Anarchism and Political Modernity

Nathan Jun
Anarchism and Political Modernity
CONTEMPORARY ANARCHIST STUDIES

A series edited by
Laurence Davis National University of Ireland, Maynooth
Uri Gordon Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, Israel
Nathan Jun Midwestern State University, USA
Alex Prichard London School of Economics, UK

Contemporary Anarchist Studies promotes the study of anarchism as a framework for understanding and acting on the most pressing problems of our times. The series publishes cutting edge, socially engaged scholarship from around the world—bridging theory and practice, academic rigor and the insights of contemporary activism.

The topical scope of the series encompasses anarchist history and theory broadly construed; individual anarchist thinkers; anarchist-informed analysis of current issues and institutions; and anarchist or anarchist-inspired movements and practices. Contributions informed by anticapitalist, feminist, ecological, indigenous, and non-Western or global South anarchist perspectives are particularly welcome. So, too, are manuscripts that promise to illuminate the relationships between the personal and the political aspects of transformative social change, local and global problems, and anarchism and other movements and ideologies. Above all, we wish to publish books that will help activist scholars and scholar activists think about how to challenge and build real alternatives to existing structures of oppression and injustice.

International Editorial Advisory Board
Martha Ackelsberg, Smith College
John Clark, Loyola University
Jesse Cohn, Purdue University
Ronald Creagh, Université Paul Valéry
Marianne Enckell, Centre International de Recherches sur l’Anarchisme
Benjamin Franks, University of Glasgow
Judy Greenway, University of East London
Ruth Kinna, Loughborough University
Todd May, Clemson University
Salvo Vaccaro, Università di Palermo
Lucien van der Walt, University of the Witwatersrand
Charles Weigl, AK Press
Anarchism and Political Modernity

Nathan Jun

Contemporary Anarchist Studies
## CONTENTS

*Acknowledgments*  vii  
*Introduction*  viii  

1  **On politics**  1  
   Introduction  1  
   Political naturalism in Aristotle  3  
   Classical and medieval political thought  7  
   Machiavelli  9  
   Social physics  11  
   From politics to political philosophy  15  
   A critique of May’s taxonomy  20  

2  **On political philosophy**  25  
   Normativity: A survey  25  
   An alternative taxonomy  35  
   On political modernity  42  

3  **Liberalism**  47  
   Representationalism  47  
   Human nature  53  
   Normativity  60  
   Politics  64  
   Economics  72  

4  **Socialism**  79  
   Hegel, historicism, and holism  79  
   The social conception of human nature  87  
   Morality versus science  89  
   The politics and economics of socialism  91  
   From modernity to anarchism  104
## CONTENTS

### 5 Anarchism 109
- History of the bogeyman 109
- Defining anarchism 111
- The political axiology of anarchism 120
- Anarchism and power 134
- Anarchism and utopianism 141
- Nature, humanity, and science 143
- The specter of Nietzsche 151
- Conclusion 153

### 6 Political postmodernity 155
- Defining postmodernity 155
- Deconstructive analysis 157
- Genealogical analysis 159
- Poststructuralist anarchism? 164
- Schizoanalysis 167
- A critique of May’s poststructuralist anarchism 175
- Conclusion 181

**Notes** 187

**Bibliography** 224

**Index** 243
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful to the many people who made this book possible, including, but not limited to: my editor, Marie-Claire Antoine, who has been extremely patient in spite of numerous delays and setbacks; my friends Jesse Cohn, Benjamin Franks, Laurence Davis, and Alex Prichard, all of whom have contributed, in various positive ways, to the argument I develop in this volume; the University Research Committee at Midwestern State University, which provided generous research funding for this project in the 2009–2010 academic year; and most of all my wife Michelle who supports me with love and encouragement in all my endeavors.

What follows is based on my doctoral dissertation at Purdue University, which was completed in 2008 under the direction of Daniel W. Smith. Earlier versions of some of the content appeared in Anarchist Studies; Philosophy Today; Working USA; Anarchism and Moral Philosophy, ed. B. Franks and M. Wilson (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); and The Postanarchism Reader, ed. D. Rousselle and S. Evren (Pluto, 2011).

Nathan Jun
“The anarchist,” wrote Theodore Roosevelt, “is the enemy of humanity, the enemy of all mankind, and his is a deeper degree of criminality than any other.”¹ From 1880 to 1920 in the United States, these “criminals,” whose “perverted instincts [led them] to prefer confusion and chaos to the most beneficent form of social order,”² were mercilessly vilified by the press, repeatedly beaten and imprisoned by the police, and, in several notorious instances, deported and executed by the federal government. In France an estimated 10,000 of them were butchered when the Paris Commune fell in 1871. In Russia under the Czars, thousands were rounded up by the Okhrana and shot like dogs in the streets; under the Soviets, thousands more were captured by the Cheka and worked to death in Siberian mines. In Spain untold numbers were routinely incarcerated and massacred without cause, first by Primo de Rivera and later by Generalissimo Franco. Who were these people and what did they do to merit such brutal treatment?

As it turns out, most of these so-called enemies of mankind were members of already oppressed and marginalized groups—immigrants, exiles, and refugees; vagrants, beggars, and wanderers; artists, dissidents, and freethinkers; women, homosexuals, Jews, and ethnic minorities—whose sole crime was that of criticizing “the most beneficent form of social order” in both word and deed. They published newspapers and pamphlets; organized unions and cooperatives; initiated strikes, marches, and demonstrations; preached “the Idea” from street corners and soapboxes—in short, struggled militantly against a system that, far from being beneficent, appeared in their view fundamentally opposed to the goals of freedom, equality, and peace. In the United States, anarchists and other socialists campaigned for and helped achieve the eight-hour working day, the abolition of child labor, the enactment of safety regulations in the workplace, the minimum wage, and the right to unionize, among other things. They vigorously condemned America’s incursions into Cuba and the Philippines, its attempts to overthrow the Bolsheviks in Russia, and its involvement in the First World War. They protested against racial and ethnic discrimination, championed the rights of women, and promoted tolerance for gays and lesbians.

Unfortunately a very tiny handful of them, both in the United States and abroad, resorted to murder, assassination, and terrorism in pursuit of such
ends. Then, as now, the bad apples not only spoil the bunch but inevitably receive the most attention as well. As a result, the anarchist of popular imagination has long been, and continues to be, a fanatic, an extremist, a terrorist. Americans, already notorious for our historical amnesia, are unlikely to know or even learn about Emma Goldman, Voltairine de Cleyre, or Lucy Parsons. On the rare occasions that we are able to recognize and remember a “famous anarchist,” it is most likely Leon Czolgosz, the madman who assassinated President William McKinley. The philosophy of anarchism, in turn, continues to be associated with violence, with terror, with “confusion and chaos.”

It goes without saying that some people who have been identified, or who have identified themselves, as anarchists were indeed depraved lunatics or malicious hoodlums who gloried in the creation of chaos for the sake of chaos. Although historians recognize that such individuals constituted a small minority within the broader anarchist movement, this has not prevented them from consigning that movement to marginalia and footnotes, if not ignoring it altogether, and continuing to play up and sensationalize its most fanatical elements. Philosophers and political scientists, meanwhile, have paid scant attention to anarchism as a political theory. Within the so-called Anglo-American tradition, the precious few who have studied, or attempted to study, anarchism have consistently misinterpreted and misunderstood it.

From a purely academic vantage, the attempt to accurately understand and correctly interpret philosophical theories is generally considered a worthwhile pursuit, even when the theories in question are viewed as obscure, insignificant, or of little interest to anyone save the pure historian—and it is safe to assume that this is how many if not most Anglo-American political philosophers regard the study of anarchism. As the anthropologist David Graeber points out, however, anarchist political philosophy “is veritably exploding right now [and] anarchist or anarchist-inspired movements are growing everywhere; traditional anarchist principles—autonomy, voluntary association, self-organization, mutual aid, direct democracy—have gone from the basis for organizing within the globalization movement, to playing the same role in radical movements of all kinds everywhere.” Why, then, has anarchism continued to be mostly ignored within academia and especially in Anglo-American philosophy? Although there are no easy answers to these questions, one tentative answer concerns the fundamentally conservative nature of Anglo-American philosophy. As the late David Mitrany noted, “most political philosophers in the past few generations have what the psychoanalysts might call a 'state fixation.'” Liberalism is not just one theory—albeit the dominant one—among many theories, but instead has become the de facto framework within which all political theorizing is carried out. In such a context, the idea of abolishing the state, let alone capitalism, is at best hopelessly utopian and at worst patently absurd.
Ironically, mainstream Anglo-American philosophy (or what is often referred to as “analytical” philosophy) is more than a little marginalized within the American academy, having largely cut itself off from other disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. The same is not true of various strands of nineteenth- and twentieth-century European philosophy (e.g., phenomenology, existentialism, hermeneutics, and poststructuralism), which have tended to be interdisciplinary in orientation, drawing freely upon research in other academic fields as well as literature, visual art, cinema, and music. Over the last forty years, a wide range of scholars (literary theorists, art historians, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, etc.) have “returned the favor,” as it were, by drawing upon the insights of European philosophy in their own scholarly endeavors. In consequence, many American academics have implicitly or explicitly inherited the Marxist political orientation that colors much European philosophy. As Graeber notes, although “there are thousands of academic Marxists of one sort or another . . . most [of them] seem to have only the vaguest idea what anarchism is about or else dismiss it with the crudest stereotypes.”

The marginal status of anarchism in the academy is therefore a partial consequence of entrenched liberalism, on the one hand, and entrenched Marxism, on the other. This is an exceedingly odd state of affairs for at least two reasons: first, much of the European theory that has become a mainstay of American humanities departments has actually disavowed Marxism to greater or lesser extent; and second, Marxism has ceased to be a powerful or even relevant force within most contemporary radical movements. Regarding the second point, Graeber notes that “anarchism has by now largely taken the place [in contemporary social movements] that Marxism had in the social movements of the 60s: even those who do not consider themselves anarchists feel they have to define themselves in relation to it, and draw on its ideas.” As for the first point, even those academics who recognize that traditional Marxism has been surpassed continue to frame their analyses in largely Marxist terms (hence the use of “post-Marxism,” “neo-Trotskyism,” and similar descriptors).

One of the broadest goals of this book is to pull academia out from behind the curve. If it is indeed true that the major radical movements of the day are not just “post-Marxist” but anarchist in orientation—and this is scarcely in dispute—then scholars who desire to analyze and understand these movements can no longer afford to overlook anarchism. It is not enough, moreover, to consider anarchism in its current theoretical and practical manifestations. The anarchism of today is part of a tradition that stretches back to the early nineteenth century and even earlier in the strictest sense. In order to understand contemporary anarchistic movements such as Zapatismo, one must look to their historical precursors. This requires, in turn, that one situates anarchism in its proper historical and intellectual context.
All too often, historians have portrayed anarchism as a minor sect within the larger socialist movement. Socialism, in turn, has been identified as one of the two major political ideologies of the modern era, the other being liberalism. This would seem to imply that anarchism is just one more component of political modernity, albeit a small and largely insignificant one. However, if we construe modernity as more or less coextensive with Enlightenment thought and praxis—that is, as a set of distinctive movements, practices, and institutions underwritten by certain distinctive ideas and modes of thought associated with the Enlightenment—then anarchism is not, nor has it ever been, a component of modernity. On the contrary, anarchism has from the beginning defined itself against modernity—not by stealing Romantic glances at a premodern past, but by looking for something new, something that stands apart from, exists outside of, or altogether moves beyond, modernity. To this extent it is rightfully termed the first “postmodern” philosophical and political movement.

As far as I am aware no one has ever made such a claim about anarchism. In fact, almost everyone who has attempted to trace the origins of “postmodern” thinking to the nineteenth century has invariably associated them with Nietzsche. Such associations are not entirely inaccurate. After all, there is no doubt that Nietzsche was a systematic critic of modernity, a man who subjected every aspect of modernity, including its most basic theoretical foundations, to rigorous and devastating critique. Many would also argue that Nietzsche was the most important and influential critic of modernity. He was not, however, the first. As we shall see, that credit belongs to Proudhon and other key thinkers in nineteenth-century anarchism, whose critique of modernity is remarkably similar to Nietzsche’s even though it developed somewhat earlier.

The “postmodern” impulse that I associate with Nietzsche and the anarchists appeared alongside and coexisted with the modern—not as an outgrowth, a supplement, or a replacement, but as a kind of nagging opposition: a gadfly. Throughout the nineteenth century and since, it has manifested itself in every thought—whether from Nietzsche or Proudhon, Derrida or Foucault—that has not only questioned the foundations of modernity but has attempted to think otherwise. The problem, of course, is that every practical expression of this thought, every attempt to translate it into action, has thus far ended in failure—sometimes owing to the kind of naked aggression mentioned earlier, other times owing to more subtle strategies of appropriation and appeasement. In any case, the “postmodern” has as yet failed to be anything other than an impulse, an attitude, an abstraction. More damningly, it has tended to be understood chiefly, if not solely, as something negative, a negation of the modern. The unifying feature of everything that has been called “postmodern”—from art to architecture to philosophy—is opposition to Enlightenment in both its theoretical and practical expressions. If there is anything positive to be
found in “postmodernism,” it has typically been ignored or overlooked or dismissed as cynical. The result, not surprisingly, is that the postmodern impulse is frequently viewed as a nihilistic impulse, a will to negate, a will to nothingness. At its best it is clever and “playful”; it parodies or plays with the failures of modernity from within modernity, a space that it cannot, and knows it cannot, escape. At worst it is the most solemn pessimism imaginable, one that would suggest that we are always and already slouching toward another Auschwitz, or that Auschwitz is a locus that we are doomed to occupy forever.

Nowhere is this problem more evident than in what has been called “postmodern” political philosophy. We are told repeatedly that Derrida, Deleuze, Foucault, and Lyotard have done nothing save elevate the Nietzschean critique of modernity to a critical mass or a point of no return. We are told that they have not bothered formulating alternatives to modernity because they do not believe any such alternatives exist; that in attempting to think otherwise they have discovered that there is no otherwise to be thought. In recent years a number of philosophers have begun to challenge such claims. They have done so, moreover, by looking to what so many of their peers have ignored and continue to ignore: namely, the tradition of anarchism. Their investigations purport to reveal that postmodern political philosophy is not a nihilism but an anarchism, one which takes certain important cues from older anarchist traditions but ultimately transforms them into something altogether new. This “something new” is nothing other than the long-lost positive content of postmodern philosophy.

As I have already suggested, anarchism cannot be regarded as a fundamentally modern political philosophy that just happens to contain bits and pieces of postmodernity. Unfortunately, this is how many “postanarchists” have tended to characterize it. If we look hard enough, they claim, we will find those same bits and pieces scattered about the writings of Foucault and Deleuze. When we put them together, moreover, they end up constituting the moral and political framework of a postmodernism-which-is-an-anarchism. Unlike “classical anarchism”—a term which is almost always used pejoratively—this new “postmodern anarchism” or “poststructuralist anarchism” or “postanarchism” does not rely on conceptions of universal rationality, human nature, or any of the other paradigmatically “modern” illusions which Deleuze et al. have so skillfully and summarily dismissed.

Although I heartily welcome this renewed interest in, and enthusiasm about, anarchist political philosophy, I do not believe it has achieved much for anarchism or postmodernism. By and large, this is because much of what has been written about the connections between them leaves much to be desired. Every major writer on the subject has tended to treat anarchism as something akin to Marxism—that is, as a uniform and comprehensive system of thought devised by a handful of “canonical” thinkers, the doctrines of which are shared in common by all anarchists. But no one who engages
the history of anarchism with a modicum of rigor or precision can think of it in this way. There is no such thing as “classical anarchism.” In fact, there is no such thing as “Anarchism” (with a capital A)—only a diverse array of theories and practices developed by a diverse array of individuals who, despite their myriad differences, share certain basic commitments in common. It is a mistake to privilege the ideas of any one of these individuals except for the sake of scholarly expedience (some of them wrote more than others, after all). Likewise, it is a mistake to assume that Bakunin’s philosophy, say, is fundamentally the same as Kropotkin’s philosophy (it’s not!).

These same writers have attributed numerous ideas to the so-called classical anarchists that they simply do not hold. It is not true, for example, that Kropotkin believed in a fundamentally altruistic or cooperative human “essence” or that Bakunin believed that all power as such is repressive. Nowhere do the anarchists make such claims; in fact, they repeatedly deny them. But this doesn’t seem particularly important to the postanarchists. They have produced a helpful caricature of anarchism, a straw man that has been used again and again to play up the alleged novelty of postmodernism—the idea that postmodernism has somehow found in anarchism a “diamond in the rough,” that it has scrubbed and scoured away the rough parts so that only the diamond remains; that this diamond, when placed in a suitably postmodern setting, will chase away the shadows of nihilism.

To be clear, I agree wholeheartedly that certain “postmodern” philosophers—especially Deleuze and Foucault—articulate a political philosophy that is anarchistic in nature. I am even willing to agree that these philosophers expand, elaborate, and to some degree improve upon earlier forms of anarchism in various important ways. What I take issue with, first of all, is the idea that “postmodernist” political philosophy represents an altogether new form of anarchism. In fact, all of the features that allegedly characterize that philosophy were already present to greater or lesser extent in classical anarchism more than a century before Deleuze, Foucault et al. began writing. It is not just that postmodernism is an anarchism, therefore, but that classical anarchism is arguably the first political postmodernism.

Second of all, I find fault with the interpretive strategy that certain writers have used to draw out connections between postmodernism and classical anarchism—chief among them, the attempt to show that they both espouse common normative principles. In fact, I believe that anarchists and poststructuralists alike categorically reject normativity. The upshot is that these writers often misinterpret poststructuralism at least as badly as they do classical anarchism.

There is no doubt that anarchism is a timely subject, one that is undergoing an important and influential resurgence. Other scholars have realized this, and I applaud them for bringing the long-ignored theoretical tradition of anarchism the attention it deserves. At the same time, I cannot help but feel
that their efforts, however well intentioned, have misrepresented anarchist theory. Prejudiced scholars have long assumed that there is no such thing as an “anarchist theoretical tradition” or that, if there is, it is deeply fragmented and incoherent. Postanarchist analysis of classical anarchist theory—the theory which historically precedes postanarchism and which postanarchism is supposed to supersede—has only corroborated such assumptions. It has portrayed classical anarchism as a theory at odds with itself, a theory that equivocates and contradicts itself, that is hopelessly muddled and inconsistent.

To help academia and the broader world understand anarchism in the present—how it connects with newer philosophical trends, why it is such a powerful force in contemporary social and political movements, and so forth—we must clear away the detritus of postanarchism and start from the very beginning. My foremost claim is that anarchism presents a vision of political postmodernity, one that is expressed immanently in both “classical” and “poststructuralist” modes. To defend this claim, however, I must start by defining the terms through which it will be articulated: the political; the meaning and purpose of political philosophy; and the nature of “political modernity” and the political philosophy that underlies it. Only then will I be in a position to define anarchism and, more importantly, to demonstrate why it is a vision of political postmodernity. From there, my goal is to explain whether, how, and to what extent this originary vision can be transformed by the insights of more recent philosophy. As such, this book will take a threefold approach.

In the first and second chapters, I analyze the category of “the political” and its relation to philosophy. In the second and third chapters, I explore the nature of political modernity in terms of its major theoretical traditions—namely, liberalism and socialism. These traditions are analyzed along four conceptual trajectories: descriptive theory, normative theory, political theory, and economic theory. In the fifth chapter, I provide a historical, exegetical, and critical examination of the anarchist political tradition in order to illustrate its connections to, and deviations from, both modern and postmodern political philosophy. In the sixth and final chapter, I argue that contemporary postmodern political philosophy—both in its negative and positive dimensions—should be understood as an expansion of or elaboration upon the anarchist tradition, but not in the way that philosophers such as May, Newman, and Call have suggested. On the contrary, I contend that anarchism is and always has been a kind of postmodernism in its own right.

The starting point of this book is a brief analysis of the category of “the political” and its concomitant relation to philosophy. In addition to discussing various classical approaches to these topics, I will devote special attention to Todd May’s conception of the political and his highly influential threefold schematization of political philosophy. As I will argue, May’s attempt to situate
the political in the interstice between facts and norms, though interesting in many ways, runs afoul his main project (viz., to unearth and demystify the positive content of postmodern political philosophy). In the first place, the distinction between facts and norms is clearly a product of modern rather than postmodern political discourse, and this for a number of reasons. To name just one, this distinction is founded on a conception of transcendental subjectivity rather than exterior forces, which produce, condition, affect, or otherwise underlie subjectivity, the latter being one of postmodernism’s most central and characteristic preoccupations. In the second place, May’s approach does not provide a means by which to distinguish “the political” from other categories that exist between is and ought (for example, practical reasoning more generally)—a crucial distinction that May very clearly wants to preserve.

So, too, May’s threefold schematization of political philosophy (formal, strategic, and tactical) fails to provide sufficiently clear distinctions among competing theoretical approaches. He is simply wrong, for example, to suggest that liberalism is a purely formal political philosophy, or that Marxism is a purely strategic political philosophy. In point of fact, such theories can and often do contain a mixture of formal, strategic, and tactical components. We must therefore look elsewhere for a means by which to distinguish them from each other. As I shall argue, the category of “the political” should be analyzed genealogically rather than formally. In other words, it ought not to be analyzed in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions so much as the conditions of possibility that give rise to it as a distinct conceptual category in the first place. I contend that politics is a social physics—a reciprocal affectivity among power relations. “The political,” by extension, is a purely descriptive category that refers to (a) the various ways in which power relations affect and are affected by other power relations, (b) the conditions of possibility for said affectivity, and (c) the conditions of possibility for social formations which power relations produce. Unlike May, therefore, I do not presuppose any distinction between facts and norms in my definition of the political because I do not presuppose any entities that are already “subject” to norms.

The concept of normativity only becomes germane once we consider the relation between politics and philosophy. May, not to speak of many of his precursors, regards political philosophy as a negotiation between the descriptive (i.e., the sociophysical) and the prescriptive (i.e., the ethiconormative). Its purpose is to “apply” the latter, which is philosophical, to the former, which is scientific or empirical, in order to affect a reconciliation between them. On my view, however, the object of political philosophy isn’t the political itself so much as the aforesaid relation between politics and philosophy. By “philosophy,” moreover, I am not referring solely or even principally to ethics, but to the entire spectrum of philosophical analysis. As will become clear, my own approach to “philosophical analysis” is problematic rather
than theorematric. Following Deleuze and his peers, I understand philosophy in terms of the creation of concepts, which creation itself is undertaken in order to expose—not necessarily to “solve”—problems. According to this view, the purpose of political philosophy is to expound problems that emerge in the relation between the sociophysical and the political theories we invent to describe and/or explain it. This process, in turn, may involve creating new concepts that describe the nature and limits of said problems. Having clarified my own approach to political philosophy generally, my aim in Chapters 3 and 4 is to provide a historical, exegetical, and critical overview of political modernity. As I have already noted, I take “modernity” to refer to various concrete formations that correspond to abstract or intellectual formations (viz., of the Enlightenment). My discussion of modern political philosophy therefore revolves around the relation between political modernity and the philosophical ideas that simultaneously affect and are affected by political modernity. Particular attention is paid to the liberal tradition (in both its classical and modern forms) and the socialist tradition, both of which are analyzed along four conceptual trajectories. Ultimately I conclude that the politcophilosophical “core” of modernity is representation—the generic practice of dictating to people who they are, what they should want, and so forth.

Chapter 5 discusses classical anarchism. Although anarchist political philosophy is by no means a unified movement—different “anarchisms” may provide different definitions of anarchy, different justifications for pursuing anarchy, different strategies for achieving anarchy, and different models of social, economic, and political organization under anarchy, and so forth—all “anarchisms” are properly so called by virtue of certain distinct ideas, practices, and commitments. One of the chief questions I seek to answer in this chapter is what such ideas and practices might be, which in turn requires a detailed historical, exegetical, and critical analysis of key thinkers and movements within the anarchist tradition. Rather than argue, as May and others have done, that postmodernism is a kind of anarchism, I instead contend that anarchism as such is and always has been a kind of postmodernism. Among other things, such an argument yields a much fuller justification for interpreting the positive content of postmodern political philosophy through the lens of anarchism. More importantly, it provides the initial ingredients for a theory of political postmodernity.

My discussion of postmodern political philosophy proceeds in a similar but distinct fashion. Here I initially address how various “postmodern” thinkers—chiefly Deleuze and Foucault—have problematized and criticized modern political theories and concepts. In other words, I begin by way of via negativa, calling attention to the critical or oppositional side of postmodern political philosophy in order both to distinguish it from modern political philosophy and to motivate subsequent analysis of its positive content vis-à-vis an exploration of its connections with classical anarchism. Against the
postanarchists, I argue that the positive content of Deleuzean/Foucauldian political philosophy both produces and is produced by the same problems that constitute anarchism as discussed in the previous section. One of the most crucial implications of this argument is that anarchism, far from being a “solution” to said problems, is in fact presupposed by them. This is because the “postmodern” reading of anarchism offered in Chapter 3 reformulates anarchism as a problem or a precondition for problems rather than a principle. Instead of prescribing opposition to coercive authority anarchism calls attention to the problems that generate both descriptive and normative political theories—chief among them, the problem of representation. The political philosophies of Deleuze and Foucault are properly termed “anarchistic” largely because they attend to related if not altogether identical problems.

The point, however, isn’t merely to reiterate Deleuzean/Foucaultian criticisms of reactive social formations such as the state and capitalism. Rather, it is to show how Deleuze and Foucault lay an anarchistic groundwork for thinking otherwise—that is, for imagining a political theory and praxis that lies outside the framework of modern political philosophy. As I will argue, the main point of intersection between classical anarchism and postmodernism is a general critique of representation, both in its epistemic and political manifestations. This, in turn, requires a discussion of political normativity—a method for describing political relationships and a set of criteria by which to judge or evaluate them. Particular attention is paid to what I call “traditional normativity”—a classical liberal concept which subsumes human behavior under abstract, universal, and transcendent principles or laws (e.g., Kant’s categorical imperative, Bentham’s principle of utility, etc.). Some thinkers, most notably Paul Patton and Todd May, have attempted to situate Deleuzean normativity within this paradigm. May, for example, tries to found Deleuze’s political philosophy on a pair of normative principles that, he thinks, are intimated below the surface of Deleuze’s writings. As I will show, although he is correct to point out that Deleuze “promotes” ways of thinking and acting that affirm life, this promotion need not—indeed, cannot—be cashed out in terms of traditional normativity. Instead, I briefly explore an alternative reading of Deleuze on normativity, one that relies on the concept of “absolute deterritorialization,” or what I call “pragmatic norms.”

Ultimately, however, I argue that anarchism replaces normativity with an ethics or axiology based on the value of life (understood as the process by which an individual or group creates itself, transforms itself, etc.). For Deleuze and Foucault, no less than the anarchists, ethics presupposes the importance of experimenting, escaping along lines of flight, opening possibilities, and pursuing the new. More importantly, ethics would be conceptually prior to normativity if normativity is maintained—that is, it would function as a ground or guiding light for the creation and adoption
of norms. In the end I suggest that Deleuze and Foucault can adopt an ethics or axiology of life without forsaking the pivotal concept of immanence. Furthermore, I emphasize the extent to which such an ethics, in virtue of being nonteleological and antiutopian in orientation, precludes absolute moral judgment as well as practical speculation about the future. For anarchists, revolution is an ongoing process rather than a singular event. Thus I focus on how traditional anarchist strategies and practices—for example, an emphasis on local rather than global struggles; the discourse of diffuse forces rather than of class/modes of production; the principles of voluntary association, mutual aid, solidarity, direct action; and the creation of new institutions rather than single-minded opposition to existing institutions—is reinforced by postmodern political philosophy.

The overarching point of this book is to offer a preliminary revision of “classical anarchism” and, by extension, of its place in postmodern political discourse. Although many questions are left unanswered, my hope is that it not only provides a sturdy foundation for future investigations, but also a better understanding of the anarchist tradition in the here and now. As I suggested at the outset, such an understanding is desperately needed. In the “real world” of social and political struggle, anarchism has rolled steadily ahead, leaving academia largely behind. It is not just important but imperative that academics generally, and philosophers in particular, catch up with a movement that is “veritably exploding.” However, in order to understand why and how that movement is exploding, as well as where that explosion might lead, we must first achieve an accurate understanding of its origins and its history. It is to this task that I now turn.
On Politics

Introduction

Most of Western political thought from the classical period to the present has taken the concept of government as a fundamental presupposition. Indeed, the very word “political” means “having to do with forms of government” (polities), where the word “polities,” in turn, comes from the Greek polis, the ancient Greek city-state and its citizens. Like the axioms of Euclid’s geometry, government has been an implicit starting point, always assumed and never justified—the transcendental condition of possibility for thinking, writing, and talking about human social organization.

The government of which I speak, however, is not a political so much as an ontological force, preceding and constituting the polis and not the other way around. The earliest Greek philosophers believed that the universe as a whole was subject to government by a fundamental organizing principle known as the archē, a term which means “chief,” “authority,” or “head.” The archē brings order from chaos, defining the laws, relations, and hierarchies of nature. Human beings, no less than rocks, plants, and animals, are bound by and subject to its authority, our own authorities being mere expressions or extensions of a more basic natural order. It is this thought—which is archic in the purest and most literal sense of the word—that has been so foundational in Western politics.

Nowhere is this clearer, perhaps, than in Aristotelian political philosophy. For Aristotle politikē (politics) is a shorthand for politikē epistêmē (the science of politics). Like ethics (the things concerning customs of habits), politics belongs to the third of the three main categories of Aristotelian science, which are distinguished according to their respective ends (teloi): Contemplative or theoretical science (theorētikē epistêmē), which includes physics and metaphysics and is directed toward knowledge for its own sake; productive science (poiētikē epistêmē), which is directed toward the creation...
of useful or beautiful objects; and practical science (praktikê epistêmê), which is directed toward good or virtuous action.\(^2\)

In *Nicomachean Ethics* I.2 Aristotle famously defines the highest good as that end which all human beings desire for its own sake.\(^3\) Were the highest good desired solely as a means to something else, he argues, there could be no end to our search for it, and our desire to attain it would forever remain unfulfilled.\(^4\) For Aristotle this is an obvious logical problem, as an infinite chain of means-ends relationships (desiring X as a means to Y, which is in turn desired as a means to Z, and so on) is, strictly speaking, impossible. Thus there must be a highest good which is desired for its own sake, and this good, whatever it is, “belongs to the most sovereign and most comprehensive master science.”\(^5\) The highest good is *eudaimonia*, usually rendered as “happiness” or “flourishing,”\(^6\) and its “master science” is politics.\(^7\)

Aristotle assigns politics this role because it legislates all the activity—whether theoretical, productive, or practical—of the *polis*. To this extent, the various ends of these activities are all subordinate means to the ultimate political end, which for Aristotle is nothing less than the highest human good. This idea is reinforced in Book X of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where Aristotle suggests that politics involves the teaching and implementation of ethics at the level of human social communities.\(^8\) The treatise known as the *Politics* is largely devoted to analyzing, explaining, and directing the role of the statesman (*politikos*) in bringing this about.\(^9\) There Aristotle compares the statesman in his capacity as lawgiver (*nomothetês*) to a physician who must diagnose social ills and prescribe treatments (e.g., laws, habits, customs, mores, and institutions) with a mind to achieving the common good.\(^10\) These prescriptions are the constitution (*politeia*), “a certain ordering of the inhabitants of the *polis*.”\(^11\) For this reason the statesman is also likened to an artisan (*dêmiourgos*) who creates the constitution of the city-state from the “raw materials” of individual citizens and natural resources.\(^12\)

I need not go into extensive detail about the *Politics* here, though I will have occasion to return to it from time to time below. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note three general characteristics of Aristotelian politics, which is my point of departure in analyzing the history of Western politics as such. First, politics is “politicocentric”; it is always concerned with, and to a certain degree presupposes, the state under some description or other. Second, politics is always and already a normative discourse. It does more than merely describe the various forms human social relations can and do take;\(^13\) rather, it is concerned with how human social relations ought to be organized in order to achieve the highest good. Third, politics generally presupposes the concept of political force or power or else renders it secondary in the order of explanation. Political concepts are not defined in terms of a specifically political type of force or power, and political power as such is generally not subject to any sort of independent analysis. Let us explore these three characteristics in greater detail.
Political naturalism in Aristotle

In describing Aristotelian political theory as “politicocentric” I do not mean that it completely ignores other forms of interpersonal relationships and social organization. On the contrary, Aristotle provides a very extensive analysis of the forms of rule by which individuals or groups exert power over other individuals and groups—for example, despotic rule (slavery), marital rule, and paternal rule. In general, however, Aristotle regards marriage, the family, the institution of slavery, the village, and all other such relations as simple and primitive arrangements that come about for specific reasons but eventually and naturally evolve into the city-state. As I noted above, Aristotle views such relations as “raw material,” the components or parts of a community (koinônia) that are molded into a polis by the lawmaker through the implementation of the constitution. The entire process is directed toward the achievement of the good, which is its single telos and final cause.

To a limited extent, this outlook prefigures later thinkers like Hobbes for whom social relations may be seen as “solutions” to various sorts of problems and conflicts that arise among individuals in a state of nature. The crucial difference, of course, is that for Aristotle human beings are always and already social and political by nature. As Todd May helpfully notes:

In ancient philosophy, the question was: How should one live? . . . the question of how one should live is asked within a context that assumes the existence of a cosmological order to which a good life must conform. A human life does not exist divorced from the cosmological whole within which it is embedded. It has a role to play that ought to converge with or at least complement the movement of the rest of the universe. For Plato, that role consists in seeking the Good; for Aristotle it is a matter of living out a specifically human teleology. Neither doubts . . . that the universe has an order to it, a stability and a general form that ought to be mirrored and conformed to by the lives of human beings.

The city-state is prior to individuals and is contained, if only as a potentiality, within their nature as social creatures. Because the city-state is the natural end of all human association, the concrete actualization of the city-state by the lawmaker isn’t an arbitrary exertion of power but a necessary consequence of human nature. Furthermore, insofar as human beings have a nature or natural function (ergon) that is directed toward the natural end of eudaimonia, and insofar as the city-state is the fullest expression of this nature and its corresponding end, it follows necessarily that the existence of the city-state is, ceteris paribus, naturally good and just.

As to the second characteristic noted above, my point is merely that politics is not what one would call an empirical science but rather a kind
of social ethics. Insofar as ethics proper is concerned with the good of the individual, politics may be seen as pertaining to the good of the community as a whole. For this reason, it is no surprise that Aristotelian politics tends to focus on “statesmanship”—namely, on questions concerning the proper governance of extant political communities, where “proper” refers not to expedience but to virtue. In other words, the purpose of political science is to offer a kind of moral compass to “the good lawgiver and the true politician.”

Again, this is not to say that Aristotelian political theory is purely nondescriptive. As we have already seen, Aristotle provides a very extensive analysis of different forms of political and nonpolitical rule. The ultimate goal of his analysis, however, is to discover which of these forms are most conducive to the practice of virtue and, by extension, to the achievement of the good life. Put simply, the most important question for Aristotle is not what states are or how they come into existence, but rather how they ought to operate once they do, in fact, exist.

The last characteristic, which is closely related to the first two, is that Aristotelian politics is generally not concerned with questions of power. In fact, one could argue that Aristotle simply takes the existence of political power for granted. This follows directly from a rudimentary feature of Aristotelian science—namely, the method of explaining how things come to exist and why they behave as they do in terms of natural functions, causes, and ends. For Aristotle, individual human beings are naturally directed toward the good by internal causal principles such as appetite. Political power, in turn, is simply the internal causal principle which directs human communities toward their natural end. Thus it makes no sense to inquire whether and to what extent political power as such is “justified” or “legitimate.” For Aristotle this would be tantamount to asking whether human appetites, animal behavior, or the motion of the spheres are “justified” or “legitimate.” Such questions are specious precisely because whatever is natural is, ceteris paribus, good. Again, the principal goal of politics is not to justify political power nor even to explain its operation, but rather to show how political power ought to be implemented by the statesman (whose possession of, and claim to, political power is always and already presupposed).

Furthermore, there is a sense in which Aristotle regards political power (variously referred to as kratos, dynamis, exousia, etc.) as one more natural relation of force among many such forces—for example, motion. In Book III of the Physics, he defines motion as “the fulfillment of what is potentially, as such.” Taken by itself, this definition is highly ambiguous and readily open to misinterpretation. As Joseph Sachs has pointed out, “[it] is constructed at the limits of thought and speech, and inadequate translation makes it crumble away to nothing. It did not travel well in Latin, and in the form in which it came into English from Latin it is scarcely intelligible.” Particularly problematic is the word entelecheia, translated above as “fulfillment,” which Aristotle uses on three separate occasions
at the beginning, middle, and end of his account. The standard English translation of this word as it appears throughout the Aristotelian corpus is “actuality.” This seems, for the most part, to be a sound exegetical strategy. When Aristotle uses entelecheia in Book IX of the Metaphysics, for example, he specifically identifies it with the related word energeia, which refers to the actuality of a potency or, to use Joseph Sachs’s clever expression, “the being-at-work-staying-itself of a potency, as material.” Thus the actuality of a potency is not a definition of motion here, but rather a definition of being a thing—namely, “thinghood.”

If we translate entelecheia as “actuality” in the unique context of Physics III, then motion is defined as the actuality of what is potentially as such. This seems to imply that motion is somehow the end result or final product of a potentiality having become actual—in other words, that the motion of building a house (that is, the actuality of bricks and stones qua potentially a house) just is the house itself. But this seems absurd; surely the product of building is ontologically distinct from the process by which it is built. In order to circumvent this spurious conclusion, W.D. Ross argues, we must interpret entelecheia in the sense of motion not as actuality, but rather as the actualization of that which potentially is as such—namely, “if something is actually x and potentially y, motion is the making actual of its y-ness.” According to this view, motion is the process by which the potential y-ness in x is actualized—not the actuality of the potential y-ness in x.

Speaking very generally, power or force (dynamis) is understood as the capacity to be or become something. To use a simple example, a seed has the power to become a tree but not a dog. Motion itself, however, may also be seen as a form of dynamis. It is, in fact, the most basic and fundamental form of dynamis insofar as it underlies all particular instances of motion (i.e., the process by which a potential x becomes an actual x). From this it follows that political power (kratos) is the dynamis by which a collection of individuals becomes a city-state, and this in at least two senses: first, all human groups have the natural power to become a state through the formal causation of the constitution, the efficient causation of the statesman, and the final causation of eudaimonia; and second, the process by which human groups are transformed into states is dynamic (i.e., brought about by motion).

Here an important distinction must be made. In Metaphysics 5: 1015a–b, Aristotle introduces the concept of bia, “a kind of necessity which hinders and impedes the course of impulse and purpose.” In Aristotelian physics, as is well known, the natural state of objects is stasis or rest. Objects belonging to nature (physis) possess the ability to set themselves in motion by means of growth, accidental change, displacement, generation, and destruction. Thus, for example, the process by which a seed grows into a tree does not involve the application of any sort of external power but is rather guided by internal principles of causation. Artificial objects, in
contrast, belong to “convention” (*nomos*) and so require *bia*, the external force that causes them to move against their own natural tendency toward rest. 41 Consider, for example, the process by which a pile of stones becomes a house. This requires the work of builders, which is a form of efficient causation involving the application of external force or *bia*. (Simply put, the house does not and cannot build itself.) The formation of a city-state is analogous to the construction of a house insofar as the process of uniting human beings into a cohesive political entity requires the intervention of a ruler whose application of political power is the efficient cause of said entity.

At first glance such an analogy seems accurate; Aristotle does claim that the statesman creates city-states through the application of political power. The problem, as we have seen, is that for Aristotle the distinction between “internal” and “external” principles of causation is not so simple and straightforward. Though it is true that piles of stones cannot and do not become houses on their own, the process of building houses (i.e., bringing about the motion by which actual piles of stones are transformed into actual houses) would not be possible unless piles of stones already possessed an internal capacity (power, *dynamis*) to become houses. This capacity requires the application of *bia* to be actualized, but the application of *bia* itself is impossible in its absence. No matter how much *bia* a builder applies to a pile of stones, he cannot transform it into, say, a pack of dogs. Again, this is because it is not in the nature of stones to become dogs; stones do not have such a *dynamis* and so cannot be moved in this way.

Political power, too, reflects this interplay of internal and external components. Aristotle acknowledges the existence of *bia* in human conduct in “cases where the cause of action lies in things outside the actor and the actor contributes nothing.” 42 The statesman may exert a kind of political *bia* upon citizens to form and maintain a city-state, but no amount of *bia* can achieve the same result with a pile of stones or a pack of dogs. Only human beings have the natural and internal power to unite as a city-state, even if this unification must be brought about by *bia* or other forms of efficient causality.

The upshot of all this is that a collection of individual human beings, at least under ideal conditions, tends naturally toward the formation of a city-state. The formation of the state is not the result of chance or an arbitrary exertion of power even though particular states come into being at different times and under different circumstances. In all cases, it is just as natural for collections of human beings to develop into states as it is for seeds to develop into trees, even though the causal processes involved are somewhat different. This is, at least in part, why Aristotle does not define politics in terms of power nor devote any independent analysis to political power as such.

On a final note, although Aristotle takes for granted that political power is necessarily coercive to the extent that *bia* must be exercised by statesmen...
in order to initiate and enforce the constitution, maintain order, protect the citizenry from outside aggression, and so forth, he does not seem to regard this as ethically problematic. In his discussion of the various constitutional forms, Aristotle defines democracy as the rule (or, more precisely, the power) of the people (*demos*).\(^43\) Here the *demos* does not signify the sovereign body of citizens, or at least that is not all it signifies. (In fact, Aristotle defines the *demos* in a variety of ways in the *Politics*—for example, as the large mass of poor and/or unskilled people who do not own property\(^44\)). The defining principles of at least certain forms of democracy for Aristotle are liberty and equality conceived as ends in themselves.\(^45\) These democracies assume that a more or less equal distribution of political power—usually by means of what we would call “direct democracy”—is necessary to preserve individual freedom. This in turn implies that democrats regard coercive political power as a threat to, or outright forfeiture of, liberty.

I need not rehearse all of Aristotle’s criticisms of democracy here,\(^46\) but at least one important point is worth noting. As I mentioned above, Aristotle does not view coercive political power as such as repressive. Rather, he seems to believe that genuine freedom is impossible outside the city-state or, more precisely, that the city-state is a necessary precondition to freedom. (His ideas in this respect are somewhat of a piece with Hegel, as we shall see later.) Furthermore, freedom and equality are not ends in themselves for Aristotle. Indeed, they are quite meaningless apart from virtue and, by extension, the city-state, since virtue can only be cultivated by and through the formation of the city-state. If freedom and equality have any value at all for Aristotle, it is precisely because they are preconditions for the pursuit of the good life. Put simply, freedom and equality exist for the sake of the *polis* and not the other way around.

### Classical and medieval political thought

Although Aristotle’s (and, for that matter, Plato’s) view of politics, which is best described as a kind of “political naturalism,” is in many ways representative of classical thought, there are notable exceptions.\(^47\) In the *Memorabilia*, for example, Xenophon notes that Aristippus, the founder of the Cyrenaic school, denied having any desire to govern or to be governed, as he considered government an impediment to the pursuit of the good life (which, in his case, turns out to be *hēdonē* or pleasure).\(^48\) “In order that I may not suffer such treatment,” Aristippus says to Socrates, “I shall not shut myself up in one state, but shall be a traveler everywhere.”\(^49\) Furthermore, although Stoics such as Zeno of Citium shared Aristotle’s valorization of reason and nature,\(^50\) they denied the natural necessity of the state and similar institutions, claiming instead that rational beings that live in accord with nature have no need for them. In the Stoic utopia, society would be governed
by natural law and the rule of reason rather than human convention. Unlike
the Aristotelian *polis*, however, there would be no slavery, marriage, private
property, law courts, police, soldiers, or any other mechanisms of authority,
domination, or institutionalized violence.\(^{51}\)

Many Stoics believed in the existence of an ancient “golden age” in
which human beings had actually lived in the manner described above but
were subsequently perverted by avarice, ambition, and other such moral
vices.\(^{52}\) This view, along with its explicit critique of political naturalism,
proved enormously influential on early medieval philosophy and theology.
Given the centrality of biblical exegesis within this milieu, controversial
questions concerning the obedience owed to rulers, the sanctity of property,
the justifiability of slavery, and the legitimacy of warfare were all analyzed
and debated, at least in part, through recourse to relevant passages from
scripture.\(^{53}\) On the basis of such discussions, many early Christian thinkers
denied that political practices and institutions, especially those which are
explicitly or implicitly condemned in the New Testament, are in any sense
“natural” but are rather a consequence of Original Sin.\(^{54}\) Such institutions,
they believed, did not exist before the Fall (a view which very closely follows
that of the Stoics).

The development of medieval jurisprudence, which was initiated in part
by the revival of Roman civil law in the eleventh century, maintained certain
influential Stoical ideas concerning natural freedom and the communal
ownership of property.\(^{55}\) With the rediscovery of Aristotle in the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries, such ideas needed to be reconciled not only with
Aristotelian political naturalism but also with authoritative religious texts
(most importantly the Book of Genesis).\(^{56}\) The cumulative result of this
process, as is well known, was the development of medieval natural law
theory.\(^{57}\) For present purposes I need not discuss this theory at length. It is
worth noting, however, that for certain natural lawyers, especially those of
an Averroist bent, the absence of slavery, private property, and so forth, in
the Garden of Eden presented an interesting problem. Such features, after
all, are also found in the primitive *koinonia* that precedes Aristotle’s *polis*.
From a strictly Aristotelian standpoint, then, it would seem to follow that
the Garden of Eden, like the primitive *koinonia*, would have eventually led to
the formation of the *polis* even in the absence of Original Sin.\(^{58}\) Such a view,
however, is at odds with scripture, in which the abolition of private property,
the institution of slavery, and all the other features of the Aristotelian *polis*
are inflicted on Adam and Eve by God as a punishment. This, in turn, would
seem to imply that the *polis* is not natural in the way Aristotle suggests. (For
the sake of brevity I shall not discuss the solutions offered in response to this
problem, though I should note in passing that many of them are incredibly
clever.)

To greater or lesser extent, late antique and medieval political thought,
whether Stoic or Aristotelian in orientation, can be said to inherit the first
two of the characteristics we ascribed to Aristotle’s politics—that is, it is a straightforwardly normative discourse that generally regards the state as the primary locus of political analysis.\(^5\) As to the third characteristic, medieval thought differs somewhat from pure Aristotelianism insofar as it devotes a degree of independent analysis to the nature of political power, if only to distinguish it conceptually from ecclesiastical and/or divine power. From the perspective of intellectual history this is an unquestionably important difference, but for my purposes it is mostly irrelevant. Medieval thinkers, no less than their Stoic forebears, were every bit as “archic” as Aristotle. They tended in large part to take the existence of political power (again, under some description or another) for granted and concerned themselves more with its proper exercise than with its origin or operation, its underlying structures and processes.

**Machiavelli**

In many important respects the work of Niccolò Machiavelli represents a crucial turning point in the history of politics. At first glance, Machiavelli’s most famous work, *The Prince*, resembles the countless “mirror-of-princes” books which were produced during the Middle Ages, the central goal of which was to provide counsel to rulers.\(^6\) In the “mirrors-of-princes,” however, this counsel is always moralistic in nature. They advise the prince to cultivate a virtuous character and to rule justly and benevolently, not only to ensure a peaceful and successful reign, but also to fulfill various temporal and religious duties that are fundamentally ethical in nature. *The Prince*, too, offers advice to rulers, but it does so from a prudential and self-interested vantage devoid of genuine ethical considerations. To this extent, Machiavelli severs politics from the built-in normativity of earlier theories.

In the first place, Machiavelli completely jettisons the idea of “legitimate authority” (i.e., authority that is justified to the extent that it meets certain moral or ethical criteria). For him, political authority is coextensive with the *de facto* possession of power; the right to rule belongs to whoever has the capacity to rule. (“Since there cannot be good laws without good arms, I will not consider laws but speak of arms.”\(^6\)) Moral virtue does not always provide a ruler with power and, in any case, does not lend any further “legitimacy” to his authority. On Machiavelli’s view, therefore, the idea of a moral right to rule that implies corresponding moral obligations to obey is an academic fiction.

Subjects obey their ruler first and foremost because they fear the consequences of disobedience, and this fear is always proportionate to the ruler’s power to bring such consequences about.\(^6\) For this reason, the acquisition and maintenance of political power requires the capacity to effectively compel obedience through fear. Effectively compelling obedience,
in turn, requires the ability to vacillate between moral and immoral action “as fortune and circumstances dictate.” The successful ruler is one who acts solely for the sake of preserving his authority, but in so acting he is always guided by discretion, prudence and strategic acumen rather than moral principle.

The foregoing overview, however cursory, demonstrates the radical extent to which Machiavelli departs from his predecessors. For one thing, he completely repudiates several of the foundational ideas of political naturalism: for example, that human beings accept political subjection because they are naturally inclined toward the good; that political authority exists for the sake of the good, that it naturally desires the good, and that it is justified to the degree that it achieves the good; that political authority is something that evolves *sui generis* from nature itself. Machiavelli argues, on the contrary, that human beings submit to authority not because of any natural inclination toward the good but because of self-interest and fear; that political authority exists solely for its own sake, that it is coextensive with coercive power, and that its only goal is to maintain and augment that power by any means necessary; and that political authority comes about haphazardly from power, ambition, and the vicissitudes of fortune rather than from any sort of natural teleological process.

Insofar as Machiavellian politics retains any sort of normativity at all, it is at best an instrumental or pragmatic normativity—a kind of means-ends rationality comprised solely of hypothetical imperatives. Such a politics, however, has no teleology and is fundamentally uninterested in questions of ethics. Its sole concern is the operation of power—what power is, how it is acquired, how it is maintained, and so forth. For this reason, Machiavellian politics can reasonably be said to lack the second and third characteristics associated with Aristotelian politics, but not the first. Machiavelli is far more politicocentric than Aristotle. He tends to ignore extrapitical social relations or else views them in the same way he views individual persons: as objects to be manipulated, subjugated, and controlled by the state.

Nevertheless, by divesting politics of normativity Machiavelli laid the foundation for several important developments that would come to pass several centuries later. At the level of policymaking, for example, he is rightfully called the father of modern *Realpolitik*, a model of politics and diplomacy that emphasizes practicality over ideological or moral considerations. In an important sense he is also the unwitting inventor of what we now call “political science.” To be sure, the mere fact that Machiavelli employs descriptive rather than ethical analysis does not make him a social scientist on the modern empirical model. He was not a dispassionate observer of political phenomena so much as a shrewd tactician. (To this extent he has more in common with Henry Kissinger than, say, John Kenneth Galbraith.) Nevertheless, by separating political analysis from metaphysics and moral
philosophy, Machiavelli opened the door to a distinction between politics and political philosophy.

Social physics

As we know, it took several centuries for the “natural philosophy” of Galileo and Newton to develop into the distinct fields of inquiry collectively referred to as “science.” The same is true of politics. Four hundred years of political philosophy separates Machiavelli from the first self-described political scientists of the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, there is an important sense in which the political scientists picked up where Machiavelli left off. Like him, their analyses concentrated on the operation of power within and between states. The crucial difference, of course, is that political scientists are, at least in theory, concerned with the collection, observation, and analysis of ostensibly “objective” phenomena. They are neither tacticians nor diplomats but “scientists.”

The object of their inquiry, moreover, is political power. Political scientists are generally uninterested in the operation of power within other spheres of human existence, a subject which was eventually taken up by other social scientists working in the disciplines of psychology, economics, and sociology. Until fairly recently, the predominant tendency among social scientists was to attempt to maintain these supposedly tidy distinctions. Early sociologists, for example, made a point of avoiding “politics” in their analyses, focusing instead on allegedly extrapoltical phenomena such as culture, marriage, and the family. The underlying assumption throughout was that “political power” represents a unique category which can be distinguished from and studied independently of other sorts of power. This is precisely because politics has been understood, and continues to be understood, principally in terms of the state.

In spite of this, it is not uncommon for people to refer to “politics” in contexts that have nothing whatever to do with states. Most every form of human association, from university departments to bowling leagues, seems to have a singular brand of “politics” that is not reducible to the kind of power we attribute to governmental or juridical institutions. This is not just an idiosyncrasy of ordinary language. It is no mistake that people refer to “departmental politics” rather than, say, “departmental sociology,” and this reveals something extremely important—namely, that politics is not concerned with any particular type of association but rather with social relations in general as well as the forms of power that operate within and among said relations. For this reason, the word “politics” is better defined, despite its etymology, as referring generally to power relations between and among human beings.
Until fairly recently the extent to which power penetrates every aspect of human thought and activity has tended to be understated. This is due in large part to a longstanding and widespread tendency to think of power in terms of the Aristotelian *bia*—that is, as a coercive or repressive force which is “inflicted” upon otherwise passive objects from without. In ordinary experience, the most palpable manifestation of this force, at least in the Western world, is and always has been the government with its rules and regulations, its prisons and policemen. For this reason it is not surprising that power has always been associated with politics and that politics, in turn, has always been associated with the state. The point, in any case, is that the politics of everyday life is not simply analogous to the politics of the state. As the schoolmen would say, power is predicated univocally. (I shall say much more about this below.)

In order to articulate this idea a bit more clearly I should like to briefly invoke the name of Heraclitus, as Nietzsche once did, with special reverence. This might strike the reader as somewhat jarring. What, after all, has an ancient sage, obscure in both life and work, and remembered principally as a metaphysician, to do with political theory? The answer, simply put, is that Heraclitus was arguably the first philosopher to recognize, albeit in a different context, the very point I have just propounded. For Heraclitus, no less than for Aristotle, all power is a species of motion, which is in turn a species of change. And because ancient thinkers like Aristotle generally do not acknowledge any fundamental distinction between political power and power as such, it follows that political power is itself a category of motion and change. The famed Heraclitean dictum—“all things are in motion and nothing remains still”—is not only ontological but political as well.

The study of power—that is, of force, motion, and change—appears in a variety of distinct contexts in the Aristotelian corpus ranging from ontology to physics (which Aristotle understood as the general study of nature). Thanks in part to the revolution of Newtonian mechanics, however, we are nowadays accustomed to thinking of physics more narrowly as the study of forces, motion, and change within and among physical objects. If, as we noted above, politics is to be understood as referring to power relations between and among human beings, and if it is true on some description or other that all power relations involve relations of force, motion, and change, it would seem to follow that politics is a kind of “social physics.” Unlike physics proper, which is concerned with power relations within and among physical objects, social physics is concerned with power relations between and among human beings.

The Heraclitean insight is that everything is what it is and does what it does because of change, motion, activity—in short, power. At first glance this may seem controversial. When we stop to consider it, however, it becomes clear that all of our relations and interactions with other people involve power. This is perhaps most obvious in those instances in which we use
direct force to compel others to do our bidding or are compelled in turn. But it is true even of exchanges which do not seem to involve any explicit coercion at all—for example, purchasing food at the grocery store, asking a friend for a loan, making a promise, inviting someone on a date, and so forth. All such circumstances involve subtle and complicated intersections and relays of power. These intersections, in turn, are situated in even more subtle and complicated networks of cultural, social, political, economic, and moral rules, all of which are underwritten by power.

If we go a step further and examine the general history of human thought, we find that proposed answers to the perennial (and not so perennial) questions of science, religion, and philosophy almost invariably end up invoking the concept of power, if only implicitly. Here are some token examples with relevant terms highlighted:

- **Question:** “Why is there something rather than nothing?” Answers: (1) “Because reality is a perfection and an omnipotent God seeks to bring about the highest possible amount of perfection in the universe.” (2) “Because possible things strive to become actual.”

- **Question:** “How did the universe come to exist?” Answers: (1) “Because God created it.” (2) Because the primordial bird Nyx laid a golden egg whence Eros was born, and Eros divided the halves of the hatched egg into Earth (Gaia) and Sky (Uranus).” (3) “A singularity of infinite density and temperature began to expand and cool very rapidly; approximately $10^{-32}$ seconds later a phase transition occurred which caused an exponential cosmic inflation.”

- **Question:** “Why does the lightning flash and the thunder roll?” Answers: (1) “Because Thor swings his hammer.” (2) “Because Indra (or Zeus or Xoxotl, etc.) throws his thunderbolts.” (3) “Because God is expressing his wrath.” (4) “Because colliding atmospheric particles are charged by electrostatic induction and react via electrical discharge with oppositely charged particles.”

Notice that every answer cited above involves activity or motion—hence, power—of some kind or another. This lends considerable credibility to Heraclitus’s dictum, or at least to a slightly modified version of it according to which all things are explained by motion and change. Such a dictum would seem to hold true even of definitions. The question “what is $X$?” is very often answered by referring to $X$’s powers and capacities, to its actual or possible movements and transformations—in short, to what it does or is capable of doing. To this we may add the somewhat obvious Foucauldian point that power is often responsible for making certain answers “acceptable” and others “unacceptable.” (The Spanish Inquisition comes immediately to mind here.)
Lest we push the point too far, it must be emphasized that social physics is not and should not be reduced to physics proper. For example, consider the question “Why did John push Mary down the stairs?” As theorists of action repeatedly point out, there are several ways of answering this question, none of which are necessarily reducible to any of the others. To be sure, we could provide a strictly physical explanation of John’s action, which focuses entirely on neural signals, muscular contractions, momentum, gravity, and so forth. However, we could also explain John’s action by pointing out that Mary is Jewish and John happens to be virulently anti-Semitic. Although both explanations involve the exertion of physical force, we cannot reduce John’s racially motivated act of violence to purely physical explananda. From the standpoint of social physics, John’s action must be explained in terms of social rather than physical relations. This requires, among other things, analyses that fall outside the scope of conventional physics, whether or not such analyses are ultimately grounded in a materialist ontology.

All human relations are, to greater or lesser degree, relations of power, and to this extent all human relations—friendships, sexual affairs, business transactions, marriages, and so forth—may be viewed as analogous to physical relations of power (hence my use of the heuristic term “social physics”). Furthermore, this social physics is coextensive with what is conventionally called “politics.” Thus all human social relations qua relations of power are political and “politics” is simply a generic descriptive term for the myriad ways in which human beings affect and are affected by sociophysical power.

Just as physics proper contains various subfields that are distinguished according to their objects of analysis, so social physics contains various subfields that we call “social sciences.” The aim of these sciences, simply put, is to analyze and describe particular types of sociophysical (i.e., political) relations. From this it follows that what is typically called “political science” is more properly termed “juridical science” (or something of that sort) insofar as its principal object of study is juridical or governmental power. Like all social sciences, the goal of juridical science is to analyze and describe particular types of political relations in terms of their basic structure and operation. To this extent it is incapable of answering any questions that fall within the scope of moral or normative discourse, a fact that is often cited as the fundamental distinction between political philosophy and the social sciences generally. It is true that political philosophy extends the analysis of social physics into the normative realm, but it is capable of doing far more than that. As I shall argue below, political philosophy is better seen as a holistic analysis of social physics which combines both descriptive and normative elements. Just as quantum physics reveals that matter and energy are infinitely more chaotic, unstable, and uncertain than Aristotelian ontology, Ptolemeian astronomy, Newtonian mechanics, and all other earlier systems surmised, such an analysis reveals that the power underlying social
existence is dynamic, volatile, unpredictable, pliable, decentered—in short, an-archic.

Whether normative or descriptive in emphasis, the greatest portion of ancient and modern political thought has adopted a teleological (which is to say, “archic”) view of power—namely, it has taken power to be always and already organized, constituted, distributed, and directed toward specific ends. As a result, it has tended to prioritize actuality (what is the case) at the expense of possibility (what could be, what might be), deriving the latter from the former. Politics has never been an art of the possible but a science of the actual.

From politics to political philosophy

Politics is not a field of inquiry. Rather, it is a descriptive term for power relations that are described and analyzed by various fields of inquiry including, but not limited to, political science, psychology, anthropology, and sociology. Because this distinction has largely been overlooked within the Western tradition, politics has often been conflated with the very disciplines that attempt to study it. A similar fate has befallen political philosophy, which is commonly regarded as a subordinate branch of moral philosophy that applies specifically to states or governments. To the extent that philosophers have analyzed other forms of social relations, such as friendship or marriage, their analyses have tended, with a few notable exceptions, to fall outside the scope of political philosophy sensu stricto.

This characterization of political philosophy is misguided. If politics refers not to the study of social power relations but to social power relations themselves, and if political philosophy is understood as the broadest and most general study of social power relations, it follows that moral philosophy is better viewed as a branch of political philosophy and not the other way around. (Thus Aristotle was on the right track after all in suggesting that political philosophy is the “highest” practical science, as this implies, among other things, that ethics is subordinate to it.) Although I will say more about the role of moral philosophy in the next chapter, let us describe it for the time being as a kind of micropolitical analysis that focuses on the actions of individual people. It is micropolitical, again, because human actions—especially the sort of actions that are studied by moral philosophers—always involve relations of power.

Todd May has suggested that political philosophy “is a project perpetually haunted by crisis . . . because it inhabits that shifting space between what is and what ought to be.” Unlike moral philosophy (which May, following Kant, identifies with the study of “what ought to be”) and metaphysics (which he identifies with the study of “what is”), “the work of political philosophy is dictated by the tension between the two, rather than by one of the poles.”
May somewhat half-heartedly grants that it is impossible to study “what ought to be” without also studying “what is,” and vice versa. All moral theories depend, to greater or lesser extent, on descriptive analyses, whether metaphysical or otherwise. Likewise, all metaphysical theories depend, to greater or lesser extent, on “the normativity inhabiting the epistemology that provides [their] foundation.” Nevertheless, he contends, “political philosophy . . . has only discussed the ought given what is,” thus “as the social configuration shifts, so must the philosophical approach.”

May is right in suggesting that there is a “shifting space” or “tension” between ethics and metaphysics, but I do not agree that this is the locus of political philosophy, even if political philosophy has more often than not discussed ethics on the basis of metaphysical presuppositions. Rather, it is within political philosophy itself that the ethical and the metaphysical come into conflict. Whereas some forms of philosophy study the relations between human beings and the world, my claim, simply put, is that political philosophy studies social physics—that is, actual and potential power relations among human beings. It is therefore a holistic discourse that includes both descriptive and normative elements in its general analysis of power relations. As a descriptive discourse it comprises “all the activities of co-operation and conflict within and between societies, whereby the human species goes about organizing the use, production and distribution of human, natural and other resources in the production and reproduction of its biological and social life.” As a normative discourse, it goes one step further by asking, for example, which of these activities ought to be promoted (or at least tolerated) and which ought to be condemned outright.

Although I suggested in my brief discussion of Heraclitus that metaphysical discourse almost always implies concepts of power, I would not go so far as to say that metaphysics (or, for that matter, logic and epistemology) should be regarded as forms of political philosophy, even if it turns out that such discourses are always situated in political contexts that affect and are affected by them. As I noted above, however, I would affirm this of moral philosophy which, when considered as a distinct type of inquiry, is generally concerned with “what ought to be” at the level of individual human actions. When this concern is applied to a wider range of social fields, it gives rise to new problems that collectively form the normative content of political philosophy.

The distinctive mark of political philosophy, then, is its overarching focus on the conflict between the realm of actual power relations (what Todd May calls the “is pole,” referring to the empirical or metaphysical) and the realm of possible power relations (the “ought pole,” referring to the moral or normative). Once again, I do not believe, as May does, that political philosophy occupies a medial space between these social-physical realms. Rather, political philosophy is precisely the arena in which the conflict between them emerges and is played out. It is within this framework that
we can draw distinctions among various approaches to political philosophy. May attempts something like this with his threefold taxonomy of political philosophy. The first type of political philosophy, which he calls “formal political philosophy,” aims at discovering “the nature, or at least the important characteristics, of a just society.” It does this by attaching itself to one or the other of the two “poles” (is versus ought, descriptive versus normative) mentioned above and builds its analysis upon this attachment. Most classical political philosophy can be seen as operating in this way. For example, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes, and Locke all attempt to determine “what ought to be” on the basis of certain descriptive assumptions about human nature.

The same is true of much contemporary Anglo-American political philosophy. For example, John Rawls’s *Theory of Justice* is founded on a variety of descriptive assumptions, most importantly the notion that human beings are by nature rationally self-interested. As May points out, “By utilizing the maximin principle of decision theory in a situation (the original position) of ignorance about one’s eventual place in society, Rawls tries to provide the principles which all rational beings would choose as the cornerstone of [a just] society.” Like his classical forebears, Rawls begins with an account of what is allegedly the case (i.e., that human beings are rationally self-interested) and on this basis produces an account of what ought to be the case (i.e., a society governed by Rawls’ principles of justice).

Note that formal political philosophies that cleave to the “ought pole” (i.e., to normative claims about “what ought to be”) need not rely on descriptive accounts of human nature in the way that Rawls’ theory does. For example, Robert Nozick’s *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* provides “a prescription for a society that relies on no facts about the current composition of the world.” Nozick’s principles of justice do not depend upon any decision-theoretical speculation about what rationally self-interested agents would or would not choose (this is what Nozick refers to as “end-state” reasoning). Rather, the concept of justice is defined on the basis of what Nozick calls “historical principles.” The difference between an “end-state principle” and a “historical principle” is analogous to the difference between a legal decision based on common law precedent and one that is based on concerns about what may or may not happen in the future as a result of said decision. For Nozick, justice is historically concerned with the just acquisition and transfer of property (where “just” means something like “pursuant to a contract freely entered into by reasonable parties”). Again, this conception of justice examines how the world ought to be “regardless of what people are actually like and what kind of world they live in.” As May notes, this is precisely what makes Nozick’s theory “utopian.”

Formal political philosophy can also hew to the “is pole” (i.e., to empirical or descriptive claims about the way the world actually is). Of
particular interest here are certain Marxist theories that espouse strict historical determinism. If history is guided by necessity, as such theories suggest, then the moral responsibilities of individuals are “negated, if not severely diminished.” This, in turn, implies that normative considerations are at best of secondary importance. In their place, these theories offer a description of society and proceed to demonstrate by means of dialectical analyses how society will naturally evolve. In Lukács’s *History and Class Consciousness*, to cite just one example, bourgeois capitalism automatically introduces commodification (or “reification”) across society that, in turn, produces revolutionary class consciousness among the proletariat. As proletariat consciousness grows, it will eventually “overcome reification by overthrowing the capitalist order” and replacing it with a communist society.

The second type of political philosophy is what May calls “strategic political philosophy.” Unlike the formal, which relies on one or the other pole of political philosophy, the strategic involves “an immersion into the tension between the two.” For example, whereas the formal philosophy of Rawls employs normative analyses to determine what a just society would be like, strategic philosophy employs analyses of context, including historical and social conditions, in order to answer the question famously raised by Lenin, namely, “what is to be done?” According to May, although formal political philosophies seek to formulate conceptions of justice, they generally avoid devising concrete strategies for the realization of justice in society. Occasionally they provide critiques of extant political institutions or sketch out hypothetical “alternatives” that might be implemented in the future, but they seldom explain how we are to realize such alternatives in practice—a task that is instead left to activists, politicians, or policy analysts.

Strategic political philosophy sometimes produces normative critiques, which are in turn leveled against real historical, social, and cultural institutions. This is especially true of socialists of the early nineteenth century who criticized capitalism on squarely moral grounds. More often, however, such moral critique is simply assumed or otherwise taken for granted within strategic political philosophy. Given that this or that institution is unjust, the predominant question for the strategic philosopher becomes “what are we going to do about it?” As May notes by way of summary:

Strategic political philosophy recognizes that history and social conditions unfold not of necessity but are mutable and perhaps even regressive at times. However, neither are history and social conditions secondary; they are consulted not merely to realize an ethical program but to determine what concrete possibilities present themselves for intervention. In this sense, not only is the historical and social situation read in terms of ethical demands, but the ethical program is limited and perhaps partially determined by the situation. This is why much—though by no means
all—political philosophy that falls under the category “strategic” addresses itself to the concrete historical conditions under which the philosophizing takes place.\textsuperscript{99}

The idea here is that the normative and programmatic analyses of strategic political philosophy are self-reflexive: they recognize their embeddedness within a particular context and the extent to which this context shapes and reshapes them. Consequently, as the context shifts, so must the philosophy that would seek to analyze and, ultimately, change it. This is generally not true of formal political philosophy, which attempts to arrive at abstract and universal principles and prescriptions by disentangling itself from the vicissitudes of history and context.

Another important feature of strategic political philosophy according to May is that it usually “involves a unitary analysis that aims towards a single goal.”\textsuperscript{100} Marxist philosophy, for example, locates the source of power within the substructure of economic relations with a mind to the eventual abolition of capitalism: “Political and social change, if it is to be significant, must rest upon a transformation at the base . . . All problems can be reduced to the basic one.”\textsuperscript{101} The same is true of certain strands of radical feminism, which reduce all oppression to patriarchal dominance. Strategic feminist philosophy of this sort therefore relies on radical critique of gender relations with a mind to “overthrowing” patriarchy. In all cases, the basic idea is that oppressive power emanates from a unitary source that must be combated and destroyed in order to achieve the goal of liberation.

The third and final type of political philosophy that May discusses is “tactical political philosophy.”\textsuperscript{102} Like strategic philosophy, tactical philosophy subsists in the tension between the is-pole and the ought-pole, but it does not attempt to reduce political analysis to a central and foundational problematic. For the tactical philosopher, any attempt to locate power in a single center radically circumscribes the sphere of possible intervention. Tactical political philosophy instead acknowledges the “many different sites from which [power] arises and . . . the interplay among these various sites in the creation of the social world.”\textsuperscript{103} Power does not originate in or flow from these sites but rather builds up around them in varying degrees.

One of the central theses of May’s \textit{The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism} is that classical anarchism, as well as “poststructuralism, particularly as it is embodied in the works of Foucault, Deleuze, and Lyotard, has defined a tradition of the type of political philosophy . . . called ‘tactical.’”\textsuperscript{104} Although I shall discuss this claim in greater detail later on, it is worth noting here that tactical political philosophy need not be associated exclusively with classical anarchism or “poststructuralism.” For example, the efforts of community organizers and activists to achieve concrete reforms in their immediate locales clearly involve a tactical orientation. In recognizing that it is wrong for industries to dump
harmful chemicals into local rivers, environmentalists are not necessarily committed to any kind of “central or foundational problematic.” They need not regard environmental degradation as a symptom of any larger disease (for example, capitalism) and their interventions need not be influenced by any overarching commitment to abolish it. Instead, they may simply regard pollution as a local problem, which requires a local solution. Whatever tactics they devise in this pursuit will inevitably be shaped by the specific situation in which the problem arises. The point, therefore, is that tactical political philosophy is often an important part, at least implicitly, of the campaigns and projects of “single-issue” activists who are simply striving to create change in their communities.

A critique of May’s taxonomy

As May points out, the formal question (“What is justice?”) has always been accompanied by the strategic question (“What kind of society should we try to create?”). This claim, though unquestionably true, reveals a weakness in May’s taxonomy—namely, that it is not strong enough to sustain the kinds of hard and fast distinctions he seeks to draw among political theories. One problem, which I have already noted, is that May situates political philosophy within the tense and shifting space between ethics and metaphysics. As a result, political philosophy becomes something like a collection of particles caught between two electromagnetic forces, some of which are pulled in one direction, others in the opposite direction, still others trapped in a kind of inertial state between the two. As I said, I agree that there is a tension between the realm of what is and the realm of what ought to be. What that tension produces, however, is not political philosophy but politics.

The actual, concrete power relations experienced by millions of people in the world every day involve extraordinary oppression, corruption, and violence. Whenever people begin to believe in the possibility and desirability of alternative power relations, a tension emerges between what is and what ought to be. This tension expands ten-fold when people make efforts to act on those desires, producing everything from violent revolutions to peaceful reforms in their wake. Political philosophy stands above politics but not apart from or outside of it. It analyzes, but its analyses are never perfectly neutral or objective; they both affect and are affected by their object.

May confuses political philosophy with politics and, in so doing, divests political philosophy of any distinctive raison d’être. If we say that the goal of political philosophy is to provide normative analyses of political institutions, then political philosophy is nothing more than a specialized branch of ethics. If, on the other hand, we say that the goal of political philosophy
is to provide descriptive or empirical analyses of political institutions, then political philosophy is simply political science by another name. Clearly, then, political philosophy must be something that is both normative and descriptive. This, however, is not May’s position. For him, political philosophy is somehow produced by and situated within the fluctuating gap between actuality and possibility. Strictly speaking, it belongs neither to the normative nor the descriptive; rather, it is a kind of tertium quid that is caused by their disjunction from one another. If this is the case, however, what could political philosophy possibly analyze from such a vantage other than itself?

Political philosophy is not Aristotle’s god nor, in fairness, does May intend it to be. One of his goals in positing this framework is to carve out a special and distinctive place for political philosophy within human thought and, as I have said, it is not without some merit. The problem, as I see it, is with the way May pursues another of his goals, which is to provide categorical distinctions among competing political theories. Simply put, May’s framework seems to be built atop these distinctions and not the other way around. Consider, for example, the distinction between formal political philosophy and strategic political philosophy. The former, we are told, cleaves either to the normative pole or the metaphysical pole, whereas the latter is “immersed” in the tension between them. Without providing the metaphor of mutually tense poles, and without situating political philosophy within this tension, there is no way to sustain the distinction between the formal and the strategic.

May acknowledges that there is a “spectrum” within formal political philosophy according to which “the more closely one pole dominates the philosophizing, the more formal it is.” Consequently, political thought that is more formal in this sense differs “in kind” from political thought that is less formal. On my view, however, this “spectrum” applies just as well to political thought which May excludes from the category of formal political philosophy. For example, there is no question that Marxist-Leninism, say, differs from Rawlsian liberalism in its emphasis on strategic praxis. (This is perhaps best summed up by Marx’s vaunted eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.”) However, the claim that a political theory should be excluded outright from the category of “formal political philosophy” simply because it includes strategic or practical considerations is baseless. As I argued earlier, all political philosophy includes normative analyses by definition, which means that all political theories stand in some relation to what May calls the “ought pole.” Even in cases where a strategic political philosophy “assumes” its normative commitments rather than argues for them, such commitments are unquestionably “formal” elements of that philosophy, at least as May understands the term “formal.”
I also take issue with May’s characterization of “formal political philosophy” as a kind of academic game divorced from real world concerns. On the contrary, it is seldom the case that formal political philosophy is completely and totally devoid of strategic elements. This is true even of Aristotle who, as I showed earlier, is not only concerned with what sort of society ought to be created but also with how that society could and should be brought about (viz., by transforming oligarchs and tyrants into virtuous *aristoi* who, in turn, will cultivate virtue among the citizens of the *polis*). We might also cite Rousseau or Mill here. Both men were keenly concerned with the question of justice and to this extent are rightly called formal political philosophers *par excellence*. At the same time, both had much to say about how justice could and should be implemented in the real world—that is, about strategy. This is precisely why their ideas had such an enormous impact on actual historical events. Rousseau, as is well known, was the *de facto* intellectual godfather of the French Revolution and, ironically, a celebrity within the aristocratic circles that the Revolution ultimately destroyed. Mill, it is worth recalling, was not just a philosopher of, but also a member of, the British Parliament. During his tenure as an MP he attempted to put his ideas into practice by advocating on behalf of women’s rights, proportional representation, labor unions, and the extension of suffrage.

As far as tactical political philosophy is concerned, it is not clear to me why May treats it as a separate and distinct category. The only difference between tactical political philosophy and strategic political philosophy is their respective conceptions of political power. In all other regards they appear to be more or less identical. As we have seen, however, power is not the conceptual basis of May’s distinctions. Formal political philosophies are distinguished from strategic political philosophies not because they conceive of political power differently, but because they cleave to “what is” or “what ought to be” rather than immersing themselves in the tension between the two. This seems to imply that tactical philosophy is simply a species of the strategic genus rather than a category unto itself.

The point, in any case, is that these distinctions, at least as May articulates them, appear somewhat vacuous. All political philosophy is “formal” inasmuch as it is concerned with the relationship between “what is” and “what ought to be.” And while I agree with May that formalism defined as such should be understood proportionately, it makes more sense to posit that political philosophies, regardless of whether or not they include “strategic” considerations, are more or less formal depending upon how closely they gravitate toward one pole or the other. *Mutatis mutandis*, evolutionary Marxism, with its emphasis on dialectical analyses of history, can be seen as gravitating strongly toward the “is pole.” Rawlsian liberalism, with its emphasis on abstract normative analyses, can be seen as gravitating strongly toward the “ought pole.” Other theories fall somewhere in the middle. This
would hold true, for example, of the Marxist humanism of Harry Cleaver, which combines normative analyses of a quasibloliberal sort with more traditional Marxist analyses of historical and economic relations. For May, as we have seen, “formal” means little more than “nonstrategic.” Once we reconstruct his framework by abandoning this distinction, however, the term “formal” begins to seem somewhat moribund. Inasmuch as “formal” conventionally denotes a concern with forms or structures as opposed to substance or content, it seems odd to say that Lukács, for example, is more “formal” than Cleaver. Although Cleaver does tend to discuss normative questions more explicitly than Lukács does, this scarcely implies that he is somehow less concerned with forms and structures than Lukács is. In fact, because both are Marxists, both are keenly concerned with, and share the same basic view of, a variety of “formal” concepts (e.g., the structure and superstructure of economic relations, the material conditions of production, etc.) According to this line of reasoning, how exactly would one go about showing that Marxist theorist X is “more formal” than Marxist theorist Y? More importantly, why would one even bother? Such a task, even if possible, strikes me as rather pointless.

If we are to maintain the notion that political philosophies are spread out over a theoretical spectrum between “what is” and “what ought to be,” we would do well to abandon the concept of formalism altogether. It seems much simpler and clearer to posit that some political theories are more normatively inclined than others. Viewed in this way, political theories differ from one another in degree, not in kind. If, on the other hand, we want to produce more palpable, but not absolute, distinctions between political theories, we would do better to focus on the ways in which they analyze various kinds of power relations as well as their own normative and contextual positions with respect to said power relations. I shall attempt to do both in the next chapter.
On political philosophy

Normativity: A survey

As I established in the last chapter, the fluid and dynamic nature of politics as social physics is a result of the tension between actual and possible power relations—that is, between the ways our world is and the various ways it could be. The tension between “actual” and “possible” here is to be understood not at the level of modal metaphysics, but at the level of human beliefs, desires, and actions. What matters is not so much whether certain states of affairs are possible per se but rather whether human beings believe they are possible, whether they desire them to be actual, whether they will take action to make them actual, and so forth. It is precisely this dimension that makes human power relations a kind of social physics: what happens in the human world is not a result of immutable physical laws but of the unpredictable interplay of the actual and the possible as expressed through human beliefs, desires, and actions.

The realm of “what ought to be,” which I have been calling the “normative” realm, cuts a wide swath. It is concerned not only with how the world ought to be writ large, but with a host of more limited questions—for example: How ought we to live? How ought we to act? What kinds of people ought we to be? What sorts of things and actions and states of affairs ought we to promote and protect? Although there is an implicit consensus among people in regard to at least some of these questions—for example, most everyone is agreed that one ought not to kill innocent people—this seldom entails any automatic correspondence with human social reality. No matter how many people believe that murder is wrong and desire that it not take place, innocent people continue to be killed every day. It is precisely this kind of conflict or disparity that makes our existence inexorably political and that, in turn, requires a holistic analysis of the battle between what is and what ought to be. This, I have suggested, is both the source of political philosophy as well as the purpose for doing it.
I argued previously that we cannot make absolute distinctions among political theories based upon the degree to which they “emphasize” one pole or another in their analyses. It follows from my definition that all political philosophy is more or less “normative” and more or less “descriptive.” If this is our only basis of comparison, however, we are left with nothing but a range of theories that differ only in degree but not in kind. A better route, I think, is to take a closer look at the nature of normativity within these theories. As I just suggested, after all, normativity is a complicated concept that inevitably means different things within different theoretical contexts. My goal here is not to provide a detailed analysis of the normative but to introduce some preliminary concepts that will better enable us to distinguish among political theories.

Within normative ethics, the scope of which is generally limited to individual human actions, the fundamental ethical question (“what ought to be”) is often cashed out in terms of means and ends. In order to understand this distinction, it behooves us to begin with a basic model of human action. Here the action theory of Donald Davidson is particularly helpful. Like many other theorists before him, Davidson regards actions as a species of events. What distinguishes human actions from ordinary events, according to Davidson, is intentionality. Thus an event \( x \) is an action just in case there is a true description of it under which it is something someone does intentionally (i.e., for a reason). Whenever an agent acts for a reason, moreover, she can be characterized as “(a) having some sort of pro attitude [e.g., a desire, wanting, urge, preference, etc.] toward actions of a specific kind, and (b) believing . . . that [her] actions are of that kind.”

On this model, for example, my making a sandwich begins with my having a reason for making a sandwich—that is, my desire to make a sandwich coupled with my belief that combining bread, cheese, vegetables, and mustard in a certain manner will fulfill my desire. Considered in this way, human actions can be seen as teleological—that is, they have a specific and intended end for the sake of which they are performed. An action itself, by extension, is a means taken in order to obtain a desired end, and this because the actor believes that acting in that way is likely to bring about the desired outcome. This suggests that an action can be divided, as it were, into at least three components: intended ends, means, and actual ends (or consequences).

At an extremely high level of generality, Western moral philosophy can be divided into two theoretical schools. The first, which is known as consequentialism, holds that the moral rightness or wrongness of an action depends solely on the consequences of that action. The second, which is known as nonconsequentialism, includes all moral theories that deny that the moral rightness or wrongness of an action depends solely on the consequences of that action. The debate between these two camps is nearly as old as Western
philosophy itself. For example, whereas the hedonism of the Cyrenaic and Epicurean schools affirmed a kind of primitive consequentialism according to which an action is virtuous to the extent that it promotes pleasure or happiness, Aristotle argued that an action is virtuous to the extent that the action itself expresses one or more virtues, where the virtues are understood as dispositions to act, which collectively constitute a particular kind of character—namely, that of the aretaic exemplar or “prudent man.”

The Greek concept of the “virtuous” should not be confused with the more modern concept of “morally right.” For Aristippus and Aristotle alike, the fundamental basis of moral evaluation is the character of the actor rather than the principles or norms that motivate her action. As Aristotle says, “Virtue then is a settled disposition of the mind determining the choice of actions and emotions, consisting essentially in the observance of the mean relative to us, this being determined by principle, that is, as the prudent man would determine it.” For example, if courage is a virtue, as it is for Aristotle, then a courageous act is one that, ceteris paribus, a courageous person would perform. Crucially, Aristotle held that an action could still be regarded as virtuous even if it failed to achieve its end. For example, it is virtuous to attempt to save a life even if one fails in that attempt.

Although the concept of virtue remained important in the moral philosophy of early Christianity, what mattered most were the absolute prescriptions handed down by God (for example, the Ten Commandments). According to this view, which is often referred to as the “divine command theory” of morality, actions are deemed right or wrong inasmuch as they uphold or violate God’s commandments. Though it remained influential throughout the Middle Ages and is still defended by certain contemporary philosophers, strict divine command theory was gradually rejected by the schoolmen who recognized that absolute moral prescriptions produce dilemmas that cannot be resolved by recourse to scripture alone. The case-based moral reasoning of scholastic philosophy (casuistry) evolved in part to solve these sorts of dilemmas.

Medieval casuistry may be understood as having revived the Aristotelian distinction between means and ends in order to devise principles of practical reasoning. A famous example is the so-called doctrine of double effect, which relies on a distinction between the underlying intentions of a voluntary action and its foreseeable consequences. According to the doctrine, it is sometimes permissible for an agent to bring about some outcome as an unintended but foreseen consequence of an action, where the outcome in question would be impermissible as an intended aim. The point is to provide criteria for judging the moral permissibility of actions that will foreseeably bring about multiple consequences—specifically, a good consequence that is intended and (at least) one bad consequence that is foreseen but unintended. Strictly speaking, it forbids the intentional performance of morally impermissible
actions in order to achieve morally good ends. At the same time, it allows for
the performance of actions that produce both permissible and impermissible
consequences, provided that (1) the former are intended and the latter are
merely foreseen, and (2) the overall aim is morally permissible.

Casuistry arose in part out of medieval natural law theory, which, as I
noted above, is itself a product of the recuperation of Roman jurisprudence
and Aristotelian philosophy in West. The most well-known theory was
articulated by Thomas Aquinas in his *Summa Theologiae*. For Aquinas,
following Aristotle, human reason is structured in such a way as to naturally
and immediately apprehend “its proper act and end” (i.e., the good). Aquinas
calls this “ordering of reason” (*ordo rationis*) the natural law.

Among other things, the natural law provides an ordered set of basic values
from which are derived true principles or propositions about what is and
is not to be done (the most basic of which is “good is to be done and evil is
to be avoided”). As rational creatures, human beings recognize the good
vis-à-vis the natural law and are generally inclined toward it. At the same
time, however, human beings are free to act or not act in accordance with
the natural law.

Aquinas holds that certain actions are *malum in se*, which means, among
other things, that humans beings ought not to perform them irrespective
of intentions or consequences. At the same time, Aquinas, like the casuists,
acknowledges that the commission of certain bad actions may be morally
permissible depending on the circumstances. For example, killing, though
evil in itself, may be morally permissible in cases of self-defense. In all cases,
however, an action is regarded as good first and foremost because it conforms
to the principles of natural law. Intentions and consequences, though not
entirely without importance, are always secondary considerations.

Abelard was one of the first moral philosophers to argue that normative
evaluation should focus principally on the intentions of agents rather than
on their characters or their actions. Although Abelard does not deny that
certain actions are intrinsically wrong insofar as they violate God’s will,
what matters is whether an individual actor believes that what he or she is
doing is in accordance with God’s will. Acting on the basis of incorrect
beliefs about what one ought to do is not the same thing as knowing what
one ought not to do and doing it anyway. For Abelard, the latter is sinful.
The former, on the other hand, is not sinful even though it leads to evil
consequences. There is no sin except against conscience, and ignorance itself
is not a sin. Therefore, as long as one believed in good faith that what one
was doing was right, one has not sinned.

What is interesting about Abelard’s ethics is not just that it situates moral
culpability on the side of intention but that it emphasizes the importance of
“acting according to principle.” The principle in question, simply put, is that
one ought to act according to the good-faith dictates of one’s conscience. An
action is judged right in accordance as it follows this principles and bad in
accordance as it does the opposite. As such, it is reasonable to claim Abelard as one of the first “deontological” moral philosophers. “Deontology,” after all, means something like “the science of duties,” and for Abelard the duty to follow one’s conscience is paramount. Though he might agree with Aquinas that the good is (mostly) self-evident to rational persons, Abelard seems much more attuned to the reality of moral conflict in ordinary human experience. The problem is not that people fail to recognize the good, but that they are often unsure how best to actualize the good in concrete moral situations. Abelard’s response, simply enough, is “always let your conscience be your guide.”

Several centuries later, Immanuel Kant formulated what has come to be regarded as the deontological moral theory par excellence, one that is grounded in the pivotal concepts of practical reason and autonomy. In a broad sense, Kant’s conceptualization of human agency may be understood in terms of a struggle. Like his medieval predecessors, Kant recognizes that human beings are a part of nature. As animals, we are subject to a dizzying array of instincts, impulses, and desires. At the same time, however, we are rational, which for Kant involves the ability to act according to certain principles. Thus rationality often seems to compete with natural inclinations. On the one hand, human beings are compelled to act by the force of inclination; on the other hand we are capable of overcoming this compulsion so as to act on the basis of independent principles.

Man’s ability to act rationally, as opposed to instinctively, presupposes a capacity to assess or analyze the world of objects—in a word, to think. According to Kant:

Now man really finds in himself a faculty which distinguishes him from all other things and even from himself insofar as he is affected by objects. That faculty is reason, which as pure spontaneity is elevated even above understanding. For although the latter is spontaneous and does not, like sense, merely contain representations that arise only when one if affected by things (and is therefore passive), yet understanding can by its activity no other concepts than those which merely serve to bring sensuous representations [intuitions] under rules and unite them in one consciousness . . . Reason, on the other hand, shows such pure spontaneity that it goes far beyond anything that sensibility can offer and shows its highest occupation in distinguishing the world of sense from the world of understanding, thereby prescribing limits to the understanding itself.

Reason, the final component of thought, is born out of man’s desire, as it were, to produce a holistic account of the world of objects independently of sense experience—to posit a theoretical explanation which does not rely on any preceding causal explanation. Whereas understanding is thought in relation to something else—namely, sense experience—reason is thought in
itself. Kant further distinguishes between two forms of reason: theoretical and practical. Through theoretical reason, we arrive at certain facts about the world independently of sense experience. In a general sense, theoretical reason merely specifies what is the case. Practical reason, in contrast, is the faculty by which we act according to principles. “[A] rational being has the power to act according to his conception of laws, that is, according to principles, and thereby he has a will. Since the derivation of actions from laws requires reason, the will is nothing but practical reason.” Thus, through practical reason we arrive at certain ideas regarding how we ought to act. These ideas do not rely on sense experience. They are not grounded in particular needs, desires, or natural inclinations. Rather, they are generated in deference to universal law as such. In this way, practical reason is the backbone of our moral experience.

Practical reason enables us to think in terms of what ought to be the case. On Kant’s view, however, “ought” always implies “can.” In other words, our capacity to act morally—to act as we ought to act within the limits of practical reason—implies that we are free to act. This leads Kant to distinguish between two types of action which, in the interest of clarity, I shall refer to as inclined action and rational action, respectively. Inclined action is determined in accordance with certain sensual impulses. For instance, when one is hungry—that is, when one desires food—one is inclined to eat. Thus if we ask someone “Why did you eat?” her response will most likely be “Because I was hungry.” Her will was therefore determined by something outside of herself—namely, the desire to eat. Human beings are also motivated by a desire for happiness, which Kant defines as “a rational being’s consciousness of the agreeableness of life which without interruption accompanies his whole existence.” When the desire for happiness determines our actions, we act according to the “principle of self-love.”

As we have seen, human beings qua rational agents do not merely abide by laws of nature or animal inclinations, but rather act with laws in mind. We are capable of stepping outside the realm of sensual impulses in order to deliberate through an appeal to our practical reason. The resulting rational action may be influenced by inclinations, but it is ultimately determined by a principle that is derived from practical reason. Any principle according to which I rationally act is called a maxim, as distinct from an imperative, which is a principle according to which I ought to act. Kant delineates between at least two types of imperatives. A hypothetical imperative is a principle according to which I ought to act in order to achieve a particular subjective end. If my end is to do well on an exam, for instance, I ought to study for it. Because studying helps me to achieve my end, it is good, albeit it in a hypothetical sense. A categorical imperative, in contrast, “declares an action to be of itself objectively necessary without reference to any purpose, i.e., without any end.” In other words, a categorical imperative is a universal law that applies to all rational beings, irrespective of their own interests. A
categorical imperative demands that we do what ought to be done as such, not as conduces to some particular goal.

Insofar as human beings are capable of acting independently of inclinations—that is, in accordance with law as constructed from our practical reason—we are autonomous. A rational autonomous agent determines what it will do based upon a reason provided by itself. It is able to do so, in turn, because it is free from natural causality—that is, it is capable of acting independently of any efficient cause such as the desire for happiness or any other natural inclination. Therefore, freedom is “the property that the will has of being a law to itself.” We are free because we give ourselves the law by which we abide—and this law is determined by practical reason. “Ought” implies “can”, then, only insofar as we can choose to act according to our own reason rather than being caused to act by something outside of ourselves. If I am not able to perform any other action save X, it makes no sense to suggest that I ought to perform X. The proposition “I ought to do X” presupposes that I could do otherwise.

Human action is determined by an imperative which is necessarily derived from practical reason. Moral action, however, is determined by an imperative which is categorical—that is, which is not reducible to any particular subjective end. It is thereby founded on a law which applies to all rational beings insofar as they are rational (capable of realizing the law through practical reason) and free (capable of independently formulating the dictates of the law as such). In order for an action to be moral and rational, its maxim must be willed as though it were a universal law which applies to all rational beings. This, in the most fundamental sense, is the “only” categorical imperative.

With respect to this categorical imperative, however, Kant inquires, “Is it a necessary law for all rational beings always to judge their actions according to such maxims as they can themselves will that such should serve as universal laws? If there is such a law, then it must be connected (completely a priori) with the concept of the will of a rational being in general.” Any free action implies a purpose—that is, an end. One’s end determines how one acts. If my end is to do well on an exam, for instance, I will act in a manner conducive to that end (e.g., I will study for four hours, I will get plenty of rest prior to the exam, etc.). Kant is asking what should be considered the proper end, specifically, of moral action. We know, first of all, that this end cannot be subjective. That is, it cannot be an end which pertains to the gratification of a particular desire. Moreover, because it does not conduce to any subjective desire, it is derived from reason alone. Thus, it is categorical—binding on all rational beings.

Kant concludes that a rational autonomous being is an end in itself, because such a being possesses value irrespective of its capacity to satisfy some relative end. “Now I say that man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily
used by this or that will. He must in all his actions, whether directed to
himself or to other rational beings, always be regarded at the same time as
an end.” Thus, when one wills morally, one wills to be rational and free,
just because these are goods in themselves. Persons, moreover, are deserving
of being treated as rational and free and thus of having absolute worth in
and of themselves. Upon this notion Kant constructs a “supreme practical
principle” that substantiates the categorical imperative in a practical sense:
always treat rational beings as ends in themselves and never as means.

In sum, moral action involves acting on laws that are categorical—that is,
which do not conduce to any particular subjective end. Insofar as all actions
imply an end, moreover, a moral action must conduce to an objective end—
that is, an end in itself. Finally, because human nature as such is rational
and free, all human beings are to be regarded as ends in themselves. It is
easy to see here why Kantian moral philosophy is regarded as the hallmark
of nonconsequentialism. For Kant, an action is morally right insofar as it
is voluntarily performed on the basis of a categorical moral principle. This
remains true even if the action in question leads to unsavory consequences.

Furthermore, Kant does not believe that particular actions are intrinsically
right or wrong insofar as they are virtuous/vicious (in the Aristotelian sense)
or good/evil (in the Thomistic sense). Though Kant does not ignore concepts
of virtue and value, he regards them as secondary to what is required by moral
principle (i.e., the right). In other words, something is good or valuable for
Kant insofar as it is right for a rational, autonomous being to pursue it and
not the other way around. To this extent Kant, like Abelard, acknowledges
the importance of intention in morally evaluating actions, though he is not
quite as lenient. For Abelard, an action is morally permissible so long as the
actor believes in good faith that she is acting according to a moral principle
(i.e., God’s law). For Kant, generally speaking, the belief must also be true.

Although there are arguably as many consequentialist theories as there
are nonconsequentialist theories, the differences among the former are not
necessarily as weighty as those among the latter. We are therefore within our
rights to cite just one example of consequentialism—namely, utilitarianism,
which claims that a given action is right in proportion as it tends to promote
“utility” (where “utility” is usually defined in terms of happiness, pleasure,
the satisfaction of desires, or some other end that is regarded as intrinsically
good) and wrong as it tends to promote the opposite. For many utilitarian
theories, neither the action itself nor the intentions of the actor are significant.
This implies, inter alia, that (a) no action is wrong in itself and (b) an action
that leads to bad consequences is morally wrong irrespective of the agent’s
intentions, whether good or bad.

The example of J.S. Mill is worth noting here in brief detail. In Chapter 4
of Utilitarianism, Mill claims that “questions about ends are . . . questions
about what things are desirable.” In other words, questions about things
that are intrinsically (i.e., noninstrumentally) good are questions about what
things are worthy of being desired for their own sake. He goes on to provide the following argument:

The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible is that people hear it; and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people do actually desire it. If the end of the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was so. No reason can be given that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good, that each person’s happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.  

For Mill, happiness is defined, at the highest level of generality, as pleasure and the absence of pain. Having shown that happiness is desired as an end by (at least some) human beings, he proceeds to argue that happiness is the only thing that human beings desire for their own sake and will as ends, which in turn implies that happiness alone is intrinsically good.

An important objection to this theory, which Mill himself discusses, claims that “to suppose that life has . . . no higher end than pleasure—no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit . . . [is] utterly mean and groveling . . . a doctrine worthy only of swine.” In other words, if the hedonistic theory of value is true, it would seem to follow that it is be better to be a contented swine than a discontented Socrates or Shakespeare or any other example of an excellent human being. The typical “Epicurean” response to this objection, as Mill notes, is that “a beast’s pleasures do not satisfy a human being’s conception of happiness” because “[h]uman beings have faculties more elevated than animal appetites and . . . do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification.” Mill himself takes a somewhat different approach:

[U]tilitarian writers in general have placed the superiority of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, etc., of the former—that is, in their circumstantial advantages rather than in their intrinsic nature . . . but they might have taken the other and, as it may be called, higher ground with entire consistency. It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize that some kinds of pleasure are more valuable and more desirable than others. It would be absurd that, while in estimating all other things quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasure should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.
He goes on to argue that a pleasure is qualitatively “higher” than another pleasure of equal quantity insofar as “all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference” to the former over the latter. Because we would prefer, on balance, to be dissatisfied human beings than satisfied pigs, it follows that the “higher pleasures” particular to human beings are more valuable than the “lower pleasures,” the experience of which we share (if only analogously) with beasts.

Here Mill is not simply defending hedonism as such but distinguishing his own theory from those of earlier utilitarians such as Bentham for whom the “intensity and duration” of pleasure was all that mattered. Like all early utilitarians, Mill believes that an action is morally right in proportion as it tends to promote happiness and wrong as it tends to promote the opposite. The key difference is that, for Mill, what matters is not how much happiness is promoted so much as what kind. Performing a piano concerto and giving a massage are both, ceteris paribus, moral actions insofar as they promote pleasure. Mill would argue, however, that the former is a morally superior action (again, ceteris paribus) insofar as it promotes a higher pleasure.

Mill’s understanding of pleasure is analogous to Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia, at least insofar as (1) they both form the basis of the good life, and (2) they are the only things which can be counted as intrinsically good. This becomes especially clear if we accept the “intellectualist” interpretation of Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, according to which eudaimonia consists in the “higher pleasure” of contemplation. Aristotle and Mill would also agree that the good life is the most pleasant life. Although Aristotle does not regard hedon as the fundamental criterion of value, he nonetheless claims that excellent activity is pleasurable by definition and, by extension, that a life of excellent activity is a pleasant life. Similarly, because Mill regards pleasure as the only thing which is intrinsically good, he would naturally conclude that the good life will be a pleasant life—that is, one in which pleasures are maximized. Lastly, both Aristotle and Mill derive their respective conceptions of the good from the function or nature of human beings. Aristotle argues that the good of human beings involves acting in accordance with our ergon, which is to be rational. Similarly, Mill contends that the good of human beings involves the experience of “higher pleasures,” which are in turn products of uniquely human activities.

As we have already noted, however, Aristotle is no consequentialist. Neither is he a hedonist. After all, although pleasure qualifies as a particular good for Aristotle, it does not satisfy the formal criteria for the highest good because other goods could be added to it. Furthermore, the highest good for Aristotle is not a matter of having certain kinds of experiences but rather in cultivating a certain kind of character or living a certain kind of life. A truly happy person, a eudaimon, is someone who pursues excellence in all fields of rational human endeavor. Generally speaking, Mill is not concerned with human character or with happiness considered over the course of an entire
human life. To the extent that he is concerned, the qualifying distinction between higher and lower pleasures would seem to suggest that a life consisting in the pursuit and acquisition of a single higher pleasure would qualify as good.

Mill’s utilitarianism is, of course, not the only utilitarianism, nor indeed is utilitarianism the only form of consequentialism. What the foregoing example shows, in any case, is that for consequentialists moral evaluation tends to be teleological. That is, it begins with a theory of the good (i.e., an account of intrinsically valuable and desirable ends) and proceeds to define the rightness or wrongness of actions principally (if not solely) in terms of the good as defined within said theory. For nonconsequentialists, in contrast, the ends of actions do not provide sufficient grounds for moral evaluation and in some cases are altogether irrelevant.

An alternative taxonomy

When we consider political theories in terms of their basic normative commitments, the differences among them become clear. Thus, for example, political theories that affirm nonconsequentialist accounts of normativity are generally concerned with the rights, liberties, and welfare of individuals over and above the various ends toward which power relations are directed. They ask whether and to what extent such relations are justified vis-à-vis principles of justice, which are in turn justified according to a conception of the good or the right. Consequentialist theories, in contrast, generally hold that power relations are justified to the extent that they bring about certain beneficial ends for society as a whole—even if this requires, in some cases, means that violate individual rights or are otherwise harmful to the good of individual persons.

Many modern political theories take it for granted that rights and liberties are valuable. The fundamental question, then, is whether political power exists for the sake of these rights and liberties, or whether they exist for the sake of political power. As we have already seen, Aristotle believes that freedom is only instrumentally good insofar as it is a precondition for the cultivation of civic virtue. The laws of the polis do not exist to maximize or even (strictly speaking) to protect the freedom of individuals but rather to cultivate virtue within the polis as a whole. (Hegel, as we shall see, takes a somewhat similar view regarding the ultimate purpose and justification of the state.) Liberals from Hobbes to Rawls tend to take the opposite view, that is, that political power is only instrumentally good insofar as it is a precondition for the protection and maximization of individual rights and liberties—which, generally speaking, is what many liberals mean by “justice.”

At the theoretical level, therefore, we can distinguish between what I will call *teleological political philosophy*, on the one hand, and *deontojuridical*
political philosophy, on the other. The former includes those theories that hold that political power relations are justified in proportion as they tend to promote some particular end or set of ends and unjustified as they tend to promote the opposite. The latter includes those theories that hold that political power relations are justified to the extent that they are necessitated by, or at least conform to, certain moral principles, duties, or obligations, and unjustified to the extent that they do the opposite.

Deontojuridical political philosophy obviously encompasses a wide range of theories that emphasize natural law and natural rights. In Thomistic natural law theory, for example, human law—and, by extension, the political institutions that legislate and execute it—is only justified to the extent that it conforms to the natural law. For John Finnis and other neo-Thomists, human beings possess inviolable natural rights that follow from the basic goods of the natural law. According to this account, all natural rights correspond to obligations: if I have a right to X, where X is always a basic good prescribed by the natural law, then everyone else is obliged to provide me with X or at least to refrain from denying me X. Thus, for example, if life itself is a basic good, it follows all human beings have a natural right to life. This, in turn, means that everyone else is obliged to protect human life, or at least to refrain, ceteris paribus, from deliberately taking human life. Political relations are justified to the extent that they promote and protect natural rights and, by extension, the basic goods of the natural law.

Other deontojuridical political philosophies do not rely on a naturalistic conception of intrinsic goodness. For Kant, as we have seen, what makes actions pervious to moral evaluation is that they are voluntary and rational. An action is right to the extent that it conforms to categorical moral principles that in turn are derived from an account of rational, autonomous agency. Thus X is intrinsically good just in case it is right to value X (where “it is right to value X” just means that one ought to value X). Furthermore, it is right to value X just in case X is the sort of thing that a rational autonomous agent would, ceteris paribus, value. To discover what a rational autonomous agent would value, in turn, we need only consult the categorical imperative. Can the valuing of X be prescribed as a universally applicable moral law? If so, then X is intrinsically valuable. If not, then X is at best instrumentally valuable, and at worst “dis- valuable” (that is, “bad”).

It is easy to see how this kind of moral theory—variously describable as “moral rationalism,” “moral nonnaturalism,” “moral nonrealism,” and so forth—translates into a conception of rights. If something is required or forbidden by the universal moral law, it is something to which I am entitled or, contrariwise, from which I ought to be protected. Because the universal moral law forbids murder, it follows that people have a moral duty or obligation to refrain from murdering others. This obligation, in turn, implies a corresponding right to “not be murdered” or, more simply, a right to live.
Because such rights are regarded as inviolable, as in the case of natural law theory, it follows that political relations are justified to the extent that they promote or protect these rights.

Although deontojuridical political philosophies may differ with respect to the theoretical foundations of moral rights, they all regard political relations as, in some sense, subservient to morality. Thus the social contract tradition, which we will examine at greater length later on, generally holds that political relations are justified to the extent that they are necessary for, or at least maximally conducive to, the protection and promotion of moral rights. This is not to say that deontojuridical political philosophy lacks teleological components. For example, a liberal like Rawls would clearly agree that political institutions are, or at least ought to be, directed toward specific goals. Rawls would deny, however, that success in these goals, not to speak of the goals themselves, is the ultimate criterion by which political institutions are to be judged. Rather, such goals are justified only to the extent that they conform to the principles of justice. (They are not, in other words, good in themselves.)

Teleological political philosophy holds that political relations are justified to the extent that they promote certain ends and unjustified to the extent that they do the opposite. Machiavelli's political theory, as we have seen, may be regarded as teleological in this sense, at least insofar as it regards the acquisition and maintenance of power as an end in itself irrespective of other moral considerations. For Machiavelli, there can be no further justification of power beyond the possession of power itself. The prince's rule (and, by extension, the means he takes to acquire and maintain it) is "justified" to the extent that it successfully achieves its end. In theory, it is not constrained by the natural law, the "rights" of the subjects, nor any other extenuating factors.

Another example is Plato's Republic, wherein the rule of the philosopher-kings is justified solely in terms of the end, which, according to Socrates, they alone are in a position to achieve. The constitution and laws of the ideal polis are the means by which this end, which is variously described as justice or the common good, is attained. As such, what liberals would refer to as personal liberty or individual freedom is severely circumscribed in the polis; the good of the individual is rendered subordinate to the good of the many. Aristotle, as we have seen, takes a similar view. For him, too, political power is ultimately justified by its end, which is nothing less than the cultivation of virtue among the citizens of the entire polis.

It is worth noting here that the deontojuridical/teleological distinction can be applied both to the theoretical and the strategic aspects of political philosophy. In certain schools of revolutionary Marxism, for example, any political action that is conducive to the abolition of capitalism and/or the protection of the worker's state is prima facie justified even if it involves
violence and repression. Here we might cite as an example the pre-Bolshevik Russian radical Sergei Nechayev:

The revolutionary despises all doctrinarism and has rejected the mundane sciences leaving them to future generations. He knows only one science, the science of destruction. To this end, and this end alone, he will study mechanics, physics, chemistry and perhaps medicine [ . . . ] His sole and constant object is the immediate destruction of this vile order.  

Nechayev’s extreme consequentialism is mirrored—albeit with considerably less ostentation—in the writings of Vladimir Lenin. As we noted previously, May regards Leninism as a “strategic political philosophy” in part because it involves “a unitary analysis that aims towards a single goal.” For Lenin, circumstances are always to be assessed and solutions prescribed with a mind to achieving this goal. This overarching emphasis on ends over and above means leads Lenin to conclude that even repressive strategies may be acceptable: “[W]e must temporarily make use of the instruments, resources, and methods of the state against the exploiters.” Similar sentiments have been expressed by countless revolutionaries for whom the phrase “by any means necessary” is virtually a dogma: never questioned but always assumed.

Other philosophers, in contrast, have argued vociferously that political praxis cannot afford to ignore moral evaluation of means. As James Guillaume, a colleague of Bakunin, once remarked, “How could one want an equalitarian and free society to issue from authoritarian organization? It is impossible.” The idea here, simply stated, is that ends must be ethically consistent with means. The social democratic tradition in socialism as well as all forms of nonrevolutionary liberalism are motivated by precisely this concern, the assumption being that political activity carried out within a legitimate system of law—such as peacefully petitioning the government for redress of grievances—is less likely to involve the violation of universal moral principles. We will say more about this in the next chapter.

Just as deontojuridical political philosophy is often concerned to some degree with ends, at least some forms of teleological political philosophy are very much concerned with rights and principles. The philosophy of J.S. Mill is particularly illustrative here. As a utilitarian, Mill is committed to the idea that the overarching goal of political relations is the “greatest good for the greatest number.” At the same time, Mill acknowledges that this goal is unachievable without a conception of justice that places certain limitations on the activity of government. For Mill, justice entails a host of individual rights and liberties that must be protected and promoted in order for society to progress. Even authoritarian political philosophies tend to acknowledge that citizens are to be granted certain rights that in turn imply obligations on the part of the state. The difference in both cases is that the state (and, by extension, the ends for which the state exists) is causally and conceptually prior to rights and obligations.
Deontological concepts are acknowledged and affirmed only insofar they are necessary for (or at least conducive to) the achievement of these ends.

In addition to focusing on the ways in which political philosophies evaluate various kinds of power relations, we do well to examine how they regard themselves in relation to said power relations. As we saw in our discussion of May, certain political theories are characterized by an abstract method of analysis that divorces itself from the any and all historical situations, including the historical situation in which it arises. (This is one of the features of what he calls “formal” political philosophy.) The content of such theories, not surprisingly, tends to be “decontextualized”—that is, it does not refer to any concrete political institutions, phenomena, or events but to general or universal concepts that allegedly obtain irrespective of context. Their central claims are not contingent upon historical circumstances; they do not change in form or substance in response to changes in the “real world.” To this extent, such theories are best described as transcendental.

Perhaps the most fitting example here is Kant. As Benjamin Franks notes, the bedrock of Kantian moral and political philosophy is “the dispassionate, objective citizen, abstract ’Man.’” The Kantian subject is not a real person living in actual circumstances but a concept, one which attempts to encompass the salient characteristics of human beings qua moral agents at the highest possible level of generality. By analyzing this a-historical, abstract “Man,” Kant is able to generate universal principles that apply to all human beings irrespective of their particular circumstances. John Rawls utilizes a very similar strategy in his Theory of Justice. Instead of discussing actual people, Rawls imagines a group of hypothetical “ideally rational agents” who must decide, from behind the “veil of ignorance,” what principles of justice shall govern society. The purpose of the veil of ignorance is precisely to separate Rawls’s hypothetical humans from any and all contexts, the idea being that the universal or the ideal is transhistorical and metacontextual by definition.

This is not to say that transcendental political philosophy bears no actual relation to the circumstances in which it arises. Kantian philosophy could not possibly have originated in sixth-century Athens, for example, if for no other reason than that it relies upon a model of human subjectivity that was quite foreign to the Greeks. Likewise Rawls’s Theory of Justice makes numerous references to representative democracy, constitutions, and other concepts which are quite commonplace for twentieth-century readers but would have been utterly incomprehensible to, say, the theology faculty of the University of Paris in AD 1220. All of this is quite obvious. The point, however, is that for transcendental political philosophers like Kant and Rawls the most fundamental claims of their respective theories do not depend on any historical contingencies. If Rawls’s account of human nature is accurate, for example, it would hold just as true of sixth-century philosophers and thirteenth-century theologians as it does of twentieth-century Harvard professors. The fact that these philosophers and theologians thought of
themselves in a very different manner is irrelevant; from the standpoint of transcendental political philosophy, they were simply mistaken or naïve or both.

Other political theories, which belong to what I call historical political philosophy, are much more self-reflexive; they not only acknowledge their entrenchment within concrete historical circumstances but recognize the extent to which these circumstances shape and are shaped by their theoretical commitments. May identifies this self-reflexivity with the strategic political philosophy of Marxism but we can find it much earlier in the work of Machiavelli or even in the “mirror of princes” books to which Machievelli’s *The Prince* is indebted. Unlike Kant or Rawls, Machiavelli is not interested in providing an abstract, universal theory of justice. In point of fact, he is not concerned with anything that could reasonably be called “abstract” or “universal.” On the contrary, his philosophy is rooted squarely in the political and social landscape of sixteenth-century Italy. Its descriptive claims no less than its prescriptive content are virtually meaningless outside this context. An intelligent student of Kant, in contrast, could hypothetically comprehend *The Critique of Practical Reason* without any knowledge of the political situation of eighteenth-century Europe.

Marxism, too, is a philosophy which is predicated on historical awareness. It not only arose within a particular historical context but is avowedly self-conscious of its place within that context as well as of the extent to which changes in context necessitate changes in theoretical and practical positions. This is not to say that historical political philosophy avoids the introduction of abstract concepts. Hegel, who is arguably the first genuine philosopher to combine philosophical analysis with historical analysis, provides a theory replete with universal claims and concepts far more abstruse than anything Kant ever devised. By introducing historicity into philosophy, however, Hegel engendered a certain theoretical fluidity that allowed philosophy to remain dynamic and future-oriented.

Ultimately certain schools of Marxism, especially those influenced by Marx’s collaborator Friedrich Engels, developed a scientific theory of history that was at least as abstract and totalizing as the Kantian/Rawlsian theories of human nature. The basic idea was that human history operated according to scientific laws which, once discovered, allowed philosophers to make pronouncements about what would or would not take place in the future. In effect, this transformed the otherwise historical political philosophy of the early Marx and even that of Vladimir Lenin into the transcendental political philosophy of orthodox dialectical materialism. (I call the latter transcendental, again, not because it divested itself of historical considerations but because it came to emphasize abstract, universal laws over and above concrete possibilities for intervention).

Historical political philosophy tends, as a rule, to rely more heavily on descriptive analysis than transcendental political philosophy. (By “descriptive analysis” here, I do not mean “analysis of what is the case” *simpliciter*, but
rather analysis of what is the case historically. Thus the historical political
philosopher is less concerned with providing a general account of human
nature than with the concrete historical circumstances that give rise to human
cases.) To this extent, it often gravitates more closely to the “is pole” than
does transcendental political philosophy, even when the latter relies on robust
metaphysical accounts of “what is the case.” The point, in any event, is that the
transcendental/historical distinction pertains chiefly to the descriptive
aspects of political philosophies, whereas the deontojuridical/teleological distinction
pertains chiefly to their normative aspects. Because political philosophy is, as
we said, a holistic discourse that includes both aspects, a given political theory
can be described as both transcendental and deontojuridical, say, or as both
teleological and historical. The taxonomy I am proposing is thus biaxial:

![Figure 2.1 An Alternative Political-Theoretical Taxonomy](image)

In this schematization, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and all other pre-
Machiavellian thinkers would appear above the horizontal axis (because
transcendental) and the vast majority of them would appear to the right
of the vertical axis (because teleological). Upon entering the era of political
modernity, most of the classical and modern liberals—for example, Hobbes,
Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Rawls, and so forth—would appear in the upper left-
hand corner, though a few, such as Bentham and Mill, would appear in the
upper right-hand corner. Machiavelli would appear in the lower right-hand
corner, as would Hegel, Marx, Lenin, and a large portion of their progeny.
The lower left-hand corner would be populated by all sorts of interesting
people, including several German idealists and, possibly, Hannah Arendt.

Here we arrive at a possible weakness in the taxonomy. Where would
the anarchism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries appear? What
about poststructuralist political theory? Many would argue that both of
these theoretical schools are, like Marxism, best described as historical
rather than transcendental in nature and, indeed, this is how I characterize
them later on. But insofar as poststructuralism is characterized in part by
its trenchant critique of both deontojuridical and teleological normative schemes, it is not at all clear on which side of the vertical axis it should appear. The same is true, I would suggest, of anarchism, albeit for a different reason. Anarchism does evaluate political (and all other) power relations in terms of conformity with basic moral principles, but it also evaluates them in terms of their conduciveness to particular ends. This is because the distinctively anarchist normative framework—prefiguration—demands a unity of means and ends, theory and practice, and so forth, that does not allow hard-and-fast distinctions between what must be protected in the present and what must be achieved in the future.

What this actually suggests, in my view, is not a weakness in the taxonomy—which applies beautifully to political theory from antiquity through modernity—but a strong affinity between classical anarchism and poststructuralism. Neither fits comfortably within the broad framework of modern and premodern political theory because both have gone beyond the modern; they are, in a word, postmodern. In the next part of the book, our goal is to make this point explicit by examining the conceptual foundations of political modernity and demonstrating that anarchism, though frequently thought of as a distinctively modern form of political theory, actually prefigures poststructuralism in its critique of modernity.

On political modernity

If you’ve ever taken a “Western Civilization” course in high school or college, you’ve very probably heard some variation on the following story: one morning, somewhere between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, Europeans walked out into the sunshine only to find that the medieval world they once knew had completely disappeared, that society as a whole had undergone a profound and total transformation, that suddenly and all at once everything had changed—become, in a word, “modern.” (An uncannily similar story alleges that the classical world spontaneously became “medieval” when Emperor Romulus Augustulus abdicated the throne to the Scirian chieftain Odoacer on September 4, 476, an event typically identified as the formal end of the Roman Empire.)

Such stories are, of course, completely spurious. There is no decisive moment at which the classical world became medieval or the medieval world became modern. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that a new form of society had come into being in Europe and North America by the onset of the First World War in 1914. As one moves back in time from that year, several of that society’s most distinguishing characteristics begin to fall away in rapid succession—for example, technological advancement and industrial mass production. Others do not. One would have to travel a good four or five hundred years into the past to witness the more or less complete disappearance of “secularization” and even further for the disintegration
of large urban centers. Certain more nebulous, though no less archetypal, features of modernity such as “rationalism” would not seem to vanish at all, but only to undergo various kinds of changes. Even in the so-called Dark Ages, after all, our hypothetical time-traveler might casually bump into Eriugena or Alcuin or countless others who bear scattered marks of rationalism.

The point, in any case, is that modernity, considered as an all-encompassing historical “moment,” is largely mythical. As such, it is perhaps more appropriate to speak of “modernization”—a process of social, political, cultural, and economic transformation constituted by intersecting and mutually irreducible forces—that gradually transformed Western civilization over many centuries. The question, of course, is what these forces are supposed to be. Anthony Giddens attempts an answer when he claims that modernity “is a shorthand term for modern society or industrial civilization . . . associated with (1) a certain set of attitudes towards the world, the idea of the world as an open transformation by human intervention; (2) a complex of economic institutions, especially industrial production and a market economy; (3) a certain range of political institutions, including the nation-state and mass democracy.” He goes on to suggest that in virtue of these characteristics modernity is “vastly more dynamic than any previous type of social order . . . a society—more technically, a complex of institutions—which unlike any preceding cultures lives in the future rather than the past.”

The problem with this answer is that it is rather too vague. For example, what exactly does Giddens take to be characteristically modern “attitudes”? He mentions “the idea of the world as an open transformation by human intervention,” but whether such an idea is indeed modern depends largely on what he means by “open transformation by human intervention.” Couldn’t one argue, for example, that a similar idea prevailed among the Romans of the imperial period? Clearly the emperors believed that they were capable of “intervening” in the world in order to remake it in the image and likeness of Rome (and this is precisely what they did, at least for a time).

It is true that the origins of industrial production can be traced with great precision to the end of the eighteenth century, but what about the so-called market economy? Again, one could reasonably argue that “market economies” existed under various descriptions in the Italian city-states of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the urban centers of medieval Europe, or even in the Roman and Byzantine Empires. Without further qualification as to the meaning of the term “market economy,” it is unclear why such economies should be regarded as peculiarly “modern” institutions. The same is true of “nation-states”—which could refer to the system of sovereign polities devised in 1648 by the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück or to the rise of postfeudal absolute monarchies even earlier—and “mass democracy,” which has arguably been practiced in all sorts of Western and non-Western cultures at various points throughout history.

As Lawrence Cahoone notes, “Everyone admits that Europe and North America developed a new, powerful technique for the study of nature, as well
as new machine technologies and modes of industrial production that have led to an unprecedented rise in material living standards.” Such developments, however, are not exhaustive of modernity, which is “generally characterized as well by other traits, such as capitalism, a largely secular culture, liberal democracy, individualism, rationalism, humanism.” He adds by way of summary that:

The positive self-image modern Western culture has given to itself, a picture born in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, is of a civilization founded on scientific knowledge of the world and rational knowledge of value, which places the highest premium on individual human life and freedom, and believes that such freedom and rationality will lead to social progress through self-controlled work, creating a better material, intellectual, and political life for all.

In the realm of philosophy, Kant epitomizes this “positive self-image” when he characterizes the Enlightenment as a transition from uncritical acceptance of tradition and superstition (which he calls “immature”) to the “spirit of freedom,” the capacity of individual human beings to “use [their] understanding without guidance from another.” Gone is the medieval dream of Aristotelian order, replaced by “a world of ultimately contingent correlations to be patiently mapped by empirical correlations.”

The “distinctive assumptions” of Enlightenment thought, according to Philip Pettit, can be roughly described as follows:

1. There is a reality independent of human knowledge of which we human beings are part.
2. Reason and method, particularly as exemplified in science, offer us the proper way to explore that reality and our relationship to it.
3. In this exploration, traditional preconceptions—in particular, traditional evaluative preconceptions—should be suspended and the facts allowed to speak for themselves.

These assumptions, which Pettit claims continue to characterize “analytical philosophy” in the present day, bring us a bit closer to understanding philosophical modernity. Nonetheless, it is somewhat difficult to distinguish them as stated from the various assumptions that undergird classical Aristotelianism, the school of thought that Enlightenment thinking allegedly superseded. Aristotle, too, affirmed the existence of a thought-dependent reality and advocated the use of reason and methodology—particularly of an empirical, protoscientific sort—to “explore that reality and our relationship to it.” Pettit may offer us an accurate image of philosophical modernity, but that image is a clouded one that blurs into premodernity along its interstices.

In all events, even if modernity ought to be defined in terms of a set of “traits” (or, as I have called them, “forces”), the historical collision of which
constitutes the uniqueness of modern civilization, it is not clear that any one of these traits or forces, considered by itself, can be unproblematically regarded as unique in human history. Cahoone agrees, adding that our inability to separate the distinct components of modernity from the whole (and, by extension, to regard some of these components as essential to modernity, or at least more important than others) makes it virtually impossible to locate the precise “historical parameters” of modernity. Depending upon which traits or components are emphasized, the origins of modernity can be traced back as early as the scholastic Renaissance of the twelfth century or as late as the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth.

As Cahoone rightly points out, “The primary question for philosophers is not, When did modernity begin? but: What is the nature, the destiny, and the validity of this new way of life?” The aim of the present inquiry is even more limited. I am not interested in analyzing modernity as such, but only those aspects of modernity that may be properly called “political.” Moreover, it is not possible to provide an adequate analysis of political modernity without examining certain aspects of modernity as such that are not conventionally regarded as “political.” For example, one cannot effectively analyze liberalism without addressing the various metaphysical claims or presuppositions upon which liberalism is founded. At the same time, to provide an exhaustive investigation of every single political theory that is properly termed “modern” far exceeds the scope of this volume. Consequently, certain recourse to broad strokes is necessary, which, I hope, will not diminish the rigor of our investigation.

The two major theoretical schools of political modernity may be identified, at the highest level of generality, as liberalism and socialism. That said, it is extremely difficult, if not altogether impossible, to provide a uniform and all-encompassing definition of either school, given the immense diversity that has existed within each over the course of the past three hundred years. While some claim that liberalism is a fixed, comprehensive, self-contained, and internally consistent system of ideas, others claim that there is no such thing as Liberalism (with a capital L) but only liberalisms—a variety of distinct and sometimes mutually exclusive doctrines that nonetheless bear some “family resemblance” to one another. Still others claim that liberalism as a political theory must be distinguished from liberalism as a political tradition or ideology. One finds a similar range of opinions with respect to socialism.

The liberal political tradition is often described in terms of a set of features including, but not limited to, opposition to political, religious, and economic despotism; representative democracy; limitation and separation of powers (i.e., republicanism); religious tolerance and the de jure separation of church and state; legal due process and equal protection under the law; equality of basic rights and opportunities; and the protection of personal and economic freedom. Liberal practices and institutions, in turn, are seen as protecting and/or promoting certain central values (e.g., freedom,
equality, progress, etc.) that are derived from or otherwise related to various descriptive assumptions about human beings.

As it turns out, this picture of liberalism as a tradition is not so much inaccurate as it is vacuous. John Locke and John Rawls are both identified as liberals, in part because both attach enormous value to individual rights and liberties. At the same time, there are considerable differences between Locke and Rawls that are not reducible to a disagreement over the quantity and quality of rights and liberties that accrue to individuals. In point of fact, Locke’s understanding of what “rights” and “liberties” are is very different from Rawls’s understanding of these concepts, which explains in part why Locke and Rawls end up articulating such different theories. But can we reasonably refer to Lockean theory and Rawlsian theory as “liberal” merely because they both employ the same kinds of words in reference to different concepts? To do so would, in effect, define “liberalism” solely in de dictu terms.

The obvious answer to this question is “no.” Just as it would be false to claim, for example, that Christianity and Hinduism are both “monotheistic” merely because both religions employ the word “God,” it would be equally false to call political theory X and political theory Y “liberal” merely because both employ the word “rights.” What matters in political philosophy are the concepts to which such words refer and, more importantly, how these concepts function within theories. Given the historical chasm separating Locke from Rawls, it is not surprising that they would use some of the same terms in different ways. After all, concepts can evolve and change over time without transforming into entirely distinct concepts, and, as concepts change, so, too, does their function within particular theories. The question is whether Locke’s conception of “rights,” say, remains similar enough to Rawls’s conception of rights that we know they are referring to roughly the same thing.

In light of this question, it is best for our purposes to think of political modernity (and of modern political theories) in the same terms we characterized modernity in general—that is, as a confluence of disparate forces rather than as a unified totality. There are, it seems, far too many differences among particular liberal and socialist thinkers (and modern liberal-democratic and socialist organizations, parties, polities, etc.) to argue for the existence of any sort of totalized “Liberal” or “Socialist” political system. We shall therefore attempt to identify the more or less distinctive elements that constitute these two theoretical schools. In all cases, these elements are not to be regarded as absolute definitional properties as much as spectra or trajectories along which liberal theories and socialist theories may be located and differentially analyzed. For purposes of the present inquiry I shall focus on four such trajectories, to wit: (a) the nature of human beings, both in themselves and in relation to society and the world at large; (b) morality, including both axiology and normativity; (c) political power relations; and (d) economic power relations. Chapter 3 deals with liberalism, Chapter 4 with socialism.
Liberalism

Representationalism

Ancient and medieval political theory, as we saw in the first two chapters, was situated in an *archic* context that presupposed a natural cosmological order. To this extent it is best understood as a kind of ethical naturalism according to which the lives of human beings (ought to) reflect or conform to the order of nature. Political relations and institutions, by extension, are described and/or justified in relation to natural laws. For Aristotle, human beings are social creatures by nature, thus life in the *polis* is natural for human beings. Certain Stoics, while not necessarily disagreeing with the idea that human beings are social by nature, nonetheless deny that the *polis* (or at least certain of its key features, such as private property) is natural in the strict sense. In both cases, the concept of the individual person is at best secondary to the concept of the community, which is in turn secondary to the *archic* concept of natural order. Because human beings are essentially social, and because this essential sociability helps to define the place of human beings within the broader cosmological order, sociopolitical relations within communities and among individual human beings are justified to the extent that they are deemed “natural.”

Political naturalism of this sort is better understood as a species of a wider genre which might be called “political holism.” This “holism,” as I understand it, rests on two crucial theses. The first is that corporate entities such as communities, societies, cultures, and states have interests that transcend those of individual persons. The second, according to Charles Taylor, is that “living in society is a necessary condition of the development of rationality, in some sense of this property, or of becoming a moral agent in the full sense of the term, or of becoming a fully responsible, autonomous being.” If holism is essentially a descriptive or metaphysical doctrine, naturalism is an ethical doctrine; for the naturalist, after all, what matters is not just that human beings are social by nature, but that “naturalness” is
the standard according to which political practices and institutions are to be ethically evaluated. Later holistic theories, such as those of Vico, Herder, Rousseau, and Hegel, do not necessarily ground ethical evaluation in an account of what is natural even though their accounts of the natural are similar to those which underwrite naturalistic theories.\textsuperscript{3}

Thus the concept of “nature” in general and “human nature” in particular did not vanish in the wake of modernity. On the contrary, questions such as “what does it mean to be human?” or “what is the universal essence shared in common by all human beings?” remained centrally important for liberal and protoliberal philosophers, especially those of the so-called early modern era. One crucial difference is that for such philosophers, human beings are generally understood first and foremost as individuals who are to be distinguished from each other as well from the natural world which they inhabit. This constitutes a rather significant departure from the aforesaid ancient and medieval theories, which, while scarcely denying the existence of individuals, tended to analyze them in terms of their relationship to the community and, by extension, to nature as a whole. Liberalism tends to invert this priority by analyzing both the community and nature as a whole in terms of their relationship to individual human beings.

From this we can adduce two distinctively “liberal” theses which serve to distinguish liberal and protoliberal theories from other theories. The first, which Pettit calls “personalism,” claims that “whatever is good or bad about a set of institutions is something that is good or bad for the people whom they affect.”\textsuperscript{4} In contrast to the first thesis of holism mentioned above, personalism claims that there are no distinctly corporate interests or, to put it another way, that all corporate interests are reducible to individual interests. The second thesis, which Pettit calls “solipsism” or “social atomism,” holds that (a) “the solitary individual—the agent who is and always has been isolated from others—is nevertheless capable, in principle, of displaying all distinctive human capacities”; (b) that “any property that can serve as an ultimate political value, any property that can be regarded as a yardstick of political assessment has to be capable of instantiated by the socially isolated person, by the solitary individual”; and (c) “that the ultimate criteria of political judgment . . . are provided by non-social as distinct from social values.”\textsuperscript{5} Taken together, these two theses basically turn political holism on its head.

One way to explain this inversion has to do with the development of modern natural sciences in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The scholastic natural philosophy of the Middle Ages, which these sciences eventually surpassed, was a bricolage of ideas drawn from Ptolemaic cosmology, Galenic medicine, Aristotelian physics, and so on. Generally speaking, medieval science retained the Aristotelian emphasis on the empirical observation of material entities and the explanation of natural phenomena in terms of internal principles of change and causation (especially
teleological principles, i.e., final causes). Within this framework human beings, alongside all other material entities, belonged to a hierarchy whose elements were differentiated according to their natural functions and ends. (This way of thinking is captured vividly in the famous Tree of Porphyry and similar classificatory schemes.) The starting point of philosophy, which was almost always regarded, with appropriate reverence, as the “handmaiden” (ancilla) of theology, was the natural world as given to the senses.

The human mind or soul, while crucial for locating human beings within the natural order, was not regarded as theoretically foundational. Broadly construed, ancient and medieval philosophy was not concerned with the problem of individuating human beings vis-à-vis mental or spiritual categories, the concept of consciousness, or the question of whether sensory experience correspond authentically to any “external” reality. For example, Aristotle's *De Anima*, which is widely regarded as the magnum opus of premodern psychology, pertains chiefly to the operation of the senses and other mental faculties. Aristotle does not discuss individuation in psychological terms (this would later become important in debates surrounding the so-called problem of other minds) nor the relation between mind and world. In point of fact, correspondence between the senses and the material world was largely taken for granted by Aristotle and his scions.

For a number of reasons, the new scientific and mathematical ideas articulated in the work of Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler cast significant doubt on the explanatory framework of medieval science. Descartes, among others, sought to create a new philosophical methodology modeled on and capable of accommodating these developments. His approach, which we will refer to as *representationalism*, involved nothing less than a comprehensive upheaval of prevailing philosophical wisdom (“rebuilding the house,” as Descartes put it). Adopting a kind of tactical skepticism, Descartes rejected any ideas, concepts, or entities which could, within the limits of logic, be doubted. As an immediate consequence, he could no longer take for granted that his perceptions faithfully corresponded to (“represented”) an external reality, or even that there was such a thing as external reality. The best he could do, at least initially, was to establish, by means of the vaunted *cogito*, that he himself existed as a thinking thing (*res cogitans*). In this way Cartesian philosophy introduces the critical modern notion of the *subject*—literally, “that which is thrown under.” The human being is no longer defined in terms of its functions or attributes or final causes—in short, its position within the Aristotelian cosmological order. Rather, the human is defined as “that which is thrown under” (i.e., the subject of) conscious experiences, including thoughts, perceptions, and sensations. It is the *res* of the *res cogitans*. The question becomes: what, if anything, exists apart from the thinking thing and its representations? Are there objects of knowledge before which stand the subject of consciousness and, if so, how do the former relate to the latter?
Attempts to answer these questions, which can be described broadly as attempts to overcome Cartesian doubt, gave rise to a debate that in many ways shaped the philosophical Zeitgeist of the early modern era. On one side we find Descartes himself, along with other “Continental rationalists” such as Leibniz and Spinoza who believed that the epistemological gap between mind and world could be bridged through recourse to fundamental logical and mathematical principles. Such principles, the rationalists alleged, could be known independently of experience (for example, by means of intuition); other things could be known, in turn, by being deduced from these principles.

Far more interesting for present purposes is the so-called empiricist school of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. At first glance, the British Empiricists’ emphasis on perceived experience over and above intuited or self-evident knowledge would seem to reinforce Aristotelian philosophical values against the Neoplatonic postures of rationalism. Upon closer examination, however, it becomes clear that for Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and their ilk, empiricism obviates rather than salvages several of the most fundamental Aristotelian doctrines—most importantly, perhaps, the intelligibility of substance and substantial qualities (where substance and its qualities is that which “stands under” not just conscious experience, but being or existence itself). One might say, then, that while the empiricists were of a piece with Aristotle as regards methodology, their conclusions were gravely at odds with Aristotelian ontology. Their goal, strictly speaking, was to rescue human knowledge—not the “real world” of substances and qualities—from the onslaught of Cartesian doubt.

Here the example of Hume is especially illustrative. In A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume begins by considering the concept of perception, two forms of which, he claims, can be distinguished. The first, which he calls “impressions,” are those perceptions that “enter with most force and violence” (for example, physical sensations, desires, emotions, et cetera). The second, which he calls “ideas,” are “faint images” of impressions that emerge in the course of thinking and discourse. According to Hume, all thoughts and ideas ultimately come from impressions. It is not possible, in other words, to have ideas for things for which we have no impressions whatsoever.

Hume goes on to argue that all ideas are interconnected by means of universal principles. The first of these, resemblance, refers to the way in which particular ideas or impressions are said to be similar to other ideas or impressions. The second, contiguity, refers to the way in which particular ideas or impressions are ordered in time and space. The third, cause and effect, refers to the way in which certain ideas or impressions cause or bring about other ideas or impressions. The first two principles pertain to relations between ideas and can be divided into categories such as identity and quality. The principle of cause and effect, in contrast, pertains to all
contingent matters of fact about the world. On Hume’s view, it is empirical observation, rather than a priori reasoning, that leads us to posit cause and effect: “Tho’ the mind in its reasonings from causes or effects carries its view beyond those objects, which it sees or remembers, it must never lose sight of them entirely, nor reason merely upon its own ideas . . .” Ultimately the observation of causal relationships among impressions forms the basis of human experience as well as all reasoning about matters of fact.

Given that resemblance, contiguity, and causation are the only ties that bind our ideas together in consciousness, how are we to distinguish true beliefs about matters of fact from false beliefs? In the first place, Hume says, a belief is not the same thing as a simple idea. Rather, belief is “a particular manner of forming an idea” that convinces the mind of some one thing’s existence. The idea, moreover, is always formed according to logical or causal relations among past and present impressions—that is, the mind forms beliefs according to the resemblance, contiguity, or causal relations that obtain among particular impressions and ideas. In cases of logical demonstration, truth is established precisely because falsity is unintelligible. But in cases of matters of fact, true belief is established to the extent that such a belief corresponds to present impressions, impressions given in the past, or a combination of both. Thus for Hume, all human knowledge is knowledge of ideas; we can have no knowledge of substance (i.e., that which “stands below” our impressions and ideas).

This account of knowledge differs from that of Locke and Berkeley in a number of important ways, a few of which are worth noting briefly. For Locke, the mind can only form simple ideas from the primary substantial qualities of objects of experience (e.g., extension, numbers, the power to produce secondary qualities in minds, etc.). Here Locke is taking for granted that minds exist and that these minds form ideas from the primary qualities of objects of experience. It follows, then, that we can know something of the world as it exists outside our minds (i.e., substance), albeit to the limited extent that it is capable of producing ideas within us. For Berkeley, in contrast, we cannot even know the primary qualities of substances; we can only know the ideas given to the mind. It is impossible, moreover, to know whether these ideas correspond to some external reality or substance separate from our own minds. Hume goes one step further than both Locke and Berkeley by suggesting that we cannot even assume the existence of a “mind” to which ideas are given. After all, if all knowledge reduces to ideas formed from impressions, and if, as Hume contends, the idea of mind is not formed from present or past impressions, it follows that “mental substance” is just as unknowable as physical substance.

Kant’s theory of knowledge is often regarded as reconciliation or even a synthesis of rationalism and empiricism. Like Hume, Kant wants to overcome Cartesian doubt by preserving some kind of knowledge, though not on pain of jettisoning the idea of a unified consciousness. For Kant, the various
moments of consciousness are not merely conjoined but connected—that is, unified—through experience. The question is not just how we experience things but rather what makes experience possible in the first place. To answer this question Kant extends his gaze beyond consciousness itself to what is consciously experienced. In order to establish conscious experience as the unifying factor among moments of consciousness, however, Kant argues that there is an objectively existing causal connection between objects of experience that is not imposed by the mind. All experiences are given to a subject within structures that Kant refers to as the forms of sensible intuition. These include space (or “outer sense”) and time (or “inner sense”). Taken together, the forms of sensible intuition comprise the whole of our perception of objects of appearance. Both are *a priori* conditions of the appearance of objects, for inasmuch as the capacity to be affected by objects relies on space and time, they must precede intuitions of the object. Without prior forms of intuition, appearances of objects would not be possible. Space and time, then, are not part of the object itself, but are part of the way we receive experience.

Kant says that we know from experience that consciousness is unified—that is, that each particular moment of consciousness is ordered or linked to another moment before and after it, and all of these are experienced by the same knowing subject across time. Because there is nothing in consciousness itself to necessitate this ordering, it must come from the experiences that constitute consciousness. For Kant, the relationships that exist among objects of experience themselves make the unity of consciousness, and thus experience, possible. All objects of appearance are given to us via the forms of sensible intuition, but in order to make judgments about these objects, we need concepts that go beyond the forms of sensible intuition. Kant calls these pure concepts of the understanding, which make sense of the relationships between appearances, the categories.

The categories precede all judgments about appearances and thus make experience possible, where by experience we mean the addition of judgments onto the appearances of objects via the forms of sensible intuitions. Moreover, they are not subjective, but exist outside the mind among objects of experience. Thus they always provide an objective test against which to determine whether one’s experiences are coherent or not. Kant derives both the forms of sensible intuition and the categories through a transcendental deduction. While the forms of sensible intuition are transcendentally necessary for the unity of consciousness and orderly reception of appearances by individual subjects, the categories are transcendentally necessary for the unity of consciousness and communicability of experience across all of humanity.

In this way Kant rescues both mind and world from the extreme skepticism of Hume. By arguing that the categories and forms of sensible intuition inhere in objects of experience themselves, Kant avoids Hume’s
groundless subjectivity. We can know the forms of sensible intuition (i.e., phenomena) and the categories by means of a transcendental deduction—that is, by reflecting on what is logically requisite for any experience at all. Thus we can prove that they exist even though we cannot see them or form impressions of them. We can also prove that there is a noumenal world comprised of things-in-themselves, the essential sources of the objects of experience that lie beyond the reach of the senses. Even though we do not have direct access to things-in-themselves, they must exist in order to explain why certain experiences are given to all of us rather than others.

The examples of Hume and Kant reveal several important features of the modern concept of subjectivity. In the first place, the subject becomes conscious of the world through the mediation of representation. As Todd May (somewhat wryly) notes:

This is how it [representation] works. The world is out there, stable and serene. In order to be conceived, it awaits our thought. Our thought represents it. That is what it does. It mirrors what is there, in its stability and its serenity, in our ideas. Thought is nothing more than a representation of the world: a re-presentation in our mind of what is presented to us once, already, out there.  

There is a world, and the subject is in the world, but unlike the Aristotelian “rational animal,” it does not have direct and immediate access to that world. Rather, the relation between subjects and the world is mediated by representation. It is precisely this representational mediation that constitutes subjectivity. The subject (or Self, or Ego, or res cogitans, which is non cogitum in turn) is independent from and transcendent of the objects it thinks—both physical objects in the world as well as other “embodied” subjectivities. It is atomized, possessing a substantial individuality and psychological interiority that separates and distinguishes it from everything else that exists. Representation is the bridge by which the atomized, individual subject escapes itself and connects with other things.

Human nature

The subject is not just a blank screen onto which mental representations are projected. It has an essence that, as Sartre might say, precedes its existence. This essence, moreover, is not just defined by how the subject thinks but also by how it acts (or is inclined to act). For many modern philosophers in general and liberals in particular, the essence of subjectivity includes (1) a set of innate capacities or dispositions that govern how the subject thinks and acts, (2) various innate conditions that enable and motivate the subject to think and act according to its capacities and dispositions, and (3) various
other innate psychological factors that prevent subjects from thinking and acting according to their capacities and dispositions. Broadly speaking, this is what is meant by “human nature.”

According to the personalist and atomist theses that underwrite liberal theories, “human nature” is most fully expressed in the individual human subject considered as a *solum ipse*—a “lone self” divorced from all particular social, cultural, and historical contexts. What is truly and essentially “human” is something that comes before, and exists independently of, the social aggregation of individuals. The subject’s innate capacities and dispositions, its interests and desires—all are conditioned to greater or lesser extent by social existence but are never determined by it. Rather, it is the nature of the atomic human subject itself that engenders social existence in various forms and that, by extension, allows us to make both descriptive and normative distinctions among these forms. Human nature, not the cosmos, is the *archē* that organizes human reality.

Classical liberal philosophers and economists—including Locke, Sieyès, de Tracy, Bentham, Smith, de Tocqueville, Madison, Jefferson, Godwin, Malthus, Constant, Say, von Humboldt, Carey, Cobden, Ricardo, and Bastiat—all emphasize to greater or lesser extent the “idea of limited government, the maintenance of the rule of law, the avoidance of arbitrary and discretionary power, the sanctity of private property and freely made contracts, and the responsibility of individuals for their own fates.” 

Modern liberalism, in contrast, “is exemplified by John Stuart Mill’s *On Liberty*, with its appeal to ‘man as a progressive being’ and its romantic appeal to an individuality which should be allowed to develop itself in all its manifold diversity.” 

Mill, along with various “new liberals” (e.g., Hobhouse), politicians (e.g., Gladstone, Asquith, FDR), and Anglo-American philosophers (e.g., Raz, Nagel, Rawls) view liberalism as a political project whose aim “is to emancipate individuals from the fear of hunger, unemployment, ill-health and a miserable old age” and, by extension, to attempt to help members of liberal societies to flourish. In the twentieth century, “modern liberalism” of this sort has been associated with government programs like the New Deal and other “social safety measures,” which, taken together, form the basis of the modern “welfare state.”

Classical liberalism generally follows Hobbes in viewing human social existence as a “war of all against all.” Human nature, in turn, is regarded as essentially self-interested, acquisitive, individualistic, egoistic, and aggressive. Some forms of modern liberalism, following Rousseau (and, perhaps, Mill), instead regard human nature as essentially good, rational, and progressive and argue that human beings only become corrupted in the face of unjust and irrational forms of social life. Others retain the basic Hobbesian outlook but, against classical liberalism, regard government intervention as a necessary condition for achieving a just, peaceful, and relatively equitable society.
For all their disagreements, both traditions are agreed that (1) human beings are, \textit{ceteris paribus}, rational (i.e., capable of knowing and effectively pursuing their interests) and \textit{self-interested} (i.e., inclined to know and effectively pursue their interests).\textsuperscript{40} Likewise, (2) human beings are all equally free, \textit{ceteris paribus}, to know and effectively pursue their interests; and (3) more or less susceptible to various “irrational” psychological factors (e.g., “passions”), which prevent them from both from knowing and effectively pursuing their interests.

On the Hobbesian view, the nastiness and brutishness of life in the state of nature result from the conflict between rational self-interest (1) and (2) and mutually incompatible passions (3). Human actions (i.e., “voluntary” or “animal” motions) are directed toward or away from objects on the basis of thought coupled with passion.\textsuperscript{41} Thought is a mechanical process whereby concepts (i.e., mental images of external objects) are formed from sensory perceptions.\textsuperscript{42} Passions, in turn, are natural inclinations directed toward certain objects.\textsuperscript{43} They are essentially primitive internal motions (“endeavors”) that precede and ultimately determine external motions such as walking. There are two fundamental kinds of passions whence all others passions are derived: desire or appetite (the endeavor toward an object) and aversion (the endeavor away from an object).\textsuperscript{44} Once an object is identified through thought, the natural passions determine whether action is directed toward that object or away from it. Those instances in which our passions are conflicted—that is, directed both toward and away from a particular object—Hobbes calls “deliberation,” and whichever passion happens to determine the final action he calls “will.”\textsuperscript{45}

As a materialist, Hobbes denies the existence of deliberative or volitional faculties in the soul or mind; the entire process is physical and mechanistic from beginning to end. As a nominalist, moreover, Hobbes denies the existence of “intrinsic goodness” or “intrinsic badness,” which resides within external objects and possesses independent ontological status. In his view, whatever a particular person desires is “good,” and whatever he is averse to is “bad.”\textsuperscript{46} Even if a group of people happen to regard a particular thing as good, this is not because it’s good in itself, but because they all happen to desire it. Thus there is no such thing as a universal or common conception of “goodness” or “badness” apart from the desires and aversions of some sort of authoritative arbitrator.\textsuperscript{47}

For Hobbes, human beings not only desire particular objects and the means to satisfying those desires, but also the continued satisfaction of those desires over the course of a lifetime. The latter Hobbes calls “felicity”—that is, happiness or a contented life.\textsuperscript{48} “Power” is simply the ability to (1) satisfy particular desires as well as (2) the means to enjoy a contented life.\textsuperscript{49} In Hobbes’s view, people desire both kinds of power. However, since the power to enjoy a contented life is nothing more than the power to ensure the continued satisfaction of all particular desires over time, the second kind
of power is basically a desire for ever-increasing amounts of the first kind of power.\textsuperscript{50} As Hobbes explains, this is because a human being “cannot assure the power and means to live well which he hath present, without the acquisition of more power.”\textsuperscript{51}

In the remaining chapters of \textit{Leviathan}, Hobbes argues that the basic human desire for power comes into conflict with the basic human desire for a contented life. According to the well-known argument, human beings in a state of nature are predominantly self-interested and more or less equal in terms of their overall individual power.\textsuperscript{52} Under conditions of scarcity, competition for goods is inevitable.\textsuperscript{53} Thus some human beings will make war in order to wrest goods from competitors. Others will make war out of fear, in anticipation of a perceived threat. Still others will make war merely because they take pleasure in their own power and glory and desire to increase it. As Hobbes famously remarks:

\begin{quote}
In such a condition, there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious buildings; no instruments of moving and removing such things as required much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and, which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.\textsuperscript{54}
\end{quote}

Although human beings are mostly self-interested for Hobbes, this does not mean they are constitutionally incapable of cooperation. Most of us, he thinks, will inevitably find the “war of all against all” intolerable and seek terms of peace.\textsuperscript{55} But because there is no “morality” or “law” in the state of nature, everyone’s passions, as well as the means they take to satisfy these passions, are equally licit.\textsuperscript{56} Every man has a “right of nature” both to defend his life and to seek out his happiness however he sees fit.\textsuperscript{57}

In the state of nature human beings are capable of discovering certain “laws of nature” through the use of reason that help vouchsafe the ends of peace—for example, that war is justified only after peace has been tried and fails; that men can enter into covenants wherein they mutually forfeit some of their natural right for the sake of promoting peace and cooperation; that to break a covenant is unjust, and so forth.\textsuperscript{58} But because human beings are not perfectly rational, the possibility always remains that individuals will be motivated by irrational desires (e.g., for glory) to make war or renege on contracts.\textsuperscript{59} For this reason, human beings enter into a mutual covenant whereby they all agree to surrender their power to a commonwealth.\textsuperscript{60} The commonwealth, in turn, is authorized to act as absolute adjudicator and arbiter through the institution and enforcement of positive law.\textsuperscript{61} (For
Hobbes, of course, the best kind of commonwealth is an absolute monarchy, which he thinks is least susceptible to corruption.62)

As noted above, many “modern liberal” views of human nature remain essentially Hobbesian. Others, taking their cue from Rousseau and Mill, agree that human beings are rational and self-interested but are more inclined to think of human beings as benign, “progressive beings” whose political aim is to implement social conditions that maximize opportunities for human flourishing as opposed to merely protecting individuals’ rights to life and property. For all liberalisms, however, “rationality” is a key watchword: the abstract individual of political modernity is unfailingly described as “rational.” At minimum this implies, again, that the individual is capable of knowing her interests and taking effective means to achieve them. The individual is also “self-interested,” meaning that she desires to know what her interests are and to achieve them. Within the context of liberal theory, the concepts of rationality and self-interest are usually combined to form a more general concept referred to as “rational self-interest.” The most salient characteristic of “rational self-interest” on the liberal model is that it is somehow universal—that is, that all human beings are, ceteris paribus, rationally self-interested and that certain ends are worth pursuing for all human beings simply in virtue of their being rational. No liberal would deny that individual human beings possess personal, idiosyncratic interests that are worth pursuing to greater or lesser degree. At the same time, however, they are agreed that there is a universal criterion or set of criteria that determines what is rational for human beings as such to pursue.

Human beings are not only naturally rational and self-interested but naturally free or, as Kant would have it, autonomous (literally, self-legislating). Kant regards autonomy as the capacity of human beings to act independently of inclinations—that is, in accordance with law as constructed from practical reason alone. A rational autonomous agent determines what it will do based upon a reason provided by itself. It is able to do so, in turn, because it is free from natural causality—that is, it is capable of thinking and acting independently of any efficient cause, such as the desire for happiness or pleasure. Freedom, therefore, is “the property that the will has of being a law to itself.”63 Human beings are free because we give ourselves the law by which we abide, and this law is determined by practical reason. “Ought” implies “can,” then, only insofar as we can choose to act according to our own reason (i.e., autonomously) rather than being caused to act by something outside ourselves (i.e., heteronomously). If I am not able to perform any other action save X, it makes no sense to suggest that I ought to perform X. The proposition “I ought to do X” presupposes that I could do otherwise, and this is, in part, what Kant means by freedom.

A similar view appears in the Second Treatise of Government, where Locke contends that the natural state of human beings is one of perfect freedom—that is, a condition of liberty, governed by the rule of reason,
which guarantees certain inviolable rights. On Locke’s view, freedom consists in the ability to suspend judgment and withhold action in response to the force of desires. Human action is not determined by particular desires; rather, human beings are free to decide what is conducive to our interests and overall happiness and to act on this decision within the framework of a comprehensive life plan. As rational creatures, human beings are inclined to pursue happiness in general, and particular desires may or may not direct us towards this goal. The point, in any case, is that human beings are always free to suspend judgment and refrain from acting on the basis of any and all particular desires.

Locke makes no real effort to defend this view of freedom. Like Kant, he largely takes for granted that certain types of human actions are performed (or capable of being performed) independently of external causal factors. Of course, one could argue, as certain determinists do, that human beings do not actually “suspend judgment” at all—that any choice is inevitably determined by preceding external factors such as desires and instincts. Assuming that we do exist in a state of perfect, indeterminate freedom, however, this does not entail that we are free to do whatever we please. Universal reason, according to Locke, imposes limitations on our ability to act on decisions. By nature, we all share in freedom, and we are all equal because we are born of the same nature. We must, therefore, act on our freedom of choice according to the natural law, and so cannot use freedom to limit the natural freedom of others or ourselves. To do otherwise is to declare invalid the very thing which allows us to act freely—namely, freedom itself. Nature does not allow freedom to violate nature.

According to Locke, the fact that we all share a common human nature further implies that we all possess certain natural rights. For example, all naturally free beings possess the natural right to liberty. Because human beings are naturally free, it follows that any human being can demand the preservation of this state. As such, the state of nature affords man a right to liberty, which in turn entails a concomitant right to life (since a being that is not alive obviously cannot exercise a right to liberty). Finally, the right to life entails a right to property. Because one has a right to live, and because living requires property, then one has a right to property.

Freedom, as described in (2) above, is not just an aspect of human nature in itself but a precondition for the realization of other aspects of human nature, such as the rational pursuit of self-interest. As Locke claims, the natural ability of human beings to “order their Actions . . . as they think fit . . . without asking leave, or depending on the Will of any other Man” is necessary in order to pursue one’s own and others’ interests and well-being. So too is the “natural freedom” from the coercive interference of others and the freedom to claim property and enter into contracts, and so forth. Not only do all men possess the natural capacity to pursue these freedoms (ceteris
paribus), but also the equal natural right to pursue them—meaning that all men are equally and naturally obliged to refrain from limiting or otherwise interfering with the freedoms of other men (except in certain cases, such as in self-defense). That being said, although all liberals value freedom and regard freedom as a basic feature of human nature, they do not necessarily regard freedom as Locke does—that is, as an essentially negative concept, according to which one is free "to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with [his] freedom." Some, following Rousseau, argue that freedom is an essentially positive concept implying the power to recognize and realize one's rational will. Still others, such as Rawls, incorporate both conceptions of freedom.

Another aspect of human nature emphasized by most major liberal theories is equality. As we have already seen, liberals generally take it for granted that human beings are by nature equally free, meaning that they all have an equal right to pursue their individual rational interests and to be free of coercive interference. Likewise, they generally hold that human beings possess equal "basic worth" (meaning that no human life is a priori more morally valuable than any other human life) and by extension an equal right to life. Political equalities (equalities of primary social goods, such as equality under the law, equality of political rights and privileges, and fair equality of opportunity for equal talents) are typically derived from and defined in terms these more general natural equalities.

Some liberals (e.g., Rawls) have also argued for equality of income via the redistribution of wealth, a move which has generated much controversy. As Bo Li notes:

To a democrat, it is easy to justify political equality, social equality, and equality of opportunity as equal access (i.e., equal opportunity for equal talents), because these equalities rest on basic moral and ethical precepts and do not involve too much state intervention (particularly, they do not involve wealth redistribution), and therefore are well accepted principles in liberal democracies. It is harder, however, to justify equality of opportunity as equal start (i.e., equal initial material conditions for equal access to opportunities), because equal start involves wealth redistribution and equalization of circumstances.

Advocates of what Li calls "equal start" believe that equal opportunity is impossible without equal access to opportunities, where such access is itself already determined by wealth and income. To this extent, some degree of wealth redistribution is justified in order to ensure equality of opportunity. Those who are opposed to redistribution, such as Nozick, believe that redistributive schemes (e.g., progressive taxation) are inherently unequal insofar as they place an inordinate burden on the wealthy (who, after all, have ex hypothesi acquired their wealth fairly).
Normativity

For liberals of all stripes, the natural capacity and right to be free constitutes the foundation of all political normativity. Again, if it is true that every person has a right to be free of the coercive interference of others, it follows that all others ought, everything else being equal, to refrain from such coercive interference. For this reason, as Mill notes, “the burden of proof is with those who are against liberty; who contend for any restriction or prohibition,” which by definition would include all forms of political authority. In order for political authority to be justified, it must be “the product of voluntary, willing, morally significant acts by all parties.” (This is the principle of voluntarism discussed below.)

It follows, therefore, that the only the political obligations we have are those which we voluntarily take on. This is the underlying assumption of the social contract theories of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which argue that human beings freely forfeit a portion of their natural liberty to the state in order to achieve a greater measure of liberty in the long run. (For certain later theorists, legitimate authority only requires hypothetical consent—that is, what one would consent to given one’s acceptance of certain basic principles, such as Rawls’s principle of justice or Bentham’s principle of utility.)

Such forfeiture will necessarily be modest in scope, as the corresponding political authority will be limited to protecting or promoting the equal liberty of citizens. If human beings are indeed rational and self-interested, it follows that they will share certain interests in common. At the same time, however, the fact that all human beings are atomized, individual subjects guarantees that they will have at least some interests which, though rational in and of themselves, are nonetheless unique to them as individuals (Rawls refers to these as “rational plans of life.”) Because rationality and self-interest are necessary preconditions for man to pursue his interests under both descriptions, it follows that whatever preconditions are necessary for man to rationally know and pursue his interests are themselves good. Rawls refers to such preconditions—including health, intelligence, and freedom itself—as “natural goods.” For Rawlsian liberals, natural goods are considered both intrinsically good (i.e., worth pursuing as an end or for their own sake) and instrumentally good (i.e., worth pursuing or having as a means or precondition to the attainment of other goods).

Though all humans have an “equal natural right” to freedom (and, in turn, to pursue their rational self-interest), not all humans are born with the same levels of health, intelligence, and so forth. Thus not all humans are born with the same capacity to freely pursue their rational interests. Furthermore, all humans are more or less susceptible to irrational passions which compel them to willfully pursue illegitimate interests or else to misidentify illegitimate interests as legitimate. For many liberals, the aim
of social and political institutions is to curtail these natural deficiencies by providing what Rawls calls “primary social goods.” These include political rights and liberties (e.g., the right to free speech, the right to free association, etc.), powers and opportunities (e.g., the opportunity to hold office, the power of attorney, etc.), income and wealth, and the social-bases of self-respect. Primary social goods are things that every rational person living in a society “is presumed to want” and that “normally have a use whatever a person’s rational plan of life.”

On the basis of the foregoing, we can map liberal normative and axiological commitments along two basic trajectories. Deontological theories, on the one hand, ascribe fundamental ethical value to rights, duties, and/or obligations and ground politiconormative judgments in said values. Teleological theories, on the other hand, ascribe fundamental ethical value to some specific political end or set of ends, thereby reducing politiconormative judgments to judgments about the conduciveness of political practices, and institutions to the achievement of said end(s). As Pettit and Braithwaite note, theories belonging to the former category recommend the honoring of certain values, while the theories belonging to the latter category recommend the promotion of certain values.

Classical liberals typically adopt a deontological approach to political normativity. For example, the liberal natural law/natural rights tradition, of which Locke is perhaps the foremost representative, holds either that rights are the source of all political obligations or else that political obligations are primitive (i.e., they are neither derived from, nor reducible to, more basic moral concepts). In other words, there are natural moral constraints on political institutions that are grounded either in the natural rights of individuals or in a broader conception of natural law as such. Thus political institutions and practices are regarded as just to the extent that they respect rights and meet corresponding obligations. (Kant adopts a similar position toward politics in particular and morality in general.)

Modern liberals from Mill onward tend to adopt a more straightforwardly teleological form of political normativity. For Mill, and for utilitarians more generally, political practices and institutions are morally evaluated according to the principle of utility—in other words, they are considered just to the extent that they promote the greatest good for the greatest number. Other theories may substitute another value or set of values for utility. For some, liberty or autonomy is the chief value that political practices and institutions ought to promote. Generally speaking, modern liberalism differs from classical liberalism in its insistence that certain other goods need to be promoted in order to maximize individual liberty, chief among them the equal distribution of political rights and freedoms, and that such promotion ought to be implemented at the level of public policy. (Welfare programs, for example, are often justified in this way.) Another common view is “that individuals are self-creating, that no single good defines self-creation, and
that taking responsibility for one’s own life and making of it what one can is itself part of the good life.” The goal of liberal political practices and institutions, as such, is to provide individuals with the resources necessary for this process of self-creation.

The theories of value and of right underlying liberal conceptions of political normativity typically adduce universalizable values and/or normative principles the justification of which is independent of historical and contextual considerations. This tendency follows directly from the personalistic and atomistic theses: axiological and normative concepts are derived from an abstract, nonsocial conception of “human nature”—the nature of individual “man” considered as a “lone self.” Even the modern liberal emphasis on “self-creation” ascribes transcendent value to autonomy and other necessary preconditions for the “development of human nature in all its diversity” and recommends political practices and institutions that promote such preconditions.

One last liberal value is worth discussing—namely, progress. Belief in progress is a more general feature of Enlightenment or “modernist” thought, which holds that rationality and scientific objectivity is capable of providing absolute knowledge about the physical world as well as human social relations. At the same time, it would be a mistake to claim that all liberals value progress in the same way or to the same degree. Classical liberalism, which gradually metamorphosed into various “conservative” and “libertarian” ideologies in the twentieth century, has tended to avoid valorizing progress, especially at the expense of individual liberty. Even among classical liberals, however, there has often been a tendency to regard liberalism itself as the present or future culmination of world historical progress—a tendency that might be termed “eschatological.” The neoconservative Francis Fukuyama’s *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992) is one such work, proclaiming as it does liberalism’s inevitable and irreversible triumph over all other political ideologies. Likewise Margaret Thatcher, who was elected prime minister of Great Britain in 1979, was exceedingly fond of declaring that “there is no alternative” to liberalism (the “TINA” doctrine as it was called by the British press), and Ronald Reagan articulated similar ideas both during and after his presidential campaign the following year. The same is true to greater or lesser extent of Eisenhower, Roosevelt, Churchill, Wilson, and countless other politicians, all of whom, ironically, adopted eschatological rhetoric.

In general, though, the valorization of progress is mostly a feature of modern liberalism beginning with Mill. Here the tendency, which we might call “soteriological” by way of contrast, is to view liberalism not as the end-state of progress but rather as the *soterion*—the “precondition of salvation”—which makes progress toward and eventual attainment of an end-state possible. According to this view, liberalism is an on-going project, a perpetual process of self-questioning and reform, and to this extent remains
engrossed in a kind of crisis or conflict from which it is constantly striving to escape. This is, again, a doctrine shared more or less in common by all “progressive” or modern forms of liberalism from Mills to Rawls.  

That said, it would be a mistake to strictly identify soteriological and eschatological thinking with classical (or conservative) liberalism and modern (or progressive) liberalism respectively, or to reduce the distinction between them to “left versus right.” History has shown that the right wing of liberalism is every bit as capable of adopting soteriological thinking as the left wing, and vice versa, depending upon concrete historical circumstances. The distinction is more accurately understood in terms of differing attitudes toward a common premise: namely, that there is a rational political telos toward which humanity as a whole is striving. Some liberals, such as Fukuyama, believe that the triumph of liberalism just is the goal of political progress, whereas others, such as Mill and Rawls, believe that liberalism is the means to such progress. Whether liberalism is understood as the means or the end, however, the nature of the project is always understood in light of other descriptive and normative ideas such as those discussed above.

As we have seen, all liberal theories share in common an emphasis on normative justification, and this is partly what distinguishes them from other political philosophies such as scientific Marxism. While the eschatological theories mentioned above may be understood as justifying what is in terms of what ought to be, the soteriological theories may be understood as doing the exact opposite. Fukuyama’s The End of History, for example, begins with a normative analysis of human history and attempts to both explain and justify the post-Soviet geopolitical climate in terms of that analysis. John Rawls’s Theory of Justice, in contrast, is founded on a variety of descriptive assumptions including the notion that human beings are rationally self-interested. As May notes, “By utilizing the maximin principle of decision theory in a situation (the original position) of ignorance about one’s eventual place in society, Rawls tries to provide the principles which all rational beings would choose as the cornerstone of [a just] society.” In both cases, the idea of a rational “end” toward which political progress is tending or has tended is taken for granted.

There are other normative and evaluative ideas that can be regarded as central to liberalism, but the aforementioned provide a more than adequate framework for what might be called the “generic liberal project.” As we have seen, some of the aims of this project include: (1) counteracting man’s natural deficiencies and irrational impulses through the creation of rational, well-ordered social and political institutions, (2) justifying these institutions vis-à-vis basic rights and values, and (3) pursuing liberal practices and institutions both as a means to, and a realization of, human progress. The question remains, however, what sorts of social and political institutions are rightfully called rational and well ordered, and to what extent such
institutions can be justified in light of the general normative commitments of liberal theory.

Politics

As noted previously, the early liberals’ rejection of classical holism leads to an inversion of political analysis. Unlike Aristotle, thinkers like Hobbes and Locke valorize the autonomous, atomic individual and, in turn, require justification for any social or political authority that would seek to place limitations on the freedom of the individual. Strictly speaking, liberals abandon the idea that the justification of State or sovereign authority is simply given by human nature. By definition, political authority or government operates by means of repressive power—that is, power “over” the individual that compels her to act and/or prevents her from acting. Thus, as Todd May points out:

The founding question for liberal theory is: “Why should an individual consent to be governed in the first place?” This is the question posed by the initiators of the liberal tradition, thinkers like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Thomas Jefferson. It remains the question for contemporary political theory. John Rawls and Robert Nozick have not shifted the question. They, and others whose writings trace the parameters of our political thought, remain bound to the same starting point. 94

This “starting point,” again, just is the abstract, atomic individual with its interests, goals, and characteristics. Why and under what conditions should individuals cede their natural rights to a government and form a society founded on and maintained by that government’s rule?

Liberals are generally agreed that a state must have a legitimate right to rule that implies a corresponding obligation on the part of citizens to obey. A state’s authority, as A. J. Simmons notes, “is the logical correlate of the obligation of citizens to obey the law and to in other ways support the state, that is, to the obligation that is usually referred to as political obligation.” 95 Thus there can be no general political obligations to “obey the law . . . or to support the political leaders or institutions that try to compel [citizens’] allegiance” 96 in lieu of legitimate state authority, precisely because of the correlation between political obligations and authoritative rights. Much of liberal theory is given to the task of formulating a minimum set of necessary and sufficient conditions for political authority to be legitimate.

At a high level of generality, theories of legitimacy can be distinguished according to their acceptance or rejection of the principle of voluntarism, which, as I mentioned above, holds that “political relationships among persons are morally legitimate only when they are the product of voluntary,
willing, morally significant acts by all parties." Classical liberals, especially those, like Locke, who endorse some form of social contract theory, typically accept this principle. For these thinkers, the only the political obligations we have are those which we voluntarily assume. Some modern liberals have defended nonvoluntarist accounts of political obligations, including Rawls (who grounds them in the natural duties of justice), and various utilitarians (who ground them in the principle of utility).

Even those liberal theories that are not voluntarist in the strict sense are at least implicitly sympathetic to the principle of voluntarism. Mill, for example, would no doubt agree that individuals must have valid moral reasons to voluntarily accept political authority, though the mere fact of individuals consenting to be governed is not necessarily enough to render a government legitimate. As we have already seen, modern liberal theories are more inclined to regard a government as legitimate to the extent that it successfully promotes certain values; merely honoring the value of individual liberty is a necessary but not sufficient condition for legitimacy. Nevertheless all such theories would generally agree, with Locke, that

\[ \ldots \text{each person is born to a broad right of self-government, which includes the right to be free of coercive interference of others (except to prevent or in response to wrongdoing), the right to act in pursuit of “innocent delights” and to advance one’s own and others’ well-being (within the limits set by others’ equal rights), and the powers to make property, to alienate or acquire rights by contract or promise, and so on.} \]

Thus it is the presumption of natural freedom—that is, “moral freedom from political obligation and the de jure authority of others”—and related concepts like fundamental rights that motivate the central problematic of liberal theory.

It is worth reminding ourselves at this point that the concept of freedom is and always has been inexorably linked to the concept of power. If, as I suggested earlier, power is a relational or polyadic concept—meaning that it always refers to at least two terms, namely, the subject of power and the object of power—it follows trivially that to say “Jones has power” is to identify Jones as the subject of power. The kind of power Jones possesses, however, depends entirely on the object of her power. For example, if the object of power is the successful performance of some action, we can describe Jones’s power as a generic ability to perform that kind of action (“power to”). If, on the other hand, the object of Jones’s power involves compelling Smith to act or else preventing her from acting, we can describe Jones’s power as the generic ability to impose her will in a way that compels, forces, prevents, inhibits, or otherwise limits the actions of someone or something else (“power over”). On this view, “power over” is obviously a species of “power to,” since “Jones has power over Smith” just means “Jones has the
power to compel Smith to $\varphi$ or not $\varphi$” (where “$\varphi$” is an action of some sort). In modern political theory, “power over” another person is typically regarded as “repressive,” all things considered and *ceteris paribus*, when the object of power does not consent (tacitly or otherwise) to being compelled to act or prevented from acting.

As suggested earlier, the principle of voluntarism presupposes what we might call the “correlativity thesis,” according to which $X$ has a political obligation to obey $Y$ only if $Y$ can claim legitimate authority over $X$ (in other words, legitimacy is a necessary condition for political obligations). The principle of voluntarism further entails what we might call the “consent thesis,” according to which “power over” another is legitimate only if it is (a) nonrepressive and, by extension, (b) consensual (tacitly or otherwise) Taken together, the principle of voluntarism and its correlates explain *under what conditions* individuals cede their natural rights to government authority. The question of *why* individuals would agree to do this forms the substance of liberal social contract theory.

In general, social contract theory begins by considering how atomic individuals in a real or hypothetical “state of nature” would think and act. From there, it deduces that individuals’ most important interests are more likely to be honored and/or promoted if they come together under a common authority than if they remain separate and without government. Thus “Each individual, deciding on his or her own, agrees to come together under a common government, and agrees to obey that government, as long as the government the individual agrees to obey is one that represents his or her most important interests.”

We have already seen how Locke, and classical liberals more generally, understand the nature of atomic individuals in the absence of social or political organization. Locke, in the spirit of Hobbes, goes on to suggest that the assertion of rights by free individuals in the state inevitably engenders conflict and this for three reasons. First, the state of nature does not provide a common law or rule. Any human being can interpret the natural law for himself. Second, nature does not designate an authority to settle disagreements about the interpretation and appropriation of rights. Human beings cannot be their own judges in conflicts because they tend to be biased in favor of their own interests. Third, though individuals have rights, they may not be in a position to enforce their rights. If one does not have the power to enforce rights, one is essentially forced to live without rights.

As it turns out, human beings are not very free in the state of nature, and this is what compels them to join into smaller associations the aim of which is to protect natural rights more effectively. In other words, human beings construct a trifold political authority as a solution to the problems that arise in the state of nature: a legislative authority consisting of one or more individuals who establish laws that are binding on the community as
a whole, thereby providing a common legal standard; a judiciary authority that impartially interprets laws and determines what is right or just in complex situations; and finally, an executive authority that has the power to enforce the laws.

Lest the original problems of the state of nature prevail, the rule of reason places certain restrictions on these authorities. First, the executive authority only has the power to enforce laws authored by the legislative authority. It cannot enforce laws of its own arbitrary design. Second, the judicial authority only has the power to decide, according to the law, whether a law has been broken. Third, both the executive and judicial authorities are subordinate to the executive. By extension, laws not arrived at through due process are not binding on the constituents. Once one commits to a society, one no longer has a right to disobey laws so long as they are legitimately created and enforced.

Locke conceives the central problematic of liberal theory in terms of a dilemma. On the one hand, the rule of reason forbids the use of freedom to violate freedom. On the other hand, when one commits to a society, one seems to do just that, at least insofar as one gives up certain natural rights and allows oneself to be governed. How does Locke resolve this dilemma? If one consents to be governed, he argues, the authority is not imposed, but rather derived from the will of the governed. As per the principle of voluntarism, a government is only legitimate if it expresses the will of the governed. Thus individuals, in assenting to government, assent to become corporate—that is, they agree to combine their individuals into a single common will and decide to establish a political authority which has the power to singularly determine the common will. (As Rousseau puts it, “Each of us places his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will.”) Freedom is preserved, therefore, only insofar as an individual agrees to incorporate her own will into the common will of society, and only insofar as the government protects the common interests of all individuals.

Rawls, whom we may discuss here as representative of the modern liberal tradition, offers a generalization and refinement of traditional social contract theory that he calls the “Original Position” (hereafter OP). He describes the OP as follows:

In justice as fairness the original position of equality corresponds to no state of nature in the traditional theory of the social contract. This original position is not, of course, thought of as an actual historical state of affairs, much less a primitive condition of culture. It is understood as a purely hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a certain conception of justice. Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and
abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that
the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special
psychological propensities. 106

Unlike earlier social contract theorists, Rawls shields the parties of the OP
behind a “veil of ignorance.” 107 He does this so that none of them will be
placed at an unfair advantage or disadvantage owing to health, intelligence,
family history, or other “outcome[s] of natural chance.” 108 In the end, the
parties are conceived of as purely rational beings with unique ends and a
capacity for a sense of justice. 109 This ensures that the principles of justice are
the product of a fair agreement arrived at under optimally fair conditions.
Furthermore, the parties are characterized as mutually disinterested, insofar
as they want to advance their own rational plans of life but not necessarily
those of other agents. 110 Although they lack specific details about their
own individual conceptions of the good and/or plans of life, they at least
know that they have such conceptions and plans. For this reason, they will
rationally prefer more primary social goods rather than less. 111

The question becomes: what principles of justice would rational
individuals in the OP choose? As we saw above, Rawls doesn’t think that
a principle of justice based on utility is compatible with a conception of
society as social cooperation among free and equal individuals for mutual
advantage. That this is so is confirmed by considering the reasoning process
of parties in the OP:

It hardly seems likely that persons who view themselves as equals, entitled
to press their claims upon one another, would agree to a principle which
may require lesser life prospects for some simply for the sake of a greater
sum of advantages enjoyed by others. Since each desires to protect his
interests, his capacity to advance his conception of the good, no one has
a reason to acquiesce in an enduring loss for himself in order to bring
about a net balance of satisfaction. In the absence of strong and lasting
benevolent impulses, a rational man would not accept a basic structure
merely because it maximized the algebraic sum of advantages irrespective
of its permanent effects on his own basic rights and interests. 112

Again, since the parties in the OP are ignorant of all facts about themselves
and other agents, they lack the sort of “benevolent impulses” that come
about as the result of being a friend, a member of a family, and so forth.
Absent such relationships, they have no particular interest in advancing
anyone else’s plans of life.

Rawls thinks that persons in the OP would choose two principles of
justice. 113 The first requires that “each person is to have an equal right to
the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar
scheme of liberties for others.” The second states that “social and economic
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices available to all.” Again, these principles pertain to the basic structures of society and regulate the distribution of primary social goods. Rawls holds that the first principle of justice applies to structures that “define and secure” rights, duties, and liberties, and the second principle of justice applies to structures that “specify and establish” inequalities in income and wealth. 114

As Rawls admits, the second principle is ambiguous as stated and thus subject to a number of interpretations. In the interest of brevity, I shall not discuss these in detail here. 115 It is enough to briefly discuss the interpretation which Rawls himself favors. On his view, part (a) of the principle is qualified by what he calls the “difference principle.” According to this principle, a distributive system is just if and only if it makes the worst off better than they would be under any other system compatible with the basic liberties. 116 Part (b) is qualified by the “principle of fair equality of opportunity.” According to this principle, individuals who are equal in terms of natural endowments must also be provided with equal means to compete for available positions. 117 Thus, for example, a poor individual must be given the same opportunities to develop her abilities as a rich individual in order to ensure that both are able to compete fairly for jobs and other positions. Rawls calls the combination of the difference principle and the principle of fair equality of opportunity “democratic equality.” 118

Before moving on, one further point is worth mentioning. At first glance, it may seem as though Rawls tries to justify the two principles of justice merely by connecting them to the impartial and ideally rational situation of the OP, but this is not true. Rather, Rawls adopts a method of justification that he calls “reflective equilibrium.” 119 In trying to decide on an adequate description of the OP, we begin with a set of basic and common moral intuitions and continue to add premises (both moral and nonmoral, theoretical and practical) until we are able to arrive at substantive principles. If these principles fail to “match our considered convictions of justice,” or if they are otherwise mutually incompatible, “we can either modify the account of the initial situation or we can revise our existing judgments, for even the judgments we take as fixed points are liable to revision.” 120 By working back and forth between the conditions of the OP and our existing judgments, we eventually reach a point at which the OP “expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted.” 121 From this it is clear that the OP is not entirely value-neutral, since it is ultimately designed in such a way as to accommodate our basic and common intuitions about principles of justice.

From both the Lockean and Rawlsian standpoints, the purpose or role of government is to represent individuals and to honor and/or promote their most important interests. The interrelated questions of whether a government is morally just or political legitimate turn crucially on its
success or failure as concerns this purpose. This, in turn, motivates another question—namely, what form of government is most conducive to success? Once again it is difficult to answer this question in a way that does justice to all the variants of liberal theory. At first blush, one might be inclined to say that liberalism is by definition opposed to political absolutism of any sort. After all, although Hobbes “supplied many of the ingredients for a liberal theory of politics,” it is precisely his defense of “absolute and arbitrary authority” that makes him at worst a proponent of authoritarianism and at best a kind of “protoliberal.” Yet mere opposition to absolutism is not a sufficient condition for a theory to be liberal. For example, both ancient republicanism as well as English constitutionalism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries stood opposed to conferring absolute political authority to any single entity, but not because absolute authority violates the rights and liberties of those over whom it is exercised. It is the latter claim that is distinctively liberal.

Historically, one of the principal liberal alternatives to absolutism was, and continues to be, the doctrine of tolerance. While Hobbes, for example, rejected religious tolerance on broadly pragmatic grounds, arguing that to recognize the right of citizens to freely practice the religion of their choice would undermine political order, Locke claimed that the sovereign did not have any right to dictate religious beliefs and practices and, contra Hobbes, believed that doing so would pose a far greater threat to political order than would tolerance of diverse religious beliefs and practices within one polity. Later, Mill extended the case for tolerance to freedom of thought and expression more generally, arguing that tolerance for conflicting political, moral, and religious viewpoints was a necessary condition for social progress.

Lastly, liberals have traditionally contended that “just as a man must think for himself, so he must work for himself; just as a society would progress only if each person took responsibility for their own ideas and moral convictions, so it would flourish economically only if everyone stood on their own two feet.” In other words, liberalism has typically endorsed broad economic freedoms underwritten by a right to private property. We will say more about this in the next section, but for the time being it is worth noting that from Locke onward liberalism has tended to emphasize the individual’s right to private property (under some description or other) and various economic liberties including freedom of contract and employment.

It would be a mistake to claim that liberalism has always favored democratic forms of government, especially if democracy is defined in terms of “majority rule.” As Ryan points out:

Liberals have historically thought at one time that liberalism was threatened by democracy . . . What liberalism is always committed to is constitutional government. Save in emergencies, where the preservation
of a liberal regime may force governments to take powers that would otherwise be intolerable, the requirements of the rule of law extend to the ways in which governments acquire power and exercise it. How this is achieved has no fixed answer.\textsuperscript{128}

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, liberals were chiefly drawn from the emerging middle class (the so-called \textit{bourgeoise}) and distinguished themselves mainly by opposing the economic and political monopoly enjoyed by the church and the hereditary aristocracy. In advocating greater intellectual, political, and economic freedom for the middle classes, liberal intellectuals such as Locke, Smith, Montesquieu, Diderot, and Voltaire typically championed political developments (e.g., the Whig Revolution of 1688) that limited the power of the church and the state through republican or constitutionalist reforms. As republicans, they believed strongly in the rule of law, the balance of powers and, in many cases, the establishment of limited parliamentary representation.

As Ryan notes, however, those who favored the latter did not, as a rule, endorse anything close to universal suffrage. The mass of unlettered, unskilled, and/or propertyless people whom Voltaire disparagingly termed “the rabble” (not to mention women, Jews, slaves, and other people regarded as inferior) were generally considered unfit to govern. Even early American liberals such as James Madison exhibited a marked distrust toward such people, “for there is nothing in the bare idea of majority rule to show that majorities will always respect the rights of property or maintain the rule of law.”\textsuperscript{129} Thus early liberalism was chiefly a republican doctrine, which at best endorsed the “aristocratic democracy” of limited parliamentary representation and at worst repudiated any form of majoritarian rule, even among elites.

It was Jean-Jacques Rousseau, more so than any other thinkers, who helped push liberalism in the direction of what is now called “liberal democracy.”\textsuperscript{130} Although Rousseau agrees with Hobbes and Locke that human beings in the state of nature are marked by an instinctive desire for self-preservation,\textsuperscript{131} he regards this desire as only one aspect of a more complex characteristic called “self-love” (\textit{amour de soi}).\textsuperscript{132} For Rousseau, self-love is not to be confused with the essentially negative concepts of egoism and acquisitive self-interest.\textsuperscript{133} On the contrary, self-love involves the capacity of human beings to develop uniquely human capacities through the power of reason (to this extent, it is perhaps better described as “self-sufficiency”). Rousseau further contends, contra Hobbes, that human beings in the state of nature also possess an instinctive disposition toward compassion or pity.\textsuperscript{134} This is in part what motivates the oft-repeated but ultimately mistaken claim that Rousseau regards human beings as “naturally good.”

In point of fact, Rousseau does not argue that human beings are by nature “morally good.” Rather, because human beings in the state of nature
are essentially solitary creatures, and because morality *strictu sensu* is not even possible until human beings enter into society, the natural human state is “premoral.”¹³⁵ For Rousseau, social living is a consequence (arguably a *necessary* consequence) of both compassion and self-love. This does not mean, however, that social living is morally superior to solitary existence in the state of nature in the way that Hobbes and Locke suggest. On the contrary, social living gives rise to what Rousseau calls “*amour propre*” (pride), a disposition which compels human beings to compare themselves to one another and which, in turn, engenders a host of vices including suspiciousness, covetousness, jealousy, and even sadism.¹³⁶ Thus Rousseau denies the idea that human beings are *necessarily* social, if by this is meant that human beings are naturally disposed to cooperate and live harmoniously with one another. On the contrary, Rousseau believes that society as such despoils the natural virtue of primitive man and engenders social, political, and economic inequality. The purpose of government, therefore, is to rectify as much as possible the evils that social life, as opposed to solitary life, brings about.¹³⁷ And because Rousseau, unlike most other early liberals, tends to regard inequality as a far greater evil than the mere abridgement of “natural freedom,” his political theory is robustly democratic in a way that Locke’s, for example, is not. It was Rousseau’s ideas, in fact, that exerted the strongest influence on the Jacobins and, by extension, of the fomentation of the French Revolution, the theoretical heart of which was political equality and radical democracy.¹³⁸

Despite its failures, the Revolution’s emphasis on radical democracy proved extremely influential on liberals such as Jefferson, de Tocqueville, and Mill, all of whom believed that “reigns of terror” could be circumvented through the implementation of legal devices such as entrenched bills of rights, as well as broad political efforts to “educate the fledgling democracy of their day in order that democracy should not [become] majority tyranny.”¹³⁹ In general, then, liberal democracy has always involved restricting or otherwise curtailing the authority of the majority to greater or lesser extent. While Ronald Dworkin and others have argued that liberalism necessarily supports democracy insofar as the right to be treated as a free and equal member of society entails the right to “have a say” in government,¹⁴⁰ there can be no doubt that democracy as such has tended to be of secondary importance in liberal theory. It is supported insofar as it is conducive to the protection or promotion of basic rights and liberties but readily restricted when it poses a threat to said rights and liberties.

**Economics**

As we noted earlier, liberalism traditionally ascribes great value to private property. It should come as no surprise, then, that several of the earliest
Liberalism

Liberals were responsible in large part for the development of what is now called “political economy.” Prior to the sixteenth century, economics was primarily understood—as was so much else—in Aristotelian terms. For Aristotle, oikonomia referred to household management, which involves, among other things, the production of goods or the provision of services that can be traded for other goods or services. In trading of this sort, all that matters is that the “use value” of one good is commensurate with that of another good, where “use value” is understood in terms of a good’s value to a household. With the introduction of currency and other forms of “exchange value,” the problem comes in determining what constitutes a “just price”—that is, the amount of exchange value that a trader may rightfully demand for the goods he brings to market. For the medieval schoolmen, trading was considered a natural and indispensable part of social life conducive to the public good. As such it was left to public authorities to fix prices, settle disputes, and do whatever else was necessary to regulate economic activity.

With few exceptions, the schoolmen regarded the possession of private property as natural and just. The same was not true of what we would now call “profit” or “economic gain.” Because greed was condemned as a vice, and because engaging in economic activity solely for the sake of accumulating wealth was considered a form of greed, practices such as usury were widely prohibited. For most of the Middle Ages, however, the issue was moot because most economic activity was carried out at a subsistence level. Prior to the fourteenth century the vast majority of Europeans did not own private property, which at the time was principally understood in terms of land and material resources. “Wealth” was monopolized by the church and the nobility and could only be acquired through gift or conquest.

Only with the emergence of the “fourth class”—merchants, artisans, and professionals—did it become possible for non-nobles and nonclerics to acquire wealth through economic activity. Even then acquisition of vast wealth in the form of land and material resources was virtually impossible for most members of the emerging middle classes. Consequently they tended to be small-scale producers and craftsmen who possessed modest property and occasionally employed apprentices. The latter, of course, did not work for a “wage” so much as for the practical training provided by the masters. Such training was invaluable, as it eventually allowed young artisans to earn an independent living and ultimately to become masters themselves. The entire system, moreover, had the implicit and explicit support of the Catholic Church and of the major Protestant churches not long thereafter.

The basic economic situation in Europe had not changed all that much by the time John Locke wrote his Second Treatise on Government in the late seventeenth century. To be sure, far more people had entered the middle class owing to the growth of cities and the new economic opportunities afforded by maritime exploration, but the vast majority remained small farmers or, in countries such as Russia, serfs on the feudal model. Nevertheless, there can
be no doubt one of Locke’s principal goals in writing the Second Treatise was to provide a detailed philosophical and moral analysis of civil society, as represented by the new middle class, and its relation to government. For this reason, it comes as no surprise that one of the major themes in this analysis is the right to private property.

As we have already seen, Locke believes that human beings possess certain natural rights in virtue of sharing a common human nature. Because human beings are naturally free, for example, it follows that we possess a natural right to liberty and can legitimately demand that this right be protected and preserved. The right to liberty, moreover, entails a concomitant right to life for the obvious reason that only living persons can possess and exercise that right. Finally, and most important for present purposes, Locke holds that the right to life entails a right to property because the possession of property is a necessary condition for human beings to live and to be free.

Locke points out that material resources, which are necessary to support life, only become private property when an individual “mixes his labor” with them (i.e., when they are acquired by individual labor). For example, if one is hungry, and if in order to live one must satiate that hunger by eating, then one must claim food exclusively for oneself. A resource is only useful, Locke thinks, to the extent that I can claim it exclusively for myself (i.e., make it my private property), and this is accomplished by “working upon” the resource in some way—for example, by foraging, collecting, growing, harvesting, and so forth. Property is necessary not only for survival but for convenience and enrichment as well. Whenever one exercises her right to property, she appropriates the use of property exclusively for herself not only to continue living, but to enrich her life or otherwise make her life more convenient.

In the state of nature, the appropriation of private property is governed by the rule of reason. On Locke’s view there is nothing unjust about the fact that claiming resources for oneself as property prevents others from claiming those same resources as property. Since everyone has an equal right to property, however, it is not just to expropriate the legitimate property of another or to claim more property than one needs or can reasonably use. The right to property does not entail a right to spoil or waste. As Locke says, one must leave “as much and as good” for others to enjoy equally. At the same time, Locke acknowledges that some can and will possess more than others, thus his “doctrine [makes] room for a primitive form of capital accumulation: a man’s natural right [is] only to such property as his own labor created, but with the income he derived from it he might acquire ‘servants’ who would toil for him.” Perhaps more perniciously, the Second Treatise also devotes an entire section to justifying slavery (which he often refers to euphemistically as “involuntary servitude.”

A member of the wealthy bourgeois minority himself, Locke was both “an absentee landlord and a stockholder in the slave-trading Royal Africa
He recognized that most Englishmen of his day owned very little property, or none at all, and this explains in part why he never advocates political democracy nor champions de facto economic equality, both of which would pose grave risks to the wealthy minority. At the same time, in fairness, he vociferously maintains the equal right to private property, which, at least in principle, provides all human beings with equal opportunities to generate wealth and improve their stations in life. By extension, Locke strongly rejects the notion that anyone is entitled—whether by nature, birth, or right—to a greater share of wealth or property than anyone else, which is one reason why he emphasizes the duty of governments to protect private property and ensure that no one is arbitrarily denied his or her right to legitimately acquire property.

Locke upholds the medieval notion that exchange value is ultimately reducible to use or labor value. At the same time, however, he insists that prices should be determined in practice by the market rather than fixed by the government. It is worth noting that for Locke “labor” refers to mainly to that of the early entrepreneur. Locke does not distinguish between “labor” and “capital” because large-scale wage labor in the service of massive private profit accumulation simply did not exist during his lifetime; such terms only make sense in the wake of capitalism, which did not fully emerge in England until the early nineteenth century.

Adam Smith concurs with Locke’s basic moral outlook. He recognizes that there was an “original state of things which precedes both the appropriation of land and the accumulation of stock . . . [and where] the whole produce of labor belongs to the laborer . . . [with] neither landlord nor master to share with him.” This state of affairs having passed away, it became possible in his own time for wealth to be accumulated without engaging in physical labor. The landlord takes rent from his tenants, the banker takes interest from those to whom he lends money, and the manufacturer takes the full value of what his laborers produce minus the cost of their wages. For Smith, all such practices produce profit, the wealth that accrues to owners, landlords, bankers, and the like. Unlike later liberals, however, Smith and Locke both believe that the economic relationship between owner and laborer, say, is fundamentally just insofar as it is freely entered into by both parties and proves mutually beneficial to them. What is more, all such economic relationships are subordinate to the broader aims of society. As Lichtheim notes, “There were some conventional values that took precedence over profit-and-loss calculation . . . wealth creation was important, but the stability of the social order came first.” For precapitalist liberals like Smith and Locke, market activity is only justified insofar as it protects and promotes the material welfare of the body politic. Despite their preference for limited government, therefore, neither was opposed to regulating the economy when doing so was necessary to protect individual rights and liberties.
In the wake of the Industrial Revolution, the relatively benign economic liberalism described above was quickly rendered moribund. By the dawn of the nineteenth century in England, the economy of small shopkeepers, artisans, merchants, and farmers had mostly been replaced by a capitalist economy of enormous factories and mills operated by thousands of dispossessed farmers, along with their wives and children. The catastrophic results of this transformation are well known and need not be rehearsed in detail here, though the following quote from Polanyi provides a vivid summary:

Before the process had advanced very far, the laboring people had been crowded together in new places of desolation, the so-called industrial towns of England; the country folk had been dehumanized into slumdwellers; the family was on the road to perdition; and large parts of the country were rapidly disappearing under the slack and scrap heaps vomited forth from the “satanic mills.” Writers of all views and parties, conservatives and liberals, capitalists and socialists, invariably referred to social conditions under the Industrial Revolution as a veritable abyss of human degradation.  

Despite the broad consensus among liberals that the Industrial Revolution had contributed to unprecedented “human degradation,” several of them remained convinced that capitalism itself would eventually make things better.

The earliest laissez-faire liberals in England, many of whom belonged to the Whig Party, adopted and endorsed a four-fold creed: first, that economic laws operate more or less like physical laws and are objectively valid; second, that the operation of the market should not be judged on the basis of its success or failure in promoting moral, cultural, and other noneconomic ends; third, that an unregulated market was in any case more likely to improve the general welfare of the people by creating more jobs and generating ever-increasing wealth, which would eventually make everyone richer and happier; and fourth, that the self-interest of private individuals would promote competition, which would in turn lower the costs of production and, by extension, the prices of goods. In the most important and relevant respects this is the very same creed espoused by laissez-faire economists throughout the twentieth century. It is the creed of Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises of the Austrian School and Milton Friedman of the Chicago School, and it was eventually incorporated into the political platforms of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, both of whom enjoyed sweeping victories in the British and American elections in 1979 and 1980, respectively.

As Ryan points out, “The liberal view that the individual is by natural right . . . sovereign over himself, his talents and his property is at once
the basis of limited government, the rule of law, individual liberty, and a capitalist economy." By the nineteenth century it had become clear that liberalism entailed by definition a commitment to the general framework of capitalist economics. Yet it is precisely the issue of capitalism that gave rise, in roughly the same period, to the split between classical liberals and modern liberals. All liberals recognized that capitalism had generated serious social problems, including increasingly heated conflicts between property owners and laborers (now referred to as the “proletariat”). Modern liberals, however, did not believe that the unregulated market itself was capable of solving these problems. From the mid-nineteenth century onward, reform-minded liberal thinkers (e.g., Mill, Hobson, Bosanquet, Green, Hobhouse, Dewey, Addams, Croly, Keynes, etc.) and politicians (H.H. Asquith, Clement Attlee, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, etc.) supported a variety of measures intended to publicly regulate the market, decrease social and economic inequality, and otherwise empower the working classes. Broadly speaking, their goal was to reform capitalism, not to reject it, and this is precisely what makes them liberals rather than socialists.

Having analyzed the concept of liberalism along the four trajectories mentioned earlier, we are now in a position to summarize its most basic commitments. First, liberal theories rely on an atomistic and transcendental conception of the individual human subject and a view of human nature defined in terms of essential properties—chief among them autonomy, rationality, and self-interest. Second, liberal theories reject the idea of impersonal or purely social goods; ascribe considerable moral value to individual rights and liberties, natural equality, and (in some cases) social progress; and tend to endorse transcendent conceptions of normativity, whether deontological or teleological in nature. Third, liberal theories advocate limited government, the rule of law, the balance of powers, the doctrine of tolerance, and the right to private property; they generally accept voluntarism and, by extension, the idea that government is ultimately justified by real or hypothetical consent (i.e., the social contract). Fourth, and finally, liberal theories endorse private property, the market, and the capitalist economic system in some form or other. Taken together, these trajectories constitute a generic liberal project that began several centuries ago and has since become the dominant political ideology of our time.
4

Socialism

Hegel, historicism, and holism

There is, of course, another important tradition within political modernity: the tradition of socialism.\(^1\) Just as liberalism developed in opposition to feudalism, modern socialism developed in opposition to capitalism. As Peter Self notes, “Both liberalism and socialism combined potent critiques of the existing socio-economic order with blueprints for a desirable future society. However, liberalism provides a rather more coherent body of thought than does socialism, and its theories are linked with the emergence of a dominant system combining capitalism and liberal democracy.”\(^2\) Pace Self, we have already seen that liberalism is not so much a coherent body of thought or comprehensive doctrine as it is a broad confluence of interrelated metaphysical, moral, political, and economic ideas and concepts. We might restate Self’s basic point by noting that socialism is a somewhat messier and more muddled confluence of ideas which, unlike liberalism, has failed to manifest itself concretely in a large-scale and far-reaching socioeconomic order. (Putting aside the question of whether China or the former Soviet Union represent “authentic” socialist societies, communism has failed to spread over large parts of the globe in the way that liberal capitalism has.) Moreover, if liberalism is primarily a political doctrine with strong historical ties to capitalism, socialism, in contrast, is primarily a socioeconomic doctrine whose strongest historical ties have been to various social movements rather than to governments. This explains in large part why socialism provides a less cohesive body of ideas than liberalism.

All such caveats aside, we can claim with certainty that modern socialism emerged only slightly later than liberalism in the early nineteenth century, and that, like liberalism, it developed from a complicated array of historical precursors, some of them thousands of years old. We have already seen that certain Stoics, Cynics and various other ancient philosophers held identifiable socialist beliefs.\(^3\) According to others, the same is true of certain
ancient sects of Judaism (e.g., the Essenes) and of the early Christian church generally. The common thread uniting these and other protosocialisms is their endorsement of communal or public ownership of land, material resources, and other forms of property.

The aims of modern socialism were quite a bit more complicated, emerging as it did in more or less direct response to the Industrial Revolution and the concomitant development of a new class structure in Europe. Oddly enough, however, the earliest socialists appeared not in England, the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution, but in France, where industrialization emerged somewhat later and at a slower pace. They included members of the extreme left wing of the French Revolution such as Maréchal (1750–1803), Babeuf (1760–1794), and Buonarotti (1761–1837), all of whom distinguished themselves by advocating radical social and economic egalitarianism. As Buonarotti writes:

What passed in France immediately after the creation of the Republic, is, in my view, only the explosion of that discord, which ever exists between the partisans of opulence and distinctions on the one hand, and the friends of equality, or the numerous class of laborers, on the other. By tracing the stream higher up, we shall find the source of the discussions which took place at that epoch, in the English doctrine of the economists, on the one side, and in that of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Mably, and other modern philosophers on the other . . . Rousseau proclaimed the inalienable rights of human nature. He pleaded for all mankind without distinction. He placed the prosperity of society in the happiness of each of its members, and its strength in the attachment of all to the laws . . . This social order of Rousseau is the same for which all true philosophers have sighed from time immemorial, and has had illustrious advocates in all ages, as, for example, in ancient days, Minos, Plato, Lycurgus, and the lawgiver of the Christians (Jesus Christ); and in modern times, Thomas More, Montesquieu, and Mably. The system of the economists has been named the ORDER OF EGOISM, or the ARISTOCRATIC SYSTEM [By this denomination is meant to be expressed that in this system, the only spring to sentiments and actions is the selfish one of mere personal interest, without any regard whatever to the general good] That of Rousseau—the ORDER OF EQUALITY.

Partisans of the Rousseauean “Order of Equality” such as Babeuf and Buonarotti referred to themselves as communists, as the term “socialism” did not come into general use in France and England until the 1830s. Unlike bourgeois liberals—who, in the words of Maréchal, merely desired “equality in law”—the communists sought “real equality . . . the COMMON GOOD or the COMMUNITY OF GOODS” [i.e., the abolition of private property]. In France Babeuf’s and Buonarotti’s ideas were inherited and refined by
Cabet (1788–1856) who formulated communism as “a revolutionary creed that specifically aims at the overthrow of ‘bourgeois’ institutions and the transfer of power to the industrial proletariat,” and by Blanqui (1805–1881) who created the first political organization (the Société des Saisons) that can be termed “communist” in the aforementioned sense.  

Though the early French socialists differed from their liberal counterparts on the issues of economic and social equality, they tended to share, or at least presuppose, the same set of core metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical presuppositions, including the notion of an external, mind-independent reality; the representational model of consciousness; the concept of atomic individuality; the autonomy and universality of reason; and so forth. The first sustained challenges to these doctrines came not from France but from Germany, where they were subjected to severe criticism by post-Kantian Idealists such as Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schleiermacher. In their place, the Idealists advanced various theories that emphasized the priority of subject over object, creation over representation, sociality over individuality, and history over abstraction. The example of Hegel is especially illustrative here.

In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the actualization of consciousness or spirit in a community involves two components: (a) the dialectic of reciprocal recognition, whereby self-conscious beings recognize each other as self-conscious; and (b) an “ethical substance,” which is shared in common by self-conscious beings. These components are symbiotic: ethical substance is constituted by the reciprocal recognition of self-conscious beings, and reciprocal recognition by self-conscious beings is made possible by their sharing ethical substance:

Reason appears here as the fluent universal substance, as unchangeable simple thinghood which yet breaks up into many entirely independent beings, just as light bursts asunder into stars as innumerable luminous points, each giving light on its own account, and whose absolute self-existence is dissolved, not merely implicitly, but explicitly for themselves, within the simple independent substance. They are conscious within themselves of being these individual independent beings through the fact that they surrender and sacrifice their particular individuality, and that this universal substance is their soul and essence—as this universal again is the action of themselves as individuals, and is the work and product of their own activity.

The shared ethical substance of self-conscious beings is none other than spirit itself, which Hegel defines as the “I that is We and We that is I.” Reciprocal recognition, in turn, is the process “of directly apprehending complete unity with another in his independence: of having for my object an other in the fashion of a ‘thing’ found detached and apart from me, and the negative of myself, and of taking this as my own self-existence.”
Reciprocal recognition originates in the primordial encounter of self and Other in the master–slave dialectic, wherein the slave recognizes the master as the master (i.e., as someone who has authority over him), but neither the slave nor the master recognizes himself in the other. This is because one is dependent and the other is independent. But for Hegel, self-consciousness desires something identical to itself, and it is this desire that prompts the coming together of self-conscious beings. The “coming together” that results from the realization of self-conscious reason is what Hegel calls Volk (a people or nation). The people express their reciprocal recognition and shared ethical substance through laws and customs, which in turn are the “language” through which absolute spirit “speaks.” In this way law and custom are actualizations of the ethical spirit of a people.

As Paul Franco notes, “at the present stage of the Phenomenology . . . Hegel insists that the ethical life of a people constitutes only the immediate form of spirit. The ethical disposition is one that is governed by unmediated custom and habit; for it the laws simply are, eternal and unquestionable.”

In this immediate stage, spirit appears as pure facticity or being in-itself; it has not yet achieved self-consciousness as a free and self-determining subjectivity or being for-itself. Thus spirit must progress through shapes of consciousness to know itself for what it is immediately. The section entitled “Spirit” provides a map of spirit’s movement from customary ethical life to self-consciousness.

To survey the entire terrain of this section would take us well beyond the scope of this chapter. For our purposes, I need only note a few of its more important topographic features. In general, Hegel is now interested in historicopolitical “shapes of the world” rather than mere “shapes of consciousness,” beginning with the immediacy of facticity (the in-itself of consciousness) in the Greek polis and ending with the mediation of facticity by subjectivity (the for-itself) in the modern world. Hegel analyzes Greek ethical life through a consideration of tragedy, and this along two axes: (a) human law, which corresponds to the nation or body politic; and (b) divine law, which corresponds to the family and its ancestral cult. Within this ethical order, as Hegel notes, there is initially an “antagonism” between the family (understood here as wife/husband/child) and the nation. Ultimately, however, the family “has its enduring basis in the nation” because the reciprocal recognition shared among members of a family can only be maintained and vouchsafed through the recognition of the ethical community at large (i.e., by having legal status).

As the dialectical progression continues, however, subjective reflection, language, and culture eclipse primitive legal status as the principal vehicles of self-consciousness. Through speech and expression, and by extension Socratic philosophy, an individual self-consciousness comes into being for others and in this way becomes universal: “It is its own knowing of itself, and its knowing of itself as a self that has passed over into another self that
has been perceived and is universal.” Primitive legal status gives way to the “more profound and inward notion of the human ‘subject’”—that is, the self’s recognition of its subjectivity and independence in culture as for-itself—the result is self-alienation. It is no longer natural but universal and abstract.

This process of self-alienation and self-cultivation continues in the period leading up to the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. Moving from the fall of the ancient world to the rise of modernity, we find in the latter “the culmination of this process of self-alienation and self-cultivation . . . under the supremely alienating sway of wealth.” As subjectivity shifts from expression through political loyalty to economic dependence, “all stability and substance vanish” giving way to “a common thing, a plaything of whims, an accident of caprice.” Pure culture, as expressed in the world of wealth, is the apex of alienation. It is a “disrupted condition” of the most egregious sort, insofar as subjectivity is now at its furthest distance from substance.

In the world of the self-alienated spirit and alienated culture (the background, as Merold Westphal notes, of the old modernity), consciousness becomes aware of its alienation and, by extension, of the futility of political and economic reality. Two strategies develop in an attempt to transcend this alienation: faith and Enlightenment. Modern faith is, in the first instance, directed toward the ethereal realm of pure consciousness that lies beyond the pale of alienated culture. It seeks to transcend the pure insight of alienated culture—the critical, negative, contentless, universalized, teleological, and utilitarian rationality of Enlightenment (what Buonarrotti calls “The Order of Egoism”). The anguish of medieval unhappy consciousness is absent in this conception because faith has become a mere projection of anthropomorphized picture content onto the spiritual world; the absolute becomes “real” in an instantaneous and unproblematic fashion by taking on the appearance of unessential being. Yet this projection, since it arises from alienated culture, carries with it the contentless negativity of culture (i.e., pure insight) into the spiritual world, which in turn destroys the iconographic content of that world. Transcendence, in this way, is once again thwarted.

Faith is the god-haunted darkness which Enlightenment seeks to illumine. But since pure insight is the totalization of negativity, Enlightenment is shown to have no “light” (i.e., content) of its own; rather, it appropriates the content of faith solely for the purpose of destroying it. The problem of estrangement is overcome by rendering the absolute an unknowable and featureless “void,” which in turn negates any possibility of movement toward it. Since “the nothingness that transcends pure sense” is just that—nothing—all that remains is the individual and his principal mode of awareness, namely, sense perception, the objects of which are known absolutely.

Between the predicateless absolute being of Enlightenment deism and the meaningless physical reality of Enlightenment materialism is utility—the
relegation of meaning to purely human aims and interests. Reality is reduced to the for-itself as self-consciousness enjoys “certainty of its individual self” in thorough and penetrating insight fixed upon the useful object”.  
But utility is a relative concept; there is no necessary connection between my being-for-self and the being-for-other of useful objects. The only way to overcome this last vestige of objectivity is for the self to view everything as product or creation of its own will—and this is what Hegel means by “absolute freedom.”

The doctrine of absolute freedom is concretely manifested in the French Revolution, wherein every act of government is a product of the general will (or self-conscious decision of each individual). As a result, the compartmentalization of ethical life into different socioeconomic classes dissolves: “In this absolute freedom, therefore, all social groups or classes which are the spiritual spheres into which the whole is articulated are abolished; the individual consciousness that belonged to any such sphere, and willed and fulfilled itself in it, has put aside its limitation; its purpose is the general purpose, its language universal law.” The work of government, however, requires functional differentiation (e.g., a division of powers) even within a single state entity. Consequently, the absolutely free individual consciousness is merely represented; it is alienated from its own expression of will in the state and is thus unable to “achieve anything positive . . . either of laws and general institutions of conscious freedom, or of a freedom that wills them.”

As Franco notes, “unable to produce a positive work or deed, the only thing left for the individual consciousness characterized by absolute freedom is ‘negative action’ and the ‘fury of destruction.’” This is the origin of the Reign of Terror, wherein the will of absolute freedom turns against itself, or rather the part of itself that is outside absolute freedom: its “abstract existence as such” within the revolutionary government.

This is Hegel’s last mention of politics in Phenomenology. Instead of providing an analysis of the rational state in the aftermath of the revolution, he instead discusses morality, religion, and finally absolute knowledge. In the section on morality, or “self-certain spirit,” Hegel focuses on the final shape consciousness takes before attaining absolute knowledge; in this shape, consciousness is now absolutely free and has no other object beyond its own subjective self-certainty. It is manifested concretely in the “moral view of the world” articulated by Kant and Fichte, as well as the concept of “conscience,” which appears in the idealism of the German Romantics. Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian notion of duty, which turns on what he sees as a “dualism” between “morality and nature, duty and inclination,” is reiterated later in the Philosophy of Right (see below). In the Romantic notion of conscience, this dualism is overcome; the empty indeterminacy of abstract duty is no longer opposed to the reality of self, having been filled with the immediate content of contingent, individual selfhood. But this merely trades one form of indeterminacy for another. For in conscience the
content of will is now determined “by the caprice of the individual and the contingency of his unconscious natural being.” Any action can be justified relative to the subjective interests, desires, or convictions of the individual. As Franco helpfully explains, “What some might regard as violence and wrongdoing in the acquisition of property, others might justify in terms of the duty to provide for the support of oneself and one’s family.” Conscience collapses into a pernicious relativism.

At the same time, the conscientious will is universal in its desire to be recognized by others. That is, in acting we want others to acknowledge and understand the reasons and intentions underlying our actions. Language is the mechanism by which this explanation or confession is brought about:

It is only by supplementing an action with language, explaining it, that the disparity between the objective deed and the conscientious intention that lies behind it can be overcome. In this way, conscience leads to a “community of consciences,” the “spirit of substance” of which is the “mutual assurance of their conscientiousness, good intentions, the rejoicing over this mutual purity, and the refreshing of themselves in the glory of knowing and uttering, of cherishing and fostering, such an excellent state of affairs.”

Conscience thereby leads to an emphasis on talk over action, as the “beautiful soul” shuns the finitude, particularity, and impurity of the latter in favor of the universality and purity of the former. It condemns as evil or selfish the concrete action of active conscience, but only by focusing narrowly on what is finite, particular, and self-interested in it. By confessing its guilt, active conscience causes the beautiful soul to recognize the necessity of concrete action and the error of ascetic flight from the world, and the beautiful soul forgives active conscience in turn. In this way are the universal and the particular reconciled within self-certain consciousness.

Much more could be said about the *Phenomenology*, but the foregoing is sufficient to illustrate Hegel’s radical critique of Enlightenment representationalism, individualism, and rationalism which, interestingly, fell prey to a number of rival and mutually exclusive political interpretations following his death in 1831. As Shlomo Avineri points out, “[A]lmost every shade of political philosophy has had protagonists claiming to state its case in what they considered to be a legitimate interpretation or derivative of Hegelianism.” An early example of this phenomenon is the conflict between the so-called Left (or “Young”) Hegelians and the Right (or “Old”) Hegelians in the 1840s. Whereas the latter group generally regarded Hegel as an orthodox Christian and a loyal Prussian patriot, the latter tended to view him as a bourgeois reactionary. Contemporary discussions of Hegel’s theory are in many respects mere continuations of this conflict. For example, some modern commentators, following the Right Hegelians, view...
Hegel as a monarchist, authoritarian, and/or crypto-fascist who believed, among other things, that Prussia in the 1830s was the actualization of the Ideal State. Others, following certain Left Hegelians (e.g., Bruno Bauer) see Hegel as a “philosopher of freedom” whose system laid the groundwork for the radical philosophical tradition of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Perhaps such disagreements are simply a consequence of the “difficulty” of interpreting Hegel. But there are other possibilities as well. For example, it might be the case that Hegel developed a series of distinct and (more or less) incongruous theories of the state rather than a single, uniform theory. Hegel’s mature political philosophy is developed almost entirely in his later writings, most notably in the *Philosophy of Right*, and it is possible that these later writings abandon some or all of the ideas outlined in earlier works such as the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Another possibility is that Hegel intended to develop a single, uniform theory of the state—such that all the ideas contained in his earlier works are, by his own lights at least, consistent with those of later works—but failed because the theory is somehow internally inconsistent or self-contradictory.

We need not concern ourselves with the specific details of Hegel’s system. It is enough to note that Hegel’s “rational” state—the living embodiment of absolute spirit—has private property, police, a class system, a bureaucratic government apparatus, a monarch—in short, many if not most of the characteristics of a prerevolutionary feudal kingdom. It is arguably for this reason that Hegel is seldom regarded as either a liberal or a socialist but rather as a kind of authoritarian or even a “protofascist.” Why, then, is Hegel such an important figure in the history of socialism? The answer is twofold. First, Hegel is one of the first modern philosophers to champion holism against the reigning orthodoxy of liberal individualism. In Hegel’s view, human communities have interests that transcend, or at least are not strictly reducible, to the interests of abstract, atomized individuals. Furthermore, all fundamental human goods and values, including those by which political practices and institutions are morally judged, are essentially social in nature. Hegel agrees with Kant that an autonomous individual wills her own freedom, but further claims that freedom is only realized in an ethical community—that is, a community of free, self-conscious individuals all of whom recognize each other as such. As such, he rejects both the personalism and atomism that characterizes much of the liberal tradition.

Second, Hegel is one of the first modern philosophers to analyze philosophical and scientific concepts through the lens of history. For Hegel, individual consciousness is an epiphenomenon of social consciousness, which is in turn an expression of the dialectical movement of spirit through history. This entails, in essence, that world-historical events must be interpreted through the lens of science and philosophy and, by extension, that science
and philosophy must be practiced through the lens of historical activity—in other words, that theory and practice form an inseparable dialectical unity (an idea that captured the imaginations of the Young Hegelians). To be sure, the *Philosophy of Right* departs from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in its suggestion that a hierarchical, centralized, and coercive system of right, which constitutes the institutional realization of the state, is a world historical necessity for the realization of freedom. The purpose of this system, however, is to enumerate the theoretical possibilities—the range of possible actions and historical potentials which are optimally conducive to reciprocal-recognition and thus to living freely. Individuals’ shared desire to live freely through reciprocal recognition is therefore expressed as a kind of “general will” in the system of right. It is general in the sense that it wills both individual freedom and social freedom, where the former can only be achieved through the latter and vice versa. Just as socialism draws upon Rousseau’s radical egalitarianism without sharing his pessimistic view of society, so too does socialism endorse Hegel’s fundamentally social and historical conception of freedom without sharing his views on private property (*inter alia*).

### The social conception of human nature

Unlike liberalism, socialism ascribes enormous value to real as opposed to *ex hypothesi* political and socioeconomic equality. Furthermore, it tends to endorse a fundamentally social conception of human nature and, by extension, a holistic view of human society. Individual natures and interests are inexorably linked to and shaped by social or communal life; what is more, the interests of the social whole are not reducible to the interests of abstract, atomic individuals in a hypothetical state of nature. (Socialism therefore vigorously denies Margaret Thatcher’s infamous claim that there are no such things as societies because only individuals are real. 51) Early socialists, taking their cue variously from Rousseau and Hegel, think of subjectivity as something always and already shaped, though not necessarily constructed, by sociolinguistic forces.

Characteristics such as “rationality,” “self-interest,” and “autonomy” are historically situated and do not attach themselves ready-made to human individuals. This is not necessarily to say that human beings are not naturally rational or self-interested or free, or that such characteristics differ substantially among individuals belonging to different societies. The point is that all such human characteristics, dispositions, and capacities are fundamentally social—that is, they can only be realized and cultivated in society. Consequently, society plays a role in determining what it means to be rational or free in practice as well as the relative value ascribed to such characteristics in particular social contexts. An individual will be more or less “self-interested,” “acquisitive,” “egoistic,” and so forth, depending on
the extent to which such characteristics are promoted or discouraged by her community.

As Self notes, however, “The socialist tendency is towards the assumption of “moral man in immoral society” rather than its reverse, and consequently carries the expectation that basic institutional reform can release beneficial human energies.” Although the early socialists criticized liberalism for representing human beings as essentially selfish and competitive, this is not because they regarded human beings as essentially altruistic and cooperative. On the contrary, as Self points out, the socialists emphasized human beings’ capacity to be altruistic and cooperative provided that certain social preconditions are met. This is quite different, obviously, from postulating that human beings are naturally and essentially X and deducing from said postulate that social existence is naturally and essentially Y. For the early socialists, this is precisely what liberals such as Locke attempt to do, and it is one of their foremost errors.

The early socialists also tend to ascribe “equal moral worth,” “equal moral capacity,” and “equal entitlement to consideration” to each individual. As we have seen, liberals generally concur with this ascription, at least at the level of human nature itself. Locke, for instance, agrees that human beings have an equal moral worth in view of their equal right to life, liberty, and property. The difference is that for liberals equality of rights does not entail “equality of outcomes.” Classical liberals will tolerate gross inequalities of income and wealth as long as they are viewed as a natural consequence of the free market. Modern liberals might endorse certain political measures intended to lessen the gap between rich and poor, but they have not generally advocated large-scale redistributions of wealth, let alone the wholesale rejection of private property, in order to achieve total socioeconomic equality. Socialists, on the other hand, have consistently argued that equality means nothing if it is not actualized in real-world socioeconomic relations where this has typically been taken to mean the abolition of private property in some form or other.

Although I will examine Marx in greater detail below, the Marxian view of human nature is worth discussing in brief detail here, if only because it differs from, and is quite a bit more complicated than, other socialists’ conceptions of human nature. In the sixth Thesis on Feuerbach, Marx states that:

Feuerbach resolves the essence of religion into the essence of man. But the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations. Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence is hence obliged:

1. To abstract from the historical process and to define the religious sentiment regarded by itself, and to presuppose an abstract—isolated—human individual.
2. The essence therefore can by him only be regarded as “species,” as an inner “dumb” generality which unites many individuals only in a natural way.\textsuperscript{54}

Here Marx seems to suggest that human nature is not an abstract “essence” (Wesen) that expresses itself in each individual, but rather the product of social relations. Elsewhere he claims human nature is “modified in each historical epoch”\textsuperscript{55} and that “as individuals express their lives, so they are; hence what individuals are depends on the material conditions of their production.”\textsuperscript{56} Along the same lines Marx inveighs against the liberal tendency to transform certain social forms arising from a given mode of production into “eternal laws of nature and reason.”\textsuperscript{57}

In all of this Marx affirms the basic ideas of social holism discussed previously, chief among them the notion that human nature is inexorably social and that socioeconomic conditions influence, if not altogether determine, the nature of human beings within a particular social form. At the same time, however, Marx often speaks of a transhistorical human nature understood as the “totality of needs and drives which exert a force” upon human beings qua human beings.\textsuperscript{58} Marx’s philosophical anthropology may be understood as an attempt to account for the basic needs, drives, instincts, functions, and so forth, of human beings and to explain how human beings satisfy, develop, and act upon them.\textsuperscript{59} Ultimately, he argues that humans have a “species-being” (Gattungswesen), an innate capacity to engage in purposive, self-conscious activity directed toward the production of the social environment as well as of individual forms of life.\textsuperscript{60}

The object of human activity is therefore species-being itself, not only insofar as we seek to express our species-being through self-activity (making our own lives the objects of our activity), but also insofar as we seek to improve the life of the human species in general.\textsuperscript{61} (Here again we can see how Marx dialectically relates individual life with social life.) Labor is an important, albeit intermediate, aspect of our drive toward self-actualization. The idea that capitalism estranges our labor from our drive toward self-actualization is one of the fundamental elements of the Marxist critique.

Morality versus science

As men of the Revolution, early French communists such as Babeuf and Bunanarotti conceived of communism as being first and foremost an ethical doctrine with various political, social, and economic ramifications.\textsuperscript{62} The same is true of Cabot’s later theoretical formulation of communism as well Blanqui’s theory of revolutionary praxis. Taking their cue from Rousseau and kindred thinkers, the early communists conceived the ethical content of communism in terms of rights—chief among them, the rights to life and
liberty. What distinguished them from contemporary liberals was their insistence that (a) rights cannot rely upon a conception of abstract, egoistic individuality and (b) that equality, far from being an abstract property of natural rights, is itself a political and socioeconomic right—indeed, the most important right of all, insofar as equality is necessary for the protection and promotion of life and liberty.

Considered as a basic good or value, however, radical equality of this sort is not something that can be merely “honored” as a right; on the contrary, it must be actively promoted as an end. As such, most of the major non-Marxist schools of socialism throughout the nineteenth century tended to endorse teleological conceptions of normativity. All such theories shared in common the idea that social justice—understood as the realization of the greatest possible maximization of both liberty and equality—was the fundamental goal of political practices and institutions as well as the moral benchmark according to which all such practices and institutions are to be judged. (Certain schools of social democratic theory constitute a qualified exception inasmuch as they placed greater emphasis on the protection of individual rights as a safeguard against state-sponsored tyranny.)

Nineteenth-century Marxism took great pains to differentiate itself from other forms of socialism on the question of ethics. As a self-described “scientific” doctrine, Marxism attempted to ground its critique of bourgeois society in empirical observation and historical analysis rather than on ethical suppositions. Marx himself tended to dismiss morality, along with law and religion, as “bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois interests.” Much of his opprobrium is directed specifically against what Marx called the “pompous catalogue of human rights,” which serves to conceal the true motivation for liberal reforms (the appeasement of the proletariat and the suppression of revolutionary agitation). Nonetheless, it is clear that scientific Marxism, like Machiavellian political theory, adopts a kind of “pseudonormativity” based on strategic hypothetical imperatives. Political practices and institutions are judged according to their conduciveness to revolutionary goals, chief among them the abolition of capitalism. Such judgments do not operate by means of moral reasoning in the strict sense so much as scientific, historical, and/or pragmatic analysis.

The social holism that serves to distinguish socialism from liberalism also contributes to another characteristic feature of the former—namely, its emphasis on historicity. This may not be surprising; after all, a theory that holds that normativity is irreducibly social in nature will perforce be concerned with the variety of human social forms that have emerged in various historical contexts. More specifically, it is a testament to the enormous influence of German Idealism in general and Hegelianism in particular upon socialism, the most visible expression of which is Marxist-Leninism. In order to understand this influence, we must briefly consider
the relationship of Marx’s thought to that of Hegel—an ambitious task, to be sure, as the nature of this relationship is famously complex and remains a point of contention among scholars. Because a thoroughgoing attempt to disentangle it would far exceed the aim and scope of this work, I will instead present Marx’s critique of Hegel, as well as the view of human nature that emerges from it, in abbreviated and general form.

As we saw above, Hegel construes the history of spirit (the whole or totality of human consciousness) as a series of dialectic stages or moments, each of which is marked by a distinctive conflict between the positive content of spirit’s previous moments and its coming to see itself as alienated from, or in contradiction with, that content. Spirit’s reflective recognition of the collision of thesis and antithesis results in a synthetic reconciliation (aufheben) that comes to be contradicted in turn. The process continues until it reaches a point of maximal consistency. In political life, this point is achieved through the institution of the so-called rational state, which resolves the contradictions inherent in the ethical life of civil (or bourgeois) society—especially those stemming from familial and class relations—and in this sense is necessary for the expression and sustenance of freedom. The state, as the “actuality of concrete freedom,” negotiates the “battlefield of private interest.” In his Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State (1843) and Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844), Marx formulates a critique of those sections of the Philosophy of Right and the Phenomenology of Spirit that pertain to the state. On his view, Hegel needlessly mystifies dialectic by inverting the relationship between “actual existents” or “real subjects” and “predicates of universal determination.” In other words, he treats individual subjects and institutions, including the state, as “vehicles” or “manifestations” of the “mystical Idea,” and not the other way around. Moreover, although Hegel recognizes the process of human “self-creation,” whereby human beings construct themselves through labor within “forms of estrangement,” the labor in question is only “abstract, mental labor” that produces mere “entities of thought.” Thus, although Hegel agrees with Marx that civil society is contradictory, “estranged from man,” and “alien to a truly human life,” the recognition of this estrangement and alienation only comes about for him in “abstract, philosophical thought.” For Marx it is material labor rather than the movement of spirit that is fundamental in explaining both individual human nature and human history as a whole, where the former shapes and is shaped by the latter.

The politics and economics of socialism

The word “socialist” first appeared in the November, 1827 issue of the Co-operative Magazine. Long before this term came into general use, there were, as I mentioned, several philosophers who endorsed common
ownership of land and resources and public control over the production and distribution of goods, which were the central commitments of both the socialism of the 1820s as well as the various strands of French communism that preceded it. The latter, however, emerged as an offshoot of the French Revolution in a preindustrial society of craftsmen, artisans, and peasants. As Lichtheim notes:

France had not yet undergone the industrial development which across the Channel was creating an entirely different kind of society. In Britain, where the small farmer had been swept away and the artisan was being transformed into a wage laborer, democracy signified the rule of the propertyless majority and hence terrified the new entrepreneurial class, which had staked its all on the success of the industrial revolution. In France, “bourgeois democracy” was still possible because the bourgeoisie had the mass of the peasantry on its side and could, if necessary, play it off against the nascent proletariat.  

By the 1830s, socialists in France and Britain alike could be distinguished from the communists vis-à-vis the latter’s endorsement of radical equality. This in turn demanded “the leveling of civilized institutions and a return to an egalitarian (and therefore natural) state.” The socialists, in contrast, were not generally opposed to civilization—that is to say, industrialization—so much as capitalism and the doctrine of liberal individualism that accompanied it. By 1840, the only major socialist thinker who continued to oppose industrialization and to champion the disappearing peasant and artisan class was Proukhon who himself was born of peasant stock.

Like their liberal peers, the socialists of the early nineteenth century were not initially committed to any particular form of government. As Lichtheim notes, “It was possible for a democrat to be a either a liberal or a socialist depending on whether or not he accepted the institution of private property in the means of production, the establishment of a self-regulating market economy, and the transformation of labor into a commodity.” While both liberals and socialists accepted the Industrial Revolution, the latter rejected the “unrestrained rule of capital or the introduction of a self-regulating market economy.” In both France and Britain, moreover, many if not most socialists shared the liberals’ general commitment to rights and liberties, though, as we noted earlier, their conception of rights and liberties was often based on very different assumptions about human nature. To this extent it is fair to say that the socialists desired many of the same political ends as the liberals. Even the notoriously antiliberal Henri de Saint-Simon, who advocated centralized rule by technocratic elites and balked at the idea of representative democracy, nonetheless looked forward to the gradual disappearance of organized coercive force as a means to maintain social order.
That said, many of the early socialists were “utopians” who simply ignored extant political institutions and looked instead to the future. For men like Robert Owen and Charles Fourier, the ultimate goal was to establish small, self-sufficient, and self-governing communities whose members would enjoy plentiful and equal material wealth as well as the freedom to work, play, and marry according to their individual desires, dispositions, and tastes. In general, it was simply taken for granted that the rights and liberties of individuals would be realized in such communities and/or that the small size of such communities would not require a rigorous legal system to protect the rights and liberties of their members. Unlike the French liberal Benjamin Constant who went to great lengths to articulate a workable political and legal model for post-Revolutionary France, the utopian Charles Fourier envisioned an ideal community called the “phalanx” whose 1600 or so members would not require elaborate legislative or judicial procedures to secure their freedoms. As I mentioned previously, liberals were greatly concerned with the question of what legal rights citizens must have in order to remain free and, by extension, what political measures must be taken to preserve and protect these rights. To the extent that the early socialists entertained such questions at all, they generally did not endorse democracy in the way the Jacobins did in theory or the Tory Chartists did in practice. When not engaged with the founding of experimental “utopian” communities, Owen and Fourier favored the gradual establishment of “enlightened” (but not democratic) rule in Europe. Saint-Simon, in contrast, argued for authoritarian rule by technocratic elites who would be drawn from the emerging entrepreneurial classes. By and large, then, the socialists of the 1820s and 1830s were not revolutionaries so much as reformers. Though their proposed economic reforms were generally more radical than those of the liberals, they did not favor revolution as a means to institute these reforms.

Communism, which by the 1830s had come to accept industrialization, remained self-consciously revolutionary at both the theoretical and practical level. The followers of Blanqui, for example, advocated proletariat revolution on the Jacobin model. Their political and economic goals were, at least in principle, robustly democratic and egalitarian. Proudhon, who was the first socialist to identify himself as an anarchist, shared the Blanquists’ goals for the most part but rejected the notion of “proletariat dictatorship” as a means to securing them. Meanwhile radical communism had spread to Germany where the customary concerns of Anglo-French liberalism were ignored or rejected outright by the left wing of the Young Hegelians, chief among them Karl Marx. Far from being indifferent to the state, radical Hegelians like Marx came to regard it with unabashed contempt and outward hostility.

In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel offers an extended criticism of both Lockean “abstract right” and Kantian moralitat, arguing that both fail to provide sufficiently objective moral principles. Broadly speaking, this is
because Locke and Kant base their theories on an abstract, ahistorical, and asocial concept of “the individual” that ignores the role that the community plays in ethical life. For Hegel, the content of morality remains abstract and indeterminate until it is actualized in the ethical life of a community. As the fullest expression of communal ethical life, the state provides the principles according to which individual conscience becomes capable of realizing the good. Properly speaking, these principles are coextensive with the “laws” of the state.

Various aspects of social living—in effect, social laws—provide a sense both of subjective individuality as well of objective moral principle. Individuals living together in society not only act in ways that are conducive to their own particular life plans (i.e., self-interestedly) but also in ways that acknowledge and honor the freedom of others (i.e., ethically). Because “the rational is the Real,” and because the Real is always a synthesis of the universal and the particular, it is, strictly speaking, irrational to reduce or subordinate the social to the individual, or vice versa. The social dynamic is required to keep individual self-interest and universal morality in balance. It is this dynamic that forms the basis of civil society, especially as it appears in work life and associations.

In Hegel’s view, work life is derived from the system of needs. Society comes into existence in the private lives of families, which are themselves units of a larger social whole. Within a family context, one not only develops an idea of himself as individual, but also as a member of a family who acts in the interest of said family with all its independent needs, projects, aspirations, and so forth. This, in turn, compels individuals to enter work life. In this context workers become mutually dependent on one another, like members of a family. An individual worker acquires what he or she needs through working, and the others get what they need through his or her work. Work life, as such, provides the individual with a kind of social “education” (Bildung). As the individual begins to view him/herself as part of this larger social context, individuality is universalized.

In civil society, people who freely work in various occupations not only associate or identify themselves with said occupations but also develop a division of labor—the classes or estates. Insofar as work within the estates conduces to the fulfillment of particular ends, it becomes efficacious for individual workers to promote the “honor of [their] estate.” The interconnectedness of people within work associations culminates in citizenship, whereby an individual comes to see his life as coextensive with the life of society as a whole. The life of the state subsists in individual subjective wills and reflects them through its laws. The state protects individuals, families, and work associations precisely because the state recognizes itself in and through these forms of life. Society, as such, is regarded as an end in itself and so is valued for its own sake. Whereas in work life one pursues his or her private interests with a view to his or her
interconnectedness with other workers, the ethical life of the state involves the identification of private interests with social interests. That is, insofar as society is an end to be valued in itself, the work of building up society entails promoting the interests of all individuals. The objective will and the subjective will collide as individual morality recognizes the universal life of society. In this way, the state is the “actuality of the substantial will.”

For Hegel, laws are independent, subjective interpretations or constructions, but they are also rooted in the universalized “ought principle.” Through laws, therefore, the good and conscientious action are united in a social (rather than individual) conscience. Here, Hegel is not suggesting that all people in a given society agree on everything in practice but rather that they share a common conscience or “fundamental spirit” which is actualized in their actions. This fundamental spirit is like the good, but it is a real as opposed to abstract force—the realization of absolute spirit mentioned in the Phenomenology of Spirit. There, spirit is at first only passively experienced in the ethical community; it is something that “happens” or “comes about” as opposed to something that is brought about by communal decision making. What is more, the individual only recognizes itself as in-itself (i.e., in the being of ethical spirit) and not as for-itself.

The concept of state that appears in the Philosophy of Right circumvents this alleged shortcoming by positing a dual self-consciousness in the ethical community: individuals in the state are (a) conscious of themselves as self-conscious and autonomous and as individual actualizations of ethical spirit, and (b) conscious of the absolute dependence of ethical spirit on their own actions (e.g., the formulation of laws and customs). This change is more than a mere shift in emphasis. On the contrary, whereas the Phenomenology presents primitive ethical community as an early moment in spirit’s dialectical journey toward self-consciousness that is soon supplanted by other moments, the Philosophy of Right articulates a related but different dialectic: one in which primitive ethical community, with all its attendant problems, is ultimately replaced and cured through the realization of the rational state.

The state is the actuality of the ethical Idea. It is ethical mind qua the substantial will manifest and revealed to itself, knowing and thinking itself, accomplishing what it knows and in so far as it knows it. The state exists immediately in custom, mediately in individual self-consciousness, knowledge, and activity, while self-consciousness in virtue of its sentiment towards the state, finds in the state, as its essence and the end-product of its activity, its substantive freedom.

In both the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of Right, the state is not merely the “system of right” (i.e. the government) but a community of individuals who share common laws and customs. The institutions of family
and civil society are the realization of a common ethical spirit. This spirit, in turn, both constitutes and is constituted by a self-conscious community of self-and-other-conscious individuals. The most crucial difference, of course, is that in *Philosophy of Right* the state as ethical community is realized and maintained through the institution of a coercive, hierarchical “system of right.”

Against Hegel, for whom the state constituted the realization of freedom, the young Marx viewed the state as an organ of class rule, or the oppression of one class by another. Its sole purpose, he claimed, was to legitimize and perpetuate oppression by arbitrating class conflict. Relations of exchange and private property, which liberals took to be foundational for freedom, equality, and all other bourgeois values, actually undermined such values; and the state, rather than existing to reconcile the contradictions inherent in bourgeois political economy, was instead a tool both for the mystification and maintenance of these contradictions. Marx initially contended, furthermore, that the state is unnecessary for the overcoming of alienation and the realization of freedom. Such ends could only be realized in “full communist society”—that is, a society with no hierarchical, centralized state apparatus, no privately owned means of production, and no socioeconomic classes wherein all property is communally owned and all individuals have equal social and economic status. Unlike the so-called utopian socialists, Marx and his earliest disciples were outspoken and unapologetic revolutionaries. In the 1840s, however, and certainly for a long time thereafter, Marxian communists distinguished themselves by embracing a unique model of revolutionary theory and praxis, the salient characteristics of which were later enumerated by Lenin as follows:

1. Marxists have tended to argue that all social ills can be reduced to a singular source—namely, the oppression of one class by another under capitalism.

2. Furthermore, Marxists “demand that the proletariat be prepared for revolution by utilising the present state.” In other words, the proletariat should participate in bourgeois electoral politics by organizing revolutionary political parties, labor unions, etc.

3. Although Marxists aim “at the complete abolition of the state, [they] recognise that this aim can only be achieved after classes have been abolished by the socialist revolution, as the result of the establishment of socialism which leads to the withering away of the state.” In other words, the initial goal of the socialist revolution is the replacement of the liberal bourgeois state by a transitional “worker’s state” or “dictatorship of the proletariat.”

4. Lastly, Marxists realize that “class political consciousness can be brought to the workers only from without, that is, only outside
of the economic struggle, outside the sphere of relations between workers and employers.” Furthermore, “the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be exercised through an organisation embracing the whole of the class . . . It can be exercised only by a vanguard . . . Such is the basic mechanism of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the essentials of transitions from capitalism to communism . . . for the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be exercised by a mass proletarian organisation.” In other words, socialists should organize a revolutionary vanguard party which aims to (a) organize the working classes; (b) incite revolution and seize power on behalf of the working classes; and (c) establish a worker’s state or “dictatorship of the proletariat” in which all power is centralized within the vanguard party.

As we have already seen, thesis (1) constitutes a crucial aspect of Marx’s critique and so is scarcely controversial. On the other hand, the so-called doctrine of complicity outlined in (2) did not become a more or less universally held article of Marxist faith until the latter half of the nineteenth century. Prior to that point, the Marxian communists were somewhat divided on the question; while some were altogether opposed to the idea of creating communist organizations, others disagreed over the form such organizations should take (e.g., political parties versus trade unions). There can be no doubt, however, that the notion of the “vanguard” described in (3) was very much in place among Marxian communists by the 1850s, as was the concomitant idea of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” described in (4).

By the time that the International Workingmen’s Association held its first congress in Geneva in 1866, the two main factions within the group consisted of Marxians, on the one hand, and the followers of Mikhail Bakunin, on the other. Bakunin represented a strand of socialism, which, from its inception in the 1840s among followers of Proudhon, rejected both vanguardism as well as the dictatorship of the proletariat. The anarchists, as they came to be known, believed firmly that the workers and other oppressed classes must organize and act for themselves without the mediation or representation of a bourgeois vanguard. They were also radically opposed to the state in any form, and for this reason balked at the idea of transferring political power from one group to another, a course which they believed would only perpetuate tyranny. Instead, Bakunin and his followers favored the spontaneous, violent, and total overthrow of the state—in other words, the immediate transition to collectivism or communism without the establishment of any transitional government, even one controlled by workers. Disagreements between these factions eventually led to the expulsion of the Bakuninists at the Hague Congress of 1872.
In the 1860s, a third group of socialists evolved, which adopted party politics, rather than violent revolution, as the preferred means for initiating the transition to full communist society. Though many Marxian communists remained revolutionary, the so-called social democrats favored the establishment of socialist political parties and the election of socialist politicians with a mind to gradually and nonviolently introducing communism into Europe. The social democrats were mostly comprised of German Marxists such as Ferdinand Lasalle, August Bebel, and Wilhelm Leibknecht, all three of whom were instrumental in founding the Social Democratic Worker’s Party of Germany in 1869. Social democracy was also influential in France among the followers of Louis Blanc and in Britain among the members of the Fabian Society.

Social-democratic Marxists and their revolutionary peers remained more or less united under the Second International until the outbreak of the First World War, at which time they underwent a spectacular parting of the ways. Because reformists in the SADP, such as Heinrich Cunow, actively supported the war, whereas revolutionary communists such as Rosa Luxemburg actively opposed it, the result was a bitter fractionalization of the party culminating in the wholesale defection of the revolutionary contingent in 1917. After Marx’s death in 1883, the loose ends of his thought were gradually woven together—some would say almost single-handedly by Engels—into what many considered a self-contained and completely uniform doctrine. This “orthodox Marxism,” as it has since been termed, took root among Eastern European revolutionaries such as Luxemburg, Martov, Pehkanov, Trotsky, and Lenin. From 1917 on, Social Democratic parties in Europe became increasingly distanced from revolutionary orthodoxy (which was eventually termed “Marxist-Leninism” after the Bolshevik Revolution in order to distinguish it from other forms of socialism) and many accepted the “revisionism” of Eduard Bernstein and Jean Jaurés. Though Social Democracy was from the beginning highly influenced by liberalism, it became even more so during and after the First World War, with many of its most important advocates eventually converting to Keynesianism and embracing the idea of the “mixed economy.”

Now one of the most important features of orthodox Marxism is the doctrine of economic determinism, according to which changes in the economic base engender mechanical changes in the social and political superstructure of a society. In his later writings, Marx argues that capitalism contains certain structural deficiencies, which, when coupled with the development of proletarian class consciousness, will inevitably lead to the collapse of capitalism and the concomitant rise of an intermediary socialist state. This entire process, as Engels particularly stresses, is dictated by a kind of scientific—or, more specifically, logico-dialectical—necessity. It is precisely this emphasis on historical and economic determinism that led Bakunin to famously ask, “Why bother trying to organize and revolutionize
the workers when they shall do so of their own accord, just as beasts in nature inevitably order their affairs.”

As we have already noted, the solution to Bakunin’s problem for Marxists like Lenin is vanguardism: the uprising of the proletariat must be incited, if not altogether spearheaded, by a revolutionary political party. (The extent to which the evolution of the vanguard is itself produced dialectically is, for Lenin at least, a complicated one that we shall not discuss here.) By the early twentieth century, however, certain Western Marxists had serious misgivings about vanguardism. Rosa Luxemburg, for instance, argued that the forcible imposition of socialist ideas upon workers at the expense of their spontaneous desires would merely recreate the most nefarious aspects of bourgeois society. Although Luxemburg and her confreres were all agreed that the working class is essentially revolutionary, they tended to seek alternate explanations for and solutions to the persistent lack of widespread revolutionary activity in its ranks.

Lukács, for example, argued that the reification and commodification of the worker and his labor has created an incongruity between individual appearance and social reality: “The atomisation of the individual is, then, only the reflex in consciousness of the fact that the ‘natural laws’ of capitalist production have been extended to cover every manifestation of life in society.” The mechanisms of reification and quantification in capitalist economics conceal dialectical totalization (the “interwoven social relationships behind the manifestations of things”). Because the proletariat is the principal object of this process, it is particularly amenable to discovering the illusion of reification; when it does, Lukács thinks, it will restore totality in “a world where things have their place in a unified whole rather than appearing in the disparateness of the commodity form. Essence will unite with appearance, and with that what ought to be will become what is.”

Like Luxemburg, Lukács emphasizes the necessity of working class spontaneity in the emergence of revolution. In doing so, however, he merely resurrects Engels’ old hope in the scientific inevitability of proletariat insurrection. The critical theory of Gramsci, Horkheimer, and Adorno agrees with Lukács that capitalist culture has reified, commodified, and quantified everything, but it remains resolutely skeptical about whether this process could be resisted with a mind to eventually abolishing it. On their view, the rationality of Enlightenment creates a new totality—one to which all must conform on pain of being excluded or marginalized as “irrational.” With this conformity, however, comes alienation—from others, from nature, from the fruits of their labors, and even from themselves.

For Horkheimer and Adorno it is precisely the culture industry which allows people to alienate themselves and, in so doing, perpetuate the new bourgeois system of totalization. Prior to the evolution of this system, culture operated as a locus of dissent, a buffer between runaway materialism on the one hand and primitive fanaticism on the other. In the wake of its
thoroughgoing commodification, culture becomes a mass culture—movies, television, newspapers, and so forth—the sole goal of which is to subordinate everyone and everything to the interests of bourgeois capitalism. The logic of Enlightenment reaches its apex precisely at the moment when everything—including resistance to enlightenment—becomes “yet another spectacle in the parade of culture.” Whatever forms of resistance cannot be appropriated are marginalized and relegated to the “lunatic fringe.” The culture industry, meanwhile, produces a constant flow of “pleasures” intended to inure the masses against any lingering sentiments of dissent or resistance.

By expanding the Marxist-Leninist analysis of capitalism to cover the entire social space, Gramsci, Horkheimer, and Adorno severely undermined the possibility of meaningful resistance to it. As Adorno notes, “In effect, positive intervention was impossible: all resistance was capable either of recuperation within the parameters or marginalization . . . there is no outside to capitalism, or at least no effective outside.” Absent any program for organized, mass resistance, the only outlet left for the revolutionary is art: the creation of quiet, solitary refusals and small, fleeting spaces of individual freedom.

For many later Marxists, the question raised by Bakunin—and the bleak situation which it ultimately forecasts—ceases to be problematic if we reject, or at least radically rethink, the notion of dialectical necessity. Most of the major schools of “revisionist” Marxism take for granted that history is not predetermined and that humans are, in some sense or other, essentially free beings. At the same time, the fact that human beings are essentially free does not imply that they always have complete and unfettered control over the direction their lives take. Habermas, for example, argues at length that cooptation only seems inevitable when we undertake our analysis from the standpoint of subjective consciousness and, by extension, the empirically constituted experience that forms the content of consciousness. In order to locate genuine sites of resistance, we must look beyond the content of consciousness to the structure of consciousness, which, for Habermas, is constituted by linguistic activity (“communicative action”). Within the framework of communicative action are various forms of rational discourse that determine the content of consciousness and define the “lifeworld” within which we act. Capitalism operates by “colonizing” the lifeworld with its own structures, thereby distorting the various modes of rational discourse and subjugating them to its own ends. The result is the ostensive disappearance of any exterior vantage or “outside” from which capitalism can be assessed and critiqued.

Against the deterministic thesis, however, Habermas argues that communicative action always presupposes freedom and responsibility. Neither colonization nor liberation from colonization are historically guaranteed because both are always and already embedded within discourses, and discourses, in turn, are always and already produced by
the communicative activity of free and responsible agents. As such, the first and most important goal of radical politics is the liberation of subjugated discourses and communicative activities. This liberation does not avail itself mechanistically in consciousness but must be actively pursued. Indeed, it is precisely the goal of Marxist theory to analyze how and to what extent human freedom affects and is affected by the economic substructure of social existence. Sartre, for example, describes capitalism and other oppressive social structures as “practicoinert”—that is, as products of free human activity that subsequently take on a life of their own, divorced from the motives and responsibilities of the original actors and, indeed, reacting back upon them in harmful ways.\textsuperscript{121} As a result social structures become mystified, as does the responsibility of individual human actors in creating and maintaining them. The Marxist intellectual seeks, in the first instance, to demonstrate the contingency of these structures, which in turn enables people to recognize their freedom and responsibility anew. This recognition, which is the true “revolutionary consciousness,” is a precondition for radical intervention—but, as in the case of Habermasian decolonization, its emergence is not guaranteed by necessity. It must be actively promoted.

In addition to the rejection of economic determinism—which one also finds in the structuralist Marxism of Louis Althusser\textsuperscript{122} and the autonomist Marxism of Cleaver, Dunayevskaya, Holloway, Castoriadis, and Negri\textsuperscript{123}—most latter-day Marxists have roundly repudiated the idea of vanguardism. Drawing upon Marx’s \textit{Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844}, autonomists have argued at length that the concept of alienation is much broader than orthodox Marxism-Leninism has conventionally recognized.\textsuperscript{124} For thinkers like Negri, alienation occurs whenever the individual is separated from the decision-making processes that affect his or her life. Workers are alienated from their own economic power via the capitalist exploitation of surplus value, but they are also alienated from their political power via the monopolization of authority—whether by elected representatives or members of a communist vanguard.

Autonomist Marxists expand the definition of “proletariat” to include all those whose subjectivity is circumscribed by homogenization, the process by which capital becomes “the totality of labor and life” and the entire social sphere is transformed into a factory for the extraction of surplus value.\textsuperscript{125} On the orthodox Marxist view, only members of the working classes are subjected to, and harmed by, this process. Everyone else somehow stands outside it and benefits from it. Autonomism argues, in contrast, that capitalism “proletarianizes” anyone and everyone whose life and labor is commodified—that is, relegated to a product whose value is determined solely on the basis of profitability.\textsuperscript{126} Obviously this would include all sorts of people—from teachers to doctors to housewives—who have not been conventionally regarded as members of the proletariat.\textsuperscript{127}
This implies, furthermore, that “class consciousness,” far from being a vehicle of revolution, is instead a symptom of homogenization. Capitalism compels people to think of themselves as members of distinct classes with uniform interests and needs. One goal of autonomism, consequently, is to break down homogenization—including the homogeneity of class—and to reintroduce the multiplicity of needs and interests that constitute individual peoples’ lives. Another goal, which follows from the first, is solidarity among people at the level of individuals rather than of classes or other collectivities. What matters in this context is not how people are being exploited so much as that they are being exploited.

Although autonomism and other revisionist schools of Marxism reject determinism, vanguardism, and traditional class analysis, they all retain what was previously referred to as a “strategic” emphasis. In other words, they continue to hold—as do Marxists of all stripes—that power as such is reducible to economic power. As May points out, for the autonomists “the focus remains capitalism, and the proletariat . . . as such, remains the revolutionary force.” Because exploitation is first and foremost an economic category, all of the various forms of exploitation are ultimately economic and so differ in degree rather than kind. Thus, even if one rejects the idea that economics is destiny, one must still admit that political analysis depends on economic analysis because power is ultimately economic in nature. An economic system that is alienating and exploitative by definition requires a political system that actively supports, or at least permits, alienation and exploitation. If it is impossible for one to have political power that is not reducible to economic power, then it is impossible to implement a system of government that does not already presuppose specific economic goals.

It comes as no surprise, then, that some Marxian socialists favored centralized economies that are planned and implemented by the government. In principle, what matters most is the equal allocation of economic power, thus legal and political powers will be determined according as they conduce to this goal. This has led some to conclude that socialism requires, or at least permits, flagrant violations of human rights, the idea being that the protection of individual rights is at odds with the goal of equal economic power. We must recall, however, that socialism does not necessarily reject the concept of rights and liberties outright; it simply denies that rights and liberties can be conceived independently of social existence. Many if not most socialists would agree with Marx that social existence is coextensive with economic existence—in other words, that economic activity is the foundation of social life. From this it follows that rights and liberties must be understood in terms of their economic ramifications, and indeed, democratic socialists have long argued that most of the rights and liberties cherished by liberals would be necessary in order for a socialist economic system to function properly.
the point another way, others have claimed that nothing in the idea of socialism itself (where socialism is understood minimally as the public ownership of the means of production) entails the abridgment of civil liberties. Strictly speaking even the right to property is preserved, albeit in the form of a positive entitlement (“To each according to his need”) rather than a purely negative freedom. Only those rights that would allow for economic exploitation (e.g., the right to hire another for a wage, the right to loan money at interest, the right to rent land or property, etc.) would go unrecognized.

Public ownership of the means of production does not by itself necessitate a specific economic system such as centralized planning. In the strict sense, larger-scale production outlets under socialism would “belong” to everyone in general and no one in particular. Clearly, however, the workers of a particular factory would have a greater stake in the management and operation of said factory than workers in other production facilities. In practice, these workers would “control” the factory, but they would not “own” it. Then again, because the factory would have no raison d’être beyond producing its goods, and because those goods will be distributed solely according to need, the very concept of “ownership” becomes moribund. The question of how goods are to be produced and distributed, on the other hand, is very much open to question. For example, many theorists have argued that a socialist economy is compatible with a market-based system of production and distribution. What is clear in all cases is that a socialist economic system would eliminate the extraction and accumulation of surplus value vis-à-vis public ownership of major production outlets.

Having examined socialism along our four trajectories, we can now see quite clearly how it differs from liberalism. First, socialist theories generally rely on a holistic view of human nature according to which the properties and interests of human beings are always defined and constituted within a social context. Second, socialist theories deny that goods can be identified independently of social contexts. Third, socialist theories ascribe enormous moral value to equality, understood not as an abstract condition but rather a concrete state of affairs. The protection and promotion of other values, such as individual rights and liberties, are only possible within a state of substantive equality. Fourth, socialist theories tend to endorse historical rather than transcendental conceptions of normativity, whether deontojuridical or teleological in nature. Fifth, socialist theories are not generally committed to any particular form of government, nor to any particular strategy for creating a socialist state, though they agree that the most important function of government is to promote the public good as a condition for protecting rights and liberties. Sixth, and finally, socialist theories repudiate the extraction of surplus value and endorse the public ownership of the means of production.
From modernity to anarchism

In the first chapter, I argued that politics is best understood as a kind of “social physics”—that is, an analysis of power relations at the level of social practices and institutions. Having analyzed liberalism and socialism at length, we are now in a position to understand political modernity as a sociophysical phenomenon. At bottom, political modernity is founded upon a very specific conceptualization of power—one which gives rise, in turn, to the theories and praxes we have discussed. Simply put, power is understood as an archê—that is, a force that coalesces within, and emanates from, a unitary center. It radiates outward from that center and, like the force of gravity, draws everything outside itself into or under itself, weighing down upon it like an anchor. The fundamental questions of political modernity, therefore, are whether, how, and to what extent this essentially coercive power can be rightfully invested in institutions and, by extension, exerted over individual subjects. For liberals, this amounts to asking with Rousseau why “man is born free but everywhere is in chains”—in other words, how and why do naturally free individuals submit to political powers which curtail their liberty? From there the question becomes whether such submission can be justified and, if so, under what conditions. For socialists, the question is only slightly altered. How and why, they ask, do human societies submit to unjust economic powers that create both conceptual and concrete inequalities? What can be done, in turn, to eliminate such inequalities without inadvertently damaging the common good?

In the first instance, then, political modernity is defined and distinguished by the problematic, or rather the problematization, of “archic” power. By disavowing naturalism, political modernity opens up a chasm between an individual or social subject, the nature of which is already defined and independently constituted, and the politicoeconomic power that acts upon it. The investment of that power in political and economic institutions, coupled with the exertion of that power upon subjects external to it, becomes a problem precisely because it appears alien to what these subjects are by nature. Political modernity, in consequence, involves the ongoing struggle to close, or at least bridge, this chasm by way of ethicopolitical justification. Put another way, the modern concept of power may be seen as emerging coextensively with the modern concept of the subject as an antagonistic “monstrous double.” In response, philosophy conjures up new concepts—of rights, liberty, equality, the social contract, and so forth—which attempt to reconcile the subject to power. Again, the entire enterprise only becomes possible and necessary when politicoeconomic power becomes the aberrant “other,” a hypostasized force outside and alien to human nature—in short, a problem. Political modernity just is the struggle to solve this problem.
As I previously suggested, however, there is no reason why political philosophers ought to define the boundaries of the problem in this way rather than some other way. Nor, in fact, is there any reason why political philosophers should treat political theory as a problem-solving enterprise. For example, what happens if we claim that the very concepts of subjectivity presupposed in political modernity are themselves problematic? One immediate consequence would be the vitiation of the power problem, which, as I have claimed, is only a side effect of subjectivity. Another consequence is that the entire range of derivative concepts that were invoked as solutions to the power problem would cease to be solutions; instead they would become problems in their own right. Concepts do not simply vanish when their genealogy becomes polluted, when their connection to other concepts are severed or changed. Even if the modern concept of the subject is problematized, it remains an open question whether another concept of subjectivity can take its place. This, in turn, leaves open the question of whether and how derivative concepts (e.g., rights and liberties) are to operate.

Political modernity is not simply defined in terms of problems, but also by the “solutions” that it poses to said problems. Despite their variety, all such solutions share in common two features that are themselves distinctive of political modernity. First, they are universal solutions. In other words, their justification qua solutions follows from general claims about man and world as such. They are regarded as valid solutions irrespective of particular social and historical circumstances. Second, they are transcendent solutions. In other words, they stand above and apart from the real-world exigencies they are meant to address. For example, when Locke claims that human beings have a natural right to property, which in turn necessitates the institution of government in order to enforce contracts, the concept of natural right combines with the concept of the social contract to form a joint solution to the problem of power. The concept of a natural right, however, is universal: natural rights are ascribed to humanity as a generic whole. It is also transcendent: the possession of a natural right does not depend upon particular circumstances or contingent states of affairs. Its source is universal nature, a transcendent totality that stands apart from and outside history. The same is true of Marxian concepts such as “species being” and “historical materialism.” To be human just is to have species being; to be part of this world just is to be determined by the dialectical force of history. This is not to play down the considerable differences between liberalism and socialism we have catalogued; the point is that both traditions developed in response to the same problem, the various solutions to which share a common philosophical foundation.

Above all, it is worth reminding ourselves that modernity begins with the concept of representation—the substitution of the one for the many, the general for the particular. Modern concepts of the subject are representational: the subject represents the world to itself as an object of knowledge in
consciousness; the individual represents the nature of human beings as such or else the nature of a social collectivity; the state represents the collective interests of individual citizens; the proletariat represents the cooperative consciousness that corresponds to the socialized nature of productive forces; and so on and so forth. In all cases, what is represented is a complex multiplicity of differences—of things and people, of goods and interests, of desires and experiences, and so forth. Representation operates, therefore, by subsuming these myriad differences under a totalized, homogeneous identity. Particular experiences of particular woody plants are subsumed under the concept of “tree.” Individual human beings are subsumed under the concept of “mankind.” The multifarious interests of individual citizens are subsumed under the concept of “the common will” or “the public good,” and so forth. To represent, in short, is to relegate difference to the same.

Representation is scarcely a “product” of modernity. If human beings are anything, we are creatures who represent and have always represented. What defines modernity, rather, are particular forms of representation marshaled in the service of particular ends. For example, when Locke represents human beings as naturally free, he automatically alters the representation of political power. If human beings are naturally free—which means among other things that political power belongs to all human beings equally—then the sovereign can no longer be represented as the embodiment of political power. The sovereign must be re-represented as one who has expropriated political power for himself at the expense of his subjects’ freedom, thereby giving rise to the problem of power. In order to solve this problem, the power of the sovereign must be reconciled with the freedom of the citizens, which for Locke is accomplished through the concept of the social contract. Through this concept, the sovereign’s power is vindicated, but only to the extent that its exercise represents the common good of the people.

Political modernity, I submit, is constituted by representational theories and practices that are underwritten by universal, transcendent concepts, conceived as solutions to political problems. Even the most cursory survey of Western history since the seventeenth century (and probably earlier) bears out this definition. It has expressed itself in most every election, revolution, war, and social movement up to and including the present moment. Consequently—and with apologies to Bruno Latour—we have never been postmodern in any real sense. Although I will say more about this later, I should note provisionally that the very idea of a “postmodern condition” as articulated by Zygmunt Bauman, Frederic Jameson, and Jean-François Lyotard is mostly chimerical. While there is no doubt that the world we inhabit has undergone radical and far-reaching changes over the past three centuries, it is nonetheless clear that we remain, in the deep and important sense articulated above, inexorably modern. The logic that governs contemporary life is founded on the very same axioms in response to the very same problems; if anything has changed, it is the solutions, and
even then the change is of degree rather than of kind. The world is smaller and faster and more complicated, to be sure, but this has not altered the nature of our representational practices nor the problems they seek to solve.

None of this is to say that political modernity has gone unchallenged. Indeed, those recent French philosophers known—usually to their chagrin—as “postmodernists” have distinguished themselves by systematically attacking its foundations and dismantling its presuppositions. They were not the first to do so, however, and this by their own admission. Well over a century ago Nietzsche and Kierkegaard both offered, each in his own way, the first salvos against certain aspects of modernity. Yet neither man was particularly engaged with distinctively political problems. (Nietzsche in particular disdained politics and reserved some of his most fiery vitriol for political theorists.) This has led some to believe that genuine postmodern political critique wasn’t initiated until the mid-twentieth century by the likes of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze.

As it turns out, this belief is completely mistaken. Nietzsche and Kierkegaard were not the only nineteenth-century thinkers to face off against modernity, nor were they even the first. That distinction belongs to a little-known and grossly underappreciated Frenchman named Pierre Joseph Proudhon who, unlike Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, was as deeply invested in political critique as he was in moral, cultural, and religious critique. Though he could scarcely imagine it during his lifetime, Proudhon unwittingly inaugurated an entire tradition of political theory and revolutionary praxis that survives to the present day—the tradition of anarchism. Like Proudhon, moreover, the men and women who populate the anarchist tradition were dedicated body and soul to an unrelenting critique of political modernity. Anarchism, as such, is rightly called the first postmodernism. Just like Foucault and Deleuze, the anarchists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries distinguished themselves by calling into question the entire conceptual framework of modernity—not just in its political dimensions, but in its philosophical, scientific, moral, cultural, and religious dimensions as well.

Why is it, then, that anarchism has tended to be so roundly overlooked in the history of political philosophy? There are many possible answers to this question, some of which I will take up below. For the time being, it suffices to note that anarchism has never been an intellectual movement so much as a social and political movement. For all its sagacity and prescience, most of the texts that have come down to us from key anarchist thinkers were written as political propaganda. Their goal was not to describe the world, but rather to change it—in other words, to present what could be rather than represent what is. This underscores an important point that I hope to defend in the next chapter: namely, that anarchism is not a movement against authority, or not just that, but rather a movement against representationalism. As we shall see, the anarchists did not make
hard and fast distinctions among various types of representation; instead, they tended to regard all representation—whether in science, religion, culture, or politics—as symptoms of a common disease. The problem of power, as understood by the liberals and socialists, was a false problem that only succeeded in generating further problems. For the anarchists, power outstrips its concrete manifestations, though it is immanent to them all. Power is life itself; it is movement, becoming, and the creative possibility of change. Far from seeking to abolish power, the anarchists sought to liberate power. Far from seeking freedom from oppression, they sought freedom to become, to go elsewhere, to do otherwise.
Anarchism

History of the bogeyman

American history has always had its bogeymen—shadowy villains who creep from out the closets and under the beds of unwary citizens, secretly plotting the overthrow of the Republic, ever ready to unleash revolutionary violence at a moment’s notice. Today, he is the turbaned terrorist of generic Arabian extraction; fifty years ago he was the stiletto-wielding communist spy cleverly disguised as your next-door neighbor. Perhaps the greatest bogeyman of all, however, was the black-clad, bomb-throwing anarchist of the American \textit{fin de siècle}—a murderous psychopath invariably portrayed as a Jewish-Italian half-breed with a hook nose and a waxed mustache.\(^1\) The anarchist embodied the Nativists’ worst fears: a nation overrun by aliens and polluted with their dangerous “foreign” dogmas, inscrutable folkways, and mysterious languages.\(^2\)

There were, of course, real bogeymen. Between 1870 and 1920, individuals identified as anarchists perpetrated countless acts of terror throughout Europe and North America.\(^3\) They also successfully assassinated numerous heads of state, including, but not limited to, Tsar Alexander II of Russia, President Sadi Carnot of France, Prime Minister Antonio Cánovas of Spain, King Umberto I of Italy, President William McKinley of the United States, Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin of Russia, Prime Minister José Canalejas of Spain, and King George I of Greece. Several other politicians, government officials, and captains of industry were targeted for assassination, often escaping within an inch of their lives. Most of these acts were carried out by solitary individuals, some of whom, like Leon Czolgosz, were mentally unstable or else did not belong to the anarchist movement in any real sense. Although many anarchists considered regicide a legitimate and useful form of “propaganda by deed,”\(^4\) several committed and well known members of the international movement unwaveringly condemned it and other individual acts of terror.\(^5\) Unfortunately this did not stop journalists and
politicians, both in the United States and abroad, from launching an iron-fisted crackdown on anarchist political activity. In the United States alone, the newspapers drove a massive antianarchist propaganda campaign that culminated in outright hysteria among an already xenophobic populace. Meanwhile Congress passed numerous antiradical bills (e.g., the Espionage and Sedition Acts of 1917 and 1918, respectively), which led to the arrest, imprisonment, and deportation of thousands of suspected anarchists and other radicals. In light of such systematic persecution is it any wonder that anarchism has been saddled with a reputation for violence, chaos, and disorder, or that anarchists themselves have been consistently branded as dangerous revolutionaries? Perhaps this also explains why anarchism, unlike Marxism, is largely overlooked in the academy, where it is more often than not relegated to footnotes, if it is discussed at all:

As any scholar of anarchism (other than the most hostile) can testify, inquiry into the subject is greeted by colleagues... with prejudicial incredulity, condescension, and even hostility—beyond the normal ignorance of the over-specialized. Intellectual curiosity and rigour, the principle of charity, and all manner of noble academic characteristics—aside from basic human respect—go out the window and sheer intolerance and not a little stupidity become standard.

How can a tradition that has attracted “some of the best minds of the twentieth century—from Bertrand Russell and George Orwell to Jean-Paul Sartre and Noam Chomsky”—be so deeply misunderstood and widely vilified, even (and especially) by scholars? Partly it is a symptom of the unfortunate tendency to judge ideas not by their merits, but by the misguided actions occasionally carried out in their name. But, in fairness to academics, it is also because anarchism does not lend itself easily to generalized and systematic analysis of the sort to which they are accustomed. After all, one cannot speak intelligibly of “Anarchism” (with a capital A) in the same way that one can speak of Marxism, Leninism, or Trotskyism—that is, as an ideology; a uniform, comprehensive, self-contained, and internally consistent system of ideas; a set of doctrines; or a body of theory. Anarchism thus described simply does not exist. As Rudolf Rocker puts it, “Anarchism recognizes only the relative significance of ideas, institutions, and social forms. It is... not a fixed, self-enclosed social system...” Anarchism does not imply acceptance of or rigorous adherence to any one overarching philosophical system; rather, it “leaves posterity free to develop its own particular systems in harmony with its needs.” It has no constitution, platform, manifesto, or mission statement, nor any canonical texts comparable to Capital or State and Revolution. It was neither founded nor created by anyone and so is named after no one. As Malatesta says—rather
polemically!—anarchism “follows ideas, not men, and rebels against the habit of embodying a principle in any one individual. It does not seek to create theories through abstract analysis but to express the aspirations and experiences of the oppressed.”

For these reasons, it is more appropriate to describe anarchism as a historically evolving set of attitudes and ideas that applies to a wide and diverse range of social, economic, and political theories, practices, movements, and traditions. As L. Susan Brown notes, “Anarchist political philosophy is by no means a unified movement . . . Within the anarchist ‘family’ there are mutualists, collectivists, communists, federalists, individualists, socialists, syndicalists, [and] feminists.” Different “anarchisms” may provide different definitions of anarchy, different justifications for pursuing anarchy, different strategies for achieving anarchy, and different models of social, economic, and political organization under anarchy. At the same time, all “anarchisms” are properly so called in virtue of endorsing certain distinctive ideas and practices. The question of course, is what such ideas and practices might be.

Defining anarchism

Unfortunately, most scholars have approached this question from thoroughly inaccurate assumptions and misguided points of emphasis. Consider, for example, the inordinate focus on what has been called “classical anarchism,” a term which, on the most charitable interpretation, refers to the international anarchist movement as it existed prior to the Russian Revolution, the First World War, and/or the Spanish Civil War. More commonly, “classical anarchism” is used as shorthand for an altogether mythical nineteenth-century system of thought developed singlehandedly by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin, and Peter Kropotkin—mythical because, as I just argued, no such system of thought exists or has ever existed. Furthermore, it is simply not the case that Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin shared anything resembling a homogeneous political or philosophical outlook, nor that these men, despite their enormous and far-reaching influence, were the only important thinkers in the pre-1917 anarchist movement. Much of the confusion surrounding anarchism has resulted precisely from these sorts of inaccuracies and, by extension, the preponderant attention paid to “classical anarchism” and the so-called classical anarchists. Because Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin were three of the most prolific and celebrated anarchist writers—not only of their own day, but of all time—and because there is considerable philosophical affinity among them, they will perforce figure heavily in any serious analysis of anarchism. Nevertheless, I must emphasize from the outset that they are not exhaustive of anarchist thinking and that my aim in drawing upon their work is merely to provide examples
of ideas and commitments that appear across a broad range of anarchistic perspectives.

There is an additional misconception about anarchism that should be immediately addressed, one which has been rehearsed repeatedly by the few Anglo-American philosophers who have bothered to discuss it. This is what I call the *reductio ad politicum*—that is, the tendency to define anarchism as such in terms of principled opposition to states, governments, or other sovereign political powers (and anarchy, by extension, in terms of the absence of any and all such entities). A.J. Simmons typifies the *reductio ad politicum* when he argues that “commitment to one central claim unites all forms of anarchist political philosophy: all existing states are illegitimate.”

From this it follows that the “minimal moral content” of anarchist political philosophy is just that the subjects of illegitimate states lack general political obligations. As I noted previously, many liberal philosophers define political legitimacy in this way—that is, in terms of subjects having political obligations of various sorts. Interestingly, several of these same philosophers deny that citizens have general political obligations, though few would agree that this is a sufficient condition for states to be illegitimate. Simmons and Wolff are among those who do believe that the absence of political obligations implies illegitimacy, though both agree that there may be other moral or nonmoral reasons to obey the laws of illegitimate states.

It is precisely such considerations that motivate Simmons to distinguish between what he calls “weak” (or “philosophical”) anarchism and “strong” (or “political”) anarchism. The former adduces nothing beyond the minimal moral content of anarchism, whereas the latter holds that “a state’s illegitimacy further entails a moral obligation or duty to oppose and . . . eliminate the state.” Simmons also distinguishes between “a priori anarchism,” which holds that all possible states are morally illegitimate, and “a posteriori anarchism,” which maintains that all existing states are illegitimate but denies that it is impossible for there to be a legitimate state. Richard Sylvan makes a very similar distinction between what he calls “principled anarchism” (corresponding to a priori anarchism) and “de facto anarchism” (corresponding to “a posteriori anarchism”). He further refers to “diluted anarchism,” which holds that certain necessary features of states (e.g., rules, separation of powers, etc.), and by extension certain kinds of states (e.g., direct democracies), can be compatible with anarchism. This suggests that, for Sylvan at least, “state” need not refer to a coercive institution, but can refer more generally to any system of organization designed to coordinate social and political life. If this is true, “diluted anarchism” is a largely vacuous distinction, since all anarchists endorse some form of social organization or other. Simmons, on the other hand, seems to think that “states” are coercive by definition. What matters to him, in all events, is not so much whether a state is coercive, but whether it is “legitimate” (that is, whether it has a right to rule, and whether its subjects have a corresponding moral obligation to
obey). This is why Simmons defines “anarchism” solely in terms of the claim that no existing states are legitimate.

I would suggest that this definition of anarchism qua anarchism, and all others like it, is extremely inaccurate. As has already been noted, the term “anarchy” is derived from the Greek word αναρχία (anarkhia), which can be translated roughly as [the state of being] “without a ruler.” Anarkhia, in turn, comes from αναρχός (anarkhos), which can be translated variously as “without chief, ruler, leader, or authority,” “without a top or head,” or “without a beginning or first cause.” Thus, anarchy does not principally mean “without a government” or “without a state,” but rather, “without authority.” As Paul McLaughlin rightly notes, the term “authority” refers to a particular kind of power, where “power,” in turn, is understood as an “effective capacity.” Power may involve the ability to bring something about (“power to”), or else the ability to compel, force, prevent, inhibit, or otherwise limit the actions of someone or something else (“power over”).

Expanding on our previous discussion of power in Chapter 3, we see that authority may refer in one sense merely to the de facto possession of “power over,” such that “Jones has authority over Smith” just means “Jones claims and effectively exercises power (of some sort) over Smith.” In another sense, however, authority may refer not just to possessing “power over,” but to being entitled to, or justified in, the exercise of said power (e.g., by having a right to command and to be obeyed). According to this de jure definition, “Jones has authority over Smith” means “Jones has a right, or is otherwise entitled, to compel Smith to φ, prevent her from φ’ing, or both,” where “right” or “entitlement” may be understood in various ways (e.g., as a legal right). Following the liberal correlativity thesis, moreover, Jones has a right to compel Smith to φ (etc.) if and only if Smith has a corresponding moral or political obligation to φ (i.e., obey Jones). For present purposes, let us postulate that “power over” is roughly synonymous with political authority in the first sense. It may be possible for X to freely consent to the authority of Y (i.e., for Y to exercise authority over X in accordance with, rather than contrary to, X’s will), in which case we must distinguish “noncoercive authority” from domination or coercive authority (that is, the power or right to compel the compliance of another against her will—for example, through the use or threat of force). If anarchy refers chiefly to the absence of authority in this latter sense, then all anarchist theories share in common “the universal condemnation of all forms of coercive authority . . . hierarchy and domination.”

Anarchists recognize that there are many types of authority relations, not all of which are coercive (thus, objectionable). As Richard Sylvan notes, “Consider, for example, the relation of a student to an authority in some field of knowledge who can in turn back up expert judgments by appeal to a further range of assessable evidence . . . [A]nyone with time and some skill can proceed past the authority to assess claims made.”
Such authority relations, which Sylvan calls “transparent” or “open,” stand in opposition to:

“[O]paque” (or “closed”) authorities, who simply stand on their position or station. . . [or] appeal to a conventional rule or procedure (“that is how things are done” or “have always been done”) without being able to step beyond some rule book . . . which has been enacted (for reasons not open to, or bearing, examination) by a further substantially opaque authority.”

Two features of opaque authorities are worth noting here. First, they are content-independent—that is, their directives are self-justifying, serving as a reason independently of the action or belief prescribed. Second, they are binding—namely, their subjects are obligated or duty-bound to obey them. Anarchists have typically objected to opaque authority relations because they lack precisely what authority in general claims to have, namely, adequate justification. In other words, opaque authority is arbitrary, which in turn implies that people have no reason to recognize its power over them. Bakunin summarizes the anarchist position well when he writes: “In the matter of boots, I refer to the authority of the bootmaker; concerning houses, canals, or railroads, I consult that of the architect or engineer . . . But I allow neither the bootmaker nor the architect . . . to impose his authority upon me.” In respecting open authorities for their “intelligence . . . character . . . [and] knowledge” anarchists do not thereby relinquish the “incontestable right of criticism or censure.” Nor do they privilege any particular kind of authority in their deliberations but consult among several, comparing various opinions and choosing whichever appears soundest. In so doing, Bakunin writes, they are deferring only to the authority of their own reason. This corroborates Paul McLaughlin’s view that anarchism may be understood as a kind of principled skepticism toward all authorities, even those of an open or transparent nature.

Submission to arbitrary authority is by itself objectionable because it “divest[s] the personality of its most integral traits; it denies the very notion that the individual is competent to deal . . . with the management of his or her personal life.” Put another way, arbitrary authority violates psychological and moral autonomy—the ability of the individual to think and act for herself in accordance with reason and conscience. Absent a theoretical or moral justification, opaque authority almost invariably backs up its power through coercion and violence, which anarchists oppose for the same reason they oppose opaque authority more generally: because it violates the “self-respect and independence” of the individual. As Bakunin says, authority that purports to be “privileged, licensed, official, and legal, even if it arises from universal suffrage . . .” will inevitably be enforced through violence “to the advantage of a dominant minority of exploiters.”
All political authority, he claims, “denotes violence, oppression, exploitation, and injustice raised into a system and made into the cornerstone of the existence of any society . . .” Compelling obedience to, or recognition of, authority through the use or threat of coercion (violent or otherwise) constitutes a fundamental denial of individual liberty, and for this reason alone deserves condemnation. In opposing “coercive authority,” therefore, anarchists are essentially opposing arbitrary authority coupled with the use or threat of coercive means to back up said authority. They are doing so, moreover, because coercive authority is by definition at odds with individual freedom.

The “universal condemnation” of closed, coercive authority would obviously apply to the second (de jure) sense of authority mentioned above. To say that Jones has a right to φ implies an obligation—namely, that no one ought to inhibit or otherwise interfere with Jones’s φ’ing. Thus, if Jones has a right to exercise closed, coercive authority, then no one ought to condemn him. But given the hypothetical characterization of anarchism just stated—namely, the universal condemnation of closed, coercive authority—it follows that no one can have a “right” to exercise such authority, since the existence of such a right would entail at least one form of closed, coercive authority, which ought not to be condemned. This explains why, for anarchists, no existing state is legitimate in the sense of having a right to rule and to be obeyed. For Simmons, recall, all anarchists believe the claim (call it C) that no existing state is legitimate; hence belief in C is a necessary condition for being an anarchist. But belief in C is not a sufficient condition since, for example, those who believe that only Nazi states are legitimate would also believe C (provided that there are no existing Nazi states). Simmons could just as easily say “commitment to one central claim unites all forms of Nazi political philosophy: all existing states are illegitimate” (i.e., because all existing states are non-Nazi).

However, suppose we modify Simmons’s definition such that anarchism is the belief (call it D) that all forms of coercive authority—not just states—are illegitimate insofar as people lack any general moral obligation to obey them. As in the previous definition, it is true that anarchists believe in the general descriptive claim being advanced (D), thus having such a belief is indeed a necessary condition for being an anarchist. But it is still not a sufficient condition, since the mere fact that people lack moral obligations to obey authorities does not by itself provide any reason to endorse or otherwise prefer anarchy (the state of being without such authorities). After all, there might be a host of nonmoral reasons why coercive authorities are good to have around and ought to be obeyed accordingly. Thus it is possible to believe D and not be an anarchist.

What matters, of course, is not that anarchists believe C and D, but why they do. As I intimated above, the definitive feature of all forms of anarchism is not the endorsement of descriptive claims like C and D, but rather of a
moral claim—namely, that all forms of closed, coercive authority are morally evil. Endorsement of this moral claim, moreover, is both a necessary and sufficient condition for being an anarchist in a way that the endorsement of C and D is not. If all states are closed and coercive by definition—and I submit that they are—then all anarchists are strong \textit{a priori} anarchists by definition. After all, if an anarchist recognizes that all existing states are illegitimate precisely because of her opposition to closed, coercive authority, then it is inconsistent for her to merely recognize the illegitimacy of states without also condemning them (contra “weak anarchism”). Likewise, if all existing states are illegitimate by virtue of being closed and coercive, then no state could possibly be legitimate (contra “\textit{a posteriori} anarchism”). All of this is by way of saying that the moral content of anarchism “is more than antistatism, even if government (the state) is, appropriately, the central focus of anarchist critique.”

Anarchism is better understood as (a) universal condemnation of and opposition to \textit{all forms of closed, coercive authority} (political, economical, social, etc.), coupled with (b) universal affirmation and promotion of freedom and equality in all spheres of human existence. Slight variations on and close approximations of these general themes abound in anarchist literature:

As man seeks justice in equality, so society seeks order in anarchy. (Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, 1840)\textsuperscript{45}

We do not fear anarchy, we invoke it. For we are convinced that anarchy, meaning the unrestricted manifestation of the liberated life of the people, must spring from liberty, equality, the new social order, and the force of the revolution itself the reaction. (Mikhail Bakunin, 1869)\textsuperscript{46}

The character of the revolution must at first be negative, destructive. Instead of modifying certain institutions of the past, or adapting them to a new order, it will do away with them altogether. Therefore, the government will be uprooted, along with the Church, the army, the courts, the schools, the banks, and all their subservient institutions. At the same time the Revolution has a positive goal, that the workers take possession of all capital and the tools of production. (James Guillaume, 1876)\textsuperscript{47}

Anarchy is the full and complete liberty of the individual who, freely and driven only by his needs, his tastes, and his sympathies, unites with other individuals in groups or in an association; the free development of associations which federate with other associations in the commune or in the neighborhood; the free development of the communes which federate together in the region—and thus would inevitably follow the regions in the nation; the nations in humanity. (Carlo Cafiero, 1880)\textsuperscript{48}

Anarchy is anti-government, anti-rulers, anti-dictators, anti-bosses. . . . Anarchy is the negation of force; the elimination of all authority in social affairs; it is the denial of the right of domination of one man over another.
It is the diffusion of rights, of power, of duties, equally and freely among all the people. (Albert Parsons, 1887)

All we anarchists want is equal freedom for all; the workers to provide for their own affairs by voluntary arrangements among themselves. (Louisa Sara Bevington)

Anarchy signifies the negation of authority . . . The Individual has a right to his entire liberty, to the satisfaction of all his needs; that is understood. Only, as there exist more than a billion individuals on the earth, with equal rights if not with equal needs, it follows that these rights must be satisfied without encroaching on one another . . . The Anarchists . . . says society should be based on the strictest solidarity. (Jean Grave, 1899)

We are anarchists, but does that not mean, perhaps, that we are enemies . . . of all oppression of man by man imposed by the authorities? (Luigi Fabbri, 1905)

Anarchism, contrary to authority, is the name given to a principle or theory of life and conduct under which society is conceived without government—harmony in such a society being obtained, not by submission to law, or by obedience to any authority, but by free agreements concluded between various groups, territorial and professional, freely constituted for the sake of production and consumption, as also for the satisfaction of the infinite variety of needs and aspirations of a civilized being. (Peter Kropotkin, 1905)

Anarchism . . . teaches the possibility of a society in which the needs of life may be fully supplied for all, and in which the opportunities for complete development of mind and body shall be the heritage of all . . . [It] teaches that the present unjust organisation of the production and distribution of wealth must finally be completely destroyed, and replaced by a system which will insure to each the liberty to work, without first seeking a master to whom he [or she] must surrender a tithe of his [or her] product, which will guarantee his liberty of access to the sources and means of production . . . Out of the blindly submissive, it makes the discontented; out of the unconsciously dissatisfied, it makes the consciously dissatisfied . . . Anarchism seeks to arouse the consciousness of oppression, the desire for a better society, and a sense of the necessity for unceasing warfare against capitalism and the State. (Voltairine de Cleyre, 1907)

As the word “anarchy” etymologically signifies the negation of governmental authority, the absence of government, it follows that one indissoluble bond unites the anarchists. This is antagonism to all situations regulated by imposition, constraint, violence, governmental oppression, whether these are a product of all, a group, or of one person. (Emile Armand, 1907)
Anarchism stands for a social order based on the free grouping of individuals for the purpose of producing real social wealth; an order that will guarantee to every human being free access to the earth and full enjoyment of the necessities of life, according to individual desires, tastes, and inclinations. (Emma Goldman, 1910)

... Anarchy is a form of social life in which men live as brothers, where nobody is in a position to oppress or exploit anyone else, and in which all the means to achieve maximum moral and material development are available to everyone; and Anarchism is the method by which to achieve anarchy through freedom and without government, that is without authoritarian organisms which, by using force, even, possibly for good ends, impose their will on others. (Errico Malatesta, 1925)

In the fewest words, anarchism teaches that we can live in a society where there is no compulsion of any kind. A life without compulsion naturally means liberty; it means freedom from being forced or coerced, a chance to lead the life that suits you best. (Alexander Berkman, 1928)

Anarchism may be briefly defined as the negation of all government and all authority of man over man; Communism as the recognition of the just claim of each to the fullest satisfaction of all his needs, physical, moral and intellectual. (Hippolyte Havel, 1932)

Anarchism may be understood as the generic social and political idea that expresses negation of all power, sovereignty, domination, and hierarchical division, and a will to their dissolution. (David Weick, 1979)

Anarchism is a movement for human freedom... Philosophically, it aims for the maximum accord between the individual, society and nature. Practically, it aims for us to organise and live our lives in such a way as to make politicians, governments, states and their officials superfluous. In an anarchist society, mutually respectful sovereign individuals would be organised in non-coercive relationships within naturally defined communities in which the means of production and distribution are held in common. (Stuart Christie, 2004)

The anarchist critique of closed, coercive authority has historically extended well beyond states and governments to include centralized, hierarchical, and exploitative economic systems (e.g., capitalism, state socialism, feudalism, slavery, etc.), religious ideologies, and sexual relations, *inter alia*:

The economic idea of capitalism, the politics of government or of authority, and the theological idea of the Church are three distinct ideas, linked in various ways, yet to attack one of them is equivalent to attacking all of them. (Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, 1840)

Political power and wealth are inseparable. Those who have power have the means to gain wealth and must center all their efforts upon acquiring
it, for without it they will not be able to retain power. Those who are wealthy must become strong, for, lacking power, they run the risk of being deprived of their wealth. (Mikhail Bakunin, 1870)  

Anarchy and communism are two terms which . . . ought to form a single term, since they jointly express a unitary concept . . . It is impossible to be an anarchist without being a communist. (Carlo Cafiero, 1880)  

. . . [Anarchists] deem it necessary to abolish slavery, wage labor—this remnant of medieval serfdom—and the exorbitant privilege of a few that have, to a greater or lesser extent, all the assets (land, machinery, homes, factories, tools, labor, etc.) and therefore the means of producing the necessities of life. (Luigi Fabbri, 1905)  

It is not only against the abstract trinity of law, religion, and authority that we declare war. By becoming anarchists we declare war against all this wave of deceit, cunning, exploitation, vice—in a word, inequality—which they have poured into our hearts. (Peter Kropotkin, 1909)  

Anarchism, then, really stands for the liberation of the human mind from the domination of religion; the liberation of the human body from the dominion of property; liberation from the shackles and restraint of government. (Emma Goldman, 1910)  

Anarchism . . . attacks not only capital, but also the main sources of power of capitalism: law, authority, and the State. (Peter Kropotkin, 1913)  

Anarchism is the abolition of exploitation and oppression of man by man, that is, the abolition of private property and government; Anarchism is the destruction of misery, of superstitions, of hatred. Therefore, every blow given to the institutions of private property and to the government, every exaltation of the conscience of man, every disruption of the present conditions, every lie unmasked, every part of human activity taken away from the control of the authorities, every augmentation of the spirit of solidarity and initiative, is a step towards Anarchism. (Errico Malatesta, 1932)  

Anarchism has in common with Liberalism the idea that the happiness and prosperity of the individual must be the standard of all social matters. And, in common with the great representatives of Liberal thought, it has also the idea of limiting the functions of government to a minimum. Its supporters have followed this thought to its ultimate logical consequences, and wish to eliminate every institution of political power from the life of society . . . In common with the founders of socialism, Anarchists demand the abolition of all economic monopolies and the common ownership of the soil and all other means of production, the use of which must be available for all without distinction; for personal and social freedom is conceivable only on the basis of equal economic advantages for everybody. (Rudolf Rocker, 1938)
We will say more about this below. For the time being, it is enough to note that all forms of anarchism are united by this all-encompassing critique of authority—a critique which is ultimately founded on a common moral position.

At the deepest and most fundamental level anarchism is an ethical doctrine; everything it affirms or denies, champions or condemns, must ultimately be understood in moral terms. Although I shall argue later that the anarchism of the nineteenth and early twentieth century bears certain important affinities with Nietzsche, it does not follow him in rejecting moral discourse *tout court*. This is one reason among many why Marx and his followers found fault with anarchism. As proponents of scientific materialism over and against Hegelian idealism, they strove to portray their projects as rational, objective, and descriptive, constructing a discourse based on actuality and necessity. Anarchists, in contrast, emphasized the possible, which in turn pushed anarchist discourse in a decidedly ethical and even aesthetic direction. As “Philo” (probably Max Baginski) explains at length in Berkman’s *Prison Memoirs of an Anarchist*:

> The disharmony of life is more seeming than real; and what is real of it, is the folly and blindness of man. To struggle against that folly, is to create greater harmony, wider possibilities. Artificial barriers circumscribe and dwarf life, and stifle its manifestations. To break those barriers down, is to find a vent, to expand, to express oneself. And that is life, Aleck: a continuous struggle for expression. It mirrors itself in nature, as in all the phases of man’s existence . . . To suppress or thwart it, means decay, death. And in this, Aleck, is to be found the main source of suffering and misery. The hunger of life storms at the gates that exclude it from the joy of being, and the individual soul multiplies its expressions by being mirrored in the collective, as the little vine mirrors itself in its many flowers, or as the acorn individualizes itself a thousandfold in the many-leaved oak . . . Well, Aleck, as with nature, so with man.71

David Graeber provides a helpful summary when he notes that “Marxism has tended to be a theoretical or analytical discourse about revolutionary strategy [whereas] anarchism has tended to be an ethical discourse about revolutionary practice.”72 That ethical discourse, however, is noticeably different from the liberal and socialist modes of normativity discussed in previous chapters.

### The political axiology of anarchism

I noted earlier that the term “anarchy” means, roughly, “without chief, ruler, leader, or authority.” I further noted that the ethical core of anarchism is the claim that all forms of closed, coercive authority are immoral. Notice that the
form of this claim is evaluative rather than normative; it is not a prescription or a recommendation but rather a value judgment, one that asserts that coercive authority is morally condemnable. When one consults the writings of the anarchists, moreover, one finds this condemnation repeated so often that it takes on the appearance of a mantra. This strongly suggests that anarchism is founded first and foremost on a conception of the good—an axiology—rather than on a conception of the right.

But in what does this conception of the good consist? The universal condemnation of coercive authority is a negative judgment—it specifies what is “bad” but does not directly indicate what is to be regarded as “good” or “praiseworthy.” The answer to this question depends entirely on what “good” stands in opposition to the “evil” of closed, coercive authority. It also depends, quite crucially, on what is meant by closed, coercive authority. As far as the latter issue is concerned, we have seen that the state, private property, and organized religion are regarded as especially harmful and malevolent forms of authority, but they are by no means the only forms. For purposes of addressing the former issue, it is worth recalling why anarchists reject such institutions, and it is not just because they are at odds with the values of freedom and equality.

While there is no doubt that anarchists value individual freedom—as is made clear, for example, in many of the definitions of anarchism provided earlier—the same is true of liberals and socialists. In fact, several of the most radical early liberals understood closed, coercive authority in the same terms, and opposed it for the same reasons, that we have just outlined. Of particular relevance here is the English political philosopher William Godwin, who argues in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Political Justice (1793) that individual freedom is logically incompatible with government. Indeed, Godwin valued individual freedom to such an extent that he openly advocated the abolition of the state. (It is not surprising, for this reason, that Godwin is often regarded as an important forerunner of modern anarchism.) Also worth mentioning is the radical individualist Max Stirner, whose 1844 magnum opus The Ego and Its Own argues for the total emancipation of the individual from all systems, institutions, and ideologies.

We must recall, however, that the “individual freedom” that Godwin and Stirner hold in such high esteem is negative freedom—that is, noninterference, “freedom from,” or what Bakunin colorfully describes as “the revolt of the individual against all divine, collective, and individual authority.” To be sure, negative freedom is also valued by anarchists, and the liberal and individualistic conception of negative freedom in particular was extremely influential in the development of early anarchism, especially in postrevolutionary France. But as Bakunin points out, individualism considers all members of society, the mass of individuals, to be mutually unconcerned rivals and competitors, natural enemies with whom each individual is forced to live but who block each other’s way . . . [and] . . .
impels the individual to gain and erect his own well-being, prosperity, and good fortune to the disadvantage of everyone else, despite them and on their backs.\textsuperscript{74}

An ideology which myopically and one-sidedly emphasizes “individual freedom” will, he thinks, inevitably promote the worst kind of criminal behavior and is itself a “continuous crime against human solidarity, which is the only basis of all morality.”\textsuperscript{75} Perhaps it should come as no surprise, then, that Proudhon, the first thinker to refer to his own political theory as “anarchism,” devotes most of his attention to the abolition of private property and the collective ownership of the means of production rather than the elimination of governments. When he does talk about eliminating governments, moreover, he does so only to motivate his positive proposal—namely, the establishment of a federal system of voluntary associations. This is because Proudhon is a socialist, not a liberal, and like all early socialists his primary ethical and political concern is not individual freedom so much as \textit{justice}, which he defines as “the recognition of the equality between another’s personality and our own.”\textsuperscript{76}

As I noted earlier, justice for the socialists is a function of equality, which is surely the \textit{summum bonum} of socialism if anything is. Like other socialists, Proudhon understands equality to be a basic and constitutive feature of human association:

\textit{Equity} makes it at once our duty and our pleasure to aid the weak who have need of us, and to make them our equals; to pay to the strong a just tribute of gratitude and honor, without enslaving ourselves to them; to cherish our neighbors, friends, and equals, for that which we receive from them, even by right of exchange. \textit{Equity} is sociability raised to its ideal by reason and justice; its commonest manifestation is \textit{urbanity} or
politeness, which, among certain nations, sums up in a single word nearly all the social duties.\(^7\)

According to Proudhon, although human beings have a natural tendency toward “sociability,” it is our capacity for reason that allows us to realize justice by recognizing our equality with others, and it is our sense of justice which impels us to realize equality through social proportionality.

Far from being at odds with liberty, Proudhon insists that equality and liberty are equivalent, “because liberty only exists in society, and in the absence of equality there is no society.” Furthermore, he writes, “Liberty is anarchy, because it does not admit the government of the will, but only the authority of the law; that is, of necessity . . . [and] . . . Liberty is infinite variety, because it respects all wills within the limits of the law.” In short, equality is not an obstacle to individual freedom but its condition of possibility—a point which Bakunin echoes repeatedly in his writings:

I am a fanatic lover of liberty, considering it as the unique condition under which intelligence, dignity and human happiness can develop and grow; not the purely formal liberty conceded, measured out and regulated by the State, an eternal lie which in reality represents nothing more than the privilege of some founded on the slavery of the rest; not the individualistic, egoistic, shabby, and fictitious liberty extolled by the School of J.-J. Rousseau and other schools of bourgeois liberalism, which considers the would-be rights of all men, represented by the State which limits the rights of each—an idea that leads inevitably to the reduction of the rights of each to zero. No, I mean the only kind of liberty that is worthy of the name, liberty that consists in the full development of all the material, intellectual and moral powers that are latent in each person; liberty that recognizes no restrictions other than those determined by the laws of our own individual nature, which cannot properly be regarded as restrictions since these laws are not imposed by any outside legislator beside or above us, but are immanent and inherent, forming the very basis of our material, intellectual and moral being—they do not limit us but are the real and immediate conditions of our freedom.\(^7\)

The right to freedom, without the means to achieving it, is only a ghost. And do we not love freedom too much to be satisfied with its ghost? We want its reality. But what constitutes the real basis and the positive condition of freedom? It is, for each individual, the all-round development and full enjoyment of all physical, intellectual, and moral faculties; consequently, it is all the material means necessary for each individual’s existence . . . The freedom of individuals is by no means an individual matter. It is a collective matter, a collective product. No individual can be free outside of human society or without its cooperation . . . But this freedom is possibly only through equality. If
there be a human being freer than I, then I inevitably become his slave. If I be freer than he, then he will be mine. Therefore, equality is an absolutely necessary condition for freedom.  

To be free . . . means to be acknowledged and treated as such by all his fellowmen. The liberty of every individual is only the reflection of his own humanity, or his human right through the conscience of all free men, his brothers and his equals. I can feel free only in the presence of and in relationship with other men. In the presence of an inferior species of animal I am neither free nor a man, because this animal is incapable of conceiving and consequently recognizing my humanity. I am not myself free or human until or unless I recognize the freedom and humanity of all my fellowmen. Only in respecting their human character do I respect my own . . . I am truly free only when all human beings, men and women, are equally free. The freedom of other men, far from negating or limiting my freedom, is, on the contrary, its necessary premise and confirmation.  

Furthermore, the equality of which Proudhon and Bakunin speak is political, social, and economic “equality of opportunity” rather than “equality of outcome.” As Alexander Berkman writes, it does not promote conformity and homogenization but broadens and expands possibilities for individual activity and expression:

Do not make the mistake of identifying equality in liberty with the forced quality of the convict camp. True anarchist equality implies freedom, not quantity. It does not mean that everyone must eat, drink, or wear the same things, do the same work, or live in the same manner. Far from it: the very reverse in fact . . . Individual needs and tastes differ, as appetites differ. It is equal opportunity to satisfy them that constitutes true equality. Far from leveling, such equality opens the door for the greatest possible variety of activity and development. For human character is diverse . . . Free opportunity of expressing and acting out your individuality means development of natural dissimilarities and variations.  

If “anarchy” refers not only to the absence of coercive authority, but to the absence of a “chief,” “head,” or “top”—in other words, to the absence of concentrated power exercised “from the top down”—anarchist equality entails the equal distribution of power, which in turn implies the categorical rejection of centralization and hierarchy. Such equality is necessary, moreover, in order to maximize individual freedom—not just “freedom from” (negative liberty), but “freedom to” (positive liberty). Positive liberty, as Emma Goldman explains, is necessary for a human being “to grow to his full stature . . . [to] learn to think and move, to give the
very best of himself . . . [to] realize the true force of the social bonds that tie men together, and which are the true foundations of a normal social life.”

Elsewhere she writes:

True liberty . . . is not a negative thing of being free from something, because with such freedom you may starve to death. Real freedom, true liberty, is positive: it is freedom to something; it is the liberty to be, to do; in short the liberty of actual and active opportunity.

This quote underscores two indispensable features of the anarchist conception of freedom: first, that freedom involves the capacity of the individual to create himself or herself, to resist what Foucault calls “subjectivation” by cultivating new identities and forms of subjectivity; and second, that freedom is a capacity that emerges in, and is made possible by, social existence. The second feature belies a crucial difference between anarchism and liberalism. In a state of negative freedom, the rational, egoistic, atomic agent of liberalism recognizes her interests (understood not just as personal desires but as various ends determined by universal human nature) and takes means to achieve them. For the anarchists, however, the development of an individual human personality is a social process in which both community and the individual play a necessary and irreplaceable role. Human subjectivity is produced in part by social forces, which can be either positive or negative, as well as by the individual force of self-creation (i.e., “positive freedom”). The realization of individuality and individual freedom, Bakunin stresses, is only possible “in society and only by the collective action of the whole society.”

He continues:

[A human being] frees himself from the yoke of external nature only by collective and social labor, which alone can transform the earth into an abode favorable to the development of humanity. Without such material emancipation the intellectual and moral emancipation of the individual is impossible. He can emancipate himself from the yoke of his own nature, that is subordinate his instincts and the movements of his body to the conscious direction of his mind, the development of which is fostered only by education and training. But education and training are preeminently and exclusively social . . . hence the isolated individual cannot possibly become conscious of his freedom.

In sum, freedom and equality are, for the anarchists, symbiotic concepts: individual freedom is positively constituted by and through social relations, which are in turn positively constituted by and through individual freedom.

The first feature of the anarchist conception of freedom is merely a reiteration of a point made earlier—namely, that freedom is a practice
of self-creation, “the freest possible expression of all the latent powers of individual . . . [the] display of human energy.” At the same time, the “desire to create and act freely [and] the craving for liberty and self-expression” are not innate characteristics but rather capacities that can be variously liberated or repressed. Freedom therefore has both a negative and a positive dimension. On the one hand, it must be understood as a precondition for self-creation, the “open defiance of, and resistance to, all laws and restrictions, economic, social, and moral” that impede the cultivation and expression of individuality. On the other hand, freedom is coextensive with the process of self-creation itself, understood not only as the cultivation of individual subjectivity but also of social subjectivity or consciousness manifested concretely in healthy social environments. It is precisely this emphasis on freedom that distinguishes anarchism from other socialist theories, especially those that developed in the nineteenth century. For Engels and Lenin, no less than for Blanqui and Saint-Simon, the freedom of the individual is subordinate to the end of economic and social equality. This is why Bakunin and other anarchists were often referred to as “libertarian socialists.” The anarchists also insist repeatedly that freedom and equality are not legal or metaphysical constructions but real and active powers. Thus Malatesta writes, “Freedom is not an abstract right but the possibility of acting: this is true among ourselves as well as in society as a whole. And it is by cooperation with his fellows that man finds the means to express his activity and his power of initiative.”

Strictly speaking, then, freedom and equality are not independent concepts for the anarchists. At the same time, it would be a profound mistake to suggest that anarchism simply fuses the liberal concept of freedom with the socialist concept of equality in a kind of dialectical synthesis. Indeed, although some thinkers—including some anarchists, such as Rocker—have argued that anarchism represents a “synthesis” of liberalism and socialism, I am strongly opposed to any and all such ideas. Synthesis presupposes an initial opposition between its two terms, and, as we have just shown, anarchists rigorously deny that freedom is the antithesis of equality (or vice versa). On the contrary, freedom and equality are symbiotic, reciprocal, and interdependent. “Anarchy” is nothing more than the harmonious relationship between maximum freedom and maximum equality.

I would suggest, further, that this “anarchy” is simply an expression of—a way of speaking about—life itself. By life, moreover, I do not mean biological life but rather the immanent processes of change, development, and becoming in terms of which anarchists like Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin (inter alia) describe human existence itself. In On Justice, Proudhon draws a sharp distinction between the “system of transcendence, more commonly known as Revelation . . .” and the system of immanence, “the triumph of which the Revolution was intended to ensure.” The former posits that justice has a “supernatural and superhuman” source and
an “origin superior to man, on whom it acts by an influence from above, free and mysterious.” According to the latter,

Man, though fully a part of the natural world, constantly produces society through the spontaneous development of his nature. It is only by abstraction that he can be considered in isolation and not subject to law other than selfishness. His conscience is not double, as taught by the transcendentalists: there is not one animal part and another from God; he is not polarized. As an integral part of a collective existence, man feels his dignity at the same time in himself and in others, and thus carries in his heart a moral principle higher than the individual. And this principle he does not receive from elsewhere; it is intimate, immanent. It constitutes its essence, the essence of society itself. This is the proper form of the human soul, a form which strives only to strengthen and improve itself more and more by the relationship that is born every day from social life.\textsuperscript{94}

Anarchy, like all human ideals and aspirations, originates in and is immanent to human life. It is not founded on mystical or supernatural revelation nor, as Malatesta insists, “on any real or imagined natural necessity, but . . . through the exercise of the human will.”\textsuperscript{95} At the same time, human life does reflect the dynamic, interdependent, anarchic reality that Proudhon and others ascribe to reality as a whole. In both its potential to change and its actual transformations, in both its singularity and universality, human life, no less than existence, is a “unity in multiplicity.” Individual and social, social and the ecological, ecological and global, global and cosmic—these are just so many levels of analysis, which, if they can be said to differ at all, only differ in terms of scope. For the anarchists, “\textit{Il ya seulement la vie, et la vie suffit}” (“there is only life, and it is enough”).

Proudhon says that equality is liberty and that liberty is anarchy. To this we can add that anarchy is life, and it is life to which anarchist ethics ascribes the highest value. Domination and hierarchy, in turn, are condemnable inasmuch as they are opposed to life. Perhaps at the level of theoretical ethics it would be enough to describe this opposition in terms of limitation: domination and hierarchy inhibit, impede, obstruct, and ultimately destroy life, and that is why domination and hierarchy are immoral. For our purposes, however, a higher degree of specificity is necessary: we must indicate not only that domination and hierarchy oppose life, but also how they do. Todd May has argued, quite rightly in my view, that the principal mode of political domination is representation,\textsuperscript{96} which I have already described above as the generic process of subsuming the particular under the general. In the political realm, representation involves divesting individuals and groups of their life, their vitality—their power to create, transform, and change themselves. To be sure, domination often involves the literal destruction of vitality
through violence and other forms of physical coercion. As a social-physical phenomenon, however, domination is not reducible to aggression of this sort. On the contrary, it is an operation characterized chiefly by “speaking for others” or “representing others to themselves”—that is, by manufacturing images of, or constructing identities for, individuals and groups. These modes of subjectivation, as Foucault calls them, are in some instances foisted upon individuals or groups through direct or indirect processes of coercion. In other instances, modes of subjectivation are enforced and reinforced more subtly—for example, by becoming “normalized” within and across a community. The result is that individuals and groups come to identify with the normalized mode of representation, to conform to it, and so to regulate themselves in accordance with it absent any direct coercion. Along these same lines, the anarchists were the first to acknowledge that representation is not a purely macropolitical phenomenon. Representation can and does occur at the micropolitical level—that is, at the level of everyday life—and needs to be avoided and resisted accordingly.

Deleuze claimed at one point that Foucault was the first to teach us of “the indignity of speaking for others.” Had Deleuze read Proudhon, Bakunin, or Goldman, he may have come to a very different conclusion. For indeed, if anyone deserves credit for this “discovery” it is the so-called classical anarchists. It was they, after all, who originally ascribed the highest moral value (and not merely dignity) to the ability of human beings and communities to “speak for themselves,” to act creatively upon themselves, to open up and pursue new possibilities for themselves—in short, to live.

So, too, it was the anarchists who realized that the essence of political oppression is wresting this ability from others, and, more importantly that this “wresting” involves “giving people images [representations] of who they are and what they desire.” It matters little whether that representation is legislated through an electoral process or imposed by a revolutionary vanguard, for the effect is the same. “The live-giving order of freedom,” Bakunin writes, “must be made solely from the bottom upwards . . . Only individuals, united through mutual aid and voluntary association, are entitled to decide who they are, what they shall be, how they shall live.” When that power is taken over by or ceded to hierarchical, coercive institutions of any sort, the result is oppression, domination, unfreedom—in a word, death.

In a 2007 article I argued that anarchists are properly so called in virtue of endorsing a moral principle, the principle of antiauthoritarianism, according to which “all forms of coercive authority ought to be opposed.” Upon further reflection, however, I came to believe that this claim is mistaken. Although I have established that anarchism is defined in part by a theory of value, this theory of value does not directly entail or endorse a principle of antiauthoritarianism, nor any other explicitly normative principle. On the contrary, it is clear that “the critique of representation in the anarchist
tradition runs deeper than just political representation,” extending into a far wider range of discourses, including morality. Kropotkin, for example, argues that the value of individual and communal vitality precludes “a right which moralists have always taken upon themselves to claim, that of mutilating the individual in the name of some ideal.” In practice, if not also in theory, the prescription of universal normative principles and moral mandates is just one more form of representation. As Malatesta writes:

How often must we repeat that we do not wish to impose anything on anybody . . . We do not boast that we possess absolute truth; on the contrary, we believe that social truth is not a fixed quantity, good for all times, universally applicable, or determinable in advance, but that instead, once freedom has been secured, mankind will go forward discovering and acting gradually with the least number of upheavals and with a minimum of friction. Thus our solutions always leave the door open to different and, one hopes, better solutions.

Malatesta does not want “to harden [his] anarchism into dogma, nor impose it by force.” Like Kropotkin, he rejects “‘the will of God,’ ‘natural laws,’ ‘moral laws,’ the ‘categoric imperative’ of the Kantians, even the ‘interest clearly understood’ of the Utilitarians” because they are “metaphysical fantasies” whose authority and motivating force depends entirely on abstractions, including totalized conceptions of a universal human nature or essence and representations of “the human being” as such. This is, again, the very substance of oppression.

In the place of normativity, the anarchists offer two alternatives: first, a sophisticated anthropological, sociological, and evolutionary analysis of the origins and functions of moral systems; and second, a pragmatic and procedural theory of action referred to as “prefiguration.” The first alternative, the finest examples of which are provided by Malatesta, Goldman, and Kropotkin, explores the extent to which particular systems of morality, ranging from Kantianism to utilitarianism, have functioned in practice as mechanisms of domination and control. Malatesta, for example, writes:

The existence of sentiments of affection and sympathy among mankind, and the experience of the individual and social advantages which stem from the development of these sentiments, have produced and go on producing concepts of “justice” and “right” and “Morality” which, in spite of a thousand contradictions, constitute a goal, an ideal toward which humanity advances . . . This “morality” is fickle and relative; it varies with the time, with different people, classes and individuals; people use it to serve their own personal interests and that of their families, class or country.
In a similar fashion, Goldman argues that the morality of puritanism “rests on an immoveable conception of life” and “repudiates, as something vile and sinful, our deepest feelings.” As a result, it has given rise to some of the worst crimes in human history, including the church’s systematic persecution of non-Christians and its oppression of women. Kropotkin, lastly, notes that

The priest accustoms the child to the idea of law, to make it obey better what he calls the “divine law,” and the lawyer prates of divine law; that the civil law may be the better obeyed. And by the habit of submission, with which we are only too familiar, the thought of the next generation retains this religious twist, which is at once servile and authoritative . . . During these slumberous interludes, morals are rarely discussed . . . People do not criticize, they let themselves be drawn by habit, or indifference. They do not put themselves out for or against the established morality . . . Little by little, youth frees itself. It flings overboard its prejudices, and it begins to criticize . . . And each time the question of morality comes up again. “Why should I follow the principles of this hypocritical morality?” asks the brain, released from religious terrors. “Why should any morality be obligatory?” Then people try to account for the moral sentiment that they meet at every turn without having explained it to themselves. And they will never explain it so long as they believe it a privilege of human nature.

Malatesta, Goldman, and Kropotkin are not interested in the question of whether, how, and to what extent particular practices can be morally justified; rather, they are interested in the question of how systems of morality—particularly those systems that allegedly provide normative grounds for the condemnation of oppressive practices—come to be oppressive practices in their own right. In this sense they are very much of a piece with Nietzsche.

The second alternative refers to a practical principle observed more or less uniformly by anarchists over the past two centuries. Simply stated, the “prefигurative principle” demands coherence between means and ends. That is, if the goal of political action is the promotion of some value and, by extension, opposition to whatever is at odds with that value, the means and methods employed in acting must reflect or prefigure the desired end. As it happens this was a major point of contention within the First International. Whereas Marx and his faction favored using hierarchical, coercive methods in pursuit of ostensibly egalitarian and libertarians ends, “Bakuninists” such as James Guillaume claimed it was “impossible” for “an equalitarian and free society to issue from authoritarian organization [.].” Bakunin himself makes this same point repeatedly in his anti-Marxian polemical writings. In *Marxism, Freedom and the State*, for example, he notes that
The Communists believe they must organize the workers’ forces to take possession of the political power of the State. The Revolutionary Socialists [anarchists] organize with a view to the destruction, or if you prefer a politer word, the liquidation of the State. The Communists are the upholders of the principle and practice of authority; the Revolutionary Socialists have confidence only in liberty. Both equally supporters of that science which must kill superstition and replace faith, the former would wish to impose it; the latter will exert themselves to propagate it so that groups of human beings, convinced, will organize themselves and will federate spontaneously, freely, from below upwards, by their own movement and conformably to their own interests, but never after a plan traced in advance and imposed on the “ignorant masses” by some superior intellects.\(^\text{117}\)

One can also point to the debate between Kropotkin, who disavowed the individual use of violent “propaganda by deed,” and the Russian revolutionary Sergei Nechayev, who advocated the use of terrorist tactics.\(^\text{118}\) As Paul Avrich notes, whereas Kropotkin insisted that means and ends are “inseparable,” which in turn implied that anarchists should not use the violent methods of the state in pursuit of the abolition of the state, Nechayev believed firmly that the end alone justifies the means.\(^\text{119}\)

As we shall see below, anarchists hold that power relations as such can never be wholly abolished. This implies, among other things, that anarchy is an ongoing process or pursuit rather than a uniform end to be achieved once and for all:

Freedom is never attained; it must always be striven for. Consequently its claims have no limit and can neither be enclosed in a program nor prescribed as a definite rule for the future. Each generation must face its own problems, which cannot be forestalled or provided for in advance. The worst tyranny is that of ideas which have been handed down to us, allowing no development in ourselves, and trying to steamroll everything to one flat universal level.\(^\text{120}\)

In order to avoid reproducing oppressive power relations, the means and methods employed in pursuit of freedom and equality ought to be consistent with their intended aims; the tactics used in pursuit of the value of freedom and equality should themselves embody or reflect that value. This principle is not a normative prescription but a pragmatic recommendation (or, to use Kant’s terminology, a “hypothetical imperative”). The point of prefiguration is not to establish a foundation for normative judgment. The word “ought” does not specify what is morally “right” or “wrong,” but rather what is practical, prudent, and consistent. To this extent, the prefigurative principle
provides a general procedure for action that does not rely upon transcendent moral concepts or totalized representations of human nature.

Some critics have suggested that the reluctance of “classical” anarchists to frame their critique in normative terms belies a lack of philosophical sophistication and rigor. When one consults the historical record, however, one sees that this reluctance is not the result of an oversight but of a deliberate rejection of normative concepts coupled with a principled pragmatism. This does not strike me as the least bit surprising; after all, it seems obvious that a philosophy predicated in large part on the rejection of laws and norms in the political realm would be skeptical toward analogous concepts in the moral realm. The same is true of the anarchists’ pragmatism—that is, their tendency to judge concepts on the basis of their usefulness. Proudhon, as we have already seen, insists that the putatively “transcendent concepts . . . that we place like divinities at the summit of our intelligence are mere products of the analysis of our own intuition, of the hypotheses and postulates of our experience.”  

In the interest of fairness, we should make it clear that not all anarchists rejected normativity in the manner just described. For example, the Americans Benjamin Tucker, Josiah Warren, Lysander Spooner, and a few other self-described “individualist anarchists” followed William Godwin in endorsing a broadly deontological conception of rights, liberties, and obligations which further entailed that centralized government is incompatible with human freedom. Like Godwin, moreover, the individualists did not advocate public ownership of the means of production or any other characteristically socialist positions. Thus, although they have often been referred to, or referred to themselves, as “individualist anarchists,” their political philosophy is better understood as an extremely radical form of classical liberalism. To this extent, they have always occupied a marginal space within the broader anarchist tradition, which has tended to be predominantly socialist and anticapitalist in orientation.

It is clear, in any case, that the so-called classical anarchists reject normativity and to this extent anarchist morality is not describable in either deontojuridical or teleological terms. At the same time, it is also clear that anarchist philosophy—as reflected both in its meta-ethical investigations and its emphasis on prefiguration—is deeply historical in orientation. Like Marxists, anarchists have always appreciated the extent to which theory and practice are historically embedded and conditioned, though they categorically reject any concept of historical determinism. Kropotkin, for example, argues that systems of morality both constitute and are constituted by determinate historical contexts. Kropotkin’s argument, in turn, underwrites the concept
of prefiguration, which recognizes that political tactics must be constantly
revised in light of changes in historical circumstances. The only categorical
limitation on tactics adopted—a limitation that is practical rather than
normative—is that they must be consistent with their intended ends.
Anarchism’s rejection of both normativity as well as historical materialism,
which together constitute an important part of political modernity, is further
evidence that it represents something altogether different, something that
stands apart from, or outside, political modernity.

In concluding this section, I should like to add a brief postscript, one
that should be regarded, at least for the time being, as a hypothesis rather
than a substantive argument. Students of contemporary moral philosophy
know that there is a tertium via that allegedly provides an alternative to
both deontology and consequentialism on the other. That alternative,
of course, is the “virtue ethics” advocated by the likes of Michael Slote,
Rosalind Hurthouse, Alasdair MacIntyre, and others. The foundational
idea of virtue ethics is that moral judgment should be grounded in moral
psychology (specifically, in an analysis of character) as opposed to abstract
normative principles. Here I want only to call attention to a few aspects
of the virtue theory articulated by MacIntyre in his seminal works After
Virtue and Whose Justice? Which Rationality? According to MacIntyre,
“virtues” constituted and are constituted by “internal goods” embodied
within intersecting social practices. These social practices, in turn, emerge
within and belong to their own specific contexts. Interestingly, MacIntyre
thinks that the relationship between the virtues and the “internal goods” to
which they are directed is reciprocal and immanent. Simply put, all particular
goods are produced by corresponding virtues, and all particular virtues
are produced by corresponding goods. (Virtue is quite literally its own
reward.) Consequently, the value of “internal goods” does not depend on
an instrumental relationship to consequences external or on a transcendent
conception of “intrinsic worth.” The virtues, moreover, arise within and
belong to context-specific fields of practice, which are in turn populated by
particular types of agents. MacIntyre therefore rejects both the universal,
transcendent subject of deontology as well as the rational, deliberative
subject if utilitarianism. Within particular contexts, the practice and
development of virtue has social preconditions, including institutions and
resources. These particular contexts do not remain isolated, however; they
intersect with each other, as do their particular practices and virtues, and
this intersection produces what MacIntyre calls “traditions.” As people
are enculturated within particular traditions, they come to “appreciate” the
virtues of that tradition as well as the “internal goods” immanent to these
virtues. The cultivation and development of virtues in practice, however, also
creates new practices, new virtues, and the possibility of new traditions.

Benjamin Franks has argued provocatively that the prefigurative ethic of
anarchism exhibits some interesting parallels with MacIntyre’s conception
of virtue—though his is scarcely obvious at first blush—and I find his argument persuasive. Like MacIntyre’s “internal goods,” the good that I have variously termed “life,” “freedom,” and so forth, stands in an immanent relation to the prefigurative action which pursues it. Strictly speaking, the dynamic, self-creating, vital processes that underlie action are coextensive with the goal of said action, which is nothing less than that freedom or vitality itself. Secondly, prefigurative action, like MacIntyre’s “practice,” is tactical, micropolitical, locally oriented—in short, tied to specific contexts and fields of endeavor. The same is true, as we have seen, of the acting agent who is constituted fluidly by, and through, her actions. Lastly, although anarchism is generically committed to practices that embody, as far as possible, life-affirming, creative social relations at the level of both means and ends, there is no single locus within which such practices are carried out, nor is there a special class of actors capable of, or responsible for, undertaking them. As with MacIntyre, there is a multiplicity of contexts, each defined in turn by a multiplicity of practices and practitioners, and it is the intersection of these contexts that makes solidarity possible. This elucidates a crucial distinction between anarchist solidarity and Leninist vanguardism, the latter of which predicates a unitary locus of struggle and a single revolutionary class. For MacIntyre, moreover, the intersection of contexts produces “traditions,” but these traditions do not subsume intersecting contexts into totalities, thereby eradicating their original particularity. In like fashion, the localized struggles of individuals and groups do not vanish into a totalized mass when such struggles intersect, join forces, act collectively, and so forth. The result is not Leninist “class consciousness” but anarchist solidarity, a concept that, on the face of it at least, seems analogous to MacIntyrean “tradition.” (One might go so far as to say that the very idea of an “anarchist tradition” only makes sense when cashed out in MacIntyre’s terms!)

Anarchism and power

Perhaps the most important difference between anarchism and the other political traditions previously discussed concerns the nature of power. Classical liberalism, as we have seen, tends to regard power as an external and essentially repressive force, “a weight pressing down—and at times destroying—the actions, events, and desires with which it comes in contact . . . a set of restraints-upon-action.” Most schools of socialism, including classical Marxism, regard power in a similar fashion, the crucial differences being that (a) power is always internal to a social context, (b) political power is reducible to economic power, and (c) repression is not a result of the nature of power so much as the monopolization of power by a particular socio-economic class. To this extent, both liberalism and socialism may be
seen as “strategic political philosophies” according to May’s taxonomy insofar as both regard power as something that emanates from a unitary source or locus. For classical liberals, that locus is the state or the sovereign, whereas for Marxists it is the bourgeoisie or capitalist class.

Here a distinction needs to be made between how power operates, on the one hand, and whence power emanates, on the other. With respect to the first issue, classical liberalism (and to a lesser extent socialism) endorses what might be called “the repressive thesis”—that is, the idea that power is by nature a force of repression, limitation, inhibition, and so forth. With respect to the second issue, Marxism and certain other political philosophies endorse what might be called the “concentration thesis”—that is, the idea that power is concentrated within and emanates from a single source. According to the repressive thesis, power as such is opposed to human freedom and to this extent must be contained, restricted, or even abolished. According to the concentration thesis, all particular expressions of power are reducible to a more general “type” of power aggregated within a single locus. It is clear from the foregoing that anarchism, as a species of May’s “tactical” political philosophy, rejects the concentration thesis. As May notes:

For tactical political philosophy, there is no center within which power is to be located. Otherwise put, power, and consequently politics, are irreducible. There are many different sites from which it arises, and there is an interplay among these various sites in the social world. This is not to deny that there are points of concentration of power or, to keep with the spatial image, points where various (and perhaps bolder) lines intersect. Power does not, however, originate at these points; rather, it agglomerates around them. Tactical thought thus performs its analyses within a milieu characterized . . . by the tension between irreducible and mutually intersecting practices of power.\(^{135}\)

Anarchists have always contended that domination exists in mutually irreducible forms that arise within multiple sites. Much to the chagrin of Marx and Engels, Bakunin adamantly refused to subordinate oppressive political and religious institutions to “economic requisites” and to reduce domination to the economic category of “enslavement.”\(^{136}\) In *Science and the Urgent Revolutionary Task* he writes:

Every government has a twofold aim. One, the chief and avowed aim, consists in preserving and strengthening the State, civilization, and civil order—that is, the systematic and legalized dominance of the ruling class over the exploited people. The other aim is just as important in the eyes of the government, though less willingly avowed in the open, and that is the preservation of its exclusive governmental advantages and its personnel. The first aim is pertinent to the general interests of the ruling classes; the
second, to the vanity and the exceptional advantages of the individuals in the government.\textsuperscript{137}

This quote makes clear that for Bakunin the state is \textit{not just} an “organ of class rule” even if that tends to be its principle function. When he argues in the same pamphlet that “political power and wealth are inseparable”—a claim echoed by Berkman\textsuperscript{138} and Rocker,\textsuperscript{139} among others—he means that state and capital exist in a symbiotic relationship of collusion and coconspiracy. For anarchists, all oppressive institutions exist independently of each other even though they \textit{overlap} and \textit{intersect} with one another.

What makes such institutions condemnable, again, is precisely their structures (how they are organized) and their functions (how they operate). No anarchist has ever claimed that political, social, or economic organization is oppressive in itself and by definition—that is, independently of its nature and function. On the contrary, anarchism has only directed its critique against specific organizational, institutional, and conventional forms that are essentially hierarchical, dominative, and coercive. Thus Bakunin writes: “It would be impossible to make the State change its nature . . . All states are bad in the sense that by their nature, \textit{that is, by the conditions and objectives of their existence}, they constitute the opposite of human justice, freedom and equality.”\textsuperscript{140} As Jesse Cohn points out, for Bakunin the “nature” of a thing is defined not so much by what it “is” but by what it does or is capable of doing (“the conditions and objectives of [its] existence”).\textsuperscript{141} Bakunin’s claim is that a “state” \textit{just is} a thing that centralizes power, organizes authority hierarchically, and employs coercion to sustain and expand itself. A form of political organization that does not function and/or organize itself in this way is not a state. The same is true, for example, of capitalism, which does more or less the same thing with economic power that the state does with political power.

The most groundbreaking insight of the anarchists, as we already suggested, is that these and other forms of structural and functional domination rely crucially on the practice of representation. The state purports to represent “the people” it rules, allegedly on the basis of a social contract. But, Bakunin writes,

If we are to maintain the fiction of the free state issuing from a social contract, we must assume that the majority of its citizens must have had the prudence, the discernment, and the sense of justice necessary to elect the worthiest and most capable men and to place them at the head of their government. But if a people had exhibited these qualities, would it not mean that the people itself, as a mass, had reached so high a degree of morality and of culture that it no longer had need of either government or state? . . . What we really see in all states past and present, even those endowed with the most democratic institutions, such as the
United States of North America and Switzerland? Actual self-government of the masses, despite the pretense that the people hold all the power, remains a fiction most of the time. It is always, in fact, minorities that do the governing.  

The fundamental difference between a monarchy and even the most democratic republic is that in the monarchy, the bureaucrats oppress and rob the people for the benefit of the privileged in the name of the King, and to fill their own coffers; while in the republic the people are robbed and oppressed in the same way for the benefit of the same classes, in the name of “the will of the people” (and to fill the coffers of the democratic bureaucrats).  

In short, even those states that assume a “the most liberal and democratic form [are] essentially based on domination, and upon violence, that is, upon despotism—a concealed but no less dangerous despotism . . .” This despotism, moreover, “by its nature places itself outside and over the people and inevitably subordinates them to an organization and to aims which are foreign to and opposed to the real needs and aspirations of the people.”  

In a similar fashion, capitalism purports to represent the welfare of consumers and producers alike by directing economic activity toward the “common good” or “general interest.” But as Malatesta notes:

The principal reason for the bad exploitation of nature, the miseries of the workers, the antagonisms of the social struggles is the right to property, which confers on the owners of the land, the raw materials, and all the means of production the possibility of exploiting the labor of others and organizing production, not for the well-being of all, but to guarantee maximum profit for the owners.

Likewise, Kropotkin:

The exploitation of man by man is expressive of the system of values underlying the capitalistic system. Capital, the dead past, employs labor—the living vitality and power of the present. In the capitalistic hierarchy of values, capital stands higher than labor, amassed things higher than the manifestations of life. Capital employs labor, and not labor capital. The person who owns capital commands the person who “only” owns his life, human skill, vitality and creative productivity. “Things” are higher than man. The conflict between capital and labor is much more than the conflict between two classes, more than their fight for a greater share of the social product. It is the conflict between two principles of value: that between the world of things, and their amassment, and the world of life and its productivity.
The idea, in both cases, is that representation subordinates individual values, interests, capacities, and so forth, to the interests of a dominating institution. Many other examples could be proffered, all of which would evince the same generic framework of subsuming multiplicity, particularity, and difference under totalized representations. This is not to mitigate or deny the particularity or uniqueness of distinct instances of injustice, inequality, and domination. The point is merely that oppression as such can be described, at a high level of generality, in terms of representational logic.

To the extent that the “good” of anarchism, which I have described at a similarly high level of generality, involves vitality, change, movement, multiplicity, difference, individuality, and so forth, its opposite involves stagnation, stasis, immobility, singularity, identity, conformity, and so forth. Representation is the principal force by which this opposition operates, but it does not do so in a uniform fashion or to a uniform degree. Whether a particular practice or institution is judged oppressive, and thus worthy of condemnation, depends on whether, how, and to what extent it depends upon representation at both structural and functional levels. (In this way, anarchists are able to avoid equating brutal totalitarian regimes with relatively benign “social democracies,” corporate plutocracies with mixed economies, dogmatic religious institutions with more open-minded forms of spirituality, etc.)

Although few scholars would deny that “classical” anarchism rejects the concentration thesis, some have argued that it endorses the repressive thesis. We have already seen that for anarchists such as Malatesta and Proudhon moral concepts (e.g., justice), no less than metaphysical concepts (e.g., being and substance), are “social truths” that are immanent to human consciousness. As it turns out, Proudhon also claims that “force is inherent or immanent in being” and that “power is immanent in society,” which means that power is a basic and constitutive feature of individual and social existence—not something external or transcendent. (It also suggests, among other things, that for Proudhon politics is indeed social physics.) Taken in context, one of the points of Bakunin’s famous adage—“the passion for destruction is a creative passion, too”—is that the same power is capable of both creating and destroying, of liberating and repressing, of affirming life and denying it. As Malatesta noted, one should avoid the “metaphysical tendency” to speak of this power in se—that is, as a transcendent essence or entity that exists apart from its concrete manifestation in practices and institutions. Power cannot be conceived in this way. In and of itself, it is neither “good” nor “bad,” “liberatory” nor “repressive.” Strictly speaking it is all of these things and none of them simultaneously. This is because power is immanent to historical forms or expressions, all of which are immanent in turn to individuals, groups, practices, and institutions.

The lattermost observation is crucial: for the anarchists, repressive manifestations of power, no less than power itself, are not abstract external
forces that act upon us, but internal forces that we ourselves generate. When Malatesta claims that “all of us, without exception, are obliged to live, more or less, in contradiction with our ideals”; when Proudhon claims that “everyone, alas, is an accomplice of the prince”; when Bakunin claims that “each individual is . . . in a sort of conspiracy against himself”; when Kropotkin claims that “all of us are more or less, voluntarily or involuntarily, abettors of this society”; when Goldman claims that “the State is but the shadow of man, the shadow of his opaqueness, of his ignorance and fear”; and when Landauer claims that the state is just a “name for that which we ourselves allow,” they all raise the same basic point:

The State is not a thing or . . . a fetish that one can smash in order to destroy it . . . The State is a condition, a certain relationship among human beings, a mode of behavior between men; we destroy it by contracting other relationships, by behaving differently toward one another . . . We are the State, and we shall continue to be the State until we have created the institutions that form a real community and society of men.

The state is an “abstraction” and an “illusion” that “has no more existence than gods and devils have.” The productive relationship between subjectivity and social forces is reciprocal; the claim is not just that individuals are constituted by social, political, and economic forces, but that social, political, and economic forces are constituted by individuals in turn. The question, therefore, is not “why do institutions like the state repress people?” but “why do people allow themselves to be repressed by such institutions in the first place?” The answer to the first question, according to Bakunin, is plain: “All political and civil organizations in the past and the present rest upon the following foundations: upon the historic fact of violence, upon the right to inherit property, upon the family rights of the father and husband, and the conservation of all these foundations by religion.” As to the second, Malatesta observes:

When a community has needs and its members do not know how to organize spontaneously to provide them, someone comes forward, an authority who satisfies those needs by utilizing the services of all and directing them to his liking. If the roads are unsafe and the people do not know what measures to take, a police force emerges which in return for whatever services it renders expects to be supported and paid, as well as imposing itself and throwing its weight around; if some article is needed, and the community does not know how to arrange with the distant producers to supply it in exchange for goods produced locally, the merchant will appear who will profit by dealing with the needs of one section to sell and of the other to buy, and impose his own prices both on the producer and the consumer. This is what has happened in our midst;
the less organized we have been the more prone are we to be imposed on by a few individuals.\textsuperscript{166}

In other words, domination is not just conjured up willy-nilly by the authorities and capitalists, but by the fractured and disempowered mass of people which cannot, or will not, organize itself, perhaps because it does not know how to do so. Thus anarchy is not (or not just) the abolition of domination so much as the process of creating alternatives to it, of gradually relegating it to obsolescence, of replacing it with others ways of being and acting.

Here Malatesta calls attention to what is arguably the heart of anarchism: the union of theory and practice, as exemplified especially in the principle of prefiguration (“building the new world within the shell of the old”). That the key thinkers of the anarchist tradition were activists as well as philosophers and scientists is not surprising given their uncompromising dedication to freedom and their relentless condemnation of tyranny. Anarchist theory has seldom been—and, indeed, cannot consistently be—merely the stuff of discussion groups and debating societies: the kinds of doctrines it propounds cannot be easily held and affirmed without also generating a profound desire to act. Thus anarchism has always involved a commitment to actively promoting and pursuing its goals in practice, both at the level of everyday life and at the level of mass movements. The nature of this praxis is defined by fusing the theoretical (i.e., the valuation of life coupled with an ethicopolitical critique of all that stands opposed to life) with the pragmatic (i.e., the principle of prefiguration).

Because anarchist theory promotes individuality, autonomy, and self-determination, anarchist praxis emphasizes voluntary association—the free ability of individuals to associate with, or disassociate from, whomever they choose. As Bakunin points out, “any contract with another individual on any footing but the utmost equality and reciprocity . . .” would be “a relationship of voluntary servitude with another individual . . . devoid of any sense of personal dignity.”\textsuperscript{167} Through prefiguration, the goal (social existence predicated on voluntary association) shapes and determines the methodology (the formation of “collectives,” “associations,” or “affinity groups,” which come together in order to collaborate on particular projects or to jointly pursue a common goal).\textsuperscript{168} Similarly, because anarchist theory promotes equality and solidarity, anarchist praxis emphasizes mutual aid, which Malatesta defines as “fraternal, equalitarian, and libertarian association, in which solidarity, consciously and freely expressed, unites mankind”\textsuperscript{169} and “the coming together of individuals for the well being of all, and of all for the wellbeing of each”\textsuperscript{170}—in short, the creation of relationships based on voluntary cooperation and collaboration among equals rather than the domination or exploitation of the many by the few. As Emma Goldman notes, “What wonderful results this unique force of
man’s individuality can achieve when strengthened by cooperation with other individualities! Cooperation—as opposed to internecine strife and struggle—has worked for the survival and evolution of the species . . . only mutual aid and voluntary cooperation can create the basis for a free individual and associational life.” 171 Once again, prefiguration ensures that the means (action and organization based on equal cooperation rather than hierarchy and coercion) embodies the intended end (social existence predicated on mutual aid).

Anarchism and utopianism

The marriage of theory and practice reveals another distinguishing characteristic of anarchism: the disavowal of utopianism. “Anarchism,” writes Federico Urales, “must be made up of an infinite variety of systems and individuals free from all fetters. It must be like an experimental field . . . for all types of human temperament.” 172 Anarchist critique, coupled with the prefigurative ethic, “is compatible with the most diverse political, economic, and social conditions, on the premise that these cannot imply, as under capitalist monopoly, the negation of liberty.” 173 In other words, anarchist theory establishes limits on the forms of political, economic, and social organization it would endorse. Within those limits, as I have suggested, a number of models and schemes have been advanced, and this is one way to account for the incredible amount of diversity within the anarchist “family.” In general, however, anarchists have avoided devising utopian “blueprints” which specify concrete goals in advance and which, in turn, affect the tactics and methods employed in anarchist intervention. As Malatesta writes:

An authoritarian party, which aims at capturing power to impose its ideas, has an interest in the people remaining an amorphous mass, unable to act for themselves and therefore always easily dominated. And it follows, logically, that it cannot desire more than that much organization, and of the kind it needs to attain power . . . But we anarchists do not want to emancipate the people; we want the people to emancipate themselves. We do not believe in the good that comes from above and imposed by force; we want a new way of life to emerge from the body of the people and to correspond to the state of their development and advance as they advance. 174

Utopian ideology is simply a representation of the future, one that supplants real possibilities with images of what is possible, or what is necessary, or what must be done. But because “only life itself can create,” it follows that “life must inform theory.” 175 For anarchists, political action is always experimentation. Again, Malatesta: “None can judge with certainty . . .
which is the best way to achieve the greatest good for each and everyone. Freedom, coupled with experience, is the only way of discovering the truth and what is best; and there can be no freedom if there is a denial of the freedom to err.” Experimentation does not proceed blindly, however. Anarchists have emphasized the importance of looking to the past—not just to the anthropological record, but to historical events such as the Paris Commune, the Spanish Civil War, the French uprisings of May 1968, the ongoing Zapatista rebellion in Mexico, and the antiglobalization movement—as well as to various nonhierarchical, noncoercive social relations, which we already experience in our everyday lives.

Anarchists have often found it worthwhile to discuss what anarchist societies might be like and to formulate models of how they might operate and organize themselves. Such discussions, though purely speculative, are nonetheless important since, as Malatesta notes:

To neglect all the problems of reconstruction or to pre-arrange complete and uniform plans are both errors, excesses which, by different routes, would lead to our defeat as anarchists and to the victory of new or old authoritarian regime. The truth lies in the middle . . . . It is absurd to believe that, once government has been destroyed and the capitalists expropriated, “things will look after themselves” without the intervention of those who already have some idea, however loose or tentative, about what has to be done, and who would immediately set about doing it. Perhaps this could happen—and indeed it would be better if it were so—if there was time to wait for people, for everyone, to find a way, by trial and experience, of satisfying their own needs and tastes in agreement with the needs and tastes of others. But social life as the life of individuals does not permit interruption.

For the sake of bringing this discussion to a speedy close, I will only provide one example—a model historically favored by collectivists (like Bakunin) and communists (like Kropotkin) According to this model, an anarchist society would consist of a variety of small collectives or assemblies convened for specific social purposes. For example, workplace assemblies would exist to coordinate production, neighborhood assemblies would exist to handle problems or issues that arise in a given neighborhood, and so forth. These assemblies, in turn, would coordinate their activities within a federation of larger groups called councils, consisting of delegates or “spokes” that have been chosen to represent the interests of their respective assemblies. Still larger regional councils could be convened on an as-needed basis, but these would be organized into a decentralized and federal system with all final “authority” residing within the assemblies. The convention of assemblies and councils, as well as the various decision-making processes operative within them, would be governed by the principles outlined above. Thus, for example,
everyone who participates in an assembly would do so freely and possess an equal say in any and all decision-making processes. Representatives and delegates to larger confederations would be chosen on an ad hoc basis and rotated, and would be charged solely with representing the various interests and decisions of their respective assemblies to other assemblies within a council or confederation. The focus in all this is to prevent power from being centralized within any one social body that would in turn possess the ability to coerce other social bodies.

This is obviously a very broad sketch that ignores a host of important issues, including how to deal with economic coordination, defense, and crime. Anarchists have discussed these issues, but in general, none of them have attempted to provide what could be called a “comprehensive analysis” of how an anarchist society would operate, nor of how such a society could or should be brought about. Though anarchists have a general sense of the kinds of societies they desire, as well as general ideas about how such societies could be actualized and maintained, their watchword is “experimentation.” Anarchist praxis, though guided by certain theoretical and tactical commitments, does not proceed according to concrete blueprints. Rather, it seeks to create forms of organization that, instead of representing social relationships, are immanent to those relationships themselves. The result of this immanentization is anarchy—the disappearance of representation and, by extension, of “government.” What forms of organization can accomplish this? How can we bring them about? Such questions can only be answered by activism, by practice, by experimenting with new ways of being and living, both individually and communally.

Nature, humanity, and science

It is commonly held, even by otherwise sympathetic philosophers, that anarchism relies on a “unitary concept of human essence” which regards human beings as essentially “good,” “altruistic,” “cooperative,” and so forth. If this claim were true, it would situate anarchism squarely in the framework of political modernity, which, as we have seen, relies heavily on essentialized representations of human nature. In point of fact, however, major and minor anarchist thinkers alike all affirmed in various ways that individuals are socially constructed and that subjectivity is socially produced. As early as 1847, Proudhon’s *Philosophy of Misery* offered a sustained critique of the concept of human nature:

Modern philosophers have erected against the Christian dogma [of original sin] a dogma no less obscure,—that of the depravity of society. Man is born good, cries Rousseau, in his peremptory style; but society—that is, the forms and institutions of society—depraves him. In such terms
was formulated the paradox, or, better, the protest, of the philosopher of Geneva... Now, it is evident that this idea is only the ancient hypothesis turned about. The ancients accused the individual man; Rousseau accuses the collective man: at bottom, it is always the same proposition, an absurd proposition. Thus, then, we are placed between two negations, two contradictory affirmations: one which, by the voice of entire antiquity, setting aside as out of the question society and God which it represents, finds in man alone the principle of evil; another which, protesting in the name of free, intelligent, and progressive man, throws back upon social infirmity and, by a necessary consequence, upon the creative and inspiring genius of society all the disturbances of the universe...

Neither understand that humanity, to use a biblical expression, is one and constant in its generations; that is, that everything in it, at every period of its development, in the individual as in the mass, proceeds from the same principle, which is not being, but becoming.

Jean Grave echoes this sentiment when he describes the idea of “the innate wickedness of man” as a “fiction.” Human beings, according to Grave, are no more fundamentally wicked than we are “originally good.” This is because “the human individual is a plastic being who is what he is made to be by heredity, corrected by educated, and above all, by circumstances and milieu.” Emma Goldman agrees:

Anarchism is... the teacher of the unity of life; not merely in nature but in man. There is no conflict between the individual and the social instincts: one the receptacle of a precious life essence, the other the repository of the element that keeps the essence pure and strong. The individual is the heart of society, conserving the essence of social life; society is the lungs which are distributing the element to keep the life essence—that is, the individual—pure and strong.

Bakunin, too, argues that it is a basic philosophical mistake to derive morality from an abstract, asocial, ahistorical, and idealistic conception of human individuality. “The real individual,” he writes, “is from the moment of gestation in his mother’s womb already predetermined and particularized by a confluence of geographic, climatic, ethnographic, hygienic, and economic influences, which constitute the nature of his family, his class, his nation, his race.” Human subjectivity does not consist of “ideas and innate sentiments.” There is no human nature apart from brute biological capacities “which every individual inherits at birth in different degrees.” For Bakunin, these “rudimentary faculties without any content” are the condition of possibility for subjectivity; subjectivity, in turn, is nothing more than the production of content (“impressions, facts, and events coalesced into patterns of thought”)
within these faculties vis-à-vis the complicated array of social, cultural, economic, and political forces that acts upon them.

It should be noted in passing that this view far exceeds the holistic thesis of socialism, which states that human nature can only be “actualized” or “realized” socially. It does not deny that there is such a thing as a physical or biological human nature, nor does it deny that this human nature is constituted by essential and “ready-made” characteristics. Subjectivity in general and human individuals in particular are still underwritten and determined by an essential human nature in this sense, which is in turn either cultivated or perverted by social life. As Bakunin writes:

Take the most intelligent ape possessing the finest characteristics, put it under the most humane conditions—and you will never succeed in making a man out of it. Take the most hardened criminal or a man of the poorest mind and, provided neither suffers from some organic lesion which may bring about either idiocy or incurable madness, you will soon recognize that if one becomes a criminal and the other has not yet developed the conscious awareness of his humanity and human duties, the fault lies not with them nor with their nature, but with the social environment in which they were born and have been developing.  

Although Bakunin believes human beings have a natural capacity for thought and self-determination, he denies that we possess any innate, ready-made “qualities” or “characteristics,” especially those of a moral nature. On his view, such characteristics are produced by social forces (e.g., politics, economics, culture, and religion) and nurtured by social conditions, for example, “rational, all-around education accompanied by an upbringing based on respect for labor, reason, equality, and freedom; and a social environment wherein each human individual will enjoy full freedom and really be, de jure and de facto, the equal of every other.” Most importantly, they must be developed in various ways by the individual himself or herself since, as Reclus says, “a man may be truly moral only when he is his own master.” The latter point is especially important because it underscores the anarchists’ rejection of social determinism. Although Bakunin and other anarchists believe that external social forces play a crucial role in constructing subjectivity, the individual subject is nonetheless capable of acting upon herself by developing certain characteristics and abandoning others—in short, of creating herself. To this extent, human beings are indeed born “free,” but this freedom remains one more “empty faculty” unless and until it is realized through the practice of self-creation. Human nature, or rather the human condition, is defined by the conflict between social construction and self-creation or development.

Kropotkin, too, denies that human beings are innately “rapacious and egotistic” and insists that “the growth of egotism and rapacity, of slavishness
and ambition” is catalyzed by underlying social, economic, and political conditions. Moreover, human beings have natural capacities both for self-interested behavior, such as dominating and exploiting others for their own ends, as well as altruistic behavior, such as sympathizing and cooperating with others. For both Kropotkin and Bakunin, however, the experiencing subject is constituted by the conflicts which emerge among these and other internal psychological forces, as well as the social forces which act upon them (as opposed to Goldman, who sees these forces as acting in a more harmonious and complementary manner with one another). From the outset, the subject is internally divided, fractured, fragmented. The subject itself, no less than the social field it inhabits, emerges from the struggle of “diametrically opposed” forces—egoism and altruism, self-interest and solidarity, competition and cooperation, and so forth—and this struggle becomes internalized. An individual person, in turn, is the “always changeable” product of “all his divers faculties, all of his autonomous faculties, of brain cells and nerve centers,” all of which are independent of, and to some degree in conflict with one another, and cannot ultimately be “subordinate to a central organ—the soul.” This anarchist conception of subjectivity, far from being founded on any representation of human nature, views the subject as a product of forces struggling within itself, which is in turn an expression of the struggle of social forces.

At the level of politics, anarchism strives to create new social forms which synthesize conflicting social and psychological forces instead of repressing them. As Kropotkin writes,

[We] conceive a society in which all the mutual relations of its members are regulated, not by laws, not by authorities, whether self-imposed or elected, but by mutual agreements between members of that society, and by sum of social customs and habits—not petrified by law, routine, or superstition, but continually developing and continually readjusted, in accordance with the ever growing requirements of a free life, stimulated by the progress of science, invention, and the growth of higher ideals. No ruling authorities, then. No government of man by man; no crystallization and immobility, but a continual evolution—such as we see in nature. Free play for the individual, for the development of his individual gifts—for his individualization.

Like Proudhon, Kropotkin recognizes that human reality is not a matter of “being” so much as “becoming,” where “becoming” is understood in terms of the dynamic play of internal and external forces. These forces cannot be selectively manipulated, the “good” ones preserved and the “bad” ones eliminated. All of them serve a necessary function in making us who and what we are. Nor can we prevent them from moving and changing by means of artificial mechanisms of “crystallization and immobility.” What we
can and must do, Kropotkin thinks, is to develop individual and collective identities that are fluid enough to accommodate change, pliable enough to adapt effectively to growth and development, and prudent enough to address conflict in ways that minimize harm and promote the happiness and well-being of all.

It cannot be emphasized enough that for Kropotkin and other anarchists, human beings are not determined by the play of multiple and mutually irreducible forces. Rather, human beings are marked by a fundamental mutability, a capacity to create and develop ourselves over and above the influence of instinct, habit, and other internal and external drives. In his famous studies of evolutionary development, Kropotkin’s goal is not to demonstrate that human beings exhibit a natural propensity toward altruism or “mutual aid,” but to argue, against the social Darwinists, that human nature cannot be defined in terms of any “inborn feelings” or essential predispositions. Evolutionary studies can establish the existence of biological instincts, some of which help, in various ways, to preserve the species over time, but brute biological facts only provide a “foundation” for ethical and moral-psychological analysis; at best they help illustrate what human beings are capable of becoming, as opposed to determining in advance what we are. Furthermore, although Kropotkin was, like the anarchist anthropologists of our own day, familiar with anarchistic forms of life among tribal peoples, he was keen to point out that

The hospitality of primitive peoples, respect for human life, the sense of reciprocal obligation, compassion for the weak, courage, extending even to the sacrifice of self for others which is first learnt for the sake of children and friends, and later for that of members of the same community—all these qualities are developed in man anterior to the law, independently of religion, as in the case of social animals. Such feelings and practices are the inevitable results of social life. Without being, as say the priests and metaphysics, inherent in man, such qualities are the consequences of life in common.

Social “feelings and practices” are not features of a universal human essence but are made possible by biological preconditions “always present in man.” Like Bakunin, however, Kropotkin insists that these rudiments remain empty unless they are developed. Beliefs, feelings, and practices are the products of social forms rather than their cause.

In sum, the anarchists of the nineteenth century were among the first to suggest that, apart from biological conditions of possibility, humanity lacks an essential nature, that subjectivity is a production of forces—in short, that the individual is constituted, as Proudhon might say, by processes of becoming rather than absolute forms of being. As we have already seen, however, their critique of representation cuts an even wider swathe, applying
not just to the being of the subject but to that of the object as well. At the beginning of *On the Creation of Order in Humanity*, Proudhon writes:

> I call “Order” any serial or symmetrical disposition. Order necessarily presupposes division, distinction, [and] difference. Whatever is undivided, indistinct, [and] undifferentiated cannot be conceived as ordered. These concepts are mutually exclusive.\(^{203}\)

Human beings use thought, which is always and already constituted by language, to impose form, structure, and order upon experience. At the level of ontology, the thing-in-itself which underlies experience is “division, distinction, difference.” The priority of explanation, therefore, begins not with existence, but with “grouping” or “classifying,” which is in turn mediated by perception. “The production of order,” he claims, “is the object of metaphysics,”\(^{204}\) and “order is unity in multiplicity.”\(^{205}\) According to the anarchist Herbert Read, Proudhon et al. argue that the very idea of “reality” is “one of those conventions that change from age to age and are determined by the total way of life.”\(^{206}\) Jesse Cohn writes:

> This is a powerful transformation of Aristotle’s insight that to “be” is, in an important sense, to have form and structure, to connect and coherent; it is directly informed by Kant’s recognition of the role of the subject in giving form to its own experience; it also reflects the influence of Hegel’s monistic claim that “the real is the rational and the rational real”; it anticipates Heidegger’s description of the way in which perception of “things” is always a construction of these “things” through the intrinsically associative, generalizing, and categorizing power of words, so that “thinging gathers,” and so that culture, as the ensemble of linguistic constructs, enables us to inhabit a *world* that is within but distinct from the *earth*.\(^{207}\)

Whereas the philosophies of political modernity contend, each in their own ways, that there is a “real world” that can be apprehended faithfully through the mediation of reason and perception, the anarchists argue that “there is no single way, even no normal way, of representing the world we experience.”\(^{208}\)

In a similar vein, Bakunin writes that “the nature of everything in existence is to be born and perish, or rather to transform,” and that “Nature is the sum of the actual changes which occur and reoccur among its parts . . . the universal, natural, necessary and real, but by no means predetermined, nor preconceived or planned combination of the infinite range of particular actions and reactions that all actually existing things exercise constantly upon one another.”\(^{209}\)

Apart from this Hereclitean flux, Bakunin insists, there is no “general idea” of nature, or rather that “the general idea is always an abstraction
and, for that very reason, is some sort of negation of real life.” Human thought is only capable of investing the “relations” and “laws” underlying and immanent to these “continual transformations” (what Proudhon calls “the logic of things”), “but never their material, individual side, palpitating, so to speak, with reality and life, therefore fugitive and intangible.” All the while, he contends,

Man, like the rest of nature, is an entirely material being. The mind, the facility of thinking, of receiving and reflecting upon different external and internal sensations, of remembering them when they have passed and reproducing them by the imagination, of comparing and distinguishing them, of abstracting determinations common to them and thus creating general concepts, and finally of forming ideas by grouping and combining concepts according to different methods—intelligence, in a word, sole creator of our whole ideal world, is a property of the animal body and especially of the quite material organism of the brain.

The mistake of theologians and metaphysicians alike for Bakunin is that in “lifting [themselves] in thought above [themselves]” they achieve nothing but “the representation of perfect abstraction”—the “absolute nothingness” of God or Nature. The same is true of science, which is useful as “the compass of life” but is folly when identified with life itself. “Science creates nothing,” Bakunin writes, “it establishes and recognizes only the creations of life. And every time that scientific men, emerging from their abstract world, mingle with living creation in the real world, all that they propose or create is poor, ridiculously abstract, bloodless and lifeless, stillborn . . .” Representation and abstraction—whether scientific, philosophical, or theological—claim to operate \textit{sub specie aeternitatis}, to affect a transcendent, suprahistorical “God’s-eye view” of existence. But for Bakunin there is no such vantage because existence as such is defined by an “infinite range” of changes and movements that outstrip and overflow our attempts to understand them: “No theory, no ready-made system, no book that has ever been written will save the world. I cleave to no system. I am a true seeker.” What remains are contingent, historically situated opinions that masquerade as “truth.”

Malatesta, like Bakunin, agrees that science is useful for purposes of “grouping and linking known facts” and “as a useful instrument for research [and] . . . the discovery and interpretation of new facts.” He insists, however, that scientific theories are not “truth.”:

I do not believe in the infallibility of Science, neither in its ability to explain everything nor in its mission of regulating the conduct of Man . . . I only believe those things which can be proved; but I know full well that proofs are relative and can, and are in fact, continually superceded and cancelled out by other proved facts; and therefore I believe that doubt
should be the mental approach of all who aspire to get ever closer to the truth, or at least as much of truth that it is possible to establish.\textsuperscript{218}

Malatesta therefore rejects “\textit{scientism} . . . the belief that science is everything and is capable of everything,”\textsuperscript{219} but he maintains a scientific approach that accepts truths “only provisionally, relatively, always in the expectation of new truths which are more true than those so far discovered.”\textsuperscript{220} By “more true,” Malatesta obviously means something like “more useful” or “more productive” or “more fruitful,” which places him squarely in the pragmatist camp.

Even Kropotkin, who, unlike the others we have discussed, was actually trained as a scientist, denies that science provides a transcendent and universal \textit{archê}:

> After having fixed all their attention on the sun and the large planets, astronomers are beginning to study now the infinitely small ones that people the universe. And they discover that the interplanetary and interstellar spaces are people and crossed in all imaginable directions by little swarms of matter, invisible, infinitely small when taken separately, but all-powerful in their numbers. It is to these infinitely tiny bodies . . . that today astronomers look for an explanation of our solar system, the movements that animate its parts, and the harmony of their whole . . . Thus the center, the origin of force, formerly transferred from the earth to the sun, turns out to be scattered and disseminated. It is every and nowhere . . . [T]he harmony of the stellar movements is harmony only because it is an adaptation, a resultant of all these numberless movements uniting, completing, equilibrating one another. The whole aspect of the universe changes with this conception. The idea of force governing the world, pre-established law, pre-established harmony, disappears to make room for the harmony that Fourier had caught a glimpse of: the one which results from the disorderly and incoherent movements of numberless hosts of matter, each of which goes its own way.\textsuperscript{221}

The totalizing representation of science, which seeks to impose stable identities, is not possible in a universe without things-in-themselves, a universe where everything is in flux, where “\textit{tout devient et rien n’est}.” For the anarchists, each particular thing is “defined” solely in virtue of its relations to, and differences from, all other things. The universe, as Bakunin says, is simply an organic system of differential relations. It is a turning world without a still point.

“The end of morals,” Kropotkin insists, “cannot be ‘transcendental,’ as the idealists desire it to be: it must be real. We must find moral satisfaction \textit{in life} and not some form of extra-vital condition.”\textsuperscript{222} By “extra-vital conditions,” he means the various “metaphysical conceptions of a Universal Spirit, or of
a Creative Force in Nature, the Incarnation of the Idea, Nature’s Goal, the Aim of Existence, the Unknowable, Mankind (conceived as having a separate spiritual existence), and so on” which would situate value in an abstract and transcendent locus exterior to life. In their place, as Jesse Cohn points out, Kropotkin and other anarchists emphasize life—that is, the immanent and immediate processes of growth, development, and change. In the place of instrumentality and rationality, of stability and order, they emphasize movement, becoming, fertility, creativity, gratuity, excession, energy, and proliferation. Thus Kropotkin exclaims:

The condition of the maintenance of life is its expansion. “The plant cannot prevent itself from flowering. Sometimes to flower means to die. Never mind, the sap mounts all the same,” concludes the young anarchist philosopher. It is the same with the human being when he is full of force and energy. Force accumulates in him. He expands his life. He gives without calculation, otherwise he could not live. If he must die like the flower when it blooms, never mind. The sap rises, if sap there be.

This profound emphasis on life pervades anarchist thought. To this extent, anarchist philosophies are first and foremost philosophies of immanence and of vitality. If all thought, all action, all desires emerge within and only within life, the same must be true of our analyses. For Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, and many others, Lebenleugnung is the most basic error, the most dangerous enemy of human thought.

The specter of Nietzsche

At this point, the reader will no doubt recognize a strong affinity between the positions I have attributed to the anarchists and those of Nietzsche. This might seem odd for a number of reasons. First, it is well known that Nietzsche reserved some of his most venomous opprobrium for anarchists, whom he referred to as “dogs” and regarded as the epitome of “herd-animal morality.” The anarchists and socialists, Nietzsche thought, sought to undermine “the prosperity of a single stronger species of man” in favor of elevating “mankind in the mass,” and to this extent were guilty of “modern misarchism” (to coin an ugly word for an ugly thing). Interestingly, there is no evidence that Nietzsche read the works of Proudhon, Bakunin, or any other anarchist thinkers. Rather, his familiarity with anarchism and other revolutionary movements came chiefly from the newspapers. (Alarmist accounts of the French Commune, for example, made the “hypersensitive” young Nietzsche “seriously upset” and left him “absolutely shattered”). In like fashion, Nietzsche was all but unknown to the anarchists of the nineteenth century. It was not until the early twentieth century that certain
key members of the anarchist movement began to take notice of and appreciate him. As Daniel Colson notes, “Pelloutier, one of the founders of the Bourses du Travail movement, certainly read [Nietzsche] during his more individualist phase. Libertad, and the ‘Libertarian Discussion Groups’ he founded in 1902, referred to Stirner as well as Nietzsche.”

To this list we can add Georges Palante, Louis Guilloux, Guy Aldred, Max Baginski, Hippolyte Havel, and Emma Goldman—who delivered at least twenty-five public lectures on Nietzsche.

There is no doubt that Nietzsche’s critique of transcendence, of abstract concepts “thought of as sovereign and universal, not as a means in the struggle between power-complexes but as a means of preventing all struggle in general,” of stable identities that preclude the creation of “human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves,” is remarkably similar to the anarchist critique described above. More importantly and interestingly, those aspects of the anarchist critique that are paralleled in Nietzsche appear in works that predate The Birth of Tragedy (1872), such as Proudhon’s On the Creation of Order in Humanity (1843). Furthermore, most of Bakunin’s writings and Kropotkin’s early works were published in the 1870s during the first phase of Nietzsche’s career. As we already noted, there is no evidence that Nietzsche himself was familiar with these works, or, for that matter, that Bakunin and the younger Kropotkin were familiar with Nietzsche.

None of this is to diminish the importance and intrepidity of Nietzsche’s philosophy. The point is merely that several key Nietzschean insights, or at least close approximations of them, seem to have been discovered independently by the anarchists (much as the calculus, for example, was discovered independently by both Newton and Leibniz). This suggests, notwithstanding Habermas’s claims to the contrary, that Nietzsche was not the only thinker, nor even necessarily the first, to provide a “turning point” or “entry” into postmodernity. It is more accurate, I think, to say that Nietzsche has emerged historically as the chief spokesperson for a mode of thought that developed in scattershot, piecemeal fashion throughout the nineteenth century. The preponderance of ideas constituting this mode of thought, however, is found not in the œuvre of a single author, but in the countless tracts, pamphlets, newspapers, and monographs of the nineteenth-century anarchist movement. If this fact has gone unnoticed or unappreciated in twentieth-century scholarship, it is mostly a consequence of the obscurity of anarchist authors as well as the initial lack of any systematic collection of their writings. Thanks in large part to the proliferation of archives, anthologies, and reprints in the second half of the twentieth century, scholars are now in a much better position to recognize anarchism for what it is: namely, the first genuinely “postmodern” political philosophy.
Conclusion

The first part of this book established a framework within which to think about political philosophy in general and political modernity in particular. I have argued that politics is best understood as a kind of “social physics”—that is, as a description of the various ways that humans beings affect each other and are affected in turn by and through sociopolitical power. So, too, I have argued that political philosophy is produced from within the arena of social-physical conflict and to this extent is an inexorably self-reflexive phenomenon. However, the characteristic strategy of much Western political philosophy has been to reduce social physics to a foundational problematic which political philosophy attempts to “solve.” It does this, moreover, by adopting an allegedly impartial and objective point of view—external to social-political conflict itself—whence it imposes an all-encompassing “archic” order upon the chaos of social-physics. By convention the preferred “archic” principle throughout most of Western history has been the state, and this doesn’t really change with the advent of modernity.

What changes, as we have seen, is the conceptualization of the state’s relations to the individual and to civil society (by liberals and socialists, respectively), which is in turn a result of a host of characteristically “modern” developments in philosophy, science, economics, political theory, and so forth. I am not alone in suggesting that the foundational, “archic” concept of political modernity is representation, nor that the anarchists distinguish themselves from liberals and socialists precisely in their rejection of representation. I am going one step further; I am suggesting that the anarchists’ rejection of political modernity is a kind of postmodernism—perhaps the first of its kind.

The evidence in this chapter makes it clear that, contrary to popular belief, the anarchists shared little in common with their liberal and socialist peers. In rejecting representation, they also rejected both universalism and relativism in ethics, rationalism and scientism in epistemology, idealism and (vulgar) materialism in metaphysics, individualism and statism in politics. Most everything that liberalism and socialism accept—everything that can be called “politically modern”—the anarchists either repudiate outright or finesse into something entirely novel. The result is a political theory that is neither wholly modern nor wholly premodern. In the last chapter, I shall make a case for calling it postmodern.
Political postmodernity

Defining postmodernity

One of my foremost goals has been to show that anarchism, both historically and theoretically, has constituted a movement beyond political modernity. At the highest level of generality, I have defined political modernity in terms of representation—representation of the subject, of society, of the world, of the relationships among them. To the extent that anarchism has distinguished itself chiefly as a critique of, and alternative to, representation, to the extent that it has moved beyond the discourse of political modernity, it is fair to say that I have achieved this goal. But I want to go a step further and reiterate a claim I made earlier—namely, that anarchism is rightly termed the first “postmodern” political philosophy. Rudolf Pannwitz, who was the first to use “postmodern” as a sociological *term de l’art* in 1917, defined postmodernity as “nihilism and the collapse of values in contemporary European culture.” ¹ If we generalize (and soften) Pannwitz’s definition a bit—such that “postmodern” refers only to what is generally opposed to, or stands outside, or moves beyond modernity—there is nothing anachronistic about calling the anarchists “postmodern,” especially in juxtaposition to what I identified as characteristically “modern” in previous chapters. I will say more about this below.

For the time being, let us be clear that 150 years of anarchist thought and action, despite being radically “postmodern” in form and content, has failed to bring about any substantial historical changes. In my view, therefore, it is not just mistaken but ridiculous to claim that the world has entered a new and distinctive “postmodern” epoch or that we have otherwise transitioned into something called “the postmodern condition.” This is scarcely to deny the very real cultural, technological, psychological, economical (et cetera) changes enumerated and discussed by the likes of Bell, Bauman, Jameson, Lyotard, and other theorists.² The point is merely that none of these changes, considered individually or *in toto*, constitute a fundamental break from the dominant social, political, and economic institutions of modernity. The
greatest changes, in my view, have been quantitative rather than qualitative—modernity has grown, expanded, “globalized,” but it has not transformed into something altogether new and different. As I said earlier, we have never been postmodern.3

We have, however, provided glimpses of what political postmodernity is or, better, what it could be. I have argued that the anarchists were among the first to provide such glimpses—indeed, to articulate the first identifiably “postmodernist” philosophy—but for most scholars political and philosophical “postmodernism” is something that developed much later. As Lawrence Cahoone notes, “postmodernism” has become a catch-all term associated especially with “the new French philosophers of the 1960s—the most infl uential of whom were Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Jean-François Lyotard.”4 He continues:

[These philosophers] had been schooled by another theoretical movement, structuralism, developed earlier by the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure and championed after the war by the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss. Structuralism rejected the focus on the self and its historical development that had characterized Marxism, existentialism, phenomenology, and psychoanalysis. The social or human sciences . . . needed to focus instead on super-individual structures of language, ritual, and kinship which make the individual what he or she is. Simply put, it is not the self that creates culture, but culture that creates the self. The study of abstract relations or “codes” of cultural signs . . . is the key to understanding human existence. Structuralism seemed to offer the student of humanity a way of avoiding the reduction to the natural sciences, while yet retaining objective, scientifi c methods . . .5

The so-called postmodernists shared the structuralists’ rejection of a presocial, prelinguistic self but “saw deep self-refl exive philosophical problems in the attempt by human beings to be ‘objective about themselves.’”6 Generally speaking, the resultant “poststructuralist” critique argues that thought itself, as manifested in various modes of “rational” inquiry, is by turns groundless, contingent, indeterminate, ambiguous, and illusory. Understood as a generic philosophical trend, “poststructuralism” variously criticizes presence (versus construction), essence (versus appearance or phenomena), unity (versus plurality), heterogeneity (versus difference), identity (versus alterity), and transcendence (versus immanence).7 In short, it attempts to undermine the very foundations of “modernity” or “Enlightenment.”

The philosophers named above have tended to reject the “postmodernist” or “poststructuralist” label, and rightfully so. It is simply a mistake to suggest that Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, and Lyotard are members of a distinct philosophical “school” defi ned by a set of doctrines that all of them would unequivocally endorse. It would be equally mistaken, however, to
suggest that these thinkers have nothing in common, or that they are not similar enough to each other that we can reasonably and accurately speak of shared orientations, or common commitments and concerns. Lewis Call has helpfully suggested that “postmodernism” is better understood as a “matrix” that is “profoundly pluralistic and nonhierarchical: it has neither a single concrete origin nor a definite teleology, and none of its strands or nodes may be said to rule over the others.” For our purposes, it is enough to briefly describe two of the central elements of “poststructuralist” critique—namely, deconstructive analysis and genealogical analysis. The first, which we shall discuss by way of Derrida, is concerned crucially with the indeterminacy of language. The second, which we shall discuss by way of Foucault, is concerned with the historical production of knowledge (discursive practices), institutions (nondiscursive practices) and subjectivity (processes of subjectivation) vis-à-vis the operation of power.

Deconstructive analysis

The most expedient way to introduce Derrida’s deconstructive analysis is by focusing on certain ideas and concepts which, when taken together, form its theoretical core. Although the “meanings” of these ideas and concepts remain more or less consistent throughout Derrida’s writings, he nonetheless adopts a variety of different terms to describe them. (For example, the “foundational” Derridean concept of the transcendental signified is variously described as “logocentrism,” “phallogocentrism,” and “the metaphysics of presence.” The same is true of other concepts such as trace, metaphoricity, the supplement, and so on.) As an exhaustive discussion of all such terms would take us well beyond the scope of this section, I will instead focus my attention on the basic concepts underlying them—concepts that are crucial to understanding Derrida’s project in general.

One such concept is undecidability—that is, the impossibility, within language, of achieving any sort of fixed, static, or transcendent meaning. Derrida articulates this concept in part through a critique of Saussurian linguistics. Broadly construed, Saussure’s theory involves the differentiation of words (phonetics sounds which signify concepts), concepts (ideas which are signified by words), and referents (objects in the “real world” which are signified by both ideas and words). Saussure is frequently regarded as the first thinker to affirm the arbitrary relationship between words and the concepts they represent, but his true accomplishment is the discovery that words actually derive their meaning from their differential relationships to other words, rather than correspondence to arbitrary concepts. Derrida goes a step further by arguing that there are no concepts behind the signifiers—in other words, that the notion of a “transcendent signifier” existing outside the play of linguistic differences is illusory.
Midway through his essay *Différance*, Derrida uses Saussure to develop a distinction between the absent and the present: “We ordinarily say that a sign is put in place of the thing itself, the present thing—‘thing’ holding here for the sense as well as the referent. Signs represent the present in its absence; they take the place of the present.” Thus the sign is a kind of intermediary between the sensible and the intelligible; we think we are aware of presence even though it is absent to perception vis-à-vis the sign. The problem, Derrida says, is that “the sign is conceivable only on the basis of the presence that it defers and in view of the deferred presence one intends to reappropriate.” Because we cannot perceive presence except through the mediation of signs, presence can no longer be regarded as “the absolutely matrical form of being”; rather, it becomes merely an effect of language.

A word, therefore, never corresponds to a presence and so is always “playing” off other words. And because all words are necessarily trapped within this state of play (which Derrida terms “*différance*”), language as a whole cannot have a fixed, static, determinate—in a word, transcendent meaning; rather, *différance* “extends the domain and the play of signification infinitely.” Furthermore, if it is impossible for presence to have meaning apart from language, and if (linguistic) meaning is always in a state of play, it follows that presence itself will be indeterminate—which is, of course, precisely what it cannot be. Without an “absolute matrical form of being,” meaning becomes dislodged, fragmented, groundless, and elusive. One immediate consequence of this critique is a disruption of the binary logic upon which much of Western thought is based. There are many reasons for this, but one is that binary logic derives difference from absolute metaphysical identity (read: presence) and not the other way around. (i.e., the law of identity: \( A = A \), not just \( A = \neg B, \neg C, \neg D \ldots \), and the law of noncontradiction: \( A \) cannot be \( \neg A \) at the same time and in the same respect). As we have just seen, however, nothing is what it is independently of the play of differences; there is nothing signified that transcends its relationship to the “differential network” of signifiers.

Derrida articulates and expands upon this general criticism of the “metaphysics of presence” in various texts and applies it to a wide range of binary concepts. In *Of Grammatology*, for example, he attacks the idea that writing is a “supplement” to speech in the sense that the former (which is marked by absence) “stands in” for the latter (which is marked by presence). Elsewhere he discusses truth and falsity, logic and illogic, and so forth. All such discussions attempt to unearth *aporias* (i.e., impassable logical contradictions) within binary structures with a mind to undermining the logicometaphysical groundwork upon which they are founded. In the place of this groundwork Derrida offers a different model that he calls the “logic of supplementarity.” This “other” logic has been repressed and excluded by the history of philosophy. Whereas binary logic operates within the limits of an exclusive disjunction (“either . . . or . . .”), Derrida’s undecidable logic of
supplementarity is a logic of “both . . . and . . .” that resists and disorganizes classical binary thinking. While binary logic is constructed on fundamental axioms such as the law of identity ($A = A$) and the law of noncontradiction ($\neg[A \cdot \neg A]$), “undecidable” logic is derived from the conjunction both $A$ and $\neg A$. Derrida provides many examples of this logic, most notably the *pharmakon*—a substance which is both a poison and a remedy (hence something that is both $A$ and $\neg A$ simultaneously). Because the *pharmakon* is both $A$ and $\neg A$, he says, it does not have any *absolute* identity or *essential* meaning; therefore, binary logic does not apply to it.

In his early essay “Structure, Sign and Play,” Derrida spurns all longing for presence and urges the deconstructive radical to “play the game without security” and to affirm “a world of signs” that “determines the noncenter otherwise than as the loss of center.” As he argues in *Différance*, moreover, “In the delineation of deconstruction everything is strategic and adventurous. Strategic because no transcendent truth present outside the field of writing can govern theologically the totality of the field. Adventurous because this strategy is not a simple strategy in the sense that strategy orients tactics according to a final goal, a *telos* or theme of domination, a mastery and ultimate reappropriation of the field.” The “adversary” of deconstruction, against which it wages its strategic and adventurous battle, is not a unitary presence but rather the multiplicity of totalized binary oppositions that are constantly and variously manifesting themselves within multiple sites. It does so, moreover, by “overturning,” “displacing,” “resisting,” “disorganizing,” and “transgressing” these oppositions wherever they arise.

Along with Foucault and Deleuze, Derrida insists that the principal vehicles through which binary opposition is manifested in multiple sites are representation and the suppression of difference. The two are related, as we have seen, because any act of representation is by definition an attempt to fix the identity of the other, to relegate it to the same. For Derrida, however, representation specifically involves the imposition of structures upon the play of differences—structures that involve both naming and logical deductions founded upon naming. This process inevitably involves privileging certain referents (“names”) as originary, as the very sources or foundations of thought, identifying them as the “absolutely central form[s] of Being” and presuming them to be transparently “present” to and constitutive of language. What deconstruction demonstrates is that the act of representation is always and already generated through a prior (and ultimately foundationless) process of textualization which is a “determination and . . . an effect.”

**Genealogical analysis**

Tidy generalizations about Foucault are neither easy nor particularly worthwhile to make. We might say, however, that Foucault is interested in
exploring the historical production of particular forms and processes of representation. Whereas Derrida’s aim is to show that all such representations fail to correspond to an underlying “presence,” Foucault’s aim is to show how and why particular forms of representation emerge historically. If there is a single pithy aphorism that captures the spirit of this project, moreover, it is Bacon’s Ipsa scientia potestas est (“knowledge itself is power”). Foucault’s perspective is of course very different from—indeed, in radical opposition to—the proto-Enlightenment scientism of Bacon, for whom knowledge is always power to do. As we shall see, knowledge for Foucault is rather power to say, on the one hand, and power to be said, on the other. This distinction underlies the metaphilosophical character of his analysis. Like Derrida, Foucault rejects the notion of transcendent “Knowledge” and instead focuses on the complex power relations that make possible, give rise to, and shape various conceptions of knowledge.

Foucault understands knowledge in a way that diverges sharply from traditional epistemology. In his early works (Madness and Civilization, The Birth of the Clinic, The Order of Things, and The Archeology of Knowledge), the principal object of his analysis is what he calls statements. Broadly speaking, a statement is any combination of signs that appears within a particular context and “enunciative field.” Context, in turn, refers to the primitive “backbone” of structures within which statements are situated (e.g., phonetics, grammar, etc.), whereas “enunciative field” refers to those structures themselves (e.g., particular languages). Statements are to be distinguished from propositions, which appear in the purely logical field, and sentences, which appear in the purely grammatical field.

For Foucault, all statements belong to a particular discourse, which is the set of all possible statements that can be articulated about a particular topic within a particular historical period. Discourse defines the boundaries surrounding what can and cannot be said, and to this extent shapes or constructs what can be known, that is, the object of knowledge itself. Foucault’s early works are principally concerned with the conditions of possibility (“historical a prioris”) that must be in place in order for certain statements (again, that which can be said) to actually emerge within a given discourse.29 They are also concerned with demarcating and analyzing discursive formations—the historical ruptures and discontinuities whereby new forms of discourse appear and supplant older forms of discourse. Foucault refers to this mode of analysis as “archeology.” The point of the archeological method is “to grasp the statement in the narrowness and singularity of its event; to determine the conditions of existence, to fix its limits as accurately as possible, to establish its correlations with other statements with which it may be linked, and to show what other forms of articulation it excludes.”30 For Foucault, knowledge is not a thing (e.g., a particular mental state) but rather a relation between statements within a particular discourse—specifically, the relation of what can be spoken or
thought to that which cannot. This method yields a radically nonteleological view of intellectual history. For thinkers of the Enlightenment (or “classical age” in Foucauldian terms), Truth is the absolute, a-historical, a-temporal, and universal telos of Reason, and Reason approaches Truth in a strictly linear progression over time. For Foucault, there is no linearity to the production and acquisition of knowledge—just a jagged, disjointed series of historical disruptions. There can be no absolute telos because the conditions for assigning truth to particular statements keep changing as discursive formations arise and are replaced.

Foucault’s three major works in the early period involve the application of the archeological method to a particular discourse. In *Madness and Civilization*, for example, he analyzes the discourse of madness vis-à-vis various historical institutions: the workhouse, the hospital, the asylum, etc. The appearance of a new discursive formation (e.g., the discourse of madness or insanity) gives rise to a new institutional form (e.g., the asylum), a new knowledge form (e.g., psychiatry) and a new object of knowledge (e.g., the insane). By reflecting on the conditions of possibility that were necessary in order for particular institutional forms to emerge, Foucault uncovers a new form of discursive knowledge that has been constructed in history. Another example: *The Order of Things* examines the conditions of possibility necessary for the emergence of scientific discourse during the “classical age” (what we commonly refer to as “the Enlightenment”), the salient feature of which was the representation of the (physical) world. In the nineteenth century, a new discursive formation came into being in which Man, rather than the world, became the object of scientific inquiry vis-à-vis three aspects of human existence: language, life, and labor. Each of these aspects in turn, now considered as particular objects of knowledge, gave rise to new forms of science—namely, philology, biology, and economics, respectively.

The early works seek to describe particular discursive formations (through “archeology”) but not to explain how and why they came about. Beginning with *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault turns his attention to analyses of how power relations produce knowledge within particular discursive formations (a method that he calls *genealogy*). To this end, he moves beyond discursive formations to a consideration of other forms of knowledge that are formed and constituted by power—namely, nondiscursive formations and the formation of subjects. Nondiscursive formations are practices through which power is manifested in particular forms (e.g., the prison, the asylum, the hospital, etc.). Subjects (e.g., prisoners, madmen, patients, etc.) in turn, are created through the process of being acted upon by nondiscursive practices. Classical political philosophers and jurists (e.g., Hobbes, Locke, Machiavelli, etc.) understood power in a purely juridical sense—that is, as a function of law and the coercive authority of the sovereign/state. Juridical or sovereign power is force exerted upon bodies (e.g., in torture or punishment). It is
repressive in nature; it prevents rather than allows, disables rather than enables, limits rather than expands, constrains rather than mobilizes, closes possibilities rather than opens them. For Foucault, power is not and cannot be centralized in the body of the sovereign or any form of coercive state apparatus. It exists not only at the macrolevel of society (e.g., in ideologies and coercive state apparatuses) but also at the microlevel of subjects (as in disciplinary power). The invisible surveillance of the Panopticon reveals a form of power that is dynamic, ubiquitous, and diffuse. It operates only in the relations of those to whom it applies. It can be exerted on individual bodies (anatomopower) or entire populations (biopower). It is not an absolute force but rather a relationship that exists between forces—a set of actions or forces exerted upon other actions or forces, or upon subjects. It is the capacity to act upon and to be acted upon, thus is not only repressive but productive as well.

When Foucault says that power “opens possibilities,” he is referring specifically to the capacity of power to bring about new discursive and nondiscursive formations and hence to produce new forms of knowledge. Because power is a mode of reciprocal affectivity, however, it not only produces knowledge but is produced by knowledge in turn. The range of possible statements circumscribed by a particular discursive formation is shaped by power relations, but the visible manifestation of power relations (for example, at the level of practices and the forms these practices take in institutions) is in turn shaped by what can be said. How does this reciprocal shaping take place? In the first instance, we recall that power makes actions possible and is made possible by them in turn. This is because all actions, once actualized by power, are related to other actions (hence other possible modalities of power). But to say, speak, utter, write, or communicate in any way is to perform a certain kind of action—namely, the action of producing statements within a particular discourse. Knowledge, then, is essentially the power to produce statements that are in turn capable of being related to other statements within a particular discourse. Truth for Foucault is simply the mechanism whereby this power is exercised:

“Truth” is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements . . . Each society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and authorities that enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.

With this basic outline in place, let us turn to a specific example of how power has produced knowledge in history.
In *Discipline and Punish*, as in the earlier archeological works, Foucault analyzes discursive formations surrounding the institutions of discipline and punishment. The change comes in his extending this analysis to nondiscursive formations (practices) and, most importantly, to the power relations that give rise to both discursive and nondiscursive formations. Thus, for example, Foucault discusses the nondiscursive formation of punishment actualized in the institution of the prison. Initially the prison was merely an extension of the juridical-sovereign power of the state, responsible solely for the administration of prison sentences (i.e., the actual confinement of a prisoner’s body for a specific period of time as determined by the courts). At a certain point the power to punish shifted from the juridical-sovereign apparatus to the prison itself; the prison system thereby became a “corrections system,” responsible for, among other things, the rehabilitation of criminals.33

The aforesaid shift in power brought about a new nondiscursive formation (“correction” or “rehabilitation”) that was actualized in a new institution (“the penitentiary”). This new formation, in turn, replaced a previous formation (“punishment”) that had its own form (“the prison”). More important, however, the formation of the penitentiary model also produced new forms of knowledge (*discursive formations*) including criminal justice, criminology, criminal psychology, prison science, forensics, and so forth. This is because, whereas juridical punishment took as its object the illicit act, penitentiary discipline focused on the perpetrator—that is, the criminal himself.34 In order to effectively exert disciplinary power on the bodies of prisoners, the penitentiary system came to regard the criminal as a type (“the delinquent”)—a form of subjectivity which exists before and is predisposed to the commission of punishable offenses. This subjectivity, in turn, constitutes the object of a whole new class of knowledge forms.

Power relations, then, produce nondiscursive formations at the level of practice (e.g., discipline), which are in turn made visible in institutions (e.g., the penitentiary). Moreover, these practices produce new forms of knowledge (e.g., criminology) that in turn produce new objects of knowledge at the level of the subject (e.g., the criminal type). This reveals another of Foucault’s essential insights: that subjects are produced and shaped by power relations vis-à-vis becoming objects of discourse (e.g., study, inquiry, analysis, classification, etc.) and practices (e.g., work, education, discipline, consumption, etc.). To paraphrase Quine (and turn him on his head), to be is to be the object of a praxis and the subject of a theory. My subjectivity is exhausted by the power exerted on me by others and the world and the power that I exert in turn.

A radical consequence of this view is that subjects, strictly speaking, are not ontologically basic in the way they are for, say, Sartre. This does not mean that individual subjectivities do not exist for Foucault—they do. His point is that there is no preexistent human nature or essence that provides the ontological foundation of subjectivity. The body alone is basic; and bodies
are constantly being created and recreated as subjects both by affecting other bodies and by being so affected. Disciplinary power, for example, is manifested in practice at the level of institutions (e.g., penitentiaries) and exerted upon bodies. This relation between the body and power gives rise to particular forms of subjectivity—namely, that of the criminal (whose body is affected by power) and, for example, the warden (whose body affects the bodies of others through power). Interestingly, this same power dynamic also gives rise to a third kind of subjectivity—that of the “expert”—whose role is not to exert power upon the body of the criminal but rather to constitute the criminal as an object of knowledge (e.g., by studying the effects of disciplinary power upon the criminal subject).

We can distinguish, in sum, at least three ways in which power produces knowledge-as-subjectivity. First, there is what we might call “disciplinary subjectivity,” which is produced when a body exerts power on other bodies in a particular nondiscursive practice at the level of institutions (e.g., police officers, generals, prison guards, bosses, teachers, etc.). Second, there is “disciplined subjectivity,” which is produced when a body is acted upon by a disciplinary subjectivity (e.g., criminals, soldiers, workers, patients, students, etc.). And third, there is “observer subjectivity,” which constitutes other subjects as objects of knowledge (e.g., medical doctors, psychiatrists, anthropologists, sociologists, etc.).

Poststructuralist anarchism?

As we have seen, the concept of representation figures heavily in Derrida’s and Foucault’s critique. For both, representation is arguably the principal vehicle by which relational concepts are subordinated to totalizing concepts: difference to identity, play to presence, multiplicity to singularity, immanence to transcendence, discourse to knowledge, power to sovereignty, subjectivation to subjectivity, and so on. We have already seen that representation plays a similar role in anarchist critique. This is one reason that Lewis Call counts “classical anarchism” among the historical precursors of poststructuralism, all of which, in turn, belong to the postmodern matrix. Call was not, however, the first scholar to associate postmodern philosophy with anarchism. Twenty-four years earlier Gayatry Spivak and Michael Ryan published a fairly groundbreaking analysis of the connections between poststructuralist philosophy (including that of Derrida, Deleuze, and Guattari) and the nouvel anarchisme of 1968. This was followed fourteen years later by Todd May’s seminal work The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism, which presented the first book-length argument that the political philosophy of Deleuze, Foucault, and Lyotard represents a new kind of anarchism. May was followed by Saul Newman (who refers to “postanarchism”) as well as Lewis Call (who refers
to “postmodern anarchism”\textsuperscript{38}). The common theme of these and related works is that poststructuralist political philosophy is an anarchism, one that unconsciously borrows several key ideas from “classical anarchism” and proceeds to reaffirm, elaborate, and ultimate “improve” these ideas.

My own argument is that (a) the so-called classical anarchists had already discovered several of the insights attributed to postmodernists more than a century before these thinkers appeared on the scene; (b) that anarchism, consequently, is a postmodern political philosophy and not (or not just) the other way around; (c) that poststructuralist political philosophy, particularly as developed by Deleuze and Foucault, indeed elaborates, expands, and even, to a certain extent, “improves” upon “classical” anarchist ideas, but not in the way, or for the reasons, that May et al. suggest; and (d) that rather than regard poststructuralist political philosophy as a totally “new” and “ready-made” form of anarchism, it is better to view poststructuralist ideas as potential ingredients for the development of new anarchist recipes. As I have already offered support for (a) and (b), subsequent sections will mostly focus on defending the other claims. In order to do so, however, we ought briefly to consider the political context within which poststructuralism emerged and, by extension, the role and status of anarchism within that context.

From Proudhon to the Paris commune, anarchist movements occupied an important place in the history of French radical politics until the end of the Second World War, when they were driven to near extinction by the triumph of the Soviet-backed French Communist Party (PCF).\textsuperscript{39} This situation had begun to change dramatically by the early 1960s, however, owing to the increasing influence of so-called New Left theory, the rise of the youth movement, and growing antagonism on the left toward Soviet-sponsored terrorism. For the first time in a long time, leftist intellectuals were no longer content to make apologies for Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy and were instead seeking viable alternatives to it. The visible culmination of this process was, of course, the uprisings of May 1968 in France, which marked the first significant revolutionary event in the twentieth century that was not only carried out independently of the Communist Party, but in flagrant opposition to it as well. Unlike the fundamentally vanguardist revolutions of Russia, China, Vietnam, and Cuba, the Paris Spring was fomented in mostly spontaneous fashion by a decentralized and nonhierarchical confederation of students and workers who harbored a common skepticism toward grand political narratives. At the forefront of this confederation were the Enragés, a group of revolutionaries who sought to reinvent leftist theory and practice.\textsuperscript{40}

Unlike the FAI/CNT during the Spanish Civil War, the Enragés were not so much an organized faction as a loose collection of individuals representing a variety of political persuasions. They were not anarchists in the narrow ideological sense of belonging to a particular anarchist movement or
endorsing a particular theory of anarchism (e.g., anarchosyndicalism). On the contrary, the Enragés had little to do with the French Anarchist Federation, nor with any other residua of the pre-1945 European anarchist movement. While some, like Daniel Cohn-Bendit, were indeed associated with organizations more closely related to traditional anarchism, several belonged to Marxist-oriented groups such as the Situationist International, Socialisme ou Barbarie, and Informations Correspondance Ouvrières. As Cohn-Bendit stated of his comrades, “Some read Marx, of course, perhaps Bakunin, and of the moderns, Althusser, Mao, Guevara, Lefebvre. Nearly all the militants of the movement have read Sartre.” Other influences included: “Trotskyist criticism of Soviet society . . . Mao Tse-tung on the question of the revolutionary alliance with the peasant masses, and Marcuse when it comes to demonstrating the repressive nature of modern society or when the latter proclaims that everything must be destroyed in order that everything could be rebuilt.” Classical anarchist theories and movements, as such, were only one source of inspiration among many, and as with all such sources, the Enragés did not regard them as infallible.

The Enragés were “anarchistic” (if not altogether “anarchists”) in the more important and fundamental sense of advocating certain principles, such as opposition to centralization, hierarchy, and repressive power, that are common to all forms of anarchism. It is precisely the realization of such principles in practice, however, that made May 1968 such a decisive turning point in the history of radical politics. For example, despite the enormous influence they enjoyed throughout the uprisings, the Enragés refused to betray their antiauthoritarian beliefs by taking on leadership roles of any sort. Moreover, they repeatedly thwarted attempts by others to consolidate the leadership of the movement, thereby preventing its appropriation by outside political parties. Ultimately, centralized leadership was replaced with democratic, self-managing councils such as the Sorbonne Student Soviet and the Commune of Nantes. As a result, the anarchist-controlled universities “became cities unto themselves, with virtually everything necessary for normal life.”

Although such successes were short-lived, the uprisings having been quelled after only six weeks, the events of May 1968 had far-reaching and lasting effects. Among other things, they marked the end of the Stalinist PCF’s longstanding dominance over the French Left, laid the foundation for the German and Italian Autonomia movements of the 1970s and 1980s, and would eventually exert a profound influence on various antiglobalization movements of the 1990s. They also radicalized a whole new generation of intellectuals including Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze. Unlike his longtime friend and collaborator Felix Guattari, who had been involved in radical activism since the early 1960s, Deleuze did not become politically active until after 1968. “From this period onward,” writes Paul Patton, “he became involved with a variety of groups and causes, including the Groupe
d’Information sur les Prisons (GIP) begun by Foucault and others in 1972.” More importantly, Deleuze’s prior commitment to speculative metaphysics gave way to a deep interest in political philosophy as he attempted to make sense of the political practices he encountered in 1968. Four years later, in 1972, Deleuze and Guattari published *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, the first of a two-volume work on political philosophy. The second volume, entitled *A Thousand Plateaus*, followed eight years later.

As we have already mentioned, Todd May has argued at great length that the political theories of Foucault, Deleuze, and Lyotard (whom I shall not discuss here) were deeply influenced by the Paris Spring and the anarchists and antiauthoritarians who helped foment it. May thinks this explains, at least in part, why the political philosophy of poststructuralism developed into a kind of anarchism. At the same time, he acknowledges that Foucault and Deleuze were in all likelihood completely unfamiliar with the so-called classical anarchists, which suggests that anarchism came to them secondhand, by way of the Enragés and the Situationists. This strikes me as plausible enough, but it is not the only possible explanation. We noted earlier that certain of Nietzsche’s ideas are remarkably similar to those of Proudhon, Bakunin, and other anarchists even though it is certain that Nietzsche was unfamiliar with their writings (and vice versa, at least until after Nietzsche’s death). Given the enormous influence of Nietzsche upon both Foucault and Deleuze, it is also possible that they inherited a portion of Nietzsche’s unconscious anarchism (or the anarchists’ unconscious Nietzscheanism, depending upon how one looks at it).

**Schizoanalysis**

Having already discussed Foucault at some length, let us turn our attention to Deleuze. The primary focus of Deleuze’s early works is metaphysics and the history of philosophy. Though they can hardly be called “apolitical,” the political dimension of books such as *Difference and Repetition* (1968) tends to be so vague and understated as to require extraction by skilled exegetes. This is not true of the two volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, the political emphasis of which is made quite explicit at the outset. (Like all of Deleuze’s works, however, *C & S* is so formidably dense and complicated that we cannot begin to do it justice in an essay of this size. Instead we will limit ourselves to a brief “thematic overview” of those ideas and concepts which illustrate the anarchistic dimension of Deleuze’s political thought according to May.) The first is Deleuze’s critique of the subject. As we noted earlier, liberal political philosophy—not to speak of modern philosophy more generally—begins with the concept of the individual, self-identical subject (as opposed to nonsubjective concepts such as essences, substances, or, in the political realm, sovereigns). Within this framework, the subject is
not only conceptually distinct from the world but substantially distinct; it is, in a word, beyond or transcendent of it. This is because the subject (which is immaterial and active) constitutes the world (which is physical and passive). To this extent, moreover, the subject is superior to the world because it gives form and content to an otherwise empty and inert “prime matter.”

Deleuze denies this dualistic picture of reality. Following Spinoza, he instead claims that there is only one Being or substance that expresses itself differentially through an infinite number of attributes (chief among them thought and extension), which are in turn expressed through an infinite number of modes. Because Being is univocal, the world and everything it contains—from physical objects to mental constructions—cannot be articulated in terms of relations of self-contained identity. It does not follow from anything, it is not subordinated to anything, and it does not resemble anything; it expresses and is expressed in turn:

Expression is on the one hand an explication, an unfolding of what expresses itself, the One manifesting itself in the Many . . . Its multiple expression, on the other hand, involves Unity. The One remains involved in whatever expresses it, imprinted in what unfolds it, immanent in whatever manifests it.

Like the anarchists, Deleuze holds that all being is immanent; there is no transcendence, thus there are no self-contained identities outside the world (gods, values, subjectivities, etc.) that determine or constitute it. Furthermore, substance is at root a difference that exists virtually in the past and is actualized in various modes in the present. These modes are not stable identities but multiplicities, “swarms of difference,” complicated intersections of forces. “There is no universal or transcendental subject, which could function as the bearer of universal human rights, but only variable and historically diverse ‘processes of subjectivation.’” The Cartesio-Kantian subject that underlies modern politico-philosophical thought is therefore a fiction. It neither transcends the world nor is transcended by anything else in turn.

Another key concept that underlies much modern thought—the concept of rationality—involves an alleged direction of fit between our thoughts and the world (theoretical rationality) or between our desires/moral beliefs and our actions (practical rationality). Both conceptions involve the idea of representation—our thoughts are rational to the extent that they accurately represent the world (i.e., are true); our actions, in turn, are rational to the extent that they accurately represent our desires/moral beliefs. Deleuze regards this concept of rationality, no less than the concept of the subject, as a fiction: “Representation fails to capture the affirmed world of difference. Representation has only a single center, a unique and receding perspective, and in consequence a false depth. It mediates everything, but mobilizes and
moves nothing.” The problem with this “dogmatic image of thought” is that it relies on representation, and difference (read: substance) cannot be represented through linguistic categories. This is because linguistic categorization assumes that the things it aims to represent are fixed, stable, and self-identical, which, as we noted above, they are not. The difference at the heart of being is fluid, constantly overflowing the boundaries of representation. In the place of representational language, Deleuze offers what he calls “logic of sense” (which, for the sake of brevity, we shall not explore here.)

Deleuze’s political philosophy as outlined in the two volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* may be seen as an extension of his earlier ontology. As we noted earlier, liberal political theory begins with “already constituted individuals, each with his or her interests,” just as the dogmatic image of thought begins with “already constituted identities, each with its qualities.” The foundational question of liberalism posed earlier—namely, “why and under what conditions should these individuals come together and allow themselves to be governed”—is a question concerning the relation between individuals and governments. Like the relation between mind and world in the dogmatic image of thought, the relation between individuals and governments in liberal theory is one of representation. As Todd May notes, “If a government is to be a legitimate one, the interests of each individual must be represented in the public realm occupied by government . . . [Thus] liberal theory is a form of the dogmatic image of thought.”

Just as Deleuze replaces the foundational modern concept of identity with the concept of difference, so does he replace the concept of the individual subject with other concepts such as the *machine*. In Deleuze’s political ontology, individuals, communities, states, and the various relations that obtain among them are all understood as machines or machinic processes. Unlike an organism, which is “a bounded whole with an identity and an end,” and unlike a mechanism, which is “a closed machine with a specific function,” a machine is “nothing more than its connections; it is not made by anything, and has no closed identity.” Whereas liberalism regards the relation between individuals and society mechanistically (i.e., as a “specific set of connections”) or organically (i.e., “as a self-organizing whole”), Deleuze regards this relation *machinically* (i.e., “as only one level of connections that can be discussed”).

Unlike the static, self-contained, and transcendental subject of liberal theory, machines are fluid, mobile, and dynamic; they are capable of changing, of connecting and reconnecting with other machines, they are immanent to the connections they make, and vice versa. In creating these connections, moreover, machines produce and are produced by desires (hence “desiring-machines”). The liberal subject consents to be governed because it lacks the ability to realize its own interests independently of the state. Machines, in contrast, “do not operate out of lack. They do not seek to
fulfill needs. Instead they produce connections. Moreover, the connections they produce are not pre-given . . . Machines are productive in unpredictable and often novel ways.” There are different types of machines which can be distinguished according to how they operate. In all cases, machines are driven by power or force or desire.

Anarchism, as we have seen, places an enormous emphasis on what we referred to as “closed” and “coercive” power. The same is true of Foucault. As for Deleuze, he, too, discusses power—especially in his book on Foucault. However, he is generally more inclined to speak in terms of forces—that is, active versus reactive forces in his book on Nietzsche, forces of desire versus social forces in Anti-Oedipus, and so forth. For purposes of this section, we will follow May in regarding “force” as more or less synonymous with “power,” at least in the Foucauldian sense. Our initial question concerns what force is and how it operates according to Deleuze. It should be noted, first of all, that Deleuze’s conception of force, as opposed to Foucault’s conception of power, is unambiguously ontological. Fundamental to Deleuze’s ontology is the idea that reality is constituted by the material actualization of forces, which are themselves virtual capacities to affect and be affected by other forces. Forces enter into relations with other forces by chance, but the nature or character of such relations once expressed is determined by an internal and immanent principle, variously described as “desire” (in Capitalism and Schizophrenia), “will to power” (in Nietzsche and Philosophy), and so forth. Desire itself is a virtual force that exists immanently in all particular relations and expressions of force; all particular relations and expressions of force exist in a reciprocally constitutive relationship with desire.

In one famously aphoristic passage, Deleuze claims there are only forces of desire and social forces. Although Deleuze tends to describe desire as a creative force (in the sense that it produces rather than represses its object) and the social as a force that “dams up, channels, and regulates” flows of desire, he does not mean to suggest that there are two distinct kinds of forces that differentially affect objects exterior to themselves. On the contrary, “the social field is immediately invested by desire . . . the historically determined product of desire.” Desire is a single, virtual force that is immanent to all relations and expressions of forces manifested concretely in particular “assemblages” (complex processes by which desire is organized, as well as the network of circuits through which these processes operate).

As Ronald Bogue notes, both Foucauldian power and Deleuzean desire/force “permeate all social relations, penetrates the body at a subindividual level, and implements an immediately political investment of the body within larger circuits of actions and production.” Existing things are constituted (“assembled”) by forces that are immanent to them; “concrete social fields” are therefore affects of complex movements and connections of forces that vary in intensity over time. For Deleuze, force/desire is as such does not
have any “natural” mode of affecting or being affected. The character of forces is determined by their qualities and affects as express in their actual relations with other forces. There are reactive forces, which are defined by their resistance to change (activity), which are conditioned in various ways by superior forces, and which act by “separat[ing] active force from it can do [and by taking] away a part or almost all of its power.”86 So, too, there are active forces, which are defined by their capacity to transform themselves, which condition inferior forces in various ways, which express themselves creatively to the fullest extent of their ability and “go to the limit of what [they] can do.”87

Deleuze further argues that “in order to be the source of the qualities of force . . . the will to power [or desire as such] must itself have qualities, particularly fluent ones, even more subtle than those of force . . . the immediate qualities of becoming itself.”88 These qualities of desire, which are also described as qualities of power or life,89 are affirmation and negation or denial. They are immanent to every force, every expression of or relation among forces; actual force is not only determined by its own quality (its sense) but by the quality of the virtual desire or will to power immanent to it (its value). As Patton notes, “there is an affinity or complicity between affirmation and active force, and between negation and reactive force, but never a confusion of these two levels.”90 Thus active force can deny life, or, what comes to the same, nihilistic forces can become active. Likewise, reactive force can affirm life, or, what comes to the same, vital forces can become reactive.91 The same is true of various types of assemblages: as complex networks of force and desire they contain with themselves both the capacity for creativity and life as well as “bureaucratic or fascist” capacities which seek to stifle creativity or annihilate life.92 Again, force does not act or works upon preexistent objects; rather, everything that exists is created or transformed or destroyed in a reciprocal relation to the particular assemblage to which it belongs.

As May notes by way of summary, “power does not suppress desire; rather it is implicated in every assemblage of desire.”93 Given the ubiquitous and ontologically constitutive nature of force, it goes without saying that force simpliciter cannot be “abolished” or even “resisted.” As we shall see, this does not mean that repressive social forces cannot be opposed. It does imply, however, that for Deleuze (as for Spinoza) the crucial question is not whether and how resistance is possible, but rather how and why desire comes to repress and ultimately destroy itself in the first place.94 Answering this question requires, among other things, theoretical analyses of the various assemblages that come into being over time (vis-à-vis their affects, their lines of flight, etc.) as well as experimentation at the level of praxis. We will say more about this below, but for the time being it is enough to note that Deleuze and Foucault, like the anarchists before them, reject the repressive thesis—that is, they reject the idea that power is “repressive” by nature. All are agreed that power can be active or reactive, creative or destructive,
repressive or liberatory. More importantly, they are agreed that power is to some extent ontologically constitutive (i.e., that it produces reality) and that it is immanent to individuals and society as opposed to an external or transcendent entity.

Foucault and Deleuze also reject the concentration thesis—that is, the idea that repressive forces emanate from a unitary source rather than multiple sites. In Deleuze’s philosophy, the interplay of multiple forces within and among multiple nodes, which are themselves interconnected via complex networks, is precisely what gives rise to the social world (this is what he means when he suggests that power is “rhizomatic” as opposed to “arboreal”). This is not to say that power does not become concentrated within certain sites; indeed, much of Capitalism and Schizophrenia is given over to an analysis of how such concentrations express themselves in particular political and economic forms, how these forms operate, and so forth. These analyses are similar to Foucault’s genealogies insofar as they seek to unearth how power (or force or desire), as manifested in concrete assemblages works. For Foucault, a genealogy of actuality is simultaneously a cartography of possibility: forms of power always produce forms of resistance, thus in analyzing how power operates one also analyzes how power is or can be resisted. Similarly, for Deleuze, “to analyze a social formation is to unravel the variable lines and singular processes that constitute it as a multiplicity: their connections and disjunctions, their circuits and short-circuits and, above all, their possible transformations.” A social formation is not just defined by its actual operation, but also by its “lines of flight,” the internal conditions of possibility for movement, transformation, “detrimentalization.” Although the rejection of the concentration thesis entails a greater number of explananda, which in turn requires a greater number of explanantia, we have already seen, in the case of the anarchists, that different and multiple forms of domination ensure that different and multiple forms of resistance are possible.

Even a cursory summary of the complicated political ontology outlined in Capitalism and Schizophrenia would well exceed the scope of this work. Fortunately, however, such a summary is unnecessary. For our purposes, it is enough to note that Deleuze’s robust ontologization of politics is what distinguishes him most vividly from the so-called classical anarchists. Like them, he denies the existence of Kantian pure reason or any other model of universal, transcendent rationality. So, too, he denies the existence of a universal, transcendent subject. As Daniel Smith writes, “What one finds in any given socio-political assemblage is not a universal ‘Reason,’ but variable processes of rationalization; not universalizable ‘subjects,’ but variable processes of subjectivation; not the ‘whole,’ the ‘one,’ or ‘objects,’ but rather knots of totalization, focuses of unification, and processes of objectivation.” Generally speaking, Deleuze, like Proudhon, takes the idea of social physics in a radically literal direction by shifting political analysis to the level of presocial, presubjective processes, operations, and
relations of force. This shift requires, among other things, the invention of new concepts as well as the redefinition of extant concepts using complex, technical, and highly idiosyncratic terminology. (The same is not true, or as true, of Foucault, who does not appear to ontologize power and power relations to such an extreme degree, if he does so at all.)

We need not go into exhaustive detail about “machines,” “becomings,” “molar lines,” and the like to note that (a) Deleuze shares the anarchists’ disdain for “abstractions,” which he typically regards as “anti-life”; (b) that the most objectionable form of abstraction for Deleuze, as for the anarchists, is representation; and (c) that Deleuze believes that representation at the macropolitical level arises from representation at the micropolitical level. As Todd May notes regarding (b):

The power to represent people to themselves is oppressive in itself: practices of telling people who they are and what they want erect a barrier between them and who (or what) they can create themselves to be. *Anti-Oedipus* can be read in this light as a work whose project is to demolish current representational barriers between people and who they can become, and in that sense Foucault states its point exactly when he calls it a “book of ethics.”

As for (c), Deleuze locates the origin of representational practices in micropolitical orders, identities, and regulatory practices (what he calls “molar lines”) and in the “overcoding” of these “molar lines” by more complicated power mechanisms (what he calls “abstract machines”). A particular society may represent individuals in terms of a variety of constructed identities—for example, familial identities (son), educational identities (school child), occupational identities (professional) racial identities (Caucasian) and so on. That same society may also represent individuals via a system of normalized ordering—for example, from son to school child to professional, and so forth.

Alongside systems of ordering and identifying, there may be other distinct regulatory practices such as “the minute observation and intervention into the behavior of bodies, a distinction between the abnormal and the normal in regard to human desire and behavior, and a constant surveillance of individuals.” For Foucault, as we have seen, discipline is nothing more than the collocation of these practices, the concrete manifestation of which is the prison. Discipline itself “does not exist as a concrete reality one could point to or isolate from the various forms it takes.” Instead, Deleuze describes discipline as an “abstract machine” that collocates diverse representational practices (i.e., “overcodes molar lines”) into a single regime of power.

For Deleuze, the state does not create representations of its own. Rather, “it makes points resonate together, points that are not necessarily already
town-poles but very diverse points of order, geographic, ethnic, linguistic, moral, economic, technological particularities.” 107 More specifically, the state helps to actualize a variety of abstract machines (e.g., discipline), to bring them into a relationship of interdependence with itself and with each other, to expand and maintain them. 108 At the same time, the state “territorializes”—that is, it marshals these machines against the various micropolitical forces, identities, multiplicities, relations, and so forth that threaten or oppose it (“molecular lines” or “lines of flight,” as well as the various abstract machines which could bring these lines together—e.g., radical political movements). Capitalism, on the other hand, is an axiomatic “defined not solely by decoded flows, but by the generalized decoding of flows, the new massive deterritorialization, the conjunction of deterritorialized flows.” 109

A given social formation is a dynamic system comprised of various “flows”—of matter, people, commodities, money, labor, and so on. Whereas the medieval state, for example, “overcoded” flows of people, land, labor, and so forth, by subordinating them to the abstract machine of serfdom, capitalism liberated (“decoded”) these flows by wresting control of labor and property from the state (“deterritorialization”). The decoded flows initially escape along a line of flight: workers are free to sell their labor, inventors can create and sell products, entrepreneurs can buy patent rights to these products and invest in their manufacture, and so on. Capitalism does not establish codes—that is, rules that govern relationships among specific people or between specific people and things—but by establishing a generic (“axiomatic”) framework for governing relationships among diverse people and things. It accomplishes the latter by reterritorializing the lines of flight it frees from codes, subordinating decoded flows to exchange value, and bounding the circulation of flows within the orbit of the capitalist axiomatic. This is what the anarchists referred to as “appropriation”—the seemingly magic ability of capitalism to transform the fruits of freedom and creativity (“decoded flows”) into commodities to be bought and sold. (Early capitalism transformed labor into a commodity; late capitalism does the same thing with lifestyles, modes of subjectivity, and even “radical” ideologies.)

The latter point underscores an important feature of social formations more generally, one that was recognized as well by the anarchists. Social existence writ large, no less than the macropolitical institutions or micropolitical practices that comprise it, is a battlefield of forces, none of which have an “intrinsic” or “essential” nature. As Bakunin and Deleuze both release, one and the same force can be at odds with itself—for example, within a single human being, or a group, or a federation of groups. The tension produced by a force simultaneously seeking to escape and reconquer itself is precisely what allows ostensibly “revolutionary” or “liberatory” movements (e.g., Bolshevism) to occasionally metamorphose into totalitarian regimes (e.g., Stalinist Russia). For the anarchists, the prefigurative ethic is intended in
part to maintain, as much as possible, a balance or equilibrium among forces or within a single force.

**A critique of May’s poststructuralist anarchism**

Such are the various parallels and points of intersection that have led Todd May and others to conclude that there is a strong affinity between “classical” anarchism and the poststructuralist philosophies of Foucault and Deleuze. As I noted early, however, much of *The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism* is devoted to showing that there are irreconcilable differences between the two. For example, May repeatedly alleges that “classical” anarchism depends upon an essentialistic conception of human nature, that the “classical” anarchists endorse the repressive thesis, and so forth. Although I and others have already refuted these charges, I mention them again because they constitute a major weakness of *Poststructuralism Anarchism* and related books. The works of several self-identified “postanarchists” have been characterized by remarkably limited engagement with actual anarchist texts coupled with problematic exegesis of the sort just cited. In fact, the very idea of “classical anarchism” is, as I noted at the outset, a straw man.

There can be no doubt that poststructuralist political philosophy elaborates, expands, and even improves upon “classical” anarchist ideas. Deleuze and Foucault cut a much wider and more incisive swathe, and this makes sense given the mid-twentieth-century context in which they thought and wrote. Nor could anyone reasonably deny that their political critique is much more sophisticated than that of Proudhon or Kropotkin, even if it is not quite as novel as some have claimed. Indeed, it is simply wrong to claim that poststructuralist political philosophy represents a totally “new” form of anarchism that was “discovered,” complete and intact, by the likes of Todd May and Saul Newman. This has not only to do with the foregoing evidence, nor with the postanarchists’ occasional tendency to misinterpret or altogether ignore that evidence, but also with their habit of misconstruing important aspects of poststructuralist philosophy, chief among them the status of normativity.

In the final chapter of *The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism*, for example, May rehearses the oft-repeated accusation that poststructuralism engenders a kind of moral nihilism. Such an accusation is a product, he thinks, of the poststructuralists’ general unwillingness to “refer existence to transcendent values,” which is surely the dominant strategy of much traditional moral philosophy in the West. Strangely, May goes to great lengths to explain why Deleuze rejects classical “ethics,” only
to argue that certain of Deleuze’s other commitments implicitly contradict this rejection. As he notes:

[Deleuze] praises Spinoza’s *Ethics*, for instance, because it “replaces Morality . . .” For Deleuze, as for Nietzsche, the project of measuring life against external standards constitutes a betrayal rather than an affirmation of life. Alternatively, an ethics of the kind Spinoza has offered . . . seeks out the possibilities life offers rather than denigrating life by appeal to “transcendent values.” Casting the matter in more purely Nietzschean terms, the project of evaluating a life by reference to external standards is one of allowing reactive forces to dominate active ones, where reactive forces are those which “separate active force from what it can do.”

In the same breath, however, May argues that Deleuze provides no explicit means by which to distinguish active forces from reactive ones beyond a vague appeal to “experimentation.” Such a means, he thinks, can only be discovered by extracting “several intertwined and not very controversial ethical principles” from the hidden nooks of the Deleuzean corpus. The first such principle, which May terms the “antirepresentationalist principle,” holds that “practices of representing others to themselves—either in who they are or in what they want—ought, as much as possible to be avoided.” The second, which he calls the “principle of difference,” holds that “alternative practices, all things being equal, ought to be allowed to flourish and even to be promoted.” In both cases, May provides ample textual evidence to demonstrate that Deleuze (inter alia) is implicitly committed to the values underlying these principles. This claim, which we ourselves have already made, is surely correct. It is very clear from the foregoing that “Gilles Deleuze’s commitment to promoting different ways of thinking and acting is a central aspect of his thought.” What I take issue with is the idea that the avowal of such values, implicit or otherwise, is a fortiori an avowal of specific normative principles.

As May himself notes, the defining characteristics of traditional normativity are precisely abstraction, universality, and exteriority to life, all of which, as we have seen, Deleuze rejects. Incredibly, May goes on to argue that Deleuze’s unwillingness to prescribe universalizable norms is itself motivated by a commitment to the aforesaid principles. Such an argument, however, amounts to claiming that Deleuze is self-referentially inconsistent; it does not lead, as May thinks, to a general acquittal on the charge of moral nihilism. If it is true that Deleuze scorns representation and affirms difference—and we have shown that it is—then surely the operative values cannot be articulated and justified by means of representation or the suppression of difference except on pain of dire contradiction. Of course this is precisely the opposite of what May wishes to argue.
The normative principles that May attributes to Deleuze are problematic not because they are categorical but because they are transcendent—they stand outside any and all particular assemblages and so cannot be self-reflexive. It is easy to see how such principles, however radical they may seem on the surface, can become totalitarian. To take a somewhat far-fetched but relevant example, the principle of antirepresentationalism would effectively outlaw any processes of majoritarian representation, even in banal contexts such as homecoming competitions or bowling leagues. Likewise, the principle of difference would permit, or at least does not obviously prohibit, morally suspect “alternative practices” such as thrill-killing or rape. A year after the publication of *Postructuralist Anarchism*, May later amended his views somewhat, expanding them into a comprehensive moral theory.\textsuperscript{120} The foundation of this theory is a revised version of the antirepresentationalist principle, according to which “people ought not, other things being equal, to engage in practices whose effect, among others, is the representation of certain intentional lives as either intrinsically superior or intrinsically inferior to others.”\textsuperscript{121} The principle of difference drops out of the picture altogether.

May buttresses the revised antirepresentationalist principle with what he calls a “multi-value consequentialism.”\textsuperscript{122} After suggesting that “moral values” are “goods to which people ought to have access,”\textsuperscript{123} he proceeds to argue that the “values” entailed by the antirepresentationalist principle include “rights, just distributions, and other goods.”\textsuperscript{124} May’s theory judges actions as “right” to the extent that (a) they do not violate the antirepresentationalist principle nor (b) result in denying people goods to which they ought to have access. Whatever substantive objections one might raise against this theory would be quite beside the point. The problem, as we have already noted, is that the very idea of a “moral theory of poststructuralism” based on universalizable normative principles is oxymoronic. What distinguishes normativity from conventional modes of practical reasoning is the universalizable or categorical nature of the rational reason in question—that is, the fact that in all relevantly similar circumstances it applies equally to all moral agents at all times. Typically this rational reason has taken the form of a universal moral principle, and to this extent, May’s “principle of antirepresentationalism” is no different from Kant’s categorical imperative or Bentham’s principle of utility. It is precisely this universal and abstract character that makes normativity “transcendent” in the sense outlined earlier, and poststructuralism is nothing if not a systematic repudiation of transcendence.

Some would suggest that normativity is attractive precisely because it provides us with a means by which to guide our actions. It is not at all clear, however, that this requires transcendent moral principles, especially if ordinary practical reasoning will suffice. The prefigurative principle, which demands that the means employed be consistent with the desired ends, is a practical principle or hypothetical imperative of the form “if you want
X you ought to do Y.” Anarchists have long argued that incongruity between the means and the end is not pragmatically conducive to the achievement of the end. As such, it is not the case that one ought to do Y because it is the “morally right” thing to do, but because it is the most sensible course of action given one’s desire to achieve X. A principle of this sort can be regarded as categorical or even universalizable, but it is scarcely “transcendent.” Its justification is immanent to its purpose, just as the means are immanent to the desired end. It provides us with a viable categorical norm without any concept of transcendence.

It may be possible to preserve some semblance of normativity in Deleuze. Paul Patton has suggested that the “the overriding norm [for Deleuze] is that of deterritorialization.” In shifting the focus of political philosophy from static, transcendent concepts like “the subject” and “rationality” to dynamic, immanent concepts such as “machinic processes,” “processes of subjectivication,” and so forth, Deleuze also shifts the focus of normativity from extensive to intensive criteria of normative judgment. As Patton notes, “What a given assemblage is capable of doing or becoming is determined by the lines of flight or deterritorialization it can sustain.” Thus normative criteria will not only demarcate the application of power by a given assemblage but “will also find the means for the critique and modification of those norms.” Put another way, political normativity must be capable not only of judging the activity of assemblages, but also of judging the norms to which said assemblages gives rise. Such normativity is precisely what prevents the latent “microfascism of the avant garde” from blossoming into full-blown totalitarianism.

Transcendent normativity generates norms that do not and cannot take account of their own deterritorialization or lines of flight. Because the norms follow from, and so are justified by, the transcendent ground, they cannot provide self-reflexive criteria by which to question themselves, critique themselves, or otherwise act upon themselves. The concept of normativity as deterritorialization, on the contrary, does not generate norms. Rather, it stipulates that “what ‘must’ always remain normative is the ability to critique and transform existing norms, that is to create something new . . . [o]ne cannot have preexisting norms or criteria for the new; otherwise it would not be new, but already foreseen.” Absolute deterritorialization is therefore categorical, insofar as it applies to every possible norm as such, but it is not transcendent; rather, it is immanent to whatever norms (and, by extension, assemblages) constitute it. (There can be no deterritorialization without a specific assemblage; thus normativity of deterritorialization both constitutes and is constituted by the particular norms/assemblages to which it applies.)

Considered as such, normativity as deterritorialization is ultimately a kind of “pragmatic” normativity. It determines what norms ought or ought not be adopted in concrete social formations according to a pragmatic
consideration—namely, whether the norm adopted is capable of being critiqued and transformed. This further entails that a norm cannot be adopted if it prevents other norms from being critiqued and transformed. We might say, then, that a norm must (a) be self-reflexive and (b) its adoption must not inhibit the self-reflexivity of norms. Because normativity is a process that constitutes and is constituted by other processes, it is dynamic, and to this extent we should occasionally expect norms to become perverted or otherwise outlive their usefulness. Pragmatic normativity provides a metanorm that is produced by the adoption of contingent norms but stands above them as a kind of sentinel; to this extent it is categorical without being transcendent.

Such a view of normativity, while interesting and promising, is not without its problems. Among other things, it does not specify when it is advisable or acceptable to critique or transform particular norms; rather, it only stipulates that any norm must in principle be open to critique and transformation. For example, suppose I belong to a society that adopts vegetarianism as a norm. The adoption of this norm obviously precludes other norms, such as carnivorousness. Is this a reason to reject it? Not necessarily. As long as we remain open to other possibilities, the norm is at least prima facie justified. But this by itself does not explain (a) what reasons we may have to adopt a vegetarian rather than a carnivorous norm in the first place, and (b) what reasons we may have to ultimately reject a vegetarian norm in favor of some other norm. Such an explanation would require a theory of value—that is, an axiological criterion that determines what things are worth promoting/discouraging vis-à-vis the adoption of normative principles.

Whether or not we ought to have done with normativity, we cannot simply ignore the charge of moral nihilism. The problem with May is that he cannot see a way around this charge without normativity or morality—that is, without some reference to laws, norms, imperatives, duties, obligations, permissions, and principles that determine how human beings ought and ought not to act; that do not just describe the way the world is but rather prescribe the way it ought to be. As we have already had occasion to mention, however, ethics is not concerned merely with expressing what is right (i.e., what ought to be done); it is also concerned with determining what is good (i.e., what is worth being valued, promoted, protected, pursued, etc.). The latter is the purview of axiology, the study of what is good or valuable for human beings and, by extension, what constitutes a good life.

The ethical question of “how one should live” (i.e., what constitutes a good life) was of primary importance “involves a particular way of approaching life . . . [i]t views life as having a shape: a life—a human life—is a whole that might be approached by way of asking how it should unfold.” For the ancients, a life is judged vis-à-vis its relationship to the cosmological order—the “great chain of being”—in which it is situated. At the summit of this order is the Form of the Good (for Plato) or the specifically human telos known as
eudaimonia (for Aristotle) “which ought to be mirrored or conformed to by the lives of human beings.” The good or the valuable is “above” the realm of human experience because it is, in some sense, more real. Consequently, the things of this world not only strive to become better but to be—that is, to exist in the fullest and most real sense. In the case of human beings, success in this striving is manifested in arête—that is, excellence or virtue. The question how should one live? was gradually replaced by another one—namely, how should one act? Enlightenment philosophers such as Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham were no longer concerned with what constitutes a good life (the ethical question) but with how one ought or ought not to act (the normative or moral question). In rejecting the idea of a “great chain of being”—that is, a qualitative ontological hierarchy with God (or the Forms) at the top and brute matter at the bottom—modern moral philosophy shifted the focus of moral judgment to individual subjects, as opposed to the relation of human life in general to a larger cosmological whole. Consequently, morality is no longer concerned with the shape lives take; rather, it establishes the moral boundaries or limits of human action. As long as one acts within said boundaries, the direction one’s life as a whole takes is entirely up to him or her; it is, in a word, a “private concern.”

Morality, as opposed to ethics, is not “integrated into our lives”; rather, “it exists out there, apart from the rest of our existence.” Whether the ultimate foundation of said morality is the divine commandment of God or the dictates of an abstract moral law (e.g., Kant’s categorical imperative or Bentham’s principle of utility), it is no longer situated in our world or woven into the fabric of our experiences. It is exterior, transcendent, other.

All of this changes in the nineteenth century with Nietzsche whose most radical moves are without question his announcement of the death of God and his systematic critique of traditional morality. In one fell swoop, Nietzsche not only destroys the idea of “theological existence” but with it “the transcendence in which our morality is grounded.” This gives rise to a new question: not how should one live? or how should one act? but rather how might one live? In lieu of any transcendent “outside” to constrain our actions or establish what sorts of lives are worthwhile for us to pursue, we are free to pursue new ambitions and projects, to explore new ways of being—in short, to discover with Spinoza “what a body is capable of.”

As with Nietzsche, the question of how one might live is the cornerstone of both “classical” anarchism and poststructuralist anarchism. Rather than attempt to refine either so as to make them conform to the commonplaces of post-Kantian moral philosophy, critics should instead recognize and celebrate the radical alternative that they propose. That alternative is precisely a turn to ethics of the sort Deleuze associates with Nietzsche and Spinoza. It is the ethical, after all, which underlies the anarchist concept of self-creation, the Deleuzean concept of experimentation, and Foucault’s “care of the self.” The question, of course, is what such an ethics would entail.
Ever since Kant, moral philosophers have tended to regard rationality as the foundation of normativity. As Christine Korsgaard puts it, “Strictly speaking, we do not disapprove the action because it is vicious; instead, it is vicious because we disapprove it. Since morality is grounded in human sentiments, the normative question cannot be whether its dictates are true. Instead, it is whether we have reason to be glad that we have such sentiments, and to allow ourselves to be governed by them.” The point here is that an immoral action—one which we ought not to perform—is one which we have a rational reason not to perform. We already know that ethics is to be distinguished from morality on the basis of its concreteness, particularity, and interiority to life itself. Rather than posing universal codes of conduct grounded in abstract concepts like “rationality,” ethics is instead concerned with the myriad ways in which lives can be led. To this extent, the traditional notion that ethics is concerned with values rather than norms is not entirely unfitting. Clearly values can be and often are universalized and rendered transcendent, as in the case of natural law theory. Even the Greeks, for whom value was a function of particular standards of excellence proper to particular things, believed that such standards were uniform for all human beings.

For the anarchists, however, every human being is the product of a unique and complicated multiplicity of forces, including the inward-directed forces of self-creation. Thus their highest value, as we have seen, is life—the capacity of the social individual (and the society of freely associated individuals) to be different, to change, move, transform, and create. To value something, to treat it as good, is to treat it as something “we ought to welcome, [to] rejoice in if it exists, [to] seek to produce if does not exist . . . to approve its attainment, count its loss a deprivation, hope for and not dread its coming if this is likely, [and] avoid what hinders its production.” There is no doubt that the anarchists value life in this way. On the other hand, I am not sure whether they would regard it as “intrinsically valuable,” if by this is meant that the value of life obtains independently of its relations to other things, or that life is somehow worthy of being valued on its own account. For the anarchists, it makes no sense to speak of life in this way, since by its very nature life is relational and dynamic. There is no doubt, however, that anarchists believe that life worthy of being protected, pursued, and promoted. As for the question of why this is so, Bakunin’s response is that “only an academician would be so dull as to ask it.” At the risk of being dull, and in the interest of being brief, I shall leave it to one side for now.

Conclusion

Near the end of his life, Foucault sought to address the following problem: given that power is pervasive, and given that power shapes, molds, and
constitutes both knowledge and subjects, how is it possible to resist power? More importantly, when and why is it appropriate to resist power? Though recast in Foucauldian parlance, this is the traditional problematic of classical anarchism and, indeed, of all radical philosophy. (That Foucault raises this question, that he calls it an ethical question, is perhaps evidence enough that he was neither a nihilist nor a quietist, but rather a new and very different sort of radical.) For Foucault, as we have seen, power is pervasive; it is neither concentrated in a single juridical entity (such as the state) nor exerted upon subjects from somewhere outside themselves:

If it is true that the juridical system was useful for representing, albeit in a nonexhaustive way, a power that was centered primarily around deduction and death, it is utterly incongruous with the new methods of power whose operation is not ensured by right but by technique, not by law but by normalization, not by punishment but by control, methods that are employed at all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus.

Thus resistance necessarily emerges within power relations and is primary to them. To resist power as though it were somehow elsewhere or outside is merely to react against power. And as radicals of all stripes have witnessed time and again, such reactive resistance is either quickly defeated by extant power structures or else ends up replicating these power structures at the micropolitical level. In the place of reactive resistance, Foucault recommends an active form of resistance in which power is directed against itself rather than against another form of power (such as the state). To actively resist is to enter into a relation with oneself, to reconstitute oneself, to create oneself anew. Through this process, extant power relations are challenged and new forms of knowledge emerge. Bakunin and Kropotkin could not possibly have put the point better.

For Foucault, the relation of the self to itself forms the basis of ethics or “modes of subjectivation.” In “Technologies of the Self,” he formulates a history of the various ways that human beings “develop knowledge about themselves” vis-à-vis a host of “specific techniques.” These techniques, which Foucault calls technologies of the self, “. . . permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.” Technologies of the self are to be distinguished as such from three other types of technology (or “matrices of practical reason”): (1) technologies of production (labor power), by which we “produce, transform, or manipulate” objects in the world; (2) technologies of signs systems, which includes human languages specifically as well as the use of “signs, meanings, symbols, or signification” more generally; and
technologies of power, by which human behavior is directed, coordinated, compelled, engineered, and so forth, in “an objectivizing of the subject.”

In Greco-Roman civilization, Foucault claims, there were initially two major ethical principles—“know yourself” (the Delphic or Socratic principle) and “take care of yourself.” To illustrate the idea of care for the self, Foucault examines the “first” Platonic dialogue, *Alcibiades I*, and extracts from it four conflicts, namely, (1) between political activity and self-care, (2) between pedagogy and self-care, (3) between self-knowledge and self-care, and (4) between philosophical love and self-care. The principle of self-knowledge/examination emerges as victor in the third conflict and gives way both to the Stoicism of the Hellenistic/imperial periods as well as Christian penitential practices in the early Middle Ages. For the Stoics, the importance of self-knowledge is manifested in the practices of quotidian examinations of conscience; the writing of epistles, treatises, and journals; meditations on the future; and the interpretation of dreams. Foucault summarizes:

In the philosophical tradition dominated by Stoicism, *askesis* means not renunciation but the progressive consideration of self, or mastery over oneself, obtained not through the renunciation of reality but through the acquisition and assimilation of truth. It has as its final aim not preparation for another reality but access to the reality of this world. The Greek word for this is *paraskeuazō* (to get prepared). It is a set of practices by which one can acquire, assimilate, and transform truth into a permanent principle of action. *Alethia* becomes *ethos*. It is a process of becoming more subjective.

For the early Christians, in contrast, self-examination involves not self-mastery but rather self-denial: the repudiation of the flesh, the renunciation of mundum, the purification of the soul as a way of preparing for death. This emphasis on self-denial, in turn, gives rise to the absolute obedience of monasticism as well as the entire *dispositif* of the confessional (both in early, public forms [*exomologesis*] and later, private forms [*exagouresis*]). Whereas the Stoic seeks to know himself in order to become a vehicle for the “acquisition and assimilation [read: mastery] of truth,” the Christian seeks to know himself in order to become a vehicle for transcendence. Self-knowledge and disclosure involve a renunciation of the body—the locus of sin and fallen-ness—and a purification of the soul.

In the modern era, the principal technology of self is *self-expression*—that is, the process of expressing those thoughts, beliefs, feelings, and desires that are constitutive of one’s “true self.” On my reading, the “true self” here is neither an immortal soul nor a transcendental subject but rather that aspect of one’s subjectivity which one has affected oneself. Modern consciousness takes for granted that there is an inner life that we are constantly forced to suppress in our myriad roles within the capitalist machine. Underneath one’s
roles as student, son, tax-paying American, and so forth,—all of which are constructed from without by power relations—there is a self that one does not discover but rather fashions. The potential for such self-construction is not necessarily radical in and of itself, since self-construction can and often does merely replicate extant power relations that lie “outside” or “on top of” the self. But it is precisely through self-construction that radical political resistance becomes possible.

It is clear that for Foucault, as for the anarchists, power is or ought to be directed toward the creation of possibilities—the possibility of new forms of knowledge, new ways of experiencing the world, new ways for individuals to relate to themselves and others—whereas under our present circumstances power is directed toward crystallizing and maintaining institutions of repression, circumscribing knowledge, severely delimiting modes of subjectivity, and representing individuals to themselves through various mechanisms of totalization (e.g., religion, patriotism, psychology, etc.). I do not think it is outlandish to claim that the later Foucault, the ethical Foucault, cherished life in the same way the anarchists did. Life, after all, is not only a condition of possibility for the “care of the self” but also is the “care of the self.”

Much of what we have said here about Foucault applies to Deleuze, whose valorization of “difference” and scorn of “representation” surely hint at, if they do not reveal, a similarly vitalistic theory of value. Time and again Deleuze, like Nietzsche, like the anarchists, emphasizes the importance of Lebensliebe—the love and affirmation of life. Likewise it is clear that Lebensliebe is both a condition and a consequence of creativity, experimentation, the pursuit of the new and the different. To the extent that representation and its social incarnations are opposed to life, they are condemnable, marked by “indignity.” This strongly suggests that for Deleuze, life is loveable, valuable, and good; that it is worthy of being protected and promoted; that whatever is contrary to it is worthy of disapproval and opposition. At the same time, however, we must recall that the life of which the anarchists speak is something virtual, and there is no guarantee that its actualizations will be affirmative and active. Of course, this is simply one more reason why Deleuze, like Foucault, like the anarchists, emphasizes experimentation, on the one hand, and eternal vigilance, on the other. “We do not know of what a body is capable.” Our experiments may lead to positive transformations, they may lead to madness, they may lead to death. What starts out as a reckless and beautiful affirmation of life can become a death camp. It is not enough, therefore, to experiment and create; one must be mindful of, and responsible for, one’s creations. The process requires an eternal revolution against domination wherever and however it arises—eternal because atelos, and atelos because domination cannot be killed. It can only be contained or, better, outrun. Whatever goodness is created along the way will always be provisional, tentative, and contingent, but this is
hardly a reason not to create it. Anarchism is nothing if not the demand that we keep living.

Political postmodernity, then, is coextensive with anarchy, an eternal revolution against representation which itself an eternal process of creation and transformation, an eternal practice of freedom. Anarchy is both the goal of political postmodernity as well as the infinite network of possibilities we travel in its pursuit. In other words, political postmodernity just is the blurring or overlapping or interstiction of means and ends, the multiple sites at which our desires become immanent to their concrete actualization, the multiple spaces within which the concrete realizations of our desire become immanent to those desires. Such sites and spaces are constantly shifting into and out of focus, moving into and out of existence like rooms in a funhouse. In producing them we occupy them; in occupying them we produce them. The freedom we seek as an end is created by our seeking. It is a process of eternal movement, change, becoming, possibility, and novelty which simultaneously demands eternal vigilance, eternal endurance, an eternal commitment to keep going whatever the dangers or costs. To stop, even for a moment, is to court domination and representation—in short, death. The forces of death, no less than the forces of life, of revolution, are always and already with us awaiting actualization. There is neither certainty nor respite at any point. There are no stable identities, no transcendent truths, no representations or images. There are only the variable and reciprocal and immanent processes of creation and possibility themselves.

Like Bakunin, all anarchists are “true seekers.” They seek nothing in particular save greater and more expansive frontiers to explore. Such frontiers, moreover, promise nothing save the possibility of further exploration. Freedom is the practice of opening up new spaces for the practice of freedom: Leben Möglichkeiten—“life-possibilities.” We might say, then, that political postmodernity, that anarchy, is nothing more than a Leben-Schaffung-Möglichkeit—a “life-creation process.” However, if all life is an indeterminate flow, we can never know in advance what forms lives can or will take. “There is a bit of death in everything,” wrote Rilke. Thus to be revolutionary is to be on guard against death, to prepare oneself not to flee death, nor even to fight it, but simply to change the subject, to do and think otherwise, to seek what is new and vital—all in the hope that some life can and will come from that death, that there is a “bit of life” in everything, too.

There is a book—as yet unwritten, perhaps as sequel to the present work—that will demonstrate that all of this is already happening, that it has been happening for a long time, that it will continue to happen. Forty years ago, when France erupted in revolution, a small window of anarchy, of postmodernity, opened up and quickly closed. Within the space of that window, paradoxical slogans such as “soyez réalistes, demandez l’impossible!” (“be realistic, demand the impossible!”) became logical and
For what were the Enragés doing if not making possible what was represented to them as impossible? Nearly ten years ago, when Seattle was shrouded in tear gas and tens of thousands of laborers, students, environmentalists, peace activists, and anarchists successfully shut down the World Trade Organization ministerial, I watched another window open up. Just as before, it was quickly closed. Still, there was a space within that brief aperture within which the cry of the Zapatistas—“otro mundo es posible!” (“another world is possible!”)—took on the appearance of an axiom, of a self-evident and unquestionable truth. For what were we doing in Seattle if not showing an alternative to a world that has been represented to us as lacking alternatives? There are many other examples, but each would belie a common theme: that the unjust, inequitable, and violent limitations that are placed upon the many for the benefit of the few—the forces that separate us from our active power, from what we can do—are not unshakeable, immutable realities but representations. When people begin to think and act otherwise, these representations begin to crack and splinter; when and if people ever grow tired of death, when and if they refuse death and come together as a massive tidal wave of life, these representations will be obliterated. Everything we have been told is real and unchangeable will be revealed as lies, and in refusing them we will make them change. Into what? No one knows, but that is not important. What is important is the change itself.

In this work I have attempted to show that politics is about power and that political philosophy is a negotiation between power and images of power, between actual power relations and their capacity to become otherwise. So, too, I have attempted to demonstrate that political modernity, in both its liberal and socialist forms, is predicated precisely on the theoretical denial and practical suppression of possibilities. What it offers instead is a series of representations—of who we are as individuals and groups, of what we should and should not want, of what we can and cannot do or think or become. Lastly, I have attempted to argue that the anarchists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were the first to launch a systematic attack on political modernity—not only by challenging its system of representational thoughts, practices, and institutions, but by offering alternative ways of thinking and acting. In this they were followed by Nietzsche, Foucault, Deleuze, and countless others, all of whom, in his or her own way, have contributed to an ongoing struggle to move beyond modernity into postmodernity and anarchy, into processes of thinking, acting, and being otherwise. Much, much more needs to be said and written and done on this subject, but for the time being, I hope I have given us some sense of where we have been, where we are now, and where—with sufficient resolve and creativity and above all, Lebensliebe—we might go.
NOTES

Introduction

1 President Theodore Roosevelt, “Message to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Regarding Transmission Through the Mails of Anarchistic Publications” (April 9, 1908).
2 State of the Union Address (December 3, 1901).
5 Graeber, p. 2.
7 “Descriptive theory” involves concepts such as human nature, autonomy, and rationality. “Normative theory” involves moral concepts such as rights, liberties, and justice. “Political theory” involves concepts such as law, political obligation, and legitimacy. “Economic theory” involves concepts pertaining to the systemized distribution of goods and services within and across societies.

Chapter 1

3 *EN* I.2.1094a18–25.
6 *Ibid.*, I.7.1907b. There is a well-known controversy concerning Aristotle’s conception of the highest good. Although the highest good is defined in terms
of eudaimonia in Book I, it seems to be associated with contemplation in Book X. For more on this, see T. Nagel, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” *Phronesis* 17 (1972), pp. 252–9.


10 *Pol.* IV.1; cf. EN VI.8, X.9.


24 *EE* II.1; EN I.7; *Pol.* I.2.


27 Most importantly the virtue of distributive justice. See *Pol.* III.9.1280a7–22.

28 *Ibid.*, II.9.1280b39–1281a4. Toward the end of *Politics* III Aristotle argues that aristocracy—that is, rule by “the best” (aristoi)—is ideally conducive to
the natural end of the city-state, which, again, is the achievement of the good life vis-à-vis the inculcation of virtue among citizens.

29 See, for example, Phys. II.2.194a28–9, 8.199b15–18.
31 2.201a1.
33 1047a30–1; 1050a21–23.
34 Sachs, p. 79.
36 Ibid., pp. 78–9.
38 Walter, p. 354.
39 See Phys. II and III.
40 See Phys. II.
41 Walter, p. 254.
42 Walter, p. 354. See EN III.1.1110b.
47 In addition to the examples noted, we also find a general rejection of “political naturalism” among the Cynics and numerous other schools of Greek and Roman philosophy. For an excellent overview see J.L. Adams, “Law and Nature in Greco-Roman Thought,” The Journal of Religion 25:2 (1945), pp. 97–118.


50 See for example, Diogenes Laertius, VII: 33, 36, 53, 55. For more on Stoic views on nature and reason, see *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*, ed. B. Inwood, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), especially essays 3, 5, 9, 10, 14.


57 For more on the natural law tradition, see H. Rommen, *The Natural Law: A Study in Legal and Social History and Philosophy* (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1946);

58 Aquinas went a step further by arguing that civil law exists even in heaven. See P. Buc, L’ambiguïté du Livre: Prince, pouvoir, et peuple dans les commentaires de la Bible, Théologie Historique 95 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1994).

59 In the Middle Ages, however, many of the social relations that Aristotle regarded as “political”—e.g., marriage, family, property, and so forth—were contained within moral-theological rather than political discourse. Medieval political thought tended to focus more explicitly on the state as a legal and juridical institution.

60 The most famous work in this genre is arguably Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum. For an excellent study of this text see C. Briggs, Giles of Rome’s “De regimine principum”: Reading and Writing Politics at Court and University, c.1275–c.1525 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).


69 Heraclitus was known in antiquity as “the obscure one” (ho skoteinos) not only because so little is known about his life, but because of the puzzling, paradoxical nature of his ideas. See Diogenes Laertius, The Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 9.6.


71 Although politics (social physics) can and often does involve physical power, this does not imply that human behavior is governed by immutable physical laws, which, if discovered, would allow human behavior to be predicted with scientific accuracy. On my view, the errors of strict determinism are a direct result of reducing all power to species of physical power in this way.

72 Miller, pp. 390–1.

73 Unless otherwise noted, “moral philosophy” here refers to “normative ethics” (i.e., the study of right and wrong conduct) rather than to “axiology” (i.e., the study of value and the good life).
Hegel, for example, discusses the family at length in Section 3 of *The Philosophy of Right*. Hegel’s extension of politicophilosophical analysis to nongovernmental social relations had a great impact on nineteenth-century political philosophy generally, most notably in the works of Karl Marx.


Chapter 2

1 Most notably Elizabeth Anscombe (see Chapter 1, note 70 above).
2 Davidson, “Agency,” in *Essays in Actions and Events*, p. 46.
4 However, it is worth reminding ourselves here, following J. Cooper, that “[Aristotle] never attempts to discuss moral reasoning as such, but always instead focuses on practical reasoning in general, treating moral reasoning as a species of this wider genus...” [*Reason and Human Good in Aristotle* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1986), p. 1].
5 *EN* II.6.1106a15.
6 See *EN* III:6–9. I include the *ceteris paribus* here because virtuous character is understood holistically by Aristotle. In other words, although courage is a virtue, it is tempered by other virtues such as prudence. It is precisely the “proper” interplay of the virtues that makes a particular action “courageous” rather than simply reckless. See D. Pears, “Courage as a Mean,” in *Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics*, ed. A.O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 171–80.
8 See, for example, 1 Corinthians 13:13.
9 The idea that morality is determined by the will of the gods predates Christianity. It is discussed at length, for example, in Plato’s *Euthyphro*.
12 See, for example, Raymund of Pennafort, *Summa de Poenitentia et Matrimonio* (c. 1235); Bartholomew of San Concordio, *Summa Pisana* (c. 1317); Sylvester Prierias (d. 1523), *Summa Summarum*; St. Antoninus of Florence (d. 1459), *Summa Confessionalis* and *Summa Confessorum*. For more on the history of medieval casuistry see A. J. Celano, *From Priam to the Good Thief: The Significance of a Single Event in Greek Ethics and Medieval Moral Teaching*, The Etienne Gilson Series 23, Studies in Medieval Moral Teaching 3 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies Press, 2000).


ST I, q. 80, a. 2 ad 2; II–II, q. 24 a.1; cf. 1:2, q.94, a. 2.

Ibid.,1:2, q. 94, a. 2.


ST II–II, q. 64, a. 7.


*Grounding*, section 412.


*Grounding*, section 415.


For other examples of nonconsequentialist theories see R. Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977);


Ed. G. Sher (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979), p. 34

Ibid.


Ibid., p. 7.

Ibid., p. 10.

Ibid., pp. 7–8.

Ibid., p. 8.


Ibid., p. 10.

The term “deontojuridical” is meant to capture the emphasis on duties (Gr. deones) and rights (Lat. iures)


May, p. 10.


Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid., p. 12.


NOTES

60 Cahoone, pp. 11–12.
61 Ibid., p. 13.

Chapter 3

1 Pettit, p. 23.
4 Pettit, p. 23.
6 For a detailed overview, see J.E. Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992); see also S. Everson, ed., Companions to Ancient Thought 2: Psychology (New York: Cambridge
NOTES


10 *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, I: 122.

11 *Meditations on First Philosophy*, ed. J. Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), First Meditation, pp. 12–15. It should be noted that skepticism was not invented by Descartes so much as appropriated for heuristic purposes. Philosophical skepticism as such has a long pedigree dating back to classical antiquity. See, for example, Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, trans. R.G. Bury (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1990).


13 The “cogito” is a shorthand for Descartes’s famous argument, first articulated in the *Discourse on Method*, in which he states “Je pense donc je suis” (*Philosophical Writings* I:127). In the later Latin edition the argument was rendered as “cogito ergo sum.” Contrary to popular belief, the “cogito” does not appear in the more famous *Meditations on First Philosophy*. The closest parallel is found in the Second Meditation: “...I must conclude that this proposition, *I am, I exist*, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind” (p. 17).

14 Second Meditation, p. 18.

15 From Lat. *subiacere*.

16 Descartes, Second Meditation, pp. 17–18.

17 For more on the historical development of subjectivity as a concept, see Donald Hall’s excellent discussion in *Subjectivity* (New York: Routledge, 2004).


20 *Ibid*.

21 *Ibid*.


26 Ibid., I:3.4–5.
27 Ibid., I:3.7.
28 Ibid., I:3.8.
30 Ibid., 1.2.A37–44.
32 Ibid., 2.3.A81–83.
33 Ibid., 2.3.A77–A80.
37 Ibid., p. 295.
42 Ibid., I:1. Note that these “concepts” are purely material for Hobbes who is both an anti-Cartesian materialist and a nominalist. We need not concern ourselves here with their exact ontological status within his system.
43 Ibid., I:6.1–2.
44 Ibid., I:6.2.
46 Ibid., I:6.7.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., I:6.58.
49 Ibid., I:10.1.
50 Ibid., I:11.2.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., I:13.1, 3.
53 Ibid., I:13.3–7.
54 Ibid.
56 Ibid., I:13.13.
57 Ibid., I:14.1.
58 Ibid., I:3.9.
59 Ibid., I:14.31.
60 Ibid., I:15.3.
61 Ibid., II.17.13–15.
62 Ibid., II:19.
NOTES

66 Locke, Second Treatise, p. 9.
67 Ibid., p. 287.
71 Ibid., p. 343.
74 Ibid.
76 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 302.
77 Ibid., A Theory of Justice, p. 54.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid. For an in-depth discussion of the primary social goods, see p. 15.
85 Ibid.
86 Cahoon, p. 11.
89 Ironically, the idea that the triumph of a particular political ideology and its accompanying institutions represents the culmination of world-historical progress often finds its fullest expressions in decidedly nonliberal theories, ranging from Hegel’s relatively innocuous Philosophy of Right to Hitler’s nefarious Mein Kampf.

For example, Nozick’s *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, while very clearly a right-wing work in many respects, can nonetheless be described as “soteriological” insofar as it criticizes, rather than apologizes for, the liberal status quo of its time.


“Ibid.”


May, *Deleuze*, p. 119.


115 Ibid., p. 12.
116 Ibid., p. 13.
118 Ibid., p. 65.
119 Ibid., p. 18.
120 Ibid., p. 18.
121 Ibid.
128 Ibid., p. 307.
132 Ibid., pp. 53, 60.
133 Rousseau, Inequality, p. 53; n. 15, p. 106.
134 Ibid., pp. 53–5.
135 Ibid., p. 53; n. 15, p. 106; cf. Lichtheim, p. 22.
137 Ibid., pp. 69–70.
138 Lichtheim, p. 20.
141 Lichtheim, p. 6.
143 Locke, Second Treatise, p. 19.
144 Ibid., p. 20.
145 Lichtheim, p. 7.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid. See also J. Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 211.
148 Locke, Second Treatise, p. 25.
Lichtheim, p. 8. Ryan adds that “Many of the rights to dispose of property just as one wished, to work for anyone willing to employ one, and to contract with anyone for any purpose not obviously damaging to the security and good morals of the commonwealth, had been established by successive decisions made by judges appealing to the English common law rather than by legislation of a self-consciously liberal sort” (“Liberalism,” p. 302).


### Chapter 4


11 Ibid., §350
12 Ibid., §177
13 Ibid., §350
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., §351.
16 Franco, p. 102.
17 PS, §265, §326.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., §450.
20 Ibid., §456.
21 PS, §508.
23 For a discussion of the interim period, which corresponds roughly to the so-called “Middle Ages,” see PS, §§300–80.
24 Franco, p 107.
25 PS, §381.
28 PS, §527.
29 Ibid., §§530–7.
30 PS, §§527–8.
31 Ibid., §529.
32 Ibid, §541.
33 Ibid., §559.
36 Ibid., §357, 432–3. As Franco points out (p. 111), Hegel definitely has Rousseau in mind here: “While one might object that his interpretation of the general will is one-sidedly individualistic, it does capture certain elements of Rousseau’s complex (not to say inconsistent) teaching: his contention that in joining civil society and submitting to the general will each nevertheless obeys himself and remains as free as before; his insistence that the general will cannot be represented and demands some sort of directly democratic arrangement; and so forth.”
37 Ibid., §357.
38 Ibid., §§358–9.
NOTES


40 PS, §§364–5, 441–2.


43 Franco, p. 117.

44 PS §§388, 469–70.


61 Marx, “The German Ideology,” Chap. 1, Section D.
62 Kriegel, Les Communistes, Chap. 1.
63 For further discussion of Marxism and ethics, see E. Kamenka, The Ethical Foundations of Marxism (New York: Praeger, 1962).
69 For an especially thorough and intensive analysis of this relationship, see T. Burns and I. Fraser, The Hegel Marx Connection (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). As the authors note, “There is an ambivalence about Marx’s attitude to Hegel which is present throughout Marx’s life and which can be clearly discerned in even his early writings” (pp. 1–2).
71 Marx, Critique of Hegel, p. 80.
72 Ibid.
73 Marx, Economic and Philosophical, pp. 385–6.
74 Ibid., p. 384.
75 Lichtheim, p. 37.
77 Ibid., p. 29.
78 Ibid., p. 21.
79 Lichtheim, p. 21.
80 Ibid.
82 See W.L. Sargant, Robert Owen and His Social Philosophy (London: Smith-Elder, 1860); A. Bebel, Charles Fourier (Berlin: Echo, 2008).
83 By 1830, France had a population of more than twenty million people. For more on Constant’s life and thought, see T. Todorov, A Passion for Democracy: Benjamin Constant, trans. A. Seberry (Algora, 1999).


85 PR, p. 189.
86 Ibid., p. 199.
87 Ibid., pp. 199–200.
88 Ibid., p. 201.
89 Ibid., p. 256.
90 Ibid., p. 258.
91 Ibid., p. 258.
92 Ibid., p. 258.
93 Ibid., p. 258.
94 PS §354.
95 Ibid., §355.
96 PR, p. 257.
105 Renamed the Socialist Worker’s Party (SADP) at the Gotha congress of 1875, the party developed a platform that was famously criticized by Marx in his “Critique of the Gotha Program.”
NOTES


113 Lukács, pp. 91–2.


115 Gramsci’s concept of “hegemony” is roughly of a piece with the concept of the “culture industry” in Horkheimer and Adorno.


124 Negri, Marx Beyond Marx, pp. 150–4.


126 Ibid.
Chapter 5


2 In his doctoral dissertation (“‘The Whole World is Our Country’: Immigration and Anarchism in the United States, 1885–1940,” University of Pittsburgh, 2010), Kenyon Zimmer conclusively demonstrates that anarchism was not a “foreign” doctrine imported from Europe, as most immigrant anarchists had no exposure to anarchism prior to emigrating to the United States.


That Marxism has not met a similar fate is exceedingly odd. After all, it wasn’t an anarchist but a self-proclaimed Marxist—Joseph Stalin—who systematically massacred nearly one million people during the Great Purges of 1937–1938. (It is true that the so-called anarchist terrorists were civilians, whereas Stalin launched the Purges in his capacity as a head of state, but this scarcely diminishes their barbarity, let alone exculpates Stalin as their chief perpetrator. And in any case, the “red menace” of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did not come close to mounting the death toll achieved during the Purges.)


Goldman, Anarchism and Other Essays, p. 49.

Malatesta, Life and Ideas, pp. 19, 29.

Malatesta, Life and Ideas, p. 198.


Ibid., p. 106; cf. Rocker, pp. 20–1.


Simmons, “Philosophical Anarchism,” p. 19.

Ibid., p. 22.

Ibid.

Ibid., pp. 20–1.
Ibid.
29. Note that “power over” may be a species of “power to” if “Jones has power over Smith” is understood as “Jones has the power to compel Smith to φ, prevent Smith from φ’ing, or both,” where ‘φ’ is an action of some sort.
33. Ibid.
34. McLaughlin, p. 56.
35. M. Bakunin, *Selected Writings from Mikhail Bakunin* (St. Petersburg, FL: Red and Black, 2010), p. 32.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. McLaughlin, p. 29.
41. *Anarchism and Other Essays*, p. 67.
42. Bakunin, *Selected Writings from Mikhail Bakunin*, p. 35.
46. *Bakunin on Anarchy*, p. 152.
NOTES 211

52 L. Fabbri, Lettere, p. 39.
55 E. Armand, “Anarchist Individualism as Life and Activity” (1907), in Anarchism and Individualism (Bristol: S.E. Parker, 1962).
56 Goldman, Anarchism and Other Essays, p. 68.
60 Ibid; cf. Kropotkin, Selected Writings, p. 150.
64 Caliero, Anarchia e Comunismo, pp. 29, 42.
65 L. Fabbri, Lettere, p. 39.
66 Kropotkin, Revolutionary Pamphlets, p. 99.
67 Goldman, Anarchism and Other Essays, p. 68.
68 Kropotkin, Revolutionary Pamphlets, p. 150.
70 Rocker, Anarchosyndicalism, p. 11.
71 A. Berkman, Prison Memoirs of an Anarchist (New York: Mother Earth, 1912), pp. 508–9. I am grateful to Barry Pateman for suggesting Max Baginski as the true identity of “Philo.”
72 Graeber, Fragments, p. 54.
73 Bakunin, Bakunin on Anarchy, p. 238.
75 Ibid.
76 Proudhon, What is Property?, p. 199.
77 Ibid., pp. 200–1.
78 Proudhon, What is Property?, p. 207.
79 Bakunin, Bakunin on Anarchy, pp. 261–2.
80 Bakunin, The Basic Bakunin, pp. 46–8; cf. 140–1.
81 Bakunin, Bakunin on Anarchy, pp. 237–8.
83 Goldman, Anarchism and Other Essays, p. 67.
84 Goldman, Red Emma Speaks, p. 98.
85 Bakunin, Bakunin on Anarchy, p. 236.
NOTES

86 Ibid., pp. 236–7.
87 Goldman, Anarchism and Other Essays, p. 61.
88 Ibid., p. 71.
89 Ibid., pp. 67–8.
90 Malatesta, Life and Ideas, p. 87; cf. p. 49: “The freedom we want is not the abstract right, but the power, to do what as one wishes . . .”
91 Bakunin, Basic Bakunin, p. 124.
92 P.-J. Proudhon, De la justice dans la révolution et dans l’église (Librairie de Garnier Frères, 1858), p. 76.
93 Proudhon, De la justice, p. 87.
94 Ibid.
95 Malatesta, Life and Ideas, p. 42.
96 May, Poststructuralist Anarchism, p. 47.
98 May, Poststructuralist Anarchism, p. 48.
99 Bakunin, Selected Writings, pp. 206–7.
101 May, Poststructuralist Anarchism, p. 48.
102 Kropotkin, Revolutionary Pamphlets, p. 105.
103 Malatesta, Life and Ideas, pp. 20–1.
104 Ibid., p. 21.
105 Ibid., pp. 74–5.
108 Malatesta, Life and Ideas, p. 77.
109 Goldman, Anarchism and Other Essays, p. 173.
110 Ibid., p. 176.
111 Ibid., pp. 176–9.
112 Kropotkin, Revolutionary Pamphlets, pp. 80–1.
115 Malatesta, Life and Ideas, p. 68.

117 Bakunin, *Selected Writings from Mikhail Bakunin*, p. 83.


121 Proudhon, *De la justice*, p. 225.


124 Historically speaking, the individualists have more in common with twentieth-century libertarians such as Murray Rothbard, Lew Rockwell, Jan Narveson, Tibor Machan, Robert Nozick, and John Hospers. For a historical survey, see B. Doherty, *Radicals for Capitalism: A Freewheeling History of the Modern American Libertarian Movement* (New York: Public Affairs, 2007).


129 *Ibid.*, p. 188.


This is in part what makes anarchist critique “fluid.” It is also “fluid” to the extent that it does not rely upon any single criterion of critique. For example, in addition to moral arguments against the state, anarchists have also proposed what be termed “pragmatic” arguments. The latter are concerned not with questions of moral justification but rather of necessity, expediency, and other prudential considerations. Thus Bakunin repeatedly points out that the state is not only morally condemnable but unnecessary as well.
Bakunin, *Selected Writings*, pp. 68–9; cf. Proudhon, “As individualism is the primordial fact of humanity, so association is its complementary term,” *System of Economical Contradictions* (Boston: Tucker, 1888), p. 429. Unlike Simmons, Bakunin et al. would not regard the principle of voluntarism as a sufficient condition for morally acceptable political relations. “Voluntary servitude” is still servitude, and to this extent remains morally condemnable.


Malatesta, *Life and Ideas*, p. 76.


See section in Chap. 6.


Goldman, *Anarchism and Other Essays*, p. 58.


Bakunin, *Selected Writings from Mikhail Bakunin*, p. 9.

Bakunin, *Basic Bakunin*, p. 124


NOTES

198 Ibid., p. 157, emphasis mine.
199 Kropotkin, Ethics, p. 22.
202 Kropotkin, Revolutionary Pamphlets, p. 203.
204 Ibid., p. 10.
205 Ibid., p. 1.
206 Quoted in Cohn, Anarchism and the Crisis, p. 60.
207 Ibid.
208 Ibid.
209 Bakunin, Selected Writings, p. 231.
210 Bakunin, Selected Writings from Mikhail Bakunin, p. 50.
211 Ibid.
212 Ibid., p. 59.
213 Selected Writings, p. 231.
214 Selected Writings from Mikhail Bakunin, p. 50.
215 Ibid.
217 Malatesta, Life and Ideas, p. 38.
218 Ibid., p. 39.
219 Ibid., p. 41.
220 Ibid., p. 39.
221 Kropotkin, Revolutionary Pamphlets, pp. 117–18.
222 Kropotkin, Ethics, p. 12.
223 Cohn, Anarchism and the Crisis, p. 74.
224 Kropotkin, Revolutionary Pamphlets, p. 109.
226 Ibid., Essay 2, Section 12.
NOTES


Chapter 6

3 Obviously this is an incredibly contentious claim, one that requires much more justification than I provide here. As it is not an essential thesis of this monograph, however, I am content to regard it as a supposition that remains open to question.
10 A false attribution, incidentally, as even Plato was aware of this relationship before Saussure. The structuralist emphasis on this point is part of a larger argument that language does not reflect the world and experience. See A. Bass, “Literature’/Literature,” in *Velocities of Change*, ed. R. Macksey (Baltimore and London: Methuen, 1974).
11 Saussure, pp. 81–8.
29 For example, statements about airplanes could not be uttered in the Middle Ages because the historical a priori condition necessary for the production, transmission, and intelligibility of such statements within discourse (viz., the actual existence of airplanes) was not yet satisfied.
31 M. Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in *The Essential Foucault*, p. 137.
33 M. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, trans. A. Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 1978), p. 248. It is during this stage that the prison becomes the “penitentiary”—a space wherein bodies are not merely confined, but in which souls are made “penitent” (through discipline).


38 L. Call, Postmodern Anarchism (see note 8).


40 On the influence of anarchism within the student movement, see K.J. Heinemann, Put Your Body Against the Wheels: Student Revolt in the 1960s (Chicago: Ivan R. Dees, 2001).


43 Richard Gombin notes that some scholars have acknowledged the implicit or subterranean influence of earlier movements such as Proudhonism and anarchosyndicalism. See for example, J. Julliard “Syndicalisme revolutionnaire et revolution etudiante”, Esprit 6–7 (June–July 1968); G. Adam, “Mai, ou les leçons de l’histoire ouvrière,” France-Forum 90–1 (October–November 1963); M. Reberieux, “Tout ça n’empêche pas, Nicholas, que la Commune n’est pas morte,” Politique aujourd’hui 5 (May 1969); A. Kriegel, “Le syndicalisme revolutionnaire et Proudhon,” in L’actualite de Proudhon (Brussels: l’Institut de Sociologie Libre de Bruxelles, 1967).


46 Gombin, p. 411; cf. Interview with D. Cohn-Bendit in Magazine Litteraire 8 (May 1968).

47 For some of the Situationists’ criticisms of classical anarchism, see Vienet, pp. 260–1.


Ibid., p. 17.


Decker, p. 407.

Hamon, p. 17.


Ibid., p. 4.

G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. R. Hurley, M. Seem, and H.R. Lame (New York: Viking Press, 1977). Though we ought not to underestimate Guattari’s contributions to this and later works in political philosophy, I will only refer to Deleuze in the present essay for purposes of clarity and convenience.


Some philosophers claim that an action is rational if and only if it satisfies a *rational* desire. This is an ongoing debate within contemporary analytic moral philosophy which, for the sake of brevity, I shall not discuss here.


Derrida, of course, articulates a similar view; the difference is that for him this fluidity is a feature of language rather than a feature of *reality itself*.


May, *Deleuze*, p. 120.


May, *Deleuze*, p. 123.
NOTES

74 May, *Deleuze*, p. 125.
76 See n. 61 above.
77 May, *Poststructuralist Anarchism*, p. 71. There is some justification for this move, as Foucault acknowledged the influence of Deleuze’s *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (1962) on his own theory of power (Patton, p. 49). “Deleuze, in turn, commented upon and elaborated Foucault’s theses about power, first in his review of *Discipline and Punish* and then in the additional comments on power in his *Foucault*” (*ibid.*).
78 Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p. 40.
80 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 29.
86 Deleuze, *Nietzsche*, p. 58.
87 *Ibid*.
90 Patton, p. 62.
91 Deleuze, *Nietzsche*, p. 67.
95 Daniel Smith, p. 307.
104 May, Deleuze, p. 140.
105 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 184.
106 May, Deleuze, p. 141.
107 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 433.
108 Ibid., pp. 223–4; Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, p. 130.
109 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 224.
110 May, Poststructuralist Anarchism, pp. 63–4.
111 Ibid., p. 61.
112 To my mind the most comprehensive and well-argued critique of postanarchism remains J.S. Cohn, Anarchism and the Crisis of Representation (Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press, 2006), which has been extremely influential on my own analysis.
113 Ibid., pp. 121–7.
114 Ibid., p. 127.
115 May, Poststructuralist Anarchism, p. 127.
116 Ibid., p. 128.
117 Ibid., p. 130.
118 Ibid., p. 133.
119 Ibid., p. 134.
121 Ibid., p. 48.
122 Ibid., Chap. 3.
123 May, Moral Theory, p. 87.
124 Ibid., p. 88.
125 Patton, p. 9.
126 Ibid., p. 106.
127 Smith, p. 308.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
131 Korsgaard, pp. 1–4. For more on this distinction see especially R. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); A. McIntyre, After Virtue; M. Slote and R. Crisp, Virtue Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
132 May, Deleuze, p. 4.
133 Ibid.
134 Korsgaard, p. 2.
135 May, Deleuze, p. 4.
136 Ibid., p. 5. As May notes, both developments pave the way for modern liberal democratic theory.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.


141 May, *Deleuze*, pp. 6–7.


143 May, *Deleuze*, p. 3.

144 Korsgaard, p. 50.


150 Ibid., p. 146.

151 Ibid.

152 Foucault, “Technologies,” p. 158.


—— *Selected Writings from Mikhail Bakunin*. St. Petersburg, FL: Red and Black, 2010.


Cognetti de Martiis, S. Socialismo antico. Turin: Bocca, 1889.


Cranston, M. “Liberalism.” In *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by
Croly, Herbert. *The Promise of American Life*. Boston: Northeastern University
— “Anarchism.” In *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by E. Craig,
1984.
Dart, Gregory. *Rousseau, Robespierre, and English Romanticism*. Cambridge:
Davidson, Donald. “Actions, Reasons, and Causes.” *The Journal of Philosophy* 60,
Dawson, D. *Cities of the Gods: Communist Utopias in Greek Thought*. New York:
Decker, J.E. “Direct Democracy and Revolutionary Organization in the 1968
French Student-Worker Revolt.” *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting for the
De Cleyre, V. *Exquisite Rebel: the Essays of Voltairine de Cleyre*, edited by
Deleuze, Gilles. *Difference and Repetition*, translated by Paul Patton. New York:
— *Foucault*, translated by Sean Hand. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
— “Intellectuals and Power.” In *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, edited by D.
— *Negotiations*, translated by M. Joughin. New York: Columbia University Press,
1995.
— *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, translated by H. Tomlinson. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1983.
— *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, translated by R. Hurley. San Francisco: City
— *The Logic of Sense*, translated by M. Lester and C. Stivale. New York: Columbia


Revolutionary Studies. London: Commonweal, 1892.


Li, Bo. “Equality and Democracy.” Perspectives 1, no. 4 (February 29, 2000).


Parsons, A. *Anarchism*. Chicago, 1887.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publisher/Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>De la justice dans la révolution et dans l’église</td>
<td>Paris: Librairie de Garnier Frères, 1858.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play.” In Law and Philosophy,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“The Justification of Civil Disobedience.” In Civil Disobedience:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reberioux, M.</td>
<td>“Tout ça n’empêche pas, Nicholas, que la Commune n’est pas morte.”</td>
<td>Politique aujourd’hui 5 (May 1969).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Scanlon, T. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


Urales, F. *La Anarquía al alcance de todos*. Barcelona, 1928.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abelard, Peter</td>
<td>46–7, 50, 212, 242, 252, 254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abstraction</td>
<td>11, 99, 106, 145, 157, 166–7, 191, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>academia</td>
<td>9–10, 14, 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>activism</td>
<td>2, 161, 184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>actuality</td>
<td>23, 33, 39, 109, 113, 138, 190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adorno, Theodore</td>
<td>117–18, 225, 242, 251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aldred, Guy</td>
<td>170, 235, 242–3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alienation</td>
<td>101, 109, 114, 117, 119–20, 222, 255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>altruism</td>
<td>164–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>4, 8, 60–1, 127, 155, 219, 227, 255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anarcho-syndicalism</td>
<td>184, 227–9, 237, 257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anthropology</td>
<td>33, 107, 205–6, 229, 234, 243, 245, 249, 255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aquinas, St. Thomas</td>
<td>35, 46–7, 59, 209, 212, 248, 256, 259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arendt, Hannah</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristippus</td>
<td>25, 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aristocracy</td>
<td>89, 206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aristotelianism</td>
<td>27, 62, 215, 244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armand, Emil</td>
<td>135, 229, 242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>art</td>
<td>10, 12, 33, 118, 231, 237, 249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assassination</td>
<td>8–9, 127, 229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assemblage</td>
<td>189–90, 196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assemblies</td>
<td>160–1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>association</td>
<td>9, 18, 21, 29, 79, 115, 134, 140, 146, 158, 207, 231, 233, 245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustine, St.</td>
<td>208, 220, 243–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>authoritarianism</td>
<td>88, 227, 237, 256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>authority</td>
<td>17, 19, 26–8, 78, 82–5, 88, 90, 100, 119, 125, 131–9, 141–2, 146–7, 149, 154, 157, 160, 179, 227, 231, 249, 255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>autonomy</td>
<td>9, 47, 75, 79–80, 95, 99, 105, 132, 158, 205, 217, 248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avrich, Paul</td>
<td>149, 227, 231, 233, 243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>axiology</td>
<td>6, 17–18, 64, 138–9, 197, 209</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX

Babeuf, Gracchus 98, 107, 220–1, 244
Baginski, Max 138, 170, 229
Bakunin, Mikhail 13, 56, 115–18, 129,
132, 134, 137, 139, 141–4, 146,
148, 153–4, 156–8, 160, 162–70,
184–5, 192, 199–200, 203, 213,
224, 227–5, 237, 241–3, 245,
250, 256
becoming 65, 126, 137, 146, 162,
164–5, 169, 181, 189, 196, 201, 203
Bentham, Jeremy 17, 52, 59, 72, 78,
195, 198, 214, 218, 243
Berkeley, George 68–9, 207, 211,
213–14, 220, 232, 242–3, 248,
253, 255–6, 259
Berkman, Alexander 136, 138, 142,
154, 229, 232, 243
Berlin, Isaiah 214, 217, 222–3, 243, 256
Bevington, Sarah Louise 135, 228, 244
Blanqui, Louis 99, 107, 111, 144, 221,
259
Bookchin, Murray 233, 244
Buonarotti, Phillipe 98, 101, 221, 244

capitalism 10, 17, 36–8, 55, 62, 93–5,
97, 107–8, 110, 114–16, 118–20,
135–7, 154–5, 185, 187–8, 190,
192, 220, 225–6, 231, 235–6,
238, 245, 247–8, 251, 258
Castoriadis, Cornelius 119, 225–6, 245
Chomsky, Noam 128
Christianity 45, 64, 211, 220, 252
classical anarchism 5, 12–14, 16–19,
25, 35, 37, 59–60, 62, 72, 79–84,
95, 106, 129, 146, 150, 152–3,
156, 177, 179–80, 182–5, 190,
193, 198, 200, 207, 215, 237,
246, 253, 256, 258
Clastres, Pierre 234, 245
Cleaver, Harry 41, 119, 225–6, 245, 255
de Cleyre, Voltairine 9, 135, 228–9,
246, 250
coercion 31, 132–3, 146, 154, 159
Colson, Daniel 170, 234, 245
commune 8, 134, 160, 169, 183–4,
233, 237, 257–9
communism 97, 99, 107, 110–1, 115–16,
136–7, 221, 224, 243, 251
community 4, 21–2, 37, 65–6, 84,
98–100, 103–4, 106, 111–14,
143, 146, 157, 165, 214, 231,
244, 253
conscience 46–7, 102–3, 112–13, 132,
137, 142, 145, 201
consciousness 36, 47–8, 67, 69–70,
99–104, 109, 113–14, 116–20,
124, 135, 144, 152, 156, 201,
225, 253
consensus 43, 94
consent 78, 82, 84, 95, 131
consequentialism 44–5, 50, 53, 56,
151, 195, 217, 231, 256
constitution 20–1, 23, 25, 55, 128,
217, 251
contract 35, 55, 78, 83–6, 88, 95,
122–4, 154, 158, 218–20, 243,
258
cooperation 74, 86, 141, 144, 158–9,
164
cooperative 13, 106, 124, 161
creativity 169, 189, 192, 202, 204
crime 8, 140, 161
critique 5–6, 11–2, 17, 26, 36–8, 58,
60, 103, 107–9, 115, 125, 134,
136, 138, 146, 150, 154, 158–9,
161, 165, 170, 173–6, 182, 185,
193, 196–8, 207, 212, 216,
223–5, 232, 240, 250, 252, 254,
258–60
culture 29, 62, 74, 85, 100–1, 117–18,
126, 154, 163, 166, 173–4, 214,
225, 232, 253, 257
Czolgosz, Leon 9, 127
death 8, 74, 103, 116, 138, 143, 146,
185, 198, 200–4, 215, 227, 244
deconstruction 177, 236, 247
Deleuze, Gilles 12–13, 16–18, 37, 125,
146, 174, 177, 182–96, 198, 202,
204, 206, 216, 218, 230, 238–41,
244–7, 252, 254, 256, 259
democracy 9, 25, 57, 61–3, 88–90,
93, 97, 110–1, 116, 207, 214,
216–17, 219, 223–4, 226, 228,
230, 238, 245–6, 250–1, 253–6,
258–9
INDEX 245

Democritus 206, 245
deontology 47, 151
Derrida, Jacques 11–2, 174–8, 182, 230, 235–6, 238, 247, 252
desire 10, 20, 25, 43–4, 47–9, 51, 73–5, 89, 100, 103, 105, 133, 144, 146, 158–9, 161, 168, 188–91, 196, 203, 213, 229, 238, 249, 255
determinism 36, 116, 119–20, 150, 163, 209
dialectic 99–100, 109, 113, 225, 242, 251
Diogenes 207–9, 247, 253
Dolgoff, Sam 224, 228, 243, 250
domination 26, 131, 134, 136–7, 145–7, 153–6, 158, 177, 190, 202–3
Dunayevskaya, Raya 119, 225, 248
duties 27, 47, 54, 79, 83, 87, 135, 141, 163, 197, 208, 213, 218, 245, 248
economics 2, 5, 29, 90–1, 95, 109, 117, 120, 163, 171, 179
economy 61, 91, 93–4, 110, 114, 116, 121, 220, 238, 255, 259
education 112, 143, 163, 181, 215, 222, 244, 252
egalitarianism 98, 105
egoism 89, 98, 101
Ehrlich, Howard 228, 244, 254
empiricism 68–9, 215, 252
enlightenment 11–2, 16, 62, 80, 101, 103, 117–18, 174, 179, 198, 213, 217, 225, 242, 251
enormous 40, 64, 94, 105, 108, 121, 129, 184–5, 188
epistemology 34, 171, 178
equality 8, 25, 63–4, 77, 85, 87, 90, 93, 95, 98–9, 105–6, 108, 110, 114, 121–2, 134, 139–45, 149, 154, 158, 163, 217, 221, 244, 253
Europe 58, 60–1, 91, 98, 111, 116, 127, 226
existentialism 10, 174
exploitation 119–21, 133, 137, 155, 158
Fabbri, Luigi 135, 137, 226, 229, 248
family 21, 29, 63, 86, 94, 100, 103, 112–13, 129, 157, 159, 162, 209–10
Feuerbach, Ludwig 39, 106, 222
Fouquet, Charles 111, 168, 223, 243
France 8, 98–9, 110–1, 116, 127, 139, 183, 203, 221, 223, 227, 234, 237, 242, 249, 251, 254–5, 260
Franks, Benjamin 2, 7, 57, 151, 230–1, 249
Galleani, Luigi 226, 249
Germany 99, 111, 116, 224, 258
Giddens, Anthony 61, 213, 249
god 26, 31, 39, 45–6, 50, 64, 101, 145, 147, 162, 167, 198, 208, 243
gods, 157, 186, 208, 211, 229, 246, 250
Godwin, William 72, 139, 150
Gori, Pietro 226, 249
Graeber, David 9–10, 138, 205, 229–31, 234, 249
Gramsci, Antonio 117–18, 225, 250
Grave, Jean 93, 135, 162, 226, 228, 233, 250
Guattari, Felix 182, 184–5, 238–40, 244, 247
Guerin, Daniel 229, 237, 250
Guillaume, James 56, 134, 148, 228, 250
Habermas, Jurgen 118, 170, 225, 235, 250
happiness 20, 45, 48–52, 73–6, 98, 137, 141, 165, 200, 207–8, 212–13, 242–3, 250, 256
Havel, Hippolyte 136, 170, 229, 250
Hayek, Friedrich 94, 217, 226, 251
Haymarket 226, 251
hedonism 45, 52, 213, 244
Hegelians 103–5, 111, 222, 255, 259
Heraclitus 30–1, 34, 209
hierarchy 67, 131, 142, 145, 155, 159, 184, 198
Hobbes, Thomas 21, 35, 53, 59, 72–5, 82, 84, 88–90, 179, 216, 219, 251, 254
holism 5, 65–6, 82, 97, 104, 107–8
Horkheimer, Max 117–18, 225, 242, 251
humanity 6, 8, 70, 81, 123, 134, 140, 142–3, 147, 161–3, 165–6, 170, 174, 228, 233, 249
ideology 63, 95, 128, 140, 159, 208, 217, 222–3, 237, 249, 260
immanence 18, 144, 169, 174, 182, 231, 245
individualism 62, 103–4, 110, 139, 171, 214, 216–17, 220, 227, 229, 233, 235, 242, 244, 247, 253–4
individuality 71–2, 99, 108, 112, 142–4, 156, 158–9, 162
industrialization 98, 110–1
instincts 8, 47, 76, 107, 143, 162, 165
intellectuals 89, 183–4, 230, 239, 246
intentions 45–6, 50, 103
knowledge 19, 58, 62, 67–9, 74, 80, 102, 113, 123, 131–2, 173, 178–82, 200–2, 225, 235, 250, 253
labor 8, 40, 92–3, 107, 109–10, 112, 114, 117, 119, 137, 143, 155, 163, 179, 192, 200
Landauer, Gustav 157, 220, 227, 232, 253
language 29, 100, 102–3, 166, 174–7, 179, 187, 230, 235, 238–9, 246
legitimacy 26–7, 82–4, 130, 205
Lenin, Vladimir 36, 56, 58–9, 114, 116–17, 144, 232–4, 253–4
libertarianism 80, 144, 158, 170, 226, 231, 234, 245–50, 253, 259–60
Locke, John 35, 59, 64, 68–9, 72, 75–7, 79, 82–5, 88–93, 106, 112, 123–4, 179, 216–19, 248, 253–4
logic 34, 67, 118, 124, 150, 156, 167, 176–7, 187, 231, 235, 238, 245–6, 251
love 7, 48, 89–90, 141, 201–2
Luxemburg, Rosa 116–17, 225, 253
Lyotard, Jean-Francois 12, 37, 124, 173–4, 182, 185, 235, 253
Machiavelli, Niccolo 5, 27–9, 55, 58–9, 179, 209–10, 248, 254, 260
machines 187–8, 191–2
Marcuse, Herbert 184, 222, 225, 254
market 61, 91, 93–5, 106, 110, 121, 226, 257
Marx, Karl 39, 58–9, 106–9, 111, 114–16, 119–20, 138, 148, 153, 184, 210, 222–5, 232, 244–5, 249, 251, 254–6, 260
materialism 58, 101, 117, 123, 138, 151, 171, 223, 251
morality 5, 45, 55, 64, 74, 79, 90, 102, 107–8, 112–13, 140, 147–8, 150, 154, 162, 169, 194, 197–9, 207, 211, 214, 217, 230, 234–5, 242, 257
Nechayev, Sergei 56, 149, 231, 243, 255, 257
Nietzsche, Friedrich 6, 11, 30, 125, 138, 148, 169–70, 185, 188, 194, 198, 202, 204, 209, 234–5, 238–9, 241–2, 245–6, 256, 259
nihilism 12–13, 173, 193–4, 197
ontology 30, 32, 68, 166, 187–8, 190
oppression 2, 37–8, 114, 126, 133, 135, 137, 146–8, 156
organization 16, 19, 21, 56, 84, 99, 129–30, 148, 154–5, 159, 161, 204, 238, 246
ownership 26, 98, 110, 121, 137, 140, 150
pain 51, 69, 117, 194, 213, 246
phenomenology 10, 99–100, 102–5, 109, 113, 174, 221, 251, 260
physics 5, 15, 19, 22–3, 29–30, 32, 34, 43, 56, 66, 122, 156, 171, 190, 207, 209, 258
Plato 21, 25, 55, 59, 98, 197, 206, 211, 235–6, 247, 256
pleasure 25, 45, 50–3, 74–5, 140, 208, 213, 241, 246, 248–9, 256, 260
Polanyi, Karl 94, 220, 257
postanarchism 7, 12, 14, 182, 240
postmodernism 4, 12–17, 125, 174–5, 213, 235, 244, 251
postmodernity 6, 12, 14, 16, 170, 173–5, 177, 179, 181, 183, 185, 187, 189, 191, 193, 195, 197, 199, 201, 203
praxis 11, 17, 39, 56, 107, 114, 125, 158, 161, 181, 189, 236–7, 242, 247
prices 91, 93–4, 157
principles 9, 13, 17–18, 22–5, 35, 37, 45–8, 53–7, 60, 66–8, 77–8, 80–1, 86–7, 111–2, 139, 147–8, 150–1, 155, 160, 184, 194–5, 197, 201, 208, 214, 218, 220, 250, 255, 259–60
progress 56, 62, 64, 80–1, 88, 95, 100, 164, 217, 224, 253–4
proletarianizes 119
property 25–6, 35, 49, 65–6, 72, 75–6, 83, 88–95, 98, 103–6, 108, 110, 114, 121, 123, 137, 139–40,
sociology 29, 33, 209
solidarity 18, 120, 135, 137, 140, 152, 158, 164
soul 67, 73, 99, 103, 125, 138, 145, 164, 201, 215, 250
Spinoza, Baruch 68, 186, 189, 194, 198, 238–9, 241, 246
spirit 62, 84, 99–105, 109, 113–14, 137, 168, 178, 221, 237, 251
Spooner, Lysander 150
Stalin, Josef 227
stalinism 184, 192
Stirner, Max 139, 170
stoicism 201, 208
stoics 25–6, 65, 97, 201, 208, 251
strategic 15, 28, 36–40, 55–6, 58, 108, 120, 153, 177, 211, 236
structuralism 119, 174, 235–6, 247, 255
subjectivity 15, 57, 71, 100–1, 105, 119, 123, 143–4, 157, 161–5, 175, 181–2, 192, 201–2, 215, 250
technology 200–1
terror 9, 90, 102, 127, 226, 260
terrorism 8, 183, 226
theology 26, 57, 67, 208
tolerance 8, 63, 88, 95
Tolstoy, Leo 227, 259
totalitarianism 196
trade 115, 204, 233, 244
tradition 9–10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 33, 37, 55–6, 62–4, 79, 82, 85, 97, 104, 125, 128, 147, 150–2, 158, 201, 208–9, 220, 234, 238, 245, 248, 250, 255–6, 259
transcendence 101, 144, 170, 174, 182, 186, 195–6, 198, 201
Trotsky, Leon 116, 224, 260
tyranny 90, 108, 115, 149, 158, 219
unions 8, 40, 114–15
unity 60, 70, 99, 105, 145, 162, 166, 174, 186, 209, 248
Urales, Federico 159, 233, 260
utilitarianism 50, 53, 147, 151, 213, 255, 259
utopia 25, 35, 217–18, 256
values 46, 63, 66, 68, 79–81, 83, 93, 104, 114, 121, 139, 155–6, 173, 186, 193–5, 199
vanguardism 115, 117, 119–20, 152, 231, 249
violence 9, 26, 32, 38, 56, 68, 103, 127–8, 132–3, 135, 145, 155, 157, 207, 226, 260
virtue 6, 18, 22, 25, 27, 40, 45, 50, 53, 55, 61, 75, 90, 92, 113, 129, 134, 146, 151–2, 168, 198, 206–7, 211, 224, 231, 240, 246, 254
vitality 145, 147, 152, 155–6, 169
voluntarism 78, 82–5, 95, 233
war 8, 60, 72, 74, 116, 124, 129, 137, 160, 174, 183, 233, 242
wealth 77, 79, 87, 91, 93–4, 101, 106, 111, 135–7, 154, 219, 259
Weick, David 136, 228, 260
women 8, 40, 89, 125, 142, 148
Woodcock, George 226–7, 260
workers 112–15, 117, 119, 121, 134–5, 149, 155, 182–3, 192, 234, 245

Xenophon 25, 207, 260

Zapatistas 160, 233, 251