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# Identifying Security Logics in the EU Policy Discourse

The "Migration Crisis" and the EU

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Maciej Stepka

# Identifying Security Logics in the EU Policy Discourse

The “Migration Crisis” and the EU

 Springer

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*To my parents Roman and Bożena Stępa*

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction



### 1.1 Introduction

The relationship between migration and security has always been a complex one, often generating deeply politicised and polarised debates in political, societal, journalistic, and also academic circles (Ibrahim & Howarth, 2017; Triandafyllidou, 2018). In the last decade, the rise of trans-border migratory flows and the corresponding increase of radicalisation of public debate and the re-emergence of extreme nationalism and xenophobia, has only contributed to the complex nature of the migration-security nexus, making it one of the most contentious and ideologically charged issues in the European Union (EU) (Rheindorf & Wodak, 2017). In this respect, the rise of fear-driven narratives of security and uncertainty towards migrants have become explicitly embedded in global and regional contexts, profoundly stimulating public debates and political discourse (Karyotis & Skleparis, 2013; Squire, 2015; “The Securitisation of Migration in the EU: Debates since 9/11,” 2016).

With deepening political and economic destabilisation in the European Union’s neighbourhood and escalation of protracted conflicts in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia, the number of civilian populations seeking refuge from war and poverty has steadily grown in recent years amounting to approx. 80 million by the end of 2019<sup>1</sup> (UNHCR Website, 2020). While most forced migrants have been internally displaced or remained in the neighbourhood of their country of origin, the numbers of those attempting to seek refuge in Europe has substantially increased since 2015, triggering what has often been described as uncontrollable mass migration to the

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<sup>1</sup>According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Globally approx. 55% of refugees come from South Sudan, Afghanistan (UNHCR Website, 2020). In the EU, the largest inflows of refugees are from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Eurostat Website, 2017b).

EU territories<sup>2</sup> (Bledsoe-Gardner, 2017; Lucassen, 2017). As reported by Frontex, in 2015 the number of irregular border crossings into the EU quadrupled in comparison to the previous years, reaching more than 1.8 million<sup>3</sup> (Frontex, 2015). Similarly, in 2015 and 2016 the EU Member States recorded an unprecedented increase of asylum claims, reaching a total of 1.2 million applications in each of these two years (Eurostat Website, 2017a). In this respect, very quickly the EU has become a rapidly unravelling site of the so-called “migration crisis”, which has become one of the most complex security and migration-related challenges Europe has faced since the end of World War II.

The situation on the borders was quickly reflected in the public perception of migrants and migration in Europe. In the November 2015 Eurobarometer, an unprecedented 58% of respondents from the EU and candidate countries defined migration as the leading security concern for the EU, topping such traditional sources of insecurity as terrorism and economic instability (Eurobarometer, 2015). It is not without reason as the political and media-driven framing of the “migration crisis” have filled the collective European imagination with mixed and often contradictory opinions and images of drowning children, invading refugees, terrorists, and economic migrants, often increasing a sense of confusion, uncertainty and insecurity about the nature and consequences of the crisis (Jaskulowski, 2019; Ragazzi, 2015; Triandafyllidou, 2018). This uneasy situation has provided fertile grounds for further securitisation of migration in Europe, intensifying narratives and policy actions that have been pushing migration deeper into the realms of discourses and practices of security. Under these conditions, the European Union (EU) has been put at the forefront of political problematisation of the “migration crisis”, becoming one of the key actors responsible for the shaping of policies and common responses. In this way, the EU policymaking environment has become an important arena for further securitisation of migration in the European context.

## 1.2 Migration and Security in Academic Literature

The “migration crisis” has certainly rekindled scholarly interest in linkages between migration and broadly understood security, expanding on the already rich and well-established academic literature (Guild, 2009; Huysmans, 2006; Huysmans & Squire, 2010; Neal, 2009; van Munster, 2009). The studies on the migration-security nexus have initially, but not exclusively, caught the attention of the Copenhagen

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<sup>2</sup>Even though since 2018 there has been a decrease in arrivals, often construed in media reports as the end of the “migration crisis” the latest developments on the EU borders (e.g. in Greece) suggest that the next waves of increased migratory flows will take place in the near future and the crisis should not be treated as a single event (Euroactive Website, 2020).

<sup>3</sup>Taking into account that one person could illegally cross the EU external border more than once (Frontex, 2015).

School and securitisation scholars, who started exploring elite-driven processes through which migration has been securitised, that is discursively constructed as a threat to security (Buzan et al., 1998; Wæver et al., 1993). Studies on securitisation of migration have quickly grown into dynamically expanding research agenda, focused on exploring new actors (e.g. security practitioners, the EU), sites (e.g. borders), processes (e.g. technologisation of migration control), all of which contributing to different modes and logics of securitisation (Bigo, 2002; Bourbeau, 2011; Leonard, 2010a; Leonard & Kaunert, 2019).

One of the most prominent strands of literature on securitisation of migration refers to the politics of fear and insecurity, most commonly observed in national contexts with powerful actors, such as political parties or the media, capable of shaping the public imagination (Huysmans, 2006; Wodak, 2015). This type of securitisation is often reflected in exceptionalist, populist, exclusionary, and racial political discourses which are supposed to spread suspiciousness and resentment towards migrant communities (Huysmans, 2006, p. 8). This type of securitisation is often linked to societal security and an idea that the identity of the host society is existentially threatened by the alien newcomers (Buzan et al., 1998). Examples of such securitisations can be found in analyses of political and media discourses on the flows of Hispanics into the United States (Ackleson, 2005) or North Africans and East Europeans to Western Europe (Carling, 2007; Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002), each following a similar narrative, describing migrants, refugees and asylum seekers as inferior, barbaric and dangerous to the stability and internal order of the host society (Skleparis, 2016). Wodak points out that these nationalistic, anti-immigrant discourses often serve very utilitarian political purposes, such as mobilisation of electorate and with the aim of gaining and sustaining political power (Pohl & Wodak, 2012). They introduce a sense of pride and superiority among members of the host society and propose a clear definition of an enemy, a scapegoat of sorts, which can be blamed for all failures and wrongdoings (Wodak, 2015).

Securitisation driven by fear and resentment is often reflected in immigration and integration policies, which abandon the idea of “multicultural integration” in favour of homogeneity of the state and assimilation of immigrants (d’Appollonia, 2015). Policies of this type “reproduce a myth that a homogenous national community or Western civilisation existed in the past and can be re-established today through the exclusion of those migrants who are identified as cultural aliens” (Huysmans, 2000, p. 758). In this respect, integration policies may have a securitising effect by no longer focusing on the “equalisation of opportunity, but rather on the discouragement and penalisation of migrants who do not possess certain attributes” and do not fit into a required template (Ryan, 2008, p. 312). This feeds the idea of the superiority of the culture and identity of the host society and deepens, often already historically embedded, divisions between host society (threatened us) and migrant communities (threatening them) (Klaus, 2017). In this way, securitisation driven by the politics of fear, resentment and alienation constitutes one of the key ingredients of the contemporary securitisation of migration at national level (Huysmans, 2006).

Numerous scholars have started exploring securitisation of migration beyond the discourse and politics of fear, turning their attention to administrative practices, technologies of surveillance and border control, or population profiling (Balzacq, 2011; Bigo, 2002; Bourbeau, 2014; Leonard, 2010a). This alternative perspective has changed the trajectory of securitisation research, steering it to actors and settings that operate in a more mundane realm of security, focused on management of risks and uncertainties associated with human mobility (Williams & Baláž, 2012). Many researchers have been trying to merge the discursive and practice-driven approaches to securitisation, by showing how these two modalities co-exist in a broader governmental landscape, such as the Schengen Area and its unique border security regime (Bigo, 2014; Neal, 2009; Sperling & Webber, 2019). For instance, Huysmans (2000) has been focusing on the correspondence between the political and the practical aspects of securitisation of migration and the fact that the discursive processes are in fact closely associated with technological and technocratic aspects of securitisation. Following this thread, van Munster (2009) observes that the signing of the Schengen Agreement in 1985 began a trend in the securitisation of migration, which has deeply impacted the EU's approach to immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers, beginning a transfer of migration to the technocratic world of risk and population control. The introduction of Schengen also marked the first time when at transnational level migration (especially in its irregular form) has been so closely associated with international terrorism, transnational crime, and border security, becoming one of the key domains of the EU internal security policy (Bali, 2008, pp. 471–473).<sup>4</sup>

Many securitisation scholars indicate that the security apparatus within the Schengen Area has been set to comprehensively control human mobility in the name of freedom of movement and more efficient governance of the internal and external borders of the EU (Bigo, 2000; Bossong & Rhinard, 2016; Kaunert & Leonard, 2010). The question of borders has been playing a significant role in the securitisation literature, often being defined as the first point of contact between security and the migrant, a site where categories are assigned and decisions are taken about “who is ‘legitimate’ and who is ‘illegitimate’; who is ‘trusted’ and who is ‘risky’; who can be allowed to cross freely and who is excluded” (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2015, p. 175). Walters observes the liberalisation of border checks caused by Schengen has transformed the traditional idea of borders from “sharp lines at the outer edge of member states into a more diffused, networked, control apparatus, substantially increasing the scope of exposure of migrants to security” practices (Walters, 2002, p. 573). In this respect, the locus and scope of potential sites of securitisation of migration in the EU has dramatically expanded, transforming the EU's internal security domain (Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) into a complex network of securitising discourses, practices, and policies designed to control risky populations within the EU. As noted by Bigo (2000, p. 185),

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<sup>4</sup>The historical analysis of securitising practices deployed at the EU level is included in Chap. 4.

security checks are no longer necessarily done at the border on a systematic and egalitarian basis, but can be carried out further downstream, within the territory, within the border zone or even upstream with police collaboration in the home country of immigrants, through visa-gathering systems and through readmission agreements.

Securitisation scholars have devoted much attention to the role of technologies of surveillance and control in securitisation of migration (Jeandesboz, 2016; Marin, 2017; Stokes-Dupass, 2017). The conceptualisation and implementation of dataveillance and biometric technologies, smart borders packages, a vast interoperable IT system has become a crucial part of security discourses and practices deployed in the EU and beyond (Bellanova & Duez, 2016; Jeandesboz, 2017). These technologies of population surveillance and control have been often described as a knowledge-driven instrument of “pre-emptive securitisation of migrants”, where every mobile person is treated as potential risk to security (Jeandesboz, 2017; Rijpma & Vermeulen, 2015). Jeandesboz (2017) notes that the contemporary construction of security is driven by flows of security knowledge within apparatus of governance, which assigns social power and legitimises securitisation of migrants based on a degree of certainty about them being a source of insecurity. This trend in securitisation has been strengthened by the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and later bombings in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), when high technology has become crucial in management of mobile and risky populations, which had to be identified and contained before threats come to realisation<sup>5</sup> (Leonard, 2010b; Ragazzi, 2016). This technocratic and technology-driven mode of securitisation of migration is not centred on definition of existential threats but rather “traceability” of risky migrants and their neutralisation if the need arises (Dijstelbloem & Meijer, 2011; Maguire, 2015).

The literature of securitisation of migration has been also focusing on investigations into the consequences of security discourses and practices on migrants themselves, their vulnerability and human security (Gasper & Sinatti, 2016; McDonald, 2010). Guild (2009, p. 3) proposes refocusing research on the migration-security nexus from mass migration-centred, dispassionate inquiries to an analysis of “how does the individual fit into a set of state structural frameworks and become categorised as a threat to security and to state control of migration”. Here, categories assigned to specific migrants matter, especially in regard to sites of security such as borders, detention centres or refugee camps, which often reflect an amalgamation of security and humanitarian practices (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015; Williams, 2015). For instance, Aradau (2008) analyses how security categories applied to counter human trafficking policies, may turn migrants into threatening criminals, unwanted immigrants on one hand or individuals requiring protection on the other. She uses an example of women categorised as victims who can be admitted to rehabilitation centres, cared for and/or deported voluntarily, while women categorised as prostitutes will be most likely held in detention centres and eventually forcibly returned

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<sup>5</sup>Some scholars argue that the terrorist attacks had rather limited impact on securitisation of migration in the EU (Boswell, 2007).

to the country of their origin (Aradau, 2008). In cases such as human trafficking, the line between irregular migrants and migrants at risk or refugees can be unclear and might lead to securitisation and victimisation of groups of people that were not supposed to be subjected to security in the first place (Aradau, 2008). This is a good example of how practices of making divisions, drawing lines and distinguishing between different categories of mobile people, in this case trafficked women, enables the securitisation of migration (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2015, p. 173).

The rapidly growing literature on securitisation of migration reveals a rather complex and fragmented picture, which does not allow this process to be fit into one specific template or modality. Indeed, within the literature there have been many indications that the construction of security is in fact entangled in a variety of logics, as well as discourses and practices dictated by them (Balzacq, 2015; Bourbeau, 2015; Kessler & Daase, 2008; Salter et al., 2019). These logics are often conceptualised within broader governmental landscapes of migration, security and border management. The EU certainly represents such a landscape, which has been expanding and evolving quite dynamically over recent years. For this reason, it is necessary, as this book does, to look more deeply into this tangled nature of the securitisation of migration and investigate how specific logics of securitisation co-exist and intertwine with one another at the EU level.

### 1.3 Aims of the Book

Having in mind a burgeoning nature of securitisation literature devoted to the “migration crisis”, this book aims to integrate the existing perspectives and shed a new light on the policy-driven securitisation of migration at the EU level. It is the author’s contention that as a result of the crisis there have been important developments in the ways the relationship between migration and security has been framed and enacted in the EU. These developments strongly highlighted the inherently messy and intricate nature of securitisation of migration, reflected in the multiplicity of policy actors who have “something to say” in regard to migration and security, but most importantly in the diversity of perspectives on how security is understood and enacted (i.e. security logics).

In this regard, this book aims to complement the already rich literature on securitisation of migration, in which the link between migration and security is most often viewed through the lenses of a dominant narrative or security logic (e.g. as a humanitarian or border security matter). Instead of focusing on one distinctive securitising logic, this book offers the missing link between earlier and current studies, showing how the securitisation process can be viewed as a complex tapestry. This “securitising tapestry” is woven out of multiple, colourful threads, each of which representing a different logic that configures the securitisation process in a distinctive way. These include more traditional notions of security reflected in a state of emergency, as well as newer concepts corresponding with risk, resilience or humanitarianism. To exemplify, the securitisation analysis presented in this book unravels

how the idea of risky migrant populations becomes interwoven with the militarisation of EU borders and the notion of protection of vulnerable groups among migrants. The analytical framework proposed in this book allows examination of how these patchworks of different logics translate into policy-driven securitisation in the EU. This unique perspective makes it possible to trace the enactment of and tensions between different security logics, to investigate the consequences of multiple security discourses and practices, as well as to question the depoliticising or desecuritising nature of security logics (e.g. risk) that linger below the threshold of state of emergency.

In general terms, this book focuses on the internal complexity and, what could be described as, the “tangled nature” of securitisation of migration at the EU level. It is concerned with the ways policy actors operating within the EU promote specific interpretations of the migration-security nexus and propose policy schemes with reference to the “migration crisis”. In order to do so, they mobilise different security logics rooted in existential security, risk management, resilience or human security, weaving them into the securitisation process. To show how security logics imbue the EU migration-security nexus, the book provides an insight into specific stages of EU policy framing of the crisis (i.e. diagnosis, evaluation and response to the crisis), investigating (1) how different EU policy actors produce and promote their interpretations of relationship between migration and security; (2) how these interpretations co-exist, intertwine and merge in this process; and (3) to what end. In doing so, it discusses the purposes and consequences of mobilisation of specific security logics vis-à-vis migrants and migration. It untangles an interpretative dynamic of securitisation and traces how the interpretation of the relationship between migration and security changes within EU security discourse depending on the stage of policymaking and the type of EU institutional actor involved.

Additionally, from a theoretical standpoint, the book also introduces a refreshed perspective on securitisation by proposing to look at securitisation of migration in the EU as the work of policy framing. This has been done in order to break up some of the most rigid theoretical building blocks of the traditional Copenhagen School’s iteration of securitisation theory that have been obstructing a more nuanced analysis of construction of security. In this sense, the presented framework diverts from the traditional speech act-based approach to the theory and proposes replacing speech act with policy frames and framing processes as the vehicle of securitisation. This allows to focus on a processual and iterative character of securitisation of migration in the EU and analyse it as a dynamic filled with multiple policy actors representing often contradictory interpretations of security, which are marginalised and/or emphasised in this process. Further, the book proposes a specific conceptualisation of interaction between securitising actors (e.g. politicians) and audiences (e.g. wider society), which have the power to accept or reject proposed interpretations of security problems and remedial actions. Here, the EU policy actors, being locked in a form of dialogical relationship, simultaneously play the role of actors as well as audiences, while producing specific interpretations as well as accepting or rejecting them. Finally, the book proposes to treat securitisation of migration in the EU as a contextually embedded process – a continuum of security discourses and practices

deployed in relation to migrants and migration. In this sense, it recommends viewing securitisation of the “migration crisis” through the lenses of security policy frames that have been developing in the integrating Europe since the 1970s.

## 1.4 Methods

In order to investigate securitisation of migration on the EU level and its underwriting logics, the book employs a qualitative method of analysis. It focuses on examination of the EU frame-narrative which emanates from policy texts on the “migration crisis” produced by the key policy actors in the EU, namely the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Council between late 2014 and the beginning of 2018. The research also includes analysis of relevant textual data produced by the key EU agencies involved in the framing of the crisis, including Europol, Frontex, European Asylum Support Office. Here, the frame-narrative has a rhetoric- and action-oriented character and is comprised of three main segments, namely diagnosis, evaluation and conceptualisation of remedial actions. Each of these segments plays a different role in the interpretative process. In respect to securitisation, the diagnosis of the security problem concentrates on its root causes and sources of threats; the evaluation focuses on attribution of blame (naming the key actors, culprits responsible for the instigation of threats and the security problem), as well as parties responsible for dealing with the problem; lastly, the remedial actions segment is devoted to conceptualisation of specific policy responses to defined threats. Each of these segments is imbued with different, often tangled security logics.

In this research, a frame-narrative is construed as a type of policy story, which underwrites, stabilises and connects the assumptions and interpretations for policy-making in situations that persist with many unknowns, a high degree of interdependence, and little, if any, agreement (Schön & Rein, 1994). In this respect, it helps to clarify the analysed textual material and create a sense of a logical and sequential interpretative process. More importantly, the frame-narrative approach makes it possible to flesh out specific security interpretations existing in particular stages of policy framing process and how they co-exist and intertwine in the collective securitisation of migration at the EU level.

The analysis feeds on three types of data: primary textual (e.g. official EU policy texts, reports, communications, press releases, materials from official websites,), secondary contextual (e.g. policy-relevant research and analyses produced by NGOs and think tanks specialising in migration, asylum and border policies), and 15 semi-structured elite interviews with representatives of selected EU institutions and agencies (ten male and five female interviewees). The interviews were anonymous and were conducted between 2016 and 2018 with representatives of EU institutions and EU agencies involved in the management of the “migration crisis” (the group included MEPs, DG HOME representatives, European Parliament Research Service representatives, Frontex, EASO and Europol field officers and case officers). It

should be noted that the textual data retrieved from the EU institutions and agencies served as the primary sources of data, while the interviews were treated as a supplementary material, allowing a more nuanced insight into specific motivations and possible alternative interpretations hiding behind EU policies. In this sense, the interviews were conducted after the analysis of primary data and the respondents were asked to weigh in on the interpretation of more controversial policy initiatives, and comment on the preliminary findings. In this respect, data retrieved from the interviews was used primarily in the sections, which were concluding application of specific security logics, in a form of closing and summarising comments.

Nonetheless, every method has its limitations and challenges. In terms of the analysis the greatest challenge of this study was the sheer volume of material to be coded and scrutinised. In order to mitigate this challenge, I followed suggestions of the Copenhagen School and built the corpus of data incrementally, starting with the most relevant, strategic documents, which are seminal for the contestation of analysed policies. Then the selection proceeded with the identification of inter-discursive patterns in respect to the hierarchy and order of policy texts produced by the selected actors. Additionally, I used the concept of “theoretical saturation”, which refers to the “point beyond which, no additional data are being found whereby the researcher can develop properties of the analysed item or category” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 61). That is why additional material data was introduced to the main corpus only up to the point when it ceased to be of added value for the analysis.

## **1.5 Clarifying the Scope and Main Characteristics of the Book**

The “migration crisis” has certainly sparked a new academic interest in studying securitisation of migration at the EU level. This is not surprising, as the crisis represents a critical case for this type of research, allowing one to look at how different modalities and dimensions of securitisation have been catalysed by increased migratory flows to the EU. Even though there is a growing literature on securitisation of migration in the EU, knowledge on securitising practices deployed at the EU level is fragmented, focused on specific actors (e.g. Frontex) or policies (e.g. EU asylum policy). Often, the findings included in these analyses are lacking correspondence and an answer to a broader question about the nature of securitisation of migration at the EU level. To this end, there is limited research devoted to a more comprehensive analysis of the EU, which encompasses various framings and security logics, interpretations and approaches mobilised against migrants and migration. For this reason, this book focuses on the internal dynamics of the EU securitisation practices, concentrating on policy discourse on the “migration crisis”, its content and consequences for human mobility to and within the EU.

In this book, I apply quotation marks whenever I refer to the “migration crisis” in order to underline the socially constructed and contested nature of this

phenomenon. There is a multitude of names such as “refugee crisis”, “immigration crisis” or “asylum crisis” that operate within the academic and non-academic literature, each imbuing increased migratory flows with a sense of urgency and linking them with different policy concerns.<sup>6</sup> It is not the aim of this book to provide an ultimate definition of the “migration crisis”, but rather explore how it is framed and then translated into specific policy actions. That is why I decided to employ the term “migration crisis” more as a broad linguistic token representing this phenomenon rather than a name, which is supposed to represent its specific nature. Of course, one cannot escape from framing one’s research with selected names and categories, but I believe it is important to be aware of the significance of such names, especially in an interpretative study such as this.

Further, I predominantly use the term “migrant”<sup>7</sup> in order to refer to the participants in the mixed migratory flows into the EU. However, in this book I also apply four supplementary categories of migrants that are prominent within the EU policy discourse, namely “refugees”,<sup>8</sup> “asylum seekers”,<sup>9</sup> “economic migrants”,<sup>10</sup> and “irregular migrants”.<sup>11</sup> These categories, whenever they are used in this book, emerge from the analysed material and are used to reflect interpretative processes of the EU policy actors rather than the author’s declaration regarding the type of migrants that have been a part of the “migration crisis”. As aptly noted by Crawley and Skleparis (2018, p. 48), most contemporary categories of migration “fail to capture adequately the complex relationship between political, social and economic

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<sup>6</sup>It should be noted that the use of the term “crisis” carries a securitising effect. Boin (2005, p. 2) and his colleagues observe that the term “crisis” already suggests an existentially threatening situation to the basic structures and fundamental norms of a protected system. The term “crisis” also initiates extraordinary decision-making procedures, which envisage mobilisation of extraordinary measures under highly uncertain conditions.

<sup>7</sup>There is no uniform definition of a migrant in the international legal or policy frameworks. In this book, I build on International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) conceptualisation of a migrant who is defined as “any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is” (IOM Website, 2018b).

<sup>8</sup>As indicated by the UNHCR, “a refugee is someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group. Most likely, they cannot return home or are afraid to do so” (UNHCR Website, 2018b).

<sup>9</sup>An asylum-seeker is defined as a refugee “seeking sanctuary in another country, they apply for asylum – the right to be recognised as a refugee and receive legal protection and material assistance. An asylum seeker must demonstrate that his or her fear of persecution in his or her home country is well-founded” (UNHCR Website, 2018b).

<sup>10</sup>An economic migrant is defined as a person who engages in cross-border mobility to “improve his/her live by finding work, or in some cases for education, family reunion, or other reasons” (UNHCR Website, 2018a).

<sup>11</sup>An irregular migrant is defined as a person who engages in cross-border mobility “outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries”. This usually involves travelling illegally through borders, without the necessary authorisation or documents required under immigration regulations (IOM Website, 2018a).

drivers of migration or their shifting significance for individuals over time and space". As often indicated in the literature, strict categories fail to account for the fact that migratory flows consist of various people with different statuses and motivations for travel, which are often dynamic and change in the course of migration (Haddad, 2008; Samers & Collyer, 2017). In this respect, an individual migrant may change his/her status, simultaneously fit in two or more categories, or not qualify for any pre-existing categories at all (Collyer, 2010).

## 1.6 Structure of the Book

The book is divided into seven chapters. It opens with the Introduction, which provides a review of the existing literature on the migration-security nexus, focusing predominantly on scholarship devoted to studies on securitisation of migration. This section delivers basic information about the topic of the book, introduces and defines basic concepts, provides statistics and presents a brief outline of the chapters. The second chapter is devoted to the Copenhagen School of security and the theory of securitisation. It explores how this particular theory views the social and discursive construction of security and discusses its main building blocks such as speech act, logic of exception, actor-audience interaction, outlining the criticism of the theory as well as its alternative modalities, which have emerged in the new waves of securitisation literature. This leads the theoretical discussion to the third chapter, which sketches out the analytical framework applied in this book by proposing to look at securitisation as the work of policy framing. This approach makes it possible to investigate not one specific understanding of security that is supposed to "break normal politics" (as is suggested by the Copenhagen School), but the whole plethora of entangled security logics that to different degrees frame migration as a security issue as well as shift power relations and control over migration within the EU. To this end, the chapter provides an overview of specific security logics and discusses how their application opens the securitisation analysis to a more interpretative reading.

The fourth chapter of the book marks the beginning of the securitisation analysis. It investigates which security logics and policy actors have been most prominent in the shaping of the migration security nexus in the EU prior to the "migration crisis". Here, a distinction in the securitisation of migration in the EU is made between "constitutional securitisation" of migration stimulated by the treaties, and "secondary securitisation" stimulated by EU legislation. In this way, the chapter unravels the so-called migration-security continuum in the EU, reflecting historically and institutionally embedded security frames, which have been influencing the EU approach to migration. It discusses how the notions of control and management of possible risks and security deficits generated by increased liberalisation of border control have been gradually coming to dominate the EU's migration policies, making the logic of risk management a key feature of securitising practices deployed at the EU level.

The fifth chapter focuses on the first segments of the EU frame-narrative (i.e. diagnosis and evaluation) and discusses how the EU has mobilised and emphasised different security logics while framing the crisis. In this regard, the chapter discusses how human security has deeply saturated the discourse on the “migration crisis”, becoming the most relevant logic during the diagnostic and evaluation segments of policy framing. It examines specific policy actors such as the European Parliament, which played the role of the key promotor of this logic, employing a humanitarian perspective while diagnosing the root causes and assigning the blame for the crisis. The chapter also focuses on risk-centred interpretations, which visibly influenced the first stages of the framing process. It provides an analysis on how the interpretation of the crisis shifted into more risk-oriented logics when the crisis “entered” the Schengen Area, which deeply influenced the interpretation of the nature of the crisis, referent objects, security concerns and their causal effects. With the shift of logic, the locus of the framing process also changed, introducing the European Commission and the Council of the European Union as key promotors of this type of framing. The discussion on specific logics is divided into sub-sections, each concluded with summarising comments extracted from the interviews.

The sixth chapter focuses on the last segment of the EU frame-narrative on the “migration crisis,” analysing the discursive institutionalisation of security logics hiding behind policy actions proposed and mobilised vis-à-vis increased migratory flows. It discusses how in this last stage of the framing process the prominence of the logics has changed as compared to the diagnosis and evaluation stages. Elements of human security, so visible in the previous segments, have become less evident, and rather deemphasised and dispersed between risk management, “exceptionalist” security and resilience. In this sense, most of the remedial actions conceptualised at the EU level and discussed in the chapter included “humanitarian concern”, although to different degrees and ends. However, the prominence of the broadly understood risk logic remained and split into risk management and resilience-oriented policy actions. In this respect, the EU policy discourse on management of risks was proliferated with calls for policy initiatives directed at normalisation and control of migratory flows, as well as stabilisation of the situation on the EU borders, while resilience-oriented actions concentrated on the robustness of the administrative capabilities of the EU asylum system, border security system, as well as the EU neighbourhood and countries of origin. Further, the chapter discusses how risk management, resilience and human security intertwine with the logic of exceptional security reflected in the militarisation of policy responses. Here, such existential threats as trans-border organised crime or terrorism are strategically deployed as reasons for mobilisation of extraordinary, often militarised means such EUNAVOR “Sophia” or EU border operations. Similarly, as in the previous chapter, sub-sections corresponding with specific security logics are concluded with comments extracted from the interviews.

The book ends with conclusions devoted to revisiting of patterns of securitisation and security logics in the EU frame narrative on the “migration crisis”. This chapter summarises the findings of the book and provides concluding remarks. It is supplemented with a table encompassing the whole structure of the EU policy framing process. It revisits how security logics intertwined and influenced each other within

the whole EU frame-narrative produced in response to the “migration crisis”, indicating points of convergence and divergence in the securitisation process.

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# Chapter 2

## The Copenhagen School and Beyond. A Closer Look at Securitisation Theory



### 2.1 Introduction

The aim of the chapter is to provide a closer look at the Copenhagen School of security<sup>1</sup> and its proposition of securitisation theory. In doing so, it will focus on the discussion on the main conceptual building blocks of the theory, outlining their characteristics and critique reflected in the current securitisation literature. For the past years, the Copenhagen School has inspired a plethora of studies and theoretical reflections on different modes and characteristics of the construction of security, becoming particularly relevant for migration-security nexus research (Huysmans, 2006; Lazardis, 2011; Leonard & Kaunert, 2019; van Munster, 2009). In this book the Copenhagen School, along with criticism of it, serves as a point of reference for further elaboration of the framing centred securitisation and discussion on the intertwining of security logics in the process of intersubjective construction of security. The chapter is structured as follows. The first section provides an overview of the mechanics of the securitisation theory, defining its key constituents – speech act, logic of exception, and actor-audience interaction. Further, it moves to discussion on each of these elements, elaborating their specific role within the theory, but also outlining their specific limiting effects on securitisation research. The last section discusses how the debate on securitisation has been expanding, opening the door to new conceptual frameworks as well as elaborations of security.

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<sup>1</sup>The term was first introduced by Bill McSweeney (in McSweeney, 1996).

## 2.2 The Concept of Securitisation

In the past 30 years, the Copenhagen School and its securitisation theory have become increasingly relevant in the academic discussion on the widening of security (moving beyond the military) and deepening the pool of its referent objects (moving beyond the monopoly of the state as something that can be threatened) (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 187). The beginnings of the theory can be traced back to a series of articles by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (Buzan, 1997; Buzan & Wæver, 1997; Wæver, 1995a, b; Wæver et al., 1993), which eventually resulted in a seminal publication entitled *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Buzan et al., 1998). The securitisation framework as presented by the Copenhagen School aligns with the constructivist approach, committing to the discursive and linguistic turn in International Relations and security studies. It builds upon the notion that “language is not only concerned with what is ‘out there’, as realist and neorealist assume, but is also constitutive of the social reality it describes” (Balzacq, 2010, p. 56). The Copenhagen School argues that security is not a given but it is constructed through inter-subjective social and discursive interactions between powerful actors who propose definitions of threats and relevant audiences who acknowledge these definitions (Buzan et al., 1998). Over the years, securitisation theory has proved to be an attractive framework and a starting point for contemporary scholars, who are challenging the notion of a materialist ontology and uncovering the philosophy, methods and dynamics hiding behind processes, which “push” or “pull” issues, actors, or processes into the realm of security (see Bigo, 2014; Bourbeau, 2015; Neal, 2009).

Even though securitisation is commonly described as a bridging theory, encompassing elements of constructivist and mainstream security studies, its founding fathers prefer to describe it as an example of “radical constructivism” (Buzan et al., 1998). In the broadest terms, securitisation theory allows one to understand how security is constructed with language, and more specifically performative utterances – speech acts (Wæver, 1995b, p. 55). As opposed to the realists, the Copenhagen School is not concerned with identifying objectively construed “real” threats and consequently does not engage in the discussion on the materiality of security (Buzan & Wæver, 1997). Instead, it allows one to peek behind the curtain of security and look at it as a “quality actors inject into issues by securitising them, which means staging those issues on the political arena in the specific way that makes them acceptable as a security problem, sanctioning security actions and defensive moves” (Buzan et al., 1998).

With securitisation theory, Buzan and his colleagues outline a framework, which combines security as an inter-subjective social construct with elements of Austin’s speech act and Schmitt’s idea of “exception” (Buzan et al., 1998). In his early writings on securitisation theory, he proposes treating security as a speech act, a performative utterance which when spoken by a relevant actor (i.e. securitising actor) brings security into being. As he puts it:

By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering “security” a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area and

thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it (Wæver, 1995b, p. 55).

In the later iteration of the theory, Buzan and Wæver (1997) put a stronger emphasis on the rhetorical structure of speech acts, underlining the importance of raising the securitised issue above the threshold of so-called “normal politics”. Here, powerful societal actors produce security discourses, by framing an issue as an existential threat to a specific referent object (a valued object that require protection). In other words, the securitisation process is concerned with

the staging of existential issues in politics to lift them above politics. In security discourse, an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus, by labelling it as *security*, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means (Buzan et al., 1998p. 26).

According to the Copenhagen School, the fact that powerful societal actors use securitising speech acts to declare a particular issue, dynamic or actor to be an existential threat does not by itself produce security. Here, speech acts represent securitising moves, an attempt, which needs to gain societal and political saliency and more importantly the approval of a relevant audience (e.g. wider society) (Buzan et al., 1998). It is the audience’s acceptance that ultimately empowers securitising moves, turning them into an inter-subjectively constructed threat (Côté, 2016). The Copenhagen School builds on the assumption that securitisation is not uniform across different issues. In order to better understand specific nuances of securitisation, it introduces the concept of security sectors, which reflect different dynamics of securitisation, including the way its constitutive elements, such actors, audiences, referent objects and vulnerabilities to security, are defined and incorporated in the act of constructing security (Buzan et al., 1998). In this regard, securitisation builds on previous work by Buzan (most notably his book *People, State and Fear*) indicating five distinctive areas, corresponding with different aspects security, namely: the military, environmental, economic, societal and political (Buzan, 1991; Buzan et al., 1998).

This general overview of the framework allows one to isolate three building blocks, which underlie securitisation, namely: (1) speech act, (2) logic of exception, (3) actor-audience interaction. In the next part of this chapter, I will discuss these elements of the theory, focusing on their unique features, functions as well as critique within a broader securitisation literature. This discussion will serve as a point of reference for further elaboration of the securitisation framework, as applied in this book.

## 2.3 Securitisation and the Speech Act Approach

As already indicated, securitisation theory is invested in John L. Austin’s and John Searle’s theory of speech acts, translating the idea of performativity of language to the concept of security (Austin, 1975; Searle, 1969). According to Austin, language

is not comprised solely of statements that carry content and can be judged in terms of true or false but is performative and introduces change into social reality (Austin, 1975, p. 10). Of course, not every utterance has performative power, as it needs to meet certain conditions and requirements. To describe this, Austin gives an example of a wedding. Here, an authoritative figure (e.g. a priest) creates a social fact of marriage through a series of utterances that culminate in the words “I pronounce you husband and wife” (Austin, 1975, p. 13). In this sense, the power of speech is based on the following elements. Firstly, the physical act of speech itself (i.e. locution) and the conventionalised script which the speaker has to follow in order to infuse the utterances with performative power (i.e. illocution); secondly, the power of the figure that engages in performing the speech act (i.e. authority); lastly, the effect of the speech on the audience, reflected, for example, in fulfilment of an order (i.e. perlocution) (Austin, 1975, p. 17; Rosaldo, 1982).

In the Copenhagen School approach, the locutionary and illocutionary aspects of speech acts are supposed to create a rupture in the common understanding of an issue and propose its introduction into the framework of security (Vuori, 2008). In this vein, the script of securitising speech act should incorporate two key elements – a definition of an existential threat and a referent object (Stritzel, 2007). The definition of an existential threat is necessary as it introduces a sense drama and extreme urgency that has the potential to validate extraordinary measures and suspension of normal politics (Vuori, 2008, p. 70). The referent object should be, at least to some extent, commonly acknowledged as socially relevant and refer, for instance, to shared values, identities, or issues that resonate with a wider part of the targeted audience (Buzan et al., 1998). Keeping these two elements in mind, a securitising actor has a chance to produce a successful securitising speech act that is commonly accepted as a legitimate and dominant security problem requiring exceptional security measures.

Apart from the conventionalised speech itself, the authority of the speaker plays an important role in the speech act approach to security. The Copenhagen School describes securitising actors as “those who speak security” – a person, or a group, who performs the securitising speech acts from the position of power that can substantiate introduction of extraordinary measures (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 40). In this regard, Buzan and Wæver point towards broadly understood political elites, governmental agencies, bureaucrats, and pressure groups, that hold a special position in defining and implementing security (Wæver, 1995b, pp. 49–50). This catalogue can be expanded with any actor, who is expected and able to define threats to the referent objects valued by the groups they represent or belong to (Williams, 2003). Buzan and Wæver argue that the actors are usually not the referent objects, but they regularly claim to speak on their behalf (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 40). A popular example of such a securitising behaviour is a political party or a non-governmental organisation producing security speech acts in defence of national identity (Huysmans, 2006) or religious values (Bagge Laustsen & Wæver, 2000). In such situations, especially political actors often apply securitisation as an instrument for gaining

control over specific areas of social and political life, dominating the discourse, setting out the tone for further actions and policies (Skleparis, 2016, pp. 97–99).

Regardless the power of securitising actors and the contents of speech acts, the inter-subjective character of the theory requires perlocution, in other words, the consent of empowering audiences (McDonald, 2008). As Buzan and his colleagues indicate, the element of

security is not held in subjective and isolated minds; it is a social quality, a part of discourse, socially constituted, inter-subjective realm. For individuals or groups to speak security does not guarantee the success (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 31).

In this vein, the Copenhagen School does not leave much space for discussion about the role of the audience, clearly indicating that “successful securitization is not decided by the ‘securitizer’ but by the audience of the security speech act” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 31). The element of audience is visibly problematic from the analytical point of view. Even though the theory clearly indicates what the audience is supposed to do, it does not elaborate on who or what the audience is (Jarvis & Legrand, 2017, pp. 150–151).

Critics of the speech act approach point out that the Copenhagen School does not equally embrace the locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary dimensions of the theory. It is evident that the locutionary and illocutionary aspects of speech act play more significant role in securitisation framework. It is reflected in the static and decisionist interpretation of securitisation theory, which has been promoted by the Copenhagen School. Indeed, it has been explicitly indicated that “the structure of the theory is organised around securitisation as an act, a productive moment (...)” (Wæver, 2011, p. 468). This act or moment of securitisation is predominantly built around the articulation of the speech by an actor, who enjoys control over securitisation. As Wæver points out in his earlier writings, “something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so” (1995b, pp. 54–55). In this sense, the Copenhagen School depicts securitisation more as a directive or static event, unnecessarily marginalising iterative and incremental processes that are so typical for the social construction of reality. Further, the Copenhagen School strongly emphasises and elaborates upon the role of securitising actors, consequently downplaying the perlocutionary dimension of the theory and the role of audience. As Stritzel puts it:

the more emphasis is put on the notion of ‘illocution’, the less important the concept of ‘audience’ seems to become, as the modus of security could be thought of as being constituted by the illocutionary utterance itself (Stritzel, 2011, p. 349).

In the light of this criticism, it could be argued that the Copenhagen School’s proposition of securitisation theory is somewhat paradoxical (Balzacq, 2005; Floyd, 2007). It is supposed to be radically constructivist and inter-subjective, but the original reading of the theory puts much emphasis on speech act decisions and self-referential elements. It is not completely clear where the real centre of gravity of securitisation theory lies.

## 2.4 Securitisation the Logic of Exception

Securitisation theory is devoted to explaining the process of creating security out of objects, issues and dynamics that normally “existed” outside security frameworks (Bourbeau, 2015). It is dedicated to studying how security “gains new grounds” and widens its scope through discursive practices. Yet, this raises concerns of turning “security” into a concept which encompasses so many areas that it in the end becomes blurred and empirically useless. As Peoples and Vaughan-Williams point out, that there are “intellectual and political dangers in simply tacking the word security onto an ever wider range of issues”, making the concept of security too broad and empirically useless (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2015, p. 93). The Copenhagen School, trying to escape this “making everything a security” trap, introduces conceptual limitations linking securitisation to the Schmittian idea of “exception” as a way of breaking “normal politics” and entering into realm of security (Buzan et al., 1998; Buzan & Wæver, 1997). It conceptualises normal politics in terms of standardised everyday forms of political interaction that allow for contestation and deliberation over an issue in the public space within the bounds of normative and causal procedures (Pram Gad & Lund Petersen 2011:320). As Wæver puts it, “the place of security in the theory is as an anti-politics or the politically constituted limit to politics” (Wæver, 2011, p. 478). In this way, the Copenhagen School looks at the process of constructing security as locked between securitisation (introduction of an issue to non-political exceptionality) and desecuritisation (reintroduction of an issue to normal politics) (Wæver, 1995b).

Indeed, the securitisation framework is very much concerned with the idea of security based on an exception, driven by “existential threats and the radical enmity between friends and foes” (Rothe, 2016, p. 48). In Schmittian philosophy, “‘the exception’ is a situation of radical danger and contingency for which no prior law, procedure or anticipated response is adequate, it is a perilous moment that exceeds the limits of precedent, knowledge, legislation and predictability” (C.A.S.E., 2007, p. 465). Exception-driven security introduces a constitutive antagonism, which constantly threatens a political community and prepares it for the possibility of introduction of exceptional measures and the breaking of the established normative and legal order in the name of the common security (Pram Gad & Lund Petersen, 2011, p. 318). For the Copenhagen School securitisation is a form of radicalisation and “extreme politicisation”, marking a moment when an issue breaks the barrier of normal politics, ends the political discussion and is handled with extraordinary measures (Patomäki, 2015). Consequently, an issue can pass through different forms of politicisation before reaching the level of security. As Buzan and his colleagues explain:

in theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential

threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure) (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 23–24).

According to Schmitt, it is the sovereign who decides on the exception and consequently the direction of the securitisation process (Schmitt, 2010, p. 5). The basis for such a decision is the identification of existential threats, external to the inner order and the consequent demarcation between friends and enemies (Rothe, 2016, p. 48). This decision of taking politics into “security mode” ascribes nearly unlimited and unconstrained prerogatives to the political authority, which acts in the name of survival of the sovereign (Pram Gad & Lund Petersen, 2011, p. 318). Authority thus construed often plays the role of a securitising actor, holding control over groups’ identity as a political community, stimulating its sense of insecurity and strengthening or weakening its coherence based on the perceived threats and realised antagonisms (Williams, 2003, p. 518).

The Copenhagen School does not elaborate on the mechanics and modes of desecuritisation. Some of the most pivotal research in this area is presented by Huysmans, who uses the example of migration to show three possible pathways of downgrading already securitised issues (1995, 1998). He suggests the existence of an “objective strategy” (framing migrants as non-threatening to “our” identity); a “constructivist strategy” (developing a broader understanding of the phenomenon of migration, so that further securitising moves have a lesser impact on the common perception of immigrants); and a “deconstructivist strategy” (desecuritisation through interpersonal experiences with migrants and breaking down exclusionary divisions of “us” and “them”) (Huysmans, 1995, pp. 66–67). Nonetheless, the literature also indicates the cases of “entrenched” or “deep” securitisations, where security narratives are so imbued into the very definition of an issue or a group (e.g. ethnic groups) that it becomes extremely problematic to develop strategies for its desecuritisation (Abulof, 2014).

This brings the discussion to the point concerned with the normative dimension of the securitisation theory, focusing on the question whether it is a “negative” concept. The Copenhagen Schools is quite clear about this, indicating that the process of constructing security indeed has a “dark side” (Wæver, 1995b, p. 64). In some ways, securitisation may be obstructive to developing creative policy solutions, limiting the political space “required to thinking through often complex issues and instead introducing an unhelpful degree of enmity and urgency” (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2015, p. 100). Wæver uses an example of environmental security, arguing that statist solutions driven by the logic of security might lead to unnecessary centralisation and militarisation of environmental issues (1995b). He also points out societal dangers, associated with increased securitisation such as increase of hate speech, discriminatory discourses and consequent reinforcement of antagonisms driven by “us” versus “them” logic (1995b, p. 65). This is when in most cases desecuritisation becomes a more desirable and effective option, downgrading a problem from security to the world of process-type remedies on “normal political deliberation and haggling” (Wæver, 1999, p. 335).

The rule of exceptionality has been widely contested in the securitisation literature, generating substantial criticisms on three interrelated grounds. Firstly, it has proven to be empirically limiting. By arguing that successful securitisation moves an issue outside normal democratic politics, the Copenhagen School unnecessarily restricts itself to domestic norms and democratic governments, limiting the applicability of the theory within non-state, non-democratic and international contexts (Stritzel, 2011; Wilkinson, 2007). This problem is specifically visible in research on securitising practices in transnational settings, such as the European Union, where the political process is not attuned to the state of democratic normalcy, but embedded in various forms of high level and technocratic politics (Huysmans, 2000; Sperling & Webber, 2019; van Munster, 2009). Abrahamson voices similar concerns arguing that “exceptional securitization does not fully capture the dominant mode of security politics, which is most often gradual and incremental, with issues only rarely moving directly from normalcy to emergency” (Abrahamsen, 2005, p. 71). Secondly, exceptionality can never fully eliminate the political haggling or political debate from the securitisation process. As Huysmans indicates, even exceptionalist securitisation is never simply an imposition of the end of normal politics as it “always entails the opening up of a political terrain of contestation of democratic political organisation and authorisation” (Huysmans, 2014, p. 69). It is a process, which brings into play various actors and political rationalities, engaging them in contestation of exceptionality of the situation.

Thirdly, due to the premise of exceptionality, the Copenhagen School tends to apply the realist vocabulary of security, closing the theory to alternative notions of security and securitisation. Indeed, contemporary security practice has much less in common with exceptional politics and can be more associated with, for instance, humanitarianism or the concept of risk and the logic of governance reflected in long-termism and precautionary measures (Corry, 2012, p. 248). In this regard, exceptional securitisation ignores a whole plethora of security practices and discourses that operate below the threshold of exceptionality, but still remain in the realm of security (Lund Petersen, 2012; Rasmussen, 2006).

## 2.5 Securitisation and the Audience-Actor Interaction

The third building block of securitisation theory, the conceptualisation of audience, is also rather problematic as the Copenhagen School does not offer any substantial definition or discussion on this matter. Audience can be intuitively defined as the society or a different entity<sup>2</sup> capable of accepting and legitimising definitions of existential threats and the consequential introduction of exceptional security measures (Côté, 2016, p. 548). This rather ambiguous conceptualisation

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<sup>2</sup>Among others: government branch (Salter, 2008b), technical experts (Rothe, 2016), international community (Vaughn, 2009), local society (Buraczyński, 2015).

has generated some confusion in the securitisation literature, resulting in vigorous discussion on the criteria of identification of relevant audience(s) (Salter, 2008b; Vaughn, 2009), its interaction with powerful actors (Côté, 2016) and modes of acceptance of security narratives and measures (Buraczyński, 2015; Stritzel & Chang, 2015).

In order to identify a relevant audience in securitisation research, one first has to understand what an audience actually does. In the Copenhagen School, the role of an audience is construed as mostly passive and conceptualised around two essential functions: listening and reacting (Rothe, 2016, p. 35). Audience as “listeners” can be described as “a strategic resource that has to be won over” for the successful finalisation of the securitising move (McSweeney, 1996). In the traditional reading of the theory “audience is there to enjoy the show” or “sit and listen”, while the real spectacle is controlled by powerful actors, who woo the audience with various methods and attractive scripts in order to secure the favourable reception of the securitising act (Stritzel, 2012). This leads to the second, and key, function of audience, which is reacting to securitising moves. The Copenhagen School identifies two types of audience responses – acceptance and non-acceptance of proposed threat definitions and security measures (Buzan et al., 1998:43). Here, audience enjoys rather limited influence over the process, with no particular ways of expressing more nuanced reactions to securitising moves. Referring to this traditional conceptualisation, Côté argues that audience is in fact an “agent without agency”, stripped of any real possibility of influencing the actor and doing what it is supposed to, that is engage in inter-subjective construction of security (2016). This limitation is partly recognised by Buzan et al., who point out that

one danger of the phrases ‘securitization’ and ‘speech act’ is that too much focus can be placed on the acting side, thus privileging the powerful while marginalizing those who are the audience and judge of the act (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 41).

Indeed, without further conceptualisation of audience, securitisation risks becoming more of a self-referential directive produced by securitising actors, than a site of negotiations and an inter-subjective process (Balzacq, 2005, pp. 179–180). One of the “ways out” would be strengthening and exploring the perlocutionary effects of security speech acts and more meaningful incorporation of the concept of audience into the analytical scheme. This, however, would necessitate a reconfiguration of securitisation theory in terms of power and agency that could be ascribed to the involved agents, as well as the repositioning of actors and audiences in the framework.

The traditional idea of audience has sparked a lot of criticism and fruitful discussions on the role, definition and interaction of relevant audience and securitising actors. The main line of argument is the extent of power that should be identified with audience. Numerous researchers argue that without power and agency audience is incapable of playing its part in the securitisation process (Balzacq, 2011; Côté, 2016; Stritzel, 2012). It has to be an agent, which has a standing in political and societal contestation of the problems. In this sense, audience should have agency and the means to challenge definitions and measures proposed by powerful actors, beyond a simple “yes” or “no” (Emerson, 2017). In this approach,

securitisation scholars, when identifying audience, look for powerful agents such as the international community, scientific community, or development aid donors, who have some positional power and an opportunity to shape the way security problems are construed and dealt with (Côté, 2016; Salter, 2008a; Vaughn, 2009).

On the other hand, some scholars make an interesting case against devoting that much attention to audience and its responses to securitising moves (Floyd, 2007; Taureck, 2006). Floyd argues that the recent fixation on the power of an audience may in fact deteriorate the real picture of securitisation and lead to false results (2016, pp. 689–691). Sometimes, powerful actors do not engage in meaningful interactions with their potential audiences. This is because at times securitising actors do not need an audience to move forward with their specific definition of a threat and implementation of security measures (Floyd, 2016, p. 692). In certain political contexts, especially non-democratic regimes, an audience may be unnecessary for the success of the process (Taureck, 2006). A similar situation can also be observed in policymaking contexts, where an issue may be securitised with policy tools and security actions without any specific audience-actor interaction (Sperling & Webber, 2019). As Taureck notes, in many types of securitisations, the incorporation of audience is not obligatory as it creates persistent theoretical and empirical complications (2006, p. 55). In this regard, Floyd goes as far as proposing that, if the context allows it, a researcher should consider removing the concept of audience from his/her securitisation framework and focus on exploration of different types of securitising actors (Floyd, 2016).

The securitisation literature does not really offer any coherent guidelines as to how audience and its interaction with powerful actors should be viewed. There is a growing body of research that shows that the nature of interaction between different audiences and actors should be treated as highly context sensitive and flexible in nature (Bourbeau, 2011; Stritzel, 2007; Wilkinson, 2007). For example, drawing on Goffman's work, Salter puts forward the idea that there are different types of audiences corresponding with different types of settings (e.g. political, technocratic, scientific) and that they vary in degree of power, agency and tools that allow them to engage powerful actors and influence the process (2008b). In a similar tradition, Kaunert and Leonard argue that it is necessary to distinguish different types of audiences which are engaged by securitising actors (2013). Depending on the situation, they may relate to and interact with each other in the production of security meanings and responses to threats (e.g. academics may collaborate with the media), potentially increasing their agency and role in the construction of security.

## 2.6 Conclusion: Moving Forward with Securitisation Theory

The Copenhagen School has created a unique intellectual space for discussion of the construction of security, expanding our understanding of how specific issues have been incorporated and used within international and national security frameworks. Building on criticism and theoretical debates, securitisation scholarship has

been dynamically expanding, moving beyond the traditional theory as proposed by the Copenhagen School. Numerous scholars have been reaching out to other disciplines and theoretical traditions, supplementing, deconstructing and reconstructing securitisation theory, developing their own “schools” and methodologies (Bigo & McCluskey, 2018; C.A.S.E., 2006; Hansen, 2011; Wæver, 2004). Consequently, securitisation scholarship has evolved into a diverse research programme exploring a variety of securitising practices and loci, at the same time providing a better understanding of processes of constructing security and threats.

The biggest revision of securitisation theory has been introduced and promoted by the Paris School. This sociological model of securitisation distances itself from speech act and the linguistic aspects of the original theory. Instead, it commits to the idea of securitisation as driven by security practice, which is institutionalised through repetitive actions and the interaction of security actors within the field of security (Balzacq, 2010, p. 13). As argued by Bigo,

it is possible to securitise certain problems without speech or discourse and the military and the police have known that for a long time. The practical work, discipline and expertise are as important as all forms of discourse (Bigo, 2000, p. 194).

The Paris School argues that securitisation does not always require definition and existential threats, drama and breaking from normal politics. It may take place though routine, over time and, on some occasions, even outside political discourse (Bigo, 2014). In this regard, the sociological take on securitisation breaks not only with the linguistic approach but also the idea of exceptionality of security. Here, security operates below the threshold of extraordinary measures, being embedded in normalised security practices such as policing, surveillance and control. For this reason, in the Paris School, securitising actors do not necessarily have to be authoritative or in position of power that allows them to shape collective understanding of security. They can be mundane practitioners, such as police and military forces, customs officers or humanitarian workers, who “manage unease” by constituting a security field within which specific problems such as migration or climate change are framed and practiced as threats to security (Bigo, 2002, pp. 63–65).

Bigo’s work has opened up the securitisation framework to a more context-sensitive, processual thinking about the construction of security. In this regard, new perspectives have come to light. For instance, Strizel proposes viewing securitisation through the lenses of translation, proposing radically processual interpretation using the concept of translation (2011). Here, securitisation is treated as a productive rearticulation of the meaning of security in a new locale. In a different interpretation, Rothe reinvents securitisation using hegemonic discourse as a point of reference (2016). He builds on poststructuralist arguments and proposes treating securitisation as a process embedded in larger governmental landscapes, driven by the struggle between discourse coalitions which problematise novel issues as security problems. Leonard and Kaunert look at securitisation from the angle of policy studies, building on a policy venue perspective and underlining the importance of institutional settings and historical contextual factors influencing the construction of security (Leonard & Kaunert, 2019). Of course, the list of new contributions to

securitisation studies is much more exhaustive and diverse. The contemporary literature on securitisation is burgeoning with new ideas and reconceptualisations of the theory in an attempt to make it better aligned with different modes of discourse and practice (including technology-driven) and ever dynamic complexities that accompany social construction of security (Jeandesboz, 2016).

That being said, this diversity of approaches has a certain “blind spot” which is reflected in its commitment to specific security logics, primarily existential security and risk, that underlie different perspectives on securitisation (Watson, 2012, p. 182). This is specifically visible in the migration-security nexus literature. On one hand, some scholars focus on elites and their political discourses revolving around fear, exceptional understanding of security and different forms of extraordinary measures and policies proposed in political debates (Armillei, 2017; Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002). On the other hand, research on technologies and the security practices of control tends to focus on risk management and the mundane activities of security experts, thus downplaying the securitising role of extraordinary and elite-driven discourses (Bigo et al., 2013). Though different perspectives on securitisation provide a unique insight into the process in their own right, they also tend to entrench themselves in their respective security logics and pathways. An unintended consequence of most securitisation research is marginalisation of voices and aspects of security that do not fall under the assumed logics and parameters. That is why in this book I propose a less rigid and more inclusive way of analysing securitisation and put forward framing as one of the theories that could expand and reinvigorate the debate. The next chapter is devoted to the notion of framing and its different conceptualisations. It discusses its main theoretical building blocks and prepares grounds for its incorporation into the securitisation framework.

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# Chapter 3

## Securitisation as the Work of Framing



### 3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters, I provided an overview of the basic characteristics and criticism of the Copenhagen School and its securitisation theory. By committing to a rather rigid framework driven by speech act theory and exceptionalism, the Copenhagen School has overlooked the complexities, embeddedness and depth of the process associated with the construction and application of security. Building on the already existing criticism of securitisation, this chapter proposes an alternative reading of the theory, addressing the shortcomings of the traditional approach and making the framework more sensitive to (1) the tangled nature of security reflected in the variety of security logics and interpretations that intertwine and coexist in the processes of securitisation; (2) contexts such as the EU policy making environment, where a clear dichotomy between securitising actors and empowering audiences is not evident. To this end, I propose looking at securitisation from an interpretative angle, placing policy framing at the heart of the framework.

In the next part of this chapter, I will reflect upon the original building blocks of securitisation theory, i.e. speech act, exceptionality, audience-actor dichotomy, acceptance and context and discuss how the framing approach might constructively inform the original conceptualisation of securitisation. At the same time, I will discuss how the existing criticism fits into this reading of the theory, elaborating upon the idea of acceptance as well as the importance of embeddedness and contextuality in securitisation analysis. At this point, I should underline that in the following discussion I do not propose a new comprehensive theory of securitisation but rather an alternative reading of it, which could be used when analysing securitisation practices proliferated with multiple conceptions of security so typical in policymaking settings. The following chapter is structured as follows. First, it focuses on an overview of the speech act-oriented approach to securitisation and discusses how framing literature can help addressing some of its main shortcomings. Further, the chapter moves to discussing the use of “exceptionality” in the securitisation research

and offers to supplement it with an idea of security logics, thus opening the analytical framework to an inquiry into different notions of security that underlie processes of securitisation. Thirdly, the chapter focuses on actor-audience interaction, showing how the traditional division between “speakers” and “listeners” of securitising moves might not fit to all instances of securitisation, policy-driven securitisation being one of them. In the next two parts of the chapter, the discussion moves to issues of acceptance of securitising moves and the role of context, elaborating on the importance of these two elements in securitisation research. The chapter concludes with a summary of the “securitisation as the work of framing” approach, outlining its most important features.

### 3.2 Securitisation Beyond Speech Act

The speech act approach has generated substantial criticism among scholars. It has committed securitisation framework to an idea of the linguistic securitising act of a decisionistic nature, more driven by the content of the speech and power of the speaker rather than actual effects it has on the audience. The speech act approach has narrowed securitisation down to a concentration of single acts, self-referential directives produced by powerful actors entitled to “speak security” to relevant audiences. As often pointed out by the critics of the Copenhagen School, the traditional reading of the theory has made application of the securitisation framework in empirical research problematic, especially in highly politicised and contestation-driven contexts such as policy making environment, which is inherently driven by interactional and dialogical processes of collective sense making (Balzacq, 2015b; Sperling & Webber, 2019; Stritzel, 2007). In order to address the shortcomings outlined in this criticism, I propose to look at securitisation as the work of framing – an intersubjective practice of meaning making that triggers a particular security-oriented mind-set and shapes the perception of both the nature of the problem and actions undertaken to deal with it (Huysmans, 2006, p. 24). The inclusion of framing opens securitisation to a more processual and iterative aspects of linguistic and non-linguistic construction of security, allowing one to look at this process as inherently diverse and proliferated with a various and often conflicting security-centred interpretations of the problem.

Studies on frames and framing constitute a conceptually rich though incoherent body scholarship (de Vreese, 2012; Entman, 1993). Framing research falls under the interpretative paradigm, focusing the attention on diversity, creativity and conflict within the human process of interpreting and dealing with problematic, socially relevant, and new situations (Neufeld, 1993). It is concerned with different competing views and interpretations of the problem and investigate how they interact and contribute to the process of collective “making meaning together” (Bacchi, 2015, p. 5). In this regard, Entman (1993, p. 52) proposes defining framing as a process of “selecting of some aspects of a perceived reality and making them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition,

causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation”. He further describes framing as a practice of problematising and constructing social reality by “culling a few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them to promote a particular interpretation” (Entman, 2007, p. 167). In this vein, framing is often described as a mixture of interactive, inter-subjective and contextually embedded processes through which interpretative schemata, or in other words frames, are constructed and communicated to relevant audiences in order to introduce a “way of thinking and acting” about a specific problem or an issue (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016, p. 93). The framing approach has been commonly applied in research on the problematisation and contestation of socially significant events and occurrences, where relevant actors engage in negotiations and sometimes struggle over dominant interpretations, meanings and solutions (Chesters & Welsh, 2004; Daviter, 2007; Eising et al., 2015). In this way, framing research has inspired numerous academic inquiries into processes and modes of collective sense- and meaning-making, contributing predominantly, but not exclusively, to media and communication studies (Brüggemann, 2014; D’Angelo, 2002; Jorg Matthes & Kohring, 2008), social movement research (Benford & Snow, 2000; Resnick, 2009; Snow, 2007) and last but not least policy studies (Boräng & Naurin, 2015; Rhinard, 2010; Schön & Rein, 1994; van Hulst & Yanow, 2016). As this book aims to discuss securitisation occurring in policymaking contexts, I will use policy framing as the main point of reference for further theoretical discussion.

Policy framing scholarship builds on the assumption that one of the core responsibilities of a policymaker is to interpret uncertain situations and remove or mitigate parts of this uncertainty, by grounding the problem in a familiar context and proposing suitable solutions (Rhinard, 2010, p. 15). As indicated by Laws and Hajer (2006, p. 252), policy actors should seek “stability and act in a social world that is a kaleidoscope of potential realities”. By engaging policy-relevant problems, they structure this reality and define what is the essence of the problem, “what is at stake?” and “what should be done about it?” (Daviter, 2007, p. 656). Rein and Schön (1977) conceptualise this practice as the essence of framing, that is a process where policy actors produce structures of belief, perception and appreciation. Consequently, policy framing can be seen in broad terms as a “process in and through which policy-relevant actors inter-subjectively construct the meanings of the policy-relevant situations with which they are involved, whether directly or as onlookers and stakeholders” (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016, p. 97). In this process, they translate worries into solvable problems by highlighting specific features of the situation, ignoring or selecting out other features, and binding the highlighted features together into a coherent and comprehensible pattern (Aukes et al., 2018).

One of the strengths of the framing approach lies in a variety of mutually inclusive, yet distinctive productive and iterative practices that assign meanings and construct interpretations: sense-making, selecting, and storytelling. From the sense-making perspective, policy framing is an iterative activity which allows actors to translate an ongoing complexity into a “situation that is comprehended explicitly in words and that serves as a springboard into action” (Weick et al., 2005, p. 409). It enables actors to make sense of the situation they are confronted with and imagine

possible scenarios in the light of prior notions concerning the ways of dealing with similar issues (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016, p. 98). In this aspect, sense-making has an important action component, as it organises prior knowledge and experiences and guides future response (Rein & Schön, 1977). It locks policy actors into a very specific temporal dimension, where the past and the future interlock in social construction of reality. On the one hand, policy actors reflect upon the situation considering a model of the world, prior knowledge and previously evoked frames of reference, on the other, they look into the future while imagining and planning collective actions (Bacchi, 2004; Rich & Oh, 2000). Rein and Schön (1996, p. 124) call this process a “normative leap from what “is” to what “ought to be”.

The process of selecting is commonly reflected in practices of naming and categorising. Naming essentially gives a “face” to a selected feature of the situation. It is understood as a practice that focuses audience’s initial attention on specific features using for example a metaphor (e.g. “refugee tsunami”) in order to strengthen a specific interpretation, make it more digestible, communicable, and/or captivating (Collyer & De Haas, 2012; Crawley & Skleparis, 2018; Stone, 1989). In this respect, categorising is a form of naming, but more explicit focused on specific taxonomy (Rogan, 2006). Categorising often offers a differentiation (e.g. “Eastern”, as not Western “legal”, as not illegal) and often grounds possible future courses of action (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016, p. 99). For example, describing migrants as “illegal” consequently criminalises (and even dehumanises) them, suggesting that, as in the case of other criminals, they are threatening and should be prosecuted for breaking the law and consequently removed from the host society (Aradau, 2004; Schuster, 2011). There are cases when naming and categorising alone can have a powerful impact on problem definition, increasing a sense of urgency and preparing grounds for the mobilisation of specific policies (e.g. “war on drugs”); however, more often than not, framing also requires an element that gives a sense of continuity and connection between selections, names and schemes – a story or a narrative (Prior et al., 2012).

Storytelling internally binds different elements of framing together, provides a “plot” and stabilises the framing process binding together various features of the situation, making it coherent and comprehensible (Rein & Schön, 1996, p. 44). In Rein and Schön’s policy-oriented approach, frame-narratives have a framing effect, yielding particular problem definitions and guiding action. They “frame subjects as they narrate them, explicitly naming their features, selecting and perhaps categorising them as well, explaining to an audience what has been going on, what is going on, and, often, what needs to be done” (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016, p. 107). In this respect, framing should communicate a credible and coherent story, which makes sense as a whole. It should set the stage for the audience, explain the situation in which actors find themselves, explain its origins and root causes, assign blame and responsibility, and finally provide remedial actions and lead to a desirable “happy end” (Boin et al., 2009). Framing through storytelling has an ongoing and dynamic character. It is sensitive to change, adaptable to unfolding events and challenges whenever they arise (Laws & Hajer, 2006, p. 261). As argued by Weick (1995, p. 61), a good story has to be accurate and plausible, it has to hold disparate

elements together long enough to energise the audience and inform action. In this respect, it is present throughout the whole policy cycle and created not only during policy design but also in the processes of policy implementation and evaluation. That is why framing actors and policy storytellers are not only those who “speak policy” from the position of decision makers, but also practitioners and street level bureaucrats who serve as boots on the ground, dealing with cases and providing feedback on the applicability of specific solutions (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016, p. 101).

Policy framing offers a fruitful contribution to securitisation studies, allowing it to move beyond the speech act-based approach and further grounding securitisation in a more dynamic and processual reading. By substituting speech acts with framing, securitisation assumes a more nuanced character, where security-driven interpretations of a given problem, event or dynamic shape collective perceptions, attitudes and inform collective actions. In this regard, securitisation is a matter of a specific security interpretation produced, communicated and contested in a given context. Framing distances the original understanding of securitisation from its decisionist and act-driven nature and focuses on repeated articulations, which create distinctive, often linguistic patterns of security meanings which are then applied to make sense of societally relevant issues (Keren, 2010). In the framing approach, it is the iteration, not a powerful directive, that makes security interpretations salient, increasing their chances to be recognised and embraced by audience as an acceptable and applicable way of “thinking and doing” (Jörg Matthes, 2012).

Securitisation as the work of framing is not limited to authoritative speech but reflected in a variety of interrelated practices such as sense making, categorising and storytelling, which together weave a web of security meanings around an issue, pulling it into the realm of security discourses and eventually practices. In this regard, repeated articulations, names and categories of security result in the development of strong associations with a specific issue, influencing collective judgment of the situation and mobilising support for security action (Chen et al., 1999, p. 48). One of the strengths of framing is the acknowledgment of the messiness of social construction. It is reflected in the dynamic nature of security-driven framings, which may change through time depending on the evolving nature of a situation that is being framed as well as interests and attitudes framing actors and audiences.

In framing-centred reading, securitisation should be treated as a continuous and intersubjective process, which is driven by contestation and dialogical relationship between relevant actors and audiences. Negotiations and struggle over meanings are inherent to framing. Van Hulst and Yanow (2016, p. 99) observe that especially in policy-oriented framing

various relevant actors bring different and conflicting experiences, expectations, desires, and fears to policy situations or develop these in them, struggles over the interpretation(s) and meaning(s) of these narrated stories can be expected, and negotiations over their meaning(s) may take place.

This competition between produced frames naturally organises actors and audiences, gathering them around shared stories and turning them into opponents or

collaborators (Vandenbussche et al., 2017). In this struggle between different framings, meanings are produced, reproduced and even transformed, opening the process to more engaged and inter-subjective construction of a societally relevant issue.

### 3.3 Securitisation Beyond Exceptionalism

The Copenhagen School applies the notion of exceptionalism in order to clearly define the boundaries of security and avoid falling into the “everything is security” trap. Consequently, it equates successful securitisation with the state of exception, which breaks from normal politics, and builds on the idea of security driven by survival and mobilisation of extraordinary measures. As argued by Doty (1998, pp. 79–80), this “exceptionalisation” of security puts the securitisation framework in a “straight jacket”, eliminating the possibility of analysing other relevant articulations of security that exist below the threshold of exception. This limitation has been often criticised in more contemporary securitisation literature, indicating the need for a more inclusive conceptualisation of security (Corry, 2012; Hammerstad & Boas, 2014; Lupovici, 2014).

One of the main benefits of framing centred reading of securitisation theory is that it opens the framework to a more political and dynamic understanding of security, looking into its different shapes and shades that manifest through collective processes of meaning making. It diverts the focus of securitisation from the exceptional state of “no discussion” and extraordinary measures to the idea of multiple security interpretations that are negotiated and contested by relevant actors (Bourbeau, 2013; van Munster, 2009). Through collective sense making, naming and storytelling, actors mobilise and promote their specific ways of thinking and responding to a problem, imbuing it with their own understanding of what security is and what security does. As pointed out by Huysmans (2014), security is essentially contested and enacted within this political realm. A more political understanding of “security” is dynamic, “constantly written and rewritten, challenged, and therefore inherently unstable” (Pram Gad & Lund Petersen, 2011, p. 318). As Campbell (1992, p. 2) suggests in his post-Cold War analysis of the United States’ foreign policy, conceptions of danger and security are not fixed and ascribed to one single interpretation, but culturally and contextually defined. As he aptly points out, “events or factors which we identify as dangerous therefore come to be ascribed as such only through an interpretation of their various contexts and dimensions of dangerousness”. In the same spirit, Fierke (1997) notes that the meaning of security is fluid and susceptible to dynamic language used by actors to describe relationships between enemies and friends, perceived threats and referent objects.

Securitisation scholarship has been gradually incorporating the idea of opening the framework to alternative interpretations of security that operate below the threshold of exceptionalism (Bigo, 2000; Bourbeau, 2013; Gray & Franck, 2019). For instance, Corry (2012) proposes distancing the theory from the realist vocabulary and look at “riskification”, as a concept more attuned to contemporary

articulations of security. He proposes a risk-centred conceptualisation of securitisation as driven by management of uncertainty and mobilisation of precautionary measures (Corry, 2012, p. 248). As he points out,

rather than engendering a politics of exception, emergency time-frames and violent and secretive means as a securitisation does, ‘riskification’ leads to long-termism, the defusing of friend-enemy relations as the construction of external existential threats is replaced by focus on internal vulnerabilities, resilience and a focus on conditions of possibility for harm, rather than direct causes of harm (Corry, 2013, p. 5).

In a similar fashion, numerous securitisation scholars have been incorporating alternative notions of security into the framework, investigating human security (Watson, 2011) or resilience (Bourbeau, 2013), as some of the logics that shape specific modes and consequences of the securitisation process.

Different notions of security in securitisation research do not have to be treated in isolation. As Rothe (2016, pp. 56–57) argues, different logics of security such as routine and exception are essentially two sides of the same governmental coin and may co-exist in the same securitisation process. Sharing this assumption, with the help of the policy framing approach, I propose to dig deeper into these different notions, modalities, vocabularies and practices of security and explore how they become “tangled” in the process of securitisation. Here, the element of “tanglement” is reflected in how different logics of security such as exception, risk, resilience or human security, collide and intertwine at various stages and in different dimensions of the framing process. This will allow one to look at securitisation beyond a singular interpretation of security meanings that guide collective action, investigating its internal complexity and dynamics.

In order to avoid the problem of “making everything security”, I propose to employ Watson’s (2012, p. 291) view on securitisation as not fixed in the state of exceptionality or even risk, but embedded within a broader institutionalised constellation of meanings, here understood as the “security master frame”. The concept of a master frame can essentially be viewed as a broad historical and/or institutional system of meanings (Gahan & Pekarek, 2013). It is a generic frame or repertoire of interpretations wide enough to integrate other issue-specific frames, which address a given problem (Mooney & Hunt, 1996, p. 178). Benford and Snow (2000, p. 619) define a master frame as generic and very “broad in interpretive scope, inclusivity, flexibility and cultural resonance”. A master frame is an overarching idea, such as justice, which can be translated and deployed across different contexts and issues (Benford, 2013). In this respect, the term justice can be applied in different discussion on social justice or legal justice, meaning different things to different people, while staying within commonly recognised boundaries and meanings of what justice means. Even though a master frame is inherently inclusive and adaptable to new circumstances, and therefore not static, it is also stable and not easily manipulated (Carroll & Ratner, 2008). As pointed out by Huysmans (2006, p. 25) in his discussion on security meanings, even though different framings of the problem might invoke different conceptions of security, they still operate within a stable “constellation of security meanings, which draws upon historically constituted and socially

institutionalised set of interpretations”. As he later observes, like grammar of a language, security meanings evolve over time but cannot be changed arbitrarily (Huysmans, 2014, p. 31). Taking this into account, I contend that looking at security as a stable and inclusive master frame allows retaining continuity in how securitisation process renders security meanings, but at the same opens up to various security logics and problem definitions resulting from different interpretive communities, experiences and perceptions.

### 3.3.1 *Security Logics*

In order to operationalise specific meanings that operate within the security master frame, I propose to use the term security logic. “Security logic” has become relatively popular among securitisation scholars, being extensively used in several works on securitisation practice and theory (Balzacq, 2015; Bourbeau, 2014; Esposito et al., 2020; Niemann & Schmidhäussler, 2014). In security literature, there have been very few but notable attempts to conceptualise what security logic entails (Balzacq, 2015; Huysmans, 1998, 2006). In general terms, security logic is viewed as discursively embedded ensemble of rules that is immanent to security practice, defining that practice in its specificity (Huysmans, 2006, p. 28). Balzacq (2015a, p. 1) proposes looking at security logic as the essence of a security notion, reduced to the rules of grammar applied to make sense of security objects, risks and vulnerabilities and define suitable course of security action. As he argues, different theories of security disagree over their understanding of security logic (Balzacq, 2015a, p. 2). For instance,

a realist rendition of the logic of security would hold that military rules inform the characteristic grammar of security practices and the concept of “existential threats” provides the background condition, which enables the different components of security practices to operate in a distinctive way” (Balzacq, 2015a, p. 2).

In this book, I use the term “security logic” to describe a pronunciation of security, connected with distinctive forms of security grammar and practice. It should be noted that the logics presented are described as ideal types and in reality, they are much more complicated and often mixed with other iterations of security. In my discussion, I follow and build on the works of van Munster (2009) and Niemann and Schmidhäussler (2014) who use “security logics” to identify specific rationale employed by policy actors in constructing and applying security oriented problematisation within the EU policy realm. Van Munster (2009, p. 10) argues that the way actors represent threats and other security problems, define security measures, and identify their final security objectives is indicative of specific security logics. This is later expanded by Niemann and Schmidhäussler (2014, p. 15), who point out that security logics reflect not only how actors describe threats but also referent objects and other types of vulnerabilities that require protection by security providers. Consequently, both discussions propose a conceptual framework for debating

“security logics” as reflected in representation of security problems, referent objects and vulnerabilities, security measures (including their nature and duration), and the final security objective. In the subsequent part of this sub-chapter, I briefly overview and operationalise four logics – “exceptionalist” security logic, risk management, resilience, and human security, which serve as a point of reference for the analysis presented later in this book (see Table 3.1).

### “Exceptionalist” Security Logic

Critical security scholarship has been using the realist concept of security as a stepping-stone for developing new and alternative conceptions and frameworks of security. Nonetheless the realist-traditional security logic has prevailed in contemporary security thinking and even, to some extent, new schools of security (i.e. Copenhagen School of Security) (Buzan et al., 1998; Wæver, 1995). Van Munster (2005, p. 2) observes that the traditional-realist logic of security is often linked to the notion of exceptionality, reflected in existential character of threats and mobilisation of extraordinary security measures. As he points out, the realist, or in other words “exceptionalist” security logic, is a “binary, zero-sum game of identity-formation that establishes an intense and particularly forceful relationship between the opposing groups” (van Munster, 2009, p. 8). Here, threats have often a personal character and are described in terms of concrete, tangible, conceivable enemies, for example “foreign countries”, “the Nazis”, “the immigrants”. They are unambiguous, often defined as elements of external origin and alien nature that endanger the survival and secure status quo of referent objects (van Munster, 2005, p. 3). Consequently, the referent objects are also clearly and unambiguously defined. They are construed as passive and vulnerable objects of security, often having state-like features described in terms of community or communitarian values or structures necessary to sustain their survival (Corry, 2012, p. 239). As indicated by Niemann and Schmidthäussler (2014, p. 15), this particular logic is most commonly invoked in relation to state security, framing referent objects in terms of protection of borders, territorial coherence of the community, its sovereignty, its financial and political stability, or continuity of government.

Brzeziński (2009, p. 23) points out that framing security problems in terms of existential threats also produces a rigid and reactive way of thinking about challenges to security. In this approach, policies are rather reactive and are oriented toward dealing with a threat upon its full manifestation or materialisation (Rasmussen, 2001, p. 293). This marginalises the element of long-term security planning, focusing predominantly on well-recognised and established aspects of security reflected in its military and political dimension. Security measures employed under the “exceptionalist” logic have an extraordinary, often militaristic, character and require mobilisation of procedures well beyond so-called normal politics (C.A.S.E., 2006, p. 463). This again refers to the notion of exceptionality that implies breaking from everyday practices and rules of existence and introduction of a state of emergency and mobilisation of sufficient power and resources to

**Table 3.1** Security logics

Logic/indicator	“Exceptionalist” security	Risk		Human security
		Management	Resilience	
<b>Representation of security problems</b>	Unambiguous Personal dimension External origin Alien nature Construed in terms of existential and “brutal threats”	Risk based on a friend/enemy continuum Impersonal correlation of factors liable to produce uncertainty Varying degree of concreteness and gravity Ambiguous origin (emphasis on internal) Interconnected		Varying degree of concreteness and severity In narrow terms construed as critical, physical and structural violence against human beings In broader terms refers to social, psychological, economic aspects of human vulnerabilities Broad spectrum of interlinked issues and security sectors Correlation of factors liable to produce extreme insecurity Pervasive, recurrent, direct and indirect nature Internal, external origin
		Construed in terms of manageable risks Uncertain materialisation of negative consequences	Construed in terms of shocks and disturbances Certain materialisation, – inevitable nature	
<b>Referent object</b>	State-related, unambiguous Passive nature, managed by other actors Often construed in relation to territoriality and sovereignty of referent objects	Different degrees of concreteness; Networked and interdependent		Individuals and their communities Human life, rights, freedoms and dignity Passive nature
		Passive nature, managed by other actors (e.g., security agencies)	Construed as active contributors to security Devolved	

(continued)

**Table 3.1** (continued)

Logic/indicator	“Exceptionalist” security	Risk		Human security	
		Management	Resilience		
<b>Security measure (nature, temporality)</b>	Exceptional, militaristic Reactive nature Short-term Bypass normal political procedures Mobilise significant amounts of force and resources	Normal, institutionalised forms of governance based on broad cooperation within the security realm Conventional, long term security actions Orientation to the future Orientation to the internal dimension	Preventive measures, Practices of control and surveillance Management of risks	Decentralised and devolved measures, Maintenance, adaptation and transformation of the system	Broadly understood as protection of human rights, life and dignity Humanitarian intervention oriented to saving threatened lives Kinetic and non-kinetic interventions directed at mitigation of threats Interventions may (but do not have to) assume extraordinary character, often of temporary nature Measures of have external orientation (deployed outside borders of security providers)
<b>Objective</b>	Eradication of existential threats in order secure the collective survival of a socio- political order Status quo orientation	Equilibrium and continuation of normal activities within acceptable risks Risk avoidance, mitigation of negative consequences	Building up ability to withstand shocks and disturbances Elimination of extreme vulnerabilities within the system	Survival and wellbeing of humans Elevation of human suffering	

Own elaboration based on Alkire (2003), Bourbeau (2015), Chandler (2014), Lund Petersen (2012), van Munster (2009), and Niemann and Schmidhäussler (2014)

counteract existential threats (van Munster, 2009). In this rationale, security policies and measures are reactive and initiated only in response to the persisting and existential threats (Niemann & Schmidhäussler, 2014, pp. 25–26). The security responses are characterised with extreme intensity in terms of scope and resources, but are also temporary and designed to reinstate the status quo from before the emergence of the existential threat. Balzacq (2015a, p. 2) points out, that this type

of thinking sets security actors on the path that entails the orientation of security policies on elimination or eradication of threatening objects, securing the collective survival of a socio-political order.

### **Risk (Management and Resilience)**

The concept of risk has deeply saturated contemporary security thinking, becoming, in its various forms, the guiding principle of security politics on the national and international level (C.A.S.E., 2006). The literature indicates two dominant perspectives on risk as based on management and resilience (Balzacq, 2015). These two notions are built on similar foundations emphasising the complexity, uncertainty and continuum of the contemporary security realm. Both risk management and resilience follow the idea of security as future oriented dynamics, entailing security actions that are supposed to manage, mitigate, avert and/or resist the upcoming shocks and disturbances to the socio-political system (Dijkstra et al., 2018). In this book, I treat these two perspectives as derivative of broadly understood risk logic, while maintaining their own identities within this specific way of security thinking. That is why I incorporate the managerial and resilience perspectives under the “umbrella term of risk”, at the same time accounting for their corresponding and differing features.

Framing of security problems is rather ambiguous in risk logic. Firstly, in contrast to “exceptionalist” logic, the term “threat” is considered unfit to describe the complex, multifaceted security problems (Renn, 2008, p. 290). Instead, it is substituted with “risk”, as the phrase more suitable to reflect future dangers, uncertainties and potentially threatening events, dynamics and occurrences. In this vein, risk logic builds on a “friend/enemy continuum” rather than strict “friend/enemy differentiation”, primarily focusing on a correlation between factors liable to produce uncertainty and levels of security (van Munster, 2005, p. 4). Here, the rationale of risk imbues “potential threats” with an impersonal character and centres on the specific interconnected features of selected phenomena, describing them as potentially dangerous with varying degrees of concreteness and gravity (Adams, 2000, pp. 199–200). In this logic, the representation of potential risks is focused on the internal and/or external dimension of security, often described as a consequence of unfortunate political decisions or omissions that can be made up for, if suitable future-oriented thinking is applied (Niemann & Schmidhäussler, 2014, p. 15).

In the managerial perspective, this translates into a specific framing of risks, as mostly internal to the system, manageable and falling under the purview of neoliberal practices of control and surveillance (Luhmann, 1996, pp. 5–6). Niemann and Schmidhäussler (2014, p. 16) point out that in risk management, “problems are defined and addressed according to their anticipated future consequences, regardless of whether they will ever materialise”. In this sense, the management of risks is essentially management of the future, which may or may not bring tragic events. Resilience, even though it uses the same grammar of risk, more often refers to the future threatening events as shocks and disturbances (Zebrowski, 2013). Here, the

key element is the inevitability of the upcoming events and departure from the belief that future can be managed and threatening situations can be fully averted (Dunn Caveltly et al., 2015). Consequently, the resilience rationale frames the future as uncertain, but filled with potential shocks and disturbances that will eventually materialise, though the timing, scope and magnitude of their negative consequences is uncertain (Corry, 2014, pp. 256–257).

Referent objects in risk logics are construed mostly as ambiguous, networked and interdependent. Risk logic takes into account a variety of possible scenarios that reflect how different components and aspects of security within a given system are connected and even interdependent. For instance, a possible terrorist attack may affect the physical security of human beings, as well as industry, stability of currency and continuity of government (Kessler & Daase, 2008). That is why the risk rationale rarely narrows its focus to one specific type of objects that should be taken into account, instead relaying on generalisations and different degrees of concreteness. In regard to specific approach to referent objects, the managerial approach to risk construes them in terms of passive entities (e.g. population of a state) that need to be controlled and surveilled for their own good (Krahmann, 2011). As observed by van Munster (2009, pp. 10–15), this type of logic expands its managerial competencies over referent objects, steering them into more risk aversive situations, creating order through technologies of security and risk interventions. In contrast, resilience proposes a different perspective on referent objects, describing them as more active agents, who should also contribute to security by investing in preparedness and increasing their own robustness and ability to cope with difficult situations (Diprose et al., 2008). In the resilience-centred logic, referent objects cannot be fully protected from unwanted occurrences. Resilient referent objects are those, which can remain stable and maintain their base functionality, to a degree that allows them to withstand shocks and bounce back to their original state (Bourbeau, 2013). In this regard, resilient referent objects are often framed as decentralised and even less reliant on external interventions (e.g. from the state).

Security measures employed within the logic of risk focus on normal, institutionalised forms of governance based on broad cooperation within a security realm. This entails the exchange of data and utilisation of informational technologies, which allow informed and future oriented security action (Ceyhan, 2008; Rusu, 2001). Within risk logic, expert communities, security agencies, analytical tools and knowledge practices receive special attention as instruments that allow glimpsing into the uncertain future and calculating at least some of its risks (de Goede, 2008; Renn, 2012). Consequently, the logic revolves around long term strategies and conventionalised security actions and practices focused on monitoring changes within the security realm, attempting to adjust to its dynamics and abrupt shifts (van Munster, 2005, p. 8).

In this vein, the managerial approach looks at risks as something that can be managed by employing preventive and precautionary measures, and in a long run averting future catastrophe. This perspective promotes the idea that with sufficient data and instruments of control it is possible to change the odds, intervene and eliminate risky situations. Here, the final objective is to maintain the socio-political

equilibrium and continuation of normal activities within acceptable risks (Krahmann, 2011). A different approach is presented by resilience-centred logic, which does not focus predominantly on governmental forms of management and control, but on devolved security practices that decrease extreme vulnerabilities of the system and build up the robustness of a protected system and its ability to withstand shocks (Coaffee & Fussey, 2015, p. 87). In this regard, the literature indicates three basic forms of resilience: maintenance of the status quo; marginal adaptation to shocks and disturbances; and renewal based on transformation of the system in response to a catastrophe (Bourbeau, 2013, p. 10). All these elements account for the main objective of the logic, which is building up the system's ability to withstand shocks and disturbances, so that it can continue its existence in the face of an uncertain future and inevitable dangers.

### Human Security

The logic of human security has been commonly introduced with the United Nations Development Programme Report in 1994, which promoted the idea of human beings as the ultimate referent object (Hampson, 2008; Kaldor et al., 2007; Paris, 2001). Human security logic puts individuals and their communities at the centre of security. It focuses predominantly on the survival and wellbeing of humans, emphasising such issues as respect for human rights, freedoms and human dignity, to name a few (Burgess & Tadjbakhsh, 2010, p. 450). In this regard, the representation of security problems is often broad and interlinked throughout multiple sectors of human life and activity (Alkire, 2003, p. 3). In its narrower conceptualisation, human security is described predominantly as “freedom from fear”, threats and direct violence. This interpretation proposes focusing on protection of human life from critical physical and structural violence that passes the threshold of severity (Hampson, 2008, p. 239). In this respect, according to Paris (2001, p. 89) human security can be narrowed down to two fundamental elements: first, human “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression”; and second, “protection of humans from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities”. In most cases, the narrow interpretation of human security is deployed in the situation where this type of violence has already reduced the security of individuals making them flee their native communities (including states) and seek protection “outside” (den Boer & de Wilde, 2008, p. 129).

The broader understanding expands the definition and includes the so-called “freedom from want”, describing human security as a “condition of existence in which basic material needs are met and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be realised” (Thomas & Wilkin, 1999, p. 3). In this vein, Alkire (2002, p. 182) suggests that the concept “should include the social, psychological, economic aspects of human vulnerabilities, including all critical and pervasive threats to the vital core and long-term flourishing”. The broader conceptualisation builds on a more nuanced understanding of

well-being, often focusing on the quality of life, structural limitations and contexts that foster systemic patterns of discrimination and vulnerability (Gasper & Sinnati, 2016, p. 15). It should be noted that human security in its broader and narrow conceptualisations connects to the notion of protection of human rights and human dignity, which provide a conceptual and normative foundation for human security by firmly rooting it in international law (Benedek, 2008). Failures to ensure fulfilment of international human rights obligations, be it in the domain of humanitarian law or economic, cultural and social rights, can directly lead to rapid deterioration of human security. According to Benedek (2008, p. 13), “the best way to achieve human security is through the full and holistic realisation of all human rights” and protection of those who are defined as vulnerable and in need.

Regardless the exact definition, the human referent object is conceptualised as passive, in a vulnerable position and requiring assistance from other actors that hold resources and power to provide protection and security (den Boer & de Wilde, 2008, p. 137).

Human security measures are focused on broadly understood humanitarian protection and, in extraordinary situations, intervention. They revolve around either direct or indirect instruments that are supposed to reduce threats, constraints or even disturbances to human life. Here, the human security approach centres predominantly on governmental tools for protection of those who are unable to protect themselves or seek shelter from physical, political and structural violence (Axworthy, 1997, p. 9). This naturally links this notion to external, often humanitarian, interventions as well as asylum and refugee policies, laws, practices and discourses that construct and enact the common understanding of protection of human beings (Huysmans, 2006, pp. 35–38). Consequently, human security measures often rely on the “coalition of good states” and security actors that are willing to take responsibility for temporary humanitarian action, restore human security and protect individuals and communities that are under severe threats (Kerr, 2013, pp. 107–108). In practice, human security-oriented security measures may substantially vary in terms of form and intensity. On one hand, they can be aligned with more mundane forms of care and protection reflected in e.g. fulfilment of international obligations in regard to refugees, provision of care to victims of violence, or transfer of development aid; on the other hand, they can link to deployment of peacekeeping operations. This latter element is commonly associated with the invocation of extraordinary security language coupled with militarised measures deployed to address the most severe instances of violence and violations of human security.

Indeed, humanitarian interventions open human security to close intertwinement with exceptional logic, but it does not have to be automatic or straightforward. Human security logic still has a distinctive identity, which focuses on many forms of protection and care, centred on preservation of human lives, rights and dignity. In this way it departs from state-like features of “exceptionalist” security, concentrated on territoriality, sovereignty and default mobilisation of extreme security measures. Finally, following Gasper’s and Sinnati’s (2016, p. 25) argumentation, while the language of emergency and exceptionality aims to “end the discussion”, human security does quite opposite. It often turns the attention on vulnerable groups and

continues democratic contestation of the situation in which human security is being violated. That is why the analysis of human security logic has to be tuned into a possible merger with other types of security and sensitive to nuances of mobilisation of this specific logic.

### 3.4 Securitisation Beyond the Actor-Audience Dichotomy

According to the Copenhagen School, securitisation is an inter-subjective process driven by an interplay between powerful actors (who produce securitising moves) and empowering audiences (who accept or reject these moves) (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 32). This relationship between actors and audiences is supposed to reflect the inherently constructivist nature of the theory (McDonald, 2008). Instead, it has ignited substantial criticism from securitisation scholars, who point out that the proposed model of actor-audience interaction is rather limiting and does not allow to fully explore the depth of intersubjective construction of security (Balzacq, 2005; Jarvis & Legrand, 2017; Roe, 2008). The criticism revolves around two key issues: firstly, the role and nature of audience is seriously under-conceptualised, leaving the theory without a clear idea of who or what may constitute an empowering agent. Secondly, the proposed mode of interaction between actors and audiences is not exhaustive, especially in reference to the interactions that go beyond mere production, acceptance and non-acceptance of securitising moves. Building on framing literature, this section offers a conceptualisation of a more active and engaged audience, which under certain conditions (e.g. within the context of policymaking) and with enough agency may break from the traditional actor-audience dichotomy. Here, the interaction is not framed around authoritative actors and audiences, but rather revolves around parties involved in the securitisation process as locked in a dialogical relationship driven by contestation.

As in securitisation, framing also envisages actors and audiences interacting in the collective construction of meanings. Here, “entrepreneurs” or “sponsors” offer generative frames and stories, which are supposed to appeal to and convince the targeted audience to acknowledge and internalise the proposed interpretation of an issue (van Gorp, 2007, pp. 123–138). Nonetheless, in the framing theory, the richness of reactions of an audience may quickly blur the dichotomy and create more of a “deliberative space of enactment of meaning”, rather than a one-way actor-audience relationship (Keren, 2010, p. 276). The function of an audience is often explained as an active processor that decodes meaning, an agent who, through complex and varying interactions with framing actors, shapes and authorises the dominant interpretation of an issue (e.g. a threat) (Aukes et al., 2018). In this perspective, an audience not only listens and reacts, but also carries interpretations and spreads them in a given context (Gamson & Madigliani, 1989; Scheufele, 1999; Vliegenthart, 2012). This can be observed in more recent studies on framing of the war in Iraq and terrorism, which analyse audience-actor interaction cycles and interpretative feedback loops in media framings (Glazier & Boydston, 2013). Here, the researchers focus on how the media (re)produce security framings, readers and listeners share

those framings among each other, react and comment (e.g. through social media), participate in opinion polls, which are then contested by the politicians and the media, etc. (Norris et al., 2003; Reese, 2007). In framing, an audience often not only legitimises but also can actively challenge particular interpretations, forcing actors to either abandon the attempt to impose their interpretation or reframe and re-engage with a new narrative (Schlichting, 2013). This leads to a very important and potentially fruitful notion in securitisation and framing literature, which is blurring the dichotomy and strict division between powerful speakers and restrained listeners.

This departure from the traditional dichotomy already has been implied in securitisation scholarship, especially in regard to contexts where clear interactional rules and differentiation between actors and audiences are not that evident (Sperling & Webber, 2019). As observed by Côté (2016, p. 550), some powerful agents associated with or assigned to the role of audience do not necessarily have to adhere to strict contextual rules that determine the audience's traditional role. In other words, they may either already hold an influence similar to actors or strive for it, and exert greater impact over the securitisation process. This phenomenon already has been recognised in the policy framing literature, where a strict division between actors and audiences disappears as policy problematisation emerges (Chong & Druckman, 2007). As Rhinard (2010, p. 42) points out, in policy framing, actors or institutional agents involved in policymaking are supposed to communicate and interact more in a form of a dialogue than a top-down directive. In his study of European Commission's framing practices, he describes how different Directorate Generals interact and struggle over dominant policy framings, without committing to the specific role of framing actors or enabling audiences. Here, all involved parties are locked in a feedback loop, where they speak, listen and problematise policy issues as a part of the same institutional setting (Sperling & Webber, 2019, pp. 244–245). Through these interactions, they shape the content of securitisating moves throughout different stages of policymaking, often committing to discursive coalitions comprised of different policy “actors from different subject positions brought together by their common orientation towards a common problem perspective on a certain political issue” (Rothe, 2016, p. 62).

In order to better grasp the intersubjective nature of interactions between parties involved in the securitisation on the EU policymaking level, I propose distancing the framework from the traditional actor-audience dichotomy. Instead, I suggest looking at securitisation as subjected to dynamic negotiations between and within groups of relevant agents (e.g. EU institutions) involved in the process of policy framing.<sup>1</sup> Here, relevant agents are locked in a dialogical relationship, an iterative

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<sup>1</sup>The emergence of different agents (dichotomous or not) and the type of their interaction is highly context sensitive and may assume different modes. It can be based on a dialogue and form a space for deliberation and democratic contestation of a security problem, turn into a struggle over power and dominance over the framing process, or be a mixture of the two. Regardless, the concept of “securitising agent” remains a highly context-sensitive but also attractive option for an analytical framework, in a situation where groups of agents do not necessary fit strictly into the roles of an audience or an actor.

feedback loop, where they “talk and respond to each other” in the intersubjective construction of security. They engage in the policymaking process, contributing to its various stages, producing and promoting their own security-driven interpretations of a problem. Sometimes, their framing gains resonance and dominates a specific stage of policymaking, sometimes it loses its prominence and becomes marginalised. Regardless of their impact, they co-shape the policy discourse, contest alternative interpretations and contribute to the intersubjective construction of security.

### 3.5 Defining the Process of Acceptance

As McDonald (2008, p. 572) points out, even though there is much commotion about actor-audience interaction, inter-subjectivity and performativity of securitisation process, it is still unclear when it all happens. Thus, the debate on securitisation propels an important question: when does an issue turn into a socially constructed security problem? The Copenhagen School has been widely criticised for mistreating the discussion on the so-called moments, processes or politics of acceptance (Balzacq, 2005, p. 179). Indeed, the criteria put forward by Buzan et al. are rather ambiguous, suggesting that securitisation takes place when a securitising move “gains enough resonance to a point when it is possible to legitimize emergency measures” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25). However, it is not clear how this resonance, or any other sign of acceptance for that matter, can be isolated and academically verified within an audience-actor interaction.

There have been several notable attempts to operationalise and define “acceptance” in securitisation research. In relation to the policymaking domain, Williams (2007, p. 67) proposes to treat it as a moment of translation of securitising moves into suitable policies and security actions. Similarly, for Floyd (2016, p. 679), acceptance can be traced in a change of the policy action, which is then “justified by the securitising actor with reference to the threat [that is] identified and declared in the securitising move”. In this section, I propose to look at acceptance not only as single moments marking changes in policy actions, but as a process, which is reflected in the way specific security interpretations and logics, to various degrees, saturate relevant socio-political and socio-linguistic contexts (e.g. the EU) and inform problem definitions, evaluations and recommendations for treatment (Entman, 2003; Hajer, 2002b, 2006). Building on Hajer’s (1995) discourse theory and Rothe’s (2016) discussion on “politics of acceptance”, I apply the concepts of “structuration” and “institutionalisation” as indicators of prominence and “acceptance” of specific security logics operating into policy discourse and practice.

The concept of structuration helps to comprehend to what extent a security interpretation or security logic is inscribed into the socio-linguistic and governmental landscapes (Rothe, 2016, p. 38). Hajer (1995, p. 60) explores this approach referring the way different policy actors use or draw upon existing and proposed interpretations of a problem (or storylines) in order to make a relevant contribution to the

polymaking process. For example, if a specific type of framing (e.g. migration as a terrorist risk) becomes increasingly and recursively present in the core policy texts, analyses, reports, speeches, and such, it means that it has saturated the policy discourse to a degree that it turned into a “natural” and acceptable way of describing the phenomenon of migration. Additionally, an interpretation, in order to become powerful and dominant, has to be acknowledged and used as a “common sense”, without which the document or speech would be considered irrelevant or less applicable in describing the challenges related to, in this case, migration. In this interpretation, such a situation is an indicator of high structuration and general acceptance of a given interpretation of a problem among involved agents (Hajer, 2002a).

The second element of “acceptance” is centred on institutionalisation of proposed security interpretations into “societal and political practices, routines and organisations and their materialisation in the form of concrete tools and policy responses employed by governmental and other relevant institutions” (Hajer, 1995, p. 61). This approach corresponds with Bigo’s and Balzacq’s arguments that policy instruments and tools constitute an important element in shaping the final product of securitisation (Balzacq, 2007; Bigo, 2002). As Balzacq (2011, p. 15) notes, “given the thickness of security programs, in which discourses and ideologies are increasingly hard to disentangle, and differences between securitising actors and audiences are blurred, there is growing evidence that some manifestations of securitisation might best be understood by focusing on the nature and functions of policy tools used by agents/agencies to cope with public problems, defined as threats”. In this regard, if a specific policy tool (e.g. military operation) is designed, announced and incorporated as a part of a policy response to a given problem, it is an indicator that the corresponding security interpretation is becoming institutionalised. Using the previously mentioned example of “migration as a terrorist risk” frame, the indicator of its institutionalisation would come down to a situation when a securitising agent recommends and executes policy tools related to on-going surveillance, detailed security screening or preventive detention of migrants.

### 3.6 Including Context in the Securitisation Process

The Copenhagen School views context as a set of “facilitating conditions” that increase or decrease the probability for success of the process of securitisation (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 31–32). Buzan and his colleagues (1998, p. 32) point towards internal linguistic rules of speech acts and external social aspects of context, where the power of speech and authority of the speaker intertwine in the construction of security. The more resources and linguistic skills the speaker has, the higher the chances for the success of securitising act (Wæver, 1995, p. 68). I propose departing from looking at securitisation as facilitated by contextual conditions, but rather treating it as situated within broader socio-political, socio-linguistic and therefore, interpretative settings. Building on the framing literature, I argue that the interpretative context to various degrees envelopes and informs socio-political and

socio-linguistic settings, reflecting the already existing ways of thinking about, and consequently responding to, proposed definitions of security problems. In this sense, securitisation should not be treated as a singled-out event but as part of an interpretative continuum, where pre-existing security frames structure and inform collective construction of security.

The framing literature allows one to view the context of securitisation as informed by pre-existing security frames, which deeply impact the field of possibility of what can be thought, said and done about a securitised issue in a given context (Rothe, 2016, p. 42). Pre-existing security frames correspond with already existing types of securitising framings reflected in e.g. historically and culturally embedded definitions of enemies and threats, resentments towards specific groups, negative stereotypes, security narratives, to name a few (Stritzel, 2007). In this respect, the interpretative context could be treated as a type of continuum, where the content and type of prior securitisations inform, but do not automatically dominate, subsequent securitising processes, and so on. For example, prior securitisations of environmental protection in the EU have deeply impacted the interpretative scheme for collective problematisation of climate change, its perceived consequences and, most importantly, policy responses (Methmann et al., 2013). In this case, securitising actors have been naturally referring to the “old” frames of interpretation, bringing out and often expanding on prior securitising moves and security responses that appeared acceptable and reasonable (Schlichting, 2013, p. 501). Actors may decide to keep the interpretation of an already securitised problem, or an issue proximate to this problem, or take it to a different level by initiating even more extreme measures. Such an escalation of securitisation is not unprecedented and can be observed in securitisation practices employed in reference to mass protests (Carvalho Pinto, 2014), nuclear energy (Peoples, 2014), or irregular migration (Provera, 2015), to name a few.

The interpretative context and pre-existing security frames inform the socio-linguistic dimension of securitisation, reflected in the “local rules of language” and “the network of constitutive norms and narratives that surround a single linguistic securitising act” (Stritzel, 2011b). This perspective expands the Copenhagen School approach, by focusing not only on the rules of speech act, but also linguistic features embedded in the context such as “the distinct linguistic reservoir that is available at a particular locality and point in time” (Stritzel, 2007, p. 370). Within the scope of the socio-linguistic context, it is possible to observe how securitising actors attempt to exploit and adapt to local linguistic rules and norms using analogies, similes and contrasts in order to increase their chances for successful securitisation (Stritzel, 2007, pp. 368–372).

As the pre-existing security frames reflect patterned ways of responding to security threats, they also influence the socio-political dimension of securitisation process, including the institutional setup governing security policies.<sup>2</sup> Stritzel (2007,

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<sup>2</sup>For instance, if the interpretative context is heavily saturated with risk-centred framings, emphasising the importance of data gathering, surveillance and intelligence, this will translate into a strengthened position of actors capable of delivering these services.

p. 370) defines the socio-political context as “sedimented social and political structures that may put actors in positions of power to influence the process of constructing meaning”. That is why the features of socio-political context often indicate “who can speak” and “to whom” (Salter, 2008, p. 329). They reflect the power structure, positioning and modes of interaction between the involved parties (Côté, 2016; Roe, 2008). Salter (2008, p. 329) recognises this marriage of the interpretative and socio-political dimensions in securitisation research, arguing that every setting can be characterised by a “different set of grand narratives by which truth is authorised, the characters who are empowered to speak, and the relationships between characters and audience”. Thus, it can be expected that different loci of securitisation will be composed of different types of actors, audiences, and linguistic rules, all of which impact the securitising narrative and success of the process differently.

The framing and securitisation literature supplement the discussion on the role of context with incorporation of so called “distal events” that originate outside the socio-linguistic and socio-political settings of securitisation<sup>3</sup> (Eder et al., 1995; Glazier & Boydston, 2013). As pointed out by Watson, problematisation of socially relevant issues cannot be treated independently from external developments (Watson, 2012, p. 287). Framing and securitisation are not a self-contained process, which can be exclusively associated with powers of speech and text or an interpretative repertoire embedded in local culture and politics (Balzacq, 2005, p. 193). Collective problematisation is most commonly influenced by complex events and developments of internal (e.g. domestic) and external (e.g. foreign) origin, which carry reinforcing or aversive consequences on the specific interpretations of socially relevant issues. For example, terrorist activity in Syria and North Africa can be a powerful external factor, facilitating and influencing the securitisation of refugees and migrants in the EU Member States, or bushfires in Australia might contribute to securitisation of climate change in the US (Diez et al., 2016; Léonard & Kaunert, 2020; Rothe, 2016). In this vein, Lupia and McCubbins (1998, p. 55) suggest there is an interaction between internal and external socio-political contexts – the more the external environment is indicative of threats, the less influence could be ascribed to local powerful actors, internal conditions and local frames of reference. As this claim provides an interesting insight into dynamics and inter-relation of different contexts, it certainly requires further discussion and empirical verification.

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<sup>3</sup>Distant external developments are understood as meaningful events and occurrences external to the immediate socio-linguistic and socio-political context of a securitising move (Watson, 2012, pp. 287–88).

### 3.7 Conclusion: Key Points of “Securitisation as the Work of Framing” Approach

The aim of this chapter was to discuss the building blocks of securitisation theory as presented by the Copenhagen School and propose a more interpretative and framing-oriented reading of the theory. Let me now summarise the main components of “securitisation as the work of framing” approach and discuss the main changes it proposes to the original framework and the direction in which it moves the securitisation analysis. For this purpose, I have reduced this chapter to five essential assumptions, which will serve as a basis for further discussion.

1. Framing, instead of speech acts – the traditional conceptualisation of securitisation relies on speech acts and a decisionist, static and illocutionary construction of security through authoritative utterances produced by powerful actors (Wæver, 2015). In this book I conceptualise securitisation as the work of policy framing, which views construction of security as a messy and internally complex iterative process comprised of a variety of actors, security logics, interpretations and interests that are inherently entangled in the way security issues are constructed. Here securitisation is reflected in mobilisation of security-related perceptions in the minds of targeted empowering agents and audiences, enabling incorporation of these perceptions into the common schemata of interpretation.
2. Tangled security logics, instead of exceptionalism – instead of fixating on a single understanding of security based on existential threats and exceptional security measures, I argue that multiple logics and interpretations of security should be considered as an intrinsic part of securitisation. Security logics are understood as pronouncements that produce a specific social order, the essence of a security notion, reduced to the rules of grammar applied to make sense of security objects. In this vein, securitisation is a complex and, more importantly, messy process, in which logics and interpretations of security collide and intertwine. This results in an emergence of different blends of security which reconfigure the relationship between referent object, referent subject and threat.
3. Dialogical audience-actor interaction, instead of authoritative instances of securitisation – in this policy-oriented framework, securitisation does not revolve around a single authoritative actor, but is subjected to dynamic negotiations between and within groups of relevant agents involved in the process. Therefore, the traditional differentiation into actors and audience is substituted with a relationship in which actors play both roles. They are locked in an iterative feedback loop, where they “talk and respond to each other” in the intersubjective construction of security.
4. Politics of acceptance, instead of one-dimensional interaction – the widely-criticised ambiguous definition of acceptance of securitising moves as “resonating” with the audience is hereby supplemented with discourse structuration and institutionalisation. Structuration corresponds to the idea that certain interpretations become dominant when they turn into obligatory and “commonsensical”

points of reference in the problematisation of an issue at hand. Institutionalisation takes place when interpretations solidify, becoming incorporated into societal and political practices, routines and organisations.

5. Embedded security, instead of facilitating conditions – securitisation should be understood as a highly context-sensitive process, deeply embedded in socio-linguistic and socio-political settings and local power structures (Stritzel, 2011a). In this respect, I propose a departure from treating the context of securitisation as a mere facilitating condition. Securitisation is contextualised within an interpretative continuum, rendering context an important factor that structures and even interpretatively pre-sets the process of constructing security.

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# Chapter 4

## EU Migration-Security Continuum. Investigating Security Frames Before the “Migration Crisis”



### 4.1 Introduction

Securitisation of migration is not new to the European Union. In fact, there is a substantial history of institutionalised practices and discourses that to varying degrees and intensity have been linking migration with different aspects of EU internal and external security (Bigo, 2001a; Huysmans, 2000; van Munster, 2009). Evidently, the “migration crisis” represents a critical case for studying migration-security in Europe, its development and specific framings. Nonetheless, before committing to its analysis it is necessary to discuss the so-called pre-existing securitising moves and security frames which deeply shaped the context of securitisation prior to 2015 and the beginnings of the “migration crisis”.

Neither securitisation nor framing take place in a vacuum, they have an important temporal dimension, negotiating between the past and the future, while making sense of the present security issues (Schön & Rein, 1991; Stritzel, 2007; van Hulst & Yanow, 2016). This statement is prominent throughout migration-security literature, which often underlines the importance of pre-existing security-centred institutional, discursive, practical and interpretative arrangements reflected in the so-called “security continuum” (Anderson & Bort, 2001, p. 155). The “migration-security continuum” can be characterised as a consecutive series of security discourses and practices, which contribute to the establishment of a coherent internal security environment that unambiguously connects the questions of immigration, asylum and visas to questions of security and border control (van Munster, 2009). Indeed, the EU has become a distinctive locus of this type of continuum, generating and accommodating both frameworks and discourses on migration and security (Baele & Sterck, 2015; Karamanidou, 2015; Leonard, 2010a; Sperling & Webber, 2019).

The EU has created a complex and internally diverse framework of securitisation, with a prolific variety of actors, practices, policies, discourses and interests having profound impact on the way migration has been framed as a security problem. Securitisation scholarship has identified several distinctive features that have

been characteristic of the EU migration-security nexus to date. Firstly, the EU migration and asylum policy discourse has been contentious towards third country nationals, consequently placing immigration from outside Europe at the centre of securitising moves at the EU level (van Munster, 2009). Consequently, the European migration-security discourses have been commonly founded on the idea of “Fortress Europe” as based on restrictive security policies and practices designed to keep out unwanted migrants and protect material and symbolic “Europeanness” (Bermejo, 2009; Geddes & Taylor, 2016). Secondly, the EU institutional arrangement of securitisation has been evolving, starting with intergovernmental cooperation in the areas of internal security and border control, and steadily spilling over to transnational EU institutions and agencies (Leonard & Kaunert, 2019, pp. 41–73). From the analytical point of view, the EU has proven to be a rather unorthodox and problematic locus of securitisation. Securitising practices on the EU level have been traditionally centred on common security policies, dominated by technocratic practices and discourses. Also, there is no distinctive or coherently defined audience, but rather multiple actors, involved in producing securitising moves as a part of the political contestation and collective policymaking process (Floyd, 2016). Consequently, securitising moves and security frames produced by the EU are not localised in one specific institution or even policy but can be attributed to various migration-related policy discourses and security frameworks that have been dynamically changing throughout the development of the European project.

In this chapter, I discuss the EU migration-security continuum, focusing on security frames and logics that have existed in the EU since before 2015 and the “migration crisis”. The discussion follows three key and overlapping dimensions of securitisation. The first one refers to so-called “constitutional securitising moves” (embedded predominantly within the EU Treaties) that have been guiding the development of the EU internal security dimension and consequently informing and stimulating further securitising practices deployed on the EU level. The second dimension refers to the development of the “Fortress Europe” and security frames centred on border control and management migratory flows. This includes EU discourse and practices on detention and deportation of “undesirable” immigrants, discussing their influence on security framing of migration in the EU. The third dimension reflects securitising moves embedded in the existing EU security, migration and asylum policies, exploring different securitising frames that have been linking immigration with clandestine, illicit and even terrorism-related activities. The last part of the discussion focuses on the internal-external locus of securitisation of migration examining the EU’s application of internal and external security measures and migration control technologies as a form of pushing undesirable migrants away from the EU.

## 4.2 From Maastricht to Lisbon. Tracing “Constitutional” Securitising Moves and Security Frames

The development of the EU migration-security continuum has taken more than four decades. It has been driven by incremental and institutionalised processes, such as development of the Schengen area, which have been enveloping human mobility with the EU internal and external security policy discourses and actions (Karamanidou, 2015, p. 42). As underlined by van Munster (2009, p. 9), the EU’s mode of securitisation of migration is rarely based on the traditional framework of “panic politics” or “dramatic speech act”, mobilising discourses of fear and resentment towards migrants. It most commonly, but not exclusively, relies on mundane political, technocratic discourses and practices, guided by the logic of risk management and control, consequently linking human mobility with clandestine, illegal and threatening activities, including organised crime and terrorism (Bigo, 2002; Cohen & Sirkeci, 2016; Ibrahim & Howarth, 2017; van Munster, 2009). Many scholars also indicate that securitisation of migration at the EU level has been stimulated by the development of European integration mainly associated with institutionalisation of the EU internal security domain, and liberalisation of movement of goods, persons, services and capital (Dover, 2008; Huysmans & Squire, 2010).

The securitisation scholarship most often defines the introduction of the Schengen area in 1985 and its operationalisation in 1990<sup>1</sup> as the stepping-stone for developing security measures and control over human mobility at the EU level (Boswell, 2007; Squire, 2015). Here, the abolishment of internal borders between the member states has facilitated the transformation of the European Union (then European Communities) into a territorial entity in need of protection and management of its internal order and external borders. Nonetheless, it is the gradual institutionalisation and Europeanisation of the internal security domain that has become the main vehicle for securitisation of migration in the EU (Neal, 2009; Zaiotti, 2007). In this regard, the Treaties and the Schengen acquis have become so-called “constitutional securitising moves”, embedding migration-security continuum within the EU primary law, generating the key institutional and political frameworks for development of further securitising moves (Huysmans, 2006, pp. 3–4). Below, I focus on an overview of three EU treaties, which are most commonly indicated as significant contributors to the development of the EU migration-security continuum, namely the

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<sup>1</sup>Initially France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg decided to abolish controls at their internal borders by signing the Schengen Agreement in 1985, which was followed by the adoption of the Schengen Convention in 1990 and led to the creation of the ‘Schengen area’. Schengen provisions were later brought into the EU framework with the adoption of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty (Leonard, 2010b, p. 33). As of 2020, the Schengen area includes 26 states – all the EU Member States apart from the Republic of Ireland, Cyprus, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, as well as three states that are not members of the EU (Norway, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Switzerland) (European Commission Website, 2021)

Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty.<sup>2</sup> Even though the Schengen acquis can be considered as one of the EU constitutional securitising moves, for the clarity of the analysis it will be discussed in the next sub-chapter, related to the frame of border control in the EU.

Huysmans argues that the Maastricht Treaty represents the first EU-wide and constitutional securitising move towards migration, introducing provisions for intergovernmental cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs (then known as the third pillar), putting such issues as asylum, irregular immigration, organised crime, and terrorism on the EU security agenda (Huysmans, 2006, pp. 66–69). Building on the legacy of intergovernmental security forums such as the Trevi group (Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme et Violence Internationale)<sup>3</sup> and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Immigration (AHWGI),<sup>4</sup> the Treaty embraced policy and security frames centred on illegal aspects of migration into the EU territories (van Munster, 2009, pp. 27–28). As emphasised in the document, one of the priorities of the EU is “safeguarding the free movement of people and internal market” while at the same time “combatting unauthorised immigration, residence and work by nationals of third countries on the territory of Member States” (European Union, 1992, p. 62). In this way, the Treaty has begun refocusing the EU institutional optics on migration onto the dangers of human mobility, introducing a significant and prevailing distinction between the “good internal mobility of the EU citizens” and “risky migration into the EU territories from the third countries” (Ibrahim & Howarth, 2017, p. 5).

The Maastricht Treaty has significantly institutionalised the securitisation process by embedding prior intergovernmental European migration-security discourses within the EU institutional framework, thus shaping the migration-security continuum in three important aspects (van Munster, 2009, pp. 36–37). Firstly, it reproduced the existing security frames and discourses, significantly strengthening the security frame of irregular immigration as a risk to the security and stability of the European Union. Secondly, it framed the European freedoms and internal market as referent objects, requiring protection from the destabilising effect of irregular immigration. Thirdly, it normalised securitisation of migration by moving it away from international security expert forums such as the Trevi group and the AHWGI to the transnational and technocratic setting of the EU. Consequently, it made room for EU institutions as new securitising actors.

Though the Maastricht Treaty moved securitisation of migration to the EU-wide institutional setting, it was the Amsterdam Treaty and the introduction of the Area

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<sup>2</sup>The impact of the Nice Treaty on framing of immigration in terms of risks to security was minimal (van Munster, 2009, p. 147).

<sup>3</sup>The Trevi group, established in 1975, was a ministerial forum with an objective of fostering European cooperation and coordination in the fight against radicalism and terrorism through ongoing exchange of intelligence (Teasdale and Bainbridge, 2012).

<sup>4</sup>The AHWGI was developed out of the Trevi in 1986 as an intergovernmental body concerned with dealing with issues related to visas/false documents, admission/expulsion, asylum, external borders, and refugees (van Munster, 2009).

of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) that have significantly expanded the scope of migration-security continuum (European Union, 1997). The introduction of a refreshed internal security policy has created room for a series of additional securitising moves, reflected in the EU multiannual action plans,<sup>5</sup> but the Treaty provisions themselves could also be considered as securitising moves (van Munster, 2009, p. 9). One of them was the “communitarisation” of border control (Schengen acquis), migration and asylum and moving them even closer to the institutional domains of the EU institutions (Huysmans, 2000, p. 765). As argued by Balzacq and Carrera (2006, p. 3), by linking these three elements within the EU transnational framework, the Union strongly emphasised the existing frame of control over immigration from non-EU countries as a way of “providing citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice” (European Union, 1992, art. 29). As stated in the Amsterdam Treaty, “free movement of persons can be only assured in conjunction with appropriate security measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime” (European Union, 1997, p. 8).

The Amsterdam Treaty has specified the referent object in more detail, putting the protection of European citizens’ and their rights and ability to enjoy those freedoms at the heart of its security discourse (Monar, 2006, pp. 497–498). The introduction of the AFSJ emphasised the “security of everyday life” of European citizens, discursively linking security of the European Union to security of individuals living and traveling within the EU (Arcarazo & Murphy, 2014, p. 87). As elaborated in the 1998 Vienna Action Plan:<sup>6</sup>

(...) freedom loses much of its meaning if it cannot be enjoyed in a secure environment and with the full backing of a system of justice in which all Union citizens and residents can have confidence. These three inseparable concepts have one common denominator – people – and one cannot be achieved in full without the other two (European Council, 1998, para. 5).

In this respect, the AFSJ set out to become the EU area of risk management, assuring common security through control and surveillance (Fletcher et al., 2017; Kaunert et al., 2013; Trauner & Ripoll Servent, 2016). The Amsterdam Treaty has strengthened the symbolic authority of security professionals to speak and define immigration, preparing the grounds for the emergence of the EU internal security agencies (e.g. European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol)) as securitising actors. In this vein, the Treaty provisions and its subsequent action plans strongly underlined the need for a closer, more institutionalised and coordinated cooperation in the area of internal security, calling for “collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of relevant information, including information held by law enforcement services (...), in particular through Europol

<sup>5</sup>The Tampere Programme of 1999, The Hague Programme of 2005, The Stockholm Programme of 2009, Internal Security Strategy of 2010 – further discussed in this chapter.

<sup>6</sup>The aim of the document was to create a concrete action plan for introduction of the area of freedom, security and justice as provided for in the Treaty of Amsterdam (European Council, 1998).

(European Union, 1997, p. 17). The development of the AFSJ has given a boost to risk driven and managerial logic in the EU migration-security continuum, incorporating border management and risk profiling technologies and focusing on “targeting risky spaces (airports, third countries), populations (asylum-seekers, undocumented immigrants) and activities (travel, human trafficking)” (van Munster, 2009, p. 15).

The 2007 Lisbon Treaty introduced several crucial changes into the EU migration-security continuum, strengthening the already mentioned risk-oriented approach and opening new avenues for securitisation. Salminen (2011, p. 276) argues that the most significant adjustment to securitisation has been brought with “depillarisation” of the EU and the subsequent removal of rigid differentiation between intergovernmental and communitarised modes of governance of the AFSJ. This move has significantly strengthened the role of the European Commission, European Parliament or the Court of Justice of the EU in the EU internal security domain, expanding the scope of securitising moves from Treaties and multiannual security strategies to the Community instruments such as regulations, directives and decisions (Kostakopoulou, 2010, p. 154). This has pushed the EU even deeper into the technocratic realm, changing the dynamics of securitisation of migration into more every-day mundane discourses and practices of security (Karamanidou & Kasperek, 2020).

In this regard, the Lisbon Treaty has emphasised the importance of Europol and the European Union's Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust) for coordinating and managing the AFSJ. Eurojust, being one of the newest additions to the EU migration-security apparatus, has been tasked with operational assistance in combating and prosecuting cross-border illicit activities, including those migration-related, and the production of advice and security expertise for the EU institutions (European Union, 2007a, art 85 and 88). As pointed out by Trauner (2011, p. 180), this expansion of internal security agencies has further opened the migration-security continuum to technocratic and managerial security logic and pushing forward the agenda for control and close surveillance of migratory movements. Having this in mind, it should be noted that the Treaty has also expanded the mandate of the European Parliament, enabling democratic oversight over European internal security agencies (European Union, 2007a, art. 15, 85 and 88). Kostakopoulou argues that in reference to securitisation of migration, this increase of democratic control and transparency cannot be underestimated, as it puts EU migration policies in the spotlight, potentially diminishing the impact of exceptional security measures and frames in favour of prevention and protection of migrants and asylum seekers (Kostakopoulou, 2010, p. 155).

The Lisbon Treaty has been promoting an idea of migration management centred on increasing outflows and curbing inflows of “risky migrants” (Hampshire, 2015; Lefebvre, 2017). It has been underlining the need for the adoption of security measures against “illegal immigration and unauthorised residence, including removal and repatriation of persons residing without authorisation” (European Union, 2007a, art 79c). This also points towards an increased role of Frontex, especially in regard to its deportation capabilities (so called return operations). Within this managerial approach to security, the Lisbon Treaty has introduced an innovation, which has

opened securitisation of migration to the domain of the internal-external security nexus. The Treaty has pointed towards the possibility of extraterritorial application of migration control through EU external actions and instruments to prevent uncontrolled inflows of third country nationals into the EU territories. This includes the incorporation of a readmission agreement, as well as “partnership and cooperation with third countries for the purpose of managing inflows of people applying for asylum or subsidiary or temporary protection” (European Union, 2007a, art. 78.g). This framing of potentially dangerous migratory inflows is also visible in the solidarity provisions, where the Treaty envisages migration-related emergency situations, necessitating introduction of special measures (European Union, 2007a). As stated in the Treaty:

(...) in the event of one or more Member States being confronted by an emergency situation characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt provisional measures for the benefit of the Member State(s) concerned (European Union, 2007a, art. 73.3).

Ibrahim and Howarth (2017) observe that this particular provision may have a substantial securitising effect, directly framing movement of people as threatening and uncontrollable flows that require extraordinary measures.

### 4.3 Schengen and Border Control – Building “Fortress Europe”

Huysmans (2000, p. 751) argues that the 1985 Schengen Agreement and the subsequent 1990 Schengen Convention can be viewed as one of the most important impulses for “development of a restrictive EU migration policy and the social construction of migration into a security question”. Indeed, the Schengen accords are commonly considered to be the first official EU policy text “in which the abolishment of internal frontiers is discursively linked to the need for compensatory measures in the area of internal security and immigration” (van Munster, 2009, pp. 19–20). These “compensatory security measures”, often assuming a strictly securitising character, have been put into the Schengen system as a way of mitigating the so-called “security deficit” which emerged after the disappearance of internal border checks (Kaunert & Léonard, 2012, p. 81). After all, the introduction of the Schengen area has turned the EU into a new and truly complex territorial entity, which is in need of protection from internal and external threats, similar to any other state-like territories. Nonetheless, as pointed out by Bigo (2000), the Schengen system has also brought into being a specific security field, introducing new policies and modes of governance effectively incorporating human mobility into the realm of EU security and risk management.

The call for the introduction of compensatory security measures, originally elaborated in Articles 7 and 17 of the Schengen Agreement, has been used strategically in the further development of “Schengenland” as a way of increasing control over

migration flows in the name of EU internal security (William Walters, 2002, p. 52). As observed by van Munster, the subsequent 1990 Schengen Convention was proof that member states' security professionals swiftly "hijacked" the control over Schengen, shifting the focus of the project from abolishing internal borders to managing internal security and building up walls against "the uncertain and potentially threatening non-EU nationals" (van Munster, 2009, pp. 23–24). In this regard, the Schengen *acquis* has produced and reproduced an important frame of differentiation between good citizens of member states and bad third country nationals, or "aliens", who pose risks to the EU freedoms and internal market (Slominski & Trauner, 2018, p. 102). As a result, the Schengen system has initiated the development of an important system of control and management, often described in terms of "Fortress Europe" or "gated community" – an elitist enclave offering security through the strong input of technologies and logistical arrangements that insulate communities from dangerous outsiders (Gruszczak, 2010).

Casas-Cortes et al. (2015, p. 79) observe that Schengen-based securitisation and development of a European gated community has been introduced through explicitly connecting undocumented and irregular immigration to the issue of crime, public order and security. As stated in Article 96 of the Schengen Convention:

(...) refuse entry to aliens may be based upon 'a threat to public order or national security and safety which the presence of an alien in national territory may pose', where security is considered to be at stake in the case of (i) 'aliens' that have been previously convicted for a criminal offence, (ii) 'aliens' that have committed a serious offence such a selling of drugs or who have the intention to commit such a crime, and (iii) when the 'alien' has been prohibited entry and who is illegally residing on the territory of one of the member states (European Union, 1990, art. 96).

After the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and the incorporation of the Schengen zone into the EU legal and institutional framework, the securitisation of migration has become much more interconnected within the newly established Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Salminen, 2011, p. 278). As pointed out by Leonard (Leonard, 2010a, p. 35), the EU migration control has become a matter of managers of risk such as police, counterterrorism, and border cooperation, increasingly focusing on surveillance and data collection on immigrants as a way of identifying and mitigating risky mobility. With the introduction of sophisticated systems for data collection such as the Schengen Information System (SIS),<sup>7</sup> Visa Information System (VIS),<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>The Schengen Information System (SIS) is a "large-scale information system that supports external border control and law enforcement cooperation in the Schengen States. The SIS enables competent authorities, such as police and border guards, to enter and consult alerts on certain categories of wanted or missing persons and objects" (European Commission Website, 2018a).

<sup>8</sup>The Visa Information System (VIS) "allows Schengen States to exchange visa data. It consists of a central IT system and of a communication infrastructure that links this central system to national systems. VIS connects consulates in non-EU countries and all external border crossing points of Schengen States. It processes data and decisions relating to applications for short-stay visas to visit, or to transit through, the Schengen Area. The system can perform biometric matching, primarily of fingerprints, for identification and verification purposes" (European Commission Website, 2018b).

European Asylum Dactyloscopy (Eurodac),<sup>9</sup> or Eurosur,<sup>10</sup> the Schengen area has turned into a “dense network of surveillance and control taking advantage of new forms of personal identity management, early warning and threat prevention regarding cross-border human and material flows” (Gruszczak, 2010, p. 6). As a result of this “technologisation” of migration control, the movement of population has become a significant factor in the EU security paradigm.

### 4.3.1 *Frontex and Protection of the EU Borders*

The EU external borders have become one of the key sites of securitisation of migration (Bigo, 2014; Ibrahim & Howarth, 2017; Jeandesboz & Pallister-Wilkins, 2014). In 2004, for the purpose of increasing efficiency of the external border control, the EU created a decentralised agency, specifically designed to facilitate operational strengthening of security at the external borders and assist in management of migratory flows into the EU – the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex)<sup>11</sup> (Neal, 2009, p. 333).

Frontex occupies a prominent place in the securitisation literature, as it is commonly described as one of the key actors securitising migration at the EU level (Horii, 2016; Kasperek, 2010; Leonard, 2010a). The significance of Frontex lies in its “double-logic securitisation”, reflected in both “exceptionalist” security- and risk-driven practices and discourses (Neal, 2009, p. 337). Its peculiar securitising position can be attributed to a wide scope of activities pertaining to its managerial, intelligence and surveillance prerogatives as well as operational involvement on the external borders of the EU (Kalkman, 2020; Leonard, 2010a, p. 232).

Frontex has been put in the centre of what is called Integrated Border Management (IBM). The IBM is a system underpinning EU cooperation on border controls, joining up all activities of the EU and member states’ public authorities tasked with

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<sup>9</sup>Eurodac is an EU asylum fingerprint database which assists with determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application made in the EU. It was originally established to facilitate the application of the Dublin Convention and its application was later broadened to facilitate preventing, detecting or investigating terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences (European Union, 2013b).

<sup>10</sup>The European Border Surveillance system (Eurosur) is “a multipurpose system for cooperation between the EU Member States and Frontex in order to improve situational awareness and increase reaction capability at external borders. The aim is to prevent cross-border crime and irregular migration and contribute to protecting migrants’ lives. It comprises all Schengen area countries and Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia” (European Commission Website, 2020).

<sup>11</sup>During the peak of the “migration crisis” in 2016, the mandate of the agency was revised, and the name of the agency has been officially changed into European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) (Council of the European Union, 2016). As this development can be considered as a part of securitisation of the “migration crisis”, I will discuss it in a later part of this book.

border security including surveillance and control (Jorry, 2007). In this regard, according to its original founding regulation, Frontex has six main tasks:

- (1) coordinating operational cooperation between Member States regarding the management of external borders; (2) assisting Member States in the training of national border guards, including establishing common training standards; (3) conducting risk analyses; (4) following up on developments in research relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders; (5) assisting Member States when increased technical and operational assistance at external borders is required; and (6) assisting Member States in organising joint return operations (European Union, 2011b, art. 1.5).

Leonard (2010a) observes that all these activities hold securitising potential, encompassing operational, discursive and bureaucratic practices, which generate a specific “technocratic security framework” around migration. In this respect, two types of Frontex’s activities are commonly attributed with substantial securitising effect and aptly reflect the double logics of securitising nature of Frontex, namely coordination of border operations and risk analysis.

Border operations align with a more “exceptionalist” security logic as they represent mobilisation of extraordinary resources in the crisis situations. The operations constitute a significant portion of Frontex’s activities (Carrera et al., 2017). The agency, being tasked with coordination of joint operations along the air, land and sea external borders, assists the EU member states and Schengen associated countries in conducting joint reinforced border control in the event of unprecedented migratory inflows (Leonard, 2010a, p. 239). The agency also coordinates Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) comprising of “specially trained experts from EU member states’ that can be deployed on the territory of another member state requiring assistance for a limited period of time (...) in exceptional and urgent situations” (European Union, 2007b rec. 6, 7). Frontex’s operations have been designed to intervene in border crises including substantial increase of transnational border crime and uncontrolled influx of migrants into the Schengen area (Léonard & Kaunert, 2020). As pointed out by Lutterbeck (2006, p. 65), given the participation of semi-military units (e.g. Guardia Civil in Spain or the Guardia di Finanza in Italy) in these emergency operations, Frontex’s involvement is often framed as militarisation of migration management based on deployment of excessive security measures against irregular immigrants and asylum seekers.<sup>12</sup>

Frontex’s operations and rapid interventions can be deployed under specific circumstances specifically relating to a sudden increase of migratory pressures generated by large numbers of third-country nationals trying to enter the territory of a member state illegally (Frontex Website, 2018b). In this regard, Frontex, relying on sophisticated intelligence analysis structures,<sup>13</sup> is responsible for production of

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<sup>12</sup>Several human rights groups and pro-migrant NGOs tagged Frontex as “migrant hunters” or as “waging war on asylum seekers” (Monforte, 2016). The German non-governmental organisation (NGO) PRO ASYL submitted a petition to the European Parliament in December 2008 entitled “Stop the death-trap at the EU borders!” (PRO ASYL, 2008).

<sup>13</sup>Risk analysis is produced by the Risk Analysis Unit on the basis the Common Integrated Risk Management Model and then distributed within Frontex Risk Analysis Network (Leonard, 2010a,

consistent security discourses, such as reports and analyses<sup>14</sup> assessing and predicting irregular migratory flows and risks they pose to the security of the EU external borders (Paul, 2017). In this vein, the agency depicts itself as an intelligence-driven discursive and epistemic actor involved in “assessing changes, risks and threats with possible impact on the security of the EU’s external borders” (Frontex Website, 2008, p. 9). Leonard (2010a, p. 240) notes that this particular self-framing seems to have an interesting securitising effect. As she argues, “given that ‘intelligence’ has traditionally referred to information concerning threats to (national security), the use of this concept, rather than more neutral concepts such as ‘data’ or ‘information’, already contributes to securitising asylum and migration in the EU” (Leonard, 2010a, p. 242). Bigo and Guild (2005, p. 86) notes that this type of risk analysis places migrants in a specific security dimension, securitising migration “proactively, anticipating the risks and the threats, locating the potential adversaries even before they have any consciousness of being a threat to others”.

It should be stressed that even though the logic of management of “risky” migrants and irregular border crossings seems to be quite prominent, traces of “exceptionality” are becoming increasingly important in the way EU frames protection of borders and the Schengen zone. As discussed above, there are visible trends leading to militarisation of EU border regime, which most notably include employment of decisive and often extraordinary security measures towards irregular migrants. This, coupled with a language of emergency that is often used in the situation of increased migratory pressures opens the continuum to more robust utilisation of logic of “exceptionality” in the future.

#### 4.4 Detention and Deportation – Reception and Return

The element of detention and deportation of irregular migrants has become a prominent frame of securitisation in the EU, constructing migrants as objects that need to be separated from the host society and expelled from its territories (Karamanidou, 2015, p. 52). As observed by Mountz et al., “detention is best understood as a sequential process that should be viewed in connection to detection, deportation, and exclusion” of migrants who are construed as a risk to public safety (Mountz et al., 2013, p. 534). In this vein, detention is a specific instrument for securitisation, controlling and moving “migrant undesirables” into a semi-prison setting and automatically designating them as threatening (Walters, 2010, pp. 80–81). Securitisation scholarship often depicts detention as a form of criminalisation of refugees, asylum seekers, and irregular immigrants, with deportation used as a deterrent and punishment for illegal, fraudulent or simply undesirable behaviour (Khosravi, 2009, p. 41).

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p. 242).

<sup>14</sup>This specifically relates to Frontex’s Annual Risk Assessment, which covers the EU external borders in general and provides long-term strategic analysis contributing to the Agency’s annual work plan (Leonard, 2010a, p. 242).

Traditionally, the issue of detention and deportation has not been high on the EU agenda, falling under the purview of the national immigration and security policies of the member states (Mountz et al., 2013, p. 525). This trend changed with the 2000s and the introduction of Reception (European Union, 2003) and Return (European Union, 2008) Directives which have established common standards and procedures for the detention and removal of “third country nationals residing illegally on territory of a member state” (European Union, 2008, p. 1). The EU defines detention as “confinement of an applicant by a Member State within a particular place, where the applicant is deprived of his or her freedom of movement” (European Union, 2013b, art. 2.h). The Reception Directive allows for application of this type of detention in reference to undocumented migrants as well as refugees and asylum seekers “when protection of national security or public order so requires” (European Union, 2013b, art. 8.3.e). The argument of public and national security has been invoked quite commonly in the EU detention provisions as a way of limiting access to information or restricting the activities of threatening immigrants, including removing the possibility of voluntary returns, imposing entry bans, and denying information on the reasons for deportation decision or entry bans (Karamanidou, 2015, p. 54).

As pointed out by Mainwaring (2012, p. 697), the EU framing of detention as a matter of public order and safety opens the possibility of “incarceration of people who have committed no crime from six to eighteen months in highly criminalising and traumatising conditions, which eventually lead to deep securitisation of immigrant and refugee populations”. Detention scholarship points out that detention has been increasingly used by the EU member states as a deterrent for curbing the influx of irregular immigrants and asylum seekers as well as means for more robust execution of returns (Amit & Lindberg, 2020; Ceccorulli & Labanca, 2016; Prem Kumar & Grundy-Warr, 2004; Niedźwiedzki & Schmidt, 2021).

Deportations or rather “returns”,<sup>15</sup> as euphemistically referred to in the EU policy discourse, are closely connected to the detention regime. As explained by Leonard (2010a, p. 245), the EU return policy “aims to send back to their country of origin (or a country through which they have transited) those whose asylum application has been rejected or who have otherwise been found in an illegal situation on the territory of one of the EU Member States”. Return operations have become a prominent part of the UE migration control mechanism, specifically designed to address the removal of risky and unwanted immigrants in regard to “special concerns of safeguarding public order and security” (European Commission, 2005, p. 5). The EU promotes an effective returns policy as key in ensuring public support for legal migration and asylum, as it projects an ability to control and remove problematic “overstayers”, irregular third country nationals and failed asylum seekers from the EU host societies (Triandafyllidou & Dimitriadi, 2014).

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<sup>15</sup>As pointed out by Borraccetti (2014, p. 46), “although the term ‘return’ normally involves citizens going back to their country of origin, either voluntarily or forcibly, according to Article 3.3 of the Directive ‘return’ also covers situations where the individual goes back to a country of transit (before arrival in Europe) or, to a third country; in this last case only with the immigrant’s consent”.

In this vein, the EU return policy is framed as a tool for combating irregular immigration, but also an important element of the internal security system, centred on detecting, removing and banning individuals identified as posing risks to the public policy, public security or national security of the member states (European Union, 2008). As observed by Baldaccini (2009, p. 114), the EU Return Directive, also called the “shameful Directive”, introduces a restrictive scheme designed not so much to protect the EU citizens from threats, but to remove and keep out irregular migrants with security measures such as “prolonged pre-removal detention and a ban on re-entering the EU”. The Directive visibly downplays the humanitarian overtones and protection safeguards, allowing for a wide application “criminalising practices” and “forceful returns” as an attempt of managing irregular immigration and decreasing the general intake of asylum seekers (Cherubini, 2015, p. 228). As stated by the European Commission,

Member States must be supported in designing and implementing voluntary return programmes and plans for enforced return, (...). Supporting Member States in obtaining the necessary documentation for an immediate return and readmission of illegal migrants remains a priority (European Commission, 2006, p. 9).

The return decisions are taken and executed by the EU member states, but they are often financially and logistically supported by Frontex (Slominski & Trauner, 2021). The agency is tasked with facilitation and coordination of return operations, where the EU member states may jointly remove whole groups of irregular immigrants and rejected asylum seekers to their countries of origin or countries of transfer (Geiger & Pécout, 2010, p. 144). Frontex most commonly provides or co-provides means and expertise in forced and voluntary expulsion of immigrants, including specialised training, escort officers, transportation or medical support necessary to conduct effective return operations (Frontex Website, 2018a). Frontex return operations constitute an important example of EU-level and practice-based securitisation, deploying joint extraordinary security measures to effectively remove large numbers of immigrants from the EU territory (Léonard & Kaunert, 2020). As observed by Leonard (2010a, p. 246), “nowhere else in the world, and never before, has there been such a high level of sophistication in the coordination of operations aiming to expel certain groups of migrants amongst such a large group of states”.

At this point, it should be noted that even though the EU’s reception-return policy scheme has strong securitising features, it is also a space where the notions of protection, care and security become closely entwined. In many aspects, the EU practice and discourse on detention and return policy seems to be internally conflicted. It presents securitised policies as “caring for” or “saving” refugees and asylum seekers by giving them shelter and addressing their needs during their detention and expulsion, at the same time categorising them as common security threats and risks to public safety (Mountz et al., 2013, p. 529). This type of approach is also visible in relation to voluntary or assisted returns which are framed as the “humanitarian solution” (Bendixsen, 2020, p. 113). Here, migrants are often framed as saved from precarious and undocumented existence in an EU member state and helped to return “home” (Bendixsen, 2020, p. 114). This type of narrative is often referred to

as “hostile hospitality” or the safety/security and risk nexus, which reflects the ways “migrant safety and border security discourse are seemingly reconciled in both official state discourse and policy. Within the discursive space of the safety/security nexus, migrant safety and border security are framed as mutually attainable goals; greater border security is posited as the means to increase migrant safety” (Williams, 2016, p. 27).

#### 4.5 Migration and Asylum Policies – Between “Bogus Asylum Seekers” and Irregular Migrants

The so-called “bogus asylum seeking” as a form of illegal activity has been one of the most prevalent security frames in the migration discourse in the EU and its member states (Karamanidou, 2015, p. 41). The general confusion around asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants in the EU arose from discursive presentation of asylum seeking as a form of alternative, potentially illegal economic immigration to the European Union (Huysmans, 2006, p. 66; Klaus et al., 2018). Leonard & Kaunert, (2019) point out that the EU has been gradually and successfully imposing restrictive control over refugees and asylum seekers. For instance, the Dublin Convention of 1990,<sup>16</sup> by addressing the problem of states’ refusal to review asylum claims, introduced important restrictions in reference to the mobility of refugees and their ability to lodge sequential asylum applications in different EU member states (i.e. asylum venue-shopping) (Kaunert & Léonard, 2012, pp. 1400–1401). As van Munster notes (2009, p. 32), “on closer inspection the Dublin Convention, and its later incarnations, seems to be designed to keep refugees away rather than to regulate their protection, facilitating readmission agreements and sequential expulsion of refugees from the EU”. Consequently, next to narratives driven by human security and the need for protection of those fleeing persecution and extreme violence, asylum seekers and refugees have been labelled as potential frauds, seeking

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<sup>16</sup>The Dublin Convention initiated a series of EU-level asylum regulations (a.k.a. the Dublin Regulations or the Dublin System). The Dublin System establishes a set of criteria assigning responsibility among the EU Member States (excluding Denmark) and non-EU states (Lichtenstein, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland) for examination of asylum applications (European Parliament Website, 2020). The criteria are set in a hierarchical order and include a variety of factors ranging from family considerations, through recent possession of visa or residence permit in a Member State, to whether the applicant has entered EU irregularly, or regularly (Adamczyk, 2017, p. 304). The last criterion, meaning point of irregular or regular entry, is often invoked as the most significant factor in assigning responsibility for processing of asylum seeker (Cesarz, 2017, p. 106). Currently the Dublin Regulation is in its third instalment (so-called Dublin III) and envisages a number of additional provisions, exceeding mere assignment of responsibility. These clauses include asylum early warning and preparedness system as well as applicant protection clauses that allow for appeals to suspend execution of return orders, compulsory interviews with applicants, special procedures for minors, assurance of legal assistance free of charge, or limitations on the duration of detention (Hruschka, 2014).

economic gains and exploiting the international system of protection (Guild & Minderhoud, 2012). The 1992 Edinburgh European Council conclusions directly refer to this rationale, calling on the member states for “common endeavours to combat illegal immigration and preventing the misuse of the right to asylum in order to safeguard the principle itself” (European Council, 1992, p. 47).

This frame has been carried on with the institutionalisation of the EU internal security dimension by the Maastricht Treaty (introduction of the third pillar – Justice and Home Affairs) and the Amsterdam Treaty (introduction of Area of Freedom, Justice and Security). De Lobkowicz (1994, p. 100) observes that the institutionalisation of the EU Justice and Home Affairs has eased the prior semi-clandestine and “exceptionalist” approach to migration and asylum, moving it away from security forums into the more technocratic EU institutional structure. It has not, however, stopped the EU from expanding its security frame over refugees and asylum seekers. Instead, it has emphasised its more mundane and risk-oriented nature through technologies of control such Eurodac (fingerprints database) and compulsory collection of biometric data from irregular immigrants, as well as all asylum applicants in the EU (Skleparis, 2016). As noted in the 2004 Hague Programme:

the on-going development of European asylum and migration policy should be based on a common analysis of migratory phenomena in all their aspects. Reinforcing the collection, provision, exchange and efficient use of up-to-date information and data on all relevant migratory developments is of key importance (European Council, 2004, p. 1).

In this regard, utilisation of technologies of control, surveillance and risk management has become an important logic behind securitisation of asylum and migration in the EU.

This is not to say that the human security, human rights and protection frame has been ultimately neglected in the EU asylum policy discourse. The EU regularly acknowledges its international obligations towards refugees and asylum seekers, often underlining the need and responsibility for providing shelter, care and protection. In this regard, the European Parliament has become an important venue for humanitarian framing of asylum and migration, pushing the EU policy discourse towards a more liberal approach to asylum and migration (Leonard & Kaunert, 2019, p. 87). In the context of the deep securitisation of migration, the EU has been attempting to create a discursive space for humanitarian framing of asylum, proclaiming itself as an “area of protection” and emphasising its commitment to the “European values and humanitarian tradition” (Comte, 2010, p. 173). Securitised migration and asylum policies have been running in parallel with gradual development of the human rights framework and instruments supporting more efficient protection of asylum seekers and refugees (e.g. European Refugee Fund) (Scipioni, 2017, p. 17). For instance, the right to asylum is included in the Charter for Fundamental Rights (European Union, 2000) and further developed within the CEAS, including harmonisation directives on asylum procedures and minimum standards (European Union, 2005; European Union, 2013a), refugee status qualification (European Union, 2004; European Union, 2011a), reception directives (European Union, 2003; European Union, 2013b), and the Eurodac directive

(Council of the European Union, 2000). The existence of the humanitarian frame is also reflected in the establishment of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO)<sup>17</sup> and Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA),<sup>18</sup> which produce expertise and provide support to human rights and the protection-oriented dimension of asylum in the EU (Carrera et al., 2013).

### 4.5.1 *Irregular Migration, Organised Crime and Terrorism*

The “security first” principle has been dominating migration and asylum policies at the EU level, emphasising the illicit and clandestine dimension of human mobility and stimulating the deployment of security- and policing-oriented practices (Jorg Monar, 2016, pp. 37–38). In the EU, the notion of illegal conduct of migrants quite visibly remains the prevailing category, deeply connecting to discourse on legal migration and exercise of freedom of movement (Huysmans, 2006, p. 97). As stated, un the 1999 Tampere Programme,

...it would be in contradiction with Europe’s traditions to deny freedom to those whose circumstances lead them justifiably to seek access to our territory. This in turn requires the Union to develop common policies on asylum and immigration, while taking into account the need for a consistent control of external borders to stop illegal immigration and to combat those who organise it and commit related international crimes (European Council, 1999, art. 3).

In point of fact, over the years the EU migration-security continuum has become an institutionalised mode of policymaking, allowing the creation of close associations between drug trafficking, money laundering and even terrorism and migration (Huysmans, 2000, p. 760). As observed by Bigo (1994, p. 164), after the introduction of the Schengen

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<sup>17</sup>The European Asylum Support Office is an EU agency established in 2010 with an aim to support and advise the EU member states on matters related to the asylum and reception systems. It provides specialised assistance that is tailored to the needs of individual member states, but also coordinates cooperation between member states and supports the external dimension of the Common European Asylum System. In this sense, EASO’s tasks include provision of data and expertise on asylum trends and key countries relevant for asylum decision makers, development and provision of training, operational support and operational tools, as well as contribution to the EU’s “Hotspot” approach and coordination of relocation measures (EASO, 2017). Since 2012, EASO has supported a number of EU member states with regard to the “migration crisis”, including Italy, Bulgaria and Cyprus (EASO Website, 2018).

<sup>18</sup>The Fundamental Rights Agency is a decentralised EU agency established in 2007, which provides the EU institutions and member states with assistance and expertise on fundamental rights. It deals with a broad array of thematic areas, including access to justice, discrimination, Roma integration, child rights, as well as immigration and integration of migrants, visa and border control, and asylum (FRA, 2016). FRA conducts large-scale surveys and comparative legal and social research, and prepares handbooks for legal practitioners, for the benefit of the EU institutions, national governments and international organisations. It also engages in dialogue with civil society, cooperating with almost 400 organisations across the EU (FRA, 2016).

the issue of security and human mobility was no longer, on the one hand, terrorism, drugs, crime, and on the other, rights of asylum and clandestine immigration, but it came to be treated together in the attempt to gain an overall view of the interrelation between these problems and the free movement of persons within Europe.

The terrorist attacks in New York (2001), Madrid (2004) and London (2005) significantly stimulated the perception of migration as a security matter, defining a common terrorist threat as alien, radicalised and connected to “undesired mobility of threatening humans” (Jorg Monar, 2016, p. 34). Baker-Beall (2009, pp. 198–199) observes that as a result of increased terrorist threat, the EU counter-terrorism discourse has decisively centred on the idea of threatening “others”, potentially engaging illegal activities, facilitating terrorism and exploiting the vulnerabilities of “Europe of open borders and open societies”.

In this regard, both the Hague (2004) and Stockholm (2010) programmes, concerned with the development of the European internal security dimension, have underlined the connection between terrorism and cross border mobility-related security problems such as irregular migration, trafficking and smuggling of human beings, and organised crime (European Council, 2004, pp. 2–3, 2010). In both cases, the EU policy discourse underlines the internal-external dimension of the issue, calling for decisive joint actions and advanced cooperation with the third countries, addressing the root causes of the problem (Kaunert & Leonard, 2010, pp. 146–147). As often indicated by security scholars, the 9/11 and subsequent terrorist attacks shocked the EU internal security dimension, repositioning migration policies as a vital part of the counter-terrorist realm (Maguire, 2015; Nail, 2016; W Walters, 2008). With the help of the Schengen-based systems of migration control and surveillance,<sup>19</sup> human mobility, especially from third countries, has become a category of risk that needs to be deeply regulated (Leonard, 2010b, p. 35). As stated in the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy:

we need to enhance protection of our external borders to make it harder for known or suspected terrorists to enter or operate within the EU. Improvements in technology for both the capture and exchange of passenger data, and the inclusion of biometric information in identity and travel documents, will increase the effectiveness of our border controls and provide greater assurance to our citizens (Council of the European Union, 2005, p. 10).

By entwining immigration with criminal and terrorist activities, the EU has been gradually applying the same modes of governance in relations to both migration as well as combating transnational organised crime, terrorism and drug trafficking (van Munster, 2009). In this regard, it has framed migration not as much as a direct threat to European security, but a risk potentially facilitating proliferation of existential security problems (Argomaniz et al., 2015, p. 201). As emphasised in the Hague programme,

the management of migration flows, including the fight against illegal immigration should be strengthened by establishing a continuum of security measures that effectively links visa

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<sup>19</sup>In particular, the Schengen Information System, Visa Information System, Passenger Name Record (PNR) (Leonard, 2010b).

application procedures and entry and exit procedures at external border crossings. Such measures are also of importance for the prevention and control of crime, in particular terrorism (European Council, 2004, p. 16).

This position was later reiterated in the EU Internal Security Strategy, which explicitly linked migration and organised crime, arguing that “in relation to the movement of persons, the EU can treat migration management and the fight against crime as twin objectives of the integrated border management strategy” (European Commission, 2010, p. 11).

#### **4.6 Externalisation of Migration Control. Securitisation Within the Internal-External Security Nexus**

The externalisation of migration control has notably influenced the EU securitisation practices and policy frames, moving migration into the realm of the internal-external security nexus or the so-called externalised dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Balzacq, 2009; Trauner & Carrapiço, 2012; Wolff et al., 2009). Trauner (2011, p. 7) observes that the internal-external security nexus has steadily become one of the key concepts guiding the EU migration-security discourse, intertwining and connecting the realms of internal/domestic security (i.e. crime, public order, political stability, population control) and external/foreign security (i.e. diplomacy, military engagement and development). In this regard, Bigo (2001b, p. 112) notes that

internal -external security is often embedded in the figure of the ‘enemy within’, of the outsider inside, which is increasingly labelled with the catchword ‘immigrant,’ who is, depending on the context and the political interests, a foreigner or a national citizen representing a threatening minority. The outsiders are insiders. The lines of who needs to be controlled are blurred.

Over recent decades, the EU has been constructing migration as a security problem that should be addressed at its roots, namely outside the EU territories and its formal jurisdiction (Menz, 2015). Since the 1990s the internal security agenda has been “leaking” into EU foreign security policies, making more room for irregular immigration and terrorism and providing for expansion of migration control to external EU action (Menz, 2015, p. 310). Consequently, EU foreign, development and neighbourhood policies have been taking on internal security features by including immigration, border control and dangers of uncontrolled influx of problematic populations into its own policy frames and actions (Fletcher et al., 2017).

For instance, the 1992 Edinburgh Declaration calls for addressing the causes of migration and refugee flows through the European Communities’ external policy while referring to the Balkan wars and observing that “the danger that uncontrolled immigration could be destabilising” to the member states (European Council, 1992, annex 5). This frame was later reiterated in the Tampere conclusions (European Council, 1999), the Hague (European Council, 2004) and Stockholm (European

Council, 2010) programmes, as well as the EU Internal Security Strategy (European Commission, 2010) where the EU once again called for the use of external policy tools to increase the Union's dialogue and cooperation with countries of origin and of transit in order to improve their capacity to carry out border control, to fight against irregular immigration and better manage migration flows (Boswell, 2003; Chou, 2009). Karamanidou (2015, p. 49) argues that this prevailing expansion of externalised forms of migration management has been motivated by "the perception that domestic and EU-level policies were insufficient in dealing with migration pressures and co-operation with other states would enhance the protection-providing and controlling capacities of the EU".

One of the most significant features of the externalised securitisation of migration at the EU level is reflected in the attempts to project its internal security measures onto surrounding states and regions (Paoletti, 2010, p. 29). As indicated by Eriksson and Rhinard (2009, p. 253), the internal-external security realm marries the instruments of manageable internal security with unmanageable external security environment, introducing a sense of control over elusive transversal threats such as terrorism or organised crime. In this vein, the EU commonly engages in political activities and so-called "policing at distance", incrementally incorporating migration into the security realm through a variety of security measures and legal frameworks, ranging from carrier sanctions and visa regimes to Frontex-run policing measures patrolling international waters so as to prevent migrants reaching EU territories, to policies on readmission (Karamanidou, 2015, p. 49).

In this regard, the EU has been applying a wide plethora of political and external action measures attempting to expand its control and influence over the external migration-security domain. Within the framework of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), the European Commission has established a political dialogue and security cooperation with third countries, which have been considered strategic for curbing and managing migratory flows, with so-called Mobility Partnerships (Strik, 2017). As observed by Collyer (2012, p. 507), the GAMM carries a significant securitising effect, broadly incorporating security measures into international frameworks concerning human mobility. For instance, the GAMM links the negotiation of visa-facilitation provisions with the establishment of readmission agreements as a means for forceful return of irregular immigrants and unsuccessful asylum applicants to partnership countries, given they are the country of origin or transfer (European Commission, 2011, p. 16). At the same time, the GAMM emphasises the resilience of the security structure of partner countries as a way of safeguarding legal migration, reducing the risks of irregular migration, and managing rapid inflows of refugees (Hampshire, 2016, p. 578). As stated in the Framework, the internal security of the EU neighbourhood must be built up along with the "external dimension of asylum in order to contribute more effectively to solving protracted refugee situations" (European Commission, 2011, p. 17).

This resilience-oriented approach to securitisation of migration is also visible in linking the deficiencies of third countries with migration-security issues, emphasising that

migration and mobility are embedded in the broader political, economic, social and security context. A broad understanding of security means that irregular migration also needs to be considered in connection with organised crime and lack of rule of law and justice, feeding on corruption and inadequate regulation” (European Commission, 2011, p. 15).

In this vein, the GAMM envisages a possibility of launching security capacity-building initiatives in third countries, transferring skills and resources in order to prevent and reduce migration-related illicit activities, including trafficking, smuggling and irregular migration (European Commission, 2011, p. 15). The framework allows for mobilisation of the EU Internal Security Fund and EU Asylum and Migration Fund, along with development of cooperation, and border assistance under the auspices of the Common Security and Defence Policy (e.g. EUBAM Libya) (European Commission, 2014, p. 6).

In regard to external dimension of migration management, the EU has been stressing the importance of pre-frontier controls such as pre-arrival visa and background checks, which are supposed to detect threatening individuals attempting to enter the EU territories (Karamanidou, 2015, p. 49). In this vein, the EU Internal Security Strategy calls for a closer cooperation with third countries in sharing intelligence and coordinating common efforts, by “deploying security expertise to EU Delegations, particularly in priority countries, including Europol liaison officers and liaison magistrates” (European Commission, 2010, p. 3). A similar provision is included the GAMM framework, which calls for a closer exchange of information between Immigration Liaison Officers and partner countries, as well as EU agencies specialising in migration and organised crime intelligence (European Commission, 2011, p. 16). McNamara (2013, p. 322) observes that this devotion to management through intelligence and risk profiling may be a double-edged sword, on the one hand generating a sense of control and security, while on the other preventing whole groups of forced migrants from accessing the EU territories and seeking protection in a safe manner, on the grounds of suspicion. In this regard, EU practices of “policing at distance” has made its mark on the EU migration-security continuum, carrying a strong securitising effect.

## 4.7 Conclusion

As discussed above, the EU is responsible for the creation of a very specific migration-security continuum, interwoven with a variety of policies, discourses, and security practices. The EU migration-security continuum was set up with the introduction of the Schengen zone, partly as a response to the internal security deficit but also as an opportunity for increasing control over inflows of migrants from outside the EU. In this sense, the securitisation of migration at the EU level can be considered as an incremental and institutionalised process locked within three closely related dimensions: “constitutional securitisation”, “Fortress Europe”, and the “migration-crime nexus”.

Even though these dimensions have been discussed separately in this chapter, they are closely entwined in the continuum, often reinforcing one another. The “constitutional” securitising moves have been gradually moving the continuum from intergovernmental into more supranational and decentralised modes of governance. Due to changes introduced by the EU treaties, the continuum has gained a framework, which enabled a much closer interplay between different aspects of migration management at the EU level. For instance, the notion of “Fortress Europe” and the development of a more restrictive border regime has discursively and practically merged with the EU’s asylum scheme and the migration-crime nexus. Irregular migrants and asylum seekers who are captured in the EU and categorised as unidentifiable, risky, or threatening are often detained and isolated for purposes of deportation. This is part of broader capture-identification-containment-return cycle that has been present in all three dimensions of the continuum, steadily gaining prominence in the EU’s approach to migration management.

As indicated in this chapter, the EU’s migration-security continuum is a complex construct, suggestive of three logics that have been intertwining and to different degrees influencing the way the EU has been framing the relationship between migration and security. This concerns most notably risk management, but also elements of “exceptionality” and human security. Traces of the logic of “exceptionality” can be found in the conceptualisation of “Fortress Europe”, especially in regard to the militarisation of border management and discourse on border operations and emergency interventions in the situation of unprecedented migratory inflows. Similarly, elements of human security are embedded within the EU’s discourse on asylum policy and “worthy” asylum claims as well as its reception and return policies. Nonetheless, it is hard to ignore that the risk seems to be most fundamental, overarching and expansive out of the logics existing in the continuum. It has a tendency to expand together with the need for precise control of migratory movements and rapid technologisation of migration management policy in the EU. References to risk can be found in a plethora of the EU migration policies, ranging from protection of refugees and management of the asylum system to border security, robust Frontex operations, detention and returns, as well as the externalisation of migration control. As a security logic, risk has been consistently introduced into the continuum, setting the tone for further securitisation of migration in the EU. In the next chapter, I analyse how risk and other pre-existing frames and security logics construed as a part of the EU migration-security continuum translate into security framing of migration-related emergency situations such as the “migration crisis”.

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# Chapter 5

## Analysing Diagnosis and Evaluation of the “Migration Crisis” at the EU Level



### 5.1 Introduction

As outlined in the previous chapter, prior to the “migration crisis” the EU has become a site of a specific migration-security continuum. It consists of securitising frames and narratives, depicting non-EU immigrants in terms of security nuances and risks, associating them with unauthorised residence, irregular immigration, and bogus asylum-seeking, to name a few. The continuum brought forth three pre-existing and intertwined security logics that have been commonly used to describe the relationship between migration and security in the EU i.e. human security, “exceptionality” and most prominently, risk management. As indicated in the previous chapter, the logic of management of “risky” migrants has notably dominated the EU’s migration-security continuum. This is not surprising, as most EU securitising moves prior to the crisis were developed under the circumstances of normalised modes of politics and incremental policy cycles. This made securitisation at the EU level more mundane and driven by technologisation of security and technocratic routine.

The outbreak of the “migration crisis” has put this risk-centred mode of securitisation into a new perspective, moving the security of migrants and humanitarianism closer to the centre of political contestation, and at the same time significantly elevating the position of “threatening features” of mass migration on the EU security agenda (Eurobarometer, 2015). This has led to a more visible intertwining of human security with “exceptionality” and to a lesser extent with risk management. For instance, even though risk management-centred framing of the crisis distinctly diverts from the idea of the human being as the ultimate referent object, it still on occasion refers to pervasive threats to migrants such as transborder organised crime or recognises the need to protect the “legitimate” refugees and asylum seekers. On the other hand, in the diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis, “exceptionality” has become more closely entwined with both human security and risk, building on the language of emergency and the need for a rapid and decisive response to the

deteriorating situation on the EU borders. In this regard, the “migration crisis” has visibly opened the EU migration-security debate to change and possible shifts towards new perspectives on the relationship between security and human mobility. This chapter is concerned with this dynamic, focusing on the analysis of the first two segments of the EU frame-narrative produced in response to the “migration crisis”, namely diagnosis and evaluation.

In the “securitisation as the work of framing” approach, the diagnosis and evaluation processes wield significant influence over the ways the issue is understood and acted upon. Diagnosis most commonly entails recognising and often taking ownership of the problem in terms of naming and selecting its security features. This imbues the problem with its own identity and meaning. In this sense, diagnosis revolves around conceptualisation of the threatening nature of the problem, its origins, and/or powers behind its escalation, while ascribing it within a specific policy realm. Thus, construed diagnosis is often merged with evaluation of causal effects and the moral dimension. Evaluation focuses on the question of how specific categories of threats affect security referent objects and who/what should be blamed. In this respect, evaluation is focused on the nature of the relationship and interactions between threats and referent objects. It should be noted that these specific elements of diagnosis and evaluation are not necessarily sequential or even occurring in a specific order. As in the EU policy discourse, these two segments are inherently connected, for analytical clarity, in this chapter they are discussed in unison.

This chapter is organised as follows. Every subchapter corresponds with security logics which have achieved the most significant levels of structuration in the diagnosis and evaluation segments (i.e. human security-centred, risk as well as “exceptionalist” security, which has seeped into the aforementioned logics). Each sub-chapter explains how different logics have been incorporated and used in the framing process, thus fleshing out different interpretations of the crisis embedded in the EU policy discourse as well as their key framing sponsors. Each sub-chapter discusses how the EU policy actors have been promoting various framings of the crisis, by proposing different definitions of its nature (introducing specific names and categories), root causes, threats and referent objects. The final part of the chapter is devoted to the analysis of the three logics, discussing how they intertwine, correspond and fit into general diagnostic and evaluation segments of the EU frame narrative.

## 5.2 Human Security

In terms of diagnosis and evaluation of the “migration crisis”, human-centred logic has reached significant levels of structuration at the EU level, turning into a meaningful and essential part of the collective framing of the crisis. It has been focused predominantly on humanitarian features, emphasising the need of protecting migrants who face pervasive, recurrent, direct and indirect threats to their lives, dignity, and freedoms. Such a broad application of human security logic in

diagnosing and evaluating migratory inflows to the EU is a novelty. Even though the concept of human security has been a part of EU security culture since the beginnings of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), it had limited impact on the EU migration security-continuum and especially with regard to events that directly affect the EU internal security domain (Huysmans, 2006; Parkes, 2014; Pinyol-Jiménez, 2011; Roos, 2013).

There is, however, a consequence to this type of framing. The EU has indeed recognised the human tragedy of the crisis and the need to protect migrants' lives, reproducing this type of narrative on numerous occasions. However, at the same time it has been avoiding taking full ownership of this interpretation, introducing ambiguity into naming and categorising practices and situating key threats and causal effects of mass migration outside the territories of the European Union. As a result, from the framing point of view, the humanitarian features of the "migration crisis" have never truly crossed EU borders, becoming yet another part of a larger equation of "distant" refugee crises caused by extreme violence, poverty, undemocratic regimes and political turmoil, to name a few.

### ***5.2.1 Naming and Categorising the Humanitarian Features of the "Migration Crisis"***

Even though all the actors analysed have been active in the application of human security in the diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis, it is the European Parliament that can be considered as the key "speaker" of this logic in the EU, setting the initial tones and interpretative cues.<sup>1</sup> The Parliament was the first EU institution which fully and explicitly recognised the humanitarian features of the events on the EU borders, focusing the framing on the tragedy of refugees and the loss of human life in the Mediterranean. The 2013 tragic events off a small Italian island of Lampedusa<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The European Parliament proved to be most receptive to external framing cues (i.e. originating outside the EU) primarily from the Council of Europe (CoE) (European Parliament, 2015b, 2016b, f), United Nations (European Parliament, 2015e, 2016a, f), International Organization for Migration (European Parliament, 2015f, 2017a) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (European Parliament, 2015a, f, 2017a), embracing their distinctive human security-centred framing and incorporating it into its own discourse. Indeed, the international community has been pushing the EU to embrace and acknowledge the humanitarian nature the "migration crisis". For instance, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has been producing human security-centred discourse on "migration crisis" since 2011, calling the EU to drastically increase its efforts in saving migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and others who risk their lives to reach Europe's borders (Council of Europe, 2011b, 2012).

<sup>2</sup>The island of Lampedusa is Italy's most southern point, situated ca. 100 km off the coast of Africa, midway between Tunisia and Malta. The small island of ca. 6,000 residents (UrbiStat.com, 2016) has become one of the symbols of the wider "migration crisis" in Europe. Due to its location, since the early 2000s, Lampedusa has been a significant transit spot for irregular migrants, with large numbers of illegal landings and a high death toll off the coast of the island (see Cuttitta, 2014). However, in 2011, following the so-called Arab Spring, the number of migrants arriving

represent one such focusing event, putting pressure on the EU to employ a more humanitarian narrative. Here, the European Parliament’s “resolution on migratory flows in the Mediterranean, with particular attention to the tragic events off Lampedusa” has unequivocally put the inflows of migrants into a humanitarian category, indicating that there is a need to do “everything possible to save the lives of people in danger” (European Parliament, 2013, rec. B). This humanitarian logic was later reproduced in the EP’s resolutions on the situation in Libya (European Parliament, 2014a, 2015e) and Syria (European Parliament, 2017b) as well as “on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration” (European Parliament, 2014b), where the EP strongly emphasised the human tragedy, exploitation of migrants and the loss of life at sea. This framing was later reproduced by the European Commission in the 2015 State of the Union, which substantially increased the exposure of the human security logic.

The 2015 State of the Union was unique in terms of framing the crisis, as it was a rare instance when an EU institution, in this case the European Commission, so bluntly gave a name to the problem. While diagnosing the crisis, Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, repeatedly used the name “refugee crisis”, describing the increased migratory flows as “first of all a matter of humanity and of human dignity” (European Commission, 2015g). In this vein, the President’s statement, directly defined the crisis as a humanitarian issue, emphasising its refugee nature. As stated in the speech:

There is no price you would not pay, there is no wall you would not climb, no sea you would not sail, no border you would not cross if it is war or the barbarism of the so-called Islamic State that you are fleeing (European Commission, 2015g, p. 3).

The State of the Union visibly placed migrant’s life at the centre of the problem, describing it as a value that has become threatened in the course of undesirable events outside the EU and on its borders (European Commission, 2015g). In doing so, for a moment it stepped out from its risk-centred and managerial role, openly categorising the crisis as a humanitarian issue (European Commission, 2015g, c).

As will be discussed in the next part of this chapter, this type of human security-centred naming and categorising is visible throughout the diagnostic part of the EU frame-narrative. However, there is a visible fluctuation in the intensity and mode of its application. The “uniqueness” of the 2015 State of the Union lies in the fact that it introduces the term “refugee crisis” in order to name and acknowledge the humanitarian nature of the problem. Nonetheless, this explicit naming has never gained significant resonance in the EU policy discourse. EU institutional actors, including

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from Tunisia and Libya rose exponentially, reaching over 55,000 (Council of Europe, 2011a, art. 13). Together with a critical increase of deaths of migrants in transit and drastic deterioration of the conditions of reception, Lampedusa is seen as the harbinger of the “migration crisis” (Dolidze 2011, pp. 123–124). In October 2013, a boat with ca. 500 migrants caught fire and capsized, killing 364, including children (Davies, 2013). However, Lampedusa has also become the symbol of humanitarian approach to the crisis with the island’s former mayor, Giusi Nicolini, providing safe haven to migrants and emphasising “the humanitarian imperative that it is more important to protect people than borders” (Olof Palme Minnesfond, 2017).

the European Parliament, have been avoiding committing to any specific name, or even a set of names, that could symbolise the EU's categorical ownership of the humanitarian interpretation of the crisis. Instead, the Union has applied the human security logic using descriptive accounts of various occurrences accompanying the crisis, most commonly referring to “tragic loss” (European Parliament, 2015f), “tragic events” (European Council, 2015f; European Parliament, 2015f, c), “tragic situation” (European Council, 2015d) or simply “tragedies in the Mediterranean” (European Parliament, 2015f).

This rather implicit mode of naming signifies an interesting trend. Even though the EU has recognised and emphasised the elements of human security and the need to protect those migrants who are at risk, it has also distanced itself from taking full ownership of the humanitarian interpretation of the crisis. Without committing to a specific and distinctive type of naming, the EU has kept the humanitarian features of the crisis at the discursive equivalent of “arm’s length”. This type of “framing without explicit naming” suggests that policy actors may acknowledge specific features of the problem and put them on the political agenda, but at the same time they do not fully internalise its ramifications. This strategised use of naming and categorising, has allowed the EU to manage expectations and balance imperative for specific types of humanitarian response to increased migratory flows. Here, the introduction and subsequent discursive marginalisation of the name “refugee crisis” can be treated as symptomatic. The EU policy actors have consistently avoided using this name in official discourse, substituting it with sympathetic language towards the migrants and refugees and their hardship, at the same time avoiding the term “refugee crisis” in describing the events within the EU territories and on its borders.

### ***5.2.2 Conceptualising the Push Factors and Defining Threats***

The EU policy actors seem to be more explicit in applying human security logic when diagnosing the root causes and defining forces behind the crisis, here represented by the push factors driving people to leave their communities of origin, such as economic, social, or political insecurities (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2014, p. 270). The EU discourse strongly emphasises the role of the unstable and dangerous “outside”, construed as territorial and socio-political space external to the EU. Here, the policy framing of the root causes focuses on “countries and regions of origin”, described as the main locus of insecurity and pervasive threats to prospective migrants and their native communities (see Council of the European Union, 2015i; European Parliament, 2015b; European Commission, 2016c). As stated in the Agenda on Security:

contemporary security concerns originate from instability in the EU's immediate neighbourhood and changing forms of radicalisation, violence and terrorism. Threats are becoming more varied and more international, as well as increasingly cross-border and cross-sectorial in nature (European Commission, 2015d, p. 2).

The EU policy discourse closely links this type of security framing of the EU neighbourhood to human security-driven migratory movements, connecting them to the turmoil in the Middle East and parts of sub-Saharan Africa (European Commission, 2015e; European Parliament, 2015a, c; European Council, 2015d). In this vein, the EU global security strategy clearly links the deteriorating security situation in the underdeveloped regions to the root causes of the “migration crisis”, indicating that, “solving conflicts and promoting development and human rights in the south is essential to addressing the threat of terrorism, the challenges of demography and migratory pressures” (European Commission, 2016d, p. 34).

There is a coherent application of human security logic across the EU policy discourse, in the framing of the root causes of the “migration crisis”, associating them with a broad spectrum of interlinked issues that affect the wellbeing of individuals and push them into mobility, or more precisely to seek refuge from pervasive threats and structural violence. The EU discourse most commonly correlates the forces pushing individuals out of their native communities with degradation of the security environment (e.g. war, regional conflict, terrorism) on the one hand, and economic decline (e.g. poverty, underdevelopment) on the other (European Commission, 2015d, 2016f; European Parliament, 2016f; European Council, 2017c). As indicated in the European Commission’s Agenda on Migration, “civil war, persecution, poverty, and climate change all feed directly and immediately into migration, so the prevention and mitigation of these threats is of primary importance for the migration debate” (European Commission, 2015c, p. 7). On a similar note, the European Parliament argues that “the root causes of violence and underdevelopment need to be addressed in the countries of origin in order to stem the flow of refugees and economic migrants” (European Parliament, 2015f, rec. 16).

And so, the EU policy discourse attributes the blame for degradation of the security environment, the decrease of human security, and human rights infringement to three culprits, namely Syria, Libya and the so-called Islamic State (IS)/Da’esh.<sup>3</sup> The EU discourse has been gradually increasing the profile of Syria and Libya in the diagnosis of the root causes, linking these countries to regional instability, the rise of terrorism, and structural facilitation of the “migration crisis” (European Commission, 2015c; European Council, 2015f; European Parliament, 2015a). In the EU policy discourse, the war in Syria is framed as the original push factor, setting a refugee-driven chain reaction in the whole region,<sup>4</sup> leading up to the emergence

<sup>3</sup> Iraq is also included in the diagnosis, but mostly in connection to Syria (see: European Parliament, 2015a, 2017b; Council of the European Union, 2015a; European Council, 2015e).

<sup>4</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated the prolonged conflict in Syria resulted in 5,5 million refugees and over 6 million internally displaced persons (as of December 2017; UNOCHA Website, 2018). The majority of Syrian refugees escaped to neighbouring countries, predominantly to Turkey (3,485,000 refugees), Lebanon (997,000 refugees) and Jordan (657,000 refugees), as well as Egypt (over 126,000) and Iraq (over 247,000) (as of December 2017; UNHCR Information Sharing Portal, 2018). The real number of refugees is likely to be higher than the estimates provided by the UNHCR, as not all Syrians decide to officially register. This massive movement of people has led to a serious humanitarian crisis, with millions left in need of protection, food, shelter and health care. What is more, it also had a serious negative

of the “migration crisis” in the EU territories (European Parliament, 2017b, p. 6). The framing of the Syrian crisis is visibly permeated with human security logic, emphasising the hardship, suffering, and the consequent refuge of the Syrian people. The European Parliament’s resolutions on the situation in Syria often strengthen this framing, reiterating that “almost 50 % of all Syrians have lost their homes and 40 % of the refugees are forced to endure sub-standard living conditions” (European Parliament, 2015a, rec. M).

On a similar note, Donald Tusk, then the President of the European Council, stated that, “(...) the biggest humanitarian challenge of our time is the Syrian refugee crisis. Refugees have had little choice but to flee their country. Many of them have lost everything” (European Council, 2016b, p. 1). Continuing this line of framing, the European Parliament has become the most explicit promoter of “human security” logic, attributing blame specifically to the Syrian government as responsible for the atrocities and violence spilling over the Middle East. As stated in the European Parliament’s resolution, the:

on-going violent crisis in Syria as a result of the Assad regime and terrorist violence has resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe of an unprecedented scale in history, with more than 200 000 people killed, most of them civilians, more than 7.6 million people internally displaced, and more than 12.2 million Syrians in desperate need of assistance inside Syria (European Parliament, 2015a, rec. A).

The situation in Libya has been connected to the root causes of the “migration crisis” in a slightly different manner. It is not only framed as a source of severe instability having a devastating impact on human security, but is also described as a structural security problem creating an ideal environment for criminal activities, including human smuggling and trafficking, consequently facilitating the “migration crisis” (European Council, 2015d, p. 9). This type of diagnosis and evaluation has been also emphasised by the European Parliament. As stated in the EP resolution on Libya:

Libya is a primary departure point for migrants attempting to reach Europe; hundreds of migrants and refugees fleeing the violence in Libya have reportedly died while attempting to cross the Mediterranean to Europe, leading to a major refugee crisis in Italy and Malta (European Parliament, 2015e, rec. P).

In the case of Libya, the attribution of blame is more ambiguous than in the case of Syria. It does not refer to a specific person, regime, or group, but “the unstable situation” that is obstructing the cooperation and management of the crisis. In this vein, the Libyan government, despite contributing to the crisis, is not blamed or shamed, but rather treated as a potential partner for the future actions addressing the root causes of the crisis (European Council, 2015d).

Regardless the differences in the framing of the Syrian and Libyan “contribution” to the “migration crisis”, the EU discourse explicitly correlates the deteriorating security situation in those countries with the proliferation of terrorist activities

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impact on the host countries’ economies, with widening fiscal deficits, raising prices, unemployment and poverty rates, as well as tensions at the social level (Berti, 2015).

of IS/Da’esh and other jihadist groups in the region (cf. European Parliament, 2015a, e; European Commission, 2015d; Council of the European Union, 2015l). The analysed EU institutions uniformly treat terrorism as having devastating impact on the human security environment, explicitly promoting it as one of the most pervasive and prevailing causes of the “migration crisis” (see: European Parliament, 2015a; Council of the European Union, 2015k, d; European Council, 2017a). As stated in the EP resolution on migration and refugees, “the rise of IS/Da’esh in neighbouring conflict areas are having an impact on the mass influx of migrants and flows of displaced people and, therefore, on the number of individuals attempting to reach the EU” (European Parliament, 2015b, rec. E). Again, the European Parliament is responsible for the most explicit and frequent diagnosis of terrorism in terms of human security related push factors, connecting it directly to the degradation of the security environment and forced migration. In the resolution on EU strategy regarding Syria, the EP indicates that:

ISIS/Da’esh and other jihadist groups have committed cruel atrocities, including the use of brutal executions and unspoken sexual violence, abductions, torture, forced conversions and slavery of women and girls; whereas children have been recruited and used in terrorist attacks; (...) these crimes may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide (European Parliament, 2017b, rec. D).

Whereas degradation of physical security is framed as the key determinant of the increased mobility of refugees, the EU actors also refer to poverty and structural underdevelopment as one of the key forces behind the rapid increase of irregular migration into the EU. Also in this case, the diagnosis of the root causes clearly employs human security logic, showing how mixed migratory flows come into being when individuals and their communities experience persistent physical and structural violence. In this respect, there are visible links in the EU policy discourse between the degradation of security with economic decline, showing how poverty and the lack of opportunities may turn into a powerful and long-term push factor. As stated by the European Parliament:

devastating civil conflict has set countries back decades in terms of social and economic development, forcing millions of people into unemployment and poverty and entailing considerable destruction of health and education services, and large-scale displacement of Syrians and brain drain (European Parliament, 2017b, art. 15).

This emphasis on the economic root causes of the crisis is also visible in regard to framing economic migration as a type of forced migration. EU actors emphasise economic hardship in the countries of origin as one of the key issues to be addressed in curbing migratory flows into Europe (Council of the European Union, 2015j; European Commission, 2016d; European Parliament, 2017a). As indicated by the European Commission, “poverty, insecurity, inequality and unemployment are among the main root causes of irregular and forced migration. This includes regions of Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe where most of the migrants reaching Europe originate from” (European Commission, 2015c, p. 8). The Council of the European Union often uses a similar type of framing, reiterating the need to look at the crisis not only in terms of security but also developmental issues and regional dynamics

that will impact the migratory flows in the near future (Council of the European Union, 2015h). The Council conclusions on migration and development observe that “by addressing political, economic and social instability, development cooperation can contribute to ensuring that migration is a choice rather than a necessity” (Council of the European Union, 2015h, p. 2).

Even though war, terrorism and poverty in the countries of origin are depicted as severe and persistent threats to human life, they are not the most persistent part of the EU humanitarian framing of the crisis. With respect to “human security” logic, the EU policy actors clearly frame human traffickers and smugglers as agents propelling the “migration crisis”, making a considerable effort to elevate their “threatening status” within the EU policy discourse (Council of the European Union, 2016b; European Commission, 2015b; European Parliament, 2016c). The trans-border criminal networks are described as the main perpetrators and facilitators of violence against migrants, exploiting human desperation and feeding on degradation of human security environment in the EU neighbourhood (European Parliament, 2016c, p. 2). As stated in the EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings:

(...) human trafficking and smuggling are complex transnational phenomena rooted in vulnerability to poverty, lack of democratic cultures, gender inequality and violence against women, conflict and post-conflict situations, lack of social integration, lack of opportunities and employment, lack of access to education, child labour and discrimination (European Commission, 2012, p. 3).

In this respect, the EU policy actors attribute blame for the humanitarian crisis on the EU borders directly to trans-border crime networks, which “put at risk the lives of immigrants for their own business profits, and are responsible for thousands of deaths in the Mediterranean” (European Parliament, 2015b). Consequently, the EU framing of human smugglers puts much emphasis on the inhuman and degrading mode of their operations, often iterating that “scores of migrants drown at sea, suffocate in containers or perish in deserts,” while being squeezed onto “unseaworthy boats – including small inflatable boats or end-of-life cargo ships – or into trucks” (European Commission, 2015b, p. 1).

In this respect, the EU actors have started producing discourse entailing a stricter understanding of human smuggling, linking it to physical exploitation and trafficking, especially of vulnerable groups such as women and children (Council of the European Union, 2016f, 2017a; European Commission, 2017b, 2017d; European Parliament, 2016b, g). They have been emphasising the fact that “migrant smuggling has become an increasingly violent form of crime, which may involve serious physical or psychological violence and human rights abuse, exposing women and children to particular risk” (Council of the European Union, 2016b, p. 1). This type of framing is recurrent in the EU policy texts devoted to the criminal aspects of the crisis, where smuggling and trafficking are often treated as part of the same “industry” feeding on structural deficiencies of the European and national security and tragic situation of migrants, who often seek “services” of trans-border criminal

groups out of desperation (Council of the European Union, 2016b; European Commission, 2015b).

### 5.2.3 *Defining the Human Referent Object*

When framing the humanitarian features of the crisis, the EU policy actors do not explicitly differentiate between refugees and economic migrants, or legal and illegal modes of migration, but rather diagnose threats to all individuals who engage in mobility out of fear of physical or structural violence. This inclusive definition of the human referent object is intensified in the definition of the root causes of the crisis, where the EU policy actors correlate push factors linked to the physical abuses of war and terrorism with poverty and underdevelopment (European Commission, 2015c; Council of the European Union, 2016a; European Parliament, 2017b). In this respect, the EU discourse makes attempts to embrace and acknowledge the mixed and internally diverse nature of migratory flows into Europe, emphasising the fact that hazardous journeys affect to an equal degree refugees and economic migrants (see European Council, 2017a, art. 21; European Commission, 2015c, p. 7). As stated in the European Council conclusions:

We are deeply concerned by the sharp increase in flows of refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants which entails suffering, abuse and exploitation, particularly for children and women, and unacceptable loss of life in the desert or at sea (...). We agree that the first priority in this context is to save lives and do everything necessary to rescue and protect the migrants whose lives are at risk (European Council, 2015f, p. 1).

Nonetheless this type of inclusive definition of referent objects is noticeably limited to the external dimension of the “migration crisis”, emphasising the humanitarian responsibility to save migrants’ lives outside the EU territories, in the countries of origin or transit (Council of the European Union, 2016a; European Parliament, 2015f). This does not encompass the acceptance of economic migrants to the European Union on similar rights to so-called “legitimate asylum seekers”.

With the progression of the crisis, the EU policy discourse has visibly shifted its attention to vulnerable groups such as children, especially unaccompanied minors, and women, underlying the specific risks that affect their security and wellbeing (Council of the European Union, 2017a; European Parliament, 2016g). Such an adjustment in framing of referent objects is not without reason, as the numbers of women and children seeking refuge in the EU amounted up to 60% of overall arrivals in 2016 (Karas, 2016). Here, the European Parliament and European Commission have proved to be vocal promoters of vulnerable groups, devoting much attention to conceptualisation and institutionalisation of their protection within the EU policy framework (European Commission, 2017c). Nonetheless, only as late as mid-2016 did the European Parliament produce a resolution devoted specifically to “the situation of women refugees and asylum seekers in the EU”, introducing an explicit policy frame for discussion on the scale and nature of vulnerabilities of female

migrants and refugees affected by the crisis (European Parliament, 2016g). As stated in the document:

(...) women refugees and asylum seekers are often subjected to multiple forms of discrimination and are more vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence in their countries of origin, transit and destination; whereas unaccompanied women and girls, women heads of household, pregnant women, people with disabilities and the elderly are particularly vulnerable; (...) women refugees not only face threats to their personal safety (long and dangerous journeys into exile, harassment, official indifference and, frequently, sexual abuse and violence, even once they have reached a place that seems safe and the resulting social stigmatisation), but are also responsible for the physical safety, welfare and survival of their families (European Parliament, 2016g, rec. K, L).

A similar type of framing has been applied to the situation of children and unaccompanied minors in migration, who have been defined as one of the most rapidly growing vulnerable groups among asylum seekers in the EU. The security of children was more decisively embraced as issue in later stages of the crisis, when the European Commission issued a communication on “protection of children in migration”. In this seminal policy document, the European Commission, building on the previous narrative of gender-related vulnerabilities acknowledged that:

(...) both girls and boys in migration are exposed to risks and have often suffered from extreme forms of violence, exploitation, trafficking in human beings, physical, psychological and sexual abuse and before and/or after their arrival on EU territory. They may risk being marginalised and drawn into criminal activity or radicalisation. Children may go missing or become separated from their families. Girls are particularly at risk of forced marriages as families struggle in straitened circumstances or wish to protect them from further sexual violence (European Commission, 2017c, p. 2).

This broad spectrum of vulnerabilities has been gradually introduced into the EU diagnosis of “migration crisis”-related threats to human security. Here, the most emphasis has been put on sexual exploitation and forced labour that have been “thriving” under the circumstances of the degraded security environment in the EU neighbourhood (Council of the European Union, 2016e; European Commission, 2016c; European Parliament, 2015d, 2016c, e). In this respect, the narrative on women and children as vulnerable groups has been explicitly connected to migrant smugglers and traffickers, who are commonly defined as one of the main perpetrators of gender-related violence (European Commission, 2015b; European Parliament, 2015d, 2016g).

### 5.2.4 *Comments*

The human security logic has become the most significant part of the evaluation and diagnosis of the crisis at the EU level. The Parliament has proved to be most dedicated promotor of this particular framing, producing a qualitatively and quantitatively rich discourse on humanitarian features of the crisis. Here, the EP’s resolutions played a significant role, case by case putting human lives and wellbeing at the

centre of the framing of the crisis. The Commission as well as both Councils did follow up on this type of framing. Even though the migration security continuum places the Commission and the Councils on the risk management and exceptional security side of the framing process, respectively, these two institutions could not ignore the humanitarian features of the crisis, while proposing its diagnosis its nature and defining its root causes. This is also a testament of the significance and structuration of the human security-centred logic in the first stages of policy framing in the EU.

The EU’s application of human security logic in the diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis clearly defines migrants as the referent objects together with a plethora of interlinked physical and structural threats that affect their lives and wellbeing. In this vein, the EU actors visibly build on the notion of humanitarian crisis as an urgent situation that is caused by security factors external to the EU such as war, terrorism and poverty, but is also facilitated and escalated by trans-border criminal networks. In this type of humanitarian framing, the main source of insecurity is defined as the degraded security environment in the EU neighbourhood and the hazardous journey, often facilitated by exploitative criminal organisations that use violence as a part of their business model (Achilli, 2016, p. 99). This is the general outlook on the human security-based securitisation of the “migration crisis”. However, as indicated above, there are several interesting points that this type of framing brings into the discussion on securitisation of migration at the EU level.

Firstly, the EU has visibly attempted to distance itself from explicit ownership of the humanitarian framing of the crisis, introducing a sense of ambiguity in its naming. Even though the EU has acknowledged the “migration crisis” as a human tragedy, it has spent substantial discursive resources to frame its humanitarian elements as external to the Union. As noted by the European Parliament’s LIBE Committee member:

I was a co-rapporteur, or a shadow rapporteur, on two migration crisis-related resolutions. I must admit that even in the EP we had this aversion to the term refugee crisis. Why? Because Europe does not have humanitarian crises, not anymore. We have challenges; we have concerns and deficiencies – this is it. The moment you recognise that something horrible and humanitarian-related is happening within the borders you change the political game. You admit that you have lost control and this is something that we did not want to admit. We still don’t (European Parliament-1).

Consequently, the application of human security logic is most prominently visible in the framing of the events and aspects of the crisis that are situated outside the EU. This is particularly noticeable in the framing of the root causes of the crisis, which here represent the security-related push factors for those who flee from their communities of origin fearing for their lives and livelihoods. In this vein, the EU policy actors align with the EU migration-security continuum, building on the narrative of an unstable, underdeveloped and threatening external environment, in which humanitarian crises often proliferate, varying in scale and nature, but always distant from the EU. In this respect, one of the interviewees argued that:

The refugee crises have always been in the EU neighbourhood, but have never reached the EU shores. It was never an internal problem, for European police or border guard. What has

changed? The scale and efficiency of facilitated illegal migration has changed. This is what made it all different (European Commission-1).

Indeed, as indicated above, the EU policy framing has been placing migrant smuggling and trafficking at the centre of the securitisation process, explicitly building a narrative of violence and exploitation around their activities and modes of operations. Here, the trans-border criminal groups have been framed as the most severe and persistent threat to migrants' lives and wellbeing, often getting more attention than the human security-related root causes of the "migration crisis". Consequently, even though they are construed as facilitating factors, smugglers and traffickers have been deeply securitised within the human security logic and defined in terms of urgent security problems that affect the whole spectrum of migrants, especially those most vulnerable. This is also reflected in the material gathered from the interviews:

If I had to define one specific threat, security challenge to the EU it is the scale of trans-border organised crime and terrorism – both connected with exploiting migrants. I think that the humanitarian factor is a little bit responsible for that. The humanitarian imperative as they call it. We need to fight human smugglers to save lives. And we do it, but more in the shadows as intelligence providers and experts (Europol-1).

Legally yes, but practically there is often no difference between traffickers or smugglers. They both feed on human misery and desperation of migrants. Even though data on unaccompanied minors have been exaggerated by Timmermans and the issue of children at risk is much smaller than described, we still have a lot of groups, vulnerable groups that have been severely exploited by all kinds of people, not only smugglers but also corrupt law enforcement in Libya, Egypt, Turkey and so on. It is all a part of the same migration crisis business model (Council of the European Union-1).

As a result of this securitising move, the EU policy discourse has visibly moved towards a more humanitarian framing of vulnerable groups, specifically women and children, that have become defined as one of the main objects of violence and exploitation in migration-related situations. As discussed above, the growing numbers of arrivals of women and children into Europe have propelled the EU to refocus its attention on the vulnerable groups and adjust its policy responses according to their needs and the specificity of their situation.

Secondly, the EU application of the human security logic in the framing of the "migration crisis" is reflected in an acknowledgement of economic push factors, such as poverty and underdevelopment, that have largely contributed to increased and mixed migratory flows. In this vein, the framing of the referent objects broadens the spectrum of migrants at risk and includes economic migrants (next to refugees) among those who are threatened. This type of framing, however, does not necessarily refer to asylum procedures or secondary protection as in the case of refugees, but rather to measures related to saving lives outside the EU or from the hands of human smugglers and traffickers. As pointed out by one of the interviewees:

It is true that when we talk about saving lives of migrants we usually talk about saving them at sea, from exploitation by organised crime groups, or from terrible things that happen to them at their home countries. We tend to forget what is happening to them in Europe. They

are still exploited, they still experience hardship, and often their lives are still in danger (EASO-2).

In other words, the economic migrants’ lives are construed as referent objects, if they are directly threatened in their country of origin or during the journey. This is symptomatic for the EU policy actors and their application of human security logic. The EU tends to emphasise the misery and hardship of migrants, but only up to the point of the external EU borders. However, when they cross the EU borders the diagnosis of the nature of crisis and evaluation of its causal effects visibly shift towards the logic of risk.

Nonetheless, as often indicated in the securitisation literature, the application of human security logic carries certain risks of manipulation and opens the narrative to more security-oriented interpretations driven by “exceptionality” (Davitti, 2018; Squire et al., 2021; Watson, 2011). Indeed, the humanitarian framing applied in relation to increased migratory inflows does invoke a very specific language of emergency and crisis. It creates a powerful frame that produces a moment of exception, consequently dismantling certainties and normal narratives of mobility, sovereignty, social bonds and belonging (Carastathis et al., 2018, p. 31). The humanitarian emergency language makes the situation more difficult to govern. It limits the response options to spectacular and extraordinary interventions such as military missions, border operations and high-level politics which are supposed to bring order into situation which is “out of control” (Jeandesboz & Pallister-Wilkins, 2016, p. 317). In this sense, the language of humanitarian emergency can be misleading. It often discursively marginalises the normalised modes of governance and routines of control and care, which even in crisis situations tend to be intertwined with one another rather than exclusive (Jeandesboz & Pallister-Wilkins, 2016)

Another consequence of the language of humanitarian emergency, so prominently deployed by the EU and its member states, is the recategorisation of forced migration, refugeeism and asylum-seeking in the lines of exclusionary and securitised narratives. Holzberg et al.’s (2018, p. 547) research indicates that even in Germany during the rise of “welcome culture”, humanitarian responses were “contingent upon the rejection of those considered to be undeserving and threatening”. This type of framing leads to interpretation of broadly international protection and implementation of asylum policy as a “bitter pill” that has to be swallowed so that the “normal times” can return (Carastathis et al., 2018, p. 31).

### 5.3 Risk Management

Even though human security-centred security logic has attracted substantial attention from the EU policy actors, the concept of risk does not stand far behind. The logic of risk has gained visible levels of structuration, introducing a distinctive way of looking at different dimensions of the crisis, especially in regard to the EU internal security domain. As already discussed, risk-oriented logic has been guiding the

EU migration-security continuum since the beginnings of the securitisation of migration at the EU level. It has been reflected in the managerial approach to security, interpreting migratory flows as a disturbance that needs to be monitored, controlled and curbed. With respect to this type of logic, the EU has been focusing on protection of non-human referent objects, such as the Schengen zone, freedom of movement or effectiveness of the European asylum system. In this regard, there is a noticeable shift in the definition of risks and potential dangers. Increased proximity to the EU external borders propels managerial and border security framing of the crisis, turning “migrants at risk” into “risky migrants”, who put the internal security of the EU and its citizens in jeopardy.

### ***5.3.1 Naming and Categorising the Risk-Oriented Features of the “Migration Crisis”***

The European Commission, as a traditional leading sponsor of risk management in the EU, has been setting the pace and tone for the rest of the EU actors, mainly the Council and the European Council, for the risk-centred framing of the crisis. As already discussed in this book, the Commission has already been at the centre of the managerial approach towards migration in the EU, driven by technocratic and surveillance-oriented security policies (Kaunert et al., 2014; van Munster, 2009). Such an approach has allowed the Commission to increase its relevance within the EU internal security domain, often building on the ambiguity and flexibility of risk logic in its diagnosis and evaluation of migration and security-related issues. To this end, the Commission, with the support of other EU institutions, has been introducing a specific type of naming and categorising in regard to the crisis, framing increased migratory flows as a technical problem, solvable predominantly at the EU level and with the EU’s policies and resources.

The risk-oriented naming of the “migration crisis” is rather descriptive and frames the crisis in terms of high-intensity and large-scale occurrences, disruptions or challenges to the EU. In this respect, the crisis is commonly referred to as “unprecedented migratory flows into Europe” (European Council, 2015b) “growing flows of illegal migration” (European Council, 2015a), “alleviated migratory pressures” (European Commission, 2015c), “unprecedented irregular border traffic” (European Commission, 2016a), or a “migratory challenge for Europe” (European Commission, 2017e), to name a few. This type of naming is visibly detached from the humanitarian and human-centred aspects of the crisis, explicitly centring on irregular migration and insufficient control over EU external borders and population movements. In this fashion, the humanitarian “refugee crisis” becomes a technical “irregular immigration crisis”.

The naming is often followed by an action verb placing the migratory flows in the category of a “manageable problem”. Here, the European Commission, often followed by the European Council and the Council of the European Union,

specifically focuses on the management of flows on the EU borders, calling for increased technological resources, funds and security prerogatives that would help: “stemming” (European Commission, 2016c, d, 2017h, g), “managing” (European Commission, 2016e, 2017c, e), “containing” (European Council, 2015a), “decreasing” (Council of the European Union, 2016a; European Commission, 2016a, 2017i), “mitigating” (European Commission, 2015c, f), or “controlling” (Council of the European Union, 2015e; European Commission, 2016b, 2017g) migration-related structural pressures (European Parliament, 2015c; Council of the European Union, 2015b). This type of framing assigns agency to the EU, which visibly attempts to take the initiative and quickly mitigate the negative consequences of the crisis.

The risk-driven framing reveals a different diagnosis of the crisis, not so much oriented to the external security environment, human tragedy and saving lives, but to diverting and pushing back its negative consequences from the EU internal security environment. In this regard, the EU policy discourse visibly emphasises two specific features. Firstly, the nature of the crisis is construed as a problem internal to the EU, managerial and revolving around “significant structural weaknesses and shortcomings in the design and implementation of European asylum and migration policy, which the crisis has exposed” (European Commission, 2016c, p. 2). In this sense, at the core of the crisis lies the EU’s (in-)ability to control its borders and manage migration, or rather its ability to regain this control for the benefit of the security and free movement of all migrants working and living in the EU (European Commission, 2015g, p. 4). Secondly, this nature of the crisis is specifically connected to the irregular migratory flows, terrorism and organised crime, which in this case are considered as a matter of both the internal and the external security of the EU. As indicated in the European Council conclusions, “a key element of a sustainable migration policy is to ensure effective control of our external border and stem illegal flows into the EU” (European Council, 2017d, p. 1). The European Commission has been reiterating this interpretation, additionally noting that “[t]he European Agendas on Security and on Migration have set the direction for the development and implementation of EU policy to address the parallel challenges of migration management and the fight against terrorism and organised crime” (European Commission, 2016b, p. 2).

### ***5.3.2 Defining Non-human Referent Objects***

The risk-centred EU policy discourse explicitly defines the Schengen zone and mobility in the EU as the main referent objects (Council of the European Union, 2016c; European Commission, 2016a, b). Here, freedom of movement (Council of the European Union, 2015g; European Commission, 2018a; European Parliament, 2016d, 2017a) and “Europe without borders” (European Commission, 2015a, c, d) are viewed as the pillars of European integration and some of the most important accomplishments of the EU member states. As indicated in the 2015 State of the Union and European Commission’s Communication on “Back to Schengen”:

(...) we have given up border controls between the Member States of the Schengen area, to guarantee free movement of people, a unique symbol of European integration. But the other side of the coin to free movement is that we must work together more closely to manage and protect our external borders. This is what our citizens expect (European Commission, 2015g, p. 5).

Schengen is one of the major achievements of European integration. The creation of an internal area without borders where persons and goods can circulate freely has brought important benefits to European citizens and business alike. Schengen is one of the key means through which European citizens can exercise their freedoms, and the internal market can prosper and develop (European Commission, 2016a, p. 2).

This type of framing has been reiterated on numerous occasions, with emphasis on the role and value of the Schengen zone and internal mobility within the EU as deeply linked to European integration and the wellbeing of the EU citizens. In this respect, the European Commission has been especially active in connecting border control and migration with the future of Europe, placing security and mobility at the centre of the framing process, clearly indicating that Europe is a mobile society and secure mobility is inherent to the European Union (European Commission, 2016a, p. 1, see also: 2018b).

The prominence of risk and the managerial approach has increased along with the progression of the “migration crisis”. In late 2016 and 2017, when the presence of migrants was more visible on continental Europe, the human referent object was marginalised and gradually substituted with the call for protection of the Schengen zone and EU freedoms (Council of the European Union, 2016a, 2017c; European Council, 2017c; European Commission, 2017a; European Parliament, 2017a). As stated in the European Council conclusions on the management of migration, “the objective must be to rapidly stem the flows, manage our external borders, reduce illegal migration in order to safeguard the integrity of the Schengen area” (European Council, 2016a, p. 1). By putting the Schengen zone, borders and European territories at the centre of the framing process, the EU policy actors indicate that the real stake of the crisis is the efficiency of the European project and the basic functionality of the EU’s internal security systems (Niemann & Zaun, 2018, pp. 5–6). This type of framing opens the securitisation process to a more “exceptionalist” logic, touching upon basic, or even existential elements of the EU, such as stability and continuation of the European project. I will discuss this framing thread later on in this chapter.

### 5.3.3 *Conceptualising Risks*

While human security-centred logic places the root causes and threats predominantly outside of EU borders, connecting them to push factors such as the degraded security environment and poverty, the risk management logic situates the causes of the crisis much closer to its territories, focusing primarily on the pull factors. Pull factors are framed as structural deficiencies of the EU external borders and criminal

activities that facilitate increased irregular migratory flows. As indicated by the European Commission:

Beyond regular travel flows, in 2015 alone, conflict in Syria and crises elsewhere triggered 1.8 million irregular border crossings at Europe’s external borders. This is the central problem. EU citizens expect external border controls on persons to be effective, to allow effective management of migration and to contribute to our internal security (European Commission, 2016b, p. 2).

In the EU policy discourse, the application of risk logic visibly shifts the centre of gravity for interpretation of the “migration crisis” and puts it within the EU territorial and socio-political structures. It moves security thinking away from distant turmoil and humanitarian crises and focuses it on the EU external borders and the internal security environment, which are put at risk as a consequence of increased and uncontrolled migratory pressures. In this respect, the application of risk logic begins on the EU borders, the moment when migratory flows reach the EU territories and become a different type of security problem – predisposed to generating high levels of risks and uncertainties. As in the case of human security logic, the framing of the causes of the crisis is closely interlinked with framing of threats, or rather risks, to referent objects. In this regard, the EU policy actors have been focusing on three distinctive risk-generating issues: (1) criminal groups facilitating the crisis and “pulling” migrants to the EU; (2) irregular migrants decreasing the efficiency of the asylum system (3) and terrorism-related mobility generating risks to internal security of the EU.

As risk management logic frames the “migration crisis” as a problem of irregular migration, it naturally defines trans-border criminal organisations facilitating irregular migration as one of the key causal effects. In this respect, the EU Agenda on Security describes trans-border organised crime as one the most challenging and severe threats to EU internal security, linking it with facilitation of “migration crisis”, terrorism and cybercrime:

(...) serious and organised cross-border crime is finding new avenues to operate, and new ways to escape detection. There are huge human, social and economic costs – from crimes such as trafficking in human beings, trade in firearms, drug smuggling, and financial, economic and environmental crime. Organised crime groups involved in the smuggling of migrants exploit the vulnerabilities of people seeking protection or better economic opportunities and are responsible for the loss of lives in the name of profit. Organised crime also feeds terrorism and cybercrime through channels like the supply of weapons, financing through drug smuggling, and the infiltration of financial markets (European Commission, 2015d, p. 12).

In the case of the “migration crisis”, trans-border organised crime is not only responsible for putting the refugees and economic migrants at risk, but also fuelling the crisis by exploiting the structural deficiencies of the EU borders and making irregular crossings an attractive form of migration. It simultaneously feeds on and drives the “migration crisis”. As repeatedly indicated by the European Commission:

Irregular crossing of borders threatens security and fuels the crisis. Effective management of borders and fight against organised crime responsible for migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings are essential. It is therefore of utmost importance to step up our

joint efforts aimed at establishing comprehensive border management (Council of the European Union, 2015f, art. 3).

Action to fight criminal networks of smugglers and traffickers is first and foremost a way to prevent the exploitation of migrants by criminal networks and to stem uncontrolled irregular migratory flows into Europe. (...) The goal must be to transform smuggling networks from ‘low risk, high return’ operations for criminals into ‘high risk, low return’ one (European Commission, 2015c, p. 8).

The second group of risks (i.e. irregular migrants) has been systematically framed in EU policy discourse as an obstructive security nuisance that reduces the effectiveness and integrity of the EU asylum and border protection systems (Council of the European Union, 2016b; European Commission, 2015b). Here, the irregularity of migration is commonly linked to economic migrants, who upon their arrival in the EU undergo reframing – from referent objects fleeing extreme poverty and underdevelopment, to a security problem that needs to be managed, processed, and returned to their place of origin as soon as possible (European Commission, 2016c; European Parliament, 2015f). In the course of the “migration crisis”, the EU has visibly strengthened its position on irregular migration, emphasising its “disorderly” (European Commission, 2016c) or “uncontrollable” (European Commission, 2017g) aspects and even framing it as an issue that European citizens need to be protected from. As stated by Donald Tusk after the European Council meeting in June 2017, “Last year we agreed that the EU will protect our people against security threats, illegal migration, and uncontrolled globalisation, and we must continue to deliver” (European Council, 2017b, p. 1). This stance reiterates the position of the European Commission, according to which:

Migration has been and will continue to be one of the defining issues for Europe for the coming decades. (...) We need to stem disorderly irregular migration flows, protect our external borders and safeguard the integrity of the Schengen area (European Commission, 2016c, p. 1).

Building on this type of narrative, the EU policy discourse has been employing a well-known frame of irregular migrants, posing risks to refugees and legal migrants and obstructing legal pathways of migration and efficient implementation of the EU asylum system. The European Commission has been actively strengthening this framing, underlining that:

the EU must continue to offer protection to those in need (...), but by the same token, the EU needs to draw the consequences when migrants do not meet the criteria to stay. Unsuccessful asylum claimants who try to avoid return, visa overstayers, and migrants living in a permanent state of irregularity constitute a serious problem. This corrodes confidence in the system. It offers strong arguments for those looking to criticise or stigmatise migration. It makes it harder to integrate those migrants staying in the EU as of right (European Commission, 2015c, p. 7).

In this regard, the EU policy actors have been increasingly framing ineffective policies on irregular migration as a major security deficiency and a pull factor increasing facilitated irregular migratory flows (Council of the European Union, 2014, 2015a; European Commission, 2016c). The EU policy discourse noticeably

reflects a stricter and more security-driven approach to migration in the EU, aimed at deterring potential irregular migrants

(...) from trying to reach the EU by using smugglers’ services, it has to be made clear to them that they will be returned swiftly to their home countries if they have no right to stay in the EU legally. For the moment, smuggling networks exploit the fact that relatively few return decisions are enforced to attract migrants (39.2% of return decisions were carried out in 2013) (European Commission, 2015b, p. 7).

The third group of risks pertains to terrorism and its effect on increased migratory flows. Here, the EU policy discourse centres predominantly on jihadist and religion-driven terrorism,<sup>5</sup> making rather marginal note of domestic right-wing radicals who have been gaining support and influence on the wave of anti-refugee and anti-migrant resentments in Europe (Ragazzi, 2016, p. 14). It should be highlighted that the EU policy actors, most notably the Commission, the Council and the European Council, do not directly frame terrorism as a causal effect of the crisis and explicitly avoid making any associations between refugees and jihadist terrorism. They do, however, extensively apply a risk-oriented approach pointing towards terrorism-related concerns, risks and possibilities, while connecting them with uncontrolled migratory flows into the EU (European Commission, 2015d, p. 2, 2016b, p. 3). In regard to this risk-centred evaluation of the crisis, two major security concerns, or security causal effects, stand out and link the “migration crisis” to the problem of terrorism, namely uncontrolled irregular migration and radicalisation.

The 2015 Paris attacks have proved to be a turning point for more decisive framing of terrorism in relation to the “migration crisis” (Council of the European Union, 2015a, 2016d; European Commission, 2016b; European Council, 2015c). Here, the EU policy discourse reflects a concern that the uncontrolled migratory inflows have been used and may be used in the future by terrorist groups to penetrate EU borders for the purposes of radicalisation, recruitment and perpetration of violent acts on the EU territories (Council of the European Union, 2017b; European Commission, 2017f; European Parliament, 2017a; European Union, 2017). As indicated by a Europol’s official during hearings in the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament:

The influx of refugees and migrants to Europe from existing and new conflict zones is expected to continue. Islamic State has already exploited the flow of refugees and migrants to send individuals to Europe to commit acts of terrorism, which became evident in the 2015 Paris attacks. Islamic State and possibly other jihadist terrorist organisations may continue to do so (LIBE, 2016; see also: Europol, 2017, p. 6).

Europe faces many complex security challenges at the moment, including at the external border of the EU where high migratory pressures are exploited by criminal organisations.

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<sup>5</sup> Jihadist terrorist attacks have increased over the course of the crisis, from 4 in 2014, 17 in 2015, and 13 in 2016 (Europol, 2017). EU member states’ law enforcement agencies also increased arrests of suspects related to jihadist terrorism from 395 in 2014, 687 in 2015 and 718 in 2016 (Europol, 2017).

Although seen on a much less frequent scale suspected terrorists also use these channels to move in and out of Europe. Combating these movements is already a top priority for the EU and the Member States (LIBE, 2015).

In this respect, the possibility of terrorist entry into Europe is framed as a problem of uncontrolled mobility and insufficient border management, which makes it impossible to stop and/or track risky movements out and into the EU territories (European Commission, 2016b). One of the more prominent aspects of this type of framing is the explicit inclusion of radicalised EU citizens into the pool of “mobile jihadist terrorists”, distinctively placing the problem of terrorist mobility on the internal-external security axis. In this regard, the European Commission has been quite explicitly pointing towards the issue of foreign fighters and the need for strengthening the filtering function of the EU external borders:

EU citizens are known to have crossed the external border to travel to conflict zones for terrorist purposes and pose a risk upon their return. There is also evidence that terrorists have used routes of irregular migration to enter the EU and then moved within the Schengen area undetected. These elements brought into sharper focus the need to join up and strengthen the EU’s border management, migration and security cooperation frameworks and information tools in a comprehensive manner (European Commission, 2016b, p. 2).

Extremist propaganda has been shown to lead foreign terrorist fighters from Europe to travel abroad to train, fight and commit atrocities in combat zones, and to threaten the internal security of the EU on their return (European Commission, 2015d, p. 14).

The EU policy discourse also reflects risks related to radicalisation (Council of the European Union, 2017b; European Union, 2017). In this type of framing, irregular and mostly economic migrants are defined as prone to indoctrination and exploitation by jihadist recruiters who feed on their poor socio-economic and precarious status in the EU (Council of the European Union, 2017b; European Parliament, 2017b). As indicated by Europol and also repeated during LIBE Committee hearing on terrorism and organised crime:

Terrorist groups continue to exploit the socio-economic grievances of Muslim immigrants to the EU, in order to recruit and incite them to engage in terrorist activities. Islamic State’s ideology has a certain appeal amongst segments of the Muslim population in the EU, sometimes expressing admiration for “martyrdom”. Motivations may generally include a belief that Islam is under attack from the West (LIBE, 2017; see also: Europol, 2017, p. 7).

Similar concerns have been voiced in relation to European reception facilities and conditions, which have been often descried in the EU discourse as “unsatisfactory” (European Parliament, 2017a) “inadequate” (European Parliament, 2016e) and failing to meet the EU security and humanitarian standards (European Commission, 2016e, 2017h).

### 5.3.4 *Comments*

The analysis of EU policy discourse, as presented above, indicates that risk management logic has deeply saturated the framing of the “migration crisis”. Here, the framing of the crisis is centred on the disruptive impact of increased migratory flows on the Schengen zone, EU borders and the European system of migration control and asylum. Such an application of risk management logic visibly shifts the point of reference for the framing process, placing it within the EU and on its border. In regard to risk-oriented logic, the “migration crisis” is described as a manageable problem, a migratory flow, influx, or pressure that can be dealt with properly adjusted policy tools and technologies of control. At the same, the crisis generates risks to the EU internal security domain, revealing and feeding on its deficiencies, creating opportunities for its further degradation. As already noted, this type of framing is not new to the EU and is well-placed within the EU migration-security continuum. However, in the case of the “migration crisis” there are several important points that should be discussed in more detail.

Firstly, the application of risk-oriented logic visibly de-escalates the urgency levels of the crisis, moving it to a more mundane realm of management, surveillance and control. This is typical for this type of framing, as application of management is problematic in a situation of “panic politics”. Managing risks requires a certain sense of stability that allows to continue and adjust “normal security politics and practices” that are necessary to normalise the situation, in this case the “migration crisis”. The interviewees, specifically those representing the AFSJ agencies, agreed that:

Nothing that has been happening around the crisis is completely new. The new mandate of Frontex has been on the agenda for some time now, the EU wanted to strengthen Europol’s anti-smuggling intelligence units and EASO has to change its mandate, because right now it is not even a fully-fledged agency. This is all, to some extent, a part of a normal institutional process (Frontex-3).

This crisis is really about a multisystem failure of the migration, asylum and border control. Look how many different policies, regulations and legal orders we have here. We do not have one specific problem or a security issue, it is a networked problem with different facets and dimensions. I hate when someone asks me what this crisis is about. Is it humanitarian or security? It is neither, it is both. We have a lot of holes in this European ship of ours and we should stop deliberating over the nature of those holes and start fixing them, all of them, otherwise we sink (Europol-2).

Indeed, the EU policy discourse does not define one ultimate referent object, as in the case of human security-centred logic, but instead points to a set of dispersed yet interconnected objects, such as the Schengen zone, the EU borders or asylum and migration policies. The common denominator for all these referent objects is control, which here can be defined as an overarching referent object that the EU strives to protect, maintain and exercise. As observed by one of the interviewees:

This crisis is not about refugees, Syrians, Iraqis, or what have you – we can deal with them. It is about irregular migrants who day in day out test our ability, as a Union, to withhold

constant migratory pressures in the situation of extreme structural deficiencies. Look at the Greek sea borders, it is impossible control them in such a situation. There is no border right now, we are playing hide and seek on the high seas, with fingers crossed that we do not die and they [irregular migrants] do not die in this very risky and tragic game (Frontex-2).

Indeed, in the risk-oriented framing, the element of “losing control” over parts of the EU external borders and consequently human mobility is construed as one of the most significant causal effects of the crisis. As a result, every element that contributes to this effect is defined as a risk, or a security concern potentially affecting the EU internal security order. Here, the issue of facilitated irregular migration, along with the clients and the perpetrators of this crime, seems to play a central role in the EU framing of the crisis. As already noted, the risk-oriented framing of irregular migrants is not specifically out of character for the EU and is in line with the EU migration-security continuum. Consequently, the massive influx of migrants into the EU is described as a serious structural problem that decreases the efficiency of the EU asylum system and obstructs the processing of those who are in “real” need of protection, namely refugees.

Even though irregular migrants play an important role in risk-oriented framing of the “migration crisis”, it is trans-border organised crime, primarily human smugglers and traffickers, that is defined as a key pull factor. In this respect, the EU policy discourse prominently reflects the destructive and obstructive role of organised crime, attributing to it the majority of the blame for creating conditions for the progression and further escalation of the “migration crisis”. As noted by one of the interviewees:

It might not be popular what I am going to say right now, but refugee crises have always been present in the EU neighbourhood. It is nothing new really. I would not say that Assad or ISIS caused this refugee crisis in Europe. It is the smugglers that have created this bridge to Europe and brought the crisis to our doorsteps (Europol-3).

Thus, in the EU policy discourse, this “bridge” between the uncertain and threat-ridden external security environment and EU internal security has become one of the most important security concerns. It is linked with increased risks of terrorist mobility and activity in the EU and consequent radicalisation of the refugee and migrant groups arriving to and living in the EU territories.

## 5.4 “Exceptionalist” Security

In the EU, the “exceptionalist” logic of security has not reached significant levels of structuration in the diagnosis and evaluation segments of the framing process. Thus, it cannot be treated as separate strand within the frame-narrative, setting a distinctive and coherent tone for diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis. In contrast to certain member states’ political and media discourse, the EU policy actors have been refraining from the traditional path of securitisation of migration and explicit diagnosis of the crisis in terms existential dangers to the European Union. Nonetheless,

this does not mean that the EU policy discourse on the “migration crisis” is completely free from the “exceptionalist” security logic.

The elements of militaristic language, the sense of extreme urgency and state-related definition of the referent object is still present in the EU’s framing of the crisis. It manifests not as a separate logic, but rather intertwines with human security- and risk-centred interpretations in different aspects of diagnosis and evaluation. As in the case of the previous logics, “exceptionalist” security has its key sponsors within the EU policy discourse, namely the Council of the European Union and the European Council. This is not surprising, as the Council is often described as a “guardian of national security”, exercising often strong militaristic and Realpolitik-driven approach to framing and conceptualisation of threats within and outside the EU borders (Maricut, 2017, p. 166). After all, both Councils are comprised of government officials who traditionally promote an intergovernmental and state-centred approach to security (Hampshire, 2016). In this regard, the Councils traditionally have sponsored a strong security-centred approach to migration and border policies, correlating it with public safety, the need of control over borders and EU territory, as well as stability of the Union as a whole (van Munster, 2009, pp. 59–63). In this sub-chapter, I will discuss how “exceptionalist” security logic has seeped into the human security-centred and risk-oriented framing of the nature and causal effects of the “migration crisis”.

### ***5.4.1 Human Security – “Exceptionalist” Security***

As already noted, the human security-oriented framing of the crisis puts the migrant’s life at the centre of the problem, defining it as the value that requires protection from a long list of pervasive threats such as war, terrorism, criminal exploitation, extreme poverty or underdevelopment, to name a few. In the EU’s diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis, this specific type framing intertwines with a more “exceptionalist” outlook on security, building on common elements of exceptionality and externality of existential and brutal threats to referent objects.

Firstly, as in the case of “exceptionalist” security logic, the human security framing imbues the “migration crisis” with a sense of urgency, centring it on the “humanitarian imperative” and “human tragedy” or “humanitarian disaster” that is happening in the EU neighbourhood and on the EU borders. It proposes an unambiguous definition of the human referent objects (i.e. “friends”) and existential threats (i.e. “enemies”) that have to be addressed decisively in order to protect the migrant’s life. In this vein, the brutality and severity of threats, defined as war, terrorism, and crime networks, create an imperative for application of extraordinary security measures that in such a situation are capable of protecting migrants. It could be argued that even though human security logic does not directly securitise migrants, it creates a very specific security framework around them, implicitly placing them within the realm of “exceptionalist” security permeated with urgency,

unambiguity, existential threats and an imperative for the application of extraordinary, often militarised, measures.

Secondly, the humanitarian framing of the “migration crisis” has coincided with “exceptionalist” security logic in the diagnosis of the root causes, specifically in regard to identification and location of existential threats to migrants. Here, the EU constructs its humanitarian perspective by focusing explicitly on threats that originate outside its socio-political and territorial domains. In this respect, the blame is commonly attributed to external actors and phenomena, which according to the EU policy discourse hold the sole responsibility for the outburst of the “migration crisis”. In this vein, the EU neighbourhood is most often defined as the source of the migratory problems, and described as in extreme turmoil, overridden with conflict, terrorism, and crime, all of which pose existential threats to migrants during their hazardous journey to Europe.

### ***5.4.2 Risk Management – “Exceptionalist” Security***

As discussed above, risk-driven diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis proposes a distinctive framing of increased migratory flows, describing them as having significant potential for decreasing the structural efficiency of the EU internal security system, consequently jeopardising the stability and controllability of the Schengen zone, freedom of movement, and external borders of the EU. In this respect, the application of risk logic locates the security problem within the internal security domain and defines it in terms of risks and security concerns, rather than direct threats. On the face of it, such a framing seems very distant from “exceptionalist” security thinking; nonetheless, there are traces of traditional securitisation logic in the risk-oriented framing of the crisis. This mesh of logics is most pronounced in the definition of the referent objects (e.g. the EU external borders and the Schengen zone) and the framing of the organised crime, which in the course of the crisis has arisen as an exceptional security problem for the EU.

The risk-driven definition of referent objects tends to include indications to state-like features of the EU such as territory and external borders, which require “safeguarding” (European Commission, 2016a, p. 12; European Council, 2015b, p. 4; European Parliament, 2016f, p. 2), “protecting” (Council of the European Union, 2016c, p. 22; European Commission, 2016a, p. 2; European Parliament, 2016f, p. 9) or “defending” from disturbing effects of the “migration crisis” (Council of the European Union, 2015l, p. 1–2; European Commission, 2016e, p. 17). In this respect, the European Council, has proved to be the most vocal promoter of “exceptionalist” logic in the EU policy discourse. In official remarks, customarily delivered after the European Council meetings, the President of the European Council has been applying the militaristic and urgent language connecting the need of regaining control over external borders with the survival of the Schengen zone and even the EU as a whole:

I will repeat this again: without control on our external borders, Schengen will become history (Council of the European Union, 2015c, p. 1).

Let there be no doubt: the future of Schengen is at stake and time is running out (European Council, 2015e, p. 1).

Yesterday’s discussion on migration confirmed the hierarchy of our aims, where protecting our territory, protecting our external borders as well as stemming illegal migration come first (Council of the European Union, 2017d, p. 1).

Another issue where the logic of exceptionality intertwines with risk management is organised crime. The problem of organised crime has been placed very high on the EU security agenda, playing an important role in both the human security and risk-oriented framings of the crisis. In this respect, organised crime has been construed as one of the main “enemies” of European integration, a direct threat to EU citizens and their freedoms as well as to migrants. Building on this narrative, the EU has been applying militaristic language, expressing the need for “combating” (Council of the European Union, 2016b), “eradicating” (European Union, 2017), or “fighting against” organised crime, most notably human smugglers and traffickers (European Commission, 2015b, f). As indicated in the Valetta Political Declaration:

We undertake to scale up our joint efforts in preventing and fighting migrant smuggling, eradicating trafficking in human beings and combatting those who exploit vulnerable people, both in Europe and in Africa. Trafficking in human beings, including for the purpose of sexual exploitation and forced labour is a serious crime and an unacceptable infringement of fundamental human rights. We will strengthen the fight against organised criminal networks, including their links to terrorism, through effective border management, enhanced cooperation and the implementation of the relevant legal and institutional frameworks (European Council, 2015f, p. 3).

The European Council reiterated this position, clearly stating that “we [the EU] must prove that we can defend Europe against organised crime and those who want to abuse our openness” (European Council, 2017b, p. 1). This type of language and militaristic narrative towards organised crime has been present in the EU migration-security continuum but has reached significantly higher levels of structuration with the framing of the “migration crisis”.

### 5.4.3 *Comments*

“Exceptionalist” security logic, though residual, exists in the EU policy discourse on the “migration crisis”, manifesting itself in different parts of diagnosis and evaluation. It does not necessarily disrupt the dominant logics of human security and risk management, but rather increases a sense of urgency and emphasises the imperative for action – often of an extraordinary nature. As noted by one of the interviewees:

We have become even more territorial with this crisis. Every time we talk about protecting our borders, putting more armed men on the checkpoints, erecting walls, I think that this migration crisis is getting more and more militarised. I have been on Parliamentary delegation on Evros and in Bulgaria very recently and there is a lot of military or military-like

activity going on there. I am not sure if it is the right direction, but this is how we face this purportedly humanitarian problem – with men in uniforms and guns (EP-1).

The elements of “exceptionalist” security logic can be observed in the example of the framing of organised crime and evaluation of its role in the “migration crisis”. Trans-border organised crime has been widely framed in the EU policy discourse as one of the most severe and urgent security issues that affect a plethora of referent objects ranging from migrants, European citizens to security of EU external borders. At same time it feeds on and fuels EU security deficiencies, becoming the key facilitator of the crisis. As noticed by one Europol official and the EP-2:

Organised crime can be linked to everything from illegal immigration to terrorist attacks. It is a security nightmare, really, and you cannot just get rid of it. Today, the problem is not as much about existence of organised crime, because they are here to stay, but their business model that feeds on our security deficiencies and fuels our security problems. For example, organised crime makes money on the migration crisis and uses this money to finance terrorism. Our first and foremost security concern should be about breaking this model (Europol-3).

There has never been so much attention paid to trans-border organised crime as there is today. I sit on the special committee on terrorism and even there we talk about a lot about organised crime, human smuggling, trafficking and radicalisation in the refugee camps. It all revolves around organised crime. It connects many dots and is a big problem in Europe and outside Europe. A good example is corruption among law enforcement officers. It is organised crime that corrupts them and pays them. We need to eradicate it, but for that we need to work together, as a Union and as global security actor (European Parliament-2).

## 5.5 Conclusion

Framing of a policy-relevant problem is a complex and messy process, imbued with many different logics and approaches reflected in a plethora of potential interpretations that struggle, correspond, and intertwine in the inter-subjective contestation of the problem’s specific nature, causal effects and remedial actions (Schön & Rein, 1991, p. 23). The aim of the “securitisation as the work of framing” approach is to flesh out these different logics and types of security thinking applied in the collective framing of issues and phenomena that potentially yield security implications for the socially valued objects. In this sub-chapter, I presented an overview of the first two components of the securitising frame-narrative produced in response to the “migration crisis”, namely diagnosis and evaluation. These two elements, though conceptually separate, constitute a very closely interlinked interpretative space, which prepares the background for remedial action by providing the definition of the nature of the problem, root causes and security implications, threats, and attribution of blame.

The analysis of the EU’s diagnostic and evaluation scheme indicates that securitisation of the “migration crisis” is interwoven with different strands of security logics that “emplot” or wrap the EU frame-narrative, unravelling the existence of a

complex and dynamic interpretation. In this respect, the analysis unveils dominant security logics that have been applied in the diagnosis and evaluation of the “migration crisis”, namely human security and risk management – both containing traces of “exceptionalist” security thinking. Even though these logics drive two distinctive types of framings and build on different features and causal effects, they still co-exist in the EU frame-narrative, overlapping and intertwining in the policy framing process.

Human security and risk management logics, being part of the same frame-narrative, place the “migration crisis” on the internal-external security axis, revealing the dynamic nature of both the crisis as well as the framing process. The human security logic is centred on the security of all migrants who embark on the journey to the EU, fleeing from pervasive threats and structural violence. This type of logic has a very strong externalising effect, placing the “migration crisis” and its main security features outside the EU and its socio-political and territorial domain. Here, the core security issues do not stem from the migrants, but hazardous migration, affected by external security environment proliferated with dangers, such as organised crime of terrorism. The human security framing, though reaching highest levels of structuration, has proved to be limited in two significant aspects. The first limitation refers to the factor of time and normalisation of the humanitarian interpretation in the EU policy discourse regime. With the progression of the crisis, the EU policy actors, except for the Parliament, have been gradually deemphasising the humanitarian features of the crisis, acknowledging their importance, but rather as a matter of courteous reference than strong support. The second limitation refers to the spatial dimension of the human security-oriented interpretation of the crisis. The humanitarian framing ends at the EU external borders and gives a way to a risk-oriented and managerial approach to security.

The EU external borders represent an important symbolic and physical space, where the two logics most extensively interact and intertwine in their framing of the central security concerns and referent objects. Upon contact with the EU borders, migrants are effectively stripped of their protective status and reframed as risks to security. Consequently, the salience of the humanitarian narrative is downplayed when confronted with the EU borders and replaced with the referent object defined as control over migration and the Schengen zone. This shift in framing of the referent object introduces tension into the EU frame-narrative, particularly in relation to the definition of the root causes and framing of migrants. While human security logic promotes an inclusive approach to migrants requiring protection, the risk-oriented interpretation clearly recognises the mixed character of inflows, differentiating irregular migrants into “desirable asylum seekers” who deserve protection and “undesirable economic migrants” who are a security nuisance. This tension has visible effect on conceptualisation of remedial actions segment of the EU frame narrative. The EU borders also reflect some important points of convergence for both logics. In the diagnostic and evaluation segments of the EU frame-narrative, trans-border organised crime constitutes a significant element for both logics. In both types of framing, organised crime is recognised as a severe security problem in relation to both referent objects, be it migrants (human security) or control over

border and migration (risk management). Organised crime also represents the point, where “exceptionalist” security thinking seeps into the EU frame-narrative, being imbued with a sense of severity and urgency and linked with other major security concerns such as terrorism.

What has been omitted in the diagnostic and evaluation segments of the EU frame-narrative is the logic of resilience. The lack of this logic in the initial stages of the framing process comes as a surprise, as it has been commonly defined in the EU studies literature as one of the newest leitmotifs in EU security policymaking (Wagner & Anholt, 2016). Being the cornerstone of the new EU global strategy, it explicitly tackles the problem of recurring migration-related risks and threats such as an unstable neighbourhood, refugee crises, terrorism and poverty, all of which have been flagged by the EU in the framing of the crisis (European Commission, 2016d, pp. 27–30). In this vein, resilience would seem like a natural fit for the diagnosis and evaluation of the “migration crisis”. Its omission could be influenced by three factors. Firstly, the prominence and framing power of risk management logic in the EU migration-security continuum has deeply impacted the interpretation of the crisis, leaving little space for other risk-oriented logics. Secondly, the framing of the crisis has been more reactive, focusing on regaining control over migration and the EU external borders and managing the situation, rather than preparing for the inevitable cycles of migratory pressures. Thirdly, when the EU Global Strategy was introduced in 2016, resilience became much more influential in the EU in the later stages of the crisis, having more impact on the conceptualisation of remedial actions.

The diagnostic and evaluation segments of the frame-narrative address the questions of “what are we dealing with?” and constitute the interpretative grounds for conceptualisation of policy responses that are most suitable for a specific category of problems at hand. In reference to the “migration crisis”, the policy actors have introduced two dominant diagnostic and evaluation framings, namely human security and risk management oriented. They represent two distinctive strands of security framing that have reached discourse structuration and have significant chances for institutionalisation within the last segment of the frame-narrative, namely conceptualisation of remedial action. In the next chapter, I discuss how these logics, along with their specific interpretations of referent objects, categorisation of threats and evaluation of causal effects translated into specific EU policies mobilised in response to the “migration crisis”.

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# Chapter 6

## Analysing the Conceptualisation of Remedial Actions Towards the “Migration Crisis” at the EU Level



### 6.1 Introduction

The collective conceptualisation of remedial action constitutes the concluding part of the frame-narrative. It represents the institutionalisation of specific interpretations, making them a part of the security practice framework. In this respect, remedial action is supposed to be the culmination of the interpretative process and a natural and logical extension of specific security logics that informed the tasks and objectives set out in the diagnostic and evaluation segments. This, however, is not always the case. Conceptualisation of remedial action often proves to be most complex, ambiguous, and confusing part of frame-narrative (Schön & Rein, 1991; van Hulst & Yanow, 2016). It commonly becomes a forum for tensions between security logics, be it those which have already reached structuration in the diagnosis and evaluation or new interpretations that have entered the stage in the last moment (Boas & Rothe, 2016). In this sense, the remedial action phase may follow the interpretative path that has already been set up, but also include a change of internal dynamics of the frame-narrative, downgrading, emphasising specific logics, or even completely diverting from the diagnosis and evaluation, introducing ambiguities and incoherencies into the framing process (Dekker, 2017, p. 130).

As outlined in the previous chapter, the EU policy actors have diagnosed and evaluated the “migration crisis” following predominantly human security and risk management logics, both containing traces of “exceptionalist” security. The remedial action segment has proved to be a game changer in terms of application of these security logics, reshuffling their prominence and revealing their tangled nature. While risk management has sustained its prominence in the conceptualisation of remedial actions, the human security-centred interpretations of the crisis have become deemphasised into a secondary or supporting logic. Instead of focusing predominantly on humanitarian aspects of the crisis, the EU policy actors have been explicitly promoting the risk-oriented measures, emphasising the risk management approach and introducing the concept of resilience into the EU frame-narrative.

This is not to say that human security-centred logic has been lost in the EU’s conceptualisation of remedial actions, but it has been rather dispersed between resilience- and “exceptionalist” security-centred measures, acting as a legitimising element rather than a guiding rationale. In this respect, the EU measures such as naval and border operations (“exceptionalist” security), as well as capacity-building operations and trust funds (resilience) have been framed as instruments of humanitarian relief and development aid designed specifically to target the root causes and alleviate human suffering. In this respect, resilience as a new addition to the frame-narrative proves to be an interesting case of intersection between the security of migrants and the notion of borders and migration management systems capable of withstanding shocks and disturbances caused by increased migratory flows. The EU policy discourse connects the effectiveness and functionality of border and asylum systems with its ability to provide necessary protection for refugees and asylum seekers. As often indicated in policy documents, without well-functioning security and asylum systems, the EU will not be able to protect migrants from organised crime or process their asylum applications in timely manner and with due diligence.

It should be also noted that “exceptionality”, even though there are more singular examples of its application in the conceptualisation of remedial actions (such as military mission EUNAVFOR MED “Sophia”), it also has a tendency to overlap with other logics. It can be identified in the framing of risk and resilience-centred policy actions such as relocation mechanism and EU capacity building missions, respectively. In this respect it can also be defined as a security logic of dispersed nature, saturating specific remedial actions with more robustness and extraordinary character.

This chapter is structured in accordance with the dominance of specific logics that manifest in the EU’s conceptualisation of remedial action towards the “migration crisis”. In this respect, the first sub-chapter is devoted to the logic of risk management that has been identified as the most dominant and the most significantly institutionalised within the EU policy responses to the crisis. It focuses on a plethora of measures, such as “hotspots” or the European Border Surveillance System that have been framed as means of surveillance and control of migrants and their movement. Further, the chapter proceeds to the analysis of resilience-centred conceptualisation of remedial actions. Resilience, being a part of a broader family of risk-driven logics, has been identified as a new development in the EU frame-narrative, reflecting a distinctive set of measures designed to increase the robustness of the EU asylum system within the EU and to address the root causes of the crisis outside of EU borders. Here, resilience coincides with human security-oriented logic, being framed as an instrument for containing migration and mitigating factors which are threatening migrants’ lives and are pushing them out of their own communities. The third sub-chapter is devoted to “exceptionalist” security logic, analysing the way militarised and border security measures have been framed as life- and migrant-saving instruments and how they have been building on the humanitarian imperative and narrative.

## 6.2 Risk Management

Risk management logic has retained its prominence in the remedial action segment of the EU frame-narrative, effectively becoming both discursively structured and institutionalised within the EU policy discourse on the “migration crisis”. As already noted in the previous chapter, the risk management-oriented framing has been predominantly (but not exclusively) sponsored by the European Commission, promoting the notion of stability of the EU internal security realm, as well as defining the Schengen zone, freedom of movement, and EU external borders as the key referent objects. Such framing naturally leads to conceptualisation of remedial actions, centred on helping to regain the control over the movement of population within the EU and restoring the functionality of Schengen and the external borders of the EU. In this respect, the risk-oriented security measures traditionally refer to normalised, institutionalised forms of security governance and are based on broad cooperation between security agencies and systems, often operating within the internal-external security nexus (Lund Petersen, 2012, p. 702). As such, risk management and resilience have much in common, attempting to strengthen the effectiveness of the system, making it more robust and capable of withstanding crisis situations. That is why it is only natural to see resilience in some elements of risk management policies. Nonetheless, what is typical of the managerial approach is a belief that crises, future shocks and disturbances are fully governable. Resilience does not subscribe to this conviction. That is why risk management-driven policy actions usually assume a conventionalised and long-term character, focusing on the future foreseeable events and ways they can be managed and mitigated. In this respect, risk management measures are based on technologies of control and surveillance of “risky objects”. They are designed to navigate and govern possible “risky futures” and achieve an equilibrium between what is considered as satisfactory security and acceptable uncertainty (C.A.S.E., 2006, p. 468).

In this regard, the conceptualisation of responses towards the “migration crisis” has been driven by the development and improvement of already existing technologies of surveillance and control, oriented on administration of migratory flows and filtering capabilities of the EU border management systems (see European Commission, 2015a, b, c, f). The overarching aim of these remedial measures is to normalise the situation, regain control and restore the desired order within the borders of the EU. In this regard, much of the risk-oriented remedial actions are heavily embedded within internal-external security dimension and the borders, which during the crisis, have proved to become a problematic space for interpretative and practical reasons. As already discussed, the borders constitute the point where the framing process shifts from human security to risk management, reshuffling security priorities and changing the definition of the referent objects. This has led to interpretative tensions within the EU policy discourse and between EU policy actors (most notably the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament) in regard to conceptualisations of remedial actions and their securitising consequences on migration and migrants.

In the next part of this chapter, I will focus on the internal and external dimension of the risk-oriented security measures, specifically by analysing activities employed to responding to the arrival of asylum-seekers at the EU’s external borders (e.g. through the introduction of “hotspots”), measures oriented to surveillance and control of population movement (e.g. return operations, European Border Surveillance System) and the prevention of irregular migration (through border control and measures against trafficking and smuggling, and the EU-Turkey deal). I also identify the policy responses that have become the most explicit examples of the tensions between human security and risk management logic within and outside the EU, namely the “hotspot approach”, “detention, returns and readmission” and the “EU-Turkey Statement”.

### 6.2.1 *The “Hotspot Approach”*

The so-called “hotspot approach” represents one of the most prominent examples of risk-based policy responses employed by the EU and framed as an instrument for regaining control over inflows of irregular migrants into the EU. The “hotspot approach” was introduced and elaborated by the European Commission and has quickly become the symbol of the EU’s response to the “migration crisis” (European Commission, 2015b, p. 6). It has been developed and implemented as a frontline mechanism for border and migration management, specifically designed to assist the EU border states, such as Greece and Italy, in coping with sudden and increased influxes of irregular migrants (Council of the European Union, 2015d, p. 2; European Commission, 2015b, p. 5). The main idea behind this approach is to increase the efficiency of EU reception capabilities by deploying specialised EU Regional Task Forces<sup>1</sup> (EURTF) and Migration Management Teams,<sup>2</sup> entrusted with providing “operational support to Member States to ensure arriving migrants were identified, registered and fingerprinted, and channelled into the relevant follow-up procedures” (European Court of Auditors, 2017, p. 5). As stated in the “Agenda on Migration”:

(...) a new “Hotspot” approach is based on the European Asylum Support Office, Frontex and Europol working together on the ground with frontline Member States to swiftly identify, register and fingerprint incoming migrants. The work of the agencies will be complementary to one another. Those claiming asylum will be immediately channelled into an

<sup>1</sup>EURTF is a specialised administrative unit responsible for coordination of the activities and information exchange between different teams of experts involved in the “hotspot approach”. This includes EU agencies (such as Frontex, EASO and Europol) as well as authorities of the host country. EURTF and operational expert teams support the work of the host Member State on the ground (e.g. registration and screening of irregular migrants at the ports of disembarkation, pre-return assistance in pre-removal centres) (Statewatch, 2015).

<sup>2</sup>The European Commission defines a Migration Management Support Team as a team of experts deployed within the framework Frontex, EASO, or another relevant EU agency. The teams are entrusted with technical and operational support to Member States at hotspot areas (European Commission Website, 2018g).

asylum procedure where EASO support teams will help to process asylum cases as quickly as possible (European Commission, 2015b, p. 6).

“Hotspots” are commonly depicted in the policy discourse as strategically located centres for migration and risk management (Council of the European Union, 2015b, g, h, c; European Commission, 2015b, c, 2016a, e; European Parliament, 2015b, c, d). They are the frontline hubs for the EU inter-agency data gathering and cooperation, employing complementary security measures and practices aimed at “improving border management, combating irregular migration, and creating sufficient and adequate reception conditions” (Papadopoulou et al., 2016, p. 19). In this respect, “hotspots” represent a physical space, where irregular migrants arriving at the EU borders become reframed, from human security-based referent objects to objects of risk that need to be managed with security technologies such as screening, security debriefing or biometric profiling (Amicelle et al., 2015). With these practices and technologies, the personal data of irregular migrants are put into the EU’s data gathering and surveillance systems such as migrant fingerprinting system (Eurodac), Schengen Information System, and Visa Information System, effectively becoming a factor in an equation calculating risk for the security of the EU and its citizens.

This fact and the process of reframing migrants from objects of protection to objects of risk has not gone unnoticed and has been reflected in the EU policy discourse as well as the general public debate concerning the “hotspot” approach. Deployment of “heavy intelligence machinery” on the frontlines of the “migration crisis has caused significant tensions between the human security and risk management logics in the EU (Jeandesboz, 2017, p. 367). In this vein, the European Parliament has yet again engaged in the debate emphasising that “great care needs to be taken to ensure that the categorising of migrants at ‘hotspots’ is “carried out in full respect for the rights of all migrants” (European Parliament, 2016f, rec. 85) focusing not so much on security but protection and humanitarian assistance (European Parliament, 2016d, rec. 13). However, the biggest criticism has originated outside the EU, mostly in the NGO sector, which has been condemning the EU for the introduction of so-called “anti-migrant security measures”, employing “inadequate, unfair and/or repressive measures towards asylum-seekers, who have been often kept in prolonged detention without access to asylum procedures and have received inaccurate or incomplete information on the latter, or have been swiftly returned” (Niemann & Zaun, 2018, p. 6). In this respect, the EU has been specifically blamed for the lack of any specific legal framework that would protect the fundamental rights of refugees and economic migrants (Amnesty International, 2016; LIBE, 2015). The discourse of NGOs and humanitarian organisations on the situation in the “hotspots” clearly frames the approach as inhuman and in violation of human rights and dignity, while Human Rights Watch indicated that “hotspots” constitute an outstanding breach of human security pointing towards poor medical services, inadequate food supply and accommodation (Human Rights Watch Website, 2016c).

### 6.2.2 *Returns, Readmission and Detention*

Detention (or using the EU nomenclature “reception”) and returns operations of irregular migrants have been a vital part of the EU migration- security continuum and have naturally become one of the key instruments for managing increased migratory flows in the EU (Ceccorulli & Labanca, 2016; Slominski & Trauner, 2018, 2021; Tazzioli, 2017). Even though detention and returns operations function under different legal and institutional frameworks, they both share similar goal, namely separation and/or removal of problematic, risky, or threatening migrants from EU public space (Mountz et al., 2013, p. 523). As already elaborated in the previous chapter, the EU regulates detention with the Reception Directive, allowing the temporary detention of migrants in order to (1) verify their identity during processing their asylum claims, (2) secure evidence when there is a risk of an applicant absconding, (3) in order to decide upon migrant’s right to enter the EU territory, (4) when protection of national security and public safety is involved, (5) and finally when a migrant has been subjected to a return procedure (European Union, 2013a, art. 8).

Even though the EU policy discourse on the “migration crisis” promotes the idea of detention as the last resort, most commonly emphasising the need for looking for alternative forms of reception, especially in reference to vulnerable groups (e.g. children), it also emphasises the need for rigorous identification (European Commission, 2017b, p. 9; European Parliament, 2016c, rec. 8), separation and return of those migrants who do not qualify for protection in the EU (Council of the European Union, 2015a, p. 3, 2016c, p. 7; European Commission, 2015b, pp. 9–10). In this regard, particularly the Council of the European Union and the European Council highlight the importance of detention measures in curbing and managing irregular flows of migrants into and within the EU territories (see for example Council of the European Union, 2016i, j, 2017d; European Council, 2015e, 2017b). As often reiterated in the outcomes of the Justice and Home Affairs Council (Council of the European Union), “to prevent secondary movements, detention measures in line with article 15 of the Return Directive should be applied urgently and effectively” (Council of the European Union, 2015j, rec. 8; see also: 2015f; 2016c, h). In this respect, detention has also been framed as an important migration management mechanism that facilitates the returns operations and deters further inflows of unwanted irregular migrants. In this respect, the Council has been underscoring that

All measures must be taken to ensure irregular migrants’ effective return, including use of detention as a legitimate measure of last resort. In particular, Member States should reinforce their pre-removal detention capacity to ensure the physical availability of irregular migrants for return and take steps to prevent the abuse of rights and procedures (Council of the European Union, 2015c, rec. 6).

In this respect, as a complementary response to the “migration crisis”, there is a visible increase in the EU policy discourse of references to returns operations as a form of migration management though voluntary or assisted (i.e. forced) removal of “aliens” from the physical, juridical, and social space of an EU member state

(Slominski & Trauner, 2018, p. 102). As already indicated in the previous chapter, the return of “undesirable migrants” has been present in the EU migration-security discourse since the late 1990s and the full operationalisation of the Schengen zone (Huysmans, 2000; van Munster, 2009). However, it is the “migration crisis” that has raised its profile and framed it as an essential part of the EU’s risk and migration management toolbox (see for example Council of the European Union, 2015c, d, European Commission, 2015b, 2017a; European Council, 2015f; European Parliament, 2014, 2015a). The EU policy discourse on returns operations focuses predominantly on the idea of swift and effective return, readmission and reintegration of irregular migrants who have not qualified for protection, legal residence in the EU and/or have been flagged as a security risk to public safety (Baldaccini, 2009). In this respect, particularly the European Commission has been promoting the image of returns operations as an effective and inevitable scenario for all “unsuccessful asylum claimants who try to avoid return, visa overstayers, and migrants living in a permanent state of irregularity” (European Commission, 2015b, p. 7).

Trauner and Ripoll Servent (2016, p. 1420) observe that in the EU policy discourse, return operations have gained strong security features, being employed to deal not only with problematic migratory flows and expulsion of irregular migrants, but to also as a deterrent to human smuggling operations. As noted in the European Council conclusions:

Effective return, readmission and reintegration policies for those not qualifying for protection are an essential part of combating illegal migration and will help discourage people from risking their lives. All tools shall be mobilised to promote readmission of irregular migrants to countries of origin and transit (European Council, 2015a, p. 3).

In this respect, the EU policy discourse on returns is based on the notion that mobilisation and effectiveness of these operations relies as much on the internal as external factors, promoting the need for increased cooperation with third countries under the Migration Partnership Framework.<sup>3</sup> Here, the European Commission along with other policy actors has been employing a rather direct or even assertive approach towards partner countries that have been reluctant to comply with readmission and/or partnership agreements, explicitly stating that while some countries comply with their international and legal obligation towards the EU, many others do not cooperate in a satisfactory manner (European Commission, 2017c, p. 12). In this respect, the European Commission and Council have visibly emphasised the element of effectiveness, promoting political and administrative actions that could speed of the returns of irregular, unwanted migrants (Council of the European Union, 2015c, f; European Commission, 2015a, b, 2016k). In this respect, the EU has called for cooperation with third countries based on leverages and incentives that could facilitate (re)negotiations of readmission agreements increasing their

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<sup>3</sup>The Migration Partnership Framework regulates returns to third countries as well as passing back irregular migrants from a member state to another on the basis of bilateral readmission agreements (see European Commission, 2017l).

scope and the effectiveness of return operations. As stated by the European Commission,

Overall, tailor-made approaches should be used to identify all the interest, incentives and leverages at stake with a partner country in order to achieve targets and commitments and to offer specific support measures by the EU and interested Member States to the partner country concerned – such as effective reintegration of returnees – so as to ensure a better management of migration, and in that context to further improve cooperation on return and readmission. The EU and Member States will need to employ their collective leverage in a coordinated and effective manner to achieve this result (European Commission, 2017a, p. 13).

In a similar spirit, the EU policy actors have consistently sought to make the return policy more effective by closing loopholes and interpreting the existing EU regulations more rigorously (Slominski & Trauner, 2018, pp. 106–107). This approach has quickly translated into further tensions between human security and risk management logics within the conceptualisation of remedial actions towards the “migration crisis”. The development of the “safe country of origin”<sup>4</sup> list represents a good example of such tensions, introducing a fast-track procedure for evaluation of asylum claims that was supposed to facilitate and increase the rate of returns decisions. As noted by the President of the European Commission in the 2016 “State of the Union”:

We are making our return policy more effective. The proposed new EU list of ‘safe countries of origin’ will allow for faster returns where an individual has no right to asylum, and we are putting in place incentives, for specific countries (starting with Algeria, Bangladesh, Morocco and Pakistan) to ensure effective returns and readmission (European Commission, 2016k, p. 42).

In this respect, the EU, and most vocally the European Commission, has been promoting the idea that increasing the effectiveness and swiftness of detention/reception and return operations “is the only way Europe will be able to show solidarity with refugees in real need of protection” (European Commission, 2017e, p. 4). This type of framing has been contested by the European Parliament, which consistently pointed towards the dangers of detaining vulnerable groups, especially minors, indicating that “the fear of being detained, sent back or transferred, is resulting in children absconding, leaving them exposed to trafficking, violence and exploitation” (European Parliament, 2018). In a similar manner, NGOs and international organisations have been pointing out ill treatment of migrants during the administrative processing of their asylum claims (Perkowski, 2016). Papadopoulou et al. (2016) observe that, especially in the frontline member states, migrants have been kept in prolonged detention, often in undignified conditions. They have been frequently provided with inaccurate or incomplete information on asylum procedures, which commonly led to administrative mistreatment and premature return decisions (Vanderbruggen et al., 2014). Similar criticism has been raised against the

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<sup>4</sup>The concept of a “safe country of origin” defines countries which, based on the stability of their democratic system and compliance with human rights standards, are considered safe to live in (Niemann & Zaun, 2018, p. 9).

Returns Directive and reliance on the “safe countries of origin” list (Slominski & Trauner, 2018; Uçarer, 2014). In this regard, NGOs have been pointing towards the danger of “blanket return decisions”, leading to disregard of individual cases and proper administrative asylum due process (ECRE, 2015).

### ***6.2.3 Intelligence Cooperation, Surveillance and Control***

In security studies literature, intelligence cooperation, surveillance and migration control are considered as the cornerstones of the risk management logic (C.A.S.E., 2006; Kessler & Daase, 2008; Skleparis, 2016). Amoore and Raley (2017, p. 12) argue that intelligence is a multipurpose tool in crisis situations, allowing policy makers and practitioners to make sense of the crisis and take informed decisions that would account not only for the current but also future shocks and disturbances. In this regard, the EU’s approach to the “migration crisis” is often described as data-driven, heavily relying on high quality operational information (i.e. intelligence) and technologies of control and management (Bellanova & Duez, 2016; Jeandesboz, 2016; Marin, 2017). Jeandesboz (2016, p. 293) notes that since 2001, systematic and large-scale gathering, analysis and use of electronic information on persons has become a preferred policy option for border control in the EU. The EU has been feeding on an elaborate network of data gathering and monitoring systems, integrated into border control, including the Schengen Information System (SIS), Eurdac, Visa Information System (VIS), Passenger Name Record (PNR), Entry/Exist System (EES), to name a few (see European Commission, 2016b, i, 2017k). This broad spectrum of risk management tools and technologies has entangled the AFSJ agencies, border and internal security authorities in a dense socio-technological web, designed for governance of regular and irregular inflows and outflows of migrants in the EU (Bellanova & Duez, 2012, p. 110). In this regard, the EU policy discourse builds on two important strands of narrative, namely “technologies of border control” and “intelligence-gathering systems”.

Let us see how these instruments for risk management intertwine in the framing of the EU external borders. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, referent objects in the risk management-driven diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis have been centred on the issue of control of migratory flows and external borders. Here, EU policy actors directly refer to smart, advanced and preventive border technologies as instrumental in regaining and sustaining control by strengthening data sharing on border traffic and migratory movements within the EU borders (see Council of the European Union, 2016h, j; European Commission, 2016b, i; European Commission Website, 2018h; European Parliament, 2016a). The framing of the data-driven policy response towards the crisis has been built on the idea of the “incomplete picture” of the “migration crisis” (European Commission, 2015e, 2017k, m; European Commission Website, 2018d), explicitly indicating that pooling and sharing information on migrants and border traffic is one of the most important pillars of the EU’s response to the crisis (European Commission, 2017h, j). The

Commission’s “Agenda on Migration” refers to the need for the technologisation of migration and border management in the EU, stating that

managing our borders more efficiently also implies making better use of the opportunities offered by IT systems and technologies. The EU today has three large-scale IT systems, dealing with the administration of asylum (Eurodac), visa applications (the Visa Information System), and the sharing of information about persons or objects for which an alert has been created by the competent authorities (Schengen Information System). The full use of these systems can bring benefits to border management, as well as to enhance Europe’s capacity to reduce irregular migration and return irregular migrants. A new phase would come with the “Smart Borders” initiative to increase the efficiency of border crossings, facilitating crossings for the large majority of ‘bona fide’ third country travellers, whilst at the same time strengthening the fight against irregular migration by creating a record of all cross-border movements by third country nationals, fully respecting proportionality (European Commission, 2015, p. 5).

As pointed out by Lehtonen and Aalto (2017, p. 219), even though the “Smart Borders” initiative is not treated by the European Commission as a policy response specific to the “migration crisis”,<sup>5</sup> the so-called “smartening of borders” certainly is, and has been serving as an umbrella concept for curbing migratory flows with border and data surveillance systems. In this vein, the European Commission has been stressing the role of “computerized systems for the collection, exchange and analysis of data related to persons crossing its external borders” (Jeandesboz, 2016, p. 292). Along with the “Smart Borders” package (i.e. Registered Traveller Programme- RTP<sup>6</sup> and Entry/Exit System-EES<sup>7</sup>) and the previously-mentioned large-scale IT systems, the European Commission has been calling for the full application of the Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD), Anti-Fraud Information System (AFIS), the Prüm framework,<sup>8</sup> Passenger Name Record (PNR), European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS), European Police Record Index System (EPRIS), and Maritime Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) (European Commission Website, 2018h). All these technologies, to different degrees, have not been maintaining electronic records on different aspects of

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<sup>5</sup>In this regard, the European Commission frames the “Smart Borders” as an instrument dealing with recording short-term legal stays of third country nationals (European Commission, 2016i, p. 1).

<sup>6</sup>RTP is a border control system which facilitates crossing of EU external borders for visitors from third countries traveling frequently to the EU. It is based on pre-vetting of specific groups of travellers before their arrival at the border (European Parliament Website, 2018c).

<sup>7</sup>EES gathers data on non-EU nationals (both visa-required and visa-exempt travellers). It gathers travel information and records entry and exit information with a view to facilitate the border crossing and identify overstayers (European Commission Website, 2018d). The system has an important security feature as it is designed to “support the identification of terrorists, criminals as well as of suspects and victims of crime. It also provides a record of travel histories of non-EU nationals including crime suspects, perpetrators or victims of crime. It would thus complement the information in the SIS” (European Commission Website, 2018d).

<sup>8</sup>The Prüm framework is an information exchange tool, which grants EU member states mutual access to DNA analysis files, fingerprint identification systems and vehicle registration data (European Commission Website, 2018c).

migration, border crossing and criminal activity and have been a part of what Jeandesboz calls the “European mass ‘dataveillance’ system”, which has been consistently framed and reframed by the Commission as the only way to ensure “control over border control” and migratory flows into Europe (Jeandesboz, 2016, p. 293).

In this vein, the EU policy discourse on the “migration crisis”, particularly produced by the European Commission and the Council of the European Union, has been extensively promoting the idea of the “interoperability” of the EU information systems (Council of the European Union, 2016g, m, n; European Commission, 2015b, c, 2017k, m). As often reiterated by the Commission, one of the consequences of the “migration crisis” was the realisation that proliferation and fragmentation of different EU dataveillance systems makes it impossible to reach effective exchange of data (European Commission, 2017k). In this vein, the Commission explicitly argued that

currently, EU information systems do not talk to each other – information is stored separately in unconnected systems, making them fragmented, complex and difficult to operate. This risks pieces of information slipping through the net and terrorists and criminals escaping detection by using multiple or fraudulent identities, endangering the EU’s internal security and making border and migration management more challenging (European Commission, 2017h, p. 2).

In response to this problem, the European Commission has proposed the creation of a massive information-sharing platform<sup>9</sup> for migration officials, police officers and border guard, that would enable EU security officials faster and seamless access to all centrally operated EU databases,<sup>10</sup> which hold information on migrants, and migration- and border-related illicit activities (European Commission, 2017i). The platform was to be based on a common search engine giving access to shared biometric matching service, identity repository and multiple identity detector, designed specifically for comprehensive and fast security screenings of migrants (European Commission, 2017k, h).

This “technologisation” of the EU’s approach to the “migration crisis” is similarly visible in reference to Eurosur, which has become a prominent part of the EU risk management-oriented framing of remedial actions. As stated by the European Council, the EU needs to “increase its reactivity towards rapid evolutions in

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<sup>9</sup>In order to reach satisfactory levels of interoperability, the European Commission has also proposed strengthening the mandate of eu-Lisa – an AFSJ agency responsible for maintenance and management of the EU IT-large scale dataveillance systems, specifically the Schengen Information System and the Visa Information System. The proposition of the Commission envisages that eu-Lisa would be responsible not only for management but also development of the new systems and would contribute to increased interoperability of the EU data gathering and surveillance (European Commission, 2017i).

<sup>10</sup>The interoperability platform initially encompasses the following databases: Schengen Information System, Eurodac, Visa Information System, Entry/Exit System (EES), European Travel Information and Authorisation System, European Criminal Records Information System for third-country nationals, Interpol’s Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (European Commission, 2017i).

migration flows, making full use of the new European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur)” (Council of the European Union, 2014, rec. 9). According to Bellanova and Duez (2016, p. 28), the EU policy discourse has been visibly shifting the perception of Eurosur, framing it not only as a platform allowing to enhance internal security by exchange of border surveillance data, but also as a tool facilitating on the one hand law enforcement operations and on the other search and rescue missions. In this vein, Eurosur as a “system of border surveillance systems” has been commonly identified as a larger part of the EU border, irregular migration, cross-border crime, and terrorism monitoring technology that in conjunction with “dataveillance” is supposed to contribute to better risk management and “joint pre-emptive actions” on the frontlines of the crisis (Jeandesboz, 2016; Jeandesboz & Pallister-Wilkins, 2014, 2016). As stated by the European Commission:

The EU should further develop monitoring of pre-frontier area for early identification of smugglers and prevention of irregular departures of migrants, including through the use of Frontex tools, such as Eurosur. The potential of using satellite imagery following the agreement signed by Frontex and the EU Satellite Centre Sat Cen should be fully exploited. EU IT systems (e.g. SIS II, VIS) and the European Document Fraud Network should be used to improve risk analysis and enable identification of irregular entry and stay through ‘look-alike’, falsified or forged documents, or nationality swapping (European Commission, 2015a, p. 5).

These different technologies of surveillance and data gathering operate for the benefit of the EU member states’ justice and home affairs authorities, which feed the systems information and utilise it for intelligence and operational activities (Friedewald et al., 2017). In this regard, the EU AFSJ agencies, specifically Frontex and Europol, play a crucial role as facilitators of the intelligence cooperation within the EU internal security realm gathering, compiling, processing and disseminating data and analysis on broadly understood border security, irregular migration trends, irregular migrants, trans-border crime and terrorism (Carrapiço & Trauner, 2013; Pollak & Slominski, 2021). In the course of the “migration crisis”, Frontex has gained a special position in the EU policy discourse, being framed as a key operational and intelligence-oriented agency involved on the frontlines of the crisis (i.e. “hotspots” and joint border operations) and in its background (e.g. Frontex Risk Analysis) (see Council of the European Union, 2016a, f; European Commission, 2015b, 2016e, 2017m; European Parliament, 2016a).

As a part of response package to the “migration crisis”, the EU has re-negotiated the mandate of Frontex bringing into existence the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) (also referred in the academic literature as “Frontex+”) (Gruszczak, 2017; Léonard & Kaunert, 2020). As a result, the agency has significantly increased in terms of scope and size, becoming one of the biggest and best-funded AFSJ agencies in the EU.<sup>11</sup> One of the most controversial aspects of the renewed mandate include what is called “preventive vulnerability assessment”,

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<sup>11</sup> In 2016 Frontex was given a 54% budget increase, amounting to 176 million EUR. In 2017, the budget reached 302 million EUR with another increase of funds negotiated for the budgetary term 2020–2027. The staff size has increased from 304 in 2016 to 488 in 2017. For comparison the

based on a border stress simulation and technical evaluation of “the capacity and readiness of the Member States to face challenges at their external borders, (...) as well as their contingency plans to address possible crisis at the external borders” (European Union, 2016a, p. 3). Following a negative outcome of the assessment, Frontex has been given the right to intervene in the cases where an EU member state facing structural deficiencies is unable to properly address increasing “migration pressures” (Carrera et al., 2017, p. 45). In this situation, Frontex is obligated to deploy technical and operation assistance supporting border controls so as to safeguard the functioning of the Schengen area (Carrera & Hertog, 2016). This specific prerogative of Frontex has distinctive features of risk management and resilience logics. On the one hand, the assessment allows for management of specific sections of external border in order to divert from possible scenarios of border and migration crises. On the other, it makes the agency responsible for identification of the “weakest link” in the EU border security system and provision of support and recommendations for the purposes increasing the state’s robustness in the case of the future migration-related shocks and disturbances on the European borders. The logic of resilience will be discussed further in the next part of this chapter.

In respect to risk management logic, the new mandate expands Frontex’s intelligence gathering and sharing capabilities by reinforcing its “points of entry into maritime border surveillance cooperation and information exchange, based on networks of authorities with coast guards’ functions”, specifically Eurosur (Carrera & Hertog, 2016, p. 3). However, most importantly, the new mandate increases the scope of collecting, processing and exchanging the personal data of migrants gathered during Frontex-led operational activities (i.e. at “hotspots”, joint border operations, pilot border surveillance programmes, rapid border interventions, etc.) (Esteve, 2017, p. 14). In this regard, the mandate allows Frontex to share personal data not only on “persons who are suspected of involvement in cross-border crime, such as migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings or terrorism” (European Union, 2016a, p. 12) but also “persons who cross the external borders without authorisation” (European Union, 2016a, p. 19). This has only increased the risk-driven securitisation of irregular migration, which has begun to operate within the same security frameworks and categories as criminals and terrorists.

In the EU discourse on remedial actions, Frontex is intertwined with Europol. The agency is tasked with supporting law enforcement authorities throughout the EU in regard to crime fighting activities, including areas specifically relevant to the “migration crisis”, namely human trafficking, facilitated irregular immigration, organised crime and terrorism, to name a few (Den Boer, 2015). Europol is often described as an intelligence hub, feeding on information provided by the Member States and other EU AFSJ agencies (Carrapiço & Trauner, 2013, p. 365). To this end, it collects, stores, processes, and analyses data for operational (e.g. supporting joint investigations) and strategic purposes (e.g. informing the European Commission

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budget of European Asylum Support Office is approx. 75 million EUR with staff of 200 people (ECRE, 2017).

and the Council of the European Union) related to EU internal security (European Union, 2016b). As a part of the EU’s response to the “migration crisis” Europol and Frontex cooperate in “hotspots”, facilitating:

(...) the process of a systematic registration, including fingerprinting of illegally entering third-country nationals according to the Eurodac Regulation and to perform systematic security checks by using relevant databases, in particular SIS II, Interpol, VIS and national police databases (Council of the European Union, 2016c, p. 5).

In this vein, Europol has re-framed from a purely intelligence-driven to a “quasi-operational” agency, capable of sending officers into the frontline of the crisis and becoming the EU’s “boots on the ground” (Scipioni, 2017, p. 6). As part of the EU remedial action towards the crisis, Europol has also gained a new mandate, which not only cosmetically renamed the agency into the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), but also strengthened its intelligence-sharing capabilities and reinforced its transnational role in fighting terrorism, cyber-crime, and trans-border organised crime (European Union, 2016b). Consequently, Europol has opened an intelligence centre, the European Migrants Smuggling Centre, tasked specifically to cooperate with the AFSJ agencies (i.e. Frontex and Eurojust) and “support EU member states’ police and border authorities in coordination of highly complex cross-border anti-smuggling operations” (Europol Website, 2021).

## 6.2.4 *EU-Turkey Statement*

Confronted with increased and continuous migratory pressures and prolonged deployment of internal policy responses (e.g. reforming of the Common European Asylum System, re-negotiations of AFSJ agencies mandates, re-negotiations of readmission agreements, to name a few), the EU has opened up to externalisation of the migration management, attempting to curb irregular migratory flows in the pre-frontier area of the EU, preferably in cooperation with third countries. The EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016<sup>12</sup> lies at the heart of this type of migration-related risk management strategy, building on the idea of control, containment and deterrence of irregular flows into the EU, specifically through Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean route (Niemann & Zaun, 2018, p. 8). It should be noted that the EU-Turkey statement can be defined as a political declaration and not an official part of the EU policy response to the “migration crisis”. In this sense, it is not institutionalised within any specific policy nor it is an international agreement and consequently legally binding for the EU or Turkey (Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2017, pp. 59–60). This means that the statement is not formally subjected to the European Parliament’s scrutiny or judicial review by the Court of Justice of the European Union (Carrera et al., 2017).

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<sup>12</sup>The content of the Statement has become a “blueprint” for similar partnership frameworks with Afghanistan, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Ethiopia (European Commission, 2017).

The content of the EU-Turkey statement focuses on pre-frontier management of migratory flows, specifically of Syrian nationals, from Turkey into Greece and is based on the following provisions: (1) as of 20 March 2016 new irregular migrants entering Greece through Turkey have been returned to Turkey. This applies to all migrants who have either not applied for asylum or whose applications have been declared “un-founded” or “inadmissible”; (2) for every Syrian being returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria (Council of the European Union, 2016f, art. 1 and 2). The statement does not allow for more than 72 thousand people being returned through this mechanism (Niemann & Zaun, 2018, p. 8). At the same time, Turkish authorities are obligated to “take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU, and will cooperate with neighbouring states as well as the EU to this effect” (Council of the European Union, 2016f, art. 3). In return, the EU has promised to accelerate visa liberalisation negotiations and disburse three billion EUR as a part of the “Facility for Refugees in Turkey” fund and additional three billion EUR for any projects aiming to help refugees in Turkey (European Commission, 2015d). The EU has also advanced the talks on Customs Union and resumption and extension of the accession negotiations with Turkey (European Commission, 2015d).

Bauböck (2018, pp. 152–153) notes that this design of the EU-Turkey Statement makes it inherently burden-sharing and risk management-oriented, being equipped with specific return and resettlement mechanisms, migratory quotas and financial features. Nonetheless, its framing and position in the EU policy discourse is not that evident. The EU policy actors quite commonly agree that the Statement has been put into action as a way of curbing irregular migratory flows, but at the same time built an explicitly humanitarian narrative around it, describing the Statement as a life-saving instrument (see Council of the European Union, 2016f; European Commission, 2017g; European Council, 2016c). An apt example of such framing is the 2016 “State of the Union”, where the President of the European Commission noted that “we adopted on 18 March 2016 an EU–Turkey Statement to end the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU to replace dangerous journeys across the Aegean with safe and legal paths to the EU for Syrian refugees” (European Commission, 2016k, p. 42). It was also reiterated in the following year, when the President of the Commission stated that:

We have managed to stem irregular flows of migrants, which were a cause of great anxiety for many. We have reduced irregular arrivals in the Eastern Mediterranean by 97% thanks our agreement with Turkey. And this summer, we managed to get more control over the Central Mediterranean route with arrivals in August down by 81% compared to the same month last year. In doing so, we have drastically reduced the loss of life in the Mediterranean (European Commission, 2017e, p. 114).

Indeed, the rapid drop of irregular border traffic to the EU from Turkey through Greek islands<sup>13</sup> has generated a momentum for optimism towards the EU-Turkey deal, gradually making it into one of the most important pillars of the EU’s remedial actions towards the “migration crisis”. The EU policy actors have been reiterating in their respective discourses the need for sustaining and deepening migration-related cooperation with Turkey as one of the most effective and key measures in stabilising border traffic and curbing irregular migratory flows in the Eastern Mediterranean (Council of the European Union, 2016b, j; European Commission, 2017g; European Council, 2015d, 2016b; European Parliament, 2016f, 2017b). In this vein, in the progress report on “Agenda on Migration”, the European Commission directly argues that:

The implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement has continued to play a key role in ensuring that the migration challenge in the Eastern Mediterranean is addressed effectively and jointly by the EU and Turkey. It continues to deliver concrete results in reducing irregular and dangerous crossings and in saving lives in the Aegean Sea. The full and sustained implementation of the Statement requires continuous efforts and political determination from all sides (European Commission, 2017f, p. 5).

Even though the EU policy discourse reflects praise of the EU-Turkey Statement for its effectiveness and rapid decrease of the migratory pressures in the Eastern Mediterranean, it has not been so vocal about its human rights and human security dimension, or rather the lack thereof.<sup>14</sup> The EU’s framing of the Statement conveniently marginalises certain practical, legal or moral aspects of the document, including the conditions in Turkish refugee camps, discrimination of specific groups of migrants by Turkish officials, or the varying degree of protection of Syrian and non-Syrian refugees under the Turkish asylum law,<sup>15</sup> to name a few (Batalla Adam, 2017). Furthermore, the EU-Turkey Statement has been brought into question in terms of its compliance with the EU and international asylum law (Barbulescu, 2017; Okyay & Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2016). As has been observed, instead of safeguarding the rights of refugees, the Statement often directly breaks them by neglecting due process of asylum law (through so-called fast track border procedures) frequently returning to Turkey those migrants who declared their intent to apply for asylum in Greece (Batalla Adam, 2017, p. 47).

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<sup>13</sup>Many have credited the EU-Turkey Statement for the lower numbers of refugees attempting to cross the Mediterranean to Greece via Turkey. Overall, arrivals in Greece decreased by 98% between 2015 and 2016 and recorded deaths and missing persons in the Aegean Sea went down by 94% (Niemann & Zaun, 2018, p. 8).

<sup>14</sup>This changed after 2019, when President Erdogan has started to use the Statement as a leverage against the EU. The European Commission and the High Representative has begun to recognise the humanitarian consequences of Turkey’s actions on the borders and in Syria (Stanicek, 2020).

<sup>15</sup>The Turkish authorities apply the 1951 Geneva Convention and not the 1967 Protocol, thus only recognising refugees coming from Europe (Niemann and Zaun, 2018, p. 8). Even though Turkey reformed its asylum laws in 2013 allowing Syrians to be considered for temporary international protection and therefore more rights, other refugees are still not eligible for protection and their rights are in danger (Batalla Adam, 2017, p. 47).

Human Rights Watch directly points towards harsh and abusive practices employed by the Turkish military and border officials who while handling returns under the EU-Turkey Statement contribute to the general (in)securitisation of the situation of refugees in Turkey (see more Human Rights Watch Website, 2016a). In this respect, in several asylum cases, “the Greek appeals committee has blocked the implementation of the Statement by rejecting the fact that Syrian asylum seekers can find safe haven effective international protection in Turkey” (Human Rights Watch Website, 2016b). As observed by Cohen and Sirkeci (2016), the EU-Turkey Statement has generated a substantial amount of insecurity among Syrian refugees, introducing not only a high degree of uncertainty in terms of their journey into the EU but also a threat of their possible mistreatment by the Turkish law enforcement and border authorities.<sup>16</sup> While the EU-Turkey Statement has introduced high levels of insecurity at migrant level, it has certainly increased the sense of security and stability for the EU.

### ***6.2.5 Relocation and Resettlement***

Relocation and resettlement constitute yet another example of conceptualisation and further institutionalisation of risk management-centred remedial actions towards the “migration crisis”. As noted by Bauböck (2018, p. 145), relocation and resettlement, though technically separate policy responses, are commonly construed in the academic discourse as a governmental technique of migration management relating to specific group of migrants, namely refugees. Both policy instruments refer to “transfers of persons in need of international protection either from other EU Member State (relocation) or third country (resettlement)” (Barbulescu, 2017, p. 304). In this way, they concentrate on institutionalised forms of migration governance and broad cooperation between member states and the EU agencies in handling increased inflows of migrants seeking international protection and the consequent asylum applications. In this regard, resettlement and relocation mechanisms represent an attempt to find an equilibrium and a continuation of normal activities within acceptable risks and to sustain the functionality of the EU migration and asylum management system.

Let us start with resettlement, which has been well institutionalised in the EU as a form of management of migrants seeking asylum status in one of the EU member states but while still outside the EU territories (Barbulescu, 2017, p. 306). As explained in the Commission’s “Agenda on Migration”:

Resettlement means the transfer of individual displaced persons in clear need of international protection, on submission of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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<sup>16</sup>As stated in the Human Rights Watch report, Turkish border guards have shot at refugees trying to cross the border (Human Rights Watch Website, 2016a). Amnesty International also reported that large numbers of Syrians have been transported from Turkey back to Syria (Amnesty International Website, 2016).

and in agreement with the country of resettlement, from a third country to a Member State, where they will be admitted and granted the right to stay and any other rights comparable to those granted to a beneficiary of international protection (European Commission, 2015b, p. 19).

In the EU policy discourse, resettlement is framed as an instrument, which is supposed to help “avoid displaced persons in need of protection having to resort to the criminal networks of smugglers and traffickers, consequently providing legal and safe pathways to enter the EU” (European Commission Website, 2017). The concept of resettlement shows yet another example of how the EU has been distancing itself from the inclusive migrant-centred referent object present in the diagnostic and evaluation parts of the framing process and moving towards a more restrictive and exclusive refugee-oriented perspective. Since 2015, the EU has launched two resettlement schemes, which were commonly publicised as “safe passage” for migrants escaping war and brutalities of terrorism, visibly marginalising the inclusive understanding of migrants and leaving out of the resettlement scheme those seeking refuge from economic hardship (see European Commission, 2015b, 2017e; European Commission Website, 2017; European Parliament, 2016a). In May 2015, the European Commission proposed an ad hoc European Resettlement scheme, a voluntary framework for EU-wide resettlement of over 22,000 people in need of international protection (Radjenovic, 2017, p. 12). The scheme also included execution of the EU-Turkey Statement, which envisages that “for every Syrian national returned from the Greek islands another will be resettled to the EU directly from Turkey” (European Commission Website, 2017). In July 2017, after proclaiming the success of the ad hoc scheme, which resulted in over seventeen thousand transfers mainly from Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon, the Commission initiated a new round of pledges for the new resettlement scheme aiming for 50,000 transfers, this time from the regions of North Africa and Horn of Africa (European Commission, 2017m).

Even though the European Resettlement scheme has raised certain controversies, especially in relation to the member states’ quotas, selection criteria, or length of procedures, it is the so-called “relocation mechanism” that has proved to be the most contentious among all the EU responses to the “migration crisis” (Thielemann, 2018, p. 71). It should be noted that the relocation mechanism, also known as the “temporary emergency relocation scheme” was not part of the EU migration-security continuum before the “migration crisis”. It was adopted by the Council of the European Union in September 2015, for the duration of 2 years, as a new burden-sharing mechanism and an emergency response system envisaged under Article 78(3) of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (Council of the European Union, 2015d). Under the relocation scheme:

asylum seekers with a high chance of having their applications successfully processed are relocated from Greece and Italy, where they have arrived, to other Member States where they will have their asylum applications processed. If these applications are successful, the applicants will be granted refugee status with the right to reside in the Member State to which they are relocated (European Commission, 2015b, p. 4).

According to the scheme, the receiving member state was responsible for the examination of the asylum application in accordance with international, European and national standards (Thielemann & Hobolth, 2016, p. 645). The redistribution key was based on criteria such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (40 per cent), size of population (40%), unemployment (10%), and the number of already hosted asylum seekers (10%) (European Commission, 2015b, p. 4).

The relocation scheme was framed as a matter of European solidarity and a remedy for the disproportionate responsibility put on the EU “frontline countries” (Niemann & Zaun, 2018, p. 6). As a result of intergovernmental negotiations, the EU member states committed themselves to relocate altogether 160,000 refugees from the “frontlines” by the end of September 2017 (European Commission Website, 2017). The negotiations and later implementation of the scheme have been highly confrontational, bringing several member states (especially Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Bulgaria) into conflict with the European Commission<sup>17</sup> (Nič, 2016; Niemann & Zaun, 2018, p. 7). The bone of contention was the mandatory character of the scheme, which obligated all the member states to accommodate the designated quotas of asylum seekers within the given timeframe. It should be noted that the mandatory relocation mechanism allowed for refusal of transfer of any asylum seeker on the basis of national security or public safety (Council of the European Union, 2015d, art. 32). This security provision was later used, or misused, by the reluctant member states to postpone transfers of asylum seekers indefinitely, thus further securitising asylum seekers and rendering the whole scheme highly ineffective (Thielemann, 2018, p. 73).

The relocation mechanism and further asylum system reform (i.e. the Dublin plus proposal) have quickly become the most problematic and dividing issues during the conceptualisation of remedial of actions in the EU. Firstly, one of the problems raised by several member states was that the mechanism diverted from the original Dublin system that has established specific set of criteria indicating which member states are responsible for examining asylum claims in the EU (Niemann & Zaun, 2018, p. 7). According to the Regulation, the establishment of responsibility should be based on a set of hierarchical criteria, one of which is the place of entry, indicating that the applicants who entered into the EU in an irregular manner shall be examined by the member state where they first arrived, limiting the possibility of secondary relocations and “venue shopping” within the EU (European Union, 2013b, art. 13). Secondly, due to the coercive character of the scheme and later proposals of “corrective fairness mechanism”,<sup>18</sup> the relocation has never been

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<sup>17</sup>On 15 June 2017, the Commission launched an infringement procedure against several Central and Eastern European Member States, referring specifically the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the Court of Justice of the EU for non-compliance with their legal obligations on relocation (European Commission, 2017o).

<sup>18</sup>Under the so-called “Dublin plus” proposal, the Commission offered a new mechanism, which stated that whenever an EU country receives disproportionate numbers of asylum seekers (exceeding a pre-set reference number by 150 per cent), it will be automatically unburdened and the surplus of asylum seekers will be relocated to other EU countries. If an EU country declines participation in

considered as a fully “politically legitimate solution” among the member states, generating substantial political opposition to any new ideas regarding this type of solution in the future.<sup>19</sup> This resulted in the official withdrawal by the European Commission from the relocation scheme in September 2017 and the subsequent failure to establish an EU permanent relocation mechanism (originally incorporated into the revision of the Dublin system), which was eventually vetoed by the Council of the European Union (European Parliament Website, 2018a). Consequently, the European Commission has sustained its position that the original relocation obligations should be honoured by the member states, but no new mandatory schemes will be introduced in the near future (European Commission Website, 2017).

The EU policy discourse on resettlement and relocation reveals a dynamic and conflict-driven framing of these specific remedial actions. The relocation scheme has certainly gained more substantial prominence in the discourse, especially in the first years of the “migration crisis”, where it was framed as the “European solution” (Council of the European Union, 2015k; European Commission Website, 2017; European Parliament Website, 2018a). At first, the EU policy actors supported the principle of the scheme, following the framing of the Commission, which promoted the relocation as driven by solidarity among the member states and as effective management and diffusion of unprecedented migratory pressures from the EU “frontlines” (Council of the European Union, 2015d; European Commission, 2015b, 2016a; European Parliament, 2015b). As explained by the Commission,

the volumes of arrivals mean that the capacity of local reception and processing facilities is already stretched thin. To deal with the situation in the Mediterranean, the Commission will, by the end of May, propose triggering the emergency response system envisaged under Article 78(3) TFEU. The proposal will include a temporary distribution scheme for persons in clear need of international protection to ensure a fair and balanced participation of all Member States to this common effort (European Commission, 2015b, p. 4).

However, this initial agreement between the actors has quickly turned into a framing conflict, a dissonance of interpretations between the Commission, the Parliament and the Council regarding the conceptualisation of nature of this measure. On the one hand, the European Commission, with the support of the European Parliament, has been producing a narrative on relocation putting emphasis on its technical and political character, embodied in the values of European responsibility and solidarity. Here, both institutions have been promoting the obligatory character of the scheme, at the same time repeatedly calling for its full implementation and even intensification within a long-term EU policy scheme (European Commission, 2015g, p. 4, 2016k, p. 25; European Parliament, 2015b, p. 7). In this respect, the

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the scheme, then it will be expected to make a “solidarity contribution” (250,000 EUR for each refused applicant) (Thielemann, 2018, p. 77).

<sup>19</sup>There have been alternative visions of the relocation. For instance, “flexible solidarity”, specifically promoted by the countries of the Visegrad Group. According to this proposal, the distribution of refugees would be voluntary. The idea behind this specific principle is that some member states could take in refugees, others could instead offer some financial support or expertise (for more detailed overview see Nič, 2016).

Commission has been framing relocation as normalised and institutionalised permanent part of the EU migration policies. As stated by the President of the European Commission in the 2015 State of the Union:

A true European refugee and asylum policy requires solidarity to be permanently anchored in our policy approach and our rules. This is why, today, the Commission is also proposing a permanent relocation mechanism, which will allow us to deal with crisis situations more swiftly in the future (European Commission, 2015g, p. 5).

On the other hand, the Council of the European Union has been promoting a rather different image of the relocation scheme, distancing itself from its institutionalisation within the EU policy framework and explicitly framing it as a temporary and extraordinary measure (Council of the European Union, 2015k, 1, 2016e). In this vein, the Council has been using the language of urgency showing that this is indeed an exceptional moment requiring exceptional measures, but it is only temporary and should not be considered as a long-term solution. As stated by the Council:

(...) in the light of the current emergency situation and of the EU commitment to reinforce solidarity and responsibility, agreed on the temporary and exceptional relocation over two years from the frontline Member States Italy and Greece to other Member States (Council of the European Union, 2015k, p. 1).

This dissonance in framing of the relocation mechanism has revealed tensions within the policy environment, specifically between the Council and the Commission. In the course of the “migration crisis”, the European Commission has proven its devotion to institutionalisation of all forms of migration and border management, attempting to push forward the reform of the European asylum and migration framework and expand its control over the realm EU internal and border security (see European Commission, 2015b, 2016a). Along with the reforms of the AFSJ agencies and the development of border-migration intelligence framework, the permanent relocation scheme was supposed to be another step towards centralisation and Europeanisation of migration control. Yet, as opposed to the rest of the proposed remedial actions, the relocation scheme has had the biggest political consequences for the member states, transferring the “migration crisis” from one state to another, making member states’ governments prone to internal criticism and loss of popular support (Bauböck, 2018, p. 153). Consequently, the relocation scheme has gained a lot of opposition from some of the member states but also reignited a conflict over the institutional locus of migration control in the EU (Barbulescu, 2017; Willermain, 2016).

### 6.2.6 *Comments*

Risk management has clearly saturated the EU’s conceptualisation of remedial actions towards the “migration crisis”, becoming deeply institutionalised within the EU’s contemporary approach to migration and border policies. In this way, it has secured its dominance in the EU migration-security continuum pushing framing of

migration even deeper into the realm of normalised, institutionalised and often technology-driven modes of securitisation. The risk management-centred conceptualisation has visibly distanced the EU framing of the “migration crisis” from an inclusive humanitarian and migrant-centred referent object, promoting the idea of regaining control over mobility and external borders as the highest security priority. In doing so, the EU has introduced a plethora of instruments and policies that were supposed to lead the way back to normalcy and stability on the borders, regulating migratory flows into Europe, and flushing out “risky migrants” within the migratory flows. This type of framing has generated visible tensions with the human security-centred logic.

In this regard, the so-called “hotspot approach” has become one of the sites of such tensions, quickly becoming a symbol of the EU’s frontline and operational involvement in the “migration crisis”. In the EU policy discourse, “hotspots” have been defined as sites for the swift identification, registration and fingerprinting of incoming migrants. They were supposed to assist national authorities in managing migratory flows by selecting and channelling migrants into proper administrative procedures. According to observers and practitioners, thus construed “hotspots” represent some of the most explicit sites of securitisation of irregular immigrants and asylum seekers, subjecting them to security practices and restrictive border and migration policies. They have been reframing migrants and turning them into objects of risk, collecting biometric information and generating security dossiers in the name of the security imperative. As noted by an interviewed Frontex officer:

In their essence “hotspots” are not about humanitarian assistance but assigning illegal migrants into a category, making them visible in the system for now and future reference. It is about turning them from “unknown” into “known”, or better from “unmanageable” into “manageable”. Identification and processing of those illegal migrants, refugee status or not, is our security imperative and cannot be ignored whatever the crisis (Frontex-2).

Evidently the need for management, control and monitoring of increased migratory flows has translated into actions of identification, registration, screening and surveillance at the EU level. This is not to say that migration-oriented technologies of data surveillance and control were not present before the “migration crisis” but they have certainly become more prominent in the EU’s conceptualisation of responses to the “migration crisis”. The increased technologisation of the EU migration and border policies has further normalised and institutionalised risk management in the EU policy discourse, moving conceptualisation of remedial actions to what Bigo (2002) calls “managers of unease” – technocrats, experts and professionals responsible for calculating uncertain futures. This has resulted in the more prominent mobilisation of EU agencies and proliferation of dataveillance systems tasked with targeting asylum seekers, irregular, but also regular migrants in search for threats to security. This incorporation of broad categories of migrants into the risk equation has a significant securitising effect, going beyond the “migration crisis”. In this vein, an interviewed Europol officer observed that:

Because of this crisis, migration has become one of the sites of security and risk management. For instance, when I train Europol officers for the “hotspot” duty, I keep telling them

that they do not interview migrants but debrief them. The task is to collect sensitive, operational data that can be used in on-going criminal investigations, counter-terrorist operations etc. These intercepted migrants are the source of this information, they can be valuable, but they also can be dangerous because of their willing involvement in certain illicit activities. The operative word is that they “can be” a problem and it is our job to know which ones already are a threat or can turn into one in the future. One way or another, they have become a serious part of a security problem that has emerged in the course of the crisis and there is nothing we can do about it. I think that this crisis has permanently changed the relationship between security and migration (Europol-2).

As observed by Niemann and Zaun (2018, p. 16), the “hotspots” and other instruments of intelligence gathering and sharing are now cogwheels in a more complex European administrative machinery that allow border and migration authorities to categorise, select and process irregular migrants in accordance with their protection or security status but also desirability. In this respect, the managerial approach to the crisis is strongly reflected in the promotion of policy instruments that enable managing and moving different categories of migrants within and out of the EU. Here, the elements of the detention and return of migrants have proved to have a significant securitising effect, labelling whole groups of migrants as risky or undesirable (often in the name of public safety), subjecting them to security practices eventually resulting in expulsion from the EU territories. In the EU policy discourse, returns represents a peculiar way of claiming control over the uncontrollable force of human mobility. In this sense, return operations are supposed to secure the outflows of migrants; they are a safety valve which can and will be used whenever there is a too much pressure in the migration and border system.

While the returns and detention are aimed at the broadly understood removal of risky and unwanted migrants, resettlement and relocation are directed at those who deserve protection and have passed administrative pre-screening and pre-processing, at the latest. In this vein, the EU has been framing relocation and resettlement as legal pathways or safe passages for refugees into their destination countries, at the same time indicating the need for solidarity among the member states in sharing the burden of international protection. As application of these measures (specifically the relocation mechanism) has proved to contentious, the idea behind resettlement and relocation has revealed strong managerial and externalising tendencies in the conceptualisation of remedial actions in the EU. An interviewed Member of the European Parliament observed that:

The whole idea of returns and resettlement is based on a filtering process. It is about letting in “good migrants” and pushing out “bad migrants” and the security, border and migration apparatus is the “filter” here. The thing is that the EU’s approach to this filtering process is to do it at a distance, preferably in Libya, Turkey, everywhere but not here. That is why resettlement was much less controversial than relocation. Resettlement places migrants outside the borders and they come in only when we choose to let them, while relocation is about migrants-refugees who are here and now, and they have to be dealt with whatever EU’s or Member States’ preferences. That is why EU likes the deal with Turkey so much. It gives you a chance to manage the “migration crisis” outside the EU and keeping, at least some of the migrants, at bay (European Parliament-3).

Indeed, the EU-Turkey deal has become the symbol of the externalisation of management of migratory flows into the EU. Thanks to the mixture of border security measures and resettlement schemes, it has allowed the EU to deter some migrants from crossing the Mediterranean and the EU to regain some control over the migratory flows. In doing so, it has also introduced a more restrictive border regime with serious consequences for the security of migrants attempting to cross the Eastern Mediterranean into Greece. In this respect, there is a tension between logics inscribed into the EU-Turkey Statement, reflected in sacrificing the human security of migrants in the name of regaining of control over migratory flows. As noted by an interviewed European Asylum Support Office officer:

The deal gave the EU a sense of control and space to breathe and think about the next steps. It pushed the flows back and externalised the problem, dropping it in Turkey’s lap. We keep forgetting that tightening border security and distancing the problem does not make the flows stop. Push and pull factors remain as they were. The change is that migrants have to find new, often more dangerous, ways of travel from there to here. They choose other routes or stay in Turkey, hiding from the Turkish authorities and paying additional fees to smugglers, who only benefit from attempts to contain the problem instead of solving its underlying causes (EASO-2).

The analysed policy discourse and accounts of interviewees indicate that the elements of management of borders, migration, and migration-related risks have indeed made a deep mark on the conceptualisation of the remedial actions towards the crisis. The Union’s discourse on the “migration crisis” is characterised by a distinctive risk-centred framing, oriented on regaining of control over EU external borders and migratory flows. To this end, the EU has promoted mobilisation of security measures and IT systems that allow identifying incoming irregular migrants, categorising them and managing them according to their status and the level of risks they generate. Thus, in response to the “migration crisis”, the EU has sponsored and enhanced a specific blend of border security and risk management measures built on tailor-made modes of migration governance (e.g. “hotspots”) or technology and intelligence-driven policy instruments (e.g. data surveillance or interoperability of information systems) in order to create and maintain a sense of order and manageability of future migration-related risks.

### 6.3 Resilience

The inclusion of resilience in the conceptualisation of remedial actions towards the crisis has emerged on the wave of its increasing popularity among international security actors such as NATO (Hady, 2017; Prior, 2017), the UN (Marulanda Fraume et al., 2020), and of course the EU (Juncos, 2017; Wagner & Anholt, 2016). According to the logic of resilience, the notion of security revolves around structural and institutional robustness to negative scenarios that will certainly materialise at some point in the future (Brassett et al., 2013; Coaffee & Fussey, 2015; Manyena, 2006). With this assumption in mind, resilience is centred on the conceptualisation

of long-term remedial actions that allow development of an interconnected, flexible and adaptable system, capable of withstanding any possible shocks and disturbances that may affect the stability or even existence of referent objects (e.g. the EU asylum system or the EU as whole) (Bourbeau, 2013). In this respect, resilience-oriented policy actions are focused on elimination of extreme vulnerabilities within the targeted system by building up its structural and institutional strength (Bourbeau, 2015, p. 1963).

During the “migration crisis”, resilience has become the new leitmotif of the EU’s approach to security. This specific logic is sponsored most visibly by the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, with contributions from the European External Actions Service (which was the result of the framings of the Commission and the Council). These framing actors have expressed a common interest in the external security realm of the EU and were already invested in the external dimension of resilience, promoting development, a comprehensive approach to security, disaster early warning and preparedness programmes, or the idea of community resilience in the EU neighbourhood (Wagner & Anholt, 2016). Broader internalisation of resilience came with the 2016 EU’s Global Strategy, which explicitly indicates the role of this particular logic within the EU’s external policy framework:

It is in the interests of our citizens to invest in the resilience of states and societies to the east stretching into Central Asia, and south down to Central Africa. Fragility beyond our borders threatens all our vital interests. By contrast, resilience – the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises – benefits us and countries in our surrounding regions, sowing the seeds for sustainable growth and vibrant societies. Together with its partners, the EU will therefore promote resilience in its surrounding regions. A resilient state is a secure state, and security is key for prosperity and democracy (European Commission, 2016h, p. 23).

This is not to say that resilience is limited to the external dimension of EU policy. It strongly intertwines with the internal security domain, gaining significance, also in relation to border control and migration management. Here, the EU policy discourse concerning the crisis strongly communicates the need for building up resilience within the internal-external security nexus, identifying structural vulnerabilities (e.g. by external border vulnerability assessment) and strengthening the capacity for crisis management (Council of the European Union, 2016d; European Commission, 2015b, 2016g, h; European Parliament, 2014, 2016f). As stressed by the Council of the European Union in its Conclusions on the EU’s Internal Security Strategy, there is a “necessity to strengthen protection of critical infrastructures and the need to ensure resilience, operational preparedness and political coordination to react, deal with and mitigate crises and natural/man-made disasters” (Council of the European Union, 2015e, p. 2).

As a result, the logic of resilience is prominently visible in the conceptualisation of remedial actions towards the “migration crisis”, specifically while addressing its root causes (external dimension) and the EU’s capacity for processing asylum seekers (internal dimension). It should be stressed that in relation to the root causes of the crisis, the logic of resilience seems to be intertwining and corresponding with

the human security-centred diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis. Here, human suffering and poverty, defined as the key push factors for the 2015 increased migratory flows to the EU, are addressed with external interventions of a capacity-building nature, aimed at enhancing the societal, economic and political resilience of countries of origin and transit (Council of the European Union, 2016b, f; European Commission, 2015h; European Parliament, 2016f, 2017a). In this respect, the European Commission has been communicating that:

a special focus in our work on resilience will be on origin and transit countries of migrants and refugees. We will significantly step up our humanitarian efforts in these countries, focusing on education, women and children. Together with countries of origin and transit, we will develop common and tailor-made approaches to migration featuring development, diplomacy, mobility, legal migration, border management, readmission and return. Through development, trust funds, preventive diplomacy and mediation we will work with countries of origin to address and prevent the root causes of displacement, manage migration, and fight trans-border crime (European Commission, 2016h, p. 27).

Similarly, the idea of building up the resilience of the EU migration and border control capacity is framed as a matter of protection of human life, alleviation of the suffering and exploitation of migrants at the hands of human smugglers and traffickers. In this respect, the EU policy actors produce a coherent message that only by improving the capacity and resilience of the EU’s asylum system, Europe is able to fulfil its international obligations and provide international protection to those who are entitled to it (European Commission, 2015h; European Parliament, 2016f). Here, the resilience-driven framing points towards the need for strengthening the Common European Asylum System directly referring to centralisation and harmonisation of the EU-wide capacity for dealing with the current and future increased migratory flows (European Commission, 2016c, p. 4).

In the next part of this chapter, I will discuss some of the most prominent examples of application of the logic of resilience in conceptualisation of remedial actions towards the crisis. In doing so, I will focus specifically on three types of actions framed in the EU policy discourse, covering the internal (i.e. Common European Asylum System) and external (i.e. EU Trust Funds, and CSDP capacity building and assistance missions) dimensions of the resilience-building activities.

### ***6.3.1 Reforming Common European Asylum System***

As aptly noted by Costello and Mouzourakis (2017, p. 263), the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is “neither truly common nor a system”. It is rather a legislative framework, consisting of a package of EU directives and regulations “defining common minimum standards to which Member States are to adhere in connection with the reception of asylum-seekers; qualification for international protection and the content of the protection granted; and procedures for granting and withdrawing

refugee status”<sup>20</sup> (International Association of Refugee Law Judges, 2016, p. 15). The idea behind development of the CEAS is harmonisation and centralisation of the main features of the EU’s migration management and asylum policy. This includes establishment of EU-wide mechanisms that would discourage secondary movements and “venue shopping”, as well as ensure uniform treatment of asylum seekers and balanced recognition rates across the EU (European Commission, 2016c, p. 2).

Some of the most prominent features of the CEAS have already been covered in this chapter, specifically referring to the issues of reception-detention, relocation, resettlement and dataveillance. That is why in this section I will focus on the CEAS as a whole, taking into account its specific framing in the EU policy discourse on the “migration crisis” and its underlying security logic. Within the timeframe of the writing of this book, the CEAS is still considered to be “under construction”, being a prominent part of the EU policy discourse rather than an effective component of the EU policy action framework (Bauböck, 2018; Niemann & Zaun, 2018). This does not mean, however, that its importance and prominence in the conceptualisation of remedial actions towards the crisis is any less significant. Quite the contrary, the framing of CEAS in the EU policy discourse reveals a very important, resilience-driven aspect of this process.

As already noted earlier in this chapter, within the EU policy discourse on the “migration crisis” the CEAS is often framed with a distinctive blend of human security- and resilience-centred logics. The EU policy actors, and the Commission in particular, have been promoting the idea of CEAS as a tool for ensuring protection and strengthening human security, noting that a well-functioning and uniform asylum system is “supposed to ensure the legal avenues to Europe for migrants seeking protection” (European Parliament, 2016f, rec. 15), at the same time “guaranteeing humane and efficient asylum policy reinforcing protection of the fundamental rights of asylum-seekers, paying particular attention to the needs of vulnerable groups, such as children” (European Commission, 2015b, p. 12). In this regard, the CEAS is unequivocally depicted as an instrument for providing protection, or as the European Commission puts it – “an area of protection and solidarity for the most vulnerable, (...) setting out common high standards and stronger co-operation to ensure that asylum seekers are treated equally in an open and fair system – wherever

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<sup>20</sup>The legislation defining CEAS includes the Eurodac Regulation (regulating collection and exchange of biometric information on asylum seekers), the Temporary Protection Directive (regulating subsidiary international protection), the Dublin III Regulation (setting out criteria for assigning responsibility for processing asylum applications), the Reception Conditions Directive (setting out condition for detention of migrants), the Qualification Directive (setting out grounds for granting international protection), and the Asylum Procedures Directive (setting out quality standards for asylum procedures) (for more detailed overview see Costello and Mouzourakis, 2017). Even though not considered as part of legislative instruments of CEAS, the Returns Directive, the Family Reunification Directive and the Long-Term Residents Directive, and the European Asylum Support Office Regulation are also commonly connected to the CEAS framework as part of a wider EU migration and asylum policy package (International Association of Refugee Law Judges, 2016, pp. 17–19).

they apply” (European Commission, 2018, p. 1). Here, the European asylum system is connected to the notions of fairness, responsibility for asylum seekers and solidarity among the EU Member States in treating all the asylum applications in accordance with the highest EU standards and international obligations (European Parliament, 2016e).

In the course of the “migration crisis”, the EU’s framing of the CEAS displayed a distinctive note of “wishful thinking”, indicating that the current state of this particular system is rather a liability than opportunity in dealing with the crisis (Costello & Mouzourakis, 2017, p. 272). In this respect, the state of CEAS becomes defined as dangerous, affecting the EU security with its dysfunctionality and vulnerability. As reiterated throughout the EU policy discourse, the increased migratory flows have revealed an inherent weakness in the EU asylum system, rendering the CEAS fragmented (European Commission, 2016c, p. 3), defective (Council of the European Union, 2017d, p. 8; European Parliament, 2016g, rec. 12), and enabling unwanted practices such as “venue shopping” and secondary movement of asylum seekers (European Commission, 2018). This has translated into concerning lack of resilience, and a collapse under the strain of increased arrivals of migrants. When the European Commission proposed reform of the CEAS it established that state CEAS defies its purpose, as it is

characterised by differing treatment of asylum seekers, including in terms of the length of asylum procedures or reception conditions across Member States, a situation which in turn encourages secondary movements. Even though CEAS sets out the standards for the recognition and protection to be offered at EU level, in practice recognition rates vary, sometimes widely, between Member States. There is also a lack of adequate convergence as regards the decision to grant either refugee status (to be accorded to persons fleeing persecution) or subsidiary protection status (to be accorded to persons fleeing the risk of serious harm, including armed conflict) for applicants from a given country of origin (European Commission, 2016c, pp. 4–5).

Under more critical investigation, the “migration crisis” reveals itself not as a crisis of migration but of migration and policies employed at the member states and the EU levels (Niemann & Zaun, 2018, p. 3). It is a crisis of resilience and functionality that feeds on the vulnerabilities of the EU asylum system, which has failed the test of the increased migratory pressures.

As a result, the EU policy discourse indicates that it is not the CEAS that should be considered as a remedial action towards the crisis, but its reform, which is supposed to build up the EU’s resilience to the future shocks and disturbances related to increased migratory flows (Council of the European Union, 2017d; European Commission, 2016c, d; European Parliament, 2015d). As noted in the European Council conclusions,

there is a common understanding that the reformed CEAS needs to strike the right balance between responsibility and solidarity and that it needs to ensure resilience to future crises. The system has to be efficient, be able to withstand migratory pressure, eliminate pull factors as well as secondary movements, in compliance with international law, fight abuse and provide adequate support to the most affected Member States (European Council, 2017a, p. 11).

In this respect, the European Commission has proposed further harmonisation and centralisation of the EU asylum instruments, framing the European Asylum Support Office as instrumental for implementation of the Common European Asylum System “by collecting and exchanging information on best practices, drawing up an annual report on the asylum situation in the EU and adopting technical documents, such as guidelines and operating manuals, on the implementation of the Union’s asylum instruments”<sup>21</sup> (EASO, 2017, p. 2). The majority of provisions included in the reform did not arouse many objections in the EU, except for the Revision of Dublin Regulation (Pastore & Henry, 2016).

The so-called Dublin system (currently in its third instalment under the Dublin III Regulation) has been present in the EU migration-security continuum since the 1990s. In the course of the crisis, it has become one of the most controversial and problematic aspects of the CEAS and the EU’s approach to migration and asylum management (Bauböck, 2018; Huysmans, 2000). The Dublin system has established clear indicators for assigning responsibility for handling asylum applications to one specific EU member state, thus limiting the secondary movements and so-called “venue shopping” (Kaunert & Léonard, 2012). In this regard, the regulation introduces a hierarchy of criteria such as “family unity, possession of residence documents or visas, irregular entry or stay and visa-waived entry” (European Parliament Website, 2018b). There is, however, one element of this set of criteria that has quickly become the symbol and the main issue of the system, namely the criterion of irregular entry, which means that “the Member State through which the asylum-seeker first entered in the EU is responsible to examine his/her asylum claim” (European Parliament Website, 2018b). During the crisis, this criterion, along with the Dublin system, has proved not only impractical but also potentially devastating for the asylum systems of EU frontline countries such as Greece or Italy, making them solely responsible for handling the migratory pressures on the EU Mediterranean border (Thielemann, 2018, p. 78). This vulnerability and inapplicability of the Dublin system has not gone unnoticed in the EU policy discourse, focusing attention around the relocation mechanism (already discussed in this chapter) and its institutionalisation within the reformed CEAS (Council of the European Union, 2017a; European Commission, 2016c, 2017i; European Parliament, 2015d).

In this respect, the framing of the CEAS reform, intertwines with the framing of the relocation mechanism revealing elements of resilience-centred thinking. Here, the reform of the EU asylum and the Dublin system is specifically promoted in the

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<sup>21</sup>The reform consists of seven individual legislative proposals including Revision of the Dublin Regulation, Recast Eurodac Regulation, Renegotiation of European Asylum Support Office Regulation, Reform of the Asylum Procedures Directive, Reform of the Qualification Directive, Reform of the Reception Conditions Directive, Development of the EU Resettlement Framework (Bauböck, 2018, p. 147). The main points of the reform included “(1) relocation of applicants from countries overburdened with asylum claims; (2) shorter time limits for transfers of applications between Member States, thus removing shifts of responsibility; (3) discouraging venue shopping and secondary movements with aim of claiming asylum in different EU Member States; (4) stronger guarantees for unaccompanied minors and reworking of the definition of ‘family members’” (European Parliament Website, 2018a; European Union, 2016c).

EU policy discourse as a response to the exposed shortcomings in the design and implementation of the EU asylum policies. As stated by Dimitris Avramopoulos, the Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, “the CEAS and the whole Schengen zone is as strong as its weakest link, and now this weakest link is the Dublin system” (Ripoll Servent, 2018, p. 89). In this sense, the policy discourse concentrates not only on the issue of processing asylum seekers, but also on the matters of resilience of the Dublin system and its ability to provide clear and binding rules regarding redirecting of increased migratory pressures into less strained components of the system (European Commission, 2016c, p. 7). For this reason, building on the idea of solidarity, fairness and trust between the member states, the European Commission has been framing the reformed Dublin system as a resilient and reliable mechanism that provides clear rules governing relations between the member states in regard to examination of asylum applications, at the same time creating “means of detecting early problems in national asylum or reception systems, and address their root causes before they develop into fully fledged crises” (European Commission, 2018, p. 1). With this outspoken outlook on the future crises, the reform of the CEAS and the Dublin system is framed as an instrument for increasing resilience, making the asylum system more balanced, flexible, and robust in the face of not so much the “migration crisis” of 2015 but rather future migration-related challenges which will, sooner or later, materialise at the EU’s doorsteps.

### 6.3.2 *European Union Trust Funds*

The EU policy discourse on the “migration crisis” frames financial aid and development programmes as some of the key instruments for addressing the external causes of the crisis, enabling direct humanitarian-, reconstruction- and development-oriented interventions in the communities and countries of origin of irregular migrants (see Council of the European Union, 2016b, d; European Commission, 2016a; European Council 2017c; European Parliament, 2017a). It is continuously reiterated, specifically by the Commission, that “EU external cooperation assistance, and in particular development cooperation, plays an important role in tackling issues like poverty, insecurity, inequality and unemployment which are among the main root causes of irregular and forced migration” (European Commission, 2015b, p. 8, 2016a, f). The Parliament has supported this type of framing, especially in reference to its human security-centred features, often underlining that “the root causes of violence and underdevelopment need to be addressed in the countries of origin in order to stem the flow of refugees and economic migrants” (European Parliament, 2015d, rec. 16; see also 2016f, 2017a).

Here, the EU’s framing revolves around developing resilience in its neighbourhood and beyond. This idea is based on the notion that by increasing financial transfers and tailored development aid it is possible to strengthen the capacity of countries of origin to alleviate human suffering, fight structural problems and, in the long term, withstand economic, social and political shocks that produce and/or facilitate

irregular migratory flows (Ceccorulli & Lucarelli, 2017). This again pinpoints the intertwining of resilience with human security in the EU discourse. The EU policy actors have been coherently promoting the idea of adjusting or reorienting development funds for the purpose of increasing resilience in the countries of transit and origin, creating a stronger EU neighbourhood that could contain the migratory flows, even before they reach the EU's borders (European Commission, 2015h; European Parliament, 2017a). Here, the Council of the European Union offers an apt example of such framing, noting already in the early stages of the "migration crisis" that

A sustainable solution can only be found by intensifying cooperation with countries of origin and transit, including through assistance to strengthen their migration and border management capacity. Migration policies must become a much stronger integral part of the Union's external and development policies (European Council, 2014, p. 3).

In this respect, the EU policy discourse is filled with calls for increased synergy between migration, trade and development policies, underlining the need for more comprehensive and coordinated actions that could address the internal and external dynamics of the crisis (for example: Council of the European Union, 2015c, e, f; European Commission, 2015b, h; European Parliament, 2017a). Along with a whole plethora of already existing financial programmes that have been earmarked to address the external root causes of increased migratory flows,<sup>22</sup> the EU has been specifically focusing attention on one type of financial instrument that is depicted in the EU policy discourse as the best stimulant of resilience, namely EU Trust Funds (EUTFs).

Trust Funds are commonly described as ad hoc and temporary instruments that allow pooling and sharing of significant volumes of financial assets from different sources in order to fund a specific goal (Hauck et al., 2015, p. 2). The funds may vary in scope, covering a specific country, region or even the whole globe while responding to identified policy priorities. They are governed by legal arrangements between donors and beneficiaries and are subjected to extraordinary financial reporting requirements for the purposes of monitoring spending priorities (Guder, 2009, p. 36). The trust funds have quickly become a preferred mode of financial intervention, proliferating in international development politics and turning into a "standard financing modality for delivering aid in coordinated international responses in fragile and post-conflict environments and complex emergencies" (Hauck et al., 2015, p. 2).

The EU started to develop its own trust fund scheme in 2013 as a way of increasing its political visibility on the international stage by creating a financial instrument for rapid and high impact interventions in external crisis situations (Hauck et al., 2015, p. 3). The main idea behind the EUTFs was to introduce a dose of flexibility into the existing development schemes, allowing the Commission to create

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<sup>22</sup>Migration and Integration Fund, Internal Security Fund, Humanitarian Aid from the Emergency Aid Reserve, External Borders Fund, to name a few (for more detailed overview see European Parliament Website, 2018d).

and manage its own EUTFs that would not only leverage additional contributions from the EU member states but also remain open to financial transfers from non-EU donors and private entities (Hauck et al., 2015, p. 3). In this way, as an added value to already existing development programmes, the EUTFs are “supposed to bring a more coherent and integrated EU response to crises by merging various EU financial instruments and contributions from within and outside the EU into one single flexible mechanism for quick disbursement” (European Commission, 2017n).

Since the early days of the “migration crisis” the EU policy actors, especially the Commission and the Councils, have been framing the EUTFs as rapid and custom-tailored financial instruments for increasing resilience. This commitment to the EUTF concept is clearly visible in the Valletta Summit Action Plan, where the EU has confirmed the importance of trust funds in responding to the “migration crisis”, indicating that they will provide countries of origin and transit with:

additional funding and will contribute to a flexible, speedy and efficient delivery of support to foster stability and to contribute to better migration management. More specifically, the Trust Funds will help address the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration, by promoting economic and equal opportunities, strengthening resilience of vulnerable people, security and development (European Council, 2015f, pp. 1–2).

In this respect, the EU quite directly indicates that the strength of EUTFs lies in their flexibility that allows mobilising additional financial resources and the possibility to finally factor-in the ties between migration control, labour mobility and trade, thus enhancing incentives for cooperation in the areas of border management and readmission (European Commission, 2015g, p. 27).

By the end of 2017 the EU had created and promoted three major EUTFs that were supposed to directly contribute to addressing the root causes of the crisis by building up societal, political and economic resilience in the relevant countries and regions. The first EUTF, framed as a policy response to increased migratory flows was launched in mid-2014 under the name “Bêkou Trust Fund” (or EUTF CAR) and concentrated predominantly on the Central African Republic (CAR) (European Commission, 2018). The Fund has been tasked with streamlining donor operations into CAR and funding post-conflict and transition-related activities, reducing human suffering and displacement by alleviating structural fragility of the state (European Commission Website, 2018b). With a broad scope of projects concentrated on employment generation, access to health services, development of water and sanitation infrastructure, and refugee support, the EUTF CAR has become a new type of Trust Fund linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) in one EU financial intervention (Niemann & Zaun, 2018, p. 12). In this way, even though limited in terms of budget (64 million EUR), the EUTF CAR has set out an overarching principle for the development and implementation of the other Trust Funds that were supposed to tackle the root causes of the “migration crisis”.

The “EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian Crisis” (also referred to as “the Madad Fund” or EUTF Madad) was established in 2014 to address the challenges of the Syrian refugee crisis in Syria and neighbouring countries (i.e. Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon Turkey), and affected regions (i.e. Western Balkans) (Den Hertog,

2016, p. 3). The EUTF Madad focused on providing help to up to 1.5 million Syrian refugees, supporting basic public services and necessities, covering access to basic and higher education, health services, socio-economic support, and development of water and wastewater infrastructure (European Commission Website, 2018a). Since its inception, the Fund has been framed as an instrument for development and resilience, covering programmes aimed at decreasing “the pressure on countries hosting refugees by investing in livelihoods and social cohesion and supporting them in providing access to jobs and education that will benefit both refugees and host communities” (European Commission Website, 2018a). With the escalation of the “migration crisis” in late 2015 and early 2016, the Madad Fund rapidly gained in significance in the EU’s development aid scheme, relatively easily exceeding the target contribution of one billion EUR and amounting to total volume of 1.5 billion EUR in 2018 (Den Hertog, 2016, p. 3).

Encouraged by the initial success and overall support for the Trust Fund for Syria, in 2015 the EU initiated another fund, this time focused specifically on Africa and programmes oriented to stemming irregular migration (Niemann & Zaun, 2018, p. 12). The “EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa” (EUTF for Africa) focused specifically on three regions, which produce the highest numbers of irregular migrants in the EU, namely Sahel and Lake Chad, the Horn of Africa and North Africa (European Commission, 2015b, p. 5; European Commission Website, 2018e). EUTF for Africa is a great example of how the EU policy actors have started to reorient the focus of development aid specifically for the purpose of migration management and resilience. The Fund is described as an instrument for removing push factors for migration by building up economic security (e.g. addressing skills gaps, improving employability through vocational training, supporting job creation and self-employment) and broadly understood resilience covering food and nutrition security, as well as good governance, rule of law and human rights protections, to name a few (European Commission Website, 2018f; European Parliament, 2016b). In this sense, the discourse on the Fund has very distinctive migration-resilience features, oriented on improving migration governance by addressing the drivers of irregular migration, encouraging legal mobility and fostering effective returns and reintegration.

### ***6.3.3 EU Border, Capacity Building and Assistance Missions***

The CSDP non-kinetic (e.g. capacity building- and assistance-centred) responses to the root causes of the “migration crisis” have become a prominent part of the resilience-centred framing in the EU. In this respect, with the Council of the European Union as the main sponsor, the EU policy actors have been expanding the understanding of the CSDP operations within the EU migration and border management scheme discussions (Council of the European Union, 2016b, c, g, 2017a; European Commission, 2015b, 2016g; European Parliament, 2017a). They have been consistently framing the EU’s military and civilian missions as one of the

instruments that “will support different paths to resilience, targeting the most acute cases of governmental, economic, societal and climate/energy fragility, as well as develop more effective migration policies for Europe and its partners” (European Security and Defence College, 2017, p. 22). The mandates of the missions are predominantly centred on elimination of the weakest links in the border and security system of host countries, focusing on security sector reform, capacity building, border assistance, and advisory and training activities. These are supposed to supplement and complement other EU efforts in strengthening political, economic and societal resilience in the regions producing highest numbers of irregular migrants (Haesebrouck & Meirvenne, 2016, pp. 269–270). In this regard, the EU policy discourse on the “migration crisis” highlights three CSDP missions in particular – EU Border Advisory Mission Libya (EUBAM Libya), EU Capacity Building Mission Sahel Niger (EUCAP Niger), and EU Capacity Building Mission Sahel Mali (EUCAP Mali).

EUBAM Libya<sup>23</sup> is an explicit example of the resilience-centred framing of CSDP instruments. In the EU policy discourse, the mission is framed as a support and capacity building capability, which is supposed to assist the Libyan (legitimate) border, migration and justice authorities in regaining control over its borders and the internal security realm (Council of the European Union, 2016k; EEAS Website, 2017). To this end, its mandate “is carried out through advising, training and mentoring Libyan counterparts in strengthening the border services in accordance with international standards and best practices, and by advising the Libyan authorities on the development of a national Integrated Border Management” (EEAS Website, 2018). However, EUBAM Libya is more than a border assistance mission. Indeed, it has very prominent migration and border control features, but it also includes strong criminal justice and counter-terrorism components, which strategically connect security and defence planning, migration and policing within one broad CSDP assistance-expertise package (EEAS Website, 2018). The EUBAM Libya shows an interesting securitising potential in the conceptualisation of external migration control, merging capacity building with elements of militarisation of migration (Jones & Johnson, 2016, p. 196). In this respect, the mission is based on the idea that the strength of the EU borders starts with the strength of the EU neighbourhood and by extension its ability to control its territories and contain migratory flows (Jones & Johnson, 2016, p. 197). In this respect, the mission’s mandate literally brings migration and border control in Libya under CSDP crisis management mentorship, generating a distinctive securitising or even militarising move towards human mobility, merging elements of resilience and “exceptionalist” security thinking.

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<sup>23</sup>EUBAM Libya was launched in May 2013, as a civilian mission under the framework of CSDP. It was extended twice by the Council of the European Union, most recently in 2016 when the EU framed it as a response to the 2015 “migration crisis” and strengthened its mandate with capacity building of criminal justice (EEAS, 2017b).

Another example of the application of CSDP missions for the purposes of curbing migratory flows are the EU Capacity Building Operations Sahel Niger<sup>24</sup> and Sahel Mali,<sup>25</sup> both mandated with security sector reforms, counter-terrorism training, and capacity building of migration control and criminal justice systems. The intensification of CSDP operations in the Sahel is not a coincidence. In the EU policy discourse, the region is defined as one of the key points of reference for security, migration and resilience building activities (Alberto & Tebas, 2015). As noted by the EEAS, “Europe has numerous interests in the region, ranging from combating security threats, terrorism, organised crime and illegal migration to assuring energy security” (EEAS Website, 2016a). In this respect, the scope of both EUCAP Sahel operations remains relatively broad and concentrates on assisting and mentoring national security authorities in security sector reform and management of the internal security system (EEAS, 2017a, p. 19). In regard to migration control prerogatives, the EUCAP, frames the national Nigerian and Malian security forces as the primary “managers” of migration, effectively supporting militarisation of migration control in Mali. As specified in the mandate of EUCAP Sahel Niger, one of the key priorities of the mission is to “support the security forces’ capability to better control migration flows and to combat irregular migration and associated criminal activity more effectively” (EEAS Website, 2016a). Similarly, EUCAP Sahel Mali has been emphasising the need for “supporting Mali in managing migrating flows and border management by strengthening of the Malian internal security forces capacity in the fight against terrorism and organised crime” (EEAS Website, 2016b). With this type of framing, it becomes evident that the clue of the EU’s approach to migration control and resilience building in its neighbourhood lies with the effectiveness of national security authorities in controlling their borders and containing irregular migration.

### 6.3.4 Comments

The prominence of the logic of resilience in the conceptualisation of remedial actions towards the “migration crisis” indicates that broader risk-oriented framing is strongly favoured. Resilience, even though it belongs to the family of risk logic, proposes a set of measures and objectives for dealing with migration-related

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<sup>24</sup>EUCAP Sahel Niger was launched in 2012 as a capacity building mission providing training and advice to the Nigerian security authorities, specifically in reference to counter-terrorist and anti-organised crime activities. In 2015 the mission was extended and operationally expanded to cover capacity building of migration control and fight against irregular migration (EEAS, 2017a, p. 19).

<sup>25</sup>EUCAP Sahel Mali was launched in 2015 as a capacity building mission tasked with providing assistance and advice to the national police, the national gendarmerie and the national guard in the implementation of the security reform. EUCAP Sahel Mali closely cooperates with United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali in execution of its mandate (EEAS, 2017a, p. 20).

challenges separate from risk management. While risk management-centred policy responses concentrate on the idea of managing, averting or mitigating potential threats, resilience focuses on building up the structural robustness of the referent object to the upcoming shocks and disturbances (Kaufmann, 2016, p. 102). In the EU’s framing of the crisis, this notion of increasing resilience, though not present in the diagnosis and evaluation, has been institutionalised into the policy responses. In this respect, in the remedial actions phase of the framing process, resilience-oriented instruments have become juxtaposed with human security and “exceptionalist” logic, inducing a specific mixture of humanitarian relief, development, capacity building and security into the internal (European Common Asylum System) and external (EU Trust Funds and CSDP missions) dimensions of EU migration and border management. In both these dimensions the EU’s framing of resilience-building reforms or interventions carry a significant potential for securitisation, to various extents linking asylum and external migration control with the realm of security.

As discussed above, within the EU’s internal dimension the logic of resilience is most prominent in the conceptualisation of the Common European Asylum System reform. Here, the CEAS is framed in the EU policy discourse as one of the key EU’s vulnerabilities, reflected in its ineffectiveness and inability to absorb pressures caused by increased numbers of applications from asylum seekers. This lack of resilience of the CEAS has been continuously reiterated in the EU policy discourse, encouraging calls for deeper and more decisive centralisation and harmonisation of EU asylum procedures at the EU level. Here, the EU’s strategy towards the identified vulnerability falls under the category of “adaptation”, which suggests the adjustment of the system within the existing policies and institutional frameworks in accordance with the identified vulnerabilities and specific types of future risks (Methmann & Oels, 2015, p. 54). This element of resilience-building adaption quite visibly pushed asylum seekers deeper into the realm of security, on one hand attempting to strengthen the effectiveness of the system, but on the other integrating it more with the EU’s internal security realm. As noted by the interviewed European Asylum Support Office officer:

From EASO’s point of view, the whole commotion around CEAS is good. It finally puts us on the map calling for strengthening of our mandate and centralisation of the whole system. But if we look closer what the EU is trying to do here, we will see that in fact in the name of protection of asylum seekers it proposes to bring closer the asylum security systems, especially in terms of identification of potential threats, terrorists, and irregular migrants among asylum applicants. For instance, the reform proposes a major increase of Eurodac competencies and scope, allowing for collecting more detailed and, using security language, operational information on asylum seekers. This data will be then, under certain circumstances, shared among EU security agencies, national security authorities that investigate asylum seekers. Another example is EASO’s rapprochement with Europol and Frontex, what is already visible in hotspots. With the new mandate we will be institutionally, organisationally and what is more important operationally closer than ever with these agencies, which are all about security – we are not. EASO is about protection, even though we do not provide protection as such (EASO-3).

In this respect, the idea of building up resilience to the future migration-related crises is linked not only to harmonisation and centralisation of specific aspects of the EU asylum system, but also its securitisation.

The logic of resilience has assumed a slightly different shape in the conceptualisation of actions addressing the external dimension the crisis. Resilience-building instruments have been commonly framed in the EU as the most suitable for addressing what is believed to be the human insecurity and root causes of the “migration crisis”; however, under closer scrutiny it becomes evident that they have been designed to externalise migration management and outsource responsibility for containment of irregular crossings into the EU. Indeed, the EU’s conceptualisation of remedial actions outside the EU borders embodies the very idea of externalisation of migration control by increasing the resilience and effectiveness of the migration and border authorities in the countries of transit or origin of irregular migrants. In this sense, the EU has been framing such external action instruments as the EU Trust Funds and the CSDP civilian missions as interventions that were supposed to assist national authorities in increasing their capacity for border and migration control. The neighbouring countries and countries of origin, with the EU’s assistance, were supposed become stable enough to absorb all kinds of shocks (be it economic, societal or environmental) and contain migrants (often their own citizens) within their borders.

Here, the EU Trust Funds represent a financial intervention that was supposed to disarm socio-economic factors pushing migrants out of their host communities, while the CSDP capacity building missions concentrate on assisting security authorities (e.g. the military) in addressing migration-related challenges, including irregular migration and trans-border organised crime, and terrorism. These resilience-centred instruments to different degrees integrate migration with the realm of security, sometimes even militarising migration control in the third countries, fortifying the EU against future migration-related shocks. As noted by the interviewed Member of the European Parliament:

The EU’s understanding of resilience to migration is about building walls outside already existing walls. The EU is trying to make different countries, especially neighbouring ones, responsible for stopping flows of migrants whatever the cost. Let’s not kid ourselves, Europe needs stable countries with stable borders in its proximity, even if they are difficult to accept for obvious reasons. Look at the EUCAPs in Sahel, they literally teach military and security personnel in those countries how to deal with illegal migrants and how to secure borders. This is not as much about the protection of migrants or citizens of those countries, but about containing them and stopping anyone who wants to illegally cross their borders into Europe or wherever. It is about building that wall. EUTF’s on the other hand allow transferring money to specific sectors that stimulate illegal migration to limit the flows, but thanks to those funds money is also transferred to civilian security sector, mostly related to border security under the “Train& Equip” scheme. You have it in the Africa Trust Fund. It does not look like addressing push factors to me. It looks like resilience according to the EU comes down to maintenance of security authorities of specific countries rather than investing in their social and economic robustness and sustainability (European Parliament-2).

Indeed, the EU’s conceptualisation of external remedial actions towards the crisis carry a distinctive blend of relief, development and security. It depicts resilience-building interventions as a development or even humanitarian assistance to the regions producing highest numbers of migrants, at the same time prominently focusing on providing assistance to the security sector that in this case is identified as the key manager of migration. This type of framing, merging humanitarian and risk, resilience and “exceptionalist” features has become symptomatic for the EU. Here, the application of human security seems to have an important legitimising effect, serving as a justification for the mobilisation of restrictive and securitising policy instruments, such as the training of the Malian military in migration management techniques, all in the name of alleviating suffering and increasing the societal, economic and governmental resilience of vulnerable groups and regions outside the EU. This framing points towards a specific type of exploitation or appropriation of the humanitarian narrative, which when coupled with “exceptionalist” security measures may lead to what could be described as “humanitarian securitisation” (Stepka, 2018). This trend is better fleshed out in the next part of chapter, dedicated to the application of “exceptionalist” security logic.

#### 6.4 “Exceptionalist” Security

Remedial actions driven by “exceptionalist” security logic are commonly associated with the state of exception, reflected in mobilisation of exceptional and reactive measures, which are designed to combat and eradicate perceived security problems in the name of maintaining the status quo and the survival of the referent object (Buzan, 1991, p. 116). Exceptional security measures are usually, but not exclusively, initiated by extraordinary procedures, bypassing normal politics and mobilising a significant amount of force and resources for a limited period of time (C.A.S.E., 2006, pp. 465–466). In the case of the “migration crisis”, the Council of the European Union with the support of the European Commission have proved to be the most outspoken sponsors of the exceptional security framing of the remedial actions towards the crisis. The active role of the Council does not come as a surprise, as it has been traditionally employing a more realist approach towards the framing of international crises, commonly building on the intergovernmental or militarised approach of the Foreign Affairs Council (Roselle et al., 2014). The Commission, however, is a more unlikely promotor of “exceptionalism”, as it has been traditionally invested in policy framing based on risk-oriented logics. Here, the imperative for decisive action, so present in the diagnosis and evaluation of the “migration crisis”, has pushed the Commission towards a blend of risk and “exceptionalist” thinking, aligning it with the Council in supporting mobilisation of military or militarised operations in response to increased migratory flows. In this respect, the analysis of the EU policy discourse reveals elements of exceptional security logic applied in conceptualisation of remedial actions in two distinctive policy responses, namely EUNAVFOR MED – Operation “Sophia” and Joint

Operations coordinated by the Frontex. As discussed later in this chapter, both types of operations represent a dynamic blend of predominantly “exceptionalist” security framing with distinctive elements of risk and human security-oriented logics.

### 6.4.1 EUNAVFOR MED “Sophia”

From the beginning of the crisis, the EU policy discourse has been filled with calls for the mobilisation of decisive security measures in the EU’s fight against human smuggling and exploitation of migrants in the Mediterranean routes (Council of the European Union, 2016a; European Commission, 2015a, b, 2016b; European Parliament, 2015a, d). As stated in the Commission’s “Agenda on Migration”:

The criminal networks which exploit vulnerable migrants must be targeted. The High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) has already presented options for possible Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations to systematically identify, capture and destroy vessels used by smugglers. Such action under international law will be a powerful demonstration of the EU’s determination to act (European Commission, 2015b, p. 3).

In June 2015, the EU member states decided to launch an unprecedented military naval operation (originally under the codename EUNAVFOR MED, later renamed EUNAVFOR MED-Operation “Sophia”) and mandated it with border security activities centred on two main tasks: (1) disrupting trafficking and smuggling of human beings; and (2) preventing further loss of life on the Mediterranean high seas<sup>26</sup> (Council of the European Union, 2016a, p. 1). To achieve this goal the mission focused specifically on disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean through the identification, capture, and disposal of vessels and associated assets suspected of being employed for smuggling or trafficking activities (European Council, 2015b). The operational area of the mission covered Southern Central Mediterranean, specifically focusing on migratory inflows from the coasts of Libya (EEAS Website, 2016c). Since 2017, it has been conducted under the so-called Chapter VII “peace-enforcement mandate” (UNSC resolution 2357 (2017)), which authorised kinetic operational activities such as boarding, search, seizure and diversion, on the high seas, of vessels suspected of being used for human smuggling or trafficking (EEAS Website, 2016d).

The EU policy framing of Operation “Sophia”, specifically produced within the Council of the European Union, has been based on an explicit humanitarian note (Council of the European Union 2016a, 1, 2017c, e). One of the most distinctive moves, framing the operation as a predominantly humanitarian endeavour, was the renaming of the mission from EUNAVFOR MED to Operation “Sophia”. For this

<sup>26</sup>The first incarnation of the mission EUNAVFOR MED was authorised by the UN Security Council Resolution 2240 (UNSCR 2240) to “inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya that they had reasonable grounds to suspect were being used for migrant smuggling or human trafficking from that country” (UN Security Council, 2015, art. 4 and 5).

purpose, Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, has been inserting into the official EU discourse a narrative about a baby girl named Sophia born on an EU naval vessel:

We all know that we need to work together – the international community, Europe, Libya and neighbours – to stop the smugglers, dismantle the criminal networks, save lives and stop this human tragedy. I particularly think of women and children and babies, one of them born on one of our vessels – this is why Operation “Sophia” is called like this (EEAS Website, 2017).

This human security-oriented frame has been continuously reproduced by other EU policy actors. For instance, the European Parliament has been expressing its continuous support “for the aims of navy operations such as Operation ‘Sophia’, and stresses the need to protect life, emphasising that all aspects of the operation should ensure that migrant lives are protected” (European Parliament, 2016f, rec. 9). In a similar tone, the European Commission has been framing the operation as one of the key and most effective EU actions and symbols of the European unity in saving human lives at high seas and from exploitation of human smugglers (European Commission, 2016k, 2017c, d, f).

The EU policy actors quite uniformly promoted the humanitarian features of the mission, but also welcomed its decisive and robust character, even going as far as describing it as the “spearhead” of the EU policy response to the “migration crisis” (LIBE, 2016, 2017). Following the general trend in the EU policy discourse, the framing of Operation “Sophia” has been changing over the course of the “migration crisis”. In this regard, the human security features were most emphasised in its early days of the mission, specifically in the discourse surrounding its development and deployment, and then gradually turned into a more security-oriented and militarised tone (see Council of the European Union 2016c, 2017c, e). This is not surprising, as under more careful scrutiny of the mission’s mandate, the element of prevention of loss of human life is rather marginal in comparison to its security-related features. As stated by the Commander of the mission during a hearing at the European Parliament on search and rescue activities in the Mediterranean:

Operation “Sophia” is not a search and rescue mission, and it should not be treated as such. We save lives because it is our international obligation, but let us not lose out of sight the primary objective of the mission and that it is combating human smugglers and traffickers and disrupting their business model (LIBE, 2017).

Indeed, starting in 2017 the framing of the mission moved towards exceptional security-oriented, emphasising and celebrating its kinetic features such as the boarding, inspection, seizure and disposal of vessels used in human smuggling and trafficking activities (Council of the European Union, 2017c, e). This turn in framing can be best observed in the human security-free description of the mission, offered in the European External Action Service’s CFSP/CSDP Missions Review:

Operation “Sophia” is a military crisis management operation that contributes to improving maritime security in the Mediterranean and supports the return of stability and security in Libya. Its primary goal is to contribute to disrupting the business model of the migrant

smuggling and human trafficking networks in the Central Mediterranean (EEAS, 2017a, p. 28).

In its later stages, the activities of “Sophia” have been framed within a security package in the Mediterranean, oriented not only to kinetic activities, but also surveillance activities (thus including elements of risk management) (EEAS, 2017a, pp. 28–30; Council of the European Union 2016a). In this regard, its mandate and operational capability have been designed to be comprehensive and open to cooperation with the EU AFSJ agencies, primarily Frontex and Europol, as well as external security actors, namely NATO Operation “Sea Guardian”<sup>27</sup> (Council of the European Union, 2016l). As a consequence, Operation “Sophia” envisaged operational support in saving lives at sea, but also increased cooperation with the AFSJ partners and NATO in its decisive offensive against human smugglers, proceeded with extensive “monitoring, intelligence gathering and adaptation to the evolving modus operandi of smugglers” (European Commission, 2017d, p. 8). This visible shift towards security and a risk-oriented understanding of “Sophia’s” tasks did not go completely unnoticed and uncontested. The European Parliament was monitoring developments in the EU’s engagement in the Mediterranean and was contesting the exceptional security-oriented remedial actions, underlining that “military operations should not be the predominant aspect of any holistic approach to migration and reiterates that Operation “Sophia” must not distract assets already deployed in the Mediterranean from saving lives at sea” (European Parliament, 2016f, rec. 10). This concern, however, did not resonate in the EU policy discourse and was rather limited to the Parliament.

### 6.4.2 *Joint Border Operations*

According to the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation (Frontex), a joint border operation is a “package of technical and operational reinforcement as well as capacity-building activities” (European Union, 2016a, p. 19). It is coordinated by the Agency in cooperation with a member state, which is “faced with a situation of specific and disproportionate challenges, especially the arrival at points of the external borders of large numbers of third-country nationals trying to enter the territory of that Member State without authorisation” (European Union, 2016a, p. 19). It represents a blend of risk (managerial and resilience-oriented) and exceptional security logics, being interpreted as both an instrument for control of migratory flows, as well as a response to persistent and severe threats to the integrity of the EU borders (Sagera, 2013, p. 171). In respect to the “migration crisis”, the framing of

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<sup>27</sup>NATO Operation “Sea Guardian” was announced in July 2016. It is a non-article 5 maritime operation tasked with support of the EU and other stakeholders operating in the Mediterranean. The mandate of the mission includes supporting the situation awareness, upholding freedom of navigation, conducting interdiction tasks, counter-terrorism, countering proliferation of weapons, and protection of critical infrastructure (NATO Website, 2018).

the missions included one more logic that visibly seeped from the diagnostic and evaluation segments of the frame-narrative, namely human security.

The framing of joint operations has been built around a sense of exceptionality and urgency reflected in the rhetoric of “human tragedy”, “emergency” and “structural deficiency of border control” at the same time intersecting with discourse on the existentially threatened Schengen area (Council of the European Union, 2016d, o; European Commission, 2016a, b, g). This has contributed to increased calls for urgent deployment of robust measures capable of addressing security and humanitarian challenges unfolding on the EU borders (Council of the European Union, 2015i, 2016b; European Commission, 2015b, 2016j; European Parliament, 2015d). In this respect, in the “Agenda on Migration”, the European Commission explicitly defines the border operations as the spearhead of the EU humanitarian engagement on its borders, calling for maintained and intensified involvement of the member states:

Europe cannot stand by whilst lives are being lost. Search and rescue efforts will be stepped up to restore the level of intervention provided under the former Italian ‘Mare Nostrum’ operation. To triple the budget for the Frontex joint-operations Triton and Poseidon, the Commission has already presented an amending budget for 2015 and will present its proposal for 2016 by the end of May. When implemented, this will expand both the capability and the geographical scope of these operations, so that Frontex can fulfil its dual role of coordinating operational border support to Member States under pressure, and helping to save the lives of migrants at sea. In parallel to this increase in EU funding, assets (ships and aircrafts) are being deployed by several Member States. This welcome solidarity will need to be maintained for as long as the migratory pressure persists (European Commission, 2015b, p. 3).

The EU promoted mobilisation and operational expansion of border missions on an unprecedented scale, emphasising their role in search and rescue, patrolling, policing and guarding the irregular immigration routes, mostly on the Southern flank of the EU external borders.<sup>28</sup> With this broad catalogue of activities in mind, the EU launched three large-scale Frontex-led sea border operations – Joint Operations “Triton” and “Themis” in Italy, and Joint Operation “Poseidon” in Greece.<sup>29</sup>

The search and rescue-oriented activities played a prominent role in the framing of the operations. They were also reflected in the revision of Frontex’s new mandate, which in addition to traditional border and internal security tasks, made the agency responsible for coordination and facilitation of search and rescue activities on the EU external borders (European Union, 2016a, art. 8). At first, the prerogative of saving lives was listed as a primary goal of the EU’s presence of the borders, with the European Parliament and the Commission underlining the humanitarian imperative of the operations (European Commission, 2015b, 2016j; European Parliament,

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<sup>28</sup> Major Frontex-led Joint Operation (JO) with a mandate specifically related to increased irregular migratory flows: JO “Minerva”, JO “Indalo”, JO “Hera” – Spain; JO “Triton”, JO “Aeneas”, JO “Themis” – Italy; JO “Poseidon”, JO “Poseidon Land” – Greece Frontex Website, 2018a).

<sup>29</sup> “Themis” is a joint operation launched in 2018, exceeding the timeframe of the study. Nonetheless, it is mentioned here as a relevant example of militarisation of the EU-led search and rescue operations.

2015d). The first Frontex-led joint operation, “Triton”<sup>30</sup> (2014–2018), was a continuation of a unilateral Italian search and rescue mission “Mare Nostrum”.<sup>31</sup> “Triton” was promoted as a support mission to Italian border and coast guard authorities, focusing on border security and saving migrants’ lives in the Central Mediterranean (Frontex Website, 2018e). Its operational area covered the territorial waters of Italy as well as parts of the search and rescue zones of Italy and Malta<sup>32</sup> (European Commission, 2016j, p. 1). The joint operation “Poseidon”<sup>33</sup> at first represented a similar type of mission, covering search and rescue in the Greek sea border with Turkey and the Greek islands (Frontex Website, 2018d). However, it has quickly embraced more security-driven activities, on the one hand strengthening search and rescue activities, but on the other focusing on identification and registration of saved migrants as well as support of returns and readmission (European Commission, 2016j, p. 1).

As it was in the case of EUNAVFOR “Sophia”, the security features of the joint border operations became more robust with the progression of the crisis. Each review of the operational mandates of the missions added new security components. For instance, while reviewing Operation “Triton” in 2017, the European Commission stated that even though “Triton” was initially launched with a focus on support to search and rescue, the state of the EU borders required its rapid expansion to “include cross border crime, such as people smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal fishing and maritime pollution” (European Commission, 2017d, p. 5). With time, the explicit search and rescue profile of the mission was substantially downscaled within the Operational Plans of both “Triton” and “Poseidon”, putting the emphasis on the tasks related to enhancement of border security, operational cooperation in combating transborder crime, terrorism and irregular migration (Frontex, 2015a, b). Since 2015 and the major revisions of the EU border regime, the joint missions have gained a significantly militarised character, employing a “‘rescue-through-interdiction’/‘rescue-without-protection’ model” of operations (Ghezlbash et al., 2018). As Moreno-Lax (2018, p. 130) argues, the EU border operations have been using the narrative of search and rescue as an excuse for increased security activity

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<sup>30</sup>In 2016, Joint Operation “Triton” was comprised of 509 guest border officers, 16 vessels, four surveillance aircraft and two helicopters, all deployed under the auspices and coordination of Frontex. It is important to note that even though the renewed mandate of Frontex does allow for purchase of equipment, the joint operations are based predominantly on staff and equipment contributions from EU Member States (European Commission, 2016j, p. 1)

<sup>31</sup>“Mare Nostrum” was launched in 2013 as a response to the tragic events off Lampedusa. It was an Italian-led military mission with humanitarian mandate, tasked with search and rescue as well as disembarkation of irregular migrants attempting to cross the central Mediterranean route to Europe. The mission covered search and rescue zones near Italy and Malta (Panebianco and Fontana, 2018, p. 7).

<sup>32</sup>Often, Frontex-coordinated vessels and aircraft were redirected by the Italian Coast Guard for search and rescue purposes in maritime zones far away from the original operational area of “Triton” (European Commission, 2016j, p. 2).

<sup>33</sup>Joint Operation “Poseidon” consisted of 680 guest border officers, 21 vessels, one surveillance aircraft and one helicopter (European Commission, 2016j, p. 1).

in the Mediterranean, mainly focusing on combating cross-border crime and counter-terrorism activities. This model has been more explicitly reflected in Operation “Themis”, which in 2018 replaced “Triton” in the Central Mediterranean area of operations. “Themis” focused predominantly on security and law enforcement operational tasks, leaving very little space for any search and rescue activities (Frontex Website, 2018b, c). The operation has been equipped with extensive security components specifically tailored for combating and tracing illicit trans-border activities, including terrorism (Nielsen, 2018). The operational mandate included “collection of intelligence and other steps aimed at detecting foreign fighters and other terrorist threats at the external borders” (Nielsen, 2018). As stated by the executive director of Frontex, “We need to be better equipped to prevent criminal groups that try to enter the EU undetected. This is crucial for the internal security of the European Union” (Frontex Website, 2018c). In this respect, the framing of the joint operations included human security logic only in the initial stages and the operations, keeping it to the point when the operation was established enough to shed its humanitarian features and become a more kinetic and security-driven response to the crisis.

### 6.4.3 *Comments*

In regard to the conceptualisation of remedial action, the logic of “exceptionality” was reflected in the mobilisation of multipurpose robust border operations and deployment of military naval vessels, vehicles and armed border guards under the special security circumstances. Here, Operation “Sophia” and Frontex-led joint operations represent such a security response, an EU reactive force symbolising a security presence on the frontlines of the “migration crisis”. The analysis shows that the framing of these operations remained dynamic and reflected in the intertwining of surveillance and security features (monitoring and reacting to threats) and humanitarian orientation (search and rescue).

The initial stages of Operation “Sophia” and Frontex-led joint operations were driven by the human security-centred framing. In the case of Operation “Sophia”, the EU has been actively promoting this anti-human smuggling and anti-irregular migration military operation as a humanitarian mission, regardless its explicit security-oriented mandate. A similar framing move has been applied in the case of Frontex-led operations, which have been mandated as both border control and search and rescue missions. As noted by one of the interviewees:

there is something wrong with mandating one mission with stopping and saving migrants at the same time. In my experience if you couple security and humanitarianism in one mandate, security always wins. There is an inherent contradiction in that. We have to remember that especially “Sophia” is not a search and rescue operation. You have vessels with big guns, sailors, soldiers hunting human smugglers and if they have a chance, picking up migrants at sea. They are not really prepared for that. I am not saying that there should not

be such a mission but let us stop calling it humanitarian. It is a hardcore military operation mandated by the UNSC resolution to combat organised crime. (European Parliament-2)

It has become increasingly visible that the human security-oriented framing of the missions has been rather used to explain and justify political decisions on deployment of military assets in the centre of the “migration crisis” (Cusumano, 2017; Little & Vaughan-Williams, 2017). In other words, they served as a legitimising factor, allowing the launch of an explicitly military operation, which then was swiftly reviewed and transformed from “search and rescue” to “seek and destroy” mode (Ghezelbash et al., 2018; Stepka, 2018). This reflects a rather narrow and utilitarian understanding of human security and humanitarian obligations, granting irregular migrants escaping life-threatening situations the right to be rescued at sea, but very little beyond that.

Even though this securitisation or militarisation of humanitarian action has been successful, it has proved to have a rather limited effect on EU security (Johansen, 2017). The reviews of the missions, indicate that saving migrants lives turned out to be the most tangible result of the missions given that there is little evidence that Operation “Sophia” or joint operations have significantly disrupted human smuggling or terrorist activities in the Mediterranean (Johansen, 2017, p. 515). Regardless, in the later stages of the “migration crisis” the EU policy actors, except for the European Parliament, have been favouring this surveillance and kinetic refocus of all the operations, emphasising the need for adaptation, and a stronger and more decisive involvement in combating human smuggling and terrorism in the Mediterranean (Council of the European Union, 2016a, 1, 2017b; European Commission, 2015a, b, 2016h; European Council, 2015c, 2016a, b, 2017d).

## 6.5 Conclusion

The remedial action phase marks a shift in the dynamics of the interpretative process as well as between the EU policy actors. Here, the framing of suitable policy responses has been visibly dominated by the European Commission, the European Council, the Council of the European Union and, to some extent, the European External Action Service – the actors that have the most significant impact on the shaping and implementation of security policies and in the EU. As a result of this changed dynamic, the European Parliament has lost its prominence in the remedial action phase, either aligning with the dominant players or on a rare occasion attempting to promote the incorporation of human security logic in the EU’s policy response. With this decline of the role of the Parliament and the rise of the member states and the Commission, the internal dynamics of the framing process and the specificity of security logics applied in the frame-narrative has changed in comparison to the diagnosis and evaluation.

Firstly, the EU policy discourse on the conceptualisation of remedial actions has proved to be far more contentious, revealing tensions between logics (e.g. human

security and risk regarding the “hotpots”, detention and returns, the EU-Turkey Statement) and conflicts among the actors (e.g. between some member states and the Commission regarding the relocation scheme and the Dublin system reform). Secondly, it revealed the dynamic and complex nature of security logics, which became increasingly entangled in the conceptualisation of remedial actions. The logic of human security has been repositioned in the EU policy discourse, leaving space for more robust introduction of another risk-oriented logic – resilience. This has confirmed the explicit dominance of risk logic in the EU frame-narrative on the “migration crisis”, which has saturated both the internal and external dimensions of the EU interventions. The fate of human security was very different. It has lost its prominence and has been “dissolved” between different policy responses, most notably resilience- and “exceptionality”-oriented measures.

The explicit dominance of broadly understood risk logic in the framing of the “migration crisis” is reflected in both risk management and resilience-oriented remedial actions. The risk management-centred interpretations have been discursively well-structured within the EU migration-security continuum and the diagnostic and evaluation segments of the frame-narrative. Building on the need to regain control over the EU’s external borders and internal security realm, the Commission and the Councils strongly promoted security measures oriented to the control, management and surveillance of human mobility. With the introduction of specific sites (i.e. “hotspots”) and measures (e.g. Eurodac, PNR system) irregular migrants and asylum seekers have been successfully reframed from objects of protection (as in human security) to objects of risk that need to be controlled for security purposes.

The prominence of risk was continued with the promotion of resilience-centred measures, which have been introduced into the EU’s frame-narrative as means for addressing the root causes of the crisis and building up the institutional robustness of the EU’s asylum system. Here, the EU started to create two categories of asylum seekers, framing them as desirable and legitimate applicants, and irregular migrants who harm the system by submitting bogus asylum claims. Resilience-centred policies have been oriented to fortifying the internal and external realm of the EU, building up the capacity to withstand future migration-related shocks and disturbances that are believed to manifest themselves sooner or later. The framing of resilience-building measures deployed outside the EU borders distinctively feeds on human security logic, being interpreted as instruments bringing relief, development, rehabilitation and security to the countries and communities ridden with underdevelopment and human suffering. In this sense, human security logic is being dissolved within resilience-centred framing, as a secondary interpretative thread which legitimises interventions outside the EU borders.

A similar trend is visible in the application of “exceptionalist” security logic in the conceptualisation of remedial actions. Here, militarised and robust security measures such as EUNAVFOR “Sophia” or Frontex-led border operations include the humanitarian narrative in a more utilitarian fashion. Here, the notion of “saving lives at sea” and humanitarian actions were successfully used for justification and legitimisation of the mobilisation of extraordinary security measures in the Mediterranean; however, they were swiftly marginalised in favour of more

security-centred modes of operation. In this respect, in the later stages of the crisis (i.e. late 2016 and 2017) the mandates of the EU missions have been gradually revised and reframed to assume tasks centred on “seek and destroy” rather than “search and rescue”. As a result, the protection and wellbeing of migrants has been deemphasised in the EU’s conceptualisation of remedial actions, making space for more risk and security-oriented framing, focused on the strengthening of external borders, control of mobility, identification of foreign fighters and terrorists within the migratory flows, and the fight against trans-border organised crime.

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# Chapter 7

## Conclusions



### 7.1 Introduction

The main aim of this book was to investigate the policy framing of the “migration crisis” and uncover the multiplicity of security meanings and interpretations that have been underlying the process of securitisation of migration at the EU level. In order to do so, the book introduced two conceptual elaborations that served as the basis for a more interpretative analysis, namely logics of security and securitisation as the work of framing. The conceptual framework applied in this book departs from the traditional understanding of securitisation theory, claiming that an “exceptionalist-” and speech act-driven approach to security is not fit to explore a full range of security logics and interpretations that are involved in the inter-subjective construction of security. In the analysed case of the “migration crisis”, such alternative notions as risk, resilience or human security proved to have securitising effects, pushing or pulling migration into the realm of security by mobilising, for example, surveillance technologies, border and assistance missions, and militarised means against migratory flows. In order to address the question of security logics, the book proposes to embrace policy framing theory within the securitisation paradigm and attune it to a variety of security interpretations that co-exist, struggle, and/or intertwine in the processes of securitisation. In order to reveal how the EU has been mobilising different security logics, generating a security-oriented mind-set around migration, the analysis concentrated on the EU frame-narrative produced in response to the “migration crisis”. In this way, it focused on how specific segments of it (i.e. diagnosis, evaluation and ascription of solutions) have been imbued with a variety of security logics.

The EU is certainly a complex and internally diverse securitising actor. For more than four decades, it has been enveloping migration with its technocratic modes of security, framing different categories of migrants in terms of manageable risks, requiring constant control and surveillance. Indeed, as discussed in this book, the risk-centred framings of the “migration crisis” have proved to be dominant, being

most significantly structured and institutionalised within all segments of the EU frame-narrative. Nonetheless, the analysis also indicated that the EU does not subscribe exclusively to one mode or logic of construction of security. The nature of securitisation at the EU level is more complex than that. If looked at more closely and beyond the dominant modes and contents of securitisation, one can see other underlying logics which play different roles and securitise human mobility in its various dimensions. There is an inherent dynamic written into the securitisation process at the EU level, which reveals fluctuations in terms of logics applied, as well the actors who mobilise them. Even though specific logics such as risk or human security have sponsors who predominantly promote them in the EU policy discourse, these actors rarely build exclusively on just one type of interpretation. They rather create complex entanglements of security logics, using humanitarianism, risk and exceptionality while framing and consequently making different categories of human mobility part of the EU security equation. Let us revisit the EU frame-narrative and discuss the most important findings of the book in more detail.

## **7.2 Revisiting Security Logics in the EU Frame-Narrative on the “Migration Crisis”**

This book focused on unravelling the EU frame-narrative on the “migration crisis”, looking into the interpretative processes and logics embedded in the EU policy discourse, which makes up a specific securitising frame-narrative on the increased migratory flows. Here, a frame-narrative creates a sense of logical and sequential process, which defines and explains a problematic and uncertain situation and translates it into an interpretative pattern that can be internalised and accepted within a specific socio-political context. By proposing a particular diagnosis, evaluation and proposition of remedial actions, a frame-narrative links an issue to a certain interpretation (e.g. security related) by silencing and/or empowering particular features of it. In this respect, the EU frame-narrative on the “migration crisis” has proved to be a complex and dynamic construct, permeated with a variety of security logics and interpretations that have been, to various degrees, underwriting the process of securitisation. Table 7.1 offers a synthesis of the EU frame-narrative on the “migration crisis” containing an overview of specific logics and their main features. As shown in Table 7.1, the analysis revealed four distinctive logics that co-exist in the EU frame-narrative on the “migration crisis”, namely risk management, resilience, human security and “exceptionalist” security. Let us now revisit their prominence, interactions, and dynamics within the diagnostic, evaluation and remedial segments of the frame-narrative.

The EU’s diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis has been predominantly saturated with human security and risk management logics of security, with elements of exceptionality seeping into the framing of specific aspects of the crisis. Here, the human security-centred framing of the crisis can be defined the most prominent,

**Table 7.1** EU frame-narrative on the “migration crisis” (own elaboration)

<p><b>Segments of frame-narrative / Security logics</b></p>	<p><b>“Exceptionalist” security</b> (sponsored predominantly by the Council of the European Union and European Council)</p>	<p><b>Human security</b> (sponsored predominantly by the European Parliament)</p>	<p><b>Risk management</b> (sponsored predominantly by European Commission)</p>	<p><b>Resilience</b> (sponsored predominantly by the European Commission and EEAS)</p>
<p><b>Diagnosis</b> (dominant logics: Human security and risk management)</p>	<p>Elements of this logic are visible in the human security-centred framing in the conceptualisation of the root causes (driven by violence, terrorism, and crime) and focus on the external enemy</p>	<p>Places the locus of the EU external security domain Root causes of the crisis are placed outside the EU and linked with the proliferation of physical and violence in third countries Refugees and economic migrants are defined as referent objects, requiring EU protection</p>	<p>Places the locus of the crisis in the EU internal security domain The sustainability of control over the EU external borders and migration is defined as the referent object</p>	<p>Resilience does not reach significant levels of discourse structuration in this segment of the frame-narrative</p>
<p><b>Evaluation</b> (dominant logics: Human security and risk management)</p>	<p>Elements of this logic are visible in risk management-centred framing of organised crime, which is described as an existential threat to migrants and the stability of the EU (incl. The Schengen zone and freedom of movement)</p>	<p>Causal security effects revolve around the wellbeing of migrants and degrading human security on the EU borders Blame for the “migration crisis” is attributed to terrorists, unstable and undemocratic countries of origin, and trans-border organised crime groups Strong emphasis on humanitarian imperative for action</p>	<p>Causal security effects relate to inefficiency of the EU border and migration policies and instruments Trans-border organised crime is defined as the main driving force behind the crisis Strong emphasis on the need of management and normalisation of the situation on the external and internal EU borders</p>	<p>Resilience does not reach significant levels of discourse structuration in this segment of the frame-narrative</p>
<p><b>Remedial action</b> (dominant logics: Risk, comprised of risk management and resilience)</p>	<p>Strong discursive intertwining of human and realist security logics reflected in mobilisation of militarised security measures for humanitarian purposes, including border operations led by Frontex and CSDP naval mission EUNAVFOR “Sophia”</p>	<p>A plethora of measures oriented to control, management and surveillance of migrants, the EU’s external borders and internal security realm</p>	<p>Stimulation of development and capacity building in the countries of origin and transit Discursive intertwining with human security logic in the EU’s framing of resilience building measures as a remedy to the root causes of the crisis</p>	<p>Stimulation of development and capacity building in the countries of origin and transit Discursive intertwining with human security logic in the EU’s framing of resilience building measures as a remedy to the root causes of the crisis</p>

dominating the framing of migratory flows, especially in the early stages of the crisis. This type of framing is centred on protection of all migrants who have become part of the increased migratory flows while seeking refuge from pervasive threats in their native communities. This type of logic has proved to have a strong externalising effect, placing the “migration crisis” and its root causes outside the EU and its socio-political and territorial domain. In this type of framing, the main security concerns do not stem from the migrants themselves, but rather hazardous migration, which takes place in an environment external to the EU and permeated with severe threats that are pushing migrants to seeking protection and betterment in Europe. In this vein, the security related causal effects are conceptualised around hardship and harm of migrants in their countries of origin, as well as their dangerous journeys to the EU. In this respect, the human security-driven framing specifically emphasises the role of trans-border organised crime, more prominently human smugglers and traffickers, who are defined as one of the effects and at the same time the driving force of the crisis, feeding on human misery and security deficiencies of the EU external borders.

The risk management-centred diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis offers a digression from human security-related interpretations, feeding on the notions of irregular migration, border security, control and management of EU internal security realm. Indeed, as soon as the “migration crisis” has “entered” the Schengen zone, the interpretation shifts into risk management-oriented logic, redefining the nature of the crisis, referent objects, security concerns and their causal effects. The centre of gravity is placed in the internal security domain as most severely affected by the increased migratory flows (i.e. marking the causal security effect). Here, the framing of the referent object visibly clashes with the migrant-centred conceptualisation, moving away from human security. Instead, the control over and functionality of the Schengen zone, freedom of movement, and the EU borders become most commonly defined as the referent objects for security policies. In this respect, the EU policy discourse has been permeated with calls for normalisation and management of the migratory flows as well as stabilisation of the situation on the EU borders. Even though human security and risk diverted from each other in their conceptualisations of referent objects, they converged in their definition of causal security effects and forces escalating the crisis. Similarly, to the human security-centred framing, risk management focuses much attention on organised crime and terrorist groups, defining them as the key perpetrators of crimes against the EU internal security and one of the key facilitators of the crisis.

The analysis suggests that the framing of organised crime and terrorism not only brings together the two logics, but also visibly infuses them with elements of “exceptionalist” security thinking. Organised crime and terrorism are both broadly defined as a threat to the existence and functionality of the defined referent objects, exploiting and feeding on the tragic situation of migrants and structural deficiencies of the EU border and migration policies. Consequently, organised crime and terrorism are defined as the major driving forces behind the “migration crisis”. Similarly, elements of “exceptionalist” security logic can also be found in the human security-centred framing of the root causes of the crisis. Here, the EU policy actors have been

placing the “migration crisis” and its push factors in the EU external security domain, commonly defining it as ridden with violence, insecurity, as well as economic and socio-political instability. This is not to say that “exceptionalist” security can be described as highly structured within the diagnostic and evaluation segments, but nonetheless, its elements are visible, and their inclusion strengthens the security-oriented tone of the frame-narrative.

As shown in Table 7.1, the diagnostic and evaluation segments of the EU frame-narrative lack any significant traces of resilience. Marginalisation of resilience in the diagnosis and evaluation of the “migration crisis” may come as a surprise, as it is a commonly accepted and internalised logic within the EU security and policy frameworks. The explanation for the lack of reference to resilience in the initial phases of the framing process could lie in the fact that both risk management and human security-driven framings already covered the diagnosis of protracted deficiencies in the EU’s internal and external security environment. More precisely, the risk management-oriented framing was to some extent diagnosing structural defects in regard to e.g. external borders, while human security was used to frame the crisis-ridden EU neighbourhood. Both these diagnoses have been used as the basis for conceptualisation of resilience-building remedial actions.

As the diagnostic and evaluation segments of the frame narrative identified and explained the main features of the “migration crisis”, its root causes, referent objects and causal security effects, the remedial action phase dealt with conceptualisation and translations of those interpretations into policy responses. Ideally, the remedial action phase should build on the diagnosis and evaluation, representing a natural and logical continuation of previously established frames and logics. However, the case of the EU’s policy framing of the “migration crisis” reveals a slightly different dynamic, reflected in dispersed and non-linear interpretative patterns. The logic of risk management prevailed in the remedial actions phase, confirming its dominance throughout the frame-narrative with the introduction and further institutionalisation of EU policy measures oriented to control, management, and surveillance of migration flows, migrants, and borders. At the same time, the EU frame-narrative has ultimately diverted from a singular human security- and migrant-centred conceptualisation. Instead, it focused on introducing sites (i.e. “hotspots”) and measures (e.g. Eurodac, SIS system) that have successfully reframed the incoming migrants from objects of protection to objects of risk that need to be controlled for security purposes.

The remedial action segment of the frame-narrative lacks any distinctive traces of human security that make it into a properly institutionalised and standalone logic. Instead, elements of human security have been dispersed or redistributed among the “exceptionalist” security- and resilience-oriented conceptualisation of policy actions, most often serving as a factor legitimising mobilisation of more robust security-militarised (e.g. EUNAVFOR “Sophia”) or financial (e.g. EU Trust Funds) measures. Here, the resilience-centred policy measures constitute a peculiar case of framing, linking elements of risk and human security with elements of “exceptionality” reflected in the mobilisation of militarised resources. In this case, the EU has been promoting two types of resilience, centred on the internal and external security

dimensions. The idea of external resilience focuses on elimination of push factors for migration by strengthening the economic, security and political sectors of countries of origin and transit. In this respect, resilience-building measures such as capacity building missions or trust funds distinctively feed on human security logic, being framed as instruments bringing relief, development, rehabilitation and security to the countries and communities ridden with underdevelopment and human suffering. The internal dimension of resilience, on the other hand, focuses on the development and effectiveness of the EU's common asylum system (i.e. CEAS, relocation, resettlement), which is commonly framed in the EU policy discourse as an essential element of the European system of international protection. Here, the effectiveness of the system is reflected not only in its robustness and ability to withstand a sudden increase in asylum applications, but also in the ability to quickly identify and remove "bogus asylum seekers" in favour of "true asylum seekers".

Traces of human security are also visible in the conceptualisation of "exceptionalist" security measures within the EU frame-narrative. Here, militarised policy responses such as EUNAVFOR "Sophia" or Frontex-led border operations have often been framed as humanitarian missions with prominent search and rescue-oriented components. This type of framing, however, has proven to be limited in scope and time-length. The notion of the humanitarian imperative successfully launched and legitimised the mobilisation of extraordinary security measures in the Mediterranean, but in the course of the "migration crisis", it has been marginalised in favour of more security-centred concerns. In this respect, in the later stages of the crisis (i.e. 2017 onwards) the operational plans and mandates of the EU missions have been gradually revised and reframed to assume tasks centred on "seek and destroy" rather than search and rescue. As a result, the protection and wellbeing of migrants has been deemphasised in the EU's conceptualisation of remedial actions, focusing on identification of foreign fighters and terrorists within the migratory flows, and the fight against trans-border organised crime.

### **7.3 Reflecting on Securitisation as the Work of Framing**

As emphasised in this book, the "securitisation as the work of framing" approach was developed and applied in order to open the discussion on the construction of security to a broader and more inclusive conceptualisation, consequently allowing analysis of securitising moves that occur below the threshold of "political drama" and extraordinary security circumstances. In this regard, the proposed approach was supposed to be better suited for analysis of securitisation at the EU policy level, tuning the analytical framework to a multiplicity of meanings, interests and logics that normally co-exist and struggle in policymaking processes. Let me now recap and reflect on how this approach has worked in the presented analysis of the EU's policy framing of the "migration crisis".

The first aim of the "framing approach" was to stop fixing securitisation analysis to one meaning of security, traditionally linked with the state of exception, but to

embrace a variety of security interpretations that commonly result from different interpretive communities and actors that take part in the policymaking process. In the presented analysis of securitisation of the “migration crisis” at the EU level, this conceptual assumption proved to be necessary and enabled incorporation of different types of diagnosis, evaluation and conceptualisations of remedial actions that have been introduced by the EU policy actors at different stages of the framing process. In this way, the analysis has revealed biases towards specific logics among the EU policy actors, who have been promoting or sponsoring their own interpretations of the “migration crisis”. For instance, the European Parliament has been the most vocal sponsor of the humanitarian and human-centred conceptualisation of the “migration crisis”, distinctively framing the crisis as a human tragedy and incoming migrants as referent objects that require the protection of the EU. At the same time, the European Commission has been promoting rather risk-centred logics, building on the notions of control of European external borders and management of migratory inflows into Europe. The Council of the European Union and the European Council emphasised yet another interpretation, sponsoring the realist security-oriented framing of the crisis, often promoting physical protection of the borders and EU territories and mobilisation of military means to fight human smugglers and traffickers. This does not mean that these policy actors were the sole “users” of specific logics. The analysis has shown that each EU institution was weaving its own set of securitising moves using a variety of security logics. In this respect, the case of the “migration crisis” has shown that there is a certain degree of messiness and a distinctive internal dynamism inscribed into the process of securitisation at the EU level.

This proliferation of actors and their interpretations has confirmed that in complex policymaking environments such as the EU, securitisation cannot be limited to one authoritative actor who controls the whole process. It is rather subjected to dynamic negotiations between and within groups of relevant actors, who wield different positional powers that enable them to influence particular elements of the collective understanding of a security problem. In this way, though the European Parliament has proved to be an influential promoter of human security-centred diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis, due to its limited control over EU security policies it has lost its influence in the conceptualisation of remedial actions. Similarly, the European Commission and the Council have proved to be the most powerful in conceptualising remedial actions and promoting instruments that would allow long-term management of the crisis and direct military interventions, respectively. It should be noted that in the analysed case of the “migration crisis”, the policy framing was rather conciliatory with limited instances of policy controversies. There have been issues that introduced conflict between the EU policy actors, namely the relocation scheme and consequently the reform of the CEAS and the Dublin system. Here, the Council and the European Commission clashed over the framing of nature and scope of the relocation mechanism, proposing different interpretations and conceptualisations of the scheme. The bone of contention was reflected in the actual definition and logics of specific measures. The relocation mechanism represents a good example, when the Council along with Central and Eastern European Member

States argued whether this measure should be included in the normalised modes of migration management (in line with risk and resilience) or rather should be defined as an extraordinary measure, mobilised only in the times of extreme crisis (in line with “exceptionalism”).

In the “securitisation as the work of framing” approach, specific biases towards security logics and differences in influence over various parts of the framing process are often influenced by contextual factors that are deeply embedded in socio-linguistic and socio-political settings as well as local power structures. In this book, the contextual factors are best seen in the pre-existing security frames, or the migration-security continuum, produced at the EU level. The presented analysis of the continuum has revealed several important tendencies in the securitisation of migration. Firstly, the EU policy actors have been intensifying securitising moves towards migrants as a way of managing security deficits within the EU borders (e.g. introduction of the Schengen zone or Europeanisation of the asylum system). Secondly, the EU has been incrementally developing and institutionalising a plethora of risk management instruments and policies such as migration and border management systems, Frontex operations, detention and returns, to name a few. The strong emphasis on risk management has prepared the ground for further proliferation of resilience-oriented thinking and policies directed at both, external and internal policy realms. As a result, the logic of risk, already dominant in the migration-security continuum, has only been strengthened during the “migration crisis”, placing more control over securitisation in the hands of the European Commission, along with the AFSJ specialised agencies.

Further, the “securitisation as the work of framing” approach embraces the fact that the inter-subjective construction of security is not based on a single powerful discursive act, but is a continuous, inter-subjective and iterative process. Indeed, the analysis of the framing of the “migration crisis” reveals that securitising moves have been embedded in a frame-narrative that has been incrementally pushing the increased migratory flows into the EU security realm. In this respect, every policy actor has been producing distinctive sets of utterances (reflected in specific types of policy documents), which to various degrees have influenced and stimulated different aspects of the framing of the analysed crisis. For instance, the diagnosis and evaluation segments were deeply influenced by the European Parliament’s series of resolutions on the “situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration” and external aspects of the crisis (e.g. on the situation in Libya, on the situation in Syria, on human rights, etc.). Similarly, the Commission was using the annual “State of the Union” speeches to initially promote the humanitarian framing of the crisis, visibly attempting to build up an imperative for action for the EU as a whole. In regard to the conceptualisation of remedial actions, the biggest impact was exerted by the Commission’s “Agenda of Migration”, along with corresponding action plans (e.g. against human smuggling) and strategies (e.g. EU Internal Security Strategy), which have been commonly referenced in other policy texts on the “migration crisis”. The Council of the European Union and European Council were communicating though conclusions (the Council and

European Council) and outcomes (the Council), mostly promoting “exceptionalist” and more robust use of security measures against the increased migratory flows.

Finally, with the “securitisation as the work of framing” approach, the analysis focused on how different EU policy actors have been “talking to each other” through policy texts and speeches, communicating specific interpretations, supporting or contradicting each other in the framing process. In this approach, policy actors play the role of interlocutors (being audiences and actors) that incrementally and inter-subjectively imbue the “migration crisis” with security meanings. Here, acceptance of securitising moves does not stem from straightforward agreement or acknowledgements, but structuration of specific interpretations and institutionalisation of remedial actions within the EU interpretative framework. In this sense, the human security-centred and risk-oriented framing have become commonly accepted within the EU by assuming the role of an obligatory and commonsensical interpretation of the crisis (i.e. reaching structuration). Similarly, in the conceptualisation of remedial actions, the risk-centred instruments and policies, already institutionalised within the EU migration-security continuum, have naturally gained prominence over other logics and corresponding policy responses. In this respect, risk proves to be the dominant and commonly accepted logic in the securitising frame-narrative, being both structured and institutionalised within the EU policy discourse.

## **7.4 Final Reflections on Risk and Securitisation of Migration in the EU**

The analysis of the EU frame-narrative on the “migration crisis”, outlined in this book, reveals its distinctive securitising features, predominantly embedded in the logics of risk. The prominence of risk signifies broader tendencies of the European Commission and the EU agencies in their claiming increasing control over human mobility within and into the EU. In this respect, the risk-driven securitisation of the “migration crisis” could have direct consequences on the future of the integration process and the way the common migration policies are constructed and implemented within the EU internal (AFSJ) and external (CSFSP/CSDP) realms.

It is important to mention the potential dangers of deeper and broader securitisation of migration to the general direction of the European integration. Regardless of other types of crises that have been affecting the EU, migration will most likely remain one of the most challenging issues in contemporary European politics. In this respect, within a broader European political discourse, migration is explicitly described as a problem, an issue, a nuance, a risk, or finally, a threat. The key word here is “migration”, not increased migratory flows or uncontrolled movement of population associated with the “migration crisis”, but the general idea of human mobility, which according to the logic of securitisation generates undesirable consequences that need to be controlled in the name of the stability and security of the EU political, social and economic system. This increased application of broadly

understood security and risk rhetoric may translate into deep securitisation of mobility and freedom of movement within Europe, incorporating one of the cornerstones of European integration into the security realm. This carries a certain risk for the future of migration policy in the EU. Securitisation is a double-edged sword that on the one hand allows gaining control over an issue or domain (here, human mobility) in order to protect it, but on the other it also limits the discussion to policy areas that do not go beyond security. Along with the crisis, the debate on migration in the EU has been dominated by security concerns, rendering such important dimensions of migration policy as integration, culture, social policy, employment, economy, or education undermined or even marginalised. As the new EU “Pact on Migration and Asylum” has shown, migration and security are now even more intertwined in the EU policy discourse, and this may become a significant challenge for the development of more comprehensive and less restrictive EU policies towards migrants (European Commission, 2020).

While securitisation through control of risky objects can be considered as one of the key features of securitisation of migration, the development of broadly understood walls can be defined as the key instrument for gaining and securing this control. The prominence of risk-driven securitisation indicated that the future of the EU’s common approach to migration lies in the “fortification of Europe” (Geddes & Taylor, 2016; Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2017). The concept of “Fortress Europe” had been well known before 2015 (Bermejo, 2009; Caviedes, 2004), but the framing of the “migration crisis” has increased its relevance among the EU policy actors, embedding this idea in the policy discourse and even significantly moving it beyond the EU borders. Here, the dominance of resilience and risk management in the framing of the “migration crisis” show that building “fortifications”, be it physical walls (e.g. Bulgarian-Turkish or Hungarian-Serbian border fences) or biopolitical constraints and systems of control (e.g. Passenger Name Record, Entry/Exit System), arise as a preferred policy option in responding to migration-related challenges.

While responding to the “migration crisis”, the EU has taken prominent steps in strengthening its border regime, attempting to regain control over irregular migratory flows and increase the resilience of the most affected portion of its external border as well its external security environment. Nonetheless, as argued by Pallister-Wilkins (2016), building stronger, and more elaborate forms of “walls” guarantees little more than more elaborate forms of human smuggling and higher costs for migrants who engage these services. For instance, deeper securitisation of border controls between the United States and Mexico<sup>1</sup> or Palestine and Israel so far correspond with the rule that “where is a border wall, there is a tunnel”, and prove that unreflective strengthening of border control has a limited impact on curbing irregular migratory flows (Baele & Sterck, 2015; Castles, 2004). In this respect, deeper

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<sup>1</sup>In 1994 the Clinton Administration launched a border operation “Gatekeeper”. As a consequence of this initiative, “the US Immigration and Naturalisation Service introduced double steel fences, helicopters, searchlights and high-tech equipment along the US-Mexico border. The number of agents patrolling the border doubled. The INS budget tripled from 1994 to 2000, reaching \$5.5 billion. However, there was no decline in illegal border crossings” (Castles, 2004, p. 206).

securitisation and strengthening of the border and migration regime in the EU should be carefully evaluated and further researched, specifically in reference to the declared and promoted aim of such securitisation, which is better management of migratory flows. As often pointed out by Castles, the notion that migration can be managed at all is rather controversial and should be approached critically (Castles, 2004, 2017). Migration is a complex and dynamic phenomenon that is stimulated by multiple factors such as globalisation, economic incentives, migrant agency, climate change, immigration policies, and many other stimulants arising from the context of countries of origin, transit and destination (Niedźwiedzki, 2010, pp. 53–58). Narrowing management of migratory flows down to smartening of borders (e.g. EU's Smart Borders Initiative), restraining of migrants in detention centres, coordinating return operations, and deterrence, may lead to a more or less effective containment of migrants rather than their management.

Many studies point out that the idea of effective migration management is often driven by addressing the root causes of irregular migratory flows as soon as possible (Brettell & Hollifield, 2015; Castles, 2017; Triandafyllidou & Spencer, 2020). As shown in this book, the EU policy actors have committed the policy responses to the “migration crisis” to the logic of resilience, focusing on building the effectiveness of the security sector in managing the migration in the countries of origin and transit of irregular migrants (e.g. EUCAP Mali and EUCAP Niger). This type of resilience-building reflected in externalisation of border controls only contributes to securitisation of migration outside the EU borders and might be ineffective in addressing the root causes of increased migratory flows. As a consequence of this type of policy, the EU has fortified itself even more deeply in the securitised politics of migration control, often underappreciating complex structural factors stimulating irregular migration such as inequality, human rights violations, or societal insecurity, to name a few (Scipioni, 2017). In this regard Castles (2004, p. 222) argues that migration policies might benefit from desecuritisation and commitment to long term political and economic agendas concerned with fair trade, global equality and conflict prevention, to name a few. Similarly, Bilgic (2013, p. 48) notes that in regard to the security-migration nexus, emancipatory approach to security could serve as an interesting policy option in a long run, potentially mitigating push factors by reducing North-South inequality and fostering fairer and less exploitative economic relations between countries of origin and the EU and its member states. This is not to say that a deeper desecuritisation of migration is a viable option in the EU, especially after the experiences with the “migration crisis”. Securitisation of migration is well established within the EU policy discourse and practice and it is there to stay. Nonetheless, looking for alternative logics that proliferate the debate on migration and security allows for nuance in the political and academic discussion but also the search for alternative migration policies.

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