CONFRONTING ANTISEMITISM FROM PERSPECTIVES OF PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

Edited by Armin Lange, Kerstin Mayerhofer,
Dina Porat, Lawrence H. Schiffman

THEM

Confronting Antisemitism from Perspectives of Philosophy and Social Sciences

An End to Antisemitism!

Edited by
Armin Lange, Kerstin Mayerhofer, Dina Porat,
and Lawrence H. Schiffman

Volume 4

Confronting Antisemitism from Perspectives of Philosophy and Social Sciences

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DE GRUYTER

Dedicated to Esther Webman ז״ל (1947 – 2020).
May her memory be a blessing.

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More than three years have passed since approximately one thousand scholars, activists, decision makers, and influencers met at the conference "An End to Antisemitism!" in February 2018, in Vienna. The conference was jointly organized by the European Jewish Congress, New York University, Tel Aviv University, and the University of Vienna to study antisemitism with an unprecedented interdisciplinary breadth and historical depth. Over 150 presenters from all over the world engaged with all forms of antisemitism from a variety of perspectives. The present series, *An End to Antisemitism!*, documents the conference's output and research results from various fields. Leading experts in religious studies, history, political studies, social sciences, philosophy, psychology, pedagogy, and cultural studies shed light on antisemitic traditions from their respective viewpoints. Together, they help to shape a discourse of understanding, knowing, and recognizing various forms of antisemitism in order to confront and combat them.

Unfortunately, today, antisemitism is still on the rise. The Covid-19 pandemic has not only led to a spiking high rate of deaths among all nations of the world. Also, it has given rise to a multitude of conspiracy theories surrounding various topics. Antisemitism is often an integral part of those conspiracy theories, regardless of their origin. In the previous volumes of our series, researchers from a variety of scholarly and scientific fields have demonstrated how antisemitism's versatile nature and constant transformation throughout history has contributed to its unfathomable success. Sadly, this tradition continues even today. One of the aims of the conference "An End to Antisemitism!" was, therefore, to create concrete policy recommendations regarding how to effectively combat antisemitism. These have been collected and published in a separate *Catalogue of Policies*,[1] a document of practical impact. They also form one of the bases of the first volume of the present series.[2] All subsequent volumes are addressed to an academic audience. They document the research leading to these policy recommendations.

The present volume concludes the series *An End to Antisemitism!* It brings together contributions from fields of the social sciences, including philosophy, ethics, psychology, and pedagogy. Together, they form an empirical underpin-

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1 A. Lange, A. Muzicant, D. Porat, L. H. Schiffman, and M. Weitzman, *An End to Antisemitism! A Catalogue of Policies to Combat Antisemitism* (Brussels: European Jewish Congress, 2018).

2 A. Lange, K. Mayerhofer, D. Porat, and L. H. Schiffman, eds., *Comprehending and Confronting Antisemitism: A Multi-Faceted Approach*, vol. 1 of *An End to Antisemitism!* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019).

ning for the previous volumes that have helped to unearth the different motivations for antisemitic persecution throughout the ages and have employed different metatheoretical approaches to find answers to questions of perceptions of race, racism, identity, and difference. The historiography of antisemitism and its current-day transformations, especially in the modern media, are also in volume 5, which reflected on various new forms of Jew-hatred in political and legal realms of society and in the media. The contributions to the present and concluding volume try to close the loop by demonstrating the importance of a three-fold scheme in investigating antisemitism. First, they demonstrate how the assessment of the level of antisemitism in society is an important prerequisite for recognizing and understanding various forms of Jew-hatred. Articles using classical social scientific approaches to collect data and specific case studies thus form the first part of the present volume. In the second part, scholars from a philosophical and ethical background use collected data and case studies to discuss the heterogeneous nature of antisemitism. They perceive antisemitism as a negative trope responding to specific socio-political processes that put society into a crisis. Finally, the results of both the empirical studies and the theoretical reflections point the way to their implementation in the form of pedagogical studies and a best practice example. The third and final part of the present volume draws special attention to pedagogy and its importance in the fight against antisemitism. Educating the following generations, not only about the history of Jew-hatred, but also about its multiple transformations and present manifestations, is of utmost importance in order to establish long-term means for combatting current-day Jew-hatred.

While the nature of many of this volume's contributions differs from articles in previous volumes as they present large quantities of scientifically collected data or develop concrete courses of action, they still forge links to the articles in the previous volumes. They address topics such as the BDS movement and anti-Zionism as contemporary and the most virulent new forms of antisemitism. Muslim antisemitism and antisemitism from the political left are discussed as dangerous chameleons, the mutability of which also fuels contemporary antisemitism. As such, these articles complement the topic of the "New Antisemitism" that volume 5 focused on and, as such, pave the way for understanding it. The non-chronological order of the publication dates of volumes 3, 4, and 5 is grounded in the research field itself: as antisemitism is ever changing, findings from the modern media, too, can have a short life. This is why the editorial team chose to proceed first with the publication of volume 5, with its focus on antisemitism in the modern media and in the political and legal world, in order to avoid the obsolescence of these studies. However, the empirical articles of the present volume connect with the previous volumes. Contributions from the fields

of philosophy, ethics and psychology, for example, refer back to earlier theoretical reflections presented in volumes 2 and 3. Most importantly, they engage with Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School in order to establish critical political and ethical responses to contemporary antisemitism.

It is in the nature of academic research that new insights are gained by a contradictory discourse. Hence, the articles in the present volume might sometimes give the impression of a variety of different textual strands bound together only loosely. Indeed, contributions might even seem to disagree with each other. They all, however, contribute to the series' aim to reflect on antisemitism from a variety of scholarly fields, to uncover its traditions, intentions, and manifestations and to, ultimately, find ways to both understand antisemitism and combat it.

A project like this volume, and the whole series, surely cannot be completed without the assistance of a number of individuals. Therefore, we would like to express our deepest gratitude to many people who have supported us in shaping this volume and bringing it to life.

First, we would like to give a word of thanks to all our colleagues who have contributed to the present volume. Their research represents a vast interdisciplinarity set of fields that makes not only the present volume but the complete series *An End to Antisemitism!* an unparalleled publication.

We are grateful to De Gruyter Publishers for accepting our five-volume series of conference proceedings for publication. The support that Albrecht Döhnert, Sophie Wagenhofer, and Alice Meroz gave us in preparing these mammoth proceedings for publication has been exemplary. The same gratitude is due to Anna Cwikla. As with all previous volumes, she has made an enormous effort in proofreading, copyediting, and English stylizing.

The other editors are especially grateful to Kerstin Mayerhofer for taking the lead in editing our proceedings. Her commitment has been unparalleled, and without her, neither our publication series nor the other outcomes of the conference would exist.

Of course, a project like this requires significant funds, which are often surprisingly difficult to raise. It is therefore more than a pleasure to express our gratitude to our main sponsor Moshe Kantor, President of the European Jewish Congress. Moshe Kantor provided much needed financial support not only for the conference "An End to Antisemitism!" in 2018 but also for all its printed outcomes. At the same time, we would also like to take the opportunity to convey words of thanks to all other sponsors as listed on pages 409–410.

Many more people have been involved in the project. They participated in the conference in 2018 and have supported us in the preparation of the confer-

ence proceedings. All their names are listed in the first volume of *An End to Antisemitism!*[3]

The present volume concludes our series and a long process of thought and academic discussion with colleagues from a variety of fields that has been fruitful and productive for all of us. Sadly, during the process of editing the series, we have lost a dear member of our project's team and editorial board. Esther Webman passed away unexpectedly in June, 2020. Her passing has left a void not only for our project but also for the scholarly community. Esther Webman's research was dedicated to the study of Islam and Islamic antisemitism. Her outstanding scholarly work was and continues to be a blessing that helps to contain and combat Jew-hatred. In the conference "An End to Antisemitism!" she served not only as an organizer of the panel on Islam and Islamic antisemitism, but in addition, her professional insight and commitment as a contributor to the conference proceedings were crucial to its success. We as editors feel her loss keenly and are truly bereaved.

Therefore, this final volume of *An End to Antisemitism!* is dedicated to Esther Webman ז״ל (1947–2020). Her memory will always be a blessing—not only for us but for all scholars who will continue to investigate Jew-hatred in the future. Esther's commitment will serve as an example and as a motivator for our future fight against the atrocities of antisemitism.

New York, Tel Aviv, and Vienna, May 21, 2021

Armin Lange
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3 Lange, Mayerhofer, Porat, and Schiffman, *Comprehending and Confronting Antisemitism*, xi–xvii.

Armin Lange and Kerstin Mayerhofer

Confronting Antisemitism from the Perspectives of Philosophy and Social Sciences: Introduction

The present, fourth volume of *An End to Antisemitism!* combines articles that address the study of antisemitism from perspectives of the social sciences, including psychology, philosophy, and pedagogy. The contributions to this final volume of the proceedings series essentially mirror the general approach to combating antisemitism that is suggested by the whole five-volume series *An End to Antisemitism!* One of the series' main arguments is that successful strategies to fight antisemitism must be based on a thorough scholarly and scientific analysis of Jew-hatred. Such an analysis begins with the assessment not only of the level of antisemitism in a given population and time but also by identifying which forms of Jew-hatred were or are more prominent than others. This assessment is followed by an interdisciplinary theoretical reflection of antisemitism and by an analysis of the assessed data. Such theoretical reflection must be the basis for the development of successful strategies to combat antisemitism.

This first part is followed by articles dedicated to the theoretical reflection of antisemitism on philosophical, sociological, and psychological levels. Historical and religious perspectives have been discussed in previous volumes.[1] The results of these theoretical contributions point the way to their implementation in the form of pedagogical studies and as examples of best practices.

Assessment of Antisemitism

Assessment of the level of antisemitism has been established as one of the key prerequisites to successfully fight it—both in volume 1 of the present series as well as in the respective official catalogue of measures for combating antisemitism.[2] Only an in-depth understanding of the level and nature of antisemitism in

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1 Cf. A. Lange, K. Mayerhofer, D. Porat, and L. H. Schiffman, eds., *Confronting Antisemitism from the Perspectives of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism*, and idem, *Confronting Antisemitism through the Ages – A Historical Perspective*, vols. 2 and 3 of *An End to Antisemitism!*, edited by A. Lange, K. Mayerhofer, D. Porat, and L. H. Schiffman (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020 and 2021).
2 Cf. A. Lange, A. Muzicant, D. Porat, L. H. Schiffman, and M. Weitzman, *An End to Antisemitism! A Catalogue of Policies to Combat Antisemitism* (Brussels: European Jewish Congress, 2018).

a given society or group allows for the development of effective strategies to counter and combat it. The work of assessing this level of antisemitism is done mostly by various non-governmental and governmental organizations. Surveys assessing the level of antisemitism in a particular society or group are often but not always guided by the methodology of the social sciences. They follow two basic approaches: (1) They measure the number of people fostering antisemitic attitudes and the forms of Jew-hatred in a given society. This is done by asking a set of questions targeted at common attitudes toward Jews and Judaism to a select sample of various members of society; and (2) they measure the frequency in which Jews experience antisemitism and how they perceive it.

Scholars have identified three main forms of contemporary antisemitism, using both assessment approaches: (a) classical antisemitism, drawing back to age-old antisemitic stereotypes that have translated from religio-cultural realms to the general society; (b) the denial of the Shoah or the relativization of it; and (c) the delegitimization and demonization of the State of Israel. How these main forms link together and how they can be assessed is demonstrated in the example of Sergio DellaPergola and his examination of the ADL 100 project by the Anti-Defamation League and of the survey of *Discrimination and Hate Crime against Jews* conducted by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). The importance of a careful antisemitism assessment is further underlined in the article by L. Daniel Staetsky in which he demonstrates that Jewish victims of antisemitism can experience a heightened antisemitic threat level from a population that is composed only to a small extent of hard-core antisemites, such as in the case of Great Britain. Rather, antisemitism has become much more a phenomenon that spans through all parts of society and the political spectrum, sharing select prejudices against Jews as one of the core elements.

Shoah education is an important asset to confront the persistent marginalization and denial of the events of the Shoah. Respective surveys from a pedagogical background, like the one conducted by Reinhold Boschki for secondary education in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, demonstrate that the willingness of educators is of the utmost importance in the fight against antisemitism. Only if they commit to an active reproach of antisemitic attitudes amongst young people, serious changes can be achieved among the youth, which is a social group of high importance when it comes to eradicating antisemitism worldwide. However, Shoah education alone has proven to be only a partial remedy. While it makes clear the horrible persecution and murder that the Jewish people suffered in Europe, Shoah education often fails to link these horrific events to contemporary antisemitic prejudices permeating all parts of society: religion, economy, and politics. In order to counter antisemitism effectively, teachers at all levels and of all different fields must engage in the challenge of explaining what an-

tisemitism is, how it can be detected, and educate the young about what negative consequences can result from antisemitism if it goes unchecked and unchallenged.[3]

In addition to social scientific and pedagogical surveys, case studies about antisemitic incidents as well as reports gathering such incidents are a further important tool for the assessment of antisemitism. Case studies allow for the in-depth study of individual antisemitic events and thus help to better understand which forms of antisemitism are prevalent in a given society or group. The reporting of antisemitic incidents helps to better assess the amount of verbal and physical antisemitic violence as well as the amount of antisemitic discrimination in a particular society. Different ways and systems of reporting have been previously discussed, especially with the focus on the internet and social media, in volume 5 of the present series.[4] Assessments by way of surveys and antisemitism reports are readily available when it comes to the measurement of contemporary antisemitism but are impossible to perform for the assessment of antisemitism in earlier times. This observation reaffirms the importance of case studies. Assessment of antisemitism in the past and present requires, thus, also the study and analysis of individual antisemitic events and phenomena throughout history. Various examples have been collected in previous volumes of the series with a religious and historical perspective, as mentioned above. The present fourth and last volume of the series adds case studies that help to assess the nature of contemporary antisemitism from philosophical, ethical, and psychological perspectives as well as through the lens of general societal processes and changes. These examples include the 2012 debate about religious male circumcision in Germany and Europe more broadly, addressed by Olaf Glöckner, who demonstrates how the lack of knowledge about male circumcision and the pretense of concern for the well-being of children gave a mouthpiece to antisemitic stereotypes about Jewish depravity, venality, and the sexual abuse of children. The case of Achille Mbembe, as discussed by Monika Schwarz-Friesel and Evyatar Friesel, serves as an example for how contemporary anti-Zionism singles out the State of Israel by evoking traditional antisemitic stereotypes in camouflaged hate speech making them acceptable in society. A thoroughly executed study on antisemitic attitudes in the workplace, conducted by Yochanan Altman and his team, demonstrates that even in organizational settings in geographical areas where the Jewish population is sparse (in this case Germany and Austria) antisemitic attitudes are fos-

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3 Cf. ibid., 79.
4 Cf. A. Lange, K. Mayerhofer, D. Porat, and L. H. Schiffman, eds., *Confronting Antisemitism in Modern Media, the Legal and Political Worlds*, vol. 5 of *An End to Antisemitism!*, edited by A. Lange, K. Mayerhofer, D. Porat, and L. H. Schiffman (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021).

tered and tolerated, especially in times of societal crises. All of these cases show that Jew-hatred is identity based and attempts to resolve an underlying self-hatred of the antisemite by projecting their self-hatred onto the Jewish other. This observation is underlined by philosophical and psychological evaluation presented by Michel Gad Wolkowicz, and Florette Cohen and her team. Both claim mortality salience as an initiator of antisemitic hate in constructing Jews as a unique cultural threat to many people's worldview. A particularly strong example for this mechanism is the perception of Israel's treatment of Palestine.

As previously mentioned, this first part of the volume collects surveys and case studies to underline the importance of in-depth assessment of antisemitism in all parts of society. They help to draw a comprehensive picture of the reality of antisemitism in contemporary times by taking into account people, institutions, and systems that foster antisemitic attitudes but also the Jewish population as their target.

In his article, *Antisemitism: National or Transnational Constellation?*, Sergio DELLAPERGOLA explores the fundamentals of contemporary antisemitism through the use of quantitative data sources and techniques. For that purpose, DellaPergola primarily analyzes the ADL 100 and the FRA Discrimination and Hate Crime against Jews surveys by way of Similarity Structure Analysis (SSA) taking "both ends of the perpetrator-victim dyad" (23) into consideration. Among antisemites, he identifies three conceptual main strands that overlap significantly: (1) classical antisemitism "attributing to the Jews economic-political power, dominance and exploitation, with further contentions of foreignness to the majority's national interests and physical recognizability" (57); (2) Shoah denial or manipulation; and (3) Israel delegitimization and demonization. The memory of the Shoah is among the most frequent markers of Jewish identification resulting in Jews deeming Shoah denial or minimization as offensively antisemitic. Because of the identificational proximity of Israel with the Shoah, denying Israel's right to exist or boycotting Israel is regarded as similarly antisemitic. The ongoing globalization turns antisemitism into "an insidious global transnational phenomenon" (57). That more prominent Jewish presence in a country is associated with less antisemitism shows that "[a]ntisemitism growingly becomes an insidious global transnational phenomenon unrelated to direct contact with Jews as real-life individuals but largely transmitted against Jews as an immanent collective" (57).

L. Daniel STAETSKY discusses *Quantifying Antisemitic Attitudes in Britain: The "Elastic" View of Antisemitism*. He observes the dissonance between surveys, finding that about 10% of the UK's population are committed to antisemitism, while surveys of Britain's Jewish population demonstrate that 50% of British Jews regard antisemitism as a problem. In response to this dissonance between

antisemitism surveys and Jewish anxiety, Staetsky develops an "elastic" approach to antisemitism (000), which is based on the survey of antisemitic attitudes in Britain by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research. In this elastic approach, Staetsky distinguishes between latent negativity (7.2%), softer negativity (3.0%), and hard-core negativity against Jews (2.4%) on the one hand, and on the other hand he distinguishes between British individuals holding a whole range of negative attitudes and ideas against Jews (2.4%) as opposed to those who hold only a few (15%) or even just one of them (30%). Staetsky argues that high Jewish anxiety about antisemitism in Britain is due to frequent encounters with those British individuals who hold only a few antisemitic attitudes, while the lower numbers of UK antisemitism surveys capture those parts of the population that hold *hard-core* negative, softer, or latent negativity against Jews.

Reinhold Boschki addresses the *Contribution of Religious Education to the Prevention of Antisemitism: An International Empirical Study*. Because the Christian roots of antisemitism are also evident in current manifestations of the hatred of Jews in European societies, there is a need for churches, theology, and religious education to grapple with and tackle the problem of antisemitism as an issue of their own. Boschki's research project examines how the complex topic of Holocaust remembrance and antisemitism is approached and perceived by pupils and teachers in religious education in the curriculum of secondary schools in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. An online questionnaire was used to provide statistical data about various ways of teaching Holocaust remembrance and about antisemitism. According to Boschki's results, religious education is able to provide a substantial contribution to learning remembrance in school education, a process that goes hand in hand with learning to combat antisemitism, racism, and "group focused enmity" (81). Some teachers see clearly that antisemitic attitudes are still present in our society and will confront students about anti-Jewish thinking. They use various methods to teach about the Holocaust such as showing and discussing movies about the Holocaust, reading books like *Night* by Elie Wiesel, visiting memorial sites, such as concentration camps, or visiting Jewish communities and synagogues to get in touch with Jewish life today. Some teachers invite Jews to their classroom, make bicycle excursions to find traces of former Jewish life, or visit Jewish museums. The teachers said that there is an obligation to unmask Christian and biblical roots of anti-Jewish attitudes and emphasize a new theological understanding of the close relationship between Christians and Jews.

Olaf Glöckner engages with *The Circumcision Debate in Germany in 2012 and its Impacts on Europe*. He especially focuses on the debate about religious male circumcision that followed a ruling of the regional German court in

Cologne from May 7, 2012, criminalizing religious circumcision. Shortly after this ruling, criminal charges were brought against two rabbis in other German cities and a toxic debate full of open and coded antisemitic polemics evolved in Germany. The events in Germany sparked a chain of antisemitic debates and attempts to prohibit it in many European countries. Glöckner emphasizes how the concern for the well-being of young male children became a channel for a range of antisemitic polemics about Jewish depravity, venality, and the sexual abuse of children. He furthermore shows that such antisemitic polemics and legal measures against religious circumcision endanger Jewish life in Germany and all over Europe.

In their article *"To Make the World a Better Place": Giving Moral Advice to the Jewish State as a Manifestation of Self-legitimized Antisemitism among Leftist Intellectuals*, Monika SCHWARZ-FRIESEL and Evyatar FRIESEL identify Israel bashing as the most common strategy of current antisemitism. In contemporary anti-Zionism, the State of Israel is singled out by evoking traditional antisemitic stereotypes in camouflaged hate speech that makes them acceptable in society. As these camouflaged antisemitic polemics are voiced by well-known intellectuals, this widespread form of educated antisemitism became much more acceptable than traditional antisemitism. Their article explains the main argumentation patterns of educated antisemitism and points to its mechanisms of denial and self-justification. Special attention is given to the case of Achille Mbembe and his foreword to the book *Apartheid Israel: The Politics of an Analogy*.

In their article *Contours of Workplace Antisemitism: Initial Reflections and a Research Agenda*, Yochanan ALTMAN et al. aim at drawing the contours of workplace antisemitism by presenting a framework for its study. To embed their propositions, the authors home in on two countries: Germany and Austria. They argue that given the deep-rooted and widespread antisemitic attitudes prevalent in both countries, in spite of their miniscule Jewish population, antisemitism is likely to affect organizations and the people who work in them, Jews and gentiles alike. Altman et al. offer a theoretical lens explicating the underlying motivation for antisemitic conduct—primed subconscious goal pursuits, within the framework of *Goal Setting Theory*[5] and the circumstances that may give rise to it in organizational settings, with particular reference to Terror Management Theory: fear arousing death awareness in times of social strife and radical change, and/or of a global pandemic. The authors propose organizational identifiers for antisemitism tolerance, outlining consequent issues for people management

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5 Cf. X. Chen et al. "An Enumerative Review and a Meta-Analysis of Primed Goal Effects on Organizational Behavior," *Applied Psychology 70, no. 1* (2021): 216–53.

and possible remedies. The article concludes with suggestions for a research agenda.

Michel Gad WOLKOWICZ's article *The Transmission of Hatred and the Hatred of Transmission: The Psychopathology of a Murder and an Anatomy of a Silence. The Nobody's Name: A Contemporary Symptom* is a case study of the murder of Sarah Halimi in France in 2017. Wolkowicz understands this case as a "contemporary symptom" reflected not only in the act as such but especially in the silencing of its antisemitic nature throughout France from intellectuals, politicians, and within French media coverage. With his case study, Wolkowicz aims at addressing "the psychopathology of antisemitism, anti-Jewish aggressions," and more specifically, of "present-day denials of the Real, a version of 'negationism' or 'denialism,' which has always been consubstantial with it" (155). Jew-hatred can be regarded as an "identity-based hatred" (156), which attempts to resolve a suppressed underlying hatred of parts of the haters' self-identity that are projected onto an arbitrary object in order to find legitimization for it. Jews then come to serve as an archetypal "Other" onto which negative aspects of the self are projected and negated in an "entanglement of archaic envy, mimetic identification, and narcissistic omnipotence, together with a fantasy of substitution" (156). This is especially true for anti-Zionist antisemitism, which demonstrates a desubstantialized reality conflated with political ideology resulting in mass protests and mob-like hatred of the State of Israel and of Israelis. Wolkowicz concludes that antisemitism can be best understood as "a chronic illness of Western politics" and Sarah Halimi's murder, as an example, is perceived as "destructive of humanity" (180). Apparently an isolated act, in reality, the murder "was really the product of an ideological group activated by the hatred of Jews and entailing a collective hush up authorizing an identical repetition and negation" (179). Unfortunately, Wolkowicz sees no end to this repetition and negation and a constant failure of democracy where judges fail to state the law and the media fail to report un-biasedly—a contemporary symptom.

Florette COHEN addresses *Modern Antisemitism: A Psychological Understanding of the BDS Movement* in a five-stage experiment using a new theoretical model of antisemitism. The model has two core proposals: (1) that mortality salience increases antisemitism, and (2) that antisemitism often manifests as hostility toward Israel. The results of the studies demonstrate that mortality salience helps to foster antisemitic attitudes, especially pertaining to Israel's treatment of Palestine, which is regarded as a greater violation against human rights than identical human rights violations such as in India or Russia. According to Cohen, this also leads to increased support for the BDS movement. An increased hostility toward Israel can be observed both from the alt-right and the liberal left especially in the US and in Europe. Concluding, Cohen's results demonstrate that

"Jews constitute a unique cultural threat to many people's worldviews," and "that antisemitism causes hostility to Israel, and that hostility to Israel may feed back to increase antisemitism" (183).

Theoretical Reflections on Antisemitism

The studies discussed in the first part of the present volume demonstrate how the assessment of antisemitism by way of surveys and case studies raise meta-theoretical questions about the nature of antisemitism. Successful strategies in combating antisemitism thus also need to be based on a (meta)theoretical reflection of Jew-hatred.

Jew-hatred comes in a variety of shades and forms. This heterogeneity and pluriformity of antisemitism has, sadly, added much to its successful continuation. Depending on historical, political, cultural, and religious contexts, antisemitism transforms itself into new forms Jew-hatred adjusting in this way to the ever-changing dynamics of societies and cultures. While through pre-modern and early modern times, Jew-hatred was mainly expressed within a religio-cultural framework of thought, new expressions of antisemitism began to develop with the birth of modernity. The new scientific mindset initiated by the Enlightenment gave birth to racist expressions of antisemitism that became dominant in the history of Jew-hatred, at the latest during the late nineteenth century. In the same time period, due the Industrial Revolution and the evolving capitalist economic system, economic antisemitism also became a popular form of Jew-hatred that often integrated with racist antisemitism. These are just a few examples of the many transformations by which antisemitism adapted to historical developments and changing circumstances. One of the most recent transformations among the ever-changing faces of Jew-hatred is anti-Zionism, that is, the hatred of Israel as the Jewish state. It responds to the changed role of Judaism when it began to strive for a Jewish state and succeeded to establish it with the founding of the State of Israel in 1948. Anti-Zionism is therefore repeatedly addressed in the contributions to this and other volumes of *An End to Antisemitism!* series.

The pluriformity and heterogeneity of antisemitism requests a theoretical reflection not just on one but on many levels. The constant transformation and thus ever-changing nature of antisemitism makes it therefore impossible to restrict its theoretical reflection to one scholarly or scientific approach. On the contrary, the heterogeneous nature of antisemitism requires an interdisciplinary approach that combines social sciences and psychology with philosophy, religious studies, and history, both in its theoretical reflection as much as in its assess-

ment and in the fight against it. The second part of this volume thus presents contributions from a variety of disciplines. They all, however, reflect on and highlight the constant transformation of antisemitism from a theoretical perspective.

Antisemitic perceptions of Jews can be perceived as a negative trope responding to socio-political processes. Especially during times of socio-political crises, antisemitic attitudes flare up at a high level, as Judit Bokser Liwerant demonstrates. This trope, on the other hand, can also be understood as phantasmal, according to Vivian Liska, with regards to the transformation of the negative image of "the Jew" in French philosophy. Lines between perceptions of the Jews based in concrete reality and simple "ideas" of Jews, of their lives and identities, frequently get blurred. This is especially true for contemporary Muslim antisemitism, which often lacks a concrete counterpart in Muslim societies of which Jews mostly are not a part today. Rather, Muslim antisemitism is an amalgamation of contemporary socio-political and socio-economic ideologies and traditional religiously motivated Jew-hatred from the Qur'an and the *hadith*, as Neil J. Kressel demonstrates.

The same blurring becomes apparent when reflecting on the term *antisemitism* per se. As argued in previous volumes, the term *antisemitism* is much debated in historical scholarship. Scholars have claimed that the term is anachronistic and reflects a racial conceptualization of Judaism that cannot be understood outside of the context of nineteenth-century nationalism and racial theory.[6] A polyvalent meaning of the term also points to the plurality of contemporary antisemitism and to possible dangers of abusing the term, as addressed by Lars Dencik. Often times, the term is used for politically motivated utterances fueled by means of economic and political rather than racial discrimination. Theoretical reflections on antisemitism, thus, need to be careful not to step into this trap as overuse and abuse of the term *antisemitism* could disarm the concept of antisemitism altogether. Of course, however, any form of violence (from hate speech to physical attacks) against Jews that are directed against Jews based on their religious and cultural Jewish identity must appropriately be addressed as antisemitic. This is in accordance with the Working Definition of Antisemitism by the IHRA,[7] which the conference and its proceedings took their bases in.

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6 Cf. K. Mayerhofer and A. Lange, "Comprehending Antisemitism through the Ages: Introduction," in *Comprehending Antisemitism through the Ages*, vol. 3 of *An End to Antisemitism!*, edited by A. Lange, K. Mayerhofer, D. Porat, and L. H. Schiffman (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021), 1–27.
7 Cf. "Working Definition of Antisemitism," International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, issued May 26, 2016, https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/node/196.

Antisemitism's heterogeneity and constant transformation also call for a constant re-assessment of existing theories reflecting upon it. One example is Critical Theory, which has been one of the main philosophical approaches addressing antisemitism on the level of metatheory.[8] Growing out of the experience of World War II and the atrocities of the Shoah, Critical Theory established a new categorical imperative, namely that the Shoah must not repeat itself. Nowadays, however, the chronological distance from the Shoah is growing. New and old forms of antisemitism that are disconnected from the Shoah thus weaken the force of Critical Theory's categorical imperative or even make it obsolete. This is especially the case for contemporary Muslim antisemitism, as stated above. Established theories need to be questioned, and, if necessary, queried and updated to fit a new understanding of the growing dangers of antisemitism in contemporary times. Only in this way can antisemitism effectively be combatted as the articles in the second part of the present volume affirm.

In her contribution, Judit BOKSER LIWERANT focuses on *Antisemitism and Related Expressions of Prejudice in a Global World: A View from Latin America.* She understands the antisemitic perception of Jews as a negative *tropos* and addresses the socio-political processes and praxis that patterns this *tropos* in Latin American societies from the arrival of Jewish immigration during the 1920s–1940s until today. To do so, Bokser Liwerant analyzes "the historical pattern of recurrence and change, the non-linearity and complexity of the interactions and mutual influences between antisemitism and related prejudices" (219). She focuses "on the interaction between antisemitism, anti-Israelism and anti-Zionism as singular yet overlapping phenomena at the meaning-making level" (219). Bokser Liwerant identifies three stages in the ideological history of the negative *tropos* of the Jews. In first stage, before and during the Nazi-period, in Latin American societies the *tropos* of the Jew was determined by western European Jew-hatred and Nazism. Antisemitic expressions were articulated in the framework of immigration and that impacted different conceptualizations of nation and society impacting vice versa immigration policy negatively. During the second stage, in response to the Six-Day War, regional, national, and global scenarios were reconfigured impacting the *tropos* of the Jews in Latin American societies bringing together Jews, Israel, and Zionism in an antisemitic triangle. Anti-Zionism accumulated old antisemitic referents and combined in this way the hard nucleus of prejudice with changing motivations and functions. During the third stage, in the twenty-first century, she observes yet another permutation

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8 Many contributions in volume 5 interact with it in more detail. Cf. Lange et al., *Confronting Antisemitism in Modern Media, the Legal and Political Worlds.*

in the antisemitic *tropos* of the Jews as the Palestinian cause instrumentalized transnational advocacy networks and global civil society. Anti-Zionism became a trans-regional and transnational cultural code that as a mobilization myth has an effect on Latin American societies as well. While *tropos*-building does not necessarily result in practices of discrimination, nevertheless, Bokser Liwerant concludes, it needs to be "contextualized within each country's political culture and status of human rights. Understanding its strength emerges as a *sine qua non* requirement when attempting to account for the actual extent of antisemitic danger derived from discursive and symbolic violence" (248).

In her article, *The Phantasm of the Jew in French Philosophy: From Jean-Paul Sartre to Alain Badiou*, Vivian Liska reconstructs the perception of the Jewish other in French philosophy from "Sartre's contentious designation of the Jew as nothing but a construction of the antisemite to its openly antagonistic and highly problematic inflection in Alain Badiou's call for the disappearance of the 'SIT Jew,' who derives his identity from the triad Shoah, Israel, and the Talmud" (253). Against Sartre and others, Liska argues that neither can a concrete Jewish person exist with a conceptualization of Jewishness nor can such a conceptualization of Jewishness be developed without remnants of concrete encounters of Judaism. She points to a spectrum of differently combined external and internal ascriptions of Jewishness, which are co-determined by the very mode of signification and along which the figure of the Jew in the works Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Blanchot, Jean-François Lyotard, and Alain Badiou can be situated. The spectrum reflects an increasingly problematic attitude toward Judaism, in which the borders between anti-Zionism, anti-Judaism, and antisemitism blur. Sartre, Blanchot, and Lyotard would transform the historically negative image of "the Jew" into a trope that testifies to its own phantasmal character. Badiou fills this empty trope with an abstract universality in declaring "Jew" a metaphor without origin.

Neil J. Kressel addresses an important question in his article: *Does Islam Fuel Antisemitism?* He scrutinizes quotes by extremist Islamist religious and political leaders with regards to their scientific accuracy and religious soundness and aims at uncovering the political, sociological, and psychological foundation of these people's antisemitism. The prevailing antisemitism in many parts of the Muslim world, however, makes it difficult to confirm that contemporary Muslim antisemitism is Islamic only and not in actuality an amalgamate of contemporary socio-political and socio-economic ideologies reinforced by classical teachings from the Qur'an and the *hadith*. In order to better identify Islamic religious sources of antisemitism, Kressel proposes twelve categories, among them verbal attacks and denunciations and public opinion in media as well as physical terror targeting Jews and Jewish institutions and institutionalized discrimination

against Jews via official laws and organizational policies. While certainly all of these categories also take their support from religious Islamic sources, the "main engine behind contemporary Arab and Muslim antisemitism" (276), however, is the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. The historical tradition of antisemitism, corroborated by religious teaching, is subsequently used to explain and support socio-political anti-Zionist arguments and render them antisemitic. Islam is certainly not "eternally, irredeemably, and incurably hostile to Jews" (278), Kressel concludes, however, many Muslim thinkers have shaped a self-perception of predisposed Muslim antisemitism being derived from traditional religious beliefs. As such, it is particularly hard to conquer, and Kressel calls for "an encounter with its antisemitic past similar to that which the Catholic Church and other Christian denominations had in the mid-twentieth century" (279). Sadly, however, he does not remain quite positive that this will happen in the near future. His initial question, does Islam fuel antisemitism, has to be answered with a yes. Albeit a tentative one, it is still a yes.

Lars DENCIK focuses *On the Ethical Implications and Political Costs of Misinterpreting and Abusing the Notion "Anti-Semitism"* today. Dencik builds his argument around four main points. First, today's use of the notion of "anti-Semitism" points to a need to sort out and distinguish from one another the contemporary mainly non-racist form of Jew-hatred from other politically motivated uses and abuses of the notion of "antisemitism." Second, three main forms of contemporary Jew-hatred exist. Classical antisemitism is at home mainly in the radical right. "Aufklärungsantisemitismus" denotes critique of core Jewish practices even calling for their prohibition and is often at home in a liberal and left wing milieu. "Israel-derived antisemitism" emanates from hostility of the perpetrators toward the State of Israel and/or anger due to actions taken by the Israeli state but targets all Jews everywhere in the world. It is mainly at home with Muslim extremists and the political left. Third, a symbiosis exists between the interest of terrorist and other violent Jew-haters and alarmist Jewish voices emphasizing chronic fear and anxiety among diaspora Jews. Fourth, overuse and abuse of the term "antisemitism" disarm the concept of antisemitism.

Lars RENSMANN addresses *The Politics and Ethics of Anti-Antisemitism: Lessons from the Frankfurt School*. He argues that the thinkers of the Frankfurt philosophical school—otherwise known as Critical Theory—and in particular Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and Leo Löwenthal provide with their work important resources not only for the analysis of contemporary antisemitism but also for critical political and ethical responses to it. To achieve this goal, Rensmann first elaborates on the task of critical enlightening about the nature and causes of antisemitism and antisemitic myths. A key part of the "enlightenment project" is analysis of new or modernized forms of antisemitism, such as

hatred of the Jewish State of Israel and Israeli Jews, post-Shoah equations of Jews and Israelis with Nazis, or the phenomenon of antisemitism denial. In a second step, largely confined to the negative ethics of Critical Theory, Rensmann outlines ethical implications of the general features of antisemitism as resentments against and projections toward a minority, and the particular features of antisemitism as a modern world explanation and conspiracy myth. In a negative dialectic established by Adorno, the Shoah points to a "new categorical imperative," that the Shoah, symbolized by the image of Auschwitz, will not repeat itself, that anything similar must not happen again. Building on such negative ethics, Rensmann finally develops the foundations of positive political and legal responses to antisemitism in domestic society, politics, and international relations. He asks for a defense of the rule of law and institutions of liberal democracy as well unconditional solidarity with factual truth, because as a distinctly anti-modern ideology, antisemitism flourishes especially in demagogic and totalitarian structures.

Education about Antisemitism and Teaching Ways to Combat It

The continuing transformation and heterogeneous nature of antisemitism implies, thus, that educating youth about antisemitism is an important aspect in the ongoing fight against it. Education offers the opportunity to influence and inform a younger generation positively about Judaism and critically about antisemitism.

After the antisemitic genocide committed by Nazi-Germany, Shoah education had and has a key function in this educational process. The role of Shoah education in the pedagogical fight against antisemitism is a thematic thread binding together many of the articles in the third and final part of this volume. However, Shoah education can only be one tool among many in the important educational process and fight against antisemitism. While it is and remains an effective tool to combat some manifestations of antisemitism and teach a younger generation about antisemitism's most dangerous consequences and effects, the effectiveness of Shoah education is limited with regards to other forms of Jew-hatred. Shoah education, therefore, needs to be accompanied by teaching the histories of antisemitism and Judaism exhaustively.

The contributions of Henry Maitles, Paul Thomas and Abdul-Razak Kuyini Alhassan, Julia Spichal, and Lars Fischer provide pedagogical flashlights on such a combined approach. Their case studies demonstrate that learning

about the Shoah results in a heightened degree of tolerance against minority groups, while it decreases the persuasiveness of antisemitic stereotypes only slightly. This is especially true for Muslim students whose particular interpretation of Islam is often one of the main motivators for their antisemitism. Shoah education can, in this case, heighten the awareness of the problem of antisemitism and its dangers, however, it cannot help to eradicate antisemitic attitudes that take their roots from a variety of religio-cultural but also socio-political notions of identity and difference as well as of discursively shaped and established social hierarchies.

Religions play an important role in the establishment and continuation of antisemitic stereotypes. Therefore, religious education holds a special role in the educational process of teaching about antisemitism and about ways to combat it. Age-old Christian antisemitic stereotypes, for example, still permeate textbooks and curricula, which, in turn, perpetuate the very same stereotypes. This has been demonstrated by Julia Spichal who calls for a thorough revision of educational material such as textbooks, especially in, but not restricted to, religious education.

Secondary education, however, is not the only field where an evaluation of curricula and unquestioned antisemitic attitudes is something most desirable. Academic education, too, needs to reflect on its educational processes. Lars Fischer calls for concrete action, for example via the exposure to living Judaism accompanied by addressing and suppressing antisemitic stereotypes in academia. The academic world needs to free itself from societal assumptions about antisemitism that impede academia's contribution to the changing of attitudes toward Jews both among individuals and on a broader societal level.

Again, also in education, assessment is of utmost importance. Only if schools and educational institutions are able to evaluate the level of antisemitic attitudes present on their campuses, both amongst students and educators, they can start an educational process to combat antisemitism. Like theoretical reflection, education about antisemitism must react to its constant transformation in order to stay on top of antisemitism's various manifestations, to teach about and help counteract them. Self-assessment—on a personal and institutional level—is of key importance in the fight against antisemitism.

In this spirit, the present volume ends with a best practice example from the realm of education. Yad Vashem's Massive Open Online Course (MOOC) on the Shoah was launched in 2016 as the first of its kind. This course, designed by Yossi Kugler and Dafna Dolinko, and addressed to anyone with an interest in the Shoah, including students, educators, academics, and policy-makers, is not restricted to the Shoah alone. Rather, it addresses Jew-hatred in its historic and religious depth as well as in the width of its many contemporary forms.

Over two millennia of the history of antisemitism are taught in this course and antisemitism is reflected on from the perspectives of sociology, linguistics, philosophy, the political sciences, and history. All these fields of study and theory link together to present antisemitism in a comprehensive way, to demonstrate its versatile nature and raise awareness for the importance of the fight against it.

In his article, Henry MAITLES asks *Does Learning about Genocide Impact on the Values of Young People? A Case Study from Scotland.* His study is based on the observation that issues involving topics such as an understanding of human rights, democracy, genocide, antisemitism, Islamophobia, and racism can be central to the development of more rounded human beings. In the West of Scotland, students in the final year of primary education (11–12 years old) and first year of secondary education (12–13 years old) were given some learning experiences outside of the normal curriculum ranging from understanding genocide, including the Holocaust and Rwanda, to UNESCO rights respecting schools' initiatives to understanding poverty in the developing world to challenging intolerance. They were surveyed before this special course and after it to ascertain if their attitudes had been affected. It was found that students were more tolerant toward minority groups after learning about the Holocaust. Nevertheless, the number of students who thought there were too many Jews in Scotland was only slightly decreased, and Jews in Scotland are only 0.1% of the population. In terms of gender, it was found that the girls were much more understanding and tolerant in general than the boys. Concluding, Maitles remarks that while Holocaust education is usually done in the context of history, there is value in mixing the historical knowledge of the events with a strong focus on its evils and that this is the end to which behaviors, such as stereotyping and racism, can lead to, when young people learn both *about* and *from* the Holocaust.

In their article, *Challenging Antisemitism: A Pedagogical Approach in a Norwegian School*, Paul THOMAS and Abdul-Razak KUYINI ALHASSAN present a study conducted by the Center for Studies of the Holocaust and Religious Minorities in Norway on attitudes toward Jews and manifestations of antisemitism in a high school in Oslo with a majority of students self-identifying as Muslims. Semistructured interviews, classroom discussions, and a trip to the synagogue in Oslo were employed in generating the data. It is recognized that several perpetrators of antisemitic acts in recent years have been young immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa. Groruddalen and Søndre Nordstrand are sections of Oslo in which many residents have immigrant backgrounds from countries such as Pakistan, Somalia, Poland, Iraq, and Eritrea to name the most prominent. Norway has a long history of antisemitism and anti-Jewish laws. The medieval, Christian association of the Jew with the Devil has persisted and resonates with students from Muslim backgrounds. Ubiquitous and blunt antisemitic state-

ments were expressed even when the topic was unrelated to Jews. Students revealed that they saw the cause of antisemitism as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and that the Jews must have done something to deserve hatred such as a desire of Jews to control the world. It was clear that the variant of antisemitism in the study was first and foremost secreted through a religious lens—a particular interpretation of Islam. As a result, Thomas and Kuyini Alhassan recommend breaking up the concentration of students where antisemitic views cluster in certain districts by bussing them to other school districts (363). The Holocaust, mentioned only briefly, must be taught explicitly and systematically. Teachers, however, are on the frontlines of this challenge and have been entrusted with the all-important task of inculcating values amenable to nurturing citizens of an increasingly interconnected and pluralistic world.

Julia SPICHAL deals with means of *Overcoming Antisemitic Biases in Christian Religious Education.* In her dissertation research, Spichal found that antisemitic prejudices are being circulated as so-called facts. While this is a serious problem and is a testament to the tenacity of antisemitism, apparently Christian religious education is also a contributing factor. Examining curricula and textbooks in Germany and Austria, Spichal takes one example: the relationship of Jesus to the Pharisees, comparing its treatment from studies done in 1995 to the way in which it is presented today. The school books she examined tend to present issues that are really conflicts between Jesus and the Pharisees as being between Christianity and Judaism in general. They imply that Judaism and Christianity split during the lifetime of Jesus and that there is a causal relationship between Jesus' conflicts with the Pharisees and his crucifixion. It is imperative to establish unequivocally that Jesus was a Jew and that therefore it doesn't make any sense to insinuate antagonism between him and "the Jews." In fact, they were mostly in agreement on fundamentals. Also it must be stressed that Pontius Pilate was responsible for Jesus' crucifixion. These recommendations foster a nuanced portrayal of Jesus' relationship with the Pharisees at primary schools.

In his *Study of Antisemitism in the Modern Jewish and Judaic Studies Context*, Lars FISCHER analyzes some of the erroneous ways in which antisemitism is all too often treated based on the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School. He states, first of all, that antisemitism is rooted in both Western culture and Muslim societies as a means of self-understanding—that they are built on contrasting themselves to everything Jewish (377). In his view, general Judaic Studies scholars cannot speak about antisemitism in an academic way unless they are trained to specialize in this subject. To subscribe to the notion that there is a "Jewish Question" or "Jewish Problem" implies that the Jews are in some way responsible for this problem and that the "solution" requires the manipulation of the Jews (380). Since antisemitism is not a personal matter but an accepted societal as-

sumption, it is possible for Jews to be antisemites as well as Christians or Muslims. To try to reduce antisemitism by having more contact between such societies and actual Jews will not be productive because the existence of stereotypes impedes the transformation of attitudes. Therefore, it is better to repress antisemitic speech than to allow it to go on the rampage unchecked. We must reject the notion of a kernel of truth to antisemitism because the Shoah affected all Jews, no matter who they were or what they had done or not done. Similarly, to deny the Jews the right to their own country, and to hold Israel to a standard higher than that which applies to other countries is inherently antisemitic.

In their contribution, *"Antisemitism from Its Origins to the Present": An Online Video Course by Yad Vashem*, Yossi KUGLER and Dafna DOLINKO focus on one of the most important initiatives in antisemitism education in recent years. Yad Vashem's ten-hour video course brings together short videos of fifty experts from Israel, Europe, and the United States that address the over two millennia of the history of antisemitism from among others the perspective of sociology, linguistics, philosophy, the political sciences, and history. The course is structured into six lessons, the first three of which explore the origins of antisemitism and its history until the Shoah. The last three engage with Islam and contemporary antisemitism in all its expressions. Different from volume 2 of the conference proceedings, the Yad Vashem course understands antisemitism in the world of Islam as an exclusively modern phenomenon beginning in the nineteenth century, although it does interact with the earlier history of Jews in the world of Islam. The course ends with a discussion about various strategies to combat antisemitism in research, legislation, education, and other fields.

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Assessment of Antisemitism

Sergio DellaPergola

Antisemitism: National or Transnational Constellation?

The fundamentals of contemporary antisemitism are explored in this paper through the use of quantitative data sources and techniques. We review the basic content of subject matter; main sources and methods of data analysis; antisemitism definitions and typologies; world population distributions of Jews and antisemites; the position of antisemitism within the complex of Jewish identification; actual Jewish perceptions and experiences of antisemitism; ideological matrices of antisemitism and inner-outer perceptional consistency; responses to antisemitism; and some implications for future research. Data illustrative of these challenges and dilemmas are presented from recent research mostly in the European Union but also the United States and Latin America—emphasizing cognitive, behavioral, and affective aspects.

Introduction

Antisemitism involves some kind of interaction between Jews—who always have constituted a tiny minority of humankind—and the non-Jewish majority. There is no symmetry in such a bilateral relationship. The study and assessment of antisemitic theories, sentiments, and actions stand at the center of a very large body of scientific research,[1] polemic and advocacy pamphlets,[2] and infinite pub-

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1 Cf. T. W. Adorno et al., *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper, 1950); S. Almog, ed., *Antisemitism through the Ages* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1988); Y. Bauer, ed., *Present-Day Antisemitism* (Jerusalem: The Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism at the Hebrew University, 1988); idem, *Rethinking the Holocaust* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); E. Ben-Rafael, *Confronting Allosemitism in Europe: The Case of Belgian Jews* (Leiden: Brill, 2014); M. Brown, ed., *Approaches to Antisemitism: Context and Curriculum* (New York: The American Jewish Committee and the International Center for University Teaching of Jewish Civilization, 1994); S. Ettinger, *Modern Anti-Semitism* (Tel Aviv: Moreshet, 1978 [in Hebrew]); C. Y. Glock and R. Stark, *Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966); B. Lewis, *Semites and Anti-Semites* (New York: Norton, 1987); K. L. Marcus, *The Definition of Anti-Semitism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); L. Poliakov, *The History of Anti-Semitism*, 4 vols. (Philadelphia: Philadelphia University Press, 2003); M. Wieviorka, *L'antisémitisme* (Paris: Balland, 2005); R. S. Wistrich, *A Lethal Obsession: Anti-Semitism from Antiquity to the Global Jihad* (New York: Random House, 2010).
2 Jewish Voice for Peace, *On Antisemitism: Solidarity and the Struggle for Justice*, with a preface by J. Butler (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2017); UN Watch, *The United Nations and Antisemitism: 2008 – 2017 Report Card* (New York: UN Watch, 2018).

licist writings.[3] Nonetheless, antisemitism still offers ample space for new research, new questions, and new answers. In this respect, the following excerpt is of interest:

> You know what a big crowd it is, how they stick together. How influential they are in informal assemblies... It was customary to send gold to Jerusalem... The senate... forbade the export of gold, but to resist this barbaric superstition was an act of firmness to defy the crowd of Jews... for the welfare of the state...

No, this is not an attack against one George Soros or one Benjamin Netanyahu and their crowd; this is Cicero in his speech *Pro Flacco* delivered in Rome in the year 59 B.C.E.[4] Many today would probably recognize as part of antisemitic speech captions such as *what a big crowd*, *how they stick together*, *how influential they are*, *barbaric superstition*, but also *send gold to Jerusalem* and *for the welfare of the state*. Considering the significantly foreign-policy context of his harangue, we do not contend here that Cicero was an antisemite, but it is remarkable how resilient and repetitive some of the light motifs of anti-Jewish critique can be across long-term cultural and political history.

Antisemitism indeed is a timeless and transnational feature that often informs parts of discourse by the hegemonic majority or by influential groups within it toward "them, the other"—in this case a particular minority essentially designated as illegitimate. Interestingly, the minority too appears to hold some entrenched modes of thought regarding "them, the other"—in this case the hegemonic majority:

> Their idols are silver and gold, the work of men's hands. They have mouths, but they speak not; eyes have they, but they see not. They have ears, but they hear not; noses have they, but they smell not. As for their hands, they touch not; as for their feet, they walk not; they give no sound through their throat. They that make them shall be like unto them; yea, *every one that trusteth in them.*[5]

To even more colorfully express the sense of diffidence that has existed and still persists between Jews and non-Jews, I may quote the old Tuscan saying:

> Con le budella del buono strangolerei il cattivo.

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3 Cf. e. g. S. Beller, *Antisemitism. A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

4 Cicero, *Pro Flacco*, 28:66, cited in M. Stern, *Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism*, vol. 1 (Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1976), 197.

5 Psalm 135:15–18, quoted in S. Singer, ed., *The Authorised Daily Prayer Book of the Hebrew Congregations of the British Empire* (London: Eyre and Spottiswood, 2012). Our italics.

(With the guts of the good guy I would strangle the bad guy.)

Many antisemites, but many Jews as well, would subscribe to this caption when referring to the opposite side.

One sure implication for research about antisemitic prejudice, stereotypes, negative paradigms, or aggression is that such features need to be examined and investigated from both ends of the perpetrator-victim dyad. Such interaction usually involves the cognitive, the behavioral, and the affective domains of those many people who in their life have had experiences that can be categorized as antisemitic, or at least hold perceptions of what antisemitism is or might be.

In this paper we present selected results on perceptions and experiences of antisemitism by Jews—typically the victim side. The materials presented here derive from a wide range of sources developed in recent years in different countries and aim to contribute by clarifying certain aspects of the content of subject matter that are still in need of elucidation, as well as stimulating more cogent planning of future research in the area of antisemitism studies. An emphasis here on quantitative analytic tools is not meant to demonstrate superiority of a given methodology over another. It rather aims at showing the value added that those tools can contribute unveiling scarcely discussed aspects related to cognitive, behavioral, and affective aspects of the Jewish experience with antisemitism and to enrich multidisciplinary discourse in the field.

Contents of Subject Matter

When antisemitism turns into a topic for research, in particular one that applies quantitative tools, what are its essential referential axes? A huge and valuable research effort has been devoted over time to the issue, but still contemporary research may benefit from some additional efforts at conceptualization and systematization.[6] The first imperative step is identifying something that can be measured, be it an event or a perception of an experience or of a trend that links together several events. These eventual measurement units can be of very different nature, ranging from the *physical annihilation of self as a victim* to *impressionistic perceptions* of something that might or might not have happened. They can involve cognitive, behavioral, and affective aspects. In current

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6 Cf. S. W. Popper et al., "Evaluating Contemporary Antisemitism: A Framework for Collaborative Conceptualization, Measurement and Assessment," draft paper, ISGAP, last updated January 22, 2017, https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Measuring-Antisemitism.pdf.

practice, several of these options have been explored quite in depth but several others have not.

Looking at past research on antisemitism, we can detect studies of antisemitic *notions*, *acts*, *experiences*, *perceptions*, *discourse*, and *emotions*. But these alternative paths have not been pursued each to the same and satisfactory depth and extent. One clarification must come since the outset: there may be a wide gap between actual experiences of antisemitism and perceptions of existing antisemitism. The subjective can be disjoint from the objective through the mediation of personal and environmental characteristics, not the least of which is the degree of Jewish identification of those who report manifestations of antisemitism.[7] Ideally, any comparisons should be drawn with the same and appropriate measuring and definitional standard.

Fundamental axes of research on antisemitism should—but do not always— include a minimum core of essential contents:
– The nature and frequency of antisemitic events
– The conceptual contents of offence
– The place of antisemitism as a component of Jewish identity
– The ideological background of perpetrators
– The geographical, demographic, and socioeconomic correlates of offenders and the offended
– The depth of damage caused by offence
– The emotional reaction by the offended
– The transmission channels of offence
– The cumulated influence (total number of persons exposed to) offence
– The Jewish response to offence
– The general response and efficiency of sanction applied

To orderly and systematically study the character and incidence of antisemitism one should first note the *type of* antisemiti*c event*. Antisemitism is a matter of expressions of ideas, concepts and stereotypes, diffusion of negative prejudices, hostile behavior, and physical aggression against inanimate objects, discrimination against individuals and communities, actions against specific persons ranging between harassment, physical violence, to the extreme of murder.

Frequency and *impact* of antisemitism should consider the *number of events*, *number of perpetrators*, and *number of victims*. We need to carefully assess the *number of persons exposed to a given event*. In one of the most vicious websites

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7 Cf. U. Rebhun, "Correlates of Experiences and Perceptions of anti-Semitism among Jews in the United States," *Social Science Research* 47 (2014): 44–60.

I visited, I was the first visitor: the site was highly offensive, but its public impact was close to nil. Such assessment of the *multiplier of events and people exposed to them* is prominently lacking in the literature.

We need a *comparative framework* that considers a short- and long-term *timeline* and is capable of separating the underlying antisemitism from the impact of any *association with external events*. It is sometimes assumed that antisemitic perceptions and actions cyclically co-variate with the economic conjuncture and business cycle,[8] particularly at times of deeper economic recession, or with periodical outbursts of violence between the State of Israel and the Palestinians. Such assumptions call for empirical validation. We also need to analyze and understand the selective incidence of antisemitism according to the geographic, demographic, and socio-cultural characteristics of all those involved: perpetrators, victims, and spectators. There may be a subtle division of labor between the conceptualization and leadership capabilities of intellectual and political elites, and the perceptions and sensitivities by less educated or lower class people—or by the people at large.

The whole gamut of human experiences can be organized into three main categories: cognitive/intellectual, behavioral/instrumental, and affective/emotional. Insert 1 delineates graphically the expected space partition in a multivariate analysis aimed at better understanding antisemitic perceptions and experiences. Such partition relies on an assumption that appropriate variables were actually included in a given study so that they can spread covering each of the three mentioned human experience dimensions.

In general, most historical research about antisemitism stresses either a cognitive or a behavioral/instrumental dimension. It is perhaps surprising how much the affective/emotional aspect has usually been neglected. For example, does antisemitism generate among Jews anxiety, anger, fear, aggressiveness, passivity, activism, loneliness, solidarity, creativity, or other feelings? Does it strengthen or weaken previously held Jewish religious or ethnic identities? Does it strengthen or weaken empathy, solidarity, and national identification with the country of residence of affected Jews?

Each of the mentioned contexts requires different analytic tools and probably also different theoretical frameworks. It is therefore necessary to carefully specify the types of sources, research methods, and technical assumptions adopted in any given analysis of the empirical evidence.

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8 Cf. S. Epstein, *Cyclical Patterns in Antisemitism: The Dynamics of anti-Jewish Violence in Western Countries since the 1950s* (Jerusalem: Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism at the Hebrew University, 1993).

Image 1: Expected Structure of Contents of Antisemitism as Part of Human Experience Domains.

Sources of Data and Methods of Analysis

An important issue for clarification is the sources of data available and the main investigation methodologies pursued. Insert 2 presents selected examples of the logical sequence followed in actual practice in planning some of the main recent research instruments about antisemitism.

Much attention has been devoted to the growth of several inventories of events rated as antisemitic. These databases are developed by Jewish organizations both community and academic oriented, as well as by general public organizations.[9] We also recognize studies of perceptions of antisemitism, by Jews,[10] and/or by others;[11] studies of violence or harassment against the self

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[9] Cf. OSCE/ODIHR, *Hate Crime Reporting. Anti-Semitism 2016* (Vienna: OSCE/ODIHR, 2016), http://hatecrime.osce.org/what-hate-crime/anti-semitism; Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry, ed., *Antisemitism Worldwide 2017: General Analysis Draft* (Tel Aviv: Moshe Kantor Database for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism, 2018).

[10] Cf. FRA – European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, *Discrimination and Hate Crime against Jews in EU Member States: Experiences and Perceptions of Antisemitism* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2013-discrimination-hate-crime-against-jews-eu-member-states-0_en.pdf; idem, *Experiences and Perceptions of Antisemitism: Second Survey on Discrimination and Hate Crime against Jews in the EU* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2018), https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-experiences-and-perceptions-of-antisemitism-survey_en.pdf;

Image 2: Main Research Strategies in the Study of Antisemitism.

as a Jew, or against other Jewish persons, or against Jewish things, reported or denounced by Jews and/or by others;[12] and studies of the contents of discourse, mostly about Jews or about Israel, through different possible channels of diffu-

idem, *Antisemitism: Overview of Data Available in the European Union 2008–2018* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2019), https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2019-antisemitism-overview-2008-2018_en.pdf; idem, *Young Jewish Europeans: Perceptions and Experiences of Antisemitism* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2019), https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2019-young-jewish-europeans_en.pdf; idem, *Antisemitism: Overview of Antisemitic Incidents Recorded in the European Union 2009–2019* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2020), https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2020-antisemitism-overview-2009-2019_en.pdf.

11 Cf. "ADL Global 100: An Index of Anti-Semitism," Anti-Defamation League, issued 2014, accessed January 19, 2021, https://global100.adl.org/map.

12 Cf. FRA, *Discrimination and Hate Crime*; M. Knobel, *Haïne et violences antisémites: Une rétrospective 2000–2013* (Paris: Berg International, 2013); OSCE/ODIHR, *Hate Crime Reporting*; Kantor Center, *Antisemitism Worldwide*.

sion such as large bulks of electronic mails, internet sites, Facebook networks, and the like.[13]

Cross-sectional surveys of populations at selected points of time have tried to measure the incidence of prejudice as perceived within the Jewish and general public. In 2012 the FRA (the European Union's Fundamental Rights Agency) initiated a study of Jewish perceptions of antisemitism among Jews in nine EU countries.[14] In one of these countries, Romania, the quality of data was insufficient, and the country was dropped from further analyses. Countries were selected for the study primarily because of their larger Jewish population size but also in view of their locations in the different regions of the continent: north, south, east, and west. About 6,000 Jews responded via the web. To assess validity of the samples, comparisons were performed with background demographic data independently available for some countries. The UK had good census data; Germany and Italy had good Jewish community registers. France did not have either but could rely on several independent national Jewish population surveys. Hungary and Sweden too could display relatively recent Jewish survey data, while Latvia and Romania had at least minimal evidence from national population censuses. Belgium is the weakest case having none of the above. In the FRA findings, the basic demographic profiles of those surveyed broadly corresponded with those known from other independent sources, which added reliability to the sample. The study, in addition to detailed evidence about Jewish perceptions and experiences with antisemitism, collected data on the sociodemographic and Jewish identification profile of respondents.

In a different study, ADL (The Anti-Defamation League) approached 500 individuals in each of 102 countries, for a total of over 50,000 respondents.[15] Respondents were asked to express agreement or disagreement facing a list of anti-Jewish prejudices (see below). Those who agreed with 6 or more statements were included in an index of antisemitism. There may be doubts about the reliability of such a measuring procedure, but this is not to minimize the usefulness of the ADL study, which for the first time provided some measure of the extent of antisemitism in 102 countries. The study unveiled less antisemitism in North America than in Latin America, in Western than in Eastern Europe. In Southeast Asia—such as in South Korea, Japan, and China—where societies were not exposed to Christian thought, classic antisemitism was found to be quite low. Antisemitism was found to be highest in Muslim countries.

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13 Cf. M. Schwarz-Friesel and J. Reinharz, *Inside the Antisemitic Mind: The Language of Jew-Hatred in Contemporary Germany* (Boston: University Press of New England, 2017).
14 Cf. FRA, *Discrimination and Hate Crime.*
15 Cf. "ADL Global 100: An Index of Anti-Semitism."

Besides sources directly focused on antisemitism, several other studies provide essential information on the interaction between antisemitism and other aspects of Jewish population and society. Here we take advantage of two such studies:

– The 2013 Pew survey of Jewish Americans included 2,786 Jews by religion, 689 Jews of no religion, and 1,190 people of Jewish background and covered a wide range of topics concerning Jewish identification in the United States.[16] Only Jews who do not have another religion were included in the present study.

– The 2013 Transnational Latin American Jewish Educator study explored the professional experiences and identification of 1,379 educators in formal and informal Jewish educators—primarily residing in Mexico and Argentina but also migrated to many other countries out of the continent including Israel.[17]

Outside sociodemographic surveys, there exists much less ongoing analysis of openly or latently antisemitic verbal and textual content expressed in the conventional printed and electronic media, on the web and in the fast developing social media. Carefully selected semantic associations between words can result in much more powerful and disruptive effects than mere acts of violence. The problem is that the latter are easy to detect and report, while the former require careful coding and wide command of historical, philosophical, and literary sources. What also has been prominently missing is studies incorporating a systematic time perspective and broad sets of external social indicators that would provide the necessary context to the specific attitudinal and behavioral patterns being investigated. For sure, further mapping needs to be developed in order to ascertain whether the actual contents of antisemitism reflect a permanent manifest and/or latent structure of contents, replicable under different circumstances, or rather reflect contingent situations related to specific times and places.

Regarding the method of data analysis, inasmuch as the focus is on quantitative analysis, the dominant mode in the literature is simple tabulations of data.

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16 Cf. "A Portrait of Jewish Americans: Findings from a Pew Research Center Survey of U.S. Jews," Pew Research Center, issued October 1, 2013, accessed January 19, 2021, https://www.pewforum.org/2013/10/01/jewish-american-beliefs-attitudes-culture-survey/.

17 Cf. J. Bokser Liwerant et al., *El educador judío latinoamericano en un mundo transnacional*, vol. 1. *Informe de investigación*; vol. 2. *Síntesis, conclusiones y recomendaciones del informe de investigación* (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, Centro Liwerant para el estudio de America Latina, España, Portugal y suyas Comunidaded Judías; Mexico: Universidad Hebraica; Buenos Aires: AMIA, 2015).

Description of features does not usually generate more complex reference to theories or processes that require the simultaneous processing of vastly larger quantities of information. In this respect the main mode of thought is causal inference, in which a given variable is posited as the one to be explained (the dependent variable), and one or more explanatory variables are posited in order to verify the respective fitness and explanatory power within the hypothesized model.[18] Some examples of this approach will be provided below.

A different approach is represented by Similarity Structure Analysis (SSA)—a methodology aimed at exploring the interrelations that exist among large numbers of variables rather than focusing on explaining only one at a time.[19] SSA, exemplified in the following, is based on the correlation coefficients that link together all of the variables included in a given analysis, and transforms the extent of co-variation of those variables—namely their proximity or contraposition— into maps. The emerging visual configurations are helpful at assessing the overall contents of subject matter and its logical partitions.

Definitions and Typologies of Antisemitism

One unescapable question is *what is* antisemiti*sm?* and how do we recognize it? It is not easy to reach consensus in this respect, partly because of the great complexity of the issue at stake, partly also because antisemitism has become a bone of contention in a political arena marred by current issues one of which is the struggle against a State of Israel that besides being a sovereign political entity, also constitutes a sensitive pole of reference in the personal identity of many Jews. In an attempt to create a consensual international point of reference, on May 26, 2016, the Plenary of IHRA (International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance) in Bucharest decided to adopt the following non-legally binding working definition of antisemitism:

> Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish

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18 Cf. U. Rebhun, "Correlates of Experiences."

19 Cf. L. Guttman, "A General Nonmetric Technique for Finding the Smallest Coordinate Space for a Configuration of Points," *Psychometrika* 33 (1968): 469 – 506; R. Amar and S. Levy, "SSA-Similarity Structure Analysis," in *Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Wellbeing Research*, ed. A. C. Michalos (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 6306 – 313.

or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.[20]

Probably better than this rather tepid prose, the remainder of the document clarifies that:

> antisemitic acts are criminal when they are so defined by law (for example, denial of the Holocaust or distribution of antisemitic materials in some countries). Criminal acts are antisemitic when the targets of attacks, whether they are people or property—such as buildings, schools, places of worship and cemeteries—are selected because they are, or are perceived to be, Jewish or linked to Jews. Antisemitic discrimination is the denial to Jews of opportunities or services available to others and is illegal in many countries.[21]

In addition, eleven modes of harassment, aggression, delegitimation, and other forms of behavior aimed against Jews as individuals or a collective were specified.

Two items addressed *too much Jewish power* concepts:

– Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective—such as, especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions.
– Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews.

Two items addressed *Holocaust denial* or *minimization* concepts:

– Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e. g. gas chambers) or intentionality of the genocide of the Jewish people at the hands of National Socialist Germany and its supporters and accomplices during World War II (the Holocaust).
– Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust.

Six items addressed *delegitimation of Israel* concepts:

– Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations.

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20 "Working Definition of Antisemitism," International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, issued May 26, 2016, accessed January 8, 2021, https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/sites/default/files/press_release_document_antisemitism.pdf.
21 Ibid.

- Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e. g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.
- Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.
- Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e. g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis.
- Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.
- Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel.

One item directly addressed *destroying the Jews* concepts:
- Calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the name of a radical ideology or an extremist view of religion.

Against the IHRA official document, it is interesting to note that different research efforts that preceded it chronologically delineate further typologies for a standard definition of antisemitism, which do not greatly deviate from the IHRA suggestions. As mentioned, different sources can provide images of varying levels of intensity of the antisemitic phenomenology, but what is more interesting is the amount of coherence between these different sources. Comparisons can be performed with the FRA 2012 survey of Jewish perceptions of antisemitism in nine EU countries[22] and the ADL between 2013 and 2014, and 2015[23] studies of antisemitic perceptions among the total populations in over hundred countries. In the 2012 FRA questionnaire, eight frequently heard hostile statements made by non-Jewish people were suggested for evaluation by Jewish respondents. Of these:
    Two items addressed *too much Jewish power* concepts:
- Jews have too much power in country in economy, politics, media
- Jews are responsible for the current economic crisis

Two items addressed *Jewish foreignness* concepts:
- The interests of Jews in Country are very different from the interests of the rest of the population
- Jews are not capable of integrating into Country's society

Two items addressed *Holocaust denial* or *minimization* concepts:
- Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes
- The Holocaust is a myth or has been exaggerated

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22 Cf. FRA, *Discrimination and Hate Crime.*
23 Cf. "ADL Global 100: An Index of Anti-Semitism."

Two items addressed *Israel delegitimation* concepts:
– Israelis behave "like Nazis" towards the Palestinians
– Jews are only a religious group and not a nation

The ADL 2013–2014 and 2015 surveys were less balanced in terms of anti-Jewish perceptional contents. In a sense it wasted some of the effort by asking somewhat repetitive questions. The following eleven questions suggesting anti-Jewish prejudices were asked:

Six items addressed *too much Jewish power* concepts:
– Jews have too much power in the business world.
– Jews have too much power in international financial markets.
– Jews have too much control over global affairs.
– Jews have too much control over the United States government.
– Jews have too much control over the global media.
– Jews are responsible for most of the world's wars.

Three items addressed *Jewish foreignness* concepts:
– Jews don't care about what happens to anyone but their own kind.
– People hate Jews because of the way Jews behave.
– Jews think they are better than other people.

One item addressed Holocaust denial or minimization concepts:
– Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust.

One item addressed both *Israel delegitimation* and *foreignness* concepts:
– Jews are more loyal to Israel than to [this country/the countries they live in].

In the data analysis, antisemitism was operationally defined as the percentage of individuals who in a country responded *probably true* to at least six out of the eleven items.

In spite of the different emphases in these different lists of items, we should note that they all pertain to the cognitive domain, that is, they refer to definitions of a given situation that is posited a priori to deviate from a normative paradigm of what an exemplary Jew or exemplary Jewish community is supposed to be. Behavioral or affective aspects were not actually included in these indicators of antisemitism. Significant overlap exists across the three different typologies proposed above regarding certain main themes of interest or conceptual components of the complex of antisemitic expressions: (1) old style *delegitimation of the Jew as an individual and as a community*; (2) *delegitimation of the Shoah* (also designated as the Holocaust); and (3) *delegitimation of the State of Israel*.

These various components appear above just as serially listed and will be addressed here below from the angle of empirical observation in a more comprehensive and interactive mode. Clearly, antisemitic expressions aim at creating damage or at least offence against the stigmatized minority, as well as a sense of superiority and dominance in the mind of the offender, while seeking consensus and support among the broader public. The question of the cumulated influence of the various components of antisemitic offence remains open.

Population Distributions: Jews and Antisemites

The next question is how expressions of antisemitism come to relate to real persons, namely the Jews in a given population. To answer the question, we review where the Jews are and where the antisemites are, and whether there is a meaningful correlation between the two population distributions. In the course of the last several decades—particularly since the end of World War II but also, following the June 1967 Six Day War, since the 1970s—Jewish population distribution worldwide has undergone dramatic changes. The main changes were prompted by massive international migration flows and to some extent by differential rates of Jewish natural increase or decrease reflecting marriage, birth and death, and assimilation patterns in different countries.[24] Overall, the Jewish population grew very rapidly in Israel, and to a lesser extent in North America, Australia, and some Western European countries, while strong declines were recorded in North Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe, and to a lesser extent in Latin America and South Africa. The question of how changes in Jewish population distribution can be related to the varying spread of antisemitism is relevant in view of the fact that transformations of Jewish geography and of other social indicators are not just a matter of territorial distribution but also significantly affect exposure of Jews to different political, cultural, and socioeconomic environments.

A cultural-political typology of world countries based on modernization studies and on the World Value Survey,[25] produced a partition into eight geocultural or civilization areas, including English-speaking countries beyond the Atlantic Ocean (the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand), European countries subdivided between Catholic and Protestant nations, Latin America, countries

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24 Cf. S. DellaPergola and U. O. Schmelz, "Demography," in *Encyclopedia Judaica* (Farmington Hills: Thompson Gale, 2006), 5:553–72.
25 Cf. R. Inglehart and C. Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

formerly under the hegemony of the Soviet Union, countries in Sub-Sahara Africa, Muslim countries, and Confucian-oriented Asian countries. In the case of Jews, it was appropriate to add a ninth category represented by the State of Israel and its close environment of the Palestinian Territories, with an eye not so much to internationally recognized legal definitions of boundaries but rather to the actual social environment perceived by people on the ground. Insert 3 presents a distribution of the world's total and Jewish populations in absolute numbers and percentwise, and the percent of Jews within the total population of each area as of 2013. The Jewish and total population spreads were totally different, with 44.9% of the Jews living in English-speaking countries versus 6.3% of total world population, and another 43.4% living in Israel versus 0.2% of total population, while at the other end 46.9% of total population lived in Confucian Asian countries versus 0.1% of Jews, and another 15.3% lived in Muslim countries versus 0.2% of Jews.[26] What is no less significant is the density of Jewish population across these different cultural areas, ranging from 14 Jews per 1,000 inhabitants in English speaking countries down to 2.6 and 1.4 per 1,000 in Catholic and Protestant European countries, 0.9 and 0.6 per 1,000 in ex-communist and Latin American countries, and less than 0.1 per 1,000 in the most populated areas of the world: Sub-Sahara Africa, Muslim countries, and Asian Confucian countries. In other words, exposure of the general population to a Jewish presence is dramatically different across countries and cultural areas. Only in Israel—also including in these calculations the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza—does the Jewish population constitute a majority, albeit a contained one, of 505 per 1,000 inhabitants. In the State of Israel itself, Jews constitute 75% of the total.

Jewish population distribution worldwide indicates that socio-economic development—measured here through the United Nations Human Development Index HDI[27]—and Jewish population density[28]—stand in strong and direct relationship. Insert 4 shows that country development accounts for 44% of total variation in Jewish population distribution, which in the social sciences is considered a very powerful directional relationship. More socioeconomic

26 Cf. S. DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population 2013," in *American Jewish Year Book* 113, ed. A. Dashefsky and I. Sheskin (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 278–358.

27 Cf. UNDP, *Human Development Report 2017* (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2017).

28 Cf. S. DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population 2017," in *American Jewish Year Book* 117, ed. A. Dashefsky and I. Sheskin (Dordrecht: Springer, 2017), 297–377.

Civilization area	Jewish population	Total population	Jews %	Total %	Jews per 1000
Total world	13,854,800	7,056,691,800	100.0	100.0	1.963
English speaking	6,216,200	443,248,000	44.9	6.3	14.04
Israel	6,014,300	11,909,800	43.4	0.2	504.99
Catholic Europe	563,600	213,871,000	4.1	3.0	2.645
Protestant Europe	189,300	132,470,000	1.4	1.9	1.43
Latin America	384,900	599,003,000	2.8	8.5	0.64
Ex-Communist	374,600	408,300,000	2.7	5.8	0.92
Sub-Sahara Africa	71,300	858,900,000	0.5	12.2	0.08
Muslim	31,150	1,080,100,000	0.2	15.3	0.03
Confucian Asia	9,450	3,308,890,000	0.1	46.9	0.00

Image 3: Source of data: DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population 2013," cit. Adjusted by author.

development is conducive to more frequent Jewish presence.[29] Higher Jewish population concentrations clearly appear in the more developed English-speaking (here labeled Anglos) and European countries. The only exceptions are a few developed societies in Asia, which have very tiny Jewish populations. The position of Israel in this chart (which for clarity of display uses a logarithm scale of Jewish population density) is very peculiar, with by far the highest proportion of Jews. It reflects the ideological determinants of Jewish migration to Israel historically. But Israel is also a developed country, ranked 19th out of 200 countries. It may therefore be an attractive destination besides any consideration of religion and culture. Of the whole Jewish diaspora, in 2016, 88 % lived in countries more developed than Israel, and 12 % in countries less developed.

It is also relevant to examine the relationship between the human development of a country and the frequency of antisemitism there (Insert 5). It appears that the more developed a country, the lower the incidence of antisemitic opinions among the population, at least as measured through the ADL study. About 17 % of the country variation in the frequency of antisemitism is explained by the level of HDI, a fairly strong relationship. It can be easily inferred that socioeco-

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29 The alternative hypothesis that Jewish presence causes greater development appears untenable in view of the very low percentages of Jews in all countries except Israel.

Log of Jews per 1000 population

Image 4: Percent of Jews among Total Population in World Countries by Human Development Index, 2016. Sources: UNDP, *Human Development Report*, 2017, cit; DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population 2017," cit.

nomic development is correlated with higher levels of democracy, freedom of expression, and autonomous self-regulation of different voluntary groups within the larger society. A more pluralistic nature of democratic regimes and openness to diversity of views and lifestyles among the broader population may be related to less antisemitism.

On the other hand, antisemitism and Jewish population density stand in reverse relationship. Measured percentwise on the basis of the ADL study, the frequency of antisemitism accounts for only 5% of total variation in the percentage of Jews in the different countries. Less antisemitism is associated with more frequent Jewish presence, but the weakness of the relationship indicates that, unlike in the past, antisemitism today does not have the power to generate great Jewish emigration flows and population redistribution to more congenial locations. But, importantly, the other way around is also true: a more frequent Jewish presence is associated with less antisemitism. This is demonstrated in Insert 6 where the dependent variable is posited to be the ADL Index of antisemitism while the explaining variable is the proportion of Jews in a country. The relationship is evidently negative, although its explanatory power remains quite weak: 7.8% of explained variance. The finding is nevertheless interesting because it

ADL 2014 percent of antisemitism

Image 5: Index of Antisemitism by Human Development Index in World Countries, 2016. Sources: UNDP, *Human Development Report*, 2017, cit.; Anti Defamation League, *ADL Global 100*, cit.

contradicts at least one of the many strands of antisemitism, namely that it is the Jews themselves who bring antisemitism upon their heads because of their alleged misbehaviors.

Antisemitism and Jewish Identification

Having outlined the reciprocal positions of Jews and antisemitic manifestations in the macrosocial perspective of the global system of countries, it is now important to detect what possible position antisemitism may hold within the collective religious ethnic and cultural identification of Jews. In the study of Jewish society, antisemitism is typically treated as an exogenous variable—something that happens out of the Jewish collective and penetrates into the Jewish collective affecting it to its depth. A complementary and much needed approach calls for assessing the role and weight of antisemitism and the commitment to fight against it as one of the several components of Jewish identification. We discuss this issue with respect to Jewish identification in three different cultural areas: in the eight EU countries investigated in the 2012 FRA survey, in the United States in

ADL 2014 percent of antisemitism

Image 6: Index of Antisemitism by Percent of Jews among Total Population in World Countries, 2016.
Sources: DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population 2017," cit.; Anti Defamation League, *ADL Global 100*, cit.

2013, and among a sample of Jewish teachers from different Latin American countries in 2013.

In Insert 7 we present a Similarity Structure Analysis (SSA) of Jewish identification in eight EU countries in 2012. The analysis addresses twelve selected variables each of which is represented by a point on the map.

The location of and distances between the points on the map reflect the intensity of correlation and co-variation between the different variables. Two neighboring points refer to two concepts that are very similar judging from the co-variation of answers of respondents toward the same and toward other concepts; two distant points refer to concepts that are less mutually related in the mind of the public. The whole space can be partitioned according to broader categories of contents providing the underlying meaning of the whole identification configuration. It should be stressed that SSA does not deal with frequencies of answers, only with similarity or dissimilarity of answers to different questions.

Questions concerning Jewish identification in Europe were formulated in terms of the degree of importance attributed by a respondent to a given indicator as an essential part of his/her own Jewish identity. The different indicators are

Image 7: Similarity Structure Analysis (SSA) of Jewish Identification in 8 EU Countries, 2012. Source: 2012 FRA Survey of Perceptions of Antisemitism among Jews in 8 EU countries. N = 5919. Author's processing.

related by mutual correlations that produce a circular configuration partitioned into conceptual domains. Beginning with the upper right quadrant, we recognize indicators of Jewish family and lifecycle, followed clockwise by several indicators of Jewish religious beliefs, norms, and rituals; Jewish philanthropy and community voluntarism; Jewish moral and ethical values; Jewish culture and education; memory of the Holocaust and fight against antisemitism—possibly to be construed as a domain of Jewish historical-political consciousness; feelings of solidarity toward the State of Israel; and belonging to Jewish peoplehood. Proximity of different domains points to some greater reciprocal affinity than to other domains in the configuration. We note in particular and underline the proximity

that emerges between the Shoah/antisemitism sector and the Israel sector among Jews in the EU.

A similar procedure is followed in Insert 8 regarding Jews in the United States, based on the 2013 Pew Survey of Jewish Americans.[30] The range of Jewish identification questions here is slightly different as there are nine of them, but the emerging map of contents in nearly identical to that seen for Europe. We detect the same circular configuration of variables and partition into conceptual domains, starting again with the Jewish family and moving clockwise to ritual normative indicators, philanthropy (a proxy for Jewish community), ethical values, Israel, the Holocaust, and belonging to Jewish peoplehood. Here too we can underline that the Holocaust and Israel identification dimensions pertain to neighboring domains. Salience of Holocaust in own Jewish identification is also relatively close to a general sense of belonging to the Jewish people. The similarity between the US and EU maps is in fact quite striking in view of several important differences that prevail in the general organization of society in the respective countries, and in the different modes of Jewish community organization—much more centralized in Europe and more disperse and voluntarist in the US.

A third observation of the structure of Jewish identification is presented in Insert 9 concerning a cross-section of the Jewish population from Latin America. As noted above, this is a more selective sample composed exclusively of educators mainly from Mexico and Argentina and spread today over five continents besides those still in the countries of origin. The number of Jewish identity indicators in this case is significantly higher and reaches 40 variables. Six of these, indicated by bright markers, refer to the Jewish communities of orientation of the respondents.

The partitions are substantially similar to those already seen, again beginning with Jewish family and moving clockwise to normative ritual, Jewish community (inclusive of philanthropy), civic participation in the non-Jewish public space, Jewish culture and history inclusive of memory of the Shoah and fight against antisemitism, and solidarity with Israel. A significant difference versus the EU and US configurations is the centrality of the Jewish peoplehood identification domain. Such a central point of shared focus and possibly mediation between other more distinct and consolidated identity options and persuasions also frequently appears in other studies of Jewish identification internationally

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**30** Cf. "A portrait of Jewish Americans," Pew Research Center.

Image 8: Similarity Structure Analysis (SSA) of Jewish Identification in the United States, 2013. Source: 2013 Pew Survey of Perceptions of Jewish Americans. N = 3126. Author's processing.

and in Israel.[31] Among Latin American educators, once more, the identification domains of Holocaust and Israel are contiguous.[32]

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31 Cf. S. Levy, "Jewish Identity Values of Israeli Youth and Adults in Contemporary Israel," in *Research in Jewish Demography and Identity*, ed. E. Lederhendler and U. Rebhun (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2015), 288–305; S. DellaPergola et al., "The Structure of Jewish Identification in the United States: 2001 Revisited," in *Jewish Population and Identity: Concept and Reality*, ed. S. DellaPergola and U. Rebhun (Dordrecht: Springer, 2018), 43–71.
32 Cf. Bokser Liwerant et al., *El educador judío latinoamericano.* Processing by the author of this article.

Image 9: Similarity Structure Analysis (SSA) of Jewish Identification among Latin American Jewish Educators, 2013. Source of data: 2013 Survey of Latin American Transnational Jewish Educators. N = 1379. Author's processing.

From these comparative analyses we evince two important conclusions. The first is that stable and repetitive patterns of Jewish identification prevail across the Jewish diaspora in very different cultural and geo-political contexts. Keeping in mind that in many cases contemporary Jewish communities are the product of international migration streams that started from similar countries of origin and split along the way, and in spite of long term separation and of the differences between countries of destination, it seems that important common threads still exist. Such perceptional commonalities involve in particular those sensitivities that are related to antisemitism. Antisemitism is perceived by Jews under different skies as something strictly correlated to the Shoah, and both are much more

cognate with the Israeli aspect than with other aspects of their Jewish identification. The second implication of these similar sensitivities is a globalization of stimuli and reactions. Some antisemitic episode that occurs in one spot on earth is understood in exactly the same way by large numbers of Jews that are not locals but live elsewhere. Moreover, attacks on Israel resonate very closely with memory of the Shoah, and respectively delegitimation of Shoah is perceived by very many Jews as impacting on the safety of the State of Israel. We return to this point in the conclusions.

Perceptions and Experiences of Antisemitism

Moving from some of these somewhat theoretical premises to the more concrete reality of antisemitism, the 2012 FRA Survey collected data and analyzed a significant number of possible occurrences of antisemitism as perceived by a large sample of Jews in eight EU countries. In Insert 10 we present the frequencies reported with regard to 13 different indicators related to antisemitism. We indicate the average frequency for the total sample, the lowest and highest frequencies reported across the different countries, and in some cases the lowest and highest frequencies expressed toward a battery of options regarding the same issue among total Jewish respondents.

In Insert 10 the highest frequency is reported for a perception that antisemitism increased during the five years that preceded the survey, 2007–2012. Over three quarters (76%) of the EU Jews' sample reported such an opinion. However this ranged between a low of 39% in Latvia and a high of 88% in France. Two other indicators elicited highly diffused perceptions by a majority of European Jews: the sense that antisemitism is a big problem in the country —66% of the total sample, ranging between 44% in Latvia and 85% in France, and that the Israeli-Arab conflict impacts their own security—68%, between 39% in Latvia and 93% in Belgium.

Other types of experiences rank at a significantly lower frequency level, such as worrying about becoming the victim of physical attack over the next 12 months (33% of total respondents), witnessing verbal insult and/or physical attack during the last 12 months (27%), or experiencing verbal insult and/or physical attack during the last 12 months (21%). Still a lower layer of antisemitic experiences includes having suffered physical violence over the last 5 years (7%), and having suffered physical violence over the last 12 months (4%). Another type of perception relates to the propensity of respondents to identify a given statement as antisemitic. Out of a list of 14 statements (see below), respondents who recognized them as antisemitic ranged between 17% (Jews as only a reli-

Type of issue	Total	Low	High
Perceives increase in antisemitism, last five years[a]	76	39	88
Feels Israel-Arab conflict impacts own security[a]	68	39	93
Antisemitism a big problem in country[a]	66	44	85
Identifies given statement as antisemitic[b]	=	17	80
Context/transmission of antisemitic comment[b]	=	14	75
Worries being victim of physical attack, nxt. 12 mo.[a]	33	17	60
Frequently heard listed antisemitic statement[b]	=	11	48
Witnessed verbal insult/physical attack, 12 months[a]	27	17	43
Experienced verbal insult/physical attack, 12 mo.[a]	21	14	30
Suffered physical violence, last 5 years[a]	7	3	10
Suffered physical violence, last 12 months[a]	4	3	7
Felt discriminated in a social situation[b]	=	1	11
Felt discriminated in a public service[b]	=	2	8

Image 10: Jewish Perceptions and Experiences of Antisemitism in 8 EU Countries, 2012 – Percentages.
a. Gaps assessed by country
b. Gaps assessed by listed modality
Source: FRA, *Discrimination and Hate Crime*, 2013, cit.

gious group and not a nation) and 80% (the Holocaust a myth or exaggerated), while those who actually heard those statements ranged between 11% (Jews not capable of integrating in society) and 48% (Israelis "Nazis"). The contexts or modes of transmission of antisemitic statements also widely ranged between 14% at sporting events and 75% on the internet. Finally, lower proportions of respondents felt discriminated in different social situations—between 1% (in a bank or insurance company) and 11% (at the work place), or in public services—between 2% (a local doctor) and 8% (the police).

One important emerging conclusion is that because of the multiform possible occurrences of antisemitic opinions and acts, from the attitudinal to the behavioral, frequencies of the respective experiences can variate greatly. We find three distinct levels of perception: one, mainly cognitive, shared by the vast majority of the Jewish public, refers to the general thrust and increase of antisemitism in society; a second more behavioral perception concerns 20 to 40% of the Jewish population who fear or actually witnessed verbal or physical violence; and a third, also behavioral, reported by less than 10% of respondents refers to actual violence suffered and to actual discrimination suffered in public

offices. It is important to keep these differences in mind if one wishes to elaborate a measure capable of describing synthetically the incidence of antisemitism.[33] The wide range of observable incidences precludes the feasibility of a single synthetic measure. Hence, much subjective latitude remains when, in order to characterize a certain situation, some observers may choose to refer primarily to indicators of antisemitism characterized by low frequency, while others may prefer to stress indicators characterized by high frequency (on the gradual perception and elasticity of antisemitism).[34] Both are true, but their overall meaning should be deepened analytically by understanding the mutual relationships that exist between different types of antisemitic manifestations, beyond listing them in decreasing frequency order.

Insert 11 presents a Similarity Structure Analysis (SSA) of 14 different negative statements that were submitted to the eight country FRA respondents in order to verify whether they judge them to be antisemitic.

Reminding the serial lists of negative items already mentioned above, when mutually related the ones to the others the various concepts reveal their overall underlying logic. We observe again a circular configuration that can be partitioned into conceptual domains. Starting with the upper right quadrant and in clockwise progression, we detect a racist component (would not marry Jews, Jews are physically recognizable, or notable), an anti-Israeli component (criticize or boycott Israel, Jews are a religion not a nation hence not eligible to have a state of their own, Israelis Nazis), a Holocaust component (Holocaust a myth, Holocaust victimization exploitative), a classic *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* component (Jews hold excessive power, are responsible for economic crisis), and a foreignness component (Jews hold different interests from the rest of population, not integrated in society, not country nationals). Once more, the proximity between Holocaust and Israel dimensions emerges clearly in this analysis.

It is notable that in this map proximity relates to negative anti-Jewish images and prejudices, while in preceding analyses we noted such proximity in terms of the positive valence of Jewish identification. But the conclusions and implications are quite the same: Holocaust and Israel are once again proximate. The perceptional proximity of Holocaust variables and classic antisemitism variables is of interest too.

We can also infer that the variables in the upper part of the map include topics and themes that are shared with virtually all forms of racism and xenopho-

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33 Cf. Popper et al., "Evaluating Contemporary Antisemitism."

34 Cf. D. Staetsky, "Quantifying Antisemitic Attitudes in Britain: The 'Elastic' View of Antisemitism," issued October 2, 2017, accessed January 19, 2021, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/the-elastic-view-of-antisemitism/.

Image 11: Similarity Structure Analysis (SSA) of Cognitive Antisemitic Concepts as Perceived by Jews in 8 EU Countries, 2012. Source: 2012 FRA Survey of Perceptions of Antisemitism among Jews in 8 EU countries. N = 5919. Author's processing.

bia, while in the bottom part of the map the themes are more directed at Jewish specificity. All variables reported in Insert 11 referred to cognitive aspects of antisemitism in a definitional sense.

Insert 12 addresses a more complex array of variables related to antisemitism perceptions and experiences including the fourteen preceding ones but adding many more, for a total of 56 variables some of which were reviewed in Insert 9. Here we start the reading of the map from the bottom right quadrant (*Prejudice definition*), which basically includes the same cognitive-definitional variables already seen in Insert 11. The next domain clockwise (*Incidence assessment*) includes variables dealing with subjective judgement about the frequency and

mode of expression of different manifestations of antisemitism in the country of residence. The next sector (*Incidents worry*) relates to a respondent's fear that incidents might occur to him/her or to their family members. It is something that might happen but has not yet happened, and therefore still not yet in the behavioral/experiential domain. The contiguous domain (*Prejudice heard*) refers to the same definitions already reviewed in the *Prejudice definition* domain, but these have been perceived in the respondents' actual experience and therefore pertain to behavior rather than to cognition. The next domain (*Discrimination experience*) refers to actual experiences of discrimination suffered by self or family in the public space.



Image 12: Similarity Structure Analysis (SSA) of Antisemitism Perceptions and Experiences among Jews in 8 EU Countries, 2012. Source: 2012 FRA Survey of Perceptions of Antisemitism among Jews in 8 EU countries. N = 5919. Author's processing.

Interestingly, when one adds to the map the responses to antisemitism devised by respondents (such as emigration or deleting signs of ethno-religious identification), the respective variables fall into this same domain. This underlines the domain's behavioral character, although to a large extent such responses have not been translated into actual practice. The next domain (*Incidents experience*) refers to actual suffering of verbal or physical attack by respondent. Finally, the next domain (*Sanction*) refers to the respondent reaction in case local state legislation would forbid circumcision or ritual slaughtering of animals. The subject matter, if put into practice, would include a behavioral component, but the issue—as it was in 2012—was only theoretical. At the same time, the Jewish public was highly involved emotionally with the ongoing polemics on these issues.

This brings us to the next domain. There is a visible empty space in the upper right quadrant, and this represents what I shall call *investigator's nightmare*. In fact, the SSA theory and technique posits that if there is a conceptual space to be investigated and meaningfully partitioned into relevant domains, all of that space should be covered, the way of entry being appropriate questions posed to respondents. If there is a conspicuous empty space in a map, it means that the pertinent questions were not asked. What would those omitted questions be? Returning to the initial logical scheme presented above in Insert 1, we submit that the missing questions pertain to the affective domain. Questions of such nature, involving personal emotional reaction under the impact of antisemitism, were not asked indeed in the FRA study nor generally are in social scientific surveys. Our proposition cannot be demonstrated with absolute certitude, but it is worth considering in future studies.

One remarkable feature of Insert 11 is that when similar issues were investigated under two different angles—the cognitive and the behavioral—they appear as clearly separated clusters in the map and not regrouped by conceptual similarity (such as Holocaust or Israel). This further strengthens the assumption about the basic nature of the different domains that emerge from this analysis.

An additional word should be said about the channels of transmission through which antisemitism is spread. As noted above, the web and the new social media are an infinite and nearly unexplored sea of hostile but also of ambiguous content. We do not know how to exactly assess the real impact of incidents through the web. Sometimes something with a positive goal may have negative side effects and vice versa. I mention for example articles and appeals critically addressing the Israeli internal political debate, which have a positive moral and educational aim in mind but can be exploited by hostile people and organizations. There also are, in this respect, important grey zones whose contents can be interpreted on each side of the antisemitic divide. A better un-

derstanding of these issues requires careful content analysis of the respective texts and expressions.

Summing up, regarding a *typology of the contents of offence*, our analysis confirms the assumption that three major strands dominate the current scene: *Jewish excessive power*, *Holocaust denial*, and *Israel delegitimation*. A fourth type stresses the *foreignness* of Jews, both physically and in relation to the local national context. A further type stressing *the Jew as a physical and moral degenerate* was important historically but is less central today. A new type recently emerged in the form of preoccupation toward the preservation of human or animal physical integrity—apparently neutrally humanistic—actually oriented against Jewish rituals such as circumcision or ritual animal slaughtering. This calls for reconsidering the ideological matrices of antisemitism. As to the tri-lateral typology of cognitive, behavioral, and affective domains, it seems that a more systematic exploration may bring essential missing notions to the study of antisemitism.

Ideological Matrices of Antisemitism and Inner-Outer Perceptional Consistency

Antisemitic offence may come from a broad spectrum of *ideological matrices*. Some rely on religious or otherwise transcendent premises—such as Pagan/Animist, Christian, or Muslim. Some derive from political ideas, such as right wing in its various manifestations (nationalist, fascist, Nazi), left wing in its various manifestations (Marxist, anarchist), or liberal-centrist. Christian (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox) and Muslim (Sunni, Shia) antisemitisms—taking into account their internal variations—view the Jew as an unfaithful deviant, an enemy, but also as a potential neophyte, hence someone to be suppressed, curbed, dominated, or possibly converted to the ranks of the faithful. Left and Right political antisemitisms, each with their own particular and different emphases, identify among Jews negative characteristics—often specular and symmetric the ones to the others, such as at the same time the Jew as Capitalist and the Jew as Bolshevik, the Jew as reactionary and the Jew as revolutionary. For liberals, partly in the vein of early Pagans, one main quest is assimilation of the Jews into the cultural mainstream. A hostile perception of Jews as an ancient culture, separated and distinct from the majority, stands in conflict with the secular elites' quest to assimilate everybody into the norm—their norm. In this sense, Tacitus—a distinguished member of first-century pre-Christian elite—and Benedetto Croce—a leading twentieth-century Italian liberal philosopher—suggest nearly identical

assimilationist propositions on Jews that we may not define antisemitism in to-day's terms,[35] but they can easily be represented and exploited in contemporary antisemitic discourse. In contemporary political discourse, environmentalist/an-imalist political groups are leading in the effort to preserve the earth's natural status from human intervention, including on its living components. Therefore, among other things, they stigmatize and sanction traditional Jewish norms and behaviors that relate to circumcision and animal slaughtering. Consciously or not, these concepts were derived and metabolized from an ancient Christian ideational root. In the end, the shared offence of these different ideological ma-trices is that none recognizes the right of a Jew to be him or herself on Jewish terms of reference.

In the 2012 FRA study of Jewish perceptions of antisemitism, one aspect con-cerned the possible linkage of events in the Middle East and alleged Israel's re-sponsibility in those events, with hostility against the local Jewish community. The findings are illustrated in Insert 13 where such association is analyzed at the country level according to four prevailing ideological matrices (Right, Left, Christian, Muslim) by which the perpetrators were identified by the Jewish pub-lic.

In most European countries examined, people associated with the Left were identified as more dominant in linking anti-Israeli attitudes to hostility against the local Jewish community, followed by people associated with Islam, and—at some distance—by followers of the Right. The association with Christianity was quite lower, except for Hungary. There appeared to be an emerging coales-cence between liberals and Islamists who could find common ground on some matters mostly related to antagonism against Israel. Different ideological matri-ces resulted in very different levels of statistical explanation of inter-country var-iation: 86.5% of explained variance across 8 EU countries when the offence came from the Left; 69.7% when it came from Muslim extremists; 9.1% when it came from the Right; and 0.2% when it came from Christian extremists. In other words, in the perception of Jews, the greater coherence across EU countries was found when problematic and dangerous statements linking together Israel and diaspora Jews came from the Left.

Another broader question is whether a group's internal perceptions of an-tisemitism are coherent with antisemitic perceptions and attitudes among the majority of society in the same countries. As noted above, the FRA 2012 study

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35 Cf. S. DellaPergola and L. D. Staetsky, *From Old and New Directions: Perceptions and Expe-riences of Antisemitism among Jews in Italy* (London: JPR Jewish Policy Research Institute, 2015), http://archive.jpr.org.uk/download?id=1531.

Image 13: Relationships between Main Ideological Matrices and Blaming Local Jews for the Middle East Conflict in 8 EU Countries, 2012. Source: 2012 FRA Survey of Perceptions of Antisemitism among Jews in 8 EU countries. N = 5919. Author's processing.

measured perceptions by Jews while the ADL 2013–2014 study measured perceptions mostly by non-Jews. In both studies, the quality of the samples was not equal in different countries. But the capital question is whether the two surveys produced results that could be compared. In Insert 14 we compare the FRA and ADL findings for the 8 EU countries that appear in both surveys.

The consistency of findings is very high, in the sense that generally higher perceptions with one type of indicator correspond to higher perceptions with the other type. General antisemitic perceptions in a given European country statistically explain over 54 % of the variation in Jewish antisemitic perceptions in the same country. Hungary and France lead the pack on both accounts—though for different reasons: Hungary right wing and Christian, France left wing and Islamic. The UK was lowest on both accounts. This means that Jewish internal perceptions of antisemitism very much reflect ongoing antisemitic perceptions among the majority of society. We learn here an important lesson for future data collection: using one instrument instead of another, we may nevertheless obtain a robust indication of variation across countries of the antisemitic phenomenology. However, it should also be noted that Jewish (defensive) perceptions are significantly higher percentwise than general (offensive) perceptions. This confirms the assumption already largely documented above that sensitivity

to antisemitism constitutes one of the essential components in the overall package of Jewish identification.

% of Jews feeling antisemitism is a serious problem

Image 14: Comparing Measures of Antisemitism in 8 EU Countries, 2012 vs. ADL 2013–14. Sources: 2012 FRA Survey of Perceptions of Antisemitism among Jews in 8 EU countries. N = 5919; ADL (2014). Author's processing.

Responses to Antisemitism

A further question seldom investigated is what type of reaction antisemitism causes among the victims. Elaborating on this last observation, we look at the frequency and patterns of *Jewish response* to instances of antisemitism. We would like to know more about who pursues counteracting action after the initial antisemitic event; toward what individual or authority; what the sanction applied is, if any; and what its effectiveness is. What surely is prominently missing in the available knowledge about antisemitism is an accurate assessment of the interrelations between one and another of these different dimensions.

Insert 15 provides a selection of possible responses and the inter-country variation of their frequencies. First, awareness is fairly high among Jews of the legal and political instruments that may be available in different EU countries

to protect Jews from antisemitic offense. Overall a majority are aware of laws against anti-Jewish hatred (74%), against discrimination (57%), and against denial of Holocaust (54%). However the inter-country variation is extremely broad with extremely low levels in some cases. Jewish response is much lower regarding possible personal behavioral changes than might reduce the impact of antisemitism, such as avoiding of wearing Jewish identifying signs (20%, ranging between 5% and 34% across countries) or emigrating from the country (29%, ranging between 18% and 48%—see more below). Even lower are the propensities to report and denounce serious antisemitic incidents to the authorities (18%, ranging between 4% in Sweden and 24% in the UK). This suggests much Jewish diffidence or even resignation in front of the extant situation.

Type of response	Total	Low	High
Aware of law that forbids hatred against Jews	74	14	84
Aware of law that forbids discrimination	57	12	73
Aware of law that forbids denial of Holocaust	54	2	85
Considered emigrating from country	29	18	48
Avoidance of wearing Jewish identifying signs	20	5	34
Reporting most serious incident to authority	18	4	24

Image 15: Responses to Antisemitic Perceptions and Experiences, 8 EU Countries 2012[a] – Percentages. a. Gaps assessed by country. Source: FRA, *Discrimination and hate crime*, 2013, cit.

Regarding concrete Jewish responses to antisemitism, perhaps the most radical one would be emigration from the country of residence, and the question is whether or not this is occurring or likely to occur. In the FRA survey, 18% of the Jewish population in France would consider moving from their neighborhoods on grounds of perceived insecurity to other more secure areas in France, and one half of these already did. Over 40% of the Jews in France also indicated that they would consider emigrating from the country. One test of those intentions is to look at actual patterns of Jewish emigration from France. Insert 16 shows the monthly variation of *aliyah*—emigration to Israel—from the world, from the Former Soviet Union (FSU), and from France between 2013 and 2018. It also points to the timing of major acts of terrorism in France, some of which were aimed at general targets and some at Jewish targets: in 2012 against a Jewish school in Toulouse, at the beginning of 2015 against the satiric magazine Charlie Hébdo and against a kosher mini-market, toward the end of 2015 against

the Bataclan theatre and several other targets, and in July 2016 at the sea Prom-
enade in Nice.

Image 16: Jewish Emigration from France to Israel in Response to Major Terrorist Attacks,
Monthly, 2013 – 2018. Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Monthly Statistical Bulletin*,
monthly.

Evidently, Israel is only one of many possible countries of destination for
Jews living in France and elsewhere, but it is the only one that provides orderly
and detailed yearly data on the matter.[36] Emigration from France clearly in-
creased over time, especially in 2014 and 2015, possibly in relation to changing
circumstances related to the fast increase in the Muslim minority, the increase in
terrorist acts but also to some extent the evolving of general political discourse in
France and the disparaging mingling of antisemitism within it. The exact timing
of migration, however, did not have much to do with the time and intensity of
terrorist attacks. Monthly variation, strongly concentrated in July and August,
was rather related to the school year and to holidays. Several instances of
major terrorist acts are indicated along the time axis, but monthly variation of
aliyah continued to follow its independent rhythms. In 2016, 2017, and 2018 mi-
gration from France clearly diminished versus 2014 and 2015, in spite of dramatic

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36 Cf. "Statistical Abstract of Israel," Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, accessed January 19,
2021, https://www.cbs.gov.il/en/Pages/search/yearly.aspx.

instances of continuing terrorism. Incidentally, immigration from the FSU is less seasonal because it is older and more dependent on Israel logistical and economic support. Further analyses of FRA and ADL data for many more countries unquestionably demonstrate that Jewish emigration is much more related to socioeconomic determinants—both personal and related to the level of economic development of the country of residence—than to levels of perceived antisemitism in a country.[37]

Implications for Future Research and Concluding Remarks

Our review of the national or transnational nature of antisemitism in light of contemporary research findings leads to several preliminary and some definitive conclusions. Some of these relate to method, others to substance. One thing, however, clearly emerges from our cumulated research findings: antisemitism is very largely perceived as a form of violence enacted against *Jews*. In fact—because of the complex manifest and latent interconnections that exist across different Jewish communities and between different aspects of the antisemitic morphology—antisemitism may come to be perceived as violence against *the Jews*. The vast majority of Jews—at least in the European Union—report perceptions of a significant increase of antisemitism in recent years, along with increases in racism and xenophobia. The vast majority report uneasiness or fear with the negative impact of the Israeli-Arab conflict on their own security.

Antisemitism has been and is a long-term resilient global feature, and contemporary globalization trends have strengthened its transnational character. The study of antisemitism at the local level is interesting and essentially informative, but a better analytic perspective is gained by expanding it to international comparisons and to globally integrated conclusions. Broadening the research perspective must involve not only the simultaneous observation of the antisemitic phenomenology over large and multicultural geographical territories and world regions but also the incorporation of many different and apparently unrelated aspects of the same phenomenology into one comprehensive and cogent analysis.

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37 Cf. S. DellaPergola, "Jewish Demography in the European Union: Virtuous and Vicious Paths," in *Being Jewish in 21st Century Central Europe*, ed. H. Fireberg, O. Glöckner, and M. M. Zoufalá (Oldenbourg: De Gruyter, 2020), 17–56.

Unlike in the past, most Jews today live in cultural areas characterized by low intensity of antisemitism, which also are better developed and the more democratic areas of the world. Therefore, the more relevant ground for observing antisemitism tends to become much less the local episode of discrimination or aggression, and much more the broader discourse on the fundamental themes at stake. Antisemitism thus affects symbolically and simultaneously all Jews as a global collective, beyond its past local salience. Antisemitism growingly becomes an insidious global transnational phenomenon unrelated to direct contact with Jews as real-life individuals but largely transmitted against Jews as an immanent collective.[38] The resonance and impact of antisemitic discourse, and the exposure of Jews to it, is enormously magnified by ongoing globalization and growing transnationalism.

Research confirms what many would suppose at the level of personal intuition, namely that the main contemporary conceptual expressions of antisemitism include three main strands: attributing to the Jews economic-political power, dominance and exploitation, with further contentions of foreignness to the majority's national interests and physical recognizability; Shoah/Holocaust denial or manipulation; and Israel delegitimation and demonization. A fourth strand stressing the Jew as a physical and moral degenerate was important historically but is less central today, substituted by a Neo-Pagan mode of Jewish group targeted *piety* for the human body and animal integrity. Multiple ideological foundations of antisemitism did and do include Pagan, Christian, Muslim, left-wing, right-wing, and liberal-centrist components. Christians and Muslims view the Jew as enemy but also as possible neophyte. Political antisemitism condemns the Jew for different, specular and totally contradictory reasons. For liberals, the main theme was and remains assimilation of the Jews.

One also needs to look at the role of antisemitism as a component within the total space of Jewish identity and at the frequency and patterns of Jewish response. Contents wise, the cognitive/intellectual and behavioral/experiential domains of antisemitism have been sufficiently clarified. This is not the case with the affective/emotional domain and its relationships to other domains. Several

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38 This is not a new phenomenon. Studies on pre-modern Judaism show that during these periods as much as in early modern and modern times, a population's attitude toward Jews was as much determined by external factors such as the image of Jews depicted in the Christian scriptures as it is today. Jeremy Cohen developed the concept of the "hermeneutical Jew" to describe this phenomenon. Cf. J. Cohen, *Living Letters of the Law: Ideas of the Jew in Medieval Christianity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 10 – 19. Already in pre-modern times, it was not contact with a local Jewish community upon which antisemites based their constructions of Jewish identity but external factors that had nothing to do with actual Jewish life.

studies in different continents reveal a strikingly similar configuration of the overall space of Jewish identification perceptions and feelings, and within it a particularly strong proximity relationship between the identification domain of memory of Shoah and fight against antisemitism, on the one hand, and the identification domain of Israel as a symbolic Jewish referent, on the other. The consequence is that attack against or denial of one domain may generate strong sensitivity among people who are attached to the other.

In this respect, thanks to the comprehensive conceptual insights allowed by the Similarity Structure Analysis approach, we came closer to decoding what perhaps is the fundamental crux of the Jewish perception of contemporary antisemitism. Comparative research identifies memory of the Shoah as the most frequent or one of the most frequently shared markers of Jewish identification.[39] The evidence is also that denial or minimization of Shoah is the one discursive topic that Jews most frequently deem as offensively antisemitic.[40] When discourse turns into criticism of Israel's government, or turns into denying or boycotting Israel's right to exist, because of the identificational proximity of Israel with the Holocaust, a highly sensitive chord is touched in the minds of many. In other words, the aggressive delegitimation mode evidently, but also the naive/neutral/factual Israel's government critique—which actually is peacefully accepted as legitimate by many Jews—tend to ignore the crucial latent connection that, rightly or wrongly, turns such arguments into harassment in the perception of the majority of contemporary Jews.

Another important finding was that the analysis of antisemitism cannot be disjoint from the different meaning and salience of its cognitive, behavioral, and affective domains. We found that within each of these different modes variables display a mutual relationship and internal order that greatly helps mapping the contents of the phenomenon. However, when the different domains are mapped together, the public tends to regroup separately the cognitive from the experiential and presumably from the affective (although the latter was not really studied).

These findings should be helpful when one wishes to reconsider the nature and priorities of future research. We have argued that still today most available research on antisemitisms relies on data collection and cataloguing of events

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39 Cf. S. DellaPergola, "Jewish Peoplehood: Hard, Soft, and Interactive Markers," in *Reconsidering Israel-Diaspora Relations*, ed. E. Ben-Rafael, J. Bokser Liwerant, and Y. Gorny (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 25–59; "A portrait of Jewish Americans," Pew Research Center; Bokser Liwerant et al., *El educador judío latinoamericano*.
40 Cf. FRA, *Discrimination and Hate Crime*.

from the field and on cross-sectional surveys of a given population at one specific point of time. In fact the main data collection strategies have included:

- Inventories of antisemitic acts of violence/aggression/profanation/discrimination reported to Jewish communities or to the security authorities of the different countries;
- Cross-sectional surveys of the incidence of prejudice among a representative sample of the total population;
- Cross-sectional surveys of the extent of suffered/perceived violence/aggression/prejudice/ discrimination among a representative sample of the Jewish population.

Reflecting on our analysis, in future research repeated data collections based on similar instruments are needed to allow for robust comparisons over time. One important case in point is the FRA survey of experiences and perceptions of antisemitism in EU member states, which after the successful round in 2012 was replicated in 2018 in an expanded number of countries and with much improved rates of response. A better and deeper time perspective should also be introduced through retrospective questioning in cross-sectional surveys of own experiences and recollections at different points in the lifecycle (childhood, adulthood, and later); or much better, through longitudinal studies, namely the periodical re-interviewing of representative panels of respondents. This would allow monitoring and following up changes occurring among the Jewish and broader public opinion over time and would provide a more consistent and accurate impression of changing experiences, perceptions, and narratives. Such panels need to be renewed periodically and may produce unprecedentedly useful insights. They potentially provide a new mechanism apt to send a regular flow of information to those interested and may create an observatory about a field in permanent transformation.

No one can deny the fundamental importance of continuing the search for the number of antisemitic events, the number of perpetrators, the number of people exposed to the event—namely the multiplier of events and people exposed to them, and the perceptions of antisemitism by Jews and by non-Jews. In this paper, trying to answer an essentially qualitative question we represented several research approaches largely relying on quantitative data. The logic explicitly or latently followed was, on the one hand, that of statistical inference, and on the other hand, that of building more complex systemic models of the whole cognitive and behavioral space of those concerned. An attempt was pursued to bring together tens of different variables and analyze them simultaneously with the help of techniques (like SSA) that aim to unveil the fundamental structure of an issue even more than its frequency. This approach seems

highly appropriate to help better understanding the latent sides of individual and collective human behaviors.

But additional updated and appropriate research methods should be applied to reach and unveil the multivariate depth and complexity of the overall phenomenology of violence and unequal treatment of otherness in society. We should develop and strengthen a real comparative framework, time- and place-wise, and associate it with external events such as economic and political conjuncture, while understanding differential geographic, demographic, socioeconomic, and cultural characteristics of perpetrators and victims alike.

We should have a better representation of the main channels of diffusion of antisemitism and of their efficiency. Among these the web tends to become the most polluted, overcoming the conventional printed and electronic media whose effects are more elusive but can reach far larger audiences. In order to decipher antisemitic discourse through the social and electronic media, we need a coherent mapping sentence capable of integrating its multivariate contents; a better outline of the active and passive actor; a better assessment of who pursues action after the initial antisemitic event; and a better notion of what the consequences of such reaction are. A systematic content analysis is needed of antisemitic discourse generated in politics, the media, cultural and artistic representation, and the academy—with particular attention to double standards toward Jews and Israel, and toward others through careful reading and recombining of words and word sequences, but also body languages and the respective contexts. We need more integrated and semantics-sensitive studies in which all that in the daily printed press, television and radio, internet, emails, social media is associated with Jews and/or with Holocaust and/or with Israel should be scrutinized, categorized, contextualized, and interpreted.

When assessing the reality of contemporary antisemitism, or any related topic, there is no pretention here to affirm the superiority of quantitative over qualitative research, or of one quantitative technique over another. Different disciplinary approaches in history, literature, and the social sciences, and the respective different methodologies are all legitimate and useful when tackling the issues, provided each is conducted systematically, within its own appropriate disciplinary paradigms and keeping in mind that there exist other disciplinary paradigms.

One important difference across disciplines is that some of them focus on the specific experiences of individual Jewish actors, while others focus on aggregate or collective Jewish communities, or on the non-Jewish societal environment at large. A micro-social research approach often infers the broader reality from the experiences of relatively small groups, such as intellectuals, writers and their work, and witnesses in general who can provide the lead to other broader

realities. A macro-social approach assesses the picture based on the collective understandings, performances, and feelings of the largest possible number of anonymous informants, within which the elites are included but do not constitute the dominant factor. Each approach has its advantages and disadvantages, the main trade-off being between depth and representativeness.

A recurring research question is whether it would be useful to integrate every possible facet of antisemitism into one measure, or rather choose to develop multiple measures adjusted to multiple types of situations and contexts.[41] Ways should be developed to coordinate research from different sources way beyond what was done so far. Comprehensive assessments are better reached based on multiple sources. One example provided here was the attempt to integrate the macro approach of the ADL world survey with the more micro approach of the FRA EU Jewish survey. Comparison of the same measures or complementing different measures across sources is imperative to a better understanding of antisemitism.

Most broadly stated the ultimate question is: How should one react to antisemitism? Can an end be put to antisemitism? Does one stop at the analytic edge, or should more operational initiatives be contemplated? The epistemic community of scientific researchers and public intellectuals should engage in analyzing, teaching, explaining, arguing, advocating, persuading, and combating. Academic books and articles in good general journals are an essential step in the dissemination of knowledge. Academic projects should be developed to gather incrementally better understanding of the phenomenology and also to create the necessary know-how premises that might help creating the foundations for policies aimed at fighting antisemitism. Continuing documentation and monitoring calls for with the involvement of Israeli, World Jewish, and general public institutions. A much stronger relationship should be established between research on antisemitism and research on all other forms of racism, xenophobia, discrimination, marginalization, and harassment in relation to other religious, ethnic, and linguistic groups, and in relation to communities who prefer lifestyles different from those of the majority. Who are those who should be concerned with old and new manifestations of antisemitism? Who should initiate the just mentioned kinds of response? Can or should worries, interests, and energies be organized and conveyed coherently? There already exist a number of roof organizations, like the IHRA, that work to promote a fair international educational platform to fight antisemitism, and they should be more intimately connected with the world of research.

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41 Cf. Popper et al., "Evaluating Contemporary Antisemitism."

A reaction strategy against antisemitism should also include educating people to know and appreciate Jewish values and history, doing good deeds and providing good behavioral examples, being alert and politically active, bringing people to directly know, freely evaluate, and if necessary also civilly disagree with Jewish and Israeli realities. It also is essential to pursue alliances with the many persons and organizations of good will, from all strands, which in the last analysis constitute the majority of society. As a last resort—one should know how to develop adequate self-defense initiatives. These questions among others, and the answers they will receive, will determine the map, impact, and hopefully diminished visibility and viability of antisemitism in the twenty-first century. Because one thing is assured: there will be antisemitism in the twenty-first century.

Acknowledgments

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L. Daniel Staetsky

Quantifying Antisemitic Attitudes in Britain: The "Elastic" View of Antisemitism

Introduction

Surveys of attitudes toward Jews have repeatedly shown that antisemitism in the UK remains relatively low when compared to other European countries. The last decade alone has seen at least 15 such surveys, all of which tell us that antisemitic attitudes in the UK are present in about 10 % of adults and that the trend in prevalence in such attitudes is stable.

Yet we know from previous surveys of the Jewish population that nearly 50 % of British Jews perceive antisemitism to be a problem in the UK. Moreover, the frequency of surveys of the British public on the subject of antisemitism (of which several were commissioned by Jewish organizations) and the centrality of the subject in the British Jewish press all testify that the "low" proportion of adults with antisemitic attitudes still translates into high anxiety about it among Jews. How does one explain this dissonance? Perhaps, 10 % *feels* low, when this figure is understood formally, purely mathematically, as describing a "minority attitude," for example, it is clearly far from being a majority attitude. However, is it possible that the true social meaning of this figure escapes us? To begin to answer this question, I propose a novel concept of an "elastic" view of antisemitism. I develop this concept based on a large survey of antisemitic attitudes in Britain, conducted in late 2016 and early 2017 by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research, JPR (henceforth the JPR Antisemitism Survey).

The Survey

The JPR Antisemitism Survey is the largest ever population survey conducted on this topic in Great Britain. It was developed by JPR with input from the Community Security Trust, the Antisemitism Policy Trust, and Ipsos MORI at the questionnaire development stage. The fieldwork was carried out face to face and online by Ipsos MORI, on behalf of JPR.

The survey questionnaire was developed by considering the following sources: (1) historical research on antisemitism; (2) past surveys of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes conducted by various research institutes and polling companies (such as the Pew Center Global Attitudes survey, the Anti-Defamation League Global 100 study etc.); and (3) the advice of practitioners developing policy responses to antisemitism.

The survey was carried out in two modes: face to face and online. The face to face mode generated a nationally representative sample of 2,003 observations (implying a 2% margin of error in application to the full sample). The national online sample of 2,002 observations was created by inviting members of the voluntary commercial panel maintained by Ipsos MORI to participate in the survey. In both face to face and online modes, the core part of the questionnaire relating to attitudes to Jews was offered to respondents for self-completion. All analyses reported in this note were carried out on the dataset of 4,005 observations, which combined the face to face and the online samples.

What Has Been Found?

In line with the previous surveys of attitudes toward religious groups, the JPR Antisemitism Survey found that an unfavourable opinion of Jews is, distinctly, a minority position in Britain. In response to the question "Please tell me if you have a very favourable, somewhat favourable, somewhat unfavourable or very unfavourable opinion of [Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Christians]," 2.4% said that they have very unfavourable opinion of Jews, 3% have somewhat unfavourable opinion, and together these groups comprise 5.4%.

Further, we found that an unfavourable opinion of *any* religious group is distinctly a minority position in Britain. The most favourably seen group is Christians, perhaps unsurprisingly so, given the Christian heritage in Britain. The least favourably seen group is Muslims: about 15% declared that they have a strongly unfavourable or somewhat unfavourable opinion of this group. Jews and Hindus feature in-between.

Notes: Face to face sample, N=900. Due to rounding, percentages may not always add up to 100%.
Question: Please tell me if you have a very favourable, somewhat favourable, somewhat unfavourable or very unfavourable opinion of (Jews, Muslims, Christians, Hindus)

Figure 1: Opinions held by the population of Great Britain about Jews and other religious groups.

We experimented with different response possibilities to the favourability question in order to test the sensitivity of our findings to the way the question is asked. Typically, survey questions include some "opt-out" possibilities, which could be used by people without strong opinions, people who have difficulty responding, and people who are not eager to reveal their true feelings. The latter possibility is especially worrying in the given context. Attitudes toward ethnic and religious groups are a sensitive topic in the West, and negativity toward certain groups is a sentiment that is neither easily admitted nor readily expressed. Within the context of this survey, that means that the respondents may have been somewhat cautious about revealing the true nature of their feelings toward certain groups, and may have given responses that were socially acceptable instead, that is, responses that were unlikely to result in them being negatively judged. In survey science jargon, the outcome of such under-reporting is called social desirability bias. The presence of such bias would mean that the survey might produce lower levels of unfavourability toward various religious and ethnic groups than the levels that exist in reality.

These considerations led to the decision to split the sample into two subsamples, with half of our respondents being asked exactly the same question as before but with fewer opt-out options. A certain degree of sensitivity was revealed. Still, we found that only 2.4% of the population hold very unfavourable opinions toward Jews and 10.2%—somewhat unfavourable, together comprising 12.6%, raising the probability of Jewish encounter with unfavourable opinions from 1 in 20 (as a 5.4% level of unfavourability would suggest) to about 1 in 8.

Figure 2 casts the findings obtained so far in a graphic form and introduces the concept of an "elastic" view of antisemitism that will pave the way—eventu-

Figure 2: Unfavourable opinion of Jews: an elastic view.

ally—to understanding Jewish anxieties. The circle represents the population of Great Britain.

The proportion holding a favourable or neutral opinion of Jews is very dominant numerically—about 87%. The proportions holding unfavourable opinion are in warm colours:

1. 2.4%: hard-core negativity toward Jews (in dark red), a level repeatedly seen irrespective of the type of response schedule used;
2. 3.0%: softer negativity (in dark pink), a level of "somewhat" unfavourable opinion obtained when many opt-out options were available, and
3. additional 7.2%: best thought of as latent negativity (light pink) expressed only under a less "generous" response schedule, in terms of response options available.

At the core of an "elastic" view is the notion that one cannot measure the prevalence of antisemitism using just one number. All three figures appearing in Figure 2 are meaningful in their own right. The power of these figures is in their capacity to capture the different intensities of negativity toward Jews.

The two estimates from the JPR Antisemitism Survey set the boundaries of the lowest and the highest levels of the prevalence of unfavourable attitudes to Jews. It is clear, considering all available estimates, that the estimates of the prevalence of negativity toward Jews vary in rather narrow boundaries: argu-

ably, the minimum recorded level is 5.4 %, while the maximum level is 12.6 %. The fundamental conclusion presented earlier, that unfavourable attitudes toward Jews in the UK is a minority phenomenon, remains unchanged. Yet the real social meaning of this level—that is, is it dangerous for the Jewish population of the country, or what level does it have to reach to become socially or politically problematic or dangerous—remains unclear. If research findings are to be of value in policy terms, it is critical that their social significance is properly understood.

An "elastic" view can be developed further. Attitudes in general, and anti-Jewish attitudes in particular, are not limited to simple emotional characterisations. In practice, we also offered our respondents a selection of specific *negative and positive* statements about Jews (Figure 3). These negative statements have been known to resonate with Jews as antisemitic from previous surveys.

Notes: N=3979 (respondents self-identified as Jews – 26 in total in the dataset – were not asked these questions in the survey). Positive statements are italicised. Due to rounding, percentages may not always add up to 100%.
Question: Below are a few statements that people have made about different ethnic or religious groups in the UK. Some people may agree with them, some may disagree and some may not have an opinion at all. Please tell me to what extent you would agree or disagree with someone who said the following statements.

Figure 3: Opinions held by the population of Great Britain on specific statements about Jews.

Note first that one of these positive statements was "A British Jew is just as British as any other British person" and that it was endorsed by a clear majority (almost 80 %). The other positive statement, "British Jews make a positive contribution to British society," was endorsed by about 60 %. The extent of neutrality and/or inability to answer are significant in relation to these questions, but

this does not undermine the overall impression of the rather common, albeit not universal, positive perception of Jews as a group that is part of Britain and that makes a positive contribution to it.

Ideas around excessive and sinister "Jewish power," "Jewish exclusivity," "Jewish wealth," and "Jewish exploitation" (of other people for economic or political gain) are the most common antisemitic ideas, but they are not widely prevalent among the British. In their strong form they are held by about 2% of the population, in their weaker form by an additional 10% or so. The most offensive and extreme forms of Holocaust denial are especially rare. The prevalence of such ideas is of a similar magnitude to the prevalence of hard-core negativity toward Jews, as reported earlier.

At the next step we collated these results into a single index of antisemitism, where each respondent who agrees strongly or somewhat with any of the negative views receives a score of 1 in relation to that particular view. We then sum across the responses to different questions and obtain a total score for this individual. The maximal number of antisemitic attitudes that one can hold is eight, which would effectively mean that an individual holds both an unfavourable view of Jews and endorses all specific antisemitic statements (seven in number, in this context). The minimal is one—which signals endorsement of just one attitude.

The distribution of this new variable, which we call the Antisemitism Index, is set in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Presence of unfavourable opinion of Jews and /or endorsement of antisemitic statements: the elastic view updated.

Note that:
1. 70% of the British population did not endorse a single antisemitic attitude.
2. Holding 6 – 8 antisemitic attitudes is very low in prevalence, affecting about 2% of the population. This figure is remarkably similar to the levels of hard-core antisemitism captured by the favourability question (2.4%).
3. About 15% of British adults hold two or more antisemitic attitudes to some degree at least. Beyond this boundary are a further 15% who either strongly agree with, or tend to agree with just one such attitude. Accounting for all groups endorsing *at least one attitude* brings the total prevalence of antisemitic attitudes, at different intensities, to 30%.

How is this 30% best understood? Categorically, 30% does *not* represent the proportion of antisemites in society. Only a small proportion of them can be called antisemitic in a full political sense of this word. What it represents instead is the level of *diffusion* of antisemitic ideas and attitudes, and the extent to which these ideas permeate society. With this we make a shift from counting antisemites to quantifying antisemitism, which may appear subtle, but it is very important for a proper understanding of Jewish anxieties.

What Does It All Mean?

This analysis suggests that while strong antisemitism is a marginal position in British society, antisemitic ideas are not. These ideas can be held with and without open dislike of Jews, and they are present to some extent in one third of Britons. In day-to-day life, the frequency of Jewish people's encounters with antisemitism is determined not necessarily by the small minority of hard-core antisemites but rather by much more widely diffused elements of attitudes that Jews commonly consider to be antisemitic. Thinly scattered and weakly held antisemitic attitudes matter, because they are more *prevalent* than strong attitudes, so the probability of an encounter with them is higher.

From the Jewish point of view, Jews come in contact with the entire *spectrum* of negativity toward them, and more often than not, they will have an imperfect knowledge about which part of the spectrum any given antisemitic view arises. It can arise from the segment holding a very weak and hesitant form of negativity toward Jews. However, there is only so much that a given Jew can do in the course of regular social interaction to clarify this. Regular social interaction is a setting where, more often than not, the Jewish side has only imperfect information about the total worldview of the non-Jewish side. That "total worldview"

may or may not include multiple antisemitic attitudes—the Jewish recipient is unlikely to know the whole picture.

To sum up the most important lesson from the elastic view—the hard-core prejudice toward Jews is rare, but encountering some degree of prejudice is much more common, and, as a result, that kind of prejudice is more visible and more impactful when Jewish lives are concerned. Antisemitic ideas, in contrast to the hard-core antisemites, are diffused among a significant proportion of the general population which makes contact with such ideas a not infrequent occurrence in Jewish lives. In many instances, those expressing such views may not even realise that a particular comment or remark might be experienced by Jews as offensive or upsetting, but they can impact significantly on the perceptions, sense of comfort and safety, and, ultimately, the quality of life for Jews.

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Reinhold Boschki

The Contribution of Religious Education to the Prevention of Antisemitism: An International Empirical Study

This research project is situated in the Europe-wide discussion on historical remembrance and the challenges of antisemitism today. The specific emphasis of the study is Holocaust remembrance in religious education. Within this horizon, we examine the practice of religious education by analyzing how the complex topic of Holocaust remembrance and antisemitism is approached and perceived by pupils and teachers in the context of this specific school subject. The research project asks, by means of an international comparative approach, how the topic of Holocaust remembrance and antisemitism is dealt with within religious education in the curriculum of secondary schools in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. Going beyond the theoretical and mostly normative discourse, the emphasis is set on the empirical investigation of the practice of religious education focusing on antisemitism. This was examined in all three countries via an online questionnaire. This approach provides an overview and statistical data about various ways of teaching Holocaust remembrance and about antisemitism. Part of the online questionnaire is a qualitative analysis of short texts written by teachers involved and initiated by open questions. Additional interviews provide deeper insight of the teachers' experiences, obstacles, and achievements in class while covering the topic of antisemitism.

1 Introduction

Antisemitism is not only a problem of society and nations, it is also a problem of religious communities and denominations. For more than two-thousand years Christian anti-Judaism and antisemitism are part of Christian tradition and can be found in holy texts, Christian sermons, rituals, teaching, and religiously motivated actions. For the last fourteen-hundred years Muslim anti-Judaism and antisemitism can be found in Islamic tradition.

In times of resurgent antisemitism in all parts of the world,[1] the serious task of any religious tradition is to rethink, rework, and renew their doctrines and principles with respect to antisemitic teachings and attitudes. Christianity has a most important task in this respect, because Christian enmity against Jews is the central source for the emergence of modern antisemitism.

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1 Cf. A. H. Rosenfeld, *Resurgent Antisemitism: Global Perspectives* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013).

"Christian anti-Judaism provided elements for an ideology adopted in modern anti-Semitism."[2] This quote expresses the entire drama of the question of religious anti-Judaism and antisemitism. Historically, Christianity cannot apologize for a supposedly less dangerous anti-Judaism, which would have little to do with the emergence of modern racial antisemitism. On the contrary, religious antisemitism and social, political, right-wing extremist or even state antisemitism are intimately interwoven. Historians such as Yehuda Bauer assume that Christian antisemitism is consistent with modern antisemitism.[3]

The Christian roots of antisemitism are also evident in current manifestations of hatred against Jews in European societies. Often religious or pseudo-religious patterns are applied to Judaism (e.g., demonization, bedevilment, and satanization of the Jews), borrowed from the history of *religious* hatred of the Jews and transferred to today's forms of antisemitism. For this reason, churches, theology, and religious education must grapple with and tackle the problem of antisemitism in today's societies as an issue of their own.

As I am not a historian it is not my task and not my competence to give an overview of Christian anti-Judaism and antisemitism. Many contributions are included in this volume that report and discuss research on the historical and sociological background of antisemitism in biblical texts, in Christian tradition since the so-called church fathers, in Christian doctrine, and so on. My own perspective is that of a researcher in religious education. That's why I'm especially interested in a critical investigation on current Christian education in terms of anti-Jewish content as well as creating educational concepts to fight antisemitism. For this reason the reminder of this contribution concentrates on what teachers of religious education actually *are doing* in terms of combating antisemitic prejudices and attitudes in their lessons on religious education in class. This is the focus of an international empirical study with teachers of religious education that was conducted in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland.

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2 R. Kampling, "Antijudaismus," in *Begriffe, Theorien, Ideologien*, vol. 3 of *Handbuch des Antisemitismus*, ed. W. Benz (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 13. See also: C. Hoffmann, "Christlicher Antijudaismus und moderner Antisemitismus. Zusammenhänge und Differenzen als Problem der historischen Antisemitismusforschung," in *Christlicher Antijudaismus und Antisemitismus: Theologische und kirchliche Programme deutscher Christen*, ed. L. Siegele-Wenschkewitz (Frankfurt/M.: Haag und Herchen, 1994), 293–317; R. R. Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism* (New York: Seabury, 1974).

3 Cf. Y. Bauer, "Vom christlichen Judenhass zum modernen Antisemitismus: Ein Erklärungsversuch," *Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung* 1 (1992): 77–91; S. Salzborn, *Antisemitismus. Geschichte, Theorie, Empirie* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014), 11–13.

2 Context of the Study

After the Shoah the shock about what happened was immense—not only in all western societies and nations but also in various religious institutions. Some early Christian reactions immediately after World War II express feelings of guilt and shame in light of what happened, the awareness that the Christian tradition was part of the road that led to Auschwitz. The documents also express the willingness and need to fight antisemitism, trace the roots of antisemitism in Christian tradition, fundamentally revise Christian doctrine, and teach respect, appreciation, and esteem toward Jews and Judaism. One of the most impressive statements is that of the so-called "Seelisberg Conference," an assembly of Roman Catholic and Protestant Christians together with Jewish representatives that took place in 1947 in Seelisberg, Switzerland. The declaration of "The Ten Points of Seelisberg" (or "The Ten Theses of Seelisberg") was a demanding address to the churches

> ...to prevent any animosity towards the Jews which might arise from false, inadequate or mistaken presentations or conceptions of the teaching and preaching of the Christian doctrine...[4]

In this document we find a nascent awareness of the fact that Christianity itself is responsible for the rise of antisemitism both in history and the present and that the duty of Christian leaders, pastors, and teachers should be to teach younger generations a new understanding of Jewish-Christian relations and to fight antisemitism. This was also an important point at an assembly of the German Protestant Church (EKD) in 1950 in Berlin. In 1965, the Roman Catholic Church delivered a fundamental declaration on the relationship toward non-Christian religions including Judaism that opened a completely new chapter in church history. The name of the famous document is *Nostra Aetate*, and it was promulgated at the last session of the Second Vatican Council. For the first time in history, the Jews and Judaism were seen in a positive light in a major official document of the Catholic Church. In *Nostra Aetate*, Christians and Jews are understood in the frame of a close partnership in the history of salvation. The consequence of this new understanding of the Christian-Jewish relationship is the rejection of antisemitism. The Vatican document states:

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4 "The ten points of Seelisberg" reported in: J. Isaac, *The Christian Roots of Anti-Semitism* (London: Kingham, 1965), 23.

> In her rejection of every persecution against any man, the Church, mindful of the patrimony
> she shares with the Jews and moved not by political reasons but by the Gospel's spiritual
> love, decries hatred, persecutions, displays of anti-Semitism, directed against Jews at any
> time and by anyone.[5]

This declaration was a tremendous step forward, especially mirrored in the numerous following explanations and documents from all Christian churches and assemblies on a national as well as on a global level. Since the 1970s, Christian theology has developed a completely different and renewed doctrine on the positive relationship between Christians and Jews. Theology has specified and clarified the document *Nostra Aetate* at decisive points.[6] The renewed church statements and theological approaches were also followed by major initiatives to revise textbooks and curricula in Christian teaching and in religious education—for example, as part of the project called "Learning Process Christians and Jews" conducted by scholars in religious education, which led to a comprehensive revision of German-speaking religious education textbooks.[7] One of the latest studies is the one by Julia Spichal who focused on still-existing prejudices against Jews in textbooks and curricula of Christian religious education.[8]

In summary, Christian awareness has grown such that right-wing thinking, antisemitic attitudes, xenophobic behaviour, and so on are an important challenge to Christian theology[9] and religious education. Nevertheless, there are

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5 Pope Paul VI, *Nostra Aetate: Declaration On The Relation Of The Church To Non-Christian Religions*, issued October 28, 1965, accessed July 17, 2018, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651028_nostra-aetate_en.html. Cf. also the following commentaries: R. A. Siebenrock, "Nostra Aetate. Theologischer Kommentar," in *Herders Theologischer Kommentar zum Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzil*, ed. P. Hünermann and B. J. Hilberath (Freiburg: Herder, 2006), 3:591–693; R. Boschki, J. Wohlmuth, and L. Ricken, eds., *Nostra Aetate 4: Wendepunkt im Verhältnis von Kirche und Judentum—bleibende Herausforderung für die Theologie* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2015).
6 As an example, one of the latest studies: M. Himmelbauer, M. Jäggle, R. A. Siebenrock, and W. Treitler, eds., *Erneuerung der Kirchen. Perspektiven aus dem christlich-jüdischen Dialog* (Freiburg: Herder, 2018).
7 E. g. P. Fiedler, *Das Judentum im katholischen Religionsunterricht: Analysen, Bewertungen, Perspektiven* (Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1980); G. Biemer, *Freiburger Leitlinien zum Lernprozess Christen-Juden* (Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1981); M. Rothgangel, *Antisemitismus als religionspädagogische Herausforderung: Eine Studie unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Röm 9–11* (Freiburg: Herder, 1995).
8 Cf. J. Spichal, *Vorurteile gegen Juden im christlichen Religionsunterricht: Eine qualitative Inhaltsanalyse ausgewählter Lehrpläne und Schulbücher in Deutschland und Österreich* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2015).
9 Cf. S. A. Strube, ed., *Rechtsextremismus als Herausforderung für die Theologie* (Freiburg: Herder, 2015).

still important tasks to complete for religious education to fight antisemitism. With respect to classroom education, very little is known empirically about what teachers really do. That is the reason why we started an empirical study within religious education that is still in progress and that will continue for the next couple of years.

3 Our Empirical Study

3.1 Theoretical Framework

The research project REMEMBER[10] is situated within the frame of Holocaust education and Holocaust remembrance in Europe. The basic theoretical point is that Holocaust remembrance is part of an educational duty of any democratic state—especially of Germany and Austria.

The research project asks, by means of an international comparative approach, how the topic of Holocaust remembrance is dealt with within religious education in the context of schools in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland.[11] Religious education is mandatory and part of the government-sponsored school systems in the countries that are studied here. Going beyond the theoretical, and mostly normative discourse, the emphasis is set on the *empirical* investigation of the practice of religious education focusing on Holocaust remembrance. This was examined in three German-speaking countries—Germany, Austria, and Switzerland—via an online questionnaire. This approach provides an overview and statistical data about various ways of teaching Holocaust remembrance and combatting antisemitism.

Some aspects of our theoretical approach are: "Memory" and "remembrance" are not identical with "history," but both concepts are closely linked together. Memory ("remembrance") is a phenomenon that is directly related to the present. It is a specific interpretation and construction of history that is relevant for the present and for the future of society—as well as for the collective identity

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10 Cf. Research group REMEMBER, *Erinnerung an den Holocaust im Religionsunterricht. Empirische Einblicke und didaktische Impulse* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2020).
11 Members of the research group REMEMBER are: Tübingen University: Reinhold Boschki, Burkard Hennrich, Stefan Lemmermeier, Rebecca Nowack, Angelika Treibel; Zürich University: Thomas Schlag, Michèle Wenger; Vienna University: Sonja Danner, Andrea Lehner-Hartmann, Martin Jäggle, Viera Pirker, Martin Rothgangel, Julia Spichal; Evangelische Hochschule Freiburg: Wilhelm Schwendemann; Mainz University: Stefan Altmeyer, Anna Weber; Katholische Stiftungshochschule München, Campus Benediktbeuern: Ralf Gaus.

construction of groups *within* society. In our approach to memory and history, we follow scholar in cultural studies Aleida Assmann in acknowledging that individual and collective memory/remembrance and history/ historiography are different perspectives on the past that are bound together in a dialectical manner "like a system of checks and balances" for mutual completion, control, and correction.[12]

Concerning Holocaust remembrance, we are living in a time of *transformational change*.[13] The generation of direct involvement is almost completely gone. The legacy of the Nazi era undergoes a process of historization. Philosophers of history speak of a "paradigm shift" concerning Holocaust remembrance.[14] This *transformational change* has multifaceted manifestations.

- *Political change:*
  – expansion of the European Union
  – process of globalization
  – overlapping memories
  – "fight for memory" / "struggle for remembrance"[15]
- *Societal change:*
  – Societies become rapidly heterogeneous and pluralistic
  – migration
  – different ethnic communities have their own approaches to memory
- *Religious change:*
  – religion is characterized by heterogeneity, plurality as well
  – religious memory in Europe is no longer identical with Christian memory
  – individual, societal, and political relevance of religion is signature of so-called post-secularity
- *Change of identity constructions:*
  – mentality transformation
  – impact of mass media on individual, social, political, and religious identity constructions
- *Change of experienced reality:*

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12 A. Assmann, *Das neue Unbehagen an der Erinnerungskultur: Eine Intervention* (München: Beck, 2013), 23.
13 Cf. Z. Gross and E. D. Stevick, eds., *As the Witnesses Fall Silent. 21st Century Holocaust Education in Curriculum, Policy and Practice* (New York: Springer, 2015); G. Hartman and A. Assmann, *Die Zukunft der Erinnerung und der Holocaust* (Paderborn: Konstanz University Press, 2012).
14 Cf. D. Diner, *Zeitenschwelle: Gegenwartsfragen an die Geschichte* (München: Beck, 2010).
15 Cf. C. Leggewie, *Der Kampf um die europäische Erinnerung: Ein Schlachtfeld wird besichtigt* (München: Beck, 2011).

- digitalization, increasing importance of new media on all fields of our life also transform the "paradigm of remembrance"[16]
- *Educational change:*
- traditional forms of Holocaust education must be "revisited" in a plural and multicultural society.

In the face of these trends the future of Holocaust remembrance is at stake. The questions are how memory and memory work will change and what role religious education can play in that context. Our hypothesis is that religious education is able to provide a substantial contribution to learning remembrance in school education. This process of learning remembrance goes hand in hand with learning to combat antisemitism, racism, and "group focused enmity."[17]

The first and foremost reason for remembrance of the Holocaust is respect for the victims. Those who have been victimized in the past have the fundamental human right to be remembered by democratic systems today and in the future. Democracy always is the successor of totalitarianism. Therefore, remembering the victims is a democratic act. At the same time, remembrance implies a special function or duty: To never forget what happened in the past helps us to never repeat it in the present and future.

For this reason, Holocaust remembrance and the fight against antisemitism as well as teaching of human rights are linked together as Monique Eckmann, a Swiss sociologist, writes:

> ... Holocaust education ... helps students see the need to protect human rights... Indeed the destiny of the Jews reveals the extreme vulnerability of stateless persons who are denied any rights at all.[18]

Learning about what happened to Jews and other minorities during the Nazi regime can be a "starting point to confront human rights issues."[19] In Monique

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16 Cf. K. Frieden, *Neuverhandlungen des Holocaust: Mediale Transformationen des Gedächtnisparadigmas* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2014).

17 Cf. W. Heitmeyer, ed., *Deutsche Zustände* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2012).

18 M. Eckmann, "Is Teaching and Learning about the Holocaust Relevant for Human Rights Education?" in *As the Witnesses Fall Silent. 21st Century Holocaust Education in Curriculum, Policy and Practice*, ed. Z. Gross and E. D. Stevick (New York: Springer, 2015), 59–60.

19 Ibid., 60; see also: M. Brumlik, "Globales Gedächtnis und Menschenrechtsbildung," in *Holocaust und historisches Lernen. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, supplement to *Das Parlament* 66, nos. 3–4 (2016): 29–37; R. Boschki, B. Reichmann, and W. Schwendemann, "Towards a new Theory of Holocaust Remembrance in Germany: Education, Preventing Antisemitism, and Ad-

Eckmann's perspective, Holocaust education is not the core of human rights education and teaching against antisemitism, but it could be a starting point, a motivation for an interest in human rights and the mechanisms of antisemitism in the past and in the present.

This comes close to *one* of the major research questions of our empirical study: How and to what extent can Holocaust education within religious education be part of the fight for human rights and against antisemitism?[20] The specific emphasis of the study is on Holocaust remembrance *within* religious education. Here we are examining the practice of religious education by analyzing how the complex topics of Holocaust remembrance and antisemitism are approached and perceived by pupils and teachers in the context of this specific school subject.

3.2 Design and Methodology of the Study

The research project asks, by means of an international comparative approach, how religious education deals with the topic of Holocaust remembrance and antisemitism in the context of secondary schools in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. The goal was (and still is) to get a survey on what happens in the classroom with respect to Holocaust remembrance and teaching against antisemitism from the perspective of the teachers. For this reason the study is an *evaluation study* or *inventory study* in order to get an overview of the state of the art of religious education in terms of Holocaust education and antisemitism prevention.

The online questionnaire generated statistical data that represents the quantitative aspect of our study. In a second step the online questionnaire explores short texts written by the teachers involved, initiated by open questions. This represents the qualitative part of the study. Analyzing these texts provide deeper insights concerning teachers' experiences, obstacles, and achievements in class while covering the topic of antisemitism. The country-specific frameworks are analyzed with the help of curricula analysis methods and content analysis of teaching guidelines and materials. All these parts of the study are in process, especially the curriculum analysis and the analysis of the qualitative data.

vancing Human Rights," in *As the Witnesses Fall Silent. 21ˢᵗ Century Holocaust Education in Curriculum, Policy and Practice*, ed. Z. Gross and E. D. Stevick (New York: Springer, 2015), 469 – 88.
20 Cf. R. Boschki, "Human Rights Education in the Context of a 'Culture of Remembrance'," in *Human Rights and Religion in Educational Contexts*, ed. M. Pirner, J. Lähnemann, and H. Bielefeldt (Bern: Springer, 2016), 209 – 18.

The online questionnaire was open on the internet between August 2016 and May 2017. There were 1,257 teachers who participated in the study, completed the questionnaire, and sent it online back to us. There were 1,201 questionnaires that were filled out completely. Eight-hundred and fifty-seven persons from Germany participated (ca. 72%), 219 from Austria (ca. 18%), and 125 from Switzerland (ca. 10.5%). The percentage figures roughly represent the number of religious education teachers in the three countries. Nevertheless, this is not a representative study because the sample of participants is not a representative one. The detail of who received the information about our project and about the online questionnaire is random and not led by representative strategies—this is the nature of online questionnaires.

The data given distinguished insights into teachers' actions and thinking about teaching Holocaust education and teaching against antisemitism.

Some exemplary questions of our online questionnaire are:

– Which topics are most important for you while teaching about the Holocaust within religious education?
– Which didactical elements do you prefer? (e.g., teaching in the classroom; undertaking excursions to historical sites like former concentration camps, traces of Jewish life before the Nazi period like Jewish cemeteries or former synagogues; showing movies in class; initiating discussion groups in classroom; reading texts and testimonies of victims or survivors, etc.)
– Are students of today ready and willing to discuss topics like the Holocaust in class?
– What are the main obstacles and resistance to the topic?
– Do you see connections between Holocaust education and today's problems and developments in society and politics (e.g., xenophobia, refugee crisis, resurgent antisemitism)?

We analyzed the statistical data with help of computer program SPSS and the qualitative data with the help of MAXQDA.

3.3 Some Selected Results

As stated above, our analysis of data is still in process. I would like to present here just some of our observations concerning the topic of combating antisemitism.

Question 5: Which topics are most important for you while teaching about the Holocaust within religious education?	percentage (%)
Resistance against NS	60.6
Current situation: How to deal with foreigners (e. g., refugees) today	54.1
Learning from history for today	53.4
Anti-Judaism, antisemitism in the past	51.8
Antisemitism today	38.9

Question 33 asks for connections between Holocaust education and today's issues and problems in society and politics. Many of the participating teachers see connections between the past and the present. Antisemitism and anti-Judaism in the past must be studied and understood in order to understand current social mechanisms that lead to antisemitism today.

3.3.1 Antisemitism is Present in Society and Schools

Some teachers see clearly that antisemitic attitudes are still present in our society and that there is a need for confronting students about anti-Jewish thinking. It is important to discuss this problem and to help students to get a "true" picture of Jewish life and Judaism: "*Even if it is not talked about publicly, antisemitism is deeply rooted and conversations are often enlightening.*"[21] Other religious education teachers write:

– "*I have been teaching religion for 30 years and I'm convinced that it is more important than ever to keep alive the memory of the Holocaust and to stand up against racism and antisemitism!!!*"
– "*I'm teaching Holocaust remembrance so that students become sensitive and immune to right-wing and antisemitic ideas.*"
– "*Holocaust education belongs to the syllabus and is pedagogically appropriate as a critique of the currently latent antisemitism (and racism in general).*"
– "*Antisemitism is on the agenda in my sixth grade. However, it is discussed again and again—even in other grades—if students want to discuss it (because of current events or because a student makes an antisemitic or xenophobic comment).*"

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21 Quotations by participants of our study are printed in italics (here and following) to distinguish them from the author's own understanding of the discussed problem and topic.

In the study, the participating teachers of religious education show a sensitive perception of the social situation and the situation in schools as far as antisemitism is concerned. They are trying to respond to it through their teaching.

3.3.2 Remembering the Shoah

Concerning the question about a connection between the Shoah and current issues one of the teachers writes:

> *I cannot answer that easily. For many students, these may be two separate issues that do not have much to do with each other. Some, on the other hand, who engage in remembering the Shoah, recognize the connection without further intervention from the teacher. Xenophobia was and is always an issue in the classroom. Social antisemitism still exists. It has even experienced a renaissance, initiated by various Internet and youtube posts.*

Other teachers argue:

> *The relationship between Jews and Christians is important. The reasons that led to the Shoah must also be examined in religious terms... [It is important to focus on remembrance of the Holocaust] because it's important that we never forget what happened. So that students can learn from it for the future.*

Other teachers ask themselves: What can be done in religious education to prevent antisemitism and to teach against it? Could Holocaust education be a "remedy" for antisemitism?

> *First of all, the Holocaust should be portrayed as such; students should be given the opportunity to deal with it without a quick connection to human rights issues of today...—After that we should teach our responsibility today, to fight against xenophobia and antisemitism.*

This quote of a religious education teacher is of special interest because it expresses the importance of not "using" Holocaust education as a "tool" or a means to prevent xenophobia and antisemitism in our time. This ultimately would do no justice to the victims of the Shoah.

On the other hand, Holocaust remembrance can be a motivation to deal with topics of hate, violation of human rights, and antisemitism today. Teachers of religious education see a possibility to sensitize young people in focusing on specific biographies—not (only) on figures and numbers:

> *Biography work (e.g. Elie Wiesel, Samuel Pisar or Saul Friedländer) with people who survived the concentration camps as adolescents and helped us to derive consequences, can become*

an anchor for dealing with antisemitism, totalitarian power and the perspective of a free and plural society.

To understand the biography of one of the victims or survivors could help students understand in an exemplary way the mechanisms of discrimination, exclusion, oppression, deportation, and extermination. This could be "*an anchor for dealing with antisemitism*" in the past and in the present.

Others prefer to show and discuss movies on the Holocaust (almost half of participating teachers), visit memorial sites, such as concentration camps or visit Jewish communities and synagogues to get in touch with Jewish life today. Some teachers invite Jews to their classroom, some make bicycle excursions to find traces of former Jewish life in a town or in small villages nearby. Some teachers read books like *Night* by Elie Wiesel in their religious education classes, some visit Jewish museums, others cooperate with Yad Vashem.

3.3.3 The Contribution of Religious Education

Question 28 of our questionnaire is of special interest from the perspective of religious education research. The question asks about the special contribution of religious education to remembrance of the Holocaust. Many teachers answer that the distinguishing characteristic of religious education is to inform about *religious* sources of antisemitism:

- "*Showing the religious roots of anti-Judaism / antisemitism; showing the inconsistency of the image of man behind antisemitism with the Christian faith.*"
- "*In grade 9, I put an emphasis in the accurate analysis of anti-Jewish and antisemitic prejudices, their biblical roots and their interplay. That does not appear in any textbook.*"
- "*The responsibility of the church for the religious antisemitism makes it necessary to teach about it. Knowledge about history can strengthen students in assessing current developments.*"

From the perspective of religious education teachers, the contribution of religious education to prevent antisemitism is to study the religious sources of antisemitism, to unmask Christian and biblical roots of anti-Jewish attitudes and to sensitize religious education students for current antisemitic thoughts. Christian religious education has an obligation to transform former hate against Jews in solidarity with Jews and Judaism today. This issue in teaching is not only motivated by human, political, and social reasons but also by a new theological understanding of the close relationship between Christians and Jews:

- *"Judaism and the relationship between Christianity and Judaism should be an important part of Christian religious education."*
- *"Historically, Christians have a special relationship with people of Jewish faith, therefore they have a special responsibility."*

Some say that is exactly the reason why Christian religious education should deal with the subject of anti-Judaism and antisemitism:

> *Because it is part of the Christian faith to keep alive the memory of the victims, but also to reveal traces of hope in the terrible events and to encourage that we can fight against exclusion processes. Because from the perspective of religious education, questions like how are people able to do such terrible things can be discussed more intensively than in history lessons (also a question for theodicy).*

Another "anchor" for dealing with antisemitism is seen in the Christian faith itself:

> *The core of religious education is a statement of faith: Every human being is an image of God. It was trampled upon (on an industrial scale in the Holocaust). We also trample on it today, in exaggerated nationalism, in the persecution of minorities, in the violation of the human dignity of refugees and others.*

Religious education has the task to stand up for other people who are in danger, who are threatened, and persecuted. And especially for the Jews. The rich material of data reveals plenty of possibilities to sensitize students and learners against antisemitism today.

Many teachers write that they create their own didactical material because textbooks mostly deal with the topic of Holocaust remembrance and antisemitism in a too superficial way, as they argue. Indeed, in the data we received, we could see an extraordinary creativity and commitment with many religious education teachers who give lessons on Holocaust remembrance and combatting antisemitism. Very often religious education teachers are promoters of a "culture of remembrance" in schools and of an atmosphere of sensitivity for human rights and for human dignity of all ethnic, social, and religious groups—including Jews and Judaism.

4 Consequences and Theses for Discussion

In this contribution, I only could provide a few insights and some of the results of our empirical research. We have analyzed the data and described the most important results in more detail in our book. This will be the starting point for future studies to deepen our research—for example, in conducting qualitative interviews with religious education teachers, exploring instruction courses, ethnographic studies of classroom interaction, and of field trips (especially to former concentration camps), group interviews with young people, and so on.

Our basic theses that are derived from our theoretical framework are also mirrored in the data we collected in our empirical work. I would like to discuss the following points:

– Holocaust remembrance is not identical with the fight against antisemitism, racism, and xenophobia today. Memory of the Holocaust means, above all, the remembrance of the victims, their lives, their deaths, and their legacies.
– On the other hand, Holocaust remembrance can be a starting point, a motivation, or—according to one of the teachers—an "anchor" for dealing with antisemitism today. It can also be a motivation for studying the violation of human rights in general and the mechanism of group-focused enmity.
– Religious education can provoke deeper insights and reflections on the *religious* origins of antisemitism and initiate an awareness of the specific bond between Judaism and Christianity. In this respect, religious education supplements the work on these issues in lessons for history and social studies.

Religious education tries to give a special contribution to a holistic and integral education of young people. Human rights education and the fight against antisemitism are important parts of education in general but also crucial for religious education in particular. The great challenge for teachers in religious education in the context of Holocaust remembrance and the fight against antisemitism is to sensitize themselves in order to be able to sensitize students and learners.

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Olaf Glöckner

The Circumcision Debate in Germany in 2012 and its Impacts on Europe

On May 7, 2012, German society held its breath. The Regional Court of the west German city of Cologne passed a ruling that criminalized the circumcision of boys for religious reasons. Many German Jews could not believe their ears and eyes: A few judges from a German regional court were due to ban a religious requirement that Jews had observed for thousands of years and one that many Muslims in Germany also observe. It was a mandate that nobody really expected. Until then, Sweden had been the only country with legislation setting out preconditions for the procedure. In other countries, for example the United States of America, circumcision is even a part of basic health care, about 70 percent of male residents are circumcised.[1]

So what, in fact, happened? The "Cologne case"[2] of May 2012 centered on a four-year-old boy whose Muslim parents allowed him to be circumcised by a local doctor, which led to medical complications in the aftermath. When the child returned to the hospital two days after the circumcision with post-operative bleeding, another doctor phoned the police. The circumcising doctor was acquitted by the court as there was no existing law prohibiting religious circumcision. Though, afterward the Cologne court reached a decision to criminalize religious circumcision in general. According to the judges, the constitutional freedom of religion could not justify physical interventions such as circumcision.

The ruling of the Regional Court of Cologne was not valid at all for any other German city or area, or even for the federal republic. However, this issue was on the table now, and it took nearly a half year before the raised juridical conflict could be resolved. Yet in summer 2012, amid a heated public debate about the legality of ritual circumcisions, criminal charges were filed against at least two rabbis who had pledged to continue performing circumcisions. For example,

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1 Cf. M. Gehlen and L. Halter, "In den USA ist es Routine," *Der Tagesspiegel*, June 28, 2012, https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/beschneidung-in-den-usa-ist-es-routine/6806704.html. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from German are made by the author of this article.
2 Jews in Germany have adhered to the commandment of circumcision (*brit mila*), which is performed on the eighth day after birth, for some 1,700 years. Cologne itself had a synagogue at least as early as 321 C.E. when Constantine the Great ruled the city as part of the Roman Empire, well before the ancestors of most of the city's current inhabitants had settled on German soil. See S. Kaplan, "Will Europe ban Circumcision?" *Mosaic Magazine*, August 29, 2018, https://mosaicmagazine.com/observation/2018/08/will-europe-ban-circumcision/.

four German citizens filed criminal complaints against Rabbi David Goldberg, an Israeli, who served the Jewish Community in the city of Hof (Bavaria) at that time and also worked as a *mohel*.[3]

Although the Cologne decision came in the context of a case involving a Muslim boy, both—Muslim and Jewish communities in Germany—felt the same shock. Expectedly, the Cologne case became quickly part of public discussion, and especially Jewish leaders quickly raised their voice.

One of the most disputed statements of the early days in the debate came from former President of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, Charlotte Knobloch, a Holocaust survivor herself. Knobloch went straight to the public, notably in an interview with the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, speaking *tacheles:*

> For six decades I have had to justify myself because I stayed in Germany, as a remnant of a destroyed world, as a sheep among wolves ... I always readily carried this burden because I was firmly convinced that this country and these people deserved it. Now, for the first time my basic convictions are starting to shake. For the first time I feel resignation. I seriously ask if the country still wants us.[4]

Indeed, the new situation appeared as extremely problematic—for Jewish and Muslim leaders, for rabbis and imams, for parents affected, and for medical doctors and *mohalim* as well. Some of the German rabbis immediately started to make it very clear: Should the Cologne ruling be adopted by the Federal State of Germany, a Jewish exodus would be the inevitable result. But it was not only the imminent legal restriction poisoning the situation. Everybody realized that it would take time to clarify the juridical situation. Though, at the same time, public discourse was lighted by mainstream media, the new social media, and some surveys and barometers of public opinion. The tenor of the discussions prompted the impression that many German non-Jews would be ignorant to essentials of Jewish belief or would even use the opportunity to show their dislike of Jewish tradition.

"This discussion has shown that we are foreigners in our own country, doing something that Germans are not supposed to do," said Stephan J. Kramer, then secretary general of the Central Council of Jews in Germany. "We are accused of torturing our own children."[5] Meanwhile, the first Jewish families openly started

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3 *Mohel* is the Hebrew word for "circumciser," a trained Jewish person, practicing the *brit mila*.

4 J. Dempsey, "Germany's Jews and the Controversy over Circumcision," *Carnegie Europe*, September 10, 2012, http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/49323.

5 J. Ewing, "Some Religious Leaders See a Threat as Europe Grows More," *New York Times*, September 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/20/world/europe/circumcision-debate-in-europe-reflects-deeper-tensions.html.

to think about consequences, if the Cologne ruling would be adopted by the federal state. Especially young, traditional Jewish families came up with the intention of "emigration from Germany" or with organizing the *brit mila* for their newborn little sons—"illegally"—in any of the neighboring countries. The Jewish medical doctors, for their part, faced the most practical problem: Should they continue to perform circumcision, or just stop it for a while and to avoid the risk of criminal proceedings? Some had to face a frontal attack by their own co-workers: 600 German physicians and lawyers signed an open letter to Chancellor Angela Merkel in the renowned *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (*FAZ*) on July 21, proclaiming that "religious freedom cannot be a charter for violence" and asserting that circumcision violates the "right of children to bodily integrity and sexual self-determination." In depicting circumcision as a form of bodily harm imposed by adults on powerless children, the doctors asserted that "religious freedom cannot be a blank check for sexual violence against underage boys."[6]

Within a few weeks, the issue turned from a medical and juridical to a moral problem. In August 2012, Germany's national Ethics Council ("Ethik-Rat") unanimously recommended establishing legal standards, including the observation of minimum requirements such as information, medical pain treatment, and a professional operating procedure. But at the same time, renowned Israeli public figures piped up strengthening the position of the Jewish leaders in Germany. Several senior Israeli officials—including President Shimon Peres, Interior Minister Eli Yishai, and Chief Rabbi Yona Metzger—contacted German authorities and strongly asked to care for real legal safety for Jews seeking to circumcise their newborn sons. Chief Rabbi Yona Metzger even had a performance at the Federal Press Conference in Berlin where he underlined: "Circumcision is the flag of Judaism, and this flag is more than just a symbol."[7]

The Jews in Israel, but also diaspora communities, followed the German developments with a certain worry. Though, one of the dynamic effects of the circumcision debate in Germany—and of following debates elsewhere in Europe—was that Jewish religious congregations closed ranks, feeling that the ethic debate on circumcision has been quickly accompanied, or even dominated, by attempts to offend the Jewish religion in its fundamental parts. Even the liberal

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6 B. Cohen, "Europe's Assault on a Jewish Ritual," *Commentary Magazine*, November 1, 2012, https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/europes-assault-on-jewish-ritual/. See also D. P. Goldman, "The Sacred Rite of Circumcision," *Tablet Magazin*, August 9, 2012, https://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-life-and-religion/108801/sacred-rite-of-circumcision.

7 K. Richter, "Fragen an den Oberrabbiner," *Jüdische Allgemeine*, August 23, 2012, https://www.juedische-allgemeine.de/article/view/id/13816.

World Union for Progressive Judaism (WUPJ), the largest congregational Jewish roof organization worldwide, strongly backed the demand of the Jewish organizations in Germany for continuing permission of *brit mila*, describing circumcision as an "essential part of our Covenant with the Eternal." All orthodox Jewish organizations, anyway, required the opportunity of perpetuation of the *brit mila* in the religious communities.

Finally, the political sphere was forced to react: The German government prepared a proposed resolution legalizing ritual circumcisions in general—assuming that they are performed by a medical professional—allowing Jews and Muslims to breathe a sigh of relief. At a special hearing, the Bundestag legal committee examined the medical risks that circumcision entails. Medical doctors, legal experts, and representatives from Jewish and Muslim associations thoroughly discussed the topic with parliamentarians. As the most controversial aspect appeared the question of the age until circumcision could remain legalized. The new regulation should have allowed parents to authorize the circumcision of their son by a trained practitioner. Once the boy reaches six months of age, the procedure needs to be performed by a medical doctor. The relevant bill was then discussed in the German parliament, the Bundestag: The new law, passed by a vote of 434 to 100 on December 12, 2018, grants parents the right to authorize circumcision by a trained practitioner.

An alternative draft law, handed in by a group of opposition left-wing lawmakers, was also on the agenda. They proposed that parents should have to wait until their son is fourteen so that he can give informed consent for the procedure. This draft took into account criticism by children's protection organizations and the Association of Pediatricians, which followed the Cologne court's ruling. Under this proposal, circumcision on the eighth day after birth would be ruled out.

Both the Central Council of Jews in Germany and the Central Council of Muslims welcomed the decision of the German parliament, a gasp of relief was to hear among both communities. It seems obvious that a clear stand by German Chancellor Angela Merkel helped a lot to induce the solution accepted by German Jews and Muslims just within a half year. Merkel had the backing of the strongest political forces at that time, but faced, anyhow, a lot of "headwind" from other parts of society, not only from the 600 medical doctors and lawyers mentioned above. We might assume that the German Chancellor knew about the almost 50 percent of German inhabitants who disagreed with her standpoint. These people shared the view of the Cologne court that neither parenthood

nor freedom of religion would legitimate circumcision. Also to their mind, circumcision would be an unlawful assault thus "worth" prosecution.[8]

German media, social networks, and TV channels had picked up the topic, and for months it remained as a hot potato. At least parts of the Jewish community and its leadership perceived the general ambience as hostile or even embittered, even when the battle was over. For example, Dieter Graumann, then head of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, concluded: "Nowhere else in the entire world has this debate been held with such acrimony, frostiness and at times brutal intolerance."[9] What Graumann also probably had in mind were statements by self-proclaimed human rights activists, by pediatricians, journalists, and intellectuals who all agreed that the religious circumcision of boys would be a "barbaric ritual" not consistent with the modern world of the twenty-first century and harmful for the little boys. Some of the fighting protagonists also did not hesitate to compare religious circumcision of boys in Jewish and Islamic religion with forms of female genital mutilation in some regions of the African continent.

Indeed, the chorus of those who had started to campaign against circumcision in general was long and dogged—and encompassed very different groups and personalities. When not accusing Jews of depravity, circumcision opponents labeled them venal. Thus, the secular humanist foundation ("Humanistische Union") leading the anti-circumcision campaign alleged that the ritual was a "two billion dollar business that has many profiteers."[10] At the same time, Marlene Rupprecht, a leading member of the Social Democratic Party, accused "Jewish circles" of using the "bludgeon of the Shoa" to suppress Germans from debating a topic that would only be off-limits in a "theocracy."[11] Holm Putzke, a law professor at the University of Passau (Bavaria) who made a name for himself as an anti-circumcision crusader, echoed the notion of a cabal of Jewish guilt-mongers, stating that "The (Cologne, O.G.) court has, in con-

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8 C. Bommarius, "Beschneidung und Holocaust," *Frankfurter Rundschau*, August 15, 2012, http://www.fr.de/politik/meinung/leitartikel-beschneidung-und-holocaust-a-812351.

9 "Juden und Muslime gehen gemeinsam auf die Straße," *WELT Online*, September 9, 2012, https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article109113576/Juden-und-Muslime-gehen-gemeinsam-auf-die-Strasse.html.

10 J. Kirchick, "Germany's Circumcision Debate: A Personal Reflection," American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS), issued December 12, 2012, accessed February 12, 2021, https://www.aicgs.org/2012/12/germanys-circumcision-debate-a-personal-reflection/.

11 Ibid.

trast to many politicians, not allowed itself to be scared by the fear of being criticized as anti-Semitic or opposed to religion."[12]

Germany has—for the time being—found a solution, but the effects of the Cologne court's ruling were quickly felt beyond the German borders: copycat bans on *brit mila* emerged in neighboring countries, including Switzerland and Austria. Swiss hospitals announced that they would abstain from performing circumcisions because they were "evaluating the legal and ethical stance in Switzerland." The chief executive of Austria's Vorarlberg province, Markus Wallner, even told regional hospitals to refrain from circumcision for religious reasons "until the legal situation had been clarified" following the Cologne court's decision.[13]

One year later, the debate spilled over to the overall continental level, again with irritating undertones. In October 2013 the Council of Europe, considered the continent's leading human rights organization, introduced a resolution called "Children's Right to Physical Integrity." The resolution based on a report by the former Social Democratic delegate Marlene Rupprecht of Germany, the same person mentioned above. In this resolution, which was confirmed by a majority of the Assembly of the "Council of Europe"—concern is expressed

> about a category of violation of the physical integrity of children, which supporters of the procedures tend to present as beneficial to the children themselves despite clear evidence to the contrary. This includes, amongst others, female genital mutilation, the circumcision of young boys for religious reasons, early childhood medical interventions in the case of intersex children, and the submission to, or coercion of, children into piercings, tattoos or plastic surgery.[14]

Undoubtedly, there were a lot of progressive ideas and important demands, for example, regarding early childhood medical intervention. But the kindly seeming paragraph, full of ideals how to protect children's life and integrity, equated female genital mutilation, which is always torture, and often murder, and piercings tattoos or plastic surgery of young children with ritual male circumcision commonly practiced among religious and non-religious Jews, Muslims, and other people around the globe. Moreover: In consequence, the Council of Europe called on its member states to care for a "public debate," also among the reli-

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12 Ibid.
13 Wallner backtracked a week later, after Austria's justice minister declared that parents could not be punished for circumcising infants. See Goldman, "The Sacred Rite of Circumcision."
14 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, "Report | Doc. 13297: Children's Right to Physical Integrity," issued October 5, 2012, accessed February 12, 2021, http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=20057&lang=en.

gious communities. Declarations of the Council of Europe, and also of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe—not to be confused with the European Parliament—have no political or juridical consequences. Nevertheless we can assume that declarations of this body reflect general moods and attitudes in Europe. Seventy-seven delegates voted for the resolution and only nineteen against it. The fact that the then President of the Council of Europe, Thorbjorn Jagland, distanced himself from the declaration, appears only as a "cold comfort."

Meanwhile it is more than obvious that attempts to ban religious circumcision rip into the heart of Jewish and Muslim religion. Circumcision of masculine infants is one of the elementary commonalities practiced across the various Jewish denominations. Even progressive Jews who embrace marriage to non-Jews, gay marriage, and female elevation to the rabbinate insist on it. But delegate Rupprecht and the other activists of the Council of Europe seemingly aimed to urge Jews and Muslims to introduce alternative rituals to express their covenant with God and their communion with their ancestors. Now, the biggest sticking point in the whole debate seems to be the question at what point the critiques become antisemitic. Or in other words: At what point do critical attacks on circumcision delegitimize the Jewish religion at its core, and the Islamic religion as well? Regarding attacks on the Jewish circumcision, Swedish psychologist Lars Dencik refers to the phenomenon of "Enlighted antisemitism" ("Aufklärungsantisemitismus")[15] especially prevalent in highly modernized, liberal states. Berlin sociologist Gökçe Yurdakul even concludes that "the language that has been used in legal decisions and in the media" during the German circumcision debate "have deeply stigmatised and criminalised Jewish and Muslim people in this context."[16]

However, the driving forces behind circumcision debates might be quite varying, and so too their motives, and the impacts are different in the respective countries and societies. For the German debate, American-Jewish publicist Alan Dershowitz remarked already in 2012 in a Jewish weekly:

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[15] Dencik writes: "There are often (but probably not only) humanitarian concerns and liberal ideas about the individual's right to choose for him-/herself ... involved in this critique of Jewish traditions. We use the term Aufklärungsantisemitismus to summarize this phenomenon." L. Dencik and K. Marosi, "Different Antisemitisms: On Three Distinct Forms of Antisemitism in Contemporary Europe. With Special Focus on Sweden," *Nordisk judaistik: Scandinavian Jewish Studies* 27, no. 2 (2016): 78.

[16] G. Yurdakul, "Jews, Muslims and the Ritual Male Circumcision Debate: Religious Diversity and Social Inclusion in Germany," *Social Inclusion* 4, no. 2 (2016): 84.

> Nobody should praise a nation that has killed millions of Jewish babies and children but now sheds crocodile tears for … a little boy who is circumcised in the frame of a thousand-years-old tradition, one week after his birth.

In the same comment, Dershowitz wrote:

> Other countries, with a more tidy history have to take the lead in research—in real research—and in the debate on the protection of children and animals. The murderous history of Germany disqualifies this country forever as a vanguard to prohibit Jewish rituals.[17]

However, not only the German Jews and Alan Dershowitz but also the Israeli Chief Rabbinate and certain Israeli politicians sounded the alarm in summer and fall of 2012. And there were also non-Jewish German voices who shared the feelings of uncertainty and made attempts to solidarize with Jews and Muslims. For example, Kerstin Griese, responsible for religious affairs in the Social Democratic Fraction of the German Bundestag, declared without ambiguity: "Some of the statements in the media, and especially on the internet do really unsettle me. They spread the antisemitic image that Jews would torture their children." Griese also stated: "We know that 20 percent of the population in Germany have latent antisemitic attitudes. But for some months they are no longer latent, but strongly visible in the public."[18]

Interestingly, Kerstin Griese also criticized that some of the media would magnify the topic, and in 2017 she remembered in an interview with a Jewish weekly again:

> I've never experienced in my life a debate, which was so underground, so emotional and so antisemitic. This topic (i.e., circumcision, O.G.) has opened a tun: All those, who always wanted to say something against Jews and Muslims, now have expressed it openly. I was shocked at how little understanding and how little willingness to understand Jewish identity was present across the political camps.[19]

What impact will the "Circumcision Debate" in Germany have in the long run on the Jewish communities themselves? Swiss-Jewish Professor of Literature, Alfred Bodenheimer, wrote a book on the debate, and he concluded in an interview with the weekly *Jüdische Allgemeine* with a certain tinge of disillusionment:

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17 A. Dershowitz, "Der gute alte Antisemitismus," *Jüdische Allgemeine*, September 6, 2012, https://www.juedische-allgemeine.de/article/view/id/13922.

18 K. Griese, "Das ist richtiger Hass," interview by A. Lutz, *Pro, Christliches Magazin*, December 11, 2012, https://www.pro-medienmagazin.de/politik/2012/12/11/das-ist-richtiger-hass/.

19 K. Griese, "Solidarisch mit Israel," interview, *Jüdische Allgemeine*, September 14, 2017, https://www.juedische-allgemeine.de/article/view/id/29616.

> First of all, the circumcision debate made one thing clear for the German Jews: It is the fact that they didn't arrive anywhere, as a religious group. Their religious practice can suddenly be declared barbarism—by two thirds of the population.[20]

Bodenheimer explicitly referred to the European dimension of the problem and wrote in his book:

> Thus, when there is debate on the legitimation and opportunities of Jewish life in a country, the stakes are high: the ability of a society to tolerate difference, to be aware, when the sharpness of applied law and overflowing discourses disavows well-meaning intentions. This is a script for living together in the Europe of today.[21]

Indeed, the uncertainties and disillusionments are not limited on the Jews currently living in Germany. They have spread across Europe. Similar campaigns against ritual circumcision were carried out in Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Poland, Denmark, and Iceland, progressing to Holland and France. It is without a doubt that the campaigns are accepted by considerable parts of the non-Jewish population but deeply harm and alienate the Jewish population from their neighborhoods. Huge majorities of the Jewish respondents in a 2012 survey by the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) in nine EU member states explicitly classified a hypothetical ban on circumcision as a huge problem for themselves. Over three quarters of the respondents in France (88%), Belgium (87%), Italy (85%), and the United Kingdom (80%) and over two thirds in Germany (71%) and Sweden (68%) indicated that a prohibition of the *brit mila* would get them into big trouble.[22] An extreme German peculiarity in the same FRA survey was the huge share of witnessed non-Jewish Germans who would suggest prohibition of the *brit mila:* Nearly 30% in Germany, while the other countries were even below 20%. This appeared as a direct result of the "circumcision debate."

Irrespective of existing discussions on whether circumcision might be an "outdated" ritual of former ages in Jewish and other religions—the huge numbers of Jewish respondents in the FRA survey confirming *brit mila* as an essen-

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20 A. Bodenheimer, "Toleranz genügt nicht," *Jüdische Allgemeine*, December 6, 2012, https://www.juedische-allgemeine.de/article/view/id/14670.

21 A. Bodenheimer, *Haut ab! Die Juden in der Beschneidungsdebatte* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2012), 60.

22 Cf. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), *Discrimination and Hate Crime against Jews in EU Member States: Experiences and Perceptions of Antisemitism* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2013-discrimination-hate-crime-against-jews-eu-member-states-0_en.pdf.

tial, indispensable part of their religious beliefs and practice should have encouraged Europe's politicians to revisit the intended politics of restriction in this sensible field. Though, obviously until today they have not.

In strong contrast to these trends, Ira Forman, the then US State Department's special envoy to monitor and combat antisemitism in the Obama administration, warned the European governments already in summer 2014 that moves to ban ritual circumcision could lead to the demise of their countries' Jewish communities. In an interview with the *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, Forman, himself a Jew, declared: "Our priority is to make sure these communities don't go out of existence. It would be a tragedy not just for the communities. It would be a tragedy for Europe, for these cultures." [23]

Meanwhile the fights concerning the "legality" of boy's circumcision continue with unabated persistence. Thus, while the Iceland parliament has discussed initiating legislation to ban circumcision,[24] in May 2018 a majority of the European Parliament and its President Antonio Tajani expressed support for the Jewish right to continue religious traditions and practices. At a ceremony in Brussels' Great Synagogue, Tajani said that there would be no place for banning European Jews from carrying out religious rites such as circumcision and kosher slaughter. The president declared:

> Europe will not achieve integration and unity among its citizens as long as it limits or bans the religious community from fulfilling its religious commandments, such as circumcision and kosher slaughter ... Only by protecting their rights and preserving their identities, will every citizen have personal security, with the unity and equality which lead to tranquil lives. This is what Europe is based on.[25]

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23 R. Kampeas, "U.S. Intervenes in Europe's Circumcision Wars," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency* (JTA), July 8, 2014, https://www.jta.org/2014/07/08/news-opinion/world/u-s-intervenes-in-europes-circumcision-wars.

24 The suggested legislation, recently introduced in Iceland's parliament by Silja Dögg Gunnarsdóttir, a member of the center-right Progressive Party, would impose prison sentences of up to six years on anyone performing circumcision on a child that is not for medical reasons. The proposal won support from around one-third of Iceland's doctors. See C. Glick, "Anti-Semitism in Poland in Part of a Larger European Problem," Caroline Glick, issued February 20, 2018, accessed February 12, 2021, https://carolineglick.com/anti-semitism-in-poland-in-part-of-a-larger-european-problem/. More recently S. Smith, "Iceland's proposed ban on circumcision rattles Jews, Muslims," *NBC News*, September 21, 2018, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/iceland-s-proposed-ban-circumcision-rattles-jews-muslims-n910541.

25 H. Lev, "EU Parliament President: No Laws against Jewish Practice," *Arutz Sheva*, May 28, 2018, https://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/246560.

Tajani also promised: "The European Parliament will continue to condemn and consistently and determinedly fight all forms of anti-Semitism and hatred, and will protect religious freedom."[26] However, only one month later the Danish parliament also began discussing a ban on circumcision, which was extremely alarming to the Jewish community.[27] Danish Jews, while living in one of the most liberal countries in the world, now began to consider leaving. The real alarming point, also in Denmark, is the Jewish feeling that a considerable part of the non-Jewish population is eager to back such a law to ban circumcision of newborn boys. In the run-up to the Danish parliament's discussion, more than 50,000 people signed a petition on the Danish parliament's website endorsing the text, which equates nonmedical circumcision of boys with female genital mutilation (!). This could even mark a certain "breakthrough," a new regulation says that 50,000 signatures within six months of their posting on the parliament's website are expected to be brought to a vote as a nonbinding draft motion in parliament.[28] Already in a survey conducted in 2016 among 1,027 adult Danes, 87 percent of respondents said they support a ban on nonmedical circumcision of boys.[29]

Since the protagonists of campaigns against religious circumcision come from quite different professions, milieus, and political camps—just as in the 2012 "Circumcision Debate" in Germany not a few medical doctors, lawyers, self-proclaimed human rights activists, public figures, and politicians from right to left—it remains, again, quite difficult to clear the "twilight zone" between pure political and/or anti-religious activism and distinct antisemitism. In fact, Jews and Muslims are in the same boat here, and sometimes they pick themselves up for cooperative action, as for example joint demonstrations in Berlin in fall 2012 have shown.

For now, it is difficult to assess whether infamous antisemitic stereotypes and clichés from the past will celebrate their comeback among far-right and right-wing populist, maybe even among left-wing populist forces, when the discussion on the *brit mila* will be "reignited" again. But if Jewish religion would become problematized again in its essentials, as "something other" and "alien," that would be high time for Europe to reconsider its own self-concept.

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26 Ibid.

27 C. Liphshiz, "As Denmark Considers a Ban on Circumcision, some Jews Consider Leaving," *The Times of Israel*, June 16, 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/as-denmark-considers-a-ban-on-circumcision-some-jews-consider-leaving/.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

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Monika Schwarz-Friesel and Evyatar Friesel

"To Make the World a Better Place": Giving Moral Advice to the Jewish State as a Manifestation of Self-Legitimized Antisemitism among Leftist Intellectuals

Antisemitism is hostility toward Jews as Jews. It is easily detected and condemned when it manifests itself explicitly in discriminatory hate speech. When, however, it is articulated in the garb of anti-Israelism or anti-Zionism by intellectuals—often academics claiming not to be antisemitic themselves—civil society often finds it hard to perceive the antisemitic semantics lurking beyond sophisticated utterances. Even more so, educated antisemites claim to act according to high ethical values, referring to the moral categories of the Western world in order to deny their antisemitic attitude. Using philosophical argumentation patterns and the strategy of self-legitimization, they call upon values such as humanity and reason, and striving for world peace. "For the sake of humankind" or "for the benefit of world peace," they demand the alteration of Jews, Judaism, and connected to this, the modification or "improvement" of the Jewish state. Singling out and bashing Israel by evoking traditional Judeophobic stereotypes is by now the most common strategy of contemporary antisemitism. This kind of camouflaged antisemitism is readily accepted in society, and as such, is more dangerous than vulgar hate speech. Even more so, if it is articulated by well-known intellectuals. This article explains the main argumentation patterns of educated antisemitism with both its denial and self-justification. It refers to data from corpus studies and discusses the case of Achille Mbembe, which launched a larger debate on freedom of expression and criticism regarding the state of Israel versus Israel-related antisemitism.

1 Contemporary Antisemitism and its Denial

In the twenty-first century, the official ban on antisemitic utterances has lost its influence in many discourse realms, and the articulation of traditional antisemitic stereotypes has increased significantly. In fact, antisemitism turns out to be a worldwide phenomenon on the rise. Jews have been attacked and killed in Belgium and in France, spit upon in Rome and in London. In Berlin, there is growing hostility (both verbal and physical) toward Jews on the streets of certain areas. Jewish institutions in Germany have to be kept under constant police supervision. International polls show that the attitude toward Israel has become extremely hostile and aggressive everywhere; this hostility is based on Judeophobic stereotypes and an age-old bias in new garb. All over the world, anti-Israel boycott movements have spread, gaining influence especially in left-wing circles but also in parts of Christian churches and public institutions. There is a virulent

campus antisemitism in both US and British colleges and universities that claims to be critical of Israel but in fact is based on hostility toward Jews and uses the same demonizing verbal strategies as right-wing extremists and neo-Nazis.

However, despite the experience of the Shoah, there is a strong tendency to deny the very existence of contemporary hostility against Jews in the German society.[1] This goes along with the delegitimization of the IHRA Working Definition that includes all contemporary manifestations of antisemitism, among them forms of anti-Israelism and anti-Zionism. Antisemitism is expressed in various forms stemming from diverse political and ideological directions. Jew-hatred may be articulated explicitly as hate speech and implicitly in more indirect verbal acts that are declared as "freedom of speech." However, the concept of antisemitism in public opinion still very much rests on the historical phenomenon of racism and its continuity in right-wing circles. Many left-wing intellectuals find it hard to accept that there is Jew-hatred outside of the right-wing political spectrum in post-Shoah Germany. Thus, "true antisemitism" is seen and recognized by them only at the outer edges of society. The fact that today's judeophobia has developed into new manifestations is still widely ignored or vehemently marginalized. In particular, the articulation of traditional antisemitic stereotypes by projecting them onto Israel has increased significantly.[2] Claiming to just criticize Israeli politics, but using at the same time Judeophobic stereotypes, is by now one of the most common, if not the predominant manifestation of contemporary Jew-hatred. At the same time, there is a remarkable rejection of the results from research on antisemitism in mainstream society. One of the dominant strategies of dealing with left-wing and educated antisemitism as Anti-Zionism/anti-Israelism in German public discourse is to deny the very existence of it. In Germany, this became quite evident in a public debate in April 2012, on a poem by the German Nobel laureate Günter Grass in which he attacked and bashed Israel (and not Iran) for being a "threat to world peace" because of its nuclear program. Although the poem borrowed Judeophobic clichés and projected them onto Israel, many people commenting on it were not able or willing to recognize anything antisemitic in the text. Since the text focused on the nuclear power of Israel, and the word *Jew* did not occur once, many defended it as "simply critical," "giving just facts," or a "manifestation of free speech." Claiming to just criticize Israeli politics but simultaneously using Judeophobic stereotypes

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1 Cf. M. Schwarz-Friesel and J. Reinharz, *Inside the Antisemitic Mind: The Language of Jew-Hatred in Contemporary Germany* (Boston: University Press of New England, 2017), 285ff.
2 Cf. M. Schwarz-Friesel, "The Persistence of European Antisemitism," *BESA Center Perspectives Paper*, no. 1067, January 18, 2019, https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/european-anti-semitism/.

and argumentation patterns is by now one of the most prominent and at the same time most commonly denied manifestation of contemporary Jew-hatred. The debate flamed up anew in January 2013, when Jacob Augstein, a leftist journalist and columnist for Spiegel Online, appeared on the Wiesenthal list for "2012 Top Ten Antisemitic/Anti-Israel Slurs," ranking him ninth for his public attacks on the state of Israel. Although Augstein admitted never having been to Israel, he frequently condemned and demonized the country. Having very little knowledge regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he nevertheless felt competent enough to bash Israel. He stated, for instance, that orthodox Jews follow "the law of revenge" (thus repeating a very old anti-Jewish stereotype) and implied that some ominous Jewish force determines political decisions through "lobby groups" (hence, leaning on conspiracy phantasies). He called Gaza a "camp" and accused Israel of "breeding terrorists." This kind of language used among the moderates of society and articulated in mainstream press can trigger and reinforce stereotypical thinking and evoke sentiments against Jews even if such processes are not intended. Since language in mass media has a mental power of its own and is capable of subconsciously influencing the collective mind to a large degree, it is not a matter of the intention that lies behind a text but above all the text and its content itself, its cognitive implications, and associations that make it verbal antisemitism or not.

A third debate, even more forceful and aggressive, arose in in April 2020 concerning the anti-Israeli texts of Achille Mbembe, a renowned African scholar in the field of post-colonial studies.[3] The text of Mbembe employed a rhetoric usually found in the writings of anti-Zionist antisemites, since they implicitly invoke stereotypes of classical Jew-hatred. Further, he communicated conceptualizations of the conflict with the Palestinians that were apt to minimize and belittle the Holocaust. In Mbembe's book *Politics of Enmity* and his foreword "On Palestine" to the book *Apartheid Israel: The Politics of an Analogy,* he writes that "[t]he occupation of Palestine is the biggest moral scandal of our times, one of the most dehumanizing ordeals of the century we have just entered, and the biggest act of

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3 The historian and philosopher from Cameroon was honored many times as an important figure of post-colonialism. He was awarded several prizes in Germany and was called "one of the most important thinkers on the African continent." Hence, Mbembe with all his "outstanding research achievements" has some influence in academic and public circles. His rhetoric has impact on people. He showed no insight that his texts were at least dubious. Currently, the debate is still ongoing. All in all, it has done great damage to scientific and social work combating antisemitism.

cowardice of the last half-century."[4] Adding, "since what they [the Israelis] are willing to do is to go all the way—carnage, destruction, incremental extermination—the time has come for global isolation."[5] Furthermore, he uses demonizing superlatives and metaphors that trigger implications of classical Judeophobic semantics.

Therefore, a politician from the FDP (the German liberal party) criticized the organizer of a major international cultural festival for inviting Achille Mbembe to give a speech at the opening. When Mbembe was accused of spreading hatred of Israel and the relativization of the Holocaust in his texts, it triggered a fierce and highly emotional debate about antisemitism, the use of analogies, and the uniqueness of the Holocaust. Many in German mainstream media and in the academic world rushed to defend Mbembe without even having read his columns or considering the impact of such a rhetoric. Even more disturbing, most of Mbembe's public defenders claiming to argue for the "freedom of speech" showed neither competence nor any knowledge about verbal antisemitism and its numerous modern expressions. Not only did the ongoing debates keep drifting away from the insight of research, they also revealed a pattern common and typical of left-wing discourse on this topic. Hence, we will delve into the Mbembe case later.

2 The Israelization of Antisemitism and its Denial

Overall, research on antisemitism sees the persistence of age-old classical stereotypes and argumentation patterns in modern discourse, in spite of coping with the past after the Holocaust: Jews and/or Israelis are described as *murderers of little children, blood libel users, shylocks, traitors, liars, land robbers, disloyal strangers*, as a collective with specific characteristics. Jews are still conceptualized by antisemites as "the others," as "the most vile and mean creatures on earth." They are perceived as "a threat to humankind." Anti-Zionists like to claim that their attitude is something new, something completely unrelated to the old Jew-hatred, which they pretend to reject. They usually claim that they oppose Israel because of its supposed cruel treatment of the "Palestinians" or of its "colonizing Arab land," or of being an "apartheid" state. In this view, it is Israel's

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4 A. Mbembe, "On Palestine," in *Apartheid Israel: The Politics of an Analogy*, ed. J. Soske and S. Jacobs (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2015), viii.
5 Ibid.

conduct that gives rise to hostile feelings toward the Jewish state and that makes them harsh critics. Going a step further, they claim to have a moral duty to sharply criticize Israel. This de-realized stance obviously re-activates the age-old stereotype that Jews are themselves responsible if anti-Jewish feelings occur. The experience of Auschwitz and years of education did not change the age-old hostile conceptualization of Jews: We see the recurring conceptualization of "Jews are the evil in the world" re-activated as "Israel is the evil in the world," as in the following email to the Israeli embassy: "Israel is an illegitimate evil state and threatens world peace" (IBD; Gaza-14). And a journalist, member of a left-wing party writes that "Only by the complete dissolution of the illegal Zionist 'construct,' peace will come to the world" (IBD; Gaza-2014).

Antisemitism is not primarily a phenomenon found among neo-Nazis or Muslim fundamentalists but present in all levels of society. More than fifty percent of the antisemitic writings to the Central Council of Jews in Germany and to the Israeli embassy in Berlin come from people belonging to the so-called moderates of society: students, architects, bankers, lawyers, doctors, priests, and so on, often highly educated persons with an academic background who know well what happened in the Holocaust.[6] Those antisemites pose as anti-antisemites, fiercely denying being antisemitic. "Israel's cruelty…Now I understand why Jews are said to be rotten, brutal, lying, greedy and ruthless. Many of my classmates feel exactly the way I do!" states an email to the embassy of Israel in Berlin from an eighteen-year-old high school student who "is politically left," "works for Amnesty International," "is against all kinds of racism." Thus, modern judeophobia is not necessarily connected to racism and xenophobia, and to combat antisemitism in an effective way, that fact has to be acknowledged.

There is a fierce antisemitism from the left[7] that appears camouflaged as "criticism of Israel" or as "Anti-Zionism," and educated people from the mainstream also articulate verbal antisemitism: The following email to the Central Council of Jews in Germany was sent by a law professor: "… all your crimes … The reason for this must be the Zionist idea to be the chosen people." Here, we see one of the most dominant argumentation patterns in antisemitic discourse: the conflation of Jews and Israelis, that goes along with ascribing collective responsibility for everything bad going on in the world to the "collective

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6 Cf. Schwarz-Friesel and Reinharz, *Inside the Antisemitic Mind*.

7 See D. Hirsh, *Contemporary Left Antisemitism* (London: Routledge, 2017); and L. Rensmann "The Peculiar Appeal of the 'Jewish Question': The Case of Left Antisemitism," *Antisemitism Studies* 3, no. 2 (2020): 343–71.

Jew." This "Israelization of antisemitism"[8] proves to be the predominant conceptual pattern and communicative narrative in contemporary Jew-hatred.

3 Educated Antisemitism and its Long Tradition

Seventy-five years after the Holocaust, hostility against Jews is once again a phenomenon of worrying magnitude in Germany and in the world. The attack on the synagogue in Halle and the rampant growth of antisemitic conspiracy phantasies circulating online and in the streets in response to the COVID-19 pandemic are only the most recent and most alarming indications of what scholars studying antisemitism have been warning about for more than a decade: the taboo over antisemitic language has been eroding steadily and not only on the fringes of society; ordinary citizens openly and assertively express anti-Jewish ideas. Yet those who take up the fight against antisemitism in politics, the media, and the public sphere often misconstrue the causal relationship between the educated middle class and the social margins, a misapprehension reflected by headlines such as "Antisemitism Has Arrived in the Center."

Historically speaking, anti-Jewish ideas have in fact always originated in the center, in the writings of academics and educated authors, and from there spilled out into the street. That is because hatred of Jews is a cultural phenomenon first and foremost and only secondarily a matter of social psychology, and Judeophobic tropes are an integral element of Western religious and intellectual history. And so it bears repeating that anti-Jewish ideas and verbal patterns have been firmly and deeply rooted in Western cultural memory for two millennia precisely because art and culture—not just uneducated marginal figures but the thought leaders, the masterminds whose thinking has informed the cultural sphere of society—have perpetuated them over the centuries.[9] This tradition is still alive, as

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8 See M. Schwarz-Friesel and J. Reinharz, "The Israelization of Antisemitism," *The Jerusalem Post*, February 16, 2017, https://www.jpost.com/opinion/the-israelization-of-antisemitism-481835.

9 For much of the long history of anti-Judaism, learned churchmen and priests were virtually the only ones who knew how to read and write and articulated Judeophobic ideas in their writings and sermons. That is why antisemitism is not a problem of the undereducated, as commentators are fond of claiming; in fact, nothing could be further from the truth. Education does not confer immunity to anti-Jewish resentment. In the US, for instance, the campuses of elite universities have recently emerged as the hotbeds of an alarming upsurge in antisemitism. See, e.g., M. Schwarz-Friesel, "Antisemitismus an Universitäten: die lange Tradition gebildeter Judenfeindschaft," *Gender, Politik, Universität. Gegen Diskriminierung an Hochschulen* 1 (2016): 22–23,

every debate over antisemitism of the past several years, including, most recently, the emotionally charged Mbembe controversy, has illustrated afresh. The debate once again showed that something is going seriously wrong in Germany. After the Halle attack on Yom Kippur in 2019, one might have expected uniform condemnation of all Judeophobic comments, including those disguised as "criticism of Israel." One might have hoped that academics who resort to crude analogies (e.g., comparing Islamophobia with Jew hatred) and antisemitic tropes to demonize the Jewish state or irresponsibly toy with such linguistic structures would be met with adamant opposition. Instead, some public voices have defended and even endorsed such rhetoric, seconded by the now obligatory signature collections supporting the "freedom of opinion" and lending legitimacy to unequivocally anti-Israel movements like BDS.

4 Implicit Antisemitism and Camouflage Technique

There is hardly any difference between the texts of right, left, and mainstream educated antisemites: they evoke the same stereotypes, and they use the same patterns of argumentation. The difference lies only in the style—the less radical language use—but the semantics of devaluation are the same. The antisemitic texts of mainstream writers are not as vulgar as an extremist's writings, they avoid death threats but instead propose other genocidal solutions in the name of "humanity." Lethal "solution plans" are being transferred from "the Jewish question" to the state of Israel. "Dissolve the state of Israel with the help of UN!" (a left-wing "Peace Activist" to the Israeli embassy in Berlin) articulates the old antisemitic "salvation phantasy." Antisemites from mainstream society prefer to use indirect speech acts (rhetorical questions, allusions of specific kinds, and reference shifting) to express their hostility toward Jews and/or the state of Israel. This implicit verbal antisemitism, however, invokes the same traditional stereotypes as in the texts from extremists. Hence, those indirect forms are as dangerous to the collective mind of a society as direct, manifest forms of Jew-hatred.

In today's most important space of social communication, the Web 2.0, anti-Judaism manifests itself with unprecedented frankness and candor—as what it has always been and still is: resentment directed against the existence of Jews

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http://www.audiatur-online.ch/2016/06/16/antisemitismus-an-universitaeten-die-lange-tradition-gebildeter-judenfeindschaft/.

in the world.[10] As stated, antisemitism is not a prejudice, it is a singular unified belief system, a pure phantasm, since the cultural concept of the JEW in the minds of antisemites is an abstraction just as their image of Israel is a construct: the product of processes of projection. And so, right now, fantasies of conspiracy and annihilation flood the worldwide web. Minute by minute, the slogans are re-circulated: "Israel bred the coronavirus," "Smash Israel!", "Tod dem Zionismus," "Death to Israel," "Free Palestine."[11]

No less alarming and perhaps even more profoundly concerning than the hate that people spew online are the irresponsible voices from the cultural scene and the academy who bring their capacity to deny or reinterpret the hatred of Jews in its currently dominant form, anti-Israel antisemitism.[12] Studies have shown that this form has been especially prevalent for years, which is why we scholars have long diagnosed an "Israelization of antisemitism": hatred toward Israel has become the glue holding all present varieties of Judeophobia together. Yet if there is one epithet that "renowned," "well-known," "prizewinning" come-

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10 M. Schwarz-Friesel, *Judenhass im Internet: Antisemitismus als kulturelle Konstante und kollektives Gefühl* (Berlin: Hentrich & Hentrich, 2019); English synopsis: https://www.linguistik.tu-berlin.de/fileadmin/fg72/Antisemitism_2.0_short_version_final.pdf.

11 In many contexts, "Free Palestine!" is code for the incitement to make Israel vanish from the map, based on the slogan "From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free!" Such codes have been a fixture for many years of antisemitic communicative indirection, which camouflages radical content by disguising it in de-radicalized form; see, e.g., L. Rensmann, "Zion als Chiffre: Modernisierter Antisemitismus in aktuellen Diskursen der deutschen politischen Öffentlichkeit," in *Gebildeter Antisemitismus*, ed. M. Schwarz-Friesel (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2015), 93–116. See also M. Schwarz-Friesel, "Educated Anti-Semitism in the Middle of German Society: Empirical Findings," in *Being Jewish in 21st-Century Germany*, ed. O. Glöckner and H. Fireberg (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015), 165–87; and A. H. Rosenfeld, ed., *Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism: The Dynamics of Delegitimization* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2019).

12 See, e.g., M. Zuckermann, "Antizionismus, Antisemitismus und Israelkritik sind drei Paar Schuhe," interview by J. Nichelmann, Deutschlandfunk Kultur, April 25, 2020. https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/moshe-zuckermann-zur-debatte-um-mbembe-antizionismus.1013.de.html?dram:article_id=475490; and M. Brumlik, "Vergleich bedeutet nicht Gleichsetzung," interview by T. Lieske, Deutschlandfunk, May 4, 2020, https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/solidaritaetsbrief-fuer-achille-mbembe-vergleich-bedeutet.691.de.html?dram:article_id=475977. See also E. Friesel, "The Inverted Ideological Pyramids of Anti-Zionist Jews: The Case of Moshe Zuckermann," *BESA Center Perspectives Paper*, no. 436, March 30, 2017, https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/inverted-ideological-pyramids-anti-zionist-jews-case-moshe-zuckermann/; and E. Friesel, "Jews against Zionism/Israel: On the Ambivalences of Contemporary Jewish Identity," in *Comprehending and Confronting Antisemitism: A Multi-Faceted Approach*, vol. 1 of *An End to Antisemitism!*, ed. A. Lange, K. Mayerhofer, D. Porat, and L. H. Schiffman (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), 427–40.

dians, writers, musicians, academics, and journalists who populate the post-Holocaust society indignantly reject, it is "antisemite."

Instead, whenever antisemitic language is exposed to be just that and faces criticism, the defendant invariably responds with well-rehearsed protestations that he or she is "aghast," "distraught," even "stunned" by the charge of antisemitism. Extensive research has shown these defensive strategies to be an integral component of the discourse of antisemitism denial.[13] Fully aware of the dangerous persuasive force of the verbal patterns they employ, public figures play with rhetorical fire; their defenders lionize them as champions of the freedom of speech. Intellectuals and university graduates keep regurgitating the same arguments and injecting them into the public discourse. These contentions have no basis in fact, are myopically trained on the surreal enemy stereotype ISRAEL, and are impervious to empirical data or the findings of experts:[14] "criticism of Israel," they claim, is off limits (a notion not borne out by reality); political criticism must not be equated with hatred of Jews (as though anyone making a serious argument had ever identified one with the other); and it is ultimately difficult to draw a neat line between antisemitism and criticism of Israel (even though the scholarship has long presented analytical criteria and decoding categories for a precise distinction[15]).

Yet many artists and academics, it appears, find it unthinkable that educated, sophisticated, liberal-minded voices might be spouting antisemitic ideas.

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13 See Schwarz-Friesel and Reinharz, *Inside the Antisemitic Mind*, chapter 10.

14 For a typical representative of these amateur contributions to the debate, see Yossi Bartal in conversation with Inge Günther, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, June 24, 2019: "I experience the climate in Germany, especially after the Bundestag resolution on the BDS boycott movement, as one in which any fundamental critique of the situation in Israel/Palestine is marginalized or even criminalized." This climate, Bartal asserts, "stifles a free discourse." Y. Bartal, "Ein freier Diskurs wird erstickt," interview by I. Günther, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, June 24, 2019, https://www.fr.de/kultur/interview-yossi-bartal-juedisches-museum-berlin-12665805.html. Reality challenges such claims: legitimate critique of Israeli actions is widely and sharply expressed in the media and political discussions and by no means "criminalized" as antisemitism. There is virtually no issue that is debated more freely and with greater intensity than the Middle East conflict. See P. Woldin, "Die Medien kritisieren kaum ein Land so oft wie Israel," Zeit Online, August 4, 2017, https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2014-08/israel-medien-kritik. Moreover, an empirical study has demonstrated that the frequently invoked taboo over criticism does not exist; see M. Schwarz-Friesel, *Judenhass im Internet: Antisemitismus als kulturelle Konstante und kollektives Gefühl* (Berlin: Hentrich & Hentrich, 2019), 135ff.

15 See Schwarz-Friesel and Reinharz, *Inside the Antisemitic Mind*, chapters 2–4, and A. Lange, K. Mayerhofer, D. Porat, and L. H. Schiffman eds., *Comprehending and Confronting Antisemitism: A Multi-Faceted Approach*, vol. 1 of *An End to Antisemitism!* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019).

"Witch hunt," "lynching," "repression," "McCarthyism,"[16] academics have brought out as the reversal of perpetrator and victim in support of Mbembe, without looking into what research has to say.[17] Genuinely relevant research distinguishes, for good reason, between verbal antisemitism (i.e., the linguistic manifestations) and conceptual antisemitism (the mindset): given the operation of language's semantic dimension, antisemitic language is always also and especially effective on an unconscious level; it always adds to the circulation in society of stereotypes and clichés, regardless of who utters it and whether it is articulated with or without antisemitic intent.[18]

Nor do educational attainment and the embrace of progressive ideals automatically prevent the production of Judeophobic verbal patterns, as the history of the Western world illustrates. Voltaire, Fichte, Hegel, Dickens, and many others were liberal-minded writers and men of learning, yet their works contain verbally explicit passages demonizing Jews. Knowing about the potential of antisemitic rhetoric to shape the collective consciousness, we should—indeed, we must, if we are serious about combating antisemitism in society at large—criticize and reject language that encodes Judeophobic tropes and combines with explosive catchwords. We have to do this without any exception and without regard to individual speakers and their educational background or point of view.

It is primarily academics from philological disciplines outside antisemitism studies as well as journalists and artists who downplay this crucial aspect or altogether brush it aside. On the subject of "modern Judeophobia," they cannot point to basic research or empirical studies to buttress their beliefs. All they have is the emotional intensity with which they proffer their "opinions." But opinions are no substitute for valid research findings that might be gained, for example, through quantitative and qualitative textual analyses conducted over

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16 See, e.g., the historian A. Eckert, "Antisemitismus-Vorwürfe gegen Achille Mbembe: 'Anzeichen einer Hexenjagd'," SWR 2, April 22, 2020, https://www.swr.de/swr2/leben-und-gesell schaft/antisemitismus-vorwuerfe-gegen-achille-mbembe-anzeichen-einer-hexenjagd-104.html [no longer available], and the education scholar M. Brumlik in a broadcast of the television station 3sat: "Der Fall Mbembe," May 15, 2020, video, 6:32, https://www.3sat.de/kultur/kulturzeit/der-fall-mbembe-100.html.

17 See, e.g., the pointers, references, and analyses at https://www.stopantisemitismus.de/.

18 See, e.g., M. Schwarz-Friesel, "Language and Emotion. The Cognitive Linguistic Perspective," in *Emotion in Language. Theory—Research—Application*, ed. U. M. Lüdtke (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2015), 157–73; and R. A. Friedman, "The Neuroscience of Hate Speech," *New York Times*, October 31, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/31/opinion/caravan-hate-speech-bowers-sayoc.html.

years. A familiar problem comes into view: amateur communication[19] has long shaped the public debates around antisemitism, in which the denial and willful misinterpretation of anti-Israel antisemitism are characteristic. One stock argument that has again proved irresistible in the present instance is the truism that "comparing is legitimate in academic scholarship and does not amount to equating." That would be true—if the comparisons were based in fact and pertinent and not fantastic constructions upheld by catchwords from the repertoire of anti-Jewish rhetoric!

Yet nothing of the sort has happened. No cognitive progress has been made. Feelings rather than facts drive this discourse, which has turned into a fight for the prerogative of interpretation. The media and the public have in many ways reinforced that situation: instead of relying on categories proposed by experts and the relevant research, they give a platform to anyone who raises their voice, and the louder the better. The press prints, without critical comment, the remarks of educated laypeople on "antisemitism as general hostility toward humans," which is an utter falsehood, or reports on the IHRA's definition of antisemitism, which, for what it is worth, was developed by researchers of international renown.[20] Antisemitism, it bears emphasis, is hostility not toward humans but exclusively toward Jews. Jews are hated and stigmatized as Jews and not as a minority.[21]

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19 Imagine a panel discussion with citizens, journalists, and politicians about possible therapies against tumor cells colonizing the brain to which no brain researcher or physician with a relevant specialization is invited. No one would take such a discussion very seriously. Yet that is exactly what happens almost on a weekly basis when it comes to antisemitism: publicists, journalists, activists, and others fill the screens and offer advice, ventilating possible causes and consequences. See also M. Schwarz-Friesel, "The Persistence of European Antisemitism," *BESA Center Perspectives Paper*, no. 1067, January 18, 2019, https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/european-anti-semitism/.

20 See, e.g., the following report on the IHRA definition: https://www.rosalux.de/publikation/id/41168/gutachten-zur-arbeitsdefinition-antisemitismus-der-ihra, and its unequivocal rejection by antisemitism researchers. See D. Porat, "The Working Definition of Antisemitism—A 2018 Perception," in *Comprehending and Confronting Antisemitism: A Multi-Faceted Approach*, vol. 1 of *An End to Antisemitism!*, ed. A. Lange, K. Mayerhofer, D. Porat, and L. H. Schiffman (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), 475–88.

21 See, already, L. Poliakov, *Bréviaire de la haine: Le IIIe Reich et les Juifs* (Paris: Calman Levy, 1951); translated as *Harvest of Hate: The Nazi Program for the Destruction of the Jews of Europe* (Philadelphia: Talman, 1954). Antisemites see Jews not as one minority but as "THE others," a label that has the status of an epistemological category. Jews embody the opposite of the antisemite's own way of life and as such must be rejected and negated unconditionally and absolutely. See also Schwarz-Friesel, *Judenhass im Internet*, 33ff., 144ff.

Nor does antisemitism have much in common with xenophobia: Jews were not and are not "foreigners" in the countries in which they live, having been well-integrated citizens for two centuries who have given no occasion for apprehensions of any kind. And Judeophobia is by no means correlated with an anti-modern and reactionary worldview; on the contrary, it is found in left-wing progressives who embrace multiculturalism and reject nationalism, forward-looking champions of an enlightened modernity and equality who nonetheless indulge in anti-Jewish hatred of Israel "in the name of humanism." It follows that antisemitism must not be equated with racism (an equation that is expressed with particular frequency in the public discourse); it is also found among liberal-minded, educated people who espouse anti-racism. Their tolerance extends to all minorities and most idiosyncrasies, with one exception: the Jewish state.

5 The Mbembe Controversy: A Case Study on the Distortion of Israel-related Jew-Hatred

Returning to the Mbembe case, in May 2020, seven hundred African artists and intellectuals expressed in a letter to the German chancellor Angela Merkel their firm belief that the accusations against Mbembe were "mendacious" through and through and that all his critics were exponents of the hard right.[22] Yet not even ten thousand signatures would undo the fact that Mbembe's writings attest to his irresponsibility in resorting to classical tropes of anti-Judaism. The debate reveals a serious and long standing problem: All public antisemitism debates of the past several years have demonstrated that for parts of German society, perceiving and acknowledging the reality and extent of contemporary Judeophobia is a massive challenge. Still, the fracas over Mbembe has revealed levels of ignorance and double standards that far exceed anything previously seen in this regard.

Achille Mbembe operates with the sort of surreal analogies and emotional superlatives that are characteristic of the verbal antisemitic patterns described above and that should have galvanized political leaders, the media, and civil society.

In the controversy over his utterances, Mbembe declared himself a victim of "German racism." He discredited the liberal politician Lorenz Deutsch with

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22 Cf. "Offener Brief afrikanischer Intellektueller, Schriftsteller- und KünstlerInnen," issued May 18, 2020, accessed December 14, 2020, https://simoninou.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/brief-von-afrikanischen_intellektuellen_an-die-dt-bundeskanzlerin_-angela-merkel.pdf.

vague insinuations of contacts into the neo-Nazi scene and imputed the "devil-ish idea" of an "antisemitic negro" regarding himself.[23] When the German gov-ernment's commissioner for antisemitism, Felix Klein,[24] criticized passages in Mbembe's writings, and pointed to serious research, Mbembe wrote that he would demand an apology "until my dying breath."[25] In fact, there was only one character in this absurd situation who should have apologized promptly for the entire string of verbal missteps: Mbembe himself. Yet no such regret, which would have required the realization that he had employed dangerous and inadequate rhetoric, was forthcoming. After his self-justifying discourse (in which he took some liberties with the facts, as a commentator for the *Frank-furter Allgemeine Zeitung* pointed out[26]), he joined the fray, answering what he described in *TAZ* as a "giant smear campaign" with a round of self-pity and vic-tim-blaming. He did not take back his anti-Israel statements. Is the "well-known and renowned scholar from Cameroon"[27] unaware of the dangerousness of cer-tain verbal patterns? Does he need to use the terms "Pharisees" and "Zealots" (which were employed as antisemitic invectives for centuries)[28] to label people whose views he does not accept? Does he need to quote the line "An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth," which is all over the antisemitic discourse? Does he really need to fabricate the charge of perpetrating an apartheid slur "worse than in South Africa" against the Jewish state, does he need to accuse it of "fa-natical extermination," demand its "global isolation," and de-realize the "occu-pation of Palestine" as the "greatest moral scandal of our time"?[29] What Mbembe is spreading are crude superlatives and extremist metaphors; there is no serious

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23 A. Mbembe, "Gigantische Diffamierungskampagne," taz, May 11, 2020, https://taz.de/Mbembe-zum-Antisemitismusvorwurf/!5684094/.

24 Felix Klein, the Commissioner for Jewish Life in Germany and the Fight against Antisemitism intervened in the case: Klein said that a person who has relativized the Holocaust should be bar-red from giving the festival's opening speech. As a consequence, many left intellectuals demand-ed his resignation. Mbembe himself claimed to be the victim of racism against Black people.

25 Mbembe, "Gigantische Diffamierungskampagne."

26 J. Kaube, "Wer hat Achille Mbembe gelyncht?," *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, May 10, 2020, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/antisemitismus-debatte-um-den-philosoph-achille-mbembe-16761907.html.

27 A. Posener, "Jörg Häntzschel oder die Unfähigkeit zur Selbstkritik," starke-meinungen.de, April 29, 2020, https://starke-meinungen.de/blog/2020/04/29/joerg-haentzschel-oder-die-un faehigkeit-zur-selbstkritik/.

28 G. Beyrodt, "Antisemiten sind immer noch die anderen," May 1, 2020, https://www.deuts chlandfunkkultur.de/zur-causa-mbembe-antisemiten-sind-immer-noch-die-anderen.1079.de.html?dram:article_id=475841.

29 Mbembe, "On Palestine," viii.

scholarship in it. The same holds true for many of his defenders, who at the same time show the practice of unique evaluation when it comes to Israel.

6 Hubris and Moral Urge, Double Standard and Unique Focus: Giving Moral Advice to Jews and the Jewish State

Hypothetical re-framing is a tool in cognitive science to reveal double standards and hypocrisy in discourse. Thus, let us imagine the following scenario: that the same statements above would have appeared in the writings, not of the scholar of post-colonialism Achille Mbembe, but in those of *Alternative für Deutschland's* right-wing Björn Höcke.[30] How different the reactions would have been!

The thought experiment above reveals a marked double standard when it comes to right-wing and left-wing hostility toward Israel that we have long known from the debates around BDS: the same people who "declare war" on neo-Nazis and the radical right keep their eyes wide shut in the face of left-wing anti-Zionism and anti-Israelism. This is no way to combat antisemitism in society at large. As long as we measure the dissemination of antisemitic language and ideas by two different standards, any effort to fight Judeophobia will remain ineffective. In the present instance, this pattern is combined with the usual indignation theatrics—the "discussion around anti-Israel antisemitism" is said to detract from the "urgently needed battle against genuine antisemit-

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30 Such hypothetical re-framing, which is to say, the placement of inherently problematic utterances in a different context, generally facilitates reflection on double standards in the assessment of antisemitic language and helps build awareness that it is the utterance as such that it is the source of danger and not (necessarily) the utterer. A similar thought experiment proved helpful in the debate around the anti-Israel poem by Günter Grass, who, for what it is worth, was a Nobel Prize-winning writer. See M. Schwarz-Friesel, "Dieser Text bedient moderne antisemitische Klischees," interview by K. Pokatzky, Deutschlandfunk Kultur, April 10, 2012, https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/dieser-text-bedient-moderne-antisemitische-klischees.954.de.html?dram:article_id=147146. Antisemitic language has the potential to stigmatize and reinforce stereotypes by virtue of their semantic content. In other words, it is solely their signification that matters, not individuals and their intention, not their social status or ethnic background, and not the context. Human cognition has been shown to process language autonomously, which is to say, without regard to a speaker's intention and functional aspects (see above n. 13). The same, it should be noted, is true of racist language: that is why people who are sensitive to language do not use fraught terms such as *negro*, which automatically and uncontrollably trigger discriminatory connotations and associations.

ism," critics supposedly engage in a "character assassination campaign" and rely on an "inappropriate construal of antisemitism"—to carry the moralizing to extremes.[31] It brings out a "new German assertiveness" that both Jews and the state of Israel can and would prefer to do without. *Frankfurter Rundschau*, for example, opines that "Aleida Assmann[32] has aptly characterized the conflict in these pages: 'A line now separates those who seek to support the State of Israel with their criticisms and make it better, from those who are determined to immunize it against any criticism [...]'"[33] Of course, it is neither apt nor sensitive when finger-wagging Germans presume to "make" the Jewish state "better."

Statements like these should leave uneasy anyone who knows even a smidgen about the past and the history of Judeophobia. It is a sort of hubris that has been able to blossom because Germany has nursed the illusion of itself as an enlightened post-Holocaust society that has learned from the horrors of history and emerged chastened and reformed. Yet this supposedly comprehensive "cathartic" process never happened nationwide. As the historical and discourse-analytical scholarship of the past thirty years has documented at length, there was no genuine accounting for the past after 1945, no serious discussion about guilt and shame. What developed instead were blame-the-victim stratagems and a collective deflection of guilt based on the idea of innocent perpetrators. Building on this tradition, many left-wing and right-wing intellectuals have adopted a know-it-all mentality that is disconcerting. As though driven by a kind of missionary urge, these moralizing self-appointed humanists, enlightened thinkers, and responsible citizens address Jews and Israelis from the pedestal of their superiority, as is illustrated both by public statements and, even more clearly, by the steady stream of letters from academics—complete with names, addresses, and profiles outlining their qualifications—that the Central Council of Jews in

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31 See, e.g., "Petition in Zeichnung—Abberufung des Antisemitismusbeauftragten Klein gefordert," issued May 3, 2020, accessed December 14, 2020, https://www.openpetition.de/petition/blog/einspruch-gegen-sprachregelungen-fuer-hochschulen.

32 Aleida Assmann is a renowned cultural scientist who has contributed to the discourse on memory culture in Germany.

33 S. Hebel, "Missbräuchliche Indienstnahme," *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, May 5, 2020, https://www.fr.de/kultur/gesellschaft/missbraeuchlicheindienstnahme-13751102.html. The quote comes from an essay in the *Frankfurter Rundschau* in which Assmann called the critical response to Mbembe's anti-Israel and antisemitic rhetoric "denunciation" and offers "proposals for a definition of antisemitism" without referring to the relevant scholarship by experts in the field, cf. A. Assmann, "Ein Klima des Verdachts, der Verunsicherung und der Denunziation," *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, May 4, 2020, https://www.fr.de/kultur/gesellschaft/klima-verdachts-verunsicherung-denunziation-13749410.html.

Germany and the Israeli embassy in Berlin have received in recent years.[34] Far from deriving an ethical or emotional principle of shame and humility from the "Holocaust experience," they turn things upside down, using the past to legitimize a peculiar inflated self-confidence vis-à-vis the descendants of the victims. They address Jewish citizens and Israelis the way a wise teacher might speak to immature children who have supposedly learned nothing from history (only too often, that is the collective reproach), giving advice and stern lectures, offering proposals on how to organize Israel and resolve the conflict with the Palestinians, and telling the Central Council how to behave. This hubris flows from the false peace that Germans have made with the history of the Holocaust, their treasured illusion of complete catharsis, their sometimes positively celebratory sense of having been reformed.

And there is no restraint in criticizing Israel because of the German past as often claimed. On the contrary: Germany's specific historic responsibility has become the fount of a universal aspiration—a kind of global ethics—for the present and the past: from now on, Germans will speak up against any and all forms of injustice and discrimination. There is no critical awareness that Israel and the Middle East conflict end up being the primary and often even the only objects of this guardian-of-virtue mentality. Repeating in mantra-like fashion that they have "learned the lessons of history" and are determined "never to be silent again in the face of suffering and oppression," these commentators demand that German Jews and Israelis "see reason at long last" and "show some humanity"[35]—in other words, they essentially suggest that the targets of their admonitions suffer from cognitive and emotional deficits. The Jewish people's history of suffering only serves to make its fall from grace the more dramatic: not even the Holocaust has transformed Jews into "morally upright humans who feel compassion for the Palestinians."[36] It is hard to imagine a more explicit or more self-satisfied coded inversion of the victim-perpetrator relationship. The recourse to anti-Judaic staples reveals the absurdity of these moralists' entire reasoning, demonstrating that they have in fact learned nothing from history: their use of

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34 See the extensive discussion in the chapter "Hostility toward Jews as a Missionary Urge," in Schwarz-Friesel and Reinharz, *Inside the Antisemitic Mind*, 255ff.

35 These formulas appear in hundreds of emails; see Schwarz-Friesel and Reinharz, *Inside the Antisemitic Mind*, 255ff. and 296ff.

36 One conspicuous feature of many of these letters is the contrast the writers draw between "good" and "bad" Jews: good Jews are those that were murdered in the Holocaust as well as those who condemn Israel, while those who like living in Israel and those who defend it are bad Jews; see ibid., 302ff.

classic Judeophobic and anti-Jewish rhetoric only makes the fact more glaring that the catharsis they routinely claim to have gone through is a fiction.

To see why, consider that advice to Jews on how they need to behave, how they ought to live, how they should mimic the ways of the "good Christians" have a long tradition in the history of Western Judeophobia. Even well-meaning thinkers and politicians who were committed to the Enlightenment and the universal "good" and advocated the "emancipation" of the Jewish population (like the late eighteenth century's Abbé Grégoire and Christian Wilhelm von Dohm) found themselves incapable of accepting the "Jewish element" as it was and demanded its assimilation to the "good Christians." No one analyzed this primal core of Judeophobic resentment more trenchantly than Léon Poliakov in his book *Bréviaire de la haine* (1951, translated as *Harvest of Hate*) about the motivation behind the "Final Solution": that Jews were killed for the single reason that they were Jews. It was not social envy nor economic or social developments that led to catastrophe, as some claim, misrepresenting the cause of the Shoah, but the centuries-old hatred of Western anti-Judaism. The singular monstrosity: annihilating Jews for the benefit of humankind (as Himmler put it in his speeches). The same demand is now expressed with regard to Israel: in radical form, as the demand for the dismantlement of the Jewish state, or, cloaked in benevolence, as the call for a "change in the name of humanity." Where are these "humanist" voices when it comes to the true hot spots and hard issues of global politics: to Syria, Russia, Turkey, China, or Belarus, to name but a few? Yet the highly emotionalized single-minded focus is on Israel, a stable democracy.[37] Disturbingly, this manifest double standard does not give people pause or wonder.

It is precisely because these voices come from within the educated elite that they are especially harmful, making effective efforts to combat the resurgent anti-Judaism that much more difficult: unlike right-wing radicals or populists (who, it is worth noting, raise exactly the same demands), they do not set off the alarm triggered by the vulgar Judeophobia of simpler minds; large parts of society listen to them, nod, and privately think to themselves with profound sat-

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[37] Israeli policies are widely and harshly criticized. The Jewish state is not unimpeachable. Instances of injustice, corruption, police violence, discrimination, controversial government action, nationalist decision-making occur in Israel as in any other country in the world. Such instances are reported in the media (and not least importantly in Israel's own press). What is crucial for the present discussion is not that criticism is expressed but which arguments are offered in its support and in which terms it is couched. Respectable critics, and there are many, do not resort to Nazi comparisons and Judeophobic tropes, nor do they preempt any possible charge of antisemitism with the communicative strategy of deflection and denial along the lines of "I'm not an antisemite, but ...". Legitimate criticism needs no such self-justification.

isfaction: "Yes, Israel is terrible, why should it be unimpeachable, they're no better than the Nazis back in the day"—and effectively espouse a concept of the Jewish collective that is at the heart of antisemitic thought and sentiment. The result is growing support for the extremists, the radicals, the fundamentalists, and populists. It is growing support for extreme-right poster slogans like "Israel is our misfortune!"[38]

Conclusion

Classic anti-Judaism is by no means on the wane or mostly absent from contemporary communication (as a growing number of commentators has recently claimed)—the stereotypes and intense emotions on which Judeophobic resentment is based have lost none of their potency. Antisemitism is chameleonic, changing its outward manifestations over time, but its substance remains the same. Since the most frequent manifestation of contemporary antisemitism is encoded as anti-Israelism and camouflaged as "criticism of Israel," there is the danger of normalization of verbal antisemitism on all social levels in the public. We do see a double standard when it comes to antisemitism: It is strongly condemned when it comes from the Right, it is accepted when it comes from the Left (framed as "political criticism"). Comprehending and confronting antisemitism means standing up against all forms of Jew-hatred without looking at its origin. There can and must be no double standard when it comes to antisemitism. Over the past two decades, however, many academics and journalists have not only learned nothing from the debates over and research on contemporary anti-Judaism, they are even taking a disastrous step backwards on the urgently needed effort to expose such resentment for what it is.

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38 This intertextual slogan is based on the simple substitution of *Israel* for *Jews*. In Nazi Germany the slogan "The Jews are our misfortune!" was published as a headline on each *Stürmer* edition of the weekly antisemitic newspaper. The German far-right neo-Nazi party *Die Rechte* used it on their posters in the European election campaign in 2019. After several complaints against this antisemitic rhetoric, the German court of Hannover ruled that the slogan is legitimate. Once again, it became obvious that not all German institutions are able to cope properly with antisemitic slurs and actions.

the Antisemitic Mind*, with Jehuda Reinharz, 2017. Her current research deals with Jew hatred on the Web 2.0 and with the emotional dimension of Antisemitism.*

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Contours of Workplace Antisemitism: Initial Thoughts and a Research Agenda

In the context of the rising tide of antisemitism worldwide, we wish to draw the contours of workplace organizational antisemitism, a hitherto ignored topic in contemporary scholarship, by presenting a framework for its study. In particular, we propose an interdisciplinary understanding of antisemitism in the workplace, drawing on theories and evidence from economics, management, and business. To contextually embed our propositions, we focus our discussion on two countries: Germany and Austria. We argue that given the deep-rooted, widespread antisemitic attitudes prevalent in both countries—in spite of their miniscule Jewish populations—it would be prudent for organizations and the people who work in them to be aware of and concerned with antisemitism. We offer two theoretical lenses explicating the underlying motivation for antisemitic conduct-primed goal pursuits (Goal Setting Theory) and mortality salience instigation and/or perceived violation of key worldview precepts (Terror Management Theory). These theories provide the dynamic element for our model on its four currents: Jewish "presence" (real and imaginary), implicit discrimination, Jewish identity, and grassroots cultural antisemitism. Highlighting selective issues of relevance to organizations and management, we end with suggestions for a research agenda.

Introduction

Jew-hatred and anti-Jewish sentiment in Europe, the USA, and numerous other geographies over the past two decades, suggest the existence of a global trend of antisemitism.[1] Barely two generations after the Shoah, at a time when the last Holocaust victims and their perpetrators can still bear personal witness, antisemitism is widespread and not diminishing. This situation confronts us with "[t]he riddle of antisemitism—its longevity and virulence, its seemingly endless

1 Cf. I. Cotler, *Global Antisemitism: Assault on Human Rights* (Yale: Yale University Press, 2009), and L. Rensmann, "The Contemporary Globalization of Political Antisemitism: Three Political Spaces and the Global Mainstreaming of the 'Jewish Question' in the Twenty-First Century," *Journal of Contemporary Antisemitism* 3, no. 1 (2020): 83–108.

capacity for renewal and reinvention."[2] It also draws our attention to a knowledge deficit in contemporary academia.

Business and management studies, which became major academic disciplines in the second half of the twentieth century and continue to grow in importance and influence in the twenty-first century, are, with very few exceptions, conspicuous in their absence from the academic discourse on contemporary antisemitism. The same is true of the discipline of economics. Given the "popularity" of antisemitism and the ongoing debate about jobs for natives as against non-natives,[3] this ignorance is perplexing. Thus we know next to nothing about antisemitism in contemporary work organizations. A critical reflection on the reasons for this gap may be long overdue, but it is beyond the scope of the present contribution. Here we wish instead to draw the main contours for an understanding and study of present-day antisemitism in the workplace.

Whilst antisemitism throughout history has been present in all corners of the globe and continues to be so in a globalised world,[4] the risk of overgeneralization of a complex, deep-rooted, and widespread phenomenon is a trap of which to beware.[5] We therefore follow good practice in our respective disciplines,[6] drawing on contemporary research in these fields to develop an understanding relevant to antisemitism at work. We situate our discourse within two geographies that have been historically among the main drivers of antisemitism as societal and cultural phenomena—as well as core players in the Shoah and its aftermath—Germany and Austria.

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2 M. Baumgarten, P. Kenez, and B. A. Thompson, eds., *Varieties of Antisemitism: History, Ideology, Discourse* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2009), 15.

3 This debate has held centre stage in the far-right rhetoric post World War II in, among others, Germany and Austria, with slogans such as "Deutschland zuerst, Österreich zuerst" (respectively: "Germany first, Austria first," cf. J. E. Richardson and R. Wodak, "Recontextualising Fascist Ideologies of the Past: Right-wing Discourses on Employment and Nativism in Austria and the United Kingdom," *Critical Discourse Studies* 6, no. 4 [2009]: 251–67) with reference to the DVU and AfD in Germany and the FPÖ in Austria—political movements with a virulent anti-Jewish history.

4 Cf. G. Rickman, *Hating the Jews: The Rise of Antisemitism in the 21ˢᵗ Century* (Brighton: Academic Studies Press, 2012).

5 Cf. H. Beyer, "The Globalization of Resentment: Antisemitism in an Inter- and Transnational Context," *Social Science Quarterly* 100, no. 5 (2019): 1503–22.

6 Cf. G. Johns, "The Essential Impact of Context on Organizational Behavior," *Academy of Management Review* 31, no. 2 (2006): 386–408; and W. Mayrhofer et al., "Context and HRM: Theory, Evidence, and Proposals," *International Studies of Management & Organization* 49, no. 4 (2019): 355–71, and idem, "Laying the Foundations of International Careers Research," *Human Resource Management Journal* 30, no. 3 (2020): 327–42.

Antisemitic Currents Pertinent to the Workplace and Organizations

We identify four currents in our conceptual model of workplace antisemitism. These are:
– "Antisemitism without Jews" in contemporary Germany and Austria
– Implicit and explicit anti-Jewish discrimination in the workplace
– The existential ontology of being a Jew in a post-Holocaust gentile world
– Antisemitism as a widespread grassroots cultural phenomenon

Jews in Germany and Austria

Formerly at the mainstream as well as avant-garde of its civic institutions and national culture, German and Austrian Jewry today are but a pale shadow of their formidable past, notably in the capital metropolises of Berlin and Vienna. Despite counting a minuscule 0.14% of the population in Germany[7] and 0.1% in Austria,[8] at least 2,275 antisemitic hate crimes were registered in 2020 in Germany, 55 of which were classified as violent—a 60% increase from the previous year.[9] Similarly, incidents in Austria in 2020 "rose to the highest level since the Jewish community's official records began 19 years ago," recording 585 incidents.[10]

Antisemitism as a generalised anti-Jewish attitude (whether against Jews as individuals, Jews as a collective, or "Jews" as an abstract concept) has been and continues to be widespread. In the early 1980s, Marin and Bunzl estimated that 75% of Austrians "express at least some antisemitic attitudes,"[11] with the rest holding strong or very strong anti-Jewish views. The latest study, based on a representative sample of the adult population in Austria, puts 31% of Austrians agreeing with the statement that "most Jews are exceptionally intelligent and

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7 Cf. S. DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population 2018," in *American Jewish Year Book* 118, ed. A. B. Dashefsky and I. M. Sheskin (Dordrecht: Springer, 2018), 361–449.

8 Cf. L. D. Staetsky and S. DellaPergola, *Jews in Austria: A Demographic and Social Portrait* (London: Institute of Jewish Policy Research, 2020).

9 Cf. "Germany Sees Spike in anti-Semitic Crimes," *Deutsche Welle*, February 11, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/germany-sees-spike-in-anti-semitic-crimes-reports/a-56537178.

10 Cf. "Austrian anti-Semitism Incidents Hit Record in 2020," *Reuters*, April 26, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/austrian-anti-semitism-incidents-hit-record-2020-report-says-2021-04-26/.

11 B. Marin and J. Bunzl, *Antisemitismus in Österreich: Sozialhistorische und soziologische Studien* (Innsbruck: Inn-Verlag, 1983), 178.

wealthy" and that they "dominate the international business world" (26 %).[12] Both statements are of relevance to the world of work. Of significance too are the large numbers of respondents who do not offer an opinion—35 % on the first statement and 24 % on the second, which may indicate reluctance to voice an antisemitic view (see Research Agenda below). A 2019 survey in Germany reports similar results.[13] Both countries have active right-wing parties, with proto-fascist ideologies. The AfD in Germany and the FPÖ in Austria attract a significant following, their messages heavily impregnated with antisemitic tropes and innuendo.[14]

Given their insignificant demographic presence, and with the exception of the Haredi community (who are highly visible in their traditional attire[15]), Jews are practically indistinguishable from the general population; hence the persistence of active antisemitism manifested in anti-Jewish incidents and passive antisemitism reflected in opinion surveys, is puzzling. Of note here is the persistent belief in one's ability to supposedly recognize someone as Jewish—a recurrent antisemitic trope. In the latest Austrian public opinion poll, 9 % of respondents were confident that "when I meet someone, I know within a matter of minutes whether that person is a Jew," whereas 11 % failed to voice an opinion on the statement.[16] The probability that the average Austrian in the provinces can identify someone as Jewish is extremely low, since 86 % of the country's Jewish population resides in Vienna.[17] The vast majority of Austrians—and that is true for Germany too—are not aware of having ever met a (real) Jew in their life.[18] Known as "Antisemitism without Jews,"[19] this state of affairs may engen-

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12 Cf. Austrian Parliament, *Antisemitism in Austria 2020* (Vienna: Austrian Parliament, 2021).
13 Cf. "A Quarter of Germans Have Antisemitic Thoughts, New Survey Finds," *The Local*, October 24, 2019, https://www.thelocal.de/20191024/every-fourth-german-has-anti-semitic-thoughts-says-new-study/.
14 For the AfD see e. g. M. Hübscher, "*Likes* for Antisemitism: The Alternative für Deutschland and Its Posts on Facebook," *Journal of Contemporary Antisemitism* 3, no. 1 (2020): 11–34. For the FPÖ see e. g. M. Reiter, "Antisemitismus in der FPÖ und im 'Ehemaligen'-Milieu nach 1945," *Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung* 27 (2018): 117–49.
15 Haredi (orthodox) Jews make up a tiny proportion of the miniscule Jewish population in both Germany and Austria. In Austria they comprise 7 % of the Jewish community (cf. Staetsky and DellaPregola, *Jews in Austria*) and in Germany the percentage is even lower (personal communication with Daniel Staetsky, May 2021).
16 Cf. Austrian Parliament, *Antisemitism in Austria 2020*.
17 Cf. Staetsky and DellaPregola, *Jews in Austria*.
18 Cf. J. Masters and A. Mortensen, "A Shadow over Europe: Anti-Semitism in 2018," CNN, November 2018, accessed May 23, 2021, https://edition.cnn.com/specials/europe/anti-semitism-europe.

der a two-pronged dynamic: Whilst sharpening the issue of identity for Jews (should they, consciously or unconsciously, conceal or emphasize their Jewish identity), the gregarious antisemite may happily identify someone as Jewish who is not, and for whom potentially undesirable consequences may ensue. As we shall see, these may have ramifications for the workplace.

Workplace Discrimination

Due to its scarcity, the academic research effort on antisemitism pertaining to the workplace is rather easy to summarize; its researchers can be counted on the fingers of one hand and are confined to a single geography (the USA and Canada). From the mid-1960s to the late 1980s, the few relevant publications (none of the articles were published in business and management journals) concentrated on the issue of discrimination by North American big business (predominately in the USA).[20] The evidence showed that Jews faced barriers of entry, starting at college recruitment[21] and continuing in promotion to the top corporate echelons.[22] Slavin concluded in a sombre tone: "it seems the present system of corporate recruitment effectively excludes Jews from most sectors of the American economy."[23] Jews also had to face overt and explicit generalized anti-Jewish prejudice,[24] which saw them side-lined into support functions in organizations and the professions: roles and occupations that required technical skills and intellec-

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19 Cf. B. Marin, "A Post-Holocaust 'Anti-Semitism without Anti-Semites'? Austria as a Case in Point," *Political Psychology* 2, no. 2 (1980): 57–74; Marin and Bunzl, *Antisemitismus in Österreich*; T. Seidenschnur, *Antisemitismus im Kontext. Erkundungen in ethnisch-heterogenen Milieu von Heranwachsenden* (Transcript: Bielefeld, 2013).

20 The implementation of Title VII from the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may play a role here: its interpretation (or lack thereof) may have inadvertently encouraged the harbouring of antisemitic expressions in the workplace as courts were reluctant to rule on what constitutes a "religion," thereby providing a blanket protection to anything that could be labelled "beliefs." Cf. B. D. Arem, "Never Again in the Workplace: Title VII's Shield of Intolerance," *Journal for the Study of Antisemitism* 4, no. 1 (2012): 73–87.

21 Cf. A. K. Korman, "Anti-Semitism in Organizations and the Behavioral Sciences: Towards a Theory of Discrimination in Work Settings," *Contemporary Jewry* 9, no. 2 (1988): 63–85; and S. L. Slavin, "Bias in US Big Business Recruitment," *Patterns of Prejudice* 10, no. 5 (1976): 22–25.

22 Cf. S. L. Slavin and M. A. Pradt, *The Einstein Syndrome: Corporate Anti-Semitism in America Today* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1982); and Korman, "Anti-Semitism in Organizations."

23 Slavin, "Bias in US Big Business Recruitment," 24.

24 Cf. R. P. Quinn et al., *The Chosen Few: A Study of Discrimination in Executive Selection* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Institute for Social Research, 1968).

tual capabilities but were less dependent on social acceptability.[25] Powell compares the level of hindrance to an executive career based on religion, reporting that Jews were nine times more impacted than the second most impacted denomination, Roman Catholics.[26] Moreover, Zweigenhaft demonstrates that Jews were barred from elite social clubs, a key entry route into the executive suite.[27] Commercial banks in particular were singled out as discriminating against Jews.[28]

As Korman's book title *The Outsiders: Jews and Corporate America* reveals, Jews were looked upon as outsiders at a time when being an outsider could be held against you. That was decades before diversity management became *de rigueur*. In today's world of work, being a mere outsider is, on the face of it, no longer a barrier; however the implicit bias inherent in one's construal as *outsider* still holds forth, though it is much more nuanced than outright discrimination.[29]

Whilst at the macro level, the occupational profile of Jews has attracted the attention of economists,[30] the literature on antisemitism from the perspective of labour economics is singularly sparse. Mocan and Raschke reveal that in Germany

> xenophobic, anti-Semitic and racist feelings are tempered when people believe that their own economic situation is in good shape, and these feelings are magnified when people think that their personal economic situation is bad. The same relationship exists for beliefs about national economic conditions.[31]

Economic theory, however, provides us useful insights. For example, *taste-based discrimination* would suggest that if an employer does not like Jews, then, one

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25 Cf. A. K. Korman, *The Outsiders: Jews and Corporate America* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1988).
26 Cf. R. M. Powell, *Race, Religion and the Promotion of the American Executive* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969).
27 Cf. R. L. Zweigenhaft, *Who Gets to the Top? Executive Suite Discrimination in the Eighties* (New York: Institute of Human Relations, 1984).
28 Cf. R. L. Zweigenhaft and G. W. Domhoff, *Jews in the Protestant Establishment* (New York: Praeger, 1982).
29 Cf. Z. Bauman, *Moderne und Ambivalenz* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2005); and G. Simmel, "Exkurs über den Fremden," in *Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1908), 509 – 12.
30 For a recent review, see J. Lipkes, "'Capitalism and the Jews': Milton Friedman and His Critics," *History of Political Economy* 51, no. 2 (2019): 193 – 236.
31 N. Mocan and C. Raschke, "Economic Well-being and anti-Semitic, Xenophobic, and Racist Attitudes in Germany," *European Journal of Law and Economics* 41, no. 1 (2016): 6.

would expect that Jews or those believed to be Jews would face a harder time finding and keeping their job. If customers dislike Jews, then a company may have to keep its Jewish employees out of sight.[32] This in turn could impair the performance of employees categorized as Jews, which may impede the chances of future hires—so-called *statistical discrimination*.[33]

The empirical literature shows that employment discrimination against Jews in the USA has receded fast. By the early 1990s, notes: "[i]n the most visible areas of society antisemitism is simply a non-factor,"[34] although the high rate of the self-employed and entrepreneurs among Jews in that period may suggest otherwise.[35] By the early 2000s, commercial banks no longer appeared to discriminate against Jews,[36] and toward the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century, Dinnerstein states

> Jews have become the most successful, admired and respected religious group in America. They have attained a place in society and a level of security and success in the United States that would have been thought unimaginable in the middle of the twentieth century,[37]

a point reiterated by Zweigenhaft and Domhoff,[38] and Chiswick concludes:

> Throughout their over 350 year presence in the US, American Jews have demonstrated extraordinary economic achievements.[39]

This raises an interesting conundrum. If Jews are so successful, why concern oneself with antisemitism (whether it manifests itself or not)? This question brings us to the third current of our conceptual model.

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32 As was the case with oil companies in the 1960s and 1970s, cf. Korman, "Anti-Semitism in Organizations"; and Slavin, "Bias in US Big Business Recruitment."
33 Cf. W. Neilson and S. Ying, "From Taste-Based to Statistical Discrimination," *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 129 (2016): 116–28.
34 L. Dinnerstein, *Antisemitism in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 248.
35 Cf. B. R. Chiswick, ed., *Jews at Work: Their Economic Progress in the American Labor Market* (New York: Springer, 2020).
36 Cf. J. D. Gale, "The Effects of Aversive Antisemitism on Selection Decisions regarding Jewish Workers in the United States" (PhD diss., Alliant International University, San Diego, 2004).
37 L. Dinnerstein, "My Assessment of American Antisemitism Today," in *Antisemitism in North America: New World, Old Hate*, ed. S. K. Baum et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 53.
38 R. L. Zweigenhaft and G. W. Domhoff, *Diversity in the Power Elite: Ironies and Unfulfilled Promises*, 3rd ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018).
39 Chiswick, *Jews at Work*, 326.

The Other Side of the Coin: Jews in a post-Holocaust Gentile World

In his review of Korman's book, Schwartz offers the following insight:

> To grow up Jewish, at least in my time, was to grow up with the knowledge that one's possibilities were limited. One knew that one could not be a member of certain groups, hold certain occupations, even go to certain schools. [...] Being a corporate executive was never something that I considered as an open possibility. As I grew older I came to realize that the sense of limitation is deeply a part of the Jewish heritage. [...] Later, I came to understand that it was this belief in limitation, the frailty of man, and the tenuousness of life that was in large measure responsible for some people rejecting the Jews. Often the world of these gentiles was a world full of manic optimism, the denial of death [...] No wonder they did not want these Jews around. From their dreams, the Jews keep waking them.[40]

Schwartz directs our attention to the underlying existential tension of a minority group's living experience as being *different*. It is a universal propensity, but for Jews, due to their historical baggage as the canonical outsiders, there are added particularistic undertones, such as being universally disliked because they are unlike, as Baron put it.[41] To complicate matters, Jews are also disliked because they are too un-different[42] as has been the case in Germany and Austria in the period leading up to the Third Reich and the Shoah, when assimilated Jews, including converts to Christianity were particularly singled out in Nazi ideology precisely because they appeared to be indistinguishable from the general population.

Schwartz also directs our attention to the interaction between a minority's existential state (and state of mind) and its impact on the majority's worldview, inter alia defining Terror Management Theory (see following) in all but name.

In the preface to their book, Zweigenhaft and Domhoff refer to a remark from a friend who learned about their project "'Is a book about successful Jews ever good for the Jews?' We understand the depth of this concern," the authors note.[43] Remarkably, some 40 years later, in a very different epoch for American Jewry, Chiswick notes in the preface to his book:

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40 H. S. Schwartz, review of *The Outsiders: Jews and Corporate America*, by A. B. Korman, *Academy of Management Review* 14, no. 2 (1989): 304–5.

41 Cf. S. W. Baron, "Changing Patterns of Antisemitism: A Survey," *Jewish Social Studies* 38, no. 1 (1976): 5–38.

42 R. S. Wistrich offered the same hypothesis, cf. *Laboratory for World Destruction: Germans and Jews in Central Europe* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007).

43 Zweigenhaft and Domhoff, *Jews in the Protestant Establishment*, v.

> I ran into a challenge [...] concern expressed by a few and held more quietly by many others, that research revealing Jewish economic success might generate negative social, cultural and political consequences.[44]

We are into the terrain of what has been dubbed the "Diaspora motive"[45]—the perennial insecurity of migrants; or as Jews would put it, "what will the *goyim*[46] say?" Of course in the case of Jews that is not merely a matter for recent arrivals but an existential ontology: the possibility and potentiality of forced unrootedness being integral to Jewish identity.

The latest survey of European Jews concerning their perception and experience of antisemitism confirms that.[47] Seventy-three percent of Austrian respondents agree that antisemitism is a very big or fairly big problem, and 75% agree that it increased in the past five years. In response to the question: "Do you ever avoid wearing, carrying or displaying things that might help people recognize you as a Jew in public?", 67% of Austrian respondents replied in the affirmative (ranging from "always" to "occasionally"). Significantly, 31% have considered emigrating "because I don't feel safe living here as a Jew." The figures for Germany were higher: 85%, 89%, 75%, and 44%, respectively. These figures are staggering. They suggest communities living in a permanent state of fear, feeling exposed to ongoing threat to their safety and well-being, unable to freely exercise their religion and manifest their identity.

Antisemitism as a Cultural Phenomenon

Cotler defines cultural antisemitism as a "mélange of attitudes, sentiments, innuendo and the like in academia, in Parliaments, among the literati, public intellectuals, and the human rights movement—in a word, *la trahison des clercs*,"[48] in reference to Julien Benda's seminal study of 1920s Europe, depicting the "betrayal of the elites." Applebaum brings us up to date as with regards to Poland under Kaczyński and Hungary's Orbán, for example, where antisemitism is actively en-

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44 Chiswick, *Jews at Work*, i.

45 Cf. R. Brenner and N. M. Kiefer, "The Economics of the Diaspora: Discrimination and Occupational Structure," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 29 (1981): 517–34.

46 Goyim (Hebrew, Yiddish) = gentiles.

47 Cf. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), *Experiences and Perceptions of Antisemitism* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2018).

48 Cotler, *Global Antisemitism*, 11.

couraged by the authorities and the intelligentsia.[49] Justin Welby, Archbishop of Canterbury, put it squarely:

> we have to recognize that antisemitism has been the root and origin of most racist behaviour for the past 1,000 years in this country [England]. It goes right back to the early Middle Ages [...] It seems to be something that is latent and under the surface, and it bubbles to the surface very, very easily indeed. I think it is one of those things that, when we see it, tells us that there are strains and stresses in society. It is the canary in the mine.[50]

We concur with Welby. Notwithstanding the critical role elites play in legitimizing and validating antisemitism at a given place in a given time, the potentiality of antisemitism is in itself a given—the so-called *continuity thesis*,[51] which comes under different titles, such as "the eternal hatred,"[52] "the longest hatred,"[53] "permanent neurosis":[54] anti-Jewish sentiment has been around at least since the birth of Christianity,[55] and it may be traced back to pagan times.[56] Antisemitism is woven into the social-cultural fabric of Western society, notably Europe—a perverse *cultural capital*[57] of sorts. In stating that, we follow Volkov's depiction of antisemitism as anchored in cultural codes.[58] She highlights "the total interconnected ways of thinking, feeling, and acting" subsuming both *Weltanschauung* and ideology, not excluding philosophy, science, and the arts, and "includes tra-

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49 Cf. A. Applebaum, *Twilight of Democracy: The Seductive Lure of Authoritarianism* (London: Allen Lane, 2020).

50 Justin Welby, Archbishop of Canterbury, in evidence before the Home Affairs Select Committee at the House of Commons, June 7, 2016.

51 Cf. S. Ettinger, *Modern Antisemitism: Studies and Essays* (Tel Aviv: Moreshet, 1978) [in Hebrew].

52 Cf. D. J. Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1996).

53 Cf. R. S. Wistrich, *Antisemitism: The Longest Hatred* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1991).

54 Cf. J. L. Talmon, "Mission and Testimony—the Universal Significance of Modern Antisemitism," in *The Unique and the Universal: Some Historical Reflections* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1965), 119–64.

55 Cf. U. Eco, *Inventing the Enemy* (London: Vintage Books, 2013).

56 Cf. S. Freud, *Moses and Monotheism* (New York: Random House, 1955).

57 In reference to Bourdieu's *embodied* cultural capital.

58 Cf. S. Volkov, "Antisemitism as a Cultural Code: Reflections on the History and Historiography of Antisemitism in Imperial Germany," *Yearbook of the Leo Baeck Institute* 23 (1978): 25–46; idem, "Readjusting Cultural Codes: Reflections on Anti-Semitism and Anti-Zionism," *Journal of Israeli History* 25, no. 1 (2006): 51–62; and "Antisemitism as Cultural Code," in *Germans, Jews and Antisemites: Trials in Emancipation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 67–158.

ditions that consciously and subconsciously affect such a collectivity, habits of mind, a variety of automatic reactions, and a plethora of accepted norms."[59]

Cultural codes, according to Volkov, signify larger important life positions, which stand out in particular in times of crisis and strife. Whilst a higher level of formal education was found to be associated with weaker antisemitic attitudes,[60] Schwarz-Friesel and Reinharz in their study of Germany (as well as Austria to a lesser extent) highlight the ubiquity of antisemitism among all social strata.[61]

Contributory factors to widespread grassroots antisemitism in Germany and Austria are *secondary antisemitism*[62] and *victimhood competition.*[63] Both concepts refer to national and personal identity construction. The former refers to individuals' ingrained defensiveness against guilt and addresses those descendants who are aware that members of their families were Nazi supporters (not necessarily as direct perpetrators). The latter refers to the resentment against Jews aroused due to the perception that their own non-Jewish families were also victims of the Nazi period. This sentiment is particularly present in Austria, which held the official position that the country as a whole was "the first victim of Hitler" decades after World War II. Nowadays, one may add *tertiary antisemitism* to the count, as the grandchildren of Nazi perpetrators, supporters, and sympathizers come of age.[64] Indeed, according to Bodemann the Jewish trope is a central element in German identity.[65]

Antisemitism being part and parcel of the cultural milieu of Germany and Austria, we would expect the day-to-day to be imbued with antisemitic behavioural conduct, though not always in an obvious way, since antisemitism went un-

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59 Volkov, "Antisemitism as Cultural Code," 110 – 11.

60 Cf. M. Fertig and C. M. Schmidt, "Attitudes towards Foreigners and Jews in Germany: Identifying the Determinants of Xenophobia in a Large Opinion Survey," *Review of Economics of the Household* 9, no. 1 (2011): 99 – 128.

61 Cf. M. Schwarz-Friesel and J. Reinharz, *Die Sprache der Judenfeindschaft im 21. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013).

62 Cf. *P. Schönbach, Reaktionen auf die antisemitische Welle im Winter 1959/60* (Frankfurt/Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1961).

63 For a recent article, see G. Antoniou, E. Dinas, and S. M. Kosmidis, "Collective Victimhood and Social Prejudice: A Post-Holocaust Theory of Anti-Semitism," *Political Psychology* 41, no. 5 (2020): 861– 86.

64 Cf. A. Hohenlohe-Bartenstein, "In the Presence of the Past: 'Third Generation' Germans and the Cultural Memory of National Socialism and the Holocaust" (PhD thesis, University of London, London, 2011), accessed May 23, 2021, http://eprints.gold.ac.uk/6601/.

65 Cf. Y. M. Bodemann, *In den Wogen der Erinnerung: Jüdische Existenz in Deutschland* (München: dtv, 2002).

derground in the aftermath of the Holocaust.[66] Thus, "Jews" is used as a dirty word,[67] and that habitual expression is not confined to the older generation. "Du Jude!" is a derogatory expression common among youth,[68] and typically directed against non-Jews.[69] Jokes about Jews feature regularly in popular culture, establishing a norm of verbal antisemitism,[70] though malice may not always be intended.[71] Yet, the distance between words and action could be rather short, as the history of Germany and Austria taught us.

Toward a Model of Workplace Antisemitism

Whilst overt antisemitic incidents (e.g., physical attacks, damage to property, and verbal abuse) are evidently on the rise, they pale in significance, at least in terms of number of occurrences, compared to implicit antisemitic manifestations. In modern Germany and Austria, expressing antisemitic views is no longer *salonfähig* (socially acceptable) and in both countries' constitutions and legal systems, expressing such views may land one in jail. Hence, without underestimating the gravity of these overt incidents, an emphasis in understanding day-to-day antisemitism and its prevalence in the workplace should be on its indirect presentation and coded nuance. Importantly, antisemitism as a widespread grassroots ingrained cultural phenomenon necessarily points us toward protagonists' subconscious, if not of entire communities' collective unconscious.

　　Having outlined the currents relevant to workplace antisemitism, we next introduce our model's conceptual building blocks. While the four currents may be

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66 Cf. L. Silverman, "Absent Jews and Invisible Antisemitism in Postwar Vienna: Der Prozeß (1948) and The Third Man (1949)," *Journal of Contemporary History* 52, no. 2 (2017): 211–28.
67 Cf. Seidenschnur, *Antisemitismus im Kontext*.
68 Cf. A. Scherr and B. Schäuble, "*Ich habe nichts gegen Juden, aber...": Ausgangsbedingungen und Perspektiven gesellschaftspolitischer Bildungsarbeit gegen Antisemitismus* (Berlin: Amadeu Antonio Stiftung + Freudenberg Stiftung, 2007).
69 Cf. J. Bernstein, *Antisemitismus an Schulen in Deutschland: Befunde—Analysen—Handlungsoptionen* (Weinheim: Beltz Juventa, 2020); and G. Jikeli, "Anti-Semitism in Youth Language: The Pejorative Use of the Terms for 'Jew' in German and French Today," *Conflict & Communication Online* 9, no. 1 (2010): 1–13.
70 Cf. T. Seidenschnur, "Kontextueller Antisemitismus in einem Alltag ohne Antisemiten," in *Kleine Geheimnisse: Alltagssoziologische Einsichten*, ed. H. Bude, M. Dellwing, and S. Grills (Berlin: Springer, 2015), 159–83.
71 Cf. S. P. Scheichl, "The Contexts and Nuances of anti-Jewish Language: Were All the 'Antisemites' Antisemites?" in *Jews, Antisemitism and Culture in Vienna*, ed. I. Oxaal, M. Pollak, and G. Botz (London: Routledge, 1987), 89–110.

construed as "constant" elements, the periodic rise and fall in the intensity of antisemitic manifestations (expressions, incidents, attitudes, beliefs) are a variable of the *zeitgeist*.[72]

Conceptual Building Blocks

We identify two theories that could be instrumental in understanding the alternating peaks and troughs of anti-Jewish sentiment and may provide promising avenues for research into workplace antisemitism: Terror Management Theory and Goal Setting Theory.

Terror Management Theory (TMT) postulates the role of death salience in human behaviour.[73] Central to the theory is the need for defence of one's *cultural worldview* and *self-esteem* in buffering humans against the universal threat of mortality.[74]

> Terror management theory may be particularly useful for understanding antisemitism because outbreaks have often occurred following major social disruptions—military defeats, epidemic lethal disease, and massive economic deterioration. Either death, or some threat to people's most cherished beliefs, or both have become salient. Terror management theory suggests that, under such circumstances, many people will attempt to protect themselves by affirming their core values. Jews' survival, their financial success and their unique religious beliefs threaten the worldview of others. This threat can be parried by denigrating Jews.[75]

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72 Cf. S. O. Becker and L. Pascali, "Religion, Division of Labor, and Conflict: Anti-semitism in Germany over 600 Years," *American Economic Review* 109, no. 5 (2019): 1764–804.

73 Cf. B. L. Burke, A. Martens, and E. H. Faucher, "Two Decades of Terror Management Theory: A Meta-analysis of Mortality Salience Research," *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 14, no. 2 (2010): 155–95.

74 Cf. B. J. Schmeichl and A. Martens, "Self-Affirmation and Mortality Salience: Affirming Values Reduces Worldview Defense and Death-Thought Accessibility," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 31, no. 5 (2005): 658–67; and B. J. Schmeichl et al., "Terror Management Theory and Self-esteem Revisited: The Roles of Implicit and Explicit Self-esteem in Mortality Salience Effects," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 96, no. 5 (2009): 1077–87.

75 F. Cohen-Abady et al., "The Modern Antisemitism-Israel Model (MASIM): Empirical Studies of North American Antisemitism," in *Antisemitism in North America: New World, Old Hate*, ed. S. K. Baum et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 107.

Hence,

> when focused on their own mortality and in need of the protections that their worldviews provide, non-Jews may become more hostile towards Jews; this is because Jews represent a challenge to their worldviews by being outgroup members.[76]

Thus, in periods characterized by strife, threat (to life, livelihood), crises (political, economic, environmental, civil unrest) that produce enhanced death awareness and/or challenge to one's central beliefs, antisemitism, manifesting non-tolerant, aggressive responses, would be expected to rise. Indeed, in one of their earlier studies, Greenberg et al. demonstrated that evoking mortality salience drives Christians to rate more positively fellow Christians and more negatively Jews.[77] Schimel et al. demonstrated a preference for stereotyping and stereotypic thinking in such circumstances.[78]

TMT, a psychoanalytically informed theory, underscores the possibility of activating mortality salience or perceived damage to one's central beliefs, subconsciously[79] as well as consciously.

Goal Setting Theory (GST) is an organizational behaviour theory that deals with the relationship between learning, feedback, and work performance.[80] GST has built on Bargh's automaticity model[81] "that a goal is a mental representation stored in memory, and that it can be activated by a situational cue in the absence of conscious awareness (i.e., a priming effect)"[82] developing an integrat-

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76 Ibid., 108.

77 Cf. J. Greenberg et al., "Evidence for Terror Management Theory II: The Effects of Mortality Salience on Reactions to Those Who Threaten or Bolster the Cultural Worldview," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 58, no. 2 (1990): 308–18.

78 Cf. J. Schimel et al., "Stereotypes and Terror Management: Evidence That Mortality Salience Enhances Stereotypic Thinking and Preferences," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 77 (1999): 905–26.

79 We use here interchangeably subconscious, subliminal, unconscious, non-conscious, in line with the terms employed by the different sources we cite. We are aware of, but do not attempt to fine-tune, the differences among these terms.

80 Cf. E. A. Locke and G. P. Latham, *A Theory of Goal Setting and Task Performance* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1990); and idem, "The Development of Goal Setting Theory: A Half Century Retrospective," *Motivation Science* 5 (2019): 93–105.

81 Cf. J. A. Bargh, "Auto-motives: Preconscious Determinants of Social Interaction," in *Handbook of Motivation and Cognition 2*, ed. E. T. Higgins and R. M. Sorrentino (New York: Guilford Press, 1990), 93–130.

82 X. Chen et al., "An Enumerative Review and a Meta-Analysis of Primed Goal Effects on Organizational Behavior," *Applied Psychology* 70, no. 1 (2021): 216–17.

ed model.[83] The theory shows that subliminal priming is often achieved by manipulating visual clues (like photos) but also verbally. Priming to behave cooperatively has been shown to enhance performance, while negative feedback[84] is detrimental to one's performance. Chen et al. conclude: "primed goal effects on organizational behavior exist, and these effects are not restricted to the laboratory."[85]

Importantly, subconsciously primed goals, enacted without one's intention or awareness, do not show a differential effect than when they are consciously activated; and any aspect of it, feedback included, could be non-conscious[86] and plays a similar role to the primed goal-performance linkage.[87] Furthermore, habits—automatically repeated in-context behaviours or associations in memory between a context and a response—when activated, may be stronger than (changed) attitudes.[88] Chen et al. comment on organizations more generally: "Over time a [organizational] climate can become second nature, and as result can influence an employee's behavior unconsciously."[89]

The emphasis in GST is on the subtlety of desired outcomes, mediating processes and achievable conduct in a work environment, represented in memory, sometimes symbolically and subliminally primed.[90] An environment (not necessarily work environment) that sends out antisemitic cues may activate antisem-

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83 Cf. E. A. Locke and G. P. Latham, "New Directions in Goal-Setting Theory," *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 15, no. 5 (2006): 265–68; A. D. Stajkovic, E. A. Locke, and E. S. Blair, "A First Examination of the Relationships between Primed Subconscious Goals, Assigned Conscious Goals, and Task Performance," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 91, no. 5 (2006): 1172–80; and G. P. Latham, J. Brcic, and A. Steinhauer, "Toward an Integration of Goal Setting Theory and the Automaticity Model," *Applied Psychology* 66, no. 1 (2017): 25–48.

84 On communicating low achievement against self-set goals cf. Bipp and Kleingeld, reported in Chen et al., "An Enumerative Review."

85 Chen et al., "An Enumerative Review," 227.

86 Cf. M. Frese, "Primed Goals and Primed Actions: A Commentary from an Action Theory Point of View," *Applied Psychology* 70, no. 1 (2021): 262–67.

87 Cf. G. Itzchakov and G. P. Latham, "The Moderating Effect of Performance Feedback and the Mediating Effect of Self-set Goals on the Primed Goal-performance Relationship," *Applied Psychology* 69, no. 2 (2020): 379–414.

88 Cf. G. Itzchakov, L. Uziel, and W. Wood, "When Attitudes and Habits Don't Correspond: Self-Control Depletion Increases Persuasion but not Behavior," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 75 (2018): 1–10.

89 X. Chen et al., "Advancing Primed Goal Research in Organizational Behavior," *Applied Psychology* 70, no. 1 (2021): 277.

90 Cf. e.g. G. P. Latham and R. F. Piccolo, "The Effect of Context-specific versus Nonspecific Subconscious Goals on Employee Performance," *Human Resource Management* 51, no. 4 (2012): 511–23.

itic conduct, with a correspondence between the level of environmental cues and expressed (antisemitic) behaviour, the workplace included. Hence, in times of increased antisemitic expressions (in the media, online messages, incidents), we would anticipate correspondent expressions also in the workplace: social priming and goal priming are actually the same.[91] Significantly, the target population of antisemitism—Jews—may be more inclined to construe events as antisemitic (i.e., they are more sensitive to interpret cues this way) than non-Jews do: Are they "primed" to detect antisemitic behaviour (that may be unintended as such) more easily, or does their sensitivity "prime" an erroneous judgment?[92]

The *Jewish Question* and the Workplace

> [N]otions of Jews as malign financial and criminal geniuses [...] remained a mainstay of antisemitic discourse.[93]

> The world is crawling with anti-semites. A Jew always has to be on guard against deadly enemies.[94]

Since the late eighteenth, early nineteenth century when Jews started to gain emancipation and, in tandem antisemitism as a modern ideology emerged, the issue of how to resolve the "Jewish question" in Europe figured prominently on the continent's civic and political agenda; and since at least Karl Marx's *Zur Judenfrage* (1844) also in the discourse of the social sciences. Jews' civic/political responses: agnosticism and/or assimilationism (suppressing or abandoning one's Jewish identity), Zionism (opting for self-determination and statehood), and cosmopolitanism (a search for universal identity) may have, we suggest, their equivalent in the world of work.

Thus, distancing and detracting from one's Jewish identity would mark assimilationism, whether by change of name, or by prominently celebrating non-Jewish festivals, for example. Entrepreneurship may be construed as a (positive) attempt at self-determination in response to a negative work experience or per-

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91 Cf. J. A. Bargh, "All Aboard! 'Social' and Nonsocial Priming are the Same Thing," *Psychological Inquiry* 32, no. 1 (2021): 29–34.

92 Cf. S. DellaPergola, "Jewish Perceptions of Antisemitism in the European Union, 2018: A New Structural Look," *Analysis of Current Trends in Antisemitism* 40, no. 2 (2019): 1–86.

93 D. Vyleta, *Crime, Jews and News: Vienna, 1895–1914* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2007), 225.

94 E. Canetti, *Auto-Da-Fé*, trans. C. V. Wedgwood (New York: Continuum, 1981), 180.

ceived lack of opportunities.[95] Could cosmopolitanism possibly be traced to exemplary organisational citizenship behaviour, championing corporate social responsibility or rigorous trade union activity? We will not be surprised to learn if the antisemitic representations to these civic/political responses, respectively: the "parvenu Jew," the "pariah Jew," and the "rootless cosmopolitan Jew"[96] have their workplace equivalents too.

Consider the following non-hypothetical scenario.

> At a time of a global viral pandemic that found the world community unprepared, resulting in millions losing their lives and livelihoods—a major upheaval that engulfed all continents: a worldwide rise in antisemitism (incidents, behaviours, beliefs, attitudes) occurs, including a conspiracy theory that blames Jews, for: a) creating and spreading the disease; and b) benefiting from it financially.

> During the pandemic, the tensions between Israel and Hamas, the Palestinian faction that controls the Gaza strip, flare up to a seasonal war, with civilian casualties and damage to personal effects and community infrastructure inflicted by both sides. The Austrian government hoisted the Israeli flag on the roof of its Chancellery in Vienna as a sign of solidarity. In Germany, in an act of solidarity, pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli demonstrations took place in Berlin, Frankfurt, Leipzig and several other cities.

How does a workplace respond? TMT would predict enhanced hostility toward out-group persons, Jews in this instance. Would that hostility manifest in any tangible (and measurable) way?

In an environment saturated with anti-Jewish images (from the TV, social media, and the press) and an organizational culture conducive to anti-Jewish sentiment, a generalized negative feedback loop may be directed against Jewish members of the organization and those believed to be Jewish, GST would predict. Would they feel it? Would non-Jews get what is happening? The former may have a (subconscious) invested interest to see no evil, or on the contrary, may be oversensitive; the latter may not recognize the issue at hand—unaware of their own prejudices "since one simply invents who and what is to be stigmatized as 'Jew' or 'Jewish'."[97]

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95 Cf. L.-P. Dana, "The Origins of Self-Employment in Ethno-cultural Communities: Distinguishing between Orthodox Entrepreneurship and Reactionary Enterprise," *Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences* 14, no. 1 (1997): 52–68.

96 Cf. R. Fine, "On the Contemporary Relevance of Arendt's 'Jewish Writings'," in *Unity and Diversity in Contemporary Antisemitism*, ed. J. G. Campbell and L. D. Klaff (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2019), 219–34.

97 Marin and Bunzl, *Antisemitismus in Österreich*, 187.

Selected Issues and Associated Questions

Negative Symbiosis

> In a letter to Karl Jaspers in 1946, on the occasion of the Nuremberg Trails, Hannah Arendt addressed the basic idea of a "negative symbiosis" of Germans and Jews after Auschwitz [...]. One can do nothing either personally or politically about a guilt that lies beyond crime and an innocence that lies beyond good or virtue [...] For the Germans are burdened with thousands, or ten thousands or hundreds of thousands who can no longer be properly punished within a system of laws; and we Jews are burdened with millions of innocents, because of whom each Jew today looks like innocence personified.[98]

Consider the following imaginary tale.

> Joseph K., a rather ordinary bank clerk in a commercial bank in Munich, Germany, feels unease. He can't quite put his finger on it, but in his quotidian dealings with customers and peers he senses a tension that he did not notice before. Is he imaging things? As it happens, Joseph K. is a Jew, and whilst not wearing his Jewish identity on his sleeve, so to speak, he never made a secret of it either.
>
> Over dinner at home (the pandemic has greatly diminished their social life) the subject of the war in Israel comes up as his wife has relatives there. Joseph K. tries to distract his mind, but the feeling of unease doesn't go away. He spends the night sleepless. The following morning, a colleague at the bank asks him if all is well. He too noticed that Joseph K. isn't his usual self.

Negative symbiosis—that is, a closed feedback loop involving Jews and non-Jews, whereby both sides, for different reasons, share the same source of discomfort, feeding on each other's misery. Jewish apprehension engages non-Jewish resentment, leading both sides to become trapped in habitual (past) perceptions and behaviour—*Huis Clos* indeed. Is there a concrete organizational form to this abstract conceptualization? If so, how can it be de-coupled?

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98 D. Diner, "Negative Symbiosis: Germans and Jews after Auschwitz," in *The Holocaust: Theoretical Readings*, ed. N. Levi and M. Rothberg (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), 425.

False Positives

> The Jew is one whom non-Jews consider as Jewish: it is the gaze of others that makes the Jew, a Jew.[99]

Consider the following imaginative vignette.

> Gregor S. is a travelling salesman in Vorarlberg, Austria.
> Gregor S. isn't Jewish, but since his school days, when he acquired the nickname "Jew," he got used to being mistaken, from time to time, as one.
> Gregor S. is not sure why, since he never met a Jew in his life, so he can't tell whether there is any resemblance.
> Last week one of his customers asked him, with a wry smile on his face, "Do you think it's kosher what Israel is doing to Palestine?" Gregor S. shrugged his shoulders and didn't reply. "It's just one of those things" his friend comforted him, when Gregor S. told him about that exchange.

In the 1960s USA, Quinn et al. report that nearly half of those executives who were inclined to discriminate against Jews agreed with the statement "most of the time you can tell a person is Jewish by his physical appearance."[100] What are the implications for someone in an organization believed to be Jewish when they are not? According to a 2018 CNN poll, two thirds of Germans and Austrians were not aware of ever having met a Jewish person.[101]

Pygmalion Effect

> You [a Jew] had the choice of being counted as insensitive, shy and suffering from feelings of persecution. And even if you managed somehow to conduct yourself so that nothing showed, it was impossible to remain completely untouched.[102]

Consider the following factual case.

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99 According to J.-P. Sartre, who wrote: "The Jew is one whom other men consider a Jew: that is the simple truth from which we must start. In this sense the democrat is right as against the anti-Semite, for it is the anti-Semite who makes the Jew." *Anti-Semite and Jew* (New York: Schocken Books, 1948), 69.
100 Cf. Quinn et al., *The Chosen Few*.
101 Cf. Masters and Mortensen, "A Shadow over Europe."
102 Arthur Schnitzler, *My Youth in Vienna*, quoted by F. Raphael in the Introduction to *Dream Story*, trans. J. M. Q. Davies (London: Penguin Books, 1999), ix.

> Seen by the Christian [midshipmen][103] as a fringe religious group, Jewish midshipmen received multiple comments from the Christian respondents pertaining to acts of intolerance [...] it is interesting that the Christians note the intolerance towards Jews [...] more often than the [Jewish] respondents.[104]

To comprehend the impact a negative or poor self-image may have on a person's view of themselves and on their occupational aspirations, the way it blinds them from facing a (painful) reality, we may need to go back over half a century and consider the status of women in the world of work then. Bem and Bem tell us in a (hyper-realist) *Case Study of a Nonconscious Ideology: Training the Woman to know her Place* what it looks like and feels like at a time of an overwhelming consensus about the place of women in society (homemaker) and at work (minimal engagement, marginal roles):

> The consequence is a non-conscious ideology, a set of beliefs and attitudes which [one] accepts implicitly [...] A society's ability to inculcate this kind of ideology into its citizens is the most subtle and most profound form of social influence. It is also the most difficult kind of social influence to challenge because it remains invisible.[105]

Looking back and realising the long way we have come in Western developed economies as regards a society's view on the place and role of women, may direct us toward possibilities in dealing with other embedded negative beliefs on minority groups, including the most protracted one: Jews.

Research Agenda

We know a fair amount about antisemitism in the public arena; we know less about the theory of antisemitism;[106] we know little about contemporary targets of antisemitism;[107] we know next to nothing about antisemitism in the workplace

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103 Midshipman—officer of the lowest rank in the US Navy.

104 M. B. Krauz, "The Impact of Religiosity on Midshipman Adjustment and Feelings of Acceptance" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 2006), 46.

105 Cf. S. L. Bem and D. J. Bem, "Case Study of a Nonconscious Ideology: Training the Woman to Know Her Place," in *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Human Affairs*, ed. D. J. Bem (Belmont: Brooks/ Cole, 1970), 89.

106 Cf. J. Judaken, "AHR Roundtable Rethinking Anti-Semitism: Introduction," *American Historical Review* 123, no. 4 (2018): 1122–38.

107 Cf. DellaPergola, "Jewish Perceptions."

and in organizations. Therefore, a number of issues rank high on an emerging research agenda to fill this knowledge gap and support action.

Reliable Data

Establishing the extent and depth of antisemitic conduct and its relevance to work and organizations is no simple task. To start with, we don't have reliable information on its prevalence in the general population. Relying on public opinion surveys on such a sensitive topic is problematic, and in the case of Germany and Austria highly questionable, since expressing antisemitic views may not be compatible with formal and informal norms and could be risky.[108] As pointed out by Kovács, in both countries there is a strong incentive not to reveal one's true positions as regards Jews[109]—a so-called *communicative latency.*[110] Hence, in addition to those who express an antisemitic sentiment, at the very least the "no opinion" figures should be viewed with scepticism.[111] It is possible to improve on the standard public opinion survey, to a degree, but it comes at a cost,[112] and alas, there are no shortcuts.

Data on workplace antisemitic issues is glaring in its absence. It is conceivable that the lack of data indicates a non-issue, that is, there is no antisemitism in the workplace worthy of mention. On the other hand, it may be the case that the lack of data is simply the result of not asking the correct questions or in a correct manner; and, we would add, not listening attentively to what is not being said. Both in-depth qualitative enquiries and field experiments are called for.

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108 Cf. H. Beyer and I. Krumpal, "'Aber es gibt keine Antisemiten mehr': Eine experimentelle Studie zur Kommunikationslatenz antisemitischer Einstellungen," *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozial Psycholgie* 62 (2010): 681–705.

109 Cf. A. Kovács, "Public Identity in Defining the Boundaries of Public and Private: The Example of Latent Anti-Semitism," *Social Research* 69 (2002): 179–94.

110 Cf. N. Luhmann, *Soziale Systeme: Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1984).

111 Kovács refers to a 1989 opinion survey in Germany and a 1991 survey in Austria, referencing respectively W. Bergman and R. A. Erb, *Antisemitismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Ergebnisse der empirischen Forschung von 1946–1989* (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1991); and F. A. Karmasin, *Austrian Attitudes towards Jews, Israel and the Holocaust* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1992).

112 For a fine example, see I. Krzemiński, "Polish National anti-Semitism," *Polin* 31 (2019): 512–42.

Mapping Organizational Antisemitism

We have a well-developed set of theories and concepts to map organizational structures, norms and values, and culture.[113] With a specific focus on the issue at hand, one can use them as a starting point and ask questions such as: What does an antisemitic organization look like? Feel like? How shall we categorize an organization's culture as antisemitic? What are the key parameters and how to diagnose them? What is the role of management; or vice versa, how does a non-antisemitic organization that is immune against antisemitism look like and feel like?

On the first set of questions we have the recent case of the British Labour party, which was found to have been antisemitic under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn (2015–2019) in an official enquiry and may serve as an example.[114] There are already a good number of academic and other publications on this case. On the latter, the literature on the healthy workplace, which has had a comeback in recent years, may prove helpful, as well as attempts by various bodies to combat widespread campus antisemitism that may serve as blueprints for other institutions.[115]

Is Antisemitism a Special Case?

How antisemitism compares to Islamophobia, anti-Black racism, and other current anti-minority trends remains unclear, notes Judaken.[116] In organizational contexts, the relative success of Jews, of which we have evidence for the USA and Canada, raises a further interesting question, since discrimination in the workplace on the grounds of religion or race has typically been formulated in terms of denial or restriction of opportunities.[117] Our analysis points toward

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113 Cf. e.g. K. S. Cameron and R. E. Quinn, *Diagnosing and Changing Organizational Culture: Based on the Competing Values Framework* (San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons, 2011).

114 Cf. "Investigation into Antisemitism in the Labour Party," Equality and Human Rights Commission, issued October 29, 2020, accessed May 23, 2021, https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/publication-download/investigation-antisemitism-labour-party.

115 Cf. L. D. Klaff, "Antisemitism on Campus: A New Look at Legal Interventions," *Journal for the Study of Antisemitism* 2, no. 2 (2010): 303–21; and E. G. Pollack, *Antisemitism on the Campus: Past and Present* (Brighton: Academic Studies Press, 2010).

116 Cf. Judaken, "AHR Roundtable."

117 Cf. e.g. K. A. Phipps, "The Limitations of Accommodation: The Changing Legal Context of Religion at Work in the United States," *Journal of Management, Spirituality & Religion* 16, no. 4 (2019): 339–47.

more subtle forms of discrimination, the implications and consequences of which are yet to be established; thus calling for an examination of the workplace in the widest terms.[118]

Final Note

The launching pad for this discourse has been the rising tide of antisemitism in our day and age. Our aim is to bring to the foreground its possible configurations in organizational life. Given the paucity of empirical data, the absence of theoretical frames and lack of know-how on grounded responses, we are necessarily at the very beginning of a scholarly voyage. Still, the journey has started.

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118 Cf. C. Mainemelis and Y. Altman, "Work and Play: New Twists on an Old Relationship," *Journal of Organizational Change Management* 23 (2010): 4–9.

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Michel Gad Wolkowicz

The Transmission of Hatred and the Hatred of Transmission: The Psychopathology of a Murder and an Anatomy of a Silence. The Nobody's Name: A Contemporary Symptom

> Was Du ererbt von Deinen Vätern hast, / Erwirb es, um es zu besitzen.
> J. W. von Goethe, *Faust I.*

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to address the psychopathology of antisemitism, anti-Jewish aggressions, and more specifically of present-day denials of the Real, a version of "negationism" or "denialism," which has always been consubstantial with it.

As a starting point, I will use two particularly savage murders, which were committed in France ten years apart (fifteen targeted attacks having taken place in the meantime). In 2007, a young man named Ilan Halimi, precariously employed as a sales assistant in a cell phone shop, was kidnapped as a Jew (hence supposedly likely to raise a huge ransom). He was tortured for twenty-four days and finally murdered, the persistent denial of the antisemitic nature of the act tragically hampering the conduct of the investigation. In May 2017, a sixty-seven-year-old Jewish woman employed at a kindergarten and living in a low-income Paris neighborhood was tortured for a whole night in her home by a twenty-seven-year-old man whose Muslim family, including himself, had been insulting and threatening her for months. She was finally murdered and thrown out of a window. Her name was Sarah Halimi. The anatomy of the act itself, as well as the resounding silencing of its antisemitic nature by intellectuals, politicians, and the media can truly be interpreted as a contemporary symptom.

I will be concerned here with exploring the mass-psychology characterizing antisemitism, together with the genealogy of the culture underlying it, which presents itself as a meeting point for Christian radicalism, the ultra-left, an expression of the return of a Paulinian repressed, and Islamic totalitarianism.

The parasemitic anti-Zionist obsession combined with an ideological desubstantialization of reality leads to a vicarious mob murder, whether its form be the so-called "lone wolf" kind or that of collective action. What operates in all cases

is a compulsion to repeat and a perverse purifying all-absolving narcissistic guilt, the [resulting?] violence and destruction being helped by the "failures" of national, republican, and international authorities supposedly acting as guarantors for the symbolic order, as well as those of eroded and perverted structuring landmarks (the law, history, civilizing prohibitions and commandments).

In my view, Judeophobia can be seen as the expression of projections activated by a mortified sense of self, an identity-based hatred attempting to dissolve an underlying unconscious hatred by resorting to an object likely to legitimize it. This is achieved by attributing to the Jewish "Other" a power of "being" that can only be conceived metonymically in terms of "having," an entanglement of archaic envy, mimetic identification, and narcissistic omnipotence, together with a fantasy of substitution. A delirious conception of filiation or self-generation, the rejection of all indebtedness, of sexual and generational difference, of alterity and narcissistic incompleteness, a quest for immediate and limitless enjoyment, an investment of totality, possibly through destructiveness—all of this implies a rejection of the ethics of truth, of spiritual elevation, of the building-up of subjectivity, of a singularity conceived as a universal and of a responsible freedom. Simultaneously, it counter-invests transmission as a process, the transmission of transmission as an introduction to oedipal competition, the unknown, the field of fantasy and transference, the in-between space of ambivalence and indefinite thought.

These questions will finally serve as an introduction to another question: that of the building of a people.

Introduction: Making an Event of the Tragedy: Restoring a Face to Sarah Halimi

The tragedy of Sarah Halimi's murder took place in spring 2017 and was immensely traumatic for the [French?] Jewish community, not only on account of the particularly savage and horrifying character of the act, but also—beyond the horror, and with equal significance—because of its treatment as insignificant by the media sphere as well as by politicians and intellectuals. Jews thus found themselves once again excluded from the inter-subjective sphere, at least until President Emmanuel Macron declared, in his speech commemorating the 1942 "Vel d'Hiv Roundup" of Paris Jews by French police prior to their deportation to the death camps, that he had given orders for justice to shed full light on the affair.

A Clinical Study of Contemporary Reality

A clinical study of contemporary reality cannot but perceive a paradigmatic symptom in the fact that the barbaric murder of Sarah Halimi in Paris and the ensuing resounding silence on the part of the prevailing "doxa" took place ten years after the murder of Ilan Halimi, appearing thus as a hallucinatory compulsion to repeat the desubstantializing denial of reality,[1] of the antisemitic nature of Islamist crime, and of the group psychopathology (with culture here playing the part of a collective psyche), which binds, inhabits, and activates desingularized and atomized individuals, as Freud has demonstrated in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*.[2] This significant and genuine symptom can be seen as a Pavlovian reproduction.

How is it that no lesson was learnt from the police mistakes, constant bungling during the twenty-four-day abduction of Ilan Halimi, a young man kidnapped, tortured, and murdered in 2006 because he was a Jew, by the self-named "Gang of Barbarians." Ten years and a great many deaths later, ten years later, then, from one Halimi to another, from Ilan to Sarah, both savagely tortured, murdered, like the children in Toulouse killed in cold blood in front of their Jew-

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1 Cf. M. G. Wolkowicz, ed., *Le sujet face au réel, et dans la transmission* (Paris: In Press, 2017).
2 Cf. S. Freud, *Group Psychology and The Analysis of The Ego*, in vol. 18 of *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. J. Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-analysis, 1955).

ish school, or like children in Israel: this is almost a textbook case for those who want to scrutinize the collective unconscious and its pathologies.

Sarah Halimi, too, had been subjected to antisemitic abuse on the part of the murderer's family, and her own children had had the same experience as victims and witnesses. Having first entered Sarah's next-door neighbors' apartment, the murderer climbed into her flat, where she lived alone, via the balcony and started beating her to death with horrendous, relentless savagery, shouting insults, and reciting suras from the Qur'an all the while. All this was heard and recorded by Sarah's neighbors, together with her desperate cries for help and screams of pain. Her face and body broken in twenty places, the dying woman was finally thrown out of a third-floor window, her corpse lying on the ground like something left over, a scrap, a bag, a piece of rubbish, a *stück*, a *schmatteh*. Incredibly enough, all this took place without any intervention from the three police officers who had been present in the building since four o'clock, and who had been called by the neighbors locked up by the murderer. While he was slaughtering her, Sarah's torturer kept calling her "Satan" in Arabic. In the end, having "finished off" his victim under the nose of the police, the murderer returned via the neighbors' apartment, still praying aloud, the human sacrifice over, and was peacefully arrested by the thirty or so police officers then present on the spot, twenty-seven of whom were members of a heavily armed elite squad sent as reinforcements. For reasons which have remained obscure to this day, none of them had intervened while the old woman was being tortured to death. The arrest was made at half past five in the morning. The man did not put up any resistance. As for Sarah, she was lying dead on the pavement.

Several dozens of neighbors never made a move. The national media were informed but did not investigate, and the murder was passed over in silence. Her name was Sarah—Sarah Halimi.

This atrocious scene did not take place in 1942, before or after the Vel'd'Hiv Roundup, but during the night from April 3 to April 4, 2017, to cries of "Allahu Akbar" located in a small apartment in a low-income block of flats. A white march organized the next Sunday in Belleville to honor her memory came up against shouts like "Death to Jews!" and "We've got our kalash!" on the part of youngsters from the neighboring housing estates. Without any loss of time, the public prosecutor hastened to explain that one would have to wait for the results of the enquiry before the murder could be characterized. Who knows? In case the savage murder of an old Jewish woman by a sturdy young Islamist with a long criminal record might fall within the category of neighborhood quarrels. Incidentally, the murderer, Kobili Traoré, of Malian origin, used to terrorize his victim and repeatedly called her a "dirty Jew."

A Deathly Silence

"We are at war," Prime Minister Manuel Valls declared on January 13, 2015, so that Muslims may no longer "be ashamed" and "any Jews [...] be afraid any more."[3] A strange symmetry and a strange assessment in a country in which it has once again become possible to murder Jews without our compatriots being overly moved. A mere news item? Not even that. Antisemitism has an extraordinary capacity for adaptation; yesterday it was denouncing an excess of Jewish existence—Jews having too much, being too many, doing too much, just as Israel's defensive actions are always "disproportionate" and its name, too, is one too many; today the same applies to the negative hallucination turning Jews into mere ghosts. Bodies are run over on Nice's Promenade des Anglais and the catchphrase "living together [in harmony]" is flung over them like a shroud. Dozens of young people are shot down by Kalashnikovs at the Bataclan concert hall and the next morning in every trendy café glasses are clinked as a toast to "living together." Yet there are districts in France that the Jews have had to leave, because their kippas made them easy targets for aggression. Others, non-Jews, have followed suit. Only the poorest have remained. They cannot afford to go anywhere else and have no choice but to submit to "living together."[4] Thus not a word was said during the French presidential election campaign, and most media remained silent. Just as the Nice mass murderer, Belleville's Jihadist was deemed "insane."

This Kind of Denial[5] Has already Killed in France

Fifty-eight percent of the attacks carried out in France are directed against Jews, who represent 0.7% of the population. This should never be tolerated in a healthy democracy, and as everyone knows any resurgence of antisemitism has always been a sure touchstone for a society's moral and political state of

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3 Cf. "Tribute to the Victims of the Attacks: Speech by M. Manuel Valls, Prime Minister, in the National Assembly," issued January 13, 2015, accessed January 8, 2021, https://www.gouverne ment.fr/en/tribute-to-the-victims-of-the-attacks.

4 P. Bruckner, "L'inversion de la dette. Antisémitisme et islamophobia," in *Présence de la Shoah et d'Israël dans la pensée contemporaine: Nom sacré / Nom maudit*, ed. M. G. Wolkowicz (Paris: In Press, 2014), 97.

5 Cf. S. Freud, *The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis*, in vol. 19 of *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. J. Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-analysis, 1961).

health. Yet the authorized hatred and the uninhibited aggressions of some, together with the deliberate blindness and approval of others, in silence or in joy, stare us in the face. And last but not least, there is the tragic "beautiful" indifference of the vast mainstream indifference.

This event—an antisemitic murder coupled with a denial of its antisemitic character—caused a real trauma in the French Jewish community, since it combined the obliteration of the victim's Jewishness with the automatic dismissal of the murderer's responsibility—the criminal being promptly declared "mentally ill" to prevent any link being established between this attack and terrorism, between terrorism and the war that is being waged against us, between Jihad and Islamism (an impressive number of children in France have been given the first name "Jihad" in the last few years), between Islamism and Islam, and lastly between the Palestinian genocidal terrorism against Israel and the Israelis, and the murderous terrorism in Europe. Equally significant was the fact that the tragedy of this particularly brutal and barbaric murder had been predictable and inscribed itself in a long list of similar acts eliciting little response from the authorities, a series of attacks and mass murders directed against the population with the aim of terrorizing people and deterring them from living and thinking freely but also of controlling the whole Muslim population as well as the "no-rights zones" (i.e., no *Republican* rights zones) actually ruled by the Muslim (Sharia) law or by that of the underworld.[6] The trauma was thus all the more violent as it brought to naught the idea of a democratically shared common territory: once again Jews found themselves isolated from the rest of society and delivered into the hands of murderers. Hence the community's need to honor the victim's memory but also to come together and try to understand.

Equally traumatic was the failure of authorities who were supposed to uphold the symbolic order. The trauma materialized a hallucinatory situation combining elements that I have already mentioned, namely the failure of all our republican institutions. Now it has become obvious that whenever national and international authorities give up on their functions[7] and on the historical, legal, and anthropological landmarks—which articulate the lives of people as parts of a collective body, ensuring another mode of "living together," namely one which could be something more than an empty shell, an exorcist slogan, a paradigmatic instance of the desubstantializing of present reality on the part of right-thinking groups, something different from the "living together" whose

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6 Cf. G. Bensoussan, ed., *Une France soumise: les voix du refus* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2017).
7 Cf. M. G. Wolkowicz, ed., *États du Symbolique: Depuis L'Homme Moïse et la religion monothéiste, en passant par Freud, Rothko, Appelfeld… Droit, Loi, Psychanalyse* (Paris: In Press, 2014).

very expression suppresses the "third party" constitutive of "life in society," and might well turn out to mean "living together minus One" (that is, minus the Jew). Whenever those authorities give up on the ethics of truth, the demand for intellectual seriousness and responsible thought and action, one then falls into the raw Real and into foreclosure: denials are objectified, feelings of omnipotence spread, transgressions are rationalized, collective deliriums of filiation and self-generation get legitimized, all of which can only result in an explosion of acts of destruction and finally self-destruction. Thus, in the case of Sarah Halimi's murder, both police and the law gave in: the judge hastened to send the murderer to hospital, on the grounds that he did not have the mental ability to be interrogated; the very same justice had prosecuted Pascal Bruckner and later Georges Bensoussan for incitement to racial hatred, "Islamophobia" and "essentialization," but it instantly brushed aside the antisemitic motivation, be it only as an aggravating circumstance, in spite of the ritualized gesturing and chanting accompanying the extermination. The same French justice might perhaps have condemned Goebbels to ten years' imprisonment for criminal association in relation to a terrorist undertaking, as has just been the case with murderer Merah's elder brother and mentor. Similarly the media failed by not even reporting the murder as a news item. The cover-up of this cruel and significant crime by the press was remarkable. As George Steiner wrote about Shoah: "Words fail *us*, as we failed *them*."[8] This, to me, is the main point: if terror paralyzes thought, so does intellectual terrorism, and that dies hard. Press manipulation appears as one of the consequences of ideological pathologies. Misinformation by the media operates via semantic distortions, the fabrication of new mythologies, mirror reversals and role exchanges, tell-tale signs of pleasure and omnipotence as one comes to perceive the world exactly as one has hallucinated it, under one's control and in perfect conformity with one's representations: lazy thinking, a willed powerlessness (Nietzsche), a sense of narcissistic fullness as one swims with the compassionate tide while basking in self-aggrandizing projections as the very embodiment of rebellion, insubordination and indignation, substituting the idea for the truth in the name of good and universality. Hallucination as a product of conformity. All ideological, totalitarian languages (V. K. Klemperer, G.-A. Goldschmidt) begin by depriving language itself of its own memory, the narcissistic rule of ideology annihilating the locus of language, its political, neighborly features.

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8 G. Steiner, "The Long Life of Metaphor," *Encounter* (1987): 56.

The Mass Murder of a People by Individuals in Crowd Formation

This was what caused so much distress and anger: the compulsion to repeat as evidenced by the crime and the identical denial of Islamist antisemitism[9] participated in that feeling, as they turned the name Halimi into nobody's name, both victims having their lives taken away and their deaths obliterated, dissolved in senselessness and insanity, their identities massified; murdered for what they were, they were nonetheless eliminated as persons, since the genocidal intention was foreclosed. The word terrorism is used as a veil to avoid naming the crux of the matter, which is theological. "How can one persist in using only the word 'terrorist' to designate Islamist killers?" Were the Nazi killers mere "murderers" or "criminals," or were they murderers *because* they were Nazis? To evade the word "Islamist" is a way of relegating the killer's gesture to the category of a sensational news item. Not to do so amounts to integrating the guilt attending accusations of islamophobia, a process that is essential to the discursive strategy of Islamism. This strategy obeys a logic consisting in discrediting criticism. Why should it be racist to look closely into the Islamic matrix of Islamism? What if the persistent reduction of these crimes to psychiatric cases finally acted as a kind of Freudian slip, in that it points out the pathological dimension constitutive of ideology and its effects on individuals—psychically "en masse" whether they stand alone or in a crowd—while consciously aiming at dissociating the individual from the ideological group? Unless we are simply facing a misunderstanding of the workings of group psychology, group contamination, and hysterical-paranoia identification in a crowd. There lies the (oh so terribly disquieting) banality of the mechanical acting out process. The perversion of language takes on a great variety of forms. How can one go on calling human bombs "suicide attacks"? What is the suicidal proportion in the act of a man who blows himself up in the midst of innocent civilians in order to make a maximum number of victims? In its obsessive concern with social causes, the compassionate ideology will never understand anything about Islamist terrorism so long as it continues to read it in terms of its own social, political, and psychological categories.

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9 Cf. J. Tarnero, ""Le déni du réel ou le négationnisme du temps présent," in *Le sujet face au réel, et dans la transmission*, ed. M. G. Wolkowicz (Paris: In Press, 2017), 133.

The Anatomy of a Silence: A Ban on Thinking

In immediate reaction, the same injunctions are brandished: "no amalgamation," "down with Islamophobia"; serving as exorcist slogans, these are used to induce "a ban on thinking."[10] One must mask the fact that Islam might be directly or indirectly related to violence, lest this give a jolt to the sacrosanct creed of "living together," fatal though this creed often turns out to be. And the fact that the price for it is paid by Jews is easily brushed aside, as experts after experts come forward to explain that "the first victims of terrorism are at bottom Muslims, the vast majority of moderate Muslims." Subjects are effaced, responsibilities dissolved, all sense of reality is obscured. The media orchestrate the propagation of the pleasures derived from repentance, absolution, and a perverse narcissistic guilt, the quest for love and self-sacrifice, which means above all the sacrifice of Jews to wolves. To think that the murderer is unbalanced, psychotic, or irresponsible ought to be regarded as more disquieting than comforting, and should seriously question the omnipresent power of the ideology influencing, contaminating and arming these atomized or agglutinated individuals. As a matter of fact the lone wolves entered Paris in July 2015, during an afternoon marked by a pro-Palestinian Islamo-leftist-Nazi demonstration comprising supporters of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Palestinian Fatah, the Muslim Brotherhood, members of the ultra-left, elected representatives of the Greens, and far-right activists. As the march degenerated, a howling crowd rushed toward two near-by synagogues (in the rue des Tournelles and rue de la Roquette) intent on destruction—a pogrom-like violence reminiscent of what took place in Sarcelles, in Europe before World War II, as well as in Arab countries, sending 900,000 Jews into exile. From lone wolves to hordes of wolves.

> Some people imagine that they are more objective because
> they embrace the subjectivity of others.
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> Eliana Amado Lévy-Valensi

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10 Even if ten Islamist terrorist attacks were to happen a day, the media coverage would still be unchanged. The same questions would be asked again and again: did the terrorist attack have any connection with the Islamist State? What could account for an ordinary citizen, notwithstanding some criminal acts, to take this action? Are the terrorists "wretched loners" resorting to "low cost terrorism," a new concept which appeared after the Barcelona attack in the summer of 2017? Have they become more radicalized and how? *Daesch* terrorist ideology is nevertheless blamed for urging Muslims to commit barbaric crime, following a contagious momentum typical of crowd psychology, dramatically featuring the Arab crowd. Pacifist and absolving rituals display candles and teddy bears expressing forgiveness: "they won't have my hatred," "we'll go on sitting outside cafés," "why don't they love us ?"

"Hallucinatory" is indeed an Apt Description of the Name Halimi, Turned into Nobody's Name

By systematically reducing such ritualized genocidal murders to "border-line" acts, one exonerates the criminals from any affiliation to a human group and any genealogy of thought, as though they had lost their minds, committing senseless (?) acts; turning these crimes into non-events instead of seeing them as acting out an introjected discourse of which the subject himself as the object (?) contributes to turning the repetition of the name Halimi into a travesty of belonging, the simulacrum of a name, an Islamo-Nazi caricature of Jewish homonymy, a word exterminating language and its memory, exterminating the singularizing, historicizing, and subjectivizing distinctiveness of Jewish names: the name Halimi, like the Sarahs and Israels endlessly inscribed on the suitcases taken from deported Jews on their arrival in the Nazi extermination camps as shown in Claude Lanzmann's movie *Shoah*,[11] became nobody's name. The Nazi parody of the Jewish name has been analyzed by Éric Marty. Negationism and revisionism are consubstantial with antisemitism and its genocidal project, murder.[12] The Nazi extermination of the Jews also appears through the parodic homonymy whose principle is an extension of the mimetic principle to the point where mimetism itself becomes an extermination, an extenuation of all names. This parody of the principle of belonging appears as a morbid inversion, since the systematic use of "Israel" and "Sarah" actually turns them into synonyms for "nobody"; the Nazi operation on the names literally reverses the Jewish endeavor, which implies that the sacrificial process, to which we bear witness, is achieved through an effacing of subjectivity. Beyond the psychic and intellectual archaism of Jew-hatred, of this murderous drive acted upon in an increasingly mimetic and banal manner, in this unconscious generic reduplication of the name Halimi, from Ilan to Sarah, both tortured, savagely slaughtered, the bodies dumped by the side of railroad tracks or thrown out of the window like mere rags, *schmattes*, after having explicitly been subjected to stereotyped anti-Jewish ideological discourse without any place, any meaning being ascribed to them.

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11 Cf. É. Marty, ""L'Échange inégal – Sur Guilad Shalit," in *États du Symbolique: Depuis L'Homme Moïse et la religion monothéiste, en passant par Freud, Rothko, Appelfeld... Droit, Loi, Psychanalyse*, ed. M. G. Wolkowicz (Paris: In Press, 2014), 83.
12 Cf. C. Lanzmann, *Shoah*, film, 9:00:00 (New Yorker Films, 1985), and the discussion by É. Marty, "'Shoah': Généalogie d'un nom, histoire d'une negation," in *Présence de la Shoah et d'Israël dans la pensée contemporaine: Nom sacré / Nom maudit*, ed. M. G. Wolkowicz (Paris: In Press, 2014), 107–22.

All of a sudden names, instead of heralding a presence, produce nothing but absence and become the very names of extermination. Destruction ensures that no name can name any longer. The denial of the antisemitic act implies the obliteration of Jews in their factual, existential legitimacy, both singular and collective, but also the parallel obsession of their fantasized omnipresence, parasemitism.

"The final solution" was indeed what European culture gave birth to, as the end-product of a genealogy of thought and of a desire to destroy symbolic landmarks—consubstantial as these are to the question of being, to being as question. The paradigm of dehumanizing systems involves the use of words that enact a perpetual lie, the un-naming of people. "The final solution," the radical nature of mass murder implied that both words and the dead could never be sufficiently extinct, hence the absence of gravesites testifying to the survival of a human being in another human being. Language itself, which finds itself affected, as if it were dispossessed of its own memory and thus excluded from the *epos* of what is memorable. No word in the language escaped the perverse operation of lies. This was the core of the dehumanizing process, the loss of all likeness, of any possibility of similarity in difference. What we call "human" depends on the recognition of appearances making it possible to think in terms of a resemblance. In the experience of extermination humanity was doomed to dissimilarity. The undoing of a human[13] means that appearances that used to permit recognition are undone. As Jean Améry put it, "Men were dying everywhere but the figure of death had vanished."[14]

"Though this Be Madness, Yet There is Method in It"[15]

The death camp at Belzec illustrated from the very beginning the Nazi determination to erase all traces of the destruction of the European Jews:[16] bodies, names, and places had to be obliterated. Negationism was not solely a consequence of the crime, or even conditioned by fear of a possible judgement but was fundamentally its ultimate purpose. It did not only concern the reality and planned character of extermination, but it lay at the very basis of the

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13 Cf. P. Levi, *If this was a Man*, trans. S. Woolf (London: Orion, 1959).

14 J. Améry, *Par-delà le crime et le châtiment: Essai pour surmonter l'insurmontable* (Arles: Actes Sud, 1995), quoted in *Présence de la Shoah et d'Israël dans la pensée contemporaine: Nom sacré / Nom maudit*, ed. M. G. Wolkowicz (Paris: In Press, 2014), 14. Translation by the author of this article.

15 W. Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, II, 2.

16 Cf. R. Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1961).

Nazis' delirious concerning origins and filiation. Obliterating the traces of the mass murder and its reality meant obliterating the Jews, effacing the very existence of the Jewish people from the history of humankind, annihilating any priority.[17] Nothing short of this obliteration could realize the Nazi fantasy of embodying origin to all eternity, which entailed the supersession of the envied chosen people in order to come into possession of the symbolic treasure, the imaginary fullness of "being" only conceivable metonymically, in terms of "having." The same goes for Islamism, the politico-religious doctrine of Islam, which denies the historicity of the present order of things and refuses any event which doesn't fit the perfect reproduction of the same, an established narcissistic filiation, an identical transmission running counter to the idea of a people, whose legislator would stand as a guarantor for an unconscious whose law is supported. To graft itself onto this people, the Jewish people, onto the existing other, negated in its Jewishness as well as in its own infinite otherness, to spread the message while crushing the people appropriating the Jewish signifier in order to expel the Jew from the locus of his being, to place him essentially "outside the world" implies a disappearance; only thus will substitution be made possible; hence the necessity for extermination, the obliteration of all traces of the crime, of the other people's existence and of one's indebtedness. A reliable inter-subjective space is necessary for each and every one to feel part of the same species, the same humanity, part of a common world where one may have differences of opinion, come into conflict, and recognize the other in one's opponents, failing which one falls into the real and radical violence, archaic forms of destruction and self-destruction. It is human as bearing the question of existence, of the bonds uniting language, sexuality and the law which was exterminated. Indeed the collapse of the symbolic heralds the Real, which has to be put into words so that one may hope to be free from deadly drives and the compulsion to repeat.

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17 Cf. M. G. Wolkowicz, *Les Figures de la cruauté, entre civilisation et barbarie* (Paris: In Press, 2016).

The Psychopathology of Anti-Judaism: The Transmission of Hatred and the Hatred of Transmission

A Truly Significant Symptom, in That it Was the Product of Repetition

As his neighbor was a Jewish woman, the murderer projected onto her all the introjected stereotypes of the discourse and representations prevailing in his cultural environment, owing to which he could believe without any ambiguity or qualm of thought that she was in possession of all, either personally or through the solidarity of her community—all the power of being, of possessing the all, which prevented *him* from being and which was the very source of his own essential deficiencies. Which raises questions concerning both thought and action. What exactly is an antisemitic act? What is a subject? How does a subject construct itself as a political, collective subject? How does his relationship with reality, a moral conscience, get constructed? Acting out takes place when an individual has become an object but does not know what he is the object of, what he is activated by. He then acts as the object of a discourse that circulates in society, just like that, and that drives him to act without his having to refer to it, a dominant discourse that acts through him or makes him act (out); he may occasionally refer to it, but only as an after-effect; while he is acting he is the embodiment of a collective, latent discourse, which is not even explicit, nor is it only explicit in some areas of the collective space.[18] "Where I am the object (of a discourse), I do not think," such is Jean-Pierre Winter's definition of the acting out. But acts of this kind are not insane, or exclusively insane, gestures; they are the products of another mental and cultural world.

The function of psychiatric experts is to assess the mental state of a criminal at the time the act was committed and consequently his penal responsibility. A particularly competent expert, Dr. Daniel Zagury, who was commissioned to examine Sarah Halimi's killer, concluded on an acutely delirious act, not without mentioning the presence of an antisemitic substratum. From a different angle I will submit that this act can be understood as a manifestation, conscious or unconscious, in the dynamics of a psychopathological structure in which antisemitic hatred is a symptom borne and transmitted by an introjected collective psy-

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[18] Cf. J.-P. Winter, ""Antijudaïsme et barbarie," in *Le sujet face au réel, et dans la transmission*, ed. M. G. Wolkowicz (Paris: In Press, 2017), 649.

che that is its real basis. Everywhere the same ideology, everywhere the same barbarity. All totalitarianisms have antisemitism in common. As if terrorists were not all, and always, psychopaths. As if the Nazi thugs of the 1920s and 1930s, Hitler's storm-troopers chasing their enemies and the SS ruffians in charge of the ideological instruction of the German masses had ever been anything else than more or less high-ranking psychopathic brutes. The question of the "lone wolf" pertains to the uberisation of a small-time terrorism, but one that is psychically en masse. Our society is discovering today that it must once again fight the fanaticized mortal enemies of liberal modernity, in whom one sees a meeting point between pathology—the megalomaniac fascination exerted by violence and the attractions of terrorism—and an ideology in which the pathology itself originates; these people place themselves above or outside all the prohibitions at the basis of civilization. What if Islamism were the expression of the same collective delirium of filiation, of an archaic envy, an ego splitting and a massive, obsessive projection of a shame attempting to dissolve itself in a form of hatred seeking to legitimize itself by finding a projectively persecuting, omnipotent and omnipresent object, a perverse-apathetic mass paranoia?

The Man Moses and the Monotheistic Religion: Freud simultaneously Interrogates the "Character" of a People and what Predisposes the Other to Antisemitic Hatred, Characterized by a Hatred of the Name

Today the theory of substitution, part of a trilogy comprising a theology of contempt and a strategy of defilement, also operates by proxy, as Europeans have endowed another people with symbolic attributes, substituting it for the Jewish people and Israel: indeed the "Palestinian people" has now become the new people, both relic and fetish, established as *the* original people.[19]

An equally staggering fact is the coincidence of the elaborate denial of reality and meaning where anti-Jewish terrorism is concerned, and the posturing and

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[19] What is at stake to ensure the present and out of desire and mimetic identification, is the theft of history, ancestors, signifiers, of what would constitute a whole held only by the People of Israel, which all Jews embody and have within themselves, and which would secure an existential and identity fulfilment, being almighty in its absolute and diabolic knowledge, requiring so as to make it one's own and keep alive the fantasy of self-begetting and self-essentializing, to obliterate it in order to take its place and to wipe it out from history, which will be hardly achieved without perpetrating endless destructions—and self-destruction. Such a human group will never become a people.

resolutions of international institutions such as UNO and UNESCO—in which history gets voted upon by solid majorities and power politics instead of being studied and taught, just as right is the result of blackmail rather than a reference to the law. In this way, all extant Jewishness vanishes as the Jewish Name is dissolved and the history of the Jewish people is negated simultaneously with its links with its place, language, signifiers, figures and names, its historical, spiritual and psychic locus, its presence and constructions, both visible and invisible, as Freud has demonstrated when assessing the Jewish contribution to the foundations of civilization (precisely with a law at the center and through specific modes of identification and transmission),[20] and subsequently to the cultures of the various countries in which Jews had been accepted.

The Invention of the Jewish People, far from Being a Proof of (its) Non-existence, definitely Testifies to the Radical Singularity of its own Existence

How may one conceive today what it is precisely that knots people together into a people, and what is it that makes a group regress to a mob-like state? How might one define the internal links of a people, its common fund, its cultural superego, and its historical truth?

Should this be conceived in terms of the question of the father and of transmission as an endless questioning, or conversely as a quest for immediate perception and satisfaction, for compulsive, boundless enjoyment?

What kind of signifying articulation can be sought between the individual and the community, between the community and the human species, what kind of identification can one opt for: one conceived as a form of internalizing process refusing idolization and constantly open to conflict, an identity forever in the process of becoming, always under construction as a plurality, as multiple possibilities of identity? Or one conceived as a cannibalistic incorporation, in this case a mimetic identity, a mortified identity seeking an embodiment in hatred?

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20 All that would be needed, according to our official Pol Pot supporter, the philosopher Alain Badiou, is to dilute the noun "Jew" into the mythic universality of the generic, the unspecified, the conflation of all distinctions to solve the Jewish question and antisemitism, the soft final solution consisting in dilution of the noun "Jew."

A people builds itself up by transferring on transmission,[21] the transmission of transmission that enables the younger generations to become part of it by assuming a mutual transmission, the possibility thus opened to acquire and transform their heritage, to question it, and to recreate it before transmission.

Any living identity is an in-between. What matters therefore is to trace the genealogies of thought, and to examine the reasons why and the modes in which a culture may produce in the course of its history a moment of acute strain, a regression toward a mob-like state in which "progress can ally itself with barbarity."

Freud has shown that a people can be analyzed just as individuals can. To him violence has to do with an impossible mourning process on the part of the masses. In *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, Freud asks himself the following question: how is it that a mass of people "acquires the capacity to influence the psychic life of the individual so decisively?" And what does this psychic alteration consist in?

In what ways does the psychic agglutination of individuals endow a dominant totalitarian ideology with the fullness of a collective narcissism so that each separate individual becomes mimetically identified through the idealization of a leader or of a totalizing cause, collective submission and idealization then coinciding with the community's compulsion to project onto a common scapegoat (whether internal or external) an eternal guilt and a full responsibility for every deficiency, failure, and frustration?

The enigmatic phenomenon of hypnosis[22] brings to mind this image of a state in which the mass-ego appears as self-fascinated by its own non-fragmentable totality, sunk in blindness or sleep: "I am all in each," an individual caught in the crowd's group-narcissism and lack of differentiation as well as in love for one's leader and brothers. Being-in a multitude induces a state in which one can see and listen without hearing. All personal initiative is cancelled: "the hypnotist has taken the place of the ego-ideal (…) the hypnotic relation is the devotion of someone in love to an unlimited degree but with sexual satisfaction excluded." But as a matter of the fact that "precisely those sexual impulses that are inhibited in their aims which achieve such lasting ties between people"[23] as eroticized violence in conjunction with the narcissistic passion for power contributes to turning the death instinct into a destructive drive. Whatever the slogan they

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21 Cf. J.-P. Winter, *Transmettre (ou pas)* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2012).

22 F. Pierre, ""Hypnose, transfert et suggestion: Contribution à une métapsychologie du transfert et du contre-transfert," in *Crise et contre-transfert* (Paris: PUF, 1992), 97.

23 Freud, *Group Psychology*, 115.

chant, the masses stage a cohesive and resolutive globalization of the world, through stereotypes and mimetic thinking (faith in this instance being on the side of submission). Could the fascist masses' need for fascination be related to such a death drive, an attraction toward murder and destruction? Freud tends to view things this way when he says that "man is basically a horde animal, an individual creature in a horde led by a chief."[24] In a crowd heterogeneity yields to homogeneity, the singular makes way for the same. As part of a crowd the subject experiences a sense of power that can lift the repression of drives that he might not have obeyed otherwise.[25] This is where, as Freud sees it, the subject's responsibility comes into question.

The mythical universality, the overwhelming mother figure, and the fraternal terrorist mass constantly work toward a desubstantializing of reality, by confusing the human, the crowd and the divine; meanwhile the project is indeed the wiping out of the symbolic order, "the human no-condition" as Emmanuel Levinas[26] called it, against "the ethical obligation" in which the rules of speech are articulated, and in which one recognizes Freud's Oedipus complex limiting pleasure by the prohibition of incest and murder and cutting into the narcissistic omnipotence of the Other—wounding thereby that of the subject.[27] And when the tyrannical paternal imago, a caricature masking an archaic all-powerful undifferentiated maternal figure, cracks up and crumbles, then the time is ripe for the fratricide that the homosexual coalition against the so-called Satan tried to avoid.

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24 Ibid., 121.

25 Cf. G. Le Bon, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* (Auckland: The Floating Press, 2009).

26 Cf. E. Lévinas, *Totalité et Infini: Essai sur l'extériorité* (Paris: Hachette, 1991).

27 Men substitute their ideal ego to this common object and identify to each other. The ideological discourse held by the leader, or its equivalent, directly reaches the listeners' unconscious, which doesn't acknowledge the process of negation or contradiction and which is beyond any form of temporality or space and in the end anything is possible. It is a discourse about love and the conflation of differentiations, about the impossible, to "little men" (W. Reich). At last a bright future to come (the 1,000 years of the Third Reich and paradise with 1,000 virgins). Such a discourse promises redemption to all and the possibility for individuals to act out their destructive impulses related to narcissist and supreme pleasure against the group who has led them to this state. Then collectiveness changes into an obscure mass and individuality into inconsistent particles seeing bondage in the quest of the self towards the ideal. The foreclosure of the name of the father, the disqualified fathers, worth noticing in criminals' and terrorists' families, the apparently omnipresent mother is bound to go toward spurious fathers—dictators, fanatic imams, asking for human sacrifices, for a fundamentalist cause, consubstantial to the society of brothers of the primitive horde, and is actually often related to brotherly configurations, carrying weapons and embodied by "martyrs" (e.g., the Muslim Brothers, the Coulibaly brothers, or the Mehra brothers).

What is it that turns men into warriors or murderers? What is it that turns people into a group or a mass? *Massenpsychologie* is never far from *Hassenpsychologie*, which is often part of it. The transmission of hatred, intent on extermination, fundamentally partakes of a feeling of identity-based integrity and expresses a hatred of transmission. War has been replaced by mass murder; if war ceases to be conceivable in terms of conflict, the resulting dead are dissolved into a mass, which is tantamount to replacing death with disappearance. The Nazis as well as serial killers and genocidal Islamist fanatics enjoy the omnipotence resulting from their indifference to what is human and psychological, to the other, which they have reified, objectified, obliterated, reduced to nothing or rubbish, just as they enjoy their belief in an absence of limits. In this light "the group appears to us as a revival of the primal horde,"[28] an No crowd can resist the temptation of doing harm gleefully.

The Freudian Description of the Process of Becoming Man

Might one consider what we call by the name of "psychic life" (what we call "psyche") is precisely the essential human appearance (?), which makes for our recognition of everyday humanity, and ensures the subjectivity of an inanimate being?

According to Freud, one may consider that *the function of culture*, which imposes sacrifices upon its subjects in an ambivalent conflict through a form of libidinal and narcissistic renunciation, is to intricate the principles of pleasure and reality through the recognition of processes of historization and subjectivation, in contradistinction with group psychology, which is devoid of any desire for the truth, without memory or language, and permits the untrammelled instinctual satisfaction sustaining the sense of an identity-based narcissistic omnipotence and plenitude, at its highest in the instinct for mastery, cruelty, and the sense of power over the world through the destruction, the dehumanization of the Other as a different-similar. The "love of certainties" and the temptation of immortality being present in the hypnotic suggestion of the masses, it is indeed the play of identifications, whereby humanity partakes simultaneously of resemblance and appearance, which is annihilated, placed alongside with incorporation and disappearance rather than on the side of loss and mourning.

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28 Ibid., 123.

What Turns a People into a People?

No people exists ex nihilo, as an essentialized entity embodying origin; on the other hand, it can and indeed must build itself in history, by appropriating a heritage, a plurality of filiations in a common project that is its own in coexistence with others, such a project assuming indebtedness, gratitude and free will, existing in constant self-renewal, disengaging itself from all projective temptations,[29] from a culture of resentment and excuse, that ideological poison continuously and steadily discharged in public opinion. All of which tends to literally justify aggressive acts and helps to make it impossible to assess the situation in terms that are truly ethical, civilized, and political, leaving it archaically fixated in an endless state of war endlessly fueled by ethno-religious passions working against the recognition of historical facts and perpetually projecting one single idea onto the universal culprit marked out by an unbearable fantasy of distinction: the idea that one people might in essence have privileged access to "being," thereby preventing others from "having" the place he occupies in the eyes of those who resent his existence, whether this place be real, symbolic, or imaginary.[30]

The Jew therefore may be envied even on the grounds of his misfortune, of Auschwitz as a symbol, projectively imagined as if he once more was possessed of All because of that—ultimately what he is envied for is his capacity to face the flaw and to assume a transmission of difference (as opposed to the same), a transmission that is constantly twisted, shifted, recognizing that the notion of identity is a delusion and renouncing a purely narcissistic transmission.

Thus the strength of the Jewish people does not exclusively lie in its concern for ethics, the work of guilt, and the internalization of the superego, but in the fact that its transferences, be they negative or positive, are directed toward transmission and not toward such or such a group, contrary to antisemites, who need the disappearance or obliteration of another group in order to exist, to be, to fantasize, to hope, to be happy. In order to survive the Jew does not require the obliteration of any other people.

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29 Rather than feeling mortified and assuming a cynical and victim posture, which only strengthens the feeling of humiliation and projective identification and destruction to the point of using one's own children as human shields or human bombs. The first president of Algeria, Ben Bella, a country that has become independent and totalitarian from the start admitted that his people "could only be only if the other wasn't."

30 Perverse guilt can release either its hatred toward some (the Jews as a people) or its contempt toward others (identitary Islam).

Antisemitism is the product of bankrupt identities asserting their fullness in the face of the flaws unmistakably reflected in their history.

The underlying paradox of antisemites' position is that while they are intent on making the Jew pay the heaviest price possible, they necessarily posit the hypothesis that what they want to eradicate is superior to them, so that as a matter of fact they condemn themselves to a pathetic and bitter satisfaction; they grant the Jew an infinite credit. Could it be that an identity-based hatred and a mortified sense of identity—both of which being expressions of an intolerable existential flaw and repeatedly seeking embodiment in an idealizing, totalizing and self-purifying cause—find a meeting point in anti-Judaism, a meeting point for yearnings after a narcissistic absence of limits (unlimited then meaning "minus One") precisely in that blind spot of envy and demonization, could it be that parricidal filiations converge upon the intolerable "paternal" heritage—an object of fundamental ambivalence? In such a transference Jews come to be identified with everything that escapes us in our fate—the unconscious, the Real.

> *"Modern man's tragedy is not that the meaning of life escapes him,*
> *but that this worries bothers him less and less."*
>
> Václav Havel

The Opium of Intellectuals

The news is full of staggering examples of denials of reality, on the part of certain members of the French intelligentsia, past masters in the art of ideological negation: clinging as they do to an indiscriminate passion for great causes, and particularly fond of prismatic categories of thought, they have repeatedly shown themselves submissively attracted to various totalitarian ideologies annihilating the subject, mimetically actualizing themselves in the codes and rhetoric of the doxa prevailing in the world of media and politics, embodied in right-thinking conformity: from Nazism to Islamism, via Stalin and Pol Pot this doxa has tended to shield reality from investigation and criticism. As in the 1920s and 1930s, today's massive pacifism appears as an enigma that marches in the company, and in support of, those who slave-drive and kill en masse. One wonders whether a world undergoing a crisis involving identity and limits is not attempting to transfer its guilt and thus fabricate for itself a form of innocence as well as the assurance of its own salvation by perpetually, endlessly projecting (for itself) the distorted spectacle of Israel's "sin" and "inhumanity," as displayed in a continuous loop on the media screens, contrary to the very real and massive barbaric

Islamist atrocities. As Bruckner puts it, "Repentance creates people who apologize for ancient crimes in order to exonerate themselves for present crimes."[31]

What lies at the basis of the ideological denial of reality? Its horizon of illusion and negation? Where does its force of conviction come from? A clinical study of contemporariness cannot fail to observe a genealogy of submissive thinking and of totalitarian thinking. Arthur Koestler, George Orwell, Simon Leys, Raymond Aron, and Albert Camus in *L'Homme révolté* (*The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt*) had been the first to understand that communism implied the same hatred of freedom as fascism, while other intellectuals, blindly and delightedly deemed it just because of its theoretical foundations. To hell with freedom and the truth. A number of them in France have had a persistent and paradoxical history in terms of the fascinated or indulgent relationships they have entertained with totalitarian, not to say genocidal regimes. The media, ideological conformity, the humanities, and social sciences all seem to dramatize and trivialize, to fatalize and rationalize violence, legitimizing it by actively participating in the enjoyment of its own staging in a fantasy of perverse narcissistic mastery best illustrated by its capacity to confuse events. As Mohammed Merah's killer profile disturbed established patterns, nobody paid any attention to what he was saying. In the eyes of ideologues, black is white, hate is love, and antisemitism reduces itself to inter-community tensions. Pascal Bruckner examines the ways in which the hatred directed against the West always entails a hatred of the law and freedom, and after the murderous attacks on Charlie Hebdo and the Jewish supermarket Hypercacher, the temptation to yield ground to fundamentalists was already strong on all sides. One of postmodernism's assumptions is that the West is guilty as a matter of principle, while all non-Westerners are innocent; morality and academic knowledge are instrumentalized so as to impose a ban on any other perspective. One rakes up the history of the West to provide elements likely to feed the denial of reality and destructiveness, complicity and submission? As Philippe Val[32] writes, "Not to report things is to collaborate with the worst of them." Why this antisemitic passion? What is it that persistently causes nations to unite "preachers of hate and preachers of shame"[33] and to refuse for centuries to acknowledge their moral, intellectual and symbolic indebtedness to Judaism and the Jews, produc-

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31 Cf. P. Bruckner, *The Tyranny of Guilt: An Essay on Western Masochism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 98.

32 Cf. P. Val, ""Le Sujet face au réel – Cris et chuchotements," in *Le sujet face au réel, et dans la transmission*, ed. M. G. Wolkowicz (Paris: In Press, 2017), 123.

33 P. Bruckner, *Le Sanglot de l'homme blanc: Tiers-Monde, culpabilité, haine de soi* (Paris: Seuil, 1983), 76.

ing Europe's obsessive desire to efface it (... and them) and a hatred so blinding that it leads to murder and collapse? Ideology simultaneously offers a solution to narcissism for its hatred of otherness, and a solution to love for its hatred of rivalry, hate being a form of identity-based self-assertion and participating in a united front against transmission, shame finding in it the monstrous end of its expiation; if we follow Eric Marty's analysis, we may consider that the locus of Judeophobia is paradigmatically that which legitimizes hatred and the meeting point of mimetic ideas, as if once again hate and shame themselves became an origin, in the absence of any origin.[34]

We have recently felt the evil wind of the lawsuit brought against the historian Georges Bensoussan. "*Indicting a metaphor does not exculpate reality*" (Jacques Tarnéro): "Since when does the rejection of a religion or an ideology express a racist attitude? What ideological denial forbids to see reality, the inversion of which lies at the heart of A. Finkielkraut's testimony at the trial. Finkielkraut questions this refusal to see what one's eyes can see. If one refuses to see reality and if one indicts those who attempt to reflect upon it, there's no way we can hope to escape social divisions and the growth of hatred.

Still, the doxa holds that the only racist threat in France comes from Islamophobia. According to Bruckner,[35] everywhere race struggle seems to replace class struggle, as Raymond Aron feared sixty years ago. The experience of totalitarian regimes has taught us that languages, too, can develop illnesses which may corrupt them. "Islamophobia" is one of those toxic words that confuses and denatures the whole vocabulary, which then becomes a new instrument in the extension of a fundamentalism proceeding with its face masked, draped in the victim's apparel and armed with a twofold ambition. The first is to silence Westerners, who Bruckner claims to be guilty of three capital sins: religious freedom, freedom of thought, equality between men and women. But above all, according to Bruckner, the aim is to forge an internal police tool in order to control reformist or liberal Muslims. Frédéric Encel[36] has shown the inversion of values, which results in antiracism being harnessed by obscurantism and discrimination against women, while UNO is being transformed into an instrument of international regression. The European way of war is a matter of minutes of silence, words of "peace and love," funeral ceremonies, flowers and candles, and a cow-

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34 Cf. M. G. Wolkowicz, ""L'analyste à la masse. Passer de la haine à la guerre: ainsi pourrait se dire l'œuvre d'une analyse," in *La psychologie de masse, aujourd'hui*, ed. M. G. Wolkowicz et al. (Paris: Rosiers, 2012), 83.

35 P. Bruckner, *Un racisme imaginaire: La querelle de l'islamophobie* (Paris, Grasset, 2017).

36 Cf. F. Encel, "Daesh et le nazisme, quelques caractéristiques communes," in *Les Figures de la cruauté, entre civilisation et barbarie*, ed. M. G. Wolkowicz (Paris: In Press, 2016), 413.

ardly refusal to link the murderous terrorism in Israel with the terrorism operat-ing in Europe. And in a kind of mirror effect we have the contagious suggestion of the activated mass formation together with the stunning, hypnotic, and para-lyzing fascination exerted by the atrocities of primal hordes, in this case Islamist killers unspecified by the occidental medias, by the real of barbaric violence, of cruel murders, rapes, and beheadings, all of which seem to partake of a regres-sion toward some reactualized primal scene, a pre-symbolic ritual reenacting reminiscences from an archaic past, from the time of human sacrifices. Has all reason been lost before this lifting of the fundamental repression?

And here is Europe, shameful, fearful, uneducated,[37] in quest of a universal expiatory redemption, having got rid of the greater part of her Jewish population, yet not inoculated against her antisemitism. As a representative of a paternal order, the Jew seems to act as a permanent reminder of the fundamental charac-ter of sex and generation differences, as has been demonstrated by Sophie Freud Loewenstein, Béla Grunberger, and Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel: all of them have pointed out the "avoidance of the Oedipus complex" in Christianity as well as among the 1968 "revolutionists." Can we consider that a Europe in a state of can-nibalistic melancholy and in quest of redemption is trying to transfer her guilt and to fabricate for herself an innocence and the assurance of salvation? Judeo-phobia is the fear engendered in the anti-Jewish subject by his repressed own, which he then transfers onto the Jew, as the latter renews his refusal both of Christian grace and Islamic submission. In the ideology of the media, politics, and diplomacy, the Jew and Israel have to be treated as a mere parenthesis. Four-teen Jews have been killed in France and Belgium since 2006 because they were Jews. No amalgamation or silence will indefinitely hide these crude facts. What matters is to maintain the Jew "within the boundaries of Auschwitz" whenever he attempts to tear himself away from his status as expiatory victim bearing the stigma of original sin, and thus to demonize and Nazify him.[38]

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37 Cf. S. Freud, *Beyond The Pleasure Principle*, trans. J. Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press & The Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1950). In a widely dechristianized society, the symptom of com-pulsive repetition in contemporary European antisemitism repeats the same structures, what has been suppressed is coming back all the more powerfully as it has been denied.

38 We are sorry for the exterminated Jews, we loathe the ordinary citizens of a nation, and thus antisemitism, following a perverse rhetoric, thrives and is shamelessly and immodestly allowed by the name of anti-Zionism (cf. V. Jankelevitch). The connection isn't made between pro-Palestine and Islamic terror, though the former has been the gateway to the latter. Politicians and media people are responsible for actually bringing in "the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" as an excuse to the necessarily "desperate" actions of the terrorists. During the war that opposed the State of Israel to Hamas and Islamic Jihad, anti-Israeli protests conflated the browns, the greens, and the reds that George Orwell used to call in the 30s, to characterize this ideological

Denial is central to modern antisemitism. Anti-Jewish madness, whether expressed by Hamas or Goebbels, deserves to be analyzed for what it really is, and not in the roles it is made to play in the service of a hidden agenda. Transforming Jihad into a class war is tantamount to forgetting its cultural origin. If one wants to restore faces to the victims, we have to confront the reality of things. Today's antisemites proclaim themselves anti-system and anti-racist, while imputing to the Jews racism and the possession of the system; the Jew is no longer attacked as such, but one attacks the horrors of which he is presumed to be guilty.

We are thus drawn into paradoxical situations that are literally "maddening," literally "drive one crazy." We want the antisemitic nature of acts against Jews to be recognized by people whose culture has developed around negationist representations; in other words we want the Shoah to be recognized by people who simultaneously negate its existence and regret that the planned extermination was not fully carried out, or we want the Jewish character of the State of Israel to be recognized by people who deny it the right to exist. "What can object to the man who wants to slit my throat to earn his paradise?" Bruckner asks, quoting Voltaire, while the truth we do not want to hear is blatant: they hate us for what we are.

Conclusion

Still, the twentieth century should have taught intellectuals to be more humble. One cannot ignore an antisemitism that is one of the symptoms and maybe one of the sources—whether one wants it or not—of what Abdelwahab Meddeb calls "The Malady of Islam." Bruckner is concerned about the weakness of our democracies in the face of the "murderous jihadist madness" contaminating European countries. A great deal remains "unthought" in the way we approach terrorism, while Jihadists claim they are the only true Muslims. The ideological denial of that reality constitutes the other face of this disaster of thought, together with the compassionate pro-Palestinian obsession of part of the Left and the far Left, which has also bred the hatred of Jews; to present Israel as responsible for Arab misfortune is one of the great frauds of contemporary history. Everyone intones the mantra "avenge Palestinian children!" But what about Jewish children? Who spares a thought for them among the noble souls demonstrating? The killers were not the supposed promoters of Islamophobia, but real Islamist

mixture, "the fascists," and showed outraged pacifists and exterminatory Islamist bigots marching side by side.

killers armed with Kalashnikovs: the confusion is at its height when the prime responsibility for Islamist hate crimes is ascribed to a reaction against the "Islamophobic climate" allegedly created and fostered by some intellectuals and writers categorized as members of a supposedly crypto-fascist sphere.

The fetishistic slogan "I am Charlie," "I am a cop," "I am a Jew," which inundated the demonstration is also a tell-tale sign of surrender, this time an inner surrender: if "I" am every victim, I am in fact no one, as I choose not to accept what I am, and not to face the attacker in order to win the fight. As regards the neutralization of the victims' identities, the Jews were a problem for commentators, since the general spirit of abdication cannot tolerate their breaking out of their roles as silent consenting victims, which would be the case if they were to decide to leave the country. It is only in their position as victims that Jews can be celebrated as sacred symbols of the Republic ("Whoever hurts a Jew hurts our Republic"), which is quite ominous in fact, since the sacred lies very close to the terrifying taboo, one feeding the other and potentially reversing itself into the other. The victims at the Bataclan were "innocent French people," conjuring up an echo of Raymond Barre's Freudian slip after the bombing of the Rue Copernic synagogue in 1980! Again and again, the day after November 13th, the same question was heard in every possible form: "But why us? Why France?" From now on, breaking the necessarily supposedly "neo-reactionary" fire detectors won't be enough, and the fire will not burn itself out, even at the cost of sacrificing Jews or at best alienating both the Jewish and Muslim communities, another perverse manner to deny the specific problems posed by Islam to the Republic, and by denying the exemplary integration of the Jews of France, and their particular implication to defend and enrich the Republic in all the fields.

The murder of Sarah Halimi was an apparently isolated act, but it was really the product of an ideological group activated by the hatred of Jews and entailing a collective hush up authorizing an identical repetition and negation. Jean-Jacques Moscovitz has shown how terror annihilates any form of desire on the part of potential victims, including the desire to kill: *l'Enténèbrement, Darkness Visible*, according a quote from Milton, already taken again on by William Golding in one of his novels, means the killing of death itself; for today's mass killers, negationism involves even the act of getting killed. It joins politics and psychoanalysis in terms of silencing/foreclosure. ISIS suggests that the murderers unconsciously identify themselves with the reality of origin as such. They are death itself, in a kind of "deathly incest" in which all bodies are intermingled: the killer enacts an apocalypse in which extermination is the means and aim of the end of the human world. As death came to be master of Germany, Nazism and Islamism destroy the origin to embody themselves in it totally and for-

ever. As a source of a possible interpretation of their limits, the Jew, the *Mensch*, must be exterminated. And the same goes for the Yezidi, and other communities.

Perhaps antisemitism can best be understood as a chronic illness of Western politics, the latter finding itself incapable of confronting what has constituted it, or rather what its constitution began with and went beyond: a certain idea of a people and its law, the two-sided idea that is formed in the *Geist* of *Geistigkeit*.[39]

Sarah Halimi's murder was destructive of humanity. The function of judges is to state the law, and it is our duty as citizens in a democracy to state what we want and what we do not want, with regard to the freedom of ideologies that deny the laws and principles of our Republic, which terrorize and fashion minds in hate, and which promote murderous acts. One wonders whether Goebbels might not be condemned today by French justice, Nuremberg notwithstanding, for criminal association in relation to a terrorist undertaking.

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39 Cf. S. Freud, *Moses and Monotheism*, in vol. 23 of *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. J. Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-analysis, 1964).

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Florette Cohen

Modern Antisemitism: A Psychological Understanding of the BDS Movement

Recently, prejudice, bigotry, and intolerance have been a topic of great concern. Antisemitism in particular is notably visible in the US and Europe stemming from both the alt-right and the liberal left. Globally, the specter of ongoing violence in the Middle East accompanied by repeated failed peace talks have ignited anti-Israel demonstrations and the BDS (Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions) movement. However, until the last decade, the resurgence of antisemitism accompanying the Middle East turmoil may not have been so readily apparent. In Europe, Jewish Day schools, supermarkets, and pedestrians have been violently attacked; in the US, Jewish cemeteries and synagogues have been defaced, and in Israel innocent, Jewish civilians have been brutally beaten and bludgeoned to death. Antisemitism is indeed increasing. What may account for the uptick in antisemitism? And what if any is the connection to Middle East turbulence?

Recent research demonstrates that the psychological underpinnings of both may be one in the same. A new theoretical model of antisemitism is presented and tested in five experiments. The model proposes that mortality salience increases antisemitism and that antisemitism often manifests as hostility toward Israel. Study 1 showed that mortality salience led to greater levels of antisemitism and lowered support for Israel. This effect occurred only in a bogus pipeline condition, indicating that social desirability masks hostility toward Jews and Israel. Study 2 showed that mortality salience caused Israel, but no other country, to perceptually loom large. Study 3 showed that mortality salience increased punitiveness toward Israel's human rights violations more than it increased hostility toward the identical human rights violations committed by India or Russia. Study 4 showed that mortality salience increased people's agreement with support for political cartoons demonizing Israel but not China. Study 5 showed that mortality salience increased support of BDS for Israel's human rights violations committed against Palestinians more than it increased support of BDS for Russia's identical human rights violations committed against the Ukraine. Collectively, results suggest that Jews constitute a unique cultural threat to many people's worldviews, that antisemitism causes hostility to Israel, and that hostility to Israel may feed back to increase antisemitism.

A few years ago, a close friend and colleague of mine at Columbia University walked into her office to find her walls covered in swastikas; a month earlier, congregants at a synagogue in Pennsylvania were gunned down during Sabbath services. According to new FBI data, hate crimes targeting Jews rose in 2016 immediately following the Trump presidential election with increased social media harassment targeting Jews during the 2018 midterm elections (U.S. Department of Justice, 2018). Globally, the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement has become an issue of contention across college campuses. What began as a non-violent movement in 2005 by Palestinian non-governmental organizations to end Israel's occupation of the Gaza and West Bank territories has turned

into a referendum on the legitimacy of Israel. Recent research found that after World War II, anti-Jewish prejudices went underground and were expressed through socially acceptable channels referred to as modern antisemitism,[1] and thus antisemitism research took a back seat to more and timely concerns such as racial tensions and women's movements. Unfortunately, antisemitism or prejudice against Jews has once again become a topic of concern. The current paper reviews the theory and research examining the psychology of antisemitism and presents a new study reflecting the modern antisemitism underlying the BDS movement.

Modern Antisemitism Research

Currently, there is little disagreement that the specter of ongoing violence in the Middle East is of great concern throughout much of the world. It is at the heart of international peace processes and continues to interfere with global economies.[2] Despite President Trump's negotiated peace treaties between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, the resurgence of antisemitism accompanying the Middle East turmoil has become apparent. Antisemitism is increasing, so much so that it has hit an all-time high.[3] This is true not only in the Middle East, where animosity toward Jews has customarily been linked to hostility toward Israel,[4] but also in the liberal West,[5] with politicians currently blaming the surge in Covid-19 cases on the Jewish clusters.[6]

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1 Cf. F. Cohen et al., "Modern Anti-Semitism and Anti-Israeli Attitudes," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 97, no. 2 (2009): 290–306.

2 Cf. J. Aita, "Doha Meeting Critical to Mideast Peace, Economic Growth, U.S. Says," U.S. Embassy in Israel, issued 1997, accessed June 8, 2012, http://www.usembassyisrael.org.il/publish/peace/archives/1997/me1028c.html [no longer available]; F. Cohen et al., "The Modern Anti-Semitism Israel Model: An Empirical Relationship between Modern Anti-Semitism and Opposition to Israel," *Conflict and Communication Online* 10 (2011): 1–16; T. Pyszczynski et al., "Mortality Salience, Martyrdom, and Military Might: The Great Satan Versus the Axis of Evil," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 32 (2006): 525–37.

3 "Antisemitic Incidents Hit All-Time High in 2019," Anti-Defamation League, issued May 12, 2020, accessed October 2, 2020, https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/antisemitic-incidents-hit-all-time-high-in-2019.

4 Cf. D. Matas, *Aftershock: Anti-Zionism and Anti-Semitism* (Toronto: Dundurn, 2005).

5 Cf. S. K. Baum, "Christian and Muslim Antisemitism," *Journal of Contemporary Religion* 24 (2009): 137–55; Cohen et al., "The Modern Anti-Semitism Israel Model"; E. H. Kaplan and C. A. Small, "Anti-Israel Sentiment Predicts Anti-Semitism in Europe," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 4 (2006): 548–61.

Terrible double standards have been imposed by the international community as far as Israel as a Jewish state is concerned. While many insist that Israel and the Zionists are responsible for horrific genocidal crimes against the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, the numbers tell a different story. Over the past twenty years, the Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories put the Palestinian death toll at 10,012.[7] This number accounts for militants and civilians. The international answer has been to boycott over fifty Israeli products, academics, and artistic venues. In contrast, in a twelve-month period the UN estimated that the Syrian regime (still in power) was responsible for over 10,000 civilian deaths, 20,000 displaced persons, and 40,000 detained prisoners; the death toll in the Ukraine is estimated to be approximately 13,000 civilians since the war broke out in 2014;[8] and in 2015 the estimated death toll in Darfur stood at approximately 400,000 lives with 3,000,000 displaced persons.[9] The international response—zero boycotts. Despite the inconsistency of the international community regarding human rights violations, many major works on stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination have paid relatively little attention to antisemitism and its relationship to anti-Israel sentiment.[10]

This lack of attention reflects the inconsistency of public opinions as well. A personal story may serve to demonstrate the point. Several years ago, I subscribed to a local New York newspaper, both print and online. On March 25, 2009, I opened my e-paper to reveal the vilest of syndicated cartoons by American cartoonist Pat Oliphant (see image 1). The cartoon (published by *The New York Times, The Washington Post,* Slate, and Yahoo! News, among others) depicted a headless soldier wielding a sword and pushing a shark-like toothy monster shaped like the star of David with its sights set on a fleeing Gazan woman carry-

6 Cf. C. Campanile, "Cuomo Calls COVID-19 Resurgence an 'Ultra-Orthodox' Jewish Problem," *New York Post*, October 9, 2020, https://nypost.com/2020/10/09/gov-cuomo-ny-covid-19-spike-an-ultra-orthodox-jewish-problem/.

7 Cf. "Israel-Palestine Timeline: The Human Cost of the Conflict," Israel-Palestine Timeline, last updated October 25, 2020, accessed October 28, 2020, https://israelpalestinetimeline.org/charts/.

8 "Death Toll up to 13,000 in Ukraine Conflict Says UN Rights Office," Radio Free Europe, February 26, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/death-toll-up-to-13-000-in-ukraine-conflict-says-un-rights-office/29791647.html.

9 Cf. S. Straus, *Making and Unmaking Nations: War, Leadership, and Genocide in Modern Africa* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015).

10 E.g., one can find little or no mention of antisemitism in S. T. Fiske, "Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination," in *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, ed. D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, and G. Lindzey (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998), 357–411; J. T. Jost and M. R. Banaji, "The Role of Stereotyping in System-Justification and the Production of False Consciousness," *British Journal of Social Psychology* 33 (1994): 1–27, or many other recent reviews.

Image 1: Cartoon by Pat Oliphant.
Syndicated cartoon of Israeli flag depicting a headless soldier wielding a sword and pushing a shark-like toothy monster shaped like the star of David with its sights set on a fleeing Gazan woman carrying a baby. Source: http://www.eyeonthepost.org/Oliphant-Anti-Semite.html, accessed November 13, 2020.

ing a baby, all within the confines of the Israeli flag. The media outlets eventually removed the cartoon from their sites, but little fuss was made over the cartoon.[11]

In contrast, Kurt Westergaard's cartoon depicting the prophet Mohammed wearing a bomb in his turban (image 2) triggered violent riots around the world. The cartoon, printed in the Danish *Jyllands-Posten* newspaper in September 2005, was considered "offensive" and sent Westergaard into hiding for fear of his life.[12]

There seems to be a double standard with regard to Israel and public opinion—the question is why? Why is it acceptable to demonize Israel? Is demonization of Israel a form of antisemitism? How can we know? To answer these questions, we must first understand the psychology of antisemitism and the methods used by social psychologists to test hypotheses based on these questions.

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11 Cf. "Washington Post Continues Steady Drum Beat of Attacks On Israel and Its Jewish Supporters," Eye on the Post, issued March 28, 2009, accessed November 13, 2020, https://www.eyeonthepost.org/.
12 Cf. "Kurt Westergaard and the Danish Cartoons in the Open," No Dhimmitude, issued February 13, 2008, accessed November 13, 2020, https://nodhimmitude.blogspot.com/2008/02/kurt-westergaard-and-danish-cartoons-in.html.

Image 2: Cartoon by Kurt Westergaard. Danish cartoon depicting the Prophet Mohammed wearing a bomb in his turban. Source: https://nodhim mitude.blogspot.com/2008/02/kurt-westergaard-and-da nish-cartoons-in.html, accessed November 13, 2020.

Psychology of Antisemitism

Antisemitism is a peculiar social phenomenon in that many of the stereotypes associated with it are mutually exclusive and shift radically across time and space. Jews have been condemned for being radical communists, and for being avaricious capitalists. Fascists in Nazi Germany and in 1980s Argentina accused their nations' Jews of having hidden loyalties to socialist regimes,[13] whereas the Soviet Union regularly persecuted its Jews for harboring secret sympathies for the West.[14] Jews have been chastised as corruptly cosmopolitan and as insular traditionalists, as heretical free-thinkers and as mystical obscurantists, as weak, ineffectual, and effete, and as stealthily advancing toward worldwide domination.[15]

Some scholars of antisemitism see a method in these contradictions. Antisemitism may serve to create a tangible target upon which non-Jews project their own fears, especially fears that arise during times of social disruption.[16] Indeed, attacks against Jews spiked during the Crusades, the Black Plague, in France following the Franco-Prussian War, in Russia in the years preceding the Bolshevik revolution, in Germany following World War I, in the United States during the Depression, in the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and in South America dur-

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13 Cf. R. Rein, *Argentina, Israel and the Jews: Peron, the Eichmann Capture and After* (Bethesda: University Press of Maryland, 2003).

14 Cf. E. D. Weitz, "Stalin's Secret Pogrom: The Postwar Inquisition of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 17, no. 2 (2003): 368–70.

15 Cf. B. Lewis, "The New Anti-Semitism: First Religion, then Race, then What?," *American Scholar* 75, no. 1 (2006): 25–36; P. Johnson, *A History of the Jews* (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 310.

16 Cf. D. Cohn-Sherbok, *Anti-Semitism* (Charleston: History Press, 2009).

ing the transition from dictatorships to democracy. Currently, anti-Jewish sentiment is spreading rapidly throughout the Muslim Middle East, which is itself undergoing massive social change.[17]

Why this correspondence between antisemitism and social transition? Tolerance for others' opinions, especially those that challenge one's own deeply held personal values, are tied to people's own feelings of certainty or worth.[18] When people feel less secure, they become less tolerant of those whose views, perspectives, or beliefs are different from their own. Yet these findings themselves beg the question of why insecurity leads to intolerance toward Jews.

The current line of research examines the psychological underpinnings of prejudice and ethnic discord in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on the Modern Antisemitism-Israel Model (MASIM).[19] The MASIM was designed based on a juxtaposition of Terror Management Theory (TMT),[20] and modern prejudice theory.[21] Specifically, the present study tested the hypotheses that uniquely human fears of death serve to perpetuate expressions of antisemitism and anti-Israeli sentiment as expressed in the BDS (Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions) movement against Israel.

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17 Cf. E. L. Glaeser, "The Political Economy of Hatred," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 120, no. 1 (2005): 45–86.
18 Cf. G. L. Cohen, J. Aronson, and C. M. Steele, "When Beliefs Yield to Evidence: Reducing Biased Evaluation by Affirming the Self," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 26, no. 9 (2000): 1151–64.
19 Cf. F. Cohen et al., "The Modern Anti-Semitism Israel Model: An Empirical Relationship between Modern Anti-Semitism and Opposition to Israel," *Conflict and Communication Online* 10 (2011): 1–16.
20 Cf. J. Greenberg, T. Pyszczynski, and S. Solomon, "The Causes and Consequences of a Need for Self-Esteem: A Terror Management Theory," in *Public Self and Private Self*, ed. R. F. Baumeister (New York: Springer, 1986), 189–212.
21 Cf. D. O. Sears and D. R. Kinder, "Racial Tensions and Voting in Los Angeles," in *Los Angeles: Viability and Prospects for Metropolitan Leadership*, ed. W. Z. Hirsch (New York: Praeger, 1971), 51–88.

Terror Management Theory

Death Denial

According to terror management theory, human beings, like all other animals, are driven to survive. However, because of their complex cognitive capabilities—specifically, the ability to think abstractly and symbolically, culminating in explicit self-consciousness—humans are uniquely aware of the inevitability of death and the ever-present potential for lethal experiences, which creates the potential for paralyzing terror. Terror is the emotional manifestation of the self-preservation instinct in an animal intelligent enough to know that it will someday die.[22]

TMT posits that to "manage" this potentially debilitating terror, humans created cultural worldviews: symbolic conceptions of reality shared by individuals in a group. Cultural worldviews minimize death anxiety by imbuing the world with order, meaning, and permanence, and by providing a set of standards of valued behavior that, if satisfied, confers self-esteem and ultimately death transcendence through symbolic and/or literal immortality. Thus, from the perspective of TMT, individuals manage their terror by maintaining faith in the cultural worldview and living up to the standards of value that are part of that worldview.

Cultural Worldview

Though the cultural worldview is treated as absolute reality by those who subscribe to it, it is actually a fragile social construction[23] requiring continual validation from others in order to be sustained, especially when confronted with reminders of mortality. This validation occurs mainly through the process of social consensus.[24] Thus, the mere existence of people with similar worldviews bolsters individuals' faith in the validity of their own worldview, thereby increasing its effectiveness as an anxiety buffer. Likewise, the mere existence of people with

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22 Cf. G. Zilboorg, "Fear of Death," *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 12 (1943): 465–75.

23 Cf. P. L. Berger and T. Luckman, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (Hermondsworth: Penguin, 1967); G. J. McCall and J. L. Simmons, *Identities and Interactions* (New York: Free Press, 1966).

24 Cf. L. Festinger, "A Theory of Social Comparison Processes," *Human Relations* 7 (1954): 117–40; H. H. Kelley, "Attribution Theory in Social Psychology," *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation* 15 (1967): 192–238.

dissimilar worldviews threatens individuals' faith in their own worldview, thereby undermining its effectiveness as an anxiety buffer. As such, people generally prefer ideas and people that conform to their worldviews and derogate ideas and people that deviate from them.

Cultural Worldview and Antisemitism

TMT may be particularly useful for understanding antisemitism because outbreaks of antisemitism have often occurred following major social disruptions —military defeats, epidemic lethal disease, and massive economic deterioration. In all cases, either death, or some threat to people's most cherished beliefs, or both become salient. TMT suggests that under such circumstances, many people will attempt to protect themselves by affirming their core values. Jews' survival, their financial success, and their unique moral and religious beliefs threaten the worldview of others. This threat is parried by denigrating Jews (i.e., expressing antisemitic attitudes).

The basis for predicting cultural hostility toward Jews includes all the well-established reasons for outgroup hostility, in addition to some singular ones. Outgroups might not share the same attitudes and beliefs as in-groups; outgroups compete for resources; outgroups are perceived as more different from in-groups than they really are; outgroups are often seen as less deserving of trust than in-groups; and so forth.[25] Indeed, many of the classic stereotypes of Jews fit these phenomena like a glove ("Jews are clannish, grasping," if a common example). This generic outgroup hostility begins to explain why they are potentially threatening.

In support of this view, Greenberg et al. (Study 1)[26] demonstrated that, consistent with TMT predictions, when Christians thought about their own death (mortality salience) their trait ratings of fellow Christians became more positive and their trait ratings of Jews became more negative. Across all measures, the

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25 Cf. the classic work by G. W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley, 1954); M. B. Brewer, "In-Group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A Cognitive-Motivational Analysis," *Psychological Bulletin* 86, no. 2 (1979): 307–24; M. Rokeach, "Prejudice, Concreteness of Thinking, and Reification of Thinking," *Journal of Abnormal & Social Psychology* 46, no. 1 (1951): 83–91; H. Tajfel, "Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice," *Journal of Social Issues* 25, no. 4 (1969): 79–97, and many others all attest to these processes.
26 Cf. J. Greenberg et al., "Evidence for Terror Management Theory II: The Effects of Mortality Salience on Reactions to Those Who Threaten or Bolster the Cultural Worldview," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 58 (1990): 308–18.

Christian was rated more positively than the Jew only in the mortality salient condition. Similarly, mortality salience led American college students to increase their agreement with the statement that "the holocaust in Nazi Germany was God's punishment for the Jews."[27]

While TMT paints a grim picture of people in general, it cannot completely explain the history of pervasive victimization suffered by Jews from antiquity to the modern day. From a TMT perspective, the straightforward explanation for antisemitism is simple—when focused on their own mortality and in need of the protections that their worldviews provide, non-Jews may become more hostile toward Jews, because Jews represent a challenge to their worldviews by being outgroup members. There are quite a large number of religious and historical reasons, however, to believe that Jews are potentially more threatening than other outgroups and may indeed constitute a unique cultural threat. The suggestion that Jews pose a unique threat remains true today to the point that it caused the American delegates at last year's OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) meeting on contemporary antisemitism to insist that antisemitism be recognized as a unique form of prejudice.[28]

Subtle Modern Prejudices

The tenor of most TMT research suggests that reminders of death will increase prejudice and hostility toward different others. However, although blatant forms of antisemitism do exist, prejudice in general is often stigmatized. As such, people may often try to deny or hide their prejudices. Although a person may appear friendly and tolerant, hostility may be lurking not far from the surface. The terms *modern* or *symbolic racism* were developed because people stopped saying "Blacks are despicable and should not be allowed in our schools or restaurants." Instead, they simply opposed government policies to promote racial equality, and they opposed candidates supporting those policies.[29]

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27 R. Kunzendorf et al., "Repressed Self-Consciousness of Death and Insensitivity to Religious Genocide," unpublished manuscript, (1992, typescript), as cited in J. Schimel et al., "Stereotypes and Terror Management: Evidence That Mortality Salience Enhances Stereotypic Thinking and Preferences," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 77 (1999): 907.

28 For a complete review, see Cohen et al., "Modern Anti-Semitism and Anti-Israeli Attitudes"; idem., "The Modern Anti-Semitism Israel Model"; and R. S. Wistrich, "Waging War on Judeophobes Old and New," *Haaretz*, July 31, 2003, https://www.haaretz.com/1.5354050.

29 Cf. D. R. Kinder and T. Mendelberg, "Cracks in American Apartheid: The Political Impact of Prejudice among Desegregated Whites," *Journal of Politics* 57 (1995): 402–24; J. B. McConahay,

Just as people veil their racism and anti-Black prejudice (e.g., by opposing busing and affirmative action), people may similarly veil their antisemitism by opposing Jews' national aspirations. If one is a racist, opposing affirmative action is a safe way to express it; if one is an antisemite, opposing Israel is a safe way to express it. For example, Israel has been involved with numerous wars over the last sixty years. Some of them have been offensive, while others have been defensive. Unfortunately, though, even Israeli wars of self-defense may be twisted into evidence of Israeli imperialism and oppression and the "racist" nature of Zionism.[30]

The Modern Antisemitism-Israel Model (MASIM)

The Modern Antisemitism-Israel Model is a juxtaposition of TMT and modern prejudice theory. The MASIM predicts that when mortality is salient, Jews are commonly perceived as threatening to one's worldview because they are different from non-Jews in their beliefs and behaviors, thus leading to an increase antisemitism, which can manifest itself in two ways. It can develop into expressions of antisemitism such as verbal slurs, defamation of property, or bodily harm; or, because prejudice (antisemitism) is stigmatized, it can manifest itself through the application of double standards, demonization, and delegitimization (a product of double standards and demonization) of Israel, the Jewish state. As such, those who harbor antisemitic attitudes may increase hostility to Israel.

The model predicts that mortality salience leads to increased antisemitism, and that increased antisemitism leads to decreased support for Israel. Thus, the model also predicts that antisemitism may partially mediate effects of mortality salience on attitudes toward Israel. Such mediation, however, is predicted to be only partial because the model also predicts that mortality salience can increase opposition to Israel for reasons having nothing to do with antisemitism. This is because Israel, as a combatant for over sixty years, may be regarded as perpetrating human rights violations. Mortality salience activates worldview defenses, and worldviews typically include moral codes. For these reasons, mortality fears

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"Modern Racism, Ambivalence, and the Modern Racism Scale," in *Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism*, ed. J. F. Dovidio and S. L. Gaertner (San Diego: Academic Press, 1986), 91–125; J. B. McConahay and J. C. Hough, "Symbolic Racism," *Journal of Social Issues* 32 (1976): 23–45; Sears and Kinder, "Racial Tensions."

30 Cf. J. Kotek, "Anti-Semitic Motifs in Belgian Anti-Israel Propaganda," in *Anti-Semitism Worldwide* 2001/2 (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2003), https://en-humanities.tau.ac.il/sites/humanities_en.tau.ac.il/files/media_server/humanities/kantor/2001.pdf, 26–36.

lead to more punitive attitudes toward those committing moral transgressions.[31] Mortality salience, therefore, may decrease support for Israel due to heightened moral sensibilities, rather than to the arousal of latent antisemitism.

The model also posits that a reverse causal path exists. Although concern for human rights violations may lead to reduced support for Israel for reasons having nothing to do with antisemitism, it may then actually trigger an increase in antisemitic prejudices (see image 3).

Path 1 = Mortality Salience increases anti-Semitism.
Path 2 = Anti-Semitism decreases support for Israel.
Path 3 = Mortality Salience decreases support for Israel for reasons other than anti-Semitism.
+ means the path is predicted to be positive.
- means the path is predicted to be negative.

Image 3: Theoretical Model of Antisemitism.

Experimental Studies of Antisemitism

Three experiments conducted by Cohen, Jussim, Harber, and Bhasin[32] demonstrated that: (1) participants expressed significantly greater levels of antisemitism and lower levels of pro-Israeli sentiment when reminded of their mortality and when told that they would be caught in the act of lying; (2) antisemitism partially mediated the effects of mortality salience X bogus pipeline manipulation on opposition to Israel; (3) mortality salience increased the perceived size of Israel but not of other countries; and (4) mortality salience increased opposition to Israeli oppression more than it increased opposition to Russian or Indian oppression.

Study 1 included 151 participants from a Rutgers University psychology class (99 females, 52 males; 9 African American, 30 Asian American, 18 Latino, 77

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31 Cf. Greenberg, "Evidence for Terror Management Theory II."
32 Cf. Cohen et al., "Modern Anti-Semitism and Anti-Israeli Attitudes."

White, 26 "other,"; 96 Christian, 3 Muslim, 2 Buddhist, 19 Hindu, 28 "other") all of which were given extra credit for their participation. A mortality salience (MS) manipulation was crossed with a "prejudice obvious/bogus pipeline" manipulation. In the MS condition, participants responded to two open-ended questions relating to their own mortality, which read as follows: "Please describe the emotions (in writing) that the thought of your own death arouses in you." And, "Write down as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you physically when you die."

Exam salience (control) participants responded to parallel questions regarding taking an upcoming exam, as follows: "Please describe the emotions that the thought of your next important exam arouses in you." And, "Write down as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you physically as you take your next important exam and when it's over." Exam salience provided an apt control condition among college students because, as demonstrated in previous TMT studies, exams are an unpleasant as well as anxiety-provoking yet non-lethal event.

The instructions provided to participants in the prejudice obvious condition explicitly stated on the cover page that prejudice toward various groups was being measured. The bogus pipeline condition led participants to believe that any deception on their part ("lying to appear unprejudiced") would be detected by sophisticated methods developed by psychologists.

Three questionnaires were used to assess blatant expressions of antisemitism, anti-Israeli sentiment, and anti-Palestinian sentiment. The antisemitism (A-S) scale was an updated version of Levinson and Sanford's *Anti-Semitism Scale* (1944), modified to sample anti-Jewish attitudes with 23 contemporary, and less blatant, attitude items such as, "Jews still think of themselves as God's Chosen People," "Jews are more willing than others to use shady practices to get what they want," and "Jews are just as honest as other businesspeople" (reverse coded). The attitudes toward Israel scale consisted of 10 questions assessing participants' levels of pro-Israeli sentiment such as, "I strongly support the Israeli cause." The attitudes toward the Palestinians scale consisted of 10 questions assessing participants' levels of pro-Palestinian sentiment. Most items were highly similar to the attitudes toward Israel scale items, such as: "The Palestinians have been oppressed by Israelis for decades," "I strongly support the Palestinian cause, and "The Palestinians deserve a homeland." Questions for each scale were scored on a five-point Likert scale. Responses were combined and averaged to create a composite score for each of the three scales.[33]

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33 Cf. ibid for full scales.

Results revealed that antisemitism was negatively correlated with support for Israel (r = -.42) and that mortality salience significantly increased self-reported antisemitism but only in the bogus pipeline condition (MS had no effect on support for Palestinians, *p* > .1). One implication of this pattern was that people recognize that hostility to Israel stems from antisemitism (if not, why the need to hide it?). Mediational analyses then revealed that antisemitism partially mediated the effects of MS on attitudes toward to Israel. Additionally, reverse mediation demonstrated that opposition to Israel also partially mediated the effects of MS on antisemitism.[34]

Study 2 employed 161 participants from a Rutgers introductory psychology class (99 female, 62 male; 8 African American, 34 Asian American, 15 Latino, 81 White, 23 "other"; 98 Christian, 13 Hindu, 7 Muslim, 1 Buddhist, 39 "other") and tested the prediction that mortality salience would increase a subtle measure of antisemitism. Prior research had shown that fear and prejudice often leads people to overestimate the size and power of minority groups.[35] More recent evidence showed that a European Union poll found that nearly 60 % of those surveyed believed that Israel was the greatest threat to world peace, worse than Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Sudan. Furthermore, caricatures of Israel often present it or its leaders as looming giants.[36]

Therefore, in Study 2 the dependent variable was the perceived size of Israel and six other countries. Following a reminder of death or of an important exam, people were given seven maps and asked to estimate the size of Israel and each of these six other countries. As predicted, mortality salience significantly increased the perceived size of Israel but had no significant effect on the perceived size of any other country.

Study 3 ruled out (1) the alternative explanation that mortality salience increased hostility toward Israel because mortality salience provokes hostility to any nation perceived as committing obvious human rights violations, and (2) the alternative interpretation that prejudice against Jews has something to do with the fact that the principal experimenter was Jewish, that the study was

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34 All participants in all studies completed a self-report mood scale (PANAS-X; cf. D. Watson and A. Clark, "Affects Separable and Inseparable: On the Hierarchical Arrangement of the Negative Affects," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 62, no. 3 [1992]: 489–505) to assess the affective consequences of the MS induction. No significant effects for affect due to MS manipulations were found in any of the present studies.

35 Cf. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice*; J. H. Robb, *Working-Class Anti-Semite* (London: Tavistock, 1954).

36 Cf. J. Kotek, "Major Anti-Semitic Motifs in Arab Cartoons," Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, issued June 1, 2004, accessed October 28, 2020, http://www.jcpa.org/phas/phas-21.htm.

done in a Jewish professor's lab and that the obvious aim of the studies was in assessing feeling against Jews.

In order to increase the generalizability of this research, this study did not examine college students. Rather, an Indian research assistant surveyed 235 patients (and those accompanying them; average age 45; 155 female, 80 male; 6 African American, 6 Asian American, 19 Latino, 196 White, 8 "other"; 200 Christian, 3 Muslim, 4 Buddhist, 26 "other") of a local non-Jewish, Indian physician while in the waiting area of either of her two offices. Participants were randomly assigned to either a mortality salience or an aversive pain control induction and were asked to recommend punishments of Russia, India, or Israel for (identical) human rights violations. Mortality salience increased willingness to punish Israeli moral transgressions more than it increased willingness to punish Russian or Indian transgressions. Furthermore, despite the fact that an Indian ran the study in an Indian doctor's office and assessed attitudes toward India, post hoc analyses showed that mortality salience had no effect on India. Taken together, these studies provided preliminary empirical support of the MASIM.

Demonization, Double Standards, and Delegitimization

Based on the finding of Cohen et al., it seems likely that hostility toward Jews and Israel in response to reminders of death will often be expressed in subtle and indirect ways that are plausibly interpretable as something other than prejudice. One way to unveil modern antisemitism has come to be known as the "3D" test —double standards, demonization, and delegitimization.[37] The results of the Cohen et al. study showed that mortality salience increases the application of double standards to Israel by showing it increased support for punishing Israeli transgressions more than those of other countries.

A follow-up study[38] tested the model by examining demonization and delegitimization. Demonization is the classification of a person or group as evil, thereby justifying or legitimizing either verbal slurs or physical violence. Once demonized, the individual or group is denied humane behavior and human respect. Types of demonization include dehumanization (e.g., depiction of the group as savages, insects, beasts, or monsters), negative trait characterization

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37 Cf. N. Sharansky, "3D Test of Anti-Semitism: Demonization, Double Standards, Delegitimization," *Jewish Political Studies Review* 16, no. 3–4 (Fall 2004), https://www.jcpa.org/phas/phas-sharansky-f04.htm.
38 Cf. F. Cohen, "Do Political Cartoons Reflect Antisemitism?" *Journal for the Study of Antisemitism* 4 (2012): 141–64.

(e. g., aggressors, idiots, lazy); out-casting (i. e., violators of social norms, murderers or terrorists) and rejected political labels (i. e., Nazis, communists, socialists).[39] Throughout history, demonization has been used by groups and nations as a tool of exploitation and to justify aggression. For example, the perpetrators of genocide often (e. g., Cambodia, Darfur, Germany, Rwanda, and Turkey) created a political atmosphere supportive of mass murder by demonizing their intended victims.

Delegitimization means causing something to appear illegitimate or invalid. Borrowing from Bar-Tal's definition,[40] delegitimization is the denial of some entity's right to exist because that entity is inherently immoral. Delegitimized groups are seen as transgressors of basic human norms or values and are therefore characterized as bad and ultimately evil. Demonization is often used in the service of delegitimization—if "they" are merely beasts or insects, or if "their" behavior is sufficiently revolting or immoral, then "they" do not deserve the right to exist.

Empirical Findings

Cohen[41] tested the MASIM through the hypothesis that expressions of hostility toward Israel will be magnified by a mortality salience induction even in the absence of bogus pipeline conditions. Therefore, demonization of Israel was assessed through obtaining participants' impressions of two political cartoons. Political cartoons typically use visual metaphors and caricatures to draw attention to important social and political issues with a humorous or emotional picture.

Political cartoonists in the Arab media often depict non-Arab countries and their leaders as exterminators of the Muslim world.[42] And in a Western media outlet, a popular British cartoon that depicts former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon eating babies is a form of demonization. This cartoon draws heavily on the medieval Jewish blood libels in which Jews were accused of murdering non-Jewish

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39 Cf. D. Bar-Tal and A. W. Kruglanski, *The Social Psychology of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); D. Bar-Tal, "Causes and Consequences of Delegitimization: Models of Conflict and Ethnocentrism," *Journal of Social Issues* 46, no. 1 (1990): 65–81; idem, *Group Beliefs: A Conception for Analyzing Group Structure, Processes and Behavior* (New York: Springer, 1990).

40 Cf. Bar-Tal and Kruglanski, *The Social Psychology of Knowledge.*

41 Cf. Cohen, "Do Political Cartoons Reflect Antisemitism?"

42 Cf. I. Marcus and B. Crook, "US Soldier Is Rapist and Rice is 'Exterminator;' US committing 'Ethnic Cleansing'," Palestinian Media Watch, issued November 22, 2004, accessed June 8, 2012.

children in order to use their blood to prepare Passover matzos. There are many other examples of modern political cartoons portraying Israel and Israelis as Nazis, animals, insects, or cannibals.[43]

These cartoons are striking in several regards. First, on the surface, they seem to reflect the virulent type of loathing that often characterizes deep-seated bigotries. Second, they were obtained from mainstream presses from a variety of countries (American, British, Egyptian). Third, many have a haunting similarity in substance, style, and motif to Nazi-era cartoons depicting Jews in a manner widely recognized as reflecting the most virulent form of antisemitism.

The vile nature of these cartoons may suggest that antisemitic attitudes may run wide and deep, and they raise the possibility that these cartoons reflect more than mere opposition to Israel. While it is possible that other countries, cultures, or peoples are similarly depicted as widely and as frequently in such a revolting manner, these real-world examples are also consistent with the perspective suggesting that hostility to Israel may be expressed with such virulence that it is most likely powered, at least in part, by antisemitism. Thus, one purpose of this study was to assess whether mortality salience increases support for the anti-Israeli political cartoons more than for those of another country (Path 1 X 2 of the image 3 model).

Study 3 therefore tested the hypothesis that expressions of hostility toward the Jewish state would be magnified by a mortality salience induction even in the absence of bogus pipeline conditions.

One-hundred and fifty-two Rutgers University students assessed a subtle expression of antisemitism and anti-Israel sentiment and opposition to Israel in the form of demonization. Participants included 97 females and 54 males. Ten identified themselves as African American, 26 as (non-Chinese) Asian American, 17 as Latino, 82 as White, and 12 as belonging to other ethnic groups. One hundred and four identified themselves as belonging to one of the many Christian faiths, 12 as Hindu, 5 as Muslim, 1 as (non-Chinese) Buddhist, and 29 as "other."

Participants were randomly assigned to either a mortality salience or an aversive pain control induction and were then asked to read a short vignette discussing either Israeli brutality toward Palestinians or Chinese brutality toward a group of monks. Participants were then shown impressions of two offensive political cartoons depicting the Israeli leader eating Palestinian babies (see image 4) and a Jew atop the world with a bleeding Arab surrendering beneath (see image 5).

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43 Cf. Kotek, "Major Anti-Semitic Motifs in Arab Cartoons."

Image 4: Cartoon depicting PM Sharon eating Palestinian children. Al-Hayat al-Jadida, March 22, 2004. Source: Cohen et al., "The Modern Anti-Semitism Israel Model," 8.

Image 5: Cartoon depicting Chinese president eating Tibetan children. Source: Cohen et al., "The Modern Anti-Semitism Israel Model," 9.

Two parallel cartoons of the Chinese leader eating Tibetan babies (see image 6) and a Chinese man atop the world with a bleeding Tibetan surrendering beneath served as the control conditions (see image 7).

Image 6: Cartoon depicting victorious Jew atop bleeding world with a surrendering Arab beneath. Al-Hayat al-Jadida, May 14, 2005. Source: Cohen et al., "The Modern Anti-Semitism Israel Model," 8.


Image 7: Cartoon depicting victorious Chinese man atop bleeding world with a surrendering Tibetan beneath. Source: Cohen et al., "The Modern Anti-Semitism Israel Model," 9.

Participants were asked to indicate on a scale of 1 to 5 how "justified" they thought each cartoon was. Results showed that mortality salience in conjunction

with a bogus pipeline manipulation increased perceived justification for offensive political cartoons of Israel but not China (effects were significant for both the leadership cartoon and the world cartoon). That the bogus pipeline was needed to reveal this effect suggests that, in fact, a cartoon of Ariel Sharon eating babies is a relatively obvious assessment of antisemitism.

Anti-Israel Demonstrations on College Campuses

The BDS movement was designed as a peaceful campaign that attempts to put economic and political pressure on Israel to comply with Palestinian demands for an end to occupation and the rights of Palestinian return as stipulated in UN resolution 194,[44] but for Jewish students the movement has proven to be anything but peaceful. Based on the findings of Cohen et al., it seems likely that hostility toward Jews and Israel in response to reminders of death will often be expressed in subtle and indirect ways that are plausibly interpretable as something other than prejudice. Wars, civil unrest, police shootings, riots, and pandemics have served to remind people on a daily basis of the finitude of their lives.

The past decade has seen an unprecedented rise in the BDS movement. In the early part of the decade, anti-Israel faculty members at the University of California, Santa Cruz supported the Muslim Student Association (MSA) campaigns boycotting and harassing Jewish and pro-Israel students, thus creating a threatening environment for many Jewish students at the university.[45] In response to the need to protect Jewish students from antisemitic harassment, the Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights (OCR) instituted new policies of protecting Jewish students from antisemitic harassment to ensure that university programs and activities are free from discrimination of race, color, or national origin. The incident at UC Santa Cruz was only one of many. This situation has become so dire that just this month in response to harassment complaints by a Jewish graduate, New York University was forced to reaffirm these policies. By executive order from President Donald Trump, universities must consider the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism. Universities

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44 Cf. "Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS," issued July 9, 2005, accessed December 15, 2020, https://bdsmovement.net/call.
45 Cf. T. Rossman-Benjamin, "Fighting on the Front Lines: Anti-Semitism at the University of California and Efforts to Combat it," *Israel Affairs* 18 (2021): 485–501.

must be able to recognize and define all forms of antisemitism, including harassment of pro-Israel groups, considered a contemporary form of antisemitism.[46]

The most recent study[47] is an extended conceptual replication of Cohen et al., Study 3 which tested the MASIM through the hypothesis that expressions of hostility toward Israel will be magnified by a mortality salience induction even in the absence of bogus pipeline conditions. Prejudice is more likely to be expressed when it is "safe" to do so—when one has plausible reasons other than prejudice for acting in a prejudicial manner.[48] One such manifestation is punishing transgressors. "Why are we punishing them? Not because we are prejudiced, but because they have committed an immoral act."

If the BDS movement is a manifestation of our morals leading us to oppose human rights violations, then we should punish any transgressor nation through sanctions, boycotts, economic embargoes/divestments, and even war. Thus, one purpose of this study was to test the hypothesis that when we encounter reminders of death, we reaffirm our sense of belief in a moral world order by more strongly demanding that human rights violators be punished. Thus mortality salience should lead people to more strongly supporting a BDS movement against any country committing human rights violations.

Hypotheses

- H1: If mortality salience increases our sense of belief in a moral world order, then mortality salience should increase people's support for the BDS movement (imposing sanctions, boycotts, economic embargoes/divestments, and even war) against all countries committing transgressions.
- H2: If BDS is indeed an expression of prejudice then mortality salience should disproportionately increase support for punishing Israel. This is because there are two separate routes by which mortality salience may in-

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46 Cf. U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR)'s letter to the New York University, issued September 25, 2020, accessed December 15, 2020, https://mesana.org/pdf/NYU-OCR-Resolution-Agreement-9-25-20-With-Watermark.pdf.

47 Presented here in its entirety; cf. F. Cohen, and G. Ritorto, "A Psychological Understanding of the BDS Movement on College Campuses," unpublished manuscript (2018, typescript). This study was originally conducted for the purposes of an undergraduate honors thesis. Participants constituted a sample of convenience recruited from various clubs and classes and thus is limited. The results however are compelling enough that they are worthy of discussion with the acknowledgement that further research is needed.

48 Cf. e. g. McConahay and Hough, "Symbolic Racism"; T. D. Nelson, *The Psychology of Prejudice* (Needham Heights: Allyn & Bacon, 2002).

crease opposition to Israel: the desire to reaffirm the world as a moral place *and* an increase in antisemitism. Therefore, our model predicts that the increase in support for punishing Israel in response to mortality salience should exceed the increase in support for punishing other countries that commit the same moral transgressions.

Methods

One hundred and forty participants were recruited from the CUNY College of Staten Island, 4 were dropped for missing data. Participants received no credit for their participation, which lasted about 15 minutes. Participants included 80 females and 53 males (3 unidentified). Nine identified themselves as African American, 12 as Asian American, 31 as Latino, 68 as White, and 15 as belonging to other ethnic groups (1 unidentified). Eighty-seven identified themselves as belonging to one of the many Christian faiths, 8 as Hindu, 13 as Muslim, 5 as Buddhist, and 23 as "other."

Design and Procedure

Participants were approached on campus and randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions in this study's 2 (mortality salience: Death v. Pain) X 2 (target country: Russia v. Israel) independent groups design.

– *Mortality salience.* In the mortality salience (MS) condition, participants responded to two open-ended questions relating to their own mortality, which read as follows: "Please describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you." And, "Write down as specifically as you can what you think will happen to you physically when you die."

– *Pain salience.* In the pain salience (PS) condition (control), participants responded to parallel questions regarding thoughts of pain as follows: "Please describe the emotions that the thought of intense physical pain arouses in you." And, "Write down as specifically as you can what you think will happen to you as you experience pain and when it's over." Pain salience provided an apt control condition because, as demonstrated in previous TMT studies, thoughts of physical pain are an unpleasant as well as anxiety-provoking, yet non-lethal, event.

- *PANAS-X.* Given that previous TMT research demonstrated that MS manipulations emerge after a short delay and distraction,[49] following the MS manipulation participants completed the PANAS-X[50] to assess the affective consequences (or lack thereof) of the MS manipulation, and a short literary passage used in previous studies to provide the delay and distraction.
- *Readings and questions.* Participants read one of two versions of an article concerning human rights abuses based on one published by Amnesty International (Amnesty International, 2002). Both versions of the article were identical, except for our alterations locating the event to Palestine, or the Ukraine and the perpetrator nation as Israel, or Russia, respectively (see Appendix A for the Israel/Russian version of the article).

After reading the article, participants were presented with six scenarios describing possible punishments or actions to take against the human rights violator (see Appendix A). Participants were then asked to indicate how much they agreed with the punishment on a five-point Likert scale (1 = "disagree" and 5 = "agree"). These items demonstrated good internal reliability (α = .81). In order to keep participants' score on the original 1–5 point scale, we summed participants' responses to the 6 sanctions questions and divided by 6. The average constituted each participant's score on this scale. Higher scores indicated stronger support for BDS of the described country committing the human rights transgressions. Participants then completed a demographics questionnaire and were then debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.

Results and Discussion

To determine if mortality salience affected mood, we performed analyses of variance on an abridged version of the PANAS-X (Watson and Clark, 1992) including Positive Affect and Negative Affect. There were no significant effects of mortality salience on any affect scale or subscale (all *p.* values > .1). Additionally, we conducted a test for outliers. We did not find any.

The main analyses consisted of a 2 (mortality vs. pain salience) X 2 (country: Israel vs. Russia) ANOVA, with support for BDS as the outcome.[51] The fundamen-

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49 Cf. J. Greenberg et al., "Role of Consciousness and Accessibility of Death-Related Thoughts in Mortality Salience Effects," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 67, no. 4 (1994): 627–37.
50 Cf. Watson and Clark, "Affects Separable and Inseparable."
51 Preliminary analyses indicated no effects by gender or ethnicity.

tal predictions of this study were that: (1) mortality salience will increase BDS attitudes toward any country committing human rights violations; and (2) mortality salience will selectively amplify BDS support for punishing of Israel. These predictions were optimally tested by a one degree of freedom a priori contrast.[52] Reflecting the mortality salience increases support for sanctions hypothesis, Russia pain salience, Russia mortality and Israel pain salience each received contrast coefficients of -1. Reflecting the mortality salience selectively amplifies support for punishing Israel hypothesis, Israel mortality salience received a contrast coefficient of 3.

The ANOVA produced a significant main effect for country, $F(1, 132) = 9.36$, $p = .003$, which was qualified by a significant interaction between mortality salience and country, $F(1, 132)=14.72$, $p < .001$ (there was no significant mortality salience main effect). Cell means are presented in Table 1.

	Pain Salience				Mortality salience			
Country	N	M	SD	CC	N	M	SD	CC
Israel	33	2.92	.90	-1	37	3.61	.53	3
Russia	33	3.03	.68	-1	33	2.75	.87	-1

Table 1: *Cell Means, Standard Deviations, and Contrast Coefficients (CC) for testing Study 5 Predictions.* Numbers in each cell are, respectively, participants (N), cell mean (M), standard deviation (SD), and a priori contrast coefficient (CC). Higher means reflect support for stronger sanctions.

More important, the a priori contrast was significant, $t(132) = 5.12$, $p < .001$, effect size, r = .39.[53] This contrast, therefore, strongly supported the hypotheses that mortality salience generally increases support for punishing transgressors but that it also increased support for punishing Israel more than it increased support for punishing the other countries.

Post hoc contrasts further supported this conclusion. The effect of mortality salience on increasing support for punishing countries committing human rights violations was most strongly apparent in the Israel condition. Within this condition, those who considered their own mortality expressed greater support for punishing Israel ($M = 3.64$, $SD = .55$) than did those who considered thoughts

52 Cf. R. L. Rosenthal and R. Rosnow, *Essentials of Behavioral Research: Methods and Data Analysis* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991).

53 Levene's tests for homogeneity of variance were significant $p < .05$ as such analyses adjusting for unequal variances were conducted and remained significant $t(99) = -6.24$, $p < .001$. Cf. also A. Lenhard and W. Lenhard, "Calculation of Effect Sizes," Psychometrica, issued 2016, accessed October 28, 2020, https://www.psychometrica.de/effect_size.html.

of pain (M = 2.92, SD = .90), t (68) = -4.15, p <. 001).[54] Mortality salience did not significantly increase support for sanctioning Russia, t (64) = 1.41, p > .10.[55]

This pattern is particularly valuable for revealing the role of antisemitism in anti-Israeli sentiment. If antisemitic prejudice did not increase support for BDS attitudes toward Israel, the mortality salience manipulation would likely have led to an increase in support for BDS for both transgressors equally. In the mortality salience condition, antisemitism selectively increased support for punishing Israel.

Conclusion

The main purpose of this research has been to understand the nature of antisemitism (i.e., why it endures, is so widespread, and takes so many different and even contradictory forms), and to link antisemitism to opposition to Israel. The research assumes that Jews represent a worldview threat, and hostility toward Jews and toward Israel arises from this threat. If Jews represent such a threat, then hostility toward Jews and toward Israel should be greater when worldviews are more valued and more needed—that is, in the shadow of mortality fears. All five of the presented studies confirmed this formula by testing the hypothesis that expressions of hostility toward the Jewish state would be magnified by a mortality salience induction.

According to the Modern Israel Anti-Semitism Model (MASIM), mortality salience increases antisemitism and that antisemitism often manifests as hostility toward Israel. Study 1 showed that mortality salience led to greater levels of antisemitism and lowered support for Israel. This effect occurred only in a bogus pipeline condition, indicating that social desirability masks hostility toward Jews and Israel. Study 2 showed that mortality salience caused Israel, but no other country, to perceptually loom large. Study 3 showed that mortality salience increased punitiveness toward Israel's human rights violations more than it increased hostility toward the identical human rights violations committed by India or Russia. Study 4 showed that mortality salience increased people's agreement with support for political cartoons demonizing Israel but not China. Study 5 showed that mortality salience increased support of BDS for Israel's human rights violations committed against Palestinians more than it increased support

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54 Levene's tests for homogeneity of variance were significant p < .05 as such analyses adjusting for unequal variances were conducted and remained significant t (50) = -4.03, p < .001.
55 Levene's tests for homogeneity of variance were significant p < .05 as such analyses adjusting for unequal variances were conducted and remained significant t (60) = 1.41, p > .10.

of BDS for Russia's identical human rights violations committed against the Ukraine.[56] Collectively, results suggest that Jews constitute a unique cultural threat to many people's worldviews, that antisemitism causes hostility to Israel, and that hostility to Israel may feed back to increase antisemitism.

Even with media reports of antisemitism on the rise, social psychological research has yet to resume its once prominent emphasis on understanding antisemitism.[57] This is, however, an unfortunate state of affairs, which the present paper begins to rectify. The research presented extended the findings of Cohen et al.[58] and Cohen[59] and provided insight into the psychological underpinnings of the BDS movement. First, it demonstrated that under the right (wrong) conditions, antisemitism readily emerges. Denials of antisemitism, therefore, cannot necessarily be taken at face value. Opposition to Israel is a good/convenient method for expressing antisemitism without seeming to do so.

Second, the hypotheses derived from the MASIM model were built on the original tenets of terror management theory and presented preliminary experimental evidence to support the model. Given the recent rise in the salience of a deadly pandemic coupled with violent acts against civilians in the West (e. g., World Trade Center, Spanish train attacks, London bus bombings, police shootings, riots, etc.), it seems likely that mortality salience has been chronically raised. If so, then the current model provides a strong explanation for recent acts of antisemitism.[60]

The MASIM contributes one explanation toward establishing the relationship between antisemitism and opposition to Israel. Because war, conflict, and extreme economic conditions (unprecedented since the Great Depression)[61] raise mortality salience concerns, antisemitic attitudes may be triggered. Higher levels of antisemitism, in turn, increase hostility toward Israel. And bitter public condemnation directed at Israel may feed back to increase antisemitism. The

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56 Study 5 is limited due to unequal variances, however these limitations were taken into account when conducting statistical analyses and adjusted for.

57 Cf. H. Bachner, "Anti-Jewish Motifs in the Public Debate on Israel, Sweden: A Case Study," in *Anti-Semitism Worldwide* 2001/2 (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2003), https://en-humanities.tau.ac.il/sites/humanities_en.tau.ac.il/files/media_server/humanities/kantor/2001.pdf, 5–25.

58 Cf. Cohen et al., "Modern Anti-Semitism and Anti-Israeli Attitudes."

59 Cf. Cohen, "Do Political Cartoons Reflect Antisemitism?"

60 Cf. M. Kunzelman, "Report: Anti-Semitic Incidents in US Hit Record High in 2019," *ABC News*, May 12, 2020, https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/report-anti-semitic-incidents-us-hit-record-high-70629134.

61 Cf. B. Wills, "US Recession Worst Since Great Depression, Revised Data Show," *Bloomberg News*, August 1, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aNivTjr852TI [no longer available].

major advances within social psychology over the last 50 years (i. e., since the last major wave of antisemitism research) provide an extraordinary opportunity to understand the sources and consequences of antisemitism. They also will undoubtedly help detect the sometimes veiled manner in which antisemitism is expressed and the conditions under which opposition to Israel reflects and does not reflect antisemitism.

Florette Cohen is Associate Professor for Social Psychology at CUNY College of Staten Island. She received her PhD from the Social Psychology program at Rutgers University-New Brunswick in 2008. Her most recent line of research demonstrates that people who are reminded of their own death (mortality salience) respond by reaffirming their core values and beliefs, making their expressions of these more intense or more extreme. The mortality salience paradigm may be applied to cases of individual voting preferences, stereotypic thinking, and prejudice, which seems to be aroused by major social disruptions.

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Appendix A

Please read the following excerpt frome Amnesty International's web site and answer the questions on the following page:

The last [GAZA] war in the in the Israeli-Palestinian/ Russian—Ukrainian territories had lasting effects on the status of world peace and humanitarian decisions. The violence and killings in the region over the past four and a half years has brought untold suffering to the Palestinian/Ukrainian and Israeli/Russian civilian populations. More than 3,200 Palestinians/Ukrainians, including more than 600 children and more than 150 women have been killed by Israeli/Russian forces. Most of the victims were unarmed civilians who were not taking part in any armed confrontations. Thousands more have been injured, many of them maimed for life. Amnesty International has repeatedly condemned and campaigned against the killings of civilians.

Since the beginning of the Palestinian/Ukrainian uprising against Israeli/Russian occupation, there has been an increased militarization of the conflict. From the first days of the uprising, the Israeli/Russian army abandoned policing and law enforcement tactics and adopted military measures, generally used in armed conflict. Israelis/Russians routinely used excessive and disproportionate force against civilians, including frequent air-strikes and tank shelling in densely populated Palestinian/Ukrainian residential areas. Large-scale destruction of Palestinian/Ukrainian homes, land and infrastructure, and imposition of military blockades and prolonged curfews kept the Palestinian/Ukrainian population imprisoned in their homes. Armed Palestinian/Ukrainian attacks against Israeli/Russian civilians, which were sporadic before the uprising, became a frequent occurrence. Suicide bombings, shootings, and other attacks on buses, cafes and public places became commonplace.

However, the endless cycle of killings is not the only human rights scandal. The increased militarization of the conflict has resulted in a dramatic deterioration of the human rights situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip/Ukraine, with unprecedented levels of poverty, unemployment, and health problems. Palestinian/Ukrainian women have borne the brunt of the suffering but their plight has been largely ignored. The multiple violations committed by Israeli/Russian forces in the Occupied/Ukrainian Territories have had grave and long-term consequences for the Palestinian/Ukrainian population and a particularly negative impact on women (as well as children and other vulnerable sectors of Palestinian/Ukrainian society), compounding the pressures and constraints to which Pal-

estinian/Ukrainian women are subject in the traditional Palestinian/Ukrainian patriarchal society.

What types of actions should be taken against Israel/Russia to prevent the human rights violations that have repeatedly occurred in the Palestinian/Ukrainian territories?

1. *Form a National Campaign against Israel/Russia* – American Citizens should rally to demonstrate their opposition towards Israeli/Russian actions.

1	2	3	4	5
Disagree				Agree

2. *Citizens' Boycott* – US citizens band together to boycott all Israeli/Russian products.

1	2	3	4	5
Disagree				Agree

3. *Citizens' Boycott* – US citizens band together to boycott all Israeli/Russian products.

1	2	3	4	5
Disagree				Agree

4. *Withdrawal of Aid* – The US government should conduct a total military and economic aid withdrawal from Israel/Russia until these human violations are no longer occurring.

1	2	3	4	5
Disagree				Agree

5. *Governmental Economic Bans* **–** The US government should ban all Israeli/ Russian products and goods.

1	2	3	4	5
Disagree				Agree

6. ***Installation of a New Government*** – The US and the United Nations should remove the current Israeli/Russian government and replace it with a government that cares about the welfare of **all** of its citizens.

1	2	3	4	5
Disagree				Agree

Theoretic Reflections on Antisemitism

Judit Bokser Liwerant

Antisemitism and Related Expressions of Prejudice in a Global World: A View from Latin America

Introductory Reflections

Antisemitism has acquired complex dynamics; its recurrences and transformations appear differentially over global interconnected realms, mediated by shared regional traits and distinct local configurations. Thus, the current international and transnational scenario, characterized by the unexpected revival of old antisemitic expressions and the rise of new ones, calls for an analysis of both the specific and the common traits. Due to its global character, which remains anchored in diverse local realities, it is vital to avoid abstract universalisms that could dilute space, actors, and societies' specificity.

Antisemitism and its different ideological matrices are subjective (stereotypes, myths, attitudes) and behavioral (actions, practices, institutional arrangements); agency and structure meet. The intellectual corpus that nourishes ideological frameworks and theoretical formulations interacts with socio-political processes and praxis. The imaginaries that nourish direct discourses and practices have been built on mobilizing myths that strengthen their routes by opposing the negative identification of Jewish Otherness as the radical outsider or enemy of the collective, be it society, the nation, or the state.

Latin America stands out with its inner diversity and singularities but not in isolation from other countries and regions of the world. While the focus on antisemitism in Latin America may not be surprising given its historical legacy and foundational experience, simplistic and reductionist approaches to the region should be avoided and instead replaced by more analytical ones, showcasing differences in time, place, and forms of expression and its relation to changing contexts: from the Conquest and the Inquisition to nation-building and the search for national integration; the Western world as the origin and as a referent to follow or oppose: the early translation of antisemitism without Jews; politicized ethnicities; contradictory efforts to build and reach modernity, displayed

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between multiple modernities[1] and the mausoleum of modernities;[2] nationalism and its bifurcations, peripheral nationalism and its exclusionary dimensions; fascism *vis-à-vis* liberalism and its neutral spheres; the place and role of the Catholic Church and Catholicism as a civic religion; from globality to the contradictory impact of globalization; from the Third World to the post-colonial Global South; from the search for modernity to its radical critique. And, still, a substantive chain well into the twenty-first century: populism; dissolvent democracies; democratization and de-democratization; the redefinition of globality and regional alliances.

Particular attention must be paid to its historical socio-political expressions and its symbolic representations. Indeed, antisemitism's symbolic and conceptual representations and how they are discursively formulated, repeated, re-elaborated, and transmitted pose new challenges to social research.[3] The building of the negative *tropos* of the Jew and its changing role and functionality run across time and distinctive social, economic, political, and cultural constellations.

Antisemitism's configuration is based on equal/different *tropos* as thematic fields displayed interactively, which create a habitus. According to Bourdieu, habitus refers to principles connecting a unitary field; they are classification schemes that work as distinctive signs of one symbolic capital.[4] Conservatives, liberals, religious, secular, Right, Left: different camps and overlapping motives reveal several less obvious social and political currents and cultural traits. Its different ideological matrices thus interact.

An analysis of contemporary antisemitism accounts for multiple timeline connections among particular individual and collective actors, ideas, and symbols through different circuits and levels. A multidimensional and transnational perspective shall contribute to robust explanations of its meanings, structural manifestations, and expression modes. The historical changing shades, shapes, and meanings of negative conceptual images of Jews, the recurrences of original stereotypes and prejudices, and their shifting significance on the one hand, and the overlapping of new expressions at the meaning-making level on the other, provide a fertile field for its analysis.

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1 Cf. S. N. Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities," *Daedalus* 129, no. 1 (2000): 1–29.
2 Cf. L. Whitehead, "Latin America as a 'Mausoleum of Modernities'," in *Latin America: A New Interpretation*, ed. L. Whitehead (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2006), 23–68.
3 Cf. M. Reisigl and R. Wodak, *Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism and Antisemitism* (London: Routledge, 2005).
4 Cf. P. Bourdieu, *Razones prácticas: Sobre la teoría de la acción* (Barcelona: Anagrama, 2007).

Indeed, antisemitism's symbolic and conceptual representations and how they are produced and reproduced discursively pose renewed challenges to social research.

This article builds on snapshots of negative Jewish *tropos*-building, the avatars of negative representation and stereotypes of Jews in Latin America, with a global perspective. Historic recurrences and changes and their different referents of collective belonging—culture, ethnicity, language, religion, nation, and culture—will be analyzed in paradigmatic contextual scenarios, differing sources, and currents. In its specificity and its interactions with related prejudices, negative *tropos*-building will be seen at different levels. Given the historical pattern of recurrence and change, the non-linearity and complexity of the interactions and mutual influences between antisemitism and related prejudices will be analyzed. We will emphasize theoretical formulations and conceptual approaches, focusing specifically on the interaction between antisemitism, anti-Israelism, and anti-Zionism as singular yet overlapping phenomena at the meaning-making level. Its discursive production and material projection, as well as its dual physical and symbolic links with violence, concern society, culture, and the public and civic sphere, where discourse and interpretation meet, and vocabularies connect images and representations while shaping prejudices.

Recurrences and Changes

The historical recurrence of antisemitism and its discursive production does not mean witnessing the same phenomenon. It may bring back old elements while acquiring new expressions or introducing new ones, responding to different logics and functions and framed by distinct individuals and groups. In this sense, one problem with the "Hydra" explanation—the monster always lurking under the surface of the water and revealing its many heads in other places and times—is its ahistorical conception of the various expressions of antisemitism. Indeed, like geological layers, while each form draws on and replicates older forms,

> they are also different phenomena. They arise and they become widespread in radically different times and places. They have different manifestations, are employed by different social forces, they make use of other narratives. [...] the difference between a time or a place where it is visible and one where it is not is purely contingent.[5]

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5 D. Hirsh, "Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism: Cosmopolitan Reflections," Occasional Papers (Yale Initiative for the Interdisciplinary Study of Antisemitism [YIISA], New Haven, 2007), 19–21.

Similar to other discriminatory social processes, it may be veiled, diffuse and structural, latent or manifest. The recovery and elaboration on previous representation and images may be better understood as a constellation of attitudes, stereotypes, and prejudices, conceptual legacies that overlap. A realm of ideologies and theories: world visions and conceptualizations. Its practical behavior implies acts, praxis, institutional orders, and structural configurations. It has indeed displayed a wide range of expressions: hostile behavior and physical aggression against individuals and communities, actions against specific persons ranging between harassment, physical violence, the extreme of murder, the racialization of a people, and the Holocaust.

Not the Hydra, then, but *tropos* and representations that relate to the Jews and Jewishness's imaginations, were built throughout history by discursive elements.[6] Different times and ideological matrices that nourish direct discourses and practices have been constructed on mobilizing myths that strengthen the view of Jews as the radical outsiders.

Tropos indicate metaphors that objectify antisemitic imagination—a deicidal people, composed of money-grubbers and money lovers; rich, powerful, selfish, immoral; alien, un-rooted; an exclusive caste, a distinct racial character; Jewish World domination; world conspiracy; the Zionist lobby; Zionism equated to racism; Israel and Zionism—the matrix power of colonialism. Simultaneously, antisemitism has multiple connections with other processes and trends—currents and countercurrents—amidst complex social dynamics of acceptance and rejection.

Thus, *tropos*-building leads to a diachronic perspective amidst changing socio-political and cultural constellations. Latin America has different codes of inclusions and exclusions. The rejection and absence of collective actors as legitimate inhabitants of the public sphere have been built and narrated differently. In the Southern cone, in Euro-American countries, where mass migration modified the population profile, it took shape in an alleged neutral public sphere *vis-à-vis* private differences, which was the idea of secular, liberal thought, of a national identity constructed on the supposedly integrating foundations that homogeneity provides. The national subject was not understood in its diversity; the Latin American liberal narrative turned its back to the latter. In Indo-America, diversity remained a referent and bastion for the indigenous peoples, who became the essential national subject and the sole dweller of Otherness. Together with them, immigrant minorities emerged as a fenced-off duo. In both

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6 Cf. S. DellaPergola, "Jewish Perceptions of Antisemitism in the European Union, 2018: A New Structural Look," *Analysis of Current Trends in Antisemitism – ACTA* 40, no. 2 (2020): 1–86.

constellations, the process of national building found difficulties facing the collective Jewish condition.

Whereas the Western program of modernity constituted a crucial and critical referent for Latin American societies, they developed distinctly modern singular models and paths concerning their cultural premises, traditions, and historical experiences. Sustained global dynamics developed through a peripheral connection to external centers that provided the parameters of institutional creation and conceptions of the nation.[7] Being part of the West but simultaneously differing from it shaped many values and institutional arrangements as cultural hybrids. While religion has been structurally embedded in social life, Catholicism's internalization also implied its conversion into civic culture. Profound paradoxes developed: civic Catholicism opened the possibility of creating new meanings and codes, thus advancing secularization in the public sphere. However, it simultaneously sets its limits. The Catholic Church's central place enhanced difficulties when dealing with religious and ethnic diversity, thereby projecting encounters with Otherness as contradictory realities of social diversity and homogeneous goals and narratives. Ethnicity and religion have public significance, and nationalism has not displayed secular civic inclusiveness. Nationalism and politicized ethnicity, as characteristically modern phenomena, have been subject to chronic challenges in the region.

Convergences and divergences between opposites framed the encounter with Jews. Their ethnonational diaspora character, as a socio-cultural formation, was perceived as an anachronistic, unacceptable realm of alterity; its members were suspected of not having been assimilated or fully integrated. This issue has been part of modernity's European configuration, and it is also the case in Latin America. Even in the absence of Jews, the struggles of liberals and conservatives carried anti-Jewish arguments, nourishing their negative representation.

One among the foundational examples of the various nationalist/anti-foreigner tones that were expressed along the continent may be seen in Mexico, in the universal hatred the Revolutionaries (1910) aimed at the technocratic elite of Porfirio Díaz's dictatorship (1884–1910), the so-called *científicos* (scientists). The anti-*científico* discourse took the shape of antisemitic ideology, even though there were no Jews in the group, and set the tone of revolutionary nationalism that would ultimately get institutionalized. The "traitor within" image generated

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7 Cf. S. N. Eisenstadt, "Latin America and the Problem of Multiple Modernities," in *Shifting Frontiers of Citizenship: The Latin American Experience*, ed. M. Sznajder, L. Roniger, and C. Forment (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 43–54; J. Bokser Liwerant, "Thinking Multiple Modernities from Latin America's Perspective: Complexity, Periphery and Diversity," in *Varieties of Multiple Modernities: New Research Design*, ed. G. Preyer and M. Sussman (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 177–205.

fears as diffuse and widespread as the support for capitalist development, stability, and progress that defined the regime. The traitor's association with cosmopolitanism and finance made antisemitic rhetoric politically viable. On the eve of the outbreak of the Revolution, consensus on this matter was such that revolutionaries like Luis Cabrera had no qualms about calling the *científicos* avatars of the eternal Jew. They, he argued, were of neither the conservative nor the reformist/liberal party. "Rather, they belonged to the cowardly and calculating group that sides opportunistically with whomever is in power to further their financial interests." No loyalties, only selfishness and materialism.[8] Forged in the Dreyfus Affair furnace, and at the time of the United States' rise as the hegemon in the Americas, anti-*científico* rhetoric adopted the Jew-fetishism that had been emerging in Europe since the mid-nineteenth century and used it to rally a variety of constituencies. As an example of modern antisemitism, the anti-*científico* sentiment was unusual in two respects: it targeted symbolic, rather than literal, Jews; and it developed in a context of growing economic dependency, rather than in the transition from nationalism to imperialism, as was the case in France and Germany.[9] The Affair became an integral part of conservatives/liberals confronting the church and the military's role and place. Known prejudices constituted early contents of the negative *tropos*.

Antisemitism, historically, has been nourished by religious beliefs, myths, socio-economic motives, xenophobic sentiments, and racism. The latter is not exclusively associated with biological inferiority but has recently extended to a cultural version that implies veiled attitudes against national, ethnic, and religious groups, especially minorities, thereby isolating and segregating them. Such attitudes allegedly support cultural differences. However, their underlying assumptions point to fixed and naturalized traits primarily attributed to social groups and confined to a pseudo-psychological culturalism. It concerns society, culture, and the public sphere where discourse and interpretation meet, a space for hermeneutics, a mosaic of dominant and subordinate vocabularies overlapping prejudices, all of which acquire particular saliency in different constellations.[10]

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8 Cf. C. Lomnitz-Adler, *El antisemitismo y la ideología de la Revolución mexicana* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2010); idem, *Exits from the Labyrinth: Culture and Ideology in the Mexican National Space* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); J. Bokser Liwerant, "Sinopia and Pentimenti" (Wistrich Lecture, Jerusalem, 2018).

9 Cf. Lomnitz-Adler, *Exits from the Labyrinth*.

10 Cf. P.-A. Taguieff, *Rising from the Muck: The New Anti-Semitism in Europe* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2004); M. Wieviorka, *The Lure of Anti-Semitism: Hatred of Jews in Present-Day France* (Leiden: Brill, 2007).

Antisemitism and Related Prejudices

Despite the greater conceptual awareness of the complexity of antisemitism, more clarity is still needed to analyze related contemporary expressions of prejudice, exclusion and, specifically, anti-Zionism, in its heterogeneous composition, criticism of Israel and even anti-Israelism. Antisemitism, anti-Zionism, and anti-Israelism are singular yet overlapping phenomena at the meaning-making level. Latent and manifest dimensions interact.

Criticism of Israel is not necessarily antisemitic in essence or motivation. However, both overlap if prejudiced rhetoric or images drawing on old myths and old/new stereotypes, such as conspiracy theories or the representation of Israel's policies as emblematic of evil, racist, or genocidal states, are used.[11] By overlapping at the meaning-making level, these phenomena are likely to have significant—and even dangerous—implications. Legitimate criticism of Israel and its policies in light of the long-lasting Israeli-Palestinian conflict is different in its inner and outer sphere of origin, the causality of origin (ethical, universal, cosmopolitan) and the expected outcome (public pressure). A discursive tool may imply a double standard when making judgments regarding Israel's policies toward the Palestinians. Tools may also include the representation of Israel's policies as evil, racist, or genocidal. Such approaches lead to the demonization and de-legitimization of Israel with significant, even dangerous, implications. Antisemitism adopts singular forms that reflect the complex interactions between historic recurrences and changes and between different referents of collective belonging—religion, culture, ethnicity, history, hermeneutics.

Without denying that it is challenging to know the motivations that may drive antisemitism, anti-Zionism, and anti-Israelism, multiple layers of prejudices, cultural configurations, social interests, political constellations, and geostrategic interests can certainly be highlighted. A socio-historical analysis should not focus on intent or motive but its effects, given its societal resonance:

> Antisemitism should be understood as a social phenomenon that is not reducible to the intent or the self-consciousness of the social actors involved. Antisemitism is a social fact produced through shared meanings and exclusions; it is not an individual moral failing.[12]

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11 Cf. R. Chazan, *Medieval Stereotypes and Modern Antisemitism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

12 D. Hirsh, "Hostility to Israel and Antisemitism: Toward a Sociological Approach," *Journal for the Study of Antisemitism*, no. 5 (2013): 1403.

Inner differentiation also finds expression in its possible outcomes, which include the normalization of hostility toward Israel and (or) Jews; the radicalization of discourse; new thresholds of acceptance, prejudice, rejection and delegitimation of Israel, and symbolic and physical violence. These outcomes become acute in our times characterized by globalization and transnationalization processes leading to new convergences between seemingly different and even opposing actors (a historical feature of modern antisemitism).

Hence the need to approach these singular but overlapping phenomena from a multifactorial perspective.

Singular, yet overlapping

ANTI-ZIONISM

MOTIVATION

- Predjudices/cultural configuration
- Social interests
- Political constellations and geo-strategic interests

ANTISEMITISM

- Attitudes/behavior
- Ideological constructs
- Old and new

POSSIBLE OUTCOMES NEW SCENARIOS

- Normalization of hostility towards Israel and/or Jews
- Radicalization of discourse
- New thresholds of acceptance/rejection
- Violence (symbolic and physical)

MULTIFACTORIAL PERSPECTIVES

- Socio-cultural legacies
- Population characteristics
- Historical legacies
- Political actors
- Communal condition (integration, participation, legitimate status).

ANTI-ISRAELISM

Image 1: Overlapping processes at the meaning-making level.

Conceptual Debates

The interactions between historical and emerging forms of antisemitism find expression in current conceptual elaborations and prevailing debates that include pragmatic and heuristic dimensions. The discussions have been triggered by the concept of "new antisemitism," around which a broad spectrum of conceptual approaches has been formulated.

It has been argued that a "new antisemitism" stems from the Left, the Right, and radical Islam, and tends, as a rule, to converge in its opposition to the existence of Israel as a Jewish state.[13] This new expression is nourished by convergent interests of otherwise opposed political actors that run from the Left to the Right (including nationalists who view Jews as the eternal foreigners) and fundamentalist Muslims who immigrated to Europe carrying their hatred of Israel and the Jews.[14] It is argued that the new antisemitism of the Left presents several parallel tracks that symbolically converge to include Jews and Israel. Therefore, the terms Jew, Zionist, and Israel are increasingly interchangeable in contemporary discourse globally.[15]

Whereas classical antisemitism involved discrimination against the personhood of Jews, the new one entails discrimination against the statehood of Jews. Thus, both assault the core of Jewish self-definition. This line of thought underscores antisemitism's uniqueness in that classical formulations deny Jews the right to live as equals in society; it now denies Jews the right to live as equals in the family of nations. Some proponents of the concept argue that criticism of Israel and Zionism is most often disproportionate in degree and unique in kind when compared to attitudes toward other foci of conflict worldwide.[16] The argumentative structure presents several parallel tracks that symbolically converge to include both Jews and Israel.

Other perspectives point to new sources of antisemitism. Pierre-André Taguieff contends that antisemitism is no longer based on racism and nationalism but, paradoxically, on anti-racism and anti-nationalism. It equates Zionism and racism; resorts to Holocaust denial; borrows from the Third-World discourse and the slogans of anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, anti-Americanism, and anti-globalization, and disseminates the image of the Palestinian as today's unique innocent victim. However, while Jews may not suffer discrimination,

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13 Cf. B. Lewis, *Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice* (New York: Norton, 1999); Taguieff, *Rising from the Muck.*

14 Cf. J. R. Fischel, "The New Anti-Semitism," *Virginia Quarterly Review* 81, no. 3 (2005): 225–34.

15 Cf. B. Cohen, "The Persistence of Anti-Semitism on the British Left," *Jewish Political Studies Review* 16, nos. 3/4 (2004): 157–69; S. Edelman, "Antisemitism and the New/Old Left," in *Not Your Father's Antisemitism: Hatred of the Jews in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. M. Berenbaum (St. Paul: Paragon House, 2008), 271–94; D. J. Goldhagen, *The Devil That Never Dies: The Rise and Threat of Global Antisemitism* (New York: Little, Brown, 2016).

16 Cf. I. Cotler, "Human Rights and the New Anti-Jewishness: Sounding the Alarm" (Jerusalem: The Jewish People Policy Planning Institute, 2002); L. N. Powell, *Troubled Memory: Anne Levy, the Holocaust, and David Duke's Louisiana* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).

they are often victims of stigma, threats, physical violence, and narratives that build on the negative *tropos*, which endorse radical anti-Zionism. Judeophobia or neo-judeophobia expresses itself in violence incited by radical Islamists. It becomes a cultural given on a public scene mechanically and unanimously supportive of a counter-cause that transcends the boundaries between Left and extreme Left. Its anti–Israelism, coupled with anti-Americanism, permeates all parts of right-wing opinion. Judeophobia accuses the Jews of being "too community," too religious and nationalistic, as well as too cosmopolitan. Zionism as victimizer is the ideological core mode of legitimation for contemporary anti-Jewish violence. This awakens old accusations of "ritual murder," that is, the blood libel.[17]

Michel Wieviorka emphasizes the multiple sources of antisemitism: far-right and far-left circles, given milieus in the Muslim population, youngsters of disadvantaged educational contexts or the spin-offs of the Middle East conflict and the sympathy awakened by the Palestinian cause among educated strata. Nevertheless, Wieviorka views antisemitism as one aspect among many of general societal malaise and not a major crisis in its own right.[18]

Scholars such as David Hirsh take a different stance by asking if Israel's criticism is necessarily antisemitic. In his view, the problematic argument for some "critics of Israel" to deal with is that criticism is often expressed by using rhetoric or images that resonate as antisemitism: holding Israel to higher standards than other states, articulating conspiracy theories, using demonizing analogies and harmful stereotypes, casting Jews in the role of oppressors, formulating criticism in such a way as to aggravate the vast majority of Jews and any other instance of using the word "criticism" but meaning discriminatory practices against Israelis or Jews.

As mentioned above, Hirsh adds that the recurrence of antisemitism does not mean witnessing a repetition of the same phenomenon, but one that may bring old elements while acquiring new expressions, responding to different logics and framed by distinct individuals and groups. One problem with the "Hydra" explanation is that while each form of anti-Judaism draws on and replicates older forms, "they are also hugely different phenomena. They arise, and they become widespread in radically different times and places. They have different manifestations and are employed by different social forces; they use different narratives."[19] Such differences are as striking as the commonalities between

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17 Cf. Taguieff, *Rising from the Muck*; idem, *La nueva judeofobia: Israel y los judíos, desinformación y antisemitismo* (Barcelona: Gedisa, 2009).
18 Cf. Wieviorka, *The Lure of Anti-Semitism*.
19 Hirsh, "Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism," 20–21.

the Spanish Inquisition, Christian antisemitism in nineteenth-century Poland, socialist antisemitism in Germany at the time of August Bebel, right-wing anti-Bolshevism, Nazi racist and genocidal antisemitism, understated and gentle-manly English exclusion, contemporary anti-imperialist anti-Zionism and Jihadi antisemitism. Anti-Zionism is indeed defined as antisemitism because it denies Jews' right to self-determination while defending self-determination for all other nations.[20] Its structural argumentative continuity takes place through historical elaborations.

In his extensive analysis of antisemitism and the perception Jews have of it, DellaPergola[21] analyzes the relationship between three principal axes: the recurrent historical and analogical demonizing strategy; the emphasis on permanent alterity, foreignness, detachment, and the questioning and denial of the Holocaust. He analyzes how Israel and the Holocaust are prevalent lines that point to the winds of time and emerge through their close links and association.



Image 2: Old and/or new antisemitism? Conceptual debates.

20 Cf. D. Matas, *Aftershock: Anti-Zionism and Anti-Semitism* (Toronto: Dundurn, 2005).
21 Cf. DellaPergola, "Jewish Perceptions of Antisemitism in the European Union, 2018."

Contrasting approaches downplay the significance of the new antisemitism. Much of the recent discourse on it is deemed to blur conceptual differences between antisemitism, criticism against US imperialism, and condemnation of both anti-Zionism and Israel security policies *vis-à-vis* the Palestinians.

Brian Klug considers that the new prejudice is not strictly speaking antisemitism but rather a recent phenomenon.[22] He argues that the concept is unhelpful because it devalues the historical significance of the term, transforming it into a part of a *mindset*, a way to overstate criticism and hostility of the Left toward Israel as irredeemably antisemitic prejudice. Earl Raab argues that charges of antisemitism based on anti-Israel views usually lack credibility. Thus, people supporting the Palestinians resent being wrongly accused of antisemitism, and the Jewish state's supporters exploit this alleged stigma to silence legitimate criticism of Israel's policy. He further states that accusations of antisemitism based on anti-Israel opinions lack credibility and that reasonably informed people think that Israel has the largest share of responsibility for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[23]

Image 3: Contrasting approaches.

22 Cf. B. Klug, "The Collective Jew: Israel and the New Antisemitism," *Patterns of Prejudice* 37, no. 2 (2003): 117–38; idem, "Is Europe a Lost Cause? The European Debate on Antisemitism and the Middle East Conflict," *Patterns of Prejudice* 39, no. 1 (2005): 46–59.
23 Cf. E. Raab, "Antisemitism, Anti-Israelism, Anti-Americanism," *Judaism* 51, no. 4 (2002): 387–96; S. J. Zipperstein, "Historical Reflections on Contemporary Antisemitism," in *Contemporary Antisemitism: Canada and the World*, ed. M. R. Marrus, D. J. Penslar, and J. Gross Stein (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 52–63.

Amidst the ongoing debates on antisemitism and new antisemitism, post-colonial and de-colonial perspectives gained ground in the framework of the Global South's conceptual and political formulations, where Latin America stands as itself and a symbol of other exclusions. Indeed, confronting the Global North, the Global South is conceived as the space of liberation from Western political, social, and epistemological assumptions that justify domination, economic takeover, and cultural management. Its focus is on the matrix of the colonial link between knowledge and power, allegedly diluted and obscured under modernity's Western epistemology. The argumentative rationale is based on the limits of the "unseen history"—the history of coloniality hidden under or behind Modernity's history, for example, the history of the second *nomos*.[24] The Global South thus becomes a conceptual and geopolitical territory that recovers conceptual exploration of the experience of the expansion of the West and the foundation of a hegemonic World System that defined its periphery.[25]

The decolonial debates approach a radical critique of Zionism, Israel, and the Jews overlapping prejudices in explicit or implicit transferring of meanings.


Image 4: Creating-recovering prejudices.

24 Cf. W. D. Mignolo, "The Global South and World Dis/Order," *Journal of Anthropological Research* 67, no. 2 (2011): 165–88.

25 Cf. A. Quijano and I. Wallerstein, "La americanidad como concepto, o América en el moderno sistema mundial," *Revista Internacional de Ciencias Sociales* 134, no. 4 (1992): 583–91.

In contrast to Islamophobia, which is framed as a Western ideology against non-Western subalterns, antisemitism is conceived as an outcome of the Israeli state's imperialist and colonialist establishment.

Indeed, one core element of the decolonial conceptions regarding the relations between antisemitism and racism finds its source in the whitening of the Jewish collectives compared to other racialized groups. As analyzed by Julia Edthofer, one of the central problematics lies in

> [the] dismissal of the very functionality of antisemitic racialization ultimately relates to one core element of de-colonial misconceptions regarding the relation of antisemitism and racism(s)—namely to the discursive "*whitening*" of Jewish collectivities when compared with other racialized groups.[26]

Thus, it implies both the negation of the antisemitic racialization of the Jew and the recovery of other racialized collectives. Mignolo further brings the Zionist project and Israel's state under the optic of Israel's collaboration with Western Imperialism. He would ultimately explain antisemitism and anti-Zionism as reactive: they are a consequence of the cooperation between Western neo-liberalism, capitalism, and secular Jews. For that, an old-new stereotype—essential to the negative *tropos*—is the rich and established Jews collaborating with the capitalist and colonial world order.

Focused on Israel, the Middle East conflict—originated by the Zionist enterprise—becomes the focal point of the global conflict between the Western neo-colonial world order and the subaltern resistance of the rest.[27] Gradually an exercise in conceptual synonymy nourishes the public narrative and is in turn nourished by it—Israel becomes a genocidal state; Israel is carrying out Nazi-like atrocities; Gaza is equivalent to the Warsaw Ghetto; Israel was born as a settler colonial state.[28]

The other line of thought embedded in the post-colonial perspective refers to another of the pillars of current antisemitic arguments: the Shoah. The Holocaust

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26 J. Edthofer, "Israel as Neo-Colonial Signifier? Challenging De-Colonial Anti-Zionism," *Journal for the Study of Antisemitism* 7, no. 2 (2015): 39.

27 Cf. R. Grosfoguel, "Human Rights and Anti-Semitism After Gaza," *Universitas Humanística*, no. 68 (2009): 157–77.

28 Cf. Grosfoguel, "Human Rights and Anti-Semitism after Gaza"; D. Lloyd, "Settler Colonialism and the State of Exception: The Example of Palestine/Israel," *Settler Colonial Studies* 2, no. 1 (2012): 59–80; R. Busbridge, "Israel-Palestine and the Settler Colonial 'Turn': From Interpretation to Decolonization," *Theory, Culture & Society* 35, no. 1 (2018): 91–115; L. Veracini, "The Other Shift: Settler Colonialism, Israel, and the Occupation," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 42, no. 2 (2013): 26–42.

is criticized as a Western Eurocentric remembrance paradigm stressing the alleged role Europe has assigned to the remembrance of the Holocaust as a unifying remembrance, omitting and erasing other past colonial genocides.

Snapshots of *Tropos*-Building: Historical Perspective on Latin America

The cumulative character of the negative *tropos* of the Jew and its different referents—from the individual to the collective; from the ethnic to the national; from diasporic existence to state existence—has interacted with changing historical circumstances. Continuity and change have been part of representations and praxis. Otherness, alterity, and its negative perception were part of a dynamic of acceptance and rejection.

For Latin America, Jewish Otherness was embedded in visions and immigration and exile policy. Antisemitism's impact on the social representation of the Jew as the Other was built with the arrival of Jewish immigration during the 1920s–1940s. Throughout these decades, migration became a prominent sphere in which different concepts of the nation and the desired type of society were formulated, and around which antisemitic expressions were articulated. Indeed, antisemitic stereotypes, prejudices, and behavior that were projected into norms and practices substantially impacted immigration policies. The official criteria that regulated the influx of Jewish immigration, first, and the Jewish exile, later—both for economic and ethnic-racial reasons—were widespread among the pressures of different social sectors and antisemitic associations that aimed to curb Jewish entrance to countries, which makes the analysis of concurrent social processes and political factors more complex.

During this period, antisemitism developed in the context of fundamental national political trends and was part of the rise and consolidation of European Nazism. Otherness was socially represented as foreignness amid debates that resulted in restrictive policies toward Jewish immigration and Jewish refugees and became a prominent sphere in which different antisemitic expressions were articulated.

In light of the challenges faced during these decades, complex interactions between widespread anti-Jewish prejudices and governmental policies developed. Nationalism bifurcated; the different modes of interpretation of the national interest were gradually polarized. The Right acquired growing strength, articulating prejudices that originated in Europe and were adapted, recreated and nourished by each country's reality. In different political and cultural constella-

tions, the main referents of the negative *tropos* were brought together, combined, and overlapped.

These decades were also marked by interconnected national, regional, global histories, and separate ones. Interconnected phenomena coexisted with social and political efforts by societies and governments to disassociate from the critical issue of Jews needing to abandon Europe. The international fora that addressed the refugee crisis during Nazism are exemplary cases. At both the Evian Conference (France, July 1938) and the first meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (London, August 1938), the Latin American nations were influenced by each other's positions as well as by pressure from the great powers and thus acted as a regional bloc, rather than making decisions solely on the basis of local or national considerations.[29]

Debates in these arenas expressed, transmitted, and reinforced prejudices that informed the negative images of the Jew, shaped national attitudes, yielding arguments that strengthened ambivalence, fostered indecision toward the refugee problem, and ultimately led to policies of exclusion. Renewed arguments were displayed that emphasized the Jewish community's separateness and its differences from the general population or the notion that Jews brought inconveniences and risks to the country.

In the case of Mexico, one of the paradoxes that must be highlighted is that despite the conceptual, ideological, and political differences that motivated right-wing groups and the economic and ethno-historic motivations that fueled official immigration policies, from the point of view of restricting Jewish immigration, there actually were meaningful interactions and convergences. Pragmatism and ideology interacted, stereotypes too.

The convergences can be seen in the argumentative structure of the extreme-right antisemitic organization *Acción Revolucionaria Mexicanista*, other antisemitic organizations that spread, right-wing intellectuals, and the socialist government of Lázaro Cárdenas. The recurrence of historical prejudiced expressions and the appearance of new ones can be discerned in the following graphic.

Indeed, the entry of Jews as immigrants and refugees was limited by and subjected to a restrictive logic. Concerning the refugees, restrictive policies prevailed in most Western countries. It defined a world pattern characterized by the continuity of the restrictive measures on immigration adopted since the

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29 Cf. J. Bokser Liwerant, "El México de los años treinta: cardenismo, inmigración judía y antisemitismo," in *Xenofobia y xenofilia en la historia de México, siglos XIX y XX: Homenaje a Moisés González Navarro*, ed. M. González Navarro and D. Salazar Anaya (México: SEGOB, Instituto Nacional de Migración, Centro de Estudios Migratorios; Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia; DGE Ediciones SA de CV, 2006), 379 – 415.

Image 5: Converging different and antagonistic sources of anti-Jewish prejudice. The Mexican case.

early 1930s and the limitations set on refugee admittance as Nazism took hold. However, in the Mexican case, this pattern contrasted with the country's open attitude concerning other exiles, notably Spaniards. Without ignoring the impact of several elements and factors in defining a restrictive immigration policy, the perception of Otherness *vis-à-vis* Jews as an obstacle to their admission, the stereotypes engendering prejudices that Nazism brought to the forefront enhanced it.[30]

Other countries restricted Jewish immigration with criteria similar to those of Mexico. The Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs limited the entry of German Jews in 1938, and restrictive measures had already been applied to Jews from Romania, Poland, and Russia since 1930. It based its decision on the assessment that Jews represented a severe problem for Colombian integrity due to being "a ubiquitous, diffuse people, bearing the mark of every nationality and—strictly

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30 Cf. Bokser Liwerant, "El México de los años treinta"; idem, "Identidades colectivas y esfera pública: judíos y libaneses en México," in *Árabes y judíos en Iberoamérica similitudes, diferencias y tensiones*, ed. R. Rein (Mexico City: Fundación Tres Culturas, 2008), 323–58.

speaking—none at all." This condition of statelessness was added to "their formidable capacity for adaptation and mimicry that allows them to conform to the most extreme, diverse circumstances, their wandering condition that is so favorable for commerce and making a profit."[31]

Costa Rica witnessed intense antisemitic campaigns between the 1930s and the 1950s, encouraged by tradespeople, the middle classes, and the Nazi Party. Perhaps the ultimate leader of these campaigns was politician Otilio Ulate, who was president between 1949 and 1953. Ulate owned the newspaper *El Diario de Costa Rica*. He published all sorts of antisemitic propaganda, accusing Jews of ruining national commerce, spreading communist ideas, practicing a satanic religion, and even degrading the milk they sold to children. Jews suffered various acts of violence during these campaigns: attacks on their businesses, antisemitic graffiti on their homes, arbitrary detentions, and being forced to show their belongings under suspicion of carrying communist propaganda. The synagogue in the capital, San José, was also set on fire in April 1948. The antisemitic attacks lasted well into the Cold War, headed by the extreme right-wing organization *Movimiento Costa Rica Libre* (MCRL), which saw Jews as the agents responsible for spreading communism.

The alternative ways in which prejudices that conform to the anti-Jewish *tropos* were used can be seen in the Brazilian case. Images of Jews began to change in Brazil in the 1930s, linked to how Brazilian antisemitic stereotypes were conceived and discussed. By maintaining traditional ones and modifying the meaning that accrued to them, international relief organizations could turn accepted stereotypes to refugees' advantage. Thus, the image of Jews, which involved their financial and economic success could be glorified for their ability to help domestic industrial development by injecting capital into Brazil, instead of being denounced as part of an international conspiracy to force national wealth out of the country.[32]

Different types of nationalism that developed and expanded during the following decades found roots in the continent, further nourishing a strong harmful *tropos* component and found expression in acts of symbolic and physical violence. Indeed, a series of actors turned violence into one of their central axes of political action and shaped an extreme version of nationalistic antisemitism.

Around the conceptualization of fascism, of peripheral fascism, and its populist regional version, the revision of its alleged inclusionary vision was con-

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31 Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Memoria del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores presentada al Congreso Nacional* (Imprenta Nacional, 1938), viii.
32 Cf. J. Lesser, *Welcoming the Undesirables: Brazil and the Jewish Question* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

fronted with its exclusionary dimensions, as specifically has been the case of Argentina's sustained antisemitism throughout the twentieth century.[33] It built on the nationalist organizations of the 1930s that formulated rhetorical principles aimed at popularizing nationalism like violence, anti-imperialism, and social justice.[34]

Antisemitism was one of the pillars of the right-wing Argentine nationalist imaginary, which directed discourses and practices as a mobilizing myth that strengthened its own identity by opposing it to the negative identification of Jewish Otherness as the mortal enemy of the nation. As a social field with heterogeneous actors, nationalists developed a differentiating habitus about different ways to approach the "Jewish problem" and possible solutions in their antisemitic discourse, all linked by the generalized condemnation of Jewish presence in Argentina.

Exemplary is the historical context of the antisemitic organization Tacuara, a period of approximately ten years between President Juan Domingo Perón's overthrow in 1955 and General Juan Carlos Onganía's rise to power in 1966. Holocaust denial is represented as the revelation of one more Jewish fabrication aimed at stigmatizing Nazism (a truly nationalistic movement) and presenting themselves as victims to achieve one of their old conspiratorial goals: establishing a home for the descendants of David in Palestine through the creation of Israel. The victim then becomes a sinister victimizer who delegitimizes his adversary to fulfill his dark plan. Although Jews had been seen as foreign agents incapable of assimilation since the 1930s, in the 1960s, because of the Eichmann event, nationalist antisemitism began underlying anti-Zionism to justify their rejection of Jews based on the argument that their foreignness made them subservient exclusively to Israel's interests, as harmful to the country as Anglo-Saxon imperialisms and the communist shadow of Moscow.

From there, accusations of "dual loyalties" rained down on Argentinian Jews: a conspiratorial plot by Israel, their true motherland, destined to promote their growth to the detriment of their host country, making them obey their new Land of Zion and not the Argentinian state, which made them the internal enemies of the latter.

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33 Cf. M. García Sebastiani, ed., *Fascismo y antifascismo, Peronismo y antiperonismo: Conflictos políticos e ideológicos en la Argentina (1930–1955)* (Madrid/Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert, 2006); F. Finchelstein, *La Argentina fascista: Los orígenes ideológicos de la dictadura* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 2008).

34 Cf. S. M. Deutsch, *Counterrevolution in Argentina, 1900–1932: The Argentine Patriotic League* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986).

For Leonardo Senkman, these accusations tried to legitimize the antisemitic, xenophobic ideology that, this time, required anti-Zionism as a doctrinal need to explain the conspiracy theory as a method for interpreting history, stalked by a mythical, many-headed synarchy.[35] The renewal of Argentinian antisemitism's tradition and its transit into anti-Zionism was not exclusive to the far Right: the historical foundations of political instability in Argentina made outbursts of antisemitism possible even under democratic regimes. Overlapping of arguments, negative stereotypes, and prejudices, as the elaboration of new equations took place, can be seen in the following image:


Image 6: *Tropos*-building in Argentina: Advancing the anti-Zionist paradigm.

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35 Cf. L. Senkman, *El antisemitismo en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1986).

Critical Juncture: Zionism, Racism, Regionalization—Ideological Elaborations and the Expansion of a *tropos*

Representations of mythical prejudices continued to develop in changing political constellations. Indeed, during the 1970s, as an aftermath of the Six-Day War, the national, regional, and global scenarios were reconfigured, and antisemitic expressions gradually catalyzed through political codes that would bring together the triangle: Jews, Israel, and Zionism. This process reached its climax with UN Resolution 3379, which equated Zionism with racism, thereby entering the international dynamics while projecting entrenched stereotypes onto the State of Israel and the Jewish people.

Anti-Zionism recovered old antisemitic referents, combining the hard nucleus of prejudice with changing motivations and functions. Symbolic violence calls for hatred and enables discrimination intertwined with (the old) referents of ascription. Mexico will again provide a case study. The Jew representation transited from being the only Other to the redefinition of Otherness in new terms; it may be considered paradigmatic of the confluence of transnational trends, regional and national contextual settings.[36]

Mexico's positive vote was interpreted as an expression of the progressive stance of the government, whose domestic policies aimed to incorporate dissent and opposition, mainly in the intellectual sectors. Moreover, the meaning that Mexico's vote acquired in the domestic realm linked the condemnation of Zionism with the promotion of democratization. Global and regional perspectives also reinforced the relationship between progressive stands and anti-Zionism. Mexico was the World Conference setting for the International Women's Year, a significant precedent of Resolution 3379 that already incorporated Zionism's condemnation in the fight against colonialism, equating Zionism with apartheid and other forms of racial discrimination. Such perspectives intertwined with an ideology and a discourse that brought the Third World as an actor. The drafting of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, the goal of establishing an Economic System for the Third World, together with the proposal to increase its participation in international organizations, constitute some of the emblematic moments of President Luis Echeverría's project. It would encompass a collec-

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36 Cf. J. Bokser Liwerant, "Fuentes de legitimación de la presencia judía en México: el voto positivo de México a la ecuación sionismo-racismo," in *Judaica Latinoamericana III*, ed. M. Bejarano and E. Zadoff (Jerusalem: Hebrew University of Jerusalem; AMILAT, 1997), 319–50.

tive bargaining power and the examination of specific programs of economic, financial, industrial, and technological cooperation.

Following Mexico's vote against Zionism, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger declared that his government would retaliate against those countries that voted in favor of the resolution, even before it would take any action against the UN. In this context, the Jewish community in the US announced its decision to cancel tourist trips to Mexico. Its justification was that "Americans make more business and touristic trips to Mexico than to any of the other 71 nations that voted against Zionism." The interplay between discourse and practice developed in complex ways, given that the Mexican regime attempted to "rectify the vote" through arguments intersecting different moments: the vote against Zionism, the tourism boycott declared by the US, and the attempt to amend Mexico's position at the UN. "Rectifying measures" that aimed to clarify the "misunderstandings" associated with the vote included the visits of high-level politicians to Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York, where meetings with Jewish leaders were held, as well as the foreign minister's trip to Israel.[37] Foreign Minister Emilio Rabasa asserted on several occasions that Zionism was not racism, that there was no discrimination in Israel—exemplified by a floral offering at Herzl's grave—and that given the clarifications of the matter, the "misunderstanding was forgiven and forgotten."[38]

However, despite that the official discourse sought to differentiate between the condemnation of Zionism and antisemitism,[39] critiques of Zionism also included anti-Jewish prejudice in particularly acute ways. Thus, Zionism was seen not only as expansionist and colonialist,[40] but also as a "doctrine based on ethnic motivations, relentless, messianic, discriminatory and even brutal,"[41] or as the "combination of a religious fanaticism and an exclusionary nationalism, both equally racist." It was further defined as an ideology "that reflected

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37 Cf. "Antisionismo no es antisemitismo," *El Universal*, December 11, 1975; "Los malos entendidos," *El Universal*, December 6, 1975.

38 "'Completa tolerancia religiosa hay en Israel,' afirma Rabasa," *El Nacional*, December 8, 1975; *El Nacional*, "Ofrenda de Rabasa ante la tumba del 'padre del sionismo'," December 6, 1975; *Excelsior*, "Llegó Rabasa a Tel Aviv, 'para discutir cualquier malentendido', dijo," December 5, 1975.

39 Cf. J. L. Huerta Cruz, "Antisionismo no es antisemitismo," *El Universal*, November 27, 1975.

40 Cf. G. González, "Amenazas Norteamericanas. Falta de bases históricas y legales," *Excelsior*, November 17, 1975; idem, "Diplomacia caprichosa: ¿hay algo que perdonar?," *Excelsior*, December 15, 1975; A. Lara Barragán, "El judaísmo internacional," *El Universal*, December 6, 1975.

41 J. M. Téllez Girón, "Judaísmo, sí; sionismo, no," *El Día*, December 1975; T. G. Allaz, "Estatuto de animales para los no judíos," *Excelsior*, December 1975; T. G. Allaz, "Israel, víctima de sí Mismo," *Excelsior*, December 1975.

the belief of God's chosen people; as if Jews segregate, have pride and believe to be superior to other races."[42]

It also reinforced the symbolic connection between Jewish pressure, AKA the Jewish lobby, and loss of autonomy. The radicalized prejudice emerged: that the boycott confirmed its racist and imperialist attitude.[43] The argument that Jews were an influential and alien group reappeared in the Mexican context.

Grounding Terrains of Prejudice
Zionism, Racism and Regionalization in a Critical Juncture:
Enchancing-Redefining Discursive Strategies

- Ethnic motivations
- Relentless
- Messianic
- Discriminatory
- Brutal

Expansionist and colonialist

Zionism

- Religious fanaticism
- Exclusionary nationalism

God's chosen people

Intransigent

Aggressive   Israel   Victim-Victimizer

Paranoid   Genocide

Arrogant

Money lovers   Jews   Exclusionary

Domination   Explotation

Image 7: Grounding terrains of prejudice.

The radical questioning of the whole paradigm stood at the intersection of ideological discourse, social representations, and political conflicts. Mexico

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42 E. Ilanes, "Elitismo pero no racismo," *Novedades*, November 22, 1975; J. L. Huerta Cruz, "No sólo discriminación semántica del racismo," *El Universal*, December 29, 1975; S. Chávez Hayhoe, "Sionismo y racismo," *El Universal*, November 27, 1975; A. Armendáriz, "¿Semitismo o sionismo?," *Novedades*, December 1, 1975; L. Zea, "¿Qué es por fin el sionismo?," *Novedades*, December 16, 1975; idem, "El sionismo y las trampas del pacifismo," *Novedades*, December 23, 1975.
43 Cf. Zea, "El sionismo y las trampas del pacifismo"; idem, "¿Qué es por fin el sionismo?"; A. Villegas, "Balance político de 1975. Candidato, grupos de presión, Israel," *Excelsior*, December 22, 1975.

and the continental scenario were paradigmatic of what Shulamit Volkov has defined as cultural code. This means that antisemitism becomes a sign of cultural identity, of one's belonging to a specific cultural camp. She uses this concept for the study of Imperial Germany "Contemporaries, living and acting in Imperial Germany, learned to decode the message. It became a part of their language, a familiar and convenient symbol."[44] However, anti-Zionism, and also antisemitism, became part of a larger, more comprehensive ideological "package deal," which had components of anti-colonialism and anti-capitalism. Volkov notes that in the late 1960s and the 1970s, expressions of anti-Israelism and anti-Zionism were frequently presented by leaders of developing countries as declarations of solidarity with the Arab cause. At this point, she says, the anticolonial struggle came to be based on its cultural contours. Concomitantly, it turned into an attack on cultural conceit, on disregard for the suffering of non-white peoples, on the traditional paternalism and cultural arrogance of the colonizers. As Volkov suggests, it was an assault on the values of the imperialist West, its priorities, excesses and vices, of which, in this context, the Jews became a symbol: "by attacking them one was finally up in arms against all and every manifestation of Western culture." She adds that "cultural as well as social and political views come in packages, in the form of ideational syndromes" and that "only relatively minor issues, though of the kind that are common enough in public discourse, can serve as codes, signifying larger, more important syndromes."[45]

In Latin America, Jews and Israel became associated with the US in this cultural code. As in Imperial Germany, where Volkov identified two notorious cultural camps, in Latin American countries, we can also find at least two different cultural camps: the one that associates US and Israel with freedom, democracy and progress, and the other that identifies them with cultural and economic imperialism and colonialism and with the use of military force to achieve those aims.[46]

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44 S. Volkov, "Antisemitism as a Cultural Code: Reflections on the History and Historiography of Antisemitism in Imperial Germany," *The Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook* 23, no. 1 (1978): 25–46.
45 S. Volkov, "Readjusting Cultural Codes: Reflections on Anti-Semitism and Anti-Zionism," *Journal of Israeli History* 25, no. 1 (2006): 51–62.
46 Cf. L. Senkman, "Anti-Zionist Discourse of the Left in Latin America: An Assessment," in *Reconsidering Israel-Diaspora Relations*, ed. E. Ben-Rafael, J. Bokser Liwerant, and Y. Gorny (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 309–33; J. Bokser Liwerant and Y. Siman, "Antisemitism in Mexico and Latin America: Recurrences and Changes," in *Antisemitism in North America: New World, Old Hate*, ed. S. K. Baum et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 21–173.

The permanent and problematic relationship between ideological discourse and symbolic representations, on the one hand, and political conflicts, on the other, and how symbolic violence can not only shape a conflict but transpose it, contributing to its configuration even if its root causes have changed, were expressed in a paradigmatic way during the Gulf War. Fueled by fifteen years of international reinforcement and mediated by the invasion of Lebanon and the events of Sabra and Shatila, the initial anti-Zionist discourse was projected as a total delegitimization of the Zionist paradigm. In that discourse encouraged by the conflict, more primitive antisemitic stereotypes appeared as well. Thus, Jews were portrayed as arrogant, exclusionary money-lovers of questionable morality. They were also seen as someone who cannot exercise a "non-prejudiced and autonomous thought."[47] Given that Israel was seen as a military power that was "paranoid by nature and set as its main objective the displacement, and even … the destruction of … the Arab race," it was asserted that "dispossession was followed by expansionism and genocide."[48]

The victim-perpetrator dialectic was inverted, thus projecting the Nazi Holocaust onto relations with the Palestinians, arguing that the Jewish people "[have] always raised the suffering of the diaspora and the Holocaust around the world." However, Israel was the perpetrator of a new Holocaust as they (Jews, Israelis) had "learned from their own Nazi killers, the use of violence to impose their interests."[49] This evil inversion was also expressed in the questioning of Israel as an entity that was "doing to the Palestinians what Hitler did to the Jews,"[50] "playing the eternal role of the attacked victim given that it has benefited from it over time,"[51] and succeeding given their economic power in turning the Holocaust "into the massive crime more widely publicized in the history of humanity" in contrast to the Palestinians who lack the means to broadcast their own genocide.[52]

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47 R. García Jaime, "El judío," *Uno más uno*, February 4, 1991.

48 H. Bellinghausen, "¿Razas arrasadas?," *La Jornada*, January 24, 1991; "Duro golpe a la OLP, la muerte de Abu Iyad; era considerado un héroe por los palestinos," *La Jornada*, January 16, 1991.

49 "Autorizan al ejército israelí disparar contra palestinos que arrojen piedras," *El Día*, December 12, 1990; E. Segovia, "Palabras de México en la filosofía y en la ONU," *El Día*, February 27, 1991; L. Zea, "Israel en el conflicto del Pérsico," *Novedades*, November 6, 1990; "Duro golpe a la OLP," *La Jornada*.

50 E. Galeano, "Preguntitas," *La Jornada*, January 15, 1991.

51 G. Martre, "La tormenta debe seguir," *El Universal*, January 22, 1991.

52 H. Hernández Ascencio, "Scuds: 'los que van a morir te saludan'," *El Sol de Mediodía*, February 1, 1991.

The global questioning of the State of Israel and its ideological paradigm surpassed criticism of a particular government, the army's actions, or the ruling coalition's political platform. Israel was recursively seen as a "racist country that operated outside any legal framework" and as the soil for "the movement of international gangsters."[53]

Overlapping at the meaning-making level between anti-Israelism and anti-Zionism can be observed through analogies, parallels, and metaphors that point to the Holocaust inversion: the West Bank Wall was conceived out of a great strategic plan, the slow and sustained "extermination," "this time, without gas chambers."[54]

The *Nakba* as Israel's "expulsion" of 700,000 Palestinians—which was preceded by "ethnic cleansing"—has a straight parallel with the Holocaust: the word *Nakba* denotes the "oldest and most prolonged Holocaust" in contemporary history as a result of the creation of an "illegal Zionist state."[55] They are compared to the Nazi perpetrators toward their ancestors in Europe, to an extermination camp into which they only allowed the water and food necessary for the survival of the Palestinian inhabitants.[56] The Nazi-Fascist wall locked up Palestinians alive in "ghettos" (the author uses the term within quotation marks). As part of the anti-American and anti-imperialist discourse that emphasizes the alliance between the US and Israel, the walls at the West Bank and at the USA-Mexico border were compared, though only the former was seen as a "genocide."

Re-shaping the *tropos:* its Transnational Projection

In its avatars, the various meanings of that negative *tropos'* transferred were reinforced through a historical and now transregional and transnational cultural/ideological code that characterizes the media, broad sectors of intellectuals, and public figures. Thus, anti-Zionism, anti-Israelism, and antisemitism—in their singularity and convergences—become transnational phenomena that connect peo-

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53 U. Pipitone, "El Golfo," *La Jornada*, February 24, 1991.

54 J. Steinsleger, "¿Cuándo caerá el muro?," *La Jornada*, January 6, 2010, https://www.jornada.com.mx/2010/01/06/opinion/015a2pol.

55 J. Steinsleger, "Palestina: orígenes de la *nakbaa*," *La Jornada*, May 5, 2010, https://www.jornada.com.mx/2010/05/05/opinion/021a1pol.

56 Cf. Á. Guerra Cabrera, "Gaza, prisión no, campo de exterminio," *La Jornada*, November 22, 2012, https://www.jornada.com.mx/2012/11/22/opinion/028a1mun.

ple across countries, regions, and continents through the flow of theories and prejudices and the political agenda of social movements at the local, regional, and global levels. As stated, we distinguish the critique of Israel and its policies from stands that recover, use, and extend anti-Jewish images.

Worldwide, and in Latin America, after many years of an unsettled Israel-Palestine conflict, today's opposition to Israel ceased to be a code for some other evil. Alongside more open antisemitism by right-wing xenophobic groups—though not exclusively—the subculture of the Left, even of the center-Left, cannot be seen in its stance toward Israel as a side-issue, ripe to serve as a cultural code.[57]

Increased hostility toward Israel appears to be globally articulated, transcending the national boundaries of countries. It is a "transnational ideological package" that symbolizes the struggle against globalization and US hegemony. Thus, simultaneously, the anti-Zionist discourse points to a larger camp that transcends Latin American countries' national boundaries. Globalization and transnationalism magnify positive and negative trends that have been built over time.

Latin America has incorporated global cycles of political opportunities and social conflicts, as evident in democratization and de-democratization, centralization, civic citizenship, and ethnic allegiances, collective affirmation and the individualization of rights. Multiculturalism and new claims for recognition of primordial identities have also reinforced exclusion on ethnic grounds. While the scope for diversity broadens, Latin American societies also face severe risks of fragmentation and even de-structuring processes. The prevalence of historically complex relations with the United States and widespread dissatisfaction with globalization opened new opportunities for radical movements in the region.

Neo-liberal and growingly institutionalized citizenship regimes coexist with the corporatist and populist political forms, social mobilization, and plebiscitary democracy. Thus, the region experiences contradictory trends: increasing civic participation of social and political actors is threatened by exclusionary initiatives. The region experiences the transnationalization of prejudice. Interacting

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57 Cf. Volkov, "Readjusting Cultural Codes"; Senkman, "Anti-Zionist Discourse of the Left in Latin America"; J. Bokser Liwerant and L. Senkman, "Diásporas y transnacionalismo: nuevas indagaciones sobre los judíos latinoamericanos hoy," in *Judaica Latinoamericana VII*, ed. M. Bejarano, F. F. Goldberg, and Y. Goldstein (Jerusalem: AMILAT, 2013), 11–71; J. Bokser Liwerant, "Anti-Semitism and Related Expressions of Prejudice in a Global World. A View from Latin America," in *Measuring Antisemitism: An Expert Research Report in Progress*, ed. Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy and The Jewish People Policy Institute.

with the discursive production and reproduction of negative symbols, antisemitism acquires new modalities of expression.

Social movements gained problematic protagonism. In the anti-globalization stream, the World Social Forum in Brazil in 2003 brought together swastikas and the peace sign, the rainbow flag and the blue and white UN symbol as visible images. The Malaysian prime minister referenced Jews who determine the currency level and bring about the collapse of currencies.[58] Later, 157 organizations and social movements worldwide participated in the World Social Forum (WSF) held in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in November-December 2012. The meeting was "taken over" by organizations and NGOs from the US, Canada, South Africa, Europe, and Asia. Many Palestinian organizations also attended the forum. It was convened to support the Palestine cause and brought together non-governmental organizations, left-wing political groups, Arab federations based in Brazil, and both formal and informal social movements. This WSF meeting epitomizes transnational advocacy networks seeking the international recognition of Palestinian statehood claims at the UN through mass demonstrations and the use of social networks, in addition to the local media. Indeed, an extensive array of local social movements, international NGOs, and heterogeneous institutions within a transnational civil society used an anti-Zionist discourse globally. Advocacy for Palestine's legitimacy through anti-Zionist language that de-legitimizes Israel reflects the constituencies, ideological codes, and working procedures/mechanisms of transnational advocacy networks and global civil society.[59] Unlike developments in previous decades, current social and political actors with anti-Zionist stands are not confined solely to political parties and organizations. In contrast to the 1960s, in the new millennium, anti-Zionism has become a mobilization myth for action and political identification.

A new constellation that redefines the links between collective identities, cultural and ideological trends and the public sphere's boundaries has given birth to scenarios in which anti-Jewish prejudices become entrenched in progressive claims. It is both a legacy of the anti-Western cultural code and new representations of the axis Jewish-Zionist state. It problematically meets, embraces, and re-elaborates Jewish anti-Zionist and post-Zionist voices.

Concurrently, different social movements attract vast middle-class sectors, including Jews and the Jewish community, as civic participants of the national arena. Liberal democratic policies have further enhanced this trend. Indeed, Jew-

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58 Cf. M. Strauss, "Antiglobalism's Jewish Problem," *Foreign Policy*, no. 139 (2003): 58–67.
59 Cf. D. F. Wajner, "In Quest of Legitimacy: Framing Battles in the Arab Spring and the Arab League's Legitimation Role" (MA Thesis, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2013).

Image 8: Rethinking the relations between collective identities, culture, and the public sphere.

ish individuals have increasingly entered the political sphere and assumed high-ranking public offices, while organized Jewish communities have reached prominent roles due to increased citizenship participation. Thus, the twofold recognition and erosion of a national ethnic narrative and the increased recognition of minorities based on religious and ethnic grounds confer increasing visibility and legitimacy to Jewish communities.

Following a profound polarization of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the end of the Cold War and bipolarity positively affected the region, leading to the normalization of relations with both the Palestinians and Israel, although founded on an equidistance basis. In the 1990s, motivated by the signing of the Oslo Accords (1993), formal diplomatic missions of the new Palestinian Authority opened in several countries.[60]

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60 Chile (1992), Brazil (1993), Mexico (1995), Argentina and Colombia (1996), and Peru (1998). A few years after the signing of the Chilean-Palestinian Memorandum for Scientific, Technical, Cultural and Educational Cooperation (June 1995), Chile opened the first diplomatic Latin American representation in Ramallah (April 1998).

Simultaneously, as an ideological stance among Latin American diplomacy, anti-Zionism lost its virulence as a resource to rhetorically attack Israel and was replaced instead by pragmatic considerations in countries such Brazil, Mexico, and Nicaragua. Meaningfully, all Latin American countries except Cuba voted on December 16, 1991, in favor of UN Resolution 46/86, revoking the resolution that equated Zionism with racism.[61] However, throughout the following years, the major ALBA countries (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Cuba) severed diplomatic ties with Israel. They all voiced harsh anti-Zionist and anti-Israel criticism. In a reconfigured world system, the Venezuelan regime under Hugo Chávez (1998–2013) became a Latin American proxy of the Iranian state and its hatred of Jews under Maduro. Geopolitical considerations played an essential part in making both Zionism and Israel Venezuela's enemies. Thus, part of the government's animosity toward Jews might have been due to his determination to win Tehran's favor. This explanation also seems to hold when analyzing the ALBA countries' anti-Zionist position, the anti-US bloc led by *Chavismo.*[62]

Regarding the policies of Latin American countries toward the Middle East, a contradictory picture develops. On the one hand, globalization has brought new opportunities to the region, both in international relations and world markets. On the other hand, the stalled Israel-Palestine peace process has given way to the emergence of regional leaderships and their positioning as emergent superpowers in the international arena.

The globalization of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will likely continue if certain conditions are present, such as the continued stagnation of the peace process, the eruption of new cycles of violence in the Middle East, the strengthening of Islamic radical groups in countries that are now experiencing political turmoil, the presence of neo-populist governments in the region and the particular interactions between strategic decisions of international, regional and national and local activists.[63]

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61 Cf. Senkman, "Anti-Zionist Discourse of the Left in Latin America"; C. Baeza and E. Brun, "La diplomacia chilena hacia los países árabes entre posicionamiento estratégico y oportunismo comercial," *Estudios Internacionales* 44, no. 171 (2012): 61–85; C. Baeza, "América latina y la cuestión palestina (1947–2012)," *Araucaria* 14, no. 28 (2012): 111–31.

62 Cf. L. Roniger, *Antisemitism, Real or Imagined? Chávez, Iran, Israel, and the Jews* (Jerusalem: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2009).

63 Cf. J. Bokser Liwerant, "El conflicto palestino israelí. Recurrencias históricas, nuevos dilemas," in *El conflicto en Gaza e Israel: una visión desde América Latina*, ed. M. Férez Gil and S. Sberro (México: Senado de la República, Comisión de Biblioteca y Asuntos Editoriales, LXI Legislatura, 2009), 95–124.

The criticism of Israel's policies—as grounded as it may be—continues to overlap with prejudiced arguments that recover, re-elaborate, and project comprehensive anti-Zionism and various contents and expressions of antisemitism. As seen, even though they are singular phenomena, and have explicit and implicit prejudices and negative expressions, they overlap at the meaning-making level as well as in the more concrete realm of argumentative convergences.

Tropos-building and praxis meet and are mutually nourished. University settings became academic fora of solidarity with Palestine, and it is expressed in extreme anti-Zionist stances. Among the many, in the one held in 2017 at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), the criticism of Israel incorporated hard-core antisemitic prejudices. As the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement (BDS) was promoted, expressions like "dyslexic biblical exegesis," "a vicarious avocation" and "a dangerous delusion" were unexpectedly uttered. The transnational dimension of prejudice may be best appreciated in the words of Columbia professor Hamid Dabashi:

> Half a century of systematic maiming and murdering of another people has left its deep marks on the faces of these people, the way they talk, the way they walk, the way they handle objects, the way they greet each other, the way they look at the world. There is an endemic prevarication to this machinery, a vulgarity of character that is bone-deep and structural to the skeletal vertebrae of its culture.[64]

Current expressions of anti-Zionism and its antisemitic tones are much more than an ideational-cultural struggle for equality and human rights. In contrast to the past, social, and political actors with anti-Zionist stands are not confined solely to political parties and leftist organizations.

The interfacing between national, regional, and global dimensions, antisemitism and the differentiation of its contemporary expressions are framed by the pluralization of social and political actors and the relevance of the media as a source of collective representation in the public sphere. Diffuse and latent prejudices, veiled and structural, as well as those rejected in the official semantics but evident in the rhetoric of individuals and of collective sectors are part of contemporary reality both in Latin America and elsewhere. The configuration of the anti-Jewish *tropos* has been analyzed here through conceptual constructions and metaphors that objectify antisemitic imagination. These expressions show the geological cumulative levels of stereotypes. As they are connected to a certain

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64 H. Dabashi, "For a Fistful of Dust: A Passage to Palestine," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, September 23–29, 2004, https://web.archive.org/web/20080112011322/http:/weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/709/cu12.htm.

imaginary, they can also be traced in concrete images—the powerful world of caricatures that we have analyzed elsewhere.[65] Produced and reproduced discursively, as that which has concrete impact on individual and collective behavior, exhibits structural trends, as a *longue durée* historical phenomenon with recurrences and changes.

The historical course of *tropos*-building, which does not necessarily translate into discriminatory practices, needs to be contextualized within each country's political culture and status of human rights. Understanding its strength emerges as a *sine qua non* requirement when attempting to account for the actual extent of antisemitic danger derived from discursive and symbolic violence.

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65 Cf. J. Bokser Liwerant, "Mexico in a Region Under Change," *Journal for the Study of Antisemitism* 3, no. 1 (2011): 27–49.

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N. N. "Llegó Rabasa a Tel Aviv, 'para discutir cualquier malentendido', dijo." *Excelsior*, December 5, 1975.

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Vivian Liska

The Phantasm of the Jew in French Philosophy: From Jean-Paul Sartre to Alain Badiou

"Between Sartre and the Jew in person, the Jew as idea, the phantasm of the Jew intervened."[1] With this diagnosis, Benny Lévy, in his 1986 essay "Sartre et la Judéité," points to a distinction that underlies some of the most intense philosophical debates concerning Jews and Judaism in the decades following Sartre's *Réflexions sur la question juive*. This article reconstructs the development of the form, function, and fate of this "phantasm," from Sartre's contentious designation of the Jew as nothing but a construction of the antisemite to its openly antagonistic and highly problematic inflection in Alain Badiou's call for the disappearance of the "SIT Jew," who derives his identity from the triad Shoah, Israel, and the Talmud.

"Between Sartre and the Jew in person, the Jew as idea, the phantasm of the Jew intervened."[2] This was the diagnosis of Benny Lévy, who served as Sartre's personal secretary from 1974 until Sartre's death, in 1986. Once a prominent Maoist, Lévy would later embrace Orthodox Judaism. In his 1986 essay "Sartre et la Judéité," Lévy points to a distinction that underlies some of the most intense philosophical debates concerning Jews and Judaism in the decades after Sartre's *Réflexions sur la question juive*. The dichotomy Lévy draws must be somewhat corrected, however: there cannot be a "real," concrete Jew, a "Jew in person," without an at least implicit idea of Jewishness. Similarly, the figural use of the word "Jew" retains remnants of the concrete experience, history, or tradition of "being Jewish" and, perhaps more to the point, has concrete consequences on so-called "real Jews." A phantasm is thus an imaginary image that carries potentially serious consequences in the actual world. In such invocations of the "Jew as idea," the possible form and function of these tangible links to the concrete are thus not distributed in binary opposition between a real Jew and a false or phantasmal one. One can instead speak of a spectrum of differently combined external and internal ascriptions, which are co-determined by the very mode of signification. In the works of French thinkers from Jean-Paul Sartre to Alain

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Note: Parts of this essay are a reproduction of the author's *Sartre, Jews, and the Other: Rethinking Antisemitism, Race, and Gender* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020).

1 B. Lévy, "Sartre et la judéité," *Études sartriennes* 2–3 (1986): 142. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are by the author of this article.
2 Ibid.

Badiou—as well as Maurice Blanchot and Jean-Jacques Lyotard, about both of whom I will add brief reflections—the figure of the Jew can be situated along precisely such a spectrum and observe an increasingly problematic attitude where the borders between anti Zionism, anti-Judaism, and antisemitism become blurred.

Each of these thinkers who wrote after 1945 shares a common denominator: a self-proclaimed attempt to combat antisemitism by reversing a negative image of the Jew into a positive figure that holds universal relevance. It is in this sense that all the thinkers discussed below invoke the Jew in their own (self-)understanding of the intellectual.

Against this common denominator, major differences stand out. My essay will, in brief, reconstruct the development of the form, function, and fate of this "phantasm," from Sartre's contentious designation of the Jew as essentially nothing but a construction of the antisemite, to its openly antagonistic inflection in Alain Badiou's call for the disappearance of the "SIT Jew" who derives his identity from the triad Shoah, Israel, and the Talmud. My comparison will focus on their explicit or implicit identification with a figural Jew in light of Jewish *history*, particularly the Shoah, the Jewish *place* between diaspora, exile, and Israel, and the Jewish *scriptural tradition*.

Sartre

Sartre was among the first and most influential non-Jewish thinkers of the twentieth century to articulate an exemplary and positive reference to Jewishness. The best-known universalizing inversion of the old stereotype of the wandering, deterritorialized Jew finds expression in Sartre's *L'Être et le Néant* (*Being and Nothingness*). Here he famously determines consciousness as a mode of being that is "for-itself" (*pour-soi*) in "Jewish terms": Contrary to the "in-itself" (*en-soi*), consciousness is inherently marked by self-distance, which Sartre describes in Jewish terms:[3]

> In the ancient world the profound cohesion and dispersion of the Jewish people was designated by the term "Diaspora." It is this word which will serve to designate the mode of being of the For-itself: it is diasporatic.[4]

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3 J.-P. Sartre, *L'Être et le néant* (Paris: Gallimard, 1943), 138.
4 J.-P. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1984), 195. The original French reads: "On désignait dans le monde

For Sartre, consciousness itself can thus be described in terms borrowed from Jewish experience. In these lines, Sartre approaches but ultimately avoids any metaphorical *appropriation* of the conditions of Jewish existence: In his definition of consciousness, proximity does not imply direct equivalence between universal human consciousness and Jewish exile. Rather, he merely sketches a structural analogy,[5] and he explicitly reflects on his use of a word as something he *borrows* from another context for the sake of clarification.[6]

Some have spoken of "Sartre as Jew" or "Jewish-like Sartre," or even "Jewish Sartre." Sartre himself, however, insisted to the end that "he has no access to the interiority of Jewish experience"[7] and thus refrained from this gesture of appropriation. Where he comes close to actually associating himself with the Jew, it is retrospectively and always marked as an indirection or even a retraction—albeit a potentially problematic one. In *Les mots*, for example, he writes self-critically:

> I later heard anti-Semites reproach Jews any number of times with not knowing the lessons and silence of nature; I would answer: "In that case, I'm more Jewish than they."

Most explicitly, in one of his oft-quoted acknowledgments about his *Réflexions sur la question juive*, Sartre commented to Lévy: "It is me that I was describing when I thought I was describing the Jew, a type who has nothing, no land, an

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antique la cohésion profonde et la dispersion du peuple juif du nom de 'diaspora.' C'est le mot qui nous servira pour désigner le mode d'être du Pour-soi: il est diasporique."

5 For an overview of criticism of Sartre's *Réflexions sur la question juive* along these lines, see the final chapter of J. Judaken, *Jean-Paul Sartre and the Jewish Question: Anti-antisemitism and the Politics of the French Intellectual* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), especially 256–83.

6 *Analogy* and *metaphor* are both figures of speech in which reference is made to one thing in order to convey another. *Analogy* most often involves reference to something familiar or readily understood, in order to illustrate and explain something more complex and less readily understood. The word comes from the classical Latin *analogia*, meaning ratio or proportion. Thus an *analogy* essentially possesses the same properties and characteristics as the more complex thing it is being used to represent but in a simplified, scaled-down manner that is easier to grasp. To a certain extent, *metaphor* works the other way around. Thus a *metaphor*—a descriptive word or phrase used in place of another to which it bears no literal relationship—is intended to "carry" or "bear" the meaning of the word(s) it is replacing, in a manner that is generally more vivid and memorable than the original. A metaphor is almost always more forceful than an analogy, but in using it you must rely on the reader's or listener's intuition to infer what you really mean. An analogy is clear and straightforward about what you mean, but it does not always have the same force as a metaphor, nor is it so easy to visualize. A metaphor is a living, breathing frog; an analogy is a frog, cut open on the dissecting table.

7 S. Hammerschlag, *The Figural Jew: Politics and Identity in Postwar French Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 110.

intellectual."[8] Sartre occasionally echoes antisemitic stereotypes of the Jew, even as he reverses them into a positive figure. He remains, as Jonathan Judaken puts it, "mired in contradictions and aporias"[9] arising from his claim that the Jew is nothing but a projection of the antisemite even as he more or less unwittingly endows him with dubious characteristics. Sartre is ultimately aware of these problematic ascriptions and open to their revision. The instability—"double binds" and "ambivalent commitments" that change with historical and political situations—remains in accordance with his idea of the erring intellectual.

Blanchot

Blanchot represents the figure of the Jew as an intellectual without property, land, or belonging. Such a figure bears similarity to Sartre's portrait of the Jew, at times even to the point of echoing his wording: Sartre, invoking the wandering Ahasverus, writes that the Jew "at any moment must be ready to pick up his stick and his bundle."[10] Blanchot reiterates this, almost verbatim, yet with certain fundamental differences:

> If Judaism is destined to take on meaning <u>for us</u>, it is indeed by showing that at whatever time, <u>one </u>must be ready to set out [*être prêt à se mettre en route*] because to set out is the exigency from which <u>one</u> cannot escape if <u>one</u> wants to maintain the possibility of a just relation: the exigency of uprooting; the affirmation of nomadic truth.[11]

Blanchot echoes Sartre's analogy between the intellectual and the wandering Jew, the latter always ready to take to the road, but he invokes the figure of the Jew in quite different ways. In particular, he replaces the Jew with Judaism. This shift reflects his critique of Sartre's failure to regard "being Jewish" as anything more than a reversal of the antisemite's gaze ("*revers de la provocation antijuive*"). Yet notice Blanchot's barely perceptible shift from *he* (the Jew) to *it* (Judaism) to *us* (meaning for us) to the neutral and universal "one" to whom the injunction is addressed. This shift reveals the process of metaphorization which, unlike Sartre's structural analogy between consciousness and Jewish diaspora, is not an illustration of a state by analogy; instead, it is the imperative

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8 Lévy, "Sartre et la judéité," 141.

9 Judaken, *Jean-Paul Sartre and the Jewish Question*, 138.

10 J.-P. Sartre, *Réflexions sur la question juive* (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1946), 132.

11 M. Blanchot, *L'Entretien infini* (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1969), 195. Translation modified by the author of this article.

for an experience, a call to cross over—to pass—into the terrain of the other. By "filling" Jewish identity with metaphysical content (as when he speaks of "*une vérité juive*"), Blanchot further blurs the boundary between self and other. As such, he may come closer to an appropriation than does Sartre's images of the Jew, which Sartre either purposely omitted or unwittingly introduced and later regretted.

Blanchot's use of the Jew as metaphor is particularly evident in his association of Jewish exile with *écriture*. He effects a complex association between literature and Jewishness, in which factual and fictional references intermingle. In his text "Être juif," (which takes up Levinas's text of the same title, written twenty years earlier) Blanchot criticizes Sartre's *Réflexions sur la question juive* for depriving the Jew of his own history and tradition. In contrast to Sartre, however, Blanchot does not *borrow* a notion from within the Jewish experience for the purpose of an analogy—an example based on a parallel without intersection. Instead, he invokes the Jew explicitly as a *metaphor* in which two things disappear: the distinction of self and other, and the problem of accessibility of another's interiority. Blanchot subtly yet significantly transforms Levinas's conception of a Jewish, but universally valid, "ethics of rootlessness" into a "poetics of wandering" that reflects his own poetics.[12] Levinas argues against attachment to soil from an explicitly ethical perspective. Blanchot, though vaguely invoking "justice," does so in the name of the writer's experience of *errance*—an experience metaphorically associated with the Jewish people's wandering in the desert.[13]

Blanchot has been criticized for romanticizing the Jews as the stereotypical people of the book. From his perspective, however, such criticism hardly undermines his metaphorical construction: in Blanchot's view, such discourse is more authentic than the conceptual language of philosophy, for it admits referential failure from the start. Considered as a performative and destabilizing act, a metaphor is itself a form of deterritorialization where factual and figural are blurred. Unlike Sartre, for whom human consciousness, being diasporic, is itself an unhappy condition, Blanchot characterizes Jewish uprootedness as "nomadic." He thereby elides the hardships associated with exile and disassociates it from the historical experience of the Jews. Jewish exile becomes a pure metaphor of Blanchot's own vision of a "necessity of foreignness" [*exigence de l'étrangeté*], an exteriority of speech which, according to Blanchot, "unfolds in the prefix

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12 Ibid., 91–92.

13 For an excellent discussion of the similarities and differences between Levinas and Blanchot on Jews, place, and exile, see Hammerschlag, *The Figural Jew*, esp. 173–75 and 187–96. See also my review of Hammerschlag's book in *European Journal of Jewish Studies* 6, no. 2 (2012): 303–8.

of the words exile, exodus, exteriority and *étrangeté*."[14] Blanchot would call the sliding shift of these concepts a performative act that subverts the foundations of referential language. Metaphor is itself associated with the exiled Jew: a disturbing stranger, an intruder. It is "*impropre,*" in the sense of "out of place" [un*eigen*tlich], that is, itself astray and confusing the order of identities: the Jew as metaphor, the metaphor as Jew. In this circular argument, the very exteriority that Blanchot promotes is at risk of being lost.

Lyotard

As a metaphor of the "non-selfsame," the non-identical, Jewish exile reaches its apotheosis in Lyotard's *Heidegger et les "juifs."* Lyotard differentiates between "juifs" and Juifs (the latter capitalized and without quotation marks), between the exilic "jew" as metaphor for non-identity and the historical Jews. Lyotard's understanding of the term "jews" is succinctly captured in his description of the "fate of this non-nation of survivors. Jews and non-Jews whose being together is owed to no authenticity of an original root, but to the sin of a never-ending anamnesis."[15] Lyotard suggests that Jews who describe themselves as such are bad "jews," insofar as they claim an identity for themselves without fulfilling, as should good "jews," the commandment of remembering a sublime unsayability, an "immemoriality" of the radically [divine] Other. Instead, such bad "jews" insist on a referential or narrative recourse to their particular history.[16] Lyotard later retracted this approach, ascribing it to the haste and urgency with which he wrote the text at the time of the Heidegger controversy. Later, he would replace his earlier metaphorization of the Jew as "jew" with a rather stereotypical praise of Jews as the "people of the letter."[17] He compares their injunction and practice of endless textual commentary and interpretation to the eternal wandering of exile: in both cases, the objective remains beyond reach. In other words, Jewish exegesis of Scripture implies a structure of non-arrival. In his later writ-

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14 Blanchot, *L'Entretien infini*, 18.

15 J.-F. Lyotard, *Heidegger et les "juifs"* (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1988), 152.

16 Blanchot endorsed Lyotard's position except for one point: he reacted critically to the quotation marks around "*juif*" because, in order to function as a self-cancelling trope, there can be no distinction between real and metaphorical *juifs*, as otherwise there would remain a referential reminder to the "real" (see Hammerschlag, *The Figural Jew*, 196).

17 Cf. R. Klein, "La pensée française contemporaine et la figure juive: Une rencontre inattendue avec Jean-François Lyotard," *Controverses* 11 (2009): 302–16.

ings, Lyotard rehabilitates "capitalized" Jews and their tradition. Yet his writings as a whole obliterate the historical experience of exile.

Badiou

Alain Badiou praises himself as being the most read and most translated living French philosopher. He carries to an extreme the problems encountered with both Sartre's and Blanchot's "troping" of the Jew, to the point of ultimately reversing their positive reversals of antisemitic preconceptions. In a 2009 lecture on Sartre, Badiou says of himself: "I was a Sartrien to the bone" and emphatically presents himself as his pupil: *"Mon lien à la philosophie a été entièrement constitué par ma rencontre avec l'œuvre de Sartre." ("My relationship to philosophy has been entirely constituted by my encounter with the work of Sartre").* In his 2005 essay collection entitled *"Portées du mot 'juif,'"* Badiou adopts Sartre's suggestion that the Jew is a creation of the antisemite and pushes the formulation to the limits. It is actually Hitler who "glorified, multiplied the name 'Jews' … He made the incessantly named Jew into an emblem … Once the Nazis were defeated, the name 'Jew' became, like every name of the victim of a frightful sacrifice, a sacred name."[18] Badiou vehemently rejects this sacralisation of the word "Jew" as the ultimate manifestation of the victim ideology, which he regards as the final, pathetic, and utterly dispensable metaphysical remnant in today's dire "humanism animal." For Badiou, the task of the Jew today is to emulate the truly authentic Jews: those who, "from the apostle Paul to Trotsky, including Spinoza, Marx, and Freud," have broken with Judaism and Jewishness alike, as in the examples of "Paul's religious rupture with established Judaism, of Spinoza's rationalist rupture with the Synagogue, or of Marx's political rupture with the bourgeois integration of a part of his community of origin." With these *compagnons de route* Badiou sets out to envisage a redeemed future in which, paradoxically, the self-negating Jew is the exemplary revolutionary.

Badiou thereby calls for a forgetting of the Holocaust—"j'admets que c'est difficile"—and a dissociation of Jews from Israel. Badiou regards the Jewish exile and diaspora neither as an analogy for the basic human condition nor as metaphor for a basic human experience. Instead, the Jew is—rather astonishingly—the name of "a new *place*" yet to be created ["*un nouveau* lieu *à créer*"].[19]

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18 A. Badiou, *Polemics*, trans. S. Corcoran (London: Verso, 2006), 168.

19 Badiou, *Polemics*, 207 (emphasis added). Originally published in French in 2005 as *Circonstances* 3: *Portées du mot "juif"* (Paris: Lignes, 2005). These statements were made in the context of Badiou's discussion of Udi Aloni's film *Local Angels* and were republished in *Polemics*.

In line with the writings of Paul, whom Badiou calls the ultimate Jew ("juif entre les juifs"),[20] the Jew is supposed to stand for a "Jewishly located universalism" ("un universalisme de site juif"),[21] in which, as Paul proclaimed, "there is neither Jew nor Greek." Badiou's universalism thus requires divesting the Jew of any historical, national, ethnic, or religious or cultural particularity—and in particular, SIT. The consequences of this postulate are remorseless: "If we have to create a new place (Si nous avons à créer un nouveau lieu)," Badiou writes, "this is because we must create a new Jew (c'est parce que nous avons à créer un nouveau juif)."[22] Satisfying this imperative would indeed not only solve the question of the reality, exemplarity, or metaphoricity of the figure of the Jew; it would solve the "Jewish Question" altogether.

Not much is needed to become a New Jew: only the elimination of what can be captured in three letters, an abbreviation that lends not only analogous or metaphorical content to the Jew, but links this "universal Jewishness" to a particular event and a particular history. Badiou seeks to ward off "the desire of the petty faction that is the self-proclaimed proprietor of the word 'Jew' and its usages." This "proprietor" who claims monopoly of the word "Jew" fills it essentially with the abbreviation SIT—"the tripod of the *Shoah*, the State of Israel, and the Talmudic Tradition." The SIT Jew "stigmatizes and exposes to public contempt anyone who contends that it is, in all rigor, possible to subscribe to a universalist and egalitarian sense of this word."[23]

In the final lines of the section on *The Use of the Word Jew*, Badiou takes on this task himself:

> I know better, a thousand times better than the extremist faction, of the connection between the word "Jew" and the immense history of universal truths ... In liberating the word "Jew" from the triplet SIT, to which this faction tries to reduce it, I associate myself amicably with the work undertaken by many others.[24]

Badiou does this differently than Sartre's analogy or Blanchot's metaphorization: he turns it into a concept.

The "many others" to whom Badiou refers are also "those Jews, in sum, for whom the triplet SIT is a fatal attack on their liberty." They are those from whom

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20 Badiou, *Polemics*, 194; Badiou, *Portées du mot "juif*," 65.

21 Badiou, *Polemics*, 194.

22 Badiou, *Polemics*, 207; Badiou, *Portées du mot "juif*," 86.

23 Badiou, *Polemics*, 220.

24 Ibid., 230.

the emergence of a new force of the word Jew can and will emerge. "So in opposition to the petty faction," Badiou concludes:

> I shall boldly claim: I am one of those Jews. In this affair, since everything that exists in the world, and especially names, are only thinkable in situation, then *le juif c'est moi*.[25]

Sartre, Blanchot, and Lyotard transform the historically negative image of "the Jew" into a trope, that—problematic as it may be—self-consciously testifies to its own phantasmal character. In violently cutting the link to its origins, Badiou fills the empty trope with an abstract universality. After ridding it of S, I, and T, he declares "Jew" a metaphor without origin, a name that is a concept that can be given to or claimed by anybody, without relating to anything. The comparative reconstruction of the image of the Jew from Sartre to Badiou may indicate worrisome developments in this realm that certainly point beyond mere philosophical issues.

Coda

In 2005 Benny Lévy wrote:

> Il y a des fils de Sartre qui sont, si j'ose dire, aussi authentiquement fils que moi, et qui sont les nouveaux antisémites d'aujourd'hui. Le noyau du nouvel antisémitisme c'est un Monsieur qui s'appelle Alain Badiou.
>
> *There are sons of Sartre who, if I dare say so, are as authentically his sons as I am, and who are the new antisemites of today. The center of the new antisemitism is a gentleman called Alain Badiou.*[26]

He reverses Sartre's—and for that matter also Blanchot's—reversal of the antisemitic image of the Jew, from overpowered object of antisemitic projection to overly powerful subject, master over morality and politics. Blanchot thereby demonstrates the pitfalls of invoking the figurative Jew, entirely detached from all experience of concrete "Jews as persons."

But can the father be held responsible for the sins of the son? Sartre could not have foreseen Badiou's oedipal and Judeophobic rage. Possibly, Sartre did not himself address the inevitable entanglement between outer gaze, inner experience, and what he himself would call the "situation" one is "thrown into" ex-

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25 Ibid., 247.
26 B. Lévy, *La Cérémonie de la naissance* (Paris: Verdier, 2005), 114.

istentially. Benny Lévy's "Jew as person" cannot be without "the Jew as idea"—
an idea of Jewishness open to others. But that idea is turned into a phantasm by
the entanglement of universalizing abstraction and the bond to a concrete, his-
torical experience—precisely the S I T, the *site juif* as *situation*.

Badiou's rather chilling *cri de bataille* "Le juif, c'est moi" echoes not only
Goering's "Wer Jude ist, bestimme ich" ("I decide who is a Jew") but also
Louis XIV's "L'état, c'est moi." ("I am the State"). We may take a degree of com-
fort in a minor consolation, however, for it seems that the dying Louis XIV ac-
tually said something else entirely, namely, "Je m'en vais, mais l'État demeurera
toujours" ("I am leaving, but the State will always remain").

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Neil J. Kressel

Does Islam Fuel Antisemitism?

Quotations can always be taken out of context, and the words of any given leader do not necessarily represent the views of his or her followers. Nonetheless, it can be useful to hear what a few admittedly extreme Muslim leaders have been saying about Jews recently. Consider, for example, how the Sudanese Imam Mohamed Abdul-Kareem responded in February, 2017, to a call for normalization of relations with Israel. "The Muslims' enmity toward the Jews," he suggested,

> stems from their very belief in Allah. The belief in Allah makes it imperative for the Muslims never to refrain from feeling and evoking enmity toward the slayers of the prophets, towards the brothers of apes and pigs ... How can a Muslim possibly reach out to a people who were cursed by Allah and who incurred his wrath?

The imam then made clear the extent of his disagreement with Yousuf Al-Koda, the Sudanese sheikh who had proposed better relations with Israel: "Whoever strives to remove the enmity and hatred between the Muslims and the Jews is a heretic and apostate, who has renounced Islam."[1]

Several months later, Saudi Sheikh Mamdouh Al-Harbi concurred that contemporary political disagreements do not lie at the root of Muslim anger toward Jews: "Anyone who claims that our war is with the Zionists rather than the Jews is mistaken. This constitutes a denial of the words of Allah and of the Prophet Muhammad."[2] Also in 2017, across the world in Jersey City, New Jersey, Imam Aymen Elkasaby declared:

> So long as the Al-Aqsa Mosque remains prisoner in the hands of the Jews, this nation [the Muslim nation] will remain humiliated. So long as the Al-Aqsa Mosque remains under the

1 "Sudanese Imam Responds to Call for Normalization of Ties with Israel," MEMRI TV clip no. 5949, February 16, 2017, https://www.memri.org/tv/sudanese-imam-responds-call-normalization-ties-israel-muslims-enmity-towards-brothers-pigs-and.
2 "Saudi Cleric Mamdouh Al-Harbi: Muslims' War Is with the Jews, Not Just Zionists," MEMRI TV clip no. 6162, July 26, 2017, https://www.memri.org/tv/saudi-cleric-muslim-war-with-jews-not-just-zionists.

feet of the apes and pigs, this nation will remain humiliated . . . Oh Allah, bring Al-Aqsa back into the fold of Islam and the Muslims. . . Count them [the Jews] one by one, and kill them down to the very last one. Do not leave a single one on the face of the Earth.[3]

Finally, numerous times in the past few years, Islamic religious and political leaders have made reference to one particular *hadith*, or saying, attributed to the Prophet Muhammad. In July 2017, Ammar Shahin—a California imam— sermonized:

The Prophet Muhammad said: "Judgment Day will not come until the Muslims fight the Jews, and the Jews hide behind stones and trees, and the stones and the trees say: Oh Muslim, oh servant of Allah..." They will not say: Oh Egyptian, oh Palestinian, oh Jordanian, oh Syrian, oh Afghan, oh Pakistani. The Prophet Muhammad says that the time will come; the Last Hour will not take place, until the Muslims fight the Jews. We don't say if it is in Palestine or another place. . . When that war breaks out, they [the Jews] will run and hide behind every rock, and house, and wall, and trees. The house, the wall, and the trees will call upon the Muslims: . . . "Come, there is someone behind me—except for the Gharqad tree, which is the tree of the Jews. . . . That's the tree that will not speak to the Muslims."[4]

The same hadith appeared in a lecture by Syrian Imam Abdullah Khadra in Raleigh, North Carolina, and it was featured by Jordanian Sheikh Muhammad Bin Musa Al-Nasr in a December, 2016, sermon in Montreal, Canada.[5] Yet again, and not surprisingly, the hadith animated Hamas legislator Marwan Abu Ras's sermon in January, 2017. The reason his allusion to the hadith is not surprising, of course, is because until recently, it was a part of the official Hamas Charter. Marwan Abu Ras's conclusion was, arguably, genocidal:

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3 Quoted in "Friday Sermon at Jersey City, NJ," MEMRI TV clip no. 6310, December 8, 2017. Retrieved from https://www.memri.org/tv/antisemitic-sermon-jersey-city-imam-aymen-elkasaby, (accessed July 30, 2018).
4 "California Friday Sermon: Imam Ammar Shahin Cites Antisemitic Hadith, Prays for Annihilation of Jews, and Calls to Liberate Al-Aqsa Mosque from Their 'Filth'," MEMRI TV clip no. 6133, July 21, 2017, https://www.memri.org/tv/california-sermon-antisemitic-sermon-kill-jews-liberate-al-aqsa-mosque.
5 "Friday Sermon in the Raleigh Area, NC, by Syrian Imam Abdullah Khadra," MEMRI TV clip no. 6310, December 8, 2017, https://www.memri.org/tv/antisemitic-sermon-jersey-city-imam-aymen-elkasaby; Al-Nasr quoted in A. Pink, "Arrest Warrant Issued for Imam who Called for Jews to be Killed," *Forward*, July 16, 2017, https://forward.com/fast-forward/377144/arrest-warrant-issued-for-imam-who-called-for-jews-to-be-killed/.

> Oh Allah, show us the black day that you inflict upon them, and the wonders of your abil-ity. Oh Allah, count them one by one and annihilate them down to the very last one. Do not spare any of them.[6]

Needless to say, the religious leaders quoted above are extremists. None of them represents the views of moderate Muslims, and while their expressed opinions should not be described as rare in the Muslim world, neither can they be called mainstream. Sometimes, the people who say these sorts of things end up apol-ogizing under pressure or, less often, are fired—especially in the United States. Occasionally, organizations like CAIR—the Council on American-Islamic Rela-tions—denounce them.

Moreover, we cannot assume that these extremists' attribution of their own current attitudes toward Jews to ancient religious sources is either scientifically accurate or theologically sound. Marwan Abu Ras, the Hamas politician, certain-ly sounds like his hatred is religiously inspired. Yet he also declares:

> Oh criminal Jews, Allah described your characteristics to us. You cannot remain on our land! We shall never relinquish a single inch of our land. . . [The Jewish enemy] sends AIDS-infected girls to fornicate with Muslim youths, in order to spread fornication and AIDS among Muslim youth. . .[7]

Such paranoia, intransigence, and hostility are hardly a cause for hope; they may, however, suggest that there are political, sociological, and psychological foundations for Marwan Abu Ras's antisemitism. Plenty of antisemitic quota-tions in the Muslim world, after all, sound like they might have been lifted from the Nazis or from *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*—both European im-ports having nothing to tie them directly to Islam. The religion may or may not be a central cause of Marwan Abu Ras's hatred; he, arguably, may be using the language of the past to provide a prose background for hostility which, in actuality, has more proximal causes. Some Muslim thinkers have ar-gued that the hadith about killing Jews to bring about end times has been unjus-tifiably appropriated by Jew-haters and that benign interpretations of this hadith are plausible.[8] This may seem like a stretch but the matter is, in the final anal-

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6 "Gaza Friday Sermon by Hamas MP Marwan Abu Ras," MEMRI TV clip no. 5846, January 6, 2017, https://www.memri.org/tv/gaza-friday-sermon-hamas-mp-marwan-abu-ras-jews-recruit-prostitutes-girls-aids-lure-arabs-their.

7 Ibid.

8 Yaqeen Institute for Islamic Research, "The Hadith And The Myth Of An Antisemitic Genocide In Muslim Scripture," *Huffington Post*, March 28, 2017, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-jew-killing-hadith-and-the-myth-of-an-antisemitic_us_58da7e56e4b0e96354656eb6.

ysis, for Muslim scholars to decide. In any case, progressive Muslims may seek and, possibly, find theologically acceptable methods of defanging antisemitic hadiths that are genuinely rife with antisemitic potential.[9]

Nonetheless, a large enough number of Muslim religious leaders have identified a vast number of religious sources for their hostility, enough to make a potentially refutable prima facie case that source material in the Islamic tradition predisposes contemporary Muslims to anti-Jewish bigotry. But it is a complicated matter to determine precisely how—and to what extent—contemporary Muslim antisemitism can be described as Islamic, or religious, in origin. That such antisemitism prevails in many parts of the Muslim world, however, is far less subject to debate among reasonable people.

The Prevalence of Antisemitism in the Muslim World

Few realms of scholarly debate these days seem less likely to turn on careful collection of scientific data than those involving bigotry, religion, Jews, Muslims, and the Middle East. Yet, for those who care to look, a great deal of empirical evidence documents substantial anti-Jewish hatred in much of the Muslim world. While the style, intensity, and extent of this bigotry vary by region, country, political ideology, religiosity, and other dimensions, the overall antisemitic movement seems undeniably widespread. Scholars who have studied Muslim antisemitism have concluded that it is currently growing and dangerous.[10]

Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons (which I have addressed elsewhere), most experts on the Middle East and most "anti-racists" in government, academ-

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9 T. Fatah, *The Jew is Not My Enemy: Unveiling the Myths that Fuel Muslim Anti-Semitism* (Plattsburgh: McClelland & Stewart, 2011), 103 – 29.
10 R. N. Bali, "Conspiracy Theories, Antisemitism and Jews in Turkey Today," in *Global Antisemitism: A Crisis of Modernity*, ed. C. A. Small (New York: ISGAP, 2013); A. G. Bostom, *The Legacy of Islamic Antisemitism: From Sacred Texts to Solemn History* (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2008); A. G. Bostom, *Iran's Final Solution for Israel: The Legacy of Jihad and Shi'ite Islamic Jew-Hatred in Iran* (Washington: Bravura Books, 2014); Fatah, *The Jew Is Not My Enemy*; R. Jaspal, *Antisemitism and Anti-Zionism: Representation, Cognition, and Everyday Talk* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014); G. Jikeli, *European Muslim Antisemitism: Why Young Urban Males Say They Don't Like Jews* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015); N. J. Kressel, *"The Sons of Pigs and Apes": Muslim Antisemitism and the Conspiracy of Silence* (Washington: Potomac, 2012); R. S. Wistrich, *A Lethal Obsession: Anti-Semitism from Antiquity to the Global Jihad* (New York: Random House, 2010).

ia, and the human rights community have shown either an unfortunate blindness to the problem or a willingness to explain it away as insignificant or otherwise unworthy of attention.[11] Some social scientists have objected to the way antisemitism has been operationalized in studies, while others have argued that antisemitic attitudes really tap hostility toward Israel.[12] Yet even among those relatively few journalists, scholars, and activists who are keenly aware of current antisemitism in Muslim communities, there remains considerable confusion, disagreement, and debate about the sense in which this bigotry can be described as "Islamic." Most controversial has been the question of whether Islamic religious beliefs, practices, and traditions might in some sense—perhaps a crucial sense—be responsible for (or contribute to) the creation and maintenance of antisemitism.

The possibility of linkage between religion and prejudice has been a major topic of interest for psychologists of religion at least since Gordon Allport highlighted the relationship between measures of Christian religiosity and some types of bigotry in his seminal 1954 volume, *The Nature of Prejudice*.[13] As recent reviews of studies in the psychology of religion have noted, research on religion and prejudice overwhelmingly has dealt with Christian attitudes toward various minorities, frequently focusing on Blacks and the LGBTIQ+ community but also, occasionally, including Jews—as for example, in Charles Glock and Rodney Stark's (1966) classic, *Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism*.[14] Psychologists of religion have devoted great effort to understanding which aspects of Christianity

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11 N. J. Kressel, "The Great Failure of the Anti-Racist Community: The Neglect of Muslim Antisemitism in English-language Courses, Textbooks, and Research," in *From Antisemitism to Anti-Zionism: The Past and Present of a Lethal Ideology*, ed. E. G. Pollack (Boston: Academic Studies, 2017), 29. See, also, B. Harrison, *The Resurgence of Anti-Semitism: Jews, Israel, and Liberal Opinion* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006); N. Cohen, *What's Left?: How Liberals Lost Their Way* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2007); D. Hirsh, "Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism: Cosmopolitan Reflections," in *The Yale Papers: Antisemitism in Comparative Perspective*, ed. C. A. Small (New York: ISGAP, 2015), 57–174.

12 See, for example, M. Bunzl, *Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Hatreds Old and New in Europe* (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm, 2007); J. J. Mearsheimer and S. M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008); J. Cohen, "The Accusation of Anti-Semitism as Moral Blackmail," *Human Architecture* (2009): 23–33; J. Butler, "Foreword," in *On Anti-Semitism: Solidarity and the Struggle for Justice*, ed. Jewish Voice for Peace (Chicago: Haymarket Books: 2017), vii.

13 G. W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 444–57. See, also, G. W. Allport and J. M. Ross, "Personal Religious Orientation and Prejudice," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* (1967): 432.

14 C. Y. Glock and R. Stark, *Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966).

and which orientations to religion (intrinsic, extrinsic, quest, etc.) do and do not encourage bigotry of various types.[15]

Very little research by psychologists has examined the relationship between Islamic religious beliefs and anti-Jewish prejudice. Social scientists' relative neglect of Muslim antisemitism was recently documented in an empirical content analytic study of items listed in four huge social science databases: *PSYCHINFO*, *Sociological Abstracts*, *ProQuest Social Science Journals*, and *Worldwide Political Science Abstracts*.[16] Database searches went up to the end of 2014, though the starting dates varied due to differing coverage—*PSYCHINFO* (1940), *Sociological Abstracts* (1950), *ProQuest Social Science Journals* (1990), *Worldwide Political Science Abstracts* (1970). While antisemitism in general was not neglected, and many studies addressed the Holocaust, almost no research in any of the databases until 2000 covered antisemitism in the Muslim or Arab worlds. After 2000, a handful of studies appeared on the topic, though it remained largely ignored. An associated content analytic study of psychological research showed that very few psychologically based investigations of antisemitism of any kind made reference to the religious roots of the prejudice. When studies did allude to religious roots, they more often spoke of the Christian roots of Jew-hatred than of the Islamic roots. Overall, 77% of the examined psychological works made no reference at all to the religious roots of Jew-hatred. Twelve percent at least briefly noted a role for Christianity and 4% mentioned a role for Islam. An additional 7% alluded to religious origins of antisemitism that were either unspecified, or related to both Christianity and Islam. The coding scheme aimed at being inclusive; thus, if there had been any possible way to infer that the author of a study saw a possible religious source of the prejudice, it was scored as present. Consequently, we may conclude that relatively few authors of psychologically based studies of antisemitism saw religion as a key causal factor. Alternatively, if they did think religious causes were important, they nonetheless omitted them from their research for one reason or another.

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15 See, for example, R. W. Hood, P. C. Hill, and B. Spilka, *The Psychology of Religion: An Empirical Approach* (New York: Guilford, 2009); M. E. Nielsen, A. T. Hatton, and M. J. Donahue, "Religiousness, Social Psychology, and Behavior," in *Handbook of the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality*, ed. R. F. Paloutzian and C. L. Park (New York: Guilford, 2013), 312.

16 N. J. Kressel and S. W. Kressel, "Trends in the Psychological Study of Contemporary Antisemitism: Conceptual Issues and Empirical Evidence," *Basic and Applied Social Psychology* 38, no. 2 (2016): 111.

Some Preliminary Caveats

This paper aims to clarify the relationship between Islam as a religion and Jew-hatred as it currently exists in the Muslim world. As we shall see, part of this clarification involves more carefully stating the questions we are attempting to answer. So, we need to start with a few caveats.

First, and regardless of the view one ultimately takes about whether Islamic religious sources feed Jew-hatred, it is patently clear that individual Muslims may be entirely free of antisemitism.[17] Many religious Muslims may not even have heard of the particular antisemitic texts and sources that antisemitism scholars find so troubling. Many have not been exposed to the hateful utterances that occur in some mosques, simply because they attend other mosques where such bigotry is not spoken or tolerated. Some have been exposed to the antisemitic ideology and—due to secular learning, skepticism, human decency, past interactions with non-believers, and many other reasons—have dismissed the hatefulness as nonsense or otherwise unacceptable. People cannot be seen as vessels who receive fourteen-hundred-year-old streaming religious traditions passively and mindlessly. It is not like Islamic civilization is downloaded by a button press into the individual. People are complex beings who derive their identities from multiple sources—their careers, their families, their neighborhoods, their schools, their friends, and the media.[18] In America and other parts of the West, especially, those agents of socialization can go a long way toward erasing the effects of religion—good or bad.

Another clarification that must be made from the outset is that all religions, or—at least—most religions, have what might be called "hard passages" or "difficult verses," ones that most reasonable people would find difficult to accept at face value nowadays.[19] One cannot escape the conclusion that those who have scoured the Jewish Bible, the New Testament, the Qur'an, the Book of Mormon, and other classic religious sources have been very productive in their research, finding loads of troubling passages with which believers must contend. For fair-minded, tolerant, modern, and progressive believers, the key generally is

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17 D. V. Goska, "Counter-Jihad: We're About Truth, Not Hate," *Frontpage Mag*, December 2015, https://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/261187/counter-jihad-were-about-truth-not-hate-danusha-v-goska.

18 B. Beit-Hallahmi, *Psychological Perspectives on Religion and Religiosity* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 40–55.

19 N. J. Kressel, *Bad Faith: The Danger of Religious Extremism* (Amherst: Prometheus, 2007), 149–98.

to disable (or weaken) these religious passages one way or another via theological reinterpretation or some other means. And this is rarely a simple task. Usually, the most dangerous scripturally based problems come from two sources—(1) the founding narrative of the faith and (2) the rules, stories, and examples that deal with treatment of those outside of the faith. If we conclude, as I shall, that Islam contains problems of this sort, we must not overlook similar problems in most other faith traditions.

Moreover, we must acknowledge that the presence of religious sources and imagery in contemporary antisemitism does not prove that the antisemitism was directly "caused" by the religious material. We must, more generally, be cautious about what some political scientists call "mystification by history," the idea that distant historical events fully explain contemporary occurrences. For example, years ago, in a discussion of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, I noted that some people tended to explain the bloodshed as the product of hundreds of years of nonstop and "ancient" animosities.[20] Such explanations tell us little about how distant historical events become psychologically relevant for contemporary individuals and sociologically and politically relevant for contemporary societies. Even if Islamic religion contributes to the genesis of current Jew-hatred in the Muslim world, it cannot be considered a sufficient explanation, and it may not be the most significant level of analysis to pursue.

At the same time, we can reject the position that Islam cannot possibly be the problem because the faith—and the Qur'an—have been around for many centuries and during nearly all of that time Jews in Islamic civilization were treated well. This argument, quite simply, fails historically.[21] Some authors, like Andrew Bostom and Ibn Warraq emphasize a more or less continuous pattern of bigotry and mistreatment; others like Mark Cohen paint a rosier picture, especially in contrast with how Jews were treated by Christians in Europe. Bernard Lewis suggested that under traditional Islam, there was "normal" prejudice—sometimes more, sometimes less—but not usually obsessive until modern times.[22] I think

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20 N. J. Kressel, *Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror* (New York: Plenum, 1996), 20.

21 M. Gilbert, *In Ishmael's House: A History of Jews in Muslim Lands* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010); Wistrich, *Lethal Obsession*; N. A. Stillman, *The Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Sourcebook* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1979); idem, *The Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1991).

22 Bostom, *The Legacy of Islamic Antisemitism*; I. Warraq, *The Islam in Islamic Terrorism* (Nashville: New English Review, 2017); M. R. Cohen, *Under Crescent and Cross: The Jews in the Middle Ages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); B. Lewis, *Semites and Anti-Semites* (New York: Norton, 1987).

the most reasonable position is that, under Islam (overall), Jews frequently were treated better than under Christianity until recent decades. But Christianity, after all, set a very low standard for treatment of Jews, varying from bad to intolerable to murderous. Islam created a political and religious world that sometimes included a degree of tolerance based on second-class citizenship purchased at a high price. Hatred was intensified whenever Jews, individually or politically, tried to emerge from second-class status. Violence was sometimes a feature of the Jewish condition in the world of Islam—but not always. The whole system rested on Jews acknowledging their individual and collective inferiority; if they did so, they might—sometimes—be able to live reasonably well. As Eunice Pollack recently argued, part of the reason for the popularity of the "happy dhimmis" myth is that it has proved useful to anti-Zionists.[23]

Finally, we should note a general tendency in some quarters to give religion a pass in explaining human misbehavior. In these circles, there is often even more unwillingness to consider the Islamic roots of misbehavior because of a belief that world peace depends on Christians and Muslims getting along and that this goal cannot be advanced through any analysis that shows Islam in negative light. Such analyses, according to some, would feed prejudice against Muslims. As Europe found out during the Thirty Years War, it can certainly be destructive to try to insist on unanimity in matters of religion, and there are very good reasons for treating other people's religious beliefs respectfully and with some sensitivity. But, in the final analysis, one cannot be allowed to plead religious belief as a shield against those who charge bigotry. To pretend that religion is irrelevant is to be blind, unwise, and dishonest.

Identifying Islamic Religious Sources of Antisemitism

Previously, I suggested that we can divide the documentation of Jew-hatred into twelve categories:

1. Antisemitic assertions by heads of state, political leaders, former political leaders, government officials, religious figures, and scholars;
2. Lack of general outrage or even significant, well-publicized challenges in response to these antisemitic assertions;

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23 E. G. Pollack, "Foundation Myths of anti-Zionism," in *From Antisemitism to Anti-Zionism: The Past and Present of a Lethal Ideology*, ed. E. G. Pollack (Boston: Academic Studies, 2017), 245.

3. Antisemitic articles and images in newspapers, magazines, broadcast media, and the internet;
4. Antisemitic textbooks and other instruments for socialization of the young;
5. Public opinion data showing highly prevalent negative and stereotypical attitudes toward Jews;
6. Video documentation of bigotry in very young children;
7. Terrorist targeting of Jews and Jewish institutions;
8. Vicious denunciations of Muslims who defend Jews;
9. Denunciations of all sorts of political, personal, and theological opponents as Jews, or as friends of the Jews;
10. Excerpts from religious texts—the Qur'an, the Hadith, the Sira, etc.—that plausibly appear to sustain or reinforce hostility toward Jews, coupled with anti-Jewish interpretations by contemporary religious leaders and theologians (in contrast to more moderate or tolerant interpretations);
11. Laws and organizational policies that discriminate against Jews;
12. Reports by Jews that they feel uncomfortable or unsafe practicing Judaism or displaying signs of Jewish identity in Muslim countries or regions with high percentages of Muslim residents.

Supporting documentation for each of these categories can be found in numerous works.[24]

Sometimes—though not in my view frequently—Muslim religious leaders, especially in Western countries, have condemned or otherwise opposed antisemitism in their communities.[25] These condemnations have ranged from opposition to "racism and prejudice in all forms," which we see most commonly in comparison to "racism, prejudice, and *antisemitism*," which we see less commonly to specific denunciations of particular instances of Muslim Jew-hatred tied to named Muslim leaders, which we see rarely. There is also a category of Muslim religious leaders who neither support nor oppose antisemitism: bystanders, so to speak. However, if we examine the twelve categories of documentation of antisemitism in the Muslim world, we also frequently observe Islamic religious leaders taking a leading role in permitting, endorsing, supporting, and generating many forms of hostility. These religious leaders may represent a relatively small percentage of Muslim religious leaders in total, but we do not have clear data on this question.

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24 See, for example, Kressel, *"The Sons of Pigs and Apes"*; Fatah, *The Jew Is Not My Enemy*; Gilbert, *In Ishmael's House*; Wistrich, *A Lethal Obsession.*
25 Kressel, *"The Sons of Pigs and Apes,"* 188.

What we do know is that Islamic clerics are the source of a large percentage of the most virulent antisemitic utterances found in the mass media and on the internet. They frequently deliver antisemitic speeches and pen antisemitic writings. They also contribute to the antisemitic socialization of the young through sermons and religious education. Denunciations of those who defend Jews often are made by those who possess religious credentials, and denunciations are justified on religious grounds. Many antisemitic events take place in mosques. Moreover, the vast majority of Muslim religious leaders—even those who speak out against terrorism—remain quiet when confronted by evidence of bigotry in their community. So, in this sense, the Islamic religion certainly plays a role in sustaining antisemitic sentiments and activities.

However, it is certainly possible that religious leaders themselves derive their prejudice from sources outside of Islam. Some scholars have gathered evidence suggesting that a good deal of antisemitism in the Muslim world seems pretty clearly to have been imported from Europe in the twentieth century and even earlier.[26] The Muslim clerics who feed contemporary antisemitism could be deriving their ideology partly from this colonial heritage of imported bigotry, not to mention from their anger (whether justified or not) toward Israel.

The case for a deeper Islamic involvement in the genesis of antisemitism requires us to review specific sources of hostility toward Jews in the Islamic religious tradition. Unfortunately, such sources are not hard to find. He was exaggerating to achieve his objectives, but the Grand Mufti Amin el-Husseini in 1944 was able to tell Bosnian troops fighting for the Nazis in World War II—"Nearly one-third of the Qur'an concerns the Jews. The Qur'an calls upon all Muslims to protect themselves against the Jews and to fight them wherever they may meet."[27]

Many Islamic texts concern Jews. A full analysis of the Qur'anic and other Islamic religious references to Jews is not possible here, but it should be made clear that not all such references are unequivocally negative. Although Islam at its core has the notion of Jews and Christians having mishandled their religious obligations, Muhammad at times expressed somewhat positive thoughts about aspects of Judaism and Christianity, and the Islamic religious system put Jews and Christians in a different, more protected category from other non-believers. Reviews of Islamic religious materials by Bostom and Ibn Warraq, while useful, are highly polemical and do not show how texts might be interpret-

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26 J. Herf, *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009); M. Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-hatred: Islamism, Nazism and the Roots of 9/11*, trans. C. Meade (Candor: Telos, 2007); B. Rubin and W. G. Schwanitz, *Nazis, Islamists, and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014); Lewis, *Semites and Anti-Semites*.
27 Quoted in Warraq, *The Islam in Islamic Terrorism*, 291.

ed with less antisemitic potential.[28] It is probably more accurate to say that tolerance and intolerance coexisted within the same tradition. To sort all this out systematically lies beyond the scope of this essay.

But, without question, the Islamic religious tradition contains many sources that are ready for use by contemporary antisemites. In each instance, the progressive or moderate Muslim is probably able to interpret, reinterpret, or adapt the tradition in a way that renders its less useful for the antisemite. On the other hand, it is rarely clear that the moderate interpretation is the more textually accurate or historically plausible one.

Three aspects of the Islamic tradition are especially troubling:

– *Events in the Seventh Century as Reported in the Qur'an, the Sira, and the Hadith.* All surviving accounts of Muhammad's conflicts with the Jews come from the religious sources of one side. Thus, there is no definitive historical evidence about what actually transpired in the seventh century. For example, did any Jews actually break treaties with Muhammad? If so, did they have good reasons to do so? Did the Muslims break any treaties with the Jews? Did the frequently cited story of sexual harassment of a Muslim woman by a Jew in a marketplace really happen? Who knows? But historical truth, by now, has become largely irrelevant. Tales of Jews as deceivers, treaty violators, falsifiers of sacred books, Sabbath violators who were transformed into pigs and apes, and more have roots that can be traced back to the Qur'an and other early religious sources. Jews are blamed for rejecting Jesus and for poisoning Muhammad's food, a deed sometimes cited as a contributing factor to his death years later. Some of these stories involve particular Jews, or groups of Jews; few are aimed at the entire Jewish people. But the Muslim religious tradition, at the very least, shows Jews as people who rejected the great teacher's ideas and were defeated by him in battle.

– *Later Spins on Muhammad's Conflict with the Jews.* Tarek Fatah has made a case that certain parties in the early centuries after Muhammad's death, notably the then-powerful descendants of the Meccans who had rejected Muhammad, had reason to portray the Jews as his greatest enemies.[29] Thus, some hadiths (which may have been inauthentic) may have greatly reinforced the anti-Jewish aspects of Muhammad's era, even creating for him a role that he may never have played in presiding over the massacre of the unarmed tribe of Banu Qurayza Jews. According to Fatah, the worst antisemitism in the early Islamic tradition may have been fabricated. But

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28 Bostom, *The Legacy of Islamic Antisemitism*; Warraq, *The Islam in Islamic Terrorism*.
29 Fatah, *The Jew Is Not My Enemy*, 134.

it should be pointed out that—Fatah's fascinating arguments notwithstanding—most observant Muslims regard Muhammad's murder/punishment of the Banu Qurayza Jews as an historical event. It is hard to know whether Fatah's argument is correct or merely wishful thinking, but his heart is in the right place. On the other hand, many Muslim's accept as truth that Muhammad was willing to wipe out an entire tribe of Jews—hardly a happy precedent.

–   *The Long Muslim Political and Religious Tradition of Discrimination and Prejudice.* The Islamic religious tradition, like other religious traditions, had an element of contempt for non-believers, although this negative sentiment usually did not rise to the level of hate or obsession observed in the Christian world. Still, institutionalized discrimination, a sense of superiority, and various restrictions on free religious practice were rarely missing over many centuries. It remains a matter of debate just how widespread, intolerable, and injurious various anti-Jewish measures were. It also remains a matter of historical debate whether the Christian experience of life under Islam was better, worse, or the same as the Jewish experience.

Indigenous religious traditions made the Islamic world especially receptive to new, sometimes more intense and obsessive, antisemitic ideas that accompanied the European colonialists. When Christian missionaries and later secular antisemites told stories of blood libels and Jewish conspiratorial plots, Muslims had been prepared by Islam to accept such ideas uncritically—even enthusiastically. Nazis, later on, were somewhat successful in recruiting Muslims partly because of the indigenous religious foundations of Jew-hatred. Islam prepared the ground for Jew-hatred in a way not entirely different from how Christianity laid the soil for later non-Christian antisemitism to grow.

The Islamist perspective on the faith had been developing gradually over many years, starting all the way back with Wahhabi movement in eighteenth-century Arabia. The Salafi approach, which emphasized a spiritual return to the early days of Islam, brought additional focus on Muhammad's negative interactions with Jews. The Muslim Brotherhood movement, founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, grew increasingly anti-Jewish during World War II (in part through its connection to the virulently antisemitic Grand Mufti). Sayyid Qutb perhaps brought antisemitism to its ideological fruition in his mid-century works; as Qutb's extremist approach was accepted by more and more Muslims, antisemitism spread with it. Islamists could only make their case because of the pre-existing Islamic foundation for Jew-hatred.

At various times in Islamic history, anti-Jewish elements of the tradition loomed more or less large. When the Jews were weak and without a state, and

Islam was thriving, the old seventh-century enemies could be viewed as natural-
ly subordinate. And so some of the antisemitic traditions at other times receded
into history, occasionally mentioned but not—as Lewis noted—the basis for ob-
sessive hatred.[30] With the emergence of Israel, and the Muslim world (for many
reasons) in sociopolitical disarray, the old texts were dusted off.

As I have argued elsewhere, the great hostility toward Israel may in fact have
a religious element at its core.[31] The late psychoanalyst Mortimer Ostow ex-
plained the situation well. He wrote, that:

> The obvious source of current Arab and Muslim resentment against the Jews derives from
> the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 on land claimed by the Muslim Arabs. . . .
> But the Jews also represented a mythic enemy, a principle of cosmic evil. It was only be-
> cause of that satanic power, the Arabs argued, that they were able to defeat the Arab armies
> which had come to wipe them out in recent years. Throughout the history of Jewish-Muslim
> coexistence in Muslim countries, both Jews and Christians were tolerated only as long as
> they acknowledged the subservient status to which they were assigned, and which they ac-
> cepted. That the Jew, who, in Muslim eyes, was seen as weak, cowardly and ineffectual,
> could impose such a quick and definitive military defeat upon the Arab enemy could not
> be explained except by the theory that the Jews embodied a principle of cosmic evil, a sa-
> tanic element, whose worldwide conspiracies would some day be disclosed and defeated.[32]

This, I think, is the main engine behind contemporary Arab and Muslim antisem-
itism. It is the deepest reason why the Arab-Israeli conflict has been so difficult
to resolve. Conflicts over land can be negotiated. Peace with Israel almost cer-
tainly would bring huge economic and political dividends first and foremost
to the Palestinians. The problem is that peace might extract a psychological,
and perhaps theological, cost that would be difficult to bear. Jews as equals is
bad enough, a violation of the religious order in which they are supposed to be-
have as dhimmis. But Jews who prevail in fair competition would be a bad reflec-
tion on the faith, the culture, and by extension, the self.

One can, to some extent, work through inconsistencies between political re-
ality and what Muslims expect from their religious ideology by holding that Jews
are, as the religious sources taught, godless, evil, tricky and, as the imported *Pro-
tocols* taught, involved in a massive plot to control the world, possessing power
over the United States and just about everyone else. One might also get some re-

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30 Lewis, *Semites and Anti-Semites*, 21.

31 Kressel, *"The Sons of Pigs and Apes,"* 169–70.

32 M. Ostow, "Commentary on 'Mass Hatred in the Muslim and Arab World: The Neglected Prob-
lem of Anti-Semitism by Neil Kressel," *International Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies* 4,
no. 3 (2007): 229–30. See, also, idem, *Myth and Madness: The Psychodynamics of Antisemitism*
(New Brunswick: Transaction, 1996).

lief by maintaining that corrupt leaders betrayed the Muslims. With beliefs such as these, the crumbling yet psychologically important edifice can be buttressed. Such mental manipulations end up reducing the unpleasant psychological dissonance and restoring some tranquility.[33]

Conclusion

While it would be an immensely complicated task to specify the precise social psychological mechanisms through which Islamic anti-Jewish tenets become relevant in the generation and maintenance of antisemitic beliefs and behaviors in the contemporary lives of individuals, it is a fairly straightforward matter to outline the major pathways of this influence.

–   The historical tradition of antisemitism can legitimize and render more plausible all arguments and positions that involve Jew-hatred, whatever their source.
–   A call to oppose the Jews may most immediately stem from exposure, say, to a television program based on the imported *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*; yet that program may be popular precisely because it reinforces indigenous religious messages.
–   Jews may become scapegoats for frustrations that originate in contemporary economic, political, sociological, or personal problems; however, their selection as *the scapegoats of choice* may be the product, in part, of their traditional portrayal as deceptive, dishonorable, and murderous in some Islamic religious sources.
–   The inability to find a reasonable resolution to the Israeli-Arab conflict may indeed feed the fires of Jew-hatred. However, the difficulties in solving this conflict may, themselves, arise from religious expectations about the proper role for Jews in the Islamic world, along with the religious notion that land which has been ruled by Muslims cannot ever fall under the rule of other groups.
–   Children may become antisemites because of the socialization processes they experience while under the influence of imams who have been radicalized. The ideologies they absorb may not represent "true" Islam as defined by moderates. But these extremist imams are still part of the religious tradition, and their positions derive plausibility from the existence of real precedents in the religious tradition.

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33 This argument is developed in greater detail in Kressel, *"The Sons of Pigs and Apes,"* 169 – 70.

- The more one takes the religious tradition seriously, the more its anti-Jewish elements become relevant, though religiosity may also lead one to examine the countervailing tenets of tolerance as well. On the other hand, abandonment of the religious tradition does not mean that one has become free of Islam's potential to legitimize hostility to Jews.
- Those who oppose antisemitism may be rendered less effective by portraying them, not implausibly, as out of touch with the views that prevail in the Hadith, the Sira, and elsewhere.

When the roots of prejudice lie within a religious tradition that helps more than a billion people to cope with their existential issues and to achieve an overall sense of meaning in life, there is certainly a basis for pessimism. But perhaps the greatest reason for optimism lies in the recognition that the Christian religious tradition contains at least as strong, and arguably a considerably stronger, basis for Jew-hatred. And yet many Christians in the twentieth century went very far toward removing, weakening, and rendering inoperable (at least, temporarily) these antisocial elements of the faith. An analysis of currently prevailing theological and political trends does not suggest that a similar process of prosocial reinterpretation is likely in the mainstream Islamic religious community. But it is, at least, possible that current progressive efforts originating outside of that mainstream might over time gain more adherents.

Where do we stand now? If we ask, is Islam eternally, irredeemably, and incurably hostile to Jews, the answer is no. And if we ask, is Islam different at its core from other major faith traditions in preaching hostility to certain nonbelievers, the answer—I think—is also no. If we were to probe the sacred texts of Judaism (and Christianity), would we find a large number of difficult, morally challenging passages? Absolutely. Do individual Muslims necessarily derive from their religious tradition beliefs that predispose them to become antisemites? Again, I think not. Individuals have complex identities and belief systems; they are not passive recipients of everything in their faith's tradition. Are some Muslim religious leaders speaking out forthrightly and effectively against the antisemitic potential of Islam? Definitely, some—but not many. Are religious Muslims more likely to be antisemitic than non-religious people from Muslim backgrounds? This seems an empirical question for which we have only sketchy answers. Do Jews have anything to worry about with increasing immigration of Muslims into the West? This one is tricky. I think the answer is yes, Jews should be concerned. But I'm not sure what political and policy implications should follow from this concern. Can interfaith programs with Muslim leaders be a useful way to improve relations? Yes, probably, but only if such programs are open and honest about antisemitism when it occurs. Does Islam need an en-

counter with its antisemitic past similar to that which the Catholic Church and other Christian denominations had in the mid-twentieth century. Yes. Is this likely to happen? Not as far as I can tell.

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Lars Dencik

On the Ethical Implications and Political Costs of Misinterpreting and Abusing the Notion "Anti-Semitism"

There is antisemitism in the world, even several distinct kinds of antisemitisms. There is also a lively discourse on what antisemitism is. This discourse, often inflamed, is pierced by both hypersensitivity and rejections, accusations and counteraccusations. Different groups have vested political interests both in launching accusations of antisemitism and in denying that certain propositions and actions are in fact antisemitic. The interrelations between actual real-life antisemitism and the discourse on antisemitism in media and public debate in general are subtle and complex. This article focuses on how the notion "antisemitism" in the contemporary era is sometimes used by different political interests as a vehicle for promoting certain political goals. By way of conclusion, the ethical implications and political costs for the Jewish people of the political exploitation of the fear Jews associate with real-life antisemitism is discussed.

In this article I will elaborate four points:

(1) The notion of "anti-Semitism." Taken literally, this term is in itself an antisemitically based notion. The quasi-racial idea it is based on is today largely discredited. Still the notions "anti-Semitism" and "antisemitism" have become firmly rooted. And still contempt and hatred of Jews persists. The very notion "anti-Semitism" and also, but to a lesser extent, the notion "antisemitism," at times serves the sophistry of some anti-Jewish agitators. It is necessary to sort out and to distinguish the persistent, however today not mainly racially motivated, Jew-hatred from other, often politically motivated uses and abuses of the notion "antisemitism."

(2) Besides carrying misleading racial connotations, and being at times politically abused, the notion "antisemitism" covers distinctly diverse phenomena. Although diverse, these phenomena are all expressions of particular kinds of Jew-hatred. In this article three such phenomena are distinguished. Since they are not strongly correlated, it is better speak of different antisemitism̲s. Each of these different kinds of antisemitism has its specific underlying "philosophy," its specific forms of manifestation, and its particular socially delimited carriers/perpetrators.

(3) A functional, even if unintended, symbiosis appears to become established between, on the one hand, the interest of terrorists and other, violent Jew-haters who by their proclamations and actions cause anxiety and fear among Jews. And, on the other hand, some (understandably) alarmist Jewish voices. Among them are right-wing Zionists' and the Israeli government's often frivolous

claims that Jews in the diaspora live in a fearful and basically antisemitic world in which a latent antisemitism constantly "shows its ugly face." Both sides, however for differing reasons, serve to underpin a sense of chronic fear and anxiety among diaspora Jews. From the one side, the fact that Jews constantly may fear being attacked is a calculated goal in itself; from the other side, underpinning the same feelings of constant fear may be intended to serve as a background for persuading Jews to leave the country in which they live and move to Israel as "the only safe place for Jews."

(4) There is a tendency of overusing, and at times even abusing, the term "antisemitism." This has potentially negative side effects for those who are, or potentially might be, targeted by actual Jew-hatred. By extending the notion "antisemitism" to cover also phenomena that are not directly expressions of Jew-hatred, for example, opposition to certain policies and actions by the state of Israel, the concept of "antisemitism" becomes hollow and disarmed. As a consequence, there is a risk that people and institutions might not take even valid accusations of antisemitism seriously.

1 Terminology

The notion "anti-Semitism" was coined by the German journalist Wilhelm Marr in a pamphlet published in 1879, titled *Der Weg zum Siege des Germanenthums über das Judenthum* (*The Way to Victory of Germanism over Judaism*).[1] In his pamphlet, Marr introduced the idea that Germans and Jews were locked in a longstanding conflict, the origins of which he attributed to race. According to Marr, the struggle between Jews and Germans would only be resolved by the victory of one and the ultimate death of the other. In coining "anti-Semitism" he confused a linguistic term with a quasi-racial one. There are in fact Semitic languages, however there are no Semitic peoples or races. The term "anti-Semitism" was coined to denote a racially based fight against the Jews, and just Jews, as a supposed—as Marr saw it—dangerously intruding "race" in *Germanenthum*.

Marr founded a society called *Die Anti-Semiten Liga* as an organization in the service of that fight.[2] The construction of and subsequently successfully dispersed term "anti-Semitism" meant a turning point in the history of Jew-hatred. Coinciding with the rapidly growing secularization of modern societies, it enabled a turn from the religiously based Christian hatred of Jews to a modern "scientifically" based contempt for Jews. Since Jews through this quasi-scientific optic were considered not only as inferior, but at the same time also as dangerous, it was no big step by extension to conclude that the threat Jews were supposed to pose should be eliminated by "necessary" hygienic operations.[3]

Today the quasi-scientific racist ideas catch little, or at least less, support. But still contempt and hatred of Jews persists. If not anymore primarily based on a quasi-scientific idea of race, then still manifesting itself in contempt and prejudices toward Jews and Jewish customs, in ideas of a threatening Jewish world conspiracy, and—not least—in actions and attacks on individual Jews and Jewish institutions with reference to policies and actions taken by the state of Israel.

Although a quasi-racially founded concept, "anti-Semitism" is still often, for example, by the English spelling control of my computer, spelled with a hyphen between "anti" and "Semitism"—as if "Semitism" were a real phenomenon of its own, such as socialism, liberalism, Zionism, or Judaism. Some of those who par-

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1 This pamphlet by Wilhelm Marr (1819–1904) was published in several editions in the 1880s in Berlin by O. Hentze.

2 Cf. M. Zimmermann, *Wilhelm Marr, the Patriarch of Anti-Semitism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

3 Cf. Z. Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Cambridge: Polity, 1991).

ticipate in the contemporary public debate on Israel and hate crime against Jews, for example, my former teacher and colleague, the world renowned founder of peace research, professor Johan Galtung, do not refrain from the sophistry of claiming that Arabs cannot be anti-Semites because they are themselves "Semites."[4] This type of argument implicitly acknowledges that it is based on a clearly quasi-racial concept.

Today the term, whether spelled "anti-Semitism" or "antisemitism," refers to standpoints and actions *exclusively* directed toward Jews. This might then be based on different mixtures in different persons of racial, religious, mythological, political, economic, and other images and prejudices. And could, as history shows, be driven all the way to wishing and acting to eradicate both Jews as living persons, and the Jewish people as such, and by implication also Judaism as a living religion and "Jewishness" as a mentality and lifestyle.

Since such tendencies exist in the world and constitute a unique phenomenon in itself, and since "anti-Semitism" is now an acknowledged term to denote this phenomenon, we have little choice but to use it, even if it is actually is a misconception. However, in order to avoid unnecessarily carrying along the possible misinterpretations and misunderstandings contained in Marr's conceptual invention—the unique phenomena of discrimination, contempt, hatred, fear, and obsession of Jews the term denotes—it should be conceived of and written as a concept in itself, without hyphen and capital letters: *antisemitism*.

In Anglo-Saxon literature the term "*Judeophobia*" is sometimes used as a synonym for antisemitism. This, however, is not a proper substitute: For some it may in fact be a kind of phobia, but most often a "phobia" is not the central element of antisemitism. A "*phobia*" by definition is a type of anxiety disorder, defined by a persistent fear of an object or situation. What usually is in play in antisemitism is something else. Rather than fear of Jews, antisemitism is usually an expression of contempt for, and even hatred toward Jews.

Realizing this distinction, some have contemplated terming this phenomenon "*Jew-hatred*." One practical advantage to doing so would be that the concept would be more congruent to the acknowledged concepts "hate speech" and "hate crime." However, antisemitism usually holds more sentiments and refers to other attitudes than just hate.

So even if it theoretically would be desirable to find a substitute for the concept "antisemitism," we for practical reasons will have to do with this term. A

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4 For an extensive documentation of Galtung's antisemitic declarations, cf. J. Færseth, "Johan and Antisemitism," *Fri Tanke*, November 12, 2020, https://fritanke.no/bakgrunn/johan-galtung-and-antisemitism/19.11455.

similar argument goes for the Greek term *Holocaust*, which means "A sacrifice consumed by fire"—taken literally, it is a fundamentally misleading concept since the mass killing of Jews by the Nazis was by no means a sacrifice. Jews today usually prefer to use the Hebrew word *Shoah*, that literally means "catastrophe." But since "Holocaust" today has become the acknowledged concept in the Anglo-Saxon literature to denote the systematic attempt at exterminating the Jewish people, for all practical purposes it also remains unavoidable to use, even if this by no means implies accepting the tacit "sacrifice" component of the concept.

2 Antisemitism*s*

A current, widely accepted working definition of antisemitism reads:

> Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.[5]

This is the working definition adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) at their plenary meeting in Bucharest, on May 26, 2016.

A complication of this or any other definition of "antisemitism" is that it covers several distinctly diverse empirical phenomena. There are at least three different sources of contemporary contempt and hatred toward Jews that I have identified empirically. These are:

1. Classic stereotypes of Jews
2. "Aufklärungsantisemitismus"
3. Projections of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

In my reports Different Antisemitisms: Perceptions and experiences of antisemitism in Sweden and across Europe[6] and Antisemitisms in the Twenty-First Century: Sweden and Denmark as Forerunners?[7] on the 2012 and 2018 survey studies

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5 "Working Definition of Antisemitism," International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, issued May 26, 2016, https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/news-archive/working-definition-anti semitism.

6 Together with K. Marosi (London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, 2017).

7 Cf. L. Dencik, "Antisemitisms in the Twenty-First Century: Sweden and Denmark as Forerunners?" in *Antisemitism in the North: History and State of Research*, ed. J. Adams and C. Hess (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), 231–66.

by the European Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) on Discrimination and hate crime against Jews in EU member states,[8] I have investigated the relative presence of these three kinds of antisemitism in several of today's European countries. I could then also conclude that these three antisemitisms are rather distinct, that is, not strongly empirically correlated. And furthermore, that each of them is based on disparate anti-Jewish images, becomes manifested and expressed in differing ways, and are carried by socially different kinds of perpetrators.

The three different kinds of antisemitisms I have delineated are classic antisemitism, *Aufklärungsantisemitismus*, and Israel-derived antisemitism.

Classic Antisemitism

This antisemitism is based on traditional antisemitic stereotypes about Jews. Those who manifest this kind of antisemitism are mainly found among political right-wingers. This kind of antisemitism mainly manifests itself in verbal derogatory personal or public remarks and acts of social discrimination.

One way of measuring this kind of antisemitism is by the scale used in a global survey study by the Anti-Defamation League in 2015.[9] The scale consists of eleven statements to which the respondent can answer either "probably true" or "probably false." The statements are:

1. Jews are more loyal to Israel than to [this country/the countries they live in]
2. Jews have too much power in international financial markets
3. Jews have too much control over global affairs
4. Jews think they are better than other people
5. Jews have too much control over the global media
6. Jews are responsible for most of the world's wars
7. Jews have too much power in the business world
8. Jews don't care what happens to anyone but their own kind
9. People hate Jews because of the way Jews behave
10. Jews have too much control over the United States government

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[8] European Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), *Discrimination and Hate Crime against Jews in EU Member States: Experiences and Perceptions of Antisemitism* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014); idem, *Experience and Perceptions of Antisemitism: Second Survey on Discrimination and Hate Crime against Jews in the EU* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2018).

[9] "ADL Global 100," Anti-Defamation League, accessed December 28, 2020, https://global100.adl.org/map.

11. Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust

According to the criteria adopted by the ADL survey "respondents who said at least six out of the eleven statements are 'probably true' are considered to 'harbor anti-Semitic attitudes.'"[10]

In short, they are *classic antisemites*. The ADL study finds out what proportion of the inhabitants in each of the investigated 101 countries are classic antisemites. I will here report only on those eight EU countries that participated in the first FRA survey. The data in the Table 1 below stems from 2015:

Hungary	41
France	37
Latvia	28
Belgium	27
Germany	27
Italy	20
UK	8
Sweden	4

Table 1: Percentage of the population in the some of the European countries harboring *classic antisemitic* attitudes according to the ADL index.

Noteworthy here is on the one extreme the high proportion of Hungarians who harbor classic antisemitic attitudes, and on the other extreme the relatively very low proportion of Swedes who do so.

The high number of classic antisemites in Hungary is not outstanding if compared to its neighboring east European countries such as Poland (45%), Ukraine (38%), Romania (35%), Serbia (42%), Bulgaria (44%), and also Greece (69%). Greece is actually the country outside the Middle East and North Africa with the highest Anti-Semitism Index Scores.

In contrast to this, the proportion of Swedes who qualify to be regarded as classic antisemitic is virtually the lowest registered in Europe and actually one of the very lowest in the entire world.[11] On the whole the western European countries score considerably lower on the ADL Anti-Semitism Index Score than do the inhabitants in eastern Europe. And among the Western countries, the inhabitants in its perhaps most modernized and secular corner,[12] the Scandinavian

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10 Ibid.

11 Only two countries in the world manifest a lower Antisemitism Index Score than Sweden, viz. Laos (0.2%) and the Philippines (3%).

12 Cf. "Findings & Insights," The World Value Survey, accessed December 28, 2020, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp?CMSID=Findings.

countries, harbor less of classic antisemitic attitudes than in other parts of Europe.

Denmark	8 %	Norway	15 %	Sweden	4 %
Men	11	Men	21	Men	4
Women	6	Women	9	Women	3
Age		Age		Age	
18 – 34	7	18 – 34	8	18 – 34	2
35 – 49	4	35 – 49	15	35 – 49	1
50+	12	50+	20	50+	7

Table 2: Percentage of the population in Scandinavian countries harboring *classic antisemitic* attitudes according to the ADL index.

Noteworthy is the fact that men consistently score somewhat higher on classic antisemitism than women do and that there are more classic antisemitic attitudes among the older generation than among the younger adults.

It should be noted in this context that classic antisemitism is just one out of three distinct kinds of antisemitism. Even if classic antisemitism is more present in eastern European than in western European countries, we have in recent years experienced much more of antisemitic violence in West Europe than in East Europe. And even if classic antisemitism is less present in Sweden and Denmark than in all other European countries, antisemitic violence nonetheless has become manifested to a considerable degree in these countries.

Clearly something other than widespread classic antisemitic attitudes seem to be at play here. I will return to this discussion later in the article.

A special kind of anti-Jewish attitude has to do with negativism and prejudices against certain core Jewish practices. Today this is particularly widespread in the most liberal and enlightened countries of the world, such as the Scandinavian countries. The French historian Diana Pinto has labelled this kind of anti-Jewish attitude *Aufklärungsantisemitismus*. The German term for the Enlightenment is *die Aufklärung*. The background for using the German term here is the work *Beantwortung die Frage: Was is Aufklärung?* (*Answering the Question: What is Enlightenment?*) from 1784 by the groundbreaking German philosopher Immanuel Kant.

Aufklärungsantisemitismus

Aufklärungsantisemitismus denotes critique, even to the extent of calling for prohibition, of core Jewish practices, such as the circumcision of baby boys (*brit mila*) and slaughtering of animals according to Jewish religious rules (*shechita*). Implied are accusations against Jewish representatives and individuals because of their adherence to such practices. Those who criticize these religiously based traditions are often persons who perceive themselves as progressive, liberal, left-oriented. This kind of anti-Jewish critique is usually presented as comments in public debate and at times, as recently in Iceland and Denmark, takes the shape of proposing legal prohibition of the Jewish practices in question. *Shechita* is today forbidden in all Scandinavian countries, whereas *brit mila* is not (yet), although there is widespread support in the general population of, for example, Denmark, to prohibit this Jewish tradition.

　　Aufklärungsantisemitismus is based on altogether different kinds of anti-Jewish attitudes than those that drive classic antisemitism. Those who advocate standpoints implied in *Aufklärungsantisemitismus* often argue in terms of the right of the child and animal protection and strongly oppose these standpoints be labelled antisemitic at all.

Sweden	85
Germany	80
UK	61
France	59
Italy	52
Belgium	50
Latvia	22
Hungary	21

Table 3: Percentage of Jews in the country having heard non-Jewish people suggest prohibition of *brit mila* or s*hechita*. (Data from the 2012 FRA Survey).

We may here observe that the order of nations in Table 3 is almost a reversed version of the order of nations in Table 1. If Table 1 gives a picture of how *classic* antisemitism is distributed among the investigated European nations, Table 3 may be said to give a picture of how a kind of *modern* anti-Jewish sentiment is distributed among them.

　　History has shown that classic antisemitism in given social conditions may quite easily switch into pogroms and other violent acts against Jews. So far there are no known cases of *Aufklärungsantisemitismus* leading to acts of physical violence against Jews.

The third kind of antisemitism that I want to demarcate as a particular, and by the way also a modern kind of antisemitism, *Israel-derived antisemitism*, on the other hand frequently finds violent outlets directed at individual Jews and Jewish institutions in Europe, the US, and virtually anywhere in the world. For Jews around the world, Israel-derived antisemitism is today the most threatening form of antisemitism.

Israel-derived Antisemitism

Israel-derived antisemitism refers to attacks on individual Jews or Jewish institutions just because they are Jewish, regardless of where they are. The attacks referred to here emanate from hostility of the perpetrators toward the state of Israel and/or anger due to actions taken by the Israeli state. To these perpetrators any Jew and anything Jewish around the world is perceived as somehow being in collusion with the state of Israel and hence in their eyes a relevant target for the perpetrators' hatred or anger toward the state of Israel. Those who carry out such attacks are mainly found among Muslim extremists and partly among political left-wingers. This kind of antisemitism is more often than the other forms of antisemitism manifested by acts of violence toward Jewish institutions, symbols, and persons.

A special circumstance to be aware of in this context is the fact that this kind of antisemitism, to be perceived as frightful and to cause individual Jews as well as communities to have to invest in means of precaution, is not necessarily a widespread phenomenon. Even if only manifested occasionally by a few individuals and groups, the constant fear at any time of becoming a victim of such actions understandably becomes widespread in Jewish circles.

To get an indication of how widespread attitudes potentially underpinning Israel-derived antisemitism might be in different countries are of interest. One indication might be the extent to which individual Jews in different countries are blamed for anything done by Israel.

	overall, in %	**"frequently," in %**	**"all the time," in %**
Belgium	62	45	17
Italy	59	42	17
France	58	38	20
Sweden	49	27	22
Germany	41	28	13
UK	36	26	10
Hungary	15	12	3
Latvia	6	5	1

Table 4: Percentage of Jews who feel that people in their country accuse or blame them *because you are Jewish* for anything done by the Israeli government. (Data from the 2012 FRA Survey).

Interestingly, the rank order of the countries listed in Table 4 appears rather congruent with the degree to which antisemitic terrorist attacks have actually hit the Jewish populations in the countries listed in this table. Noteworthy is that the most antisemitic countries according to the ADL Anti-Semitism Index (cf. Table 1) such as Hungary and Latvia are those where Israel-derived antisemitism appears as the least represented. Whereas the reverse also seems to be true: Sweden is clearly the least antisemitic country as measured by the ADL Anti-Semitism Index, and Sweden is also the country with the largest proportion of Jewish respondents stating that they feel blamed for what Israel is doing "all the time"—the proportion is 22% of the 49% who indicate they feel blamed—whereas in the country topping Table 4, Belgium, the corresponding figure is 17% of the 62% who feel blamed there.

Antisemitism is clearly not a homogenous concept. The three kinds of antisemitism I have defined are not strongly correlated. On the contrary, they become manifested by different kinds of perpetrators, they are carried by disparate "philosophies," and are expressed in quite different ways.

In trying to put "An end to Antisemitism!", that is, in order to adequately fight antisemitism as a real-life phenomenon, it is necessary not only to distinguish the different kinds of antisemitisms described above but also to clarify what kind of threat they pose, how each of them could be confronted, and in which order of priority, based on the threat they actually pose to Jews and Jewish life today.

One necessary prerequisite for achieving this goal is to stop using the term "antisemitism" in an imprecise and frivolous way, for instance as a political tool for blaming critics and opponents. This, however, is nowadays often done.

3 Abuses

There is among some Jews an understandable hyper- or oversensitive registration of almost anything as expressions of "antisemitism." A simple and stupid joke, a careless remark, a straightforward criticism of actions and policies of the state of Israel, etc.—anything like this might be taken as an expression of "antisemitism."[13] As could and should, of course, also conscious discrimination and violent terrorist attacks on Jews and anything Jewish.

Using the term "antisemitic" without further specification of how and why does not help either understanding or contribute to bringing it to an end. Quite the contrary. A sloppy and frivolous labeling of "antisemitic," for anything we perceive as a threat, or just don't like, or for some political reason want to fight will in the long run be counterproductive and even cause self-harm to the Jewish cause. There are three reasons for this:

(a) There is a risk that by overusing the term "antisemitism" we hollow and disarm the very concept of "antisemitism." The danger built into this is that in the end people and institutions will tend not to take even valid accusations of antisemitism seriously.

(b) There is also another danger in this: incessant descriptions of even trivial, but perhaps dubious aspects of the reality we live in as "antisemitic" tend to foster unnecessary fear among us. However, to further such a sense of fear might even be the aim of some of those who tend to overuse the notion of antisemitism in describing a situation.

(c) We also have to realize that an accusation of "antisemitism" is sometimes used polemically just to defend a position or to promote a certain political cause —even if what is accused is in fact not an expression of actual Jew-hatred. This also inevitably promotes mistrust toward the very concept "antisemitism" itself.

For both political and ethical reasons, we need to protect the concept "antisemitism" from abuses such as those indicated above. Antisemitism is a harsh real-life reality, to have a "clean" and clearly understandable notion "antisemitism" to grasp this real-life phenomenon to be able adequately to counter it, is very much needed. Hence, Jews as well as non-Jewish champions for equal and human rights ought to be careful and restrained in accusing anyone of "antisemitism." And also, when it is actually relevant to do so, as it unfortunately too often is, supplement any such accusation with a relevant reason or argument clarifying why the utterance or action taken to be "antisemitic" actually is so.

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13 I might myself be one of these oversensitive Jews.

Otherwise, ubiquitous labelling of things as "antisemitic" is not merely abuse: it will boomerang the Jewish position itself.

4 Intended Over-interpretations—Unintended Symbioses

Antisemitic attacks on Jews are still ubiquitous in the world of today. As noted, such attacks in certain parts of Europe mainly emanate from classic antisemitic stereotypes. They then often take the form of derogatory remarks, sometimes subtle forms of discrimination and at times turn into elaborate conspiracy theories about Jews worldwide controlling the world, or aiming to do so, through a secret conspiracy—run by "globalists," pulling the threads of a supposed "deep state."

In other parts of Europe and the world, antisemitic attacks mainly emanate from hatred toward the state of Israel and actions taken by Israel. This then at times is manifested in violent attacks on Jewish institutions and individual Jews anywhere in the world. The argument goes as follows: because they are Jewish the targeted people/institutions are seen to be linked with Israel by these perpetrators, subsequently they are regarded as relevant targets in the perpetrators' "fight against Israel."

Heavily exaggerated and evil-minded accusations toward Israel are ubiquitous in today's political discourse. Part of this negative focus on anything done by Israel is certainly carried by projections of classic Jew-hatred. It is necessary and important to point out and report all manifestations of antisemitism and to do whatever is relevant to hinder any potential antisemitic hate speech, discrimination, and violence. However, to exploit and even abuse such events for other, often not openly stated, political purposes may both corrupt and eventually disarm the very fight against antisemitism.

The rather recent notion of the "New Antisemitism" becomes relevant in this context. This concept attempts to capture what by some is regarded as a new kind of antisemitism that has appeared in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. According to adherents of the concept, this kind of antisemitism is manifested in certain initiatives at combatting Zionism and manifests opposition to actions and policies by the state of Israel. Within the optics of this concept, what purports to be criticism of Israel is in fact tantamount to the demonization of the state of Israel. This demonization then, according to the concept, is in itself a kind of antisemitism.

"Israel-derived antisemitism," however, is something else. It denotes very precisely those verbal accusations or violent attacks directed toward individual Jews and/or Jewish institutions in the diaspora that are carried out with reference to, that is, "legitimated" in the eyes of the perpetrators, by what they imagine the state of Israel is, has done, or supposedly intends to do.

It is necessary to distinguish clearly between what is referred to by the notion the "new antisemitism" and what I refer to by the concept "Israel-derived antisemitism." "Israel-derived antisemitism" refers exclusively to attacks on individual Jews or Jewish institutions, mainly in the diaspora, emanating from the perpetrator's hostility toward the state of Israel and/or anger due to actions taken by the Israeli state. The concept "new antisemitism," however, refers to hateful critique and certain forms of opposition the state of Israel itself.

When harsh critique and actions of protests directed toward Israel are perceived as overly exaggerated, unfair, hostile, and unjustified, the concept of "New Antisemitism" is taken to be another expression of antisemitism. Since "antisemitism" is nowadays a strong taboo in all Western and democratic countries, but hateful attitudes toward the state of Israel and "anti-Zionism" are not, expressions of such attitudes and actions manifesting strong opposition to the state of Israel, such as agitation for the boycott of Israeli products and the like, are within the frame of the New Antisemitism concept seen as just "antisemitism in disguise." To substantiate the IHRA definition of antisemitism cited above, the IHRA present some examples of what according to them is antisemitism. Among these examples are:

a) Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust.
b) Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations.
c) Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, for example, by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.

Doubt could be raised concerning whether some of these examples are truly antisemitic. For example, the notion that being so traumatized by the Holocaust that virtually everything in the world is perceived through this prism, the notion of being more loyal to Israel than to the state one happens to live in, or finding Israel is pursuing an apartheid-like politics—it is debatable whether these standpoints are actually antisemitic. Many concerned Jews of the world today would be doomed antisemites if this were the case.

Several concerned Jewish scholars and intellectuals have consequently launched critiques both of the concept the "New Antisemitism," and of the situations that IHRA are presenting as examples of antisemitism. They argue that

it conflates anti-Zionism with antisemitism, defines legitimate criticism of Israel too narrowly and demonization too broadly, trivialises the meaning of antisemitism, and exploits antisemitism in order to silence political debate about Israeli actions and policies.[14]

The abuse of the concept "antisemitism" and a tendency to over-interpret incidents that may comprise antisemitic elements in an alarmistic way, may cause an ironic symbiosis could occur:

On the one side, the interest of terrorists and other violent Jew-haters is to harm and cause anxiety and fear among Jews. On the other side, insistent and exaggerated remarks by, for example, Israeli officials and certain right-wing Zionist organizations claiming that Jews in Europe and elsewhere in the diaspora live in a basically antisemitic environment in which a latent but still constantly present antisemitism will unavoidably in different ways "show its ugly face" and harm, also kill, Jews living there, in effect serves the same purpose: to cause anxiety and fear among Jews.

"Friendly warnings" of latent threats and potential antisemitic attacks may of course be both well-founded and well-intended. However, there is a tendency for them to become exaggerated and alarmist. Sometimes they emanate from incidents that many would perhaps regard as course and scurrilous, but by a hyper-sensitive observer (as Jews for very good reasons often are) could be interpreted as having a perhaps veiled but still antisemitic component.

Some "friendly warnings" have other backgrounds. They may rather be calculated and conscious over-interpretations in order to stir up fear among Jews for political purposes other than fighting actual antisemitism. Here are two examples from my own corner of the world, Sweden:

Malmoe is the third largest city of Sweden. In 2012, this city became world famous for repeated antisemitic incidents largely consisting of harassments of an orthodox rabbi. Furthermore, an openly manifested anti-Israeli atmosphere prevailed there, partly tolerated by the city's former mayor Ilmar Reepalu, who has since left office.

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14 Cf. e. g. B. Klug, "The Myth of the New Anti-Semitism," *The Nation*, January 15, 2004, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/myth-new-anti-semitism/; B. Lewis, "The New Anti-Semitism: First Religion, then Race, then What?," *The American Scholar* 75, no. 1 (2006): 25–36; M. Lerner, "There is no New Anti-Semitism," *The Baltimore Chronicle*, February 2, 2007, http://baltimorechronicle.com/2007/020207LERNER.shtml; A. Lerman, "Jews Attacking Jews," *Haaretz*, September 12, 2008, https://www.haaretz.com/1.5029448; B. Klug, "Interrogating 'New Anti-Semitism'," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36, no. 3 (2013): 468–82.

Karolinska is a very renowned hospital in Stockholm.[15] In 2018, a leading surgeon and a whole department at Karolinska was accused of antisemitically motivated discrimination and spreading of antisemitism.

In both cases the Simon Wiesenthal Centre, located in Los Angeles, reacted very strongly. In the case of Malmoe, they suggested that Jews boycott going there. In the case of Karolinska, in December 2018, they put the incidents at Karolinska on their list of the ten worst antisemitic incidents in the world that year.

However, the Jewish community in Malmoe was not in accord with the condemnation of the city launched by the Simon Wiesenthal Center. On the contrary, they opposed it and expressed a desire to work in close cooperation with the city authorities to curb the antisemitic incidents that emanated from sectors of Muslim inhabitants in Malmoe. This is still an ongoing process.

With respect to what happened at the Karolinska hospital in Stockholm, an independent investigation was launched to find out whether the accusations of antisemitic discrimination and the spreading of antisemitic material could be substantiated. The investigation concluded that there was no evidence supporting the accusations. However, the investigation also found that the accused leading surgeon, Dr. Inti Peredo, had reacted to Israel's handling of Palestinians in Gaza in an improper way, which Dr. Peredo also admitted to.

Both in the case of Malmoe and in the case of Karolinska, the Simon Wiesenthal Center consciously grossly overexposed and overreacted to what had actually taken place. The political reasons for this seem to be twofold: (1) To blur the distinction between opposition to Israel and antisemitism, and (2) to exploit incidents that in some sense comprise antisemitic elements in order to fan anxiety and induce Jews in these and other places of the diaspora to make *aliyah*, that is, the move to Israel as "the only safe place for Jews."

Given this and other examples, we encounter what appears to be a symbiotic relationship. On the one hand we have statements and actions done with clearly antisemitic aims, on the other hand we have some measures allegedly taken to point out the ever-threatening antisemitism—even if basically for political reasons other than to protect against antisemitism. Both foster fear and anxiety among Jews. Basically, even if unintentionally, the one side profits from the actions by the other side.

One intended effect of blurring the distinction between opposition to Israel and antisemitism is that criticism and opposition to what Israel is doing will become perceived as expressions of antisemitism. But by this, the very concept of

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15 The Karolinska Institute awards the Nobel prize in medicine.

antisemitism also tends to become excavated. This may have serious consequences, because in order to be able to confront and combat Jew-hatred, in particular of the kind that today manifests itself by violent attacks on Jewish persons and institutions (of the kind that has actually taken place in Malmoe), a clear and undisputable concept of antisemitism is an indispensable tool. A too frivolous use of the term "antisemitism," for instance for the sake of defending questionable actions and policies by the state of Israel, or in order to smear its critiques, contributes to draining the strength of the concept in the fight against real-life antisemitism.

To what degree, then, do Jews in Europe actually consider people antisemitic if they criticizes Israel?

	overall, in %	"probably," in %	"definitely," in %
Latvia	43	37	6
France	41	28	13
Hungary	37	28	9
Italy	36	27	9
Belgium	34	23	11
Germany	32	27	5
UK	32	26	6
Sweden	22	17	5

Table 5: Would you consider a non-Jewish person antisemitic if he/she criticizes Israel? (Data from the 2012 FRA Survey).

We find that generally just a very minor portion of Jews in the eight investigated EU states do think that a person who criticizes Israel is "definitely" antisemitic. Taking also the response alternative "probably" into account we find a rank order between the participating states that is very similar to the rank order we found in mapping the proportion of classic antisemitism in the countries (cf. Table 1). We see that among the countries with the highest proportion of classic antisemitism in the population, we also have the largest proportion of Jews who perceive criticism of Israel as antisemitic. At the other end we again find Sweden being outstanding: Sweden is the country with the lowest proportion of persons with classic antisemitic attitudes in their population, and in Sweden we also find that Jews to a lesser extent than anywhere else would consider a person antisemitic if he/she criticizes Israel.

However challenging the correspondence may appear, there is no evidence that there is a causal relationship here.

Let's take it one step further:

	overall, in %	"probably," in %	"definitely," in %
France	85	59	26
Italy	80	52	28
Germany	79	51	28
Hungary	77	43	34
Latvia	76	33	43
Belgium	74	47	27
UK	65	33	32
Sweden	53	24	29

Table 6: Would you consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if he or she supports boycotts of Israeli goods/products?

A majority of Jews in all of the studied countries regard boycotting of Israeli products antisemitic. A majority of Jews in Sweden also do so, however to a somewhat lesser extent than in the other countries. But like in the other countries about one third of the respondents mark that they "definitely" regard boycotting Israel "antisemitic."

It should be noted that in Israel, the international BDS movement, which promotes boycotts, divestments, and sanctions against Israel, as well as active support of this movement is, regarded as criminal (Israeli laws from 2011 and 2017). Organizations such as the Anti-Defamation League and the Simon Wiesenthal Center have proclaimed BDS "antisemitic." However, some Jewish human rights and leftist organizations such as Jewish Voice for Peace as well as individual Jewish intellectuals and celebrities, such as Judith Butler, openly support the BDS initiative.

5 Dilemmas in the New Phase of Antisemitism

I will conclude by pointing out two serious ethical, and also political, dilemmas in the contemporary political discourse, colored as it is by raising populist and illiberal tendencies.

(1) Over the last decades right-wing and populist parties and movements have gained growing success in many parts of the world, not least in countries in Europe and the USA. Several of these parties and movements harbor sometimes openly, but more often modestly veiled, antisemitic elements. Among them, for example, Sverigedemokraterna [The Sweden Democrats], Front (now Rassemblement) National in France, Jobbik and also Fides in Hungary, etc. At

the same time several of these, and also governments run or influenced by them, like the present leaderships in Hungary, USA, but also Austria, Poland, and the Czech Republic ostentatiously support Israel. How come?

One underlying reason is their rather outspoken anti-Muslim and anti-Arab stance. Israel in the view of these parties and movements is understood as a kind of champion in the, according to them, necessary struggle of civilizations against non-Western and—as it is tacitly understood—anti-Christian forces. However, their demonstrative and often symbolic support for Israel, ranging from, for example, serving Israeli wine at the party convention (as done by the Dansk Folke-parti [Danish People's Party], to acknowledging Jerusalem as the capital of the state of Israel (as done by the USA, the Czech Republic, and Taiwan) may also, in addition to other interests, serve as a fig leaf to cover their underlying antisemitic roots. This applies, for instance, to Sverigedemokraterna in Sweden and Rassemblement National in France. It may also be in order to blur their anti-semitic positions, as in Hungary where Orbán's idea of constructing an "illiberal democracy" and the backing of Israel is accompanied by a poorly disguised anti-semitically colored campaign targeting "George Soros"—the originally Hungarian Jew who has devoted his life and money to promote liberal values and human and democratic rights.

This illustrates a new phase in the history of antisemitism, a phase in which Jewry will confront new ethical and political dilemmas.

On the one hand acknowledging the right of Israel to exist and flourish as a free and democratic state, on the other hand questioning the moral and political costs implied in supporting certain actions and policies of the state of Israel. Should one accept that even antisemitic features, elements, and tendencies among insistent right-wing populist supporters of Israel be overlooked and even tolerated, just because of their parallel support for Israel? Or should one as a concerned Jew and champion of human rights and democratic values unveil and confront antisemitism also when it means ripping off the fig leaf of demon-strative Israel support on political bodies like, for example, Viktor Orbán, Donald Trump, and the anti-Muslim populist parties in many of the European countries?

(2) By extension of the just stated, another ethical dilemma for Jews, but not only for Jews, in the contemporary political field emerges: the predicament of having to choose between (a) supporting the strategic interests of Israel or (b) defending and promoting Jewish values. Recent developments in Hungary may again serve as a case in point. As stated and well-known, the government of Hungary has run an antisemitically infected campaign against "the Jew George Soros"—a contemporary counterpart to "the plutocratic Jew Rothschild" in a previous phase of antisemitic discourse. On the surface the campaign might look as directed at Mr. Soros as a person, but more profoundly it is launched in

order to counteract what "Soros" represents: an open society, liberal values, the idea of enlightenment, individual freedom, universal human rights, free trade, globalization, and cosmopolitanism. To many Jews this corresponds very well with what is understood to be also basic values of modern Judaism.

A further deepening of this dilemma arises as the Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in spite of the antisemitic features and elements in the campaign against "the Jew George Soros," openly bonds with Mr. Orbán and his government. Even to the extent of launching also in Israel—in Israel!—a campaign against "Soros."[16]

One way of interpreting this is that Israel, and by implication some of those Zionist groups in other countries that tend to defend whatever Israel is doing, gives priority to promoting Israeli national interests over promoting Jewish values. And this even at the cost of disregarding, and by implication tolerating, the antisemitic elements that join in the support of Israel.

It seems we are confronting an emerging and growing contradiction between fundamental Jewish values and the strategic and national interests of the state of Israel. In the wake of this, the notion "antisemitism" tends to become expanded and diluted. The risk is the concept "antisemitism" will become useless in the necessary fight against real-life antisemitism. The ethical and political costs involved in this development need to be seriously contemplated.

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16 Cf. H. Ben-Sasson, "Attacking Soros: Israel's Unholy Covenant With Europe's anti-Semitic Ultra-right," *Haaretz*, July 12, 2017, https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/attacking-soros-israels-unholy-covenant-with-europes-anti-semitic-ultra-right-1.5493531.

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Lars Rensmann

The Politics and Ethics of Anti-Antisemitism: Lessons from the Frankfurt School

I Introduction: The Frankfurt School and Antisemitism in Our Time

In 1941, Max Horkheimer wrote:

> As long as antisemitism exists as a constant undercurrent in social life, its influence reaches all groups of the population and it can always be rekindled by suitable propaganda.[1]

The Frankfurt School philosophers and sociologists, in particular Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and Leo Löwenthal, have dedicated a considerable part of their scholarly work and social research to the study of anti-Jewish politics—its forms, causes, and implications for critical thinking after the Holocaust. These scholars have thereby immensely contributed to our understanding of modern antisemitism and the origins of anti-Jewish politics in the nineteenth and twentieth century.[2] However, in so doing, they have also grounded new ethics and politics of anti-antisemitism, even if so, in part, ex negativo. Reconstructing central explicit and implicit arguments by these Critical Theorists, this article argues that the Frankfurt School provides important resources for the analysis of contemporary antisemitism but also for critical political and ethical responses to the persistent legacy of judeophobia after the Holocaust. Even though written in a different age—the context of mid-twentieth century "crises of humankind" and their aftermath—the thinkers offer some still relevant impulses, delineating the meaning of the struggle against antisemitism for democratic societies and

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1 M. Horkheimer, "Research Project on Anti-Semitism," *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* 9, no. 1 (1941): 125.
2 See for a comprehensive analysis Rensmann, *The Politics of Unreason*; see also J. Jacobs, *The Frankfurt School, Jewish Lives, and Antisemitism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

ways to confront the ongoing, and once again resurgent, challenge of antisemitism in our time.

Proceeding in three steps, this article addresses some key "lessons" that can be drawn from engaging with Frankfurt School authors (most prominently the aforementioned three scholars), which can serve as a starting point for the discussion of ethical and political responses to the contemporary threat of antisemitism in democratic societies and beyond. Against the backdrop of, first, a brief reconstruction of some of the major analytical insights developed by the Frankfurt School, I elaborate on the task of enlightening about the causes of antisemitism and antisemitic myths. This "enlightenment project" entails understanding and analyzing a variety of new or accelerated and modernized forms (what I call "modernized antisemitism")—including hatred of the Jewish state of Israel and Israeli Jews, as is manifest in ideologies of anti-Zionist antisemitism, which was initially radicalized by the Nazis in the 1920s; post-Holocaust equations of Jews and Israelis with Nazis; or the phenomenon of antisemitism denial.[3]

I will then outline, second, some ethical implications—though largely confined to "negative ethics"—from the Frankfurt School's sophisticated understanding of both the general features of antisemitism as resentments against and projections toward a minority, and the particular features of antisemitism as a modern world explanation and conspiracy myth. The negative ethical response proposed by Adorno also entails, unconditionally, reflecting on the fact that the hitherto unimaginable crime of the Shoah has happened, and how it happened. The monstrous human failure and the catastrophe point to the collective and individual responsibility to make sure, in Adorno's "new categorical imperative," that Auschwitz will not repeat itself, that anything similar must not happen again,[4] just as it points to the particular threats to the Jewish community and the fact that Jews were systematically persecuted and murdered, that *it did already happen.*

This negative ethics leads, third, to the foundations of—partly unacknowledged—"positive" political and legal responses to antisemitism in domestic society, politics, and international relations. In light of the Frankfurt School's self-reflexive critique of authoritarian politics and antisemitic "politics of unreason," I hereby sketch out some political and legal arguments and reflections that prepare a more robust response to the current threat of antisemitism. Such a response entails a defense of the rule of law and institutions of liberal democracy

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3 On antisemitism denial, see M. Schwarz-Friesel and J. Reinharz, *Inside the Antisemitic Mind: The Language of Jew-Hatred in Contemporary Germany* (Lebanon: Brandeis University Press, 2017), 338 ff.

4 T. W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics* (New York: Seabury Press, 1973), 365.

as well unconditional solidarity with factual truth: The Frankfurt School thinkers recognize that in a demagogic populist and resurgent authoritarian political context, as in today's increasingly "post-liberal," "post-democratic," and "post-factual" public environments around the globe, antisemitism can especially flourish and become yet again a powerful social force.

II Understanding Antisemitism: Mapping Features, Origins, and Theoretical Frameworks

Turning to the Frankfurt School for philosophically grounding an ethics and politics of anti-antisemitism means, first and foremost, adopting their idea that it is important to fully recognize antisemitism as a socio-political force, in its blunt and its more coded forms. With the rise of liberal democracies after the Holocaust and the age of totalitarian antisemitism promoted by governments, Adorno warned of a shift from overt racial anti-Jewish propaganda to "innuendo" and more subtle verbal manifestations in public discourse. "The lure of innuendo," Adorno claimed, "grows with its vagueness. It allows for an unchecked play of the imagination and invites all sorts of speculation."[5] Demagogues may refer to "dark forces" determined to "undermine" the nation's culture, "and the audience at once understands that his remarks are directed against the Jews."[6]

But for Adorno and his colleagues, the antisemitic "lure" could only so effectively be ignited and mobilized because of its character as an undercurrent socio-cultural phenomenon and because of its socio-psychological attractiveness in an inevitably complex and demanding modern world also shaped by superfluous, seemingly incomprehensible, and irrational forms of social domination. Critical Theorists researched and reflected upon both the societal origins of antisemitism —socio-economic, cultural, social, psychological—as well as the particular political and public conditions that allowed for antisemitism to become such a powerful ideological force in society, in other words: the political conditions inductive to antisemitic dynamics and norms. Moreover, "the underlying antisemitism of our cultural climate" persisted also in democratic societies, Adorno argued, and "proves in the more extreme cases to be stronger than either conscience

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5 T. W. Adorno, *The Psychological Technique of Martin Luther Thomas' Radio Addresses* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 54.
6 T. W. Adorno, "Anti-Semitism and Fascist Propaganda," in *The Stars Down to Earth and Other Essays on the Irrational in Culture*, ed. S. Crook (New York: Routledge, 1994), 162–71.

or official democratic values."[7] The multi-faceted project of enlightening about the origins and conditions of antisemitism in the midst of modern society constitutes, in the view of the Critical Theorists, a primary, critically important task in order to combat antisemitism. This project finds its most advanced expression in the "Elements of Antisemitism" in Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment*.[8]

In Critical Theory's view, modern antisemitism should hereby be conceptualized as a *distinctly anti-modern* ideology (or fragments thereof) that is both similar to and different from other group-specific discriminations. For the Critical Theorists, to be sure, antisemitism is not an entirely new or "modern" phenomenon. Rather, it has a long historical trajectory reaching back to antiquity, and it always included conspiracy myths and the projective denigration of Jews in society.[9] Modern antisemitism absorbs centuries-old myths, religious discriminations, prejudices, and historically transmitted as well as free-floating projections. Yet, for the Frankfurt School thinkers *modern antisemitism* is also profoundly shaped by political modernity. In particular, it serves to "explain" and fantastically personify the latter's abundant contradictions. In that sense, antisemitism functions as an empty vessel, a container for all kinds of projections of unfulfilled wishes and societal problems of the modern world. In the modern antisemitic imago, Jews control both capitalism and are made responsible for its nagging critique (as Jews are especially identified with money and the sphere of circulation, which people tend to make responsible for exploitation in a "socially necessary illusion," in contrast to allegedly "productive capital" in the sphere of production);[10] Jews are construed as all too civilized, too progressive, yet also all too uncivilized; they are regarded as "both backward and too advanced, like and unlike, shrewd and stupid";[11] they are charged with being too submissive and too unyielding; too individualistic and too much focused on their closed community; seeking world domination and being all too powerful, yet ultimately physically weak and cowardly:

> The fantasy of the conspiracy of lascivious Jewish bankers who finance Bolshevism is a sign of innate powerlessness, the good life an emblem of happiness . . . The banker and the in-

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7 T. W. Adorno et al., *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), 608.
8 M. Horkheimer and T. W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*, ed. G. Schmid Noerr and trans. E. Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 137–72.
9 For the history of this "longest hatred," see especially R. Wistrich, *A Lethal Obsession: Anti-Semitism from Antiquity to the Global Jihad* (New York: Random House, 2010).
10 Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 143.
11 Ibid., 153.

tellectual, money and mind, exponents of circulation, are the disowned wishful image of those mutilated by power.[12]

The Frankfurt School thinkers thereby point to both *general dimensions and particular elements*. The former suggest links between modern judeophobia and other hatreds or group-focused social resentments[13]—a general and generalizable stereotypical or objectifying logic vis-à-vis minorities and those who are identified as different from the social norm. The latter call attention to the need to reflect on the specificity of antisemitism as a modern political ideology and socio-psychological as well as cultural undercurrent. It is not, in the view of the Frankfurt School researchers, a mere prejudicel like others. Rather, antisemitism constitutes a particular narratives serving particular socio-psychological and political purposes, as much as it grows out of more general trends, conditions, and objectifying ways of thinking. Both the general and the particular need to be recognized and understood in order to effectively combat antisemitism.

While the Critical Theorists explicitly draw connections between the general and the particular, at times they also, to be sure, oscillate between interpretations emphasizing either. However, Critical Theory ultimately provides a framework that allows for recognizing and theorizing both general dimensions of anti-Jewish resentments, analogous to other forms of racism, and structural principles social functions, and ideological shapes that are specific to modern antisemitism. Modern judeophobia, as pointed out by the Frankfurt School, is fundamentally contradictory. It incorporates century-old stereotypes yet it is almost infinitely mutable. It serves as a profoundly irrational container for free-floating projections and "objectifications run wild." Antisemitism works well, one may add following the insights of the Frankfurt School, in the actual presence of Jewish minorities or Jews as political agents (as in the state of Israel); yet it works

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12 Ibid., 141.

13 Understanding the distinctiveness of antisemitism does not imply that there are no similarities between judeophobia and other racist or misogynist projections. The work of the Frankfurt School scholars points to both specific and more general features of antisemitism that can also be found in resentments directed against other minorities or women. Yet there are distinctions to be made. Racist and misogynist ideologemes usually do not portray women or minorities as the power controlling the global economy and the personified force behind imperialism, capitalism and "rapacious capital," Wall Street, or ISIS. Conspiracy ideologies tend to directly point to fantasies about Jewish power, media, and lobbies, just as antisemitic constructs portray Jews or "Zionists" as the main obstacle to human emancipation and world peace. Cf. for instance K. Stögner, *Antisemitismus und Sexismus: Historisch-gesellschaftliche Konstellationen* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014).

even better without them. Projective in nature, it has nothing to do with actions by *actual* Jews. In that, to be sure, it is similar to other forms of prejudice.

Thus antisemitism could in principle victimize any minority, or could be replaced by other projective fantasies, ideologies, resentments, and objects, as Horkheimer and Adorno suggest:

> And just as, depending on the constellation, the victims are interchangeable: vagrants, Jews, Protestants, Catholics, so each of them can replace the murderer, in the same blind lust for killing, as soon as he feels the power of representing the norm.[14]

However, both authors also recognize that in reality, the image of Jews has never been replaced. Adorno and Horkheimer are aware that the social ideology and the force of antisemitism, past and present, old, modern, and modernized, continues to target Jews. And Jews are its primary victims.

In Critical Theory's understanding modern antisemitism, while ultimately being an empty vessel for all possible charges and fantasies, historically absorbs a set of specific historically disseminated features and tropes, of which some especially striking ones analyzed by the Frankfurt School should be mentioned here. First, it constitutes a topological worldview, separating Jews not *just* as "others" (or discriminating against them as a minority among others) but also viewing them as singular "enemies of humankind." This trope, that Jews are a group separate from the rest of humankind and responsible for preventing universal human salvation, can be traced back to ancient Christian antisemitism. Since the early years of modern antisemitism and culminating in Nazi ideology, "the Jew" was then singled out as a singular "destroyer of peace between the peoples."[15] Second, antisemitism is always also a conspiracy myth and functions as such. It is generally only a small step from conspiracy myths to antisemitism. In this myth, Jews tend to appear as a hidden, cunning, powerful, cosmopolitan, globally operating cabal running the modern world and pulling the strings behind all that goes wrong, dragging countries into wars and constantly conspiring to advance a ruthless world conquest. Third, antisemitism objectifies Jews as representatives of the impenetrable sphere of circulation—money and finance, global trade, "rapacious capital," lawyers and salesmen, intellect and media, all of which are allegedly in control of the world or conspiring to take control of the world. Antisemitism thereby also identifies in its image of Jews all presumably abstract aspects and the inscrutable complexities of modern society. Fourth, modern antisemitism implies a fundamental, reified dichotomy between us and

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14 Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 140.

15 J. Streicher, *Der Stürmer*, October 17, 1940.

them, or people and the (hidden, evil) elite. It thereby also implies the Manichean counter-image of idealized, autochthonous, "natural" ethnic or religious communities that would provide unlimited collective gratification and happiness if only purged from the negative influence of "the Jews." Based on binary oppositions between the "good people" or "good gentiles" versus the "evil Jews," or "humanity" and against "enemies of humanity" (the aforementioned trope that is also very popular in today's anti-Zionist discourses), judeophobia therefore often combines extreme nationalist aspirations and megalomania with paranoid delusions of collective persecution.[16] And fifth, accusing Jews of ritual murder and other grave crimes, antisemitism construes Jews as driven by insatiable, "barbaric" desires to ruthlessly fulfill their (economic) interests and (sexual) desires, even to poison, kill, and eat children; and, they are seemingly even ready to "abuse" in bad faith their own history of persecution. A persecution for which, antisemitic myth-making suggests, the Jews themselves bear responsibility.

The key to understanding these features and functions, the Frankfurt School shows us, is in analyzing the social and political afterlife of antisemitic resentments and their rationalizations—and to understand the political-psychological functions they serve as a kind of anti-enlightening "psychoanalysis in reverse," in Leo Löwenthal's phrase, which obscures and mobilizes rather than illuminates one's unconscious feelings, traumas, fantasies, aggressions, and projections.[17] As the Critical Theorists suggest, antisemitism is a specific form of "rationalized idiosyncrasy" that is ultimately directed against freedom and difference as such—against the very idea of "a better state in which people could be different without fear."[18]

Critical Theory's conception of the intimate links between an *anti-democratic syndrome*, authoritarian social conditions and politics, hatred of difference, and antisemitism also deserves particular attention today for ethics and politics of anti-antisemitism. Just as empirical studies have shown time and again that authoritarian attitudes and glorifications of authoritarian rule strongly correlate with homophobia, misogyny, and racism, they also continue to especially strong-

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16 See Rensmann, *The Politics of Unreason*; modernized antisemitism often employs an equally stark dichotomy between the allegedly kind-natured, "good Palestinians" and the inherently "evil Israelis," no matter what real actors of each group are actually doing or not doing.

17 Leo Löwenthal, cited in M. Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School, 1923–1950* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 173.

18 T. W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life*, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott (London: Verso, 1974), 103.

ly correlate with antisemitism.[19] The Frankfurt School theorists hereby identify underlying socio-psychological conditions forming an authoritarian syndrome reinforced in political modernity. This diagnosis seems to be regaining relevance, or at least merits renewed attention in the current age of global Islamism, new authoritarianism, and the full force of authoritarian populism—indeed an authoritarian revolt—now affecting Western democracies from America to Europe.[20]

After Auschwitz, the Frankfurt School's imperative of critical enlightenment about the nature of antisemitism also implies understanding "secondary" motives of antisemitism, that is: forms of antisemitism motivated by the wish to downplay the Holocaust due to related, unprocessed feelings of (national) guilt and discredited national identity inducing unconscious defense mechanisms that can take antisemitic forms. Externalizing and projecting such guilt onto the image of Jews by identifying this historical guilt with them and making them responsible for the memory of past atrocities committed against them—instead of openly dealing with those atrocities—motivates, according to Adorno, such "*secondary antisemitism.*"[21] Using antisemitic clichés, Jews are hereby attacked and morally devalued for remembering, willingly or not, the history of the Holocaust: For instance, if it is claimed that "Jews use their own persecution for their own political and material purposes" or to "legitimate Israel," or if (-Israeli) Jews are compared with Nazis and called "today's perpetrators" committing awful crimes against (Palestinian) "victims of the victims." This secondary dimension identified by the Frankfurt School, and the underlying mechanism motivating it, may be also be at play outside of the German, post-Nazi context of historical guilt which Adorno analyzed it. On case of this may be called *post-colonial antisemitism*, for example in the UK: animosity and hatred against the Jewish state of Israel that is present in England—and often especially public in the radical left—could be interpreted as also motivated by secondary motives related to unprocessed, or continuously haunting, feelings of national guilt for colonial crimes. Jews living in Israel many of whom either escaped from the Hol-

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19 See for instance A. Zick, C. Wolf, B. Küpper et al., "The Syndrome of Group-Focused Enmity: The Interrelation of Prejudices Tested with Multiple Cross-Sectional and Panel Data," *Social Issues* 64, no. 2 (2008): 363–83.

20 See L. Rensmann, "The Noisy Counter-Revolution: Understanding the Cultural Conditions and Dynamics of Populist Politics in Europe in the Digital Age," *Politics and Governance* 5, no. 4 (2017): 123–35.

21 T. W. Adorno, "Zur Bekämpfung des Antisemitismus heute," in *Kritik: Kleine Schriften zur Gesellschaft* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971), 105–33. See also L. Rensmann, "Guilt, Resentment, and Post-Holocaust Democracy: The Frankfurt School's Analysis of 'Secondary Antisemitism' in the Group Experiment and Beyond," *Antisemitism Studies* 1, no. 1 (2017): 4–37.

ocaust or violent exclusion across the Middle East, are then identified and blamed as the (new) "colonizers" or even "the worst colonizers" perpetrating a genocide against Palestinians by means of "settler colonialism." In so doing, the history of British colonialism and related guilt is relativized and delegated to the Jews in the Middle East.

Finally, as initially indicated and related to this last point, Adorno points to the need for ongoing, self-reflective critical enlightenment vis-à-vis modernized or coded variations of antisemitism in democracies and beyond, which Adorno calls "crypto-antisemitism" (and what I call *modernized antisemitism*):

> This crypto-antisemitism is a function of the authority that stands behind the prohibition of openly antisemitic articulations. However, this concealed position contains a dangerous potential of its own . . . Whoever espouses this belief, this rumor, gives the impression from the start of belonging to a secret, truthful community that is suppressed by the superficial structures of the society.[22]

Modernized antisemitism features a variety of forms of hatred of the Jewish state of Israel (often accompanied with the trope that criticism of Israel is "suppressed" or "taboo" in society). They include demonizing the state as illegitimate and particularly evil or equating Israel and Israelis with Nazism, as well as other new forms of antisemitism rationalization and denial. The latter is most frequently applied when anti-Jewish stereotypes occur in the context of discussions about Israel. Max Horkheimer already observed in 1969 that anti-Zionism provided a (thin) screen for both neo-Nazis and Communists.[23] Monika Schwarz-Friesel and Jehuda Reinharz calls this the "Israelization of antisemitic discourse."[24] Anti-Jewish myths are applied to Israel and Israelis, and when called out, their antisemitic character is frequently denied as "only criticisms of Israel" that "must be allowed" (as if criticism of Israeli governments has been banned anywhere in the world). Such denial can entail charges of bad faith against Jews who allegedly exploit the problem of "antisemitism" and their own persecution when they address anti-Israel antisemitism, and allegedly use even the Holocaust for their own collective interests (or to justify Israeli policies).[25] However, neither the theory of secondary antisemitism nor the modernization claim should be overstretched in this context. It is important to remember that the widespread use of pseudo-cosmopolitan claims and tropes against Jews and Israel, portraying "the Zionists" as *unique* threats to world peace and human rights

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22 Adorno, "Zur Bekämpfung des Antisemitismus heute," 109.

23 Horkheimer, quoted in Jacobs, *The Frankfurt School*, 140.

24 Schwarz-Friesel and Reinharz, *Inside the Antisemitic Mind*, 192 ff.

25 See D. Hirsh, *Contemporary Left Antisemitism* (London: Routledge, 2018).

violators can also be traced back to centuries-old myths charging Jews with being enemies of humankind, or of "enlightened mankind." Moreover, today's widespread anti-Zionist antisemitism was first part and parcel of and radicalized by the Nazis in the 1920s. Alfred Rosenberg wrote an entire book attacking "Zionism," and Adolf Hitler focused in his programmatic speech of August 1920, "Why we are Antisemites," on attacking the "Zionist state," allegedly designed to serve as "a spiritual center" for Jewish world conspiracies, and as nothing but the last, complete institution of their "international dirty tricks, and from there everything should be directed."[26]

Intuitively, Horkheimer and Adorno knew quite well that the claim that there are "no more antisemites" after Auschwitz, as Horkheimer and Adorno provocatively predicted in the seventh thesis of the *Elements of Antisemitism*, which also implies that virtually no one any longer identifies with every antisemite rather aggressively but denies being antisemitic, would possibly not hold in the face of the strong socio-cultural forces and lingering causes of antisemitism they described. This claim is by now also more than seventy years old. While few today would openly say they are antisemites when they make antisemitic claims about Jews, antisemitism has remained a societal undercurrent all along, and antisemitism has neither ever fully dissipated, nor been displaced by something else.

III Anti-Antisemitism after Auschwitz: Ethical Reflections

That antisemitism never went away even after Auschwitz, that it remains a threat that we will need to face in the present and most likely in the future, and that from now on it will always be a possibility that Auschwitz can repeat itself: these observations and insights have consequences for all ethical reflections—and for anti-antisemitism as an ethical imperative. As indicated in the introduction, in response to the Holocaust Adorno argued that a new categorical was forced upon humankind, namely that "Auschwitz must not be repeated, nothing similar should happen." This is the constitutive backdrop for Adorno's negative ethics and moral philosophy—and much of his work—after Auschwitz, as origi-

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26 See A. Rosenberg, *Der staatsfeindliche Zionismus* (Hamburg: Deutsche Völkische Verlagsanstalt, 1922); A. Hitler, "Warum sind wir Antisemiten?" in R. H. Phelps, "Hitlers 'grundlegende' Rede über den Antisemitismus," *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 16, no. 4 (1968): 405–6.

nally and persuasively elaborated by Gerhard Schweppenhäuser.[27] Just as understanding antisemitism and its social meaning, such ethics entails several general and particular dimensions. On the one hand, this negative categorical imperative points to critical resources of a Jewish cosmopolitan ethics, grounded in a universalism that negatively reformulates the positive Kantian cosmopolitan idea by taking the indescribable suffering of Auschwitz as a starting point of ethical reflection. Individual and collective suffering, genocide and crimes against humanity hereby form the negative—even absolutely negative—basis for a general, indisputable, non-negotiable, that is, *categorial* ethical imperative: to advance human rights and to prevent genocides, anywhere and for good. On the other hand, Adorno's categorical imperative also contains and specifically points to anti-antisemitism: the need to prevent the paranoid politics, delusions, exclusions, and ultimately violence *targeting Jews*. Their persecutions should never happen again. But they do: anti-Jewish ideologies, regimes, and violence against Jews remains a reality in the twenty-first century, even if the monstrous crimes in Auschwitz have not been repeated.

Similar to the analytical level, both the general and the particular are interrelated in Adorno's and the Frankfurt School's work, concerning ethical imperatives and ethical failures: Both universal ethical claims and specific consequences, or moral commitments in relation to the particular persecuted group of Jews, are betrayed by antisemitism; for instance, when double standards are employedin relation to one group only, and Jews or Israel are singled out as criminal, at times cloaked in the language of "human rights," or when human rights violations, which abundantly happen in this world today, in Syria, in Russia, in Pakistan etc. are ignored. Another example of this link between anti-Zionist antisemitism and double standards refers to ethnic nationalism: if *only* the Jewish state is blamed for it, while the diverse, pluralistic, and multi-ethnic character of Israeli society is ignored, and ethnic nationalism does not appear to be a problem elsewhere in the region. The contradictions, hyperbolic speech, and anti-universalistic use of human rights vocabulary from the contemporary *Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS)* movement , which ignores all human rights violations by Hamas against Jews and Palestinians, to the UN Human Rights Commission[28] show the nature of a widespread anti-Jewish pseudo-cosmopolitanism that only allows for an outcry about Palestinian suffering when Jews or Israelis are the alleged perpetrators but remains consistently silent if Pal-

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27 See G. Schweppenhäuser, "Adorno's Negative Moral Philosophy," in *The Cambridge Companion to Adorno*, ed. T. Huhn (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 328–53.
28 See recently A. Feuerherdt and F. Markl, *Vereinte Nationen gegen Israel: Wie die UNO den jüdischen Staat delegitimiert* (Berlin: Hentrich & Hentrich, 2018).

estinians are murdered by others, for instance in the Syrian "death camp" (a term used by Ban Ki-moon) of Yarmouk.

A key element of an ethical response after Adorno's negative ethics is thus the development of self-reflective standards, sensibility and senses, and to recognize and address antisemitism (and racism) wherever and however it appears in this world—to name, address, and respond to antisemitism (and racism) wherever antisemitism (and racism) occur. While the origins and agents of antisemitism and racism can vary—they can be multiple, distinct, or overlapping—differences of causes and perpetrators should have no impact whatsoever on the ethical critique and refusal of all forms of antisemitism. Identifying or qualifying a social phenomenon, violent act, or subtle discursive denigration as antisemitic should not be less rigorous if the agents of such antisemitism come from a discriminated group, or an objectively antisemitic expression is allegedly subjectively not "intended" to be directed against Jews. Following Adorno, the analysis of different causes should not be ethically confused with a denial or downplaying of antisemitism. Yet this happens quite frequently when antisemitic discourses and violent acts are directed against Israel or Israelis. Antisemitism is antisemitism, and it needs to be confronted as such: the collective denigration, defamation, discrimination against Jews that includes the use of anti-Jewish tropes and stereotypes. Adorno emphasized early on the need to decipher the coded, subtle, modernized forms and antisemitic innuendo at play after Auschwitz, and the pressing need to speak up in the face of antisemitism in all contexts.[29] In Adorno's view, antisemitism needs to be called out as such no matter what different causes and motives are at play. In reality, however, even today antisemitism often remains unrecognized, unacknowledged, downplayed, or rationalized as being something else, such as "legitimate protest." This denial and rationalization, Adorno reminds us, enables antisemitism to grow unhampered and continue to seize the public imagination time and again.

Apart from radical-right groups and movements on the fringes of society, we, luckily, by now hardly hear laments about an overuse or abuse of "illegitimate racism charges" in bad faith—even though with the rise of radical-right populist actors and movement parties, such racism denial may soon celebrate a comeback.[30] By now and by and large, racism—including more subtle cultural rac-

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29 See T. W. Adorno, "The Meaning of Working Through the Past," in *Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords*, trans. H. W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 89–104.

30 To be sure, as with almost any social phenomenon, there are cases where inappropriate use of racism claims do exist, for instance when students lament "racist cultural appropriations" when a cafeteria serves the wrong kind of ciabatta, or when any criticism of Islamism is por-

ism—has been broadly recognized as a persistent menace to democratic society that needs to be tackled, and when minorities and others raise the ongoing problem of racist exclusions, this is increasingly—though certainly not sufficiently—the subject of public attention. However, the charge of bad faith, of "overstretching" the term and illegitimate charges, is almost ubiquitous whenever Jews raise the issue of antisemitism or anti-Zionist antisemitism. This denial, which constitutes a profound ethical problem, reproduces the old antisemitic myth of Jews instrumentalizing antisemitism for their political and material interests, or seeking to exploit their own persecution. The aforementioned ubiquitous charge of "bad faith" motivating unjustified antisemitism accusations by Jews, as David Hirsh has shown in the case of the UK,[31] is virtually without empirical evidence; many analyses of debates in continental Europe indicate the same.[32] It is a chimera that constitutes an ethical, discriminatory betrayal to universalism, like the related, equally ubiquitous antisemitic myth that Jewish lobbies control the media, the public, and therefore it is "taboo to criticize Israel"—while the Jewish state is, in fact, from the UN to the international public, arguably the most criticized country in the world, despite its tiny size and the limited scope of the conflict with its neighbors. Just like cultural racism, *cultural and institutional antisemitism* should be publicly criticized and condemned, where Jews or Israel as the "Jew among the states" are exclusively singled out, targeted, discriminated, defamed—on the UN level, in domestic and international public discourse, in national and transnational movements.

One of the biggest ethical challenges in relation to antisemitism today, following Adorno's insights, is therefore the widespread tendency to deny antisem-

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trayed as "Islamophobic racism." See on the former C. Friedersdorf, "A Food Fight at Oberlin College," *The Atlantic*, December 21, 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/the-food-fight-at-oberlin-college/421401/. On the latter see M. Walzer, "Islamism and the Left," *Dissent*, Winter 2015, https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/islamism-and-the-left.

31 David Hirsh does a great job of analyzing manifold variations of this theme of antisemitism denial turning into an antisemitic charge. Jews and antisemitism scholars are thereby often attacked for allegedly not being "nuanced." When Jews raise the issue of antisemitism, Hirsh shows, they are charged with allegedly really doing so for hidden and dishonest ulterior motives. Hirsh calls this the "Livingston formula." See Hirsh, *Contemporary Left Antisemitism*; see also R. Fine and P. Spencer, *Antisemitism and the Left: On the Return of the Jewish Question* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017).

32 R. A. Elman, *The European Union, Antisemitism, and the Politics of Denial* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015); P.-A. Taguieff, *Rising from the Muck: The New Anti-Semitism in Europe* (New York: Ivan R. Dee, 2004); L. Rensmann and J. H. Schoeps, "Politics and Resentment: Examining Antisemitism and Counter-Cosmopolitanism in the European Union and Beyond," in *Politics and Resentment: Antisemitism and Counter-Cosmopolitanism in the European Union*, ed. L. Rensmann and J. H. Schoeps (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 3–79.

itism or define antisemitism away, to downplay it when it is experienced and raised by Jews and non-Jews, to attribute ulterior self-interested motives when the problem of antisemitism is addressed, and to keep silent in a climate of intimidation that has spread alongside eroding boundaries of public discourse. Today more often than not, those who address the problem are targeted by portraying them as allegedly swinging "the antisemitism bat" against innocuous "Israel critics" or "upset Muslim youth" in bad faith. Similarly, it is frequently suggested in public discourse that it is only "criticism of Israel" when synagogues and Jews are attacked with Molotov cocktails in Germany or France; when influential publicists like the German journalist Jakob Augstein claim that the Israeli government would keep "the entire world" in "leading strings" of an escalating war song,[33] or if the former Austrian foreign minister Karin Kneissl claims that Zionism is like the German blood and soil ideology, thus implicitly equating Israel with Nazi Germany.[34]

The fear or failure to recognize and speak up against antisemitism even in our democratic societies, as well as the active denial of antisemitism by some policy-makers, judges, publicists, and even scholars after Auschwitz are, in the Frankfurt School's lens, thus significant ethical failures of our time. So is the current inability to prevent or stop the erosion of antisemitic boundaries (alongside other collapsing boundaries in relation to resentments in civil discourse), the exponential growth of verbal antisemitism by means of social media and transformed public spheres, and the resurgence of antisemitic violence.

The fact that Jewish schools, restaurants, synagogues, and institutions must be protected by police in Europe epitomizes this ethical failure of post-Holocaust societies. That racial, eliminationist antisemitism has regained public spaces, and that Jews are attacked as "pigs" on European streets: this is a situation that many have thought to be unthinkable after what happened in Auschwitz but not so according to the Critical Theorists some fifty years ago.[35] This ethical challenge—the collective and individual failure to stop the resurgence of antisemitism in verbal, public, and physically violent forms and a lack of solidarity

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33 Quoted in "Was hat Augstein eigentlich geschrieben?" Publikative.Org, April 1, 2013, http://www.publikative.org/2013/01/04/was-hat-augstein-eigentlich-geschrieben/ [no longer available].
34 Quoted in M. Engelberg, "Don't fixate on the Freedom Party," *Haaretz*, December 19, 2017, https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-in-austria-muslims-not-nazis-are-the-real-anti-semitic-threat-1.5629027.
35 See O. Aderet, "Anti-Semitic Slogans Chanted at Berlin Protest against Israel's Gaza Operation," *Haaretz*, July 18, 2014, https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-protesters-in-berlin-come-out-jews-cowardly-pigs-1.5255993.

with the victims of antisemitism—is thus also an eminently *political* challenge. The Frankfurt School thinkers understood this as well.

IV From Ethics to the Politics of Anti-Antisemitism: Political Implications after the Frankfurt School

It seems to be no coincidence that contemporary authoritarian political regimes, denying public freedom, civil rights, and democratic participation in public life, also often engage in politics of hate against ethnic minorities, and perpetuate Jewish conspiracy myths in particular—just as these regimes tend to simultaneously agitate against or even persecute gays and lesbians and deny women's rights. It is also no coincidence that antisemitism constitutes the ideological core of Islamist aspirations, which are simultaneously profoundly authoritarian, misogynistic, and driven by hatred against the deviation from the conformist norm. Anti-Jewish hatred and authoritarianism, the Frankfurt School suggests, arguably benefit from societal dependencies and forms of irrational domination, unfree conditions, and weakened public and private autonomy that are also a problem in increasingly post-liberal democratic societies. Yet they are especially engendered under conditions of authoritarian regimes, with their state-sanctioned political violence and unhampered propaganda while controlling the media.

In light of the Frankfurt School, political thinking and action therefore need to advance a rigorous critique of authoritarian social conditions, political regimes, and movements that undermine or violate human rights and dignity and public freedom. More often than not, they simultaneously promote antisemitism and engender what Adorno calls the "rumour about the Jews,"[36] whereas countries with robust democratic institutions and liberal constitutional frameworks granting civil rights are less susceptible to antisemitism and antisemitic violence. Politically speaking, the survival of democratic rule and of Jews is, according to the Frankfurt School, strongly correlated. Totalitarianism, on the contrary, translates into the threat of total persecution of Jews, "means knowing no limits, not allowing for any breathing spell, conquest with absolute domination, complete extermination of the chosen foe."[37] Critical Theory's models and in-

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36 Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, 110.
37 Adorno, "Anti-Semitism and Fascist Propaganda."

sights show how much such regimes and movements threaten the very condition of possibility of a humane, free, and just society that could be free of, or at least significantly reduce, antisemitism. Ethics and politics of anti-antisemitism, it can be concluded from that argument, are always also ethics and politics opposing all forms of authoritarian rule suppressing civil rights and democracy, as well as repressive social conditions (re)producing authoritarian longings and rebellions.

However, our liberal democracies are currently under pressure from inside and out. They are marked by levels of polarization and domestic conflicts unprecedented in the post-War period. Such accelerated political conflicts, currently boosted by authoritarian populists and polarized social media publics advancing liberal democracies' profound legitimacy crises, are bad news for Jews and other minorities—when there was a fundamental crisis in politics and society, historically conspiracy myths further flourished and Jews were among the first to be blamed. By contrast, Jews and other minorities are groups that have historically benefited from democratic inclusion and the granting of equal civil and political rights. But we live in a time where both racist and eliminationist antisemitic ideas about Jews have spread again the world over—in democracies and autocracies—alongside modernized variations and rumors. Today they are, for sure, more socially relevant, more public, more aggressive than in previous periods of the post-Holocaust era.

In view of this grim reality, a proactive politics and political frameworks that respond to this challenge requires, in light of the Frankfurt School, first educational programs advancing "critical enlightenment" about antisemitism and the conditions engendering judeophobia. In Adorno's understanding, this should be supported by democratic "education to autonomy," which means education that seeks to strengthen capacities for free and independent individual judgment, critical (self-)reflection, and conscience.[38]

Second, a politics of anti-antisemitism inspired by the Frankfurt School points to a consistent, robust defense of liberal democratic values and human rights policy, at home and abroad—in contrast to double standards in human rights law and international law, including double standards that are often applied to the Jewish state of Israel.

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[38] T. W. Adorno, "Education after Auschwitz," in *Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords*, trans. H. W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 191–204. See also recently S. L. Mariotti, *Adorno and Democracy: The American Years* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2016), especially 67–88, and G. A. Mullen, *Adorno on Politics after Auschwitz* (London: Lexington, 2016), 107–14.

Third, such politics call for an active political intervention against seemingly "authentic" claims about groups and people,[39] which are social illusions and reifications that are mirrored in exclusionary identity politics, resurgent aggressive ethnic nationalism, and global Islamism, all of which currently threaten or undermine liberal frameworks and universalism and are often interspersed with, or shaped by, antisemitism. Where civil rights and laws are violated, this also requires the consistent application and exercise of political authority and legal rules protecting all, including the most vulnerable members of society.

Fourth, a politics of anti-antisemitism will have to engage in the larger struggle over relevant "boundaries of what can be said," of what in part has become socially "acceptable" public discourse about Jews and other minorities in the public sphere and on social media—which increasingly includes open hate speech and disinformation about minorities, and especially conspiracy fantasies about Jews. Without overregulating free speech, social media should be held accountable for damaging a pluralistic, fact-based, and hate-free political debate, on the basis of transparent principles, and in similar ways as traditional media. The changes in the terms and boundaries of public discourse have immediate negative ramifications on Jews in society; so have the increased acceptance of post-factual discourses and fake news relativizing factual truth claims. Antisemitism, one may say, is the quintessential fake news about the Jews since ancient times. Antisemitism is the prototype of disinformation that any politics of anti-antisemitism will have to tackle.

A key step for more proactive politics of anti-antisemitism is helping to reverse the tide by achieving a broader recognition of the problem—of old and new antisemitic phenomena—on the basis of critical scholarship. The definition of antisemitism by the International Holocaust Remembrance Association, which has been adopted as legally non-binding by the EU Parliament in June 2017 (rather than being legally ratified through the EU's co-decision procedure), is a good example. It points to a variety of antisemitic resentments against the backdrop of current antisemitism scholarship. It establishes a political standard to which critics of antisemitism and policy-makers can appeal to.[40]

However, that antisemitism and thus the need for ethical and political responses to and struggles against it, could become obsolete any time soon is

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39 See for a critique of these claims and the underlying "Heideggerian speak" T. W. Adorno, *The Jargon of Authenticity* (New York: Routledge, 2002).

40 To be sure, a vast majority of the EU MEPs also applauded with standing ovations Abbas in Strasbourg after he had suggested in a talk that rabbis in Israel have said to their government that water should be poisoned in order to have Palestinians killed. Much is to be done in the face of an enormous emotional energy: antisemitism, Critical Theory has come to understand.

an illusion the Frankfurt School thinkers did not harbor. Neither should or can we today. As the challenge becomes, instead, ever more pressing again, the primary task may well be to limit and constrain it without giving up on reflecting on the conditions that seem to continuously make antisemitism so appealing to all too many citizens around the globe.

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Education about Antisemitism and Teaching Ways to Combat It

Henry Maitles

Does Learning about Genocide Impact the Values of Young People? A Case Study from Scotland

In many countries throughout the world, an integral component of education for citizenship is the development of informed values and attitudes. Within this context, issues involving topics such as an understanding of human rights, democracy, genocide, antisemitism, Islamophobia, and racism can be central to the development of more rounded human beings. There is a case for giving pupils experience in areas of learning relating to citizenship such as human rights and genocide outside the structures of the traditional subject based classroom. Such a method of learning has been attempted in the West of Scotland comprehensive, which is the subject of this study. Students in S1 (first year of secondary education—12–13 years of age) and in the final year associated primary (elementary schools—11–12 years of age) were taken off normal timetable for thirteen days and were engaged in a series of rich tasks and learning experiences (involving role play activities) ranging from understanding genocide, including the Holocaust and Rwanda, to UNESCO rights respecting schools initiatives to understanding poverty in the developing world to challenging intolerance.

There have been a number of studies examining whether learning about the Holocaust either as part of a study on the Second World War or as part of a citizenship programme in primary and secondary schools impacts young people's values and attitudes.[1] In this case study, the project in this school was called "One World" and involved a number of activities and events for the students. The entire S1 student body—aged about 12 years and the P7 in its associated primary

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1 Cf. G. Short and B. Carrington, "Unfair Discrimination: Teaching the Principles to Children of Primary School Age," *Journal of Moral Education* 20, no. 2 (1991): 157–77; G. Short, "Lessons of the Holocaust: A Response to Critics," *Educational Review* 55, no. 3 (2003): 277–87; B. Carrington and G. Short, "Holocaust Education, Anti-Racism and Citizenship," *Educational Review* 47 (1997): 271–82; P. Cowan and H. Maitles, "Never Again! Does Holocaust Education Have an Effect on Pupils' Citizenship Values and Attitudes?" *SEED Sponsored Research* (2006): 1–72, https://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/archive/20180520121056/http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2006/09/06133626/17; idem, "Does Addressing Prejudice and Discrimination through Holocaust Education Produce Better Citizens?" *Educational Review* 59, no. 2 (2007): 115–30; H. Maitles and E. McKelvie, "Why Does Wearing A Yellow Bib Make Us Different? A Case Study of Explaining Discrimination in a West of Scotland Secondary (High) School," *Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies* 8, no. 1 (2010): 246–61; "Continuing Professional Development," Centre for Holocaust Education, issued 2011, accessed March 15, 2017, http://www.hedp.org.uk/page_viewer.asp?page=Continuing+Professional+Development+&pid=3 [no longer available]; P. Cowan and H. Maitles, *Understanding and Teaching Holocaust Education* (London: SAGE, 2017).

schools—was taken off timetable for thirteen days and immersed in citizenship activities. Active learning was to be at its core. The first two days involved workshops around motivation, leadership, and peer pressure issues—entitled "what it means to be human." They were led by outside agencies. Days three to six were spent in subject departments, and every department in the school took responsibility for developing citizenship from the perspective of the subject discipline. For example, mathematics developed work around percentages using the "small earth" project, designed to develop awareness of global sustainability; English focused on supporting students to research and write about inspirational figures of their choosing; science examined global warming and environmental issues. Days seven and eight involved activities around UN Convention on Human Rights, in particular a day with UNICEF speakers organizing workshops around global inequalities and human rights. Days 9 and 10 used trips and workshops outside school relating to Scotland, diversity, and racism. Days 11–13 were Genocide and Holocaust awareness, involving drama, music, the Anne Frank Trust, Rwanda, stages of genocide, Auschwitz, and workshops on Nazism. The approximately 200 students had some prior learning about the rise of the Nazis in Germany and the events leading to the Holocaust.

There are a number of reasons for why this type of learning can be of particular value. Firstly, it concentrates the learning experiences of the pupils in a way that cannot be done in the formal timetabled pattern. Secondly, it suggests that the key learning experiences in education for citizenship are best developed in a cross-curricular method, where a number (and best if a large number) of subjects have an input. Thirdly, it enables the school to comply with the best aspects of the new curriculum, in particular ideas developed through the Scottish Government Curriculum for Excellence,[2] which highlights the development of responsible citizens as one of its four key capacities that schools should develop in pupils. Thus, it is felt that children need to be regarded as active, competent, and vocal members of society and that schools need to embody the values of justice, freedom, and autonomy within their institutional practice.[3] Fourthly, in common with the rest of the population, young people are becoming increasingly aware of, and engaged in, single-issue politics. In particular, many children are intensely interested in issues connected with environmental sustainability and

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2 Cf. Curriculum Review Group, *A Curriculum for Excellence* (Edinburgh: Scottish Executive, 2004).

3 Cf. P. White, "Political Education in the Early Years: The Place of Civic Values," *Oxford Review of Education* 25, nos. 1–2 (1999): 59–69; C. Burke and I. Grosvenor, *The School I'd Like: Children And Young People's Reflections on An Education For The 21st Century* (London: Routledge, 2003); H. Maitles, *Values in Education: We're All Citizens Now* (Edinburgh: Dunedin, 2005).

global poverty, and many schools have responded to this through the establishment of eco-schools committees, fair trade groups, and a focus on development education programmes. However, media images in a global age also allow children to become exposed to many more controversial social, political, and humanitarian issues than ever before, and evidence has illustrated that pupils are keen to discuss such issues and that a programme on citizenship education needs to respond to this.[4] Fifthly, there is evidence of deeper learning through these kinds of experiences.[5]

However, for the initiative to be of "best value," there needs to be some impact on the outlook, values, and attitudes of the young people. In the best of worlds and pupils, it will reinforce their attitudes of caring, respect, and understanding; in the real world, where some pupils don't hold these values, it is to be hoped that the programme will foster some of these and challenge aspects of their thinking. The whole *raison d'etre* of this approach to citizenship is summed up by this quote from a Holocaust survivor headteacher in the USA:

> I am a survivor of a concentration camp. My eyes saw what no man should witness. Gas chambers built by learned engineers. Children poisoned by educated physicians. Infants killed by trained nurses. Women and babies shot and burned by high school and college graduates. So, I am suspicious of education. My request is: Help your students become more human. Your efforts must never produce learned monsters, skilled psychopaths, edu-

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4 Cf. H. Maitles and R. Deuchar, "'Why Are they Bombing Innocent Iraqis?' Encouraging the Expression of Political Literacy among Primary Pupils as a Vehicle for Promoting Education for Active Citizenship," *Improving Schools* 7, no. 1 (2004): 97–105.

5 Cf. Burke and Grosvenor, *The School I'd Like*; J. Dewey, *The School and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1915); J. MacBeath and L. Moos, eds., *Democratic Learning: The Challenge to School Effectiveness* (London: Routledge, 2004); D. MacIntyre and D. Pedder, "The Impact of Pupil Consultation on Classroom Practice," in *Consultation in the Classroom: Developing Dialogue about Teaching and Learning*, ed. M. Arnot et al. (Cambridge: Pearson, 2005), 7–41; Maitles, *Values in Education*; H. Maitles and I. Gilchrist, "Never too Young to Learn Democracy!: A Case Study of a Democratic Approach to Learning in a Secondary Class in the West of Scotland" (paper presented at *SERA*, November 27–29, 2003, Perth, Scotland); idem, "Never too Young to Learn Democracy! A Case Study of a Democratic Approach to Learning in a Religious and Moral Education Secondary (RME) Class in the West of Scotland," *Educational Review* 58, no. 1 (2006): 67–85; A. Ritchie, *Our Lives Consultation: Final Report* (Edinburgh: Save the Children Scotland, 1999); J. Rudduck and J. Flutter, *How To Improve Your School: Giving Pupils a Voice* (London: Continuum, 2004); "'It's our Education': Young People's Views on Improving Their Schools," and "Education for Citizenship in Scotland: Perspectives of Young People," Save the Children Scotland, issued 2000 and 2001.

cated Eichmanns. Reading, writing, arithmetic are important only if they serve to make our children more humane.[6]

This piece of research was designed to test this point. Has this initiative had any impact on the values and attitudes of the young people involved? Further, are there any discernible gender influences in the cohort?

To examine the impact, a values and attitudes survey was devised, building on the work of research into social values.[7] It attempted, through a series of questions with a three-point Likert scale, to examine student attitudes toward diversity/multi-ethnicity; immigration/racism; and responsibility for tackling racism. The questionnaire was issued immediately before the initiative started and very soon after it ended. The pre questionnaire involved 211 students (103 male and 108 female); the post questionnaire, 207 students (101 male and 106 female). This strategy has a strength of ensuring anonymity and encouraging honest answers but meant that individual targeted follow-up interviews would not be possible. At this point a caveat must be stressed: there can be a marked change in the values of a cohort of this size with just a small number of students altering their answers leading to a large percentage shift. It was possible though to compare not just the impact of the initiative itself but also to include a gender perspective. The surveys were given to the pupils in the hall, their rights were explained to them, and objectivity was ensured.

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6 H. G. Ginott, *Teacher and Child: A Book for Parents and Teachers* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 317.

7 Cf. M. Angvik and B. von Borries, *A Comparative European Survey on Historical Consciousness and Political Attitudes among Adolescents* (Hamburg: Korber-Stiftung, 1997); C. Hahn, *Becoming Political: Comparative Perspectives on Citizenship Education* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998); R. Lister, S. Middleton, and N. Smith, *Young People's Voices: Citizenship Education* (Leicester: National Youth Agency, 2001); J. Torney-Purta et al., *Citizenship and Education in Twenty-Eight Countries: Civic Knowledge and Engagement at Age Fourteen* (Amsterdam: IEA, 2001); D. Kerr et al., *Citizenship Education Longitudinal Study: Second Annual Report: First Longitudinal Survey Making Citizenship Education Real* (Nottingham: DfES, 2004), https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/4155186.pdf; P. Whiteley, *Citizenship Education Longitudinal Study Second Literature Review. Citizenship Education: The Political Science Perspective* (Nottingham: DfES, 2005); Cowan and Maitles, "Never Again!" and idem, "Does Addressing Prejudice and Discrimination through Holocaust Education Produce Better Citizens?"; H. Maitles, "They're Out to Line their Own Pockets!' Can the Teaching of Political Literacy Counter the Democratic Deficit? The Experience of Modern Studies in Scotland," *Scottish Educational Review* 41, no. 2 (2009): 46–61, and idem, "Citizenship Initiatives and Pupil Values: A Case Study of one Scottish School's Experience," *Educational Review* 62, no. 4 (2010): 391–406; W. Schulz et al., *Initial Findings from the IEA International Civic Education Study* (Amsterdam: IEA, 2010).

Findings/Results

Diversity

We asked a number of questions to assess attitudes regarding diversity, using future potential voting attitudes, primarily as the school had recently engaged in a major mock election exercise, involving these students, around the 2016 Scottish Parliamentary elections. Following the initiative, in almost all areas there was improvement and, in the cases of Jewish, Muslim, Catholic, and English people and women, substantial improvement. In the other two cases, Black and Disabled people, it was virtually the same before and after the initiative. Attitudes toward gay people, whilst more tolerant after than before the programme, were lower overall. This supported our findings,[8] which found that students in transition from primary 7 to secondary 1 were more tolerant toward minority groups after learning about the Holocaust.

Table 1: "I think there are too many...in Scotland."

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8 Cowan and Maitles, "Never Again!"; idem, "Does Addressing Prejudice and Discrimination through Holocaust Education Produce Better Citizens?" and idem, *Teaching Controversial Issues in the Classroom: Key Issues and Debates* (London: Continuum, 2013).

Multi Ethnicity

Welcomingly, in most areas the results suggest a positive general outlook. Attitudes toward Jews, Asians, and Poles improved over the initiative; but attitudes toward Blacks and Chinese stayed constant. Worst overall were the attitudes toward the English. They were the most negative in both surveys and actually were less positive after the initiative than before.

The picture was more complex with regards to immigration/asylum seekers. Whilst the students' attitudes toward full rights for black people improved slightly, and there was some increased support for refugees, there was no increase in positive welcoming attitudes toward asylum seekers and economic immigrants, although we were not in a position to find out whether students understood the difference between the two categories. Clearly, the impact of both the recession and media and political calls for "British jobs for British workers" and supposed concerns of immigration into Britain, particularly fuelled by the BREXIT debate, will be hard for school education programmes to challenge, if we wished to do so. More than 80 % in both surveys felt that it was wrong to make racist jokes.

Welcomingly, there was a reduction in hostility toward Jews, but worryingly the numbers who thought there were too many Jews in Scotland only reduced by 3 % to 11 %. And this despite the fact that Jews in Scotland only comprise some 0.1 % of the population (incidentally a similar percentage to Jews in Germany in 1933), and there were no Jews in this cohort. This area clearly needs some further investigation, and we can only hypothesise about this in the context of the survey. Firstly, there can be antisemitism where there are few or no Jews. There is a negative perception of Jews that can be very pervasive.[9] Linked to this is a necessity to discuss Holocaust education in a way that raises antisemitism. Maitles and Cowan found that many teachers used the word racism instead of the word antisemitism to discuss the Holocaust.[10] It is important to use the word antisemitism or it can lead to confusion for students.

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9 Cf. G. Short and B. Carrington, "Antisemitism and the Primary School: Children's Perceptions of Jewish Culture and Identity," *Research in Education* 54 (1995): 14–24; Cowan and Maitles, "Does Addressing Prejudice and Discrimination through Holocaust Education Produce Better Citizens?"

10 Cf. Cowan and Maitles, "Does Addressing Prejudice and Discrimination through Holocaust Education Produce Better Citizens?" and idem, *Teaching Controversial Issues in the Classroom*.

Responsibility for Racism

The attempt here was to gauge the attitudes toward both collective and individual responsibility for dealing with racism.


Challenging Racism

Legend: Survey 1 (white), Survey 2 (black)

Responsibility of All: Survey 1 — 47%, Survey 2 — 66%
My Responsibility: Survey 1 — 76%, Survey 2 — 75%

(Y-axis: Percentage Agreeing, 0%–80%)

Table 2: Challenging racism.

The results are positive. In particular, a large increase in the percent believing that society as a whole should challenge racism and a welcomingly high response to individual responsibility in both surveys. It is feasible to suggest that the 1% drop in individual responsibility can be explained by one pupil thinking the two areas were mutually exclusive. But, because of anonymity, this is impossible to confirm.

There can be issues when examining this kind of evidence of Holocaust education and citizenship education as to whether one sees the glass as half full or half empty. For example, should we be pleased that over three-quarters of the students felt that they had personal responsibility for challenging racism or worried that 25% think that racism has nothing to do with them? Overall, there is evidence of a general improvement in values and attitudes after the students undertook the initiative, although in most issues (except with attitudes toward gay and English people) there was a high(ish) level before the citizenship initiative. Nonetheless, the fact that in the vast majority of categories, students were more positive after than before suggests that these initiatives were worthwhile.

However, the research can be of best value as we try to evaluate the development of citizenship ideas in young people. The involvement of many subjects in the school can take Holocaust education and citizenship education out of a potential isolation and place its understanding at the heart of the school. This allows for cross-curricular/active learning experiences for deeper learning and more interesting (and potentially longer lasting) learning experiences. For example in their genocide awareness days, there was an observable and powerful impact on the students of the speaker from Rwanda and the workshop by two senior students at the school outlining their experiences of Auschwitz as part of the Lessons from Auschwitz Programme, the Anne Frank workshops, and diverse and active music and drama. We can surmise that this helped their understanding of some of the issues, reflected in the results of the survey reported above.

Other Areas

There was an increase from 25% to 35% of those who believe that the "world would be a better place if more women were world leaders" and an increase from 76% to 79% of those who thought that "we should end religious segregation in schools."[11] Maitles in his sample of approximately 1,600 15- to 16-year-old students found that 25% agreed with the point about woman leaders, but in terms of ending religious segregation in schools only 43% agreed.[12] Whether the older age of the Maitles sample was the issue for this divergence or whether the fact that the cohort in the survey of the present paper was all from a non-denominational school, and this had an impact, would need further investigation.

Gender Issues

The clearest differences are between the attitudes of boys and girls in our sample. In every index, girls were more progressive in terms of citizenship values than boys (Tables 3 to 7).

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11 It should be noted that some 97% of Scots children go to state funded comprehensive schools and that these schools are non-denominational or Catholic, with one Jewish primary (elementary) school.

**12** Cf. Maitles, "They're Out to Line their Own Pockets!'"

Full Equality for Gay People

Table 3: Full equality for gay people.

Too Many English People in Scotland

Table 4: Too many English people in Scotland.

I would be as likely to vote for an English person as a Scottish person for the Scottish Parliament

Table 5: English people in Scottish Parliament.

I think we should reduce Immigration into Scotland

Table 6: Immigration to Scotland.

I think we should try to buy Fairtrade Goods

Table 7: Fairtrade goods.

It is well documented that there is a gender attainment gap with recent official reports and statistics across the UK,[13] showing that girls are continuing to out-perform boys in academic achievement, even if the difference has ceased to grow. The statistics are similar internationally in, for example, Australia[14] and in Spain.[15] The PISA surveys from 2003 onward found boys ahead (marginally) in math but well behind in reading; there was no significant difference in science. One very interesting point was that boys showed a greater range of performance in problem solving than girls; more boys were among both the higher and the lower performers. Much of the research puts this down to maturity, indeed

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13 Cf. e. g. Department for Education and Skills, *Gender and Education: The Evidence on Pupils in England* (Nottingham: DfES, 2007), https://dera.ioe.ac.uk/6616/8/rtp01-07_Redacted.pdf; "SQA Examination Results in Scottish Schools, 2007/08," Scottish Government, issued 2008, accessed December 1, 2017, https://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/archive/20160121070437/ http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2008/09/10154841/1; E. Busby, "GCSE Results 2017: Girls Maintain Lead over Boys despite New Linear Exams," *Times Educational Supplement*, August 24, 2017, https://www.tes.com/news/gcse-results-2017-girls-maintain-lead-over-boys-despite-new-linear-exams.
14 Cf. S. J. Gibb et al., "Gender Differences in Educational Achievement to age 25," *Australian Journal of Education* 52, no. 1 (2008): 63–80.
15 Cf. O. Marcenaro-Gutierrez et al., "Gender Differences in Adolescents' Academic Achievement," *Young* 26, no. 3 (2018): 250–70.

concepts of masculinity, and different learning styles of boys and girls.[16] Linked to this, it can be argued that the type of examinations in the UK, many of which involve significant coursework, are better suited for girls as this type of work fits better with their maturity and learning styles.[17] As regards disaffection and dispositions, the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England research suggested that there was not a great deal of difference in the ways that boys and girls viewed school but that there was a much higher chance of boys disaffection resulting in exclusion; boys accounted for 80% of exclusions.

In general, thus, in many indices girls are outperforming boys. However, when it comes to trying to find out whether there is a gender difference in the values and attitudes of adolescents, the research evidence is much weaker. Large scale comparative attitudes surveys[18] do provide valuable information about values and attitudes but don't provide a gender dimension. Prough and Postic found that girl adolescents in the USA were more intolerant of racists and homophobia and more positive toward social equality than adolescent males.[19] Soule and Nairne found that girls are slightly more interested in politics, more participative, and are more politically tolerant than boys.[20] Similarly

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16 Cf. M. Arnot et al., *Recent Research on Gender and Educational Performance* (London: The Stationary Office, 1998); R. Bray et al., *Can Boys Do Better?* (Leicester: Secondary Heads Association, 1997); C. Forde et al., *Professional Development, Reflection and Enquiry* (London: Paul Chapman, 2006); A. MacDonald et al., *Boys' Achievement, Progress, Motivation and Participation: Issues Raised by Recent Literature* (Slough: NFER, 1999); S. Machin and S. McNally, "Gender and Student Achievement in English Schools," *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 21, no. 3 (2005): 357–72; E. Millard, *Differently Literate: Boys, Girls and the Schooling of Literacy* (London: Falmer, 1997); J. Oakhill and A. Petrides, "Sex Differences in the Effects of Interest on Boys' and Girls' Reading Comprehension," *British Journal of Psychology* 98, no. 2 (2007): 223–35; L. Sukhnandan et al., *An Investigation into Gender Differences in Achievement: Phase 2: School and Classroom Strategies* (Slough: NFER, 2000).
17 Cf. C. Gipps and P. Murphy, *Equity in the Classroom: Towards Effective Pedagogy for Girls and Boys* (London: Routledge, 1994); J. Powney, *Gender and Attainment: A Review* (Glasgow: The SCRE Centre, 1996); G. Stobart and J. White, *Differential Performance in Examinations at 16+: English and Mathematics: Final Report* (London: School Examinations and Assessment Council, 1992).
18 Cf. e. g. Hahn, *Becoming Political*; Torney-Purta et al., *Citizenship and Education in Twenty-Eight Countries.*
19 Cf. E. Prough and R. Postic, "Today's Dick and Jane: A Look Into the Levels of Political Tolerance of Adolescents in Public and Religious High School Environments" (paper presented at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 3–6, 2008, Chicago, IL, USA).
20 Cf. S. Soule and J. Nairne, "Are Girls Checking Out? Gender and Political Socialization in Transitioning Democracies" (paper presented at the Midwestern Political Science Meeting,

Badger et al. measuring gender preferences in terms of caring and personal values, found girls more positive.[21] Contrastingly, Flanagan and Tucker found no consistent gender pattern in adolescents' political attributions.[22] Similarly, drawing on interviews and observations with high school students in the USA, Morimoto argued that boys' and girls' explanations for participating are strikingly similar.[23] However, all these studies were for the USA; there is little of this type of evidence from Britain, and this was one of the areas we wished to examine. British studies, for example, Archer[24] and Archer and Francis examine the values of Muslim boys in the former and British-Chinese in the latter. Whilst most of the evidence is ethnic in nature and shows a generalised racism in schools, a key finding is of a generalised male sexism and a macho "laddish" outlook that impinges negatively on their values. On occasions, this has led to some schools opting for single gender classes and "boy calming" initiatives, although these types of responses have been questioned and criticized in research by Lingard et al.[25] Maitles and Cowan, in their study of Holocaust education in high schools, found that their adolescents (aged 15 to 16 years) showed significant gender differences in terms of values and attitudes. The study reported here finds similarity with the research discussed above in that girls are much more understanding and tolerant in general than boys. In the tables above (3 to 7) we find clear evidence to back this up.[26]

April 19–23, 2006, Chicago, IL, USA), https://www.civiced.org/pdfs/research/Gender AndPolitical.pdf.

21 Cf. K. Badger et al., "Age and Gender Differences in Value Orientation among American Adolescents," *Adolescence* 33 (1998): 27–52.

22 Cf. C. Flanagan and C. J. Tucker, "Adolescents' Explanations for Political Issues: Concordance With Their Views of Self and Society," *Developmental Psychology* 35, no. 5 (1999): 1198–1209.

23 Cf. S. A. Morimoto, "Democracy for Teens: Gender and Becoming a Good Citizen" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, August 11, 2007, New York City, USA).

24 Cf. L. Archer, *Race, Masculinity and Schooling: Muslim Boys and Education* (Berkshire: Open University Press, 2003); L. Archer and B. Francis, *Understanding Minority Ethnic Achievement: Race, Gender, Class and 'Success'* (London: Routledge, 2007).

25 Cf. B. Lingard et al., *Boys and Schooling: Beyond Structural Reform* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

26 Cf. Maitles, "Citizenship Initiatives and Pupil Values."

Conclusions

There is a real debate about the pedagogy surrounding Holocaust education and its relationship to citizenship education. Where the Holocaust is embedded in the curriculum, generally through the subject discipline of history, there is the clear advantage of learning about it—albeit with the time constraints and lack of interdisciplinarity as key drawbacks. In curriculums where the Holocaust is taught as part of a citizenship education programme, there can be interdisciplinary activities and learning related to the citizenship areas inherent in Holocaust education, with the proviso that the historical events leading up to the Holocaust must play a central role. In reality, there is no dichotomy between the two. It is not in the interests of developing Holocaust education to argue that it can only be adequately or properly done through history. Where we can mix the historical knowledge of the events with a strong focus on its evils and that this is the end to which behaviours, such as stereotyping and racism, can lead to, young people learn both *about* and *from* the Holocaust. Finally, our research suggested that even after learning about the Holocaust, some 11 % of the sample agreed that there were too many Jews in Scotland. As we discuss above, this has clear implications for pedagogy.

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Paul Thomas and Abdul-Razak Kuyini Alhassan

Challenging Antisemitism: A Pedagogical Approach in a Norwegian School

Introduction

This paper is based on an earlier study published in the *Journal of Jewish Education* and used with permission.[1] In addition, the paper also draws upon a nationwide study conducted by The Center for Studies of the Holocaust and Religious Minorities in Norway.[2] The topic of the study was attitudes toward Jews and manifestations of antisemitism in a high school in Oslo, Norway, with a majority of students self-identifying as Muslims. The main author was a full-time teacher at the high school (2013–2016) and took the initiative to conduct the study with the consent of the school leadership with a view toward challenging what was perceived as an entrenched antisemitic discourse. Semi-structured interviews, classroom discussions, and a trip to the synagogue in Oslo were employed in generating the data that informed the study.

Speaking in 2009, the then Foreign Minister of Norway, Jonas Gahr Støre, said:

> Norway has one of its darkest chapters in the way we treated our Jews during a dramatic period in our history. It has given us some instincts and lessons about when we should be on guard. I believe that we see particular signs in our time that indicate we should be on guard.[3]

It is such exhortations "to be on guard" that guide this study. Jahn Otto Johansen further observes that while neo-Nazis have been associated with antisemitism in Germany and western countries like Norway after 1989, several perpetrators of

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1 Cf. P. Thomas, "Exploring Anti-Semitism in the Classroom: A Case Study Among Norwegian Adolescents from Minority Backgrounds," *Journal of Jewish Education* 82, no. 3 (2016): 182–207.
2 Cf. Center for the Studies of the Holocaust and Religious Minorities, "Antisemitism in Norway? The Attitudes of the Norwegian Population towards Jews and Other Minorities" (Oslo: Center for the Studies of the Holocaust and Religious Minorities, 2021), http://www.hlsenteret.no/publikasjoner/antisemitism-in-norway-web.pdf.
3 J. O. Johansen, *Den Nygamle Antisemittisme* [The New-old Antisemitism] (Oslo: Jogo Media AS, 2015), 120. Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Norwegian are by the authors of this essay.

antisemitic acts in recent years have been young immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa.[4]

Demographic Context

The population of Norway was 5.29 million in the last quarter of 2017, with immigrants, that is, first and second generation, comprising 17.3% of the total.[5] The capital city, Oslo, was registered with a population of 673,468 with 33.1% coming from immigrant backgrounds. The highest categories obtained for immigrants from Pakistan (22,000), followed by Poland, Somalia, Sweden (13,000–14,000) and Iraq respectively, according to Statistics Norway.[6] Due to the raging civil war, the highest demographic growth has been among refugees from Syria: "At the beginning of 2017, there were 20,800 immigrants from Syria, while the corresponding figure for the previous year was 9,700."[7] As this study was conducted in Oslo, and pertinent to the topic of antisemitism is the skewed distribution of certain ethnic groups to which we shall return to later. While the total percentage of immigrants is at 33.1% for Oslo, Figure 1 shows that immigrants tend to cluster around the northeast and southeast regions of the capital. Districts such as Alna, Grorud, and Stovner, which are often referred to collectively as Groruddalen, and Søndre Nordstrand, all in dark red on the map, have over 50% with immigrant backgrounds. While the two regions comprise 27% of Oslo's population, 98% of the residents have immigrant backgrounds from countries such as Pakistan, Somalia, Poland, Iraq, and Eritrea to name the most prominent.[8]

4 Cf. ibid., 22.

5 Cf. "Key Figures for the Population," Statistics Norway, last updated March 14, 2018, https://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/nokkeltall/population.

6 Cf. "Kommune fakta Oslo" [Facts on Municipality Oslo], Statistics Norway, issued 2017, accessed January 28, 2021, https://www.ssb.no/kommunefakta/oslo.

7 "Many New Syrian Immigrants," Statistics Norway, issued 2017, accessed May 1, 2018, https://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/artikler-og-publikasjoner/many-new-syrian-immigrants.

8 Cf. K. S. Wiggen et al., "Innvandreres demografi og levekår i Groruddalen, Søndre Nordstrand, Gamle Oslo og Grünerløkka" [Immigrants' Demographics and Living Conditions in Groruddalen, Søndre Nordstrand, Old Oslo and Grünerløkka], *Rapporter* 43 (2015), https://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/artikler-og-publikasjoner/_attachment/242895?_ts=150d7a03038, 7.

## Andel innvandrere og norskfødte med innvandrerforeldre. 1. januar 2017

Image 1: Percentage of immigrants and their distribution in Oslo.
Source: Statistics Norway, "Færre medlemmer i kristne trussamfunn – dei islamske veks"
[Fewer Members in Christian Denominations—Islam Is Growing], issued December 1, 2017, accessed January 28, 2021, https://www.ssb.no/kultur-og-fritid/artikler-og-publikasjoner/faerre-medlemmer-i-kristne-trussamfunn-dei-islamske-veks.

Historical Context of Antisemitism in Norway

That antisemitism has a long pedigree in Norway is evident as far back as 1436, when Archbishop Aslak Bolt made it an offense to observe the sabbath in a Jew-

ish manner.[9] A small number of Sephardic Jews were given refuge after escaping persecution in Portugal in the 1490s, but these exemptions were rescinded by King Christian IV in 1687 during the Union of Denmark-Norway. Martin Luther's antisemitism undoubtedly loomed large in the Scandinavian context.[10] The Norwegian Constitution of 1814 forbade Jews from entering Norway. Frode Ulvund argues that two conflicting discourses dominated the political landscape before and after 1814.[11] Prior to 1814, accusations of Jews being subversive of nationalist aspirations held sway and culminated in the 1814 ban. The architects behind the constitution were convinced that Jews could never be good citizens and, because they apparently harbored ambitions to resurrect the State of Israel, would never assimilate, but seek to subvert nationalism.[12] Hence they posed a serious threat to national cohesion, not due to religious adherence but political convictions. After 1814, one detects arguments in favor of granting Jews entrance and citizenship underpinned by a Christian-liberal discourse. The writer, Henrik Wergeland, wrote to the Norwegian Parliament to lift the ban on Jews in 1839. He appealed on the basis of morals, love of fellow-humans, and justice. Among others, he pointed to the Quaker community in Norway who were exempted from certain official laws on religious grounds and countered that even Napoleon's Sanhedrin had demonstrated that obedience to statutory laws was a tenet of Jewish doctrine.[13] Wergeland argued:

> Can a Christian state exclude other humans whose family life is irreproachable and whose way of life is admirable? Can one forever ban a people whose history has turned up so many spiritual giants, so great lawgivers, significant scientists and intellectual leaders in ethics, music, literature and philosophy?[14]

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9 Cf. O. Mendelsohn, *Jødenes historie i Norge gjennom 300 år. 1969* [The History of the Jews in Norway in the Last 300 Years] (Oslo: Universitetsforlag, 1969), 10.

10 Cf. T. Eriksen et al., *Jødehat: Antisemittismens historie fra antikken til i dag* [Hatred of Jews: The History of Anti-Semitism from Antiquity to the Present] (Oslo: NW Damm & Søn, 2009), 213.

11 Cf. F. Ulvund, *Nasjonens Antiborgere: Forestillinger om Religiøse Minoriteter som Samfunnsfiender i Norge, ca. 1814–1964* [The Nation's Anti-Citizens: Perceptions of Religious Minorities as Enemies of Society in Norway, approx. 1814–1964] (Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk, 2017).

12 Cf. H. Harket, *Paragrafen: Eidsvoll 1814* [The Eidsvoll 1814 Paragraph] (Oslo: Dreyers Forlag, 2014).

13 Cf. H. Wergeland, *Indlæg i Jødesagen, til Understøttelse for Forslaget om Ophævelse af Norges Grundlovs § 2, sidste Passus* [Submission in the Jewish Case, in Support of the Proposal for Repeal of the Constitution of Norway § 2, last Passus] (Kristiania: Malling, 1841), 36.

14 Johansen, *Den Nygamle Antisemittisme*, 107.

Wergeland died in 1845, six years before the controversial *Jødeparagrafen*—§ 2 in the constitution banning Jews and Jesuits from entering Norway—was repealed. Despite this, antisemitism lingered and would crystallize in legal proscriptions, such as the law banning the *shechita* Jewish ritual slaughter in 1930.[15] Contemporary Jews draw parallels between the political party, *Senterpartiet*, and its call for a further tightening of the ritual slaughter laws and ban of Jewish circumcision with that of its predecessor in the 1930s, *Bondepartiet*, or the Farmer's Party. He concludes: "They believe that without meat which is slaughtered ritually and with a ban on circumcision, it will be impossible to sustain Jewish life in Norway."[16]

Once the Nazis occupied Norway on April 9, 1940, all Jews were required by law to hand in their radios, and "J" for Jew was stamped on their passports to expedite traceability.[17] Ragnar Ulstein states, "On Yom Kippur, 10 September 1942, one of the holiest days in the Jewish calendar, the Nazis confiscated many Jewish-owned villas in the Oslo area. This occurred while many were in the Synagogue."[18] According to the Norwegian government's report, the "Action Plan against Antisemitism (2016 – 2020)":

> ... the Norwegian police also participated in the arrests, along with members of the paramilitary unit of the Norwegian Nazi Party "Quisling's Hird" and Germanic SS Norway. The police action against the Jews on 26 November 1942 was the largest in the history of Norway. All Jewish assets and property were confiscated, on the initiative of the Norwegian Nazi party *Nasjonal Samling*. Members of the civil service, taxi drivers and civilians were also involved in the actions.[19]

On the other hand, several Norwegian citizens relayed coded messages to Jews warning them to go into hiding.[20] Seven hundred and seventy Jews, roughly one-third of the Jewish population were forcefully put onto the ship SS Donau and sent to concentration camps, with only thirty surviving.[21] It was not before January 27, 2012, that the then Norwegian Prime Minister, and current General

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15 Cf. ibid., 109.

16 Ibid.

17 Cf. Ulstein, *Jødar på flukt* [Jews on the Run] (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 2006), 41.

18 Ibid., 55.

19 Ministry of Local Government and Modernization, "Action Plan against Antisemitism 2016 – 2020," issued 2016, accessed April 30, 2018, https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/dd258c081e6048e2ad0cac9617abf778/action-plan-against-antisemitism.pdf, 17.

20 Cf. Eriksen et al., *Jødehat*.

21 Cf. Hoffmann et al., *Antisemitism in Norway? The Attitudes of the Norwegian Population towards Jews and Other Minorities* (Oslo: Center for the Studies of the Holocaust and Religious Minorities, 2012).

Secretary of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, issued an official apology to the Jewish community for the arrests and deportations. Groping for explanations, Eriksen et al. ask:

> Can one of the explanations be that Norwegian society already was so tainted by latent anti-Semitism that the Jews, after a presence of nearly a hundred years, were still considered an alien element? That they were as a group still excluded from the national "we", and therefore were in the main abandoned to their own destiny?[22]

Three aspects of George Fredrickson's theory of antisemitism will be considered next. These include: antisemitism that is religiously inspired, one that acts as a "safety vale" against humiliation and defeat, and the medieval leitmotif of the Jew as the "Devil's accomplice." This will be followed by Emmanuel Levinas' face-to-face ethical philosophy, which inspired the trip to the synagogue in Oslo and will be presented in the findings section.

Theoretical Framework

Racism, according to Fredrickson, is the assigning of "fixed or permanent differences among human descent groups and using this attribution of difference to justify their differential treatment."[23] Vital to this study is the fact that the antisemitic variant of racism, unlike for instance its white supremacist variant, "presses toward the dissolution of the hierarchy through the expulsion or destruction of the lower-status group."[24] Furthermore, and pertinent to this study, is Fredrickson's understanding of religious bigotry as "directed at what people believe and not what they are."[25] The students in this study come from Muslim backgrounds. However, this is not to say their antisemitism emanated from a well-defined Islamic theological underpinning given their disparate— that is, ethnic and denominational—backgrounds (some were Sunni and others Shia). A case in point is one student's assertion from the findings: "It says in the Torah that Jews are permitted to tear out the vital organs of non-Jews and use their hearts, kidneys, etc., for themselves." Despite this, and commensurate with Fredrickson, it is clear that their antisemitic utterances were rooted in a

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22 Eriksen et al., *Jødehat*, 420.

23 G. M. Fredrickson, *Racism: A Short History* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002), 156.

24 Ibid., 157.

25 Ibid., 140.

worldview where Jews were perceived as the nemesis of their peculiar interpretation of Islam, one which may or may not find support among other Muslims. Seen through such a lens, Fredrickson's elaboration on religiously inspired antisemitism is apposite:

> It is, however, useful to be reminded by Horowitz that for many groups outside the West, "religion is not a matter of faith but a given, an integral part of their identity, and for some an inextricable component of their sense of peoplehood."[26]

The students often demonstrated this "sense of peoplehood" as global Muslims in their antisemitic utterances. In particular, the pejorative trope of the nefarious Jew was triggered because Palestinians were perceived as fellow-Muslims (some were unaware that Palestinian Christians existed)—much the same way that Muslims worldwide have championed the cause of Bosnian, Syrian, and the Myanmar Rohingya Muslims. Fredrickson argues that racism rooted in religious conviction is less susceptible to rational persuasion as its foundations are not subject to empirical falsification. However, he further contends that it is not the harboring of such antisemitic or racist views spawned through religious dogmatism that creates ethnoreligious conflict, but the "politicization of faith" when religious zealots endeavor "… to make others conform to beliefs they do not share […] The Taliban ruled Afghanistan in ways that much of the rest of the world found unacceptable."[27]

In addition, he draws attention to the socio-economic disparities thrown up by globalization that have led some to valorize race and religion as buffers against the erosion of self-worth and dignity. The above aligns with an earlier study in the same high school where Thomas et al. conclude:

> The alienating effects of a postmodern world, or what Zygmunt Bauman (2000) calls "liquid modernity", where affiliations are dispersed, ephemeral and fragile, coupled with a general hardening of attitudes towards Islam in the aftermath of 9/11, are dislodged by students' recruitment of an explicit Muslim identity. The concept of *ummah* is germane in this regard. This is the transnational Muslim "imagined community" (Anderson, 2006) which transcends local parochialism.[28]

Fredrickson builds on the work of Magnus Hirschfeld who fled Weimar, Germany and wrote his critique of Nazi ethnological theories in Nice. In attempting to un-

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26 Ibid., 140–41.

27 Ibid., 149.

28 P. Thomas et al., "Third Space Epistemologies: Ethnicity and Belonging in an 'Immigrant'-Dominated Upper Secondary School in Norway," *Improving Schools* 19, no. 3 (2016): 223.

derstand the rise of German antisemitism, he postulated that the Germans employed antisemitism as a "safety valve"—a logical extension of the will to power that had suffered a crushing defeat in the First World War. Unlike the powerful and inaccessible allies, the Jew served as a proxy figure—the enemy within the gates—who could be accessed and made to pay for the humiliating defeat.[29]

Besides the antisemitism of the religious zealot and the scapegoating "safety valve" variant sketched above, Fredrickson considers how anti-Judaism morphed into antisemitism. This occurred when the "belief took hold that Jews were intrinsically and organically evil rather than merely having false beliefs and wrong dispositions."[30] Of particular concern is the manner in which this medieval, Christian association of the Jew with the Devil has persisted and resonates with students from Muslim backgrounds, as the findings section reveals. It is precisely in its ability to change religious "garments" while retaining its toxic potency that antisemitism becomes the "scavenger ideology" par excellence.[31] The toxicity lies in the fact that, not only is this fantasy impervious to rational persuasion, but its conviction that Jews are beyond redemption and that their obliteration is the will of their deity. Seen in this light, the Holocaust survivor, Primo Levi's admonition is apt:

> Few countries can be considered immune to a future tide of violence generated by intolerance, lust for power, economic difficulties, religious or political fanaticism, and racialist attritions. It is therefore necessary to sharpen our senses, distrust the prophets, the enchanters, those who speak and write "beautiful words" unsupported by intelligent reasons.[32]

Levinas' critique of phenomenologists like Husserl and Heidegger was that their engagement with the "Other" was weak. The transcendent face of the "Other" abruptly announces its presence like an epiphany and morally accosts us, according to Levinas.[33] He argued that a genuine social dialogue—what he referred to as the face-to-face encounter—was premised upon the jettisoning of all preconceived binary codes and epistemological straightjackets. Language is the interlocutor that shatters the "strangeness" of the "Other" and compels us to confront and acknowledge the ethical inviolability of the "Other." He further posits that the encounter does not seek to ignore the differences but acknowledges the gamut of emotional tension from trust to distrust, love and hate, and community

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29 Cf. M. Hirschfeld, *Racism* (London: Gollancz, 1938).

30 Fredrickson, *Racism*, 19.

31 Ibid., 22.

32 P. Levi, *The Drowned and the Saved* (London: Abacus, 1986), 186–87.

33 Cf. E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), 194.

and war. Ultimately, the infinity and alterity of the "Other" demands attention encapsulated in one word: obligation.[34] As such, this ethical obligation toward one's neighbor is morally superior to relational typologies buttressed upon, for instance, Rousseau's social contract or similar rational justifications because the "Other's" inescapable beckoning becomes my master.

In relation to Levinas' encounter, Karl Nipkow asks whether we can stand the "Other's" strangeness.[35] Its salience lies in the fact that the "Other" meets us often against our will, not according to our preferences or convenience. To his mind, the encounter is akin to a biblical meeting—a "visitation" (*Heimsuchung*)—which subverts prejudice and has the potential to sow the seeds of a genuine "plurality" as "difference" that challenges us.[36] Hence the Levinasian dialogic relation is contingent and valorizes the inconvenience of proximity—the face-to-face encounter. Moreover, it is radical in that it goes beyond the Kantian categorical imperative in that responsibility to the "Other" is expected prior to consciousness or choice.[37] Nipkow's summary below is commensurate with the purpose of this study, which is a pedagogy that takes seriously a life with responsibility in a plural world.

> Moreover, the whole of moral education and true moral maturity is highlighted if maturity is understood, together with Levinas and other Jewish authors as well as Christian theologians, as a life with responsibility in a plural world.[38]

Some methodological considerations follow after which the findings are presented.

Issues of Methodology

School Site, Access, and Ethics

The high school is situated in the east of Oslo and had approximately 622 students enrolled at the time of the research. Twenty-two public high schools and eight private ones receive state subsidies. While the average entrance score for

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34 Cf. ibid., 201.

35 Cf. K. E. Nipkow, *God, Human Nature and Education for Peace: New Approaches to Moral and Religious Maturity* (Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate, 2003).

36 Cf. ibid., 168.

37 Cf. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*.

38 Nipkow, *God, Human Nature and Education for Peace*, 169.

schools was 39.7, this particular school had an entrance score of only 31.3—one of the four lowest-performing schools in Oslo.[39] The study employed an ethnographic approach where semi-structured interviews, classroom-based discussions, and a trip to the synagogue in Oslo yielded the empirical data presented in this paper. Some of the participants shared their views during English classes, but the lion's share of the data was obtained during the biweekly classes in religion, philosophy, and ethics. The latter is commensurate with the observation, "Aside from history, the other principal curricular area which easily benefits from focus on antisemitism is religious and moral education."[40]

Obviously, issues of reflexivity and ethics ought to be considered in a research undertaking where a teacher is an inescapable part of the research milieu.[41] The idea to conduct this research arose on account of the ubiquitous and blunt antisemitic statements volunteered across the range of classrooms—years one to three; age range: sixteen to eighteen and above. Often this occurred without warning while the main author was teaching about a subject unrelated to Jews, as the findings section demonstrates. Once again, it must be made clear that while not all students in this school identified as Muslims, the opinions in the findings came from students who identified as Muslim. Given the gravity of the situation, and determined that such attitudes should not go unchallenged, the main author along with a couple of colleagues sought and secured permission from the head teacher to conduct the research as a first step in gauging the scale of the problem. Students were informed about the aims of the research and promised confidentiality. Significantly, the trappings of formality (interviews, notes, etc.) did not appear to temper the earlier antisemitism of the students. Obviously, the conundrum of the researcher's loyalty to the school and the public's right to know loomed large during the research.[42]

39 Cf. Oslo Kommune Utdanningsetaten, accessed January 29, 2021, https://www.oslo.kom mune.no/etater-foretak-og-ombud/utdanningsetaten/.

40 P. Cowan and H. Maitles, eds., *Teaching Controversial Issues in the Classroom: Key Issues and Debates* (London: Continuum, 2012), 191.

41 Cf. M. Hammersley and P. Atkinson, *Ethnography Principles in Practice* (London: Routledge, 1983), 14.

42 Cf. K. Morrison, *Planning and Accomplishing School-centred Evaluation* (Dereham: Peter Francis, 1993); M. LeCompte and J. Preissle, *Ethnography and Qualitative Design in Educational Research* (London: Academic Press, 1993), 106; M. de Laine, *Fieldwork, Participation and Practice: Ethics and Dilemmas in Qualitative Research* (London: Sage, 2000), 13.

Classroom Discourse

Classroom discourse analysis explores "language in use" in the classroom and how this is shaped in the confluence of a plethora of contexts within and external to the classroom.[43] The "communicative repertoires" of the students are employed as analytical tools to approximate their attitudes toward Jews. This can be defined as "The collection of ways individuals use language and other means of communication (gestures, dress, postures accessories) to function effectively in the multiple communities in which they participate."[44] Three aspects are salient: the degree to which students' prior attitudes gleaned from home may conform or diverge from mainstream society, what Bakhtin calls "living in a world of other's words."[45] Next comes the interactional context, which considers the influence peers have in the classroom context, and, finally, students' agency and the ways in which their own multicultural/multiple repertoires shapes what transpires in the classroom.[46] As the findings indicate, despite the diversity of languages and repertoires represented in the study, one detects a "standard" antisemitic communicative repertoire which, it is argued, highlights the urgent need for authorities and stakeholders in education to combat.

Findings

Semi-structured Interviews

Semi-structured questions were administered in two classes—one in the first year (total 12) and the other in the final year (total 23). In response to the question, "What in your opinion is the reason for antisemitism in Norway?" the majority, 12 of 35 students, blamed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A few examples follow:

> In my view, the reason there is antisemitism in Norway today is Israel's war against the Palestinians. It is no secret that the majority of those who hate Jews come from religious immigrant backgrounds. They see that this war affects families who practice the same religion as theirs (A1: final-year student).

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43 Cf. B. Rymes, *Classroom Discourse Analysis: A Tool for Critical Reflection* (New York: Routledge, 2016).

44 Ibid., 8.

45 M. M. Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 143.

46 Cf. Rymes, *Classroom Discourse Analysis*.

> Another reason why some individuals hate Jews could be what is happening in Palestine. Hating someone for killing innocent people to me is normal. But hating all Jews is wrong (A4: first-year student).

> As long as Jews continue to kill Palestinians, all Jews will be objects of hate (A4: final-year student).

> Israel and Jews in general are responsible for this hate. They oppress the Palestinians and the majority of Jews support this. They say that they have the right to defend themselves, but the Palestinians are defenseless—you cannot oppress those who have no military or economic strength. Jews have thought they are superior to others for thousands of years, which is the cause of antisemitism (A2: final-year student).

> When people see Israel's aggression in the media, they believe that all Jews are murderers, which is the reason for antisemitism (A3: final-year student).

Some stated that their Muslim faith triggered a sense of religious altruism—a shared suffering with the afflictions of their fellow Muslims in Palestine. Overall, none saw any need to differentiate between the modern State of Israel and antisemitism as a racist phenomenon that predates the creation of the State of Israel. One student stated,

> I believe that prejudices against Jews are "inherited." It has become a trend to look negatively upon Jews. Most of all, people consider the terrible crimes committed against Jews in history and think they must have done something to deserve this (A6: final-year student).

"Jew" as an Offensive Term

The second question elicited responses to the question, "Have you heard the word 'Jew' used as a term of abuse? How should one react if 'Jew' is used to malign someone you know?" Twenty three of 35 students responded that they have heard someone use the term as a pejorative. The answers can broadly be grouped according to those who heard the term and unequivocally denounced its use, as opposed to those who heard the pejorative but appeared complacent or justified its use.

The lion's share of what is described as "complacent" responses (with some clearly indulging in classical antisemitism) came from first-year students. Some of these follow:

> Not only my friends and family use this term pejoratively, but even I do. For instance, "stingy Jew" refers to someone who does not share his food with us. I do not think most of us mean it in a bad way, but it is a stereotype that Jews are stingy (B5: first-year student).

Yes, I have heard friends use the word "Jew" in a bad way. But there is no deep hatred harbored towards Jews. Nothing special, really! (B6: first-year student).

Yes, it is quite funny because "Jew" is used when someone is being greedy or has a big nose (B7: first-year student).

I have heard many, including myself, use the word in a very derogatory manner. Not just once, but almost on a daily basis. I don't know any Jews so I don't bother (B8: final-year student).

Obviously, it isn't nice to call someone a "Jew," but the Jews have themselves to thank for this negative connotation because of what they did to other religions in the past. I actually am indifferent (B9: final-year student).

Yes, I have heard this abuse several times. It is not good, but quite normal. (B10: final-year student).

A few other respondents affirmed the pejorative use of this word by making reference to friends who "hated" Jews, without divulging information about their own stance on the topic.

"Yes, I have a friend who really hates Jews" (B11: first-year student), and "Yes, my best friend uses "Jew" offensively. She is from Palestine" (B12: first-year student).

I have heard many use the word "Jew" as a term of abuse. It is used in much the same way as "homo" to hurt someone. One should put a stop to such behavior. (B1: final-year student).

Classroom Discussion

The English textbook contained a passage about the Puritans who left England for America and flirted with the idea of using Hebrew or Greek as the national language. Puzzled, several hands went up and asked "why Hebrew?" Having explained that the Puritans believed the Bible to be divinely inspired and the *Tanakh* was written in Hebrew, among others, the following conversation ensued:

Student (D1): I believe that Jews collaborate closely with the Devil.
Teacher: Can you please explain what you mean by this? Are you speaking metaphorically?
Student (D1): No, no ... they really have special powers through contact with Satan.
Teacher: Is there anyone else who believes this?
Student (D2): Teacher, have you read the Torah? Teacher: Yes, I have. What are you alluding to?
Student (D2): It says in the Torah that Jews are permitted to tear out the vital organs of non-Jews and use their hearts, kidneys, etc., for themselves.
Teacher: I am a teacher of religion, philosophy, and ethics and have not come across any-

thing remotely approaching what you say. Where in the Torah is this? Can you give me the chapter and verse please?

Student (D2): I don't have it here but I will show you.

Teacher: What is the cause of so much anti-Semitism in the world?

Student (D3): You have to understand that Jews' wish to dominate and colonize wherever they go. This is why they create tension wherever they go. They control all the multicorporations of the world.

Trip to the Synagogue

Teachers of religion in the final year of high school in Norway often plan a trip to a church, a mosque, and either a Hindu or Buddhist temple. Some may elect to include a visit to the mainly atheist Norwegian Humanist Association. Although there is an entire chapter on Judaism, the religion is not a part of the mandatory curriculum. Having initially planned a trip to the local Lutheran church, the main author decided a visit to the synagogue would be salutary given the unvarnished antisemitic views encountered. Upon hearing about the decision to visit the synagogue, several of the students appeared visibly uncomfortable and took umbrage. Once again, the fierce opposition came from students who self-identified as Muslim; non-Muslim students raised no objections. Several questions were raised: "Do we have to go to a synagogue?" "Are we seriously expected to put on *kippas* (Jewish skullcaps)?" "What if I don't want to go?" The importance of cultivating tolerance in a multicultural world was explained. Furthermore, would they not take offense if a fellow student refused to remove his or her shoes when entering a mosque? Somehow, the latter counterargument ameliorated the earlier recalcitrance. Only 2 of 30 students failed to show up during the excursion to the synagogue.

The synagogue resembled a fortress with concrete blocks, armed police guards patrolling the vicinity and even a security guard inside the building. In September 2006, the Norwegian-born Islamist of Pakistani extract, Arfan Qadeer Bhatti, was arrested for spraying the façade of the synagogue with bullets. The armed police presence, an aberration in the otherwise peaceful urban ambience of Oslo, was a jarring reminder of how easily antisemitism transmogrifies into murderous violence. All the students (males) respectfully put on the *kippas* and behaved themselves in an exemplary manner. The female speaker lectured on diverse aspects of the Jewish faith and Jewish life in Norway. She made reference to the aforementioned Henrik Wergeland, who spearheaded the effort to jettison Paragraph 2 that bars entry to Jews. Furthermore, she paid tribute to the Muslim youth who formed a "Peace Ring" around the synagogue in February 2015, generating attention in international media outlets. The speaker made

the case for decoupling events that transpire in Israel with her right to be a Norwegian Jew. "I cannot be held responsible for the politics of the State of Israel," she reiterated. Along the way, she expressed her admiration for a choir that toured Norway featuring Palestinian and Jewish children singing about peace and coexistence. Quite suddenly, she asked a few male students whose heads were buried between the pews to lift their heads and look at her. She shared that a student had recently engraved a swastika in the pew during her lecture. Prior to this, a student sitting close to the main author quietly drew attention to this swastika engraved close to where he sat. There was pin drop silence and stunned looks as students tried to come to terms with this.

Discussion

It was clear that the variant of antisemitism we were dealing with in the study was first and foremost secreted through a religious lens—a particular interpretation of Islam that held sway in several classrooms. Although coming from countries with disparate languages and cultures, such as Somalia, Chechnya, Morocco, Turkey, and Iraq, to name some, there was some unanimity to the effect that the default position of Islam was one that was simultaneously opposed to Jews. As Fredrickson pointed out, racism rooted in religious conviction is less susceptible to rational persuasion as its foundations are not subject to empirical falsification and becomes even more formidable when faith is politicized.[47] For instance, once while on break duty, the main author noticed a female student from a Somali background pass out leaflets on the school campus. The leaflet advertised for a seminar with a white British convert to Islam who had been condemned for explicitly antisemitic views in the UK.

Students would often share quite candidly, "Muslims will never rest until Israel is destroyed." A male student, originally from Turkey, vociferously tried to silence a female student who expressed concerns about what she perceived as a growing "religiously motivated" antisemitism in the school. The boy interrogated her from across the classroom repeatedly shouting, "Would you marry a Jew?" At this point the main author had to intervene and threaten disciplinary action if the girl was not permitted to have her say. Once again, Fredrickson's distinction between the antisemitism rooted in a white supremacist worldview and

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47 Cf. Fredrickson, *Racism*.

the racist variant, which "presses toward the dissolution of the hierarchy through the expulsion of destruction of the lower-status group" is salient.[48]

A deeper analysis of the conundrum brings up the following: the plight of Palestinians who are fellow Muslims, the collective defeat of several Arab/Muslim countries since the creation of the State of Israel—both often mentioned by students in discussions—and, vitally, Fredrickson's aforementioned socio-economic disparities created by globalization appear to have induced these students to embrace a politicized variant of Islam as a buffer against the erosion of self-worth and dignity experienced in Norway and the West at large. A blend of crime, Islamophobia, and low aspirations has seen the district stigmatized over the years and many ethnic Norwegians leave.[49]

In assigning all the blame to Israel for the prevalence of antisemitism, one is reminded of Fredrickson's "safety valve" metaphor. Put differently, these students appear gratified that Jews everywhere are made to pay for the predicament of the Palestinians and what they often called the "Zionist" policies of the USA in classroom discussions. This "safety valve" phenomenon was played out violently in public when young demonstrators, many of Arab/Muslim origin, rioted in Oslo's main parade street, Karl Johan, to draw attention to the war between Israel and Hamas in 2009. "One could hear many shout that they should go on to the University at Blindern (Oslo) to find and attack Jews."[50] The youth clashed with police, attacked journalists, and smashed windows of restaurants and shops in unprecedented scenes. The above is commensurate with the view that "the new anti-Zionist/anti-Semite does not distinguish between Jews and the Jewish state and finds both objectionable."[51]

What does a high school teacher do when one student raises his hand and states that the Torah commands Jews to tear out the hearts of non-Jews and use it for their ritual sacrifices? To further compound this, one-third of the classroom nodded in agreement. Here was a case of anti-Judaism morphing into antisemitism.[52] Many teachers had quietly decided to sweep such incidents under the rug, but the main author was of the conviction that we as educators were doing a dis-

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48 Cf. ibid., 157.

49 Cf. I. Morken and S. Theie, "Skolebytte ved overgangen til ungdomsskolen: Hvilke faktorer legger foreldre i Groruddalen vekt på ved valg av skole?" [School Change at the Transition to Upper Secondary School: What Factors Do Parents in Groruddalen Emphasize when Choosing a School?] *Norsk pedagogisk tidsskrift* 99, no. 1 (2015): 15–27.

50 Johansen, *Den Nygamle Antisemittisme*, 119.

51 P. Chesler, *The New Anti-Semitism: The Current Crisis and What We Must Do about It* (Jerusalem: Green Publishing House, 2015), 145.

52 Cf. Fredrickson, *Racism*.

service to these adolescents in not challenging and, even better, transforming their attitudes toward Jews. Nevertheless, the realization that adolescent students genuinely hold the conviction that "Jews are intrinsically and organically evil rather than merely having false beliefs and wrong dispositions"[53] seriously tests the resolve of a teacher. Invoking the medieval Christian association of the Jew with the Devil—the "scavenger ideology"—and its blatant, cavalier affirmation in our presence was very unnerving. History has demonstrated what can transpire when individuals with power believe that they are agents of a divine being "anointed" to rid the world of Jews.

Admittedly, the thought of taking twenty-seven students with explicit antisemitic views to a synagogue was daunting. The event was unprecedented in several ways: for many, this was the first time they ever stepped in a synagogue; the first time they ever, in their own words, "permitted" a Jew to speak for so long to them; the first time males put on a *kippa*. The conditions clearly appear to have facilitated a Levinasian "face-to-face encounter."[54] This was the "Other"—that is, the Jew announcing his presence like an epiphany and morally accosting these inimical students. The female speaker's mention of members of her family who were murdered in the Norwegian Holocaust, and her appeal to be treated as a Norwegian Jew and not an extension of the policies of Israel, clearly left a deep impression on these adolescent students. Levinas reminds us about language's potential to shatter the "strangeness" of the "Other" and compels us to confront and acknowledge their ethical inviolability.

Later, in the classroom, while broaching the subject of the architecture of synagogues, we meandered into the issue of ancient Israel's first Temple—Solomon's Temple—and reminded the students that it was a Lebanese King, Hiram of Tyre, who loved King David and Solomon and sent masons and material to build the Temple. One student retorted, "Arabs and Jews were good friends back then?" Obviously, the ancient Phoenicians were not Arabs, but aligned with a Levinasian pedagogy of ethical responsibility, we focused on King David and King Hiram's ancient rapport as an example of a biblical meeting—a "visitation" (*Heimsuchung*)—which subverts prejudice and has the potential to sow the seeds of a genuine "plurality" as "difference" that challenges us.[55] Prior to the excursion to the synagogue, students were encouraged to pose critical questions to the speaker, but many responded later that her speech did ameliorate some of the anger they harbored. Although it would be an overstate-

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53 Ibid., 19.

54 Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 194.

55 Cf. Nipkow, *God, Human Nature and Education for Peace*, 168.

ment to claim that one visit to the synagogue expunged the antisemitic views of these students, the more modest claim of enhancing the aim of moral education understood as a life with responsibility in a plural world is appropriate.[56]

By way of conclusion, we will highlight some issues and policies that ought to be considered in combating the growing antisemitism in schools of a similar student composition. The cavalier manner in which antisemitism has become more upfront can be gauged by a recent incident reported in many Norwegian newspapers: the Norwegian-Iranian rapper, Kaveh, who has also performed at several high schools in Oslo, including the one in this study, said the following while performing at a concert on June 15, 2018. The authors have not spelled out the expletive, although every newspaper reporting this issues has.

> "Are there any Muslims here? Eid Mubarak to you." "Are there any Christians here?" without receiving an answer. "Are there any Jews here?" he asked, before he paused a bit. "F – Jews!" The statement did not get an immediate response from the public, but after a short while the artist said, "Oh, no, just kidding. We are all God's children."[57]

After some complaints, the incident has been reported to the police, however, regrettably, past incidents have shown that very few are convicted for racism in Norway, according to NrK, the main broadcasting channel. "Few are convicted in line with the racism paragraph. Between 1977 and 2001, only seven persons were indicted for racism in line with the penal code's paragraph 135a, racism paragraph, according to the Law Data (Lovdata)."[58]

Conclusion and Way Forward

Bussing Students to Other School Districts

Both at this school, and as university lecturers, we have made it a point to highlight the current Islamophobic climate in Norway and other European countries. Students from Muslim backgrounds with antisemitic views are made to under-

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56 Cf. ibid., 169.

57 F. Andresen, "F**ck jøder, sa Kaveh fra scenen. Nå vil han beklage" [F**ck Jews, Kaveh said from the stage. Now he will apologize] *Dagbladet*, June 15, 2018, https://www.dagbladet.no/kultur/fuck-joder-sa-kaveh-fra-scenen-na-vil-han-beklage/69907758.

58 E. Larsen and M. Friestad, "Dømt for rasisme i Høyesterett" [Convicted of Racism in the Supreme Court], *NrK*, April 12, 2012, https://www.nrk.no/rogaland/domt-for-rasisme-i-hoyesterett-1.8070509.

stand the plethora of ways in which hatred and persecution of Jews and, current-ly, Muslims, share some commonalities. For example, Jewish ritual slaughter was banned in 1930 in Norway with arguments at the time curiously resembling con-temporary arguments to ban halal food.[59]

To begin with, the authorities cannot allow a situation where so many stu-dents with virulently antisemitic views cluster in certain districts and schools in Oslo. Teachers cannot cope with this. Given the scale of the challenge, the cur-rent admissions policy must be changed. Denmark has practiced "forced busing" of students from deprived districts to more affluent ones for some years now with some success. Discussions about following the Danish model in Norway (e. g., the Copenhagen model where no school should have more than 40 % with a mi-nority background) have revolved around language and a vaguely defined "inte-gration" concern.[60] Clearly, concerns about antisemitism should also be factored into this debate as this unsavory phenomenon will not dissipate without effec-tive intervention.

Educational Literature on Antisemitism

The Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training stated in 2016:

> A study of the teaching materials disclosed that minority groups, such as Sami and Jews, are mentioned quite often, but only in a historical context. Contemporary challenges are given minimal attention.

The paucity of references to the Holocaust in all high school subjects in Norway is telling. The only subject which makes brief mention is history where one para-graph out of twenty pages about WWII refers to the Nazi incursion into East Europe and the Soviet Union. The paragraph mentions how the SS Einsatzgrup-pen followed in the wake of the regular Nazi soldiers into these countries to ap-prehend and kill Jews many of whom were sent to Auschwitz with 5.6 million Jews dying during the Holocaust. This is weaved in more as an appendage to the Nazis march on East Europe and the Soviet Union rather than a subject to be probed in its own right given that the Holocaust devastated Norwegian

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59 Cf. P. Thomas and A. Selimovic, "'Sharia on a Plate?' A Critical Discourse Analysis of Halal Food in Two Norwegian Newspapers," *Journal of Islamic Marketing* 6, no. 3 (2015): 331–53.
60 Cf. "Københavnermodel 2.0: Skeler ikke til etnicitet" [The Copenhagen Model 2.0: Ethnicity Does not Matter], Folkeskolen, issued 2011, accessed April 30, 2018, https://www.folkeskolen.dk/68630/koebenhavnermodel-20-skeler-ikke-til-etnicitet.

Jewry. One teacher, who has taught history for over thirty-five years in Norway, told me, "There is little problematization of the topic, and results from recent research are not included in the textbooks. Any proper study of the Holocaust in Norway is contingent therefore upon the teacher's knowledge and will to work with the topic."

Significantly, while the old curriculum for religious education from 1997 (L97) stated, "Students shall be taught about the history of Jews in Norway," the current curriculum, which came into force in 2006 (LK06), changed this to "Students must be able to describe and reflect on the characteristics of art, architecture and music linked to Judaism." Clearly, this lacuna in the curriculum stipulation must be addressed if the challenges uncovered in this study are to be ameliorated.

A Pedagogy to Combat Antisemitism

Above all, it will ultimately be the dedication and efforts of teachers that will make the difference if antisemitism is to be seriously confronted. It is imperative, however, that researchers and stakeholders in education first acknowledge the scale of the problem. It is the author's opinion that this is currently not the case. The reason several teachers chose to look the other way in this particular school was due to what they perceived as the overwhelming magnitude of the problem. One Norwegian-Jewish minority advisor, for instance, broke down in tears in her office due to the abuse she had suffered during the short period she had worked in this school. She has since moved on.

As university lecturers training teacher-students currently, we have incorporated literature that aims to combat antisemitism in some of our courses. Teacher-students have expressed appreciation and shared that this subject has been shrouded in obfuscation for too long. In this regard, Critical Race Theory's subversive storytelling is germane. The main author narrated the story about Ruth Maier, Norway's Anne Frank which, surprisingly, a tiny few are familiar with. The Anschluss of 1938 devastated Ruth's life in Austria, and she was forced to flee to Norway. Ruth spoke Norwegian fluently within a year, graduated from high school, and read Knut Hamsun's classic novel *Hunger* (Sult) with ease. Ruth modeled for the sculptor Gustav Vigeland and is immortalized in the statue "Surprised," which stands on permanent display in Frogner Park, Oslo. On November 26, 1942, Ruth Maier was arrested at her address in Oslo. Ruth was put on the SS Donau and sent straight to the gas chambers in Auschwitz five days later.

The aforementioned trip to the synagogue was another pedagogic tool employed to confront antisemitism. Obviously, it would be duplicitous to project

these recommendations as tools that banish antisemitism. Each case is different, with differing results. Teachers, however, are in the frontline of this challenge and have been entrusted with the all-important task of inculcating values amenable to nurturing citizens of an increasingly interconnected and pluralistic world.

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Julia Spichal

Overcoming Antisemitic Biases in Christian Religious Education

1 Introduction

This article presents the results of my dissertation, wherein I researched the question of how to overcome antisemitic biases in Christian Religious Education. The existence of antisemitic biases in everyday life of youth has been shown by the sociologist Barbara Schäuble. In her research on constructions of difference and common antisemitism, she interviewed teenagers and discovered that they reproduce anti-Jewish stereotypes, naively assuming these notions to be grounded in facts. When asked about the source of this "knowledge," they name history class, ethics class, and classes in religious education.[1]

One would like to assume that today's world of Christian education is free of antisemitic biases, because since the Shoah much has been done in Christian theology to combat this phenomenon. So the question remains how religious instruction that is informed by this theology could engender negative biases toward the Jewish people. If my assumption is correct, Schäuble's discovery actually points to an even larger issue: Subtle forms of antisemitism appear time and time again on the part of Christians who have experienced religious education. Here's an example of a student of theology who wrote an open letter to the makers of the movie *The Passion of Christ* by Mel Gibson saying that she considers it incredibly morbid to hear the chief rabbi of Vienna say that crucifixion was not a Jewish execution method and that the Romans were the ones who killed Jesus. She accuses Jews of secretly commissioning the murder, because Pilate never would have come up with the idea if it hadn't been for their completely irrational accusations, since religious matters were of no interest to the Romans, she states.[2]

It is quite possible that the student is not aware of how problematic her statement really is, because she assumes her accusation of murder rests solidly upon the historical facts she learned about in class. In any case, she would cer-

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1 B. Schäuble, *"Anders als wir": Differenzkonstruktionen und Alltagsantisemitismus unter Jugendlichen Anregungen für die politische Bildung* (Berlin: Metropol, 2012), 392.

2 H. P. Wassermann, "Zwischen Stagnation und Modernisierung: Antisemitismus in Österreich," in *Feindbild Judentum: Antisemitismus in Europa*, ed. L. Rensmann and J. H. Schoeps (Berlin: VBB Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg, 2008), 217–18.

tainly deny claims of antisemitism on her part because open animosity toward the Jewish people has been considered taboo in Austria and Germany since the Shoah. Yet prejudices toward Jews are still prevalent and continue to appear in public discussions disguised as "hard facts," as this example shows. Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb have dubbed this phenomenon the "functional latency" of antisemitism.[3]

The theology student may be claiming historicity or be referring to something she heard in religion class. We don't know exactly. In any case: The fact alone that such antisemitic prejudices are being circulated as so-called facts is a serious problem and is testament to the tenacity of antisemitism. Apparently Christian religious education is a contributing factor.

2 Empirical Findings

Examining religious instruction directly is a tricky matter, so I decided to analyze curricula and school books in order to find the root of the problem. Curricula determine what goes into school books and are intended as standards for religious education. They are therefore an ideal starting point for an analysis of biases purported in religious education. Nevertheless, it is not possible to judge the quality of instruction in class based solely on these findings.

A research project headed by Günter Biemer pioneered this field of study in 1977.[4] Later research projects were completed by 1995 after which there was a long twenty-year gap that preceded my dissertation. The scientists on Biemer's team developed a system of categories for qualitative content analysis to identify antisemitic prejudices in curricula and school books.[5] Three studies by Peter Fiedler,[6] Helga Kohler-Spiegel,[7] and Martin Rothgangel[8] used this system. They concluded that the curricula and school books for Catholic and Protestant religious education analyzed in Germany and Austria use antithetical patterns of

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3 W. Bergmann and R. Erb, "Kommunikationslatenz, Moral und öffentliche Meinung: Theoretische Überlegungen zum Antisemitismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 38, no. 2 (1986): 226.

4 P. Fiedler, *Das Judentum im katholischen Religionsunterricht: Analysen, Bewertungen, Perspektiven* (Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1980), 11.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 H. Kohler-Spiegel, *Juden und Christen—Geschwister im Glauben: Ein Beitrag zur Lehrplantheorie am Beispiel Verhältnis Christentum Judentum* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1991).

8 M. Rothgangel, *Antisemitismus als religionspädagogische Herausforderung: Eine Studie unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Röm 9 – 11* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1997).

valuation to highlight Christianity in contrast to Judaism. The following topics turned out to be particularly sensitive in this context:

– The responsibility for Jesus' death
– Jesus' relationship with the Pharisees
– the Hebrew Bible as the sacred text of modern-day Judaism
– the Jewish understanding of the Torah
– Jewish history between 70 C.E. and the Shoah and
– the State of Israel

Another finding was that none of the curricula and school books examined offered a positive vision of Jewish-Christian relations.

What has changed since 1995? This question was the common thread throughout my dissertation. More specifically I asked myself the following questions: How is the relationship between Judaism and Christianity portrayed in current curricula and school books in Germany and Austria in the context of these sensitive topics? And: In what way, if any, has the portrayal of Judaism changed compared to the previous analyses?

In order to ensure comparability between my study and those of my predecessors I applied the same methodology used in the previous studies to my dissertation in order to compare the findings. Furthermore, I examined new versions of the curricula and school books analyzed by my predecessors. In addition, I chose to take a look at some of the most popular school books in use for my study that haven't so far been analyzed.

In this article I will limit myself to a presentation of my results in the context of Jesus' relationship with the Pharisees.[9] The Pharisees are the most frequently mentioned Jewish group in curricula and school books. Their supposed rigor and faith in justification by works are presented as opposing Jesus' teaching. The school books I examined tend to present issues that are really conflicts between Jesus and the Pharisees as being between Christianity and Judaism in general. Furthermore this issue is intertwined with the responsibility for Jesus' death and the Jewish understanding of the Torah. That's why the relationship between Jesus and the Pharisees is the most important of these sensitive topics in my opinion.

The studies I mentioned earlier all came to the same conclusion: While the school books examined admit to the fact that Jesus was himself a Jew, they tend

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9 For more findings, see J. Spichal, *Vorurteile gegen Juden im christlichen Religionsunterricht: Eine qualitative Inhaltsanalyse ausgewählter Lehrpläne und Schulbücher in Deutschland und Österreich* (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2015).

to follow this admission with passages from the Bible that stress his opposition to Jewish practices. The framing and rhetorical set-up of these chapters makes it appear as though Jesus was opposed to Judaism as a whole. This problem still exists. Let me illustrate this by examining a school book currently in use:

The following passages are taken from the appendix of the school book *RELi +wir*,[10] which is in use in Germany and Austria. The first passage emphasizes the fact that Jesus was a Jew and that he plays an integral part in the story of the people of Israel:

> Jesus war Jude. Er gehört zu dem Volk, das sich als Nachkommenschaft der Kinder des Erzvaters Israel (Jakob) betrachtet. Er steht damit in der langen Geschichte einer Familie, eines Volkes und in der Geschichte dieser Familie und dieses Volkes mit Gott.[11]

Only twenty pages later, it says that Jesus broke the Sabbath rules of THE Jews in order to heal the sick:

> Jesus hat die Sabbatvorschriften der Juden manchmal bewusst gebrochen, z. B. um zu heilen. Er wollte zeigen: Der Sabbat ist für den Menschen da. Aber der Sabbat soll niemanden hindern, Gutes zu tun oder sich und anderen eine Freude zu bereiten.[12]

Jesus is presented as having been the one to correctly interpret the rules of the Sabbath. Thereby it is implied that Judaism and Christianity split during Jesus' lifetime.

The three studies also showed that school books construct a causal relation between Jesus' conflicts with the Pharisees and his execution. This hasn't changed either as this example illustrates: The authors of the German school book *Kursbuch Religion elementar* for grades seven and eight went so far as to compose an imaginary conversation between the Pharisees and the Zealots, in which both these groups express their indignation over Jesus' teaching about the Sabbath and the fact that many have started seeing him as the son of God. Finally a Pharisee by the name of Aaron says that Jesus must be dealt with violently, because more and more people are beginning to follow him, and this will harm his group of Pharisees:

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10 RELi is an abbreviation for "religion." In German it is common among students to call classes in religious education "Reli."
11 I. Kirchhoff and S. Dievenkorn, eds., *RELi + wir* (Österreich-Ausgabe, Göttingen, Wien: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht; Evangelischer Presseverband, 2010), 269.
12 Ibid., 289.

> Aaron: Die Römer stören mich eigentlich nicht so sehr. Wenn die da sind, herrscht wenigstens Ruhe und Ordnung. Aber dass Jesus sich als Jude nicht an unsere religiösen Vorschriften hält, ist eine Unverschämtheit. Ihr wisst doch noch, wie er das Sabbatgebot gebrochen hat. [...]
> Benjamin: Aber viele laufen ihm nach.
> Aaron: Das ist ja das Schlimme. So einer findet immer mehr Anhänger, und uns glaubt bald keener mehr was. Am besten wäre, wenn er verschwinden würde.[13]

The school book for grades five and six from the series *Religion entdecken, verstehen, gestalten* presents us with a passage about the Pharisees during the time of Jesus, mentioning the fact that conflicts between them and Jesus were common and contributed to the development of the Jewish theology. It also says that Jesus himself may well have been a Pharisee according to some researchers. This is one of the rare examples of a nuanced discussion of Jesus' relationship with the Pharisees:

> Pharisäer sind oft Lehrer in Synagogen, denn die religiöse Bildung des Volkes liegt ihnen sehr am Herzen. Auch Jesus hat ihnen nahe gestanden. Manche Wissenschaftler meinen sogar, dass er selbst ein Pharisäer gewesen sei. Heftige Streitgespräche und Diskussionen waren unter Pharisäern üblich, sie waren eine gute Schulung bei der Suche nach Lösungen.[14]

During my analysis I was confronted with a serious problem: The system of categories couldn't be applied to a particular book, because it is meant for primary education as this example shows: The authors of the series *Wegzeichen Religion* seem to have been aware of the risk involved in putting blame on the Pharisees. In their first volume while treating the topic of Jesus' affection toward sinners, they refer to Jesus' adversaries simply as "people" to avoid negative clichés:

> Die Leute sagen: "Mit Zöllnern setzt man sich nicht an einen Tisch. Sie nehmen mehr Geld, als recht ist."[15]

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13 W. Eilerts and H.-G. Kübler, eds., *Kursbuch Religion Elementar: Ein Arbeitsbuch für den Religionsunterricht im 7. / 8. Schuljahr* (Stuttgart, Braunschweig: Calwer Verlag; Diesterweg, 2004), 137.

14 S. Baden-Schirmer, G.-R. Koretzki, and R. Tammeus, eds., *Religion entdecken, verstehen, gestalten: Ein Unterrichtswerk für den evangelischen Religionsunterricht* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 79.

15 G. Miederer, *Wegzeichen Religion 1: Ein Unterrichtswerk für den evangelischen Religionsunterricht in der Jahrgangsstufe 1* (Frankfurt a. M.: Diesterweg, 2001), 24.

According to the system of categories we must nonetheless rate this passage as tendentious.[16] A reformulation of the system of categories was necessary, since this assessment conflicts with the intentions of its creators. This was one of the methodical steps I carried out in my dissertation from a subject didactics perspective. Therefore I drew on new findings in the fields of Jewish and biblical studies and integrated these findings with the experiences and approaches of pupils.

3 Recommendations

The following passage presents my recommendations to overcome antisemitic biases in Christian religious education at primary schools:

Whenever we make any attempt to portray Jesus' relationship to the Pharisees, it is imperative to establish unequivocally that Jesus was a Jew and that therefore it doesn't make any sense to insinuate antagonism between him and "the Jews." This is especially important when treating Jesus' teaching about the Sabbath and his care of sinners. It is also vital to keep in mind that we cannot address polemics aimed at Pharisees from the New Testament until students reach the age of at least ten, because this task requires the ability to reflect on a meta level.

In primary education this topic should therefore be treated in the following way:

1. The Pharisees and Jesus often disagreed, yet according to the Gospel of Luke Jesus was a regular guest in the houses of Pharisees, which implies that they were basically on good terms.
2. The Pharisees and Jesus were in agreement about two of the most crucial elements of the Hebrew faith: The main teachings of the Torah and the hope of resurrection.

In order to avoid insinuating a causal connection between this conflict and Jesus' crucifixion, authors of school books should avoid relating these events in sequence. Pontius Pilate should instead be portrayed as being responsible for Jesus' crucifixion. These recommendations foster a nuanced portrayal of Jesus' relationship with the Pharisees in the context of primary school education.

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16 Fiedler, *Das Judentum im katholischen Religionsunterricht*, 65–66.

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Lars Fischer
The Study of Antisemitism in the Modern Jewish and Judaic Studies Context

Contrary to my usual practice of honing in on a particularly illustrative close reading of relevant material, this chapter will consist of seventeen fairly apodictic bullet points of varying length, which take a programmatic rather than descriptive approach to the topic in question. That said, the explicit and implicit criticisms I make are obviously predicated on an analysis of the erroneous ways in which antisemitism is all too often treated. My arguments draw on and utilize the approach to antisemitism developed by and in the tradition of the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School.[1]

(1) Antisemitism is a product of, not a fundamental aberration from, the values prevalent in Western and Muslim societies. Both Western culture, whether in its pagan or Christian inspiration, and Muslim culture have developed their self-understanding in no small measure by contrasting themselves to what they conceived of (or rather: constructed in their imagination) as being negative Jewish traits.[2] In the West, both the Enlightenment's proponents and its opponents have contributed to the perpetuation of this tradition. In both cultures, the transformations required to put an end to antisemitism are so fundamental that they far outstrip what any of us could possibly imagine. If, hypothetically speaking, it were possible to erase all the products of Western and Muslim culture tainted by antisemitism at one stroke, both cultures would effectively have to start from scratch. I am skeptical, then, as far as the goal of putting an end to antisemitism any time soon is concerned. This does not, however, change the fact that it needs

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1 For a basic introduction to the Frankfurt School's grappling with antisemitism, see L. Fischer, "Antisemitism and the Critique of Capitalism," in *SAGE Handbook of Frankfurt School Critical Theory*, ed. B. Best, W. Bonefeld, and C. O'Kane (London: Sage, 2018), 2:916–31. For further reading, see E.-M. Ziege, *Antisemitismus und Gesellschaftstheorie: Die Frankfurter Schule im amerikanischen Exil* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2009); J. Jacobs, *The Frankfurt School, Jewish Lives, and Antisemitism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); R. Fine and P. Spencer, *Antisemitism and the Left: On the Return of the Jewish Question* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 44–71; M. Jay, "The Jews and the Frankfurt School: Critical Theory's Analysis of Anti-Semitism," *New German Critique* 19 (1980): 137–49; A. Rabinbach, *In the Shadow of Catastrophe: German Intellectuals between Apocalypse and Enlightenment* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 166–98.
2 For an overview, see, for example, D. Nirenberg, *Anti-Judaism: The History of a Way of Thinking* (London: Head of Zeus, 2013).

to be combatted and contained wherever it rears its head. Moreover, it would certainly help if we all at least stopped promoting it, however inadvertently or unintentionally. To this end, I have formulated (as requested in the initial invitation to speak at the conference in Vienna) a set of specific recommendations, which is based directly on my discussion.

(2) There is a reason why some of us dedicate our entire working lives, or at least a sizeable proportion of them, to the study of antisemitism—and I can assure you, it is not because the study of antisemitism lightens the mood. Antisemitism is a serious issue; it is a strong, complex, and resilient force whose causes and momentum are deeply rooted in Western and Muslim culture and the functioning both of modern society and of those social, political and/or religious projects, which programmatically reject modernity but, in fact, of course remain part of it. It is, in short, a highly complex issue that requires careful and sustained study or, to put it differently: the academic study of antisemitism is a discipline in its own right, and its practitioners are scholars with a specialization that requires a fairly high measure of intellectual sophistication and is not easily emulated in passing.

(3) The fact that you are a Jewish or Judaic Studies scholar, in and of itself, makes you no more qualified to speak in academic (as opposed to political or moral) terms about antisemitism than any of your colleagues, say, from the Physics or the Music department. To be sure, antisemitism has repeatedly affected Jews, in some cases in a dramatic fashion, and you should probably be in a position to offer an accurate account of that impact. Depending on your area of specialization, you may also need to be able to say something meaningful about the ways in which Jews have responded to antisemitism. There is, however, no reason why you should need to be a scholar of antisemitism in order to be a consummate Jewish or Judaic Studies scholar.

By way of an analogy: you do not need to be an engineer or a geologist to offer a sound account of the impact of an earthquake on the residents of a particular area struck by an earthquake and/or of the subsequent relief efforts. You do, however, need to be a geologist to offer a sound account of why earthquakes occur and how they might be more accurately anticipated—and an engineer to figure out how buildings might be rendered more secure and resilient in case an earthquake strikes.

There are only so many specializations any one scholar can acquire, and there is absolutely no shame in being a Jewish or Judaic Studies scholar who does not count the study of antisemitism among his or her specializations. Let us not forget that antisemitism is above all else a non-Jewish problem, even though non-Jews frequently succeed in turning it into a problem for Jews as well. However, if you are a Jewish or Judaic Studies scholar (or, of course, a

scholar from any other discipline) who, for whatever reason, cannot claim a specialization in the study of antisemitism, then have the courage to say so—and own it.

It is one of our biggest problems that everybody thinks they ought to have something to say about antisemitism. That may be right in political and moral terms. In terms of the actual scholarly treatment of antisemitism *and* its productive application to the non-academic world, however, it is a disaster. To share a personal experience: I have attended a fair number of job interviews in the last two decades and most of them were effectively over before they had begun because every single person on the interview panel felt the need to inform me of their own profound take on antisemitism at the outset, thus rendering further serious scholarly discussion virtually impossible before I had even been asked a single meaningful question. I very much doubt that historians of the medieval book or early modern liturgy face similar problems.

Everyone may be entitled to their opinion, as the saying goes. But unless you are equally convinced that your own specialization renders your findings no more meaningful or insightful than those of any lay person interested in your topic, please pay the same respect to scholars of antisemitism as you would expect for your own specialization. By presenting yourself as a scholar of antisemitism when in fact you are not one, you will invariably cause more confusion and do more harm than you possibly could by recusing yourself.

Just to clarify: I am by no means trying to argue the case here for some haughty form of academic gatekeeping. In fact, some of the most important scholars currently engaged in the serious critical study of antisemitism have had a hell of a time finding or keeping academic positions and some of them have been unable to secure or maintain a foothold in academia altogether. What I *am* saying is that antisemitism is far too serious an issue for it not to be taken seriously as one that requires specialized in-depth study.

(4) It should be clear from my initial remarks that antisemitism is not a whimsical orientation that can be switched on or off as ever one fancies. It fulfills, both for individuals and for social groups, important functions that help them make sense of the world and their position within it. For some, to quote Adorno, "charging the Jews with all existing evils seems to penetrate the darkness of reality like a searchlight and to allow for quick and all-comprising orientation."[3] We therefore need to address the question Adorno formulated as fol-

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3 Th. W. Adorno, "Prejudice in the Interview Material," in *The Authoritarian Personality*, ed. Th. W. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswik, D. J. Levinson, and R. N. Sanford (New York: Harper & Row, 1950), 619.

lows: "What good [...] accrue[s] to the actual adjustment of otherwise 'sensible' persons when they subscribe to ideas which have no basis in reality and which we ordinarily associate with maladjustment?"[4]

(5) Just as there will always be people who still think Father Christmas exists or who do not yet know how babies are made, there will always be people who do not yet know what the problem with antisemitism is. Where this is genuinely the case, conventional educational work may be effective. This is, however, the exception. Studied or feigned ignorance has long been one of the most popular devices deployed by antisemites who, for whatever reason, shy away from professing their antisemitism, at least for the time being. By taking that studied or feigned ignorance seriously and responding to it in a reasonable or didactical manner we already concede ground to the antisemites and veer into the territory of apologetics. It is true that historically Jews too accepted the notion that there was such a thing as a "Jewish Question." This does not, however, make it a valid concept. Any approach that incorporates the concept of a "Jewish Question" or "Jewish Problem" other than in order to critique it, regardless of its proponents' intentions, is highly likely to facilitate continued antisemitic stereotyping. Let me quote Adorno again:

> The term "problem" is taken over from the sphere of science and is used to give the impression of searching, responsible deliberation. By referring to a problem, one implicitly claims personal aloofness from the matter in question—a kind of detachment and higher objectivity. [...] As soon as the existence of a "Jewish problem" is admitted, anti-Semitism has won its first surreptitious victory. [...] While the veneer of objectivity is maintained, the implication is that the Jews are the problem [...] It is but one step from this position to the implicit notion that this problem has to be dealt with according to its own special requirements, i.e., the problematic nature of the Jews, and that this will naturally lead outside the bounds of democratic procedure. Moreover, the "problem" calls for a *solution*. As soon as the Jews themselves are stamped as this problem, they are transformed into objects [...] To call for a "solution of the Jewish problem" results in their being reduced to "material" for manipulation.[5]

> Unprejudiced subjects try to restore the objective, "sociological" meaning of the term, generally insisting on the fact that the so-called "Jewish problem" is actually the problem of the non-Jews. However, the very use of the term may be partially indicative, even with unprejudiced persons, of a certain ambivalence or at least indifference.[6]

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4 Ibid., 618.
5 Ibid., 620.
6 Ibid.

> The man who speaks about the "problem" is easily tempted to say that there are two sides to every problem, with the comfortable consequence that the Jews must have done something wrong, if they were exterminated.[7]

(6) Antisemitism is not primarily a matter of personal attitudes towards Jews but fundamentally a social (and socially mediated) phenomenon. Hence, it is rarely adopted and assimilated individually, nor is it merely or even principally a question of the subjective intentions of those who articulate or propagate it. To varying degrees, depending on one's political, social and cultural immediate, mediate and global background, context and orientation, it is likely to have become part and parcel of the package of basic assumptions about the world, which we generally tend to take for granted without actively reflecting upon them and often without even being aware of them. (Nobody would have to think twice about this if my topic were racism rather than antisemitism.)

This also means that Jews are perfectly capable of being antisemites, and we need to stop pussyfooting around this fact and trying to make excuses for Jews who subscribe to antisemitic positions and engage in antisemitic activism. Nor do we need to resort to some fanciful construction of Jewish self-hatred to explain this. Identification with the oppressor is a common phenomenon prevalent in all walks of life. In fact, it is arguably the single most important cohesive force that ultimately holds our societies together. Jews' Jewishness is a hindrance to engaging in antisemitic activities only insofar as the non-Jews may not like it and intervene to stop them. Other than that, there is no reason why Jews should not be able to subscribe to, propagate, and engage in antisemitism just like non-Jews.

(7) Where the mechanisms that generate antisemitism have become entrenched, neither educational or didactical approaches nor intergroup contact can effect change. Again I quote Adorno:

> It is often advocated as the best means of improving intercultural relations that as many personal contacts as possible be established between the different groups. While the

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[7] Ibid., 621. As Holly Case points out in the preface to her recent book on *The Age of Questions*, the "drive to *settle* or *solve* questions reveals something essential about them: they were construed as problems. The 'question' had become an instrument of thought with special potency, structuring ideas about society, politics, and states, and influencing the range of actions considered possible and desirable. This potency is evident in another familiar formulation, one which nineteenth-century commentators arrived at quite early: the 'definitive' or 'final solution.'" H. Case, *The Age of Questions: Or, A First Attempt at an Aggregate History of the Eastern, Social, Woman, American, Jewish, Polish, Bullion, Tuberculosis, and Many Other Questions over the Nineteenth Century, and Beyond* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), xiv–v.

value of such contacts in some cases of anti-Semitism is to be acknowledged, the material presented in this section argues for certain qualifications [...] There is no simple gap between experience and stereotypy. Stereotypy is a device for looking at things comfortably; since, however, it feeds on deep-lying unconscious sources, the distortions which occur are not to be corrected merely by taking a *real* look. Rather, experience itself is predetermined by stereotypy. The persons whose interviews on minority issues have just been discussed share one decisive trait. Even if brought together with minority group members as different from the stereotype as possible, they will perceive them through the glasses of stereotypy, and will hold against them whatever they are and do. Since this tendency is by no means confined to people who are actually "cranky" (rather, the whole complex of the Jew is a kind of recognized red-light district of legitimized psychotic distortions), this inaccessibility to experience may not be limited to people of the kind discussed here, but may well operate in much milder cases. [...] Optimism with regard to the hygienic effects of personal contacts should be discarded. One cannot "correct" stereotypy by experience; he has to reconstitute the capacity for having experiences in order to prevent the growth of ideas which are malignant in the most literal, clinical sense.[8]

And yet, to this day, virtually all publicly sponsored practical initiatives to counter antisemitism hinge on the assumption that personal familiarity and intergroup contact can achieve precisely what Adorno deemed impossible and, leaving Adorno to one side for a moment, also cannot be explained logically: what might actually get people to perceive of something that contradicts their worldview not as the exception that confirms the rule but as a reason to draw not the experience but that worldview into question? To be sure, individuals may subjectively experience a change of heart as though it had been precipitated directly by a new and unexpected experience but unless they already went into that experience with a willingness (potentially) to change their mind, the experience simply cannot have that effect on them. The unexpected experience, then, may be the point at which individuals first become aware of their change of heart or the point at which it first shows an effect, but it certainly cannot cause it. As yet, we have no developed concepts as to how this insight might be used to develop practical initiatives suited to counter antisemitism; this results from the fact that the sort of concerted effort and thorough research and reflection required to develop such concepts does not readily attract funding, given the preoccupation of potential funders with easy answers and instant demonstrable impact.

(8) What inferences one can reasonably draw from so-called "philosemitism" is a closely related issue. I think it is fair to say that virtually all scholars in the field would now agree that non-Jews have frequently been conflicted, to varying degrees, and rarely entirely negative in their attitudes towards Jews.

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8 Adorno, "Prejudice in the Interview Material," 617.

Nor can there be any doubt that the negative attitudes have generally received rather more attention than their positive competitors. A number of scholars have proceeded in recent years to round off the bigger picture by giving these positive sentiments their due.[9] Studies in this vein undoubtedly contribute to a fuller and richer account of Jewish/non-Jewish relations.[10] There is, however, a tendency to play these positive attitudes off against the negative ones, implying that the former invariably blossomed to eradicate the latter. Yet positive encounters with Jews (real or imagined) have had (and in some cases still have) an enormous potential to generate subsequent regret, embarrassment, feelings of guilt and the desire to compensate for one's temporary lapse in judgement, sometimes more or less instantly, in other cases over time. What the study of "philosemitism" illustrates above all is how little even quite significant positive attitudes and encounters were ultimately able to achieve against their negative counterparts and the deeply rooted social and cultural predisposition towards antisemitism.

   (9) As difficult as this may be for scholars and dedicated university teachers to stomach, where the aforementioned "reconstitution of the capacity to have experiences" (Adorno) cannot be achieved, outright repression can become the only possible alternative. For rather obvious reasons, continental Europeans tend to have a fairly hard time comprehending the radical Anglophone approach to freedom of speech on this score. From the German or Austrian perspective, it is rather difficult to be as confident as one can perhaps be from the perspective of the US or the UK that giving antisemites a free rein will not endanger the stability of the democratic order and Jewish life in the diaspora. Would we much rather live in a society in which antisemitic ideas and activities genuinely no longer attract support? Absolutely. Barring that, it is, alas, still better to live in a society in which the existing antisemitism is, if need be, curtailed by means of repression than in a society in which it is allowed to go on the rampage unchecked. As Samuel Salzborn has noted, to the extent that antisemites actually do display authoritarian character structures, repression is in any case their preferred language and may arguably act not only as a deterrent but even effect a change in attitudes.[11]

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9 The obvious first port of call for those interested in redressing this balance is J. Karp and A. Sutcliffe, eds., *Philosemitism in History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2011).

10 See, for example, the late Jonathan Hess's outstanding study, *Deborah and Her Sisters: How One Nineteenth-Century Melodrama and a Host of Celebrated Actresses Put Judaism on the World Stage* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017).

11 S. Salzborn, "Repression oder Bildung? Zu den strukturellen Kontextbedingungen der Entstehung und Bekämpfung von Antisemitismus," in *Gebildeter Antisemitismus: Eine Herausfor-*

(10) Our discussions in university classrooms are never primarily about *what* we think but above all about *how* we think, that is, how we arrive at particular inferences and conclusions. Unless his or her utterances give rise to serious concerns regarding the security of his or her peers or society at large, no student should feel that what he or she says in the context of a university course will have disciplinary or legal consequences for him or her. This does not mean, however, that we should not alert students, where applicable, to the fact that outside of university classrooms their views might well become subject to repression—and explain why this repression, though far from creating an ideal state of affairs, is, for pragmatic reasons, legitimate and necessary.

(11) Antisemitism is not, as the poststructuralists and postmodernists would have us believe, one of many expressions of a universal and arbitrary desire to engage in the othering of difference per se, regardless of specific individualization processes.[12] Nor, for all that they share certain generic features, is antisemitism a form of racism. In their study on antisemitism among American workers, the Frankfurt School identified "a difference in the texture of prejudice" setting antisemitism and racism apart.[13] All other things being even, this needs to be stressed because the claim that antisemitism is a form of racism all too often serves simply as an excuse not to deal seriously with antisemitism in its own right and to grant oneself a clean bill of health on the grounds that, as an upright anti-racist, one could not possibly be susceptible to antisemitic ideas.

(12) As the earlier remarks on stereotypy indicate, antisemitism does not reflect actual Jewish/non-Jewish interaction nor does it even require the presence of actual Jews. The critical analysis of antisemitism therefore depends fundamentally on the ability to distinguish reflective from pathic projection.[14]

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derung für Politik und Zivilgesellschaft, ed. M. Schwarz-Friesel (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2015), 288. As Jan Weyand has pointed out, the role antisemitism comes to play in the attempts of modern society to grapple with its own contradictions depends "not on truth but on power": "The best one can do is to delegitimize it [antisemitism], i.e., ostracize it socially and criminalize it." J. Weyand, *Historische Wissenssoziologie des modernen Antisemitismus: Genese und Typologie einer Wissensformation am Beispiel des deutschsprachigen Diskurses* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2016), 338–39.

12 G. Scheit, *Quälbarer Leib: Kritik der Gesellschaft nach Adorno* (Freiburg: Ça Ira, 2011), 28.
13 See L. Fischer, *"A Difference in the Texture of Prejudice": Historisch-konzeptionelle Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von Antisemitismus, Rassismus und Gemeinschaft* (Graz: Leykam, 2016).
14 See M. Horkheimer and Th. W. Adorno, "Elemente des Antisemitismus," in *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, ed. M. Horkheimer and Th. W. Adorno (Amsterdam: Querido, 1947); M. Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. A. Schmidt and G. Schmid Noerr (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1987), 5:217–30; "Elements of Antisemitism," in *Dialectics of Enlightenment*, trans. E. Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 154–65.

There has also existed, and continues to exist, an alternative school of thought. Its proponents contend that antisemitism results not from what Horkeimer and Adorno termed pathic projection but that a kernel of truth inheres in the antisemites' perceptions of the Jews. To be sure, the antisemites blow things out of proportion, and they are prone to exaggerated and distorting generalizations, but their negative attitudes towards Jews are ultimately based on genuine Jewish characteristics and behaviour observed by the antisemites and/or genuine conflicts of interest between Jews and non-Jews. This approach is also known as the correspondence (or "realist") theory of antisemitism, that is, it assumes a genuine *causal* correspondence between the antisemitic image of the Jew and actual Jews. Not least, this results from an inability or unwillingness to distinguish between the historical reasons that help explain why Jews seemed suited to serve as a foil for antisemitic projections in the first place, on the one hand, and the antisemitic notions subsequently projected onto that foil, on the other.

On a more fundamental level, however, the notion of a direct reflection of reality in human perception is in any case nonsensical, not only when it comes to antisemitism. I take it for granted that we always need to apply conceptual skills to make sense of what lies before us but that these conceptual skills cannot simply be derived from what lies before us. Otherwise we would have to assume that someone who meets only unpleasant Jews would be entirely justified in becoming an antisemite. Moreover, anyone who meets both pleasant and unpleasant Jews would have to develop multiple personality disorder, and people who never meet a Jew would be incapable of subscribing to antisemitic ideas—which is patently untrue.

As Shulamit Volkov noted in her discipline-shaping article on antisemitism as a cultural code, published in 1978, what I call the kernel-of-truth approach to antisemitism is incapable of explaining how the qualitative leap from partial realistic observation to patently untrue generalization supposedly transpires. "Only if one assumes that the antisemites' claims were truthful [...] only then is one exempt from the effort to show how men, who were perhaps not sufficiently alert to the dangers of indoctrination but who were not necessarily psychopaths or morally inept, succumbed to the patently false world-view of antisemitism. Even the assertion of the partial accuracy of this view, questionable and unproven, does not provide a sufficient explanation." Volkov then added: "No serious historian of antisemitism has argued in this vein."[15] In this assessment, Volkov was clearly rather too optimistic.

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15 S. Volkov, "Antisemitism as a Cultural Code: Reflections on the History and Historiography of Antisemitism in Imperial Germany," *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook* 23 (1978): 36.

At a time when the primacy of Jewish agency in the writing of Jewish history still seemed contested and many scholars of Jewish history were firmly committed to asserting this primacy, the kernel-of-truth approach seemed, to some, to offer a way out of the dispiriting impasse created by the fact that antisemitism in general, and the Shoah in particular, had massively impacted the Jews *regardless* of what Jews had actually done or not done. For some scholars, then, acceptance of the kernel-of-truth approach was born of the understandable but misguided desire to assert Jewish agency even where for all intents and purposes there had been none. For some, this approach doubtless also resonated with the notion that European Jews who had failed to heed the call of Zionism ultimately had only themselves to blame for their fate at the hands of the Nazis.

This is all the more ironic, given that today the kernel-of-truth approach is particularly popular with *anti*-Zionist scholars. Steven Beller's *Very Short Introduction to Antisemitism*, published by Oxford University Press, stands paradigmatically for this trend. He not only dismisses but positively mocks the notion that antisemitism constitutes a form of pathic projection. This is only possible because he offers a potted history of various conceptualizations of antisemitism that jumps straight from early positivistic ineptitude to postmodern whateverism and simply leaves out the Frankfurt School and Critical Theory altogether. This is the equivalent of writing a history of Western art music that covers only Hildegard of Bingen and Dame Judith Weir but leaves out Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, and Schoenberg.[16]

(13) Scholars and academic institutions engaged in research on antisemitism need to be more responsible in their dealings with the public. To be sure, I would like to see them all agree with me in everything they put out, but that is not what I am driving at here. Rather, we should develop a framework allowing both fellow scholars and institutions and, once sufficiently educated, the interested public, to identify at a glance what conceptual assumptions underlie any given public statement on antisemitism. To take a concrete example, the Pears Institute affiliated with Birkbeck, University of London, published a report in 2018 claiming that the considerable influx of migrants from the Middle East in recent years has led neither to an increase in antisemitism in Europe nor in any way changed its character. If I find this a counter-intuitive suggestion the question arises: am I

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16 For a detailed discussion of Beller's little book, see L. Fischer, "Unpublishable Review Article: Conceptualizing Antisemitism," https://www.academia.edu/36999474/Unpublishable_Review_Article_Conceptualizing_ Antisemitism, accessed August 2, 2019. We have to assume that Beller's *Antisemitism: A Very Short Introduction* is now the most-purchased and most-read single work on antisemitism worldwide, which should be deeply troubling to anyone committed to combatting rather than whitewashing antisemitism.

surprised by the actual research findings or do I simply disagree with the authors' definition of what does and does not constitute antisemitism? Put bluntly: if they applied my definition of antisemitism, would their claims still stand? To answer this question, I have to go beyond the headline-grabbing stuff and peruse the fine print. It seems to me that this is not a helpful state of affairs.

Rather than simply telling the public that nothing has changed or, for that matter, that something has changed, the responsible approach would surely be to tell the public that these respective statements are true provided one accepts a handful of fundamental presuppositions. It should be more than evident that I think the Pears Institute, to return to the example, is fundamentally wrong in categorically excluding animosity towards Israel from their definition of antisemitism. Then again, it is obviously the institute's prerogative to do so. My point is that the public should surely know (without having to go to the fine print first) that the institute's claims about antisemitism are based on this assumption—and I would insist that it is the institute's responsibility to ensure that it does. To be sure, we will have an uphill struggle sensitizing the interested public to these fundamental conceptual issues but as long as scholars and academic institutions themselves do not stress them in a transparent manner their interaction with the public may well serve propagandistic ends (and impress donors or research councils), but it will contribute precious little to informed debate and the struggle against antisemitism, quite the opposite.

I know this will initially sound like a strange suggestion, but I imagine we could develop a sort of taxonomy that straddles the existing conceptual controversies and would make it possible to label all publications on antisemitism in a way not dissimilar to food labels telling the customer how much of their daily recommended intake of various nutritional elements any given product contains. Ideally, every time a scholar or academic institution makes a statement regarding the causes, development, and dynamics of antisemitism, I would like to be able to see instantly in a schematized form the conceptual underpinnings on which that statement rests. Do(es) the author(s) assume that antisemitism is a form of pathic projection or that a kernel of truth inheres in the antisemites' perceptions? Do(es) the author(s) assume that animosity towards Israel is always, mostly, sometimes, rarely or never antisemitic? Do(es) the author(s) assume that antisemitism only really becomes a problem when it translates into antisemitic activism or that antisemitic sentiments and attitudes need to be combatted in earnest, no matter what? Do(es) the author(s) assume that is it antisemitic to liken Israeli actions or policies to those of the Nazis? How many antisemitic statements did those questioned have to affirm before being considered antisemitic? There would be no need for straightforward yes/no options and gradations (never, rarely, mostly, always) would allow for a reasonable measure of nuance.

It should not be too difficult to devise a taxonomy of this kind nor should this be in any way a controversial process, given that it would merely turn what currently tends to be in the fine print into an instantly recognizable shorthand. Nor does it require anyone to subscribe to any one given definition of antisemitism, it would merely make transparent to which definition any given author or group of authors does subscribe. At the very least, this exercise would save scholars in the field the enormous amount of time and effort currently expended on talking past each other.

(14) "Criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic." You will find this statement both in the so-called *Working* and now *International Definition of Antisemitism* and its adaptation by the US State Department. And yet the self-styled critics of Israel and anti-Zionists persistently claim that these definitions stifle legitimate criticism of Israel. What their claim clearly indicates is that these critics of Israel think that legitimate criticism of Israel does in fact need to go beyond "that leveled against any other country." Theirs is therefore quite obviously an inherently antisemitic claim. This is all the more evident from the fact that its proponents have long since moved on from claiming that they are prevented from criticizing specific Israeli policies or governments to insisting on the right to criticize the State of Israel, the Jewish state or Israel as a Jewish state. I have already pointed to Steven Beller's *Antisemitism: A Very Short Introduction*, which is a particularly shocking example of the extent to which this approach has infiltrated the academic mainstream. The same obviously holds true of the BDS campaign.

(15) It turns out that people who have been to death camps and their descendants are not invariably better people than those who were spared this experience and their descendants. It would be grotesque and perverse to expect otherwise. All other things being even, Israel has the right to exist as a Jewish state because Jews have the same right as anyone else to enjoy the protection of a country in which they can be as brilliant and pathetic, as courageous and cowardly, as gentle and aggressive, as single-minded and distracted, as ethically high-minded and corrupt, as reasonable and reckless, as socially-minded and egotistically neo-liberal, as pacifist and warmongering, as inclusive and exclusive as non-Jews are the world over without anyone questioning the existence of their countries as a result. A world in which non-Jews do not measure their own characteristics and activities by the same standards they apply to Jews is an inherently antisemitic world.

(16) I would be surprised if we are more than two years away from the point at which numerous established liberal and left-wing scholars, including a sizeable minority if not the majority of Jewish and Judaic Studies scholars, along with major mainstream political parties in the West, begin to call openly for

the destruction—or, as they prefer to call it, the "dismantling"—of Israel. The endlessly futile, phony debates over whether Iran and organizations like Hezbollah, Hamas, and Fatah really want Israel to disappear from the map or not will finally be over and what we have long known to be the truth about their sinister aspirations will be widely embraced as a good thing. The Left in the West has a long and well-established tradition of finding everything it considers oddly tolerable about nationalisms elsewhere (not to mention their own) utterly intolerable in Zionism, and of wanting Jews to earn rights they themselves take for granted by jumping through hoops they would never dream (nor most likely be capable) of jumping through. In some ways, it will be good to have all this out in the open. At least we will no longer have to spend so much of our time playing cat and mouse with our enemies.

(17) There is no case to be made for the destruction (or even a boycott) of Israel that does not hinge crucially on the application of double standards to the Jewish state. Any such demand is therefore inherently antisemitic. Some of Israel's critics will presumably continue to argue that there have always been Jews opposed to Zionism and the State of Israel and that, consequently, this opposition cannot be inherently antisemitic. Yet, as I have already pointed out, Jews are in any case perfectly capable of being antisemitic. More importantly, while one did not need to be an antisemite to voice opposition to the possible future establishment of a Jewish state in the first half of the twentieth century, opposing the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish state today is obviously something altogether different. Our biggest problem, however, is going to be this: most of Israel's detractors are not going to care one iota what scholars of antisemitism think of them. As yet, I have no idea what to do about this. One thing I do know, however: we had better think of something soon!

How not to Facilitate or Promote Antisemitism: Practical Recommendations

1. Never ever hyphenate antisemitism, doing so suggests that there actually is such a thing as "semitism," which might be (legitimately) opposed.
2. If you cannot in good conscience call yourself a scholar of antisemitism, recuse yourself and own it.
3. Do not portray antisemitism as an ultimately incomprehensible phenomenon totally alien to Western or Muslim values. Antisemitism is not from Mars. It springs from the fact that our societies are organized in a way that renders antisemitism a way of making sense of life and seemingly taking control of it that can be more effective and comforting than many others.

4. Do not accept the suggestion that this releases individuals and/or groups from responsibility for choosing this particular coping mechanism.
5. Never ever concede that a "Jewish Question" or a "Jewish Problem" exists.
6. Never engage in apologetics.
7. Never, ever resort to or legitimize the kernel-of-truth approach to antisemitism.
8. Always distinguish clearly between the reasons that help explain why the Jews were singled out in the first place and the content of antisemitic projections.
9. Do not make excuses for the antisemitic utterances and activities of Jews. Their utterances and activities are no less antisemitic for their being Jews.
10. Do not be unduly squeamish about the role of repression in the struggle against antisemitism. Concede both the ultimately limited range of repression and its necessity and legitimacy.
11. Never ever succumb to or tolerate the assumption that Jews/Israelis should be better people because of the experience of the death camps.
12. Do not allow the specificity of antisemitism to be concealed by subsuming it under the category of racism.
13. Never ever tolerate the application of double standards to Israel.
14. In the later modern context, only refer to Jews and Christians, rather than Jews and non-Jews, if you are confident that the non-Jews in question would have identified themselves as Christians and their relevant attitudes and actions were motivated by their Christianity. If you are referring to the fact that Western culture is deeply shaped by Christianity, even though many are no longer aware of those Christian roots, make it clear that this is what you mean when you use the term "Christian/s." Otherwise you risk turning antisemitism into a religious issue, which may be part of the problem but really is only part of the problem.
15. If, as a scholar of antisemitism, you engage the public, always be absolutely transparent about your criteria and proactively make them part of your communication strategy.

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Yossi Kugler and Dafna Dolinko

"Antisemitism From Its Origins to the Present": An Online Video Course by Yad Vashem

In March 2018, Yad Vashem—The World Holocaust Remembrance Center—launched a free online video course dedicated to the topic of antisemitism. The course aims to explore and analyze the nature of this phenomenon, its development, and evolution from its origins until the present day.

Creating an Online Video Course on Antisemitism

The need to create a free online course that would be open to the wider public and that would provide a concentrated overview of this subject was one that became increasingly apparent to us at Yad Vashem over the past decade. Yet we also were aware that presenting over two millennia of complex history and delving into different cultures and societies would be challenging and beyond our scope of expertise. We therefore turned to fifty experts, filming them in Israel, Europe, and the United States. They include historians, sociologists, linguists, philosophers, and political scientists among others. These video interviews form the base for the total of approximately ten hours of short video lectures that comprise the course.

Taking this material and molding into a course was a challenge within itself. How could we best introduce such a plethora of subjects, providing learners with necessary historical contexts and a clear narrative? We ended up structuring the materials chronologically, having a presenter connect the different video lectures and providing the relevant background information.

The Structure of the Course

Titled "Antisemitism: From Its Origins to the Present," the course is divided into six lessons: the first three explore the origins of the phenomenon and its development until the Holocaust, while the last three examine contemporary antisemitism.

In the first lesson "What is Antisemitism? Definitions and Origins," learners are first introduced to the general topic of hatred through a lecture by social scientist Ruth Wodak. The lesson then moves on to question whether there is a uniqueness to antisemitism and presents a discussion of the term itself. We then turn to explore the historical origins of the phenomenon, beginning with the ancient and early Christian worlds. This is done by historians Paula Fredriksen, John G. Gager, and Jeremy Cohen.[1] Cohen then explores Augustine's "Doctrine of Jewish Witness," which provided a sort of safety net for Jews in the early medieval period and the reasons that brought about the escalation of anti-Jewish attitudes and actions during the late Middle Ages.[2] Historian David Nirenberg also presents his analysis of anti-Judaism and its place in the Western tradition.[3]

The second lesson, "The Changing Face of Antisemitism," moves on to the modern era, examining how attitudes toward Jews were affected by the major religious, social, and political movements that were shaping Europe and the world at the time. Historian Judith Kalik begins the lesson with the early modern period, comparing anti-Jewish actions and sentiments in Western and Eastern Europe. Focusing on France, Pierre Birnbaum discusses the conflicting attitudes toward Jews that arose following the Enlightenment, which allowed for a more tolerant perception of them, on the one hand, but also for the rise of a certain hostility against them, on the other. Moving on to the late modern period, the lesson turns to explore the development of modern antisemitism, showing the ways in which it was impacted by processes and movements such as Jewish emancipation, nationalism, urbanism, and racism. These are discussed by Shulamit Volkov, Aviel Roshwald, as well as by other historians.[4] The lesson then focuses on three regional case studies—Germany, France, and the Russian Empire—examining how modern forms of antisemitism developed and were expressed in these realms. Subjects such as the Dreyfus Affair and *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* are discussed. The in-depth analyses of these regions and top-

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1 Cf. J. G. Gager, *The Origins of Anti-Semitism: Attitudes toward Judaism in Pagan and Christian Antiquity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), and P. Fredriksen, *When Christians Were Jews: The First Generation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018).

2 As he presents in his studies: J. Cohen, *The Friars and the Jews: The Evolution of Medieval Anti-Judaism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982) and ibid., *Living Letters of the Law: Ideas of the Jew in Medieval Christianity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

3 More on this in his seminal book: D. Nirenberg, *Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2013).

4 Cf. S. Volkov, *Germans, Jews, and Antisemites: Trials in Emancipation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), and A. Roshwald, *The Endurance of Nationalism: Ancient Roots and Modern Dilemmas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

ics are presented by historians such as Pierre Nora, Elissa Bemporad, and Yehuda Bauer.

As can be understood from the title of the third lesson—"Genocidal Antisemitism: From World War I to the Holocaust," the lesson deals with the volatile first half of the twentieth century, touching upon subjects such as the First World War, the Bolshevik Revolution, the Russian Civil War, examining both the events themselves and the effects they had on the development of antisemitism. A substantial part of the lesson is dedicated to the rise of Nazism to power, the place of antisemitism in Nazi ideology, and the Holocaust. A video lecture of the late Otto Dov Kulka presenting his analysis of Redemptive Antisemitism is included as part of this.[5] The lesson ends with a short lecture by Alvin Rosenfeld in which he shows how many people had expected antisemitism to disappear from the public sphere following the Holocaust and the great disappointment that arose once it became clear that it had not. He focuses on the contemporary world, stating that the need to analyze and understand current-day expressions of antisemitism has become, without being melodramatic about it, rather urgent.[6]

This statement brings the learners to the second half of the course and its fourth lesson—"Contemporary Antisemitism." The first part of the lesson examines antisemitism in the Far Right. Ruth Wodak defines this sphere and the place of antisemitism in it and explains the differentiation between the radical and the populist right.[7] She continues by presenting current-day examples from Europe, and historian Juliane Wetzel discusses the populist-right and the philosemitic tendencies that can be found within it today, both in Europe and the United States. The recent rise of antisemitism in the United States is also explored. As part of this topic, Jeffrey Herf examines right-wing populism and conspiracy theories in this sphere. Dina Porat and Anthony Julius then turn to discuss Holocaust denial and distortion—its origins and current-day variants and manifestations. The latter half of the lesson is dedicated to the topic of antisemitism in the Far Left. British researchers Dave Rich and David Hirsh define this phenomenon,

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5 The term expanded on by Saul Friedländer but which first appeared in Kulka's "Richard Wagner und die Anfänge des modernen Antisemitismus," *Bulletin des Leo Baeck Instituts* 16 (1961): 281–300.

6 An issue of course expanded on in: Alvin H. Rosenfeld, ed., *Resurgent Antisemitism: Global Perspectives* (Boomington: Indiana University Press, 2013).

7 For more on this see: R. Wodak, *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean* (London: Sage, 2015).

its roots, and expressions.[8] The complex issue of anti-Zionism is analyzed by Anita Shapira, Dave Rich, and Alvin Rosenfeld, while Elissa Bemporad and Jeffery Herf explore the historical development of the phenomenon in the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc.[9] The lesson then examines the important topic of the boundary between antisemitism and legitimate criticism of the Israeli state, and it ends with an exploration of the allegations of antisemitism in the British Labour Party.

Keeping within the framework of the contemporary world, the fifth lesson, "The Islamic and Arab World," deals with antisemitism in this sphere today. To a certain extent it diverges from the chronological structure of the course, as it also goes back in time to the early days of Islam. Lectures by historians Meir Litvak, the late Esther Webman, Bassam Tibi, and Mark R. Cohen present the accepted historiographic approach, influenced greatly by the work of Bernard Lewis[10], showing how antisemitism in this world is a modern phenomenon, one that appeared in the nineteenth century as a result of national and geopolitical changes and developments.[11] The early days of Islam and the Islamic religious texts are examined, and the history of Jews under Arab rule is also discussed. The researchers show how the religious, social, and economic factors that led to the development of antisemitism in Christian Europe were absent in the Islamic world. The second part of the lesson analyzes the rise of antisemitism in this sphere, focusing particularly on Islamism in today's world, the place of Holocaust denial, *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, and the Iranian government.[12]

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8 Discussed in-depth in D. Hirsh, *Contemporary Left Antisemitism* (London: Routledge, 2018), and D. Rich, *The Left's Jewish Problem* (London: Biteback Publishing, 2016).

9 Cf. J. Herf, *Undeclared Wars with Israel: East Germany and the West German Far Left*, *1967–1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), and ibid., "The Anti-Zionist Bridge: The East German Communist Contribution to Antisemitism's Revival After the Holocaust," *Antisemitism Studies* 1, no.1 (Spring 2017): 130–56.

10 One example being his seminal B. Lewis, *Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1986).

11 For more on this see, for example, E. Webman, "From the Damascus Blood Libel to the 'Arab Spring': The Evolution of Arab Antisemitism," *Antisemitism Studies* 1, no.1 (Spring 2017): 157–206.

12 Subjects that are explored in their many works, including: B. Tibi, *Islamism and Islam* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012); E. Webman, "Adoption of the Protocols in the Arab Discourse on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Zionism, and the Jews," in *The Global Impact of the 'Protocols of the Elders of Zion'*, ed. E. Webman (London: Routledge, 2011), 175–95: and M. Litvak and E. Webman, *From Empathy to Denial: Arab Responses to the Holocaust* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

The sixth and final lesson of the course "Addressing Antisemitism," opens with an additional examination of the issue of differentiating between antisemitism and legitimate criticism of the State of Israel. The BDS Movement is also discussed. The lesson then turns to examine a major issue in the topic of contemporary antisemitism and in that of hatred in general—the world of the internet and social media. As there is no group that is not targeted or attacked in this sphere, the examination is done within the wider context of online hatred by information scientist and elected president of the Israel Internet Association Karine Nahon.[13] The lesson then turns to an exploration of how antisemitism is being addressed in our world today in different realms, such as research, legislation, education, and more. Figures such as European Commission Coordinator on Combating Antisemitism, Katharina Von Schnurbein, Advisor to the British Government on Antisemitism, John Mann, and Prefect and Inter-ministerial Delegate for the Fight Against Racism, Anti-Semitism, and Anti-LGBT Hatred (DILCRAH) in France, Frédéric Potier, discuss how antisemitism and other forms of hatred are being confronted in the European Union, the United Kingdom, and France.

The course ends with a video in which different religious leaders and leading figures and thinkers such as the late Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks, Imam Sheikh Dr. Usama Hasan, Archbishop Pierbattista Pizzaballa, and Prof. Michael Walzer, contemplate and discuss if and how antisemitism and other forms of hatred and intolerance can be eradicated.

Platforms and Scope

As mentioned, the course is open to the wide public free of charge. It was initially launched on the British digital education platform FutureLearn and has since been launched on the American-based Coursera and on the Israeli Campus IL platforms. The presentation language is English, however there are Hebrew, Spanish, and French subtitles. German subtitles are currently being produced as well.

As of early 2021, over thirty thousand learners from dozens of countries from around the world have actively participated in the course. To these we can add hundreds of thousands of views of different video lectures from the course, up-

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13 A major topic discussed by Nahon is that of "virality," based on her research on the topic, cf. K. Nahon and J. Hemsley, *Going Viral* (Cambridge: Polity, 2013).

loaded to YouTube. The feedback received on the course so far has been extremely positive.

Each video lecture in the course is followed by a short suggested bibliographical list for those interested in expanding their knowledge on the discussed topic, and each unit also allows for learners to comment, share their thoughts, and interact with other learners as well as with the Yad Vashem moderators. Over one hundred thousand comments have been posted thus far. The vast majority of them have been respectful and to the point, following the guidelines and the codes of conduct put up by the different platforms.

The course was promoted by Yad Vashem as well as by different international institutions and organizations committed to confronting hatred and antisemitism. It has been used by different organizations and parties, particularly in the United Kingdom, as a means to educate their members on the topic of antisemitism. Thus there were several politicians from both the left and right wings of British politics accused of making antisemitic remarks who have attended the course.[14]

Reflecting on the Work Thus Far

March 2021 marked the course's third year online. Reflecting on the process of both constructing and moderating this course, we believe we may be able to provide some insights and thoughts on teaching this topic, particularly in the online sphere.

First and foremost we learned the importance of a balanced approach. This was expressed in the way the topic of differentiating between antisemitism and legitimate criticism of the State of Israel is discussed in the course. We touched upon this topic twice in the second half of the course, with lectures by philosopher Michael Walzer, historian Yehuda Bauer, and researchers Dave Rich and Kenneth Marcus, among others. We also expand this issue further by showing how not every criticism of Jews, Judaism, or the Israeli state is necessarily antisemitic. This is done by presenting actual examples of cases that may appear antisemitic but are not necessarily so.

In the course it was also imperative for us to show how hatred in general, stereotypes, and preconceived notions should be identified and confronted,

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14 See, for example, the following post made by Neale Hanvey, SNP member of parliament for Kirkcaldy & Cowdenbeath: N. Hanvey, "Apology for Posts Was a Watershed Moment for Me," Jewish News Blog, issued June 9, 2020, accessed February 25, 2021, https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/apology-for-posts-was-a-watershed-moment-for-me/.

alongside antisemitism. As previously mentioned we do point out the uniqueness of antisemitism—this is discussed early on in the course by Ruth Wodak, sociologist Michel Wiewiorka, philosopher Steven T. Katz, and historian Peter Hayes. However, we truly believe that disconnecting this topic from the wider issue of hatred would be both incorrect and misleading.

A major concern for us going into the course was how to discuss different cultures and societies, particularly when presenting complex elements and issues. Any forms of generalizations and simplifications should of course be avoided. We mentioned earlier the issue of Islamism. In this regard we attempted to follow the balanced and sensitive approach established by researchers such as the late Esther Webman, whose videos feature prominently in the lesson dealing with the Arab and Islamic world.[15]

In order to present a more critical standpoint we also tried to include references and viewpoints that question some of those discussed in the course. For example when dealing with the term "antisemitism" itself, it was important for us to show that there are those that do not necessarily accept it in the same way it is presented in the course, referencing David Engel's well-known article.[16]

From their reactions it seems that the learners have responded extremely well to this balanced approach. However as can be expected, presenting complexities in a massive online platform has its downsides. In-depth discussions that we are used to, from classrooms or seminars, are of course nearly impossible to have in this sphere. The interpersonal and intimate contact between fellow learners and between learners and instructors is one that is also limited. Therefore the ability to reach tens of thousands does, and can come at times at the price of more comprehensive and exhaustive debates and discussions.

Another issue we have come across is that of updating the course content. Whereas a university professor could update a course at any given moment, the online course format is pretty much a closed and final one. Yet as we well know, the phenomenon of antisemitism is one that continues to develop. We have therefore done our best of adding components and video lectures to the course as much as possible. Among others, we have updated the lecture dealing with antisemitism in the British Labour party, added lectures on the French Yellow Vest Movement and the recent rise of antisemitism in the United States, and presented a wider analysis of populism and antisemitism.

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15 On Esther Webman's academic legacy cf. D. Porat, "Esther Webman, 1947–2020," *Antisemitism Studies* 4, no. 2 (2020): 388–90.
16 Cf. D. Engel "Away from a Definition of Antisemitism," in *Rethinking European Jewish History*, ed. J. Cohen and M. Rosman (Oxford: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2009), 30–53.

Lastly, any attempt to deal with such a wide topic in one course does not allow for a full examination of all the complexities and issues this topic brings up. However we do believe that the course presents an important overview of major developments in the history of antisemitism, hopefully allowing learners to both learn new information, question their own preconceived notions on a variety of topics, and hopefully allow for some level of change to take place, both within the online sphere and within the real world.

The course can be accessed free of charge at https://www.yadvashem.org/education/online-courses/antisemitism.html.

Yossi Kugler and Dafna Dolinko have led the production and content development of the online video course "Antisemitism: From Its Origins to the Present." They work together at the International School for Holocaust Studies at Yad Vashem. Yossi is a PhD candidate at Tel Aviv University, writing his dissertation about the Israeli attitudes toward antisemitism in the years 1948–1987. Dafna has completed her MA studies in Jewish History at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

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