particular reason to require approximately another 200,000 tons of requisitioned ships from July onwards, efforts to meet this requirement shall separately be made by quickening the salvaging of ships as well as by increasing the use of captured ships, motorized sailing boats, [and wooden ships,] etc.,” they came to an agreement.

After the aforementioned earnest discussion, the following was decided on in the end:

**The Standard for Shipping Operations in Fiscal Year 1942**

**The Actual Situation of the [Total] Tonnage [of Requisitioned Ships Available] and Measures [to Cover the Shortage] (Decisions made at the Liaison Conference [between IGHQ and the Government] on 7 March 1942)**

If the following established tonnage of requisitioned ships for the Army and the Navy needs to be changed in the future, it should be decided once again at a Liaison Conference between IGHQ and the Government.

By this decision, the government shall secure the tonnage required to transport the necessary minimal amount of supplies for the general mobilization.

The Army and the Navy shall cooperate in transporting the supplies for the general mobilization with their requisitioned ships as much as possible.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ships requisitioned by the Army</th>
<th>Ships requisitioned by the Navy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 2,144,400 tons</td>
<td>1,500,000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1,744,400 tons</td>
<td>1,478,700 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1,694,400 tons</td>
<td>the same as the above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1,544,400 tons</td>
<td>the same as the above</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In the original document it is the Vice Chief of the Army General Staff who says, “Then the Burma operation should be cancelled.” To which the Prime Minister answers: “I don’t want that to happen.”
July and onwards 1,044,400 tons the same as the above

(1) The tonnage includes merchantmen and passenger ships of 1,000 tons or more.
(2) Since the Army has a particular reason to require approximately another 200,000 tons of requisitioned ships from July onwards, efforts to meet this requirement shall separately be made by quickening the salvaging of ships as well as by increasing the use of captured ships, motorized sailing boats, and wooden ships, etc.
(3) As for the shipping tonnage of other categories, the numbers in the explanatory documents provided by the president of the Cabinet Planning Board in the Liaison Conference between IGHQ and the Government of October 1941 shall apply.

The high command of the Army thought that if it had to derequisition every month until July the tonnage as established in the above decision, it would have to separately squeeze the tonnage necessary for the concentrated transportation (of about 500,000 tons) for the Burma operation and that for subsequent ongoing transportation needs out of [the ships employed on] all fronts of the southern operation. However, the invasion of Java, in which a considerable loss of ships had been anticipated in the beginning, was making smooth progress with an insignificant loss of ships, which made the high command think that, if the operations of the ships in other areas were closely examined, it was still possible to squeeze out available ships. In the end, it came to the view that with an additional tonnage of 200,000 tons from July onwards, it would somehow be able to accomplish the Burma operation.

This was the first argument after the opening of hostilities about ship [allocations] between the government and the high command. However, the ship [allocation] problems successively became the biggest issue in the subsequent conduct of the war.

Implementation of the Operation to Transport Reinforcements to Burma (Operation U)

Reinforcements to Be Sent by Sea

In the agreement between the Southern Army and the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet of 21 February, (General Agreement No. 8, which was previously mentioned [p. 413]), Operation U was scheduled to be implemented around Day W + 20 (W indicates the day when the operation to sweep mines in the Malacca Strait was largely completed), in parallel with the Andaman operation, with the ports of Singapore and Penang as the assembly points, and Rangoon as the landing point.

The transport ships were [first] to be employed for the Sumatra operation to transport in two shifts the Imperial Guard Division to Sumatra before returning to Singapore and carry the 18th Division to Rangoon.

Apart from the above, it was planned (in the outline on the separate sheet of General Agreement No. 8) that the ships in service in areas such as Saigon, Java, mainland Japan, and Taiwan should be assigned to the transport of the Sakaguchi Detachment (the 56th Division Infantry Group headquarters and the 146th Infantry Regiment as the core), which was in Java, the horses of the 18th Division left in Guangdong, and the units under the direct control of the [Fifteenth] Army, which were to be newly sent into Burma as reinforcements, etc.

However, the sea transport of the main force of the 56th Division, the units of the 33d Division left in eastern China (the infantry group headquarters, the 213th Infantry Regiment,
the 33d Mountain Artillery Regiment (minus the 3d Battalion) and the 33d Transport Regiment (minus the 2d and the 3d Companies) as the core) was not included in this plan; they were supposed to go ashore in Bangkok and advance overland to Burma, along the road connecting Rahaeng and Mae Sot.

Among the above [units], the aforesaid 33d Division units that were to follow and join the division went ashore in Bangkok as planned and then made an overland advance by crossing the mountain system along the border between Thailand and Burma, while on 25 February, the transport of the 56th Division was suddenly changed from that by land to that by sea.

The following is an outline of the formation of the 56th Division and its movements after the completion of its formation.

The order to form the 56th Division was issued on 15 December 1941, and its formation was completed on 23 December of the same year in the Kurume divisional district.

Due to the formation of the Sakaguchi Detachment, the infantry group headquarters, the 146th Infantry Regiment, the 56th Field Artillery Regiment, the 56th Transport Regiment and the 1st Field Hospital had completed their formation in late October, ahead of the formation of the main force of the division. After its formation, the Sakaguchi Detachment ([consisting of] the infantry group headquarters, the 146th Infantry Regiment and the 1st Field Artillery Battalion as the core) advanced to Moji, and left port between 17 and 19 November for Palau.

The division consisted of the divisional headquarters (commander: Lt. Gen. Watanabe Masao), the infantry group headquarters (commander: Maj. Gen. Sakaguchi Shizuo), the 113th Infantry Regiment (commander: Col. Matsui Hideji), the 146th Infantry Regiment (commander: Col. Yamamoto Kyōhei), the 148th Infantry Regiment (commander: Col. Matsumoto Kiroku), the 56th Field Artillery Regiment (commander: Col. Tōmi Mutsutsugu), the 56th Reconnaissance Regiment (commander: Col. Hirai Usuke), the 56th Engineer Regiment (commander: Lt. Col. Ejima Tsuneo), the divisional signal unit, the 56th Transport Regiment (commander: Col. Ikeda Kōichi), and others.

Note: On 28 March 1942, Col. Imaoka Sōshirō replaced Colonel Yamamoto as the 146th Infantry Regiment commander.

An infantry regiment consisted of three battalions, an infantry artillery battery, an antitank gun battery and a signal unit, of which an infantry battalion consisted of three companies, a machinegun battery and an infantry artillery section.

A reconnaissance regiment consisted of three companies and a signal company, all motorized.

A field artillery regiment consisted of three battalions, of which two battalions were equipped with field guns and another battalion with 10cm howitzers.

From 13 February onwards, the main force of the division successively departed from its place of formation, went to Moji by rail, where it embarked between the 14th and the 17th of the month, and headed for Bangkok in two convoys.

The first convoy of six ships (the divisional headquarters, the 148th Infantry Regiment, one field artillery battalion, the engineer regiment, the medical unit and one field hospital), left [the waters] off Mutsure of Yamaguchi Prefecture (off the waters west of Shimonoseki) on the morning of the 17th, and reached Saigon on the 23d.
The second convoy of seven ships left [the waters] off Mutsure on the morning of the 18th. Although it temporarily took shelter in the Karatsu Bay en route due to the appearance of an enemy submarine, it resumed sailing and reached Saigon on 5 March.\(^{(87)}\)

In the initial plan of IGHQ and the Southern Army, the 56th Division was supposed to land in Bangkok and make an overland advance from there to Burma by crossing the border between Thailand and Burma, while the ships employed for carrying the division to Bangkok were supposed to be emptied there and sent then to Singapore, from where they would carry reinforcements for the Burma [operation] to Rangoon.

However, having troops march on foot to cross the border of Thailand and Burma would involve enormous difficulties, markedly deteriorate the fighting strength of the unit, and moreover, would take considerable time, so the Southern Army suddenly started studying alternatives.

As a result, the army changed [the plan] so as to have the division continue its sail directly from Saigon to Rangoon by way of Singapore, and immediately took the necessary emergency steps.

That is, to have the first convoy, which had already left Saigon on 24 February for Bangkok, sail back to Saigon.

The following telegrams explain the turn of events during this period:

**To: Chief of Staff of the Fifteenth Army**  
**From: Chief of Staff of the Southern Army**

Southern Army Staff Section 1, Telegram No. 997 (25 February)
The 56th Division shall be transported to Rangoon by sea.

Accordingly, the first echelon shall immediately return to Saigon, while the second echelon shall respectively replenish oil (or coal) on the way at Saigon, and [both] shall reach Rangoon around 20 March by way of Singapore.

Due to the above, the arrival of the 18th Division [in Rangoon] shall be a little delayed until early April.

**To: Vice Chief of Army General Staff**  
**From: Chief of Staff of the Southern Army**

Southern Army Staff Section 1, Telegram No. 7 (26 February)
The original plan was to concentrate the 56th Division in Burma by land. However, in view of the situation that it [is expected to] take about forty days to march [into Burma] because of the unexpectedly poor condition of the newly constructed road connecting Rahaeng and Mae Sot and the poor condition of the river-crossing facilities over the Salween River, we had no choice but to concentrate [the division in Burma] by sea, by rearranging the operation schedules of the ships or by using them on a shuttle service.

We request your approval.

The schedule to concentrate [the division] in Burma is basically as shown in General Agreement No. 7, however, details shall be newly sent by telegram after arrangements are made the day after tomorrow, the 28th, in Singapore.

Thus, the 56th Division, which had gone ashore in Saigon and waited for a while, [finally] left Saigon on 10 March, and called at Singapore en route, from where, under the escort of the Navy, it sailed the Malacca Strait and the Andaman Sea northward and reached the port of Rangoon on 25 March.

Meanwhile, it was decided that the Sakaguchi Detachment (which had participated in the Java operation under the control of the Sixteenth Army) should be transferred to Burma...
after the invasion of Java and return to its original unit (the 56th Division). While leaving behind the Kume Detachment (the main force of the 1st Battalion of the 146th Infantry Regiment as the core), which had been assigned to guard Sanga Sanga in eastern Borneo at that time, [the Sakaguchi Detachment] left Java on 31 March for Singapore, from where the detachment sailed to Rangoon in the third transport convoy and arrived there on 19 April.

In successive engagements from the opening of hostilities onwards, the Sakaguchi Detachment had sustained loss of a total of 158 men, of whom, six officers and forty-three non-commissioned officers and men were killed and six officers and one hundred three non-commissioned officers and men were wounded in action. In conformity with the Southern Army Order of 31 March, the Kume Detachment, which had been left in Sanga Sanga, handed over the guarding of the place to the Navy, followed the main force of the regiment and shifted to Burma.

In the meantime, it was decided that the 18th Division, which after the fall of Singapore had shifted to Johore to restore public order and enforce strict control over the Chinese residents there, should be transferred to Burma, while the Sumatra operation, in which the division had been previously and unofficially told to participate, was assigned to the Imperial Guard Division.

And, as previously told, the [18th Division’s] 56th Infantry Regiment 2d Battalion (commander: Capt. Hayashi Reizō) had participated in the Andaman operation under the command of Navy Capt. Kawasaki Harumi.

However, the time for the division to be transferred to Burma drew nearer; it handed over the guard of Johore to the Imperial Guard Division’s 5th Infantry Regiment and successively assembled in Singapore.

The division left the port on 2 April and arrived in Rangoon on the evening of 7 April. The battalion led by Capt. Hayashi Reizō left the Andaman Islands (Port Blair) on 16 April, followed the main force of the division and arrived in Rangoon on the evening of the 17th.

The Implementation of Operation U

The reinforcements for the Burma [operation] were supposed to make preparations mainly in Singapore, sail northward while hugging the Malay Peninsula and remaining within the sphere of action of Japanese air power. They would be escorted by surface forces consisting mainly of the 2d Escort Unit led by [Navy] 9th Special Base Force Commander R. Adm. Hiraoka Kumeichi. After arriving at the mouth of the Rangoon River, they were supposed to sail upstream escorted and guided by the Navy Base Unit stationed in Rangoon, and go ashore at the port of Rangoon.

Thus, in the space of about forty days from 19 March when a convoy of thirty-two ships of the first transport unit carrying the 56th Division left the port of Singapore, until 28 April when the last fourteen ships of the fourth transport convoy reached Rangoon, the transport operation was carried out with a total of 134 ships.

During this period, there was no loss inflicted by enemy aircraft or submarines, and the operation was carried out very smoothly.

Prior to the arrival of the above transport convoys in Rangoon, the units of the [Navy] 12th Special Base Force, newly formed to be stationed there, had left the port of Penang on 20 March under the command of Commander R. Adm. Ishikawa Shigeru, advanced to a point near Elephant Point at the mouth of the Irrawaddy [Rangoon] River on the evening of
the 22d. Having spotted no underwater obstacles other than sunken ships, [the unit] there-
after sailed upstream the Rangoon River and advanced to Rangoon at 1800 on the next day
the 23d.

On the following day, the 24th, [the unit] completely cleared the waterways from the
mouth of the river up to Rangoon and guided the first convoy, which arrived at the mouth
of the Rangoon River at noon of that day.

The following is an outline of each transport and the escort operations.\(^{84}\)

**First Transport** (the main force of the 56th Division)

- Escort forces: the *Kashii*, the *Shimushu* (replaced en route by the *Hatsutaka*), the *Hatakaze* (re-
  placed en route by the *Harukaze*), the *Asakaze*, the *Matsukaze*, the *Shikinami* and
  *Submarine Chaser No. 7*
- Transport ships: 32 slow ships
  11 fast ships
- 19 March (20th for the fast ships): Departure from Singapore
- 24 March: Arrival in Rangoon

**Second Transport** (the 18th Division)

- Escort forces: the *Kashii* (replaced en route by the *Hatsutaka*), the *Shimushu, Submarine Chaser*
  No. 8, the *Shikinami* (turned back along the route), the *Hatakaze* (separated for
  a part of the route); the *Kari* joined en route
- Transport ships: 45 ships
- 2 April: Departure from the anchorage for Keppel West, port of Singapore
- 7 April: Arrival in Rangoon

**Third Transport** (the Sakaguchi Detachment and others)

- Escort forces: Escort Unit of the 10th Special Base Force up to the waters off Penang.
  From the waters off Penang: the *Hatsutaka*, the *Asakaze*, the *Akikaze*, the 11th
  Subchaser Division (minus *Submarine Chaser No. 9*), and the *Kari*
- Transport ships: 32 ships
- 13 April: Departure from the port of Singapore
- 19 April: Arrival in Rangoon

**Fourth Transport** (other units)

- Escort forces: the forces of the 9th Special Base Force (44th Minesweeper Division up to the
  waters off Penang)
- Transport ships: 14 ships
- 22 April: Departure from the port of Singapore
- 28 April: Arrival in Rangoon

Apart from the above, the movements of the main unit of the [Navy] Malaya Unit led by the
V. Adm. Ozawa Jisaburō were as mentioned in the sections about the Andaman operation.

[The Effort of] the Units of the 33d Division Left Behind in Eastern China to Catch Up by
Land

When transferred to Thailand, the 33d Division left in eastern China the 213th Infantry Reg-
iment (commander: Col. Miyawaki Kōsuke), the 33d Mountain Artillery Regiment (minus
the 3d Battalion), the 33d Transport Regiment (minus the 2d and the 3d Companies), one
engineer company and the 1st Field Hospital, all led by Infantry Group Commander Maj. Gen.
Araki Masatsugu.
In order to catch up with the main force of the division, the above units embarked in thirteen transport ships at Nanjing between 4 and 8 February, assembled at Magong in Taiwan one after another between 16 and 21 February, and went ashore in Bangkok between 6 and 8 March.

After that, they advanced toward Burma by land and marched the long distance toward the battlefield of the main force of the division.\(^{(78,89)}\)

Meanwhile, the main force of the 33d Division, which had captured Rangoon on 8 March and proceeded to prepare for its advance toward Prome, started from Rangoon on the night of 25 March to seize Prome.

Therefore, among the aforesaid units which were trying to catch up [with the main force] by land, only Infantry Group Commander Major General Araki and the 213th Infantry Regiment 1st Battalion (commander: Maj. Arinobu Iwao), who had been marching at the head, arrived in time in Rangoon before the main force started [for Prome].\(^{(47)}\)
Notes Volume 5, Chapter 4


(28) ‘Ishii shiryō’ ([The Ishii documents]). The documents about operations in the possession of Maj. Gen. Ishii Masayoshi, senior staff officer of Section 1 of the Southern Army at the time of the opening of hostilities, when the operations were under way, and the documents such as various kind of orders, plans, agreements and intelligence related to the Southern Army, which had been kept in the Demobilization Bureau after the war and which he [later] sorted out and kept as records of the Southern Army.

(30) ‘Tairikumei-tsuzuri’ ([The files of IGHQ Army Department orders]). File[s] of the Imperial Orders passed down by the Army Department of IGHQ.

(38) ‘Daihon’ei–Seifu Renraku Kaigi Gijiroku’ ([The minutes of the Liaison Conferences between IGHQ and the Government]).

(39) ‘Nampo-gun Kankei Dempo-tsuuzuri’ ([File[s] of the telegrams related to the Southern Army]).

(47) Ida Masataka Chūsa no shuki, ‘Dai-Sanjū-san Shidan no Sakusen’ ([The operations of the 33d Division', A personal account by [later] Lt. Col. Ida Masataka]), [then] 33d Division staff officer.

(53) ‘Arao Nikki’ ([Arao's Diary], Diary kept by [later] Col. Arao Okikatsu]), [then] staff officer of the Southern Army.

(54) Kitayama Yūzō Taisa kaisō ([Recollections of Col. Kitayama Yūzō]).

(66) Hashimoto Hiroshi Taisa kaisō ([Recollections of [later] Col. Hashimoto Hiroshi]), [then] staff officer of the 18th Division.

(75) ‘Tokyo Asahi Shimbun’ ([Tokyo Asahi Shimbun [Newspaper]]).

(76) Hayashi Reizō Shōsa no nikki ([Diary kept by [later] Maj. Hayashi Reizō]), [then] 56th Infantry Regiment 2d Battalion commander.

(77) Oinuma Yoshio Taisa no kaisō, ‘Konoé Hohei Dai-san Rentai Senki’ ([An account of war of the Imperial Guard Division 3d Infantry Regiment,’ a memoir by Col. Oinuma Yoshio]), [then] Imperial Guard Division 3d Infantry Regiment commander.

(79) ‘Dai-Nana Sentai Sentō Shōhō’ ([Action report of the 7th Cruiser Division]).

(80) ‘Dai-Nana Sentai Sentō Shōhō’ oyobi Kaigun Sakusen Kenkyū Shiryō ‘Hokubu Sumatora Jōrikku Sakusen’ ([Action report of the 7th Cruiser Division’ and ‘Northern Sumatra Landing Operation,’ Operation reviews by the Navy]).


(83) Sawamura Shunsuke Taisa no kaisō ([Recollections of Col. Sawamura Shunsuke]), [then] commander of the 5th Infantry Regiment of the Imperial Guard Division.

(84) Kaigun Sakusen Kenkyū Shiryō ‘Maré Butai Dai-Ichi-Dan Dai-Ni-Ki Sakusen’ (海軍作戦研究資料「馬來部隊第一段第二期作戦」 [Stage-One Phase-Two Operations of the Malaya Unit,’ Operation reviews of the Navy]).
(85) Sawamura Shunsuke Taisa no ‘Konoé Hohei Dai-Go Rentai no Kōdō Gaïyō’ (澤村俊雄大佐の「近衛歩兵第五聯隊の行動概要」 [‘The outline of the actions of the Imperial Guard Division 5th Infantry Regiment’, provided by Col. Sawamura Shunsuke]).

(86) ‘Kaigun Dai-Kyū Tokubetsu Konkyochi-tai Senji Nisshi’ (海軍第九特別根拠地隊戦時日誌 [‘War journal kept by the Navy 9th Special Base Force’]).

(87) Dai Gojū-roku Shidan-chō no ‘Jōkyō Hōkoku-sho’ (第五十六師団長の「状況報告書’ [‘The status report,’ submitted by the 56th Division commander]).

(88) ‘Dai Gojū-roku Shidan Shijitsu Shiryō-tsuzuri’ (第五十六師団史実資料綴 [‘Files of documents of historical facts of the 56th Division’]).

(89) Ueno Shigeru Taisa no shuki ‘Sempaku Yusō no Kenkyū’ (上野滋大佐の手記「船舶輸送の研究’ [‘Study of the shipping transportation,’ notes of [later] Col. Ueno Shigeru], [then] staff officer of the Shipping Transport Command.

(90) ‘Shōwa Jūroku-nen, Jūichi-gatsu Itsuka, Teikoku Kokusaku Suikō Yōryō (Gozen Kaigi Gi-jiroku)’ (昭和16-11-5帝国国策遂行要領 (御前会議議事録) [‘Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy’ decided on 5 November 1941, (the minutes of the Imperial conference)].

(92) [This part] was [written] with reference to the account provided by [Maj. Nagatomi Moriyoshi, commander of the 3d Machinegun Battery], which belonged to [the Yoshida Detachment] in the war and others, along with the then articles of Tokyo Asahi Shimbun [Newspaper].

(93) [This part] was [written] with reference to the recollections of [later] Maj. Gen. Kunishi Kentarō, who was [then] regimental adjutant [1st Lt. Kimura Yuichirō, then regimental adjutant], and others, along with the then articles of Tokyo Asahi Shimbun [Newspaper].
Glossary

Army

15-cm Howitzer Battery jū-qī-chū taitai
1st Bureau (Operations Bureau), 1st Bureau (Sakusen-bu)
[Army Department of IGHQ] Dai-ichi-bu (Sakusen-bu)
2d Bureau (Intelligence Bureau), 2nd Bureau (Jōhō-bu)
[Army Department of IGHQ] Dai-ni-bu (Jōhō-bu)

Air Arm of the Southern Army Nampō-gun Kōkū Butai
[Numbered] Air Force Hikōhō Shūdan

Air Armament, Ordnance Nampō-gun Heiki-bu

Air Army/Theater Air Force Kōkū Gun

Air Corps Kōkū Heidan

Air Division Hikō Shūdan

Air Force Hikō Sentai

Air Field Battalion/Company Hikō-jō Daitai

Air Group Hikō-shō/-shishō

Air Transport Unit/ Squadron Hikōtsūshin Sentai

Air Intelligence Unit Kōkū Jōhō Tai

Air Raid Warden Oberhaupt der Luftschutzführung

Air Signal Unit/ Company Hikō Chūtai

Air Transport Unit/ Squadron Hikō Chūtai

Airfield Battalion/ Company Hikō-jō Daitai

Airfield Duty Unit Hikō-jō Kimmu Butai

Airfield Headquarters Hikō-jō Shihaku-bu

Anti-aircraft Artillery Regiment/Battalion Kōshahō Sentai/Daitai

Anti-aircraft Searchlight Company Shōkū Chūtai

Army Affairs Section [of the Ministry of War] Gunji-ka [Rikugun-shō]

Rikugun Kōkū Gijutsu Kenkyū-jo

Rikugun Kōkū Gijutsu Gakkō

Land Army

Air Arm of the Southern Army Nampō-gun Kōkū Butai

Air Armament, Ordnance Nampō-gun Heiki-bu

Air Army/Theater Air Force Kōkū Gun

Air Corps Kōkū Heidan

Air Division Hikō Shūdan

Air Force Hikō Sentai

Air Field Battalion/Company Hikō-jō Daitai

Air Group Hikō-shō/-shishō

Air Transport Unit/Squadron Hikōtsūshin Sentai

Air Intelligence Unit Kōkū Jōhō Tai

Air Raid Warden Oberhaupt der Luftschutzführung

Air Signal Unit/ Company Hikō Chūtai

Airfield Battalion/ Company Hikō-jō Daitai

Airfield Duty Unit Hikō-jō Kimmu Butai

Airfield Headquarters Hikō-jō Shihaku-bu

Anti-aircraft Artillery Regiment/Battalion Kōshahō Sentai/Daitai

Anti-aircraft Searchlight Company Shōkū Chūtai

Army Affairs Section [of the Ministry of War] Gunji-ka [Rikugun-shō]
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| Army Flight Test Department | Akeno/Hakujōshi / Hamamatsu/Hokota/Kumagaya/Mito/Shimoshizū/Tachiaraiz/Tokorozawa/Utsunomiya | 浜松/鈴田/熊谷/ /
| Army Flying School, Akeno/Baichengzi/Hamamatsu/Hokota/Kumagaya/Mito/Shimoshizū/Tachiaraiz/Tokorozawa/Utsunomiya | Kōka Gakkō | 明野/白城下/ |
| Army Ordnance Administration Headquarters | Rikugun Heiki Gōsei Hombu | 陸軍兵器行政本部 |
| Army Ordnance Depot | Rikugun Heiki-shō | 陸軍兵器廠 |
| Army Ordnance Headquarters | Rikugun Heiki Hombu | 陸軍兵器本部 |
| army railway unit | gun tetsudō butai | (第16)軍鉄道部隊 |
| army signal unit | gun tsūshin tai | 軍通信隊 |
| Army Technological Headquarters | Rikugun Gijutsu Hombu | 陸軍技術本部 |
| Army Technological Laboratory | Rikugun Gijutsu Kenkyū-jo | 陸軍技術研究所 |
| Army Toyama [Training] School | Rikugun Toyama Gakkō | 陸軍戸山学校 |
| assault plane | shūgeki-ki | 袭撃機 |
| Aviation Group [of Section 2 (Operations Section) of IGHQ] | Kōkō Han [Daihō-ei] Dai-ni-ka (Sakusen-ka)] | 航空班 [大本営第二課(作戦課)] |
| Aviation Group [of Section 3 (Organization and Mobilization Section) of IGHQ] | Kōkō Han [Daihō-ei] Dai-san-ka (Hensei, Dōin-ka)] | 航空班 [大本営第三課(編成・動員課)] |
| aviation training unit | kōkō kyōiku-tai | 航空教育隊 |
| battalion artillery section | daitaihō shōtai | 大隊砲小隊 |
| bridge building material company | kakyō za iryō chūtai | 橋梁材料中隊 |
| cavalry regiment | kihei rentai | 騎兵聯隊 |
| Central District Army | Chūbu Gun | 中部軍 |
| Central Shipping Transport, [Ministry of War] | Un’yu-bu | 運輸部 |
| China Expedi tory Army | Shina Haken Gun | 支那派遣軍 |
| combat relief squad | sentō kyūgo han | 戦闘救護班 |
| construction duty company | kenchiku kimmu chūtai | 建築勤務中隊 |
detachment

direct support aircraft

direction finder

Direction Finder Unit [17th]

Disembarkation Group [1st]

disembarkation working unit

division

division headquarters

divisional district

divisional signal unit

Eastern District Army

Economic Mobilization Bureau, Seibi-kyoku

[Ministry of War]

engineer regiment

equipment platoon

field aircraft depot/ detached depot

field aircraft repair depot

field aircraft supply depot

field airfield construction unit

field antiaircraft artillery regiment /

battalion (B)

field antiaircraft defense unit headquarters

field artillery regiment

field duty unit headquarters

field freight depot

field gas company

field heavy artillery regiment

field hospital

(field) meteorological battalion/

company/unit

field military police unit

field motor transport depot

field ordnance depot

field postal unit

Field Replenishment Air Unit [1st]

Field Replenishment Air Unit [1st]

Flight Test Group [of the Army Flight Test Department]

flight training unit

General Affairs Division [of the Army Aviation Headquarters, etc.]
General Clerical Section [of the Army Aviation Headquarters, etc.]

General Defense Command
ground duty company [Army aviation]
ground service unit
guarding company
heavy bomber
Imperial Guard Division
Imperial Japanese Military Academy
independent air division/unit/
squadron
independent antitank gun
battalion/battery
independent balloon company
Independent Defense Unit
independent engineer regiment/company
(electricity)/[[to facilitate] river-crossing of heavy equipment]
independent field antiaircraft artillery
battery (horse-carried)
independent mixed brigade
independent motor transport
battalion/company
independent radio platoon
infantry artillery unit
infantry group
infantry regiment/brigade/
battalion/company/platoon
Information Department,
[Ministry of War]

Inspectorate General of [Army] Aviation
Inspectorate General of
Line of Communications
Inspectorate General of Military Training
intendance department director
Japanese China Garrison Army
junior airmen
Kwantung Army
legal department director
light-armored car unit
light bomber
line-of-communications area unit
line-of-communications
hospital/medical unit
line-of-communications motor
transport company
line-of-communications sick horse depot
machine gun company

Shomu-ka [Rikugun Kōkū Hombu]
Bōei Sō-shirei-bu
rikujō kimmu chūtai
chijō kimmu butai
keibi chūtai
jū-bakugeki-ki
Kono’e Shidan
Rikugun Shikan Gakkō
dokuritsu hikō dan/taidaitai
chūtai
dokuritsu sokushahō
daïtai/chūtai
dokuritsu kikyū chūtai
Dokuritsu Shubi Tai
dokuritsu kōhei rentai/chūtai (denki)/(jūtoga)
dokuritsu yasen kōshähō
daitai/chūtai
dokuritsu konsei ryodan
daïtai/chūtai
dokuritsu musen shōtai
hohei hō tai
hohei dan
hohei rentai/ryodan/
daïtai/chūtai/shōtai
Hōdō-bu

Kōkū Sōkan-bu
Heitan Sōkan-bu
Kyōiku Sōkan-bu
Kantō Gun
hōmu-buchō
kei-sōkōsha tai
kei-bakugeki-ki
heitan chiku tai
heitan
byōin/eisei tai
heitan jūdōsha chūtai
heitan byōba-shō
kikanjū chūtai

庶務課 [陸軍航空本部等]
防衛総司令部
陸上勤務中隊
地上勤務部隊
警備中隊
重爆撃機
近衛師団
陸軍士官学校
独立飛行団/隊/中隊
独立速射砲
大隊/中隊
独立気球中隊
独立守備隊
独立工兵联隊/中隊
(電気)/（重渡河）
独立野戦高射砲
中隊 (騎[馬])
独立混成旅団
独立自動車
大隊/中隊
独立無線小隊
歩兵砲隊
歩兵団
歩兵聯隊/旅団/
大隊/中隊/小隊
報道部
航空総監部
兵站総監部
教育総監部
経理部長
支那駐屯軍
少年飛行兵
関東軍
法務部長
軽装甲車隊
軽爆撃機
兵站地区隊
兵站
病院/衛生隊
兵站自動車中隊
兵站病院
機関銃中隊
Main Aircraft Depot
Manchurian North Eastern Defense Air Force
Mark-3 radio squad
material depot
medical department director
medical unit
meteorological battalion/company
meteorological observation detail
military administration department
Military Affairs Bureau,

[Ministry of War]
Ministry of War
mixed brigade/infantry group
mobile aircraft repair detail
mortar battalion
motor transport squad
motorcycle unit
mountain artillery regiment
Northern China Area Army
Northern District Army
Office of Army General Staff
Office of the Chief of Field Air
Ordnance
oil-drilling section
on-board antiaircraft artillery regiment
Operations Section [of Army
General Staff or IGHQ]
Ordnance Bureau [of the Ministry
of War]
ordnance department director
ordnance service unit
patient transport unit HQ/platoon
press corps
Propaganda Group
radio telegraph platoon
radio wave guarding system A, B
raiding air unit, [paratroop]
Raiding Group, [1st Paratroop]
raiding regiment, [paratroop]
Raiding Training Department, [Paratroop]
railway depot headquarters
railway regiment
reconnaissance regiment
regimental artillery battery/section
regimental signal squad

Kôkû Hon-shô
Manshû Tôhoku Kôkû Gun
san-gô-musen bunta
zaïryô-shô
gun’i-buchô
eisei tai
kîshô daïtau/chûtau
sokkô han
gunsei-bu
Gummu-kyoku

[Rikugun-shô]
Rikugun-shô
consei ryodan/hoheidan
kôkû idô shûri han
hakugeki daïtau
jidôsha han
jidô-nirinsha tai
sampohei rentai
Kita-shina Hômen Gun
Hokubu Gun
Sambô Hombu
Yasen Kôkû Heiki
Chôkan-bu
saiyu han
sempaku kôshahô rentai
Sakusen-ka [Sambô
Hombu or IGHQ]
Heiki-kyoku

[Rikugun-shô]
heiki-buchô
heiki kimmu tai
kan’ja yusô tai hombu/shôtai
hôdô han
Senden Han
musen denshin shôtai
dempa keikai-ki Kô, Otsu
teishin hikô tai
Teishin Dan [Dai-ichi]
teishin rentai
Teishin Renshû-bu

teishajô shirei-bu
tetsudô rentai
sôsaku rentai
rentaihô chûtau/shôtai
rentai tsûshin han

航空本廠
滿州東北航空軍
(東北邊防航空軍)
3号無線分隊
材料廠
軍医部長
衛生隊
気象大隊/中隊
測候班
軍政部
軍務局
[陸軍省]
陸軍省
混成旅団/歩兵団
航空移動修理班
迫撃大隊
自動車班
自動二輪車隊
山砲兵聯隊
北支那方面軍
北部軍
參謀本部
野戦航空兵器長官部
採油班
船舶高射砲聯隊
作戰課
[參謀本部, 大本營]
兵器局
[陸軍省]
兵器部長
兵器勤務隊
患者輸送隊本部/小隊
報道班
宣伝班
無線電信小隊
電波警戒機甲, 乙
挺進飛行隊
挺進[第一]
挺進聯隊
挺進練習部
停車場司令部
鉄道聯隊
搜索聯隊
聯隊砲中隊/小隊
联隊通信班
Glossary

Replenishment Division [of Army
Aviation Headquarters]
Research Department
Resource section, [Ministry of War]
river-crossing material company
sea duty company
sea transport supervisory unit
Section 2 (Operations Section),
[Army Department of IGHQ]
Section 3 (Organization and
Mobilization Section),
[Army Department of IGHQ]
Section 4 (Mainland Defense Section)
[of Army General Staff then]
servicing company
ship repair depot
Shipboard Aircraft Depot
shipping engineer
shipping signal regiment
Shipping Transport Command
shore duty company
sick horse depot
signal unit/squad
South China Meteorological Department
Southern Army
Southern China Area Army
Southern Group,
[Army Department of IGHQ]
special air transport unit
Special Broadcasting Detail
squad
squad for collecting cast-off articles
strategic reconnaissance aircraft/
[command reconnaissance aircraft]
supply platoon of the train [of regiment]
tactical reconnaissance aircraft/
[army reconnaissance aircraft]
Taiwan Army
tank regiment
Technical Department of the air
arm of the Southern [Army]
telegraph regiment
transport aircraft
transport regiment
Transport section, [Ministry of War]
twin-engine light bomber
ultrashort wave guarding system
unit
Hokyū-bu [Rikugun Kōkū
Hombu]
Kenkyū-bu
Shigen-ka [Rikugun-shō]
toga zairyō chūtai
suijō kimmu chūtai
kaijō yusō kanshi tai
Dai-ni-ka (Sakusen-ka)

Dai-san-ka
(Hensei, Dōin-ka)
Dai-yon-ka [Hondo Bōei
Tantō, Sambō Hombu]
seibi chūtai
sempaku kōsaku-shō
Sempaku Kōkō-shō
sempaku kōhei
sempaku tsūshin rentai
Sempaku Yusō Shirei-bu
rikujō kimmu chūtai
byōba-shō
tsūshin tai/han
Minami-shina Kishō-bu
Nampō Gun
Minami-shina Hōmen Gun
Nampō Han

tokusetsu yusō hikō tai
Tokushu Hōsō Han
buntai
ikibutsu shūshū han
shōrei hōsei-ki [shitei]
rantai danretsu hokyū shōtai
gun teisatsu-ki [guntei]

Taiwan Gun
sensha rentai
Nampō-gun Kōkū Gijutsu-
bu
denshin rentai
yusō-ki
shichō rentai
Kōtsū-ka [Rikugun-shō]
sōhatsu kei-bakugeki-ki
chōtampa keikaki
tai/butai

租借材料中隊
水上勤務中隊
海上輸送監視隊
第二課 (作戦課)

第三課
(編制・動員課)

第四課（本土防衛担当）
[参謀本部(當時)]

整備中隊
船舶工作廠
船舶航空廠
船舶工兵
船舶通信聯隊
船舶輸送司令部
陸上勤務中隊
病馬廠
通信隊/班
南支那気象部
南方軍
南支那方面軍
南方班

特設輸送飛行隊
特殊放送班
分隊
遺棄物収集班
司令部偵察機 [司倠]

軍偵察機 [軍倠]

電信聯隊
輸送機
幅重聯隊
交通課 [陸軍省]
超短波警戒器
隊 / 部隊
### Glossary

**unit under direct control of**
the [Sixteenth] Army

**vessel launching unit**

**veterinary department director**

**veterinary quarantine depot**

**voluntarily enlisted reserve officer**

**War College**

**War Preparation Section, [Ministry of War]**

**water supply and purification department**

**wire company**

---

**Navy**

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**air group detachment**

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<p>| teishin butai | 持進部隊 |
| sokushahō-tai [rikusen-tai] | 遠射砲隊 [陸戦隊] |
| hō-tai [rikusen-tai] | 砲隊 [陸戦隊] |
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<td>shirei</td>
<td>司令</td>
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<td>commander</td>
<td>shirei-kan</td>
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Defense Unit [1st, 2d]
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"Destroyer Squadron [10th [Destroyer] Squadron]"
detached unit [of a base force]
detached unit [of an air flotilla]
Dutch East Indies Unit
East Indies Unit
East Philippines Unit
Eastern Attack Unit
Eastern Support Unit
engineer unit [of the SLF]
Escort Unit [1st, 2d, 3d]
[of Malaya Unit, Dutch East Indies Unit, etc.]
Glossary
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chūtai [rikusen-tai]  中隊 [陸戦隊]
Setsuei-han [Dai-ichi, Dai-ni, Dai-san, Dai-yon, Dai-go, Dai-roku, Dai-hachi, Dai-kyū]
Kensetsu-bu  建設部 [第102]
Sentai [Dai-yon, Dai-go, Dai-roku, Dai-hachi, Dai-kyū, Dai-jū-roku, Dai-jū-hachi, Dai-nijū-ichi]
Bōei-han [Dai-ichi, Dai-ni]  防衛班 [第1, 2]
Bōbi-tai [Dai-ichi, Dai-ni]  防衛隊 [第1, 2]
Suirai Sentai [Dai-ichi, Dai-ni, Dai-san, Dai-yon, Dai-go, Dai-roku]
Sentai [Dai-jū]  戦隊 [第10]
bunken-tai  分遣隊
kōkū sentai haken-tai  航空戦隊派遣隊
Ran’in Butai  蘭印部隊
Tōin Butai  東印部隊
Hitō Higashi Butai  比島東部隊
Tohō Kōryaku Butai  東方攻略部隊
Tohō Shien-tai  東方支援隊
kōsaku-tai [rikusen-tai]  工作隊 [陸戦隊]
Goei-tai [Dai-ichi, Dai-ni, Dai-san]
[bunkentai, kōkū sentai haken-tai, Ran’in Butai, Tōin Butai, Hitō Higashi Butai, Tohō Kōryaku Butai, Tohō Shien-tai, kōsaku-tai [rikusen-tai], Goei-tai [Dai-ichi, Dai-ni, Dai-san], [Malaya Unit, Dutch East Indies Unit, etc.]]
fighter plane unit
dispatched from an air group

fire-control officer
Fleet [First, Second, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth]

Forward Unit
Fuel Depot [101st]

ground patrol section [of base force]
Greater East Asia War’s Lessons of War
([section] Air Operations)

Guard District [Makô]
Guard Unit [2d, 3d, 4th, 91st, Celebes,
Ambon]

Gunboat Division [1st, 2d, 3d, 12th]
gunnery staff
headquarters
headquarters [of the SLF]
homeland units
Hydrographic Department
Kure [Naval Station] Special Landing Force
[1st, 2d, 3d]

land-based air unit
land-based attack plane
lookout commander
main body [of task force, group, unit]
main force
main unit [of task force, group, unit]
Malaya Unit
Malaya Unit Striking Force
medical unit [of the SLF]
mid-sized [medium-sized] land-based
attack plane
military supplies department
Minelayer Division [17th, 19th]

Minesweeper Division [1st, 11th, 21st,
30th, 41st, 44th]
Glossary

Dai-yonjū-ichi, Dai-yon[jū-yon]

Gummu-kyoku [Kaigun-shō]

Kaigun Taisen Gakkō

Kaigun Kōshō

[Da-i-hyaku-ichi, Toyokawa, Yokosuka]

Heibi-kyoku [Kaigun-shō]

Kaigun Gijutsu Kenkyū-sho

Kōkai-chō

Kōkū-Hombu

Daihon’ei Kaigun-bu

Shisetsu-bu

Gunrei-bu

Kaigun-shō

Kansei Hombu

Hoppō Butai

[suijō] kansoku-ki

shintō butai

kūtai butai

Shōkai-tai or Shōkaitei-tai

[Dai-ichi]

kannai shōkai
dai-ichi haibi

shukei-tai [rikusen-tai]

Hitō Butai

Kōmu-bu [Dai-ichi, Dai-ni]

Suishibumi

[Dai-itchaku sagyō,

Dai-ni-chaku sagyō]

keikai kōkō taikei

keikai kōkō joretsu

Kyūshō-tai [Dai-ichi,

Dai-ni, Dai-san, Dai-yan,

Dai-go]

sokuteki shiki-kan

keikai butai

suijō teisatsu-ki

Palembang sokō-butai

Sasebo [Chīn’ju-fu] Rengō

Tokubetsu rikusen-tai

[Dai-ichi, Dai-ni]
seaplane base
Seaplane Tender Division [11th, 12th]
section
[of the 1st/2d Combined Signal Unit]
section [of a ship division]
senior staff officer
Ship Management Association
Signal Unit [1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 12th, 21st, 24th, 91st, Chichijima, Okinawa, Takao, Tokyo]

South Seas Unit
Southern Expeditionary Fleet
[First, Second, Third]
Southern Task Force
Southwest Area Fleet
Special Base Force [9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 21st, 22d, 23d, 24th, 31st, 32d]
special landing force [SLF]
special meteorological detail
special minesweeping service unit
squadron [of air units]
Subchaser Division [1st, 2d, 5th, 11th, 12th, 21st, 31st]

Submarine Base Unit [11th, 21st]
Submarine Division [1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 33d]
Submarine Squadron [1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 

Glossary

seaplane base
Seaplane Tender Division [11th, 12th]
section
[of the 1st/2d Combined Signal Unit]
section [of a ship division]
senior staff officer
Ship Management Association
Signal Unit [1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 12th, 21st, 24th, 91st, Chichijima, Okinawa, Takao, Tokyo]

South Seas Unit
Southern Expeditionary Fleet
[First, Second, Third]
Southern Task Force
Southwest Area Fleet
Special Base Force [9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 21st, 22d, 23d, 24th, 31st, 32d]
special landing force [SLF]
special meteorological detail
special minesweeping service unit
squadron [of air units]
Subchaser Division [1st, 2d, 5th, 11th, 12th, 21st, 31st]

Submarine Base Unit [11th, 21st]
Submarine Division [1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 33d]
Submarine Squadron [1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 

Glossary

seaplane base
Seaplane Tender Division [11th, 12th]
section
[of the 1st/2d Combined Signal Unit]
section [of a ship division]
senior staff officer
Ship Management Association
Signal Unit [1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 12th, 21st, 24th, 91st, Chichijima, Okinawa, Takao, Tokyo]

South Seas Unit
Southern Expeditionary Fleet
[First, Second, Third]
Southern Task Force
Southwest Area Fleet
Special Base Force [9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 21st, 22d, 23d, 24th, 31st, 32d]
special landing force [SLF]
special meteorological detail
special minesweeping service unit
squadron [of air units]
Subchaser Division [1st, 2d, 5th, 11th, 12th, 21st, 31st]

Submarine Base Unit [11th, 21st]
Submarine Division [1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 33d]
Submarine Squadron [1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th,
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| Submarine Unit | Dai-go, Dai-roku, Dai-nana, Dai-hachi |
| supply unit | Sensui Butai 潜水部隊 |
| support unit | hokyū-tai 補給隊 |
| Surface Escort Division [1st, 2d] | shien-tai 支援隊 |
| surface patrol section [of base force] | Kajō Goei-tai [Dai-ichi, Dai-ni] 海上護衛隊 [第1, 2] |
| Survey Unit [1st, 2d] | Suikei-ka [of base force] 水警科 [根拠地隊] |
| Torpedo Boat Division [21st] | Sokuryū-ō-tai [Dai-ichi, Dai-ni] 測量隊 [第1, 2] |
| torpedo chief | Suirai-tai [Dai-nijū-ichi] 水雷隊 [第21] |
| torpedo launching commander | suirai-chō 水雷長 |
| transport aircraft unit | hassha-shiki-kan 発射指揮官 |
| transport unit [of the SLF] | yusōki-tai 輸送機隊 |
| units engaged in operations outside [Japan] | un’yū-tai [rikusen-tai] 運輸隊 [陸戦隊] |
| Wartime Formation | gaisen butai 外務部隊 |
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| Yokosuka Gunnery School | Tokubetsu rikusen-tai 特別陸戦隊 |
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