Assessing EU Leadership in Inter-regional Relations

The Case of the Institutionalisation of ASEAN Disaster Management

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Chapter 1

A framework beyond EU uniqueness

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1 A framework beyond EU uniqueness

Introduction
This book is about roles, motivations and modes in interregional cooperation. The ways in which actors influence the development of regional institutions (how) and the motivations behind their involvement (why) are relevant issues to understand interregional cooperation.

Interregionalism flourished in the 1990s and early 2000s. All three main International Relations (IR) literatures have contributed to the discussion and the development of Interregionalism. Realists focus on the balancing function of Interregionalism, Institutionalists on the mechanism of cooperation, and Constructivists on the constitution of identities and the process of regionalism through Interregionalism (Doidge, 2008).

By exploring the role of actors as drivers of the process that led to the institutionalisation of the ASEAN disaster response mechanism, the book argues that actors are fundamental drivers of the institutionalisation of regional policies and that their role in influencing this process should be explored systematically. In particular, this research introduces the process and the actors that played a role in institutionalising a regional policy, meaning disaster management in ASEAN.

The analysis suggests four key actor’s typologies intervening in this process: the leader, the reference, the sponsor and the implementer. Each of them performs an essential role in influencing the adoption of the identified regional policy.

Theoretical considerations: the EU as a non-unique interregional actor
Interregionalism defined as a region-to-region interaction and as the situation, or a process in which two (or more) regions interact as regions (Baert, Scaramagli, and Söderbaum, 2014) is not a prerogative of the EU. International regions were initially defined as a ‘limited number of States linked together by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence’ (Nye, 1971, vii). New Regionalists gave more attention to these regions’ institutional dimension and refined regionalism to signify institutionalised, multidimensional cooperation among interdependent neighbouring countries belonging to the same continent.
A framework beyond EU uniqueness

(Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert, 2015). New Regionalists focused more on globalisation and the economy as drivers of these new forms of institutionalised regional cooperation, giving less importance to the security issues typical of the Cold War period. More recently, the ‘pure’ understanding of Interregionalism has been enlarged to encompass other forms of cooperation. Pure Interregionalism, as the cooperation developed between two clearly identifiable regional organisations within an institutional framework (Aggarwal and Fogarty, 2004) has been extended to other forms of Interregionalism, like Hybrid Interregionalism, a framework where an organised region negotiates with a group of countries from another unorganised region (Aggarwal and Fogarty, 2004; Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert, 2015) or Transregionalism, a dialogue process with a more diffused membership which does not necessarily coincide with regional organisations (Rüland, 2010).

Far from being perfect, it is undeniable that the EU is a successful example of regional integration where tensions between competing countries have been transformed into a cooperative structure where divergences are peacefully discussed (Fawcett and Gandois, 2010). Therefore, it is not surprising that the EU tries to export its model outside the region. Yet, this idea of looking at the EU as the champion of regional integration able to export its norms and institutions has been questioned by the revisionist scholarship which invites us to look at other alternative examples to the EU and to take into greater consideration the local drivers of regionalism. The following sections will present the main features of the existing opposite views of the EU’s role in the interregional arena.

The EU as a model: the Eurocentric vision

A plethora of embryonic regional projects exploded already before 1945. They did not immediately result in formal structures of cooperation, but helped develop a ‘regional consciousness’ (Fawcett, 2015b, p. 36). Initiatives such as Pan-Americanism (Sikkink, 2014), the conferences that lead to the creation of the League of Arab states in 1945 (Fawcett, 2013), as well as discussions about African Unity or discourses on pan-Africanism (Murithi, 2005) developed before the start of the European project. Yet, since the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, and the ensuing experiences of EURATOM and the European Economic Communities (1957), Europe provided the first successful example of formal regional institution building. The economic link between Europe and its former colonies reinforced the idea that the European model would be – to some degree – exportable to other regions of the world. Furthermore, the successful adoption of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) favoured the idea that the European project could represent a model not only for economic integration, but that also political and security issues could be dealt with at the regional level.

The scholarship that looks at the EU as a potential model for other regions is based on the idea of the EU as a normative power (Manners, 2002) and as a global actor alternative to US leadership (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). This
view is articulated in two distinct understandings, one looking at the direct mechanism that the EU uses to promote its model and the other arguing that the EU is a model that other regions autonomously decide to emulate (Börzel and Risse, 2009).

The first group of scholars look at the EU foreign policy and its efforts to promote the European way outside via external incentives (conditionality) in the near abroad, as well as technical and financial assistance (capacity-building) in the far abroad (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; Vachudova, 2005; Radaelli, 2006). The explicit efforts to promote regional cooperation outside its border are also perpetrated by using political dialogue and cooperation venues to persuade other actors to adopt the EU model – or at least some elements of it. In this framework, Interregionalism, defined as ‘institutionalised multidimensional cooperation’ (Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert, 2015, p. 2), has been the main venue used by the EU to diffuse its institutions and policies. Some examples of this are the EU relations with Mercosur and the 50 million euro to support its Secretariat and Parliament. Similarly, the EU also supported the Andean community in building its regional institutions and, finally, the EU also influenced to some extent ASEAN through 40 years of long structured cooperation (Börzel and Risse, 2015).

On the other hand, the second group of emulation scholars still consider the EU a model replicated by others without the need for the EU to self-promote. Emulation is driven by recipients and in the words of Börzel and Risse: ‘the EU is often more successful as a model of regionalism when it just sits there, while others emulate and localise its institutional designs’ (Börzel and Risse, 2015, p. 49). The EU is here considered as a model because other actors emulate its policy or institutions. These are perceived as the best practices in a particular policy (Börzel and Risse, 2009) or are adopted because an actor is looking to increase its legitimacy via adopting practices and norms implemented by another actor recognised as legitimate (Polillo and Guillén, 2005).

Overall, it is not always easy to distinguish between the two understandings. Is the EU actively promoting itself as a model for other regions, or are the other regions simply looking at the EU as a model as such? Although different mechanisms have been proposed to assess the level of influence of the EU, as we will see later in the chapter, it is hard to argue in favour of one explanation excluding the other. For example, Jetschke and Murray (2012) argue that ASEAN has adopted EU-style institutions – and in particular the Committee of Permanent Representatives and elements of economic integration – in a case of lesson drawing and normative emulation in which the EU only played a passive role. Nevertheless, the fact that the EU and ASEAN are considered a model of interregional relations with many opportunities for their representatives to meet and exchange (Rüland, Hänggi, and Roloff, 2006) makes it hard to believe that the EU did not play any role in the promotion of its institutions towards ASEAN.

The idea that the EU is a model, in both its understanding of self-promotion and emulation, has been counter-balanced by a more critical view provided by the Euro-critical scholars inspired by the work of Acharya (Acharya, 2004, 2009).
The irrelevance of the EU: contesting the EU as a model vision

Euro-critical scholars started from the assumption that the EU is a *sui generis* actor that cannot be replicated elsewhere, as perfectly summarised in the sentence ‘one of the lessons of European integration is that it is not a lesson’ (Hurrell, 2005, p. 40). The distinctive nature of the European integration process is too embedded in its historical and geographical features to be replicated. The general perception that Europe is in crisis has reinforced the idea that the EU should not be considered a model for other regions anymore. According to this critique, the Eurozone crisis (2008) shows some of the limits of the economic integration of European member states (Fawcett, 2015b). Even more, the rejection of the European project expressed by UK citizens in the pro-Brexit vote (2016) risks, according to some, to end the European dream. These discourses reinforce those scholars contesting the idea of perceiving the EU as a model for other regions in the world. To explain why the EU should not be considered as a model for other regions, Euro-critical scholars advanced two alternative proposals.

The first proposal focuses on the alternative options available in the multipolar world. Although the EU is the most integrated regional organisation, some alternative models can be taken into consideration. The UN remains a key norm producer in the global world, but also other growing regional organisations can provide an alternative understanding of regionalism. The most famous example of this is the inter-governmental alternative structure proposed by ASEAN and the general idea of the ASEAN way. However, also Latin America proposes several alternative options, as with Mercosur and its alternative model to the Western-hegemonic view (Malamud, 2013).

The second proposal prioritises internal dynamics and localisation processes. Here the main drivers of integration should be found in the cognitive priors of the local actors (Acharya, 2004). The analysis should focus on the local agents and on how they reconstruct foreign norms to ensure the norms fit with the local’s cognitive priors and identities. This Euro-critical literature has its foundation in Acharya’s work (2004, 2009). He was the first scholar who raised the attention around the critical role played by local agents in diffusing norms in the case of ASEAN. According to him, the international relations scholars who want to focus on the causal mechanisms and processes by which ideas spread should consider local agents and how they reconstruct foreign norms to ensure the norms fit with the agents’ cognitive priors and identities. Acharya named this process *localisation*. In more detail, Acharya defined localisation as the ‘active construction through discourse, framing, grafting, and cultural selection of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing significant congruence with local beliefs and practices’ (Acharya, 2004, p. 245). When discussing the conditions that may affect the likelihood of localisation, Acharya identified four main catalysts: first, a prominent economic or security crisis that might question the existing norms/practices; second, a more systemic change in the distribution of power; third, a domestic political change in the norm-taker (for example a new focus on human rights); fourth, international or regional demonstration effect
could lead to ‘norm borrowing’ via emulation, imitation and contagion, and so on (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Furthermore, Acharya (2004) argues that localisation also depends on

its positive impact on the legitimacy and authority of key norms-takers, the strengths of prior local norms, the credibility and prestige of local agents, indigenous local traits and tradition, and the scope for grafting and pruning presented by foreign norms.

(Acharya, 2004, p. 247)

Initially, the aim of this literature was to counter-balance the ‘illusionary and rhetorical’ Eurocentrism of the literature (Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert, 2015, p. 3) and to pay attention to the role of beliefs and practice arguing that the process is more complex, interactive and co-constitutive than mere copying of the EU. For example, Biörkdahl et al. (2015) focused on how the normative power of the EU is perceived and received in different parts of the world and how EU norms are sometimes resisted if not rejected. In addition to that, some scholars have been highly critical of the EU’s external action both in terms of efficiency and legitimacy (Cusumano, 2018; Bicchi, 2014; Carta, 2014). Nevertheless, the EU remains a recognised key actor of the international scene. EU scholars recently started to re-conceptualise the role of the EU in the world (Missiroli, 2016). In this context, post-revisionist scholars present themselves as the synthesis of the Eurocentric and Euro-critical visions.

The EU as a point of reference: the post-revisionist vision

The post-revisionist approach to Interregionalism is a theoretical approach that aims at going beyond the Eurocentric approach of ‘normative power Europe’ (Manners, 2002) but still looking at Europe’s distinctive integration process that continues to be referenced by other regional organisations. Moreover, this approach also aims at going beyond the more Euro-critical approach to Interregionalism, which argues that ‘the only lesson to be drawn from the EU’s experience of integration is that there are no lessons to be drawn’ (Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert, 2015, p. 5). The post-revisionist approach to Interregionalism, similar to the recent considerations of the literature on EU actorness, recognises that Interregionalism is not a monopoly of the European Union (EU), since a set of other state-powers and regional organisations have initiated various partnerships with regions belonging to other continents. Nevertheless, this approach still considers the EU as a key proponent of the regional option within the emerging multipolar system. The three main questions identified by Fawcett, Ponjaert and Telò are: ‘How should we understand and locate European regionalism in the wider world of regionalism and multilateralism? How is the EU changing its internal and external policies towards other regions? And how do other regional groupings refer to the EU’s unprecedented institutional experience?’ A series of attempts to apply the
post-revisionist approach to the study of Interregionalism explored the impact of EU-sponsored interregional dynamics on \textit{de facto} drivers of regionalism in other regions of the world (Shu, 2015; Valladao, 2015; Jakobeit, 2015). With a focus on the EU’s interregional efforts towards East Asia, Latin America and Africa, the three authors answered the question ‘how the EU’s purposeful external action has impacted the endogenous regionalisation dynamics in its main partner regions?’ Although all three authors remain sceptical and consider the interregional policies and formats set up by the EU inadequate and characterised by a lack of strategic thinking, they do not provide a systematic analysis of where the EU is failing in the interregional process. Their analysis is limited to a pure assessment of the outcome. In addition to that, the missing comparative analysis with the other actors potentially involved in these processes makes it hard to assess the actorness of the EU as there is no clear benchmark.

Overall, although the post-revisionist understanding of the EU’s role in the international arena has not been yet systematically applied, it suggests a new reading of the interregional actorness of the EU that is worth exploring further.

The drivers of regional integration: a focus on national, regional and international actor’s influence

The research that looks at regional institutions cannot avoid answering the question ‘how and why regional organisations – such as the EU and the ASEAN – are formed and sustained?’ However, it is hard to present a single set of factors that explain regional organisations’ creation and further institutionalisation. Comparing regional experiences is always considered risky as the specificities of each organisation allowed them to be considered ‘unique cases’. For example, the historical and geographical factors that facilitated European integration cannot be found in the ASEAN experience. Nevertheless, the effort should be made to understand better the processes that drive institutionalisation. Moreover, although different in substance, some common factors are present across different experiences (Mattli, 1998; Laursen, 2003; Murray and Brennan, 2015). In a contribution edited by Brennan and Murray (2015), internal or external factors explaining the process of regional institutionalisation, intended as progressive regional integration/cooperation have been explored. Fawcett (2015a) identifies three different drivers of regionalism: ideas, institutions and core states. Mayer (2015) proposed historical narratives as normative drivers of integration, and Moxon-Browne (2015) examined the role of institutions in regional integration. Economic and business perspectives are considered to play a key role in regionalism. Particular focus has been given to the role of international business (Brennan, 2015), as well as trade and investment (Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 2015). Furthermore, traditional and non-traditional security is also proposed as one of the drivers of regional integration. Here authors look at the role of great powers (Stumbaum, 2015), or specific issues such as food security (Matthews, 2015; Silfvast, Brennan and Murray, 2015) and climate change (Torney, 2015). Indeed, several elements could explain the further institutionalisation of regional cooperation. The initial attention given
by realists to nation-states (Morgenthau, 1948) has been progressively challenged by also including non-state actors in the analysis (Keohane and Nye, 1977), and then by looking at the normative and cultural aspects as fundamental drivers of these processes (Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner, 1998). Without undermining the role potentially played by other drivers in the process, the aim of this research is to contribute to a better understanding of the actors that could potentially play a role in the process.

The term ‘actors’ here includes domestic, regional and international actors. Indeed, although national actors have often played a primary role in promoting deeper regional cooperation (Moravcsik, 2002), increasing attention has been given to similar pre-existing regional structures. The direct consequence of this has been the growing role assigned by scholars and policymakers to the EU as a model for other regional experiences or the importance of interregional relations (De Lombaerde and Schulz, 2009; Allison, 2015b). Finally, international and multilateral actors also deserved attention as ‘crucial factors in the start-up, but also in influencing and controlling […] regionalism’ (Fawcett, 2015a, p. 44). In addition to these three categories of actors, this research also includes the other non-domestic nation-states with a role in the process. Fawcett (2015a) refers to them as powerful or hegemonic states, mainly referring to the United States. In this research, this fourth category of actors includes state actors relevant to the process and not necessarily powerful states as such.

The challenge of moving beyond the EU as a sui generis actor

The need to move beyond the conceptualisation of the EU as a sui generis actor and add a comparative perspective on the analysis of EU actions abroad have recently encountered the favour of EU’s scholars. Among the various attempts, Hettne’s framework of actorness was built by looking at both the EU and the United States in a comparative manner (Hettne, 2007). Overall, the inclusion of a comparative dimension to EU studies on actorness has been interpreted in two different ways.

The first way suggests assessing the actorness of the EU by looking at its performance on a specific issue by contemporarily including the comparative analysis of other actors’ performance on the same issue. Among the most recent attempts, Brattberg and Rhinard (2013) proposed examining EU actorness in international disaster relief by comparatively assessing the United States role in the 2010 Haiti earthquake. Their comparative choice is based on the assumption that ‘the actorness concept was first developed in an EU context, but can be applied elsewhere and is constituted by variables that, in principle, are ‘abstract from any particular institutional form’ (Brattberg and Rhinard, 2013, p. 357). Indeed, they show how their definition of effectiveness as context-related, coherence-related, capability-related and consistency-related could be equally applied to the EU and the United States.

The second way recently implemented by scholars who wanted to move beyond the conceptualisation of the EU as a sui generis actor is the attempt of discussing
actorlessness by not looking at the EU only, but by including other regional organisations such as ASEAN or Mercosur in the discussion on actorlessness – regional actorlessness, in these cases. Here the work of Wunderlich, which comparatively examines the actorness of the European Union and ASEAN, is particularly relevant (Wunderlich, 2012). Wunderlich suggests a framework that challenges the uniqueness of the EU as an international actor. By using his framework based on self-image/ recognition, presence/institutionalisation and decision-making structures, he argues that ASEAN is also more and more behaving as an international actor. Relevant to this discussion is the link between regional actorlessness and the socio-historical background in which regional integration took place. Brennan and Murray (2015) explored this aspect in their edited volume that looked at the drivers of integration and regionalism in Europe and Asia. Even more relevant for this analysis is the intuition of Allison. Based on Wunderlich’s framework, Allison’s research looks at the European Union’s ambition to be an international actor by promoting its regional experience to ASEAN (Allison, 2015b). Allison suggests moving beyond a simple comparison of the EU and ASEAN regionalism(s) by looking at the inter-regional dimension of EU-ASEAN relations, meaning looking at the concrete ways in which the EU is intervening in the ASEAN regional process.

Overall, the two intuitions on how to move beyond the idea that the EU cannot be compared (i.e. the policy focused on the comparative intuition of Brattberg and Rhinard and the regional dimension of Wunderlich, Murray and Brennan and Allison) were lost in the subsequent works that look at EU actorlessness, which went back to an EU inner-looking approach, giving up on the idea that the EU actions should be compared in order to be properly understood and assessed (Koenig, 2016; Lettenbichler, 2014). Furthermore, the same Allison’s intuition (i.e. the exploration of EU actorness with the literature on norm diffusion), although deserving attention, finally focused only on the EU, avoiding going deeper in the analysis, by looking into the role played by other relevant actors in the region different from the EU. Therefore, this book should also be read as a contribution to this EU actorness literature by going beyond the incomparability of the EU by focusing on the institutionalisation of one single policy, meaning disaster management, while looking at the role played by other actors beyond the EU itself. Indeed, the need to avoid the ‘EU as a sui generis actor’s’ conceptualisation to prevent any comparative analysis was also felt in the Interregionalism literature. The following section will present how this challenge was approached methodologically in this book.

**Conceptualisation and methodological considerations**

The book considers the institutionalisation of a regional policy as the outcome to be explored by looking at the role play by domestic, regional and international actors. The book argues that the mechanism that explains the institutionalisation of a regional policy is based on the influence on the process of four actors’ typologies: the leader, the reference, the sponsor and the implementer.
Building a theory by tracing a process

The main analytical component of the study uses a process-tracing methodology to investigate the institutionalisation process of the ASEAN disaster response and identify the actors influencing this institutionalisation. The fundamental logic behind the methodology of process tracing is to investigate the causal mechanisms (Bennett, 2008; George and Bennett, 2005; Beach and Pedersen, 2013) defined by Glennan as ‘a complex system, which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts’ (Glennan, 1996, p. 52), rather than focusing on the correlation between independent and dependent variables (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994).

This relatively new methodology is particularly suited for in-depth analysis through a qualitative methodology. The institutionalisation of the ASEAN disaster response is set as the outcome that needs to be explained. The analysis proceeded in three steps. First, the selection of actors that could potentially influence the institutionalisation of a regional institution was identified during the initial collection of empirics. These actors included the ten ASEAN member states; other external actors such as the EU; other states that supported the institutionalisation of the ASEAN policy on disaster management, mainly Australia, Japan, the United States, New Zealand and the UN as a multilateral driver of integration.

Second, the empirical analysis of the institutionalisation of ASEAN regional disaster management was divided into three parts: the first part is dedicated to the adoption in 2004 of the ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM); the second part focuses on the signature in 2005 of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) and the third part is devoted to the operationalisation of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (the AHA Centre). Third, the roles of the identified actors in influencing processes of institutionalisation have been explored by the different literatures discussed above. These literatures are used to inform the building of the causal mechanism (third phase of the process tracing) that explains the chosen outcome: the institutionalisation of ASEAN disaster management. Overall, the book proposes a theory-building process tracing, as the aim is ‘to build a theory about a causal mechanism that can be generalised to a population of a given phenomenon’ (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p.11).

The research uses data from primary and secondary sources. The process-tracing methodology relies on primary sources (ranging from meeting notes to official documents), supplemented by interviews (see Appendix 1) and a wide range of secondary documents (i.e. press releases, press articles, policy analyses, scientific articles and more). The empirical analysis is based on a combination of document analysis and elite, semi-structured interviews conducted in Brussels and Jakarta. Overall, the analysis is based on 23 interviews conducted in Brussels and Jakarta and the analysis of over 115 documents. Some interviewees have been interviewed twice, both in the first and in the second phase of the data collection. Secondary sources, in particular academic literature and interviews with academics, have also complemented the data collection.
The question: ‘how can we be sure that the theory we built is externally valid, meaning exportable?’ arise. Indeed, this research aims at proposing a mechanism that is valid not only for the ASEAN disaster management policy, but that is also applicable to other similar cases. In this respect, the analysed case in this book is a revelatory case, where the ‘investigator has an opportunity to observe and analyse a phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific investigation’ (Yin, 2009, p. 48). For example, by exploring other policies institutionalised at the ASEAN level to assess the EU influence, or by investigating other EU interregional relations on similar subjects such as the creation of the African Union (AU) Situation Room in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, within the Peace and Security Directorate in 2009 and the creation of the League of Arab States (LAS) Situation Room in Cairo, Egypt, in November 2012. Looking at these other cases, as the analysed regional organisations differ in terms of structures and scope from ASEAN, we expect the observations and evidence to be different, but the four actor’s typology to remain the same.

The emergence of an original analytical framework: leader, reference, sponsor and implementer

The following three chapters of the book focus on the empirical analysis of the book. They are presented in a narrative format organised around the four actor’s typology that emerged from the analysis: the leader, the reference, the sponsor and the implementer. The three empirical chapters explore the role of the EU within these four categories compared to other actors involved.

The leader

The role of the leader is attributed to the actor(s) that first took the initiative of proposing a new step (goal) towards the institutionalisation of regional policy in general and disaster management in particular. The leader does not set the content of the new initiative but makes the point that this new step should be made. The leader is so keen on proposing certain advancements in the institutionalisation of the disaster management policy of three types and can be explained by looking at the three new-Institutionalist logics. First, as a rationalist reading would suggest, the calculation logic drives the leader. The leader has a primary interest in the adoption of the given advancement. This interest can be economic, as the advancement positively impacts the leader, or a more strategic one as the leader sees the added value of having the coordination of this policy done at the regional level, as it considers it more efficient and effective. In this case, the leader will use its political resources to propose new avenues for cooperation proactively. Second, as a historical Institutionalist reading of the issue would suggest, the leader sees the institutionalisation of this specific policy as a natural continuation of a path broadly involving the region. In this case, the leader will insist on advancing the cooperation, as the process cannot be stopped. Finally, following a sociological Institutionalist reading, the leader might be interested in supporting
the advancement of the general idea of ASEAN regional integration and the potential advancement in the disaster management domain serves this purpose. In this third case, the leader would insist more on the benefits that advancing this policy will have for reinforcing the cooperation with ASEAN.

Independently from the logic behind the leader’s action, its influence might be realised via a direct influence on the process. Following Börzel and Risse’s conceptualisation (2009, 2012a), a leader’s influence can take the form of coercion, manipulation of utility calculation, socialisation or persuasion. First, coercion might be difficult to find in the explored case, as ASEAN institutional setting does not allow for legally binding rules for member states or partners. Second, for similar reasons, the manipulation of utility calculation is expected to be mainly present in terms of positive incentives (and not as negative ones). The leader might propose forms of positive rewards to its fellows in forms of financial and technical assistance, not necessarily proposing itself as a potential sponsor or implementer (see definitions below) and showing that there are credible actors ready to take up these roles. Third, socialisation, by setting certain expectations during social situations (from technical working groups to summits) the leader influences the process, as it is able to act as the entrepreneur that influences priorities and agendas. Finally, persuasion is used by the leader to convince its fellow actors about the legitimacy of its proposals, as they make sense to the overall objective. The leader is successful in framing the issue as a political or technical objective for ASEAN. As a key proponent of regionalism and interregional relations, driven by the desire to export its own version of regional actorness (Mattheis and Wunderlich, 2017), the European Union could be expected to act as a leader. European commitment towards regionalism linked with the reading of the EU as a normative power (Manners, 2002) suggests that the EU would be a proactive proponent of the regional solution to tackle disaster cooperation in Southeast Asia. The EU would be expected to proactively influence ASEAN to adopt regional norms and instruments to manage crises for three reasons that reflect the institutional logic.

The reference

The role of the reference is assigned to the actor(s) that acts as a model for the norms or instruments firstly proposed by the leader. The reference provides a good model from which to take inspiration. An actor proactively proposes its norm or instruments for different reasons. First, as proposed by rational-choice Institutionalists, the reference considers its norm or instruments the most appropriate for the said policy (calculation logic). Second, as suggested by a historical reading, an actor that is often a reference for the receiver will keep proposing its solution to the receiver, following the historical path of their relation. According to this historical logic, an actor that has acted as a reference in the past will try to replicate this role in the future for other norms and instruments. Finally, as an organisational reading would suggest if the norm proposed by the referent is chosen, this reinforces the legitimacy of the norm or instrument proposed by the reference. In this case, the reference will also try to convince
the leader that its norms/instruments are the best available to achieve the objective set by the leader. The actor proactively acting as the reference proposes its norm or instrument as the best available by adopting direct modes of influence, including coercion, utility’s manipulation, socialisation or persuasion (Börzel and Risse, 2012b; Lenz, 2013).

On the other hand, the reference can also exercise its role indirectly. In this case, the actor exercises an indirect influence, voluntarily auto-perpetrated by the receiver (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). The receiver takes inspiration from a norm or instrument already adopted by the reference. Overall, the reference can be a completely passive actor, not even aware of the mechanism it is part of. Looking at why the receiver adopts the norms or instruments of a certain actor as its reference, new-Institutionalist approaches propose three explanations. First, a rationalist view suggests that as the receiver wants to improve its efficiency and efficacy, in the process of learning (Rose, 1991), it adopts a policy that is recognised as the best available. Second, according to an organisational understanding, the receiver aims to gain legitimacy in a mimic process; it adopts the norm or instruments implemented by an actor recognised as legitimate. Finally, the receiver chooses the reference based on a long-standing history of cooperation between the two actors. The receiver does not look too much around to select the most appropriate norm or instruments but adopts the one from a long-standing cooperation partner. Overall, this indirect influence of the reference can be of different types (Rose, 1993; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; 2000). First, it can be a fully copying of the norms or instrument adopted by the reference. Second, it can be an emulation of the norm and instrument, meaning that the norm or instrument adopted by the reference is then adapted to the local realities. Third, the receiver picks and chooses parts of the norms of instruments from a set of other actors acting as references. The difference with the previous one is that more than one actor is playing the role of the reference.

In the case of disasters management’s norms adopted by ASEAN, the role of reference is expected to be represented by another regional or international organisation. These norms better adhere to the needs of a regional organisation. It would be hard for a regional organisation to apply a norm conceptualise for a nation-state. However, in terms of instruments, ASEAN member states and nation-states dialogue partners (Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the United States) can also be a valid reference for the instruments adopted. A technical instrument can – more easily than a norm – both fit a national, international and regional setting. The European Union is the most integrated regional organisation; therefore, the system developed by the EU to respond to crises and disasters can act as a reference for the other regional organisation wishing to implement a similar regional system.

**The sponsor**

The role of the sponsor is given to the actor(s) that financially sustained the steps that led to further institutionalisation. The sponsor funds both norms and
instruments. This support can be direct, meaning financing directly the instruments analysed, or it can sustain the process by sponsoring the meetings, the workshops and – more in general – the activities in which the norm is discussed. The sponsor might streamline its financial support in a multi-annual cooperation planning, or it might simply use some remnants from other projects or actions for giving ad-hoc support to the process. There are different reasons why the sponsor financially supports the adoption of certain norms or instruments. First, in line with a more rational-choice institutionalism perspective, the sponsor might have some internally inspired interests in showing it is supporting the process, for example, because its own public opinion is pushing for it. In this case, ASEAN’s leaders might see an interest in concretely contributing to the institutionalisation process. In addition to that, leaders from ASEAN’s dialogue partners might also be pushed to concretely support the process for example, in response to the emotional wave generated in the public opinion by particularly severe disasters. This has been the case for the many countries sponsoring various projects in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami. Complementary to this is the organisational view according to which the sponsor wants to contribute to reinforcing the ASEAN regional system to respond to disasters, or more in general, it wants to reinforce ASEAN as a regional organisation as it believes in the regional solution for the global governance. In addition to this, an organisational explanation would also suggest that the sponsor is interested in financially supporting the institutionalisation process as this will legitimate its role in the region as a dialogue partner or as a key actor among other ASEAN member states. Finally, a historical understanding would suggest that the sponsor support a specific norm or instrument as this is the logical consequence of a previous action taken by the sponsor.

The type of influence that the sponsor might exercise is vertical pressure (coercive isomorphism) towards the actors involved (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). It is not necessarily the result of an explicit imposition, but it can also result in what Boxenbaum and Jonsson (2008) defined as ‘resource dependence’. The demand to adopt specific practices to fulfil eligibility criteria can also be understood as vertical pressure.

The EU is among the most prominent investors in the ASEAN region. The declared interest of the EU in supporting the ASEAN institutionalisation of a disaster management policy that could ‘reduce the EU [humanitarian] interventions in the Southeast Asia area’ (European Commission Official, 2017d) would suggest that the EU would be rationally interested in also financially supporting the steps towards a further institutionalisation of the ASEAN disaster management policy. Second, during the 40 years of interregional cooperation, the EU launched a series of programme to sustain the development of disaster management in the Southeast Asia region (see Chapter 2). Starting with the ten years 2006 DIPECHO programme, following with the even stronger cooperation announced after the 2004 Tsunami and the launch of the ASEAN-EU Emergency Management Programme in 2012, the EU invested numerous billion euro in their 20 years of support in building an ASEAN regional disaster management mechanism. Therefore, following a historical reading, the EU would be interested
in further sponsoring existing norms or instruments as a follow up of previous actions. Finally, the continuous research for ways to sustain the further integration of the ASEAN region explains why the EU would be interested in sponsoring the adoption of norms or instruments.

**The implementer**

The role of the implementer is ascribed to the actor that is in charge of the technical implementation of the norm or of the instruments that will advance the institutionalisation process. The implementer can influence the technical set up of the norms. It might (co-)draft the text of the norm or the instruments; it might also take care of the design of the technical tools and the drafting of the job descriptions.

The reasons why the implementer is interested in being involved in the institutionalisation mechanism are threefold. First, as a rational-choice understanding would suggest, the implementer is interested in receiving the funding linked to the implementation of the phase. Second and sometimes complementary to the first one, is the organisational explanation, which would argue that receiving these funds also add to its legitimacy as a credible implementing actor capable of managing this type of project. Overall, it is just another project to have on the list of accomplished results. Third, from a historical point of view, when the leader directly suggests the sponsor, this one aims at keeping good relations with the proponent actors (leader or sponsor) and would therefore implement an instrument in line with the past expectations of the leader or sponsor.

The type of influence exercised by the implementer is a direct influence often translated into almost complete copying of technical instruments or norms already implemented somewhere else (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; 2000). Indeed, often the implementer is chosen because of the experience in implementing similar instruments. Therefore, we should not be surprised if what will be proposed by the implementer it will be a slightly different version of what someone else already implemented. The implementer is active in proposing itself as the best option for implementing the agreed norm or instruments. By adopting socialisation or persuasion’s behaviour (Börzel and Risse, 2009, 2012a) the implementer convinces the involved actors that the presented option is the best possible solution. Quite often, the leader, the reference and the sponsor, already know the implementer for their previous cooperation in similar projects. In this case, they directly propose the implementer as the best actor to implement valuable solutions.

The capacity of the EU to influence the process via the technical assistance it provides to regional partners has been widely discussed. The EU can directly influence the ASEAN institutionalisation process by supporting the technical implementation of norms or instruments (Mattheis and Wunderlich, 2017). As demonstrated by Allison (2015a), the technical assistance provided by the EU to ASEAN in other domains, such as economic integration with the APRIS, ARISE and TREATI programmes, demonstrated a high level of transference between the two regional organisations.
Table 1.1 Analytical Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective of influence</th>
<th>Logics behind influence</th>
<th>Modes of influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leader</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals</td>
<td>(RCI) More efficient, effective and/or economically convenient</td>
<td>Direct influence via:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(HI) The natural next step in the institutionalisation process</td>
<td>• Coercion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(OI) A way to advance ASEAN regional integration</td>
<td>• Manipulation of utility calculations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Socialisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Persuasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reference</strong></td>
<td>Reference Content of norms or instruments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(RCI) Reinforce the efficacy and efficiency of receiver</td>
<td>• Coercion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(HI) The actor has already acted as a reference in the past in the same domain</td>
<td>• Manipulation of utility calculations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(OI) Reinforce reference’s legitimacy</td>
<td>• Socialisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indirect:</td>
<td>• Persuasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(RCI) The norm/instrument is the most efficient</td>
<td>• Copying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(HI) The reference is a long-standing partner (trust)</td>
<td>• Emulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(OI) The chosen reference is recognised as legitimate</td>
<td>• Synthesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sponsor</strong></td>
<td>Financial support to norms (workshops, events, exchanges) or instruments (providing direct funding)</td>
<td>Vertical pressure (coercive transfer) via:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(RCI) In response to public opinion’s requests</td>
<td>• direct imposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(HI) It has already sponsored previous actions in the same domain</td>
<td>• resource dependences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(OI) Reinforce ASEAN regional integration &amp; be perceived as a legitimate actor in the region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementer</strong></td>
<td>Technical implementation of norms (drafting of text) or instruments (design of tool, job descriptions)</td>
<td>Direct influence:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(RCI) Interested in receiving the funding to implement the project</td>
<td>• copy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(HI) Involvement linked with already existing relations with the leader, the reference or the sponsor</td>
<td>• emulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(OI) What to be perceived as a legitimate actor in the domain of its actions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusions

This chapter provides an overview of the literature on the EU role in interregional relations. It introduces the idea that the research that looks at the EU-ASEAN interregional relations should go beyond the conceptualisation of the EU as a *sui generis* actor that cannot be compared with other national or international actors. It focuses on the role played by the EU in the regional institutionalisation process of ASEAN, and it does so by not limiting the analysis to the EU, but by looking at the role played by the other actors involved. The recent turn of Interregionalism policy suggests that the EU is not the only actor promoting regionalism and that we have to take into consideration the entire framework in which this is happening (Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert, 2015). Against this backdrop, the analysis presented in the book adds a comparative dimension to the exploration of the EU’s role by considering other relevant actors, namely Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the United States. To apply that, the analysis focuses on the specific policy of crisis management and explores the mechanism that led to the institutionalisation of the ASEAN’s policy and assess what the role of the EU has been in the institutionalisation process in comparison to other actors involved.

This chapter also presented theory-building process tracing as the methodology used in this study. The institutionalisation of the ASEAN disaster response is set as the outcome to be explored. Furthermore, the chapter introduces the three steps in which the empirical analysis is performed. The chapter also presented the data-collection process and how document analysis and elite interviews have been used as the primary way to gather the information.

The final part of the chapter proposed the original analytical framework proposed by this book. This is based on the interaction of four actors: the leader, the reference, the sponsor and the implementer. After introducing the main features of each actor, the chapter advanced the hypothesis that the EU could potentially play a role in each of the four identified roles. This original framework is informed by neo-Institutionalist theories (to explain the actors’ logic) and the conceptualisation of influence proposed by scholars in both IR and public policy (to describe modes of influence). It contributes to the debate on the EU’s influence on regional processes as it proposes a framework to go beyond the conceptualisation of the EU as a *sui generis* actor advancing an analytical instrument to explore EU’s interregional actorness in a comparative way. The proposed analytical framework will be applied in the three following empirical chapters to answer the research questions.

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A framework beyond EU uniqueness


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