Susanne Popp / Katja Gorbahn / Susanne Grindel (eds.)

History Education and (Post-)Colonialism

This book deals with the challenges for history education arising from the centrality of colonialism in shaping the modern world. It breaks new ground by bringing together an international range of national studies on the legacies of colonialism that permeate the way how colonial history is thought and taught at schools. The case studies examine the representation, understanding and use of colonial heritage from different angles: They focus on European and non-European states as well as on states with and without colonial past as colonizers or colonized. Thus, and with its wide range of approaches – postcolonial theory, memory studies, educational media studies, teaching practice – this volume makes an essential research contribution to the ongoing international debate on the position of colonial history in present and future history education.

The Editors
Susanne Popp is professor of Didactics of History at the University of Augsburg (Germany).
Katja Gorbahn is associate professor of German language, literature, and culture at the Aarhus University (Denmark).
Susanne Grindel is head of the staff unit ‘key issues’ at the Philipps-University of Mannheim (Germany).
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International Case Studies
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Introduction

The significance of the influence exerted by the historical phenomenon of colonialism, of which violence and rule by external powers were fundamental components, on the history of the twentieth century and on our present times is beyond question. We are living in a postcolonial world. Most of the 193 UN member states\(^1\) have imperial or colonial pasts which, however history has come to judge them, stand as focal points in the landscapes of their self-image. Further, the process of decolonization, which reached near-completion in the twentieth century’s second half as numerous sovereign nation states came into being, both ushered in a restructuring of the world order which had been in place hitherto and progressed beyond this to posit a paradigmatic shift in the norms framing that world order: Decolonization meant, alongside the end of colonial empires and of peoples’ subjection to rule from without, the ‘discrediting of foreign rule’ \textit{per se}. It was in this spirit that the United Nations proclaimed, in the ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’ issued in 1960:

1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation. 2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. […].\(^2\)

UN Resolution 1514 thus gave rise to a fundamentally new set of values upon which the political world order was to rest going forward.\(^3\)


The global relevance of the era of colonial power and subsequently of decolonization, and the implications for the present arising from both, provide ample justification for consideration of whether, and how, present-day history teaching in schools, and specifically in curricula and educational media, represents and communicates the set of issues surrounding these periods. The primary impetus for the creation of this volume has been the upsurge in public interest and relevance to our contemporary world experienced by academic and public engagement with colonial pasts and the postcolonial order over approximately the last twenty years. This upsurge is reflected in the increasing frequency of public debates around the issue in Europe, to name one example. It finds further expression in the degree of passion with which those involved wrestle with appropriate ways of remembering the colonial violence originating from this continent, including slavery, and the responsibility issuing therefrom in both historical/political and moral/ethical terms, from which in turn emerge, inter alia, questions around potential compensation.

One exemplary case in this regard might be the debates that took place in the British public arena in 2007, on the occasion of the two hundredth anniversary of the Slave Trade Act of 1807, which abolished the transatlantic slave trade in the British Empire. Controversy in the public sphere was also a feature of the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary in 2013 of the abolition of slavery in the Netherlands, which in 1863 had been the last European colonial power to free its slaves by emancipating those in Surinam and the Antilles. On this occasion, the government of the Netherlands, while expressing its ‘deep regret’ about the country’s involvement in the slave trade, refrained, primarily for fear of demands for reparations, from making an official admission of historic culpability. In 2004, Germany marked the beginning of the colonial war against the

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Herero and Nama which had taken place between 1904 and 1908 in what was then German South West Africa, and remembered in particular the massacres of 1904. The commemorations occasioned renewed debate around the genocidal character of this war and calls for a formal recognition of historic guilt. Twelve years later, in July of 2016, the German Bundestag issued an official document which for the first time referred to the massacres committed against the Herero and Nama during the course of this war as genocide.\footnote{Cf. the text of the resolution: Bundesdrucksache18/5385. 1 July 2016. http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/053/1805385.pdf (18.10.2017).}

It is impossible to overlook the fact that engagement with the history of colonialism and with its significance to the present frequently arises out of discourses around historical memory which are located in their turn in wider contexts. The following discussion will attempt to shed light on three selected aspects of the issue which simultaneously hold considerable relevance for the depiction of the history of colonialism\footnote{‘Colonialism’ in relation to history textbooks encompasses ‘decolonization’ and the impact of colonialism to the present day.} in the history classroom.

One of these factors, of which a key determining element is the accelerating advance of ‘globalization’, is the heightened perception of a rapidly widening global development gap. Of the 31 states classed by the World Bank in December 2016 as ‘Low-Income Countries’ (LIC), 27 are in Africa.\footnote{Cf. World Bank list of economies (December 2016); see the current classification by income in XLS format in https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519 (31.12.2017). ‘As of 1 July 2016, low-income economies are defined as those with GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method, of $1,025 or less in 2015 ...’ https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/new-country-classifications-2016 (13.10.2017).} Although some of these 31 LICs have no history of colonization, the global asymmetry in economic development manifest in this figure points to, among other factors, the direct and indirect aftereffects of the colonial era. Without historical knowledge of this period and its enduring impacts, including neocolonial structures, we have little chance of properly comprehending our present.\footnote{Cf., for example, the questions about colonialism in Africa on Quora; www.quora.com/How-would-Africa-be-today-if-colonialism-never-happened (11.10.2017). See also the topic of the history of colonialism and ‘global education’ in Jones,}
A further factor of substantial significance is the complex and far-reaching movements of migration which we are currently experiencing worldwide. In Europe in particular, one of their effects is to increasingly erase the spatial distance that had hitherto separated the arenas of experience and memory of former metropolitan centers and their erstwhile colonial territories and had long enabled a dominant view of colonialism and its consequences as events located outside the Western world without profound impact on the attitudes of European societies with Occidental habitus.

Migration movements to Europe have direct consequences for history teaching due to their effects on the composition of student bodies in European classrooms, which therefore frequently feature social, cultural and experiential backgrounds far beyond the frames of reference determining the typical national narratives proposed in history teaching. This factor exerts a fundamental influence on the entanglements of European history with the history of the world beyond Europe and specifically on the history of colonialism with all it brought in its wake. In addition to this, not insignificant numbers of students with non-European or non-Western backgrounds find themselves confronted with diverse racial stereotypes\textsuperscript{11}, many of which are reminiscent of colonialist patterns of thinking. In the face of this situation, history teaching finds itself urgently called upon to critically reflect on the Western, or European, narratives that dominate its exercise in the classroom. It is beyond question that the teaching of history represents a significant societal locus of discussion and negotiation around social identities and modes of inclusion or exclusion. Central elements of the discourse that emerges here include the traditional image, or, more correctly, self-image of Occidental-European history as the epitome of ‘modernity’, ‘progress’ and ‘humanity’ and the role assigned to colonialism within this notional framework. A further issue here is the critical consideration of whether, and in which form, colonial mentalities remain

implicitly present in the national ‘master narratives’ of history as it is currently being taught in Europe’s classrooms.\textsuperscript{12}

In this context, those engaging in scrutiny of the depiction of colonialism and its aftereffects, and of its status, in history teaching have on occasion received innovative inspiration from civil society stakeholders. In some European states, people from former colonies are today speaking out more confidently and emphatically than has previously been seen, and pointing via projects with high public impact to the presence of ‘forgotten’ manifestations of the colonial past, both material in nature and evident in ideas, in the everyday European world\textsuperscript{13}. The carriers of such traces...
include street names, monuments and indeed textbooks. Those identifying and raising awareness of them thus shine light on the fact that the cultural heritage of colonialism is in evidence in the former metropolitan centers and that, as such, colonialism is a part of European history in Europe itself. These activities amount to a call by civil society actors for a Western/European culture of memory which no longer cordons off, represses or minimizes the significance of colonialism and slavery to the continent’s history. Indeed, they go beyond this ambition and seek to induce a shift in awareness around colonialism’s frequently unrecognized cultural legacy. This would imply a critique of numerous Western/European terms, categories and notions which currently ‘go without saying’, in an attempt to identify whether, and if so, the extent to which, they carry implicit connections and connotations with colonial and neo-racist stereotypes and other thought patterns.¹⁴

We would finally make reference in this context to two relatively recently emerged academic disciplines which have provided those with a critical interest in the depiction of colonial pasts in the present-day history classroom with key ideas and impetus: global history and postcolonial studies. The first of these¹⁵, one of whose raisons d’être is to engage closely and intensely with the role of imperialism and colonialism in the history of globalization¹⁶, regards European colonialism¹⁷ as an integral,

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that is, non-incidental, component of ‘European modernity’ and European ‘nation-building’. From this perspective, the typical depiction and contextualization of colonial pasts into national historical narratives appear in a more than dubious light. Put simply, these typical European national narratives – including their reproduction in the history classroom – tend to present the colonial past principally as a completely finished epoch in the age of imperialism, which, while it forms a part of national or European history, does not represent a constitutive component of national or European identity in the sense of a ‘negative heritage’. Additionally, these narratives barely perceive or take account of the changes in the society to which they pertain which were wrought by the colonial mentality, nor of the retroaction of colonial practice on European societies.

The issue of colonialism thus fails to occasion critical reflection on whether the dominant European self-image, with its claim to the humanity and therefore superiority and the universal validity of European values and Western modernity, may be in need of a fundamental reassessment in the light of colonial practices and the ideologies which framed them.

Postcolonial theories likewise proceed from the assumption that colonialism and colonial mentalities possess constitutive, and not merely supplementary, significance to our understanding of European history.

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and to European identity in general. While the study of history didactics has not yet completely mapped or harnessed the potential of these approaches for the field, we can perceive some of the challenges they present to history teaching. Put very generally, theoretical approaches rooted in postcolonialism call for a retrospective ‘decolonization’ of a historical mode of thought whose orientation has remained unchangingly Eurocentric to this day. The principal focus of this critique is the currently predominant European/Occidental self-image which, in the postcolonial view of the matter, emerged in close interrelation to and has received the profound stamp of the long-enduring practices of colonialism. Colonialist notions, mentalities and imaginings outlived formal colonial power and continue, largely unrecognized and unreflected upon, to perpetuate their influence in the shape of today’s Western/European sense of superiority and mission over and toward non-European states and societies. Postcolonial theories perceive this claim to a historical role as the leaders of civilization to be based on the conviction that the Occidental ideas of ‘humanity’, ‘human rights’, ‘reason’, ‘progress’, and ‘modernization’ can assert universal validity and form the ‘essence’ of European-Occidental

21 See also the concept of ‘coloniality’ delineated, for example, in Mignolo, Walter D. 2011. The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options. Duke.
23 The approaches represented by the sub-discipline of ‘new imperial history’ point in a similar direction; they differ from older forms of imperial history in that they seek to shed increased light on the reciprocal interactions and relationships of profound mutual influence between colonial centers and overseas peripheries and the effects of empire resp. colonies on metropolitan centers. This approach to the issue attempts to shift the perspective away from the simplistic juxtaposition of ‘us’ and the ‘Other’ by including processes of cultural transfer and adaptation in the vista and to explore reciprocal perceptions and constructions of the ‘foreign’ or the ‘Other’, taking into account the categories of race and gender. See, for instance, Howe, Stephen (ed.). 2010. The New Imperial Histories Reader. London et al.
24 ‘Concepts’ here encompasses the Western idea of scientific or academic knowledge and, with reference to the pedagogics of history, key terms of academic history and the study of its teaching.
history and identity, and are not tarnished to any degree by the colonial practices of the past.

The attitude thus described manifests itself in still-widespread tendencies to unabatedly adhere to the notion that colonial rule exerted ‘positive effects’ on colonized societies in their ‘backwardness’ and to racist colonial ideas. By contrast, postcolonial positions emphasize the fact that even where a depiction of colonial rule is critical, it will frequently feature typical imbalances. One example might be the tendency for European/Western depictions of colonialism to frame the relationship between the colonizers and the colonized in the one-sided terms of an opposition between the active, dominant ‘us’ and the passive, dominated ‘them’, with the result that colonized people find themselves reduced to the unacceptable status of objects of Western/European action, as they had been in the era of active colonial practice. It goes without saying that this critique does not call into question European responsibility for the abuses committed in the course of the colonial project or the imbalance of power on which the practice of colonialism was predicated. Its aim is the uncovering of a Eurocentric attitude and self-image which, largely unconsciously, is far from comprehending colonial practices as an integral contextual framework encompassing both colonizers and colonized and placing both parties, despite all differences in their positions and experiences, effectively on a level. This limitation in the view of colonialism acts as a block to insight into the quite literal repercussions of colonial rule, which has historically exerted a substantially defining influence not only on the colonial territories themselves, but also on the histories of the former colonial powers. Further, it crowds out any awareness that the self-image held dear by ‘Europe’ or the ‘West’ depended, and continues to depend, at a fundamental level on the ‘colonized’ peoples, due to the inescapable fact that the construction of a self as ‘superior in civilization’, ‘progressive’, ‘humane’, and ‘universally valid’ requires, indeed is predicated upon, the existence of an ‘Other’ constructed as ‘backward’, ‘inferior’, ‘barbaric’, and ‘particular’. This attitude in its turn stands in fundamental contradiction to those historically ‘singular’ values and principles, such as the natural liberty,

25 Cf. also the French ‘Mekachera law’ of February 23, 2005, which we will discuss further below.
equality and solidarity of all people, which the European sense of mission likes to summon as witnesses to its self-image.

Postcolonial approaches thus emphasize the fact that colonialism is not identical to its pragmatic political dimension. The end of colonialism as a historical epoch by no means heralds the disappearance of the colonialist mentalities and imaginings so deeply rooted in the ‘modern’ ‘West’; they live on, some in altered form, and in spite of the far-reaching denial, ignorance or ‘invisibling’ to which they are subject. All this challenges the teaching of history in our schools to engage more closely and intensely with the history of colonialism and its aftereffects than it has done hitherto. If changes acknowledged as necessary are to be effected, however, it is equally important in this context for history educators and educationalists to critically examine their own presumptions, notions and terminologies for implied elements of ‘Eurocentrism’ and of the ‘coloniality of power’\textsuperscript{26} that have thus far remained overlooked.

For the reasons outlined above, the history and aftereffects of colonialism and postcolonial approaches to history have been attracting increased attention in the academic discipline of history didactics. Various instances of research, such as history textbook analyses which progress beyond exploration of the significance and depiction of the issues of colonialism and decolonization by critically interrogating these publications to uncover the traces of implicit colonial ways of thinking, bear witness to this upsurge in interest in the topic.\textsuperscript{27} The findings of such studies, a number of which proceed in a comparative manner, demonstrate unambiguously that history educationalists need to take the issue of the ‘decolonization of historical thinking’ seriously as an important task facing their profession.

This said, we find ourselves obliged at this point to train a spotlight on comprehensive and worrying omissions in the research. One of these relates to the absence from the extant body of work of studies which give an international overview of the status afforded to the issues of colonialism

\textsuperscript{26} The reference here is to the concept of ‘coloniality’ as the enduring legacy of colonialism, as employed, for instance, in Quijano, Anibal. 2000. ‘Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America’. \textit{Nepantla: Views From the South} 1(3): 533–580.

\textsuperscript{27} Cf. footnote 12.
and decolonization, and their depiction, in current curricula revolving around national histories and history textbooks. Further, we have no overall knowledge of whether history educationalists or representatives of related disciplines internationally are engaging with these issues, which questions are guiding their research, where it is taking place, and how they are responding to the impetus delivered by the sub-field of postcolonial studies.

This inadequacy in general awareness of research activities in the field forces us to rely for the time being on hypotheses and assumptions which will need to be tested in further research. One of these assumptions is that colonialism as a topic area, conceived of in a broad sense to encompass decolonization and the aftermath of the colonial era, has an at least marginal place in most national history curricula worldwide. Driving this supposition is our awareness that the issue is one with global impact, having influenced the history of a very large number of states and macro-regions, and with close links to a range of other canonical themes of history, such as imperialism, the two world wars, and the Cold War. However, this assumption alone leaves us barely any further on than we were; we remain uncertain, in the absence of detailed analyses, of the position and function of this issue in national narratives, of the manner of its presentation, and of whether postcolonial approaches make a consistent and influential appearance – which last is admittedly improbable at this moment in time.

We additionally proceed from the further assumption that curricula for the teaching of national histories primarily present the issue of colonialism, again in its broader sense, from a specifically national point of view rather than conceiving of it from the transnational global history

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28 Curricula for world history, as a distinct object of research, are not discussed here.

29 The compilation of such an overview, which would generally make primary reference to curricula and textbooks for the teaching of national history, proves difficult in settings which operate without centralized and/or compulsory curricula and textbooks designed to fulfill them.

perspective as a substantial component part of European or Western ‘modernity’. Taking a transnational view of these issues enables us to identify extremely close links between the history of (later) colonialism and the fundamental convictions upon which the ‘modern age’, itself a central pillar of the Western/European self-image, rests. The unlimited faith in ‘progress’ ubiquitous across all sectors and strata of Occidental society was indivisibly connected to the firm belief in the fundamental superiority and destined global leading role of Western or European culture and, to an extent, the European ‘race’. These connections manifest themselves in such phenomena as the widespread hailing of the expansion of colonial rule in the Western/European sphere as a ‘progressive’ project on, for instance, economic, civilizational, racial or scientific grounds. This was an attitude by no means limited to Western/European states with colonies; it was shared by many which did not pursue active colonial policies, yet – which possibly explains their assent to these ideas – often participated indirectly in colonial imperialism through activities including unofficial relationships of trade, missionary work and academic research. The difference between specifically national approaches to the history of colonialism and those supported by a transnational concept does not consist in a denial or erasure of the key ideological precepts and colonial, partially racist, constructs at the center of the colonial project; indeed, both types of approaches generally include discussions of these matters. Instead, the most significant difference appears in the complete isolation and separation, in histories with national emphasis, of the ideological attitudes and tropes intimately connected with colonialism from the typical narrative.


32 A frequently observed characteristic of narratives – and indeed history curricula – set up to convey national histories is their depiction of transnational issues and phenomena primarily in their specific national forms and the concomitant neglect of the transnational dimension of the events in question. The two world wars are exemplary cases of this phenomenon. Many history textbooks fail to adequately point out to students the global dimension of these conflicts, which also encompassed colonial issues.
Introduction

so frequently headed in textbooks and curricula on national history with a formula such as ‘The Path to the Modern Age’, referring, of course, to the nation state in question and the European Occident. Such approaches distinguish themselves principally by their failure to depict and discuss the interrelationships among these elements of the discourse.

A further assumption underlying our exploration of the issue is that the curricula and textbooks of Western-influenced European states tend to allocate only a marginal role to the history of European colonialism in their narrative construction of the historically-founded national identity they seek to present and transmit. It appears to be a general principle governing the narratives of national histories that events and processes which took place within the boundaries of the core nation’s territory and directly affected its population are of greater significance for the construction of national history than are other historical events which unfolded outside the nation or at the imperial periphery, or are perceived in the collective memory to have done so. This means that ‘memories’ of national or European colonialism cannot compete in the national history narratives conveyed in schools with other, more ‘direct’, national memories of events and upheavals such as political change, wars and civil wars, the imposition of foreign rule, national resistance, victory, liberation, or the attainment or reattainment of national sovereignty. We thus assume that the colonial past has a peripheral status in the history taught in the classrooms of Western/European states.

Finally, on the rather slight basis of extant textbook analyses on this subject, and despite the gaps that are more than apparent in this body of work, we can identify indicators of some typical characteristics of the configurations of ‘colonialism’ as a topic in curricula and textbooks from Western/European states whose principal purpose is the teaching of national histories. These include the factor of whether the country had its own colonies, the role of academic history in the country or countries in question, competition among divergent ‘memories’ in national spaces of memory, and the way in which the nation handles its ‘negative’ historical legacies. These tendencies, as we will go on to explicate, may be present in a variety of permutations.

Commencing with European states, we open this overview with two case studies on the significance of the issue of ‘colonialism’ in contemporary
Estonia and Poland\textsuperscript{33} whose findings, we hypothesize, can stand for further comparable instances. These two exemplary cases share a lack of historical colonial possessions and the experience of the deprivation of national sovereignty from the eighteenth century at the latest\textsuperscript{34} to the end of the Second World War. Like many other states in Central and Eastern Europe, they were occupied during the war and subject during the Cold War to Russian domination. The history textbooks of both states, while they do include discussion of the early and later phases of European colonialism, are clear in their categorization of this history as a history of ‘others’, that is, of other European states which were colonial powers and maintained colonial possessions. The message thus transmitted is that the history of European colonialism is of no import to the construction of these states’ own national identity due to the lack of a connection between colonialism and the course of Estonian or Polish history. The narratives in these countries’ textbooks are accordingly far from raising the question of whether, a lack of actual colonial possessions notwithstanding, Estonian or Polish society may have been indirectly involved in colonialism, through such activities as Christian mission, trade and colonial societies.\textsuperscript{35} They are likewise silent


\textsuperscript{35} Cf., for instance, on the work of the Estonian missionary Leonhard Blumer (1878–1938) in Arusha (in today’s Tanzania) from 1907 onward, Groop, Kim. 2006. With the Gospel to Maasailand: Lutheran Mission Work among
on whether, and if so, to what extent colonial ways of thinking or racist colonial stereotypes were endemic in parts of Estonian or Polish society, as the expression, for instance, of belief in the general ‘civilizatory’ superiority of Europe or in the spirit of agreement with the notion of a white man’s ‘mission’ to bring European ‘progress’ to the ‘backward’ outer reaches of the world. In this attitude, Polish and Estonian textbooks are completely in line with public historical discourse and the emphases of national historiography in these nations. While both states identify today with ‘Western Europe’ or ‘Western modernity’, a self-positioning pointedly intended to set them apart from Russia, they evidently do not consider this identification to incorporate the challenge of integrating the ‘negative heritage’ of European colonialism into their national ideas of themselves. This said, ‘postcolonial’ theories are anything but irrelevant to this setting; historical and cultural studies in Poland and the Baltic region use them as springboards for the interpretation of (Soviet) Russian dominance in the region as ‘intra-European colonial rule’..

It is an approach reflected at least partially in the narratives found in textbooks, although its manifestation leaves intact the distanced position taken by national histories in these cases toward ‘traditional’ European colonialism as an integral component of European ‘modernity’. It would seem, going by this evidence, that there is no connection between the ‘victims’ of Russian ‘colonialism’ in Europe

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and those of European colonialism in Africa and Asia, save via a theoretical concept.

This representation of European colonial history as exclusively a history of ‘others’ in the textbooks of European states which had no colonies of their own is a widespread pattern. Yet it is not without its exceptions. Switzerland offers a counter-example of engagement with the colonial past by states without histories of being colonizers. Its interaction with the issue points to a potential way of approaching a nation’s relationship with European colonialism which impacted its history despite the lack of an active colonial policy. Further, this example bears witness to the great significance of national academic histories and historiographies to the development of textbooks and curricula, in light of the fact that the history taught in a nation’s classrooms rarely touches upon themes not discussed in national historiography. For some years now, a number of Swiss historians have been undertaking research on ‘Swiss colonialism without colonies’ which has generated considerable attention. Alongside the exploration of the colonial mentalities and racist colonial stereotypes which circulated to profound effect in Swiss everyday life, this research seeks to illuminate the various ways in which Switzerland participated indirectly in European colonialism and in so doing has uncovered the link between a national history ‘without colonies’ and transnational European colonialism. Its findings have inspired, *inter alia*, the creation of teaching and learning materials whose purpose is to familiarize Swiss history teachers with this

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postcolonial view of the traces of Europe’s colonial history in their nation and offer them options for their day-to-day practice. The issue of indirect Swiss involvement in colonialism has begun to appear in newly created textbooks.39 These developments open up a potential opportunity for the issue to exert an impact in teacher training and new curricular guidelines and textbooks for the subject of history.

Turning now to the representation of colonial history in history textbooks from European states which did hold colonies, we observe that the matter of colonial possessions may play a significant role in nations’ historiographical minimization of their part in European colonialism. In Italy, Belgium, and Germany, for instance, we can perceive tendencies to emphasize the – compared to the British or French colonial empires – small size of the area over which these nations’ colonial activities extended and the relatively brief duration of their colonial activities. In this way, such states pull off the feat of simultaneously raising the issue of their colonial history and asserting that European colonialism was actually in essence perpetrated by ‘others’.

We further note that the interaction of the factors we discuss above, particularly states’ desires to avoid potential political conflicts and controversies, can lead to the relative marginalization of national histories of colonialism in the historical narratives presented in the classroom. A recent textbook study from Belgium supplies a highly illustrative and indicative example of this phenomenon. It found that Belgian colonialism remains a little-discussed issue the teaching of the country’s history in its schools to this day and as yet is far from incorporation into the construction of national identity as a ‘negative heritage’. In line with the public culture of memory which predominates in contemporary Belgian society, history textbooks currently in use continue to depict King Leopold II (1865–1909), the second monarch of the Kingdom of Belgium established in 1831, as a figure for national identification connotated with exclusively positive qualities. The dominant narrative credits him with having brought riches and renown to the young Belgian state, transformed Brussels into a metropolis and combated the African slave trade. By contrast, historical

studies, such as that by Adam Hochschild (1998)\textsuperscript{40}, which have uncovered a shocking level of uninhibited violence and exploitation in the early stages of Belgium’s colonial activities, effectively fall upon deaf ears, indeed presumably finding more frequent entry into the textbooks of other European states which seek in their turn to provide lurid examples of the cruelty that accompanied the colonial rule exercised by ‘others’.

In interpreting its findings, the study primarily cites the profound tensions within Belgian society that issued from the conflict between the Flemish and Walloon populations. The Belgian government has long avoided giving prominence and emphasis in history teaching, and thereby in public cultures of memory, to matters which run the risk of additionally increasing the potential for conflict in this already deeply divided society. Belgian colonial rule in Central Africa is undoubtedly such an issue due to its association with matters of historical responsibility and reparation in the present. Further complications arise from the fact that both the Flemish and the Walloon population are showing an increasing tendency to regard Belgium’s colonial past not as a matter that concerns them, but rather as an affair of the ‘Belgian state’, with which, as a rule, neither group primarily identifies. In this way, the collective memory of the Belgian colonial past is successively losing the population which might jointly maintain it. The study indicates that no particularly emphatic calls or initiatives for change to the current status quo have emerged from civil society, a silence in which one of the determining factors is likely to be the small numerical size of postcolonial migrant-background communities in Belgium.\textsuperscript{41}

The example of Germany differs from that of Belgium in the fact that the ‘negative heritage’ of Germany’s colonial past is not compelled to confront a version of national history built around patriotic pride. The role of Germany in the First World War, the National Socialist dictatorship, the Second World War and the Holocaust stand irrevocably in the way of the


reiteration of familiar patriotic self-lionizations in history teaching, and certainly did so in West Germany after 1945. We can observe here what we might call a marked competition between various forms of ‘negative heritage’, which has tended to push Germany’s colonial history into a background role in classroom historical narratives.

The unprecedented outrages against humanity perpetrated by the National Socialists have brought four key factors, which remain in effect today, to bear on perceptions of Germany’s colonial past in history teaching. First, the colonial rule exercised by Germany tends to be considered as relatively brief and insignificant. Second, German classroom narratives assert that the levels of violence and numbers of victims of the colonial era place it far behind the crimes of the Nazi period. Third, its chronological distance from the present mitigates against its significance, enabling its definition or dismissal as the antecedent past to the Nazi era, as colonialism was formally at an end by the close of the First World War. The fourth, and decisive, aspect in this regard is the fact that to this day, familiar perceptions of the ‘Third Reich’ categorize it as a political system with no structural connection whatsoever to German colonial rule, despite the shared foundations of both upon racist ideologies. History textbooks in West Germany began in the 1970s to include critical discussion of Germany’s colonial period, making explicit mention of acts of colonial violence such as the massacres of the Herero and Nama. This notwithstanding, Germany’s colonial history remained isolated from the Holocaust-centered German master narrative. Putting it very simplistically, we might observe that a historical self-image persists in Germany which gives such weight to the ‘negative heritage’ of the Holocaust that German colonialism, and the crimes committed in its name, barely registers on the scales.42

The example of Germany further bears witness to the key role of academic history for the teaching of the subject in schools. Some German historians began relatively recently to call for the location of National Socialism within a context of European ‘coloniality’ whose roots lie well back in the nineteenth century, thus suggesting a framework which would uncover a connection between the ‘Third Reich’ and Germany’s colonial record and increase the significance of colonialism’s ‘negative heritage’ for Germany today. These debates are currently ongoing; while they proceed, new history teaching and learning materials, inspired by postcolonial approaches, are appearing on the market, illuminating the entanglements of colonialism and National Socialism via a spotlight on various forms of racism and linking these issues to matters of great currency via their contextual regard for present-day Germany as a society influenced by immigration.\(^{43}\)

We will complete these cursory references to significant tendencies in the teaching of students’ home nations’ histories in European states with a look at Britain and France. One might assume that in these cases, the teaching of national history cannot possibly have recourse to minimization of the nation’s role in the European ‘colonial project’, nor can it ignore the resultant ‘negative heritage’ weighing upon that nation’s self-image. Such an assumption, however, would be erroneous. The factors we have discussed above, with their influence upon the depiction of the colonial past in other European states with and without erstwhile colonies alike, are equally in effect in these two cases and, at least in part, give rise to similar results. At the same time, however, the history curricula currently in force in Britain and France evince marked differences from each other, differences with a multiplicity of causal origins, such as idiosyncrasies of

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historical self-image, specificities of national history policy, and the political orientation of decision-makers in the education sector.

As of 1922, a fifth of the world’s population was under British rule. An enquiry, in light of this fact, into the status of colonialism in Britain’s history classrooms might instructively begin by examining the National Curriculum currently in force for England, issued in 2013, and might be surprised to find that it stipulates compulsory teaching of ‘history’ only up to and including Key Stage 3, which covers 11- to 14-year-old students and concludes with year nine of compulsory schooling. While, in contrast to France, Britain does not endow the content of its national history curriculum with binding force as regards what is actually taught in the classroom, its provisions speak eloquently of the status ascribed to colonial history by the British Department of Education. It is unlikely to be a matter of coincidence that the program of study for Key Stage 3 does not feature the term ‘colonialism’ at all and uses ‘colony’ only once, in a ‘non-statutory’ suggestion for a teaching topic titled ‘The first colony in America and first contact with India’. ‘Empire’, by contrast, figures in a heading to one of four compulsory groups of topics: ‘ideas, political power, industry and empire: Britain, 1745–1901’. The only two further topic suggestions related to colonialism are ‘Britain’s transatlantic slave trade: its effects and its eventual abolition’ and ‘Indian independence and [the] end of Empire’. The impression delivered by this program of study is that it obscures Britain’s colonial past, allowing it to be eclipsed by the concept of empire; the process of colonization appears in this curriculum, distinctly euphemistically, as ‘the development of the British Empire’, which itself takes a role subordinate to that of the British national historical narrative. It is apparently in this spirit that the National Curriculum’s first-listed required learning objective for history, valid across all Key Stages, is that ‘all pupils know and understand the history of these islands as a coherent, chronological narrative, from the earliest times to the present day: how people’s

lives have shaped this nation and how Britain has influenced and been influenced by the wider world.\textsuperscript{45} We should, in fairness, mention here that the centrality of British historical events and the secondary nature of focus on relationships between Britain and ‘the wider world’ extends beyond the issue of colonialism, with three of the four compulsory topic groups in Key Stage 3 referring solely to ‘Britain’ as their subject and ‘Europe and the wider world’ only receiving a look-in in the fourth and final area, covering 1901 to the present.\textsuperscript{46} In January of 2016, the British daily newspaper \textit{The Independent}\textsuperscript{47} posed critical questions on the status and significance of the topics of the British Empire and colonialism in the National Curriculum for history. Its enquiry was inspired by the findings of an online survey conducted by the market research company YouGov on respondents’ assessment of Britain’s colonial past: ‘YouGov found 44 per cent were proud of Britain’s history of colonialism while only 21 per cent regretted that it happened. 23 per cent held neither view.\textsuperscript{48} A further illuminating piece of evidence in this context is a comment piece in the daily newspaper \textit{The Guardian}\textsuperscript{49} with reference to an exhibition in Berlin’s German Historical Museum on ‘German Colonialism. Fragments Past and Present’\textsuperscript{50} (October 2016 to May 2017). The piece offers a comparative reflection on the attitudes of German and British society to their colonial history. The following passage taken from the article might provide a context to the brief stipulations of the National Curriculum as well as touching upon some of the issues we have encountered in our analysis thus far:

\begin{quote}
It is worth reflecting on why an official exhibition in London about British colonialism, similar to the kind that is now running in Berlin about the German equivalent, is so inconceivable. It’s because it is too difficult and painful. Such an event
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{46} For a detailed discussion of these issues, see the chapter by Terry Haydn in this volume.


\textsuperscript{48} More detailed information on this survey could not be located.


would not be an act of collective national reflection, because that seems beyond us. The passions of supporters and opponents alike would make any kind of consensus approach difficult. [...] This predictability is a reminder of three things. The first is that, whether we acknowledge it or not, the colonial past is still with us in Britain today. The second is that Britain has a lazy tradition of taking a rosy view of its own history, in which national crimes play little or no part and from which there is no lesson except British greatness. The third is that modern Britain lacks not just a shared view of history, but a common culture generally, as the clumsy arguments about British values always expose.

As in the case of Britain, the historical assessment of colonialism and its heritage in France is highly controversial in the political and social arenas. A frequently-cited example of the passions that arise in the debate is article four, rescinded in 2006, of the so-called ‘Mekachera law’ of February 23, 2005, which placed the school curriculum and textbooks under an obligation to show French colonization in ‘the positive light […] which is its right’\(^51\). We should specify here that the objections to this law were not solely aimed at its interpretation of the French colonial past, but additionally sought to resist its subjection of dissenting academic positions held by historians to legal process. Pierre Nora, whose voice was among those raised most vehemently against the law in 2005, has more recently expressed his decided rejection of the curricular content for history introduced in 2016 as part of the ‘grande réforme’ for the collège school type and with the declared aim of better fitting the topics covered by the curriculum to the exigencies and needs of a multicultural society. Pierre Nora accuses the new curricula of one-sidedly viewing the entire history of the West in general and France in particular in the light of colonialism.

and its attendant crimes and seeking to create feelings of guilt toward the extra-European world\textsuperscript{52} while simultaneously reducing humanism and the Enlightenment, key aspects of French and European history, to the status of optional curricular extras. In contrast to the attitude apparent in the British curriculum, the reformed French collège has given colonialism and decolonization a place in its history curricula which draws substantially on the contemporary setting of a postcolonial society marked by migration and takes some of the premises of ‘global history’ and postcolonial approaches into account.\textsuperscript{53} This said, the critique of the curriculum exercised by Pierre Nora, as an intellectual whose thought is characterized by liberal-conservative positions, casts light on the fact that neither French politics and society nor its academy have reached consensus on the ideal function of the ‘negative heritage’ arising from colonialism and slavery within France’s patriotic idea of itself.

Moving on to the depiction of colonialism and decolonization in the history classroom in those countries subject to colonial rule in their past, we find ourselves required still more than we have been thus far to rely on a handful of provisional assumptions and isolated indications apparent in a small number of exemplary case studies. We may assume, in relation to textbooks for the teaching of national history in postcolonial states, that there may well be substantial variations in the depiction of colonialism as a historical phenomenon in general and the national colonial past in particular. Such variations are likely to be evident in the issue of whether, and if so, how, textbooks discuss, depict, and evaluate colonial rule from without. Evident proof of the diversity and divergence in interpretations


\textsuperscript{53} For the topics set out for history teaching, under the keyword ‘histoire’, see: http://www.education.gouv.fr/cid81/les-programmes.html (23.11.2017).
of a state’s colonial ‘prehistory’ from nation to nation emerges in a study on the depiction in the textbooks of South Korea and Taiwan of Japanese colonial rule, which was structurally highly similar in each of these countries. In the Taiwanese case, Japanese colonial rule is credited with positive attributes that in South Korea are subject to rigorous censure. This appears to us to reflect the fact that the ‘modernization’ undertaken by the Japanese colonial power in both these colonies has received very different assessments in each.\(^{54}\)

It is additionally to be assumed that depictions of the colonial past in decolonized, or postcolonial, societies differ in the nature of the connection they create between the colonial experience and the ‘birth of a nation’ unfolding in the process of decolonization. A study on the depiction of colonialism in Tanzanian history textbooks made the exemplary finding\(^{55}\) of their intense emphasis on the history of resistance to the colonial power. In this view, the acts of heroism and sacrifice that took place in the struggle against illegitimate foreign rule encompassing the Maji Maji Rebellion (1905–1907) and other conflicts appear as events of national history *avant la lettre* due to their renown in the historical narrative as having prepared the way for national unity and the birth of the independent state.

In a context where a past of colonizing activity finds itself incorporated into a narrative of national history, we can barely expect national historical narratives in the history textbooks of postcolonial states to automatically present their pasts of colonization in the spirit of critique of colonialism as it frequently manifests itself in Europe and the U.S. Even where a narrative is strongly critical of a colonial past and its consequences, it may still be that the objectives of typical national historical narratives continue to call the tune, focused as they generally are on the central notions of ‘national unity’, ‘national identity’ and ‘patriotic pride’. We should therefore barely be surprised when in the construction of a colonial past we perceive the

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impact of factors similar to those we have described in relation to European states. We might usefully illustrate this assertion by pointing toward the avoidance of societal conflict and discord which, as we have seen, appears to be an important aim of European history textbooks’ depictions of the colonial past, with their frequent strategies of foregrounding the paradigm of ‘patriotic pride’ and repressing any ‘negative heritage’. In relation to postcolonial states and societies, we should be aware that the colonial powers to whom these states were subject drove deep wedges through society by ruthlessly playing off different social groups against one another. In the course of the subsequent processes of decolonization and of the foundation and establishment of new states, which, as Osterhammel has demonstrated\textsuperscript{56}, followed divergent and frequently heavily conflict-laden trajectories, there often emerged profound intra-societal tensions which persisted over long periods of time and in some instances linger to this day. In light of this phenomenon, we would be justified in the assumption that it is likely to be the view of the colonial past held by those in political power which determines the narratives contained in textbooks and that a tendency will exist toward avoiding discussion of those aspects of colonial history which seemingly threaten to undermine the idea of ‘national unity’, in the particular definition with which each society endows it.\textsuperscript{57}

As we come to the end of this brief overview of the depiction of colonialism in current curricula and textbooks for national history, we find ourselves compelled to reach the conclusion that the international research landscape, where we are able to find a vantage point over it at all, as yet features more craters than landmarks. This is a highly concerning situation, not least because the sparse data available indicate that the master narratives currently predominating in history teaching, in Europe in particular, tend to take an extremely circumscribed perspective, founded on national history, which stands in the way of their recognizing the global significance of colonialism and its history. Additionally, these narratives

\textsuperscript{56} Cf. Jansen, Jan C., and Jürgen Osterhammel. 2017. Decolonization: A Short History. Princeton, 188 f..  
\textsuperscript{57} For an overview on how societies make sense of the past through different ways of representing it see: Carretero, Mario, et al. (eds.). 2017. Palgrave Handbook of Research in Historical Culture and Education. London.
largely interpret the history of colonialism as a phenomenon located entirely in the past, which might well carry the implication that it is over and done with and certainly suggests that the colonial period has no connection to the national history thus taught, nor to its course over time, and no relevance to the present. While there is a need for research in this field to thoroughly examine these tendencies, it does appear that we would be justified in assuming that the depictions of colonialism, constructed in the light of national historical narratives, which dominate the scene – certainly in textbooks from European countries – have little genuine capacity to enable students to gain appropriate insight into the challenges of the postcolonial world they inhabit. Without such insight, however, students will barely attain the ability to navigate the historical and political complexities of today’s globalized world. History teaching, if it is to contribute to the improvement of this unsatisfactory state of affairs, will need not only to conduct systematic comparative analysis of extant depictions of colonialism in its media, but also to incorporate the ideas emerging from research directions such as global history, new imperial history and postcolonial theory – a process which will inevitably mean calling widespread national historical master narratives, and their role in history education, into question.

This volume is the result of a long-standing internationally conducted discussion among its contributors, initiated at a conference held by the International Society for History Didactics in 2013. The contributors’ shared aim is to take an initial step in the direction of inspiring international debate and research in history education on the presentation of colonialism in classrooms across the globe, the significance of the history of the colonial era for history teaching in a globalized contemporary world, and ways of meeting, in the theory and practice of history teaching, the challenges posed by research in global history, new imperial history, and postcolonial studies.

The first part of the volume, entitled Essays, comprises two chapters which engage with fundamental considerations on the issue. The chapter by JÖRG FISCH centers on a highly concise overview of the history of

58 See footnote 30.
colonialism and decolonization, commencing with the historical lead-up to European colonialism and extending to the present day, and seeking to provide precise definitions of key terminology. Fisch focuses on the history of the principle of national self-determination and the process which resulted in the condemnation of colonialism issued by the General Assembly of the United Nations. As this opening chapter highlights, while the abolition of colonialism and colonial rule saw the end of a major source of injustice in the international order, it was far from ushering in a just and equal order in the postcolonial world.

JACOB EMMANUEL MABE discusses both African and German discourses on colonialism. He investigates the significance of colonialism in African debates since the inception of the Pan-African idea and distinguishes different categories of intellectuals in accordance with their positions in this regard. The second part of his chapter turns a spotlight on discussions around colonialism in Germany and on the ongoing rediscovery of the country’s colonial legacy within the framework of postcolonial theory, new colonial history and memory studies. Mabe, in pointing to the diversity of both African and German positions, emphasizes that a true discipline of remembrance can only be the product of egalitarian cooperation between African and European researchers.

The discussion of topics and issues in the history classroom always unfolds within the context of the narratives predominant in the contemporary academic history and political historical culture of the country in which that classroom is located. Exploration, as in this volume, of the topic of colonialism in the context of history teaching calls of necessity for analysis of these historiographical narratives as they might and do translate into classroom practice. It is this focal emphasis that links the three chapters forming Part Two of the volume, Narratives.

FLORIAN WAGNER analyses European colonial historiography from the mid-nineteenth century to the 1960s and beyond. He demonstrates that promoters of colonialism evoked and utilized internationalism in a range of contexts and forms and that nationalism and internationalism often proved to be interdependent. As a history of colonialism materialized in the 1960s and new voices emerged, colonialist patterns of thinking remained nonetheless pervasive. Wagner, in calling for a critical approach to colonial history, argues that the teaching of colonialism should always
include the experience and suffering of the colonized, which gives it the potential to teach a global history that enables reflection on the relationship between globality and inequality.

ELIZE VAN EEDEN discusses African and South African historiography from the colonial era onward and points to the gaps it manifests, particularly in relation to African perspectives and approaches to both history and historiography. The chapter provides insights into the teaching of colonialism at South African schools and universities, demonstrating that issues of colonial history may still prove controversial. Van Eeden argues that historiography and history teaching are called to contribute to a better and deeper understanding of South Africa’s national heritage. She recommends a focal emphasis on local and regional history in its global connectedness as one way of tackling shortcomings and simplified narratives and thus of fostering an understanding of the past in South Africa’s present.

The third and final chapter in this part of the volume is a discussion by SHEN CHENCHEN, MENG ZHONGJIE, and YUAN XIAOQING of possible ways of overcoming the one-sidedness of depictions of colonialism the authors consider ‘nation-state-centric’ via the example topic of the Boxer Movement of 1898–1900, a key event used to teach colonialism in Chinese history education. The authors explore the potential of perspectives from global history to break up the simplistic dichotomies frequently typical of national master narratives, such as that between colonizer and colonized. They make reference in their discussion to the concepts of multiperspectivity and synchronicity and middle-range theory, which they consider possess the potential to cast light on the nuanced nature of colonialism’s history within China and its wider transnational complexity.

The political and societal significance of the past in the present has given rise to controversy around the content and objectives of teaching about colonialism and decolonization in schools in many regions of the world, controversy fueled further by the challenge postcolonial approaches are now posing to traditional narratives. Debates around this issue are by no means limited to countries directly affected, as colonizers or colonized, by processes of colonization. Part Three of the volume, Debates, contains documentations and examinations of the issues and dilemmas facing the
theory of history didactics and practice of history education in the highly diverse cases of the Middle East, South Korea, Switzerland, Hungary, and the UK.

The comparative study presented here by RIAD NASSER revolves around concepts of cosmopolitanism, national identity and the role of myths of origin in history textbooks currently in use in Jordan, Palestine and Israel. Nasser’s study is closely related to postcolonial theories’ critique of typical processes of ‘collective-national identity formation’ which transform the dialectical relationship between sameness and difference into a hierarchical structure in which ‘we’ – the national collective – is primarily defined against an external and lower ranking ‘other’. The author perceives this structure to contain inherent and powerful neocolonial potential, to which he responds by calling emphatically for the promotion of a ‘cosmopolitan identity’ intrinsically linked to universal values of inclusion, which might provide a much-needed answer to the challenges of globalization in our postcolonial present.

KANG SUN JOO’s contribution to the volume, centering on the historical topic of the transition to the modern age, explores the question, passionately discussed in academic history and history education in South Korea, of how the discipline might transcend the traditional perspective equating ‘modernity’ with ‘Europe’, which South Korea has recognized and critiqued as Eurocentric. The author points to a number of ways forward for the foregrounding of postcolonial approaches in the teaching of world history. They include comparing various different routes to nation-state building, teaching the concept of ‘modernity’ as an outcome of cross-cultural interactions, drawing comparisons of mutual perceptions across cultures, transnational approaches, long-term perspectives and, importantly, a change in the perspectives of the colonized on ‘modernization’.

As discussed above, colonialism had a profound impact even on European countries that did not possess colonies. Switzerland is one state to which this applies; current research has referred to its ‘colonial complicity’. The undeniable fact that Switzerland and its nationals were part of and did profit from the colonial system has not prevented the establishment and persistence of a widespread view in Swiss society that the country had nothing to do with colonialism. The analysis by MARKUS FURRER of Swiss history textbooks from the 1950s onward directs a spotlight at
this erroneous belief. While Furrer demonstrates that the 1980s saw the advent of a more differentiated picture of colonialism, he also shows that, this development notwithstanding, Swiss textbooks to this day mostly fail to discuss the country’s involvement in colonial structures and the impact exerted by colonialism’s long shadow on present-day perceptions and power structures.

MARIANN NAGY discusses a different kind of discourse of colonization, a narrative that depicts Hungary as an exploited colony within the Habsburg monarchy. This argument, which serves the purpose of explaining Hungary’s economically backward state, first emerged in the eighteenth century, to be eagerly embraced by Hungarian national-romantic historiography. Later, it became integrated into a Marxist framework in accordance with the political exigencies of the time. Though a modified picture gained ground in historiography in the second half of the twentieth century, the traditional interpretation persists in school textbooks to the present day. While the term ‘colony’ with respect to Hungary has vanished from textbooks since the 1960s, the simplified narrative patterns remain. Nagy demonstrates how current political discourses operationalize this pattern in order to discredit the European Union as a foreign colonizing power.

TERRY HAYDN’s discussion of debates around the role of the British Empire’s history in British schools demonstrates that Britain’s imperial and colonial past is contested. Haydn analyzes the different manifestations of the National Curriculum alongside textbooks, history education websites, popular history magazines, and the findings of an exploratory survey giving insights into teaching practice. As Haydn points out, the evidence does not support the right-wing claim that the British Empire is not sufficiently covered in British history teaching and presented in an one-sidedly negative manner. However, the findings of the survey referenced indicate that problems do exist. Haydn argues that history teaching should encompass learning about different empires, which might counterbalance Eurocentric bias as well as expanding students’ conceptual knowledge and understanding of the present.

The volume’s final section, Approaches, encompasses three chapters which seek to harness inspirations from postcolonial theory and global history for the classroom. The chapter by PHILIPP BERNHARD
describes his approach to teaching (post-)colonial history at German secondary school level. Examples from his practice include teaching units on Spanish colonial history in the Americas, German colonial history, and the Israel-Palestine conflict. In his theoretical considerations, Bernhard combines Howard Zinn’s concept of a People’s History with ideas of post-colonial approaches. He demonstrates how concepts such as hybridity and transculturation can enrich teaching practice using methodological approaches which have the potential to contribute to a decolonization of knowledge.

DENNIS RÖDER’s starting point is located in teaching practice and the difficulties he experienced as a history teacher using current textbook material on colonialism in Africa with his class. In his analysis of German history textbooks, he investigates the use of visual materials, pointing to considerable shortcomings in the visual presentation of colonial Africa and Africans under colonial rule. Many textbooks do not provide students with the information they would require in order to critically deconstruct visual sources such as photographs stemming from a colonial context. Though recent developments indicate increasing awareness of these issues, the use of visual material in textbooks still tends to strengthen traditional narratives and stereotypes on Africa. Concluding, Dennis Röder suggests ways in which teachers and textbook authors might contribute to supporting students in the development of their historical competencies and decolonizing history textbooks.

Basing his discussion on the exemplary case of Vietnam, KARL BENZIGER argues that the role-play method can be a useful approach to teaching contested history. In his analysis of debates on Vietnam, he shows that the connection between decolonization, civil rights and American Cold War foreign policy became evident in the U.S. as early as 1946; however, U.S. history teaching systematically neglects this narrative. In a role play Benziger staged with college and high school students, the participants were soon able to access the relevance of the connection between race and foreign policy and thus an understanding of how the present-day evaluation of this period came into being.

This volume treads new ground in bringing together for the first time the spectrum of differing national approaches to and contents of colonial history and its teaching. It explores history education on modern
European colonialism across different regions of the world and addresses the representations, understandings and uses of colonial heritage from a global and diachronic perspective. Many of the contributions demonstrate how colonial patterns persist in history education, and in so doing open up new questions on the significance of colonial pasts for contemporary societies and on the relevance of postcolonial theories to history education at schools. In this spirit, History Education and (Post-)Colonialism. International Case Studies seeks to bridge the gap between the academic and educational dimensions of colonial and postcolonial history. Engaging with the representation of colonial history and postcolonial theory, the contributions draw to a considerable extent, although not exclusively, on textbooks and curricula as tools of teaching and cultural translation. The potential of textbooks as reflectors (and mediators) of master narratives and the longevity of these narrative patterns as they appear within the structure and design of textbooks are at the core of this book. Readers interested in the current state of research into ongoing debates on the place of colonialism in national narratives, textbooks, and curricula as well as in the challenges of postcolonial theory to history education will find that the contributions offer wide-ranging perspectives on these topics.

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Part 1: Essays
In the official view of the United Nations, there is, with a few insignificant exceptions, no longer any such thing as a colony today. Every year, the United Nations Committee on Decolonization submits to the General Assembly a list of so-called Non-Self-Governing Territories. When it was presented for the first time in 1946, it was long and contained huge territories, especially in Africa. Since then, it has shrunk to 17 items. The comparatively most important of these territories are the Western Sahara (which, however, is usually no longer considered as a colony) and New Caledonia. A few of the territories on the list are still quite controversial, notably the Western Sahara, the Falkland Islands/Malvinas and Gibraltar. But most of them are small, unimportant and little known, treated by the world almost as a kind of *terra nullius*, no man’s land by lack of interest, although they are inhabited.

The concept of *terra nullius* is incompatible with the idea of the modern state system, which serves as the foundation of the United Nations. In this view, every piece of inhabited territory is supposed to be either a sovereign state of its own or part of a larger sovereign state. This concept was one of the preconditions of decolonization, and decolonization resulted from it.

But what does ‘decolonization’ actually mean here? This is a question we cannot answer unless we first ask what colonization and colonialism are. ‘Colonialism’ is one of the most detested concepts in contemporary political language. In 1970 the United Nations General Assembly declared colonialism in all its forms and shapes to be a crime, and the UN has repeated this assertion countless times at all levels, without, admittedly, defining ‘colony’ or ‘colonialism’.

**Definitions**

Our point of departure for gaining an understanding of the modern meaning of the terms is the Latin verb *colere*, to till the ground, or to cultivate, or simply to inhabit. A person who does such work is a *colonus*,

**Colonialism: Before and After**

Jörg Fisch
a colonist. Even though a *colonus* may be sedentary, reaping the fruits of the earth always means being in search of the richest land which will give the best returns on a given input of work. Cultivation of the best soils means being prepared to move to or at least to move near such soils, or to other places where riches are produced. Thus, the concept of a *colonus* is also linked to migration movements of individuals (or rather families) and larger groups such as clans, tribes, peoples or nations. Whether or not they are politically organized, it is very likely that, in such a situation, conflict will arise between the various groups in search of the best environment for their living and those already inhabiting these areas, who will attempt to defend their traditional, ancestral places and the living they gain from them.

The *colonus* or colonist becomes, once he systematically tries to improve his situation by putting himself into the place of his competitors, a colonialist. The colonialist does not simply till a piece of soil or tend a herd of cattle like a colonist or colonizer, but develops colonialism, which is aimed at making political, economic, cultural and other gains at the cost of his competitors and is often consolidated into colonial rule.

The beginning of modern colonialism, which developed in this way into colonial rule, is usually thought to have occurred around 1500, while its end is located around 2000, although for many observers it has simply been replaced by neo-colonialism. It has been a movement originating in Europe and extending to cover most other areas of the world.

**Why is colonialism a crime?**

But why is colonialism, or colonial rule, a crime or indeed – in view of its moral reprehensibility – a sin? Since the end of decolonization as a significant historical process in the 1980s, this might seem almost an illegitimate question. The crimes of colonialism have made colonialism itself a crime; they are hardly ever contested in present-day discourses and usually attributed to Europe. Europe has plundered its colonies and countless other territories all over the world. It has conquered and destroyed, killed and wounded, tortured and exterminated on an unprecedented scale. But this is not the real reason for the uncontested criminal character of colonialism. Both sides in these conflicts have committed what
today are considered heinous crimes. It is not even certain that the largest
toll of slaughter, plunder and torment in the course of European expa-
sion is to be attributed to the Europeans, who generally conquered and
ruled their colonial empires with a very small number of their own people
and compensated their deficit in numbers with huge contingents of native allies who became the actual perpetrators of a great part of what are now considered the crimes of colonialism. It is difficult to maintain that all or most of these allies of the Europeans were traitors and in reality have to be considered as victims of colonialism. All in all, it is not easy to decide to which side those involved into the history of colonialism belong, to the colonialists or to the colonized, to the perpetrators or to the victims.

**Foreign rule and war**

Taking these rough definitions as our point of departure, we will now proceed to take a broader look at the modern history of colonists and colonialists, colonization and colonialism. Although the terminology is mostly modern, the subject itself is quite old. There are always at least individuals or families moving or migrating into the territories of other families, groups, societies or states. Circumstances will dictate whether these migrants are welcomed or treated as competitors or even enemies. If land is scarce, migrants will soon be looked upon as intruders and foreigners. The more numerous they are, the more likely enmity will be. New arrivals may be harmless colonists initially, but may soon turn into colonialists. They and the region’s original inhabitants begin to compete amid growing conflict.

Now let us suppose there is scarcity of labor. Migrants will be encour-
gaed and looked upon rather as friends and helpers than as competitors or even enemies, at least as long as they are not turned into forced labor. In terms of language, race, descent, religion and similar characteristics, migrants and indigenous inhabitants may appear foreign to one another, yet subjectively they may look upon one another as friends.

**Positive and negative consequences of colonialism**

Colonialism is part of the political, social, economic, cultural, religious history of the whole world. What are its consequences? Colonists turning
into colonialists will frequently influence the balance of power in a certain area. Thus, to take one famous example, the Spaniards under Cortés became the decisive power in the intra-Mexican struggle between Aztecs and Tlaxcaltecs in the 1520s.

Much will depend on the extent of political unity immigrants maintain among themselves. Sometimes colonists will collaborate with indigenous people in order to fight other immigrants (or colonists). The important point to make is that we cannot really distinguish between immigrants and indigenous people for political purposes. This also applies to moral questions. In principle, it is not morally more reprehensible for an indigenous person to support colonialists than to combat them. Foreignness is not a natural category. Otherwise we would have to pretend that the degree of (natural?) enmity between two individuals or groups is exactly proportional to the increasing geographical distance that was originally between them.

If we were to attempt to strike a balance between positive and negative consequences of colonialism before 1500, it would be difficult to come to a clear-cut result, especially in the moral field. There was no generally accepted view and terminology of colonialism at this time. While today there is an uncontested difference between self-rule or independence and foreign rule, in the sense that foreign rule is always illegitimate, while self-rule is at least not necessarily illegitimate, in pre-modern times neither was viewed as such. One of the reasons for this may have been that ‘colonialism’ (in the sense the word received in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) did not play a very important part in history. Foreign rule was not consistently advancing. Rather it shifted continually.

This gradually changed after around 1500. Hitherto, the most important empires in history had mainly occupied contiguous territories, notably Rome and China. Now, maritime empires situated in at least two continents gained in significance, eventually becoming colonial empires, although this term had yet to come into being. Their strengths were in maritime technology and in the great geographical distance that separated the settlers’ places of origin from the places where they now became active. It was more difficult for immigrants from faraway parts of the world than for those from nearby to change sides. Gradually the concept of foreign rule emerged. It was, in a logical sense, an irrational concept, especially in
its idea of there being a moral difference between foreign and non-foreign rule. There is no guarantee that foreigners will be worse rulers than indigenous people. Yet here was a concept that might eventually permit the discrediting of foreign rule on moral grounds.

Behind this concept was another, even more important idea around the fundamental legitimacy (or illegitimacy) of foreign rule. In the early stages, colonialism was neither allowed nor prohibited; it was rather a fact, and often it was part of the business of empire-building. This changed with the formation and development of the great European maritime colonial empires from the sixteenth century onward. Two fundamentally different positions emerged during this period; both taken together defined and determined, in conflict and in combination, colonialism and its consequences in the centuries that followed.

The first of these positions was rooted in natural law and found its most influential expression in 1539 with the Spanish philosopher, lawyer and theologian Francisco de Vitoria. Vitoria postulated a right of all peoples (and states) to free settlement, trade and intercourse, and thus free colonization. This was a very radical position. It demanded, implicitly, that the riches of the world had to be shared, even with latecomers. But it was also a very dangerous view. Once it was accepted that every human being had a right to their share of the riches of the world, a refusal to participate in their distribution could be interpreted as a reason for a just war: if you did not receive your share, you could lawfully appropriate it. This had the potential to become a license for colonists (or rather colonialists) to take a great part of the land from the indigenous population – it could even become a permit to plunder. In theory this license was reciprocal. But in the circumstances of the European expansion of the period, it was essentially a one-sided affair to the advantage of the colonists. If you wanted your share, you had to seize it, and this meant you had to travel to the place where the riches were to be found. This ability to travel, to get to every corner of the world, was an almost exclusive privilege of the Europeans.

The second of these positions held the political entities of indigenous populations to be fully sovereign and entitled to decide whether they wanted to allow trade with and colonization by foreigners. This view accorded them more freedom and independence; if they wanted to remain among themselves, nobody had a right to enforce intercourse. Immanuel
Kant was to become the most influential advocate of this position. According to this view, indigenous peoples could refuse to admit migrants and traders, at least in principle. The basic supposition underlying this position was the fundamental freedom of all individuals and groups of people. In reality, however, this freedom was limited. Colonialists and colonial powers that were refused what they wanted quite often took to conquering and occupying it.

**Rationales for European superiority**

From around 1500, the European position in the world gradually gained strength. Europeans initially primarily explained this success by virtue of their technological superiority, which allowed them to maintain maritime strength and thus to keep non-Europeans away from the centers of European power. In consequence, it became attractive for many non-Europeans to participate in European colonization and colonialism in their own regions, even if this meant them having to accept a secondary position.

In time, explanations of European superiority and thus of the distribution of power in the world based on theories of mental advantage gained ascendancy and gradually turned racist, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This state of global power relations afforded indigenous peoples some opportunities; their states and other political entities could become allies of the Europeans, and their members could enter into the service of the colonists and the colonialists. But fundamentally, the outlook for non-Europeans was bleak. They had no chance of becoming settlers or colonists (and even less colonialists) in Europe, and in their own countries they had no chance of rising through the ranks. This had been different in earlier empires. The Mongols had become emperors of China ruling in China, not in Mongolia, while the Moguls were for a long period of time emperors of and in India. From the point of view of the colonized, the new situation demanded a radical change. It was a change initially brought about not by the colonized, but by the colonialists, yet later given momentum and completed by the colonized.

European expansion from approximately 1500 onward was primarily overseas in nature, which usually meant that there was a long distance
between the European center and the extra-European periphery of colonial empires. The frequency of long voyages tended to increase, which intensified conflict internal to colonial powers and among colonialist states. The principal struggle in this regard concerned maritime access routes to the colonies.

Within the societies of the colonial powers, there was one group deriving their power from the European center, consisting of such groupings as civil servants or army officers, and a second group, mainly consisting of settlers or colonists living overseas, seeking to increase their power base overseas. As long as they had strong adversaries among the indigenous population, both European groups found themselves required to work together. Once the indigenous forces had been reduced to insignificance, however, the decisive conflicts were those which took place between the (European) center of the colonial power and its (extra-European) periphery. The first colonists to be seriously involved in such a conflict were the British in North America; the issue culminated in the war of independence between 1776 and 1783. Soon afterwards, inspired by the success of the United States, the Latin American territories likewise achieved their independence. These developments entailed a further weakening of indigenous populations, which had always had a chance of playing off the various European colonial powers overseas, but which were unable to successfully play off the settlers overseas against the central administrations in Europe. Now the European capitals had lost their strength overseas to the new independent states. Washington was closer to and more dangerous for the Native Americans than was London.

The heyday of colonialism

Although the European states had by the 1820s lost much of their political power overseas, they were at the same time gaining, by the growth of modern industry and the development of superior weapons, enormous additional strength on a worldwide level. Colonialism reached its apogee when in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries European states, together with Japan and the United States, occupied most of the territories outside of Europe, America and China.
In this situation there were, in theory, two ways in which the ruled might improve their position: they could either attempt to increase their resistance or seek to take advantage of their own weakness. In the long run the second method proved more successful. It was mainly built upon moral considerations which had been developed in Europe but brought to political perfection in the colonies, and its foundation was the concept of nationalism, which was elaborated in Europe, especially in the nineteenth century.

The idea of nationalism asserted that a state was, historically speaking, not the result of power relations but of the character and the history and culture of a people or a nation. The nation became a kind of mystical unit of its members. If a people, or part of it, did not live within the state they wanted, they had a kind of natural right to build a new state or to separate from or to become part of an existing state. Any other state of things was held to be illegitimate. For colonies this meant that they had an automatic right to a state of their own, if they so wished.

The issue thus defined was referred to, from the 1850s onward, as the ‘right of self-determination of peoples’ or ‘national self-determination’. But the use of these terms became frequent only with the First World War and almost exclusively in Europe. Peoples that were genuinely able to exercise self-determination were thought to exist in Europe only. Colonial peoples were merely considered as subordinate annexes of European states. Nevertheless, it soon became difficult and even impossible to maintain this view. Once the right of self-determination had been defined, it was bound to be extended, as a postulate at least, to the whole world, to all those who considered themselves or were considered by others to be peoples, although the realization of such a state still seemed far away. During the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the US president Woodrow Wilson received petitions from colonial peoples all over the world calling for self-determination. While he was prepared to listen to the demands of some European peoples, he almost totally refused or ignored those from the colonies and from outside Europe in general, to the great disappointment of the colonized peoples. Further, the Covenant of the League of Nations did not contain the word ‘self-determination’, not even for European peoples. However, this was an issue that the world could no longer afford to ignore. Resistance to colonialism increased in the years between the two world wars, despite the fact that the area covered by the colonial empires still continued to expand somewhat after 1918.
The colonial powers became entangled in contradictions when they attempted to justify their actions with the idea of a ‘civilizing mission’. Once accepted, but then not kept, such justifications gradually lost their value. But there was one exception. Soon after the United States had become a ‘genuine’ colonial power in 1898, it promised independence, or self-determination, to the Philippines for a fixed date, a date postponed several times before the promise was eventually realized in 1946.

Decolonization remained a difficult affair, as some long and bloody colonial wars showed. It was a concession of the United States to the European colonial powers and an indication of the atmosphere of what would become the Cold War that there was still no clear-cut mention of a right to self-determination in the UN Charter, despite Soviet support for the colonies and the newly independent states.

**Decolonization since 1945**

All this said, we have reached a period in our overview in which practice was starting to outpace theory, primarily as a consequence of the Second World War. Beginning in 1946–1949 with a major part of the Asian colonial territories, decolonization began to accelerate enormously. Resistance to these developments on the part of the colonial powers became a rear-guard action. An official turning point of sorts arrived on December 14, 1960, with the passing of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514, which declared colonialism and colonial rule to be illegal and demanded its immediate and unconditional abolition. All peoples were declared to have a right to self-determination. Not one single state dared to vote against the resolution, and only nine abstained.

This was a great victory for the colonies, one which was further confirmed and strengthened on other occasions. In 1966, the two International Covenants on Human Rights declared self-determination to be the first and foremost human right. In 1970, colonialism was declared to be a crime.

**From power relations to human rights**

Decolonization has introduced a new principle into international life. Formerly, the distribution of the surface of the world among states was the mirror of the distribution of power between these states. The new basic
principle ushered in by decolonization asserts that every human being, or every community, has the right to live in the state in which he or she, or they, want to live. In theory, it is a convincing principle. But it is easy to see that in practice it can never be realized, at least not without serious impacts and conflicts. Does the principle really refer to the individual, or rather to collectives usually called peoples? If the individual has the right to make this decision, anarchy may ensue. If the collective decide as to the state they belong to, there will usually be minorities whose wishes are neglected. Furthermore, the wishes of both individuals and collectives can change over time, especially when the decisive criterion for belonging to a state also changes. When, for instance, in 1905/1906 the British divided Bengal administratively, there was opposition on the grounds that the Bengalis on both sides of the administrative border spoke a common language. In 1947 the criterion changed from language to religion, with the British partitioning Bengal into a Hindu and a Muslim part.

The politico-territorial order of the world will never fully correspond to the wishes of each individual or population. The result may give rise to disappointment: It is impossible to realize the idea of self-determination of peoples if this idea is taken to its logical conclusions. In the interests of peace and order, the international system has accepted several restricting factors which not only have little to do with justice and self-determination but which even deny them.

Decolonization leads to a postcolonial world, which is not synonymous with a just world. The restrictions pragmatism has placed on justice can best be seen in the history of the United States, whose independence gave birth to the basic principle of decolonization, that is, independence for territories either overseas or a long distance away overland; France and Vietnam might be one example. For contiguous territories, another principle usually has priority: the principle that each independent state has a right to its territorial integrity. This is incompatible with a right to self-determination, which necessarily implies a right to secession. This was the controversial point in the American Civil War, and the conflict’s resolution entailed a decision against self-determination. The South could refer to the parallels between the situation in 1861 and that of 1776. In both cases there was a seceding group claiming a right to self-determination. At least initially, the North did not refer to slavery in countering this claim, but
simply to the indissolubility of the Union. It refused to accept a secession, which in this context was essentially another word for independence. By winning the Civil War, the Union, long in advance of the decolonization which took place in the twentieth century, settled the basic principle of decolonization: that self-determination in its literal sense is restricted to colonial situations in a narrow geographical sense and that only colonial territories have a right to it. Thus, for example, for India self-determination meant independence from Britain, but not independence for Tamil Nadu from India. According to UN law, foreign rule in the sense of rule from overseas is usually illegal, even though it might be sanctioned by plebiscite (Gibraltar, Falklands/Malvinas).

A second general principle with immense consequences for the world order was introduced not just by the United States but by all independent American states. Known by the Latin term *uti possidetis*, it meant that the borders of decolonized states were to be identical with the colonial borders, either between the territories of the former colonial powers or within the colonial empires. The character of these borders was very variable; usually, however, their courses had little to do with justice and much with power relations and sometimes with economic convenience or administrative colonial-era arbitrariness. At first sight it may seem astonishing that both the new states in Latin America in the early nineteenth and those in Africa in the mid-twentieth century (the question was of lesser importance in Asia, but the principle even held there) eagerly adhered to *uti possidetis*. It was obvious, however, that the principle had the potential to prevent endless conflict. Thus another general principle, also deriving from the American Civil War, was confirmed: Self-determination was strictly limited to one single decision, when the people, in the course of decolonization, had the right to vote, or otherwise to decide in favor of independence. This is why West Germany, during the period of German partition, never found more than lukewarm support in the ‘Third World’ for its recourse to the principle of self-determination with regard to Germany as a whole; German reunification was certainly not a case of decolonization in the sense defined by the United Nations. Nevertheless, the Germans found some support. When in 1966 the International Covenants on Human Rights were passed by the United Nations, self-determination was not restricted to colonial peoples, but simply referred to ‘all peoples’. This, as a
principle, could hardly be rejected, but the decolonized world tried to keep its consequences within as a narrow a frame as possible. It is unlikely, for example, that there will be many further referenda on the independence of provinces of African states, as took place in Sudan.

**Conclusion**

Looking back, we will struggle to consider decolonization as a realization of justice in international relations through the abolition of colonialism. This would be a utopian view of the phenomenon. Although one major aspect of injustice in the international order – colonial rule – has almost completely disappeared, it has not simply been replaced by a just order. Post-colonialism is an advance on colonialism, but it is still far from an overarching order which delivers justice to all, as we can see in our own times. While in the period of colonialism relations between colonial powers and political entities overseas usually gave rise to a system of colonial rule, this no longer happens. There are still armed conflicts leaving behind winners and losers, but the winners cannot incorporate the losers into their possessions; it is difficult for them to find ways to develop a system of more or less indirect rule, as could be seen in Afghanistan and Iraq in particular. The legal advantages the conqueror can derive from his conquests have been minimized. Post-colonialism has been restricted by anti-colonialism. But we are yet to see the emergence of a just and equal world order from these developments.

**References**


An African Discourse on Colonialism and Memory Work in Germany

Introduction

The term ‘colonialism’ is over-used today and is connected with almost every military and administrative presence in a foreign country. But colonialism generally refers to a state’s political ambition to annex other people’s social and cultural areas of life in order to subject them to its authority and rule. The colonial moment is expressed not only through the simple unilateral extension of sovereignty and territorial rights, but also through economic exploitation, land expropriation, denial of the right to self-determination, etc.

In Africa, colonialism refers to the political systems established by France, England, Spain, Portugal, Germany, and Italy that involved violent occupation and the exercise of power overseas sanctioned by legality. Colonial tyranny in Africa began with the political implementation of the decisions adopted at the Berlin Conference of 1884/85, its essential principles of international law being the inviolability and the purity of colonial borders. Thus the European colonial powers managed to ban wars of aggression and prevent uprisings by African people.

The fact that colonial policy has a long history, however, in no way indicates that it should necessarily be accepted or legitimized. On the contrary, since its inception colonialism met with violent and intellectual opposition until African countries attained national sovereignty and territorial integrity. This article demonstrates the significance which colonialism has in Africans’ intellectual discourse and shows how the colonial question is discussed in Germany.


The critics of colonialism from the African perspective since the beginning of the Pan-African idea

The intellectual criticism of colonialism began around the end of the 19th century with the idea of Pan-Africanism, which had the goal of raising the awareness of all peoples of African origin worldwide of the ruthless territorial usurpations and occupations of the Europeans in Africa, and to make them feel equally concerned by them. The Pan-Africans strove for the freedom and unity of all the peoples of Africa, perceived colonialism as a barbaric and at the same time illicit act, which according to their conviction could only be ended by the common action of all historically aware people professing cultural ties with Africa.

Historically Pan-Africanism went back to a minority of Africans living in America, who had already founded the Back to Africa Movement and in this way wished to convince their compatriots, due to the unhindered and continuous racist discrimination, to return to Africa. This movement culminated in the founding of the Republic of Liberia in 1879 through the first returners. However, the term ‘Pan-Africanism’ itself dates back to the ‘African Association’ founded in 1897 by Henry Sylvester William (1869 – 1911) from Trinidad, which addressed the task of providing legal assistance for Africans living in Great Britain with the solution of their problems. As a lawyer in London, Sylvester even advised official delegations from Africa visiting the British crown on general questions of colonial law. In this way he became aware of the critical position of the African peoples in relation to the colonial powers’ policy of dispossession. Hence in 1900 he decided to organize a conference bearing the name ‘Pan-African Conference’, which endeavored to find strategies particularly for the protection of land. This was led to international solidarity for the promotion of the cultural and political emancipation of all black peoples.

The fact that the Afro-Americans prepared the way for the African ideology is witnessed by the involvement of figures such as Edward Wilmot

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Blyden (1832 – 1912), William Edward Burghardt Du Bois (1868 – 1963), Marcus Garvey (1887 – 1940), etc. They were convinced that it was only academic understanding would make it possible to fight the tyranny of colonialism at its roots, which in turn were connected with philosophical, economic, political and social theories (e.g. racial ideologies, etc.). In this way, the Pan-Africanism became the only academic ideology in favor of African emancipation.

Considered philosophically, Pan-Africanism has since served as an epistemology, i.e., a theory which has aided comprehension of African issues of life and existence, and on the other hand, as a set of ethics which sought to find the best rules and principles of action in dealing with colonial law and injustice, as well as with unrighteousness.⁴

From 1920 onwards, the intellectual discourse on colonialism was enriched by the entirely new concept of Négritude, which was no longer an ‘intellectual import’, and which quickly advanced to become the most important philosophical and academic category to decisively determine Africa’s process of emancipation over decades.

Originally Négritude⁵ was conceived as an affirmation of the African being. Its goal was to strengthen the self-confidence of the blacks suffering from colonialism and racism, who were victims of discrimination, oppression and humiliation. Although the Martinican Aimé Césaire created the word Négritude, it is nonetheless the Senegalese Léopold Sédar Senghor who gave it its theoretical meaning. Both attempted, on a poetic foundation, to create a philosophical platform for the promotion of the African consciousness. They were the first to understand colonialism as also being a racist phenomenon. With their conceptualization of the issue of race, Senghor and Césaire anticipated almost all the philosophical reflections on colonialism and neo-colonialism, and hence shaped the

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intellectual discourses of African modernity. In summary, *Négritude* was understood as:

(a) a literary current which united all writers and poets of African origin in the battle against European racism, and itself was not constructed on the basis of racism, but rather promoted common humanity and peaceful coexistence between the peoples;
(b) a cultural theory which had the goal of strengthening the consciousness of blacks of their culture and their African origin;
(c) a political ideology which strove for the unity of all blacks in the battle against the cultural dominance of the whites.

After 1945, the intellectual debates were no longer solely literary, but with Kwame Nkrumah and Frantz Fanon also took the shape of a new form of political and academic criticism. Unfortunately, the heads of state, who were themselves very involved in the anti-colonialist battle, neglected to construct a national and continental platform for intellectual debates immediately after the phase of dependency (1956–1961). They would only have needed to create the legal foundations to consistently promote dialogue between Africans on all issues concerning their continent, in the search for potential solutions for them. What is meant here is the legal foundations for free expression of opinion on political, cultural, social, religious and economic issues. In this way the path would no doubt have been cleared for the continuous education of competent leading figures, who today would be able to face the national and global challenges confidently. The situation of Africa would also doubtless be different in many areas today. Instead, a hunt was launched on free-thinking artists and academics. Hence up to the present day they, with their critical comments, are not infrequently exposed to religious and political persecution in some countries.

If the fear of intellectuals has clearly receded in the meantime, nonetheless resentment against them is still rife, as they are often made into scapegoats for the negative image of Africa. While the opposition parties in the intellectuals’ homeland flirted with them for tactical reasons, the established powers always viewed every form of intellectual activity highly skeptically, even stoking fears against them politically. The intellectuals themselves, however, do not see their activity as an act of superiority, but

The first category is that of the Optimists, who generally support an approach free of prejudices both towards European culture and toward the colonial past. They also demand reconciliation through cultural dialogue as well as economic cooperation, and they warn against always demonising European models or blaming the Europeans for all the undesirable developments in the respective African countries. For the Optimists, there is no alternative for the cultural, economic and technical progress of Africa other than forging ties with the west through the acquisition of its values. The Optimists have subjected themselves passively not only to colonialism, but also to the current neo-colonialism as well as globalization.

The second category encompasses the Pessimists, who not only see colonialism as being responsible for the disempowerment and desacralization of African cultures and traditions, but also criticise it in all its forms. The Pessimists justify their position with the argument that it is the Europeans who, without any provocation and of their own accord, came to Africa in order to intentionally kill the people living there, to drive them out of their home and homeland, or to subject them to their power and authority. In their view, colonialism led to the creation of societal situations which were not only against traditional unwritten law (family law, people’s rights, etc.), but were also incompatible with human dignity. The Pessimists distrust European theories and models of thought not least because to date they have scarcely contributed towards an adequate investigation by the west of the nature of colonialism, let alone describing its dimensions appropriately.
According to the view of the Pessimists, the cultural ideas from Europe prevent any search for truth on colonial injustice. Finally, the Pessimists uncompromisingly refuse to adapt to the western system, insofar as it may lead to the Europeans intentionally driving the African continent into cultural, political and economic crisis, in order to make its elites intellectually and financially dependent on them and hence to manipulate over a long period of time. They therefore see no difference between colonialism and neo-colonialism, because the latter is also based on greed for profit, selfishness and unscrupulous exploitation, and serves exclusively to secure the prosperity of the rich industrial countries at the cost of weaker states of Africa. In the view of the Pessimists, independent development of Africa is only possible through a distancing from western ideologies together with a simultaneous retrospective reflection on African roots. This, however, does not mean a relapse into an atavistic and unknown tradition. All that is desired is to counteract the increasing historical illiteracy, particularly in young Africans, by making them able to understand and value the authentic ethical and metaphysical values of Africa.

The third category is that of the Neutralists, also called the Neo-optimists, who neither oppose an association with the west nor support a dissociation of Africa from it. What is of decisive importance for Africa, from the point of view of the Neo-optimists, is not the question of the origin of a model of thought, but rather whether this model is suitable to promote the economic and technical progress of the countries of Africa. They warn not least against political compromises and dogmatic positions in Africa which lead to unnecessary stagnation or loss of time. The Neutralists wish to mediate between the rival tendencies, in order to move them towards an objective discussion. They therefore warn against all blind optimism, as well as against intransigent pessimism, because both positions can change respectively into an irrational illusion. Instead they recommend realism and objectivism.

What logic, then, does the intellectual discourse have? The logic is connected with the goal of reaching a societal consensus that the undesirable developments and problems of the countries of Africa, individually or collectively, are not subject to natural laws which cannot be captured or explained with the African mind. The logic of the discourse also aims to
effectively use the intellectual potential of Africans for economic, political and social purposes.

**Colonialism in the remembrance debates of the Germans**

While critical discussions relating to colonialism continue in Africa openly and almost without any taboos, until recently scarcely any intensive and factual consideration of the colonial past took place in Germany in particular. The shameful events dating from the colonial period were either for a long time reported to the public in an overly one-sided Eurocentric manner, or were simply concealed. It therefore remains a great failing, particularly on the part of academics, that many colonial issues have not been dealt with comprehensively.

The fact that the German Empire was a colonial power (1884–1918) and had territorial holdings in Cameroon, East Africa (present-day Tanzania), South-West Africa (present-day Namibia) and Togo, and the remembrance of this period, was erased in many Germans’ memory a long time ago, particularly after the Second World War. Particularly the intensive occupation since 1945 with the brutal experiences during National Socialist dictatorship brought about a general tendency to forget other historical periods and events, including the colonial past.

In general, the attitudes of the Germans towards colonial history as early as the period of German division (1949–1990) were emotional rather than rational, and therefore continually through the various reports presented by the media. However, the significance which is currently assigned to colonialism also depends essentially on the image of Africa which is conveyed by the information and communication media. It can be derived from the current situation that with respect to colonial consciousness of remembrance, the Germans have a trivalent relationship with Africa:

First, Africa remains an unforgotten continent for the Germans insofar as its geographical division, which is valid up to today, was carried out in 1884/1885 in Berlin, the capital of Germany. This historical event, which has engraved itself firmly in the memory of history-conscious Germans, partly determines their emotional attitude towards Africa. Hence they often tend to attribute most conflicts and wars between African ethnic groups to the colonial frontiers drawn up in the continent.
Secondly, Germany owes its historical reputation as a colonial power to its overseas possessions, particularly in Africa. Germans who are aware of this fact are highly sensitive regarding the problems in Cameroon, Namibia, Tanzania and Togo, and gladly support projects of the state, the church and private organizations in Africa which promote development.

Thirdly, Africa is the place in which the German Empire, through the loss of its colonies during the First World War, is thought to have shown its first weakness in world politics. In memory of this ‘bitter’ experience, all Germany governments, in my opinion, have taken a hesitant and very reticent position on any foreign political or military involvement in Africa in particular.

These three aspects are, in any case, a concise presentation of the components of German remembrances of Africa as a colonial scene. What was seen as a reason for suppression of the past between 1918 and 1945, namely the feeling of shame – caused not by the crimes committed against Africans, but by inferiority compared with England and France in the competition for the colonies – should have no more legitimacy in a united Europe.

In the question of German involvement in the colonization of Africa, opinions vary: the Historical Patriots, who are convinced advocates of European civilization and German nationalism, contrast with the Historical Humanists, who decry without any compromise the territorial annexing of African regions, and place Germany on the same level as other colonial powers.

The Historical Patriots, for their part, defend an extremist Eurocentric and at the same time a very contradictory position: one the one hand they assume a homogeneous European civilization contrasting with highly heterogeneous and fragmented living environments in Africa, which according to their firm conviction were very foreign and closed to the Europeans.

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7 However, the experiences of defeat in the Second World War and the associated human losses also strengthened the foreign political reticence of the Germans.
8 On 28 June 1918 in Versailles, the end of the German colonial empire was sealed in international law, and the colonial areas of East Cameroon and Togo were transferred to France, West Cameroon and Tanzania to the United Kingdom, and Rwanda and Burundi (even if they are not always well-known as German colonies) to Belgium.
They see every form of colonial intervention in Africa as the only appropriate method to disseminate and assert European civilization. Hence Germany, according to the view of the Historical Patriots, had merely provided its contribution towards civilization. On the other hand, for the Patriots the Germans were unfortunate victims of colonial history, insofar as they lost all overseas areas through their defeat in the war, and hence were no longer able to carry out their civilizing task completely.

The category of Historical Patriots includes academics as well as adventurous travelers, business migrants and missionaries, whose books report almost exclusively of courageous and heroic achievements of the Germans in the colonies. They attribute the failure of Europe’s civilizing mission exclusively to the heterogeneity of the cultures and peoples of Africa. The Historical Patriots do not even mention the gravest errors of colonial policies, such as genocides, forced labor, dispossession of land, displacement, exploitation, etc., or simply exclude them. In this way they have constructed a monolithic system of suppressing the past, rendering colonialism harmless, and exorcising injustice, with which they either falsify every form of academic objectivity or subject it to the Eurocentric subjectivism.

For the Humanists, however, the German Empire was indisputably a colonial power, admittedly not from its proclamation in 1871, but from the 1884/85 Congo Conference in Berlin onwards, up to the end of the First World War in 1918. Hence they argue in favor of carrying out the remembrance debates in a manner which is free of ideology and without excessive patriotic feeling, so that the colonial phase enters into

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9 Historical Patriotism began with the arguments in support of European imperialism and colonialism. Their most important ideological precursors were, among others, Friedrich Gotthardt Karl Ernst Fabri (1824–1891) and Wilhelm von Hübbe-Schleiden (1846–1916). While many entrepreneurs, missionaries and academics openly identified with this theory between 1918 and 1939, today no German dares to profess it publicly.

10 The interesting book of Leo Frobenius also entirely excludes the cruelties of the colonial administration: Frobenius, Leo. 1913. *Unter den unsträflichen Äthiopen.* Berlin; in many books the ‘colonial heroes’ are remembered with pleasure such as Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck (1870–1964), who as General is said to have gained victory over the English troops in the First World War in East Africa.
people’s consciousness as an unerasable period in German history. In their investigations the Humanists study some realities and even follow some obscene issues (e.g. about genocides), without concealing the guilt of Germany in the crimes and cruelties practised in Africa.\textsuperscript{11}

In recent years Historical Humanists have presented some very brilliant and value-neutral studies which do justice do both European and, in part African epistemic interests. It is thanks to them that increasingly young people no longer interpret colonial events solely with cynical metaphors. They have thereby learnt their lessons from the archaic Eurocentric handling of history and the accompanying principle of the subordination of objectivity under patriotic emotional thinking. It is to the credit of the Historical Humanists not only that colonialism is gradually being incorporated into current debates of remembrance, but also that it has become an interdisciplinary research field on which philosophers, linguists and ethnologists with different methods and positions are working together.\textsuperscript{12}

However, a true discipline of remembering which is intended to do justice to its ethics and its historical task can only be the product of egalitarian cooperation between African and European researchers. The future discipline of remembering will have three important functions:

(a) a synthetic and communicative function consisting of balancing and reconstructing the negative and positive impulses of the colonial period such that they can be presented in a clear schema of interpretation;


\textsuperscript{12} The topic of remembrance is largely overlaid by debates on National Socialist and Communist dictatorship. In this context we may call to mind the discussion triggered by the former president Richard von Weizsäcker in his speech of 8 May 1986, when he declared, ‘Whoever does not want to remember inhumanities becomes prone to new dangers of infection,’ or the speech by Federal President Roman Herzog ‘Remembrance must not end’ on 27 January 1996, which was held on the ‘Day of Remembrance of the Victims of National Socialism’. Moreover, it is astonishing that the most recent standard books on German places of remembrance simply leave out the colonial locations. See for instance Hahn, Hans Henning, and Eva Hahn. 2010. \textit{Die Vertreibung im deutschen Erinnern. Legenden, Mythos, Geschichte}. Paderborn. Carcenac-Lecomte, Constance, et al. (eds.). 2000. \textit{Steinbruch: Deutsche Erinnerungsorte. Annäherungen an eine deutsche Gedächtnisgeschichte}. Frankfurt/Main.
(b) a retrospective function which makes a comprehensible chronological historical view on colonial events possible;
(c) a prospective function, which aims to continue researching on colonialism, so that it does not disappear from people’s collective memory even in the future.

Closing remarks

While remembrance discourses on colonialism have been led very marginally by a minority of ethnologists and historians, they take place in Africa in poetry, philosophy, theology, literature, art, etc. However, in the process Africans reflect critically both on European politics and civilization and on orally transferred modes of life. With this bivalent methodical reflection, they associate the hope of finding objective answers to the issues (a) of increasing social inequality and injustice (b) on the unhampered exploitation of the natural human resources of Africa, (c) on the continuing practice of the right of the stronger party, etc.

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Part 2: Narratives
Florian Wagner

The Pitfalls of Teaching a Common Colonial Past

Colonial Internationalism and the Invention of a Shared European History (1830s-1960s)

Colonial historiography lives through a period of transnational reorientation. The global turn has not spared colonial historians and indeed strengthened their position. Therefore, they happily picked up the new trend and engaged in rewriting colonial history from an international, transnational or European point of view. A broader perspective, they claim, helps to overcome the methodological nationalism that historians had chosen to explain colonial history throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As a result, textbooks continue to stress the linearity between nationalism and colonialism, while a new generation of global historians ascribes historiography the task to sensitize for nationalist narratives and broaden the scope of historical thinking by introducing transnational approaches.¹ Many of these innovative authors claim to be the first to explore trans-imperial encounters between colonizers – with special regard to mutual exchanges and learning processes. Their asserted pioneer spirit, however, obliterates a long history of internationalism in colonial historiography. This article unveils the long tradition of transnational historiographies and the political and politicized contexts from which they emerged. The main

intention of this essay is to show that a transnational historiography of colonialism is not as young as many claim – and certainly less innocent than it seems at first sight.

Hardly any recent account on colonialism fails to emphasize the necessity of internationalizing the colonial past. ‘Colonial historiography’, Ann Stoler and Frederick Cooper warn us, ‘has been so nationally bound that it has blinded us’ to transnational phenomena. In order to fully understand colonialism, we need to analyze the ‘pan-imperial European moral and legal order.’ Other historians go even further and declare colonialism a distinctively European lieu de mémoire. They claim that a shared past overseas provided the basis for a common Western identity back home.

This attitude is genuinely new, as Europeans previously refused to assume collective responsibility for colonial expansion. In the face of post-colonial accusations – as eloquently rendered in Aimé Césaire’s ‘Europe colonisatrice’ – Europeans were stuck for an answer. Already in the 1950s, Césaire had blamed Europe to be a degenerated civilization that had to assume collective responsibility for its colonial crimes – which it had committed in the name of humanity.

Some of the recent initiatives go as far as turning the notion of Césaire’s ‘Europe colonisatrice’ upside down, by re-interpreting colonial expansion as a positive reference for a united Europe in the making. Unlike Césaire, the more recent manifestations of a common European colonial identity tend to shift the essence of collective remembering from a Tätergemeinschaft (community of perpetrators) to an Erinnerungsgemeinschaft (community of remembrance).

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5 This also gives room to apologies of Empire. British historian Niall Ferguson, for example, lamented in his TV documentary ‘Empire. How Britain made the modern World’ the stigmatization of empire as ‘something we should say a collective sorry for.’ See for that debate: Morefield, Jeanne. 2014. ‘The Empire Whisperer: Niall Ferguson’s Misdirection, Disavowal, and the Perilousness of Neoliberal Time’. In Morefield, Jeanne (ed.). Empires Without Imperialism. (ed.). Oxford: 133–68.
If we qualify these revisionist tendencies as apologies or not, only a few historians have attempted to analyze a common Western or European colonial past from an explicitly postcolonial and critical perspective. Andrew Zimmerman exposed racist patterns of thinking in the joint effort by Western colonizers to introduce cotton to the German colony of Togo. By involving the expertise of black cotton planters from Alabama, European colonial administrators racialized the black workers’ economic role as cotton planters.6 Ulrike Linder described imperial encounters between British and German colonizers in their African colonies and argued that they cooperated closely in order to enforce colonial rule on Africans.7 New studies are under way that critically analyze various forms of pan-imperial orders.8 By the same token, comparative literature on empires and imperial societies is growing considerably. The contributors to these mostly edited volumes occasionally address transnational transfers and shared identities. So far, no single author dared to tie them together into a comprehensive colonial history based on inter-imperial comparison.9 Nevertheless, the comparative and trans-imperial perspectives allow them to paint a bigger picture that enables us to combine existing threads into a comprehensive narrative. In order to develop that narrative and make

it teachable, however, we have to be aware of previous explanations and former misinterpretations of a shared colonial history. This essay therefore focuses on the history of the historiography that referred to a common colonial past.

Although following the trend of transnational history, I challenge two of its main assumptions: I question the idea that colonial historiography has never been European, transnational or ‘international.’ And I refute the notion that scholars assume a global perspective for the first time. Instead, I will argue that, as early as the nineteenth century, intellectuals from all colonizing countries tried to invent a common colonial past. Traces of such ideas can be found in often neglected colonialist historiographies, from the 1830s through the 1960s. During this period, colonial theorists and activists sought for common models of colonization and fostered international exchange. By unveiling colonialist concepts of a shared colonial past, I would like to show that transnationalist historiography is not more ‘innocent’ than nationalist historiography. Instead, transnationalism is deeply inscribed in the colonizers’ self-perceptions. This article therefore wants to make postcolonial historians aware of the historical link between colonization and transnationalism, as well as the political use and meaning of this symbiosis.

The colonizers from Europe and the West shared a colonial tradition, which was constantly renegotiated—according to the necessities and circumstances of their situative presents. I distinguish four ideal-type phases of colonialist history writing. The first phase starts in the mid-nineteenth century, when colonial historians dismissed the colonial prerogatives of the Ancien Regime, which had failed in Haiti and elsewhere. In accordance with the classicistic tendencies of the time, they turned to Antiquity instead, in search for a sort of archetype model for European colonization. As we will see, the colonial classicists ultimately valued Germanic models over Roman schemes. The second phase between the 1890s and 1914 is dominated by the non-governmental International Colonial Institute (ICI), a colonial think tank whose members embraced the concept of colonial autonomy. They considered themselves colonial experts, who tried to act more independently of the ‘motherlands’. Colonial historians in the ICI found the origins of colonial autonomy in the debates following the emancipation of the colonies during the French Revolution. The third phase is
the period between the two world wars, when mutual accusations to have failed in the colonial mission reached a climax. However, transnational dialogues emerged from this debate and finally led to reconciliation and the revival of internationalist ideals among the colonizers. The fourth and last phase precedes the era of decolonization. It opposes Western internationalist historiography to Communist anti-imperial historiography. Both competed for the approval of subaltern authors, who started to contribute to colonial historiography. Their appearance as historiographical actors marked a further step in the ‘internationalization’ of colonial history writing.

The analysis of the colonizers’ historiography does not only reveal their international mentalities. To a greater degree, it allows us to identify the specific historical situations in which they intentionally evoked an international past – or consciously denied it. This again helps us to understand how colonizers used the concept of internationalism in particular historical moments. Unlike those who call for a transnational turn in colonial history, I would like to propose a more careful and critical approach: by showing that the international pasts of the colonial had constantly been reinvented and reshaped. This constructivist approach to the concept of internationalism and colonialism places itself within a broader context of critical, postcolonial studies.

Constructivism is conducive to reveal the contexts in which colonizers thought of themselves as internationalists. Thus, it was the context of the colonization of North Africa since 1830, which provoked classicist debates about the role of the Roman model. The colonial internationalism since the 1890s, instead, aimed to improve cooperation between colonial experts, like those in the International Colonial Institute. In the context of the First World War’s legacy, mutual accusations dominated the interwar period. But this transnational dialogue also triggered the interest in the ‘empire of the Other’ and ultimately led to new forms of colonial cooperation by the 1930s. Finally, the Cold War setting after 1945 opposed the Communist and the Western internationalism of colonial history writing. Both claimed to be more internationalist than the other by integrating native historians in their respective camp. This article analyzes the particular historical contexts in which colonizers combined the concepts of colonization and internationalism to legitimize the colonial project.
The search for common origins: Colonialist historiography and the Roman model

Colonization and colonialism as dynamic concepts rose to prominence in the nineteenth century only. Prior to the Sattelzeit, when essential political concepts of modernity emerged, expansionist projects were rarely couched in colonial terms: the Iberian possessions in the Americas belonged to the realm of composite monarchies (vice-royalties), British and Dutch presence in India served a commercial purpose (East India Companies) and French rule in the Antilles backed planter aristocrats, who were not colonists in the strict sense of the word, but constantly travelled between the Old and the New World.10 While the term colonization had its origins in the mid-eighteenth century, it unfolded its full semantic power in the mid-nineteenth century, when fifty million Europeans left the Old World as emigrants and settled in the new World as colonists. Finally, it was not until the beginning of the twentieth century that the word colonialism entered European vocabulary. It was the French socialist Paul Louis who invented the term to denounce colonial lobbyists and their aggressive promotion of overseas expansion. Capitalists equally got their share, as both Paul Louis in his Le Colonialisme (1905) and John A. Hobson in Imperialism. A Study (1902) blamed them for using colonies to continue economic expansion.11

Unlike these anticolonial authors, the first colonial theorists of the nineteenth century searched the past for the origins of colonialism. They were


aware of colonialism’s plural roots and tried to identify different types of colonies that humanity had seen in its history. When positivist science set out to categorize and catalogue the world, just by fitting these taxonomies into evolutionary patterns of thinking, colonial theorists did not stand by idly. Theorists like the French Jules Duval (1813–1870) and Prosper Enfantin (1796–1864), the British Herman Merivale (1806–1874) and Edward Gibbon Wakefield (1796–1862), the German Wilhelm Roscher (1817–1894), and the Belgian Émile Banning (1836–1898) dominated colonial historiographies in the nineteenth century. Most of them were actively involved in colonial projects. With the end of the century approaching, innumerable colonial theorists joined them, mostly members of colonial learned societies like the International Colonial Institute (ICI), who also established colonial sciences at European universities. Among them were Paul Leroy-Beaulieu (1843–1916), Joseph Chailley (1854–1928), Alfred Zimmermann (1859–1925), Édouard Deschamps (1847–1933) and many others. Intending to analyze the colonial phenomenon with ‘scientific’ means, these authors first set out to identify its origins.

Searching for colonial archetypes, all colonial theorists of the nineteenth century claimed that colonial expansion originated in Antiquity. For them, the classical age divided history into a primordial period of ‘instinctive’ migration and a new phase of planned colonization. While the pre-historic times had already known migration as a recurrent pattern based on instinctive behavior, colonization required careful planning. Thus, authors like Wakefield described the mere fact of migration as an a-historic, anthropological drive inherent to all humans. Colonization, instead, appeared to be an act of historical engineering, a voluntary attempt by the civilized part of humanity to bring about the world’s evolution by colonizing the uncivilized. Unlike migration, European theorists claimed, colonization was intrinsically linked to civilization and progress. Antiquity crossed the threshold, and turned instinctive migration into civilized colonization. Seen from the evolutionary perspective of nineteenth-century colonial theorists, the emergence of colonization marked the transition from a-historical to historical times.12

According to these colonial classicists, the classical era gave birth to both colonial and civil concepts. Nineteenth century Europe would use them to polish its own identity and would integrate them as an essential myth of its origins. Just as civilization, French colonial theorist like Jules Duval argued, so too colonization was an art that originated in Antiquity and was refined by Europeans over the course of time. The relation between civilization and colonization was one of pre-condition and consequence. Colonial expansion overseas, in particular, demanded long-term preparation and skills like shipbuilding and navigation. Only civilizations might provide the basis for such a complex process of colonial expansion. Colonization was therefore an expression and a consequence of civilization. Without any doubt, Ancient Greece and Rome were considered landmarks of civilizational development and they introduced colonization as the purposeful transfer of humans, which required careful planning.\(^13\)

Yet, while the conceptual origins of colonization were found in Antiquity, these concepts did not necessarily serve as a timeless model for nineteenth-century colonization. In most modern treatises about colonial theory, the Phoenicians and Carthaginians earned the merit to be pioneers of overseas expansion. Opinions were divided, however, on the question whether their contribution could be qualified as truly colonial. The fact that Phoenicians and Carthaginians had been traders rather than settlers, and had developed no colonial mission beyond material interests, opposed them to late nineteenth century concepts of the civilizing mission.\(^14\)

Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, the most important French colonial theorist and ICI member, doubted their colonial character and rather labeled them trade


empires. He claimed that overseas traders from Phoenicia to early-modern Portugal showed a similar inclination to establish commercial trading posts, without aiming at a visionary colonization. According to him, the Portuguese commercial expansionism in the East, for example, ‘did not want to possess the Indies themselves, but the commerce of the Indies.’

Colonial theorists had tested, but ultimately dismissed Phoenician, Carthaginian or Portuguese expansions as the origin of colonial mentalities. Instead, the Romans and the Greek competed for the title of truly colonial pioneers. Both had delivered the essential colonial vocabulary that was still in use in the nineteenth century. The Greek had invented the concept of the metropolis or the ‘motherland’ that sent out its citizens to create offshoots overseas. The Romans had delivered the concept of the ‘colonial’, which combined the ideas of agricultural cultivation and human settlement. For several reasons, colonial theorists of the nineteenth century favored the Greek model over the Roman one.

The dismissal of the Roman approaches to colonization had much to do with contemporary debates about the nature of French expansion in Algeria since 1830. As soon as the French conquest of Algeria brought the Roman presence in North Africa back to the minds of Europeans, the latter drew analogies with their ancient predecessors. But despite Rome’s persisting prestige as an Empire, its colonial attempts failed to provide modern colonizers with a model. By the 1850s, the French imitation of Roman military colonies in Algeria – settling veterans in the conquered lands – had proven a disaster. French general governor Thomas Robert Bugeaud (1784–1849) had tried to establish military colonies during the 1840s, but finally had to back down and concede to civil concepts of

colonization. Most of the senior members of Bugeaud’s African army preferred returning to France instead of settling Algeria. Those army members who stayed were not believed apt to accomplish a civilizing mission—which consisted in demilitarizing the administration and replacing it by a civil bureaucracy. The military presence ran counter to the civil purpose. Enfantin Prosper, one of the many French opponents to Bugeaud’s military colonization, added that the army members were male only, while the colonies lacked female settlers to produce a progeny that would allow creating a new society overseas.

The most valid argument against the Romans’ scheme was their ultimate failure to colonize overseas territory. Several authors blamed the Roman Empire for its shortsighted colonial policy in North Africa. This criticism included the notion that Romans had applied inappropriate colonial ‘methods’ to guarantee an enduring colonial presence there. As early as 1843, Prosper Enfantin argued that Romans had administered their territories in North Africa, and governed them at best. Never, however, had they colonized the Southern Mediterranean shore in the true sense of the word: by sending Roman families there, who would have guaranteed reproduction and therefore a substantiated colonization. Instead, the Roman attempts of military colonization had left no ‘traces sensibles’. ‘In Algeria’, Enfantin complained, ‘it seems evident that the Roman race cannot be found anywhere, despite seven centuries of occupation, despite the ruins of giant monuments and roads that they built there.’ The Vandals and Arabs, who followed them, were way more effective colonizers. They brought their families to the territory, who were predominantly ‘familles de cultivateurs’ and actually colonized the country by combining settlement, reproduction and cultivation. Unlike in Italy’s terra ferma, where

17 Prosper, Enfantin. 1843. *Colonisation de l’Algérie*. Paris: 27. These arguments, forwarded by Prosper Enfantin, have to be interpreted in the context of his rivalry with the military general governor of Algeria, Bugeaud, who advocated soldier-colonists in the 1840s: See also
the Romans established real colonies with the help of families, they only sent military colonists to North Africa.

Assuming that only small-scale cultivation by European families enabled sustained colonization, Enfantin denounced that only six big landowners had divided Roman Africa among themselves. He took this information from Pliny’s Natural History, and in doing so, followed Edward Gibbon. Gibbon had cited the same passage from Pliny some years earlier, to substantiate his thesis of the fall and decline of the Roman Empire: ‘And if the truth be confessed, large estates have been the ruin of Italy, and are now proving the ruin of the provinces too — half of Africa was owned by six landlords, when the Emperor Nero put them to death.’

The decline of Rome in North Africa, Enfantin stated, was due to the shortsighted creation of huge latifundia that were cultivated predominantly by slaves and not by Roman families. This was not colonization, as Enfantin emphasized: ‘Yes, the Romans possessed Africa, like they possessed all the provinces of their Empire. But they did not cultivate it.’

It was exactly here that Enfantin – guided by Saint-Simonian principles – drew an analogy with the French presence in Algeria. Like most of the colonial theorists of his times, Enfantin advocated colonization with ‘petits colons’ (small-scale peasant-colonists) in Algeria, instead of ceding the possessions to aristocratic speculators. He warned the French to not repeat the errors committed by the Romans.

According to Enfantin, colonization was more than mere occupation. It was a transitory occupation to develop the country economically and to civilize it. The essential pre-condition of such a sustainable development seemed to be the ‘petits colons’ and their families who settled the land and founded a new society. At the same time, the native population should be given a chance to contribute to the development, instead of being enslaved by big landowners who imitated the Roman model.


But the rejection of the Roman model had even deeper roots in philosophical conceptions of colonization. The Roman way of colonizing the Italian *terra ferma* was said to result in the assimilation of the ‘natives’. This was the case with most of the colonies the Romans created on the Italian peninsula and beyond. The most important German colonial theorist, Wilhelm Roscher, described the Roman colonies as military colonies, in which the settlers – soldiers-citizens from Latium – kept their Roman civil rights. In Greater Rome, citizenship was soon extended to the conquered people living in or near these colonies. A first degree of legal assimilation consisted of granting them ‘civitas sine suffragio’ and the ‘commercium’ (the right to trade with Romans according to Roman commercial law). Finally, the integral body of Roman law was transferred from Latium to these colonies.23

Joseph Chailley-Bert, the founder of the ICI, agreed that these assimilative practices made up the essence of Roman colonization:

In the beginning, the Romans created a belt of allied kings and imposed a political constitution on the conquered peoples. This is what we call a protectorate... but soon, the Romans went well beyond that: they imposed administrative laws (leges dates) on the conquered peoples; they created several Roman colonies in the very heart of foreign territories; they founded municipalities and gave them charters; they tried to control the jurisdiction; everywhere, they appointed their own prefects and magistrates; they changed everything for the sake of a unified system...the native government collapsed, they built a new government and instead of protecting them, they annexed the territory [translation F.W.].24

24 Chailley-Bert, in ICI CR 1899, 456: ‘Au début, les Romains se font une ceinture de Rois allies et ils imposent aux Etats conquis une constitution politique; cela, d’est du pur protectorat...Mais bientot les Romains vont plus loin: ils imposent aux peuples des lois administratives (leges dates); ils établissent de nombreuses colonies romaines au Coeur même de des territoires étrangers; ils fondent des municipes, ils délivrent des chartes aux municipalités; ils interviennent dans l’administration de la justice; ils substituent la langue latine à la langue indigène; ils imposent partout la monnaie romaine; ils établissent partout leurs préfets et leurs magistrats. Et alors, ayant touché à tout, ayant, par amour de l’unité de système, tout altéré et tout stérilisé de ce qui était avant eux, ils sont conduits à
Chailley described Roman colonization as a process of legal assimilation and political annexation. Those concepts resembled the French approach in colonizing modern Algeria, which France annexed in 1848. By declaring northern Algeria French departments, the French pursued a strategy of legal assimilation, which coincided with settler colonization. Chailley himself, however, objected to the Algerian-cum-Roman model of assimilation and advocated colonial ‘association’.\textsuperscript{25} Assimilation, Chailley argued, was too expensive for the metropolis. The colonization of Algeria had cost the French taxpayer a fortune. Association, instead, was a system of indirect rule that allowed the colonizers to exploit the colonies without spending too much money. Therefore, Chailley and the majority of colonial theorists at the \textit{fin de siècle} dismissed the Roman model of assimilation and sought to replace it by association. His opinion was representative for the International Colonial Institute and its members.

Assimilation was diametrically opposed to the colonial theories of the outgoing nineteenth century. Especially Roman cultural assimilation fell afoul of prevalent theories on racial difference. Roman legal assimilation came with a particular form of cultural syncretism.\textsuperscript{26} Roman expansion was built on the incorporation of the conquered gods into its pantheon, along with the fusion of central and local culture and customs.\textsuperscript{27} This incorporation highly contradicted the \textit{fin de siècle} ideologies of difference that grounded in cultural relativism and racial purity. Following racist theories by Gustave Le Bon, the ICI members were convinced that racial mixture would lead to the decline of the superior race. As a consequence, the Roman colonial syncretism was never an option for the colonial theorists of the outgoing nineteenth century.

Paul Leroy-Beaulieu added that the Roman concept was dated, because it was grounded in an old-fashioned doxa of Roman law. Roman law stipulated that the colony belonged to the motherland ‘without restriction or

\textit{recréer tout de toutes pieces; le Gouverneur indigène s’effondre, ils rebattissent un Gouvernement nouveau; et ayant pas su protégér, ils annexent’}


warrant; it owed obedience and services to the motherland and received protection instead.’ The relation between motherland and colony therefore equaled the relationship between father and son in Roman law. Unlike this authoritarian model, Leroy-Beaulieu asserted, the impact of moral and political progress had led Europeans to rethink colonial relations in the nineteenth century. He proclaimed a new era that took the interests of both colonizers and natives into account. Natural law had replaced Roman law as a source of justice and stipulated that ‘all societies are equal, and none of them, as small and young they might be, can be sacrificed to an older or bigger society’. Thus, he delivered another reason to reject Roman colonization and Roman concepts as a basis for common European colonialism.

Instead of finding their common origin in Roman concepts of colonialism, the ICI experts regarded it as a reason for a divide among Europeans. In accordance with early racial theories, they asserted that there was a ‘Germanic’ or ‘Anglo-Saxon’ way of colonial occupation that was diametrically opposed to the ‘Latin’ program of colonial assimilation. Obviously, the Romans had introduced the ‘Latin’ way of colonization. But the peoples of Roman origin then perpetuated it: the Spanish in the Americas, the Portuguese in Brazil and the French in Algeria. The practice of distinguishing inner-European races according to their respective colonial ‘character’ was a recurrent pattern in nineteenth century colonial theory. Chailley was only one voice in the chorus of colonial experts who rejected the Latin tradition. Roman style assimilation had caused enormous costs during conquest and colonization of overseas territories like in Algeria. Moreover, it had ultimately

28 ‘La colonie était en perpétuelle minorité elle appartenait sans réserves ni garanties à la métropole; elle lui devait obéissance et service en retour de la protection qu’elle recevait situation vraiment analogue à celle du fils de famille dans le vieux droit romain. Sous l’influence du progrès des idées morales et politiques, et aussi par une conception plus juste de l’intérêt véritable des deux parties, les principes se modifièrent on en vint à des notions plus conformes au droit naturel, qui veut que toutes les sociétés soient égales entre elles et qu’aucune, si petite et si jeune qu’elle soit, ne soit sacrifiée à une plus ancienne et à une plus grande.’ Leroy-Beaulieu. Paul. 1882. *De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes*. 2nd ed. Paris: XIII.
resulted in equally expensive wars of decolonization, like in the Spanish and Portuguese cases. Their colonial past suggested that the same might happen to Algeria as well.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the most influential colonial theorists, among them Paul-Leroy-Beaulieu and Joseph Chailley, claimed that the Anglo-Saxon and the Germanic (predominantly Dutch) ‘associationist’ way of colonization had proven a much more profitable enterprise. Colonial newcomers like the Belgians under Leopold II or the Germans who created ‘protectorates’ in Africa, thought along the same line. The Roman model had served its time. Europeans did not find their common origins in Roman colonialism anymore.

However, the international debate about the Roman origins of colonialism and the rejection of its assimilative colonial policy resulted in a new form of colonial solidarity. By the 1890s, all colonial theorists embraced associationist models. Even countries like France, Spain or Portugal, who generally claimed their Roman heritage, turned to the ‘Germanic’ counter model. The latter was ascribed to the British and the Dutch who stood for a ‘modern’ way of colonizing. Those ‘Germanic’ countries did not follow the Roman model of legal assimilation or cultural incorporation. Instead, they stressed a rather utilitarian approach over any ‘historical’ legacy. The Dutch and the British legitimized their colonial rule not through the past, but through the future. Their programs of ‘development’ seemed to value economic progress over a glorious past. The International Colonial Institute was created explicitly to diffuse this ‘Germanic’ developmentalist model.

**The International Colonial Institute and the concept of colonial autonomy**

With the creation of the Institut Colonial International in 1893, history gradually lost its legitimizing authority for colonial projects. The Institute refused to look back into the nineteenth century for inspiration, a century on which nationalism had left its imprint. Instead, its members tried to portray colonialism as a joint project of the civilized Western countries. For them, colonialism was a sort of global engineering to make the world advance culturally and develop economically. The ICI’s founders thus did
not define colonialism as a political act, but as a scientific method to bring about global progress.\textsuperscript{29}

The key element of this notion of development was that colonies were autonomous spaces that escaped the strict control of the possessing nation. Instead of assimilating colonies to the motherlands, or reproducing metropolitan societies and culture overseas, colonies should develop economically under the guidance by (white) colonial experts. Unlike theorists back in Europe, those experts were familiar with the local conditions and able to organize the administration and exploitation of the colonies in a more efficient way. ICI members cherished this ideal of colonial autonomy and considered the emancipation from nationalist bias necessary to successfully govern a colony. Alfred Zimmermann, an ICI member and author of a five-volume series on ‘The European Colonies’, had located the origins of colonial autonomy in the French revolution: Once the sugar cane planters of Saint-Domingue had cast off the yoke of Paris’ ‘exclusive’ trade monopoly and invited powers like Great Britain to protect them against the patronizing motherland, the white ‘coloniaux’ enhanced their scope of action. According to Zimmermann, Saint-Domingue was the first manifestation of the ‘coloniaux’\textquotesingle s turn to explicit internationality– that went hand in hand with the autonomy of the colonial administrators.

While conceptually framed during the French Revolution, colonial autonomy seemed to be best applied by the British. British colonial rule, Zimmermann continued, guaranteed autonomy to the administrators on the spot. Thus, they were able to react quickly and without passing the red carpet if local constellations changed. They were also able to act independently of slow decision taking, which a cumbersome legislation back in Europe allegedly imposed on them.\textsuperscript{30}

Chailley, the founder of the ICI who also set up its ideological guidelines, equally promoted the British model of colonial autonomy. He had travelled there in several occasions and published widely on British India.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{29} Institut Colonial International (ed.). 1896. \textit{Compte Rendu de la Session de 1895.}
Brussels: 37.
He became a renowned expert for British colonialism and his works were translated into English – an honor rarely bestowed on French colonial theorist.\textsuperscript{32} Even more so because Chailley openly valued the Dutch over the British system, arguing that the former granted even more autonomy to the administrators overseas. Dutch colonial administrators, he asserted, were carefully chosen with regard to their moral and technical aptitudes. Upon arrival in Java or Sumatra, however, they would take decisions on their own, drawing on their profound knowledge of the native society on the ground rather than complying with Dutch metropolitan laws.

The Dutch Indies’ unofficial status as an autonomous colony indeed attracted myriads of non-Dutch colonial experts – predominantly experts in agronomy and engineering – who contributed to improving colonial exploitation.\textsuperscript{33} By the same token, the colonial administration in Sumatra invited planters and investors from all over Europe to establish their businesses in the so-called ‘plantation belt’. The plantation belt was located in Sumatra’s south, in a region that had been transformed into a profitable area of cash crop production with the help of international capital.\textsuperscript{34} In the Dutch Indies, colonial autonomy and international cooperation went hand in hand. The ICI promoted Dutch East India as a model that guaranteed the autonomy of colonial experts, be they administrators, planters, tropical hygienists or engineers. The Dutch Indies were soon globally acclaimed to be the model for a veritable colonial internationalism.

The Dutch Indies, however, were not the only model for colonial autonomy and internationalism. Since the 1880s, the Belgian King Leopold II had gained international support to create the Congo Free State (CFS) in central Africa – a state that existed independently of the Belgian motherland and was internationally acclaimed as a new form of ‘pure colonialism’. At the 1884/5 Berlin Conference on West Africa, all of the Western colonizing countries recognized the CFS’s sovereignty. As Carl Schmitt has emphasized in \textit{The Nomos of the Earth}, the Congo colony

\textsuperscript{32} Chailley-Bert, Joseph. 1910. \textit{Administrative Problems of British India}. London.
\textsuperscript{33} Chailley-Bert, Joseph. 1893. \textit{La Hollande et les fonctionnaires des Indes néerlandaises le Recrutement des fonctionnaires coloniaux}. Paris.
was a genuinely new phenomenon in the history of international law.\(^{35}\) The CFS was an independent state according to international law, while it was a colony according to European mental maps and realities in the Congo basin. The Belgian king Leopold was nominally head of the CFS, in personal union with his monarchical duties in Belgium. However, the CFS was not an official Belgian colony until 1908, when Leopold had to resign as a head of the CFS. The territory then passed into the hands of the Belgian state. Before that date, the CFS was an independent state by the grace of the international community. At the same time, Leopold chose his staff for the state not in Belgium but all over Europe, therefore internationalizing the administration of the CFS.\(^{36}\)

Far from being a mere curiosity of international law, the CFS developed into a veritable training ground for European colonial experts. Since the Anglo-American Henry Morton Stanley, and the Italian-born Savorgnan de Brazza had conquered the Congo region for Leopold II and for France respectively, the CFS’s employees’ international background was salient. Stanley’s initial expedition to the Congo comprised four Belgians, three British, two Danish and one French.\(^{37}\) The Congo’s founding era saw a wide range of administrators, scientists and merchants from all over the world: The British captain Grant Elliott led the expedition to occupy the valley of Niadi Kwilu, while the German general Wissmann conquered the Lunda region and the kingdom Muata Yamvo. Sir Frederick Goldsmith drew on his experiences as a former administrator in British India in order to regularize the treaties between the Congolese and Leopold’s International Congo Association, to which the former transferred their lands and rights. The German Alexander van Danckelmann created a scientific station at


The official list of CFS employees listed Swedish skippers, Italian engineers, German administrators, and Austrian adventurers. A census in 1898 provides us with the number of 102 Portuguese, 102 Italians, 91 Swedish-Norwegians, 91 British-Scottish, 61 Dutch, 51 Americans, 34 Danish, 26 French, 17 Germans, and 11 Swiss nationals, whom Leopold employed in the CFS.

Many of the foreigners used the colonial experience acquired in the CFS and applied it to other colonies. Danckelmann, for example, became an advisor to the German colonial ministry and issued the influential *Kolonialblatt*, the official journal on German colonial policy. Wissmann became governor of the German colony in East Africa, where he organized the ‘Schutztruppe’, commonly known as the ‘Wissmanntruppe’, a colonial army that rose to military fame during the First World War. Danckelmann and Wissmann were examples for early ‘autonomous’ colonial experts. They were frequently cited as representing colonial internationalism in later accounts about colonial autonomy. Albert Thys, for example, a founding member of the ICI, portrayed Eliott, Goldsmith, Danckelmann or Wissmann as representatives of the ‘international character of the oeuvre’, which Europeans accomplished overseas. According to their own ideology, they were not responsible to their motherland, but responsible for the progress of humanity and the spread of civilization.

Colonial autonomy, as it was praised by the ICI and realized in the Dutch Indies or in the Congo Free State, was only one pre-condition for

colonial internationalism. Colonial internationalism was multifunctional. Colonial experts also hoped to learn from the colonial experience made by other nations, in order to apply successful methods of colonization in their own empires. By international exchange of knowledge, as it was practiced in the ICI, colonial experts could enhance their own position, be it personal or national. The emulation of successful ways of colonization ruled out nationalist solipsism, without amending nationalist thinking.

Already since the 1870s, learned societies and colonial lobby groups all over Europe promoted international knowledge exchange as the basis for this concept of ‘competitive emulation’. Non-governmental associations, like the German Colonial Society (1887), the French African Committee (1893) and French Colonial Union (1890), or the Belgian Colonial Union (1910), had openly declared competitive emulation their primordial purpose. They produced colonial literature and circulated it on an international scale, trying to learn and to profit from the experience of other colonizers. This colonial ‘method’ proved so successful that they institutionalized the colonial comparison and transfer by creating the ICI. The ICI then edited comparative studies on colonial legislation, colonial education, and labor recruitment in the colonies or the construction of railways overseas. It published more than 50 comprehensive volumes the series *Bibliothèque Coloniale Internationale*, which could be found on the bookshelves of all colonial administrations in Europe and overseas.43

Joseph Chailley, who had created both the French Colonial Union and the International Colonial Institute, was particularly keen on profiting from competitive emulation. He was well aware that the Dutch and the British colonies exceeded the French by far in terms of profitability. By studying them, he hoped to imitate their economic success, without having to go through a painful process of finding adequate colonial methods: ‘Why invent, if inventions already exist?’ he claimed, ‘it is more effective to look around us.’44 In the period between the 1890s and the First World War, the concepts of colonial autonomy and competitive emulation brought about an unprecedented trend to colonial internationalism. Competition,

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however, was always seen as a positive and peaceful means of progress. This changed with the arrival of the Great War.

The empire of the other – confrontation and cooperation in the interwar period

While colonial autonomy and internationalist cooperation reached a climax in the years leading up to 1914, the war plunged Europeans in a wary mood of mutual distrust. These postwar conflicts on colonies were a direct legacy of the war. The dispossession of Germany’s colonies by the Allies in the Versailles Treaty, as well as the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire resulted in a myriad of debates over the general nature of colonialism and its implementation. The aggressive reaction by Germany’s revisionist colonial movement fueled these international debates.\(^45\) In a more sophisticated way, the League of Nations discussed the failures and triumphs of European colonial policies. Within the League’s ‘Permanent Mandates Commission’ experts evaluated colonial achievements and condemned colonial mismanagement by certain colonial powers. Those colonial powers had to defend themselves against possible reproaches. During this process, colonialism and nationalism converged and solidified their relation.\(^46\)

However, as the example of the League of Nation’s colonial dedication shows, a new variant of colonial internationalism accompanied and framed the nationalist confrontation. This paragraph will show that nationalism and internationalism were mutually interdependent, especially with regard to colonial expansion. The interwar period illustrates the peaceful coexistence of colonial internationalism and nationalism. Instead of declaring colonial rivalry a *casus belli*, international cooperation continued on various levels.\(^47\) The lively debates, instead, resulted in the fact that, between 1919 and 1930, ever more Europeans developed an interest in their own

\(^{45}\) Schmокel, Wolfe W. 1964. *Dream of Empire: German Colonialism, 1919–1945*. Westport, CT.


empires, but also in the ‘empires of the others.’ The increased interest in colonial matters also required a rereading of colonial pasts.

The postwar debates on colonial topics mobilized the masses in Europe. In Germany, the membership of the revisionist German Colonial Society (created 1887) rose to one million, whereas it had stagnated at around 40 000 before the war. The French Colonial and Maritime League aimed at similar dimensions, claiming 700 000 supporters for their cause.48 Spain had a comeback as a colonial power in Morocco that soon became the nation’s backroom from which a civil war was planned and executed.49 Belgium extended its colonial empire to Ruanda and Urundi, as did France and Britain in Africa and the Middle East. These colonial relocations animated colonial exchange and entanglement.

The assignment of the former German and Ottoman colonies stimulated colonial rivalry. The allied powers who had won the war felt a particular need to justify the colonial dispossession of the Germans. British ‘blue books’ and French ‘yellow books’ – strategically published during the war to delegitimize the German colonial policy – diagnosed Germany’s inability to colonize. The British and French governments published those books to deliver evidence of Germans mistreating their colonial protégés. Those publications highlighted the German genocide in South West Africa against the Herero and Nama and listed atrocities committed against the ‘natives” in Cameroon and Togo. Illustrated with photographic evidence, these albums revealed the full range of the colonizers’ inhuman behavior.50 In the wake of the war, reports on the Germans ruling with an ‘iron hand’ and aiming at ‘heartless exploitation’ multiplied.51 Unsurprisingly, British

48 Although the society claimed to have 700 000 members, this seems to widely exaggerated. A maximum of 60,000 members is a more reasonable reckoning. With disregard to quantitative evaluation, its impact on public opinion, press, education and the government can hardly be exaggerated: Ageron, Charles R. 1978. France coloniale ou parti colonial? Paris: 251.
and French administrators, who replaced the German governments in colonial Africa, announced the prohibition of physical punishment and the end of forced labor with much publicity.52 By the same token, Germans were accused of having recruited native troops and to have thus ‘militarized’ their colonies prior to the war.53

Comparative colonial historiography backed the allegations against Germany and held that German colonial administrators had indeed always been excessively violent. Although based on true facts, this narrative drew on elements of a ‘black legend.’ Invented to delegitimize early-modern Spanish colonialism, black legends had singled out one colonial power (Spain before 1900) and charged it with crimes against humanity in the colonies. By 1900, a similar ‘black legend’ had been created to blame Leopold II and his lethal rubber exploitation in the Congo. Finally, after the end of the First World War, Germany replaced Spain and Belgium as prototypes of anachronistic empires, which had allegedly failed to accomplish their civilizing mission towards the colonized peoples. The allegations included a violent penal law, cruelty and slavery, along with the militarization of the colonies.54

German counter-propaganda against this black legend (which obviously emphasized that the other colonial powers misbehaved in the same way) and the loss of its colonies was highly nationalistic and aggressive. Books on the matter were re-edited and translated in several languages. Heinrich Schnee’s publications are a case in point. A former governor of German East Africa and leader of the German Colonial Society, he had published a pamphlet to combat what he termed the ‘Koloniale Schuldlüge’.55 The Koloniale Schuldlüge (colonial guilt lie) referred to the Versailles Treaty, which allegedly blamed Germany for its violent colonial administration and accused it of having failed in its civilizing mission. Schnee’s book was re-edited twelve times in the interwar period and translated into French,

54 Dawson, Problems of the peace, 208–212.
English, Italian and Spanish. Schnee himself gave lectures on the topic in several countries, including Great Britain. His wife being British, he was not a stranger to colonial circles across the Channel and made them rethink their agenda. Thus, in an ironic turn, the ‘Schuldlüge’ debate inaugurated a transnational dialogue rather than causing serious confrontations over colonial matters. While Germans like Schnee asserted their nationalist position, the international community engaged in a policy of appeasement – the British government, for example ordered the blue books to be destroyed and banned it from reprinting.

In the long term, literary clashes over the German colonial dispossession provided the basis for new transnational dialogues. First of all, the debate stimulated international interest in the German colonial past. While before the First World War, histories of German colonialism had been written predominantly by Germans, it was now French, British or US-American authors who dominated the historiography of the German colonial empire. Curiously, these authors developed sympathy for the German claims. Mary Townsend, a lecturer at Columbia University and the first non-German historian of colonial Germany, agreed with Heinrich Schnee that ‘German treatment of the natives has been unjustly indicted.’ She prompted the colonial experts of the League’s Permanent Mandate Commission to acknowledge the facts and to condemn the falsification of militarization and cruelty reproaches. British historian on Germany,


57 Silvester, and Gewald, *Words cannot be found*.


William Harbutt Dawson, wrote a prologue to the English translation of Schnee’s book. He admitted that Germans had once lagged behind in civilizing and developing their colonies. But since colonial minister Dernburg inaugurated a reform and rationalization of colonial policies in 1907, Dawson claimed, the colonies had gone through a process of modernization. This process resulted in the more humane treatment of the ‘natives’. Dawson asked to drop the charges against the Germans and tried to convince the British that: ‘[…] it is to the interest of Great Britain more than of any other country that Germany should be encouraged and even assisted to colonize, and to acquire a rightful ‘place in the sun.’’

Both Townsend and Dawson held close ties with the German colonial lobby and had personally met its leading members.

Shortly after, French voices attuned to the international choir of germanophiles. Henri Brunschwig was one of them. He had been a student of Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre in Strasbourg. In his history of German colonialism, he chose to elaborate on the Dernburg era in Germany, which he saw inspired by French and Belgian colonial reformism. Like in all colonial countries, he concluded, Dernburg’s reform era broke with former errors and inaugurated a change for the better. Brunschwig highlighted the Germans’ fertile commercial activity and widely ignored the ‘nationalist’ origins of the German Empire (as Townsend had done before him). With regard to Germany’s contribution to the civilizing mission, Brunschwig gave the example of Robert Koch’s achievements in bacteriology, which grounded in the latter’s trans-colonial experimentation and cooperation with experts all over the world to fight the sleeping sickness and other tropical diseases.

In doing so, Brunschwig interpreted German colonialism as part of an international chronology that ran counter to the alleged German ‘exceptionalism’. All in all, he underlined the positive aspects of German colonialism.

Brunschwig earned himself the reputation for being the first French to present an ‘unbiased’ history of German colonialism. As a teacher and ultimately director at the famous French École Coloniale (renamed École d’Outre-Mer in 1945), he had an important say in the education of colonial

administrators. Robert Cornevin, a Frenchman who governed the former German colony of Togo between 1948 and 1956, confirmed his views on German rule. A colonial governor by profession and anthropologically-minded historian by passion, Cornevin was among the first to tell African history by taking account of African perspectives. The Togolese played an important part in his historical accounts. As there was an important group of Togolese ‘Germanophiles’, who had even petitioned the League of Nation’s Mandate Commission for the German return to Togo, Cornevin admitted their views to his accounts of the colony’s history. He took their desire to have the Germans back as an evidence that the allegations against the Germans were unfounded: ‘We ourselves, at the end of the colonial period often noted germanophilia in Togo, expressed not only by certain old men who still spoke a few words of German and evoked with emotion their youthful memories, but also by intellectuals in the prime of life whose families had taught them to respect the German colonial achievement.’

African historians, he claimed, did ‘barely mention the accusations of cruelty against the celebrated Governor von Puttkamer and his associates.’

In 1906, the German government had revoked Puttkamer from his post as governor of Cameroon. The reason for his revocation was the excessive and cruel punishment of native Cameroonians who had petitioned the German Reichstag for help.

All this support did obviously not restore Germany’s colonial empire. But much was done to appease the German colonial revisionists. The League of Nations, in an act of embracing its fiercest enemy to neutralize him, employed Heinrich Schnee. He was sent on a fact-finding mission as far as Manchuria, to uncover the reasons for Japan to seize Manchuria from China. As a result, Schnee finally participated as an international expert in the League’s neocolonial policies.

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64 Heinrich Schnee, who was married to a British national, permanently oscillated between nationalist activity and international engagement. When Hitler came to
More curious, however, was the historiographical rehabilitation of Germany’s colonial past. Townsend and Dawson, played an important part in Germany’s rehabilitation. But more astonishing was the French germanophilia cultivated by the administrator-historian Cornevin and the ideologist-historian Brunschwig. Their pro-German attitude was certainly a result of their individual biographies (both of them had lived or studied in Germany). But the origins of French germanophilia lie in the general context of the postwar era, when France itself came under attack for its colonial policy.

Reproaches against the French colonial tradition originated in the propaganda of the First World War. The French had been the only power in Europe to deploy colonial troops on European battlefields during the war (while British and Germans deployed them overseas only or as back-stage workers). The presence of almost half a million soldiers from all over the French Empire had played a crucial role in raising fears among Europeans. Not only German war propaganda accused colonial troops of excessive cruelty and an inclination to rape white women. Even French indigenophiles, like the governor of French West Africa Joost van Voellenhoven, refused to send African troops to Europe. After the war, colonial ‘experts’ in Europe spilled a lot of ink on delegitimizing empires that had abused their civilizing mission – by dragging their colonial fosterlings into the war.

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The most eloquent and seminal condemnation of ‘colored troops’ was E.D. Morel’s pamphlet *The Horror on the Rhine*, first published in 1920 and re-edited eight times until 1921 – although banned from the allied occupation zones in Germany. Morel was British and had risen to global fame when he had led an international press campaign against Leopold II’s violent exploitation of the Congolese rubber workers since 1900. Universally known as an ‘indigenophile’, his accusations fell on sympathetic ears all over Europe. His pamphlet accounted for twenty-two cases of native soldiers raping white women while stationed in occupied Germany. But the force of Morel’s argument rested on ‘far larger grounds’, as he put it. He claimed that ‘if Europe is to become accustomed to the employment of colored soldiers for political purposes, there is a danger in store for the African populations as well as the European, the full extent of which we can only faintly realize.’ Morel pretended not to accuse the ‘black troops’, whom he portrayed as victims as well. Instead, he blamed the ‘French militarism’ to pursue a shortsighted and ‘suicidal policy’ that might turn against France and ultimately lead to the end of European colonial domination. The French committed the error of not separating what had to be naturally separated: the white and the black races, each having its own milieu, customs and sexuality.

By dwelling on the detrimental effects of miscegenation, Morel alluded to the French colonial tradition of assimilation, which aimed at giving the colonized a status similar to the Europeans. This policy inaugurated the end of European pureness, as an official US report on the colored troops in occupied Germany confirmed: ‘the color line is not regarded either by the French..., as we regard it in America to keep the white race pure.’ With regard to the undisciplined colonial troops committing crimes in Europe, the report continued, ‘in general French courts do not punish these crimes as severely as American and English courts do.’

Morel had many followers. Members of the French Labor Party and the Comintern feared that ‘tomorrow these Moroccan and Senegalese troops

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will be employed against the French Labour Party’. Women’s associations all over Europe and in the USA protested against the black troops, whom the habit of polygamy and the absence of their numerous wives allegedly drove to live out their sexuality with white women. The Dutch women’s association petitioned the League of Nations to increase pressure on France. Upon protest of US-citizens, Washington asked for investigations into the matter. Although the US government was wary of German propaganda, it commissioned an investigation conducted by the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission. The investigators came to the conclusion that France had changed its policy and ultimately revoked the ‘purely black troops.’ Most of the allegations were revealed to be false or ‘occasional and restricted numbers, not general or widespread.’ While the debate about the black troops dwindled, the charges against the French and their colonial troops led them to rethink the employment of the African army in Europe.

As a reaction to the allegations, the French generally abstained from deploying colonial troops in the future. French membership in the League of Nations stood for this new attitude: The League of Nation’s mandate system prohibited the recruitment of natives for European wars. After the First World War, France had threatened not to join the League over this regulation. Although highly reluctant in the early 1920s, the French government finally backed down and agreed to join the League of Nation’s Mandate Commission. In doing so, France committed to keeping native troops out of European wars. By the same token, French authors embraced the idea that races should be kept separated from each other. Arguing along Morel’s line, they stated that each race would be at ease in its own milieu. This view coincided with the programs of outstanding French colonial autonomists, who aimed at developing the colonies with the help of the colonized instead of sending

70 Ibid. 11 f.; moreover, the report emphasized that the ‘black troops’ were not from ‘black Africa’. By 1921, out of a total number of 86,000 troops in the French occupation zone, 16,386 were North Africans and 3,224 Madagascans.

them to slaughter at European battlefields.\textsuperscript{72} France was back on the internationalist track.

The debates in the interwar period threatened to dissolve the common colonial history of the European states. Evoking German atrocities and French militarism served to delegitimize their colonial present by condemning their colonial past. However, in the early 1930s, international solidarity seemed to be restored. The debates became less aggressive and Western stronghold against contestation of colonial projects was gradually re-established.

Colonial internationalism had never fully disappeared throughout the interwar period. Both the International Colonial Institute and the League’s Permanent Mandate’s Commission institutionalized international cooperation in colonial matters. These institutions were backed by international conferences that legitimized international colonialism. When France celebrated the centenary of Algeria’s conquest with an ostentatious colonial exhibition at Vincennes in 1931, it highlighted its internationalist attitude. Indeed, the Vincennes exhibition was officially labeled \textit{International Colonial Exhibition}, with all colonial powers being represented.

Several international congresses were held during the six-month exhibition. One of them was the First International Congress for Colonial History, convoked in September 1931. At their first meeting, representatives from France, Great Britain, Belgium, Italy, Brazil and Canada decided to hold a second Congress in The Hague in 1932. Delegates from 17 colonizing countries attended the second conference.\textsuperscript{73} Both congresses were dedicated to the publication of an international colonial bibliography that assembled all publications on colonial matters. The first volume was published in 1932, funded by the Parisian organizing committee of the International Colonial Exposition. The delegates proudly announced that ‘The oeuvre of international collaboration among historians of colonization from all nationalities has finally been initiated.’ \textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{72} Koller, \textit{Recruitment of colonial troops}, 117.
\textsuperscript{73} Great Britain, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, USA, Norway, Denmark, Brazil, Chili, Colombia, Canada, Portugal and France
They proceeded with drafting a general history of colonialism, to be published in two volumes of 600 pages each. Struggling with the sheer amount of data, colonial historians had to decide between a synthesizing approach – which analyzed the general colonial doctrines and their application ‘as we find them among all colonizing nations’ along with the ‘colonial theories in different periods and their bond with general civilization’ – or a simple chronological approach. Due to feasibility, they chose a chronological approach. They were guided by a very French approach to chronology: starting with the Spanish colonies in 1500, they distinguished between the older and monarchical colonies of the Ancien Régime and the modern colonization since 1815. This diachronic periodization seemed more important to them than a distinction among the different nations and their ‘colonial characters’. The internationalization of colonial history and the conscience of a shared colonial experience survived the interwar period – despite colonial rivalry and revisionism. French colonial administrator and historian Robert Delavignette resumed proudly that ‘the achievement of The Hague conference is to give colonial history its well-deserved place in universal history. The conference proves those people wrong who have denied it that place, and who treated colonial history as a facultative annex to the national history of the metropole’ Colonial autonomy and colonial internationalism went once again hand in hand. The general history of colonialism designed in Paris and the Hague was, however, never realized. Another war led to the suspension of colonial internationalism.

A new past for colonization: internationalisms after 1945

The post-World War II era was slow to produce new transnational projects of colonial history writing. It was not until the 1960s that an attempt similar to the pre-war General History of Colonization was made by Stanford historians L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan. They edited a five-volume account on Colonialism in Africa, comprising the political, economic and

social history of colonial Africa, along with a comprehensive bibliography. A highly politicized project, the five volumes were meant to counterbalance Marxist interpretations of colonial history – and to ideologically drive back Communist influence in Africa.\textsuperscript{77} The project therefore set a tradition of Western colonial internationalism against communist internationalism. Apart from a majority of Anglo-Saxon historians, economists and anthropologists, the editors invited the French colonial internationalists to contribute to the volumes: Henri Brunschwig, the head of the French Colonial Academy, gave a concise summary of French colonial history. Former colonial governors Hubert Deschamps and Robert Delavignette provided details on the French empire. And Robert Cornevin introduced German colonialism, while no German appeared in the list of authors.

The editors’ stated their political agenda bluntly in the introduction. They emphasized not to ‘share the widely-held assumption that equates colonialism with exploitation.’ For them, colonialism was a ‘much-needed transfer of modern skills’, and they ‘look favorably on many of the European’s political achievements…modern forms of education, medical facilities…economic techniques.’\textsuperscript{78} Their position was clearly directed against the anti-imperialist rhetoric of the Soviet Union and the Internationals.\textsuperscript{79}

However, the editors were aware of views that differed from their own. This is why they gave room to innovative young authors, who showed a strong tendency to interpret colonialism from a Marxist or Developmentalist point of view – while being firmly rooted in Western academic institutions.\textsuperscript{80} Among those were Immanuel Wallerstein with an early version of the world-systems theory, Terence Ranger and his analysis

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\textsuperscript{77} Gann and Duignan explicitly styled themselves as conservative historians, who wanted to show the positive role of colonial administrators. Professors at the Hoover institution, their works were said to be funded by the CIA.


\textsuperscript{79} Gann, Lewis H., and Peter Duignan. 1968. \textit{Burden of Empire}. London

\textsuperscript{80} One of them, Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch explained her participation in the project: ‘I knew nothing about the authors (Gann and Duignan), but only that they or rather Stanford University at the time had the reputation of being very conservative […]. You may be conservative and right, and leftist and wrong although, in the faculty world’: ‘Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch: contribution to Duigan and Gann discussion from 23 May 2005’: h-net list African history:
of native resistance to colonial rule, or Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, who analyzed the capitalist penetration into the African continent. Those authors provided the project with the legitimacy to have assembled all Western experts on colonial history, anthropology and economy in Africa.

Western experts, however, did not suffice to satisfy the political purpose of the project; therefore the desire to include African historians, whom Gann and Duignan consistently called ‘Negro authors’. For them, closing ranks with African historians also meant to counter the Communist solidarity with the Third World intellectuals by proving that the Western World also gave a voice to subaltern authors and took them seriously. This is why the ‘Negro authors’ were crucial to purport an ‘Afrocentric’ history of colonialism, which the contributors to the volumes supposedly held dear.\(^{81}\) Contributors like Robert Cornevin seconded this program and vociferously called for an ‘Afrocentric’ view.\(^{82}\) He, who had dedicated his free time as a governor in French Togo to study Togolese perspectives on the colonial era, seemed to give voice to the natives. His history of Africa drew on first-hand knowledge and painted a rather harmonic picture of the ‘colonial encounter’.

In order to substantiate their claims, the Stanford editors also invited African historians, like Jacob Ade Ajayi and Albert Adu Boahen, to contribute to the volume. Both were trained in Western universities but had taken up chairs of colonial history at the University of Ibadan and the University of Ghana, respectively. Outspoken anti-Marxists, they were equally outspoken ‘Afrocentrists’. They readjusted the narrative of colonial rule in Africa by making use of oral history and non-colonialist sources. Arguably, this did not mean that their views differed widely from the editor’s guidelines: Gann and Duignan had always emphasized that Africans had played a vital role for the colonial system and African history in general. As Ajayi and Boahen, they highlighted the Africans’ role

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in shaping the precolonial history of their continent: ‘Nothing would be more unjustifiable than to look upon precolonial Africa as a \textit{tabula rasa}.’\textsuperscript{83} Then, when the Europeans arrived, they helped to establish the colonial state as a modernizing state. By the 1960s, the views of the colonizers and the ‘assimilated’ natives about the colonial era had converged.

Thus, from the 1960s onwards, international cooperation in writing colonial history included ‘subaltern’ historians. For the apologist project of Gann and Duignan (which was certainly more complex than its bluntly announced apology by the editors themselves) gained in legitimacy by including African authors. It therefore served to mark the territory of the Western intellectuals against the Communist threat.\textsuperscript{84}

By this time, the UNESCO planned a General History of Africa (first planning phase 1965–1969), one of the biggest editorial projects of the organization. An international scientific commission directed the project. It collected and systematized source material and organized international debates on how to write the history of Africa. Originally written in French, English and Arabic, the \textit{Histoire Générale de l’Afrique} should be translated into Swahili, Haussa and other ‘subaltern’ languages. After an extended period of preparation, the UNESCO published eight volumes, subsequently between 1980 and 1999. Albert Adu Boahen, who had already been a contributor to Gann’s and Duignan’s project, edited the UNESCO’s volume on the colonial era in Africa and set its guidelines. While explicitly inviting African historians to express their nationalist views in the volume, he also emphasized the positive role of colonization. Citing Gann and Duignan, he claimed that colonization was not only exploitation and dismissed Walter Rodney’s metaphor of colonialism as a ‘one-armed bandit’ that had only negative and no positive effects. Unlike Rodney, Boahen identified colonialism’s positive effects, including social mobility, economic prosperity and the diffusion of modern ideas and techniques. Without colonization, he argued, there would have been no nationalism, even though this was an unintended effect of the colonizers.

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.14.
\textsuperscript{84} The mentalities of the time can be traced in Gann’s and Duignan’s retrospective self-reflections: Duignan, Peter, and Lewis H. Gann. 1994. \textit{Communism in sub-Saharan Africa: A reappraisal}. Hoover essays no. 8. Stanford.
‘Even the Marxist and anti-colonialist schools’, Boahen continued, ‘cannot deny the fact that after the colonial occupation...the majority of African countries enjoyed peace and security.’ His final verdict was that the colonial system as such was not necessarily bad, but that the General History of Africa had to study its ‘defects and failures’ to avoid them in the future of independent African nations.85

Boahen’s version of colonial history in Africa still argued along the colonialist’s lines. In doing so, he answered other contributors to the UNESCO history, who attacked colonial rule from a Marxist or an anti-racist point of view. Boahen was among the almost exclusively African historians who wrote the UNESCO History of Africa. But the series also included Soviet specialists in the field, like the anti-imperialist Basil Davidson. It was therefore the first real attempt at an ‘international’ account of colonial history – that was comprehensive and multifaceted indeed. It was however not free of the colonialist legacy that had promoted colonial internationalism to legitimize colonial pasts and presents.

Conclusion

This article showed the colonizer’s struggle with their shared colonial past. It showed how promoters of colonialism evoked internationalism and used in different contexts throughout the ‘colonial’ period. While the early colonial ‘classicists’ dismissed the Roman ‘assimilationist’ model for its shortcomings and incompatibility with ‘modern colonization’, they embraced the ‘Germanic’ associationist model. This Dutch and British way of colonizing became the most-imitated ideal of colonization among the members of the International Colonial Institute. Dutch and British combined concepts of colonial autonomy and competitive emulation, a symbiosis that resulted in a need for international exchange and cooperation. In the wake of the First World War, mutual stigmatization among the colonizers generated an increased interest in the ‘empire of the Other’ and its defects. Aggressive rivalry, however, did not oust a sense of international solidarity among the colonizers. Transnational solidarity raised awareness

of a shared past and international associations launched projects to write a common colonial history. A history of colonialism did however not materialize until the 1960s when conservative and apologist authors used the international cooperation to drive back the anti-imperial historiography of Communist provenance. The rivalry between Western and Communist historiography gave room to subaltern voices, who entered the domain as historiographical actors. Throughout this period of colonial history writing, colonialist patterns of thinking remained nonetheless virulent.

The transnational trend in colonial historiography is therefore not new. It dates back to the very beginnings of modern colonialism, whose agents imagined and constructed a past that legitimized their colonial present. When historians of the twenty-first century set out to write colonial history from a global and transnational perspective, they should be aware of their craft’s historically encumbered tools. The future of the colonial past needs to be written from an unbiased, critical and explicitly postcolonial point of view.

School curricula have to follow straight. When Western teachers refer to colonialism as a common experience, they have to be aware that the colonized people are part of this ‘Erinnerungsgemeinschaft’. Only their experience of and suffering from colonialism can provide us with an honest and comprehensive account of colonial history. Their accounts unveil the uneven consequences of global interconnectedness. If we take their view into account, colonialism can provide the basis for teaching a veritable global history – a history that shows how globality can create inequality, and how inequality can create globality. Only by teaching their version of colonial history we can provoke empathy and produce a sense for multiperspectivity. Studying the history of colonial internationalism is necessary not to repeat its original sin over and over again: to write and teach colonialism from a ‘Western’ point of view. Only this critical approach enables us to teach a ‘total history’ instead of a ‘post-totalitarian history’.

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Elize S. van Eeden

Reviewing South Africa’s colonial historiography and its visibility in Higher Education and Training

Introductory remarks

It is as if in the past decade South Africans have awakened to vehemently stand up against the tangible status quo of the country’s deeply rooted colonial history. Triggers to complement these actions have been the emigrants working on mines and spurring on tendencies of xenophobia, as well as the government’s perceived incompetent way of sufficiently providing for basic societal needs, all of which is believed to have been cultivated under apartheid between 1948 and 1993, and now also – as a result of a past even further back in time – colonialism.¹ Issues of land grabbing, economic rootedness in colonial time thought and mentality (coloniality) and in governing structures are the recent day debates (Kallaway & Angier, 2017; Legassick, 2016; Crais, 2002) that South Africans want to come to terms with.

Master narratives of South Africa’s national histories have so far mostly accentuated the evils of apartheid, while colonial South Africa in its pre-formal and formal years (covering at least 300 years in South Africa’s history) has been mainly diluted into thematic-like eras. Colonial South Africa has not yet been presented extensively as a major historical event that transformed and claimed people’s and a nation’s identity. Between the lines of narratives about the colonial years under the Dutch East Indian Company (VOC) rule followed by British indirect rule, the seed of provoking racism have perhaps been thinned down for too long, until recently (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013a, 2013b). In the discussion to follow, an overview

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of understanding colonial South African historiography in its African continental context is presented. Another major emphasis is reflecting on the visibility of teachings on the colonial legacy in South Africa at institutions of Further Education and Training (FET) and especially Higher Education and Training (HET).

**Africa’s colonial historiography from Westernized and continental perspectives**

Precolonial written sources of Africa are known to belong to three different traditions, namely those of the Islamic missionaries – inclusive of some Muslim historians – and considered as being an extensive contribution with regard to observations of local societies. The written accounts of European traders and travelers dating back to the fifteenth century are viewed as the second phase of the historiographical tradition, with a third phase of tradition known to have been developed by Africans in the Americas during the eighteenth century. None were totally biased against their tradition regarding origin and in some instances the writing tended to be overwhelmingly in favor of a particular culture or way of doing and believing (Odhiambo, 2000). Colonial time history of Africa embedded in impacts, consequences and outcomes is reflected in several conceptual thoughts like colonialism processes, anti-colonialism, postcolonialism and a resistance to the erstwhile dominantly viewed Eurocentric colonial contemplations (Compare Howard, 2006; Dei & Kempf, 2006; Boahen, 1984).

Additionally, the colonial historiography of Africa is often referred to as dominant reflections by ‘non-Africans (Eriksen, 1979; Cooper, 1994), pioneered by explorers, Christian missionaries, travelers (compare Koivunen, 2011), anthropologists, ethnographers (Manning, 2004) and historians’.² Africa as a continent and Africans as its peoples were for

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many decades perceived to be ‘without a history’ – something that still remains a debating point in the early twenty-first century (Odhiambo, 2000).

Two themes in postcolonial Africanist historiography form the basis of Eriksen’s focus: the ecological-historical approach, and the articulation of precolonial African social formations under imperialist hegemony (Eriksen, 1979). Cooper, on the other hand, identified trends of approaches to African history as Resistance Studies (followed by subaltern studies) to provide an African perspective as part of the African History Research Forum, which eventually embarked on a project on Africa’s general history (Cooper, 1994; Unesco Courier, 1984). As a result, this alternative view is also observable in the Unesco initiative for publications on Africa. Its origins can be traced back to the early sixties and way back to a conference of Africanists in Accra in 1962. Eventually the ‘General history of Africa’ project started with Nigerian Kenneth Onwuka Dike as first director. Eventually 500 specialists worldwide participated in the eight-volume project, which was essentially conducted greatly as an African project for Africans. At the time it was regarded as socially and scientifically important to undertake such a project, especially because African peoples were progressing towards political independence. Its content and completion were not without criticism, yet, in the main, the Africa-centered goals in most of the volumes published were achieved. It was only in 2007 that the ‘General History of Africa’ project centered on the objective to diffuse the project outcome in teaching by means of adopting a common curriculum for the History of Africa among member states. This project is currently ongoing (http://www.unesco.org/new/en/africa-department/africa-week-2017/africa-week-launch/), and still nurtures the 1971 vision of the project, namely (Barbosa, 2012):

- Following a scientific and democratic approach;
- Looking at the totality of Africa, with its regional inter-relations;
- Focused on the history of societies, civilizations and institutions, valoring the contributions of tradition and African art; and
- Looking for Africa’s own knowledge of itself, from the point of view of African authors about their own history, the recognition of African cultural heritage and the factors that have contributed to the unity of the continent.
Regarding art, it is of value to note that it was found, amongst others, that the impact of colonialism on African art was neither profound nor permanent (Unesco Courier, 1984).

These impressions and developments can be complemented by many other contributions, including that of Funso Afolayan, who remarked in 2005 that a study of African history as an autonomous scholarship is a recent development. This development also marked rejections by Africanists of only Eurocentric time colonial history (Roberts, 1978; Arowolo, 2010), although it appears as if there is some uncontested acknowledgement of Islamic and Arabic views of African societies (Afolayan, 2005), as in pre-colonial times.3

As far as the teaching of colonial time history in Africa is concerned, Atieno Odhiambo regards the setting up of western-type universities in Africa on the eve of his country’s independence to be a significant milestone to strengthen the recovery of African initiatives. Some new and established departments of History started the teaching of African history in preference to European history at the core of the curriculum. Some historians were trained in other parts of the world and invested their training in Africa. Odhiambo furthermore states that the biggest challenge for academia of African history was of a methodological nature, with History as understood in the West having been based on written documents. The acceptance and refinement of the methodology of oral traditions allowed for a major break with traditional written sources. Over 6 000 postgraduate studies were created in Africa. Slavery, African religions, women and the natural environment were initially emphasized in this research (Odhiambo, 2000). Subsequently, domesticity colonialism with culture as broad focus was given more prominence by the late nineties in teaching and researching, with social history being equally prominent and its strength embedded in its ‘multidisciplinarity and multivocality’.4


However, a few Africans have so far embarked on efforts to historiographically map the impact of colonialism on the continent, inclusive of South Africa (Maathai, 2009; Arowolo, 2010; Mamdani, 1996; Mamdani, 2011). The previously mentioned Onwuka Dike is also regarded as the first black professional African historian (Cooper, 1994). Yet, as with many others, his training was also provided by ‘imperial mentors’, but ultimately this fact should not necessarily be questioned or viewed negatively. Mostly, contributions on Africa are either regionally and theme selective, or country-focused. A critical, inclusive, comprehensive and diverse view of the historiography of Africa by an African is yet to be produced.

In a broader context, Nobel Prize winner Wangari Mathaai (2009) critically reviews the status of postcolonial leadership, economic relationships and an enmeshed and penetrated (Keegan, 1996) approach to evangelical humanitarianism as strong pointers to how colonialism was conducted at the time, but only perceived in its true context and colors in post-colonial times. She also complains about the impacts of a growing spiritual inferiority among African peoples in the heydays of colonialism (Maathai, 2009).

In trying to obtain a critical view on the historiography of Africa (inclusive of South Africa), Africans still rely mainly on expertise output from abroad for information, interpretation and education. In fact, South Africa is yet to ‘produce’ an African historian reflecting African history like Mamdani and Maathai, although South African colonial historiography


since the advent of the twenty-first century seems to be more vibrant. Discussions on the impact of colonization on the mind (coloniality) and its manifestation in daily life (inclusive of understanding of knowledge and whose knowledge) are topics of debates recently locally embraced, as inspired from Latin-American thought (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni in Council of Higher Education (CHE), 2017), and in particular that by Walter Mignolo (2000).

South Africa and colonial times: conquering years and status by 1994

Europe’s connection with a tiny part of South Africa as it is today dates back to the 15th century (Portuguese explorers). A European economically motivated intervention in South Africa developed from 1648 and was formalized in 1652 (Dutch East India Company or DEIC for short, in the Netherlands) (Ross, 1991). Dutch rule of the Cape lasted for 143 years until 1795. During DEIC rule, some Dutch, German, French, Malaysian and other peoples populated the region. Britain conquered the Cape in 1795, lost it to the Dutch Batavian Republic in 1803 and regained possession of it in 1806, ruling the colony until 1960 and in the process extending its territory farther into the interior, especially between 1899 and 1902 during the bitterly fought South African War. Stringent rule continued to characterize the governing spirit of British colonialism within a broadly maintained imperial vision that eventually culminated in a managing system of indirect British rule in which groups of peoples were unequally empowered (Myers, 2008).


Since the advent in 1948 of institutionalized apartheid in South Africa, both the privileged (white) minority and the disadvantaged (black, colored and Indian) majority groups had their own ‘postcolonial’ struggle (either against British indirect rule and/or against the racially initiated apartheid ideology or both). South Africa officially unshackled itself from British rule in 1961 by becoming a Republic. The country’s peoples however continued their struggle to free the majority from the oppressive apartheid rule that mostly continued in the typical governing spirit of British colonialism. South Africa officially liberated all South Africans in 1994 by becoming a democratically focused republic.\textsuperscript{10} Yet the impact of especially 19th and 20th century colonialism on the southern tip of Africa is deeply rooted in all spheres of life, and its visibility surfaced in the pre- and post-apartheid years in South Africa.\textsuperscript{11} It has also recently been acknowledged that the country remains economically and psychologically locked in the spirit of a colonial heritage and mentality (Rossouw, 2008; Poplak, 2014) that will probably take several more decades to transform into something more characteristically South African (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013).

A colonial historiography of South Africa

South Africa has produced several voices of standing on the country’s colonial historiography, and in the approach to the country’s history several paradigms have come forth.\textsuperscript{12} Pioneers of colonial historiography in

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{10} Compare the last part of the text with Lester, Alan. 1998. \textit{From Colonization to Democracy: A New Historical Geography of South Africa}. New York: 288.
\end{itemize}
Southern Africa are said to be Alexander Wilmot, John Chase, George Theal and Harry Johnston. They are labeled as pro-British settlers who presented ‘Afrikaners’ as conservative oppressors of the indigenous peoples. This orthodox impression was soon challenged by a series of publications by Afrikaners documenting British injustices and the accumulative grievances of the Boers. Amongst others, there was the 1877 contribution of Stephanus J du Toit, namely *The History of our land in the language of our people* (Afolayan, 2005) followed in 1902 by the outspoken views of General Jan C Smuts in *A century of wrong* (Afolayan, 2005).

The impression of Afolayan (2005) regarding these contributions and others that followed (Shillington, 2013) were summarized as being too white-centric:

The main features of these histories are clear. Almost without exception, they all focus on the South African white settlers, their conquests, and industrialization. The African majority was regarded as non-population, a part of the landscape to be occupied, used, dispossessed, and discarded. [...] In the rare cases where African societies received attention, their history was distorted. Their ways of life were presented as monolithic, static, and unchanging. Overworked clichés such as listless, impudent, fractious, thieving, savage, harmless, docile, and others were applied to describe black Africans. The oppressive, dehumanizing, and racist nature of white rule was often ignored, while its debt to the indigenous population and most especially the Khoisan, was rarely acknowledged (pp. 629–630).

Odhiambo also interprets South African academia’s contribution to the continent’s history as being of a divided nature, with white scholars mainly trained in the Western tradition, and a featuring of a defense of the colonization of Africans with McCall Theal\(^\text{13}\) as first nineteenth century ‘historian’ (Odhiambo, 2000). Theal’s view cannot be accepted, as Odhiambo asserts, as representing the majority of scholars’ views at the turn of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century. In the course of

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\(^{13}\)In South Africa McCall Theal is not widely accepted as having been a trained historian, neither are some others who produced histories in more or less the same timeframe.
his argument he also totally ignores the historically Afrikaans associated institutions from which several contributions came forth and sentiments were expressed (Thompson, 1962; Smith, 1988).

A change in focus and perspectives on South Africa’s colonial history during the second half of the 20th century commenced with the revised contributions in the two-volume publication by Leonard Thompson and Monica Wilson as editors, titled *The Oxford History of South Africa* (published in 1969 and 1971 respectively). Subsequently, there followed the Marxist approach to history (emphasizing materialistic insights and regarded as a holistic model for studying colonialism), tailed by the nationalist-liberalist approach. Afolayan aptly observes that contributors in this field vigorously attempt to write history from below. As a very specific example from South Africa, he refers to Charles van Onselen’s ‘Sharecropping in apartheid South Africa’ in *The seed is mine*.¹⁴ There were several other ‘history from below’ contributions at the time that were not necessarily written in a Marxist spirit (Compare Visser, 2011). In retrospect they may be reviewed as either politically inspired *Alltagsgeschichte* reflections¹⁵ on South Africa’s colonial and postcolonial history and/or local/regional history contributions in a typical British-European model that mainly complemented white community developments in South Africa in colonial times.¹⁶ Despite all these efforts and trends, the crisis in the Africanist historiography remained. A reflexive deconstructionist approach (also known as ‘postmodernism’) was regarded as an effort to review the past from a present-day ideology and understanding. All these

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and new thinking still shape the history of Africa in postcolonial times (Gordon, 2013), amidst global trends of a growing urge for democracy. For example, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and of the Soviet Union as well as the failure of socialist experiments in Africa started to provoke revisionist responses from the neo-Marxist historians of Africa. Ethnicity as a major specialty in African study gained some field.

After the democratic elections of 1994, new challenges for historians – in addition to foci for historical research – steadily surfaced. In standard narratives on South Africa’s national history in pre- and post-1994, the emphasis remains more on a knowledge dissemination of colonial times than an expansive critical discourse. The publication of Timothy Keegan (1996) is an exception, as he quite extensively and passionately covers colonial South Africa in a broader revisionist, global context. The title of the publication, namely *Colonial South Africa and the origins of the racial order*, rightly serves the content Keegan deals with. He departs from a colonial chronology regarding South Africa’s history by discussing the Dutch beginnings prior to and subsequent to 1652 – most South Africans are perhaps familiar with this era. Then Keegan continues with the colonial ordeal when Britain colonized the Cape Colony in 1806, and decades later other parts of the interior (Natalia and the two Republics known as the ‘Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek’ or ZAR and the Orange Free State). Keegan observed that the early British governors at the Cape ruled more autocratically in some ways than their Dutch predecessors (Keegan, 1996). He critically reviews the status of economic relationships and the enmeshed penetrated-like approach to evangelical humanitarianism as strong pointers as to how colonialism was steered then, but only understood better in postcolonial times.

Like Mathaai (2009) earlier in African colonial history, Keegan (1996) complains about the very same impacts colonialism brought about, namely spiritual inferiority among African peoples in the heydays of colonialism. Most of Keegan’s examples with regard to groups and regions depict the

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Cape Colony. Skillfully, Keegan also points out several myths with regard to the settlers and colonial authorities. One such myth is that the Trek by the ‘hardy pioneer’ Boers into the interior ‘wilderness’ from especially 1836 was politically driven, in order to be as far as possible from the ‘hated British’. Instead, he argues that they ‘never wanted to break ties with the colonial market’, but rather wanted to extend the ‘geographical range’ (Keegan, 2009). An observation Keegan has made with regard to colonial expansion in the interior close to the current Lesotho and which relates to the formidable chief Moshoeshoe, is insightful:

Settler imperialism had failed in its immediate objectives, not least because imperial expansion evoked massive resistance from both Boers and black peoples. Policies of aggression and dispossession aimed at independent chiefdoms evoked in fact, not support, but rebelliousness and sedition from the Boers on the frontiers of settlement, and contributed to a crippling crisis of legitimacy for the colonial government. Most of the Boers saw no reason to throw in their lot with British imperialism against black chiefdoms, and many of them, including those who lived closest to the centre of Sotho power, openly chose the patronage of Moshoeshoe rather than that of the British [...]. (Keegan, 2009: 278).

To come to all these conclusions and to assess the colonial years of South Africa, Keegan strongly relied on the numerous regional and very local contributions of historians in various fields of history. These findings are supported by various standard publications on South Africa’s history and supported by global contexts, inclusive of colonial histories on Africa in general (Roberts, 1990). Former and present-day regional history study contributions on, for example, the Cape and KwaZulu-Natal are still regarded as of the best in the country (Worden, 2010), and sufficiently informative to utilize in a framework of understanding and debating the colonial and postcolonial phases of the region.

Regional and more micro local contributions in South Africa, covering a limited or narrow-parochial view of history inclusive of colonial times and its impacts, still have to be explored more broadly from a postcolonial impression.\(^\text{18}\) The work of Nigel Penn on the northern border-line of the Cape Colony and the impact of colonizers on the reducing of

Khoisan territory needs to be acknowledged (Penn, 2006). De Klerk is of the opinion that more research is required on the relations between the colonizers and the locals or indigenous peoples in the Cape Colony, and not only on social and economic aspects (De Klerk, 2009).

In, for example, research contributions on the Western and Eastern Cape as pioneering spaces (and known as provinces in the current context) in South Africa, as well as KwaZulu-Natal as province (Laband, 1996; Thompson, 2006), some colonial-specific practices in these regions do feature, although still not necessarily from the pen of South Africans. The University of KwaZulu-Natal is also associated with the *Alternation* journal that publishes colonial-related content in PDF format on colonial


22 Information on the Alternation Journal is available at alternation.ukzn.ac.za/docs/04.2/16 %20Att.pdf (26.05.2018).
themes useable in teaching colonial discourses (Attwell, 1997). So the general challenge embraced by Africa and African historians since the late fifties and early sixties, namely to search for an ‘African’ voice, surprisingly has not yet attracted the historians of South Africa. Therefore, as Albert Grundlingh (2005) puts it, the question of ‘South Africa’s ‘exceptionalism’ on the continent has the potential to draw historians into a wider frame and therefore the question of the South African past in relation to the rest of Africa remains’ as a postmodernist and a postcolonial challenge.

Consequently, most of South Africa’s (colonial) history since the early twentieth century up to the early twenty-first century can still be considered to have been written mainly by white historians, as well as historians from other countries. Voices being raised for an Africanization or indigenization (CHE, 2017) of historical research and teaching content is present-day news, but not yet clearly articulated or resulting in something being done in this regard. Considering a conceptual shift (Letsekha, 2013) to unlock some hidden histories as part of the existing narratives will take time but should be done. As life is a (historical) process, under particular circumstances it will probably take many more decades to observe research done on South Africa’s (colonial) past in more culturally reflective ways.²³ Apart from Bernard Mbenga (1994;1996) and Alois Mlambo (20014;2008), who produced some histories on regions in Africa (and Mbenga in particular who produced histories on South Africa as well) (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008), the country has yet to produce historians in the field of its history and Africa’s past from a refreshed colonial consideration. Perhaps this shortcoming, in addition to the lack of a more critical insight, could be reasons for the response of a journalist, Johann Rossouw, in 2008. In a salutation, before debating his argument, he states (2008, 1–8):

The rainbow nation dream was just an illusion. South Africa is not yet postcolonial.

Recent violence between the poor and the poorer in South Africa was the by-product of the country’s stagnation – it has achieved what it set out to do racially, but not economically or socially. The old colonial model of modernity is still the basis for power (p.1).

This insight, and some deeper historical moments resulting in the 2008 status of the country, are applauded by several intellectuals. See for example the thinking of Myers (2008) and Khonou (2009). Khonou also recently endorsed the current colonial mind ‘operational’ within the African National Congress (ANC) echelons (compare Myers, 2008). Other recent border history works like those of Robert Ross on ‘The Kat River Settlement’ (on the Khoekhoen) in the 19th century, Clifton Crais (on the Xhosa) and Martin Legassick’s ‘Hidden Histories of Gordonia’ (on Northern Cape land possession pertaining to the Basters and Blacks of the region), and the study on the Cape San in colonial times by Jared McDonald (2016), also fall within this ambit of colonial impact on South Africans.

In essence, the vehicle of running the ANC government remained based on the thinking of government as in the ‘indirect rule’ days of Britain (two governing systems in one country in which both are functioning with sets of laws). While the one is perceived to be authoritative and minding ‘its own way’, levels of being subordinate to the other ‘unconsciously and consciously’ were in place.

An inability, and most definitely a difficulty thus far, namely to efficiently serve minorities and majorities within a broader constitutional model in the present, with a centuries long colonial heritage, has allowed for remarks like those of Rossouw, as well as the thoughts of Mandisi

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26 The author’s interpretation of Khonou’s writing and other sources like Claassens, Aninka. 2012. ‘Unaccountable chiefs are a recipe for a new Marikana’, Business Day Live 18 September.
Majavu in 2011 on Higher Education in South Africa, but based on a 2008 report entitled The Charter for Humanities and Social Sciences (CHSS). This report, amongst others, grossly skew and one-sided as it may turn out to be, outlines the following:

As has been pointed out by African thinkers such as Mahmood Mamdani, the enduring apartheid intellectual legacy at South African universities is the ‘paradigm of the colonial academy’. [...] Thus many universities across post-apartheid South Africa continue to study white experience as a universal, human experience; while the experience of people of colour is seen as an ethnic experience. [...] Additionally, in many cases students are taught a curriculum that is premised on the notion that Africa has no intelligentsia worth reading. This pedagogical approach is more pronounced at former white universities. [...] Dissenting black voices that refuse to bow down to the oppressive paradigm of the colonial academy are caricatured as ‘polemicists’, or lacking ‘theory’ in their scholarship. [...] Obviously, this is a universal problem. (Majavu, 2013)

Apart from the fact that Majavu is over-generalizing a very complex scenario, it should be realized that centuries of practices by peoples and governments within a ‘colonial mode’ cannot transform overnight. (In SA it has been 20 years of democracy against 342 years of being in a colonial state of some kind). Rather, the intellectual attitude should be to efficiently and morally record, through refreshed African-centric approaches – inclusive of multidisciplinary intentions – to what degree these contributions can truly impact coming to an understanding of the country and its region’s precolonial, colonial and postcolonial state.

To only ‘calculate’ (or to defend or criticize) to what level(s) a past history contribution may or may not actually have been excluding peoples, could become too repetitive (knowledge) or plain counterproductive (stagnation in thinking). The continent’s regional histories, inclusive of their colonial heritage, should be deliberated as well as liberated from an African state of mind in methodology. A mere focusing on mainly oral history will not be sufficient. It would be inspired mainly by political motives/reflections. Saleem Badat (2011) recently also argued that the ‘colonial/apartheid’ [sic] legacy should be addressed on Higher Education levels. A kind of quick fix social equity and redress is regarded as of more importance at this stage than to deepen South Africans’ understanding of the colonial past. What is required is truly visible positive transformation every day, as well as responsible leaders who know how to efficiently redress
issues based rather on an effective long-term program by transforming the human mindset, opportunity, capacity and ability.

From recent research, produced since 1994, with as focus or as contextual focus the colonial legacy of South Africa, it appears that this wide and complex topic embedded in colonialism remains a vibrant field. The foci mainly relate to themes such as: property, family, identity, slavery; reconstructing a post-apartheid state; comparative colonialism studies (Meredith, 2005; Thompson, 2010; Nugent, 2012); religious divides; colonial administration and development (Worsfold, 2011); missionary teaching and teaching white literature (Batzer, 2008); drama and theatre (Sirayi, 2012).

At the University of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), for example, academics in History have not only contributed extensively to the region’s colonial history, but some have also ventured to deliberate on teaching African History particularly in a postcolonial era. Specific foci on the past and the impact of colonialism also feature in recent academic conferences (Carruthers, 2014). In July 2013 the School of Education at the University of Cape Town (UCT) hosted a workshop on ‘Colonial Education in Africa: Connecting Histories of Education through Text, Image, Voice, Memory and Word’. Amongst others, this workshop encouraged a research conversation on the

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29 See the University’s Journal available at alternation.ukzn.ac.za/docs/04.2/16 %20 Att.pdf . (26.05.2018)
history of African colonial education and its legacies. Whether this workshop created a sudden awareness and negative perception among students of the University of colonial legacies, like those of Cecil John Rhodes whose statue was vandalized on the campus and eventually removed altogether, is debatable. Whether those very sentiments were responsible for more instances of monument vandalism and violent practices against management by 2015 still require a thorough study. The impressions of the Ghanian Neo Lekgotla Laga Ramoupi in 2011 on how European the UCT landscape still compared to the University of Ghana, should also not be ignored as part of the instigating vibes that recently shook UCT academia and management to its core. Especially also because, to quote Ramoupi (2012), the UCT from 1997 ‘[even] wanted to preserve its colonial heritage via its Centre for African Studies (CAS)’.

Despite the reality that a country’s heritage is a country’s heritage, to be preserved and expanded to be all-inclusive (Van Vollenhoven, 2015), for outsiders the irony in this case is that the UCT has – in some way – always been perceptionally viewed as synonymous with being liberal, as well as an upfront leader in all spheres of decision-making practices, processes and human activity. The fact that this current outrage against a colonial leader’s visibility on the UCT campus took more than two decades after democracy (and even prior to democracy) to provoke discontentment (Masondo, 2015), makes one wonder to what measure the UCT intellectuals in reality critically contested the South African heydays of colonial indirect rule with their students, and whether apartheid was scorned in times of Afrikaner nationalism only or has been mostly scorned

30 See SACHES, Workshop, Colonial Education in Africa, 4-5 July 2013 (UCT, Cape Town South Africa).
as culprit for South Africa’s racist stand since 1994 and thereafter.\(^{33}\) The UCT Postgraduate Prospectus of 2014–2016 at least generally refers to ‘Cape Town’s colonial and precolonial history ... that make[s] it an interesting city with a vibrant culture’ to study in.\(^{34}\) Judging by recent events on the campus (unilaterally loaded and political of nature) it can be assumed that not all would share this historical sentiment.

### Teaching colonial and postcolonial legacies in South Africa

#### Colonial histories in the CAPS\(^{35}\) school curriculum

As there are so many histories and milestones in South Africa’s history to consider in school curricula, the idea here is not to criticize but rather to reflect on what is available, before discussing what appears to have been embraced regarding colonialism on a higher educational level in specifically History as discipline. Within the senior phase history (grades seven to nine) it is only grade seven and grade eight that are exposed to some historical knowledge with regard to the colonization of the Cape (grade seven) and the colonial process well-known as the Scramble for Africa in the late 19th century (grade eight).\(^{36}\)

In the Further Education and Training teaching framework, the curriculum for History has been revised twice since the turn of the century in

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35 CAPS meaning Curriculum Assessment Policy Statements under authority of the Department of Education of South Africa.

36 See the curricula for Grades 10-12 in History as outlined in Republic of South Africa, Department of Basic Education, Curriculum and assessment Policy Statement (CAPS), Social Sciences Senior Phase, 2012, pp. 15-16.
order to accommodate a national past that is more acceptable and representative of the country’s population. Colonialism as a theme still remains within the deliberations of considering its expansion, impacts and limitations. On the Grade 10 level, the learners currently deal mainly with pre-colonial expansion in South Africa by covering the years 1750 to 1860. In the Grade 11 curriculum learners are introduced to colonialism from a different angle by being taught about British imperialism and the role played by colonial businesses in gold mining. The British impact on the steadily diminishing existence of African societies after 1870 is also covered. In Grade 12, only one theme (from a possible six) engages with Africa in postcolonial times, with the emphasis on ‘Independent Africa’.  

As always, the compiling of curricula is an unrewarding task, always arousing much debate. Distorted labeled representations of colonial-related communities in school textbooks have recently been criticized as limiting the role and visibility of white South Africans in the nineteenth century parts of the CAPS-curriculum, while exposure to English and black histories appears to be accentuated more. It was slated as not being in the spirit of reconciliation and allowing for distortions of the country’s history (Pretorius, 2007). It is as if the nineties and some years thereafter in many ways featured a kind of an insensible debate among so-called ‘schools’ of historians regarding which colonial community (the Dutch from 1652 to 1795 or the British from 1806 to 1960) should be marked as the cultivators of racist practices in South Africa). In published works, the general course content concerning colonialism still featured strongly, lacking a thorough socioeconomic and cultural recording of research on communities as in colonial times to enhance mapping the impact on local areas and regions with the intention to contribute to broadening perspectives on colonial time histories with colonialism per se being the point of debate.

37 See the curricula for Grades 10-12 in History as outlined in Republic of South Africa, Department of Basic Education, Curriculum and assessment Policy Statement (CAPS), History, 2011, 9-16.

38 Bill Nasson even dares to make the a-historical assumption that South Africa has seen an overproduction of white nationalist educators … whoever they may be or are perceptionalized to be, and apparently not necessarily include historians from English descent. See Bill Nasson’s book review in footnote 33.
The Higher Education and Training (HET) environment

In 1979, Eriksen asserted that it would have been impossible for an earlier generation to write Africanist history as there was ‘simply nothing to talk about’. He continued that institutions, ‘allegedly concerned with the teaching of Africanist history had very little to profess.’ This was indeed so – the habit merely appeared to be to repeat and/or inform. In 2013, a research exercise was undertaken to identify the status of teaching colonialism in the Higher Education and Training sector. Traditionally South Africa had 23 universities and 19 colleges, but the new century saw mergers and forms of integration to change to 11 traditional universities, six comprehensive universities and approximately 28 private colleges and universities. For this discussion, information from the history departments/subject groups of the traditional universities were obtained from subject heads, or from a person who had been tasked to respond to three basic questions which were:

i) Provide a scanned copy of your current undergraduate and postgraduate history module content.

ii) Give your impressions on the status of research and the teaching of colonial-related modules or themes and trends in Southern Africa.

iii) How regional or local do you get when focusing on colonial-related themes?

Six universities responded to the call for information, namely the University of South Africa and the University of Johannesburg (recently grouped as comprehensive universities); the University of Stellenbosch; the University of KwaZulu-Natal, the University of Pretoria and the North-West University. Later on, some information of other universities (such as the University of Cape Town and the University of the Witwatersrand) was obtained through a desktop research exercise.

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The general outcome of specifically questions ii and iii as orally responded to was as follows:
The remainder of the universities communicated generally in writing or the information was obtained through a desktop research process.

It seems reasonable to suggest that colonialism as theme at South African universities is mostly offered in undergraduate courses, and mainly

Tab. 1: Results of the survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>The status of research and the teaching of colonial-related modules or themes and trends in Southern Africa</th>
<th>How regional or local do you get when focusing on colonial-related themes?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University of South Africa(a)\</td>
<td>‘…teaching of colonial history here is reasonably vibrant/robust – though colonial themes are not all that dominant in the overall program, there are two undergraduate modules which deal exclusively with the colonial period, and one Honors course as well.’</td>
<td>‘We certainly do focus on the western and eastern Cape; northern Cape could do with more attention; the area that became the Transvaal and Natal enjoy reasonable attention too; perhaps the Free State is also neglected’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Stellenbosch(b)</td>
<td>‘We focus on South African colonial history in the 1st and 2nd year and on Africa in the 2nd and 3rd year’.</td>
<td>‘On Honors level we cover themes rather than specific regions or times’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of KwaZulu-Natal(c)</td>
<td>‘…we were put under pressure last year to redesign...’</td>
<td>‘…ALL our courses to reflect (even more than before) African-centered themes, but these templates sit in limbo.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Pretoria(d)</td>
<td>Very much an individual choice and selection was observed. The respondent was uncertain.</td>
<td>No response.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(a\) E-Mail, Mr Nick Southey (Unisa)/Eeden, Elize S. van, 19 August 2017. See also http://www.unisa.ac.za/Default.asp?Cmd=ViewContent&ContentID=157 (20.08.2017).

\(b\) E-Mail, Prof Albert Grundlingh (US)/Eeden, Elize S. van, August 2017. Take note that the emphasis is on colonial history (my accentuation) and not necessarily critically reviewing colonialism.

\(c\) E-Mail, Prof Julie Parle (UKZN)/Eeden, Elize S. van, August 2017.

\(d\) E-mail, Mr Zimkhitha Tsotso(UP)/Eeden, Elize S. van, August 2017.
reflects the historical development of colonialism, especially since the days of formalizing states and the development of a system of indirect rule, gradually imposed by the British after colonizing the Cape of Good Hope in 1806.\textsuperscript{40} Universities also do not necessarily cover a historiography of colonialism at undergraduate level, but it is equally doubtful whether the universities under discussion engage with it at postgraduate level. A tendency to be multi-reflexive on the past impact of colonialism in South Africa appears to be a twenty-first century trend. Thus, for example, the University of Cape Town recruited John Lonsdale to come and teach at the university. He brought with him his knowledge of how England sees the historiography of South Africa (Lonsdale, 1983). From an undergraduate perspective, the teaching of history at the UCT from a colonial angle appears hazier.\textsuperscript{41}

On the other hand, if information on courses and disciplines in tertiary yearbooks or prospectuses can be regarded as reliable, the undergraduate themes chosen by the subject group History at the University of Johannesburg are mostly reflections of certain trends, time frames and phenomena in which themes on the history of the Cape Colony are the closest that one can get to an assumption that aspects of colonialism also feature. On a postgraduate level, themes covering postcolonial legacies appear to be more prominent.\textsuperscript{42}

At the University of Cape Town, currently the only postgraduate course in History that is clearly related to colonial matters is the one on African environmental history, which offers precolonial, colonial and postcolonial environmental impact reflections.\textsuperscript{43} On an undergraduate level, the approach appears more generic and in line with modern-day trends of

\textsuperscript{40} Theophilus Shepstone could perhaps be seen as a pioneer in the Indirect Rule way of governing in the 1840s and years before Frederick Lugard has imposed Indirect Rule in Nigeria.

\textsuperscript{41} The University of Cape Town, Undergraduate courses, History, in http://www.humanities.uct.ac.za/ (15.08.2017).

\textsuperscript{42} E-Mail, Prof Gerald Groenewald/Elize S. van Eeden, August 2013.

engaging in world and transnational histories with gender studies and other themes of choice of which Africa and Southern Africa form a selection to choose from.\textsuperscript{44}

Other examples of how to think about colonialism when teaching are those of mutual partnerships between South African universities and universities abroad, such as the partnership between the University of the Western Cape and the Makerere Institute (Uganda).

Back in 2011 the following remarks were made by Mahmood Mamdani (2011) regarding colonialism and teaching colonialism:

The central question facing higher education in Africa today is what it means to teach the humanities and social sciences in the current historical context and, in particular, in the postcolonial African context. [...] To brainstorm the outlines of this programme, we held a two-day workshop in January with scholars from the University of the Western Cape in South Africa and Addis Ababa University. We agreed to create a graduate programme that combines a commitment to local — indeed, regional — knowledge production, rooted in relevant linguistic and disciplinary terms, with a critical and disciplined reflection on the globalisation of modern forms of knowledge and modern instruments of power. Rather than oppose the local to the global, we seek to understand the global from the vantage point of the local.

To also quote Badat (2011) on the same issue of teaching:

In South Africa, social inequalities were embedded and reflected in all spheres of social life — as a product of the systemic exclusion of blacks and women under colonialism and apartheid.

What is stated by Mamdani and Badat on features of teaching from two different angles and/or issues of teaching is not new, but they still remain issues that lack drive and creativity in the spheres of research and teaching in Africa and about Africa. An initiative worth mentioning is the Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research (WiSER) program at the University of the Witwatersrand, in which the emphasis is on studies in Africa. Apart from having regular seminars (called the Wits Interdisciplinary Seminar

\textsuperscript{44} University of Cape Town (UCT), Faculty of Humanities (Undergraduate), 2014, as in http://www.humanities.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/2/2014HumUG_Handbook.pdf (15.08.2017), 147.
In most Higher Education and Training (HET) yearbooks or prospectuses in South Africa, postgraduate studies (like the undergraduate modules) also seem to mainly reflect generic themes under each curriculum or program offered. It is therefore not that easy to gain a conclusive insight into the particular focus that the facilitator of History may choose for covering a generic theme in a specific year. It may thus be assumed that more universities may indeed cover colonial-related themes in courses than what may be observed on paper.

Occasionally, more is shared, as happens in course examples to be found in, for example, Botswana – an independent country immediately to the north of South Africa. The University of Botswana seems to deal mainly with the precolonial status of Southern Africa, utilizing only the evergreen narratives of the South Africans Ken Smith (1998) and Nigel Worden (2008; 2012). The course is described as follows:

The course commences by considering the major ‘schools’ of historical writing about Southern Africa, and then examines debates among historians, mainly in the 19th century, ending with colonization and African responses to it.

Equally so, some other universities in foreign countries appear to reveal explicitly more about ‘colonial-labelled’ studies than appears to be the current scenario in South Africa. Thus, for example, the University of Manchester offers a Master’s Degree in Postcolonial Studies, describing it as follows:

The MA in Postcolonial Literatures and Cultures has been running since 2005. Since then, a steady number of excellent students have taken it up, many of whom are now pursuing PhD work. Students are taught by specialists in colonial and post-colonial studies and are encouraged to take courses across disciplines such as English and American studies, history, film, art history and sociology and to study materials from a variety of perspectives. Ideological diversity and openness of debates are strongly encouraged!

45 As example see e-mail: Keith Breckenridge/E-mail list of historians, 15 May 2015, in which the WISH was about Dilip Menon’s discussion regarding Deep time and the colonial present in which counter histories were exposed.

46 See http://www.arts.manchester.ac.uk/subjectareas/englishamericanstudies/research/postcolonial/ (15.08.2017).
Paul Landau at the University of Maryland, College Park in the USA, not only co-edited a general book on Africa, entitled *Images and Empires: Visuality in Colonial and Postcolonial Africa* (2002), but also presents an honors course in History covering colonialism in South Africa. The course, entitled ‘South Africa: Race, Colonialism and History’ (Hist 619E),47 very much relates to the Botswana sources and themes mentioned earlier, although it covers a far more intensive engagement, and a more comprehensive literature list for reading by students. It furthermore portrays contributions by several South African historians.

The George Mason University (GMU) in Liverpool, USA, also offers modules on the roles of women in the development of the Cape Colony, which engages with sources of some historians in early colonial South Africa.48

Within the ‘deep re-examination of current hegemonies’ in higher education in South Africa the boisterous call for a decolonization of curricula are indeed diverse, and not based on similar concepts and ideologies (CHE, 2017). Dealing with teaching about colonialism – specifically in South Africa and by South African historians – still requires more research to be done and more novel ideas with regard to teaching about the style of management and the deep-rooted impact of British colonial indirect rule until recent times. This ought to be captured even more widely in the regions and local surrounds of the country as some historians, earlier mentioned, have done so far but still falling far too short. Some effort in this regard is being made on undergraduate level at the North-West University in South Africa. A more extensive discussion by Van Eeden (2013) is available in the *Yesterday&Today* Journal. In the Hist 213 module, the educational point of departure in teaching colonialism and colonial themes in Africa in particular is to provide a multidimensional critical perspective, and to also relate to the theme closer to home – namely South Africa. Hist 213 is a 16-credit module that covers themes on Africa and South Africa and politics. An important theoretical and practical assignment explores identifying traces of regional or/

47 See http://www.history.umd.edu/Faculty/Landau/ (15.08.2017).
and local colonialist practices (perhaps arriving from the British indirect rule governing system, and its possible culmination in rooted racist nurturing, also possibly allowing/having allowed for distorted local democracies). Also the current debate of decolonizing South African curricula in disciplines call for the importance to develop sufficiently rigorous local knowledge that ‘relates better to the needs of students and the development challenges of South Africa while contributing to the global knowledge production from the perspective of Africa (CHE, 2017). Defining the status of teaching ‘decolonialized’ History at a higher education and Training level in South Africa has received some attention from the South Africa’s Council of Higher Education from late 2017, and is still ongoing in 2018. The idea is to take maintain some conversation on decolonialized curricula change and development (CHE, 2018).

Globalism and teaching colonial histories of Africa and South Africa: Some thoughts

In 1994, rethinking colonial African history, Frederick Cooper, an acknowledged USA expert on the African continent of yesteryear, stated that the essence of compiling African history at the time was to bring together the historiographies on colonial history of several continents in which, apart from Africa, Latin America and Asia featured (Cooper, 1994). On the other hand, there are others who still analyze Africa superficially as having been colonially exploited only. In the environmental history of Africa, touched on by a Zimbabwean, Vimbai Kwashirai, the author asserts that Africa’s global contribution was more or less restricted to ‘involuntary supply hugely significant resources in slaves, minerals, farm and forest produce to the world capitalist system’ (Kwashirai, 2012). Early in the twenty-first century, Jean-Francois Bayart (2000) observed that a world economic system existed before the capitalist commercial expansion of the West. About Africa and the continent’s relatedness to the rest of the world, he noted that:

... Africa has never ceased to exchange both ideas and goods with Europe and Asia, and later with the Americas. The antiquity of Christianity in Ethiopia, the spread of the Islam on the coasts, the establishment of Austronesian colonies in Madagascar, regular patterns of trade with China, India, the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean are all evidence of the degree to which eastern and southern
Africa were for centuries integrated into the pre-modern economic systems of what scholars used to call the Orient. Trade with Europe and the Americas already featured in the fifteenth century and even earlier (Unesco Courier, 1984). The Sahara Desert region, especially after the nineteenth century, also remained an important commercial and cultural axis, and a highway for the exchange of commodities such as gold as well as slave trade. Bayart further elaborates that ‘new research underlines more clearly than previously how much Africans have [freely] participated in the processes which have led to the insertion of their societies as a dependent partner in the world economy’ and in the process of colonization as a kind of last avenue (Bayart, 2000). A form of dialogic relationship existed between the colonizer and the colonized. The imported state was considered the most important form of political organization associated with Africa’s globalization. Lastly, Bayart regards a discourse on Africa’s marginality as ‘nonsense’, (Bayart, 2000) to which other academics will give an affirming nod. Several in-depth sources on the colonial periods did engage in thorough global moments and reflections. The name of Keegan has already been mentioned. Comaroff can be added on the basis of his publication *The African State in a changing global context* (1998).

Regarding South Africa and the global imaginary, Duncan Brown (2001) states that:

The humanities and social sciences have a crucial role to play in the developing of ... understandings ... towards the challenges of ... teaching and research ... regarding a recuperated or revindicated nationalism, based not on the fictions of imagined unity, but on a shared problematic: a mutual implication in a history of difference, which acknowledges local as well as global affiliations.

Teaching, researching and dealing with the colonial histories and historiographies of Africa and South Africa – and reflecting the global relatedness (compare Kohnert, 2008) of these on profound and weak

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scales – still require more exposure originating from within the echelons of Africa. Yet European, Asian or American perspectives of Africa’s past, present and future will always remain a necessary part in reaching an understanding of the peoples of Africa and to progress towards measures of comparisons and reflections on a global scale. If not, decolonizing teaching and content in History remains just as exposed to ideology and being retrogressive of nature (compare Mbembe, 2016 as in CHE, 2017) if not done according to historical principles which does not include nation building.

**Conclusion**

This discussion has exposed aspects of the African and South African historiography since the early days of formal colonialism. It has, amongst others, stated that African and South African historiography (inclusive of political thoughts and governing modes) still mainly reflect ‘his [former] master’s voice’. Some impressions on the teaching of colonialism in South Africa have been shared. In essence, it appears that the teaching of colonialism in the majority of tertiary educational institutions still has to cross a Rubicon of mainly reflecting colonialism for its historical existence, and also for its mainly negatively perceived European connectedness. A broader reflection, in searching for an understanding of the breadth and depth of colonialism’s engraved traces in narrow local and extended regional spaces, requires fresh angles of thought in both research and in teaching. From local history there will eventually evolve deeper meaning and better understanding (and appreciation) of the country’s national heritage (whether currently viewed as positive or as negative) and its global connectedness. In the discipline of History, reflections on colonialism should not be selectively taught or thought about, and African perspectives on Africa’s (and South Africa’s) past can only grow from an open mind and agenda. Thoughts about colonialism caught up, for example, in tracing only parts of a legacy embedded in ‘western racism’ and ‘exploitation’ is to lose sight of the actual issue and to remain caught up in a cyclical mode concerning the present and the future. For many years, for instance, most thinking about democracy portrayed it as an intellectual discourse, a policy and government
style characterized by a refusal to encourage traces of racism as experienced in the former apartheid government (Green, 2004; Nathan, 2004). The post-1994 government and broader South African community also barely allowed themselves to think about how the past British colonial system of indirect rule in South Africa may have contributed to racism (as eventually allegedly done by apartheid – although some still fail to make any connection at all in this regard) in the country or paved the way for large-scale service inequalities currently experienced country-wide. Certainly, the urgency currently in South Africa is for intellectual voices in history and history teaching with regard to the colonial and recently started postcolonial past that are methodologically refreshing, diverse in knowledge and more constructive in focus.

The 2015 destructive debacle at UCT with regard to the University’s colonial attachment to a legacy that some (foreign) students do not appreciate historically as an inevitable heritage and legacy should not be the standard practice or be repeated. The colonial legacy of the present South Africa, in its entirety inherited from its past masters, was not and could not possibly have been swiftly eradicated with the country’s becoming a democracy in 1994. As it took more than 300 years to create a colonial mentality and worldview, historical time is again inevitably required to rethink and restructure the historical avenue by searching for a more favorable mean between the done – but not gone – past and how to become more inclusive and diverse sensitive in thought in research as well as in teaching and learning activities in a time of requesting for more decolonized thought (CHE, 2017). A widened and revised scope on South Africa’s regions concerning the history and long-term nature of past colonial system visibility and application in people’s ‘living experience’, will shed even more light on the nature of regional colonial dominance, racism and land issues. Reflecting this all from an African wisdom, inclusive from a global historiography and thought to students and learners in History in a balanced inclusive way will in future be the big challenge.

50 Compare footnote 33 to the assumptions by Bill Nasson The recent publication of Hélène Lewis should also not be ignored. See Lewis, Hélène Oppermann. 2018. Apartheid Britain’s Bastard Child, rev. ed. Wandsbeck: 512.
References


Eeden, Elize S. van. 2012. ‘Regional, Local, Urban and Rural History as Nearby Spaces and Places: Historiographical and Methodological


Vollenhoven, Anton, C. van. 2015. ‘Dealing with Statues and Memorials in South Africa – a Heritage Based Response to Current


Traditionally, the development of national and political identities is regarded as one of the most important aims of history education. In nineteenth-century Germany, the history taught in schools served to promote the identity-making process of the German *Reich* by ‘inspiring [students’] love of [their] Fatherland’.1 Similarly, in twentieth-century China, fostering patriotism has been regarded as the principal aim of history education.2

As a result, the representation of historical events involving multiple countries has frequently been twisted to achieve objectives related to the formation of identities. When it comes to the controversial topic of colonialism, divergence between narratives has the potential to escalate into political debates due to the fact that countries which once played opposing roles as colonies and the colonizer tend to make opposing judgments on colonialism and its aftermath.

However, in view of growing tendencies toward globalization, educationalists have begun to argue for a rethink, asserting that the primary task of history education should be assisting younger generations to develop an impartial, balanced and well-founded methodological view on

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the history of other nations and cultures. Multiperspectivity is outlined in teaching colonialism. Expected objectives includes: first, teaching multiple perspectives held by former colonies and former colonizers, instead of one-sided national narratives; second, teaching changing perspectives, instead of holding a stationary standpoint.

Besides, this article pays extra attention to ‘synchronicity of the non-synchronous’. This term refers to a differential classification of historical sequences contained in the same naturalistic chronology. It was outlined in theoretical discourse by Koselleck. This concept could be classified into diachronic dimension and synchronic dimension. The former refers to the existence of multiple diachronic periods in one’s own society. The latter refers to the synchronous existence of multiple cultures in the confrontation. In teaching colonialism, it points to revealing entangled history of multiple processes, such as interaction between internal factors and external impacts. To the author himself, such an approach will only stand a chance of being found if history educators are willing to revise their accustomed ideas.

This chapter explores possible solution with a case study on the Boxer War, 1900. In the first part, we provide a brief review on the event and relevant academic study. In the second part, representative narratives will be summarized in accordance with comparative researches on history textbooks published in China and Germany. Here, the two countries are respectively outlined as a case of former colony and colonizer. Further analysis will reveal the shortcoming of previous narratives. In the third part, we will provide an example to improve synchronicity in teaching colonialism. At last, the article will summarize theoretical proposals and practical exploration in order to improve synchronicity in teaching colonialism.


The Boxer Movement and relevant academic discourse

As a historical event, the Boxer Movement could be identified as one of the typical conflicts between the ‘aggressive’ western colonizing powers and the ‘resistant’ eastern colonized societies. At the end of the nineteenth century, Chinese society faced serious internal and external crisis. The declining Qing dynasty (1644–1911) was no longer able to ease domestic social and political tension and unrest, including instances of corruption, discontent and rebellions. At the same time, China suffered overwhelming external pressure from industrialized western states which sought to incorporate it into the global network of capitalism and colonialism by appropriating a series of colonies, trading ports and spheres of influence on the remaining territory of the collapsing oriental empire. Colonization and modernization was entangled with each other in nineteenth century China.5

In 1897 and 1898, Germany, as a newly rising western power, seized Shandong as the German Reich’s colonial frontier in the Far East. In this newly colonized province, local Chinese people started to gather in secret societies known as ‘Boxers’. Before long, the Boxers began to share a similar xenophobic creed.6 From 1899 onward, violent conflicts gradually escalated between Chinese Boxers and local foreign population, especially Christian missionaries in north China. As fanatic Boxers fought against the exotic ‘heresies’ these missionaries were introducing, the conservative ruling clique regarded this resistance as an opportunity to exclude western influences.7 In the spring of 1900, an international crisis was triggered by


the increasing violent conflicts between Boxers and the foreign diplomatic community in the capital city of Beijing. On June 21, the Qing regime of China declared war on major western countries. In response, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, America, Japan, Italy and Austro-Hungary rapidly formed the Eight-Nation Alliance to wage a military expedition against the oriental empire and revolting Boxers under the command of the German general Alfred Graf von Waldersee (1832–1904). Eventually, Chinese resistance was suppressed in the face of the overwhelming military superiority of the western powers. The Qing court had to accept another ‘unequal treaty’, the Boxer Protocol, as the cost of peace.

The historical interpretation of the Boxer War follows different paradigms in China and the western world. It was not until the 1990s that more globalized perspectives came to be accepted by some historians from both China and the west in their endeavor to understand transnational phenomena, such as mass violence, in relation to the Boxer Movement and the Boxer War.

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In China, Boxer is a controversial topic between anti-colonialism and xenophobia. Since the 1950s, to Chinese historians, the event was idealized as a patriotic movement, in the international aspect, as a part of resistance against imperialism and colonialism; in the internal aspect, as one step in the nationalistic liberation of the Chinese people. This depiction appears to be predominant by a nationalistic and ideological agenda. Wang Xuedian (王学典) criticized the predominance of politically-influenced agenda in previous presentation of the Boxers in the twentieth century China. He argued that, evaluation of the Boxer is trapped in tension between academia and politics, between rationality and emotion.\(^{11}\)

In western world, scholars paid attention to empirical study on the origin of Boxer. Joseph Esherick contributed one of the most important works on origin study in 1980s. Paul Cohen provides an interpretation on continuous ‘mythologization’ of the event in both western world and China. The portrayal of the Boxers appears to be consistently linked to changing political agendas rather than to academic research\(^{12}\). Later, he summarized a paradigm transformation from ‘impulse-response’ framework, to ‘China-centered’ perspective, which paid more attention to internal factor of China, for example, population growth and its aftermath in the nineteenth century, rather than bringing an external mindset based on the standpoint of westerners.\(^{13}\)

From the 1980s onward, the huge chasm between Chinese and western academia has closed due to the opening of contemporary China toward the western world and increasing international academic communication. As western scholars’ works were introduced into China, Chinese historians started to challenge orthodox narratives with new contexts and new documents. As a result, international and transnational perspectives have become important paradigms in Chinese and western academia.


In term of theory, American scholar Prasenjit Duara was the first to urge historians of nineteenth- and twentieth-century China to ‘rescue[e] history from the nation’\textsuperscript{14}. Chinese theorist, Yang Nianqun (杨念群), supports to adopt multiple flexible frameworks in viewing China’s development in the past two centuries\textsuperscript{15}.

In term of empirical studies, historians responded actively to new theoretical trend. According to Thoralf Klein, violence, media reports and transnational impacts are identified as three significant focal points in historical studies on the Boxer Movement emerged in the international academic community since the turn of the millennium.\textsuperscript{16} The Boxers, China and the World, edited by Robert Bickers, published in 2007, provides a series of corresponding research outcomes. The Boxer Movement is no longer simplified as a conflict between pre-modern China and modern western world, but instead depicted it as a modern anti-globalization movement closely related to contemporary anti-colonial tendencies appearing across the globe at that time.\textsuperscript{17} Among ten articles in this book, three articles emphasize contemporary reports on and debates about the coalition forces in China during the Boxer War in various countries across the world.\textsuperscript{18} A further three pay attention to the potential transnational impact of the Boxer Movement, in places such as India, then a colony, and the imperialistic

\textsuperscript{14} Duara, Prasenjit. 1995. Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China. Chicago.

\textsuperscript{15} Nianqun, Yang. 2001. Zhongceng lilun dongxi fang sixiang huitongxia de Zhongguoshi yanjiu [Middle Range Theory: The Chinese History Research under the Understanding of East and West Thought]. Nanchang.


An international seminar held on the occasion of the 110th anniversary of the event took ‘The Boxer Movement: China and the World’ as the topic of the academic forum it organized. International and transnational approaches represented one of the most significant focal points of this conference. Chinese historians and international academia have increasingly reached consensus on controversial issues in history, including the origin and the organization of the Boxers. Scholars paid more and more attention to the transnational social and cultural interaction between Chinese society and outside world before and after the Boxer War. Some of the issues they have analyzed include the intricate conflicts between the Chinese community and Christian missionaries and the Chinese acceptance of westernized and modernized nationalism after the Boxer War. Furthermore, researchers have reinterpreted contemporary media reports from various countries around the world so as to uncover the outside world’s changing image of China and diversified attitudes to colonization there, and reviewed the actions and views of the foreign soldiers of expedition force in China in the light of newly discovered documents in order to recapture internal transformation of western colonists before and after their expedition across China.


In conclusion, since 2000s, in the academic discourse on the Boxer Movement, globalized perspectives are replacing non-interconnected nation-centric standpoints; social-cultural interactions are replacing political conflicts. In term of synchronicity, scholars no longer remain in a dichotomy between colonization and anti-colonization. They increasingly tend to reveal interaction of multiple internal and external courses.

The Boxer Movement in traditional historical narratives

We may wish at this juncture to take a closer look at whether new tendencies within the academic community are bringing or have brought about considerable changes in the teaching of the Boxer War and colonialism in school history lessons. History textbooks in both China and Germany allow us to identify principal narratives in the representation of the Boxer Movement.

The anti-colonialism narrative

We might describe the first of these as the anti-colonialism narrative, which has been adopted by the majority of Chinese history textbooks from the late 1940s to the present day. The Boxer Movement is depicted as the Chinese people’s patriotic resistance to colonialism or imperialism, in spite of Boxers’ fanatical xenophobia.

From a diachronic point of view, the image of the Boxers in Chinese history textbooks has witnessed three significant changes in the course of the twentieth century. When modern history education at basic education level was initially established in China in the period 1903–1911, the Boxer Movement was described in negative terms, as ‘the disastrous Boxer Riot’. It is evident that textbook designers of the early twentieth century, who were still loyal to the imperial house, attempted to demonize the Boxers as rebels so as to absolve the regime from responsibility for the international crisis that ensued.\(^21\) In history textbooks published during the period of the Republic of China (1912–1949), even though

\(^{21}\) The cause of the riot was described in a biased fashion as ‘bandit chieftains’ and ‘their blockhead followers’, who ‘first incited riots in Shandong and then fled into neighboring provinces after a long time of plotting’. The aftermath of the revolt was described as an unprecedented disaster as well as a major humiliation
the Boxer Uprising was still negatively portrayed as a highly xenophobic mass movement, a not insignificant number of textbooks emphasized at least to a degree the patriotic significance of the anti-colonialist Boxers; the ‘external pressure’ from western colonial expansion and the ‘righteous indignation’ (patriotism) of the Boxers were outlined differently in these textbooks from the disastrous aftermath of the Boxer War. A number of history textbooks published in the 1930s and 1940s even started to praise the Boxers’ patriotic spirit:

Their overwhelming bravery was surprising and admirable. Thus, after the bloody battle in 1900, foreigners realized that the Chinese are the people of nationalistic spirit and the people who can never be eliminated.

The most important turning point emerged when left-wing Chinese intellectuals began to become involved in history education during the 1940s. In accordance with the new ideology of the communist revolutionists, the Boxer Movement was idealized using new terms: it was referred to as a ‘spontaneous anti-imperialistic mass movement’, a ‘heroic but tragic patriotic movement’ and an ‘anti-imperialistic and nationalistic liberation’.


representatives of the peasant class; brutality of imperialism is outlined instead of xenophobic fanaticism of Boxers.\textsuperscript{25}

Later, this patriotic and revolutionary narrative was inherited by history curricula and textbooks published in the newly founded People’s Republic of China from 1949 onward. The Boxer Movement, once depicted as a disastrous riot, was now eulogized in the 1956 history curriculum as ‘the great patriotic movement of peasants’ which ‘struck a hard blow to the imperialistic powers and defeated the conspiracy of imperialists to carve up China, but it was still backward and unsuccessful due to the lack of proletarian leadership.’\textsuperscript{26} From then on, the anti-invasion storyline became the orthodox narrative in Chinese history didactics.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{25} The origins of the Boxer Movement were reinterpreted through the lens of class theory: ‘The majority of boxers were poor peasants and they fought against oppression by landlords and bureaucrats’. See Administration Committee of Jin-Cha-Ji Border Area (ed.). 1947. 

\textsuperscript{26} Institute of Curriculum and Textbook (ed.). 2000. 

\textsuperscript{27} The invasion of the Eight-Nation Alliance was identified as the sole cause of the Boxer Movement. The imperialist powers and the feudal regime of the Qing dynasty were condemned as oppressors who strangled this patriotic movement. The historical significance of the Boxer Movement was formulated thus: ‘The revolting Boxers forced the imperialist powers to realize Chinese people’s unconquerable power. Thus, the imperialists’ dream of carving up and dominating China vanished like a soap bubble. In conclusion, it [was] the Boxer Movement that pushed Chinese society to move forward’. See Institute of Curriculum and Textbook, (ed.). 2000. 
\textit{20shiji Zhongguo zhongxiaoxue kechengbiaozhun jiaoxuedagang huibian: lishijuan} [Collected 20th Century Curriculum Standards and Teaching Outlines for Chinese Primary and Secondary Schools: History]. Beijing: 144. Similar expressions, with slight modifications, were to be found in the corresponding sections of the history curriculum for senior secondary schools; see ibid: 228; for minor revisions criticizing the Boxers’ superstition and xenophobic fanaticism, see ibid: 721.
Anti-colonialist representation on the Boxer War is found only occasionally in textbooks published in the Federal Republic of Germany – for example on a textbook published in 1951. In the German Democratic Republic, with its Marxist-Leninist educational framework, the anti-imperialistic narrative was dominant in the description of the event. The Boxers were praised as an ‘uprising of Chinese patriots’ and an ‘uprising of Chinese peasants and artisans’ in response to ruthless imperialist invasion. Most textbooks condemned atrocities committed by the coalition forces in suppressing the uprising: ‘Thousands of innocent Chinese men, women and children [were] slaughtered’ by the foreign invaders. In particular, German workers’ protests against the Boxer War were sometimes mentioned in order to illustrate the global struggle between imperialism and the working class in the name of socialism. Although the Boxer War is interpreted within a globalized framework with its shift of perspectives, the GDR version of the anti-imperialism narrative seems to be more biased than the Chinese version, since it wholly omitted colonizers’ constructive role and anti-colonial fighters’ destructive side.

Other narratives

In contrast to the anti-colonialism storyline, corresponding narratives based on the standpoint of western colonists make significant appearances in a number of history textbooks published in West Germany between 1950 and 1990. We might identify one typical narrative as the ‘colonial policy storyline’. Some history textbooks mention the Boxer Rebellion in chapters entitled ‘Colonial Expansion and World Policy’. Germany’s intervention in the Boxer War was interpreted as one case among a series of symbolic events characterizing the German Reich’s ambitious ‘world policy’. Another textbook mentions the USA’s fighting ‘side by side’ with

European countries in order to suppress the Boxer uprising as one of the eight typical cases discussed within the topic of ‘American Imperialism’. In short, the Boxer War was identified as a chapter of individual western countries’ diplomatic policy, to which the Boxer Movement was described as background.

We might term the other mainstream narrative in German textbooks the ‘international relationship storyline’. One textbook mentions the Boxer Movement in the context of ‘the Era of Classic Imperialism’ (Das Zeitalter des klassischen Imperialismus) and focuses on mutual cooperation and conflicts among western imperial powers before and after the Boxer War within the context of the Eight-Nation Alliance, which would eventually result in the Open Door Policy in China at the beginning of the twentieth century. Other history textbooks have regarded the Boxer Rebellion as one of the symbolic events relating to ‘Imperialism in Asia’ (Imperialismus in Asien). Obviously, this approach paid substantial attention to the broader picture of the international configurations within the global network of imperialism.

Since the 1990s, increasing numbers of newly published history textbooks have adopted a perspective we might refer to as the ‘international relations’ narrative. This narrative contextualizes the Boxers within the context of the global network of imperialism, which includes discussion of such events as ‘imperialist penetrations into China’, ‘colonial powers in China’ and ‘the race for colonies’.

been reframed from a ‘Europeanized’ perspective. In one typical instance, in the Franco/German history textbook *Histoire/Geschichte* published in 2008, the Boxer Movement is outlined in a ‘Dossier’ on ‘China as the area of European Rivalries’.\(^{35}\) Only one or two paragraphs describe internal process of industrialization in China and add the modernization of China as a subordinate clue within the frame of imperialism, including sentiment against industrialization as one of the factors that triggered the Boxer Rebellion and the collapse of the imperial reign in 1911 as one of the further consequences of the Boxer War.\(^{36}\)

It is not difficult to summarize several similar characteristics of each of the three mainstream narratives: the Boxer War is interpreted as a typical case in the model of impulse-response, based on the one-dimensional political confrontation between colonizer and colony as the two sides of dichotomy.

However, it is evident that the first and second narratives, revolving around anti-colonialism and colonial policy, limit the discourse to nation-state-centric one-sidedness. Based on the victimhood of eastern colonies, the anti-colonialism storyline emphasizes legitimation of national liberation movements and the social revolution via class liberation through the idealization of anti-colonial fighters and the demonization of colonial invaders; conversely, the colonial policy narrative, based on the standpoint of western colonizing countries, has traditionally paid more attention to western powers’ colonial policy, such as Germany’s ‘World Policy’ before the First World War. The international relations narrative focuses on explaining the transformation of international political configurations defined as ‘imperialism’ in which intricate contradictions inside the European community were eventually to trigger the World War I. To a substantial extent, the colonial policy and international relations


narratives essentially seek to interpret the same Eurocentric political theme through respectively highlighting two different aspects, i.e. the national and the international dimension.

In term of multiperspectivity, existing narratives fail to present multiple perspectives. In textbooks of China and GDR, nationalistic and ideological agenda are predominant; in textbooks published in the Federal Republic, Eurocentrism plays a dominant role. In term of synchronicity, they are incapable of revealing entangled multiple courses. To German students, internal developments of China are excluded from their horizon; To Chinese students, external impacts are simplified with the concept of imperialism. To both sides, textbook narratives outline conflicting courses in politics and religion, but they generally neglect synchronic interactive factors in social and cultural aspects, even though these courses are highlighted in contemporary academic discourse.

An attempt to reinterpret the Boxer Movement in a global context

The analysis reveals the predominant role of nation centric and politically focused stereotypes in representing the Boxer Movement. In order to correct these problems, besides the introduction of multiperspectivity, retracing ignored synchronic processes should be identified as one of the most important approaches as well, for instance: Whether were xenophobic Boxers in fact influenced by western and modern factors? Whether were imperialistic colonizers factually affected by local impacts of China? Only by unfolding these ignored aspects could history teachers and learners realize the synchronic dimension in the Boxer War.

The following paragraphs will attempt to present a possible solution to this situation and the difficulties to which it gives rise by considering an instance of innovative educational practice in China. In the National College Entrance Examination of history discipline held in Shanghai in June 2010, the Boxer Movement was chosen as the theme of the 37th question. The question is as follows:

Although this ‘peace treaty’ was not legally effective, as an actual historical document it reflects the author’s factual thoughts.

The following clauses were listed in the document:

1. Any claim to reparations by the Eight-Nation Alliance to be declared invalid.
2. Each country to pay China 400 billion taels of silver as military expenditure.
3. Any vessel harbored in Chinese ports shall not be permitted to leave without permission.
4. The rent for concessions to be doubled from the current price.
5. The general administration of Customs to be returned to China.
7. Ally churches in China to be confiscated.
8. Taiwan to be returned to China by Japan.
9. Kiaochou to be returned to China by Germany.
10. Dalian Bay to be returned to China by Russia.
11. All missionaries to return to their countries and never come back to China.
12. Korea and Vietnam to be restored as tributary states of China.
13. Chinese customs to be administered by the Chinese.
14. In accordance with the decree issued by Emperor Qianlong, no diplomatic envoys to remain in Beijing.
15. Each country to pay the Boxers 400 billion taels of silver as military expenditure.
16. Japan to pay tribute to China in accordance with the decree issued by Emperor Qianlong.
17. Any Chinese contact with foreigners or disobedience of official rules to be punished by the Chinese government.
18. All foreigners to kowtow when they meet Chinese bureaucrats.
19. No foreigner may travel around China.
20. All railways in Russian Siberia and other regions to be demolished.
21. Kowloon and Xin’an to be returned to China by Britain.
22. Taxes on any goods imported from other countries to China to be doubled.
23. No foreign merchant ship may enter a Chinese port without permission of the Chinese authorities.
24. Rice shall not be exported.
25. Taxes on any goods exported to other countries from China to be doubled.

Questions: (25 points in 150 points)

(1) Which two unequal treaties are relevant to the 8th and 19th articles of the treaty? (4 points)
(2) What kinds of claims were made by the author in the treaty? (6 points)
(3) What is your opinion on this peace treaty? (15 points)

This essay-type question about the Boxer War is designed in the typical 'material-analysis' form. With the given document as the ‘material’ (in this specific case, the ‘peace treaty’ drafted by a Boxer), the question’s authors first test candidates’ basic capacity to memorize historical knowledge (Question 1) and, second, examine their competence in summarizing information from historical material (Question 2). Then, in the most important part of the question, the task tests students’ comprehensive ability to construct their own discourses and observations on the Boxer Movement and the relevant theoretical topic, colonialism and anti-colonialism (Question 3).

The document on which the question is based was collected by a Japanese journalist, Sawara Tokusuke, in 1901. Although scholars disagree on the author’s true identity, it is commonly acknowledged by the academic community as a contemporary historical document which indicates Chinese people’s actual thoughts during the Boxer Movement.

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37 Published test paper, see http://learning.sohu.com/20100611/n272729448_8.shtml (20.09.2017)
and the Boxer War. Multiple Chinese historians have cited this document as evidence in major academic works, including Chen Xvlu (陈旭麓, 1918–1988) and Mou Anshi (牟安世, 1924–2006), two of the most accomplished experts on the history of nineteenth- and twentieth-century China.  

This potential ‘peace treaty’ contained a series of political, economic and cultural claims which reflected the diversified political opinions of Chinese activists during the Boxer Movement. Some of the treaty’s articles can be regarded as reasonable claims whose purpose was the protection of territorial sovereignty and national dignity, including the refusal of unjust war reparations and the reclamation of the sovereignty of western colonies in China (nos. 1, 8, 9, 10, 21), while other terms could be regarded as a vivid reflection of xenophobic fanaticism against all kinds of western influence, including the removal of Christian churches, rigorous restrictions on commercial trade, and instant deportation of all foreign travelers, envoys and missionaries (nos. 11, 14, 19, 20, 23). Further, some claims seek to restore the pre-modern Sino-centric international order in the Far East (nos. 12, 16, 18). However, other elements included in the treaty indicate the potential for transformation in Chinese society in the course of colonization and globalization. For instance, it is clearly a typical westernized approach rather than any pre-modern Chinese tradition for political claims to be raised in the form of a suggested ‘peace treaty’ in the context of international negotiation. Further, judicial and customs sovereignty (nos. 5, 13, 17, 22, 25) could be regarded as typical evidence indicating the gradual acceptance in China of ideas stemming from Western modernity.

The designers of this question used the abundant information provided by this document to ask examinees to reinterpret the Boxer Movement from multiple perspectives on the basis of reasonable analysis of given

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material, rather than repeating conclusions listed in textbooks. Besides the utilization of a historical document, logical reasoning and fluency of narration, the standard for evaluation of the question directed markers to pay particular attention to the diversity and systematization of ‘perspective’ in the student’s response. Expected answers are categorized at four levels:

**Level 1: 13–15 points**

Examinee was able to summarize abstract perspectives from the given document, for instance:

1. The peace treaty reflects the fact that the Chinese peasantry could only organize their resistance with traditional spiritual and material weapons in the transitional period of Chinese society.
2. The peace treaty reflects the contradictory situation that latecomers to modernization (Chinese rebels in the Boxer War) always unconsciously adopt the ‘rules of the game’ established by western powers when they fight against the unfair global system of modern capitalism.

**Level 2: 8–12 points**

Examinee could analyze the given document through at least two perspectives, such as:

1. Reasonable and unreasonable claims mentioned in the treaty;
2. Patriotism and xenophobic fanaticism of claims reflected in the treaty;
3. Anti-invasion and traditional Sino-centric ideas implied in the treaty;
4. Claims in the treaty originating from agricultural society and industrial society.

**Level 3: 3–7 points**

Examinee adopts only one single perspective in analyzing the given document, for example:

1. The treaty reflects the Boxers’ xenophobia, anti-imperialism, resistance or anti-Christian culture;
2. The treaty reflects the Boxers’ patriotic spirit;
3. The treaty reflects the Boxers’ conservative ideas.
Level 4: 1–2 points

Examinee draws his/her conclusions based on only one clause of the given document.\textsuperscript{41}

By encouraging examinees to interpret the Boxer Movement from multiple perspectives or correlate multiple synchronic courses with an interactive framework, in this case, internal modernization with external impacts, the question designers’ further purpose is to guide teachers and learners in updating their understanding of Boxer Movement and, by extension, of colonialism. First, the marking scheme no longer accepted one-sided nation-state-centric and isolated politics-centered narratives as qualified answers (levels 3, 4). Second, analysis organized through multiple perspectives is now considered as a better answer (level 2), which implies that understanding of the inner complexity of the globalized topic of colonization and decolonization, or at least the ability to perform a change of perspectives in this regard, is a basic skill for a history learner. Finally, the best answer (level 1) would consist in the systematic reinterpretation of the delicate contradiction and interaction between western colonizing powers and eastern colonized society.

The question and corresponding standards for its evaluation aroused controversy, with some specialists complaining that it is too difficult for average students to summarize comprehensive information working from one single document and organize the answer from multiple perspectives. The markers established that three examinees among about 10,000 candidates in this exam succeeded in constructing a systematic discussion of the Boxer Movement and the topic of colonialism.

The extremely small number of answers, which could be categorized in Level 1, indicates the fact that it is necessary to reflect problems in the teaching of colonialism. Most students are aware of multiperspectivity in conception on the topic colonialism. ‘Globalization’ is mentioned even in unsatisfactory answers, categorized at Level 4. In the majority of the average answers, which are classified at Level 2 and Level 3, students differentiate constructive and deconstructive dimensions of anti-colonization.

In answers at Level 2, examinees attempt to interpret colonialism with frameworks, including exogenous modernization, the industrialization of the pre-industrial society, and the reorientation from Sino-centric international relationship of tributary system to modern western-centric global network of capitalism, industrialism and colonialism. However, examinees are incapable of summarizing impacts into systematic theory. They frame only the beginning of their discussions in terms of multiple perspectives. After this, instead of defending their points with information from the document, students tend to do nothing more than retell the accustomed description of this event in accordance with what is written in textbooks, such as: patriotism and xenophobia. There are only a few cases in which students achieve impressive insights with articles included in the treaty as source; an example, which appeared in two Level 1 answers, might be recognition of the ironic phenomenon that the Boxers sought to counter the inequality of the western-centric unequal treaty system through restoring the even more unequal hierarchy of Sino-centric tributary international orders. It is noticeable that students accept the necessity of viewing colonialism from multiple perspectives, but they lack analytical tools to sketch synchronic multiple.

This attempt is indicative of the promising potential for history education to overcome the one-sidedness narratives in the textbook representation of colonialism. The further aim is to enable history learners to acquire an inclusive view on globalization and elements of critical thinking around national identity making. However, the fact that the examination results brought only few fully satisfactory answers points to the difficulties in replacing old stereotypes with new approaches.

Further suggestions on teaching colonialism in a globalizing world

In the experiment, problem and source are introduced into history education from academic research so as to re-contextualize the topic of colonialism into globalization. As a whole, the outcome could be summarized as the significant deviation between contemporary academic discourse and history education in schools.

In scholarly discourse, a review of historical studies on the Boxer War reveals that historians provide abundant resource for the globalized
Is Synchronicity Possible?

re-contextualization of Boxer. In term of multiperspectivity, transnational perspectives receive increasingly attention, which would indicate that it is time to introduce multiple perspectives into education. In term of synchronicity, multiple internal, external and interactive courses have been noticed in existing academic accounts about the origin and impact of the Boxer War, for example, how anti-colonialism ‘learn’ from colonialism which it fight against, indicated in the ‘treaty’. As a whole, perspectives and synchronicity are synergistic. Globalized perspectives enlightened scholars to reveal multiple historical courses. Synchronic existence of multiple courses enhanced further observation on interaction.

In history education, a comparison on textbooks on the topic of Boxer Movement indicates their incapability in teaching multiperspectivity and revealing synchronicity. First, narratives are centered on individual nation-state, nonmatter colonist or colony. They tend to strengthen the uniqueness of historical experience of each nation-state. In turn, these narratives have to waken students’ understanding on other countries. Second, textbook narratives are politically focused so that they tend to reinforce the one-dimensional interpretation of history, mainly internal and international politics. Consequently, in China, the Boxer Movement has been simplified as one chapter in the epic combat between the western colonialism and the patriotism of Chinese people, rather than as a part of gradual acceptance of the modernized national identification; in Germany, as one case in the changes of German diplomatic policy and imperialism, instead of as a chapter in interaction between Christianity and non-European societies. Social and cultural interaction has been excluded from learners’ horizons.

Knowing significant deviation between academic discourse and textbook narratives, it is not difficult to understand students’ incapability in forming systematic framework, even though they are surely aware of adopting multiple perspectives. In the meantime, it also indicates the possible approach to overcome this unsatisfactory status in quo. Alongside existing ideas like textbooks compiled based on international cooperation, revealing synchronicity could be identified at least as an important assistance in the construction of teaching colonialism in the global era.

Firstly, it is necessary to reduce predominance of nation-state in history conception. In this regard, theoretical framework pointing to the
entangled historical courses, should be introduced in history education, for example, ‘theory of the middle-range’, which term denotes a theoretical approach to research on history covering the period from the nineteenth century to the present day. According to Yang Nianqun, the ‘theory of the middle-range’ allows observers to transcend those so-called ‘grand narrative’\(^{42}\). In the case of the Boxer Movement, the ‘middle-range theory’ suggests the pursuance of a \textit{via media} between the dichotomy of western colonists and non-western colonies. Eastern countries have always been identified as innocent victims of the colonialism. They tend to ignore their hegemonic past, especially in the case of empire of China. China has been a gigantic empire and a powerful conqueror in East Asia for centuries. Articles mentioned in above-mentioned Boxers’ treaty claim Chinese dominance over Asian neighboring countries, such as Japan, Korea and Vietnam. They were factually the reflection of the synchronic existence of different roles of China: on one side, victim of western colonialism; on the other side, imagined dominator of East Asia. Likewise, not all of the influenced exerted by western colonists on their former colonies are harmful and destructive. There are occasions on which colonized societies have consciously or unconsciously absorbed ideas from western modernity. It enabled colonies to benefit in terms of the modernization process of their society. One example of this may indeed be the manner in which the Boxers presented a treaty in their attempt to negotiate with the western diplomatic system.

Secondly, it is necessary to reduce predominance of politics in history conception. Traditionally, international relations have been considered the only framework within which a political event of global significance, such as Boxer War, might be explained. However, political confrontation is certainly not the whole story of globalization. Although social-cultural transformations appear not as noticeable as political affairs, they gave rise to profound impacts on countries and societies, which are involved in. In the case of the Boxer War, contradictory attitudes and perennial suspicion toward western civilization within Chinese society might be regarded as

the key factor causing both the sudden rise and the eventual failure of the xenophobic Boxers. Diversified impressions among westerners of the – in their eyes – mysterious China, could also be seen as the vital motive of their intervention in the riots.

Of course, synchronicity does not mean homogeneity of globalized perspectives. However, it is history educators’ obligation to represent the diversity and integrality of major global phenomena as colonization and decolonization to younger generations, who are now living in an increasingly globalizing world. In this light, it seems imperative for us to begin to review, revise and reshape the existing nation-state-centric one-sidedness of historical narratives so as to reveal the multiperspectivity and synchronicity within the phenomena studied.

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Part 3: Debates
Cosmopolitanism, National Identity and History Education: Jordan, Israel, and Palestine

Introduction

In this article I discuss the role of political socialization and the way the state-sponsored school system contributes to the formation of national identity and nation. Specifically, I examine the strategies by which the educated class, through its control of state-sponsored school curricula, especially history curricula, constructs identities of co-nationals and citizens in three case studies on history textbooks from Jordan, Israel, and Palestine, respectively. These three case studies represent a wider global phenomenon of the system of nation-states and the idea of political socialization through state-sponsored schooling. As an illustration, Jordan is a postcolonial state incorporating within its boundaries a mixture of ethnicities, religions and nationalities. Israel is a migrant community (settler society) aiming at reconstructing a nation out of a diverse group of religious Jewish communities, while Palestine continues to be colonized by Israel.¹

When discussing the challenges of postcolonial theories to history education, an understanding of those strategies of national identity formation and political socialization is indispensable. For, as can be shown, these strategies must undoubtedly be one of the most important subjects of an analysis of history education from the perspective of postcolonial theories. The examination of those history textbooks can help us answer the question of whether the state education system is conducive to the forging of identities in line with the development of a global civil society, identities that are detached from the logocentric principles of Western discourse,

rooted in the idea of difference and alterity. This issue is of growing significance due in particular to recent global waves of migration and the emergence of diaspora groups of faith, ethnicity/race, culture, and nationality in many societies across the globe. The risk is that the continued use of the binary paradigm in identity formation may increase social, economic, and political marginalization and discrimination against those deemed as Other, and consequently intensify intra-social conflicts, as recent episodes of ethnic friction in Europe have shown.

If history education, being one of the main actors in political socialization at school, does not further wish to ignore the problem diagnoses and challenges of postcolonial theories, then it also has to consider potential alternatives to the concept of national identity and deal with the concepts of cosmopolitanism and global citizenship. The clarification of these concept with regard of postcolonial aspects will be the first step.

**Cosmopolitanism vs. global citizenship**

The origin of citizenship and cosmopolitanism goes back to ancient Greek culture. Citizenship dates back to the sixth and fourth century B.C.E. in Sparta and Athens and to the five-century-long rule of Rome. It was the Greek philosopher, Aristotle, and the Roman lawyer, Cicero, who laid the foundations guiding the principles of citizenship in ancient Greece and Rome.\(^2\) Interestingly, in spite of the fact that equality and rights of citizens were cardinal elements in all these ancient traditions, a closer look shows there were major differences among them. For example, citizen rights in ancient Greece were interconnected to obligations and duties of the citizen vis-à-vis the collective or the governing body, whereas in Rome citizen rights were independent of their duties. In the modern era, citizenship is associated with the commencement of the nation-state system since the end of the nineteenth century. Therefore, it is a new form of identity which transcends gender, race, ethnicity, religion among other social differences, unto a universal identity based on equality among individuals in the state.\(^3\)

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Global citizenship, then, refers to a form of belonging to a supra-national identity beyond the local and the regional. However, the lack of a universal body of governance, renders this form of identity problematic.

Cosmopolitanism, ‘kosmopolites’ in Greek, refers to ‘a citizen of the world,’ and it distinguishes between people as belonging to two distinct communities: the local and the wider ‘common’. In contemporary debates, scholars make distinctions between moral and political cosmopolitanism. The political aspect of cosmopolitanism can be understood as a perspective on global justice and as a concept within which the discourse on human rights and theory of justice takes place. In addition, cosmopolitanism can be understood as an ethical attitude, in which individuals engage with others in dialogue and understanding in order to move beyond provincialism and ethnocentrism. For other scholars, cosmopolitanism is seen as articulated in cultural phenomena, e.g., lifestyles and identities.

In contemporary literature, although both concepts – global citizenship and cosmopolitanism – refer to universalism, and the development of an identity beyond the national and regional, the persisting question is ‘whose universal, and what interests does it conceal.’ Wright adds, ‘the generic ontological substrate of human existence the universal assertion reveals – or posits – can challenge the stratifying, divide et impera tactics of oppressive power by means of which hierarchies of race, class, gender and sexuality enforce and reproduce an iniquitous status quo.’ David Jefferess, in his study, ‘Unsettling Cosmopolitanism,’ asserts that while both forms of identity share a common feature which is the transcendence of ‘other exclusionary modes of affiliation, such as race, ethnicity,

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7 Ibid., 50-51.
gender or religion; however, global citizenship ‘marks not simply a conception of belonging but an ethics of being [...] but as an ethics of action the global citizen is defined as one who helps an unfortunate Other.’ This interpretation, Jefferess suggests the same, turns the idea of global citizenship into a form of ‘humanitarian benevolence’; or what Edward Said calls ‘the structures of attitudes and reference of European imperialism, as a project of humanitarian benevolence’. As a result of these conceptualization, the ‘Other’ becomes an object of either benevolence and mercy of the hegemonic, or an object of inquiry to improve one’s own status, skill development, and knowledge production. Wright asserts that ‘[p]recisely because of this cosmopolitan appeal to a new universality that cleaves together sameness and difference, unity and plurality, the necessity of rigorously distinguishing between progressive and reactionary forms of universalism becomes an urgent theoretical but also political task’.

Similarly, Mohanty is critical of the neoliberal or neo-colonial discourse which ignores the power differences existing in the universal system among ‘one-third world, the materially privileged, and the majority two-thirds world who are marginalized, disenfranchised or lacking basic needs’. Thus, he explains that without acknowledging these power differences, all attempts to theorize cosmopolitanism as universal are partial and biased.

The alternative theoretical framework maybe explored from within postcolonial theories, which are critical of Eurocentric ideas of universality and modernity. According to those postcolonial theorists (e.g., Said, Bhabha, Fanon), Western modernity involves a Darwinian line of ascent, with Europe at the highest evolutionary stage, and the so-called developing nations occupying lower rungs of the ladder of progress. Venn suggests that,

[...] one of the characteristics of modernity as a period [...] is that it imagined it would bring into existence a particular concept of the subject, namely, the

8 Jefferess, Unsettling Cosmopolitanism, 32.
9 Ibid., 33.
10 Wright, Postcolonial Cosmopolitanism, 51.
11 Cited in Jefferess, Unsettling Cosmopolitanism, 31.
12 Cf. Wright, Postcolonial Cosmopolitanism, 53.
subject as (ideally) the unitary, rational, autonomous, self-sufficient, masculine, and European agent of the history of humanity.\(^ {13}\)

Venn adds that the subject has dual attributes. On the one hand, he is part of the project of modernity and simultaneously the agent of that project. As such, Europeans perceived themselves as a civilizing force during the colonial era. Their encounter with peoples from Africa, Asia, and Latin America turned the differences between them into a hierarchy in which Europeans portrayed themselves superior to ‘the rest’. According to Foucault, it was the power of the West that turned difference in identity formation into a hierarchy, where the Other is always inferior compared to the superior West.\(^ {14}\) Similarly, Bhabha,\(^ {15}\) proposes that the colonial discourse made difference ontological, so that European identity would appear as if it had organic qualities and was simultaneously portrayed as superior to the uncivilized and invisible ‘Other’.

For many postcolonial theorists, the alternative to this Eurocentric hegemonic perspective of modernity is the development of an inclusive and pluralistic perspective which according to Appiah, ‘provides the beginnings of a theory of global ethics that engages with structures of inequality, both material and cultural’.\(^ {16}\) Jefferess adds that ‘[f]or Appiah, the cosmopolitan seeks to understand the interrelationships among all of the people on the planet, specifically in a way that values human diversity’.\(^ {17}\) In simple words, cosmopolitanism as an ethical philosophy focuses on the role of the individual in understanding and analyzing the legacy of colonial regimes of domination and their residual political, socio-economic, and psychological effects on formerly colonized and postcolonial societies. The consequences

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16 Jefferess, Unsettling Cosmopolitanism, 29.
17 Ibid.
of such theorization is the development of a plural inclusive perspective that values all human experiences and ways of life.\(^{18}\)

The development of such a perspective and the elimination of the previous paradigm in which cultures and identities develop in the dialectic between similarity and difference, seems a theoretical solution to the evolving contemporary world system in which, in the words of Eric Hobsbawm, ‘international migration has created – or recreated – ethnic diversity even in states which previously [...] had eliminated it’.\(^{19}\) However, the question remains, as Hobsbawm continues, ‘[w]here does this leave exclusive ethnicity, exclusive nationalism, the exclusive division of the world’?\(^{20}\)

Mass education: modernity and the invention of a nation

With the emergence of the nation-state system and the industrial revolution, mass education became a necessity.\(^{21}\) Bauman argues that

> [t]he ‘enlightenment project’ gave culture (understood as an activity akin to land cultivation) the status of a basic tool for the building of a nation, a state, and a nation-state – at the same time entrusting that tool to the hands of the educated class. In its perambulations between political ambitions and philosophical deliberations, a twin goal of the enlightenment undertaking had soon


\(^{20}\) Hobsbawm, ‘Ethnicity, Migration, and the Validity of the Nation-State’, 236.

crystallized (whether openly or tacitly assumed) into the double postulate of obedience of subjects and solidarity among fellow countrymen.\textsuperscript{22}

In other words, the educated elite in the emerging nation states became an agent of social engineering, aiming at turning the subject into an object that can be molded and formed into an obedient citizen. In addition, it attempted to develop a sense of solidarity among citizens beyond family, kin, faith, or locality, aimed at making the individual citizen attached to a larger entity called the ‘nation’. Both concepts, of co-nationals and citizenship, defined the political, spatial, and cultural-historical boundaries of the nation, boundaries formed following the binary template of Western thought which organizes the universe and the life of societies around concepts such as mythos and logos, rational and irrational, East versus West, and Us versus Them. Advancing this line of thought made it easy for a citizen and a co-national to develop their distinctive sense of collective identity via exclusion of Others. Moreover, with the emerging new world order of nation states, the state became the primary agent of the social and political socialization of its citizens, and, through its control of most forms of knowledge production and school curricula, made intensive use of history, geography, and civic studies, among other subjects, as vehicles for the forging of citizen and co-national identity.\textsuperscript{23}

Importantly, among scholars there is no agreement on the meaning of national identity in specific instances and the ways in which it comes into being. Scholars distinguish between civic or territorial and ethnic nationalism, among other categorizations. The former portrays nations as units of populations which inhabit a demarcated territory, possess a common economy, common laws with identical legal rights and duties for everyone, and public mass education. The latter conceives of a nation as a human population with a belief in common ancestors, shared solidarity, common


traditions, and history.\textsuperscript{24} Other scholars, such as Anderson, argue that nations are ‘imagined communities’ with ‘invented traditions’.\textsuperscript{25} Interestingly, regardless of the theoretical approach one adopts, the narrative of any national movement, almost without exception, portrays the nation as immemorial, treating its past as a constitutive element in its formation. Such emphasis on a nation’s past, as Smith argues, begs the question of why the past is important if nations are imagined communities that have been engendered by scientific and industrial processes of modernity.\textsuperscript{26} Smith’s answer is that, unlike scholars of nationalism, people do believe that their nation, although the idea of nation and nationalism are modern, is a real historical entity that has evolved from a common ancestry. For this reason, recovering the past seems vital to understanding the present, and is an act which also allows people to maintain a sense of coherent and continuous identity. In this regard, the constructed narrative of a nation as an ‘imagined community’ is aimed at forming its collective memory,\textsuperscript{27} which is organized by binary oppositions of triumph and defeat, of Us and Them, as Halbwachs has argued.\textsuperscript{28} Such a narrative makes the nation appear distinctive in its origins, culture, and history, in opposition to other collectives.

Furthermore, the recoveries of the past, and the ability of a community to establish continuity, real or imagined, between its present generation and its ancestry, seem to be at the core of the claims put forward by a collective to its political entitlement to land and to self-determination. This issue becomes of special significance in a universal system organized, as it has been since the end of the eighteenth century, around nationhood and the nation-state system. Furthermore, the purpose of the construction of history, as Williams has argued,\textsuperscript{29} is to ratify the present conditions and to

legitimize the present-day boundaries of a collective, to give it a sense of continuity over time, and to read through the past the evolution of the nation from its sacred or mythical ‘origin’ to the present. Making history, Friedman argues, is a way of producing identity.

The construction of history is a construction of a meaningful universe of events and narratives for an individual or collectively defined subject. And since the motivation of this process of construction emanates from the subject inhabiting a social world, we may say that history is an imprinting of the present onto the past. In this sense, all history including modern historiography is mythology.

Other scholars argue that the construction of history is a dynamic process that is in permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformation, vulnerable to manipulation and appropriation, susceptible to being periodically dormant and periodically revived. Furthermore, a nation’s history is not an inclusive discourse of the various claims to that nation’s past but a representation of the dominant group’s version of the past. It continues to serve as the official narrative of a collective as long as it succeeds in excluding alternative narratives, whether they be those advanced by competing groups within a nation or other national narratives. It is not surprising, then, that, in our contemporary modern nation-state system schools, and, in particular, history curricula have turned into arenas for competing ideologies over the process of the construction of national narratives which have a decisive influence on individuals’ notions of belonging within a community. Eric Hobsbawm puts it thus:

30 Ibid.
All human beings, collectivities and institutions need a past, but it is only occasionally the past uncovered by historical research. The standard example of an identity culture which anchors itself to the past by means of myths dressed up as history is nationalism.\(^{35}\)

Elsewhere in the same work, he comments:

Why […] do all regimes make their young study some history at school? Not to [enable them to] understand their society and how it changes, but to [encourage them to] approve of it, to be proud of it, or to become good citizens of the USA, or Spain or Honduras or Iraq. […] History as inspiration and ideology has a built-in tendency to become self-justifying myth.\(^{36}\)

In our case studies, mass education and history studies played a significant role in the process of emerging nationhood both Jordan and Israel, and, later, for Palestinians in the territories under the Palestinian Authority (PA). While under British colonialism, historical Palestine and Transjordan were mandate territories, granted to Britain by the Council of the League of Nations in 1922 to manage and ‘help’ Jordanians and the Jewish minority in Palestine (with the exclusion of the indigenous Palestinian majority of Palestine) build their nation and their state institutions, and develop a self-governing system. For several decades, with varying degrees of autonomy, the process of nation-building and the creation of a state apparatus in both Jordan and Israel took place under the eye of the British. In both cases, state institutions, particularly the mass education system, were fashioned after British models of governance.

Once Jordan became independent in 1946, and Israel in 1948, the state, in each case, consolidated its power and assumed responsibility in the continued process of forging a unified ‘nation’ out of the complex ethnic, religious, and national groups under their sovereignty. In both Jordan and Israel, public education has been one of the critical agents of nation-building, in addition to the army.\(^{37}\) Similarly, following the

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\(^{36}\) Ibid., 35-36.

Palestinian Authority’s (PA) national elections in 1996, the creation of state institutions, including education, began in the semi-autonomous Palestinian enclaves which are part of the Israeli colonized West Bank and Gaza Strip. In each of these regions, history studies continue to be an arena contested by local factions and regional forces, each of which seeks to appropriate the past as exclusively theirs.

**History school textbooks in Jordan, Palestine, and Israel**

I have chosen to examine school history textbooks for this study for several reasons. First, textbooks in general carry the authority and the legitimizing power of an established social, political, and historical order. Apple asserts that ‘it is the textbook which establishes so much of the material conditions for teaching and learning in classrooms in many countries throughout the world, and it is the textbook that often defines what is elite and legitimate culture to pass on.’ Further, in the following case studies textbook decisions are made at national level. Although, in the PA and Israel, ministries of education may outsource textbooks to non-state

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committees or institutions, authors, and publishers, contributors are nevertheless required to follow strict ministry-issued guidelines. In the case of Israel, for example, non-ministry authors have to seek the approval of the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sport if they wish to have their textbooks included in the Ministry’s official list of approved textbooks offered to teachers in schools. This form of control leads to homogeneity in content as well as in educational strategies and enforces uniformity of the history and cultural experience passed down to pupils.40

In the years 1948–1967, Palestinian students in the West Bank and Gaza used Jordanian and Egyptian textbooks respectively. Upon Israeli occupation of those territories, teachers were authorized to use the same textbooks; however, they were subject to censorship by the Israeli (military) Civil Administration. In 1996, after the signing of the Oslo Accord by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel, the PA established an independent body, the Curriculum Development Center, whose remit was to draft the national curriculum for all Palestinian schools. The first set of textbooks to conform to this curriculum was introduced to schools in 1998, and the completion date for all textbooks was set as 2006.

This study will focus on the history taught from years four to twelve of schooling, as this is the stage in formal education at which students, having acquired mastery of basic competencies such as language and arithmetic, begin to address questions related to their identity, which are at the heart of school subjects such as history, civic studies, and geography. It is worth reiterating here that my analysis focuses primarily on history and social/national education textbooks in the three case study countries. In Jordan and Palestine, national education combines history and civic studies. My analysis focuses on textbooks used by students in state schools.

1 Jordan: nation and origins

A review of national education and history textbooks in Jordan’s schools reveals a complex picture in relation to the issue of nation and origins. This complexity stems from the difficulty of defining ‘a Jordanian’. Contemporary Jordanian society is a mixture of ethnic, national, and religious groups. The largest community of Jordanians is of Palestinian origin; other ethnic groups represented in the country include Circassians, Chechens, and local settled and nomadic tribes. The year 4 national and social studies textbook says that ‘Jordanian society is comprised of many collectives, most of Arab ethnicity. There is a small number of Circassians, Chechens, Kurds, and Armenians’.

Another issue is the fact that Jordan’s ruling dynasty is foreign, originating from a noble Saudi Arabian family, the Hashemite. For decades this was a source of friction between indigenous Jordanians and their rulers. What complicated the matter further was the continuous influx of Palestinian, Iraqi, and Syrian refugees to the country due to civil and regional wars. As a result, and primarily in order to resolve the conflict between rulers and ruled, the state-sponsored national narrative has traditionally focused less on nation-building, with ‘Jordan’ as a distinctive collective, and more on similarities between Jordanians and other Arabs in the region. In this way, Jordan’s narrative makes the complex ethnic structure of the state less of an issue and facilitates the legitimation and acceptance of rulers by their citizens as part of a larger whole, the Arab nation.

The emphasis in Jordan’s textbooks is on the multi-faceted nature of Jordanian identity. Jordanians are presented as an integral part of the Arab collective and part of the universal Islamic umma (nation). The political divisions of the Arab world into mini-states, which separate one collective from another, are portrayed as artificial and temporary and as consequences of colonial powers’ past intrusion in the region’s affairs; the textbooks also suggest that they are associated with the project of implantation of Zionism into the heart of Palestine, which is an obstacle to Arab

Put simply, Jordan’s narrative shifts the discussion of identity in Jordan from the local and territorial frame into the regional Arab and the universal religious-Islamic context. This strategy of forced exclusion, as I have mentioned, ultimately serves the political ends of the rulers rather than those of the ruled.

The emphasis on the regional and universal aspects of identity in Jordan dominates the textbook discussion of the issue. Thus, a year 6 textbook notes that ‘The Jordanian people have their origins in the Arab race. Most of [Jordan’s] residents practice Islam, and its citizens speak Arabic.’ Similarly, the year 5 textbook asserts that ‘We [Jordanians] belong to a great nation, the Arab nation, whose place of origin is the Arabian Peninsula.’ To explain the relationship between Jordanians as a group and the larger Arab collective, the textbooks introduce the distinction between people (sha’b) and nation (ummah). A ‘people’ is defined as a collective subject to the rule of a specific state, while a ‘nation is a large group [...] that shares a common language, history, religion, tradition, and customs; an example of this is the Arab nation’. This distinction seeks to demonstrate that Jordanians are a branch of a larger whole, the Arab nation.

Importantly, the emphasis here on the multi-faceted nature of Jordanian identity (as Arabs and Moslems), makes the issue of ‘imagined community’ as a continuous historical entity in Jordan less significant, shifting the discussion from the identity of a people to the identity of the rulers, who are presented as divinely ‘chosen’. In fact, the textbooks perpetuate the idea of a lack of historical roots to Jordanian identity in the geographical space Jordanians now occupy. A book for year 10 says that ‘Jordan has been continuously populated since ancient times. Several civilizations had risen and fallen in tandem [...] such as the Edomite, Moabite, Ammonite, Aramaic, Assyrian, Greek, Persian, Roman, Byzantine, and Arab Islamic’.

42 See ibid., 11–15.
On the same page, the book adds that in ancient history there were several ‘immigration waves of Semites [from the Arab Peninsula who] had settled in Jordan. [These tribes] formed the racial [ethnic] foundation of the region’s population’. Although the textbooks do mention the development in antiquity of a few Arab kingdoms in Jordan’s lands, they make no effort to link contemporary Jordanians with these ancient civilizations; on the contrary: the emphasis is on the eclectic nature of past civilizations, a depiction which portrays Jordan as a region of transit for other nations passing through. This said, the textbooks do emphasize the fact that Jordan was ‘liberated’ by the ‘Arab Muslims’ in the seventh century C.E. This emphasis on Islam serves to create continuity between the contemporary generation of rulers in Jordan and the Prophet Mohammad. The textbooks argue that the origin of the Hashemite goes back to the tribe of Hashem. A year 11 textbook asserts that:

\[\text{Quraysh}\] came to Mecca for the first time in the second century C.E. Six generations later, the first generation of \textit{Quraysh} rose to power in Mecca when \textit{Qusai ibn Kelab} took a leadership position in 480 C.E. He was preceded by his grandsons from \textit{bani Hashem}. Thus, they earned the respect of all Arab tribes for the many good things they did to ensure livelihood, security, and Arab unity.\(^4^7\)

The textbooks state that the Hashemite were driven by an internal call to save and protect Arabs and their collective interests. They are portrayed as the upholders of Arab glory, especially later in history, with the rise of Islam. This emphasis on their unique historical contribution to the glory and progress of Arabs is repeated time and again in numerous places in the textbooks.\(^4^8\) Other textbooks suggest that the origins of both the Hashemite and \textit{Quraysh} tribes date back to Abraham. Claiming Abraham, through

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his son Ishmael, as the founding father transforms the Hashemite dynasty into one more deeply rooted in human history. In addition, the textbooks emphasize that from their origins to the present, the Hashemite have been a distinguished dynasty among Arabs, a deity chosen by a divine hand, specifically, the Prophet Mohammad.\textsuperscript{49} Other textbooks suggest kinship relations between modern-era Hashemite leaders and the Prophet; the year 10 textbook, discussing the origins of Jordan’s modern founding father, Amir Abdullah, claims:

He is Abdullah ibn al-Hussein ibn Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Abed al-Moa’in ibn ‘Awam. Born to two Hashemite parents in 1882 C.E. in the honorable Mecca; [born to a] a noble family that had a title to the Emirate of Mecca. His kin extends to the Prophet (peace be upon him).\textsuperscript{50}

In this way, the textbooks link the modern era and the contemporary Hashemite ruling family in Jordan to their ancestors in the Arabian Peninsula, particularly to the town of Mecca and the Prophet Mohammad himself. This lineage bestows on the rulers the same religious and social status of nobility their ancestors had enjoyed among Arabs and Muslims alike since the rise of Islam at the turn of the seventh century C.E. and into its golden age later on. Pan-Arabism is another strategy Jordan’s narrative uses to legitimize its ruler. Jordan’s textbook depicts Sharif Hussein as a trans-religious, pan-Arab ideologue. On page 77 it cites Hussein’s rejection of British colonial officer, McMahon’s plan to divide the Arab countries, and Hussein’s opposition to the Balfour Declaration, in which Britain promised Palestine to the Zionist movement as its homeland.\textsuperscript{51} Further, it cites Sharif Hussein thus: ‘I refuse to accept partitions and the Mandate. [...] I will not sign the treaty should it reject my conditions, independence for all Arab regions.’\textsuperscript{52}

In short, the emphasis in Jordanian nationalism of exclusive pan-Arabism and Islam strengthens the textbooks’ claim of dynastic historical continuity in Jordan. The books present the Hashemite family as encompassing and giving significance to the diverse ethnic/national and religious groups in Jordan, turning them into one collective with a meaningful identity.

\textsuperscript{50} Thoouqan, *Contemporary History of Jordan*, 117.
\textsuperscript{51} Al-Masad, et al., *General Education*, 77.
\textsuperscript{52} Al-Madani, et al., *Modern Arab History and its Contemporary Affairs*, 71.
In this depiction, without the rulers, the nation as a political entity has no actual distinct existence. In addition, the emphasis on Jordanians as being an integral part of the Arab nation renders the particular makeup of Jordan irrelevant. This use of pan-Arab ideology helps the Jordanian narrative gain legitimacy and validity, as well as representing the current state of Arabs, divided into mini-state entities (including Jordan), as temporary. The Hashemite are presented as those who will achieve the future dream of Arab unity. Out of all these dialectical forces, the national narrative of Jordan, as represented in these textbooks, gives birth to Jordan as a territorial nation state.

The textbooks do not discuss the discrepancies between Jordan’s official narrative and its actual historical record. The collusion of King Abdullah with colonialism and Zionism is transformed in the textbooks into an act of defiance and resistance, thus glorified. Second, from a historical perspective, once colonialism created the artificial boundaries between Arabs, they became real. Since Jordan’s independence, it continues to have border disputes with both Syria and Saudi Arabia. Internally, in contradiction to the textbooks’ inclusive narrative of the various ethnic and national groups in Jordan, in reality, the status of Palestinians in Jordan continues to be contested. In fact, members of the Jordanian parliament, repeatedly question the status of Palestinian Jordanians and their civil and political rights in the Kingdom. To close with an anecdotal point, visitors to Amman will notice the large signs decorating the highways leading to the capital, with the banner *al-Urdon Awan*an*, that is, Jordan is (or comes) first.

### 2 Palestine: identity under siege

In contrast to those in Jordan, Palestinian history textbooks dedicate extensive space to the territorialization of their collective identity as one which is separate from that of other Arabs. A more significant challenge in Palestinian textbooks is presented by the ‘decolonization’ of Palestine’s history in the context of Israel’s continuous appropriation of the country’s ancient past as entirely Jewish and rendering Palestinian ancient history, culture, and society obscured and unspoken. In the context of

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contemporary history, Edward Said has asserted, in his introduction to *The Question of Palestine* that ‘Israel itself, as well as its supporters, has tried to efface the Palestinians in words and actions because the Jewish state in many (but not all) ways is built on negation of Palestine and the Palestinians’.  

In the textbooks analyzed for this case study, discussion of Palestinian identity commences by making a distinction between three interrelated concepts: society, people, and nation. First, the textbook defines Palestinian society as ‘[a] collective of people living in a [specific] geography called Palestine with a common language, religion, customs, tradition, and future aspirations’. The emphasis in this definition of society is on the territory, or living space, which has helped a collective evolve into a distinctive community. Both the past and the future are conceived as important elements in constituting the present of society and in shaping its specific characteristics. In this case, Palestinian society is defined as the sum total of historic processes of evolution and their dynamics, the development of its tradition, religion, aspirations, and intra-group communications.

The second concept defined here, and apparently more complex, is that of Palestinian peoplehood, *al-Sha’ab al-Falastini*. In its definition of Palestinian peoplehood, the same textbook we cited above starts by tracing this people’s origins: ‘The origins of Palestinian people are Canaanites. And this land was called the land of Canaan.’ On the basis of this statement, on the same page, the authors conclude that ‘*[A]l-Sha’ab al-Falastini* [the Palestinian people] are those who inhabited the land called Palestine, the [Palestinians] are those who have created a society with distinctive customs and traditions, and [those who are] part of Arab-Moslem society’. This claim that the roots of the Palestinians are with the Canaanites and the depiction of the Palestinian people as part of the Arab-Islamic nation establish two intersecting dimensions: There is a diachronic dimension of the historical ‘rootedness’ of the Palestinian people in their land, Palestine/Canaan; at the same time, the definition synchronically – geographically

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56 Assaf, 19.
and evidently culturally – links the contemporary Palestinian people with their surroundings, the Arab-Islamic nations. Therefore, what seems to distinguish Palestinians from their fellow Arabs is their geographical location and the specific history of that land. In this rendering, both the geography and the local history of Palestine have contributed to the distinctive evolution of the people from their Canaanite origins to the present. In simple words, Palestinian collective identity is created in the dialectic between similarity to and difference from other Arabs and Moslems in the region.

Another way in which these textbooks discuss Palestinian identity is via its depiction as multi-faceted, an identity which shifts from one local circle to a second regional/Arab and subsequently a third form, as part of a universal collective, the nation of Islam, umma. The complex nature of this identity appears in the following definition, taken from one of the textbooks, of nation:

A group of people that achieved unity throughout the ages, and developed a common language, one history, and a common symbolic and material heritage; it has common interests, and has developed a sense of belonging to a specific collective. The nation could be one state, or many states, similar to the Arab umma [nation].

This discussion is followed by another which states that ‘all Arabs, throughout history, were subject to the same historical influences, whether they before or after the rise of Islam. Those historical forces contributed to the development of a common aspiration for future unity among Arabs.’

The textbooks further incorporate the broadest circle of identity in this context, the universal Islamic. Religion, in this case Islam, is conveyed as a unifying factor: ‘There exists a common shared religion among the majority of all Arabs in the Arab lands, Islam. Islam is a religion, a culture, and a scientific enterprise shared by both Moslem and Christian Arabs alike.’ Similarly, language appears as another factor: ‘Arabic is the dominant language in the region, and it is the language that helps in the development of social and political solidarity among Arabs.’ In addition, the book continues, Arabs share a common cultural heritage which binds them together into one nation: ‘[This cultural heritage] is manifested in

57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
all the cultural and scientific achievements Arabs have made during their
day. [Those achievements] have led to the formation of a distinctive
cultural identity which unites Arabs under one banner.’59 Again, based on
those definitions, the Palestinians are a people – sha’ab – which is a branch
of a larger whole, the Arab-Islamic nation.

Significantly, Palestinian identity is not limited to identification with
Islam or Arab Moslems; it also incorporates Christianity. On numerous
occasions the textbooks emphasize Christian Palestinians and Christianity
as integral parts of Palestine’s history and contemporary identity. The
books often contain images of Christian religious sites, whether in
Bethlehem, Jerusalem, or Nazareth, alongside Islamic historical and
religious sites across the country.60 Of particular significance here is the
explicit reference in the ‘Declaration of The Palestinian State’, cited in one
of the textbooks, to Palestine as the birthplace of prophets and the simulta-
eneous reference to churches, mosques, and (Jewish) places of worship as
witnesses to the declaration.61

We see, then, that the Palestinian national narrative simultaneously
advances dual identifications: a local territorial identity which is inclusive
to all ethnic and religious groups (including Jews until 1948), and a supranational one, rooted in the Arab-Islamic culture which is viewed more as
a civilization than as a religion. The textbooks’ main concern appears to
be the recovery of Palestine’s ancient history and the establishment of ter-
ritorial historical continuity between contemporary Palestinians and their
ancestors in the land. To this end, they trace the origins of the Palestinians
back in time, as we have seen from the depiction of the Canaanites as
the founding fathers of the Palestinian nation. Further, they portray the
Canaanites as having been the first to arrive in Palestine in antiquity. This
emphasis on ‘being first’ appears to be aimed at counterbalancing Israel’s
appropriation of Palestine’s past history as exclusively Jewish:

59 Ibid., 6.
60 Abu-Bakr, Amin, et al. 2003. National Education. Seventh Grade. 3rd edi-
Grade. Albirah/Palestine: 1–5.
61 Assaf, National Education, 39.
The Canaanite Arabs were the most ancient among the nations who [later] lived in Palestine [and who came] to inhabit Canaan 3,500 before the birth of God’s prophet, Jesus the blessed. The Canaanites built cities and villages in Palestine such as Jerusalem, Gaza, ‘Asqlan, Megiddo, and Nablus. Jerusalem was named by many names, among them Jabus [Yabus] after the Jebusite Arabs who had built it.\footnote{Sa’adah, Jawdat A., et al. 2003. 	extit{National Education}. Fourth Grade. Vol. I. Ramallah: 50.}

Many of the places mentioned in this quotation above continued to exist as Palestinian cities until the destruction of Palestine in 1948 and the expulsion of Palestinians from their homeland by Israel. Later, Israel renamed these cities and towns, reclaiming them as ancient Jewish sites.

Importantly, the textbooks view Canaanite migration to Canaan as one of many waves of migration of Arabs from the Arabian Peninsula to Palestine, with the last of these said to be the Arab-Islamic conquest of Palestine at the turn of the seventh century CE. This type of periodization is used in Palestinian textbooks as a way of establishing ‘firstness’ in the land and a sense of historical continuity from time immemorial. Notably, the Canaanite period is also portrayed as one of Palestine’s golden ages. Textbooks enumerate the Canaanites’ contribution to human civilization, including the invention of the alphabetical letters which contributed to the development of writing in Europe and elsewhere, and emphasize the greatness of the Canaanite culture and its contribution to humanity:

\begin{quote}
The Canaanites [were] a nation that created a great civilization, mastered a language, introduced the alphabet letters to the world, used mathematics [...] softened iron and manufactured plows and weapons, disseminated knowledge [and ideas], created a golden age, in doing so, immortalized [their] nation.\footnote{Abu-Bakr, 	extit{National Education}: 27.}
\end{quote}

Finally, the textbooks mention the entry of Jewish tribes to Canaan and their history in the land.\footnote{See Al-Tarawni, Mubarak M., et al. 2003. 	extit{Contemporary Arab and World History}. Eleventh Grade. Ramallah: 9–11.} However, they argue that Jewish history and presence in the land was sporadic and short-lived, and above all that Jews never made up the majority of the population. Overall, the textbooks assert that in spite of the numerous invading nations to which they refer as colonial forces, the people of Canaan remained in the land and continued to...
develop their own culture. Again, the textbooks portray Palestinian identity as multi-faceted, developing in the tension between differentiation and inclusion (similarity/difference), both exclusively territorial, with its ancient Canaanite roots, and simultaneously interconnected to the regional, and universal, history and cultures of the Arab and Islamic nations.

3 Israel: from diaspora to homeland

The question of ‘nation’ in the Israeli case is unique and complicated. Unlike Jordan and Palestine, where ‘nation’ and ‘homeland’ were carved out of a larger existing collective of the Arab people and lands, the Israeli people, homeland, and national history had to be invented or (in the case of the homeland) colonized, a process which commenced with the first wave of Zionist settlers in 1892 and was almost complete by 1948. In spite of this, Israeli textbooks portray the Israeli Jewish identity as naturally rooted in Palestine and assert that all diaspora Jews are related by blood ties to the ancient Jewish nation and its Palestinian homeland.

An analysis of Israeli school textbooks reveals the strategies employed in defining the nation and in establishing its rootedness in Palestine and continuity between contemporary Jews and their ancestors in the Biblical homeland. The textbooks state that at the time of early Zionism, a total of over nine million Jews lived in a number of countries in Eastern and Western Europe, yet these Jewish communities were persecuted and excluded from their local communities, and as a result sought a national solution to the issue of Jewish diaspora. Palestine was chosen because it is perceived in the Zionist discourse as the birthplace of Jews in antiquity.\footnote{See Aden, Hanna, Varda Ashkenazi, and Belha Alperson. 2005. \textit{To Be Citizens in Israel: In a Jewish and Democratic State}. Jerusalem: 10.} But, in Palestine, according to the textbooks, at the eve of the first Zionist migration wave to the country in 1892, the total Jewish population of Palestine was a tiny minority, less than 5% (twenty thousand) of the country’s population. In addition, in diaspora, each of those Jewish communities had its own history, culture, local language, and specific religious tradition.\footnote{See Adiv, Zvi. 2003. \textit{Hope and Peace: The Jews and the World, 1870–1920}. Jerusalem. Ben-Baruch, Bruyya. 1998. \textit{The 19th Century}. History for the Eighth
world’s Jewish communities comprise a unified nation with many branches (i.e., the twelve tribes), each of which is directly connected by blood ties to common roots in the Promised Land.\textsuperscript{67}

The textbooks cite common origins and religion as the principal pillars of Jewish nation-building both in antiquity and in the modern era, and retrace the origins of the Israeli nation to Abraham, Jacob, Isaac, and Moses. The Bible is used as the main source in the Israeli textbooks for the retelling of the story of the nation’s founding father and as a proof text for the ‘authentication’ of Jewish history in antiquity. The story of the founding fathers, fashioned after the Biblical narrative, starts with a description of Abraham’s place of birth, his departure from his town of birth, and finally his arrival in the Promised Land. It commences thus: ‘Terah, the father of Abraham, first lived in Ur with his family, and later all of them moved to Haran.’\textsuperscript{68} This statement is followed by an actual quotation of a number of verses from the book of Genesis (11: 31–32) as follows:

Terah took Abram his son and Lot the son of Haran, his grandson, and Sarai his daughter-in-law, his son Abram’s wife, and they went forth together from Ur of the Chaldeans to go in the land of Canaan; but they came to Haran, they settled there. The days of Terah were two hundred and five years; and Terah died in Haran.\textsuperscript{69}

On the question of Abraham’s migration from his place of birth to the Promised Land, the textbooks cite from Genesis 11 and 12, with God’s command to Abraham: ‘Go from your country and your kindred and your father’s house to the land. […] And Abram took Sarai his wife, and Lot his brother’s son, and all their possessions which they had gathered, and the persons that they had gotten in Haran’.\textsuperscript{70} Notably, some textbooks

\begin{flushleft}
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\item Harpaz, Moshe, and Yhia’m Y. Shurek. 1998. \textit{Life of the People of Israel in their Own Country During the Biblical Era}. Fifth Grade. Jerusalem: 7, 9, 27 f.
\item Ben-Baruch, Brurya. 1996. \textit{In the Era of Greece and Rome}. For the Sixth Grade. Tel Aviv: 14, 16.
\item Harpaz and Shurek, \textit{Life of the People of Israel}, 65.
\item Ibid.
\item Ibid., 65.
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describe the revelation to Abraham of the monotheistic God as a main factor behind his migration into the Promised Land. Using the Biblical narrative, the textbook mentions that ‘After our father Abraham came to acknowledge [the existence] of one God, he no longer could stay in a place where people believed in idol gods.’ In simple words, Abraham’s religious revelation creates in him a new form of identity; an identity that is in direct conflict with the people of Ur’s faith who worshipped multiple gods and idols. Migration (Exodus) becomes the only alternative solution to the conflict between these two forms of identity, and, guided by the Lord, helps Abraham transplant his new identity into a new place chosen for him by God, the Promised Land.

Moses is a further figure discussed as a national and religious founding father of the Jewish people. One textbook states that ‘[t]he formation process of the sons of Israel from tribes into a nation was long-drawn-out. It began in the desert after leaving Egypt, and continued in Canaan, the land allotted to the Jewish people’. The narrative continues: ‘During the period of wandering in the desert, Moses, the great man of all times in our nation, headed the tribes’. Again, the main source of these assertions of origins and kinship is the Bible itself.

Homeland is another concept the textbooks seek to construct. Canaan is described as Eretz Yisrael (Land of Israel), a land pledged by God to the Jewish people as an exclusive patrimony for all generations to come. In reference to Jonathan Hyrcanus, who could not tolerate non-Jews in the Land, a textbook comments that he ‘acted according to the clear view that the entirety of the Land of Israel is a patrimony of the Jewish people’. Other textbooks refer to the Promised Land, not only of the founding fathers, but of the modern-era sons of the Jewish nation who have ‘returned to reclaim it as their patrimony’.

71 Ibid., 66.
72 Ibid., 128
73 Ibid.
74 Ben-Baruch, In the Era of Greece and Rome, 77.
The textbooks further justify Jewish historical rights over the land by advancing two arguments. The first is the depiction of Palestine as a sparsely populated land, particularly in the modern era; the second is the claim that once the Jewish people had entered Palestine – in both ancient times and the modern era – they became a majority in the country’s population. For example, a civic studies textbook asserts that, ‘[s]ince the nation of Israel settled in its land and throughout the period of the first and second Temple, for more than one thousand years, there was [always] a Jewish majority in the country’.\(^76\)

The two-thousand-year Jewish absence from Palestine is ignored in this textbook, which turns to the present, arguing that Jews comprise a majority in Israel (Palestine) and that the land therefore belongs to the Jewish people. It is worth mentioning that the textbook does not specify by what means that Jewish majority was achieved, neither does it discuss the well designed, and executed Israeli plans of Palestinian ethnic cleansing from their homeland.\(^77\) However, it does refer to the Law of Return and its contribution to ensuring continuous Jewish demographic dominance in the country through its exclusive practice of permitting only Jews to migrate to Israel.\(^78\)

The historical dwindling – to almost non-existence – of Jewish presence in Palestine in the two thousand years before the establishment of the state of Israel remains a major challenge to the Israeli narrative and its political claim to Palestine as an exclusive historical homeland for the Jews. To resolve the challenge and dilemma of lack of significant physical Jewish presence in Palestine, the textbooks turn to symbolic elements, such as ‘prayers’ and ‘hopes for return’ which they say, were common among diaspora Jews. Thus the textbooks transmute religious sentiment into national aspirations in order to advance the claim of Jewish links to the land. They also advance the argument that Jewish links were maintained through


\(^{78}\) Aden, *To Be Citizens in Israel*, 47.
the presence of a ‘dispersed Jewish community’ in the country. The civic studies textbook asserts that,

[for nearly two thousand years, since the destruction of the second temple when the majority of the Jewish nation lived in exile, a dispersed minority of Jews had lived in the country and had maintained a continuous Jewish settlement in the country. Jews in the diaspora never stopped yearning for the Land of Israel and they gave expression to this in their prayers and customs (emphasis added).]  

Finally, to add to the construction of a distinctive Jewish collective, the textbooks advance the idea of community of blood and ethnic purity. Notably, and in spite of numerous references in the textbooks to inter-ethnic and inter-religious Jewish marriages with local and invading nations of Canaan, the textbooks, citing Biblical sources in particular, assert the ethnic purity of the Jewish people throughout their ancient history as well as in the modern era. They add that following the ‘Roman expulsion’ from Canaan, and in the last two thousand years, Jews in diaspora maintained their ethnic purity. In a similar vein, the textbooks argue that the Jewish returnees in modern history are the descendants of the ancient Jews of Canaan. This emphasis on the biological/racial purity of the various Jewish collectives across the globe renders cultural, territorial, and linguistic factors insignificant in the making of a nation. Ironically, it was anti-Semitic and colonial ideologies which for centuries had categorized Jews as a distinct racial group, a classification employed to justify their persecution throughout European history.

**The formation of national identity vs. postcolonial theory**

The analysis of the three case studies I have presented here confirms the exclusive nature of nationalism and demonstrates how the process of nation-building entails processes of differentiation and exclusion. Defining

81 Ben-Baruch, *The 19th Century,* 65, 72.
a nation sets apart the geography, history, and culture of one collective from another. Postcolonial states are no exception to this general phenomenon of nation-state building. Additionally, in a manner similar to other states, postcolonial states use their exclusive power to employ the apparatus of political socialization, such as mass education, in the process of nation-building. Consequently, under the nation-state system, the question of identity becomes a matter of identity politics. It renders the identity of co-nationals subject to manipulation. This process leaves little choice for individuals as to how their national identity is constructed and shaped. Specifically, the findings of this analysis show that the messages transmitted to students through state-sponsored school textbooks demonstrate that mass education is deliberately designed to invoke in subjects a sense of selective loyalty and devotion to one collective over another. National history – from late eighteenth century to the present – has been the focal point for the state educated elite to recover and reconstruct. It also becomes the backbone of national identity, an identity reinforced through the dialectic between similarity and difference.

Against this form of national identity formation, which so little corresponds to global challenges of the present world, postcolonial theories – as already indicated above – set alternative concepts of identity. During the 1990s, difference became the dominant variable in postcolonial discourse, accounting for the process of identity formation. According to scholars who discussed these issues in terms of difference, it makes identities seem distinctive from one another, more than any form of internal similarity within the same identity group. Benhabib, for example, argued that, ‘since every search for identity includes differentiating oneself from what one is not, identity politics is always and necessarily a politics of

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83 Benhabib, The Democratic Moment, 3.
the creation of difference’. Similarly, Derrida\textsuperscript{84} explains that difference has always been part of the logocentric binary mode of Western thought as an essential element in the identity formation of the ‘I/we’.

In the linguistic paradigm, and according to poststructuralist approaches, meanings develop in a relational manner. Thus identity is always ‘alterity identity’, that is, identity dependent upon the Other to define self.\textsuperscript{85} Derrida believed that whenever linguistic and social identities are said to be fixed or assumed to be stable and organic, this should be understood less as a disclosure of truth than as an act of power.\textsuperscript{86} According to this view, identity is an act of signification created by power relations within language itself.

During the colonial era, difference was a core strategic element in identity formation. It distinguished between East and West, black and white, backward and advanced, barbaric and civilized, and other forms of identity. According to Foucault, it was the power of the West that turned difference in identity formation into a hierarchy, where the Other is always inferior compared to the superior West.\textsuperscript{87} Notably, in the colonial discourse, Europeans perceived themselves as agents of civilization and the motor of historical change, bearing the burden of civilizing the uncivilized. Part of their ‘civilizing’/colonizing mission was to set into motion a process

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{84} Derrida, Jacques. 1981. \textit{Positions}. Chicago: 86. – Wagner adds that ‘[d]ifference […] is […] always already preconstituted. One pretends to name a state immediately and positively that is always created by the act of setting one thing apart from another one with which it is not identical’. Cf. Wagner, Peter. 2002. ‘Identity and Selfhood as a Problematique’. In Friese, Heidrun (ed.). Identities: Time, Differences, and Boundaries. New York and Oxford: 32–55, 42.


\bibitem{86} Derrida, \textit{Positions}.

\end{thebibliography}
of bestowing identity on people who had hitherto lived in a void.\textsuperscript{88} In the Palestinian case, for example, Zionist discourse had for decades claimed that the origin of Palestinian nationalism was a by-product of Zionism,\textsuperscript{89} an assertion which essentially argues that without Zionism Palestinians would have no collective sense of self and would consequently be left behind in the progress of civilization and the project of modernity.\textsuperscript{90}

Postcolonial theorists such as Du Bois and Fanon provide an articulate discussion of the impact of colonialism on black people’s identity and the relations between the colonized and the colonial powers’ identity. Both authors have shown how the colonizers constructed an oppressed identity for their subjects; one of its foundations being the idea of inferior black peoples compared to superior Western white races.\textsuperscript{91} Evidently, race in the colonial discourse makes the categories ‘black’ and ‘white’ dichotomous and relational. The hierarchy established in this discourse turns one of these identities into ‘superior’ in contrast to an ‘inferior’ other. Bauman argues that Western colonialism had produced a theoretical commentary in the form of evolutionary cultural theory which promoted the ‘developed’ world to the status of unquestionable perfection, to be


\textsuperscript{90} In a similar vein, Theodor Herzl wrote to European leaders that ‘[…] we could constitute part of the wall of defense against Asia; [we would] serve as an outpost of civilization against barbarism.’ Cf. Herzl, Theodor. [1896]/1988. \textit{The Jewish State}. New York: 52.

imitated and aspired to sooner or later by the rest of the globe. In the pursuit of this goal, the rest of the world was to be actively helped and, in the event of resistance, coerced.\textsuperscript{92}

Fanon’s view is that colonialism had stripped black people of their past, memory, and culture and reduced them to objects without souls or identities of their own. He adds that the essence of colonized peoples’ struggle should not exclusively focus on their social and economic oppression, but also on their internalization of forced constructions of self and identity.\textsuperscript{93}

Venn asserts that ‘the systematic denigration of the other in colonial discourse and the long period of [...] subalternization has left a legacy buried in the psyche and at the level of cognitive grasp of the world that continues to have effects for the problem of (postcolonial) identity’. This is evident in the difficulty ‘involved in breaking away from the hold of occidentalist categories’.\textsuperscript{94}

Other scholars reject the exclusive emphasis on difference as a prime element of identity formation. For example, Bhabha, for different reasons, rejects the logocentric notion of identity formation. In his view, the twin concept of similarity/difference assumes the homogeneity of those deemed similar: ‘Cultures are never unitary in themselves, nor simply dualistic in the relation of Self to Other’.\textsuperscript{95} Bhabha adds to the binary concept of similarity/difference another concept which he calls the ‘Third Space’. He explains that the ‘intervention of Third Space of enunciation, which makes the structure of meaning and reference an ambivalent process, destroys this mirror of representation in which cultural knowledge is customarily revealed as an integrated, open, expanding code’.\textsuperscript{96} Further, Bhabha explains that the Third Space has

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\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., 14-15.
\textsuperscript{94} Venn, \textit{The Colonial Challenge}, 26.
\textsuperscript{95} Bhabha, \textit{The Location of Culture}, 52. – Likewise, Jürgen Straub agrees that collectives are never unitary or homogeneous. In fact, he rejects the whole idea that collective identity is even possible: ‘Whenever a nation is supposed to have its own “identity”, we are dealing with ideological language.’ Cf. Straub, Jürgen. 2002. ‘Telling Stories, Making History’. In Straub, Jürgen (ed.). \textit{Narration, Identity, and Historical Consciousness}. (ed.). New York and Oxford: 44–98, here 69.
\textsuperscript{96} Bhabha, \textit{The Location of Culture}, 54.
productive capacities [...] [which] may reveal that the theoretical recognition of the split-space of enunciation may open the way to conceptualizing an international culture, based not on exoticism of multiculturalism or diversity of cultures, but on the inscription and articulation of culture’s hybridity [...] And by exploring this Third Space, we may elude the politics of polarity and emerge as the others of our selves. [Emphasis in the original] 97

The development of hybrid identities, and the elimination of the previous paradigm in which identities develop in the dialectic between similarity and difference, seems a theoretical solution to the evolving contemporary world system. Borrowing from several literary, cultural, and postcolonial theorists, such as Henry Louis Gates, Stuart Hall, and Cornel West, Bhabha explains the contours of the new type of identity that may develop in the Third Space as hybrid:

Postcolonial and black critiques propose forms of contestatory subjectivities that are empowered in the act of erasing the politics of binary opposition – the inverted polarities of a counter-politics [...] there is an attempt to construct a theory of the social imaginary that requires no subject expressing originary anguish [...] no singular self-image [...] no necessary or eternal belongings. 98

Other scholars suggest the return of civil society as a new kind of ‘utopia’ which will enable the creation of new spaces so that new forms of identity can emerge. Cohen argues that international

‘[c]ivil society proper is the terrain and target of this politics of identity. It is here that collective actors defend spaces for the creation of the new identities and seek to render more egalitarian and democratic the institutions and social relations in which identities are generated’. 99

Evidently, the ramifications of the possible emergence of such a global civil society are the weakening or suppression of other forms of hierarchy or exclusiveness such as nationality, ethnicity, social class, gender, and race. The new global civil society will create a new space in which identities are horizontal and non-sexist and ‘based on the principles of individual rights and democratic participation in associations, and public’. 100

97 Ibid., 56.
98 Ibid., 256.
100 Ibid., 36.
These two theoretical options, the global civil society and the possible emergence of an identity without origins, history, or spatial dimension, pose a dilemma and a challenge to the way identity has been theorized and constructed via various agencies of state, economic, political, and cultural forms of power. Both proposals call for the creation of temporal identities, stripped of their history, and eliminate any type of continuous membership in one collective. Implicitly, these theories valorize individuality and the universality of a horizontal identity, beyond ethnic, national, or civic affiliation, and invoke a new strategy for identity formation, an identity which is based on favoring the other in self, than a strategy of identity based on the Other and Self. The question remains whether these forms of identity without history and culture can sustain themselves in an international system which is saturated with power struggles over domination, exclusiveness, and distinction.

Conclusion
The results of the three case studies corroborate the exclusive nature of national identity the textbooks convey to the students and demonstrates how the process of nation-building entails processes of differentiation and exclusion. Under the nation-state system, the question of identity becomes a matter of identity politics, and this process leaves little choice for individuals as to how their national identity is constructed and shaped. An emphasis on national history in particular leaves little space for individuals to choose their identity outside of the binary system, to assume, for instance, hybrid identities or adhere to cosmopolitan identification across national lines.

Looking at both the concepts of national identity and cosmopolitan identity from the perspective of postcolonial theories in conjunction with the analysis of history textbooks from three postcolonial states, it is very clear that addressing the concept of national identity that still prevails in history education worldwide today is undoubtedly one of the most important challenges of history education that has been raised by postcolonial theories. However, the question remains as to whether there is an alternative to these identity politics in which the twin concepts of either-or, similarity and difference are dominant. One may speculate that mass education
should be removed from state control and thus from politics. Once it has been thus removed from state control and returned to civil society, collective actors might be able to create and defend spaces for the creation of new identities. They could seek to create more egalitarian and democratic institutions and social relations in which identities are generated. Civil society may call for the creation of temporal identities, stripped of their history, and eliminate any type of continuous membership in one collective. In this way, we might come to realize and valorize universal identity beyond ethnic, national, or civic affiliations and invoke new strategies for identity formation, an identity based on favoring the other in oneself, over a strategy of Other and Self as Bhabha has offered. The question remains as to whether these forms of identity without history can sustain themselves in an international system dominated by power struggles over exclusivity and distinction.

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101 Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*. 


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Teaching Nation-State Building Movements from a Postcolonial Perspective

The postcolonial perspective

Since the first Korean national curriculum was developed in 1948, Korean history educators have endeavored to attenuate nationalistic and Eurocentric perspectives in the teaching of Korean and world history.¹ This chapter is, in a similar spirit, an attempt to reduce Eurocentrism in history teaching. It will suggest a conceptual framework for teaching nation-state building movements in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries from a postcolonial perspective.

Beginning in the 1990s, the concept of colonialism has been expanding, eventually coming to refer to diverse forms of domination and exclusion with their accompanying features of Eurocentrism, racism, ethnocentrism, and sexism.² This chapter will use the term ‘postcolonialism’ to critique the enduring colonial legacy of Eurocentrism with a view to progressing toward overcoming that legacy. More specifically, this chapter proposes a process of rewriting and teaching world history with a critical perspective on the Eurocentric theory of modernization, which will proceed by adopting transnational and transregional approaches while restoring regional points of view.

¹ This chapter is based on the translated version of the article ‘Facilitating Students’ Exploration of the Transition to Modernity Focusing on Modern Nation Building Movements’, published in Yeoksa Gyoyuk 140, 2016, in the Republic of Korea. Where sources cited originally appeared in Korean, this has been indicated in the reference. – This article deals with the case of the Republic of Korea only. The term ‘Korea’ in this article refers to the ‘Republic of Korea’, i.e. South Korea, and does not include North Korea.

‘The West’, represented by Western Europe and the U.S.A., long held the general status of simultaneously the origin and the final, completing stage of modernity. Schools taught modern world history with a sole focus on the cultural traits unique to European civilizations and their realization as generative of modernity, while paying reduced attention to the various processes of transition to ‘modernity’ in other parts of the world. During the period in which advancing toward and imitating Western modernity was regarded as the principal task of non-Western countries, the Eurocentric theory of modernization widely held sway, before gradually finding itself discredited in academic circles in a process commencing in the 1960s. Recently, a number of works have highlighted the contingency of European modern development in a global historical context. Some have emphasized the European creation of modernity as a result of the transregional circulation of ideas, products, practices, and peoples throughout history. These works attempted to attenuate Eurocentrism by minimizing the historical significance of European domination of the world in the nineteenth century and by explaining ‘the rise of Europe (the West)’ with contingency theory or transregional interactions.

In the early 2000s, Korean academics, including historians and educators, reflected on how a Eurocentric view had become intractably diffused throughout Korean history scholarship and education. They attempted to give Europe less of a central place while restoring the status of non-European peoples’ identities and their roles in world civilization. Many Korean scholars are concerned with potential ways to reconstruct


an alternative modern history which might transcend a Eurocentric conception of modernization. Sung Bo Kim, a historian of Korea, argues that historical ‘generality’ and ‘modernity’, conceptualized from a Eurocentric point of view, have been disintegrating with the recent advent of new global challenges. Sang Woo Lim, who specializes in European history, asserts that ‘modernization’ and ‘a linear path of progress’ have been central Eurocentric conceptions adopted by East Asian scholars. The idea of multiple modernities, or multiple paths to modern times, has been discussed among Korean academics from a postcolonial perspective.

The importance of teaching about modern nation-building movements

Kyung Chul Jou, a historian of European history, has defined ‘modern times’ as ‘present times’, and the study of modern history as the endeavor to learn how the world in which we live today came to be. Following this definition of modern history, teaching modern history can be defined as teaching how the world in which we live today emerged. A variety of themes suggest themselves to this task, such as everyday life, cultures, socio-economic structures, and political systems. However, because it is not feasible for school history curricula to cover all possible topics, selection of content is inevitable.

Over a long period of time, Korean elementary, middle, and high school history curricula, in both Korean history and world history courses, have

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taught modern times primarily around the topic of nationalist movements, sometimes referred to as ‘modern nation-building movements’. In the world history classroom, teaching about European modern times has centered around civil revolutions, encompassing such events as the Renaissance, the scientific revolution and the Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution, while the teaching of modernity in non-European regions has revolved around nationalist movements. Are events such as the Industrial Revolution, civil revolutions, and nationalist movements suitable for explaining how the period in which we live emerged? Approaching modern history primarily via these topics could be viewed as Eurocentrism.

Academics largely define modernity on the basis of two factors, capitalism and the nation state, which originated in the West and spread around the world in the nineteenth century.\(^{10}\) It is a definition of modernity that has come in for criticism as Eurocentric. The intensification of postmodern and postcolonial discourses has seen postmodernists and postcolonialists increasingly call for a reconceptualization of modernity beyond capital and power.\(^{11}\) Accordingly, some academics, such as Dipesh Chakrabarty, who attempted to restore regional ideas and values from a postcolonial perspective, have sought to redefine modernity in a way unique to each region of the world, thereby critiquing the oppressive nature of the Eurocentric concept of modernity and restoring the value of diverse cultures.\(^{12}\) However, the emergence of capitalism and nation states is a historical reality that cannot be denied. It is difficult to explain present-day political and economic systems and issues, as well as sociocultural phenomena and everyday life, without involving these concepts. Recent global changes, principally the phenomenon of globalization and the emergence of post-globalization discourses, cannot be discussed without taking into account the transmutation of capitalism and nation states.

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Two Korean historians, Young-Soo Yook, a specialist in European modern history, and Eun Jeong Yi, whose specialism is the Ottoman Empire, have also emphasized that, in order to understand how the world came to be as it is today, students need to study nation-state building movements and the development of capitalism, which generally occurred not separately but simultaneously in each country.

**Recognizing Multiple Paths to Nation-State Building**

Schools in many European countries provide a curricular course called simply ‘History’ which frequently excludes non-European histories. Criticism of the Eurocentric perspective on the teaching of history can be found in several European scholars’ writings. Kab-Soo Choi, a Korean historian, is also critical of Eurocentrism in European history scholarship and states that to many historians in European countries, ‘History’ means European history, with the relevant national history at its center.

Many intellectuals believe that we are currently in an age of migration and another period of historical transition. Contemporary global changes and paradigm shifts call for more inclusive configurations of history education in every country. In particular, the expansion of the scope of ‘History’ as taught in schools is imperative if students are to be equipped to cope with a changing world. Approaching nation-state building movements from a postcolonial perspective requires the provision of opportunities for students to compare different cases of transition, which would broaden the scope of modern history, not limiting it to the European case. Students would then be able to recognize varying patterns of modern nation-building movements and the trans-configurations of modern institutions and values in different countries.

13 Nieuwenhuyse, Karel van. ‘Belgian Example of the History of One’s Own Country,’ paper presented at the International Conference of the Center for History Teaching and Learning and Memory Culture, ‘Shared and Divided History—Analyses of the Cold War and Other Topics in the Classroom,’ Lucerne, Switzerland, December 1-2, 2016.

Kyung Chul Jou, in *Modern History of Europe*, wonders about Europe’s dominant cultural and discursive status in the contemporary world: ‘Even until the Middle Ages, Europe, situated at the western frontier, was a relatively marginal power, compared to the vast Eurasian continent; it underwent rapid growth and development, without a hitch, throughout the modern period and ultimately gained dominance over the world. How did such development occur?’ Meanwhile, Jin A Kang, a specialist in Chinese modern history, poses an analogous question in *From a Civilization Empire to a Nation State*: ‘How did China, which believed itself to be the center of the world, come to realize and accept that it had come to be just one of the countries, or even one of the inferior countries in the world?’

The converse developments described in these questions demonstrate that each region transitioned into the modern era within the context of different situations and conditions and reflect these regions’ divergent paths to modernity.

Eun Jeong Yi has asserted that, if we are to understand recent conflicts between the Muslim and the Western world and the ‘uncomfortable minds’ of the Muslim world toward Western values and norms and the modern international order, we need to explore the interrelationship between the Muslim world and the West in ‘the long nineteenth century’. In her article ‘Islamic Nationalism and Anti-Christian Sentiments (in Korean)’, she questions why so many conflicts between Europe and the Islamic world have occurred in the contemporary world. Yi suggests that the recent anti-Christian sentiment of the Islamic world is related to the process of nation-state building in the Islamic world in ‘the long nineteenth century’:


17 Interview with Eun Jeong Yi, specialist in the Ottoman Empire, professor, Seoul National University, November 4, 2016.

in the course of the Islamic world being incorporated into the world order that Western empires regulated in the nineteenth century, Muslims experienced many occasions that led them to believe that because of the religious difference [between them and the West], Muslims were isolated or deprived of their national sovereignties by Western empires.19

Yi, while stressing that violence and terrorism must be condemned, considers that comprehending and resolving issues related to the international conflicts that occurred in the Middle East requires an understanding of these conflicts from the perspective of the invaded. Yi’s position prompts researchers to explore the canonical achievements of European modernity together with their darker side, imperialism, and to investigate the divergent experiences and problems of regions and nations arising from encounters with European empires in the nineteenth century.

Helping students critically examine the multiple facets and paths of nation-state building from a more complex perspective which might diminish the influence of Eurocentrism will mean providing them with opportunities to engage with in-depth case and comparative studies. Appropriately guided, students would thus recognize that the modern transformation of societies in the world did not begin at the same time under the same conditions for each society, nor did it follow a single, uniform path. In the process of entering the modern period, each society differed in its political and economic situation, socio-economic conditions and issues, and its modes of establishing relations with other countries. Each society developed different nation-state systems and values and faced specific social problems over time. Students therefore need guidance in exploring these differences among regions and nations and the diverse trajectories they took in their path to becoming nation-state systems.

Students should be able to ask questions about the transition to the modern period, which might include: what were people’s worldviews as they engaged with international affairs? What predicaments did they face, what issues did they perceive as requiring resolution, what priorities for resolving those issues did they put forward, what setbacks and frustrations did they experience, how did they overcome them, and what kinds of problems did they fail to address, and why? Teaching the development

19 Interview with Eun Jeong Yi.
of modern nation-states in such a manner would encourage students to develop insight into the complex issues affecting today’s world.

**Cultural mixing, selective adoption, and appropriation as conceptual frames of analysis**

Commencing in the early years of the new millennium, Korean history educators have identified serious flaws in the world history curricula in force in Korean schools and their attribution of sole credit to European civilization for the creation of modernity. They suggested that instead of continued adherence to this Eurocentric view, students should learn about the creation of modernity as an outcome of cross-cultural interactions in hemispheric and global contexts. Korean history curricula, revised in 2007 and 2011 and subsequently in each case adopting an interregional approach, have challenged the Eurocentric explanation that the European creation of modernity was the logical outcome of the realization of peculiarly European cultural traits. The curricula were organized into world history units to help students understand the influence of Asian technological development and economic growth on European economic transformation in modern times, mapping Afro-Eurasia as an open area of transcultural interaction. The *Compilation Standards for High School World History Textbooks for Curricular Applications Based on the Curriculum Revised in 2009* suggest that textbook authors

[...] avoid the Eurocentric perspective in writing about ‘European[s] pioneering of the new sea-routes in the sixteenth century’. It should be written from an inter-civilizational and ecological perspective. [...] It should be recognized that scientific revolution in Europe was based on the Natural Science developed in the Islamic world and the technologies innovated in the period of [the] Renaissance. It should be taken into consideration that Enlightenment thought had [the] fundamental limitations of Eurocentrism and racial prejudices [...].

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20 Kang, Sun Joo ‘Asia versus Europe’.
The authors of the world history textbook series\textsuperscript{22} issued in 2014, following the guideline, attempted to reduce Eurocentrism by making it clear that Islamic science had an impact on the European scientific revolution in the seventeenth century. Still, in their organization of the units discussing the transformations of the modern age, the world history curriculum and textbooks currently in use in Korea retain the dichotomy of European development of modern ideas, institutions, and culture and non-European acceptance of European modern ideas and institutions. As presented in Tab. 1, the world history curriculum of 2011 prescribes study of not only

\begin{table}[h!]
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\hline
\textbf{Units and Textbook Pages} & \textbf{Topics} \\
\hline
Building the Modern Nation State and Industrialization in the West (approximately 60 pages in total) & The Development of Modern Consciousness (the Scientific Revolution, Enlightenment, European culture in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) Civil Revolutions (the ‘Glorious Revolution’ U.S. independence, the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Age) Formation of Nation States in the Nineteenth Century (liberalism and nationalism, the birth and development of the nation state) Formation of Industrial Society and Culture in the Nineteenth Century (the Industrial Revolution, social change, the culture of the nineteenth century) \\
\hline
Imperialist Aggression and Nationalist Movements (approximately 40 pages in total) & The Age of Imperialism Nation-State Building Movements of East Asia (China, Japan, and Korea) Nation-State Building Movements of India and Southeast Asia (India; Southeast Asian nations including Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia) Nation-State Building Movements of West Asia (Ottoman Empire; anti-imperialist movements and modernization: Arab nationalism, Iran, and Egypt) \\
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\end{tabular}
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\textsuperscript{22} Korea uses a state textbook approval system. Four high-school world history textbooks following the 2011 amended school curriculum have been approved and continue in use.
the nation-state building movements of Europe and America, but also the nationalist movements in Asia, America and some parts of Africa. However, in comparison to the curriculum units and textbook pages dedicated to European modern transformations, those assigned to nation-state building movements in other regions are few and superficial.

The textbook structures its narrative of the modern history of the West around a series of events related to modern Western values and institutions. By contrast, modern histories of other regions are told via a narrative describing a simple process of accepting Western values and institutions through reforms while resisting imperialist aggression. For example, a high school world history textbook of 2014 explains the modern nation-building movement of the Ottoman Empire as follows:

The Ottoman Empire […] flourished. However, starting in the 17th century, political corruption and the dominance of local powers caused the decline of the Empire. After Greece gained independence from the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 19th century, the nationalist movements of the minority groups reached their height, and Serbia and Egypt gained autonomy. Also, because the Ottoman Empire was a geographically strategic location, bridging the East and the West, it was forcefully pressured by great powers such as Great Britain and Russia. In order to overcome the internal and external crises, the Ottoman Empire proactively accepted Western culture and pursued the Tanzimat, a series of reformation attempts intended to attain national prosperity and military power. However, the reforms heightened resistance amongst the regional powers and old-fashioned military officers, and due to the Crimean War among other events […] they were not very successful.

The Sultan’s despotic rule created dissatisfaction among the domestic powers desiring modernization. Accordingly, the Young Turks re-introduced the Constitution (1908).²³

This explanation of the nation-state building movement of the Ottoman Empire perpetuates the simple, dichotomous notion of the reformists accepting Western culture and the old-fashioned anti-reformists resisting its introduction. Such a narrative will leave students no closer to understanding why the Tanzimat reformists’ attempts to overcome internal and external crises involved adopting Western culture, what aspects of Western culture the reformists adopted and how they adjusted them to their own culture.

The discussions of European intellectuals in the eighteenth century consistently involved issues of the non-European world, and awareness of this world had an impact on the assertions, thoughts and ideas of the thinkers of the Enlightenment.24 Currently, Sebastian Conrad, a German scholar, is of the view that the argument that Enlightenment thought was a product of European culture is no longer tenable.25 He challenges the dominant view that the Renaissance, the humanism to which it gave rise, and religious reforms provided the basis for the age of Enlightenment in the eighteenth century. Conrad states:

The assumption that the Enlightenment was a specifically European phenomenon remains one of the foundational premises of Western modernity, and of the modern West. [...] According to this master narrative, the Renaissance, humanism, and the Reformation ‘gave a new impetus to intellectual and scientific development that, a little more than three and a half centuries later, flowered in the scientific revolution and then in the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century.’ The results included the world of the individual, human rights, rationalization, and what Max Weber famously called the ‘disenchantment of the world.’ Over the course of the nineteenth century, or so the received wisdom has it, these ingredients of the modern were then exported to the rest of the world. As William McNeill exulted in his Rise of the West, ‘We, and all the world of the twentieth century, are peculiarly the creatures and heirs of a handful of geniuses of early modern Europe.’26

Conrad argues that ‘the emergence of the scientific revolution and [of] Enlightenment thought cannot be understood as the sovereign and autonomous accomplishment of European intellectuals alone’ and that ‘Enlightenment ideas need to be understood as a response to cross-border interaction and global integration.’27 In other words, scientific revolution and Enlightenment ideas should be understood in their historical context,

in which Europeans engaged aggressively with the rest of the world, posed questions about man and the world, and expanded their knowledge, while reaffirming, modifying or rebuilding the knowledge and beliefs they had held in the past.

As Jou stresses, all civilizations were formed by mixing of cultures; European civilization was also a product of such a process, and modern European civilization emerged through continual communication with its neighboring civilizations in Asia, Africa and the Americas. As Jou stresses, all civilizations were formed by mixing of cultures; European civilization was also a product of such a process, and modern European civilization emerged through continual communication with its neighboring civilizations in Asia, Africa and the Americas. As Jou stresses, all civilizations were formed by mixing of cultures; European civilization was also a product of such a process, and modern European civilization emerged through continual communication with its neighboring civilizations in Asia, Africa and the Americas. 28 Considering this recent interpretation, students should be guided to understand the transition of Europe to the modern age, with such events as the scientific revolution in Europe and the age of Enlightenment, in the context of European political, economic and cultural interactions with regions other than Europe. Simultaneously, we might consider that the transformations occasioned in the modern age in non-European regions should be described and taught with a focus on how the principal agents of this change in each region selected, resisted, integrated, and changed Western culture based on their own awareness and perception of the issues. 29 Eun-Jeong Lee, a specialist in the study of the Ottoman Empire, argues that our view of its Islamic modernization should be predicated on the fact that during the period of modernization, the Ottoman people mediated conflicts and confrontations among various powers and took a major part in interaction and interchange with European culture. 30 She also claims that the Ottomans in accordance with their cultural heritage and societal needs, selectively incorporated Western modernity into their traditions and adapted some of its aspects, thereby achieving modernization by effectively repackaging extant tradition. 31

28 Lee, Young Lim et al. Formation of Modern Europe, 17.
31 Lee, Eung-Jeong ‘Crisis in the Ottoman Empire, 73.
Ok Soon Lee, a specialist in Indian history, addresses the dilemma faced by Indian intellectuals in regard to the modernity of the West as follows:

The nationalist elites, who studied Western and European history through modern education, possessed an ‘unfortunate consciousness’ as they accepted yet denied the Western view of history and modernity. They were faced with a dilemma because if they accepted modernity [as] introduced by […] Great Britain, they would be unable to avoid the fate of being subordinate, whereas if they chose autonomy, they would need to acknowledge the lack of modernity [in India]. They opposed […] colonization by Great Britain and reminisced about the past (traditions) of India, and at the same time, they had a strong desire to become equals with their rulers and become part of the general world (modern world).³²

Ok Soon Lee asserts that ‘Indians modeled [their cultural transition] after their British colonizers in order to defeat them, pursued modernization of India based on this, rebelled against their British rulers at the point of accepting their subordination, and ultimately gained victory.’³³ She stresses that Indians used the knowledge they had gained from the British colonizers as a weapon for resistance against them. This perspective on the events that occurred in India during the British colonial regime and the process of the country’s modernization employs the conceptual frame of selective adoption and appropriation. To be more specific, Ok Soon Lee continues, Gandhi, who criticized the development of the railways, led the independence movement using the railways, while Nehru, who regarded science as the symbol and principal agent of modernity, wrote about ‘the discovery of India’ in prison and turned his attention to the Indian past.³⁴ Further, when an epidemic spread in India, the people of India, who had resisted the sanitation policy of Great Britain, actively accepted Western knowledge of epidemics.

In a similar vein, the nineteenth- and twentieth-century intellectuals of East and Southeast Asia did not absorb unchanged the Western concepts of citizenship, constitutional monarchy, and the social contract theory, among others. We should acknowledge the element in the building of nation states in these countries of cultural translation or appropriation

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³³ Ibid., 332.
³⁴ Ibid.
of European ideas and values, which entailed adjustment of traditional ideas and behavioral norms and the transformation of institutions and systems. While in the West, social Darwinism served as the theoretical basis for imperialistic expansion in the nineteenth century, Chinese and Korean intellectuals and bureaucrats translated it with an eye to their own concerns and used it as a logic for building the capacity to survive amid competition for power and as a theoretical foothold for the pursuit of modern transformation.

Around the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Korean intellectuals introduced the concept of the ‘nation state’ in an attempt to transform political ideas and institutions. Many put the European ideas of the nation state before the Korean public, translating key works into Korean. Between 1908 and 1910, *Daehan Maeil Sinbo*, a Korean newspaper, sought to help Koreans comprehend the concept of the nation state by comparing it to ‘a big house’\(^{35}\). It stated that ‘the state is like a house. Losing the nation state is losing the house. The King should make great efforts to strengthen the foundation of the nation state and not let other people dare to invade.’ The writer of the newspaper article attempted to introduce the new concept of the nation state to the Korean public by using the traditional notion of a house. This Korean conceptualization of the nation state in the early twentieth century thus appears as an instance of cultural translation.

According to Han Wu Lee, a Korean historian, even though Western liberal ideas had spread across Vietnam in the early twentieth century, individuals were not viewed as subjects in the formation of the state.\(^{36}\) Instead, in a fusion of the communalism of East Asia with the individualism of the West, the Vietnamese concept of a nation state regarded families as its fundamental units.\(^{37}\) Further, although Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s social contract theory had been introduced in Vietnam, it did not become

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37 Ibid., 145.
prominent or influential in reform movements or reformist policies. Rather than adopting the theory in its original state, Vietnam readily accepted the idea of communality as expressed in Rousseau’s works. This represents another example of selective acceptance and appropriation on the basis of the active local mobilization of issues needing resolution at that time.

Via the concept of appropriation, we can recognize that culture is not fixed but fluid, and define it as the practice of traversing locations and interactions. This perspective enables us to conceive of the era in which we live not as a product of Westernization, but as that of selective appropriation of Western modernity by each region or nation. Through these conceptual frames of cultural mixing, appropriation, and selective adoption, we come to an awareness of the unique culture and specific problems faced by each region and nation alongside the universal issues arising from the modern nation-state system and the culture of modernity. We additionally perceive that these specificities result from a particular process within the nation-building movements that characterized the modern age. Similarly, as well as attaining a greater understanding of the common cultural values pursued by the modern nation-state system and manifest in the societies that have adopted it, we find ourselves enabled to examine the cultural values unique to each region and nation, which likewise emerged from processes of cultural mixing, selective acceptance and appropriation.

**Exploring changes in mutual perceptions across cultures**

Recently, scholars have delineated and explicated the trajectories of the changing Western conceptions of the East, as well as illuminating the

38 Ibid.
reverse perspective by examining how the peoples of various regions perceived Europeans on encountering them in the period from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries. Examining changes in mutual perceptions of various peoples in the world during this era is important in understanding the nature of contradictions in the modern period. In particular, the investigation of how European Enlightenment thinkers interpreted reports from Christian missionaries working in non-European countries between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries and how Christian, especially American missionaries perceived the regions in which they carried out their missions may help students critically understand Western imperialist justifications of imperialism and colonization.

The reports sent back home by Jesuit missionaries and European diplomats working in non-European regions served as a lens through which Europeans, specifically the Enlightenment thinkers, viewed non-European peoples and regions. These reports had a significant influence on the policy decisions on non-European regions made by European empires. For instance, the reports of French Jesuit missionaries working in China created the image of the Chinese sage in the eighteenth century. *La Description géographique, historique, chronologique, politique et physique de l’empire de la Chine et de la Tartarie chinoise*, edited by Jean-Baptiste Du Halde in 1735, introduced its readers to China and Korea. René Pomeau and Jean Ehrard have suggested that it was this report, combined with the efforts of the Jesuits that created the myth of the ‘sage chinois’, an image that spread in Europe and influenced the Enlightenment thinkers. The notion fell into decline at the end of the eighteenth century, as Enlightenment thinkers such as Montesquieu and Rousseau highlighted the idea of liberty or the separation of powers while critiquing absolutism. China began to be criticized as stagnant and uncivilized. In the nineteenth century, Hegel

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accused the Chinese of deceiving with no morality or conscience. The image of ‘stagnant and duplicitous’ China had a great impact on European politicians and diplomats in their encounter and engagement with East Asian countries in international affairs. ‘The White Man’s Burden: The United States and the Philippine Islands’ (1898) by the British novelist and poet Rudyard Kipling was a marked manifestation of the European perception of non-European peoples, and its justification of imperialism, at the end of the nineteenth century.

By contrast, the Qing and Ottoman Empires of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were characterized by marked and vocal confidence, sophisticated cultures, and influence on the world stage. The interactions of these two powers with foreign countries bore witness to their self-perceptions as the center of the world. International relations in East Asia were influenced by the concept of the Middle Kingdom and the tributary system, while European Christian merchants were allowed to carry out their trade in the Ottoman Empire under the notion of contractual ‘capitulation’, which meant that the Christians residing or trading in the Ottoman Empire’s territories were subject to the application of the laws of their homelands, that is, Christian nations, and not to those of the Ottoman Empire.

Following the Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century, European powers attempted to take control of overseas markets, and endeavored to establish diplomatic and commercial relations with countries throughout the world on the basis of European concepts. European-style diplomacy, which was founded on reciprocity, extraterritoriality, and sovereignty, differed from the views and principles of diplomacy held by the Ottoman Empire and the Qing Dynasty. Scholars have noted that these two powers were not aware that the modern treaties they signed with European countries deviated from their own customs and traditions, and did not recognize

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44 Ibid.
their unfairness. Later, heavily challenged by the European imperialist aggression and demands which emerged in the late nineteenth century, the two powers realized that their incorporation into the modern international treaty system was entirely at odds with their customs and traditions and attempted to amend the treaties in order to ameliorate this imbalance.

If students are to fully understand the issues and problems of the period of transition to modernity, it is important that they receive the opportunity to explore and comprehend the changes in mutual perceptions of Europeans and non-Europeans and in people’s perceptions of the relations of their own region, nation or group with others. In particular, when studying modern nation-building movements in Asia and Africa, students should be encouraged to investigate what the intellectuals and leaders of these movements failed to recognize while forming relations with modern European empires on the basis of the modern treaty system and what types of changes these intellectuals and leaders promoted or inhibited. In this light, students might pursue questions such as: How did the Ottoman Empire and the Qing Dynasty understand and perceive the treaties with European powers that were based on the European concept of diplomacy? And how did the intellectuals of the Qing Dynasty and the bureaucrats of the Ottoman Empire, who lived under their societies’ specific rules and values, view the changes occurring in many European countries and the European trade demands that shattered the conventions to which all had thus far adhered?

Evaluating events from complex angles: the transnational approach, the perspective of the colonized, and the long view

The Transnational Approach: The French Revolution is commonly taught as the central contributory event to the development and spread of the modern system of nations throughout the world. The humanist ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity have gained great significance and resonance. This notwithstanding, Young Soo Youk asserts that in a world

45 Yu, Yong Tae et al. 2016. Modern and Contemporary History of East Asia to Be Read Together. [In Korean]. Seoul: 130. Quataert, Donald. The Ottoman Empire.
history context, the French Revolution should be re-interpreted in relation to the Haitian Revolution that occurred in the same period.\textsuperscript{46} The leaders of the French Revolution attempted to violently suppress the Haitian Revolution of the black slaves and resurrected the system of slavery that had been previously abolished. Therefore, Youk argues that historians should be allowed to point out the contradictions and anomalies of the French Revolution. Continuing, he asserts that it does not suffice to explain the ideals of the French Revolution and the spirit of the declaration of human rights associated with it as a product of the French Revolution itself, but that instead students should come to understand it as an outworking of imperialist conflicts.\textsuperscript{47} Youk’s argument implies that the history of European modernity should be explored within the context of colonialism. In addition to the Haitian Revolution, other independence movements and political revolutions in Latin America and the system of slavery must also be understood in relation to the French Revolution and the nationalist movements in Europe. At the same time, there should be awareness of the differing patterns of the nation-state system as its global spread advanced. From women’s perspective, for instance, it was not until the mid-twentieth century that the ideals of the French Revolution came to be institutionalized. Examining nation-state movements while taking the diverse composition of a nation’s population into consideration might help students become conscious of, and indeed encourage them to tell, different and more complex stories than the ones they are used to hearing.

A transnational approach and a long-term perspective to the teaching of history allow students to understand multiple aspects of an event. In this way, students can appreciate that the appropriation of the ideals of the French Revolution by other regions and ethnic groups played an important role in the formation and dissemination of the concept of human rights as we know it today.\textsuperscript{48} Further, this approach points out to us, and

\textsuperscript{46} Youk, Young Su. 2013. \textit{The Treachery of Revolution and the Memory of Resistance}. Seoul.


\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 81.
to students, that the creation of modern values is not explicable solely through logical developments within Europe, but can be more convincingly depicted as a product of complex relationships with other regions.

The Long View: The impact of an event should always be reviewed from a long-term perspective. In general, Korean world history textbooks explain China’s period of transition through singular events such as the Self-Strengthening Movement, the Hundred Days of Reform and other reform movements, thus cumulatively depicting this era as an age of confusion, frustration, and failures. Jin A Kang, taking a contrasting approach, discusses the historical meaning of the economic policy of the Self-Strengthening Movement in association with the industrialization of China and from a long-term perspective. She has pointed out that, while the economic policy of the Self-Strengthening Movement period had limitations, the factories and enterprises founded during this time played an important role in the subsequent industrialization of China. The first modern factories of China, built at this time, were the most critical industries even during the Republic of China period, and most members of the first group of students sent to study abroad by the government in this period came to play major roles in modern China as, for instance, scientists, engineers, financial experts, and politicians.

Korean world history textbooks describe the reform movements of Africa and Asia using a collection of sporadic, unsuccessful events, while describing the Industrial Revolution and popular revolutions of the West from a long-term perspective. However, perceiving the events in Africa and Asia from a similarly long-term perspective would identify aspects not previously noted.

A postcolonial consciousness in the teaching of history

The nation-state system is a distinct reality of the modern times in which we live, although its status is changing in a globalizing world. This globally similar but regionally particular nation-state system, along with political cultures and some recent world problems and conflicts, stems from the

49 Kang, Jin A. *From a Civilization Empire to a Nation State*, 85–86.
50 Kang, Jin A. *From a Civilization Empire to a Nation State*, 86.
51 Ibid.
period of transition to the modern age, an era, as we have set out above, generally taught in schools thus far via the Eurocentric theory of modernization. It is a theory that manifests limitations when it comes to explaining how regions and nations have developed particular national political systems and cultures while faced with different socio-economic systems and local and global problems.

Provision of school students with an understanding of today’s global and regional issues calls increasingly for them to be given opportunities to explore the process of transitioning to modernity through such conceptual frames as cultural mixing, selective adoption, and appropriation. Students should examine this transition from both an interregional and a transnational perspective, in European and non-European countries alike. Educators need to guide students to analyze the events and issues related to the transition to modernity from complex perspectives: regional and transregional, long-term and short-term, conservative and reformist, the perspective of the oppressors and that of the oppressed, of the invaders and the invaded, of the colonizers and the colonized, and that of powers on the rise and in decline.

The period of global transition to the modern age cannot be understood without the issues of imperialism and colonialism. Therefore, to promote postcolonial consciousness, it is important for students to recognize and analyze instances of oppression, ‘otherness’ and ‘othering’ during the age of imperialism and colonialism. In so doing, when interpreting and evaluating the historical meaning of those events and issues related to modern transition, they should be guided to take ethical problems into consideration.

References


Colonial Complicity?

The Impact of Post-Colonialism on History
Teaching in Switzerland

The concept of post-colonialism

Post-colonial studies emerged in North American literary and cultural sciences in the late 1970s and made their way to Europe in the 1990s, initially to Britain.\textsuperscript{1} For a relatively long time, post-colonial theories received little attention in German-speaking regions, only drawing scholarly interest appropriate to their academic significance over the course of the last decade.\textsuperscript{2} ‘Post-colonialism’ has undergone a transformation from an imperialism-critical term used to donate a specific historical epoch to a politically programmatic, discourse-critical concept\textsuperscript{3} which asserts that all of us, not just those individuals in or from former colonized areas, live in a post-colonial world.\textsuperscript{4}

In this reading, the post-colonial world also encompasses Switzerland, which never possessed colonies, yet, from a cultural-studies perspective, is part of that relationship that has connected Western Europe with the rest of the world since the conquest of America in the sixteenth century. We might state that in an indirect manner, Switzerland and its society ruled the non-European continents and were at the same time influenced by

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{4} Cf. Falk, Postkolonialismus, 55.
\end{itemize}
them; indeed, Switzerland has been accused of ‘colonial complicity’. It is therefore a basic thesis of post-colonialism in its current meaning, and therefore of our investigation in this chapter, that this process has had an impact which continues to make itself felt in the present.\(^5\) It is in this context that some of the more recent studies on this topic have engaged with Switzerland during the colonial and post-colonial eras.\(^6\)

Post-colonial theories fundamentally revolve around colonization, the ongoing process of decolonization, and the emergence of neo-colonial tendencies. The prefix ‘post-’ refers to the further development of such colonial structures. Post-colonial studies seek to illuminate not only the occupation and economic appropriation of territories by colonization, but also the processes of construction and formation of identity which eventually produce a contrasting dichotomy between ‘Europe’ and its ‘others’, along with these processes of ‘othering’ themselves and their ‘discursive power’.\(^7\) The discipline therefore generates a discourse-critical cultural theory which analyzes and criticizes the Eurocentrism of common systems of knowledge and representation. As a consequence, the reach of post-colonial theory goes beyond those countries which possessed colonies or were colonies themselves or still are, and encompasses continuing colonial discourses, whose essentialism and Eurocentrism can be identified by means of post-structuralist approaches, in a global context. Post-colonial


\(^{7}\) Purtschert et al., *Eine Bestandsaufnahme der postkolonialen Schweiz,* 18.
Theories suggest that Western colonization did not disappear after World War II or after decolonization, a fact which becomes apparent at a cultural level in particular. ‘Africa’ and ‘Switzerland’ are thus not strictly separate entities, but fundamentally intertwined. In this context, ‘hybridity’ becomes a key academic formula: ‘cultures cannot be distinguished clearly from each other; instead, they ‘penetrate’ each other as soon as they come into contact with each other.’

In what way, however, have these new research developments been absorbed and implemented by history teaching, and to what extent does this teaching sensitize students to the fact that post-colonial structures continue to exist? We might, before we go on to answer this question, suggest that two central functions of post-colonial theory are of particular relevance to teaching. (1) Post-colonial approaches are raising awareness of the ongoing impact and powerful influence of colonial interpretative patterns in everyday life as well as in systems of knowledge. (2) In addition, they enable us to perceive more clearly the ongoing impact of neo-colonial economic and power structures.

Post-colonial structures in Switzerland

Like other states such as Luxembourg and Liechtenstein, the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and certain Scandinavian countries such as Norway or Iceland, Switzerland never possessed any overseas colonial territories. Therefore, no direct violence was ever exercised in the military conquest or occupation of land, and the country was officially involved neither in economic exploitation nor in violent political repression. This situation means that, as the editors of the volume *Post-colonial Switzerland* emphasize, other fields must necessarily be looked at when examining Switzerland in the context of the post-colonial era. This leads us to cultural aspects of colonialism, such as the structural violence of trade relations, the seeming logic and mechanism of technologically defined development aid,

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the subtle implications of the Swiss policy of neutrality in the service of rivaling colonial powers, the mostly ‘silent’ everyday racism in the images and text of children’s books or the post-colonial structures that have had and continue to have an effect on everyday culture.\(^{10}\)

It is in these and other ways that colonialism has permeated Swiss society and influenced a number of generations and their ideas of the world. We are called to pay particular attention to the Swiss image and awareness of Europe in this context, due to the extent to which Swiss society is culturally, economically and socially intertwined with Europe and holds shared values and ways of thinking; Swiss ideas of Europe therefore give clues to shared perceptions of the ‘other’, such as the fears of ‘colonization’ by migrants from non-European regions which have arisen in current debates. Most European countries and the European Union have seen the public expression of anxieties and concerns in connection with post-colonial migration and its spread.\(^{11}\) Europe has since the 1970s become a continent of immigration, which has strengthened the impact of post-colonial thinking on the presentation and perception of colonial history.

**Switzerland and ‘colonial complicity’**

The expression ‘colonial complicity’, which emerged in the context of European states’ processes of coming to terms with their colonial pasts, is used to signal the participation of the ‘complicit’ entity in Western hegemonic discourses and universal thinking patterns and practices of Western rule.\(^{12}\) Studies have shown how actors in the region of today’s Switzerland profited from an early stage from colonial trading and the transatlantic slave trade.\(^{13}\) During the imperialist age, colonial powers did not perceive the country as a competitor; actors from Switzerland were therefore able

\(^{10}\) Cf. ibid.


\(^{13}\) David et al., *Schwarze Geschäfte.*
to benefit from the advantages of colonial relationships. Contemporary analysts spoke of Switzerland as the ‘laughing third party’ because the country was able to take part in trade without having to assume the military costs of a colonial power.

Subsequently, colonial policy did not give rise to wide-ranging debate in Switzerland, a small state which could only commit itself to a ‘moderate’ foreign policy.\(^4\) At the height of imperialism in 1884, there was, however, a debate in the Swiss parliament on whether Switzerland should be part of specific colonization projects. A petition launched by a parliamentarian called for the direct legislative and material participation of Switzerland in relation to ‘emigration and colonization matters’.\(^5\) The government, however, responded by listing the complications of such an undertaking for a country without access to the sea and a fleet. There are no indications in the official Swiss archives that Switzerland sought to possess overseas property. Nevertheless, Swiss public opinion evidently shared feelings of European superiority toward colonized countries. It is in this context that Patrick Minder speaks of a ‘colonial’ Switzerland rather than using the term ‘colonialist’, which implies an active colonializing dimension.\(^6\)

Switzerland endorsed the positions of the colonial powers and asserted itself in the world system they created. In 1847 the then president of the Federal Government, the Tagsatzung, and later federal councilor Ulrich Ochsenbein formulated this attitude in the following manner:

> On the entire globe, wherever the bold British have gained a foothold as a result of their persistence, you will find the Swiss as a loyal companion at their side in the search for a market for products of art and of industriousness of their homeland.\(^7\)

Helvetian nationals personally contributed to European colonialism in Africa by acting as militarists, colonists, entrepreneurs, missionaries


\(^5\) Purtschert, et al., Eine Bestandsaufnahme der postkolonialen Schweiz, 15.

\(^6\) Minder, La Suisse coloniale, 10-12.

\(^7\) Cit. in Purtschert, et al., Eine Bestandsaufnahme der postkolonialen Schweiz, 29.
and researchers. Thus, while the state itself did not actively colonize, individuals from Swiss society did. Swiss mercenaries also participated time and again in colonial wars, as well as Swiss colonists who had settled in colonial regions such as Algeria. In later analyses, historians and social scientists have taken a view of Switzerland as a ‘secret empire’\(^\text{19}\), a regime of ‘bank and stock market imperialism’\(^\text{20}\), or a ‘part-time colonial power’\(^\text{21}\) and have identified a ‘secondary Swiss imperialism’\(^\text{22}\).

Further research has examined the colonial perceptions and images which were prevalent in Switzerland and how they circulated in the public sphere.\(^\text{23}\) Some Swiss entanglements in colonial practices appear to us to be part of what we might describe as ‘everyday racism’. Exhibitions of euphemistically described ‘anatomical wonders’, the so-called *Völkerschauen*, which essentially presented people from non-European races as objects for exhibition, were held in Switzerland. In 1960, the Knie Circus organized an ‘African animal and peoples exhibition’ as a colonial spectacle in the *Sechseläutewiese* public square in Zurich.\(^\text{24}\) Ignorance and stereotypical perceptions continued to prevail during the period of decolonization. As research has shown, the image of Africa in the Swiss press was marked by stereotypes. For a long time, Africa was primarily presented from atavistic perspectives. There was agreement early on that World War II had strengthened resistance among colonized peoples and that this would cause a change in the colonial system. The European image of Africa underwent various changes during decolonization: Criticisms of the colonial system emerged in the early 1950s, and the bipolarism caused by the Cold War

\(^{23}\) Cf. Minder, *La Suisse coloniale*.
\(^{24}\) Purtschert, et al., *Eine Bestandsaufnahme der postkolonialen Schweiz*, 36.
gave rise to increasing concerns that the former colonies in Africa and Asia could fall into the hands of communism.\textsuperscript{25}

Post-colonial criticism arose in particular in connection with the emergence of the new social movements of the 1970s. Unlike the development organizations which were embedded in the political mainstream, the new social movements criticized development policy as it had been practiced thus far as being guided too strongly by commercial and economic interests.\textsuperscript{26} Development policy became a highly controversial field of discourse from the late 1960s onward.\textsuperscript{27} In a debate which saw calls for a new understanding of solidarity with other countries, circles committed to a workable development policy sought to redefine state support and aid and bring about changes to world political and economic structures in favor of the global south. In the process, the economic and financial relationships maintained by Switzerland became an issue for the first time.

Perceptions and representations of colonial history

In Switzerland the view is widespread that the country and its population never had anything to do with colonialism. It is likewise an impression which emerges from daily newspapers, periodicals, and educational media such as textbooks. Educational media has only recently begun to examine the workings of primary and secondary teaching and its impact on students’ patterns of knowledge in this context. An unpublished master’s thesis submitted at Lucerne University\textsuperscript{28} surveyed 41 fifteen-year-old eighth-grade


students by means of a standardized task format which presented them with a stereotypical image of Africa, revolving around the specific case of Kenya. The predominant image of Africa among the participants can be said to have been primarily characterized by ‘perceptions of destitution’. In the word groups provided for the investigation, students gave associations with Africa including lacking water, poverty, sickness, hunger, death, hard work, horn of Africa, dirty water, poor-rich, and slums. Terms with negative connotations prevailed. This image of Africa appears to stem from colonial perceptions of ‘underdeveloped ethnic groups’. Asked about images of Africa, students describe women carrying water vessels on their shoulders and people living in clay huts and going about naked or in dirty and torn clothes. Atavistic perceptions evidently continue to exert an impact here.

26 students at the Lucerne University of Teacher Education were confronted with the question: ‘Would you support an initiative for Switzerland to provide financial compensation to Africa for past injustice?’ In their written answers, five students tended to support compensation payments, whereas eight of them clearly rejected the idea and 13 took an ambivalent position. The question was not primarily aimed at finding out which of the options they would choose, but instead at whether the students could make any references to Switzerland’s colonial entanglements. Very few such references were made, and little knowledge on this matter was in evidence. One student stated: ‘Sadly enough, I don’t know much about this issue and therefore cannot give my opinion.’ Other respondents were of the view that Switzerland behaved ‘largely correctly and generously’ towards Africa, and there was considerable emphasis on development projects and aid, with a general consensus that any financial support should be directed toward this area.

The following tables will illustrate the ways in which history textbooks in past and current use in Switzerland discuss colonial and post-colonial developments.29

Colonial Complicity?

Selected books for secondary level I from the German-speaking part of Switzerland (12–16-year-old students)

The analytical questions and categories we applied to our investigation of the books were as follows: Where do we find colonial and post-colonial topics in textbooks (1), what are the reasons given in the books for European expansion (2), are there any references to Swiss involvement in colonialism (3) and how are post-colonial entanglements recorded?

Burkhard’s *World and Swiss History* published in 1962 treats colonial history in two thematic fields under the headings of ‘Seafarers discover new countries’ and ‘Imperialism’. The author explains European expansion by stating that Europeans ‘discovered’ the world thanks to their technological advantage. According to him European nations arrived at prosperity and growth through ‘clever’ colonization. Exploitation and oppression are not discussed in a critical light. Under the heading ‘Swiss citizens in the entire world’ the author mentions emigration in the context of the long nineteenth century. However, colonial settlement or colonial policy is not an issue. Colonial entanglements or the degree to which post-colonial critiques of colonialism apply to Switzerland are not mentioned.

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**Tab. 1: Overview of examined textbooks**

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In Halter’s *On the Passage of Time* published in 1972 we find three colonial topics: ‘Discoveries’, ‘World and Colonial Empires’, and ‘Decolonization’. As for the reasons given for European expansion, these are based on Europe’s emergence as a global power. The end of ‘white colonial rule’ is described against the backdrop of ‘the awakening of colored peoples’. Switzerland is not at all involved according to the book and Development aid is looked upon in the context of the Cold War as a means of fighting communism.

The 1985 edited textbook *World History in Pictures* presents colonial history within the three thematic fields of ‘Discoverers and the discovered’, ‘The era of imperialism’, and ‘On the road to one world’. It critically refers to European rule and the destruction of indigenous cultures. Switzerland is mentioned incidentally in this context. Post-colonial critique of European colonialism can be discovered for example when the newly emerging Third World Movement in Switzerland is mentioned positively which took as its motto ‘There is only one future’.

Ziegler’s textbook *Times – People – Cultures* which appeared in print in 1986 addresses colonial history under the heading of ‘imperialism and colonialism’. It presents source material to induce a critical examination of European colonists intentions and attitudes for example on ‘How to treat native people’, ‘Native people judged by Europeans’ or ‘Economic exploitation and colonial atrocities’. There are, however, very few references to Switzerland in this context and there is no mentioning of Switzerland as a European power involved in colonial undertakings. Instead the textbook presents Albert Schweizer as an agent of development aid.

Meyer and Schneebeli’s *The Present through History* published in 1988 deals with colonial history in the section ‘Colonies and Empires’. It offers a critical presentation of colonialism and it indicates that Switzerland was actively involved in colonialism. A paragraph is devoted to ‘Switzerland and the Colonies’ with references to the ‘Basler mission’ and the Swiss economic involvement in colonialism respectively neo-colonialism up to the present. As far as post-colonial critique is concerned the book points to the participation of Swiss entrepreneurs in colonial trade and the effects of colonialism which can be traced up to now in Swiss society. It analyzes the processes of decolonization in the context of the Cold War.
The most recent textbook *People in Time and Space* published in 2014 treats colonial history in the section entitled ‘Under Europe’s rule’. It discusses the European view of other cultures as a topic in its own right. Colonial violence, however, is referred to rather implicitly. Belgian, British and French colonial rule are an issue but Swiss involvement into colonialism is not mentioned explicitly. The textbook offers critical considerations on colonial policy with illustrative examples and it takes into account the effects of the colonial past on the former colonies. Post-colonial issues in Swiss and European societies are not mentioned explicitly.

Our analysis of the textbooks allows us to roughly distinguish two categories with respect to the ways in which they represent history during and after European colonization. The first category (Burkhard and Halter), which covers books in use until about the mid-1970s, draws a picture of colonization that, within the context of a now outdated approach focusing on history as the history of politics and policy and without engaging with the underlying issues, presents colonial policy and empire-building by European naval powers uncritically factual. Books in this category do not give colonized people a voice of their own, and their presentation of history, generally speaking, revolves around states and peoples rather than human experience, although the feelings of those colonized are discussed at a general level, as here: ‘Even the Egyptians unwillingly endured British paternalism; they yearned for total independence’\(^\text{30}\) or thus: ‘However, the gifted people of India became tired of English supremacy.’\(^\text{31}\) On the side of those that colonized as well there are states that act, and their actions appear arrogant as a result: ‘Great Britain sent a fleet to protect its nationals and interests, and it occupied the land on the Nile.’\(^\text{32}\) These books contain no specific descriptions of colonial encounters, that is, of how colonizing parties and colonized peoples interacted.

Processes of decolonization are described as a struggle for liberation, for instance in the case of India, or as an ‘awakening of the peoples’. In the context of the outbreak of the Cold War and with the perception of


\(^{31}\) Ibid., 262.

progress and technology-oriented development aid, the author argues in a paternalistic style:

Charity in the form of grain and other food cannot solve the problem. The Indians must be educated so that they are able to help themselves. If we do not succeed in controlling the great famine in India, there is a danger that the people will believe the deceptive promises of the communists. All the ‘developing countries’ find themselves in a similar situation. It is the duty of the Swiss people to also help build this development work.\(^{31}\)

This manner of presenting decolonization follows traditional thought patterns; while national movements in the colonies are recognized as conducting a legitimate struggle for liberty, the European powers are depicted as being needed to benevolently support the peoples’ ‘awakening’ from their state of immaturity by means of development aid.

The second category we have identified in our analysis comprises textbooks from the 1980s to the present. These textbooks present a differentiated picture of colonial expansion and shed critical light on European supremacy by giving voice and importance not only to the actions and motives of the colonists, but also to the concerns of the colonized peoples. They explain where the causes of colonial expansion lie, but also how it was accompanied by destruction, subjugation and violence. ‘Colonial Switzerland’ is rarely mentioned, and only as a country without direct rule over colonized regions. This means that issues of involvement in colonialism are generalized beyond specific national contexts. One textbook (Meyer/Schneebeli) provides an exception in its direct reference to ‘Switzerland and the colonies’.\(^ {34}\) The books also contain references to the effects of European colonization in the former colonies after their independence.\(^ {35}\)

The former ‘European view’ of foreign cultures is also discussed in some of the textbooks, which include cartoons, photographs and written source material, largely from the colonial era.\(^ {36}\) Current points of intersection

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33 Ibid., 185.
between Swiss society and colonial legacies continue to receive very little attention, an omission which goes hand in hand with the historicizing treatment the issues receive in the textbooks.

**Conclusion**

All the textbooks in the second category we have discussed above deal with colonialism in a differentiated manner. In particular, the historical dimensions of colonialism and decolonization are very well depicted. Switzerland, however, is included to a limited extent only – the country does not seem to exist in the context of colonialism. Switzerland, as a country that practiced what we might call ‘secondary’ colonialism in the colonial era, shares in today’s post-colonial structures, which exist in a globalized age with internationally operating businesses and a lack of regulation of financial and trade systems. Western states no longer operate in a directly colonizing way, but they are still the dominant actors in a global market whose rules were created for their benefit.

Such issues cannot only be approached from the perspective of post-colonial studies. Mechanisms come into play here which Hans-Heinrich Nolte has explained in the context of the history of the world system that is marked by features such as competition, the accumulation of skills, expansion, and hierarchy. Such theoretical approaches accord a key role to the center-periphery opposition, which should be understood in a pluralizing way and as encompassing an inherent categorical distinction between province (= shelter of tradition) and periphery (= contact zone to other cultures and realms of knowledge), as opposed to a multitude of centers. Further, the political, military, economic, religious and ideological center of an area of power is never to be found in one single place.

Time and again, rules are imposed on the periphery by the centers. According to critical observers, the European Union is practicing ‘colonialism on velvet paws’ with its planned policy of free trade between the

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European Union and India. It recently became public that, according to cautious estimates, African nations lost a minimum of 1,200 billion dollars through illegal cash outflows to other continents. In this context Switzerland has acted as an important hub. Further examples could be added, such as instances of ‘colonialism’ or its after-effects in the international commodity trade.

Our increased awareness of post-colonial structures uncovers the still-unbroken impact and powerful influence of colonial interpretative patterns in everyday life and in the systems of knowledge which govern our societies. In other words, post-colonial structures have and continue to have an effect on everyday culture. Our sample of Swiss textbooks indicates that teaching materials do not yet seem to make full reference to current events related to these structures. There is a need in this regard for teaching materials which enable students to understand and interpret the construction and formation process which eventually ends with ‘Europe’ and its ‘others’.

Textbooks


References


Mariann Nagy

The Discourse of the ‘Colonization’ of Hungary in Hungarian History Textbooks

Introduction

On January 21, 2012, businesspeople, intellectuals and journalists held ‘March for Peace’ at the side of the Hungarian government. Tens of thousands of people walked side by side carrying torches, national flags and signs and banners supporting the ‘sovereignty of Hungary’ and protesting against allegedly ‘untrue and biased news in the international media’. At the forefront of the marching crowd, 15–20 people carried a banner reading in Hungarian and English, ‘We will not be a colony’\(^1\). Posters showing the circle of stars of the European flag with a hammer and sickle above the merged initials ‘EUSSR’\(^2\) identified the European Union with the Soviet Union. On March 15, 2012, the national holiday commemorating the 1848 revolution in Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, giving his official speech to mark the day (as reported by Fidesz.hu), asserted that the demands of the Hungarians in 2012 were the same as they had been in 1848, not to be a colony. The speech further referred to the constitutional situation of Hungary in 1848, when, instead of reforming the dynastic and composite Habsburg Empire, the Hungarian political opposition aspired to a government independent of Vienna and other Habsburg territories\(^3\) and answerable responsible to the Hungarian parliament under

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1 See a photography e.g. in https://444.hu/2014/12/01/magyarorszag-9-vadonatuj-ellensege (12.03.2018).
2 See the logo e.g. in https://www.rtnnewspaper.com/2017/04/welcome-to-the-eussr/ (12.03.2018).
3 The main body of the Habsburg monarchy (which after the Compromise of 1867 became a dual monarchy, called Austria-Hungary) consisted of three separate territories – the old ‘hereditary provinces’ of Austria, the kingdom of Bohemia and the kingdom of Hungary. They were connected primarily by their common ruler, the Habsburg monarch. Each part had its own laws and political life. In the second half of the eighteenth century the Habsburgs held territories that now fall within the borders of 12 different European countries. Cities such
the Habsburg king, demanding only a personal union with the Habsburg monarchy. One of the key questions of the debates between Austria and Hungary which ran from the end of the eighteenth century until 1849 was the customs barrier that separated Hungary from the rest of Austria. Many of the opposition claimed that it kept Hungary in a situation of ‘colonial dependence’ on the remainder of Austria. Indeed, the Declaration of Independence eventually issued on April 19, 1849, claimed that ‘in the subordination of our commercial interests to the emperor’s interests and [its] cutting off from world trade Hungary became a colony’ (Pajkossy 2003: 327).

In other words, the discourse of ‘colonization’ in relation to Hungary is an old one. The contemporary events leading to its renaissance began unfolding in 2010, when, in a free and fair election, the center-right political party Fidesz received 53 % of the vote, translating into 68 % of the seats in parliament under the Hungarian electoral law in force at that time. With this two-thirds majority, Fidesz won the power to change the constitution or even to enact a wholly new one. These powers took effect on January 1, 2012. In addition to the new constitution, the government, commencing in 2011, introduced further significant changes concerning the judiciary. The changes caused concern among the Venice Commission for Democracy of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and the United States, which issued a warning to the government which went unheeded. The new constitutional order imposed the most severe restrictions on the judiciary. The Constitutional Court, which had once been responsible for reviewing nearly all laws for constitutionality, was killed off in three ways. First, the government expanded the number of judges on the bench and filled the new positions with their own political allies. It then restricted the jurisdiction of the court to preclude its reviewing any law that might have an impact on the budget. Finally, it changed the rules of access to the court so that it would no longer be easily able to review laws in the abstract for their compliance with the constitution. ‘The old Constitutional Court, which served as

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as Prague, Lviv, Cluj, Milan, Florence, or even Antwerp in the northwest, and the regions in which they were located, belonged to Habsburg territory.
the major check on governmental power in a unicameral parliamentary system’ – as Krugman suggested (Krugman 2011) – became ‘functionally dead’. This series of events inclined international media and even some politicians from the West to express their concern about the condition of democracy in Hungary. Where this criticism of the Hungarian government’s and parliament’s actions came from the various organizations of the European Union, the Hungarian government denounced it as symptomatic of a ‘colonial attitude’. This rhetoric of ‘colonialism’ refers back on the one hand to a specific interpretation of Soviet rule between 1945 and 1991 and on the other hand has historical roots in national discourses around Hungarian history since the eighteenth century.

These events are indicative of the continued resonance of the rhetoric of colonialism and colonization in the public and political discursive arenas in Hungary. This study will aim to reveal how history textbooks can influence these discursive arenas, which have in their turn an effect on the historical canon. It will discuss the ways in which the history books used in Hungarian secondary schools between 1948, the year of the Communists’ ascendancy to power, and 1990, the year of the first democratic election in the post-Communist era, interpreted the status of Hungary within the Habsburg monarchy from the second half of the eighteenth century up to the First World War. The analysis will enable us to understand how the historical image of the various generations living in 2012, as manifest in the description of the demonstration that opened this chapter, emerged on the foundations of the history of the relationship between Hungary and the Habsburg dynasty as recounted in history textbooks. In addition to this, the chapter will endeavor to provide an explanation of how and why Hungarian politicians from the second half of the eighteenth century until the end of the nineteenth century and professional historians defined the position of the Hungarian kingdom in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a ‘colony’ of the Habsburgs.

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Political oratory from the second half of the eighteenth century to 1849

We have a few contemporary sources from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that used the words ‘colony’ or ‘colonization’ in relation to Hungary and its position in the Habsburg monarchy. Its first recorded use in this context was by Joseph II (1780–1790) in 1785, in the assertion: ‘If the nobility in Hungary is willing to pay taxes, Hungary can expect equal treatment, if not, Hungary should be treated as a colony’ (Eckhart 1922: 256). ‘Colonial’ and ‘colonization’, in the original meaning of these terms, bear no relation to the notion that surfaced at the end of the eighteenth century in the context of the Austro-Hungarian relationship. Hungary as a land had not been invaded by people from Austria and there was no military force deployed to gain and maintain control over Hungary. The inhabitants of Hungary did not become the subjects of the Habsburgs, nor did they become victims of racism and cultural genocide. On the contrary, the Habsburg dynasty acceded to the Hungarian throne by marriage contract after King Lajos II (1516–1526) died in the battle of Mohács against the Ottomans in 1526. After 1541, when the Ottoman Empire occupied the central part of Hungary and penetrated as far as Buda, the capital, Ferdinand I (1526–1564) ruled the western part of Hungary while the eastern part, Transylvania, became a vassal state of the Ottomans. According to recent research by Pálffy (2015), this period is regarded as a century of compromises between the ruler and the nobility. The kingdom/nobility and the Habsburg monarchy/the king were dependent on each other for the defense of the frontier against the Turks and the maintenance of a solid political, military and financial basis for this defense.

In the light of this situation, we may be forgiven for wondering what precisely the background to Joseph II’s statement was. The eighteenth century saw states as communities united by common borders and institutions which needed centralization and strong armies with huge amounts of money to assert themselves in the European balance of power. At this time, Habsburg rulers aimed, as Judson (2016: 14) has observed, to make a state by applying ‘a unified and centralized set of institutions to the collection of diverse territories over which they ruled, many of which functioned
largely according to their own particular laws, institutions and administrative traditions’. Hungary even retained its own constitution, according to which all noblemen were exempt from paying direct taxes. Maria Theresa (1740–1780) and her sons Joseph II and Leopold II, influenced by the three major political economic theories of cameralism, mercantilism and physiocratism, inaugurated a broad range of administrative and institutional reforms, ranging from reducing the forced labor burden on the peasantry to taxing the nobility. In the provinces of Austria taxation of noblemen was introduced in the early 1750s. However, none of them succeeded in imposing direct taxation on the Hungarian nobility. Prussia’s annexation in 1748 of Silesia, the empire’s most economically valuable province, was followed in 1754 by a new tariff system, guided by mercantilism, as part of the Viennese government’s economic policy. This system encompassed internal tariff barriers inside the monarchy, between, for instance, the eastern border of the Austrian lands and the western border of the lands of the Hungarian Crown, too, in order to let in only necessary items from abroad and allow the export of redundant goods. The Hungarian administration did not protest these changes, only demanding duty-free access to goods for the nobility’s own sake. The primary purpose of these measures was to protect Austrian and Czech industry from competition from abroad, as long as foodstuffs and raw materials were available for Austria from Hungary. The tariff barrier system concluded in consolidating the division of labor which first emerged in the Habsburg monarchy. Further, Hungarian merchants were excluded from external markets because it was cheaper to buy goods from Austrian merchants than from abroad. At the same time, Hungarian oxen were not worth exporting as far as Nurnberg or Augsburg, for example, because the tariff was higher at the Austrian-German border than at the Hungarian-Austrian one. In 1764 the Habsburg court promised to withdraw this tariff barrier system and to launch reforms for the development of the economy even in Hungary if the Hungarian nobility was willing to pay taxes. After

5 The provinces of Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary diverged in their geographical nature. Hungary’s location in a basin was suitable for growing agricultural products, and it was surrounded by mountains which contained precious metals, non-ferrous metals, salt and iron ore.
they refused their agreement to do so, Maria Theresa refused in her turn to ease trade in Hungarian goods and products, but she gave some support for the foundation of manufactures. Moreover, she did not convene the Hungarian parliament at any further point during her reign, because she did not find it cooperative in economic and social matters. However, in the 1770s the internal tariff barriers were annulled in Austria in order to boost the integration of markets, and Joseph II abolished the barriers between Hungary and Transylvania, but retained those between Austria and Hungary because he was likewise unsuccessful in introducing taxation of the nobility on their land (Katus 2012: 69–70).

At the beginning of the reign of Leopold II (1790–1792), pamphlets written by some enlightened Hungarian noblemen and intellectuals, who recognized the disadvantages Hungary suffered from a lack of economic and social reforms⁶ and perceived a need for the abolition of tax exemption for the nobility, criticized the tariff barrier system and referred to it as ‘colonization’ (Katus 2012: 182). In 1797, a book entitled *On the Trade and Industry of Hungary*, whose author⁷ was evidently influenced by both mercantilism and Adam Smith’s central ideas⁸ on free commerce, asserted: ‘A lot of money goes through Hungary, but it does not stay here, it accumulates in the Austrian lands, especially in Vienna. It happens in all places where colonization becomes prevalent’ (Berzeviczy 1979: 18). From the 1790s onward, the term ‘colonization’, in reference to the Habsburg economic and financial policy toward Hungary, became part of public oratory. The complaint was voiced in the Hungarian parliament and re-emerged in the 1830s and 1840s, a time when major social, economic and political reforms initiated by several groups of the nobility – in

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⁶ The reforms in Hungary were generally blocked by the Hungarian nobility during the reign of Maria Theresa and Joseph II and prevented the establishment of a unified modern state from the diverse territories.

⁷ Berzeviczy, Gergely (1763-1822), born in the northeast of Hungary, who trained as a lawyer and studied at the University of Göttingen among other institutions, used the term ‘colony’ for Hungary’s status in the empire in his work, with reference to mercantilist theory. His book’s original title was *De commercio et industria Hungariae*. Lőcse (Levoča) 1797.

the absence of a strong middle class—were on the agenda and eventually culminated in the April Laws of 1848. These laws were a milestone in Hungarian political, economic and social history, bringing the emancipation of serfs, the general and proportionate distribution of taxation, freedom of the press, the right of assembly, a representative parliamentary system and other freedoms. The abolition of the tariff barrier system was not among the achievements of 1848. However, after the war of independence was won by the Habsburgs with the help of the Russian tsarist army and a new type of integrational policy commenced in 1849, a decree of 1851 removed the tariff barrier between Austria and Hungary in order to improve the economic position of the monarchy and to integrate markets within the empire by creating a single free-trade zone.

Hungarian historiography

The political argument, which became part of protest rhetoric from the 1790s onward, that the tariff barrier system made Hungary a ‘colony’ of the Austrian provinces in the Habsburg monarchy found its way into the work of historians in the second half of the nineteenth century, in the period of national romanticism. One of the most prominent and highly influential among these historians was Mihály Horváth (1809–1878), who was born into an impoverished noble family and, after studying liberal arts, became a Catholic priest. He was the founder of the national liberal interpretation of Hungarian history and additionally influenced by romanticism (Romsics 2011: 86–87). In his six-volume history of Hungary, when speaking about the economic life of Hungary he never neglects to mention that it was the tariff barrier system that made Hungary a ‘colony’ and prevented Hungarian industry from developing (Horváth 1878: 14, 425, 428.). No professional research was undertaken on the economic policy of Austria until the 1920s, when an eminent legal and economic historian, Ferenc Eckhart (1885–1957), who was in charge of reorganizing the documents in the Viennese archives on behalf of Hungary after the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, wrote a book on Maria Theresa’s economic policy (Eckhart 1922) based on archival documents. He based his argument on that of his predecessor as historian (Marczali 1898: 570) that Hungary and Austria had been at the same level of development at
the beginning of the eighteenth century. Drawing on documents from the Viennese archives, he described the economic policy of Maria Theresa in detail and argued that it had made Hungary a colony and caused it to gradually fall behind Austria in the course of the eighteenth century. However, Eckhart admitted that the role of the nobility in this development was significant due to their refusal to pay direct taxes and contribute to the financial system of the monarchy (Eckhart 1922: 256). In the decades following its publication, Eckhart’s work became a key text of Hungarian historiography and a solid basis for the Marxist historians of the 1940s and 1950s (see Mód: 1943, 1957).

This development meant that the identification of Hungary with a ‘colony’ was no longer merely a political statement or a chapter from a nineteenth-century history book written by a liberal nationalist author of the period. Instead, it had now attained the status of an argument proved by an archivist through the use of archival documents, even though Eckhart’s investigation was one-sided and he had no knowledge whatsoever of the nature of Hungarian economic development in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Katus 2012: 70) The 1950s saw the history of Hungary from the sixteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century as a series of ‘wars of independence’ against the Habsburg Germans and the period from the end of the First World War until 1945, when Soviet troops arrived, as a battle against the Germans (Mód 1943, 1954). In his most famous book, 400 Years of Struggle for the Independence of Hungary, the historian Aladár Mód merged a national-romanticist concept of history with Marxism as early as 1943, and identified with the notions proposed by Eckhart. He subsequently undertook several processes of revision and extension on his book, which was used for decades. The work, in an effort to prove that Communism was not anti-national in nature, connected the struggle for Hungarian independence with the conflict between social classes from the sixteenth century to the First World War. Leaders of peasant uprisings and on occasion kings, such as Stephen I, the founder of the Hungarian state, became heroes of independence and progress. The former heroes of Hungarian history were reassessed to fit Communist ideology. The Habsburg monarchy was a ‘colonizer’ and the compromise in 1867 became a ‘betrayal’. (Dévényi, Gőzsy 2011) It was József Révai (1898–1959), the main ideologist of the Hungarian Communists, who,
without having undertaken any studies in history, elaborated the fundamental historical concept of the Communist era (Romsics 2011: 350–355). He explicitly stated, in his preface to his essays, that his ‘aim was to serve the struggles of the present, to unite all social classes willing to take part in the national war of independence against German oppressors’ (Romsics 2011: 352). His follower, Mód, set forth in detail Révai’s concept in his work. This fitted into the ideology of the Soviet Union as the liberator of Hungary.

The events of 1956 played an important role in Hungarian and international politics as well as in its historiography. The revolution of 1956 did not bring democracy and freedom of speech and the press in Hungary, but it ended terror and eased the totalitarianism which had characterized the Rákosi regime. The key slogan under Rákosi – ‘whoever is not with us is against us’– became ‘whoever is not against us is with us’. The consolidation of the regime exercised by Kádár extended into people’s daily lives, into science and culture, giving space to professionalism alongside ideology.

Discussions started over the historical concept propagated by Mód at the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in the early 1960s. Further, the late 1960s saw free access for historians at the Institute of History to Western periodicals and opportunities to attend conferences and build academic networks in Western countries or overseas and to accept research scholarships. Historians thus became acquainted with new trends and methods in international historiography (Romsics 2011: 397–422). It was in this period that Hungarian historians undertook fundamental research on the economic development of the eighteenth century, especially the history of manufacturing and the industry. The findings generated by Walter Endrei, Imre Wellmann, Gusztáv Heckenast and Domokos Kosáry have modified the picture and the conclusions to which Eckhart had come.9 In 1983, Kosáry summed up these findings as follows: ‘Hungary lagged behind Austria or the developed Western European countries as early as the sixteenth century. Hungary was a subordinate and backward agrarian market before 1754 when the internal

A tariff barrier was set up, and had been for centuries. Economic underdevelopment and subordination had gone parallel and hand in hand in Eastern Central Europe since the beginning of the sixteenth century. Hungary stepped into the eighteenth century as an underdeveloped agrarian country and the Austrian customs policy did not change the basic economic structure of Hungary. On the contrary, Hungary’s economy grew and developed’ (Kosáry 1983: 33–35). In other words, the new era in Hungarian historiography arrived much earlier than the political transition that took place in 1989. No professional history books have mentioned ‘colonialism’ in relation to Hungary in the last forty years.

**History textbooks 1948–1989**

During the reign of the one-party system until 1989, a system of only one approved textbook per subject and year group was in place, meaning there was no opportunity to choose among textbooks. An analysis of textbooks of this period reveals that the use of the term ‘colonialism’ in its earlier years is strongly connected with the ideological narrative of Hungarian history which merged nationalist-romantic notions with Marxism and re-evaluated the former national-romantic heroes to serve the new ideology. The term ‘colony’ disappeared from textbooks from the mid-1960s onward, but the value judgment it had represented was replaced with the view that Austria, or the Habsburg dynasty was to blame for the underdevelopment of Hungary. This notion was important for the maintenance in the historical narrative of the liberator status for the Soviet Union, and specifically its army, in relation to the events of 1945.

According to the curriculum for Hungarian secondary schools in force in 1950 (Dévényi, Gőzsy 2011), history teaching was to pursue the objectives of guiding pupils to learn and analyze, first, the role of the national independence movements in the progress of human mankind, and second, the significance of people’s struggle for their freedom against their colonizers. The historical narrative taught to students likewise served these goals. At the same time, one of the key methodological principles guiding history teaching was the selection of facts to be taught according to the objectives decided in advance (Dévényi, Gőzsy 2011). The textbook, thus adapted to these curricular aims, met these expectations (Heckenast, Spira...
The Discourse of the ‘Colonization’ of Hungary

1955). The title of the chapter on the eighteenth century in the secondary-school textbook in use at this time is ‘The building-up of the Habsburg colonization of Hungary (1711–1790)’. The introduction to the chapter commences thus: ‘While the eighteenth century saw the total colonization of Hungary, it also became the cradle of those forces which were able to fight face to face with the oppressors in 1848 to destroy the Habsburg monarchy and establish the independent national states’ (Heckenast, Spira 1955: 69). The chapter drew a detailed picture of the subordinated status of Hungary at that time: ‘The Austrian state deliberately wasted the Hungarian industry and trade. [...] the economic policy of the Viennese government, especially the tariff system set up in 1754, inhibited the development of Hungarian industry’ (Heckenast, Spira 1955: 80–81). Even Baroque culture was interpreted here as ‘the ideology and art of the colonization’ (Unger 1957: 124).

It became apparent as early as 1954 that the curriculum of 1950 was overfull and unteachable, but it took until 1962 for a new secondary-school curriculum to be announced (Dévényi, Gőzsy 2011). This new curriculum preserved some of the objectives of its 1950 predecessor, but its content and some of its didactic aspects were altered. Political, economic and social matters took on greater significance, and new didactic requirements came into force, including the use of sources for the teaching of history. The author of the new textbook did not use the term ‘colonialism’ or the assertion ‘Hungary was made to be a colony’, but, writing about the economic policy of the Habsburgs, he claimed that ‘Hungary suffered the consequences of it especially by becoming the monopolized market of Austria’ (Unger 1966: 88) and that ‘the disastrous economic policy had a fatal effect on the development of Hungarian industry’ (Unger 1966: 89).

In an edition issued three years subsequently, the authorial narrative posits the notion that Austria, having been without opportunities to colonize elsewhere, compensated for this by exploiting Hungary. Moreover, ‘the Habsburg economic policy had a positive and stimulating effect only on [Hungarian] agriculture’, although even this was ‘limited’. Referring to the tariff system, Unger suggested that the Hungarian nobility’s exemption from taxation was merely a false claim put about by the Habsburgs (Unger 1969: 87–89). These tendentious claims notwithstanding, the chapter’s title was formulated rather neutrally, being, ‘History of Hungary 1711–1790’.
In the history textbook published in 1971, rather than making references to a ‘colony’ or to a ‘disastrous’ or ‘fatal effect’, the author approached the question positively: ‘Hungary saw little advantage from the Habsburg mercantilist economic policy’ (Unger 1971: 112). This book, like its predecessor, emphasized that it was only agriculture that was stimulated by the Viennese economic policy, with the addition of a list of state-initiated agriculture programs. The most striking part of the chapter from which these references are taken is its underlining of ‘the responsibility of the nobility, who, sticking to their right to tax exemption, gave a handle [i.e. the means or justification for action] to the Habsburg court’ (Unger 1971: 114; emphasis in original).

The tenth congress of the Hungarian Workers’ Party, held in 1970, resolved to conduct a review of the country’s entire education system. The subsequent process of reform, lasting from 1972 to 1977, entailed significant expenditure on importing from abroad the latest findings from educational studies and various branches of science in order to prepare a new curriculum in each subject. The new history curriculum, alongside curricula in other subjects, emerged in 1978. Its principal objective continued to be pupils’ ideological education, but it additionally sought to promote competencies such as expressing oneself and orientation in space and time (Dévényi, Gőzsy 2011).

A new textbook was issued in 1980. It had an attractive appearance and contained numerous maps, images, graphs and sources, with less text. It provided students with access to new historiographical assessments, such as the thesis that the twin factors driving the failure of Hungarian manufacturing were the lack of a free labor force and limited demand in the country (Závodszky 1980: 82). This said, some content, specifically in our area of interest, harked back clearly to the past. Concerning the findings of historians in the 1970s, the book’s author stated: ‘Some of the positive outcomes of the Habsburg economic policy have recently begun to receive more frequent mentions. But this is true in so far as mercantilism everywhere helped to develop an integrated economy. The Habsburgs did not want this, they did not know about this’ (Závodszky 1980: 88). The part of the book on the economic policy of the Habsburgs was unchanged in the textbook’s 2014 edition (Závodszky 2014), excepting the removal of the following statement: ‘The selfishness of the nobility must be judged
because by clinging to their tax exemption they did not put a stop to the tariff barrier system’ (Závodszky 1980: 88).

It might appear fortunate in this light that a number of new textbooks10 have been published since the mid-1990s. As Hungary’s single-party system was replaced by a multi-party system, so did a multi-textbook system replace the previous single-textbook system. Most of these books distanced themselves from both Marxist and romantic-nationalist narratives of Hungarian history. Unfortunately, these publications remained marginalized in schools in general, despite their use spreading in some schools in Budapest or other major cities in particular. The majority of teachers did not want to have to become accustomed to new books due to the differences in narrative and methodological approach from the content of their own training. Závodszky’s book dominated the history textbook market until 2006.

To summarize these findings, we can state that after 1956, during the Kádár regime, the direct manifestation of Marxist ideology in Hungarian history textbooks gradually diminished. From the 1970s onward, professional aspiration and competency education gained more space in the teaching of history; however, the patterns of thinking in the textbooks and, as a result, those circulating in Hungarian society have survived the political system which originally implemented them. The stereotypes that were born during the pre-1956 era of the Communist dictatorship persisted under Kádár and even after 1989. Although direct terms such as ‘colony’ have fallen out of use, the simplified and constructed patterns of historical and political interpretation of past events have remained and the majority of the Hungarian population adheres to them to this day.

Conclusion

The identification of foreign powers with ‘colonizers’, as we have seen above, has a long tradition in Hungary. Both orators and historians have at one time or another favored the idea that Hungary had been a victim of Austria, which was responsible for the country’s underdevelopment. Neither politicians nor, for some time, historians were aware or acceptant

of the fact that Hungary had lagged behind Austria or the developed Western European countries as early as the sixteenth century, when it became an agrarian market in the European world of commerce. It took in some cases until the late 1960s for professional historians, making use of their greater professional freedom in the post-1956 period to undertake fundamental research, to cease employing the rhetoric of Austria as Hungary’s colonizer, allied as it was to the Marxist ideological image of what has been viewed as ‘Hungary’s endless war against the Germans’.

History textbooks tend to respond to new research findings with some delay, and are additionally particularly acutely exposed to the ideologies in favor with the government of the day, unlike textbooks in subjects such as physics and chemistry. Although the term ‘colony’, in relation to Hungary’s former status, fell into disuse in history textbooks over 40 years ago, the value judgments behind this erstwhile use of language have remained in place in several ways, continuing to suggest that the Habsburgs were to blame for Hungary’s underdevelopment. The link between this belief and the idea of Hungary being ‘colonized’, either by the Habsburgs or by the European Union, is apparent. In a country whose national collective memory has not yet faced the challenge of addressing its failures in democratic discussions, it is and always will be easy to make people believe that someone else must be blamed for their frustration. Moreover, as we have pointed out, the simplified and constructed patterns of thinking behind these notions have survived political systems and decades and the majority of the population still follows them. To conclude, and bring our analysis full circle, we observe that politicians pursuing anti-EU agendas have made ample use of the ‘colonial’ trope.

References


Dévényi, Anna, és Zoltán Gőzsy. 2011. A történelem tanításának tartalmi és módszertani változásai. [Changes in content and methodology in


How is ‘Empire’ taught in English schools? 
An Exploratory Study

The importance of Empire as a historical concept
Empires are an important phenomenon in history, and it seems reasonable to argue that history in schools should have something to say about empire and empires. There are few countries that have not, at one time or another, possessed an empire, or been part of another country’s empire. Howe goes as far as to argue that ‘a great deal of the world’s history is the history of empires. Indeed it could be argued that all history is imperial – or colonial – history, if one takes a broad enough definition and goes back far enough.’

Given that Great Britain at one point had one of the biggest empires in history, it seems reasonable to suggest that young people growing up in England ought to know something about this facet of the country’s past. But what, exactly, should they be taught about empire, and what should be the balance between learning about The British Empire, and empires more generally? Ian Dawson has used the phrase ‘knowledge takeaway’ to draw attention to the importance of being clear about exactly what we would like students to know, remember and understand after being taught a particular topic in history. As Byrom and Riley have pointed out, given the time constraints on curriculum time, it is not possible to teach everything about the British Empire, from its earliest days to the present, or to

1 Howe, Stephen. 2002. Empire: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford, 1. The opening chapter of Howe’s book (‘I read the news today’, pages 1-8), makes an important point about the ubiquity of ‘empire’ as a concept, pointing out that it goes beyond applying solely to countries and territories, and embraces a number of other manifestations – commercial, cultural, ideological, and technological.
2 Dawson, Ian. Some Thoughts on Subject Knowledge at Key Stage 3. Thinking History Website. 2010. http://www.thinkinghistory.co.uk/Issues/downloads/IssueKnowledge.pdf (20.02.2018). Key Stage 3 is the term given for the stage of education when student are aged between 11 and 13 or 14. In England, students can drop the study of history at the end of Key Stage 3.
cover the entire geographical breadth of the empire. History departments therefore have to make hard choices about exactly which aspects and facets of empire they are going to focus on as being important or essential, in terms of the aimed for ‘knowledge takeaway’.³

As in other countries, ideas about empire and colonialism have changed over the past century. Whereas in the first half of the nineteenth century, there was a general consensus within Great Britain that the British Empire was ‘a good thing’ (both for Britain and for those territories who were part of the Empire), the post 1945 era saw the erosion of this positive consensus, with some historians looking at Empire through a much more questioning and critical lens.⁴ Grindel’s study of the portrayal of the British Empire in school textbooks in the last decades of the twentieth century demonstrated that these changes percolated through to school text books in England, which moved towards a much more nuanced and balanced approach to the question of Britain’s imperial rule.⁵

The public controversy about the revised National Curriculum for History to be taught in England from September 2014 demonstrated the extent to which the concept of empire, and in particular, Britain’s imperial and colonial legacy, remains fiercely contested facets of history education in schools. A Historical Association collection of media coverage of the recently revised National Curriculum for history gives an indication of the scale of this controversy.⁶ As the Historical Association’s survey revealed, many politicians and academic historians made strident contributions to this debate. Several historians argued that insufficient time and attention were given to the British Empire in English classrooms, with William

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⁴ See Haydn, Terry. 2014. ‘How and What Should we Teach about the British Empire in English Schools?’ yearbook – jahrbuch – annales. International Society for History Didactics 35: 23–40, for further elaboration of this point.


Dalrymple asserting that ‘... at the moment our imperial history is not taught in schools – our children go from Henry VIII to the Nazis, omitting that very interesting period in-between when we had the greatest empire the world has ever known.’

Some historians and politicians claimed that history teachers in England were painting an anti-national and inaccurately damning picture of the British Empire. Former Secretary of State for Education, Michael Gove argued that ‘too much history teaching is informed by postcolonial guilt’, and asserted that ‘this trashing of our past has to stop.’

The aim of the research reported in this chapter is to try to gain some insight into how ‘Empire’ is taught in English schools, and to examine the recent claims made in the media about this facet of history in schools. The concluding section of the chapter points to some divergences between the aims of teaching empire envisaged by policymakers and the thinking and beliefs of practicing history teachers in England about what students should know and understand about empire. Some suggestions are also put forward about what might constitute a desirable ‘knowledge takeaway’ from the study of empire at school.

How to find out how ‘Empire’ is taught in English schools?

Even the most eminent historians sometimes have a limited acquaintance with curriculum arrangements for the teaching of history in schools, both in terms of curriculum specifications (what topics are to be taught), and in terms of the amount of classroom time allocated to the study of history. A Historical Association survey of English history teachers conducted in 2014 found that typically, history lessons for 11 to 14 year olds were limited to between 60 to 75 minutes per week. This inevitably places limits how much substantive history can be covered in the time available.
and how many lessons can be allocated to the topics which are taught. There has been a tendency for politicians and some academic historians to misjudge the amount of history that can be meaningfully fitted into this amount of curriculum time. Attempts to find out how much time is allocated to the teaching of Empire and what students are taught about the British Empire are complicated by the fact that in the English education system, history curricula have specified very limited compulsory content (i.e. topics which must be taught by statutory order). The tendency has been rather to suggest ‘indicative content’, although the most recent version of the National Curriculum for History, introduced in September 2014, has increased the amount of content ‘which should be taught.’

The National Curriculum for History introduced in 2007, for example, contained only four compulsory topics (Slavery, The Holocaust, World War One and World War Two). This has led to media headlines which suggest that large swathes of British history are not being taught in schools. The reality is that there is a large degree of consensus amongst history teachers about the main events and themes of British History from 1066 to the present, with nearly all departments teaching, for example, The Norman Conquest, The English Civil Wars of the seventeenth century, the Industrial Revolution – and the British Empire. This consensus is also reflected in the content of English history text books.

Scrutiny of the official curriculum specifications for the National Curriculum for history (first introduced in 1991, now in its fifth version) do not support Dalrymple’s assertion that the British Empire is not taught in schools. The original National Curriculum for history (introduced in 1991) contained only four compulsory topics (Slavery, The Holocaust, World War One and World War Two).

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1991) stipulated that pupils should be taught about the history of Britain 1750–1900 under the themes of ‘Expansion, trade and industry’, with ‘the British Empire and its impact in late 19th century proposed as a ‘depth’ or ‘thematic’ study. The first revision of the National Curriculum in 1995, designed to slim down the excessive content demands of the original version, retained the study of Britain 1750–1900, as did the second revision in 1999. A third revision in 2007 made explicit reference to ‘the British Empire and its impact in Britain and overseas. A draft proposal for a further revision of the history curriculum was put forward by a Conservative led coalition government in February 2013. This proposal placed increased emphasis on the teaching of British history, and in particular, there was to be an increase in the time devoted to the British Empire. Instead of being confined largely to the role of the Empire in the nineteenth century, this was to include English expansion to the New World, India and the plantations in Ireland in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ‘Britain’s global impact’ in the nineteenth century including:

War in the Crimea and the Eastern Question, gunboat diplomacy and the growth of Empire, the Indian Mutiny and the Great Game, the scramble for Africa, the Boer Wars’, and ‘Britain’s retreat from empire’, including ‘independence for India and the Wind of Change in Africa, the independence generation – Gandhi, Nehru, Jinnah, Kenyatta, Nkrumah, the Windrush generation, wider new Commonwealth immigration, and the arrival of East African Asians.

Thus, the intention was that the teaching of the British Empire would be accorded a much more substantial place in the National Curriculum.

16 Qualifications and Curriculum Authority. 2007. History: Programme of study for key stage 3 and attainment target. London.
There were also exhortations from politicians that teachers should present a much more positive picture of the empire.\textsuperscript{18}

The proposed draft was subsequently modified in the face of severe criticism from history teachers, with a Historical Association survey reporting that over 90\% of history teachers participating in the survey reporting that they thought the changes would have a negative influence on the quality of history education which would be provided (this was in part because of the feeling that the new curriculum was unduly Anglo-centric, but also on the grounds that the curriculum contained an unmanageable amount of content).\textsuperscript{19}

The current version of the National Curriculum for History, introduced in September 2014, retains explicit reference to the teaching of the British empire, stipulating that pupils should be taught about ‘ideas, political power, industry and empire: Britain, 1745–1901’, with a suggestion that ‘the development of the British Empire with a depth study (for example, of India)’ would provide an appropriate (but non-statutory) focus of study. The overarching aims stated for the curriculum included the statements that all pupils should understand ‘how Britain has influenced and been influenced by the wider world’, ‘the expansion and dissolution of empires’, and that all pupils ‘should gain and deploy a historically grounded understanding of abstract terms such as ‘empire’, ‘civilization’, ‘parliament’ and ‘peasantry’’.\textsuperscript{20} Thus, in terms of curriculum specifications, a study of the British Empire has been an integral part of the National Curriculum for history, in all five versions, right through from 1991 to the present day.


The presence of ‘empire’ as part of the history curriculum in schools is also indicated by the content of commonly used text history books used in English classrooms, usually in terms of text books for the last year of compulsory study of history (for pupils aged 13–14). Moreover, coverage of the British Empire in these text books does not suggest an ‘anti-British’ slant to coverage of the empire, as some politicians have suggested. A not uncommon approach is for textbooks to examine both positive and negative historical sources, opinions and commentary on the empire, and sometimes cautioning pupils against simplistic ‘black or white’ interpretations of the impact of empire on Britain’s colonies.\textsuperscript{21}

An examination of some of the most popular history education websites in England also suggests that exploration of the impact of Empire tends to be presented as balanced and subject to differing interpretations, rather than espousing an anti-British or anti-colonial position. There is space here for just three examples, with brief extracts from site content to substantiate this assertion:

a) Extract from the National Archives Education website: ‘Was the British empire a force for good or not?’

This question cannot be answered with a yes or a no! The British Empire brought many changes to many people and many countries. Some of these changes involved innovations in medical care, education and railways. The British Empire fought to abolish slavery in the 1800s, but it profited from slavery in the 1700s. For many peoples the British Empire meant loss of lands, discrimination and prejudice. There will never be an answer to this question that everyone will agree on.\textsuperscript{22}

b) Extract from the BBC History Education website: ‘What historians think’

The ‘Whig’ historians regarded the Empire as the deserved result of Britain’s technological and moral, superiority. They were proud that ‘a small kingdom’ had amassed such a huge empire. By contrast, some modern historians such as Edward Said (1978) have criticised Britain’s ‘cultural imperialism’, suggesting that it was based on nationalism and racist scorn for other people.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{21} See, for a not unrepresentative example, Fisher, Peter, and Nicholas Williams. 1991. \textit{Past into Present 3. 1700-Present day}. London.

\textsuperscript{22} \url{http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/empire/intro/overview5.htm} (01.12.2017).

\textsuperscript{23} \url{http://www.bbc.co.uk/education(guides/zf7fr82/revision} (01.12.2017).
c) Extract from the Thinking History website: ‘What do you want pupils to learn about empires?’

Planning begins with the take-away – what is it that you want pupils to take away about empires from KS3? The first decision is the one above – is the take-away solely about the British Empire or is it more generally about empires, something that helps pupils deal with issues in the contemporary world – e.g. why empires are controversial, why differing interpretations are possible and therefore the ability to place the British Empire in the context of other empires... It is probably useful to build your coverage around a set of questions that apply to empires in general: a) Why did they build an empire? b) How did they get it and keep it? c) What impact did the empire have? d) How did it fall apart – was it given back to its people or ...?

By comparing the experiences of the Roman and British empires or other combinations of empires pupils will get a better sense of perspective on the British Empire in relation to these questions. A product of questions (a) and (d) is the understanding that until relatively recently the right to build and maintain empires wasn’t questioned. However one feature of 20th century ideas and beliefs is that empires should be dismantled – but this in turn has led to a host of other problems, some visible in the collapse of the Soviet Union’s empire in eastern Europe – very similar in some ways to what happened in Britain after the Roman legions left.24

Analysis of the content of popular history magazines, often used by history teachers as a resource for augmenting their subject knowledge of historical topics, also suggests that the magazines contain a wide spectrum of historical opinion about the impact of the British Empire25.

However, the pronouncements of politicians, the detail of curriculum policy documents, and the content of school text books and history websites offer no guarantee that the actual teaching of the historical topics prescribed will be taught as the authors of those documents intended. In a study of the development of history teaching in England over the past century,26 co-author Nicola Sheldon warns that

a politicia’s pronouncement in Westminster does not automatically lead to change in the classroom. Ultimately teachers are the arbiters of the curriculum

and if they are not on board, the outcomes are usually rather different to those the Minister intended.\footnote{27}

Michael Fullan also makes the point that ‘It is the hubris in policy makers to over-rate their own power to reshape practice by underrating the power of practitioners to subvert initiatives or to simply carry on as before.’\footnote{28}

In the next section, this chapter draws on a small-scale exploratory survey of Heads of History Departments in English schools, which aimed to find out how the concept of Empire, and in particular, The British Empire is taught \textit{in practice}, (as opposed to how these topics are defined in curriculum specifications, and in school text books and other resources). In particular, the research aimed to discover what practising history teachers were trying to achieve in teaching students about the British Empire, and the concept of empire more generally.

**History teacher testimony about the teaching of empire**

The aim of the survey was to gain insight into how history departments in England went about teaching The British Empire, and the concept of ‘Empire’ more generally, and to do this not by looking at curriculum specifications, text books, and departmental schemes of work, but to ask Heads of Department directly how the topic was taught.

In terms of sampling, a deliberate attempt was made to try to elicit the testimony of Heads of Department that I knew quite well: former students, and colleagues with whom I had worked with quite closely over a number of years. Although there are clearly some dangers to this form of ‘insider’ research, a tentative hypothesis was that people with whom one had a reasonably close and positive working relationship might be more likely to be, (given assurances about confidentiality and anonymity), more open and ‘honest’ in their responses. This is of course a need to be transparent about this variation on ‘convenience’ sampling (Cohen, et al., 2007), or what

\begin{flushleft}


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might be termed ‘trust’ sampling’, and to acknowledge factors which may have distortion effects (for example, the danger that respondents may be inclined towards giving answers that they felt might please the researcher).

Research procedures observed the British Educational Research Association guidelines and the study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the School of Education, University of East Anglia. In all 20 Heads of History departments were approached by email, to explain the purpose of the study and to see if they were willing to be involved. Fifteen of the Heads of Department agreed to take part in the survey, a response rate of 75%. The responses to the questions posed are summarized below.

The first question asked respondents whether study of the British Empire formed any part of the department’s schemes of work for Key Stage 3 students (11 - 13 or 14 year olds). All the responses indicated that to at least some extent, the British Empire was part of the schemes of work. However, responses to the second question posed revealed that there were substantial differences in the amount of time allocated to the teaching of the British Empire (see Tab. 1).

The third question asked respondents about which aspects of the British Empire the department attempted to cover, given the impossibility of covering every aspect of the empire, geographically, and over time. It was interesting to note that there was considerable variation in terms of the extent to which responses talked about the substantive history of the British Empire – places, campaigns, events, and the extent to which coverage focused on second order concepts such as ‘cause’, ‘significance’, ‘interpretations’, and ‘enquiry questions’ such as ‘Should we be proud of the British Empire?’ (In England ‘The Enquiry Question’ has become a very influential mode of planning schemes of work in history, and second order concepts have also been influential in planning for learning in history). The responses overall show that although elements of the substantive history of the British Empire were taught, in terms of examples, depth studies and case studies, coverage was also thought of in terms of ‘What questions might one ask about the British Empire?’ (Tab. 2 shows the responses given to this question. What is also apparent from the responses is that in addition to the differences in how much time is allocated to the study of Empire, history departments adopt very different approaches to teaching this topic.
The fourth question on the survey asked respondents to identify two or three of their most important aims in teaching empire to their students. Their responses are given in Tab. 3. As with time allocated, and content covered, there were substantial differences in what departments were aiming to achieve in terms of the ‘knowledge takeaway’ for their students. Question 5 asked if students were taught about any empires other than the British Empire. Five out of the 15 departments said ‘No’ in response to this question, 7 departments also taught students about the Roman Empire, and 3 respondents also taught about the Normans as a study in empire building. Only two respondents made mention of Columbus and the colonial conquests of Spain and Portugal – a topic which was widely taught in the era before the National Curriculum was introduced in 1991.

**Tab. 1:** If the British Empire is part of your schemes of work, how much time is allocated to the topic (lessons and homeworks)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Amount of time allocated to study of the British Empire</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>‘5 lessons and 5 homeworks.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>‘Approximately 20 lessons, possibly slightly less.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>‘About 10 lessons and 5 homeworks. Roughly, a half term enquiry.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>‘About 5 lessons and 1 homework.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>‘About 8 lessons and 4 homeworks.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>‘8 or 9 lessons.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>‘About 4 one hour lessons and 3 homeworks.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>‘We touch on it briefly when we do the slave trade/triangle. It’s more about life of a slave and their experiences. So the empire is just the one introductory lesson.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>‘One lesson – the long term causes of the First World War.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>‘We have a half term on the British Empire. We teach history twice a week to these classes.’ (This would mean approximately 12-14 lessons).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>‘3 hours’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>‘No response provided, but responses to other questions suggested at least several lessons.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>‘About 12 hours – i.e. 6 weeks and probably 6 homeworks.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>‘Maximum would be 3 to 4 one hour lessons and possibly a homework task.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>‘10 one hour lessons in year 8.’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Tab. 2:** Can you summarize what ‘bits’ of the British Empire you try to cover?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>‘What ‘bits’ of the British Empire do you try to cover?’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>‘Desire to build an Empire/ Growth of the British Empire/ Impact of the British Empire/ Case-study: Indian Mutiny/ Should we be proud of the British Empire? / Introduction to slavery and how this relates to European Empires.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>‘We start with a brief overview of what Empire is and what it means, before moving on to look at early colonies. We study in depth Roanoke, Jamestown and Plymouth and finish with an assessment which considers which colony was the most successful and why. We look at the colonies within the context of what was happening in Britain at the time and consider the factors which lead to Britain wanting to gain overseas colonies.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>‘The overall assessment enquiry question is ‘Should we be proud of the British Empire?’ and they write an essay looking at both sides. They are encouraged to look at the varying impacts the British Empire has had around the world in both the short and long term. A couple of years ago the major change I made was to try and teach it through the dramatic stories and fascinating characters. So through stories we teach: the origins of empire, long term significance, settlement of America, Scramble for Africa, Conquest and rule of India and migration.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>‘We trialled last year a mini scheme of work about what the empire did for us.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>‘We cover the beginnings of Empire with Columbus, and the attempts at settling America during the reign of Elizabeth I, then how this leads onto African slavery. We also look at it in terms of Crime and Punishment – looking at transportation to America and then to Australia. Thirdly, we look at in terms of Victorian London being ‘a tale of two cities’; looking at the Great Exhibition and its connections to Britain’s wealth and empire, in opposition to 1/3 of the population living in country. Finally in Year 9 we briefly talk about the impact of empire on the First World War.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>‘Origins, reasons why did the British want / gain an empire: Ambition, power, religion, trade, ports, adventure– Who gained from the empire and what did they gain – The Slave Trade – the Triangle route / life of slaves on plantations / reasons for the abolition of the trade and the work of Thomas Clarkson/ Interpretations of the empire – a carousel lesson where working in groups students each investigate a large event from the empire than teach to the rest of the class– covers the Indian Rebellion; The India Company; The Boston Tea Party; The Opium wars; The establishment and growth of the royal society; The Great Exhibition;’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department</td>
<td>‘What ‘bits’ of the British Empire do you try to cover?’</td>
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<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Scramble for Africa/ How should we remember the empire? Assessment lesson re designing Queen Victoria’s jubilee ‘empire plate’ comparing the interpretations of Simon Schama to Niall Ferguson.’ (This department also did a unit on Columbus and the activities of the Spanish and Portuguese).’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>‘We cover why we wanted an empire, where we had an empire, and then move on to slavery.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>‘We touch on it briefly when we do the slave trade/triangle. It’s more about life of a slave and their experiences. So the empire is just the one introductory lesson.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>‘In regards to imperialism in the context of the First World War, we would look at what colonisation meant and examples such as the Scramble for Africa.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>‘We cover origins, India, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, evil vs good interpretations, Roanoake, slavery....’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>‘What the empire included/ how it benefitted Britain/ what the impact on others were.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>‘What is an empire- origins and factors in Britain’s empire- East India Company- India- colonies like Australia (and hopefully Ireland)- why it fell apart- slave trade- whether it was a ‘good’ thing or not.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>‘Expansion under the Tudors and the later Stuart monarchies, developments related to the Slave Trade and the Chinese wars of Palmerston in the 18th and 19th century, the economic impact of the empire and the Industrial Revolution, the Scramble for Africa as part of the Causes of World War 1.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>‘Year 7 and 8 students are made aware of overseas land which was in control of the English (and then lost) – Laying the foundations of the problems cause by imperialism. In year 9 Students gather information about the scale of the British Empire by the end of the 19th century and decide what impact this then had on trade, travel and the causes which led to the outbreak of the Great War.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>‘We look at whether there is a need to apologise for the British Empire. To allow the students to explore this enquiry, we look at the effects of rule in India, Ireland, Australia and the continent of Africa. We included an overview of what empire is – focussing upon the differing definitions of media, economic and military empires. They (students) then look at historians’ (and politicians’) views, assessing the extent to which they agreed with their assessment of the empire based on the evidence that they had explored. The higher ability students were asked to think about why the historian/politician may have made their comments based upon their background (nationality, age, agenda, religion).’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department</td>
<td>‘What are the 2 or 3 main points you want pupils to know, understand and remember about the British Empire/empires in general?’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td>‘Why Britain/ Europe were so eager on building an Empire. How we treated our colonies and link with those countries today. How slavery is linked to the European Empires.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td>‘We want pupils to gain a greater understanding of social and cultural clashes as a result of Empire building. E.g. looking at relationships with Native Americans. We aim to give students a sense of chronology and greater understanding of the broader historical context, as a lot of our Yr 8 work focuses on the 1600s. So we aim to give in depth knowledge of a time period rather than a broad sweep of empire more generally.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td>‘1. That the British Empire has left an enduring legacy around the world for good and ill. 2. That it has played a role in changing Britain as much as other countries. 3. That our views on the major characters who shaped empire has changed over time.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td>‘What an empire is; what that meant in terms of benefits/ disadvantages for both the empire and colonies.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td>‘How Britain benefitted from the Empire and what the legacy is both here and abroad.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td>‘The legacy of the empire is contested and controversial and we each need to make our own minds up about it for our own reasons. The Empire did terrible things such as go to war to maintain international drug trading in the Opium Wars. It also Contributed to large advances in technology reaching all corners of the world. We didn’t ‘give countries back’ they weren’t ours to take in the first place and countries chose their own paths (sooner as in case of America and later as in the case of India / or even Australia today), reflective of their experiences of the empire and view of the British.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td>‘An understanding that we were very exploitative in the past and that many of the world’s issues are caused by this period which is quite often unacknowledged. I would also like them to understand that immigration/emigration has been going on for centuries in the hope that this knowledge will challenge some of the scaremongering that we see from politicians/ media.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td>No response provided.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td>‘When researching how the First World War started, the main point I would like the children to understand that the British Empire, along with other European empires, were created out of competition with each other.’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tab. 3: (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>‘What are the 2 or 3 main points you want pupils to know, understand and remember about the British Empire/empires in general?’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>‘Get students to understand our imperialistic past, see how it has left a mark today and to understand the different interpretations of it so they can make their own opinion.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>‘Positive and negative impacts of Empire, what Britain once had and the fact it no longer has this, are empires beneficial to the countries involved?’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>‘The British Empire was both good and bad, and certainly not wholly one of these – it had a huge impact on the world they live in today.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>No response provided.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>‘The impact of imperialism on other cultures and to what extent it affected nationalism. To what extent did imperialism cause the Great War?’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>‘Empire had both positive and negative effects, for both Britain and the wider world and these effects are still relevant today. How the differing types of empire (military, economic, and media) are used to control people. That opinions formed on empire, and/or events, come from a particular view point that is affected by the nationality, age, gender, religion etc. of the author.’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 6 asked if departments addressed the question of whether the Empire was ‘a good thing or a bad thing’. 13 out of the 15 respondents said that this was part of the scheme of work, in many cases, it was an enquiry question around which much of the teaching of the topic was focused. Only one department taught empire as ‘a bad thing’ (‘We treat it as a study of exploitation which fits in with other exploitative empires, i.e. The Romans, the Spanish’). It was interesting to note that 3 respondents made the point that the aim was for students to be able to make their own judgment on the empire, rather than to get across or inculcate a particular ‘position’ on this. Six responses indicated that it was important that students should understand that historians had different views on this matter. Amongst several responses arguing for the case about empire to be ‘balanced’, one Head of Department wrote, ‘It is not be taught in a manner of triumphalism (a la ‘Our Island Story’). It deserves to be balanced,
though, and not as some fantasy villain in black mightily oppressing “the good guys.”

Only 2 responses reported that some time was spent teaching about empires more generally, and only 2 said that there was any focus on the role of empires in the world today (questions 7 to 9). In 5 cases, this was attributed to lack to time and pressure to cover other essential curriculum content, one respondent acknowledged that this was because they had not thought about it.

Conclusions

The survey was a very small scale and exploratory one. Any conclusions and inferences drawn from the data must therefore be appropriately tentative. However, the data emerging from the study does not support the claim that students in English schools are not taught about the British Empire, although it does suggest that the amount of time spent on this topic varies considerably from school to school. Neither does the testimony from teachers, text books and history education websites support the idea advanced by some right wing politicians that the British Empire is taught in a negative and anti-British way. The evidence from the departments surveyed suggest that it is most commonly taught as an enquiry question, where students are presented with both positive and negative statements about the motives for empire, and the morality, governance and impact of the Empire. In terms of learning outcomes, a common aim appeared to be to get pupils to understand that historians have very differing views about the British Empire, with several departments having as one of their aims that ‘pupils should be brought to the point where they can make their own interpretation of historical evidence’.  

Nearly all the departments surveyed treated the topic as a combination of substantive knowledge about the British Empire, and conceptual understanding of ‘empire’. However, coverage of ‘Empire’ was often limited to consideration of the British Empire, (or in some cases, the Roman Empire and the British Empire). The most commonly given reason for this was the

requirement to cover many of the other topics prescribed by the National Curriculum in the time available. Only a handful of the departments surveyed found time to teach about empires more generally, or to address the questions posed by empires which exist, in various forms, today.

Neither was British imperial decline prominent in schemes of work, with much more time and attention paid to the rise of the British Empire, rather than to its decline and fall. It is interesting to note that no department mentioned teaching the 1956 Suez Crisis (this is perhaps redolent of De Gaulle’s history of the French Army, which did not mention the Battle of Waterloo). Another interesting aspect of the feedback from practising history teachers was the decline in coverage of Columbus, the voyages of Discovery, and the Spanish and Portuguese colonization of the Americas – a standard topic in the pre-National Curriculum era. It is possible that the increased involvement of politicians in the construction of the school history curriculum since 1991 has led to an increasingly Anglo-centric history curriculum. (British politicians from all parties have been keen to promote a positive and celebratory image of ‘Britishness’, and schools and initial teacher education courses are obliged to promote ‘British Values’). As I have argued elsewhere, it is ‘healthy’ for students to understand that historians disagree about the British Empire, and empires more generally. On the evidence of this very small exploratory study, this does seem to be a feature of history teaching in English schools. What seems to be less helpful, in terms of a historical education appropriate to life in the twenty-first century, is if young people learn only about the British Empire (or at best, the Roman Empire as well). This could easily give students the impression that empires are a ‘white’ or ‘European’ phenomenon. (John B. Sparks’ Histomap is a useful corrective to this view). The testimony of

30 Kettle, Martin. 2015. ‘Napoleon’s dream died at Waterloo’. The Guardian 17 June.
31 See Terry Haydn 2012 op. cit. for further elaboration of this point.
32 Haydn, Terry, How and What Should we Teach, 23–40.
the teachers involved in the survey also suggests that limited attention is paid to the decline and fall of the British Empire. Not only does this seem to be a slightly dishonest portrayal of the national story, it also elides the important point that empires are usually susceptible to decline and fall. Nor is there much evidence of any connection being made between empire building and war (another important concept in history).³⁴ Another possible weakness in current modes of teaching about empire is the difficulty in finding curriculum time to trace the history of empire up to the present day. Not only does this limit students’ understanding about the ways in which different forms of empire have evolved over time, this might also limit young people’s understanding of the impact of empires on the world that they are living in today. When we are thinking about ‘the knowledge takeaway’ from the study of empire, the last thing we want students to think is that empires are a thing of the past.

References


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Part 4: Approaches
Philipp Bernhard

A Postcolonial People’s History? Teaching (Post-)Colonial History
Inspired by Howard Zinn’s Concept of a People’s History

Introduction: Principal considerations concerning (post-)colonial history and theory in a German high school classroom

For a history teacher at a Bavarian Gymnasium\(^1\) it might seem rather unusual to place special emphasis on teaching (post-)colonial history, and even more so when concepts from postcolonial theory are to be incorporated. Colonial and postcolonial history play no crucial role in the history curriculum for Gymnasium in Bavaria, especially in the senior years 11 and 12. As far as German colonial history is concerned, it is often argued that it was comparatively short and thus cannot have had a significant impact on the course of German history. In their introduction to postcolonial theory, Castro and Dhawan claim that, on the one hand, it is now well established that Germany was indeed a major colonial power and that the impact of German colonialism on German history can no longer be seen as marginal. Yet on the other hand, conclusions regarding the importance of

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\(^1\) In Germany the school system differs from federal state to federal state. Traditionally in Bavaria there have been three school types: Gymnasium, Realschule and Hauptschule (recently renamed to Mittelschule). After Year 4 (10-year-olds) the pupils are streamed according to their grade average. The higher achievers attend the Gymnasium, which finishes after Year 12 with a university entrance qualification, the Abitur. History curricula also differ from state to state, but similar patterns can still be identified. Up to the Middle Ages, the curricula follow a classic ‘western civilization’ approach, which then changes into a focus on national history. From Year 6 (12-year-olds) to Year 10 (16-year-olds) the Bavarian history curriculum for Gymnasium progresses chronologically from prehistory to the world today.
colonialism for the respective nation states cannot be drawn directly from their involvement in direct colonial rule.\textsuperscript{2} Furthermore, the question as to whether postcolonial theory is at all relevant in Germany is superfluous, as such theoretical approaches critically address neo-colonial structures and the expansion of international capitalism. One of the most significant achievements of postcolonial theory is therefore to have pointed out that no region on earth can evade the consequences of colonialism.\textsuperscript{3} A similar thought is put forward by the Argentinian postcolonial theorist Walter Mignolo. He claims that the history of modernity cannot be understood without its ‘dark’ side, the history of coloniality.\textsuperscript{4} If the history of modernity, whose starting point for Mignolo is the European conquest of the Americas from 1492 on, cannot be understood without the history of colonialism, then the role of (post-)colonial history in the historical sciences, in history teaching and in curriculum design must be reconsidered.

A similar reasoning can be found in the work of late American historian Howard Zinn. In his 1980 \textit{A People’s History of the United States} Zinn offers a U.S. history of coloniality in which he argues convincingly that such a history must be taught from \textit{below}, from the perspective of the colonized. His work has been controversially discussed in the United States because he criticizes the traditional Eurocentric reading of U.S. history, which is based on the narrative of American exceptionalism. While supporters of the left celebrate Zinn like a pop star, proponents of the right condemn him as anti-American.

In this contribution I will argue for an innovative approach to teaching colonial and postcolonial history, combining Howard Zinn’s notion of a People’s History with ideas and concepts from postcolonial theory. This combination promises valuable tools for teaching (post-)colonial history, which indeed complement one other. Postcolonial theory is often accused

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\textsuperscript{2} See, for example, a recent anthology about the impact of colonialism on Switzerland, which did not have colonies: Purtschert, Patricia, Barbara Lüthi, and Francesca Falk (eds.) 2013. \textit{Postkoloniale Schweiz. Formen und Folgen eines Kolonialismus ohne Kolonien}, 2nd edition. Bielefeld.


of neglecting the power difference in the colonial situation between colonizers and colonized, focusing only on cultural aspects. A People’s History approach can be useful in this respect because it takes the perspective of the oppressed as its starting point. Postcolonial theory examines the interplay and exchange processes between the two perspectives above and below, an aspect which Zinn does not emphasize enough. Here postcolonial theory offers several concepts which reflect the complexity of historical processes, e.g. the concepts of hybridity and mimicry.

In the first part of this chapter I will explain how ideas and concepts from postcolonial theory can be useful for teaching colonial and postcolonial history. The second part will address the figure of Howard Zinn, whose work cannot be understood without his biography. Zinn not only exposed the ‘dark’ sides of U.S. history; he publically took a stance against war, discrimination and injustice. He thus not only sought to decolonize the U.S. history curriculum through his scholarly work, but as a teacher and activist he also embodied what he taught. Zinn’s approach to history is therefore particularly interesting because some of the ideas he promoted were similar to those later developed by postcolonial theorists. That is why in this contribution I try to re-read Zinn’s People’s History approach against the background of postcolonial theory. In the third part of this chapter I will outline key educational objectives and methodologies for history teaching from a postcolonial People’s History perspective, which I tested and evaluated in three teaching units on Spanish Colonial History (Year 7/13-year-olds), German Colonial History (Year 8/14-year-olds) and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Year 10/16-year-olds).5

Postcolonial theory for postcolonial history teaching

Although there has been a boom in postcolonial approaches since the 1980s, there are no universally agreed definitions of the terms ‘postcolonial’ and ‘postcolonial theory’. Castro and Dhawan define postcoloniality as ‘a set of discursive practices [...] which resist colonialism, colonialist

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5 For the evaluation I used both informal methods to test students’ understanding and progress (e.g. a revision of key aspects covered in the previous lesson) as well as a feedback form at the end of the teaching unit.
ideologies and their legacies’. For Kaltmeier postcoloniality is a way of thinking which sees the global European expansion as the key turning point that changed political, cultural as well as economic developments both in the conquered regions and in the European center. A postcolonial approach emphasizes the reciprocal creation of the colonized and the colonizers through processes of hybridization and transculturation.

A key goal for a history curriculum from a postcolonial perspective must be to achieve a decolonization of knowledge. Rather than assuming that Western knowledge is at the same time universal knowledge, it is important to inquire as to the location of the speaker within the matrix of power. A postcolonial perspective must point out that historiography has always been an instrument of power and that history has always been highly political (cf. Year 10 Lessons 2 and 3). A decolonization of knowledge thus replaces the positivistic idea of one definitive history (‘the way it actually was’) with the idea of many different histories. However, the goal of a postcolonial historiography cannot be to recover ‘true’ indigenous perspectives or even to look for an ‘original’ indigenous culture in an idealized precolonial past. A postcolonial historiography should instead try to retrace the construction of knowledge in the intercultural zone of culture contact as a hybrid, respectively transcultural process (cf. Year 7 Lessons 1, 7, 10 and 11). Here it becomes necessary ‘to think from both traditions and, at the same time, from neither of them’, as Walter Mignolo has put it. Shalini Randeria speaks of ‘entangled histories’. She adopts a relational perspective which claims that it is impossible to write a history of the West without the history of its colonies and of colonialism (and vice versa). To that end it is crucial to include voices from historians, teachers and activists from the former colonies. Mignolo’s arguments are very

6 Castro Varela, 25, original quote: ‘ein Set diskursiver Praxen [...], die Widerstand leisten gegen Kolonialismus, kolonialistische Ideologien und ihre Hinterlassenschaften.’ (Translation Philipp Bernhard)
8 Walter Mignolo, quoted as found in Kaltmeier, 210.
9 Castro Varela, 23 f.
similar. In his book *The Idea of Latin America* (2005) he argues that the so-called ‘discovery’ of the Americas and the genocide of the indigenous population as well as the deportation of African slaves to the Americas mark the beginning of modernity, a historical landmark often attributed to the French or the Industrial Revolution.\(^\text{10}\) For this ‘dark’ and hidden side of modernity he uses the term coloniality, which was introduced by the Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano. In his latest publication – *The Darker Side of Western Modernity. Global Futures, Decolonial Options* – Mignolo gives a detailed account of his view on modernity and options as to how its dark side might be overcome. He speaks of decolonial thinking and delinking, which are necessary to create a pluriversal, non-capitalistic world with different decolonial options; a world in which many worlds can coexist.\(^\text{11}\) The goal of decolonial education is for Mignolo to render students more deeply aware of and sensitive to the world in which they live unconsciously.\(^\text{12}\)

The definitions mentioned above already suggest that a postcolonial perspective is strongly linked with a political impetus. It is about resistance against colonial ideologies and about uncovering instances where colonial and neo-colonial patterns continue to exist (cf. Year 7 Lesson 12; Year 8 Lesson 9). Thus the goal of postcolonial theory is not only to write texts for academia but also to have a political impact. An important point when teaching (post-) colonial history is to consider the students’ and teacher’s positions in the matrix of power: in a Bavarian *Gymnasium*\(^\text{13}\) students study history against the background of their (mostly) privileged position as (mostly) white, (mostly) well-off and well-educated citizens of one of the richest countries in the world. The students should be made

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11 Mignolo, *The Darker Side*, e.g. 9 f., 275.
13 The German school system has repeatedly been criticized for reproducing social inequality. Students from a privileged background are much more likely to attend a *Gymnasium* than children from working class or immigrant families. The vast majority of students in the classes where I tested the three teaching units came from white and relatively affluent families. The majority of the teachers at the *Gymnasium* in Germany are also white and middle-class.
familiar with the different attempts to justify European superiority by constructing the colonized as the opposite of the Europeans: at first as ‘the infidels’, then as ‘the uncivilized’ and finally as ‘racially inferior subhuman beings’. But postcolonial theorists would point out that in the process of colonization not only the image of ‘the other’ was constructed but also the self-perception of the Europeans (cf. Year 8 Lesson 7). This mutual construction of Europeans and indigenous people in the course of the culture contact in the colonies is linked with processes of hybridization and transculturation. The processes that were thus triggered, however, often eluded the control of the colonial power, which led to developments that upset, unsettled or even scared the Europeans (cf. Year 7 Lesson 11).

Howard Zinn (1922–2010): Biography and ‘A People’s History of the United States’

At first glance Howard Zinn’s biography is reminiscent of a typical example of the American Dream. Zinn was born in New York in 1922 as the son of poor Jewish immigrants. He grew up in a working class environment and started to work in a shipyard, building war ships for the U.S. Navy. In 1943 he joined the Army Air Corps and served as a bombardier in the European theatre of World War II. After the war the G.I. bill allowed him to go to university, complete a PhD in history and become a professor. A closer look reveals that the American Dream did play an important role in Zinn’s biography. But rather in the sense that his experiences as a shipyard worker, soldier and student of history opened his eyes for the ‘dark’ side of the American Dream. The opportunity to expose and denounce this ‘dark’ side of the American experience inspired both his activism and his work as a historian. His working class background made him well aware that the key slogan of the American Dream – that wealth is achieved through hard labor – was a lie. As a young worker he was actively engaged in a labor union and came into contact with Marxist ideas and the Communist Movement. Disappointed by the developments in the Soviet Union, he distanced himself from Communism after the war. As a professor at Spelman College in Atlanta, a college for black women, he experienced the discrimination of African-Americans and the beginning of the Civil
Rights Movement at first hand. Together with his students, Zinn protested against the apartheid regime in the South of the United States, which led to his dismissal. When he started teaching in Boston in 1964, he began to participate in the protests against the Vietnam War. Soon Zinn became one of the leading figures within the American Left. He died in 2010.\textsuperscript{14} In 1980 he published his \textit{People’s History of the United States}. Zinn writes the story of the U.S. from \textit{below}: from the viewpoint of ‘the others’, i.e. the marginalized and the oppressed, e.g. Native Americans, slaves, workers, women, socialists or African-Americans. Zinn’s starting point is the insight that it is impossible to write an objective history. Traditional historiography, which pretends to be objective, is for him a tool of the elite to control the lives of ordinary citizens; to manipulate people and to control politics. Zinn clarifies for his readers from the outset that a People’s History approach is biased;\textsuperscript{15} that he sees his work as an academic form of affirmative action.\textsuperscript{16} His People’s History adds historical perspectives that have long been suppressed in U.S. history classrooms. That ordinary people \textit{make} history is for Zinn a powerful insight that can lead students to think differently about the present and the future, empowering them to act and to ask themselves what they can do to make the world a better place. In Zinn’s People’s History perspective, history from \textit{below} is not limited to a history of \textit{Alltagsgeschichte} (history of everyday life), an approach which was especially popular among German historians in the 1970s/80s; rather, Zinn’s history from \textit{below} criticizes the key narratives on which the history of the United States and of Western modernity are founded. Emphasizing the key role of colonialism for understanding U.S. history, Zinn offers an analysis which is in line with what was later postulated by postcolonial theory. His approach to teaching can be seen as decolonial education in the sense of Walter Mignolo, as Zinn tries to make students aware of what all too often remains untold. And this perspective – for which Zinn has

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} Miner, Barbara. 2008. ‘Why Students should Study History. An Interview with Howard Zinn’. In Bigelow, Bill (ed.). \textit{A People’s History for the Classroom}. Milwaukee: 8–14, here 13.
\end{itemize}
been fiercely attacked by conservative historians and politicians – is still not adequately reflected in history teaching.¹⁷

A postcolonial People’s History – classroom experiences from three teaching units

Before presenting my experiences with the three teaching units, I will briefly summarize the most important educational objectives and methodological recommendations which follow from the theoretical considerations. When teaching colonial and postcolonial history, emphasis should be placed on processes of exchange and hybridization (cf. Year 7, Lessons 10 and 11), resistance of the colonized (cf. Year 7, Lesson 1; Year 8 Lesson 5) as well as the repercussions of colonialism on Europe (cf. Year 7 Lesson 9 and 10; Year 8 Lesson 7, 10 and 11). Underlying these themes should be an awareness of the imbalance of power between the colonizers and the colonized, the economic (rise of capitalism) and the physical (forced labor and genocide) exploitation of the colonized as well as attempts to justify European superiority through discourses of civilization or race. The goal should be to open up the Eurocentric perspective of national history curricula for global historical perspectives. Students should learn that history is a construct and that historiography can never be objective and is therefore an instrument of power (cf. Year 10, Lessons 2 and 3). A key component of such an approach is to follow historical processes through different periods and regions (from impacts on the local level up to global effects) and to teach the consequences of colonial history until today (cf. Year 7 Lesson 12; Year 8 Lesson 9). Particularly relevant methodological approaches include use of multiple perspectives, use of fiction and (auto-)biographical writing (cf. Year 8 Lesson 1), use of role plays (cf. Year 7 Lessons 3 and 4; Year 10 Lessons 2 and 3) and other forms of scenic learning, and finally the criticism of traditional narratives (cf. Year 7 Lessons 2–6). The students should have the opportunity to express value judgments and to deal with different opinions (cf. Year 7 Lesson 6; Year 8 Lesson 6; Year 10

¹⁷ Students and supporters of Zinn’s People’s History approach started the website ‘Zinn Education Project’, (accessed June 14, 2017, http://zinnedproject.org/), where articles, teaching materials and information about upcoming events can be found.
Lessons 2, 3 and 5). They should be encouraged to reflect upon their position in the colonial matrix of power and to confront the consequences of (neo) colonialism in their environment (cf. Year 8 lesson 11).

Teaching unit Spanish Colonial History in the Americas, Year 7 (13-year-olds), 12 lessons

The first teaching unit is on Spanish Colonial History in Year 7 (13-year-olds). In Year 7 students cover a large period from 500 A.D. to 1789. One aspect is the European encounter with foreign civilizations in the course of the ‘Europeanization of the earth’. The curriculum here wants students to see this ‘Europeanization’ of the globe as a precursor of modern globalization.\(^\text{18}\) The curriculum does not allot as much time to colonial history as I devoted to it; however, it does allow some flexibility on the part of the teacher. It was thus possible to break out of the strict chronology and teach thematically, covering colonial history in Latin America from Columbus until today. Most of the students had already heard of Columbus and his ‘discovery’ of America before. But the first lesson told the story of the ‘discovery’ of the Americas not from the point of view of Columbus, but from

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the perspective of the Taíno, the first indigenous people Columbus encountered. In this lesson I worked with excerpts from the documentary *500 Nations*.\(^{19}\) This was also used as an opportunity to discuss historical documentaries as a source of knowledge as well as the fact that there exist only few sources (especially written ones) from the Taíno themselves. A lot of what is known about their civilization stems from Europeans and is thus filtered through a European lens. Having familiarized students with the Taíno civilization, we talked about the first contact, where Columbus was received with generosity as a new trading partner. The students speculated that the Taíno probably expected Columbus to return with a merchant fleet, which would mean the beginning of trade relations with the newcomers. Then the students were confronted with the excerpt from *500 Nations* about the genocide, as well as the desperate resistance of the Taíno, which ensued after Columbus’ return. The second lesson presented the classic school textbook perspective on Columbus and the ‘discovery’ of the Americas from *above*. Both the curriculum and the school textbook present Columbus and the ‘discovery’ of the Americas as one key element in the narrative of a successful transition from the ‘dark’ Middle Ages to a ‘bright’ modernity. At the end of the lesson the students discussed how they think the story of Columbus should be told and if they are happy with how their school textbook tells the story. In the third and fourth lesson I adapted a role play suggested by Bill Bigelow,\(^{20}\) an American history teacher who regularly offers lesson plans on the website of the Zinn Education Project. The fictive trial confronts students with the question as to who of five accused parties was responsible for the genocide of the Taíno: Columbus, Columbus’ men, King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella, the church or the Taíno themselves. The students were put into six groups, of which one group was the jury at the trial and the five other groups were to defend one of the accused parties. For example, the group defending

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Columbus was to argue why Columbus was not or was only partially responsible for the genocide. They were allowed to blame others; they could say Columbus just followed the orders of the Catholic Monarchs. The teacher was the prosecutor at the trial. This role-play is intended to convey to the students that simply blaming Columbus for the genocide would be shortsighted; that different players in the game of history were involved. In period five students analyzed the depiction of Columbus in popular history magazines. The focus was here on a critical analysis of paintings used to illustrate an article on Columbus in the German magazine *Geo Epoche*.\(^\text{21}\) The picture analysis was conducted in three groups, each of which was assigned a different painting illustrating the article. After a detailed description of their painting, the students were to assess from their knowledge of the Columbus story which information was missing in the caption, and whether the painting portrays Columbus as a hero and contributes to the widely held belief that ‘great men make history’. As a final step the groups were encouraged to write their own caption for their painting. Working with pictures/paintings as sources from popular history magazines in this way can create a critical awareness of such magazines. Period six explicitly asked whether Columbus is a hero or villain, using an article on Columbus published in the British magazine *History today*\(^\text{22}\) in 1992 by historian Felipe Fernandez-Armesto as a starting point. Fernandez-Armesto claims that Columbus was neither a hero nor a criminal, but that historians (and in fact anyone relating his story) turned him into both. In contrast, the students were also given a comment by Howard Zinn, which contradicts Fernandez-Armesto’s view and claims that Columbus indeed can be judged according to today’s moral standards. Both today and in the time of Columbus it was and is a crime to torture and kill people. Even if slavery was widely spread 500 years ago, it was still not morally acceptable to treat slaves so brutally that they died as a result of forced labor.\(^\text{23}\) At the end of the lesson the

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\(^{23}\) Miner, Why Students should Study History, 9 ff.
students were to produce their own responses and arguments to the question as to whether Columbus was a hero or a villain. Periods seven and eight covered the next step of European colonization of the Americas, using the example of the conquest of the Aztec empire. In period seven students were presented a complex picture of the Aztec civilization. Period eight discussed the different reasons as to why the Spanish had been able to conquer the Aztec empire in the first place. Lessons 9–11 dealt with life in the Spanish colony New Spain and the consequences of European colonization into our present. Period nine covered the economic exploitation of the colonies and the beginning of the slave trade. Keeping this perspective in mind, periods ten and eleven focused on cultural phenomena; students were familiarized with the idea of culture contact in the sense of Homi Bhabha’s concept of hybridity. Three areas were discussed in which the culture contact changed life in the colonies: population, agriculture and language. The result was something new, something hybrid, something distinctly Latin American. And this result was often very different from what the colonizers had originally intended. Period eleven used the same model, taking religion as an example, to emphasize the ambivalences and frictions that arose in the colonial situation, religion being the area in which Europeans were least willing to accept hybridization with indigenous elements. Nevertheless, in a process which took decades if not centuries, elements of the indigenous religion mixed with Spanish Catholicism, bringing about something new: a Mexican form of Catholicism. The lesson began with a contemporary picture of the Aztec pyramid of Cholula in Mexico, which is surmounted by a Catholic church. The students were encouraged to speculate why the Spanish had built a church exactly on that spot. In order to introduce the students to the worldview of the missionaries who accompanied the establishment of the colony New Spain, they were asked to analyze a text by the Franciscan missionary Bernardino de Sahagún (1499–1590), who spent more than fifty years studying Aztec language, culture and beliefs. Although he developed a positive view of the indigenous people in the course of his studies, this changed nothing about his conviction of the cultural and religious superiority of the Spanish. He never doubted that it was not just the right but even the duty to ‘civilize’ and evangelize the indigenous people. This attitude is obvious in the excerpt from the source text discussed with the students, ‘Medicine
against idolatry’, in which Sahagún compares his role to the one of a doctor who has to free the indigenous people from the disease of their heathen beliefs. Then the class was split into two big groups. One group read an informative text on ‘Our Lady of Guadalupe’ about Juan Diego, an indigenous peasant, who saw in a vision the Virgin Mary with indigenous features. The topic of the second group was The Day of the Dead (El día de los muertos). Here Aztec traditions mixed with the Catholic traditions of All Saint’s Day and All Soul’s Day, on which days the souls of the deceased visit the living in accordance with indigenous belief. Students should understand that – contrary to the European tradition – it is a cheerful holiday with flowers, picnics and colorful sugar skulls for the children. At this point Homi Bhabha’s concept of mimicry comes into play. At the beginning such processes of hybridization irritated and frightened Europeans because the colonized creatively appropriated the religion of the colonizers. They succeeded in questioning the colonizers’ claim to cultural purity and cultural superiority, and a long time passed before the Catholic church understood that if they tolerated the inclusion of indigenous elements, this would help them spread Catholicism in Latin America. Ultimately, the indigenous people were more willing to accept this new Latin American version of Catholicism. At the end of the lesson students were shown the relevance of the subject matter for their everyday life in a multicultural Germany. They were asked where they experience culture contact in their lives, in their community and how they experience this culture contact. The last lesson of the unit illustrated the consequences of European colonization until today. The students’ feedback of lessons 10 and 11 on culture contact in New Spain showed that if concrete examples are used, even young students (Year 7, 13-year-olds) can understand the ideas behind complex concepts such as culture contact, hybridity and mimicry.

Teaching unit German Colonial History, Year 8 (14-year-olds), 11 lessons

Part of the Year 8 curriculum is the topic ‘Imperialism and World War I’. As one of several optional focus themes, the curriculum suggests dealing

with aspects of German colonial history, such as the Herero uprising (from a postcolonial People’s History perspective the phrase ‘anti-colonial resistance of the Herero and Nama’ should be used; the curriculum does not use the word ‘genocide’). The structure of the second teaching unit on German Colonial History in Year 8 is very similar to that of Spanish Colonial History in Year 7. The first lesson used excerpts from an autobiography by a Kikuyu elder to show students the brutal character of imperialism and how the arrival of the British changed the lives of the indigenous people in British East Africa. The second lesson offered an introduction to ‘The Age of Imperialism’ from above, discussing key terms, features of imperialism as well as motives for European expansion. Lessons three to six focused on the history of the German colony German South-West Africa. Lesson three was intended to show students that – contrary to the colonial propaganda at the time – the seizure of the colony was a chaotic process. Lesson four on German rule in German South-West Africa sought to emphasize that not only the Germans attempted to take advantage of conflicts among the different indigenous groups in order to establish their rule; the indigenous people themselves equally tried to use the

Germans in inner-African conflicts towards their own goals. Here texts of African historians were used who emphasize the agency of the indigenous people in order to prove that they cannot just be seen as passive victims of the colonists. Lesson five covered the colonial war 1904–1908 and the Herero and Nama genocide. The students worked with an adapted excerpt from an essay by the German historian Jürgen Zimmerer. Using the UN-definition of genocide, the students discussed whether what happened in German South-West Africa can legitimately be called genocide. The next lesson dealt with the consequences of the genocide in German South-West Africa until today. The students were confronted with different points of view from both the Namibian and the German side on whether Germany should pay reparations for the genocide. Period seven covered the repercussions of colonialism on the German Empire using the examples of so-called human zoos, pseudo-scientific race theories and the debate on racially mixed marriages. The students were introduced to how racist beliefs were transferred back to Imperial Germany via the colonies, subsequently changing the racist discourse there. In lesson eight students were to critically analyze colonial photographs. Period nine briefly covered the impact of colonialism and imperialism on Africa until today. Period ten discussed consequences of colonialism that can still be seen in Germany, e.g. the persistence of racist colonial stereotypes in contemporary commercials. In preparation for the concluding excursion the students were introduced to the work of the postcolonial initiative [muc] münchen postkolonial, a project concerned with the traces of colonialism in Munich which seeks, for example, to rename streets in Munich named


27 The students were rendered aware of the controversy surrounding Zimmerer’s 2011 monograph Von Windhuk nach Auschwitz? Beiträge zum Verhältnis von Kolonialismus und Holocaust, in which he discusses the relationship between the Herero Namaqua genocide and the Holocaust.

after German imperialists, German colonial ‘possessions’ and even places where German massacres occurred.

The tours developed by [muc] münchen postkolonial are designed as rallies, requiring the students to find QR codes and scan them with a smartphone. The participants receive information about the historic site, several tasks they should discuss in the group as well as a map with clues where they find the next QR code. Then they post their solutions on Twitter, using the hashtag #dekolonisieren. The use of modern technology and social media here not only renders the excursion more fashionable and attractive to young people; the use of Twitter in particular is highly innovative because the students post their own decolonial traces and thus contribute themselves to decolonizing the urban space. Some of the colonial traces the students have to look for can be seen at first glance (e.g. a roll of honor at the Old South Cemetery for soldiers who died in the colonial wars). Other traces require more intensive observation (e.g. the history of stolen exhibits in the State Museum for Ethnology in Munich), while many traces remain invisible (e.g. the grave of the two indigenous children Juri and Miranha, which no longer exists. The two children were captured by two Bavarian natural scientists as ‘exhibits’ in South America and abducted to Munich in 1820, where both soon died). This excursion is a good example of decolonial education in the sense of Walter Mignolo, because it heightens the students’ awareness of the world in which they live unconsciously: it shows them the hidden traces of colonialism in their hometown Munich.

In the feedback session on the whole teaching unit the students criticized that – because most lessons focused on German imperialism – there were not enough comparisons to other imperial powers. Especially when addressing the Herero Nama genocide or the so-called human zoos it would indeed have been beneficial to point out that other colonial powers also committed genocide and that human zoos were common all over Europe.

Teaching unit: The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Year 10 (16-year-olds), 5 lessons

In Year 10 Bavarian secondary school students only have one history lesson a week, rendering the complex topic of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict something of a challenge. The first lesson provided the students with an overview of the conflict, and the subsequent two lessons involved working with the German translation of the Israeli-Palestinian textbook,
Learning Each Other’s Historical Narrative. This textbook was developed by the Peace Research Institute in the Middle East (PRIME) in cooperation with the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research (GEI), and is the result of a cooperative project between Israeli and Palestinian history teachers. The textbook contrasts on the same page the Israeli point of view with the Palestinian point of view with blank space in the middle – between the two narratives – for the students to take notes. I chose the chapter on the events of 1947/1948 (for the Israelis the War of Independence; for the Palestinians the Nakba or ‘catastrophe’) and asked the students to directly contrast the Israeli with the Palestinian view on six events from this period in a role-play. They were astounded by the dramatic differences between the two narratives, recognizing that history is never objective but that it is always constructed from the point of view of the present with all its political implications. It would have been interesting to explore the (post-)colonial nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, using concepts from postcolonial theory. To conclude the teaching unit, however, we focused on the peace process. Our lessons on the peace process contrasted the perspective from above, i.e. the political and diplomatic efforts, with the perspective from below, i.e. the Israeli and Palestinian peace movements. Lesson four focused on the failure of the Oslo Peace Process between 1993 and 2000. This was the background for lesson five, which inquired as to whether there is such

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a thing as a peace process from below. The students learned about the history of the Peace Movement in Israel and Palestine and analyzed the work of several peace initiatives such as the Israeli-Palestinian group Parents Circle. The goal was to demonstrate that there are different groups and perspectives among Israelis and Palestinians. The students were then asked to discuss the impact of these grassroots peace initiatives on the stagnating peace process from above. They were confronted with two perspectives: A People’s historian would claim that pressure from below is necessary to break up the stagnation. The opposite view, which could be called political realism, would claim that the conflict can only be solved by politicians and diplomats who do not pay much attention to the Peace Movement. The final discussion focused on this relationship, and the students concluded that progress has to be made on both levels.

**Conclusion: incorporating a postcolonial People’s History perspective in the classroom**

While the three teaching units discussed here should be seen as one possible way to teach (post-)colonial history, it is the intention of this chapter to inspire other teachers to use insights from postcolonial theory and from Howard Zinn’s People’s History approach in their classrooms. When teaching (post-)colonial history under different circumstances than described here (e.g. to ethnically more diverse groups), the educational objectives and methodological recommendations suggested above might have to be adapted. Combining Zinn’s People’s History approach with insights from postcolonial theory offers a perspective on teaching (post-)colonial history which emphasizes both the material (i.e. political and economic) and the cultural effects of colonialism and postcolonialism. A Postcolonial People’s History also leads the way to a decolonization of knowledge and to innovative ways of dealing with colonial and postcolonial history in the history classroom and beyond.

I would like to conclude with two final remarks: It remains to be hoped that in history didactics there will be systematic research on the use of postcolonial theory in the history classroom, which – to my knowledge – has not happened yet (at least not in Germany). Here interdisciplinary collaboration is inevitable. For the specific context of teaching privileged
students, insights from Critical Whiteness Studies, for example, should be incorporated into the research framework.\[^{30}\]

It would appear that many critics of Howard Zinn underestimate the ability of both historians and history teachers to themselves cast a critical eye on his legacy. Of course history cannot only be taught from below, and of course not all historical events were brought about by ‘ordinary people’. Yet one key message of Zinn’s is that ‘ordinary citizens’ can make a real change in the world, an inspiring message for both the influential and ‘ordinary citizens’ of tomorrow who are sitting in our classrooms today.

References


\[^{30}\] One goal of my current research project is to develop guiding principles for teaching history from a postcolonial perspective. An important aspect here is the question as to how the experiences and presumptions of the students can influence the approach of the teacher when dealing with (post-)colonial topics in the classroom.


Dennis Röder

Showing Africa: The Visual Presentation of Africa and Africans During the Period of Imperialism in German History Textbooks

Introduction

Visual illustrations and sources had been used in the history classroom long before the phrase ‘A picture is worth a thousand words’ entered popular parlance. Teachers have always liked to use pictures as ‘ice breakers’ with which to begin a lesson with or have referred to famous historical drawings or portraits as visual representations or illustrations of particular eras, largely treating them as ‘windows into how it was’.¹ Recent decades have seen tremendous change in critical approaches to visual aids and illustrations as historical sources in academic history and therefore the discipline of history education. ‘Visual History’ has become a new field of academic research.² Although Peter Burke, writing at the dawn of the twenty-first century, still observed a lack of critical awareness in historians’ engagement with visual sources³, most current history textbooks give students clear advice on how to interpret visual sources and analyze them in a critical manner. German history textbooks, for instance, ask students to analyze war propaganda from both World Wars, look at the manipulation of photographs in the Stalin era or attempt to get to the bottom of the contemporary popularity of Nazism by investigating how propaganda

photographs were produced and distributed during the 1930s and 1940s. This said, this critical visual approach cannot be easily found in textbooks with reference to the topic of imperialism, despite the fact that photography became a mass medium in its heyday, around 1900.

It was my history students who made me aware of this apparent gap. A group of Year 9 boys noticed a photograph in our textbook captioned ‘Der Häuptling von Balibe mit seinen zwanzig Frauen’ (The chief of Balibe and his 20 wives). The photograph depicts ‘the chief’ in the center, surrounded by the wives. All of the women are naked; some are trying to shield their breasts with their hands. In the background there is a huge palm tree and traditional mud huts. No further information is provided as far as place or time are concerned. This photograph sparked widespread laughter among the class and monkey-like noises emerged from the back row. Clearly, this photograph had the capacity to trigger deep-rooted stereotypes and both sexual and racist images about Africa among my male students. Along with providing me with food for thought about my Year 9 and the visual images they were exposed to in their everyday lives, this episode made me think about the ways in which history textbooks use visual material.

Images of Africa and Africans took on considerable importance in the age of imperialism for a number of reasons. However, as proven to a degree by my students’ reactions to the picture described above, the impact of such images has long been underestimated in history teaching. In the case mentioned above, the textbook effectively left students to interpret a photograph and its racist connotations alone. There was no advice on how to deconstruct the image, let alone on how to examine the origins of the clichés transported by it. This example might prompt us to ask wider questions about the German history textbooks currently most commonly in use, relating to the visual sources they employ, their captions and any tasks associated with them, what help is provided to students in analyzing and interpreting them, and the general implications of these practices in specific relation to visual sources on Africa and Africans in the context of imperialism. We are interested, in other words, in whether German history

textbooks, or specifically the visual sources to be found in them, have been ‘decolonized’.\(^5\) We will approach these issues in what follows by first looking at the significance of the visual and of photography in the age of imperialism before going on to detail my research into the use of visual sources to illustrate the topic of imperialism in German history textbooks.

**Looking back: The visual representation of Africa and Africans during the age of imperialism**

From a Eurocentric point of view, the 1880s are often viewed as the starting point of the ‘scramble for Africa’, a somewhat misleading term frequently employed in European textbooks to describe the entire era of Western imperialism.\(^6\) Globally speaking, this decade indeed brought to the fore the role of ‘the West’ (i.e. Great Britain, the US, France, and also Germany and Japan) as a construct associated with perceived sovereignty over many distant parts of the world and their peoples.\(^7\) The ‘westernization’ of the colonialized world was a process that continued until World War II and unleashed a tremendous impact on perceptions of the world within and beyond the colonies. The 1880s were to photography what the 1990s were to the Internet; the invention of the KODAK camera in 1888 made photography cheaper and more available to the masses in Europe, the United States and, later, in the Ottoman Empire and Japan.\(^8\) Photography is also comparable to the Internet in that both the web and the camera were ‘Western’ inventions, first spread around ‘the West’, which encouraged and to a degree imposed a Western view of the world. The invention of the KODAK camera, which one will not find in any history textbook, thus came in tandem with the so-called ‘scramble for Africa’ and had a profound effect on the view on Africa and Africans passed ‘home’ from the colonies to Europe and other parts of the world, on perceptions of

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5 For a general discussion on the context of the ‘decolonization of textbooks’, see the essay by Susanne Grindel in this volume.
reality and on the construction and invention of ‘otherness’ as applied to ‘the Africans’. According to Jürgen Osterhammel, the camera became a visual means of waging the imperial war, but also of depicting the former ‘unknown world’ in what appeared at the end of the nineteenth century as more realistic way than had previously been achievable.9 In the hands of missionaries, adventurers, travelers, journalists and colonial soldiers and higher officials alike, the Kodak produced a whole range of impressions of these individuals’ and groups’ ideas and intentions, of their ‘regard’.10 It is striking that all Western photographers of the late nineteenth century who went to Africa had the tendency to generalize their visual motives as being typical of ‘Africa’ or ‘Africans’, in line with mainstream racist thinking of the period around 1900.11 This generalizing tendency of photography was combined with the widespread conflation of photography with the documentation of authentic ‘fact’.

The first photographs of North Africa appeared around 1850, picturing Egypt and specifically Cairo and its inhabitants.12 Photographs of sub-Saharan Africa began to circulate in the late nineteenth century, depicting a wide range of scenes from all European colonies. Many photographs were taken by missionaries in the German colonies and Leopold’s ‘Free State’. It is characteristic of these photographs that, in keeping with the technical possibilities of the cameras available in this era, they do not show ongoing events or action, but rather more static scenes (such as the one my students laughed at) or results of certain actions (e. g. the amount of rubber being harvested by African workers).

The end of the nineteenth century was the point in world history at which Europeans explored the interior of Africa for the first time; the camera was their companion. Images of ‘exotic jungle tribes’ or of ‘chiefs’ such

9 Ibid.
12 Ibid., 15-19.
as the image discussed above were printed on postcards and in magazines and sent to Europe and around the world. Science and school teaching made heavy use of photography, developing a specific racist terminology only employed when referring to Africa and Africans and featuring terms such as ‘tribes’, ‘chiefs’, ‘fetishes’ and ‘Hottentots’). Companies used these images and the associated terminology for advertising purposes. The ‘human zoos’ (Völkerschauen) held in Hamburg, Paris and other cities were the ultimate exemplar of this ‘colonial regard’, representing a synthesis of advertising, news photography and the European self-image as a center of colonial power as showcased in the European-dominated ‘World Fairs’ of the time.  

While photographs and other visual means were instrumental in imagining superior and inferior ‘races’ and thus in glorifying colonial rule over the ‘primitive black Africans’, photography had also a tremendous impact on the fight against colonial rule and colonial atrocities. The most famous example is the role photography played in the uncovering of colonial crimes in Leopold’s (and the later Belgian) Congo. It was mainly the photographs of missionaries that were to visually uncover the way officials treated the indigenous people of the Congo in the context of economic exploitation of the colony for rubber. A key figure and photographer was the British missionary Alice Seeley Harris, wife of a Baptist missionary in the Congo around 1900. Her hundreds of photographs, which became widely known in Europe and the US, show the end of a chain of global pressure brought to bear on the Congolese people; they were published in a 1909 essay entitled ‘The Camera and the Congo Crime’, thus becoming

16 A portrait of Alice Seely Harris can be found in Grant, Kevin. 2001. ‘Christian Critics of Empire: Missionaries, Lantern Lectures, and the Congo Reform Campaign in Britain’. Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 29 no. 2 (May): 27–58.
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a political weapon in the fight against the Belgian king’s rule in the Congo. Her images of severed hands, stemming from atrocities which shocked her despite her essential agreement with the contemporary racist attitude toward ‘Africans’, gained iconic status. White Belgian officials demanded of their black helpers that they punish Congolese workers who did not harvest enough rubber plants by killing them and bringing their hands to the whites as proof that the person had indeed been killed and thus a bullet used. It was common practice for the black helpers to simply cut off the workers’ hands but spare their lives, illegally saving the ammunition for other local wars or for potential rebellion; this increased the number of weapons and ammunition in the region. Although it is true that the practice of severing hands was not a widespread phenomenon\(^\text{18}\), photographs, and their later mass-reproduction, turned the practice into a ‘fact’ of the result of white rule over black people. On her tour across Europe and the US, Alice Harris exhibited the graphic images during her lectures in highly popular ‘magic lantern shows’\(^\text{19}\) which are said to have had an intensely emotional and shocking effect on their viewers, sparking widespread protests against colonial rule in the Congo.\(^\text{20}\)

Many famous contemporaries, including Mark Twain and Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, supported Harris’s fight against colonial rule and published material about the atrocities, intensifying their message by adding Harris’s photographs of Africans suffering under colonial rule. In 1905, Twain published ‘King Leopold’s Soliloquy’, in which the king says: ‘The Kodak has been a sore calamity to us. The only witness I have encountered in my long career that I couldn’t bribe.’\(^\text{21}\)

To sum up, in terms of the visual perception of the world, the turn from the 19th to the 20th century marks an important step with widespread consequences into how photographs and images of Africans are used in

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20 Ibid.
the fight against colonial rule. On the other hand, the era of imperialism generated certain visual clichés of Africans that were re-produced again and again and can still be found in the mass media nowadays.

The age of imperialism in German school textbooks

General remarks on visual sources

What do current German school textbooks make of all this? The federal structure of the education system in Germany means that a huge range and variety of textbooks is currently in use. For this analysis, I took a close look at the six most commonly used history textbooks in use in academic secondary schools (Gymnasien) in three states in northern Germany (Lower Saxony, Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein), the region in which I teach. The content studied is aimed at Year 9 students; all books were published between 2003 and 2011. Usually, the period of imperialism is covered in a specific chapter on the period, which generally also covers World War I; only one book focuses mainly on German history and integrates the topic within the context of German national history of the 19th century.²²

In general, we can find a marked amount of visual material in these chapters. This analysis takes all types of visual material into consideration, including maps, drawings, cartoons, photographs, and contemporary and present-day sources. The number of visual sources relating to Africa and Africans in chapters specifically on imperialism and World War I, however, varies greatly from book to book, as does the number of pages discussing Africa. Characteristic of all books is the introduction of the topic using a map of the world circa 1914 (‘states with colonies’), generally showing Africa in a range of colors standing for domination by various European nations. One book features small drawings of huts in its introductory pages.²³ Only one book has added a map featuring ‘Afrikanische Reiche und Stämme im 19. Jahrhundert’ (‘African kingdoms and tribes in the nineteenth century’) to at least give some indication of what Africa was

like before the Europeans colonized it. In terms of other visual sources, colonial cartoons generally feature more prominently than photography; one book contains a special page on analyzing cartoons from the age of imperialism.

One of the books fails to include a single visual source showing Africa or Africans in the period of imperialism. Here we only find a modern-day photograph an image from the year 2000, credited to Unicef, showing a Rwandan child with scars on her face. The focus in this textbook is on analyzing written text (‘Sachtexte exzerpieren’). No schoolbook mentions the invention of the Kodak camera and its impact.

Focus on photographs

The photographs used as visual sources in the books analyzed generally depict stark visual effects and contrasts. We might classify the photographs used in the textbooks into various groups or subsets. One such subset shows Africans half-naked; this appears to function as a visual code to refer to the point in time immediately after Europeans’ initial arrival in the continent and the practice of so-called ‘ethnographic photography’ that abounded at the time. Another group of photographs appears to have the purpose of demonstrating the results of European influence and change after some years of colonization; these feature Africans in schools and Africans wearing clothes, but also Africans in chains or with severed hands. The Year 9 textbook I had used in my class, containing the photograph that inspired hilarity among my students, is no exception. The image of the polygamous ‘chief’ is juxtaposed with a photograph of an African wedding ceremony taking place some years later. Whereas the first photograph can be called an icon of all clichés about Africa rolled into one (huts, the ‘jungle’, tribes, nakedness, the chief, a lack of sexual taboos), the second image appears to have the purpose of underlining the change brought about by Europeans (Africans in smart suits, women all in

clothes/skirts). It is evident that this strong visual contrast may encourage students to generalize the phenomena shown in such images as typical of Africa before and after European colonization. While this is evidently an effect the photographs sought to achieve at the time they were taken, students confronted with the images today require assistance with the deconstruction of this contrastive effect, assistance with which they are not provided in this textbook. We can and should also regard critically the fact that the two photographs were taken in entirely different regions of Africa with no connection whatsoever, and that the first picture is undated. The contrast effected by the images’ juxtaposition is thus entirely constructed, and the visual sources are not critically located in their specific historical context.

Further, it is striking that some photographs appear in almost all the textbooks analyzed. One of these is a photograph showing ‘Gefangene Herero in Ketten, Deutsch-Südwestafrika’ (captured Herero in chains, German South-West Africa).\(^28\) We might observe here tendencies toward the emergence of a canonical set of images used to represent the period.

**Photographs and captions**

Captions are difficult to get right in textbooks. They can give away too much information which students were intended to find out by themselves; they may leave out important information, preventing the photograph and its context from being fully understood; they have the potential to mislead or manipulate students by using inappropriate register or by failing to indicate quotations, irony or offensive and outdated language as such. They also run the risk of projecting generalizations onto the image, giving the impression that photography equals reality. We will now discuss two examples from the textbook analyzed.

Two books include the same photograph taken by Alice Harris (without, incidentally, crediting her).\(^29\) Whereas the first book captions

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the image with ‘Arbeiter einer Kautschukplantage im belgischen Teil des Kongo 1907. Ihnen wurden die Hände abgehackt, weil sie zu wenig Kautschuk abgeliefert hatten’ [Workers on a rubber plantation in the Belgian part of the Congo in 1907. Their hands were cut off because they harvested too little rubber], the second uses ‘In Belgisch-Kongo mussten Afrikaner als Steuer Kautschuk sammeln. Wer zu wenig sammelte, wurde bestraft.’[In Belgian Congo, Africans had to collect rubber [and hand it to the authorities] as tax. Those that collected too little were punished.] Neither caption takes into account the full story behind the severed hands or its implications. In addition, both captions use passive constructions (‘wurden’ and ‘wurde’) without apportioning responsibility for the crimes. This vague style extends to the labeling of the workers thus mistreated as Afrikaner, which gives the erroneous impression that this was a general phenomenon of the situation of ‘Africans’ as well as treating an entire continent as an unspecific entity. It may be the case that the captions aimed to simplify the explanations they provided due to the nature of their audience; however, this approach reduces students’ capacity to contextualize the situation, leaving them without information on the Force Publique guards who cut off the hands, the policies of the whites and the increasing importance of ammunition and the maxim gun in the hands of African warlords and uprisings that were a result of these developments.\footnote{Comparing editions of the textbook \textit{Geschichte und Geschehen} from 2006 and 2011 respectively, we notice a degree of change exemplified in the treatment of a particular caption. In the older edition, a visual source from 1906 showing a school in the French colony of Senegal is entitled \textit{Zivilisation}, without inverted commas.\footnote{My point here is that few German textbooks provide scope for the presentation from all viewpoints of historical controversy, meaning they fail to engage adequately with sensitive issues of this kind. The debate on ‘teaching emotive and controversial issues’ is very much underway in Anglophone countries; an example from the UK is The Historical Association, T.E.A.C.H. Teach Emotive and Controversial History.} This caption, with its uncritically Eurocentric view of ‘civilization’ and its connotations, is no longer found


in the 2011 edition\textsuperscript{32}, having been replaced by a more neutrally formulated caption (\textit{Dorfschule in der französischen Kolonie Senegal}). This is an important step toward a more critical approach to the topic itself, taking the visual source itself more seriously.

**Photographs and student tasks**

Where photographs are connected with specific tasks set to students, we might categorize those tasks in two basic groups. The first of these asks students to judge the behavior of colonists or to discuss the long-term consequences of white colonial rule for Africa in a very general way. The photograph is thus used as a trigger to initiate more general discussion. The other group consists of approaches intended more to stimulate specific creative or productive responses to the issues and tasks that engage more closely with the message of the photograph but which result, more or less, in a discussion about the consequences of colonial rule again – but on a different level, taking, to cite one example, the perspective of one of the people depicted in the photograph. We find, for instance, an additional task to the photograph of mutilations in the Congo Free State in one textbook.\textsuperscript{33} Pupils are to imagine they are a European journalist and write an article based on the photograph and its background. The problem common to these two types of task is the fact that they both tend to treat the photograph around which the task revolves as a given fact, leaving it unquestioned as a source. However, more recent books appear to be exhibiting a tendency toward more source-oriented tasks. One task referring to the \textit{Dorfschule in Senegal} image asks students to think about the possible intentions of the photograph (why was it taken?) and the effects of its being disseminated in Europe.\textsuperscript{34}

Overall, the tasks relating to visual sources in the textbooks analyzed largely remain too general or vague (‘Judge the behavior or treatment…’). There are no additional hints on how to interpret or analyze the photographs, unlike those given in connection to other media and topics at this level, such as drawings from the imperial period and manipulated


\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 51.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 50.
photographs from the USSR. The only book which furnishes a degree of an exception to this rule is Expedition Geschichte G3\textsuperscript{35}, which contains a special chapter examining and reflecting on the image of Africans created during the age of imperialism (Das Bild vom Schwarzen – Nachdenken über den Kolonialismus).\textsuperscript{36} This is one example of a focus on the analysis of visual representations and the effects of such images into the present. This chapter contains a wide variety of visual sources in this chapter for students to critically work on; they include a photograph of a ‘human zoo’ in Hamburg, illustrations of advertisements, and a range of photographs from differing perspectives.

**Textbook survey**

Most of the visual material used in the context of Africa and Africans in the age of imperialism in the textbooks we have analyzed is in line with the traditional narrative of Africa found in Western and European history, which depicts Africa as an exploited continent and Africans in general as passive victims while largely ignoring the African and global context and developments in the continent. None of the textbooks we examined provided background information on the photographers. The books placed all photographs that appeared in direct (and thus constructed) connection with colonial rule. Contextual information is often too vague or not present at all, and the exercises set for students that make reference to visual sources are usually too general. No maps or weblinks are added that could give additional background information. Sometimes, as we have discussed, the captions are misleading or dubious. African involvement and cooperation in the European project of colonialism is not shown in the photographs selected or in the text accompanying them. There is little attempt to approach visual sources analytically, in contrast to other topics elsewhere in the books.

This said, there are exceptions to these tendencies and some new developments indicate increasing awareness of these issues. Still, textbooks in Germany appear to us to be as yet inadequate as instruments for enabling


\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 63-65.
students to find out more about the global context of Imperialism, Africa’s role in this worldwide phenomenon, and the role of visual material, especially photographs, in this context. It is frequently the case that the text and images in textbooks simply seem to confirm what we think we already know about this chapter in world history. New perspectives such as global history and information on African perspectives and photographers are rarely included. This makes it easy for students to more or less retain their acquired views on the topic, instead of them being given the opportunity to revisit and revise deeply-rooted ideas. In other words, textbooks, in relation to this topic, appear to foster what psychologists call the ‘belief perseverance’ of stereotypes rather than promoting critical thinking on the role of Africa and Africans in German, European and world history.37

Challenges and approaches for history teaching

To sum up, we would like to draw some conclusions and implications from the findings we have uncovered on the use of visual material in textbooks discussing imperialism in Germany. Recent years have seen a growing focus on the long-term competencies students are intended to develop in history learning, such as interpretive skills for narratives, skills of source analysis, the evaluation of historical events and figures, and critical approaches to ‘facts’ and historical terms. In the course of their learning of history, students are to constantly and critically develop their reflective historical consciousness and their historical identity.38 The textbook chapters on imperialism and World War I which we have discussed here provided evidence of the current gap between this theory and practice as it appears in today’s textbooks; I am, however, of the view that the visual material these textbooks provide represents a good potential starting point for the development of the competencies intended to be at the center of history teaching and learning.

38 There is a useful depiction of the German discussion in Heil, Werner. 2010. Kompetenzorientierter Geschichtsunterricht, Stuttgart.
This would, of course, call for teachers to take a more critical stance toward the textbooks currently in use and explicitly teach about broader historical contexts and deep-rooted stereotypes. In general, this would mean placing more emphasis on contextualization before encouraging students to judge historical events or figures. The age of imperialism continues to be presented from a broadly Eurocentric point of view in our textbooks; we are in need of a much more comprehensive context, as exemplified in recent historical works based on global history.\(^{39}\)

For example, students might be encouraged to ask questions about the context of one of Alice Harris’ photographs and about its photographer and subsequently, progressing from this starting point, build all their research about imperialism around this process of inquiry. This would both emphasize the importance of the photograph and provide a connection between visual analysis and global historical background; in this instance, such background might encompass issues such as the importance of rubber, the craze for bicycles in nineteenth-century Europe, missionaries, the KODAK-camera, the colonial system in the ‘Free State’, the impact of colonial photographs on the Western world, and the pros and cons of photography used in journalism. As well as structuring the acquisition of a considerable range of content, this approach would develop competencies in the analysis of visual sources. Raising awareness of the ‘making of visual stereotypes’ in the age of imperialism represents a good approach to teaching about the modern aspects of imperialism and about the role of the media in creating, constructing and disseminating ‘facts’. This said, textbooks are currently lacking in ‘toolkits’ for specific skills such as analysis as well as basic context information on visual sources.\(^{40}\)

\(^{39}\) The book by David van Reybrouck (note 15) is only one example of the presentation of imperialism from a Congolese, African and global point of view.

\(^{40}\) As mentioned before, we can find critical approaches into analyzing visual sources in textbooks here and there, but there is still no systematic approach into how students learn how to deconstruct visual material from all historical eras. This systematic lack is heavily discussed in Pandel, Hans-Jürgen. 2011. ‘Bildinterpretation. Zum Stand der geschichtsdidaktischen Bildinterpretation’. In Handro, Saskia, and Bernd Schönemann (ed.). Visualität und Geschichte. Münster: 69–88.
Product-oriented student tasks might help students deconstruct visual stereotypes. In our context, such tasks might involve drawing comparisons with present-day-photographs of Africans, inserting speech bubbles, writing letters-to-the editor, and comparing textbooks, to name a few potential activities which would enable students to become aware of the processes behind selecting visual images for illustrative purposes.

Teaching about the age of imperialism without using any visual sources would ignore the major impact images have had on collective memory and on ‘our’ perceptions of ‘the other’ to this day. The roots of inequality and racial stereotypes reside to a significant extent in the use of visual imagery and in ‘regard’ it conveys. It is time to contrast the European point of view and the clichés it perpetuates with photographs seen through African eyes. There are many collections of photographs from around 1900 that have not been officially published; they come from African photography studies completed in South Africa and other regions, showing contemporary Africans in cities and private homes and containing no huts, tribesmen or naked women. The African photographer Santu Mofokeng, for instance, has collected and archived a large number of these forgotten photographs. Including more visual material of this kind in teaching about this period might represent a step toward the visual emancipation and decolonization of Africans in German textbooks.

References

German history textbooks


**Other works**


Karl P. Benziger

Decolonization, National Cold War Narratives, and Contested History

The Case of Vietnam and Civil Rights

‘Shall Negro sharecroppers from Mississippi be sent to shoot down brown-skinned peasants in Vietnam – to serve the interests of those who oppose Negro liberation at home and colonial freedom abroad?’ Paul Robeson, ‘Ho Chi Minh Is the Toussaint L’Ouverture of Indo-China,’ March 1954

‘No Mississippi Negroes should be fighting in Vietnam for the White Man’s freedom, until all Negro people are free in Mississippi.’ A McComb, Mississippi Protest, 28 July, 1965

The narrative of the Cold War found in American history textbooks at the secondary and higher education level tells the story of how children were socialized during the first decades of the affair. Duck and cover drills and requisite civil defense shelters were explicit reminders of the nuclear contest between the United States and the Soviet Union in the bipolar construct of the global system. The drama of the Cuban Missile Crisis found in all texts emphasizes the cataclysmic prospects that one false move could make on the global stage. In this light, the politics of decolonization and civil rights needed to take second place to superpower confrontation and the American commitment to contain the spread of communism. And yet, for those being denied basic civil rights in the United States, or bearing the brunt of the politics of decolonization, taking a back seat was no longer an option.


The Vietnamese bid for independence from France was dominated by the communists and led by their charismatic leader Ho Chi Minh. The United States was committed to contain communism in Asia, and because of this was gradually drawn into its longest and costliest war of the Cold War period in Vietnam. Perhaps the most poignant critique of American foreign policy during the Cold War linked African American aspirations for civil rights to the cause of Vietnamese national liberation. This was exemplified by the McComb Mississippi Protest that captured the growing antiwar sentiment among many within the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and eloquently expressed by Robert Moses in August 1964. Moses’ opposition to the war and its intimate connection to civil rights germinated in the context of the lynchings that marked the Freedom Summer in Mississippi. Freedom Summer was a massive effort led by SNCC and other civil rights organizations to register African Americans to vote. The savage violence used against African Americans and civil rights workers in Mississippi to maintain segregation and disenfranchisement was likened to the violence used against Vietnamese peasants in order to quell the National Liberation Front.

In spite of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, resistance to civil rights continued unabated. At the same time, African Americans were being drafted into the United States army to

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fight in Vietnam. The solution offered by Moses and many within SNCC was resistance to the draft. To many Americans the idea was shocking, especially because by the summer of 1965 over 82,000 American troops had been committed to this effort of containment in Vietnam. Textbooks continue to leave out the origins of this critique, creating the illusion that it simply appeared in the mid-1960s with the radicalization of the civil rights and antiwar movements. This should not be surprising, given that the critique was initially sidelined, and then in the wake of a lost war, ignored. This in fact exemplifies the painful history of racism that characterized the post-World War II period in the United States. This paper traces the origins of this narrative and then turns to the more difficult question of how to incorporate this globalized narrative into the classroom.

African Americans long understood the symmetry between their plight in an America characterized by brutal racial segregation and that of people of color living under the thrall of colonial oppression. As early as World War I African Americans linked their struggle for civil rights with the aspirations for freedom in the colonial world. The promise of self-determination enshrined in the Atlantic Charter that undergirded the war aims of the Allies in their fight against the Axis powers during World War II further cemented this linkage. The Double V campaign initiated by African American’s through the Pittsburgh Courier in the United States proclaimed victory over the Axis abroad and Jim Crow at home seemed inextricably linked to the demand for national liberation from


colonial masters throughout the world. The Vietnamese Declaration of Independence proclaimed by Ho Chi Minh on September 2, 1945 challenged France to live up to these war aims. But by November 1946 the Vietnamese were locked in a war for national liberation as the French attempted to reestablish control over Indochina. The Vietnamese struggle for independence and America’s role assisting France to maintain hegemony over their former colony caught the attention of members within the civil rights community. Just as France had failed to live up to goals proclaimed in Allied War aims, the United States did little to ameliorate the open and institutionalized racism faced by African Americans in the years following the war.

Journalist George Padmore met with Ho Chi Minh in mid-September 1946. Padmore was in Paris helping organize the fifth Pan African Congress. Ho Chi Minh had been in Paris attempting to negotiate a settlement with France. The French agreed to Vietnamese independence in March 1946 as part of the French Union, but then backtracked demanding that France control Vietnamese foreign affairs and the economy, leaving the country as a protectorate of France. The negotiations failed, and Ho needed to prepare the fledgling Republic to fight. Ho linked civil rights with national liberation exclaiming, ‘...I know the struggle of the Negroes in America and they have my goodwill.’

Vietnam became entwined in the neo-colonial critique that emanated from African Americans associated with the old left. Fighting in Vietnam was brutal costing thousands of Vietnamese lives. France was allowed to buy American surplus war material left over from World War II at bargain prices. Though many within the United States government were uneasy

8 Plummer, Rising Wind, 155-156.
about providing aid to help France recover their colony, the increasing fear of the communist threat led to a policy that firmly backed the French.\textsuperscript{11} American support for the French pawn Bao Dai in Vietnam in 1949 was reinforced by the People’s Republic of China’s recognition of Ho Chi Minh’s Democratic Republic of Vietnam that same year. Between 1950 and 1954 the United States provided over to 2.6 billion dollars of assistance to the French effort. At the same time, international attention focused on the unending brutality of segregation and poverty found in the United States.\textsuperscript{12} Actor Paul Robeson likened the oppression of South Africans to that of the Vietnamese, claiming that Jan Smuts’ regime had resurrected the ‘evil forces’ that World War II was meant to stamp out.\textsuperscript{13} This sentiment resonated within parts of the American Labor movement as well. In spite of intense scrutiny given to organized labor in the growing red scare politics of the Cold War, Walter Reuther and The Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) provided robust support for Civil Rights and the anti-colonialist agenda akin to that of progressives within the Democratic Party and Socialist Party leader Norman Thomas.\textsuperscript{14}

Howard University President Mordecai Johnson was a strong supporter of labor and intensely critical of the contradictions that segregation and colonialism posed for the United States during the Cold War.\textsuperscript{15} On November 21, 1950 the \textit{New York Times} reminded Americans of the increasing costs of aiding the French effort in Vietnam and included

\textsuperscript{11} Lawrence, \textit{Assuming the Burden}, 92-201. Prados, \textit{Vietnam}, 21-22.


France’s request for 721 million dollars in aid to help fight the war.\textsuperscript{16} In an address to the CIO Convention on November 24, 1950 Johnson rebuked assertions that America was the leader of the free world. Responding to increased American aid to the French in Indochina he stated that the French had held sway over the Indochinese for more than a century ‘[but] we haven’t ever sat down with the French and demand they change their system.’\textsuperscript{17} Johnson warned that Russia was likely to win the allegiance of peoples of the colonial countries unless the United States took the lead in performing ‘a great act of expiation.’ He called on the United States to provide 25 billion dollars per year to raise the standard of living in Africa and Asia.\textsuperscript{18}

The old left included individuals and organizations with multi-faceted interests from the anti-communist stance of Mordecai Johnson and Walter Reuther to the communist affiliated Paul Robeson. They were united however, on the issue of decolonization and race. Robeson underwent intense scrutiny by the federal government because of his outspoken criticisms of American foreign policy and admiration for the Soviet Union. Robeson was impressed by Soviet strides to break poverty and the absence of racial animosity that pervaded the United States. On April 20, 1949 at the Paris Peace Conference he asserted, ‘Negroes would not fight against Russia…Go ask the Negro workers in the cotton plantations of Alabama…Will they fight for peace so that new ways can be opened up for freedom…or be drawn into a war in the interest of the senators who have just filibustered them out of their civil rights.’\textsuperscript{19} This was viewed as subversive by the House Un-American Affairs Committee (HUAC). Robeson’s stance revealed fissures both within the old left and the civil rights community spawned by the red scare. He was denounced by baseball legend Jackie Robinson

\textsuperscript{17} Foner, \textit{Paul Robeson Speaks}, 572, n. 4.
and other institutions such as the Urban League.\textsuperscript{20} W.E.B. DuBois, on the other hand, rejected this critique claiming that Robeson was pointing to the contradictions of European neocolonialism as found in Indochina and its American mirror in the United States, in contrast to the Soviet Union where racism was a crime.\textsuperscript{21} But the American government would have none of it and Robeson would lose his passport and be blacklisted for his critique of American Cold War policy and race. This was followed by an unsuccessful attempt by the federal government to frame DuBois in 1951 as an unregistered foreign agent.\textsuperscript{22}

The Vietnamese thwarted France’s design to reestablish hegemony over Indochina. As the French effort faltered, the United States became more deeply involved. Journalist William Worthy critiqued America’s role in Vietnam in February 1954. After reviewing American support for the French in Vietnam he attacked America’s ‘conspiracy of silence about not only the internal slavery our witch hunters are leading us step by step; but also slavery’s external counterpart: namely, [the] counter-revolutionary direction of American policies among darker peoples.’ He concluded, ‘When …does a citizen brace his feet and ask why?’\textsuperscript{23} Robeson’s incendiary ‘Ho Chi Minh is the Toussaint L’Ouverture of Indo-China’ followed the next month as direct American intervention was considered. In spite of American’s unwillingness to intervene in Vietnam, public debate never considered connecting America’s intransigent problem with race to the plight of the Vietnamese. The critique served up by Worthy and Robeson seemed radical and out of step with mainstream American politics. Robeson remained blacklisted and was hauled before HUAC in 1955 for

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23} Worthy, William. 1954. ‘Our Disgrace in Indochina’. The Crisis 61 (2): 83.
\end{itemize}
a humiliating grilling that challenged his identity as an American citizen, a point not lost by those within the Old Left.\footnote{Investigation of the Unauthorized Use of Passports – Part 3'. In Foner, \textit{Paul Robeson Speaks}, 427.}

Walter Reuther’s anti-communism allowed him to continue to pressure for civil rights in a way that echoed the sentiments of Mordecai Johnson. Addressing the annual convention of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) on June 26, 1957 Reuther explained, ‘This [the Cold War] is a struggle for hearts and minds... America’s immorality in the field of civil rights could be the Achilles’ heel of American democracy in the struggle against communist tyranny’\footnote{‘Address of Walter P. Reuther Before the Annual Convention of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Detroit, Michigan, June 26, 1957’. In Foner, Philip S., Ronald L. Lewis, and Robert Cvornyek (eds.). 1984. \textit{The Black Worker since the AFL-CIO Merger, 1955–1980}. Vol. VIII. Philadelphia: 424–425.} Gone however was the connection between American foreign policy in Vietnam and civil rights. After 1955 Reuther’s foreign policy positions were compromised by the newly formed American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL CIO) dominated by its new President George Meany and Jay Lovestone who insisted that American foreign policy could not be questioned.\footnote{Boyle, \textit{The UAW and the Heyday of American Liberalism}, 103-106.}

The French disaster at the battle of Dien Bien Phu set the stage for American consideration of direct intervention, a proposition which 68 % of the American public rejected in a Gallup Poll May 1954. The international community ended the conflict in July.\footnote{Prados, \textit{Vietnam}, 27–30. Franklin, \textit{Vietnam and Other American Fantasies}, 51–52.} Vietnam was neutralized through the Geneva Accords, but the United States decided to continue its policy of containment in Vietnam through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) treaty and support of what became the Republic of South Vietnam. Americans fared no better than the French.\footnote{Though the United States had agreed not to disturb the Geneva Accords it had created SEATO in September 1954 that included a protocol that would protect the southern portion of Vietnam from the communist north. To that end they supported Ngo Dinh Diem as the leader of South Vietnam whose patron/client}
insertion of over 16,000 advisors and an aid package costing hundreds of millions of dollars a year, the United States was thwarted by a determined National Liberation Front. Worse still, the deliberate antagonism of the Buddhist majority by the American backed regime exploded into violence in May 1963 and exposed the magnitude of the opposition to the government.\(^{29}\) By fall of 1963 the dramatic escalation of the American effort by President John F. Kennedy had largely failed, leaving Lyndon B. Johnson with the unenviable problem of how to resolve the chaotic political situation in South Vietnam beset by an internal revolution and open civil war with North Vietnam.\(^{30}\) Dissent with American policy in Vietnam had largely been shut down by 1955. Popular dissent with what became the American War in Vietnam and its connection to the neo-colonial critique developed slowly. What is the connection between old left dissent as resurrected by SNCC and Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)?

The connection was made by a variety of actors on both the international and domestic stage. The Afro-Asian Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia April 1955 that included newly independent countries such as Egypt and India demanded a place in global politics and economics that assured their sovereignty. Importantly, they demanded an end to the bloody contest being waged throughout the former colonial world by the superpowers.\(^{31}\) Bandung provided the foundation for the non-aligned movement and intensified the neo-colonial critique leveled against the

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superpowers. In the United States a collection of diverse groups such as the American Friends Service, the War Resisters League, and the Student Peace Union (SPU) opposed American Cold War policy in general and worked together on issues such as nuclear testing. The SPU was the largest student organization until 1963. 32 By 1960 labor cooperation between older civil rights groups was extended to a younger generation through the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID) who in 1960 changed their name to Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). This was seen as advantageous for labor and civil rights. This cooperation which included financial support further cemented the relationship between the old and what would become the new left. 33 However, this same financial support by the League for Industrial Democracy (LID) through the AFL CIO initially served to restrain connecting civil rights to American foreign policy in Vietnam. SNCC was certainly one of the critical engines that spawned the New Left, but it was the SPU that acted as a bridge to publically resurrect the fiery neo-colonial critique that directly connected American foreign policy in Vietnam to the politics of race as offered by the likes of Robeson and William Worthy.

To the chagrin of many within the Old Left SPU directly criticized the militarization of American policy in Southeast Asia and on college campuses. The SPU monthly bulletin for October featured a story on the Laotian elections of May 1959 that resulted in the Communist MP’s going to prison and the International Control Commission established by the Geneva Convention of 1954 leaving in protest. Beginning in 1958 the United States had backed a coup that unseated neutralist Souvanna Phouma for a more aggressive pro American General Phoui Sanankone which initiated a bitter Civil War that was stoked directly by both the United States and the Soviet Union. 34 The November bulletin featured University of California student, Fred Moore who went on a fast to protest

   The role SNCC played in shaping the New Left is crucial see: ‘Bridges to the North’ in Hogan, Many Minds, One Heart, 95–116.
34 Tamiment (hereafter TAM) Student Peace Union Records, 1959-1964, Box 1, TAM-057. SPU Bulletin October 1959. ‘Memorandum From the Deputy Director
compulsory Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) on the campus. In two days he had collected 1,000 signatures.\textsuperscript{35}

By 1962 SPU targeted Kennedy’s escalation in Vietnam, insisting on self-determination for the people of Vietnam ‘without the fear of American troops intervening in [their] civil war’.\textsuperscript{36} SPU also became deeply enmeshed in civil rights, which included the campaign to desegregate Chapel Hill, North Carolina. The consequences of accelerating violence unleashed against civil rights projects in the United States and the unrelenting brutality of the Vietnam War came together at the SPU National Convention in June, 1963. The Convention likened Vietnam to an imperialist adventure at the expense ‘...of first class citizenship for Negroes and other minorities’.\textsuperscript{37} Though the SDS Port Huron Statement June 1962 poignantly exposed contradictions between post-World War II ideals and American Cold War policy, it failed to connect these ideas to specific policies as SPU had done. SDS was funded by organized labor through the League for Industrial Democracy (LID) who insisted that SDS not engage in united action with procommunist organizations. SPU unconstrained by such financial ties went bankrupt in 1964. It would be Robert Moses along with other parts of SNCC that would forcefully bring the connection of civil rights and Vietnam to the fore. SDS broke with LID in 1965 and was then free to officially adopt this line of protest.\textsuperscript{38}

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\textsuperscript{35} TAM, SPU Bulletin, November, 1959.

\textsuperscript{36} TAM, National Council, Convention, 1962 Folder, 1962 National Convention, Political Action Resolution.

\textsuperscript{37} TAM, Correspondence et. al., 1963-1964. SPU News Notes 7, SPU Field Worker Pat Cusick, Report from Charlottesville, NC and National Council, Convention, 1963, Minutes, Resolution on Vietnam and Statement of Purpose, Civil Rights.

\textsuperscript{38} TAM, SDS Ephemera, Box 2, Letter from Vera Rony, Executive Secretary, LID to SDS, July 2, 1962, Letter from Tom Hayden to Vera Rony, July 24, 1962, LID News Bulletin, 1965 and Box 11, SDS, 1962-1963 Development, Letter from Tom Hayden to Todd Gitlin, August 2, 1963, National Secretary’s Report, SDS National Convention, June 1963.
certainly resonated with Martin Luther King who in 1967 would elegantly explain the brutal connection between civil rights and foreign policy at the Riverside Church in New York City on April 5, 1967. ‘If America’s soul becomes totally poisoned, part of the autopsy must read Vietnam.’

How do we teach this narrative in the classroom?

Americans remain uncomfortable with this type of story as it sets the egalitarian ideals forwarded by the United States during the Cold War against the bitter reality of civil rights at home and its connection to American foreign policy in Vietnam. In 2010 the Texas School Board proposed that High School students learning about civil rights be required to understand that segregationists such as George Wallace were attempting to maintain the ‘status quo.’ While this may be viewed as a distortion of the civil rights narrative, and one that distracts attention from Klan violence, there are other ways to avoid making connections between foreign and domestic policy. The State of Virginia’s Standards of Learning underscores the importance of the Supreme Court’s 1954 Brown v Board of Education decision and Virginia’s response, which forces students to confront the State’s segregation policies of the time. Davis v County School Board of Prince Edward County, located in Virginia, became one of the cases challenging school segregation that was taken up by the Supreme Court as part of Brown v Board of Education. Furthermore, the curriculum indicates that students must understand the importance of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Yet the requirements seem to stop at what Manning Marable calls the politics of engagement. Missing is the connection that would help students


understand the politics of confrontation.\textsuperscript{42} This is due to an interpretation of the Vietnam War in which ‘the Geneva Accords divided Vietnam into two countries’, or that ‘the communist government of North Vietnam attempted to instill through force a communist government in South Vietnam’. In this light American containment policy in Southeast Asia makes sense, but problematizes another standard that encourages students to understand how the war ‘bitterly divided’ Americans.\textsuperscript{43} The State of Rhode Island Grade Span Expectations for Civics and Government and Historical Perspectives/Rhode Island History take a different approach, as they were designed to ‘capture the big ideas of civics and history’ and not ‘narrow or replace existing social studies curriculum.’ Students are expected to ‘analyze democratic ideals’ opposed to the ‘realities of American social and political life exemplified by the concept of equal protection of the law and the reality of discrimination.’ In another section, students are expected to ‘analyze multiple perspectives on current and historical events’ such as Vietnam.\textsuperscript{44} The concepts are important for high school students to understand, but in spite of attempts to understand American/Rhode Island history at a global level, the connection between civil rights and Vietnam remains absent. If these connections are not mandated, how and where can students make these connections?

Connections between America’s enemies and dissent remain a volatile issue in American politics, exemplified by revelations about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is not surprising, therefore, that connections made by Paul Robeson about the plight of people of color in Vietnam and the

\textsuperscript{42} Manning Marable identifies the politics of the Civil Rights movement following World War II to 1965 as that of engagement more in line with the non-violent tactics of Martin Luther King and SNCC, whereas after 1965 [in line with the escalation of the Vietnam War] politics become confrontational as evidenced by the demand for Black Power. See: Marable, Manning. 2001. \textit{Race, Reform, and Rebellion}. Jackson. 84–105.


\textsuperscript{44} Rhode Island Grade Span Expectations for Civics and Government and Historical Perspectives/Rhode Island History. 2008. Final Version, 1, 7, 10.
United States are absent in textbooks.\textsuperscript{45} Interestingly, two recent textbooks proposed for use in Rhode Island utilize excerpts from Martin Luther King’s Riverside address in 1967 in an attempt to reveal these connections. In Prentice Hall’s \textit{United States History} we find his devastating critique ‘…We have been repeatedly faced with the irony of watching Negro and white boys on TV screens as they kill and die together for a nation that has been unable to seat them together in the same school.’\textsuperscript{46} Glencoe’s \textit{American Vision}, considered for use by the Providence School District, features another King segment, ‘…I speak for the poor of America who are paying the double price for smashed hopes at home and death and corruption in Vietnam…The great initiative in this war is ours. The initiative to stop must be ours.’\textsuperscript{47} Though the connection is made, it is not connected to the evolution of the critique reviewed here. Both texts indicate that opposition to the war began either in 1965 or 1966, affirming Bruce J. Schulman’s criticism that early opposition to the war, with the exception of the free speech movement, is largely ignored.\textsuperscript{48} The war is framed in foreign policy terms in which the United States continues its policy of containment. American support for French involvement in Vietnam is based on this bipolar dichotomy, and though we find ourselves enmeshed in the terms of an authoritarian regime our intentions are noble.\textsuperscript{49} Escalation becomes inevitable and the root causes of dissent encapsulated by World War II war aims are avoided. The power of this revitalized old left critique


\textsuperscript{46} Lapansky-Werner, Emma J.; et al. 2008. \textit{United States History}. Boston. 993.


to shatter the liberal Cold War consensus in 1965 is obscured making it appear radical and unique.

After a review of the American escalation and expansion of the war, the texts continue to the politics of détente and the Cold War, moving away from the complexity of Vietnam to the inevitable conclusion of the Cold War. This mirrors the discomfort that many teachers have with Vietnam and its connections with the freedom movement.\(^5^0\) In Rhode Island many teachers are unable to cover the topic, or do so, only at a surface level, because of time and a curriculum that packs all of United States history into one year. Others avoid teaching about Vietnam altogether, by ending U.S. History at the end of World War II. Some even jump over the topic.

Vietnam is difficult to teach in a narrative that points to a victorious past and to the promise of the future. Vietnam is sandwiched in between complicated discussions of Civil Rights centered on the politics of engagement, America’s technological prowess, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and American success at reducing Cold War tension. Commitment to this narrative assures less possibility of criticism from nervous parents and an inoculation against the volatile politics that surround the story. Avoiding these painful connections remains the rule, despite the fact that students enjoy the challenge laid out by contested history. Engaging in creative activities enables students to grapple with some of the seemingly impossible choices and compromises that plagued the actors at all levels during this time.\(^5^1\)

Most recently I had the opportunity to stage a role play I created with students from one of my foreign policy courses ‘The American War in Vietnam’ at Rhode Island College and an advanced placement U.S. History class from Lincoln High School through a mini-grant from the State of Rhode Island which encourages collaborations between secondary and higher education. ‘A Cold War Reenactment: July 1965: America at the Crossroads, Vietnam’ enabled students to participate in a fictitious


debate regarding American escalation in Vietnam. Students play the roles of Lyndon Johnson, key players from the National Security Council, Dissenters within the National Security Council and the United States Senate, as well as Popular Dissent that included players from SNCC, SDS and notables such as Martin Luther King and Malcolm X, and a skeptical press corps. The purpose of the exercise is to develop student’s historical skills through formulating interpretations and analyses based on multiple perspectives and competing narratives in order to understand the intersections between United States foreign and domestic policy from a global perspective.

The players are chosen at random. Students are required to research their particular character in depth and to create detailed outlines or notecards that they use in the context of the reenactment. All players are provided with a basic set of documents that provide them with an outline of their character’s argument and clues where to find more documents. To add depth and context for their character students make use of materials that shaped their particular character’s point of view. For example, the Robert Moses and Malcolm X characters include old left critique as described earlier in this paper, whereas Robert McNamara and McGeorge Bundy characters make use of previous rationales made by their predecessors such as John Foster Dulles and the SEATO treaty to explain the need to contain communism. The press corps is divided into four groups in order to focus in on one point of view and formulate questions designed to challenge the arguments. This means they need to get into their documents and familiarize themselves with counter-arguments. All players make use of biographies and other interpretive materials.

The National Security Council presents its arguments for escalation. They are followed by dissenters within the executive and legislative branches, and finally the voices of popular dissent are heard. The three groups are provided with a follow up in order to respond to critique and undermine their opponent’s position. At this point the President closely questions each group in order to weigh the options as he decides whether to escalate the war in Vietnam. This is followed by a twenty-minute press conference in which the press grills all parties. The reenactment closes with the President’s decision and an examination of the rationale he used in making it.
This cooperative exercise provides students with the opportunity to test arguments they have formulated, and through debate understand where they need to fill in gaps in their research. Preparation for the group presentations provides students with a chance to examine a wider range of research models and character sketches which they can utilize in their final papers. Students in my class are required to write a research paper that cogently presents their particular character’s point of view and actions. The exercise is reinforced on my final exam through an essay in which students are asked to weigh the arguments and rationale for escalation of the war in 1965. The high school students wrote an essay about their experience in which they explained what they might have argued differently resulting from the exercise.

Students from both classes became deeply engaged in the role play. The high school students took a cue from my students as they presented arguments designed to undermine their opponents. It was clear that the younger students enjoyed having the opportunity to argue forcefully with adults. The interaction between college and high school students proved interesting and certainly helped all students to better clarify their arguments. Important for both the high school and college students was the fact that the exercise quickly gets to the deep divisions that marked American society at this time and the volatility engendered by the connections of race and foreign policy. It also showed how our present understanding of this period is shaped by the contested politics of 1965 that were rooted in the promises of what the post-World War II world would be as interpreted by all involved in the debate at the time. All parties in the debate undergirded the veracity of their claims with the promises of freedom enshrined both in America’s rational legal documents and Charter of the United Nations. The stakes couldn’t have been higher for all parties involved.

Race was a key component of politics in the post war WWII world as the former colonies broke the chains of the masters who had excused their domination of the third world based on the discredited theory of eugenics. The new world order envisioned by the Atlantic Charter seemed to be the death knell of old world order and the United States could not escape the new global reality that placed its policies of segregation under the spotlight. The logic of segregation was no longer acceptable to the freedom movement confronted by the Ku Klux Klan or institutionalized racism.
The escalation of the Vietnam War coincided with the demand for civil rights, and by 1965 the arguments had begun to change from the politics of engagement to confrontation that would hasten the coming of Black Power in 1966. What burned 1965 indelibly into the consciousness of both those within and outside the United States was the symmetry of violence exacted against people of color in Vietnam and places like McComb County, Mississippi. The violence that erupted in Watts on August 11, 1965 was emblematic of what the denial of access to the levers of economic power coupled with racism had wrought. These problems could not be ignored. What Paul Robeson and W.E.B. DuBois understood in 1949 certainly held true in 1965. What was viewed as fringe politics in the aftermath of World War II became the frame for popular dissent after 1965. It is no wonder then that it is a story many preferred to forget in the post 1945 Cold War world when the United States held sway as the bastion of freedom and democratic change.

References


Contributors

Benziger, Karl, M.A., PhD, professor of History, State University of New York, College at Fredonia, USA; e-mail: kbenziger@ric.edu

Bernhard, Philipp, M.A., graduated in History, American Studies and Philosophy/Ethic, research assistant in History Didactics at Augsburg University, Germany; e-mail: philipp.bernhard@philhist.uni-augsburg.de

Eeden, Elize S. van, professor of History, North West University, South Africa; e-mail: elize.vanEeden@nwu.ac.za

Fisch, Jörg, Dr. phil. habil, professor of History, University of Zürich, Switzerland; e-mail: joerg.fisch@uzh.ch

Furrer, Markus, Dr. phil. habil., professor of History and History Didactics, teacher training college Luzern, Switzerland; e-mail: markus.furrer@phlu.ch

Gorbahn, Katja, PhD, associate professor for German language, literature, and culture, Aarhus University, Denmark; e-mail: katja.gorbahn@cc.au.dk

Grindel, Susanne, PhD, head of the staff unit ‘key issues’ at the president's office of Marburg university, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Germany; e-mail: susanne.grindel@staff.uni-marburg.de

Haydn, Terry, PhD, professor of Education, University of East Anglia, UK; e-mail: T.Haydn@uea.ac.uk

Kang, Sun Joo, PhD, professor of Education, Gyeongin National University of Education, South Korea; e-mail: sukang@ginue.ac.kr

Mabe, Jacob Emmanuel, Dr. Dr. phil. habil., professor of Intercultural Philosophy, permanent Visiting Scholar at the French Centre of the Free University in Berlin, Germany; e-mail: Jacobemabe@t-online.de

Meng, Zhongjie, PhD, professor of World History, East China Normal University, Shanghai, China; e-mail: zjmeng@history.ecnu.edu.cn

Nagy, Mariann, Dr. phil. habil., associate professor of History, Károli Gáspár University, Budapest, Hungary; e-mail: nagy.mariann@kre.hu
Nasser, Riad, PhD, professor of Sociology, Fairleigh Dickinson University, USA; e-mail: nasser@fdu.edu

Popp, Susanne, PhD, professor, chair of History Didactics, University of Augsburg, Germany; e-mail: susanne.poppp@philhist.uni-augsburg.de

Röder, Dennis, M.A., graduated in History and English Studies, doctoral student in History Didactics at Augsburg University; teacher for History and English, Germany; e-mail: Dennis.Roeder@gmx.de

Shen Chencheng, M.A. graduated in History at East China Normal University, Shanghai, fellow of the China Scholarship Council (CSC), doctoral student in History Didactics at Augsburg University, China/Germany; e-mail: zodiac1848@126.com

Wagner, Florian, Dr. phil. habil., assistant professor for Contemporary European History in Global Perspective, University of Erfurt, Germany; e-mail: florian.wagner@uni-erfurt.de

Yuan, Xiaoqin, graduated in History, research assistant in World History at East China Normal University, Shanghai, China; e-mail: zjmeng@history.ecnu.edu.cn